Brick-by-Brick Integration: The Effect of Multi-Level Governance on Refugee Housing and Integration in Germany

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Abstract

After Chancellor Angela Merkel opened Germany’s borders in 2015 in the ‘Great Summer of Migration’, many cities were left utilising ad-hoc policy interventions and housing infrastructure that was unprepared for the level of incoming asylum-seekers. Berlin in particular experienced a significant collapse of its policy governance around asylum housing and integration benefits, leading the city government to an unprecedented direct policy partnership with consulting firm McKinsey & Co. Leverkusen, which had an existing model of refugee housing policy since 2002, utilised the institutional framework of its eponymous Leverkusen Model to expand its features and adapt the city’s response accordingly.

Housing, however, is a contentious subject around German cities because housing shortages have affected German cities for the past two to three decades since cities across the country sold off their municipal housing companies to private owners in order to compensate for budgetary shortfalls amid economic pullback. Housing thus became a focal point not just for refugee integration, but as a policy over which cities must regain some control.

This thesis contributes to a growing field of study on refugee housing, urban integration, and policy governance, centred on the refugee experience by being one of the first, if not the first comparative research of refugee housing policy utilising multi-level governance as a framework, as well as the first to study the Leverkusen Model in depth. It does so conceptually and empirically by exploring complexities around policy governance and implementation, as well as subjective experiences of housing and integration processes for refugees. Conceptually, this thesis draws from Multi-Level Governance and Integration theory literature and engages with concepts of collaborative governance, public-private partnerships, policy implementation, policy learning, interculturalism, civil society engagement and housing as an object of theorising. Empirically, this thesis provides a detailed account of refugee housing and integration policies in Berlin and Leverkusen, supported by in-depth interviews with government employees, NGO workers, and Syrian refugees. This culminates in the creation of an original theoretical framework for refugee housing policy, the first of its kind.
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Author’s Declaration

I declare that this thesis is a presentation of original work and I am the sole author. This work has not previously been presented for an award at this, or any other, University. All sources are acknowledged as References.

None of the research presented in this thesis has been published; however, a paper based on the research conducted within this thesis, entitled ‘Multi-Level Governance in Refugee Housing and Integration Policy: A Model of Best Practice in Leverkusen’, was published with the Journal of International Migration and Integration at the time of submission.
Chapter 1: Introduction

1.1 Background

In the summer of 2015, Chancellor Angela Merkel and Germany made a decision that would have been inconceivable for the country 20 years prior: the Dublin Regulation (see European Union, 2013) was suspended, and Germany welcomed in refugees from across Europe who would have otherwise been legally obligated to lodge an application for asylum in their countries of first entry in the European Union (EU), which for many was Greece and Italy. Instead, these refugees were not only allowed to submit an application for asylum within Germany, but they found eager and enthusiastic German citizens waiting for them to arrive and help them begin new lives in Germany.

Germany received 60% of all applications for asylum in the EU in 2016, and 5 times the number of applications of any other European neighbourhood country in the peak years of 2015 and 2016 (Eurostat, 2017).

However, the suddenness of Merkel’s decision left many local authorities struggling to develop immediate spaces for refugees to be sheltered while their applications could be processed. Furthermore, refugees could not be expected to live in the temporary shelters and refugee-specific accommodations forever while they sought jobs and education within the country; the influx of refugees made Germany acknowledge and face a national housing shortage across its major and smaller cities, and cities have responded with a variety of means to either facilitate refugee access to the housing market while developing more general housing structures, or severely restrict them.

Thus, we seek to understand and juxtapose the policy responses between two cities comparable in terms of their governance structures through the following research questions:

1 ‘We’ is often preferred to ‘I’ in certain places throughout this thesis, as appropriate, to recognise that this research, while carried out through fieldwork and research by myself, involved the input of numerous people,
1. What were the main mechanisms, instruments and types of housing adopted in the two cities for the governance of refugee housing policy?

2. How do the two cities’ differing responses to refugee housing policies affect refugee integration prospects in the respective cities?

3. How can refugee housing policy governance be structured to best facilitate refugee integration?

This thesis will explore the local reactions to the refugee influx in two German cities, Leverkusen and Berlin, and will analyse how the two cities crafted their governance over the aspects of policies covering refugee housing, including the construction and location of refugee-specific accommodation, as well as the policies enacted towards integrating refugees into German society. We define ‘refugee’, for the purpose of residence in Germany, as any asylum-seeker holding any protected status (full asylum, subsidiary, humanitarian) from the German government.

The two cities were chosen for three main reasons: first, Leverkusen is recognised as a model of ‘best practice’ within policy discussions (see Deutscher Bundestag, 2014), which, if true, should provide a benchmark against which to analyse a more idealised MLG structure; second, Berlin received a high number of refugees for a comparably small city size (~5% of all refugees in Germany are placed in Berlin), making it a reasonably centralised ‘hub’; and third, their overall multi-level governance (MLG) structures are similar enough to compare their policy implementation practices and draw illustrative policy lessons.

Our core argument surrounding these research questions follows on from and synthesises interculturalist theory (see chapter 3.2.6) and collaborative governance (see chapter 4.2.2). Refugee integration is better facilitated with direct private housing market
i.e., my supervisors and numerous interview partners. Without their input helping to shape this thesis, it would not contain the substance and structure that it does now. My usage of ‘we’ reflects that while the research itself came from my own ideas and curiosities, much like the implementation of policies for refugees, there is a necessity for input, feedback, and impact that shapes the result, as well as including the reader in the research journey.

intervention and access for refugees granted by the government when in a governance partnership with refugee-facing organisations. However, because Germany’s housing market is largely informal, a government’s ability to promote direct contact between Germans and refugees is also integral in ensuring refugees can access the housing market. Furthermore, we also argue that a state or city’s ability to engage in policy learning mediated through the input and knowledge of both refugees and refugee-facing organisations while engaging within the scope of collaborative governance, i.e. having both directly invested into the policy implementation process, will yield better results for refugee housing situations. Subsequently, integration will also be a boon to local governance as more refugees would be able to enter into work or education faster through their facilitated entry into private housing.

‘Governance’ and ‘integration’ will be explored as theoretical concepts and practical implementation in the following chapters, both within the German context and outside of it.

Overall scholarship on analysis of housing policies and its effect on refugee integration has been largely absent from academia, as there is more focus solely on housing as an object or indicator of integration rather than as something that can be delivered through policy to facilitate integration (see Ager & Strang, 2008; Czischke & Huisman, 2018; Hamann & El-Kayed, 2018; et al.), or on the issue of refugee and migrant houselessness and homelessness in Europe (European Observatory on Homelessness, 2016; see Pleace, 2011), or on the importance of ‘place and space’ and locality of cultural placement in integration without delving too deeply into local policy or administration (Platts-Fowler & Robinson, 2015; Phillips & Robinson, 2015; et al.). This thesis fills a research gap that is likely to become more prominent as climate-related migration is expected to increase due to effects
from global warming, with major cities expected to bear the brunt of this population influx (Hoegh-Guldberg, et al., 2018)\(^2\). We take a unique approach towards analysing housing for refugees and how housing policies are coupled with refugee inflows. We do this by utilising a multi-methods approach of speaking both with those who craft and implement housing policy, and those whom the policy impacts. First, rather than solely focusing on the governing/policymaking level, as much policy analysis does, this study focuses on the recipients of policymaking to determine whether policy successes, from the governance perspective, could or should be considered as much. This gives us a ‘thicker’ and more holistic understanding of policy and its effects, rather than keeping policy analysis and studies of integration separate. Second, we analyse these policies through policy governance, specifically looking at the factors within the multi-level governance (MLG) framework and how the structure of governance affects policy output. Furthermore, we utilise various strands of theories surrounding migrant integration to analyse how governance of refugee housing can affect integration prospects for refugees for better or worse, and how refugee predicaments are inevitably shaped by the state. This culminates in the development of a theoretical policy framework that combines the lessons learned from our two case studies and the theoretical literature to determine an ideal model for how refugee housing policies can be enacted in cities.

Housing was chosen as a primary vector for refugee integration because it exists as both an object to be controlled/implemented/monitored by the state (either through accommodation facilities or subsidised private housing) and as something that refugees can ‘obtain’ as a first act of agency within a new country (see King, 2009; Adam, et al., 2019). It exists at the centre of one’s immersion in society, either serving as a ‘home’, where one feels

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\(^2\) See chapter 8 for discussions surrounding the possible future impacts of climate-related refugee movements.
that they belong and are accepted as part and parcel of the neighbourhood in which they live, or as a ‘notable exception’ that keeps them on the fringes of society without allowing for a sense of inclusion (see HACT, 2004; Salvi del Pero, et al., 2016; European Foundation for Democracy, 2018). On a more basic level it is also something that one cannot live well without. When it is provided but isolated away from others (and not by choice), it can act as a further barrier to societal entry by restricting a refugee’s ability to obtain social connections (Vey, 2018).

Housing is thus unlike two other common staples of integration, work and language acquisition, in that it comprises both a physical and metaphysical space that can either serve to include or exclude refugees from beginning or engaging in integration practices. While both work and language acquisition are undoubtedly important features of a refugee’s integration pathway, housing maintains a centrality in integration as a method of societal access and (permanent) settlement into a ‘home’.

MLG was chosen as a framework of analysis because it allows for discovery of why and how governance structures elicit certain policy outcomes under specific conditions by revealing the mechanisms of policy governance and implementation (George, 2004; Homsy, et al., 2019). Type-II MLG contains facets within it, such as different partnership styles of governance between government and non-government organisations, be they corporations, non-profits, or something else, that can illuminate how and why policies operate as they do (see Kjær, 2004, and Piattoni, 2010). The discovery of these different policy outcomes between two cities with structural governance similarities can help us explain why these differences occurred and what factors contributed to those differences. Our two city case studies have their own respective chapters where governance structures and issues within each city will be reviewed and explored in detail.
This study is one of the first, if not the first, comparative refugee housing study of German cities to utilise MLG as an organising framework by which to understand how a city’s governance structure affects policy outcomes for both government and refugees, and reveals the specific connections between strongly and actively promoted refugee entrance into private housing by government and the important facets of integration. This study is also the first (at least in English) to analyse the Leverkusen Model as one of ‘best practice’ of both refugee housing policy and policy governance (see Deutscher Bundestag, 2014) and draw lessons from its relative success around refugee housing and integration while demonstrating that other cities, including Berlin, have begun (or are already) enacting facets of the Model that have been central to its function since its beginning in 2002 (see Flüchtlingsrat NRW, 2017).

This is significant for three reasons: first, because German cities’ variegated approaches to refugee integration allow us to determine which policies functioned best under similar contexts with the strain of the sudden refugee influx; second, because governing structures across German cities are generally similar, we can more easily determine why some policy responses failed while others succeeded by comparing cases; third, because establishing policy frameworks now from the lessons learned since 2014 can allow for cities both within Germany and across Europe to adjust adequately both if and when there is another sudden refugee influx in the future. As Europe and its cities continue to develop new methods and strategies of integration for increasing future refugee migration, analysis of best practice models can provide cities across Europe, regardless of state, with policy ideas to graft onto their own governance structures.

Our ideal MLG-based theoretical framework of refugee housing and integration policy delivery will come from the lessons learned from the two case studies. An MLG implementation model would syncretise varying strands of both integration theory and MLG
literature and could help to focus the utilisation of MLG in policy studies, as well as understanding how governance structures can affect refugee integration prospects.

The next sections will discuss the rationale for our theoretical selection, as well as theoretical contributions and the methods used in this thesis.

1.2 Theoretical Contributions

1.2.1 Multi-Level Governance

Currently, MLG is utilised for policy analysis in a variety of methods and frames due to the continuous grafting of components onto MLG as a body of work since its inception (see Stephenson, 2013). MLG, as an analytical framework, has been used to understand the structural components of various policies and styles of governance, from European integration policy, to energy policy, to migration policy and beyond (see Marks, 1996; Ohlhorst, 2015; Scholten, et al., 2015). Part of its appeal is in its flexibility in both tracking the interactions of relevant actors throughout government levels (Homsy, et al., 2019) and setting up a frame in which to analyse the nitty-gritty of issues within the broader governance structure that contribute to how and why policies succeed or fail, or fall somewhere in between. It is this reason why MLG is an analytical component of this thesis.

Generally, however, there is disagreement within academia over whether MLG constitutes a school of theory, meaning it could postulate predictive outcomes based on its use in analysis (Bache & Flinders, 2004a) or that it is too broad and piecemeal to contribute meaningful analyses to academia (Peters & Pierre, 2004). As explored further in chapter 4, these two sides of the argument could be brought to reconciliation by what Ongaro (2015) calls a ‘systematic approach’, where MLG as an analytical frame is utilised in addition to a conceptual explanatory idea within the subject area in order to best capture its analytical potency.
For our purposes, the main internal logic of Leverkusen’s and Berlin’s governance styles is that of type-II multi-level governance, where specific domains are structured to cover refugee affairs and where external actors are brought into the fold, through contracting of services or through partnership governance where two entities share competence of service delivery while coordinating with each other and other actors. We argue that while multi-level governance serves to describe how the structures of Leverkusen’s and Berlin’s refugee affairs systems function, MLG tends to lack a functional specificity\(^3\) to explain why there are different outcomes or similar in the field of refugee integration services when it comes to service delivery from different or similar MLG structures, and it requires a subsidiary narrowing frame to discern the ‘why’ and ‘how’ of differing outcomes. This is because the broad-based MLG literature exists as more of a framework than a theory of how governance at different levels should operate. There is no widely accepted ‘ideal model’ of type-II MLG to which one can compare a single structure, and this is largely due to how the concept of MLG developed and changed over the past three decades.

Our approach to tackling the debate on MLG adds to a wide range of literature on the merits and deficiencies of MLG’s explanatory/theoretical prowess and efforts to create models through which MLG can have a functionally specific capability to explain policy and policy outcomes (Stephenson, 2013; Homsy, et al., 2019; etc.). Instead of seeking to argue whether or not MLG constitutes a framework or a theory, we will develop a theoretical framework for MLG functionality within the realm of refugee integration service delivery.

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\(^3\) ‘Functional specificity’ and ‘functional specialisation’ are terms used within the field of neuroscience to postulate that certain regions of the brain only carry out a single, focal task. In the case of MLG, I argue that MLG is unable to act as a predictive theory for policy because it lacks the tools a theory would typically utilise, i.e. a set of values, norms, or assumptions that could indicate future behaviour of a governance structure beyond that of democracy and federalism. In that sense, MLG has expanded beyond what Marks & Hooghe (2001) first presented, as a method to understand European policymaking, into a concept that describes many forms of policy implementation and service delivery without a core set of normative markers.
In doing so we hope to combine the logics of the various strains of theories covering integration, particularly those developed by Ager and Strang (2008) and Zapata-Barrero (2017), et al., with the efforts by MLG scholars such as Homsy, et al. (2019), Hooghe and Marks (2003), Stephenson (2013), Emilsson, et al. (2015), to conceive of a strong theoretical framework covering MLG governance that is able to facilitate the delivery of refugee integration services and capture the outlying, intangible, immeasurable variables that affect integration (Ager & Strang, 2008). We will seek to move beyond explanatory models of governance and posit a theoretical framework that crosses the typical policy analysis/integration theory boundaries. We seek to capture the centrality and effect housing, as a physical and community space, has on other commonly measured facets of refugee integration, as well as how policy and governance of refugee housing policy can intervene in or interfere with refugee integration, and postulate a theoretical framework that can elicit better policy and integration outcomes for cities and refugees, respectively.

Through the empirical work of this thesis, as well as the background provided by the MLG and integration theory literature, we hope to adequately account for the work of individuals, both in and outside of positions of power, internal (government) actors, and external (civil society) actors within the structure of a given city’s laws. This expanded theoretical framework will have the ability to bring together integration and governance theories using comparative research and public policy analysis to bridge the gap in the existing policy, governance, and integration literatures.

The impact of such a theoretical model/framework would have bearing on all states and governing entities that deal with refugees and so-called ‘hard to integrate’ migrant populations. Additionally, the theoretical framework proposed here would impact the theoretical study of integration and MLG as separate strands of literature while contributing to the study of pragmatic implementation issues that can hamper streamlined policy
implementation and subsequent integration pathways, such as party politics and city budgetary concerns. Such an approach would galvanise the disparate strands of literature in both avenues and attempt to cover a broad enough base to be applicable across differing governance structures.

One admitted difficulty with creating a model of governance to cover refugee integration services is that many countries and cities do integration services differently, and models of governance may differ from city to city within the same country, as seen in this thesis. Some countries’ central governments outsource service delivery at the local level to private providers, such as the United Kingdom, leaving little purview for municipalities to oversee integration besides in more peripheral ways. Others, such as Germany, are devolved polities in which the regional governments have a major financial and policy-making stake, leading to varying outcomes across cities and states. Outcomes are often endemic to political willingness at both the city and state level regardless of central government support; for instance, when Berlin’s Lageso (Landesamt für Gesundheit und Soziales, State Office for Health and Social Affairs) sought to burden-share refugee numbers with ensconcing neighbour Brandenburg, the surrounding state refused to take any more refugees than their allotted quota (Sebastian Muschter interview, 2018).

However, the intention of the proposed new theoretical framework (chapter 7) is not to overwrite a city/state’s governance structure, but rather demonstrate aspects where a government can engage in policy learning and adaptation in order to improve refugee housing and integration prospects and utilise its ideas within the city’s unique governance context. This holds relevance for cities across Europe in both federal and centralised states, especially where there is a lack of clarity at the national (and supranational) level for the division of duties for refugee integration policies, and where cities may be more inclusive
than their national governments and more willing to act in lieu of national (or EU) directives (see Buonanno, 2017).

1.2.2 Theories of Integration

Theories of integration cover a wide conceptual ground and hold viewpoints from, generally, three levels and directions: the individual/actor level looks towards the mesosocietal and government levels for ‘guidance’ on integration necessities, such as cultural idiosyncrasies and understanding how society is ordered/formulated through government action; the meso-societal level looks towards both the individual and government levels, both for guidance in cultural norms and acceptance within the acceptable ‘societal bubble’ in which it exists and whether the new individuals are acculturated enough to enter the mesosocietal level; and the government level looks downward at both, presenting norms through enforced laws and governance styles that dictate what concepts are held to be important within the state, i.e. equality, religious freedom, etc.

From within these three general levels we will look at various strands of integration theory that concerns how these levels interact (if they do) and what implications there are for refugee integration. These theories will be explored in chapter 3.

With regard to existing integration theory literature, we will take one variable generally accepted as a key ingredient in a migrant’s integration, housing, and seek to measure its impact upon a refugee’s immersion into society. We make the argument that housing comprises one of the most, if not the most important aspect of integration, and can strongly determine a refugee’s ‘integration course’ (see HACT, 2004; Ager & Strang, 2008; Eichholz & Spellerberg, 2019). We demonstrate this through the empirical work in which
refugees recall the different types of housing and accommodation they experienced, what the conditions were, and how it affected them.

In this way we will exemplify an actor-theory gap in which housing and housing types lend the actors, i.e. the refugees, the agency with which to better take control of their integration prospects. One argument is that housing acts as a springboard into other facets of integration while remaining a constant, i.e. a refugee may move from education to work but his or her housing situation will remain relatively consistent for longer durations of time.

With that in mind, it is necessary to understand that housing is both a physical and mental space, encompassing both a structure in which one lives along with the surrounding neighbourhood, and a place in which a person can feel secure and relaxed without the stress of an evanescent housing situation, i.e. living in a hotel or hostel short-term, a mass accommodation with relatively little privacy and lower standards of sanitation, or in a shelter of any type.

Much of the integration theory literature considers housing to be a ‘tangible’, ‘measurable’ variable that is a marker of integration without defining whether housing constitutes solely a physical object a government can measure as indicating greater integration or something that, once obtained, can lead to greater integration (Ager and Strang, 2008; see Adam, et al., 2019). However, the same literature is more concerned with the conceptual and metaphysical methods of adaptation by migrants and refugees towards their new country of residence rather than ascribing weight towards the tangible aspects, such as housing, language acquisition, education, and so forth (Berry, 2004; Zapata-Barrero, 2017; Goodman, 2010; et al.). Within the various frameworks proposed of how a migrant finds his or her way through the new intricacies they face are socio-psychological theories of integration, theories on continuing transnational identities, the fight between ‘civic integration’ and multiculturalism, complete assimilation or rejection, intercultural contact,
etc., all of which depends on an increasingly metaphysical, broad-stroke understanding of integration.

Part of the argument is that these grander, broad theories of integration have difficulty accounting for individual differences and tangible accomplishments by new arrivals in their new country of residence. They ignore an actor-focused ontology in order to paint with a broad brush, when in fact the individual actor and how they interact with the governing and societal structures is the most important facet of integration. There are two foci in a theoretical ‘road to integration’: the starting line, i.e. where the refugee is mentally on the first day when he or she arrives, and the ‘finish line’, i.e. where one would consider themselves ‘integrated’ into their new home. The space between the two points is filled with continual interactions with governance and societal structures, and will be expounded upon further on in the thesis.

With regard to the previously mentioned model development, housing will be taken as the central facet attributed to the framework as it can be overseen by a governing entity and the refugee has a method of agency in deciding where he or she chooses to live in the two case studies of Leverkusen and Berlin. Thus, it becomes a quintessential variable in determining how best to ascertain a multi-level governance structure that functions for both the governance structure and refugees. It will act to bridge the divide between the bodies of integration theories and MLG, as housing can accommodate the more metatheoretical aspects of integration while being tangible and measurable.

Finally, integration as a catch-all term will be explored and narrowed within the purview of the refugee experience, as refugees experience a different subjective reality than traditional legal migrants, and thus should not be classified with the same expectations as those who cross borders by choice.
1.3 Methods

Our two cities, Leverkusen and Berlin, were selected because of the latter’s higher plurality of refugee reception as a percentage of population relative to Germany as a whole and the former’s policy model referred to as one of best practice, while both share a similar governance structure, allowing for an illustration and comparison of their governance structures. Their operating policy managers and administrators contain comparable directionality of contact, with lines of access to the relevant recipients of policy output (refugees) and modes of communication and transparency between governance partners (both cities operate within Type I and Type II MLG with third-party partnerships).

Two rounds of fieldwork were conducted within Germany for a total of two months, with one month spent in both Berlin and Leverkusen. There were 44 total semi-structured interviews, divided between 26 in Berlin and 18 in Leverkusen. The disparity between the numbers is accounted for by the lower population in Leverkusen, as well as the smaller number of civil service and NGO actors involved in integration service delivery, as per the function of the Leverkusen Model. In Berlin, 13 interviews were conducted with recognised Syrian refugees, 8 with non-profit/NGO/social workers, and 5 with current and former civil service workers and policymakers. Syrian refugees were chosen specifically because of the rights allocation differentiation within Germany’s 2016 Integrationsgesetz, which allowed refugees from countries with high acceptance rates to receive immediate integration benefits rather than waiting until after an asylum decision has been reached. Anonymised interviewees from Berlin are given 2-letter identifiers. In Leverkusen, 7 interviews were carried out with recognised Syrian refugees, 7 with non-profit/NGO/social workers, and 4 with civil service workers. Anonymised interviewees from Leverkusen are given 3-letter identifiers that end in ‘L’. Interviews were conducted in both German and English, as most of
my interview partners either spoke English as a second or third language with a high degree of fluency (and those who did wished to practice speaking English), or they spoke German. The interviews conducted in German were translated by me into English for transcription. Ethical clearance for interviews with a vulnerable population was granted by the University of York ELMPS Ethics Committee 27 July 2018.

Initial interviews were obtained through phone calls, e-mails, or social media queries. Almost all were face-to-face, though one interviewee had to respond via written questions through e-mail due to issues of availability, while another was conducted via phone, as the interview partner lived in a different city. Subsequent interviews were obtained via chain referrals or ‘snowballing’, where one subject would recommend one of his or her contacts for a further interview. Snowballing mostly benefited the numbers of interviews with Syrian refugees I had, as refugees often maintained active networks of contact with other Syrians, as well as friends and volunteers they met throughout their journeys.

Several events about Syrian life in Germany were attended with interview partners, as well as several sprachcafes. Most interviews took place in public spaces, such as in cafes, the interviewees’ workspaces or libraries, though some Syrian interview partners invited me into their places of residence or homes, as it was more comfortable for them to sit in a place that was familiar, as well as maintaining a home-worn custom of inviting guests into one’s home to serve both food and tea even during the interview allowed for greater comfort in interviewing (Harris & Roberts, 2003). I found that speaking to interview partners in the places in which they lived elicited stronger and more salient observations and recollections about the process of obtaining a private space than when speaking with interview partners in public spaces. Conducting interviews in their residences also clarified the emotions they held that they associated with the place itself and what it symbolised; for those interview partners who were comfortable in their living spaces and living in them longer-term, they spoke with
greater pride about the process of obtaining the space and their situation in Germany in
general, while interview partners who were either in government accommodations or coming
to the end of a lease period (see chapter on Berlin) expressed greater anxiety, not just over
housing, but over residency status, obtaining work, education, etc.

All interviews were recorded with the permissions of the interview partners except for
several where the participant requested no recording be made. In lieu of a recording,
meticulous notes were taken both during and after the interviews, and then typed up for
storage. Anonymity was granted automatically for all refugee participants, and for those
nonrefugee interview partners who requested not to be identified in the write-up of this study.
Several follow-up messages were sent (with the participants’ permission) to refugee
participants to ‘check in’ and see if their situations had improved in the time since the
interview. All notes taken during interviews and interview transcripts were typed up and
stored in NVivo, and those who requested their data be deleted once this thesis is complete
have been assured the record of their interview will be erased.

The purpose of these interviews was to understand how refugee housing and
integration policy operated on three levels: that of the refugee, that of the NGO/civil society
effort to help refugees understand German society, and that of the government. Identifying
individual perspectives that were couched within the respective cities’ policies allowed for
eliciting areas of best practice and greater understanding of both the perceptions of how the
respective cities were coping with the current situation as well as how the people in the cities
interacted with the policies and believed there could be improvements (Devine, 2002). A
secondary purpose was to understand how policies can be considered either successful or one
of ‘best practice’, and determine if and how a policy that works in one city can be
successfully learned/transfered to another (see chapter 8.3.1). As previously discussed, the
perceptions of what makes a successful policy will likely differ between the levels of society,
so it was important to capture these differences in order to understand what sort of policy worked best for both the government and the refugees (Vromen, 2010).

This study does not claim to be representative of issues facing refugees with regard to their housing situations; rather, the interviews provide the colour to the sketches provided by the other data. There were issues of access surrounding both refugee and government participants. One of the limitations of the data I collected was the relative dearth of female Syrian interviewees. This is due to several factors: first, my initial Syrian contact in Berlin knew mostly men, and thus I spoke to mostly Syrian men with the exception of two women. Second, being a male interviewer makes my access that much more difficult given cultural complexities around language and broaching conversation about interviews, as well as the perception of differences regarding backgrounds that may make interview partners wary to interview with someone about their possibly traumatic experiences for research rather than for something that may be perceived as more pragmatically useful, such as a study on refugee health or direct discussions with policymakers (Frazier, 2020).

Issues of selection bias are inherent in chain referrals given it is more likely that an interviewee will refer someone in a similar situation to themselves (available and willing to be reached via phone or computer, likely to be social, or willing to talk about their situation) (Biernacki & Waldorf, 1981). An example of this is how one of my interview partners in Berlin reached out to a refugee who was still living in the mass accommodations several years after his arrival. He refused an interview because he believed (according to my interview partner) that his perspective was not worthwhile since he was still living in the mass accommodation and unable to support himself or become more fully versed in German while living in Germany. Alternatively, those who had more ‘controlled’ lives, i.e. those who were working, in education, or generally active contributed to this thesis, exemplifying a gap in the generalisability of the data gathered here (Hugman, et al., 2011). Thus, this thesis
unfortunately cannot cover those who have fallen through the gaps in the system, or those who faced similar obstacles to my interview partners and met rejection or difficulty where my interview partners succeeded.

Additionally, there were issues of access to public figures and politicians given both my status as an overseas PhD researcher and their reluctance to agree to interview for this specific research. In Berlin, this was encapsulated in the lack of response by many members of parliament (save for the one interviewed), as well as being told that their schedules could not accommodate an interview despite contacting them well in advance of fieldwork. In Leverkusen, this was prevalent in political party representatives telling me first that there was no one available to interview in English, and then that there was no one available to interview at all when presented with the option of interviewing in German. Possible reasons for this could be due to my lack of ‘insider knowledge’ of the party, i.e. having an insider contact who could facilitate an interview, as well as my relatively ‘unimportant’ status as a PhD researcher, or the topic of the research as politically sensitive (Frazier, 2020). Additionally, given my German speaking abilities are more conversational than fluent, there may have been general reluctance on the part of party officials to communicate with someone with a comprehension deficit.

To close this data deficit, I have examined research conducted by other academics who have worked on similar/related topics to support this thesis, though this research can only be used as a supplement rather than a replacement for interview data given the novelty of the approaches and research practice in this thesis that are less typical in conventional housing or refugee research.

This thesis is divided between knowledge derivations from literature and experiences derived from interviews with recognised refugees in Germany, volunteers/NGO workers, and government officials, whether they are within the civil service or elected. The literature is
utilised mainly as a foundational bedrock for both theory and background knowledge that informed how the research questions were posed, and what types of questions were asked during the interviews with the various interview partners. All literature contributions are weighed critically and are juxtaposed with conflicting ideas from other relevant literature, where applicable.

A portion of this literature informs the study of path dependence and process tracing of the two cities in question, their respective histories of migration, and how they positioned themselves towards refugees when Germany accepted many more asylum seekers than the rest of Europe combined. This leans more heavily towards Berlin because there is a longer history of immigration to Berlin when compared to Leverkusen, as well as more conflicting politics given its nature as a formerly divided city during the Cold War. Because Berlin’s migration policy history is more varied than Leverkusen’s given the duration of the Leverkusen Model, its process tracing narrative will be filled with more ‘twists and turns’ in order to delineate how the city came to develop the refugee housing policy implemented at the time of data gathering (Collier, 2011).

Much of the literature concerns the various theories of integration and multi-level governance that will be expanded upon in chapters 3 and 4. This literature contains the important variables and aspects of both integration and multi-level governance that the thesis seeks to study and analyse; within the scope of the interviews, the variables and facets of integration/governance that were found to be more active/important in the study of refugee housing policy governance were isolated and studied, and are used to structure the integration framework that will be created in chapter 7.

Analysis of government documents and publications, such as from the city of Berlin, Leverkusen, Germany, and the EU also supplement the thesis as primary sources of data and statistics concerning refugee movements, asylum numbers, integration programmes, changes
in law, etc. Documents from government partners, such as Caritas in Leverkusen, are also used as resources. Most of these documents were published online, though several were obtained in person during the interviews and are noted as such throughout the course of the thesis when they are cited. Official documents from both government and non-government sources ensure there are factually anchored causal moments from which we can derive important signposts, especially when studying both path dependency and process tracing (Blatter & Haverland, 2014).

Above all else, this thesis relies on the subjective inputs of its interview partners, especially the refugee partners, and thus may inadvertently showcase individual psychologies and traumas rather than discussions of how policy worked for them (Bishop, 2015). A refrain heard from several of the interview partners was that they were doing their best to move on with their lives and establish a sense of normalcy while trying to leave behind or let the past distress they suffered fade into distant memory. For all refugee respondents, the interviews took place two years or more after they had arrived in Germany; in this time they had secured a living space, learned German, taken up education or work, began paying taxes, etc. Inevitably interviews, for some, prompted memories of traumas they suffered and kept in the back of their minds since they occurred. I followed ethics guidelines in ensuring that any information the interview partners wished to be kept out of the record would be. Any moments when the interview partners wished for the interview recording to be paused due to difficult emotions weren’t noted as data either.

While the difficult personal emotions behind the struggles of integration are mitigated in the presentation of the thesis through their quotes, it is not completely directed in favour of only commentating on policy or housing because questions of housing and integration are intimately tied into the refugees’ lived experiences, and to ignore that reality ignores the central issue at hand when discussing matters surrounding asylum and integration: the
necessity for asylum exists to protect those who cannot find protection in their homelands, and integration serves to provide a semblance of protection and comfort through learned familiarity, even if efforts for integration and adjustment into a new, foreign country are not clearly formulated by the receiving country (Hugman, et al., 2011). While refugees engage in these integration programmes implemented by the host government, they remain tied to the incidents that drove them to flee and the experiences that demonstrated to them their homelands were no longer safe (Al-Ali, 2001). These experiences can surface at any time and in any setting, day or night, awake or asleep, and not all are able to bury their pasts and move forward.

Thus, maintaining an awareness of the ever-present mental trauma that corresponds with war refugees is integral in any study concerning policy over refugees and asylum, it should be a cornerstone of every policy concerning integration and this was a key consideration over the course of the interviews (Bishop, 2015).

The information obtained through the interviews was mainly narrowed through a series of questions surrounding first arrival, placement in refugee accommodations and subsequent moves to other accommodations, how they were able to find their first private residence (if they had), interactions with government for their accommodations, interactions with volunteers and NGO workers in helping them find accommodations, and how differences in their accommodations affected other factors of integration, such as education, German comprehension, etc. These questions were used as jump-off points for subsequent discussion and questions. Differences between how refugees perceived housing and integration and how NGOs/government officials perceived them are noted, as these differences are important in explaining the discrepancy between how a governance structure perceives policy implementation and how those on the receiving end perceive policy implementation (Hamann & El-Kayed, 2018).
Though this thesis is not generalisable on the broader refugee population in Germany, answers to the questions fit within an expected spectrum of relative ‘success and failure’ of one’s ability to find a place to live and the struggles therein. This is to be expected, on the one hand, because, as previously stated, all refugees interviewed had been living in Germany for some time and were generally considered to be ‘on the right track’, i.e. knowledgeable in the language, enrolled in education, working a job, etc., and referrals came through those who were, themselves, working through the nuances of German social structures.

On the other hand, a second reason the responses fit within a general spectrum of success and failure, rather than existing in an extreme outside perspective (i.e. enduring longterm homelessness, drug abuse, etc.) is that the refugees interviewed generally had educated/experienced backgrounds even if their education/work was cut short by the Syrian civil war. This demonstrates a slight selection bias in the interview partners for this thesis: before they were forced from their homes, interview partners had been engineers, musicians, nurses, management consultants, software engineers, geologists, opera singers, etc. There was, generally, a high level of education among interview partners, so they would likely be able to understand and adapt to changing circumstances. However, all interview partners had problems transferring their credentials to Germany as their qualifications were impossible to verify given the shambolic situation in Syria, so they all began, generally, at the same level when they arrived in Germany.

The next section will provide a chapter overview for the rest of the thesis.

1.4 Chapter overview

Chapter 2

This chapter will give a brief history of Germany’s migration and integration policies and standpoints and how they have changed from the time of the Gastarbeiter in the
1960s/1970s to the present. It will describe how we understand Germany’s conceptualisation of migration and integration in general, and how it has applied to refugees today. It will also cover in brief Germany’s housing laws and the current shortage that affects not just refugees, but the general population.

Chapter 3

The aim of this chapter is to review and critique the relevant literature on integration theory that predominates in the international and academic arenas and delineate the differences between them and how they are applied currently. Key themes of integration theories will be drawn out and understood through the lens of application, i.e. how concepts within the theories can be applied by stakeholders in integration service delivery to refugees, offering a critique of more generalised and ‘meta-unspecific’ notions of integration.

Housing will be identified as a singular variable of interest as to how it can help or hinder the previously discussed concepts of integration, with different understandings of ‘housing’ presented within the literature about housing and its importance as a social object. The instrumental theme surrounding housing as a variable of integration is that it serves a key purpose in either hindering or facilitating integration depending on the form it takes.

Chapter 4

This chapter will analyse the literature and academic debates surrounding multi-level governance as both a framework and a theory by which a government can maintain policy delivery systems within its borders. It will summarise the key points from the debate around the theoretical contributions of MLG and will delineate the important factors that determine what makes MLG a useful method of analysis.

We will critique the disparate notions of framing MLG as an applicable predictive theory. From this, we will parse out type I MLG from type II, and delve more deeply into the
facets that comprise type II governance and how these can lead to differences in policy outcomes between two systems that use type II governance, even if the governing structures are relatively similar. These differences will be carried forward into the development of our theoretical framework on refugee housing policy in chapter 6.

Chapter 5

This chapter will revolve around the case study of Leverkusen and the empirical data garnered from the fieldwork conducted there. It will map out the Leverkusen Model and utilise relevant stakeholder interviews surrounding both the formulation and implementation of the Leverkusen Model as well as document analysis as provided by civil servants and government partners to both analyse and critique the Model’s ability to fulfil its objectives, i.e. helping refugees both find a place to live outside of the mass accommodations and provide integration support.

The central argument of this chapter will be that Leverkusen is able to elicit better integration outcomes because of the governance structure of the Leverkusen Model and the active participation and cooperation between the government and the relevant NGO stakeholders it entails. This will be supported by the interviews conducted in the city with government officials as well as NGO workers and refugees.

The chapter will also contain a brief history of migration to Leverkusen, coinciding with the development of the Leverkusen Model and its progress since its implementation in 2002. The successful structural governance and integration elements of the empirical work will be brought forward into the development of the theoretical framework that will be created in chapter 7.
Chapter 6

The second empirical case, Berlin, will be introduced and analysed in this chapter. In it, Berlin’s response to the refugee influx from 2014 will be analysed from the perspective of its integration service delivery governance, taking into account the viewpoints from the NGOs and civil society organisations that shouldered much of the burden for refugee care. How Berlin organises its housing governance and how its policy surrounding housing has evolved from 2014 to today will be covered.

The central argument is that Berlin’s decentralised organising standards surrounding oversight of its refugee housing regulations created a chaotic and iniquitous system in which outcomes for refugees vary strongly depending on their housing experiences. Further, this system is exacerbated by the general housing shortage in Berlin (and across Germany), as well as perceptions of racism and preference for German tenants over refugee ones within the strained housing market.

Berlin’s general governance structure will be mapped out and analysed in order to understand where it succeeded and where it failed, and how Berlin’s new initiatives are ‘closing the gap of governance and implementation’ in terms of making housing and integration initiatives more accessible for refugees. The notion of Berlin having ‘unique’ problems from other German cities will be put to task given the city’s continuing move towards more inclusive housing and integration programmes, similar to those enacted in Leverkusen and elsewhere.

Chapter 7

This chapter will synthesise the key features of housing policy observed in the previous two empirical chapters and discuss why and how they were successes/failures. This discussion will be essential to pull out the variables that will help to build our theoretical framework for refugee housing policy governance. These will be tied into what we have
discussed about integration and multi-level governance, and will inform us as to what
variables within the two realms of integration and MLG can create a successful
implementation of policy.

This will be preceded by a short discussion as to what constitutes policy success or
failure, as the definitions over the two terms often change or are used loosely depending on
how they or the policies that are studied are framed.

Our theoretical model will be visualised along with the typical stages of processing
refugee experiences when undergoing an asylum procedure. Governance and integration
objectives for both the government and the governance partners will be established in order
to clarify how these objectives fit into the model, and how the model can be utilised to fulfil
the objectives for both the government and governance partners. Because the model will be
based on the examples of best practice from the two empirical case studies and the
background knowledge from the respective literature, we will discuss why these examples of
best practice were chosen in order to strengthen the model and what they imply for the
model’s possible use in the future.

Chapter 8

This chapter will reflect on the application of the study and the theoretical framework
on cities both within Germany and throughout Europe. Can other cities utilise the theoretical
framework for refugee housing policy governance in a similar way, or are there restrictions in
how governance can be employed at the local level? This question will segue into a broader
discussion on how asylum and refugee integration laws are governed between the local and
the national levels, and whether policies constructed at the national level reflect on how
policies are made and implemented at the local level.

This chapter will also discuss the role of the EU and how it affects refugee
integration, as well as how policy networks that exist within the EU’s policy umbrellas are
able to transfer policy ideas and communicate policy successes to each other. This will lead to a discussion of where the priority of asylum and refugee integration ultimately rests, and whether cities should have a greater say in the national considerations of how a country crafts its asylum and integration policies.

There will also be a brief discussion about the future of asylum and integration policies, surrounding such topics as climate migration, burden sharing, sustainable housing allotments, etc., as it is important to look to the future of what policymakers and social scientists believe will occur in the realm of forced migration.

Chapter 9

This will be the concluding chapter, wrapping up the main points from the thesis and summarising how the empirical cases and the development of the theoretical framework answered the research questions. There will also be a list of policy recommendations based on the findings from this study intended to be applicable to cities with saturated housing sectors while hosting refugees. These recommendations will be broad-based and divided between short-term and long-term, i.e. that which can be implemented immediately and that which will take more time to fully implement.

Finally, this chapter will briefly discuss future avenues of research that stem from the study within this thesis, and what that research can mean for both Germany and the European Union.
Chapter 2: Ticket to Ride (or More Recently, Remain): Historical context of German migration

2.1 Introduction

This chapter will provide a general overview of Germany’s history with migration and integration in order to provide a greater context of understanding of the surprise and extreme recency of Germany’s transition into a willing country of immigration and integration. We will start with an overview of the first large non-ethnically German migration wave post-World War II in the Gastarbeiter, i.e. workers (from southern Europe and Turkey, primarily) imported into the country to fill gaps in the workforce in order to help the country’s industry grow.

We will then move into the modern era of Germany’s migration history in the latter part of the 1990s/early-2000s, where liberalisation reforms entailed easements on both citizenship and integration benefits allotted towards enabling migrants to facilitate life in Germany. From there, we will look at the contemporary era and how the refugee movements of 2014/2015 changed how Germany defines integration, as well as the burdens and restrictions placed upon refugees.

Finally, we will provide an overview of the general housing situation across Germany, which provides us with the understanding of the general housing problems for both refugees and the population at large, and what led to the difficult adjustments our two city case studies had to make in order to acclimatise to the refugee influx.
2.2 Gastarbeiter

Germany’s first experience\(^4\) with large non-ethnically German populations was through its ‘guest worker’ (Gastarbeiter) programme that ran from 1955 to 1973. Rapid growth in the German economy necessitated the import of workers from other countries to facilitate jobs where Germany lacked qualified citizenry, though as the title suggests, the German government expected these workers to be only temporary residents who would eventually return to their homelands. However, by the end of the guest worker programme in 1973, there were 4 million migrants living in Germany (both workers and their families), leading to the government creating incentives to encourage even longer-term Gastarbeiter to return home, such as paying all fees of return in excess (Brubaker, 1992: 171-173).

As one would expect, government efforts at ‘integration’ between German citizens and the migrant populations were negligible, with cities often acting at the forefront of attempting integration, even if half-heartedly, because of the general expectation on the part of the German government that the guest workers would leave and the efforts at integration may be ‘wasted’ (see Hackett, 2018: 44-45). After a study conducted by Heinz Kühn, the first appointed commissioner presiding over the question of migrant integration, he demanded that an integration policy or initiative be conducted by the German government to ensure that those guest workers who would reside in Germany over the long term will not be treated as second-class citizens and have the opportunity to acquire citizenship rights; instead, the German government promoted a voluntary return programme, though the numbers of guest workers returning to their native countries was well below the government’s desired figure (Borkert & Boswick, 2007).

\(^4\) Before the Gastarbeiter, Germany had a mass inward migration experience with the Aussiedler, ethnic Germans outside of Germany, which consisted of around 12 million Germans after World War II. They were accorded automatic citizenship under German Basic Law, but still had relative difficulties integrating back into Germany (for a variety of reasons) (Geddes & Scholten, 2016).
Germany then had a large demographic of Turkish, Italian, and Greek (among other nationalities) migrants who had resided within the country for a number of years, raised children within the country, but who could not apply for citizenship for themselves or their children given the *jus sanguinis* nature of Germany’s citizenship laws before 1992 (Brubaker, 1992). The sentiment of ‘Deutschland ist kein Einwanderungsland’ remained a steadfast policy within the government despite growing consensus, especially after German reunification, that immigration numbers were increasing to the country.

### 2.3 Migration reforms and the National Integration Plan

With the formal creation of the European Union after the end of the Cold War, elements of migration policy were removed from the national level and moved up to the supranational level, notably the application to asylum with the signing of the Dublin Regulation. It falls in line with Germany’s overall migration strategy in the 1990s, which was to restrict ‘illegal’ or burdensome migration, i.e. asylum seekers, and attempt to attract qualified professional migrants (Prümm & Alscher, 2007: 74). To this end, Helmut Kohl’s government introduced migration reforms early in the 1990s that allowed for long-term migrants residing in Germany, notably members of the Turkish *Gastarbeiter* who did not have citizenship rights under the newly-created European Union, to apply for German citizenship if they had lived in the country for 15 years, though with an application deadline of 1995 (Borkert & Bosswick, 2007); ironically, the same government implemented in the

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5 Here we refer to the formal implementation of the 1992 Maastricht Treaty, which is recognised as the formal beginning of the European Union and its supranationalisation of several policy areas.

6 Included within this restrictive immigration strategy were the *Spätaussiedler*, or *Aussiedler* who sought to migrate into Germany after 1992 due to the fall of the Iron Curtain. Quotas on applications and requirements that the *Spätaussiedler* apply from their country of residence curtailed numbers, as did a new imposition in 1996: *Spätaussiedler* would be dispersed at the German local level in a similar way to asylum-seekers, effectively removing the agency of the *Spätaussiedler* to determine where they would live and work. (Geddes & Scholten, 2016)
Basic Law the concept of ‘safe third country’ for asylum seekers in order to restrict their ability to submit an application for asylum within Germany if they had passed through a country the German government deemed to be ‘safe’ (Prümm & Alscher, 2007: 76).

The election of the centre-left coalition of the Social Democratic Party (SPD) and the Greens in 1998 changed the nature of Germany’s immigration status. The new government shifted towards a more inclusive society, allowing for dual nationality of citizens up until the age of 23 (the limit would be removed in 2014) and a more open labour market with the Hartz reforms, allowing for an expansion of welfare coverage and a more ‘adaptive’ labour market that would respond to the needs of lower-income and immigrant areas with targeted education and training, as predominantly Turkish areas in Germany faced persistent negligence and higher unemployment partly due to the aforementioned restrictions (Geddes & Scholten, 2016: 141; 154).

A new immigration law, the Zuwanderungsgesetz, came into effect in 2005 and further expanded the criteria and rights of immigration, as well as creating the Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge (BAMF) and integration courses for legal immigrants who chose to remain in Germany long-term. Despite initial objections towards the SPD’s stance on liberalising the immigration and citizenship laws, the centre-right CDU continued the trend of broadening the country’s migration and integration structuring after the 2005 federal elections in which Angela Merkel became Chancellor of the country. The general agreement between the two parties in maintaining the societal shift in favour of increased migration was likely because the facets of the immigration law and shift towards integration expanded on existing structures of German society rather than adding or upending existing ones, making the reforms far more palatable (Geddes & Scholten, 2016: 155).

This culminated in the 2006 forum on integration as assembled under Angela Merkel’s government, which resulted in the 2007 National Integration Plan. The plan
comprised national support structures around language, education, and employment, and equal opportunities and access to societal benefits (with housing being an exception that fell under ‘equal access to benefits’ at the state and city levels, rather than at the federal level; see Die Bundesregierung Der Deutschland, 2007, and Leise, 2007) as a guiding framework for the federal states to follow in crafting their own specialised integration laws. Notably, integration courses were offered that “provide knowledge of topics such as rights and obligations, democracy, government structure, the history of the Federal Republic of Germany, regulations, time, religious and cultural/regional diversity, view of mankind and coexistence in Germany” (Die Bundesregierung der Deutschland, 2007: 37). Much is left to the federal states, which are able to tailor their own practices of integration towards regionspecific needs.

At the end of the 20th century and the beginning of the 21st, Germany also saw a move from its more corporatist-welfare system to a more liberal or neoliberal one in what was called the ‘New Steering Model’ (similar in ideology to New Public Management), where an effort to induce marketisation and private enterprise involvement of government arms and functions gained traction and became the norm of governance (Kuhlmann, 2009: 234). For German social services, the eligibility of citizens and residents for social welfare benefits was pared back and limited and portions of what was formally federal responsibility were devolved to the local level, such as coverage of assisted housing, and vice versa (see BuschGörtsema, 2004). Within the circumstance of a recession, social housing and social services saw dramatic reductions and restrictions on eligibility in order to recoup budgetary deficits and slow expenditures (Kholodilin, 2017: 282; and see below section on German housing). Many cities that had their own ‘municipal companies’ for a variety of services had to sell off portions or the entirety of these companies to ensure a short-term budget savings,
though these short-term savings often have not equated to long-term budget surpluses and became financial burdens (Kuhlmann, 2009).

This introduced an expansion of the ‘state-ordered’ NGO aid services through large government-funded charity organisations such as Caritas and Diakonie, which de facto took on many responsibilities towards the impoverished that the government would traditionally otherwise maintain; given the disparities between the enduring former Gastarbeiter population and the native German population, these organisations also took on important roles within integration as a by-product of the federal government’s pullback (Borkert & Bosswick, 2007: 14; Busch-Geertsema, 2004).

As a result of the reforms within social services and additional responsibilities placed on localities, disparities emerged between certain states in the creation and implementation of integration laws and practices (see Schmidtke, 2014), though these were largely created during a trough in widespread migration/refugee movements between 2000 and 2014. These state-level government structures were tested under the weight of the 2014-2016 refugee influx to varying degrees of responses, ranging from the capable to the deterrent (see Hamann & El-Kayed, 2018).

2.4 The 2014 refugee influx and the Integrationsgesetz

Europe saw an unprecedented movement of refugees into the continent due to a combination of the ongoing civil wars in Syria and Yemen, ISIL’s (Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant) presence throughout the Levant and its persecution of residents who refused to join their cause, an insurgent Taliban in Afghanistan, continued government oppression in Eritrea, etc. Between 2014 and 2016, approximately 3,024,000 people applied for asylum throughout Europe, with more than 60% of those applications made in Germany alone (Eurostat, 2017). In 2015, Angela Merkel made the unilateral decision to suspend the
bordering measures implemented in the Dublin Regulation and allow refugees to submit an application for asylum in Germany even if they had passed through a ‘safe third country’, a stunning turn on the changes in German asylum policy some 20 years earlier.

The suddenness of the decision left cities and states adapting on the fly to cope with the dispersal of refugees throughout the country, using whatever resources were available and relying on the aid of civil society volunteers and organisations for the delivery of the bulwark of integration policy and practice, which will be covered in more detail in this thesis in the chapter on Berlin. Legal changes were also implemented at the federal level: the 2015 Asylverfahrensbeschleunigungsgesetz (Asylum Procedures Acceleration Act) opened integration courses to all recognised refugees and those given tolerated status from Iran, Iraq, Syria, and Eritrea (Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge, 2015).

The 2016 Integrationsgesetz (Integration Law) focused on shoring up resources for integration courses as well as facilitating entry into the labour market, but also enacted a nationality barrier for immediate access to integration courses: those from nationalities with a ‘good remaining probability’, i.e. nationalities whose refugee acceptance rate is over 50% are able to access integration benefits immediately upon arrival rather than having to wait for their asylum applications to be approved and status to be assigned (Rietig, 2016).

Additionally, the law expanded the list of ‘safe countries of origin’ for refugee applicants which included states on the periphery of the European Union, such as Albania, Serbia, Bosnia, Montenegro, et al., as well as states in Africa, such as Ghana and Senegal (Bundesministerium der Justiz und für Verbraucherschutz, 2016). Asylum applicants from those countries would, in all likelihood, have their applications denied outright and would be deported back to their country of origin.

Refugees are sorted and dispersed into states through a formula called the
Königsteiner Schlüssel, which is normally used to determine federal funding for universities.
The formula lends 1/3 weight to total population of a given state (rather than population
density) and 2/3s weight to total tax revenues, leading to a city-state such as Berlin receiving
5% of the total admitted refugee population while sitting on a comparatively small landmass
to Germany’s other cities, even while it is both the most populated overall and most densely populated city in the country (Katz, et al., 2016). For a city facing an ongoing housing availability crisis, this extra population influx presented a problem: where could they live, both in the short- and long-term?

2.5 Housing in Germany: A self-made time bomb

Germany’s housing market emerged from the ashes of World War II with two key tenets: first, that the German housing market is predominantly rented rather than owned, where approximately half of all Germans are property renters rather than owner-occupiers (Kuhn & Grabka, 2018); second, that cities typically have strong rental protection laws to ensure that costs are sustainable for tenants, leading to Germans spending a lower amount of their income on rent when compared to many other OECD countries (Kholodilin, 2017; OECD, 2017).

The conservative government of the 1980s encouraged the expansion of the financialisation of the housing market by loosening restrictions against commercial banking and mortgages (Wijburg & Aalbers, 2017) while taxation reform removed construction and maintenance incentives for municipal housing companies, leading to many of them selling off or privatising their existing housing stocks (Martin, et al., 2018: 58). Adding to this was the strain of German reunification: in an attempt to stem and prevent migration from the former East Germany to West Germany, the Kohl government issued tax and real estate subsidies to encourage development of buildings, both commercial and housing, in former East Germany (Wijburg & Aalbers, 2017). This did not work, and housing markets in former
West Germany were pressured by high demand and low supply while housing markets in former East Germany had high supply but lower demand and very low occupancy (Holm, et al., 2015). Further exacerbating public housing development was a formidable recession in the latter half of the 1990s, pushing cities across Germany to confront budget deficits by further enervating public housing stocks and selling off municipal housing company assets to private ownership, either corporate or individual (Aalbers & Holm, 2008). Across Germany, social housing stock fell from approximately 3 million affordable housing units in 1990 to approximately 1.25 million by 2017 (Manthei, 2018). Berlin was not exempt from this trend, with its council housing stock numbering just 95,723 out of a total 1.66 million leasehold properties in 2021, a decline of 2.2% from 2020 (Investitionsbank Berlin, 2021). Social housing policies, instead of targeting the broader population, became narrowed to marginalised and special-needs groups as a method by which to justify narrowing the scope of policy and saving on public expenditure (Aalbers & Holm, 2008).

With the Föderalismusreform-Begleitgesetz (federal reforms) of 2006, the federal states gained more control over spending and development of social housing. Now, rather than the federal government funding the proliferation of social housing directly, the states have access to a designated government funding item in the budget, last set at a little over a billion euro in the 2015 Asylverfahrensbeschleunigungsgesetz (Asylum Procedure Acceleration Act). This is at odds with the 2001 Gesetz zur Reform des Wohnungsbaurechts (Act to reform the Residence Building Law), which designated the federal government provide €230 million euro yearly to each of the 16 states for social housing (Kholodilin, 2017). The difference in total federal investments between the two laws is staggering: measured at 2018 inflationary rates, money from the Residence Building Law totalled €4.721 billion, while money from the Asylum Procedure Acceleration Act totalled €1.065 billion.
What this amounted to, especially in cities such as Berlin but in both large and medium-sized cities across Germany, was a housing shock when refugees were dispersed throughout Germany. For years, many German cities had seen general population growth and rising rental prices while housing construction lagged behind and occupancy rates were at near-full saturation (Investitionsbank Berlin, 2019). For cities already experiencing a housing crunch, an infusion of a new population of thousands further exacerbated an issue that had been developing over the previous two decades and came to a head after 2015. For cities/towns facing economic decline and dwindling populations, this population infusion came as both a burden and an unexpected opportunity, the former because of the sudden necessity to house and care for people who likely did not speak the native language, and the latter because this new population presented a possibility for these declining cities to experience new growth while they sought to balance the possible backlash of the local populace with the needs of the refugees, though these neglected smaller cities and towns had little to offer refugees beyond shelter (Bock, 2018; Schiffauer, et al., 2017).

With this context, we can better understand the difficulties faced by both refugees and governments, and why there was a constant array of uncertainty from both sides. The next chapter will take an in-depth look at various theories surrounding integration and housing, which will lead into a discussion of multi-level governance before utilising these two concepts to analyse our empirical cases of Leverkusen and Berlin.
Chapter 3: The Long, Winding and Differently Directional Road of Integration and Housing Theories

3.1 Introduction

This chapter will review the primary and secondary literature for two bodies of theory utilised for analysis in this thesis, integration theory and housing. These two theories will inform the empirical and analytical sections of this thesis by providing a fundamental understanding of integration and a theoretical conceptualisation of how housing can impact the process of integration. Because housing is not a cohesive body of theory and comes under contention as to whether or not housing can be theorised, the primary objective of this chapter’s section on housing will be to input a theory of housing as it pertains to the structural facets of integration.

Integration and housing theory will inform how we will answer the research questions in four ways: first, by providing a concrete understanding of the variables important within refugee integration; second, by developing a conceptualisation of what comprises ‘housing’, as the term itself is applied to a wide variety of accommodation for refugees (first reception centres, hangar halls, apartments, container accommodation, etc.); third, by combining the important variables within housing and integration with our utilisation of multi-level
governance (MLG) as a policymaking framework to analyse refugee housing implementations in Leverkusen and Berlin\textsuperscript{7}; and fourth, by juxtaposing the essential elements of integration and housing against the policies that are implemented in Leverkusen and Berlin while also combining the individualistic elements derived from participant interviews as a critique of both applications of the two theories and the policies themselves.

We will look at ‘integration’ as a core concept and derive the various theories, concepts and uses within. Migrant integration theory covers a broad swath of approaches and schools, from more positivist-based methods that quantify measurements of integration to that which is attainable, i.e. education levels, residence, etc., to more conceptual and interpretivist methods that, rather than seeking to directly and tangibly measure ‘integration’ as a hard and fast variable, instead exists within an intersectionary subfield of sociology, psychology, and politics as a normative field of study.

Even within the EU where member states are subject to EU law\textsuperscript{8}, ‘integration’ holds different meanings and measurements across most member states (Bertossi & Duyvendak, 2012). There currently exists no standard ‘definition’ of integration generally accepted by academics, international/local organisations, governments, etc. given how contentious the subject is\textsuperscript{9}.

\textsuperscript{7} Framework will be developed in Chapter 7.

\textsuperscript{8} Though the EU has no direct jurisprudence over the implementation of member state programmes of integration, the component parts of the Common European Asylum System (CEAS) acts to ensure a minimum of reception standards and conditions across member states. However, some member states, notably the United Kingdom, Ireland, and Denmark, have opt-out clauses for portions of the CEAS. While the EU’s purview over wholesale integration is limited, the EU does have the potential to impact aspects of integration, such as education and employment rights.

\textsuperscript{9} Over the course of my interviews with NGO employees who work directly with refugees, many expressed disdain at the term ‘integration’ as it precipitated the notion that refugees existed somewhere outside of society and that society must ‘pull them in’ so that they can live closer to how Germans live. Some directly equated the term with ‘assimilation’, which to them elicited a concept of overriding and erasing the refugees’ native culture in favour of becoming more German. There was, overall, a desire by NGO employees to ensure that while
This chapter will also delineate the analytical strengths and weaknesses of the various groups of literature and critique the overall ideas presented with arguments from the other groups, as well as inputting my own analysis and critique for the respective schools of thought. The framework by Ager and Strang (2008) was one attempt to reconcile the various disagreements between the groups, and it will serve as both an example of how the overall concept of integration can be reified and how the framework needs ‘touching up’ in light of the consequences of the refugee movements into Europe in the latter half of the 2010s.

Housing, as an indicator of migrant integration theory, will be explored on its own through the current work on its establishment as both a tangible and theoretical object. Whether ‘housing’ can be considered a theory or a body of theoretical work is a subject of some debate (see Kemeny, 1992, and Ruonavaara, 2018), which will be covered in the section. There is currently a relative dearth on the socio-theoretical conception of housing outside its traditional marker of economic health and wealth, though the literature surrounding it is growing (see King, 2009). It is worth isolating its own theoretical section because it serves an important role in the general mechanics of integration, and without an aggregated description of the theoretical and tangible role of housing in refugee integration, this thesis would be enervated in its arguments.

Because integration is generally studied on a wider, more normative scale rather than through one tangible facet of integration, this chapter will elucidate the importance of housing, both as a physical space in which a refugee may or may not have privacy and agency to control, as well as a space in which one can access local community. Given the...
importance of the local level in refugee integration (Bendel, et al., 2019), this chapter will conceptualise housing as a gateway to community and immersion in the local level, and make it a determining variable for the other facets of integration.

Finally, this chapter will capture and demonstrate the gap in literature pertaining to how housing affects refugee integration experiences. Though there has been extensive study around general integration policies, practices, and theories, deep dives into how types of housing policies, practices, and theories affect integration outcomes are lacking. There are notable studies that touch on housing situations for refugees (section 3.3) that reflect on interactions with government and civil society, as well on how housing types and policy structures surrounding housing choice affect refugee self-perception of delegated rights within a country, but the greater link to integration prospects and ‘moving forward’ for refugees, as it were, has not been well constructed. From uncovering this gap, we can directly move into the empirical chapters to analyse how housing situations and policies for refugees have affected their integration experience, both at a personal level and how they perceive the state/local government’s ‘attitude’ towards their efforts, i.e. if the relevant government policies seems to impede more than facilitate ameliorating the issues refugees face.

Because of the width and breadth of integration literature, we will focus on the ‘bigger names’ in integration theories, namely acculturation, transnationalism, civic integrationism, and interculturalism while analysing and discussing the variations within, and how they apply to policies enacted by both Germany and other EU member states. Doing so ensures that we can extract key variables from the theories with which we will apply in our analysis of the empirical chapters. This analysis will inform the development of the theoretical framework in chapter 7.

The next section will begin by giving the lay of the land in integration literature, drawing on different theories and disciplines to give a clear, broad picture of the generalities
concerning integration. We will then cover state/society-refugee interactions, both formally and informally, and then we will tackle some of the frameworks developed to cover integration, ranging from those created by academics to those created by governments and draw comparisons between their applicability in a contemporary setting. Here we will differentiate between the theoretical bodies of work covering integration and briefly examine how several states envision their integration policies, and how they compare to the integration literature and theory. Finally, housing will be discussed and analysed as a theoretical object by which the main variables discussed within these models of integration can be attained or facilitated.

3.2 Theories of Migrant Integration

3.2.1 Introduction

Before all else, it must be noted that while the following theories of integration pertain mainly to regular migrants, they are also applicable to asylum-seekers/refugees and have been applied to studies covering asylum-seekers/refugees (see examples below). Though there are obvious differences between wilful migrants and asylum-seekers/refugees on the consequences of their arrival to a new country, similar mechanics of integration are shared between the two situations: language acquisition (whether it is implied cultural idioms or a completely separate language), work/education acquisition, and housing acquisition, et al.

Integration theories in the following subsections are ordered by integration theories and perspectives at the individual level, integration theories from government and societal levels, and current theoretical and state models of integration. These variations allow us to reflect on the research questions by first developing a general conceptualisation of how integration theory functions at the individual level, as integration is simultaneously an
individual and societal experience and interaction (Council of the European Union, 2004), and how those individual experiences interact with theoretical models and those employed by governments. Because we are focused on housing and integration outcomes for individuals and how they interact with policy governance, prioritising how refugees experience integration qualitatively rather than attempting to glean successful outcomes through quantitative measurements places individual perceptions, decision, and actions at the forefront of our study.

3.2.2 Theories on Individual and Group Integration- ‘Acculturation’

An individual’s perception of how integration occurs can greatly affect their potential integration outcome (Bourhis, et al., 1997). Though not explicitly relating to refugees, Berry (2005) proposed an ‘acculturation and ethnic relations’ model to determine “how can peoples of different cultural backgrounds encounter each other, seek avenues of mutual understanding, negotiate and compromise on their initial positions, and achieve some degree of harmonious engagement? (Berry, 2005: 698)”. He distinguishes an important facet about acculturation, and one that largely applies to the process of integration: a process of interaction and participation with the dominant (or other) culture relies entirely upon the decision of the individual to do so within the respective cultural contexts between the individual and the other society [emphasis mine](Ibid: 702), which touches on the theory of interculturalism discussed below.

The understanding (or lack thereof) of discrete cultural differences in interactions affects the outcome of the interactions and the eventual acculturation strategy of the individuals in question. Murphy (1977) found the cultural contexts or perceived relative openness of a society also contributes to whether or not individuals from ‘different cultures’ are able to acclimate to a new culture; if there is a section of the receiving culture that contains elements of one’s home, i.e. areas where first- and second-generation migrants have
settled into the new culture, acculturation can be facilitated (Murphy, 1977: 678-679; see transnationalism below). This does not, however, mean that the migrant group is actively accepted by the dominant society, which can lead to strife and active discrimination; that requires more intimate and detailed intercultural dynamics (see Lebedeva and Tatarko, 2004).

Berry (2005) posits four acculturation strategies employed by individuals: assimilation, separation, integration, and marginalisation. Figure 1 demonstrates the differences therein. Briefly, assimilation is when one does not care to maintain one’s original cultural identity and instead seeks to integrate fully with the new society; separation is when an individual wishes to maintain their cultural identity and avoids purposeful interaction with society; marginalisation is when an individual does not care to maintain their cultural background but also does not engage with the society around them (for any number of reasons); and integration is when one cares about maintaining one’s cultural heritage as well as creating links with society around them (Ibid: 705).

Figure 1 - Berry’s (2006: 705) Acculturation Model
The development of the acculturation strategies is based on 3 underlying concepts: “cultural maintenance, contact and participation, and the power to decide on how acculturation will take place. (Ibid: 706)” Berry, et al. (2006) demonstrated the applicability of both the strategies and the underlying concepts in their wide-ranging study on immigrant youth acculturation prospects, while Koos & Seibel (2019) confirmed the necessity of governments to facilitate contact and interactions between society and refugees to best help refugees ease into a new life. This ties into findings from Bourhis, et al. (1997), where “state integration policies can have a decisive impact on the acculturation orientation of both immigrants and members of the host society. (Ibid: 369)”

In the same vein as Berry, Bourhis et al. (1997: 371) propose acculturation strategies that a state can take in its integration policies: pluralism ideology, civic ideology, assimilation ideology, and ethnist ideology, and identified that the disparity between a state’s integration policy and the out-group’s acculturation strategy (and how they would like to perceive themselves within the new society) affects how the group is able to integrate. As with Berry’s (2006) individual acculturation strategies, this list is a continuum from one ideological end to the other rather than being mutually exclusive with siloed implementations.

Phillimore (2011) studied the acculturative strategies of refugees in the UK with a focus on refugees utilising the health services. Many of the study participants experienced various problems interacting with the National Health Service and were unable to find or understand guidance, which increased their stress; thus, they sought relative separation by turning to either underground medical practices or physicians not approved to practice in the UK (but who may have had medical licenses from their home countries) (Phillimore, 2011: 18-20). Further, recalling Bourhis, et al. (1997), the study found that the ‘race blind’ policies within the health service hindered refugees’ access to it, demonstrating a hybrid assimilation/ethnist ideology on the UK government’s part, as well as difficulty for the
refugees to penetrate de facto cultural boundaries that would be considered otherwise mundane for average citizens (Allport, 1954).

One possible issue with proposing such a standard framework of acculturation onto all migrants is the essential notion of choice: some migrants choose to leave their native culture and live elsewhere, while refugees do not. As in the case of the empirical work conducted for this thesis, several refugees expressed a yearning to return to their homes in Syria, or at least a desire to return to the lives they had because of the difficulties they faced adapting to Germany. Others were more than happy to envision settling into German life given the support and care provided by German society, as they felt that they owed the country for giving them the opportunity to begin anew (KD Interview, 2018). Though outside the scope of the work done by this thesis, further study into the methods of acculturation employed by refugees compared to those employed by wilful migrants is warranted.

The desire to return to a life with less stress is to be expected when one is forcibly displaced from one’s home; however, the demands placed upon them by the German government can be more than those placed on migrants (EU nationals or other voluntary migrants) who chose to move to Germany (Söhn, 2013), given the difficulty of adapting to a new cultural zeitgeist, a largely unfamiliar language, and the possibility that the individual may be dealing with the psychological trauma of having to flee his or her home under duress (see Allen, et al., 2006).

3.2.3 Theories on Individual and Group Integration- ‘Transnationalism’

The concept of transnationalism may be a coping method for this stress (Phillimore, 2011). Transnationalism, as a general frame of study, has expectedly grown in parallel to the explosive expansion of global interconnectedness of the past few decades. One can easily establish a connection with one’s family half a world away as long as there is either an
internet connection or a mobile signal, or engage actively in diasporic connections through social media. Along with this has come a diversification of consumer options, where it is now possible to find in any number of online retail items that one might commonly find in one’s home country. Thus, ensuring one has access to facets of one’s home takes little effort.

Vertovec (2009) classifies transnationalism as more a ‘messy’ process than a straightforward one, and differentiates six general takes on the concept: social morphology, which focuses on diasporic groups and the networks they maintain; types of consciousness, which focuses on the dual identities that members of a diaspora may adopt, i.e. that of their current home and that of their diasporic roots; mode of cultural reproduction, which focuses on how one’s culture is spread, consumed, and understood, i.e. through media, entertainment, etc.; avenue of capital, focusing on the expansion of trans-national corporations and business, as well as the cross-border avenues of work where workers abroad send money home; site of political engagement, which concerns both the work of international organisations and the political advocacy of local diasporas towards the home country; and (re)construction of ‘place’ or locality, which concerns people’s relationships towards the country in question, in such a way that they might find areas inhabited by people from their native culture rather than ‘nationals’ (Ibid: 4-12).

The concept of ‘transnationalism’, however, runs into several questions about its applicability of analysis because of the broadness of the term, i.e. whether it studies at the micro- or macro-level, whether it applies only to people or to corporate entities, what makes something transnational and not, for instance, multicultural, and so forth (Ibid: 15-20). For instance, Bendel, et al. (2019) utilise the term to understand networks formed by municipalities within the realm of refugee policy. Erdal and Oeppen (2013) apply the term for the efforts individuals make to both integrate into a new society while maintaining ties with their home culture, and argue that integration and transnationalism can be seen as
similar in that they are both forms of adaptation to social processes (Ibid: 875). Not only that, but the two processes need not conflict and transnationalism can facilitate integration, in some cases (Ibid: 874).

For our purposes, we can simplify the term ‘transnationalism’ to be any act that serves to connect a refugee with his or her home or culture, whether it is finding familiar food or watching familiar TV/films, keeping contact with those in the home country, or engaging actively with a local diaspora, among others (see Ehrkamp, 2005 for examples of transnational actions large and small).

In the case of understanding integration processes for refugees, all the varying meanings Vertovec (2009) proposes hold relevance: each implies a connection of some sort to one’s distant homeland, whether it is more passive (such as watching familiar TV or news) or active, such as sending money to friends/relatives or partaking in organisations specifically tailored to one’s ethnic background. Or, in the case of many Syrian refugees in Germany, connecting with the local Syrian diaspora as an aid to more comfortable immersion into German culture.

Before the refugee movements of 2014-2015, Germany experienced the growth of a Turkish diaspora during the mid- to later-20th century, as the country imported guest workers to help boost the country’s growing economy. Sert (2012) studied the transnational activities of Turks (and Turkish-Germans) and found that their transnational activities generally facilitated the individuals’ integration efforts into German society, and that transnationalism and integration are co-supportive. However, those were wilful migrants; for refugees, lives ‘back home’ only exist in memory and may be sources of trauma (Al-Ali, 2001). For those refugees with family and friends still in their home country, transnationalism may entail a

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108 See chapter 2.2.
‘balancing act’ of living psychologically in one place and physically in another (Erdal & Oeppen, 2013: 877).

Thus we can differentiate a strong integration distinction between migrants of necessity, i.e. refugees and those who have little choice in where they will eventually reside and must rely on their new residence to aid them in returning their lives to a state of homeostasis, and migrants of choice, i.e. those who have no fear of returning to their home countries.

This correlates with Al-Ali’s (2001) study of Bosnian refugees spread throughout Europe after the Dayton Accords, where the refugees had established small diasporas in their new countries of residence while also seeking to integrate vis a vis job and language training. They still had a connection to their homes in the wake of the reconstruction effort and the political precarity; however, a majority were reluctant to return within 5 years after the Dayton Accords were signed because they had established lives within the new countries, and because of the complex political and ethnic situation that unfolded in the region (Ibid: 97-98).

3.2.4 State and Societal Theories and Integration Conceptualisations

The state was the main actor that has been traditionally been involved in policy delivery in this policy area, but in more recent times new actors have emerged in the delivery process, such as local and regional level organisations, civil society organisations, private sector actors (Caponio & Jones-Correa, 2018). This section explores the literature on the interactions between these actors, starting with a brief mention of EU competence over
integration practices that then continues with discussions of civic integrationism, followed by a discussion of general German integration policies, and finally moves into interculturalism.\footnote{Interculturalism was chosen as the primary mode of integration analysis rather than multiculturalism because of Germany’s migration history in the 20th century as it regards the \textit{Gastarbeiter} (as discussed in Chapter 2). The \textit{Gastarbeiter}, and notably the Turkish migrants who settled in Germany, became a ‘parallel society’ that had noted difficulties integrating into the ‘mainstream’ of German society, especially with the formerly \textit{jus sanguinis} model of German citizenship serving to exclude millions of Turks (Brubaker, 1992). Thus for Germany, the general ‘side-by-side’ model of multiculturalism (Meer & Modood, 2012) was unfavourable as a method of acculturation. Instead, the German federal government utilises civic integrationism (see Joppke, 2007), while local levels, depending on policy and practice, may seek more inclusive and interactive models of integration.}

State responses to integration governance vary widely by country, depending on their history with migration management and the respective countries’ approaches to social welfare and education. The rights/privileges afforded refugees by states to aid in integration affect the life outcomes of those refugees’ children and their ability to contribute to the state, should they remain in it (Söhn, 2013). In addition to that, integration policies for migrants and refugees can vary from city to city within a given state, oftentimes providing for variegated integration outcomes by region (European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, 2019). Material conditions often vary from state to state and city to city, resulting in different introductions to the new host state (ECRE, 2016). How a state (and city) government postures itself towards refugees and migrants can strongly determine the course of integration and how well the migrant can situate themselves within the new host country (Nuissl, Domann, and Engel, 2019; Bendel, et al., 2019; Jørgensen, 2012; OECD, 2018; Braun & Dwenger, 2017; Czischke and Huisman, 2018; et al.).

The EU does not have direct jurisprudence over the issue of integration as a whole, but does oversee aspects such as non-discrimination in work and accessibility of education\footnote{In 2016, as a reaction to the refugee crisis and continued efforts to reallocate refugees throughout member states and maintain a standard of integration, the EU enacted The Action Plan on the Integration of Third Country Nationals. The Action Plan was an attempt by the EU to centralize and coordinate decision-making on the crisis within its purview as a supranational entity, given “whilst the competence on integration lies primarily with the Member States, the EU may establish measures to provide incentives and support for Member States in promoting integration of third country nationals residing legally in their territories and has an important role in supporting, stimulating and coordinating Member States’ actions and policies in this area. (European Commission, 2016)”}. 

\begin{figure} 
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\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{image.png} 
\caption{Figure Caption} 
\end{figure}
Some EU member states, such as Hungary, have been outwardly hostile to refugees, adopting restrictive and harsh practices intended to curtail refugee interest in settling in those states (Zaun, 2018). The obvious implication is that integration for these refugees is unlikely to happen in these states, though the more likely outcome is that they attempt to claim asylum in another EU member state. According to the EU’s Dublin Regulation, refugees must make an application for asylum in their port of first entry; applications made in a secondary member state are likely to be rejected (Robila, 2018: 9). The refugees unfortunate enough to experience such an outcome can end up living ‘informally’, i.e. in tenuous camps (such as Calais), on the streets, or in homeless shelters without the opportunity to begin the process of integration if they do not wish to be deported back to their homeland (see Davies, Isakjee, and Dhesi, 2017).

3.2.5 Civic Integrationism

In the case of the EU member states that typically receive migrants, each member state defines and conducts their integration frameworks differently (see Geddes and Scholten, 2013 for overview). Joppke (2007) argues that these national models and frameworks are actually converging as a result of the fallout from the September 11 terrorist attacks, from one of multiculturalism and general plurality to one that leans towards assimilation (but does not entirely become assimilation; see Joppke, 2017), to contain the same selective variables termed to be ‘civic integration’, a framework pioneered by the Netherlands and gradually adopted by other EU member states: education on and tests of civic knowledge, enforced language courses, and encouragement to enter the workforce. The onus of integration moves towards the individual, rather than being a ‘two-way’ process (Council of the European Union, 2004) where both the state and the individual move towards each other. Civic
integration, Goodman (2010) argues, promotes the values that a state would want to see in future citizens (and expects of its citizens already).

Joppke identifies the shared notion of ‘obligation’ for migrants across the realm of civic integration policies (Joppke, 2007: 14). These obligations can be exported, as in the case of the Netherlands having tests outside their borders on both language and culture before migrants enter the country legally (Ibid: 5). External testing of qualifications before entry is not exclusive to the Netherlands.

That the state’s integration requirements impose a checkpoint system that allow migrants to access further benefits only if they attain certain levels seems to contravene the ideal of a pluralistic, multicultural society, these policies can coexist with multiculturalist policies set at the city or municipal level (Joppke, 2017:1164). This system acts as a sieve, allocating the opportunity to move only to those with the resources and time, though this differentiates the ideals of the state and the local: where the state government coordinates ‘bordering’ aspects, i.e. access and those associated with citizenship and/or ‘contributing to society’ (such as through paying taxes), the local level is tasked with ensuring that the individual has access to housing, social welfare provisions, job aid, etc., that which would serve inclusivity.

In the 21st century Germany has walked the line between being a pluralistic, open society and one that has stricter civic integrationist mechanisms. Dual citizenship was not fully legal until 2014, even as the country unveiled its National Integration Plan in 2007 (Heckmann, 2016). The Plan instituted standards for integration mainly through language and civics courses, along with measuring employment levels, among other things (Die Bundesregierung Der Deutschland, 2007). Much was left to the federal states, leading to disparities between integration outcomes and demonstrating the civic integrationist-pluralistic divide between the national level and the state/local level.
For instance, Schmidtke (2014) cites North-Rhein Westphalia (NRW) as being a leader in formulating its own Teilhabe-und Integrationsgesetz (Participation and Integration Law), notable in allowing refugees to test their expertise in fields in which they were qualified in their home countries, even if they were unable to bring their documentation with them (Ministerium des Innern des Landes Nordrhein-Westfalen, 2012). Investing in education and qualification certification for refugees has been found to expedite or ameliorate their integration prospects (Bach, et al., 2017), and though it was restrictive before the refugee influx, the German federal government studied how to liberalise its highly regulated qualifications system to ease the difficulties already-qualified refugees had in re-joining their fields of expertise (Maroufi, 2017), demonstrating the ability of the non-federal level to lead in integration policy innovation.

With the increase in refugee flows in 2015, Germany adopted the Integrationsgesetz in 2016, which standardised vocational training programmes and integration courses with the mandate of a 3-year residence permit for those undertaking vocational training, with an additional 2-year residence permit for those taken on by their places of work (Rietig, 2016: 14). There is still much leeway given to the states and municipalities for implementation of integration practices. It is not uncommon that national and local integration policies differ in both their conceptualisation and supporting political ideology, and has come to be expected in the current era of migration and integration (OECD, 2018; Bendel, et al., 2019; Zapata-Barrero and Cantle, 2018). The disparity between the national and the local in this regard provokes

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13 See chapter on Multi-level Governance for further discussion on policy development within federal systems.
further questions about the state’s priorities in integration policy: whether it is to deter
general migrants or promote future citizenry, or something else.

Goodman and Wright (2015: 1887) argue that national civic integration measures are
more of a ‘symbolic’ measure than a functional one, acting to satisfy the demands of the
more conservative political voices in society that would otherwise impose strict integration
requirements on all migrants. In the case of refugees and asylum seekers, civic integration
clashes with the duties imparted by the rights and obligations for the state surrounding
refugee status: the state (in this case, Germany) has the obligation to support the refugees,
first with a place to live and substantive benefits with which to support themselves, then with
education and eventual access to the job market, whereas overall integration requirements for
other migrants would work in the opposite direction, i.e. they must know/have the
language/job first, then comes access to benefits. These factors, along with various
programmes enacted by the EU and cross-border city networks, shift the ‘door to entry’ to the
local level
(Schmidtke, 2014).

However, Goodman and Wright (2015: 1898-1899) found that countries whose
integration policies scored highly on the civic integration scale (CIVIX) did not have an
immediate effect on the political integration of immigrants into the mainstream, and that it
was likely tertiary factors (social aspects outside the scope of civic integration policies) that
contributed to immigrants ‘feeling’ more integrated rather than learning and being tested on
language and culture. This corroborates Ersbøll and Gravesen’s (2010) study of Danish
legislation and integration practices and how immigrants responded to the requirements
placed on them, with “[t]he frequent changes to the legislation cause great insecurity and a
feeling of hopelessness among the respondents. (Ibid: 40)” What did help half of the
respondents integrate was “their family, friends, and work” rather than the requirements placed on them by the state (Ibid: 41).

This points to the difficulty in attempting to legislate ‘integration’, where the term and practice itself is still too vague and varied between states and locales to determine what can make effective integration practices, especially one that can be measured statistically (Phillimore, 2012: 535-541).

3.2.6 Interculturalism

The rise of ‘measurable’ integration factors has contributed, conversely, to the rise of interculturalism as a method by which to conduct integration. The term is used to connote a mixture of cultures rather than keeping them distinct (Taylor, 2012: 417). The term itself has been applied to disparate meanings, such as a new word by which to describe a world where the word ‘culture’ is no longer applicable to describe discrete aspects of one region/ethnic group to differentiate from another (Abdallah-Pretceille, 2006); a method of ‘discursive moral contract’ of immigrant integration primarily developed in Quebec, Canada as a way of deviating from Canada’s use of multiculturalism, which was perceived by the Québécois as a method by which to remove the ‘Québécois heritage’ within greater Canadian society, i.e. the French language (Gagnon and Iacovino, 2006); and a term used to diagnose and treat the inherent anxiety present in a societal majority when a visibly ‘different’ sizeable minority comes to occupy a (reasonably sized) part of the living space (Bouchárd, 2011).

All three uses of the word share (more or less) the same underlying concept: promoting *inclusivity* and acceptance of differences.

Interculturalism need not conflict with the requirements of civic integration, but the theory behind interculturalism believes that encouraging interaction and discourse between the different groups is the best way to encourage integration of the new/outsider group
The basic assumption behind interculturalism is that integration is more than simply checking boxes of tangible accomplishments such as language, education, a job, etc., but the interpersonal connections developed in the course of acclimating to a new surrounding. The aspects of interpersonal connections also redefines the notion of ‘diversity’ away from multiculturalism’s assumed silos of ethnicity, nationality, etc., to individual preferences and practices (Ibid: 5).

While some might argue that interculturalism is a synonym of multiculturalism (though multiculturalism, in its various uses, tends to take on many meanings not originally ascribed to it; see Bhabha, 1998), interculturalism is differentiated from multiculturalism in its belief that there must be interactions between different groups in order to promote a more cohesive culture, rather than the general living side-by-side nature of multiculturalism (Meer and Modood, 2012). In that sense, multiculturalism exists as a method by which to ensure a minority group can live alongside a majority, while interculturalism acts as a way to bridge the divide.

Interculturalism has seen practical implementations without being called as much through the extensive work done by civil society actors in conjunction with the various levels of government. Within Germany, countless civil society organisations sprang up to help refugees in the wake of the 2014-2015 migration movements and existing organisations increased their efforts to both draft volunteers and extend partnerships with municipalities and states. For example, in 2011, Caritas, one of Germany’s largest nonprofits, partnered with the German Red Cross, the Refugee Council of Cologne, and the city of Cologne to develop a Relocation Coordination Centre, which both helped refugees transition into the private rental market and provided them access to social workers; they increased their efforts in 2015 and directly partnered with the Municipal Housing Company to facilitate refugees moving into the housing market (Adam, et al., 2019: 10).
However, in the German case, civil society and non-profit organisations have been the entities promoting interculturalism rather than the federal government, and sometimes the state/municipal government. Contacts with civil society, typically supported through NGOs both large and small, can facilitate integration practices (Doomernik & Ardon, 2018: 96), though this is dependent upon local policy and how local policies surrounding refugees may clash with national policies, as alluded to above. There are various programmes sponsored by civil society organisations and governments aimed at promoting contact and inclusion between refugees and citizens; some relate to sport, such as initiatives around football (Dukic, et al., 2017), while others surround socialising while learning the German language, and still others comprise a mentoring role to help refugees understand the complexities and distinctions of their new homes (Aumüller, et al., 2015). Furthermore, positive contact with volunteers and civil society in general alleviates the anxiety that refugees may feel about the burdens they face when entering a new society, i.e. figuring out living arrangements, education, work, paying bills, etc., and acts as a type of informal therapy (Han-Broich, 2015: 45-46).

Volunteers and civil society organisations also provide practical integration support, such as through language courses and ‘sprachcafes’ (language cafes often coordinated by civil society organisations), helping directly with ‘integration points’ offered in some German states, and through other coordination efforts with municipalities (Bogumil, et al., 2017). In many cases, volunteers and civil society organisations also take on integration tasks that would normally be the domain of the state: ensuring communication with job centres, attending health appointments, registering for school places, etc.; while this has enabled the creation of contacts networks between citizens and refugees, it is also indicative of the state’s failure to provide those basic services at levels adequate for a basic level of need (Hamann & Karakayali, 2016).
From this, we can conclude that integration has components at varying levels that must be utilised in order to effectively promote integration: the federal government must create accessible services for refugees that do not impress a burden on them as recipients (i.e. imparting a cost for language courses, or creating bureaucratic hurdles when applying for services) while mandating a standard across states/municipalities to ensure equal access for all refugees; the states/municipalities must engage with advocacy organisations and work with communities to ensure area-specific issues, such as school, health, and housing access, are addressed; local volunteer programmes should be mobilised to encourage contact between refugees and citizens; cultures should be exchanged and celebrated between refugees and citizens; and refugees themselves should be consulted about their needs while adjusting to a wholly new society. The next section will discuss some attempts, both academic and policy-oriented, to address these strands of thought and compress them into models and practices, with the primary focus on the integration model developed by Ager and Strang (2008).

3.2.7 Makes and Models- Ager and Strang

Ager and Strang (2008) attempted to coalesce these varying strands of integrationist theory and literature into a functional framework on which to possibly base government policy directed at facilitating integration. As seen below in Figure 2, they utilise the tangible means presented through civic integration (employment, education, language, as well as the inherent basis of citizenship, according to Goodman (2010)), the social connections present in transnationalism and interculturalism, and the overall psychological aspects of acculturation as detailed above.
The model maintains, much as the EU does, that integration is a two-way process in which individual and society must move towards each other in order to ameliorate any tensions one side may have about the other (Ager & Strang, 2010). The model is not without its criticism from its authors, who state “[g]iven the wide variation in income and employment, in housing status, in educational experience and outcome, and in health access and status across the settled population of any nation, what constitutes ‘successful integration’ across those domains? (Ager & Strang, 2008: 173)” Though they seek to rectify this sentiment with the ‘rights and citizenship’ domain of the model, attaining refugee status can ascribe the rights of a citizen (save the right to vote) to the recognised refugee in the case of Germany, where refugees gain access to the social system upon recognition of their status.

The model also runs into the issue of most countries conducting their integration methods and practices differently than others, and even then cities have different practices as well. Where employment and education may be the main focus of one state or city, language and health may be the focus of another, or even another may solely focus on fostering social
connections. For example, France’s notion of integration stems from its establishment of an assimilationist republic, where all people are equal under French law (see Brubaker, 1992, for a detailed history about France’s development of citizenship). This ‘colour-blind’ notion of integration tends to ignore the difficulties faced by migrants attempting to integrate within French culture because their statuses/backgrounds are not taken into account when it comes to government interventions (Streiff-Fenart & Segatti, 2012; Simon & Beaujeu, 2018).14

Comparatively, the Swedish government frames its definition of integration through the goals of its integration policies, i.e. “equal rights, obligations and opportunities for all, regardless of ethnic or cultural background. (Government Offices of Sweden, 2009)”15. The state even goes so far as to assign cities/towns of residence to refugees (not necessarily in mass accommodation centres), though this can lead to refugees taking more time to enter the labour market due to being placed in areas outside of large cities because of high population density and unavailability of places for accommodation (Bevelander & Dahlstedt, 2013).

The strength of Ager & Strang’s model is that it can be generalised into integration provisions that the state can measure: housing, education, employment, etc. while accounting for the metaphysical aspects that cannot be enforced or measured. A potential weakness, however, is the lack of structure surrounding the implementation or utilisation of government

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14 Brubaker (2014) asserts assimilationism (defined differently from aforementioned definitions of assimilation) has made a return into French discourse on integration. Mainly helped along by Jean-Marie Le Pen’s argument that the country should only accommodate that which is ‘French’ and neglect that which falls outside the realm of what is considered to be ‘truly French’, the politics of refugees and integration has been suffused with the notion that mixture with a culture that eschews French ‘values’ sullies the French cultural monolith. Given the surprisingly high turnout for the National Front at the previous French presidential election, Brubaker’s argument may hold water.

15 Referring back to the various frameworks surrounding migrant integration, this type of definition can be construed as pseudo-assimilationist/multiculturalist given that, while the definition doesn’t demand a social contract to the state a la France, the state will still seek to provide the tools and means by which a migrant can become more ‘Swedish’ through language education and civics classes. Both Sweden’s left- and right-aligned parties regard inclusion and inclusiveness of immigrants and refugees within Swedish society to be a fundamental understanding of Swedish identity, along with the provision of welfare and residence allotted to each (Jensen, 2016). The exception is the Sweden Democrats, the country’s far-right nationalist party that has openly stated the country should restrict immigration and that integration policies should end (Sweden Democrats, 2020).
resources. Research into more ‘hands-off’ attempts at integration programmes revealed that utilising primarily volunteer-based organisations to steer integration services for refugees led to extreme uncertainty for refugees and high levels of turnover for the volunteers (Phillimore, 2012).

In that vein, Ager & Strang found “both refugees and non-refugees suggested that an important factor in making them feel ‘at home’ in an area was the friendliness of the people they encountered on a daily basis” (Ager & Strang, 2008: 180). This idea was exemplified with the Startblok programme enacted in Amsterdam, where refugees were given the opportunity to live side-by-side with native Dutch, which helped in their acculturation to Dutch society (Czischke & Huisman, 2018). By allowing refugees the opportunity to be surrounded by people who had the desire to be around them, the social bridges and bonds portion of Ager & Strang’s model could be fulfilled through a pragmatic approach, i.e. providing diverse and integrated housing opportunities to the refugees.

Social connections, according to Ager & Strang, act as the ‘connective tissue’ with which to forge greater links with tangible objects such as education, language, housing, and others (Ager & Strang, 2008: 177). How a government can facilitate the development of social connections is a wide-ranging discussion; there currently exist many programmes set at the local level across Germany that seek to create social connections between native Germans and newly-arrived refugees (see Flüchtlingsrat NRW, 2015).

Taking the literature into account, we can define refugee\(^\text{16}\) integration as \textit{an ongoing, dynamic process between a state/society and a refugee, by which a refugee is able to acclimate his or herself into a new society through the interaction with processes and programmes employed by both the state and civil society.}

\(^{16}\) Here we refer to those who have received positive asylum decisions from the government and have been granted residence permits and basic legal allowances, such as education, right to work, living benefits, etc.
How does a refugee/migrant engage with that first connection? Does it come with the tangible policy objects provided by the state, or does the connection come before? With that in mind, we can focus on housing as a singular aspect that exists in both the tangible realm of integration policy and that which can aid in the intangible realm, i.e. creation of social connections, promote dialogue between refugees/migrants and society, and ease group/outgroup relations by encouraging daily contact.

### 3.3 Housing (Theories) as a Pathway Through Integration

#### 3.3.1 Introduction

In this section we will review housing as both a theoretical object and as a pivotal part of integration and integration theory. Because housing comprises the sum of many different fields of study, our review of housing literature focuses on housing as a social problem around which it is possible to develop theory (Ruonavaara, 2018), and as a pivotal aspect of refugee integration that is (and should be) considered at the forefront of policies surrounding refugee integration. We start with a discussion about the limited theories concerning housing as a social problem, transitioning into aspects of ‘power’ in housing with examples around refugees and their access to housing. Then we move into a policy-oriented discussion surrounding housing and its relation to the theoretical aspects discussed, at both the local and federal level, and coalesce our theoretical and practical discussions into important variables concerning refugees and housing, and how it can affect integration.

#### 3.3.2 Can there be theories on or around housing?

Housing as a material component is widely regarded as an integral part of integration for refugees and migrants (UNHCR, 2013; OECD, 2015; Ager & Strang, 2008; Andersson,
2010; Bordignon & Moriconi, 2017; et al.), though there is not a singular socio-theoretical framework about housing onto which one can chart an integration course, or understand how housing and accommodation affects a refugee’s integration prospects (see King, 2009).

Ruonavaara (2018) delineates between a theory of housing and a theory about housing. The former indicates that it is possible to create a theory of housing that encompasses housing in all academic fields, while the latter follows from what Kemeny (1992) believes, that it is not possible or desirable to create a theory around housing separate from other academic fields (Ruonavaara, 2018: 180). However, Ruonavaara takes a different approach in postulating a theory from housing, i.e. that it is possible to create a theory that can scrutinise the nature and experience of housing as an object unto itself rather than as a domain of a greater field of study (Ibid).

For Kemeny (1992) in his work *Housing and Social Policy*, housing should be related within the social strata in order to focus attention on the socio-structural and economic issues in which housing plays either a minor or major role (Kemeny, 1992: 10), and should be conceived within the greater study of the welfare state (Ibid: 65-77). Attempting to formulate a theory solely on the basis of housing or a household is akin to “building a conceptual framework on shifting sands. (Clapham, 2004: 97)”

On the face of it, Kemeny’s argument holds apolitical water: that because housing is such a wide-ranging object that it touches on so many fields, theorising around housing is a fruitless endeavour. That it can be made the subject of economic study, sociological study, market analysis (see Pugh, 1986), class divides, anthropological study, etc. shows that a body of coherent theory about and around housing would be massive and likely too complex to sufficiently explain social outcomes.

However, rather than embedding housing within a discipline, we can make it the ‘roof’ (pun intended) of a potential theory of housing and study housing, as Ruonavaara
(2018) and King (2009) believe, as an object in which the occupier experiences society. Much like other social issues, such as public health, environment, work, etc., housing can comprise a social issue around which a theory can be developed when the nature of inhabitation becomes the focus rather than housing’s place in broader social study (Hatuka & Bar, 2016). In the case of refugees, their housing situations are suffused with power and political dynamics that can either embolden them or limit them.

Handel (2019) applied critical theory to the study of houses and homes, underlining the basic assumption that housing/homes “are part of a power dispositive, built in certain form and material features, based upon theoretical and practical assumptions concerning good or bad, efficient or inefficient, desired or undesired. (Handel, 2019: 1050)” Power, in the sense of choice over construction and inhabitation is tiered, first at the hands of the state, and then to the manager/owner of the housing/home rather than the inhabitant (if they are not the owner). How the ‘recipients of housing’ (buyers, renters, occupants) situate themselves within society then contains a number of socioeconomic determinants which must be first allowed or allocated by the state: for example, a home buyer must contend with property taxes while a renter must contend with a landlord, who may or may not utilise his or her power to take advantage of a renter for excess fees, sidestepping local renter legal protections (if any exist). Refugees often have their housings chosen for them, and depending on where they arrive, their ability to choose housing could be generous, restricted, or exceedingly bureaucratic.

3.3.3 Refugees and Theories Around Housing

When we apply this power dynamic to refugee housing, we find that the state (or the relevant government level determining housing arrangements) marks the first determinant in the locality and initiation of integration practices: this can result in a ‘loss of agency’ for
refugees placed into accommodations far from the locus of social life in society, where access to societal resources is difficult because of being physically remote and refugees then have fewer options for choosing their own paths (Vey, 2018); a ‘permanent state of exception’ can be foisted on refugees, in which they exist in bounded legal limbo while in accommodation centres because of lack of transparency and trust on the state’s behalf (Engler, 2018); or refugees can be encouraged to enter into societal mainstream with aid from government and local organisations (Hamann & El-Kayed, 2018), among other possibilities.

Because of the differing levels of interaction and agency pertaining to housing, its development, and its inhabitation (Hatuka & Bar, 2016), it is necessary to understand how the state/governing authority manages the agency of its potential inhabitants. For refugees, this is a question of where they are initially placed and to what resources they have immediate access. For example, refugees placed in a mass accommodation that allows for regular interaction with civil society gives them the opportunity to acclimate more to a new life (Bock, 2018: 580-582), though this depends largely on the allowances of the state. Berlin, for instance, allows for refugees to find private apartments while Saxony only allows for private residences for those in special need (Hamann & El-Kayed, 2018: 140). The inconsistency in practice across Germany can lead to uneven outcomes for refugees; housing for refugees thus cannot simply be a covered space to protect from weather or an army barrack-style accommodation, but a place that ensures a standard of living for refugees, as well as an opportunity for societal immersion (Murdie, 2008).

Housing access and location may also determine community interaction, specifically volunteer organisation interaction, which has emerged as a key variable surrounding the debate on refugee integration (Gesemann & Roth, 2016: 23). These organisations, in many cases, have taken on duties typically reserved for the state in what Hamann & Karakayali (2016) call “the failure of the state to care and provide refugees the necessary access to
Thus we find two central issues surrounding refugees and housing: agency, i.e. the ability to regain a sense of control over one’s life (see Vey, 2019) and community access. Agency with regard to housing, where a person has the ability to determine how and where they will live, enables a person a modicum of control and choice over at least one aspect of their life (Parsell, 2012: 160-161), which, as discussed by Al-Ali (2001) and Berry (2002), acts as an individual motivation to pursue active integration.

Accommodation for asylum-seekers in Germany is typically limited upon arrival to reception centres/mass accommodations with varying conditions depending on local government capacity. Some towns/cities renovate unused buildings into accommodations (Bock, 2018) while others build ‘tempohomes’, small short-term container buildings meant to last for up to a decade, or sometimes longer (Kreichauf, 2018). Other cities have developed unique programmes to fit the circumstances of their demographics and available land/buildings, leaving an extremely varied arrangement of policies across the country (Schiffauer, et al., 2017). What agency the refugees are given after they are placed into these accommodations is largely up to the laws of the city and relevant state, and sometimes that agency may rest with the residents of a community who may vocally object and attempt to

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17 See chapter on Multi-Level Governance for an expanded discussion on the role of civil society within the realm of government service delivery.
block the construction of any type of refugee accommodation (Hubana, 2019; Hamann & El-Kayed, 2018).

The importance of access to community within the realm of refugee housing cannot be understated; imbuing neighbourhoods with access to key resources, as well as ensuring that poorer areas do not face exclusion or segregation is the way to ensure that poverty or deprivation do not become endemic to communities (Kearns & Forrest, 2000: 1010-1012). Refugees are often at the most risk of falling into deprivation and homelessness (Murdie, 2008). Furthermore, organisations based within communities can provide key socio-cultural integration benefits, which also depends upon access granted by the local government for organisations to interact with refugees (European Foundation for Democracy, 2018: 64-65).

Community aid to refugees comes back to the question of agency: by allowing more contact with refugees to help them acclimate to a new society, they would be better able to orient themselves rather than having to rely solely on the state or help organisations (Engbersen, et al., 2016).

These aspects of refugee agency with regard to housing reflects on two aspects elicited by King (2009): housing policy, that which can be measured, controlled, developed, bought and sold, and *dwelling*, that which happens inside the physical structure in which someone lives (King, 2009: 43-44). The former can be measured and analysed *en masse* through statistics and other quantifiable means, such as quality inspection of buildings and overall occupancy; the latter, however, exists as an interaction between the residents, the owners, and the community around them. Accordingly, housing entails a political spectrum outside of economic measures, as access to housing (social housing in particular) becomes a question of policy differences between two (or more) political viewpoints (Allen, 1997: 88), or a representative totem bearing the symbolism of access to capital and class struggle (Pugh,
1986: 23); but, the process of integration is a personal experience (Berry, 2002) and requires an understanding of the individual’s perceived position with his or her housing situation.

Thus, the use of an ‘inside’ perspective on housing rather than an ‘outside’ perspective, i.e. an experiential-agency frame, provides a reasonable critique to Kemeny’s (1992) belief that housing must be embedded within a social discipline rather than existing as something around which a theory can be formulated. Especially when we take into account refugee interactions with both physical housing and policy surrounding housing and how that can differ from the general socio-economic study of housing, while utilising Ruonavaara’s (2018) notion of a theory from housing we can observe a marked investment in how housing can affect the wellbeing and integration prospects of refugees, as will be demonstrated in the chapters on Berlin and Leverkusen.

3.4 Conclusions

The literature covers a wide swath of ‘integration’ theories generally used to refer to both refugees and general migrants, though the term itself lacks a unified definition on which to draw from a cohesive body of theory. From theories at the personal level demonstrating how individuals may decide to approach, as Berry (2002) terms it, acculturation, to state individual interactions, to work-first perspectives and academic models, integration has different meanings in different locales, which can lead to different and uneven outcomes among populations.

The chapter coalesced a definition of integration taking into account the ‘two-way’ nature of the phenomenon and the necessity to ensure that both the state and the individual are actively engaged in the process. Though the general process contains different measures of accomplishment to determine integration ‘levels’ depending on locality and state (see Joppke, 2007), the use of the phrase ‘two-way’ process includes the work done by civil
society and non-government organisations to aid refugees in their acculturation. Governments typically either act liberally, allowing for refugees to obtain housing and contact with organisations, or stringently, allowing only certain refugees under explicit conditions to access private housing.

The local level has been shown to influence integration as much as or more than the state can, with cities/municipalities directing policies aimed at more inclusivity than otherwise. This can be observed in the differences between Berlin and Saxony, where the former has more liberal allowances towards refugee integration benefits than the latter.

Housing is shown to be an important variable within the realm of integration because it can afford a refugee access to the community and increase both exposure and immersion to the new society in which they live. Though there are limited theories surrounding housing and its ability to help or hinder refugee integration, we can draw on Ruonovaara’s (2018) concept of a theory from housing to better understand and develop an interactive and dynamic application of how housing interacts with a refugee’s integration prospects. While this has much to do with the state and its proprietary nature over refugee accommodation, the refugee living inside the accommodation must also attempt to interact with the state and its citizenry, and where they are accommodated can have a massive impact on their ability (agency) to do so. This will be further studied in the empirical chapters.
Chapter 4: Deconstructing Multi-Level Governance: To be, or not to be, a Theory (or just a very useful concept)

4.1 Introduction

This chapter will overview the generalities and the specificities of the body of multilevel governance literature, going back to its conceptual creation in the 1990s up to today and will detail how the method of analysis has changed to accommodate different modes of analysis.

Multi-level governance holds relevance both towards the understanding of integration policy development and its implementation. As demonstrated in the previous chapter on integration and housing theory, there are two general vertical levels to integration policy construction: national level and local level (with federal state level also included for those countries that have federal states within). They may be more synchronised in their outlooks on how integration policies should be structured, or they may clash more with decisions concerning inclusivity and access for refugees to greater societal resources (see Goodman & Wright, 2015). Policy development and implementation structures involve multiple levels of
government, and this chapter will show how multi-level governance can help elucidate and evaluate those structures.

Further, MLG also comprises the governance partnerships between governments and non-government organisations. This vertical-horizontal framework of analysis is relevant for studying integration policy given how often municipalities partner with or contract out various integration services to private organisations. This partnership is not always straightforward, and may involve the government taking a ‘back seat’ over governance and allowing the NGO to operate with relatively free reign, or may entail greater coordination, cooperation, or oversight rather than a relatively laissez-faire approach. Thus, MLG can provide us with the tools by which we will both analyse refugee housing policies in the proceeding chapters, and with which we will construct the theoretical framework in chapter 7.

Governance studies\textsuperscript{18}, as a general body of work, comprise a ‘core concept’ rather than a cohesive, unpolemical school of thought, with MLG sitting as a more recent addition to the study of governance (Kjær, 2004). Because of how new MLG is and how many different academic studies in different fields have both utilised it as a framework of analysis and as an object to critique because of its relative lack of cohesive corpus, MLG requires both meanstesting and continual application and critique in different studies that contain different levels/hierarchies of analysis. Doing so allows and requires us to ‘break down’ what the core of MLG is, what components have been added on along the way, what its strengths and weaknesses are, and what its limitations are in order to best utilise and critique it in this study.

\textsuperscript{18} Corporatist models of governance were considered as a method of analysis before settling on to MLG due to the highly pluralistic and non-centralised (and sometimes dynamic) nature of the policies in question.
In that regard, we can identify a literature gap where MLG has not been actively applied to the study of refugee housing policy at the local level in the German example, or even more generally. MLG has been used to analyse migration and/or integration policy at the national and local level, sometimes in juxtaposition to analyse why they are similar or different (see Careja, 2019; Fakhoury, 2019; Homsy, et al., 2019; Zapata-Barrero, et al., 2017; et al.). However, as it pertains to the specificities of housing policy as a prime facilitator of integration (or otherwise), studies have generally remarked upon the importance of housing as an area over which the local level has policy competence, but not upon the variations of how policy is implemented and the impacts of that implementation on refugee integration prospects (see Doomernik & Ardon, 2018; Hamann & El-Kayed, 2018; Jørgensen, 2012; et al.)

In the current context of global affairs and situations regarding the rights and movements of refugees around the world, filling this literature gap is essential as MLG constitutes a wider structural mechanism through which many governments are divvying up the responsibilities over refugee affairs, both to the local level and to non-governmental organisations, whether they are non-profit or otherwise (see previous chapter). Whether this is a result of rational decision-making, structural pressures, individual preferences, or another factor is part of what MLG seeks to uncover (Cairney, 2012), and will be one of the foundational aspects of Berlin’s and Leverkusen’s respective policies that will be analysed in the following chapters.

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19 A slight exception to this is Lukes, et al.’s (2019) study of housing discrimination against migrants and policy in the UK. It covers a brief history of policymaking concerning housing discrimination based on ethnicity. The paper only touches briefly on refugees. Similarly, Ringel (2017) studied how refugees are able to create homes within Germany and the agency they have in differing circumstances, though without analysing the policies governing refugee housing or how the policies are implemented.
The following section will begin by overviewing the origin and development of MLG from the early 1990s to today, highlighting several critiques of MLG as a method of analysis. We will then briefly discuss MLG’s tangibility as a theory of policymaking, and whether its loosely-defined corpus should be considered a theory or something else. Then we will look at how MLG is applied in different policy circumstances, which include attempts by several academics to codify a solid theoretical structure around MLG. After, we will do a deeper dive into Type-II MLG, as it is the primary focus of our analysis and the eventual theoretical framework, and delineate several strands of public policy study that comprise Type-II as a method of governance.

Finally, we will discuss the contribution of this chapter and thesis to the greater MLG literature: creating the building blocks of a functionally-specific model for local refugee housing policy utilising the aforementioned embedded MLG concepts.

4.2 The MLG Corpus

4.2.1 Origins

Multi-level governance (MLG) as a concept began with Marks’ (1992, 1993) analysis of the then-nascent European Union policymaking structure regarding structural development funds and why/how those funds were increased, and how policy was formulated and advanced. It came as an alternative to liberal intergovernmentalist and neo-functionalist theorists who viewed, respectively, that European policy came from member states, or that the power to make policy was gradually being ceded to the EU as a result of ‘functional spillover’ (i.e. that the European Commission/Parliament/etc. was able to glean increased ability to oversee and adjudicate over issues because of the necessity to move those issues to the EU level rather than have them remain as something between individual member states) from the supranational level forming the general rules about which the EU will function. In Marks’ original definition, MLG is
“a system of continuous negotiation among nested governments at several territorial
tiers—supranational, national, regional, and local—as the result of a broad process of
institutional creation and decisional reallocation that has pulled some previously
centralized functions of the state up to the supranational level and some down to the
local/regional level. (Marks, 1993: 392)”

His research focused on the development of supranational EU bodies and their extent of contact with regional and subnational governments in forming the guidelines for structural development funding, dedicating specific attention to the work of individual actors within the spheres of power and influence. He found that information was exchanged between the various levels within the then-European Community and much of the process was decentralised, giving member states a say in how the funding would be allocated while those less-developed members gave a wider berth to the European Commission to finalise the budget. The Commission also had a large number of meetings with subnational governing bodies, which ultimately led to a wider shift in negotiating between all relevant parties (Ibid: 402-403). Thus, for Marks, the centre of policymaking or influencing policy development did not rest solely with the Commission or the European Parliament, but was an active process involving the member states, the EU governance structures, and regional levels within the member states.

To liberal intergovernmentalists this would only signal that, while the Commission had meetings with subnational levels, it was ultimately the member states that decided on the final allocations for the structural development funding and on the governing structure of the EU as a whole (see Moravcsik, 1993). The states maintained their centrality while all else, including the supranational and the municipalities, sat as peripheral actors in policymaking,
and the impetus and discretion for formulating and directing policy creation resided with the state (Piattoni, 2010: 18-19). However, analysing the EU only as an “international regime for policy coordination” (Moravcsik, 1993: 480) minimises the role that the supranational level inhabits in policy/law creation and judicial enforcement, as well as the regional and local levels did play and have increasingly played in both policy innovation and influence at the supranational level, which will be looked at further on in this section. Because the European Union is a *sui generis* international organisation and can enact binding laws and policies upon its member states, another method of analysis was needed to better understand how EU laws are formed.

Marks, Hooghe, and Blank (1996) further developed MLG to explain that governance within the EU is not nested, as in federal systems, but rather governance structures are interconnected in such a way as to allow the subnational level direct access to the supranational level (Marks, et al., 1996: 346-347). They also further enumerated the importance of actors and institutions within the state, rather than referring to the state as a wholly unitary actor; this was a hard break from the liberal intergovernmentalists and the neo-functionalists, who both typically viewed the state and institutions through the lens of the more ‘traditional’ IR theories, i.e. realism and liberalism. By shifting the locus of study onto the actors within states, MLG could take a more holistic view of how policy structures operate and analyse the impact of actors on the different directions policies and governance can take.

The example given by Marks, Hooghe, and Blank (1996) is of decisional reallocation, where some heads of governments decided to cede competence to the European Commission in areas of policy where the member state might normally have purview. This is done for any number of reasons: sometimes it enhances the ability of the member state, if it is a small one, to have its voice heard in the international arena; alternatively, it could be a way of deferring
blame for policies that could bring about some level of strife (Ibid: 349). Because of this possibility, the Commission is keen on developing contacts at the regional level, which is why the EU has bodies such as the Committee of the Regions (and others) that has representatives from regional and local areas within each member state.

With the increased utilisation of MLG as a framework (Bache & Flinders, 2004a), Hooghe and Marks (2003) delineated two types of MLG, Type I and Type II, as a method by which to generally organise the different styles of governance that could be implemented. Type I is most familiar as federalism, or the ‘Russian nesting doll’ of governance, where the layers of competence are neatly stacked one on top of the other with general jurisdictions defined for each. These structures are very stable and durable, and typically resist large-scale changes or destruction throughout changes in ruling party or ideology (Hooghe & Marks, 2003: 236).

Type II is more horizontal than vertical. Here the number of jurisdictions are potentially infinite, with smaller organisations handling specific areas of policy rather than, for example, the municipal government handling a wide array of general policy (Ibid: 237). Jurisdictions may also overlap rather than staying firmly within the overall nested governance structure, leaving authority on a given policy typically decentralised to individual entities, or shared between two or more entities. An example of this is the Rheinisch-Bergischer Kreis20, a county/district within the German state of North-Rhein Westphalia that encompasses six cities and two municipalities. While the cities and municipalities within the Kreis develop their own policies on integration and housing, they consult with the Kreis and the other members within, and the Kreis is able to provide funding and support, as well as links/network associations that are of use to the cities and municipalities.

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20 Kreis literally translates to ‘circle’ in German.
Type II also involves issue-specific jurisdictions which may be made to last for the length of the issue, if it is finite (Ibid: 240). It is designed to fit as a panacea to specific policy problems, and the method of jurisdiction creation can vary between the creation of a new government body or, as has been increasingly seen since the last decade of the 20th century, public-private partnerships, whereby a government contracts out a specific service to be delivered either by a for-profit business or a non-profit (Cairney, 2012: 158-159), or a government creates single-issue agency or quango whose functions may then be parcelled out to other organisations (Talbot, 2003: 10-15). This practice has emphasised the role of nongovernmental organisations in fulfilling duties that would, typically, be occupied by a government body but are otherwise not engaged in doing so, or do so in a more limited fashion, in order to cut back on budget expenditure (Haque, 2011: 336-338).

Scholten (2013) identified that MLG has a more ‘technocratic’ orientation in its cooperative maintenance, where there is more policy implementation focus between the relevant actors instead of engaging in political handwringing (Scholten, 2013: 220). He identified four ‘ideal type’ relationship paradigms between government levels, derived partly from Marks’ and Hooghe’s (2001) work developing MLG: centralist, localist, MLG, and decoupled. Centralist implies power is held almost entirely within the central government a la the Westminster Model, and all policymaking power comes from the top-down. Localist views the local level as an important asset in, in this case, migration policy, and possibly more important than the central government, with the local level producing more specific policy prescriptions than the national level could. MLG is, as expected, a coordination game with constant interaction between the different levels of government. Finally, decoupled refers to a complete lack of communication and coordination between levels of government, where one level may even be completely antithetical to what is enacted in another (Ibid: 220221).
He found that while the local level set policies apart from the national level, the use of MLG determined that the different levels set different priorities for the same types of policies, i.e. the national level was far more reserved in engaging in both inclusive and adaptive migration policies while the local level often acted the policy entrepreneur, creating policies that could later be adopted at the national level (Ibid: 232-234). There was also a disconnect between how the local level and the national level portrayed their migration and integration policies, demonstrating that while MLG may be a common method of governance within the realm of migration policy, it is possible to adopt the characteristics of more than one of Scholten’s ‘ideal types’ of governance at a time to analyse the relationships between the levels, and in many cases the ideal types likely have overlap.

But does Scholten’s (2013) reification of the ideal types of governance compress or disregard the dynamic adaptation and development of network governance that occurs within MLG? Supranational committee development and the (often spontaneous) creation of policy networks would suggest that in order to best analyse policy governance, one must take a more holistic view on a policy-by-policy basis in order to not silo oneself into a specific ideal type (Piattoni, 2010). Policy can be developed at the local level in tandem with the national, as seen in Germany’s National Integration Plan, or from market-based government partners (Cohen & Sabel, 1997), or from the supranational level; et al. Part of the appeal of utilising MLG rather than ascribing a specific ideal type of governance dimensionality is MLG’s ability to capture the relevant stakeholders and how they are able to implement policy, i.e. who the important partners are, how the policy is administered at different levels, what the centres of power are within a policy’s implementation, etc.

With that in mind, MLG’s use as an analytical frame moved from mostly concerning the development of EU policy towards the study of other policy areas around the world because of the flexibility with which it could be applied towards any government’s efforts to
develop policy responses to immediate issues (see Marti, 2019; Schiller, 2018; Fakhoury, 2019; et al.). The component parts of policy development, i.e. issue reaction, specialist input, etc. can all be applied not at the state and local level because those component parts are found within local and regional policy; thus, Type II as a method of analysis had the chance to spread to other policy areas.

4.2.2 Type II structures

Rosenau (2004) postulated 6 types of governance in 3 structures that fit within the Type II MLG framework on an international or global scale: formal structure (top-down and network governance), informal structure (bottom-up and side-by-side governance), and mixed formal and informal structure (market and Mobius-web governance) (Rosenau, 2004: 42). Top-down concerns governments, transnational companies, and intergovernmental organisations; bottom-up concerns public movements and (international) nongovernmental organisations; market governance involves a mix of the previous two, with governments interacting with the previously mentioned stakeholders along with elites and markets themselves. These three are directionally vertical or horizontal with regard to decision making and policy implementation, and are rather straightforward by design.

The next three (network governance, side-by-side governance, and Mobius-web governance), rather than maintaining a hierarchy of movement with policy creation/implementation, rely more on cross-sectional interaction between the various stakeholders rather than dominance by any one body (Ibid: 43). Any one of the actors within these three categories can take the initiative with regard to steering policy direction and can influence the other members of the same category, typically through discussion or utilisation of available resources.
These are, as Rosenau states, governance models explicitly pertaining to international governance rather than state-subnational-society relations (Ibid: 43). However, it is possible to conceive of these models within the framework of a nation-state by simply removing the ‘international’ label and applying their characteristics to national and subnational instances of unique governance. For example, the Startblok programme in Amsterdam is a collaboration between the City of Amsterdam, Socius Wonen (housing and building management company), and housing organisation De Key that works to house refugees within communities of Dutch nationals, which came about because of a collaborative and negotiated discussion between the city of Amsterdam and its housing associations (Doomernik & Ardon, 2018). The same mechanisms of bargaining, cooperation, negotiation, and networks operate at the international level as they do at the sub-state level.

As a German example, the German government held direct discussions with relevant community and representative national advocacy groups when developing the concepts surrounding the National Integration Plan in 2007 (Dekker, et al., 2015: 13-14). Though the initiation of the plan’s development formally came from the government, local advocacy (in cities such as Berlin) had already codified integration practices into local policies through direct consultations with the municipal governments, allowing for those local organisations to act as policy entrepreneurs and experts to inform the National Integration Plan’s development (Mushaben, 2010: 156-158). The National Integration Plan demonstrates both of Rosenau’s (2004) formal and informal governance structures, as community/advocacy groups are those that most often work to ensure that government policies are put into action for migrants/refugees, and while the start of the policy came from the top-most level of government, it was a bottom-up development that emerged from network and side-by-side governance at the local level.
With that in mind, Peters and Pierre (2004) argue that MLG, Type II in particular, is evidence that the standards of governance around policy implementation have been loosened from those of the 20th century: where governments once dominated the policy sphere, deregulation has opened up the utilisation of smaller agencies and non-government/third sector organisations in place of the traditional oversight/implementation by centralised government power, and has devolved policy implementation to specialised organisations that engage in contracting with governments rather than being subject to them (Peters & Pierre, 2004: 83-84). This presents a potential problem in oversight and implementation of policies when these organisations interact with the general public, and how they are governed or monitored by the government (Haque, 2011).

One recent example of the devolution of oversight in refugee accommodation practices was the Tempelhof reception facility in Berlin, which was notable in how much leeway the contracted company Tamaja was given to administrate the facility. There were few, if any, mechanisms for residents to make complaints or contact the Landesamt für Flüchtlingsangelegenheiten (LAF; State Office for Refugees Affairs), which is supposed to oversee Tamaja’s operations, and Tamaja was able to sub-contract several operating services without the oversight or approval of the LAF (Engler, 2018)\(^\text{21}\). A less deregulated example is a prior partnership between the Evangelische Jugend- und Fürsorgewerk (EJF; Protestant Youth and Care Council of Berlin) and the Berlin government. EJF and the government worked hand-in-hand to place refugees in private accommodations, though eventually the government ended the contract and shifted elsewhere the service EJF had offered (Bhagat & Soederberg, 2019).

4.2.2.1 Factors Inherent to Type II MLG

\(^{21}\) See chapter 6 for greater detail and discussion about the Tempelhof facility.
Here we will focus on smaller quirks that contribute to Type II governance, notably models of interaction between governments and private sector actors, establishments of policy networks, public-private partnerships, and policy implementation.

Type II creates a horizontal rather than vertical (Type I) structure, where governance of an issue can be sequestered from government to a specialist organisation, or it can be shared within a network of divided and managed competences within complex markets (Kjær, 2004: 39-41, 48-49). As it pertains to refugee integration services, many of the shared governance contracts go to non-profit charitable organisations or refugee-facing organisations, among others (generally, non-governmental organisations (NGOs)). As per Haque (2011), the relationship between a government and a contracted NGO can be modelled in one of five ways:

1. *The Government-Dominant Model*: the focus is on the power of the government to specify methods by which service delivery is done; typical of welfare states. NGOs are given limited autonomy by which they can act, and have agency as more of an extension of the state’s desire to deliver a service rather than as an independent body.

2. *The Third-Sector Dominant Model*: NGOs hold greater autonomy over their operations, funding, and how they deliver services. This is indicative of states without strong welfare provisions.

3. *The Dual-Track Model*: the government is unable to deliver all services, and thus duties are split between the NGOs and the government.

4. *The Collaboration Model*: the government works directly with the NGOs, sharing competences with mutual responsibility and partnership. Unlike the Dual-Track Model, the Collaboration Model does not divide responsibilities
between the NGOs and government, but rather has both working on the same issues together.

5. **The Competition Model**: opposed to the previous models, the Competition Model implies that the NGOs and government are at odds with one another. It is a zero-sum game where only one can gain while the other loses. (Haque, 2011: 333-334)

The collaboration model is of particular interest to the German case. Given the wide variety of policies and methods of implementation across German states and cities when it comes to refugee integration service delivery, there is typically one common factor between them: actively working with and relying on local organisations, NGOs, and non-profits to aid with service delivery (see Deutscher Landkreistag, 2016, for an overview of different policies). As opposed to solely coordination, where governments and their partners remain separate but informed as to the activities of the other, and cooperation, which is more short-term and less formal, collaboration implies a more durable, shared, dynamic relationship where each party stands to gain social capital with increased activity (Bingham, 2011: 391).

Imperative within the collaborative model of governance is the presence of accountability between the government and the partner organisation in the practice of joint service delivery. Since government contracting partners are not typically chosen via referendum or by public approval, partnerships with the private sector may be viewed as nepotistic or plutocratic (Haque, 2011). The process of collaborative governance ensures conceptual accountability on behalf of both the contracting organisation and the government in three ways: first, the implied transparency in collaborative governance allows for each organisation to monitor the other, or to at least have better access to policy implementation practices. As collaborative governance requires that both organisations work intimately, there
is a greater chance of reporting on perceived malfeasance. Second, shared competence over a policy area creates a point of contact for the subjects who receive the policy benefits, where they might report on apprehensions or misdeeds perceived by one or the other partners in collaborative governance.  

For example, individuals at the receiving end of policy implementation who may experience a type of discrimination by a government/contracting body member can voice their concerns directly to the other or to the superiors, who can act directly to rectify any malfeasance. Third, collaboration may entail growth of area-specific knowledge within government so that future policy implementations, even if it is done without the contracting organisation, will be better suited to rectify whatever issue the specific policy is covering. Thus, collaborative governance is better suited at tackling the accountability issue, which is a key issue surrounding governance in general (Kjær, 2004: 49-50).

Collaborative governance also allows for direct input from civil society, adding another layer of accountability by countering criticisms of ‘private governance’ or lack of transparency on behalf of the networked actors in service delivery (Bingham, 2011: 398). In the German refugee case, this input can come in the form of volunteer outreach initiatives, which, while touching on both government and NGO organisational efforts, creates a third actor essential to both the governance bodies but maintaining a discrete, non-organisational viewpoint (Mayer, 2017). These volunteers will often have the most face-to-face contact with refugees and will understand their needs and issues better than the governance organisations (Bock, 2018).

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22 An example of this will be discussed in the chapter concerning Leverkusen.
4.2.2.2 Policy Networks

A natural foundation in type-II governance is the utilisation and/or the development of specialised policy networks. These networks can be formal or informal, and involve civil servants engaged in the development and implementation of policies with an NGO that likely contains specialised knowledge surrounding that policy. Development of policy networks is a natural by-product of both the retreat of the public sector\textsuperscript{23} and the specialised nature of policy implementation: because civil servants cannot be expected to know the minutiae of every policy they help to develop or oversee, they require the input of organisations that are expertise leaders in that field (Cairney, 2012: 165). Policy networks are formed in variegated ways, both formally (through contracted partnerships, roundtable discussions, invited consulting, etc.) and informally (through personal discussions, lobbying, familiarity, etc.) and how they are utilised depends on the willingness and trust the government has of the NGO.

These networks likely end up involved in policy implementation, with different members of the networks being involved to varying degrees and tasks. As with the models of interaction between governments and private sector actors discussed above, implementation of a specific policy depends on how the government is structured and maintained in relation to its partner(s) (Saito, 2011). These structures do not necessarily determine the success or failure of any given policy implementation, but rather serve as the backdrop onto which one can determine why and how a policy was implemented well or otherwise (Koliba, et al., 2011). Networks typically have three determining characteristics: interdependence (the actors require each other to see objectives through), coordination (acting jointly maintains a network

\textsuperscript{23} Much attention has been given to state failure in solving so-called ‘wicked problems’ (social, environmental, economic, etc.) on its own, which has given rise to increasing network governance over given policies and reliance on market forces to deliver services through New Public Management means. Some have called this the increased privatisation or hollowing out of the state, as accountability is shifted away from government bodies, while others believe that network governance can increase democratic accountability. For more information, see Koliba, et. al. (2011).
and ensures better policy outputs), and pluralism (networks are generally autonomous from other networks that cover other policy areas) (Enroth, 2011: 27).

Network formation may be mandated by the central government as a form of top down policy implementation, or may form at the local level through advocacy organisations, relevant agencies, or municipal partnerships as a form of bottom-up implementation (Cairney, 2012: 37-39). However, cultivating networks at the local level that are either aligned with a policy’s goals (perhaps through political or ideological affiliation) or have field-specific knowledge and experience can facilitate the policy’s implementation and may create more favourable perceptions about the implementation of the policy, as a local organisation would have greater access to those whom the policy would affect (Weimer & Vining, 2010: 292-293).

Germany holds countless examples of network formation between local government and local organisations, two of which will be studied in the following chapters on Berlin and Leverkusen. However, similar network formation dynamics take place in countries that have struggled relative to Germany’s situation in asylum integration dynamics. An interesting example of bottom-up network creation (or lack thereof, at the municipal level) comes from Italy, where Cappiali (2018) found that the political leanings of local government and refugee advocacy organisations determined how and under what conditions networks were formed with the local government. For instance, in traditionally ‘conservative’ Bergamo, the primary mover for refugee aid was the Catholic church, which partnered with pan-European charity Caritas and developed several local sub-bodies to aid refugees in areas of public administration where the local government was lacking; however, the church’s attitude towards immigrant-run organisations was paternalistic and often ignored their input, solidifying a ‘policy-less’ centralised network of general aid (Ibid: 120-122).
Contrarily, the city of Reggio Emilia had a strong network of both local government and civil society actors laid out in a governance strategy that promoted inclusion and diversity through co-planning of programmes and integration initiatives to treat refugees and immigrants as would-be citizens, an approach similar to that of civic integrationism while also adopting the ideals of interculturalism (Ibid: 123-124). Thus, in countries where either formal institutional integration power is devolved to federal state or the local level, or the central government neglects to take the lead on development of integration policy networks or implementation, variations between different cities’ political and policy alignments determine the strength of policy network development and implementation rather than the influence of local groups or the central government (Pilati & Morales, 2018).

Key within this relationship for implementation is the transit and availability of information and information flow (Kobila, et al., 2011). Information transparency is a cornerstone of collaborative governance, and the state/government plays a make-or-break role in facilitating information flows for local policy implementation and, as an extension, accountability. In cases where the state has been ‘hollowed out’ and much of its services have been rendered to privately contracted organisations, these networks may exist as less of a coordinating/implementing body and more as a loose association between them with little direction, if any, given by the central/local government (Rhodes, 1997).

4.2.2.3 Public-Private Partnerships

But then, how are these networks formed? Are they spontaneous responses from private and civil society organisations to a wicked policy problem that the government finds itself unable to handle on its own? Or are they directly established or convened by the government as a novel way to handle a policy problem? Do they first begin solely between organisations to the initial exclusion of the government because of the government’s
perceived inability or apathy towards solving a policy problem, or is it something else entirely?

The answer is, as one would expect, varied by circumstance. But here, we can break down the public-private partnerships (PPPs) that take place within governance and form the basis of policy implementation networks, as the utilisation of private non-government actors for governance is often considered to be a linchpin in determining what constitutes Type II MLG (Caponio & Jones-Correa, 2018).

First, we must delineate several factors why public-private partnerships are utilised: typically, PPP is done to facilitate government cost-saving. A government does it when it cannot provide a good or service by itself, or the good or service is too costly for overall budget expenditure, or the good or service can or has been delivered more proficiently by a private organisation (Cohen & Eimicke, 2011). It can also be used to reach local demographics more easily when uniting with a local or community-based organisation, thus eliminating the ‘faceless bureaucrat’ stereotype that often entails some policy implementation.

Increased use of PPPs may also be a natural consequence of the modern age of communication. Because civil society groups and organisations are so much more widespread and visible through social media than in the previous century, civil society and advocacy organisations have the ability to reach far more people than before and more directly connect with and demonstrate an impact in their local community in a policy area (Bingham, 2011). Their increased visibility may lead to more direct collaboration with government and even direct contracting of services through partnerships that serve to benefit all parties involved24, though as in the above example on the two cities in Italy, whether or

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24 Chapters on Leverkusen and Berlin will explore several of these organisations involved in the governance of the respective cities’ refugee housing policies.
not these organisations are engaged by the government depends largely on the willingness of
the local government to engage with them.

As one would expect, however, not all PPPs are constructed with community and
local organisations that advocate for policy pertaining to a specific group of people or a
locality. Goods and services from all sectors of the economy are contracted out in PPPs to
varying degrees of oversight and regulation, and how the partnerships are structured can
“…structure public policies and their outcomes… and they structure the modes of
governance. (Le Galès, 2011: 151)” Oversight, transparency, and regulation become
paramount questions within the agreements forged in these partnerships, especially when
lines between government and contracting partners have become more blurred over the past 3
decades as governments have opened and extended the use of PPPs in a variety of policy
areas (Koliba, et al., 2011). As governments have a democratic accountability to provide
goods and services to its citizens and its for-profit contracting partners seek to engage in
profit maximisation, how the partnership process is managed will shape the policy output,
public perception, and the future possibilities of cooperation between the government and the
partnering entity (Weimer & Vining, 2010).

Issues of accountability, responsibility, and ethics, especially in cases of policy that
cover issues of life or death, health and wellbeing of citizens or those receiving services
becomes a major sticking point in the use of PPPs. There is general agreement that
governments should not only hold its governance partners accountable for any ethical
infractions, but that the government itself, whether it is the civil service or the elected
politicians, must also be held to and hold itself and its contracted partners to a high standard
of ethical guidance (Cohen & Eimicke, 2011). Especially now that numbers of NGOs have
exploded over the past few decades and governments have increasingly relied on both nonprofit and for-profit organisations to aid in policy governance, ensuring that organisations involved carry through policy implementation and monitoring ethically is a challenge and a key responsibility of governments, raising questions of whether governments should rely on PPPs (Haque, 2011). How that is done, however, is a matter of how the government’s role in governance is envisioned.

To that end, countries have utilised PPPs (and more broadly, ‘New Public Management’, i.e. the extended use of third organisations to fulfil government policies) for different reasons: some states may do it as a way of decentralising government power from an ideological standpoint (an example being Thatcher’s reforms in the UK), or some states may justify the practice as extending the capacity of the government to cover more policy ground and thus reinforce the state’s ability to deliver goods and services (Cohen & Eimicke, 2011; Saito, 2011). How this affects the governance of a single policy issue depends upon how much the central/local government involves itself in the oversight or implementation of a policy; for example, some states had poor control over peripheral functions in the past (civil service operations, nationalised industry monitoring, etc.), so a move towards a partnership with a specific organisation may be justified as a way to both return the government to its core competency and ensure that a specific policy area is enacted in a cost-efficient, ethical, and effective manner (Cairney, 2012: 160).

4.2.3 A theory of sorts?

However, discussions around MLG’s suitability of analysis raises questions of its tangibility as a theory that can produce hypotheses. MLG’s conceptual development sits as
the middle-ground between intergovernmentalist theory and neo-functionalist, where both posit hypotheses about how states will act and what will happen within certain situations (George, 2004). Piattoni calls MLG “at the same time a theory of political mobilization, of policy-making, and of polity structuring, hence any theorization about MLG must be couched alternatively or simultaneously in politics, policy, or polity terms” (Piattoni, 2010: 26).

Bache, Bartle, and Flinders (2016) posit MLG as ‘fuzzy’, or as encompassing perhaps too many concepts without having defined borders as to what precisely MLG ‘is’ and where it ‘ends’ (Bache, et al., 2016: 486).

This conceptual ambiguity about MLG and its boundaries also follows the study of governance as a whole (see Bartolini, 2011), where there are many definitions of the concepts that are applied in slightly different ways. Generally, there is agreement that there is a hierarchical structure, involvement of partners (either through formal or informal agreements), and co-production/implementation of knowledge/policy, though the methods through which these are built or achieved differ between the varying strains of thought around governance.

Bache and Flinders (2004a) sought to explicitly clarify how MLG can be considered different to other types of governance, such as network governance, by emphasising four common strands of characteristics: first, that decision making at various territorial levels is characterized by the increased participation of non-state actors; second, that levels of governance have become almost indiscriminate in some policies, marking a difficulty in differentiating them; third, the state’s role is transforming to where it finds its duties in coordination and policy development becoming more plastic depending on the specific policy being implemented; fourth, that in this changing context, the nature of democratic accountability has been challenged and need to be rethought or at least reviewed (Bache & Flinders, 2004a: 197). Part of the reasoning behind Bache & Flinders’ (2004a) desire to
enumerate MLG’s definitive qualities was to ensure that MLG can produce testable hypotheses, as a theory would.

Hooghe and Marks (2003) refer to MLG Type II governance “theory” (Hooghe & Marks, 2003: 240) in their work, though their work does not claim to suggest how a state will act on a particular policy problem, rather describing the structure of a state’s decision-making or policymaking entity. Our focus when linking the study of refugee housing and integration with MLG is to identify the necessary variables by which one can determine whether or not a refugee housing policy will encourage integration; thus it is important to understand whether or not MLG constitutes a theory or a framework of analysis, as a theory would seek to postulate outcomes while a framework would only organise a policy implementation structure (Jordan, 2000: 204).

The debate over whether or not MLG constitutes a theory comes down largely to two arguments, one enunciated by Peters and Pierre (2004) and one put forth by George (2004). The former take issue with how wide the application of MLG is towards the study of any interaction between government levels or between governments and non-state actors that engage in governance. For them,

[a]ny complex and multi-faced political process can be referred to as multi-level governance. Second, and perhaps more importantly, multi-level governance appears incapable of providing clear predictions or even explanations (other than the most general) of outcomes in the governance process. As already noted, this approach has some similarities with network analysis, and one of those similarities is its indeterminate nature (Peters & Pierre, 2004: 88)

MLG began as a ‘third way’ of analysing and understanding the functions and dynamics of the then newly formed EU with special attention paid to cooperation and
bargaining between the national, subnational, and supranational levels; in that regard, it is understandable why it does not have any predictions to offer, simply because it was not initially conceived of having any. Conversely, George (2004) points to the fact that utilising MLG as a framework elicits questions about how policy is formed, changed, and influenced, thus leading to testable hypotheses “the findings from which can lead to further research questions, and to answer which further testable hypotheses can be formulated. (George, 2004: 117)”

In that sense, MLG does not directly posit a theoretical outcome before a study is conducted and does not necessarily point to predictions without first having a grasp on how the structure of governance of a given issue works. It does not attempt to say ‘if a governance structure does not demonstrate that its Type-II setup facilitates bargaining at the local level, then X policy will fail’; rather, it tells us how governance is arranged today (Stephenson, 2013: 818). This falls in stark contrast to the broad study of political and international relations theories, an example being international realist theory, which will typically claim that the state with more power will seek to dominate weaker ones, and that all states will seek to maximise power for themselves, no matter the situation.

With how Hooghe and Marks (2003) established the outlines of how Types I and II MLG operate, much is left to interpretation as to whether or not MLG constitutes a theory (besides the brief mention within the same article labelling it as such). They detail the boundaries and borders of Types I and II and give them characteristics, but never delve into what they can and cannot do. The sole area that could be considered positing a theoretical base is in the coordination dilemma, i.e. what happens when limited jurisdictions have overlap. They prescribe two possible strategies that governing bodies can enact: limit the number of autonomous actors (indicative of Type I) and limit interaction among actors (indicative of Type II), as well as how the governing entities should be designed in order to
limit any sort of conflict between them (Hooghe & Marks, 2003: 239-240). Beyond that small aspect of governance, little can be said of them cultivating a fully-realised theoretical body.

Then again, is it important if MLG as a whole can be considered a theory or not? MLG as a framework of analysis, separate from the claims of theoretical aptitude, have elicited studies from various disciplines to understand and detail the structure of governance that surround policies and their implementation (see Bisong, 2019; Hinterberger, 2018; Kearns & Forrest, 2000; et al.). These studies have shed light on how their respective structures of governance operate, what facets make them unique, what their shortfalls are, etc. MLG as a concept has entered into the fray as one of the main schools of thought when studying not just policymaking in the EU, but policymaking structures in general. To quote George (2004), “does it not really matter so long as a disciplined research agenda emerges that uncovers new knowledge about and understanding of, the nature of the European Union? (George, 2004: 117)” To put it another way, as long as MLG’s use can tease out new unanswered questions and reveal new understandings about governance and policymaking in any region of the world, is the discussion about whether or not MLG constitutes a theory a frivolous cavil against it?

Because of the wealth of knowledge that has emerged from MLG, the debate on its applicability as a theory will likely remain moot. For the purposes of this study, however, MLG is a framework of analysis.

4.2.4 Applying Types I & II MLG

Type II MLG, in our case, allows us to juxtapose policy implementation in a specific area and determine what causes success or failure, and what the intangible variables are (i.e.
connections that fall outside the scope of theoretical schools such as intergovernmentalism, as alluded to earlier) that could contribute to these outcomes.

Hooghe and Marks (2003) mention several times how Type II structures contain ‘functional specificity’, i.e. the ability to tackle a single policy issue with exacting policy prescriptions and oversight. Much of the literature surrounding Type II structures, as well as the MLG literature regarding migration and integration (Scholten, 2013; Zapata-Barrero, et al., 2017; Borkert & Bosswick, 2007; et al.), tends to describe the interactions between the levels of governance and how they function rather than engaging in how policy can be implemented efficaciously, or what an ideal MLG policy structure would look like.

As an example, Panizzon and van Riemsdijk (2019) engage a general concept of MLG towards the study of large-flow migration into Europe by asking how the use of MLG affects both the movement of people and how MLG impacts the policies contained within. MLG is utilised because migration policies have been generally dispersed among levels of government within the member states of the EU, with local levels now handling more responsibility towards integration programmes than in the past (Scholten & Penninx, 2016: 91).

They evoke the MLG function of ‘blurring’, i.e. distributing risk and accountability around levels rather than engaging completely with the centre of power (Panizzon & van Riemsdijk, 2019: 1233). It is a natural consequence of both types of MLG: in the case of migration policy within and at the border of the EU, much was shifted away from the member states to the EU level, allowing for member states to shift blame of inconvenient outcomes to the EU (Scholten & Penninx, 2016: 96-97). Border and asylum policies became

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25 The local level has also engaged in ad-hoc arrangement for governance over migration (and asylum) issues, both sharing responsibilities with local organisations and skipping the national level entirely to deliberate directly with the EU level, which has demonstrated its willingness to support migrant integration-facing projects at the local level (Panizzon & van Riemsdijk, 2019: 1231; Bendel, et al., 2019: 22-23).
the domain of the Common European Asylum System, with the Dublin Regulation affecting how and where asylum seekers can declare their applications for asylum; with the Dublin Regulation requiring states of first arrival to process asylum claims and provide for initial reception conditions, member states at the borders faced the largest burden of all the EU member states (Pollet, 2016).

This perceived stress at the state/national level gets shifted downward with cities bearing the brunt of integration duties, forcing cities to engage in ‘crisis mode’, which facilitated ‘blurring’ for better or for worse, i.e. delegating what used to be state power to non-state actors: accountability for negative actions within the scope of the integration services can then be directed at the non-state actor rather than the state, and the state can end or amend its relationship with the non-state actor (Careja, 2019: 1329).

Accordingly, there has been much literature studying the differences between national and local migrant integration policy and how the structures either clash with or complement each other (see Scholten, 2013; Jørgensen, 2012; Poppelaars & Scholten, 2008; Schiller, 2018; et al.). From the literature it becomes evident that the largest factor affecting sentiments towards refugees/asylum-seekers and what they receive with regard to integration aid is political ideology, where the national/central government is more restrictive while the local level advocates for greater inclusivity for refugees (OECD, 2018).

Emilsson (2015) argues the opposite, that within the realm of integration policy, it is actually the state that sets the benchmark for integration practices within municipalities, rather than municipalities having leeway with which to conduct their distinct policies with the state’s use of power as the main focus (Emilsson, 2015: 2). However, while this may be more

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26 The OECD found that, in OECD countries, subnational governments oversee 40% of public spending and 60% of public investment in refugee integration measures and care (OECD, 2018: 30).
the case for states with higher degrees of central planning, such as his cases of Sweden and Finland, this does not take into account a federal system, such as that in Germany, where each of the federal states defines integration differently, and assigns different weight to different metrics therein\textsuperscript{27}.

While the central government may determine funding levels or broad principles for integration within a federal (Type I) structure, because of the distinctions among jurisdictions and power of implementation, the central government does not strictly determine the integration policies and procedures among the states and cities; rather, the central government within a federal system provides necessary resources to support policies, even if sometimes that support becomes contentious (Bogumil, et al., 2017: 31-32)\textsuperscript{28}.

Emilsson uses Germany’s development of its National Integration Plan in 2007 as evidence that the national government is ‘setting the agenda’ for the local levels; however, the National Integration Plan, rather than a method of centralised policymaking, proposed the general guidelines around which integration would be made, i.e. language acquisition, education, civics, etc. In addition, the National Integration Plan took cues from Berlin’s 2005 integrationskonzept, demonstrating that the National Integration Plan was a bottom-up rather than a top-down policy (Dekker, et al., 2015). And, as referred to above, it was the advocacy

\textsuperscript{27} An example of this can be found in the different definitions of integration provided by the states of Berlin and North-Rhein Westphalia (NRW). For Berlin, integration is defined as “in addition to promoting cultural diversity, above all that individuals or entire groups are given equal opportunities to participate in social life and the articulation of their interests, and are protected against individual and collective exclusion. Integration policy therefore essentially means creating equal opportunities. (Land Berlin, 2007: 3)” For NRW, integration is defined through its integrationsgesetz (integration law), which is “to support and accompany people with a migration background, regardless of their social situation, their origin, their gender, sexual identity, religion or belief, especially in their education, training, and employment” (§1), as well as offering explicit support for integration programmes and paradigms enacted at the municipal level (§2) (Ministerium des Innern des Landes Nordrhein-Westfalen, 2012).

\textsuperscript{28} Issues of communication and coordination are common between central government and state/municipal authorities, leading to confusion among refugees about the competences of the various agencies to which they have to report for checking in and ensuring that they are maintaining compliance with their integration requirements.
groups and civil society organisations that rallied to ensure that cities such as Berlin had integration laws and programmes.

Further, cities have become actively vocal when the national government has been seen as inactive. In July of 2018, the mayors of Bonn, Cologne, and Düsseldorf sent an open letter to Chancellor Angela Merkel, requesting that German ships begin Mediterranean Sea rescues of refugees and that the refugees be brought to any of the three cities, while openly critiquing Frontex’s Mediterranean operations²⁹ (Geisel, et al., 2018). Among other examples, this stands out as one in which the cities directly sought to critique and contravene the central government’s policies concerning refugees, settlement, and integration.

Homsy, Liu, and Warner (2019) developed a framework with which to track the various interactions between the different levels of a policy within an MLG structure. It has five components: first, the coordinating and sanctioning role of a central authority; second, engagement of civil society; third, co-production of knowledge; fourth, capacity provision; and fifth, framing of co-benefits (Homsy, et al., 2019: 574). Inherent in the framework is actor tracking, a key component in understanding the relationships between the various levels involved in MLG. As actors are the key players in MLG, rather than governments as a whole, it is possible to glean exactly how co-benefits are produced and understood between the various levels. The existence and elucidation of co-benefits within MLG structures can be analysed from both a Type I and Type II perspective. With the example of refugee integration policies, the reception and integration costs to both the municipal and central governments can be offset by an understanding of how refugees can contribute to society.

²⁹ Frontex’s mission in the Mediterranean Sea, Operation Triton, is far less proactive than its predecessor, Mare Nostrum. Comparatively, the budget is 1/3 that of Mare Nostrum, and the borders it patrols are significantly further away from the North African coast than those done by Mare Nostrum. Further, the mandates differ: whereas Mare Nostrum was explicitly a humanitarian mission, Triton was aimed at border defence and deterring human trafficking rather than active search-and-rescue (Koller, 2017).
An example of this can be seen in Germany. Before Angela Merkel’s decision to allow refugees to come to the country despite having entered the EU at another member state, the country faced a demographic crisis of workers aging out of the workforce and areas of the workforce were suffering from labour shortages. In 2018, it is estimated that between 8,500 and 10,000 refugees entered the labour force every month (Trines, 2019). In Bavaria, tradespecific German was taught to refugees allowing for accelerated entrance into the workforce and education programs; in 2016, the year’s target was met in six months, while the 2019 target was already three-quarters achieved by 2017 (Bayerische Staatsregierung, 2016; Bayerische Staatsregierung, 2017). Applying this example to the above framework, it is clear that the infusion of refugees into Bavaria posed a benefit to both Bavaria and the central government, in that the refugees in work and education are already contributing to the economic potential of Bavaria and the country at large.

However, allowances change by state and municipality given differing interpretations of federal law and differences in political and policy perspectives. Hamann and El-Kayed (2018) studied the housing allowances given by Berlin and Dresden. According to Berlin law, refugees may find private accommodation outside of the first reception housing before their asylum cases have been cleared; in Dresden, refugees must wait until they receive a decision on their cases, except if they have exceptional medical circumstances. A key difference they found is discrimination: local NGOs working with refugees in Dresden reported high amounts of outright discrimination from landlords and housing operators, whereas the Berlin government directly contracted (Type II) with NGO Evangelisches Jugend- und Fürsorgewerk (EJF) to help refugees find private accommodations (Hamann and El-Kayed, 2018: 141-143)30.

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30 Further discussion and empirical data will be presented on this case in the chapter concerning Berlin’s refugee housing laws and programmes. In particular, interviews were conducted with representatives of EJF and other
4.3 Conclusion

This chapter covered the wealth of literature written on and about multi-level governance, covering its origins and its development since its creation in the early 1990s. In particular, this chapter delineated the differences between Type I and Type II MLG, the latter of which will be more relevant for the upcoming empirical and analysis chapters. From its start as a way to analyse EU policymaking, MLG has evolved into a catch-all with which to study different types of policies at varying levels of government, leading to criticism that its applicability is limited.

Much of this argument coalesces into the debate as to whether MLG comprises a theory of policymaking or a framework of analysis, and it is this author’s opinion that the debate is largely a moot one and a minor cavil in the face of expanded and extensive study already done with MLG that has elicited new knowledge and analysis about countless policies and how the varying levels of government and governance structures implement those policies. So long as MLG allows researchers to pull out key variables of why and how a policy does or does not work, the discussions of ‘theory or no theory’ are less important than the use of the framework itself.

Finally, Type II MLG (and the study of governance over specific ‘wicked’ policy problems) has evolved as a method by which to study how governments partner with private organisations to implement and manage policy areas. This is done through the establishment of policy networks, bringing in key stakeholders to share input and oversee policy implementation through different models of partnership, which develop through NGOs helping to house and find houses for refugees. Notable in the EJF example is that the city of Berlin ended its cooperation with EJF despite the relative success of the partnership.
public-private partnerships, where services are directly contracted to organisations with varying degrees of autonomy.

Issues of transparency and accountability expectedly arise within these networks and PPPs when the government may take more of a ‘back seat’ in oversight and regulation, leading to ethical questions of how much involvement the government should have in the implementation process, and perhaps whether PPPs are necessary at all for policy implementation.

The following chapters will look at the cases of Leverkusen and Berlin, how their models of governance are similar and different, and what the outcomes have been for the governments, the organisations involved in policy implementation, and the refugees impacted by those policies.

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**Chapter 5: Refugee Housing Policy in Leverkusen: ‘mit einer kleinen Hilfe meiner Freunde’, or analysing a potential model of best practice**

**5.1 Introduction and Background**

Nestled in an enclave between Cologne, Düsseldorf, and Wuppertal is Leverkusen, a mid-sized city best known as being the headquarters for multinational pharmaceutical giant Bayer, as well as home to Bundesliga football club Bayer Leverkusen. Its layout engenders the feeling of bordering larger cities, with its mixture of suburban, urban, and bucolic pastures spun together within a border wrapped by a frenetic bus system and punctuated by a few stops on the S-Bahn. Reaching its surrounding cities, as well as other cities in NorthRhein Westphalia (NRW) such as Essen and Bonn, takes little time at all, making
Leverkusen an attractive hub for working commuters who would rather not pay a premium to live within the boundaries of a more expensive city.

It is also the home to its eponymous model of refugee housing and integration policy, which this thesis considers to be a model of ‘best practice’\(^{31}\) with regards to how housing and integration policy can be structured. Despite its position as a ‘satellite’ city to the other cities around it, Leverkusen was able to coalesce a fractured governance landscape into a coherent policy centred on a balanced collaborative governance partnership that has endured and expanded since 2002, and has influenced those ‘main’ cities that it orbits.

This chapter will go in depth on Leverkusen’s governing structure and its policies surrounding refugee accommodations and housing, along with the integration infrastructure built around refugee housing policy. Along with the next chapter covering Berlin’s refugee housing policies, this chapter will comprise the ‘juxtaposition’ of policies concerning refugee housing, and will allow us to analyse the similarities and differences and what we can learn from each in the following chapters. Leverkusen provides us with the ‘best practice’ model when juxtaposed to Berlin: the city has a higher degree of both centralised planning and durable, long-term relationships with NGOs whose missions are specifically catered towards ensuring refugees are able to acclimate to German society.

This is achieved through the eponymous ‘Leverkusen Model’, formed in 2002 out of the wake of the refugees who arrived in Germany after the collapse of the post-Soviet order in the 1990s. Leverkusen contained many refugees living in camps, tents, and generally poor conditions. Members of the NGOs Caritas and the Refugee Council of Leverkusen argued to the government that ensuring better quality accommodations and giving refugees access to the private apartment/housing market will both save the city money and ensure greater integration outcomes for the refugees.

\(^{31}\) See chapter 7 for further discussion on best practice and lessons drawing
The Model insisted on moving refugees as soon as possible from shelters and temporary accommodations into full-time private housing, and had members of staff actively searching through classified ads in newspapers to find refugees places to live (Refugee council employee interview, 2019). Its creation was predicated on two tenets: first, that integration into society for refugees starts at day one of arrival into the country, and second, that helping refugees find accommodation in private housing is more affordable for the city (Schillings and Märtens, 2015). The former contends an external (humanitarian) reasoning, while the latter contends an internal (fiscal) reasoning, both of which are important facets of the Model. This enables asylum-seekers, regardless of asylum status, to obtain private housing, even if their asylum cases have not yet been decided by the Bundesamt.

The Model has expanded beyond its original intent of partnering Caritas and the Refugee Council with the government to include other NGOs and organisations throughout the city, and has also developed long-term collaborative governance structures where the multiple actors involved in the policy’s implementation all have input into how policies are designed and enacted. Though the city had to reopen its formerly closed refugee residences to cope with the 2014/2015 influx, the Model has continued to operate and its design and relative success in the area of refugee housing has drawn the interest of other cities and political parties in Germany (Caritas employee interview, 2019a).

This chapter will first begin with a brief description of Leverkusen’s governing structure, discussing relevant laws and the details of the Leverkusen Model itself, before moving into how refugee accommodations are managed throughout Leverkusen. This section will also discuss refugee access to the private housing market and what allowances are given for refugees to search for and rent their own spaces. The section after will cover the work done by NGOs, both at the outset of the Model and today, and how it has evolved in the interim. The subsequent section will review how refugees find their housing, i.e. whether it is
through the government placing them in an accommodation, whether it is through NGO help, or some other means.

As stated above, this chapter and the next will elucidate key differences and similarities between Leverkusen and Berlin in how they organise their governance over refugee housing, both in built accommodations and access to the housing market. These differences will be analysed in subsequent chapters. Lessons will also be drawn from these two cities about what policy successes and failures occurred; these lessons will inform the theoretical framework that will be developed in chapter 7.

5.2 Leverkusen’s Governing Structure

Leverkusen operates within a typical Type I MLG structure, i.e. federalism. It is subordinate to the German state of North-Rhein Westphalia (NRW) and its laws, though it is also free to make laws specific to its borders so long as they do not violate state or federal law. The city has 3 Bezirke (districts) and representatives from the districts are elected to sit on the city council. As of writing, the city is governed by a CDU/SPD coalition, with the mayor Uwe Richrath a member of the SPD. The administrating offices in the Bezirke, much like those in Berlin, do not have the power to craft or override the laws set by the city council, and must administer programmes and carry out policies as they are drawn.

The city operates its integration infrastructure under the aegis of NRW’s 2012 Teilhabe- und Integrationsgesetz (Participation and Integration Law). The law gives municipalities a high degree of discretion in conducting their integration infrastructures independently and supports integration efforts so long as the efforts are in line with the tenets of the law, i.e. ensuring that minority and immigrant groups have access to education, work rights, and the right to participate in both local and state government (Ministerium des Innern des Landes
NRW’s law is unique from other integration laws throughout Germany given that it encourages refugees to re-enter the professions in which they specialised in their home countries even if they are not able to bring their credentials with them, or if their home credentials are inaccessible. This is done through active promotion of language and job training.

Leverkusen established its Communal Integration Centre in 2013 after the passage of the NRW Integrationsgesetz in 2012, which receives funding and support directly from the NRW Ministerium für Kinder, Familie, Flüchtlinge und Integration (Ministry for Children, Families, Refugees, and Integration) and also receives project-specific funding from the Ministry (Gesellschaft für Innovative Beschäftigungsförderung mbH, 2020).

For the governance of its refugee housing policy through the Leverkusen Model, the government partners with Caritas and the Refugee Council to directly provide both social workers in refugee accommodations and funding for integration programmes. The next section will discuss the types of refugee housing that are found in Leverkusen, as well as initiatives to move refugees from mass accommodations into private housing.

5.3 Refugee Housing in Leverkusen

5.3.1 First and mass accommodations

The city (as of writing) maintains 12 refugee accommodations distributed throughout the city with a new accommodation currently under construction; this new accommodation, however, will partially replace an older one currently existing at Sandstraße in the city’s north (see Figure 3) to upgrade the facility to current building codes and create more spaces.

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32 The law is regularly updated to reflect new changes in both asylum situations and federal allocations for budgeting under the German Basic Law.
a total of 450, at which refugees can stay upon arrival in the city (Bussang, 2019). These accommodations, much like those built in Berlin, are designed for short-term stays and are not meant as private residences, but rather a transitory place while asylum-seekers acclimate to living in Leverkusen and eventually attain their own private residences. While this new residence will have more of an apartment setup, the city will still seek to move refugees quickly into private residences. A map of the current accommodations and their locations in Leverkusen can be seen in Figure 3.

As in Berlin, Leverkusen has several types of housing structures for refugees: Zentraler Standort, i.e. those that are more durable and larger, and often comprise multiple rooms per unit similar in style to apartment buildings; Containerstandort, i.e. modular housing built in a similar way to shipping containers that are less durable and constructed quickly with the express use for emergencies and quick relocations from first arrival centres; and Landeseinrichtung, or the state’s initial arrival centre.

Figure 3- A map of Leverkusen showing the locations of the various refugee accommodations. (Stadt Leverkusen, 2017)
Many of these structures existed before the creation of the Leverkusen Model, though in addition to the mass accommodations, the city utilised tents as emergency shelters to accommodate increasing refugee movements from Eastern Europe (Refugee council employee interview, 2019). The city was prepared to continue building mass accommodation centres, though the transition to the governance regime utilised by the Leverkusen Model meant that the city was able to close all but one of the refugee accommodations up until the number of asylum seekers rose dramatically beginning in 2014; all were subsequently reopened in 2015 to accommodate the influx (Schillings and Märtens, 2015).

A number of temporary spaces, such as school gyms, were utilised during the height of the refugee influx though they were able to be closed ahead of the city’s proposed timetable (Leverkusener Anzeiger, 2017).

The new accommodation centre in Sandstraße is meant to largely centralise refugee housing with more durable facilities and ultimately replace the 7 temporary modular housings located throughout the city (the yellow markers in Figure 3). It will add 350 more spaces to the existing 100 at the accommodation, though refugees are not meant to spend more than 5 months in the accommodations as the Leverkusen Model operates to distribute and help them find private residences throughout the city (Bussang, 2019).

The governance partners (Caritas, Refugee Council, and the Leverkusen government) continually interact with and discuss with refugees the necessities of living on their own to ensure that they are knowledgeable enough about how the German housing market works, as well as responsible enough to take care of themselves once they leave the refugee accommodations; doing so enables refugees to spend less time on average within the mass accommodations, estimated by aid workers to be between 6 months to a year per person (Leverkusen civil servant interview, 2019; Caritas employee interview, 2019a). The new
accommodation will also contain a wing dedicated to social work and care centres, occupied by Caritas.

However, members of the civil service and the city’s NGO partners have criticised the location of the Sandstraße accommodation as being too far outside the city centre and contradicting the general agreement that refugee accommodations should be embedded in neighbourhoods and communities to best facilitate integration and immersion into German society (David Nelson interview, 2019). The counterargument for this is that the area has more space for development, which allows for more spaces for refugees and further expedites shuttering the lower quality modular accommodations.

In a 2017 study, the city found that, in 2015, 450 refugees were able to move from the accommodations into private spaces, while in 2016 411 refugees were able to obtain private spaces from a total refugee population of ~3500 in both years; unfortunately the report does not delineate what percentage of those ~3500 lived in accommodations or otherwise (Stadt Leverkusen, 2017). A Leverkusen civil servant interviewed for this study (with numbers provided through email and updated at the time of writing this chapter) reported that, in 2017, 267 people moved out of the accommodations; in 2018, 411; in 2019, 308; and in the first 8 months of 2020, 137 (Leverkusen civil servant interview, 2019).

What this indicates is that even with declining numbers of refugees being allocated to Leverkusen as a whole, turnover within the accommodations is nearly consistent year over year as refugees are able to transition into the private housing market (pandemic conditions notwithstanding). With the primary function of the Model being to move refugees as quickly as possible from the accommodations into private residences, a good percentage of refugees are able to transition into the private housing market.
### 5.3.2 The private housing market

However, as in many other German cities, Leverkusen suffers both from a lack of social affordable housing and housing availability in general, thanks in no part to the privatisation of German housing over the previous 30 years (see Wijburg and Aalbers, 2017). In an immediate effort to mitigate this housing crunch, Leverkusen initiated a short-term programme where it would buy out the leases on select apartments throughout the city in order to ensure refugees can live in private apartments with low costs. In 2017, there were 1,121 refugees living in both refugee-specific accommodations and city-rented apartments, approximately 32% of the total refugee population of the city at the time (Stadt Leverkusen, 2017). The city’s recent study of its housing sector found that the tension in the medium- and lower-cost rental sector will continue to intensify as Leverkusen’s population grows, the only exception to this being in the upper-cost rental sector, where tensions in acquiring spaces have been lower; while construction has been at decade-long highs, prices continue to rise, demand still remains high, and occupancy of available housing remains high (Stadt Leverkusen, 2019).

Because of this housing shortage and projections that the city’s population will continue to grow, the city has embarked on a Wohnungsbauprogramm 2030+ that will seek to construct at least 500 places (available bedrooms in both 1-bedroom and multiple-bedroom flats, given the number of people who live alone) per year until around 2035 to adapt to the estimated continual population growth, while similar scaled necessities are projected for other German cities (Freudenberg, 2018; Hanhörster, et al., 2020). Discussions are still ongoing as to locating appropriate construction sites, as well as delineations of social housing percentages.

The city actively advertises and requests citizens to volunteer any open rooms within their apartments or open residences they may own to specifically let out for refugees (Stadt
Leverkusen, 2016). This is done as part of the Leverkusen Model, i.e. developing a network of owners and occupants willing to give first priority to refugees for room rental. This effort is mainly coordinated through Caritas and Leverkusen’s Refugee Council NGOs, and those organisations are then able to report changes in residence directly to the government.

Leverkusen has a ‘rent ceiling’ for all renters, meaning that there is a maximum amount of money that can be charged, as detailed in Figure 4. Maintaining the centrality of the housing search for refugees through the governance structures and subsequent volunteer initiatives ensures that, first, the volunteers helping refugees are informed as to the legal rent limits, and second, that refugees are not bilked out of the legal terms for rental payments by shady landlords.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Personenanzahl</th>
<th>Kaltmiete in Euro</th>
<th>Betriebskosten in Euro</th>
<th>Heizkosten in Euro (ohne Warmwasser)</th>
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<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>989,00</td>
<td>340,00</td>
<td>170,00</td>
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*Figure 4- The 'rent ceiling' (Kaltmiete) levels per number of occupants in 2016. (Stadt Leverkusen, 2016)*

This is a far more expedited venture for the Leverkusen Model than from its inception, where the members of Caritas and the Refugee Council did not have the aid of the internet to help them search for apartments for refugees (Refugee council employee interview, 2019).
5.3.3 How the government defines its objectives in refugee housing

The city government (in Stadt Leverkusen Kommunales Integrationszentrum, 2017) specifies 4 objectives to achieve with regard to refugee accommodation:

1. Studying how land can be made available for residential building development;

2. Systematic reviews with new immigrants to assess what sizes of accommodations will be needed when taking family reunification into consideration;

3. Unaccompanied minors will be given appropriate living conditions for their respective situations;

4. For the sake of civic planning and development law, living with others in the district will be promoted over choosing to live by oneself.

These objectives are a direct consequence of the city finding itself with a population influx without the adequate building measures for new living space; however, they are also an extension of the ideals within the Leverkusen Model, i.e. consulting with new immigrants as to the space they require even before family reunification is exercised. The city will try to achieve the objectives through 4 specific methods (Ibid):

1. There will be administrative checks with policy planning and the private housing developers as to which areas are eligible for inner-city consolidation, as well as a mandatory quota for all new housing projects to include affordable housing;

2. There will be further analysis of immigration figures and preliminary assessments of the prospects of refugees staying and family reunification will be made, including with round-table discussions; home-sharing methods will also be designed and tested;

3. Funding opportunities will be explored, as well as a catalogue of requirements for youth living developed;

4. Support the development of district-shops, i.e. availability of housing by district; make support systems transparent and promote patenschaften, i.e. ‘godparent’
programmes; promote the expansion of care networks; if needed, create more open
meeting spaces for residents and refugees with intercultural neighbourhood
management.

These measures, in tandem with the yearly building programme and the consolidation
of refugee housing at the Sandstraße accommodation as well as the continued utilisation of
the
Leverkusen Model, will likely allow refugees faster entrance into the private housing market.
By actively offering decentralised housing for refugees, the city can avoid some of the major
issues that plague mass accommodations, such as risks of disease, building decay, and
delayed integration prospects, among others. And for refugees, a sense of ownership and
privacy over their space inculcates satisfaction and a desire to learn the native language:
“[T]hat plays a large role that one has at least a room, say a chair to sit on and a desk to learn
on, that is very helpful to learn the language. That is very helpful. That is at least having a
room for a full feeling, that one has a desire to do and to learn. (BDL interview, 2019)”

What the government’s proactive integration measures point to is an ingrained
strategy of dynamic policy governance through active collaboration with both its NGO
partners and civil society (see Haque, 2011; Bingham, 2011). It also utilises an across-and
horizontal method of governance, i.e. both Type I and Type II MLG, where the city
government utilises its governing structure to establish and develop housing and determine
affordable housing availability while maintaining its collaborative governance policies
around the administrative operations behind the housing and care within. The flexibility of
this dynamic is largely owed to the efforts of the city’s NGOs, which will be explored in the
next section.
5.4 NGO Efforts and Cultural Advocacy

5.4.1 Basis of the Leverkusen Model

The relative success of the Leverkusen Model in moving refugees from mass accommodation to a sense of normalcy in private residence rests in the city’s NGOs and other social advocacy groups and individuals. As previously mentioned, before the Leverkusen Model was enacted, refugees fleeing the wars that erupted in the post-Soviet order were housed in unhygienic conditions within mass accommodations and tents, as well as other extemporaneous housing ‘solutions’ that the city could develop to actively deter refugees from coming to the city (Refugee council employee interview, 2019).

At the time, the NGOs were the ones actively providing help and services to the refugees due in part to the widespread sale of German public utilities and welfare as well as a not-yet-consolidated sense of national German migration policy, and understandably had a tenuous and antipathic relationship with the city government given the poor conditions to which the refugees had been subjected upon arrival (Caritas employee interview, 2019). Caritas and the Refugee Council were able to convince a member of the city government (the sozialdezernent, i.e. the head of social services) to tour the areas where refugees were forced to stay, who then recommended to the mayor and the city council that a new model of housing be put in place in partnership with Caritas and the Refugee Council.

The 2002 amendment to the Grundgesetz (Basic Law) of Germany devolved many powers down to the states and municipalities, allowing them greater ability to interpret and develop their own integration procedures (Bundesamt für Justiz, 2019).

Both Caritas and the Refugee Council recommended moving refugees into private accommodations with help from the two organisations to secure leases for the accommodation (Caritas employee interview, 2019a). The government was largely sceptical:
some believed that the refugees would not be able to adapt to living in apartments, while others were concerned about cleanliness and refugees being unable to operate utilities (Refugee council employee interview, 2019). However, the pilot operation was sold on economic and budgetary savings: 80 refugees were moved from mass accommodations to private residences. It was estimated (in 2012 prices) that the cost of keeping a refugee in a centralised accommodation was €223 per person, whereas the price of a rented room cost the city €148 per refugee (Schillings and Märtens, 2015).

The pilot programme saved the city a total of €145,000 in expenses (Ibid). The Model was then instituted full-time with the two following guidelines: there would be no minimum or maximum required time spent in group accommodations (as opposed to the policies used by other cities in Germany, such as in Berlin), allowing refugees and asylum-seekers (regardless of asylum status) to live in private accommodations and access integration benefits immediately (including language classes), and Caritas and the Refugee Council would help refugees with their searches.

This fledgling connection between the NGOs and the government has expanded in the years since the Model’s inception and has become formalised as a staple of the city’s policy regarding refugee rights in housing and accommodation.

I was signing up to search for an apartment, and that’s good in Leverkusen that one could find an apartment search even though one doesn’t have an aufenthaltstitel [staying permit]. That was a big help to find, not every city is like that. One can do that in Leverkusen. (KPL interview, 2019)

Thus it was the impetus of non-profit and civil society organisations that were able to shape government policy by demonstrating the co-benefits of moving refugees into private
accommodation: the city was able to save a not-insubstantial amount of money on its refugee accommodations, and the NGOs were better able to aid refugees. An additional benefit not considered by the government was that normalisation of life for refugees, i.e. actively helping them into their own spaces, would help move them into work and education faster. We can see an extension of this idea in the next section, where the influence of the Model became a general collaborative framework for the city’s integration infrastructure.

5.4.2 Normalisation of the Model

The Model’s continued operation and entrenchment into Leverkusen’s integration governance structure has normalised the active collaboration, coordination, and cooperation between NGOs, community organisations, and government in both the procurement of private accommodations for refugees and in the development of community-oriented outreach endeavours. In 2017, the city updated its ‘integration conceptualisation’ to reflect this collaborative structure in the face of a new wave of refugees declaring asylum in Germany.

The new concept reinforced the city’s position that integration is a collective action that necessitates a “constructive interplay of educational institutions, charities, business enterprises and other civil society groups… [and] the resources, actions, and motivations of migrants also play a decisive role,” with housing and accommodation existing as one of the key factors in facilitating integration (Stadt Leverkusen Kommunale Integrationszentrum, 2017: 8). With the NGOs and the government able to communicate transparently and actively, and coordinate between each other, they are able to increase interactions between refugees and the locals: “[B]ecause of organising even meeting points by volunteers inside the camps or beside in the neighbourhood by the camps and there are certain contacts even to German people… by this chain houses are found even the expectation of refugees of certain
people or of certain people who I meet increase. (Refugee council employee interview, 2019)”

This concept also developed a structured ‘communications flowchart’ between the ‘controlling group’ (i.e. the government institutions typically responsible for policy areas, such as the Department of Education or the Social Services Department) and the ‘specialist groups in integration’, which can be both other government entities and specialist NGOs and organisations dedicated to those policy areas, i.e. the Department of Education has direct input from the Social Services Department and the head of the Migration Office (Stadt Leverkusen Kommunales Integrationszentrum, 2019: 8-9).

Further, the new integration concept proposed the extension of ‘intercultural offerings’ and facilitating the creation of new representative groups for refugees in order to ensure a ‘two-way’ understanding of integration, i.e. that refugees’ voices and needs can be adequately and directly communicated to the government by refugees themselves rather than through interlocutors, who may misunderstand more specific cultural issues (Stadt Leverkusen Kommunales Integrationszentrum, 2017: 14-15). This elicits the points raised by Zapata-Barrero in his work developing ‘interculturalism’, demonstrating the necessity of two perceptibly different cultures bridging the notional divide between them to better adapt both sides for coexistence (see Zapata-Barrero, 2015). How governance on this issue is handled can determine cultural representation and government relations between groups involved in establishing community ties and aiding in facets of integration.

Further, Leverkusen initiated cultural sensitivity seminars for its employees and invited professional speakers from outside the government and even the city to lead these seminars and classes, which received high approval (~90%) and satisfaction from the employees, though this is only a beginning measure that the city intends to expand upon (Stadt Leverkusen Kommunales Integrationszentrum, 2019: 11). Inviting migrant-oriented
perspectives into those who both implement and craft policy is a key tenet of removing the one-sided nature of integration policies that can often lead to uncertainty for refugees (Ersbøll & Gravesen, 2010).

Part of this intercultural work has been carried out through the Leverkusen Integrationsrat (Integration Council), an arm of the Leverkusen government that specifically works to facilitate the creation and support the maintenance of migrant organisations in Leverkusen. Contact first begins as a relay from refugee-facing NGOs operating in refugee accommodations or working with relevant refugees directly to the Integrationsrat. “When a new group, for example, the Syrian Kurds, when they organise, then comes Caritas or the Flüchtlingsrat, they tell me there is a new group, and here in the house we have rooms that they can use for their groups. Because that is often, the first question, where can we meet? (Andreas Laukötter interview, 2019).” The migrant-facing organisations working through the Integrationsrat act almost as a ‘council’ of representatives on behalf of refugees and interact with the government to represent their interests (Ibid). The city recently facilitated the creation of a representative Kurdish cultural group, of which one interview participant (KPL) is a supporting member.

The city also pledged to increase the ‘intercultural orientation’ of its employee base, ensuring to have employees who represent a diverse set of cultural and linguistic backgrounds (Stadt Leverkusen Kommunale Integrationszentrum, 2017: 14). By establishing a more diverse civil service, the government can then be more responsive and dynamic in its approaches to integration, such as through its volunteer coordination efforts (Leverkusen civil servant interview, 2019a), and sensitive to cultural peculiarities that would not otherwise be known by a more homogeneous employee corpus. For instance, AQL, a Syrian refugee who had a corporate job in his home country, chose to work as a social officer for
refugees near Bonn while living in Leverkusen, but still volunteers his time with Leverkusen when he can spare it (AQL interview, 2019).

5.4.3 Extension of the Model’s tenets

One of the more remarkable and unique aspects of the Leverkusen Model, enabling asylum-seekers to attain private housing regardless of their asylum status (including those awaiting asylum decisions) and without minimum or maximum mandatory times spent in refugee accommodations, also applies to the city’s offered formal language courses (Stadt Leverkusen Kommunale Integrationszentrum, 2019: 12-13). Asylum-seekers can then register for German classes as soon as they arrive in the city regardless of whether they have received an asylum decision from the BAMF.

Housing was adopted as one of the primary foci for the city’s integration platform, which melded with the recognition that housing availability and construction were not keeping up with either rent inflation or an increasing population, with or without the addition of refugees. In this sense, the Leverkusen Model and the 2014/2015 refugee influx acted as a ‘spark’ for the city to recognise the absolute necessity to create new housing through the Model’s preference to have refugees in private accommodation rather than in mass accommodation and the recognition that housing comprises an integral aspect of integration, not just for refugees, but for the growing non-refugee migrant population as well. These needs are taken into account in the Wohnungsbauprogramm 2030+ (Ibid: 25). Through this immersion of the Leverkusen Model’s precepts, the Type II MLG structural interconnections between civil society organisations and the government became normalised throughout the realm of the city’s integration policy. Ironically, one might even compare it to a more traditional Type I, top-down governance style in that the government
actively supports smaller local organisations for their efforts in promoting integration as a state would support a city, as will be discussed in the next section.

### 5.4.4 Community Access and Local Help

A culture of local access and help around refugee accommodations emerged in the neighbourhoods in which the accommodations were built. This help was rendered by a variety of organisations, small and large, both religious and not, and was further aided by the more active collaborative governance instigated by the Leverkusen Model, though it was an unintended result. Smaller local organisations, such as churches, could ask the city government for material and financial help in holding intercultural events and have a strong focus on creating immersive interactions within the specific boundaries of a small community (Jürgen Dreyer interview, 2019). Events within Jürgen Dreyer’s church, such as ‘tea time’ for the women of the community (including refugees) help to remove the uncertainty around interaction and provides clarity on how to do mundane daily things, such as going to the grocery or taking the bus, while churches and other small organisations can also hold small language classes for children not yet of school age both inside and outside the refugee accommodation.

The government also partners with Caritas and volunteers with a programme called “Willkommen im Quartier” (Welcome to the Neighbourhood), which was implemented in 2019 as a means to introduce refugees to native Germans in the neighbourhood in which they will live without the burden of presenting an ‘official face’ from either Caritas or the government. The native Germans are responsible for acting as tour guides for the refugees’ new neighbourhoods; there have been 11 pilots of this programme, and they involve guided tours (with language support) of the areas of commerce, culture, and leisure in the area. The Job Centre supports training for the ‘tour guides’ so as to impart practical information to the
refugees, such as on the technical aspects of accessing the health system and getting a mobile phone contract (JOB Service Beschäftigungsförderung Leverkusen, 2019; Stadt Leverkusen Kommunale Integrationszentrum, 2019: 26).

One of the most reliable means of neighbourhood integration and help for refugees within Leverkusen has been through the *sprachcafes*. Each major (and many smaller) NGO in Leverkusen hosts a *sprachcafe* that is open for refugees and Germans alike. Typically, the NGO offices are near the accommodations, allowing for refugees to easily access the place and have a space of interaction and learning.

I was there for 6 months, but I didn’t stay there much. I was always out, for example, we went to cafes, to learn German, to see how quickly we can learn German. Therefore I had only six months of staying there… We didn’t learn any German in *Sandstraße* [accommodation] *sprachkurs*. We had there, there is a, they gave a *sprachkurs*, and that was also voluntarily… next door was an international café. The people meet there and talk, for example, they help when one gets mail and we don’t understand. And I show them, and they helped me… more helpful, the international café [was than the *sprachkurs*]. They help a lot when you need, for example, for post, they take time, they clear things up well so you can understand. (YSL interview, 2019)

At the height of German volunteering efforts during and after the Summer of Migration, the *sprachcafes* in Leverkusen became an epicentre for refugees to informally learn the language and create a network of contacts and friends. It also enabled refugees who were able to learn German faster to act as interlocutors and ease other refugees into learning German, as well as helping them find places to live:
For new arrivals, I had helped in these cafes when they put forward questions, I had accompanied them when they needed German volunteers, and I was always translating and a [Syrian] wanted to find a flat for himself, there was volunteers… They had asked me where do you live, I said in the Sandstraße, and ‘you have no place to live, and you help the people to search for apartments?’ I said it’s normal, I like to help. (KPL interview, 2019)

The availability and promotion of sprachcafes, intercultural events, and the organisational support enabled by the extensions of the Leverkusen Model reflects on the importance of Ager & Strang’s (2004) tenets of social bonds and social bridges, derived from Putnam’s (2000) studies in solidarity and community mobilisation through social capital, as being integral to the process and practice of integration. Social bonds are those relationships between members of a specific group, i.e. between Syrians, and social bridges are those that help to anchor a person in a new culture. Social bridges, rather than requiring intensive government planning to construct or maintain, often only require small instances of friendliness or openness to develop and blossom (Putnam, 2000: 39-40; Ager & Strang, 2008). The two compose what is termed ‘social capital’, i.e. that which serves to connect and advance a person to and through society (see Putnam, 2000). These friendships often allow for opportunities for the refugees to find places to live, work, or study, i.e. these small-scale interactions broach larger-scale life outcomes (Granovetter, 1973); these small aspects of network creation also lend refugees a sense of agency33, in that once they become immersed in a new cultural system, they are better able to navigate it and find their own living spaces, jobs, and opportunities (AQL interview, 2019; MPL interview, 2019). Much of this

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33 See chapter 3 for further discussion on the importance of ‘agency’.
community access and events surrounding the refugee accommodations is developed through intensive discussions between the government and the NGOs, reflecting on how governance initiatives and policies can influence societal and community integration. There are numerous standing group meetings discussing different subjects around both refugee accommodations and integration, where communication and direct network access is facilitated:

[W]e have a very good structure of co-working with different institutions like AWO, Caritas, Flüchtlingsrat, and the Kommunales Integrationszentrum and we manage to do a very, very good cooperational work. We're not like confronting with the Flüchtlingsrat, we have a very strong connection with them… I think I have like, four or five meetings every week with different actors. (David Nelson interview, 2019)

Additionally, there was much less conflict between the NGOs and civil society groups and the city government (especially when compared to Berlin) because of the entrenched connections between those groups and the governing structure of refugee policy in Leverkusen. Changing the locus of control over integration from being centrally focused or top-down to a more holistic, neighbourhood- and collaboration-based approach removes what might be seen as domineering or faceless demands on refugees, which are replaced with the relative inclusivity promoted by community integration efforts. The difference is not lost on refugees: “I always say that the refugee integration process is not successful from the government but from the people, from the community, the initiatives… I think that the process needs more time about it, and the process had to make clear, to work with refugees. (AWL interview, 2019)”
It is clear that Leverkusen’s focus on community-based governance and volunteering will continue, with the ties between the NGOs, the government, and the volunteers remaining durable for the foreseeable future. The next section will focus on how refugees find housing, and whether these methods are facilitated through policy or by other means.

5.5 How Refugees Attain Housing

Table 1 shows how the refugees interviewed found their housing. It is not uncommon for refugees to become friends with those who volunteer at either the refugee accommodations or the sprachcafes, or in the camps outside Germany\(^{34}\). This muddies the division between the categories of ‘friends/family’ and ‘volunteers’, but for all intents and purposes it maintains the strong division between those two categories and the ‘government’ category, the latter of which usually denotes placement into either an emergency accommodation vis a vis a mass accommodation centre (where a room is shared with multiple occupants) or into a specialised modular notunterkünfte\(^{30}\) or pre-fabricated accommodation where room occupancy numbers are lower and residence types are closer to private accommodations.

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\(^{34}\) Chancellor Angela Merkel’s 2015 decision to freeze the rule of the EU Dublin Regulation meant that many of the refugees in camps in Greece, Italy, and other countries were able to come to Germany to declare asylum without having their claims revoked, as would normally be the case with Dublin. \(^{30}\) See chapter 6 on Berlin.
government-placed housing, i.e. mass accommodation, and methods of attaining private housing.

Another important note is that HSL is a refugee living with his family in a modular notunterkünfte at the far end of Cologne rather than in Leverkusen. I was referred to the social worker at the accommodation through a mutual contact, who then suggested I interview the man. The accommodation, while centred within a smaller neighbourhood, does not have the same type of access or community activities established around it from the neighbours, and with few, if any, volunteers from the surrounding area (Cologne social worker interview, 2019). The occupied accommodation sits across from an older, decrepit unoccupied one. The reason given for the lack of neighbourhood interaction is that the neighbourhood had poor experiences with refugees who lived in the now-decrepit accommodation, as well as the city having restrictions on visitation and community access (Ibid).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Identity</th>
<th>Government Placement</th>
<th>Volunteer/NGO Help</th>
<th>Friends/Family Help</th>
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Table 1 - How refugees attained their housing at the time of interview (including changes with any follow-up notices). Arrows indicate trajectory of housing attainment, i.e. moving from government accommodations to private residence through help of volunteer/NGO

As clearly shown, all Leverkusen respondents (save MPL, who had a friend already living in Germany) were placed in their initial housings by the city government, and most of those then quickly (less than a year within the mass accommodations) moved on to private accommodations through the help of volunteers and friends/family in the area. Only HSL had remained in the accommodation due to lack of connections and his difficulty in acquiring more advanced German due to his age (HSL interview, 2019).

Otherwise, all respondents first placed in government accommodations were able to move quickly into private apartments or houses with the help of volunteers, NGO employees, or friends.

The table and the interviews demonstrate the importance of connections and social bridges for refugees: volunteers act as direct links for refugees to engage with the receiving society and facilitate the search for housing, especially in housing markets that largely rely on word of mouth and informal methods of obtaining housing, which, as previously discussed, is largely the case in Germany (Caritas employee interview, 2019).

All respondents who received help from volunteers and friends to move into private accommodations reported that they likely would not have been able to secure a place on their own, or at least not in the timeframe they were able to, if they had not had the help. This is a natural by-product of the principles of the Leverkusen Model, but also a by-product of its principles extended into the city’s integration concept: deeper ties between the NGOs and government to extend collaborative governance can lead to the mobilisation of civil society through organised volunteer efforts. These volunteer efforts create social bridges and connections for the refugees to German society, which then helps to guide them through the
learning curve of adapting to a country whose administrative, business, and personal cultures may feel different to that found in Syria\textsuperscript{35}.

Because this volunteering system is coordinated through the governance regime of the Leverkusen Model rather than in the ad-hoc dimensions experienced by Berlin, the city can better ensure an equal standard of integration service delivery across many, if not most of its new refugee residents. Whether this is a unique function of the city’s size in comparison to Berlin is a topic to be discussed in chapter 7.

\section*{5.6 Conclusion}

This chapter looked at Leverkusen and its eponymous model of refugee housing by diving into its history and its development since its inception in 2002. The collaborative governance aspect of the Leverkusen Model has helped the Model be effective in its goals of re-housing refugees from mass accommodations into privatised housing over the course of its existence, though the refugee influx of 2014/2015 demonstrated that while the Model is conceptually effective, it requires the city to adequately maintain housing stock for a growing population.

The city updated its concept of integration in 2017 to include several things: ‘intercultural offerings’, a deepening of the government’s employee base with more workers from migration backgrounds, continued partnerships with city NGOs, and an expansion of housing development throughout the city, among others. The city also began construction of a large refugee accommodation centre in the north to consolidate and shutter other accommodations, which has come under criticism by both civil service employees and NGOs.

\textsuperscript{35} Another common refrain discussed by the interview partners was the demonstrable uncertainty of interacting with Germans, with almost all respondents (both in Leverkusen and Berlin) saying they felt Germans were more ‘closed off’ and ‘cold’, with some saying they were apprehensive and uncertain about how to approach Germans because of that perception. Volunteers helped to bridge that gap and teach refugees how best to engage socially.
because the accommodation is not centralised; regardless, the Leverkusen Model will continue to operate and the city intends for refugees to only spend 3 to 5 months in the accommodation.

NGOs and the government maintain consistent lines of communication and meet often to coordinate and collaborate on both operations and inform one another of developments for refugees. This is an extension of the Leverkusen Model’s design, demonstrating that established ties can expand into other fields concerning integration and can help to mitigate issues that arise.

These policy stipulations arose because of the incremental learning and expansion of the original precepts of the Leverkusen Model (and the perception of general failure of the previous policy), though like many other cities throughout Germany, Leverkusen had been slow to develop new housing within the city itself and now has enacted a reactive housing programme to continually develop and expand housing availability throughout the city. It is likely that, had refugee arrivals not been so high, the city would not have embarked upon its housing expansion and a general house availability shortage would have continued. The following chapter will detail and analyse Berlin’s governance over its refugee housing and integration policies.
Chapter 6: Berlin’s Refugee Housing and Integration Policies: Fixing a (governance) hole through civil society

6.1 Introduction

This chapter will cover Berlin’s multi-level governing structure, how it has adapted its laws and infrastructure to accommodate increasing levels of refugee inflows, and how the non-profit and NGO36 sectors have taken on additional responsibilities to care for refugees in ways that the government is traditionally supposed to cover. Because of Berlin’s size and how its governance is distributed (centrally governed but with tasks delegated to district administrations that do not have legislating ability), it acts as a city-state, in that it has

36 ‘Non-governmental organisations’ and ‘non-profits’ are differentiated here as two different entities because of the spontaneity of the ‘refugee moment’ in 2015 leading to volunteer efforts crafting organisations that only operate largely as a collection of people working together that utilises volunteer leaders and small donor support rather than an organisation that relies on large grant funding or receives operational funding from the German government. For instance, Caritas is the largest NGO in Germany, and it receives several million euro in grants from the German government (Caritas Germany, 2017). Place4Refugees, one of the organisations created in 2015, relies on volunteers donating their time and supporters donating in any meaningful way (Karin Windt interview, 2018).
‘governing structures’ in the districts networked with the central Berlin government but ultimately has final say in all policies regardless of district refusal or reluctance to enact them.

Germany and Berlin have also created exceptions in its building laws that allow for temporary accommodations for refugees to be built with immediacy, as well as convert older, unused structures or public spaces (such as school gymnasiums) to act as temporary shelters. These accommodations are typically built with a short lifespan, either ~3 years or several decades, and are quartered for refugees only, leading to questions of whether this segregates refugees and hinders their integration.

As this chapter will show, Berlin and Leverkusen share similar governance structures over their refugee housing policy, with utilisation of Type II MLG in connections with private organisations, as well as mandating construction of refugee accommodations within neighbourhoods. Oversight is held at the government level with instances of documented accountability enacted by the Berlin government (see 6.5.2). However, Berlin utilises more of a short-term ‘cost-efficiency’ consideration in their governing methodology than Leverkusen does, utilising tender offers from various companies (either state-owned or otherwise) to run its various refugee accommodations, rather than using either a single company/NGO across its accommodation spectrum or utilising government resources to unilaterally run the accommodations. This landscape leads to organisational anarchy, where there are many organisations doing the same or similar functions that can change often or run with low oversight.

Many of the refugee-facing non-profits and NGOs in Berlin are ad hoc and emerged out of the necessity to adapt to Chancellor Angela Merkel’s decision to open the borders for
asylum seekers, and played a pivotal role in filling the gap of governance displayed in 2015\(^\text{37}\) (Ahrens, 2015: 13; Mayer, 2017: 5-6). Several years on, however, numerous non-profits and NGOs have found themselves either at odds with the Berlin government’s policymaking towards refugees and integration, or suspicious of its new government’s promises while movement on those promises is perceived to be glacial.

Though the Berlin government allows refugees to leave initial accommodation centres after 3 months and find housing on their own, the government recommends refugees stay in refugee-designated accommodations given the high demand for housing in general across Berlin. This, some would argue, has led to de facto segregation of refugees in accommodations both near and far from areas with native populations, thereby hindering integration efforts. Building plans for Berlin have emerged recently, though assessments indicate that there will not be enough housing to keep up with demand, as Berlin has become a centre of immigration in Europe.

This chapter will cover Berlin’s governing structure in brief, describing how the state government interacts with the districts, and how its refugee integration infrastructure is woven into that government-district interaction. It will then give an overview of the relevant housing and integration laws in Berlin from the period of 2005 to present, as well as the many issues within the Berlin housing market for both refugees and non-refugees alike. Following that the chapter will detail the rise of civil society organisations that took on an integral role in housing and caring for refugees and ultimately became advocacy organisations for refugee wellbeing. The key argument of this chapter is that the Berlin government’s multi-level governance structure since 2015, utilising private for-profit

\(^{37}\) All but two NGO/non-profit interview partners in Berlin began their work in 2015 in the middle of the ‘Summer of Welcome’ (Flüchtlinge Willkommen interview, Karin Windt interview, Christiane Beckmann interview, Andreas Tölke interview, 2018).
companies to run many of its refugee housing, has generally hindered its ability to adequately deliver housing solutions for refugees given its reliance on ‘contracting out care’ rather than instituting a standard across its districts.

6.2 Berlin’s Governing Structure in Brief

Berlin exists as a unique entity within German federalism: along with being the seat of power for the whole of Germany, it is also a city-state. Unlike other cities in Germany that are typically beholden to the laws set down by the state government (for example, Bonn is subservient to the North-Rhein Westphalia government) Berlin is beholden unto itself. Encircled by Brandenburg, it is the city with the highest population concentration in the country, and the second most populous city in Europe behind London. There are two other city-states in Germany, Hamburg and Bremen, though neither is as populous or as densely populated as Berlin.

It is governed by a senate, along with a governor and a mayor. While it has 12 districts (Bezirke), these districts are not governing municipalities in the sense that, for example, Bonn, Cologne, or other cities in Germany are municipalities with local policies under the aegis of their federal state: the districts are subordinate to the Berlin senate’s regulatory supervision and have very limited lawmaking power. The districts are autonomous in administration and have local offices for services and representation, but otherwise they are limited in rulemaking by the auspices of the senate (Kramer, 2005). The pure governance structure of Berlin’s policymaking apparatus is, at first glance, Type I multi-level governance (see Hooghe & Marks, 2003). Berlin is nested under the federal government, while the districts, limited as they may be in policymaking, still maintain agency over limited local matters.
Its refugee integration infrastructure can be described generally as Type II multi-level governance (see Hooghe & Marks, 2003) given Berlin has established public-private partnerships with organisations delivering some services, for better or for worse (see Haque, 2011 for discussion on shared governance), though it is constantly adjusting to forge new ties with non-profits and independent organisations that worked to aid refugees after the Summer of Welcome in 2015. The two principal government bodies that handle refugee issues are the Landesamt für Flüchtlingsangelegenheiten (The State Office for Refugee Affairs, LAF) and the Senatsverwaltung für Integration, Arbeit, und Soziales (The Senate Administration for Integration, Work, and Social Affairs, Senatsverwaltung).

6.3 Issues in the housing market

6.3.1 The City of Berlin

Berlin, like so much of Germany, suffers from scarcity of housing both for nationals/EU residents and asylum-seekers/refugees alike. The city, like Germany as a whole, has a higher level of individuals renting rather than buying. Approximately 46% of all German citizens are owner-occupiers within the country, but that number should be divided further to exemplify that only approximately one-third of Germans own and live in a home in former east Germany (a relic of the German Democratic Republic (GDR), which discouraged private ownership of property as a policy), whereas approximately half of the citizens in west Germany are owner-occupiers (Kuhn & Grabka, 2018).

Social housing, i.e. that which is built and subsidised centrally through the federal government, has seen a different outcome. From 1990, Berlin, whose current overall housing availability in general is already tightened due to incredible demand and lack of ability to construct new units (due to planning regulations), sold off over half of its social housing holdings to private entities, down from 30% of all available housing in the city to below
15%, the majority of which were sold to global investment funds (Aalbers and Holm, 2008). The city followed the nationwide trend, where it is estimated Germany held around 3 million social housing units in 1990, down to an estimated 1.25 million (Manthei, 2018). The sell-offs attempted to shed municipal debt and balance budgets during a time of economic pullback.

The previously mentioned Law on Social Alignment, which would designate 20% of residences for those in special circumstances, only covers housing developed by state-run or owned companies and does not cover housing that is owned by private housing companies. Private companies cover 75% of the rental market in Berlin, with municipal companies covering the remainder (Ibid). At the same time, the average rent for general housing in Berlin per square meter has nearly doubled in the decade between 2009 and 2019, from €5.51 per square meter in 2009 to €9.57 in the first quarter of 2019, down from a high of €9.91 in the 3rd quarter of 2018 (Statista, 2019). For apartments only, the average rent in 2018 was €10.32 per square meter (Investitionsbank Berlin, 2019: 7), with the average size of an apartment at 73.2 square meters (Ibid; 4). New constructions (Neubau) typically are more than 10 square meters larger than older existing structures (Altbau) and tend to be more expensive at open than their older counterparts (Invest-AB, 2019).

Between 2013 and 2017, the highest period of first-time asylum applications in Germany (BAMF, 2019), Berlin’s population grew 5.6% while the average rent increased 25% with just a 2.6% increase in the number of apartments (Investitionsbank Berlin, 2019: 8). The increasing demand for places to live around Berlin means that, oftentimes, a refugee would compete with perhaps 100 or more others, both German and otherwise, to get a flat (BBC News, 2019), though their chances are often hindered by their status as receiving benefits through the government instead of through income (Karin Windt Interview, 2018).
The LAF guarantees a certain amount of rent cover for refugees without employment (Figure 5), though with the rising cost of average rent in the near term the fixed amount will become less able to cover rents. That, coupled with the sudden and dramatic rise in the cost of rent and the inability of housing construction to keep pace with population growth encouraged the Senatsverwaltung für Stadtentwicklung und Wohnen (Senate Administration for City Development and Housing) to develop a 5-year rent freeze on Berlin, which took effect January 2020.

![Figure 5 - Rental coverage levels per household size. Gross rental coverage in the second column from the left, with coverage in social housing in the third column from the left. (Senatsverwaltung für Integration, Arbeit und Soziales, 2019).](image)

The rent freeze covers 1.5 million apartments in buildings with 3 or more apartments, typically, though this excludes subsidised social housing and recently completed apartment complexes from 2014 onward (Senatsverwaltung für Stadtentwicklung und Wohnen, 2019).

It remains to be seen if the German construction sector can meet housing demand, as it is
both a burgeoning field with high demand for services but also one suffering from underemployment (ECSO, 2018: 11).

A further, and harder to measure issue with refugees finding housing is racism and/or discrimination, though these manifest themselves in several forms: first, with ‘shadow brokers’, i.e. those who prey upon the naivete and desperation of refugees to find apartments. They charge refugees extortionate amounts of money to live in apartments without legal contracts, sometimes using fraudulent credentials to earn the trust of refugees before swindling them of money, and sometimes the apartments the refugees think they are going to rent end up not existing at all (Loy, 2016). It is often difficult to regain lost funds from these ‘shadow brokers’ once they disappear, leaving refugees without any recourse to either recover their stolen money or find a solution to their housing issues.

A second manifestation of discrimination and/or racism comes from the more expected hesitation or outright refusal by landlords/existing tenants to rent to refugees. One method to counter this impediment came in the form of a pilot program from Evangelische Jugend- und Fürsorgewerk (EJF) entitled Wohnungen für Flüchtlinge (Apartments for Refugees) which was able to broker over 4700 apartments from the period between 2014 to January 2017 (EJF, 2018). In the first edition of the Masterplan, Berlin partnered with EJF, which provided refugees with a counselling service to help them overcome the traditional barriers they might normally face when searching for housing, i.e. language and discrimination (Land Berlin, 2016).

38 Though discrimination is studied by the Antidiskriminierungsstelle des Bundes (Federal Anti-Discrimination Agency) in the context of refugee integration into the country, its studies are organised through the large charities, i.e. Caritas, Diakonie, etc. which would likely work with refugees who are more open to discussing instances of discrimination. Further, explicit allusions to racism are hard to determine and assess as factual through the studies the government conducts, even if the refugee claims they experienced it.
EJF’s placement programme was ended in January 2017 and competence shifted to the LAF, and EJF was given an advisory role. The cooperation was continued until 2018, at which point the city allowed the contract to expire in order to shift the full competence to the government and save on expense reimbursement, which EJF argued was not being fulfilled by the government (Julia von Stülpnagel interview, 2018). EJF was able to provide multilingual services to refugees that greatly alleviated the anxiety of those not comfortable with the German language to access the Berlin housing market (Foroutan, et al., 2017: 25-26), and it is unclear whether the government will continue with a similar structure as EJF had (Julia von Stülpnagel Interview, 2018).

Despite awareness and aid programmes, 42% of refugees claimed they experienced discrimination while searching for housing (Antidiskriminierungsstelle des Bundes, 2016: 3). Whether this is attributed to racism is a question of debate that is left undefined by the government, given that some landlords may prefer not to rent to those without gainful employment; however, the stigma against renting out to those dependent on the Job Centre, or to refugees in general, can be overcome with the aid of volunteers speaking on behalf of the refugees to the landlords and accompanying them to the apartment viewings (Hamann & El-Kayed, 2018). In a study by Sawert (2019) where he tested the response rate of student lets to a German applicant, a Syrian applicant, a Turkish applicant, and an American applicant, response rates to Syrians were markedly lower than the response rates for others, with an overall response rate of 19% for Syrians (Sawert, 2019: 13). Syrian applicants who wrote in good grammatical German had a higher response rate, but they still had ~20 percentage points lower than the response rate for German applicants (~49%).
6.3.2 The Districts

The districts have enacted various programmes under their auspices as self-administrative entities to counter housing market stigma against refugees and to aid them in searching for housing. Treptow-Köpenik, for example, has a dedicated time every Friday between 14:00 and 17:00 for volunteers and refugees to network and find a place to live; additionally, the service organises workshops and events to help refugees understand the ins and outs of the housing market (Bezirksamt Treptow-Köpenik, 2019). After the LAF ended its contract with EJF for its Berlin-wide service, Mitte continued working with EJF to help refugees acquire flats until November 2018, at which point the city administration ended the contract and took on fully the competence of buying up and renting out residences (Julia von Stülpnagel interview, 2018).

Alternatively, the district of Charlottenberg-Wilmersdorf supports the independent voluntary organisation Charlottenberg Hilft to coordinate and organise refugee aid initiatives, including community activities such as sports, meet-ups, and helping refugees in their housing situations (Charlottenberg Hilft, 2019) though for the district itself there was no central administrative contact point that specifically helped the refugees in their housing search (Willkommen in Westend, 2018: 4).

In specific districts (Friedrichhain-Kreuzberg, Reinickendorf, Pankow, and Spandau and Steglitz-Zehlendorf in special circumstances), refugees can be issued rental licenses in advance of their housing search along with an immediate rental contract with binding social law conditions, rather than having to wait to receive a permission from the local Job Centre/LAF once a room/apartment has already been found, which in many cases can lead to the room offer falling through (Willkommen in Westend, 2018: 27; Bayram, 2017: 8, 14)

There is no underlying standard across the districts for refugee assistance for housing, as housing is typically under the auspice of the LAF through the local Job Centre and the
districts are free to utilise the money they receive from the Berlin government for refugee integration in whatever way they see fit, a key component of Type I multi-level governance.

6.4 Integration and Housing- Laws and the Like

Berlin has had a Senate Commissioner for Integration and Migration since 1981, long before former Chancellor Gerhard Schröder ushered in immigration reform for the whole of Germany in the latter part of the 1990s. The work of the Commissioner includes, as expected, mainstreaming the intake of migrants into the city, typically through means of work or gaining work through ausbildung, or trainee/apprenticeships to further develop qualifications, as well as consulting with organised migrant groups to further policy directions. In 2005 Berlin developed its Integrationskonzept and the country quickly followed suit with its own National Integration Plan two years later, a case where Dekker, et al. (2015: 649) argue that the city of Berlin set the pace and precedent for the central government to instigate its own national policy. The concept was updated and finalised in 2007, and many of the proposals put forward are similar to those found in the National Integration Plan: promotion of work and ausbildung as the strongest method for integration, promotion of ‘intercultural offerings’, promoting a welcoming culture (Willkommenskultur), (Land Berlin, 2007) et al.

In 2010 Berlin enacted the Gesetz zur Regelung von Partizipation und Integration in Berlin (Law Governing Participation and Integration in Berlin, ‘Integrationsgesetz Berlin’). The law seeks to help those with a migration background obtain the opportunity for equal participation in society (Der Beauftragte des Senats von Berlin für Integration und Migration, 2010: § 1).

When the numbers of asylum seekers rose precipitously in 2014/2015, the city was caught unaware: the Landesamt für Gesundheit und Soziales (the State Office for Health and Social Services, ‘Lageso’), which was understaffed and unprepared at the time of the
‘Summer of Welcome’ influx (Muschter, 2018: 16-27), found itself incapable of handling the queues of people who waited outside the offices for days on end to register as asylum seekers. Particularly notable was the effort by civil society to help house the refugees who were effectively sleeping outside the Lageso offices. Organisations sprung up almost overnight, such as Place4Refugees, *Flüchtlinge Willkommen* (Refugees Welcome), Be An Angel, etc., that sought to connect refugees either with an open bed or a place to sleep, effectively taking over a function of integration management that the government was unable to do.

Given the inability to organise itself during the ‘crisis of governance’, the city sought and received free advice from McKinsey & Company, though Lageso was still short-staffed and unable to acclimate to the persistent numbers of refugees arriving in Berlin, either intentionally or otherwise39 (Muehlebach, 2016); so, the Mayor forced out the head of Lageso and replaced him with Sebastian Muschter, then a Senior Consultant with McKinsey (Soederberg, 2018: 12). With Muschter, the first ‘Masterplan’ for Berlin was implemented in 2016, which established the *Landesamt für Flüchtlingsangelegenheiten* to both re-brand Lageso and move the administration to a new building, as well as creating 7 organising principles for the city’s asylum infrastructure: first, arrival, registration, and benefits; second, accommodation and places to live; third, ensuring education; fourth, ensuring access to the job market; fifth, security for both refugees and the city; sixth, an inclusive and open society; and seventh, active participation of refugees in social life (Land Berlin, 2016: 7).

The Masterplan also enabled the conversion of the decommissioned Tempelhof Airport, then used as a museum/landmark, into a refugee reception centre for centralised processing of asylum claims. Given the building’s historical monument status previously

39 In January 2016, an anonymous source within Lageso revealed that up to 5000 applications for asylum had been mishandled, meaning that up to 5000 refugees had not been properly registered for months in Berlin while living there. (Muehlebach, 2016)
anointed by the government, no permanent alterations could be made to the structure, which made converting a former airplane hangar into a liveable space extremely difficult (Parsloe, 2017). Even when infrastructure was created within the hangar, it was packed tight for the refugees: typically there would be 12 people living in a small area of 5x5 meters and without privacy (Soederberg, 2018: 4). The registration process is supposed to take several days-

instead, many ended up living in the hangar for weeks or months due to the LAF’s lack of employees, among other problems (Keilani, 2018).

The LAF oversaw the contracting of certain reception services, such as management of the Tempelhof registration facility at the former Tempelhof Airport in Berlin to the company Tamaja. Otherwise, integration services, such as integration and language classes, were organised through the districts and the local Job Centre and provided for with funding by the Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge (Federal Office for Migration and Refugees, BAMF). Federal integration services were clarified and expounded upon in the 2016 German Integrationsgesetz (Integration Law), which was aimed at getting refugees into the workforce faster and having those with high prospects to remain (typically benefitting Syrians, who apply in the largest numbers and whose asylum/protection acceptance rate is higher than 90%)\(^{40}\) begin integration courses immediately regardless of status, as well as having a place of residence assigned to them (typically in mass accommodations) in order to deter massive movements into already densely populated urban areas (Bundesregierung, 2016). Under the Masterplan, the development of modular container housing (modular notunterkunft) was

\(^{40}\) At last reported by the BAMF statistics collated by the European Council of Refugees and Exiles, in 2018 Syrians had the lowest asylum application rejection rate at 0.2%, while Eritreans had the second lowest at 6%. Somalians had the third-lowest rejection rate at 34.2%. (ECRE, 2019; 8)
promoted as a quick-fix solution to ensure that refugees would have a space to live while the city continued developing a new urban planning agenda (Land Berlin, 2016: 24, 28). This was based on the Sonderregelungen für Flüchtlingsunterkünfte (Special Regulation for Refugee Accommodation), which was incorporated into Germany’s Baugesetzbuch (Building Code) by the federal government in 2015. It allows Berlin (and Hamburg) to sidestep legal boundaries and create emergency refugee accommodations (Bundesministerium der Justiz und für Verbraucherschutz, 2017: § 246)\(^4\). The terms of the Special Regulation ended at the end of 2019, which then put all modular accommodation operated by Berlin up for tender to private accommodation companies. Berlin allows refugees to leave the initial reception centres and search for apartments after a minimum of three months, but the city advises for refugees to stay in the mass accommodations given the relative ‘security’ of being able to stay in one rather than the uncertainty of finding a private room in an apartment (Land Berlin, 2019).

In 2015, Berlin passed a new affordable housing law, the Gesetz zur sozialen Ausrichtung und Stärkung der landeseigenen Wohnungsunternehmen für eine langfristig gesicherte Wohnraumversorgung (Law on Social Alignment and Strengthening State-Owned Housing Companies for Long-Term Housing Supply), which designates 20% of all newly built units as sequestered for special needs groups such as refugees, homeless people, those needing assisted living, and other special circumstances (Land Berlin, 2015: §2). It also raises funds for the development and modernisation of social housing.

After the election of a ‘red-red-green’ coalition government in Berlin in September 2016, i.e. a coalition between Die Linke (the left party), The Green Party, and the SPD,

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\(^4\) The law allows for Berlin, Bremen, and Hamburg specifically to make special allowances in order to quickly construct and develop refugee accommodations. For temporary mobile (or modular) accommodations, the citystates are allowed to house refugees in them for up to 3 years.
overthrowing the previous coalition between the SPD and the CDU, the government took a new direction in refugee and asylum matters. It chose Elke Breitenbach of *Die Linke* as the Senator overseeing the *Senatsverwaltung*, which allowed for the injection of *Die Linke’s* particularly inclusive policy proposals on refugee integration and participation in society into the government’s development of a new Masterplan\(^{42}\) (Katina Schubert interview, 2018).

First, in October 2017, the *Senatsverwaltung* established the *Koordinierungsstelle Flüchtlingsmanagement* (Coordination Office for Refugee Management) which was created to “accompany and support the communication of the LAF with the actors in the management of refugees in Berlin” (*Senatsverwaltung für Integration, Arbeit, und Soziales*, 2018). The office holds monthly meetings with relevant stakeholders in the NGO, volunteer, and non-profit sectors that work with refugees, though their reception has been mixed. Though some working directly with refugees praise the increased conversations with the government, other organisations are still critical of how they do not directly engage with refugees (Christiane Beckmann interview, 2018; Andreas Tölke interview, 2018).

The post-2016 government then set out to create a new Masterplan given the previous Masterplan had “a lot of ideas, but without enough specifics in it to make it a workable entity” (Sebastian Muschter interview, 2018). Some aspects of the first Masterplan, such as the objective of integrating housing needs of refugees into the broader housing needs of Berlin (*Land Berlin*, 2016: 24, 30) and promotion of temporary modular accommodation (*Ibid*: 28) remained, though the new Masterplan recognises the effectiveness for integration of moving refugees from mass accommodations into private rooms/apartments, and seeks to increase its correspondence with private/non-profit organisations to aid in the moving process (*Land Berlin*, 2018: 56). Mayor Michael Müller celebrated the passage of the new

\(^{42}\) *Die Linke*, on its website, states outright that the party’s platform is one of moving asylum-seekers as quickly as possible towards social participation and professional qualification recognition, as well as access to jobs, education, and fighting discrimination against refugees. (see *Die Linke*, 2019)
Masterplan, as it confirmed that Berlin would follow a position that “integration starts on day one” (Land Berlin, 2018a).

Another aspect of the new government’s action plan is that new modular accommodations will be constructed in each district regardless of any complaints or hesitations on the part of neighbourhoods or the district administration (Land Berlin, 2018). The districts are required to indicate two places to the Berlin Senate where new refugeespecific accommodations can be built. Consultations between the neighbourhoods, the districts, and the senate administration take place prior to finalising construction plans; these include typically the Staatssekretär für Integration (City Secretary for Integration), the Senator for Integration, district council political representatives, a representative from the Landesamt, the media, and building planners. However, there is no explicit representative from the refugee community, or a refugee advocacy organisation speaking on behalf of them at the planning meetings. “While the participation of refugees is not, I don’t remember one, they’re there, they’re in the audience sometimes, but I think it could be more” (Berlin Senate Representative interview, 2018).

The relevant laws are summarised in Table 2.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Law (Berlin/Federal)</th>
<th>Highlights</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2005 - 2007</td>
<td>Integration Concept and Plan (Berlin)</td>
<td>● Promotion of ausbildung (apprenticeships) and work as best method to integration ● Intercultural offerings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>Law Governing Participation and Integration in Berlin</td>
<td>● Obtaining equal participation in society by increasing percentage of migrant employee population ● National Advisory Council on Integration and Migration established ● District commissioners for integration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year</td>
<td>Act</td>
<td>Key Points</td>
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| 2015 | Law on Social Alignment and Strengthening State-Owned Housing Companies for Long-Term Housing Supply (Berlin) | - 20% of newly constructed housing units sequestered for special needs groups  
- Raises funds for modernisation of social housing  
- Controlled increase of rent by max. 15% over four years |
| 2015 | Special Regulation for Refugee Accommodation in the Building Code (Federal) | - Allows city-states to sidestep building regulations and develop emergency shelters for refugees  
- Refugee accommodations are run by Berlin until the end of 2019, at which point they are available for offer by private accommodation companies |
| 2016 | Masterplan for Integration and Security (Berlin)                     | - Created *Landesamt für Flüchtlingsangelegenheiten* as the central refugee agency for Berlin  
- Centralising registration and distribution efforts  
- Attempted streamlining asylum decisions  
- Created ad-hoc shelter and accommodation system  
- Encouraged partnerships with NGOs  
- Social and medical care access |
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Details</th>
</tr>
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</table>
| 2016   | Integration Law (Federal)                | - 3+2 rule of residence allowance and extension based on achievement of vocational training  
|        |                                          | - Residences decided by government if refugee has financial needs  
|        |                                          | - Increase in German teacher allowance  
|        |                                          | - Immediate access to integration benefits before asylum decisions to nationalities with higher acceptance rates |
| 2018   | New Masterplan (Berlin)                  | - Development of refugee accommodations (modular) within district community areas; direct consultations with neighbourhoods  
|        |                                          | - Increasing communication with non-profit/NGOs for regular consultations  
|        |                                          | - Moving refugees as soon as possible from mass accommodations to private houses/apartments  
|        |                                          | - Ensure access to psycho/social care in refugee accommodations |
| 2020   | Senate bill no. S-2365/2019 (Berlin)     | - Imposes a rent freeze for 5 years on 1.5 million apartments in buildings with 3 or more apartments |

Table 2- A table summarising the relevant laws governing refugee housing and integration in Berlin.

### 6.5 Types of housing for refugees

Though there is a stated preference by refugees for private apartments/houses, the city constructed and continues to develop different types of quick-building housing for refugees. Berlin allows refugees to leave the initial reception centres and search for apartments after a minimum of three months, but advises for refugees to stay in the mass accommodations constructed on behalf of the city given the relative ‘security’ of being able to stay in an
accommodation (Land Berlin, 2019). There are several different types of specially constructed housing allowed under the previously mentioned amendments to the Building Code. Many of these are operated by different organisations whose tender offers were accepted by the Berlin government, exemplifying the public-private partnerships of Type II multi-level governance where the government pulls back from direct oversight of an issue area and ‘steers’ rather than ‘rows’ (Le Galès, 2011).

6.5.1 Tempelhof, the Reception Centre

The hangars at the decommissioned Tempelhof Airport were converted, through the edict of the first Masterplan, into an erstaufnahmeeinrichtung (First Reception Centre) in order to centralise the first accommodation and processing of asylum claims in Berlin (Land Berlin, 2016: 11). Refugees were supposed to spend only 2-3 days in the hangar accommodations (see Figure 6), but the reality was that they spent 3-4 weeks or more in the hangars awaiting a decision on their asylum applications (Keilani, 2018). The spaces refugees had to share in the facility allow about 3 m² per person, sometimes fitting 8 people in 25 m² without ceilings (Flüchtlingsrat Berlin, 2018).
Converting and maintaining the hangar accommodations was an expensive task: water and showers had to be piped in without damaging the infrastructure given Tempelhof’s historical protected status, while the hangars had to be insulated against lightning strikes, as if lightning struck the hangars then all electrical equipment would short out and people would possibly be killed. Noise travelled unencumbered throughout the hangars, making it a difficult environment in which to sleep. Additionally, the walls were not insulated for heating or cooling, so maintaining a liveable temperature became another massive expense. The complete addition and renovation cost the city administration several hundred million euros (Sebastian Müller Interview, 2018; Senatsverwaltung für Finanzen, 2018: 230 - 239).

Tempelhof was managed by a company called Tamaja, contracted by the LAF, which many of the refugee-facing non-profits and NGOs within Berlin say had been neglecting care for refugees in order to cut expenses, including a lack of medicines, access for doctors, and
social aid benefits that they would be guaranteed to under Germany’s Asylum Seekers Benefits Act (Flüchtlingsrat Berlin, 2018; ET Interview, 2018). Flüchtlingsrat Berlin, in conjunction with 9 other legal, medical, and refugee advocacy organisations called for Tempelhof to be closed in 2018 because of the hazardous health conditions faced by refugees living there rather than for the facility to be gradually wound down, as the refugees will only be moved to another facility rather than a more stable form of housing (Flüchtlingsrat Berlin, 2018).

The LAF defended its choice of Tamaja, as the LAF had “dissatisfaction with renowned NGOs [initially chosen to care for residents at Tempelhof] that seemed to be cutting costs to residents” and Tamaja demonstrated that it cared about the refugees living there (LAF employee interview, 2018). ET, who worked as a translator for Tamaja, spoke of how refugees attempted to ‘escape’ Tempelhof to find a better accommodation:

It’s better we do this, we can now fight and make problems and then after a while they had to kick us out and they for sure have to find us a place’, which in most cases will be in a proper room… Even the social workers would tell you that this is, some people are doing this and that because they are repeating this because it’s obvious that they could go somewhere else. And sometimes it could be like some kind of conclusion, because every time when someone is kicked away, he still has connection in the camp, and the camp asks him ‘where are you now’, and he answers ‘it’s way better now here’ (ET Interview, 2018).

The facility was closed at the end of 2019 as a first accommodation centre, but remained open as a processing centre for asylum applications to capitalise on the relative centrality of Tempelhof within Berlin without invoking the high upkeep costs as a residence. Other first reception facilities exist around Berlin, some of which are in converted army
barracks, old factories, or defunct hospitals, many of which faced similar (but ultimately lesser) problems to the Tempelhof hangars: how to convert a space that was not previously used for residency into one that can accommodate several hundred to several thousand people for days, weeks, or even months while maintaining the integrity of it for historical preservation. Given the employee shortages at the LAF (Keilani, 2018; Flüchtlingsrat Berlin, 2018) that contribute to longer wait times for asylum applications, these converted spaces become the refugees’ first ‘home’ within Germany, subjugating them to a lack of privacy, space, and hygiene while they endure the stress of waiting on their asylum decisions (LD Interview, 2018).

The employee shortages in the LAF reflect a broader trend in Berlin, where the government-oriented social care sector is shrinking in favour of private organisations taking over operations (Soederberg, 2018: 6-7; Tamaja employee interview, 2018). This has become problematic for those who work in the social non-profit sector, as the cost-saving motive for the city/state is seen as a deterrent to effective oversight of companies operating care homes (Flüchtlingsrat Berlin, 2018).

[T]amaja social work represents the shittiest, and this is because they, the observation over them, oversight over them is very weak… It’s not that I’m criticising Tamaja exactly by itself, but I’m criticising the situation because I think that whatever company comes in this setting, the same shit would happen… If you are trying to minimise your costs in the situation where nobody is going to observe what you’re doing then you completely or definitely will go and cut the spending. So the major concern at the end, in this way, to keep people as much as possible and no matter how they are staying, how they are there, because this how we generate income or profit. (ET Interview, 2018)
Tempelhof, like much of Berlin’s new refugee infrastructure, was constructed out of a crisis of governance and uncertainty at the necessary logistics to care for and properly house the number of refugees that arrived in the city. Though it was replaced as a first accommodation centre and asylum applications have slowed dramatically (BAMF, 2019), it remains to be seen if the city will adapt a more government-centric approach to refugee care or maintain the structures that arose from 2015.

6.5.2 Tempohomes

These are basic modular accommodations, typically made of metal. They are referred to as ‘container villages’, as they resemble shipping containers, and are touted as a temporary solution until such time as more permanent structures can be built around Berlin. The analogy is apt, as I had the privilege of touring the container village in the Tempelhofer Feld, including entering and looking around in one of the residences. Three containers are joined together: two on either end consist of bedrooms where two to four people share a closed space (2.5 meters x 7.5 meters) with the middle container holding a kitchenette and a bathroom (Senatsverwaltung für Gesundheit und Soziales, 2016).

The roommates are assigned randomly except for family or gender, and can lead to conflict between ‘housemates’ given the small amount of shared space, as in the case of my interview partner HD: HD’s roommate was a religious fanatic and gave HD a lot of stress,

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43 According to the BAMF, first-time asylum applications up to June are down nearly 11% from the same time in 2018. This is due to several factors: first, the EU-Turkey deal, which stemmed the flow of refugees from Turkey into the EU; second, FRONTEX’s (EU coast guard) pullback of active patrol zones near Africa in the Mediterranean when compared to the first rescue mission Mare Nostrum, which ran from 2013 to 2014; third, states on the maritime border, such as Italy, refusing a port of entry to independent rescue ships operating in the Mediterranean.
preventing HD from focusing on his studies while in his room, and though HD complained to the camp administration about the roommate, the administration did not act; instead, the roommate left of his own accord to a neighbouring room (HD Interview, 2018).

The containers are noticeably not insulated and do not retain either heat or cool air well. In winter the structures become extremely frigid without the use of an installed radiator, and during the summers the containers become dangerously hot given the metal structure and poor ventilation. When there is rain and wind, the noise echoes in the container. It is also very easy to hear neighbours during all times of the day. My interview partner lived next to a married couple, and he noted hearing them having “intimate time” through the walls occasionally when he tried to sleep (HD Interview, 2018). Even during our interview, sounds from the neighbours permeated the walls on occasion.

There are small social areas outside, as well as playgrounds in which children can play. All of it remains behind the fenced perimeter of the camp with a view of the larger field just behind the fence.
The tempohomes are arranged in a ‘camp’ style: as shown in Figure 7, the containers are arranged in ‘blocs’ and given a fenced perimeter. Services such as laundry and postal collection are kept in a separate area and given limited accessible hours (typically normal business hours). The tempohome camps are given a 3-year permit of existence, as they are not made to last longer. They are dispersed throughout Berlin in different locations, both near and far from more populated areas, sometimes near the border of Brandenburg far from populated areas (Vey, 2018). Upon the end of their 3-year life spans, the Berlin government has replaced some with longer-lasting modular accommodations, also termed *Modulare Unterkünfte für Flüchtlinge* (to be expanded upon in the next section).

The camp at *Tempelhofer Feld* has been a point of contention between activists and the Berlin government, the former who want to keep the field open as a park and not open to building developers. Activists see the partial development of the camp under emergency law as a way to justify further housing development on the field, though this argument may mask a Not-In-My-Backyard sentiment that is ultimately based in xenophobia (Hubana, 2019). Either way, their location in *Tempelhofer Feld* has put refugees in the crossfire of a longstanding debate of how to treat one of Berlin’s largest open green spaces (Schönball, 2017). The limited options with *Tempelhofer Feld* is why the tempohomes next to the hangar were removed at the end of 2019, and all remaining refugees were moved to a facility in either Spandau or a former hospital in Reinickendorf, in the north of the city (Amin, 2019). Kreichauf (2018) argues that the creation of such structures serves to exclude and stigmatise refugees from society, making them extremely visible and discernible from the normal day to day (Kreichauf, 2018: 10-11). It also creates both a physical and metaphysical border between refugees and the citizenry: where there is a hard border between the camp and life outside, either with a fence or with the remote location of a camp outside of a populated area, isolation and a sense of a lack of agency sets in for refugees who are unable to change their
circumstances; many end up feeling trapped and excluded from society and exhibit nihilistic
tendencies (Vey, 2018; Dalal, 2018: 73-74). My interview partner, HD, stated his opinion of
living in the tempohome succinctly: “I want to get out of here” (HD Interview, 2018).

In follow-up messages, HD received a new roommate who was no better than the
first, but was able to leave Tempelhof Feld soon after when HD found an open room in an
apartment with the help of a friend.

The tempohome ‘villages’ are run by different companies throughout Berlin: EJF,
Deutsche Rote Kreuz (DRK) Müggelspree gGmbH (German Red Cross), Tamaja, Hero
Norge, Milaa GmbH, and many more, all of which were awarded contracts by the Berlin
government (Land Berlin, 2019a). Though the companies are given leeway to operate the
accommodations, they must still adhere to LAF standards and are subject to oversight by
social workers employed by LAF and district council officials who conduct visits to ensure
standards (ET interview, 2018). There were several notable instances of fraud committed by
companies that operated refugee accommodations, where the operators extorted money from
the government to run shelters without delivering needed services (see Haak, 2017; and
Memarnia, 2017), which encouraged the government to increase its contracting standards to
companies that have 3 good references from previous operations and operations lasted at
least one year (Public Tenders Germany, 2019).

6.5.3 Modular Accommodations

Though similar in concept to tempohomes, i.e. quickly constructed and with a
‘temporary’ lifespan, the programme Modulare Unterkünfte für Flüchtlinge (Modular
Accommodations for Refugees, MUF) aims at constructing accommodations that are both
easily built/deconstructed and are more similar to actual apartment buildings while also
having longer lifespans. Where the tempohomes are only rated for around 3 years, the MUFs
are rated to last 50 to 80 years and can eventually be used to house the general population if the refugee population that requires a place in the MUFs falls below a consistent replenishment level (Land Berlin, 2019b).

MUFs represent a midpoint between managing the necessities of refugee accommodation and mitigating the needs of a city that would have been growing even without the refugee influx (Larios, 2017: 42). The initial round of MUFs were designed as ‘dormitory style’, which would allow for them to be used as student housing or as a nursing facility after it is no longer needed for refugees; they had shared dining and common areas, as well as shared bathrooms (divided by gender).

The ‘MUF 2.0’ are designed to be closer to individual apartments with each unit holding its own bathroom, kitchen and dining areas, typically called a klassische gemeinschaftsunterkünfte (classical shared accommodation), though the structures will still have a protective fence and security managing the building, as well as a ground floor with spaces for social workers (Senatsverwaltung für Stadtentwicklung und Wohnen, 2018). Figure 8 shows an example of 3 layouts in the MUF 2.0 that will be constructed at MarzahnHellersdorf. Of note is that each bedroom is designed to hold two beds, while each room is accorded a maximum occupancy of double the number of rooms, i.e. 3 rooms is given a maximum occupancy of 6, 4 is given 8, and 5 is given 9.
Single rooms (not shown in Figure 8) are reserved for those with special needs/issues, while 4 rooms and up are reserved solely for families. The single rooms are located on the ground floor next to the social worker area for ease of access. They also have their own bathrooms and kitchenette, affording those who live there the ability to sustain themselves without needing to share dining space, as one would in other refugee housing situations.

As mentioned previously, the Berlin Senate gave each district the option to choose a location in which two MUFs would be constructed (see Figure 9). Planning meetings are held regularly within the districts that include representatives from the Senate, the Coordination Office, the Landesamt, the media, and the relevant neighbourhoods, though without any explicit representation on behalf of refugees, either in the form of an advocacy organisation or a future resident of the proposed MUF (Berlin Senate Representative Interview, 2018),
which has been criticised by representatives of the NGO and non-profit communities as serving the needs of the government for its budget before the needs of refugees who actually require help (Andreas Tölke interview, 2018; Karin Windt interview, 2018).

Figure 9 - A map of MUF locations around Berlin. Green are ones that are currently open; blue are ones that are either currently being built or under planning; and red are ones that are under consideration as new locations. (Senatsverwaltung für Finanzen, 2018a)

While refugee-facing nonprofits and NGOs and refugees themselves have said that MUFs are an improvement from tempohomes and the mass emergency accommodations because of a better sense of privacy, cleanliness, and control over their lives (living with 2-6 others in a larger space rather than more in just one room), they state that the MUFs are isolating and restrict a refugee’s ability to facilitate a feeling of normalcy, welcoming and integration by encouraging them to only be around other refugees whose circumstances, such as in health needs, may necessitate different surroundings (KD Interview, 2018; LD
Interview, 2018; PD Interview, 2018; XD Interview, 2018; ZD Interview, 2018; Christiane Beckmann Interview, 2018; Karin Windt Interview, 2018). The districts have shifted some of their integration programme focus onto both MUFs and existing tempohome areas in an attempt to avert ‘ghettoization’ of refugees; the districts receive ~€30,000 per year from the Berlin government to focus on local projects through the Berlin Entwickelt Neue Nachbarschaften (Berlin Develops New Neighbourhoods, BENN) programme, which they use to work with neighbourhood-specific organisations for community interaction and to avoid social exclusion of refugees (Bezirke coordinator interview, 2018).

6.6 Non-profit and NGO work on Behalf of Refugees

As previously mentioned, during the height of the ‘Summer of Welcome’ multitudinous organisations sprang up to help refugees find places to live or sleep for a few nights given the havoc that occurred outside of Lageso. Some, such as Flüchtlinge Willkommen and Be An Angel dealt directly with finding refugees rooms in private apartments, whether through connecting refugees directly with landlords or leasing apartments for refugees; others, such as Place4Refugees searched for immediate places, whether in hostels, hotels, houses, or apartments where refugees could sleep. Other organisations such as Moabit Hilft brought items such as clothes, blankets, and food to the refugees who had no choice but to camp out overnight outside the Lageso building. All the organisations provided services that should have been legally guaranteed by the government\(^{44}\), which ultimately failed to do so in the hour of need.

\(^{44}\) In the case of refugees applying for asylum, they are covered by two laws for before and after the asylum application has been made: the Sozialgesetzbuch (Basic Law) in § 67 through § 69 assures those who are involuntarily homeless or sleeping rough have the same rights as citizens to receive benefits to help mitigate and prevent homelessness, while the Asylbewerberleistungsgesetz (Asylum Seekers Benefits Law) entitles all those who have applied for asylum the immediate right to certain material reception conditions (Bundesministerium der Justiz und für Verbraucherschutz, 2003 & 2017a, respectively). Given the disarray with Lageso, reception conditions weren’t met for months.
Caritas, the largest charity in Germany and one of the largest in Europe, established a shelter on its campus grounds in November 2015 to ensure that refugees were not waiting at Lageso overnight in the cold (Caritasverband, 2019). They also established an advisory service in partnership with the Berlin-owned housing association HOWOGE to consult refugees on how to navigate the housing market and understand what they need to do to abide by terms of a lease, to understand how to maintain utilities, etc. (Caritasverband, 2019a).

The initial turbulence stated in the previous sections instigated a confrontational relationship between the organisations and the government, which was seen to be inept in its handling of processing asylum claims while employee levels at Lageso were still unfilled (Christiane Beckmann interview, 2018). Be An Angel, for example, took on additional responsibilities beyond just the limited function of helping refugees find places to live:

After registration and the inability of the German government or the senate of Berlin to provide all the acclaimed rights in the asylum law, we had to go to the social court to force the authorities to hand over whatever the people needs are, and that was 800 people that we had been with at the social court. The registration process for some individuals took more than 4 months. After the registration, our expectation has been that the government would take over or that the authorities, so the volunteers could lean back. Unfortunately that did not happen, so what we did afterwards, we were confronted with different tasks in terms of asylum laws, in terms of educational programmes, language skills, learning the language, providing homes, and during from September 2015, to March 2016 we rented, as an NGO, 17 apartments in Berlin which we handed over even to people who were not registered. (Andreas Tölke Interview, 2018)
The non-profits became housing consultants for refugees, not only by directly helping them find places in which to live, but also providing translating services and accompany them to the relevant government offices when they had to register their intent to move out of the mass accommodations, where they often experienced difficulties when enumerating the rights of refugees to move or encountered overworked government employees (Karin Windt, 2018). Some refugees who were helped by these organisations then turned around to volunteer or work with them to further help other refugees. ND, a refugee who speaks 8 languages, performs a vital job with Moabit Hilft, helping to translate both documents and in person while interacting with landlords and the government.

You need like WBS [housing certificate], we need schufa [credit]... you must have to also know German language and for this you also need certificates if you have b1 or b2, they will know ok, you can talk to them, you can live there and you don’t make a problem... If you don’t know German, then it will be tough for them and they need every time a translator... we cannot go each and every time with them. (ND Interview, 2018)

In general, volunteer engagement with newly arrived refugees was essential in ensuring that refugees, across age groups, genders, and national backgrounds, were able to adapt to new circumstances in the country in which they apply for asylum (Hemmer, 2017; Hamann & Karakayali, 2016). With regard to Berlin however, the volunteer, NGO, and non-profit efforts became integral and imperative to ensuring that refugees were able to navigate their new realities given the failure of the city’s governance. NGOs also became employers for refugees, which were then able to further provide better aid to newly arriving refugees.
This was especially the case when it came to housing. For those refugees unlucky enough to not meet someone who could help them find housing, the organisations provided a valuable lifeline. Without the aid of native or fluent German speakers, refugees faced discrimination and extortionist practices when searching for housing from landlords who either refused to rent to refugees outright, or who refused based on their reliance on a stipend from the Job Centre (Soederberg, 2018: 11). Beyond interacting with landlords, difficulty with paperwork is common, where refugees (and even native Germans) have trouble understanding the requirements for living standards set down by the government and sorting through the various forms, as refugees have to report to numerous agencies when looking to move: Job Centre, Auslanderbehorde, LAF, etc. Without outside help or clarity from the government on how it handles paperwork, refugees are often left with uncertainty in what to do with their documents, which adds stress onto their obligations to integrate under German law.

…this country needs to be active, need to be always motivated, and you have to do a lot of stuff, you have to follow your work, you have to follow your papers every day or two days you get a post with some Amt, Burgeramt, Bundesamt, Sozialamt, and so [on], and you have to follow and you have to take paper from here, send it to here; but you don’t have this energy, and you spend a lot of your energy at work also, because here they are working always under pressure. (DD Interview, 2018)

I have to go to 6 or 7 auslanderbehorde, like migration office, amt, a whole 6, 7 government circuits just to show them that I need my issues done, and each one takes their time and they’re very slow with it, they need a lot of papers and stuff, and it kind of isn’t the easiest, and it’s quite hard actually, come to think of it, because it’s a
lot of work and very time consuming. And as a student I don’t really have that luxury.

(ZD Interview, 2018)

As previously mentioned, EJF ran for some time a programme that helped refugees find places in private apartments, and was successful in several thousand cases. A remarkable aspect of this was that, instead of negotiating only with property management companies or housing collectives, EJF was able to broker contracts with private landlords on behalf of refugees, who are notoriously more difficult to contact than the larger housing collectives or companies (Julia von Stülpnagel interview, 2018). Though EJF still runs several tempohomes across Berlin, they do not know if the LAF will be able to replicate EJF’s success in placing refugees in private apartments given the general staff shortages in the government body, as previously mentioned.

Another exceptional case is the ‘Sharehaus Refugio’ that works in tandem with Give Something Back to Berlin (GSBTB), in which refugees can live and learn in one apartment building. With a café on the ground floor and apartments for both refugee families and individuals on the numbered floors, the building serves as a school for the residents (with GSBTB organising German language classes and sprachcafes), as well as a community space in which events are held to encourage refugees and local Germans to interact and develop a sense of community (Give Something Back to Berlin interview, 2018).

The local and larger organisations began networking with each other, holding workshops and roundtables on their efforts in order to better coordinate and ensure that, if the refugees they were helping needed services that one organisation could not handle, they would be able to point refugees in the direction of the organisation that could help them (Karin Windt interview, 2018; Julia von Stülpnagel interview, 2018; Give Something Back to
Flüchtlinge Willkommen has hosted several roundtable discussions with other NGOs, along with members of the city/state government and the political parties to discuss all the issues surrounding housing for refugees and the work done by civil society organisations (Flüchtlinge Willkommen, 2017).

Some of the recommendations of the organisations, such as establishing central points of contact for housing within the districts and closer ties between district mayors and the local organisations, have come to fruition in some districts, but not all (Willkommen in Westend, 2018: 34-35). In a March 2019 roundtable between the Senate, the districts, and civil society, the government demonstrated its increased willingness to heed suggestions by refugee-facing organisations by adopting several recommendations made by Flüchtlingsrat Berlin, such as studying ways through which refugees can have easier access to a Wohnberechtigungsschein (a permit to access social/reduced cost housing options) with more transparency in the district’s awarding process, and housing companies letting some larger apartments (4 rooms or more) directly to the LAF for rent to refugees with larger families, as well as others (Land Berlin, 2019c). Thus, despite the initial animosity and conflict between the civil society organisations and the Senate, the new government has enabled a stronger measure of communication and coordination with civil society.

Homelessness among refugees is also an issue, with an estimated half of the 30,000 to 40,000 homeless in Berlin having recognised refugee status, living either on the street or in homeless shelters (Willkommen in Westend, 2018: 31). The city established the first Strategiekonferenz Wohnungslosenhilfe (Strategic Conference to Prevent Homelessness), where representatives from the Senate consulted with representatives from charities, nonprofits, NGOs, district representatives, and others to discuss and workshop ideas to counteract the rising numbers of homeless (Senatsverwaltung für Integration, Arbeit, und Soziales, 2019a). Organised into working groups that focused on specific areas around the
issue of homelessness, the conference released draft guidelines on homelessness assistance, and followed up with another conference in October 2019 to produce a new resolution based on the working groups’ final study results (Ibid).

6.7 How Refugees Find Housing in Berlin

Besides initial placement in mass accommodations, the most common way the interview partners (13 total; DD is a married couple where the wife arrived on a reunification visa) found their housing at the time of the interviews was through friends and family, with 8 of them having found their first and/or subsequent rooms/houses/apartments through their friend/family networks (see Figure 7). 4 interview partners found their housing through volunteers and/or NGOs (with DD and LD overlapping for both friends/family and volunteers), and just 3 found their housing through government services, though PD was moved around several camps and MUFs and MD lives far from the school he attends. HD, as previously mentioned, was initially placed in the Tempelhof container housing before finding an apartment through a friend.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Identity</th>
<th>Government Placement</th>
<th>NGO/Volunteer Help</th>
<th>Friends/Family Help</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BD</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DD</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>HD</td>
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<td>JD</td>
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<tr>
<td>KD</td>
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<td></td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LD</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>MD</td>
<td>X</td>
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</table>
Table 3- A table denoting how each interview partner was able to find their housing up to the time of the interview and the trajectories taken from initial placement to their then-current housing. Arrows indicate movement from being helped by one category (gove

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ND</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PD</td>
<td>X</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>QD</td>
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<tr>
<td>XD</td>
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<td>X</td>
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<tr>
<td>ZD</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

While the clear favour is finding housing through friends/friend networks, it should be noted that many of the refugees’ German friends began as volunteers, either working through the various non-profits, teaching, or in refugee camps in Greece (LD interview, 2018; HD interview, 2018; DD interview, 2018). This highlights the importance of social links, bridges, and bonds within Ager & Strang’s (2008) integration model, where encouraging contact between native and non-native people enables both the material aspects of integration, i.e. finding a house or a job, and the cultural aspects, such as language acquisition and societal interaction.

Encouraging both volunteering and community events that involve both the refugee and native populations, both at the city/state and district level, is reinforced by Gesemann & Roth’s (2016) study on integration, which found “productive cooperative relationships with civil society actors on the ground and the involvement of the population as a whole are seen as important design tasks of municipal integration policy” (Gesemann & Roth, 2016: 4). With further encouragement and direction from the Berlin Senate across all districts to establish minimum standards of district-centred housing aid and integration information points, increased interaction between the native population and the refugee population will likely follow.
6.8 Conclusion

This chapter mapped out the development of Berlin’s multi-level governance structure with regard to refugee policy. In 2015, Berlin emerged at the forefront of refugee integration politics, taking in 5% of the more than 1 million refugees let into Germany when Angela Merkel bypassed the Dublin Regulation. The city was caught unaware of how best to process and care for the refugees, even if there were warning signs from within the government that the country and the city needed to prepare for an influx of refugees (Karin Windt interview, 2018; Sebastian Muschter interview, 2018). Refugees faced harsh situations while trying to register their asylum applications, leading to a mass civil society movement to care for and support refugees in the ways that the government should have fulfilled.

The refugee influx also laid bare the housing issues that had been percolating in Berlin and across Germany, in that a lack of social housing and increasing immigration before the refugee movement were leading to the Berlin housing market becoming more unaffordable over time. Other key issues for refugees as presented in the chapter are inordinate times waiting for asylum decisions, leading to long waiting times within mass accommodations; discrimination from landlords and rental companies; employee shortages at relevant government bodies, leading to increased wait times for asylum decisions and returns on paperwork; rents rising beyond the stipend amounts provided by the government to refugees; and no universal standards of housing information assistance across the districts, among other issues.

In adapting to the crisis of governance, Berlin adopted several policies, as well as two Masterplans to facilitate and expedite areas of focus for the Berlin government to streamline integration services. The government encouraged the development of rapidly built modular housing in which refugees would be given first priority, but would also serve the needs of the general public once the incoming refugee population lowered to a more sustainable nadir.
The government also took the step of mandating that each district choose two locations for the development of refugee modular accommodation rather than giving the districts the option of vetoing the development (Berlin Senate Representative interview, 2018). This was done to intentionally encourage placing refugees into a native community to better facilitate integration. The Berlin government also mandated that social housing become a priority for the future building development of the city.

It remains to be seen if housing building and development can meet constantly rising demand.

The government also encouraged the development of district-level integration programmes and directed funding towards each district through the Berlin Entwickelt Neue Nachbarschaften programme. Funding can then be put towards neighbourhood-level programmes, or district-wide programmes that work in conjunction with local organisations and refugee-facing NGOs.

Though housing is an important issue in each district, there are no minimum standards set by the Berlin Senate for how the district should create access points for refugees to receive counselling about the housing process. Some districts (such as Treptow-Köpenik) have dedicated times for refugees to interact with both the government and native volunteers to have their housing questions answered, while others (such as Charlottenberg-Wilmersdorf) outsource housing competence to the local non-profits.

Local non-profits, NGOs, and civil society groups play an integral part in both acting as welcome and support services for refugees, and as advocacy organisations on behalf of refugees, as the new government has increased the frequency of policy workshops and roundtables to include many organisations across Berlin that work both within a specific district and throughout the city. Though there is still scepticism and frustration with the
government on the side of the non-profits, they are generally more satisfied with the direction the new Berlin government has taken towards refugees.

How Berlin ensures equal access to housing for refugees will determine integration outcomes and whether or not the newest arrivals to Germany become unintentionally, or otherwise, self-segregating. The next chapter will take into account the important aspects of the two case studies to best syncretise the successful practices in both cities into a functional theoretical framework for refugee housing.
Chapter 7: Policy Lessons: Constructing a theoretical framework for refugee housing governance

7.1 Introduction

The previous two chapters have demonstrated the similarities and differences in integration policy implementation between Leverkusen and Berlin, notably that while their governance structures are similar in how the city governments envision their respective housing policies to be implemented, there is a distinct difference between the cities in both the collaboration style between the government and its governance partners and the durability of the structures established to implement policy. From these examples and the prior theoretical sections, we will draw policy lessons of success and failure to develop our functionally specific theoretical framework as it pertains to refugee housing policy implementation.

We will first discuss what it means for a policy to either succeed or fail, and whether or not failure within the realm of refugee integration policy is, to paraphrase the film Apollo 13, ‘an option’. We will then elicit the strengths and weaknesses observed in governance and oversight of policy from both the Leverkusen and Berlin cases and juxtapose them with the ideal-type models and concepts we discussed in the chapter on multi-level governance through a discussion on how the respective policies may have succeeded or failed. Specifically, we will utilise Homsy, et al.’s (2019) framework for multi-level governance actor tracking to analyse why there are differentiations in policy outcomes between Berlin and Leverkusen despite similar governing structures, which will determine the four key variables we will use as the foundation of our theoretical framework. These factors will be expanded upon in section 7.3.

After the section on core MLG variables, we will reflect on how housing choices and provision affects refugees’ perceptions of their ability to integrate into German society. This
will involve reflecting on the differences between how the refugee residents of Berlin and Leverkusen perceive the respective cities either helped or hindered them acclimate to their new lives. Here we will link the interviews and observations conducted in the respective cities with the integration literature and what it tells us about what can be considered the most important aspects of integration into a new society, and what role housing plays in that, whether it plays any role at all. One of the key aspects that will be elicited from our analysis is the importance of community and neighbourhood immersion for refugee accommodations and private residences, which is key in ensuring that refugees have the opportunity to interact with the native population as well as access nearby social and economic infrastructure, i.e., parks, sports venues, shops, restaurants, etc, and the spaces in which curated interaction with the native population occurs, i.e. in sprachcafes and other community areas that promote interaction. Another key aspect is the quality of housing and the ability for refugees to obtain a modicum of agency over their housing options, whether it is in something as simple as decoration or in being able to navigate the rental market and obtain a residence of their own.

We will then reflect on several models and definitions of refugee integration, notably Ager and Strang’s (2008) model, as well as how Berlin and North-Rhein Westphalia define integration and how they perceive integration should proceed. This is done to allow us to better understand the respective policies and the results of those policies in context, and reflect on whether those policies achieve their stated goals or could be improved upon.

Finally, we will construct a conceptual theoretical framework based on the previous variables and justify the use of certain structures of governance and implementation over others. The framework will serve as an analytical tool through which we will reflect on how Berlin and Leverkusen structured their policies at the time of this study, and will hopefully be applicable to other cities and municipalities that find their refugee housing policies to be more ad hoc than organised.
7.2 Success and Failure in Policy Implementation: An Overview

While the phrases ‘policy failure’ or ‘policy success’ may elicit certain images of checklists and official reports of how resources were allocated, measuring the output against the desired outcome, or news articles decrying a policy as one or the other without a deep dive into what they mean, the reality of defining just what entails a ‘policy failure’ or ‘success’ is far more vexing. If determining that a policy was either a success or a failure was a straightforward, quantifiable process, academia around the subject would not be so prone to argument about what can truly constitute either concept (see McConnell, 2015). As it is, we will attempt to syncretise the main points about defining both of the terms and establish a baseline of how we perceive success or failure in refugee housing policy, and how that reflects on the theoretical framework to be built at the end of this chapter.

Both success and failure of policies and their objectives, unsurprisingly, exist in a spectrum of implementation and contextual analysis, as well as through perceptions of how policies change over time. As with any public policy, considerations have to be made as to the context in which it is developed, whether it has defined goals, what the targeted population is, what the unintended consequences were of the policy’s implementation, who were the main and secondary stakeholders, was there a power disparity in the relevant stakeholders, et al. before beginning an assessment of a policy’s success or failure (McConnell, 2015). Marsh and McConnell (2010: 571) highlight a heuristic guideline about how to assess policy success across three dimensions, the process (the development of the policy, i.e. the policymaking stages), the programmatic (the operations, the implementation, and the outcome), and the political (popular or not for the government), though it can apply to failure as well. The heuristic asks questions about the possible indicators of success and
the places where to look for evidence, i.e. in how the policy was implemented, who benefited, whether it was popular, etc.

Failure (and success) of policies can be a result of the governance over implementation of a policy just as much as outside unrelated factors, such as a sudden economic shock or a natural disaster, or an unexpected mobilisation of civic engagement (Peters, 2015). Determining success and failure also lays on a spectrum; that is, policies may have succeeded to some degree in being designed with relatively high support from government and implemented ubiquitously, but the policy may be received poorly by the public even if it is effective in its goals, ultimately becoming unpopular with its implementation waning over time, i.e. a relative process and programmatic success, but a political failure (Marsh & McConnell, 2010: 578). One must also ask, for whom was the policy a success/failure (McConnell, et al., 2020)?

In the case of refugee housing policy, what we search for in terms of benchmarks for policy success or failure is, similarly, piecemeal. Generally, we can refer back to Marsh & McConnell’s (2010: 580) and McConnell, et al.’s (2020) list of considerations when asking if a policy is successful or not, or somewhere in between: is the policy durable? Does it change/get amended often to contravene or winnow its original intentions, or does it become expanded? Whose interests are primarily being served by the policy? Are those interests onesided, i.e. in the interest of cost-savings on behalf of government budgets, or is there a dual interest for the public? Is it popular among the citizenry? How do we establish reference points to determine a baseline for success or failure? Can this policy be viewed in isolation as a success/failure, or was there an exogenous factor that altered the policy’s trajectory? What conflicts affected the policy’s implementation? These notions of temporality, maintenance, power relationships, popularity, connection to other related policies, and internal/external conflicts will carry over into our analyses.
Policies regarding refugees are subject to endogenous and exogenous shocks that can change how policies are created, implemented, and received. The most obvious example is within Germany, which saw a number of new laws enacted at the federal level after 2014 to set deterministic restrictions on refugees\(^{45}\) as well as the rise of the far-right Alternative for Germany (AfD) party as a direct response to refugee arrivals. Where some states enacted more inclusive policies when compared to the national level, others whose electorates showed growing favour with the right-wing enacted harsher measures as a method to either exclude refugees from society or to deter them from arriving or remaining once their asylum cases are settled, while maintaining favour with voters who may turn away from the mainstream parties and support the AfD (see Christian & Schmidt-Catran, 2017, and Hamann & El-Kayed, 2018).

For our study on refugee housing policy (and the neighbourhood integration policies that follow establishments of refugee accommodation), we can look at a spectrum of success and failure from Marsh & McConnell’s (2010) list of considerations, while adding an important one for the study of housing: delivery capacity, or the ability to continually provide a resource to attain a policy goal as needed. In our case, ‘housing’ is a limited and time-dependent commodity, meaning that a government has a limited control over an issue of housing in general when a policy shock is immediate, i.e. in our case, the government may not have the capacity to ensure that all refugees gain private housing because housing occupancy rates are near full saturation (Hupe & Hill, 2014: 12). This entails the construction of temporary accommodations, another policy output orbiting the central issue of refugee housing and eventual normalised integration (i.e. employed, secured housing, etc.) into society.

\(^{45}\) See table containing relevant German laws in chapter 6.4.
Our heuristic for analysing the spectrum of success or failure in the realm of refugee housing policies will take into consideration the following variables and the questions therein:

1. Temporality:
   a. Was the existing policy (or policies) drastically altered, changed entirely (perhaps with the same name), or ended from its inception?
   b. Has the existing policy (or policies) enjoyed support over time from all relevant stakeholders, i.e. the government, refugee advocacy organisations, and the refugees themselves?

2. Delivery capacity:
   a. Have the essential resources to the policy (in this case, housing) been maintained at sustainable levels? Have adjustments in resource numbers been required?
   b. Does the delivery capacity of the government to the specific policy depend on other unrelated policies?

3. Power relationships:
   a. How are relationships between the power brokers (i.e. government and organisations implementing policy) and the receivers perceived and determined? How are the relationships between the government and organisations dedicated to implementing policy (if not the government itself)?

4. Maintenance
   a. Does the policy still exist in the face of exogenous shocks? Has it been replaced with another?
b. Has the policy been expanded upon, or have its precepts been adapted to other related orbital policies?

These four variables were chosen because of how they associate with both refugee housing and the policies that surround refugee housing, such as how a city conducts or manages the neighbourhood integration policies that work around the refugee-specific accommodations, especially in times where asylum applications drop to miniscule numbers compared to 2014/2015 and fewer resources would be required. These variables also speak to the long-term nature of integration and the policies that surround them, as integration is a longitudinal process and cannot be understood as an action that can be implemented within a year or two (Goodman & Wright, 2015). For our assessments of success or failure, ‘success’ will largely depend on whether the policy has been maintained and will continue to exist with general support from all relevant parties. A policy that is maintained over time, with its power relationships kept relatively static in the face of little to no pushback by either voters or political processes, can be assumed to be generally ‘successful’, though even then, there are considerations.

This leads us to the sticky subject of policy ‘goals’. The desired outcomes stated by a specific policy can be vague but proactive, i.e. ‘ensure as many refugees as possible do not become homeless’, or extremely specific, i.e. ‘ensure a consistent refugee private housing rate of at least 90% for all incoming refugees over the next ten years with a turnover rate within refugee accommodations of at least 50% year over year’. The latter can lend itself to a greater perception of failure than the former for obvious benchmarking reasons as well as a litany of problems with constant data-recording, which can also hamstring policy maintenance in times of sudden exogenous shocks. Policies with decidedly vaguer goals can thus be touted as relative successes if they can demonstrate moderate success over previous policies, even if those successes are only marginally higher.
There are also dichotomous goals, of which the Leverkusen Model is an example: where the NGOs advocating for the Model desired to implement the policy to ensure that refugees are able to live in sanitary, stable housing, the city’s priority in implementing the Model was in cost-saving. This is an instance of having one’s cake and eating it too, at least in the sense that the two primary power brokers in the Model both achieved what they wanted without suffering at the expense of the other.

Because goals are built on policy paradigms, i.e. political ideologies, they can also change with the electoral winds (Cairney, 2012: 228-230). If and how a policy is able to survive changes in the political landscape is also a determining factor to success and failure (a la temporality), and one that will be taken into account as we move ahead with our analysis of Berlin and Leverkusen.

7.3 Governance and Government Structures

7.3.1 Leverkusen

As identified in the chapter covering Leverkusen, the city has maintained a direct collaborative partnership with both the local Caritas organisation and the Refugee Council to ensure a standard of governance and policy implementation over its housing and integration policies and programmes. Because the Leverkusen Model has been operating since 2002 and has seen reported success and satisfaction from both the Leverkusen government and its refugee-facing partners, there has been little reason to change or adjust the structure of the policy (Leverkusen civil servant interview, 2019).

The sole changes within the scope of the policy has been the reopening of previously closed refugee accommodations due to the refugee influx of 2014/2015, though this was a temporary measure with accommodation space being centralised along with refugees moving out consistently year-over-year and the city commencing its Wohnungsbauprogramm. All of
the refugee accommodations are embedded within neighbourhoods, and each is staffed both by city social workers and employees of Caritas and the Refugee Council. This creates an incentive for transparency and accountability within the framework of the Type II MLG setup of the Model, both on the part of the city government and the organisations. As referred to in the chapter on Leverkusen, a resident of the accommodations was able to contact the city government directly and ensure that an abusive non-government employee was removed from their job at the accommodation, demonstrating the ties and assurances of accountability between the collaborating organisations within the Model (AML interview, 2019).

A point of contention surrounding the housing is the development of a new refugee accommodation further outside a neighbourhood than any of the others, to the north of Leverkusen rather than being more centrally located within Leverkusen (David Nelson interview, 2019). Both local government civil servants and members of Caritas and the Refugee Council have voiced minor opposition to the location of the accommodation relative to the city centre when compared to the existing ones, though the new accommodation will have enough spaces to shut many modular accommodations across Leverkusen and will include Caritas care offices within the structure (Refugee council employee interview, 2019; Leverkusen civil servant interview, 2019).

The Leverkusen government and its relevant civil servants meet regularly and informally (several times a week) with members of the various local neighbourhood groups, along with Caritas, the Refugee Council, and the other larger NGOs to ensure maximum transparency and information flow (David Nelson interview, 2019; Leverkusen civil servant interview, 2019; Caritas employee interview, 2019). All relevant Leverkusen government and NGO stakeholders who agreed to be interviewed for this study reported their relationships with their partners to be amicable; no requests for interviews with relevant stakeholders were rejected outright. Smaller community organisations are able to contact the city government
directly for help in funding outreach events aimed at promoting inclusivity with refugees. The city government also promotes the creation of advocacy groups through consultations with relevant stakeholders and by providing areas in which to meet and organise (Andreas Laukötter interview, 2019).

As opposed to Berlin, where the city government adjusted its policy several times over the past several years and faced pressure from refugee advocacy groups to include them in discussions regarding integration policies, the Leverkusen Model was pushed for by members of Caritas and the Refugee Council on the premise that moving refugees quickly into private apartments rather than maintaining refugee accommodations and tents would save the city money. Because of the declining asylum numbers in Germany throughout the late-2000s to early-2010s, the functionality of the Model precipitated the closure of most of the city’s refugee accommodations.

With the recent increase in asylum applications, the Model was both able to adapt and grow to include greater community outreach and coordinated volunteer efforts through the long-established connections between the civil society groups and the local government. The Model also expanded to include larger NGOs that were not initially included in the Model, such as AWO, which were then able to offer community outreach programmes such as sprachcafes and volunteer initiatives to their local areas, among other offerings. While the refugee accommodations were reopened, the city government recognised the core issue surrounding private housing for refugees was the availability of housing for the general public (Stadt Leverkusen, 2017).

While there has been some pushback in some districts of Leverkusen for having more refugees moved to certain accommodations or ensuring that private apartments/houses are available to refugees, the refugees have easy access to volunteers, both from the city government and the NGOs, to accompany them and help them understand the intricacies of
the rental market (Caritas employee interview, 2019). This is done in part with both native German volunteers and with refugees who have gone through the process before and have acclimated to both the language and the necessary paperwork needed to rent a place. The refugee volunteers are able to translate documents for the newly-arrived refugees and confer with the Leverkusen government authorities overseeing the monthly monetary disbursement all refugees receive, as there are limits on rental contracts for refugees that may be difficult to understand for those who are new to the German system (AQL interview, 2019; KPL interview, 2019).

The Model enjoys political support from not only the left SPD (currently in power), but also the centre-right CDU and CSU wings of the city government, meaning that it would likely remain constant as an anchored policy even if the city government were to shift rightward in an election (Leverkusen civil servant interview, 2019). The Model’s preference for privatised housing also encouraged the Leverkusen government to develop new housing with dedicated social housing structures (David Nelson interview, 2019).

The city also expanded the core precepts of the model in 2017 by enacting a number of measures to formulate a broader neighbourhood/community-oriented basis for integration, with the refugee accommodations acting as the loci of these efforts. These efforts were done to promote contact between newly arrived refugees and native Germans, and was enacted in collaboration between the NGOs and the Leverkusen government (Stadt Leverkusen Kommunales Integrationszentrum, 2019). The ability of both the Leverkusen government and its governance partners to adapt the Model to the shifting circumstances of the exogenous shock demonstrates that the governance partners are able to engage in policy learning and adjustment for the shortfalls encountered, both within the circumstances of neighbourhoodlevel challenges\(^\text{46}\) and city-level challenges.

\(^{46}\) See chapter 5.4.4 on Leverkusen’s initiative *Willkommen im Quartier*. 
The Leverkusen Model represents a circular or dome-shaped model of governance, where the main governance partners, i.e. the city government, Caritas, and the Refugee Council oversee refugee housing policy and implementation of integration efforts in tandem. Shared between the city government, Caritas, and the Refugee Council are the responsibilities for implementation, with clearly defined pathways for accountability, transparency, and policy entrepreneurship vis a vis the extended partnerships with the other participating NGOs. Through this circular model of Type II governance the civil society organisations are also able to encourage and enlist refugees as volunteers through a centralised focus on specific policy areas, either at the neighbourhood or city level, further reinforcing the Model’s aptitude to help newly-arrived refugees adapt to their new accommodation circumstances.

7.3.2 Berlin

As identified in the chapter covering its refugee and integration housing policy structure, Berlin engages in numerous public-private partnerships with both for-profit and non-profit organisations (as per Type II governance) which are managed by the Berlin government’s Landesamt für Flüchtlingsangelegenheiten (State Office for Refugee Affairs). Housing operations partners are found through contract tenders. The Landesamt does not select only one operator to oversee all its refugee accommodations; rather, it selects multiple to operate the numerous accommodations developed throughout the city.

As noted, there have been incidents of recorded lack of oversight on behalf of the Berlin government in terms of ensuring the partners are held to a standard of regulation, which can be a by-product of multiple contract tendering over a single policy area (Cohen & Eimicke, 2011: 239-241). The most prominent example is that of Tamaja, the company contracted to operate the Tempelhof accommodation facility. Residents and even employees
of Tamaja were uncertain as to how the company was accountable to the Berlin government given the lack of a consistent city government presence on the premises, and if there was a feasible sense of transparency in its decisions regarding refugee complaints and subcontracting services (ET interview, 2018).

The city of Berlin also contains a Type I MLG structure in how the Bezirke (districts) have administrative capacity over their small areas within the city; however, unlike a city within a state, the Bezirke do not have the capacity to create laws, only implement them in the way they see fit. Each Bezirke has different advice and offerings for accommodation-search counselling services, with some involving private partners (mainly local community non-profits).

Though the Berlin Senate now holds regular monthly meetings with various refugee advocacy and stakeholder organisations to better coordinate integration and outreach efforts, this was not always the case. When the city became inundated with asylum applicants, its understaffed and underfunded asylum office (Sebastian Muschter Interview, 2018) was unable to adequately provide the compulsory necessities refugees were entitled to under Germany’s asylum law. Through this publicly perceived failure of policy implementation rose numerous civil society organisations to fill the gap and provide shelter for refugees with whatever means they had available. Even with these monthly meetings, some civil society and advocacy organisations are dissatisfied with what they perceive as reluctance on behalf of the city government to actively take the organisations’ consultations under consideration (Karen Windt Interview, 2018).

While the city government developed quick accommodations (including Tempelhof), the civil society organisations continued to advocate on behalf of refugees, though there was a noted disconnect between the policies being formulated within the first Berlin Masterplan and the needs communicated by the advocacy groups, notably when it came to refugees
attempting to navigate the complex bureaucracy surrounding their statuses, their housing allowances, their allotted government funding, etc. (Christiane Beckmann interview, 2018; Julia von Stülpnagel interview, 2018). Given the factors of the language barrier, the stress of acclimation, and the lack of guidance on the part of the Berlin government, many civil society organisations developed an antagonistic attitude towards the city government because the organisations perceived the Berlin government at the time to prefer budgeting exercises over ensuring stable integration tracks for refugees (Andreas Tölke interview, 2018). While the Berlin government invited several organisations to discuss options and programmes, the organisations were often left feeling that they had not been listened to.

Even now, the Berlin government faces ongoing criticism from many civil society organisations who see the Berlin government’s continued contracting of services to for-profit companies as undermining the integration efforts they do in favour of cutting expenditures or keeping the city’s budget in line (Karin Windt interview, 2018; Andreas Tölke interview, 2018).

Similarly with finding housing for refugees, accommodation development by the city has evolved from constructing temporary accommodation (of varying types) anywhere land can be obtained to ensuring that the accommodations are embedded within a neighbourhood rather than far away. However, these development plans sometimes face resistance and backlash from residents within the district neighbourhoods for approval, and it is not uncommon for residents to adopt a ‘not-in-my-backyard’ attitude (Berlin Senate Representative interview, 2018). This policy of neighbourhood consultation, while intuitively democratic and accessible to civil society, lacks a strong civic participation variable in the sense of requiring the potential refugee residents (or a representative of them, or an advocacy organisation) to sit in on the meetings or partake as a relevant stakeholder (Berlin Senate Representative interview, 2018).
This relative disconnect between the Berlin government and the civil society organisations points to a more ‘umbrella-shaped’ model of cooperative governance, where the local government stands at the tip of the umbrella and the functionalities of policy governance are pointed downward towards the Bezirke and the contracted partners a la German ‘corporatism’ (Döhler, 2011: 523). The city’s government has discretion towards its housing and integration policy, which strongly favours immediate budgetary cost-savings as a priority (Kuhlmann, 2009). This is indicative of how Germany has postured its governance reforms since the 1990s, where broad policy goals are largely dictated vertically from the central government and the Länder while oversight/regulation/implementation maintenance is not uniform across the policy region within cities, and relies on more horizontal governance (a la Type II MLG) at the municipal level.

In the differences between the two cities, we begin to see how each utilises type II MLG structures differently, which allows for us to reflect on the first two variables mentioned at the start of the chapter: first, while there was active civil society participation and entrepreneurship in Berlin and Leverkusen, the disconnect between civil society and the Berlin government at the time of the first Berlin Masterplan created tension between the Berlin government and civil society organisations, while in Leverkusen these organisations were largely ‘brought into the fold’ both by the Leverkusen government and its governance partner NGO Caritas; second, in Leverkusen that there is active collaboration between civil society and the city government, including fostering development of cultural groups to help represent refugee interests, which also fulfils our third variable, while comparatively Berlin only began direct consultations with refugee-facing groups only recently, an instance of policy learning and adjustment by a more politically left-leaning government. The next section will expand on these two variables by examining them through Homsy, et al.’s (2019) MLG actor tracking framework.
7.3.3 Derivations from the literature (key literature variables)- pulling out successes and failures

When we juxtapose these two cities’ governance frameworks alongside the key MLG literature, we discover both how some policy areas can be considered failures, and how some can be considered successful and entrepreneurial. We begin with Homsy, et al.’s (2019) framework\(^{47}\) for tracking actor interactions within an MLG (specifically Type II) structure because of its ability to capture key elements while analysing MLG (see Schiller, 2018). The five key variables within the framework (summarised in Table 4) are:

1. The coordinating and sanctioning role of a central authority;
2. Engagement of civil society;
3. Co-production of knowledge;
4. Capacity provision; and
5. Framing of co-benefits.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Coordinating and sanctioning role of central authority</th>
<th>Leverkusen</th>
<th>Berlin</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>City government has strong coordinating and sanctioning role while also maintaining active collaboration with NGO governance partners as equals in policy development and implementation; communication and meetings between the groups is constant and continuous</td>
<td>The city brought in independent consulting company McKinsey &amp; Co. to help organise its asylum infrastructure in 2015; election of a new government in 2016 changed the organising dynamic to become more inclusive for civil society organisations; initiated the BENN programme; now mandates refugee accommodations to be built within neighbourhoods</td>
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<tr>
<th>Civil society engagement</th>
<th>Leverkusen</th>
<th>Berlin</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Civil society groups, even those at the neighbourhood level, have access to government resources for integration programmes; volunteer utilisation is</td>
<td>Experienced a massive flood of civil society engagement in light of the government’s failure to adjust to the refugee influx in 2015; organisations maintain independence away</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^{47}\) See chapter 4 on Multi-Level Governance for elaboration on the framework.
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<tr>
<th>Co-production of knowledge</th>
<th>Coordinated between the civil service and the NGOs for where they are needed; new neighbourhood-oriented programmes (<em>Willkommen in Quartier</em>) are focussed around volunteers in the local community helping refugees acclimate to Leverkusen and Germany</th>
<th>from coordinating with Berlin government; now invited to monthly meetings with the Berlin government to discuss integration matters, but NGOs still feel kept at arm’s length from being able to coordinate policy implementation with the government</th>
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<tr>
<td>Capacity provision</td>
<td>Because of the direct partnership between the government and the NGOs, as well as the inclusion of neighbourhood organisations and the development of refugee-representative organisations, the governance model can ensure that viewpoints and unique knowledge pertaining to refugee situations in Leverkusen are included in the knowledge base</td>
<td>Initial developments of policy and integration programmes were conducted solely within the crafting of the first Masterplan, though this has now changed with more inclusion of the civil society organisations; civil society organisations still feel they are outside the range of being impactful on how Berlin implements its refugee housing and integration policies</td>
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<td></td>
<td>The Leverkusen Model was able to provide refugees access to both the housing market and integration benefits through a centralised, coordinated effort from the governance partners and the utilisation of civil society; as demonstrated, there is a consistent level of refugees moving from the refugeespecific accommodations into private accommodations</td>
<td>Initial capacity to provide basic accommodations and services was lacking and required a disjointed effort by independent volunteer services to come to the aid of the refugees; accommodations were built far from communities, leaving refugees difficult access to Berlin; now more durable and spacious accommodations are being built in neighbourhoods; housing options are still inconsistent for refugees with the city government recommending refugees stay in the mass accommodations</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Framing of co-benefits

| The city saves money on its refugee expenditures, and refugees are better able to both support the Leverkusen Model by volunteering and are able to enter into work/education faster through the faster immersion into society; because the Leverkusen Model does not discriminate based on asylum status, refugees are better able to start integration |
| The city continues to prioritise cost-savings in how it chooses its housing operators though it has recognised the need to face its housing crisis and has implemented a rent freeze and building programme to ensure that there will be more places not just for refugees, but for the city’s overall growing population; refugees still require help from civil society |
| The city continues to prioritise cost-savings in how it chooses its housing operators though it has recognised the need to face its housing crisis and has implemented a rent freeze and building programme to ensure that there will be more places not just for refugees, but for the city’s overall growing population; refugees still require help from civil society |
| immediately rather than being left to wait in uncertainty; Leverkusen enacting new construction programme to adjust to rising population |
| organisations disconnected from the Berlin government, though the BENN programme seeks to adjust that |

Table 4 - A summary of the actor tracking variables using Homsy, et al.’s (2019) MLG tracking framework.

7.3.3.1 Leverkusen

The city government’s coordinating and sanctioning role with the Model leads to the inclusion of civil society, where there is an overt and obvious inclusion of civil society in both the development and implementation of the policy as key stakeholders. Communication with the Leverkusen government is facilitated through active meetings and contact points with the city government’s civil service, while even smaller community organisations and churches/mosques are able to engage directly with the city government for neighbourhood integration programmes. Because refugee accommodations are based in neighbourhoods, both the larger NGOs not already given a collaborating role in the Leverkusen Model (Diakonie, AWO, etc.) and the smaller community groups can facilitate refugee entrance into German society.

Additionally, the city has volunteer coordinators in its civil service that also coordinate volunteer activities with the NGOs. Communication is regular and often, and involves ensuring there is volunteer coverage for individual cases if, for example, a refugee
must attend a doctor’s appointment but is uncertain of the procedure how, or does not yet
know conversational German.

Co-production of knowledge within the Leverkusen Model has an interesting history,
given that, before the Model’s inception, the refugee-facing NGOs had an antagonistic
relationship with the city’s government. There was reluctance on the Leverkusen
government’s part to engage in directly finding private housing for refugees, as some in the
city government viewed the poor conditions in the camps and tents as a deterrent to prevent
more refugees from wanting to stay in the city, thus ‘lowering costs’ (Refugee council
employee interview, 2019). Caritas and the Refugee Council engaged directly with members
of the city government who were concerned with the poor conditions refugees were
experiencing, which gradually enabled the two organisations to propose the underlying
structure of the Leverkusen Model to the Leverkusen government’s leadership: by actively
seeking to move refugees into private housing, the city can save costs it would normally
spend on upkeep for accommodations/tents.

Capacity provision is not an issue within the scope of the Model: because all relevant
organisational players have a seat at the table or can directly discuss needs and ideas with the
city government, they are free to provide organisational capacity as is necessary. An example
of this is the Leverkusen Integrationsrat, which provides a regular, secure space and
encourages communication and the formulation of interest groups that can assist newly
arrived refugees in acclimating to life in Germany. The Integrationsrat is thus able to provide
the material needed for refugee advocacy groups while the advocacy groups are then able to
provide support services to refugees. Similarly, the refugee accommodations owned by the
city are co-staffed by members of Caritas and the Refugee Council, which are able to bring
along refugee volunteers to help in translation and acculturation services for the newly
arrived. Finally, the Leverkusen government is able to provide money for community
organisations that work directly with refugees, such as churches and mosques, which can then provide spaces both for social activities or for education services for children and adults (Jürgen Dreyer interview, 2019). The open lines of communication between the city government and the community organisations ensures that maximum knowledge and material capacity can be brought to use.

Finally, co-benefits have been framed since the inception of the Model in 2002: the city saves money on the cost of maintaining refugee accommodations by encouraging refugees to move into private housing and the NGOs achieve their goal of ensuring that the refugees are better able to settle down in Germany. While it may seem counter-intuitive that the city would save money on refugee expenses because the city (and the state) are obliged to cover (at least a portion of) rents and a monthly stipend to refugees, the city does not need to hire personnel for security, cleaning, upkeep, etc. for the accommodation itself, as the refugee accommodations are not built for long-term dwelling and require maintenance. Unexpected co-benefits are that refugees helped by the system are likely to reinforce it in some way, either by volunteering occasionally or actively working on behalf of the city or the NGOs to help other refugees (AQL, BQL, KPL interviews, 2019). This cycle helps to encourage refugees to learn German faster and participate in the economy, ultimately creating a boon for the city.

Further, because of Germany’s sectoral worker shortage, many refugees are entering fields that have high demand but low entry. A natural consequence of facilitating a refugee’s entry into society through a model of civic participation and active housing aid is ensuring that those job shortages are filled.

Assessing the success/failure of the Leverkusen Model is a streamlined task: the Model’s implementation has not ceased since its creation in 2002 and is politically popular with all parties except those on the far-right (Leverkusen civil servant interview, 2019). Its
tenets have expanded into other facets of refugee integration policy, such as language classes, and has spurred the expansion of tangential policies such as development of housing throughout the city and neighbourhood integration policies. We can consider this a strong success, as it is supported by the Leverkusen government, those in the civil service who work with and within the refugee accommodations, and the refugees themselves, who have stated they are thankful that Leverkusen allows them the option to gain their own housing regardless of asylum status (KPL interview, 2019; Leverkusen civil servant interview, 2019).

7.3.3.2 Berlin

It is initially clear that the coordinating and sanctioning role of a central authority is placed strictly within the confines of the Berlin government; however, when we pull back to view the circumstances around Berlin’s development of its integration Masterplan in 2016, the coordinating role becomes muddled. The Berlin government brought in consultants from consulting group McKinsey to help organise and develop Berlin’s response to the refugee influx with consultant Sebastian Muschter becoming temporary head of Lageso, suggesting that the city government itself was unable to adapt with its organisational structure as it was and could not adjust on its own because of a lack of provision over the previous years (Muschter, 2018). This could be due to the city government’s own obstinacy regarding the role Germany would eventually play in the run-up to the Summer of Migration (Sebastian Muschter Interview, 2018), but it is clear that, at the time, the Berlin’s government’s response was uncoordinated, prompting the development of ‘subversive humanitarianism’ through local civic organisations and volunteer initiatives specifically to counter perceived government apathy or inaction (Vandevoordt & Verschraegen, 2019: 105).

Since that time, the Berlin government has taken a more front-foot approach with regard to its refugee housing policy, such as mandating that communities cannot block construction of a refugee accommodation in the neighbourhood without due cause (Berlin
Senate Representative Interview, 2018) and that the Tempelhof facility would be closed and moved to a former hospital, where living conditions would be far more amicable for the refugees and the costs of maintenance would be far lower. However, secondary policies surrounding refugee housing, such as active counselling and help for refugees trying to enter the rental market, are left up to the Bezirke to dictate and local organisations to navigate. This leaves refugees with varying degrees of help depending on where they live within the city.

Engagement of civil society organisations has not been an issue in Berlin, as previously stated; however, we must make the distinction between civil society being engaged with the issues surrounding refugee housing and integration policy, and the Berlin government engaging directly with civil society. Organisations such as Be an Angel had to actively represent refugees in court against the city to ensure that they were receiving the appropriate benefits to which they were legally entitled (Andreas Tölke interview, 2018), while other organisations actively found themselves at odds with the Berlin government and its position regarding the Tempelhof facility, construction of accommodations in remote areas, etc. This testy relationship has gradually been eased with the new Berlin government’s mandate of regular meetings with NGO and organisational stakeholders, however these organisations still find themselves at an arm’s length from direct partnership with the Berlin government.

Cost-effectiveness as a motive still predominates with the current Berlin government, as an employee of the Landesamt stated that while they had trialled partnering with nonprofit organisations to operate refugee accommodations, the Berlin government found they could contract out the services more cheaply to a for-profit company (Landesamt employee interview, 2018).

48 44 See chapter 6.3.2 for examples.
Similarly, under suggestion from the 2016 Masterplan for Integration, Berlin partnered with NGO Evangelisches Jugend- und Fürsorgewerk (EJF), which was already helping refugees find rooms and apartments throughout the city. The partnership was unique in that EJF dealt directly with landlords and letting organisations on behalf of refugees. The partnership was ended near the end of 2018 and the responsibilities were transferred to the specific Bezirksamter (district offices), with the likely reason being to save on costs (EJF interview, 2018).

Another reason may be the Berlin government’s reaction, or lack thereof, to the refugee influx in 2014/15. After years of the Berlin government trimming back Lageso’s personnel and operating budget (Muschter, 2018), the office was perceived as being both ineffectual and apathetic to the needs and issues facing asylum seekers, precipitating in both the office space being relocated to a different part of the city and the office itself being rebranded as the Landesamt (Christiane Beckmann interview, 2018).

Co-production of knowledge, as it concerns Berlin’s refugee housing policy, is another scattered area. On the one hand, the 2016 Masterplan involved the input from several refugee advocacy groups, but at the same time held little in terms of practical implementation ideas (Sebastian Muschter interview, 2018). On the other hand, NGOs and refugee advocacy groups found their efforts to interact with the Berlin government in terms of crafting policy ideas to be either stymied or ignored. This has, of course, changed with the reformulation of policies, where various NGOs now have monthly meetings with the city government to exchange knowledge and detail programmes; however, this is a far cry from the refugee-facing organisations having more direct input into policy formulation or implementation. Trust and viable information sharing and paths to co-implementation still are not fully established.
Capacity provision, where the government mobilises material and intangible resources (such as consulting those with specialist knowledge), is another complex area for Berlin. When the city faced its administrative failings, it reached out to McKinsey& Co. to structure its policy response rather than operating with refugee-facing organisations. This could be understood as the city wishing to create a structured, formalised policy framework through which it can work and eventually formulate more specific policy responses; however, there was a discrepancy between the material capacity mobilised by the Berlin government and the knowledge/practical capacity mobilised by the organisations. The city’s refugee accommodations were initially placed wherever land could be obtained, something to which the refugee-facing organisations strongly objected. When refugees attempted to obtain private residences, they found both issues of discrimination and cost, as private rents nearly doubled in Berlin from the period between 2009 and 2019 (Investitionsbank Berlin, 2019). The money allotted to refugees for living expenses and rent coverage was becoming insufficient (Karin Windt interview, 2018).

Organisations such as Flüchtlinge Willkommen that work directly with refugees and landlords to secure places in private apartments or houses also began to recognise the difficulty and disparities between those with different statuses assigned by Germany (for instance, ‘tolerated’ status versus full asylum) where full asylum gets more immediate rights and ‘tolerated’ must have a waiting period before moving into a private accommodation, which can invariably delay or impact a refugee’s opportunity to integrate (Flüchtlinge Willkommen interview, 2018).

For Berlin, framing of co-benefits became the most pressing matter in 2015 with Lageso’s administrative failure. In this case, the immediate benefit was obvious: helping refugees and shaping up the administrative shortfalls of the Berlin government. However, another co-benefit emerged, if an inadvertent one: a far greater awareness of the housing
crisis in Berlin and how, even before refugees arrived in 2014/2015, availability and construction of housing as a corollary of the city’s increasing population had fallen off considerably (Investitionsbank Berlin, 2019). This forced the city to not only engage in building new apartment complexes, but also instituting a 5-year rent freeze for all residents as well as increased investment in social housing availability.

Much as Bavaria demonstrated the benefits of accelerated workforce training and entrances for refugees, another obvious co-benefit to ensuring that refugees can establish a sense of stability and security is their ability to obtain work, pay taxes, and participate in society and the economy.

We can identify the relative successes and failures within Berlin’s policy landscape since 2014 through our previously mentioned variables of temporality, delivery capacity, power relationships, and maintenance: the exogenous shock of Angela Merkel’s suspension of the Dublin Regulation exception for asylum applications exposed the general neglect of Berlin’s asylum office operating capacity (Sebastian Muschter interview, 2018). Thus, policy was completely reformulated, with a new office for asylum created through the first Berlin Masterplan (2016). We can call existing Berlin asylum support policies at that point both political and implementation failures given popular support to revamp the city’s asylum infrastructure.

The policy landscape after that becomes more relativistic. For construction of refugee accommodations before the second Berlin Masterplan (2018), the city government may argue that the policy was successful, as numerous accommodations were developed quickly and refugees were housed in these places, with a centralised first reception centre constructed at Tempelhof to handle initial asylum cases. As previously mentioned, the refugee accommodations were constructed anywhere land was available, including far from residential areas and public transit, placing isolation stresses on refugee residents (Vey,
It was not uncommon to see refugees overstay the maximum recommended time of stay within Tempelhof, and refugee rights advocates continuously criticised its managing company and the Landesamt for poor oversight of the facility (Christiane Beckmann interview, 2018; Karin Windt interview, 2018).

With the election of the red-red-green coalition government in 2016, the second Berlin Masterplan was developed in 2018 and a new residential locality requirement for refugee accommodations was implemented, altering the policy espoused in the previous Masterplan. The Tempelhof facility’s use was not renewed and was closed at the end of 2019, with its operations moving to a defunct hospital in another district. Thus, that policy was a (relative) political and implementation success for those who developed it at the time, though the alteration indicates that it was not favourable with the new governing coalition.

The new governing coalition also instituted monthly meetings with relevant NGOs and community-based organisations after recognising the essential work these organisations did while the Berlin government was unable to accommodate all refugees. This we can consider a relative success on behalf of the organisations and the Berlin government, though some of the groups still remain sceptical that the Berlin government will actively heed their advice (Andreas Tölke interview, 2018).

The differences and similarities between Berlin and Leverkusen are clear, even while their governance structures are both Type II MLG: greater communication and collaboration between local government and the refugee advocacy organisations allowed for greater policy clarity and implementation of both specific housing policies and the neighbourhood integration policies that followed. The essential difference, as referred to by Kjær (2004: 4447), is the utilisation and management of a policy implementation network versus a policy hierarchy, i.e. fostering a community-based approach to policy implementation versus contracted New Public Management-style governance. The policy network style of
governance allows for the inclusion of relevant actors while keeping the city government as a key stakeholder in oversight of a policy issue (Piattoni, 2010: 22).

We can infer that success or failure of refugee housing policy, or at least how durable a policy is, relies on the approach of the city government towards implementing uniform standards across its jurisdiction as well as continuous transparency and consultation with its refugee-facing implementation partners. In other words, rather than taking a ‘feudal’ approach where oversight of an issue is delegated outwards, government (and refugees) benefit from active government participation and coordination in refugee housing because of ensured standards of policy and regulatory maintenance.

Local governments taking a more central role in actively collaborating and partnering with the established non-profit organisations also acted as a way to mobilise organised volunteer efforts, thus ensuring positive contact between refugees and Germans, who can provide the refugees with accurate information because of the coordinated programmes established by the city government and the organisations.

From our juxtaposition and analysis of the two cities, we can simplify our four variables of successful policy through a type-II MLG structure into the following:

1. Active *civic participation* and *entrepreneurship* is co-dependent with city *government leadership* in creating a sustainable policy implementation structure, both for ensuring continuous operational support for policy as well as political support; government support for *volunteer services* should be continuous and localised around refugee accommodations to promote interaction between natives and refugees;

2. Direct, transparent, and active *collaboration and coordination* between civil society groups and the city government is a necessary and essential part of
successful policy governance where power relationships between them are balanced, especially in policy areas where civil society groups contain greater subject area and operational knowledge; city governments must also maintain consistent standards for its accommodations, including in the utilisation of operators, with strong mechanisms for oversight over the internal operations of the accommodations to ensure transparency of standards;

3. Direct consultations with refugee advocacy groups (both separate NGOs and local cultural/religious organisations) is essential in formulating an adequate policy response so as to understand cultural nuances and differences that may arise between the expectations of the local government and the arrived refugees; and

4. There must be multiple avenues for dynamic policy adjustment in the face of recognisable policy failure or shortcomings, either through city government intervention, civil society organisational challenges, or a combination therein.

These lessons and variables will be carried over into the development of the framework in section 7.5. The next section will discuss the other side of the study, perceptions of integration and housing’s role in it.

### 7.4 A Focus on Integration Variables and Housing

This section will utilise several of the key concepts and theories from the integration and housing literature to analyse the responses collected from the interviews conducted in Berlin and Leverkusen. The purpose of this analysis is to elicit the pragmatic experiences of what helped and hindered refugees from both achieving a ‘feeling’ of integration and what role housing played in that experience. Because integration is a subjective experience, commonalities will be looked for from the interview partners.
Those variables will then be considered and utilised in constructing the theoretical framework in the next section. We will look at 3 factorial levels of integration perceptions: what the individual refugee feels helped them personally either feel integrated, or helped them along the path to fuller integration; what the individual felt about their interactions with the community around them, i.e. whether their community interactions were restricted to fellow Syrians or native Germans; and how housing affected their integration perspectives, if at all.

7.4.1 Personal factors

One commonality shared between almost all the interview participants was the difficulty and the awkwardness they felt in trying to speak with Germans they did not already know. Some of the anxiety and hesitancy felt by the interview participants came down to the broadcasting and increased voter share of the far-right *Alternativ für Deutschland* (AfD) party at the time and its views on culling numbers of asylum seekers and migrants, as well as restricting benefits to refugees (BD interview, 2018; HD interview, 2018; LW interview, 2018). Others felt the anxiety of their precarious situations and their backgrounds, mixed with harmful right-wing rhetoric and the imposition of having to adapt to a new culture that was not as familiar as that back in Syria weighed on them in such a way that they could not relate to Germans (MD interview, 2018).

However, all interview participants expressed a desire to interact more with Germans and make more German friends. An obvious hindrance to this, however, is language. Given that hardly any Syrians came to Germany with knowledge of German, much of their communication had to be in English or through a translator as respondents stated many civil servants refused to converse about the asylum process in English. The interactions refugees had with official offices could hinder or help a refugee greatly with understanding both the
society and the systems in which they now had to operate. One refugee who worked extensively with other refugees stated “[s]o I can tell you here in Germany from first step to now, and this everybody says, it’s a matter of luck. How the employee can help and support you, your life will be changed. (QD interview, 2018)"

What this suggests, and is integral within Berry’s (2006) acculturation model, is that how society presents itself to the individual is as important as the individual’s efforts to settle into society. How this is done can vary extensively with disparate results: a government-led intervention to ensure amiable contact through mobilising its civic volunteers would differ considerably from a laissez-faire, disorganised civil society effort to aid. There are obviously many degrees of implementations between those two extremes, one of which can be seen in Berlin’s unprepared and understaffed immediate response to the refugees who had to wait outside the asylum offices for many nights in a row (QD interview, 2018; Karin Windt interview, 2018). This further reinforces Bourhis, et al.’s (1997) main finding, that how a government intervenes will determine how a new population can begin its acculturation process.

Across all interview partners, all agreed that establishing connections with Germans was the most important way not only to begin feeling more comfortable in Germany, but to find a place to live. Given the housing shortages in many German cities, almost all refugee respondents found their housing through friends and volunteers: in Berlin, 83% of respondents (10 out of 12) found their living arrangements at the time of interview (or if their housing situation changed after the interview) through friends, volunteers, or NGO workers rather than through city government allocation; in Leverkusen, 71% of respondents (5 out of 7) found their housing through friends/volunteers, though they started in government accommodations. Because of the Berlin government’s poor initial response, some of the
refugee respondents never stayed in refugee accommodations because of the help of the civil society groups and volunteers.

Even in Leverkusen where the local government’s response was not as unprepared as Berlin’s, the civil society response formed the strongest base on which refugees could find places to live and begin acclimating to German society. However, this response was done in conjunction with the Leverkusen government rather than due to its perceived impotence, and led to streamlining some refugees as volunteer workers (AQL interview, 2019).

For those refugees who arrive with family, have family already in Germany, or have family in Syria who are trying to reach Germany, an integral part of their integration journey is ensuring that the family is able to remain together, or ensuring that they can arrive in Germany with a secured status. One respondent experienced a great deal of stress with the housing authorities in Berlin because he [an adult] was not able to stay with his younger brother [a minor], who was staying in a youth camp before his family was able to arrive (PD interview, 2018).

Other refugees hold a constant anxiety over their families’ situations in Syria, given many escaped the country to avoid being forced to fight for Assad’s government and now fear their families may face reprisal for that action (MPL interview, 2019). Reunification with one’s loved ones brings a sense of relief as well as a sense of home, and the family member who has resided in Germany longer can give extensive help for their family members’ acclimation (DD interview, 2018).

This points to an important delineation between housing and home (Parsell, 2012), and it is one that must be taken into account when states/cities make integration policies: family constitutes an integral aspect of integration for those whose loved ones are not yet safely settled.
Along with that, all refugee interview partners stated that a fast transition to normalised housing (especially without status renewal burdens) was key in lending them a sense of stability and safety from which they could pursue education, work, or simply focus on a return to a sense of normalcy. This entails a troubled consideration of differences between asylum statuses, where one status will allow for family reunification while another is severely restricted, which will be delineated below.

7.4.2 Community access

For refugee accommodations based in communities, organisations near or within that community are able to provide social programmes or events both within and around refugee accommodations (Jürgen Dreyer interview, 2019). In Leverkusen, sprachcafés are offered by NGOs as a way through which refugees can interact with Germans and learn about German society, as well as for Germans to learn about refugees (KPL interview, 2019). This serves a dual purpose: helping refugees overcome the fear of interaction and anxiety that comes with being immersed in a different culture, and removing any sort of perceived stigma that Germans may have about refugees, i.e. by actively promoting contact between the perceived ‘different groups’, the boundaries of differentiation can gradually lower (Allport, 1954).

Sprachcafés are also places for refugees to make friends which, as previously stated, is possibly the most important method by which to find housing in Germany by making contacts. For Leverkusen, because there is a lower barrier for refugees to enter housing, this can mean an accelerated private space away from the often crowded and lower-privacy refugee accommodations with the right connections (KPL interview, 2019; YSL interview, 2019).

Having a centred community meeting place, such as a sprachcafe, also encourages refugees with more established lives in Germany to donate some of their time to newly
arrived refugees who are still uncertain of how, for example, to find housing. Refugees already familiar with German can help bridge communication gaps (KPL interview, 2019; AQL interview, 2019).

An interesting model of community access is that run by the organisations Give Something Back to Berlin (GSBTB) and Refugio, which operates within a network of other community and refugee-facing organisations. Within the organisations (and the building itself) is a ‘sharehaus’ model of housing for refugees, with German residents also living in the building side-by-side. Refugees are able to obtain apartments in the building, while downstairs is a café and community space where sprachcafes and other community interaction events occur regularly. “I would say, for the newcomers, it is a motivation to reach for a stable life in Germany. We could just support them, with answering letters, being there, encourage each other to not be frustrated with all the paperwork. (Give Something Back to Berlin interview, 2018)”

Much like the Startblok programme in Amsterdam (see Czischke & Huisman, 2018), GSBTB and Refugio formed a community around refugees rather than implanting refugees into a community. In Berlin’s case, this kind of community establishment may be a consequence of relative organisational detachment from city government policies regarding refugee housing. While Give Something Back to Berlin began in 2013, the Refugio concept began the Summer of Migration in 2015, as a response to the influx and the lack of organised or focused centralised response to homeless refugees (Give Something Back to Berlin interview, 2018; Katina Schubert interview, 2018).

7.4.3 Housing as the ‘base’

Housing emerged as a focal point when refugees arrived in Germany, both in practical and theoretical applications: the most pressing issue was, ostensibly, where people can stay.
immediately despite the lack of prepared areas by the government. Questions arose about housing allowances and allocations: should refugees be given the right to obtain a private accommodation upon arrival, or must they wait in a refugee accommodation? Should there be a minimum amount of time spent in an accommodation? Should there be a maximum amount of time? Should these accommodations be made temporary with materials only rated to last up to 10 or so years, or should they eventually be converted into fully functional residences? Most importantly, where should accommodations be built, if they are built? What space is there to convert into at least a temporary residence?

Each state and city in Germany handled these questions differently leading to different outcomes for refugees.

We start, first, with refugee-specific accommodations. In Berlin, these were constructed quickly with materials typically only rated to last a limited amount of time, and were operated by a number of different organisations under Senate remit. One of the most visible refugee residences was the one at Tempelhof airfield, on which modular accommodations were constructed. While monitored by the local Bezirksam, a civil servant working in the office expressed frustration with how the Senate and Landesamt handled its contracting process and how often operators changed, which also changed oversight interaction (Tempelhof Bezirksamt representative interview, 2018).

The constant change of housing operators in Berlin caused frustration for refugees and care workers given the different standards under which each company would operate. Further, the respondents interviewed did not want to spend time in the accommodations because they were so crowded, noisy, and had poor climate controls (LD interview, 2018; PD interview, 2018; Christiane Beckmann interview, 2018; et al.). Many spent their time going to places where they could meet others, either community spaces such as those offered by GSBTB, churches, or elsewhere, if they could. One simple reason for this is that there was
virtually no way to learn or retain German while learning it if one were to stay in the accommodations all the time (KD interview, 2018; KPL interview, 2019; YSL interview, 2019). Another reason is the lack of privacy found in accommodations, as, depending on the accommodation, one individual could share a small room with three others, or more, an obvious health hazard and a cause of conflicts between those sharing a space (HD interview, 2018; YSL interview, 2019).

Location thus becomes a central aspect in refugee housing, especially in first reception and subsequent refugee accommodations. Refugees who are placed in accommodations in remote areas will not have access to community resources, such as those made available by community-oriented organisations and NGOs.

Families that arrive together will also typically first be placed into a refugee accommodation, though depending on which accommodation it is, the size of the space may vary considerably: “[W]e were four people in like a 20-meter room... It was pretty small. We barely, we literally slept next to each other and it was, we were lucky that it was winter, I can’t even imagine it in summer. But it was so annoying because, my sister is 28, my father is older than old, plus of course and I’m not a child anymore and I would like my privacy, all of us would. (ZD interview, 2018)”

The city of Berlin recommends for refugees to stay in refugee accommodations (heims or modular accommodations) for longer durations of time because of how oversaturated the private housing market is (Land Berlin, 2019). However, not all refugees were aware that they had the right to search for private apartments in Berlin, sometimes due to implicit policies stating that social workers should encourage refugees to remain in the accommodations (Hamann & El-Kayed, 2018), a misapprehension experienced by a respondent where she was informed that if she tried to rent a private place before obtaining her settled status, it would affect her chances of remaining in Germany (QD interview, 2018).
Moving into a private space for a refugee is an uncertain and anxious process, as QD described (QD interview, 2018). There is a language and comprehension gap with regard to how rental processes work. Some of the interview partners in Leverkusen had guidance from volunteers who went along with them to meet landlords and view apartments/rooms in order to ensure the refugees get fair treatment, as it is common that refugees may be taken advantage of when searching for places to rent. Many respondents, both refugee and NGO workers/advocates, said it was common knowledge that there are landlords who charge several thousand more euros than should be allowed under the law, with some respondents admitting to paying more because they do not want to deal with legal issues and simply wanted a place to live (QD interview, 2018; ZD interview, 2018; Karin Windt interview, 2018).

Lack of guidance about how housing policies and the rental market work can act as a detriment towards integration, given the inherent untrustworthiness of having to pay excessive amounts of their monthly stipend/income towards renting a place that may otherwise be affordable, and impresses further anxiety about monetary security. In this case, structuring a stable volunteer-guided programme, such as that which occurs within Leverkusen, becomes a method by which to cut through any shady dealings that are likely to arise when refugees attempt to tackle the housing market without any prior experience or knowledge. Related to this, because of the over-saturation of the German housing market, the most common way refugees and non-refugees alike find housing (especially in Berlin) is by word of mouth or through friends. Almost all of the respondents living in private accommodations found their place through friends or contacts rather than through formal ‘room available’ ads. This points to the absolute importance of encouraging the growth of contact networks (i.e. social bonds and bridges from Ager and Strang, 2008) among refugees and the native population (as per the interculturalist school of thought, Zapata-Barrero,
2015), as those respondents who lived with Germans said they acquired the language faster than when they were living either in refugee accommodations or among non-German speakers (XD interview, 2018; DD interview, 2018), and those who were in school or studying while living in the accommodations had trouble due to the noise, lack of privacy, or poor climate control (HD interview, 2018; PD interview, 2018).

As one would expect in a crowded city, many refugees end up in homeless shelters. Unfortunately there is no solid measurement of how many refugees have to resort to living in a shelter, but even refugees who can speak good German and have jobs have to live in shelters even while the conditions are poor (BD interview, 2018). Currently, Berlin has enacted a new programme to set aside housing for both homeless and refugees, however this has come under criticism by refugee advocacy groups as treating refugees as if they were in the same qualification as chronically homeless, where afflictions and health issues would be the same between the two (Christiane Beckmann interview, 2018).

One of the primary difficulties faced by refugees in attempting to attain or maintain a private residence is trying to navigate the paperwork and bureaucracy implemented by the state. In Berlin, because refugees have to answer to different offices about their living status, job status, etc., and often must send their important documents to these individual offices for weeks or months at a time while simultaneously needing those documents to search for a place to live, they experience a great deal of stress about their housing status, as well as their permanent residency (DD interview, 2018; ZD interview, 2018; Andreas Tölke interview, 2018). Because of the competitive rental market, by the time refugees get clearance to move the room may be taken. They may also miss out on other opportunities (class registrations, ausbildung programmes, etc.) because they do not have their official documents on hand.

They often require help from friends or volunteers to understand the technical language used on the documents, though even native Germans sometimes found the phrasing
confusing or excessive and the requirements to be arduous: “If for a German people it’s complicated, how could we do it, explain it? How could we make it? That was a big problem for us, and sometimes I ask, when it’s so complicated for a German person, why the office didn’t make a simple solution, simple rules about it that they make it in an easy language so people can understand it? (AWL interview, 2019)”

While both cities face housing shortages and difficulties constructing new housing, maintaining a model of structured support and contact between refugees and civil society determines the difference between proactive and delayed private housing, which, as previously demonstrated, is a primary indicator that one’s integration process is well underway.

States of private housing and apartments can vary widely given location and general upkeep; however, all respondents who were in private residences rather than refugee accommodations expressed both relief and happiness that they were not living in the accommodations anymore. While it may be unreasonable to demand that every refugee be allotted a private apartment upon arrival, it is important to recognise the necessity for a person to have privacy, stability, and a sense of agency over their choices in life after having to flee a traumatic situation. Housing, specifically the ability for refugees to attain private residences, should be a priority for cities when deciding how to structure their policies regarding refugee reception.

Table 5 summarises the objectives for both the government and the civil society organisations in the realms of governance and integration. The next section will take the important aspects and variables surrounding policy implementation and governance described in the MLG section and the variables around integration and housing presented in this section and coalesce them into a functionally specific theoretical framework.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Governance objectives</th>
<th>Government</th>
<th>Civil society organisations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>● Ensuring a sustainable population turnover within refugee accommodations with expeditious asylum decisions</td>
<td>● Ensuring government meets legal standards for wellbeing of refugees</td>
<td>● Provides platforms for volunteer initiatives and supporting refugees with those initiatives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>● Maintaining a steady rate of new housing construction throughout city for general populace, including subsidised housing for low-income groups</td>
<td>● Oversee volunteers for sensitivity training on any issues that may arise</td>
<td>● Working to help refugees move into private accommodations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>● Ensuring provision of formal government integration benefits</td>
<td>● Maintaining communication and collaboration with governance partners</td>
<td>● Actively collaborating with representative cultural groups</td>
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<tr>
<td>● Ensuring development of further refugee accommodations, if needed, are situated within communities</td>
<td>● Maintaining active and consistent communication and collaboration with governance partners</td>
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<tr>
<th>Integration objectives</th>
<th>Government</th>
<th>Civil society organisations</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>● Ensuring refugees spend as little time as possible in the mass accommodations before moving into private accommodations</td>
<td>● Helping refugees with technicalities of adjusting to new society, i.e. facing bureaucratic hurdles, providing volunteer translators, etc.</td>
<td>● Involving civil society and promoting contact between natives and refugees</td>
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<tr>
<td>● Continuous support for community integration programmes focused on refugee accommodations</td>
<td>● Promote creation of or consult directly with cultural groups representative of refugee populations</td>
<td>● Be able to refer refugees to various societal resources</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>● Support for medical aid for refugees who need it, including psychological help</td>
<td>● Promote creation of or consult directly with cultural groups representative of refugee populations</td>
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<tr>
<td>● Promote creation of or dialogue with cultural groups to consult with policies as needed</td>
<td>● Be able to refer refugees to various societal resources</td>
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| Steer direction of policies at lower district level (if relevant) | from refugee countries of origin, if available |

Table 5: Essential variables and duties for governments and NGOs in the theoretical model

7.5 Building a Framework

Following from the previous sections and chapters, this section will construct a theoretical ‘best practice’ framework around implementation of a Type II MLG refugee housing policy. We have taken lessons from both empirical cases in Berlin and Leverkusen,
as both cities serve as unique examples of policy responses to the refugee influx while operating within both Type I and Type II MLG structures. We have also looked at the relative successes and failures of both cities’ responses and taken into account differing factors that can affect how cities respond to refugee movements, such as population density, location, housing availability, et al. While it is impossible to account for all types of locational idiosyncrasies with a single theoretical model, it is our hope that this model is generalisable across the vast majority of municipalities, and can be implemented successfully.

The following sections will describe the important variables from our study of MLG and policy implementation, and then from integration and housing, and how they fit into the overall model. Then we will provide a simplified visual representation of the model to demonstrate how, in theory, such a structure would operate. Finally, we will discuss the potential applicability of the model in the current atmosphere surrounding asylum governance in European municipalities.

7.5.1 MLG variables

While Berlin and Leverkusen are different at a glance, with differing land sizes and populations, they share similarities in governance structures: the local government is able to formulate policies determining how refugees are housed, what partners are utilised for contracting/policy implementation, as well as how these policies are regulated and how durable they are. They also share a common problem found in most German cities: a chronic housing shortage. However, these two cities have tackled the policies surrounding refugee housing in considerably different ways, though both within Type II MLG frames.

A more stratified system of policy governance and implementation, where operators of refugee accommodations are chosen by limited contract, with those contracts up for renewal upon review can cause confusion and frustration both for the local Bezirksamt and
the residents of the accommodations. Furthermore, in some cases oversight and regulation of these operators has been lax and led to issues with the refugee occupants, who then have trouble reporting those issues to the Berlin Landesamt.

Thus, *consistency of management* becomes a key part of establishing policy governance. As we have seen from Leverkusen, trust between the NGOs and the city government is high because they have implemented a durable, long-term collaborative model of governance over refugee accommodations with proven success in both placing refugees in private housing and saving the city money on expenses regarding refugee accommodation. Part of this has to do with the division of duties between social workers employed in refugee accommodations, where there are social workers employed by both the city and the NGOs in each accommodation. This active division of labour encourages both transparency and accountability.

What this requires is *active and regular collaboration* between the city government and the relevant NGO partners without resorting to time-limited paid contracting. Relationships must be established without regard for profit or cost-savings, as it is more important to ensure quality care rather than budget effectiveness. Cost-savings can be ensured, first, by encouraging refugees to enter the private housing market (alongside the city actively engaging in housing construction); the Leverkusen Model has exemplified that aiding refugees to leave accommodations and find their own living space will produce costsavings. Second, it can also be ensured by the longer-term benefit private housing has on refugee’s integration efforts, such as through language acquisition or through the ability to have privacy.

The establishment of longer, durable relationships between city government and NGOs requires regular contact and meetings between them, as well as a mitigation of onesided power relationships, i.e. government engineering policy by contract rather than
partnership or collaboration. This has begun in Berlin with monthly meetings between the
government and the NGOs, though we have seen in Leverkusen that meetings are weekly,
and sometimes more than once a week between the relevant actors, with communication
consistently flowing between them. In a more tightly knit collaborative model, city
government must treat the relevant NGOs as governing partners and equals rather than
contracted clients. Part of this emerges with the shared duties of social workers in
accommodations, while much of it comes from how civil servants work with NGO members
and vice versa.

Constant, regular meetings and active communication between the city government
and the NGOs is needed to ensure that policies are being implemented efficaciously and to a
standard that would ensure, for instance, that refugees only spend 6 months on average in a
refugee accommodation before being moved into their own private residence.

Refugee accommodations themselves should be situated in communities, or as close
to communities as possible to allow for active civil society involvement. This is where local
government operates within a Type I structure rather than a Type II: building permits and
construction laws may face backlash from some members of the community (or the district
administration) about constructing a refugee accommodation near to a specific
neighbourhood or in a particular place. In Berlin, the city government has taken the initiative
to implement direct edicts that refugee accommodations will be constructed in Bezirke
without recourse; in Leverkusen, the existing accommodations were constructed within
neighbourhoods, though a new one is proposed somewhat further outside the city than the
existing accommodations, facing backlash from members of the civil service and the NGOs.

Further, it is not enough to regularly construct refugee accommodations, which are
largely degradable with limited life-spans: as the refugee influx has made patently clear,
cities must ensure that housing construction can match projected population growth even
without the surprise addition of refugees. This requires consistent city government
interjection to guarantee a high percentage of all new housing units built are for low-income
and vulnerable populations, rather than allowing persistent gentrification or overdevelopment
of housing by private financial interests. Both Berlin and Leverkusen have enacted new
building programmes and laws as a reaction to the refugee influx, but this is a policy that
should not be reactionary; rather, it has to remain consistent both to ensure an adequate and
durable housing stock for regular population increases and the ensure that rent rates do not
rise outside of a minimum inflationary amount.

Finally, city government must be willing to facilitate the creation of representative
diaspora groups if they do not already exist. These groups, usually composed of migrants
from those countries, can help facilitate refugee integration by guiding refugees through the
necessary bureaucratic rapids that inevitably arise with asylum in Germany. Local
government support for these groups demonstrates implicit integration support for newly
arrived refugees, as encouraging the creation of diasporic groups centralises a location for,
first, language-specific translators, and second, cultural familiarity.

In conclusion, the active facets of MLG being brought into the theoretical framework
are: durable structures of collaborative governance not determined by time-limited paid
contracts; active and responsive communication between the NGO partners and the local
government; sharing duties within refugee accommodations to ensure transparency of work
and accountability; embedding refugee accommodations within communities to ensure direct
access to civil society groups and neighbourhood resources; dedicated housing construction
by city government, as well as assurances on rent control; and support for the creation of
diasporic groups within the city.

Secondary facets, such as power relations, are embedded into the collaborative
aspects of governance and are mitigated by those aspects to ensure that one side does not
dominate the other, as well as maintain transparency so that each side is accountable for any actions that may hinder efficient policy implementation. Because the governance partners all desire the same general outcome, i.e. efficient delivery of policy, power is ceded to the larger whole in exchange for collaboration.

7.5.2 Integration variables

Those who arrive in a new country as refugees generally want to learn the native language (if they do not know it already) and wish to return to a sense of normality, i.e. not be treated as a refugee. This usually means returning to work, going to school, etc. as soon as they are able to. However, there is obviously a necessity for refugees to become acclimated to the new country in which they have asylum, especially one in which they do not speak the native language. Thus, efforts promoting contact between citizens and refugees ensures that refugees can have a basis on which to begin understanding the nuances of the new country.

Integration itself is a wholly personal and subjective experience of how the individual perceives him or herself within their new society. Do they identify themselves as a refugee within a host country, or a resident? Do they feel welcome, or still outside the ‘bubble’ of society despite knowing the language, having an education/job, etc.? The efforts to ensure that this subjective experience depend on how the government orients itself towards both refugees and the organisations dedicated to helping them acclimate to their new country.

How this can be achieved depends partly on central/city government leadership and coordination of volunteer efforts with relevant NGOs. Leverkusen’s government has dedicated volunteer coordinators who communicate directly with NGOs to guarantee that volunteers are always available to refugees who require their help, whether it is with attending a doctor’s appointment or registering one’s child in school. This effort is less pronounced in Berlin given the relationship between the refugee-facing organisations and the
Berlin government began as icy, but may increase with increased communication and interaction within the scope of the now-regular meetings.

Volunteers and positive interactions with native Germans helped refugees understand central government documents, learn German faster, and navigate the ins and outs of the housing market in Leverkusen. The primary difference here between Berlin and Leverkusen is the limiting factor of assigned status: those who were able to move from the refugee accommodations without restriction felt less confined than those who were restricted to a minimum amount of time spent in them and could better acclimate themselves to their new surroundings.

This is also where embeddedness in communities demonstrates its importance: with greater access to community resources, i.e. local organisations, sprachcafes, sports clubs, etc., more interaction can occur with the native population, which is the lynchpin of almost all modes and theoretical assertions about integration previously stated (see Allport, 1954; Zapata-Barrero, 2014). This also demonstrates the importance of housing within the realm of integration: where and how a refugee is housed can largely determine how they perceive their integration to progress.

Diasporic groups speak to a transnationalistic element within integration (see Sert, 2012) and can facilitate a refugee’s acclimation to Germany. Several interview partners were in active contact or a part of a diasporic group in their respective cities, and one of the interview partners in Leverkusen contributed to the creation of a Kurdish organisation within Leverkusen, whose creation was also facilitated by the Leverkusen government. Diasporic groups can then partner with the local government and other NGOs to create events and promote interculturalism to bridge any hesitance on behalf of both the native population and newly arrived refugees.
Small things, such as the ability to cook within one’s residence, is a positive marker of comfort in one’s own place, as refugees interviewed for this project all stated dissatisfaction with being unable to cook in refugee accommodations. Other small but important aspects include the ability to furnish one’s space with personal belongings and items of cultural significance (books, furniture, etc), as well as the simple ability to choose where one lives (or have the means to choose where one lives by navigating the housing market). This further promotes the idea of encouraging refugees into the private housing market, or for cities to construct refugee accommodations into a more liveable space akin to an apartment or house; however, the latter is less likely given refugee accommodations are often built quickly and, as previously mentioned, to a limited lifespan.

In conclusion, the important aspects of integration utilised by this theoretical model are: encouragement of positive interaction between civil society and refugees through promotion of volunteer efforts; ensuring access to community resources for refugees by situating accommodations within communities and neighbourhoods; encouragement for refugees to enter the private housing market without restriction for status; facilitating the creation of or contact with diasporic groups; and the creation of intercultural offerings to ensure contact and cross-cultural understanding.

7.5.3 Envisioning a Theoretical Framework

Before we create a physical representation of our theoretical ‘best practice’ framework, we should both list out the essential variables for integration and governance that the model will utilise, as well as envision an ideal timeline of arrivals and asylum integration procedures in order to better understand how this model will fit within the general framework of an asylum system. Table 4 (above) shows the table listing out the prime duties for
governments and their NGO partners in the model, while Figure 11 shows the flowchart of the time from arrival to an ideal move into private accommodation.

In this flowchart, ideal times for asylum application assessments should be considered within as fast a time as possible in order to allow for refugees to settle into the country and avoid living in first reception centres for extended periods of time. In the past, wait times for asylum decisions in Germany have eclipsed a year or more, with some applicants having to wait months for a first interview (Beirens, 2018: 13-15). Asylum benefits (stipend, classes, etc.) should begin for all upon the at the start of the asylum process rather than once a decision as to status is reached, given possible lengthy delays in an asylum decision that can severely hinder both integration prospects for refugees and overall mental health (ECRE, 2016; LD interview, 2018).

In addition to this, differentiated rights based on tiers of asylum status should not be taken into account for refugees to receive a right to better housing conditions or integration benefits. While this may seem a polemic statement, one need only to look at differentiations in statuses granted to Syrian asylum seekers: as of BAMF’s December 2019 statistics for the year, 22,705 asylum seekers were given full refugee status while 15,173 were given subsidiary protection (BAMF, 2019a: 3). The differences between asylum status and subsidiary protection, while seemingly small, are actually large: asylum entitles one to a 3-year residence permit with the possibility of extension, while subsidiary protection only entitles one to a 1-year residence permit, and an application for extension may be denied if the factors that caused one to be granted subsidiary protection, i.e. danger of harm or unlawful imprisonment, are found to no longer exist or are not sufficient to warrant an

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49 As a response to the inflated wait times experienced by many refugees in 2014/2015, Germany opted to ‘fasttrack’ applicants for statuses if they were from a country that received greater than 50% approval for an asylum status. This has mainly pertained to Syrians, who, in the most recent statistics released by the BAMF, have a status approval of more than 95%.
extension (Wallis, 2019). The continual precarity and slow response times of government offices handling refugee official documents leads to stress and lost integration time (see 7.4.3).

Asylum status also allows for family reunification, while that right under subsidiary protection was effectively abolished in 2018 in Germany and replaced with a monthly limit of 1,000 visa applications total granted to family members of those with subsidiary protection (see European Council on Refugees and Exiles, 2020). As stated by interview partners, reunification and bringing one’s family safely to Germany is a primary contributor to ensuring a sense of home in the country (KPL interview, 2019; DD interview, 2018; PD interview, 2018).

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*Figure 10- A flowchart describing the general process of arrival and asylum application for our ideal model.*
This allocation of standard rights across asylum statuses should also apply, ideally, to those refugees whose cases may have been given an initial rejection but are under appeal.

At the time of writing, there is no foreseeable end to the Syrian civil war, which raises the question of why there would be a difference in assigned asylum status if the country’s humanitarian situation is largely unchanged i.e. hazardous to civilians. Subsidiary protection is only temporary and granted with a “view to returning [them] to their country of origin” (Gesetzentwurf der Bundesregierung, 2016: 1). Removing the arbitrary roadblocks of different asylum statuses removes a high degree of stress for refugees, especially when they require their various documents (passport, resident ID, insurance card, etc.) to apply for different things within Germany, often in timeframes very close to each other, such as subsidised housing, extension of status, education, etc. and must wait until they receive their documents back from one government body to apply with another (ZD interview, 2018; DD interview, 2018).

From the first reception centre, refugees should be moved into more stable living conditions as soon as possible. This is obviously dependent upon what the city has available for use, but ideally there would be a dormitory-style facility available for temporary living where refugees can have a better sense of privacy and from where they can establish a semblance of normalcy while looking for a private living space. These spaces should have access to NGO/government psychosocial aid (such as through a dedicated office within the residence) so that refugees can have direct help with queries related to government paperwork, registering for classes, etc.

Figure 11 is a simplified representation of how our theoretical best practice model over refugee housing policy governance would look in practice.
The local government and the civil society organisations are joint proprietors of governance surrounding refugee housing, and policies surrounding refugee housing. This entails collaborative governance and active communication between the groups, where formal meetings are held at regular intervals but informal communication is expected and continuous. The city government, as expected, has prudence over housing provision in the sense of allotting building spaces/locations for construction or conversion of refugee accommodation, while the civil society partners have input about location. There is joint operation of the accommodations, with duties shared rather than split.

The city government is also responsible for ensuring that refugee accommodations are stationed near essential community resources, i.e. proximity to schools, groceries, public transit, etc. Community resources also contains volunteer initiatives, *sprachcafes*, etc., whether it comes from religious organisations or otherwise. In cases where there is devolved administration (but not policymaking), i.e. how the *Bezirke* relate to the Berlin government,
the devolved administrative district must be as involved with the NGO partners as the city government, if not more so. For larger cities with ‘independent’ district offices that oversee refugee accommodations within the district borders, it is expected that these offices will collaborate with NGO partners/accommodation operators just as the city government would if the city were smaller and did not have individual district offices.

While the primary structure of this model adheres to Type II MLG, it still fits the Type I structure found within the city-district government structure.

The aforementioned MLG and integration variables all fit within the scope of the model with the equal responsibility given to the city government and the NGO partners to ensure an effective implementation of housing policies. Because of the active collaboration, transparency between the actors is maximised and can become normalised over time. This normalisation creates a consistency of policies and operations over both refugee accommodations and policies regarding refugee’s rights over accessing the private housing market.

While this framework is derived from the lessons learned from studying the policy successes and failures of both Leverkusen and Berlin, this model would require implementations testing and continued study to determine its efficacy and rigour in ensuring consistency in housing and integration policy implementation. The hope is that it is generalisable across the spectrum of cities and different modes of government, and that it is of use in improving the policy responsiveness of cities where refugees find themselves living. Implementations testing circles us back to perceptions of policy success and failure and the relativistic qualities therein. In terms of a city implementing the framework, we can see two possibilities for their existing or previous refugee housing policy: either it was relatively successful but the city wants to build on what they have to improve their ability to move refugees into private spaces, or their previous housing policy was regarded as a failure, either
by the government, the populace, the refugees themselves, or a combination therein. The former posits an easier transition into the policy governance of the framework than the latter, as they have an existing infrastructure on which to build and likely have active relationships with the local NGO/refugee-facing organisations.

Building off a failed policy, however, becomes more difficult especially in the face of perceptions of anomie and ‘blame games’ by all sides for why/how the policy broke down. One cannot simply walk into a government office, lay down a framework for a new policy mechanism and feel victorious at the positive change to come. Even in the case of Leverkusen, where their eponymous Model has existed since 2002, the Leverkusen government and the NGOs were antagonistic towards each other leading up to the recommendation of a high-ranking civil servant to attempt a pilot programme of the basis for the Model. If not for that intervention, it is likely there would not have been a pilot project to test whether the Model could achieve positive outcomes for both sides.

In the case of building a new policy after reeling from a failed one, assessing or pronouncing a cause of failure can lead to further antagonism from one side or the other due to the political unwillingness or political ‘poison pill’ of admitting one’s failure in the wake of possible electoral change due to the issue failure, especially where one side (be it government, NGO, etc.) was perceived as negligent in duty or as a ‘fiscal black hole’, i.e. pocketing or frivolously spending money on immaterial things that should have been used for policy implementation. Re-establishing a sense of trust and transparency thus becomes a key in reconciling relations and building up a new foundation for a policy, which then must cause the pre-existing power relationships from the failed policy to ebb. Ensuring no one party dominates the other allows for greater policy dynamism, though this may also cause the policy to become watered down depending on the demands of either side. How all parties learn to surmount their own desires and can cede some stronger policy ideas to ensure
continued effective policy implementation will be one of the determinants of how successful and durable a policy could be.

We also cannot assume from the framework that a city that chooses to implement its structure will have a perceptual success in implementing its refugee housing policy. As referred to in the section on policy failure (Marsh & McConnell, 2010), it is entirely possible for one of many things to go pear-shaped, whether there is political backlash from more nationalistic/xenophobic elements of the political parties or perceptions of financial embellishment or ‘waste of resources’ through the policy, or something else. This framework does not claim to be a panacea for policy shortfalls that cities experience; it is simply the result of learning lessons from two instances of different policy reactions to a refugee influx, and proposing that these lessons can contribute to our understanding of one way of how refugee housing policy can be implemented effectively given a certain governance structure.

7.6 Conclusion

This chapter attempted to coalesce the various strands of MLG and integration literature, as well as the examples of policy success and failure from the empirical cases of Leverkusen and Berlin, into a functionally specific Type II theoretical framework covering refugee housing policy in cities.

Within Berlin, which has experienced significant policy change since 2014, important developments such as the government’s dicta that refugee accommodations must be built within districts without the possibility of veto, as well as the implementation of regular meetings between the government and civil society organisations, were imported for the framework. Aspects of policy inadequacy, such as inconsistency in housing policies and advice given to refugees, and disconnects between the government and civil society, were also accounted for.
Within Leverkusen, which has utilised a consistent model of partnership since 2002, important facets of the policy such as direct collaboration between the government and the civil society organisations, as well as shared duties within refugee accommodations were imported for the framework. Aspects of policy inadequacy, such as the government’s proposed construction of a refugee accommodation away from a neighbourhood, were also accounted for.

Common definitions and analytical perspectives of policy success and failure were applied to both cities to derive key structural variables for the theoretical framework. From these structural variables we also explained some of the more general concepts that fit within the variables and linked them to the styles of governance within a type-II structure to demonstrate how these concepts, such as social connections helping obtainment of private housing, can be implemented through the framework.

Collaborative governance through direct partnership with refugee advocacy organisations was found to be largely beneficial for both the city government and the city’s refugees because these organisations act as connective tissue between the refugees’ and the new society’s relatively distinct perspectives. In addition, governments must spearhead a policy of continuous housing market adjustment for population growth over time; as observed in both Leverkusen and Berlin, the cities’ neglect of housing development resulted in a saturated housing market with very little leeway to properly adjust to a growing population, let alone the population shock that came from the sudden infusion of refugees to each city. This also involves increasing investment in social housing for the cities, something that experienced a drastic reduction at the end of the 20th and beginning of the 21st centuries.

By investing in both a sustainable housing development plan and in mutually supportive integration programmes, cities can ensure that refugees who arrive can begin their
integration processes on day 1, allowing them to pick up the local language faster (if needed) and adapt to the new cultural setting in which they live.

The framework seeks to be applicable to cities across a diverse array of city government structures, and will hopefully be tested in the future to demonstrate its rigour.

Chapter 8: For the Benefit of Europe: Reflections on the relevance and lessons of the study on both Germany and municipalities across Europe

8.1 Introduction

This chapter will reflect on the study, both its normative and pragmatic relevance for Germany and the greater European asylum framework, and how the framework developed in the previous chapter can be implemented and adjusted across European cities. Taking considerations from the previous chapters on Berlin and Leverkusen and the lessons learned from policy failure and success, we will discuss how other cities across Europe have generally responded to the ongoing situation and whether they abide by or contravene their national governments. Future directions for research of these cities and their refugee housing infrastructure would be conducive to deeper knowledge and policy variation by governance style, and would only serve to facilitate greater interweaving and communication across city and state borders in order to exchange ideas and establish more sustainable policies going forward; for now, we will only overview systems of refugee housing already studied in academia given the comparative nature of this chapter.

We will also reflect on the discussion of which level has more sway in integration policies, i.e. states or localities, given the results of our study. Throughout the development
of Germany’s national integration laws (see Chapter 2) and programmes, we have seen cities taking the ‘first leaps’ into more inclusive and progressive measures, such as through Berlin’s integration plan preceding the national one, the federal state of North Rhine-Westphalia enacting its *Integrationsgesetz* several years before the country did and with greater measures to ensure facilitated integration through qualifications recognition, and from examples of Cologne, Bonn, and Düsseldorf requesting that Germany take in more refugees rather than restricting their access to asylum in the country through the externalised borders of the EU, among others.

First, we will ask whether states or localities lead in integration policy, or if the answer lays somewhere in between. The repercussions of this balance (or lack thereof, depending on the country) of centralised decision-making with regard to integration policies will be explored, looking at examples of local versus state practices. What impact does this difference of conceptual policy centres have on refugees? What impact does it have on cities when the national government has a greater say in determining how integration is conducted at the local level, and vice versa? This area of study is relatively new (see Bauder & Gonzalez, 2018; Bendel, et al., 2019; Borkert & Bosswick, 2007; Emilsson, 2015; et al.) within the realm of European asylum given the recency of the EU’s development of a ‘common’ asylum system and the foibles within, and is worth exploring conceptually as cities become policy innovators in the field of refugee integration due to the exigency of refugee flows from the Middle East and Africa.

We will then discuss how cities engage in policy learning through networks facilitated by cities themselves, states, and the EU, as well as through transnational NGOs. Examples of policy and idea dissemination will be given to demonstrate that, while policy ideas may not be ascribed to single areas of what may be regarded as ‘best practice’, they are still able to take hold and influence development of new policies. More importantly, we will
also review to what degree a networked organisation can influence policy development or change, and whether NGOs are limited in what and how they can influence governments based on how the NGOs are organisationally structured.

This chapter will also look at the use of bordering and the externalisation of borders throughout the EU, as it relates to aspects of how we conceive both house and home through access to the right of reunification and integration within EU states and the normative paradox of bordering and asylum for the EU. Bordering has come to signify the externalisation of ‘the other’ from accessing societal benefits and integrative aspects, presenting the other with more ‘hoops to jump’, as a method of isolating a country’s cultural and political systems and structures from any influence perceived as ‘outsider’ (Collyer, et al., 2020). Complexities surrounding the Dublin Regulation will be touched upon, as well as how housing at the fringes of the EU, i.e. those structures made within isolated and fenced camps reflect on our understanding of the promise of asylum and integration within the EU, both in the quasi-legal sense and the humanitarian sense.

Our discussion of bordering will also touch on the preferential treatment given to refugees of some nationalities over others, as well as the ‘pragmatic’ argument in favour of refugee allocations, i.e. that countries that are expected to experience demographic ageing and degradation should take in refugees to replace its ageing tax base and fill work sector gaps that have emerged as economies have shifted towards more technical work than trade work. We argue that the desire to utilise refugees as ‘work replacement’ is illogical given that numbers of refugee intake will always be too low to account for work sector shortages. We will finish off this chapter with a look to the future and how Germany and Europe should adapt to what is expected to be an overall increase in migratory movements to Europe due to estimations surrounding global warming and conflicts that may develop from it. The expected increase in climate-related migration will impact cities as climate refugees seek to
readjust their lives by adopting new employment or seeking to return to their previous fields of employ; how cities can sustainably adjust to the pressures imposed by global warming while ensuring climate refugees and migrants (see Burrows & Kinney, 2016; Puaschunder, 2020) are able to enjoy equal access to citizens’ social rights is one area our new theoretical framework can touch upon.

We focus on these values because they set the groundwork for how a city postures itself with regard to their refugee housing and integration policies, and whether or not they have the leeway to act independently by national law. These values also establish how a city
may act towards a national government where outlooks and goals surrounding refugee intake and integration clash, and ultimately help us understand the context in which the research questions are couched and how the local level affects integration policies.

8.2 States as leaders, or localities?

In 2018, the mayors of Bonn, Cologne, and Düsseldorf, neighbouring cities in the German state of North-Rhein Westphalia, published an open letter to Chancellor Angela Merkel asking the German state to intervene in the Mediterranean to conduct naval rescues of asylum-seekers unable to reach Europe and allow them to settle in the three cities (Geisel, et al., 2018). It was a highly unusual request for a group of prominent cities to make of the federal government given it touches on policy areas (external borders, naval patrol) reserved to the remit of the federal government and, in this case, the European Union, but it represented how asylum and integration practices and priorities had diverged between the federal and local levels.

In the years following the summer of migration, major cities have, generally, acted with aggressive probity to ensure that refugees allocated to their regions are given access to requisite services that would allow them to return to a state of normalcy, while some national governments have pulled back on asylum obligations and sought to deter further ‘waves’ of migrants from attempting to reach the EU (Careja, 2019; Emilsson, 2015; Joppke, 2017). Though more pronounced now due to the recency of the refugee influx from 2014, this bordering aspect enacted by states (and uploaded into the European Union through the Dublin Regulation as well as civic integration policies50) traces its roots back to the aftermath

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50 See chapter 3.2.
of the 11 September attacks in the United States, and lingers as a remnant of fear concerning terrorism and transnational crime (Joppke, 2007).

Because of Germany’s federal and devolved governing structure, the experiences of cities during the height of the refugee influx differed by state and city to varying degrees of inclusion and political willingness, as well as measured success and failure, as alluded to in previous chapters. Generally, cities will utilise national guidelines for creating the basics of local policy while adjusting finer details, such as housing, to local requirements. But the letter from the three mayors was a subversive act of political speech, as Germany had been a strong proponent of the EU-Turkey deal of 2016 that sought Turkey’s aid in limiting the flow of refugees to Europe in exchange for money and the promise of restarted EU accession discussions (Eralp, 2016), while the European Union has continued to fund migrant returns through the Libyan coast guard, which human rights groups have decried the coast guard’s treatment of migrants as inhumane and the EU’s support as undermining the values on which the EU was established (Amnesty International, 2017).

But what influence can cities exert over national governments in policy areas reserved for national governments that touch on important aspects of integration? Cities throughout Europe, and especially in Germany, have been at the forefront of policy innovation with regards to refugee integration and inclusion because they are left to adjust and acclimate to the new populations, both acting as providers of everyday resources and as potential longterm homes (see Mayer, 2017; Schiffauer, et al., 2017). Many have developed strong networks and lines of communications over which they are able to share policy ideas, sometimes facilitated by the charitable NGOs that operate in different locales (see Flüchtlingsrat NRW, 2015).

Zooming out from the local municipal level, the federal states within Germany have also acted ahead of the national level. As highlighted previously in previous chapters,
NorthRhein Westphalia developed its *Integrationsgesetz* several years before the refugee influx, and the law tackled (or attempted to tackle) issues that were still prevalent for refugees across the country after the passage of the 2016 national *Integrationsgesetz*, such as recognising native credentials, support for language education, etc. while the national law focused more on labour market access (Schmidtke, 2014; Gesetzentwurf der Bundesregierung, 2016). Berlin, as a city-state, formulated its integration plan before Chancellor Angela Merkel convened the National Integration Plan in 2007.

Of course, the strength of cities to influence national policy can only go so far: in 2016 the German government introduced a 2-year suspension of the right of family reunification for refugees who only receive subsidiary protection rather than full refugee status, which constitutes a significant number of refugees accepted into Germany\(^{51}\). In 2018, rather than allowing full family reunification rights at the end of the 2-year suspension, the German government instead scrapped the right entirely and replaced it with a 1,000-visa per month quota system, assessing for, as stated by a CSU spokesman, those refugees with “illness or injury” (Deutsche Welle, 2018). Visa fulfilments have continually been below the maximum threshold allotted by the government (European Council of Refugees and Exiles, 2020).

We have identified previously that having one’s family with them is an important part of integration. What this suspension represents for refugees with only subsidiary status and the cities/towns that host them is a continual suspension of normal life even while they attempt to establish a sense of normalcy. Beyond violating the principles of asylum and refugee rights as laid down in the EU’s Common European Asylum System directives, it installs a further arbitrary border or hurdle that refugees must surpass. Cities have no

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\(^{51}\) See chapter 7.5.
ameliorative power in this regard, as they have no jurisprudence to offer a visa or residency for someone not already in the country. Alternatively, cities (and organisations within) have acted to protect refugees and irregular migrants from deportation by their state governments, either by shielding them in churches or by not recording or revealing intimate details when asked for the information by state authorities, such as address, workplace, or previous residences (Fauser, 2019).

8.2.1 Where cities innovate

When we envision a policy moving vertically down through a federal system, sometimes we may see it as a parent (federal/central government) giving chores to a child (city/municipality), such as mowing the grass in a particular fashion as designed by the parent. Depending on their size and different abilities, the child can either mow the grass exactly to specifications, mow the grass however they want to with varying degrees of completion, or have the entire endeavour result in a catastrophic failure where the lawnmower catches fire, along with the lawn and possibly the house. In the first case, the parent’s recommendation for how to cut the grass (our metaphorical policy) is reinforced as the preferred method, and the parent would likely maintain this method the next time the grass needed to be cut (i.e. no policy entrepreneurship); in the second case, the parent’s perception of their preferred method of cutting grass may change or be reinforced depending on how efficient and functional the child’s method of cutting grass is perceived to be, and if the new method proves to be better, the parent may adopt it as the new standard for when the other children have to cut the grass, or choose to be hands-off and let the children cut the grass however they want so long as it ends with the same result; in the third case, the parent should check if their home insurance covers accidental lawn-mowing fires.
While the analogy for how a policy may move vertically downward from the central government to a local government may be simplistic, it highlights the main features of a theoretical archetype of Type I multi-level governance functions: policy domains are nested à la federal structures, with the central government encompassing the policy domains straight down into the municipal area (Emilsson, 2015; Hooghe & Marks, 2003). We see this within Germany through the areas within integration policies where the federal government holds a remit, such as the mandated integration courses and extension of residency through work or apprenticeships (Rietig, 2016). The local government, typically, would follow federal guidelines (for instance, only allowing access to integration courses for Syrian refugees and those others whose statuses are approved rather than blanket allowance) given the funding for a federal programme is provided from the central government. Deviation from that central advice would not be the norm.

As we have seen within this study, however, some cities have chosen to shirk federal guidelines on access to integration benefits in order to better promote inclusivity and societal access to those who may face restrictions, i.e. asylum seekers. Leverkusen is a prime example, which followed its Model in housing and removed status requirements to allow refugees immediate access to integration and language courses. Hinger (2020) conducted a study on Osnabrück, a city in Lower Saxony which eliminated programmes that discriminate between general migrants and refugees and instead followed a similar course to Leverkusen in 2014-2015: that is, removing status requirements in order to access certain benefits, such as private housing and integration courses (Hinger, 2020: 32). The city even requested that refugees be transferred from overcrowded Greek camps into the city; however, the city government became divided on whether or not to allow Dublin deportations, with the

48 See chapter 5.
conservative fraction of the city government arguing that they should comply with federal and EU regulations (Ibid: 33).

Other cities around Europe have excelled in their own right in developing inclusive integration policies while their national governments have been more restrictive towards admitting refugees (see Careja, 2019). The European Commission Partnership on the Inclusion of Migrants and Refugees transcends a member state’s central government and partners directly with cities and organised representative groups within as the primary foci of integration practices, while actively seeking to include third-country national groups to better improve integration policies across EU cities (Lang, 2019: 200). The EUROCITIES network has even advocated for refugee recognition to be accepted across the entire EU in the spirit of the right to free movement in the bloc, a sort of EU-mandated asylum rather than delineated state-by-state (Doomernik & Ardon, 2018: 94).

The general trend since the refugee influx, and even before then, has been that of cities acting to support and protect refugees and expand integration services, either through formalised policy implementation or partnerships with non-profit organisations, while central governments have sought to otherwise restrict access to European borders by acting through externalised instruments, either the Dublin Regulation, Frontex, or other national policies designed to ‘disincentivise’ refugees from coming to Europe (Mayer, 2017; Nuissl, et al., 2019; Jorgensen, 2012). Priorities between national governments and the local level have diverged: national governments seek to ensure dispersal of ‘national and cultural norms’ to newcomers and press on quick labour market entrance, while local governments mostly seek to ensure inclusion and interculturalism (Scholten, 2018).

Germany presents an interesting dynamic in that regard: because of Germany’s devolved federal nature and the areas of integration policy that are left largely to municipal governments, successful or efficient local initiatives are able to spread to other municipalities.
through conventions such as the annual Integration Summit at the Federal Chancellery, which is attended by both local and state integration representatives and migrant advocacy
organisations, which helps to address local-national issues and mainstream policy areas that
the national government can implement nationwide (Scholten, et al., 2017). Some of
Germany’s cities besides Leverkusen and Berlin have innovated in their own ways to expand
the ways by which refugee integration is conducted locally (see Schiffauer, et al., 2017)
while the central government has sought ways to restrict refugee access to both German
asylum procedures and European borders.

What this leaves refugees with are (sometimes) two very conflicting structural facets
of integration, where the local level can feel more welcoming than the central government.
Within the scope of the empirical work in this thesis, this was found to be true for all
refugees and only serves to reinforce the argument that local level engagement with refugees,
through either the direct provision of aid or inclusion in policy governance, provides
paramount integration support that, sometimes, the central government may seek to restrict.
While the local level may disregard requirements and make exceptions for status fulfilment
with integration requirements, the federal government most likely will not and will continue
to maintain stringent standards by which to measure refugees based on their given status.
Hinger (2020) terms this ‘disintegration’, or the supposed limited capacity of the state for
integration of refugees. As the local level may seek to reach out and enact a ‘two-way’ model
of integration, the federal government places the onus of integration on the refugee to achieve
the benchmarks the government sets out for them, tying both broader societal and welfare
access to these arbitrary benchmarks (Lebuhn, 2013: 43).

This constitutes an inherent conflict between different aspects of bordering in both
the physical and conceptual sense between the central and local governments. While three
major cities in Germany may ask that the federal government take aggressive action to
subvert current Frontex operations and rescue refugees stranded in the Mediterranean, the
federal government (reliant on its conservative party coalition to govern) will defer to the
EU, and leave a hard border between what can and cannot be done. It might then be inferred that cities are able to innovate in the realm of refugee integration policies because they do not have a duty for external borders and the political pressure that often rests on issues of border control, and that lack of bordering pressure allows for greater solidarity for refugees within government (if the city government is so obliged). While our framework requires that cities are active in their work and dedication to ensure that refugees obtain housing and integration benefits as soon as they arrive, the notion of ‘limited capacity’ may still predominate through the federal government’s legal leadership.

The next section will focus on policy networks that exist across cities and states, where both seek to exchange and gain knowledge on policies surrounding refugees and integration. This ties into our discussion on bordering and our framework given the differing priorities surrounding asylum and integration for different areas: where some cities and states may seek to make policies and practices more inclusive, others may seek to exclude refugees more in order to ‘deter’ them from remaining.

8.3 Networks across states and between cities: Moving policies across and around

The modern configuration of the European Union has created more avenues through which cities in different member states (and non-EU member states, such as Switzerland and Norway) can exchange policy ideas and recommendations for various policy sectors not typically controlled exclusively by the central government or the EU (Slaughter & Hale, 2011). Policy networks also reflect upon our study of multi-level governance and implementation: policies that can be implemented well in one city may travel to another if the
recipient city holds a similar ideological outlook, even if these cities exist on opposite sides of the same country or in different countries altogether.

For this, we can look at both formal and informal policy networks that facilitate policy ideas, with the formal methods existing in more obvious forms, such as through various EU-established organs, and informal methods, such as through transnational NGOs communicating local policies across borders from within. We will look at several examples of policy transfer/learning (see Cairney, 2012) and policy mobility from one region to another in integration policy and other fields, as policy communities have grown throughout the late-20th and continue to grow within the 21st century.

8.3.1 Can a policy in one city be adopted in another and expect the same results?

Two cities may face similar policy issues, but in the area of drafting or adopting a new policy, context reigns supreme. In the example of attempting to counter a housing shortage with a drive to build new low-cost housing, contextual factors such as available land within the city’s boundaries, available public transit near possible areas of housing development, land development laws, population density, government funding/budget issues, environmental issues of new housing development, political expediency, etc. can affect possible outcomes. The complex interplays between intra-metropolitan factors sometimes precludes the ability of one city to simply graft another city’s policy into its implementation outlook and call it a day (Schmitt, 2020).

Before many states enacted decentralisation reforms (as Germany did in 2002/06), policymaking in certain domains may have been guided (or fully implemented) through central governments at the local level. This would be classified, Dolowitz and Marsh (1996) argue, as policy transfer instead of policy learning, since cities/states within a federal system would have little say in that policy becoming a standard for the recipient. The policy in
question could be significant, as in completely reformulating how a city/region conducts energy efficiency to how a comparable city does it, or part of administrative minutiae, such as removing outmoded software to upgrade tax collection ability (see Cairney, 2012: 246).

There is also a constantly shifting middle ground of policy transfer and learning in terms of the relationship between the central and the local governments: where the central government may not lead, the city may choose to innovate on their own when the specific policy area or aspects of it falls within their remit (see Homsy, 2018); and where the central government chooses to lead, the city government may decide to ignore policy advice if the central government cannot force them to follow (see Kern, 2019, for a discussion on leaders and laggards in climate mitigation policies across Europe).

We have seen previously in chapter 4.2.4 the example of different policy implementation comparing Dresden to Berlin, and by extension, Leverkusen. Where Germany maintains general advice and guidelines on treatment of refugees (and, by extension, the CEAS also has similar legal guidelines for member states and cities), some cities will attempt to maintain spartan policy aid to refugees as a function of its local political mechanisms rather than engage in wilful policy learning and overhaul, even where a tangential policy (housing development in general rather than specifically refugee housing) is concerned53 (see Schönig, et al., 2017).

And even within cities or states that have similar governance structures and general political outlook regarding issue areas, officials within cities or states may view the same policy situation differently. An example comes from the empirical work conducted for this thesis: when Berlin officials and key stakeholders interviewed were presented with an

53 During the budget crunch of the 2000s previously referred to in Chapter 1/2, Dresden completely sold off its municipal housing company (WOBA) to private organisations in order to erase its debt, leading to harsh housing conditions within the city and difficulty in developing new affordable housing when compared to the efforts of Berlin and other cities and city-states (Schönig, et al., 2017).
example of how Leverkusen structures its Model, the Berlin officials were quick to bring up that Berlin is unique and should not be compared to other cities, or that Berlin’s problems require a Berlin solution (Berlin senate representative interview, 2018; Sebastian Muschter interview, 2018). Interestingly enough, this notion was shared by some officials interviewed in Leverkusen, who believed that Berlin is a unique issue-area (Andreas Laukötter interview, 2019). That is to say, some who work within city governments may only look to other ‘comparable’ cities, i.e. in the case of Berlin, officials may only want to look to major metropoles like London, New York, Paris, etc. for policy inspiration.

While it would not be unusual to look to cities of comparable population size for policy ideas, one must take into account actual modes of governance employed in each and how much independence a city has from its encompassing federal state (if there is one) or the central government to consider whether a policy can be grafted into the governance regime of another. City governments that have different governance structures, such as one city utilising a majoritarian rule council while another utilises a party coalition governing council would likely have very different outcomes in policy output. Similarly, one city may have internal district councils operating subsidiary to the city council, while another may only have a central council. In terms of actual implementation, one city may rely more on private contracting for implementation of its services while another relies on central distribution of services. These differences in functionality and MLG Type II structure (ignoring central government for the time being) can determine the finer points of how policy is written and implemented, and why a policy in one city may not necessarily work the same in another.

In the cases of Berlin and Leverkusen, where governance structures operate similarly enough in the area of refugee housing policy (see chapters on Berlin and Leverkusen), the

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54 See Mulvey (2018) for a discussion on MLG practices around power devolution and social citizenship for refugees between the UK and Scottish governments.
former’s newest policy surrounding refugee housing and integration (more neighbourhood engagement and government interaction with refugee-facing NGOs through its Berlin Entwickelt Neuen Nachbarschaften (BENN) programme) elicits direct comparisons to the policy of the latter (see Senatsverwaltung für Stadtentwicklung und Wohnen, 2018a).

While this change was not a result of direct policy learning by Berlin lawmakers and civil servants from those in Leverkusen, it could be argued that the style and substance of Leverkusen’s Model, i.e. direct links between government and NGOs, active coordination with civil society, etc. became mainstreamed because of the work done in Leverkusen since 2002. Before 2015, the architects of the Model had been invited to speak in various other cities on their experiences utilising the Model and lowering city costs while ensuring that refugees were able to attain their own housing (Leverkusen Flüchtlingsrat employee interview, 2019; Caritas Leverkusen employee interview, 2019a & 2019b). Die Linke (The Left) party had members advocating directly for policies in the style of the Model (Die Linke, 2013), and the Model was even recognised as a policy of ‘best practice’ by some in public hearings held by the Bundestag in 2014 (Deutscher Bundestag, 2014).

The current (since 2016) Berlin Senator for Integration, Labour, and Social Services (Senatorin für Integration, Arbeit, und Soziales) Elke Breitenbach is from Die Linke, suggesting that the tenets of the Leverkusen Model as a model of best practice may have influenced how BENN was conceived and implemented, at least partially, though the work done in this thesis cannot directly prove it is so. However, what we can state is that no city exists in such a ‘unique’ bubble that it cannot learn from those cities that are not directly comparable to it in size, stature, or international standing. Aspects of the Leverkusen Model were adopted by far larger neighbouring cities Cologne and Essen, while cities in other federal states have also begun to utilise policies similar to those found in the Leverkusen
Model (Flüchtlingsrat NRW, 2015). Especially in a complex and dynamic policy area as that of refugee housing and integration, learning can and should be done and adapted from even smaller cities and towns, especially when governance structures between two different cities are recognisably similar.

The issue area is one that requires a multifaceted response which should not preclude policies that are considered qualified successes within a certain locality; so long as one city understands why a policy was successful in another and is able to scale a similar policy accordingly, positive learning and implementation should be possible (Zimmerman, 2020). This type of knowledge can be exchanged within and beyond Germany’s borders through organised networks at either the federal or supranational level, such as through the annual Integration Summit at the Federal Chancellery, the European Commission Partnership on the Inclusion of Migrants and Refugees, the EUROCITIES network, and others, to allow for idea exchange between cities with similar policy goals and outlooks (Dolowitz & Marsh, 1996). Membership in policy networks can often strengthen the prestige and political weight within the EU (Mocca, 2019).

While we have mainly talked about transfer and learning of policies through formal means, i.e. via government summits, party policy recommendations, etc., NGOs and other refugee advocacy organisations play a large role in disseminating policy ideas, though there is a caveat: the city in question has to have a working relationship to the organisation to consider changing or altering existing policies.

8.3.2 From without, speaking within: NGOs and their effect on policy spread

Europe contains several cross-border NGOs, notably Caritas, that work in the same general policy areas regardless of their location. In cities where services are contracted out or decentralised away from the local government/central government, NGOs end up fulfilling a
number of vital functions for the public, either in partnership with the government or on their own (Careja, 2019). NGOs, as a matter of definition, comprise a wide array of organisations, both for-profit and non-profit that provide services either under contract/partnership with governments or on their own as part of their operational missions; for the purpose of brevity our focus will be on social welfare non-profits.

Relationships between local/national governments and charity NGOs throughout Europe differ from state to state. In some, such as Germany, they operate in both partnership and advocacy roles with the various levels of government, as well as supplementary providers of welfare where the various levels of German government have remained pulled back in the area of social services since the New Public Management reforms throughout the 1990s and the public services selloffs of the late-1990s and early-2000s (Martin, et al., 2018; see Chapter 2). In other states, this supplementary role is more extreme to the point where large-scale NGOs have explicitly promised not to take government money to fund their work due to how the government is perceived by its citizens (Witkowski, et al., 2019). This more at-odds approach to conducting social welfare lends itself to a lack of interest on behalf of the organisations in attempting to alter policy and instead focus solely on the humanitarian aspects of the organisation itself (see Vandevoort & Verschraegen, 2019).

As reflected by the work in this thesis, different city governments with similar policy outlooks can interact with these organisations in diverse ways when governing priorities vary (Haque, 2011: 334-335). Conflicting/antagonistic relationships between advocacy organisations and local governments are, intuitively, the most obvious in terms of understanding the effect of NGO policy proposals for local governments, where organisations almost always encounter a slammed door to the face when they want to try to affect local policy with a recommendation from another city where governing outlooks differ. Where local governments and NGOs work in tandem, NGOs may sometimes try to push
recommendations for greater allowances than are delineated in law (Leverkusen civil servant interview, 2019). As previously mentioned in the Leverkusen chapter, some cities may also resist policy change based on political outlook even when NGO representatives are invited to present on why a certain policy model works.

But doors are not always closed and attitudes towards policy governance are not always obstinate. Some cities will gladly accept means-tested ideas from civil society organisations if they have been scaled to how the receiving city operates, or the organisations could be invited to plan out how to scale a policy to the new city in tandem with the local government (Cappiali, 2018). In other instances, citizens or residents of one city can act through a local organisation and reach out to organisations in other cities where governance or governance practices are more inclusive, and instigate contacts between the two cities as a result in the hopes of policy learning between them (Schiller, 2018).

However, there may be a caveat to that action: local governments (depending on their political inclusivity and policy outlook) may only listen to one type of organisation over another even if they share the same positions and goals. For example, a religiously-affiliated organisation or a regional church-based aid initiative that is familiar to the local government may have more sway with a local government than an organisation based around a foreign national background started by a group of migrants, even if the issue advocacy or policy desires are similar (Caponio, 2005). This denotes two important caveats about NGO policy advocacy: the first is that familiarity between governments and NGOs, as well as a history of positive coordination/interaction, can lead to greater influence to change policy; the second is that internal (i.e. political and cultural) bordering aspects maintain a large role in access to government for migrants and their representative organisations.

The importance of the second point cannot be overstated. As found in the Berlin chapter, while refugee voices are paramount to include while planning policy around helping
to integrate refugees, local governments may not always consult directly with refugees, instead choosing to deliberate with familiar NGOs/citizen groups as a proxy for policy formulation (Berlin senate representative interview, 2018). Instead of determining what it is the refugees need to facilitate integration by asking them, local governments may end up with what organisational heads believe refugees need through a subjective/cultured perspective, which can be condescending and lacklustre in terms of facilitating integration (Kevins & van Kersbergen, 2019).

Our framework attempts to subvert this implicit internal bordering by adopting a successful mechanism implemented by Leverkusen, i.e. immediate contact upon arrival with local refugee aid groups, including organisations that directly represent the refugee’s national or ethnic background. Additionally, the city government facilitates the creation of refugee representative outreach groups (Andreas Laukötter interview, 2019). In partnership with local/national/international NGOs that operate within a city as part of its governance structure, these organisations (depending on their size, funding, structure, etc.) could act as policy advisors to NGOs if the new organisations themselves do not have the outreach or breadth that the NGOs do. This aspect of the framework rests on the necessity for the city government and the NGO partners to be tied together in collaborative governance, as well as willingly facilitating and requesting the cultural expertise of newly arrived refugees in order to best tailor arrival and integration experiences for those who will come after.

This self-reinforcing mechanism would act as a structural buffer that would ease a refugee’s transition from their journey into their new life. So long as the government is willing to help facilitate the creation of representative groups in order to have an organisational voice(s) specifically for refugees, as in the case of Leverkusen, policy implementation and adjustment can likely be adapted to the needs of the day.
Taken altogether, NGO influence on local government policy only extends so far as the willingness of the local government to adapt and adjust their policies, and perhaps even beliefs, in light of an emergency situation and studies/data that demonstrate the benefits of facilitating integration rather than impecuniously implemented policies. Despite how policies/practices may spread through cross-border organisations due to a unified structure, not all cities in which they operate may be receptive to successful governance practices in another city.

The next section will discuss bordering, as well as how our model reflects on bordering practices that can serve to hinder integration, even while bordering practices are established by some national governments as a method to ‘facilitate’ integration.

8.4 Bordering aspects- both physical and cultural

Borders constitute more than the legal boundaries established to delineate where one state ends and another begins; they are also conceptual spaces, both externalised and internalised from the core of the state that help to keep ‘undesirables’ outside a ‘protected’ space, effectively excluding them from and controlling their access to a state’s economic/financial benefits or serving to protect a state’s cultural ‘homogeneity’ (see Menjivar, 2014; Schönwald, et al., 2018). They can be as one would expect, i.e. a checkpoint of crossing between two countries, such as in an airport or at a physical border, or borders can exist as visa requirements, such as those that require a visa applicant to have a certain amount of money in one’s bank account before one is able to apply for a visa (Fauser, 2019).

Within the context of our framework and its applicability towards how cities conduct refugee housing and integration, we can look at two dimensions of bordering utilised by Germany (and Europe) in the realm of refugee movements: internal borders, i.e. the mechanisms within EU states that serve to exclude refugees from accessing certain facets of
member states while they may have already lodged their application for asylum or have had their asylum approved, and external borders. Internal borders, in our case, are those mechanisms by which refugee access to societal features and support are limited by the status imposed upon them from the state, and sometimes by the city/municipality in which they are allocated. These mechanisms, while derived from state practices and policies, also depend upon cities to comply with (or agree with) the precepts for those policies. For example, Germany originally required schools and teachers to check and report to the BAMF the residency and citizenship credentials of children (and their parents) applying for school places, implementing a precarious sense of belonging to families whose statuses, such as those under subsidiary protection, may be in constant question by the German government; in response, a number of cities adopted ordinances that required teachers and schools not to report that information to the federal government (Lebuhn, 2013: 45). Additionally, North-Rhine Westphalia was the first German state to implement a law that made primary and secondary schools exempt from the reporting requirement (Ibid).

The pressure to alter one’s legal frameworks to be more accommodative can come from a variety of actors and factors, such as leading politicians from more inclusive-minded political parties, from religious groups, from NGOs aimed at providing care and resettlement services to refugees, or from a combination therein (Hinger, 2020: 32). The results, as demonstrated in this thesis, have not been homogenous across Germany, even in cities that make inclusion of refugees into society a priority.

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55 Borders, both internal and external, serve four functions: identity (cultural perceptions), solidarity (perceptions of belonging, e.g. entitlements from the state), stabilisation (conditions that stabilise welfare state systems), and regulatory (that which limits the reach of the state itself, as well as entry to those at the borders) (Schönwald, et al., 2018).
However, not all cities and localities opt to implement more inclusive local ordinances, and often comply with harsher state restrictions (or go even further with more draconian local measures) for a variety of reasons (see Fauser, 2019). As mentioned previously in this thesis, housing allowances for refugees between cities in Germany vary wildly, from the less restrictive (Leverkusen) to the more tacitly restrictive (Berlin) to the heavily restrictive (Dresden) (see Hamann & El-Kayed, 2018 for a comparison between Berlin and Dresden).

As stated in chapter 7.5.3, differentiations in asylum statuses allocated by governments creates a tiered level of rights that severely restrict one’s access to societal resources and rights typically granted under asylum. How these restrictions are implemented, however, depends upon the restrictiveness of the locality. This differentiation was hard-coded into Germany’s 2016 Integrationsgesetz, where integration services are ‘fast-tracked’ for refugees with a good chance of staying, typically defined as those belonging to a nationality with greater than a 50% asylum approval rate, regardless of status. The law frames Germany as a ‘homogenous’ culture and the refugees as a ‘problem to be solved’ or ‘outsiders’ being granted indefinite permission to remain once they are able to fulfil government and societal objectives, rather than framing integration as something the national government must do as well to help accommodate refugees to society (Hinger, 2020: 24).

This institutes an arbitrary border around society by classifying refugees akin to ‘unstable elements’ by understating the government’s duty to maintain a stable society in the face of the refugee ‘problem’ (Gesetzentwurf der Bundesregierung, 2016: 23-24). Further, the arbitrary nature denoted in asylum statuses, where subsidiary status must be continually reviewed and renewed because a refugee cannot directly prove ‘persecution’ even if they are, in this case, from areas of Syria made uninhabitable by fighting provides another border that refugees must navigate.
Some of these distancing and bordering elements likely arose as direct backlash to the November 2015 Paris terrorist attacks, where Syrian passports were found near the perpetrators; for many, both in governments and electorates, this was enough to equate refugees with a risk of terrorism (Funk & Parkes, 2016).

The inherent contradictory nature raised by these bordering policies and practices creates uneven situations on the ground for refugees and cities alike. Some cities that lean away from refugee inclusivity, such as Dresden, will follow and reinforce these bordering elements while others, as seen in Leverkusen, do not regard these central restrictions on refugees as the primary guidelines by which to conduct their integration programmes. Reinforcing these bordering elements physically typically serve to make refugees more visible in society, either by isolating refugees within camps away from neighbourhoods or societal centres (Vey, 2019), or isolating them in fenced structures (such as in Tempelhof) that are within view of neighbourhoods but have controls and restrictions set to keep general society out, and rules that restrict the activities refugees are able to do within their residences.

For people fleeing precarious situations where their identities openly displayed would put them at risk, such as from either the Syrian army attempting to draft citizens under threat of imprisonment, torture, or death, or by ISIL terrorising their homes, such visibility imposes a border on one’s ability to integrate beyond the isolation under which they are placed.

The theoretical framework developed in chapter 7.5.3 attempts to erase the arbitrariness of imposed internal borders, such as those with asylum statuses, by adopting one of the core tenets of the Leverkusen Model, i.e. refugees may access benefits that can be allocated by the city without reference to their denoted status. This shifts the focus of policy from restricting societal access to those refugees with ‘unworthy’ statuses, whether the reasoning is fiscal impecuniosity or cultural protection, to faster integration into work, education, a new home, etc. Rather than the state/city acting within the bounded rationality of
legalistic securitisation of borders, which is typically an extension of a state’s desire to control access primarily to the labour market (Lebuhn, 2013: 41), the state/city can make refugees ‘part of the neighbourhood’ (Murdie, 2008), i.e. people (whose status as refugees may otherwise exclude them from either material goods or cultural idiosyncrasies) who, like so-called ‘regular’ migrants, are simply learning to adapt to their new homes.

Furthermore, the framework seeks to embed refugees into society as quickly as possible. This entails, upon arrival, living in a collective accommodation that is built within a neighbourhood in a city/locality rather than being distant (if the city/locality does not have a direct placement programme into municipally-rented houses/apartments) and having government workers and governance partners actively assessing whether there is private housing available for refugees, as collective accommodations typically have low quality standards and entry into a housing market can be a byzantine process without help (BBSR, 2017). Waiting times for asylum decisions can be excessively long, thus hindering initial efforts at integration (Beirens, 2018)- the theoretical framework seeks to eliminate that lost time.

What this would entail is a restructuring of the EU’s member state refugee camps that sit at the extreme borders of the bloc, i.e. those in the Greek and Italian islands that have become overcrowded and neglected by both member state and EU authorities, and where refugees are forced to wait extended durations to lodge asylum applications (Malafeka, 2018).

This delves into a stream of discussions on the normative aspects of implementing borders or restrictions when it comes to asylum and the rights that should be inherent with the granting of asylum or subsidiary statuses (see UNHCR, 2014), i.e. should one group of asylum-seekers receive preferential treatment over another when every group has no safe opportunity to return?
8.4.1 The irrational normativity of utilitarian asylum

Despite the highly philosophical and jargonistic tone of this section’s header, its meaning can be condensed to ‘what the state likes to tout as its values only applies to asylum practices when it wants them to apply’ or humanitarianism-by-utility. All EU member states had to ratify the Lisbon Treaty and thus agree with the ideas within, demonstrating that they identify with the normative values of respect for human rights, respect for the UN charter, pluralism, tolerance, etc. As has been the case with asylum and proactive operations in the Mediterranean versus reframed border policies, these values shine in bright contrast to the actions taken by the EU and its member states.

This concept is emblematic of how the German central government has evolved its policies and practices since the summer of migration. As noted in Chapter 2, Germany’s population is ageing and leaving shortages in essential work fields with an eventual danger posed to the social welfare system. It faced a similar situation in the latter half of the 20th century, thus prompting the development of the Gastarbeiter programme where subsequent inequalities developed between the native German population and the long-term migrant workers who remained in Germany.

The infusion of one million and more refugees presents Germany with an opportunity in a new population of workers to fill many of the gaps left by its aging population, with age demographic layouts almost opposite those of the German population: counting those refugees who arrived since 2015, those aged below 24 constitute ~60% of all refugees registered, while the number of Germans over the age of 40 in the same timeframe is 57% (Färber & Köppen, 2020: 103). At the same time, Germany is a highly advanced economy with well-functioning educational and labour
infrastructures that can both adapt and grow with the brought expertise and the necessary tutelage for the refugees.

With that in mind, it should seem logical that Germany would and should encourage the EU to be more welcoming of refugees and immigration in general as nearly all EU member states face aging populations where shares of the over-65 demographic will rise against all other demographics due to low birth rates and longer lifespans (Eurostat, 2020). But, as we have seen, the EU’s and its member states’ bordering practices contravene that notion with externalisation of borders through partnerships with Libya, with ‘integrated migration management’ (see Hänsel, et al., 2019) making borders ‘secure’ and ‘securitised’ rather than guaranteeing an integrated networked system of asylum where the EU is able to enact a humanitarian mandate across the bloc and ensure that asylum-seekers are able to access the guarantees that the EU and its member states agreed to under both UN and EU treaties.

Here is where the irrationality in ‘irrational normativity’ lay—Germany’s obvious history involves the displacement and death of millions, which remains on the country’s collective conscience. The right to asylum is written into the country’s Basic Law. Opening its borders to asylum-seekers in 2015 with an overwhelmingly positive and enthusiastic public outreach was, in a way, a method by which to demonstrate how far Germany had moved in relation to its painful historical memories. But almost as soon as Germany welcomed the refugees, its government set restrictions on family reunification and then sought to restrict refugee access to the continent, even though, by most measures, the country had the capacity to accommodate more refugees, with federal leadership and high organisational competence (Brücker, 2020: 30). Conservative pushback against more opened borders led to tightening both the
immigration system and requirements for refugees to reach integration quotas, or face deportation.

The country also set tiered allowances on asylum-seekers by country, giving immediate benefits for some while restricting others simply based on national background rather than on individual necessity or on the strength of asylum cases. Preferential treatment of one nationality/ethnicity over another explicitly violates the aforementioned aspects of the Lisbon Treaty, and even within that preferential treatment the tiers of status/allowances may be perceived as arbitrary because asylum-seekers are required to prove they have experienced or are under the threat of ‘political persecution’ on the basis of political beliefs, race, religion, nationality, or being a member of a particular social group (BAMF, 2018). The difficulty in proving ‘political persecution’ for refugees fleeing generalised violence is well documented, making delineations in granted status all the more difficult to justify between individuals fleeing the same country (see Chow, 2018; Kirchhoff & Lorenz, 2018; Hinger, 2020). Restrictions on allowances elicits restrictions of access to the country itself, and a determination by the country’s government to maintain distance between those migrants the government may deem to be ‘deserving’ versus ‘undeserving’.

What we see with this dichotomy of policies can be summed up through Pierre Bourdieu’s assertion of the ‘left hand’ versus the ‘right hand’ of the state, or the social welfare and state protections aspect of a national/local government against the financialised/nationalist portion that seeks to exclude as many non-citizens as possible from the common till (see Swartz, 2018). Within Germany, this clash began, as previously discussed in chapter 2, with the financialisation of social welfare programmes throughout the 1990s/2000s and the ascendance of non-profit organisations (such as
Caritas) as providers of social welfare services as a ‘secondary state’ within the local level context.

Decoupling the state from many local welfare programmes also invariably decoupled the state from many direct integration services for refugees beyond that which is identified as mandatory in the Integrationsgesetz and the Basic Law, such as the integration and language classes and a living stipend. Ironically, within some cities (such as Leverkusen) this led to the utilisation of refugee-facing organisations within the scope of Type II MLG arrangements as voices and advocates for refugees and other migrants who had difficulties in integration due to lack of a national performance standard before Germany’s integration infrastructure faced its first reformulation in 2016.

These organisations, either within the scope of shared governance in a city’s asylum framework or outside of it, have advocated for more inclusivity and an increase in refugee intake despite the current CDU-CSU national government’s approach to tiered restrictions in favour of some refugees over others. This has, in some ways, emboldened aspects of solidarity towards refugees because of a perception that the national or local government is either too timorous/incompetent (which many saw in Berlin, see chapter 6) in providing a guiding path for refugees to eventually become part of the citizenry, or the perception that they wish to push refugees to the margins of society (Volunteer worker interview, 2019). The MLG partnerships between these organisations and municipal governments may also explain why some cities, as referenced above, choose to speak out in favour of an active integration agenda rather than increasing bordering: the cities that have enabled their governments to take a leading role in refugee integration have
‘rejuvenated’, in a way, the ‘left hand’ of government, though the right still maintains a disconnect.

This brings to mind the ongoing German programme of ‘Freiwillige Rückkehr’ (Voluntary Return), operated in tandem with the International Organisation for Migration (IOM), where the migrant in question can consult with the German government about obtaining support (often a stipend or the German government covering one’s costs of return, such as for a flight) to return to their country of origin. Posters advertising the programme are present in many areas of Germany and translated into various languages, with the example below taken at a train station in Berlin in 2018 (Figure 12). The Voluntary Return programme is offered with the proviso that if the migrant accepts the offer to return to their home country, their application for asylum or their asylum status is rescinded, and if they choose to return to Germany, they must repay whatever amount the German government gave to them to facilitate their initial return (BAMF, 2020).
The details of the advertisement and the website containing information on countries of return reveal some telling characteristics about what constitutes a country whose citizens can receive return benefits: the country flags presented on the advertisement are from predominantly African, Middle Eastern, and South Asian countries. While searching the website’s database for information on facilitated returns to non-EU countries such as the United States, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, etc., there is no information available or no help offered. Interestingly, the
programme is not available for Libya (and Syria and Yemen) because the International Organisation for Migration has determined that Libya currently has a ‘difficult security situation’ (BAMF, 2020a), raising questions about the ethics and legality of the EU’s partnership with Libya for returning migrants.

The paradox of values between Germany’s opening of its migration laws, such as allowing refugees eased access to the labour market and broadening offers of integration courses stands in stark contrast to a programme that offers money to send migrants (refugees or otherwise) back to their countries of origin. Given the operational guidelines of the Voluntary Return programme (with countries that have supported returns and those that do not, i.e. Syria, Libya, Yemen, etc.) and that Germany’s population is going to experience a large demographic shift, with many ageing into retirement years without a strong base of a younger workforce to support the pension system, the logic of integrating a large population of refugees as a panacea to solve the demographic issue rather than seeking a wholesale easing of migration restrictions falls apart given that the number of refugees in Germany is insufficient to adequately ameliorate the future strain on the country’s social system (Brücker, et al., 2020: 34). While the figure of one million+ refugees is conceptually large, it is only a miniscule percentage point compared to the country’s 83 million residents.

The ‘utilitarian’ aspect of Germany’s asylum actions in 2015 thus seem diminutive when compared to the necessities of the country as a whole going forward, where protracted and encouraged net migration into Germany is needed for the country to continue operating as one of the foremost economic powerhouses in the world. This may entail removing signifiers of demarcated migration statuses, such as those delineated for refugees, and even those given to other temporary workers who may be
enticed by limited-time visas offered by the German government to fill gaps in labour fields with little possibility of extension after the visa’s expiry (Lebuhn, 2013: 46).

This discussion leads us back to the normative aspects of our theoretical framework. In it, inclusivity and facilitated integration are offered to everyone regardless of their asylum decisions or statuses both to eliminate the ‘lost time’ that has plagued refugee applicants across the EU where waiting times for both interviews and granted statuses have been protracted and lasting far longer than CEAS guidelines would advise (ECRE, 2016), and to ensure that asylum applicants feel ‘welcomed’ by both the German government and the local area in which they are placed. As we have found throughout this study and have confirmed the findings from studies conducted by Ager and Strang (2008), Ersbøll and Gravesen (2010), Adam, et al. (2019), and others, social bonds and connections established in a place are part and parcel of successful integration, whereas government mandates placed on migrants produce more stress than encouragement. Our theoretical framework seeks to build up this integral aspect through organised policy actions, which is explicitly contrarian to programmes and policies such as Freiwillige Rückkehr which explicitly encourages migrants to return home if they feel they are experiencing difficulty, or limited asylum rights by assigned status.

Furthermore, given Germany’s concern with labour market integration as signified through its 2016 Integrationsgesetz56, facilitating immediate contact between the native population and newcomers upon arrival, either through a dedicated policy

56 The 2016 Integrationsgesetz contains a ‘3+2’ rule, where a recognised asylum-seeker undergoing job training in a field is given a 3-year right of residency and then an additional 2-year residence permit if their employer wishes to keep them on after completing their job training. It also eased access for asylum-seekers into local job markets by suspending ‘preference tests’ (i.e. a preference for native Germans in a job over a migrant with similar qualifications) in areas with less than average unemployment (Rietig, 2016).
action or through volunteer initiatives, can help refugees better understand and navigate their options in the labour market (Doomernik & Ardon, 2018). For all the concerns about the immediate costs of integration on both the country and localities, labour market integration is the most important factor in terms of managing the costs of integration and ensuring a positive ‘return’ on the integration ‘investment’ (Färber & Köppen, 2020: 109; Manthei, 2020). Therefore, it is in both a city’s and a country’s best interests to make integration benefits accessible to all as quickly as possible rather than enforcing a prolonged waiting time, including access to stable private housing, or at least housing that allows for greater privacy and security rather than continuous stays in overcrowded and often poorly maintained refugee accommodation facilities.

The next section will look to the future and the possibilities covering future refugee movements and how countries and cities may react to them, as well as how this area may evolve as cities adapt to global causes of refugee movements, such as global warming.

**8.5 A future in refugee housing and integration: greater inclusion or increased bordering?**

At the time of writing this chapter, the world is currently in the grips of an unforeseen and largely unprepared for pandemic. While the first wave of that pandemic crested within the first three months and western nations, including the United States, the EU, Australia, etc. were eager to reopen their economies and return life to a notional ‘normal’ while the number of active cases dropped to sustainable levels, the inevitable second wave that resulted from government measures to revitalise economies has brought about lackadaisical government mechanisms to avoid shuttering once again. Businesses remain open, universities and schools
continue teaching in-person, and national governments have resorted to turning the fault of this towards its citizens rather than at the policymakers who craft piecemeal policies by tangoing around the inevitable necessity of a national lockdown.

Unfortunately, refugees tend to become visible distractions for times when political pressure is on for national governments. Notably, the United Kingdom government began announcing in August 2020, as pandemic testing failures became prevalent and viral case numbers skyrocketed, that boats of refugees crossing the English Channel constituted a ‘threat’ and the government appointed a ‘Clandestine Channel Threat Commander’ to make “the Channel route unviable for small boat crossings” (UK Home Office, 2020). Prime Minister Boris Johnson also engaged in political sabre-rattling with regard to human rights lawyers, blaming them for subverting government policies designed to keep the country ‘safe’ (Bowcott, 2020). The government also confirmed potential plans to ‘offshore’ government asylum facilities, relocating asylum centres to the South Atlantic Ocean, echoing policies of a decade past that sought to have asylum processing centres within the countries from which refugees were fleeing, or immediate deportation to far-offshore processing facilities (Verkaik, 2020).

Refugees (and migrants generally) have been used as political set-pieces in international politics as recently as in the EU-Turkey refugee deal and its aftermath, where Turkish President Erdogan threatened the EU several times to ‘unleash refugees into Europe’ when European leaders have expressed dissatisfaction with the Turkish government’s treatment of refugees (Deutsche Welle, 2020). The future of how asylum and integration policy will evolve (or not) in the era of a warming world and all its repercussions is uncertain; as of now, ‘climate refugee’ exists only as a notional phrase in academia and media rather than anything official inscribed in international law. Even UNHCR speaks of the necessity to account for global warming’s effect in displacement, though the organisation
avoids direct recommendations to apply refugee rights to those displaced by global warming effects (UNHCR, 2020).

What follows in the next sections are speculation based on both the fieldwork conducted in this thesis, current policies, and outlooks by other experts in the field. In the first section we will look at a possible future for city development around refugee integration, and then we will look at a possible future for bordering mechanisms in place at both the city and EU levels. However, we will maintain two assumptions within the next sections: no stipulations for asylum/refugee statuses as it regards displacement due solely to global warming effects will be enacted throughout the EU, and attempted mitigation for global climate effects did not change the trajectory of warming below 2 degrees Celsius (see HoeghGuldberg, et al., 2018).

8.5.1 Dynamic Cities in the Age of Forced Migration

As is trite at this point to write, the EU and its cities (especially those in Germany) had to adjust strongly to the influx of refugees since 2014. This process was different for all cities: some had more financial and social leg room to stretch out benefits and volunteer aid, while those ageing towns and cities that had little to offer refugees beside shelter in aged buildings (Bock, 2018; Schiffauer, et al., 2017). Climate-related migration is expected to increase to major metropolitan areas from areas affected by global warming (i.e. equatorial
regions and those with land closer to sea level), especially to Europe and the US, as extreme
drought, storms, floods, famine, etc. become more frequent (Hoegh-Guldberg, et al., 2018)\textsuperscript{57}.

\begin{quotation}
Climate-related effects are also expected to drastically increase the gap between
wealthy and poor across the world, with the wealthy better able to relocate in the wake of a
climate disaster, such as a hurricane or wildfire, but the lion’s share of climate migrants will
not be wealthy or able to sustain themselves without the aid of a government (Arcanjo, 2018;
Puaschunder, 2020). Cities will inevitably be the main recipients of these climate migrants as
they seek to restore stability to their lives.

German cities demonstrated the ability to adapt and restructure their governance over
refugee housing and integration policies with relative aplomb when they accepted and
worked with the civil society movements that sprang up to help the refugees that arrived, and
solidarity movements have emerged throughout Europe (European Foundation for
Democracy, 2018).

There are positive trends as it regards city adaptations to sustainable development: 44
cities across Europe in the EUROCITIES network pledged €14.2 billion to combat inequality
and social exclusion, as well as seeking deeper partnerships with the EU with a place for
cities at the EU Social Summit in 2021 (Godson, 2020). EUROCITIES had previously issued
a call for increased allowances from national governments and the EU to help refugees
acclimate, including a call for better housing quality, more social housing availability, and
\end{quotation}

\textsuperscript{57} The IPCC Special Report discusses the stark differences between warming levels of 1.5C and 2C above
preindustrial temperatures, with 420 million fewer people experiencing extreme heatwaves at 1.5C rather than at
better coordination between cities and national governments to ensure consistency in policy output (EUROCITIES, 2016).

 Expedited movement from precarity to stability is a central tenet of our theoretical framework, but it must go hand-in-hand with cities that continue to plan for the future, i.e. consistent development of new city-wide accommodations that are cost-effective, environmentally friendly, and affordable for all rather than ‘luxury’, rent controls to ensure housing markets are not plunged into hyperinflation, connections with neighbouring cities to ensure that burdens of housing allocation and development are not being shouldered by just one metropolis, and an engaged and enthusiastic civil society that welcomes inclusivity. Conservative and restrictive bordering pushback against migration arises in times where some groups feel threatened by the arrival of ‘outsiders’ because of what might be perceived as ‘limited societal resources’- by ensuring a consistent investment in societal resources and engagement of civil society, cities can then limit inevitable pushback against higher levels of migration.

 In addition to this, cities that continue to advocate on behalf of asylum-seekers (such as Bonn, Düsseldorf, and Cologne, among others) can help pull national governments towards inclusivity. Cities hold a prominent place in national politics, whether they are a capital city or a regional metropolis. The ability to demonstrate the benefits of inclusive policies can act as a buffer against more restrictive policymakers.

 This also necessitates a long-term budgetary plan for cities. German cities serve as the ultimate example of this, with the vast majority of them having sold off public utilities and services when deficits climbed and economic pullbacks shook the country, only to reap the repercussions of those decisions in skyrocketing rent levels, housing shortages, and public welfare deficits over the subsequent decades. Thankfully, costs for sustainable building materials and renewable energy continue to drop, thus ensuring that new housing
constructions can be made affordably for both the city and its eventual tenants, and with general German city reinvestment in affordable social housing construction and purchase of social housing stocks, the cities that have adjusted to the refugee influxes (while possibly struggling at the beginning) can ensure better adaptivity going forward so long as investment in public services continues.

That being said, much of this dynamism depends on the actions of the central government in both how the structure of governance is centred in the state and how the national government perceives the role of immigration and immigrants more generally.

8.5.2 Blind Eyes and Perpetual Shrugs - a possible future of bordering

National governments across the world recoiled from extending asylum rights to those refugees seeking protection in 2015, and the current experience with the UK may be a sign of future ‘offshoring’ border policies when it comes to asylum that may restrict the ability of refugees to apply for asylum or protection at the national border. Much as the UK utilises France’s Calais border as an external asylum checkpoint, it is not unconscionable to assume that wealthier nations will seek to further externalise places where refugees can declare asylum, such as an embassy. If a person flees their home country and transits through what a receiving country may consider to be a ‘safe third country’ even if that country lacks capacity to enact asylum protections, that person would be unable to declare asylum anywhere else. These practices will likely increase.

It is here where cities can attempt to circumvent the harsh bordering practices enacted by national governments. Humanitarian corridors, where a city and humanitarian organisation may work in tandem to secure a visa (tourist, work, etc.) for refugees in order to skirt border efforts, may arise. These corridors can involve private companies or educational institutions to sponsor visas and subvert typical restrictions. It would be a next step in the evolution of
sanctuary cities, moving from simple protection to outreach and rescue (see Fauser, 2019). At the same time, depending on how governance is structured in a country, a city may not have the relative independence to ‘shield’ refugees and migrants from immigration authorities if national priorities are restrictive against immigration. Cities may depend on contingent funding that comes with complying with immigration authorities in countries where governance is structured around the central government (i.e. the Westminster Model). In the future, it is likely that these governments, working through an institution like the EU, will further externalise the possibilities of asylum-seekers.

Beyond adding externalised checkpoints for asylum throughout Africa and the Middle East (see Frowd, 2019 for discussion on the EU’s utilisation of African states as ‘border checkpoints’), identity validation systems will likely become far more networked and spread as methods of security surveillance. Just as one’s phone can now contain access to a bank account, social profile, health information, etc., citizenship verification (such as through a digital passport) will likely be the next phase of securitised bordering.

This method works both internally and externally as well. Every time someone utilises, in this instance, a phone to pay, their identity can be tracked and checked for valid citizenship or residency status even if they are doing something as simple as buying groceries. How this data gets negotiated between the private companies that own payment applications and the government is a topic of future concern; at the moment, we only worry that this capability will soon exist, and that border enforcement agencies would have the ability to identify and deport someone not by violations of law, but because their digital identity verification demarcates their status in society.

This digital status could be tied to the ability to obtain housing, integration benefits, a railcard, etc. as a national government moves towards a more controlled immigration platform in light of increased migration into Europe. Again, depending on the federal
structure of a country, this could be subverted by the local level if the local level is amenable to inclusion and greater integration.

It is also likely we will see an increase in targeted, localised projects from the EU within states that are the source of large migrations that encourage developing protected and sustainable structures rather than allowing migrants to file for asylum in the EU. Just as the EU currently funds the Libyan ‘coast guard’ to enforce returns in the Mediterranean, one would expect (should drought conditions worsen in the highest-temperature areas) the EU to begin attempting to create micro ‘eco-cities’ through badly affected states as a method to justify security and sustainability within a country that is otherwise experiencing drought/famine.

‘Technological solutions’ will likely be championed as a reason for migrants to stay, with the EU encouraging companies to invest in sustainable technologies or jobs in countries badly affected by global warming. However, in extreme conditions where global warming affects the effectiveness of governments and governance (see Puaschunder, 2020), corporate exploitation of extreme conditions is likely where a strong centralised government cannot ensure the wellbeing of its citizens.

As of present writing, Germany held the EU presidency and failed to implement an EU-wide migration pact New Pact on Migration and Asylum (see European Commission, 2020) due to difficulties amid the pandemic; the effort to implement this now rests with the Portuguese presidency. Among its stipulations are increased border utilisation for assessing asylum claims, though these may not necessarily take place at the EU borders, either external or internal; another notable stipulation is increasing support for ‘refugee-sending countries’.

In more extreme future global conditions, it is possible that the EU may create a ‘work/asylum stipulation’, where the EU and its member states may agree to view a person’s application for asylum only if they are willing to work within the EU-funded security
operation for an indeterminate amount of time, thereby demonstrating qualities that most member states value, i.e. work experience, qualifications, unique experience, etc. What this may entail is a subversive act of deterrence: by forcing someone to work for an indeterminate amount of time within a country where there is a ‘securitised area’ before applying for asylum, the individual may develop a life/sense of stability within that place even if it exists as a temporary solution solely constructed to keep asylum-seekers at bay.

Both can ‘mitigate’ asylum scepticism towards more inclusive asylum and integration policies while allowing for economic productivity towards the EU/member states. Neither is appealing as a method of ensuring humanitarian principles or the rights of asylum are respected, as the former takes advantage of a person’s productivity while keeping integration benefits/possibilities at an arm’s length, and the latter can be perceived as neo-colonialism by both intervening within an unstable country and not allowing those fleeing violence to leave the country in question.

Though it is hard to project the future with any degree of certainty outside of weather probabilities week by week, the impact of global warming over the course of the next century will cause instability and precarious situations across the world. People will need to leave and find safe harbour under extreme duress, and unless there is a unified response for equitable treatment of those in need of protection, we will likely see further externalisation and restriction.

8.6 Conclusion

This chapter reflected on the work conducted in this thesis and what it means for both Germany and the European Union. Specifically, it sought to juxtapose the theoretical framework developed in this thesis to the otherwise restrictive bordering policies enacted through the EU and within its member states and demonstrate the differences between the
relatively inclusive policies favoured by cities and the stronger restrictions implemented by central governments.

While cities became more inclusive since the summer of migration, central governments and the EU sought to push back more migrants through bilateral agreements, such as that made with Turkey and that made with the Libyan Coast Guard. Additionally, while the German government spearheaded the suspension of the Dublin Regulation in 2015, it immediately imposed restrictions on new refugees, with tiered allowances doled out by nationality and new requirements imposed on them under threat of possible deportation. Rights to family reunification were suspended for 2 years and never fully reinstated. However, cities have demonstrated the ability to adapt and learn under the pressure of accommodating new refugees, both through policy learning and improvisation. Cities have also become outspoken in their support for refugees by advocating for the central government to actively engage in rescuing refugees in danger in the Mediterranean. Their voices have been emboldened by networks such as EUROCITIES and through the EU, with group pledges to create sustainable pathways for city development to promote inclusivity.

Their effect on national governments’ and the EU’s policies surrounding externalised borders remains to be seen, as border securitisation and the methods enacted by the EU and its member states flies in the face of cities that have demanded more social inclusion. Cities may develop methods of shielding refugees from scrutiny from immigration authorities, or work together to skirt federal guidelines on how asylum procedures are enacted, depending on how dependent cities are on their national governments.

What happens in the future, however, is likely up to central governments. With the current trend of externalised borders and bilateral agreements, it is unlikely that central governments and cities will agree on immigration and asylum prospects and allowances, and there will likely be a further increase in city discretion to shield their residents from
immigration authorities, where possible. Integration will be largely up to local practices and the discretion therein.

Chapter 9: ‘And, in the end…’- Conclusions, Future Avenues of Research, and Policy Recommendations

This thesis presented a novel comparative study utilising a unique holistic and multidisciplinary approach to how housing policies affect prospects for refugee integration into Germany by focusing on two cities: Leverkusen and Berlin, and is, at the time of writing, one of the few, if not the only comparative study of asylum housing utilising a governance analysis framework. These two cities were chosen due to their similar governance structures as well as their similar outlook/political approaches regarding refugee integration, but also for the different strategies they employed to house refugees. We analysed these two cities through two theoretical lenses: that of multi-level governance and theories of and around migrant integration.

Multi-level governance as a frame of analysis was chosen due to the necessity to understand how housing and integration policies are structured, i.e. if they are top-down (Type I MLG) and centred on the city government implementing policy directly, or if they are horizontal policies (Type II MLG) where the city government engages in a relationship with a private organisation for the implementation of a policy.

Integration theories were also chosen as a second frame of analysis because it allowed us to understand both how integration functions as a subjective experience on behalf of both the individual and the government, and what aspects regarded as important within the main theories of integration can be promoted by city government policies, and what is extraneous or burdensome for the individual. With integration theories, we did not attempt to syncretise a ‘universal’ definition of integration, as what integration ‘is’ constitutes a heavy debate
among migration scholars—instead, we utilised a general definition according to what mattered most to the subjects interviewed for this study.

Within the theories of integration presented in this thesis, one stood out in particular: that of interculturalism, which itself is derived from the contact hypothesis developed by Allport (1954), which states that direct contact between two different groups removes barriers of entry to acceptance of the different groups into a larger group. This was demonstrated through the interviews conducted with refugees, who continually stated that the largest help in feeling welcome in Germany was through the volunteer efforts and those native Germans who took the initiative to guide refugees through the country’s bureaucratic processes. Housing was our primary focus as the nexus of both integration theories and MLG because housing, conceptually, is something that can be actively altered by policy and is considered to be one of the key tenets of successful integration. In the case of this study, all types of housing occupied by the interview partners became essential to the understanding of how they perceived their integration.

Reflecting on our first research question, the interview partners occupied variegated types of housing at the time of interview, such as mass refugee accommodations, container accommodations built specifically for refugees (mimicking apartments but constructed with short-duration materials), private apartments, and private houses. Within our understanding of housing, propinquity to neighbourhoods and communities, agency (i.e. the ability of refugees to choose their own space and how agency was gained or lost through policy), and accessibility of the housing market were important factors in determining how comfortable refugees were in their housing situations and in their respective cities more generally. Within Leverkusen, the primary focus of the city’s refugee housing policy was to move refugees from mass accommodation into private housing as quickly as possible while connecting refugees to German volunteers to facilitate private housing searches. Within
Berlin, the goal was similar but the implementation was less direct, with volunteer coordination not centrally organised between governance partners as it was in Leverkusen.

Reflecting on our second research question, the fieldwork revealed the inherent juxtaposition in refugee integration outlooks between Leverkusen and Berlin. Though the cities are of different sizes and populations, the general governance structure is similar in fundamental processes but different in policy implementation: the Leverkusen Model, being a strong form of collaborative Type II MLG between the NGOs Caritas and the Refugee Council and the Leverkusen government, was expanded rather than reconfigured in the face of a refugee influx, while the Berlin government implemented piecemeal and ad-hoc Type II policies around refugee housing until a new government was elected in 2016. The primary reasonings behind each city government’s respective policies was cost-savings; the irony is that the Berlin government had to keep spending to change/remake its refugee housing and neighbourhood policies, while Leverkusen expanded its Model and continued to benefit from its inherent cost-savings.

Housing was found to not only be integral for refugees as a place where integration can begin, but paramount in determining how their integration can proceed and central to accessing other facets of integration. It provides them with an opportunity to access German society as well as a place to establish a sense of normalcy in a new life, and access to German society can help them navigate the complexities of German bureaucracy surrounding attaining new housing and living on their own. How cities (and countries) structure their policies around housing and refugee accommodations can either help or hinder this effect.

Finally, reflecting on our third research question, based on these two case studies, we constructed an original theoretical framework of refugee housing policy, the first of its kind, that also draws upon the strands of MLG and theories of integration discussed earlier. Our framework, under ideal conditions, adopts several tenets of the Leverkusen Model:
integration begins on day one, preferences is given to privatised housing, and direct and transparent connections with NGOs allow for specialised care and services that the city government may not be able to provide within refugee accommodations. Additionally, it allows room for neighbourhood-oriented volunteer initiatives that can be tailored to microsituations, such as housing or neighbour issues in a district of a city such as through Berlin’s BENN.

The theoretical framework also posits that engagement of civil society is desirable and necessary for the swift functioning of a successful refugee housing and integration policy, as it allows for direct contact between nationals and refugees and lowers the presumed ‘cultural barriers’ either side may perceive of the other, abiding by the theories of interculturalism and acculturation. Creating a holistic refugee housing and integration policy requires open and dedicated engagement by all levels of society, with clear and transparent lines of communication between all and discussions with the refugees themselves as to what their needs are.

In total, this study has allowed us to gain a deeper understanding of an intersectional social and political experience that has not been well covered in previous studies, either within housing studies or integration studies. We have taken a view of macro factors (law changes, refugee allocations, etc) to how they have affected the individuals on whom the policies are enacted and clarified that housing, both the physical/mental space and the policies around it, strongly affect refugee integration prospects through issues surrounding location, community access, government transparency, and housing type, and can determine how well refugee integration proceeds.

Table 6 summarises the policy recommendations for cities derived from the empirical work in this thesis.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>For first/mass asylum accommodations:</th>
<th>Policy Recommendations</th>
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<tr>
<td>• Refugees should have <strong>as little time as possible</strong> in first- and mass accommodation facilities before moving into the private housing</td>
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<tr>
<td>• NGO and volunteer initiatives should work together with the government to enable refugees the opportunity to interact with natives inside the mass accommodations and within the local neighbourhood.</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Government must maintain a presence in its mass accommodations to ensure transparency (if operated by a third party).</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Government should ensure direct support to refugees living in mass accommodations through utilisation of social/care workers, psychologists, medical doctors, etc. These care workers should have a direct line to government civil service members in case of any malfeasance on the part of accommodation operators (if not operated by the government).</td>
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<tr>
<td>• New mass accommodations should be constructed near/within neighbourhoods in order to access community goods and societal resources. Before construction, community consultations should be held to ‘introduce’ refugees to new communities; this lowers the accessibility threshold refugees may face from those who are reluctant to allow refugees to live nearby.</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>• In times of low refugee intake, accommodations should be retrofitted to be more durable/sustainable to cut down on excessive repair and maintenance costs associated with ‘quick builds’.</td>
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For entry into the housing market:

- Cities whose populations are projected to continually grow must ensure there is a steady availability of housing on the private market, including an increasing market share of social/subsidised housing available for at-risk and low-wage groups.
- Cities can and should engage with private housing developers to ensure that a high percentage (at least 20%) of new units being constructed are sequestered specifically for at-risk groups.
- Government should actively promote entry into the housing market for refugees by coordinating civil society/volunteer efforts to find suitable spaces in the housing market. This includes collaborating with refugee-facing NGOs and community-oriented organisations to facilitate the creation of ‘social networks’ between refugees and the native population.
- Government should remove/ignore delineated asylum classification distinctions that would otherwise restrict a refugee’s ability to enter into the private housing market and society at large.

For neighbourhood-oriented integration policies

- Government should promote ‘locality’ of refugee mass accommodations, whereby communities that have a mass accommodation nearby can interact with the refugees housed in it.
- Government should promote community-oriented meeting areas (community centres) and programmes (such as sports, arts, culture, etc.) that serve to encourage interaction between refugees and the native population.
<table>
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<th>For governance over integration policies:</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>- Government should look to partner with local organisations to formulate outreach programmes that can help to increase language acquisition and lower perceptual barriers of societal entry.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- If governance over refugee housing and general integration policy implementation is centralised through the city government with the government as the primary actor of capacity delivery, the government should continually coordinate with relevant NGOs for relief efforts, as the NGOs will seek to provide and offer aid regardless of whether or not the government wants them to.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- If governance over refugee housing and general integration policy is devolved into Type II MLG arrangements where either partnering or contracting with third organisations is done, then the government should not take a hands-off approach to ensuring standards of policy delivery and implementation, nor should governments seek to contract out essential services while removing oversight of how the contracted parties implement the policy.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- There must be direct lines of communication from mass accommodations to civil service and vice versa regardless of how governance over the policy area is conducted. This includes communication from residents (refugees) to the relevant civil service officers to ensure contracted party compliance with standards for accommodation maintenance and operation.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Governance partners should remain consistent over time unless there is a breach of ethics from the contracted organisations.

Government should seek to facilitate the creation of nationality representative cultural groups (if they do not already exist), and seek to tailor policy guidelines with their recommendations.

Short-term cost-savings should not be prioritised over policy entrepreneurship, i.e. developing a new mode of either governance or policy implementation that can increase integration outcomes for refugees, since increasing refugees’ access to societal resources can allow them to ‘pay back’ a city’s investment in them faster.

Table 6- A summary of policy recommendations for cities as derived from the work conducted in this thesis.

One caveat of the theoretical framework is that it depends on consistent sustainable housing practices enacted by the city. Both cities had to face and adapt to the increasing housing availability and affordability crises that had slowly crept in over the years, raising the question of whether the cities would have sought to alleviate the pressure placed on its residents if the refugee influx had not occurred. Given estimated population growth throughout main cities in Europe, developing sustainable and affordable housing is key to the functioning of the framework, both in terms of supporting privatised housing for refugees and also to alleviate any social tensions that may arise between regular residents and refugees in a situation where housing provision for the public may appear to be scarce.

The theoretical framework should undergo means-testing to determine its validity in public policy so as to ‘iron out any kinks’ that may not be necessarily generalisable within its bounds. This is an avenue for potential future research.
The theoretical framework and the normative values within reflect on our broader notions of allowances for housing and asylum in general in Germany and Europe, both of which have enacted further measures since 2015 to increase bordering practices both internally and externally. It also furthers our understanding of the differences between the local and the national level, where the local level seeks (generally) greater inclusivity while the national level seeks to limit migrant access to the country. The contrast between them also brings to the fore the contravention of the values the EU is supposed to represent, as enumerated in its various treatises: plurality, human rights, equality, etc. This policy and outlook differential between the local and the national/supranational can lead to strain on the ground for refugees who seek family reunification, as well as access to integration benefits when they arrive in a country.

This leads us back to one of the Leverkusen Model’s core tenets, and a policy stance adopted by the new Berlin government: housing can be allocated regardless of asylum status because integration begins on day one of arrival. Artificial stratification of refugees can only serve to further divide them from native societies when the opposite is the stated goal of every national government that has accepted asylum-seekers.

The core contributions of this thesis extend from that precept: housing is a key component that must immerse refugees in their new societies rather than cut them off from it. This extends to border camps and remote refugee accommodations operated by the EU. Cities that can offer more direct support for housing and access to societal resources to refugees upon arrival and utilise the help and goodwill of civilian volunteers through coordinated outreach and targeted support will have a strong foundation on which refugees can begin to feel integrated within a new country and will lower costs for EU member states and cities. Utilising a multi-methods approach to understanding policy impacts from both the governance side and those on whom the policy is enacted allows for greater understanding of
the true impact of policies, such as whether policies that may be touted as successes by
government due to cost-savings or facilitating government processes may be a detriment to
the target population. In this case, we found that refugee/representative population
connection and input to the local government is paramount in determining how truly effective
a policy is in its most important determinant, i.e., delivering services to the target population.
If the targets of a specific social policy are not included in determining how a policy is
implemented, it may only be a success from the governance side and serve to exclude the
wellbeing of the target population. This is reflected in the theoretical framework developed in
this thesis (see chapter 7.5.3).

Overall, and somewhat intuitively, our core finding is that when refugees are given
more opportunities to both access societal resources and facilitate entry into their countries of
asylum, they are better able to ‘integrate’, as it were, allowing for more immediate
contributions to both their new city of residence and country as a whole.

When it comes to refugee housing, pecuniary costs for both the cities and the state are
typically at the forefront of policymakers’ minds, as we have seen from our two case studies.
While there is an upfront immediate cost to enacting policy reform with refugee housing, as
we have seen in Leverkusen, there are cost-savings in both financial and, more importantly,
human terms. In this case, short-term expenditures pale in comparison to the longer-term
benefits of ensuring that refugees can integrate into their new society faster and become
taxpaying and contributing members of society. Restricting their access to facets of
integration, such as housing, language classes, education, etc. only enacts further costs
towards the state/local government in necessitated upkeep costs for mass accommodations
and state monetary support, which can lead to political backlash.

How the EU and its member states choose to organise their asylum and integration
policy infrastructures will likely determine to what degree integration-oriented cities
cooperate with national government requirements or mandates. This, in turn, affects how electorates perceive refugees and their place in society, and how integration can be conducted between a local government and the refugees who arrive there.

There are many avenues for future research in this field given the plurality of housing and support policies that grew from the refugee influx of 2014/2015, including: studying the effect volunteer efforts have on housing integration for refugees; analysing the integration pathways of refugees in cities with more restrictive housing policy allowances versus those with greater housing allowances utilising the theoretical framework created in this thesis; if and how the refugee influx has caused city governments to reinvest in social welfare infrastructure, and whether refugees will benefit from that reinvestment; comparing cities whose integration policies were centralised versus those that had policies devolved to their district offices; uncovering the ‘policy rationality’ behind national government policies on asylum and bordering; studying the gap between the EU’s bordering policies and the inclusive policies advocated by cities; etc.

Refugees will constitute more than solely a political burden going forward, as the world’s climate changes and forces difficult situations on already precarious governing problems. Those cities and countries that can position themselves as able to adapt due to having learned lessons from previous policy failures (either within their own borders or from without) will likely benefit, as Leverkusen and Bavaria have, from ensuring that refugees can transition into normal lives quickly and begin contributing to society. Utilising the findings in this thesis, cities that are able to engage with and partner with local organisations, both general non-profit welfare organisations and representative national/ethnic organisations, and focus policy formulation on immersing refugees into local populations without condition will be better able to ensure that their housing markets and welfare systems are not overwhelmed
by rising numbers of asylum-seekers; all that is required for these efforts to succeed is the drive to make it so.

Appendix: List of Interviews

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<tr>
<th>Interview Number</th>
<th>Description of Interviewee</th>
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<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Landesamt official</td>
<td>24 November 2018</td>
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<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Andreas Tölke</td>
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<td>3</td>
<td>Sebastian Muschter</td>
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<td>4</td>
<td>Christiane Beckmann</td>
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<td>5</td>
<td>Karin Windt</td>
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<td>6</td>
<td>Flüchtlinge Willkommen</td>
<td>20 November 2018</td>
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<td>7</td>
<td>Give Something Back to Berlin</td>
<td>Via email</td>
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<td>8</td>
<td>Julia von Stülpnagel</td>
<td>15 December 2018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Katina Schubert</td>
<td>17 November 2018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>Date</td>
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<td>10</td>
<td>Berlin Senate Representative</td>
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<td>11</td>
<td>Bezirksamt coordinator</td>
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<td>ET</td>
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<td>14</td>
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<td></td>
<td>In Leverkusen</td>
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<tr>
<td>27</td>
<td>Volunteer worker</td>
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<td>28</td>
<td>Andreas Laukötter</td>
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<td>29</td>
<td>David Nelson</td>
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<td>30</td>
<td>Jürgen Dreyer</td>
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<td>31</td>
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<td>36</td>
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### List of Abbreviations

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BENN</td>
<td>Berlin Entwickelt Neuen Nachbarschaften</td>
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<tr>
<td>BAMF</td>
<td>Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge</td>
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<tr>
<td>CDU</td>
<td>Christian Democratic Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSU</td>
<td>Christian Social Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>CIVIX</td>
<td>Civic integration scale</td>
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<tr>
<td>CEAS</td>
<td>Common European Asylum System</td>
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<tr>
<td>DRK</td>
<td>Deutsche Rote Kreuz</td>
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<tr>
<td>European Council on Refugees and Exiles</td>
<td>ECRE</td>
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<tr>
<td>European Union</td>
<td>EU</td>
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<tr>
<td>Evangelische Jugend- und Fürsorgewerk</td>
<td>EJF</td>
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<tr>
<td>German Democratic Republic</td>
<td>GDR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Give Something Back to Berlin</td>
<td>GSBTB</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Organisation for Migration</td>
<td>IOM</td>
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<tr>
<td>Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant</td>
<td>ISIL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Landesamt für Flüchtlingsangelegenheiten</td>
<td>LAF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Landesamt für Gesundheit und Soziales, State Office for Health and Social Affairs</td>
<td>Lageso</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Modular Accommodations for Refugees</td>
<td>MUF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multi-level Governance</td>
<td>MLG</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-governmental organisation</td>
<td>NGO</td>
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<td>North-Rhein Westphalia</td>
<td>NRW</td>
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<td>Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development</td>
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<td>Public-private partnership</td>
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<td>Search-and-rescue</td>
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<td>Senatsverwaltung für Integration, Arbeit, und Soziales</td>
<td>Senate</td>
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<td>Social Democratic Party</td>
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<td>United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees</td>
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<tr>
<td>Wohnberechtigungsschein</td>
<td>WBS</td>
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