Bashing the fash: the effect of civil society opposition on the electoral performance of far right parties in the United Kingdom, 2005-2015

David Landon Cole

PhD

University of York

Politics

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Abstract

Far right parties attract opposition; that is to say, civil society groups, not formally connected with other political parties, that have as their sole or principal aim achieving a reduction in the number of people who support, and particularly vote for, far right parties.

What is the effect of this opposition on far right parties?

While the far right is a frequent research topic, what effect different kinds of opposition have on different kinds of far right party is understudied. Using the United Kingdom as a case study, this thesis researches how fascist and populist radical right parties are affected by confrontational and community-building styles of opposition. These are, respectively, the British National Party (BNP), United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP), Unite Against Fascism (UAF), and Hope not Hate.

A mixed methods approach is adopted; the first step is quantitative analysis, and the second is an in-depth analysis of the particular case of Barking and Dagenham from 2006 to 2010, with particular reference to the BNP and allowance made for UKIP.

More specifically, this thesis uses regression analysis on a new data set of activity by opposition groups, with local electoral, socio-economic, and demographic information to understand what effects opposition groups have. This is supported by historical and newspaper analysis and elite interviews to understand the nature of the opposition groups and why they campaign in the manners they do, using the particular experiences of Barking and Dagenham to explain where and why effects manifest.

The principal results are that opposition of the forms studied does not, in general, have substantive effects. To the extent that there are effects, they are under specific circumstances. Opposition group activity has more effect on UKIP than BNP. Consistent activity over a period of time can reduce voting for far right parties, but short bursts of activity can paradoxically increase voting for them.
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<td>AFA</td>
<td>Anti-Fascist Action</td>
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<td>AFDA</td>
<td>Anti-Fascist Democratic Action</td>
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<td>AFL</td>
<td>Anti-Fascist League</td>
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<td>ALARAFC</td>
<td>All London Anti-Racist Anti-Fascist Co-ordinating Committee</td>
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<td>ALCARAF</td>
<td>All Lewisham Campaign Against Racism and Fascism</td>
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<td>ANL</td>
<td>Anti Nazi League</td>
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<tr>
<td>API</td>
<td>Application Programming Interface</td>
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<tr>
<td>APS</td>
<td>Annual Population Survey</td>
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<tr>
<td>ARA</td>
<td>Anti-Racist Alliance</td>
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<td>Anti-Racist and Anti-Fascist Co-ordinating Committee</td>
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<td>BBC</td>
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<td>BNP</td>
<td>British National Party</td>
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<td>BUF</td>
<td>British Union of Fascists</td>
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<tr>
<td>BZOe</td>
<td>Buendnis Zukunft Oesterreich, German for Alliance for the Future of Austria</td>
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<td>Chadwell Heath Residents Association</td>
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<td>CP</td>
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<td>CSV</td>
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<td>CWU</td>
<td>Communication Workers Union</td>
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<td>EDL</td>
<td>English Defence League</td>
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<td>EU</td>
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EUROSTAT – European Statistical Office

FN – Front National, French for National Front

FPOe – Freiheitliche Partei Oesterreichs, German Freedom Party of Austria

GBM – Greater Britain Movement

GNU – Gnu’s Not Unix!

HMT – His Majesty’s Troopship

HnH – Hope not Hate

JSON – JavaScript Object Notation

LAOS – Laikos Orthodoxos Synagermos, Greek for Popular Orthodox Rally

LCC – London County Council

LEAP – Local Elections Archive Project

LFS – Labour Force Survey

LLX – League of Labour Ex-Servicemen

MEP – Member of the European Parliament

MP – Member of Parliament

NAAR – National Assembly Against Racism

NF – National Front

NSM – National Socialist Movement

NUCF – National Union for Combatting Fascism

NUT – National Union of Teachers

NUTS – Nomenclature of Units for Territorial Statistics

OeVP – Oesterreichische Volkspartei, German for Austrian People’s Party

OLS – Ordinary Least Squares

OMS – Organisation for the Maintenance of Supply
ONS – Office for National Statistics

OUAR – Oldham United Against Racism

PCS – Public and Commercial Services Union

PVV – Partij voor de Vrijheid, Dutch for Party for Freedom

RMT – National Union of Rail, Maritime, and Transport Workers

SDP – Social Democratic Party

STV – Single Transferable Vote

SWP – Socialist Workers Party

TEU – Treaty on European Union

TUC – Trades Union Congress

UAF – Unite Against Fascism

UK – United Kingdom

UKIP – United Kingdom Independence Party

USA – United States of America

WUNC – Worthiness, Unity, Numbers, Commitment

WW2 – World War Two
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Former Labour Member of Parliament for Neath/Castell-nedd who held various Cabinet roles; one of the founders of the Anti-Nazi League and a veteran anti-racist and anti-fascist campaigner

The Rt. Hon. Dame Margaret Hodge, DBE MP
Labour Member of Parliament for Barking

Jon Cruddas, MP
Labour Member of Parliament for Dagenham and then Dagenham and Rainham

David Rosenberg
Historian and anti-racist and anti-fascist activist

A representative of Unite Against Fascism
Preface

I dedicate this thesis to the memory of Heather Heyer.

‘If you’re not outraged, you’re not paying attention.’

- Heyer’s last Facebook post before being murdered while protesting against the ‘Unite the Right’ rally in Charlottesville, Virginia.
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Finally, for her unstinting love and support, my wife, Alice.
Declaration

I declare that this thesis is a presentation of original work and I am the sole author. This work has not previously been presented for an award at this, or any other, University. All sources are acknowledged as References.
Chapter 1 - Introduction

Admit me Chorus to this history;
Who prologue-like your humble patience pray,
Gently to hear, kindly to judge, our play.

- The Chorus, Henry V, William Shakespeare

On Saturday, 17th April 2010, around five hundred people, including the author, gathered in a warehouse that had been converted into offices in a run-down part of East London. They would spend the day delivering newspapers, specially produced for the occasion, to prevent a far right party from gaining more seats in that municipality’s administration.

Did it matter?

The day of action described above was organized by Hope Not Hate, and took place in Dagenham, shortly before the 2010 local elections. In 2006, after a slow build up, the British National Party (BNP) had had an electoral breakthrough, becoming the official opposition at the London Borough of Barking and Dagenham Council. The aim of the day was clear; to stop the BNP.

The campaigners were clear that they had made a difference. Hope Not Hate would release a book subtitled ‘the story of the campaign that helped defeat the BNP’ (Lowles 2014). Another group, Unite Against Fascism, would claim that, ‘[s]uccessful campaigning by UAF ... dealt the BNP heavy electoral blows’ (Unite Against Fascism 2003).

What is not clear, and not studied, is what actual effect it had on votes for the British National Party.

The day of action was not a one-off; not in its location, not in the organisation behind it, not in its tactics. Rather, it was part of a concerted effort, ongoing to this day, to prevent, as far as possible, far right parties from gaining seats in the House of Commons, the European Parliament, and local government by civil society organisations employing different strategies to achieve their aims.

The rise, or re-rise, of the far right is a frequent topic of discussion in both lay and academic circles in the UK, the EU, and beyond (see, for instance, Grierson 2019 and Foster 2016 for the former, Trilling 2012, Vasilopoulou and Halikiopoulou 2015, Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser 2018 for the latter). These have variously addressed electoral success (Golder 2003), leadership (Veugelers 1999), internal organisation (Ellinas and Lamprianou 2019), social and economic drivers (Mudde 2007), and a host of other factors. However, relatively few have examined
responses to the far right, and still fewer have looked at civil society responses to the far right in the electoral arena.

The far right is controversial; there is no universal agreement on what the far right even is, let alone what causes it, what its effects are, or what it means. Among the many reactions it has provoked, it has produced opposition (see Renton 2000 and 2006, Copsey 2000 and 2004, Mudde 2007). That is to say, it has caused other political and social players to take actions with the specific intent of worsening the position of far right parties, not simply because they are political opponents but because they are held to represent a politics and a philosophy that is in and of itself morally unacceptable.

This opposition takes different forms - mainstream political parties engaging (or not) with such parties in different ways, up to a cordon sanitaire; indirect state action, such as electoral thresholds systems; direct state actions, such as outright bans and legal proceedings (Akkerman and Rooduijn 2015). Much of this is captured in the recent literature on political opportunity structures and the far right (Arzheimer and Carter 2006).

A potentially significant part of the picture that is understudied, however, is the effect of direct opposition from civil society groups. There is a range of such groups across the world, some stretching back to the 1980s or before, some much more recent. They range from general anti-racist groups to investigative magazines, from organisations that gather intelligence on their opponents in the shadows to those that organise marches of thousands. This opposition and these groups bear study both because their purported effects, if true, are substantial factors in the political choices made by citizens and because the effort expended, if misdirected, is, at best, a waste and, at worst, counterproductive.

The potential range of opposition, therefore, is very large. However, much of the opposition to far right parties that exists is ancillary to other objectives. An organisation like Show Racism the Red Card, which uses professional footballers to promote anti-racism, may have the effect of damping support for far right parties, and it may even be pleased at that result, but its objectives are not directly the diminution of the far right parties.

The intent of the present study is to investigate the effects of those organisations whose raison d'être are specifically to hinder far right parties at elections - to either stop people voting for them, or to have people vote for another party.
The far right is a diverse grouping - in terms of geography, in terms of history, in terms of ideology, in terms of success. It ranges from Greece’s LAOS\(^1\) to the Golden Dawn; from the previously regional Lega Nord to the Movimento Sociale Fiamma Tricolore with its fascist roots; from the Frente Nacional to Vox. There is a generally accepted divide in the literature within the broader far right category or family between, crudely, more extreme and less extreme subtypes. It is convenient to label these as fascist and populist radical right, respectively (Golder 2003; Mudde 2007). Although there are substantial similarities between these two groups, the differences are profound. The fascist parties tend to be longer-established and more extreme than the populist radical right. The populist radical right tends to be more acceptable and more electorally successful. The differential effects of opposition on the two sub-groups of the far right also merit investigation as this can better explain why particular forms of action are effective.

In order to determine the effects of opposition groups, and particularly different types of opposition groups, on far right parties and on different kinds of far right parties at election time, certain data are required. These include electoral results, information on the activities of the opposition groups themselves, and data on other phenomena that can affect far right parties’ performance.

The United Kingdom presents an excellent testing ground for these questions.

Firstly, both a fascist party, in the form of the British National Party, and a populist radical right party, in the form of the United Kingdom Independence party, are present, contest elections, and have candidates returned to office (Mudde 2007; Ford and Goodwin 2014a).

Secondly, there are a range of elections that can be studied, at the local, national, and European level. The socio-economic and demographic data needed and for which allowance must be made as existing theory suggests that they materially impact the far right (Golder 2003) is also readily available.

Thirdly, by studying a single country, other factors that could materially affect the electoral performance of far right parties, such as geographic situation, national history, political situation, and the like, are held constant.

Finally, there are two different opposition groups, Hope not Hate and Unite Against Fascism, that respectively represent a liberal and a radical tradition of anti-fascism and opposition (Copsey

\(^1\) Popular Orthodox Rally. The Greek is Λαϊκός Ορθόδοξος Συναγερμός, transliterated as Laikós Orthódoxos Synagermóς, and abbreviated in Greek as ΛΑ.Ο.Σ. and in English as LAOS.
2017) to the broader far right, allowing a determination of the effects of different styles of activity on the far right.

The portion of this study that analyses large numbers of election results using quantitative measures runs from 2005 to 2015. This time period is chosen as it marks a distinct phase in terms of opposition to the far right in Britain. Unite Against Fascism was started in 2003, with Hope not Hate beginning the following year. While far right parties had been growing for some time before this, it was for the 2005 elections that the opposition groups under study were in full swing. The end date is the 2015 general election, following which the protracted Brexit process marked a new phase in British politics (Jennings and Lodge 2018). While the quantitative analysis focuses on both UKIP and the BNP, the qualitative analysis zooms in on the BNP through the case study of the London Borough of Barking and Dagenham, over the period from 2006 to 2010, looking at the activities of both Hope not Hate and Unite Against Fascism. This time period represents the four years between the 2006 election that saw the British National Party become the largest opposition group on the London Borough of Barking and Dagenham Council and the 2010 election that saw them lose all their seats. It is a period of maximum activity that gives the best opportunity to see the effects of activity by Unite Against Fascism and Hope not Hate. This case study focuses on the British National Party because of the particular nature of its campaigning and concentrated support, where the United Kingdom Independence Party campaigned in a more traditional, media-based manner and attracted diffuse support across the UK.

Structure
Having set out the case for the study, this introductory chapter moves on to give brief backgrounds to both Unite Against Fascism and Hope not Hate; then gives a precis of the research design; a summary of the findings follows; and, finally, the importance and contribution of the study are presented.

The thesis then progresses by looking at the available literature, broken down by literature on the far right itself, literature on opposition to the far right, and literature on social movements as a means of understanding groups that oppose the far right. The third chapter lays out the research design for this study, based on an explanatory sequential mixed methods approach, which is justified in that chapter. The research design chapter continues by covering the variables used in the quantitative analysis and operationalisation thereof, before looking at data sources. Finally, it covers both the quantitative and qualitative methods that are used, before setting out some expectations for the quantitative analysis. In order to place both the far right and opposition to the far right in context and to explain how their modern manifestations depend both on their own histories and the interplay between them over time, chapter four sets
out a history of fascism and anti-fascism, from its origins through the Second World War, through the rise and fall of the National Front and its concomitant opposition, to the emergence of the BNP. The fifth chapter discusses the United Kingdom Independence Party, the British National Party, Unite Against Fascism, Hope not Hate, and how they each operate and campaign. Chapter six presents the results of the quantitative analysis. The quantitative analysis then guides and is supplemented by the qualitative analysis of a case study, the London Borough of Barking and Dagenham from 2006 to 2010, in chapter seven. Finally, the thesis concludes with the key findings and their interpretations and implications; and the study’s limitations and possible extensions.

**Research questions**

The core question of this thesis is: what effects, if any, civil society opposition groups have on the electoral performance of far right parties in the United Kingdom? In order to approach this larger question, three groups of sub-questions are asked:

- What is the nature of the opposition groups?
- What are their effects?
- What are the explanations for any effects?

These begin with asking how the long history of interaction between the far right and groups opposed thereto shape the worldviews and understandings of modern-day groups that oppose the far right. It further asks as to whether and to what extent the groups opposing the far right under study in this thesis can be understood as social movements and, if so, what implications this has for how their activities, and particularly for the longevity or otherwise of forms of action. It combines the answers from these to give an understanding of they will operate today.

The next set of questions are as to the effects of the activities of the opposition groups. Do the activities of the opposition groups have a measurable impact on the electoral performance of far right parties? These questions are answered through statistical analysis of an extensive data set of elections and opposition group activity. The impact is not found to be great; at times counterproductive; and that particular patterns of activity have particular effects.

The final questions asked are as to what explains the apparent connection between activity by the opposition groups and the diminution of votes for far right parties, taking Barking and Dagenham as a case study, and finding that a range of substantial changes in the communications strategy of local government in the area, along with other changes, may have actually been the drivers of that reduction in vote.
Unite Against Fascism

As the BNP started to pick up council seats in the early 2000s, there was no national campaign opposed to the far right; with the decline of the National Front in the 1980s, the various anti-fascist groups had drifted away.

The Anti-Nazi League had been relaunched in 1992 with the Millwall by-election (Popple 2003). It attempted to continue in the mould of its illustrious predecessor, although it would not catch the imagination as its namesake did. In 2003, it became apparent to people on the left of British politics that a different approach was needed as the BNP were changing tactics (Unite Against Fascism 2018).

This alternative would be Unite Against Fascism, which brought together the National Assembly Against Racism (a successor to the Anti-Racist Alliance of yore), the Anti-Nazi League (close to the Socialist Workers Party), the Muslim Council of Britain and other faith groups, the Trades Union Congress, and a range of MPs (Socialist Worker 2003; Unite Against Fascism 2018), including three Conservative MPs, two of whom - David Cameron and Michael Howard - would go onto be leaders of their party, while the third, Sir Teddy Taylor, was a member of the hard-right Monday Club. The initial leadership was Weyman Bennett of the SWP and Sabby Dhalu of the National Assembly Against Racism (NAAR); members of Rock Against Racism were also involved, as were Unison, the Association of Teachers and Lecturers (ATL), and the Communications Workers Union (CWU) (Unite Against Fascism 2018). The National Union of Teachers (NUT), the Public and Commercial Services Union (PCS), the National Union of Rail, Maritime and Transport Workers (RMT), and Unite would also take part.

Searchlight - to become Hope not Hate, as discussed below - would be part of the steering group, but would leave after disagreements over strategy (Copsey 2011b:133). As it was Hope not Hate that left Unite Against Fascism, this is discussed at greater length below.

It should be noted that Unite Against Fascism did not deal solely with political parties, and was particularly concerned with the rise of the English Defence League after 2009 (Copsey 2011:134; Unite Against Fascism 2018). This took the form of reverting to physical confrontation, and spilt over into its efforts regarding the BNP (Copsey 2011b:138).

Hope not Hate

Hope not Hate’s origins lie in Searchlight. Searchlight is discussed at greater length in the history chapter, but there were three principal, if overlapping, activities in the latter years of the
twentieth century and the first years of the twenty-first; these were education; investigations; and publishing the magazine. These were carried out by three separate entities - Searchlight Information Services, Searchlight Educational Trust, and Searchlight Magazine Limited. This split is not unusual. There are considerable tax benefits available to charities, but those benefits come with equally considerable restrictions on what charities may do, particularly in and around politics. However, control of these various organisations would become an issue further down the line.

Searchlight started campaigning as a result of the BNP’s emergence around 2001. The Hope not Hate moniker emerged from a t-shirt design in 2003, and then appeared on Searchlight leaflets, before becoming the brand for Searchlight campaigning (Lowles 2014:11). Over a period of time, Searchlight Information Services would come under the Hope not Hate brand, as would Searchlight Educational Trust. Searchlight Magazine would retain its identity.

Hope not Hate split from Searchlight during 2011 and 2012. It is well known in anti-fascist and left-wing circles that this split, and the split between Nick Lowles (of Hope not Hate) and Gerry Gable (of Searchlight), was surrounded by some acrimony (Rosenberg 2018). Precisely what caused this conflict is not clear, though a combination of disagreements about strategy, leadership, and financing seems probable (Rosenberg 2018). Around 2011 and 2012, the changes were completed (Hope not Hate 2014b). The change in the senior management team and corporate structures did not, however, affect the style of campaigning under the Hope not Hate brand.

The spark for Searchlight to start campaigning, rather than just investigating and publishing, was the series of race riots across the north of England in the summer of 2001. The causes of the riots were, of course, complicated. Searchlight, though, would become particularly engaged in Oldham, in the outskirts of Manchester. In crude terms, the white and Asian communities in Oldham lived effectively separate lives, with little interaction. A series of race hate incidents caused a powder-keg of resentment to explode, which the BNP stoked and from which it tried to benefit.

The principal campaigning opposition to the BNP at the time was the Socialist Workers Party-dominated Anti-Nazi League. Searchlight, however, wanted to campaign for something, rather

² It has often been pointed out that the initials of Searchlight Information Services are the same as those of the Secret Intelligence Service, better known as MI6.
³ Searchlight Information Services would become Hope not Hate (1986) Ltd in 2012, and would be wound up in 2015. Searchlight Educational Trust would become Hope not Hate Educational in 2012 and then Hope not Hate Charitable Trust in 2016. A new organisation, Hope not Hate Ltd, would be established in 2012. Searchlight Magazine Ltd. would continue as it was (Companies House 2019).
than merely against the far right, and to that end started working with a local group, Oldham United Against Racism (OUAR). Searchlight used its expertise in research and investigations to find the unsavoury pasts of people associated with the BNP there, and then used the local connections and branding of OUAR (Lowles 2014:32) to spread the results of those investigations in the form of leaflets and a free newspaper. There were also efforts to convince the local press to become openly hostile to the BNP on the back of these investigations, where previously it had been ambivalent or even acknowledging that they were raising real issues (Lowles 2014:32). This was followed up with research in Oldham that suggested that aggressive leaflets that did not relate to people’s quotidiarian experience, including of the BNP, simply did not have any effect.

Moreover, the BNP had changed the way it campaigned. It was no longer a matter of physical control of streets (Copsey 2011a:131) and so a new form of opposition work was required.

Hope not Hate identified a key driver of votes for the far right as being disconnection between people and the political process, both locally and nationally (Copsey 2011b:135) and particularly where the local Labour Party had effectively taken an area for granted (Cruddas 2018; Hain 2018; Hodge 2018).

In 2013, Hope not Hate initiated a consultation of their members as to how they should engage with UKIP after its surge in that year’s council elections (Hope not Hate 2013b). Two-thirds of respondents were in favour of taking more action regarding UKIP (Hope not Hate 2013c; Hope not Hate nd). The results of this would only come to fruition after the time period of this study, but it would represent a ramping-up of specific activity against UKIP. However, as with Unite Against Fascism, and in spite of protestations to the contrary, Hope not Hate was carrying out work in relationship to UKIP at least as early as 2004 (Hope Not Hate 2013).

**Research design**

An explanatory sequential research design is used (Cresswell 2015) using mixed methods is employed. This design involves the collection and analysis of quantitative data on the activities of the opposition groups, the electoral results of the far right parties, and relevant socioeconomic indicators, that are then explained with qualitative data, with the second phase building on the results of the first (Ivankova et al 2006). This approach is particularly appropriate given that the area is under-studied and lacks data.

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4 Regrettably, Hope not Hate have had several revamps of their website, with a lot of information that was on it no longer available.
Because of the relative paucity of coverage in the literature on opposition to the far right, it is necessary to answer a set of questions to understand the phenomena under study before the main question of effects can be answered. As set out above, these come under three broad headings:

- What is the nature of the opposition groups?
- What are their effects?
- What are the explanations for any effects?

The nature of the opposition groups is taken to include their strategy, their tactics, and their activities, but also their background and history, particularly in terms of their lineage and how events and debates in the past shape their understanding of the world today and so what they do. This is their weltansschauung, including where it comes from, and how it affects their actions in the now.

In order to understand the opposition groups and why they operate in the manner they do, a history of the far right and of opposition to the far right is provided, understanding the opposition groups as social movements (Tilly 2004). This is supplemented with elite interviews to provide a picture of what the philosophical and political underpinnings of the opposition groups are and how their own institutional memories shapes how they act today.

As the opposition groups are specifically seeking to affect the far right parties at the polls, quantitative analysis using electoral data lends itself to answering the question of what, if any, effects the opposition groups cause. This is done using regression analyses using a new and original data set of activity by Hope not Hate and Unite Against Fascism, based on content analysis of around two thousand documents. Local level electoral, socio-economic, demographic, and opposition activity data are used to give the finest-grained picture possible. The result is an understanding of the effects, such as they are, of activity by the opposition groups - Hope not Hate and Unite Against Fascism - on the far right parties - the British National Party and the United Kingdom Independence Party.

Finally, to explain the effects revealed by the quantitative analysis, a comparison of the operations of Hope not Hate and Unite Against Fascism on the British National Party in the London Borough of Barking and Dagenham from 2006 to 2010 is conducted.

Findings

Opposition groups might be expected to have a substantial impact on the electoral performance of the far right, given their history, the amount of their activity, and the claims they make for the
effects of their activity. However, this is not the case; the impact of the opposition groups is in fact limited. In explaining this puzzle, this thesis makes four principal findings.

Firstly, the pattern of opposition over time is very important. Consistent activity over a period of time tends to hamper both types of far right party, but flashes of intense activity, counterintuitively, tends to actually help them. This is a significant result that suggests at least some opposition activity is having the opposite effect to that which its instigators desire and expect.

Secondly, different types of far right party respond to opposition activities differently; populist radical right parties are more susceptible to the effects of opposition activity than are fascist parties, both when being helped and when being hindered. This provides further evidence for the distinction within the far right, and leads to an expectation that the parties will behave differently.

Thirdly, the effects of the opposition group activity in toto is relatively limited when compared to the impact of social, economic, and demographic drivers of votes for the far right.

Finally, the nature of the opposition groups and their choice of activities can be effectively explained by considering them as social movements and understanding their respective histories.

**Importance and contribution**

The importance of the subject of this thesis lies in its contribution to the broader study of far right parties. While the far right is broadly studied, opposition to it is not. Although no moral judgment is passed in this thesis, much of the study of the far right, both in academic and popular writings, carries a subtext of understanding a pathology in order to combat it. A considerable amount of work is expended in opposing far right parties and this thesis could shape how that effort might be used to greater effect.

The study makes a number of theoretical contributions. Firstly, opposition to the far right is generally under-researched. This study begins to address that lack of research, and indicates avenues for future research. It also addresses contemporary, rather than historical, opposition. Specifically, it indicates the importance of meso level effects on the electoral performance of the far right, suggests that patterning of activity in opposing the far right is critically important, and that the net effect of opposition to the far right from civil society groups is underwhelming.

Furthermore, it provides a synthesis of anti-fascism based on activity, but seeing radical and liberal traditions. It identifies the two opposition groups under study as representative of those groups, but also shows how they can be understood as social movements. It plots the histories of
the two social movements going back into those traditions. As social movements with long histories, their particular dynamics inform how they see the world and how they understand the far right and, hence, how they campaign and why certain tactics and strategies persist.

It also provides a quantitative analysis of the far right, based on a new and substantial dataset of activity by groups opposed to the far right, and matching, localised electoral, socio-economic, and demographic data, as well as indicating the viability of protest event analysis in this field if allowance is made for the patterning of protest events. Based on the new data sets, it provides a sharper picture of some of the dynamics affecting far right parties than is afforded by national data, which can obscure local trends with national statistics. A contribution is also made to the literature on how local factors affect the fortunes of far right parties, including opposition, but also the more-commonly studied socio-economic and demographic factors.

This has a range of implications. Many of the contributions may be applicable to other party families that lie outside the mainstream, including the radical left and the green movement. It emphasises the importance of local and meso effects, which has implications for studies that solely use national data.

Finally, there are clear, real-world implications as to the efficacy of combating the far right in these manners in terms of consistent activity over a longer period of time being at least somewhat effective, while flashes of intense activity can have the opposite effect to that which is intended in actually helping far right parties.

This chapter has laid out in brief the rationale for the study as a whole. In the next chapter, the scene for the study is set with a review of the literatures on the far right, on opposition to the far right, and on social movements.
Chapter 2 – The far right and its opposition: a review of the literature

So many books, so little time

- Frank Zappa

Introduction

In 1993, the British National Party (BNP) won their first ever council seat, when Derek Beackon was returned at a by-election in the Millwall ward of Tower Hamlets. Despite increasing his total vote at the full election the next year, Beackon’s share of the vote fell and he and his two fellow candidates lost. In 2008, Richard Barnbrook was elected as an at-large member of the Greater London Authority for the BNP, with more than five per cent of the vote; at the next election in 2012, the vote for the BNP more than halved in both votes and share. At the 2010 general election, the British National Party received in excess of half a million votes, reaching almost two per cent of ballots cast. Five years later, this had fallen to fewer than two hundred thousand votes, representing a share of less than one per cent.

Nor was this restricted to local government; the BNP went from a vote share of 1.13% in the European Parliament elections of 1999 to 6.2% in the same polls ten years later, returning two MEPs – Nick Griffin, the party leader, in the North West England European constituency with eight per cent of the vote, and Andrew Brons, with almost ten per cent of the vote in the Yorkshire and the Humber European constituency. By 2014, they had fallen again to 1.2% of the vote and did not even contest the elections in 2019.

Nor is this a phenomenon restricted to the BNP; the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP) went from five councillors in 2007 to over 200 in 2015, including control of Thanet District Council. UKIP also went from one per cent of the share of the vote in the European Parliamentary elections of 1994 to a third of Britain’s European delegation in 2014 before losing all its MEPs at the 2019 elections.

The essential question being asked in this thesis is ‘why do some far right parties do better than others’? Although the question may be simply put, the answer - or rather, answers - are less tractable. As with almost any question in the social sciences, there is no one answer. Rather, a there are a set of explanations that, together, give a picture of what circumstances will help and hinder far right parties and, more importantly, why they do so. As the phenomenon is so broad, with so many variables at play, this thesis looks to one particular sub-question: what is the effect of opposition by civil society groups on far right parties?
In order to provide a background on the understanding offered by the literature on the various phenomena that must be understood to answer this question, this chapter proceeds in three parts. Firstly, it looks at the broad debate on the far right and, in particular, on the causes of the far right’s success, examining existing explanations and their limitations in addressing the present research question and, in particular, identifying two key gaps in the literature - meso-level explanations and opposition - as well as some of the more problematic areas in what is available. Opposition is largely self-explanatory, although this thesis looks specifically at groups that have opposition to the far right as their core activity, as set out below. Meso-level explanations sit alongside macro- and micro-level explanations. Where macro-level explanations deal with gross factors – the unemployment rate, the level of immigration, and so on – that can drive votes for the far right and micro-level factors deal with more individual, attitudinal factors, meso-level explanations are how national-level factors are understood by individuals in particular localities, mediated through group membership, local media, and the nature and conditions of the area. They are ‘the local contextual determinants of radical right support’ (Goodwin 2009:325) and ‘local organizations to which individuals belong, or through which they gain knowledge and norms, such as the family, school, or party’ (Eatwell 2000:350). Meso-level explanations are the glue that joins micro-level and macro-level explanations.

This chapter then moves to the literature on opposition to the far right. While it takes on some of the theoretical distinctions made, it argues that much of it is either out of date or irrelevant to the contemporary far right. Using this section of the literature, it provides a historical account of the development of opposition to the far right. Following this, the thesis will look at the particular parties and opposition groups, giving a brief overview of their development.

It will then look at the literature on social movements, applying Tilly’s (2006) conception of repertoires of contention and Tarrow’s (2011) idea of cycles of collective action to opposition groups, to offer an explanation for how opposition groups develop a set of strategies and then cleave to them even when they are outdated.

**Explaining the success of the far right**

Explanations for the success of the far right are as varied as the far right itself. In order to make sense of the explanations, this section begins by looking at definitional questions. It then looks at drivers for support of the far right, broken down, following a common split in the literature, into supply and demand. This split is between the supply factors that are intrinsic to parties themselves – the choices they make, for instance – and the demand factors that look at the social and economic factors that drive people to vote for far right parties. This split allows similar factors to be analysed together to understand the broad processes at work and see commonalities
between, for instance, the way different socio-economic conditions affect the vote for the far right. This framework, as discussed below, is widely used in the literature to understand drivers for far right success.

It then looks at levels at which the far right may be understood, in terms of individual affect, the means by which individuals and groups gain their opinions, and large-scale drivers such as the economy.

What is the far right?

The question of what exactly makes the far right is a vexed one. Hainsworth (2008:23) describes the situation as one of ‘taxonomic ambiguity’; it is, per Roberts (1994:480) very varied and not clearly delimited. This section proceeds chronologically through both the development of the far right itself and the development of how the literature understands the far right as it changes. In short, it is held that, for the decades after the Second World War, ‘far right’ and ‘fascist’ were synonyms, but that a new, non-fascist but still definitively far right variant emerged and rose to prominence, with much of the ‘old’, fascist far right emulating, either just in form or in form and in substance, this new far right. This new far right is best understood, following Mudde (2007) as nativist, authoritarian, and populist.

For much of the post war period, ‘what is the far right?’ was barely a question: ‘[u]ntil the 1980s the term extreme right was synonymous with that of neo-fascism’ (Ignazi 2003:1). From the ashes of 1945 for almost four decades, the only people who considered themselves or were considered on the further reaches of the rightward edge of politics were the likes of Britain’s National Front (NF) and, of greater political relevance, the Movimento Sociale Italiano (MSI) in Italy (Ignazi 2003).

The term far right, then, at one point meant the same as neofascist, but this changed as the new far right emerged and the neo-fascist wing became less important. This change, from a comfortable match between ‘neofascist’ and ‘extreme right’ has led to a great number of terms for the phenomenon. Cas Mudde (2007:11) finds authors using twenty-three different terms, for what he calls the populist radical right. This panoply of names, per Mudde, does not represent contestation over what the far right is so much as ‘a lack of clear definitions’.

One of, if not the earliest, attempts to pin down the nature of the far right was Theodor Adorno’s ‘The Authoritarian Personality’ (Adorno et al. 1980), which, seeking an explanation as to how ordinary people could either be driven or convinced to commit the atrocities seen in the Second World War, purported to find markers of an authoritarian personality. This work, though influential, has been widely criticised for its methodology, not least by Martin (2001). Moreover,
it focusses on the individual level, rather than the party; it might or might not explain why someone of a given set of persuasions might vote for a far right party, but it does not actually say what a far right party is.

Nor is it sufficient to approach the far right themselves for a definition. As Hainsworth (2008:5) points out, the extreme right do not generally call themselves the extreme right, mutatis mutandis for radical right and far right. That said, there are instances where parties will take, if not the ‘right’ moniker, the name of extreme, as in the case of the French Front National, who turned the designation used against them and made it a virtue, branding themselves ‘extremists of the middle’ (Backes 2007:246), neither right nor left.

Backes (2007), through a historical and lexicological investigation, arrives at ‘the antithesis of the constitutional state’ (Backes 2007:248) as a definition of extremism that consists of ‘striving for autocracy’ in the sense of concentration and lack of control of governmental authority. Its entry into use at various times in the various European political lexica were at times of political and religious ferment (Backes 2007:244); in the modern period, it was originally applied to the left, but was ‘extended to the extreme right’ after Mussolini led the March on Rome that was precipitated his appointment as Prime Minister by Victor Emmanuel III (Backes 2007:244). Pace Dahl’s (1971:5) definition of the state as polyarchic, extremism also aims for monism – a single political actor which, even if variegated, manages the affairs of state and (if even considered separate) people. This gives a pair of two-fold options for a potential four-fold typology; ‘democratic anti-constitutionalism’, ‘constitutional anti-democratism’, ‘anti-constitutional anti-democratism’ and ‘constitutional democracy’ (Backes 2007:251), with the former three opposed and antithetical to the latter one. Constitutional democracy, while allowing for substantial variation in terms of political and economic outcomes, encompasses mainstream parties that are committed both to the existing structures of the state (particularly as regards who counts as a member thereof) and the democratic process for choosing and replacing representatives and governments that asserts the ‘fundamental equality of human beings’ (Backes 2007:252). Democratic anti-constitutionalism covers those ideologies that accept the principle of equality, but not the manner in which the state is constructed. Anti-democratic constitutionalism accepts the state order, but challenges who is a member of the state (and, implicitly, the nation). Anti-democratic anti-constitutionalism rejects both the current form of the state and the principle of equality. These categories (with the exception of constitutional democracy, which cannot apply to the far right) do not necessarily apply solely to the far right; democratic anti-constitutionalism could cover some varieties of the far left, as could anti-constitutional democracy, while anti-constitutional anti-democratism could conceivably contain regimes such as the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia or the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.
This simple schema worked well enough for a while; the terms ‘fascism’ and ‘Nazism’ and then ‘neo-fascism’ and ‘neo-Nazism’, were the language of political and historical researchers until the 1960s (Hainsworth 2008:8). All the parties grouped under the label of the far right in this period could comfortably be placed in the anti-democratic, anti-constitutional box. The situation now is rather different. There are far right parties across Europe - Mudde identified over fifty in 2000 (2000:185), rising to over seventy in 2007 as new parties were formed (Mudde 2007:305-308), with that list excluding parties we would now include, such as the Fremskrittspartiet of Norway. The MSI reformed itself into a new party, Alleanza Nazionale in 1995 (Carter 2011), its fellows would start gaining substantial political representation, even entering government in Austria in 2000, when the Freiheitliche Partei Oesterrichs (FPOe) formed a coalition with the Oesterrichische Volkspartei (OeVP). Even in Britain, where the ‘story... has long been one of failure’ (Goodwin 2011:xiv), the British National Party (BNP) received almost one million votes at the 2009 elections to the European Parliament. This remarkable turnaround in the fortunes of the far right is explained by the far right, in some way, having changed from its neofascist past; as Ignazi (2003:2) puts it, ‘as these new extreme right parties do not share any commitment to neo-fascism they are a different type of extreme right’.

Following Backes’ (2007) terms, the emergence of these new far right parties presented a definitional and conceptual challenge. The extreme right moved from just being in the anti-constitutional, anti-democratic box to also be democratic anti-constitutionalists or anti-constitutional democrats as new parties emerged and old parties changed to ape them (Ignazi 2003:22). This change was not limited to ideology; the manner in which parties presented themselves and campaigned changed as well, including in cases where the core ideology either did not change or was occulted. As described below, this would open the door to different electoral fortunes.

This dilemma in pinning down the new version of the far right is noted in the literature; citing Mudde (1995: 204-5), Hainsworth (2008) highlights the novelty of this new far right as a potential reason why it has yet to be pinned down; the various -isms have histories extending, in some instances, centuries. However, twenty-five years since Mudde wrote, the problem does not seem to have abated. How, then, to understand this dichotomy?

One option, following Carter (2005), is to say that far right parties must be both anti-democratic and anti-constitutional. They must exhibit ‘a rejection of the fundamental values, procedures and institutions of the democratic constitutional state (a feature that makes right-wing extremism extremist)’ (Carter 2005:17) as well as ‘a rejection of the principle of fundamental human equality (a feature that makes right-wing extremism right-wing)’ (Carter 2005:17). This translates, to, in the first instance, ‘anti-partyism, anti-parliamentarianism and anti-pluralism’ (Hainsworth
2008:12) and, in the second, ‘nationalism, racism, xenophobia, ethnocentrism and exclusionism’ (Hainsworth 2008:12).

This would suggest that parties like UKIP, who arguably meet the latter requirements but are not necessarily anti-parliamentary, fall outside the definition; in Hainsworth’s (2008:12) words, ‘[t]hey do not reject democracy per se, but have reservations about its actual workings’. They are then ‘perceived as right-extremist because they unquestionably occupy the right-most position of the political spectrum’ (Ignazi 2003:2). Clearly, this definition does not work in all cases. In some cases, the rightmost party is not generally considered far right – for instance, Portugal, until the emergence of the Partido Nacional Renovador (later renamed Ergue-te) around the turn of the Millennium, did not have what we would instinctively recognise as a far right party, but on this definition one of the mainstream parties would have to be considered as such. Equally, some countries have more than one far right party, not least of which is the UK with UKIP and the BNP or, Italy with the Lega and FT-MSI. Abedi (2004:12) suggest that being opposed to the political establishment identifies the far right, although this has the problem of snap changes in characterisation on joining a coalition, and Hainsworth (2008) points out that the FPOe, DVP, and LN have all entered coalition governments without giving up their (perceived) outsideriness. It may be a difficult rope to walk, but it is at least conceptually possible for – to use Abedi’s term – an anti-political establishment party to continue to seek to change the establishment from within without being totally subsumed into it.

However, if we accept that there are different types of far right party (Ignazi 2002:24; Carter 2005:17; Hainsworth 2008:17), we can return to Backes’ typology to explain it. If the classic variant of the far right party only appeared as both anti-constitutional and anti-democratic, it today also appears as anti-democratic and constitutional, and anti-constitutional and democratic. This allows us to distinguish between these ideal types while still categorising both as far right inasmuch as their shared opposition, even if that opposition is qualitatively different or only overlaps rather than being the same, to the democratic, constitutional order is sufficient to put both populist radical right parties and post-fascist parties under the same header of far right, particularly

This also allows us to understand UKIP and similar as a far right party if we see ‘anti-partyism, anti-parliamentarianism and anti-pluralism’ (Hainsworth 2008:12) not as binaries but as scalars; UKIP may not be as anti-pluralistic as the BNP (for instance), but it is still anti-pluralistic; the BNP’s had a stated preference for removing people they do not consider autochthonous (Goodwin 2011:68), where, crudely, UKIP wanted to restrict further immigration. Using this approach also has the potential to allow a different view of the Backes typology. Rather than being a simple question of being anti-constitutional and anti-democratic, an ideology can be seen as more or less
anti-constitutional and more or less anti-democratic and, in graphical terms, plotted on a chart rather than set in boxes; Backes’ graphical representation (Backes 2007:251) does not show the (logically necessary) position of anti-constitutional anti-democratism being diametrically opposed to constitutional democracy, instead placing it alongside.

With the possible exception of the Golden Dawn, there are few, and even fewer successful, far right parties that, at least as they present themselves to the public, are traditional, *Blud und Boden*, fascist or neo-fascist entities. Rather, even those that have clear roots in the fascism of the Second World War or earlier now present themselves as approximating more moderate (or, at least, less extreme, parties) as closer to the mainstream. Indeed, as Nick Griffin, then leader of the British National Party, put it in an address to various far right activists in the United States, while sitting next to the Ku Klux Klan leader, David Duke, ‘There is a difference between selling out your ideas and selling your ideas’ (Panorama 2001).

This emergence of new far right parties, and the morphing of old far right parties to be like them, either in actuality or in appearance, merits explanation. What is it that happened or changed that lead to this emergence and metamorphosis? An approach to this question that focuses on the party as the unit of analysis comes, ultimately, from Stein Rokkan’s model of political cleavages (Rokkan 2009). The various cleavages in a society give space for political parties to emerge. Kitschelt & McGann (1995) argue that a shift in the cleavages in society, and the principal axis along which issues salient to the population lie, while political parties remain wedded to their former positions, gives political space for parties on the far right and far left. Thus, what emerged on the right began as economically liberal though politically and culturally authoritarian, but the political and cultural dimensions either started or rapidly became not just more important but definitional, while the economic positions were either downplayed, quietly dropped, or outright reversed. Their ‘new radical right’ does not map onto or descend from the ‘old’ extreme right, having different origins, demands, and bases of support. It attracts cross-class support, with support for capitalism and a small, but strong, state. Rather than being authoritarian in the manner of neofascist parties, they seek to defend with a paternal authority the structures of capitalism. Crucially, they are a response to multiculturalism, rather than a re-heated version of a philosophy that predates it.

Ignazi (2003) adopts this party family approach as the first step of his two-step classification, seeing it as only a ‘screening’ mechanism. The second step is the party’s ideology: do they exhibit ‘anti-parliamentarianism, anti-pluralism, and anti-partyism’ (Ignazi 2003:33)? From this, Ignazi

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5Blood and soil, a motto of the Nazi Party.
offers two subgroups within the far right, the traditional and the post-industrial. The traditional is the neo-fascism represented by the MSI, as discussed above, while the post-industrial varietal is anti-system, while maintaining at least an apparent support for democracy as a norm, a focus on post-material issues such as ‘the defence of the natural community’ and ‘the demand for law and order ... and the uneasiness over representative mechanisms ... express a desire for an authoritative guide’ (Ignazi 2003:2) in an atomised society. They are a mix of ‘free enterprise and social protection (limited to the native), of modernizing inputs and traditional reminiscences’ (Ignazi 2003:34). This division is similar to Taggart’s (1995) neo-fascism and neo-populism, or Betz’s (1994) authoritarian and libertarian varieties, even if there is no clear boundary between the variants (Roberts 1994:480)

Fennema (1997) argues that one of the fundamental attributes of these parties is that they are stigmatised by mainstream parties. This argument very quickly runs into some substantial problems. There are stigmatised parties on the far left, and opposition to immigration and to immigrants is not confined to the far right. More substantively, it also implies that a party can fundamentally change if anything causes it to be no longer stigmatised; it seems to defy logic that the Bündnis Zukunft Österreich/Alliance for the Future of Austria can be considered far right in the morning and, having formed a coalition with the Österreichische Volkspartei/Austrian People’s Party, is no longer so by the afternoon. A similar approach is taken by Kitschelt & McGann (1995), who use perception as far right as well as when it first appeared to decide whether a party is neofascist or new radical right.

In the same 2007 text where he raises the problem of definition, Mudde provides an admirably concise (and potentially falsifiable) definition: populist radical right parties are nativist, authoritarian, and populist (Mudde 2007:22).

Nativism is, for Mudde (2007), nationalism and xenophobia combined. Authoritarianism is given in the vein of Adorno et al. (1980), and is uncriticality and positivity towards figures of authority within one’s own nation, and hostility towards others, coupled with support for law and order (effectively as a hand-me-down from earlier militarism). Populism is a conflict between two groups within the nation - a corrupted and corrupting elite that betrays the interests of the honest people. It is fundamentally different from the neo-fascism that previously made up the far right, in that

‘the radical right is (nominally) democratic, ... whereas the extreme right is in essence antidemocratic, opposing the fundamental principle of sovereignty of the people’ (Mudde 2007:31).
Mudde has a ‘ladder’ to get from the prerequisite of nationalism to the flavours of the far right. Nationalism plus xenophobia is nativism; the addition of authoritarianism gives the radical right. At this point, the ladder effectively branches. Adding anti-democracy to the radical right leads to the extreme right, while adding populism instead gives the populist radical right. This is, again, the standard division that is seen in the far right as described above.

While widely accepted, this ‘ladder’ is not without its problems. For one, there is no necessary reason why a party cannot be populist and anti-democratic. The Golden Dawn, prima facie, seem to fit that bill (Vasilopoulou and Halikiopoulou 2015). Secondly, the implicit assertion is that the populist radical right has displaced the neofascist right. This seems like a premature view; indeed, since Mudde wrote in 2007, parties that cannot meaningfully be considered as part of the populist radical right because of their antipathy to democracy have been (by their standards) positively resurgent, with Jobbik receiving more than one of every five votes cast in the Hungarian parliamentary elections of 2014, and the Golden Dawn managing more than six per cent of the vote in the 2015 elections to the Hellenic parliament, despite its leadership being imprisoned awaiting trial for being members of a criminal organisation, following the murder of the left-wing rapper Pavlos Fyssas.

It is also important to note that the populism of the right is a creature unto itself; it is different from populism of, for instance, the left. March (2016) finds right populism exclusionary, opposed to elites and outsiders, and focussed on ethnic issues, while left populism is broadly inclusionary, opposes elites but not outsiders, and looks to socioeconomic issues as its bread and butter issues.

There are also more problems around parties that are less clearly anti-democratic. Mudde lists the BNP as a populist radical right party. Goodwin (2011:49) suggests this may at least appear to be the case, as the BNP could ‘mobilize protest votes while not appearing as revolutionary anti-democrats’. However, ‘the impetus behind the demand for a change of strategy was political expediency rather than ideological conviction’ (Goodwin 2011:52). It is not clear whether the BNP had actually changed its spots, had simply covered them up for the sake of expediency, or had a compromise of the two, with some parts of the party having actually moved away from previous positions while others were willing to go along with them while it offered success.

A potential explanation for the rise of far right parties to relative electoral success that must be considered is that it is not the far right that has been helped by these changes, but populism, and that we are better off understanding these as a manifestation thereof, and including in our analyses left populist parties and acknowledging that we see populism in mainstream parties as a reaction to a populace that is increasingly weary of a political class they see as remote, self-interested, and ineffectual.
March identifies three elements that must be present for populism to be identified: ‘people-centrism, anti-elitism, and popular sovereignty’ (March 2017:283); they can occur in other ideologies or positions, but it is their simultaneous occurrence that is diagnostic of populism. This does, returning to the discussion on Backes’ (2007) typology raise the issue of whether these are binary or scalar variables, or whether a surfeit of one can compensate for a lack of another – can an ideology that is (say) not particularly people-centred but very anti-elitist be considered populist?

The above notwithstanding, populism is more easily described than actually measured. Following Pauwels (2014:33-36), March (2017:286) identifies two broad ways of measuring populism. The first is ‘quantitative computer analysis’ (March 2017:286), ideal where information technology can make light work of large amounts of data and removes the judgment of the researcher as a factor; while March sees this latter aspect as a negative, removing interpretation, it also provides a certain robustness given that the human factor is removed. The second is content analysis as traditionally understood, with a human coding texts against a schema. This content analysis is further broken down into three types; analysis of entire speeches, analysis of paragraphs, and key-word coding.

This presents an apparent conflict with the conceptualisation of the far right in binary terms discussed above as we are quantifying the amount of populism. Pappas (2016) applies Sartori’s (1984) criticism of degreeism – that categories are not merely useful but essential when trying to demonstrate necessary and sufficient conditions for social phenomena – and applies it to the specific case of populism. There are particular problems in measuring populism – ‘questionable data reliability, irregular sampling, and coding biases’ (Pappas 2016:10) as well as the great difficulty in ‘measur[ing] (degrees of) populism over time and space’ (Pappas 2016:10). This has the result that populism can be found everywhere and, to paraphrase Popper, potentially explaining everything, explains nothing. This is a particular problem with definitions of populism that reduce it to ‘closeness to the people’ (March 2017:283), an understanding that makes it ubiquitous.

As, therefore, we can separate the populism of the right from the populism of the left, Mudde’s formulation of the populist radical right as nativist, authoritarian, and populist provides a working definition with some robustness.

As is often noted, the far right is a diverse grouping of political parties (Mudde 2013). It has developed over time, such that it has two identifiable subgroups. While they share substantial commonalities, not least nationalism, there are grounds to distinguish between them, and set
them as the extreme right, consisting of fascist and neo-fascist parties, on the one hand, and populist radical right parties on the other (Halikiopoulou and Vasilopoulou 2016).

In the next section, the existing arguments given to explain the successes and failures of far right parties are covered.

Supply and demand

Having established a working definition of a far right party, it is easier to turn to the question of what explains their electoral success. Why, given the opprobrium heaped upon far right parties, do voters in their millions cast their metaphorical pebbles into those urns?

As described above, Kitschelt and McGann (1995) suggest that the effect of contemporary capitalist development is to allow populist appeals to the market and authoritarian decision-making. They distinguish between ‘supply’ and ‘demand’ factors, an important distinction that remains in much of the work on the far right. This division is common across the literature (Eatwell 2003, Koopmans et al. 2005, Mudde 2007, Rydgren 2007, van Kessel 2015 to indicate just a few). While there are some factors that fall across both categories, the division is useful, based on a split between a focus on structure, in the case of demand, and agency, in the case of supply (Eatwell 2003). The demand side, then, looks at ‘arguments that focus primarily on socioeconomic developments, such as the impact of immigration, unemployment or rapid social change (Eatwell 2003:46), while the supply side looks to ‘the messages which reach voters … leadership and programmes of the insurgent and mainstream parties, or the media’ (Eatwell 2003:46). More succinctly, the demand side focusses on voters, while the supply side focusses on the parties themselves and their strategies to make discursive opportunities for themselves and to exploit political opportunities, such as the dynamics of competition amongst other parties. Aside from providing broad coverage of the factors that affect votes for the far right, this split covers the two types of drivers for the far right – those extrinsic to far right parties and those intrinsic. It also allows the commonalities in the processes by which, for instance, social and economic factors drive votes for the far right, and makes it clear that there is an interplay between the activities and choices of far right parties and the social and economic conditions of the voters whose support they seek.

As part of the changes Kitschelt and McGann (1995) describe, they see three axes of political competition, around citizenship, decision making, and resource allocation. An expansion of the public sector leads to more left-leaning, liberal voters, while exposure to international competition in the private sector leads to people favouring lower taxes, and hence a smaller welfare state. Where political parties either remain wedded to old combinations, or have converged, voters will demand a different alternative if the new dimensions of division that
emerge are not covered by existing parties. This is not, however, sufficient for a breakthrough; a far right party must supply an alternative. By positioning themselves to take advantage of new alignments on the axes of competition, far right parties can capitalise on the opportunity. For Kitschelt and McGann, it is important to see parties as more than mere ciphers for public opinion, but as organisations with their own preferences and decisions to make. In short, the far right can do well given three factors: an advanced, capitalist, and postindustrial society with increased salience of the libertarian left/authoritarian right divide; convergence of mainstream parties; and the parties finding the right formula to present themselves.

As presented, these arguments have some major flaws. For one, Kitschelt & McGann suggest that Greece does not have the social preconditions for a strong extreme right, which conflicts with the emergence of the Golden Dawn. It also remains rather broad-brush; it suggests how demand factors may change, but not what they may change to, and it does not explain how the (very) macro-level change in political salience leads to changes in how individuals vote. Moreover, supply, protestations to parties not being ciphers notwithstanding, seems to be little more than political opportunism. Nevertheless, the division between demand and supply is a useful one in seeing that, within the broad heading of the far right, the populist radical right are not merely a continuation of neofascist antecessors. The next two sections expand on demand and supply explanations, respectively, for support for the far right, and at specific instances of these explanations.

**Demand**

As detailed above, demand arguments look to structural factors to explain far right voting. Amongst the instances of demand arguments that Mudde (2007) offers are two that appear promising but suffer from the same flaw of a lack of specificity. These are modernization and crisis. Modernization seeks some feature of recent changes to society that causes people to vote for the far right, largely because they have lost out from modernization (Betz 1994, but see also Ford and Goodwin 2014a). In the case of modernization, grand changes are described, but not applied to how people vote; large-scale processes are not translated down to the micro level (Mudde 2007). Equally, there are different patterns of modernisation against different backgrounds of historical experience – the former Warsaw Pact, the European south, Protestant north and west Europe - but, as mentioned above, the distinction seems increasingly hard to sustain given the rise of far right parties where, apparently, they should not flourish.

Similarly, crisis - a shock to the political system causing voters to prefer a radical alternative to what is on offer – is poorly specified. There are various possibilities - unemployment (Lubbers and Scheepers 2001), immigration (Golder 2003), political dissatisfaction (Dahl 2000), change in the political system (Kitschelt 2002), and so on. The essential theoretical problem Mudde
identifies with all of these is poor specification as to what constitutes a crisis, although it is not at all clear that the authors mentioned would necessarily group themselves into a crisis-driven camp; indeed, at times the difference between crisis and modernisation seems rather thin; Kitschelt’s (2002) argument around the rise of the cartel party could just as easily be a feature of modernisation. More problematically, however, the evidence does not clearly point in one direction, with weak and contradictory correlations between the given explanation of different works.

However, several of the possible drivers included under crisis or modernisation do appear to have meaningful effects. It is perhaps more fruitful to look at these individually.

Perhaps no issue is, prima facie, more likely to help the far right than where immigration, or perhaps issues that can be connected thereto, have high salience amongst the population. Eatwell (2003) identifies immigration having high salience, or issues that can be connected thereto, amongst the electorate will benefit far right parties as a possible driver; it was ‘initially, the most common demand-side approach to the revival of extreme right voting in Western Europe’ (Eatwell 2003:47). This matches Mudde’s (2007) description of ethnic backlash. In both formulations, it is the presence or increase of the numbers of people who are not members of the nation or ethnie that serves as the driver. Mass immigration is given as one possible cause of this. However, the evidence is contradictory; Mudde’s own research shows no particular correlation, while others do (Golder 2003, again with an interaction between unemployment and immigration) and still more find none (Duelmer & Klein 2005). Similarly, Eatwell (2003) identifies cases where there appears to be a match between immigration and votes for the far right, such as the Front National in France, but apparently not in the case of the Alleanza Nazionale in Italy. In any case, the motivation for voting for far right parties appears more complicated and allowance must be made for supply-side factors; for instance, parties like the Front National have broad platforms that run across the whole gamut of politics and policy. Not everyone who votes for a far right party will do so because of their position on immigration (although, manifestly, it must be at least tolerable); authoritarian conservatism and ‘ninism’ – being ‘ni droit ni gauche’, neither right nor left – attract voters (Eatwell 2003). Eatwell (2003) also indicates that it may be perceptions, rather than the reality of the number of immigrants, that matter, such as the Norwegian Fremskrittpartiet benefiting from perceived over-favourable treatment of immigrants; indeed at least one study finds ‘it is not clear if voters’ decisions to vote for an anti-immigrant party are impacted by actual demographics or by perceptions’ (Stockemer 2016:1001).

A similar issue is raised by Eatwell (2003) in regard to the argument that economic disadvantage is the driver. The argument itself is straightforward enough; those who are deprived in a society will vote for parties that offer an improvement in their economic circumstances. The far right
often offer this, even if through the lens of wanting to make sure that their co-nationals are favoured by virtue of the nationality rather than their economic circumstance, linking to the aforementioned discussion of the role of immigration. A more sophisticated version of the argument is that ‘extreme right voters are not simply likely to come from those already suffering disadvantage, but from those who fear economic change’ (Eatwell 2003:54). Again, the evidence is mixed, with an apparent, broad trend but counterexamples thereto.

It should also be noted that older studies tend to look at numbers of immigrants, rather than rate of change in the number of immigrants, and absolute economic indicators rather than change in those indicators. This is particularly true for older research in the field.

A further possible driver of votes for the far right is social breakdown (Eatwell 2003); the dissolution of the traditional bonds of community – church, social groups, trade unions, even political parties – that ground people in a society. This growing anomie or social isolation leads to a search for meaning and identity in the traditional values offered by far right parties. However, while Eatwell (2003) does find evidence for the thesis, citing particularly urban areas of France and Germany, there are countervailing instances both of people suffering from this social breakdown not voting for the far right, and people not suffering from it that do vote for the far right.

The particular variant of this social breakdown is Eatwell’s (2003) protest thesis; put off by mainstream parties’ convergence, voters choose a radical outlet for their frustrations. However, there are many possible such outlets, including left and green parties, or even parties traditionally excluded from government, such as the British Liberal Democrats, but votes go to parties of the far right. This suggests that votes are not merely being cast for the sake of protesting, but that there is, the element of protest notwithstanding, a particular appeal to far right parties, in the form of their ideology or programme. This touches on political opportunity structures that parties can exploit, and is revisited below.

This social breakdown ties into Eatwell’s (2003) idea of reverse post-material politics as a motivator for voting for the far right. As the general political debate represented in the media has shifted from the traditional issues of economic and class competition to post-material issues, those for whom material issues remain front and centre are effectively abandoned by the mainstream political parties. This runs into problems in that it cannot explain local variations; given that political culture will be broadly similar across an entire country or, at least, large areas of it, one would expect, were this driver to be definitive, all areas where traditional, material issues remain in contention to exhibit similar propensity to vote for far right parties. This is not borne out in reality.
Mudde (2007) raises two final possibilities similarly quickly that are dispensed with in short order; the apparent connection between populist radical right attitudes and voting for populist radical right parties is only ever taken to the level of correlation and not causation. Insecurity and fear of crime simply do not have the empirical backup to suggest they are substantial reasons for people to vote for the far right.

The broad trend across demand drivers for voting for the far right is that the various possible factors, prima facie, are promising, but that promise breaks down. There are too many counter-examples for any one demand factor to be the key to explaining votes for the far right. A possible explanation for this comes in Matt Golder’s (2003) interaction of unemployment and immigration. It is not a single factor that matters, overriding all others, but particular combinations of them.

An important methodological point emerges here. Most studies of the far right use national data for immigration, whether in terms of economic migrants, asylum seekers, totals, or other measures. It would not be expected for migrants to equally distribute themselves across a country and the available data (Rienzo and Vargas-Silva 2014) suggest they do no such thing; differences between two different parts of a given state are likely to be greater than a difference between the average of that state and another (Veugelers 1999). It is perhaps no surprise, then, that what emerges are weak and contradictory results from statistical analyses when the number of foreign-born people in the UK ranges from 1.5% in Northern Ireland to 36.2% in London, mutatis mutandis for other countries. Even if migration were constant across a state, the economic situation is not. This objection can similarly be levelled at the crisis and modernization arguments; plainly, a crisis in one part of a state may not affect all parts of a state. Particularly as far right parties have adopted a local first strategy (Goodwin 2011), using finer-grained data is important. However, many studies continue to use country-level data, as Kestilä and Söderlund (2007) point out, including Mudde (2002, 2007), Luebbert (1991), Taggart (1995), Ignazi (2003), Kitschelt and McGann (1995), and Golder (2003). The use of NUTS 2 and NUTS 3 level data or similar, together with the local research that Mudde (2007) advocates can readily ameliorate this. There are a growing number of studies that do use finer-grained data; these are dealt with below.

A final demand factor is the history of the particular country in which a far right party operates. Many states, particularly in Europe, have a history of authoritarian rule, from the military

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6 Nomenclature of Units for Territorial Statistics is a system of hierarchical subdivisions of EU and EEA states devised by EUROSTAT. For the United Kingdom, NUTS 1 consists of the nine regions of England plus, Wales, Scotland, and Northern Ireland. NUTS 2 has forty divisions, and NUTS 3 has one hundred and seventy four, consisting of unitary authorities, counties, and groups of districts. The full system is at http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/nuts/overview.
dictatorships seen in Spain, Portugal, and Greece, to the Soviet domination of eastern Europe. While it may be an aggravating factor, it is plainly neither necessary nor sufficient: ‘the thesis ... cannot account for the striking absence of populist radical right success in most of the postcommunist world’ (Mudde 2007:np) while populist radical right parties have emerged in, for instance, the Netherlands in the form of the Partij voor de Vrijheid (PVV) which has an authoritarian rule in its history that is both much more distant and associated with resistance thereto. Far right parties also exist in the United Kingdom, which not only has no history of authoritarian rule, but has opposition to fascism and the far right as a part of its national identity (Eatwell 2003:59). This begins to enter the realm of political opportunity structures; indeed, Eatwell (2003) considers national traditions to come under the heading of supply, emphasising that the categories are not cut and dry. In any case, it seems that national traditions are intervening variables, rather than causes in and of themselves.

Ultimately, Mudde, Kitschelt and McGann, and Eatwell reach similar conclusions; demand factors may give an indication of the potential size of support, and they may be necessary, but they are not sufficient. Alone, they treat political parties as mere ciphers with no agency of their own. For that, supply factors must be brought into play. A particular problem with demand factors is that they cannot account for local variations; as both Eatwell (2003) and Mudde (2007) highlight, these processes operate on macro, meso, and micro levels.

Supply

Supply side factors, as stated above, are those that shape the manner in which votes perceive far right parties (Eatwell 2003). Clearly, there are many potential factors that shape this, from leadership to manifesto to the media (Kestilä and Söderlund 2007). It is useful, therefore, to split them into supply side factors that are internal to the party and those that are external to it (Mudde 2007).

External supply side factors are, broadly, political opportunity structures. Tarrow gives a useful definition:

‘By political opportunity structure, I refer to consistent - but not necessarily formal, permanent or national - dimensions of the political environment which encourage or discourage people from using collective action’ (Tarrow 2011:18)

In the specific case of far right parties, these include how other political parties act, both in terms of messaging and campaigning, whether they converge on the centre of politics, or leave salient issues unraised (Eatwell 2016:412), as well as the effects of proportionality, district magnitude, minimum vote requirements and so on in making it more or less easy for small and new parties
to succeed at elections. The latter are discursive opportunity structures; how far right parties can shape their narrative and, in some cases, adjust their policies to create 'a legitimate discourse about immigration and conceptions of citizenship' (Eatwell 2017:415). Political opportunity structures can be short-term or long lasting, draw from institutional setups or the particularities of a given time and place, or situation of a party (Dinas et al 2016).

It should be noted that Tarrow draws collective action widely, such that it will include political parties. Most obvious is the electoral system - generally, the more proportional a system, the easier it is for a far right party to do well (Eatwell 2000), though this is true for small parties more generally (Duverger 1972). Similar is the political context - if pre-existing parties maintain the loyalty of their voters, it is harder for new parties to emerge. However, convergence amongst the mainstream parties and disconnection from issues and issue-complexes that are salient to voters (Kitschelt & McGann 1995) can open a space for the populist radical right. An important counter to this comes from Piero Ignazi (2003), suggesting that the rise of the new right, figureheaded by Thatcher and Reagan, effectively legitimized the territory that the populist radical right would later claim. Minkenberg’s (2001) evidence can be taken to suggest that convergence is more important for allowing populist radical right parties to emerge than to continue thriving after having broken through, and add that it may be that the prior legitimization, per Ignazi, of certain policies and politics then allows their continuance.

As above, it is often not realities, but perceptions of realities that shape how people vote. The manner in which the media portrays the far right, its competition, and the conditions of society manifestly shape these perceptions (Eatwell 2003:57). Exactly how the media affects the far right is a complicated picture; it can advance their interests by raising the salience of their interests, while simultaneously attacking them directly, as in the Sun’s ‘Bloody Nasty People’ front page; the far right are both legitimised and delegitimised by the media. It should be noted that local media are also important players here, and can help explain different results between apparently similar localities, such as in Oldham (Eatwell 2003:57), where uncritical reporting of the BNP’s activities appears to have boosted them in the early 2000s.

The cultural context is suggested as another political opportunity structure, linking back to national context above. While this factor sits above in demand, more appropriately under supply is that, as a populist radical right party does well, it forms links into society that make it more acceptable and make it easier to find supporters and, crucially, organisers. This, though, would apply to almost any organisation - success breeds success. This similarly applies to the media, who can be both supportive and destructive of the far right (Mudde 2010). The media can explicitly criticise or support the populist radical right, and they can also increase the salience of the issues that the populist radical right would want to raise simply by discussing them. Most
importantly, they can raise public awareness of a new populist radical right party, making them particularly important in breaking through on to the electoral scene.

It is generally accepted that, as for any small party, a majoritarian electoral system is a hindrance and a more proportional system with low entry barriers is a help. It should be noted, though, that second-order elections, particularly the European Parliamentary elections that must be conducted using a proportional system, provide an alternative route to electoral success.

In short, external supply side factors are not as clear as might be ideal, but it can be seen that they help, but do not determine, the success of populist radical right parties, particularly when they are breaking into the mainstream, and less so when they are more established.

Internal supply factors are those intrinsic to the parties. These include ideology and organisation (Mudde 2007) and the presence (or otherwise) of a charismatic leader (Eatwell 2003).

It is reasonably obvious why being organised would be matter to any political party of any stripe; it is easier to achieve your aims if you have a system for recruiting candidates, managing volunteers, determining policies, and so on. From this, it is reasonable to posit, as Lubbers et al. (2002) do, that ‘extreme right-wing parties ... gain support only when they are well-organised’ (Lubbers et al 2002:351). However, Mudde (2005) provides counterexamples of the Deutsche Volksunion in Germany and Bulgaria’s Ataka of parties that gained electoral success either before or without ever developing effective internal organisations. This suggests, per Mudde (2005), that party organisation explains the persistence of populist radical right parties, rather than their emergence from the shadows. It may be possible for a populist radical right party to rapidly grow from nothing or next to nothing without strong party organisation, but it will not have any sort of longevity without either having or developing some organisational heft (de Lange and Art 2011; Mudde 2005).

Parties of this stripe adopt command-and-control structures, with decisions made by a limited group of members around the party leadership (Betz 1998). This allows parties to make decisions rapidly, even completely changing tack on an issue, without having to refer back to members or other stakeholders (Betz 1998). This is even more important for the fissiparous rightward and leftward ends of the political spectrum. Far right parties, in particular, ‘have shown themselves to be especially prone to factionalism and infighting’ (Carter 2005:65) and so a charismatic leader’s instructions will be sent down a relatively centralised chain of command (Carter 2005).

Mudde (2005) suggests various ways that effective organisation can impact a party’s success, from party cohesion to stability of the leadership to discipline. Many of these make intuitive sense; if a party has the wherewithal to recruit and train members who make effective candidates
and elected representatives, it will do better than a party that is casting around for anyone to stand. A more organised party will also be able to deal with the administrative requirements of standing for election. Harrison (1997) highlights the inability of some far right parties to stand in the same seat at subsequent elections. This is perhaps not surprising, given, to take the British example, the nomination requirements. To run for a Westminster constituency, a prospective candidate must be nominated by ten electors who live in that constituency; for a general election, that means marshalling thousands of signatures and hundreds of forms that must be physically handed over to a returning officer. For local council seats, the requirements are the same, but must be met for every ward contested (Local Elections (Principal Areas) (England and Wales) Rules 2006).

Carter (2005) finds, as one would expect from the above, that organisational ability does affect the electoral prospects of far right parties and has real explanatory power. Carter identifies three types of far right party: ‘(1) weakly organised, poorly led and divided parties, (2) weakly organised, poorly led but united parties, and (3) strongly organized, well-led but factionalized parties’ (Carter 2005:66).

However, it is hard to analyse any political party’s organisation. No corporate body wants its dirty laundry aired in public; still less so whose success and, indeed, existence is premised upon the public having a positive view of it. This is even more so in the case of populist radical right parties, who are suspicious of anything that smacks of the liberal elite, including academia (Mudde 2005:267; Carter 2005:65-66). This leads to a particular problem in how to characterise and then study the different organisational modes of such parties. Lubbers et al. (2002) effectively reduce this to a linear scale between ‘good’ and ‘bad’; alone, this clearly fails to account for, for instance, different modes of territorial organisation, democracy and member involvement, leadership powers, management of stakeholders, and so on.

However, the problem of measuring organisation may be resolved in another way. Lubbers et al (2002:360) find a high degree of multicollinearity between their triptych of charismatic leader, the activity of members, and the organisation of, in their terms, an extreme right-wing party. De Lange and Art suggest that it is not organisation per se so much as organisational institutionalisation that matters. This is seen in their comparison of the List Pim Fortuyn and Geert Wilders’ Partij voor de Vrijheid, where the extensive structures of the former did not prevent its collapse. This view of the importance of institutionalisation rather than organisation per se is shared by Rooduijn (2015).

Institutionalisation here suggests a certain degree of predictability and the ability to manage internal divisions and provide structures, formal or otherwise, by which to recruit and marshal
volunteers. Where a charismatic leader has effective control over all aspects of the party, their
directions can substitute for formal organisational structures. In short, it is predictability – that
party members and elites know and abide by the rules of the game, instead of engaging in
infighting and competing claims for internal legitimacy – that benefits far right parties. This can
come from formal organisational structures, a charismatic leader, or a Fuehrerprinzip style of
leadership. However, well-understood structures that are abided by will have a life beyond the
departure or weakening of a leader. This, though, seems a rare occurrence, and far right parties
often struggle following the departure or defenestration of a charismatic leader (Betz 1998). The
idea of a charismatic basis for authority extends back to Weber and this version of charisma –
more than just an inspiring orator or effective parliamentarian, ‘a charismatic leader constitutes
a new leadership, a new structure of social relationships, and a new cognitive definition of the
situation of social action’ (Rainer Lepsius 2016:89). However, while the Weberian understanding
of charisma certainly works for this explanation, a more mundane form of charisma amongst
leadership also fills the function necessary for driving far right votes; it can be a form of ‘low-cost

All political parties seek to effect political change, whether by gaining office, raising issues, or
putting pressure on other parties to change their positions. This is also true for far right parties;
they have ideologies. While parties are not completely free to change their ideology – moderating
too much may lose more extreme members (Eatwell 2003:60) – it can be modified to an extent,
and the focus can be shifted to different aspects of the platform with a view to putting the party
in the most favourable light. It is also the case that far right party platforms are popular with
some voters.

The picture that emerges from the combination of the above is unclear, sometimes contradictory
and ridden with methodological problems. In many areas, there is simply not enough literature,
either because of the intractability of the subject or because the academy has not yet had time to
analyse what are relatively recent developments. Indeed, Mudde (2007:259) writes, only a year
after Twitter was founded and before Google’s acquisition of YouTube, that ‘the growing
popularity of the internet will inevitably increase [populist radical right parties’ websites’]
prominence in years to come’.

Nevertheless, some tentative conclusions can be drawn. Firstly, there is no magic formula that
explains or predicts when the far right, in any guise, will do well. There appear to be certain
factors that make success more likely, with political space, formed by crisis, convergence, or
realignment, foremost among them. Political opportunity structures, in the form of the electoral
system and the like, also matter but are not definitive. An ideology and presentation that are
tolerable to a significant number of voters seems to matter, as does the ability to recruit effective
organisers behind a charismatic leader. Again, however, these are adjunctive and not definitive. Many of these factors are relevant, or are greatly increased in relevance, only when another variable is also present.

A broader criticism may be made; all the potential factors, with the possible exception of the electoral system and the media, only operate in the positive space. That is to say, their complete absence is treated as null, while their presence will aid the populist radical right. This is somewhat counter-intuitive.

Levels of analysis

As mentioned above, the demand factors are categorised by Mudde as macro, meso, and micro. While the macro and micro are simple enough to pin down, ‘[t]he meso [level] is concerned with local organizations to which individuals belong, or through which they gain knowledge and norms, such as the family, school or party’ (Eatwell 2000:350 cited in Mudde 2007:217). The meso level is specifically marked as under-studied. Supply factors can also be, though Mudde does not deal with this, found at different levels. Much of the criticism levelled at some of the macro level explanations boils down to no connection being made to how this actually causes people to change their voting behaviour. The connection has to be made through the meso level, and so it is particularly important. ‘Organisations’ must be drawn broadly here; they need not be formally established. The residents of a particular block or estate will form an organisation for these purposes – a means by which they learn about and understand their environs – even if there is not, for instance, an established residents’ association.

Moreover, political opportunity structures need not be national. The local context clearly matters; if traditional parties are resting on their laurels in a given area, an opportunity might open up for a far right party that does not exist even in the neighbouring district. This is compounded by local variations in socio-economic and demographic indicators.

The institutional context, listed under supply, changes at different levels. Particularly if a party is adopting a local strategy, of which more later, this does apply differently at each level. The same is true of political context. While a party’s ideology will be consistent within a certain range, and top leadership is definitionally the same for all members, local organisers are not necessarily as effective in one place as another. It cannot be assumed that supply factors operate in the same way or with the same logic at each level of analysis. This further underlines the problem highlighted earlier of using national level data to deal with phenomena that vary substantially at the sub-national level, even being completely absent in some places.
The combination of this is to make studying far right parties at the local level particularly important. Indeed, the only way to understand the organisations to which people belong that shape their worldview and so to open up the meso level to study is to approach the local level.

The picture that emerges is complicated. Broadly, there are supply and demand factors. These can operate at different levels. However, there are substantial gaps and methodological problems with the analysis available.

This provides a working understanding of the far right and of some of the phenomena that affect its performance in gross. The next section looks at the local level, including its importance, the benefits of studying the far right at sub-national levels, and the challenges therein.

Local factors

Although many studies use national-level electoral, socioeconomic, and demographic data, there are a growing number of studies that use finer-grained, subnational data. These studies bring particular benefits in dealing with sub-national demographics and socio-economic situations; particular local political opportunity structures; the activities of local political parties to capitalise on those structures; and other benefits. There are particular approaches that can be taken for measuring the activity of political parties and, indeed, other organisations at the local level, although there are certain methodological problems with using such local level data. These are all dealt with in turn.

Local socioeconomics and demographics

These studies address the immediate issue of the considerable variation that can occur in socio-economic and demographic indicators across the breadth of a state (Kestilä and Söderlund 2007) – the gross domestic product per capita of a country, for instance, may be a useful comparator against other countries, but it may conceal a great deal of internal variation. Intuitively, the economic conditions of a city in post-industrial decline are not going to be the same as those for a global city based on finance. Using local data brings other benefits to the study, as detailed below.

Local political opportunity structures

As set out above, political opportunity structures are ‘consistent - but not necessarily formal, permanent or national - dimensions of the political environment which encourage or discourage people from using collective action’ (Tarrow 2011:18). Political opportunity structures will clearly vary at the sub-national level where, for instance, there are different regional governments (or, in the case of much of England outside of London, no regional government). Different electoral systems at different levels of government will also vary, both in terms of the manner in which
votes are counted, how many representatives are returned, and the size of the electoral circumscription (Kestilä and Söderlund 2007).

Beyond these effects of the administrative structures across types of area, there are particularities to each area that will have an effect on them. Media landscapes will likewise vary; the decision of a newspaper to be relatively uncritical of a party may, at least, not hinder them and may actively help them by normalising their positions. For instance, the coverage of the British National Party in Oldham, which was not openly hostile to them, connects to their subsequent electoral success (Eatwell 2003:57). Similarly, the local socio-economic and demographic situation, and the saliency of concerns about those issues amongst a given population, can open or close opportunities for parties of all sorts, including far right parties. Taken to extremes, the presence of a single-issue party that only campaigns on single issues can result in that one, particular issue having very high saliency in a given area where it would have very little in other places. For instance, the very specific issue of the level of provision at a hospital in the West Midlands of England led to a party, Independent Kidderminster Hospital and Health Concern, returning an MP to parliament and having some success at the level of local government, while the promotion of a bypass around the largest town in Lincolnshire saw Boston Bypass Independents take control of Boston Borough Council (Bottom and Crow 2011).

**Political parties at the local level**

Political parties of different families campaign in different ways, according to their political priorities, their bases of support, and the political opportunity structures in which they find themselves. For instance, a left wing party is more likely to spend its time focusing on blue collar or unionized workers, where a party with a base amongst ethnic minority will focus on that community and so on, mutatis mutandis.

In the specific instance of far right parties, activities can broadly be broken down into the direct and the indirect. The former is largely self-explanatory; the latter is operating through mobilisation issues, including candidates for elections, and other activities that give the party an organisational base and a kernel of support in the community (Ellinas and Lamprianou 2019).

Local political activity is also critically important, especially when a political party or local branch thereof has developed roots in a community, in that it affects the meso level. As discussed above, the meso level is ‘is concerned with local organizations to which individuals belong, or through which they gain knowledge and norms, such as the family, school or party’ (Eatwell 2000:350 cited in Mudde 2007:217). Manifestly, the activities of a political party in a specific area, as opposed to national, broadcast campaigns and media appearances, affect how individual voters and groups of voters will see the political situation and consequently affect how they vote. Using
Local level data allows us to unpack some of these variables to gain a better understanding of why people vote for far right parties and how far right parties seek their votes.

The traditionally-studied drivers – immigration, economy, and so on – of the far right vote cannot explain the differential votes for the Golden Dawn across Athens in Dinás et al. (2016)’s study; rather, allowance must be made for local organisational strength and effectiveness. The process of developing that local effectiveness also takes time, hence the finding that the Golden Dawn made breakthroughs where there was the conjunction of the right circumstances and an existing local party with the wherewithal to capitalise thereupon. In particular, this includes a feeling of being part of or otherwise embedded in that particular, local community to give a sense of authenticity.

Because they are generally smaller parties without the organisational heft of established, national political parties, and because they are more likely to receive a hostile reception in national broadcast and print media, local activity is particularly important to far right parties. This is seen with Golden Dawn (Dinas et al. 2016), the British National Party and (British) National Front (Eatwell and Goodwin 2010), and the (French) Front National (Kestilä and Söderlund 2007). These strategies seek to ‘[create] a ‘local culture’ that reinforces anti-immigrant positions through contacts in the local community and cooperation with local initiatives’ (Dinas et al 2016:81).

This establishes the importance of using sub-national data in looking at the electoral performance of the far right. There are further benefits. Kestilä and Söderlund (2007) identify three particular advantages of using subnational units as basis for comparative analysis; it increases the number of cases, concomitantly increasing degrees of freedom; it is very difficult to operationalise different political opportunity structures across states, almost by definition; and many campaign or otherwise salient issues can be held constant. This allows the use of comparative techniques that would typically be used between states to be used within a single state.

**Measuring at the local level**

With both the importance of using local level data to account for sub-national variations and the various benefits set out, the following sets out the process for actually measuring and operationalising said data.

Measuring what political parties are doing at the local level is difficult. In particular, as Ellinas and Lamprianou (2019) indicate, the nature of political campaigning has changed over time. As identification with mainstream or, indeed, any parties has dropped and vote volatility has
increased, political parties have shifted from being able to just campaign in the weeks leading up to an election – in essence, to remind ‘their’ voters that they were, say, Labour voters and that the local polling station was at such and such a place – to campaigning that takes place month in and month out, to build relations with voters and avoid the charge of political parties only being seen when they want something – votes at election time. This shift presents a particular challenge to many studies of campaigning activities by political parties, particularly at the local level. It also represents an opportunity upon which, as described above, far right parties have seized.

It is not necessarily sufficient, as some (Carty and Eagles, 1999; Pattie et al. 2003) do, to look at spending returns. For instance, under UK electoral law, an appearance by the leader of a party in a given locale is included in election returns as spending by the national party, and not by the local party (Electoral Commission 2019:16). This flurry of activity, bringing local, regional, and national press attention that will make potential voters in a given electoral circumscription much more aware of that party, as well as galvanising party activists and, for a time, bringing increased administrative support from national and regional political party offices, will not show up as local activity in information provided to the Electoral Commission.

Even setting this aside, local election spending is not necessarily a good guide to activity. A relatively wealthy local party with few members can pay for its election literature to be delivered to electors, where one without such resources but with willing members can achieve the same effect without any financial outlay.

At the local level, contact is likely to be directly between candidates and party workers and voters. It is therefore relatively unlikely to attract attention precisely because of its humdrum nature. An alternative, as used by Ellinas and Lamprianou (2019), is self-reported activity by local activists and leaders, and by recollections from voters as approaches variously used that have the obvious problems of being dependent on human recollection. This is clearly problematic, given both the vagaries of human memory, the tendency to present things in a light favourable to oneself, and the potential for deliberate deception. This is supported by a dataset gathered from the website of the subject of their study, Golden Dawn, that lists all their activities. This is then further supported with qualitative research, notably interviews of party leaders, to give an understanding of what organisers seek to achieve with their campaigning, and why they choose where they campaign.

However, a simple count of activity in a given location is not sufficient. The temporal factor is important. A burst of activity in the period immediately before the polls open might, on a simple count, appear of greater magnitude than a lesser total amount of activity that is spread out over
months, even though the latter, conceivably, has a greater impact (Ellinas and Lamprianou 2019). Intense activity in the run-up to the election may be the traditional form of campaigning, and may be effective with some voters, but it is limited to the run-up precisely because party workers can only maintain that intense level of campaigning for short periods. Particularly given that, as described above, far right parties are likely to be trying to put roots into a community and build personal relationships with people, both processes that take time, it is important to have a means of assessing both how regularly an area is the target of campaigning and the level of that campaigning.

The solution taken by Ellinas and Lamprianou (2019) is to use separate measures for intensity and consistency of action. Intensity is how many campaigning activities taken place in a given time period in a given location; consistency is how frequently and regularly campaigning takes place. These measures can then be used as independent variables in statistical analysis, with a measure of electoral success as a dependent variable. This provides a means of assessing the impact of campaigning given the factors listed above that must be considered. It should be noted that this method is not necessarily limited to far right parties themselves; the method logically works for any form of campaigning where the patterning of intensity and consistency is important. This include organisations that campaign against far right parties, both because their own activities may be subject to the same dynamics as the parties themselves, and because they will be impacting the parties’ campaigning activities. Although this relatively new approach has yet to be widely adopted in the literature, the results from Ellinas and Lamprianou’s own work is encouraging and suggests the method’s validity, and the results have been adopted by others (Vrakopoulou and Halikiopoulou 2019 and Whiteley et al. 2019, for instance).

**Methodological problems**

Translating the potential benefits into reality does run into methodological problems.

In their critique of Kestilä and Söderlund’s 2007 paper, Arzheimer and Carter do concur that ‘features of the subnational context are potentially relevant for the radical right vote and should be incorporated into more comprehensive accounts of support for these parties’ (Arzheimer and Carter 2009:336). However, Arzheimer and Carter (2009) raise a pair of substantial problems: the size of electoral circumscriptions, and immigrant status.

The question of the size of electoral circumscriptions essentially asks as to how local local must be. In Kestilä and Söderlund’s (2007) analysis of the FN in France, their units of study, are the French departments, which are relatively large in terms of population. The smallest, Lozère, in Occitanie, with a population of on the order of seventy-six thousand, approximates the size of a Westminster constituency. The largest, Nord, on the border with Belgium, has in excess of two
and a half million people, or slightly more than the population of the entire country of Slovenia. Indeed, twenty-one departments have over one million inhabitants. Beyond the issue of scale, there is also considerable variation between departments in terms of size.

However, in no small part due to the advances in computing and in governmental attitudes towards the open availability of such demographic data, it is increasingly easy to obtain precisely the kind of very low level data, both through EUROSTAT and national statistical bureaux. Electoral information is dependent on the manner in which votes are collated, but are available down to much small circumscriptions than the departement. Berning et al. (2018), for the Sub-national context and radical right support in Europe (SCoRE) project, were able to use the over two thousand French cantons for their study.

The second issue raised by Arzheimer and Carter (2009) is around immigrant status. People can simultaneously be immigrants and have the right to vote. An area with many immigrants, then, will not necessarily be a strong candidate for a far right party, of which ever variation, to do well on the basis that immigrants who can vote are unlikely to vote against their own interests or, in extremis, for their own expulsion. Taken to extremes, Arzheimer and Carter’s (2009) criticism is essentially that a department that consisted entirely of immigrants would, on Kestilä and Söderlund’s account, be expected to have a very high vote for the Front National, which is clearly counter-intuitive. This will hold true for other measures of the allochthonous population.

Although Kestilä-Kekkonen and Söderlund (2009) do not directly address this issue in their rejoinder, the complaint raised by Arzheimer and Carter (2009) is not insurmountable. There are few areas of European countries that are not overwhelmingly populated by natives of that country; even in the great metropolises, few areas are not majority white. While the effect Arzheimer and Carter (2009) describe is real, it does not overwhelm the countervailing effect, not least because propensity to vote must be considered. Both registering to vote and turning out to vote is lower amongst ethnic minorities (Heath et al 2013), further diminishing the strength of the effect.

In short, the available literature suggests that there are both benefits and necessities to studying the far right at a subnational level and that, while there are difficulties in doing so in a rigorous manner, they can be overcome.

This section has set out the first part of the triad of the review of the literature, concerning the far right itself. We turn now to opposition to the far right.
Opposition to the far right

This section begins with definitional questions around opposition to the far right in general and anti-fascism in particular. As the history of opposition to the far right is unavoidably intertwined with the far right itself, this section then sets out that history to later explain how both the far right and opposition thereto have developed.

In one sense, opposition to the far right is trivial to define: it is simply ‘being against the far right’. This, however, is rather too loose, and something more workable is required.

The literature on opposition to the far right is sparse. Much of it specifically deals with opposition to fascism, rather than the far right as a whole, and much of it is essentially historical in nature, dealing with the previous waves of the far right: the 1930s and the 1970s. It is also generally poorly integrated into the literature on the far right itself. As described above, fascist and far right were synonyms until the 1980s, and so, until then, anti-fascism was opposition to the far right was anti-fascism. What literature there is on anti-fascism can therefore be used.

Nigel Copsey provides an anti-fascist minimum:

> ‘What all anti-fascists shared in inter-war Britain, at a minimum, was political and moral opposition to fascism rooted in the *democratic* values of the Enlightenment tradition.’

[emphasis in original] (2010:xviii)

While the premise that the COMINTERN was meaningfully rooted in the Enlightenment tradition is an eye-raising one, that is a debate more properly belonging to the realms of political theory.

Copsey suggests that an actor’s opinion as to whether they are anti-fascist or not must be accepted. This is very deeply problematic. His intention is to allow that the Communist Party (CP) was anti-fascist, even when, under direction from the COMINTERN’s theory of social fascism, even social democrats were fascists. However, it would also mean that someone who genuinely believed the Royal Society for the Protection of Birds was protecting cormorants in a fascist manner and opposed them on that basis could be considered an anti-fascist. It may be that the CP was in some meaningful way antifascist while it considered the Trades Union Congress (TUC) to be fascists, but that would be because they actually opposed actual fascists, and not because they considered themselves anti-fascist. Motivation is, therefore, less useful in determining what anti-fascism is, although it may well be useful in determining types of anti-fascism. This does, though, have a starting point: ‘political and moral opposition to fascism’. For the present purposes, this is still problematic. ‘Moral opposition’, or a general attitude hostile to fascism, would bring in, as Williamson (2010) argues, the Conservative party as a major anti-fascist force, despite not taking any particular steps against the British Union of Fascists. Translated to the supply and demand
factors, it may have had the effect of denying or making political space, as Kitschelt & McGann (1995) suggest may have happened in Europe sixty or so years later, but this is an incidental effect rather than a specific aim.

Renton (cited in Copsey 2000:xvii) provides a more useful definition:

‘activists, people who objected to the rise of fascism, who hated the doctrines of fascism and did something to stop their growth [emphasis added]’

Renton’s intention is to give particular importance to the CP (and later the Socialist Workers Party and Anti-Nazi League, as in Renton (2006)). He highlights the importance of activity. For the present purposes, this is key; the specific objects of interest are those civil society organisations that oppose far right groups, rather than more generic and widespread attitudes, even if they must be taken into account.

Although Renton’s definition is preferred over Copsey’s, Copsey’s division between radical and liberal is more useful than Renton’s active and passive. For Renton, anti-fascism must have a countervailing vision, or it is merely non-fascist. This is rather problematic; it is clearly possible, both in theory and in practice, to oppose something and to desire its diminution or extinction without changing any other part of society, or to simply not have any position on the rest of society. It also implies that an organisation with great capacity and many members that did not advocate a different vision would be non-fascist, while an organisation that did very little but had that alternative vision would actually be anti-fascist (if somewhat ineffectual). The radical/liberal division is more useful. That is to say, there is a long-standing division between more and less militant approaches to anti-fascism (Olechnowicz 2010), with the former focussing on direct confrontation and the latter on demonstration and education, even if they can complement each other. Olechnowicz contrasts the Battle of Cable Street with Labour-controlled local councils denying the British Union of Fascists access to halls for meetings. These tendencies are at times closer together - for instance, during the Popular Front era - and at times further apart - for instance, during the Social Fascism era, but persist, certainly into the seventies, with the Anti-Nazi League ‘emphasising the importance of destroying the NF as an electoral force, and the other ... emphasising the importance of a layered response to racism’ (Lloyd 1998:81).

Lloyd (1998) gives many examples of anti-racist groups that could, at least incidentally, oppose far right groups. These range from third sector organisations, such as the Joint Council for the Welfare of Immigrants, through government bodies, such as the Commission for Racial Equality (now the Equality and Human Rights Commission), to those that are neither one nor the other, such as Race Equality Councils. While many of these may well have strong views on far right parties, they generally do not campaign directly against them, in many cases because they would
be specifically prohibited from doing so. Their actions may affect the political climate, but otherwise do not directly affect far right parties. Crucially, there is no substantial information available on how any effects that they might have would fit into the framework of supply and demand, or at what level, as discussed above.

Husbands (2002:57) provides a useful breakdown of state responses to far right parties under three heads: control-based, education-based, and social policy-based. While some of these, such as proscription, are clearly outwith the abilities of non-state actors, it is interesting to note that some, principally in the education-based policy area, can be delivered by them.

This provides a working understanding of what the opposition to the far right that is of interest to this study in both is and is not. It is active, rather than passive; it is deliberate rather than incidental; it is targeted rather than generically aimed at improving race relations. It is therefore possible to describe the subjects of this thesis as those groups that campaign against far right parties, or parties they perceive to be far right, specifically on the basis that they are far right, with a particular focus on damaging their electoral prospects and, potentially, their very existence.

The historical literature on the development of opposition to the far right

Having established what the far right is and why it may do well, and what opposition to the far right is, it is useful to very briefly give an account of the development of opposition to the far right in the particular case of the UK. Because the existence of the far right is almost a precondition for the existence of opposition thereto, the development of far right groups and opposition groups is intertwined. The particular historical circumstances of the case of the far right and opposition thereto in the United Kingdom shape how both sets of groups understand the world around them and each other and, consequently, how they act. The list of anti-fascist and anti-racist groups (AFOR, ALARM, ALCARD, ALARAFC, ALCC, AAM, AFA, AFDA, AFL, AFRG, ANL, AWAFM, to list just some of those beginning with the letter ‘a’) reaches Pythonesque levels. To list the associations, divisions, rapprochements, and relations between the groups over the years would be akin to herding Geryon’s cattle. A synthesis of the broad trends in the available literature will therefore be used.

The first wave of far right activity in the UK is generally associated with Oswald Mosley and the British Union of Fascists. This provoked a range of opposition, much of it centred around the CP and the Labour party (Copsey 2010). The opposition saw the British Union of Fascists. as a direct, physical threat to themselves, potentially interested and able to take over the country, and (at times) the manifestation of the most reactionary parts of capitalism. In particular, they used
marches as a recruiting tool and as a show of force. In response, there was inter alia direct physical confrontation, area denial, and restriction on access to meeting halls etc. (Olechnowicz 2010).

The experience of the Second World War made fascism and anything that smacked of it so socially unacceptable that it would remain politically unviable until the 1960s, with the rise of the National Front (Copsey 2000). A range of factors, not least the loss of the 1966 election by the relatively moderate Edward Heath and the intervention of A.K. Chesterton led to space for the resurgence of the far right in the form of the National Front (NF). Meanwhile, opposition to the far right had withered without a substantial far right to oppose (Copsey 2000). Nevertheless, the NF would be in turn eventually opposed by the Anti-Nazi League (Renton 2006), who followed the tactics that had passed into collective memory to oppose the Front. Copsey (2000) suggests that the Anti-Nazi League may have appeared on the scene relatively late in the day, when the NF had passed its zenith. The NF, in turn, would go into decline, perhaps aided by the rightward shift of the Conservatives under Margaret Thatcher. The anti-fascist movement itself would decline, such that ‘[i]n October 1981 [anti-fascist magazine] Searchlight had described a situation where there was “no anti-racist, anti-fascist movement to speak of”’ (Copsey 2000:153)

The next re-emergence of the far right would be the British National Party, itself the result of a split in the NF. Their first apogee was with the election of Derek Beackon to represent the Millwall ward of Tower Hamlets in 1992. This rather caught the quiescent anti-fascist movement on the hop, with what protests there were being described as ‘too little, too late’ (Copsey 2000:153) and mainly after the fact. Indeed, the campaigning efforts in 1994 by the remains of the Anti-Nazi League were seen by some in the area as worse than the BNP (Copsey 2000). The Anti-Nazi League would eventually be wound up in 1996.

The BNP would become less effective until the replacement of its leader, John Tyndall, with the more charismatic Nick Griffin in 1999, which was the prelude to another rise for the far right in Britain. As it grew, two new organisations were set up. One, Unite Against Fascism, was formed in 2003. In an interesting historical parallel, it emerged a year after the music-based campaign, Love Music Hate Racism, it would later shepherd, much as the Anti-Nazi League emerged after Rock Against Racism. In 2004, Hope Not Hate (HnH) was set up, as a split from Searchlight. Long a magazine, Searchlight had become more active in campaigning since the nineties (Copsey 2000), crucially differing from groups such as Anti-Fascist Action (which would gravitate to UAF) in seeing the state as a potential ally, rather than a partial cause of the racism on which the far right capitalised. UAF adopted the methods and mores of the tendency previously found in the Anti-Nazi League and, before that, the CP-organised protests against the British Union of Fascists. HnH
would adopt a more moderate strategy that had started with Searchlight in the late 1990s (Hope not Hate 2014a).

Both UAF and HnH would later include UKIP amongst their targets of opposition (Unite Against Fascism 2014; Lowles 2004). Without wanting to pass judgement on whether UKIP actually are far right, UAF and HnH act on the basis that the party is a far right party.

As a crude indication that these are not fly-by-night organisations, Hope Not Hate has received support from popular singers, comedians, politicians, businesspeople, trade unions, and newspapers. Hope Not Hate Educational, the charitable wing of Hope Not Hate, attracts grants running into six figures and has received funding from the Department for Communities and Local Government (Hope Not Hate 2015). Unite Against Fascism similarly lists MPs, MEPs, peers, and the general secretaries of trade unions amongst its officers.

This section has set out the historical context of the far right and opposition to the far right in the United Kingdom, particularly how they have interacted. However, it is necessary to understand the why as well as the how. In the next section, the literature on social movements is examined as a possible explanation for why these opposition groups have evolved and behaved as they have done.

This has set out the second part of the literature review, concerning opposition to the far right. The next section looks to the literature on social movements as a means to understanding the groups that engage in that opposition.

Social movements

The first two sections of this chapter have given an overview of the literature on the far right, and particularly of the focus in that literature on the different factors that cause far right parties to be more or less successful, and located some of the gaps in that literature, especially around opposition and meso-level explanations. It has then given a historical account of opposition to the far right (qua opposition, rather than incidentally to other objectives) in the particular case of the United Kingdom. While this gives what has happened and explains some of the particular events and narratives that have emerged, it does not explain the internal dynamics of groups opposed to the far right, either in general or in the specific cases of Hope not Hate and Unite Against Fascism, and so how the act and react.

In order to do this, it is useful to understand Hope not Hate and Unite Against Fascism as social movements (Tilly 2006), and to consider the dynamics between those two opposition groups and far right parties, both in general and the pair that are the focus of the present study, and the state as contentious politics (Tarrow 2011). In this manner, we can explain much of the rise of the
opposition groups through the lens of political opportunity structures (McAdam 1982). This section begins by looking at definitions of social movements, before expanding their focus beyond the state. It then considers how they can have impact and how that impact can be measured.

What is a social movement?

Prior to the work of the triumvirate of Tilly, Tarrow, and McAdam, both separately and in combination, analysis of what would later be called social movements engaged in contentious politics was compartmentalised, according to interest in revolution, strike, protest, and the like, or in single case studies of historical interest. It was not systematically studied as a phenomenon in its own right (McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly 2001).

These three would synthesis these into a broader phenomenon – the social movement – engaged in contentious politics. These terms warrant further analysis. For Tilly (2006:21), ‘Contentious politics occurs, then, when connected clusters of persons make consequential claims on other clusters of persons or on major political actors, just so long as at least one government is a claimant, an object of claims, or a third party to the claims’. This definition allows us to make some determinations as to both the nature of the contestation and the participants in it. Firstly, because these groups of individuals must be connected, they are acting together for more than a moment; a single petition would not indicate contentious politics, but a series of petitions and other activities from the same group on the same or similar issues, seeking change in the actions and activities of another group, would indicate contentious politics. By the involvement of the state, even if just as a third party, we can also see that these are inherently political activities.

From the cases studied by Tilly and Tarrow, which are returned to below, it can be seen that contentious politics are often taken to be dealing with issues of the greatest import – the high politics of the nature and even the existence of the state when faced with revolution or widespread internal dissent. However, the definition does not require such grand themes to be at play; to take a banal example, a one-off petition for (say) a cycle lane on a particular street would not be contentious politics. A sustained campaign by an organised group to improve cycling provision across a district would be, not least because it has the state, even if manifested through municipal government, as target and a change in its behaviour (at least as regards the use of the public highway) as object.

This sets out the broad dynamic of contentious politics; it will be returned to below in the discussion of political opportunity structures. What, then, is the social movement? For Tilly (2005:369), it is ‘the deliberate, ostentatious mounting of a sustained challenge to powerholders
in the name of a disadvantaged population living under the jurisdiction or influence of those powerholders’.

Prima facie, this offers little beyond the understanding of contentious politics set out above. However, where contentious politics sets out the broad, political, and social context in which this manner of disputation occurs, the description of these actors as social movements shifts the focus to them as agents. It focuses on their actions – what they actually do (Kriesi 2009).

The key here is that there is contestation going on; this contestation is not merely ‘market relations, lobbying, or representative politics’ (Tarrow 2011:4) of a transactional nature, but actions that represent either a challenge to power – power is being exercised in the wrong way – or a threat to power – power is being exercised by the wrong people. Moreover, it both depends on and builds solidarity and connection between the participants (McAdam 2013). The phenomenon of contentious politics both requires groups, rather than collections of individuals, and then deepens the bonds of trust and, indeed, kinship between them so that they have the ability to act as a collectivity and have motivation to act as such, even if it is not necessarily in their own personal interest. In this, we see an answer to a question raised by Mancur Olson’s Logic of Collective Action (1971). If, pace Olson, it is not in an individual’s personal interest to, for instance, attend a protest calling for a given change, or it is too easy to free ride and allow others to do the unglamorous work of standing in the rain to collect signatures for a petition, why would people bother? Essentially, such activity becomes a requisite of group membership and signifier thereof. This can then be either a psychological necessity, or, from a view perhaps more palatable to Olson, a valid expenditure of time because of the social benefits it brings.

It is important to note that much of the focus of Tarrow, McAdam, and Tilly was on politics that sought to change or influence the state qua the state. This means looking at movements that sought to change what activities the state did or did not engage in, to promote acting in certain ways or deter acting in others, to deal with certain groups of people but not others, and, indeed, who occupied positions of power and influence within the edifice of the state. Much of this come from the particular cases from which conclusions about broader trends were drawn; in the case of Tilly, protests against the French ancien régime, from the peasant uprisings in the Vendée (Tilly 1964), or, for Tarrow, revolutionary France and America, and Britain of the same period (Tarrow 2011), or the American civil rights movement of the twentieth century (McAdam 1982). The civil rights movement has remained a fruitful avenue of research concerning social movements up till now (for instance, Wasow’s (2020) paper on the particular effects of violent, as opposed to peaceful, protest). This gives a view of contentious politics as always being state-focused; McAdam and Tarrow (2018) look at openings in regimes and, crucially, how states respond to contentious politics. The locus is clearly placed on the state. There are three elements
to this conception of the social movement; the campaign, a ‘social-movement repertoire’ (Tilly 2006:53), and displays of ‘worthiness, unity, numbers, and commitment’ (Tilly 2006:53), or WUNC displays.

The campaign is largely self-explanatory; rather than a one-off event, it is a series of co-ordinated events by a group that has at least some temporal persistence that makes claims on the state or on other groups. In this, little distinguishes it from what we would expect to see from contentious politics.

A key feature is the repertoire of actions is a set of well-understood and well-practiced means of protest; well-understood by both those engaging in them, and those at who they are aimed. They are ‘routines that apply to the same claimant-object pairs’ (Tilly 1986:2), whether those pairs be rival political factions or people in an economic relationship. This repertoire varies from time to time, place to place, and group to group as it is ‘rooted in the shared subculture of … activists’ (Della Porta 2018:465). A repertoire might involve a march to a traditional gathering place – Trafalgar Square in London has variously served as location, starting point, or destination for protests and marches in the United Kingdom since the Chartists arrived there at the end of their 1848 march (Weinreb and Hibbert 1983). Even within a single field – for instance, industrial relations – there is the variety of sabotage, lock-out, strike, work to rule and so on. However, only one or a small number of these will form a particular repertoire.

While the defining feature of these repertoires are their recurrence – a one-off performance is definitionally not a repertoire – they are not static in time or in place. Indeed, they are both modular and transferable (Wada 2012). That is to say, the repertoire of one time and place can reappear, deliberately copied, in another (it is transferable) and parts of one repertoire can reappear, rather than the whole concert being taken (it is modular). For instance, the cacerolazo, or noisy protest of banged pots and pans, typifies protests in South America against right-wing, military dictatorships in the latter half of the twentieth century (Meléndez-Badillo 2019); it would translate to Spain, initially used as a protest against Spain’s engagement in the Second Iraq War and to indicate the protestors’ views of the then-Prime Minister of Spain, Jose-Maria Aznar (El País 2003). What drives a repertoire is precisely its familiarity; there must be, at least, a substantial portion of any protest or similar that is familiar enough to its participants for them to know what to do. Because these repertoires act on a relationship between ‘claimant-object pairs’ (Tilly 1986:2), the way in which objects of protest, whether the state or a third party, they will change in response to the reactions of said objects of protest, or the public at large, media, and so on.
However, this process of innovation is slow (Tilly 2006). Such innovation in tactics and strategy that occurs is slow. The features of protest – the routes that are marched, the songs that are sung, the slogans that are chanted, but also the fact that there is a march, there is a song, there is a slogan – are handed down from generation of activists to generation of activists (della Porta 2013). Indeed, the aforementioned march to London goes well back before Trafalgar Square’s use as a rallying point by the Chartists, perhaps as far back as the Peasants’ Revolt of Wat Tyler in 1381. In a less extreme version, the manifestations of protest seen in contemporary left-leaning groups today have roots back into their forebears on the left.

A further feature is the WUNC display, with WUNC representing worthiness, unity, numbers, and commitment (Tilly 2006:53). The idea is simple enough; the demonstration of a substantial number of worthy people who are unified in message and committed to a cause are more likely to achieve the change they desire. The importance of the number of people present is largely self-explanatory; a substantial number of people suggests that the issue at hand is important to many and, so, may be of importance to the bystander and the politician – democratically elected or not – whether because of the issue itself or because it is of import to those under them. Unity similarly suggests that there is agreement on the issue’s importance and, perhaps, the manner in which it can be remediated. Commitment – repeatedly raising the issue, or inconveniencing oneself by raising the issue – again suggests that the issue matters enough to raise a fuss over. Worthiness refers both to the manner in which participants conduct themselves and the people who are chosen to represent the movement, perhaps as speakers; if they are people of standing, recognised by the community, they are likely to have greater weight in convincing people of the importance of the cause, particularly if supported by people acting in a sober manner.

Worthiness is, however, very much in the eye of the beholder. A manner of protest that might be considered entirely appropriate by, say, an organiser might be seen very differently by others; what is a carnival atmosphere to one is unwelcome rowdiness to another. Similarly, the choice of a particular parliamentarian as a speaker might be made by organisers on the basis of their stature and because they and people likely to attend the protest consider them worthy, while that opinion is not shared by the public at large.

It should be noted that a gathering of people together does not, in and of itself, constitute a social movement; rather it is the organisation and persistence of action, taking a cue from existing relations and building on them, that turns it into a social movement (Tarrow 2011).

**Social movements beyond the state**

Thus far, contentious politics and social movements have targeted the state. However, the delimitation of contentious politics has been such that it does not look at activity that concerns
itself with the government or the state, even when the processes at work in the organising
groups are the same (Snow 2004); it is necessary to broaden the scope of social movements
(Goodwin and Jasper 1999). Indeed, McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly (2001) accept that their take on
the phenomenon may be too rigid. Snow modifies the classic definition of a social movement to
be collective challenges to ‘extant systems of authority, or resisting change in such systems’
(Snow 2004:11).

In short, while contentious politics may often have the state as target, they do not necessarily
have to. Indeed, Tilly makes it clear that, for his definition, governments do not have to ‘figure as
the makers or receivers of contentious claim’ (Tilly 2008:7); rather, it is sufficient for
governments to be ‘monitoring and regulating public contention, and preparing to step in if the
claim making gets unruly’ (Tilly 2008:7). This reduces the necessary role of the state to little, if
anything, more than any other activity that private individuals undertake within a given state.
Even the most quotidiarian task takes place against the backdrop of a state that regulates the
manner in which goods and services may be sold, what may or may not be included in products,
how water will be delivered to the household, and so on; most importantly, it regulates how
grievances against the state or against other private actors may be expressed. Indeed, if the role
of the state in this definition may be as limited as Tilly suggests, the requirement for a state to be
involved is essentially met by the mere existence of a functioning state. Even if the state were so
reduced as to not meet the classic Weberian (Weber 2014) minimum of a monopoly on the
legitimate use of violence, the state would, definitionally, be under contestation and so would
conceivably be more assertive in its actions.

In any case, the state largely gives or, at the very least, shapes the laws. The state may not say
that a particular form of protests is good or bad, effective or counter-productive, desired or not
desired, but it certainly says, even if implicitly, whether a protest is legal or not. Indeed, police
are often deployed at protests specifically to maintain law and order; to ensure that the
 gathering stays within the boundaries of what the state deems acceptable and to detain and
potentially prosecute those who go beyond those bounds.

A starting point in shifting away from the exclusive focus on the state is to look at the relations
between social movements and political parties. Although Tilly (2006) sees members of the polity
and participants in social movements – that is to say, those who already have access to the state
and those who must combine in order to pressure the state to achieve their preferred outcomes
or, more simply, insiders and outsiders – as quite separate, the division is not necessarily so clear
cut (Hutter et al 2018). There are relations of different sorts between political parties and social
movements. Political parties can grow from social movements; this is typified by the pattern of
Labour and Social Democratic parties growing out of the trade union movement. Political parties
and social movements can also be allies; a social movement can seek to achieve its aims through an existing political party or by establishing its own, as with many green parties. Equally, political parties can use mobilised social movements as a means to demonstrate the extent of their support in bargaining with other political parties, not least as a signal to strength and depth of feeling (Hutter et al 2018).

However, this presupposes a positive relationship between the party and the movement, with the one trying to support or, at least, exploit the other. No allowance is made for an explicitly hostile relationship, where the aim of the social movement is the diminution of the party’s power, votes, and relevance. Nevertheless, the insights from the theories set out still hold. The focus can be shifted away from the state further - for instance, with movements for corporate social responsibility (Soule 2009), Wal-Mart openings (Ingram et al 2010), and universities (Walker et al 2008) - and still allow for the use of social movements as a lens for understanding. The target may also influence the tactics and strategies that groups use (Walker et al 2008); different targets have different abilities to respond and are vulnerable in different ways, both from each other and from the state.

How can social movements have impact?

Whether social movements have any impact is a vexed question (Amenta et al 2018); with findings that they do matter (Gamson 1990) and that they are not particularly important (Giugni 2009). Social movements can be causal agents; they can have impact. However, ‘they are not likely to be dominant causal forces’ (Amenta et al 2018:449). It is therefore useful to look at different manners in which social movements may have impact.

Most work on the consequences of social movements has been about policy (Giugni 1998); for instance, McAdam and Boudet’s (2012) work on granting of licences for the construction of liquefied national gas infrastructure in the United States, Giugni’s (2004) research on the policy outcomes of the anti-nuclear, green, and peace movements in Europe, or Burstein and Freudenburg’s (1978) study of the effects of protest on votes concerning the Vietnam War in the United States Senate, variously looking at how different state structures, incentives, and types of mobilization work, but also Rochon and Mazmanian (1993), Schumaker (1975), Rudig (1990), and others.

At first glance, it appears that work on the internals of social movements and the tactics they use give contradictory findings. However, this may be explained by looking at context; a strategy that works in one setting may not work in another (Giugni 1998). The political opportunity structures against which a social movement takes place mean that the same action or set of actions will not necessarily have the same result (Kitschelt 1986).
Amenta and Young (1999) argue that states with different structures and capacities will react to social movements in different ways, with more or less openness and responsiveness. This opens up an important consideration; it is possible for a social movement to be effective in its aims, to not have any particular effect, and to actually make it harder for its stated aims to be achieved. In Amenta and Young’s (1999) formulation, this is because the state may, essentially, respond to challenges repressively, but the logic can be extended beyond the state. If the target of a social movement is the public at large, its actions may drive some or all away from the protest and even towards the opposite position. In some cases, this would lead to a negative outcome, from the movement’s perspective, because of the effect on the state (Giugni and Yamasaki 2009), but where the state is not needed as an actor and the intention of the movement is to change voting behaviour, it can have its effect directly.

In this regard of changing public opinions as expressed at the voting booth as the objective rather than a concrete change in state policy, the nearest comparator for the policies of a state would be the individual perspectives of voters when the aim of a movement is limited to convincing people to vote in a particular way with the objective of preventing a given party from achieving electoral success, rather than an instrumental means of changing government policy. This focus is broadly common across the literature that looks at the impact, rather than the generation or maintenance, of social movements, and is seen in how success and failure is understood; Gamson’s (1990) search for concessions granted by targets to challengers. This is extended by Amenta and Young (1999) to allow for collective benefits, or ‘benefits from which members of the intended beneficiary group cannot be readily excluded’ (Amenta & Young 1999:155).

Clearly, there are other means of having impact aside from policies. This includes the ‘influence of movements on elections, political parties, administrative agencies, and courts and legal systems’ (Amenta et al 2018:459-460). Although the focus of the activities of the groups under consideration do not cover administrative agencies or legal systems as a substantial part of their activity, the process is similar to seeking policy changes from the elected, legislative part of the state, although the dynamics by which public pressure is brought to bear are different, with elected representatives potentially acting as a conduit to state functions that are usually at one remove from the public. The relations between social movements and political parties, particularly at elections, are discussed below.

It is worth considering some of the means by which social movements seek to make change, and the activities they engage in to do so. In a review of transnational, and particularly European, anti-racist coalitions, Stefano Ruzza (2006) highlights the varied nature of anti-racist and allied movements and the actions they undertake, from extra-institutional protest actions to working
alongside or very close to policy-making and enforcing institutions. In particular, Ruzza emphasises that it is hard to pin down compared to other movements that might broadly come under the heading of social justice, as it waxes and wanes, and is not bookended by signal events that give it clear demarcations in the manner that, for instance, anti-nuclear protests were galvanised by the nuclear disaster at Chernobyl (Ruzza 2006:116). In short, anti-racist and allied movements wax and wane over time and space, with their methods and focuses likewise changing.

However, we can begin to categorise the methods used by protest groups by using Rootes' five-fold categorisation of conventional, demonstrative, confrontational, minor attacks on property, and violence (Rootes 2003b). As the category names suggest, there is an implied increase in militancy up the scale. Conventional methods might also be understood as polite forms: writing letters and signing petitions, distributing leaflets and holding public meetings. The next step up is the demonstrative: ‘street matches, rallies, and vigils’ (Rootes 2003b:31) followed by the confrontational – ‘occupations and physical obstructions’ (Rootes 2003b:31). The penultimate category is minor attacks on property, and the last is outright violence, including property damage that could pose a risk to life.

Clearly, these are not hard and fast categories. There is a grey boundary between property damage that could and could not pose a risk to life. A street march necessarily takes up space on the public highway and is therefore very close to a physical obstruction, the difference being whether the prime intention is to cause the obstruction or not. The difference between a public meeting and a rally can be whether a hall is booked or a meeting point is chosen in a park.

However, besides the increasing militancy, other features can be seen. Firstly, there are different targets. In some cases, the target is the public at large; in others, it is the state in its various different manifestations. This leads to the second feature; the theory of the case. In some cases the aim is simply to change public opinion as an end in and of itself. This is clearly of benefit for a campaign that seeks to change attitudes such as one concerned with racial and ethnic integration, for instance. However, shifting public opinion can also be an intermediary step in changing the opinions or the actions of politicians, or both, by encouraging the public at large to communicate their preferences two elected and other officials. Changing the decisions made by public officials by directly lobbying them is a further avenue. All of these aims can be seen in the different categories, though a connection may be drawn between increasing militancy and the extent to which the group perceives the urgency of their campaign or their distrust of the state. (Rootes 2003a:2). Ultimately, a violent action may be calculated to directly hinder the ability of a target – the state or a non-state actor, such as a company or political party – to go about its business.
Although social movements might not think in terms of WUNC displays (Tilly 2004), the range of actions they can take – from as unthreatening an action as handing out a leaflet all the way to acts tantamount to terrorism do give us insight into how they may see themselves, and who they think they are appealing to.

**Conclusion**

This review has looked at the three principal literatures that impact on the question: what effect does opposition to far right parties have? These are the literature on the far right itself, on anti-fascism and anti-racism, and on social movements. In looking at the literature on the far right, it has identified a split common to the literature between an older form of the far right descended from the fascism of the 1920s and 1930s and a newer form based on populism, authoritarianism, and nativism (Mudde 2007). Support for this newer form, that now dominates the far right, can be explained in terms of demand and supply. Demand factors are felt to be helpful and sometimes necessary, but not sufficient, for the far right to do well. These can be understood at different levels - macro, meso, and micro. While the macro level offers many potential explanations for why people might vote for far right parties, they are generally poorly connected to the individual. The meso level, which remains understudied, can potentially offer this connection. In particular, the role of opposition, which remains understudied, can potentially offer this connection. Much of the literature is historical, focusing on anti-fascism from the 1920s to the 1980s, rather than in the world of the populist radical right. The development of opposition to the far right was briefly discussed, with attention being paid to its long roots in anti-fascism, and how this shapes more and less confrontational forms today. Finally, possible explanations for this were found by identifying opposition groups as social movements, with all that entails, including the development and maintenance of repertoires of contention. Taken together, this provides the basis for the next parts of this research.
Chapter 3 – Research design, data, and methods

Introduction
While voting behaviour in general, and why people vote for far right parties in particular, is a well-studied area, the effect of opposition on voting for the far right is understudied. There is not a broad range of readily available theories that can be tested in a particular circumstance, or even a dataset against which to test. This leads to two different kinds of questions: what is happening, and why is it happening? Plano Clark and Badiee argue that one ‘should start with research questions, and all methods decisions should follow directly from these questions’ (Plano Clark and Badiee 2010:278). In order to answer these two different kinds of question, this thesis adopts a mixed-methods approach; more specifically, it adopts an explanatory sequential research design (Cresswell 2014), consisting of a quantitative analysis of far right electoral performance in the United Kingdom between 2005 and 2015, accounting for opposition group activity, followed by a qualitative case study of the London Borough of Barking and Dagenham to explain the results.

This chapter sets out the rationale for using a mixed methods approach, and the specific instance of an explanatory sequential approach. It then identifies the variables measured for the quantitative section and how they are operationalized, together with how data are sourced and processed. Next, it provides further details on the methods used and the rationale for them, before setting out expectations as to what will be seen in the quantitative analysis.

Throughout this study, there is a focus on the local level because of the manner in which campaigns and opposition take place, and because, as set out in the review of the literature, it is held that using national-level data obscures the variation that is seen within a country. By using local level data, we also increase the number of cases; instead of a relatively small number of countries, data for hundreds of constituencies or thousands of wards is used. This adds robustness to the quantitative methods described below, both through the mathematical operation of a larger $N$ and because of the theoretical reasons set out here.

Why a mixed methods approach?
Although we can develop informed expectations, the effect of opposition groups on the electoral performance of far right parties is unknown; thus, the first questions to answer concern what is actually happening. Do we see a diminution of votes for far right parties where opposition groups are active? Does it matter how the opposition manifests, or what kind of far right party it targets? These are questions about what is happening; are there correlations between the activity
under investigation and the electoral results we are measuring? With these answered, we can turn to the second kind of question – what explains these results?

Quantitative and qualitative methods provide different views of data and have their own advantages and disadvantages. In short, quantitative methods are useful for analysing large amounts of data, with relatively few variables, and provide generalizability. However, quantitative methods cannot provide the understanding of particular cases that qualitative cases can. Moreover, qualitative methods can show the causation that quantitative methods cannot. In this instance, we can use quantitative methods to analyse what is going on at elections, and then qualitative methods to understand why it is going on. Adopting mixed methods provides 'breadth and depth of understanding and corroboration' (Johnson et al 2007:123).

However, satisfactorily answering the research questions also requires an approach tailored to the specifics of the questions given the state of knowledge about the particular subjects.

There are, of course, very many possible research designs, even when just considering mixed-methods approaches; when categorizing just mixed-methods research designs, Cresswell and Plano Clark (2017) identify fifteen different typologies of research designs, including four by Cresswell, Plano Clark, and their various co-authors. However, Cresswell and Plano Clark's (2017) most recent typology of mixed-methods research designs is also, their most parsimonious, and gives an indication of the broad approaches available. Of the three they identify – explanatory sequential, exploratory sequential, and triangulation – an explanatory sequential design is most appropriate.

An explanatory sequential research design begins with quantitative research and then seeks to explain the results from that numerical portion with qualitative research. (Ivankova et al. 2006). The qualitative section selects cases from the quantitative research that are particularly apt for explaining the broad trends seen. Because this approach uses the results of the quantitative investigation to guide selection of the qualitative research, it is particularly appropriate for an under-studied field.

In short, the extensive, quantitative research uses a large number of cases to determine, in a robust and generalizable manner, what correlations exist, while the intensive, qualitative research uses a single case study to explain those correlations. Although luminaries such as King, Keohane, and Verba (1994) decry the use of case studies, this extensive-intensive approach that makes use of case studies is also used elsewhere in the study of political parties generally (such as Katz 1980) and the far right in particular (for instance, van Kessel 2015; Vasilopoulou 2010).
Time period

The aim of this study is to determine the effect of civil society opposition on the electoral performance of far right parties. In the process of narrowing down this very broad question to our exemplar of the situation in the United Kingdom, and the particular groups and parties – Hope not Hate, Unite Against Fascism, the British National Party and the United Kingdom Independence Party – the geography of the study is set for us. It is necessary to also determine a time period in which to conduct this study. Because this study focuses specifically on the electoral performance of the two parties and the effects of the opposition groups thereupon, it makes sense to use elections as cut-off dates as campaigning specifically for an election ends with that election.

Nick Griffin’s election as leader of the British National Party saw him start on a process of modernizing the party. By 2002, this was starting to yield success, with the first candidates returned to office since Derek Beackon in Millwall in 1993, in Burnley. The British National Party would continue to see electoral success, leading to the formation of Unite Against Fascism in the mould of the Anti-Nazi League in 2003. Searchlight started what would become Hope not Hate following race riots in the north of England in 2001. Lowles (2014) marks 2004 as the start of Hope not Hate. However, both these groups took time to organize themselves, fundraise, employ staff and engage volunteers, and begin the process of campaigning, and specifically campaigning at elections. It is therefore appropriate to take the next set of elections, on 5th May 2005, as the starting point for the study.

On winning an absolute majority in the House of Commons on the 7th May 2015, David Cameron began implementing his party’s pledge to hold a referendum on the United Kingdom’s continued membership of the European Union. The necessary legislation, the European Union Referendum Act 2015, began its journey through Parliament only twenty-one days later when it received its first reading in the House of Commons on 28th May 2015. It would complete that journey shortly before the end of the year, receiving Royal Assent on 17th December 2015. The passing of the Act and the beginning in earnest of the Brexit referendum would mark a sharp discontinuity in British politics; the public debate would shift from the breadth of policy to focus almost exclusively on the plebiscite. Accordingly, the close of polls at eleven o’clock in the evening on 7th May 2015 at the last election before the beginning of the Brexit process marks an appropriate end date for the present study as British politics would substantially shift, with the saliency of issues changing very quickly thereafter.

The case study of Barking and Dagenham looks at a period within this period; specifically, 2006 to 2010. This covers the electoral cycle from the British National Party’s greatest success, becoming
the largest opposition party on the council in 2006, to the loss of all their seats in 2010. This period represents a high point for activity by the opposition groups and so gives the best opportunity to identify and understand them.

Elections

The elections under consideration are as follows.

For the entirety of Great Britain, the Westminster elections of 5th May 2005, 6th May 2010, and 7th May 2015;

For the entirety of Great Britain, the European parliamentary elections of 4th June 2009 and 22nd May 2014;


For Wales, the local elections of 1st May 2008 and 3rd May 2012;

For Scotland, the local elections of 3rd May 2007 and 3rd May 2012.

The governments of Wales and Scotland have instituted a single system of local government across their respective jurisdictions with one level of municipal government with all-out elections below Holyrood and Cardiff Bay, and so there is, with the exception noted below, one set of local elections every four years. England retains a complex, patchwork quilt of two-tier and different types of unitary arrangements, with some councils having all-out elections and others electing by halves and thirds. Hence, there are local elections somewhere in England almost every year, although generally not across the entirety of the country.

The local elections that took place in the rest of Wales on 3rd May 2012 did not take place in Anglesey/Ynys Môn as the council had had executive functions suspended; the elections were delayed until 2nd May 2013. They are included in the data set.

Northern Ireland is excluded from this study for a variety of reasons. The political situation is substantially different; none of the Northern Irish parties contest elections in Great Britain, and the parties in Great Britain do not contest elections in Northern Ireland. The electoral system for European elections is different to the rest of the UK. Moreover, the BNP and UKIP did not make great efforts in Ulster. The BNP did not contest either the 2009 or 2014 European elections there, and UKIP only contested the 2014 elections. UKIP ran a single candidate at the 2007 Stormont elections despite there being 108 seats. At the 2011 Stormont elections, UKIP ran only six
candidates and the British National Party three, again out of a possible 108 seats. UKIP ran ten out a possible eighteen candidates for the Westminster parliament in 2015 while the BNP did not stand at all in that year. Neither UKIP nor the BNP stood any candidates for the Westminster elections in 2005 or 2010. Most importantly, neither Hope not Hate nor Unite Against Fascism undertook any activities there.

**Case study: Barking and Dagenham**

A case study, per Gerring (2004:341), is ‘an intensive study of a single unit with an aim to generalize across a larger set of units’. Because case studies are conducted on a low, perhaps singular, number of cases, time- and resource- intensive analysis is possible (Katz 1980).

There are several criteria on which to choose a case study; these include the typical, diverse, extreme, deviant, influential, most similar, and most different (Seawright and Gerring 2008:297-298). As the function of the case study here is a broad analysis of a particular unit within the broader universe of cases, the ‘extreme’ strategy is most appropriate (Seawright and Gerring 2008). The particular case chosen is the London Borough of Barking and Dagenham in the period from 2006 to 2010. It is extreme in two ways; it represents the greatest success obtained by the British National Party, becoming the official opposition in a local council for the first and only town, and it represents the greatest intensity and consistency of activity by both Hope not Hate and Unite Against Fascism.

The time period for this thesis is from 2005 to 2015. As set out above, this represents a relatively distinct period of activity opposing the far right. The far right had, before the late nineties, been quiescent, with its opposition therefore being the same. By 2005, both the far right and the opposition thereto in the UK was back. The 2015 general election marked the beginning of the Brexit process and the end of that period of the history of the far right in British politics. The case study only looks at the period from 2006 to 2010 as it represents the complete, four-year cycle of local elections in the London Borough of Barking and Dagenham. It focuses on the BNP because of the geographically concentrated nature of its support, which allows intense forms of activity by both Hope not Hate and Unite Against Fascism against it, which does not apply to UKIP, who have a more traditional, mass communication-based form of campaigning.

As the results from the quantitative analysis suggest that any effect of campaigning by the opposition groups is subtle, choosing Barking and Dagenham gives us the greatest chance of seeing and explaining those effects precisely because there is the largest number of votes for their campaigns to act on, and the greatest amount of campaigning by them.
There are further benefits to using Barking and Dagenham as a case study. As the name suggests, Barking and Dagenham is a municipality that covers two areas. Hope not Hate largely campaigned in Dagenham, while Unite Against Fascism largely campaigned in Barking. We thus have two areas, largely similar in terms of social and economic conditions, where the opposition groups are conducting their campaigns, but under a single municipal government. This effectively holds many of the possible variables, from rates of immigration to history of economic decline to relative position to central London, that could affect the vote for the British National Party constant. A quirk of the Labour Party’s internal administrative structures also means that Hope not Hate were largely campaigning in an area represented by one Labour Member of Parliament, and Unite Against Fascism in an area represented by another, providing useful avenues for gaining information.

Variables and operationalization
This section sets out the variables that are included in the quantitative study and how they are operationalised, looking at consistency and intensity of activity by the opposition groups, electoral performance of the far right parties, and the socio-economic and demographic control variables. It pays particular attention to the difficulties of measuring the activities of social movements.

Measuring the activities of social movements
Measuring – quantitatively analysing – manifestations of social movements such as protests and demonstrations has immediate appeals, not least in that large numbers of events that are geographically and temporally spread can be analysed from the desktop in a comparative manner. In particular, a form of content analysis, protest event analysis, ‘is an unobtrusive technique, it can handle unstructured matter as data, it is context-sensitive and it can cope with large volumes of data’ (Hutter 2014:337). It is ‘a way of measuring the effect of political opportunities in comparative design’ (Klandermans and Staggenbord 2002:xi f, cited in Hutter 2014:336). Connected to the political process approach, the method allows us to ‘see how protests co-vary with ... changes in the economy’ (Hutter 2014:336).

Hutter (2014) identifies four generations of the use of protest event analysis: the pathfinders, who looked at broad ranges of indicators, who were in turn succeeded by a generation that made greater use of protest data with greater categorisation. A third generation began to use automated approaches made possible by developments in computing to speed up the process, including searching for keywords in archives, and allowing for the bias present in newspaper
reporting (and, indeed, non-reporting). A final generation ‘abandon[s] the strict focus on (aggregates of) protest events as their coding unit (Hutter 2014:338).

The available literature suggests several considerations that must be borne in mind for using protest event analysis, particularly around selection and sampling, bias, geography and time, and coding.

Newspapers are used across many studies (Earl et al 2004), both because of the positive advantages described above and because they give frequent, regular coverage. Equally, there is often either little alternative or no alternative at all (Koopmans 1995). The emergence of readily-accessibly and readily-searchable online collections of newspapers – often covering entire countries, and including both national and local press – such as Factiva and Lexis-Nexis do help to ameliorate earlier problems around data collection (Hutter 2014), particularly when technological and time limitations meant that sampling was necessary (Earl et al 2004). Hutter highlights the utility of keyword searches, finding ‘a comprehensive list of keywords to be both more efficient and consistent with the manually selected data sets’ (Hutter 2014:352).

However, there are particular problems with using newspapers for this form of analysis. The journalist’s aphorism that ‘if it bleeds, it leads’ is at work; newspapers are more likely to cover an event that is violent, large, or otherwise unusual. This leads to the broader issue of selection bias. Newspapers have their own political preferences and their own views of what will appeal to their readerships and, ultimately, sell copies; they therefore do not report on all events equally or, indeed, at all (Earl et al. 2004). Whether or not a particular newspaper has a reporter in the area, or whether a particularly dramatic photograph emerges, can also affect whether a given event is covered or not. Downs (1972) indicates that whether a topic is particularly relevant at the time may affect whether it is covered or not. Even if a particular event is covered, the same processes may affect the manner in which it is covered, leading to description bias, although this is less of an issue when looking at counts of events.

Selection bias can be mitigated by using all events that a newspaper or set of newspapers report (Earl et al. 2004). Particularly important is triangulation (Earl et al. 2004): using multiple media sources and, if possible, alternative sources of information to both verify reports in particular newspapers and to provide broader coverage. Attention must also be paid to the selection of geography and time (Hutter 2014) to ensure that both will capture the desired effects without unjustifiably removing cases while keeping numbers of cases manageable.

There are alternatives to using newspapers – Earl et al (2004) suggest police reports – but these are much less readily available, and prohibitively difficult to obtain across multiple local areas or
even an entire country. The issue of data availability is also highlighted by Amenta et al (2018), particularly at the subnational level.

A further necessary step is coding, the process of taking words and categorising them to indicate desired information in a manner that is, ultimately, machine-readable. These were traditionally done against an inventory, based on Tilly’s repertoires of contention, that covers the various activities in which protest groups might be expected to engage, although more recent studies have adopted not protests as the unit of coding, but ‘“political claims”, “core sentences” or “semantic triplets”’ (Hutter 2014:342).

Although there has been much work studying social movements, there are gaps that future work can address. Giugni (1998) suggests comparing different movements over relatively long periods of time and across different countries, allowing an understanding of how the same actions might have different consequences given different circumstances. A further gap is unintended consequences (Giugni 1998); do social movements sometimes not only fail to achieve their aims, or see them achieved but not by their action, but hinder or prevent them from coming to pass, or also lead to other consequences that the movement would consider negative?

A particular method of protest event analysis is used by Rootes (2003a, 2003b) and collaborators. Coding protest events from a newspaper (in the case of the UK, the Guardian on Mondays), this uses a typology of different types of action engaged in by protest groups. These have several advantages; they are, by design, usable across different countries and different situations. Although originally calibrated to the environmental movement, they deliberately cast a broad net across all the activities that protest groups could engage in, from the very direct to the very formal. Risks of bias and selectivity are limited by triangulation with other sources. However, it still selects a single newspaper from each country as principal source based on quality (Fillieule and Jimenez 2003), which will bring in bias based on the political preferences of that newspaper. As with opposition to the far right, this presents a systematic problem. Coverage of environmental protest is more likely to be in left-leaning newspapers – indeed, the selection of the Guardian, El País, La Repubblica and the like was deliberately that there is coverage of said protest – which will have a particular view on the worthiness or otherwise of green causes. This is remediable by drawing on a broader range of sources though, naturally, this increases the work involved considerably.

Thus, although there are challenges to using protest event analysis in the study of social movements and pitfalls to be avoided, it does provide a useful means of building a data set that can be analysed. However, quantitative analysis is not a panacea. For one, causality must be established to avoid the fallacy of post hoc ergo propter hoc; that an organisation campaigned for
a change and then that change happened does not mean that the campaign necessarily caused
the change, either in whole or in part (Giugni 1998). Amenta et al. (2018) further question the
chain of causality; if the organisation did actually achieve the change through its activities, did it
rely on persuading another actor to make the change? As Doherty and Hayes (2018), qualitative
research is not just desirable but necessary for understanding social movements. This extends
beyond the issue of causality. Quantitative approaches of necessity reduce widely varied
phenomena to categories and codes; more data can be analysed, but there is a loss of information.
The meaning given to the same action by different people may be different and, in particular, ‘it
cannot answer the question of how social movements make tactical choices, or imbue them with
meaning’ (Doherty and Hayes 2018:274).

This provides an overview of the literature of social movement, and how they may be
understood, analysed, and measured.

**Independent variables: Consistency and intensity**

As this study looks at the effects of activities by groups opposed to the far right, and as a
quantitative approach is taken, it is necessary to operationalize those activities. A simple count of
activities by electoral circumscription over the electoral cycle will not suffice. As set out in the
discussion on consistency and intensity of action, we can adopt these measures to allow for the
different effects of different patterns of campaigning, with consistent campaigning more likely to
form relationships between voters and parties than a flurry of activity in the run up to an
election. As set out below in Chapter 5, a certain amount is known about how Hope not Hate and
Unite Against Fascism operate, and how the United Kingdom Independence Party and the British
National party campaign, and that makes this form of measurement that allows for different
strategies all the more important.

As set out in the review of the literature on measuring campaigning at the local level, when
campaigning takes places matters as much as how much of it takes place. A burst of activity in
the weeks before an election and prolonged, but perhaps less dramatic, campaigning over an
entire electoral cycle might come to the same number but represent very different patterns of
activity. It is not unreasonable to expect that knocking on doors, week in and week out, to have
conversations with voters will have different effects to a flurry of contacts in the immediate run-
up to an election, regardless of what kind of party or organisation is campaigning.

It is particularly important to pick up on this patterning in the instances of groups that oppose
the far right precisely because of the manner in which the two far right parties under study
campaign and because of how the activities of the opposition groups under study will interact with that campaigning. More specifically, the British National Party adopted a strategy of inculcating itself into local communities over a long period, picking up on issues particular to those communities to establish itself as an organisation that would achieve results and to present itself as an acceptable party for which to vote, drawing on a relatively small number of very committed activists. The United Kingdom Independence Party adopted a more traditional campaign based on large-scale messaging, particularly through broadcast and print media, with bursts of activity in the short campaign, suited to volunteers who could commit for a short, intense period but not for longer stretches. Campaigning that takes place against the parties can therefore be expected to have different effects according to whether it matches and engages with the consistency and intensity of the parties against which it is directed. Indeed, it is also plausible that consistent campaigning by the opposition groups may form an inoculation against later campaigning by far right parties.

This observation also matches to the different styles of Unite Against Fascism and Hope not Hate; the latter will work an area for a period of time, while the former prefers large, carnival-style events. By further separating out Hope not Hate from Unite Against Fascism, we can also determine if the particular styles and contents of the respective campaigns, whether delivered intensely, consistently, or both, impact how they affect votes going to the British National Party and United Kingdom Independence Party.

In order to account for this important patterning of campaigning, the measures of consistency and intensity developed by Ellinas and Lamprianou (2019) are used, though with months instead of weeks to account for the longer timespan under consideration and the relative amount of activity. The means by which these are calculated are set out below under data sources. In simple terms, intensity is the number of incidents of interest per number of units of time, while consistency is the number of units of time with activity as a share of the total number of units of time.

Intensity is calculated as

\[ i = \frac{M_a}{M_t} \]

and consistency is calculated as

\[ c = \frac{M_a - M_t}{M_t} \]
where \( i \) is intensity of action, \( c \) is consistency of action, \( M_t \) is the total number of months observed and \( M_a \) is the number of months with opposition group activity. Details on how \( M_t \) and \( M_a \) are derived are given below. It should be noted, as in the review of the literature above, that Ellinas and Lamprianou apply this method to activities by the Golden Dawn in their 2019 paper. However, they establish that the Golden Dawn is an unusual party, seeking to be as much social movement and welfare organisation as political party, and so its campaigning style requires analysis in this manner in order to understand where particular party units of the Golden Dawn do more or less well.

This method, then, allows us to distinguish between campaigning once a month, every month, for a year in the same area, and campaigning twelve times in the twelve days before an election, and so to account for the potential variation in effects of the patterning of campaigning by the opposition groups.

Risks of multicollinearity are avoided as consistency of action and intensity of action are measured separately. Because they are measured separately, it is also possible to distinguish whether it is simply the pattern of presence, in terms of intensity and consistency, of these opposition groups that has an effect, or whether the materials and style of campaigning also matter.

These variables are included as cHnH for consistency of action by Hope not Hate, cUAF for consistency of action by Unite Against Fascism, iHnH for intensity of action by Hope not Hate, and iUAF for intensity of action by Unite Against Fascism.

**Dependent variables: elections**

As set out above, the effects of civil society opposition on the electoral performance of far right parties are understudied. While, as below, expectations can be generated based on the available literature and analysis of the manner in which the parties and opposition groups operate, a deliberately broad net must be cast to determine what effects actually occur.

Electoral performance is captured in three different ways: absolute share of vote, simple change in share of vote, and change in share of vote relative to the previous election for that circumscription.

The essential difference between the absolute share of vote and the two measures for change in share of vote is the difference between ‘doing well’ and ‘improving’, or ‘doing badly’ and ‘worsening’. To take a fictional example, a party might, on average, receive five per cent share of vote across all constituencies it contests, but in a particular constituency might receive twenty per cent share of the vote. By comparison with other constituencies, it is doing well in this

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particular hypothetical location. However, that twenty per cent share of vote might represent a loss of several thousand votes. Even though it represents a good performance, it is worse than the previous performance for that constituency.

This allows us to determine how the activities of Unite Against Fascism and Hope not Hate impact the British National Party and the United Kingdom Independence Party across the range of possible circumstances, from growth in a new area to a failure to capitalize on inroads in another area to continuing to work an area of considerable success.

An inverse correlation between activity by the opposition groups and the share of vote for the parties would suggest that there is a correlation between the opposition groups being present and the parties doing badly at a given election. An inverse correlation between activity by the opposition groups and the change in share of vote measures would suggest a correlation between the opposition groups being present and the situation for the parties having worsened since the last election.

By adding in relative change in share of vote, we can understand how the parties fare at an election given how they did at the previous election while accounting for a (say) two per cent increase from a base of two per cent being intuitively more significant than from a base of (say) eight per cent share of vote. This allows an understanding of what affects votes for the far right parties given their previous success or otherwise in a given electoral circumscription.

**Control variables**

Manifestly, it is not just the effect of direct opposition from particular groups at election times that affects how many people vote for UKIP and the BNP. Other factors that may influence how people vote must be accounted for.

Previously, following Kitschelt and McGann (1995), the factors thought to drive voting for the far right were split into two, demand and supply. Supply is further divided into external and internal factors (Mudde 2010). The precise factors are briefly enumerated here. In terms of demand, they are losers of modernisation (Betz 1994; Ford and Goodwin 2014a); crisis, which can be unemployment (Lubbers, Gijsberts, and Scheepers 2002), immigration (Golder 2003), political dissatisfaction (Dahl 2000), political system change (Kitschelt 2002); ethnic backlash (Golder 2003), authoritarian legacy (Mudde 2000), attitude (Adorno et al. 1980), and crime and insecurity (Kinnvall 2014). In terms of supply, the external factors are the electoral system (Eatwell 2000; Duverger 1972), party convergence (Minkenberg 2001), the cultural context (Mudde 2010), while the internal, all from Mudde (2010), are ideology, leadership, organisation, and internationalisation.
Some of these can be dispensed with in short order. The United Kingdom does not have an authoritarian legacy in the form of communist or fascist rule as do, for instance, Poland or Spain. In any case, this would be the same across the whole country, and so can be set aside. Similarly, it is possible to, as mentioned above, discount attitude as being correlative rather than causative. The empirical basis for a link between crime and insecurity, and voting for the right is not found, per Mudde (2010). Both party convergence and the cultural context show a lack of clarity in definition. In any case, they would be constant across the United Kingdom geographically, if not temporally, and are hard, if not impossible, to measure.

Similarly, the electoral system for each election is held constant across the country; members of the Westminster parliament are always elected on a plurality system, members of the European Parliament by the d'Hondt system, and so on, mutatis mutandis.

Internal factors - that is to say, a party’s ideology, leadership, organisation, and internationalization - do bear some consideration. However, these are, again, hard to define with any precision and, particularly given the notorious reluctance of the far right to engage with academics or even outsiders in general, hard to research. While not necessarily held constant over time, they are held constant over geography for each election as there is only one leadership at any given point in time. They are not operationalizable for the purposes of the current study.

It is contested above that while the manner in which it presented its politics changed, the core ideology of the British National Party did not change. This is somewhat different in the case of UKIP, where it is argued that it moved over time from being a perhaps marginal instance of a populist radical right party, particularly given its roots in the Anti-Federalist League, to a fully-fledged member of that grouping as different parts of its piebald makeup come to the fore (Tournier-Sol 2015). To the extent that internationalisation plays a role, it is with respect to the BNP, which learnt greatly from the French Front National. However, this process of learning was complete by the beginning of the time period in question.

In both UKIP and the BNP, the respective leaders did, however, exert a great deal of control over their parties for most of their time in office. Nick Griffin of the BNP did have to contend with a leadership challenge in 2011, but he was able, in 2013, to set his own time of departure from the head of his party. The internal organisation, because of the outsized influence of their leaders, of both parties is largely similar and consistent over time. General improvements or deteriorations in the capacity and professionalism of the organisations are captured by the number of seats a party is able to contest.

This leaves three other variables to be controlled for. These are the effects of modernization, and particularly on those who do not benefit from it; ethnic backlash; and crisis.
Although crisis is variously used as an explanation for an increase in popular propensity to vote for the far right, the term is nebulous. It can be a sharp event, or an ongoing situation; Brexit, for instance, could conceivably be either or both. Two of the possible sources given for crisis - change in the political system and political dissatisfaction - are excluded from consideration. The former is excluded by virtue of not having happened; the latter, aside from again being nebulous, does not have data available at the geographic levels required. However, two of the possible causes of crisis can be used; these are unemployment, and immigration or ethnic backlash.

Unemployment, or at least economic activity or inactivity, as mentioned below, and immigration are suggested both as independent motivators for an amelioration in the fortunes of far right parties and as explanations for crisis. This further suggests that, as far as crisis is concerned, it is a convenient term for unfortunate political developments rather than an objective reality. Crisis is therefore not specifically operationalised. Nevertheless, some of what may lead to crisis is included in the measures for the left behind and racial threat.

The logic of immigration, or ethnic backlash, or racial resentment, having an effect on votes for the far right is relatively straightforward. It is a combination of simple racism, concern about change per se, and the perception that immigrants are receiving preferential treatment from the state in its various manifestations. The reasons for this are varied, including latent attitudes, lack of understanding of the operation of the welfare state, misinformation about what benefits or support certain groups are in fact receiving, a general societal narrative about immigration, a media and political narrative about immigration, and so on. These are, of course, capitalised upon by far right parties in manners that range from presenting a one-sided view of a matter to making things up out of whole cloth.

The ‘left behind’ is a rather more complicated set of drivers. Per Ford and Goodwin (2014a), there are two broad parts. One is a shift in people’s social and economic situation, and consequent gap between expectations of how life would turn out and reality. The classic example of this would be the loss of jobs caused by the closure of the Ford plant in Dagenham, which saw well-paying, steady, skilled jobs of high status replaced with either no jobs at all, or with casual and zero-hours work, affecting both individuals and generations. This gap is particularly pronounced amongst certain sections of the population: white, older, with fewer socio-economic resources, and less education. The second part is a broader attitudinal shift amongst such people, occasioned by those circumstances, and perhaps aggravated by the rejection of said values by bien-pensants liberals and by the mainstream political parties, particularly Labour (which would previously have represented them as solid members of the working class).
As set out above, then, behind the ‘left behind’ lie concerns around immigration and lost economic opportunity. Crisis is a different combination: economic privation and the effect of immigration. Immigration is also given as a driver in and of itself of votes for the far right.

Unemployment can be directly measured as the proportion of the working age population that is actively seeking work. It is included as the UNEMP variable.

The phenomenon of the left behind, however, is not just one of unemployment, but of disconnection from the economic life of a community. This can be captured by the economic activity rate of an area. The economic activity rate measures the proportion of the working age population that is either in employment or actively looking for work. The remainder are those who are unemployed and, crucially, not looking for work. This includes discouraged workers – those who have been looking for work without success for some time and have simply given up – and those who have been driven onto disability benefits by the inability to find work. It is included as the ECON variable.

The ethnic backlash/immigration driver is operationalised by looking at the proportion of the population that is both white and British-born. This variable is coded as ETHNIC.

As has been mentioned, using low-level geographic data is important; unemployment rates will vary widely across a country, as will the number of immigrants in given areas. As data is available at much lower levels than the national - indeed, down to the individual ward - the opportunity for finer-grained analysis presents itself.

It is not just the absolute level that bears consideration. Ford and Goodwin (2014b) suggest that far right parties do not necessarily target areas that have high levels of ethnic diversity or exhibit relative economic privation. Rather, both UKIP and the BNP target areas that are changing - becoming more economically insecure, becoming less white. Kaufmann further argues (2017) that it may indeed be change, rather than absolute level, of both immigration and economic condition that affects votes for far right parties. Accordingly, data were used for both levels and changes. For the ETHNIC variable, the change variable is CHETHNIC; for UNEMP, it is CHUNEMP; for ECON it is CHECON.

In short, these variables allow us to capture the expected effects from the ‘left behind’, economic crisis, and racial backlash.

As described above, a broad net must be cast to pin down what effects are at work. The breadth of this net comes in part from the use of not just absolute values for socio-economic and demographic indicators, but also how those values have changed over the year preceding an election. A far right party might, in absolute terms, do well in a given ward that has a large non-
white population. However, that success might be relatively less than the previous election. Alternatively, an area might have a relatively high share of vote for a far right party, even though (say) that area is becoming more diverse from a starting point of low diversity. The share of vote variable would capture that this is still an area where far right parties are likely to do well; however, the change in share of vote variables would capture that the situation is worsening for the party in a manner that correlates with the change in the ethnic makeup of the area.

With the variables and their operationalisation set out, we turn to data sources.

Data sources
Because this study uses a new data set, attention is paid in this section to data sources and how they are processed, beginning with consistency and intensity of action by the opposition groups before moving to elections and finishing with the control variables.

Consistency and intensity
In order to calculate the consistency and intensity variables for Hope not Hate and Unite Against Fascism, a new data set had to be built of instances of opposition by these groups that was then coded and matched to electoral circumscriptions. This then allowed consistency and intensity variables to be calculated for each opposition group as appropriate.

Collection
Attention is given below to how the raw data is geocoded and operationalised. In order to determine the effect of the opposition on far right parties, information is needed on what kind of activities they are undertaking and where they are happening. Almost by definition, organisations like Unite Against Fascism and Hope Not Hate would be expected to seek public attention. Tilly (2004) suggests that social movements engaged in a campaign engage in 'WUNC displays'; that is to say, 'concerted public representations of worthiness, unity, numbers and commitment'. Such displays '[convey] crucial political messages to a social movement’s targets and the relevant public' (Tilly 2004:54). This methodology is similar to that employed by Rootes (2003b). However, instead of just using the Guardian, searches were conducted using the Nexis UK database. This included the Daily Telegraph, The Times, Guardian, Financial Times, The Independent, i, The Daily Mail, The Daily Express, The Daily Mirror, the Daily Star, the Morning Star, and their respective Sunday editions; newswires including Agence France Presse, Associated Press, and the Press Association; magazines like New Statesman; and various local newspapers. The total number of publications in the Nexis service for the United Kingdom is 1,225.
Therefore, the first port of call was a search of newspapers and other periodicals for mention of Unite Against Fascism or Hope Not Hate. This was conducted using Nexis UK, using the search terms described below.

**First newspaper search**

The first search term was ‘Unite Against Fascism’ OR UAF OR ‘Hope Not Hate’ OR HnH. In plain English, this would return any article that had the name or the abbreviation of either HnH or UAF. This yielded 5,667 results. However, these results had a very high signal-to-noise ratio, with many rent-a-quote style contributions that did not suggest any actions by the groups in question. An illustrative example comes from Wales on Sunday (McCarthy 2012); the article reports that a publican had accepted a booking for a music event, not knowing that it was a memorial for a far-right music group, ‘Violent Storm’, and includes quotes from Unite Against Fascism and Hope Not Hate:

‘A spokesman for Unite Against Fascism was appalled by the show at Newport’s Riverside Tavern earlier this month.

He said: ‘It is a disgrace that fascists and neo-Nazis are organising in Wales.

‘We believe they are linked to racist and anti-Islamic attacks.’

[...]

Simon Cressy is spokesman for anti-racist organisation Hope Not Hate.

He said: “People travel great distances to go to see these bands so it is possible there were people from Belgium there.”’

While of some general interest, this does not say anything about Hope Not Hate or Unite Against Fascism beyond that the press is aware of them and that they provide comment. It was also not possible to meaningfully locate, with any useful level of precision, where these incidents would have taken place when there was some geographic indication (along the lines of ‘South Wales’ or ‘Yorkshire’). Moreover, many of these results were comment pieces looking at the UK-wide situation, with comment from Unite Against Fascism and Hope Not Hate.

**Second newspaper search**

In order to narrow it down and find instances of where Hope Not Hate and Unite Against Fascism were actually engaging with the BNP and UKIP, even if not directly, a second search was conducted with the term as (‘unite against fascism’ OR ‘uaf’ OR ‘hope not hate’) AND (‘bnp’ OR ‘british national party’ OR ‘ukip’ OR ‘united kingdom independence party’ OR ‘uk independence
party’). This yielded 1,971 results; on a brief survey, there was much more signal and much less noise. However, there were many results that presented essentially the same problem as with the first search, except that comments were given on the BNP and UKIP. An illustration would be an article from the Independent (Rawlinson and Macerlean 2013):

‘Matthew Collins of the Hope not Hate anti-extremism campaign group said: “The more people look at Ukip, the more shady it appears.”’

As with the first search, this returns a lot of comment; much of it is more directed, but is still of limited utility.

**Third newspaper search**

This needed further refining, and so the third search term was (‘unite against fascism’ OR ‘uaf’ OR ‘hope not hate’) AND (‘bnp’ OR ‘british national party’ OR ‘ukip’ OR ‘united kingdom independence party’ OR ‘uk independence party’) AND (‘protest’ OR ‘demonstration’ OR ‘police’ OR ‘violence’ OR ‘confrontation’). In plain English, this search would return any newspaper article that had the name of one of the opposition groups, the name of one of the parties, and one or more of the words ‘protest’, ‘demonstration’, ‘police’, ‘violence’, or ‘confrontation’.

This yielded 1,180 results that largely gave the information required: instances of actions taken by Unite Against Fascism and Hope Not Hate regarding the BNP and UKIP.

This was the starting point for the near-Sisyphean task of coding these newspaper entries; this is further discussed below.

**Other sources**

While many activities of Hope Not Hate and Unite Against Fascism would be expected to have a view to seeking public attention, not all of their activities would. In any case, they might want attention from newspapers, but not find it. It would appear that, as they tend to engage in confrontational tactics, Unite Against Fascism activities appear in the press relatively more frequently.

Moreover, some relevant results could have been excluded in narrowing down from the second to the third search; for instance, if Unite Against Fascism had organised a gathering outside a BNP event that was reported as a ‘gathering’, or somesuch. The data from the newspaper search were therefore supplemented with the publications of Hope Not Hate and Unite Against Fascism themselves, both physical and electronic.
The Unite Against Fascism website retains extensive archives of all their activities, including a comprehensive news archive (Unite Against Fascism 2017). It was thus straightforward to find their account of their activities and to include them for coding.

The Hope Not Hate website has had various redesigns over the years, which made the process rather more difficult, but their calendar of events was, until recently, available online. Although that is regrettably no longer available from their website, it is largely reconstructable through the archives of the British Library (Hope not Hate 2009, 2013, 2014a).

Both Unite Against Fascism and Hope Not Hate also publish magazines - Unity and Hope not Hate, respectively, both starting in 2012 - that were included. Of the various books published by Hope Not Hate, only one, Lowles (2014) was relevant in its description of events and was coded.

**Coding**

Each instance was given a unique serial number, and the publication, publication date, article title, and by-line were recorded, along with the date it took place, what organisations were present, and whether there was any violence reported. The incident was coded using Rootes’ (2003b) typology of direct action/demonstration, petition, media campaign, lobbying, judicial action, participation in formal consultation, participation in decision-making, providing expertise, and public meeting. However, in practice almost all of the incidents were direct action/demonstration, with a few public meetings, and a smattering of judicial action. There were so few instances of the latter two that there would not be sufficient numbers to make comparison worthwhile.

This coding process yielded a spreadsheet of all the incidents. In some articles, and particularly in the books and on the websites, more than one incident was recorded; each appearance receives a separate entry. This provides a list of incidents, with what took place and who was there, as well as a location.

**Geography**

As has been noted, one of the intended, principal contributions of the present study is the use of sub-national data. The social and economic conditions of Kensington are very different from those in Whitechapel, ten kilometres to the east, to say nothing of the difference between both of those and Aberdeenshire. It is possible to provide a more fine-grained picture than one would otherwise obtain by using national-level data.

The electoral circumscriptions being used open up the first part of that possibility. It is important to note that reporting units can be smaller than electoral units. European Parliamentary constituencies in the UK are very large both geographically (in excess of eighty thousand square
kilometres for Scotland) and in terms of population (in excess of eight million people for London). However, they are reported at a much lower level, based on local government boundaries. Parliamentary constituencies are on the order of seventy thousand voters; wards are a few hundred.

The process of geocoding instances of activity by the opposition groups is discussed below. Considerable care was taken in matching up opposition group activity, election results, immigration status, and economic indicators.

This was done in blocks for Westminster elections, European elections, and the different levels of local elections. The process is the same in each case, and relies on the VLOOKUP function. VLOOKUP looks for a given term (in this case, the electoral circumscription of interest) in a separate sheet (the list of socioeconomic data) and returns the requested data. A simplified example appears below as Table 3.1.
This process could, of course, be done manually, by checking one sheet against another. However, this would be a very laborious process. By automating matching as described, many hundreds of searches can be done almost instantaneously.

Intensity and consistency of activity by the opposition groups must be calculated for the purposes of the analysis, using the formulae given above (Ellinas and Lamprianou 2019). To do so, the data were geocoded. Geocoding is the process of converting a human-readable address or location to a systematic, machine-readable address. The most convenient, standardised, machine-readable location for this purpose in the UK is the post code.

The location of the incident was recorded to the greatest level of detail available in the article; in some cases, this was very specific (the B&Q car park on London Road in Crawley being an example (Unite Against Fascism 2008)). In other cases, it was not quite as exacting, but still sufficient to pin the location down to within a few tens of metres. Where there was a march leading to a static demonstration - very much part of the traditional left-wing representation of Tilly’s repertoire of contention (2003) - the final location was recorded; this represents the focal point of the protest as well as typically being the point of longest dwell. This was converted to a post code using the Google Map Application Programming Interface (API).

Taking, as an example, 10 Downing Street (with no other information), the Google Maps API returns data on the Prime Minister’s residence in the UK. A less famous address, such as the prosaic ‘1, Station Road’, returns a result in the USA. However, if given the address as ‘1, Station Road, UK’, every building in the UK that has that address is returned. Changing it to ‘1, Station Road, Barnet’ only gives a single address. Thus, with relatively sparse information a postcode can be obtained. Where a street is given as the input without a number, the postcode of the

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**Table 3.1: sample VLOOKUP inputs and outputs**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Searched data column 1</th>
<th>Searched data column 2</th>
<th>Searched data column 3</th>
<th>VLOOKUP input term</th>
<th>VLOOKUP output 1</th>
<th>VLOOKUP output 2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Barking</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>Barking</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Westminster</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>Islington</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>D</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Camden</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>Westminster</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>B</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Islington</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>D</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
geographic centre of the road is returned. As described above, addresses were recorded to the greatest level of accuracy available.

Individual calls to the Google Maps API can be made using a web browser, but to speed up the process of converting addresses to postcodes, GNU Wget (a small programme that retrieves information from a server) was used to run the API calls in batches. The output is in the JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) format. JSON is a structured means of communicating data that contains human-readable data but can still be parsed by a computer.

In order to more easily process this data, the JSON output was converted to a spreadsheet format, Comma Separated Values (CSV), using the free service at konklone.io/json.

This provides the same table with postcodes added. The next step is to identify the electoral circumscriptions for each incident. This was done with postcodes.io.

Postcodes.io is a regularly-updated, open-source means of conducting the reverse geocoding with easy API access.

Postcodes.io provides more information than is necessary (for instance, which Care Commissioning Group, a type of body within the NHS, is responsible for the location). For the purposes of this thesis, the relevant outputs are Westminster constituencies, European constituencies, local council (unitary, London borough, county, district, etc.) by name and code, and NUTS information. The output from postcodes.io is again a JSON, which was converted to CSV. As the order of data inputs was the same, these could be simply copied across onto the main spreadsheet but, in order to make sure this was done correctly, the VLOOKUP function, as described above, was used.

Calculating consistency and intensity

As set out above, the calculation of intensity and consistency of opposition requires us to know the number of incidents in the electoral cycle leading up to a given election. That is to say, sorting is required such that it can be identified that there were $n$ incidents by (say) Hope Not Hate in electoral circumscription $e$ so that consistency and intensity variables can be calculated. This was done with pivot tables.

A pivot table is similar to a crosstab in that information about one table is displayed in another table. It differs in that a crosstab is static, displaying the frequency of entries in each category, where a pivot table is dynamic, allowing different operations to be conducted on the data in the original table. This means a table of incidents can readily be produced, sorted by which
opposition group ran them, with totals by month up to a given date (that of the election) for each electoral circumscription.

Once the pivot table is built, it is straightforward to adjust the dates and geographies being used for each set of elections. This yields (for instance) the number of instances of opposition by Unite Against Fascism in the Cities of London and Westminster parliamentary constituency in the electoral cycle that finished with the general election in 2010 (ten). This then allows the calculation of the consistency and intensity values for each electoral circumscription for each electoral cycle of each level of elections. It is then straightforward, again by the use of VLOOKUP, to copy across the appropriate values to the spreadsheet of elections (which already has socioeconomic data included).

There were some issues in putting together this dataset. A lot of the manipulation of the data to put it in the required format is quite sensitive to errors, and so considerable time had to be spent checking everything had worked properly; this was either by repeating the process on a copy of the data to check results were the same, or by following an individual piece of data through the process, checking that changing it resulted in an appropriate change to the final outputs.

A particular problem was that of names. Because some places have similar names – Newcastle-upon-Tyne and Newcastle-under-Lyme, for instance – searches and processes such as VLOOKUP have to be set to look for exact matches. Although a human will recognise Newcastle upon Tyne, Newcastle Upon Tyne, Newcastle-upon-Tyne, and Newcastle-Upon-Tyne as all referring to the same place, a computer regards them as being different. There is no canonical list of what councils are called, with even different parts of the government using different orthographies, and some just reporting the common name of a council, while others will specify that something is, for instance, a district council or will append ‘DC’. Parliamentary constituencies with cardinal directions in their name are sometimes reported as ‘East Barnsley’, and sometimes as ‘Barnsley East’; commas are sometimes included and sometimes omitted, as in ‘Birmingham, Edgbaston’ and ‘Birmingham Edgbaston’. A canonical list of councils and constituencies, and converted all the variations on names of councils and constituencies to that list as data was imported from the various sources.

All the data required is available - where UKIP and the BNP ran, how they fared in the elections, the socioeconomic and demographic data for where they ran, and how many opposition incidents took place where they ran - and in the format required, allowing statistical analysis thereof.

Elections
The dependent variable is the electoral performance of the United Kingdom Independence Party and the British National Party. Further consideration is given to operationalisation and
geographic metainformation below; for the present, three sets of data are needed. These are the votes for UKIP and the BNP; turnout; and the electoral circumscription. The number of votes for the parties is straightforward. Turnout is either directly reported or imputed from number of votes cast and the total electorate where possible. The electoral circumscription consists of the type of election, the body to which the elections are being held, and information on what geography is used to report votes.

Raw election data for elections to the Westminster and European parliaments are readily available and were taken from the Electoral Commission (2005, 2010, 2015, 2017b). For local elections, data from the Local Elections Archive Project (LEAP) (Teale 2017) were used.

Both the Electoral Commission and LEAP make their data natively available as CSVs. In both cases, some work was required in Excel and GNU Emacs (a text editor) to remove superfluous data (principally, votes for other parties and elections where neither the BNP nor UKIP ran) though a total turnout had to be first calculated for the LEAP data by adding all the votes cast for all the parties.

The boundaries for Westminster constituencies have changed over time. The Fifth Periodic Reviews took place around the time of the 2005 election (Boundary Commission for Wales 2005, Boundary Commission for Northern Ireland 2007, Boundary Commission for Scotland 2004, Boundary Commission for England 2007). England, Wales, and Northern Ireland used the boundaries established in 1995 for the 2005 election, while Scotland used the boundaries established for constituencies north of Hadrian’s Wall in 2004. By the 2010 election, all parts of the United Kingdom were using the new boundaries.

Aside from requiring care in selection of boundaries for data, one of the effects of the reviews is that it makes some comparisons effectively impossible. The name of the Aberconwy constituency, for instance, did not change between the 2005 and 2010 elections, but the boundaries of the seat were very substantially redrawn, such that the ‘new’ constituency encompassed an area more than 45% different from the ‘old’ (Press Association 2010).

Changes to the 2005 election therefore cannot be calculated because UKIP and the BNP were not significant players. Changes to the 2010 elections can be calculated based on the notional results for the 2005 elections on the 2010 boundaries from Rawlings and Thrasher (Press Association 2010). A similar issue occurs with the elections to the European parliament in 2009; as the 2004 elections were reported at the European constituency level, it is not possible to calculate change in vote etc. to the 2009 elections.
The Electoral Commission records the number of eligible voters for Westminster and European elections, and so turnout and share of vote relative to the number of electors can be calculated. Because local authorities generally do not record this information by ward (and do so inconsistently when they do) and the Local Elections Archive Project uses local authority data, details of the size of an electorate are not available for local elections, meaning that share of vote can only be calculated relative to people who actually voted, rather than electors, and turnout cannot be calculated.

For first past the post elections, the number of votes for each candidate was used. For elections conducted using the single transferable vote – namely, Scottish local elections – the number of first preference votes was used. As voters can give a preference to all candidates, any other option could see the total share of votes exceeding one hundred per cent, or even all candidates receiving one hundred per cent.

Levels of reporting
For Westminster elections, the lowest level of reporting – that is to say, the smallest geographical unit for which data is available – was the parliamentary constituency. For local elections other than county council elections, the lowest level of reporting was the ward; for elections to county councils, it was the county division.

In 2009, the lowest level of reporting for the European elections to Wales’s single constituency was Westminster constituencies. For Scotland’s single constituency, it was the council area. For London’s single constituency, it was the London borough. For the remaining eight constituencies of England, the lowest level of reporting was either the lower tier (i.e., district council or metropolitan borough) in the two-tier, shire counties; or the unitary district in the remaining areas.

The lowest level of reporting for the 2014 European Parliament elections was the same, except that Wales reported by principal areas. Principal areas are similar to English unitary authorities; they are referred to as principal authorities because they are styled by many different names in two languages, and the matter is further confused by the eight, traditional counties of Wales which are still culturally significant.

Processing
The next step was to match up elections in a given year with the last time they had been run in that ward or constituency in order to calculate share of vote. For elections to Westminster, this was, subject to the note above about which elections are under consideration, straightforward, as all the elections took place at the same time. The same holds true for European elections.
The picture is rather more complicated with local elections. While some councils have ‘all out’ elections every four years, where all seats are re-elected at the same time, others elect ‘by halves’ or ‘by thirds’. Where the ‘by halves’ system is used, half the seats are elected for four years every two years. Where the ‘by thirds’ system is used (typically the lower level in a two tier area, but also metropolitan districts and 17 of the 55 unitaries), one-third of seats are elected for a four year term in years one, two, and three, with no election in the fourth or fallow year (typically when county council elections are held in two tier areas).

It is therefore not possible to simply look back one or four years for the last election. Instead, a spreadsheet of election results sorted by council, ward, and year, was prepared and the IF function was used to return the results of the previous election if it was in the same ward and council. This gives when the last election in that circumscription took place, and by a similar method whether UKIP or the BNP ran. Like is compared with like.

Calculating the absolute share of vote

The absolute share of vote is straightforward. It is the number of votes cast for a party divided by the total number of votes cast for all parties. Mathematically, it is

\[ A = \frac{P}{V} \]

Where \( A \) is the absolute share of vote, \( P \) is the number of votes cast for the party in question, and \( V \) is the total number of votes cast for any party.

Votes that are cast but not counted for, as with the traditional end of the returning officer’s announcement, want of an official mark, voting for too many candidates, writing by which the voter can be identified, etc. are excluded. While these figures are available for Westminster and European elections, they are only sporadically available for local elections and so they are left out to maintain consistency. This is because local councils, which hold the information for past local elections, do not always keep full data available. This is reflected in the LEAP database that is used.

The result is a figure from zero to one inclusive, with zero indicating that a party contested an election but did not receive a single vote and one indicating that it received all available votes (neither of which actually happened).

This provides an indication of how the party did at the moment of the election; how many people could they convince to mark their ballot paper next to the UKIP or BNP candidate, as compared to people who went for one of the other parties, given the level of opposition from Unite Against Fascism and Hope Not Hate and the underlying socioeconomic conditions.
Calculating the simple change in share of vote

The simple change in share of the vote is the increase or decrease in share of vote. It is effectively the absolute change in share of vote for a given election less the same figure for the previous election. Mathematically, this is

\[ C = \frac{P_t}{V_t} - \frac{P_{t-1}}{V_{t-1}} \]

Where \( C \) is the simple change in share of vote, \( P_t \) is the vote for the party at the election, \( V_t \) is the total number of votes cast at the election, \( P_{t-1} \) is the vote for the party at the previous election, and \( V_{t-1} \) is the total number of votes cast at the previous election.

By previous election, the last election to the same seat to the same body is meant. For instance, this would mean that a district council seat would be compared with the last time that district council seat was up for election (and not, say, a coterminous county council seat).

The simple change in share of vote represents how a party’s vote has changed over an electoral cycle. It can vary from +1 (indicating that the party received no votes at the previous election and all of the votes at the present election) to -1 (indicating that the party received all of the votes at the previous election and no votes at the present election). Again, neither of these outcomes occurred.

The change in share of vote can reflect the effect of a campaign or other changes on voters who might place their mark next to one of the parties under consideration at the ballot box, or who definitely would if they were to vote. It excludes those who will always go to the polls and will always vote for the party in question.

Calculating the dependent variable in this manner does, though, come with a health warning. If a party did not contest a given race in one election but did do so in the next, or vice versa, the change in share of vote is from or to zero. The reason for not contesting one of the elections could be the party assessing its chances as slim, and so dedicating resources elsewhere, which might indicate that a very low or zero vote total is appropriate. It could also, however, be because resources were less than sufficient to contest every viable seat, or because of a lack of a willing candidate, or because of the administrative overhead involved in running for an election.

Calculating the relative change in share of vote

The use of the relative change in share of vote is in the simple notion that an increase in the share of the vote from (say) 2% to 4% is more significant than from 8% to 10%. The former,
intuitively, should have more weight, as a doubling of the vote, than the much more modest relative increase in the latter.

Relative change in share of vote is calculated as

$$R = \frac{\left( \frac{P_t}{V_t} \right) - \left( \frac{P_{t-1}}{V_{t-1}} \right)}{\frac{P_{t-1}}{V_{t-1}}}$$

Where $R$ is the relative change in share of vote, $P_t$ is the vote for the party at the election, $V_t$ is the total number of votes cast at the election, $P_{t-1}$ is the vote for the party at the previous election, and $V_{t-1}$ is the total number of votes cast at the previous election.

While this is potentially more useful, it does present a problem if the party did not contest the previous election. In this case, the denominator of $R$ resolves to zero, meaning that $R$ as a whole is undefined. These cases are not considered in the analysis as there is no meaningful value that can be assigned to $R$.

There is a further limitation. It is unclear what pattern, if any, there is to why the BNP contested certain seats at certain times but not others. Given the administrative and financial overheads involved in running for the House of Commons, however, it is likely to be where they have a presence, believe they have a receptive audience, or both. A prerequisite is a willing candidate, so potentially viable seats for the BNP would go uncontested for lack of a candidate.

As such, the effective exclusion of some seats on a non-random basis means caution must be exercised with models using this measure of the dependent variable.

However, where $R$ can be used, an indication is given of how the party has performed relative to its previous performance.

A particular issue presents itself with the variables for change in share of vote and relative change in share of vote. Clearly, in order for there to be a change in share of vote, there must be a previous vote; that is to say, the party must have contested the previous election in the electoral circumscription under consideration. Where, for whatever reason, a party did not contest that prior election, there is no value for change and relative change in share of vote.

**Control variables**

Data for unemployment and immigration were taken from NOMIS, a database of labour statistics maintained by the University of Durham for the Office of National Statistics; as well as being authoritative, data are readily available for a range of geographies, including those that have
changed. However, there are many possible ways, even with the data provided by NOMIS, of measuring the effects that this study sets out to capture.

Data were taken from the Annual Population Survey; the reasons for using it are set out with admirable clarity by the ONS itself:

- ‘the sample size is approximately 320,000 respondents
- has the largest coverage of any household survey and allows the generation of statistics for small geographical areas
- uses data from the Labour Force Survey (LFS)
- the data sets consist of 12 months of survey data and are broken down on a quarterly basis
- the first APS data set was published for the period January to December 2004’

(Office for National Statistics 2012)

In short, it is the most reliable set of data that provides local information with the requisite frequency.

The specific datasets taken from NOMIS were rates for economic activity and unemployment; and percentages of the population who were white and UK born. NOMIS also has data for people who are white and not UK born; of an ethnic minority and UK born; and of an ethnic minority and not UK born. Because survey rather than census data are being used, error ranges are reported in the data. In some cases, data are suppressed as they are felt to be insufficiently reliable or, in a very few cases, because there are so few people in a given category in a given area that it would identify them. This is particularly true for non-white people not born in the UK in very homogeneous parts of the country. The white UK born is therefore contrasted with the population that is white but not born in the UK, not white but born in the UK, and neither white nor born in the UK, on the basis that both are potential drivers for the far right.

The datasets were used with different geographies: parliamentary constituencies (on the 2010 boundaries) for Westminster elections, and the lowest level of local council for European elections (which report on those boundaries) and municipal elections.

Datasets were used for the years of the present study, reported by the appropriate geographies. For Westminster elections and the Welsh European elections of 2004, this was Westminster
Parliamentary constituencies. For local and other European elections, it was the various council boundaries as discussed above. Data is not available at the ward level.

Data were used for the quarter in which the given election took place. The change variable was calculated on one year previously. This gives both absolute values and changes (Kaufmann 2017).

The economic activity and unemployment rates were taken because they capture the same phenomenon - engagement in the economy - in slightly different ways. Unemployment is measured as a rate compared to the workforce (that is to say, excluding those in the first age, the third age, or education). The economic activity rate is the number of people employed and unemployed but seeking jobs as compared to the total number of people in a given area; it indicates how many people are involved in the economic life of an area, and as such may give a better estimation of, in Ford and Goodwin’s (2014a) celebrated phrase, ‘the left behind’.

In short, indicators for ethnic makeup and economic status of areas down to the second tier of local government, that closely match the elections in time, and can be used for both absolute levels and for changes in levels, are available.

Methods

With the variables set out above, this section sets out both the quantitative and qualitative methods that are used in this study.

The broad logic of the explanatory sequential mixed methods research design of this study is set out above. In this section, greater attention is paid to the specifics of the quantitative and qualitative aspects.

Quantitative

The aim of the quantitative portion of this study is to determine the effects of activity by the opposition groups on the performance of the far right parties at elections, while accounting for other factors that the literature suggests are relevant. This requires a model where one dependent, or response, variable is explained by multiple independent, or explanatory, variables, such as regression analysis (Hutcheson 1999). However, there are multiple types of regression analysis (Kellstedt and Whitten 2013) that are appropriate for different situations. The most popular of the various regression analyses is ordinary least squares (Kellstedt and Whitten 2013), including in the study of the far right (for instance, Söderlund and Kestilä-Kekkonen 2009, Vlandas and Halikiopoulou 2019, and Ellinas and Lamprianou 2019). Mathematically, this seeks to find the best relationship between the independent variables and dependent variable by
determining a linear relationship between them that minimizes the sum of the squares of the differences between the dependent variable and the linear function (Hutcheson 1999).

While ordinary least squares is an appropriate method, it does have certain requirements, including that the dependent variable range, in theory, from negative infinity to positive infinity, or, mathematically, an interval of $[-\infty, \infty]$ (Ferrari and Cribari Neto 2004). In practice, this condition is not strictly met as infinities are rare in the social sciences, but the analysis produces usable results when the response variable operates in an interval from negative to positive or, mathematically, in an interval of $(-\infty, \infty)$. This does not present a problem for the change in share of vote or relative change in share of vote, which could range across positive and negative values. However, the absolute share of vote for a party does not meet this requirement as, no matter how badly a party does, it cannot receive negative votes; that is to say, the interval is $[0,1]$.

Therefore, ordinary least squares is used for the analyses with change in share of vote and relative change in share of vote as dependent variable, while beta is used for analyses with share of vote as the dependent variable.

The regressions were conducted using the R statistics programme, which has native support for ordinary least squares, and using the `betareg` package for beta regressions (Cribari-Neto and Zeileis 2010).

**Qualitative**

As described above in this chapter, quantitative methods can explain the *what*; they cannot explain the *how*. To understand the processes at work, rather than identify and describe them, the use of qualitative methods is necessary. In this study, a particular case study, the London Borough of Barking and Dagenham in the period of the local government electoral cycle from 2006 to 2010, was chosen for the reasons given above, with a view to understanding why Hope not Hate and Unite Against Fascism appeared not to have much effect, even in what should have been the best case scenario for them having an effect, and to understand what, instead, may have led to the British National Party’s dramatic failure in 2010, four years after an equally dramatic success.

There were two principal sets of sources for the qualitative portion of the research. The first was a set of semi-structured elite interviews. The second was traditional desktop research, including such academic literature as exists on the far right in Barking and Dagenham; specifically, local newspapers, and publications from the London Borough of Barking and Dagenham, Unite Against Fascism, and Hope not Hate.
Interviewees were selected based on having participated in or otherwise having knowledge of the opposition groups, the area of Barking and Dagenham, or both. These were a representative of Unite Against Fascism; the Rt Hon Lord Hain, founder of the Anti-Nazi League and a long-standing campaigner against the far right; Dave Rosenberg, likewise a long-standing campaigner against the far right; and the two MPs whose constituencies lie in the London Borough of Barking and Dagenham, the Rt Hon Margaret Hodge MP and Jon Cruddas MP. Hope not Hate were invited to participate but regrettably chose not to.

As these interviews were conducted with senior politicians, at the top of the ladder in their particular area and thoroughly connected to the social networks of their constituency, or with people whose experience or role gave them particular viewpoints and knowledge not generally available, these are elite interviews (Harvey 2011).

The interviews with people with particular knowledge of the geographic areas – Rt Hon Margaret Hodge MP and Jon Cruddas MP – each covered five strands. These were a general background of the area from their perspective; what activity by the British National Party specifically in their area they were aware of; what activity they undertook regarding the British National Party; what other groups they were aware of in the area taking action against the British National Party; and relevant parts of the national context. As these interviews are part of the case study of Barking and Dagenham, which focuses on the BNP for reasons elaborated in chapter 7, they only cover UKIP tangentially.

The interviews with people with particular knowledge of the opposition groups – the representative of Unite Against Fascism, the Rt Hon Lord Hain, and Dave Rosenberg – covered four strands. These were the background to and history of the organisations; how the organisations generally affected far right parties; national and local activities; and specific activities carried out at the local level.

In order to use open-ended questions that allow the participants to cover the areas they consider relevant, including those that might not otherwise have occurred to the researcher, while still covering all of the necessary ground, semi-structured interviews were used (Bryman 2012). These take the form of an interview schedule, with the broad topics and sub-questions that the researcher wishes to cover, but without a set order.

These interviews sought information in two broad areas. The first of these concerned the political situation prior to 2006, and how it evolved from 2006 to 2010, including the BNP’s activity and other developments in the area. This in turn included what other organisations, including the Labour Party and the local council, were doing. The second broad area concerned what the two opposition groups were doing in Barking and Dagenham and their logic for doing it.
This information was then combined with the information from desktop research and used to
guide further research to build a picture of what the opposition groups had been doing, why they
had been doing it, against what background they had been doing it, and what else was going on in
the Borough that would explain the decline in the BNP’s fortunes.

As set out above, this is a mixed methods design. The quantitative section informs the questions
to be asked in the case study, and which particular case should be studied to answer those
questions. As such, it benefits from the advantages of the quantitative element in providing a
generalisable account of the effects of the opposition groups on the far right parties, and from
the explanatory power of the qualitative element in the specific case of Barking and Dagenham.

With the methods set out, we can draw certain expectations as to the effects of the opposition
groups on the far right parties. These are set out in the next section.

Expectations

Based on the literature available above and the conclusions drawn in chapter five on the British
National Party, United Kingdom Independence Party, Hope not Hate, and Unite Against Fascism,
we can draw certain expectations as to the effects that the opposition groups will have on the
electoral performance of the parties.

As will be discussed at greater length below, the British National Party campaigned with a ground
war – candidates and volunteers knocking on doors – while the United Kingdom Independence
Party operated an air war – using the media and other forms of mass communication (Mullen
2016). The British National Party campaigned on local issues, matching its local campaigning,
while the United Kingdom Independence Party campaigned on national issues, in turn matching
its national campaigning. The British National Party chipped away consistently over time, while
UKIP campaigned at election time.

Hope not Hate’s campaigning in the period in question was fundamentally a ground war
campaign (Mullen 2016; Lowles 2014). It also campaigned on local issues. Some of these issues
matched up directly with the issues that their opponents were raising; some are novel to them,
such as putting out information on the often less-than-savoury backgrounds of candidates from
their intelligence gathering and research.

Unite Against Fascism’s campaigning was effectively a hybrid of air war and ground war (Unite
Against Fascism 2018). It had neither the resources for nor the tradition of using the mass media
for campaigning; rather, it adopted the ‘boots on the ground’ approach, but using national
messaging, with a view to local media coverage and awareness in a broad area.
Because Hope not Hate campaigned against the British National Party in a manner that directly engaged with the latter’s style of campaigning and effectively countered their messages (Lowles 2014), it would be expected that Hope not Hate would have a negative effect on the British National Party’s vote across the different measures. This is a meso level effect (Eatwell 2000), where Hope not Hate are playing a role in the local processes that shape people’s viewpoints (Goodwin 2009) and dealing with issues that are salient to the population but not generally dealt with by mainstream political parties (Eatwell 2017).

However, Hope not Hate’s style of campaigning could not compete with the overwhelming publicity and media coverage of UKIP. The local style of campaigning, looking at individual personalities (Hope not Hate nd), was simply swamped by the volume of national messaging (Murphy and Devine 2018). Accordingly, it would be expected that Hope not Hate would not have any effect on UKIP’s vote.

Turning to Unite Against Fascism, their campaigning did not effectively engage with the British National Party’s messaging, either in content or temporally. Although the actions of Unite Against Fascism may have had effects in changing national discourse and so on, for the purposes of the present study there is no expectation that their activity would have any effect on the vote for the British National Party as there is simply no causal mechanism that would lead to such an expectation. If the BNP are seeking to embed themselves in an area (Copsey 2008), a protest will not unembed them.

Unite Against Fascism effectively reinforced UKIP’s messaging around elites and disconnection from politics; although aware of the risks of branding UKIP as fascist or extreme, they still did so (UKIP 2018), and had the further effect of legitimising UKIP by making themselves look like left wing extremists engaged in a post-material politics of little relevance to the lived experience of potential UKIP voters (Eatwell 2003). The engagements between Unite Against Fascism and, for instance, the English Defence League further weakened Unite Against Fascism’s ability to campaign effectively as they could be interpreted as two sides of the same coin as the BNP, thus making their position worse. UAF’s actions could also have the effect of emphasising mainstream convergence (Eatwell 2003), putting it in said negative light, and so leading to protest votes. The expectation, paradoxically, is for campaigning by Unite Against Fascism to increase UKIP’s vote.

Unite Against Fascism and Hope not Hate employ different campaign strategies. This results in Hope not Hate generally being more consistent in their campaigning, while Unite Against Fascism are generally more intense in their campaigning. However, these are not hard and fast styles; for instance, Unite Against Fascism could return to the same area several times. Nevertheless, consistent action would establish a local connectedness (Ellinas and Lamprianou
that intensity of action would not. This connection with a locality based on having spent time there would counter the narratives put out by the BNP, but not the overarching media messaging of UKIP.

Thus, the expectation is that consistency of action would have a negative effect on the BNP; consistency of action to have no effect on UKIP; intensity of action to have no effect on the BNP; and intensity of action to have a positive effect on UKIP.

Conclusion

In order to provide a reliable answer to a question – to meaningfully solve a puzzle – the right approach must be taken in answering it. This means a consideration of the nature of the question, what data is available and how it can be effectively gathered and used, and then marshalled to answer the question. In this study, we address two questions, or sets of questions. The first asks what the effects of campaigning by civil society groups on far right parties – an understudied area – actually are. More particularly, given what is known about how the opposition groups campaign, with Hope not Hate adopting a more targeted, localised strategy while Unite Against Fascism goes for a more traditional, demonstrative strategy (Lowles 2014; Unite Against Fascism 2018) and how the parties operate, with local activity by the BNP and mass media usage by UKIP, (Lilleker 2016; Copsey 2004), does different patterning of campaigning by the opposition groups have an effect? Along with this, other variables that could affect votes for far right parties must be considered. The second set of questions ask what explains the effects determined in the first part.

This chapter has established that, because of the different types of question to be asked, an explanatory sequential mixed methods approach is adopted (Cresswell 2015). This approach begins with a quantitative analysis of the effects of opposition groups. The results of this analysis is reported in chapter six and speaks to the expectations given above. A qualitative analysis, making use of interview data, then looks at a specific case study, Barking and Dagenham, in chapter seven to explain the quantitative results.

This chapter has established the time period to be studied – from 2005 to 2015 – and justified it as capturing the emergence of Hope not Hate and Unite Against Fascism, and measuring their impacts until the beginning of the Brexit process occasioned a substantial change in British politics.

It has further set out the variables used, particularly the method of consistency and intensity pioneered by Ellinas and Lamprianou (2019), and justified their inclusion and how they can be operationalized. This chapter then described the process of collecting and processing data, before
setting out the specifics of the quantitative and qualitative methods used – ordinary least squares and beta regression, and interviews and desktop research, respectively. Finally, it has provided a set of expectations for the quantitative analysis.
Chapter 4 - A brief history of fascism and anti-fascism in Britain

*The only man for whom Hitler had ‘unqualified respect’ was ‘Stalin the genius’*

- Hannah Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism

**Introduction**

Because of the interrelatedness of fascism and anti-fascism, or of the far right and opposition to the far right, and because, understood as social movements, opposition groups evolve slowly and remain wedded to tactics that they have used for long periods, this chapter sets out the development of fascism and anti-fascism in Britain. It proceeds chronologically, highlighting particular incidents that have entered the lore of opposition groups and act as touchstones for them, such as the Battle of Cable Street.

As has been noted, opposition to the far right in Britain is understudied; there is some coverage of the inter-war period, rather less on the seventies, and little to nothing on its manifestations in the twenty-first century. The aim of this chapter is to provide some of the history that leads to the organisations under consideration - Hope not Hate and Unite Against Fascism.

Renton (2001) asks if the winding history of anti-fascist groups constitutes a tradition. The answer given will be that, although intertwined, there are two distinct anti-fascist traditions, one more militant and one less so.

Because anti-fascism almost requires fascism to exist, this chapter also covers some of the principal waves of the manifestations of fascism, and allied philosophies and organisations, in the United Kingdom. The chapter thus goes, in brief, from the British Brothers League through the British Union of Fascists to the National Front. In addition to discussing some of the earlier forms of opposition, this chapter largely concentrate on the second half of the twentieth century; for obvious reasons, the need for anti-fascism was not as pronounced immediately after the Second World War. The British National Party, UKIP, Hope not Hate, and Unite Against Fascism are dealt with in the next chapter.

In order to properly contextualise these organisations and to explain how they may see themselves as inheritors of particular traditions and draw on historical memories of particular events, this chapter proceeds from the beginnings of opposition to the far right in the early part of the twentieth century.
For much of its existence, opposition to the far right meant anti-fascism. This question is manifestly more difficult today; whether the populist radical right sit within the far right category is a vexed question. However, prior to the third wave of populist parties that emerged from the 1980s onward, there were no groups of significance that contended for the space. The far right was fascism, and fascism was the far right.

Opposition to the far right, therefore, meant opposition to fascism, and opposition to fascism meant opposition to the far right. While there is always a certain ambiguity in what, precisely, is meant by fascism, and so by anti-fascism, it was only with the rise of the populist radical right as a phenomenon that opposition by anti-fascist groups of organisations they saw as threatening but not fascist would be seen.

As will be discussed below, there is considerable disagreement from anti-fascists as to what fascism was and the best way to oppose it.

Early fascism in Britain

If a date is to be set for the beginnings of fascism, 11th December, 1914, serves as well as any other. On that date in Milan, Benito Mussolini’s Fascio d’Azione Rivoluzionaria7 was founded; it would later be renamed the Fasci Italiani de Combattimento, or Italian Combat Fasci. One of Mussolini’s original political aims was the engagement of Italy in the First World War on the side of the Central Powers. Perhaps because of that initial military opposition, fascism did not take hold in Britain as soon as it did elsewhere. The situation is summed up well enough by the mere title of Richard Thurlow’s (1998:13) section on the period from 1917 to 1932 in ‘Fascism in Britain’: The Lost Generation. Such fascism as there was, then, ‘was little more than “Conservatism with knobs on”’ (Thurlow 1998:13, quoting Arnold Leese).

This is not to say there were no fascist, or at least proto-fascist, organisations in Britain in that period. Nor should the racism of the period be overlooked: empire was justified in the language of social Darwinism. Such fascist groups as did exist were based ‘in reactions to the political, economic and social problems of late Victorian and Edwardian Britain, and to the disillusion created by the First World War’ (Thurlow 1998:14). A set of beliefs would emerge – economic and military strength based on an empire that meant alliances with other powers, which necessarily weakened Britannia, could be avoided. These would colour British fascism and similar positions

More or less, ‘League of Revolutionary Action’. The term ‘fascio’ was used by avowedly socialist groups – the image of the Roman fasces, or bundle of sticks, was an obvious choice. It was only later that it became an unavoidably fascist symbol.
for decades to come, despite the efforts of Oswald Mosley in his later years and Enoch Powell to change that.

A flavour of the activities of these proto-fascist groups comes from looking at three: the British Brothers League, the Britons, and the British Fascisti.

The British Brothers League, founded in 1901 (Hann 2013) or 1902 (Benewick 1972), focussed on London’s East End, and particularly on the issue of immigration. Its leaders and supporters included members of both Parliament and the London County Council, members of the clergy, and former senior members of the Metropolitan Police (Benewick 1972). The League had a paramilitary side, and would become explicitly anti-Semitic after the departure of its founder, one Captain William Stanley Shaw. The League supported and promoted an Aliens Bill to restrict further immigration (Benewick 1972). The strong Jewish community in the East End was, unsurprisingly, a target for the League’s hostility (Thurlow 1998:78).

Another side of this proto-fascism is reflected in the publishing activities of the Britons (Benewick 1972:43). Its output was entirely anti-Semitic and largely conspiratorial, including a translation of the Protocols of the Learned Elders of Zion.

Thus, there are two traditions within what would later be seen as British fascism: a muscular variety and an intellectual variety. The panoply of similar organisations approaches, as is noted elsewhere with regard to the hard left, Pythonesque levels. The National Fascisti (as distinct from the aforementioned British Fascisti, from which they splintered), the British Empire Union, the National Citizens Union, the Imperial Fascist League, the Ulster Volunteers, and others fill out the list.

The members of the British Fascisti, founded by Rothe Lintorn Orman, wore their inspiration on their sleeve - literally - as well as in their name, and were the first group in Britain to use a variant of the fasces for their nomenclature and to expressly acknowledge their debt to Mussolini (Benewick 1972:27). Although it began as anti-Communist and anti-red, it developed something resembling a political programme. It would hold public rallies, guard or steward meetings of friendly organisations, and publish (Benewick 1972:33). Orman’s experience with the Girl Scouts meant that it adopted much of the structure of that innocuous organisation (Thurlow 1987:34). It represented a potentially more effective combination of the two varieties mentioned above.
Early opposition to fascism

As these groups grew, so did opposition to them. The two first organisations set up in Britain to oppose fascism qua fascism were the People’s Defence Force and the National Union for Combatting Fascism (NUCF) (Hann 2013). The former organisation was set up by the Communist Party in 1924 (Copsey 2017:2), while the latter was established by Alfred and Ethel Holdsworth in the previous year (Hann 2013). The NUCF saw itself as ‘Labour’s Criminal Investigation Department’ (Copsey 2017:3) – a specialised detachment trying to investigate and expose fascism. The NUCF also published a journal, The Clear Light, but both journal and organisation would cease by 1925.

Much of the opposition to the nascent fascism in Britain was undertaken by the Communist Party, in the form of physically disrupting meetings and engaging in other altercations. However, the Communist Party, operating under the instructions of the COMINTERN and its understanding of a Third Period of capitalism, would not work with other groups. Indeed, social democracy was condemned as ‘social fascism’.

While ‘majority opinion on the left was not unduly concerned by British fascism’ (Copsey 2010:3), seeing it rather as a joke, the Communist Party saw it as an inherent threat to the proletarian revolution as a means by which capitalism would retain its power.

The Communist Party also had perhaps more parochial reasons for wanting to confront fascism. In 1925, Harry Pollitt - then head of the Communist Party’s trade union movement and later general secretary of the whole party - was kidnapped for about twenty-four hours by a group of people believed to be allied to the British Fascisti (HC Deb 16th March 1925). By July of the same year, the Communist theoretician Rajani Palme Dutt was arguing that fascists and fascism needed to be taken seriously (Copsey 2010:4).

The Communist position, however, should not obscure that there were substantial sections of the Labour Party and of the trades unions that wanted radical changes to the state and, in many cases, thought that the state and those whose interests would be harmed by those radical changes would be hostile to them. That is to say, there were substantial parts of the non-Communist left who viewed the state at least as a problem to be overcome.

The General Strike of 1926 would be seized on by both fascists and communists.

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8 Regrettably, there appears to be no connection between the People’s Defence Force established in Britain in the early twentieth century and the People’s Defense Force of Marvel Comics.

9 Hann gives 1924 as the start date for both organisations, but The Clear Light was published from 1923.
On the fascist, or proto-fascist, side, this manifested in offered support for the Organisation for the Maintenance of Supplies (OMS). Fearing shortages of essential goods if the strike lasted as well as a red takeover, the OMS was set up by private actors, and rapidly co-opted by the Government (Perkins 2006:70). The Communist Party viewed this organisation as fascist or fascistic, though Labour averred (Copsey 2017:5). The government nonetheless rebuffed offers from the British Fascisti to help with the OMS. This would cause a split in the group, with some abandoning the British Fascisti to help in the OMS, with others remaining with the former (Thurlow 1998:35). The organisation would split when a substantial part of it left to join Mosley’s New Party, and it would collapse with Orman’s death shortly thereafter.

At the same time, the Communist Party established the Workers’ Defence Corps around the country, preparing for a long strike and violent response from the state and para-state actors, including the OMS. The Workers’ Defence Corps was intended not only to handle the OMS and support the General Strike, but to protect - physically - other left-wing groups, particularly in the trade union movement, at risk from fascist intervention. Ultimately, the General Strike would last nine days, excepting coal miners, who continued until the winter of 1926/27. The TUC and labour movement lost; this was a blow to the Communist Party in general, but, from the particular perspective of this research, left the Workers’ Defence Corps with a tarnished name. It would morph into the Labour League of Ex-Servicemen (LLX) (Hann 2013). The LLX would emerge as a para-military force, complete with a uniform that led to questions in Parliament (HC Deb 19 March 1928). It would defend progressive causes and meetings from any threats of fascist intervention.

Even at this stage, the formation of para-military groups on both sides is seen, and a dance of feints and parries around the OMS, ranging from actively seeking physical confrontation to preparing in case their event was disrupted. This sets the scene for the next entry: the British Union of Fascists.

The British Union of Fascists

Neither fascism nor anti-fascism were particularly entrenched in British society in the 1920s. Such organisations as there were petered out in a few years. That would change, however, in the 1930s with the emergence of the largest, best-organised, and best-known fascist group in Britain before the Second World War: the British Union of Fascists.

The life of Sir Oswald Mosley, 6th Baronet Ancoats, is better covered elsewhere. For the present purposes, it is sufficient to note that he first sat in the Commons as a Unionist – the youngest sitting MP of that Parliament - representing the Harrow constituency, but, increasingly at odds with his party’s policy on Ireland, became an independent, winning re-election in both the 1922
and 1923 polls; after his last re-election in Harrow, he would join the newly-formed Independent Labour Party. He would fail in his attempt to unseat Neville Chamberlain in 1924, having moved from Harrow, where he did not rate his chances of election on a socialist ticket. In a prefiguration of the 1964 general election, Oswald Mosley would be elected at a by-election in Smethwick. Placed in charge of unemployment strategy, he would produce the ‘Mosley Memorandum’, arguing for Keynesian public works to reduce unemployment on a scale previously unimagined and possibly unimaginable and a radical reworking of how government operated in order to manage the programme (Marquand 1977:539). When the Labour Party narrowly rejected the Mosley Memorandum, the 6th Baronet Ancoats, would again leave a major party, this time to form his own: the New Party.

It should be emphasised that while statism and radicalism were certainly part of Mosley’s political agenda, his future journey to fascism was not pre-ordained. Signatories to the Mosley Memorandum included, for instance, Aneurin Bevan, and the New Party attracted the financial support of William Morris, later Viscount Nuffield. It should also be noted that Mosley was a political figure of some standing; George Bernard Shaw, after initially pushing him to set up a new party, encouraged him to stay within Labour as he would succeed Ramsay MacDonald (Dorril 2006:163). However, substantial parts of the British Fascisti would defect to Mosley on formation of the New Party, bringing with them their history, understandings, and experiences.

They published a magazine, Action, and a film, Crisis. The National Policy developed by the New Party ranged across economic matters, including making the UK less dependent on imports other than from the Empire.; Mosley advocated more, including suspending normal civil liberties and peace-time living to deal with unemployment (Dorril 2006). Already wary of ‘the reds’, Mosley would have a personal bodyguard (Dorril 2006).

The New Party would stage events across the country, attracting sizeable crowds. Amongst these crowds, however, were ‘reds’, as Mosley would brand them, intent on a violent response towards those whom they saw already as fascists. Mosley’s bodyguard would become the ‘biff boys’: the beginnings of a serious para-military, led by a popular and well-known rugby player of the day. A youth wing, Nupa, was formed. The Communist Party saw the New Party as proto-fascist (Copsey 2017:8).

The New Party contested the 1931 election without returning any candidates to Parliament, although two MPs did cross the floor to join them. Their best results at the 1931 election would

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10 The Independent Labour Party was in a protracted process of disaffiliation from the Labour Party over dissatisfaction with the latter.
be in Merthyr, where Sellick Davies received almost one third of vote casts (there being, admittedly, only one other candidate), and almost a quarter of the votes in Stoke, where Mosley was beaten into third and last place by the Conservatives and Labour. None of their other candidates reached five figures. The return of the National Government would spell the end for the New Party, both because, having been crushed electorally, they were not taken seriously by the public and because Mosley no longer saw a Parliamentary route to power as viable (Dorril 2006:188).

Following the New Party’s electoral defeat, Mosley undertook a sort of latter-day grand tour, visiting both Rome and Munich, heralding his turn to out-and-out fascism and the formation of the British Union of fascists. The BUF was ‘the mature form of fascism in British Society ... the only organization with any pretension to significance in inter-war Britain’ (Thurlow 1998:61).

The BUF would largely draw members from Nupa and the British Fascisti (Thurlow 1998). The use of physical security and paramilitary forces in response to left-wing disruption of New Party events grew with the BUF into I Squad and then the Fascist Defence Force (Dorril 2006). This force would also be used to harass the National Unemployed Workers’ Movement’s marches due to the latter’s support from the Communist Party, setting the scene for the future. The BUF was an organisation that feared its events being disturbed, and so would assert physical control of venues, streets, even whole districts, to the extent of disturbing the events of groups they viewed, essentially, as un-British: communists, socialists, and Jews.

These experiences would be borne down the line of organisations descending from the BUF of Oswald Mosley to the BNP of Nick Griffin. The electoral route to power would only ever be used instrumentally; it would only be used when circumstances in broader society appeared to make it an appealing option. As covered below, these would include the late seventies, when concerns about Commonwealth immigration and race relations were high; the late nineties, in the particular circumstances of Millwall; and, in the early part of the twenty-first century, when immigration from the newly-acceded members of the European Union was a concern. Even during this periods of electoral activity, there was an expectation that there would be physical confrontation with opposition from the left. Whether it was preparedness for violence first specifically amongst fascist groups or their opponents or, more likely, a ratcheting-up from both sides, is likely lost to history. However, the result is that both sides both expected violence. The pattern of focus on the leader of a far right group by its members so that there was little distinction between the head and the organization itself, already the pattern for Mussolini and others, would be marked on the British experience.
For much of this period, Mosley was not seen as a particular threat to the establishment. He was rather something of a curiosity, even if he did have notable supporters (many of whom, such as Harold Nicolson, left as he moved rightwards). The dismal failure of the New Party at the general election of October 1931 seemed to underline this. There was certainly criticism of both Mosley and the New Party in the press, but it was only the Communist Party and Labour League of Ex-Servicemen – returners from the Great War of a communist or trade unionist persuasion, militantly opposed to fascism – who took direct action against them, disrupting their meetings. The perception of the British Union of Fascists as slightly comical would change with events in Germany in 1933.

The rise of Hitler and the end of the Third Period

As has been noted above, the COMINTERN saw social democracy as a roadblock on the way to the dictatorship of the proletariat, as well as sharing economic traits with fascism; it was therefore denounced as ‘social fascism’. This was glossed as capitalism’s Third Period, with economic privation leading to mobilisation and radicalisation of the working class. Yet, the revolution did not come, and Communism and the COMINTERN would be shocked into changing their position and their tactics by the rise to power of Adolf Hitler in Germany.

The passing of the Ermaechtigungsgezetz in 1933, essentially giving Hitler and the Nazi Party untrammelled power, was a shock in and of itself. According to the theory of the COMINTERN, there should have been a proletarian uprising, not a fascist takeover. The suppression of communists, as well as trades unionists, social democrats, and essentially anyone who was not at least willing to go along with the new regime added physical threat to theoretical confusion.

In light of this, at the 1935 COMINTERN congress, the position changed. Henceforth, communists would seek a popular front with non-communists against fascism and fascists. As long as they shared the goal of defeating fascism, it was acceptable to co-operate with other groups. This would have widespread effects but, specifically, it meant that the Communist Party’s organisational abilities and personpower would be available to help other groups.

11 It is sometimes necessary to remember that the Communist Party was not like the current alphabet soup of small, hard left groups, but was a serious organisation capable of winning seats in the House of Commons and London County Council. When Bob Darke quit the Communist Party in 1951, it was sufficiently important that his explanation of why he left, The Communist Technique in Britain, was published as a Penguin Special.
It should be noted that Hitler’s Sturmabteilung began as the Saalschutzabteilung, or ‘hall protection division’. The Biff Boys and the like were seen - not without reason - as being a first step to something similar in Britain.

Aside from the Communist Party, opposition to the BUF and other, similar groups was informal and sporadic. The Labour Party very much adopted a hands-off approach formally, even if individual members took a different approach (Copsey 2010:52); the BUF was derided as ‘the 6,000 stalwarts of Sir Oswald Mosley (TUC Report 1933, p321, cited in Copsey 2010:57); in any case, Labour argued that communist activity would provoke a fascist reaction. The Independent Labour Party supported the Communist Party’s popular front. Local Labour and trade union groups disagreed with the official party line, and in some cases supported the popular front. This was most common in highly unionised, industrial, urban areas: Sunderland, Tyneside, London, Sheffield. However, as activity was locally organised, anti-fascism was ‘loose-knit and ill-defined’ (Copsey 2000:12)

A Co-ordinating Committee for Anti-Fascist Activities (Copsey 2017:22) was formed in July 1934; it would effectively be a means for an end-run around Labour’s official disinclination toward ‘robust’ responses to fascism, although its intention was to get Labour to join the popular front. The opposition was much greater in number than previously, but still lacked coherence and organisation. A former member of Mosley’s New Party, John Strachey, was now running the British Anti-War Movement, which adopted anti-fascism as part of its pacifism.

Local communist and allied groups would disrupt fascist meetings; a Fascist Defence Force was formed in response. It would reach its zenith at Hyde Park on September 9th, 1934. Anti-fascists would use the same tactics as they had previously to disrupt fascist gatherings - obtaining tickets and then either heckling the speakers or otherwise causing so much disruption that they would be expelled, notably at the Albert Hall, and Olympia in Kensington in 1934. This expulsion would be forceful, giving a pretext for a response in kind from the expellee’s associates. The gathering in Hyde Park was to be a signal affair for the British Union of Fascists; Lord Rothermere’s Daily Mail gave it favourable advance coverage, and it would be the largest gathering of Mosley’s group in an outdoor rally.

Two narratives emerged. For the Communists, it was ‘a great blow against fascism’ (Daily Worker 1934), while the Fascists saw the event as a victory for free speech and fascism.

**Cable Street**

Thus, there are two competing movements - perhaps ‘alike in dignity’ after a fashion - with particular histories. One, closer to the Communist Party, advocated physical responses; the other,
closer to Labour, saw the threat as over-stated and best dealt with within civil society. This would reach a zenith at Cable Street.

The build-up to a proposed march by the BUF through the East End, against a background of increasing anti-Semitism from Mosley and the BUF, including physical attacks on Jewish persons and property, saw eighty-six different organisations (cablestreet.uk nd) come together to form the Jewish People’s Council against Fascism and Anti-Semitism. These would be joined by another half-dozen organisations, shepherded by the Communist Party (Copsey 2017:48, 51). The result would be the Battle of Cable Street - a confrontation between fascists, anti-fascists, and police. It has entered the collective memory of anti-fascism as a triumph and turning point, as a symbol of the working class coming together against a common enemy (Copsey 2017:57). There had been other, similar confrontations - notably two years earlier in Hyde Park - and would be again - in 1937, in Bermondsey - but perhaps what does set Cable Street apart is the state’s response in the form of the Public Order Act of 1936. The Public Order Act banned political uniforms, required permission to be sought before political marches, prohibited para-militaries (‘quasi-military organisations’ in the language of the Act (1936)), and gave the police broader powers to deal with disorder, broadly construed, at protests.

Cable Street, though, entered anti-fascist mythology. It was when anti-fascists gave the fascists a good kicking; when all kinds of people came together to stand up to oppose the far right; when the police were protecting a deliberately provocative march through a multicultural area, and the people of the area rose up to turf them out. Indeed, the claim of a connection to Cable Street remained so powerful that Jeremy Corbyn spoke of his mother’s presence there to burnish his credentials (Bloom 2016).

As much as any activity by anti-fascist groups, it was the Public Order Act that ‘deprived the [British Union of Fascists] of the propaganda value of its paramilitary displays’ (Dorril 2006:408). The increasing presence of Nazi sympathisers such as William Joyce (better known as Lord Haw-Haw) and turn to anti-Semitism meant that it was impossible for ‘respectable’ members of the BUF to remain. Ultimately, increasing tensions with Germany and the outbreak of war would rob Mosley and the BUF of support. Mosley was interned and the BUF dissolved under Defence Regulation 18B.

The Second World War would, for a time, put paid to fascism in the UK.

The departure point for many pre-war fascists was socialist or communism; Mussolini started as a creature of the left, and Mosley went through the Labour Party on his route rightwards. Certainly, the economic programmes of communist and fascist both opposed the then-extant form of capitalism and bore more than passing similarities, even if they placed the blame in
different places (the anti-Semitism amongst some communists notwithstanding). They also operated in similar conditions, given that they were active at the same time (important differences including in the organisation of international support, the COMINTERN being rather more effective than ad-hoc support from international fascism). It is perhaps, then, not surprising that there are a number of similarities between these groups.

In brief, these similarities are militancy; an attitude towards the state as a cipher; and publishing as an intellectual exercise.

The militancy is straightforward enough. Both sides wanted to dramatically change the nature, scope, and activities of the state and would only operate in a democratic mode if they thought it would achieve their ends, whether short-term or long-term. They anticipated - and, indeed, met - resistance from the state, and from non-state opposition, and prepared themselves accordingly (Copsey 2010a).

Secondly, they each viewed the liberal state as a cipher for the other side. That is to say, communists viewed the state (including such organs as the police) as fundamentally hostile to them, if not allied to or at least sympathetic to fascism, with its liberalism a pretence (Copsey 2017). The same was true, mutatis mutandis, for the manner in which fascists saw the state (Mann 2004).

Finally, there is publishing. Both sides saw a crisis of the state and society (Mann 2004), and a new world to be born (Marx and Engels 2010). Exactly what and how that would be born was to be discovered; both sides would give their take on it as they tried to understand the world they were in, how they had arrived at that condition, what the world should become, and how it would be reached. Both sides also used this work to propagandise to the unconverted, and to inculcate their values into their supporters.

**Fascism and anti-fascism after WW2**

This, then, was the ground from which the British far right would draw when it started to reappear after it was discredited by the WW2 and the Holocaust, and hamstrung by internment. Concerned with control of the streets, with a view that the state was useful and necessary but ill-managed, an anti-Semitism that ran from casual racism to frothing paranoia, and a connection to the working class.

Prior to World War Two, ‘there had been widespread indifference to fascism provided that public order was not threatened’ (Thurlow 1998:203). The pre-war connections of leading British fascists to the likes of Lord Haw-Haw - traitors and collaborators - and the horrific news and cine-reel that came from the liberation of Nazi camps across Europe was a bromide against anything that
looked like fascism. There were attempts to rehabilitate and rename fascism but they were of no relevance.

Such small groups as there were gave rise to the 43 Group - named for the number of people at its initial meeting rather than the year - that sought to physically oppose remaining fascist organisations in Britain. Formed in 1946, and counting Vidal Sassoon among its members, the group disbanded in 1950, seeing the threat as having passed (Copsey 2017:89).

A few people like Arnold Leese notwithstanding, there were no out-and-out fascists active politically immediately after the war; the connection with Hitler was just too much. The League of Empire Loyalists, occupying the rightmost fringes of the Conservative Party and beyond, was formed in 1954 by AK Chesterton, a former lieutenant for Oswald Mosley. This institution provided a link back to inter-war fascism; it would bring in people like John Tyndall, Colin Jordan, and Martin Webster, and John Bean.

The League’s stated aim was to prevent the dissolution of the British Empire. Decolonization had started under Labour after 1945 but stalled when the Conservatives returned to office in 1951, only to be restarted with MacMillan’s ‘Winds of Change’ speech in 1960 (technically, two speeches; the first, in Ghana, garnered little attention, while the version in Cape Town received much more). Colin Jordan, John Bean, John Tyndall, and Martin Webster all joined the League. Jordan left in 1956, and Bean & Tyndall in 1957, to form the White Defence League and National Labour Party, respectively (Thurlow 1998:233). These two organisations would merge in 1960 to form the first incarnation of the British National Party.

The first British National Party

This first British National Party was explicitly racist and virulently anti-Semitic (Walker 1977:34). It would rapidly split, with Jordan and Tyndall leaving to form the even more extreme and explicitly pro-Hitler National Socialist Movement (Thurlow 1998:239). The remaining BNP ‘was to concentrate on local political activity and building up a strong political base in constituencies like Southall and Deptford’ (Thurlow 1998:234). A further split would occur between Jordan and Tyndall over how explicitly Nazi they should be; Tyndall left to form the Greater Britain Movement in 1964, starting a new magazine, Spearhead. There was then a debate within the World Union of National Socialists as to which, NSM or GBM, would be the official franchisee in the UK. Tyndall, in a foreshadowing of Nick Griffin, would argue that ‘one could adhere to the principles of fascism and Nazism whilst presenting them in a manner in which Britons could identify with the cause of their own country’ (Gable 1978:2). As Tyndall gave the appearance of moderation, Jordan became more explicit in his Nazism. Also active was the Greater Britain Movement, through which Andrew Brons would be brought into the National Front.
The splits aside, the far right was doing better electorally than it had for a generation. John Bean would receive 9.3% of the vote in Southall at the 1964 general election, with other candidates receiving votes in four figures at the same elections, and local government candidates receiving up to a quarter of votes cast in some wards.

What caused this rise in groups that ten years earlier would have been unthinkably evil? In short, it was immigration - the fact of it but, more particularly, the political opportunity spaces it opened up.

Although HMT Empire Windrush had docked at Tilbury Docks in 1948, it became symbolic of post-war immigration into Britain from the colonies, particularly the West Indies, as well as the ressentiment at the loss of the empire. It would be augmented by the arrival of the Ugandan Asians in 1972. Concerns about immigration rose, although the major parties remained relatively liberal on the subject and race relations more generally. This could have been a space on which the far right could have capitalised; however, their continued adherence to the symbols and language of explicit Nazism made them beyond the pale for the great bulk of the British population, with memories of the horrors of the Second World War not yet faded. Tensions were there, however - race riots broke out in Notting Hill in 1958 - and a series of events would open up that space to the far right.

Firstly, the rightward fringes of the Conservative Party were increasingly vocal with their dissatisfaction with immigration policy; it was simply not restrictive enough for them. Secondly, the Race Relations Act 1965, and the accompanying Race Relations Board, appeared to some, and were deliberately portrayed as such by others, to be clamping down on free speech and preventing ordinary people from voicing their concerns about immigration. Simultaneously, the main parties were starting to become more restrictive in language and policy on immigration.

The ‘62 Group formed in its eponymous year, taking its inspiration from the 43 Group of Jewish ex-service men that formed on their return from the Second World War to combat the fascism they saw in Britain. They would provide the principal activities directly aimed at fascists (rather than, say, improving race relations more generally) of the late sixties and early seventies (Copsey 2017:111). These would range from the now-traditional disruption of meetings to breaking and entering the offices of the NF (Copsey 2017:112). Perhaps the most notable member of the ‘62 Group was Gerry Gable, who would go on to found Searchlight, which would in turn give rise to Hope not Hate and be associated with Unite Against Fascism.
Most activity regarding fascism and the far right, however, was directed at Powellism and the Monday Club\textsuperscript{12} tendency of the Conservative Party. The groups and people one might perhaps expect to be focussing on the extraparliamentary far right were otherwise engaged.

As mentioned above, Labour was increasingly concerned about the electoral threat posed by the far right, as well as opposing it on moral grounds. Two Labour MPs with a history in local government set up Searchlight in 1964. These were Joan, later Baroness, Lestor, MP for Eton and Slough, who had worked her way up through local government and then the London County Council; and a former journalist, Reg Freeson, who had served on Willesden and Brent councils. This incarnation of Searchlight was an occasional publication, both warning of the dangers of fascism and providing exposés on the far right. It would only last until 1967. However, its research director, Gerry Gable, would go onto play a major role in British anti-fascism with the re-founded Searchlight. Gable had been a member of the ‘62 Group.

The National Front

In 1967, the National Front would be formed as a merger of the BNP and League of Empire Loyalists. John Tyndall, in a foreshadowing of Nick Griffin, would argue that the values of fascism could be presented in a manner that would at least not be repulsive to, and could perhaps be attractive to, British public opinion. There would be a definite shift away from the symbology of the past, and a focus on actual political campaigning, rather than marches, protests, and mass meetings, in areas such as Southall.

The National Front would receive a real boost in 1968 with Enoch Powell’s ‘Rivers of Blood’ speech (Taylor 2018). The speech itself legitimated hardline positions on immigration. Powell himself was, for all his faults, a remarkable scholar turned soldier (he was a professor of classical Greek by 25, and a brigadier general by 33). In addition, he had held government office as Financial Secretary to the Treasury in MacMillan’s first ministry, and as Health Minister in his second. At the time of the speech, he was Heath’s Shadow Defence Secretary. He was a mainstream politician advocating, in incendiary terms, substantial restrictions on immigration and warning of dire social problems should he not be heeded. This was further boosted by the reaction of what might crudely be termed polite society. Edward Heath promptly fired him from the shadow cabinet, and press and politicians alike condemned him for racism. The presentation

\textsuperscript{12} Officially, the ‘Conservative Monday Club’. It dates from Harold MacMillan’s second ministry on the belief that the party had moved too far leftwards, the Monday Club became a by-word for reactionary Conservatism with a particularly controversial record on race issues, including support for apartheid South Africa and Rhodesia, and opposition to non-white immigration to the UK. The Conservative Party terminated its formal links with the Monday Club in 2001.
was that immigration could not be discussed. This legitimated the National Front, and encouraged it to at least attempt - even if not to the exclusion of its former violence - an electoral path based on the working class support received by Powell.

Nevertheless, the National Front was relatively small for its first years. The principal group opposing the National Front was the ‘62 Group, as described above. The arrival of the Ugandan Asians, coming on the heels of the fallout from Enoch Powell’s speech in Birmingham, led to a substantial increase in membership of the National Front (Copsey 2017:114).

It would be the combination of an openness to electoral politics, an increasing membership, and the political opportunity space afforded by the debate around immigration that would see the National Front start to grow further.

At the 1970 general election, the National Front ran ten candidates; two reached five and half per cent of votes cast. They would contest by-elections in that Parliament with increasing success, with Martin Webster receiving fully sixteen per cent of the votes cast at the West Bromwich by-election in May 1973 (Fielding 1981).

On the back of this success, the National Front contested forty-nine seats at the February election of 1974, and ninety-three at the October election. By 1974, West Bromwich had been split into two seats, West Bromwich West and West Bromwich East, which gave the National Front their highest and third-highest share of the vote respectively, at 7.8 per cent and 7 per cent. By the autumn of that year, their best results were coming in London - 9.4 per cent in Hackney South and Shoreditch, 8.3 per cent in Tottenham, 8 per cent in Wood Green (Fielding 1981). The number of seats that the National Front were contesting also entitled them to a party political broadcast (Taylor 1982).

The National Front would contest all but one of the seats on the Greater London Council in 1977 (Taylor 1982). Although they did not receive any seats due to the majoritarian electoral system, they did much better than they had hoped and others had feared. Their share of vote jumped from half of one percent to more than five per cent, equalling approximately two-thirds of the vote for the Liberal party. What opposition that did exist was very local, without much organisation, and directed to the physical confrontation of fascists.

Searchlight had folded in 1967. However, Gerry Gable formed Searchlight Associates to continue the research side of the project; essentially, digging up information about the past and present activities and associates of people active on the far right of politics and passing that to the newspapers (Copsey 2017). In 1975, Searchlight magazine would be relaunched, continuing
providing research and information to its two audiences: activists and the media. While the activity can be summed up in short order, its impact was substantial.

There have long been suggestions that Searchlight and Gerry Gable had connections to the police and secret services (Campbell et al. 1980). Because such relationships are necessarily covert, it is impossible to definitively say whether they existed or not, and, if they did, whether they represented individuals passing information or a full and formal relationship or something in between. Nevertheless, the plausibility to many of such links suggests, if nothing else, that the quality of information that Searchlight was able to put out was impressively high.

However, Dave Renton’s 2006 assessment that the most important anti-fascist organisations were Rock Against Racism and the Anti-Nazi League; they were the most active, the most visible, and had the most public support can be agreed with.

Rock Against Racism and the Anti-Nazi League

In 1976, a drunken Eric Clapton went, on stage, on a tirade in support of Enoch Powell and against immigration, laced with racist epithets (Rachel 2008). In response, a letter appeared in the New Musical Express, Melody Maker, and Sounds from Red Saunders, a photographer. Saunders’ political affiliation is given by the fourth publication in which the letter appeared: Socialist Worker. The letter highlighted the black roots of much of Clapton’s music, and argued that music, and rock music in particular, could ‘be a progressive culture’. The letter ends

‘We want to organise a rank and file movement against the racist poison music. We urge support for Rock Against Racism’ (Renton 2006:32)

An advert would appear in Socialist Worker asking for support for a ‘Rock Against Racism ad hoc committee’. This would lead to offers of support from across the country, concerts, a magazine, a fanzine, posters, and carnivals. Music ranged from Northern Soul to blues to reggae to punk to two-tone. While the SWP was instrumental in getting Rock Against Racism off the ground, it did not - or was not able to - control it. Rock Against Racism became what a modern public relations professional would call a viral marketing campaign. It was easy to get a few bands together, hire a venue, and print leaflets with ‘Rock Against Racism’13. Rock Against Racism was undoubtedly successful in showing that there was considerable opposition to racism and a groundswell of people who were willing to do something about it. It should be remembered that racism was

13 This was the era, after all, of ‘this is a chord, this is another, this is a third. Now form a band’, as the punk fanzine, Sniffin’ Glue put it.
common, not just as an attitude amongst people, but in the form of violent attacks on non-whites, the rhetoric of politicians, and the policies of the state.

If the Battle of Cable Street became a leitmotif for the anti-fascism of the thirties, the equivalent for the seventies was the Battle of Lewisham. The National Front’s vote had been growing. In a by-election in Deptford ward to Lewisham council, the combined vote of the National Front and a breakaway, the National Party (395 and 580, totalling 975) was actually more than Labour’s 968. A local group, the All-Lewisham Campaign Against Racism and Fascism (known universally by its acronym, ALCARAF) was formed in response to the rise of the National Front and National Party. The Metropolitan Police launched a series of raids on black people - the Lewisham Twenty-One - in response to muggings in the area. A demonstration in support of the Lewisham Twenty-One attracted National Front supporters to a counter-demonstration; they would later organise a march from New Cross to Lewisham town.

This impending march would lead to the old division between anti-fascists over tactics rearing its head. Those around ALCARAF favoured a demonstration removed in time and space from the National Front’s march; this was supported by a range of other organisations and notables, including the Bishop of Southwark, Mervyn Stockwood¹⁴, and Roger Godsiff, later the Labour MP for Birmingham Sparkbrook and Small Heath and Birmingham Hall Green, but then the mayor of Lewisham. The Anti-Racist and Anti-Fascist Co-ordinating Committee, ARAFCC, wanted a direct confrontation with the National Front. In an echo of Cable Street, the Metropolitan Police would try to escort the far right protest, which in the end could not reach its destination. Widespread disorder followed.

The term ‘Battle of Lewisham’ directly echoes the Battle of Cable Street. The same lessons were taken: that many people, of all classes and races, coming together to physically confront the far right was effective and ‘the right thing to do’.

Of the many outcomes of Lewisham, two particularly concern us. The first was the continuation of Cable Street as the ideal of opposition. The second was the formation of the Anti-Nazi League.

Although the Socialist Workers Party were behind the Anti-Nazi League - it was, for them, a classic popular front - it had broad support. The Anti-Nazi League was founded at a meeting at Parliament in November of 1977. Its leadership would be Ernie Roberts (a former Assistant General Secretary of the Amalgamated Engineering Union and later a Labour MP), Paul Holborow

¹⁴ Stockwood is probably best known now for his appearance criticising Monty Python’s Life of Brian on Friday Night, Saturday Morning, but was then known as an effective and radical clergyman associated with various liberal causes.
(an organiser for the Socialist Workers Party) and Peter Hain (best known in 1977 as an anti-apartheid activist, a former Liberal who was in the process of joining Labour, under which banner he would sit in both the Commons and the Lords).

This was combined with Labour taking a more clearly anti-racist and anti-fascist tone. There was widespread concern within the party that the National Front would do well at the next general election - eventually held in 1979 - particularly after they received more than five per cent of the vote at the 1977 elections to the Greater London Council.

The Anti-Nazi League’s principal activity was disseminating propaganda exposing the National Front as Nazis, their criminal pasts, and various unsavoury connections. Much of this information came from Searchlight. Millions of pieces of literature were posted through letterboxes across the country (Copsey 2017:135). With increased public awareness and access to easy stories about them, newspapers, both local and national, started carrying stories exposing members of the National Front.

The Anti-Nazi League also provided some of the administrative capacity necessary to put on the larger Rock Against Racism carnivals. While these did not directly impact the National Front, they provided both publicity for the League’s cause and acted to recruit activists. The re-founded Anti-Nazi League would claim that ‘two carnivals organised by the ANL and Rock Against Racism in 1978 were the biggest anti-racist demonstrations in Britain since the 1930s’ (Anti-Nazi League 2001).

The National Front was further hampered by local councils, particularly but not exclusively those controlled by the Labour Party, refusing to make their premises available for meetings (Copsey 2017). Often the only meeting halls of sufficient size in provincial towns, this would prove to be an effective tactic against the Front. This also put pressure on private venues, particularly public houses, to follow suit and not take bookings from the Front.

Prior to the formation of the Anti-Nazi League, individuals within the Socialist Workers Party had started forming small groups engaging in what was euphemistically referred to as physical anti-fascism. This was squaddism, or violent attacks on far right groups, particularly the National Front. This continued up to and past the 1979 general election, although the leadership of the Anti-Nazi League and, increasingly, the Socialist Workers Party was hostile to the idea.

In the run-up to the 1979 general election, the Conservatives, under Margaret Thatcher, were becoming increasingly tough on immigration; in an infamous interview for Granada television in 1978, she would talk of Britons’ fears of being ‘rather swamped’ (Thatcher 1978) by immigrants from the Commonwealth.
Combined, this meant that the political opportunity space for the National Front on the right was now the subject of competition; Labour were working to ensure their traditional voters did not leave them for the Front; newspapers, the Anti-Nazi League, and Searchlight were giving people information and reason not to vote for the Front; and their organisational and campaigning efforts were hampered.

The net result of this activity was that at the 1979 general election the National Front declined to 0.6 per cent share of the vote. The Scottish National Party received more than double that share of vote, at 1.6 per cent, despite only contesting Scottish seats. The National Front was effectively finished.

As has happened previously, with the spectre of fascism defeated, anti-fascists would themselves sleep. Largely from a lack of support, the Anti-Nazi League would close in 1981, the same year as Rock Against Racism’s last carnival, in Leeds. Much of the left-wing activism behind the organisations would transfer its energies to opposing the government of Margaret Thatcher.

It would be wrong, however, to view Rock Against Racism and the Anti-Nazi League as being effectively the same organisation. While they certainly co-operated extensively and there was much crossover in personnel, the attitudes of the organisations towards the state were substantially different. Rock Against Racism saw the state as either enabling or responsible for fascism in the form of the National Front. ‘The ANL, by contrast, subscribed to the 1939-1945 legend of British anti-fascism. Its leaflets criticized the [National Front] as shame patriots. Ultimately, it colluded with the state.’ (Renton 2006:iix).

How much of the National Front’s failure was attributable, in whole or in part, to the activities of the Anti-Nazi League and Rock Against Racism is very hard to assess. Some of its effect would have been mediated through other channels. Martin Webster, the National Activities Officer for the National Front, would admit in 1982 that the Anti-Nazi League ‘stuffed’ them (Vulliamy 2007).15

What is certain, however, is that Rock Against Racism and the Anti-Nazi League would become two more touchstones in the collective memory of anti-fascism. The Anti-Nazi League would later be resurrected, while the idea of Rock Against Racism would come back to life as Love Music Hate Racism. Beyond that, there was a clear call back to the hagiography of Cable Street - many people of all kinds coming together to deal - physically when necessary - with fascism and fascists. There was, however, an innovation in the nexus of Rock Against Racism and the Anti-Nazi League. The

15 The circumstances of the admission bear remarking upon. Peter Hain had sued Webster for libel over some of the latter’s remarks about the tactics of the ANL.
focus was shifting from targeting the far right itself to targeting those who might be receptive to the far right’s clarion with a countervailing narrative, and on encouraging very large numbers of people to help in getting that message across.

**The 1980s**

The 1980s were a fallow period for the far right and, consequently, its opposition. There was still some activity, however.

The squaddists would be expelled from the Socialist Workers Party, and would form Red Action (as was traditional for the left, Red Action was officially the name of a newspaper). Red Action would be the nucleus of Anti-Fascist Action, who would continue violent attacks on the remnants of the National Front while seeking to spread their vision of class consciousness amongst the working class. Part of the split was, as previously, based on different opinions on how to engage with the capitalist state writ large (so including, for instance, what is now called the third sector, other political parties, the media, and so on) (Hann 2013). That the left was returning to its traditional internecine conflict, and in an echo of Cable Street and Lewisham, there would be a disagreement over which protest to attend on 16 October 1993. The Anti-Nazi League called for a protest in Welling in south east London, outside a bookshop operated by the British National Party; the Anti-Racist Alliance, meanwhile, called for a protest on Trafalgar Square. The former protest became violent, with both attendees and police being injured.

On the other end of the political spectrum, a series of splits and mergers were taking place. John Tyndall left the National Front to form the New National Front in 1980; the National Party also splintered from the National Front, as did the Constitutional Movement and the British Democratic Party. Various groups would come together in a Committee for Nationalist Unity (Copsey 2004:34) which would then go on to become the second incarnation of the British National Party under Tyndall’s leadership in 1982. Their ranks would be swelled by defectors from the British Movement, British Democratic Party, and National Party. They would eschew democratic and electoral politics for the first years of their existence. This would change in 1993 with the election of the British National Party’s first councillor, Derek Beackon, at a by-election for Millwall ward on the London Borough of Tower Hamlets.

**Millwall and the second British National Party**

The unexpected election of the first British National Party councillor in Millwall sent shockwaves through the political classes. The far right was meant to have been holed below the waterline in the late seventies, and yet they were not only back, but winning elections. Indeed, it had barely acknowledged electoral politics.
At the 1990 local council elections, Labour took all three Millwall seats. Tower Hamlets council consisted of thirty Liberal Democrats and twenty Labour representatives. However, the share of vote was extremely close, with the Liberal Democrats only coming three tenths of one percent ahead of Labour across the borough. As often happens, a by-election was needed in Millwall ward - there would be five by-elections across the London Borough of Tower Hamlets over the course of the four year term - to fill a vacated seat. The by-election was held on October 1st 1992. The British National Party candidate, Barry Osborne, received twenty per cent share of the vote; they had not even stood a candidate at the 1990 elections.

Turnout at the 1990 election was 41.3%. Unsurprisingly, the turnout for the by-election was lower, at 33.8%; however, this is not dramatically lower (Boothroyd nd). What, then, explains the British National Party’s success?

Millwall sits at the western half of the Isle of Dogs, a peninsula of north London sticking out into the Thames. A former industrial area based around the docks and later printing, it bore many of the features of similar urban areas in decline, not least unemployment. Docklands was starting to grow as a financial centre and the contrast between the wealth of the immediate north - the then-tallest building in the country, One Canada Square, was opened in 1991 - and the relative poverty of Millwall was stark. The Isle of Dogs also suffered from poor transport connections; it was literally the end of the line - the Docklands Light Railway terminated at Island Gardens - until 1999. It had a sense of community and distinct identity, perhaps best captured by the popular chant of Millwall Football Club: ‘No-one likes us, we don’t care’.

The BNP’s campaign in Millwall was called ‘Rights for Whites’. It capitalised on a perception that public monies in the borough were disproportionately going to Asian groups. Beyond this, however, the BNP ran a local campaign - targeting very specific areas where they believed their voters to be, addressing very local issues, and presenting themselves as a realistic choice to represent Millwall on Tower Hamlets council. Beyond the concerns over immigration and perceived favouritism towards non-white residents, the BNP also highlighted crime, disorder, and anti-social behaviour as issues they would address.

Following the British National Party’s (relative) success in Millwall, the Anti-Nazi League was restarted in 1992. Because of prior disagreements, Searchlight and Gerry Gable were not invited to take part, and the re-founded Anti-Nazi League was seen as very much a front group for its principal organisers, the Socialist Workers Party.

In an accident of history, another councillor would resign from Millwall ward in 1993. The by-election would be held on September 16th.
The re-formed Anti-Nazi League started working the Isle of Dogs. However, they did not have a history or presence in the area, and did not understand the effect that people coming in from outside would have. Copsey (2017:174) cites a local priest:

‘Like the BNP, they brought in large numbers of people from outside this well-boundaried and insular community to canvas [sic] door-to-door. On weekends near to the May elections there were running battles between rival groups. Islanders hated it, and the Anti-Nazi League got the reputation of being worst [sic] than the BNP who had done their best throughout to seem respectable and to appear as a party of law and order’.

Simultaneously, the Liberal Democrats distributed leaflets alleging favouritism to Asian communities; the then-leader of the Liberal Democrats, Paddy Ashdown, effectively disavowed the leaflets (BBC 1993), but the damage was done.

The total effect of social and economic disadvantage, legitimisation of the talking points of the far right by a mainstream party, a counter-productive campaign by opposition groups, and a British National Party that had been carefully campaigning for some time in the area was that the far right party would achieve its first electoral success.

Beackon’s tenure as a councillor was neither long nor glorious. Besides the expected condemnation from leading public figures, a cordon sanitaire was established by all other Tower Hamlets councillors, refusing to work with him in any way, and his lack of experience and knowledge of local government prevented him from being effective in his aims. Beackon would lose his seat at the scheduled 1994 local elections.

What explains the loss of the British National Party’s only councillor? In a word, turnout. Turnout in 1994 was 66.4% in Millwall (Boothroyd nd), and 53.6% across the borough (Boothroyd nd a), compared with 41.3% and 46.1% respectively at the previous scheduled election (a significant amount of the increase in the latter figure being the increase in the former).

With financial support from the Rowntree Trust, churches in the Isle of Dogs did a lot of work (Copsey 2017:176) registering voters and encouraging them to actually go to the polling station. There was a perception that the shock and opprobrium of having allowed themselves to be represented by a fascist caused turnout to go up itself (Rosenberg 2018). The Liberal Democrats, while still fielding a candidate, essentially did no campaigning in order to give Labour a clear run at the seat to defeat Beackon. Labour started addressing some of the issues of disconnection and anomie and highlighted what the British National Party stood for and its roots, in an echo of the articles in Searchlight. While there were still people coming in from outside to support the campaign against the British National Party, the organisation and leadership of the campaign had
a clear, local face. With that local lead from the Labour Party, other groups were not as likely to cause problems either between themselves or with the British National Party.

The British National Party’s raw vote actually went up between the 1993 by-election and the full election in 1994, from 1,480 to 2,041\(^\text{16}\). However, Labour’s vote more than doubled. Increasing turnout had diluted the vote for the far right party such that their share of vote was approximately one-quarter. A two-thirds turnout at a local election is stunningly high - only five percentage points short of the 71.3% across the country who voted at the next general election in 1997. The average turnout for the 1994 local elections was 41.5% (Boothroyd nd).

The late nineties

Despite the brief tenure of their councillor, the BNP were set to return to electoral politics. They would be doing so by attempting to change their image of being neo-Nazi thugs to one of speaking up for local people abandoned by the metropolitan elite and prohibited from speaking on the issue of immigration by a liberal consensus. This was established at a meeting of the BNP in January 1994 (Copsey 2017:177).

John Tyndall, the veteran fascist and still leader of the British National Party, contested the Dagenham by-election in June 1994 (Boothroyd nd). While Labour, predictably, won the seat with fully seventy-two per cent of the vote, Tyndall received over 1,500 votes, or just over seven per cent share of the vote.

Similarly, parts of the opposition to the far right also realised that their tactics would have to change to match the change from the British National Party.

The British National Party did not do particularly well at the 1997 general election, receiving a total of a little over thirty-five thousand votes across the fifty-seven seats they contested. They only exceeded five per cent share of the vote in three constituencies - Poplar & Canning Town (the constituency that included the Isle of Dogs and Millwall), the neighbouring Bethnal Green & Bow, and the Yorkshire seat of Dewsbury. Beyond this, the national political environment was did not favour the BNP. It was widely expected that the Labour Party, under Tony Blair, would win the election, though the magnitude of the victory took even them by surprise. The Conservatives under John Major did not tack right on immigration (Copsey 2017:180).

However, the British National Party were refining their campaign strategies, and ran enough candidates to garner both a party political broadcast and a free mailshot. This further

\[^{16}\text{2,041 votes went to Derek Beackon. The votes for the other two BNP candidates were 1,775 and 1,713.}\]
emphasised the need for the left to change tactics: the traditional anti-fascist response was not possible as there simply were not meetings and marches to disrupt.

Opposition to Tyndall’s leadership of the British National Party grew after 1997; the modernisers who had pushed for new campaign strategies in Millwall saw him as a block to future success, both because of his less than enthusiastic reception of those strategies, and because he was inescapably linked to the very image of neo-Nazi thuggery that they wished to avoid. Thus, in 1999, he was successfully challenged for the leadership of the British National Party by Nick Griffin.

That Griffin won as a moderniser indicates the change in his own politics. At the time of the Millwall by-election, Griffin said that

‘[t]he electors of Millwall did not back a post modernist rightist party, but what they perceived to be a strong, disciplined organisation with the ability to back up its slogan ‘Defend Rights for Whites’ with well-directed boots and fists’ (Eatwell and Mudde 2003:69)

Griffin himself had joined the British National Party at Tyndall’s behest, and edited their two publications - Rune and Spearhead. He had been associated with the ‘political soldier’ faction within the Party, ultimately deriving from Julius Evola’s almost vanguardist ideas. Nevertheless, he had seen, perhaps following on from Millwall, that a different route might actually achieve results for the far right politics he espoused or, at least, something close to it (Copsey 2004).

It took some years for the changes happening in the British National Party to come to fruition. With Millwall an apparent blip, by the late 1990s, the ARA, ANL, and others had split, disbanded, or otherwise disappeared from the scene. Red Action would go on to form its own political party, the Independent Working Class Association.

Meanwhile, the British National Party was starting to make inroads outside of London. They embedded themselves, in a manner not unlike the Golden Dawn of Greece, providing services and support to local communities from Tipton to Burnley to Oldham (Wilks-Heeg 2009).

This, then, sets the stage. The British National Party is moving on from a long tradition of, essentially, violent and physical control of streets as a means and end of political activity, with a view to overturning the state. It is taking on a new, decentralised, community-based form of campaigning. Meanwhile, the opposition to the far-right and fascism - the question of non-fascist parts of the far right not yet having been raised by UKIP - was abeyant and divided, and in large part still wedded to tactics that dated back to the 1920s.
Conclusion
A question was asked at the start of this chapter, following Renton (2001): do the practices of anti-fascist groups over time amount to a tradition?

In order to determine whether there is an anti-fascist tradition, the fascist tradition and relationship between it and anti-fascism was considered. For much of its existence, fascism focussed on physical control of areas; electoralism was a secondary consideration.

This chapter has sought to show that there are, in fact, three traditions to anti-fascism; intertwined, certainly, but nevertheless distinct. These, broadly, are physical confrontation, demonstration of opposition, and interference of operation.

The first, physical confrontation, comes from two parts. One is the desire for a direct challenge to the mere presence of fascists. The second comes from a similar view of the way in which society and the state are likely to develop - with a revolution - and the need to prepare the ground for that change.

Demonstration of opposition is essentially the manifestation of moral outrage, and to show that there are great numbers of people who wish to make it clear that the far right are not representative of the broader populace. In short, these are demonstrations of worthiness, unity, numbers, and commitment (WUNC) (Tilly 2004:53).

These traditions of interpretation can be seen coming together in Cable Street. What was it about Cable Street that mattered? Was it many people and peoples coming together, or was it that ‘the fash’ was turfed out of the area? Both answers would have their adherents; they would give rise to the WUNC-style concerts of Rock Against Racism and protests of the Anti-Nazi League, and they would give rise to the militancy of Lewisham. In both cases, however, there would be focus on signal events.

The third tradition dates back as far as Alfred and Ethel Holdsworth: finding out information about the far right that they would rather was not shared, and then sharing it. This continues with Searchlight, and with the Millwall campaign in 1994.

With the change in tactics from the British National Party in the closing years of the twentieth century, parts of the opposition to them realised that what mattered was not lots of people coming together as at Cable Street, Lewisham, Trafalgar Square, and countless other places, but getting lots of people to do the dull, unglamorous, unexciting work of campaigning: knocking on doors, managing databases, and getting voters to polls.
Certain other trends can be discerned. Firstly, there is a symbiotic relationship between fascism and anti-fascism. This manifests in two forms. One is that both regard the other as a particular threat and particularly infamous. They regard each other as a particular evil, in a manner that the long political stretch between them is not. Frequently, they have similar views about the state, though to different ends, as a liberal cypher. As such, not just frequent, physical confrontation between them is seen, but an active desire to fight the opposition. The second is that anti-fascists have been incapable of maintaining a substantial level of activity, awareness, and preparation when there is not a clear and present threat from fascists. As the threat fades, so does anti-fascism.

This chapter has set out the interconnected history of the far right and groups that oppose the far right. The next chapter provides more detail on the specific parties and opposition groups under study: the British National Party, United Kingdom Independence Party, Hope not Hate, and Unite Against Fascism.
Chapter 5 - The parties and the opposition groups

To the sea the barbarians drive us, to the barbarians the sea drive us;
Between these two our burials are to be butchered or be drowned

-Gemitus Britannorum, or the Groans of the Britons,
as recorded in Gildas’ On the Ruin of Britain

Introduction

This chapter details UKIP, the BNP, Hope not Hate, and Unite Against Fascism. It sets out their development, worldview, and how those affect and inform how they campaign today.

In the literature review, a dichotomy within the far right party family are identified. The two sides are variously called neo-fascism and neo-populism (Taggart 1995), authoritarian and libertarian (Betz 1994), and traditional and post-industrial (Ignazi 2003). As the precise nature of the split and the specific characteristics of the two groups are of secondary importance for the purposes of the present study, the simpler, if less specific, terms of fascist and populist radical right are adopted.

For the purposes of this chapter, a fascist party is one that has ‘[a]n ideology that strives to forge social rebirth based on a holistic-national radical Third Way, though in practice fascism has tended to stress style, especially action and the charismatic leader, more than detailed programme, and to engage in a Manichaean demonisation of its enemies’ (Eatwell 1996:313).

A populist radical right party is ‘nativist, authoritarian, and populist’ (Mudde 2007:22). Nativism is nationalism and xenophobia combined (Mudde 2007); populism is a division of society into ‘the pure people’ and ‘the corrupt elite’ (Mudde 2004:544).

Essential differences are attitudes to democracy and the quasi-mystical. Though it may participate in elections as a means to advance its goals, a fascist party is fundamentally anti-democratic; the will of the people, manifest in a leader, is not to be stymied by bureaucratic machinations. A populist radical right party may advocate a particular form of direct democracy and advance many doubts about current structures, but it is in some manner committed to the idea of a popular mandate verified at the ballot box.

A fascist party also has a quasi-mystical offering of a national rebirth - Roger Griffin’s palingenesis (Griffin 1991) - and that the shadowed world in which we live will be swept away to
create a place for new men. Populist radical right parties may want radical changes to the political establishment, but their ambitions are less esoteric.

There is broad agreement in the literature that the British National Party may be understood as fascist (for instance, Sykes 2004, Copsey 2004, Goodwin 2011) and that the United Kingdom Independence Party may be characterised as populist radical right (Ford and Goodwin 2014a, Gruber and Bale 2014, Clarke et al 2016). This agreement is not, however, complete, with Mudde (2007) considering the British National Party as populist radical right.

The United Kingdom Independence Party

How did UKIP come to be?
The history of UKIP can be summed up in relatively short order. It was founded by Alan Sked in 1991 as the Anti-Federalist League to oppose British participation in the Treaty on European Union (TEU), better known in the UK by the name of the Dutch city in which it was signed in 1992: Maastricht. When TEU was eventually passed by the House of Commons by the narrowest of majorities17, it became apparent that a different tack would be needed. Rather than limit itself to scepticism about the European project, the new United Kingdom Independence Party, founded in 1993, would have as its leitmotif the withdrawal of the country from the European Union.

UKIP’s first years were challenging. With few supporters, little money, and hardly any organisational capacity, it limped along, in Michael Howard’s words, as cranks and gadflies. From shortly after its formation until the death of its founder, Sir Jimmy Goldsmith, in 1997, they had to compete with (and were out-competed by) the Referendum Party, a mix of pressure group and political party (Carter et al. 1998). After the 1997 General Election, Alan Sked would leave both the leadership and the party itself, seeing it as best hopeless and at worst beset by racists. UKIP itself could not decide whether to be a single issue group, looking to force a shift against the European project amongst the Conservative Party, or whether it wanted to be a proper party in its own right (Ford and Goodwin 2014a:25)

With the turn of the millennium, UKIP’s fortunes would start to change. The 1999 elections saw their first representatives returned to the European Parliament. A new leader, Michael Holmes, provided funding and a degree of stability. However, internecine struggles would rear their head again for UKIP, as Holmes and the other two MEPs elected in 1999, Nigel Farage and Jeffery

17 By a single vote. The original count on Labour’s Social Chapter amendment was 317 in favour and 317 against, and Speaker Boothroyd cast a deciding vote against the amendment. A later check revealed that there had actually been 316 votes in favour. John Major’s substantive motion fell by eight votes, forcing him to re-hold the vote the next day as a confidence vote.
Titford, disagreed over the direction of the party. Such was the acrimony that Holmes became the second leader not just to stand down but to leave the party.

Ford and Goodwin (2014a:12) sum up the situation: ‘the party repeatedly undermined their own prospects through fierce infighting, strategic miscalculations, single-issue obsessiveness and a failure to build an effective campaign organisation’.

In 1997, the Labour Party returned to power after eighteen years of Conservative administrations. Alongside the implementation of major policy changes during their long absence from Downing Street, Labour had changed its image. While this appealed to a certain demographic necessary to win elections, it alienated, or risked alienating, much of the traditional, ‘Old Labour’ bases of support.

The period of the Blair ministries would translate into a pair of factors would combine to give UKIP the space to flourish. One is the phenomenon of the ‘left behind’ (Ford and Goodwin 2014a); a group of people, generally older, white, less educated, with less secure or no employment, whose expectations of how their lives would develop were not met, and who, losing their natural political home in the Labour Party, became alienated from politics more broadly. The other was the decision by the Labour government not to impose transitional controls on the rights of citizens from the so-called A1018 - the ten states that joined the EU in 2004 - to move to and work in the United Kingdom (Evans and Mellon 2019).

In 2004 UKIP achieved its best election results to date, coming third in the European elections with sixteen per cent of the vote and returning a dozen MEPs to Brussels. With the advice of the veteran American political consultant, Dick Morris, UKIP ran an extensive billboard campaign.

The same year saw the faintly surreal episode of a former Labour MP turned talk show host, Robert Kilroy-Silk, joining UKIP, being elected as an MEP on their ticket, trying to take over as leader, failing, and then leaving and forming his own party, Veritas. Despite the strangeness of the events, UKIP did appear to benefit from Kilroy-Silk’s brief dalliance. He was well known through his day-time television programme, and the very fact of a former Labour MP saying that UKIP was the party for him was significant.

While Labour opened space for UKIP, its opposition did not for some time. The Conservative Party had gone through a long period of introspection following the disaster of the 1997 General Election. It had, under William Hague, Iain Duncan Smith, and Michael Howard, adopted tougher and tougher stances on Europe and immigration (Ford and Goodwin 2014a:38), culminating in the

18 Cyprus, Czechia, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia.
‘Are You Thinking What We’re Thinking?’ series of billboards of the 2005 general election campaign, which included ‘It’s not racist to impose limits on immigration’. Under David Cameron, the party would attempt to detoxify itself, including on immigration.

The following year, Nigel Farage became UKIP leader. Farage would act as a figure around which the party could rally and provide stability and organisation, as well as attracting funding. With the exception of a year in which Lord Pearson of Rannoch ran the party, he would serve as leader for ten years.

The result, after a difficult first few years, was a party that both recognised the importance of the media and knew how to use it and how to drive it; that had a developing organisational capacity; that had political space between it and its closest major party, the Conservatives; that had a narrative from the governing party of disconnection from its traditional basis of support; that had a rising concern about immigration and Europe. European elections would remain the high water marks for UKIP, with the MPs expenses scandal of 2009 making that year's elections something of a spring tide.

**What does UKIP stand for?**

The principal raison d’etre for the United Kingdom Independence Party has been the United Kingdom’s independence from the European Union. Whether it should develop a broader platform than that was one of the internal debates in the party’s early years. By the time of Nigel Farage’s ascension to the leadership, the matter had been settled in favour of UKIP presenting itself as a full-service party, with policies across the range of government functions, rather than a single-issue campaign group.

While Europe remained the theme that linked them, UKIP did develop a range of other policies. A tension with UKIP was between a libertarian, market-oriented tendency (Ford and Goodwin 2014a:7) and the more populist variant that would win out. The libertarian tendency was in favour of a small state with limited taxation and government spending. It saw the EU as increasingly a project of ‘big government’ with an expansive vision of social policy. This was coupled with concerns about the perceived lack of democratic accountability in the functioning of the European Union. These concerns merged into sovereignist concerns - essentially, that the *demos* and the *polis* should be coterminous in order for the *polis* to be properly represented. This also shows a connection between the libertarian and populist tendencies. The populist tendency was essentially a text-book rendering of Mudde’s (2004) understanding of the term: a counterposition of a ‘pure people’ with a ‘corrupt elite’ coupled with the view ‘that politics should be an expression of the *volonté générale* (general will) of the people’ (Mudde 2005:543). Thus, plebiscitary politics, hostility to the elite’s projects, and a range of ‘common sense’ policies
that would appeal to the broader population but not *bien-pensants* liberal elites such as support for capital punishment, would emerge.

The libertarian and populist tendencies could appear to be in tension, as the former focuses on a small state and the latter allows, at least in certain circumstances, for a very large state. Given the experience of Thatcherism in Britain, which itself merged free market economics and traditional values\(^\text{19}\), and the connections with the United States, where the Republican Party managed these two wings through the doctrine of fusionism, this tension could be managed. However, the more populist variant won out. As early as 2004, as well as concerns about the EU spending British money, UKIP was talking about immigration (Ford and Goodwin 2014:60). As migration increased as a concern, so did UKIP’s focus on it (Ford and Goodwin 2014a:64). By the 2009 election, with the scandal around MPs’ expenses having damaged the standing of the political elite in society, UKIP was further pushed to emphasise the classic distinction made by populists between mass and elite.

The libertarian tendency manifested in support for flat taxes, but UKIP’s principal area of interest became the populist staples of the disconnected elite, Europe, immigration, and Islam and their effect on autochthonous culture.

Beyond the above, the strategy under Nigel Farage was to pick up those issues that the mainstream parties either could not touch for ideological reasons or would not touch because of their toxicity (Lynch et al 2011). This strategy had the effect of giving UKIP unique positions and talking points across a broad range of issues.

**How does UKIP campaign?**

It is useful here to distinguish between two broad areas of campaigning in British politics: the air war, or national-level, broadcast media and similar; and the ground war, or the time-honoured practice of locally-organised volunteers knocking on doors and having conversations with voters (Mullen 2016).

The air war is, to paraphrase Joseph Kennedy, Sr, selling candidates like soap flakes. It uses mass communications - television spots, seeking coverage in the press, billboard posters, and the like - to transmit the party’s messages to as many people as possible.

An important distinction within the air war is between earned and unearned coverage. Unearned coverage is that which is simply paid for by an organisation (Stephen and Galak 2012). Earned

\(^{19}\) Margaret Thatcher specifically said she was trying to bring back Victorian social mores, and famously described FA von Hayek’s *Constitution of Liberty* as ‘this is what we believe’.
coverage is that which an organisation – in this case, a political party – has not paid for, but has obtained by being newsworthy, or by shifting the media agenda to cover areas where it feels it has relative strength. The example par excellence of earned media is Donald Trump.

The ground war operates with varying levels of sophistication. At its most basic, it consists of a clipboard, a list of addresses, a stack of leaflets, and a stout pair of shoes. It ranges up to databases matched with demographic segmentation and information on whether people vote and how often, using mobile apps, to allow precise targeting of messages. The aim is to have conversations (or the appearance of conversations) with as many potential voters as possible, with the intention of making sure your voters turn out and convincing others to vote for you.

The two different domains of campaigning have different requirements. The ground war is organised at a very local level, often by individual ward. Above all, it needs volunteers who will spend time on this laborious exercise. The air war depends on having a clear set of messages - these are often used as part of the ground war, but are set at the national or regional rather than local level - and communicating them to as many people as possible. This means a national media operation and, of course, money.

UKIP faced a similar problem to the Social Democratic Party. In 1981, four senior members of the Labour Party - David Owen, Shirley Williams, Roy Jenkins, and Bill Rodgers - left, soon to form the Social Democratic Party, unable to stay in the tent as Labour moved to an increasingly hard left position. Although the Liberal-SDP Alliance would receive around one vote in ten at both the 1983 and 1987 General Elections, they would only manage to see six and then five MPs returned.

Given their situation, the ideal choice for UKIP would have been to soak particular areas. It did make efforts to do so at by-elections (Ford and Goodwin 2014a:243). However, by-elections, by virtue of being outside the usual electoral calendar, operate differently to scheduled elections. Because, for instance, by-elections to the parliament at Westminster will generally be the only poll happening on that day, the national parties can dedicate a great deal of resource - including rounding up supporters from across the country to come and campaign - to the seat. The same applies for local parties and council by-elections.

UKIP did make attempts to copy the successful tactics of the Liberal Democrats, who had also learnt from the problems faced by their predecessors in the Social Democratic Party, in working particular areas over a period of time, particularly after that tactic proved successful in Ramsey (Ford and Goodwin 2014a:94). However, UKIP lacked the dedicated base of supporters and organisers to make this a viable strategy across the country.
This local strategy was not what UKIP, ultimately, used. This was partially for the deficit mentioned above, but also because of the resources it had at its disposal.

What UKIP did have was money, both from individual rich donors who gave substantial amounts of money, like the aforementioned Lord Pearson of Rannoch, and from larger numbers of donors of more ordinary means. This would allow for an effective air war campaign, including large numbers of posters in UKIP’s distinctive purple and yellow colours, as Dick Morris advised.

UKIP also talked about issues that other parties did not, and talked about issues that other parties would cover, but in different ways (Lynch et al. 2011). This is immediately attractive to the press on the ‘man bites dog’ principle. It also allowed it to express its distinctiveness to voters. The result was that UKIP placed far more relative importance than any other party on ‘impacting the media agenda [from 2009 to 2015]’ (Lilleker 2016:88).

It should be emphasised that one of the main targets of UKIP’s criticism (which would appear to have found some popular favour) was a disconnected, metropolitan, liberal elite. This broad criticism of the political class was a simple-to-understand, eye-catching story that the media - and certain parts of the media in particular - would spread. This is a hallmark of populism: the honest, good mass of people let down by the machinations of a small elite.

Having a clear set of messages from the central party also helped to deal with the crankish tendency within UKIP, both by convincing members to stick to a narrative and so that unusual proclamations by candidates could easily be disavowed.

There is a question as to which way the arrow of causation falls between media coverage and public interest. It is argued in general both that the media follow the lead of the public (Pauwels 2010) and that the media, in fact, lead the public (Boomgaard and Vliegenthart 2007). In the specific case of UKIP, it appears that media interests largely drives public interest (Murphy and Devine 2018). Either way, ‘mass media is widely considered to be an important resource for social movements’ (Davidson and Berezin 2018:487) - including their manifestations as political parties.

The above was summed up by Farage on taking over the leadership of UKIP: 'I said I would do the three M’s: media, messaging and money’ (Ford and Goodwin 2014a:90).

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20 ‘When a dog bites a man, that is not news, because it happens so often. But if a man bites a dog, that is news’ (Bartlett and Kaplan 1992).
21 Such as when a UKIP candidate for the Commons advocated repealing the Representation of the People Act 1832, better known as the Great Reform Act, which greatly extended the franchise (Bienkov 2014).
The British National Party

The British National Party in the Twenty-First Century

Partly because of its longer history, the British National Party and its antecedents are more studied than the United Kingdom Independence Party. The British National Party is therefore treated at greater length above and it would be otiose to more than recapitulate it. The key features are that it is the latest in a long line of parties that trace their lineage back to the fascism of the period immediately before the Second World War and beyond (Eatwell and Mudde 2003); that it remains a fascist party; that it has a history of confrontation with anti-fascist groups based on a particular understanding of the motivations of said groups; it has a particular, *Fuehrerprinzip*-like focus on the leader of the party; it expresses opposition to immigration qua immigration rather than about its effects on culture; and, despite its protestations to the contrary, maintains a fundamental belief in a biological difference between races, and the superiority of certain races over others (Copsey 2017).

The BNP had long expected a crisis - which, in the end would arrive at approximately the same time as Godot - and so their strategy had been to appear 'strong' so that they could capitalise upon it when it arrived (Goodwin 2011:71).

Most recently, it had, following the sparks of some success, started a turn towards electoral politics after years of either total disengagement with electoral politics or a desultory acknowledgment of it.

The British National Party’s first flash of electoral success came, as mentioned, in Millwall in 1992. The success came from a couple of sources. One was the particular nature of the area - insular, working-class, with housing as a particular issue, and with a Liberal Democrat campaign that had legitimised racialized discourse on housing. The particular, aggressive style of campaigning by groups opposed to the BNP inflamed the matter. The second was that the BNP were already ensconced in the area, with the local organiser, Eddy Butler, having led the party to capture one-fifth of the vote at the 1990 local elections.

The BNP would not capitalise on that spark for some time. Its founder and leader, John Tyndall, remained wedded to a worldview that was becoming out of date even for the BNP. It would not be until 1999 that the BNP would begin to change, with Nick Griffin elected as leader after a group of moderates ousted Tyndall in the party’s first leadership election. Griffin was an unlikely choice of new broom. He had been brought into the British National Party by Tyndall himself; he argued that the BNP’s success in Millwall had been due to the party’s readiness for violence (Eatwell and Mudde 2003:69).
Griffin learnt, however, from the French Front National, which had moderated its image to successfully compete at the ballot box (Copsey 2011a). Having been a member of the Julius Evola-inspired Political Soldier faction, Griffin now wanted to make himself and his party more saleable (Panorama, 2001), though without changing their commitment to, for instance, mass repatriation of non-whites (Panorama, 2001). Combined with the ballot-box successes that the BNP had had by moderating its image, this was enough to convince Griffin (Goodwin 2011:66). He would lead the BNP by aping the FN (Macklin 2011:19).

This strategy manifested itself in several ways. The party tried to professionalise itself, so as to share best practice, campaign more effectively, solidify its esprit de corps, and avoid people going off-message with its first annual college in October 2001 (Copsey 2004:136). Nick Griffin tried to brand the BNP’s areas of interest as ‘security, freedom, identity, democracy’ (Rhodes 2011b:63) as less scary than out-and-out racism, even if in the BNP’s hands they amounted to the same thing. This was part of making the BNP more media-friendly (Copsey and Macklin 2011:83). From 2007, Jim Dowson came in as the BNP’s fundraiser at Griffin’s behest (Gable 2012), though they would fall out by 2010 (Gable 2012). Dowson, later connected with Britain First (Electoral Commission 2017), had been associated with hardline unionism and anti-abortion activism in Northern Ireland.

A training programme and media monitoring unit - largely a media response unit - were established (Copsey 2004:107). ‘Circles’, or front groups, through which supporters could be brought into the party from particular groups - veterans, families, businesspeople, and so on - were established (Copsey 2004:108). This also allowed plausibly independent groups to put out messages that just so happened to accord with the BNP’s viewpoints.

A new membership system, Voting Membership, was introduced (Copsey 2004:171; Goodwin 2011:90). Before members were eligible to vote on, for instance, the party’s policies or leadership, they had to have been a member for two years, then spend a further year as probationer during which time they were expected to attend educational sessions, make financial contributions, and fulfil a certain amount of campaigning. This effectively built a cadre of core members on which the party could rely - for money, for working, and for not rocking the boat.

**How does the BNP campaign?**

By 2001, the BNP was running a reasonably professional campaign (Copsey 2004:139), making use of electoral rolls (Copsey 2004:120) and engaging in the process of doorknocking and canvassing. It would make use of such opportunities as it had to broadcast its message - at the inaugural election of the Mayor of London, it spent the £20,000 necessary on a deposit for a candidate,
Michael Newland, with the effect that every elector in London received a copy of its election address.\textsuperscript{22}

The BNP had the opposite of UKIP’s resource situation. The clouds of opprobrium around the party meant that, excepting the occasional bequest, finances were always tight. It never succeeded in persuading the media to push their narratives, or at least present them for discussion. Indeed, Griffin and the BNP had to deal with outright hostility to them and their messages when they did appear in the media (Goodman and Johnson 2013). However, the same stigma that affected the BNP in broadcasting has the perverse effect of helping the party when it came to campaigning. The very act of publicly associating with a party perceived by most people as beyond the pale forms an in-group, and strengthens members’ identification with the group. This makes them more willing to undertake activities for the party (Moreland and Levine 1982). The effect is that, while lucre was short, committed volunteers are not, at least relative to the size of the party.

The BNP could not campaign across the country – it did not have the resources – so it chose particular areas (Goodwin 2011:71). Based on experiences dating back to Millwall, the National Front in Bury St. Edmunds (Goodwin 2011), and elsewhere, the BNP developed a community-based campaign strategy in areas it felt could yield results.

The aim of this strategy was to build from the lowest levels of government up; by starting with single councillors and growing, the intention was to take whole councils, European parliamentary seats and, perhaps, seats in the Westminster parliament.

The BNP targeted ‘Old Labour’ wards – not the poorest, but those that were likely to be concerned about the future and disconnected from politics. They were not wards with a large immigrant population (Goodwin 2011). In this, they were seeking a similar base of support to UKIP’s ‘left behind’. In particular, they sought areas that Labour had not assiduously worked.

The campaign started with very basic, low-level campaigning – litter picking, concerns about dog fouling – that allowed the BNP to present itself as non-threatening and ‘getting the job done’. This would build to voter identification, and into a traditional, ground war campaign (Goodwin 2011).

\textsuperscript{22} Although the cost of production is borne by the candidate, the Representation of the People Act 1983 provides for candidates to certain elections to have an election address delivered to every elector. They are sometimes combined together into a single booklet. The practice was originally provided for in the Representation of the People Act 1918, which has since been repealed.
The opposition groups

One of the arguments made in the present thesis is the lack of study of opposition to the far right in general, and of recent forms of opposition in particular. Indeed, addressing this gap is one of the aims of this thesis. However, this does mean the available literature on the two particular groups of interest to this study is very limited. Including references to newspaper articles and the occasional use of the term without reference to the organisation, Google Scholar only yields slightly more than three hundred mentions of Unite Against Fascism, and a little more than four hundred for Hope not Hate. By contrast, the singer Barry Manilow returns more than two and a half thousand results. The following two sections regrettably rely, therefore, on a limited literature, supplemented by the organisations’ own publications and interviews.

How Unite Against Fascism campaigns

The stated aim of Unite Against Fascism was to increase voter turnout to dilute any vote for the far right (Copsey 2011b:134; Unite Against Fascism 2018). This aim was to be achieved through a variety of means: rallies, protests, concerts, carnivals, leafleting (Unite Against Fascism 2018). The specific heritage of Cable Street and hallowed traditions of anti-fascist protest were driving forces behind this strategy (Unite Against Fascism 2018). There was co-operation with Love Music Hate Racism - a revival of Rock Against Racism - and using celebrities and people generally in the public eye to attract attention to campaigns was a deliberate strategy - ‘getting high profile people speaking out’ (Unite Against Fascism 2018).

The importance of working with local people was emphasised by Unite Against Fascism (2018). However, this aim appears to have been more aspiration than achievement, with Unite Against Fascism themselves acknowledging that their inspiration were national campaigns and that localisation was secondary (Unite Against Fascism 2018).

The messaging around the BNP was that it was a Nazi party, and so the BNP and what it stood for had to be rejected in toto. A difference was recognised between the BNP and UKIP, in that UKIP was not, for Unite Against Fascism, a fascist party (Unite Against Fascism 2018). A separate campaign, Stand up to Racism, was established in 2014 so that similar groups to Unite Against Fascism could work against UKIP without labelling it as fascist, which was felt would lead to either confusion or rejection of their messaging. However, Unite Against Fascism was itself engaged in activity against UKIP at least as early as 2004 and Unite Against Fascism promoted Stand Up to Racism on their own website (Unite Against Fascism 2013).

A particular feature of Unite Against Fascism campaigning was the desire for physical control of streets. This tactic originates in the perceived threat of far-right mobilisation in the 1930s and
1970s, and became part of the repertoire of anti-fascism. Although Unite Against Fascism acknowledge that, by the 2000s, the BNP were campaigning in a novel way, Unite Against Fascism maintained the desire to keep opponents it considered beyond the pale from carrying out their activities.

This leads to a broader point. The very nature of this style of campaigning invites controversy; physically contesting control of streets, regardless of the cause, will not be universally popular. Physical damage is done to the public realm, a day’s takings are lost to local business, and the local constabulary must shoulder the cost of policing the event. These consequences may affect an organisation’s image - in this case, Unite Against Fascism’s - even if it was physically confronting (say) the English Defence League instead of UKIP.

In this was an explicit criticism of previous, less militant anti-fascist activity - ‘what’s the use of demonstrating the day before or the day after the fascists are in town?’ (Unite Against Fascism 2018) - where direct, physical confrontation with their opponents had been avoided, as happened at Cable Street, Lewisham, and elsewhere. Unite Against Fascism deliberately maintain a connection to this tradition - ‘You know it’s principle for us. We don’t give up the streets if possible to fascists, and when they come to town we should be there’ (Unite Against Fascism 2018) - and implicitly criticise the more hands-off tradition and its descendants in Hope not Hate.

The aim, in short, is to draw as much attention as possible to the campaign in a given area in as short a time as possible. The campaign therefore also tends to move around the country, spending relatively little time in one area, and generally congregating in metropolises. Unite Against Fascism’s campaigning is also against a variety of targets - UKIP and the BNP, but also the remnants of the National Front and the English Defence League and its splinters - as well as (for instance) demonstrating outside the Greek Embassy in regards to Golden Dawn and marching for justice for the murdered black American teenager, Trayvon Martin. Because of the relative lack of focus, there is manifestly the potential for spill-over - where perceptions of one particular campaign affect perceptions of another, including negatively.

As will become clear when compared with Hope not Hate, Unite Against Fascism is a relatively informal organisation. It is not registered either with Companies House or the Charity Commission and so, technically speaking, is an unincorporated association by default.

**Relations with other groups**

There is a relationship between the Socialist Workers Party and Unite Against Fascism. Indeed, one of UAF’s founders, Weyman Bennett, was a senior figure in the party. This relationship has attracted comment because of the Trotskyite tendency towards setting up front groups, with the
suggestion that Unite Against Fascism is effectively a cipher for the Socialist Workers Party (Toube 2009).

Founded by Tony Cliff, The Socialist Workers Party emerged from the International Socialists, which in turn emerged from the Socialist Review Group (Birchall 2010). The doctrinal differences between the Socialist Workers Party and other groups on the far left are beyond the scope of this thesis, but it sits within the Trotskyite tradition (Høgsbjerg 2019). This tradition, dating to its eponymous founder, saw the Communist Party as the means for the proletariat to achieve class consciousness (Hallas 2018); this would later be transferred from the party of Lenin to a variety of successor parties. Because of the need to promote this class consciousness, later Trotskyite groups, including the SWP, would engage in the practice of setting up front groups (Kelly 2018) as a means of reaching people with particular issues who might not otherwise be interested in the class struggles, a Trotskyite view of the world, or a given Trotskyite party. The implied criticism of such front groups is that they are there to advance the interests of the party behind them, rather than the cause itself.

It is not in doubt that there is a close relationship between the Socialist Workers Party and Unite Against Fascism. The question, in essence, is whether Unite Against Fascism has a life of its own, or can only be understood as acting to promote the Socialist Workers Party’s view of the world.

Kelly (2018:200) identifies three types of social movement in which Trotskyites are involved: ‘broad social movements’, in which Trotskyite groups are present but not dominant; ‘social movements initiated and led by Trotskyists’; and ‘Trotskyist front organisations’. Kelly (2018:200) gives Unite Against Fascism as being a member of the second group, and describes the Anti-Nazi League as being in the same group, suggesting a certain continuity between the two. This category into which the UAF falls dates back to the ‘united front’ agreements on pressing issues with social democrats in the twenties (Kelly 2018:21)

As with the Anti-Nazi League (Hain 2018), the Socialist Workers Party did not set up Unite Against Fascism alone; indeed, even Searchlight/Hope not Hate were involved with it (Lowles 2014). This suggests a perceived need to work with other groups because of the importance of the issue: opposing fascism. Fascism is seen as uniquely bad because of the specific antagonism towards communism (of whichever variety) and its capacity to divert the proletariat from class consciousness. It must be opposed because it is the antithesis of the good represented by the party. Beyond this, from the 1970s on, there was an increased focus on the nexus of race and class on the far left (Virdee 2014); how much of this was because the increased diversity of the working class in the UK led to new perspectives and an increased appreciation of the connections between
race and politics, and how much was simply capitalizing on an opportunity to gain members is a difficult question to answer; however, the effect happened.

In short, Unite Against Fascism’s aims and the Socialist Workers Party’s aims were, in this terrain, largely the same; the SWP were genuinely concerned about an emerging far right threat and returned to the tactics that it felt had successfully halted the National Front in the 1970s. That is not to say that the Socialist Workers Party did not benefit from Unite Against Fascism activities. It strains plausibility to suggest that members of the Socialist Workers Party would not strike up conversations with attendees at demonstrations, at least occasionally with a view to gauging someone’s politics and prospects as a member or supporter. Nor is it to say that the Socialist Workers Party did not seek greater control over Unite Against Fascism; Renton (2014) highlights disputes with Sabby Dhalu of the National Association Against Racism (influenced by another Trotskyite group, Socialist Action) over black leadership of anti-fascist activity, as well as the aforementioned falling out between UAF and Searchlight/Hope not Hate. Moreover, SWP members would have shaped the UAF’s own worldview. However, the close cooperation with Labour in Barking (Hodge 2018) suggests that there must have been a preparedness to work with others without worrying about the effects for the SWP.

The relationship with the SWP would include some compatibility of worldview. This may further explain Unite Against Fascism’s failings; McGowan and Keith (2016) find a limited ability for radical left wing parties to draw on the same social bases of support as far right parties – principally white men. This lack of understanding or appeal on the electoral stage may also apply when seeking votes against a party instead of for one.

A particular problem with examining this relationship is that representatives of Unite Against Fascism are unlikely to admit that they were, should it be true, running the organization in the interests of the Socialist Workers Party. However, the fact that Unite Against Fascism is influenced by, rather than dominated by, the Socialist Workers Party, with other organisations involved in it; and that there is a genuine opposition to fascism, however understood, within Trotskyism suggest that Unite Against Fascism was principally operating in accordance with its nomenclature rather than just to advance the interests of the Socialist Workers Party qua the Socialist Workers Party. The presence, however, of members of the SWP in the leadership of Unite Against Fascism would shape exactly how those interests were understood, and do not mean that the SWP did not make the most of the opportunities afforded to it by Unite Against Fascism’s campaigns.
How Hope not Hate campaigns

Based on an understanding of changing drivers for votes for the far right and coupled with the experiences of the Millwall by-election, Hope not Hate developed a particular style of campaigning based on three strands. These were briefing and working with local stakeholders in at-risk wards; mobilising a network of leafletters; and voter ID or canvassing to find anti-BNP voters.

At-risk wards were identified through a mixture of reasoned guesswork, knowledge through local contacts, and Hope not Hate’s own investigative capacity. Working with stakeholders was to establish a degree of trust and understanding, and to give access to volunteers. These groups would include trades unions, local Labour branches, faith groups, community groups, and the like (Copsey 2011b:133). Voter ID was similar to that described above as part of the ‘ground war’ in campaigning, but was with the purpose of campaigning against rather than for a party.

Partly because of the desire to show local links, and partly because of the simple lack of people to set up groups everywhere, Hope not Hate initially worked with pre-existing local groups. It would later set up locally-branded groups itself. Thus, leaflets about specific local issues and newspapers for specific local areas were produced (Lowles 2014). These leaflets would deal with ‘difficult topics’ (Copsey 2011b:133), including issues around the sexual grooming of minors associated with Asian gangs. This would be a source of conflict with Unite Against Fascism in future.

Hope not Hate would also pioneer new types of campaigning made possible by developments in information technology (Grindrod and Rusling 2007:x), including retaining the services of Blue State Digital (Lowles 2014:130), which had spun off from Howard Dean’s pioneering campaigning in his (ultimately unsuccessful) bid to the Democratic nominee for President of the United States. Much of this would become standard fare for British political parties and, indeed, non-party campaigns, but was novel in 2005.

One of Hope not Hate’s intents was to remain actively engaged in an area. Sending out small groups ran into the problem of interference and intimidation from BNP campaigners. Their solution was the day of action (Lowles 2014:56); sending out lots of people across a given area, such that numbers provided safety. These would be repeated at intervals, often with large numbers of people - into the hundreds (Goodwin 2011:14); Hope not Hate also worked with local media, particularly local newspapers, providing information from their own intelligence and trying to turn them against the far right.
In short, Hope not Hate’s campaigning was localised, information-driven, and engaged with ‘difficult’ issues.

**Relations with other groups**

Hope not Hate had critiques of both the Labour Party and Unite Against Fascism. In the case of Labour, Hope not Hate saw its leadership as viewing the BNP as a transient electoral threat rather than anything else, and not recognising that it represented a more fundamental change in voting behaviour (Copsey 2005:198). This criticism was shared by several Parliamentarians (Hodge 2018; Cruddas 2018; Hain 2018), who all claimed to have raised the issue of the BNP with the then Prime Minister, Tony Blair, and the Downing Street Director of Strategy, Alastair Campbell.

The relationship with Unite Against Fascism was strained. Where Unite Against Fascism retained a traditional style of anti-fascist campaigning, Hope not Hate, as described above, was trying something new. More of a problem was a set of disagreements that predated the period of time of the study over how to deal with (perceived) anti-white racism. Hope not Hate produced a leaflet setting out a position against all racism and violence in Oldham (Lowles 2014:32) that the Anti-Nazi League refused to hand out. At the same time, the ANL held a march in Manchester city centre - not Oldham - that Hope not Hate saw as a waste of time and resources (Lowles 2014:42).

The trade unions would broker a meeting between Hope not Hate and Unite Against Fascism in 2004 with the former joining the latter’s steering committee for a time. No real reconciliation would emerge, and by 2005 the groups would again work separately, with Unite Against Fascism calling Hope not Hate Islamophobic, and Hope not Hate seeing Unite Against Fascism as not willing to tackle difficult subjects (Lowles 2014:77). Unite Against Fascism saw Hope not Hate as giving ground - literally - to the BNP and EDL (Unite Against Fascism 2018).

A specific criticism made by Hope not Hate of Unite Against Fascism was that other national groups came and went without putting down roots in a community (Macklin 2011b:32). Moreover, Hope not Hate argued that it was insufficient to simply brand the BNP in particular as Nazis; it did not match what people were experiencing from BNP campaigners on their doorstep.

As mentioned, Hope not Hate had relations with the Labour Party - sometimes strained at the national level, but often effective at the local level. This should not be taken as it being a cipher for the Labour Party; Nick Lowles, for instance, helped with speechwriting for the then-leader of the Conservatives, Michael Howard (Lowles 2014:55).

The final major group with which Hope not Hate enjoyed close relations was the trade union movement. Unite provided office space for Hope not Hate (Cruddas 2018); various unions provided monies to the organisation, through direct grants and advertising in Hope not Hate’s
magazine. Local union branches were also contacted by Hope not Hate when they started looking at an area, both for information about the area and as a source of volunteers.

Having set out information on the two parties and two opposition groups in this chapter, chapter six presents the results of the quantitative analysis. This chapter has set out information on the British National Party and United Kingdom Independence Party on the one hand, and Unite Against Fascism and Hope not Hate on the other. As well as setting out some of the history of the BNP and UKIP, it has focussed on how they campaign and why they campaign in their respective manners. Furthermore, it has set out how the two opposition groups campaign against the BNP and UKIP, building on their historical development as set out in chapter four. In the next chapter, the results of the quantitative analysis of the effects of activities by Unite Against Fascism and Hope not Hate on the United Kingdom Independence Party and the British National Party are set out in order to show what measurable effects they have.
Chapter 6 – Quantitative results

Thus must we toil in other men’s extremes,
That know not how to remedy our own.

- The Spanish Tragedie, Thomas Kyd

Introduction

This chapter reports the results of the quantitative section of the analyses conducted for this thesis set out in the chapter of research design, data, and methods.

It presents the output of each regression in turn along with a description of the results of each regression, before providing a more thematic summary looking first at each type of election – European, Westminster, and local – and then the effects of the opposition groups across the levels of election. Finally, it looks at some of the implications of these findings. The chapter will suggest that the effects of the opposition groups on the far right parties are relatively limited. This will be further explored with the case study in chapter seven.

Because different levels of elections and different parties are being studied, and using more than one means of operationalising the dependent variable, the results are presented across a large number of analyses. These are the permutations of level of election (European, Westminster, and local), dependent variable (share of vote, change in share of vote, and relative change in share of vote), and party (UKIP and BNP).

As described above, standard linear regression analysis is used, substituting beta regression where appropriate. This is noted below.

Throughout this section a decrease is taken to mean a move down the number line, and an increase is a move up the number line. In other words, a change from (say) -1 to -5 would be described as a decrease, or a change from -1 to -0.5 as an increase.
Descriptives

Table 6.1: Descriptive statistics for share of vote for the British National Party and United Kingdom Independence Party at European, Westminster, and local elections

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>European Parliament</th>
<th>Westminster</th>
<th>Local</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>BNP</td>
<td>UKIP</td>
<td>BNP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cases</td>
<td>777</td>
<td>777</td>
<td>346</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>0.037</td>
<td>0.23</td>
<td>0.037</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Median</td>
<td>0.024</td>
<td>0.21</td>
<td>0.034</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St. dev.</td>
<td>0.034</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>0.020</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minimum</td>
<td>0.0033</td>
<td>0.036</td>
<td>0.0021</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maximum</td>
<td>0.19</td>
<td>0.52</td>
<td>0.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Variance</td>
<td>0.0011</td>
<td>0.010</td>
<td>0.00040</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Results from statistical analysis

Tables

The following tables present the results of the statistical analyses. Absolute share of vote was modelled with beta regression; change in share of vote and relative change in share of vote was modelled with ordinary least squares.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Intercept</th>
<th>BNP</th>
<th>UKIP</th>
<th>Change in share of vote</th>
<th>BNP</th>
<th>UKIP</th>
<th>Relative change in share of vote</th>
<th>BNP</th>
<th>UKIP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-4.81 ***</td>
<td>-4.22 ***</td>
<td>0.066</td>
<td>-0.24 *</td>
<td>-0.37 **</td>
<td>1.09 *</td>
<td>(0.94)</td>
<td>0.71)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>cHnH</td>
<td>-39.06 ***</td>
<td>-12.73 *</td>
<td>-1.58 **</td>
<td>0.34</td>
<td>-1.37</td>
<td>-3.22</td>
<td>(6.58)</td>
<td>(5.29)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>cUAF</td>
<td>-3.77 (1.60)</td>
<td>3.48 (2.68)</td>
<td>0.022</td>
<td>-0.45</td>
<td>-0.68</td>
<td>-3.60 *</td>
<td>(1.69)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>iHnH</td>
<td>30.90 ***</td>
<td>12.97 **</td>
<td>0.43</td>
<td>0.30</td>
<td>0.20</td>
<td>2.17</td>
<td>(6.94)</td>
<td>(4.62)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>iUAF</td>
<td>-0.053 ***</td>
<td>-1.05 (0.79)</td>
<td>-0.00020</td>
<td>0.045</td>
<td>0.13</td>
<td>0.84 *</td>
<td>(1.14)</td>
<td>(0.79)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECON</td>
<td>-0.00016 (0.11)</td>
<td>0.026 *** (0.0079)</td>
<td>-0.00044 (0.00064)</td>
<td>0.0024 * (0.0011)</td>
<td>-0.0052 *** (0.0015)</td>
<td>0.012 * (0.0056)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CECO</td>
<td>-0.0053 (0.013)</td>
<td>-0.028 ** (0.0094)</td>
<td>0.00076 (0.00071)</td>
<td>-0.0024 * (0.0012)</td>
<td>0.0019</td>
<td>-0.0016 (0.0061)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNEMP</td>
<td>0.079 *** (0.021)</td>
<td>0.037 * (0.015)</td>
<td>-0.0051 *** (0.0012)</td>
<td>0.0073 *** (0.0019)</td>
<td>-0.0043</td>
<td>0.018 * (0.010)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHUNEMP</td>
<td>-0.0056 (0.020)</td>
<td>-0.067 *** (0.014)</td>
<td>0.0027 ** (0.0010)</td>
<td>-0.0065 *** (0.0017)</td>
<td>0.0056 * (0.0024)</td>
<td>-0.014 (0.0087)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ETHNIC</td>
<td>0.011 *** (0.0028)</td>
<td>0.0093 *** (0.0021)</td>
<td>-0.00057 *** (0.00014)</td>
<td>0.0014 *** (0.00024)</td>
<td>-0.000074 (0.00034)</td>
<td>0.0061 *** (-0.0012)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CETHNIC</td>
<td>-0.016 (0.015)</td>
<td>0.023 * (0.011)</td>
<td>-0.00000042 (0.00071)</td>
<td>0.00084 (0.0012)</td>
<td>-0.00041 (0.0017)</td>
<td>-0.0010 (0.0062)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multiple R²</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>0.29</td>
<td>0.12</td>
<td>0.20</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adjusted R²</td>
<td>0.21</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>0.071</td>
<td>0.15</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pseudo R²</td>
<td>0.17</td>
<td>0.16</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>p-value</td>
<td>&lt; 2x10⁻¹⁶</td>
<td>&lt; 2x10⁻¹⁶</td>
<td>0.000000015</td>
<td>0.0000000015</td>
<td>0.0099</td>
<td>0.000020</td>
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Table 6.3: Results of analyses of Westminster elections

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Absolute share of vote (β)</th>
<th>Change in share of vote</th>
<th>Relative change in share of vote</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>BNP</td>
<td>UKIP</td>
<td>BNP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Intercept</strong></td>
<td>-1.35 (4.29)</td>
<td>-2.80 *** (0.52)</td>
<td>-1.03 (2.19)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-2.80 (2.62)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>cHnH</strong></td>
<td>-52.39 * (30.31)</td>
<td>-34.17 ** (12.96)</td>
<td>112.09 (110.34)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-97.71 (131.71)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>cUAF</strong></td>
<td>6.00 (7.70)</td>
<td>-18.56 *** (4.78)</td>
<td>-2.95 (5.60)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>4.07 (6.69)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>iHnH</strong></td>
<td>66.09 * (25.80)</td>
<td>16.49 * (9.14)</td>
<td>-93.23 (92.95)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-93.09 (110.95)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>iUAF</strong></td>
<td>0.63 (1.34)</td>
<td>0.69 (1.42)</td>
<td>-0.56 (0.91)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.23 (1.08)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>ECON</strong></td>
<td>-0.032 (0.050)</td>
<td>-0.0026 (0.0061)</td>
<td>0.015 (0.021)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.0088 (0.026)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>CHECON</strong></td>
<td>-0.031 (0.041)</td>
<td>-0.00084 (0.0074)</td>
<td>-0.0012 (0.0023)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.00026 (0.0028)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>UNEMP</strong></td>
<td>-0.031 (0.076)</td>
<td>0.041 *** (0.012)</td>
<td>-0.00082 (0.038)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.0079 (0.046)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>CHUNEMP</strong></td>
<td>-0.012 (0.062)</td>
<td>-0.029 ** (0.0097)</td>
<td>0.0056 (0.061)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.050 (0.073)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>ETHNIC</strong></td>
<td>-0.0042 (0.012)</td>
<td>0.011 *** (0.0014)</td>
<td>0.0066 (0.013)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.014 (0.016)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>CHETHNIC</strong></td>
<td>0.074 * (0.042)</td>
<td>-0.0092 (0.0072)</td>
<td>-0.0012 (0.035)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.027 (0.041)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multiple R²</td>
<td>0.52</td>
<td>0.024</td>
<td>0.76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adjusted R²</td>
<td>-1.078</td>
<td>0.0040</td>
<td>-0.0469</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pseudo R²</td>
<td>0.67</td>
<td>0.24</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
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</table>
| p-value               | 0.0016 < 2x10⁻¹⁶           | 0.92                     | 0.29                             | 0.5919                     | 0.000000000000062
### Table 6.4: Results of analyses of local elections

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Absolute share of vote (β)</th>
<th>Change in share of vote</th>
<th>Relative change in share of vote</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>BNP</td>
<td>UKIP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Intercept</strong></td>
<td>-1.96 ***</td>
<td>-3.65 ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.54)</td>
<td>(0.34)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>cHnH</td>
<td>-2.75 *</td>
<td>-1.66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.39)</td>
<td>(1.64)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>cUAf</td>
<td>0.63</td>
<td>-4.19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.18)</td>
<td>(1.25)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>iHnH</td>
<td>1.33 *</td>
<td>-0.89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.52)</td>
<td>(0.67)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>iUAf</td>
<td>-0.57</td>
<td>0.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.45)</td>
<td>(0.64)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECON</td>
<td>-0.016 *</td>
<td>0.0080 *</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0063)</td>
<td>(0.0039)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHECON</td>
<td>0.017 *</td>
<td>0.0023</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0086)</td>
<td>(0.0044)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNEMP</td>
<td>-0.0081</td>
<td>0.014 *</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0098)</td>
<td>(0.0061)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHUNEMP</td>
<td>0.055 ***</td>
<td>-0.039 ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0096)</td>
<td>(0.0054)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ETHNIC</td>
<td>0.0093 ***</td>
<td>0.013 ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0017)</td>
<td>(0.00086)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHETHNIC</td>
<td>0.015 *</td>
<td>-0.020 ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0088)</td>
<td>(0.0045)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multiple R²</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adjusted R²</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pseudo R²</td>
<td>0.042</td>
<td>0.068</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>p-value</td>
<td>&lt; 2x10⁻¹⁶</td>
<td>&lt; 2x10⁻¹⁶</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The following sections set out the effects described in the quantitative analysis above and place them into context. They proceed by looking in turn at the effects of Hope not Hate, Unite Against Fascism, and then the socioeconomic control variables.

**Summaries**

**Effect of Hope Not Hate on the BNP**

At European Parliament elections, consistency of action by Hope not Hate is strongly and substantially correlated with a reduction in the share of the vote gained by the British National Party (-39.06***). It is also correlated with a reduction in the change of share of vote for the BNP (-1.58**). It should be noted that the magnitude of the effect is very much less because the scales being used are shorter, where the absolute share of vote might be in tens of percentage points while the change in share of vote is generally in single digits. There is no significant effect on the relative change in the share of vote.

Turning to intensity of action by Hope not Hate - that is to say, lots of activity in a given area in a shorter period of time - there is a correlation with an increase in the share of the vote for the British National Party (30.90*** at European elections as seen in table 6.2. There are no significant effects on change in share of vote or relative change in share of vote.

The headline figure of -39.06% for European Parliament elections seems astonishing at first - something that purports to represent a diminution of the vote for a far right party by more than a third would be remarkable indeed. It should be borne in mind, however, that to achieve the necessary one point increase in consistency of activity, given how it is measured, would require vastly more work to be done, far beyond the capacity of a small, non-governmental organisation. It would also likely increase the intensity of activity, given how both measures are calculated.

In terms of Westminster elections, a broadly similar pattern is revealed (table 6.3). Although the significance level is lower, there is again a correlation between consistency of action by Hope not Hate and a reduction in the absolute share of vote for the BNP (-52.39*), and a positive correlation between intensity and absolute share of vote for the BNP (66.09*). For local elections, at table 6.4, consistency of action is correlated with a decrease in share of vote for the BNP (-2.75*), while intensity correlates with an increase (1.33*). These results are important in two ways. Firstly, even when coming from Hope not Hate – the more community-oriented, less confrontational of the two opposition groups – intensity of action can be actively harmful. Secondly, the results are relatively weak, even in the field where Hope not Hate would expect to have greatest impact.
Effect of Hope Not Hate on UKIP

In broad terms, the effects of opposition by Hope not Hate on UKIP are similar to those of opposition by the same on the BNP; that is to say, consistency of action hinders them, while intensity of action helps them.

Looking at European elections (table 6.2), this is the case with the absolute share of vote, where consistency of action correlates with a decrease for UKIP (-12.73*) while intensity correlates with an increase (12.97**). Both the significance and magnitude are less in the case of UKIP than in the case of the BNP, but are nonetheless there. There were no significant results in terms of change in share of vote or relative change in share of vote. The results would appear to indicate that there are similar effects at play for the BNP as for UKIP, but that the effects are less substantial.

Moving to elections to the Westminster Parliament (table 6.3), the pattern is repeated. Consistency of action by Hope not Hate correlates with a decrease in the share of vote for UKIP (-34.17**), while intensity of action correlates with an increase (16.49*). The correlation with intensity of action is relatively weak at 16.49, and is again only at the ten per cent confidence level. There is also a correlation between consistency of action and the relative change in share of vote for UKIP; greater consistency is linked to a decrease in that measure (-9.77*).

At local elections (table 6.4), there is no statistically significant relationship between either intensity of action or consistency of action by Hope not Hate on any of the measures for UKIP’s electoral success. This is, in itself, noteworthy.

Effect of Unite Against Fascism on the BNP

Where Hope not Hate’s activities show significant effects across elections and measures, Unite Against Fascism appear less impactful.

None of the measures for electoral success for the BNP at European elections (table 6.2) show themselves to be significantly affected in either direction by consistency of action by Unite Against Fascism. Intensity of action by Unite Against Fascism does not show any significant effect for change or relative change in share of vote for the BNP. It is significantly correlated with a decrease in the absolute share of vote (-0.053***). However, the magnitude of this effect is very small, on the order of one twentieth of a per cent, compared to, for instance, in excess of thirty per cent for the negative effect on the BNP’s absolute share of vote from consistency of action. That is to say, an increase in intensity of action by Unite Against Fascism by a given numeric amount would have a negative effect on the absolute share of vote for the BNP around six hundred times smaller than an increase in consistency of action by the same amount.
There is no statistically significant effect from either consistency or intensity of action by Unite Against Fascism on the electoral performance of the British National Party at Westminster elections (table 6.3), or at local elections (table 6.4).

**Effect of Unite Against Fascism on UKIP**

The pattern of consistency of action hindering and intensity of action helping the parties continues. With regard to the specific effects of Unite Against Fascism on UKIP at European elections (table 6.2), there are only significant effects when looking at relative change in share of vote; consistency of action correlates (-3.60*) with a decrease and intensity with an increase (0.84*).

At elections to the parliament at Westminster (table 6.3), consistency of action by Unite Against Fascism correlates with a decrease in both the absolute share of vote (-18.56*** ) and the relative change in share of vote for UKIP (-3.43*). There are no statistically significant effects from intensity of action by Unite Against Fascism.

When measured both by change in share of vote (-0.80*** ) and relative change in share of vote (-117.21***), consistency of action by Unite Against Fascism at local elections is correlated with a reduction in UKIP’s standing, while intensity has the reverse effect (0.33* for change in share of vote and 69.74* for relative change in share of vote). In both cases, the confidence is greater for the negative correlation of consistency than for the positive effects of intensity. When looking at relative change in share of vote, the figures again appear to be extremely large. This can be in part attributed to the same factor as previously mentioned - a one point increase in the measured consistency or intensity of activity represents a very great increase in that activity.

**Consistency and intensity**

A clear pattern has emerged: consistency of action correlates, across measures and elections, with a decrease in the vote for the far right parties, while intensity of action similarly correlates with an increase in the vote for both UKIP and the BNP.

There is one exception to this pattern. Increased intensity of action by Unite Against Fascism correlates with a decrease in the absolute share of vote for the British National Party at European elections (table 6.2). While this appears significant at the most stringent level of confidence, it should be borne in mind that the magnitude of the effect is very small.

**European elections**

At European Parliament elections (table 6.2), consistency of action by Hope not Hate is correlated with a decrease in the vote for both the BNP and UKIP (-39.06*** and -12.73* respectively), while
Intensity of action by Hope not Hate correlates with an increase (30.90*** and 12.97** respectively). This pattern is repeated when looking at Unite Against Fascism with regards to UKIP when considering the relative change in share of vote (-3.6* for consistency and 0.84* for intensity). The effects for Unite Against Fascism, however, are less substantial than for Hope not Hate with the following exception.

Intensity of action by Unite Against Fascism correlates with a decrease in the share of the vote for the BNP at European elections (-0.053***). This is the only instance in any of the quantitative analyses of intensity of action by one of the opposition groups hindering one of the far right parties.

In terms of the socioeconomic indicators, UKIP are helped on all measures by higher economic activity rates (0.026***, 0.0024*, and 0.012*, respectively), higher unemployment rates (0.037*, 0.0073***, and 0.018*, respectively), and a higher proportion of the population being both white and born in the UK (0.0093***, 0.0014***, and 0.0061***, respectively). A decrease in the change in both the rates of economic activity (-0.028**) and unemployment (-0.0065***)) correlates with a diminution of UKIP’s vote, although there is a very small negative correlation (-0.0024*) with share of vote for the former and a small negative correlation of -0.067 *** for absolute vote share for unemployment.

The picture with regards the BNP is complicated. The only significant effect in terms of the economic activity rate or change thereof is for the relative change in share of vote, which decreases (-0.0052***). An increase in the unemployment rate correlates with a increase in the absolute share of vote for the BNP (0.079***), but a decrease in the change of share of vote (-0.0051***). For the change in unemployment rate variable, there is no significant correlation with the absolute share of vote, but there is a positive correlation with both the change in share of vote (0.0027**) and the relative change in share of vote (0.0056*). The proportion of an area that is both white and born in the UK correlates with an increase in the share of the vote for the BNP (0.011***), but a decrease in the change in share of vote (-0.00057***). Changes in the ethnic makeup of an area in the year to an election do not have statistically significant correlations with votes for the BNP however measured.

**Westminster elections**

The effects of activity by Hope not Hate on both the BNP and UKIP at Westminster elections are clear (table 6.3); consistency of action has a statistically significant negative relationship with the absolute share of vote for both parties (-52.39* for the BNP and -34.17** for UKIP), while intensity of action has a positive relationship with the same (66.09* and 16.49*). Both the relatively low
(but still significant) confidence levels achieved and the magnitudes suggest that there are real
effects at play.

Consistency of action by Hope not Hate also shows a significant negative relationship with the
relative change in share of vote for UKIP (-9.77*); that is to say, their activities have a
proportionately greater effect where UKIP are stronger. Given that the simple change variable
does not show a statistically significant relationship, it may be that the effects of consistent
action by Hope not Hate may be where UKIP are relatively weak.

The socioeconomic factors included as control variables show the least effect at Westminster
elections. For the BNP, only an increase in the change of the proportion of the population that is
white and UK-born has a significant correlation; specifically, positive, with the absolute share of
vote (0.074*).

For UKIP, there is no significant relationship between economic activity or change in economic
activity and any of the three measures of votes. For both absolute share of vote (0.041***), and
relative change in vote (0.017***), the unemployment rate shows a positive correlation. For
change in rate of unemployment, the same measure indicate significance, but negative rather
than positive (-0.029** and -0.012***).

There is a positive correlation between the proportion of an area that is both white and UK born
and the absolute share of vote (0.011***), as well as between the relative change in share of vote
and the proportion of an area that is both white and UK born (0.0019***).

Local elections
The pattern of consistency of action hindering the far right parties while intensity of action helps
them is repeated at local elections (table 6.4). Specifically, consistency of action by Hope not Hate
correlates with a reduction in the absolute share of vote for the British National Party (-2.75*),
while intensity correlates with an increase in the absolute share of vote for the same (1.33*).
There are no effects with respect to UKIP.

Regarding Unite Against Fascism, consistency of activity negatively affects UKIP (-0.80*** and -
117.21***), and intensity of action positively affects UKIP (0.33* and 69.74*), when measured by
change and relative change in share of vote. The magnitudes for relative change in share of vote
are large.

Of note is that the broad pattern of results from local elections is similar to that for European
elections.
Economic activity

The general picture is that an increase in the economic activity rate - that is to say, the number of people either in work or actively seeking work expressed as a proportion of the total population - hinders the British National Party but helps the United Kingdom Independence Party. Negative effects are exhibited for the BNP at European elections (table 6.2) when measured by relative change in share of vote (-0.0052***); and by absolute share of vote (-0.016*) and change in share of vote (-0.0043*** at local elections (table 6.4). For UKIP, there is a positive correlation between the economic activity rate and all three measures of electoral success at European elections (0.026***, 0.0024*, and 0.012*); and with absolute share of vote and change in share of vote for local elections (0.0080* and 0.0026***). There are no significant findings for Westminster elections (table 6.3).

The picture with change in the economic activity rate in the year to the election is almost the reverse. There is a negative correlation between change in the economic activity rate and votes for UKIP, measured by absolute share of vote (-0.028**) and change in share of vote (-0.0024*), at European elections (table 6.2). There are no statistically significant findings for the BNP at European elections and, again, there are no significant findings for Westminster elections (table 6.3). At local elections, there is a positive correlation between the economic activity rate and the absolute share of vote for the BNP (0.017*) and change in share of vote (0.0023**) but not for relative change in share of vote (table 6.4).

In simple terms, areas that are ‘bad’ or bad but improving are better for the BNP, while areas that are ‘good’ or good but worsening are better for UKIP. The British National Party will find its most fertile territory in those areas that exhibit high unemployment or low economic activity, even if unemployment is dropping or economic activity is rising. UKIP’s equivalent will be in those areas that have low unemployment or high economic activity, even if unemployment is rising or economic activity is dropping.

Unemployment

For the most part, the effects of the unemployment rate or changes in the unemployment rate are straightforward. There is a positive correlation between unemployment and all three measures of electoral success for UKIP at both European (0.037*, 0.0073***, and 0.018*) (table 6.2) and local elections (0.014*, 0.0025*, and 0.27*) (table 6.4), and for absolute share of vote (0.041*** and relative change in share of vote at Westminster elections (0.017*** (table 6.3). The absolute share of vote for the BNP at European elections is positively correlated with the unemployment rate (0.079***), while the change in share of vote shows a negative correlation (-0.0051*** (table 6.2). The unemployment rate has no effect on votes for the BNP at Westminster elections (table
6.3). At local elections, there is only a negative correlation for change in share of vote for the BNP 
(-0.0050***) (table 6.4).

Turning to change in the unemployment rate, there is a negative correlation with the absolute 
share of vote (-0.067*** and change in share of vote (-0.0065*** for UKIP at European elections 
(table 6.2). For the BNP at European elections, there are positive correlations when measured by 
change in share of votes (0.0027**) and relative change in share of votes (0.0056*) (table 6.2). At 
Westminster elections (table 6.3), the only correlations with change in the unemployment rate 
are for UKIP when measured by absolute share of vote (-0.029**) and relative change in share of 
vote (-0.012***).

At local elections (table 6.4), there is a positive correlation between change in the unemployment 
rate and absolute share of vote for the BNP (0.055*** and change in share of vote (0.0056***). 
There is, however, a negative correlation for UKIP on the same indicators (-0.039*** and -
0.0064***, respectively).

To sum this up in simple terms, a higher unemployment rate helps UKIP almost across the board. 
The picture is mixed for the BNP; however, the correlations are slight and only found on some 
measures, suggesting that there is not a simple relationship at work. To the extent that there are 
patterns for change in the unemployment rate, it is that a worsening unemployment rate – that is 
to say, a higher rate, indicating more people out of work – helps the BNP but actually hinders 
UKIP, suggesting that the precise means by which unemployment translates to support varies 
between the parties.

**Ethnicity**

As mentioned above, the measure used for ethnicity is the proportion of the total population of 
the electoral circumscription that is both white and born in the UK; therefore, a higher value 
means fewer black and minority ethnic residents.

The first thing to note is that the ethnicity measure displays the same pattern as with 
unemployment for the BNP at European elections (table 6.2); that is to say, there is a positive 
correlation between the ethnicity measure and the absolute share of vote for the BNP, but a 
negative correlation between the ethnicity measure and the change in share of vote for the BNP. 
In plain terms, this means that an area that is whiter is more likely to vote for the BNP, but that 
effect may wear off over time as the change in share of vote suggests a move away from the BNP.

Beyond this, there is a positive correlation between the ethnic measure and all three measures of 
success for UKIP at European elections (0.0093***, 0.0014***, and 0.0061*** respectively) (table 
6.2); no effect for the BNP at Westminster elections (table 6.3); a positive effect for UKIP in terms
of absolute share of vote (0.011***) and relative change in share of vote (0.0019***)
at Westminster elections (table 6.3); and, for local elections (table 6.4), a positive correlation between the ethnicity measure and absolute share of vote for both the BNP (0.0093***)
and UKIP (0.013***)
at local elections.

The patterns for a change in the ethnic measure in the year to the election are somewhat varied.
At European elections (table 6.2), there are no statistically significant correlations for the BNP,
while there is only a positive correlation for UKIP (0.023*)
when measured by absolute share of vote. For elections to the Westminster parliament (table 6.3), there is a positive correlation between change in the ethnic measure and the absolute share of vote for the BNP,
relatively weak (0.074*). There are similarly weak correlations, but in the other direction, with
the change in share of vote for UKIP (-0.0057*) and relative change in share of vote for UKIP (-0.0043*).
Turning to local elections (table 6.4), there are positive correlations between change in
the ethnic measure and the absolute share of vote for the BNP (0.015*) and change in share of
vote for the BNP (0.0020**). For UKIP, there are negative correlations between change in the
ethnic measure and absolute share of vote (-0.020***)
and relative change in share of vote (-0.22783*)

As was predicted from the ‘air war’ campaign of UKIP and the ‘ground war’ of the BNP,
there are greater effects from the opposition groups overall on the BNP than on UKIP. Across all the
measures, the impacts on the British National Party are greater than on UKIP. As the BNP engage
in local campaigns, the local activities of both UAF and Hope not Hate engage, for good or ill,
with the messaging of the BNP and the effects they have within local communities. This messaging
from the opposition groups simply does not engage with the national messaging of UKIP.

Analysis

A clear pattern emerges with respect to consistency and intensity of activity. Consistency of
action by the opposition groups appears to have the intended effect - that is to say, a reduction in
the vote for the far right parties. However, intensity of action by the opposition groups has the
paradoxical effect of increasing the vote for far right parties. This pattern appears at all levels of
election, from both groups, and to differing extents in all measures.

The difference in effect between consistency of action and intensity of action is important. Both
measures indicate the amount of activity that one of the opposition groups is undertaking in a
given electoral circumscription. It is clearly not just the amount of activity that matters. In crude
terms, consistent activity is having a regular presence in an area, while intensity of action is
saturating an area in a relatively short period of time. The two are, of course, not mutually
exclusive; it is possible, given sufficient resources and committed volunteers, to consistently saturate an area\textsuperscript{23}. That is to say, it is possible to have high intensity and high consistency for the same area.

The broad picture is that consistency shows more significant effects than intensity; that consistency shows greater magnitudes than intensity; that Hope not Hate shows more significant effects than Unite Against Fascism; and that Hope not Hate shows greater magnitudes than Unite Against Fascism. Hope not Hate generally has effects in terms of the absolute share of vote, whereas Unite Against Fascism generally has effects in terms of change or relative change in share of vote.

There are relatively few trends for consistency and intensity; that is to say, where a significant result emerges for (say) intensity of action with respect to the BNP at European elections when measured by absolute share of vote for both Hope not Hate and Unite Against Fascism. Two of these trends occur in the case of Westminster elections, where consistency of action by both Hope not Hate and Unite Against Fascism hinders UKIP when measured both by absolute share of vote and relative change in share of vote. In both of these cases, the effects of Hope not Hate’s activities are substantially larger.

This leads to a set of questions. Firstly, why does consistency of action appear to hinder far right parties while intensity of action appears to actually help them? Secondly, what causes Hope not Hate to exhibit effects when measured by share of vote, and what causes Unite Against Fascism to exhibit effects when measured by the two change variables, and not vice versa? Thirdly, why are Westminster elections very different from European and local elections? Finally, what can be learnt from the socioeconomic indicators used in the statistical modelling?

**Consistency and intensity**

It is easier to set out the possible explanations for why intensity of action might have this paradoxical effect - that is to say, why it is that more activity in a short period from the opposition groups actually makes it more likely that the far right parties under consideration will gain votes.

\textsuperscript{23} This is what happens in Westminster by-elections; once it becomes obvious that a by-election is in the offing, parties will contact members to try to regularly campaign in the constituency, sometimes for months ahead of the actual date. At the time of writing, for instance, the Liberal Democrats are campaigning in Sheffield Hallam, as it is expected that the sitting MP will at some point resign.
One is simple; being repeatedly told the same thing in a short period of time is likely to annoy people. It is also necessary to consider that the activities of the opposition groups do not take place in a vacuum, but are, in fact, interactions with the messages being put out by the parties, and sometimes directly with them.

In the case of the British National Party, campaigning is done, as described above, in a ground war style. This gives voters, particularly at local elections, actual experience of contact with British National Party candidates and canvassers. When they turn out not to be the two-headed monsters that they are portrayed to be, the credibility of the campaigners may well be damaged. Indeed, a specific aim of the British National Party’s ‘ground war’ campaigning is to detoxify their brand by giving people experience of dealing with their representatives as normal and non-threatening people concerned about the community.

A particular manifestation of this is when direct conflict occurs between the opposition group and a party. This can involve members or associates preventing a group from leafleting (for instance, Hope not Hate 2013a) or clashes at protests (O’ Brien 2013). Unsurprisingly, this will tarnish both the messenger and the message, at least in the eyes of some people, not least because, in the case of protests, costs of policing will fall on the local constabulary and costs of a lost day’s trading because of shop closures will fall on small businesses, as well as inconveniencing people in their day to day activities. The authorities are also less than uniformly welcoming; the police have, on occasion, blamed the opposition groups for starting violence and disorder (for instance Smith 2010).

This would also be true for activities similar to those described above but targeted at other groups. Unite Against Fascism, in particular, protest against a range of far-right organisations that are not political parties, including the English Defence League street movement, and organisations that contest elections but are between political party and social movement, such as Britain First. Actions by Unite Against Fascism to protest, say, the English Defence League might descend into violent confrontation. This could then damage, in the public’s eyes, all of Unite Against Fascism’s activities, including those that are wholly peaceful or that are targeting a group other than the English Defence League. Worse still, the broader anti-fascist or anti-racist movement can be tarred with the same brush, weakening unrelated organisations.

It should be borne in mind that activities that are not actually carried out by Hope not Hate or Unite Against Fascism, or that are carried out by people associated with the groups but not with

24 This feeling will be familiar to anyone who has encountered charity collectors, also known as charity muggers or ‘chuggers’, generally spread out in a line on a high street.
the groups’ sanction, may still affect how they are seen because they are part of a broader anti-racist, anti-fascist, or anti-establishment movement. Indeed, the confusion may be deliberately made; far-right blogs and blogs sympathetic to the far right, for instance, make such assertions, as in an incident where Nigel Farage was accosted in a pub was associated with Hope not Hate; while a member of Hope not Hate was at the protest, it was not organised under the Hope not Hate rubric (Nope, not Hope25 2015).

Turning to UKIP, the specifics of the BNP’s ground war campaign clearly do not apply. However, a particular feature of UKIP’s messaging is important: the focus on a disconnected, liberal, metropolitan elite as a source of the woes of the common people. When a campaigning organisation appears and swiftly disappears, particularly if it causes problems in the area, it feeds into this narrative. This has two effects. Firstly, it legitimates UKIP’s discourse and, by extension, its other policies. Secondly, it de-legitimates the opposition to UKIP. In both cases, the effect is to make voting for UKIP more palatable.

The effects of consistency of action are largely explained by the opposite effects to intensity of action. Being a regular presence in the community establishes the organisation’s commitment to an area particularly, as is important to Hope not Hate, when visibly connected to the community, as in newspapers branded with geographies that make clear a connection to the locality. In the particular case of the BNP, this gives them the standing - through a receptive population - to challenge them. This is particularly true in the case of Hope not Hate, who use more targeted literature that highlights, for instance, the criminal records of specific candidates in the areas in which they are contesting elections, as opposed to generic material about why voting for a far right party is bad. The dynamics of direct contestation with the political parties also changes; while it is straightforward enough for a political party to organise the occasional counter-protest, it is much harder, if not impossible, to do the same on a sustained basis.

In short, consistency of action makes it easier for the opposition groups’ messages to come across, while intensity of action makes the population less likely to be receptive. The greater impacts on the BNP support Dinas et al (2016)’s arguments around the fascist variant of far right parties trying to set up ‘local cultures’ (Dinas et al 2016:81); consistent action, targeted to hinder or reverse that local embedding, counters that process.

25 Nope, not Hope is a blog critical of Hope not Hate.
Hope not Hate and Unite Against Fascism

The second question is as to the difference in patterns between the effects of Hope not Hate and Unite Against Fascism.

To restate the situation, Hope not Hate generally exhibits significant effects when measured by absolute share of vote, while Unite Against Fascism generally exhibits significant effects when measured by change in share of vote or relative change in share of vote. Both exhibit the same pattern, with one exception, of consistency of action hindering the far right parties while intensity of action helps them.

Consistency of action by Hope not Hate is correlated with a statistically significant decrease in the change of share of vote - that is to say, moving in a negative direction - for the BNP when measured by change in share of vote at European elections (1.58**), and with a decrease in the share of vote for UKIP when measured by relative change in share of vote at Westminster elections (-9.77*).

The exception to the rule is the case of intensity of action by Unite Against Fascism regarding the BNP as measured by absolute share of vote at European elections, which displays a negative correlation (-0.053***). While the effect is significant at the 0.01 level, the magnitude is extremely small at around five orders of magnitude less than the equivalent effect for Hope not Hate.

The above establishes a statistically significant correlation between activity and absolute share of vote. If, however, they were having a material effect, significant relationships in the change measures are also expected to be seen.

If the effects from both consistency and intensity of action by Hope not Hate were in the same direction - that is to say, were both either positively or negatively associated with share of vote - it would be possible to draw the conclusion that the effect was one of targeting, with Hope not Hate being particularly good (or bad, depending on one’s point of view) at choosing areas where the parties, and in particular the British National Party, were either on the rise or on the decline anyway.

However, this is not the revealed pattern. Rather, consistency of action is associated with a lower vote for the far right parties, and intensity with a higher vote. It is possible that Hope not Hate are intensively targeting areas where the BNP are on the increase anyway, and consistently targeting areas that are on the decrease anyway, although this starts to strain credibility.

It is also possible that there is an overlap between areas where there is intensity of action and the parties doing better, or between areas where there is consistency of action and the parties doing
worse. While this is hypothetical, it is not an unreasonable supposition. The mechanism could plausibly be a divide between more and less urban areas. Particularly if support is being brought in from outside a particular area, how well connected, especially to public transport, that area is could affect how campaigns are organised. If an area is relatively easy to reach, it is also easy to campaign there, and vice versa. Well-connected areas are more likely to be metropoles and city centres, while less well-connected areas will be outskirts, and suburban and rural areas. That the dynamics of rural Lincolnshire will be different from central Manchester, even allowing for differences in economic and demographic situation, is not surprising.

A further possibility is that there are interaction effects between the control variables and each other or the measures of activity for Hope not Hate and Unite Against Fascism not captured by the models.

There are some significant relationships, however, in the change measures. This suggests that, beyond any geographic juxtaposition of effort and target, there are material effects from Hope not Hate’s activities on the far right parties. When taken in the context of the effects as measured by absolute share of vote, it seems reasonable to surmise that the effects are real, but not great.

The corollary of the above is that, while Unite Against Fascism do consistently have effects, there does not appear to be any reliable targeting of their activities. Inasmuch as this is true, it is consistent with the activities of Unite Against Fascism - city centre festivals and the like - and, indeed, accords with the criticisms made of Unite Against Fascism by Hope not Hate. Particularly striking are the effects on local elections. Consistent action by Hope not Hate hinders the BNP (-2.75*) when measured by absolute share of vote – it is at local elections that Hope not Hate hold themselves out as being most effective (Lowles 2014) – while Unite Against Fascism have larger effects, but against UKIP and when measured with the two change variables (-0.80*** and -117.21***, respectively).

It is important to note that Unite Against Fascism and Hope not Hate exhibit different patterns of consistency and intensity. Using the data for local authorities from 2008 to 2014, similar mean consistencies of action, at 0.032 for Unite Against Fascism and 0.030 for Hope not Hate, are seen, while intensity is approximately one-quarter higher for Unite Against Fascism, with the figures being 0.06 and 0.048. However, because of the models, it can be said that consistency of action by the groups, ceteris paribus, has different effects. This suggests that it is not merely the pattern of activity, but also the content of activity, that matters. The striking differences between consistency and intensity suggest that Ellinas and Lamprianou (2019)’s measures are, in the first instance, capturing genuine effects, and that these effects from the patterning of campaigning are of paramount importance.
This leaves us with a particular pattern that requires explanation; correlations are seen for Hope not Hate in terms of the absolute share of vote, while for Unite Against Fascism correlations are seen for the two variables that indicate change in the share of vote.

Because the statistical measures used can only show a correlation and not a causation, it is necessary to be cautious in interpreting these patterns. In the case of Hope not Hate, the most we can reliably say is that they are engaging in actions where the BNP are present because of the high significance for Hope not Hate of the absolute share of vote measure. This follows on from what has been set out about Hope not Hate above; they are intelligence-led, often have good links in communities where the BNP may do well or make a point of establishing them, and have links to trades unions that give further insight into areas that may be of interest.

No such relationship is seen in the case of Unite Against Fascism and absolute share of vote. This suggests that UAF are not targeting their activities as precisely as Hope not Hate. Again, this matches what may be expected given what is known about Unite Against Fascism’s style of campaigning, which favours city-centre demonstrations, concerts, and protest marches rather than very local activity. Neither with Unite Against Fascism nor Hope not Hate can we draw, based on the statistical evidence presented, a causal link between the diminution of vote for the far right parties and the activities of the opposition groups; the particular dynamics are treated at greater length in chapter seven.

However, Unite Against Fascism do show more correlations when measured against either change in share of vote or relative change in share of vote. These correlations run in both directions – that is to say, in some instances they achieve their stated aim of hindering the far right parties they oppose, but have the opposite effect on some measures, being correlated with an increase in change of share of vote for the far right parties. By the same logic as above, this suggests that Unite Against Fascism’s activities take place where changes in voting for the far right parties are happening. It should be emphasised that the correlations run, depending on measure and election, in both directions, both helping and hindering the far right parties. This could suggest that consistent campaigning by UAF is hindering the far right parties and intense campaigning is helping them, or it could suggest that UAF activities are in areas that show lots of change in voting patterns, without there necessarily being a particularly high vote for the British National Party or United Kingdom Independence Party.

The impacts of Hope not Hate are not completely limited to absolute share of vote, however, and there are correlations between their activities and the two change variables. These are patchier than the correlations with absolute share of vote. The combination of Hope not Hate going where there is, from their point of view, a far right problem and also being active where there are
changes in votes is suggestive of some actual impact on far right votes. However, for both Unite Against Fascism and Hope not Hate the magnitude of the impact of their activities is relatively slight, suggesting that whatever effects they do have are limited. This is explored further in chapter seven.

Levels of election

It is not prima facie a surprise that Hope not Hate and Unite Against Fascism have less effect on Westminster elections than on local and European elections; the former is a first order election, the latter two are second order elections.

There is no statistically significant effect from either consistency or intensity of action by Unite Against Fascism on the electoral performance of the British National Party at Westminster elections, or at local elections. These results are, again, striking; it suggests that a considerable amount of human and financial resources are being used to no appreciable effect.

Reif and Schmitt (1980) highlight a few features of second-order elections: lower levels of participation, a better chance for small and new parties, more spoilt ballots\(^\text{26}\), and more voting against the incumbent national government. The first two of these would certainly help the BNP and UKIP, and the last conceivably could as well, with voters at the rightward, Monday Club end of the Conservatives’ base of support and working-class Conservatives (Parkin 1967) who have become ‘left behind’ (Ford and Goodwin 2014a). When the distorting effect of the first-past-the-post system and the tactical voting it engenders is taken into account, it is not surprising that the BNP and UKIP do not do well at Westminster elections and, so, that there is little scope for opposition groups to affect them. Beyond that, there is little incentive for opposition groups to specifically target far right parties at elections to the House of Commons - by investigating candidates or publishing specific literature - precisely because the electoral system already hampers them so effectively. The BNP have never returned a Member of Parliament, while UKIP have only won one seat at a general election\(^\text{27}\).

It was suggested above that Hope not Hate and Unite Against Fascism might be effective in targeting their activities to where the BNP and UKIP have a presence. However, this is not the

\(^{26}\) Reif and Schmitt term this a ‘higher percentage of invalidated ballots’.

\(^{27}\) Douglas Carswell in 2015. Carswell and Mark Reckless left the Conservative Party in 2014 and both forced by-elections in their constituencies of Clacton and Rochester & Strood, which they won under the UKIP banner. Mark Reckless would lose his seat at the 2015 general election, while Carswell would retain his. Bob Spink, in his second period as MP for Castle Point, resigned the Conservative whip to become an independent, and then joined UKIP, and then became an independent again.
same as targeting their activities where they will have the greatest impact; it may well be that the same amount of effort could be expended to a greater effect by taking account of the various socioeconomic factors at play. This could be by targeting areas whose socioeconomic and demographic profile suggest that UKIP or the BNP are likely to struggle anyway - to use a boxing metaphor, to throw the punch to make sure that a stunned opponent does not get back up from the mat. It could also be where UKIP and the BNP are actually most likely to do well given the same socioeconomic factors, on the basis that this is where effort most needs to be applied. Alternatively, the likelihood of the BNP or UKIP making a breakthrough and actually seeing candidates elected in a given area might be combined with the socioeconomic considerations so that such efforts and resources as can be expended have the greatest impact in electoral terms.

Moreover, this lends to support to the importance of Tarrow (2011)’s notion of political opportunity structures. Manifestly, political opportunity structures are different at the local, European, and Westminster levels for a host of reasons – level of election, electoral system, timing – and this is supported by the results of the quantitative analysis.

This also lends support to Mudde (2007)’s assertion that the meso level warrants further study. Hope not Hate and, to a lesser extent, Unite Against Fascism act to prevent the far right parties, particularly the BNP, from embedding themselves in a community (Dinas et al 2016). This embedding, almost definitionally, is going to be seen more in local elections, where local issues are to the fore and smaller circumscriptions give voters more ability to highlight particularly local issues. The greater impact at local elections, when meso dynamics will be to the fore, suggest the importance of that level of analysis.

The strong correlations on socioeconomic and demographic factors, which are based on local data, also suggest that Kestilä and Söderlund (2007) are right to stress the importance of subnational comparisons.

**Socioeconomics**

Lastly, the effects of the socioeconomic and demographic indicators - the economic activity rate, unemployment rate, and proportion of the population that are both white and UK born, and the changes in those rates, are considered.

Most of these effects are straightforward, particularly as regards UKIP and are detailed immediately below, but a few results, concerning the BNP are more interesting in their implications, and are covered below that.

In broad terms, UKIP is helped by a higher economic activity rate - that is to say, there is a positive correlation between the economic activity rate and votes for UKIP. This holds for five of
the nine possible combinations of levels of election and measures of votes. To the extent that
there is a relationship between votes for UKIP and change in the economic activity rate, it is
negative; it only appears at European Parliamentary elections. In plain English, places where
there are lots of people either in work or seeking work are more likely to vote for UKIP, while
places where the number of people either in work or seeking work is decreasing are more likely
to vote for UKIP. This would represent areas that have been prosperous but are in decline – the
left behind (Ford and Goodwin 2014a)

The same pattern holds for unemployment and change in unemployment, except that it is seen
across more of the measures. In crude terms, a high economic activity rate is ‘good’, while a high
unemployment rate is ‘bad’. At first glance, this appears contradictory. It is necessary to recall
that the economic activity rate and unemployment rate are different, and do not mirror one
another. Combined, this could be taken to suggest that fertile ground for UKIP would be areas
where people are leaving the job market, either through retirement or giving up on being able to
gain a job.

The pattern repeats itself again for the ethnic composition of an area. The measure used is the
proportion of an area that is white and UK-born; that is to say, a high score on the measure
indicates a whiter area with fewer people born outside of the UK. As is discussed above, this
measure was chosen as an efficient proxy for the ethnic composition of an area that was available
at small geographies and with sufficient frequency. Simply put, then, ‘whiter’ areas vote UKIP,
but areas that are becoming less ‘white’ do not vote for UKIP. This supports Golder’s (2003)
findings around immigration. Stockemer (2016) suggests a lack of clarity on whether voters are
motivated by immigration or the perception of immigration. These results add some weight to
actual demographics, rather than just perceptions, being the driver at work.

The picture as regards the British National Party is rather different. In several instances, the
effects are essentially the opposite of what is seen with UKIP. Thus, there is a negative correlation
between the economic activity rate and the relative change in share of vote for the BNP at
European elections, and with absolute share of vote and change in share of vote for local
elections. Although the evidence is not particularly strong, it suggests that areas with lower
economic activity rates will tend to favour the BNP more than those with higher rates. Change in
the economic activity rate only shows significant, positive correlation at local elections, as
measured by absolute share of vote and change in share of vote.

The effect of the unemployment rate on the BNP at European elections appears to point in both
directions. Specifically, there is a positive correlation between the absolute share of vote for the
party and the unemployment rate, but a negative correlation with the change in share of vote.
This could imply that the rate of unemployment does help the BNP, but that the power of this help is diminishing over time as its effect wears off. This could be as a result of changing social policies, or unemployment becoming more common in the country at large, or simply people becoming used to unemployment. There is also a negative correlation between unemployment and change in share of vote for the British National Party at local elections. It is also compatible with the argument that it is relatively well-off areas in deprived local authorities that tend to vote BNP (for instance, John et al. 2006; Rhodes 2011b).

The same pattern of a positive correlation with absolute share of vote but a negative correlation with change in share of vote exhibited with the unemployment rate is also seen with the measure of the ethnic composition of an area. It can therefore be concluded again that a ‘whiter’ area is, the more it is favourable turf for the BNP, but that the power of this effect may be declining over time, again because of general attitudinal change in society as regards racial equality or increasing familiarity with a more diverse environment, or immigration becoming a less salient issue. Looking at the effect of the other control variables on voting for the BNP, there is some evidence that a change in the ethnicity measure - that is to say, an area becoming ‘whiter’ - helps the party.

This also lends credence to Ford and Goodwin’s (2014a) argument that UKIP voters are driven by different concerns to BNP voters, and that their socioeconomic positions are different, with UKIP voters being, crudely, better off.

As with the measures of activity by the opposition groups, effects from the socioeconomic indicators are less prevalent at Westminster elections than at local or European elections. This is particularly the case with the British National Party, where a solitary measure displays significance. As discussed above, this will be a result of the combination of Westminster elections being first-order elections and the distorting effect of the first-past-the-post system.

Conclusion

This chapter has set out the results of the statistical analyses and provided a breakdown thereof.

The headline take-aways are that, for both Unite Against Fascism and Hope not Hate, consistency of action is associated with a decrease in votes for both the British National Party and UKIP, while intensity of action from both opposition groups is, unexpectedly, associated with an increase in votes for both parties. Hope not Hate's activities are more associated with absolute share of vote, while Unite Against Fascism's activities are more associated with the two measures of change in share of vote. This could suggest that Hope not Hate are going where the problem is, while Unite Against Fascism are going where things are changing; however, that does not imply a causation.
Most importantly, given the effort expended, the effects of the opposition groups’ activities reap meagre rewards.

This leads to a question; why do the opposition groups have relatively slight effects? To answer this, the next chapter looks at the London Borough of Barking and Dagenham in the period from 2006 to 2010 in greater detail.
Chapter 7 - Barking and Dagenham

‘If I lived here, I wouldn’t vote for Harold Wilson.’

He paused and added, ‘I wouldn’t vote for myself either - I’d vote for Robespierre.’

Ted Heath, shortly before becoming Prime Minister, in Newcastle, as recorded by Greg Knight MP in Dishonourable Insults

Introduction

‘Welcome to Barking - new far right capital of Britain.’

That is how the Guardian reported the 2006 local elections (Muir 2006).

The election of a dozen British National Party members was a signal event. Amidst all the usual election night punditry, the result in Barking and Dagenham sent shockwaves through the political establishment. Britain was meant to be immune from the far right, a step removed from the problems of its European cousins. Instead, not only had a fascist party won a clutch of council seats, the British National Party was now the official opposition on a London Borough Council.

However, at the next elections to the London Borough of Barking and Dagenham Council, not a single British National Party candidate was returned. The far right party had apparently gone from nowhere to the verge of power and back again in the space of forty-eight months. Both Hope not Hate and Unite Against Fascism would claim this reversal of fortunes for the British National Party as being the result, at least in part, of their work in the borough. It therefore provides a unique opportunity to gauge the effectiveness or otherwise of Unite Against Fascism and Hope not Hate in a comparative perspective.

This chapter sets out the case for the comparison and highlights a few particular features of the London Borough of Barking and Dagenham and how it complements the quantitative analysis conducted above. It then provides a brief explanation of why people might have voted for the British National Party in the specific context of Barking and Dagenham in the middle of the first decade of the century before looking at the activities of the two opposition groups in the borough. It proceeds to look at the outcome of the 2010 elections before analysing what happened to the British National Party’s vote and, finally, positing explanations for the actions of the organisations involved. The aim of this chapter, in short, is to explain how the British National Party went from electoral success to electoral wipeout in one cycle, and what effects, if any, Unite Against Fascism and Hope not Hate had on that precipitous decline.
The comparison

As set out in the chapter on research design, there are considerable advantages in adopting a mixed methods design, both in general and in this specific instance.

Specifically, an explanatory sequential design was adopted as the understudied nature of opposition to the far right means that there are not existing theories to be applied in a new case. Using this model, a series of expectations as to the effect of the two civil society opposition groups on the far right parties were drawn up based on the available literature and an understanding of the history and activities of those groups. These expectations were then quantitatively tested in chapter six. The headline takeaway was that consistency of action, in general, depresses votes for far right parties while intensity of action, in general, has the perverse effect of actually increasing votes for far right parties. However, while statistically significant, the magnitudes of the effects are small. In order to explain both the fact and the size of the effects, a qualitative, case study is undertaken.

The case study is of the London Borough of Barking and Dagenham in the period from 2006 to 2010, with particular reference to council elections. Barking and Dagenham is an appropriate case study for two reasons. Firstly, as set out in the chapter on research design, it is an extreme case (Seawright and Gerring 2008). It is extreme on two counts; first, it represents an extraordinary success and then decline by the British National Party. Secondly, it is a high water mark for both Unite Against Fascism and Hope not Hate. Both organisations place great stock by their actions in Barking and Dagenham, indicating it as a success on their parts (Unite Against Fascism 2018; Hope not Hate 2017). This becomes particularly useful when considering the relatively low magnitude of the effects. If a subtle effect is to be explained, it is logical to look to where that effect has been greatest so that there is as much chance as possible for it to be seen and, crucially, explained.

A second factor, based as much as anything on a quirk of electoral geography, makes Barking and Dagenham a particularly useful case study. The Borough is represented in the House of Commons by two MPs, from the Barking constituency and the Dagenham constituency. The Labour Party organises itself internally on parliamentary constituencies, rather than local government boundaries. As such, there are effectively two Labour Parties at work in Barking and Dagenham, with two MPs. Hope not Hate would focus on the portion of the Borough that lay within the Dagenham constituency, while Unite Against Fascism’s activity would largely be in that area that fell within the Barking constituency. This allows a comparison between Unite Against Fascism and Hope not Hate. The Dagenham constituency would be renamed Dagenham and Rainham as part of the 2010 boundary changes.

28 The Dagenham constituency would be renamed Dagenham and Rainham as part of the 2010 boundary changes.
Fascism and Hope not Hate that keeps many possible variables constant, from a similar history of economic decline and recent immigration, to its relative position to a metropolitan centre, to the actions of the local municipal government. By virtue of being in a single London borough, the political situation is constant across the area, and the social and economic conditions are broadly the same. Factors such as transport are likewise the same. The two parts of the borough are, of course, geographically proximate; taking the First Law of Geography - 'everything is related to everything else, but near things are more related than distant things' (Tobler 1970:234) - it can be surmised that much, if not everything, will be comparable for the present purposes.

The aim, at least in terms of their campaigning against the British National Party, of both organisations is to reduce the number of votes and seats that the party receives. This can be done by convincing people not to vote for the British National Party, or by diminishing the relative weight of such votes as the party receives by increasing turnout, or, indeed, both. Barking and Dagenham offers excellent opportunities for both inasmuch as there are manifestly lots of people who have voted for the British National Party who can be dissuaded from doing so again; and turnout is very low, giving excellent scope for other voters to be convinced to make the trip to the polling station and so dilute the far right vote. These two features of voting patterns in the area mean that, bearing in mind the conclusions drawn in the previous chapter on the effectiveness of the activities of Hope not Hate and Unite Against Fascism, it can be argued a fortiori that if the opposition groups are of little effect in Barking and Dagenham, they will not be of greater effect anywhere else.

**UKIP**

The United Kingdom Independence Party is not included in this case study.

In general, UKIP is difficult to study in this very local manner. As set out above, the party runs an air war campaign, making use of national media. This makes them less sensitive to local campaigning than the British National Party; indeed, this is borne out by the results of the quantitative analysis. Moreover, UKIP’s support is diffused across the country, rather than concentrated in particular areas as are the BNP’s voters. This lack of concentration of voters means that we do not find tight geographies that hold as many potentially relevant variables constant. In short, we do not find areas that offer the same advantages for analysing UKIP’s success as we do with the BNP in Barking and Dagenham.

The attitude of the opposition groups to the United Kingdom Independence Party in Barking and Dagenham is also relevant to this particular case. Neither Hope not Hate (Cruddas 2018) nor Unite Against Fascism (Unite Against Fascism 2018) targeted UKIP, but focussed their energies on
stopping the British National Party as the populist radical right party presented less of a risk than the fascist party.

This lesser risk manifested in two ways. Firstly, UKIP was simply not going to take the council, running only seven candidates in an election of seventeen, three-member wards, where there was real apprehension that the BNP could actually emerge from the local elections in control of a London Borough. In any case, although neither Hope not Hate nor Unite Against Fascism would have welcomed any electoral success by UKIP, it would have been seen as preferable to the BNP winning seats. Moreover, UKIP was not seen as likely to win any of the seats they did contest. In that case, a vote for UKIP was effectively a vote against the BNP inasmuch as it did nothing to move the latter any closer to going past the post. In simple terms, if a BNP voter were to shift to casting their ballot for UKIP, it would be counted a win.

Therefore, because of the difficulty in studying UKIP at the local level due to the nature of their campaigning and the diffuse nature of their support, and because of the particular circumstances of Barking and Dagenham that led the opposition groups to pay them little heed, this case study focusses on effects regarding the British National Party.

The London Borough of Barking and Dagenham

The London Borough of Barking and Dagenham sits in the eastern part of the city. It is on the north bank of the Thames, with the London Borough of Havering to its east, the London Borough of Redbridge to its north and west, and the London Borough of Newham to its east. It was formed by the major reorganisation of the London Government Act 1963 from the Municipal Borough of Barking and the Municipal Borough of Dagenham. Prior to the significant expansion of London under the 1963 Act, both Municipal Boroughs lay in Essex. All of the Metropolitan Borough of Barking would go into the London Borough of Barking (the ‘and Dagenham’ would come in 1980) except for Beckton, a small corner of land between the Thames and the Roding, which would go to the London Borough of Newham. The bulk of the Metropolitan Borough of Dagenham would go to the London Borough of Barking and Dagenham, with the northern end of Chadwell Heath ward going to the London Borough of Redbridge (London Government Act 1963).

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29 Passed in 1963, with ‘shadow elections’ to the new London Boroughs in 1964 and full effect in 1965, the Act abolished the London County Council (LCC) and established in its place the Greater London Council (GLC). The GLC had much wider boundaries than the LCC; what is now Barking and Dagenham had been outside the easternmost edge of the LCC area, while now it is ten miles inside the M25 London Orbital Motorway.

30 Municipal Boroughs are one of the many types of local government setup that have faded into history.
The expansion of the political boundaries of London recapitulates much of the history of Barking and Dagenham. In the aftermath of the Second World War, rebuilding and urbanisation led London to expand such that the government had to act to recognise the development of a rural or quasi-rural area\(^\text{31}\) into part of the metropolis. The area also began to industrialise. The largest employer in the area for generations was the Ford Motor Company; its rise and fall would chart the fortunes of the borough. Although Dagenham Ford was founded in the thirties, it was from the sixties that it achieved particular prominence. Indeed, the sewing machinists’ strike of 1968 would be given by Barbara Castle as one of the drivers for the Equal Pay Act 1970 (Castle 1993:409), and the pay negotiations of 1978 lay partially behind the Winter of Discontent. For various reasons, the Dagenham plant would go into decline, with investment by Ford going to other European sites.

At the turn of the Millennium, the factory would receive the blow of the end of carmaking. Although enginemaking would continue, the last Fiesta would be produced in 2002 (BBC News 2002). Thousands would lose their jobs. More than just the headline figure, these jobs were well-paid, skilled jobs that provided stability and standing in the community.

Barking and Dagenham is one of the poorest local government areas in the country, with the most social problems, sitting in the second decile on the Index of Multiple Deprivation (Ministry of Housing, Communities & Local Government 2019). The population grew from just under 164,000 at the 2001 census to just under 186,000 at the 2011 census, an increase of approximately thirteen per cent (London Borough of Barking and Dagenham 2014). This was not just immigration from outside the UK; people moving from central London to an area of relatively cheap housing had a particular effect in making accommodation expensive for locals (Cruddas 2018).

### Political situation

The London Borough of Barking and Dagenham is one of thirty-two municipal areas within the Greater London Authority. As a London Borough, Barking and Dagenham is responsible for a broad range of services, from education and trading standards to recycling and tax collection. Some services, such as fire and policing, are administered by the Mayor of London; the most important of these is transport, though this is often done, particularly in the case of buses, in concert with the council.

\(^{31}\) The massive Becontree estate of nearly three thousand houses was the forerunner of the urbanisation of the eastern fringe of London, and started the process that led to the expansion of London, but it should be remembered that, although built by the LCC, it was a cottage estate; the nearest modern equivalent might be a garden city.
Politically, Barking and Dagenham is very much a Labour area. The council consists of fifty-one members, elected from seventeen wards, three from each ward. Labour is not just dominant, but hegemonic. Not a single councillor was elected from any party other than Labour at the 2010, 2014, and 2018 polls. Even in the shock 2006 results, more than two-thirds of the seats were won by Labour councillors. This can be seen in table 7.1.

Table 7.1: councillors elected in the London Borough of Barking and Dagenham by party, 1998-2018

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Labour</th>
<th>Con</th>
<th>LibDem</th>
<th>CHRA</th>
<th>BNP</th>
<th>UKIP</th>
<th>Green</th>
<th>Ind</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2018</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

‘CHRA’ is the Chadwell Heath Residents Association. A dash indicates that the party did not contest the elections. Parties that never had a councillor elected are not included.

Data from London Borough of Barking and Dagenham (2019)

For the Greater London Assembly, Barking and Dagenham is in the City and East constituency, along with the City of London and the London Boroughs of Newham and Tower Hamlets. It has returned a Labour member at every election since its foundation in 2000.

Barking and Dagenham is represented in the Westminster Parliament with two constituencies. Barking constituency occupies the middle and west of the borough, while Dagenham and Rainham constituency covers the eastern and northern part of the borough and extends into the neighbouring London Borough of Havering. Until boundary changes in 2010, the latter constituency was simply ‘Dagenham’. Dagenham is a solidly red constituency; it has only ever returned Labour MPs, and did so from 1987 to 2010 with more than fifty per cent share of the vote. The MP since 2001 has been Jon Cruddas. Barking is evenly more solidly Labour. It too has only ever elected Labour MPs and did so with more than half of votes cast for the Labour candidate in every election since its creation in 1945, except 1983, 1987, and 2005. The MP since 1994 has been the Rt. Hon. Dame Margaret Hodge.
The Labour Party typically organises itself around Westminster constituencies. Thus, the two parts of the borough have separate Labour parties, albeit with arrangements to co-ordinate campaigning for local elections (Labour Party 2019). This gives further scope for the separation between the Hope not Hate and Unite Against Fascism campaigns, with each one co-operating more with one of the Constituency Labour Parties.

The BNP in Barking and Dagenham

The National Front had a history of relative success in East London generally, and Barking and Dagenham in particular. Despite concerns about London becoming too multicultural for its messages to have purchase, the British National Party did continue to work in the area. The pattern is of growth over time before the breakthrough of 2006.

Two parliamentary by-elections were held in Barking and Dagenham on 9th June 1994, one in each Westminster seat. Both were won by the Labour candidates - Margaret Hodge in Barking and Judith Church in Dagenham - albeit with reduced majorities due to very low turnouts. In Dagenham, John Tyndall, the veteran fascist, received over 1,500 votes for the British National Party. On a low turnout of thirty-seven per cent, this meant that, for the first time in two decades, the British National Party retained its deposit. The new United Kingdom Independence Party would receive just over two per cent of the vote in Dagenham. The British National Party did not contest the Barking seat, but the National Front received almost three per cent of the vote, while UKIP received just over two per cent (Boothroyd nd).

The BNP would remain on the ballot paper for the 1997, 2001, and 2005 general elections in both Barking and Dagenham and would increase both its total number of votes and share of vote on each occasion. This can be seen in table 7.2.
Table 7.2: votes for the British National Party at General Elections in Barking and Dagenham, 1997-2005

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Barking</th>
<th>Share (%)</th>
<th>Dagenham</th>
<th>Share (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>894</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>900</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>1,606</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>1,378</td>
<td>5.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>3,211</td>
<td>11.1</td>
<td>2,870</td>
<td>9.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Data from Boothroyd nd

The British National Party did not contest any constituencies at the 2000 or 2004 London Assembly elections, but did receive 2.9% and then 4.8% share of the vote on the London-wide list. The BNP contested a single constituency, City and East, which included Barking and Dagenham, at the 2008 elections and received almost ten per cent of the vote, and 5.3% on the London-wide list (Greater London Authority, 2014).

By 2004, the British National Party was contesting local by-elections. At the Valence by-election in July of that year, it would come second with almost a third of all votes cast. It would win the Goresbrook by-election in September 2004 with an absolute majority of votes cast, and would again come second with around a third of the vote at the Becontree and Goresbrook by-elections in 2005.

This campaigning was not limited to election times, and as described above, focussed on presenting the British National Party as a realistic option that would address the issues facing people in Barking and Dagenham.

The 2006 local elections

At the 2006 elections to the London Borough of Barking and Dagenham Council, the British National Party went from not having contested the previous elections to winning twelve seats and receiving eight and a half thousand votes, representing 17.2% of all votes cast, despite not standing in every ward.

The reasons why a voter might choose to place their metaphorical pebble in the urn of a far right party are covered extensively in the literature and are discussed in the review of the literature in
this thesis, and so are only briefly touched upon here. However, there are a few features of this specific time and place, and particular manifestations of it that are not covered and which bear consideration. These had already started to manifest in the increasing electoral success indicated immediately above.

The Labour government that came to power under Tony Blair was very different to previous socialist governments in the UK; indeed, the party had deliberately rebranded itself as ‘New Labour’ and was appealing to the middle classes whose support it felt it needed to win an election, while not worrying about traditional Labour voters - the white working class - on the basis they had ‘nowhere else to go’ (Rhodes 2011b). Immigration remained a top concern for the general public, with the majority of people in the UK wanting a reduction in immigration (Ipsos MORI 2017).

Both Margaret Hodge and Jon Cruddas reported speaking to senior officials at Number Ten to raise the increasing dissatisfaction amongst such voters and the risk of the far right capitalising on that dissatisfaction, but were unable to secure action from Downing Street (Cruddas 2018, Hodge 2018). This perception was particularly present in Barking and Dagenham, with a specific concern that people moving into the area were crowding out indigenes from services, in particular housing, and that black and minority ethnic communities were being prioritised for council housing, (Hodge 2018; Rhodes 2011a).

Barking and Dagenham council was not held in high regard by its residents (Goodwin 2008), and at times considered to be outright untrustworthy (Wood and Fowlie 2010). Added to this was that the local Labour Party was effectively sclerotic. Its overwhelmingly strong position meant that it had to do very little work to see its candidates elected; this phenomenon was not limited to Barking and Dagenham, but was part of a familiar pattern in Labour’s strongholds (Hazel Blears, quoted in Rhodes 2011a:103). The effect of this can be summed up in the stereotypical voter’s complaint of, ‘we only see you at election time’: there was little communication between the local party and the local population, and so less understanding of the issues facing that community and, crucially, a missed opportunity to build up a relationship of trust between citizen and political party.

The British National Party was able to build on its history in East London - both recent and extending further back - to deploy its local style of campaigning in an area it knew well and which was as likely as anywhere to be receptive to it (Cruddas 2018). In short, there was a perfect storm of a close-knit community (Goodwin 2008), particularly vulnerable to the local politics of the BNP, seeing dramatic change with little confidence in the ability of national or local government to address their grievances. The BNP would capitalise on this, pushing racialised
concerns to the fore - as it had in Tower Hamlets in the 1993 by-election - as well as presenting itself as a party able to deal with the banal concerns of everyday life (Wilks-Heeg 2009). The BNP imported organisers from outside the borough to campaign and run for election there (Cruddas 2018). Coupled with the fallout from the substantial reduction in employment at the Dagenham Ford plant, the British National Party was able to present Barking and Dagenham as an area and a people forgotten by the elites that could be saved with a vote to shake things up.

Unite Against Fascism in Barking and Hope not Hate in Dagenham

Aims

Both Hope not Hate and Unite Against Fascism regard their campaigns in Barking and Dagenham and the removal of the British National Party from the council as amongst their greatest successes (Lowles 2014; Unite Against Fascism 2018). The manner of campaigning for both groups was archetypical of their respective styles as described above. Both organised campaign days of action, when large numbers of volunteers would come to the area.

For both Unite Against Fascism and Hope not Hate, the headline aim was simple: convince as many people as possible to vote for a party other than the British National Party. Both the general election and the local elections were conducted on the first past the post system. Seats were not to be allocated proportionately or with any preference system. With the British National Party’s aim being simply to be first past the post - or, more precisely, one of the first three past the post as each ward returned three councillors – any vote that did not go to them could be seen as a victory. Hope not Hate had a second aim; as well as encouraging people to vote against the BNP, they would seek to ‘suppress the BNP vote’ (Lowles 2014:158).

Beneath this headline aim, there were particular goals for Hope not Hate. Because of access to private polling conducted by the Rt Hon Margaret Hodge MP, Hope not Hate did not estimate Nick Griffin as having any substantial chance of winning the parliamentary constituency of Barking and so its focus was on the local council elections (Lowles 2014). ‘Our initial objective was to keep the far-right party below the 26 seats it needed to win control of the council’ (Lowles 2014:151). Activity would therefore be focused on the seats where the BNP either had sitting councillors or could pick up more.

Unite Against Fascism did not have such a view; it would campaign against the BNP across Barking. The stated aim of Unite Against Fascism was to increase voter turnout to dilute any vote for the far right (Copsey and Macklin 2011:134; Unite Against Fascism 2018). This aim was to be achieved through a variety of means: rallies, protests, concerts, carnivals, leafleting (Unite
Against Fascism 2018). The importance of working with local people was emphasised by Unite Against Fascism (Unite Against Fascism 2018). However, this aim appears to have been more aspiration than achievement, with Unite Against Fascism themselves acknowledging that their inspiration were national campaigns and that localisation was secondary (Unite Against Fascism 2018).

As discussed above, there is a close relationship between the Socialist Workers Party and Unite Against Fascism. It is possible that, because of that relationship, Unite Against Fascism had subsidiary aims in its campaigning, including increasing the profile of the Socialist Workers Party, gaining more supporters, and raising money. However, there is no evidence of this and, were it the case, it is unlikely that representatives of the Socialist Workers Party would be advertising the fact. Moreover, the aims of Unite Against Fascism do align with those of the Socialist Workers Party even without any ulterior motive; fascism is seen as a particular threat by the hard left and visibly, volubly opposing fascism has become part of its DNA. The particular threat perceived by the hard left from fascism dates back, as set out in the fourth chapter, to the inter-war years, as does the interplay of activity between them. Indeed, fascism does hold particular opprobrium for the hard left (Payne 1996). The activity of Unite Against Fascism could have been gauged to advance the Socialist Workers Party, but it seems at least as likely that its campaigns in Barking were the latest iteration of an ever-evolving repertoire of contention that dates back as long as the clashes between fascists and anti-fascists, if not longer.

While the Socialist Workers Party promoted Unite Against Fascism events and while there was certainly crossover in terms of senior personnel between the two organisations, the SWP did not take a public role in the campaign. Indeed, this would have made for a very uncomfortable relationship with the Labour Party.

Activities

Hope not Hate and Unite Against Fascism were both very active in the London Borough of Barking and Dagenham in the weeks leading up to the 2010 elections. However, these activities differed in a number of ways, including the messages they sent, who these messages were targeted to and how they were targeted, and other activities in the area.

Firstly, the messaging in the literature of the two parties was different. The essential difference between Hope not Hate and Unite Against Fascism’s messages and the tone of those messages was between voting against something or voting for something. Indeed, that notion of voting for something was encapsulated in the very name of one of the organisations: Hope not Hate. The name, and the genesis of the campaign under Searchlight, come from experiences in Burnley and Oldham around 2004 and research carried out for the organization that suggested even voters
hostile to the BNP were put off by very negative messages (Lowles 2014). Future campaigns would still criticize the BNP and highlight what Hope not Hate thought a BNP-led council would mean, but would also focus on positive changes in the area where they were campaigning, realities around multiculturalism and the like (Lowles 2014). Private polling from the Rt Hon Margaret Hodge MP and made available to Hope not Hate suggested that Nick Griffin was very much more unpopular than the local BNP (Lowles 2014). In any depiction of the local BNP, therefore, Hope not Hate emphasized the figure of Nick Griffin to reinforce the connection in voters’ minds between the party and its leader. The BNP would still be taken to task for its racist views, but in a less aggressive manner than Unite Against Fascism, as detailed below.

Crucially, Hope not Hate were willing to ‘acknowledge some of the real grievances in the community which weren’t race based but [had] become racialized because of the activities of the far right’ (Cruddas 2018) such as housing and employment, fitting in with their localized approach to campaigning. For instance, Hope not Hate promoted in one of their tabloid-style newspapers a successful campaign that included a petition organized by Jon Cruddas MP to prevent the opening of a prison in the area (Lowles 2014). This approach would be criticized for potentially confusing a simple message and for giving ground to the BNP (Hodge 2018).

Unite Against Fascism’s messaging was much more direct. They would specifically and repeatedly brand the British National Party as Nazis based on their history, past statements, and connections to other parties in Europe (Unite Against Fascism 2018) as can be seen in figure 7.1. The connection with the Holocaust and the death of millions of Jews was made explicit (Hodge 2018). While local issues were acknowledged as important, a consistent national message of opposition to the BNP and to the fascism they represented was held to be more important (UAF 2018). Indeed, Copsey suggests that the Hodge campaign had concerns over the UAF’s ‘hysterical language’ (Copsey 2017:213).
There is a further difference in messaging. UAF broadly maintained a consistent tone, and delivered leaflets widely across the borough and the campaign (UAF iv). Hope not Hate took a different approach, with more tailored messaging. As well as delivering leaflets, Hope not Hate printed three tabloid-style newspapers, setting out a much broader range of messages than a leaflet, including emphasizing local community leaders and the positive aspects of the area, as well as highlighting problems with the BNP and their leader. These were also felt to more likely to be kept and read than a leaflet through the letterbox (Lowles 2014).

These were then supplemented by publications targeted at segments of the population. By using the electoral register, which lists dates of birth and with educated guessing about names, the population of the constituency was effectively segmented. This allowed a Unison-funded booklet to go to all women in the Borough, with a prominent female newspaper columnist and a local teachers’ leader writing for it. Specific leaflets were also delivered to Sikh, Muslim, Hindu, and Black voters, based on names. A leaflet with an open letter from a decorated World War Two veteran was delivered to pensioners, and a tailored leaflet was delivered to those who had only recently reached majority and so were voting for the first time. A leaflet was designed for the largest mosque in the area, and posters were put up at local churches. Shortly before election
day, ward-specific leaflets were delivered highlighting the inactivity of BNP councillors in those wards. (Lowles 2014) as can be seen in figure 7.2.

Figure 7.2: materials distributed by Hope not Hate. Attention is drawn to the columnists and positive messages under the masthead of the newspaper
Source: Lowles 2014 p.163

This represented a substantial amount of work for both Unite Against Fascism and Hope not Hate. When large amounts of material had to be delivered, both would organize a ‘day of action’ – a specific day, promoted widely to supporters, when people were encouraged to come from outside the area to join the campaign (Lowles 2014; Unite Against Fascism 2018). Both organisations had set up offices in the area – UAF in Barking and Hope not Hate in Dagenham, and both had staff to manage their campaigns (Unite Against Fascism 2018; Lowles 2014).

On the day of the election, both Unite Against Fascism and Hope not Hate engaged in the time-honoured process of ‘knocking up’ – visiting voters who had pledged to vote to make sure they would actually go to the polling station.

This illustrates a further difference between the two organisations. The Hope not Hate campaign was active in Barking and Dagenham well before Unite Against Fascism, with its ‘anti-fascist
fortnight’ of campaigns as early as March 2007 (Copsey 2017). Searchlight – then still the parent organization for the Hope not Hate campaign – set up a local group, Barking and Dagenham Together in 2006, distributing fifty thousand tabloid-style newspapers under that banner (Cruddas 2006). Meanwhile, the Unite Against Fascism website records no activities in Barking between 2006 and 200932. Hope not Hate would work with a local organization, Barking and Dagenham Together, to guide its activities in the area (Lowles 2014). By the end of 2009, Hope not Hate was establishing a voter ID operation in co-operation with the Barking and Dagenham Council for Voluntary Service (Copsey 2017).33 Voter ID is the process of asking voters in advance of an election how they intend to vote and if they intend to vote so that, on election day, campaigners can ‘knock up’, or remind voters to actually go to the polling station. This process of knocking up, at least for Hope not Hate, was fundamentally similar to that for the Labour Party discussed below, with the aim of encouraging two groups. The first group is those who would definitely go to the polls, and could be persuaded to vote against the BNP; the second is those who would definitely vote against the BNP, but were not sure they would go to the polling station.

Unite Against Fascism would also canvass in this way, but were much more closely integrated with Barking Constituency Labour Party (Hodge 2018). While the aims of Labour and Unite Against Fascism were clearly very similar – in practice, for the BNP to lose a seat meant for Labour to win a seat – they were not precisely the same; Labour had a longer-term, institutional aim. While UAF campaigners would not specifically endorse a Labour vote, ‘Labour people were alongside us [who] would say “Vote Labour”’ (Unite Against Fascism 2018). Crucially, the data would be held by Barking Constituency Labour Party. Unite Against Fascism could therefore get out the vote on election day, but without being able to manage the targeting itself. Unite Against Fascism were also, with Barking Constituency Labour Party, doorknocking before election day (Hodge 2018) to talk to voters, very much in line with a new campaigning strategy undertaken by Margaret Hodge that is discussed below.

Unite Against Fascism would also hold more visible demonstrations and protests (Hodge 2018; Unite Against Fascism 2018) outside tube and train stations and other prominent locations, while Love Music Hate Racism – allied to Unite Against Fascism much in the way that Rock Against

32 As can be seen at http://uaf.org.uk/page/6/?s=barking.
33 Copsey lists this as ‘Barking and Dagenham Council Voluntary Services’, but this may be an error. Councils for Voluntary Service are charities, generally set up on local government boundaries, that help co-ordinate other charitable and voluntary activities. While they are likely to have a relationship with local government, they are not formally part of it.
Racism was allied to the Anti-Nazi League in the seventies – organized concerts in Barking (Socialist Worker 2010).

Both organisations saw Barking and Dagenham as a key battleground where there was a real risk of the British National Party making further gains, and used figures from popular culture to try to attract campaigners, notably the singer Ms Dynamite in the case of Unite Against Fascism and the spoken word poet Scroobius Pip for Hope not Hate.

Relations with other groups

As has been set out, there were close relations between Hope not Hate and Dagenham Constituency Labour Party and its MP, Jon Cruddas, and between Unite Against Fascism, Barking Constituency Labour Party, and its MP, the Rt Hon Dame Margaret Hodge. This is not to say there were not relations between Hope not Hate and the Barking side of the borough, and between the Dagenham side and Unite Against Fascism. Indeed, as has been noted, Margaret Hodge made private polling available to Hope not Hate (Lowles 2017) and there were meetings between Jon Cruddas and Weyman Bennett of Unite Against Fascism (Cruddas 2018).

Although there was an existing relationship between Nick Lowles of Hope not Hate and Jon Cruddas MP (Cruddas 2018) and the Hope not Hate office in Dagenham was located in the same building as Jon Cruddas’ campaign office, Hope not Hate are at pains to separate themselves from Labour, saying that ‘on no occasion did we [Hope not Hate] actively campaign on its [the Labour Party’s] behalf’ (Lowles 2017:163), while, for his part, Cruddas describes Hope not Hate as having been independent of him and the Labour Party, but that he was supportive of their work (Cruddas 2018).

However, Hope not Hate and Dagenham Constituency Labour Party were manifestly aware of what each other were doing. If nothing else, by focusing their campaign on the British National Party, Hope not Hate relieved Dagenham Constituency Labour Party of this task, allowing them to focus on getting out their own messages for their candidates (Lowles 2017).

Ironically, given the connection between it and the Socialist Workers Party, it was Unite Against Fascism that had a closer relationship with the Labour Party, specifically the Rt Hon Margaret Hodge MP and Barking Constituency Labour Party. Unite Against Fascism would campaign and knock on doors with Margaret Hodge and Barking Constituency Labour Party (Hodge 2018) in addition to their own activities, and were willing to take some direction over the content of materials (Copsey 2017).

One of the largest impacts of the relationships between Hope not Hate, Unite Against Fascism, and the Labour Party may have been in effectively choosing the geographies in which they
campaigned. Hope not Hate already had a relationship to Dagenham Constituency Labour Party through Jon Cruddas (Cruddas 2018), and did not want to work with Margaret Hodge (Hodge 2018). They therefore focused on the Dagenham side. Unite Against Fascism fundamentally disagreed with Hope not Hate on messages and dealing with ‘sensitive’ issues, and would gravitate to the other part of the Borough when campaigning there, and so develop a relationship with Margaret Hodge and Barking Constituency Labour Party.

The relationship between Hope not Hate and Unite Against Fascism and religious groups in Barking and Dagenham was essentially twofold. Firstly, they would allow both groups to contact their parishioners, whether through posters, emails, or directly addressing the congregations (Lowles 2017; Unite Against Fascism 2018). Given the antipathy of the British National Party towards Muslims, the support of the main mosque in Barking, Al Madina, is unsurprising. Its wide catchment area meant that Hope not Hate would distribute leaflets there, despite being outside the area it focused on (Lowles 2017). Many of the churches in Barking and Dagenham cater to the Black communities, and the Church of England had made clear its distaste for the British National Party (Press Association 2009), and so were seen as likely being effective places to find people who could be encouraged to turn out to vote against the BNP. This is in addition to any doctrinal or theological opposition that the religious groups may have had. Secondly, volunteers for campaigning would also come from the religious organisations (Unite Against Fascism 2018), and they would assist in identifying ethnic minority voters from the electoral rolls (Lowles 2017).

Trades unions were also a source of volunteers; particularly for days of action, local trade union branches, especially in London, would encourage their members to travel to Barking and Dagenham to campaign with Hope not Hate or Unite Against Fascism. They would also be sources of funding, both generally for the organisations and for specific activities; for instance, the leaflet targeted at women produced by Hope not Hate was funded by UNISON (Lowles 2014). Trade unions were also an easy way to identify local people who were likely to be supportive of the campaigns, particularly in writing for the Hope not Hate tabloid-style newspapers; Lowles (2014) identifies a local NUT official in particular as having done this.

However, neither the available written accounts of the campaigns nor the interviews conducted for this study suggest that the unions took a particular role in determining messages or campaign strategies. Rather, they supported the broad approach of Hope not Hate or of Unite Against Fascism, according to their own internal politics. In particular, the Transport and General Workers’ Union34 would support Unite Against Fascism activities in Barking, while the General

34 Now part of Unite.
Manufacturers and Boilermakers Union would concentrate on Hope not Hate and Dagenham, although some, such as the National Union of Teachers, would support both (Cruddas 2018). Individual trades union activists and trade union branches, through the local trades union council, tended to work with whichever organization was operating in their area (Cruddas 2018).

There were also groups set up specifically because of the BNP’s success in 2006. Many of these groups faded away and have left little evidence of their activity. However, two bear commenting on. These are Barking Says No which, at Margaret Hodge’s instigation (Copsey 2017), Unite Against Fascism worked with. Searchlight established a group, Barking and Dagenham Together (Cruddas 2006), which the Hope not Hate campaign worked with. In the latter case, this relationship went back to shortly after the 2006 elections, and seems to have involved Hope not Hate better understanding the area – a hallmark of their approach – and forming links in the community, rather than direct campaigning (Lowles 2017). Barking Says No produced its own leaflets, and these were delivered by Unite Against Fascism activists (Unite Against Fascism 2010).

It seems reasonable to presume that this relationship was mutual, and that Barking Says No would also deliver Unite Against Fascism leaflets. Either way, it appears that it was principally a sort of clearing-house for various local groups to get involved in the campaign against the BNP.

In short, Hope not Hate appears to have had a sophisticated and long-lasting approach to its campaign in Dagenham, based on an understanding of what messages would work for that specific area, and groups within that area. Unite Against Fascism had a simpler theory of the case, based on reinforcing the message that the British National Party were Nazis. Unite Against Fascism came to the area later in the day, and appear to have engaged with Margaret Hodge and Barking Constituency Labour Party, integrating themselves into their campaign, as much as anything for want of alternatives, while putting out their messaging that specifically highlighted the extremist roots and connections of the British National Party as a whole.

Hope not Hate’s actions can be seen as speaking to the literature in three ways. Firstly, it has some effect on the supply side of the equation. Mudde (2007) suggests cultural context under this heading, while Minkenberg (2001) adds party convergence. By changing the narrative around immigration, Hope not Hate shifts the cultural context. It can also open up a space for other parties to make positive campaigns, reducing the perceived effects of party convergence.

More importantly, however, is that Hope not Hate are operating clearly in the meso level (Mudde 2007). There is a strong emphasis on local connections and local issues, with publications targeted to engage with difficult issues, using celebrities as part of the effort. The actions of Hope not Hate speak directly to the meso level, which relates to how people form their opinions of the world around them.
As with other social movements, Hope not Hate has a repertoire of contention (Tilly 2006). It is, perhaps, unusual in that it is more intelligence- and research- led than others (though both of those are based on its history). Its leadership’s use of online tools meant that it could adapt it more quickly than other groups. Nevertheless, it sought out worthy people to promote its messages; set out the unity of the people in the community supporting the message; and demonstrated numbers and commitment by repeated, prolonged presence; it engaged in a WUNC display (Tilly 2006).

Unite Against Fascism is much more clearly a classic social movement (Tilly 2006), for good and for ill. It had a time-honoured repertoire that it understood and that it knew would draw people, and stuck to it. However, it may inadvertently have shifted the political opportunity structures (Tarrow 1995) in the area. Because, in addition to its usual activity, it worked closely with Barking Constituency Labour Party, it effectively boosted the latter’s ability to campaign effectively and reach potentially disconnected voters.

The 2010 elections

The results of the 2010 elections were a serious reverse for the British National Party, losing all of its councillors elected in 2006. The Labour Party won every seat on the Council. The British National Party actually increased its total number of votes, though this can be attributed to running thirty-four candidates across all seventeen wards in 2010, as opposed to twelve candidates across seven wards in 2006. Its share of the vote across the entire borough barely changed, but was distributed across the whole borough instead of concentrated in a few wards.

There are a number of challenges in gauging the effect of activity by the two opposition groups on the particular wards.

Principally, consistency and intensity of action are calculated on local authority boundaries rather than ward boundaries on the basis that the effect of campaigning is not limited to such a small area. If, for instance, a street stall is held in a town centre, campaigners will not only be speaking to people who live in the ward that contains the town centre, but to everyone passing through. Mutatis mutandis, a demonstration or concert will attract more people from the surrounding areas than from far away.

Making a turnout comparison is also difficult because the elections are not the same; the 2006 local elections did not take place at the same time as any other elections. In Barking and Dagenham, there were no other elections of any sort. The 2010 local elections took place on the same day as a general election; unsurprisingly, turnout at these elections was very much higher, at sixty-two per cent, than the thirty-eight per cent London average at the 2006 elections.
(Greater London Authority 2010). For Barking and Dagenham, turnout rose from just over thirty-eight to just over sixty per cent (London Borough of Barking and Dagenham 2019).

However, comparison can be made between wards in Barking constituency and wards in Dagenham constituency, and wards where the BNP had councillors returned with wards where the far right party did not win any seats to determine any effect.

Turnout was higher in every ward that did not elect a BNP councillor in 2006 than those that did, with the exception of Eastbrook ward.

Manifestly, turnout increased. However, the increase in turnout was not uniform, and three particular trends can be distinguished. Firstly, as seen in chart 7.1, turnout was higher in every ward across the borough in 2010 than in 2006. Secondly, with the exception of Eastbrook ward, the increase in turnout from 2006 to 2010 was greater in wards that had not been contested by the BNP in 2006 than in those wards the BNP had not contested, as can also be seen in chart 7.1. Again with the exception of Eastbrook ward, the third trend that can be identified is that the increase in turnout from 2006 to 2010 was greater in those wards that did not elect BNP councillors in 2006 than in those that did.

Eastbrook ward is effectively divided into two along a north-west to south-east axis by an extensive set of green areas - Central Park, Eastbrookend Park, and the Chase Nature Reserve - with the larger, north-eastern part being geographically and socio-economically closer to the London Borough of Havering than the rest of Barking and Dagenham across multiple measures, from ethnic makeup to life expectancy to type of housing (Greater London Authority 2017). This may account for its apparently anomalous position.

It could be that the particular factors that led to the BNP contesting those wards in the first place, or led to them winning those wards, covary with turnout. However, the BNP struggled to find sufficient candidates and could not stand the maximum of three in each ward. It may also be that the particular factors that led the BNP to choose those wards to contest make them more resistant to general trends that increase turnout or less likely to be affected by the specific style of campaigning used by Hope not Hate and Unite Against Fascism. Given the findings of the statistical analyses above, an application of Occam’s Razor would suggest that the activities of Hope not Hate and Unite Against Fascism were simply not particularly effective in driving up turnout in those wards.

*Chart 7.1: Change in turnout for elections to the London Borough of Barking and Dagenham Council 2006-2010 by BNP presence in 2006. Data from Greater London Authority (2010)*
Chart 7.2: Change in turnout for elections to the London Borough of Barking and Dagenham Council 2006-2010 by constituency. Data from Greater London Authority (2010)

Valence and Alibon wards were formerly in Dagenham constituency but moved to Barking at the
Fifth Periodic Review of Westminster Constituencies. The changes were published in 2007, and took effect at the 2010 general election (The Parliamentary Constituencies (England) Order 2007)

While there is a slight bias towards greater increases in turnout in wards in Dagenham, there is not sufficient evidence to conclude that there was a greater increase in turnout in Hope not Hate’s principal area of operations than in Unite Against Fascism’s, or vice versa, as shown in chart 7.2.

Had Hope not Hate or Unite Against Fascism or both had particular effects on the British National Party through their chosen method of diluting the vote by increasing turnout, differential increases in turnout would have been observed, either between ‘BNP wards’ and ‘non-BNP wards’, or between the Barking side of the borough and the Dagenham side.

What, then, might explain why the BNP went from nowhere to being the official opposition to nowhere in the space of fifteen hundred days?

**Political change in Barking and Dagenham**

A series of changes took place in and affecting Barking and Dagenham from 2006 to 2010. They are set out below as national, local, and internal to the BNP.

**National level**

Two potential factors for the precipitous decline in the BNP’s fortunes sit at the national level. One is, simply, that a general election took place at the same time. This would, irrespective of anything else, increase turnout, which would hamper the British National Party and any other minority party.

The second is the passage of time: the national political environment in 2010 was different from 2006. This ranges from perceptions of the national parties and their leaders to what concerned people in politics at the time. In 2006, the Labour Party under Tony Blair had won a third general election in a row, and the Conservatives under Michael Howard had run a campaign hostile to immigration. By 2010, the Labour Party was on the cusp of defeat, and the Conservative Party had a new leader, David Cameron, who had set about detoxifying the party’s brand. Attitudes to immigrants were warming (European Social Survey 2006-14).

**Labour in Barking and Dagenham**

These are, of course, national changes. There were also changes specific to Barking and Dagenham; one accidental, two quite deliberate.
The first, accidental change is simply the effect of increased immigration to the area. Voters’ mores do not dramatically change in a short period of time simply from a geographical translocation, and immigration to the area included immigration, as is described above, from within the UK and from within London. This demographic change would likely effect a change in the aggregate values and, so, voting behaviour of the population.

The second change is in the activities of the Labour Party in the area. The British National Party’s electoral success was a wake-up call to two Constituency Labour Parties that had become accustomed to easy victories.

In the case of Dagenham (now Dagenham and Rainham) Constituency Labour Party, there was a substantial increase in the traditional Labour style of campaigning, with contact rates – the share of the electorate that had been spoken to by a Labour campaigner – reaching seventy per cent, coupled with experimentation in different forms of voter engagement (Cruddas 2018).

The changes in campaigning in Barking were more substantial. The sitting MP, Dame Margaret Hodge, initiated an ambitious programme of voter engagement after the 2006 local elections. These involved coffee mornings with people who had voted in at least one of the previous three elections of any level, and were an opportunity for two-way communication between voters and politician. Hodge herself estimates the numbers involved to be in the thousands (Hodge 2018). There was also a revitalisation of the local party, with changes in leadership and councillors to better reflect the community in terms of age, gender, and ethnicity (Copsey 2012), occasioned by the demonstrated threat of the BNP’s electoral breakthrough, and a consequent increase in campaigning and therefore contact with the community (Hodge 2018). Voter contact rates went from six per cent to sixty-two per cent in four years (Copsey 2012). Voter contact rates are a key metric for campaigning; the simple number is how many electors the party has spoken to within in a given electoral circumscription. Each political party has a variation on how this is conducted, but for Labour it involves asking a set of questions to gauge each person’s propensity to vote for the party. This is combined with information from the marked register – a copy of the electoral roll indicating who actually voted35 made available to political parties – in the Contact Creator database to give an indication of where effort can be most effectively spent for elections (Labour Party 2019a). The tenfold increase in the voter contact rate indicates not only that Barking Constituency Labour Party was having conversations with and so gaining data on voters, but was capable of organizing volunteers to have tens of thousands of such interactions.

35 But not, of course, how they voted.
There was also an increase in co-operation between the Dagenham and Barking constituency Labour parties over time, although this came towards the end of the 2006 to 2010 cycle as elections loomed and continued thereafter (Hodge 2018; Cruddas 2018). In both Barking and Dagenham, the threat of the British National Party was an effective way of mobilising people to vote if they did not always make the trip to the polling station, particularly amongst black and minority ethnic communities.

The Council

As Wilks-Heeg (2009) argues, the fortunes of the British National Party are tied to the fortunes of local democracy. Many of the issues on which the BNP campaigns are local or are presented through a local lens, capitalizing on disaffection and disconnection.

The election of the BNP councillors in 2006 was an unignorable warning that the situation in Barking and Dagenham was dire. Although the Borough could not make substantial changes to what it did – local government finance was and remains tight – and would likely argue that it was doing the right things, it did accept that it had a problem with perceptions. Indeed, the chief executive of the Council would admit ‘a fundamental mismatch between the traditional style of council communications … and our residents’ world view’ (Whiteman 2010).

This mismatch between ‘aspirational’ (Whiteman 2010) messages and people’s perceptions would be toxic in Barking and Dagenham. The British National Party would exploit these perceptions, including to the point of outright lying to people on the doorstep (John et al 2006). The result is highlighted by a response from a focus group participant:

‘I know for a fact, and I’m sure we all know, that most of the asylum seekers that live in our boroughs or near where we live, they’ve been allocated property and it’s council property at that’ (John et al 2006:25).

This widely-held perception typified attitudes towards the council, even though it did not accord with reality.

The Council recognized that these myths existed, but its efforts to challenge these perceptions may have even made the situation worse, with its messaging being marked as propaganda from a distant and disconnected bureaucracy (Whiteman 2010). Direct challenges to these myths from the Council would not work as they would essentially be using factual arguments to deal with ‘what is fundamentally an emotional response’ (Wood and Fowlie 2010:295). That the messages were coming from a distrusted organization would have worsened this.
The Council set about dealing with this failure of communication and the myths it had created and engendered in partnership with an external organization, The Campaign Company, to redevelop its communications strategy. The new strategy would be based on social marketing, or ‘the application of commercial marketing approaches to achieve behavioural change for individual or social good’ (Wood and Fowlie 2010:293). In simpler terms, attention would be paid to how messages were communicated and who was communicating them as well as the content of the messages.

This process began with an extensive consultation process, speaking to thousands of residents, in a variety of settings (Whiteman 2010) that would detail residents’ outlook and values as ‘based on traditionalism, social conservativism and fear of threats’ (The Campaign Company nd). Moreover, rapid changes in the area meant that residents favoured very local sources of information, and were distrustful of ‘outsider input’ (The Campaign Company nd). The British National Party under Nick Griffin had tried to present itself as concerned with ‘security, freedom, identity, [and] democracy’ (Copsey and Macklin 2011a:63) as more acceptable versions of its traditional concerns. In essence, the BNP took concerns latent in the community and presented them in a manner intended to convince voters to choose British National Party candidates and to accept British National Party messages.

In order to provide residents with trusted, local sources of information, the Council recruited local influencers – members of parent-teacher associations and residents’ associations, (Local Government Association 2019), hairdressers, owners of pubs and shops (The Campaign Company nd) – to work with them to provide accurate information about what was going on in the Borough, as well as breaking down myths (Wood and Fowlie 2010). Instead of a message coming from the distrusted Council, it would be coming from a local, friendly face. This made it more likely that the messages would be taken on board and believed, and that counter narratives from the British National Party would be disbelieved.

An extensive staff training programme was also undertaken. The aim of the programme was to give Council employees who would be interacting with the public the skills to listen, empathise, and present Council perspectives in a manner that was more likely to be taken on board by residents. This would reach over one thousand staff, from benefits officers to librarians to street sweepers (Wood and Fowlie 2010).

In common with most local councils in the United Kingdom, the London Borough of Barking and Dagenham produced a regular newsletter. As part of the changes in communications, this went from being a glossy, monthly magazine to a fortnightly tabloid. (Whiteman 2010). It was rebranded from the Barking and Dagenham Citizen to simply The News. As well as the usual council
information, the newspaper included perspectives from local people, and took a more conversational tone. It even included games and puzzles as part of the effort to make people actually read the publication.

As part of the communication strategy, the Council built a set of clear messages that could be easily and effectively communicated (Whiteman 2010) built around four themes – safety, fairness, respect, and togetherness (Wood and Fowlie 2010). These themes paralleled the themes used by the BNP, but portrayed in a positive light, showing what the council was actually doing.

This process lasted until 2009 but, in short, the London Borough of Barking and Dagenham went from being 'remote and disengaged' (Copsey 2012) to being sufficiently competent and engaged with its residents to win the maximum four stars in the Audit Commission’s Comprehensive Performance Assessments in 2010 (London Borough of Barking and Dagenham 2009). From the point of view of the ordinary resident, people they trusted in the community were putting a more positive complexion on the Council’s activities, their interactions with Council employees suggested that they were being listened to, and information was being presented in a manner perceived as more straightforward. The grievances that the BNP had exploited were still there, but the narratives around them changed; instead of the Council telling people how well it was doing, it was acknowledging challenges and making a show of listening.

There were other initiatives, including from the national government, such as the Connecting Communities initiative launched by Labour MP and minister John Denham that were widely regarded as being a response to the BNP’s success in Barking and Dagenham and elsewhere (Travis 2009). There is also anecdotal evidence that funding to services in Barking and Dagenham and to projects aimed at improving community cohesion there increased (Hodge 2018; Cruddas 2018). This could suggest that there is an instrumental advantage to voting for the British National Party in extra funding brought to an area as a result (Cruddas 2018; Hodge 2018).

The BNP

Finally, there are factors specific and internal to the British National Party. One is the apparently ever-present problem for the far right (and far left) of splits and internal divisions. The British National Party is a secretive organisation by nature, but statements by Nick Griffin in 2007 addressing the charge that ‘the Griffin clique makes the BNP unelectable’ (British National Party 2007), and the formation in 2008 of a new far right organisation, Voice of Change, by members expelled from the BNP in 2007 (Voice of Change 2008) suggest that the party was far from united and operating towards a common goal on a common programme.
Moreover, key activists were selected for their commitment to the cause and ideological purity, rather than more mundane but perhaps more important organisational skills (Rhodes 2011a). Internal criticism was stifled, meaning that discontent within the ranks of the British National Party was more likely to blow up into disengagement from activism. The appearance of Nick Griffin on Question Time, and his admission that he did not know what was going on in Stoke-on-Trent when the local leader resigned (Copsey 2012), and a series of other missteps hindered the party’s intention of becoming a durable political force.

Despite their efforts to present themselves as a trustworthy party, they were still seen as ‘racist ... and deceitful’ (John et al. 2006:12). Part of the motivation for voting for the British National Party was a ‘kick up the backside’ for the establishment (John et al. 2006:12). Once the metaphorical boot had been applied to the state’s posterior, and after there was a definite and pronounced change in the way local government in the area approached its citizens, the need for a *cri de cœur* manifested in a vote for a far right party faded, and the British National Party failed to capitalise on the opportunity that the 2006 breakthrough had presented it.

**Discussion**

A number of threads can be drawn out from the developments in Barking and Dagenham from 2006 to 2010.

It has been argued throughout this study that Hope not Hate and Unite Against Fascism can be understood as social movements and, as such, have a campaign, a repertoire of actions, and engage in displays of worthiness, unity, numbers, and commitment (WUNC) (Tilly 2006:52). There is considerable evidence to support this position from the study of Barking and Dagenham, particularly in the case of Unite Against Fascism.

Unite Against Fascism clearly engaged in WUNC displays with its demonstrations in Barking and Dagenham. At least some of its work with Barking Constituency Labour Party, in leafleting, can also be seen as a WUNC display, albeit a slightly inchoate one. Where the classic formulation of the social movement has the state as its target, and the later formulations allowed for other bodies as targets, this particular instance of a social movement was seeking to make claims – specifically, that the BNP was a Nazi party that should be voted against – to individual voters. As such, doorstep conversations and leaflets through the letterbox can demonstrate commitment; the knowledge that this is being done across an area can demonstrate numbers and unity; and supportive statements from popular figures demonstrate worthiness. As noted in the review of the literature, worthiness is in the eye of the beholder, and while the presence of Ms Dynamite at an event might well be appealing to a younger audience, it would likely not be as impactful for senior citizens. It may also be that Unite Against Fascism’s engagement with Barking...
Constituency Labour Party was prompted by the absence of an established repertoire for the specific purposes of an election campaign.

Hope not Hate is a slightly different case. It eschews the protests and marches of Unite Against Fascism. However, its messaging also sought to establish worthiness – for instance, by having a veteran support their campaign – to demonstrate commitment through its frequency, and to demonstrate unity and numbers by delivering across an area, again with voters as targets rather than a state or corporation.

By understanding Hope not Hate and Unite Against Fascism as social movements, we can also understand why they cleaved to tactics that appear not to have been effective. These tactics represent part of their repertoire of contention (Tilly 2003). The parts of a repertoire of contention change but slowly; to move faster would risk alienating supporters who are familiar with and used to those tactics. Hope not Hate did try new ways of gaining supporters through online means in its collaboration with Blue State Digital amongst other innovations. However, it fundamentally remained of the view that a campaign of leafletting, albeit a sophisticated one, would work.

This can also help explain the relatively limited effects found in the quantitative analysis. Unite Against Fascism and, to a lesser extent, Hope not Hate were taking campaigns based on social movements and applying them to circumstances where they did not fit. The techniques and tactics in the repertoires of left-wing groups, dating back to the inter-war period, were simply not calibrated for electoral activity.

One of the key avenues for the far right to do well is, under the broad heading of supply (Kitschelt and McGann 1995), the nature of political opportunity structures (Tarrow 1995; Eatwell 2018), and particularly local political opportunity structures (Kestilä and Söderlund 2007). The British National Party were able to adopt a local style of campaigning because the main, almost hegemonic, party in the area, Labour, had become complacent. Contacts between the party and the electorate were few, and Labour was not, in essence, engaged in the community. By 2010, both of the two local Labour parties in the area had overhauled their activity, both in frequency and in style. In doing this, the political opportunity structures that had been open for the BNP in 2006 were closed by 2010.

Finally, the experience of Barking and Dagenham validates Mudde’s (2007) emphasis on the importance of the meso level. The meso level – sitting between micro level factors such as individual attitudes and macro level factors such as the unemployment rate – is how individuals gain their understanding of the world around them, through organisations, friends, and family. When the BNP’s councillors were elected in 2006, information was being spread and shaped by a
populace that was on the defensive and mistrustful of the local council. By the time of their defeat in 2010, the entire structure of communications from the local council had been overhauled, such that the dynamics of the meso level had fundamentally shifted. If the BNP had earlier been able to exploit the disconnection of the council and the disengagement of Labour to create a localised, anti-immigrant culture (Dinas et al 2016) to set those attitudes, later on the activities of the London Borough of Barking and Dagenham Council at least started to break that process.

Conclusion

This chapter has set out the particular circumstances of the London Borough of Barking and Dagenham from 2006 to 2010 in order to explain the relative lack of impact of the activities of Hope not Hate and Unite Against Fascism. In doing this, it has provided an overview of the political situation in the borough and its immediate political history, as well as looking at both the stated aims of Unite Against Fascism and Hope not Hate and what they actually did. The case was chosen because it provides, both theoretically and in the opposition groups’ own assessment, the scenario most likely to yield results. It has done this by looking for gross and differential effects on turnout, again because both theory and the organisations suggest this is what to look for.

Not finding any convincing evidence for effects from the activities of Hope not Hate and Unite Against Fascism of enough substance to account for the British National Party’s electoral decline, this chapter then proceeded to determine other factors that could have either reduced the absolute number of votes cast for the British National Party or increased turnout in other ways to reduce their relative share of vote. It found that changes in political activity by the two local Labour parties and a major change in communications from the Borough itself were likely to have increased turnout for Labour and decreased satisfaction, and so votes for the BNP, respectively. There are also national-level changes that further reinforce this pattern.

The 2006 elections brought a great deal of attention to the area; this led to substantial changes in the political environment of the London Borough of Barking and Dagenham by the time of the 2010 elections. These factors were then explained in terms of the literature on social movements and far right parties.

Ultimately, the reason for the British National Party’s failure in 2010 may be its success in 2006. ‘There was a view that it was ‘safe’ to vote BNP and they [voters] ‘knew’ that the BNP could only win a few seats, not a majority’ (John et al. 2006:12). 2006 showed that the BNP was a real threat that could control the council. Voters reacted accordingly.
Chapter 8 - Conclusion

‘I am glad you are here with me. Here at the end of all things, Sam.’

-J.R.R. Tolkien, The Return of the King

Introduction

This thesis has set out a question, explained the literature to date around that question, set out how it may be analysed, provided history and context on the groups in play, and analysed them quantitatively and qualitatively. This concluding chapter sets out the key findings of the research conducted. It then discusses the interpretation of those results and their implications. It then covers the limitations of this study and how it could be extended in future. Finally, it answers the question asked at the beginning of this thesis: did it matter?

Key findings

In the introduction of this study, three questions were asked.

- What is the nature of the opposition groups, measured by their strategies and tactics?
- What are the effects of these opposition groups?
- What are the explanations for any effects?

In answer to the first question, the opposition groups are social movements that engage in a variety of tactics to hamper the electoral progress of far right parties. The principal method by which this is asserted to work is by increasing turnout amongst non-far right voters in order to dilute the relative importance of such votes as there are for far right parties (Lowles 2014; Unite Against Fascism 2018). In general, Unite Against Fascism is more confrontational in that it will stage counter-marches and counter-demonstrations and engage more directly with the far right parties and other organisations it opposes. Unite Against Fascism has more of a focus on interrupting the activities of the groups it opposes. Its pattern of activity tends to be intense rather than consistent. Hope not Hate is connected to a broad, information-gathering network that gives it insight into particular communities. Its publications are generally highly localised in content, and its pattern of activity is consistent rather than intense. Rather than confronting the opposition, it seeks to build a community that will oppose far right parties. Both groups have particular links to the Labour Party and the trades unions.

In answer to the second question, the effects of these groups are relatively limited. Consistency of action by both groups, where a given area is host to activity regularly over a period of time, is associated with a reduction in the vote for the far right parties. Intensity of action - that is to say, a relatively large amount of activity in a given period of time - by both groups is,
counterintuitively, associated with an increase in the vote for far right parties. Unite Against Fascism appears to have greater effects, in both directions, than Hope Not Hate.

In answer to the third question, the reduction in vote for far right parties is caused by encouraging people who do not vote to go to the polls to register a vote against the far right parties, or by convincing people who have previously voted for far right parties not to do so again. The limited power of this effect is due, in the case of the British National Party, both to multiple other institutions also taking actions that impact the vote for the party and to the inability of the party, for internal reasons, to capitalise on such bridgeheads as it can make. In the case of the United Kingdom Independence Party, the ‘ground war’ campaigning of the opposition groups is simply swamped by the ‘air war’ campaigning of the party. The broad trends of national politics will outweigh local trends.

In chapter three, a set of expectations was laid out. These were:

- That Hope not Hate would have a negative effect on the BNP’s vote;
- That Hope not Hate would have no effect on UKIP’s vote;
- That Unite Against Fascism would have no effect on the BNP’s vote;
- That Unite Against Fascism would have a positive effect on UKIP’s vote;
- That consistency of action would have a negative effect on the BNP’s vote;
- That consistency of action would have no effect on UKIP’s vote;
- That intensity of action would have no effect on the BNP’s vote;
- That intensity of action would have a positive effect on UKIP’s vote.

Hope not Hate does indeed, in general, have a negative effect on the British National’s Party - but only sometimes, and only on some measures; there is also indication that intensity of action by Hope not Hate does help the BNP. Hope Not Hate actually has similar effects on UKIP to those it has on the BNP, rather than no effect. Unite Against Fascism does, in fact, have an effect on the British National Party, contrary to predictions, but that effect can be in either direction depending on the pattern of activity. Unite Against Fascism does increase UKIP’s vote but, again, only in certain circumstances; consistent activity reduces it. Consistency and intensity of action have broadly the same effects on the BNP and on UKIP in that consistency of action depresses their vote while intensity of action increases it.

The results of the quantitative analysis both inform and are built on by the case study of Barking and Dagenham. Because of the particularities of UKIP in its support base being broad, rather than concentrated as in the case of the BNP, and because UKIP was not seen by the opposition groups as a particular threat and so did not take substantial action against them, the case study focuses on the BNP. The case study is the best case scenario for finding an effect from Unite Against
Fascism and Hope not Hate. Hope not Hate and Unite Against Fascism were active in Barking and Dagenham before the precipitous decline in the BNP’s fortunes; the two opposition groups would claim responsibility for the BNP’s woes. However, it reveals that there are a number of other changes that took place in Barking and Dagenham, not least in how the Council communicated with its residents, that explain the decline in vote for the BNP, rather than the activities of the opposition groups.

The long continuation of tactics, perhaps considered time-honoured by the respective opposition groups, suggests that both UAF and Hope not Hate can be understood as social movements (Tilly 2006) that are engaged in, broadly, contentious politics (Tarrow 2011). As well as explaining the persistence of those tactics, with only slow innovation – their repertoires of contention – understanding the opposition groups as social movements helps to explain their different levels of effectiveness. Both are engaged in WUNC displays (Tilly 2006), but it appears that Hope not Hate’s WUNC displays are more effective; indeed, UAF appears to actually be counter-productive at times. This could be because they are mistargeted, or because, for instance, who UAF consider ‘worthy’ does not match who those who must be convinced consider ‘worthy’.

The measures of consistency and intensity developed by Ellinas and Lamprianou (2019) find considerable utility in this research, suggesting that the different ways of counting incidents are meaningful. That consistency and intensity of action have such different results also speaks to the manner in which Hope not Hate and Unite Against Fascism have effect at the meso level in shaping how ordinary voters understand and interpret the world around them (Goodwin 2009; Eatwell 2003) and in reinforcing or challenging local political opportunity structures (Tarrow 2011).

**Interpretation**

Effects are greater on UKIP than on the BNP. Explaining this definitively would require work with individual voters, but there is an obvious conclusion to draw: BNP voters are stickier. Voting for UKIP is more socially acceptable than voting for the BNP. This can be seen in the simple fact of UKIP’s greater electoral success, or in the howls of outrage at Nick Griffin’s appearance on the BBC’s Question Time compared with Nigel Farage’s multiple visits to the programme. There is therefore more inertia to be overcome before a voter will opt for the British National Party. Once the step has been taken to vote for the British National Party, it may be that a Rubicon has been crossed; the inertia that kept a voters from voting for the British National Party will thereafter keep them voting for the British National Party. The consistent absolute shares of votes in, for instance, Barking and Dagenham suggest there may be inertia in remaining as a BNP voter. UKIP voters are, therefore, more likely to be swayable.
The broad patterns of votes, share of vote, and relative change in share of vote for the British National Party and the United Kingdom Independence Party, particularly in response to opposition group activity, suggest that there may be significant commonalities between them.

The information and intelligence based campaigning of Hope not Hate may be more effective in identifying where to campaign to best effect, but its campaigning is not unique. The style of campaigning may, in fact, be efficacious but there are other institutions, including parts of the state, undertaking similar activities to similar outcomes, albeit without the explicit anti-far right leitmotif. Where Hope not Hate are effectively drowned out by similar activity on a much larger scale, Unite Against Fascism stand out because their protests are eye-catching and attention-grabbing, even if on a small scale compared to work undertaken by, say, a London Borough. This means that, for good and for ill, their activities are more impactful, in both directions, than that of Hope not Hate.

An implicit question in this research is as to why Hope not Hate and Unite Against Fascism campaign as they do. In both cases, their history provides a guide to their presents. Unite Against Fascism places itself in the long tradition of more militant anti-fascism (Olechnowicz 2010). Its history and its shared memory is Cable Street and Lewisham; it is disrupting far right meetings and preventing fascist marches. It is bashing the fash.

Hope not Hate is the dirk to Unite Against Fascism’s cudgel. Hope not Hate’s history, through Searchlight, is in gathering, disseminating, and using information. It is the work of the long watches of the night; of quiet, patient toil. The use of voter ID and, now, online campaigning is the latest iteration of this process.

These are part of their respective ‘repertoires of contention’ (Tilly 2004). There are two other aspects to a social movement, per Tilly. The claim is that the far right is particularly ‘bad’, in morality, in policy, and in result. The final part of Tilly’s triad is, of course, the WUNC display: worthiness, unity, numbers, and commitment. These manifest in slightly different ways - protests and marches versus days of action, dealing with ‘difficult issues’, coming together in small groups across the country regularly or in large groups less frequently - but nonetheless allow the use of this lens. While Tilly’s characterisation effectively describes the organisations under study, it does not guarantee their success.

The rise and fall of the British National Party in the London Borough of Barking and Dagenham has been held out in the literature (Lowles 2010) and directly to the author (Unite Against Fascism 2018; Rosenberg 2018) as a signal example of how opposition can stop the far right. Another conclusion appears more likely. People became more used to immigrants in the area. Economic conditions improved. Government, both local and national, paid more attention to factors that
drove people to vote for the far right. The BNP councillors that were elected were often lazy and incompetent (Ford 2010). More than anything, the disgust at seeing a fascist party nearly in charge of their neighbourhood drove people who would otherwise not go to the polls to vote. Turnout increased most in areas that had not had a BNP candidate, which are the relatively less deprived and more affluent parts of the borough. It seems at least plausible that the threat of the BNP was an effective tool for Labour campaigners, and the revulsion of fascism drove people to the polls in the nicer parts of the borough.

If the vote for the BNP in Barking and Dagenham was a cri de cœur, it was the fact that it was answered, rather than that people were told to complain in a different way, that caused the BNP to fall away.

**Implications**

This has potential implications for how the opposition groups studied, or, indeed, others might operate. There are two key implications. Firstly, groups seeking to oppose far right parties at elections should engage with an area consistently, over months and years rather than days and weeks. Such groups should also be wary of over-saturating an area in a short period of time, as this can actually have the opposite effect to what is intended. Secondly, groups that want to stop far right parties doing well might be better off investing their efforts in convincing government, at all levels, to engage in work that enhances community cohesion and, most importantly, changes the way that the state communicates with the citizen. Lobbying or otherwise encouraging councils in areas at risk of the far right doing well to adopt communications strategies based on social marketing, similar to the London Borough of Barking and Dagenham, would be a clear option, although the specifics would vary according to each area. This could be extended to the national level, through influencers on social media, or holding up the print and broadcast media to scrutiny for stories that are felt to give a jaundiced view of a given policy issue, either by the specific content or by repeated focus on that issue. The apparent importance of the meso level would suggest that online influencers, who are likely to be trusted by their followers, would be important allies.

Given that Unite Against Fascism and Hope not Hate have effects in the same direction for intensity and consistency, it would appear that the precise messaging is less important than the manner in which it is delivered, as would be expected from the apparent success of the aforementioned social marketing strategy. That is not to rule out testing, perhaps through focus groups, of particular messages, but it is the manner of their delivery rather than their content which has effect.
If formed as a recommendation, for Unite Against Fascism, it would be to continue with distinct messaging, but to better choose which areas to work in and to show commitment to those areas. That would likely mean less eye-catching protests, but more leafleting, to undercut the counter-narrative and impression of stereotypical, liberal, metropolitan elites flying into an area and flying out. More formally, it would mean preferring consistency of action to intensity of action. Areas for campaigning should be chosen based on the social and economic factors that are likely to drive votes for far right parties, rather than being in a city centre, otherwise easily accessible, or being a large venue. They would have to be visited repeatedly. Recruiting of local notables would aid in this.

For Hope not Hate, it would be to seek distinctiveness of action. Its messaging and community-building may be effective, but it does not stand out and cannot compete with other, much better-funded institutions, including the state itself. To an extent, this is already happening, as it moves more into the online space as social and other online media have become more and more important. The effectiveness of that endeavour, though, is for another study.

There are also a number of implications for the literature. Although crisis as a driver was felt to be nebulous, there is clear evidence to support a number of the factors that are included under it. Unemployment (Lubbers et al. 2002) and immigration (Golder 2003) are seen to have impacts. These impacts are different on the different parties, supporting the widespread division between fascist and populist radical right parties in the literature (Halikiopoulou and Vasilopoulou 2016). The cultural context (Mudde 2010) that shapes political and discursive opportunity structures as well as affecting issue salience is, manifestly, key; it is also not necessarily constant across a state, with very local issues being taken up by political parties and by opposition groups in their respective campaigns.

A few areas of interest from this research remain understudied. The distinct effects of consistency of action and intensity of action validate the insights of Ellinas and Lamprianou (2019) that a simple count of activity is insufficient. This has implications for the broader field of protest event analysis (Hutter 2014); if a message is transmitted more effectively by an organisation that is or is perceived as being embedded in a community, account must be taken of this patterning.

Unemployment, economic activity, and migration have impacts on votes for the far right, but the fact that changes in the levels, rather than the levels themselves, of immigration, unemployment, and economic activity seem relevant may speak to the perceptions people have of their situation (Dahl 2000) being as important as the reality.
The importance of looking at the meso level (Goodwin 2009; Eatwell 2000) is emphasised. The clear implication of this study is that explanations that sit between individual attitudes and overriding socio-economic and demographic trends are essential to explaining the electoral performance of the far right.

Finally, this study speaks to the importance of the use of local data. As discussed, there is evidence that the meso level is very important in determining why people vote for far right parties. Moreover, the implicit assumption in using national level data that a single datum will effectively account for a country no matter the variations within it seems problematic. This has implications for a great deal of research on far right parties, but may also be applicable to other party families outside the mainstream, including the radical left and green movements.

**Limitations**

As with almost any effort in the social sciences, data is a problem. In an ideal world, allowance would be made for how the political parties conducted themselves; however, gaining reliable data on, let alone operationalising, the internal dynamics of a political party, while useful, would likely be an impossible task, particularly where the far right are concerned. It is also impossible to characterise how much activity took place at each incident recorded in the dataset. There is simply no record of how many people took part, or what precise activities they engaged in. These limitations, while regrettable and meaning that we do not have as broad a picture as might be desired, are unavoidable.

This research looks at the specific effect on electoral performance in individual electoral circumscriptions on the basis that local activity will have local effects. However, what this research does not consider is the effect that local activity may have on the national conversation. It is possible that, particularly where there is media coverage, the individual, local activities taken together have an effect on how topics like the far right, race, and immigration are discussed and understood. It may even be possible, even if it would require considerable substantiation, that these national effects might negate or outweigh any particular local effect.

As a hypothetical example, Unite Against Fascism might not have locally distinguishable effects at elections, but it might have a gross national effect that the methods used in the present study would not be able to identify.

It is also possible that the actions of the opposition groups have publicity and force multiplication effects. The opposition groups may act, particularly if they have effective means of gathering information on where a far right party is likely to do well, as proverbial canaries in the coal mine, alerting other actors to where a problem is likely to develop. They may also act to bring attention to a particular area, effectively shaming local institutions, including organs of the
state, into action. This publicity may also act as a force multiplier for such institutions, bringing in extra funding, awareness, and other support. This is also not treated in the current study.

A particular period in time is studied in this research. As is illustrated by Hope not Hate taking on Blue State Digital, one of the major changes in the political and social landscape of the last few years, and which was starting to happen at the end of the period in question, is the emergence of social media as a phenomenon. For all kinds of political actors, social media is important. For both smaller political parties and civil society organisations, it offers a cheap means of mass communication. The nature of social media can also have nationalising and localising effects. A message put out on social media can, if the publisher wishes, be seen by anyone. The gatekeepers of the print and broadcast media have been pushed aside. This has been capitalised upon, in the instance of the United Kingdom, by groups like Britain First, and has provoked a response, with Hope not Hate now operating a YouTube channel, a podcast, and sharing memes to their Facebook and Twitter with a view to their going viral to spread an anti-racist and anti-fascist message. Social media has also revealed an increasing internationalisation of far right activity. While co-operation between far right parties is not new, the direct cross-pollination between members through videos shared on YouTube and the like is a novelty. Indeed, Hope Not Hate now has a section of its website and workstream dedicated to the far right in America because of its impacts in the UK.

Perhaps of more interest, however, is that social media also offers remarkably precise targeting. Adverts can be shown to narrow geographical or interest audiences. For this to be most effective, though, requires an understanding of an area and data on voters to be effective. This means that, to capitalise on this potential, an organisation would need to be set up in a different way to the opposition groups studied herein, with different skills brought into the mix.

Extensions

This research could usefully be extended in several directions.

The first would be to apply the methodology used here to other political campaigns to determine their effectiveness. However, groups that specifically set out to damage a political party’s electoral fortunes are unusual. Not least because of the restrictions of charities law in the United Kingdom, an organisation like the Campaign for Real Ale might have very strong feelings about which party offers the better policies on beer, but is unlikely to campaign against parties in this way. However, localised campaigns might affect how Members of Parliament vote and how local

36 And, arguably, the Leave.EU campaign for the United Kingdom to leave the European Union.
A particularly interesting case study might be Momentum, the left-wing pressure group around the Labour Party set up to support Jeremy Corbyn. A study could measure Momentum’s impact by looking at effects on Constituency Labour Parties; for instance, by the passing of motions on particular issues, or by public statements. Momentum also campaigns directly, as well as through seeking change in the Labour Party, and it would be possible to search for correlations between Momentum activity, particularly where they have a community organiser in place, and local support for given policies. In particular, Momentum has supported campaigns to support Labour parliamentary candidates to unseat Members of Parliament from other parties with small majorities, which could be a fruitful avenue for determining the effects of Momentum activity in having impacts on the public.

The second, and perhaps more fruitful, extension would be to replicate this study on a Europe-wide basis using the techniques of geolocating opposition activity. There are anti-racist and anti-fascist groups that campaign against far right parties beyond the UK, such as Antifaschistisches Infoblatt of Germany, Expo of Sweden, and the broader Antifa movement. This could be done using data from EUROSTAT and European Parliament results to place the results in a transnational perspective. Belgium and Spain would be interesting case studies. The dynamic of relations between Flanders and Wallonia, including how far right groups mobilise based on that, would pose interesting challenges for groups opposed to the far right. The plurinational nature of Spain, coupled with the legacy of the Franco dictatorship, and now the desire among some for Catalonia to become independent set an interesting backdrop against which both fascist parties, such as those in the Spanish Identity coalition, and populist radical right parties, such as Vox, compete and in which opposition groups would have to operate.

This study also emphasises that opposition groups are understudied. In particular, the process of change over time is unclear. The emergence of social media as a driving form of communication seems to have caused Hope not Hate to radically rethink its strategy, while Unite Against Fascism has largely carried on before, albeit with greater publicity online. Is this a case of seizing an opportunity, or being forced to change because what far right parties are doing has changed? This would require extensive, qualitative research, and could be compared with similar organisations in other countries. It may also be that studying far right groups other than parties, such as Generation Identity and the English Defence League, would shed further light on opposition groups.

One of the leitmotifs of this study has been the importance of local level data. While there are challenges in using this data, this thesis has argued that it is both theoretically coherent and methodologically sound. The strong results on the ethnic, unemployment, and economic activity measures demonstrate that local effects matter, and that simply using national level data will
obscure this granular detail. Ethnicity and immigration could be explored in further detail, perhaps using census classifications. There are a host of suggested drivers for far right votes in the literature that could be analysed with local data. A particularly interesting option might be a comparison of two different media markets to determine the effect of local newspapers, television, and radio. It would be possible to use sub-national data to re-examine past conclusions about the effects of different socio-economic and demographic drivers on far right parties with a richer, finer detail that would better explain variation within states. For instance, Golder’s (2003) seminal study could relatively easily be replicated using local level data across the EU.

Answering the question

A question was asked at the start of this thesis about the effort spent by opposition groups to reduce voting for far right parties in Britain: did it matter?

The short answer is ‘no’. Opposition from civil society groups that have as their raison d’etre the diminution of support for far right parties do not, in general, have substantive effects on votes for far right parties. There are specific circumstances in which they can have an effect, but they are both not the norm and sometimes actually counterproductive. That the efforts of the opposition groups can, at least in certain circumstances, have the opposite effect to what was intended clearly suggests that the patterning of activities needs changing to show more consistency and, thus, commitment to an area. However, even with such a change, the impact, given the time, effort, and resource invested, might be considered disappointing, and suggest that other forms of campaigning against the far right might be a better use of that time, effort, and resource.
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