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School of Politics and International Studies

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The candidate confirms that the work submitted is his/her own and that appropriate credit has been given where reference has been made to the work of others.

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I would also like to give my deepest love and thanks to my wife, Lucia. Our lives have changed so much over the past seven years, but your love and support while writing my thesis have been constant. My children, Anastasia, Sebastian and Matteo were all born just before or during my PhD, and it has been a joy to have them play around me as I worked. I actually think the noise helped me write! I wish my dad, Alan, was here to see me achieve this goal, but his work ethic helped me to keep going. Mum, thank you for all your love and support during tough times and heavy workloads. I look forward to us all spending the summer at the cottages in Brittany with you.
Abstract

While in office from 1997 to 2010 the Labour government incorporated the US’s ballistic missile defence (BMD) system into the UK’s defence policy. Based on an upgrade of the radar systems at RAF Fylingdales and RAF Menwith Hill, this experimental technology was intended to detect and track incoming Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBM) and launch US interceptor missiles to destroy them. What is unusual about these developments is that they took place during the administration of a Labour government initially committed to the maintenance of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABM) Treaty, and emerged from a party with a history of anti-militarism. These events cannot be explained without referring to two themes running within and above British domestic politics. First of these is the skill of the Conservative Party in appealing to voters on defence issues. New Labour's pro-militarism, including support for BMD, was an attempt to counter the Conservatives’ dominance in this field. The second and perhaps overriding factor was the UK's Special Relationship with the United States. The UK relies on the US in order to augment its power internationally, and missile defence is part of this. Due to these constraints on the Labour government’s defence policy, this research draws on the theoretical concepts of structure and agency, specifically the strategic-relational approach (SRA), to explain the UK’s support for BMD. Labour’s involvement with BMD during this time should be an area of substantial research. Yet it has been almost totally eclipsed by the UK’s involvement in the invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan. This thesis deepens understanding of this under-explored subject and seeks to explain this research puzzle with reference to the structural factors relevant to Labour’s policy towards BMD.
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ABL</td>
<td>Airborne Laser</td>
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<tr>
<td>ABM Treaty</td>
<td>Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty</td>
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<td>ALTBMD</td>
<td>Active Layered Theatre Ballistic Missile Defence</td>
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<tr>
<td>AN/TPY-2</td>
<td>Army Navy Type 2 Radar</td>
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<td>AFSPC</td>
<td>US Air Force Space Command</td>
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## B

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<tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BMC3I</td>
<td>Battle Management, Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence</td>
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<tr>
<td>BMEWS</td>
<td>Ballistic Missile Early Warning System</td>
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<td>BMD</td>
<td>Ballistic Missile Defence</td>
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<td>BMDR</td>
<td>Ballistic Missile Defence Review</td>
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<tr>
<td>BMDS</td>
<td>Ballistic Missile Early Defence system</td>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>C2BMC</td>
<td>Command, Control, Battle Management and Communication</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAAB</td>
<td>Campaign for the Accountability of American Bases</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CBRN</td>
<td>Chemical Biological Radiological and Nuclear threats</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CND</td>
<td>Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSSD</td>
<td>Czech Social Democratic Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C3I</td>
<td>Command, control, communication and intelligence</td>
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<tr>
<td>CWU</td>
<td>Communication Workers Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>EKV</td>
<td>Exo-Atmospheric Kill Vehicle</td>
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<td>EPAA</td>
<td>European Phased Adaptive Approach</td>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GBI</td>
<td>Ground-Based Interceptor</td>
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<td>GEO</td>
<td>Geosynchronous Orbit</td>
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<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<tr>
<td>GMD</td>
<td>Ground-Based Midcourse Area Defence</td>
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<td>GFC</td>
<td>GMD Fire Control</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H</td>
<td>Highly elliptical orbit</td>
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<tr>
<td>HEO</td>
<td>Highly elliptical orbit</td>
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<tr>
<td>I</td>
<td>Intercontinental Ballistic Missile</td>
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<td>ICBM</td>
<td>Intercontinental Ballistic Missile</td>
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<tr>
<td>ICOC</td>
<td>International Code of Conduct</td>
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<tr>
<td>J</td>
<td>Joint Functional Component Command for Integrated Missile Defense</td>
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<tr>
<td>JFCCIMD</td>
<td>Joint Functional Component Command for Integrated Missile Defense</td>
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<td>M</td>
<td>Missile Defence Agency</td>
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<td>MDA</td>
<td>Missile Defence Agency</td>
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<tr>
<td>MDC</td>
<td>UK Missile Defence Centre</td>
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<td>MDIOC</td>
<td>Missile Defence Integration and Operations Centre</td>
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<td>MDP</td>
<td>Ministry of Defence Police</td>
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<td>MTCR</td>
<td>Missile Technology Control Regime</td>
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<tr>
<td>NEC</td>
<td>National Executive Committee</td>
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<td>NMD</td>
<td>National Missile Defence</td>
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<td>NRBP</td>
<td>National Radiological Protection Board</td>
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<tr>
<td>NSS</td>
<td>National Security Strategy</td>
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<tr>
<td>PAC-3</td>
<td>Patriot Advanced Capability-3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PNAC</td>
<td>Project for a New American Century</td>
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<tr>
<td>QDR</td>
<td>Quadrennial Defence Review</td>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>RF</td>
<td>Radio frequency</td>
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### S

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SBX-1</td>
<td>Sea-based X-band radar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SBIRS</td>
<td>Space-Based Infrared System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SDI</td>
<td>Strategic Defense Initiative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SDR</td>
<td>Strategic Defence Review</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SLD</td>
<td>Polish Social Democratic Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SM-3</td>
<td>Standard Missile 3</td>
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<tr>
<td>SOCPA</td>
<td>Serious Organised and Policing Act 2005</td>
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<tr>
<td>SRA</td>
<td>Strategic-Relational Approach</td>
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<tr>
<td>STSS</td>
<td>Space Tracking Surveillance System</td>
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### T

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<th>Acronym</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>THAAD</td>
<td>Terminal High-Altitude Area Defence</td>
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### U

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<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UEWR</td>
<td>Upgraded Early-Warning Radars</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US</td>
<td>United States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USSTRATCOM</td>
<td>United States Strategic Command</td>
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<tr>
<td>USVVF</td>
<td>United States Visiting Forces</td>
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Chapter 1. Introduction

The central counter-intuitive research problem this thesis will try to answer is; why did a centre-left government elected on a mandate of multilateralism and espousing an ‘ethical dimension’ to foreign policy (Cook, 1997) ultimately enact policies committing the UK to US ballistic missile defence (BMD), one of the most internationally divisive and right-wing associated military projects?

Labour first came to office in 1997 with a strong commitment to multilateral institutions like the UN and upholding international law through multilateral agreements like the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty and the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) (HoC Deb, 2001j, c285WH). Though not a signatory of the ABM Treaty – which was an agreement between the US and USSR – the UK supported it as it was in the UK’s interest for the two superpowers not to develop anti-ballistic missile systems which could lead to nuclear proliferation and prompt Russia to build a system which would render the UK’s modest nuclear deterrent impotent (Stocker, 2001, p.63). However, the British Labour government’s amenability to US missile defence policy is demonstrated by the fact that while the Clinton Presidency was developing a BMD system which still stayed within the limits of the ABM Treaty the Labour government also praised the stability that the treaty brought (HoC Deb, 2001j, c285WH), yet when Bush Jr came to office and abandoned the ABM Treaty in order to build exactly the kind of BMD system he wanted, suddenly the Labour government’s stance became that it was not the kind of mechanism guaranteeing nuclear stability that was important but the stability itself (Ministry of Defence, 2002, p.26). If that level of security could now be gained through BMD, then so be it. Therefore, it seems Labour’s stance on missile defence changed according to US policy.

Labour’s involvement in BMD also had major ramifications for Britain’s strategic relationship with the US, its wider role in the world, and consequently other member states of the European Union on issues of common defence (Stocker, 2004a, p.17). Did Labour’s commitment to BMD take Britain down the path of ever-closer union with the EU or the US? The fact that Labour aligned itself to US BMD policies is important because it demonstrates the power of the Special Relationship in overriding political principle in the pursuit of national security. The Labour government’s alignment with a US policy so closely identified with the Bush
administration caused real tensions within the Parliamentary Labour Party (PLP) itself (Vickers, 2011, p.29).

The primary empirical research question is then framed within a larger theoretical research puzzle which asks; how do external threats and internal domestic electoral pressures interact to influence security policy making by centre-left governments?

Therefore, this thesis has two main aims. The first is to give a descriptive historical account of the security policy decisions Labour made between 1997 and 2010 so the UK could play a role in US BMD. A full picture of Labour’s policy on BMD during its entire term of office has not been attempted before. The most complete attempt as yet only goes as far as 2002, leaving a full 8 years to piece together and set into a solid narrative. The second is to use the strategic-relational approach to explain why Labour made the missile defence policy decisions that it did during this period. This second aim necessarily flows from the first, since because there is no full narrative account of Labour’s BMD policies it follows that there has been no full theoretical attempt to explain why Labour chose them.

1.1 Hypotheses

This research puts forward three hypotheses to account for Labour’s support for the UK’s role in BMD from 1997 to 2010. None of them are mutually exclusive, each has different explanatory weights, and the thesis intends to investigate their relative influence:

1. Support was due to the need to maximise the UK’s defence capabilities by maintaining Britain’s alliance with the US.

The UK’s relatively weak position as an isolated military actor and the Special Relationship with the US are structural constraints on a British government of whatever party. Thus, the Labour party’s adoption of BMD is to be seen in the historical context of other Labour governments who for the most part have complied with the wishes of US administrations over matters of defence due to these aforementioned structural constraints (Keohane and Nye, 2000).
2. Support was an indirect outgrowth of the Labour Party’s policy reforms to become more electable on defence issues.

Labour sympathy towards BMD can be seen as a new component in the pantheon of policies first defined by the party’s Strategic Defence Review of 1998 which sought to enable the Labour party to outflank the Conservative party on defence (Little and Wickham-Jones, 2000), an area in which they have traditionally held the upper hand.

3. The relationship between different Prime Ministers and Presidents worked in favour of Britain’s involvement in BMD.

Ideological and personal closeness between Presidents and PMs between 1997 and 2010 changed the tempo but not the general direction of the UK’s integration into BMD. Moreover, the Labour government’s BMD policy decisions always followed the US’s lead, they were never taken on its own initiative.

1.2 Research Background: Why is this Thesis Important?

Externally, Labour’s support for BMD comes from the pressures on British governments of whatever party to do what is required to maximise the UK’s security in an anarchical international environment. In the UK’s case a large part of this comes from maintaining the Special Relationship with the US (Smith, 2005, p.451).

Strategically, BMD is supposed to overcome the logic of mutually assured destruction (MAD) by providing a shield to defend against nuclear attack. Its main aim is to defend against limited attacks from rogue-state proliferators such as North Korea and Iran, though it is also meant to send a message to and complicate the missile strategies of China and Russia (Stocker, 2011, p.61). Practically, it is intended to achieve this by detecting, tracking and intercepting incoming ballistic missiles. It destroys them by launching rocket-propelled, self-guided ‘hit-to-kill’ vehicles that collide with the incoming missile causing it to disintegrate through blunt impact kinetic force (Stocker and Weinack, 2003a, p.68).
During the Labour government of 1997 to 2010 US BMD developments progressed substantially. By the time Labour left office in May 2010, BMD had evolved from an experimental system to one that deployed functioning theatre-ready interceptor silos at military bases in Alaska and California, capable of intercepting a limited number of enemy missiles (Department of Defense, 2010, p.15). Crucially for the UK and its Labour government of the time, this system was coordinated through a sophisticated command and control infrastructure receiving information from upgraded radar and telecommunications sites around the Northern hemisphere including RAF Fylingdales and RAF Menwith Hill (Ministry of Defence, 2002, p.22). These developments between 1997 and 2010 meant that Labour had to respond to BMD in two ways. Firstly, in terms of foreign policy, since in order to build BMD the US withdrew from the ABM Treaty in 2003, which had the potential to spur nuclear proliferation (Stocker, 2004a, p.x). The UK’s involvement with BMD also complicated the relationship with its EU partners who were largely opposed to the system (ibid, p.17).

Secondly, in terms of defence, since in order to work at all RAF Fylingdales and RAF Menwith Hill would need to play a vital role in detecting and tracking incoming missiles fired from the Eastern hemisphere and would therefore need substantial software and hardware upgrades to be able to do this (ibid, p.195). Labour’s agreement to these upgrades and to involving the UK in BMD in other ways, such as establishing the UK Missile Defence Centre to facilitate research and development between the US Missile Defence Agency and the MoD and British and American defence companies (Taylor, 2008, p.16), as well as giving general backing to the US’s BMD plans, is one half of the research topic for this thesis.

The second half of the research topic for this thesis covers the domestic political reasons driving Labour’s BMD policy. Labour’s support for BMD can be seen as coming from the pressures of domestic electoral competition driving the radical policy changes the Labour Party underwent from the mid 80s to late 90s to create New Labour, move towards the centre-ground of politics to win votes and finally form a government after 18 years of Conservative rule. Labour’s defence policy in general was seen as a particular weakness (Ipsos-MORI, 2014a). The Conservative Party’s defence policies traditionally held much greater appeal for the public (Brown, 2010, p.2), and they had been able to portray Labour as unpatriotic at best, treasonous at worst. The locus of this unpopularity in Labour’s defence policy was its adoption
of unilateral nuclear disarmament in 1982 (Gould, 2011, pp.69-71). However, it was not just that unilateralism was unpopular with voters, but that it split the PLP and Shadow Cabinet, thereby having a compounding effect on Labour’s unpopularity with the electorate as a party divided against itself (Allan, 1997, p.31).

Eventually Labour modernised, abandoned unilateralism and tried to outflank the Conservatives on defence policy in general. So, when ballistic missile defence became an issue once in government, it is possible to see how Labour supported Britain’s involvement in it in order to prevent the Opposition from portraying them as neglecting the nation’s security. There is an important caveat here, however; that while Labour’s BMD policy may have been a political issue within the Westminster bubble, it barely registered with the wider public, apart from the membership of pressure groups opposed to BMD outright (Richardson, 2001). Furthermore, the interesting and counter-intuitive point is that on the few occasions when opinion polling was carried out on the public’s perception of BMD it was clear that not only were people not familiar with missile defence but also the majority of respondents tended to be against the UK’s involvement in it (Ipsos-MORI, 2001; CND, 2008c; Jenkins-Smith et al., 2004, p.300; Ipsos-MORI, 2015; Ipsos-MORI, 2010).

So, Labour’s policy on BMD cannot be seen as an attempt to win votes in its own right, but as a logical outgrowth of its more conservative turn in order to win broader support from the electorate on defence issues in general. Therefore, the extent to which Labour actually developed its BMD policies to meet the desires of the electorate forms the second half of the thesis research topic. Together, these external and internal pressures can explain why Labour incorporated ballistic missile defence into the UK’s security policy.

This thesis uses the term security policy to refer to defence and foreign policy because they relate to different dimensions of the UK’s relationship with the world and Labour’s BMD policy. Foreign policy is about Britain’s relationship with other countries; in this case it refers to how Labour’s policy on BMD underscored the UK’s Special Relationship with the US and strained its relationship with the EU. Defence policy refers directly to territorial defence of the UK mainland; how Britain’s role in BMD would actually help defend the physical space of the UK.

Defence policy and foreign policy are two branches of national security; one is about relationships, the other about strategy and physical weaponry. Furthermore, they are developed by different government departments with different ways of
interpreting Britain’s interests. Security means the absence of threats (Evans, 1998, p.490). Therefore this thesis brings together defence and foreign policy under the umbrella of security policy because defence deals with physical threats to the UK and foreign policy deals with the management of relationships between Britain and other nations and organisations, which left unchecked can in turn lead to physical threats to the UK.

This thesis is important for three main reasons:

1 By involving the UK in BMD the last Labour government set Britain on a path which has the potential to totally undermine the UK’s foundational strategic deterrent based on mutually assured destruction by threat of nuclear annihilation. BMD could totally transform the way of looking at Britain’s defence that has held sway since the UK set out to acquire nuclear weapons – under a Labour government – in 1947 (Scott, 2006, p.686). Depending on the point of view, Labour’s involvement in BMD either provides the opportunity to ensure Britain has some protection from nuclear Armageddon, even allowing the UK to reduce its number of nuclear weapons if it is part of a shield that can defend against them (Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 2009), or it will place the UK in harm’s way by making RAF Fylingdales and RAF Menwith Hill prime targets for an enemy wanting to blind BMD, while also encouraging massive nuclear proliferation in order to overwhelm the system (Stocker, 2004a, p.195). Since it concerns an existential threat to the UK’s survival, there cannot be a more serious issue worthy of investigation.

2 This thesis is also important because it will help the Labour party with its revisionism and self-understanding in order to improve its grasp of its electoral successes and failures, and improve its policies for the future. The last Labour government’s policy on BMD is a microcosm of the traumatic modernisation its entire policy universe went through in order to become electorally viable. It is redolent with the tensions in the Party over defence that still cause major disruption within it currently.

The legacy of Labour’s support for BMD has massive implications for its future direction on defence and foreign policy issues. Are progressive and internationalist
values best served through systems like BMD, to enable the British military to intervene against rogue states around the world under the safety of a shield protecting it from the ultimate deterrent of nuclear attack? Or are they best served through staying away from systems like BMD, and combating nuclear proliferation by committing to strengthening international arms control treaties and safeguarding and verification regimes like the International Atomic Energy Agency? Would the vast funds given to BMD research be better spent on alleviating poverty in developing countries, thereby reducing the despair that makes terrorism and militaristic nationalism appealing? What does it mean for Labour’s BMD policy and electability now Keir Starmer has become leader of the Party with the aim of moving the Labour Party more towards the centre-ground of British politics after the Corbyn era? If we want to understand where Labour has been on defence and what lessons the Party can learn for the future in terms of its electoral appeal on defence, then its policies on BMD give new territory in which to find them.

3 The final important point about this thesis is that it could aid the understanding of how governments make foreign policy by applying the strategic-relational approach (SRA) where more mainstream models fail to explain what is happening. It makes an important contribution to a growing and maturing body of literature to help statesmen and women understand the influences on their security policy decisions, so that they will gain greater insight into these influences and so be able to manipulate them to their advantage. What seem like straightforward decisions on national security can actually be seen as manifestations of IR theory precipitating into the real world. Using the SRA to analyse security policy decisions could help policy makers to better achieve their security policy goals. The strategic-relational approach is a relatively little-known theory. Its application to foreign policy analysis is even rarer. In order to make the world a safer place the literature applying the SRA to foreign policy analysis must grow due to the insights it brings. This thesis adds to this canon and strengthens the body of literature.
1.3 Theoretical Framework

The main theoretical problem this thesis seeks to solve is how to account for the interaction of international and domestic structural pressures on the agency of the Labour government in BMD policy making.

Labour’s BMD policy generates interesting theoretical puzzles because it confounds mainstream models of security policy making. It demonstrates these models’ inabilitys to account for how external and internal constraints act together to influence defence policy outcomes.

Classical realism cannot explain it because it claims that security decisions are a result of pressures from the inside-out, but if all that matters in making defence policy is the machinations and scheming of politicians (Waltz, 2001), would it not have made more sense for the government to oppose BMD seeing as it was unpopular with a majority of the electorate (Ipsos-MORI, 2001)? Why risk losing votes over BMD if staying in power domestically is all that matters?

Neorealism cannot explain it because it claims that security decisions are a result of pressures from the outside-in, but if all that matters in forming defence policy are threats from abroad (Neack, 2008, p.34), why would Labour go to all the trouble of changing its general defence policy to appeal to a greater swath of voters in order to get elected?

Two-level games cannot explain it because although it tries to bring together internal and external pressures on foreign policy making, it claims that the policy finally made will be an alignment of the two (Putnam, 1988, p.434), but this is not the case with Labour’s BMD policy because while BMD may have made sense from a strategic point of view, the public were mostly against it (CND, 2008d; CND, 2007b; CND, 2004; Ipsos-MORI, 2001), so the two do not line up.

The second-image reversed model cannot explain it, because although it tries to explain how international affairs affect the public’s perception of international threats which then leads them to put pressure on the government to take particular defence policies, it says that the public will themselves come to a realist view of international relations and favour policies accordingly (Drezner, 2002, p.4). Yet, again, this does not work here because the public was opposed to BMD (CND, 2008c).

Holistic constructivism cannot explain it because it expects the interface between the international and domestic discourses on defence to be self-reinforcing
(Nia, 2011, p.289), but in this thesis the public’s scepticism towards BMD diverged diametrically from the government’s supportive position on missile defence.

This thesis overcomes what is missing in the models discussed above by using the strategic-relational approach (SRA). The SRA is able to account for the influence of both domestic and international structural constraints on the Labour government as an agent making policy choices on BMD.

The version of the SRA used in this thesis draws heavily, though not uncritically, on an adaptation of Elisabetta Brighi’s application of the strategic-relational approach to Italian foreign policy in her 2013 work, Foreign Policy, Domestic Politics and International Relations: The Case of Italy. The strategic-relational approach is the theoretical model which best explains why the Labour government of 1997-2010 incorporated US BMD into the UK’s security policy. It does this by emphasising the key role of ideas as a medium in which structures can enter into discourse with agents in their decision-making role; in this case the role that both domestic and international structural pressures played in shaping the Labour government’s BMD policy (De Simone, 2014). The SRA is therefore able to account for the Labour Government’s agential ability to ignore the British public’s specific opposition to BMD while still pursuing a missile defence policy which conformed to the structural constraints exerted by the ideational discourses of the Special Relationship and British militarism in general.

Another strength of the strategic-relational approach when developing an analysis of defence policy is the way that it addresses the ‘pre-theoretical’ underpinnings of ontology and epistemology (Brighi, 2013, p.16). Ontologically, it overcomes the issues of which level of analysis (individual states-people such as Blair and Brown/the state apparatus such as the core defence policy community/international society) and which policy boundary (inside/outside international/domestic) are more important in determining defence policy making decisions by answering, dialectically; all of them, depending on the context and their interplay. Epistemologically, it combines both positivist and interpretative methods of investigation, allowing for mixed efficient and intentional causation between material and ideational factors (ibid, p.30, 36), such as the intertwining of very physical factors like upgrades to RAF Fylingdales and RAF Menwith Hill and the number of votes required to win elections with the ideational discourses of the Special Relationship and British militarism, making it a particularly fruitful model for explaining complex
systemic interactions between structure, agency and discourse and their influence on BMD policy outcomes (ibid, p.38).

In the strategic-relational model, structures and agents are both relational and dialectical. Structures only arise from the interactions of agents, they do not exist prior to or independently of agents; structures such as international relations but also the ideational structures of the Special Relationship and British militarism are the auto-generated epiphenomenon arising from the sum-total of the countless interactions of individual actors. This means that structure and agency are relational; one cannot exist without the other. Indeed, they both can only exist simultaneously. Accordingly, the interplay between the structure of international relations and the agency of the Labour government is a dialectical process; actions taken by actors in conformity with the structural constraints of the moment can cause the parameters of the Labour government’s permissible actions regarding BMD to change over time (Brighi, 2013, pp.37-38).

Adapting Brighi, this thesis rejects explanations that rely solely on ‘black box’ statism as in traditional foreign policy analysis or the ‘psychologism’ of individual defence policy makers (Blair/Brown) as their unit of analysis. Instead, the ‘prime mover’ in this thesis is constituted as the defence policy making process itself. It holds to a ‘processual notion of actorness’, encompassing a plurality of actors and processes (ibid, p.3), while moving away from Brighi’s reluctance to place any component above another by giving a preponderant agential role to what Self calls the ‘core defence policy community’: the Prime Minister and the Secretary of State for Defence, followed closely by the Foreign Secretary and the Chancellor (Self, 2010, p.267).

As mentioned above, the dialectical interplay between strategic actors and strategically selective context is crucially mediated by discourse (Hay, 2002, pp.209-10). In this thesis the discourses framing the Labour government’s policy stance towards missile defence are the ideational discourses of the Special Relationship and British militarism.

1.4 Secondary Research Questions

The central research question of this thesis asks why a centre-left Labour government would seek to commit the UK to US ballistic missile defence (BMD), one of the most internationally divisive and right-wing associated military projects? Three hypotheses
were put forward to help answer this question: (1) support was due to the need to maximise the UK’s defence capabilities by maintaining Britain’s alliance with the US; (2) support was an indirect outgrowth of the Labour Party’s policy reforms to become more electable on defence issues; and (3) the relationship between different British Labour Prime Ministers and US Presidents worked in favour of Britain’s involvement in BMD. Alongside the primary research question and hypotheses, this thesis also raised several important and interesting secondary research questions. These secondary questions can be placed into two groups; narrative and theoretical:

1. Narrative:

1.1. To what extent did Labour actually incorporate BMD into the UK’s security policy? It is not entirely clear to what extent BMD did become a fully-fledged part of the UK’s defence policy. Even though RAF Fylingdales and RAF Menwith Hill were to become vital parts of the US system, these upgrades were more piecemeal responses to individual US requests rather than the fulfilment of a specific British ‘policy’ on missile defence, beyond the general one of maximising the UK’s defensive capabilities (Young, 2000, p.33). Furthermore, the Labour government certainly played the long game with regards to the prospect of gaining any degree of protection from the US’s missile shield. Although during the 2000 Presidential election campaign Bush had spoken of wanting to create a BMD system that would also protect ‘US friends and allies’ (HoL Deb, 2000, c1327), and the June 2003 US/UK Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) concerning Ballistic Missile Defence ‘welcomed assurances that the U.S. is prepared to extend coverage and make missile defense capabilities available to the U.K.’ (Department of Defense, 2003, p.4), it would not be until several months after Labour left office, at the Lisbon summit of November 2010, that the UK would formally come under the protection of a ballistic missile defence shield when NATO finally announced BMD would become part of its shared defensive apparatus (NATO, 2010). Even so, the technical capability of the BMD system as it existed at that point would not have been able launch its interceptors from Fort Greely or Vandenburg Air Force Base (AFB) to destroy nuclear missiles headed for the UK.
1.2. Did Labour’s policy on BMD have anything to do with electoral appeal in itself? Labour’s reforms to its general defence policy were an attempt to win votes. Defence was one of Labour’s weakest areas in the eyes of the electorate, and one in which the Conservatives had much more popularity (Brown, 2010, p.2). In the 1980s Labour was seen as unpatriotic, against the armed forces and willing to placate the Soviet Union (Seldon, 2001, p.617). However, the most unpopular aspect of Labour’s defence policy was unilateral nuclear disarmament (Ipsos-MORI, 2014b).

Further, and even more damaging, was the fact that the Shadow Cabinet was publicly split over unilateralism. The open confusion between senior Shadow Cabinet members over whether Labour was serious about unilateralism further damaged Labour in the public’s eyes (Ipsos-MORI, 2014a). During its long reformation from the mid-80s onwards, Labour slowly revised these policies; vowing to retain Trident, support a strong defence industry and ensure Britain remained a key player in NATO (Vickers, 2011, p.160). The reforms worked; the unpopularity of Labour’s defence policy fell, although the Conservatives’ were always more trusted on defence on all but three occasions between 1997 and 2010 (Ipsos-MORI, 2014a).

However, Labour’s BMD policy was probably not seen as a part of this vote winning strategy in and of itself. Firstly, this was because the UK’s role in BMD simply did not register with most of the electorate (Richardson, 2001). Although the Labour manifesto of 2001 did state a commitment to ‘encourage the US to consult with its NATO allies on its ideas for missile defence’ (Labour Manifesto, p.39), it remained a niche issue, only really of importance to members of anti-war pressure groups (Ipsos-MORI, 2010; Ipsos-MORI, 2015). The second, and more counter-intuitive fact about BMD and the electorate, was that on the few occasions that polling was carried out, a clear majority were opposed to the UK’s involvement in it (CND, 2007d). In pure electoral terms then, the Labour government should not have pursued a British role in BMD. The fact that the Labour government did facilitate the UK’s integration into the US’s BMD systems means that considerations other than the need to win votes were at play.
1.3. What differences in opinion existed among the Parliamentary Labour Party and government Ministers on BMD? There were great differences of opinion not just on their own government’s policy involving Britain in BMD, but the entire US missile defence system as a whole among Labour MPs and the Cabinet (BBC News, 2002b; Stocker, 2004a, p.193). Circuitously, the prime argument of those in favour of UK involvement in US missile defence was not that it would help defend the UK per se, but that it would strengthen the Atlantic alliance and thereby aid the UK’s defence by keeping the US onside (Casey, 2009, p.277). Those against argued that British engagement in BMD would encourage nuclear proliferation, make the UK a target by hosting elements of the system, and was a colossal waste of money that would be better spent on domestic public services like the NHS and education (BBC News, 2001d; Coates, 2001, p.30).

Senior Cabinet members clearly in favour of BMD numbered Jack Straw at the Foreign Office, Geoff Hoon in Defence and John Reid (Stocker, 2004a, pp.172, 203, 204). Those against included Robin Cook, Peter Hain, and Junior defence Minister Peter Kilfoyle (ibid, pp.193, 195, 202). Backbenchers in prominent opposition included Jeremy Corbyn MP, John McDonnell MP, Austin Mitchell MP, Ann Cryer MP, David Drew MP and Jon Cruddas MP (CND, 2008a). Outspoken in their support for BMD was the Chair of the Defence Committee Bruce George MP and the former Labour supporting peer Lord Chalfont (Stocker, 2004a, p.178). However, during this period the Blairite wing of the Labour Party was firmly in control in government and so was easily able to press ahead with involving the UK in BMD (Vickers, 2011, p.147).

1.4. What was the opinion of Labour Party members and affiliated trade unionists on the government’s BMD policy? The affiliated trade unions were largely opposed. In the Spring of 2001, several passed resolutions at their annual conferences criticising plans for missile defence (Richardson, 2001). In June 2001, 17 unions – including Unison and GMB – wrote a letter to the Guardian urging the government not to support BMD (Bertrand Russell Peace Foundation, 2001, p.75). Britain’s role was due to be debated at the Labour Party annual conference in 2001, mooting a resolution put forward by the
unions opposing any cooperation with US plans (Wintour, 2001a), but in the wake of 9/11 the party’s Conference Arrangements Committee barred constituency resolutions on Bush’s missile defence system on the grounds that they were ‘not contemporary’ (Appleton, 2001). In 2008, the General Secretaries of seven major trade unions – and 50 MPs – signed a statement urging the UK government to arrange a full debate to allow MPs to scrutinise in public the US Missile Defence deployment plans in the UK (CND, 2008d). It is clear that the affiliated trade unions were largely opposed to Labour’s policies on BMD.

1.5. How did Labour’s BMD policy affect the UK’s relationship with NATO and the EU? This was one of the most contradictory examples of two of New Labour’s foreign policy goals in conflict with one another. On one hand, the Labour government wanted to be something of a pioneer in bringing the UK into the heart of the EU in order to play a leadership role there (Sperling, 2010). On the other hand, the Labour government was firmly Atlanticist and supported NATO (Seldon, 2001, p.611). Labour wanted to synthesise these two positions by playing a bridging role between the US and EU, bringing them together (Vickers, 2011, p.175). However, BMD was a major stumbling block for this plan (Stocker, 2004a, p.17). The governments of many EU member states were very much opposed to BMD, and saw the UK less as a bridge and more of a Trojan Horse for the US’s plans (Sperling, 2010). To overcome this opposition, the US government sought to negotiate directly with individual European countries – particularly in the East – who were interested in hosting BMD components (Hynek and Stritecky, 2010, p.182). The UK was already physically committed to BMD by hosting RAF Menwith Hill and RAF Fylingdales (Smith, 2005, p.452).

The issue of European division over BMD was not resolved until the NATO summit of November 2008 in Bucharest, where allied leaders agreed that the planned deployment of European-based US BMD assets set up on an individual basis between the Bush administration and individual EU member nations would be integrated into a NATO-wide missile defence architecture (NATO, 2008). Ultimately, in the final analysis Labour sided with US policy
over that of the EU. This strengthened the government’s position in NATO and complicated its relationship with the EU.

1.6. Was Labour’s policy towards US BMD an aspect of the Special Relationship, or just another normal bilateral defence agreement? Although it is a disputed term, the Labour government certainly believed in the UK’s Special Relationship with the US. On numerous occasions Blair reiterated the necessity of Britain remaining America’s number one ally (Casey, 2009, p.277). The UK’s close allegiance with the US was usually justified as necessary to maintaining a defensive alliance between the two nations and thereby increasing the UK’s own defence (Defence Committee, 2003, Summary). The Labour government also tried to exert a degree of benevolent influence over the US; by staying close to America the British government hoped to moderate US power and keep it aligned with world opinion (Butler, 2003b).

2. Theory:

2.1. Does the strategic-relational approach actually meet its own claims to explain changes in policy in terms of the dialectical interplay between structure, agency and discourse? The SRA is more than just a means to an end, a useful way of bridging the gap between internal and external pressures on defence policy making. Studying Labour’s policy on BMD is also a vehicle for exploring and understanding the SRA itself; for answering the question of whether the SRA as set out by Brighi can actually explain foreign policy decisions. The fact that this thesis takes Brighi’s model – which she uses to analyse Italian foreign policy decisions from 1901-2011 (Brighi, 2013) – and applies it to a totally different country and subject hopefully shows that the SRA is broadly applicable to all manner of situations and is therefore valid and its assumptions are highly determining.

Labour’s policy on BMD provides an opportunity to apply the SRA to a new scenario. However, one criticism of the SRA is that in its flexibility it can be used to explain any social/political phenomena, and therefore actually explains nothing. This does not actually mean that the SRA has to be absolutely theoretically watertight in order to have explanatory power and
uncover some original insights; in its application to foreign policy analysis the SRA is a work in progress.

2.2. Was Labour’s BMD policy solely a product of international or domestic influences? If not, what was their relative weight? At first glance it would seem that international pressures were the sole influence on Labour’s BMD policy. For example, why would the UK be interested in BMD in the first place if it were not for potential threats emanating from other countries? Why would the UK be involved in an American defence project if it was not for being able to latch on to the preeminent military force the US possesses, and reinforce the Special Relationship the two countries have built up since the Second World War? In comparison to such military considerations, electoral structural constraints – the need to put together an appealing policy platform, get voted in and form a government – may seem paltry. Yet, without responding to this structural challenge how could any political party ever become elected and be in a position to put in to action policies on anything, let alone BMD? However, the problem with this analysis is that although there was clear electoral pressure on Labour coming from voters to take a stronger line on defence – most clearly by dropping unilateralism – on the few occasions that public opinion on BMD was gauged in the UK, most people were against the system (CND, 2008d; Seldon, 2001, p.617).

The ambiguity surrounding international and domestic pressures means that, actually, neither of these two pressures can fully explain Labour’s BMD policy. Pressure from the structure of international relations alone cannot explain it because it does not account for the domestic pressures that act on political parties forcing them to put forward popular policies in order that they can get elected and be able to put any defence policies into action in the first place; while pressure from the structure of domestic electoral politics cannot fully explain Labour’s BMD policy since it seems missile defence was unpopular among the British public, and so in pure electoral terms Labour should have abandoned it.

Here, the SRA plays a central role in determining the relative influence of international and domestic pressures on Labour’s BMD policy because it brings these two structural constraints into relation in a way that other theories
do not. Crucially, the SRA grants agents the wherewithal to judge and navigate responses to different levels of structural constraints depending on what they will allow (Brighi, 2013, p.36). In this case, the need to appeal to a broader range of the electorate on defence was a structural influence on Labour’s defence policy in general to which it had to respond (Coates and Jaures, 2007, p.17), but the fact that BMD was of low salience to most voters (Ipsos-MORI, 2015; Ipsos-MORI, 2010) meant that the Labour government could chose to ignore this opposition and prioritise the UK’s security needs and go ahead with a BMD policy which would increase the UK’s defence capabilities while at the same time reinforcing the UK’s allegiance to the US.

In the final analysis therefore, international pressures were definitely of greater weight in shaping Labour’s BMD policy. Not only was the main aim of the Labour government’s BMD policy to increase the UK’s security in a dangerous world, it pursued this policy against the apparent wishes of the electorate. However, this does not mean that domestic electoral pressures were of no influence on Labour’s BMD policy. Indeed, they played an absolutely vital gate-keeping role. For if Labour had not adapted its defence policy to better meet the needs of voters, then it would not have been elected, and would have been in no position to do anything. Domestic electoral pressures were the catalyst that catapulted Labour into office so that the international structural pressures could take effect on the Party in office.

2.3. To what extent can neo-realism account for Labour’s BMD policy? What are its weaknesses that the strategic-relational approach overcomes? Neorealism actually goes a long way in accounting for Labour’s BMD policy, yet its explanation is necessary but not sufficient. Neorealism cannot explain Labour’s BMD policy because it claims that security decisions are a result of pressures from the outside-in (Neack, 2008, p.34), but if all that matters in forming defence policy are threats from abroad, why would Labour go to all the trouble of changing its general defence policy to appeal to a greater swath of voters in order to improve its electoral chances?

2.4. Did Labour’s BMD policy change depending on the alignment of Prime Minister and President in office, or did things stay the same? Do leader’s
personalities matter, or are structures more important? The configuration of leaders between 1997-2010 makes for an interesting and fruitful comparison of BMD policy. Blair and Brown both interacted with Bush, but Blair only interacted with Clinton, and Brown only with Obama. This gives a control and two variables. The SRA is well placed to address this issue because it places structures and agents into a dialectical relationship in which actors are capable of making strategically selective decisions based on what they perceive the structures they find themselves in will allow (Brighi, 2013, p.36). Therefore, different actors in similar circumstances will perceive the choices open to them differently and behave accordingly. This explains the different BMD positions different Prime Ministers took when working with different US Presidents. What this shows is that in the case of joint UK/US BMD policy, structural constraints were a preponderant influence, while agential relationships played a necessary but not sufficient role in accelerating the tempo but not the tendency of this collaboration towards ever deeper integration.

1.5 Academic context

This thesis finds itself in an academic context lacking any specific systematic account or explanation of how or why Labour made the particular security policy decisions that it did regarding BMD during 1997-2010. The sources that come closest are themselves disparate and sparse, and refer to Labour’s BMD policy only tangentially and incidentally. Still, among these sources there are several key texts which provide useful background information relating to the research aims of the thesis. Central among these are a handful of works by former Royal Navy officer Jeremy Stocker which cover the BMD policies of various UK governments right from 1942 to 2002, although none of them address the party political reasons for these policies, only the strategic motives for doing so (Stocker, 2004a; Stocker, 2004c; Stocker and Weinack, 2003a; Stocker, 2001). There are also some important sources – Vickers’ The Labour Party and the World Vol.2 (2011), Brown’s The Development of British Defence Policy: Blair, Brown and Beyond (2010) – which set a foreign and defence policy context within which Labour’s BMD policy decisions can be placed, although they only contain a few sentences on Britain’s role in BMD directly. In terms of theory, the
use of the strategic-relational approach to explain how international and domestic structures interact to influence government security policy is also rare. However, Elisabetta Brighi’s *Foreign Policy, Domestic Policy and International Relations: The case of Italy* (2013) is one such core text attempting this. It is her application of the strategic-relational approach to make an analysis of the intersection between Italian foreign policy, domestic policy and discourse which is adapted to form the theoretical framework of this thesis.

1.6 Methodology

The methods used in this thesis consist of documentary and archival analysis supplemented by semi-structured elite interviews. Documents and archives provide background and grounding for the thesis. Qualitative information from semi-structured elite interviews brings in original material from decision makers who may have had influence on or a particular insight into Labour’s BMD policy. This is triangulation; using more than one method or source of data to strengthen analysis (Burnham et al, 2004, p.217).

Information on the last Labour government’s policy towards BMD comes in the form of primary, secondary and tertiary sources. Primary sources are those that directly played some role or were a product of the event in question (Burnham et al., 2004, p.165). Just one example of these would be the *Framework Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on Ballistic Missile Defence* between the US and UK signed by Donald Rumsfeld and Geoff Hoon MP in 2003 (Department of Defense, 2003). However, due to the lack of primary documents because of the 30-year rule, this thesis aims for ‘the careful use of secondary and tertiary document sources buttressed by elite interviewing’ (Burnham et al., 2004, p.168). Semi-structured elite interviews were undertaken with Labour MPs identified as being particularly vocal on BMD during 1997-2010. Ultimately, several individuals agreed to be interviewed for this thesis including British missile defence scholar Dr Jeremy Stocker; Peace Studies expert Professor Paul Rogers; theorist of the strategic-relational approach Dr Elisabetta Brighi; outspoken missile defence critic and Liberal Peer Lord William Wallace of Saltaire; prominent anti-BMD former backbench Labour MPs Roger Godsiff and Kelvin Hopkins; the current UK industry lead for the Missile Defence Centre at BAE Systems Bryan Hore; the current Director of the Missile Defence
Centre; as well as a former ambassador, a former MOD official and two other individuals who wished to remain anonymous.

Secondary sources include those that were circulated at the time or soon after and which were available to the public (ibid, p.165), such as the MoD’s self-explanatory pamphlet; Ballistic Missile Defence: A public discussion paper (2002), for example. There are also a wealth of secondary sources narrating the government’s policies on BMD in this era available from news organisations and pressure groups.

The tertiary academic literature specifically analysing the last Labour government’s policy on BMD from a political point of view is non-existent. Yet there are some detailed strategic analyses of Labour’s BMD policy covering the 1997-2010 era. Two key works are Stocker’s Britain and Ballistic Missile Defence: 1944-2002 (2004), and Mark Smith’s Britain: Balancing ‘Instinctive Atlanticism’ (2005). This existing literature is explored and analysed in more detail in the following chapter.
Chapter 2. Literature Review

This literature review has three main goals: (1) to establish what literature already exists on the subject of the last labour government’s BMD policy; (2) to analyse the methodology and ideological underpinning of that literature; (3) to establish the extent to which the existing literature can explain why Labour adopted the particular policies on BMD that it did between 1997 and 2010. These three components all have the ultimate aim of identifying the gap in the literature that the rest of the thesis can fill through original research.

A short summary of the following literature review presents five findings: (1) there are no sources with the specific aim of analysing Labour’s BMD policy from 1997-2010; (2) the literature which tangentially refer to Labour’s BMD policy during 1997-2010 does so as part of a different goal – such as giving an account of the UK’s BMD policy as a whole, or as a case study for examining the UK’s relationship with the US – and numbers little more than half a dozen texts; (3) any analysis of Labour’s BMD policy these sources contain only do so in terms of the strategic defence reasons for it, not the domestic political reasons, let alone give an account of the interaction between the two; (4) there is, however, a rich and detailed general literature on BMD as well as Labour’s electoral modernisation and foreign and defence policies between 1997 and 2010 coming from academic, government, pressure group and news sources; (5) the theoretical literature on the strategic-relational approach is underdeveloped in its application to foreign policy analysis, but it does provide a promising theoretical tool that can be used to explain Labour’s policy on BMD (Brighi, 2013, p.33).

This review groups the existing literature into five areas. The first of these covers the ‘core’ texts of the literature review; namely, the handful of sources written by Jeremy Stocker covering the UK’s BMD policies. The second examines the ‘outer’ core texts. These sources contain valuable information on the last Labour government’s BMD policies, but are not as in-depth as the core texts. They themselves are sub-divided into analytical and descriptive pieces, pro and anti-BMD sources.

After spending the majority of the review examining the ‘inner’ and ‘outer’ core texts, three broader areas of literature are examined. First, is the literature relating to Labour’s general defence and foreign policy outlook during its last term of office; covering the evolution of Labour’s foreign policy outlook and Britain’s Special Relationship with the US, of which collaboration on BMD can be seen as a
manifestation. Second, is an examination of the literature relating to Labour’s stance on BMD in the context of a move to the centre ground on defence policy in general in order to appeal to a greater range of the electorate. Finally, the review offers a critique of the mainstream theoretical literature which could be used to explain why Labour went along with BMD; such as classical realism, neorealism, two-level games, the second image reversed and holistic constructivism, in favour of an interpretation of events based on the strategic-relational approach.

The review concludes with a synthesis of its main findings on the literature relating to the last Labour government’s BMD policy. It then presents openings in which the rest of the thesis can make a new contribution to fill the historical and analytical gaps in the existing literature.

In order to critique any body of work the reviewer needs to adopt a critical position from which to analyse. This review is part of a wider thesis which uses the strategic-relational approach as its theoretical basis (Brighi, 2013). The SRA is used to analyse the last Labour government’s BMD policy because it combines the influences of domestic and international structural pressures on the making of defence policy while allowing government actors the ability to perceive the limits and openings these structures place on them and make strategic policy choices that feed back into and alter these very same boundaries (Brighi, 2013, p.38). Therefore this review will be examining the literature for the absence of domestic political explanations for Labour’s BMD policies.

This review also makes a technical and analytical critique of the existing literature on Labour’s BMD policy from 1997-2010. It is technical because it will examine the accuracy and veracity of the claims made in the literature, and it is analytical because it will identify the ideological, political and institutional viewpoints which sway the objectivity of those who have written on the subject.

2.1 The Core Texts

The fact that the literature on Britain’s policy towards BMD is so limited presents opportunities as well as challenges. One such positive is that it gives a concise number of texts to examine in very close detail.

At the heart of this literature review is the work of one particular author, Dr Jeremy Stocker. Stocker is the one single author who has written the most about BMD
in the British context. Although a literature review is not an annotated bibliography, it is worth analysing Stocker’s work as a stand-alone body because anyone trying to get a picture of the UK’s relationship with BMD would be likely to come across his work first.

The nucleus of this review is Stocker’s 2004 work *Britain and Ballistic Missile Defence 1942-2002* (2004a). At over 240 pages long it is the most comprehensive account of the UK’s policies towards ballistic missile defence that exists. Stocker’s in-depth book is supported by a short monograph thirty pages long entitled *Britain’s Role in US Missile Defence* (2004c), plus an even more concise 6-page RUSI journal article called *Britain and Ballistic Missile Defence: A Brief History* (2001). There is also a RUSI Whitehall Paper co-curated by Stocker and Wieneck called *Missile Defence in a New Strategic Environment* (2003a). Finally, there is a brief RUSI article by Stocker named *The Strategy of Missile Defence* (2011), which more explicitly sets out Stocker’s own opinion on the strategic benefits of missile defence to the UK’s security. It is useful to first examine each text individually, as they were written with different aims and for different audiences. Then the themes common to them all can be summarised in the conclusion. To some extent each source is a more sophisticated version of the last. It is therefore clear to see how the key themes Stocker covered developed and grew.

A very brief summary of each source is as follows: *History* aims to give a quick overview of Britain’s BMD policy from WW2 to 2001; *Role* focuses on the UK’s role in BMD, especially in the late 90s - early 00s; *1942-2002* goes into the themes raised above in much greater detail; *Environment* is a collection of pro-BMD presentations on missile defence technology from a RUSI conference; *Strategy* presents Stocker’s own opinions on the strategic benefits of missile defence.

Before examining his work, it is useful to look a little into Stocker’s background, as it may be possible to infer something of his strategic worldview from this. Stocker himself worked at the MoD where he was Assistant Head of the Royal Naval Reserve. He is also an Associate Fellow at RUSI. Prior to this he spent 20 years as an officer in the Royal Navy. He completed his PhD on missile defence at the University of Hull in 2002 (RUSI, [no date]). As such, he cuts a deeply establishment figure and this is reflected in his work. Stocker is clearly in favour of BMD, but he does not read as an evangelist for it. He believes that BMD is just one strand in preventing a nuclear attack on the UK alongside traditional nuclear deterrence based
on Trident, diplomatic negotiations on arms control, and even passive defence (Stocker, 2004c, p.12). It seems possible that his connections gave him an advantage in his research by giving him access to policy makers for interview that may not have been open to someone from a purely academic background (Stocker, 2004a, p.6).

Establishing Stocker’s theoretical standpoint on international relations was more difficult because he does not state what it is in any of his works. At first it seemed plausible to place him in the English School. This is because his main concern seems to be with the need for the UK to counter threats by maximising its hard military power through nuclear deterrence and participating in BMD (Stocker, 2011, p.58), yet he also evidently believes that international non-proliferation treaties and good relations between nations – the maintenance of a positive ‘international society’ – can help to prevent war (ibid, p.60). Perhaps Stocker’s work has no clear statement of his analytical viewpoint because he considers it to be common-sense, and therefore self-evident and of no need for greater explanation. Fortunately, an interview with Stocker for this thesis confirmed this inference. Stocker stated that he is sceptical of pure IR theory which ‘descends into the world of abstract philosophising’, as in his personal view its ‘connection with the real world of security is often tenuous’ (Stocker, 2017). It could also be argued that Stocker’s articles are just not that type of theoretical analysis, being mostly deeply detailed historical accounts of Britain’s BMD policies over the years with a few policy recommendations at the end, rather than debate pieces with the explicit aim of arguing for the UK’s role in BMD against other points of view.

The literature review will now examine Stocker’s works individually in chronological order. This makes it clear to see how his ideas developed over time. It also places them in the context of the era they were written. This is important because although he made a massively detailed study of the UK’s BMD policy up to 2002 when ‘Britain’ was published, Stocker released nothing further on the subject until ‘Strategy’ in 2011, and this addition was a statement on the defensive potential of BMD technology as it stood in 2011, not a catch-up on British BMD developments over the intervening 9 years. In itself this shows that there is a glaring lack of research on Labour’s BMD policy over the remaining 8 years in power to 2010, although this is somewhat addressed up to 2008 by some of the ‘outer core’ texts. It is also possible to see the development of Stocker’s work in an academic context, since A Brief History reads almost like a literature review submitted for the PhD upgrade panel, while
Britain and Ballistic Missile Defence 1942-2002 is in fact a revised version of Stocker’s final PhD thesis (Stocker, 2004a).

2.1.1 Britain and Ballistic Missile Defence – a brief history (2001)

This is a historical paper which has the aim of giving a concise summary of the UK's missile defence policies from WWII up to 2001. It recounts in great detail Britain's encounters with missile defence from the V2 attacks of the Second World War, on to the emerging nuclear threat from the Soviet Union in the 1960s, the Thatcher administration's response to Reagan's Star Wars proposal, and finally into the post-Cold War world and the implications of missile proliferation for the UK's missile defence policy as of 2001 (Stocker, 2001).

The main points Stocker makes in this paper are: the UK has a long involvement with missile defence going back to WWII as the UK was the first country to come under ballistic missile attack from the V-2 (Stocker, 2001, p.61); public and political debate on BMD is ill-informed; the UK has been able to acquire BMD radar equipment from the US at a small cost to itself (ibid, p.62); the ABM Treaty between the US and USSR was of key significance for the UK since any limitation of Soviet missile defence meant that Britain’s relatively small nuclear deterrent was still potent (ibid, p.63); a NATO-wide approach to BMD is the only sensible policy for the UK and other European countries because they are so geographically close (ibid, p.65); the fundamental arguments for and against missile defence, and the strategic and technical problems and opportunities associated with it were already identified by the 1950s and still hold true today.

Stocker clearly has great technical knowledge of the development of missile defence technology and how this links in with policy making in government departments. The most interesting point in this article is that Labour was in office in 1964-70 and 1997-2001 when the US made important decisions about missile defence that required a British response (ibid, p.63). There is a concluding statement at the end of the article which sets out Stocker’s own analysis:

The United Kingdom has a long, if intermittent, history of attempting to deal with the threats posed by the proliferation of ballistic missiles. Britain's position as a small nuclear power, the closest ally of the United
States, a leading European power and a state with worldwide interests, concerns and capabilities, puts the country in a unique, and not always comfortable, position as regards missile defence. Despite the apparent novelty of the issue, it has been around for a very long time, consistently posing much the same dilemmas; strategic, technical, diplomatic and financial. What perhaps have changed, are the first two of these. With the end of the Cold War a decade ago, the world's strategic landscape has altered fundamentally. Technological progress now makes active defence against ballistic missiles, whatever their payload, a realistic option. Perhaps, after more than half a century, BMD's time has now come (ibid, p.65).

There is much to agree with here. Since it first came under attack from the V2 and then the Soviet missile threat the UK has always engaged with the idea of missile defence. Yet precisely because it is a relatively small power the UK was not able to afford its own missile defence and so relied on the US to build and provide upgrades to RAF Fylingdales and RAF Menwith Hill (Stocker, 2004a, p.16). This meant that the UK was already involved in missile defence whether it wanted to be or not. The strategic environment around missile defence changed after the Cold War era. The logic of MAD may have been strengthened by the lack of missile defence, there is no way any missile shield could have intercepted the tens of thousands of missiles held by the Soviet Union. Yet the shift in threat from major nuclear states to developing world proliferators armed with perhaps a dozen missiles at most after the end of the Cold War made the protection offered by BMD plausible.

However, Stocker’s last two sentences sound very over-optimistic in hindsight. This article was published in 2001, US missile defence technology was still highly experimental at this point. This seems like wishful thinking on Stocker’s part, perhaps illustrating his enthusiasm for the technology rather than an objective assessment of BMD capabilities.

A slight criticism of this article finds a contradiction between the beginning of the article where Stocker says that public and political discussion of BMD is uninformed (ibid, p.61), while at the end of the article he says that National Missile Defence (NMD) has been a major topic of public debate in 2001 due to US plans to deploy such a system (ibid, p.65), although the idea of a major debate being ill-
informed are not mutually exclusive qualities. A serious criticism of Stocker’s paper is the fact that there is no engagement with domestic political issues that might have been influencing Britain’s missile defence policy over the decades. To the researcher using the SRA, this is a major oversight as it misses out half of the influence on the production of government policies.

### 2.1.2 Missile Defence in a New Strategic Environment (2003)

This short compendium of presentations focuses on the technical aspects of missile defence and fostering cooperation between the US and its allies over the system, but it also gives some coverage of the UK and US’s wider strategic policy on BMD. The fact that Stocker and Wieneck chose these particular speakers to be in this volume perhaps shows something of the assumptions and hopes they themselves hold about BMD.

The various speakers make several interesting points which deserve analysis, though it must be noted that they are all pro-BMD. The only criticisms that come up in their presentations say nothing of the potential dangers that could arise from BMD such as proliferation, but argue that if anything missile defence research and deployment is not proceeding fast enough, and that European nations and the US need to work together more to speed the project on.

Although a straight analysis of what the various speakers themselves are saying could be made here, it is much more insightful to examine what messages about BMD Stocker is trying to put across by proxy through these speakers? Fundamentally, this seems to be that BMD is good for the UK and Britain should commit to it straight away. Other points are: there is convergence between the government and the Conservatives over BMD, since both agree that fundamentally BMD is a good thing, the only difference being one of emphasis on whether the UK should immediately offer the US basing rights for interceptors (Jenkin, 2003) or adopt a more cautious ‘wait and see’ approach (Bach, 2003); the missile threat is coming from rogue state proliferators – major nuclear powers are not mentioned – and BMD is a response to them, not a cause of their proliferation (ibid); missile defence will allow the West to intervene against rogue states who have already developed nuclear weapons and put off potential proliferators as it can neutralize their attack (Mey, 2003); the ABM Treaty’s usefulness had expired (Rubin, 2003); the UK should receive upgraded radar
facilities and missile interceptors, and from there on could act as a springboard for spreading missile defence across Europe (McCulloch, 2003); British defence companies are poised to use their great expertise to make significant contributions to the research and development of missile defence but the government must give more funding to and promote the British defence industry to US contractors (Bond, 2003); US research on BMD has already cost up to $60 billion dollars, there is still a long way to go to make it work but it will be worth it (Kadish, 2003).

The main criticism of this collection of speeches is the lack of any critical voice. There are no oppositional views presented here. Even from a conservative standpoint there are concerns over BMD, but we do not hear them. Should so much money be spent on such an experimental system at the expense of funding for conventional forces, for example? There are also some cracks in the ‘only for defence’ argument here. Mey openly calls for missile defence to allow pre-emptive intervention (Mey, 2003). As ever there is no mention of public opinion. It gives the impression that BMD is an elite issue to be decided by elites.

2.1.3 Britain’s Role in US Missile Defence (2004)

To some extent Role is an expanded version of History. It gives much more detailed information about the UK’s own policies on missile defence and cooperation with US BMD development over the decades. It is important to bear in mind that the paper was funded by the US Army War College with the aim of looking at what linked and divided the US and UK over their approaches to missile defence strategy. The opening statement by the editors of the series sums up their outlook: ‘This monograph…seeks to examine the many facets of the role that Britain, America’s closest and strongest ally, plays in missile defense, and to identify the ways in which disagreements can be minimized and cooperation enhanced, to mutual benefit’ (Stocker, 2004c, p.iii). Evidently, by writing a paper for them Stocker believes this is a good idea. It seems he is trying to be part of this debate. Maybe Stocker’s insider background gives him an aura of kudos that the editors hope will be influential. And of course, Stocker is a scholar in the field.

Firstly, Stocker sets out the traditional British response to BMD. He states that Britain has been sceptical of BMD because it has always seen the effectiveness of
decoys and overwhelming numbers as undermining missile defence (Stocker, 2004c, p.v).

The abandonment of the ABM Treaty was supposed to be a real game-changer for the UK’s deterrent, but in the end it passed quietly (ibid, p.9). A British government paper addressing the end of the ABM Treaty stated that US missile defence was a response to, not a cause of, missile proliferation (ibid). In this new post-ABM climate, the Foreign Office stated that one of its objectives in its relationship with the United States was to ensure that ‘Missile Defence is pursued in a way which protects UK interests and minimises divisions within NATO’ (Foreign Affairs Committee, 2001b, para 14).

For Stocker, the only way a junior partner like the UK can influence a more powerful one like the US is to act as a reliable but not slavish ally (Stocker, 2004c, p.12). Yet, because the UK already has US missile detection facilities on its soil missile defence is not just an abstract issue of wider ‘strategic stability’ (ibid, p.13). The UK has done well out of its cooperation with America over missile defence; the US has met most of the cost of constructing and upgrading RAF Fylingdales and RAF Menwith Hill, with the UK paying for maintenance (ibid, p.14).

Then there is the difference in strategic outlook between the US and its allies. A certain degree of vulnerability is acceptable to Europeans due to their geography, they are used to living in close proximity to threats. The reverse stands for Americans, who are geographically isolated from their enemies (ibid, p.13). There are real benefits to internationalizing BMD for the US. Stocker claims that if Europe is defended by BMD it will not be deterred by the threat of missiles from supporting American interventions around the world. Likewise, the US needs BMD assets in Europe if the system is to work at all. Also, if more countries are involved BMD seems less like US unilateralism (ibid, p.25).

Stocker very firmly states that ‘Missile defense is an integral part of U.S. security policy and wider transatlantic relations. It is not separable from either’ (ibid, p.28). The US must address its overseas audience in its domestic security BMD debate. He talks about how technological protectionism is harmful and other countries have expertise to offer the US above just basing rights and diplomatic support: The US must reform its legislative and commercial barriers to encourage cooperation with its allies (ibid, p.29).
Stocker concludes by stating that active defence should be pursued alongside counter-proliferation methods including arms control, export control, deterrence, counterforce and passive defences (ibid, p.28).

In the conclusion to this monograph Stocker makes several assertions that require analysis. The first of these is that interdependence is growing as states, even the US, become relatively less powerful in relation to each other. This means the US and its allies must learn to work together more closely over BMD, ‘Americans need to talk more clearly, and Europeans need to listen more acutely’ (ibid, p.26). This seems a little one sided; the US is playing the active role while Europe is passive. Stocker adds that Britain itself is already so entwined in BMD that the UK and US must have that open conversation and understanding so that missile defence and the Special Relationship work (ibid). It seems he is saying that the Special Relationship must be preserved at all costs, and going along with BMD is a good means to an end for the UK to do this, rather than an end in itself.

On a more critical note against the US, Stocker argues that the way in which the US pursues BMD can have a large effect on preventing proliferation, so at least he is open to the argument that it could cause proliferation, he is not a dogmatic supporter of BMD. However, if the US pursues BMD in isolation it will not work technically or strategically (ibid, p.27). The US needs to seek allied participation in its BMD system to neutralize negative diplomacy, yet no ally should expect veto powers over US actions (ibid, p.8). This shows how unbalanced the relationship is. If the US’s supposed partners have no veto, why would the US take any notice of their wishes?

Stocker argues that the British proposal for active defence as part of a package that includes nuclear deterrence diplomacy is attractive (ibid, p.12). He suggests a merger of this approach with the US’s commitment to make large investments in security problems and meet security challenges head on (ibid, p.27). He says that Transatlantic thinking on missile defence has narrowed (ibid), and indeed it has, but by the UK coming around to the US’s point of view. Stocker is right to point out that there is a relationship of mutual dependence between the US and UK on missile defence, if an asymmetrical one (ibid). Missile defence is not a done deal between the two countries and collaboration needs careful discussion (ibid). Again, however, it is not clear whether Stocker sees BMD as an end in itself to enhance the UK’s security, or as a means to the end of cementing the Special Relationship?
A final criticism can be made of Stocker’s assertion that ‘UK policy on missile defence since the end of the Cold War has not simply been a matter of reacting to U.S. policy and proposals’ (ibid, p.18). Actually, it appears that, especially during the era when *Role* was written, virtually all of the time it was. When Clinton wanted the ABM Treaty preserved so did the British government (HoC Deb, 2000d, c312-3), yet when Bush wanted to get rid of it Downing Street accepted his decision (Ministry of Defence, 2002, p.26). The British government would not be thinking about missile defence at all if it were not for the American’s development of the system.


*Britain and Ballistic Missile Defence: 1942-2002* is an incredibly detailed historical account of the UK’s policies towards missile defence over several decades from WWII to 2002. In fact it is the only single definitive comprehensive attempt to write such a history. Therefore, perhaps four-fifths of Stocker’s book is descriptive. It is only in the conclusion that Stocker puts forward his own assessment of the strengths and weaknesses of the UK’s approach to missile defence over the years and gives recommendations for how it should be involved in missile defence in the future. For the most part, Stocker’s history traces the various strategic and technical reasons influencing the UK’s policies towards BMD without criticising these decisions. Furthermore, because missile defence and nuclear weapons are so closely linked, *42-02* also provides a good shadow narrative of the UK’s nuclear deterrent programme.

Far more important that Britain’s own attempts at BMD have been its attitudes and responses towards the BMD of other states (Stocker, 2004a, p.2). BMD has often been a significant factor in transatlantic relations (ibid, p.1). According to Stocker, the UK has passed through three eras when missiles threats have been prominent. The first during the V2 attacks of the Second World War, followed by the Soviet missile threat of the Cold War, and the latest period of rogue state proliferation (ibid, p.209).

Likewise, US missile defence has been of particular concern to the UK on three occasions. Firstly, when the US made a limited ABM deployment during the Labour government of 1964-70, then during Thatcher’s response to Reagan’s Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) in the mid-80s, and then again for Labour in the late 1990s to the early 2000s with Clinton’s National Missile Defence, intended to protect the US,
and Bush’s full Ballistic Missile Defence, intended to protect the US and its allies (ibid, pp.107-108).

The concept of ballistic missile defence arises out of and is deeply entwined with the credibility of a country’s nuclear deterrence (ibid, p.210). Stocker often refers to the strategic link between the two systems that emerged from the Cold War. Quite apart from the UK’s own involvement in US missile defence from the 90s onwards, the British government was largely opposed to BMD during the Cold War. The development of missile defence was seen negatively because it was feared that if the Soviets expanded such a system (The ABM Treaty allowed an incredibly limited missile defence system on the outskirts of Moscow) it could neutralize the UK’s relatively small nuclear armoury (ibid, p.135). During the Cold War, Britain’s nuclear deterrent was based on a tactic called ‘counter value’; targeting the Russian civilian population in cities. At the heart of this counter value targeting tactic was the ‘Moscow Criterion’, the threat that at the bare minimum some British nuclear missiles would reach the Soviet capital (Defence Committee, 1981, cited in ibid, p.132).

In response, the UK resorted to overwhelming numbers of nuclear missiles on undetectable submarines to ensure its defence. When the Cold War ended, Russian BMD ceased to be of real concern to Britain (Stocker, 2004b, p.139). Nonetheless, Stocker points out that BMD carries a huge legacy from the end of the Cold War. He quotes the then Foreign Secretary Jack Straw in 2002, arguing that those who were opposed to the nuclear arms race during the Cold War should now support missile defence as it undercuts mutually assured destruction (Foreign Affairs Committee, 2001c, Examination of Witnesses, Q62). Still, ‘the technological and financial demands of active defence were considered to be beyond Britain’s means’ (Stocker, 2004b, p.211). The Ministry of Defence did carry on with a small amount of BMD research, however. This was more to enable the UK to be an ‘intelligent customer’ when making decisions to get involved in US BMD (ibid, p.174).

The later chapters which cover BMD developments over the years 1997-2002 have two subsections called ‘The British Reaction’ (I) and (II) (ibid, p.192). This is telling because it again illustrates how the British government merely reacted to the actions of the US over BMD. The first of these sections focuses on the Labour administration’s reaction to Clinton’s more restricted National Missile Defence programme. It reveals that in the late 90s the British government was concerned about BMD for several reasons: was the missile threat really that severe? Could the UK’s
nuclear deterrence be maintained if other countries started building their own missile defences? Would BMD undermine arms control? How would it alter relations with Russia? Would it lead to the strategic decoupling of the US and Europe? Were the NATO allies being properly consulted? There was also concern about whether the technology could actually ever be made to work and the mounting financial cost of the research involved (ibid, p.193). Stocker points out that NMD ‘posed a real dilemma for the British Government’; its close defence and intelligence ties made the UK more sensitive to US security concerns and more reluctant to criticize US policy than other European countries (Fergusson, 2000, pp.17-18). Stocker then gives a concise summary of British policy throughout BMD history: ‘The British Government therefore sought to apply the ‘Special Relationship’ to the SDI issue. It would avoid overt disagreements, whilst seeking to influence US policy behind the scenes’ (Foreign Affairs Committee, 2000, cited in ibid, p.149). Stocker says that certain concepts such as ‘strategic stability’, arms control, transatlantic relations, East-West relations and defence budgets have an ‘established pedigree’ in British defence policy circles and are hard to change (Missile Proliferation Study Group, cited in ibid, p.213).

RAF Fylingdales gave Britain some leverage in the BMD debate with the United States, Stocker continues, but could also have forced the government to make a firm decision on getting more deeply involved when it would rather have not. Agreeing to the use of RAF Fylingdales would at least imply British support for BMD, though at that point the UK would not itself be protected by the new system (Young, 2000, cited in ibid, p.195). Yet, on the other hand, the government also wanted the UK to be seen as a ‘good European’ (Cambone, 2000, cited in ibid, p.194). The Labour government tried to act as a bridge between the US and the EU countries over BMD, relaying concerns between the two camps (RUSI, 2001, cited in ibid, p.202). The result was ‘an official policy to have no policy’ on BMD (Garden, 2000, cited in ibid, p.194).

The second subsection covers the Labour government’s reaction to the Bush administration’s BMD policy. A major development of this period was Bush’s abandonment of the 1972 ABM Treaty in order to build a fully functioning missile defence system. Britain was not a party to the Treaty but deeply valued the strategic stability it brought and wanted to see it preserved (HoC Deb, 2000f, c350). By limiting Soviet missile defence the ABM Treaty also assured the credibility of the British nuclear deterrent. In 1999, the British government maintained that the ABM Treaty
was the foundation of arms control (Battle, 2001, cited in ibid, p.198). However, they had been willing to countenance Clinton’s thin NMD system in an amended ABM Treaty.

By mid-2001, however, President Bush was in office, and by December he had given notice of the US’s withdrawal from the ABM Treaty (Stocker, 2004b, p.199). The UK response was surprisingly mild. The Foreign Secretary said the Treaty ‘was a product of its time’, and that the world had moved on from MAD (Straw, 2002, cited in ibid, p.199). The British, like the Russians, wanted the ABM Treaty to stay in place but realized they could not do much about it once the US had made up its mind. As it turned out, a new arms race did not materialize, Russia actually reduced its nuclear arsenal (Lords, 2002, cited in ibid, p.199). Stocker pointedly observes that ‘one could wonder what all the fuss had been about’ (Stocker, 2004b, p.199).

Following 9/11, the Defence Secretary, Geoff Hoon MP, confirmed that Britain’s stance towards missile defence was unchanged: it was still too early for the UK itself to acquire a BMD capability (Hansard, 2001, cited in ibid, p.202). He later agreed, however, that the events of 9/11 strengthened the case for missile defence (Hansard, 2002, cited in ibid). The Foreign and Commonwealth Office told the Foreign Affairs Committee that one of its objectives in the United States was to ensure ‘that Missile Defence is pursued in a way which protects UK interests and minimises divisions within NATO’ (Foreign Affairs Committee, cited in ibid, p.202). Incidentally, there are a few references to the Atlantic alliance in Stocker’s book, but he states that a detailed examination of NATO’s work on BMD is outside the scope of his study (Stocker, 2004b, p.183).

Nevertheless, by late 2002 the British Government was reconciled to the idea of US missile defence (Ministry of Defence, 2002, p.26). The remaining question was how far the UK would get involved? As Stocker points out, ‘This represents a dramatic…change in official British thinking, which since the mid-1960s had consistently viewed deployment of missile defences as destabilising’ (Stocker, 2004a, p.203).

At the beginning of 2003, Hoon announced in Parliament that the UK should agree to the upgrade of RAF Fylingdales so that it could play a role in US BMD (Hansard, 2002, cited in ibid). His statement clearly outlined the government’s view of missile defence, and the extent to which it had become reconciled to US plans:
Missile defence is a defensive system that threatens no one. We see no reason to believe fears that the development of missile defences will be strategically destabilising. Reactions from Russia and China have been measured. Missile defence would need to be used only if a ballistic missile has actually been fired... Once the missile is in the air, it is unthinkable that anyone could not want us to be in a position to shoot it down (HoC Deb, 2003c, cc697-698).

The Defence Committee concurred with Hoon’s stance. It listed the reasons why the UK should agree to the upgrade in telling order: (1) the importance of the UK-US relationship; (2) Improvements to the UK’s early warning capability; (3) the opportunity to keep open the prospect of missile defence for the UK; (4) potential British industry participation; (5) these combined factors outweighed the negatives (Defence Committee, 2003, cited in ibid, p.204). Formal assent to the US Government’s request to upgrade RAF Fylingdales so it could play a role in BMD was given on 5 February 2003 (Hansard, 2003, c11WS).

Before analyzing the main body of Stocker’s book it is worth examining the series editor’s preface, as it places Stocker’s work in the wider editorial context of what the sequence of books it is a part of hopes to achieve. Britain and Ballistic Missile Defence: 1942-2002 is part of the Cass Series on Strategy and History. The series editor – a Colin S. Gray – states that the purpose of the collection is to focus on the theory and practice of strategy, which is understood to mean: ‘the use made of force, and the threat of the use of force, for the ends of policy’ (ibid, preface) This is a defining statement as it shows that the focus of Stocker’s book will be on strategy, not unit level politics, and the focus on the threat of force suggests that theories of conflict resolution based around peace studies will not be prominent.

Gray states that the series’ aim is to cover neglected strategic history (ibid, preface), of which Stocker’s work is certainly a clear example. He adds that although Stocker’s main subject is Britain and BMD, ‘the main issue almost always has been Britain’s attitude towards the latest shift in American policy on the matter’ (ibid). This statement illustrates a major subtext of Stocker’s book: the need for the UK to maintain the Special Relationship with the US at all costs and on the US’s terms. This is indicative of a massively asymmetric power relationship between the two nations
that is evident in their cooperation over BMD. Gray’s preface then moves on to cover two main themes; the ABM Treaty and the politics of missile defence.

Much like Stocker in his earlier articles, Gray agrees that the ABM Treaty was the ‘defining event in the UK’s response to both US and Soviet [missile defence systems]’ (ibid, p.6). However, Gray disparages those who believe that the ABM Treaty maintained stability by guaranteeing vulnerability, whereas missile defence would undermine it and cause proliferation, as being ‘theological’ (ibid, preface). At times it appears there is an inherent opposition to the centre-left in Gray’s writing. He says that the ‘principally liberal’ arguments of the supporters of the ABM Treaty allowed the UK to ‘conceal its distaste’ for BMD. Gray believes that the lack of a strategic arms race, a relaxed Russia, the end of the ABM Treaty, and a changed threat environment makes it ‘close to a certainty that BMD’s hour is arriving at last’ (ibid). In hindsight this seems overly optimistic; BMD is the issue that is forever delayed.

Another recurrent theme of Gray’s preface is the effect of politics on the development of BMD, as opposed to purely technical and strategic considerations. This actually leads to a major criticism of Gray and the rest of Stocker’s book. If, as Gray states, BMD is ‘even more political than it is technical’ (ibid), why is there so little politics in this book? Stocker’s whole focus is on the wider international strategic pressures guiding Britain’s BMD policy. Governments of different colours come in and out of the narrative, and there is some reference to the parliamentary debates over BMD between the Opposition and government, but they are just presented as differences of opinion. There is no deep attempt to explain the domestic political reasons behind the respective parties positions on BMD. As Gray points out, BMD is debated on the technical merits of whether it will work or not ‘when both sides really regarded the matter as being primarily one of political symbolism. To oppose BMD was to oppose the arms race, to ‘believe in’ arms control, and—ergo—to stand for peace!’ (ibid). So why is there no deeper domestic political analysis of why different political parties took different stances on BMD and how this changed over the years? Since we are talking about politicians in a democracy, there must be some electoral reason behind the stances they took on BMD that had an impact on how missile defence policies actually turned out. Gray seems to be saying that the technical issues were solved and the time for BMD had come. Yet, if indeed that were the case, and still the UK equivocated over BMD, does it not reveal that the real underlying reasons behind Britain’s enthusiasm or otherwise for missile defence were exactly the political
ones? ‘Although the issues could hardly be more technical, the on-off-on ‘debate’ was always dominated by political attitudes’, says Gray (ibid). So, again, why is there no political discussion of these political attitudes here? It is as though Gray – and Stocker – want to hive off the politics from the strategy and present it as a technocratic decision that is easily made based on ‘the facts’. This is where the SRA can give a more rounded account of the last Labour government’s BMD policy, as it combines domestic political machinations over BMD with the pressures of the international security environment; allowing the Labour government the agency to recognize that they could push ahead with missile defence in the face of latent (though minor) public opposition while at the same time suppressing the parliamentary debate over BMD so that it did not become a more prominent issue.

What is also useful about Stocker’s book is that he recounts the literature review he himself undertook to write his book. It is interesting that the same kind of patterns emerge in the literature he found as the ones that emerged when researching for this thesis. For example, Stocker says there is a very substantial body of literature on BMD, though most of it is American, and even the literature published in the UK is usually by US authors on US issues. There is also a substantial amount of literature on UK nuclear defence, but it barely mentions BMD (ibid, p.5). This is an almost exact mirror of the research for this thesis.

Stocker says British sources on BMD pick up after Reagan’s 1983 ‘Star Wars’ speech. However, the absence of primary source material is to some extent compensated by the amount of public statements made in Parliament, in the media and in speeches and journals (ibid, p.6). The Defence and Foreign Affairs Committees also provide a good source of unclassified material. Stocker says he was also able to talk directly to people involved in both the technical and policy aspects of UK BMD throughout most of the period of his book (ibid). Perhaps his background in the military and MoD gave him privileged access to sources that researchers from a purely academic background would not have.

The introduction to Stocker’s book starts with the assertion that the UK’s own efforts to develop missile defence are little known outside a small military and technical community (ibid, p.1). To this, one could also add campaigning organizations like Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CND) as vital sources of information.

Stocker’s research shows that the basic arguments of deterrence and missile
defence that still stand today were understood by the 1950s. There are many parallels between the missile defence debate in the 1950s and the 2000s. For example, the Sandys Defence Review of 1955 concluded that since massive nuclear bombardment by Russia was the main threat to the UK, no defence could withstand it and so nuclear retaliation should be the main deterrence (DEFE, 1956, cited in ibid, p.66). A Royal Radar Establishment report observed that countermeasures costing a fraction of any missile defence would be used to confuse any such system (DEFE, 1955, cited in ibid, p.62). As early as 1956 the government’s Chief Scientific Advisor, Sir Frederick Brundrett, noted that the UK would not need active defence if its nuclear deterrence were placed on submarines. He also noted that if any form of missile defence were to go ahead the UK should restrict itself to radars and the US to interceptors (DEFE, 1958, cited in ibid, p.70); prefiguring the RAF Fylingdales and RAF Menwith Hill upgrades by nearly 50 years. Brundrett also said that the UK could not afford missile defence on its own and would have to work with the US if it wanted a complete system. Echoing Brundrett’s foresight, the Ministry of Aviation said that any missile defence would be too easily overwhelmed, while ‘On the other hand, it appears to be a particularly suitable one in which to be largely dependent on America’, and that therefore ‘...our effort should be confined to work on techniques at the minimum level necessary to maintain access to US information and progress’ (DEFE, 1960, cited in ibid, p.74). This attitude was to become ‘an early foretaste of the main focus of British policy for the next three decades’ (Stocker, 2004a, p.75).

Stocker also recounts how many important missile defence developments have taken place while Labour was in power. It is interesting to observe the different reactions during those two occasions when Labour was in office. In the 60s, the Labour government and the Foreign Secretary of the time, Dennis Healy, were very much opposed to the US’s Sentinel plans (ibid, p.108). This outlook held for the first New Labour years in the late 90s while Clinton was in office, yet when Bush became President and pushed ahead with BMD that same Labour government suddenly accepted missile defence (Ministry of Defence, 2002, p.26).

This change in Labour’s stance from the 60s to the 2000s probably reflects the radically different security environment between the two eras. In the 1960s the idea that US missile defence could spur on a similar Soviet shield probably felt like it could undermine the UK’s relative small nuclear deterrent. However, by the turn of the century and the demise of the Russian threat, the idea of missile defence was much
less threatening to the UK. Conservative governments had a cautious approach to missile defence too (Stocker, 2004a, p.149).

By 2001, there is some acknowledgement that BMD was becoming a party political issue. Stocker points out that the Conservatives came out strongly in favour of missile defence, and that for the Leader of the Opposition it was ‘something of a personal crusade’ (ibid, p.194). Iain Duncan Smith criticized what he perceived as hesitancy on the part of the Labour government to commit fully to the system, saying it was ‘perhaps not surprising, however, given the left-wing credentials of those Ministers currently in residence at the Foreign Office, to whom any notion of missile defence is anathema’ (Duncan Smith, 2000, cited in ibid, p.179). Duncan Smith sought to exploit Labour differences over BMD, describing the government as ‘no longer sitting on the fence, they are impaled on it’ (Hansard, 2001, in ibid, p.202).

Stocker also acknowledges that missile defence was deeply disputed within the Labour government too. For example, there is some exposition of different views on BMD in the Cabinet; Stocker cites Peter Hain’s distaste for any missile defence ‘limited or unlimited’ (Guardian, 2000, cited in ibid, p.193). There is also recognition that ‘Political views outside the government were in some cases highly polarized’ (Stocker, 2004a, p.194). He notes that there were several EDMs sponsored by Labour MPs against BMD, but that some figures formerly associated with Labour, such as Lord Chalfont, were now vocal advocates (ibid). However, yet again there is no analysis of why there would be such polarized political positions both between and within the Parties. It is just stated as self-evident that this would be the case.

In hindsight, his final comment in the book seems premature: ‘It may be that, for perhaps the first time in Britain’s long history of involvement in BMD, policy debate and technical research are becoming fully aligned, each supporting and informing the other’ (ibid, p.213). In fact, it seems the UK has been forever delayed when it comes to getting fully involved in missile defence.

The usual criticisms of Stocker’s other documents apply to 42-02: although party political positions on BMD are acknowledged, there is no deeper ideological explanation of why the different parties held the policy positions they did and how these different party postures interact with and change according to the British public’s views on missile defence. Also, despite some concerns about the precise calibration that BMD could play in protecting the UK vis a vis other methods such as diplomacy and classical nuclear deterrence, at heart Stocker fundamentally accepts missile
defence as a positive. He does not entertain the idea that such a system could be an aggressive rather than defensive system.

However, 42-02 also contains a particularly unique and interesting fragment of a comment which almost cuts right to the heart of why Stocker is unable to offer a full explanation of the UK’s BMD policy over the years, yet it is not developed any further. After some coverage of the stolid consistency of British policy attitudes towards missile defence Stocker quotes another academic to say ‘Given this consistency…we should perhaps begin to question the value of conventional historical and documentary accounts of “commanding heights” defence decision making. A more holistic view of working-level policy implementation…may be more useful’ (Moore, 2001, cited in ibid, p.214). Just such a holistic view of the policy formulation process, incorporating the agency of traditional ‘commanding heights’ government bureaucracies with the structural influences of international relations and domestic politics in a dynamic process of feedback and synergy, is the key strength of the SRA. Using the SRA would have offered Stocker an explanation of the consistency of Britain’s policy on BMD by showing that this was due to the long-term structural pressure on the British government to maintain its alliance with the US in order to maximise the UK’s security, while at the same time accommodating voters’ desires to see Britain as a powerful military country, but also recognizing that the latent hostility of the British electorate towards missile defence allowed the government some leeway to maintain a detached commitment to involving the UK too deeply in the system.

2.1.5 The Strategy of Missile Defence (2011)

As its title suggests, this short RUSI article is not just another historical account of BMD developments over the years, but is instead an exposition of Stocker’s assessment of the strategic strengths of US missile defence in general and the UK’s involvement in it. The central argument of the paper is clearly stated: ‘missile defence can provide deterrence by denial in addition to long-established nuclear retaliatory capabilities for deterrence by punishment’ (Stocker, 2011, p.61). This piece is also informative because it was published in 2011 and so illustrates Stocker’s views on the strategic possibilities enabled by missile defence just after the end of the last Labour government when a relatively more developed BMD system was in place compared to his last publication in 2004.
Stocker begins his article by explaining that missile defence is necessary because the expertise to develop missile technology is spreading beyond the nuclear powers. Ballistic missiles are attractive to proliferators because they are so hard to intercept, and states that cannot match their enemies in traditional armaments see missiles as a short cut to parity.

Stocker then moves on to criticise pure BMD advocacy. He argues that missile defence is only one aspect of nuclear security since the proliferation of missile technology is actually mostly still focused on delivering conventional explosives, so a range of responses to this proliferation beyond the massively destructive threat of nuclear deterrence are required (Stocker, 2011, p.58). Yet as Stocker points out: ‘Recognition that traditional threats of retaliation are not always adequate or appropriate does not mean that deterrence has had its day’. Stocker argues against the assertion that missile defence is the ‘conceptual opposite of deterrence’, since it counters an attack that has not been deterred, by stating that a mixed response to missile threats is more effective than either alone (ibid). Classical nuclear deterrence by ‘punishment’ will still be needed to deter certain kinds of actors, but deterrence by denial is where missile defence comes into its own as it denies the adversary the certainty that their attack will work, or at least complicates their calculations (ibid).

Another benefit of missile defence is that it allows a step down from full nuclear deterrence when the stakes are too high. Nuclear weapons are so powerful that the game of bluff they require may be called over relatively less serious scenarios. Would a nuclear weapons state really commit to launch over a relatively minor incident? If not, does this not undermine their whole defensive posture? ‘Nuclear retaliation has a strictly limited application’, says Stocker (ibid). In such a situation ‘The ability to defeat (rather than avenge) a limited nuclear attack’ becomes attractive (ibid, p.59). Circumstances might arise where the threat of all out nuclear war might not be believed, but defeat of the attack might (ibid). Missile defence therefore allows for a proportionate response.

A further strategic aspect of missile defence is that it undermines other nations’ potential abilities to deny the US freedom of action (ibid). In this reading, countries build nuclear missiles not so much to intimidate others, but to restrict the US from intervening directly inside a rogue state, or in the countries or theatres that the US might want to protect from a rogue state. However, the point is made that missile defence is not meant to deter peer competitors like Russia who have missiles in
numbers that could overwhelm any missile defence, but technologically inferior countries like North Korea and Iran (ibid, 56).

After the strategic criticisms of BMD are made, technical criticisms of missile defence are raised. In missile technology the technical and financial advantage lies with the offence because it is usually easier to defeat defences than to defend against attack (ibid, 60). This can be done through overwhelming force or the deployment of countermeasures. However, this matters less with less powerful nations as they have such modest nuclear arsenals that even a limited missile defence could neutralize their missiles. Stocker draws on British government sources to make the point again; missile defence is not an alternative to deterrence, ‘missile defence should be regarded as complementary to other forms of defence or response, potentially reinforcing nuclear deterrence rather than superseding it’ (HM Government, 2006, cited in ibid, p.60). The missile defence option should raise the threshold for nuclear retaliation and reduce the effectiveness of nuclear attack. However, although it is unlikely that a missile defence paradigm will overtake the nuclear offence paradigm, it could rule out threats by less-than-peer competitors. As Stocker puts it: ‘Defence options cannot fully overcome the inherent uncertainty of deterrence, but they may mitigate a failure of deterrence’ (ibid).

In terms of the diplomatic implications of BMD, Stocker was in favour of the ABM Treaty while it lasted, but he believes that the bipolar logic of international relations outlived its usefulness after the end of the Cold War (ibid, p.57). However, Stocker argues that BMD nevertheless can still play a positive role in current arms control endeavors. Established nuclear powers could reduce their nuclear arsenals because they have a shield, and potential proliferators might be put off in the first place because – and here he cites former Labour Foreign Secretary Jack Straw in 2002 – it raises their ‘cost of entry’ into the nuclear arena if they also have a missile shield to contend with (Straw, 2002, cited in ibid, p.61). BMD could also help prevent allies (like Japan) from developing nuclear weapons as they could potentially come under the protection of the US’s missile shield (ibid). Yet later on he challenges European nations to step up and provide a greater contribution to missile defence. NATO’s role is ‘in integrating US capabilities in sensors, missiles, communications and command and control with European capabilities such as they are’ (ibid). Missile defence also raises questions about just what level of minimum nuclear deterrence a state like the UK or US might require? Whatever it is, missile defence could push this minimum
even lower. All this shows that Stocker definitely wants to see nuclear weapons reduced, and that BMD can supplement diplomatic efforts to do this.

Overall, and interestingly, Stocker employs a quotation from Tony Blair in 2001 to define the role missile defence could play in protecting the UK: ‘It is important to tackle all these potential threats with a comprehensive strategy that includes arms control, counter-proliferation, diplomacy, deterrence and defensive measures. We understand the role that missile defence can play as one element of a comprehensive strategy’ (Blair, 2001, cited in ibid). Put together, Stocker argues these different components perhaps form a new ‘strategic triad’ of diplomacy, deterrence and defence.

One of the main criticisms of this document is the absence of any public opinion in the major policy proposals Stocker puts forward. In Stocker’s paper it is as though this whole policy discussion takes place only between elites on either side of the Atlantic. What British, American or European citizens think about missile defence is not included. All of these countries are democracies, at least formally via the ballot box the public have a say in how they want their government to pursue missile defence or not. Each national bloc is presented by Stocker as monolithic in their stances towards missile defence; either pro, anti, or acting as an intermediary in the UK’s case. By excluding the democratic pressures arising from the changing opinions of voters on missile defence, Stocker’s analysis overlooks an important dynamic that influences and alters states’ policies on BMD: an especially important factor in the British case where a nuanced analysis of the balance between public opinion and the Labour government’s BMD policy requires an account of the possibility that the Labour government could afford to over-ride latent public opposition to BMD because it remained such a minority concern for most of the British public (Ipsos-MORI, 2001; Ipsos-MORI, 2015), while acknowledging that the Labour government also needed to suppress parliamentary scrutiny of its BMD decisions to ensure that the missile defence debate in the UK remained that way (HoC Deb, 2003c, c697; HoC Deb, 2007h, c71WS). This oversight does not come across as an arrogant dismissal of the public’s thoughts on the benefits or otherwise of missile defence, more as an example of deeply embedded assumptions about how the US and UK policy elites make defence policy in general, let alone on BMD, in which even the very idea of public participation simply does not arise.

There is also no engagement with the argument that missile defence is an
aggressive technology through which the US could intervene unilaterally against nuclear-armed states in the pursuit of its own power interests rather than for security (Carter and Schwartz, 1984, p.46). Indeed, this point links back to the previous discussion about the impact of the changing dynamics of public opinion on missile defence policy. For anti-BMD pressure groups, such as CND, who seek to mobilize citizens’ protests against missile defence, the ‘BMD in pursuit of American Empire’ thesis is one of their main criticisms (CND, 2009a). Even from a ‘realist’ perspective there is the potential for the UK to become embroiled in missile defence as a ‘fig leaf’ for US adventurism that would not necessarily serve the UK’s interests well if it undermined the UK’s minimal nuclear deterrence by leading to nuclear proliferation (HoC Deb, 2000j, c105; HoC Deb, 2000f, c364). These are critiques which need countering if Stocker’s advocacy of the UK’s involvement in missile defence is to be robust and convincing.

2.1.6 Overall Conclusion

Stocker’s body of work is clearly the most detailed compendium of British missile defence policy there is. It is incredibly deeply researched, with a particularly rich grasp of the technical aspects of BMD development and function. Equally impressive is Stocker’s ability to take what could be dry data and committee meeting reports and craft it into a readable and engaging narrative. Stocker’s work is a sound foundation upon which to continue investigating the last Labour government’s policy on BMD. This work needs to continue, Stocker’s last major work covering events up to 2002 was published in 2004, leaving a further 8 years of the last Labour government’s BMD policy to be analysed.

It is clear that Stocker is not an out-and-out evangelist for the UK’s involvement in missile defence. He sees it as one more tool in securing the UK’s defence alongside traditional nuclear deterrence and arms control diplomacy. The main reasons for his qualified support of the UK’s role in BMD is that it allows a less than nuclear response to a limited nuclear attack and, more importantly, by working with the Americans on missile defence the UK helps to strengthen the strategic alliance between the two nations which is much to the overall benefit of the UK’s security.
One might say that Stocker does well not to reveal his political allegiances in his writings. He is obviously not a unilateralist or a warmonger, but placing him in the more mainstream bandwidths of left and right is difficult. Occasionally he does refer to parliamentary debates on BMD, but he does not noticeably take sides. His natural stance on Britain’s integration into BMD would seem to be close to the Conservatives, yet he often quotes Labour Ministers and Tony Blair’s comments on BMD approvingly.

Stocker’s work uses a strategic narrative, not a political one. Governments of different political shades come in and out of office during this book, but they feature more like actors coming on and off stage, taking decisions according to the national security ‘script’ they are presented with in order to maximise the defence of the nation, rather than due to their own internal political aims. For example, decisions made by the Labour government on BMD are examined in some detail in the later chapters of this work, but everything is couched within purely strategic considerations. There is no examination of the internal political process by which Labour came to its decisions and how electoral calculations may have influenced this. There is no role for the public in his analysis.

The difficulty in classifying Stocker’s particular theoretical stance on international relations through a reading of his works alone – though the English School seems quite a close match due to his apparent support for power maximization coupled with the maintenance of international social norms – is backed up by a personal interview with Stocker undertaken for this thesis, which confirms his aversion to excessive theorizing (Stocker, 2017). However, by bringing in domestic electoral influences to the facts that Stocker has already uncovered, the SRA would provide a much more holistic explanation of Labour’s policy on missile defence than Stocker’s sole focus on international strategic pressures acting on small policy elites does.

2.2 The Outer Core Texts

Outside of the core texts are another handful of sources which refer to the last Labour government’s BMD policy. These are: Mark Smith’s article for the journal of Contemporary Security Policy, Britain: Balancing Instinctive Atlanticism, What Price British Influence? (2005), two entries from the Acronym Institute for Disarmament
Diplomacy; *Tony Blair and the Decisions to Back Missile defence* (2003c) by Nicola Butler and *Labour Government Faces Tough Questioning on Missile Defence* (2001) by Lorna Richardson, and finally House of Commons Standard Note 4664, *UK Participation in US Missile Defence* (Taylor, 2008). However, just like with Stocker’s work, none of them have the specific aim of covering Labour’s BMD policy. Of the four sources mentioned here, three of them are analytical – two of which are critically so – and one is descriptive. The analytical pieces are useful because they approach the UK’s BMD policy from different perspectives to Stocker’s works. The descriptive source is also packed with information as it covers the British government’s BMD policies up to 2008.

The two pieces from the Acronym Institute for Disarmament Diplomacy, a research and advocacy organization working on arms control and disarmament issues, are highly critical of BMD. The positions it takes against missile defence can be seen as emblematic of other organizations who are in outright opposition to missile defence.

### 2.2.1 Britain: Balancing ‘Instinctive Atlanticism’ (2005)

Mark Smith’s *Britain: Balancing ‘Instinctive Atlanticism’* is a classic example of the incidental coverage of the last Labour government’s BMD policy as a vehicle for analyzing something else. In this case, the main focus is how the UK balances its defence commitments to the US and the EU. The fact that the government in power at the time was a Labour one is incidental.

Smith appears to base his analysis in a constructivist framework in which a states’ perceptions of the nature of international society and its place within it are socially constructed (Neack, 2014, p.18). He seems to be saying that the UK’s perception of itself, its own self-esteem and standing in the world compel it to make certain decisions. He talks about the way in which the UK expresses its own ‘defence identity’, that it has its own ‘strategic culture’ (Smith, 2005, p.448).

The premise of Smith’s article is that the UK has a distinctive strategic culture of ‘Instinctive Atlanticism’; an inclination to side with and support the US (ibid). However, this stance generates tension over the issue of BMD because at the same time the British government has shown ambivalence over becoming too deeply involved in the system, a position much closer to that of its fellow European nations than to the US (ibid).
Smith states there are four decisive factors influencing Britain’s BMD policy. The first of these is that missile defence is an Anglo-American issue because RAF Fylingdales is part of the detection system for protecting the US from missile attack. Secondly, missile defence is a ‘small-a Alliance’ issue for the UK in its relationship with the US because BMD is another example of the UK participating in an informal ‘coalition of the willing’ type military project with the United States. Third, missile defence is a ‘Capital-A Alliance’ issue for the UK in its relationship with NATO because the UK has a major role in NATO and there were questions about how BMD would fit into the command structure of European NATO member states. Finally, missile defence is a major investment issue for the UK defence industry, even if this is only in terms of gaining contracts to build BMD equipment for the US, not Britain (ibid, p.447).

He then outlines three key ‘self-understandings’ that Britain holds about its role in the world which shape its foreign policy decisions, including those on BMD. The first of these is what Smith calls the ‘Anglo-American’ relationship, and ‘Atlanticism’ (Smith, 2005). This seems analogues to what might more commonly be called the Special Relationship. Smith says this Atlanticism itself has four components: (1) the presence of the US as a major security guarantor in Europe; (2) Atlanticism is a political state mind that produces policies in accordance with this worldview; (3) a tendency to regard the maintenance of the US’s security involvement in Europe as an end in itself (ibid, pp.448-9).

The second self-understanding is that of the UK remaining a global power even though lacking global power projection. This means the UK working to maintain the Anglo-American bond in order to maximize its own power, while also using whatever influence it can to keep US interests in line with British ones (ibid, p.449).

Nuclear weapons form the third self-understanding. They are understood as being necessary for the UK to be seen as a great power and to ‘punch above its weight’ (ibid).

These three self-understandings link together and are self-reinforcing. However, Smith says that the fourth self-understanding stands independently of them. It is the UK’s perception of itself as being a European nation. This is expressed in the British preference for arms control and multilateralism, which is a result of, like other European nations, the contraction of Britain’s global power which forces it to favour
methods of maintaining stability based on those other than raw military strength, such as international treaties (ibid, p.450).

These self-understandings form the basic coordinates for how Britain perceives threats such as missile defence and how to deal with them.

To summarise, Smith states that three changes in the international environment led to a ‘limited’ change in British missile defence policy: opportunities for British defence companies, potential NATO-wide BMD application, and the ending of the ABM Treaty (ibid, pp.464-5). If he was being more concise, however, Smith might have condensed this environmental change down to the election of George W. Bush. For it was under Bush that these developments took place spurring on the UK’s shift in policy.

Smith claims that the lack of a direct missile threat to the UK means that the need to maintain a good relationship with the US by agreeing to American requests for the RAF Fylingdales upgrade was a greater influence than proliferation (ibid). This would back up the government’s own SDR, which stated that the missile threat to Britain was still many years away.

He cites the influence of the British military establishment’s view that in a straight cost benefit analysis Trident is much less expensive than developing a whole new missile defence system (ibid). What influence the defence industry may exert comes from wanting to make the sure the UK government maintains good access for British defence companies on US missile defence R&D contracts (ibid, p.449).

Smith then tries to predict where British missile defence policy is likely to go. His first theme is inertia (ibid). He sees little reason for UK BMD policy to change radically if the pressures influencing it have not caused it to do so already. His second theme is pragmatism. British missile defence policy is made in response to what is happening around it rather than according to a grand plan. He writes that the defining influence of this pragmatism is the US. Whatever the US asks of the UK in regards to missile defence, the UK will do. These predictions bear out. In 2007 the British government agreed to US requests to upgrade RAF Menwith Hill so it could play a role in BMD (HoC Deb, 2007f, c894W). Also that year, the British government lobbied to get interceptor missiles based in the UK, but was unsuccessful (HoC Deb, 2007k, c919).

The main strength of Smith’s article is the way in which it sets out the key ‘self-understandings’ of Britain’s role in the world and then applies these to explain
how they frame the UK’s missile defence policy. However, just as with Stocker’s work there is no examination of the influence public opinion might bring to bear on Britain’s BMD policy. Even when comments appear about the (lack of) parliamentary influence on Britain’s BMD policy, and the continuity of Britain’s missile defence policy from one government to the next, there is no discussion of the way in which public opinion might be influencing MPs to vote in ways that maintain this consistency. It is as though Parliament just exists of its own volition, not that it is made of individuals chosen by electors who may have a particular opinion on BMD and want to see their representatives vote on it in particular ways.

The notion of British missile defence policy being closer to the European model than the American (ibid, p.465) does not ring true. Yes, throughout the late 90s the UK line was to encourage the US to keep the ABM Treaty, yet once Bush came to power this position was soon dropped. One of the most controversial statements in Smith’s paper is where he states that the main purpose of British defence policy was to maintain the security of the US. Therefore the British government would have been more than happy to host American interceptor missiles if it had been offered because it would have strengthened the transatlantic alliance and gained the UK protection from a cutting edge technology for little cost (Smith, 2005, p.461).

2.2.2 Labour Government Faces Tough Questioning on Missile Defence (2001)

This Acronym article by Lorna Richardson focuses on opposition to the government’s BMD policy from within the Labour Party, the PLP and the trade union movement shortly after the general election of 2001. It is mostly descriptive, although incredibly informative, and there is some analysis.

During the election itself, missile defence was ‘all but invisible’ (Richardson, 2001). After the election there was a cabinet reshuffle which placed more pro-US MPs in the Foreign and Defence ministries. Many questions were asked in Parliament by Labour MPs trying to pin down a clearer picture of what the government’s plans actually were towards missile defence. However, ‘Throughout these exchanges, the government's view of the almost automatic correctness of the US threat assessment was made clear’ (ibid).
There were several EDMs sponsored and signed by Labour MPs condemning missile defence and any British involvement in it. Seven major Labour affiliated trades union’s secretaries signed a letter to the Guardian stating they considered it ‘wholly inappropriate’ for the government to support US plans for missile defence because it would encourage proliferation, and withdrawal from the ABM Treaty would undermine international faith in treaties in general (ibid).

It is clear to see from Richardson’s article that BMD was a highly divisive issue for Labour. It had the latent potential to tear apart the Party in much the same way as unilateral nuclear disarmament did in the 1980s. This perhaps goes some way to explaining why the Labour leadership never went for a vote in the House of Commons on Britain’s participation on missile defence; the government could have found itself with a rebellion on its hands in the House and division within the wider Party and trade unions, potentially igniting the latent opposition to missile defence among a wider section of the general public (CND, 2008c) and ultimately damaging the government’s electoral standing.

Again, Richardson puts forward the idea that ‘the moment has now arrived for missile defence’ (ibid). Supposedly, because the election was over it was now the time for principled opponents in Parliament and society to push forward their arguments against missile defence. This shows that the opposition itself was also convinced of the imminence of missile defence, when in fact, as usual, it was forever delayed.

Although Richardson does bring in extra-parliamentary actors such as the trade union, there is no mention of the role of public opinion as a counter to the government’s BMD policy, particularly the way in which the Labour government had to navigate the British public’s desire for a strong national defence policy stance in general but opposition to missile defence in particular (Reifler et al., 2011; CND, 2008b; CND, 2008c). This leaves out what could have been an important influence on the government’s calculations towards missile defence policy.

In her conclusion, Richardson asserts that ‘The inescapable fact, however, is that missile defence deployment would have a devastating impact on almost every aspect of the global non-proliferation regime’ (ibid). Yet, in hindsight, it did not. Her closing line is that ‘Parliament has an important role to play in the outcome of this drama’ (ibid). This is quite a poignant statement. What Richardson could not know was that at the critical moment to come, when BMD could have been debated, Parliament was totally bypassed, as the next article now covers.

Nicola Butler’s article for the Acronym Institute is highly critical of Labour’s BMD policy up to the year 2003. It claims that the volte-face in the government’s stance on missile defence from supporting the ABM Treaty to agreeing to the upgrades of RAF Fylingdales shows how craven the British government was to US demands. The ‘price’ paid was the over-riding of public and parliamentary debate and the abandonment the UK’s prior commitment to non-proliferation (Butler, 2003). It claims that this turn of events illustrates something highly negative at the heart of the Special Relationship.

One section in particular mounts a detailed critique of the MoD’s Ballistic Missile Defence: A Public Discussion Paper. The first criticism Butler makes is that the Defence Secretary Geoff Hoon had earlier stated there was ‘no significant threat to the UK from ballistic missiles’ (House of Commons, 2000, cited in ibid), whereas the discussion paper states there is ‘no immediate significant threat to the UK from ballistic missiles’ [emphasis added] (MoD, 2002, cited in ibid). Butler claims this allowed the government to maintain there had been no overall change in policy while allowing an opening through which future missile defence commitments from the UK might be required.

Butler says that the MoD paper is clearly biased in favour of missile defence. She notes that it is presented as being ‘value for money’, when the costs have not been quantified. Butler argues that unsubstantiated statements on the supposed cheapness of BMD are ‘misleading’, and ‘appear designed to deter parliamentary debate’ as MPs would normally debate projects requiring large investments (Butler, 2003).

The argument that BMD would bring large contracts for British defence companies is also doubted by Butler. She argues that missile defence is dominated by US contractors and that in the 1980s British contracts for ‘Star Wars’ R&D were limited.

She then quotes Hoon’s statement on BMD as ‘a defensive system that threatens no one’ (MoD, 2003, cited in ibid), and counters that the Bush administration itself intends the system to be used in conjunction with US offensive forces, including nuclear weapons. Indeed, Butler states this mix of offensive and defensive use is
mentioned in the MoD paper because the UK needs the ability ‘to intervene in regional crises’.

Butler reserves her most serious condemnation for the price at which supposed ‘influence’ with the US was bought at the expense of parliamentary scrutiny (Butler, 2003). She calls the MoD discussion paper ‘not so much a serious attempt to inform and foster public debate as a PR document that could have been written by the US Missile Defense Agency’, intended ‘not so much to stimulate debate as to stifle it’ (ibid). And further, that the way it was released in December 2002 before Parliament’s Christmas recess, with the decision to allow upgrades of RAF Fylingdales announced in February 2003, was one of a number of classic ‘curtailment' devices, used by the government to avoid scrutiny of missile defence policy, included making major policy statements just as the House was about to go into recess, dripping out information bit by bit whilst refusing to answer parliamentary questions, and refusing requests for a full debate’ (ibid).

Turning back to the article’s original proposition, Butler claims that the only explanation for the government’s shift in BMD policy between 2000 and February 2001, when in essence Blair endorsed Bush’s missile defence plans after their first meeting, is the change of US President: ‘On missile defence…policy is driven not by public and parliamentary opinion in the UK, but by the perceived need for alignment with the United States’ (ibid). Butler argues that Downing Street realised that Bush was going to go ahead with missile defence no matter what other countries thought and therefore the UK would have to go along with it regardless of parliamentary or public opinion, ‘but might also perhaps gain some influence with the US in the process of acquiescence’ (ibid).

Butler quotes Blair’s speech from 2003 where he said the first principle of Britain’s foreign policy must be to ‘remain the closest ally of the US, and as allies influence them to continue broadening their agenda...it is massively in our self-interest to remain close allies’ (Blair, 2003, cited in ibid). Against this, Butler argues ‘the purported 'influence' gained for Britain often seems intangible and nebulous, woefully inadequate to the task of inducing beneficial corrections to the course of American strategy’ (Butler, 2003).

Butler’s statement that the British government’s BMD policy was driven by the need to stay close to the US, rather than from any push from the public or Parliament, is highly perceptive. However, because it is possible to take this view one
step further and state that the UK’s support for missile defence was *not even to do with missile proliferation*. Instead, the greater threat to Britain’s national security would come from not complying with the US’s wishes and creating a rift between the UK and its main security guarantor. This could come from any issue over which Britain and America might disagree, in this case it happened to be BMD.

We see how a change in Ministers in the FCO and MoD over time shifted the government’s position on missile defence. Robin Cook and Peter Hain in the Foreign Office were in favour of the ABM Treaty, as was Geoffrey Robertson in Defence. However, with the replacement of Robertson with Hoon as Defence Secretary and Straw at the Foreign Office, a new alignment of pro-BMD Secretaries came into place (ibid).

Butler says that the way in which Parliament was bypassed on missile defence is typical of how defence issues are treated in the UK. Her statement that despite a large majority the government did not go for a debate and vote on missile defence because it would have shown Blair and Hoon as being closer to the Conservatives than to many of their own MPs has some truth to it (ibid). With an election looming, why bother causing a massive row within the PLP over an issue which bleeds into all the Labour weak points like nuclear disarmament, just when the Labour leadership had spent so much energy trying to convince the electorate that Labour was now strong and united in its defence policy? Why bother risking fall out over BMD if ministerial prerogative got the job done just as well? Missile defence was to be debated at the 2001 Labour Party Conference but it was sidelined because of 9/11 (Financial Times, 2001, cited in ibid).

Again, though, the same structural weakness appears in Butler’s analysis: to whom would such a division over missile defence be highlighted to but the public? It is clear that the public must play a role here, since they would be the ones electing the government in the first place, so their opinions on BMD are important. Yet there is no discussion of the role of public opinion as an influence on the government’s BMD policy in this piece. It is all framed in terms of the UK’s power relationship with the US in a world of threats. Ironically, although this is a critical piece it takes a strongly realist line on defence.
2.2.4 UK Participation in US Missile Defence (2010)

The final source in the outer core texts to be briefly examined is the House of Commons Standard Note 4664, *UK Participation in US Missile Defence*, published in November 2010. The particular strength of this document is that it takes developments right up to 2008 and is packed with detail. Although it must again be stated that its main aim is to cover the British government’s missile defence policy, the fact it was a Labour government is incidental. It offers a solid narrative of how British policy towards US missile defence had developed since the 1998 Strategic Defence Review up to 2008, though it also contains background information going back to the 1960s. Standard Notes are intended to get MPs up to speed on aspects of government policy, and so are neutral in their coverage. The most important development it covers up to 2008 is the upgrade to RAF Menwith Hill in 2007 (Taylor, 2008, p.4). It is incredibly useful as a source of statements from Defence and Foreign Secretaries, Select Committees, MPs and the Opposition.

2.2.5 Overall Conclusion

The ‘outer core’ texts are an invaluable source of information for fleshing out the last Labour government’s BMD policy. Smith’s article looks at the influence of the Special Relationship on the government’s actions towards BMD. Richardson notes the divisions the government’s policy choices created in the PLP and wider Labour movement. Butler criticizes the way the government made decisions on British involvement in BMD by bypassing parliamentary and public debate. The Standard Note covers British BMD policy developments up to 2008, longer than any other source.

There are some themes common to all of them, however. They all stress the dominance of the US over the UK, and argue that the government’s BMD policy was a means to an end for maintaining the alliance with the US. They all focus on policy elites.

Although the outer texts are all works in their own right, it seems impossible not to compare them to Stocker’s output. Actually, if a researcher only relied on Stocker’s work they would miss out on several important features of Labour’s BMD policy. Firstly, they would not pick up on any critical views on BMD. The depth of research in the Acronym articles is a feature common to most of the literature
produced by organizations opposed to BMD (Butler, 2013). They are often better sources of information than those arguing in favour of missile defence.

It is also refreshing that a broad spread of theoretical outlooks can be seen in the outer texts, even if the authors do not explicitly state them. These range from constructivism, to neorealism to liberalism. The Acronym papers seem to be coming from a classical liberal standpoint on international relations. Their critique is of hard power relations between states; BMD is just another example of this mistaken worldview, whereas truly peaceful relations between nations comes through international documents such as the ABM Treaty and the promotion of rules-based norms like non-proliferation advocacy.

The main criticism of the outer texts is that none of them bring the public in to their analyses. Smith’s article is working at the ‘unit level’ of international relations between states, and although the Acronym articles take a domestic level viewpoint, they still do not mention public opinion anywhere. This is a major oversight in both cases, since they are missing out on a key influence which in a democracy must surely have a bearing on the making of defence policy. Another criticism of the outer texts, not in themselves but in terms of the wider thesis, is that none of them have the goal of examining the last Labour government’s BMD policy specifically, instead they are all vehicles for examining some other hypothesis, and so the task of addressing this issue still needs to be done.

2.3 The Background Literature

The next section of the review examines those sources that rarely mention BMD themselves, but provide context to the last Labour government’s policy decisions on missile defence. The themes common to several texts are condensed under each heading.

The first subsection focuses on New Labour’s defence and security policy; the key themes that underpinned it, and the foreign policy outlooks of Tony Blair and Gordon Brown.

The literature covering New Labour’s defence and foreign policy during 1997-2010, is quite substantial. There is a solid academic literature with several recurrent themes: the importance of Blair himself; the UK’s relationship with Europe, the US and NATO; Britain’s role in the world; the ethical dimension to foreign policy and, of
course, the war on terror (Beech and Lee, 2008; Cornish and Dorman, 2009; Corthorn and Davis, 2012; Daddow and Gaskarth, 2011; Lunn, 2008; Kettell, 2011; Little and Wickham-Jones, 2000; Roche, 2011; Vickers, 2003; 2011; Williams, 2006; Haines, 2010).

Chief among these sources is The Development of British Defence Policy: Blair, Brown and Beyond (2010), edited by David Brown, which as the name and year of publication suggests, gives excellent coverage of the issues listed above. However, BMD only makes two appearances in this book, both of them in James Sperling’s chapter on ‘The Anglo-American Security Relationship’, which fleetingly mentions missile defence in regards to cooperation between British and American defence companies over missile defence R&D (Sperling, 2010). This illustrates how little BMD has featured in analyses of Labour’s foreign and defence policy.

The overarching theme of these texts is the Labour government’s acceptance of the use of force in world affairs. Moreover, in a world in which the Westphalian idea of inviolable sovereign nation states was breaking down (Haines, 2010), the UK had not just the military capability but also the moral duty to uphold the values of the international community by intervening against regimes killing their own citizens (Dyson, 2009, p.60). Although it is nowhere mentioned in this literature, it can be seen how BMD would fit with this particular foreign policy outlook by allowing the UK to intervene alongside the US against rogue states who were flouting international law without the fear of nuclear reprisal.

It is undeniable that the figure of Tony Blair dominates the literature on Labour’s last term of office. Anyone trying to research any particular New Labour policy would find this, but within the literature on defence and foreign policy it is overwhelming. Most of the sources covering Blair’s time as PM are focused on the foreign interventions taken under his leadership (Casey, 2009; Dyson, 2009; Mumford and Selck, 2010; Naughtie, 2004; Seldon, 2001; Haines, 2010).

The typology of the literature includes a much greater proportion of ‘popular’ books written by journalists. This is probably because the story of a build-up to war is more interesting to a lay audience than academic analysis. These works make the subject more accessible, but methodologically they lack the academic rigour of full referencing. They tell many interesting anecdotes from unattributed sources, and so one is unsure whether these claims are true or not (Naughtie, 2004; Riddell, 2003). Many facts are asserted without any referencing. This is not to claim that statements
are being invented, but perhaps the full context of being able to look up the original source would make things clearer.

So, what claims does this literature make? That Blair has a messianic drive, that he had an especially close relationship with George Bush (Dyson, 2009, p.82), that Blair’s foreign policy outlook was interventionist (Plant, 2008).

There are some direct mentions of Blair’s thoughts on BMD outside of the academic literature. Prior to their first meeting, Blair told Forbes magazine: ‘This is definitely in the box marked ‘Handle with care’’ (Forbes, 2001). When asked in Parliament if he supported BMD, he replied: ‘I do not agree with those who are opposed to it’ (Department of the Official Report (Hansard), 2001).

From these statements we start to see how Blair’s worldview might support the UK’s involvement in BMD by, again, allowing a shield from under which the UK might intervene against rogue states.

In contrast, the literature on Gordon Brown’s foreign policy outlook is more limited and less bold in its assertions. The main points made are that Brown’s foreign policy was largely similar to Blair’s (Seldon and Lodge, 2011, p.26), but that under him the Special Relationship was strained. Brown was more focused on the reform of international institutions in an effort to promote global economic growth and development, coupled with an especial focus on education for the very poorest in developing nations (Vickers, 2011, p.211). There was some hope among some academics such as Professor Paul Rogers that Brown could have changed Britain’s foreign policy direction. His paper on Brown’s future direction does also have a section on BMD, which laments Brown’s commitment to the upgrade of RAF Menwith Hill as a sign of the status quo carrying on (Rogers, 2007). There is a difference in tone on Brown’s defence posture too; it is much more low key. For example, with Brown’s Foreign Secretary David Miliband the ‘Special Relationship’ became ‘our most important bilateral relationship’ (Brown, 2010, p.217). Nor did Brown use the term ‘the war on terror’ (Vickers, 2011, p.204).

The only sources that mentions Brown referring to missile defence at all are a Channel 4 News webpage and Atlantic Council article which quote Brown welcoming Obama’s decision to cancel the BMD Third Site for Poland in 2009 (Channel 4 News, 2009b; Office of the Press Secretary, 2009a; Joyner, 2009).
The second subsection examines the literature surrounding the Labour government’s relationship with the US, the EU and NATO, and, where it is mentioned, how this related to missile defence.

The Special Relationship is examined first because it takes precedent over Britain’s other international alliances. The first thing to note in the literature is that there is a major area of contention over whether such a thing as the ‘Special Relationship’ exists at all (Wallace and Phillips, 2009). The empirical and theoretical differences between authors’ views on this manifest themselves in semantic differences about what to call this phenomenon. Some capitalise it, some put it in ironical quotation marks, others both and some neither (Bowen, 2001; Gordon, 2001; Hughes, 2006; Smith, 2005). There is also some debate over whether the US values or believes in the Special Relationship more than the UK does (Dumbrell, 2009). There is discussion about what benefits this Special Relationship brings to the UK. Is it one-sided or a genuine partnership (Wallace and Phillips, 2009, p.270)? Is the UK nothing more than a poodle (Richter, 2004, p.167)? Can the UK really influence the US or is it just a delusion? Much of the literature alleges that the Special Relationship suffered in the transition from Blair to Brown (Dumbrell, 2009, p.64).

As covered in the outer core texts section, Mark Smith’s Instinctive Atlanticism analyses the Special Relationship using BMD as a case study. The only other source outside of this is a brief mention by Terence Casey in his The Blair Legacy, in which he mentions that missile defence is another tie between the two countries (2009, p.274).

The literature on BMD and the EU largely focuses on the difference of opinion between European leaders and the US government (Hildreath and Ek, 2010; Ranger, 2002). The basic argument is that the US is in favour of BMD, while the EU is against (Gray, 2002, p.279). Europeans have a different security perspective to the US as they are much closer to threats and are more tolerant of them, hence they prefer diplomacy to military solutions (Stocker, 2004c, p.13). Yet the US needs Europe to site its BMD interceptors so the system works (Ranger et al., 2002, p.44).

It is actually hard to establish if there was an official EU position on BMD. For the EU to develop its own missile defence system would have been technically and politically impossible (Stocker, 2004b, p.23). However, when BMD was made a NATO-wide project the EU did not object to this; the small size and proximity of European states made a multilateral approach the most feasible (ibid, p.65). As ever,
the opportunities for European industry to play a part in the missile defence project were also seen as too good to pass by (European Parliament, 2007, p.45).

Caught between the US and the EU over BMD was the British Labour government. Blair wanted to make sure that Britain played a strong role in Europe, acting as a bridge between Europe and the US, at the same time influencing the US to take heed of its European allies (Vickers, 2011, p.175). Anthony Seldon’s *The Blair Effect* (2001) is one of the few books outside of the core texts that makes any reference to missile defence at all. There is a short passage stating that the ‘main transatlantic difficulty Blair faced [was] national missile defence’ (p.301). BMD was a problem for most EU governments as it seemed like an unreliable solution that could cause arguments with Russia over the ABM Treaty. The Blair administration’s response was to ‘ask polite questions in public without moving to condemnation, while hoping the problem might go away’ (ibid, p.302). It is alleged that because of its support for the ABM Treaty, Britain’s position on BMD was closer to the EU’s than the US’s (Smith, 2005, p.448). However, ultimately the UK sided with the US over BMD (Sperling, 2010).

The literature covering NATO is often the same as that covering the EU. There is an overlap here of course because EU members are also members of NATO. The literature also points out how as part of Labour’s modernisation the Party recommitted itself to staying in NATO (Vickers, 2011, p.160). Just as with the EU, New Labour maintained that the UK could be an upstanding member of NATO and the EU. Although there is some debate as to whether the UK does act as a bridge between the US and NATO, or a wedge ensuring that the EU never gains military strength of its own (Sperling, 2010).

Apart from official NATO documents on its decision to officially integrate BMD into NATO’s command structure in 2010 (NATO, 2010), there is scant mention of missile defence directly. What comes across in the literature is how much NATO is controlled by the US. The opinion forms that the US was using NATO leverage to get European NATO members to acquiesce to BMD, but that there would be no question of the opposite taking place; of European nations using the NATO structure to get the US to abandon BMD. It is insinuated that the European nations free ride on their commitments to NATO, and this relates to BMD, too (Stocker, 2011, p.61).

The final subsection summarises the literature covering the domestic electoral pressures which led to the creation of New Labour. This is important because this
transformation included a wholesale reassessment of Labour’s defence policy in order to appeal to a wider range of voters by making it much more pro-defence. This shift to a more militaristic outlook helps to explain Labour’s policy on missile defence. This section also looks at the literature surrounding the evolution of the Labour Party’s nuclear weapons policy, which can be seen as a precursor to its prevarications over BMD. The intention is to show how there is cross over between the domestic and international levels of politics.

This literature has two main components. The first concerns why Labour needed to move to the centre ground (Chadwick and Heffernan, 2003; Cronin, 2004), the second relates to how this was done (Fielding, 2002; Heath et al., 2001). This literature is similar to that which covers Labour’s foreign and defence policy, however the focus is on Labour’s poor electoral performance and how this eventually led to internal reform and the rise of New Labour. Importantly, there is some cross-over with defence issues as these texts discuss defence as an electoral liability for Labour, particularly over nuclear disarmament (Gould, 2011).

What is particularly interesting about this literature is that there are accounts from insiders and instigators of this modernisation process. Chief among these, figuratively and literally, is the account by Labour’s head political consultant and advertising agent Philip Gould (2011), followed by Peter Mandelson (2002). While they give a first-hand account, it is important to bear in mind that they may be particularly biased. Taking on something of the air of self-justification, these works tend to portray their authors in the best light and their diagnoses and prescriptions for Labour’s electoral rebirth as being the most incisive. Still, let us take these sources for what they can give; an insight into the plans of what those at the heart of New Labour believed they were doing and why it was done. What is also clear, and which relates to the larger thesis, is that Labour’s defence policy comes up several times as an electoral problem in need of reform.

What are the arguments actually put forward in these sources? They all agree that Labour’s policies in general were too left wing for much of the public. They all agree that Labour’s defence policy was particularly unpopular, and that Labour’s policy of unilateral nuclear disarmament was the most unpopular aspect of the defence policy (Gould, 2011, pp.69-71). However, what was even more damaging was the division this policy caused in the Labour Party. Prompting the thought among the
electorate that if Labour could not manage themselves, how could they manage a country (Allan, 1997, p.31)?

Then there are some empirical sources to back these assertions of perceived Labour incompetence up. IPSOS-MORI has some interesting opinion polling that goes back to the early 1980s. The two main polls relate to perceptions of the Labour Party on a range of different factors, and who is best trusted on a range of policies. Labour went from being -35 points behind the Conservatives on ‘who is best trusted on defence’ in 1983 to a brief high of +12 ahead in February 2002 soon after the invasion of Afghanistan (Ipsos-MORI, 2014a). Perceived division in the Labour Party reduced from 63% in 1983 – the single most unfavourable thing about Labour on any issue at any time – to 8% by 1997 (Ipsos-MORI, 2014b). For Gould and Mandelson, change in Labour’s defence policy led to change in the public’s perception of Labour in general. The positive impact of taking a stronger general line on defence on the improvement in Labour’s electoral standing would, however, present something of a conundrum when faced with missile defence since, when polled, the general public showed that they were opposed to BMD.

There is scant but absolutely vital empirical data on the British public’s attitudes towards BMD. Surprisingly for a country in which the electorate lean pro-defence (Reifler et al., 2011), on the few occasions when opinion polling did take place responses tended to be against the UK’s involvement in BMD and in agreement that it would increase the security risk to the UK (CND, 2008d). A 2004 poll of over 1000 British citizens published in the Journal of Conflict Resolution rated the desirability of the US policy to develop missile defence – on a scale of 0 (strongly undesirable) to 10 (strongly desirable) – well below half, at 3.83 (Jenkins-Smith et al., 2004, p.300). In an earlier poll a majority also agreed that the relationship between Britain and America would suffer if the UK did not cooperate with the US on BMD (Ipsos-MORI, 2001). These studies illustrate the counter-intuitive attitude of the British public towards missile defence. They demonstrate the domestic political landscape the Labour government had to navigate between the public’s desire for a government that would put forward a strong defence policy in general (Reifler et al., 2011) while also being aware that although missile defence was a niche concern among voters (Ipsos-MORI, 2010; Ipsos-MORI, 2015) there was real latent opposition towards it (Ipsos-MORI, 2001; CND, 2008d) and so the government had to prevent the public debate around missile defence from growing.
There is some back-story to Labour’s stance on BMD which can be prefigured in the literature relating to Labour’s policy on nuclear weapons (Stoddart, 2009; 2010; Taylor et al., 2006). The literature tells us that there have been two points of view in the Labour Party. One wing is in favour; after all, it was a Labour government that began Britain’s research into these weapons in order to make an atomic bomb ‘with a bloody union jack on top’ (Scott, 2012), in order to make sure that the British Foreign Secretary was not ‘sent naked into the conference chamber’ (ibid, 2006, p.687). This branch of Labour did want a world free from nuclear weapons but only if other nations would agree to give up theirs multilaterally (Vickers, 2011, p.29). Then there is another wing of the Labour Party which takes its ethical foundations from an even older strain of pacifism found within the Party at its founding (ibid, p.219). In the nuclear age, this pacifism manifested itself as unilateral nuclear disarmament in the 1960s and 80s. This nuclear literature is therefore useful for charting Labour’s policy evolution from the 80s through to the 90s in abandoning unilateralism and slowly moving towards not just acceptance of Trident, but agreeing to its renewal (Allan, 1997, p.63). This literature is important because BMD grows out of nuclear deterrence and although these sources do not refer to missile defence in themselves, similar arguments for and against can be found in them.

2.4 Theoretical Literature

The wider thesis of which this literature review is a part uses the strategic-relational approach to explain Labour’s BMD policy from 1997-2010. So, this next section critically analyses the competing literature on other theoretical explanations of how states make security policy, before turning to the SRA itself, which is put forward as a theory with greater explanatory power, but one not without its own flaws.

Classical realism looks at the causes of states’ behaviours from the inside-out (individual leaders grasp for power, therefore so do the countries they lead), whereas neorealism’s perspective is from the outside-in (international anarchy makes nations fearful and warlike) (Waltz, 2001). Neither of these models fully work to explain the last Labour government’s BMD policy because there is no way of linking them together. Neorealism actually goes a long way in accounting for Labour’s BMD policy. This is because it argues that in an international environment characterized by anarchy, states will adopt policies that maximize their power against other states
(Neack, 2008, p.34), which the UK’s assimilation of BMD attempts to achieve by providing some defence against countries with limited numbers of nuclear missiles, and by maintaining the UK’s alliance with the US.

Neorealism’s emphasis on the primacy of ensuring the survival of the state over all other considerations also explains why domestic electoral factors were not a decisive factor in the government’s decisions on BMD (Aldrich et al., 2006, p.491), as the majority of British citizens polled about the UK’s involvement in BMD were opposed to it but the government still went ahead with the policy anyway since polling also indicated that concern among the British public towards BMD as a subset of defence issues in general must have been vanishingly small (Ipsos-MORI, 2010; Ipsos-MORI, 2015). In the neorealist literature this would be seen as a prime example of a decentralized democratic state using an international commitment to overrule domestic veto points in the form of voters’ preferences (Snidal and Thompson, 2002, p.201). Furthermore, by rejecting the public’s stance on BMD the government’s actions also reinforce the neorealist notion that domestic politics only influences states to pursue suboptimal foreign policies (Fearon, 1998, p.302).

This is not to take a reductionist line to argue that neorealism predicts exactly how Labour would go about incorporating BMD into the UK’s security in the particular way it did (Lumsdaine, 1996, p.302). Instead the international system acts by limiting the menu of security policy choices considered by a states leaders, rather than in forcing the selection of one particular choice over another (Dyson, 2009, p.15).

So, neorealism can take the argument this far, but at this point its explanatory power begins to falter; it is necessary but not sufficient. Neorealism can explain why the Labour government would go along with BMD in the face of the apparent opposition of voters, but it cannot explain – if all that matters is the international structure – why bother taking voters preferences into account at all? Why bother changing defence policy in general for them? These questions demand a theoretical model which can explain the relationship between the pressures of the international system and the vicissitudes of British electoral politics.

A first take on addressing the questions posed above might draw on Peter Gourevitch’s concept of the ‘second image reversed’, which reverses Kenneth Waltz’s neorealist concept of the ‘Second Image’ of international relations – domestic causes and international effects (Putnam, 1988, p.430) – to one in which the international system affects domestic politics, which then affects national policy choices (Chaudoin
et al., 2014, p.9). So, in Figure 1. below, the UK’s defence policy (Y) is directly influenced (βS) by both the structure of the international system (S) and the electorate’s voting preferences (βD) on defence policy (D), and also indirectly influenced by the structure of the international system’s direct influence (δ) on the UK electorate’s voting preferences on defence policy.

Figure 1. Indirect system effects

What this means when applied to this thesis is that the structure of the international system would influence how the British electorate assessed the threat environment surrounding the UK and they would therefore vote for parties that would ensure the UK is best protected from these threats. Unfortunately, this is where the explanatory power of the second image reversed breaks down. Although it might be useful for explaining how Britain’s place in the world had an influence on the type of defence policies favoured by the British electorate in general, it would be expected that the ‘reverberation of international norms onto the domestic stage’ (Drezner, 2002, p.4) would also condition voters to favour BMD as well in order to protect them from nuclear missiles, opinion polls evidenced that this was not the case (CND, 2008c).

At this point Robert Putnam’s concept of two-level games may be offered as a solution to the domestic/international interface. Level II is the national arena: domestic groups such as the electorate put pressure on the government to adopt policies that benefit them, and politicians seek power by meeting these needs (Putnam, 1988, p.434). At level I, the international level, governments try their best to reach agreements that please the electorate while limiting the impact of international settlements as much as possible (Putnam, 1988, p.434). According to Putnam, the requirement that level I agreements must be ratified at level II imposes a crucial theoretical link between the two – Inoguchi calls it a dialectical relationship (Inoguchi, 2010, p.155). This ratification can take the form of public opinion through the democratic voting process (Putnam, 1988, pp.436-7). The complexity of this two-level
game is that rational moves for a player at one level (such as a decision on incorporating BMD into the UK’s defence policy) may be awkward for that same player at the other level. To paraphrase Putnam, actors and spectators may tolerate some difference in rhetoric between the two levels, but ultimately either the UK gets involved in BMD or it does not (ibid, p.434). However, two-level games theory also ultimately fails to explain what is going on here as it assumes that there should be consistency between the games played by politicians at the domestic and international ‘tables’, and that any decisions reached should first and foremost try and placate the domestic arena (ibid, pp.436-438). Yet, again, this was quite the opposite with BMD as shown by polling which revealed an underlying opposition towards missile defence among the British public that the government had to carefully navigate by recognising that while missile defence was only of concern to a small minority of voters it certainly had the potential to become a much bigger and electorally damaging issue if public debate on the issue grew (Ipsos-MORI, 2001; CND, 2008b; CND, 2008c; CND, 2009b; Ipsos-MORI, 2010; Ipsos-MORI, 2015).

The next potential theoretical model that might be put forward to explain Labour’s BMD policy is holistic constructivism. Its two main theorists are John Ruggie and Fredrich Kratowil (Burchill et al., 2005, p.201). Holistic constructivism is similar to the SRA in that sees foreign policy behaviours as resulting from the fusing of a country’s internal domestic identity and its external social identity at the international level. From this perspective, domestic identity as well as shared norms of international society combine to form a ‘self-reinforcing cycle of norm-driven behaviour’ (Nia, 2011, p.289).

The problem with this form of constructivism in its application to explaining Labour’s BMD policy is in its very name, ‘holistic’. Holistic constructivism says that the interface between the international and domestic discourses are self-reinforcing, but in this thesis the opposite is the case. The public’s scepticism towards BMD was entirely the opposite of holistic. Nia’s analysis still seems to say that the domestic and internationally constructed identity must line up (2011, p.289), but in regards to BMD they did not. For example, what happens when the domestic level discourse dissents from its general framework? What about when the self-reinforcing cycle is broken by a foreign policy outlook that is not self-reinforcing but dissenting? We might expect the British public to favour BMD, but they did not. If the British public supported BMD, Labour’s policy could be explained in terms of neorealism or two-level games
quite easily, but it is this mismatch that complicates the theory and requires the application of the SRA. The reason why the SRA has greater explanatory power than holistic constructivism is that the SRA allows for political actors to take note of these kind of contradictions and make strategic decisions depending on what they think circumstances will allow. It is to a more in-depth analysis of the SRA literature itself that we now turn.

The strategic-relational approach (SRA) is originally a theoretical model developed by Bob Jessop for explaining state action (2001; 2005; 2008a). Applying the SRA to foreign policy analysis is a novel approach which has only been tried a few times before, ironically, in attempts to explain various New Labour policies towards Europe (Bieler, 2008; James, 2010). However, if Stocker’s work forms the core empirical text of this review then Elisabetta Brighi’s application of the strategic-relational approach to Italian foreign policy in her 2013 work, *Foreign Policy, Domestic Politics and International Relations: The Case of Italy*, is the core theoretical text. Putting the sections that specifically cover Italian foreign policy to one side, Brighi’s work contains a most excellent exposition of the strategic-relational approach as applied to foreign policy analysis in general. This general application can then be adapted to explain Labour’s policy on BMD from 1997-2010.

The strategic-relational approach is the theoretical model which best explains why the Labour government of 1997-2010 incorporated BMD into the UK’s security policy. This is because it solves the problem of how structures interact with agents, shaping the specific policy decisions that they make; in this case the role that both domestic electoral pressures to look tough on defence and international structural pressures to keep the US on-side played in shaping the Labour government’s BMD policy. It does this by emphasising the key role of ideas – in this thesis the ideational discourses of the Special Relationship and British militarism – as a medium in which structures can enter into discourse with agents in their decision-making role: ‘ideas provide the point of mediation between actors and their environment’ (Hay, 2002, pp.209-10, emphasis in original). Therefore, how political actors interact with context is based on their mental conception of what it will and will not permit. In turn, structures auto-select certain discourses and narratives over others (ibid, p.212). The product of these processes of mediation are known as policy paradigms; intersubjectively agreed-upon narratives that provide ‘cognitive templates’ through which the world is interpreted (Brighi, 2013, p.36).
In this thesis, the cognitive templates shaping the Labour Government’s BMD policy are based on the Special Relationship and what Reifler et al call 'British militarism'; a complex of beliefs based around support for military activity and national security, and concerns about British sovereignty and prestige (Reifler et al., 2011, p.11). This definition is based on their own opinion polling in which a majority supported extra military spending (61%), maintaining overseas military bases (56%), and stated that participation in peace keeping missions was worth the risk to British soldier’s lives (45% for, 27% against) (ibid, pp.28-261). This frames the larger policy paradigm, which appears to be that any political party that wants to win enough votes to form a government must conform to the ideational discourse of British militarism and take a conservative line on defence. The ideational discourse is the key, the link between the international and domestic influences, and their interaction with government agency.

The strength of the strategic-relational model is that it accounts for strategic actors – in this case the Labour government – being perfectly capable of differentiating between and navigating different levels of strategically selective environments, favouring certain strategies over others depending on what circumstances will allow (Brighi, 2013, p.36). Therefore it was entirely rational for Labour’s overall defence policy to become more conservative in order to gain votes from a broader range of people while recognizing that although there was latent opposition to BMD among the British public it was such a niche issue for most of the electorate (Ipsos-MORI, 2010; Ipsos-MORI, 2015) that the strategically selective context gave the Labour government the leeway to go ahead with a policy which prioritized the considerations of British national security by maintaining the Special Relationship with the US through BMD above the opinions of voters. At the same time the Labour government had to exert a significant degree of agency to make sure that this latent public opposition towards missile defence was not inflamed by any parliamentary debate by only announcing BMD upgrade decisions in Parliament after they had been made (HoC Deb, 2003c, c697; HoC Deb, 2007h, c71).

There are two main criticisms of Brighi’s account of the SRA. One of the main criticisms of the strategic-relational approach is that it can read as though it can be all things to all people; that it can be used to explain everything and therefore explains nothing; that it is a little too convenient.
The second criticism of Brighi’s thesis is her reluctance to place any agent above another. Brighi rejects explanations that rely solely on ‘black box’ statism or the ‘psychologism’ of individual defence policy makers as their unit of analysis. Instead, the ‘prime mover’ in her thesis is constituted as the defence policy process itself. While the wider thesis of which the review is a part does hold to Brighi’s processual notion of actorliness, encompassing a plurality of actors and processes (ibid, p.3), it moves away from Brighi’s reluctance to place any component above another by giving a preponderant agential role to what Self calls the ‘core defence policy community’; the Prime Minister and the Secretary of State for Defence, closely associated with the Foreign Secretary and the Chancellor (Self, 2010, p.267).

2.4.1 Overall Conclusion
Better known theories of foreign policy analysis are unable to synthesise both international and domestic influences on the Labour government of 1997-2010 to explain its policies towards missile defence. This is due to the discrepancy between the British public’s support for a strong defence policy in general, but their apparent rejection of BMD in particular. This creates a problem for neorealist and holistic constructivist explanations, because – for different reasons – they would expect the domestic and international levels to align in agreement with BMD, but they do not (Fearon, 1998; Nia, 2011). The SRA’s strength is it allows the government the intelligence to perceive the strategic policy space it had to pursue the best interests of the UK’s defence by agreeing to the US’s BMD policies, while being able to navigate the apparent contradiction between the British public’s support for pro-defence political parties in general and their rejection of BMD in particular.

2.5 Synthesis and Contribution
Synthesis is the act of making connections between the parts identified in analysis. It is not simply a matter of reassembling the original components back into the original order, but looking for a new order (Hart, 2003, p.111). This poses a challenge, because it would be easier to write about any other aspect of Labour’s security policy than BMD, there is more missing from the literature on this subject than there is available. The main finding of this literature review is that there is no study with the central aim of explaining why the last Labour government incorporated BMD into the UK’
security policy. Those studies which do exist have different goals in mind, such as giving an account of Britain’s BMD policy in general (Stocker, 2004a), or using it as a case study for the Special Relationship (Smith, 2005), or for illustrating the injustice of a Parliament and public side-lined in acquiescence to US power (Butler, 2003c). None of them have the specific aim of asking why did this Labour government pursue the missile defence policy that it did. They are also chronologically incomplete, a full account of Labour’s BMD policy from 1997-2010 has not yet been written.

Further, at the theoretical level the current literature is deficient because there is no attempt to address the reasons behind the UK’s BMD policy from anything other than the international level, let alone provide a synthesis of the domestic and international influences, which is what is required to give a holistic and convincing answer.

However, the literature which does exist provides a sound footing on which to build, covering as it does incredibly detailed information on Britain’s BMD policy in general which fortunately overlaps with Labour’s last term in office. These sources include vital government statements, news sources, strategic analysis, policy documents and committee reports. There is also a rich thematic background which place Labour’s BMD policy in context. These themes include the Special Relationship, Britain’s nuclear deterrent, the Labour Party’s electoral modernisation, Blair and Brown’s foreign policy outlooks, divisions between the government and PLP over BMD, and opinion polling on the public’s perceptions of BMD.

Having stated what the findings of the literature review are, it is now possible to say what contribution the rest of the thesis can make by filling the analytical gaps in the existing body of literature. Chief among these is a robust explanation of why the Labour government of 1997-2010 incorporated BMD into the UK’s security strategy. Such an explanation must include a synthesis of both international and domestic pressures acting on Labour’s BMD policy formulation. This explanation can be found by building on the literature collated in this review, and adding to it analyses of government documents on BMD in the public record going up to 2010, as well as new primary research based on interviews with former and current MPs, government officials and others involved in making or opposing the last Labour government’s BMD policy, in order to establish whether they think the biggest influence on this policy was international security or domestic electoral politics.
With the literature review now completed, the thesis turns to take a more detailed explanation of how the strategic-relational approach will serve as its analytical underpinning.
Chapter 3. The Strategic-Relational Approach

This chapter aims to give both a critical evaluation of the strategic-relational approach (SRA) and demonstrate how the electorate can influence government foreign policy making. It does so in service of a wider thesis which uses the last Labour government’s policy towards ballistic missile defence (BMD) as a case study for demonstrating how the SRA can be used to explain the influence of both domestic electoral and international pressures on foreign policy making. To this end this thesis has three goals: (1) to define and critically review the SRA; (2) to critically assess and demonstrate the ability of electorates to influence the government’s foreign policy making process; (3) to explain how the SRA can be applied to foreign policy analysis in a more fruitful way than better-known theories.

So, crucially, this thesis examines foreign policy as made by the state – the government – but yet the state level is not its real unit of analysis. The real essence of this thesis is a study of how foreign policy is made by political parties when they are in power. Although this thesis looks at foreign policy as an output of government decision making, at its core it is a study of domestic politics; the extent to which the last Labour government made strategic policy choices regarding BMD to balance the defence of the nation with the need to stay in power. Many theories of international relations claim that it is not necessary to examine domestic politics to understand a country’s foreign policy, whereas this thesis argues that any such analysis would be incomplete; the domestic must be brought back in. In a democratic society the influences on the party in government come from below as well as above; as illustrated by the Labour government’s need to uphold the Special Relationship through agreeing to the US’s BMD upgrade requests while at the same time managing the public debate over these decisions among which there was latent opposition Ipsos-MORI, 2001; CND, 2008c). The thesis now continues with a definition of the SRA.

The SRA was developed by Professor Bob Jessop at the University of Lancaster (Jessop, 2006; Jessop, 2016) as he drew upon the work of Greek Marxist philosopher Nicos Poulantzas’s concept of the state as a social relation (Poulantzas, 1978, pp.128-9). This means that instead of the state being seen as a thing, a tool that can be grasped and used by this or that group, or a subject in itself that acts in its own interests, the state was better conceived of as more of an arena or terrain in which different economic classes entered into a contested relationship with each other, vying
for control and influence over the outcomes of state policy, with their respective fortunes waxing and waning depending on the balance of forces and the strategies they pursued (ibid).

Jessop’s main modification of Poulantzas’s original idea was to move away from a class-based conception of the state-power struggle to a more pluralist view of competing forces. In further comparison to Poulantzas, Jessop stressed that although it originated in Marxism, and he himself was a Marxist, the SRA need not only be applied in a Marxist framework (Jessop, 2006), but was useful in whatever context the analyst was making a study of structure and agency. He also intended to develop the SRA beyond its initial application as a theory for explaining how states make policy, to a more general heuristic for explaining a range of social phenomenon (Jessop, 2008b, p.2), as is outlined below.

The strategic-relational approach is an attempt to addresses the age-old question in social science of how structures and agents interact in the making of social and/or political action, and whether structure or agency has the greater role in driving social change. In doing so, the SRA draws on the foundational Marxist concepts of contradiction and dialectic. Marx said that if appearance and reality were the same, there would be no need for science (Harvey, 2014, p.4). Hence it is the role of the SRA to uncover the hidden processes behind the making of social action.

The SRA attempts to overcome the apparent contradiction between structure and agency by placing them in a dialectical relationship ‘of motion, change and transformation’ in which they interact with each other in an endless process of thesis, antithesis, synthesis (Harvey, 2010, p.11). A process which is never fully resolved, but is a ‘perpetual reshaping, rephrasing and expansion’ (Harvey, 2010, p.63). Here we have the basic drive that characterises the fluid motion of the SRA.

The essence of the SRA can be defined as ‘politics is the art of the possible’ (Jessop, 2016, p.92), or in one word: flexibility. The ‘strategic’ aspect of the SRA grants political actors the ability to survey the political landscape, understand the barriers and opportunities facing them, and act accordingly in the pursuit of their goals; Labour’s BMD policy in the case of this thesis. In the SRA, this power to act is defined as an agent’s production of an event that would not otherwise occur; how the actions they took ‘made a difference’ – Blair and Brown’s influence on Labour’s BMD policy, for example (Jessop, 2008b, p.43). However, achieving goals can be quite difficult for actors because they can never possess all the information required to make
accurate strategic decision (ibid, p.47). They may also face rival agents actively working against them, such as the Conservatives in this thesis. Furthermore, the strategic choices actors make may lead to unintended outcomes which spiral far out of control. Even a ‘successfully’ achieved goal usually involves elements that are incomplete or compromised (ibid, pp.40-43).

The ‘relational’ part of the theory states that structure – barriers and opportunities – and agents – those making decisions – can only exist in relation to each other, one cannot exist without the other. There can be no structure without agents and vice-versa. Structures cannot exist independently of agents, since without agents who would exist to perceive the limits and possibilities of structures and act accordingly? Likewise, agents cannot act without a scaffold to frame their decision making. Structures should not be seen as ‘things’, Jessop defines them as those elements of a social situation that cannot be changed immediately by the strategy a given agent is pursuing at that moment (ibid, p.44). It is not that ‘structures’ exist as concrete entities somewhere ‘out there’ as such; instead structures represent what is strategically selective – actors can theoretically chose whatever course of action they would like, but in reality only a small number from the horizon of choices open to them will work in the particular context confronting them (in the electoral and international relations landscapes) at that moment (Jessop, 2016, p.55; Hay, 2001).

The SRA conceives of actors as being reflexive and able to learn from experience. Structures and agents are therefore in a relationship of feedback and exchange. Actors can make adjustments to their strategies in real-time across different temporal frames – be it the short and/or long-term – and different spatial dimensions, such as the domestic and/or international levels; the interaction between structures and agents is not just a linear process of cause and effect. Over time, the various choices made by actors in pursuit of their goals can actually change the strategically selective limits the structures initially placed on them (Jessop, 2008b, p.42). Here, the idea of the parallax is a useful way of imagining this constant shift in structure and agency; the perception of what in any given structure constitutes a constraint or an opportunity is entirely related to the particular agent (Blair/Brown) doing the perceiving (Zizek, 2006, p.4).

No two agents will perceive the strategically selective limits placed on them by structures in exactly the same way (Jessop, 2006).

Ultimately, in the SRA the dialectic of structure and agency is doubled. The first order dialectic is the ability of actors to perceive the strategic selectivity of the
structures they inhabit and act accordingly. While the second order dialect is the alteration of these structural constraints through the strategies they pursued in acting in the first dialectic; in this case the Labour government’s attempts to share US BMD policy to UK needs. The important point is that this dialectic is processual — it develops over time through the evolutionary mechanisms of variation, selection, and retention (ibid).

Discourse is also another vital component of the SRA. The very ideas actors can conceive about the options open to them provide powerful cognitive filters that frame the limits of possible strategic action, such as British militarism and the Special Relationship in this thesis. What makes the SRA a powerful analytical tool is that it allows for flexibility and change in what actors perceive as possible depending on improvements in their level of knowledge about a given situation. Just as structure and agency are in a dialectical relationship, so to are the material and ideational. To demonstrate this Hay draws on everyday experience to point out that often when individuals change their minds about a particular choice of action, suddenly their point of view shifts and the barriers and problems that seemed so real beforehand simply do not matter anymore. Note that it is not that the material limits have changed, but the individual’s understanding of them (Hay, 2001, cited in Jessop, 2008b, pp.48-9).

Having defined the SRA as a general heuristic, we can now apply it an analysis of how states make policy.

Since this thesis examines government policies, it needs to set out some understanding of what the state is and how it makes them. Jessop’s conception of the SRA differentiates between a particular definition of the state, and more importantly a definition of state power, the process by which states actually make and enact policies. Jessop’s definition of the state is as follows:

As an institutional ensemble, the state does not (and cannot) exercise power, it is not a real subject…The state is an ensemble of power centres that offers unequal chances to different forces within and outside the state to act for different political purposes…It is not the state that acts; it is always specific sets of politicians and state officials located in specific parts and levels of the state system (Jessop, 2008b, p.37).
Note that Jessop’s definition of the state does not talk about the state ‘as such’. Instead there is a great emphasis on the ability of different groups, such as the legislature or executive, to act in the face of other opposing groups. In the SRA the state is not a unitary subject which acts in and of itself, instead the competition between different agents and the wider society (Jessop, 2016, p.56) as they vie to impress their respective interests on the state apparatus through strategically selective decisions form a dense nexus of social relations which generate a ‘state effect’ (Jessop, 1990, Mitchell, 1999, Foucoult, 2007 & Bourdieu, 2014 cited in Jessop, 2016, p.55)

Reaching back to the Marxist underpinning of the SRA it is possible to see how not only is capital not a thing but a process of social relations (Harvey, 2011, p.40), but so too Poulantzas’s initial preposition can be reformulated to say that the state is also not a thing but a process of social relations in flux and interaction.

In the SRA the state is not a ‘black box’ into which outside influences enter and from which government policies mysteriously appear fully formed. Instead of inputs and outputs, the SRA emphasises ‘withinputs’; the contest between and within government institutions, state managers and the wider society in which they are embedded as they struggle for control over the state apparatus used in the making of policy (Jessop, 2016, p.67). This does not mean that the state is somehow a neutral instrument or a level playing field to which potentially all actors have equal access; the relative dominance of particular interests can strengthen the hand of particular departments (ibid, p.68). For example, the dominance of the Foreign Office/Ministry of Defence nexus is an important element in the structural hegemony of the importance of the Special Relationship to Britain’s strategic defence. This state of affairs again emphasises the processual conceptualisation of actorness present in the SRA (Brighi, 2013, p.3) and the preponderant agential role that the ‘core defence policy community’ – consisting of the Prime Minister, the Secretary of State for Defence, followed closely by the Foreign Secretary and the Chancellor (Self, 2010, p.267) – plays in the formulation of British foreign and defence policy.

The notion of state managers – including top advisors and other sources of policy ideas (Jessop, 2008b, p.3) – let alone the state itself exercising power, masks a complex set of social relations; different government departments have rivalries, different ministers get on well or dislike each other. All of these many contingencies play a role in how policy forms. In the SRA, state institutions themselves are not fixed monolithic entities. Legislatures, executives and government departments are in a
constant state of flux and are subject to the reorganisation and reattribution of their powers. Hence their strategic power in relation to each other changes over time. Accordingly, the state managers supposedly in charge of these institutions may struggle to maintain control (Jessop, 2016, p.67). Ultimately, it is therefore actually quite difficult for all the different levels, components and rivalries of the state to work in unity and achieve the policy outcomes they desire (ibid, p.57).

Due to this large number of actors working on numerous different levels, the idea of scale, and in particular the concept of scale jumping, is very important in the SRA’s explanation of state action. Scale refers to the ability of actors to work within ‘tangled hierarchies of power’ across multiple levels of government (ibid, pp.136-7). This means actors are perfectly capable of working across organisations on the same level and among organisations at different levels in a hierarchy at the same time. Due to the fluid relationship of feedback and exchange between actors working across these different horizontal and vertical levels, the SRA’s concept of scale means that it would be wrong to look for a single specific locus of power, there is ‘no single overarching peak at which multiple scalar hierarchies culminate’ (ibid), no place for the buck to stop, so to speak. Hence the most powerful institutions and actors may not be located at the highest scale. Scale jumping is where actors try and achieve the outcome they desire by exploiting whatever advantage they have to apply their strongest leverage to the level they feel they have the greatest influence over, and can also occur between the domestic and international levels (ibid).

Instead of a simple model in which it is the classical reified concept of the government alone that governs, the SRA emphases governance, in which the making and enactment of public policy is an intensely political process taking place on a highly contested terrain in which numerous actors and organisations vie and ally with each other in a fluid and reciprocal interactive process which cuts across the traditional ‘juridico-political boundaries’ (ibid, p.165) of state agencies. Governance thereby moves beyond the idea that state power is exercised through orders and bureaucracy backed up the monopoly of violence alone, to include social networks and ideational appeals (ibid, pp.166-7). Thus, in the SRA the state operates less as a supreme sovereign body than as ‘primus inter pares in a complex and heterogenous network of social relations’ (ibid, p.173).
Before moving on to examine how the SRA can be used to demonstrate the influence of electorates on government policy, it is important to pause and counter some potential criticisms of the SRA.

One of the main criticisms of the SRA is that because it requires such a deep investigation of the motivations behind the strategic choices made by agents across numerous temporal and spatial frames, and in interaction with many other actors all pursuing their own strategic paths, it takes so much time to sift through the evidence and find the real locus of social action that it can only undertake such an investigation once a given social event is over, and that therefore it is only useful post hoc for historical description rather than as a predictive tool of social behaviour (Jessop, 2008b, p.44). Jessop counters this criticism by arguing that the ex-ante prediction of specific policy outcomes before events have taken place is not what the SRA is about. Yes, the SRA provides a generally predictive heuristic in the way it asserts that agents will engage in strategically selective decision making when faced with strategically selective situations, but beyond that the very strength of the SRA is that opens up rather than restricts the horizon of potential explanations for social action based on the particular level of abstraction or agential viewpoint from which the analyst wants to examine a social event. The SRA is entirely open to the shifts in analytical vantage point which would be seen as destabilising to a simplistically empirical predictive model in which event b follows a (Jessop, 2006).

Indeed, in an interview for this thesis, Elisabetta Brighi, whose 2013 book *Foreign Policy, Domestic Politics and International Relations: The Case of Italy* constitutes the most developed application of the SRA to international relations thus far, stated that she did not believe in predictive models in the social sciences, as social phenomena are open-ended systems. For her, a key strength of the SRA was its potential to use prediction as a foil against which to consider counterfactual assemblages of structure, agency and discourse in a way that highlights the complexity of social phenomena rather than trying to flatten their complexity (Brighi, 2017).

Another criticism of the SRA is the allegation that it requires all actions to be deliberate strategic choices in a similar way to those made by the utility-maximising actors of rational choice theory. Hay counters that although strategic calculation does come into decision-making in the SRA, agents also make intuitive decisions, and sometimes both their strategic and intuitive understanding of the context and menu of potential good actions open to them is simply wrong (Hay, 2001).
Then there is the accusation that although Jessop claims to be working in a Marxist framework, the SRA is not really Marxist because introducing strategic calculation means that agents may not always act in class interests (Jessop, 1990, p.263). Jessop counters this claim by moving beyond instrumentalist and structuralist views of the state as either the ‘executive committee of the bourgeoisie’, or that it acts in the interests of capital in general, to separate class power from state power. Again, he states that it is entirely relational to the particular circumstances whether the state sometimes acts in the interests of capital or capitalists or sometimes does not. However, this does not mean that the state is a neutral template, it all depends on the balance of social forces that capture the various branches of the state at any one time (Jessop, 2008b, p.31). This also links to another critique of the SRA in the assertion that in not fundamentally privileging class the SRA abandons a global – or all-encompassing – strategic perspective (Jessop, 1990, p.264). Jessop counters that the state is not necessarily capitalistic because although it can help to maintain the conditions necessary for capitalist production, it also fails to do this. Abandoning this ‘search for guarantees’ that the state is necessarily capitalistic in all its functions and that the ‘master strategy’ of capital reproduction can shape all social relations at all levels at any given time gives the SRA greater flexibility (Kelly, 1999, p.111; Jessop, 1990, p.265).

Perhaps the closest rival to the SRA is Anthony Giddens’ theory of structuration (Giddens, 2007). Giddens’ rejection of viewing social practices as the products of either structures or agents in favour of positing a dialectical relationship between them obviously has some similarity with the SRA (Allan, 1997, p.13). However, Jessop’s critique of structuration is that in it structure is over-determining regardless of the agents and actions subject to constraint. Whereas structuration sees structures as constraining all agents in a similar way, in the SRA what can be a structure for one agent can be an opportunity for another (Jessop, 2008b, pp.40-41).

Having now established what the SRA is and how it informs state policy making, as well as countering some criticisms against it, we can now move on to explain how it can be used to account for the influence of the electorate on foreign policy.
3.1 How Electorates Influence Foreign Policy

This section has five aims: (1) to establish that foreign policy is something that influences the electorate’s voting intentions; (2) to establish that these voting intentions actually influence government foreign policy making; (3) to establish the role political parties play as transmission belts for translating the electorate’s views on foreign policy into government policy; (4) to demonstrate how the SRA can account for the strategic choices political parties in office make when developing foreign policy; (5) to explain the role that state projects and hegemonic visions play in giving ideological coherence to party policy platforms.

First of all we need to establish that foreign policy does indeed influence electors’ voting intentions in the face of a substantial literature which states that they do not. Early studies claimed many of the answers respondents gave to survey questions on international affairs were random “non-attitudes” (Reifler et al., 2011, p.246). The public was believed to be relatively uninterested in foreign affairs, holding an attitude of ‘voting ends at water’s edge’ (Aldrich et al., 2006, p.477). Even studies which did conclude that the electorate was interested in foreign policy still doubted the ability of voters to actually shape foreign policy themselves as opposed to only making choices between different foreign policies developed and presented to them by political elites (ibid, p.496). A further development of this sceptical view accepts that public opinion can play a role in formulating foreign policy, but highlights the difficulty of establishing exactly how and where in the policy making process their views intercede. Do policy makers anticipate or react to public opinion on foreign policy? Does the public alter foreign policy through choices in the polling booth or through constraining already elected officials (ibid)?

In order to address these concerns, this thesis draws on Reifler et al’s paper on Foreign Policy Beliefs in Contemporary Britain (2011) to meet Aldrich’s proposal that three important conditions are to be met if public opinion regarding foreign policy can be said to influence electoral outcomes: first, the public must actually possess coherent attitudes about foreign policy; second, voters must be shown to be drawing on these attitudes when deciding who to vote for; third, the major parties must offer sufficiently different foreign policies so that voters can draw on their opinions to make a choice (Aldrich et al., 2006, p.478).
Reifler et al begin their study with some background on the British public’s general foreign policy beliefs in the mid-to-late 2000s. The 2001 general election was dominated by domestic issues, but by the time of the 2005 election British forces had been deployed to Afghanistan and Iraq and there was a sizable increase in the percentage of people who designated Britain’s foreign interactions as the most important issue facing the country (Clarke et al, 2009, chapter 4, cited in Reifler et al., 2011, p.255), although this was mostly focused around immigration (23%) while concerns over terrorism (4%) and Iraq (2%) remained of low concern (Whiteley et al., 2005, p.810). Nonetheless, according to Whitley et al and Reifler et al, the decline in Tony Blair’s electoral standing worsened as these issues grew, suggesting consequential linkages between foreign policy attitudes and electoral politics in the UK (Clarke et al, 2009, p.138; Reifler et al., 2011, p.246). In such a context it would therefore be important for the Labour government to ensure public discussion over missile defence remained of low salience and that latent public opposition was not further inflamed by only announcing its BMD upgrade agreements with the US after they had been made.

In order to parse these various opinions and look for any coherent attitudes towards foreign affairs among the British public and how they might translate into voting intentions, Reifler et al undertook their own opinion polling and condensed the results under what they found to be two broad foreign policy outlooks; liberal internationalism and British militarism. Britons with a liberal internationalist outlook tended to have greater support for immigration and the Euro, they tended to be opposed to military spending and more sceptical about ‘fighting terror’, as Reifler et al phrase it. Voters with an outlook conforming to British militarism favoured military spending and maintaining the UK’s overseas bases, they were opposed to Britain’s membership of the Euro. Both groups held quite high support for the UK armed forces’ involvement in peacekeeping around the world (Reifler et al., 2011, p.253). These blocs demonstrate that the British public do indeed hold coherent attitudes about the UK’s involvement in the world. However, do they translate into choices at the ballot box?

Fortunately, Reifler et al’s study revealed significant covariation between the two foreign policy belief factors and voting intentions, even in the presence of several control factors such as educational attainment (2011). Liberal internationalism was strongly associated with the intention to vote for Labour and the Lib-Dems, but had a
negative association with Conservative voters. Likewise, British militarism had a	negative association with the intention to vote for the Lib-Dems, but a positive
correlation with that of the Conservatives. Although interestingly, British militarism
also had a positive correlation with the intention to vote Labour, although not quite as
strong as that of the Conservatives (ibid, p.259). Furthermore, foreign policy outlook
was also correlated in much the same pattern as above with party identification – a
key predictor variable of likely voting behaviour in itself. Significantly, by
themselves, the foreign policy factors explained between 12% and 22% of the variance
of the decisions to vote for a particular party (ibid, p.258). This demonstrates that
although they are not a preponderant consideration when electors decide whom to vote
for, foreign policy beliefs do indeed have a significant influence on the electoral fates
of political parties. This helps to explain how public opinion in democratic politics
affects how Britain conducts international relations (ibid, p.245).

So far the thesis has established that British voters have coherent foreign policy
attitudes and bring these to bear when deciding on which party to vote for. However,
does this actually lead political parties to create foreign policies which they hope will
appeal to the electorate and win them office, and if so, how exactly does the electorate
interject in the foreign policy making process? The first part of answering this question
is to establish the ‘mode of representation’ operating in the UK; the general political
framework by which the public and other groups can represent their concerns and
interests to government power centres. The second step is to explain the role that
political parties play within this mode of representation as mediators between the
demands of voters and as hopeful governments-in-waiting. The final part is then to
demonstrate how political parties take into account the wishes of the electorate in the
development of their policy platforms which they offer up for election.

How can different political agents make their feelings known to the
government and influence its policies? In order to establish this we need to establish
the modes of representation in a given country. Modes of representation are the ways
in which different political forces can voice their opinions and interests to decision
makers with the power to formulate and implement policy (Jessop, 2016, p.61).
Formally, the UK’s mode of representation is that of a parliamentary democracy.
Parliamentarianism is the indirect participation in policy making by equal citizens
exercising their right to vote for a legislature or executive (ibid, p.62). However, the
mode of representation is not just the type of government in a given country, it is more
the way in which political agents can access the type of government that exists there. For example, Jessop agrees that the formal typology of government in Britain is a parliamentary system, yet according to his strategic-relational approach the idea of individual citizens each exerting a formally equal amount of influence sufficient enough to affect the policy making process by electing a new government every 5 years is far too static, whereas the actual operation of politics in the UK is more akin to that set out by (neo)pluralism (ibid, p.72).

(Neo)pluralism is a theoretical approach in political science which critiques the kind of formal institutionalism outlined above. Instead, (neo)pluralism grants a wide range of individual and civil society actors with diverse power resources the ability to intercede in the parliamentary process in non-linear ways. It emphasises the importance of competition and coalition building between these individuals and groups as the driving force behind conflict over specific policies, as long as this conflict stays within accepted policy paradigms (ibid, p.72). Therefore, (neo)pluralism is not a mode of representation in itself, but a method of representation which occurs on the terrain of parliamentarianism. British politics has a parliamentarian shell, but its method is (neo)pluralist (ibid, p.63).

However, at this point it is necessary to bring the SRA back in to this analysis in order to counter some deficiencies in (neo)pluralism. The SRA has some similarities with (neo)pluralism as it emphasises competition among groups, yet they differ in that the SRA gives equal weight to the strategic structural pressures exerted by both formal institutions, such as Parliament, and social relations, such as networked access to politicians, depending on the strategies used by agents to navigate them – Director of Communications Alistair Campbell’s ability to instigate a clarification of the government’s BMD policy after an off the cuff remark is a case in point – (ibid, p.63; HoC Deb, 2001d, c984), whereas (neo)pluralism privileges certain structures over others (Cerny, 2010, pp.10-11).

The original goal of this section was to establish the political framework by which the public and other groups can influence government policy making. The conclusion here is that although the UK’s formal mode of representation is one of parliamentarianism, the actual influence of outside actors on the policy making process is much closer to that of (neo)pluralism. This means that while the public do play an indirect role in the formulation of government policy by voting for policies which the parties presenting them hope they have developed with the greatest appeal
to voters’ desires, other individuals and actors have greater capacities to intervene more directly in the government policy making process in ways which the average citizen is excluded from by only participating in the process through voting once every 5 years. The SRA adds to (neo)pluralism’s insights by maintaining that it is the different strategies different actors try to use to influence the government policy making process that is important, not the particular types of structures that are trying to be influenced.

Having now established the SRA’s take on parliamentarianism as the mode of representation operating in the UK, the next step is to give a strategic-relational explanation of the role that political parties play in parliamentarianism by mediating the demands of voters when formulating policy platforms (Jessop, 2016, p.62). This is fundamental because in parliamentary systems it is parties that form governments, so getting elected is the core goal of political parties. In keeping with the overall theme of this thesis, this section will move from an abstract explanation of the role of political parties in mediating the demands of voters in the development of appealing policy platforms in the hope of being elected to office, to a concrete example of how this mediating role facilitated the political evolution of Labour Party policy.

As electioneering machines in a parliamentary system, parties must win votes in order to form governments. Therefore party decision making always revolves around the calculation of votes (ibid, p.75). However, parties have to mediate between many interests besides voters – social movements, pressure groups, etc. These navigations form trilemmas for party leaders around difficult policy choices among maximising votes, shaping policy and gaining office; these trade-offs are made through deeply strategic-relational calculations (ibid, p.74).

The type of party operating in the parliamentary mode of representation also has an influence on the type of policies they will put forward. In modern liberal-democratic states, parties tend towards the ‘catch-all party’ type. (Kirchheimer, 1996, 1969, cited in ibid, p.78). This kind of party is a vote-maximising machine that aims to capture the electoral centre ground by appealing to floating voters. Catch-all parties are more concerned with capturing swing voters in key swing seats than with maintaining the support of their traditional core (Crouch, 2004; Blyth and Katz, 2005; Rohrschneider and Whitefield 2012, cited in ibid, p.78). Hence the types of policies these parties put forward are less ideological, more based on soundings of voter
opinions gathered through techniques more commonly used in the advertising industry, such as focus groups (ibid, p.79)

A clear example of a political party changing its policies in response to the demands of the electorate in order to win office is the modernisation of the Labour Party’s entire policy platform from the mid-1980s to the creation of New Labour. Having lost the 1979 election, during the early 80s Labour underwent a shift to the left, adopting a preference shaping strategy (Hay, 1999, p.60) in an attempt to win over voters to a radical socialist agenda which was at odds with the prevailing political mood of the era. After one of its worst election defeats at the 1983 election on this platform, Labour began a slow process of modernising its internal party structures and policy agenda. The Party began to engage in the politics of catch-up, coming to terms with the basic parameters of Thatcherism (ibid, p.42), giving up preference-shaping policies in favour of preference-accommodation policies in the face of significant sections of the electorate’s support for the Conservatives and distrust of Labour, and move its policies – especially its defence policies – towards bipartisan convergence on the centre ground of British politics (ibid, p.105). In this way Labour’s modernisation fits closely with Anthony Downs’ spatial theory of electoral competition in which parties move their policies towards the centre-ground of electoral competition in order to win the support of as many median voters as possible (ibid, p.76), in essence becoming the ‘catch-all’ type of party mentioned earlier (ibid, p.77). However, Downs’ framework is greatly enhanced by adding a strategic-relational analysis, since Labour’s entire policy shift to the centre-ground was prefigured by a deeply strategic appreciation of the selectivities the British electoral landscape presented to the Labour Party in terms of the kind of policies it could put forward in order to become elected and form a government.

A further role that political parties play in a strategic-relational account of the influence of the electorate on government policy making is by articulating state projects and hegemonic visions through their policy platforms (Jessop, 2016, p.85). Indeed, a party’s policy platform can be seen as a series of proposed state projects embedded within an overall hegemonic vision. The term ‘proposed’ is central here, since a ‘state project’ can only come in to being if the political party in question actually wins office and gains access to the levers of state. As always with the SRA, the notion of the ‘state’ as a self-contained subject is rejected. However, once a party is in office and in a position to actually enact its policy platform, state projects can
provide a framework which helps various parts of the nebulous state apparatus to work together with a semblance of unity in pursuit of a common goal. Again, Jessop defines state unity not as a subject, a unified thing, but as an outcome of the process of social interaction; the ability of the state apparatus to reproduce itself and to use the physical and ideological powers at its disposal to secure compliance with its policies in the face of opposition (ibid, p.85). However, even this desired homogeneity is subject to competition between different state agencies as to who defines what the state projects will be and how they are to be administered. This flux means that what constitutes the state project at any given time is also open to change depending on the balance of forces. National boundaries need also not limit state projects, which can take intra and international forms (ibid, pp.84-86). Indeed, Labour’s support for BMD could be seen as an attempt to foster a hegemonic vision through a state project.

Hegemonic visions form the next level of abstraction in that they move beyond the more material aims of state projects to an attempt to associate the particular ideological interests of the social fraction in power within what is seen as the wider ‘public interest’. This tactic is particularly important to those political organisations wanting to become ‘natural governing parties’ (ibid, p.74), such as New Labour.

Therefore, although the trend for political parties to represent the state to society rather than society to the state (ibid, p.79) may appear to offer limited opportunity for the electorate to influence the formation of state projects and hegemonic visions, voters do have such influence because parties in office, or seeking office, must overcome the ‘part-whole paradox of the state’ (ibid, p.86). This means that although the state is itself only one small part of the overall social order it is nonetheless charged with maintaining the cohesion of the entire social body, and, further, the party in office in supposed control of the state at any given moment represents an even smaller fraction of society. To overcome this paradox, catch-all parties may still represent a core social fraction and even make political appeals based on a residual left-right ideological position (ibid, p.78), but in their desire to become natural governing parties they must reach out far beyond their base. In doing so, the party will adopt a hegemonic vision which conforms to the broad electoral desires of the general population as well as trying to shape those desires, an outline which very much seems to account for New Labour’s stance on defence. In turn, this hegemonic vision informs the kind of state projects the party will place before the public vote in its policy platform. In this way the electorate have an influence on state projects and
hegemonic visions; New Labour’s reconciliation with British militarism being a case in point.

In conclusion, this section demonstrates that the public’s influence on the formulation of policy platforms comes towards the end of the electoral cycle when parties are developing their manifestos during the build-up to elections (Smith, 1996, p.133). The electorate’s influence on policy making is therefore latent, not active. Nonetheless, voters do exert a strong structural pressure on the kinds of policy platforms parties put forward because in liberal democracies parties must get elected before they are in any position to implement policies of any kind in the first place. State projects and hegemonic visions then provide some level of unity among the various branches of government around a common goal and form part of the policy platforms parties put forward for election. Hence, the calculations parties make when developing their policy platforms are deeply strategic, requiring a close reading of the electoral landscape and what the public will or will not vote for. The strategic-selectivity parties exercise when developing policy is clearly demonstrated by the evolution of New Labour in its wholesale reappraisal of its policy platform from the mid-80s onwards in order to become electable. The relationship between voters and parties also demonstrates clear strategic-relational outlines because from the point of view of political parties the electorate are a structure, but as individuals voters are exercising agency.

Once parties are in office after the conclusion of an electoral cycle and the election of a new government, however, access to policy making becomes much more difficult for the general public. At this point a more (neo)pluralist take on access to government policy making is more appropriate, since individuals and groups with greater strategic access to the levers of power for whatever reason are more able to intercede more directly in the policy process outside of exerting influence in a formal plebiscititary role at the culmination of the electoral cycle once every 5 years. However, the electorate do still exercise some latent structural pressure though the monitoring of opinion polls, and of course in the build-up to the next election when the process of policy formulation for electoral consumption begins again.
3.2 Applying the SRA to Foreign Policy Making

Having given an account of what the SRA actually is and stated how it can explain the influence of the electorate on government policy making in general, it is now possible to examine attempts to apply the SRA to analyses of government foreign policy making. Taking the insights these studies have made, they will then be used to apply the SRA to an analysis of the last Labour government’s BMD policy from 1997 to 2010.

Despite the SRA being an under-utilised approach, and its application to analyses of foreign policy being rarer still, there are a handful of examples where just this has been attempted. The first of these is Andreas Bieler’s paper on Swedish and British trade unions’ attitudes towards the EU (Bieler, 2008). Although this is not strictly foreign policy as such, since he is examining trade unions not national governments, it still gives a flavour of how organisations can be seen to be making policy choices at the international level based on a strategic understanding of the particular constraints and opportunities facing them at the national level.

In Bieler’s article it is clear that the differing stances Swedish and British trade unions took towards the EU membership were based on a strategic calculation of their relationship with their home governments’ attitudes towards trade union rights and whether they believed they would get a better deal through EU trade union legislation or not. In the British case, transnational trade unions favoured EU membership because they were situated in a strategically-selective environment in which trade union rights were somewhat marginalised by the British state and so they looked to the European Union as an alternative guarantor of trade union rights through the Social Chapter. Whereas Swedish trade unions enjoyed more privileged access to the Swedish state’s policy making process, and so were sceptical towards the EU’s free market commitments. Here we see the same type of organisation making quite different types of policy decisions based on an assessment of the options open to them depending on their particular relationship to the strategically-selective context confronting them. Beiler’s article also emphasises the different scales agents can act strategically across and between, in this case the domestic and international levels (Bieler, 2008).

Also addressing the European Union, and interestingly for this thesis, the last Labour government, are two titles by Scott James (2009; 2010). In The Changing Face
of European Policy-Making under Blair James focuses on the way in which, as the title suggests, EU policy making under Blair became both increasingly informalised in the ‘sofa cabinet’ and at the same time centralised in the Cabinet Office/10 Downing street axis (James, 2009, p.616). In The Rise and Fall of Euro Preparations, James employs a strategic-relational framework to account for the Treasury’s decision to depoliticise the Euro question by separating the logistical preparations for changeover from the political decision over whether or not to join the Euro (James, 2010, p.368).

In both case studies, James considers the strategic action of networked individuals across Whitehall within a broader ‘strategically-selective context’ that favours certain strategies over others as a means to realise strategic goals. The choices these strategic actors make feed back into the structured context by facilitating strategic learning of the constraints and opportunities afforded by it (James, 2009, p.605; James, 2010, p.369).

However, the thesis now turns to what is the most comprehensive attempt to apply the SRA to an analysis of foreign policy that exists to date; Elisabetta Brighi’s Foreign Policy, Domestic Politics and International Relations: The Case of Italy (2013). Putting the sections that specifically cover Italian foreign policy to one side, Brighi’s work contains a most excellent exposition of the strategic-relational approach as applied to foreign policy analysis in general, which is outlined below.

Brighi’s application of the SRA asserts that foreign policy is produced through an assessment of both the international context of action and the state’s own domestic preferences. Furthermore, in the process of choosing the appropriate course of action, foreign policy actors have to take into account the strategies of all other players in the foreign policy making process. Due to this relational nature, international politics is conceived of as a strategically-selective constraint, one that favours certain foreign policies over others. As many states compose the international system their complex interaction and conflicting interests will create an ‘uneven terrain for foreign policy’: some actions will be more successful while others will be severely structurally constrained (ibid, p.37). The SRA offers the most complex framework for analysing foreign policy because its relational model encompasses all types of interaction between foreign policy, domestic politics and international relations as it ‘captures the relation between variables’ rather than absolutes, e.g. small countries vs. large countries, times of peace vs. times of tension, and so on. (ibid, p.40).
At this point it is important to briefly critically analyse some other theoretical models which might be put forward as superior alternatives to the SRA in explaining how foreign policy is made.

Classical realism looks at the causes of states’ behaviours from the inside out, whereas neorealism’s perspective is from the outside in (Waltz, 2001). Neither of these models fully explain how governments make foreign policy because there is no way of linking the internal and external pressures together. Neorealism actually goes a long way in accounting for foreign policy. This is because it argues that in an international environment characterized by anarchy, states will adopt policies that maximize their power against other states (Neack, 2008, p.34). Neorealism’s emphasis on the primacy of ensuring the survival of the state over all other considerations also explains why domestic electoral factors are not a decisive factor in governments foreign policy making (Aldrich et al., 2006, p.491). So, neorealism can take the argument this far, but at this point its explanatory power begins to falter. Neorealism cannot explain – if all that matters is the international structure – why political parties bother taking voters preferences into account at all? Why would New Labour bother taking voters’ defence preferences into account?

A first take on this might draw on Peter Gourevitch’s concept of the ‘second image reversed’, in which the international system affects domestic politics, which then affects national policy choices (Chaudoin et al., 2014, p.9). Unfortunately, this is where the explanatory power of the second image reversed breaks down. Although it might be useful for explaining how a country’s place in the world has an influence on the type of defence policies favoured by a country’s electorate in general, it would be expected that the ‘reverberation of international norms onto the domestic stage’ (Drezner, 2002, p.4) would also condition voters to favour exactly the same types of foreign policies as the government, but this is not always the case; the second image reversed would expect Labour voters to support BMD but they did not.

At this point Robert Putnam’s concept of two-level games may be offered as a solution to the domestic/international interface. However, two-level games theory also ultimately fails to explain what is going on here as it assumes that there should be consistency between the games played by politicians at the domestic and international ‘tables’, and that any decisions reached should first and foremost try and placate the domestic arena (Putnam, 1988, p.436-438), but this does not always happen, as with the British electorates’ BMD scepticism.
The next potential theoretical model that might be put forward is holistic constructivism (Burchill et al., 2005, p.201). Holistic constructivism is similar to the SRA in that it sees foreign policy behaviours as resulting from the fusing of a country’s internal domestic identity and its external social identity at the international level. The problem with this form of constructivism is in its very name, ‘holistic’. Holistic constructivism says that the interface between the international and domestic discourses are ‘mutually constitutive and self-reinforcing (ibid), but on many occasions the opposite is the case. The fact is that a public’s scepticism towards a particular foreign and defence policy can be entirely the opposite of holistic, as with the British public’s scepticism towards missile defence (CND, 2004). The reason why the SRA has greater explanatory power than holistic constructivism is that the SRA allows for government foreign policy actors to take note of these kind of contradictions and make strategic decisions depending on what they think circumstances will allow.

Better known theories of foreign policy analysis are unable to synthesise both international and domestic influences on states’ foreign policies. This is due to the discrepancy between the British public’s support for a strong defence policy in general, but their apparent rejection of BMD in particular. The SRA’s strength is it allows governments the intelligence to perceive the strategic policy space they have to pursue the best interests of the national defence by agreeing to the US’s BMD requests and thereby upholding the Special Relationship, while being able to navigate the apparent contradiction between a public’s support for pro-defence political parties in general and their rejection of a particular defence policy.

3.3 Applying the SRA to Labour’s BMD Policy 1997-2010

Now we need to bring the three main strands of structure, agency and discourse together to demonstrate how the SRA can be used to explain the influence of domestic electoral pressures and international structural constraints on the last Labour government’s BMD policy making process as mediated by the ideational discourses of the Special Relationship and British militarism.

Earlier, the role of ideas in providing a point of mediation between actors and the strategic environment to produce cognitive templates through which the limits of what is possible in foreign policy is interpreted was outlined. In this thesis, one of the main cognitive templates is based on what Reifler et al call 'British militarism' (Reifler
et al., 2011, p.261); a complex of beliefs based around support for military activity and national security, as well as concerns about British sovereignty and prestige. This definition is based on their own polling in which a majority of those Britons polled supported extra military spending (61%), maintaining overseas military bases (56%), and participation in peace keeping missions (45% for, 27% against) (ibid, pp.248-249). British militarism frames the larger domestic policy paradigm, which appears to be that any political party that wants to win enough votes to form a government must conform to the ideational discourse of British militarism and take a conservative line on defence. The ideational discourses of the Special Relationship and British militarism are the key, the link between the international and domestic influences and their interaction with government agency. Yet it is wrong to see them as one more chain in the process of cause and effect; they are more the medium, the fluid in which the chemical reaction between these components takes place; the lens through which the Labour government perceived the limits of its policy space on BMD.

The SRA was defined as a general heuristic for thinking about how agents and structures interact in general contexts. The key theoretical insight of the SRA was its concept of strategic-selectivity: the ability of different actors to perceive options and closures presented to them by particular structural situations and to make strategic choices about which path to follow, and by working through those choices over time changing the boundaries of those self-same structural limitations they first found themselves in to create new options for action (Jessop, 2016). The SRA’s application as an explainer of state power was a stepping stone to examining the reasons behind foreign policy as an expression of state agency. The most powerful critique of the SRA was that its forensic examination of causes and actors intentions limited it to a post hoc type of analysis, instead of giving it more predictive power (Jessop, 2008b, p.44).

The electorate were found to possess coherent foreign policy views which influenced their choice of who to vote for; forcing political parties to develop foreign policy platforms which catered to these outlooks in order to be elected to office (Reifler et al., 2011). However, it was also shown that outside of the voting booth, electors had restricted access to the day-to-day making of foreign policy, with greater influence on the policy process being exerted by agents with greater insider access to that particular strategically-selective context on the day-to-day level by whatever means gave them an advantage.
Bringing the two previous sections together, the SRA was then applied to analyse the influence of the electorate in the making of the last Labour government’s BMD policy from 1997-2010. The SRA was shown to have a particularly strong explanatory capability for this case study as it accounted for the government’s ability to survey the strategically-selective domestic electoral and international environments and make the choice to pursue a potentially unpopular foreign policy under the appreciation that BMD was such a little-known issue for most of the electorate that the risk of losing a small number of votes over it was far outweighed by the need to bolster the UK’s national security by upholding the Special Relationship with the US as the UK’s prime security guarantor and gain a foothold in an emerging defence system.

Ultimately, the fact that the SRA is an under-applied theoretical model, and even rarer in its application to foreign policy analysis, especially in the British context, is not limiting but liberating, as it points to new horizons of potential enquiry.

The thesis now turns from the theoretical to the technical in order to give an overview of missile defence strategy and technology as it developed and matured between 1997 and 2010.
Chapter 4. The All-Seeing Eye

This chapter explains the strategic and technical underpinnings of BMD. It complements the wider thesis by explaining the background to Labour’s BMD policy from 1997-2010, since it was the strategic intentions behind BMD, and the technology developed to achieve those goals, that made it a defence, foreign policy and electoral issue for the Labour government of that era.

The chapter runs as follows: section one gives an outline of the abstract strategic theory supporting BMD; section two explains the technology and technical issues surrounding missile defence; section three gives a chronological account of BMD decisions taken by the various US administrations between 1997-2010; the final section gives an account of the UK’s role in BMD in terms of the strategic hopes the UK placed in taking part in the US’s BMD plans and the role that the physical BMD infrastructure based in the UK played in the overall system. Having given a broad summary of BMD developments, subsequent chapters then chart the detail behind these decisions.

The basic goal of BMD is to intercept incoming nuclear missiles. However, from this simple premise many strategic complications and questions arise. For example, even the name ballistic missile defence implies a somewhat dovish foundation to the system. Yet, as with all technology, its potential use lies with the intentions of the humans who control it. It is these different intentions for BMD strategy that are broadly outlined below.

The entire history of conflict is one of swords and shields. BMD is just one more step, albeit a highly technological one, in this endless dialectic between offence and defence. The unusual feature of BMD is that it can be used as both, depending on the kind of things the enemy wants to destroy vs. the kind of things the defender wants to protect, or what is more formally known as counter-force vs. counter-value. Counter-force refers to the targeting of nuclear weapons themselves: hence, missile defence is positioned to protect the nation’s nuclear silos (Smith, 2010). Counter-value means the targeting of civilian targets: in essence it is like holding a gun to the opponents head. Accordingly, missile defence is placed to defend cities (Sloss, 1984).

Exactly whose missiles BMD is expected to protect against is also an important strategic question. The usual model is that of a limited strike from a small nuclear proliferator or ‘rogue state’, an accidental launch of a few nuclear missiles from a major
nuclear-armed nation, or even an imagined lone nuclear missile attack from a terrorist group (Wilkening, 2000b, p.2; Futter, 2013, p.138). Defence against an all-out attack from a major nuclear weapons state involving thousands of missiles would not be possible as it would overwhelm the system (Wilkening, 2000a, p.2).

So, how supposedly does missile defence deter these enemies from launching a nuclear attack? In technical terms, it is because BMD raises an adversary’s ‘marginal costs’ – their capability to inflict damage at an affordable level – in two ways (Kent, 1984). First of all, it complicates their strategic calculations (Sloss, 1984). They must bear in mind that any attack may be unsuccessful, or at least less successful than they might anticipate, and they could suffer a devastating nuclear counterstrike in return. Secondly, the enemy would have to waste money and resources building more missiles in order to overcome the defence shield (Carter, 1984). An added bonus for any BMD possessing nation is that this raised marginal cost may be enough to deter potential proliferators from even beginning a nuclear arms programme in the first place (Steff, 2013, p.25).

The perennial strategic Achilles heel associated with BMD, however, is the assertion that no matter how sophisticated the technology, the advantage lies with the offence, who can just manufacture more warheads for less than it would cost the defence to build more interceptors (Sloss, 1984). The simplest way for an opponent to defeat a BMD system would be for them to launch more missiles than the system could cope with. For example, a BMD system focused on defending counter-value targets that was even 90% successful in defending cities from incoming missiles would still be a failure (Keeny Jr., 1984).

Having now established the general background to BMD strategy, it is necessary to explain how this strategy arose as a response to classical nuclear deterrence.

BMD arises from the threat of nuclear war. As soon as ballistic missiles were invented research began to find ways to intercept them (Stocker, 2004a). However, by the time the Cold War was solidly underway in the 1970s, serious attempts at developing missile defences had been abandoned due in part to the technical difficulty of building them, but moreover due to their proscription by international treaty, in particular the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty 1972. These treaties were based on the doctrines of mutually assured destruction and minimum deterrence, which saw missile defence as dangerously destabilising and a spur to nuclear war (Carter and Schwartz,
1984, p.330). It is now important to explain what these traditional doctrines entail, in order to demonstrate how much the strategies emerging from missile defence depart from them (Steff, 2013, p.1).

The idea of mutually assured destruction has underpinned nuclear deterrence since the invention of the atomic bomb: country $a$ fires its nuclear missiles at country $b$, country $b$ detects the incoming missile and launches its own nuclear missiles in retaliation at country $a$ (Bowen, 2001, p.10). Hence, anyone wanting to start a nuclear war would be ‘mad’ to do so, since the level of destruction suffered by the aggressor would be equal to that suffered by the country under attack.

This doctrine states that in order to prevent nuclear war by maintaining mutually assured destruction, nuclear-armed states should only build the minimum number of nuclear weapons needed to maintain the ‘balance of terror’ (Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, 2010, p.10). They certainly should not engage in developing ballistic missile defence as this would be a dangerously destabilising spur to the nuclear arms race, since each side would seek to overwhelm the other’s missile defence through sheer numbers (Sloss, 1984). It could also encourage national leaders to start a nuclear war under the misguided impression that a missile defence shield would protect them (Sloss, 1984).

Over time, the doctrines of minimum deterrence and MAD came to be undermined by the proliferation of missile defence technology to states outside the bipolar balance of power between the US and Soviet Union, greatly complicating the many possible interactions between nuclear-armed states and therefore raising the statistical chance of a nuclear conflict taking place (Craig, 2009). This changing landscape of nuclear confrontation can be divided into several different ‘waves’ of deterrence theory. Using this waves model it is possible to see how as missile defence emerged as a technology in its own right, the novel innovations in strategy it engendered came to compliment and potentially eclipse those of traditional nuclear deterrence.

First wave deterrence theory is the classical notion of deterrence that has already been outlined above: peace is maintained in the form of mutually assured destruction with minimum deterrence as its guarantor (Steff, 2013, p.14). By the 1970s, second wave deterrence theory had risen to prominence: moving on from a shaky reliance on the balance of terror to prevent nuclear war, nuclear stability became
formalised and bureaucratised through the maintenance of treaties preventing the build up of arms and missile defences, such as the ABM Treaty 1972 (ibid, p.16).

The third wave of deterrence was precipitated by the proliferation of nuclear weapons to other states outside of the traditional superpower dichotomy. Such a development posed real challenges to classical nuclear deterrence, as it became apparent that in this strategic nuclear environment emerging nuclear powers had an asymmetric advantage over the established nuclear powers (ibid, p.20). These smaller nations could be tempted to pursue proxy conflicts with a level of impunity, since for the superpowers the stakes of risking Armageddon over a containable regional conflict were too high. The threat of all out nuclear war against such relatively ‘minor’ incursions would have been overkill. After the end of the Cold War, the main threat from nuclear proliferators came not so much from the threat of an all-out nuclear war – the new proliferators just did not have the numbers of missiles and warheads to start such a conflagration – but that they would nevertheless try to use their limited stockpiles to limit the US’s freedom of movement to intervene against them (USSTRATCOM, cited in ibid, p.22). Consequently, missile defence began to be considered with greater seriousness, due to its potential to maintain the US’s freedom of movement from behind such a shield.

The fourth and most recent wave is characterised by concern over the proliferation of nuclear weapons to non-state actors, such as terrorist groups (Sperling, 2010), and can be seen as the era when the strategies associated with missile defence really came into their own. The concern was not that terrorist groups would develop nuclear weapons themselves – such a capability being outside the technical expertise of most countries, let alone a stateless terrorist gang – but that rogue states might supply one to such a group as some kind of asymmetric revenge against a rival they could not hope to challenge through a more frontal assault (Steff, 2013, p.24). It was feared that these groups and their sponsors would be so inherently irrational to attempt such a scheme in the first place, that the usual strategy of nuclear deterrence would be useless in dissuading them. Therefore, missile defence was required in order to intercept any irrational acts of nuclear conflagration (ibid). Once identified, missile defence would then provide a shield from behind which the US could hold the rogue state that had supplied the terrorists to account, and meet out its retaliatory punishment as it saw fit (ibid).
Yet, what if one country did develop a shield against nuclear weapons in response to these waves of proliferation? In this model, country \( a \) fires on country \( b \), but country \( b \) deploys its missile defence system to intercept the incoming missiles and render the attack harmless. Country \( b \) could now choose to relent, safe in the knowledge that it has defeated a deadly act of aggression, or it could launch its own nuclear weapons on a now defenceless and spent enemy (Carter and Schwartz, 1984, p.116). Immediately, problems with this simplistic model spring to mind. Is it possible for any missile defence system to intercept all the incoming missiles launched from an adversary? What would be an acceptable number of missiles to get through? Should missile defence protect cities or military assets, one’s own nuclear missiles in particular? Would not a country with missile defence be tempted to launch a first strike against potential rivals knowing they could not fight back? Why not simply build huge amounts of missiles to overwhelm any possible defence? Here we have the basic arguments that have surrounded missile defence since its inception, causing the formation of at least four different military strategies seeking to apply BMD to different ends. Two of these approaches – countervailing strategy and deterrence by denial – may be deemed as more mainstream, based upon the observation that they appear to align with the strategic thinking behind actual BMD policies enacted by various US Presidencies. Two others – defence emphasis and war-fighting – have had less practical application.

The most influential of these approaches is known as countervailing strategy. Here, missile defence is used to ensure that the defending nation’s nuclear missile silos and command and control facilities are protected and can therefore fire back, unimpeded by the aggressor’s attack (Carter and Schwartz, 1984, p.47). This deters enemies because they will doubt the efficacy of their assault, while recognising that they are leaving themselves open to a devastating response against which they have no corresponding defence. Even an imperfect defence would still allow a ‘ragged response’ from the defending nation’s surviving missiles of sufficient destructive capacity as to still deter the enemy (Wilkening, 2010, p.11). This is the basic stance that appears to have informed much of missile defence policy over the decades, based on the observation that it seems to match with the military posture BMD is intended to portray by states that have such a system; i.e., emphasising its defensive nature while hinting about how it improves the threat of massive retaliation.
The next most influential missile defence strategy is known as deterrence by denial, which could be referred to as something of a shadow doctrine behind countervailing strategy because its application is implied rather than explicit. The basic concept behind deterrence by denial is that missile defence creates a shield from behind which a state can intervene against nuclear-armed adversaries with impunity: in this way missile defence preserves a state’s freedom of action (European Parliament, 2011, p.12). It undercuts the potential for an enemy nation to engage in ‘nuclear blackmail’; the ability to carry out acts of aggression against its own population or neighbouring countries through the implicit or open threat of nuclear retaliation against any state that attempts to intervene (Sloss, 1984). This particular application of BMD strategy can be seen in the Bush administration’s interactions with what it called rogue states (Steff, 2013, p.2).

Although this seemingly idealistic interpretation of missile defence strategy was once deeply canonical, being advocated by President Reagan as the source of inspiration for his Strategic Defence Initiative programme (Carter and Schwartz, 1984, p.159), the strategy of defence emphasis is today much more of an outlier. Simply put, defence emphasis argues that missile defence should be used as a platform for the total abolition of nuclear weapons (ibid, p.44), which appears similar to the stance Gordon Brown’s administration took towards missile defence (Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 2009). From this point of view mutually assured destruction is totally immoral, a system in which unwitting civilians are held hostage to the balance of power (Schaffer, 2012, p.2). International stability is maintained through the enemy’s easy access and ability to vaporise your fellow citizens, and you theirs. It is therefore vital to build missile defence in order to break out of this deadlock. The hope is that the rise of missile defence among rival nations will utterly undermine MAD, leading to the obsolescence of offensive nuclear weapons. Potential proliferators will also be dissuaded from even beginning to develop their own nuclear missiles, as it raises the research and development entry cost beyond any kind of useful return, seeing as the missiles could just be intercepted anyway (Wilkening, 2010, p.14).

Last among the missile defence strategies is the warfighting school. Something of an extension of deterrence by denial – and taking its cue from countervailing strategy – this strategic outlook sees the aggressive potential in missile defence as an opportunity for pre-emptively starting a ‘winnable’ nuclear conflict in which one’s nation and military are left intact to wage a victorious conventional war against what
is left of the enemy (Sloss, 1984). Having already depleted the enemies nuclear forces with a pre-emptive strike, missile defence would then be able to intercept any lingering enemy ICBMs that survived (Lonsdale, 2019, p.109). Hence, the warfighting school requires full-spectrum missile defence to protect nuclear forces, conventional forces, command, control, communication and intelligence (C3I) assets, population and industry (ibid, p.43). While deterrence by denial still errs on the side of being a defensive posture – yes, it facilitates active military operations against nuclear-armed states, but only, its exponents maintain, in response to their aggression – so the warfighting school seeks to use BMD to take the fight to the enemy first. This stance has had less direct influence on actually existing missile defence policy due to its inflammatory nature. However, there were advisors in the Bush administration that advocated a potential strategy for dealing with Iraq, Iran and North Korea, which resembled the warfighting school outlook very closely (Donnelly, 2000, p.56).

4.1 Missile Defence Phases
Different components of missile defence attempt to intercept incoming ballistic missiles during different phases of their flight. Acting together, they provide a layered defence, which gives a greater chance of the attacking missiles being intercepted at some point during their flight (Stocker, 2004b, p.32). This is known as the ‘kill probability’, it is based on the assumption that a single interceptor missile has a 90% chance of destroying its target, and that therefore two interceptor missiles have a 99% chance of destroying the target (Glazebrook and Washburn, 2004, p.454). However, this is countered on the attacking side by what is called the ‘drawdown curve’, the probability that multiple attacking missiles will eventually reach their target. Again, it is assumed that the chance of the defending target surviving an attack by a single missile is around 85%, but that the probability of the target surviving an attack by two missiles is the square of the first attack, 85 x 85 = 72%. The chance of surviving a third missile is even smaller (51%), and so the overall probability of surviving falls rapidly with the increasing number of attacking missiles (Carter and Schwartz, 1984, p.109-111).

Of course, it is recognized in the missile defence literature that these calculations are simply models based on assumptions of perfect information and a perfect time horizon (Glazebrook and Washburn, 2004, p.454). Ultimately, however, the irony is that even though both attack and defence know this, the psychological
pressure of needing to maximize their respective offence and defence forces them to act as though it were true. The attacker will be forced to maximize its attack based upon the hedge that their attacking missiles will suffer the greatest number of malfunctions and the missile defence system will work at optimum capacity, while the defence must maximize its defensive capabilities based upon the exact opposite assumption (Carter and Schwartz, 1984, p.7).

The boost phase of an attacking missile’s flight refers to the period between launch and leaving the Earth’s atmosphere. This would be the ideal point to intercept the incoming missile as it is most distance from its target, has not reached full speed, and the missile’s hot exhaust also makes it easier to detect and track (Carter and Schwartz, 1984, p.52; Stocker, 2004a, p.2). However, boost-phase intercept has proven the most difficult phase to develop missile defence components for due to its short span of around 240 seconds, and because the launch takes place deep within the attacking nation’s territory and far from the defending nation’s interceptors (Young, 1984, p.148). Consequently, by 2010 boost phase targeting remained without a specific intercept technology.

During the midcourse phase the missile has now left the Earth’s atmosphere and is travelling at full speed. Most BMD components, particularly Ground-Based Midcourse Area Defence (GMD), but also Aegis, focus on intercepting the incoming missiles during this stage as it lasts around 20 minutes, 80% of the missile’s total flight time (ibid). Consequently, most of the attacking missile’s anti-BMD countermeasures also come into play during this phase, such as inflatable fake warheads and chaff (Carter and Schwartz, 1984, p.61; Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, 2010, p.6). Since all the countermeasures travel at the same velocity in the vacuum of space they form a ‘threat cloud’ which makes it difficult for the interceptors to differentiate between the actual warheads and the general detritus emanating from the missile chassis (Bowen, 2001, p.6; Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2016). To further undermine BMD, attacking missiles could be launched on super-lofted or super-depressed trajectories which, in the case of the former, pressurise the defence by greatly increasing the speed of re-entry and, in the latter, significantly reduce the flight time from launch to impact (Carter and Schwartz, 1984, pp.58, 108).

The terminal phase covers the final 15 seconds of the missile’s trajectory as it re-enters the atmosphere (Roper, in Ranger et al., 2002, p.100; Youngs and Taylor, 2003, p.9). The imminence of the missile’s impact makes it very difficult to intercept,
however the BMD components allocated to terminal defence – Aegis and Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) – have some advantages during this phase as the heat of re-entry causes the missile to become very hot and therefore easier to track, as well as causing any decoys to burn up, making targeting easier (Young, 1984, p.150).

At this point it is important to discuss the strategic relationship between BMD and the militarisation of space, of which it is often seen as a part. This is not surprising; space has a vital strategic role in US military thinking. As the US Air Force puts it, ‘Throughout history, controlling the high ground of the battlefield has been a vital element of military strategy. Space is the ultimate high ground’ (2006, p.1). Indeed, the control of space is a desired aim of US strategy: the US Joint Chiefs of Staff document Joint Vision 2020, states that in order to meet future challenges the military would employ a strategy of ‘full spectrum dominance’ in which US forces would be able to dominate ‘space, sea, land, air, and information’ [emphasis added] (Director for Strategic Plans and Policy, 2000, p.6). Further, the 2001 Quadrennial Defence Review noted, 'A key objective...is not only to ensure US ability to exploit space for military purposes, but also as required to deny an adversary's ability to do so' (Department of Defense, 2001, p.7). The link between these broader statements of US space strategy and BMD come together in the concept of the high frontier, as developed in 1982 by Lt. General Daniel O. Graham, which argued for the abandonment of Mutual Assured Destruction in favour of Assured Survival through the creation of effective defences against ballistic missiles (Pressler, 1986, p.99).

However, it must be noted that BMD in and of itself is not a component of space warfare. The destructive elements of BMD – the Exoatmospheric Kill Vehicles (EKVs), and to a lesser extent THAAD and Aegis – can destroy incoming missiles in space, but they are not based there. Indeed, BMD could be seen as nothing more than a rather extreme form of surface-to-air combat. This is quite different to what was originally envisaged in Reagan’s SDI of the 1980s, the aptly nicknamed ‘Star Wars’ programme, consisting of lasers in space ready to vaporise missiles as they took off. Where BMD could be seen as contributing to the militarisation of space, however, is through a powerful logic pushing enemies towards directly targeting the detection and tracking elements of BMD that are indeed based in space – the Space-Based Infrared System (SBIRS) and Space Tracking Surveillance System (STSS) – (O’Hanlon, 2004, p.18), which in turn led to US proposals for what were called 'bodyguard satellites'
that would shadow American satellites and defend them if necessary (McMahon, 1997, p.230). So far, no such components have ever been built, but there is actually no ban on such weapons, the Outer Space Treaty of 1967 only prohibits the deployment or use of nuclear weapons in space (O'Hanlon, 2004, p.9).

4.2 Strategic Arguments For and Against BMD

Having covered the strategy behind missile defence it is now possible to summarize some key arguments for and against.

One of the main arguments in favour of BMD is the assertion that traditional nuclear deterrence based on MAD is immoral (Schlosser, 2013, p.455). Missile defence gives an opportunity for the state possessing it to withdraw its citizens from the abusive co-dependency of minimal deterrence. The proliferation of missile defence technology to other countries is a strategic good, which will eventually lead to the obsolescence of nuclear armaments since they would be pointless in a world where every nation could intercept them (O'Neill, 2002). Missile defence will also deter potential nuclear proliferators from beginning their own research programmes, since the numbers of missiles and sophisticated countermeasure technology required to outmanoeuvre BMD raises the entry price of the missile defence club even higher (Steff, 2013, p.24).

Building missile defence makes sound strategic sense, its supporters argue, because it improves a country’s survivability quotient against nuclear war. It may help prevent nuclear war altogether, as the opponent must consider that their attack may fail, or at least be retarded (Carter and Schwartz, 1984, p.103). A further positive by-product of possessing missile defence is that it preserves freedom of action against nuclear-armed states (Sperling, 2010). Nuclear blackmail is neutralised by the protective network of missile defence interceptors (Frontline, 2001). This could even be taken a step further to use BMD as a shield from behind which to launch pre-emptive attacks against nuclear-armed adversaries, while at the same time ensuring dominance in space (United States Air Force, 2006; Stocker, 2004a, p.4).

The main objection to BMD is that it will make nuclear war more likely as countries build more missiles in order to overwhelm the system (Futter, 2013, p.11). It also makes war more likely because the country that possesses missile defence may be tempted to launch a first strike against its enemies (Carter and Schwartz, 1984, p.46). In response, proliferation will be exacerbated as states which do not already
possess nuclear arms will construct them in order to prevent themselves coming under pre-emptive attack. Finally, it makes war more likely as countries believe they can solve the conundrum of nuclear deterrence with a technological fix instead of diplomatic negotiation, as well as contributing to the militarisation of space (Carter and Schwartz, 1984, p.22; O'Hanlon, 2004).

### 4.3 Missile Defence Technology

In addition to these strategic considerations there are also a number of technical challenges facing BMD, it is to these aspects of missile defence that the thesis now turns.

The challenge of making a missile defence system work has been said to be one of the most difficult technical challenges in military history. Lt General Ronald Kadish, the head of US missile defence from 1999-2004, likened it to the Manhattan project or the Apollo Moon landings (Kadish, 2002, cited in Peoples, 2010, p.203). Stephen Schwartz of the Brookings Institute claims that the US spent $274bn dollars on missile defence between 1962 – when reliable records of missile defence R&D began – and the publication of his article in 2012 (Schwartz, 2012). During 1997-2010 alone the Americans spent $94.1bn on missile defence (MDA, 2016d). Yet how much progress did all this money actually bring to missile defence research? What exactly was it all spent on? This section addresses these questions by examining technology; how the individual components of BMD work, and systems; how these different parts of BMD work together. Because this chapter is part of a historical study, it discusses BMD technology as it existed between 1997-2010, although where necessary it does make reference to developments in BMD technology before and after this period.

Missile defence is not a single thing, it is a network of numerous components; interceptor missiles, radars, command and control stations, theatre defence elements, satellites and cruisers. These components all add up to make the Ballistic Missile Early Defence System (BMDS). Some of these technologies were in development before 1997, while some of them began development after this date but did not come to fruition until after 2010. Some of these technologies were created and scrapped within this period – despite having billions of dollars of research spent on them. This section of the thesis therefore outlines the roles each of these components play in BMD from
the ground up, as it were, e.g. target acquisition, tracking, discrimination, interceptor control and target kill (Weiner, 1984).

First of all, in order to be able to intercept a ballistic missile you need to be able to ‘see’ it. Radars and satellites therefore form the ‘eyes’ of BMD: they range from fixed to mobile, and large to (relatively) small. Together, they all form part of the Ballistic Missile Early Warning System (BMEWS). The many types of BMD radars and the bandwidths they emit play different roles in missile defence. Radars function by emitting radio waves that rebound from the objects they are searching for: the shorter the wavelength the greater the rate of return and the sharper the image. The Upgraded Early-Warning Radars (UEWR) such as RAF Fylingdales therefore use a low frequency UHF bandwidth for broader searches at great ranges, while the sea-based X-band radar (SBX-1) uses the much higher frequency X-band for enhanced tracking. It is akin to switching from using a large searchlight to give a broad but diffuse view of the night sky, to using a small but powerful hand torch to highlight a specific area (Raytheon, 2016a).

UEWRs form the bedrock of BMD. Their primary mission is to scan for and track incoming nuclear missiles. The UEWRs themselves look like a truncated pyramid with a flat top, several stories tall. On the front and back of the ‘pyramid’ is a circular layout of several thousand antennae (RAF, 2015a), resembling short, stocky TV aerials. These antennae form a ‘phased array’, a totally electronic computer-controlled system by which the bandwidth, focus and tracking speed of the radar’s scanning beam can alter instantly and precisely. There are three UEWRs – Site I at Clear, Alaska, Site II at Thule, Greenland, and Site III at RAF Fylingdales in North Yorkshire. The scanning field of each radar emanates in a dome shape far above the Earth’s surface to a range of 3,000 nautical miles and can track up to 800 moving objects at once (RAF, 2015b). A map of their coverage would show that these three radars provide an invisible semi-circle of detection, ensuring that any missile attack coming from the US’S North, West and East would be picked up by them. However, because they are radars they cannot see below the horizon, and so they are complemented by the Space-based Infrared System (SBIRS).

SBIRS is a configuration of two separate satellite systems which can detect ballistic missile launches anywhere around the world. SBIRS HIGH – aptly named due to its distance of over 22,000 miles above the Earth – was conceived of as a series of four satellites in geosynchronous orbit (GEO) around the equator, with a further
two in a highly elliptical orbit (HEO) around the poles, although by 2010 only the two HEO satellites had been deployed (Air Force Space Command, 2013b; Lockheed Martin, 2013). From their vantage point the SBIRS-HIGH satellites could use their infrared equipment to detect the heat signatures of missile launches anywhere on Earth. However, once a missile has left the atmosphere and is no longer firing its rockets it becomes undetectable to SBIRS-HIGH and the Space Tracking and Surveillance System (STSS) comes into play (Lockheed Martin, 2016b).

By taking its cue from SBIRS-HIGH, the two satellites which make up STSS (deployed 2009) are able to use their relatively low orbit at the height of 1350 km to visually observe and track the incoming missiles as they move to the mid-course phase of their trajectory (Northrop Grumman, 2012). The data from SBIRS-HIGH and the STSS is then fed back to US Space Command via four ground-relay stations based at various points around the world, including RAF Menwith Hill (MilsatMagazine, 2009).

Back on Earth, the sea-based X-band radar is a behemoth of a platform. Composed of a spherical radome mounted on a self-propelled oil-rig platform, its mobility allows it to be deployed anywhere around the world in response to rising tensions (MDA, 2008, p.3-4). Placing the SBX-1 in international waters also reduces concerns about issues of sovereignty or having to gain permission from a country to deploy such equipment. The X-band frequency in which the SBX-1 radar scans is a very fine wavelength, making it capable of tracking and differentiating between objects at high resolution. This makes it an extremely useful tool for its intended purpose of missile tracking, countermeasure discrimination and missile kill assessment (ibid). It was an X-band radar that was rumoured to be under consideration for RAF Fylingdales, before being put forward for the Third Site in the Czech Republic (Defence Committee, 2003, para 61; Whitby Gazette, 2003; Dodge, 2019, p.93; Missile Defense Agency, 2007, p.6).

Right on the frontline of BMEWS, the compact design of the squat, rectangular bus-sized Army Navy Type 2 Radar (AN/TPY-2 Radar) allows it to be transported and forward deployed as close to the potential missile threat as possible. At such close quarters its high-resolution X-band radar is ideally placed to detect, discriminate, classify and estimate the trajectories of ballistic missiles as soon as they are launched (MDA, 2016a, p.1). Indeed, its manufacturers claim it is capable of tracking a baseball from several hundred miles away (Raytheon, 2015). The AN/TPY-2 Radar was a key
component of the European Phased Adaptive Approach put forward by Obama (Mayer, 2011, p.8).

Once the target has been acquired the next step is to destroy it. Ground-Based Midcourse Area Defence (GMD) is the archetypal missile defence technology. It is the classic vision of an interceptor missile which shoots up from the Earth’s surface to destroy an incoming ICBM warhead out in space. GMD is actually composed of several elements. The first of these are the Ground-Based Interceptors (GDI); large, multi-stage rockets housed in underground missile silos, capable of intercepting medium and long-range ballistic missiles outside of the atmosphere. Since 2004 there have been 30 GDI in operation: 26 at Fort Greeley in Alaska, and 4 at Vandenberg Air Force Base in California (MDA, 2016g). However, the GDI is just a mean of delivery, its payload is known as the Exoatmospheric Kill Vehicle (EKV). Looking like a telescope with rockets, the EKV has no additional explosives or any specialised design features that makes it more destructive, such as pointed or blunt protrusions. It is nothing more than a series of precision electro-optical sensors necessary to guide the kill vehicle towards its intended target, attached to a highly manoeuvrable rocket motor. The EKV itself is its own destructive element, and obliterates the incoming missile simply by colliding with it. Despite all this high technology, however, the decision to launch the GDI missiles and their EKV payload is made by US Air Force personnel based at the two GMD Fire Control (GFC) stations in Vandenberg and Colorado Springs, where the outside data from the various satellite and radar systems comes together (ibid). The GFC stations in turn constantly feed back to the larger Command, Control, Battle Management and Communications (C2BMC) infrastructure. Several rumoured sites for the placement of GMD interceptors somewhere in the UK – RAF Lakenheath, RAF Fylingdales, northern Scotland – emerged from 2007 onwards, before a site was chosen, and subsequently cancelled, in Poland (Taylor, 2008; The Economist, 2007; HoC Deb, 2007j, cc1141-2; Hildreath and Ek, 2010, p.1).

Aegis – meaning shield – is the naval component of ballistic missile defence. Aegis itself is a weapons system made up of an S-band radar capable of tracking multiple targets at sea, in the air and in space, coupled with the Standard Missile 3 (SM-3), which launches vertically from the ship’s deck and contains its own EKV (Lockheed Martin, 2003; 2016a; 2016c). The main advantage of Aegis cruisers, as with the SBX-1, is that they are highly mobile and operate in international waters.
They can therefore patrol close to potential flashpoints, ready to detect and respond to missile launches much earlier. In this way Aegis plays a central role in regional defence, where it is capable of intercepting short and intermediate range ballistic missiles both inside and outside the atmosphere. Aegis also plays a subsidiary role in homeland defence by using their SPY-1 long-range surveillance and tracking radars to cue GMD interceptor missiles (MDA, 2011).

First coming into service in 2004, by 2010 there were 20 Aegis cruisers in operation, mostly deployed in the Mediterranean and Middle-Eastern waters (MDA, 2016f; O'Rourke, 2010, Summary). One unusual spin-off from this technology was Aegis Ashore, announced in 2009. This was an almost exact copy of the ship-based Aegis radar and missile system, except built on land. It effectively took the place of a cancelled GMD interceptor site which was originally scheduled to be built in Poland (then relocated to Romania to be operational by 2015), due to the Aegis system’s higher success rate in tests (MDA, 2016f).

Coming back to dry land, THAAD is a truck mounted missile battery providing theatre defence to troops and cities against short and medium range ballistic missiles inside or just outside of the atmosphere in the terminal phase of their flight. Due to its compact design, THAAD can be rapidly transported to threat situations around the world (Lockheed Martin, 2015). Its caravan like configuration is made up of a truck-mounted launcher, the earlier mentioned AN/TPY-2 radar for targeting, and a fire control unit from which Army personnel commit the launch sequence and uplink situational awareness data into the overall BMDS. Twelve THAAD batteries were active by 2009, which worked in concert with Aegis and Patriot to provide layered defence (MDA, 2016i).

The last line of missile defence, Patriot takes something of a meta approach to BMD in that it provides missile defence of missile defence. It is therefore not directly involved in the interception of the classical long-range ICBMs that other elements of BMD engage. What Patriot does provide, however, is missile defence to the BMD components that do indeed play a direct role in this, such as radar stations, which the enemy might try to destroy in order to blind the system (MDA, 2016h). It also contributes to BMD’s overall situational awareness by transmitting incoming missile data to the C2BMC infrastructure (ibid). Physically, Patriot resembles a more stripped down version of the THAAD caravan set-up, with separate radar and command units dominated by a large rectangular missile launcher (Raytheon, 2016b).
Yet how do the various components of BMD actually work together in the event of a missile attack? Overall, BMD is managed by the United States Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM) based at Offutt Air Force Base, Nebraska, and its subsidiaries at the Missile Defence Integration and Operations Centre (MDIOC) and Joint Functional Component Command for Integrated Missile Defense (JFCCIMD), both at Schriever AFB in Colorado Springs (JFCCIMC, 2015; MDA, 2016e; 2016j; Northrop Grumman, 2016). However, it would be wrong to say that BMD is controlled from these bases. Instead, BMD is a network of nodes located within the US and around the world (Cockburn, 2015, p.32). If one of these nodes is triggered, the system activates in relation to the scale of the response that is required. This could be THAAD in response to short to medium-range missiles, Aegis in response to medium to long-range missiles, GMD in response to ICBMs, or a combined response from all three. Fire control is instigated at the various launch sites by the military personnel that control them, such as the 100th Missile Defence Brigade which controls the GMD detachments in Vandenberg and Fort Greeley, the Air Force Space Command at Peterson AFB, also in Colorado, which receives radar data from the BMEWS radars (inc. RAF Fylingdales) and satellite data from SBIRS (via RAF Menwith Hill), and the US Pacific Fleet operating out of Pearl Harbour, which has responsibility for the Aegis cruisers (SMDC/ARSTRAT, no date; Air Force Space Command, 2013a; Commander U.S. Pacific Fleet, no date; MDA, 2016b). USSTRATCOM, MDIOC and JFCCIMD provide only operational support, there is no centralised command as such (MDA, 2016c). Technologists talk about cybernetics and synergistic functionality: BMD is the archetypal decentralised network. One of its main strengths is that it has no ultimate operational command centre, no prime target ‘headquarters’ to knock out: it is a system, not a thing (Department of Defense, 2006). Even if USSTRATCOM was destroyed BMD would still function.

4.4 US BMD Timeline

Having now examined the technical components of BMD and their strategic underpinning, it is possible to give a chronological account of the political decisions actually made to create missile defence. As the prime mover in BMD developments, and hence the greatest influence on the UK’s own missile defence policies, this section of the thesis gives an overview of US missile defence developments from 1997-2010.
The broad trend apparent from examining this period is the shift from resistance to BMD to its acceptance. However, even though by 2010 BMD was well on its way to becoming ‘just another’ military system, albeit a highly expensive and technologically advanced one, it had also suffered something of an effacement in being greatly scaled back from the grand vision of ‘lasers in space’ as set out in Reagan’s iconic ‘Star Wars’ plan. Giving the BMD developments of this period the most concise of summaries, it is possible to say that under Clinton BMD was resisted and then grudgingly accommodated, under Bush BMD was evangelically embraced and expanded, and under Obama BMD was accepted and normalised.

Despite being opposed to missile defence that went beyond the ABM Treaty’s one site, 100 interceptors limit (Futter, 2013, p.46, 75), President Clinton (1993-2001) was eventually pushed to enact two major pieces of missile defence legislation due to Republican control of Congress after 1994, the 1998 publication of the Rumsfeld report which argued that the US’s enemies would develop long-range missile capabilities far earlier than expected, and, ironically, North Korean missile tests that same year (ibid, p.87). The first of these policies was Clinton’s 3+3 plan announced in 1996, which set in motion a missile defence research programme based on three years of development prior to a presidential decision to deploy, followed by three years of construction, supposedly making live missile defence ready for 2003. Further, in 1999 Clinton signed the Missile Defence Act, which increased funding for missile defence. However, both of these policies sought to develop missile defence systems that would stay within the ABM Treaty while at same time committing the US to deploying a National Missile Defence shield ‘as soon as technically possible’ (Steff, 2013, p.76).

While the Clinton administration laid important groundwork for missile defence developments to come, most of the major BMD initiatives took place during the Bush administration (2001-2009). He took the US out of the ABM Treaty and looked to expand missile defence across Europe. This stance was underpinned by the ‘Bush Doctrine’, a foreign policy aimed at ensuring US power and pre-empting imminent military threats (Steff, 2013, pp.4-5). In May 2001 Bush announced his intention to move beyond the ABM Treaty (Futter, 2013, p.99). Then, 9/11 happened. The American government stated that 9/11 had strengthened the case for BMD since it demonstrated the lengths the US’s enemies might go to; next time the attack could be from a nuclear missile (Smith, 2005, p.459; Futter, 2013, p.125). Bush formally
withdrew from the ABM Treaty in December 2001 (Stocker and Weinack, 2003a, p.16). National Security Presidential Directive 23 was signed in December 2002, committing the US to develop a multi-layered BMD system that would target every phase of a missile’s flight (The White House, 2002). The BMD budget was boosted by more than 50% to $8.3bn for 2002 and directed to GMD, Patriot, THAAD, the Airborne Laser (ABL), a 'boost phase' interceptor and two space-based options (Wall, 2001). By December 2005 10 GMD interceptors had been deployed at Fort Greely in Alaska and Vandenberg Air Force Base in California (Steff, 2013, p.100). In July 2006 GMD was placed on alert 24 hours a day. By 2005 BMD funding stood at $10bn, rising to $11.2bn in 2007, the highest ever amount (Boese, 2006, cited in ibid, p.101).

In 2006, the Bush administration began thinking about placing a Third Site for missile interceptors in Europe. This plan was to place Ground-Based Interceptor missiles similar to those at Vandenburg and Fort Greely in Poland, and an X-band BMD radar in the Czech Republic by 2013 (Hildreath and Ek, 2010, p.1). Finally, the Obama administration (2009-2017) accepted, consolidated and in many ways expanded BMD. Obama’s new administration’s approach towards the system was aided by the publication of the Department of Defense’s Ballistic Missile Defence Review (BMDR) report in February 2010, which outlined BMD’s then current state-of-play after so many years of research (Department of Defense, 2010). Taking the BMDR as its cue, experimental BMD systems such as the Airborne Laser were cancelled and investments were focused upon more mature Aegis, THAAD, Patriot and GMD systems, yet overall Obama’s BMD funding stayed at levels only slightly below those of Bush (Futter, 2013, p.134). However, Bush’s Third Site policy was cancelled in favour of a European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA) which aimed to deploy less sophisticated but tried and tested BMD equipment to counter intermediate range missile threats from Iran more quickly (Office of the Press Secretary, 2009b). The EPAA plan was to send Aegis cruisers to the Mediterranean by 2011, followed by placements of Aegis Ashore in Romania by 2015, and in Poland by 2018 (Arms Control Association, 2013). The highpoint of Obama’s multilateral BMD approach came at the 2010 NATO Lisbon Summit when it was agreed that America’s EPAA system would be integrated with NATO (NATO, 2012; Steff, 2013, p.111). The Obama administration essentially continued Bush's policy of establishing a global multi-layered system except with the more exotic and costly elements removed. As such, BMD became normalised under Obama (Steff, 2013, p.103).
4.5 The UK’s Role in BMD

At last the thesis turns to the UK’s involvement in BMD. The fact that it has taken so long to get here is very informative, however, as it illustrates US dominance in missile defence. This sub-section mirrors the same outline as seen in the previous passage; strategy, technology, timeline.

The prime strategic goal for the UK in participating in US missile defence between 1997-2010 was to reinforce the deterrent effect of the UK’s conventional nuclear forces against proliferators who may have been so irrational that traditional nuclear deterrence alone would have had no effect on them (Ministry of Defence, 2002, p.23-29). This was something of a gamble for the British government; despite Bush’s 2000 campaign trail promise that he would extend BMD to ‘US friends and allies’, and the 2003 US/UK BMD Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) mentioning the potential extension of BMD coverage to the UK, the missile defence system such as it existed by the time Labour left office in May 2010 did not have the capability to launch interceptors from Vandenburg Air Force Base to intercept an attack (HoL Deb, 2000, c1327; Department of Defense, 2003, p.4).

Essentially, the British government’s decision to upgrade RAF Fylingdales and RAF Menwith Hill was a continuing hedge to gain a foothold in an emerging military technology with the hope that its protection would one day be expanded to the UK as the system matured (HoC Deb, 2007k, c919). Indeed, the UK’s willingness to play the long game eventually bore fruit when in November 2010 it was decided that BMD would cover all NATO member states (NATO, 2012).

As well as the particular goals of using BMD as a way of bolstering Trident and gaining the benefits of a new defence system without having to incur any of the development costs, the larger strategic picture requires that in order to augment its power in an anarchic international system and gain protection (Dyson, 2009, p.11) the UK allies itself with US foreign and defence policy in general. Hence, the integration of RAF Fylingdales and RAF Menwith Hill into US BMD architecture is just another facet of this drive.

The UK plays an absolutely vital role in BMD. Without the UK’s contribution of hosting two major sensor components at RAF Fylingdales (BMEWS) and RAF Menwith Hill (SBIRS) the system would not work. Financially, the UK has done quite
well out of the situation: the original cost of building the stations – and subsequent upgrades – was borne by the US, with Britain providing maintenance (Spinardi, 2007, p.93; Taylor, 2008, p.10).

RAF Fylingdales radar base was built in 1963 as part of BMEWS in order to detect the launch of Soviet nuclear missiles aimed at the UK, Western Europe and the US (Ministry of Defence, 2002, p.22). This information would then have been passed to UK and US command which would have retaliated with their own nuclear weapons. Rebuilt – at US expense – as a rectangular phased array in the 1990s, in 2003 software and hardware upgrades at RAF Fylingdales made it also capable of tracking incoming ballistic missiles as part of the US BMD system (Stocker, 2004a, p.195). Its position and 360° scanning range of 3000 nautical miles (RAF, 2015a; RAF, 2015b) put it in the ideal position for detecting missiles from the Eastern hemisphere, of which the greatest potential emerging threat during 1997-2010 came from Iran (Brown, 2010, p.26).

The iconic golf ball shaped radomes of RAF Menwith Hill which protect the radars inside from the weather, and also hide the direction they are pointing, became operational in 1960 as a communications hub and listening post for the US military (CND, 2012, pp.4, 32). In 1997 it also became the European relay ground station for SBIRS (CND, 2012, p.34; Taylor, 2008, p.5). In 2007 RAF Menwith Hill received further upgrades which would enable the detection of launches to be fed into the US BMD system, making it one of only four such sites around the world (MilsatMagazine, 2009; Taylor, 2008, p.19). In this way it complements RAF Fylingdales' more detailed tracking and differentiation.

Tony Blair’s premiership from 1997 to 2007 is characterized by an about turn in the UK’s missile defence policy, from staunchly upholding the ABM Treaty to the wholesale embrace of BMD. Prior to Blair coming to office, Clinton had already put in place his 3+3 missile defence plan in 1996, and in 1999 signed the Missile Defence Act (Futter, 2013, p.87). However, both of these policies sought to develop missile defence systems that would stay within the ABM Treaty. Accordingly, the British government and Prime Minister Blair re-stated the value they placed on the stability that the ABM Treaty provided (Butler, 2003a; Rusbridger and Freedland, 2004). In public the Labour government’s official position on potential upgrades to RAF Fylingdales was not to have a position (Stocker, 2004a, p.195). This non-committal approach was to remain the British government’s stance on BMD until 2002 when the
arrival of President Bush radically changed the US’s, and consequently Blair and his administration’s outlook on the UK’s involvement in the system (ibid, p.196).

The Bush/Blair era was the apogee of British and American cooperation on BMD. This cooperation began with a somewhat cautious start, as the Labour government came to terms with Bush’s intention to develop a full BMD system which would necessarily require the US to leave the ABM Treaty (Foreign Affairs Committee, 2000, Examination of Witnesses, 28 June 2000, HC 1999-00, Q167-8). Prior to their first meeting, Blair said that BMD ‘is definitely in the box marked ‘Handle with care’ (Forbes, 2001). This caution was to change quickly, however. Indeed, after their first meeting in February 2001, the White House issued a joint statement from Bush and Blair, which recognized the existence of a common threat stemming from the growing proliferation of WMDs and ballistic missiles, and called for defensive systems to counter them (Office of the Press Secretary, 2001a)

When Bush formally withdrew from the ABM Treaty in December 2001, suddenly the British government’s position became that it was not the ABM Treaty itself that was important, but strategic nuclear stability achieved by whatever mechanism worked best (Ministry of Defence, 2002, p.26). If this mechanism was now to be BMD, then so be it. Consequently, in December 2002 the Labour government received a request from the US to upgrade RAF Fylingdales so it could play a role in BMD (Taylor, 2008, p.8). In February 2003 the government agreed to the US’s request. Also in 2003, an MOU between the two countries was signed. Specifically, this MOU established the UK Missile Defence Centre (MDC), intended to be a forum for the exchange of scientific and technical information between US and UK defence companies, and an interface between the MOD and the US Missile Defence Agency (ibid, p.16).

In 2006, the Bush administration began thinking about placing a Third Site for missile interceptors in Europe. In February 2007 press reports alleged that Blair himself had actively lobbied for the Third Site to be based in the UK, supposedly at RAF Lakenheath (ibid, p.19). Ultimately, however, the next steps towards Britain’s integration into BMD would not be taken by Blair. He stood down as PM in June 2007 to be replaced by Gordon Brown who remained Prime Minister until 2010.

During the overlapping periods of Gordon Brown and President Bush’s leaderships the UK took another major step towards integration into BMD with an upgrade to RAF Menwith Hill. The US government’s official request to upgrade RAF
Menwith Hill as part of the US BMD system was received on 29th June 2007, two days after Brown became Prime Minister (Taylor, 2008, p.20). Permission was granted the following month (HoC Deb, 2007h, c71WS). However, this was to be the last of the major BMD developments under a Labour government, since after this the UK’s role in BMD was eclipsed by a shift to deploying BMD assets in Eastern Europe, with the US negotiating over housing Third Site components in Poland and the Czech Republic (Futter, 2013, p.126). Indeed, there are no records of Bush and Brown discussing the issue. In fact, Brown never made any policy statements on BMD at all during the Bush/Brown years. This move away from the UK being the forward outpost of BMD architecture in Europe would continue under Obama.

There were no further integrations of British assets in the US’s BMD plans during the overlap between the Gordon Brown and Obama administrations. The earlier upgrades received by RAF Fylingdales and RAF Menwith Hill during Labour’s term of office meant that the UK continued to play an important role in the US’s BMD system, but there were no further developments along these lines, while absolutely leaving the door open for future developments should they take place. The focus of Obama’s BMD policy finalised the trend of shifting to a focus on Eastern Europe and Aegis cruisers. Obama’s decision to scrap negotiations on placing a Third Site for missile defence in Poland and the Czech Republic in favour of a Phased Adaptive Approach for interceptors in Eastern Europe, which also eventually made BMD sensors and weapons systems available for NATO (Arms Control Association, 2013; Futter, 2013, p.140; NATO, 2012), led Brown to state that he welcomed the decision; the only direct comment attributed to Brown on BMD developments during his entire premiership (Joyner, 2009; Channel 4 News, 2009b; Channel 4 News, 2009a).

4.6 Conclusion

The thesis has so far examined the strategic and technical underpinning of BMD in the US and British contexts between 1997-2010. The strategic evolution of BMD during this era can be most broadly described as a general shift away from deterrence through retaliation to deterrence by denial through the inclusion of BMD (Steff, 2013, p.4-5). Various administrations leaned this way or that in regards to the particular type of missile defence strategy they wanted to pursue, but it does appear that the ‘countervailing strategy’ is the natural centre to which BMD returns. The UK’s
experience is somewhat different in that its BMD strategy mostly reacted to the US’s lead. However, it would be wrong to say that Britain’s stance on missile defence was totally subservient to America. While remaining somewhat sceptical about whether BMD could ever be made to work in a technical sense, the British Labour government nonetheless perfectly understood the UK’s own national interest in agreeing to become involved in the US’s BMD plans in terms of the psychological boost it would give to the perceived efficacy of the UK’s nuclear deterrent in the eyes of potential enemies, as well as the need to keep the US onside at all costs (Casey, 2009, p.277).

As for BMD technology, 1997-2010 saw considerable advancements, and several components of its overall system becoming operational and deemed able – though not proven – to defend against a limited ballistic missile attack on the US homeland (Department of Defense, 2010, p.iv). BMD as it existed in 1997 consisted of a few disparate test models and scattered theatre defence systems, such as Patriot, which had not yet been amalgamated under the missile defence umbrella. The BMD architecture that existed by 2010 could be divided into Eastern and Western spheres. Each sphere was intended to defend against a particular type of threat, and so the architecture differed in both its basic components and its level of development. The western half of BMD was based on the US’s Pacific coast and was primarily intended to defend against an attack from North Korea, though it could have potentially intercepted missiles from Iran as well (ibid). By 2010 this architecture included: 26 ground-based midcourse interceptor silos at Fort Greely, Alaska, and 4 at Vandenberg Air Force Base in California; upgraded detection and tracking radars in Alaska, California, Greenland and the UK (RAF Fylingdales), along with Sea-Based X-band radars; Aegis destroyers and cruisers; all linked via a sophisticated command and control infrastructure (ibid, p.15), including RAF Menwith Hill. However, despite including components based around the world, GMD was only meant to provide hemispheric defence for the US homeland.

On the Atlantic side, the US missile defence architecture based in Europe was in a way less ambitious but also more complex, in that it was made up of improvements to, and the integration of, several already existing theatre defence systems (Department of Defense, 2010, p.19). It was primarily intended to counter missile threats from Iran against US troops stationed in Europe, but also had a wider remit of guarding against missile proliferation across the Middle East and Eastern Hemisphere in general. By 2010 its role had been integrated into NATO and provided cover for
the US’s European allies. Its architecture consisted of Patriot missile batteries for the
defence of troops, bases and armaments, supported by the AN/TPY-2 radar. At sea,
Aegis cruisers were poised to intercept ballistic missile attacks in the upper-tier of the
atmosphere (Department of Defense, 2010, p.19). However, it is important to note that
if called upon to do so, there was no guarantee that BMD would even work. The
system as a whole has never had any real world battle testing, and perhaps the whole
point is that it never should, seeing as it is intended to enhance nuclear deterrence by
increasing the futility of attack.

Finally, there is a third factor to add to the strategic and technical aspects of
BMD; the political. As mentioned in the introduction, missile defence, like all
technology, is just a tool for whatever ends the government in power wants to put it
to. The last analysis, therefore, should be one which considers the properly political
reasons behind why the Labour government took BMD technology and strategy and
sought to apply it in the ways that they did. Doing so leads to some striking paradoxes
and contradictions.

Missile defence has always been most associated with the right-of-centre in
politics. Reagan dreamed of a world in which missile defence would make nuclear
weapons obsolete (Carter and Schwartz, 1984, p.159), and it is clear that the George
W. Bush administration was the most dynamic and ambitious in the sheer scale of
funding and the cornucopia of BMD technologies under development (Futter, 2013,
p.99). However, while it was the Republicans who evangelised missile defence, it was
the Democrats, and indeed Labour on the other side of the Atlantic, who took the
greatest steps to normalise BMD and turn it into an actually existing defence system.
Why would this be so? Perhaps it is a clear example of the ‘Nixon paradox’, which is
usually stated as the conundrum of conservative politicians enacting liberal policies,
and vice versa (Cowen and Sutter, 1998, p.605). In this case, the Democratic and
Labour administrations – being governments of the centre-left – were politically tied
to enact and even expand BMD, as to cut it would have been seen as ideological
shirking, and cost them votes. Furthermore, the pursuit of a traditionally centre-right
policy by centre-left governments reinforces the credibility and desirability of BMD
for governments of all political persuasions (ibid p.606). This is a very different
explanation than the technological determinism usually associated with BMD; that the
sheer size of the military architecture takes on a life and impetus of its own, that BMD
is too big to fail. Or perhaps there is something of the ‘sunk cost fallacy’ about BMD:
the US has spent so much money and time on it already that they feel compelled to keep doing so. Since it has never been conclusively demonstrated that BMD would actually work in a conflict situation, because it has never been in one, it cannot be the demonstrated usefulness of BMD technology that has caused it to be one of the biggest spending military projects in history at nearly $100bn by 2006 alone (Futter, 2013, p.124).

Having so far explained the theoretical, strategic and technical underpinning of the thesis in the preceding chapters, the thesis now turns to its three substantive chapters giving an original historical narrative and strategic-relational analysis of the Labour government’s missile defence policies during each of the three Parliaments that made up Labour’s overall term of office between 1997 and 2010.

The aim of this chapter is to provide both a narrative account of Labour’s BMD policy from 1997 to 2001, and, moreover, to use the strategic-relational approach to explain the reasons behind these particular policy choices. The structure of the chapter is as follows. Firstly, it summarises the main ballistic missile defence developments that took place during this Parliament. Secondly, it examines the structural constraints that shaped the government’s BMD policy, such as the international environment and the electoral preferences of British voters. Thirdly, it scrutinises the agential role that influential individuals, such as the Prime Minister, Secretaries of State and US Presidents played in shaping the British government’s BMD policy. Then, an assessment is made of the role that ideational discourses such as the Special Relationship and British militarism played in shaping these agent’s perceptions of the opportunities and restrictions the aforementioned structural constraints placed on their formation of Labour’s BMD policy. Finally, the chapter concludes with a strategic-relational analysis of the interaction between these structural, agential and discursive factors, thereby offering a richer explanation of the formation of the Labour government’s BMD policy in their first term of office than more traditional theories of foreign policy making can provide.

The Labour government’s BMD policy during its first Parliament from May 1997 to June 2001 was characterised by a wait and see approach (Stocker, 2004a, p.172): the government waited to see what decisions the US would make on BMD and then followed suit. This tendency is most clearly illustrated by the British government’s shift from urging the Clinton administration to ensure that if they were indeed going to construct a missile defence shield then to please keep it within the boundaries of the ABM Treaty (HoL Deb, 2000, c1332), to pleading with the Bush administration to at least build missile defence that compromised on a modified ABM Treaty with Russia’s agreement (HoC Deb, 2001d, c982).

This is not to say that the British government had no agency of their own during this time – they were sincere in their attempts to convince the US to only develop missile defences that did not undermine the ABM Treaty, while also undertaking their own missile defence feasibility studies (HoC Deb, 2000n, c748) – but it is clear that the UK was responding to the US’s lead. Ultimately, however,
Labour’s first term of office expired with no formal request from the US government for the UK to upgrade any of the existing missile detection architecture at RAF Fylingdales or RAF Menwith Hill so that these sites could play a role in missile defence (HC Deb, 2001o, c341).

Between 1997 and 2001 the British government had to navigate profound shifts in the US’s BMD policy. The Clinton administration was fundamentally opposed to BMD, seeing it as a potential spur to nuclear proliferation, but was pushed towards increasing missile defence funding due to domestic pressures from a Republican controlled Congress and international events like the North Korean missile test in 1998 (Futter, 2013, pp.58, 70). Whereas for the Bush administration, creating a BMD system capable of protecting the entire US and its allies had been a key campaign pledge (Bush, 1999). The Clinton era’s stance on BMD was therefore much easier for the Labour government to assimilate, in that their emphasis on the importance of the US pursuing a missile defence system in keeping with the ABM Treaty seemed to find a sympathetic ear (HoC Deb, 2000c, c85). However, once Bush became President during the last 6 months of Labour’s first term of office, committed as he was to developing a missile defence system in abrogation of the ABM Treaty if so required (HoL Deb, 2000, c1320), the British government’s counsel to the US came to focus even more on the importance of dialogue with the international community about their plans (HoC Deb, 2001d, c983).

Personal relationships between British Prime Ministers and US Presidents also played a role in the ebb and flow of the Labour government’s BMD policy during this era. Ironically, even though Clinton and Blair were ideologically much closer, both of them being Third Way politicians with a similar viewpoint on domestic politics and the economy (Gould, 1998, p.231), in terms of foreign policy, Blair’s outlook, though coming from a very different starting point, was far closer to President Bush’s in his willingness to use force (Blair, 2006b; Blair, 2006c; Blair, 2006a, pp.8, 34). Yet, while Blair’s personal position on missile defence during his first term in office was one of caution (Forbes, 2001), he was keenly sympathetic to the Bush administration’s concerns over the spread of nuclear weapons and the missiles used to launch them (HoC Deb, 2001g, c268W).

At the departmental level, a difference in tone between the Foreign Office and the Ministry of Defence over missile defence can be detected. From their comments in the House, junior Defence Minister Reid and Defence Secretary Hoon appeared to
be much more positively disposed to the US’s plans than their counterparts, Peter Hain, Keith Vaz and Foreign Secretary Robin Cook in the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (HoC Deb, 1997, c574; HoC Deb, 2001l, c12; HoC Deb, 2000c, c85WH; HoC Deb, 2000g, c185; HoC Deb, 2001a, c735).

Within the wider Parliamentary Labour Party, two broad strands of opposition towards their own government’s BMD policy also become apparent in this era. One, characterised by Malcolm Savidge MP, is the classic leftist opposition to BMD as an aggressive tool which could be used to enable a nuclear first-strike capability (HoC Deb, 2000a, c919-920). While the other was epitomised by Mike Gapes MP, who took a more hawkish attitude, opposing missile defence on the grounds that it would undermine the UK’s nuclear deterrent by encouraging nuclear proliferation (HoC Deb, 2000j, c107).

The Conservative Opposition’s core attack lines against the government’s BMD policy also formed in these early years. Their main allegation was that the government was jeopardising the country’s security and the Special Relationship by not taking a lead in Europe in building up support for the US’s missile defence plans (HoC Deb, 2001o, c1276). As the British general election of June 2001 approached the Conservatives tried to translate Labour’s 1980s policy of unilateral nuclear disarmament and certain current Labour Ministers’ membership of CND into an attack on the government’s position on BMD (HoC Deb, 2001l, c10; HoC Deb, 2001s, c365). Such attacks had little impact, however, as missile defence was simply not of concern to much of the general public and featured only as a single sentence in Labour’s 2001 election manifesto; ‘We will encourage the US to consult closely with NATO allies on its ideas for missile defence’ (HoC Deb, 2000f, c363; Ipsos-MORI, 2015; Norris, 2001, p.576; The Acronym Institute, 2001).

As these domestic machinations over the UK’s BMD policy continued, several important international missile defence developments framed and influenced this debate. In 1998 alone, North Korea, Pakistan, India and Iran all carried out missile tests (Futter, 2013, p.72); Russia and China became deeply concerned about the US’s missile defence proposals (Foreign Affairs Committee, 2000, HC 407: para 38); while many European nations were highly sceptical about NMD, fearing that it could lead to a decoupling within NATO between the US and Europe (HoC Deb, 2000j, c109). For its part, the British government tried to impress upon the US the importance of
keeping talking to both its allies and rivals in order to allay their fears about what BMD entailed (HoC Deb, 2001w, c132).

Overall, certain structural and ideational themes emerged which provided a framework for understanding Labour’s BMD policy in this period. The first of these is the place of the UK within the structure of international relations (Dyson, 2009, p.11): its relative power vis-à-vis other states, but especially in relation to the US, and how this power dynamic shaped the British government’s need to maintain the Special Relationship as a means for the British government to maximise the UK’s defensive capability in a dangerous world by reaping the benefits of the US’s BMD plans (Smith, 2005, p.449). The second is the theme of Labour’s evolution into New Labour in response to successive electoral defeats in which the public’s dislike of Labour’s defence policy played an important role (Ipsos-MORI, 2014a). Therefore, with missile defence itself being an outgrowth of nuclear deterrence, it is possible to see how Labour tried to navigate the apparent contradiction between an electorate who favoured governments who took a strong defence stance in general (Reifler et al., 2011) but who were opposed to missile defence in particular (Ipsos-MORI, 2001; CND, 2008c).

Having outlined the basic themes of this chapter, it is now time to begin the examination of the Labour government’s BMD policy from 1997 to 2001 through the strategic-relational lens of structure, agency and discourse in earnest.

5.1 Structure: New Labour and the Move to a Centrist Defence Policy

In accordance with the strategic-relational foundations of this thesis it is important to begin with an analysis of the structural constraints shaping missile defence developments during this era. They provide an overall framework within which the actors who made decisions on missile defence policy understood the limits of their choices (Brighi, 2013). Specifically, the structures considered here are those of domestic electoral politics followed by Britain’s place in the hierarchy of international relations.

At its most general, the influence of the ‘structure’ of domestic electoral politics refers to the ordering effect that the voting preferences of the British electorate exert on the kind of policy platforms British political parties believe will be popular enough for them to have a realistic chance of winning a general election (Jessop, 2016,
In order to illustrate the influence of this structural constraint on Labour’s missile defence policy this section will begin by charting Labour’s relationship with the electorate overall, then how these electoral considerations shaped Labour’s defence policy in general, and then, how, as a subset of this overall defence policy, these same voter preferences in turn shaped Labour’s BMD policy in particular.

After yet another particularly long spell in the political wilderness, on the 5th of May 1997 the British public elected a Labour government for the first time in 18 years. During this long period out of office the Labour Party had travelled an immense ideological distance in order to make itself electable again, resulting in a wholesale revision of the Party’s policy platform. The architects of this modernisation; Tony Blair, Gordon Brown, Peter Mandelson and the polling advisor Philip Gould, based their prescriptions for reform on an understanding of the profound restructuring of the British economy that had occurred since the 1970s which had led to the deindustrialisation of communities among which Labour traditionally found its core vote (Blair, 2010; Gould, 1998; Mandelson, 2002; Cronin, 2004, p.336; Kenny and Smith, 2003). Technically speaking, what Blair et al had done was to engage the Labour party in the ‘politics of catch-up’; that is, a coming to terms with the idea that the basic parameters of Thatcherism had been accepted by the voting public (Hay, 1999, p.42).

Alongside the adoption of Professor Anthony Giddens’ concept of the Third Way and the use of triangulation as a political campaigning technique, Labour therefore abandoned its 1980s ‘preference-shaping’ stance – essentially, trying to win the public over to socialism – in favour of ‘preference-accommodation’ (Geyer, 2001, p.2; White, 2001, p.139; Hay, 1999, p.105; Giddens, 2003). This meant acquiescing in the face of significant sections of the electorate’s support for the Conservatives and distrust of Labour, and moving its policies – especially its defence policies – towards bipartisan convergence on the centre-ground of British politics (Hay, 1999, p.105).

The effects of this modernisation process were also clearly apparent in Labour’s defence policy, which had also undergone nothing less than a volte-face since the 1980s, with the party’s commitment to unilateral nuclear disarmament being the most totemic change. Throughout much of the 1980s the Conservatives’ had used unilateralism to relentlessly castigate Labour as being weak on defence (Rogers, 2007). However, even more off-putting in the eyes of the electorate than unilateralism itself were the divisions that it caused within the party and the PLP (Vickers, 2011,
Or, as Jeremy Stocker put it in an interview for this thesis, rather than the British public being militaristic, they ‘will not vote for a party that they perceive to be wobbly on defence. It's not the same thing’ (Stocker, 2017). Eventually, unilateralism was deemed to have been a contributory factor in Labour’s defeat at the 1983 and 1987 elections (Scott, 2012, p.116), and so, by 1997, Labour had abandoned the policy and pledged to maintain the UK’s fleet of Vanguard submarines and their Trident missiles (Seldon, 2001, p.617).

Entwined with Labour’s policy on nuclear weapons – since the latter arises from the former – was also its attitude towards ballistic missile defence. During the 1980s, as well as adopting unilateralism the Labour leadership was also opposed to Ronald Reagan’s SDI. Kinnock called it a greater threat to NATO than the USSR, while Dennis Healey asserted that SDI was a major obstacle to progress on arms control (Stocker, 2004a, p.152; Vickers, 2011, p.142). As SDI became more prominent during the Reagan administration, similar rifts and arguments latent in certain sections of the Labour party – that it was a spur to nuclear proliferation, technically impossible, a gargantuan waste of money, and a form of US imperialism – coalesced around missile defence as they had around nuclear weapons (Coates, 2001, p.30). However, with Reagan leaving office and the end of the Cold War, much of the impetus behind SDI dissipated (Futter, 2013, p.20) and so the issue largely fell from British political discourse until the late 1990s.

In the absence of the overarching security narrative formerly supplied by the Cold War, and having thrown off the mantle of unilateralism, Labour’s defence policy in general during the rehabilitation years of the late 80s and early 90s came to focus upon the idea of an ‘ethical dimension’ to foreign policy, which can also be interpreted as the precursor to Blair’s later ‘doctrine of the international community’ (Williams, 2002, pp.54-55; Haines, 2010; Hill, 2001). Suffice it to say that missile defence could have been seen by the Labour government as a tool with which to ensure the continued vulnerability of rogue states to intervention from the international community for breaking global norms.

But what was the attitude of the British public towards Labour’s BMD policy during its first term of office? How was Labour supposedly adapting its BMD policy to the structural pressures exerted by the electorate’s opinion on missile defence? There are several sources – and one opinion poll taken shortly after the 2001 election
– that can be drawn on to at least try to infer the views of the general public on missile
defence during this first Parliament.

The first of these are parliamentary sources. In particular, there were a few
MPs, such as Laurie Quinn, the Labour MP for Scarborough and Whitby, whose
constituencies either bordered with or actually contained RAF Fylingdales and RAF
Menwith Hill, and who had received correspondence from their constituents
expressing their concerns about becoming a target if the radar bases became part of
the US’s missile defence system or if interceptors were placed there (HoC Deb, 2000q,
c626-7; HoC Deb, 2001d, c985). Perhaps another indicator of public opinion on the
US’s missile defence plans were the number of protests that took place against the
proposed upgrades to RAF Fylingdales. One particular activist group, for example,
tried to get an injunction against the government to stop any upgrades to RAF
Menwith Hill on the grounds that it would undermine the ABM Treaty and put them
at personal physical risk of nuclear attack (Foreign Affairs Committee, 2000,
Examination of Witnesses, 04 April 2000, Q34).

The Eighth Report of the Foreign Affairs Committee also gives an insight into
the position of civil society groups on BMD; containing as it does nineteen
memoranda critical of BMD submitted by various civil society groups such as the
Quakers and CND, as well as those from several individual members of the public.
The common thread to all these memoranda was a call to the government not to allow
RAF Menwith Hill to play a role in the US’s NMD plans for fear that doing so would
undermine the ABM Treaty and cause a new arms race (ibid, App. 2, 10, 20, 21, 25,
27, 36, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 45, 46, 48, 50). Furthermore, an indication of perhaps
the lack of interest and knowledge among the general public about missile defence is
the acknowledgement among parliamentarians themselves that the issue of BMD was
lacking in debate both in Parliament itself and in the country at large (HoC Deb, 1998a,
c865).

Yet, again, what can these protests and submissions really tell us about the
level of support for or concern about BMD developments in the wider public mind?
Although the level of protests possibly gives some indication of the tempo of missile
defence developments – the number rising as the potential for some new BMD
development to occur increased – they were carried out by organised protest groups
whose very focus was to protest missile defence. As such, they do not in themselves
provide an accurate picture of the general public’s views towards BMD. As
Backbench BMD-opposing Labour MP Roger Godsiff attested when interviewed for this thesis; ‘It's never been a big issue’ (Godsiff, 2017).

What these sparse testimonies seem to imply is that there was a lack of debate or knowledge about missile defence developments involving the UK among the general public, a consistent level of protest among anti-BMD activist groups, and some concern about missile defence from constituents living in the vicinity of RAF Fylingdales and RAF Menwith Hill (Defence Committee, 2003, Supplementary memorandum by the MoD, para 2). However, perhaps of greater importance is that the questions and concerns voiced by MPs in Parliament and the statements found in the various Select Committee reports demonstrate that the government was at least aware of some of the public’s worries about the government’s BMD plans. Yet, despite all of the above, the evidence presented so far still seems a somewhat slim basis upon which to build an analysis of the public’s attitudes towards missile defence; what did the country at large think about BMD?

Here, the evidence base can be made a little more robust if we draw on the first substantial opinion poll on British views towards missile defence, carried out between the 5th and 9th of July and published on the 18th of July, not long after the 2001 general election. Perhaps using this survey here can be justified because it gives a snapshot of the public’s views on missile defence after several preceding years of BMD developments (Ipsos-MORI, 2001).

The results of the survey were both fascinating and counter-intuitive. Crucially, only 30% agreed with the statement, ‘it is in Britain's best interests to allow the use of radar facilities in Britain as part of the US missile defence system’, whereas 43% disagreed (ibid). 72% of those polled felt such a move could make the United Kingdom a target for an attack directed at the United States' system. Furthermore, 63% agreed that ‘the development of the US missile defence system will make it more difficult to reach international agreement on nuclear disarmament’ (ibid).

Analytically, these results are therefore problematic. It appears there was a dilemma at the heart of Labour’s BMD policy in this first Parliament. Based on the preference of British voters for a strong military (Reifler et al., 2011), it would be fair to expect that they would be pro-missile defence too, yet these results appear instead to illustrate an unexpected antipathy towards the UK playing a role in US missile defence. So, if the British public in fact seemed to hold some latent opposition to BMD, in the light of all that has been covered earlier in the thesis about Labour’s
struggle to maximise its voter appeal on defence (Gould, 1998), would it not follow that Labour would be opposed to any involvement in the system? This is where the strength of a strategic-relational approach comes into its own, as it allows consideration of how Labour might have navigated the seemingly contradictory electoral impulses acting on its stance towards missile defence at two different levels of analysis.

At the ‘macro’, or national level, electoral pressures influenced Labour to take a strong stance on defence in general, as would be expected of a party which had fought so hard to make itself electable in the eyes of the British public. Yet, at the ‘micro’ level of internal government deliberations the influence of the electorate’s opinions on Labour’s BMD policy hardly mattered as it featured so little in public debate (Ipsos-MORI, 2015). Therefore, the ‘strategically selective environment’ (Brighi, 2013, p.36) granted the Labour government the policy space necessary to pursue its wait and see approach to the US’s BMD plans without them having to pay too much attention to the public’s apparent latent concerns over the issue. In sum, the influence of the structure of British electoral politics on Labour’s BMD policy during its first phase was marginal.

Having now examined the influence of the structure of domestic electoral politics on the formulation of Labour’s BMD policy, the same analysis will be made of the influence of Britain’s place in the structure of international relations.

The structure of international relations is often seen as one of the most important influences on a country’s defence policy. It is assumed that in a world of international anarchy the fundamental concern of any nation is to do whatever it can to maximise its own power in relation to other countries in the dominance hierarchy of nations in order to deter attacks from rival states (Wendt, 1992, p.392). This section of the thesis analyses how these structural pressures bearing down on the UK shaped the Labour government’s understanding of the UK’s position in this hierarchy of nations, thereby influencing its defence policy in general and its BMD policy in particular.

By the time Labour came to office in 1997, not only had the landscape of British politics changed deeply, but so had the contours of global security. The threat of all out nuclear war had receded, but it was feared that technology once the sole preserve of superpowers, particularly weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery via ballistic missiles, could end up in the hands of groups and leaders
irrational enough to use them (Steff, 2013, p.24). In 2000 the CIA’s National Intelligence Council concluded that by 2015, ‘most likely North Korea, probably Iran, and possibly Iraq’, would have the capability to strike the United States, and that the potential for ‘unconventional delivery of WMD by non-state actors’ would also grow (National Intelligence Council, 2000, p.11). Ballistic missile defence therefore came to be seen increasingly by the US as one way of countering these threats.

This general outline under which the US operated also shaped the way the new Labour government viewed the international security environment and the place of missile defence within it, as was most clearly illustrated in the Strategic Defence Review (SDR) of 1998. In regards to WMDs and BMD, the SDR stated that there were around 20 countries of concern that could be working on chemical/biological agents, as well as a handful of states trying to develop nuclear weapons; most notably Iraq (Ministry of Defence, 1998, p.125). However, the SDR found that ‘At present, any risk to Britain from the ballistic missiles of nations of concern in terms of proliferation is many years off’ (ibid). Therefore, while BMD systems may have been able to play a role ‘within a balanced spectrum of capabilities to counter the risks’ posed by WMDs and their means of delivery, missile defence technology was changing so quickly that it would have been too early to decide to go ahead with such a system at that point (ibid, p.127). Thus, the bedrock of Britain’s entire national defence was to continue to rely on the threat of existential nuclear deterrence provided by Trident (ibid, p.21).

Key to the Labour government’s perception of the UK’s place in the world and its missile defence requirements was its rapport with its international peers and competitors, of which its relationship with the US was paramount. As a nation with pretentions to a global role, the UK’s relationship with the US allowed Britain to project its power way beyond the limits that would be imposed on it by the structure of international relations should the UK have tried to go it alone as a medium-sized European power (Smith, 2005, p.449). What better way for a country to maximise its power in an anarchical international society than by allying itself with the world’s global hegemon and only remaining superpower?

How, then, did Britain’s general ‘instinctive Atlanticism’ (Smith, 2005) translate into its particular policy stance on the US’s BMD programme? Just as the UK’s nuclear capability grew out of its relationship with the US – Trident being an American missile system – so too did its role and foothold in BMD. In RAF
Fylingdales and RAF Menwith Hill the UK hosted two vital radar and communication bases that would be essential to the full functioning of the US’s BMD programme as the system matured to be able to detect and counter missiles launched from the Eastern hemisphere (Stocker, 2004a, p.17). And although during this first Parliament the Labour government did not have to make any firm decision on the level of the UK’s participation in BMD through upgrades to RAF Fylingdales and RAF Menwith Hill because the Clinton and Bush administrations did not do so either during this era (HoC Deb, 2001d, c984), it simply would not have been possible for the British government to have said no to such a request. If the UK had pre-emptively decided to reject the US’s BMD plans even in the early developmental stages and deny the use of RAF Fylingdales and RAF Menwith Hill as part of the system, it would have massively increased the level of threat faced by the UK in alienating a major ally of immense power and would have denied the UK the possibility of gaining an entry point into an emerging technology with potentially huge defence benefits.

Of further influence on the UK’s stance on missile defence was Britain’s position not only as an Anglo-American nation but also as a European one, and in particular as a member state of the European Union. The structure of international relations placed very different pressures on European nations in general than those faced by the United States, and hence influenced their response to missile defence in quite different ways. Their relative lack of power and small size meant that European states preferred arms control and multilateralism to missile defence when dealing with issues of proliferation (Jenkin, 2003; Stocker, 2001, p.65; Stocker, 2004a, p.13; Smith, 2005, p.450).

It was not that the EU as an organisation in its own right had a firm policy stance on BMD at this time, but that the governments of several prominent EU member states, most notably France and Germany, were opposed to missile defence (Bowen, 2001, p.501). They believed it was an unreliable technical fix to the problem of missile proliferation and could cause tensions with Russia (Freedman, 2001). This tension was therefore a problem for a Labour government which claimed that the UK could be a good ally to both the US and the EU; and that Britain could form a bridge between the two and hold the transatlantic alliance together in a post-Cold war world (Sperling, 2010; Vickers, 2011, p.175). As a former British ambassador to the US who wished to remain anonymous told me via email correspondence, during Blair’s first meeting with Bush on the 23rd of February 2001, the formal written Joint Declaration
issued after the meeting stating the need to ‘deter these new threats [WMD proliferation] with a strategy that encompasses both offensive and defensive systems’ (Office of the Press Secretary, 2001b) contained an implicit deal; the British government was worried about US ABM plans, the Bush administration was concerned, like the Clinton administration, that the UK would support EU defence plans at the expense of NATO. The declaration was therefore an exercise in mutual assurance (Anonymous Correspondent 1, 2017).

The relationship between the UK, the US and the European Union regarding missile defence was then further complicated by the additional involvement of NATO. Since many European countries were also members of NATO, the same divisions between them over the US’s BMD plans carried over into NATO itself (HoC Deb, 2000d, c362). The influential voices of Germany as a significant NATO contributor, and to a lesser extent France (which was undergoing a rapprochement towards NATO at this time), meant that during the late 90s and early 2000s NATO as an organisation was officially opposed to BMD for fear of it causing a new arms race, although a NATO feasibility study into missile defence was due to begin in 2001 (Fergusson, 2013, pp.25-26; HoC Deb, 1998b, c1215; HoC Deb, 2000p, p.c418W; BBC News, 2000; BBC News, 2001c; Vaisse & Sebag, 2009, p.25). As an Atlanticist member of NATO, the British government did not want to damage its Special Relationship with the US by being as sceptical towards missile defence as its European partners. Yet, as a ‘good European’, the UK did not want to appear as a Trojan horse, pushing the US’s agenda and subordinating the European Union’s wishes on missile defence to those of NATO, as several EU countries believed (Sperling, 2010).

Of course, these international institutions of which the UK was a member did not exist in a vacuum. In an anarchical international environment, their very reason for being was to counter strategic competitors; a role which Russia and China duly fulfilled. Although these two major nuclear powers could have easily overwhelmed any BMD system, they were concerned about the US’s missile defence plans, with the UK being caught somewhat in the middle due to its potential role of hosting the radar equipment – and the perpetual rumour about interceptors – required to make the Atlantic section of BMD work (Foreign Affairs Committee, 2000, p.paras 40; HoC Deb, 2001s, c15). Russia’s worries in particular focused around the potential of missile defence to undermine the ABM Treaty, and, by undercutting MAD, the international
influence Russia leveraged from its still substantial nuclear arsenal (Ranger et al., 2002, p.46).

The UK also had a vested interest in the maintenance of the ABM Treaty between the US and Russia and wanted to see it preserved (HoC Deb, 2000f, c350). Although not a signatory to the Treaty, it guaranteed the potency of Britain’s relatively small nuclear deterrent against the potential development of a more substantial missile defence system by Russia should the Treaty have actually been abandoned (Smith, 2005, p.455; Stoddart, 2010, p.287). To this end, during its first term of office the Labour government stressed, ‘at the highest level’, the importance of dialogue between the US and Russia over missile defence, arguing that any decision the US might make on BMD should only be taken after consultation with and in agreement with Russia (HoC Deb, 2000j, c112WH).

Like the British, the Chinese supported the ABM Treaty because they were concerned that BMD could undermine their relatively small armoury of nuclear missiles, which provided a cost-effective deterrent for a nation with under-developed conventional forces (Brookes, 2001; Foreign Affairs Committee, 2000, Ev Tuesday 4th April 2000). The Chinese also had their suspicions that BMD was really focused on them, not North Korea (Stock, 2004a, p.194). However, the British government’s take on China’s stance towards missile defence was somewhat muted, they simply did not view China as a long-term strategic competitor requiring a BMD response (HoL Deb, 2000, cc1324-5; Stocker, 2004a, p.v). Due to its relatively less powerful position in the structure of international relations in comparison to the US, Russia and China, the best option open to the British government was therefore to use what influence it had to emphasise dialogue between the US and these two great nations regarding America’s missile defence plans (HoC Deb, 2000o, c622; HoC Deb, 2001s, c16).

Britain and America’s main strategic competitors aside, the official rationale for NMD was to counter the real and suspected nuclear weapons programmes of so-called ‘rogue states’ and non-state actors, i.e. terrorists (The White House, 1999, p.16; HoC Deb, 2000k, c173WH; HoC Deb, 2001f). The end of the Cold War had not led to the cessation of the threat of nuclear annihilation, but instead to a shift from a bipolar balance of power between the US and USSR to a new ‘second nuclear age’, characterised by a ‘unipolar system in disequilibrium’, in which the US, though finding itself in a hegemonic position as the only remaining superpower, experienced
a kind of ‘Gulliverisation’ as the proliferation of nuclear weapons to less powerful but no less belligerent nations spread out of its control (Payne, 1996).

Between 1997 to 2001 the countries first labelled as ‘states of concern’ by the Clinton administration, and later on as ‘rogue states’ by the Bush administration due to their suspected attempts to develop WMDs and the missiles required to deliver them were; North Korea, Iran, Iraq and Libya. These rogues were characterised as combining the basic attributes of a state with the mentality of a terrorist group (Ranger et al., 2002, p.28). The governments in control of rogue states would not pursue a defensive strategy based on MAD, strategists argued, but would instead use their smaller cache of nuclear weapons as a form of blackmail to protect the continuance of their regime by intimidating their regional neighbours and the international community (Ranger et al., 2002, p.34; Steff, 2013, p.66). Ballistic missile defence would therefore constitute the perfect foil to this tactic by nullifying the threat posed by a rogue state’s limited nuclear armoury, thereby restoring the international community’s freedom of action to intervene against them (Peoples, 2006, p.128).

The case for missile defence was further bolstered by some weaknesses of classical nuclear deterrence theory arising from the tendency for rogue states to be minor nuclear powers rather than major ones (Gray, 1999, p.98). The main problem was one of proportion; would America really be willing to start an all-out nuclear war if a rogue state managed to attack a local rival with only a handful of nuclear weapons – terrible though the number of civilian casualties might be? Might not the level of retaliation be seen as – literally – overkill? (McDonough, 2006, p.35). Missile defence would therefore provide the extra defensive option of neutralising such an attack rather than having to respond in kind. In short, it was hoped that missile defence systems would inoculate against rogue states (Steff, 2013, p.142).

Yet, as if the threat from rogue states was not enough to contend with, strategists also identified a ‘fourth wave’ of nuclear proliferation from rogue states to non-state actors such as suicidal terrorist groups (ibid, p.24). Here, missile defence would again provide an answer to this conundrum, since the entire notion of deterrence and whether or not it would discourage terrorists who lacked a fear of death could be placed to one side in favour of simply intercepting their attack (ibid). Indeed, Bush cited a possible terrorist attack with WMDs as an additional reason to renounce the ABM Treaty (Bush, 2001).
Speculation aside, several real world developments took place which seemed to bolster these fears. In August 1998, North Korea rather obligingly confirmed the worst speculations of the Rumsfeld Report on the threat to the US from missile proliferation, published the month before, by launching a three-stage rocket over Japan (Futter, 2013, p.79). Furthermore, in 1999 the Clinton Administration published its second National Security Strategy (NSS), which attributed the potential acquisition of nuclear weapons by Iran, Iraq and North Korea to the inability of the Russian authorities to prevent the theft or loss of nuclear material from its territory (Sperling, 2010).

The British Labour government also observed the growing threat of nuclear proliferation to rogue and non-state actors. 1998’s Strategic Defence Review (SDR) identified a similar set of threats as the Americans had; in particular the potential acquisition of nuclear weapons by Iraq (ibid). Iran was noted to be developing its 1,300km range Al-Shabab missile (Foreign Affairs Committee, 2000, paras 16-19; Foreign Affairs Committee, 2001a, Ev 10 May 2001). There was also great concern about North Korea and its export of missile technology to Iran and Pakistan, which it was feared might fall into the hands of religious extremists willing to start a nuclear war without fear of the consequences (Foreign Affairs Committee, 2000, paras 24-27).

The main difference between US and UK speculation over the proliferation of nuclear technology, however, was that the British government did not ultimately regard rogue states such as North Korea or Iran as being any less susceptible to traditional nuclear deterrence than Cold War era Russia or China had been (Stocker, 2004a, p.12). As Foreign Secretary Cook blithely put it, ‘I can say with some confidence that we do not anticipate a nuclear strike from North Korea over Britain’ (Foreign Affairs Committee, 2000, Examination of Witnesses, 28 June 2000, Q179).

What all of the above demonstrates is that the supreme structural influence on the UK’s stance towards missile defence was its relationship with the United States. This structural effect was of far greater impact on Labour’s BMD policy even than the threats faced by the UK as a country in its own right. As the 1998 SDR demonstrated, the security environment facing the UK with regards to missile proliferation was ‘many years off’ (Ministry of Defence, 1998, p.128). From a nationalistic, self-interested point of view it therefore seems counter-productive for the British government to have involved the UK in the US’s missile defence plans. Especially as
doing so might have made the UK an unprotected target for those wanting to blind the system, and even more so because it could have undermined the ABM Treaty, which was fundamental to the maintenance of the UK’s nuclear potency, and hence foundational to Britain’s national security.

What appears to have been happening was that the British government was reacting vicariously to the US government’s perception of the global missile threat, rather than relying on their own estimations. For example, between 1997 and 2001 North Korea was the main focus of the US’s missile defence plans, a nation which at that point was no threat to the UK (Defence Committee, Eighth Report, Examination of Witnesses, 07 February 2001, HC 2000-01, Q 228-236). However, the overall security benefits that the UK received from its alliance with the US meant that the Special Relationship had to be upheld above all else and at all costs, and therefore not rejecting the US government’s BMD plans was an important means to that end. The fact that the British government was traversing the effects of missile developments at a level two steps removed from itself – North Korea’s influence on the US’s influence on the UK – fits well with a strategic-relational analysis, focused as it is on the multifaceted navigation of multiple levels of structure (Brighi, 2013, p.36).

Reliant upon the US for its wider geostrategic security (Sperling, 2010), the British government’s stance towards BMD was heavily influenced by changes to the occupant of the White House. The Clinton administration’s reluctance to pursue missile defence, and then on the insistence that it would still comply with the ABM Treaty, fitted more closely with the British government’s wish to see the Treaty remain intact so as not to undermine the efficacy of the UK’s relatively small nuclear deterrent, as well as preventing an even stronger spur to international missile proliferation (HoC Deb, 2000f, c358; Smith, 2005, p.455; Stoddart, 2010, p.287). However, once Bush came to power during the last months of Labour’s first term of office, the government’s stance towards the US’s missile defence plans and the potential abandonment of the ABM Treaty seemed to soften, and the UK was reduced to plaintively exhorting the US to consult with its allies and rivals before making any further decisions on BMD (HoC Deb, 2000j, c112WH).

Fundamentally, then, Labour conceptualised Britain as a major power in world affairs (Ministry of Defence, 1998, p.4), able to punch way above the weight it might have been expected to reach in terms of its geographic and population size due to the UK’s possession of nuclear weapons (Ministry of Defence, 1998, p.21). As well as
this view of the UK’s power in and of itself, Labour also had a sophisticated understanding of the UK’s rapport with other countries (Beech and Lee, 2008, p.153). The UK’s prime relationship, therefore, was as the key ally of the United States (HC Deb, 2001p, c15). Yet, as a keen European partner the UK also served as a bridge between the US and the European Union in international affairs (HoC Deb, 2001r, c342). This relationship was then complicated by the sometimes strained interaction between the UK, the US and several European nations as members of NATO over missile defence (Bowen, 2001, p.501). It was also necessary for the Labour government to factor in opposition to missile defence from more powerful rival nuclear powers such as China and Russia, supplemented by an assessment of the threat emanating from suspected nuclear proliferators such as North Korea, Iran and Iraq (Foreign Affairs Committee, 2000, Examination of Witnesses, 28 June 2000, Q179; Ministry of Defence, 1998, p.125). Again, the British government in some sense found itself acting against its own immediate best interests in order to maintain its alliance with the US, as in reality the UK shared similar fears with Beijing and Moscow about the potential abrogation of the ABM Treaty (HoC Deb, 2000f, c350). Nor did the British government consider rogue states to be such a cause for concern (HoC Deb, 2000l, c55W; HoC Deb, 2000r, c505; HoC Deb, 2001k, c49W). However, maintaining a positive partnership with the US over the long term trumped all other considerations, so the British government was willing to comply with the US’s BMD plans.

Ultimately, structural pressures exerted a preponderant but not exclusive influence on Labour’s attitude towards missile defence from 1997 to 2001, and it is to the role of agential choice in shaping Labour’s outlook on BMD that the thesis now turns.

5.2 Agency: The Core Defence Policy Community

In accordance with this hierarchy of influence, the following analysis begins with Prime Minister Blair’s stance on the US’s missile defence plans. It then moves on to consider the role of the Secretaries of State at the Ministry of Defence and the Foreign and Commonwealth Office in contributing to the formulation of the Labour government’s policy towards BMD. Taken together, the PM and the Secretaries of State at these key outward-facing departments form what Self calls ‘the core defence policy community’ (2010, p.267). An account of their interaction is vital here, since
the core defence policy community is often held as having the greatest influence over the shaping of defence policy (ibid). Finally, this section of the thesis will examine the role of MPs and Lords in shaping the political debate around the UK’s involvement in missile defence both inside and outside the Palace of Westminster. It is hoped that by considering the above a conclusion can be reached about the relative influence of agential choice on the formulation of Labour’s BMD policy in this first Parliament.

As concise a statement as any of Blair’s opinion on BMD comes from an interview with Forbes magazine, published on the 3rd of May 2001, and is worth quoting at length:

>This is definitely in the box marked ‘Handle with care.’ I understand totally America’s desire to make sure its people are properly protected. I also understand the concerns people have about the ABM Treaty and the desire to preserve it. My own judgment is that provided we handle it with care, there is a way through which meets America’s objectives and other people’s concerns (Forbes, 2001).

This statement is emblematic of others from the era and demonstrates Blair’s stance of cautious openness towards the US’s missile defence plans between 1997 and 2001. He recognized how contentious the issue was, and so he wanted to listen to the US’s reasons for pursuing BMD without preempting their choices or persuading them to take one route or another. Blair’s approach was pragmatic, stressing the importance of taking both sides of the argument into account and not rushing to make any decisions on the UK’s involvement in missile defence before the Americans had decided what they were going to do themselves (HoC Deb, 2001r, c342). Just as with the Special Relationship as a whole, Blair believed that the British government could play a mediating role between the US and the rest of the world over missile defence, helping to reconcile opposing international viewpoints to the benefit of everyone (ibid).

The practical outcome of Blair’s stance during this first term of office, therefore, was that the British government’s position on BMD was not to have a position on BMD. Traditionally speaking, the UK did not need a general policy on BMD because in the past they had only been asked to partake in specific technical upgrades to RAF Fylingdales and RAF Menwith Hill (Stocker, 2017). This is not to
say that there was no change in Blair’s posture on missile defence from 1997 to 2001.
During the Clinton administration Blair remained neutral over missile defence and
promoted the benefits of upholding the ABM Treaty, yet, after the arrival of Bush in
the White House in 2001, Blair came to assert his belief that missile defence could be
at least one useful strategy among several to counter the proliferation of WMDs (HoC
Deb, 2000m, c767; HoC Deb, 2001g, c268W).

The Clinton and Blair years were characterised by reticence towards missile
defence. Cooperation over BMD between Britain and the US during the Clinton/Blair
era was not so much about physical upgrades to the UK’s defence apparatus to enable
it to play a role in missile defence as it was about those government’s similar stance
over the efficacy of the ABM Treaty in maintaining nuclear stability (Smith, 2005,
the British government totally understood US fears regarding rogue states, and that
they were trying to ensure that this ‘legitimate and justifiable fear’ was taken into
account in a way that ‘does not put at risk the substantial progress that has been made
on nuclear disarmament over the past few years’ (HoC Deb, 2000m, c767).

This statement illustrates several important points about the nature of the
relationship between the British and American governments during the Clinton
administration. First of all, Blair does not challenge the US’s BMD plans, instead he
stresses his understanding of the US’s concerns. Secondly, it reiterates the importance
of nuclear disarmament, which is entirely consistent with the UK’s support for the
ABM Treaty at this time. Third, it highlights a theme which runs consistently through
Blair’s interactions with US Presidents; that of the role of diplomat. Blair is always
engaged in dialogue, a voice of reason relaying the concerns of other nations to the
ear of the powerful; not seeking to coerce, but to persuade. Fundamentally, the strain
running through all these points is that we see a British PM reacting to developments
taken by US Presidents and their administrations. President Clinton did not want to
develop a missile defence system that would have abrogated the ABM Treaty of 1972,
which he saw as an integral part of MAD and US/Russian nuclear relations, and
therefore wider international security (Futter, 2013, p.46). This caution was mirrored
by Blair (HoC Deb, 2000m, c767), and consequently there were no steps taken to
integrate UK military assets into BMD during this period.

In the absence of a formal request this non-committal approach was to remain
the British government’s stance on BMD until a subtle but important change of view
emerged after the election of George W. Bush in November 2000, and particularly in response to Blair’s first official meeting with him at Camp David on the 23rd of February 2001, where missile defence and the ABM Treaty were the top two items on the agenda for discussion (Chilcot, 2016, p.231). During that first meeting Vice President Dick Cheney set out the US’s concerns on Iraq, Libya, North Korea and Libya in relation to missile defence, to which Blair ‘said that if the capability existed to improve defence, we understood the reason for wanting to develop such a capability’ (Campbell, 2007, p.505). After the meeting, Blair and Bush gave a joint press conference in which they were asked about missile defence, and it was here that Blair made a watershed remark. Sharing the concerns of the President over the proliferation of WMDs, the Prime Minister added, ‘I think it's very important in that context that we discuss all the ways that we can deal with this threat…both in relation to offensive and defensive systems’ (The White House, 2001b); a stance that was also reiterated in a formal written ‘Joint Statement’ by the two premiers (Office of the Press Secretary, 2001b). This was the first time that Blair stopped equivocating and publicly considered the usefulness of missile defence as a potential option. On the 7th of March 2001, Blair reinforced this slight but significant change in perspective when he reiterated in the Commons that he shared the US’s concerns over WMD proliferation and that missile defence could play a role ‘as one part of a strategy to deal with it’ (HoC Deb, 2001g, c268W). Further evidence of this shift in position came in one of Blair’s final comments in Parliament before the 2001 general election, in which he stated that on missile defence ‘Bush has put forward new arguments, and we need to listen’ (HoC Deb, 2001b, c844). However, while Blair came to offer tacit support to BMD in principle (Alistair Campbell notes in his diary that Blair ‘wanted us to stay neutral leaning to positive’ on missile defence), at this point there was still absolutely no commitment from the UK to take part in the US’s plans (Campbell, 2007 p.523).

All of the above of course brings us to the crux of the matter, which is whether or not Blair’s actions made any difference to the way the British government’s stance on missile defence developed during this first Parliament? A strategic-relational analysis of this question would draw on the work of Stephen Dyson’s *The Blair Identity* (2009): when considering the efficacy of a particular agent’s actions in influencing the strategically selective environment they inhabit, Dyson argues, the first condition to examine is that of ‘action dispensability’. In other words, if the particular actor was removed from the particular situation, would the same events
occurred? (ibid, p.16) If not, then this constitutes a case of ‘non-substitutability’ (ibid, p.17). So, then, did Blair’s actions and statements towards missile defence in this first Parliament constitute a case of non-substitutability?

Firstly, the overall need for the British Prime Minister to maintain the Special Relationship at all costs was a greater structural influence driving the UK’s BMD policy decisions than the interactions of any particular American and British premier. This is demonstrated by the fact that no matter who was in office, UK defence assets became ever more integrated into the US missile defence system, even to the potential detriment of Britain’s wider strategic aims like maintaining the potency of its nuclear deterrence (Smith, 2005, p.455; Stoddart, 2010, p.287). However, this is not to say that personal agency had no impact on the UK’s role in BMD. Indeed, the ebb and flow of the tempo of the UK’s ever closer integration into BMD can be observed as an effect of the relationships between Blair, Clinton and Bush above and beyond the background static of structural pressures. For example, it is clear that agency played a role in tracking Blair’s attitude towards the ABM Treaty so closely with that of Clinton’s. At this point Blair found himself in a strategically selective context in which both of his main goals regarding missile defence coincided with that of Clinton’s: promoting the ABM Treaty in order to maintain the efficacy of Britain’s strategic nuclear deterrent while at the same time upholding the Special Relationship by making understanding comments towards the US’s justifications for missile defence, and not taking any decision against the UK playing a role in the President’s BMD plans (Forbes, 2001).

The role of agency is also demonstrated by the way in which Britain’s integration into BMD increased rapidly under the aegis of Blair and Bush, who were particularly close and shared a similar outlook on international relations (Dyson, 2009, p.82; Vickers, 2011, p.211). However, it is apparent that in all these different arrangements it is the Prime Minister that is responding to the President’s lead on BMD. This game of follow-my-leader even included some apparent U-turns on the UK’s behalf. The starkest example of this is Blair’s change of position from staunch support for the ABM Treaty when Clinton supported it (HoC Deb, 2000m, c767), to casually accepting its abrogation under Bush (HoC Deb, 2001b, c844). Ultimately, this shows that in the case of joint UK/US BMD policy, structural constraints were a preponderant influence, while agential relationships played a necessary but not
sufficient role in accelerating the tempo but not the direction of this collaboration towards ever greater integration.

Of course, for all his or her power the Prime Minister does not develop foreign and defence policy in a vacuum. Alongside the PM, Self also includes the Foreign Secretary and Secretary of State for Defence as the central agents in what he calls the ‘core defence policy community’, orbited by a wider coterie of less influential actors including the various departmental Ministers and the Chief of the Defence Staff (Self, 2010, pp.259, 267). The SRA lends itself particularly strongly to such an examination of the relative power of these various agents to shape Labour’s policy towards the US’s missile defence programme due to its conceptualisation of the state not as a unified black box or a neutral tool, but as an arena – perhaps akin to a wrestling ring – in which different political forces, be they ministers, the military, civil servants or Prime Ministers, etc., contend with each other for control over the levers of power (Jessop, 2008b, pp.31, 68). The interactions between these different politicians and state officials as they jockey for control over policy making by leveraging whatever influence they happen to possess, generates what Jessop calls a ‘state effect’ (ibid, p.55); what appears to the outsider as the smooth formulation of policy by an integrated bureaucracy is nothing more than an auto-generated illusion. Just as the production of harmonic music is the goal of the successful integration of the myriad components of an orchestra, so too the goal of the successful contestation of the asymmetrical institutional terrain of the state apparatus is not, therefore, to control the ‘state’, for no such thing really exists, but to navigate the ever-changing balance of forces between the ensemble of departmental power centres in such a way that the result is the generation of policy outcomes that most closely approximate those originally desired (ibid, p.37).

The ‘state’ is therefore better conceived of not as a thing, but as a ‘system of strategic selectivity’ (ibid, p.36). That is, just as in natural selection there are many more ways of being dead than being alive, the balance of forces among the various government agents in the political environment is such that only a few potential strategies for navigating this environment have any chance of leading to the successful enactment of policy.

What this means is that although the Prime Minister and the Defence Secretary occupy a privileged binary position within the core defence policy community, and the relative dominance of certain ministers and ministries can reinforce the hegemony
of particular policy interests, the most powerful institutions and actors may still not be located at the highest echelons of government (Self, 2010, p.267; Jessop, 2016, p.68). Political actors can therefore engage in ‘scale jumping’, because the ‘tangled hierarchies of power’ characteristic of modern government bureaucracies enable them to mobilise their own particular strengths to exert much greater influence over the policy making process than would be suggested by their objective position within that same hierarchy (Jessop, 2016, p.137). In the light of this theory, what follows is a detailed examination of prominent ministers’ views on the government’s stance towards missile defence in order to establish if they were able to exert any influence over its formation.

Foreign Secretary Robin Cook (May 1997 – June 2001) pursued a cautious line between emphasising the importance of the ABM Treaty while not condemning the US’s missile defence plans outright. Consider Cook’s words to the Foreign Affairs Select Committee on the 28th of June 2000, where he stated that the government ‘would find it extremely hard to agree with anything which was a violation of international rules’ (Foreign Affairs Committee, 2000, Examination of Witnesses, 28 June 2000, HC 1999-00, Q167-8). Furthermore, Cook emphasised that at that point the government did not know what their answer would be if they were asked to take part in NMD, but that ‘Certainly the background of the ABM Treaty would be a very serious factor in our overall decision’ (ibid, Q203). Cook also stated that if negotiations between the US and Russia over amending the ABM Treaty to allow NMD fell through, and the US unilaterally withdrew to push ahead with its missile defence plans, then ‘these things would obviously weigh heavily with us’ (ibid, Q209).

So, what would a strategic-relational analysis of Cook’s position on missile defence look like? As a key player in the first New Labour government, Cook would appear to have had a lot of influence over the foreign policy formulation process. He was an experienced Parliamentarian who had maintained a deep interest and involvement in Labour’s approach to foreign policy issues since the 1980s (Vickers, 2011, p.161). Arguably, as the architect of the ‘ethical dimension’ to New Labour’s foreign policy and in playing a key role in the SDR (Cook, 1997; Williams, 2002, p.53; Brown, 2010, p.1), Cook was of greater influence over New Labour’s approach to international affairs in the early years of the Labour government than was Blair (Haines, 2010), who had only set out his views on international relations once before becoming Prime Minister (Kampfner, 2004, pp.3-5). If anyone had the experience and
influence to temper Labour’s stance on the US’s missile defence policy then it was Cook. After all, he had been a member of Labour’s CND Committee in the past, and was widely regarded as being opposed to missile defence (Vickers, 2011, p.130; Stocker, 2004a, p.204).

In reality, Cook’s line on missile defence was very similar to the Prime Minister’s, he made no direct criticism or support for the US’s missile defence plans but placed an emphasis on the importance of maintaining the ABM Treaty (Foreign Affairs Committee, 2000, Examination of Witnesses, 28 June 2000, HC 1999-00, Q167-8). There does, however, appear to have been a subtle difference in emphasis between Blair and Cook’s statements on missile defence. Whereas Blair seemed more accepting of the idea that the ABM Treaty could collapse in the face of the US’s missile defence plans, Cook strikes a much more plaintive tone, seeming to lament the Treaty’s potential passing (Foreign Affairs Committee, 2000, Examination of Witnesses, 28 June 2000, HC 1999-00, Q167-8, 203, 209). A counterpoint to this observation, however, is the way in which Cook quickly adapted to Bush’s decision to renounce the ABM Treaty at the beginning of May 2001 (HoC Deb, 2001d, cc986-7; The White House, 2001a).

Far from opposing missile defence, the evidence shows that Cook used his agency to uphold collective cabinet responsibility by affirming the government’s general line on missile defence, which was to press the importance of the ABM Treaty without openly criticising or affirming America’s missile defence plans under Clinton, while subsequently adapting to Bush’s decision to rescind the US’s commitment to the Treaty in 2001.

The triad of the ‘core defence policy community’ – Prime Minister, Foreign Secretary, Defence Secretary – would not be complete without an analysis of Geoff Hoon’s role in shaping the Labour government’s position on NMD. Hoon’s response to the shifting contours of the US’s missile defence plans showed a marked contrast with those of his counterparts at the FCO, as he appeared the least conflicted about the rise of the system (HoC Deb, 2001f, c361W). Hoon did not accept that NMD would undermine the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and escalate the threat of nuclear war (HoC Deb, 2000b, c1). As Hoon put it, if the US had asked the UK to take part in missile defence, then ‘the history of our close friendship with the US is that we are sympathetic to such requests’, and the government would ‘consider them carefully’ (Ward and Taylor-Norton, 2000; HoC Deb, 2000i, c262). This was despite the fact
that right throughout this first Parliament Hoon considered the UK to be safe from missile proliferation and rogue states (HoC Deb, 2000l, c55W; HoC Deb, 2000r, c505; HoC Deb, 2001k, c49W).

Hoon was also the most comfortable with the build-up to Bush’s announcement on the 1st of May 2001 that the US intended to withdraw from the ABM Treaty. In fact, Hoon’s statements to the Commons perfectly illustrate the evolution of the government’s shift in tone over the US’s missile defence plans. For example, on the 4th of May 2000, Hoon stated that the government continued to ‘value the strategic stability that the treaty provides. We want to see it preserved’, but that ‘An evolution of thinking in response to the issues is inevitable’ (HoC Deb, 2000d, c312-3). Then, on the 15th of January 2001, Hoon recounted the government’s ‘great sympathy’ with the US’s concerns over nuclear proliferation and why they might try to protect themselves against it with a missile defence shield (HoC Deb, 2001n, c4).

However, it was Hoon’s statement to the Commons on the 12th of February 2001 that was perhaps the most pivotal of the whole first Parliament. Jeremy Corbyn MP asked Hoon if the government could assure the Commons that it ‘Values the stability that the ABM Treaty provides and wishes to see it preserved?’. The Secretary of state replied that the Treaty had been amended in the past, and could be amended again, and while the government certainly valued a ‘degree of strategic stability’, Hoon continued, ‘as the US is our closest ally, we would want to be helpful should it make a specific request on this matter’ (HoC Deb, 2001l, c12). This statement signalled the culmination of the government’s shift in tone regarding the US’s missile defence plans over the preceding months; from constantly emphasising the importance of the ABM Treaty (HoC Deb, 2000d, c312-3), to imploring the American government to ensure its BMD policies maintained ‘strategic stability’ (HoC Deb, 2001l, c12), to finally asking how the British government could ‘be helpful’ to their plans (HoC Deb, 2001l, c12). As such, Hoon facilitated the UK’s integration into the US’s system during this first term of office by softening and preparing the rhetorical groundwork upon which concrete proposals would be laid in future.

Hoon’s role as the leading mouthpiece of the government’s policy towards BMD therefore placed him alongside the Prime Minister at the very nucleus of the core defence policy community (Self, 2010, p.267). The cloistered atmosphere of this relationship stems from the highly classified nature of many national security issues, whose very secrecy necessitates high barriers to gaining trusted status in order to
influence policy (ibid). One such professional class which does have access to this inner circle due to their practical experience, however, are senior members of the armed forces, particularly members of the Chiefs of Staff Committee (ibid). Several senior commanders from the various branches of the British military commented on the government’s missile defence plans during this Parliament, expressing divergent points of view.

For example, shortly after his appointment to Chief of the Defence Staff in February 2001, Sir Michael Boyce voiced his opinion to the Defence Select Committee that due to the threat of nuclear proliferation it would be ‘very silly’ if the UK did not look into missile defence (Defence Committee, 2001a, Examination of Witnesses, 01 March 2001, HC 1999-00, Q 20-23). In contrast, Vice-Admiral Sir Jeremy Blackham, the Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff, seemed fairly nonchalant when he was told that far more had been spent on missile defence research for the Royal Navy than for the UK itself: BMD would be an issue that the Navy would look into when directed to do so, he said, demonstrating no great urgency towards missile defence on behalf of the armed forces (Foreign Affairs Committee, 2001a, Examination of Witnesses, 02 May 2001, HC 2000-01, Q143).

Having now examined the individual roles of the members of the core defence policy community in shaping the government’s position on BMD, it is now possible to make a strategic-relational analysis of their relative agency in this process, and their interactions as a whole.

What must first be remembered when examining the relative agency of those involved in the development of the new Labour government’s policies in general was the unusually strong dominance of the Prime Minister and a very small team of trusted advisors that was a hallmark of Blair’s leadership style (Dyson, 2009, p.39). The most influential of these insiders were Director of Communications Alistair Campbell, Chief of Staff Jonathan Powell, and Sally Morgan Director of Government Relations (Happold, 2003). This style of policy making – the so-called ‘sofa government’ – emerged because Blair wanted to make decisions quickly without having to negotiate with recalcitrant ministers who might disagree (Sparrow, 2010; Lord Turnbull, 2010, p.28). Policy decisions made in advance by this trusted group of likeminded individuals were then presented to Cabinet members, who then had little time to develop their own opinions before being asked to agree to them as part of collective cabinet responsibility (Lord Butler, 2004, p.148). As the Butler Report would state,
the ‘informality and circumscribed character of the Government’s procedures which we saw in the context of policy-making [reduced] the scope for informed collective political judgement’ (ibid). Sir John Chilcot believed that Blair had achieved this ‘psychological dominance’ over his Cabinet because he had delivered Labour from electoral oblivion to a landslide victory (Harding, 2016). The Kosovo intervention of 1999 then only extended Blair’s confidence into the arenas of foreign and defence policy, further demoting the FCO and Cabinet (Self, 2010, p.260).

Noting Blair’s ‘tightly held, non-consultative’ policy making style begs the question as to whether or not the various ministers examined above were actually involved in policy formulation, or were they just mouthpieces (Dyson, 2009, p.39)? Although the internal process by which the policy was constructed is not in the public domain, it appears that Blair and his small team established the government’s policy on missile defence, perhaps after consulting with the Secretaries of State for Defence and Foreign Affairs, and then disseminated the finalised policy line back to the aforementioned Secretaries of State and the rest of the Cabinet (HoC Deb, 2000r, c506). Often, it appears that the ministers and Secretaries of State are there to present greater details on the government’s plans for BMD to Parliament and then left to absorb criticism for these decisions.

This is not to say that Cook, Hoon and others did not exercise their own agency on missile defence. Nor that consistency between the various members of the core defence policy community was non-existent. These ministers conformed to a broad consensus around the government’s policy, which began as a commitment to neither condemn nor condone the US’s BMD plans while emphasising the importance of upholding the ABM Treaty (HoC Deb, 2000d, c312-3), to then accepting President Bush’s decision to leave that same treaty (HoC Deb, 2001d, cc986-7; The White House, 2001a). Acceding to this consensus may have been easier for some ministers than others, however, and their acceptance or reticence towards the government line on BMD possibly contributed to whether they remained in their ministerial position or not. However, Hoon noted that ministers well understood the concept of collective cabinet responsibility, and that therefore the government spoke ‘with a single voice’ on BMD (HoC Deb, 2000r, e506).

In light of the above, it is clear that Self’s conception of the core defence policy community is a necessary but insufficient model for understanding the formulation of Labour’s missile defence policy between 1997 and 2001. Yes, foreign/defence policy
making was a closed arena dominated by a narrow core executive consisting of Prime Minister, Foreign Secretary and Defence Secretary (Self, 2010, p.259), but under Blair this grouping was even more restricted. The agency of the Prime Minister and his advisors was paramount in this scenario, with the heads of two of the great offices of state reduced to a consultative role. One expression of the power of this inner circle over the shaping of the government’s missile defence policy making is shown in the way in which an off-hand comment made a few days before the 2001 general election by Director of Communications Alastair Campbell about missile defence being a ‘good idea’ forced Cook to immediately clarify the government’s position on BMD more explicitly than it had ever been before up to that point (HoC Deb, 2001d, c984).

A further example of the dominance of Blair’s small team of trusted advisors (Dyson, 2009, p.39) over other components of the core defence policy community during this first Parliament, especially since Treasury officials enjoy ‘unprecedented’ oversight over defence policy (Cornish and Dorman, 2009, pp.248-249), is illustrated by the lack of input from Chancellor Gordon Brown into the government’s missile defence decisions. The well-known tensions between Blair and Brown apparent throughout New Labour’s time in office (BBC News, 2010) did not seem to manifest over BMD. However, this is not to say that tensions could not have arisen between Blair and Brown over missile defence. If a greater monetary contribution had been required from the UK towards the US’s missile defence plans then this may have provided an opportunity for conflict between Blair and Brown due to the strain Chancellor Brown’s defence funding increases were already suffering due to them being inflated away by the increasing costs of defence equipment (Cornish and Dorman, 2009, p.258; Dannatt, 2010). Ultimately, this tension did not arise because during this first Parliament no upgrade decisions were made, and in any case the future upgrades of RAF Fylingdales and RAF Menwith Hill would largely be covered by the US (Stocker, 2004c, p.14; HC Deb, 2008e c216W).

The strength of the strategic-relational approach here is that it can be used to account for the way in which Blair’s inner circle took primacy over the other constituent parts of the core defence policy community – the Foreign and Defence Secretaries and the Chancellor – in shaping the government’s BMD policy. This is because Self’s conceptualisation of the core defence policy community is overly rigid. Its triune structure fails to account for the insertion of more informal actors into the foreign policy making process mix, whereas the SRA thrives on its ‘sensitivity to
cross-cutting and intersecting groups and social forces’ (Jessop, 2016, p.63). Hence, while a strategic-relational analysis of Labour’s policy making on missile defence would indeed draw on hierarchical authority as embodied in the core defence policy community, it would also include ‘heterarchical coordination’. In other words, state power that is exercised not only through government hierarchies, order-giving and bureaucracy, but also through social networks, shared outlooks and friendship groups (ibid, pp.164, 167). Is this not exactly what was seen when a ‘Director of Communications’ occupied a central position in policy making, and, alongside the PM’s Chief of Staff, was given the quasi-authority to direct civil servants (Sparrow, 2010; Lord Turnbull, 2010, pp.15-17)?

With the influence of elite actors on the formulation of Labour’s posture towards ballistic missile defence now completed, it is necessary to shift to an analysis of the impact of parliamentarians on this process as non-elite agents.

5.2.1 Parliamentarians
While both Commoners and Lords made many enlightening and insightful comments on the government’s missile defence policy between 1997 and 2001, it is much harder to see any influence that their criticisms had in actually shaping it. This is not to say that Parliament was ineffectual. MPs and Lords were able to coax important clarifications of the government’s position on missile defence from ministers. The debates taking place in Westminster demonstrated a deep understanding of the issues surrounding BMD, coupled with a broad range of strong opinions on the direction the government should take on the issue (HoC Deb, 2001o, c1244-1248).

This thesis subsection shifts between comments made about missile defence in both Houses, beginning with a consideration of the criticisms of the government’s BMD plans made by the Conservatives as Her Majesty’s Official Opposition. It then gives a detailed account of the reactions and factions coalescing within the Parliamentary Labour Party around the government’s BMD policy, with the aim of assessing the level of influence, if at all, that these various individuals and groupuscules exerted on its formulation.

In Parliament, the Conservative Party’s main line of attack against the government’s BMD policy was to recycle familiar negative tropes regarding Labour’s 1980s unilateralist stance on nuclear weapons. If Labour was on the wrong side of the
debate during the Cold War, they argued, then they could be so now. ‘It shows their bad judgement’, said Conservative MP Julian Lewis, ‘their record in this matter is something of which many of them should be greatly ashamed’ (HoC Deb, 2001o, c1264). Chief among the bogeymen the Conservatives resurrected was the spectre of CND; repeatedly trying to link the government’s current policy on missile defence to the ‘one-sided disarmers’ that supposedly constituted CND’s rank and file and counted several Labour MPs among its past and current membership (HoC Deb, 2000f, c363). The Conservatives therefore simultaneously alleged that the government had both a ‘secret agenda’ to conspiratorially supress a more favourable approach to BMD while at the same being hopelessly divided over missile defence between CND sympathisers and pro-BMD MPs (HoC Deb, 2000h, c403).

For example, while working as a Minister at the Foreign Office with a brief for missile defence, Peter Hain MP gave an interview in which he said he was against missile defence regardless of whether it was ‘limited or unlimited’ (Ward and Taylor-Norton, 2000). This led to accusations from the Opposition of splits within the government, and quite personal attacks on Hain and other members of the government who still held CND membership as being something akin to saboteurs of the BMD project and therefore of being risks to national security (HoC Deb, 2001l, c10; HoC Deb, 2001s, c365). Furthermore, as Shadow Defence Secretary, Iain Duncan Smith published a pamphlet called Five years and counting… (2000) in which he argued that the Labour government was scared to commit to the US’s missile defence plans lest such a decision would ‘bring it into immediate conflict with our EU partners and most members of the Labour Party’ (Duncan Smith, 2000, p.3)

Nevertheless, despite the concerted efforts of the Conservatives to highlight BMD it barely registered among the voting public. For example, in an opinion poll taken by Ipsos-Mori shortly before the 2001 election only 1% of unprompted respondents saw defence as being the most important issue (Ipsos-MORI, 2015; Norris, 2001, p.576). What might be inferred from this poll is that if defence issues in general were only of concern to so few, then the subset of those who considered BMD itself to be a problem was probably minute. This demonstrates the power of electoral structural conditions over the Conservatives’ agency to shape the missile defence debate. If there was virtually no public anxiety over BMD, then, accordingly, there was no debate to influence.
If the political posturing of the Opposition formed the foreground to the missile
defence debate between 1997 and 2001, then its backdrop was framed by the
internecine struggles that consumed the Parliamentary Labour Party itself over BMD.
The question as to whether or not the PLP were any more successful in influencing
their own government over missile defence than the massed ranks of the Opposition,
then, is examined below.

Within the PLP there was a clear anti-missile defence sentiment – sometimes
spilling over into anti-Americanism – that emanated from an easily recognisable group
of left-wing MPs, but there were also important voices from what might be called the
centre-right of the PLP who were opposed to BMD on national security grounds. The
common denominator they shared was an appreciation for the importance of the ABM
Treaty (HoC Deb, 2000j, c107). That the very real concerns surrounding missile
defence were capable of transcending the usual left/right dichotomies within the PLP
was demonstrated by the occasions on which BMD related EDMs were signed by a
sizeable number of Labour MPs way beyond the usual Members that might have been
expected to object from the start for ideological reasons (EDM 650, 2001).

Nonetheless, the opposition of left-leaning Labour MPs towards missile
defence was the most prominent voice heard in the parliamentary debates. The left
critique of BMD could itself be categorised as dividing into two main camps. The first
of these might be called the internationalist position, which made the positive case for
arms control (HoC Deb, 2000a, c919-920). This was followed by a subset of MPs who
took an anti-imperialist stance against BMD (HoC Deb, 2001v, c252). The concerns
of the internationalists were most clearly articulated by Michael Savidge MP, who
held that NMD was not worth the UK’s participation if it undermined the international
environment and made the UK an undefended target by agreeing to host equipment
intended for the protection of the US (HoC Deb, 2000d, cc365-367).

Labour MPs who took an anti-imperialist stance towards missile defence saw
the US’s BMD plans as a projection of American power in pursuit of its own ends
(HoC Deb, 2001x, c400). Interestingly, this viewpoint was most often put forward by
the future Labour leader Jeremy Corbyn, who believed that the Bush administration
was ‘hellbent’ on developing BMD (HoC Deb, 2001x, c400). In Corbyn’s view, the
beneficiaries of missile defence were the same arms companies that manufactured
WMDs. He proposed that the British government should gather all the pressure it
could muster to convince the US to abandon BMD (HoC Deb, 2001x, c402). Another
common objection to the US’s BMD plans from the left of the PLP was to question Blair’s ideological commitments. For example, in an interview for this thesis Kelvin Hopkins MP stated that the reason Tony Blair supported missile defence, a project often associated with US conservatism, was simply because ‘Blair was right wing’ (Hopkins, 2017).

In contrast, Mike Gapes MP put forward what might be called ‘the realist alternative’ to the government’s BMD plans, attacking BMD from Labour’s centre as posing a risk to national security. Yet while Gapes shared in common with his more leftist comrades a fundamental concern that missile defence would undermine the ABM Treaty, his main rationale for why this would be a negative development was that the UK should object to BMD as its absence preserved the potency of the British nuclear deterrent (HoC Deb, 2000j, c105; HoC Deb, 2000f, c364).

A third and perhaps singular position was taken by Roger Godsiff MP. Pro-NATO but anti-nuclear weapons, Godsiff was in favour of the UK playing a role in a NATOised BMD system ‘Because it is part of the NATO eyes and ears listening, and because it engages the Americans’ as long as it was used in a purely defensive capacity and not for ‘military adventures’ (Godsiff, 2017).

Further evidence of the opinions of the PLP on missile defence can be found in the 12 BMD-related Early Day Motions that appeared between 1997 and 2001, all of which were sponsored by Labour MPs and who on average also made up 87% of the signatories (Simpkin, 2017). These EDMs were sponsored and signed by a core group of 20 or so Labour MPs – several of whom were members of the Campaign for Socialism group – surrounded by a larger coterie of 30-50 fluctuating Labour signatories (ibid). As such, these EDMs give an insight into the fears some MPs held about BMD, including concerns about missile defence causing a new arms race (EDM 580, 2000), and calls to ‘recognise the increasing swell of cross party and public anxiety about NMD and its implications for international peace’ (EDM 936, 2000).

However, what is most interesting about the development of these EDMs is that while they did indeed emanate from Labour MPs on the centre-left of the party, the election of Bush caused such consternation among a much broader cross-section of the PLP that the final BMD-related EDM of the Parliament acquired the highest number of signatures yet. Garnering the signatures of 145 Labour Members of Parliament, EDM 650 of the 8th of May could not just be dismissed as the work of the usual left-wing MPs. Over a third of the PLP had signed a document which expressed
concern at Bush’s intention to move beyond the constraints of the ABM Treaty in developing missile defence, endorsed the Foreign Affairs Select Committee’s recommendations that the government voice grave doubts about NMD, and questioned whether US plans to deploy BMD represented an appropriate response to proliferation (EDM 650, 2001). On the cusp of the election of a second Labour government missile defence had finally broken through into the PLP’s consciousness.

So, was this a classic example of campaigning MPs managing to utilise their agency and finally raise the consciousness of their colleagues to the dangers of BMD? Perhaps individual agency can be seen at work here. The dogged questioning that Backbench MPs brought to bear on ministers helped to clarify government policy on BMD, and their Cassandra-like prophesising kept the issue alive (HoC Deb, 2000e, c388). As for the large jump in signatures that EDM 650 suddenly accrued, perhaps this was aided by the inclusion of the Foreign Affairs Select Committee’s concerns about missile defence within its wording. Maybe this endorsement by the Foreign Affairs Select Committee helped to sanction and legitimise the issue in the eyes of a larger number of Labour MPs who before may have shied away from engaging with BMD due to its associations with the usual suspects, so to speak, on the left of the PLP (EDM 650, 2001).

However, the pendulum still swings back to structural concerns as a greater influence on individual MP’s reactions to missile defence. It must be remembered that the main issue hanging over the entire missile debate for several months prior to EDM 650 was the potential and then actual election of George W. Bush as President of the United States. His decision to remove the US from the strictures of the ABM Treaty in order to fully develop missile defence (The White House, 2001a) was a grave worry for many members of the PLP across the political spectrum (EDM 650, 2001). This structural development, entirely outside the influence of British MPs, did more to focus the minds of the PLP on the dangers of BMD than a dozen EDMs and speeches in Parliament against it.

Yet, how could structural boundaries shape and constrain agents so powerfully? To answer this question the thesis again draws on the strategic-relational approach to add a third element to the puzzle: the influence of ideas and discourse in mediating agents’ perceptions of what missile defence policy choices the structural context would allow.
5.3 Discourse: The Special Relationship and British Militarism

The power of discourse to influence government policy is one of the central tenants of the strategic-relational approach (Brighi, 2013, p.8). In the SRA, discourse forms a kind of meta-structure which shapes agents’ perceptions of their ability to influence more concrete political institutional structures. These structures, while in part arising from very real empirical considerations – raw military power at the international level, and numbers of votes at the domestic level – are also a manifestation of the immaterial influence of discursive ideas – such as the Special Relationship and British militarism – on the behaviour of individual actors (ibid, p.36). The ability of these ideational discourses to shape government missile defence policy is examined below.

Although the term ‘the Special Relationship’ did not appear in parliamentary discussions on missile defence, Ministers referred to the US as ‘our closest ally and strongest friend’ – a phrase with much the same ideational content – with almost mantra-like regularity (HoC Deb, 2001s, c15; HoL Deb, 2001a, c499; HoC Deb, 2001y, c801). What this expression conveyed most strikingly was the way in which the British government seemed to exhort the sacrifice of some degree of national self-interest in deference to the US’s security concerns in order to uphold the greater goal of keeping the US onside (HoC Deb, 2001s, c15). It appears that the government did not consider it sufficient for Britain’s strategic posture that the UK put its own defence considerations first, surely the bedrock of any realist conception of national security, but that the only way of securing national security was via the maintenance of positive relations with the US (HoC Deb, 2001y, c802).

The Special Relationship therefore held real purchase over the attitudes of ministerial support towards the US’s BMD plans: Secretary of State for Defence Geoff Hoon stated that ‘we want to be helpful to our closest ally’, while FCO Parliamentary Under-Secretary Baroness Scotland said that it was not in the British interest for ‘our closest ally’ to feel vulnerable to attack (HoC Deb, 2001s, c15; HoL Deb, 2001a, c499). The government was even quite willing to overturn hitherto established defence policy in order to placate the US over BMD: as well as demonstrating greater concern with the US’s worries over missile proliferation than the UK’s, Minister of State at the FCO Keith Vaz’s 2001 statement to the Commons that ‘Clearly there is a threat because our closest ally and strongest friend, the United States, believes that there is one’, directly contradicted the findings of the 1998 SDR, which stated that the threat
to Britain from proliferation was ‘many years off’ (HoC Deb, 2001y, c802; Ministry of Defence, 1998, p.128).

This demonstrates the huge influence that the ideational discourse of the Special Relationship held over political agents’ perceptions of the relation between the US and UK with regards to missile defence. Everything was interpreted through that paradigm, and so the UK was willing to compromise its short-term national security over missile defence in order meet the long-term goal of keeping the US on-side.

At the domestic level the ability of the ideational discourse of ‘British militarism’ – most simply defined as the British public’s support for a strong armed forces (Reifler et al., 2011) – to shape the government’s defence policy in general as well as its position on BMD was keenly felt in this Parliament. For example, in his introduction to the SDR the Secretary of State for Defence George Robertson MP, wrote that ‘The British are by instinct an internationalist people…We do not want to stand idly by and watch humanitarian disasters as the aggression of dictators goes unchecked. We want to be a force for good. That is why the government is committed to strong defence, and sound defence is sound foreign policy’ (Ministry of Defence, 1998, p.4).

Furthermore, Professor Michael Clarke’s statement to the Defence Select Committee analysing the assumptions underlying the SDR fitted perfectly within the rubric of British militarism when he stated that ‘a minimalist defence policy as espoused by Labour during the 1980s, was decisively rejected by the electorate’ (Defence Committee, Eighth Report, 10 September 1998, HC 1997-98, Ev Wednesday 12 November 1997). Or, more pointedly, as the Conservative MP Julian Lewis put it ‘the people who really deserve the credit for the fact that we now have a government who are prepared, under the right circumstances, to use military action properly are the electorate of Great Britain who, in 1983 and again in 1987, showed the Labour Party that it would not get re-elected unless it dropped the policy of one-sided nuclear disarmament’ (HoC Deb, 1999, c840).

Fortunately for the Labour government, at times it appeared as though they had adapted to the ideational discourse of British militarism and reformed their defence policies so thoroughly that they were able to outflank the Conservatives and turn their accusations of weakness over national security back on them. In one particularly heated exchange shortly before the 2001 general election, Foreign
Secretary Cook castigated the Conservatives’ exhortations to involve the UK in the US’s BMD plans as quickly as possible without waiting to see what the technicalities of the US’s ideas might actually be, as a ‘betrayal of national interest and any influence over the proposal’ (HoC Deb, 2001d, c984). In a final turning of the tables, Cook ended his attack with the comment that he did not think any members of the public watching the debate would conclude that a ‘single thing’ the Tories had said regarding BMD would enhance British national security (ibid, c987).

The preceding paragraphs clearly illustrate the extent to which the ideational discourse of British militarism had come to permeate Labour’s defence and foreign policy stance in general and its position on BMD in particular. The implicit assumptions of this discourse had not only been deeply absorbed by Labour but had also led to the wholesale reconfiguration of its foreign and defence policy to such an extent that Labour ministers were able to rout the Conservatives on missile defence; a policy area that should have been a natural strong point for them.

By this point the thesis has separately examined the structural, agential and discursive influences on the Labour government’s missile defence policy between 1997 and 2001. It therefore finally turns to make a strategic-relational analysis of the dialectical interplay between these three elements in order to give a thorough explanation of the overall development of this policy during this period.

5.4 Conclusion: A strategic-relational analysis

The period between 1997 and 2001 can be described as the subterranean era of missile defence. Deep structural forces surrounding Labour’s position on BMD that had slowly been gestating throughout the 80s, late 90s and the turn of the century finally began to come to fruition. At the international level, the proliferation of nuclear weapons had increasingly pressurised the Clinton administration to begrudgingly commit research and development funding towards BMD (Futter, 2013, pp.58, 70), while the arrival of Bush saw missile defence advocated with evangelical zeal (Bush, 1999). At the domestic level, the structural preference of British voters for parties with a strong stance on defence had in part repeatedly led to Conservative electoral victories over Labour throughout the 1980s (Vickers, 2011, p.132).

The exercise of agency when confronted with these structural constraints is demonstrated by the Labour leadership’s reformation of the Party’s entire defence
policy platform in order to take a stronger line on security issues in general and appeal to a wider proportion of the electorate defence (Rogers, in Coates and Jaures, 2007, p.17), while also doing its upmost to maximise the UK’s national security by maintaining a close strategic relationship with the United States (HoC Deb, 2001s, c15; HoL Deb, 2001a, c499). The SRA’s focus on the ability of agents to navigate multiple levels of strategically selective environment is a particularly useful explanatory tool here as it is able to integrate Labour’s sometimes seemingly contradictory policy decisions over missile defence.

For example, the government exercised their agency in constantly reminding the US of the importance of not undermining the ABM Treaty in the pursuit of BMD (HoC Deb, 2000d, c312-3). This worked well during the Clinton administration as both governments were broadly of the same position (Futter, 2013, p.46). However, once Bush came to office the British government still continued with the same line for a time, but in the face of a reduced ability to counter Bush’s commitment to move beyond the ABM Treaty they began to utilise their remaining agency to remind the US to consult with their allies and rivals over their missile defence intentions (HoC Deb, 2001l, c12).

The capacity of the Labour government to navigate several different levels of strategic selectivity regarding missile defence was also demonstrated in domestic politics (Brighi, 2013, p.36). While Labour had indeed gone to great pains to successfully reform its overall defence policy, taking a much stronger line on national security in order appeal to a wider range of voters, it was presented with something of a dilemma over BMD in that there appeared to be some apprehension among the public regarding missile defence (Ipsos-MORI, 2001). From a purely vote-maximising point of view the government should therefore have been more circumspect in its response to the US’s missile defence plans. However, the reality was that missile defence was such a non-issue for most of the electorate (Ipsos-MORI, 2014a) that the government could afford to continue to hedge its own commitment to the US’s BMD plans while remaining almost oblivious to the apparent opposition to BMD latent within the public’s psyche. However, at the same time, where taking a strong line on missile defence did matter in parliamentary debates, the Labour government was able to use its strong relationship with the Clinton and Bush administrations to neutralise any Conservative attempt to attack them for being weak on BMD (HoC Deb, 2000h, c403).
As for discourse itself, the Special Relationship and British militarism acted as *a priori* ideational filters which had been deeply imbibed by the Labour government. The practical manifestations of the influence of these discourses was a policy stance towards missile defence which dared not risk either alienating the US over fear of jeopardising the protective umbrella afforded by the UK’s alliance with the world’s most powerful nation, or the haemorrhaging of votes after a hard-fought path to electoral credibility.

In short, a strategic-relational analysis would attribute the formulation of Labour’s BMD policy between 1997 and 2010 to the dialectical interplay between three elements: the structural influence of the British government’s need to maximise the UK’s power in an anarchical world by upholding the Special Relationship with the United States, of which supporting the US government’s BMD plans was a means to this end; the agency of the Labour leadership in reforming the Labour Party’s national security policies in order to outflank the Conservatives on defence in general, while at the same time granting them the awareness to disregard the British public’s apparently latent but apathetic opposition to missile defence in particular and, finally; the role of the Special Relationship and British militarism as ideational discourses in framing the Labour government’s very perceptions of the policy choices open to them over BMD when faced with the need both to maintain a strong alliance with the US at the international level and to appeal to the British electorate with a strong position on defence at the domestic level. In total, it therefore appears that during this first Parliament structural forces predominated due to the need to uphold the Special Relationship via acquiescing to the US’s BMD plans in the face of latent public opposition.

With the groundwork for the Labour government’s engagement with the US’s missile defence plans laid in this first Parliament from 1997 to 2010, Labour’s next term of office from 2001 to 2005 would see a radical deepening of this cooperation.

This second substantive chapter covers the development of Labour’s missile defence policy between 2001 and 2005. Firstly, the thesis addresses the powerful structural events of the early 21st century – such as the 9/11 attacks and the subsequent war on terror – that had a profound effect on how the Labour government approached and deepened its participation in the US’s BMD plans. It also examines the nascent yet burgeoning structural influence of financial inducements on the British government’s willingness to accede to a US missile defence partnership via the establishment of the UK Missile Defence Centre (MDC). Moving on to agency, the thesis considers the impact of the uniquely close relationship between Blair and Bush in accelerating the UK’s integration into the US’s BMD system through upgrades to RAF Fylingdales, as well as considering how the alignment of pro-missile defence Secretaries of State in the FCO and MoD facilitated this integration.

The thesis then moves on to examine the agential influence of parliamentary figures on the Labour government’s stance towards BMD. The ability of members of the general public to influence the government’s BMD policy is also scrutinized through the lens of increasing protest and local opposition to the potential roles of RAF Fylingdales and RAF Menwith Hill in missile defence.

As befits a strategic-relational analysis, the thesis then makes a detailed investigation of how the ideational discourses of the Special Relationship and British militarism framed the Labour government’s perceptions of the policy space open to it regarding missile defence. As ever, the chapter then concludes by bringing structure, agency and discourse together to make a strategic-relational analysis of the forces shaping the Labour government’s missile defence policy during their second term of office between 2001 and 2005 with the aim of determining which of the three forces was most influential. A short summary of the analysis to come follows.

2001 to 2005 represents the high-water mark of the Labour government’s cooperation with the Americans over missile defence. The direction of travel towards the UK’s ever closer integration into the US’s BMD plans had already been set during Labour’s first term of office, but 9/11 and the invasion of Iraq greatly accelerated this process, finally undermining any last vestiges of support for the ABM Treaty (HoL Deb, 2001b, c1390). However, while structural forces played a prominent role in
shaping the Labour government’s responses to the US’s missile defence policy announcements, between 2001 and 2005 agency played a dominant role in increasing the intensity of Britain’s commitment to the US’s plans. Indeed, the incredibly close bond forged between Bush and Blair in the wake of 9/11 and the build-up to the invasion of Iraq in 2003 greatly accelerated this process of integration. The strength of this partnership was most clearly illustrated by the Labour government’s decision in early 2003 to agree to the US’s request to upgrade RAF Fylingdales so that it could play a role in ballistic missile defence by tracking incoming missiles (HoC Deb, 2003c).

The British government was also presented with the perfect opportunity to capitalise on the huge levels of investment that the Americans had made into BMD. The signing of a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) in 2003 established the UK’s Missile Defence Centre as a ‘government-industry partnership to understand the options for UK defence against ballistic missile threats’ and to play a role in ‘opening doors’ between British and American missile defence related arms manufacturers (Hore, 2019; Department of Defense, 2003; Anonymous Correspondent 3, 2019).

At the national level, public concerns regarding missile defence began to grow (Ipsos-MORI, 2001; HoC Deb, 2004d; Defence Committee, 2003, para 60; CND, 2004; Jenkins-Smith et al., 2004). However, the Conservatives were not able to capitalise on this emerging opposition as they themselves approved of the Labour government’s decision to allow the US to upgrade RAF Fylingdales (HoC Deb, 2003g, c340).

At the heart of government, the appointment of Jack Straw as Foreign Secretary was the perfect match for Hoon’s continued presence at the MoD. The way stood open for a real synergy and convergence for outright support of the US’s missile defence plans between these two major offices of state.

The ideational discourses of the Special Relationship and British militarism continued to exert their structural pressure in framing the debate over the UK’s involvement in BMD: in the wake of 9/11 the two became almost interchangeable. To be supportive of the Special Relationship included support for missile defence which, ergo, meant standing up for the national interest (Defence Committee, 2003, Examination of Witnesses, Q129).

Taken together, these pressures helped forge what had been Labour’s somewhat nebulous stance on missile defence between 1997 and 2001 into a coherent
policy during their second term of office. BMD came to be seen as one subset of a platform of measures required to counter the proliferation of WMDs and ballistic missiles alongside diplomacy, arms reduction and classical nuclear deterrence (HoL Deb, 2001b, c1405).

Having now given a brief summary of the developments in Labour’s ballistic missile defence policy between 2001 and 2005, it is now necessary to frame the overall theoretical picture by examining the structural forces shaping this policy.

6.1 Structure: Britain’s place in the Structure of International Relations

The structural influence of the international environment on the formation of the Labour government’s missile defence policy greatly increased between 2001 and 2005. The impact of 9/11 on the United States’ defence posture in general and its missile defence policy in particular, with all that this meant for the UK’s role in BMD, cannot be understated. 9/11 and the subsequent invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq tied the United Kingdom even more closely to the foreign and defence policy of the United States than it already was, and strongly reinforced the UK’s involvement in BMD.

Yet, in the context of a world thrown into turmoil by 9/11, the Labour government also saw opportunities for Britain to exercise its agency by fulfilling its duty as a major moral force in world affairs. The UK would be first to stand ‘shoulder to shoulder’ with its closest ally against the forces of terror and destruction, guiding and counselling the US to seek international consensus on its response to the attack on the Twin Towers and BMD (Defence Committee, 2003, Joint Memorandum from the Ministry of Defence and the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, para 24). As ever, the British government’s main strategic goal of defending the nation itself was refracted through its relationship with the United States (Defence Committee, 2003, Joint Memorandum from the Ministry of Defence and the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, para 24).

This renewed closeness with the US further exacerbated existing tensions in the UK’s relationships with its other allies over missile defence. For example, the UK’s shift towards the US held a corresponding move away from the position of its fellow EU nations regarding missile defence, who remained sceptical (Gray, 2002,
p.285), and who in any case were further alienated from the Bush administration by the Iraq war (Futter, 2013, p.94).

However, the British government’s own assessment of the risk to the UK mainland from ballistic missile attack remained low, even after 9/11 (HoL Deb, 2001b, c1404). What concerns there were focused upon the risks that British military personnel might face from missile attack in theatre or while stationed in overseas bases (Ministry of Defence, 2002, para 9; HoC Deb, 2003d, c316). However, these concerns were allayed to some extent because the British armed forces already possessed something of a layered defence against air-breathing (endo-atmospheric) missile attack and were adept at passive defence against Chemical Biological Radioactive and Nuclear (CBRN) threats (HoL Deb, 2001b, c1407). Moreover, the Bush administration’s ending of the NMD/BMD divide and promise to extend missile defence to its allies meant that theatre and national defence became part of the same BMD project, further reassuring defence staff that British personnel would be protected at home and abroad (HoC Deb, 2002i, c503; Foreign Affairs Committee, 2001b, para 41).

In fact, as far as the great nuclear powers stood regarding WMDs and the need for BMD, between 2001 and 2005 the international environment had never been more benign. For example, in May 2002 the US and Russia signed the Moscow Treaty which reduced their nuclear stockpiles even further (HoC Deb, 2002i, c503). Indeed, the obvious shift in international relations in general was away from great power conflict towards a focus on terrorism and rogue states due to 9/11 (HoC Deb, 2002i, c19).

Taken together, the actions of terrorist organisations and the fear of rogue states bolstered the British government’s argument for missile defence on two fronts. First of all, the Labour government argued, Al-Qaeda’s attack demonstrated that such groups would be willing to use any means whatsoever to attack the US and its allies – including ballistic missiles – if they could acquire them (HoC Deb, 2002i, c19). Secondly, missile defence would ensure that the international community could still intervene against states of concerns even if they managed to acquire nuclear weapons (Foreign Affairs Committee, 2001b, para 39).

A second structural pressure that became increasingly apparent between 2001 and 2005 is what might be called the ‘military-industrial complex’, or, perhaps less grandly, the influence that potentially lucrative contracts available for British industry
to take part in US BMD research and development projects held over the Labour government. Here, the public record presents a counter-intuitive picture. It appears that although there were undoubtedly millions of dollars of R&D openings made available to British arms manufacturers concerning BMD through the MDC (Department of Defense, 2003), the actual total amount of finance paled in comparison to the billions of dollars being invested into the US’s Missile Defence Agency (MDA) (MOD, 2003). In reality, then, it appears that raw capital investment was a much weaker structural influence on the Labour government’s attitude towards missile defence than might first be thought.

Overall, international structural pressures were still a dominant force in shaping the Labour government’s policy towards missile defence between 2001 and 2005. The government’s strong alliance with the US in general and their steadfast partnership with the Bush administration in the aftermath of 9/11 and the subsequent invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq meant that the government was also favourably disposed to acceding to the American’s missile defence requests. However, the main structural difference between 1997 to 2001 and 2001 to 2005 was that the American government was now promising the UK and its other allies that they too could eventually come under the protective umbrella of missile defence themselves, alongside offering lucrative BMD related R&D contracts to a select few nations (HoC Deb, 2002l, c503; Department of Defense, 2003, pp.4, 6). The benefits of the UK’s patience and the fruits of its decision not to oppose missile defence during the Clinton administration when no such guarantees of friendly involvement had been made were finally starting to be realised.

9/11 was a major world event which had a profound impact on the entire structure of defence policy in the US and the UK, strengthening the resolve of both nations to deepen their collaboration over missile defence (Foreign Affairs Committee, 2001b, Appendix 8, 2.3). For the Bush administration, 9/11 removed the final vestiges of support for the ABM Treaty and presented them with the justification to greatly expand missile defence funding (Futter, 2013, p.94). Likewise, the British government’s reaction to 9/11 was to claim that it demonstrated the lengths to which enemies of the United States and its allies would go to use any means at their disposal to attack them, including ballistic missiles (HoC Deb, 2002l, c19). BMD would therefore continue to be recognised by the British government as one potential part of
a comprehensive strategy to counter such threats alongside ‘arms control, counter proliferation, diplomacy and deterrence’ (HoC Deb, 2001t, c103).

This was not to say that the British government suddenly considered the UK to be under the imminent threat of missile attack in the post-9/11 world. Indeed, even after 9/11 the government still believed that the ballistic missile threat to the UK had ‘diminished considerably since the end of the Cold War’ (HoC Deb, 2002i, 138WH). Nonetheless, while the government did not make any impulsive changes to its missile defence policy in the aftermath of the attack on the Twin Towers, it certainly led to a re-examination of the security landscape facing the UK in this new reality. For example, Hoon’s statement in April 2002 that ‘the events of 11 September demonstrated the need to take seriously threats to international and regional stability’, suggests the recognition that a certain level of oversight had seeped into British defence planning on this issue (HoC Deb, 2002l).

Yet, in practical terms Hoon’s statement and others like it did not immediately have a great impact on the UK’s involvement in the US’s missile defence plans. Apart from increased security around the sensitive facilities at RAF Fylingdales, according to the Defence Select Committee ‘no single, distinctive doctrinal contribution’ arose from 9/11 (HoC Deb, 2002f). What the Defence Secretary’s and others’ statements did represent, however, was a deepening of the UK’s rhetorical and symbolic commitment to the US’s missile defence plans, even if over a year after 9/11 the US still had made no formal request of the UK to take part in missile defence.

Further afield, 9/11 also had a powerful effect on nullifying Russian and Chinese opposition to the US’s missile defence plans. Both these powerful states came to accept that the US would forge ahead with missile defence no matter what, while at the same time they found it more fruitful to engage with the US in the ‘war on terror’ due to the latent terrorism threats in their own countries (HoC Deb, 2001q, c1065; Roberts, 2003, p.32). Ironically, it was the US’s NATO bedfellows in Europe that remained the most sceptical about missile defence, even in the face of 9/11(Gray, 2002, p.285).

The British government’s response to these developments was to reiterate their position on the EU question that BMD was ‘an issue of territorial defence relevant to national governments or NATO rather than the European Union’ and to recognise and reflect positively upon the ‘calm’ and ‘measured’ reactions of the Russian and Chinese governments’ to the US’s missile defence plans post 9/11 (European Scrutiny
Committee, 2001; HoC Deb, 2003c, cc710; HoL Deb, 2003b, cc1398). Ultimately, while the British stance towards BMD remained remarkably consistent before and after 9/11, the attacks on the Twin Towers strengthened the British government’s resolve towards supporting the US’s missile defence plans (Foreign Affairs Committee, 2001b, Examination of Witnesses, Q61), even if they still maintained that the UK was safe from WMD attack for the foreseeable future (HoC Deb, 2002g, c1164; Defence Committee, 2003, Joint Memorandum from the Ministry of Defence and the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, para 3).

However, the violence of 9/11 did set in motion a chain of events that produced a wave of conflicts and increased tensions around the world, which in turn heightened the arguments surrounding the US’s missile defence plans and Britain’s role in them. Indeed, concerns regarding the spread of WMDs and their means of delivery via ballistic missiles featured prominently in the build-up to the conflicts which took place in the wake of 9/11 in Afghanistan and Iraq (HoC Deb, 2003c, c707; HoC Deb, 2004b, c1446; HoC Deb, 2003d).

Further tensions over WMDs emanating from the countries President Bush claimed formed an ‘axis of evil’ added yet another layer of dread to the international environment: Iran and even Libya were all pursuing high-stakes WMD and/or ballistic missile programmes at this time, with North Korea supplementing its income through the sale of missile technology to other states (HoL Deb, 2001b, c1406).

However, even in the face of such a volatile international environment the Secretary of State for Defence and the MoD and FCO still considered that there was no significant missile threat to the UK from any of these countries as late as June 2002 (HoC Deb, 2002g, c1164; Defence Committee, 2003, Joint Memorandum from the Ministry of Defence and the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, para 3). This state of affairs then begs the question as to why the British government was willing to forge ahead in cooperating with the US over BMD if it was not at risk of missile attack? At the crux of the answer to this problem lies the invasion of Iraq. The very same structural forces that shaped the UK’s involvement in the invasion of Iraq were also at play in its decisions regarding missile defence; specifically, that at the heart of the UK’s decision to support the US’s missile defence plans was the need to maintain a strong alliance with the Americans (HoC Deb, 2001c, cc273).

Just as 9/11 threw these two nations together to a degree that had not been since the end of World War II – with the mettle of their alliance being tested in the
‘shock and awe’ of the invasion of Iraq – so too was British support for missile defence emblematic of this bond. It is no coincidence that the high-point of the UK’s support for the US over Iraq also maps onto the most fervent era of US/UK BMD cooperation (Brown, 2010, p.6).

This change in the British government’s position on the missile threat to UK assets that took place between mid-2002 and the March 2003 offensive in Iraq was based upon the subtle shift in position that while states of concern might not possess the capability to attack the British mainland with WMD-armed ballistic missiles, their intention to do so could change at any moment (HoL Deb, 2002, c101). In the face of such potential threats it was therefore prudent for the UK to support both the invasion of Iraq and the US’s missile defence plans.

What the confrontations with Iraq and other ‘rogue states’ over their missile programmes in the wake of 9/11 illustrate is the supreme structural influence of international relations over the UK’s missile defence policy. In short, the UK’s involvement in the invasion of Iraq is illustrative of the kind of international structural pressures which shaped the Labour government’s position on missile defence writ large; a position that paid dividends at the close of 2002 when the British government was offered the chance to play a role in missile defence directly by upgrading RAF Fylingdales (HoC Deb, 2002o, 46WS).

The invasions of Afghanistan and particularly Iraq proved to be extremely controversial, with the Bush administration becoming increasingly alienated from the international community (HoC Deb, 2004e, c452; HoC Deb, 2003g, c381; HoC Deb, 2002h, c370). The British government thereby found itself in a somewhat awkward position vis-a-vis its main ally, having to placate worried international friends and reinterpret certain statements made by the US government in order to blunt their most provocative interpretations.

Chief among these concerns was the weaponisation of space. Critics asserted that missile defence was merely a stepping stone for the US to gain control of space as the ‘ultimate high ground’ from which it could assert ‘full spectrum dominance’ (Director for Strategic Plans and Policy, 2000, p.6; Smith, 2005, p.460; Foreign Affairs Committee, 2001b, Appendix 2, para 2.6). In particular missile defence sceptics pointed to the Project for a New American Century (PNAC), a think-tank founded in 1997 by key members of the future Bush administration – including Dick Cheney, Donald Rumsfeld and Paul Wolfowitz – which published a document entitled
Rebuilding America’s Defenses aimed at maintaining ‘American military pre-eminence’ through a network of ‘global missile defenses’ (HoC Deb, 2002l, c523; Donnelly, 2000, pp.1, 51, 69).

The motifs in Rebuilding America’s Defenses aligned with those found in the 2001 Quadrennial Defence Review (QDR), produced by a Department of Defense which was by now under the leadership of PNAC alumni Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld and Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz. Indeed, the QDR cited as a ‘key objective’, the need to improve space systems as one critical goal of military transformation, and ‘to ensure US ability to exploit space for military purposes’ (Department of Defense, 2001, p.7).

Further official sanction was given to these doctrines in the US Air Force Space Command’s (AFSPC) Strategic Master Plan FY04 and Beyond, published in November 2002 (Air Force Space Command, 2002, p.1). Crucially, however, the AFSPC noted that their plan ‘does not provide for a [Target and Engagement] T&E capability for missile defense until the far-term’ (ibid, p.14). Officially, therefore, BMD was to remain a purely defensive technology for the foreseeable future, not a tool of space warfare.

In the British context, these concerns regarding the militarisation of space coalesced around anxieties that having abandoned the ABM Treaty the US was also about to abrogate the Outer Space Treaty 1967 – to which the UK was a depository – by placing laser weapons in Earth’s orbit (HoC Deb, 2001t, c103W; Foreign Affairs Committee, 2001b, App. 2, 4, 10). In actual fact, this was something of a misunderstanding of the true stipulations of the Outer Space Treaty. For while the Treaty prohibited the placement of ‘nuclear weapons or any other weapons of mass destruction’ in outer space or on celestial bodies, legal opinion was of the view that lasers would not fall under this rubric (Meredith, 1984, p.423; Topping, 1984, p.343).

The FCO also came to the conclusion that ‘None of the proposals we have seen from the US for a missile defence system would violate the terms of the Outer Space Treaty’ (Foreign Affairs Committee, 2001b, para. 106). In any case, by the end of financial year 2002 the question of space weaponization became something of a moot point as the Bush administration greatly scaled back its research into exoatmospheric laser BMD systems due to the prohibitive costs involved (Forecast International, 2004, p.7).
6.1.1 The ‘Military-Industrial Complex’ and BMD

If the brute structural power of violence in international relations was not enough to influence the British government’s missile defence policy on its own, then, many assume, surely the financial opportunities afforded by Britain’s cooperation with the American government over BMD must have been a major inducement to taking part? In reality, the old exhortation to ‘follow the money’ is perhaps one of the most misguided hypotheses put forward to explain the UK’s cooperation with the US’s BMD plans. Indeed, according to its current Director as well as the MDC’s current Industry Lead Bryan Hore, the primary function of the MDC was to provide advice and guidance to senior decision makers within the MOD and across government on how the UK might approach BMD (Hore, 2019; Anonymous Correspondent 3, 2019). This role was particularly important because the UK did not have its own policy on BMD (Hore, 2019) and was instead ‘dependent on (and committed to) NATO BMD for the protection of the UK mainland’ (Anonymous Correspondent 3, 2019). And while the Missile Defence Centre did indeed act as a forum for British arms manufacturers to liaise with their American counterparts in the hope of securing missile defence research and development contracts worth millions of pounds, these figures were still much smaller than those surrounding other British military contracts at this time (Ministry of Defence, 2015; GOV.UK, 2018; HoC Deb, 2004a, cc961w). UK expenditure on the Eurofighter Typhoon, for example, ran to over £19 billion in R&D costs by the time it came into service in 2003 (Defence Committee, 2004, para 84).

Emerging from a UK/US Memorandum of Understanding signed by Donald Rumsfeld and Geoff Hoon in June 2003, the Missile Defence Centre (MDC) was intended to be the ‘primary interface’ between the British government and the US Missile Defence Agency, providing a ‘framework for the closest possible involvement and provide insight to the U.K., both government and industry, into the U.S. BMDS Program’ (Department of Defense, 2003, pp.4, 6). Initially operating as a ‘virtual centre’ due to budgetary constraints (Anonymous Correspondent 2, 2019), the MDC was charged with the responsibility of managing ‘potential U.K. contributions to the U.S. BMDS Program; current and future joint work programs…research, testing and procurement’ (Department of Defense, 2003, p.6). However, as UK MDC Industry Lead Bryan Hore stated in an interview for this thesis, the MDC was not ‘a vehicle for securing BMD contracts’, but a way of ‘opening doors’ and facilitating business that
way (Hore, 2019). To this end, the Missile Defence Centre was to be allocated a budget by the MoD’s Defence Science and Technology Laboratory’s Chief Scientific Advisor of £5.5m per annum, with a further £2m contribution from private industry (Ministry of Defence, 2015; GOV.UK, 2018; HoC Deb, 2004a, cc961w). For this investment the Secretary of State for Defence expected that the MDC would produce ‘advice on missile defence issues; the development of models and databases to facilitate the formulation and evaluation of concepts for defending the United Kingdom against the ballistic missile threat…and secure significant participation by UK industry in the US BMD programme’ (HoC Deb, 2004a, cc961w). Yet, while the initial investment on the part of the UK was small, it was hoped that the return would be substantial. As Lord Bach stated at the Centre’s launch, ‘With the US programme running at some $8bn a year, the opportunities for UK industry are clear’ (MOD, 2003). British defence companies were therefore of course very keen to be involved. Right from the start, AMS, BAE Systems, INSYS, MBDA and Qinetiq were invited by the MoD to form a ‘foundation group’ of major British defence contractors within the MDC (ibid).

Despite its role as a forum for bringing US and UK missile defence companies together, the question still remains as to whether the Missile Defence Agency did actually influence the British government’s BMD policy in any way? And if so, or if not, what does this say about the broader structural question of the impact of economic factors on the UK’s stance towards missile defence?

Ultimately, the answer to this quandary can be found in the observation that if British arms manufacturers were indeed capable of exerting undue influence over the direction of the British government’s missile defence policy in the pursuit of profit, then one might have expected to see them lobbying for the development of a domestic UK missile defence system. They could then have exerted far greater leverage over their own government to gain favourable missile defence contracts than relying on the largesse of the American Department of Defense (DoD) and US defence firms. Yet there is no record of this. Instead, as Smith points out, the relatively high interpenetration of British arms firms with those in the US meant that any pressure UK arms manufacturers might have tried to exert over the British government regarding missile defence would have taken the shape of lobbying for continued access to investment opportunities in US missile defence companies through the Missile Defence Centre, rather than in pressing for an indigenous UK missile defence
system (Smith, 2005, p.455). In 2002, for example, BAE systems did more business with the Pentagon than the MoD (ibid).

Another seemingly plausible claim is that the facilitation of missile defence R&D contracts for British arms manufacturers through the MDC was much more about maintaining the UK’s strategic ability to project power globally by ensuring military interoperability with US BMD systems than it was about obtaining economic benefits (Brown, 2010, p.25). However, as Bryan Hore, UK Industry Lead for the MDC noted, UK/US missile defence interoperability was a benefit arising from the MDC, but it did not influence its founding (Hore, 2019).

So, as Stocker points out, the prime benefit that the MDC brought to the British government was that having practical access to US missile defence manufacturing projects bolstered its ‘intelligent customer’ approach to potential future missile defence acquisition (Stocker, 2004a, p.25). Certainly, both the current UK missile defence Industry Lead Bryan Hore and the current Director of the MDC asserted that the MDC was ‘front and centre’ in advising the government on BMD developments and that the MDC’s technical and scientific advice was ‘routinely taken into account when making evidence-based decisions’ on BMD (Hore, 2019; Anonymous Correspondent 3, 2019).

Taken together, the various structural factors examined in this chapter exerted a stronger influence on the Labour government’s missile defence policy between 2001 and 2005 than ever before. 9/11 and the war on terror drew the US and the UK closer together, their cooperation in Afghanistan and Iraq foreshadowing their growing cooperation over missile defence. It would have been no less structurally possible for the British government to have rejected the US’s overtures to deepening collaboration over missile defence than it would have been to reject Bush’s calls to participation in the war on terror: indeed, Bush did offer Blair the opportunity to withdraw from the coalition preparing to invade Iraq, yet Blair told him “‘I'm staying, even if it costs me my government’” (Hinsliff, 2006). Taking part in both the war on terror and missile defence was vital to maintaining British national security through the maintenance of the Special Relationship. As both Bryan Hore and the current MDC Director commented, the UK’s Missile Defence Centre was certainly another pillar among many helping to cement the Special Relationship between the British and American governments (Hore, 2019; Anonymous Correspondent 3, 2019). This influence was not all one way, the UK was particularly respected by the US for its expertise in
‘sensors and shooters’, and in Bryan’s Hore’s view in this way the UK was ‘absolutely’ able to influence US BMD strategy (Hore, 2019). Yet the connections made between UK and US missile defence firms via the MDC were not enough to sway the British government into accelerating its cautious commitment to taking part in the US’s BMD plans. Structurally, strategic considerations held far greater sway over the formulation of the UK’s missile defence policy than did economic ones.

However, just as the intensity of the geopolitical circumstances following 9/11 greatly strengthened the glacial structural inertia acting on the Labour government’s commitment to BMD, that same pressurized environment also heightened the importance of agential fiat. When integrated into systems embodying great concentrations of social power such as governments, even small acts of individual agency can have great impact. And so it is to a consideration of the influence of agential factors on the Labour government’s missile defence policy that the thesis now turns.

6.2 Agency: The Core Defence Policy Community

A strategic-relational analysis of agency would place the PM less at the pinnacle of a hierarchy then at the densest intersection of the nexus of power relationships (Jessop, 2016, p.173). One of the most prominent of these intersections is that between the British Prime Minister and the US President. Indeed, the relationship between Bush and Blair was particularly intense, lasting 6 years and 6 months, far longer than that of Blair and Clinton (3 years, 8 months), Brown and Bush (1 years, 7 months), or Brown and Obama (1 year, 4 months). This intensity was born of the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks and the subsequent invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq, and spilled over into the two premiers’ cooperation over missile defence. The Bush/Blair era was the apogee, so to speak, of British and American cooperation on BMD.

9/11 massively reinforced this partnership. On the day of the attacks Blair promised to stand ‘Shoulder to shoulder’ with the US (BBC News, 2001b). In turn, Bush responded that ‘America has no truer friend than Great Britain’ (BBC News, 2001e). Years later, Bush wrote that in the aftermath of 9/11, Blair’s commitment to stand with the US ‘100%’, 'helped cement the closest friendship I would form with any foreign leader…some of our allies wavered. Tony Blair never did’ (MacAskill, 2010). Through this solidarity Blair hoped to gain influence with Bush over the
invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan (Daddow and Gaskarth, 2011, p.195). In January 2003, Blair set out exactly his reasons for tacking so closely to Bush and his administration:

First, we should remain the closest ally of the US, and as allies influence them to continue broadening their agenda...The price of British influence is not, as some would have it, that we have, obediently, to do what the US asks...But the price of influence is that we do not leave the US to face the tricky issues alone (Butler, 2003c).

Blair was prepared to follow through on his commitment to the end. When asked if one of the elements of the UK-US Special Relationship was whether ‘Britain is prepared to send troops to commit themselves, to pay the blood price’, Blair simply replied, ‘Yes’ (BBC News, 2002a).

Yet how did this closeness regarding foreign policy in general translate into cooperation over missile defence in particular? On the day of the World Trade Centre attacks Blair instinctually 'felt NMD would quickly rise up the agenda' (Campbell, 2007, p.562). Yet, at first, Blair continued to take a measured stance on the role that missile defence could play in the UK’s strategic defence in the aftermath of 9/11. Just over a month after the attacks, when asked directly in the House of Commons whether his statements of solidarity with the US in response to 9/11 also meant he was prepared to ‘stand shoulder to shoulder with them over ballistic missile defence[?]’, Blair replied, ‘The position is unchanged...We understand the role that missile defence can play as one element of that comprehensive strategy’ (HoC Deb, 2001c, cc273). What Blair had recognised in the events of 9/11, though, was ‘that there are those who will seek to attack, with whatever means are available, the United States, its friends and allies’, and that ‘In the future, this might include ballistic missiles’ (HoC Deb, 2001t, cc102-3W). In December 2001 Blair discussed missile defence with Bush, concluding that ‘We share US concerns about the threats stemming from the proliferation of missiles and weapons of mass destruction and understand the role that missile defences can play as part of a comprehensive strategy to tackle these threats’ (HoC Deb, 2002q, 819W)

However, in a later, less equivocal moment, Blair gave one of his most candidly positive statements on missile defence. In January 2003, Blair told the
Liaison Committee that he had ‘an open mind as to what missile defence can deliver us’, but that it was important that ‘we make sure this country gets some benefit out of it’ (Liaison Committee, 2003, Examination of Witnesses, 21 January 2003, Q40, 62). Blair believed that ‘If you can develop a defensive system—and this is a defensive system’, then ‘I think there is merit in it.’ (ibid).

Another of Blair’s speeches during this era ostensibly concerning terrorism but which had a subtext readily applicable to missile defence took place in his own constituency of Sedgefield in March 2004. For Blair, the intent of terrorist groups coupled with the capability of repressive states to develop WMDs and long-range missiles led him to conclude that ‘From 9/11 on, I could see the threat plainly. Here were terrorists prepared to bring about Armageddon. Here were states whose leadership cared for no-one but themselves…and who saw WMD as a means of defending themselves against any attempt external or internal to remove them’ (Blair, 2004). Although Blair made no mention of the system here, the utility of missile defence would seem to fit perfectly within the rubric he outlined. What better way to protect the lives of hundreds of thousands from the terrorist acquisition of WMDs while at the same time maintaining the ability of the international community to intervene against the corrupt leadership of potentially nuclear-armed aggressors, Blair might have argued, than through BMD?

A strong case can therefore be made for the important role of agency in the deepening of Britain’s role in BMD during the Bush and Blair years. This can be seen in the way in which the tempo of integration was much faster during this period than during the Clinton or Brown years. The fact that Bush and Blair shared a common worldview and were bound together in the white heat of 9/11 and the high-stakes responses of Afghanistan and Iraq gave them one of the closest relationships of any post-war British and American leaders (MacAskill, 2010). As Jeremy Stocker argued in an interview for this thesis, ‘when it comes to international foreign policy, what looks like a paradox of a supposedly right-wing Republican President and a centre-Left Labour Party isn't actually a tension at all because in international affairs they were on the same hymn sheet. They were both liberalist interventionists with a wish to remake the world in a certain image’ (Stocker, 2017). Both leaders also believed in the efficacy of missile defence (Liaison Committee, 2003, Examination of Witnesses, Q40, 62; Futter, 2013, p.96). This closeness would have appeared to translate into two
foundational developments for Britain’s role in BMD; the upgrading of RAF Fylingdales and the establishment of the Missile Defence Centre.

Ultimately, however, although Blair’s agency and personal bond with Bush helped facilitate a beneficial outcome for the UK regarding missile defence, this was in reality a fortunate by-product of Blair’s superordinate goal of maintaining a strong strategic alliance with the US above all else. Indeed, when once asked what he had achieved from the Special Relationship, Blair replied, ‘The Special Relationship itself’ (Casey, 2009, p.277).

Blair did not govern alone on missile defence, of course; Geoff Hoon and Jack Straw also played influential roles in shaping the government’s BMD policy as other prominent members of the core defence policy community.

The synergy between Jack Straw and Geoff Hoon over missile defence is a strong example of the influence of agency in the formulation of Labour’s missile defence policy between 2001 and 2005. Both Secretaries of State supported missile defence and utilised their agential power to support its integration into British security policy in different ways. If Hoon was BMD’s spokesman, then Straw was its ideologue. With Cook replaced by Straw as Foreign Secretary by June 2001, and Hain gone from the FCO by October 2002, the way lay open for a perfect alignment between the positions of the FCO and the MoD over missile defence.

Just three weeks after becoming Foreign Secretary in June 2001, Straw wrote an article in the left-leaning Tribune magazine in which he posed his opposition to those sceptical of missile defence in the form of a pub quiz. ‘There is a fifth pub question’, he wrote, ‘Who opposed MAD...in the Cold War and prefer it now to missile defence? The answer is, some of those who say we should have nothing to do with missile defence’ (The Acronym Institute, 2001). Straw would continue in this vein, criticising his anti-BMD colleagues in the PLP for their ‘ironic’ tendency to ‘fall back on the old doctrine of mutually assured destruction…Had there been missile defence then, we would have been in favour of it’ (HoC Deb, 2002b, cc718).

Making good on his call to debate, Straw issued a slew of parliamentary briefings, Commons debates and public speeches – both before and after 9/11 – setting out his basic position on missile defence. Just over a month prior to the events of 9/11, for example, Straw’s ministerial office published a PLP briefing on missile defence which noted, ‘The United States is far more likely to stay engaged internationally if it feels safe from attack from missiles’ (Williams, 2001b, p.4). In the aftermath of the
attacks on the Twin Towers Straw told the Foreign Affairs Select Committee that ‘The overall case for new forms of missile defence has been strengthened since 11 September’ (Foreign Affairs Committee, Second Report, Examination of Witnesses, 20 November 2001, Q61).

This is not to say, however, that Straw saw missile defence as a panacea for countering the intersection of irresponsible proliferators and the grasping hands of wickedly inventive terrorists. As Foreign Secretary, Straw’s enthusiasm for missile defence was coupled with a promotion of the UK’s role in upholding international non-proliferation agreements. A December 2001 memo from Straw’s office reminded readers, ‘Missile defence is not an alternative to our wider non-proliferation effort but part of it’ (Williams, 2001a, p.3, emphasis in original). While most importantly, a speech by Straw at King’s College, London, in February 2002, pointed out that ‘What Missile Defence should do is give pause to those tempted down the path of proliferation even before they begin…As such, it is possible that Missile Defence may pave the way for greater progress on disarmament, not an arms race’ (Straw, 2002).

Further evidence of Straw’s commitment to balancing the rise of missile defence with international diplomacy was seen in his support for the adoption of an International Code of Conduct (ICOC) on ballistic missile research by the member states of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) (Straw, 2002). After several international meetings the ICOC was signed by 92 countries in November 2002.

As Foreign Secretary, Straw therefore used his agency on two fronts: to persuade others of the necessity of missile defence, and to bolster international non-proliferation agreements. He was combative in his pursuit of the first goal, and, naturally, diplomatic in his pursuit of the second. Perhaps intentionally, Straw’s commitment to missile defence, though based on the clear-sighted pursuit of the UK’s national interest, also had a deeply idealistic element to it in his central claim that BMD would allow for the reduction of nuclear weapons (HoC Deb, 2002b, cc717). Straw’s articulation of missile defence as a way for the government to pursue multilateral nuclear disarmament also had the added benefit of triangulating the traditional nuclear unilateralism espoused by those on the left of the Labour Party.

The most powerful manifestation of Straw’s agency, however, can be envisaged in his role as the ‘not-Cook’ Foreign Secretary, who could be trusted to stay on message in favour of the US’s missile defence plans as they developed and became
more controversial internationally. In this way, Straw’s advocacy for missile defence cleared the ideological space for the real decision-making power over the government’s further involvement in the US’s missile defence plans to be exercised by Defence Secretary Geoff Hoon.

During Labour’s second term of office Hoon was absolutely central in securing the US’s commitment to a major missile defence related upgrade of RAF Fylingdales in January 2003. This was arguably the most important BMD related decision taken by any government Minister during the entire 1997 to 2010 era, as it ensured that the UK would be locked into the US’s future missile defence plans as the system matured. Yet, while Hoon’s practical role in securing the upgrade cannot be underestimated, the really interesting example of his agency in action during these negotiations was the way in which he prevented any real parliamentary debate around the actual decision to go ahead with the RAF Fylingdales upgrade, as outlined in the following paragraphs.

Initially, upon Labour’s return to office in June 2001 until the 9/11 attacks, Hoon and the MoD’s engagement with the US’s missile defence plans was very much business as usual. Hoon repeated the well-worn trope that there was at present no current threat to the UK but that the situation was being monitored (HoC Deb, 2001e). Surprisingly, this stance did not change in the wake of 9/11 (HoC Deb, 2001c, 875W; HoC Deb, 2002d, 826W; HoC Deb, 2002n, 523W), although Hoon did confirm discussing missile defence options with Donald Rumsfeld and his NATO and European counterparts on several occasions (HoC Deb, 2001c, cc609; HoC Deb, 2002i, cc19; HoC Deb, 2002e, c1W; HoC Deb, 2001i, c522). British officials also met an inter-agency delegation of US officials in London for discussions on missile defence in July 2002, although Hoon himself did not attend (HoC Deb, 2002j).

Where events started to take a more interesting turn was towards the last third of 2002. On the 17th of October that year the Defence Secretary gave a statement to the Commons in which he examined the progress that had been made in reviewing the UK’s defence policy a little over a year after the anniversary of the 9/11 attacks, ‘Our work over the past 12 months has been focused on one simple proposition: the need to defend the people of the United Kingdom, their interests and their allies’, he said (HoC Deb, 2002l, 502).

What was most interesting about the debate, however, was that it gave the first hint of the coming publication of ‘further analytical and discussion material’ on the
government’s official position on missile defence around which ‘a parliamentary and public discussion of the issues involved’ could take place ‘when we are ready’ (ibid, 504). This statement would prove to be problematic as it gave MPs the impression that there would be a formal parliamentary debate and vote prior to any British decision to take part in the US’s system.

Finally, on the 9th of December, Hoon announced the official publication of the MOD’s long awaited *Missile Defence: a public discussion paper* (HoC Deb, 2002c, 15W; Ministry of Defence, 2002). This was a strange document in that while its long-awaited publication imbued it with all the import of one of the most seminal British missile defence related documents of the entire 1997-2001 era, in reality it did not essentially say anything new. Its main strength was that it brought together all of the government’s previously disparate statements on the arguments for missile defence and its potential benefits for the UK into one document and clarified them. One such clarification was the discussion paper’s assertion that in a proliferating world the efficacy of Britain’s nuclear deterrent might not be sufficient on its own, and it was therefore worth considering whether some kind of missile defence system would reinforce Trident (Ministry of Defence, 2002, p.24). More cryptically, the report hinted that the US might need a second interceptor site in North-West Europe to bolster its defences against missiles from the Middle-East while also providing protection for Europe (ibid, pp.21-22); the impression being given that this site might be located somewhere in the UK.

Parliament and the public barely had time to digest the public discussion paper, however, before Hoon announced on the 17th of December that the US had made its long expected request to upgrade RAF Fylingdales so that it could ‘track ballistic missiles more accurately, so that they could be engaged by interceptors’ – barely two days before the Commons rose for the Christmas recess (HoC Deb, 2002o, 46WS).

Yet it was after Parliament’s return in the New Year that the timeline became even more compressed. On the 6th of January Hoon attended two meetings with locals in Goathland and York regarding the potential upgrade (The Yorkshire Post, 2003; BBC News, 2003). While on the 9th of January, Hoon gave a written answer that ‘Once we have carefully considered the issues involved and taken account of parliamentary and public discussion, I will inform the House at the earliest opportunity’ (HoC Deb, 2003l, c294W).
Less than a week later, however, on the 15th of January, Hoon announced that ‘Based on the analysis and discussion that we have undertaken so far, I have therefore come to the preliminary conclusion that the answer to the US request must be yes, and that we should agree to the upgrade as proposed’ (HoC Deb, 2003c, c697). Perhaps feeling liberated from no longer having to dissimulate his true thoughts on the UK’s role in BMD, Hoon then gave the most terse account yet of his reasons for agreeing to the US’s request:

Missile defence would need to be used only if a ballistic missile has actually been fired...Once the missile is in the air, it is unthinkable that anyone could not want us to be in a position to shoot it down...It would therefore be irresponsible for the Government to leave the United Kingdom without a route map to acquire a defence against this threat... (HoC Deb, 2003c, c698).

But, with the decision now made, what had happened to the parliamentary debate that was supposed to have taken place on this issue? When asked, Hoon ignored the question of the possibility of a vote on the issue in the House (ibid, c703). However, later that day the Defence Secretary attended a session with the Defence Select Committee where he was asked the same question again. In the light of the promises of discussion that he had made previously, Hoon replied, ‘I simply felt from some experience now of this issue that it was almost impossible to be able to debate this in the abstract without indicating the way in which the Government thought this debate should go’ (Defence Committee, 2003, Examination of Witnesses, 15 January 2003, HC 2002-03, Q240).

Although Hoon presented this statement as the start of the debate rather than the end of it, the fact that he had already indicated the desired outcome in effect meant that the decision was a fait accompli. The question then arises as to when Hoon’s decision to pre-empt the discussion was made? Was it months or even years in advance? Had it been before or after the publication of the public discussion paper? Was it taken in the few disparate days either side of the Christmas recess? Was that the intention, in order to shut down any potentially embarrassing debate? In any case, the Committee Members accepted Hoon’s response and did not press the issue (ibid).
Finally, on the 5th of February, Hoon issued a written ministerial statement stating that he was satisfied that different points of view had been taken into consideration, ‘I am therefore today replying to the United States Secretary of Defence, Donald Rumsfeld, conveying the Government's agreement to the US request’ (Defence Committee, 2003, Summary; Hansard, 2003, c12WS).

All that remained was for Hoon and Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld to sign the Memorandum of Understanding and codify the terms under which the UK and US would coordinate their missile defence partnership in general, as well as creating the UK Missile Defence Centre to facilitate this (HoC Deb, 2003b, 57WS; Taylor and Jones, 2008, p.12; HoC Deb, 2004, 374W; Kattan and Chamberlain, 2005, p.3). It seemed that Hoon had achieved the desired outcome with minimal parliamentary scrutiny and none of the Greenham Common level protests that some parliamentarians and ministers feared (HoL Deb, 2003b, c1381; Anonymous Interviewee 1, 2017).

The sheer agential power with which Hoon controlled, corralled, and – one might even go as far as to say coerced – the wider parliamentary debate on the UK’s role in BMD seems plain to see here. At a higher level of abstraction, what Hoon’s machinations demonstrate is the raw agential power of the core defence policy community to define and delimit the terms of debate and absolutely circumvent the rest of the government apparatus.

Yet, the question remains; why go to such lengths to block Parliament’s input into this decision? Perhaps Hoon’s quick agreement to the RAF Fylingdales upgrade in January 2003 without any parliamentary discussion was an attempt to neutralise the issue. If the government had allowed a debate or even a vote on the RAF Fylingdales update, missile defence’s associations with the Bush administration (HoC Deb, 2002i, c136WH; HoC Deb, 2002m, c160WH) and the looming Iraq war vote in March 2003 – a vote which saw 139 Labour MPs voting against their whip, the biggest rebellion by any party for over 150 years (Cowley, 2005a, p.5) – could have created the perfect storm for a government defeat on the upgrade. And even if not, a large yet ultimately impotent rebellion could still have been very embarrassing for the Labour government by presenting a divided party and gifting the Conservatives a new opportunity to re-open accusations that Labour was unpatriotic.

A large rebellion on missile defence among the PLP would also have made headlines and so could have also raised public consciousness on the issue, radicalising a greater proportion of the public against missile defence and causing exactly the kind
of ‘Greenham Common’ situation around missile defence feared by some parliamentarians and government ministers (HoL Deb, 2003b, c1381; Anonymous Interviewee 1, 2017).

Furthermore, the longer MPs were led to believe they were going to have some say in the government’s choice on the RAF Fylingdales upgrade the greater the eventual fall-out would be when this option was pulled away from them; it was therefore better from the government’s view to curtail the debate with a pre-emptive decision as quickly as possible.

However, while this thesis subsection has so far lauded the agential power of the core defence policy community to dominate the missile defence debate, the fact that Hoon was so concerned to prevent any substantial parliamentary discussion of the issue is a back-handed compliment to the potential agential power of Parliament to have influenced this debate. And so, accordingly, it is to a consideration of Parliament’s role in shaping the missile defence debate during this second term of office that the thesis now turns.

**6.2.1 Parliamentarians**

Although the non-debate in the build-up to the RAF Fylingdales upgrade decision may give the impression that Parliament’s agential ability to influence the government’s BMD policy was severely curtailed between 2001 and 2005, in fact the government’s efforts to prevent any such debate demonstrates the latent agency of Parliamentary rebels to amplify issues and bring them to the attention of the media and the public. As political scientist Philip Cowley points out in *The Rebels*, his study of Labour MP’s voting patterns under Blair, the PLP became increasingly rebellious after the 2001 general election. More than 200 Labour MPs rebelled on more than 259 separate occasions between 2001 and 2005, more than in any Parliament since the Wilson government of October 1974 to 1979 (Cowley, 2005a, p.5). Cowley’s explanation for the PLP’s increasing rebelliousness after the 2001 election is that Blair’s tight control over the policy making process left even mainstream Labour MPs feeling increasingly annoyed with fully fledged policies being presented to them for their rubber-stamp approval (Cowley, 2007; Cowley, 2005b; Cowley, 2005a, p.253). And where else was this style of policy making more in evidence than with the RAF Fylingdales upgrade decisions?
It therefore appears that as Secretary of State for Defence, Geoff Hoon tried to prevent any real debate for fear of deepening and exacerbating splits within the wider PLP. Indeed, in the early spring and summer months after Labour’s return to a second turn of office in June 2001, Parliamentary debate on missile defence was growing. On 20th June 2001, for example, EDM 23 – expressing concern at President Bush’s intention to renounce the ABM Treaty – was signed by 276 MPs, 215 of them Labour, including the Chair of the PLP (Richter, 2004, p.150). Protest against missile defence also began to spread to the extra-parliamentary organs of the wider Labour movement, with several trade unions signing joint public letters of concern (Wintour, 2001b).

Structural factors soon took their toll on this flowering of debate, however, as the attack on the Twin Towers quashed most parliamentary discussion, seemingly out of the fear of appearing disrespectful towards the US (Grice, 2001b). One empirical indication of this trend was the substantial fall in the number of ballistic missile defence related EDMs and signatories after 9/11 (17 BMD related EDMs between 1997 and 9/11, only three afterwards until the end of the 2005 parliament). A tabled debate on missile defence due to take place at the October 2001 Labour Conference was also cut in the wake of the attacks (Williams, 2005, p.134).

Although parliamentary debate did resume in the build-up to the MoD’s release of the BMD Public Discussion Paper in lieu of the rumoured forthcoming RAF Fylingdales request, again, any substantial discussion was quickly side-lined by the government’s prompt agreement to the upgrade. With direct critique of the government’s missile defence policy therefore somewhat curtailed, criticism of BMD took a more circuitous route. Instead, the expression of the concerns of locals living in constituencies containing or close to RAF Menwith Hill and RAF Fylingdales by their local MPs in the Commons became a proxy for critiquing the government’s policy in general. Members of Parliament also exerted their agency through the various Committees which cast a watchful eye over the government’s BMD decisions (Defence Committee, 2003, paras 10-11).

In terms of party politics at Westminster, in the wake of the RAF Fylingdales upgrade the Labour government suddenly found itself largely supported by the Conservatives but opposed by a significant minority of its own backbenchers. The Conservatives differed from Labour only in their degree of support for BMD – they would have immediately offered to site US interceptors on British soil – and so found
themselves triangulated on missile defence yet again (Stocker and Weinack, 2003b, p.6).

With this brief overview complete, it is to a deeper analysis of the ability of parliamentary agents to influence the government’s missile defence policy between 2001 and 2005 that the thesis now turns.

To begin, the Conservatives struggled to make any substantive attacks on the government’s approach to missile defence between 2001 and 2005, much as they had failed to do in the previous Parliament. However, despite their largely ineffectual results, it is possible to determine two distinct phases in the Conservatives’ critique of Labour’s stance towards BMD during this era, as outlined below.

Prior to 9/11, the Conservatives’ attack lines on BMD were still based around trying to use the spectre of Labour’s 1980s unilateralism to exacerbate splits between the government and the PLP. In the early months of the new Parliament this strategy had some limited success, as the Conservatives used EDM 23 – signed by 215 Labour MPs – (EDM 23, 2001) to portray the government as divided over missile defence. In one early debate, for example, the Leader of the Opposition, Iain Duncan Smith used the motion to claim that ‘The Government are trapped by their party’, and that ‘most of the Labour party does not want it’ (HoC Deb, 2001u, c349).

Although the above comment illustrates the attack lines gifted to the Conservatives by EDM 23, its effect was short lived. The motion represented the high watermark of opposition to missile defence within – though not outside – the PLP during this Parliament. In contrast, EDM 196 submitted the following month – asking the government to raise MP’s concerns over BMD with President Bush – garnered only 45 signatures (EDM 196, 2001). Ultimately, whatever brief upturn in rhetorical fortunes EDM 23 generated for the Conservatives, its effect was greatly reduced by 9/11 (HoC Deb, 2001h, c871). The sense of urgency generated by the attacks shifted the Conservatives’ focus from emphasising tensions between the PLP and the government to the second phase of their argument, which was to immediately implore the US to upgrade RAF Fylingdales and site BMD interceptor missiles in the UK (HoC Deb, 2001c, c609; HoC Deb, 2001h, c875; Stocker and Weinack, 2003b, p.6). As Iain Duncan Smith put it in his 2002 BMD pamphlet A race against time, ‘My own view is that the goals of the US should be our goals because their interests in these matters are identical to our own’ (Duncan Smith, 2002, p.9).
However, the Labour government’s agreement to the US’s RAF Fylingdales upgrade request on the 15th of January 2003 left the Conservatives in something of a quandary, as they now found it difficult to differentiate their own position on missile defence against that of the Labour government’s (HoC Deb, 2003c, c708; HoC Deb, 2003g, c340). Moreover, their calls for British interceptors right here, right now, were based upon something of a misunderstanding, as such exhortations went far beyond what was actually technically possible at that time. In fact, the Americans would not even begin to deploy their own first handful of ground-based interceptors until July 2004 (Futter, 2013, p.112). Yet again Labour was able to triangulate the Conservatives’ position on missile defence and render them politically neutered.

The thesis now turns to examine whether the PLP were any more successful in influencing their own government’s BMD policy than Her Majesty’s Most Loyal Opposition had been.

Just as with the other agents examined in this thesis, the events of 9/11 exerted massive structural influence over the ability of the PLP and wider Labour movement to alter the government’s position on missile defence. 9/11 effectively stifled the nascent opposition towards BMD that had grown stronger in the PLP and become more vocal in the trade unions and Constituency Labour Parties in response to Bush’s announcement in May 2001 that the US would be leaving the ABM Treaty. EDM 23 was the most visible aspect of this growing concern, yet the more interesting story during this period was how the trade unions began to agitate more openly in their opposition to missile defence. Indeed, in June 2001 17 trade union leaders published a letter in The Guardian stating that they considered it ‘wholly inappropriate for our government to support this initiative’ (Bertrand Russell Peace Foundation, 2001, p.75).

Continued opposition to the government’s missile defence plans over the summer months of 2001 pointed towards a coming confrontation over the issue at the Labour Party Conference due to take place in October. In August, The Telegraph reported that several CLPs had submitted anti-missile defence motions to be debated at Conference (Grice, 2001a).

However, the events of 9/11 ensured that none of the delegates to the Labour Conference would have the opportunity to debate missile defence that year. Despite seventeen CLPs submitting emergency motions calling for a debate on BMD, the Party’s Conference Arrangements Committee ruled out constituency resolutions and
a special debate on Bush’s missile defence system on the grounds that they were ‘not contemporary’ because there had been no change in the US’s policy (Grice, 2001b; Appleton, 2001; Williams, 2005, p.134). Charles Clarke, the Labour chairman, added that the issue had been judged as ‘not appropriate’ for discussion (Grice, 2001b).

The aftermath of 9/11 and the strictures placed around discussion of the US’s BMD plans at the October Party Conference coincided with a noted reduction in the amount of debate surrounding missile defence emanating from the PLP. This trend was most clearly illustrated by the falling number of signatories to subsequent missile defence related EDMs during the rest of the 2001-2005 Parliament (December 2002 EDM 436 = 48 signatories, February 2003 EDM 682 = 29 signatories) as compared to the 276 that had signed EDM 23 in June 2001, which, as its primary sponsor Michael Savidge MP pointed out, was an impressive feat since only backbenchers could sign it (EDM 436, 2002; EDM 682, 2003; EDM 23, 2001; The Acronym Institute, 2001).

Most of this reduction in the number of EDM signatories can probably be attributed to the overshadowing of missile defence by the intense public and parliamentary focus on the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq in the wake of 9/11, although some of it can also possibly be ascribed to the growing apprehension of some MPs who had signed EDM 23 about continuing to be openly critical of the US’s missile defence plans after 9/11 for fear of appearing anti-American. These two pressures could have reduced the number of MPs feeling compelled to publicly critique the US’s BMD policy from the broader grouping that had been eager to sign EDM 23 before 9/11 to the rump of MPs on the left of the Labour Party who had always been most committed in their opposition to BMD (HoC Deb, 2001c, c609; HoC Deb, 2002i, c136WH; HoC Deb, 2002h, c379).

With the PLP largely sidestepped on missile defence for the time being the torch of dissent passed to the trade unions. The annual Trades Union Congress agenda for 2002 expressed its concerns that missile defence could ‘spark a new arms race’, Congress therefore called upon the government to ‘announce its intention to withhold all UK support from the NMD programme’ (TUC, 2002). Individual union leaders such as Bill Morris, General Secretary of the T&G also added their voice to this opposition, arguing ‘for the UK Government to withhold its support for the National Missile Defence system’ (BBC News, 2002d).
Parliamentary debate surrounding missile defence rose again during the phony war period between the government’s announcement that it had received a request from the US to upgrade RAF Fylingdales in late December 2002 and its decision to agree to that request in mid-January. However, an example of the lacklustre response to this rather significant turn of events post-9/11 from the wider PLP was the fact that EDM 436 – welcoming the Government's commitment to a wide-ranging public debate on BMD – was signed by only 48 MPs (EDM 436, 2002). Even more surprisingly, considering the importance of this decision and the duplicitous way it had been reached, EDM 682 – noting ‘with dismay the UK's approval of the use of RAF Fylingdales for missile defence’ – garnered only 29 signatures (EDM 682, 2003).

This is not to say that the RAF Fylingdales upgrade decision passed Parliament by without comment; far from it. Debates on the 15th of January – the day of the decision – and the follow up debate on the 22nd were dominated by outspoken criticisms from committed Labour MPs, who often commented on the sense of unease the decision had created in the Party (HoC Deb, 2003c, c707, 710; HoC Deb, 2003g, c330).

A final recurrent theme during the mid-to-late stages of the 2001-2005 Parliament were the sporadic rumours that interceptor missiles were imminently to be deployed somewhere in the UK (HoC Deb, 2003c, c699; HoC Deb, 2003g, c401; HoC Deb, 2003e, c286; HoL Deb, 2003b, c1395; HoC Deb, 2003f, c349W; Elliott and Carrell, 2004; Nuclear Threat Initiative, 2004; BBC News, 2004; Norton-Taylor, 2004). This speculation led Hoon to finally publicly address the allegations in a mid-November 2004 letter to *The Guardian* stating that ‘There has been no request from the US to site ground-based interceptors anywhere on UK soil’ (Hoon, 2004). With this statement, interceptor speculation gradually diminished for the remainder of the Parliament.

One final coda to this turn of events, however, came in the form of the Defence Secretary’s response to a question by Alan Simpson MP, asking whether parliamentary approval would be required before a proposal for the siting of US interceptor missiles in the UK could be authorised. Hoon replied that ‘Any decision on the siting of interceptor missiles in the United Kingdom would be open to scrutiny and debate in the normal way. Specific parliamentary approval would not be required’ (HoC Deb, 2004c, c1292W). MPs might have been forgiven for not having the greatest
confidence in this answer considering the way that the decision to upgrade RAF Fylingdales had been made previously.

Unfortunately, this final episode illustrates in microcosm the lack of active agency that the PLP, the wider Labour movement and the parliamentary opposition at large were able to exert over the government’s missile defence policy. This is not to draw a trite conclusion about the overbearing power of the core defence policy community to make decisions without the need to seek parliamentary approval, but is instead intended to draw attention to the broader structural pressures that both reinforced the core defence policy community’s agential power vis-à-vis the parliamentary opposition and nullified its discursive voice. The most prominent of these structural pressures, was, of course, 9/11, leaving parliamentarians of all parties in a structural double bind. At the international level, the Labour government was entirely committed to support the US in the aftermath of 9/11 – including over missile defence – and so no amount of critical debate in the Commons or Lords was going to change that, as Hoon’s unilateral decision to accede to the US’s RAF Fylingdales upgrade request with minimal parliamentary consultation made clear (HoC Deb, 2003c, c697). Then, at the parliamentary level, 9/11 and the following invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq dominated most MP’s attention, relegating missile defence far down the hierarchy of important topics. The Party hierarchy’s curtailment of any debate on the issue at the 2001 Labour Party conference (Grice, 2001b) also helped to cement a feeling among the broader PLP that vocal opposition to BMD could now be seen as anti-American. One counterpoint to this paralysis in the PLP and the retreat of missile defence criticism to left MPs, however, was that trade union mobilisation against BMD continued unabated (TUC, 2002).

However, the fact that Hoon was so intent on circumventing parliamentary input into the upgrade decision represents a back-handed compliment to the latent potency of its agency if, then, it may have threatened to get out of hand, with damaging consequences for the government’s image in terms of Labour appearing as a divided party over the issue.

So, it seems that the public’s representatives were unable to influence the government’s BMD policy between 2001 and 2005. But were the public themselves any more successful on this front?
6.2.2 The Public

On the mild summer morning of Tuesday 3rd July 2001, RAF Menwith Hill radar base was invaded. Not by a foreign military or terrorist group, but by up to 150 Greenpeace protesters (BBC News, 2001a). Although by the end of the day all but one trespasser had been removed from the site, the following morning a further 20 protestors penetrated the base. And while this second incursion finally ended with the arrest of four trespassers on the Wednesday evening, the protestors had managed to make their point, with the story appearing on BBC News, as well as prompting a visit from the Secretary of State for Defence himself the following day (BBC News, 2001f; Defence Committee, 2003, Appendix 22).

What is so interesting about what BBC News dubbed ‘the battle of Menwith Hill’ – only the most dramatic of a handful of such insurrections between 2001 and 2005, sometimes requiring the presence of police officers from seven forces – is that it stands as an informative signifier for several different trends that led to the increasing visibility of missile defence in the British public eye during this era; protest, polls, planning issues, local concerns and increased security (HoC Deb, 2003h, c12; HoC Deb, 2002a, c66). Each of these differing facets can be seen interacting in microcosm in the protest recounted above.

The day after the RAF Menwith Hill protest ended, for example, polling began for what would stand as the most substantial opinion poll on the British public’s attitude towards missile defence of the entire 1997 to 2010 era. This robust poll, carried out by IPSOS-MORI on behalf of the UK Working Group on Missile Defence, an informal coalition of arms control organisations including BASIC and CND, undertook over 2,000 face to face interviews at 193 locations (Ipsos-MORI, 2001). The results of this poll were particularly interesting, especially as they ran counter to what might be expected considering the discursive influence of British militarism (Reifler et al., 2011) on other areas of the general public’s attitudes towards defence issues such as support for Trident. In fact, the poll found that 44% did not agree that it was in the UK’s best interests to allow the use of radar facilities in Britain as part of the US missile defence system, as opposed to 30% who agreed. Indeed, 72% felt that using British radar facilities in such a missile defence system would make the UK more of a target. Although, perceptively, 57% also believed that US/UK relations would suffer if Britain did not cooperate with the United States over the system (Ipsos-MORI, 2001). For their own part, protest groups themselves seemed somewhat
conflicted about how effective their methods were in influencing public opinion (MDA, 2007, K-193).

In any case, whether by accident or design the 4th of July protests certainly could have helped to increase the profile or negative image of BMD among the general public prior to the missile defence poll. However, context was key here: a separate, slightly earlier general MORI poll found that when presented with a list, only 11% of voters considered defence to be a ‘very important’ issue when deciding which party to vote for (unprompted, this dropped to 1%) (Ipsos-MORI, 2015). If defence itself was of such little concern to most voters, then the numbers who considered BMD to be their main point of contention must have been smaller still.

There was definitely a committed minority opposed to missile defence, however. Valerie Davey, the MP for Bristol West, said that her local branch of CND had presented an anti-missile defence petition with over 520 signatures to the Prime Minister (HoC Deb, 2002 p, c779). While Alice Mahon, the MP for Halifax, stated that she had received ‘hundreds if not thousands of letters’ opposing BMD (HoC Deb, 2003c, c703).

Nonetheless, despite the likelihood that BMD remained a niche concern among voters, a second substantive academic opinion poll taken in September 2004 bookended well with the one taken in July 2001, close as they were to the beginning and end of Labour’s second term of office. Researchers at the Universities of Texas A&M and New Mexico conducted telephone surveys with over 1,000 UK residents, finding that on a scale of 0-10 British respondents rated the desirability of missile defence well below midscale at 3.83 (Jenkins-Smith et al., 2004, p.300). This study was also complemented by a CND commissioned ICM telephone poll of over 1000 people undertaken in September 2004, which found that 67% of respondents opposed UK involvement in the US Missile Defence system if it involved the deployment of weapons in space (CND, 2004). Although there is always some caution to be borne in mind when extrapolating the results of a handful of polls to infer the opinions of the general population at large, the fact that these three polls, taken three years apart by different types of organisation using different methods came to similar results, could be taken as a genuine indication of a latent antipathy towards BMD among the British public.

While the general public’s true opinions on missile defence may have been hard to gauge, in the communities surrounding RAF Fylingdales and RAF Menwith
Hill the attitudes of local residents were mixed. What concerns local people did have regarding the potential involvement of their neighbouring bases in the US’s BMD plans focused around two key issues; radiation and terrorism (Defence Committee, 2003, para 60).

Radiation fears stemmed from concerns about the current energy output of RAF Fylingdales causing cancer, as well as the rumour that an X-band radar might be installed there at some point in the future (Defence Committee, 2003, para 61; Whitby Gazette, 2003). In reality, the National Radiological Protection Board (NRPB) stated that the radio frequency (RF) emissions emanating from RAF Fylingdales, at only 0.04 mW/cm², were well below the safe level of 2.6 mW/Cm² (Defence Committee, 2003, Supplementary memorandum by the MoD, paras 7-8). Concerns about the placement of a more powerful X-band radar at RAF Fylingdales were also unfounded: such radars were intended largely to be located at sea (HoC Deb, 2003c, c703)

In the wake of 9/11 locals also worried that any upgrades to the two bases might see their communities caught up in a terrorist attack (HoC Deb, 2003c, c702). Quite besides the unlikeliness of such an event actually happening, the very physicality of carrying out such an attack was now much harder. Despite the 4th of July debacle, the erection of a perimeter fence meant that incursions into RAF Menwith Hill had already dropped dramatically, from 30 in 1998 to one in 2001 (HoC Deb, 2001p, c954; HoC Deb, 2003j, c309; HoC Deb, 2003i, c37).

Nevertheless, much like the local population, following 9/11 the government recognised that the security arrangements in place at the bases were still not sufficient to deal with the potential public order threat (HoL Deb, 2001c, c870). Indeed, Professor Paul Rogers stated in an interview for this thesis that the Stop the War Coalition formed in the build-up to the invasion of Afghanistan also brought new vigour to anti-missile defence protests (Rogers, 2017).

As an interim measure, in November 2001 the Home Secretary increased funding to North Yorkshire Police Authority by £1 million to cover the extra costs of preventing unauthorised access to RAF Fylingdales and RAF Menwith Hill by protestors (HoC Deb, 2004d, c106; HoC Deb, 2002k, c107). Moreover, according to one eyewitness protestor, Ministry of Defence Police (MDP) were being ‘bussed in’ from all over the country on 12 hour shifts to assist the civil police in their patrols of the bases at this time, with the costs of the MDP presence at RAF Menwith Hill being reimbursed by the US government.
Much like local individuals, it appears that local authorities also had little influence over missile defence developments at RAF Fylingdales and RAF Menwith Hill. One major advantage that the MoD possessed when undertaking various security improvement at the bases, as well as missile defence upgrades to the radars themselves, was that because the bases were on Crown Defence Land planning permission was not actually required (Defence Committee, 2003, Supplementary memorandum by the MoD, para 2). However, acting in good faith the MoD had agreed to behave as though it was in fact bound by the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 and so would, if necessary, consult with the various local authorities with jurisdiction surrounding the sites, namely; Harrogate Borough Council, North Yorkshire County Council, and the North Yorkshire Moors National Park Authority (ibid).

The flexibility of the MoD’s commitment to this planning norm was often thrown into sharp relief, however. A case in point were the works that began around RAF Fylingdales in early 2002 to install extra fencing, barbed wire, observation posts and tarmacked paths for patrol vehicles, which brought the annual running cost of RAF Fylingdales up from £15.6m per year to £18m (HoL Deb, 2003a, c459). By the time the North Yorkshire National Park Authority raised the issue with the MoD, the improvements were more or less completed. Hoon defended the lack of consultation over the developments on national security grounds as an urgent response to 9/11 (BBC News, 2002c; HoC Deb, 2002f, c12).

The allegation that the perceived economic benefits of the bases to the surrounding communities had some influence over planning decisions also seems to carry some weight. Local politicians sometimes used this local support for the bases as leverage over the government to the benefit of their constituents (HoC Deb, 2003c, c703). WoMenwith Hill Peace Camp(aign) also maintained that Harrogate Borough Council did not reject planning applications at RAF Menwith Hill because it believed the base brought money to the area (Defence Committee, 2003, Appendix 22).

An interesting synthesis of the MoD’s lip service towards respecting planning permission with Crown Land exceptionalism, coupled with the stopping power of the core defence community to nullify public opposition to missile defence, was highlighted by developments at RAF Menwith Hill. Over a 12 month period up to January 2003 over 25 plans for the expansion of the base’s infrastructure – including
a supermarket and 100ft radome – were duly submitted to Harrogate Planning Department by the MoD (Defence Committee, 2003, Appendix 22). Despite these and earlier SBIRS upgrades at RAF Menwith prompting over 200 objections from the public, the applications were quickly approved by the Council’s Chief Planning Officer under ‘delegated legislation’, meaning that the decision could be passed directly to the relevant government minister without deliberation by the Council’s Planning Committee as the developments were on Crown Defence Land (Defence Committee, 2003, Appendix 22).

On most occasions, however, such outright circumvention of planning permission was not required, as new developments could be easily justified through a close reading of the Planning Act. For example, although planning objections were raised by a pressure group called the Council for National Parks after the decision to upgrade RAF Fylingdales was made in January 2003, the MoD countered that because these were technical software upgrades and did not ‘materially affect the external appearance of the building’, planning permission was not required (Defence Committee, 2003, Supplementary memorandum by the MoD, para 4).

Strict adherence to the minutiae of planning law would, however, be far from sufficient to allay the concerns of local people living nearby. On the 6th of January 2003, roughly one week before the official decision to upgrade RAF Fylingdales was taken, Hoon undertook two public meetings at venues close to the base. The meetings did not go well (The Yorkshire Post, 2003).

At the behest of Lawrie Quinn, the Labour MP for Scarborough and Whitby, Hoon first met locals living close to RAF Fylingdales at a hotel in the village of Goathland (The Yorkshire Post, 2003; HoC Deb, 2003c, c702). Hoon tried to reassure residents that security at the base had been ‘significantly enhanced in the last 12 months’ to prevent a terrorist attack. He argued that Britain stood to gain from potential missile defence cover. Nonetheless, Geoff Belbin, honorary secretary of the North York Moors Association, maintained that the base ‘didn’t ought to be that close to local communities’ (The Yorkshire Post, 2003).

This was not a consultation exercise, however: the one-sided nature of the meeting was obvious to those present. As one attendee put it, ‘The format was that when Geoff Hoon answered a question, no one was given any opportunity to come back’ (The York Press, 2003). Yet, there were positive voices in favour of the upgrade. Malcolm Simpson, owner of the inn hosting the meeting, stressed how RAF
Fylingdales had helped uphold international peace. He claimed that the views expressed by locals were not representative (The Yorkshire Post, 2003).

Later that same day, Hoon attended another discussion in York, organised by the city’s Labour MP, Hugh Bayley. Again, Hoon made the argument that any decision would be made in the UK’s best interests (BBC News, 2003). Even so, despite the audience being an invited one consisting of many local Labour Party members, one attendee noted that ‘the majority of the audience were not convinced’. There were voices of support, however. Bob Burrows, chairman of the York branch of the Royal British Legion, was of the view that ‘if we can get help from the US we should take it, they have been allies to us for a long time’ (The York Press, 2003).

But was Hoon listening? During the York meeting Hoon stated that the government would make its decision on the RAF Fylingdales upgrade request ‘well before the end of this year’ (The York Press, 2003). While technically true, given the subsequent timeline of events it seems that this statement was more sophistry rather than a genuine indication of a period of reflection having heard the objections of local people.

Nonetheless, in later parliamentary discussions Hoon gave the impression that he had found the meetings ‘useful and lively discussions that greatly assisted to clarify my thinking and the Government’s decision’ (HoC Deb, 2003c, c702). At other times, however, Hoon’s comments were more consistent with the assertion that his speaking tour was more about trying to allay and deflect local concerns rather than seriously engaging with any objections: ‘local anxiety is sometimes about things that have not been determined and may never be determined’, he told Parliament (HoC Deb, 2003c, c703).

Yet, for all Hoon’s assertions, the Defence Select Committee had the last word on the quality of the public consultation taken prior to the upgrade decision: ‘we emphasise that we deplore the manner in which the public debate on the issue of the upgrade has been handled by the Ministry of Defence’ (Defence Committee, 2003, paras 10-11), they said.

Ultimately, however, none of the leviathan agential efforts manifested by protestors and locals had any impact on the final reality that the government readily agreed to whatever missile defence upgrade requests the US administration made of it. The core defence policy community had long before determined the way any such decision would go, and they certainly would not relent any of their own agency to
move from this path. Especially since although some polls appeared to reveal some
genuine latent opposition to the UK’s burgeoning participation in missile defence
among the British public, other polls could be used to infer missile defence as an
almost non-existent concern in the minds of the electorate at large (Ipsos-MORI, 2001;
Ipsos-MORI, 2015). As Prime Minister Blair told John Greenway MP when asked to
reassure the residents of Ryedale about the RAF Fylingdales upgrade, ‘we have played
our part in NATO and the transatlantic alliance for many years, and RAF Fylingdales
has been part of that…there is nothing for the hon. Gentleman’s constituents to fear
and everything for this country to gain’ (HoC Deb, 2003k, c874).

Blair’s final comment here, exhorting local people to embrace the
potentialities of missile defence as part of national destiny, replete as it is with
connotations of both British militarism (‘played our part in NATO’), and the Special
Relationship (‘the transatlantic alliance’), offers the perfect segue into the power of
these discourses to shape the agential choices the Labour government made regarding
BMD during its second term of office.

6.3 Discourse: The Special Relationship and British Militarism

As a basic empirical fact, the terms ‘Special Relationship’, ‘our closest ally’, and
standing ‘shoulder to shoulder’, were used 34 times in parliamentary documents and
debates relating to missile defence between 2001 and 2005. And while the frequency
with which these phrases appeared attests to Professor John Baylis’s explanation for
the persistence of the idea of the Special Relationship as ‘Undoubtedly the most
important strategic element of British foreign and defence policy since 1945’ in
general (Foreign Affairs Committee, 2001b, Appendix 8, para 2.1), the events of 9/11
only emphasised its use.

By standing so closely ‘shoulder to shoulder’ with the US, the UK had come
to be seen as ‘the most supportive (and toughest) of America's allies’ (Foreign Affairs
Committee, 2001b, Appendix 8, para 3.1). With the Special Relationship now renewed
and strengthened post-9/11, the British government believed that through its support
for the US’s missile defence plans it could prevent the Bush administration from
taking any further unilateral decisions with regards to the system than it otherwise
might want to in the aftermath of an attack on its home soil (Foreign Affairs
Committee, 2001b, Appendix 8, 2.3). As Foreign Secretary Straw put it, ‘The United
States is far more likely to stay engaged internationally if it feels safe from attack from missiles’ (ibid, Appendix 11, para 2.6).

In practical terms, therefore, the government’s agreement to the US’s RAF Fylingdales upgrade request was used to cement the Special Relationship in pursuit of the national interest. Defence Minister Lord Bach put it this way, ‘In addition to contributing directly to the security of our closest ally, the upgrade keeps open the opportunity for the United Kingdom and Europe to defend themselves should a potentially ruinous threat become a reality’ (HoL Deb, 2003b, c1401).

Although he may not have been consciously aware of it, Bach’s justifications for the UK’s involvement in missile defence were underpinned by much deeper implicit yet unarticulated assumptions about Britain’s military role in the world. The thesis will now attempt to shed light on the impact of this underlying ideational substrata of British militarism in shaping the British government’s BMD policy between 2001 and 2005.

The depth to which British national identity was bound up in the willingness to be involved in conflict and how this shaped the government’s attitudes towards missile defence was perfectly encapsulated in a comment made by Prime Minister Blair to the Liaison Select Committee in January 2003 while discussing the RAF Fylingdales upgrade decision that had been made a few days earlier. During the discussion, Blair himself asked a rhetorical question relating to the UK’s involvement in the US’s missile defence plans, ‘which is that by our relationship with the United States do we not make ourselves a target as a country, are we not enhanced as a target?’. His answer was very telling, ‘If we end up in a situation where there is a potential nuclear conflict,’ Blair continued, ‘every country in the world is going to be drawn into that in some way and that is why I think there is no point in us thinking—and I do not think it is particularly in the British character—"Let's go to the back of the queue and hide away."’ (Liaison Committee, 2003, Examination of Witnesses, Q62).

The fact that a British Prime Minister cited the willingness of the British public to be consumed in a nuclear war precipitated by the UK’s involvement in missile defence as a facet of the national character illustrates the extent to which the ideational discourse of British militarism – defined as a general tendency for the British public to prefer a strong military stance (Reifler et al., 2011) – was imbibed by policy elites right at the pinnacle of government.
The importance of the public perception of national security and the national interest in influencing the government’s decision on the RAF Fylingdales upgrade – seemingly in contradiction with the negative polling on BMD – was also explicitly referenced by Hoon: ‘A ballistic missile launched at the UK is the most catastrophic potential threat to our people in the future. A Government's first duty is to protect their citizens, and that is a duty that this Government will not shirk from undertaking’ (HoC Deb, 2003c, c699).

At an even deeper level of cultural memory, the Second World War was often invoked by parliamentarians in defence of BMD. For example, in response to being asked if he thought the case for missile defence had been strengthened by 11 September, Foreign Secretary Straw recounted family memories of the Blitz, replying that ‘If we had had a form of missile defence…against the V2s, I would suggest the war would have ended earlier’ (Foreign Affairs Committee, 2001b, Examination of Witnesses, Q61).

Even those opposed to the UK’s involvement in BMD drew on WW2 in their critique. Glenda Jackson argued that because ‘It was not radar that won the battle of Britain, but Spitfires’, the radar upgrades at RAF Fylingdales would therefore not be sufficient to protect the UK from missile attack and so was nothing but a precursor to the placement of anti-ballistic missile interceptors in the UK (HoC Deb, 2003c, c707).

The evidence presented above clearly demonstrates the discursive influence of the Special Relationship and British militarism in framing the Labour government’s policy towards missile defence during 2001 to 2005, particularly with regards to the RAF Fylingdales upgrade. And while IR scholars such as Mumford may legitimately criticise the concept of the Special Relationship ‘as one of the most overindulged yet vacuous phrases in the modern diplomatic lexicon’ (Mumford, 2018), in a strategic-relational analysis whether the ‘Special Relationship’ is a real, empirical phenomenon is somewhat beside the point. What matters is that political actors behave as if it is real, which was certainly the case with the Labour government’s decisions over missile defence. As political agents act on these beliefs they become self-reinforcing, creating the political reality they first envisaged (Brighi, 2013). In fact, the very strength of an ideational discourse’s ability to influence its surroundings is inscribed into its immateriality. Political reality conforms to it, rather than material reality shaping ideational constructs. Indeed, the more an ideational discourse defies base material reality the more the strength of its ability to shape political norms is apparent.
Having now completed separate analyses of the structural, agential and discursive elements acting on Labour’s BMD policy between 2001 and 2005, the three elements are now brought together to make a strategic-relational analysis of their interaction in shaping this policy.

6.4 Conclusion: A Strategic-Relational Analysis

There is no doubt that structural influences played a predominant role in shaping Labour’s missile defence policy between 2001 and 2005. Paramount among these structural influences was the primacy of international relations. As always, the UK had to maintain a strong positive relationship with the United States in order to maximise its security in an anarchical international environment, of which general support for the US’s missile defence plans was a means to this ends (HoC Deb, 2003c, c698). However, the unique and devastating impact of 9/11 hugely amplified the importance of this relationship between the US and the UK. Britain pledged to stand ‘shoulder to shoulder’ with its ‘closest ally’, which alongside support for the US’s ‘war on terror’ also meant support for missile defence; culminating in the British government’s agreement to the upgrade of RAF Fylingdales.

Financial inducements also played a second structural influence on Labour’s BMD policy, although to a much lesser degree. The signing of the Memorandum of Understanding with the US and the creation of the Missile Defence Centre as a conduit for ‘opening doors’ between missile defence related British and American arms manufacturers and research bodies was far from insignificant (Hore, 2019). However, although the amount of capital facilitated by the MDC did indeed run into several million dollars (Ministry of Defence, 2015; GOV.UK, 2018; HoC Deb, 2004a, cc961w), this was still a rather small amount compared to several other R&D projects the British government was engaged in at this time (Defence Committee, 2004, para 84). Therefore, the structural influence of money on the government’s missile defence policy was certainly far from as significant as might be imagined.

Agency was also of great importance in shaping Labour’s stance on BMD during this era. The personal and political relationship between Bush and Blair was perhaps one of the strongest that had been experienced by any pairing of British and American leaders in the post-war era (MacAskill, 2010; Daddow and Gaskarth, 2011,
Thus, Blair’s support for the ‘war on terror’ also translated into support for missile defence (HoC Deb, 2001c, cc273).

At the helm of two of the great offices of state, Foreign Secretary Jack Straw and Defence Secretary Geoff Hoon also exerted a large amount of agency in both making the case for and enacting the government’s policy on missile defence via the FCO and MoD. While Straw made the ideological and strategic case for missile defence to the Opposition and the PLP (HoC Deb, 2002b, cc718), Hoon’s decision to agree to the US’s RAF Fylingdales upgrade request with minimal parliamentary and public discussion illustrated the sheer agential power of the core defence policy community to bypass concerted opposition to its plans (HoC Deb, 2003c, c697).

Accordingly, it therefore appears that the concerns of local people living close to RAF Menwith Hill and RAF Fylingdales, local authorities, protest groups and an apparent latent opposition to BMD among the general public at large were also far from sufficient to alter the government’s decisions on missile defence (Defence Committee, 2003, Supplementary memorandum by the MoD, para 2; The Yorkshire Post, 2003; The York Press, 2003). The Conservatives were also unable to articulate a coherent opposition to the government’s BMD policy precisely because they largely agreed with it (HoC Deb, 2001u, c348; Stocker, 2004a, p.194).

However, providing the backdrop to the interpretation of structural influences by individual agents were the deep and powerful ideational discourses of the Special Relationship and British militarism. In the wake of 9/11, the importance of upholding the Special Relationship was invoked as never before (Casey, 2009, p.277). Just as this sentiment was used to justify the UK’s involvement in the US’s interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq (BBC News, 2002a), so too it was deployed to validate the British government’s agreement to the RAF Fylingdales upgrade request (HoC Deb, 2003c, c698).

The depth to which the ideational structure of British militarism reached back into the mists of the historical national collective unconscious in support of the Labour government’s missile defence plans among parliamentarians and the core defence policy community was also surprising. Clearly, the supposedly game-theoretic calculations of rational political actors in support of the national interest via the pursuit of missile defence are underpinned by a deep substrate of powerful emotional ideational signifiers surrounding fear of attack and defence of the homeland.
Bringing all three components together, during Labour’s second term of office the dialectical interplay between the strategically selective structural environment, agential fiat and discourse in shaping the government’s missile defence policy was more a case of ‘first among equals’. Although the structural influence of international relations was paramount due to the impact of 9/11, all three components interacted dialectically and reinforced each other at this time. For example, the exogenous shock of 9/11 massively amplified the structural importance of international relations on the British government, carrying along with it increased support for the US’s missile defence plans. This extreme pressure from the international environment then in turn greatly enhanced the agential power of political actors such as the Prime Minister and the Foreign and Defence Secretaries to ignore any concerted opposition to the government’s missile defence plans from the public or parliamentarians. Finally, these decisions regarding the UK’s BMD policy were nourished by a deep ideational wellspring of discursive frameworks relating to Britain’s Special Relationship with the US and the UK’s self-image in the public psyche as a war-fighting nation. Every agential decision the Labour government exercised in taking the UK one step further into the US’s missile defence plans was not only deeply imbued with self-referential notions of Britain as a powerful ally of the United States, but in turn these somewhat ephemeral ideational frameworks continually reinforced the material and very real path dependency on which the UK was now set regarding BMD through physical upgrades to the UK’s BMEWS infrastructure.

Labour’s third and final term of office from 2005 to 2010 would only see the UK’s integration into the US’s BMD plans consolidated.

This chapter covers the development of Labour’s ballistic missile defence policy between 2005 and 2010. The chapter begins with an examination of the international structural forces shaping the Labour government’s missile defence policy during this era; in particular the ways in which the responses of NATO, Russia and the EU towards the US’s missile defence plans became increasingly formalised in response to the Bush administration’s Third Site proposals and their subsequent replacement by Obama’s European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA). In terms of agency, the chapter examines Tony Blair’s legacy in having shaped Labour’s BMD policy up until 2007. A legacy which is then followed by an analysis of Gordon Brown’s sparse engagement with missile defence policy as part of his administration’s reemphasis on multilateral nuclear disarmament (Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 2009).

Turning to the domestic sphere, the chapter considers the relative agency of both the Conservatives and the Liberal Democrats in shaping the Labour government’s BMD policy from pro and anti-BMD positions. The influence of the PLP is then examined, analysing whether an apparently fatigued Backbench opposition to BMD had relented to the reality of missile defence in the face of Bush’s proposed and then abandoned BMD Third Site in Eastern Europe and its subsequent replacement by Obama’s European Phased Adaptive Approach.

A further coda to the agential section attempts to clarify the relative agency of the PLP and the British public in shaping the Labour government’s missile defence policy by contrasting their apparently ineffectual efforts with the responses of opposition parties, anti-BMD groups and local citizens in the Czech Republic towards their nation’s proposed role in the Third Site.

The third section of the chapter then examines the impact of the ideational discourses of the Special Relationship and British militarism in framing the policy space through which the Labour government viewed its potential room for manoeuvre when developing BMD policy.

Finally, as well as providing an overview of the BMD architecture Labour bequeathed to the UK after 13 years in office, a conclusion is drawn about the relative influence of structural, agential and discursive factors on the Labour government’s missile defence policy between 2005 and 2010.
Labour’s third term of office from 2005 to 2010 is characterised by the final consolidation of the UK’s role in missile defence through the July 2007 upgrade decision on RAF Menwith Hill so that it could form the European downlink for the Space Based Infra-Red System (SBIRS) component of BMD (Taylor, 2008, p.19). However, despite this important step, the developments at RAF Menwith Hill were to prove the last significant move in any further integration of UK military assets into the US’s missile defence system under Labour. Despite the apparent efforts of the Labour government to lobby the US for the siting of interceptor missiles somewhere on British soil in late 2006 (The Economist, 2007), the US finally chose nations in Eastern Europe as locations for Third Site missile defence components (the other two locations being in California and Alaska) and subsequently the European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA) (The Economist, 2007; HoC Deb, 2007g, c919). This outcome was a salutary reminder of the British government’s limited agential ability to influence the US’s BMD policy according to its particular position within the structure of international relations. Ultimately, the US overlooked the supplications of its supposed ‘closest ally’ to choose potential interceptor sites that best suited its own optimum strategic interests in countering Iran rather than make a concession to its ‘closest friend’ (Butler, 2003c; Missile Defense Agency, 2007, p.6).

In summary, the primacy of international structural forces was clearly apparent between 2005 and 2010. Labour’s third and final Parliament to date was definitely the last chapter of a U-shaped story. For example, 1997-2001 was very ‘structural’, as in order to maximise the UK’s national security in an anarchical international environment by maintaining a positive relationship with a major global hegemon the Labour government kept in step with the Clinton administration’s wish to carry out research and deployment of some limited BMD without breaking the ABM Treaty (Stocker, 2004a, p.8). Then, 2001 to 2005 was very ‘agential’ due to the Blair/Bush interface over missile defence and the rise of some public opposition to the system. Finally, the Parliament of 2005 to 2010 returned to a dominance by structural factors. This was partly due to the arrival of President Obama signalling the normalisation of the US’s BMD plans (Futter, 2012). With his cancellation of the Third Site in favour of the EPAA the Labour government’s further involvement in BMD closed with a whimper rather than a bang.

The thesis will now make a detailed exploration of these structural, agential and discursive factors in order to untangle this multiplicity of events and subject them
to a strategic-relational analysis of their relative influence on the Labour government’s BMD policy between 2005 and 2010.

7.1 Structure: From the Third Site to the Phased Adaptive Approach

The period between 2005 and 2010 was the most complicated era of ballistic missile defence development with which the Labour government had to contend during its 13 years in office. As the focus of missile defence shifted towards Eastern Europe and matured technically, the number of actors involved proliferated. It was no longer sufficient for the Labour government to manage a bilateral relationship between the UK and the USA regarding missile defence. They now had to navigate the UK’s relationship with the US’s BMD project as it was refracted through a new suite of actors including the Czech Republic and Poland, the increasing integration of BMD components into NATO’s defence architecture, the European Union’s desire to use BMD as an opportunity to consolidate the Common Security and Defence Policy, and Russia’s increasingly alarmed response to these developments (Giles and Monaghan, 2014; Hynek and Stritéecky, 2010; European Parliament, 2011; Weitz, 2013). Suddenly, the British government found itself up against serious competition for the US’s attentions over missile defence from a much more strategically attractive suite of admirers. Increasingly overlooked, the British government nonetheless continued to actively lobby the United States on BMD, reminding them that should such negotiations with Poland and the Czech Republic falter – as they did in 2006 and 2007 – then the UK was still very much waiting in the wings and willing to host interceptor missiles (Gross, 2009; Dodge, 2019; Borger and Branigan, 2007; The Economist, 2007; HoC Deb, 2007k, c919).

The catalyst for this kaleidoscopic complication in the nexus of missile defence relations in which the Labour government was embedded was President Bush’s proposal in January 2007 for a third ballistic missile defence site somewhere in Eastern Europe (Futter, 2013, p.126; Taylor and Jones, 2008, p.19). This Third Site was intended to counter a potential missile threat from Iran and in doing so complement the first and second ground-based interceptor batteries in California and Alaska (Missile Defense Agency, 2007, p.3). With a Third Site complete, the US
hoped it would have some rudimentary protection against missile attack from both Western and Eastern hemispheres (ibid, p.6).

From a strategic-relational point of view, the fact that Poland and the Czech Republic were chosen to host Third Site components over the UK clearly highlights the limited agency of the British government to convince its closest ally to place BMD interceptors on British soil despite already being heavily integrated into the US’s system via RAF Fylingdales and latterly RAF Menwith Hill. For the US, what came first was the operational efficiency of its BMD architecture (Missile Defense Agency, 2007, p.6). The Missile Defence Agency had determined that an X-band radar forward deployed in the Czech Republic with interceptors set back slightly in Poland were ‘optimal locations’, providing the US with a strong ‘shoot-look-shoot’ capability against any missiles fired from Iran, which would pass almost exactly over the intended interceptor battery at Radzikowa airbase in Poland (Dodge, 2019, p.93; Missile Defense Agency, 2007, p.6). Far from feeling slighted, however, the British government welcomed the US’s proposals. Defence Secretary Des Browne noted positively that the US’s Third Site plans would thereby also provide missile defence coverage ‘for most of Europe, including the UK’ (HoC Deb, 2007d, 504W).

Yet, by pursuing entirely separate bilateral negotiations with Poland and the Czech Republic over the siting of these Third Site components on their soil, the US further fragmented the possibility of any multilateral coordination over these missile defence developments with NATO and the EU (Hynek and Stritecky, 2010, p.182). Labour’s attempt to navigate this complicated landscape of alliances and friendships while remaining positive about missile defence was exemplified in a statement made by Jim Murphy, the Minister for Europe, who put it this way, ‘It would be irresponsible in the extreme if we were not to, yes, participate with the United States, yes, have discussions with Poland and the Czech Republic, and yes—and importantly—have them with our NATO allies and friends about how best to protect ourselves and our European neighbours from a potential attack from a rogue and dangerously evolving threat’ (HoC Deb, 2007e, c1095).

Observing from afar, the Russian government became increasingly threatened by the continued integration of ballistic missile defence assets in Europe. Despite US assurances that the Third Site with its 10 interceptors could not pose any threat to Russia’s huge arsenal, the Russian government still feared that it would be relatively
easy for the US to quickly scale-up and re-target its interceptors against them (Giles and Monaghan, 2014, p.28; Weitz, 2013, p.8).

In the face of such an escalation in rhetoric the UK was keen to see that Russia was reassured over the US’s missile defence plans. In particular, the British government was keen to promote dialogue between the two superpowers through the NATO-Russia Council (Foreign Affairs Committee, 2007, Written evidence submitted by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office). The Foreign and Commonwealth Office, for example, stated that while the UK government did ‘not agree’ with the claims that Russia had made about the potential of Third Site components in Poland and the Czech Republic to destabilise the strategic balance in Europe, nonetheless the British government would ‘continue, through the NATO-Russia Council, to assure Russia that the principal reason for NATO enlargement is to promote security and stability in the wider Euro-Atlantic region—not to create tensions’ (ibid).

Yet the Russian’s were not merely reactive in the face of the US’s Third Site plans, however, and instead put forward their own positive proposals regarding missile defence. At the G8 meeting in June 2007, Putin made the bold offer to integrate Russia’s own radar sites at Gabala in Azerbaijan and Krasnador Krai in the Caucuses so that they could provide detection and tracking data for a joint US-NATO-Russian BMD system against rogue states (Taylor and Jones, 2008, p.28; Mankoff, 2012, p.336). Observing from the side lines, the British government continued to praise the importance of dialogue between Russia and the US over the Third Site (HoC Deb, 2007c, 1215W).

A major – though not fatal – rupture in these negotiations came with the Russo-Georgia conflict from the 7th to the 12th of August 2008. How much the US’s Third Site plans contributed to this conflict is a thought-provoking question. While tensions between Georgia and Russia over South Ossetia had existed for some time, it is interesting to note that at the same Bucharest summit of April 2008 where NATO announced that its Active Layered Theatre Ballistic Missile Defence (ALTBMD) programme would eventually be integrated into the US’s BMD plans, NATO also stated that Georgia and the Ukraine would one day become NATO members (NATO, 2008). The British government, however, was not dissuaded in its support for the US’s Third Site plans by Russia’s actions in Georgia. Little under a month after the end of hostilities, on 15th September Defence Secretary Browne still maintained that ‘a
ballistic missile defence interceptor site on Polish territory is welcomed’ (HoC Deb, 2008g, c2080W). Indeed, for its part, the Labour government did not consider there to have been a link between the Third Site proposals and Russia’s invasion of Georgia: the Foreign Secretary, David Miliband, for example, stated ‘I do not think it was about missile defence’ (Foreign Affairs Committee, 2008, Examination of Witnesses, Q22).

As tensions over the Russo-Georgia conflict began to subside, international attention began to shift towards the upcoming US Presidential election and what this might have meant for BMD developments. The Obama campaign had called for a re-examination of the Bush administration’s missile defence policy and Third Site proposals (Futter, 2012, p.4). As speculation over the fate of the Third Site grew, the extent to which the UK’s own policy position on the Third Site was subject to the whims of US decision-making was thrown into stark relief (Foreign Affairs Committee, 2008, Examination of Witnesses, Q39).

Through 2009 the cancellation of the Third Site seemed to become ever more likely, leading to a marked improvement in US/Russian relations (Hildreath and Ek, 2010, p.3; European Union Committee, 2009, c47). Yet, while waiting for a definitive decision from the Obama administration on its Third Site plans, the British government watched these developments closely and with some degree of uncertainty. The solution to this continued uncertainty, Minister of State at the FCO Bill Rammell stated on 4th of February 2009 was dialogue, dialogue, dialogue: ‘There clearly needs to be intense dialogue and discussion, but if we could end up in a situation where there was co-operation between the US and Russians on this issue that would be a positive outcome for both those countries and also for us in Europe’ (Foreign Affairs Committee, 2009a, Examination of Witnesses, Q284).

Finally, on 17th of September 2009 President Obama announced the simultaneous cancellation of the Third Site plans and their replacement with what he called the European Phased Adaptive Approach, which scrapped the exotic Ground-Based Interceptors in Poland and X-band radar in the Czech Republic while proposing to replace them with a ‘phased’ roll-out of more tried and tested theatre-level interceptor technologies over several years (Hildreath and Ek, 2010, p.1; Hynek and Stritecky, 2010, p.184). In the only direct quote relating to missile defence attributable to him during his entire premiership, Gordon Brown welcomed this move (Joyner, 2009).
Although Obama completely bypassed any consultation with NATO before announcing the cancellation of the Third Site and its replacement with the EPAA, ironically Obama’s decision finally resolved the ambiguous status of the relationship between the US’s missile defence plans and NATO (Hynek and Stritecky, 2010, p.185). Following the Lisbon Summit of November 2010, the EPAA was to formally become the backbone of a NATOised ballistic missile defence system into which individual NATO member states would integrate their own missile defence systems via NATO’s own ALTBMD sensors, interceptors and Battle Management, Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence (BMC3I) systems (Giles and Monaghan, 2014, p.23; European Parliament, 2011, p.24).

What all of the above emphasises is the absolute primacy of international structural forces on the Labour’s BMD stance between 2005 and 2010. Faced with the overwhelming preponderance of American and Russian influence over the Third Site the UK was reduced to a plaintive role; that of gently exhorting these two powerful states to continue to talk to each other about BMD in the hope that they would reassure each other of their intentions.

Having now examined the preponderant ordering influence of structural factors on the Labour government’s ballistic missile stance between 2005 and 2010, we now consider the role left to agency in this process.

7.2 Agency: The Core Defence Policy Community; Blair and Brown

By the time Tony Blair stood down as Prime Minister on 27th of June 2007, several developments had taken place to ensure that the UK was well integrated into the US’s BMD plans. The first of these was the decision to upgrade RAF Fylingdales in 2003, which allowed tracking data from incoming nuclear missiles to be integrated into the US’s BMD targeting systems (HoC Deb, 2007a, 468WA). The UK Missile Defence Centre had also been established in 2004 with the aim of facilitating missile defence related R&D contracts between British and American defence firms (HoC Deb, 2008d, 2553W). Furthermore, the bulk of the negotiations over the forthcoming RAF Menwith Hill upgrade request so that it could serve as the downlink node for SBIRS had taken place before Blair stood down (HoC Deb, 2007b, c400W).
It would therefore appear that Blair left a strong legacy on ballistic missile defence, handing the UK a vital foothold in an emerging military technology. However, within the coordinates of this thesis the key question is how much of this legacy was actually due to the influence of Blair’s own particular agency vis-à-vis the wider strategic structural factors also impacting on the British government’s BMD policy at this time? In order to answer this question, we need to examine Blair’s ideological disposition towards missile defence during his last years in office, as well as attempting to establish the truth surrounding the claim that Blair himself personally lobbied to have interceptor missiles placed on UK soil.

In terms of an ideological commitment to BMD, Blair gave several important speeches during his final period of office, which, while not actually mentioning missile defence at all, can still be seen as providing an overall strategic vision into which BMD would fit quite well. Taken together, Blair’s foreign policy speeches during his final years elucidated three fundamental axioms: interdependence, intervention and pre-emption (Blair, 2006b; Blair, 2006c; Blair, 2006a, pp.8, 34). A fourth UK-specific axiom asserted that Britain should be a producer of international security rather than just a consumer of it (Blair, 2007). So, although not mentioning it directly, it is certainly possible to see how in theory, the rubric outlined above may have predisposed Blair towards support for BMD. By hosting components of missile defence the UK could continue to be a producer of international security, allowing the UK and its allies to pre-emptively intervene against rogue states without fear of attack from limited or emerging nuclear missile states. Yet, such indirect speculation is a somewhat weak basis upon which to make an analysis of Blair’s relative agency in integrating the UK into the US’s BMD plans. Unfortunately, the official public record is no less equivocal when it comes to pinning down Blair’s influence on this process of integration during his last years in office.

For example, Blair’s clearest statements on the UK’s involvement in missile defence during the 2005-2010 Parliament were given a few days after the publication of an online article in The Economist on the 23rd of February 2007. This article claimed directly – without naming a source – that the Prime Minister had been ‘discreetly waging a campaign since last autumn to secure the missile-interceptor site for Britain’, including dispatching his top Foreign and Defence Advisor and head of the Defence and Overseas Secretariat of the Cabinet Office, Nigel Sheinwald, to lead discussions with the US National Security Council (The Economist, 2007; BBC News, 2007).
Furthermore, a BBC News article the following day also quoted a Downing Street spokeswoman stating that Blair thought such discussions were a ‘good idea’ (BBC News, 2007).

In any case, asked outright in the Commons by Menzies Campbell on the 28th of February 2007 as to ‘the nature of his discussions with President Bush about the possible deployment of part of an anti-ballistic missile system for the United States in the United Kingdom?’, Blair replied, ‘We will tell the House as soon as there is something to say. At the moment, those discussions are at a very preliminary stage, but it is important that we have them with the United States to see what options are available for this country and whether ballistic missile defence would be good for us or not’ (HoC Deb, 2007k, c919). Crucially, Blair also added, ‘I am sure that we will have the discussion in the House and, indeed, outside the House when we reach the point at which a proposition can be put before people’ (ibid). Yet, far from being an open admission of direct involvement in the discussions, the ‘we’ in Blair’s reply above reads more like a ‘royal we’ than a first-person admission.

Similarly, the primary research undertaken for this thesis is also somewhat ambiguous when it comes to establishing Blair’s personal role in whatever interceptor discussions took place with the US administration, although it does show that Blair was involved in internal discussions among the core defence policy community on their potential deployment. In an interview for this thesis a former official who worked in the Ministry of Defence during this era confirmed that a MOD study looked at a number of locations as possible interceptor sites in the UK. No recommendation was made, but from a geographical/technical point of view GBI’s would have been best placed in North West Scotland due to the strategic cover such a location would offer to the Eastern US by giving the maximum time to locate and intercept a missile fired from Iran (Anonymous Interviewee 1, 2017). A source who wishes to remain anonymous also stated that Scotland may have been one of the places the government considered to site interceptor missiles (Anonymous Interviewee 2, 2017). Furthermore, Bryan Hore, UK Industry Lead for BAE Systems at the Missile Defence Centre again confirmed that there were advocates within the British government of the UK hosting interceptor missiles, and that Third Site planning ‘was even under the MDC/BAE Systems remit for a while’, but ‘it was never close to reality…didn’t get beyond a concept, not even a site’ (Hore, 2019). These discussions took place between a small number of ministers, the PM, the Secretaries of State for Defence and Foreign
Affairs, and the Treasury (Anonymous Interviewee 1, 2017). This would seem to corroborate a further claim in *The Economist* article that Blair had also involved Gordon Brown in the interceptor discussions, as well as a claim published in the Polish newspaper *Trybuna* in October 2006 that the British government would ‘make the Orkneys accessible for building the second base’ (The Economist, 2007; HoC Deb, 2007j, cc1141-2). So, while the primary research reveals that Blair himself was engaged in discussions with the core defence policy community regarding the possibility of BMD interceptors being placed in the UK, definitive proof that he himself was personally involved in negotiations with the US remains elusive.

Yet, perhaps there is a way through this seeming impasse. Drawing again on Dyson’s concept of ‘actor dispensability’ – that is, if the actions of an individual are removed from the events to be explained, do these events still occur? (Dyson, 2009, p.16) – then the question as to whether Blair was personally involved in direct personal discussions with Bush over the possibility of interceptors being placed in the UK becomes a moot point; interceptors were not placed in the UK, and so whatever agency Blair was able to bring to bear behind the scenes was ultimately no match for the prime strategic interests of the US in opting to place Third Site components in the Czech Republic and Poland where they would maximise defence of the US homeland (Missile Defense Agency, 2007, p.6).

Perhaps this was the ultimate legacy of Blair’s agency regarding the UK’s role in BMD. Having secured the UK an indispensable role in the US’s emerging BMD system through the RAF Fylingdales and pending RAF Menwith Hill upgrades, Blair had leveraged as much agency as he could while British and American security interests overlapped. Once these interests began to diverge, as with the question of the optimum positioning of the Third Site components in maximising US defensive capabilities (Missile Defense Agency, 2007, p.6), Blair’s personal relationship and agency with Bush was not able to carry an interceptor agreement over the line.

In contrast to Blair, Gordon Brown was almost silent on BMD during his premiership. Although this lack of BMD commentary from Brown presents some problems in trying to analyse his relative influence on shaping the government’s BMD policy during his time in office, it is not insurmountable. Just as it was possible to draw on the several foreign policy speeches Tony Blair made between 2005 and 2007 to infer how Blair’s worldview may have fostered his tangential support for BMD, so, too, Brown’s general stance towards Bush and then Obama’s policies on BMD can be
seen in Brown’s response – ‘I strongly support the decision’ – to Obama’s cancellation of the Third Site, as well as his administration’s attempts to encourage global multilateral nuclear disarmament in preparation for the Review Conference of the Non-Proliferation Treaty in May 2010 (Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 2009, p.5; Joyner, 2009).

As mentioned in the previous chapter subsection on Blair, by the time Gordon Brown took up his position as Prime Minister on the 27th of June 2007 the UK was already heavily integrated into the US’s BMD architecture. Indeed, much of the discussion regarding the further integration of British assets into American missile defence plans had already taken place before Brown assumed office, and so whatever personal opinions he may have held towards BMD were overwhelmed by the sunk costs of bureaucratic inertia. For example, less than two days after Brown became Prime Minister, on the 29th of June the Secretary of State for Defence, Des Browne, received a formal request from the US Defence Secretary requesting that the British government agree to RAF Menwith Hill being upgraded so it could take part in the US’s BMD system (HoC Deb, 2008i, 470W). Although the receipt of the letter and Browne’s reply of the 16th July agreeing to the request were not publicly announced in the Commons until the 25th of July, tellingly, Prime Minister Brown made no mention of any of these developments (HoC Deb, 2008j, c985). Yet, speculation surrounding Brown’s particular decision-making style with regards to national security only raises the deeper question of what exactly was Brown’s foreign policy outlook in general and how might BMD sit within it?

Fundamentally, Brown’s outlook on international relations was underpinned by his understanding of how globalisation was bringing nations and peoples together as never before (Brown, 2017, p.24). Upon this foundation rested three concepts to which Brown often referred when speaking on foreign policy, and which, ultimately, it will be argued, can be seen as having influenced his government’s position on BMD via his intriguing stance on Britain’s nuclear deterrent; internationalism, the Special Relationship and multilateralism (Brown, 2007; Brown, 2009; Summers, 2008; BBC News, 2008; Brown, 2008).

Bringing these three strands together, the first principles of a foreign policy outlook particular to Gordon Brown begin to appear; one based around the pursuit of multilateral solutions to the problems faced by individual nations in an interdependent world, with the partnership between the UK, the US and the other rich G20 nations
forming a vanguard in the solution to these problems. Extrapolating out from these first principles, a framework into which Brown’s policy on Britain’s nuclear deterrent begins to form, and from this an outline of Brown’s position on BMD may be inferred, as is recounted below.

A strong illustration of Brown’s worldview on BMD coming into effect can be seen with the election of Barack Obama in November 2008, partly on a ticket of reducing nuclear weapons and reassessing the US’s BMD programme (Futter, 2012, p.5). Obama’s statement of intent was followed by the FCO publishing a policy information paper on the 5th of February 2009 entitled *Lifting the Shadow: Creating the Conditions for Abolishing Nuclear Weapons*. Brown’s introduction to this document pledged that ‘in the run-up to the Non Proliferation Treaty in 2010 we will be at the forefront of the international campaign to accelerate disarmament among possessor states, to prevent proliferation to new states, and to ultimately achieve a world that is free from nuclear weapons’ (Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 2009, p.5). Most interestingly, *Lifting the Shadow* set out the Brown government’s position on BMD quite clearly. While the Brown government ‘welcomed US proposals for a European ballistic missile defence system’ (ibid, p.43), there was concern that BMD could cause nuclear proliferation by reducing ‘the confidence of other Nuclear Weapon States in the capabilities of their nuclear weapons…leading them to acquire greater numbers of weapons’ (ibid, p.37). The government noted that Russia in particular was concerned that any US missile defence system, could ‘give the US a strategic advantage’ (ibid). However, the document noted, ‘any missile threat from a country of concern to Europe or the United States could also be a threat to Russia, so there is common interest in working together’ (p.38). Crucially, therefore, the British government hoped that in the long-term a multilateralised ballistic missile defence system might undermine the confidence of an aggressor contemplating a nuclear attack to such an extent that the major nuclear weapons states would feel confident enough to ‘reduce their numbers of weapons towards zero’ (p.38). This quote sets out the Brown government’s most concise statement on its stance towards BMD. Crucially, one which can be drawn on to interpret the only direct statement on missile Brown made during his entire time as PM giving any kind of indication of his personal opinion on BMD, when in response to President Obama’s cancellation of the Third Site on 17th September 2009 Brown said, ‘I strongly agree with the decision…I think it shows that there is more trust developing between the nuclear power nations’
(Joyner, 2009; Channel 4 News, 2009b). In light of the framework elucidated above it could be argued that Brown was happy with the Third Site cancellation as it was alienating the Russians and could have led to the collapse of the arms reduction negotiations which were ongoing at that time. In that one statement from Brown a thread appears upon which the relationship between Brown’s particular foreign policy outlook, his work towards multilateral nuclear disarmament, and his possible stance on BMD can be joined together.

With a chronology of BMD developments during his term of office and an explanation of the foreign policy outlook underpinning Brown’s defence stance now complete, what does subjecting Brown’s time as Prime Minister to a strategic-relational analysis reveal about his relative agency in shaping the UK’s ballistic missile defence policy in the face of the structural constraints ranged against him? A first approximation of Brown’s engagement with BMD policy may give the impression that he was almost totally absent from the development of this policy, and that therefore Brown and his government’s response was almost all structurally constrained. However, a closer analysis reveals that Brown may have wanted to delegate his agency and embed structural constraints on his decision making in general and UK defence policy in particular. Perhaps Brown’s non-intervention with regards to BMD policy was his preferred leadership style? For example, in his autobiography Brown states that he ‘wanted Cabinet to be more than a rubber stamp…I wanted to see a rejuvenation of a more collective form of decision-making’ (Brown, 2017, p.209). Perhaps this desire not to interfere with ministerial responsibility is why Brown did not comment on the various major ballistic missile defence announcements and comments made by the various Secretaries of State for Foreign Affairs and Defence during his term of office – most prominent among them Des Browne and David Miliband. Furthermore, the Brown government’s inauguration of the annual United Kingdom National Security Strategy, with its goal of creating a ‘single, overarching strategy bringing together the objectives and plans of all departments, agencies and forces involved in protecting our national security’, with the intention of ‘bringing greater focus and integration to our [national security] approach’, is itself further evidence of a deliberate choice to entrench structuration (Cabinet Office, 2008, p.4). Indeed, Brown’s desire to place structural constraints around government decision making appears to have been something of a pattern with him and is reminiscent of his decision to make the Bank of England independent.
This trend in Brown’s statecraft can also be analysed through the lens of ‘depoliticization’, a process through which politicians use certain methods to shift responsibility from themselves (Flinders and Buller, 2006, p.296). Brown’s move to establish a National Security Strategy can be seen as a form of depoliticization employing aspects of both a preference shaping and institutional move, or what might be termed preference shaping through institutionalism, i.e. shaping the preferences of voters to trust Labour on defence issues through institutionally depoliticising them through the establishment of the National Security Strategy (Flinders and Buller, 2006, pp.296, 298, 307).

Furthermore, Richard Rose’s theorising on path dependency and bureaucratic inertia can also be drawn upon to supplement the strategic-relational analysis of Brown’s stance towards BMD. Rose’s basic point is that since ‘policy makers are heirs before they are choosers’, the weight of years of previous governments’ decision making bears far more heavily on any current government’s actions than the inauguration of its own policies do (Rose, 1990, p.263). While this was certainly the case with Brown’s inheritance of Blair’s decisions on BMD, not least due to the fact that the US’s request to upgrade RAF Menwith Hill was received by the British Defence Secretary only two days after Brown assumed office, it would still appear that a strategic-relational analysis offers a more nuanced analysis than that of Rose’s path dependency, which is overly structural (Rose, 1990, pp.264, 285). Rose assumes path dependency as a default, whereas the SRA grants political agents such as Brown the strange dialectical choice to deepen path-dependency (Brighi, 2013, p.8). This presents an interesting embellishment of the strategic-relational approach; an example of a major defence policy actor – the British Prime Minister – choosing to limit their own agency.

This is not to say, however, that there were not also powerful external structural forces acting to constrain the Brown government’s BMD policy; the permanency of missile defence would only consolidate while Brown was PM. For example, it may appear counterfactual, but with the EPAA the Obama administration actually embedded and normalised BMD to a much greater degree than the Bush administration had (Futter, 2012, p.3). Once again British calculations on ballistic missile defence policy ultimately found themselves in US hands. This is why Gordon Brown appeared relieved that the US had taken the decision to abandon the Third Site, which the FCO feared could be a potential trigger for Russian nuclear proliferation.
(Channel 4 News, 2009b; Joyner, 2009; Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 2009, p.37), while his government had to accept that the US would not have gained any defensive advantage from basing either elements of the Third Site or the EPAA in the UK (Missile Defense Agency, 2007, p.6), and so after the RAF Menwith Hill upgrade the UK would no longer be at the forefront of US missile defence developments.

Thus, in total, Gordon Brown not only experienced a particularly strong set of structural constraints acting on his stance towards BMD, but, moreover, he chose to accentuate those structural constraints through his pursuit of a more collegiate Cabinet structure and the adoption of UK National Security Strategies (Brown, 2017, p.209; Cabinet Office, 2009; Cabinet Office, 2008).

7.2.1 Other Key Ministers: Des Browne and David Miliband
The Blair and Brown administrations saw a number of Secretaries of State and Ministers come and go at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and the Ministry of Defence between 2005 and 2010. Of these, the most long-serving and influential regarding the UK’s policy decisions on missile defence were Foreign Secretary David Miliband (June 2007 – May 2010) and, most importantly, Secretary of State for Defence Des Browne (May 2006 – October 2008), as will be outlined below.

A strategic-relational analysis of Miliband’s comments during his time as Foreign Secretary reveals some deeply structural forces emanating from the US which influenced the Labour government’s BMD policy at this time. This is most clearly reflected in the Brown government’s renewed push on multilateral nuclear disarmament, which drew in part on BMD, and appears to have been primarily emboldened by the election of Barack Obama as US President. Indeed, even before Obama had assumed office Miliband was moved to write in November 2008, ‘I believe the moment is now right to work with the new US administration and our partners for a renewed drive…to move the world towards the abolition of nuclear weapons’ (Miliband, 2008).

Building on this momentum, in February 2009 Miliband wrote the foreword to the FCO’s Policy Information Paper, Lifting the Nuclear Shadow: Creating the Conditions for Abolishing Nuclear Weapons; a document which partly attributed the possibility of multilateral nuclear disarmament to the ability of a future shared missile defence shield to encourage the major ‘Nuclear Weapons States’ to reduce their nuclear arsenals towards zero as they would be protected from the limited number of
nuclear missiles possessed by ‘countries of concern’ such as Iran (Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 2009, p.38). Miliband and other FCO Ministers such as Baroness Taylor also saw it as vital to the process of multilateral nuclear disarmament that Russia not become alienated from the US’s BMD plans and therefore begin to re-arm itself or renege on other international agreements such as the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty in response (HoL Deb, 2007, c926). To prevent this from happening, Miliband and Taylor emphasised the key role that British diplomacy could play in encouraging the US to keep a constant dialogue with Russia over its BMD plans, both bilaterally and also through the NATO-Russia Council (HoL Deb, 2007, c924; HoL Deb, 2008, c864-866; Defence Committee, 2009a, Examination of Witnesses, Q348; HoC Deb, 2008k, c1707W).

Such was the influence that US BMD decisions exerted over the UK’s stance on missile defence, that Miliband freely admitted that the UK’s policy towards BMD was ultimately entirely in US hands. Asked in December 2008 by Sir John Stanley of the Foreign Affairs Select Committee what would happen if the incoming Obama administration decided to abandon BMD would the British government still go ahead with it, Miliband replied, ‘If it is abandoned by the US, obviously it will be abandoned—to state the obvious (Foreign Affairs Committee, 2008, Examination of Witnesses, Q39). Taken as a whole, a strategic-relational analysis of Foreign Secretary Miliband’s commentary on the US’s BMD plans reveals a structural enablement of Labour’s agency here. Just as during the late 1990s when the interests of the centre-left Blair and Clinton governments aligned over the desire to develop a ballistic missile defence system which would not abrogate the ABM Treaty, so, too, a decade later, the goals of the centre-left Obama and Brown administrations aligned over the desire for a scaled back BMD in pursuit of multilateral nuclear disarmament (HoC Deb, 2000f, c358; Smith, 2005, p.455; Stoddart, 2010, p.287).

While Miliband’s work at the Foreign Office promoted missile defence as a means to the end of securing multilateral nuclear disarmament (Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 2009, p.38), over at the Ministry of Defence the second most important BMD policy decision of the Labour era – agreeing to the upgrade of RAF Menwith Hill – was quietly taken by Secretary of State for Defence Des Browne.

Although Browne had begun his tenure as Secretary of State under Blair in May 2006, having constantly fielded repeated questions about rumours that BMD interceptor missiles were to be imminently placed in the UK, it would be only two
days into his time serving under Brown as Prime Minister – the 29th of June 2007 – that Browne would receive a formal letter from the US Defense Secretary requesting the upgrade of RAF Menwith Hill so that it could play a role in the US’s BMD system (HoC Deb, 2007b, c400W). Specifically, this upgrade would involve the installation of ground terminal equipment at RAF Menwith Hill, allowing its radars to serve as the downlink node for the detection of the heat signature of an enemy missile launch by the Space Based Infra-Red Satellites (SBIRS) which would then be shared with both the UK and US governments but also fed into the US’s BMD system (HoC Deb, 2008k, c510W; HoC Deb, 2007h, c71-72WS).

After receiving this request, Browne says he spoke to his Cabinet colleagues at some undetermined date and then with David Miliband on the 10th of July – the PM is not specifically mentioned but could come under the rubric of ‘Cabinet colleague’ – before replying positively to the US’s proposal on the 17th of July (HoC Deb, 2008e, c890). Then, on the 25th of July Browne released a Written Ministerial Statement baldly asserting that ‘at RAF Menwith Hill, equipment will be installed and operated by the US Government to allow receipt of satellite warnings of potentially hostile missile launches’ (HoC Deb, 2007h, c71-72WS; HoC Deb, 2008b, c345WH). This was a key development, finally bonding the US’s missile defence architecture with defence of the UK homeland as the system matured, an absolutely vital payoff. ‘We continue to regard this system as a building block to enhance our national and collective security’, said Browne. Finally, and in line with the mantra repeated by the Foreign Office, Browne also wanted ‘to reassure Russia about the defensive nature and intent of the US system’ (HoC Deb, 2007h, c71-72WS). Browne’s strong agency in announcing this decision is clear. The very tone of his statement is declaratory, not conversational. It does not call his fellow parliamentarians to a point of reflection or debate. It just bluntly states what has taken place without any mention of the timescale of consultation between himself and his US counterpart.

When questioned about the brusque nature of his announcement, Browne continued to assert that all the discussion that needed to have taken place over the UK’s position on ballistic missile defence had been done with the publication of the MOD’s 2002 document Missle Defence: A Public Discussion Paper and what Browne now called ‘a full parliamentary debate on 15 January 2003’ (HoC Deb, 2007f, c894W; HoC Deb, 2008a, c937W). However, Browne was keen to reemphasise at a later date, there were ‘no plans’, ‘no sites’ and no ‘secret discussions’ regarding
placing interceptor missiles in the UK (HoC Deb, 2006a, c1384W; HoC Deb, 2007j, c1142; HoC Deb, 2008e, v457). Yet, Browne reminded his listeners, the UK was already deeply involved with BMD through the RAF Fylingdales and RAF Menwith Hill upgrades (HoC Deb, 2008e, c890-891). Here, Browne’s dismissive attitude towards claims of a lack of consultation again demonstrates his assured agency in having taken the RAF Menwith Hill upgrade and managing the response.

What all of the above demonstrates is how much there was a continued alignment between the FCO and the MOD’s support for BMD (Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 2009, p.38; HoC Deb, 2007h, c71-72WS; Foreign Affairs Committee, 2007, c272; Defence Committee, 2008, Examination of Witnesses (Questions 360-379), Q372). Clearly, Labour ministers were trying to manage the international structural forces emanating from the tension between Russia and the US over missile defence to the best advantage of British national security. Yet, this was still a reactive position for the Labour government, not a directing one. Even when Foreign Secretary Miliband seized the opportunity created by the new Obama administration’s push on reducing nuclear weapons to emphasise missile defence’s role in facilitating multilateral nuclear disarmament, it was still an opportunity created by the agency of the Obama administration, not an initiative of the British government itself.

Moving down from the elite level of missile defence policy development among the core defence policy community of ministers and Prime Ministers, the thesis now examines the agential ability of MPs and peers to hold the government to account over its BMD plans between 2005 and 2010.

7.2.2 Parliamentarians

One of the main words used by parliamentarians in relation to the Labour government’s BMD policy during 2005 to 2010 was ‘contempt’; there was a real feeling among a range of MPs and Lords from different parties that Parliament had been almost completely side-lined on this issue (HoL Deb, 2008, e976, e987; HoC Deb, 2009a, c944). MPs and Lords complained that not only was there a general lack of debate on the UK’s role in the US’s BMD plans, but that also important decisions such as the RAF Menwith Hill upgrade were yet again announced after the fact with no prior debate taking place in Parliament (HoL Deb, 2008, e968). The RAF Menwith
Hill upgrade decision in July 2007, for example, was described by Baroness Williams as a ‘virtually a contemptuous treatment of Parliament’ (HoL Deb, 2008, c976). With Peter Kilfoyle stating that Browne’s Written Statement of 25th July 2007, baldly announcing the upgrade a day before the summer recess, was ‘an insult to the House’s intelligence’, showing the Commons ‘almost total contempt’ (HoC Deb, 2009a, c947).

Part of what led to such little discussion regarding ballistic missile defence in Parliament during this era was the lack of opposition from the Conservatives towards the government’s BMD plans (HoL Deb, 2008, c954). Shadow Foreign secretary William Hague, for example, was convinced that the risk to the UK from nuclear proliferation and the Iranian nuclear programme meant the UK had to take part in the US’s BMD plans: ‘That is why’, Hague told one Labour backbencher, ‘he has not heard words of condemnation on the matter [of the UK’s involvement in the US’s BMD plans] from the Opposition’ (HoC Deb, 2008f, c584). Likewise, far from being concerned about The Economist’s claims that Tony Blair had been secretly lobbying for BMD interceptors to be placed in the UK, Shadow Defence Secretary Liam Fox stated; ‘those on the Conservative Benches, in particular—would welcome any discussions that we had with the United States about such a system’ (HoC Deb, 2007i, c603). As for a strategic-relational analysis of this situation, and as mentioned by parliamentarians themselves (HoL Deb, 2008, c954), the Conservatives’ lack of opposition helped facilitate the smooth investiture of the Labour government’s BMD decisions.

Fortunately, this non-action is not an analytical problem for the SRA, where agency can also be accounted for by an agent withholding action in order to allow something to happen (Brighi, 2013, p.15). Furthermore, the Conservatives’ support for BMD in general and lack of criticism of the government’s BMD plans in particular lend greater weight to the argument that, fundamentally, BMD was a centre-right project. Indeed, when interviewed for this thesis, former Backbench Labour MP and missile defence critic Kelvin Hopkins was of the opinion that nuclear defence policy was a stick for the right of the Labour Party to beat the left with – citing unilateralism’s unpopularity – and that this sentiment transferred to debates around missile defence too (Hopkins, 2017).

With the Conservatives’ support for the Labour government’s stance on BMD assured, most of the demand for debate on this issue fell to the Liberal Democrats, with Lord Wallace of Saltaire proving to be a standout voice (HoC Deb, 2008h, c955;
HoC Deb, 2009a, c947). At a more substantive level, the Liberal Democrats’ main opposition to BMD stemmed from concerns surrounding the lack of an official NATO position on the system, which made it look like a US-only project, and the absence of a meaningful dialogue with Russia over the Third Site proposals (Foreign Affairs Committee, 2009b, Examination of Witnesses, Q48). Following this sentiment, while campaigning for the Liberal Democrat leadership position on 28th October 2007, Nick Clegg argued that Gordon Brown's allowance of the RAF Menwith Hill upgrade made Britain ‘tantamount to a vassal state’ (Woolf, 2007). Most of the Liberal Democrats’ consternation surrounded the lack of debate on BMD during the 2005-2010 Parliament, particularly concerning the RAF Menwith Hill upgrade decision in July 2007 (HoL Deb, 2008, c976).

However, as mentioned above, it was Lord Wallace of Saltaire who proved to be one of, if not the most important voice questioning the Labour government’s BMD policy during this time. Wallace was excoriating in his criticism of the government’s BMD policy, condemning Labour for what he saw as an abandonment of its internationalist principles (HoL Deb, 2008, c942). Yet, Wallace’s deepest critique of ballistic missile defence stemmed from his view that the US’s BMD plans, and in particular RAF Menwith Hill’s role in them as a USVF base, undermined British sovereignty (HoL Deb, 2008, c988).

In an interview for this thesis, Wallace was of the opinion that the Labour government tried to keep debate on BMD out of Parliament because it was important not to ‘open up a flank’ and draw attention to a policy area on which they could have been perceived as weak (Lord Wallace of Saltaire, 2020). From the government’s standpoint there was no need to take a formal vote; the Conservatives were onside, and in Wallace’s view, ‘Apart from some middle-class Quaker activists, missile defence is not thought about…Why make a fuss?’ As for the impact of the Labour government’s BMD policy on the Special Relationship and sovereignty, Wallace felt that the Labour government’s BMD decisions at that time did demonstrate some agency in that they ‘helped protect’, but ‘not strengthen’ the Special Relationship. However, ultimately, for Wallace, it was ‘difficult to say’ whether Labour’s BMD policy was primarily intended to meet domestic or international pressures, since there was ‘no zero analysis here as we’ve always been involved with the US’ (Lord Wallace of Saltaire, 2020).
All in all, the Liberal Democrats exercised some agency by playing an important role in scrutinising the Labour government’s BMD policy during this last Parliament. They kept debate alive at a time when the focus on BMD appeared to be waning with the election of President Obama and the normalisation of missile defence as he shifted from the high-profile Third Site policies of the Bush era to the much more low-key but ultimately more pervasive European Phased Adaptive Approach (Futter, 2012, p.3). Yet, even with his prominent profile, a strategic-relational analysis of Lord Wallace’s interventions would have to conclude that he was unable to shift government policy in any way; neither encouraging them to hold a full Parliamentary debate and vote on the RAF Menwith Hill upgrade, nor achieving any more transparency over the status of United States Visiting Forces (USVF) bases like RAF Menwith Hill. It would be left to a final analysis of the Parliamentary Labour Party to see if they fared any better in shaping their own government’s BMD policy.

Similarly to the Liberal Democrats, in a Parliament which was quieter overall on missile defence, as evidenced by the lower number of parliamentary debates mentioning BMD or RAF Fylingdales and RAF Menwith Hill’s role in it in between 2005 and 2010 in comparison to the earlier parliaments (97-01=205, 01-05=239, 05-10=171), a few backbench Labour voices stood out among the PLP. Furthermore, Blair’s statement in the Commons on 28th February 2007, in relation to the hypothetical prospect of interceptor missiles being placed in the UK – ‘I am sure that we will have the discussion in the House and, indeed, outside the House when we reach the point at which a proposition can be put before people’ – continued to be a lightning rod of dissent for those MPs who believed Blair’s statement meant that a substantial debate and vote should have been held before the RAF Menwith Hill upgrade. This was not a criticism that the government could easily quash as a, perhaps deliberate, misunderstanding by the usual leftist MPs. EDM 65 of the 6th of November 2007, for example, noting ‘with concern’ that Des Browne’s announcement one day before the summer recess that RAF Menwith Hill would receive an upgrade to take part in BMD ‘does not reflect the spirit of the process that the former Prime Minister announced’, and therefore calling ‘upon the Government to arrange a full debate’ to allow MPs to scrutinise US BMD plans in the UK, received 113 signatures. This list included the names of much more centrist MPs, such as John Grogan and John Cruddas, far beyond the usual 30 signatories on the left of the PLP (Corbyn, McDonnell, Abbott, etc) who sponsored five of the other six BMD-related EDMs.
during this Parliament (EDM 65, 2007). Several other Labour sponsored EDMs calling for debate over BMD were also issued during this Parliament (EDM 1517, 2007; EDM 2095, 2007; EDM 2149, 2007; EDM 1846, 2008; EDM 2004, 2008; EDM 223, 2008).

Comments from the Select Committees also backed up the claims of concerned MPs. The Foreign Affairs Committee, for example, once again stated that they regretted the lack of parliamentary debate over the RAF Menwith Hill upgrade decisions, as they had with the previous RAF Fylingdales upgrade (Foreign Affairs Committee, 2007, para 275); while both the Foreign Affairs and Defence Select Committees argued that the pursuit of a Third Site style missile defence architecture to supposedly defend against rogue states such as Iran might actually lead to an overall loss in European security if it prompted Russia to place Iskander missiles in Kaliningrad in response (Foreign Affairs Committee, 2009b, Examination of Witnesses Q284; Defence Committee, 2009b, Recommendation 37).

From the standpoint of a strategic-relational analysis, however, a more satisfying answer to the perennial question of the post-Blair era as to whether the government would allow Parliament to debate and vote on the UK’s role in BMD was given in a later debate in which Peter Kilfoyle asked a similar question to Defence Minister Bill Rammell, who attempted to put paid to this accusation once and for all: ‘It is important to state for the record what Tony Blair said in February 2007...That statement was made in the context of a response to specific media allegations that there were plans to base missile interceptors in the UK’. At present, Rammell added, there were no plans to place additional BMD assets in the UK and so there was no need for any new debate or vote (HoC Deb, 2009b, c252). As far as the government was concerned, then, the RAF Menwith Hill upgrade to allow the downlink of missile launch data from the SBIRS satellites was only an update in mission aims rather than a wholly new role worthy of debate (HoC Deb, 2007f, c894W). Despite Kilfoyle’s efforts, it was clear that the government’s agency could not be challenged, and their position became only more entrenched: as far as the government was concerned nothing substantial had changed with regards to the UK’s missile defence commitment to the US, therefore there was no need for any debate or even consultation of Parliament on the issue. Basic arithmetic also strengthened the government’s need to keep debate on the RAF Menwith Hill upgrade as low as possible. In the 2005 election Labour lost 47 seats, returning a majority of 66 MPs. The government therefore knew
it was in for a much tougher time in the Commons (Cowley, 2005a, p.14), and therefore a debate and vote on missile defence could have risked a pyrrhic victory in the face of a major backbench rebellion, or even defeat.

However, Parliament was by no means the only place in which some Labour politicians and elements of the wider Labour movement chose to oppose what they saw as their own government’s mistaken stance on BMD. Many members of the PLP signed public statements, coordinated resistance to the US’s Third Site plans with sister leftist parties and politicians across Europe, took part in public protests and even engaged in hunger strike (CND, 2008a). The Labour Party Conference itself was also a site of struggle. Grass roots members echoed Parliament’s call for a debate on the UK’s involvement in the US’s BMD plans. In the build-up to the September 2007 Party Conference in Bournemouth, Harrogate and Knaresborough CLP put forward just such a motion, only for it to be quickly ruled out by the agenda-setting Conference Arrangements Committee (CND, 2007c).

As the rhetoric surrounding Bush’s Third Site plans escalated through the spring of 2008, and as the US Presidential election loomed into view in the late summer and autumn of 2008, so too did the stakes surrounding acts of protest against BMD. One of the most dramatic forms of extra-parliamentary anti-BMD protest to emerge at this time took the form of several prominent Labour figures and MPs such as Jeremy Corbyn and Tony Benn participating in a rolling 24 hour fast in solidarity with Czech hunger strikers against the proposed Third Site radar there (CND, 2008f). This hunger strike was a direct attempt to undermine the Czech government’s ability to vote in favour of the US’s proposed Third Site radar. This was because the Czech government held exactly 50% of the seats in the Czech Parliament, propped up by six coalition partner Green Party MPs (CND, 2008f; Gross, 2009, p.8). One of these Green MPs was to join the hunger strike, and this was putting pressure on the Green contingent in the Czech Parliament to withdraw their support for the proposed Czech Third Site radar altogether, thereby undermining the required number of votes (CND, 2008f).

One of the results of these high-profile acts of defiance against the US’s Third Site plans by their fellow European leftist parties was to generate greater crossover concern among a larger number of Labour parliamentarians (CND, 2008c). As might be expected, CND itself was also another extra-parliamentary organisation through which concerned Labour MPs were able to coordinate anti-BMD activities and build
commonality with sympathetic politicians across Europe. Following a press release from leaders of the Czech Social Democratic Party (CSSD) and the Social Democratic Party (SLD) in Poland, stating that they were ‘afraid’ Third Site components in their countries ‘would contribute to the undesirable return of a bi-polar division of the world and the cold war’ (CND, 2008a), CND released a supportive statement in November 2008 with 70 signatures. Those signing included 50 MPs and MEPs, such as former Defence Minister Peter Kilfoyle, ex-Foreign Office Minister Chris Mullin, Chair of the PLP Tony Lloyd, more centrist Labour MPs like former Deputy Leadership candidate Jon Cruddas, seven General Secretaries of various affiliated Labour trade unions including Unite and the Communication Workers Union (CWU), and four members of the National Executive Committee (NEC) (CND, 2008c).

Taken as a whole, the actions of Labour MPs both inside and outside Parliament offer a rich strategic-relational landscape upon which to analyse the relative agency of PLP members vis-a-vis the various structural forces acting upon them in shaping their own government’s BMD plans. First and foremost, it appears that the outside agency of the Czech opposition in pressurising their governments over the proposed placement of Third Site components in their countries greatly energised MPs on the left of the PLP (CND, 2008f). The actions of their European counterparts galvanised them to raise the profile of BMD through parliamentary questions and extra-parliamentary protest to the point where it began to radicalise a greater number of centrist Labour MPs (EDM 65, 2007). This consciousness raising among the PLP was also facilitated by the Labour government almost overplaying its own agency by trying to neutralise any claims for a substantial debate and vote on the government’s BMD plans going forward. In trying to have no debate at all by claiming that the one that took place before the 2003 RAF Fylingdales update still sufficed (HoC Deb, 2007f, c894W), the Labour government almost risked a revolt over its handling of the 2007 RAF Menwith Hill upgrade announcement. Had Obama not won the 2008 election and scrapped the Third Site then this consternation may have built into an open rebellion. Again, it would seem that the Labour government’s BMD policy was mollified by the outside agency of the US.

However, for all the intra-parliamentary activity that was indeed taking place around Labour’s BMD policy, the influence of MPs and peers on the government’s decision-making process came to nought. The over-riding image that appears when examining parliamentary oversight of Labour’s BMD policy between 2005 and 2010
is that of the Commons and Lords yet again being side-lined over the RAF Menwith Hill upgrade in exactly the same way the 2003 decision on RAF Fylingdales was taken.

With Parliament itself seemingly unable to influence the government’s BMD policy, the thesis now turns away from MPs to the people they are elected to represent, the general public, to see if they fared any better.

7.2.3 The Public

Several opinion polls, more than during any of the previous two Parliaments, were undertaken during Labour’s last term of office from 2005 to 2010. These polls are very important because they give a counterintuitive insight into the public’s opposition to missile defence and therefore help to explain the government’s attempt to manage its BMD liaison with the US as quietly as possible. Of key importance, polls from 2007, 2008 and 2009 all returned not only a consistent but a growing concern among the British public over the UK’s role in BMD. The first of these, a YouGov opinion poll in July 2007, showed 54% of those asked believed US missile defence would make Europe less safe, while only 24% thought otherwise (CND, 2008b). Most telling, however, was a YouGov opinion poll carried out on behalf of CND in November 2008. This online poll of 2087 adults indicated that a growing number of the British public – 61%, up from 54% on the July 2007 poll – thought that hosting parts of the US BMD system increased rather than diminished the security threat faced by Britain and Europe (CND, 2008c). Finally, a third poll in June 2009 upheld the trend of the previous two years, with 58% of those polled agreeing that the siting of US BMD components in the UK and Europe would increase international tension between the US and Russia and, as a result, increase the threat to UK and European security, compared to less than 19% who disagreed (CND, 2009b).

Although these various opinion polls all confirmed that latent opposition towards BMD remained as high among the British public as it had ever been since the first poll in 2001 (Ipsos-MORI, 2001), missile defence still remained the most marginal of niche interests, failing to translate into an open issue of major public concern. This is reflected in the polling data in the build-up to the 2010 general election, which was dominated by public worries over the economy (Ipsos-MORI, 2010). With only 3% of the public choosing defence as an important issue (Ipsos-
MORI, 2010), it seems likely that concerns over missile defence formed a very small subset within that. Even the government’s admission that they did indeed ‘listen to these surveys and take account of them’ (HoC Deb, 2009a, c951) was somewhat dismissive. After Peter Kilfoyle asked the Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Defence Quentin Davies whether the government agreed with the July 2007 YouGov survey showing that 68% of the British public believed UK support for missile defence should be decided by Parliament, Davies replied ‘The Government do not make it their business to agree or disagree with a survey, which is simply a series of questions’ (HoC Deb, 2009a, cc948, 951). However, anti-BMD civil society groups were certainly emboldened by the missile defence survey results, using them as justification for their protests in a vain attempt to catalyse a widespread public uprising along the lines of that taking place in the Czech Republic (CND, 2009d). However, a popular uprising against the UK’s involvement in BMD failed to appear, and, moreover, the ability of anti-BMD groups such as CND and the Campaign for the Accountability of American Bases (CAAB) to protest UK missile defence involvement became increasingly hampered by counter-terror legislation, as shown below.

The tempo of protests carried out by anti-BMD organisations such as CND and CAAB increased during the 2005 to 2010 Parliament, peaking from the spring to the autumn of 2008, as the potential decisions to site Third Site components in Poland, the Czech Republic, and, according to renewed rumours, RAF Lakenheath, became ever more urgent (CND, 2008f; CND, 2008e). However, it was during protests outside RAF Menwith Hill that protestors first felt the impact of the Serious Organised and Policing Act (SOCPA) 2005 on their activities.

SOCPA was a major piece of legislation passed following the 2005 7/7 terrorist attacks. Under SOCPA, trespass on military sites, including RAF Menwith Hill and RAF Fylingdales, now incurred a maximum imprisonment of 51 weeks and/or a fine of up to £10,000 (Human Rights Joint Committee, 2009, Memorandum submitted by Yorkshire Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament, para 1.17). The resolution of the authorities to enforce these new rules was immediately put to the test when on the very day that SOCPA came into effect on the 1st of April 2006, two protesters marched 15ft into the grounds of RAF Menwith Hill and were promptly arrested, charged and later found guilty of trespass (CND, 2006; Human Rights Joint Committee, 2009, Memorandum submitted by Yorkshire Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament, para 1.3).
The most common manifestation of SOCPA and other counter-terror legislation anti-BMD protestors claimed they experienced, however, was a vexatious increase in the amount of bureaucracy required to apply for and carry out protest marches, along with a higher level of intervention from law enforcement agencies once there. For example, CAAB stated that although in previous years they had had an amicable relationship with the police, who had even closed roads to enable their procession around RAF Menwith Hill, by August 2007 ‘things were suddenly very different’ (Human Rights Joint Committee, 2009, Memorandum submitted by the Campaign for the Accountability of American Bases). Empirical data from the time appears to corroborate CND and CAAB’s claims of increased police action. Perhaps as the realities of SOCPA became clear to protest groups, the number of trespasses at RAF Menwith Hill fell from three to one between April 2006 to March 2007 and April 2007 to March 2008 (HoC Deb, 2008c, c72W).

Evidently, the tangential effects of SOCPA and the emboldened response of the police in the light of this new legislation significantly disrupted the agency of anti-BMD protest groups to pursue their consciousness raising activities among a public that opinion polling showed to have a large and growing opposition to BMD (CND, 2008c). And while the most significant barrier to the emergence of BMD as a prominent and pressing issue in the larger British public consciousness probably had more to do with the lack of any really significant development to trigger this opposition into life, such as a decision to actually site BMD interceptors somewhere in the UK, rather than any measure of protest anti-BMD groups might have undertaken at this time, the new raft of counter-terror legislation coming into effect during this final Parliament certainly did not help their cause; and so opposition towards BMD in the UK remained in its latent stage, never breaking out into popular opposition as it did elsewhere on the continent such as in the Czech Republic. Clearly the interaction of structure, agency and discourse in the Czech Republic regarding BMD was of a markedly different composition than in the UK and so is worth investigating in its own right due to the differences it highlights against the British experience of missile defence.

7.2.3.1 Comparing British and Czech Public Responses to BMD

Why did the Czech public challenge their government’s BMD policy when the British public did not, even though opinion polling consistently showed a high level of anti-
BMD feeling in both countries (Dodge, 2019, pp.175-177; CND, 2008c)? This question presents the perfect counterfactual against which to make a strategic-relational analysis of the structural, agential and discursive contrasts between the very different responses of the Czech and British public towards the US’s Third Site BMD plans.

First of all, the strategically selective environments facing the UK and the Czech Republic were very different. As a small country in central Europe, the Czech Republic had much more humble expectations about its role in the world after the end of the Cold War (Hynek and Stritecky, 2010, p.181). The fundamental approach of the Czech Republic as a smaller state was therefore to pursue international relations based on multilateralism (Hynek and Stritecky, 2010, p.180). The Labour government, on the other hand, saw the UK as both a multilateral nation – a bridge between the US and the EU, a core NATO member and a producer of international security – as well as a leader of nations, unafraid to take part in coalitions of the willing should multilateral indecision exert a stultifying hand on the necessary actions required to uphold international norms (Brown, 2010, p.9; Blair, 2007; Beech and Lee, 2008, p.153). In this way the UK was quite willing to pursue bilateral negotiations with the US over the UK’s role in BMD, while also pushing for BMD to become a NATO system (HoC Deb, 2007h, c71-72WS).

However, the US government still determined the overall structural context within which both the Czech and British governments engaged with missile defence. For the Czech government, this was felt most keenly in September 2009 when the Obama administration cancelled its Third Site plans without consulting them at all (Hynek and Stritecky, 2010, p.185). In the British case, geography itself acted as a negative structural constraint on British aspirations to host Third Site components. The US chose the Czech Republic as the host for the Third Site radar in large part because it was much closer to Iran than the UK and so would detect enemy missile launches much more quickly (Missile Defense Agency, 2007, p.6). Both nations therefore found their policies towards missile defence entirely subordinated to the whims of US decision-making.

An even starker contrast between the missile defence situation in the Czech Republic and the UK centred around the much greater levels of agency the Czech public had to challenge their government as compared to their British counterparts. This was because while the Labour government of 2005 to 2010 had a strong and
secure majority, during this same time period the Czech Republic experienced three different governments (Gross, 2009, p.7; Dodge, 2019, pp. 86, 106, 132, 133). This state of affairs introduced a great deal of instability into the BMD negotiation process between the Czech and US governments against which the various Czech anti-BMD pressure groups were able to leverage the significant and open concerns of the larger Czech citizenry around the Third Site radar proposals as a live political issue (Gross, 2009, p.16).

The real spark which ignited the Czech public’s latent opposition to the Third Site proposals was the US’s proposal of 19th January 2007 to begin formal negotiations about placing the Third Site somewhere in the former Brdy military training area in the south of the Czech Republic (Gross, 2009, p.10). Following this announcement the Czech Defence Minister said, ‘I have never received so many negative reactions from voters and citizens’ (ibid). The Minister’s observations appeared to have been an accurate reflection of public sentiment. In March 2007 more than 20 local municipalities near Brdy held public referenda about whether the Czech government should agree to host a US radar on Czech territory, all coming out in opposition to it (Dodge, 2019, p.182).

At each step of the negotiation process between the US and the Czech Republic levels of public protest increased. When, at the end of March 2007, Prague officially entered into negotiations with the US on missile defence, members of the Czech No Bases Initiative went on hunger strike, gaining the group international attention, including from Labour MPs in the UK (Gross, 2009, p.11; CND, 2008f). In June 2007, 35 local leaders from communities close to Brdy founded the League of Mayors with the intent of opposing the radar (Dodge, 2019, p.181).

Interestingly, at around the same time as the domestic opposition to the placement of Third Site architecture in the Czech Republic began to solidify in late September 2007, in early October rumours surrounding the possibility of interceptor missiles being placed somewhere in the UK – most notably RAF Lakenheath – began to circulate again (Dodge, 2019, pp.109, 181; Lewis, 2007; CND, 2007e; Cleland, 2007). Some of the resurgence of this rumour may have stemmed from the installation of Sir Nigel Sheinwald – Blair’s former Foreign and Defence Advisor, who had been tasked with leading discussions with the US National Security Council over Britain’s role in BMD – as the new British Ambassador to the United States. A Foreign Office spokesman confirmed on 7th October 2007 that missile defence would be one of
Sheinwald’s top priorities when he took up his post (Cleland, 2007; King’s College London, 2020; GOV.UK, 2014). These developments give the impression that as the Czech government came under increased public pressure the British government may have stepped up private negotiations to remind the US government that should its missile defence plans falter in the Czech Republic the UK was still ready to step into the breach as a host for Third Site components.

However, the most fatal development in terms of alienating the Czech public over missile defence came on 23rd October 2007. US Defense Secretary Robert Gates visited Prague to discuss the planned radar installation and proposed that Russian inspectors be allowed to visit the radar site in order to verify that it was not targeted at them (Hildreath and Ek, 2010, p.14; Department of Defense, 2007). After Condoleezza Rice and Czech Foreign Minister Schwarzenberg announced the formulation of a bilateral missile defence agreement document in April 2008 two-thousand people descended on the proposed Brdy radar site and trampled the limited fencing put there by the army, refusing to leave (Gross, 2009, p.16; Czech Radio, 2008). By July 2008 public opposition to the proposed radar had grown so much that some claimed it to be the largest civic movement in the Czech Republic since the 1989 Velvet Revolution (Gross, 2009, p.16). There were now almost 60 civic groups working together against the radar. An ongoing anti-Third Site petition had over 100,000 signatures (ibid). The behaviour of the villagers bordering Brdy stood in stark contrast to that of their British equivalents. The differing responses of these communities was probably due to the piecemeal nature of the RAF Fylingdales and RAF Menwith Hill BMD upgrades dissipating any build up in public opprobrium and thereby preventing it from reaching a critical mass, whereas in the Czech Republic those communities close to the proposed Third Site were suddenly presented with the literally monumental prospect of an X-band radar several stories high being built nearby (Dodge, 2019, pp.92-93).

However, external structural factors would once again come to the aid of the Czech government in granting them a convenient exit over the looming parliamentary vote. The increasing likelihood of an Obama victory at the forthcoming November US Presidential elections led to increased speculation over whether the Third Site radar might be cancelled altogether (Dodge, 2019, p.133). At the end of October 2008 the new Czech PM Mirek Topolanek decided to delay the final ratification vote on the missile defence agreement in the Chamber of Deputies until after the US Presidential
election was over (Hildreath and Ek, 2010, p.15). It would appear that Topolanek’s caution was well founded; Obama won the election and in February 2009 his administration cancelled any further X-band radar preparations (Office of the Press Secretary, 2009a). In March 2009 the Topolanek government collapsed, leading to his replacement by Jan Fisher who decided that the Czech Republic would not go ahead with the radar site (Ceska televize, 2009; Dodge, 2019, pp.132-133). Finally, Obama cancelled the Third Site altogether on 17th September 2009 in favour of what he called the European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA) which would not require a single, large, fixed radar located in the Czech Republic (Office of the Press Secretary, 2009a; Dodge, 2019, p.133).

So far, it seems clear that structural factors were a preponderant influence on the differing reactions of the Czech and British publics towards the US’s Third Site plans. The latent opposition to BMD never ignited in the British public as it did in the Czech public because the British public were not presented with the possibility of a Third Site X-band radar being constructed on their soil as the Czech were. The British public were not presented with the possibility of the Third Site X-band radar being constructed on their soil because the Czech Republic was closer to Iran than the UK was (Missile Defense Agency, 2007, p.6). However, greater insight into these diverging responses – protest as opposed to silence – comes from an understanding of the contrarian role discourse played in shaping the Czech and British publics’ outlook on the involvement of foreign powers in their domestic defence policies.

At the core of the Czech experience of international relations was the ideational discourse known as ‘About us without us again’ (Dodge, 2019, p.99). This phrase referred to a deep cultural memory going back to the 1938 Munich Agreement annexation of the Czechoslovak Sudetenland and decisions being made about the Czech nation by foreign powers without any indigenous consultation (ibid); a feeling then amplified by the experience of Soviet occupation and the Prague Spring (Gross, 2009, pp.4, 16). ‘About us without us again’ embedded a deep wariness among a large majority of the Czech public towards potential domination by much larger countries. Interviews from this time with residents of the villages living close to the Brdy site perfectly echoed the ideational discourse of ‘about us without us again’ that many of them felt: the sense that outside powers were again dictating the Czech Republic’s future as had happened in the Munich Agreement and the Prague Spring (Dodge, 2019, p.99; Vltchek, 2008). This circumspection was reflected in one of the most important
and consistent polls on Czech attitudes towards BMD, taken by the Center for Examination of Public Opinion, a research institute attached to the Czech Academy of Sciences. In the 23 polls it conducted between September 2006, when public discussion of the Third Site first began, and June 2009, a few months after the Fisher government withdrew its participation, the Center consistently returned findings showing no less than 60% of the Czech public opposed to a missile defence site in the country, with never more than 30% in favour (Dodge, 2019, pp.175-177).

‘About us without us again’ clearly predisposed the Czech public against BMD. British militarism and the Special Relationship, on the other hand, should have predisposed the British public in favour of BMD, but the opinion polls demonstrated quite the opposite (HoC Deb, 2009c; Reifler et al., 2011). So, if the British and Czech public were both inclined against BMD, why did the Czech citizenry rise up against the Third Site but the British did not? As mentioned earlier, structural geographic factors were of prime importance. The British public were primed against BMD in much the same way as the Czech public were (CND, 2008c), but because the Czech Republic was closer to Iran than the UK, the US chose the Czech Republic for its X-band radar site (Missile Defense Agency, 2007, p.6), and so the British public were never presented with that spark to ignite their latent opposition. Indeed, if the US had decided to place Third Site components in the UK due to political instability in the Czech Republic, and the British government had chosen to bluntly announce the decision to Parliament or rely on its significant majority to win such a vote in Parliament, there could very well have been a political price to pay. As one former official in the MOD during this period told me in an interview for this thesis, there were ministers who feared a Greenham Common type situation emerging if the US started ‘digging holes in the ground,’ (Anonymous Interviewee 1, 2017). Finally, the precarious position of the Czech government granted the Czech public and protest groups a degree of agency strong enough to nudge the Czech government to continually delay the final ratification vote in the Czech Parliament lest it undermine its fragile governing coalition (Gross, 2009, p.7; Dodge, 2019, pp. 86, 106, 132, 133). The Czech government was then saved from having to take this difficult vote at all by the structural decision of the Obama administration to cancel the whole Third Site project anyway. In contrast, the piecemeal nature of the UK’s missile defence upgrades at RAF Fylingdales and RAF Menwith Hill meant that the latent opposition of the British public towards BMD never built up to a critical mass of agential energy
in the same way that the Czech public did when presented with the monumental prospect of an X-band radar. The British public had the discursive predisposition but not the structural opportunity to exercise their latent agency against BMD in the same way as their Czech counterparts.

With a consideration of the role of discourse in the differing responses of the British and Czech public towards the US’s Third Site plans now complete, it is time to examine the overall role that discourse played in shaping the Labour government’s attitudes towards the US’s BMD plans in general between 2005 and 2010.

7.3 Discourse: The Special Relationship and British Militarism

At the elite level of the core defence policy community the ideational discourse of the Special Relationship still held great currency and continued to shape the Labour government’s missile defence policy. Blair’s invocation of the need to discuss missile defence with the US in order to pursue its potential benefits for the UK is well documented (HoC Deb, 2007k, c919). Brown’s general use of the term was also fulsome, stating that the Special Relationship between the US and UK was so strong that ‘no power on earth can drive us apart’ (Brown, 2009). The Foreign and Commonwealth Office also gave a clear articulation of the core defence policy community’s view of the Special Relationship as being ‘based on strong historical and cultural ties deriving from our shared values, and close links across a wide spectrum of interests, including economic issues, a strong trading relationship and close cooperation of foreign policy issues’ (Foreign Affairs Committee, 2010, Written evidence from the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Para 154).

This rhetoric clearly translated into important tangible benefits for the UK with regards to missile defence between 2005 and 2010. Not only did the United States pay for the upgrades to RAF Menwith Hill, physical security measures such as fencing, barbed wire and CCTV cameras there were also funded by the US authorities (HC Deb, 2006, 31W). Des Browne continued to promote the UK Missile Defence Centre as ‘a showcase for the specialist expertise and equipment which UK Industry has to offer to the US Missile Defence programme’ (HoC Deb, 2006b, c401W; Foreign Affairs Committee, 2010, Written evidence from the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Para 22). Perhaps more important than the physical manifestations of missile defence cooperation wrought by the Special Relationship, however, was the sharing
of data produced by RAF Menwith Hill and RAF Fylingdales under the terms of a UK-US Combined Operating Agreement (HoC Deb, 2005, c900W).

However, outside of the core defence policy community the idea of the Special Relationship had become somewhat tarnished. Lord Wallace’s comments towards the end of the Bush administration were typical of those sceptical of this relationship. For Wallace, the UK’s involvement in the US’s BMD plans were just another example of ‘Britain as “Airstrip One” for a hegemonic USA, not the basis for a co-operative partnership among allies’ (HoL Deb, 2008, c953). Wallace and others were also concerned with what they claimed was the colonisation of the Labour government’s language around BMD by what they saw as a militaristic Bush administration (HoL Deb, 2008, c953). Ultimately, for its critics such as the Acronym Institute, the outcome of this unbalanced Special Relationship was that ‘Blair subordinated Britain's security interests and intelligence to enable an ideological US Administration to pursue wars’, and this same imbalance manifested itself in the relationship between the UK and the US over missile defence to the detriment of British interests (Foreign Affairs Committee, 2010, Written evidence from the Acronym Institute, para 6.1).

If the core defence policy community’s deployment of the ideational discourse of the Special Relationship was an attempt to ingratiate the United States government at the elite level of policy making over missile defence, then its invocation of missile defence at the level of domestic electoral politics was an apparently misguided and unsuccessful attempt to sate the British electorate’s disposition towards ‘British militarism’ (Reifler et al., 2011).

Having learnt its lesson on the importance of taking a strong stance on defence issues in order to appeal to voters (Gould, 1998), the Labour government was no less keen to assert its credentials as a proud defender of the national interest during its final Parliament of 2005 to 2010. This was particularly the case in a country in which the cultural memory of WWII was still incredibly strong and kept manifesting itself in the debates over missile defence. The Conservative Lord Marlesford, for example, stated that he believed ‘the debate about missile defence must be seen in the historical context of modern warfare…September 1944, when Hitler launched his V2 rockets on London’ (HoL Deb, 2008, c957).

In such a discursive milieu, Tony Blair continued his attempt to build a reputation for Labour as a stalwart supporter of the British armed forces and their role in international conflicts, a hand that he overplayed with his support for Bush and the
Iraq War, and one which in any case the opinion polls demonstrated did not work – Labour was only more trusted on defence issues than the Conservatives on three brief occasions; 3 points more in May 1998 after the signing of the Good Friday Agreement in April, 5 points more in July 1999 after the Kosovo war finished in June, and 12 points more in February 2002 during the Afghan war (Ipsos-MORI, 2015; Ipsos-MORI, 2014a). Following Blair, Prime Minister Brown was no less committed to making his mark as a strong defender of the national interest. Brown’s speech in March 2008 announcing the publication of the first national security strategy was an attempt to be as forthright on this front as possible: ‘The primary duty of Government, and our abiding obligation’, Brown began, ‘is and will always be the safety of all British people and the protection of the British national interest’. New threats and risks included missile proliferation, and while Brown did not himself mention missile defence during his speech, the National Security Strategy itself did include a section on BMD, stating that the government ‘welcome US plans to place further missile defence assets in Europe’ (Cabinet Office, 2008, p.44).

A strategic-relational analysis would suggest that the ability of the ideational discourses of the Special Relationship and British militarism to influence the government’s BMD policy were at their weakest during this last Labour Parliament of 2005 to 2010. This is demonstrated by the fact that despite the Labour government’s continuing deployment of ‘Special Relationship’ rhetoric during this era, it was not able to secure any missile defence architecture in the UK beyond that which maximally benefitted US strategic interests (Missile Defense Agency, 2007; The Economist, 2007). The UK was able to secure an upgrade to RAF Menwith, and this was in no doubt in part due to the role that the Special Relationship played in cementing the military bond between the US and the UK over missile defence, but, most importantly, the RAF Menwith Hill upgrade was mutually beneficial to both the strategic interests of the US and the UK (HoC Deb, 2007h, c71-72WS). However, when the Labour government lobbied for Third Site components to be placed in the UK they were overlooked in favour of the Czech Republic’s more advantageous geostrategic position (Missile Defense Agency, 2007; The Economist, 2007). Furthermore, at the domestic level, while the Labour government still espoused themes intended to court voters steeped in themes of British militarism, opinion polls still showed a majority of the British public opposed to missile defence: at the end of its three terms of office Labour had still not made the case to the British public that missile defence would make them
safer (CND, 2008c). Indeed, it appears that the Labour government was anxious not to have the debate necessary to convince the public for fear of arousing public opposition (HoL Deb, 2003b, c1381; Anonymous Interviewee 1, 2017).

7.4 Conclusion
Conceiving of the Labour government’s missile defence policy as a result of the interplay between three components – structure, agency and the discourses through which these two elements are brought into relation (Brighi, 2013, p.64) – a strategic-relational analysis of this policy between 2005 and 2010 can now be outlined. At the structural level the Labour government’s missile defence policy was deeply constrained by both the need to navigate the tension between the US and Russia over Bush’s Third Site proposal and the unfavourable geostrategic position the UK found itself in vis-à-vis the Czech Republic in securing any further upgrades or role in the Third Site once the RAF Menwith Hill upgrade had been agreed (HoC Deb, 2007e, c1095; Missile Defense Agency, 2007, p.6). While there appears to be some evidence that Prime Minister Blair was personally involved in lobbying the US in an attempt to secure Third Site components for the UK (The Economist, 2007; HoC Deb, 2007k, c919), the fact that this was not successful demonstrates the limits of his personal agency and of the rhetoric of the Special Relationship in the face of the US’s need to maximise its own security through placing Third Site components in Poland and the Czech Republic where they would deliver their optimum defensive capability, rather than in the UK (Missile Defense Agency, 2007 p.6).

Inheriting the 2003 RAF Fylingdales upgrade and becoming Prime Minister only two days before the Labour government received a formal request to upgrade RAF Menwith in June 2007 so that it could play a role in the US’s missile defence system (HoC Deb, 2008i, 470W), Brown’s agential potential to shape the UK’s missile defence policy up to that point was almost impossibly constrained. However, the election of President Obama and his scrapping of the Third Site in favour of the EPAA presented Brown with an agential opening in the form of shifting the paradigm of Britain’s engagement with the US over missile defence from a means to the end of maintaining the Special Relationship and with it the UK’s overall strategic defence, to one in which the UK’s strategic defence could be maximised through the pursuit of
missile defence as a means to the end of promoting multilateral nuclear disarmament (Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 2009, p.5).

In turn, as members of the core defence policy community the Defence and Foreign Secretaries were able to exercise a great deal of agential control over their fellow parliamentarians in effectively curtailing any meaningful discussion of the RAF Menwith Hill upgrade and the potential hosting of Third Site components in the UK (HoC Deb, 2007f, c894W). With the Conservative Opposition rendered irrelevant due to their general agreement with the Labour government’s BMD policy (HoC Deb, 2008f, c584), this left the agency of parliamentarians reduced to the plaintive role of exhorting ministers to clarify the government’s position on missile defence (EDM 65, 2007; Foreign Affairs Committee, 2007, Conclusions and Recommendations, Para 31). In this capacity The Economist probably exercised more agency than did parliamentarians by in early 2007 forcing the government to address rumours that Blair had personally lobbied to have interceptor missiles placed somewhere in the UK (The Economist, 2007).

Although when polled the British public stated that they were substantially opposed to missile defence (CND, 2008c), no mass protests emerged against the RAF Menwith Hill upgrades or the persistent interceptor rumours, and missile defence in itself remained a niche issue of public concern. Members of the public who did try to counter the UK’s involvement in missile defence found their agency to protest further eroded by the Serious Organised Crime and Policing Act 2005 (Human Rights Joint Committee, 2009, Memorandum submitted by the Campaign for the Accountability of American Bases).

Although, ostensibly, opinion polls demonstrated that the British public were as opposed to missile defence as the Czech were (CND, 2008c; Dodge, 2019, pp.175-177), the key differences between the two countries accounting for why the Czech public rose up but the British did not were that the Czech public were presented with the very real possibility of hosting a major component of Bush’s proposed Third Site architecture while the British were not (Dodge, 2019, p.124). This state of affairs was the spark that pushed the Czech citizenry into open protest. Their protest was also helped by the instability of the Czech governing coalition as opposed to the comfortable majority enjoyed by the Labour government after the 2005 election which would have dampened the impact of any public protest in the UK on the government’s BMD policy, although ministers did fear such a possibility (Gross, 2009, p.7; Dodge,
2019, pp. 86, 106, 132, 133; Anonymous Interviewee 1, 2017). Attesting to the highly contoured and fluctuating dynamics between structural and agential forces, it appears that whenever the Czech government came under particular public pressure or seemed unstable due to its own internal contradictions, as it did in mid to late 2006 and late summer 2007 (Dodge, 2019, pp.106, 109, 181), rumours would soon emerge in the British press that the Labour government was lobbying to have interceptors placed in the UK (The Economist, 2007; CND, 2007e; Cleland, 2007). Blair’s confirmation in February 2007 that the UK had at least been having preliminary discussions over siting unspecified parts of the US missile defence system in the UK (HoC Deb, 2007k, c919) also aligns with the narrative that whenever the Czech government hit a period of instability the Labour government reminded the Americans that the UK was still willing to serve as a host of Third Site components should the Czech negotiations fall through.

Framing these developments and reinforcing them were the complementary discourses of the Special Relationship and British militarism. Through these ideational discourses missile defence was perceived as a means to the end of pursuing the Special Relationship at the elite level of missile defence policy making (HoC Deb, 2007k, c919), whereas at the domestic level missile defence was framed as a way of bolstering British national security (HoC Deb, 2007k, c919). Despite not being able to convince the British public of the necessity of BMD (CND, 2008c), evidently the dialectical power of these discourses was demonstrated by their ability to bring about a reality in which by the end of 13 years in office Labour had secured a permanent role for the UK in missile defence as well as ensuring that Britain would formally be protected by the system when a few months after Labour left office in May 2010 BMD was formally integrated into NATO at the Lisbon summit of November 2010 (Hildreath and Ek, 2010, p.19).

With the missile defence policies of all three Labour parliaments between 1997 and 2010 explored, the thesis now turns to synthesise a final answer to its overarching research question.
Chapter 8. Conclusion: Someone to Watch Over Us

This thesis makes two central and important contributions to the academic literature on the UK’s ballistic missile defence policy. First of all, it provides a full political narrative of Labour’s BMD policy between 1997 and 2010, something that has not been attempted before. Secondly, underpinning this narrative account the thesis presents an application of the under-utilised yet powerfully insightful strategic-relational approach to an analysis of British foreign and defence policy.

Ballistic missile defence is a US military system for intercepting nuclear missiles. Between 1997 and 2010 BMD developed from an experimental and untested platform to an architecture made up of sophisticated radars, interceptor missiles and a command and control network capable of destroying a limited number of nuclear missiles launched from WMD proliferators such as North Korea (Missile Defense Agency, 2013, p.17). During this period the Labour government incorporated BMD into the UK’s security policy. It did this by agreeing to upgrades of RAF Fylingdales and RAF Menwith Hill in 2003 and 2007 respectively, both vital components in making BMD work by ensuring the detection and tracking of enemy missiles launched from the Middle East (HoC Deb, 2003c, c697; HoC Deb, 2007h, c71-72WS; HoC Deb, 2008b, c345WH).

By the time the Labour government left office after 13 years in May 2010 it had secured the UK a foothold in an emerging American ballistic missile defence shield (HoC Deb, 2002l, 502). At the Lisbon Summit of November 2010, just six months after Labour left office, NATO would formally declare BMD an integral component of the common defence of all member states (NATO, 2010).

One of the aims of this thesis was to tell the entire political story from 1997 to 2010 of how this situation came to be. In order to do this, the thesis posed a central counter-intuitive research problem; why did a centre-left government elected on a mandate of multilateralism, and espousing an ‘ethical dimension’ to foreign policy (Cook, 1997; Brown, 2010, p.1), commit the UK to US ballistic missile defence, one of the most internationally divisive and right-wing associated military projects? The thesis then put forward three hypotheses intended to help answer the central research problem.

In answering the research problem and its associated hypotheses the thesis used the strategic-relational approach (SRA) as the theoretical lens through which to...
analyse the Labour government’s missile defence policy between 1997 and 2010 (Jessop, 2016; Brighi, 2013). The SRA was chosen as it provided a more insightful explanation of the interaction between the domestic and international influences on the Labour government’s BMD policy as mediated through the ideational discourses of the Special Relationship at the international level and British militarism at the domestic level than did more traditional models of defence and foreign policy analysis.

In particular, more traditional models of foreign policy analysis such as classical realism, neorealism (Waltz, 2001), the second image reversed (Putnam, 1988), two-level games (Inoguchi, 2010) and holistic constructivism (Burchill et al., 2005) were unable to account for the key empirical conundrum in the thesis in a way that the strategic-relational approach could, namely; the contradiction between the need of the Labour government to formulate a supportive policy towards the UK’s engagement with the US’s BMD plans while navigating a domestic political environment in which the British electorate favoured a strong national defence policy in general, but who were opposed to missile defence in particular (Reifler et al., 2011; CND, 2008d; CND, 2008c; CND, 2007b; Ipsos-MORI, 2001). The key theoretical advantage that the strategic-relational approach possessed was in granting the Labour government sufficient agency to navigate a strategically selective environment (Brighi, 2013, p.36) in which the material and discursive demands of upholding the Special Relationship in order to maintain the UK’s national security at the international level had to be combined with the need to meet the material and discursive demands of upholding British militarism in order to appeal to the British electorate at the domestic level, while at the same time acknowledging that BMD in itself was unpopular among the general public (Reifler et al., 2011; CND, 2008d; CND, 2008c; CND, 2007b; Ipsos-MORI, 2001). More traditional theories of foreign and defence policy making were unable to account for this nuance because they either assert that domestic politics has no influence on defence policy (Waltz, 2001), that they both align (Putnam, 1988), or that international relations dictates what the public’s opinion on defence policy will be (Chaudoin et al., 2014).

Having reiterated the aims of the thesis, the conclusion to this thesis now applies the SRA to an analysis of each of the hypotheses before finally giving a strategic-relational answer to the research question.
1. The Labour government’s support for the US’s BMD plans was due to the need to maximise the UK’s defence capabilities by maintaining Britain’s alliance with the US.

External structural factors dominated during all three parliaments. Not only was the prime structural influence on the UK’s stance towards the US’s missile defence plans the need to maximise the UK’s national security by maintaining the Special Relationship (Casey, 2009, p.277), but with almost every new development in missile defence the British government found itself reacting to initiatives set in motion by the US government. However, the relative weighting between structural and agential influences on the Labour government’s BMD policy shifted between each individual Parliament. There was definitely a U-shaped pattern to the waxing and waning of the relative structural vs. agential influences on Labour’s BMD policy over its three terms of office.

During the first Parliament, for example, from 1997 to 2001 the influence of structural factors on the Labour government’s stance towards the US’s BMD policy was very strong. Within the space of a single Parliament the Labour government changed its stance towards BMD from one which encouraged the Clinton administration to uphold the ABM Treaty while pursuing its limited missile defence plans, to the sudden acceptance of the Bush administration’s announcement that it would abandon the ABM Treaty in order to pursue its missile defence plans with Ground-Based Interceptors (HoC Deb, 2000d, c312-3; HoC Deb, 2001s, c15). The common thread linking these two positions was the need to maintain the Special Relationship with the US in order to maximise the UK’s strategic defence by not alienating the United States and in the long-term gaining the protection of the US’s BMD system as it matured (HoC Deb, 2001l, c12).

During the second Parliament from 2001 to 2005, however, although structural pressures still predominated – 9/11 greatly accelerated the Bush administration’s push on missile defence and the British Labour government’s acceptance of it – there was a strong agential turn in the negotiations between the US and UK governments over the UK’s participation in the US’s missile defence plans. The strong personal relationship and shared interventionist foreign policy outlook between George Bush and Tony Blair accelerated the UK’s integration into the US’s BMD architecture through the 2003 RAF Fylingdales upgrade decision and the establishment of the UK

Another counterintuitive finding of the thesis, however, was the relatively weak structural role business interests played in shaping the Labour government’s BMD policy. Although the UK Missile Defence Centre received a few million pounds worth of British government funding per year, and did enable many lucrative contracts to be signed between US and UK missile defence related arms manufacturers, the figures involved pale in significance when compared to the billions being invested in other British defence contracts underway at the same time such as the Eurofighter Typhoon (Ministry of Defence, 2015; GOV.UK, 2018; HoC Deb, 2004a, cc961w). The UK Missile Defence Centre had a greater impact on the Labour government’s BMD policy by acting as window into the technical aspects of the US BMD system, thereby allowing the government to develop an ‘intelligent customer’ approach to the missile defence components that might be placed in the UK (Stocker, 2004a, p.25).

Finally, during the third Parliament from 2005 to 2010 structural forces reasserted themselves strongly. Despite the one clear example of the Labour government exercising some agential initiative in lobbying the Bush administration to place Third Site missile defence elements in the UK (The Economist, 2007; HoC Deb, 2007k, c919), the US ultimately proposed sites in Eastern Europe to host Third Site components as their geographical locations offered greater strategic efficacy than those of the UK in countering potential aggressors from the Middle East (Missile Defense Agency, 2007, p.6). The practical result of this structural situation for Britain was that the Czech Republic was chosen over the UK as the location for the Third Site X-band radar due to its geographical proximity to Iran, and so the British public did not experience the Czech public’s confrontation with such a major missile defence upgrade, which may have turned their latent opposition to BMD into open protest. The Obama administration’s decision to cancel the Third Site proposals and replace it with the European Phased Adaptive Approach, which was still focused on sites in Eastern Europe, only further entrenched the UK’s eclipse as the centre of the US’s BMD plans (Office of the Press Secretary, 2009a). Even the Brown administration’s support for missile defence as a means to the end of pursuing multilateral nuclear disarmament was triggered by President Obama’s lead on this front (Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 2009).
Of further structural significance, BMD had a divisive impact on the UK’s relationships with NATO and the EU. This was because Blair wanted to be both a good European and a good Atlanticist (Garton Ash, 2001), and prevent a decoupling of the US and EU over defence issues. To this end he sought the UK to play a role as a bridge between the EU and the US in foreign and defence issues (Vickers, 2011, p.175). This impasse was somewhat resolved by the US’s decision to integrate BMD into NATO’s command structure in November 2010, a few months after Labour had left office, thereby providing BMD cover for EU nations as NATO members, within which individual EU countries agreed to site particular components of BMD architecture on their soil (European Parliament, 2007, p.43; NATO, 2010).

2. The Labour government’s support for the US’s BMD plans was an indirect outgrowth of the Labour Party’s policy reforms to become more electable on defence issues.

While Labour did indeed make radical reforms to its defence policy in order to conform more to British militarism and make itself more electable in general (Gould, 1998; Mandelson, 2002; Vickers, 2011, pp.47-8), the British public’s latent opposition to missile defence was one of the most counterintuitive findings of the thesis and so disproved this particular hypothesis (CND, 2008d; CND, 2008c; CND, 2007b; Ipsos-MORI, 2001). On the one hand, the Labour government did not need to address missile defence as an electoral issue in itself as it was not an issue of public concern (Ipsos-MORI, 2010; Ipsos-MORI, 2015), yet the public’s latent opposition to missile defence when polled meant that the Labour government did need to manage their liaison with the US’s BMD plans carefully in order to prevent it from becoming so.

Thus, while ‘the primacy of the international’ (Brighi, 2013, p.1) was certainly the dominant structural paradigm ordering the Labour government’s response to the US’s missile defence plans, at the individual state level the ability to influence the Labour government’s BMD policy by different actors within and outside the British state was more contested. In particular, even though the general public were opposed to BMD it was a niche concern at best (as evidenced by the lack of concern over defence issues in general) (Ipsos-MORI, 2010), and so the Labour government could
afford to bypass those concerns to a certain degree. The latent potential agency that the public and parliamentarians did possess in relation to the government’s BMD policy, however, was apparent in the intense agency the core defence policy community exerted – especially Geoff Hoon and Des Browne as Secretaries of State for Defence – in trying to curtail any substantial debate among MPs and the public at large from emerging by only announcing its decisions on the RAF Fylingdales and RAF Menwith Hill upgrades once they had been made (HoC Deb, 2003c, c697; HoC Deb, 2007f, c894W).

And whereas anti-BMD parliamentarians were able to push for clarifications on government missile defence policy, they were ultimately marginalised by Hoon and Browne’s announcements of missile defence upgrades after the fact (HoC Deb, 2003c, c697). One particular irony for the anti-BMD left in the PLP was that in opposing missile defence through helping to destabilise the Czech government’s ability to ratify the US’s Third Site proposals through building extra-parliamentary links with and bolstering like-minded parties in the Czech Republic (CND, 2007a; CND, 2009c; CND, 2008f), the unintended consequence of this course of action was that it concomitantly strengthened the British government’s apparent appeals to Bush to site missile defence components in the UK (CND, 2008f; CND, 2008e; The Economist, 2007; HoC Deb, 2007k, c919).

3. The relationship between different British Prime Ministers and US Presidents affected the tempo of Britain’s involvement in BMD but not its general direction towards deeper integration.

Although the structural necessity of the Labour government, or any British government for that matter, to maximise the UK’s national security by upholding the Special Relationship gave an inexorable impetus towards the integration of UK radar assets into the US’s BMD system, the interactions between the various British Prime Ministers and US Presidents demonstrates both the agential potential and limitations of the British Prime Minister to have influenced US BMD policy. This was most apparent during the overlap between the Bush and Blair eras when the shared personal and interventionist foreign policy outlook between the two heads of state (Vickers, 2011, p.211; Daddow and Gaskarth, 2011, p.195; MacAskill, 2010) led to an acceleration of the UK’s integration into the US’s BMD system with the 2003 RAF
Fylingdales upgrade, the 2004 establishment of the UK Missile Defence Centre, and the bulk of the negotiations over the 2007 RAF Menwith Hill upgrade all taking place during this era. However, the agential limits of this personal relationship gave a good illustration of actor dispensability (Dyson, 2009, p.16) in that despite repeated rumours that Blair himself lobbied for placing US interceptor missiles in the UK, ultimately the Bush administration chose sites in Eastern Europe where they would maximise US defensive capabilities.

Gordon Brown’s agency in shaping Labour’s BMD policy was more constrained, as the US’s RAF Menwith Hill upgrade request came only two days after he assumed office (HoC Deb, 2008i, 470W). Brown did exert some agency in relation to the UK’s missile defence policy, however, by using the Obama administration’s decision to pursue multilateral nuclear disarmament as a springboard for the British government to propose that missile defence made multilateral nuclear disarmament easier by allowing the major nuclear weapon states to defend themselves against rogue proliferators (Brown, 2008; Brown, 2009; Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 2009).

Having now addressed the three foundational hypotheses of the thesis, and before turning to address the research problem itself, it is useful for the conclusion to return to a reminder of the power of discourse to influence government policy as one of the central tenants of the strategic-relational approach (Brighi, 2013, p.36). In the SRA, discourse forms a kind of meta-structure which shapes agent’s perceptions of their ability to influence more concrete political institutional structures (ibid). However, it is not that these discursive meta-structures exist independently of agents and are imposed upon them from outside by some mysterious source. Instead, agents themselves auto-generate these ideational structures through their discursive interactions with each other (Jessop, 2016, p.55).

One such discourse deeply shaping the Labour government’s missile defence decisions between 1997 and 2010 was that of the Special Relationship. Although the term ‘the Special Relationship’ itself did not always explicitly appear in parliamentary discussions on missile defence, Ministers referred to the US as ‘our closest ally and strongest friend’ – a phrase with much the same ideational content – with almost mantra-like regularity (HoC Deb, 2001s, c15; HoL Deb, 2001a, c499; HoC Deb, 2001y, c801). What this expression conveyed most strikingly was the way in which the British government seemed to exhort the sacrifice of some degree of national self-interest in deference to the US’s security concerns in order to uphold the greater goal
of keeping the US onside (HoC Deb, 2001s, c15). The absolutely necessity of maintaining a good relationship with the US over missile defence repeatedly emerged in ministerial discourse (HoL Deb, 2001a, c499). It appears that the government did not consider it sufficient for Britain’s strategic posture that the UK put its own defence considerations first, surely the bedrock of any realist conception of national security, but that the only way of securing national security was via the maintenance of positive relations with the US (HoC Deb, 2001y, c802).

However, this ‘Special Relationship’ was not just an academic construct or a British diplomatic creation, as some MPs alleged (HoC Deb, 2001m, c557). It held real purchase over the attitudes of ministerial support towards the US’s BMD plans (HoC Deb, 2001s, c15; HoL Deb, 2001a, c499). Occasionally, this constant invocation of British fealty towards the US’s BMD plans appeared more like a compulsion (HoC Deb, 2001y, c801).

The government was even quite willing to overturn hitherto established defence policy in order to placate the US over BMD. As well as demonstrating greater concern with the US’s worries over missile proliferation than the UK’s, directly contradicted the findings of the 1998 SDR, which stated that there was no such threat to Britain for the foreseeable future (HoC Deb, 2001y, c802; Ministry of Defence, 1998, p.128).

The Special Relationship acted as an a priori ideational filter which had been deeply imbibed by the Labour government. The practical manifestations of the influence of these discourses was a policy stance towards missile defence which dared not risk alienating the US over fear of jeopardising the protective umbrella afforded by the UK’s alliance with the world’s most powerful nation (Casey, 2009, p.277; HoC Deb, 2001y, c802).

Having now addressed the thesis hypotheses and reiterated the explanatory power of the strategic-relational approach it is now possible to use the SRA to answer the central research problem: why did a centre-left government elected on a mandate of multilateralism, and espousing an ‘ethical dimension’ to foreign policy (Cook, 1997; Brown, 2010, p.1), end up enacting policies committing the UK to US ballistic missile defence (BMD), one of the most internationally divisive and right-wing associated military projects?

Theoretically, the strategic-relational model has the greatest explanatory power when it comes to accounting for why the Labour government incorporated
BMD into the UK’s security policy. This is because it is able to integrate both international and domestic structural influences on the agency of the Labour government’s core defence community by immersing them in the ideational discourse of British militarism. This cognitive paradigm acts as the discursive solvent in which international and domestic structures interact with the Labour government’s core defence community, framing the limits of possible defence policy.

In Figure 2, British militarism is the ideational discourse which mediates voter’s perceptions of threats emanating from the international environment, and the Labour government’s foreign policies.

![Diagram showing the defence policy process, a dialectical/strategic-relational conceptualisation](adapted from Brighi, 2013, p.37)

**Figure 2. The defence policy process, a dialectical/strategic-relational conceptualisation**

Accordingly, when developing defence policy the Labour government must not only take into account threats from the international environment, but also voter’s defence policy preferences as viewed though British militarism for how to best counter these threats. The strength of the strategic-relational model is that it accounts for strategic actors – in this case the Labour government – being perfectly capable of differentiating between and navigating different levels of strategically selective environments, favouring certain strategies over others depending on what circumstances will allow (Brighi, 2013, p.36). Therefore it was entirely rational for Labour’s overall defence policy to become more conservative in order to gain votes from a broader range of people, while at the same time recognizing that BMD was such a niche issue for most of the British electorate that the strategically selective context gave the government the leeway to go ahead with a policy which prioritized
the considerations of British national security above the opinions of voters, among which there appears to have been latent opposition (CND, 2008c; CND, 2008d; Jenkins-Smith et al., 2004, p.300).

The Labour government’s core defence policy community, particularly the Secretaries of State for Defence, were then able to exercise their agency to suppress the possibility of missile defence becoming a larger and potentially dangerous political issue among the general public and opposed Backbench Labour MPs by making the decisions to integrate RAF Fylingdales and RAF Menwith Hill into the US’s BMD system privately and then presenting those decisions to Parliament as a fait accompli without the possibility for debate (HoC Deb, 2003c, c697; HoC Deb, 2007h, c71-72WS; HoC Deb, 2008b, c345WH; HoC Deb, 2008e, c890).

Once Labour's policy on BMD was enacted it fed back into the international environment, underwriting Britain’s security by strengthening the UK's *Special Relationship* with the US ([2]), and simultaneously reinforcing the Labour government’s ability to enact future *pro-BMD policy decisions* ([1]) in the face of voter’s opposition to that specific issue while making sure to meet their larger pro-defence policy preferences at the same time.

Ultimately, the last Labour government integrated the UK into the US’s BMD plans despite its international divisiveness and its association with American conservativism (although the Clinton administration did much to resurrect missile defence research after the doldrum years of the Bush Sr administration, and Obama normalised BMD more than any preceding President) because, like any government in an anarchical world, it had to place national security foremost in its considerations. By integrating RAF Fylingdales and RAF Menwith Hill into the US’s BMD architecture the UK gained a foothold in an insurance policy that would mature alongside any developing missile threat. This is why Labour had to incorporate BMD into the UK’s security policy. In the final analysis Britain’s place in the structure of international relations and the UK’s need to maintain its alliance with the US was a far more powerful influence on Labour’s integration of BMD into British defence policy than domestic electoral factors. Even though polls revealed that the British public were largely opposed to missile defence, the issue remained a minority concern to all but a committed core of anti-BMD protest groups and so the government could afford to override these latent concerns. However, the potential agency that parliamentarians and the public held to make BMD policy a problem for the Labour
government is revealed by the amount of effort the core defence policy exerted to ensure that BMD remained a minority concern by preventing debate through only presenting missile defence decisions to Parliament after they had been made.

A future Labour government engaging with missile defence policy would most likely be constrained in a similar way to follow US BMD plans in order to uphold the Special Relationship while at the same time minimising parliamentary and public debate on missile defence in order to prevent it becoming an issue of national concern.
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