Enterprise Culture in Higher Education and the Creative Arts: A Study in the Sociology of Critique

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Abstract

This thesis engages with Luc Boltanski and the sociology of critique to provide an account of the role of enterprise culture within the areas of Higher Education and the Creative Arts. In this regard, it makes a case for the ongoing relevance of Luc Boltanski’s work to sociological scholarship and therefore makes an original contribution in this area. In drawing on the conceptual vocabulary developed through *On Justification*, *The New Spirit of Capitalism* and *On Critique*, I explore the state of Higher Education before considering the way discourses of managerialism and entrepreneurialism are enacted through public policy and University mission statements. In focusing attention on a specific area of Higher Education, I work through the consequences of Boltanski and Ève Chiapello’s *The New Spirit of Capitalism* in so far as it relates to the artistic critique. Here I explore the proliferation of an enterprise culture within the Creative Arts and how this is transforming the kinds of critique that exist within the art world, how these critiques are directed at art and art education, and how artists are formulating critiques of capitalism which constitutes a bridge between the social and artist critique.
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Thesis Background, Overview and Objectives

1.0 Introduction

In this thesis I draw from the sociological work of Luc Boltanski to provide an account of the strength and status of enterprise culture in Higher Education and the Creative Arts. In working with the conceptual vocabulary of Boltanski’s sociology, formulated alone and in collaboration with others (Boltanski 2011, Boltanski and Chiapello 2007, Boltanski and Thévenot 1983, 1990, 2006), I aim to articulate the contribution that Boltanski’s sociology makes to these areas. In Part One I therefore focus on the formation of Boltanski’s sociology in dialogue with critical sociology. In Part Two, I work through Higher Education policy, university mission statements and academic and non-academic literature concerning the direction of university level education. These are focused on discourses concerning what a student is (and particularly what makes a great student in accordance with different orders of worth), what universities are for, and what role/s specific actors within universities ought to play to fulfil the objectives laid out in policy and through university publications. I argue that these make up a series of prescriptive literatures (Boltanski and Chiapello 2007: 54), concerned with identifying the correct course of action and providing examples of good practice and appropriate conduct within the Higher Education sector. These also function as literatures that justify strategic decision-making at an institutional level.

In Part Three, I focus greater attention on the Creative Arts, exploring the formation of the artistic entrepreneur (Bridgstock 2011, 2012; Flew 2004, 2012) as one consequence of the artistic critique’s integration into the spirit of capitalism. In addition to considering the formation of new kinds of justification for the Creative Arts within creative industries discourse during the 1990s, I consider the way Creative Arts education has adapted (at least in their public promotional literature) to this language, and have aimed to facilitate the inclusion of entrepreneurship and enterprise into Creative Arts programmes. Within this I will discuss the formation of new alliances between the artistic and social critique in contemporary activist groups in the Creative
Arts, as a means of building on *The New Spirit of Capitalism* thesis in productive ways which aim to ‘politicise employability’ (Precarious Workers Brigade 2017).

1.1 Original contribution

My thesis seeks to build on existing theoretical literature on the sociology of Luc Boltanski in order to demonstrate how this work may continue to contribute to the areas of Higher Education and the Creative Arts. In this way, I make an original contribution to sociological work on the formation of capitalism’s ‘third spirit’ and how this is enacted in various facets of contemporary capitalist formations. My thesis speaks to the interests of several constituencies, including the sociology of education, the Creative Arts, those working on the role of entrepreneurship and enterprise within higher education, and social theory.

1.2 Background: On the Process of Writing this Thesis

Within the original proposal for this thesis, I stated that my aim was to explore how the Creative Arts in English Higher Education engages with discourses of entrepreneurship. This was undertaken in light of the changes to Higher Education policy following the Browne Review (2010) and the growing ambition within public policy to map and evaluate particular courses at particular Higher Education Institutions through graduate earnings (Hillman 2013; McGettigan 2015; Young 2014). Although this broad objective still guides the following thesis, some of the themes, directions and methods have altered considerably since submitting my initial proposal. The first section of this introductory chapter therefore provides a broad outline of this process. A more in-depth discussion of the areas I cover within this chapter will appear throughout the thesis, and I will indicate where.

The following thesis was undertaken with the aim of building on my MA dissertation (entitled ‘Creative Capitalism and the Challenge to Resist Precarious Labour in the Art World’), which was written in the School of Sociology & Social Policy at the University of Leeds as part of my 1+3 MA/PhD programme. This explored how artists discuss their working patterns, as well as how they negotiate, understand and/or resist situations of relative precariousness (Precarious Workers Brigade 2012, Raunig, Ray and Wuggenig 2011, Standing 2011). The theoretical framework drew in part from
post-Marxist and Foucauldian traditions in social theory, in addition to scholarship on post-Fordism, neoliberalism and the emergence of ‘indebted man’ (Rose 1989; Gorz 1999; Lazzarato 1996, 2011). Together these provided a framework for further identifying the interdependence of the economic and cultural processes that had facilitated changes to the structure of capitalism in the 20th century, especially concerning how organizational formations produce subjects who come to see themselves within, and identify with, such formations. However, much of the analysis was primarily guided by Luc Boltanski and Ève Chiapello’s (2007) The New Spirit of Capitalism. As what I saw to be a key text in social theory, The New Spirit of Capitalism provided a way of understanding the development of capitalism’s ‘third spirit’, defined by “the mediating activity of the network” (Boltanski and Chiapello 2007: 107); activity, flexibility, and “the development of oneself and one’s employability” (2007: 111).

Alluding to Max Weber’s (1978) The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, the idea of the ‘third spirit’ of capitalism describes the emergence of a novel justification for engaging in capitalist activity in response to anti-capitalist critique in the middle of the twentieth century formed on the basis of demands for autonomy and individual freedom from bureaucratic, rationalised control. Consistent with Weber's analysis which linked the subjective sources of inspiration for capitalist activity among 17th century Protestant sects to the emergence of entrepreneurial capitalist economic activity (‘first spirit’), Boltanski and Chiapello identify a transition from capitalism’s ‘second spirit’ formed on the basis of life-long employment and security through loyalty to an organisation – what Boltanski and Chiapello identify as the outcome of the social critique of capitalism), to the ‘third spirit’ based on the atomisation and flexibilisation of work in the later decades of the twentieth century. Furthermore, Boltanski and Chiapello (2007) developed this analysis in a way which also spoke to the historical trajectory of art, specifically via the formation of an artist or artistic critique (Chiapello and Fairclough 2002) at the turn of the 20th century and its subsequent neutralisation and absorption into capitalism.

Bypassing the broader set of concepts that make up the pragmatic sociology of critique (but which are developed to a greater extent in this thesis [Chapter Two]) my aim was
to put Boltanski and Chiapello’s (2007) account of the relation between capitalism and the artist critique to the test. To do this, I focused on Boltanski and Chiapello’s (2007) claims concerning the fate of critique in general, in addition to their identification of a failure within the artist critique to present a convincing resistance to what they refer to as ‘connexionist’ or ‘network’ capitalism. Having been co-opted by capitalism, Boltanski and Chiapello (2007: 470–90) argue that the artist critique today is caught between a reactionary nostalgia for the past and a nihilistic (and therefore impotent) denunciation of bourgeois morality and its repression of ‘free-thinking’. It has therefore not properly taken account of how capitalism has since internalised this critique into its own rationality (through consumer culture [Baudrillard 2017, Bauman 1989, 2017, Burton 2012]; the incorporation of the politics of identity [Dean 2016]; the promotion of self-employment as a source of freedom over the expectation of secure employment in an organisation [Gorz 2011], and so on). As such, Boltanski and Chiapello (2007: 487) conclude that those with an interest in the artist critique today would have to rethink the issue of liberation in order to renew a properly anti-capitalist critique that would address the new sources of exploitation arising from its ‘third spirit’.

Although The New Spirit of Capitalism thesis had convincingly outlined the limitations of a critique of capitalism pursued along the lines of autonomy and freedom, I nevertheless felt that in doing so Boltanski and Chiapello (2007) had inadequately addressed the form, direction and content of critique pursued within and among workers in the contemporary art world. How critique emerges as a concrete undertaking by artists in situations of relative precarity (Forkert 2013, McRobbie and Forkert 2009; Precarious Workers Brigade 2013; 2017) does not appear as an object of considerable concern in The New Spirit of Capitalism, and as such, their presentation of art had perhaps limited their ability to say something significant about the relationship between art and capitalism in contemporary social formations.

In this regard, I aimed to build on Maurizio Lazzarato’s (2011) critical observation that the artist critique as formulated by Boltanski and Chiapello (2007), although potentially relevant to describing the idealistic aspirations of the so-called creative classes in the tech and advertising industries (cf. Andrew Ross’s No-collar: The Hidden Cost Of The Humane Workplace [2004] and Nice Work if You Can Get It [2009]; Richard Florida’s
[2000] *The Rise of the Creative Class*, has little to do with the way artists live and work. Rather, according to Lazzarato (2011, 2012) a competitive entrepreneurial ethic has been imposed upon workers within the creative industries, in addition to wide swathes of groups experiencing greater levels of insecurity through the growing prevalence of temporary, part-time work (Standing 2011, Gray 2004). Against the grain of Boltanski and Chiapello’s thesis, Lazzarato (2011: 43) highlights the slogan of the *Coordination des Intermittents et Précaires* in France: “No culture without social rights”. This statement, which Lazzarato (2011: 43) translates as “no freedom, autonomy, authenticity (culture) without solidarity, equality, security (social rights)”, presented a strong challenge to the distinction between the two “comparatively incompatible” (Boltanski and Chiapello 2007: xiii) styles of critique outlined in *The New Spirit of Capitalism*, and as such undermined, or at the very least troubled, their account of the fate of critique as a collective activity in the art world and beyond today.

In considering how artists aim to forge a compromise between these two critiques, I explored this issue empirically through undertaking interviews with artists across the UK, including representatives of *Artists Union England*. Through these I attempted to assemble evidence that would build on Boltanski and Chiapello’s (2008) argument concerning the fate of the artist critique within the art world, whilst considering Lazzarato’s trenchant critique of Boltanski and Chiapello’s thesis. Through semi-structured interviews, I found that there exists a tense relationship between different ideas of artistic work, what challenges exist within the sphere, and how artists aim to confront them at the micro and macro level. My participants outlined how they attempted to forge a compromise in their working practices between conflicting notions of good work. For example, my participants discussed the attempt to keep to a more traditional work routine – as it gave their work the character of a ‘real’ job as well as a more stable boundary between work and non-work time which was helpful when providing invoices and setting payment rates – and the difficulty of doing so. At the same time, they also welcomed the more flexible approach to working, where time in

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1 As representatives within the creative industries, I also asked *Carrot Workers Collective* and the *Precarious Workers Brigade* to participate, but was consistently informed that they did not speak as individual representatives; only as anonymous collectives through public communiqués and publications. As such interviews would not be possible nor fruitful from their perspective.
the studio overlapped with time spent hanging out with friends or reading in a coffee shop, attending exhibitions, and where the boundary between work and non-work became increasingly blurred. In this sense their working lives were considered liberating, and the idea of doing a ‘normal’ job was profoundly distasteful. In addition to this, there was also an identification of the high levels of stress and anxiety that come with working in the art world, due in part to financial insecurity and the intensity of competition (cf. Forkert 2013), as well as a kind of existential insecurity about one’s professional identity, even among those who would otherwise be characterised as broadly successful as they had been the recipients of prizes, artist residencies and scholarships.

These statements were indicative of what Alison Bain and Heather McLean (2012: 97) have called artist’s “schizophrenic consciousness” and express the tension-laden dynamics of working within the Creative Arts. These not only revealed the circumstances my participants found themselves in within the Creative Arts, but also embodied and further illuminated a series of core sociological tensions, foremost among these being the dynamics of ‘structure’ and ‘agency’ (Giddens 1979), that is to say the capacity to be able to have some degree of control over one’s circumstances whilst nevertheless being thoroughly aware of the situatedness of one’s actions. Indeed, as we discussed in interviews and focus groups, this indicated that merely enhancing one’s own knowledge of circumstances does not inevitably lead to a transformation in the conditions which define a collective experience, nor an immediate translation into the practical process of changing these circumstances.

This was certainly evident when considering how the aforementioned issues might be addressed or resolved. Our discussions involved the need for informal support mechanisms in which artists could share experiences, discuss how to negotiate payment rates, and identify galleries and individuals with good or bad working practices. This was something their education in art had not prepared them for, and instead arose from an informal process of ‘leaning by doing’ (cf. Bauer et al 2011; Chapter Seven), leading to one younger participant to describe the process of leaving college and entering the art world as a considerable shock. Feelings about their futures, and the possibility of achieving these aims, vacillated between fatalism in the face of capitalism
and an optimism that more formal collective protections will someday emerge from the growth of co-operative movements. Among those involved with activism, one particular issue was how to unionise collectives who often see themselves, and are treated within the job market, in individualistic terms. Across these discussions the building of a compromise between the language of the *social critique* and that of the *artistic critique* was considered a practical task and not only a linguistic one (i.e. involving the construction of a theoretical vocabulary to not only denounce but overcome injustice), even if it did pose considerable challenges when faced with the strength of individualism and competition as dominant values within the art world (Forkert 2013).

The research I undertook at MA level left open a number of interesting avenues to explore further in a PhD thesis, and my thinking on this issue became increasingly oriented around a question that had been asked by Angela McRobbie (2015b) concerning the possibly ‘emancipatory’ role that enterprise and entrepreneurship may play in the arts, in particular as it aimed to neutralise or overcome some of the more individualistic and romantic notions of art through by demystifying the idea of art as some kind of asocial, luxury activity. By emancipatory here, I mean some horizon of possibility beyond one’s immediate circumstances which promise a higher level of agency in the ability to wrest control of one’s circumstances. As Zygmunt Bauman (2000: 86) aptly puts the problem: “To understand one's fate means to be aware of its difference from one's destiny. And to understand one's fate is to know the complex network of causes that brought that fate. To work in the world (as distinct from 'worked out and about' by it) one needs to know how the world works”.

Nevertheless, entrepreneurship has often been understood as involving the toxic expansion of a neoliberal rationality into a greater number of areas of everyday life, reducing human behaviour to pure economic judgement (Forkert 2013). In this sense it constitutes an effect of Weber’s claims concerning the emergence and spread of *zweckrationalität* (instrumental-rationality) as the organising principle of modernity, involving the reduction of human values to cold calculation. Similar also to Jürgen Habermas’s (1989) thesis on the encroachment of the *system* onto the *life-world*, entrepreneurship might well be considered as one such aspect of the process, being a vehicle through which mechanisms conducive to the *system* may proliferate and stamp
out creativity. This constitutes the broad focus of writers who appear across *Semiotext(e)* and related publications, including Gerald Raunig (2013), ‘Bifo’ Berardi (2009) and Paulo Virno (2003). For them, artistic labour and entrepreneurship are considered as oppositional and truly incompatible activities (Cunningham, 2015).

As will be shown throughout this thesis, entrepreneurship is a term which has become increasingly attached to creative labour (Anderson et al 2011; Leadbeater 2001; Leadbeater and Oakley 1999; McRobbie 2015a), and the consequences have been an attempt to further separate creative workers through an individualising ethos of self-improvement and skills development. However, introducing a greater degree of *uncertainty* into the expansion of entrepreneurship, McRobbie (2015b: no pagination) asks whether this will lead to a disavowal of social and collective engagements of the type that have historically been associated with organised labour—and more widely, with social democracy—in favour of sheer self-interest. Or might new forms of organisation emerge which support the idea of welfare and social protection inside precarious creative work? Or might it be the case that creative labour can be put to social use—for example in pioneering radical social enterprises rather than simply going along with the idea of the ‘social business model’?

In this reading, artists are considered capable of negotiating their positions within the art world with a more critical eye; not merely reacting to changes but taking an active part in the construction of building their creative careers, and in ways which contest the dominant vocabulary and practices of neoliberalism. In this regard, those in the Creative Arts were considered capable of resisting and undermining, and not only adjusting to, changing expectations concerning what an artist should and could be. These are not only scholarly issues, however, but also informed the kinds of questions being asked by artists and creative workers themselves (Precarious Workers Brigade 2012; Artist Network; Beech 2015), in addition to those concerned with the central contemporary problems of Creative Arts and Creative Arts education (Giuffre 1999; Lippard 1996 [1981]; Pollock 1996 [1985/86]; Thompson 2005; UNESCO 2006; Tickner 2008; McRobbie and Forkert 2009). Although the perspective I present is perhaps not as optimistic as the one McRobbie (2015b) proposes – due in part to some limitations in research methods which I outline below – she nevertheless opens up questions about
how enterprise and entrepreneurship are engaged with in a more indeterminate way, even in situations where the influence of neoliberal styles of thought are arguably much more pronounced, and more deeply institutionalised.

I found that universities provided an important way of exploring the tension between the autonomy and freedom associated with creative work and the growing hegemony of an enterprise culture. Education has undergone a radical transformation in the last several decades (Silver 1998, McGettigan 2013, 2015, Brown and Carasso 2014), with graduate employability, enterprise and entrepreneurship, alongside processes of financialisation, coming to possess a considerably high status within discussions on the meaning of universities (Glover, Law and Youngman 2002; Hillman 2013; McGettigan 2013). In public justifications of universities, Higher Education is understood in broadly economic terms, with public policy devoted to a vision of education as human capital investment (McGettigan 2015). The grounds on which justifications of universities are formed therefore prioritise their economic role, principally understood as the only way of ensuring human flourishing (Biesta 2009, Blundell et al 1999, Collini 2012, 2017 Evans 2003, Holmwood 2017, McGettigan 2015, Peters 2001, Williams 1997). This is expressed through higher graduate earnings, the achievement of a top 100, or better yet top 10, position in University league tables, positive data on self-employment, and evidence of a contribution to economic growth and civic engagement. From the critical literature, University facilities, schools and departments are adopting to new regimes, and forging justifications which align with the discourse of the day (Collini 2017).

Still, it is worth noting the persistence of definitions and defences of university education within the public sphere which are not necessarily reducible to processes of financialisation and marketisation. My intention here is not to argue that marketisation has become so overwhelming that alternative visions of universities have disappeared entirely. As will be discussed further in Part Two, notably Chapter Five, universities

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2 By hegemony I have in mind Stuart Hall’s (1988: 7) description of hegemony as “the struggle to contest and dis-organize an existing political formation; the taking of the ‘leading position’ (on however minority a basis) over a number of different spheres at once – economy, civil society, intellectual and moral life, culture; the conduct of a wide and differentiated type of struggle; the winning of a strategic measure of popular consent; and, thus, the securing of a social authority sufficiently deep to confirm society into a new historic project”.

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undoubtedly still perceive themselves as being areas of disinterested scientific inquiry, and as having a strong historic role in the formation of civic and critically minded alumni. Still, as will be shown, the insistence on framing universities through the language of the market has made it harder for such definitions to gain a more prominent role in articulating what universities are for (Collini 2013). Indeed, the dominant presence of marketised language presented an opportunity to consider how such processes are unfolding in the area of the Creative Arts; and how Creative Arts programmes are forming justifications within a more heavily financialised and managerial culture (Howkins 2001; Universities UK 2010; Bridgstock 2013).

In the aftermath of my dissertation I returned to some key aspects of Boltanski and Chiapello’s (2008) thesis. In subsequent readings, I felt that I had not adequately addressed the formation of the sociology of critique, and the important insight into questions of moral economies, justificatory regimes and rational motivations for engaging with capitalism (cf. Hirschman 1977; Walzer 1987; Weber 1978). Nor had I considered more fully what these might contribute to my research. At this time, William Davies had also published The Limits of Neoliberalism (2014), which had drawn on some aspects of Boltanski and Chiapello (2007), in addition to the related ‘convention theorists’ (particularly Michel Callon’s [1998] edited collection, Laws of the Markets), in a way that proved fruitful for describing the emergence of a particular kind of justificatory regime within what Phillip Mirowski (2014) has elsewhere called “the Neoliberal Thought Collective”. Here Davies (2014) argues for an interpretation of neoliberalism which foregrounds its role in the shaping of self-understanding, and the creation of a language through which reality can be judged, criticised and tested in accordance with a vision of a common humanity (Davies’ also questions the extent to which this can be pursued through purely non-violent, discursive means, something this thesis is not able to address). In this sense, it takes into account how objects are judged, and how principles of equivalence between things are formed, maintained or indeed criticised. Likewise, Martijn Konings (2015) would also focus on the way capitalism integrates emotions, morality, faith and power into its logic, therefore giving people a motivation for engaging with capitalism beyond pure survival.¹

¹ A greater focus on these issues appears throughout Chapter Two and Chapter Three.
In undertaking this thesis after encountering *The New Spirit of Capitalism* with this body of literature in mind my aim was two-fold. First of all I would provide an analysis of publicly available literature on universities. Drawing on Luc Boltanski’s (Boltanski and Thévenot 2006; Boltanski 2011) approach to the sociology of critique, I would consider how these make appeals to the common good, or offer some kind of normative direction for universities. In forming a vocabulary through which universities as a whole define themselves, I would then pursue interviews with those who worked in Creative Arts education, including those who worked alongside Creative Arts disciplines to enact employability and enterprise initiatives. This included people in careers services and enterprise centres, in addition to the leaders of Creative Arts programmes with an emphasis on some kind of civic engagement. Participants were to be recruited through emails, and I received ethical approval for this in 2015. The aim was to explore how figures in this area engage with and understand entrepreneurship and enterprise culture in the process of forming programmes and interventions developed to increase the employability of Creative Arts students.

The actual process of recruitment itself proved to be more challenging than I had initially anticipated. In writing my dissertation, I had found recruitment to be a broadly smooth process and through a snowball technique followed the threads that my participants left for me; emailing contacts that had been suggested to me during interviews, or were recommended in subsequent correspondence. I also had the benefit of knowing people within the art scene in and around Leeds, and was therefore able to draw on these networks to expand the pool of potential participants. However, by the middle of the second year of my PhD I had conducted only three interviews with people relevant to the research. Several potential participants withdrew from the research before interviews were able to be arranged, and response rates from the emails I sent out were overall lower than anticipated. The reasons for this are, I would speculate, a combination of poor organisational skills and bad luck. Nevertheless, the result was that I ended up having to abandon this as a research method. Although I have attempted to allude to some elements of the interviews I managed to undertake in this thesis, the low number of participants required the use of other kinds of data, and a change in the research focus.
In this regard, my supervisors and I made the decision to pursue a kind of discourse / documentary analysis of the literature assembled, that is, policy documents and promotional literature within Higher Education including mission statements. This meant that the empirical component, which had planned to consider the pragmatic and critical process of integrating employability agendas into Creative Arts disciplines, would become a considerably less central part of the thesis than I had originally hoped. It also limited the extent to which I could pursue Boltanski’s style of sociology further, and in ways that could emphasise the critical competences of actors (Boltanski and Thévenot 1999). The resulting thesis is the consequence of a process of pragmatically adjusting to new expectations concerning what the thesis would be capable of. However, it nevertheless leaves open the possibility of future research. What follows therefore is an engagement with mission statements, promotional literature and policy statements, concerning Higher Education in general (Part Two) and the Creative Arts in particular (Part Three), read and interpreted through the conceptual vocabulary outlined in Boltanski and Laurent Thévenot’s work on socio-professional categories and critical competences (Boltanski and Thévenot 1983), the work on orders of worth in On Justification (Boltanski and Thévenot 1999, 2006), the thesis on the relation between capitalism and its critiques outlined in The New Spirit of Capitalism (Boltanski and Chiapello 2007); and the formulation of different registers of critique in On Critique (Boltanski 2011), in addition to related literature on the formation of capitalism in the latter half of the twentieth century from other prominent figures in sociology and social theory.

1.3 Why Luc Boltanski?

Luc Boltanski appears to be a somewhat neglected figure within sociology in Britain. Anthony Giddens’ (2017) Sociology textbooks make no reference to Boltanski’s work, nor does Giddens’s and Phillip Sutton’s (2017) Essential Concepts in Sociology. Likewise, John Holmwood and John Scott’s (2014) The Palgrave Handbook of Sociology in Britain features only one brief mention of the pragmatic sociology of critique. Although these literatures may appear irrelevant from a certain perspective – being the focus more of A-Level and undergraduate study rather than key reference points in contemporary scholarship – they nevertheless function as important surveys of
the field of the discipline and form important components in the formation of University
modules which train students in sociology, social theory and social research. Therefore,
the omission seems pertinent in terms of how the sociological field is understood, and
its important contributors assembled and institutionalised.

On a more autobiographical note, I was struck by how little of an impact Boltanski’s
work had made in my own School, or other Schools of Sociology in Britain, as well as
across the British Sociological Association (BSA) and their annual conferences. When
exploring the contribution of French sociologists, our reading lists were dominated by
the figures of Michel Foucault, Pierre Bourdieu and Jean Baudrillard, and it was only
half-way into my MA studies that I came across *The New Spirit of Capitalism* when
browsing a University bookshop. I do not wish to speculate too much on the reasons for
this omission, or to provide a detailed account of the history of canonisation in British
sociology. As William Outhwaite (2009) notes, the formation of the canon within
British sociology and social theory has prioritised the works of Pierre Bourdieu,
Anthony Giddens and Ulrich Beck, and both research and teaching activities in the
discipline have been heavily informed by this strand of social theorising.

Peter Wagner (2012: 57) offers up a compelling case as to why the sociology of critique
has been side-lined within mainstream British sociology, arguing that the sociology of
critique has often had a tendency to be presented – and also to present itself – as “an
alternative to critical sociology”. In this regard, the sociology of critique and critical
sociology are considered as pursuing fundamentally divergent routes in sociology (cf.
Latour 2005: 141–158) without the possibility of cross-over. The result has been,
according to Wagner (2012: 57), the severing of “the ties between what one might
rightly call two of the most important groups of social theorists and sociologists in
France”.\(^4\)

There is nevertheless a large body of scholarship that exists on Boltanski’s work, and
which situates his sociology within broader discussions of modernity and capitalism.
Peter Wagner (1999, 2012, 2014), Francois Dosse (1999), and Simon Susen and Bryan

\(^4\) Boltanski is of course not unique in this regard, and there are large areas within
sociology’s history that do not appear in mainstream sociology curricula. Similar, and
no less convincing claims, have been made about the work, for example, of Norbert
Elias (Kilminster 2007), W.E.B Du Bois, and Gabriel Tarde (Law and Lybeck 2015)
S. Turner’s (2014) edited collection, *The Spirit of Luc Boltanski*, have provided excellent surveys of Boltanski’s work. *The Spirit of Luc Boltanski* in particular constitutes a rich source of theoretical engagements with Boltanski’s oeuvre, situating the formation of the pragmatic sociology of critique alongside related figures within the social sciences such as Bruno Latour (2005), Michel Callon (1998), and Paul Ricoeur (1981). Paul Blokker’s (2011) special edition too represents a fruitful source of analysis of Boltanski’s work. From a historical point of view, Francois Dosse (1999) has articulated how the emergence of the sociology of critique was formed through the entrance of ethnomethodology, hermeneutics, and American pragmatism into France, and how this engagement led to a re-framing of questions posed within the classical sociological tradition, critical sociology, and political and moral philosophy (Rawls 1971, Walzer 1987). This last connection with the work of Michael Walzer has been pursued somewhat further by William Davies (2014; Davies and Dunne 2016), who has aimed to bring Boltanski and Chiapello’s work into a greater dialogue with works of moral economy (Stark 2009; Stark 2017), and how they help illuminate the *order of worth* that underpins the neoliberal view of the world.

Although I have not been able to engage with this literature to the full extent that it deserves, I believe these nevertheless deserve sustained reflection within Schools of Sociology in the UK. In contributing to this, I aim to bring some elements of these theoretical discussions into sociological research, and in doing so contribute to the process of exploring how Boltanski’s *pragmatic sociology of critique* might enrich empirical studies in the areas of Higher Education and the Creative Arts.

### 1.4 An Overview of Literature Consulted

The sociology of critique makes up an important set of concepts when considering Higher Education and the Creative Arts. However, these do not make up my only reference points in social theory. Throughout my thesis I consult a wide-range of literature; aiming to engage with and integrate scholarship from the Foucauldian, Deleuzian and post-Foucauldian field of governmentality studies (Dean 1994, 1996; Donzelot 1991; Ewald 1990; Foucault 1992, 2000, 2002; Lazzarato 1996; 2011; Power 1996; Rose 1999, 2006); the literature on contemporary accounts of neoliberalism and subjectivity (Brown 2015; Davies 2014; Konings 2015); and also the new ways of
working which have been ushered in by socio-economic transformations associated with post-Fordism and cognitive capitalism (Berardi 2009; Gorz 1999, 2010; Lazzarato 2011; Moulier-Boutang 2011). These are drawn on as more or less complementary accounts of capitalism in the latter half of the twentieth century, and allow for a wider engagement with how, as Boltanski and Chiapello (2007: 432) explicitly state, “new forms of management are integrated with novel forms of control”.

In approaching issues of capitalism and entrepreneurship, I cover Boltanski and Chiapello’s *New Spirit of Capitalism* as a primary text that guides my understanding of these areas, with a particular focus on the formation of the *projective order*. In addition to this, I make use of the work of Martijn Konings (2015) on the emotional logic of capitalism, and integrate his understanding of adjustments to capitalism on the basis of pragmatic ordering (cf. Boltanski and Chiapello 2007). Here I also consult the wide swathe of literature on post-Fordism and related theories of capitalist change in the late twentieth century (Gorz 1999, 2011). My main conceptual reference points here, however, are in relation neoliberalism, and as such I refer to Foucault’s (2012) *Birth of Biopolitics* lectures, in addition to William Davies’s (2014) *Limits of Neoliberalism*. These help in outlining the formation of a *neoliberal philosophical anthropology* (Davies 2014). Within the areas of education and creative industries policy the terms human capital, enterprise, entrepreneurship, and competition are foregrounded to a large extent. As such, neoliberalism constitutes a valid way of conceptualising some of these issues.

In order to understand the situation of Higher Education, I have drawn on a selection of primary works within areas that cover policy and sociological issues within this area (Allen and Ainley 2008; Coffield 1990; Holt 1987; Jonathan 1983; Radice 2013; Raven 1989; Wolpe and Donald 1983). These do not provide a complete survey of this period, but nevertheless provide a way of capturing the changing culture of educational discourse between the 1970s and the present day. In particular, I concentrate on literature that engages within the enterprise culture of the 1980s, and how it gave birth to new mechanisms that facilitated closer connections between education and industry. In building on this in my analysis of mission statements I draw on a set of existing literatures which have pursued analyses of mission statements within and outside of
universities (Ayers 2005; Morphew and Hartley 2006). There is not a great body of work on mission statements within sociology, however, so in this sense I aim to provide an original contribution to sociological studies of promotional literatures within Higher Education.

In order to grasp the literature on creative industries, I have relied on some of the interpretations of Mark Banks (2006; Banks and Hesmondhalgh 2009), Charles Leadbeater (1999; Leadbeater and Oakley 2000), Angela McRobbie (2015a, 2015b; McRobbie and Forkert 2009) and Robert Hewison (2014). These present what I would describe as a strong summative accounts of creative industries discourse. These also do the work of providing confirmations of creative industries policy, and as part of NESTA, also provide insight into the proliferation of an understanding of creative labour which aims to implement knowledge economy discourse (Oakley, Sperry and Pratt 2008). Much of this overlaps with discussions of art education, and I draw on a limited but fruitful set of readings (Pollock 1996 [1988]; Singerman 1999; 2012; Tickner 2008) that help situate contemporary discussions of the Creative Arts and Creative Arts education. However, my main focus here is on areas which aim to promote the role of entrepreneurship education in the arts, and I consider the manner in which this is framed (Bauer et al 2011; Bourner et al 2008; Bridgstock 2012).

1.5 Research Questions and Chapter Outline

The following thesis has emerged from an iterative process of working between the aforementioned scholarship and the questions that emerged from it and which guide my interpretation of the literature presented. The questions that structure this research are as follows:

1. How does the work of Boltanski contribute to an understanding of enterprise cultures? If so, how can this be pursued? In what way does it speak to or

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5 One particular issue here is that Boltanski’s œuvre has unarguably moved through distinct phases: a first phased marked by co-authored works with his mentor Pierre Bourdieu (see Susen 2014b); an explicitly post-Bourdiesuan phase in the 1990s which saw the embrace of pragmatism alongside the work of critique as an activity undertaken by actors in situations of uncertainty (Boltanski and Thévenot 2006 [1991]; Fowler 2014), and which led the development of the six orders of worth outlined in On
complement existing accounts of enterprise culture in the areas of Higher Education and the Creative Arts?

2. How do Universities present themselves to different stakeholders in ways that aim to justify strategic decisions and adjustments to new definitions of reality? Peter Wagner (2014) describes the existence of a number of orders of worth within Universities. In this regard, to what extent are these present in mission statements?

3. How do Boltanski and Chiapello (2007 [1999]) account for the emergence of an artistic critique and is it possible to see the realisation of this in the discourse of the Creative Industries as a circumvention of the critique of enterprise culture?

4. Are there signs of the new spirit of capitalism within English art education? How do they manifest themselves through public literatures?

5. Finally, how are those in the Creative Arts aiming to politicise concepts of employability? Is it possible to see an alignment of the artistic and social critiques as practical activities with the art world?

Each chapter is a way of engaging with these questions. To pursue the questions outlined above, I therefore present an outline of the chapters, and what each aims to contribute to the overall aims and objectives of the thesis. I return to this in the conclusion in order to reflect on how they have been addressed.

**Part One** is oriented around the work of Luc Boltanski in relation to sociology and critiques of capitalism. **Chapter Two** will therefore outline the sociology of critique as it appears in the work of Boltanski. I argue that the sociology of critique offers an interesting challenge and contribution to the sociological tradition. I cover the conceptual vocabulary outline in *On Justification* (2006 [1991]), the *New Spirit of Capitalism* (2007 [1999]) and *On Critique* (2011). In this regard, I focus on the concept of *tests, orders of worth, critique, uncertainty*, and place these into a productive dialogue with related sociological accounts of reality. Within this chapter I also consider how this broad set of concepts underpins the argument in *The New Spirit of Capitalism*. I use the analysis provided by Boltanski and Chiapello as a way of framing my

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*Justification*; and a third, more recent phase of scholarship tinged with ethical and political reflections on capitalism and suffering.
understanding of the development of capitalism over the twentieth century, in particular how the strength and status of critiques of capitalism are dialectically absorbed into capitalism in order to justify engagement with its central processes. Here I focus on the formation of the projective order; the seventh city developed by Boltanski and Chiapello, and which constitutes a synthesis of several orders of worth outlined in On Justification.6

I build on this in Chapter Three, which covers in greater detail the expansion of an enterprise culture in the UK in addition to works on neoliberalism, post-Fordism and cognitive capitalism, and places them into what I hope is a productive dialogue with The New Spirit of Capitalism. William Davies’s The Limits of Neoliberalism as well as Martijn Konings function as important ways to achieve this. I also integrate the work of Michel Foucault (1997, 2000, 2013), Michael Power (1996), and Pierre Dardot and Christian Laval (2013) as a means of developing the conceptual vocabulary of capitalism’s spirit further and in ways that manage to integrate non-rational or non-discursive processes, Here I argue that enterprise and entrepreneurship have been more ordinary aspects of modern self-understanding, with work and life undergoing a change in relation which promotes a neoliberal image of the actor as human capital.

This becomes particularly important when considering the engagement with managerial cultures and discourses of employability within Higher Education. Chapter Four therefore begins Part Two of the thesis, which situates the conceptual vocabulary and articulation of capitalism’s ‘third spirit’ within the context of education. Education remains a much-neglected aspect of Luc Boltanski’s sociology, and Boltanskian scholarship more generally. Nevertheless, within this chapter I propose to outline the idea of student greatness as defined through vocabulary which pits traditional against

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6 Throughout the thesis I use ‘orders of worth’ as opposed to ‘cities’ or ‘justificatory regimes’. The reason is more practical than anything else. I have no commitment to a particular translation, however as orders are more commonly used within translations this is what I will be using. Another, slightly less scholarly, reason is the result of teaching Boltanski in 2018, where I found that speaking with students about ‘orders’ rather than ‘cities’ made considerably more sense, considering the latter refers to a bounded geographical space and the former refers more explicitly to a set of normative criteria for evaluation the worth of objects, things, people and so on. Likewise, the translation of épreuves remains throughout the thesis as tests, however this is more so because it is most commonly translation as such.
modern educational imperatives. Bauman describes the student of ‘liquid modernity’ in terms of the smart missile. In pursuing policy literature, I build on this metaphor through an engagement with the work of Bourner et al and Gerrard, and also examine employability discourse in relation to changes within higher education policy since the 1970s. **Chapter Five** constructs an interpretation of mission statements. Here I pursue an analysis of the projective order further, drawing on mission statements from 16 English universities. I consider the justification of what a university ought to do; what the contemporary landscape of higher education is composed of; and how appeals to a vision of the public good which foreground employability are made. This constitutes the end of **Part Two** of my thesis.

**In Part Three,** I pursue a more thorough investigation of specific articulations of enterprise within the area of the Creative Arts. This requires a reconsideration of the artistic critique, and its expansion through the discourse of the creative industries, and makes up the focus of **Chapter Six**. This makes up another facet of my engagement with *The New Spirit of Capitalism*: that is to say, the fate of the artistic critique. The aim is to focus down on a particular discipline which has been subject to discourse of entrepreneurship, undergoing alterations in how it is understood; and how the artistic critique has returned back to the art world as a method for describing the activities of artists in the terms of the projective order. Here I cover justifications for the continued public support of creative activities, and I explore how creativity became further encompassed within the knowledge economy as an aspect of the enterprise culture

**Chapter Seven** pursues this further, and considers the way in which artists are defined as entrepreneurs, and what role education ought to be play in facilitating entrepreneurship education. Like **Chapter Five**, I draw on some statements from art departments to consider the engagement with these ideas; and how they are integrated into the public presentation of these Schools. Within this, I also reformulate some of the arguments I made in my MA dissertation, in as much as they are relevant to this thesis. I consider here how artists are reconfiguring their labour, and how creative workers present an opposition to entrepreneurship through the formation of new kinds of critique.
PART ONE
The New Spirit of Capitalism
Chapter Two

*The “Pragmatic Sociology of Critique”*

2.0 Introduction

In the following chapter I outline the conceptual contours of an approach to discussions of enterprise, entrepreneurship and employability in the areas of Higher Education and the Creative Arts, introducing Luc Boltanski’s sociology of critique. In providing an overview of Boltanski’s sociology, my aim is to situate Boltanski in the context of social theory more generally (including the consequences of the dispute with Bourdieu’s [1980, 1984] critical sociology), as well as outline the series of concepts pursued throughout works such as *On Justification* (Boltanski and Thévenot 2006) and *On Critique* (2011), identifying how these are developed within the analysis of capitalism’s ‘third spirit’ in *The New Spirit of Capitalism* (Boltanski and Chiapello 2007). In addition to *critique*, I therefore also cover *orders of worth*, the approach to and definition of *institutions* (in relation to the issue of *simple* and *complex domination*), and the formation of *reality, truth* and *existential tests*. Central also are the themes of *uncertainty* and *hermeneutic contradiction*. Within this chapter, I do not aim to present a chronological account of the development of Boltanski’s sociology, nor do I present what could be considered a comprehensive account of Boltanski’s work to date, taken as a coherent system of thought. There are therefore undoubtedly omissions in this presentation. For example, *The Foetal Condition: A Sociology of Engendering and Abortion* (2013), *Love and Justice as Competences* (2012) and the more recent *Enrichissement. Une critique de la merchandise* (2017), are not covered in the detail they potentially deserve.

In addition to this, some aspects of the critiques of Boltanski developed by Louis Quéré and Cédric Terzi (2014), Axel Honneth (2010) and Simon Susen (2014; 2016) are not pursued as far as they could be. Honneth (2010), for example, makes the claim that Boltanski and Thévenot’s *pragmatic sociology of critique* abandons the project of critical theory in pursuit of a more descriptive analysis formed around the empirically questionable concept of *orders of worth*. Likewise, Quéré and Terzi (2014) appear to contest the basis for Boltanski’s claims to have developed a *pragmatic* approach to the
question of critique at all; and Susen (2014) considers the consequences of the somewhat conceptually weak formation of institution in On Critique (see also Browne 2014: ). Indeed, there is certainly enough evidence to question Boltanski’s claims to developing a properly ‘pragmatic’ approach within sociology. It is not a work free of tensions. There are elements of these evaluations of Boltanski’s sociology that I engage with and aim to build upon, however, and I will therefore cover some parts of these as I work through my description of Boltanski. However, my main focus will be on areas that are pertinent to the rest of the thesis and will lead into the second half of this chapter where I cover The New Spirit of Capitalism. Here I explore the fate of critique within what Boltanski and Chiapello (2007) refer to as the projective order, describing how it encompasses a managerial form of domination which presents actors with a world they no longer know how to interpret and therefore limits the possibility of forging critiques and enacting change (Boltanski 2011). A more sustained discussion of this text in relation to existing scholarship on capitalism, neoliberalism and post-Fordism will be carried out in Chapter Three, where I build on The New Spirit of Capitalism thesis to explore literature on and related to enterprise culture (Wolpe and Donald 1983; Coffield 1990; Keat and Abercrombie 1991; du Gay 2008; Cremin 2009).

2.1 The Critique of Sociology and the Sociology of Critique

According to Bruno Latour (2005), the main focus of sociology is to scrutinise things that are taken for granted and which make up the domain of common sense. Indeed, as Zygmunt Bauman (1990: 15) asserts, sociology acts as a “meddlesome and often irritating stranger”, asking questions that are not ordinarily asked of everyday reality and turning the self-evidence of common behaviours and things into “puzzles”. It in this sense that sociology, according to Bauman (1990: 15), aims to “de-familiarise the familiar” (Bauman 1990: 15), and in doing so to expose the contingency of how our daily lives are structured as well as assist in opening up the possibility of considering how life could be different. In short, the sociologist aims at demystification (Stengers 2015: 18–20), out of which emancipation is said to potentially follow (Bauman 1976).

In pursuit of this project, sociology aims towards the identification of social forces and processes which transcend the specific actions or perceptions of any one actor and instead define the identity of a collective. Sociology therefore challenges what Norbert
Elias (1978) has defined as egocentric models of humanity, and instead emphasises a perspective of society which foregrounds the interdependence of human beings, both spatially and temporally. Sociology therefore works towards the identification and elaboration of concepts which account for the formation of supra-individual entities, how they direct human action and form social relations (Durkheim 1966).

There is a sense in which Boltanski’s work can be described as recognisably sociological in the manner described above, in that he is concerned “with the systematic investigation of the nature of the social”, and therefore despite not being a strictly relational sociologist in the sense of examining the relations which bind people together, pursues an analysis of “the modern world […] in terms of the constitution and evolution of social relations” (Susen 2014: 175). Nevertheless, as part of this undertaking, Boltanski aims to alter the more dominant perspective within both what Latour (2005) refers to as the sociology of the social, as well as critical sociology (Boltanski 2011), and which is exemplified by the work of his mentor and collaborator, Pierre Bourdieu.

In its place, Boltanski foregrounds a pragmatic sociology of critique. This would see a greater focus on the critical competences of actors, and introduce a larger degree of uncertainty into what had become the security that had been formed within sociology on the basis of a split between the scholarly knowledge of science and the common-sense behaviours of ordinary actors. In this regard Boltanski was part of a sea change within the French social sciences throughout the 1980s and 90s. Through the incorporation of process philosophy and American pragmatism via Giles Deleuze (2004; Deleuze and Guattari 1984), the hermeneutics of Paul Ricoeur (1981) and Harold Garfinkel’s (2002) ethnomethodology, French sociology would see figures such as Michel Callon (1998), Bruno Latour (1987) and Laurent Thévenot (1979) formulate a move further away from the dominant claims of critical sociology (from Durkheim to Bourdieu) and a prioritisation of heterogeneity, difference and innovation (Dosse 1999, Browne 2014, Susen 2014; Fowler 2014).7

7 In this regard, Deleuze and Guattari (240–241) outline the difference between Emile Durkheim and Gabriel Tarde: “Durkheim’s preferred objects of study were the great collective representations, which are generally binary, resonant and overcoded. Tarde countered that collective representations presuppose exactly what needs explaining, namely “the similarity of millions of people”. This is why Tarde was instead interested
There is certainly evidence to suggest that the distinction between the two sociological approaches, and their representative figures (in this case Bourdieu and Boltanski) is somewhat over-emphasised (Susen 2014b; Wagner 2012: 57). Susen (2014b) for instance makes the case for a reunion of Boltanski and Bourdieu based on their 1976 article ‘Le production de l’ideologie dominant’ (‘The production of the dominant ideology’) (Bourdieu and Boltanski 1976). Louis Quéré and Cedric Terzi (2014) also suggest, albeit from a more critical angle, that Boltanski didn’t stray too far from critical sociology, and rather retained many of the assumptions of critical sociology. These are issues that unfortunately go beyond the scope of the current thesis, and require a more sustained engagement with elements of the traditions from which both Bourdieu and Boltanski emerged. However, I acknowledge these simply because I do not wish to present the difference between Bourdieu and Boltanski as a choice which necessitates the elimination of the other’s sociology.

Still, this distinction is important for understanding where Boltanski’s work departed from Bourdieu. This dispute is clearly outlined by both Thomas Bénatouil (1999) and Peter Wagner (1999), who have shown the divergent paths taken in French social science in the latter half of the twentieth century, and emphasised the context of Boltanski’s own sociology as one which saw a departure from the social holism that Bourdieu had ended up privileging. As the focus of this chapter is strictly on Boltanski’s pragmatic sociology of critique, I will present a somewhat selective, but by no means unfair or inaccurate, account of Bourdieu’s sociology in as much as this allows me to consider how Boltanski attempted to distance himself from certain aspects of the former’s critical sociology and build on the central tenets of social theory and the sociological tradition to construct his pragmatic sociology of critique. More contested similarities and differences between the work of Bourdieu and Boltanski are covered in greater detail in Simon Susen (2014, 2016).

in the world of detail, or of the infinitesimal; the little imitations, oppositions and inventions constituting an entire subrepresentative matter. Tarde’s best work was his analyses of a miniscule bureaucratic innovation, or a linguistic invocation, etc”.
2.1.1 Critical sociology

Described as the critical sociology of domination (Browne 2014), Bourdieu’s sociology is an important contribution to the ongoing attempt at transcending the variety of conceptual dichotomies that are often expressed as structure and agency, or society and the individual, and perhaps mostly significantly objectivism and subjectivism (Power 1999). As Bourdieu (1980: 25) outlines at the start of The Logic of Practice, the divide between objectivism and subjectivism has been the most “fundamental, and the most ruinous” oppositions in the history of social science. On the one hand, objectivist approaches had emphasised the autonomy of social structures, affirming the relative independence of norms and values from individual will. Subjectivism, represented by the philosophical tradition of phenomenology, on the other hand, had emphasised the immediacy of ‘lived experience’, excluding from its mode of knowing the “conditions of possibility of this experience” (25), or in other words, objective social structures. These two orientations towards knowledge effectively spoke across one another.

In overcoming these oppositions Bourdieu takes up elements of Marxian and Weberian theory, as well as Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology, to consider the way in which relations of domination are maintained and reproduced at micro and macro levels. As Browne (2014: 23) observes, Bourdieu “argued that the reproduction of institutions of domination flowed from a type of implicit consent on the part of individuals to their authority and not just from the simple exercise of external power”. The concept of habitus – defined as “a socialised subjectivity” (Bourdieu & Wacquant 1992: 126) – provided one of the means of articulating how social norms become internalised. In this way it is possible to account for the ways in which certain behaviours come to be considered ordinary aspects of daily life, and to account for situations where they are maintained. One’s habitus becomes a way of perceiving, structuring and making sense of the experience of oneself and others, and in doing reproduces existing social structures. However, the condition for such recognition and representation arises in the first instance from “misrecognition of their objective truth” (Bourdieu 1980: 140).

Perhaps the most well-known, or at least oft-cited, articulation of the concept of habitus is the confrontation with aesthetic judgement pursued in Distinction: A Social Critique of the Judgment of Taste (Bourdieu 1984). In opposition to the Kantian characterisation
of aesthetic judgement as emerging from the inherent qualities of objects themselves, Bourdieu states that, rather than being a purely disinterested activity, judgement and evaluation are in fact means of symbolically legitimating the dominant tastes and values of a society (Bourdieu 1984). Judgements of taste are, as Gronow (1997: 10) summarises “nothing more than the taste of one particular class, the ruling class”. These are confirmed in a variety of domains, including “educational outcomes, national languages, aesthetic taste, sport and knowledge” (Browne 2014: 23). As such, judgements that appear to come from a place of objectivity and disinterestedness merely conceal their “real class origins” (Gronow 1997: 13). Therefore, this becomes a means of maintaining social (and class) distinctions (Bourdieu 1984). Habitus as “an orchestra without a conductor”, giving the forces driving it what Emile Durkheim (1966) might describe as a sui generis reality. Inequality is therefore sustained through socialisation, giving one’s behaviour a natural, authentic feel and the sense that this or that style of music, artistic work, type of food, or professional aspiration, ‘is (or is not) for people like me’.

Bourdieu’s critical sociology of domination has been a particularly instructive theoretical tool within the sociology of education (Biddle 2014; English and Bolton 2016; Reay 2018; Riddel, Tinklin and Wilson 2005) and the sociology of culture (Grenfell and Hardy 2007; Prior 2005; Robbins 2000; Sayer 2005). These focus in particular on the way in which class inequalities are sustained through different kinds of symbolic violence exerted through evaluations of good taste and through the system of education, in addition to show these are reflected in the symbolic violence exerted through the media in the form of reality television (Skeggs and Wood 2012).

Speaking in an interview with Francois Dosse (1999), Boltanski stated that this formation of the issue of social relations felt particularly constraining. For Boltanski, the habitus describes the internalisation of social factors and norms to such an extent “that these structures completely dominate the actor’s dispositions” (Boltanski interviewed in Dosse 1999: 218). In this sense, “the objective social structures remain totally independent of the consciousness of agents, and they are nonetheless interiorised by the latter who, in exteriorising them, give them their full expression” (Dosse (1999: 37). In short, for Boltanski, the concept of habitus left no room for the ability of people
with different *habitus* to come to agreements: “the social world would quite simply be impossible because no agreement could be found among people who did not share the same *habitus*” (Boltanski interviewed in Dosse 1999: 161).

Antoine Hennion (2016: 229) would level a similar set of criticisms towards Bourdieu’s *The Love of Art* (1966), stating that no-one reading this work “would have thought for a moment that the book would actually speak about the love of art”. To take people’s attachments seriously, and thereby foregrounding actors’ own interpretations of their activities without recourse to the conceptual vocabulary established by Bourdieu would be accused of a lapse back in the subjectivist stance he had sought to overcome; a “falling back into aesthetics” which involves “letting actors seduce you with their talk, [and] getting sucked into belief rather than showing its mechanism” (Hennion 2016: 229). Likewise, Bruno Latour (2005) would describe the tendency of critical sociology to decrease the number of agencies involved in the construction of social relations. Within critical sociology, “society is always there putting its full weight behind whatever vehicle can carry it” (Latour 2005: 36). In this sense, society becomes that which explains, and the actual constitution of social relations remains unexplained. Thus, whether expressed as faith in God, a love of art or music, the belief in the force of the Market, each could be explained as merely the expression of properly *social forces* (Latour 2005).

Furthermore, for Latour (2005), there was neither anything emancipatory about telling people that they’re wrong about their *attachments*, but also nothing sociological illuminating about identifying social determinants. In addition to this, the emphasis on the split between the scholarly competence of scientists and the false consciousness of the ordinary person shares similarities with the legislative role that Zygmunt Bauman (1987) states summed up the intellectual of modernity. Here, the capacity to reflect and

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8 Bourdieu would also receive particularly vociferous criticism from Jacques Rancière’s (2004), again focusing on the claim that the character of recognition is presupposed by a more primary misrecognition. In doing so, Bourdieu had split the world into two: “the symbolic universe will be organized on the basis of the world’s division [*partage*] into two; those who have capital to place on the symbolic market and those who have only their labor [*sic*] power to reproduce; those whose necessity becomes identified with illusory games of free will; those whose freedom is reduced to internalizing necessity as *amor fati*, love of fate” (Rancière 2004: 184).
provide criticisms of social formations could only be the domain of the critical social scientist (Bauman 1987; Latour 2005; Browne 2014).

2.1.2 The ‘pragmatic sociology of critique’

As Boltanski and Chiapello (2007) note, the exteriority of scholarly judgement from common sense quickly runs up against the issue of “morals, values and ideals” (2018: xxii). In aiming to dig beneath the surface of actors’ consciousness, unveiling structures, norms and values beyond the control of specific agents, critical sociology had little to say about the competences of actors. The pragmatic sociology of critique can therefore be summarised as a particular response to what was seen as the political and epistemological aporia of critical sociology (Blok & Anders 2011: 127; Dosse 1999: 37–41; Latour 2005: 49), as well as a challenge to the distinction between scholarly knowledge and common-sense (“the debris of common knowledge” [Dosse 1999: 4]) that had characterised the philosophy of science in France. In taking its distance from the critical sociology’s emphasis on the exteriority of social scientific judgement, and the assumption of ‘bad faith’ on the part of agents’ accounts of their activities, Boltanski’s sociology would foreground “interiority, justification and immersion” in contrast to Bourdieu’s focus on “exteriority, explanation and distancing” (Susen 2014: 183).

In this respect, Boltanski’s own path might be described as pursuing an interpretivist approach, considering his emphasis on the capacities of actors to interpret the situations they find themselves within and to come to agreements with others. Indeed, there is unarguably a hostility to positivism in Boltanski, in particular as the objectivity of scholarly judgement, itself somehow untouched by the social processes which it describes, is eschewed for a more thoroughly exploration of ordinary actor’s own activities. In this sense, Boltanski’s focus also aims to overcome the classically positivist separation of ‘facts’ - with the sense of exteriority and objectivity - and ‘values’, defined as purely subjective and arbitrary (Giddens 1995).

Whilst critical sociology had been able to articulate the formation and role of supra-individual entities in guiding human action, the definition of ideology (which understood collective representations or justifications as a “more or less hypocritical cover for relations of force” [Boltanski and Chiapello 2018: xxii]) pursued had
significantly minimised the role of intentional action, that is to say, action which is consciously undertaken with a specific series of goals in mind. As Boltanski states, the aim was not to “abandon the project of a critical sociology” (Boltanski 2011: 23); but instead to take the insights of sociology and elevate them to a new level. The sociology of critique, or sociology of critical capacity (Boltanski and Thévenot 1999) therefore involved “a shift in critical position” away from the privileged domain of the critical sociological observer and into the activities of ordinary actors. As Boltanski summarises this position, “it was a question of taking the normative principles and ideals that people claim to adhere to seriously, without reducing them to mere ideological masks or expression of false consciousness” (Boltanski and Chiapello 2018: xxiii). Therefore, whereas critical sociology had emphasised “circular relations between underlying structure and incorporated dispositions” (Boltanski 2011: 22), making agents mere transmitters – or intermediaries, to use a term from Latour (2005) – of broader ideologies, norms and values, the sociology of critique would emphasise actors engaged in situations of uncertainty where they are compelled to make decisions on which course of action to take, drawing on frameworks of the common good (orders of worth), and putting objects to tests of reality in interactions with others (Boltanski and Thévenot 2006).

This is somewhat similar to what Bourdieu (1990; 1998) has called ‘the scholastic point of view’, described as the imposition of the language of the scholar onto one’s participants. As Bourdieu (1998: 128) states, “instead of grasping and mobilising the meaning of a word that is immediately compatible with the situation, we mobilise and examine all the possible meanings of that word, outside of any reference to the situation”. In identifying a discontinuity, or discrepancy, between the language of scholarship and the language of common sense, Bourdieu therefore highlights a tendency among scholars to “[impute] to their object that which belongs to the manner of approaching it” (Bourdieu 1998: 130). Described as an “epistemocentric fallacy” (Bourdieu 1998: 130), Bourdieu accuses figures such as Noam Chomsky of assuming that ordinary people were grammarians, in addition to Claude Levi-Strauss and the field of anthropology. Indeed, this carries over into any social science which asks their respondents questions which “they do not raise and could not ask themselves” (1998: 131). However, although Bourdieu remained attentive to the language of ordinary actors,
the extent to which this became part of a methodological programme that foregrounded the capacities of individuals to engage in critique is not clear. For Boltanski more so than for Bourdieu “critique exists always already amongst the criticised” (Susen 2014: 175, italics in original). As Craig Browne (2014: 26) notes, the conception of agents pursued within critical sociology failed to reconcile accounts of capitalist domination with “the explication of the normative dimension of social actor’s own practices”.

In emphasising actor’s competences, Boltanski introduces a greater level of uncertainty into the determination of reality – what Rodrigo Cordero (2017: 6) defines as the price worth paying “for refusing all forms of transcendence” including the exteriority of scientific judgment. Reality here is instead characterised by its incompleteness, and the requirement of actors to define and test the content of reality. It is in this way that Boltanski’s sociology can be seen as pragmatic as social relations become seen as “inter-subjectively constituted processes of discourse and argumentation” (Susen 2014: 7).

This theoretical conviction formed the basis for the experimental work on “the reflexive competence of non-specialists” undertaken together with Laurent Thévenot in the early 1980s (Boltanski and Thévenot 1983). This did not reject the claim that people necessarily internalise particular modes of being; equally it would not constitute a return to the notion that actors “live in the pristine clarity of some ego cogito in full command of their actions” (Latour 2005: 50). It did however emphasis the “plurality of common humanities” (Dosse 1999: 60). This was found also in Boltanski’s Les cadres, which contested “the portrayal of this social group as a uniform and homogeneous collective force, as well as its triumphalist celebration as the protagonist of a new meritocratic era based on prosperity and progress”, replacing it with a more reality-congruent model which foregrounded the “highly complex, heterogeneous, and volatile assemblage of actors” (Susen 2014: 6).

The focus on professional classifications involved questions around the status of persons and things; in short, their greatness. As Francois Dosse (1999) has shown, it was this revelation that led to the formulation of the thesis that would underpin On Justification and lead to the formation of the six orders of worth. According to Dosse, the formation of the concept of orders of worth would allow Boltanski and Thévenot to
“escape the single axis of particular and general, by observing the multiplication of possible ways of passing from one point to another of grandeur” (Dosse 1999: 41), or between the “the micro and the macro” (Boltanski and Chiapello 2008: 32). As a conceptual enterprise, orders of worth formed one of the consequences of the confrontation with critical sociology, foregrounding the critical competences of actors (Boltanski and Thévenot 2006). Orders of worth are, first and foremost, “oriented towards the question of justice” (2006: 22). As such, they are considered as “normative supports for constructing justifications” (ibid). Orders of worth become present when forming arguments which support existing demands or can be drawn on to challenge reality. As Boltanski and Chiapello (2011: 27) would later summarise On Justification, the purpose was “to construct a model of the competences that enable actors to make critiques or to justify themselves in the face of critique”.

Orders of worth form the basis for institutions, which have the role of defining the ‘whatness of what is’. Institutions here are described as “bodiless beings” endowed with a symbolic power to define “the semantic resources mobilised by members of society when attributing meaning to reality” (Susen 2014: 18). The institution therefore operates as a material power for establishing regulatory or legislative frameworks, and these direct decision-making within an institution, and allow for the judgement of the order of worth relevant to the situation to be made. In their 1983 study, Boltanski and Thévenot (1983) had outlined the existence of the civic and domestic orders. In On Justification, the presence of several others were added to this: the inspirational order; the commercial order; the industrial order and the reputational order. Each order of worth is governed by different “principles of equivalence” and associated “repertoires of objects” (Boltanski and Thévenot 2006: 28) which are drawn upon in the formation of justifications for action, as well as critiques of actions which do not accord with a particular order. The common characteristics of such orders of worth (taken from Boltanski and Thévenot 2006) are:

- A principle of equivalence: comparisons can be made, and things/persons judged in accordance with a common superior principle.
- A state of greatness: counterposed to a state of smallness. The image of the Great Man.
• A format of investment: the way rights become linked with responsibilities; what investments ought to be made.
• A paradigmatic test: the procedures through which a person’s greatness is revealed or proved.

Through this, the high status of specific objects and person can be assigned. These differ across orders. For instance, the inspirational order accords a high status to the inspired artist or the saint, the one who renounces worldly goods in pursuit of an ideal which may arrive at any time and for which they must be in a constant state of preparedness (Boltanski and Thévenot 2006: 237). The market order on the other hand accords a high status to the activity of buying and selling, and the one who manages to sell valued commodities on a commercial market becomes a figure of greatness. The reputational order accords value to the one who is well known and well regarded by others. The figure of greatness is therefore defined on the basis of the opinions of others (2006: 98). To be feared or loved by many is in itself to be great, even honourable (2006: 100). The domestic order is formed on the basis of one’s connection to a particular lineage, or a particular corporate body. As such, the individual person becomes indistinguishable from the corporate body to which they belong, and is “defined by his or herself belonging to a lineage endowed with its own identity, superior to that of the persons who embody it over time” (2006: 90). The civic order “lays emphasis on the objectivity of rules detached from persons and on mechanisms of representation” (2006: 164). Final, the industrial order accords high status to technological and scientific pursuits, and is based on “the efficiency of beings, their performance, their productivity, and their capacity to ensure normal operations and to respond to needs” (2006: 204, emphasis in original).

It is not hard to see what form critique may take when the values of one order confront another. As Boltanski and Thévenot state, the market order becomes antithetical to achieving the state of inspiration demanded of the inspirational order. Subjecting oneself to the order of the market – to money – becomes a “form of bondage from which one must free oneself” (2006: 239). Likewise, the reputational order criticises the inspirational order for its absolute disregard for the opinions of others, or one’s reputation. Dependent as it is upon the “certainty of an intimate conviction” (2006: 247),
the *inspirational order* is therefore seen as underpinned by a kind of madness from the point of view of the reputational order. From the point of view of the *civic order*, it is perceived as ‘esoteric’ and ‘individualistic’.

### 2.2 Tests and Their Relation to Critique

In *On Critique*, Boltanski (2011) outlines the existence of three forms of test: truth tests, reality tests and existential tests. In each case, the term test indicates the fallibility and fragility of social relations, and the way in which reality is confirmed. It is possible that such tests define the worth of objects, but also that tests may be deemed inappropriate for a certain situation and can therefore be undermined. In short, therefore, all tests have the ability to fail. In this regard, tests have a strong relation to critique in so much as they retain the possibility of being challenged, and where the ‘flux of life’ that Boltanski (2011) defines as the *world* can enter. It is this that is defined as a *hermeneutic contradiction* and through which critique can emerge. I will work through each of these in turn before considering their importance to the themes of this thesis.

#### 2.2.1 Truth tests

Truth tests are defined as “instances of confirmation endowed with a semantic function” (Boltanski 2011: 103), serving to confirm a particular state of affairs often through tautological or rhetorical procedures (for example ‘Brexit means Brexit’). They define a fixed and determined relation between symbolic forms and states of affairs, with situations being instances whereby reality is simply confirmed. Here, the reality of reality is not an object of reflection in need of justification. Rather, truth tests operate through the proliferation of signs, the truth of one corresponding to and supporting the truth of another (Boltanski 2011: 105). In bringing together disparate element, truth tests offer a consistent and saturated account of reality; similar to what Erving Goffman (1968) defines as a *total institution*. Truth tests have an impersonal quality to them, and therefore speak through institutions which give them a disembodied character. For this reason, they best describe ritualistic situations. In such situations it is enough for one of the elements to be absent or not in accordance with expectations, for a necessary word not to be spoken, or not at the right moment, or not by the right person, or for the performance of a gesture to
find itself inopportunistly blocked or diverted, and the correspondence unravels and the ritual fails (Boltanski 2011: 88).

This can be the case when encountering elements which are not easily integrated into the rituals, such as “animals, things, artefacts, ‘forces of nature’, etc” (Boltanski 2011: 93). For example, the owl that had been trained to act as ring bearer at the wedding attacks the best man or flies into the church rafters. In this situation, their introduction has a disruptive effect and can have the effect of challenging or at least relativizing the institutional qualifications which appear in truth tests.9

Truth tests proliferate in what Boltanski calls simple domination, and where the possibility of relativizing reality is significantly weakened. Although truth tests are not limited to simple domination, they become the primary means of confirmation. Such tests aim to preserve orthodoxies and in doing so confirm reality “in such a way as to prevent it being outflanked by elements that have emerged from the world” (Boltanski 2011: 126). They therefore engage in what Boltanski (2011: 125) describes as an ‘obsessive’ attempt towards “preserving a ready-made reality”. Either through a semantic violence or physical violence, the truth of reality is maintained. An example of this in simple domination is outlined as follows:

In effect, the elements detached from reality that serve as a support for the truth test (e.g. in a major Stalinist ceremony, the hero of labour, the intercontinental ballistic missile, the young pioneer, the old leader whose white head is covered with a fur cap, etc. ) are there only as signs. Each of these signs supports the truth of the others. But it matters little whether the hero labour is in fact merely a lazy social climber, whether the missile always misses its target, whether the young pioneer is a rich kid thinking only of a laugh, whether the old boss is a senile, criminal dictator and so on (Boltanski 2011: 105).

9 For example: “There were hoots of laughter from guests at a recent wedding when an owl that was supposed to be delivering the rings, instead attacked one of the best men.

All seemed well when the bird of prey flew down the aisle and landed on the arm of the first best man. But, after a brief pause, the owl turned on the second best man, knocking him off his seat, drawing gasps and laughter from the wide-eyed guests” (Rawlinson 2018: unpaged)
2.3.2 Reality tests

Whereas truth tests serve to hold together disparate elements and help “stabilise interpretations and limit subsequent alterations” (Boltanski 2011: 73), reality tests are the means by which existing institutional procedures are opened up to examination with the aim of achieving resolution. The reality of reality – or in other words the appropriateness of actually existing reality in relation to the principles by which reality is organised – according with the is therefore of central importance here, and although reality tests are in some sense operations which exhibit value, they also aim to assess whether this value is indeed “materialised in the very texture of reality” (2011: 106). Whereas truth tests can be defined by the repetition of ready-made formulas which confirm a situation, then reality tests prefer “argumentative devices” (106), and require the use of metapragmatic procedures. Reality tests can however proceed in different directions. On the one hand, the reality test is used as a means to “make it possible to put to the test the reality of the claim of beings […] by confronting them with their ability to satisfy the corresponding requirements, stabilised by qualifications and formats”. In such instances, reality may fall short of a collectively endorsed ideal. Although Boltanski uses this in a different context, it is possible to draw upon the example of the seminar (in particular as it is an example that will prove fruitful for describing disputes on the meaning of Higher Education in Chapter Four):

“The professor is dreaming, the PhD student giving the paper is mumbling, the students are sleeping, chattering or playing electronic games on their mobile phones and so on. A participant who is rather more demanding than the others can then get up and ask inconveniently, ‘you call this a seminar?’” (Boltanski 2011: 72).

In asking such a question, which takes on the function of an exclamation, the speaker has the effect of presenting a critique of the situation in the here and now (the “token situation”) by reference to “the symbolic form (seminar) that indexes the properties of the type situation” (Boltanski 2011: 72). In this sense, this seminar is considered unable to live up to the tests that have been set, and as such provokes indignation on the basis of its ability to satisfy the criteria that ought to govern it. Reality is rendered unstable, and the necessity of justification becomes present.
A formulation of this kind constitutes a style of critique in which the overall aim is corrective, that is to say, to make reality accord with the tests it has set itself. The ‘order of worth’ that is drawn upon in the course of expected action within a particular situation (‘alert and attentive students’, ‘an articulate presenter’ and so on) and which has been instituted through preceding criteria is considered to be absent. Therefore, in taking the situation as its object of critique, “one then examines whether the way in which it is conducted here and now, in some particular situation, fully conforms to the form and pre-established procedures that should govern its course” (2011: 106). Here, the demand to justify (in this case, the extent to which the situation describe above can indeed be called a seminar) – becomes foregrounded. However, in other circumstances, “it is the test itself that is put to the test” (2011: 106), with certain qualifications and test formats being assessed in relation to their appropriateness to a given situation; whether reality tests “perform that which they claim to perform” (Wagner 2012: 59). Therefore, a reality test can “proceed in the direction either of confirming the established order or of critique” (2011: 106). In the case of the seminar, for example, one could arrive to the conclusion that the seminar should not only not exist in the form outlined and assumed above, but that it is an inappropriate form of learning and should be scrapped altogether. The whole purpose of the seminar is brought into question, and with reference to a different order of worth. In these instances the effect of a reality test can therefore be potentially disruptive. ¹⁰ This will become particularly important when describing changes in Higher Education and the questioning of reality in accordance with new kinds of tests.

2.3.3 Existential tests

In instances where reality is opened up to critique, evidence may be drawn from existential tests. Existential tests can include instances of suffering and humiliation, but also a joy in transgression. They have an anterior existence to institutions in so far as they “retain an individual […] character” (107), and therefore differ from truth and reality tests in the sense that “they could be seen but without being identified and integrated into reality” (107). In being outside of reality, existential tests “are difficult to

¹⁰ Nevertheless it should be kept in mind that such reality tests are mostly considered as at best reformist in orientation (Boltanski and Chiapello 2007: 103).
formulate or thematise because there exists no pre-established format to frame them, or even because, considered from the standpoint of the existing order, they have an aberrant character” (107–108). Nevertheless, precisely because of their marginal character, they have the effect of opening up a path to the world; the domain of experience that contradicts the format of existing tests, and which “furnish ingredients for unmasking its arbitrary or hypocritical character” (2011: 59). To give a spin on Bauman’s (1990: 15) statement about the role of sociology, existential tests “defamiliarise the familiar” (Bauman 1990: 15), and therefore have the function of being able to “unmask the incompleteness of reality and even its contingency” (2011: 113). They can emerge when the investments in existing tests which prove their worth “have not been reciprocated” (132). In this instance, other elements of the world intervene and impact on the definition of reality. In doing so, they can be used to support demands, “criticise existing reality tests and, if necessary, demand that new ones be introduced” (107).

This gives them an uncertain character, and as Lauren Berlant (2011: 2) states, the direction of disappointment and so on may be pursued in different directions:

> “Why do people stay attached to conventional good-life fantasies – say, of enduring reciprocity in couples, families, political systems, institutions, markets, and at work – when the evidence of their instability, fragility and dear costs abounds? Fantasy is the means by which people hoard idealizing theories and tableaux about how they and the world ‘add up to something’, What happens when those fantasies start to fray – depression, dissociation, pragmatism, cynicism, activism, or an incoherent mash?”

As such, they have a relation to critique in that they make critique possible. However, this process is not inevitable, and the move from expressions of indignation in the failure of our investments to render positive returns and the formation of concepts facilitate the formation of new definitions of reality is an uncertain one. Here, we end up in an area which is slightly underexplored by Boltanski: tests of strength. Speaking in terms of test, Boltanski uses both tests of status and strength as existing together. This eschews the idea of pure domination (as stated above). Therefore, the failure of existential tests to produce new definitions of reality which draws on an alternative order of worth is also due to power, the ability to circumvent critique, or simply bypass the need for justification altogether. In this regard, the consequence of existential tests is
undetermined, and the move from indignation to the radical critique of reality finds it blocked by more or less powerful figures and institutions within capitalist social formations. Indeed, as Lois McNay (2008: 68) states: “It is one thing, however, to assert an essential temporal indeterminacy as a condition of possibility of agency and another to trace out what this might mean at the level of social interaction which, even at its most informal, is ineluctably embedded in entrenched relations of power”. Therefore, existential critique can be circumvented, or written off by the powerful as illegitimate; arising from vested interests or not generalizable enough to be considered a real problem. It is precisely in this way that issues such as sexual assault and violence against minorities have been silenced (Perkins 2017). However, this can also involve the interpretation of existential tests in ways which serve interests antithetical to the broad demands that gave rise to critique in the first place. As I will outline across Part Three, this is ongoing in discussions of the relevance of Creative Arts education.

This failure of critique to be heard, however, is also characteristic of what Boltanski calls complex or managerial domination. If simple domination could be characterised as the refusal of change through the deployment of truth-tests that confirm reality, then complex domination is “exercised via the intermediary of change” (Boltanski 2011: 127). In this sense they intervene by promoting, managing and orientating change” (129). It is this that constitutes the focus of The New Spirit of Capitalism (Boltanski and Chiapello 2007), and which attempts to capture the fate of critique. However, it would be unfair to say that truth tests are only present in instances of simple domination. As I will show, they also make an appearance in the somewhat ritualistic format of the university mission statement (Chapter 5). Boltanski does not clarify whether reality tests form a part of simple domination, however existential tests fail to be heard due to the inability of mechanisms through which they can spread.

2.3 The New Spirit of Capitalism thesis

Starting from the Weberian problem of legitimation, Boltanski and Chiapello’s New Spirit of Capitalism aims to interrogate what moral sources capitalism has to draw upon in order to give people “a material motive for participating” (2007: 8). Capitalism is, argue Boltanski and Chiapello argue (2007: 7) a formation “singularly lacking in justifications” (2007: 7); and as such it requires the co-optation of sources that do not
emerge from its internal rationality. In this sense, “capitalism in the general sense is capable of assuming highly variable historical forms” (Chiapello and Fairclough 2002: 187). However, explanations which foreground the role of pure domination, “enforced commitment under the threat of hunger and employment” (8), is one that Boltanski and Chiapello find wanting, and instead they draw on Max Weber’s Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism as an important source for considering how an ethic of engagement is formulated within capitalism. Weber had argued that if workers were committed to the same set of values as their employers they would work tirelessly in their station in life; they “did not seek to question the situation in which they found themselves” (9) if they recognised the world as just. As such, for Boltanski and Chiapello (2007), “systematic constraints are not strong enough to leverage support for capitalist pursuits”. Rather, “it could rely on a number of shared representations – capable of guiding action – and justifications, which present it as an acceptable or even desirable order of things: the only possible order, the best of all possible worlds” (10).

Still, whereas Weber emphasised subjective motivations for engaging in capitalist pursuits, Boltanski and Chiapello cite Albert Hirschman’s (1977) emphasis on justifications for action in terms of their appeal to “the common good” (2007: 10). It is in this way that Boltanski and Chiapello arguably bypass the charge of methodological individualism by considering not only the psychological motivations for engaging activities that promise “personal salvation” (Boltanski and Chiapello 2007: 9, emphasis in original), but also motivations arising from the conviction in the collective justice of

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11 Cf: “The bourgeoisie cannot exist without constantly revolutionising the instruments of production, and thereby the relations of production, and with them the whole relations of society. Conservation of the old modes of production in unaltered form, was, on the contrary, the first condition of existence for all earlier industrial classes. Constant revolutionising of production, uninterrupted disturbance of all social conditions, everlasting uncertainty and agitation distinguish the bourgeois epoch from all earlier ones. All fixed, fast-frozen relations, with their train of ancient and venerable prejudices and opinions, are swept away, all new-formed ones become antiquated before they can ossify. All that is solid melts into air, all that is holy is profaned, and man is at last compelled to face with sober senses his real conditions of life, and his relations with his kind. The need of a constantly expanding market for its products chases the bourgeoisie over the entire surface of the globe. It must nestle everywhere, settle everywhere, establish connexions everywhere” (Marx and Engels).
such activities. Boltanski and Chiapello (2007) place these discussions within the framework outlined in *On Justification*. They “call the ideology that justifies the engagement in capitalism the ‘spirit of capitalism’” (2007: 8). This ideology solicits the engagement of those responsible for reproducing capitalism (primarily *cadres* / managers), outlining justifications for engaging that have a convincing character and give one’s work the sense of an inner vocation. By ideology Boltanski and Chiapello (2007) therefore pursue a decidedly non-Marxist definition, emphasising the role of ideas which have practical manifestations within reality and have sufficient weight to be able to guide conduct.

The spirit of capitalism develops in a relation with its critiques, and as such capitalism has assumed historically variable forms. These have moved from a “pre-industrial ascetic work ethic” and into the new spirit of capitalism in the form a post-industrial restructuring. Referring back to the orders of worth formed in *On Justification*, Boltanski and Chiapello (2007: 23) assert that the ‘first spirit’ described by Weber embodied a compromise between *domestic* and *commercial* orders, whilst the second spirit emerged from justifications drawn from the *industrial* and *civic* orders. As I will show below in reference to *The New Spirit of Capitalism*, the projective order represents a new order which has emerged in response to, but also in some ways as of circumvention of, the critiques levelled at this ‘second spirit’.

In this regard, it is worth noting that for Boltanski and Chiapello (2007) there is a third possible reaction to critique beyond reform or revolution; this is the circumvention of critique. In this instance, critique is not satisfied and a compromise it not reached. Rather, critique is circumvented. The purpose of the test is always to test *something*; it is not simply a test defined by the rules of rational debate governed by a set of common assumptions concerning the correct course of action but is also a *test of strength*. The strong in capitalism are “first and foremost the owners of capital”. Throughout the history of capitalism, there is evidence “that in the absence of legislative and regulatory

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12 Peter Wagner (1999: 346) too has outlined how unusual it is for the particular approach of Boltanski to overcome objectivism and subjectivism in a way distinct from Bourdieu to be described as “a return to individualism and an exaggeration of human agency”, especially as for Boltanski instances of justification are explicitly situated and made in reference to a collective of some kind.
obstacles they tend to use their economic power to wrest a dominant position in all spheres” (Boltanski and Chiapello 2007: 34). Therefore, the argument about the internalisation of capitalism’s critiques is not done so in a way which satisfies critique, but which aims in part to circumvent the sources of indignation arising from existential tests.

Although they identify a series of historically variable forms of critique, these are split into the social and artist critique respectively. The social critique is concerned with contesting capitalism on the basis of its inability to produce security, or to act in accordance with principles which support the good of all society, regardless of rank or status. In capitalism’s first spirit, defined by a spirit of individual entrepreneurial engagement, the social critique focuses on the “egoism of private interests in bourgeois society and the growing prosperity of the popular classes in a society of unprecedented wealth” (2007: 38). In this sense, the social critique, formed through socialist and Marxist groups and formed in part from the civic and industrial order, rejected “the immortality of moral neutrality” (2007: 38) and individualism. The artistic critique, on the other hand, developed a criticism of capitalism on the basis of its stifling conformity and bureaucratic rationalism. It is this latter critique that has since become considerably more pertinent to the justification for capitalism and has been absorbed in the ‘third spirit’ of capitalism, albeit in a perverted form (Forkert 2013: 45).

In my reading of Boltanski and Chiapello, there is a discrepancy between whether the critique which foregrounds autonomy and freedom ought to be defined as an artist or artistic critique. Chiapello (2004: 586) for instance has stated that “I prefer to speak of ‘artist critique’ rather than ‘artistic critique’ – especially since the latter is an ambiguous term liable to mean that artists are the subject of either the critique or its target”. In this sense, for Chiapello (2004), the artist critique has the significant benefit of speaking to the source of this critique; being developed amongst and having its origins in the Bohemian culture of nineteenth century France (cf. Wilson 2003). Indeed, as I will discuss in Chapter Six, this also has sociological importance as within literatures related to the creative industries, artists are taken to “constitute an exemplary illustration” of the alternatives to ‘traditional’ approaches to the management of one’s organisation.
and enterprise; “that is, a life unfettered by conventionality and uncompromisingly committed to the quest for the highest forms of human existence” (Chiapello 2004: 586).

In their analysis, Boltanski and Chiapello (2008) concentrate on the years between 1968 and the late 1990s, from when vocal opposition to capitalism was at its loudest (and strongest), to the moment when this critique was eventually silenced, and found its way into the organisational changes that accompanied the entrenchment of managerial capitalism into the 1990s. Using 60 managerial texts from France in the 1960s and 66 from the 1990s, they conclude that whereas the former had “[interpellated] specific readers through a proselytising rhetoric of ethical exhortation and a prescriptive tone of moral casuistry” (Kemple 2007: 152), the latter promoted the “virtues of flexible adaptation to inexorable competition” (Kemple 2007: 152-153), placing greater emphasis on short term co-operative projects, the formation and expansion of networks, and “a general mobilisation of workers thanks to their leader’s vision” (Boltanski and Chiapello 2007: 73). Indeed, it is today the discourse of managerialism, with its mix of formal and historical arguments, its use of generalities as well as “paradigmatic examples” that constitutes “the form par excellence in which the spirit of capitalism is incorporated and received” (14).

2.4 The Projective Order and Employability

The projective order is defined as the order of worth arising from capitalism’s new spirit. As such, it is defined by the rejection of ‘pyramidalisation’ and the ossification of social relations said to constitute both the industrial and civic orders (Boltanski and Chiapello 2018: 522). In some senses it can be seen as the realisation of the ‘inspirational city’. As will be shown further in Chapter Three, the elevation of creativity, flexibility and innovation suggest an order which elevates the inspired individual (including the artist) and affirms the creative powers of the individual. However, argue Boltanski and Chiapello (2007: 129), whereas in the inspirational city people are creative when they are separated from others, withdrawn into themselves as it were, into their internal being – the only place where they can enter into direct relation with a transcendent source of inspiration (the supernatural) – or buried in the depths of the psyche (the unconscious), in the projective order creativity is a function of the number and quality of links. Moreover, it is a matter of ‘recombination’, rather than creation ex nihilo, and readily assumes a distributed form (as one
talks about distributed intelligence) with responsibility for innovation being allocated between different actors (Boltanski and Chiapello 2007: 129).

The projective order therefore promotes the ability to move oneself and others into new combinations, with those new combinations facilitating the creation of ever more flexible, ever more adaptable and creative networks. Chiapello and Fairclough (2002: 191) offer a concise summary of this order of worth, its principle of equivalence, state of greatness, format of investment and paradigmatic test:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 2. Part of the grammar of the project-oriented or connectionist cité</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Equivalency principle (general standard):</strong> activity; project initiation; remote links between people.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>A state of smallness:</strong> inability to get involved, to trust in others, to communicate; closed-mindedness, intolerance, stability, over-reliance on one’s roots, rigidity . . .</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>A state of greatness:</strong> adaptability, flexibility, polyvalence; sincerity in face-to-face encounters; ability to spread the benefits of social connections, to generate enthusiasm and to increase team members’ employability.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Format of investment:</strong> ready to sacrifice all that could curtail one’s availability, giving up lifelong plans.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Standard (paradigmatic) test:</strong> ability to move from one project to another.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Figure 1 Fairclough and Chiapello 2002: 191*

Here, anything which limits one’s ability to spread one’s link is considered antithetical to the spirit of the projective order. Projects which keep people in place, which demand life-long commitment, or which are inflexible are therefore criticised in so far as they constitute barriers to “the development of oneself and one’s employability” (Boltanski and Chiapello 2007: 111). Employability here is elevated to both the state of greatness and to the paradigmatic test, taking the form of “the long-term personal project underlying all the others” (Boltanski and Chiapello 2007: 111). This, argue Boltanski and Chiapello (2007), will not be successfully achieved with the proliferation of new management and organisational techniques which can elevate actors to the figures of greatness in the projective order.
Indeed, Ronald Burt (1992) outlines this principle as a fundamental quality of capitalist competition, arguing that the size and quality of networks is, in itself, a driver of innovation:

“Size is the more familiar criterion. Bigger is better. Acting on this understanding, people can expand their networks by adding more and more contacts. They make more cold calls, affiliate with more clubs, attend more social functions. Numerous books and self-help groups can assist them in "networking" their way to success by putting them in contact with a large number of potentially useful, or helpful, or likeminded people” (Burt 1992: 16).

The process of expanding one’s network is achieved through a variety of informal mechanisms, and emphasises the ability to communicate within social groups rather than rely on formal institutional mechanisms. Quantity however does not beget quality. In this sense, the expansion of one’s network requires an understanding of what each node contributes. Therefore:

increasing network size without considering diversity can cripple a network in significant ways. What matters is the number of nonredundant contacts. Contacts are redundant to the extent that they lead to the same people, and so provide the same information benefit (Burt 1992: 16).

The kind of networks which expand through nonredundant contacts:

![Networks A, B, and C diagrams]

*Figure 2 Burt 1992: 16*

In contrast, to remain too committed renders one’s networks is to remain redundant, where the relation is unable to transcend beyond simple triadic relations, or what Ferdinand Tönnies (1963) would describe as close, *Gemeinschaft* (community) style bonds. Thus, the strength of a relationship, that is the closure of the ability to expand one’s network and hence increase one’s employability, are “redundant to the extent that they are connected by a strong relationship” (Burt 1992: 18).
In the following chapter I pursue this idea of the relevance of networks further, drawing on literature connected to neoliberalism and the growth of entrepreneurship and enterprise as stimulants to greater economic performance.

2.5 Summary

Within this chapter I have provided an overview of Luc Boltanski’s sociology of critique and articulated how this underpins the analysis undertaken on connexionist capitalism in collaboration with Ève Chiapello in *The New Spirit of Capitalism* (2007). This involved outlining some of the ways in which the sociology of critique departed from the then dominant tradition of critical sociology, especially concerning the role of actors’ critical competences in the creation of social relations. In doing so, I outlined the broad conceptual framework developed across *On Justification* and *On Critique* before considering the formation of the projective order within *The New Spirit of Capitalism*. My main aim of this chapter was also to situate the formation of capitalism as emerging out of the various forms of indignation presented to it, and in this sense I provided an overview of the relation between the social and artistic critique and the way in which the emergence of connexionist capitalism effectively neutralised the latter. Thus, the shift from the first through to the ‘third spirit’ of capitalism has been marked by adjustments to, and circumventions of, critique.

In the following chapter I will build on this conceptual vocabulary through an engagement with related literature on post-Fordism, cognitive capitalism and neoliberalism. My main focus here is the work of Martijn Konings (2015), Michel Foucault (2008) and William Davies (2014). Each of these allow me to build on Boltanski and Chiapello’s thesis, alongside the sociology of critique, in what I believe
are fruitful and which allow me to contribute to an understanding of the constitution of enterprise culture.
Chapter Three

Neoliberalism and the Enterprise Culture

3.0 Introduction

Within this chapter I cover the formation of the enterprise culture as one expression of capitalism’s ‘third spirit’. In doing so I wish to focus on aspects of this spirit which go under-explored by Boltanski and Chiapello (2007), but which nevertheless present a fruitful dialogue with this thesis. Pierre Dardot and Christian Laval (2013: 262) in particular have described The New Spirit of Capitalism as taking “the new capitalism’s claims about itself in the managerial literature of the 1990s as valid currency”. Stating that this betrays a certain kind of naivety on the part of Boltanski and Chiapello, Dardot and Laval (2013: 262) therefore claim that the appeal to the ‘artistic critique’ was in fact “an optical illusion”; a sort of ideological cover for what is in reality a “new, more sophisticated, more individualised, more competitive phase of bureaucratic rationalisation”. Whilst I don’t wish to pursue the idea that the spirit of capitalism is merely ideological in the sense of a cynical cover for relations of force (cf. Boltanski and Chiapello 2007: xii), I nevertheless believe there is considerable worth in building on the thesis through an examination of the processes Dardot and Laval (2013) discuss, in addition to the emergence of technologies, or apparatuses, which facilitate engagement with capitalism.

In this sense, I follow Stephan Lessenich (2015), who has also affirmed the importance of understanding how the new forms of justification have emerged with ‘connexionist capitalism’ which facilitate engagement with capitalism. However, the way in which justifications and disputes are linked to the proliferation of new kinds of technologies requires some account of the involvement of these, particularly processes concerned with the ‘welfare’ of citizens and the construction of powers that make engagements with capitalism’s new spirit more rather than less likely. In this sense, tests of strength, that is, the strength of capital, have a particularly important role when considering how the domain of reality can be claimed to such an extent that the possibility of alternatives appear less present. The link between internal justification and external forms of control
is summarised for Dardot and Lavall (2013) in Margaret Thatcher’s statement that “economics is the method, the aim is to change the soul”.

Within this literature, neoliberalism has been a particular powerful explanatory concept, and recent scholarship that engages with this term makes a strong case for situating it as the term for describing contemporary capitalist formations, foregrounding the role of enterprise and entrepreneurship. In this sense, scholarship has sought to understand how the entrepreneur concept functions within areas such as economic and political governance (Marttila 2013; Lazzarato 2015); housing policy (Jones 2012, Harvey 2005); academic life and educational governance (Collini 2012; Brown and Carasso 2013); creative industries policy (Harney 2010, Lazzarato 2011; Flew 2012); and the changing nature of work within capitalism itself (Ross 2009; Gorz 2010; Lazzarato 2012; Boltanski and Chiapello 2007). Throughout these texts the claim emerges – albeit in sometimes very different ways – that a neoliberal rationality has come to govern more and more spheres of economic and non-economic life, aiming to promote and hence realise the conditions for the “universality of the man-enterprise” (Dardot and Lavall 2013: 116). Likewise, as Tomas Marttila (2013: 2) states, today the entrepreneur has become a “general dictum or ethos for the way in which a number of different social practices should be carried out”. It is therefore my purpose in this chapter to engage with aspects of this literature, and through which I aim to build meaningful connections between Boltanski’s sociological work and accounts of the proliferation of a ‘neoliberal rationality’ (Brown 2015).

3.1 Neoliberalism

In defining neoliberalism there are of course a number of competing claims concerning its usefulness as an analytical concept or description of the economic, social and political processes that have defined the period it aims to describe. For some, neoliberalism has a fairly negligible status. Mitchell Dean (cited in Mirowski 2014: 28), for example, has claimed that neoliberalism is an “overblown notion which has been used, by a certain kind of critic, to characterise everything from a particular brand of free-market philosophy to a wide variety of innovations in public management”. Neoliberalism therefore refers to a far too wide-ranging set of contradictory and multifaceted events and processes to be of any real use. Analyses of contemporary
capitalist formations might therefore be better serviced by some other term that exists with the contemporary landscape of social and political thought: disorganised capitalism (Lash and Urry 1987); post-industrial capitalism (Nelson 1995), cognitive capitalism (Moulier-Boutang 2011; Bueno 2016), late capitalism (Jameson 1991; Horsley 2015), liquid modernity (Bauman 2000), risk society (Beck 1992; O’Malley 2004), in addition to Boltanski and Chiapello’s (2007) own formulation of ‘connexionist’, ‘reticular’ or ‘network’ capitalism.

My aim here is not to draw upon neoliberalism as a means of identifying the general character of society, and through which all aspects of human behaviour within capitalism can be understood; it is not therefore a grid on which a series of unrelated activities can be understood in their totality. As Dan Stedman Jones notes, by the 1970s, neoliberalism had “developed a sharper focus and an icy coherence”, becoming “a highly disciplined and effective political movement” (Jones 2012: 86, 337) which exerted considerable influence on politics and economic policy across the US, the UK and large parts of Europe. Likewise, as Mirowski (2013: 28) notes, “neoliberalism as a worldview has sunk its roots deep into everyday life”. From my perspective, the strength of neoliberalism is in how it manages to formulate a style of philosophical thinking which aims to elevate economic science to a fundamental principle of human existence. As my thesis is concerned with establishing the import of particular orders of worth as modes of self-understanding, exploring neoliberal ideas therefore seems appropriate in that it provides an appropriate philosophical anthropology, or way of describing the essential character of human action that arguably guides large swathes of human activities.

In this regard, I believe that William Davies (2014) has provided a compelling account of neoliberal styles of thought, identifying the way writers such as Fredrich Hayek, Ludwig von Mises, Joseph Schumpeter and others formed an approach to economic thinking which departed from neoclassical economic thought and aimed to construct a world-view on the basis of the enterprise. Although there are differences between each of these, it is possible to identify common themes. Following Davies (2014) I therefore define the common features of neoliberal styles of thought (which I return to throughout this and the next chapter) as being:
• guided by the idea that economic calculation can and ought to supplant the process of democratic deliberation;
• promoting a definition of human action as principally ‘economic action’, and expands the sphere of economic understanding to include all human activity;
• situating the ‘enterprise’ as an instrument and space of competition, and therefore the site of human flourishing (autonomy contra security);
• foregrounding the mediating role of the market as an information processor (Hayek) which facilitates advantageous, rational, entrepreneurial judgements (Kirzner).

We can also add to this processes of deregulation, decentralization, denationalization, flexibilization, marketization and monetarization which occurred throughout the 20th century which constituted a global project of structural transformation on the level of economics, society, industry and culture. The experiments which took place on the basis of the Chicago Boys in Chile and under the regime of Pinochet are, as both John Urry (2014) and Valdéz (1995) state, emblematic of how these processes became articulated in different world regions.

Within this, the domains of the political, economic and social are collapsed, with the need for forging compromises between different orders of worth effectively replaced with a single economic logic of judgement; what Davies (2014: 20) calls “economic imperialism”. Indeed, for Davies: neoliberalism might best be described as “the pursuit of the disenchantment of politics by economics” (2014: 4, emphasis in original)

In referring to the disenchantment of politics, Davies invokes the figure of Weber. As the theorist of disenchantment (Entzauberung), Weber used this term to describe “the rejection of sacramental magic as a road to salvation” (Weber 1920 cited Carroll 2011: 19). This encompassed the dethronement of contemplation; a hostility towards ritualistic or magical methods of communing with God (“The Puritan even rejected all signs of religious ceremony at the grave” [Weber 105]); and the elevation of purposive human action in the world. As Weber (1978) outlines in The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, this formed the basis of Protestantism’s hostility to Catholic doctrines and perhaps most importantly, constituted one important pre-condition for the emergence of European capitalist modernity. In this sense, Protestantism played “its part in building
the tremendous cosmos of the modern economic order” (Weber 1978: 181). In its secularised form, this displacement of magic from the world results in the affirmation that “principally there are no mysterious incalculable forces that come into play, but rather that one can […] master all things by calculation” (Weber 1991: 139). Indeed, for Davies, the elevation of this to a capitalist world view extended the elimination of ‘magic’ from the world, pursuing it in a secularised form. As Davies (2015: 9) states, “Weber argued that modernity disenchant the world through positivist science and bureaucratisation, subsuming the particular within the universal, reducing qualities to quantitates”. Furthermore, these contained a profoundly impersonal quality, lacking the character of a “public sense” (Davies 2014: 9).

This is precisely what Davies means by economic calculation coming to supplant politics. Indeed, as Davies (2014: 19) observes, “politics has an explicitly performative dimension” requiring an uncertainty of outcomes and the necessity of establishing critiques presented in good faith between relevant parties in the public sphere. In this regard, it is not too far from how Boltanski and Thévenot (2006) characterise the role of disputes, or how Jürgen Habermas (1984) conceives of communicative action, in that all are undertaken in relation to a set of action which aim to achieve something within the public sphere and in relation to a set of common problems.

3.2 A Disembedding Narrative?

The elevation of the economic over the political does not explain much in and of itself, however. As Martijn Konings (2015) observes, self-declared progressives have emphasised an interpretation of economy as constituting a realm apart from the world of morality, political deliberation and authentic social togetherness. For capitalism’s critics, the valorisation of the economy results in the erasure of “the independent logic of social, cultural and political processes” (22), ultimately leading to a colonisation of the life world by the cold, calculating rationality of capitalism. Churning out what Konings (2015; 2) calls a “ready-made narrative template” which affirms that capitalism has “[imposed] a regime of cold calculation […] in conflict with the substance of social life”, this narrative of dis-embedding argues there has been a conceptual de-coupling of society and economy, positioned as spheres affirming diametrically opposed values (2015: 1). Symptomatic of the critical strand in sociology the products of capitalism are
perceived in the manner of ‘false idols’, as fetishes which must be erased by an authentic, iconoclastic force. In doing so, the critique of capitalism along these lines aims to achieve precisely what Walter Benjamin and Paul Klee’s Angel of History could not: “to awaken the dead and to piece together what has been smashed” (Benjamin 2003: 393).

In a similar vein to Latour (2005) and Boltanski’s claims concerning critical sociology outlined in the previous chapter, for Konings this not only has detrimental effects for how we account for the formation of capitalism’s spirit, but also has detrimental effects for politics: “the conceptual evacuation of ethics from economy entails an emphasis on the need for external infusions of morality that displace agency from ordinary people to elites” (Konings 2015: 10). This suggests that morality is divorced from the economy. This is a critique common to both liberal progressive critiques ala Lasch (1979) but also the neoliberal critique of democracy on the basis of a distrust of common-sense, ordinary judgment. What Konings calls for instead is not simply an account of the way capitalism divests society of its humanity and morality (cf. Bauman 2008), but rather how capitalism forges and organises connections. For Konings (2015: 2) therefore, the focus of capitalism’s logic must be able to articulate how capitalism actually imbricates and interiorises “distinctive qualities of human association [such as] morality, faith, power and emotion”. In this regard, the economy (as that which makes normative demands and …) becomes not simply an inhuman value sphere which has eroded social relations, but rather as encompassing processes of “pragmatic ordering, the reconfiguration of patterns and the constitution of the new assemblage as an identity that we can relate to efficiently” (Konings 2015: 2, my emphasis). Indeed, much as Boltanski makes the case for an understanding of capitalism which prioritises a moral engagement with the products of capitalism, so too does Konings (2015: 2) make the case for a “different meaning of economy”; one that emphasises “economy as operating through what we might call […] processes of translation and purification, forging new connections among different phenomena and synthesising these into a coherent whole”.

Indeed, this is how I interpret Davies’s claim that economics disenchant politics in that it involves “a deconstruction of the language of the ‘common good’ or the ‘public’, which is accused of a potentially dangerous mysticism”, and in this purification
promotes new kinds of judgement. As Davies observes, the doctrines of neoliberalism do not simply have an exterior existence; rather they “become normative rituals in their own right, through which actors make sense of and criticise the world around them” (2015: 10). The process of disenchantment described by Weber is therefore considerably incomplete, and is not simply an iron cage, but requires an active engagement. Indeed, this was seen by Weber, who in describing the activity of professionals states that they hold on to an inner vocation, and therefore the spirit of capitalism “depends for its progress on some inner ethical commitment on the parts of those who propagate it” (Davies 2014: 9).

3.3 The Use of Enterprise

Definitions of enterprise have been as ambiguous as they have been ambitious, and as such there have been as many calls to reject the term as there been to expand its usage (Watts 1989; Coffield 1990). Wellington (1987: 30-31) for example has argued that enterprise has “no descriptive, but only emotive meaning”, with the invocation of skills within public policy becoming a kind of capitalist “incantation”. Likewise, Frank Coffield (1990: 68) describes the language of enterprise as a “farrago of hurrah words like creativity, initiative and leaderships” (67) that make up the “warm abstractions” (Toscano 2008: 58) of late capitalism and through which we misrecognise the reality of capitalist subjection. Even the Training Agency (1988 cited in Ainley 1990: 15) called enterprise little more than a “buzzword”. Coffield therefore highlights the sheer volume of capacities both brilliant and banal that have been attributed to enterprising individuals as a justification for its conceptual and descriptive vacuity. Allan Gibb (1993), for example, has defined enterprise as entailing the employment of specifically entrepreneurial characteristics, including behaviours such as resourcefulness, flexibility, creativity, autonomy, persuasion and problem solving, and cover a variety of ‘enterprising’ situations, from running an organisation to “filling a supermarket shelf, ‘sorting incoming’ mail’ and ‘counting items singly or in batches’” (Jonathan 1987 cited in Coffield 1990: 66).

For advocates of the term, however, the open-ended-ness of enterprise has been a strength rather than a weakness, signalling emancipation from rationalised, closely monitored objectives organised in a hierarchical way, instead allowing individuals and
institutions the freedom to use their own specific interpretations of what enterprise means for them (Caird 1990; Pittway and Cope 2008). In this regard, enterprise is the realisation of capitalism’s new spirit, emphasising values that promote expansion, openness and flexibility. Enterprise has become synonymous with this flexibility of meaning and implementation, becoming a general way of approaching work, management, organisations and life itself with requiring no particular ideological commitment. It can therefore be applied to a range of distinct projects (cf. Boltanski and Chiapello 2007). Bill Law (1983) for instance discusses how enterprise might be used to characterise the action of organisations focused on business and self-employment (described as the ‘blue’ use of enterprise); social enterprises and non-profit activities (pink); and enterprises directed towards environmental and ecological issues (green). Despite being different kinds of projects, each of these nevertheless may operationalise enterprise in some way, and provide a justification for its relevance.

Nevertheless, the recent history of enterprise has seen very limited applications, with uses often “confined to the blue corner” (Coffield 1990: 69). Despite the theoretical openness of enterprise, invocations of enterprise have displayed characteristics more akin to what Paul du Gay (2008) calls Enterprise (with an emphasis on the capital E). According to du Gay, these display an epistemological unity and shared style, suggesting a broadly consistent approach to how the world is known, how it ought to be acted upon and by whom. Du Gay (2008: 38–39, my emphasis) therefore states the following:

Contemporary usage is distinctive in traversing established definitions of ‘enterprise’ and ‘entrepreneur’ to signify a novel and vastly expanded meaning for the term. No longer does ‘enterprise’ refer simply to the creation of a independent business venture or to the characteristic habit of model entrepreneurs or (successful) persons in business for themselves, rather it refers to the ways in which economic, political, social and personal vitality is considered best achieved by the generalization of a particular conception of the enterprise form to all forms of conduct—to the conduct of organizations previously seen as non-commercial (‘grant-incomed’), to the conduct of government and its agencies and to the conduct of individuals.

As Coffield notes, enterprise is linked to “individualism, self-reliance, self-help, competition, privatisation [and] financialisation” (1990: 75). This has been covered well
by Michel Foucault who provides an understanding of the proliferation of the enterprise form in neoliberal economic theory.

3.4 Human Capital, the Enterprise Form and the Neoliberal Way of Work

As I will show further in Chapter Four, human capital investment constitutes a key priority of strategic priorities in English Higher Education and links to enterprise and entrepreneurship. Identified with figures such as Theodor W. Schultz (1961; 1971), Gary S. Becker (1993) and early twentieth century neoclassical economic philosophers such as Irving Fisher (1903; 1930), human capital can be defined as the stock of attributes, characteristics and capacities possessed by a population. In a broad but nevertheless influential definition of human capital, Fisher (1903) would describe it as any asset that produces an income stream; that is to say, any activity which positively contributes to future earnings.

According to Michel Foucault (2008: 219), two key developments in economic thought emerge from and around this foregrounding of human capital. First of all, the extension of economic analysis to a series of activities that had hitherto “remained blocked or at any rate suspended”, and second, “on the basis of this, the possibility of giving a strictly economic interpretation of a whole domain previously thought to be non-economic”. According to the series of writers that make up what Mirowski calls “the neoliberal thought collective”, classical political economy had only been able to account for labour in a quantitative way, taking stock of the addition the number of workers, or as a “temporal variable” (Foucault 2008: 220), for example, the number of hours laboured. As such, it had been unable to properly take into account “[labour’s] concrete specification and qualitative modulations” (221). Therefore, central to a proper economic analysis would be forming a theory on the basis of “substitutable choices” (222), that is to say, on “the way in which scarce means are allocated to competing ends [by individuals]” (222). Whereas classical economics had focused on machines and production (or fixed capital), neoliberalism would “adopt the task of analysing a form of human behaviour and the internal rationality of this human behaviour” (223). In short, it concerned itself with the choices individuals make, and how they draw on dispersed and fragmented blocks of information in order to take advantage of the situations they find
themselves in: how they calculate, rationalise, plan and implement their goals and hence improve their incomes (Foucault 2008: 223; Dardot and Laval 2013:110).

This involves a change in how income is understood. As Foucault (2008: 224) continues in reference to Gary Becker and Schultz: “How can we define an income? An income is quite simply the product or return on a capital”; and a capital is considered as “anything which returns a future income” (224). This even incorporates one’s psychological, intellectual, emotional and physical capacities, transforming the understanding of a capital into a skill, a capacity, an ability; and one which is “inseparable from the person who possesses it” (Foucault 2008: 224). Alongside this definition of human capital the worker also undergoes a change in definition. As Lazzarato (2011: 47) states, “the worker is no longer simply a factor of production; the individual is not strictly speaking a ‘workforce’ but rather a capital competence, a machine of competences”. Through this mode of analysis it becomes possible therefore for labour – or what Foucault (2010: 225) now refers to as “capital-ability” – to be located in every sphere of human activity. The individual becomes, in essence, a person endlessly invested in increasing their stock of human capital and hence take on an entrepreneurial mind-set, defined as a discovery process.

This notion of the entrepreneur can be expanded to include “potentially any and every economic subject” (Dardot & Laval 2013; 102): describing someone who is capable of seeing beyond the conditions of the present towards possible future markets (Davies 2014, Jones 2014); and who “strategically draws on social networks, scientific research, technological insight and imagination to make ‘new combinations’” (Davies 2014: 53). the entrepreneur understood as “himself his own capital, being for himself his own producer, being for himself the source of [his] earnings” (Foucault 2008: 226). As Dardot and Laval (2013: 267) state with reference to Israel Kirzner, even at the age of fifteen “people are entrepreneurs as soon as they ask what they are going to do with their life”.

Boltanski and Chiapello (2007) outline the work of international consultant Bob Aubrey as an example of the expression of this in the spirit of capitalism. As an example of a work of edification, Aubrey sits alongside related literature on management in a way which mobilises the order of worth of the projective order. According to Aubrey, the
worker must no longer see themselves as strictly labouring, but must conceive of their activities in terms of an enterprise. This includes family life, personal relationships, developing a business portfolio, education, and physical and spiritual health. Indeed, this ought to be reflected in the workplace; the manager “must assimilate the new reality by treating each wage-earner as an enterprise” and requires the abandonment of the idea derived from Maslow’s ‘pyramid of needs’ that “individuals seek job security” (Boltanski and Chiapello 2007: 92fn.lxv). Rather, what individuals seek is the ability to mobilise and expand their employability. To do one must be an enterprise of oneself be an enterprise of oneself. One must eschew security for self-fulfilment and engage in a thorough erosion of the boundaries of personal and work life; defined as a kind of self-mastery – or what Aubrey borrowing from Foucault calls ‘care of the self’ (epimeleia). In this way, one can prove oneself capable not of “leading one’s life in a linear, conformist way, but in proving oneself capable of flexibility, of entrepreneurship” (Aubrey cited Dardot and Laval 2013: 267).

As has been alluded to in Chapter Two, work is no longer defined by the rigid, mechanised forms of labour characteristic of Fordism, where the individual labourer was offered long-term security through the promise of an incremental rise in wages – and which made up capitalism’s second spirit. Described by Bauman (2002: 145) as ‘heavy capitalism’ or ‘solid modernity’:

Workers depended on being hired for their livelihoods; capital depended on hiring them for is reproduction and growth. Their meeting-place had a fixed addressed; neither of the two could easily move elsewhere – the massive factory walls enclosed and kept both partners in a shared prison.

Whereas classical liberal economics had defined by “material productive work, measurable in units of output per unit of time” (Gorz 2010: 2), now possible to identify a more fluid approach to work, and a shift in the spirit of modernity “from the collective project of humanity to the level of the individual” (Campbell 2013: 27). As Grey (2004) observes, the transition from the 1960s into the 1970s saw the intensification of processes ranging from the transition from industry to service-based jobs, automation, the easing of restrictions on employers to dismiss workers, and attacks on the rights of trade unions. As such, labour for many modern companies has become “like water, a resource to be turned on and off at will” (Gray 2004: 3). In addition to this, it also
emerged as a consequence of the state’s vulnerability. According to Gorz, the decades prior to the ascendancy of neoliberalism had increase the vulnerability of the state. By placing itself on “the front line” (11)... and required a more diffuse form of government, or what Gorz (1999: 11) calls “de-centred self-organisation”, that is to say, not a visible structure which could be held democratically accountable but rather an invisible force “whose un-authored laws would be irresistibly imposed on everyone” (1999:11). It has also involved the transference of risk onto the shoulders of the individual worker, conceived as their own enterprise, with incremental wage increases supplanted by the offer of tiny slices of businesses in the form of stocks and shares (Mirowski 2014).

The forms of labour which came to increasingly characterise post-Fordist forms of work are defined as “non-measurable” (Gorz 2010: 26) or immaterial (Lazzarato 1996). Just as Foucault described the transition from classical to neoliberal economics as the transition from accounting for labour in terms of fixed capital to situating the individual him or herself as a human capital, the move from a ‘second’ to ‘third spirit’ of capitalism saw the move beyond the sphere of the factory floor and into a much larger ‘social factory’ (Thoburn 2003). This process of why Berardi (2009) refers to the process of *autonomisation* as simultaneously a process of *atomisation*, leading to a greater risk of insecurity among wider swathes of the labour market.

Furthermore, as Gorz (2010: 17) states: “By limiting the rights of employers and the duties of the employees to a determinate amount of work performed, it has an emancipatory character. In doing so, it marks a boundary between the sphere of work and the sphere of individual private life”. Such an arrangement had constituted a limitation of the space-time necessary for capital to exploit labour, with capital and labour situated in tension with one another, and where the “heterogeneity between the individual and company” (Gorz 2010: 19) was foregrounded. It also constituted the presence of two distinct orders of worth which would be forced to forge a compromise in labour disputes represented by labour and capital. Gorz (1999) makes the distinction here between the relation to the company under the Fordist model of that of post-Fordism, and the move away from a tense or conflictual relationship between employer and employee, where work was owed in relation to a pre-established contract made between employer and employee, requiring a series of continuously “negotiated
compromises” (1999: 37). The subjective commitment to one’s work could therefore be minimal, and their allegiances instead residing with “their own trade unions, their class, their society” (Gorz 1999: 37). However, for labour in its post-Fordism form, the boundaries blur. Citing Norbert Bensel, Human Resources Director of Daimler-Chrysler from a speech given in 2001: no longer is the employee placed in a position of exteriority to the company, “assessed by the number of hours they put in”, but rather must be seen as “part of [the company’s] capital, with their “motivation and flexibility”, their “social and emotional skills” and their “concern to satisfy clients’ wishes” providing the basis on which work would be evaluated (Bensel 2001 cited in Gorz 2010: 6).

Again, this confirms the notion that the objective measurements used to measure the value of one’s labour is eroded. Instead, emphasis is on the production of oneself as human capital. The proliferation of this ethos involves increasing access to opportunities, representing a formal equality between various parties. However, when individuals do not seek out opportunities to increase one’s employability, to increase the quantity and quality of one’s networks (cf. Burt 1992), then justifications often draw on a series of excuses as to why this individual could not advance. As Walter Benjamin observed at the start of the twentieth century, drawing on Max Weber’s analysis of the role of Protestantism on the development of a capitalist spirit: “capitalism is a culture of blame”. This is precisely a characteristic of managerial domination, as Boltanski understands it, and which shifts responsibility from the level of the collective and onto the shoulders of the individual. As Boltanski (2011: 128) states, victim blaming involves “shifting onto ‘individual responsibility’ the weight of the constraints that operate at a collective level”. Thus, if actors do not take advantage of the opportunities afforded them, then they have no one to blame but themselves. Boltanski continues: “The main device consists in endowing people with a formal autonomy and, no less formally, an equal access to a range of ‘opportunities’, such that any failure confronted with the established tests can be assimilated to a shortcoming in the one who, of her own free will, did not want to seize ‘the opportunities offered her’ or who proved incapable of doing so” (2011: 128).
Konings (2015) presents a similar account of blame in the proliferation of self-help literature and television programmes. Speaking to the unique issue of American republicanism, Konings states that neoliberal discourses also perceive the “progress-liberal subject […] as worshipping false gods, as expecting credit without being willing to work for it” (2015: 89). In pursuing an idea of purification, therefore, blame becomes a means of restoring the original ethos of liberalism, founded on a belief in “personal independence and self-help”. Standing in contrast to the promotion of a pure possessive individualism (cf. Macpherson 1964), neoliberal discourses therefore “offer a promise of purification through austerity”, involving a sort of collective therapy that encourages subjects to both accept their own weakness whilst permitting them to “access new sources of strength and discipline” (Konings 2015: 108). The ethos of blame as ‘tough love’ therefore permits collective failings to be acted upon at an individual level.

This focus on the transformation of the workforce, away from notions of security and towards freedom, gives entrepreneurship a disciplinary character; concerned with governing the soul itself, and becoming “a way of organising social life according to rational thought, exactitude and supervision” (Rose 1989: 226). At first glance this stands in contrast to the level playing field implied by the notion of entrepreneurship, which makes of every individual the manager of his or her own self and which rejects interventions which may introduce subjective or arbitrary judgements. However, it is consistent with what both Mirowski and Davies see as the centrality of a Schmittian notion of politics, with decision-making removed from the level of the political executive to the manager and economic scientist. This is a politics antithetical to the Rousseian question of representing the collective will, and instead “a Schmittian one of how to decide on behalf of others” (2014: 34, emphasis in original). Interventions within the social therefore favour managerial and technocratic interventions through which critique becomes considerably limited (Boltanski and Chiapello 2007). According to Davies, it is the price mechanism that comes to take on this function in neoliberalism, as an independent force outside the realm of individual judgment, but which nevertheless can be interpreted by a small coterie of informed experts. The price mechanism achieves this: “inducing the individual, while seeking his own interest, to do what is in the general interest” (Hayek 1945: 529); and to do so through the mediating mechanism of price. Central to this is the abolition of democratic
forms of mediation, and the establishment of competition governed by a free market and directed by strong state legislation. Through such mechanisms, entrepreneurship and competition is promoted as an essential good.

This also speaks to the broad literature on governmentality; a concept developed by Michel Foucault, Francois Ewald and Daniel Defert through the seminars at the College de France in the 1970s, and which was taken up by sociologists such as Nikolas Rose (1989), Peter Miller (1987) and Mitchell Dean (1995; 1996; 1999) in Britain in the 1980s and ‘90s. By governmentality is therefore meant a variety of activities which aim to “conduct the conduct” of others. As Foucault (1991: 192) has articulated in relation to power, that “it produces reality; it produces domains of objects and rituals of truth”, so too does governmentality refer to “the way in which the conduct of individuals or of groups might be directed” (Foucault 2000: 341). In this sense, it must be directed at the self-government of individuals and open a space of freedom through which individuals recognise themselves in the representations of society.

It is therefore worth emphasising then that the neoliberal project is a profoundly constructivist one – based on concerted human action in the world (cf. Weber 1978) – and in which entrepreneurial subjects are not necessarily said to exist a priori, but must be “taught, nudged, mimicked, nurtured and learned into existence” (Davies 2014: 152). They must be fashioned through psychological expertise, within schools, and must aim towards “connecting the way a man is ‘governed from without’ to the way that he ‘governs from within himself’” (Dardot and Laval 2013: 264). Indeed, this is envisioned as a kind of “elite transformation over any kind of democratic movement, in which a small coterie of informed individuals are compelled to decide, while the rest are obligated the “obey the rules as they are created” (Davies 2014: 135, 145). Competition, as a necessity, is treated as beyond democratic debate, and therefore taken as a given. In Chapter Four I will centre more closely on education as an important technology of such transformations foregrounding the place of competition and enterprise; however, in the remainder of this chapter I will focus on building on the understanding of new ways of working within capitalism’s ‘third spirit’, before considering the role of enterprise, and the imaginaries constructed around it, in some aspects of British public policy during the 1980s.
3.5 Enterprise in the UK

In 1986, Lord Young attempted to account for the economic and social turmoil of the previous decade. Unemployment had risen considerably. Encouraging his readers not to apportion blame to the “managers of industry”, he instead directed attention towards the problems of Britain’s recent history and culture (cited Coffield 1990: 60). For Lord Young, managers at least “made the choice to go into industry and commerce, they took on the challenge of producing goods and services and they are fighting to create wealth and jobs”. In highly emotive language that emphasised the language of capitalist class against the stubbornness of a “protectionist industrial system […] a financial system with little concern for small businesses […] a confrontational industrial relations systems”, and a back looking education system, Lord Young claimed that it was in fact a hostility towards enterprise within these areas that were the cause of Britain’s “sharply worsening economic performance” (Raven 1989: 178). The world had undergone change, and certain strands of British society were unwilling or incapable of adapting.

As James Raven (1989) observes, the period was marked by a supposed hostility among those in education, finance and trade unions to business and money making. As a broadly stubborn section of British society. Within this, “the most influential contributions were those suggesting that British economic decline had in some way been culturally determined” (Raven 1989: 179). As such, the culture of Britain towards enterprise would have to be altered. Throughout this period, employability and enterprise become elevated within public policy (Allen and Ainley 2010). The period during the 1980s saw the proliferation of enterprise programmes in the UK, with many focused on forging a greater link between education, training and work. Among these included Technical and Vocational Education Initiative (TVEI), the Mini Enterprise in Schools Project (MESP); Enterprise in the Youth Training Scheme; the Enterprise Allowance Scheme (EAS); Enterprise in Education; Enterprise in Higher Education (EHE); Enterprise Awareness in Teacher Education; Evangelical Enterprise. In addition, saw the creation of 400+ Local Enterprise Agencies, and the Training and Enterprise Councils (at the end of the 1980s and which ran until 2001). This is by no means an exhaustive list, and could also include the creation of the New Enterprise Programme
started under Labour in 1977 and was focused on re-integrating unemployed managers back into the workplace; the Graduate Enterprise Programme, and Young Enterprise.

In terms of their objectives they were oriented around a move away from direct funding from central government to the promotion of competition; entailed a shift from a culture of dependence to a culture of enterprise, emphasising the transformation in the culture of industry, education, training and employment (Coffield 1990). Despite calling it a ‘buzzword’, the Training Agency nevertheless would state that “every person seeking a higher education qualification should be able to develop competencies and aptitudes relevant to enterprise” (Training Agency cited in Coffield 1990). In doing so, enterprise would signal a return to a plucky nineteenth century industrial and entrepreneurial spirit that would breathe new life into capitalism, and constitute a reaction against what was seen as the hostility of dominant strands of British society towards enterprise. As a symbolic moment in the history of enterprise, and to assert the connection between the new enterprise culture to Britain’s industrial past, The Enterprise Express, “a seven carriage special exhibition train” was launched from “Euston station with a fanfare of trumpets from the band of the Royal Marines ‘to spread the message of enterprise throughout the nation” (In Business Now April/May 1986: 22 cited Coffield 1990: 64). As Coffield (1990) notes, this even made a stop in the fictional town of Borchester, home of The Archers.

The celebration of enterprise established a “new metanarrative […] about the prospect of economic growth and development based on the triumvirate of science, technology and education” (Peter 2001: 65), positing the idea that allegiance to free market principles, and an entrepreneurial image of citizenship, could once again create the conditions for the realisation of both national and individual aspirations (Jonson 1983: 13). As a normative framework for promoting a new spirit of capitalism, enterprise would push aspirations common as much to the Left as to the Right. Indeed, as Jonson (1983: 13) stated of the enterprise culture, “behind their ever-so-practical exteriors lie hopes and aspirations which are often as speculative and certainly as evaluative as [those of the Left]”.

As Coffield (1990: 64) observed, in a similar vein to du Gay:
“a whole new world of enterprise has been brought into being and its influence it spreading in so many directions simultaneously that few people are likely to escape whether they are children in primary school, students in university, unemployed miners or redundant executives”.

Enterprise here again would entail the demand to produce oneself as a saleable commodity, alongside the requirement to identify oneself with one’s employers, as a friend to whom one is loyal, on call at all times, and permanently available. As Lazzarato (1992: no pagination) states “il faut s’exprimer, il faut parler, il faut communiquer, il faut coopérer (one must express oneself, one must speak, one must communicate, one must co-operate)”. In such a situation free time becomes a means of enhancing one’s value through the development of skills that protect the fall into irrelevance. Indeed, recent self-employment figures have come to be positioned as the success of such activities in the UK compared to other world nations: with individual citizen-entrepreneurs opening themselves up to the spirit of enterprise and leading the way towards possible future economic growth (ONS 2013; Romei 2013).

Indeed, as Andre Gorz (2010: 19) notes, “people must be enterprises for themselves”. Expanded to all but with the awareness that the capacity to succeed will be limited to a few. According to Bauman (2000) agency becomes effective in the market. Other forms of political and social organisation become denigrated. Labour becomes flexible, networks become fragile. In the place of collective projects, one is encouraged to develop communicative skills, to network effectively with those who may expand the quality and quantity of one’s networks, to spend long hours engaged in unpaid work, becoming “accustomed to precarious, non-standard employment” (Ross 2010: 10: a loser who develops brief and temporary contracts with a multitude others, living a self-chosen loser existence” (Raunig 2010: 80).

3.6 Summary

Within this chapter I have made connections between the work of Luc Boltanski and related accounts of capitalism and neoliberalism in the late twentieth and early twenty-first century. In pursuing a discussion of neoliberalism, I showed how the account of the formation of the projective order complements and overlaps with contemporary accounts of neoliberalism and post-Fordism. Here I aimed to foreground the centrality
of enterprise culture, entrepreneurship and employability as broadly governing the field of contemporary capitalism and offering mechanisms through which justifications and criticism of oneself and others can be found. In doing so I emphasised the way in which these new forms of justification tend to foreground economic and individualistic accounts of subjectivity, and the favouring of technical or administrative interventions from above over processes of democratic deliberation on the uncertain process of interaction and dispute that Boltanski emphasises. Here, the conditions of being able to criticise have been emphasised, and tests of strength were pushed further into the foreground.

In aiming to understanding the enterprise culture, I mainly covered the period during the 1980s in British public policy. I save a discussion of enterprise culture in and throughout the 1990s for Chapter Five, where I will explore the formation of enterprise culture within the creative industries. Here, therefore, I remain focused on enterprise culture in so far as it relates to the substantive areas of this thesis.
PART TWO
Higher Education
Chapter Four

“More Than Academic Attainment”:
Enterprise and Employability in Education

4.0 Introduction

In Chapter Two and Chapter Three I provided an overview of Luc Boltanski and the sociology of critique, before introducing the thesis developed in The New Spirit of Capitalism (Boltanski and Chiapello 2007) in relation to the broad range of scholarship on the transformations of capitalism over the 20th century. I argued that the sociology of critique offers a useful approach to understanding the way in which reality is sustained through the establishment of tests which confirm (or contest) its justice. Here I placed emphasis on uncertainty, on the practical and metapragmatic activities of actors, and on qualitatively distinct modes of justification and confirmation through the concept of orders of worth (Boltanski and Chiapello 2006). In expanding on these theories, I drew on the work of William Davies (2014), Martijn Konings (2015) among others to work through the way emotional, moral and psychological resources are mobilised in the production and maintenance of subjectivities receptive to capitalism.

A central theme that emerged in the discussion of the projective order was that of employability. Employability is defined as both a feature of the greatness of individuals in the projective order, as well as an aspect of its paradigmatic test. What raises the greatness of individuals in the projective order is the capacity to raise one’s employability, in addition to those of others (Boltanski and Chiapello 2007). This is a term which now suffuses educational discourses, and is frequently spoken of alongside the related notions of entrepreneurship and enterprise. As I will argue in this chapter, contemporary educational discourse presents a vision of the world in which the idea of the student has undergone a significant transformation; no longer concerned primarily with expanding their interests through a commitment to scholarship, but rather with increasing their employability. I therefore focus my discussion around the series of questions that implicit or explicitly guide literature, policy and recommendations related to higher education and graduate employability. These are:

- What is a student?
- What information do students act upon?
- What is the content of this information and is it appropriate?
- What is the goal of higher education?
- What tests currently define the ‘greatness’ of students, and what proof is put forward to confirm the legitimacy of these tests?
- Conversely, what sources are drawn upon to contest these?

In working through these, I move from more general characteristics of students in what Zygmunt Bauman (2000) calls ‘liquid modernity’, and through to practical proposals that call for a greater alignment between learning and the so-called ‘needs of industry’. From here I present an overview of HE policy in so far as it has been oriented around the promotion of education as a human capital investment. The presentation of this perhaps risks providing an account of education which will satisfy neither the policy wonk nor the sociologist of education. Nevertheless, I believe the following discussion will appeal to different constituencies. This history focuses on a small selection of White Papers and key moments in Education policy, moving between secondary and tertiary education to present a general movement in British thinking on education and its relationship to employment and the enterprise cultures that have facilitated this.

In the following section, I provide a discussion of some contemporary articulations of employability, enterprise and entrepreneurship within commentaries and policies on Higher Education before exploring the formation of an economic ideology of education within the context of the restructuring of British public policy (Burrows 1991). Central to this has been the creation of an “anti-vision” (McGettigan 2014: 2) of Higher Education as human capital investment, and the creation of new technologies for governing the education sector.

4.1 Defining the Greatness of Students

It is possible to see in emerging definitions of the student a change in the identification of what is said to define a student’s ‘greatness’ (Boltanski and Thévenot 2006). In this first section I provide some general claims concerning the transition from what Zygmunt Bauman (2011, 2012) calls ‘solid modern education’ to the more ‘fluid’ versions that define the contemporary era. I focus attention on Bourn et al’s (2011)
promotion of the necessity of promoting an ethic of general learning geared towards employability within universities. This then allows me to discuss the connection between a work ethic and a learning ethic (Gerrard 2014) within contemporary capitalist formations.

4.1.1 A liquid modern education

Zygmunt Bauman (2011) has worked through the distinction between old and new forms of education in terms of how it can be mapped onto his broader theory that modernity can be split into two distinct modalities: solid and liquid. The transition from the one to the other for Bauman (2000) entails a transition from collective projects of emancipation to a more individualised ideology which promotes self-fulfilment at the expense of others, and is characterised by movement and fluidity over the quality of duration. Just as Bauman (2000) identifies a fissure between solid and liquid modernity so too does he identify two distinct educational imperatives that underpin solid and liquid formations respectively, utilising a particularly evocative militaristic metaphor. In solid modernity, Bauman (2012) states that education was akin to the production of ballistic missiles, while liquid modernity concerns itself with the production of smart missiles. In the case of the former, the missile’s target, trajectory and speed have been determined in advance, and are made possible “by the shape and position of the gun barrel and the amount of gunpowder in the shell” (2012: 17). If calculations are precise, then the missile will hit its intended target.

Education was therefore reliant upon the teacher’s self-confidence in carving “on pupil’s personalities, as sculptors do in marble, the shape presumed to be, for all time, right, beautiful and good – and for those reasons virtuous and noble” (2009: 160). Through this the “immutable order of the world” (2009: 159) was affirmed, and the solidity of modernity reproduced, placing worth only in actions and pleasures which possess “a lasting quality” (Durkheim cited Bauman 2000: 183). In this regard, the production of memory was central, forging a firm link between the knowledge and people of the past and the order of the present. Written in terms of either a vast and glorious progression from barbarism to civilisation, or the continuation of a valued tradition which established the high status of the present, the transmission of knowledge created a solid chain connecting now and then, as well as the responsibility to the young
for the continuation of that history into the future (Bauman 2009, 2012). Despite the number of calamities which have beset the world, according to Bauman (2012), this form of orthodox education had nevertheless remained unchanged for centuries, preparing the young for a world which would remain more or less the same.

The smart missile on the other hand assumes a constantly moving target, and follows the “liquidized, fluid version” (Bauman 2011: unpaged) of modernity’s ‘instrumental rationality’. The smart missile is designed to “change its direction in full flight” and ought to be able to “spot the target’s movements, learning from them whatever needs to be learned about the targets current direction and speed, and extrapolate from the information gathered the spot where their trajectories will cross” (Bauman 2012: 18). What is of decisive importance is that smart missiles, “unlike their ballistic elder cousins, learn as they go” (2012: 18). As such, they ought to be equipped with the ability to anticipate the moment at which “acquired knowledge is of no use any longer and needs to be thrown away, forgotten or replaced” (2012: 19). In this regard, “the ‘smartness’ of the flying missile and its effectiveness would benefit from its equipment being of a rather ‘generalistic’ or ‘uncommitted’ nature, un-focused on any specific category of ends, not overly adjusted to the hitting a particular kind of target” (Bauman 2011: unpaged).

It is precisely this rationale that underpins Tom Bourner, Susan Greener and Asher Rospigliosi’s (2011) claim that education must be oriented towards the principle that all knowledge is essentially transient, thereby promoting a more generalistic vision of learning that transcends subject-specific expertise. In Social Acceleration, Hartmut Rosa (2010, 2013) has argued that modernity is characterised by acceleration, and indeed that the classical sociological tradition has been preoccupied with processes of acceleration since Marx. Adding a more triumphalist spin to this critical observation, Bourner et al (2011: 20) observe that the rate at which knowledge develops and becomes obsolete has rapidly increased over the course of the twentieth century: “the shelf-life of knowledge is falling and no matter how up-to-date the knowledge of a new graduate, it will soon be out-of-date without new learning”. This for Bourner et al (2011) is both an ordinary aspect of the learned professions (for example, “a doctor who acquired no new knowledge after graduation would soon be hopelessly out of date” [2011: 20]), but is
also situated as a necessary criterion for survival within late capitalism in and of itself (“the key to surviving and thriving in a changing environment is adaptation and the ability to adapt depends on learning” [Bourner et al 2011: 18-19]). This is explored through the opposition between inward-looking academic study and outward-facing learning, which I argue below forms of a central theme of the critique of higher education.

4.1.2 Learning and labour

According to Bourner et al (2011: 12), universities traditionally prize the “ability to test assumptions, assertions, arguments and conclusions”, encouraging the development of critical thinking and understanding among their students, and which is tested through the work they undertake over the course of their studies. Through these tests, the relative worth (or greatness, to use the grammar outlined in Boltanski and Thévenot’s On Justification [2006]) of a student is revealed and demonstrated in the form of grades. This is contrasted with what could be described as a state of smallness within the setting of higher education: poor attendance, the inability to formulate arguments, to cite appropriate sources, or to evidence claims in a manner consistent with the overall aims and objectives established by a particular degree programme or module. This is reflected in what University Admissions Officers (ACS International Schools, 2017) identify as desirable characteristics among university applicants, including a positive attitude towards study and a passion for the subject, with “evidence of an entrepreneurial attitude” being considerably lower down in the list of priorities (Figure 4). This is a somewhat surprising piece of evidence which suggests that entrepreneurship has not entirely suffused the educational side of Higher Education in quite such a homogeneous fashion as might be expected.

There is no evidence, however, that graduate employers share this appreciation of critical abilities or subject-oriented interests (Bourner et al 2011). Indeed, ‘critical skills’ and ‘deep understanding’ occupy a significantly lower place in a list of 62 “desirable items listed in terms of importance by employers” (2011: 9) (32 and 56 respectively, see Figure 5), and are overshadowed by capacities conducive to the high status accorded to individuals in the projective order (Boltanski and Chiapello 2007). These include “dependability, co-operation, drive, self-management, flexibility, initiative, time
management, self-confidence, persistence, planning ability and ability with information technology” (Bourner et al 2011: 12). Cited at number 1 is the ‘willingness to learn’, defined as a generic competence that prioritises cognitive adaptation and flexibility over rigidity and disciplinary specialisation. Bourner et al (2011) identify this as a generic competence nurtured by universities, and as such they are keen to observe that the willingness to learn is a significantly desired quality of university graduates.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>GENERAL ACADEMIC SKILLS</th>
<th>UK - %</th>
<th>US - %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Evidence of an ability to think and work independently</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>An inquiring mind</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ability to persevere and complete tasks</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Good written English</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Confidence with basic maths</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ATTITUDE OR APPROACH</th>
<th>UK - %</th>
<th>US - %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Evidence of a positive attitude towards study</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evidence of a passion for their chosen course subject</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evidence of success through a difficult start or background</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intercultural awareness</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evidence of an entrepreneurial attitude</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>EMPLOYMENT OR BUSINESS SKILLS</th>
<th>UK - %</th>
<th>US - %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Able to problem solve independently</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ability to work well in groups</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal flair and positivity</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Creativity</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Good presentation skills</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>OTHER QUALITIES</th>
<th>UK - %</th>
<th>US - %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Experience of the workplace</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Having held any positions of responsibility or leadership</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participation in community or voluntary services</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Figure 4 ACS International Schools, 2017: 7**

This process of unlearning, as a key component of learning itself, is necessary for survival in a modern world defined by acceleration. It is also, according to Bourner et al (2011) what universities are most equipped to do, even though they may have trouble seeing this. As was found in a study by Bourner (1984), “graduates of traditional universities remained more attractive to graduate employers” (Bourner et al 2011: 8). In fact, those who had spent more time concentrating on studies were considered to be at a greater advantage than those who had focussed more heavily on developing
employability skills. This, it is suggested, is due to their ‘willingness to learn’, a psychological competence suitably tuned to the times. Still, for Bourner et al (2011) universities have arguably not been keen to promote this generic capacity or formulate justifications which confirm its relevance to graduate employability, and instead remain committed to what Bauman (2009; 2011; 2012) would call the old, solid model of education. This suggests that graduate employers – more so than educators – are more keenly attuned to the demands of reality. Universities have been slow to catch up. However, just as Bauman’s (2012) smart missiles must have an uncommitted relation to their current trajectory and target, the current knowledge that students learn is considered to be of little or no consequence as old skills will have to be “unlearned as new graduate employees acquire alternative communication skills such as writing business reports, executive summaries and other forms of organisational communication which require rather different abilities” (2011: 13).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>62 items ranked in terms of importance by graduate employers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1  Willingness to learn</td>
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<tr>
<td>2  Commitment</td>
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<tr>
<td>3  Dependability/reliability</td>
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<td>4  Self-motivation</td>
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<td>5  Team-work</td>
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<tr>
<td>6  Communication skills (oral)</td>
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<tr>
<td>7  Co-operation</td>
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<tr>
<td>8  Communication skills (written)</td>
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<tr>
<td>9  Drive/energy</td>
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<td>10  Self-management</td>
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<td>11  Desire to achieve/motivation</td>
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<tr>
<td>12  Problem-solving ability</td>
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<td>13  Analytic ability</td>
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<td>14  Flexibility</td>
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<td>15  Initiative</td>
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<tr>
<td>16  Can summarise key issues</td>
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<tr>
<td>17  Logical argument</td>
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<td>18  Adaptability (intellectual)</td>
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<tr>
<td>19  Numeracy</td>
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<tr>
<td>20  Adaptability (organizational)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21  Can cope with pressure/stress</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22  Time management</td>
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<tr>
<td>23  Rapid Conceptualisation of issues</td>
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<tr>
<td>24  Enquiry and research skills</td>
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<td>25  Self-confidence</td>
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<tr>
<td>26  Persistence/tenacity</td>
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<td>27  Planning ability</td>
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<tr>
<td>28  Interest in life-long learning</td>
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<tr>
<td>29  Ability to use information technology</td>
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<tr>
<td>30  Understanding of core principles</td>
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Figure 5 Bourner et al 2011: 9
Bourner et al’s (2011) argument constitutes the soft edge of a broader critique of traditionally defined, ‘solid’ education (Illich and Verne 1976; Rancière 1991), and aims to respond to a range of issues perceived to be indicative of the modern age: the demographic changes of universities (cf. ONS 2013); the transformation in the process of civilisation (Elias 2013) towards an informalisation of social behaviour (Wouters 2007); the decline of deference (Allen and Ainley 2008; Boltanski Chiapello 2007); and a post-modern openness to the relational construction of knowledge. Whilst from a sociological point of view, the degree to which these constitute accurate or valid analyses of contemporary society is debatable, they nevertheless constitute explanatory terms of references in Bourner et al’s (2011) argument, indicating a cultural as well demographic change which has brought with it the need to transform the goals of education in the short- and long-term. Indeed, it is within this context that the claim that ‘traditional’ education is no longer tenable is partly situated, and in which Bauman’s smart missile functions as a potentially progressive educational vision. However, as Ruth Jonathan (1983: 8) argues, learning “cannot be epistemologically divorced from content, since the logic of an area of knowledge dictates at least partially how it is to be acquired, indeed what it would mean to acquire it”. Knowledge is always knowledge of something, and equally involves decisions, more or less explicit, about what is not worth knowing.

This renders problematic Bourner et al’s (2011: 23) claim that the promotion of a general ‘willingness to learn’ which exists outside of any particular discipline “serves the goals of both subject advancement and student employability”. Definitions of learning can often stand in “for a multitude of aspirations and imaginaries” (Gerrard 2014: 864), and implicitly speak to an image of citizenship (Tomlinson 2001). Education is therefore a malleable concept which can be “painted in myriad hues” (Gerrard 2014: 864), and without some level of specificity as to the epistemological or moral content of what is learned (why something is learned, what it is for etc), Jonathan (1983: 3) states that “the prescriptive gap will be filled by particular pressure groups, urging their own conceptions of relevance and usefulness in the furtherance of specific sorts of learning”. Whereas Bourner et al (2011) wish to erase the existing tension between graduate employability and subject-specific knowledge – assuming a unity of purpose between educators and employers or shared vision of the contemporary age –
Jonathan (1983) instead brings this tension into the foreground, and uses it to explore what she calls the ‘manpower service model of education’: education dominated by an obfuscating and contradictory economic epistemology which places learning at the service of labour.

This bringing together of a work ethic with an ethic of learning has been described too more recently by Jessica Gerrard (2014), who also starts from the Marxian and Weberian sources that inspired Boltanski and Chiapello’s argument. Making explicit reference to Karl Marx’s “all that is solid melts into air”, Gerrard considers the way in which, through the expansion of what I have been referring to as capitalism’s ‘third spirit’, both a learning ethic – of constant self-improvement and development – and a work ethic – based on the acceptance of change and the necessity of adjusting oneself to new conditions through the acquisition of the appropriate skills – have intersected. As such, whereas Bourner et al (2011) situate the alignment of learning and labour as an almost natural outcome of the seemingly unstoppable accelerative tendencies within capitalism, and therefore places emphasis on educational institutions’ need to respond to the call for a greater focus on graduate employability, Gerrard emphasises the directedness of this process.

Similar to Bauman (2012), Gerrard argues that over the latter half of the twentieth century education has become less concerned with collective projects of human emancipation and enlightenment, and instead promotes an image of learning as an individualised response to necessary change. As visions of personhood increasingly see the self as a project to be worked on, as something to be improved or transformed through reflexive (individual) action, the acquisition of “new skills, dispositions [and] understandings” (Gerrard 2014: 863) becomes a central part of this project. However, as Gerrard continues, as “practices (and people) are described, identified and judged in and through the terminology of ‘human capital’, ‘use value’, ‘marketability’, ‘value-added’, and ‘entrepreneurial’” (Gerrard 2014: 863), the manner in which one works on such projects of self-formation is governed by a neoliberal ethic. Work on the self therefore means to “accrue value, competitiveness and flexibility” (2014: 868), and in doing so to give oneself an advantage in a deeply competitive and aggressive job market.
As was argued in **Part One**, the work ethic has expanded beyond the confines of the workplace, creating a more thorough integration between life and work. Replacement of collective conditions as being able to be transformed through work on the self. Therefore, as Matthew Charles (2012: 41) observes:

> the phantasmagoric substitution of objective socioeconomic conditions (rising unemployment, growing inequality, cuts in investment and welfare, evidence of police, media, and government corruption) for subjective feelings of hopelessness and disenfranchisement permit nearly all of the piecemeal policy recommendations to fall within the sphere of educational reform (a lack of jobs, for example, is to be resolved by better vocational training, and a lack of personal resilience by education into optimism, self-sufficiency and entrepreneurialism)

Indeed, this can be observed within the current proposals related to Higher Education which encourage a greater engagement with employability, enterprise and entrepreneurship in order to off-set an apparent skills deficit. Indeed, as I will argue below, since the 1970s, it is possible to observe a proliferation of programmes which foreground particular kinds of education and training (at the service of the ‘needs of the economy’) as necessary for increasing productivity and preparing the young for a world characterised by constant, unavoidable transformation.

### 4.2 The Role of Universities: Foregrounding Employability

Over the last decade, it has been said that a poorly educated workforce has resulted in a skills shortage, leading UK employers to report “that some graduates lack communication, entrepreneurial and networking skills, as well as an understanding of how businesses operate” (Browne 2010: 16). Lord Young (2014) has once again lamented the lack of valuable skills possessed by the population, championing the development of a national enterprising spirit within the culture of education that will boost the competitive standing of the UK economy. Indeed, as the authors of *Enhancing employability through enterprise education* (HEA 2014: 3) state,

> “Graduates need the skills, capabilities and attributes to enable them to be successful in an ever-changing global economic environment. Increasingly, employers expect graduates to be innovative, adaptable, resilient and flexible and have an enterprising mind-set. Enterprise education supports employability by enabling students to develop the characteristics, attributes and skills that will enable them to make effective contributions to the
economy and society. Enterprise education clearly links to employability and as such, should be at the core of employability strategies”.

Likewise, in a document by the Higher Education Career Services Unit (HESCU) (2013: 8) it is observed that

“enterprise skills have been included in the lists of attributes which universities hope their students will develop, such as creativity, persuasion and negotiation, project management, effective networking and building business opportunities. This is not necessarily targeted just at business schools and enterprise classes but at the curriculum as a whole so all students have an opportunity to be more enterprising” (my emphasis).

Alongside these suggestions there has been a proliferation of schemes and courses within Higher Education that attempt in some way to experiment with the development of enterprise skills among students, especially following the establishment of bodies such as the National Council for Graduate Entrepreneurship (NCGE) in 2004, who have built on the enterprise culture of the 1980s in order to “facilitate improvements in the ‘enterprise culture’ within UK universities” (Pittway and Cope 2007: 479). Involves the cooperation of Higher Funding Council for England (HEFCE), the Association of Business Schools (ABS), the Quality Assurance Agency (QAA), Enterprise Educators UK (EEUK), the Institute of Small Business and Entrepreneurship (ISBE), Universities UK, and the Local Enterprise Partnerships (LEPs). Therefore, across the board, HEIs are being “supported to incorporate embedded enterprise education”, with the aim of encouraging all students “to consider themselves as enterprising individuals” (All-Party Parliamentary Group for Micro Businesses 2014: 106).

Examples of where these initiatives have been introduced can be found across HE providers, but most often – perhaps unsurprisingly – within business schools (Pittway and Cope 2007; Young 2014). In addition to this, there are now around 100 enterprise parks that exist in the UK, and which work to increase the commercial activities of universities in an enterprising capacity (Universities UK no date). As universities have become attuned to the employment outcomes and professional development of students within the creative discipline there has also been a rise in the number of enterprise initiatives within the areas of media, visual art, communications, design, fashion and
architecture (Flew 2012; HEA 2014). Therefore, taking “enterprise education outside a business school environment” and embedding it across a variety of diverse discipline throughout the university, the long-term aim is the promotion of “skills, capabilities and attributes” across a wide swathe of students, hoping to “enhance employability and enable them to be entrepreneurial in a range of settings including employment” (HEA 2014: 3). According to the NCGE (2008: 6), this requires

“a systematic overhaul of academic disciplines so that entrepreneurship education is embedded in every subject. We do so in recognition of the fact that graduates need more than academic attainment. To add value, they need to have the entrepreneurial skills that enable them to seize and exploit opportunities, solve issues and problems, and make a difference in their communities” (my emphasis)

As Paul du Gay (2008) observed in the previous chapter, enterprise has expanded beyond its business confines, becoming a generalised model of human behaviour capturing a wide range of activities. These proposals therefore constitute evidence of a transformation in the culture of higher education, away from the ‘traditional’ approach defined above (Section 3.1.1) – and which is alleged to be inappropriate to the needs of the present (cf. Young 2014, Bourner et al 2011) – towards a new, entrepreneurial vision for university level education. Taken together they foreground an economic ideology which promotes the idea that engagement with enterprising activities, as a supplement to academic study, is key to improving graduate employment and the ‘student experience’. By supplement I have in mind Jacques Derrida’s (1976 [1967]) concept of supplementarity. This entails both an improvement to, as well as the replacement of, a ‘natural’ ability. In this sense, education is understood as deficient in itself, that is to say, if it takes as its primary aim the education of students in accordance with purely academic principles (whatever this might entail). Indeed, it is this that Lord Young (2014: 32) has in mind when he criticises universities for once upon a time being “divorced from outside life”, engaged in ‘pure’ as opposed to applied research, and pursuing the idea that education ought to exist “for its own sake”. It is also why Lord Young (2014) celebrates when he discovers evidence of a proliferation of enterprise across university campuses, and their demonstrable commitment to enterprising

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13 These areas are the focus of Chapter Five and Chapter Six.
activities in the form of business start-ups, enterprise zones and the promotion of graduate employability.

4.2.1 Human capital investment

The increasing emphasis on employability and enterprise as competences to be nurtured among student populations cannot be separated from broader changes in Higher Education policy, which have increasingly become oriented around what Andrew McGettigan (2015: 2) describes as an “anti-vision of Higher Education”. Distinct from what Alfred North Whitehead (1967 [1927]: 93) deemed the “connection between knowledge and the zest of life”, or what Hannah Arendt (1978) has defined as education’s role in the fostering of thoughtfulness, at the level of public policy Higher Education is principally understood as providing “the private good of training and the positional good of opportunity, where the returns on both are higher earners” (McGettigan 2015: 2). Consistent with a central feature of the neoliberal philosophical anthropology (Davies 2015) I discussed in Chapter Three, education is considered important in so far as it is seen as a human capital investment. This has eclipsed the promotion of education within public policy as the “initiation into the production and dissemination of public knowledge” (McGettigan 2015: 2).

Education as a human capital investment is summarised within Milton Friedman’s 1955 essay ‘The Role of Government in Education’, which McGettigan (2015: 2) refers to as the “ur-text of English higher education policy” (McGettigan 2015: 2). Here, education is defined as

“a form of investment in human capital precisely analogous to investment in machinery, buildings, or other forms of non-human capital. Its function is to raise the economic productivity of the human being. If it does so, the individual is rewarded in a free enterprise society by receiving a higher return for his services” (Friedman cited in McGettigan 2015: 2).

Roger Brown and Helen Carasso (2014) locate the contemporary concern for human capital investment in earlier Higher Education policy. The 1970s witnessed the growing realisation of the importance of knowledge and status as unique resources possessed by educational institutions and which could contribute to social and economic development (Salter and Tepper 1994). Universities also have a monopoly on the production of values over which government has limited control (Salter and Tepper 1994; Brown and
Carasso 2014). This had historically been part of the privilege of universities, and as such their relative degree of autonomy from industrial or economic strategies - the idea of the university as “a partly protected space in which the search for understanding takes precedence over all more immediate goals” (Collini 2017: 156) – was considered a great strength. However, in policy that appeared during this period, this also prompted a more considerable worry that “if left to themselves, universities would make a suboptimal contribution to national wealth” (Brown and Carasso 2014: 12).

The 1972 White Paper, Education: a framework for expansion (DES 1972) would therefore call for a ‘critical’ and ‘realistic’ examination of the priorities of universities, making the case for a closer relationship between government and education in order to further integrate the needs of a new economic and political reality into higher education policy and practice. A framework for expansion (DES 1972) would also promote the idea that students themselves would have to consider more carefully what and where to study. A framework for expansion would therefore advise the following:

“The Government hope that those who contemplate entering higher education, and those advising them, will the more carefully examine their motives and their requirements; and be sure that they form their judgement on a realistic assessment of its usefulness to their interests and career intentions” (DES 1972 cited in Brown and Carasso 2014: 13).

For Brown and Carasso (2014: 13), this meant that students would need to form decisions about their education on the basis of future earnings rather than “whether they would find it intrinsically interesting”. The intended consequence of this would be that students would see themselves as primarily guided by personal, economic motivations, transforming universities into centres for “the efficient distribution of human capital “, becoming a more central node in facilitating “the linkage between economic demand and human supply” (13).

4.2.2 The end of the educational consensus

This speaks to a wider set of tensions that pervaded all education policy in the decades following the Second World War (Wolpe and Donald 1983, Tomlinson 2001); tensions that for Ann-Marie Wolpe and James Donald (1983) had been embodied in the 1944 Education Act. On the one hand, expansion of educational provision to the working-
class was justified in so far as “their problem was a lack of equal opportunities” (Wolpe and Donald 1983: vii). This could be solved by greater access to knowledge and status pursued by opening up access to educational resources. On the other hand, “industrialists were being told that a skilled workforce was a prerequisite for industrial efficiency and economic growth” (1983: vii). This constituted a compromise between the social critique and the capitalist pursuit of profit; what Boltanski and Chiapello (2018) considered in Chapter Two as indicative of capitalism’s second spirit.

However, this compromise could only be maintained so long as economic growth was sustainable. As the class structure of Britain began to change, and “the markets of empire” (Allen and Ainley 2008: 17) were in decline, this compromise began to unravel. Therefore, by the start of the 1970s “the educational consensus began to crack” (Wolpe and Donald 1983: vii), and the idea that education was an intrinsic social good became considerably undermined. This also saw the start of a “cycle of ever deeper cuts in expenditure on education” (Wolpe and Donald 1983: vii). Hugo Radice (2013) cites the Warwick affair as an example of the growing encroachment of industrial affairs into universities during this period. Here, a “particular kind of subordinate relationship with industrial capitalism” (Thompson 1971: 17) was revealed. The close ties between Warwick and local industry was revealed by students and led to protest: “nose to nose not only with Rootes, but with directors of Coutaulds, Hawker Siddeley and Barclays Banks”. Revealed here was an industrial capitalism “which exerts its influence not only directly in the councils of the University but also within the educational organs of the State, and which, from both directions, is demanding, for its better service, an approved educational product” (1971: 18). The Warwick affair has the effect of being a critical reality test, crossing the boundaries between education and industry: in this instance, evidence of collusion overstepped the boundaries between education and an industrial order of worth.

However, as Radice (2013) states, this did not halt the process of a greater co-ordination of education and industry; rather the necessity of a closer alignment of these two spheres became a more central feature of mainstream political discourse in the following years, and in ways that would aim to circumvent or neutralise critique rather than respond to it. One particularly important moment for commentators on educational
history was then Labour Prime Minister James Callaghan’s 1976 speech at Ruskin College, Oxford; and the ‘Great Debate’ on education which surrounded it (Wolpe and Donald 1987; Wellington 1987; Tomlinson 2001; Allen and Ainley 2008). Between 1972 and 1977, total unemployment had risen by 45 per cent; however youth unemployment alone had increased by 120 per cent (Allen and Ainley (2008: 55). By 1975, this figure stood at half a million, and by 1977 would rise to 1.3 million. It is within this context that Callaghan hoisted “the banner of skills and vocationalism” (Holt 1987: 165), and drove home the idea that educators would have to do more to raise the productiveness of the nation and the employability of the youth.

This was driven by a simple and familiar enough argument: that in the decades that followed the end of the Second World War the “educational establishment” (Callaghan 1976 cited in Tomlinson 2001: 21) had failed to adapt to new economic circumstances and had jettisoned their obligations to society. The argument mobilised a logic of disappointment and readjustment, through which education is undermined due to its failure to produce ‘necessary skills’ and provide a pathway to employment for students (Wellington 1987). This began from a critical questioning of ‘traditional’ education, with the “implicit promise of schooling and education being undermined” (Wellington 1987: 22); the elevation of certain kinds of ‘pre-vocational training’ as a response to growing unemployment; and finally a strengthening of “the bonds between education and employment” (Wellington 1987: 22), prioritising the needs of latter as a key basis for further reforms within the sector. Considerable publicity was given to figures within business, and in papers such as The Daily Mail and The Times, each of which stated that the needs of industry were not being met by educational institutions (Tomlinson 2001). As Tomlinson (2001: 21) notes, this delighted the new generation of Black Paperites under Rhodes Boyson, who had increasingly shifted from attacking progressive education to attacking the very ivory towers from which they had emerged and was therefore viewed as a concession to the Right by some Labour politicians (Tomlinson 2001: 21; Holt 1983). This helps build on the claim made by Ruth Jonathan (1983): that policies during this period were guided by the strength of capitalism. Here, educators were a scapegoat for “an economic recession and unemployment for which they had no responsibility” (Allen and Ainley 2008: 7). It is for this reason that the
thrust of education policy since this period has been described as little more than a “Big Lie” (Allen and Ainley 2008: 7).

4.2.3 ‘New Public Management’

The critique of education was pursued further into the 1980s, with policies, proposals and commentaries making further claims about the failings of education in the post-War period. In tandem with the enterprise initiatives covered in the Chapter Three, British education policy saw the publication of White Papers such as A New Training Initiative (1982), Training for Jobs (1984) and continued promoting a ‘new vocationalism’. In Higher Education, Brown and Carasso (2014) draw attention to the publication of the Green Paper, The development of higher education into the 1990s. Much like A framework for expansion (DES 1972), this again claimed that

The economic performance of the United Kingdom since 1945 has been disappointing compared to the achievements of others. The Government believes that it is vital for our higher education to contribute more effectively to the improvement of the performance of the economy […] The Government is particularly concerned by the evidence that the societies of our competitors are producing, and plan in the future to produce, more qualified scientists, engineers, technologists and technicians than the United Kingdom (DES 1985 cited in Brown and Carasso 2014: 13)

In Higher Education, this had the most detrimental effect on research centres, who saw the emergence of ‘New Public Management’, defined by modernisation, minimisation and marketization (Brown and Carasso 2014: 14). These processes were focused on “bringing in faster and more flexible ways of budgeting, managing and accounting for the delivery of services”; outsourcing and ‘hollowing out’ departments; and a belief that the costs of education could be transferred from the responsibility of collectives to that of the individual. NPM was, according to Radice (2013), the next sequence in a ‘shake-up’ of the public sector. Within universities, it was underpinned by the principle that “academics are idle slackers who will only do their job if the whip of competition is applied to their bleeding flanks with some regularity” (Collini 2017: 106). Indeed, confirming the pre-requisite for the expansion of connexionist capitalism as outlined by Bob Aubrey, the networks of academics would have to be broken up and greater surveilled in order to better promote enterprise: “it is important to sweep away the
networks of ‘buddies’, bureaucracy or corruption that obstruct the path to progress” (Aubrey cited Boltanski and Chiapello 2007: 121).

According to Radice, this was a “more systematic transformation of HE” than what had come previously, “exemplifying the increasing dominance of neoliberal ideas” (Radice 2013: 412). The hopes that the coming to power of a New Labour government in 1997 would’ve brought an end to this were “quickly disappointed” (Radice 2015: 414). Twenty years after James Callaghan’s speech, and again in Ruskin College, Tony Blair called for “education, education, education”; again this placed education at the service of an enterprise culture. Alongside this, universities became “a simulated private enterprise” (415).

Both Ron Amann (2003) and Hugo Radice (2008, 2014) identify parallels with a Soviet-style organisational culture during this period, or what Michael Power (1996) refers to as an audit society, defined as the expansion throughout the 1980s and into the 1990s of administrative methods of problem solving beyond finance and into a wider array of institutional settings, foremost among these being schools and universities. As Ron Amann (2003: 475) clarifies, for audit culture to be effective it must “relate to an activity that is auditable”. In Foucauldian terms, it must produce a domain of reality that can be acted upon. As Amann (2003: 475) continues “what is of high value (in common-sense terms) but not auditable tends to be neglected, while on the other hand what is auditable, but of little real value, can come to dominate the collective consciousness of institutions”. Such a neglect does not result in a level of autonomy-through-exclusion for activities seen to be outside of practices of quantitative audit. Instead, audit “defines the core activity of an organisation and shapes the priorities of those who work within it” (475). It is this that has constituted the current organizational culture of higher education, whereby the distinction between artistic and purely instrumental activities becomes neutralised; where “balance-sheets sound like Homer and Homer sound like balance-sheets” (Davies 1996 cited in Evans 2003: 97).

4.2.4 After Browne

In The Great University Gamble, McGettigan (2013) asserts that English Higher Education has undergone a profound transformation, with money and markets coming to play a more prominent role in directing its purpose and place within society,
alongside policies that promote allegiance to market principles. McGettigan predicts that continuing enthusiasm for fees will reinforce and intensify the financialisation of the sector, and where education as human capital investment will be pursued further. In pursuit of this recent years have seen the creation of “a series of measures designed to support a new performance metric: repayment of loans by course and institution”. It is this, according to McGettigan (2015: 2) that “could become the one metric to dominate all others”. Ushered in by the Browne Review.

The ‘Browne Review’ (or ‘Securing a sustainable future for higher education: an independent review of higher education funding and student finance [2010]”) was established to assess the future of Higher Education funding in England. Led by John Browne, former chief executive of BP, the Review put forward 8 recommendations: a 100% cut to teaching grants in the arts, the uncapping of tuition fee levels, and a change in the rate of loan repayments.

The Browne Review oversaw the creation of new mechanisms “designed to create genuine competition for students between HEIs” (Independent Review of Higher Education Funding and Student Finance 2010 cited in Brown and Carasso 2013: 91). The cut to direct funding was accepted, and “degrees in the arts, humanities, business, law and social sciences, no longer were in receipt of direct HEFCE funding”. In a snap vote on 9th December 2010 and despite large national student protests, the proposal to increase fees was passed. Saw the replacement of direct funding from HEFCE to a loan system. Loans effectively changed their status from additional funding to replacement funding for cuts to the teaching grant. This transition also saw HEFCE’s role being transformed from funder into ‘Independent Lead Regulator’ for Higher Education. As McGettigan (2012, 2013) observes, there became a democratic deficit both in terms of who the HEFCE is accountable to (the Treasury) and in terms of the lack of public scrutiny or debate into the series of piecemeal reforms ushered in through secondary legislation.

These mechanisms were effectively accelerated following the publication of the government White Paper Higher Education: Putting Students at the Heart of the System (DBIS 2011) the following year, and which promoted “competition and efficiency” (2011: 19) and “diversity of provision” (2011: 3) through the creation of new, private
(for- and non-profit) providers within the market for HE. *Higher Education: Putting Students at the Heart of the System* “presented undergraduates degrees as a human capital investment that benefits the private individual insofar as it enables that individual to boost future earnings” (McGettigan 2015: 4). David Willetts for example would promote the entrance of the principles of consumerism into higher education. Universities became significantly more reliant on undergraduate fee income, as well as fees from non-EU students, to make up for large reductions in HEFCE teaching grants (see **Figure 3**).

![Figure 3](image.png)

**Figure 3 ONS 2016**

The creation of a structure focused on determining the ‘creditworthiness’ of institutions and individuals followed from proposals contained with Lord Young’s *Enterprise for All: The Relevance of Enterprise in Education*. For Lord Young (2014: 5) a transition from a situation in which the focus of research was more insular, towards a situation in which universities must have as their aim economic growth and boosting the nation’s competitiveness. The justification for this resides in the claim that “publishing this information through league tables […] would promote competition and improvements amongst educators in their response to raising standards and their relevance to work and business”. Students can therefore “assess the full costs and likely benefits of specific courses at specific institutions” (9).
Lord Young identifies three consequences of these mechanisms: they incentivise universities to drive up quality through competition; they empower learners to make informed choices about their chosen careers paths through the publication of the short, medium and long-term trajectories of graduate earnings; and they allow governments to draw comparisons between the “effectiveness of institutions”, in particular utilising “business start-up activity to help understand the entrepreneurial credentials of each education institution” (Young 2014: 9). This forms the basis for mapping the terrain of graduate earnings in order for ‘value’ to be communicated more efficiently through the price mechanism (McGettigan 2015: 7).

Enterprise became further entrenched within HE policy, and led to the creation of the Bill on Employment and Enterprise, which achieved Royal Ascent in March 2015. This saw the creation of “an incentive and reward structure at universities by distinguishing the universities that are delivering the strongest enterprise ethos and labour market outcomes for their students” (GOV cited McGettigan 2015: 3). It was taken further within the Conservative Party 2015 manifesto, which pledged to make more data “openly available to potential students so that they can make decisions informed by the career paths of past graduates” (Conservative Manifesto 2015: 35). This it is hoped that students will be able to access the employability and earnings of all graduates will be made available to potential students.

The publication of this information provides a way in which enterprise, employability and entrepreneurship as specific competences can be positively identified, through the evaluation of universities through League Tables, Research and Teaching Excellence Frameworks, and recently also the Longitudinal Educational Outcomes datasets. Through expert judgment, and through objective quantitative data, this functions as a means of letting the market determine the quality of particular educational, institutions in so far as they increased one’s human capital. It is perhaps for this reason that the Minister for Universities Sam Gyimah MP has recently sent out the call for applications from tech-savvy entrepreneurs to develop apps that can assemble this data for use by prospective students and their parents (Department for Education 2018).
4.3 The Critique of the Neoliberal University

The changes identified above have been perceived as “part of a concerted ideological move” (Gildea, Goodwyn, Kitching, Tyson 2014: 5, see also Bailey and Freedman 2011; McGettigan 2015, 2017, Collini 2017), and contribute to what Mary Evans (2004: 3) has described as a “shift from a collective world in which independent and critical thought was valued, to a collective world in which universities are expected to fulfil not these values but those of the marketplace and the economy”. The series of mechanisms introduced display a consistent critique of education, first that the decisions regarding educational priorities result from processes that are beyond the control of politics, and second that the response they demand is outside the realm of democratic debate. As Morrish and Sauntson (2013: 62) state, “universities are but one set of institutions that have fallen under a neoliberal governmentality”.

It may indeed be fair to ask at this point whether the classical Humboldtian ideal of education – based on the idea of education as the cultivation of mind and character through the interrogation of ideas in an arena untouched by the immediate demands of society – has been romanticised here. As Collini (2012: 26) outlines, Alexander von Humboldt’s model of universities as “centres of ‘higher learning’” has become a go-to reference point for the liberal defence of universities against marketisation. Cardinal John Henry Newman too has been presented as offering a vision of education modelled on the belief in the university as a “community engaged in the education of character and intellect” (Holmwood 2011: 14). Such reference points make an appeal to a past which may not have existed, and which was likely also to have been a period when universities were much more homogenous in terms of gender, class and race. As Collini (2012) continues, such romanticised notions divorced from the activity of teaching and research often overlook how such ideals are riddled with tensions. In particular, the expectation of a withdrawal from social life whilst also being responsible for addressing or resolving social needs was. Whilst it is therefore worth taking such accounts with a certain amount of scepticism, the notion that

It is the case that recent policy has more or less jettisoned the idea that education is about more than preparation for the world of work, with successive governments situating “the purpose of universities as the inculcation of skills for a corporate business
environment” (Walton 2011: 21). In this regard, the contemporary university has been described as an “ideological state apparatus […] through which lives are shaped and managed to dance in step with the dominant tune” (Bishop 2012: 269); a place in which academics’ “working lives are being constantly remodelled” through a series of ever-changing and irrational metrics; and where the constantly shifting targets and goals of higher education have subordinated staff to “managerial control … [and]… corporate objectives” (Radice 2013: 414), producing with it a “state of permanent anxiety and existential unsettlement” (Pollock 2012: 93). In more apocalyptic accounts, the university has been situated as part of a strategy of elimination, with governments pursuing a “ruthless marketization of education” (Charles 2014: 52) which has led to the abandonment of the universal principles of education as a public good; has produced and will continue to produce generations of indebted students (McGettigan 2013; Lazzarato 2015); has crushed student and staff dissent; and overseen the piecemeal, but by no means complete, privatisation of education (Blacker 2013). With this has gone any meaningful, democratically mediated notion of the public who benefit from universities as centres for the cultivation of reasoned, independent thought.

The “disenchantment of politics by economics” (Davies 2014: 4) has therefore had great implications for the governance of Higher Education, in which the entire sector has come to be defined through a ‘New Public Management’ (Radice 2013) and regimes of calculation and audit. This has produced a deeply hierarchical and competitive environment in which the ethos of private sector management is now imposed on universities; where a greater focus is placed on “performance as measured by quantitative targets, and the widespread use of financial incentives” (Radice 2013: 408), among them being the individual promise of higher salaries, promotion and increasingly job security, and where policy has sought “to turn the culture of higher education towards entrepreneurialism” (Hall 2015: no pagination).

Griselda Pollock (2012: 92) for one has even linked the “bureaucratic administrative modernity within which the atrocities of both concentration camps and a specialized extermination process were made possible, and aspects of the contemporary university culture”. As Pollock (2012: 92) writes, this is not an attempt to simply conflate the two processes, identifying any “distasteful social transition” as being understandable
through the historical and moral lens of the Holocaust. Rather, it focuses on “an echo of situations about which I read in my historical research”, and which “[foster] obedience and thoughtlessness in place of love for the world and political responsibility”. This builds explicitly on Hannah Arendt’s reflections on ‘thinking’.

Of course, the aims of HE policymakers, vice chancellors or staff themselves are by no means genocidal, and the comparison is by no means an unproblematic one. In *Modernity and the Holocaust*, Bauman (1989) had described the Holocaust as involving more than just the physical elimination of undesirable populations. By linking the event to the project of modernity itself, it speaks also to the processes by which the transformation of a society can be undertaken, and it is this aspect that Pollock is most concerned about. Citing Saul Friedlander’s *Nazi Germany and the Jews* (1997):

“as a system, the Nazi regime installed itself by making small changes or demands, each of which was just about manageable, and was, therefore, little resisted. These small changes accumulated, however, to a point when resistance, inspired by something really outrageous, had become utterly impossible because of the preceding concessions that eroded the space or positions from which now to resist. It was simply too late”

Indeed, it is precisely such a process that Pollock attributes to university staff, who, like petty functionaries have continued to make concessions to neoliberal forms of governance, adding here and there certain elements that may one day “so change the sphere of education that there is no line of defence for what has to be defended” (2012: 93). Therefore, just as it was ‘thoughtlessness’ that motivated the actions of Adolf Eichmann and not mere stupidity (Arendt 1978: 4), so too to universities “succumb little policy change by little policy change until an entire system has been irreversibly altered” (94).

As an analytical and descriptive statement about the changes undergoing Higher Education, such claims are not the most accurate. Indeed, it may be worth instead considering Pollock’s argument as a strange kind of *existential test* (Boltanski 2011), voiced through the standard means through which the academic community communicate and formulate ideas (i.e. the journal), and which constructs comparisons between the scholarly activity they engage with and the current environment in which
they work in order to make sense of why processes of marketisation or neoliberalisation appears to be unfolding with little resistance or thought to their long-term consequences.

Nevertheless, Ron Amann (2003) has presented a similar argument comparing change in British public policy at the start of the 20th century with regimes of domination in Soviet Union. Indeed, for Amann, the willingness to engage in a certain kind of contradictory behaviour happens due to the sheer repetition of norms, languages and practices associated with processes of financialisation As Amann argues (2003: 473), “groups which are subject to a concerted political and ideological attack of this kind frequently make a psychological adjustment which they usually too proud to own up to”.

In this regard, “the constant drumbeat of ideological repetition […] can produce conversion and consensus” (473). This combination of the presence of what we might call truth tests after Boltanski (2011), whereby a state of affairs is continually asserted as the only possible reality, according to Amann (2003) produces a circumstance whereby the possibility of critique, formed from those resources which constitute the world (Boltanski 2011) is profoundly limited. On an organisational level, strategies of ‘communicative planning’ rather than hierarchical organisation have been important developments as they affirm the necessity of “embedding values organically rather than devolve specialist information hierarchically” (2003: 474) such that those in the institution come to ‘own’ the process of enacting ‘necessary’ changes. Those who hold to the ‘old’ values become treated with pity at best, and contempt at worst.

4.4 Summary

The chapter has provided an overview of some dominant characteristics in the articulation of what education, and more specifically, higher education is for. Drawing on Bauman I first provided a description of a transition from the student of ‘solid modernity’ to the student of ‘liquid modernity’. Although an arguably inaccurate account of how universities are characterised and characterise themselves (See Chapter Five), Bauman here presented a vision of a world in which the individual student ought to be equipped in the manner of the smart missile as a metaphorisation of the way capitalism’s new spirit is governed by adaptation to constant change. This was then developed through a discussion of Gerrard (2014) and Bournet et al (2011) who both,
albeit in different ways, allowed me to identify an overlap between learning and employment within capitalism.

I then related these broad conceptual issues to proposals in policy and the creation of new mechanisms for governing education and promoting employability as a generic competence that can be mapped through graduate earnings to assess the worth of universities. The overarching aim of these proposals are to clear and constitute the emergence of new tests of an institution’s worth in accordance with a broadly technocratic vision of education which is beyond critique. Within this vision – although McGettigan calls it a “non-vision” – no longer can education be seen as an inherent social good; rather it ought to be considered as offering something beyond mere academic content (“more than academic attainment”) and introduce processes which supplement (Derrida 1967) ‘pure’ academic education. Universities can no longer be considered places where academic staff carry out “pure research”, transmitted disinterestedly to the next generation. Rather, they will have to rise to the challenges presented by a changing and increasingly global economic landscape. These points to the next chapter, in which I will consider mission statements as expressive of this spirit.
Chapter Five

Confirming the Reality of Institutions: An Analysis of University Mission Statements

5.0 Introduction

In the previous chapter I provided an overview of the state of higher education with reference to employability, entrepreneurship and enterprise. I referred to the tensions between universities and government in representing what students are, what a university is for, and what role is expected of certain actors within university settings. This vision – or “anti-vision” (McGettigan 2005:2) – foregrounded an approach to Higher Education policy consistent with the philosophical anthropology of neoliberalism (Davies 2015). As was shown throughout the chapter, there are numerous constituencies to whom universities (and academic staff) are considered accountable, and in the last several decades a ‘market order’ (which draws its legitimacy from neoliberal economic principles [Davies 2015]) has become more clearly dominant within policy literature and within commentaries on the purpose of Higher Education. This was shown through reference to sociological, policy and related literatures.

In this chapter I pursue this discussion further, drawing on university mission statements in addition to promotional literature to address the formation of a ‘spirit of capitalism’ within Higher Education. Using the concepts associated with Boltanski’s (2011) ‘sociology of critique’, and which I outlined in Part One, I will consider mission statements as the means by which the reality of an institution is confirmed, and through which common characteristics of universities can be articulated. This, I argue, is a means of institutional justification, and in this sense mission statements can be understood as one aspect of a broader conversation about the meaning of university level education. I also include within the methods section of this chapter (Section 5.3) an explanation of how my intentions for this part of the thesis had to change in light of the inability to recruit relevant participants. I will explain what data I have been able to assemble, how it has been used. Finally, I will conclude by identifying what avenues remain to be explored in further research (Section 5.6).
5.1 The Plurality of Common Humanities in Higher Education

It is possible to identify a number of situations which present a small range of interpretations, and where one can be more or less certain about what actions are called for within them (Goffman 1971; Wagner 2014). University settings, however, present a situation where interpretations proliferate, and where evaluations, definitions and justifications can be undertaken in reference to one of many possible orders of worth (Wagner 2014). Indeed, unlike the ‘market order’ associated with, for example, a supermarket, where “the transfer of money and goods presides over the success of an action at the cash desk” (Wagner 2014:239), universities are an instance (among many) where defining the dominant order of worth is a much harder task. Wagner (2014: 239) therefore observes that

“it is highly unclear whether it is the reliable application of research methodology (‘industrial order’), the acquisition of monetary resources in competition with others (‘market order’), popularity with students or in the media (‘order of fame or renown’), or even intellectual creativity (‘inspirational order’) that make an academic ‘great’ or ‘worthy’”.

The evaluation of a great or worthy academic can be undertaken in reference to multiple orders of worth. Within such situations, actors themselves are tasked with determining “which order of justification is the appropriate one in the situation in which they find themselves immersed” (Wagner 2014: 238). This process involves interacting “with the other participants in the situation to resolve a possible dispute over justifications” (Wagner 2014: 238, emphasis in original), and to therefore come to a compromise concerning the appropriateness of a given definition within some particular situation. In doing so, various representations, documents, procedures and tests are called upon in the process of evaluation.

Recall, for example, the seminar covered in Chapter Two (p.41), in which one participant called out, indignantly, “you call this a seminar?” Within this situation, reality comes under scrutiny, and “the need to justify becomes explicit” (Wagner 2014: 239). As Wagner observes, “the plurality of criteria and their relative weight in the situation become visible” (Wagner 2014: 239) and as such the reality of reality becomes an object of dispute. It is therefore possible to consider the relative worth of a justification arising from the ‘market order’ within this situation, in addition to an order
of fame or renown, or an inspirational order associated with intellectual creativity. Based on the accounts provided in Chapter Four, it would be relatively easy to make the claim that a ‘market order’ might be an unwelcome participant in the ensuing dispute.

This is not to say that a ‘market order’, or a related managerial discourse, are absent from academic discourse entirely. However, the identification of uncertainty and the necessity of justification leaves a gap between what Chiapello and Fairclough (2002) outline as enacted and inculcated discourses within Universities. It is along these lines that Paul Trowler (1998) has contested approaches to organizational cultures in universities which pursue what he calls a “nomothetic” account. Nomothetic or functionalist account pursue an understanding of the organisation in holistic terms, able to articulate a “clear understanding of itself and its mission” with members of the organisation “[sharing] a common purpose and for the most part can agree about the means to achieve it” (24). The culture of an organizational is understood as merely enacted, and individual practices are assumed to be “simply adopting a set of pre-existent values and attitudes which they encounter there and performing sets of behaviours which have come to be considered 'the way we do things round here’” (Trowler 1998: 25). In this sense, the formation of an academic *habitus* requires the adoption and internalisation of pre-existent norms.

The move from enactment to inculcation is not inevitable. Rather, there is a gap between enacted and inculcated discourses (Chiapello and Fairclough 2002), and this gap can be greatly pronounced in situations characterised by higher levels of uncertainty concerning the dominant order of worth; that is, where a greater number of possible interpretations are co-present (Wagner 2014). Therefore, like Wagner (2014), Chiapello and Fairclough (2003) characterise British universities as an instance where the link between enactment and inculcation is not as smooth as could be assumed:

A new discourse may come into an institution or organization without being enacted or inculcated. It may be enacted, yet never be fully inculcated. For instance, managerial discourses have been quite extensively enacted within British universities […] Yet arguably the extent of inculcation is very limited – most academics do not ‘own’ these management discourses” (Fairclough and Chiapello 2002: 195).
The thesis of *The New Spirit of Capitalism* developed by Boltanski and Chiapello (2008) presented the relation between capitalism and its critiques as one in which the latter becomes absorbed into a new spirit, facilitating new kinds of engagement with capitalism which respond to the critique, and which are subsequently institutionalised through the proliferation of new tests which confirm the new dominant order of work. In the case of the New Spirit of Capitalism, this was the projective order. As Chiapello and Fairclough (2002: 196) state, the spirit of capitalism became enacted in the formulation of tests and in the form of genres, “and dialectically inculcated in ways of being (identities) such as new manager identities” (196).

In the case of *The New Spirit of Capitalism*, the process of enactment is demonstrated through managerial literature. As works of edification, they constitute a source of inspiration and guidance, and enact discourses through which human action can be rendered accountable in a manner consistent with principle of equivalence, format of investment, state of greatness and paradigmatic tests of the projective order (Boltanski and Chiapello 2007). In forming a new vocabulary for speaking about work, they can come to guide institutional settings, so that “new management discourses become as new genres, for instance, genres for team meetings” (Chiapello and Fairclough 2002: 195). In Chapter Three this was seen in the case of figures such as Allan Gibb (1993) in articulating a model of entrepreneurship in enterprise education, but also the broad statements which aimed to confirm a particular state of affairs through rhetorical gestures. Each of these aim to construct an *ethos* for guiding decision-making within Higher Education Institutions, and have considerable weight. Here, the inculcated identity might be summarised in the figure of greatness of the projective order, that is, the idea of ‘entrepreneurial man’ (Lazzarato 2011), able to forge new connections, expand the employability of himself and others, and increase their stock of human capital. These are aspirational identities over which actors have a high degree of ownership.

However, there are moments of reflexivity in social life, as people “interpret and represent to themselves and each other what they do, and these interpretations and representations shape and reshape what they do” (Fairclough and Chiapello 2002: 195). Again, the process of inculcation is not complete, and although new dominant
discourses may appear, the process of internalising other elements is undertaken “without the different elements being reducible to each other”. This is somewhat similar to how Stuart Hall (1988: 8) has described hegemony in Antonio Gramsci, that is, as the struggle to take a “leading position” in the area of the economy, culture and politics; and to define the language through which individual relate to themselves and others, but which is always “in process,” always being – to greater and lesser extents –pushed back against by criticisms, critique and contradictions which could not be contained by the process of institutionalisation and as such remain as part of ‘flux of life’. Indeed, this is a central aspect of hermeneutic contradiction, and which never quite puts to rest such critique.

This was certainly seen in responses from within academia to processes of neoliberalisation and the entrance of ‘New Public Management’ (Radice 2015; Brown and Carasso 2014) in British universities. Here the sense of something being done to academic pursuits, over which academic staff have little control constituted a vast array of critiques which possess a vocabulary which contests neoliberalism, and are given through academic journals in addition to newspapers, blogs and social media sites such as Twitter. It is possible here to see a rising sense of indignation at the redefinition of academic labour, and the growing denigration of the worth of the knowledge of academics. Thus, it is possible to find different claims concerning the dominant order of worth within universities.

Trowler (1998: 25) has therefore contrasted nomothetic accounts with an “understanding of organisational cultures which sees them at least partly constructed on an on-going basis by individuals and groups”. In this sense, universities are characterised by this ongoing process of construction rather than mere enactment, and draw upon different values in the process of making decisions. Michèle Lamont (2009), for example, has explored the process of evaluation within American universities, and in taking the term ‘excellence’ has shown how this term takes on different associations depending on whether seen from the perspective of academic peer review; interdisciplinary assessments (such as the evaluation of what in the UK would be described as ‘REF-able’ material); in the appointment of new academic staff, and so on. Therefore, questions such as where ‘excellence’ is located has to forge compromises
with the demands for student and staff diversity, processes associated with internationalisation and so on. These terms are situated and debated, and not merely enacted (Trowler 1998).

What follows is an attempt to speak to some aspects of this scholarship through drawing on mission statements. The use of mission statements offers one level of the enactment of discourses associated with entrepreneurship and enterprise. I make no claims here to be able to pursue the above literature to the extent it deserves. However, in exploring mission statements as expressions of institutional reality, the presentation stands alone as a piece of empirical research, while presenting a jumping off point for future research in examining orders of worth within Higher Education.

The apparent necessity of producing a mission statement as “a key element in any organisation” is a relatively recent phenomenon (Davies and Glaister 1996: 261), and appears to derive from corporate settings. According to Peter Drucker “a business is not defined by its name, statutes or articles of incorporation. It is defined by the business mission. Only a clear definition of the mission and purpose of an organisation makes possible clear and realistic business objectives” (Drucker 1973 cited in Davies and Glaister 1996: 261). As Davies and Glaister state, the mission statement ought to be defined by its ability to

“define that the organisation is and what it aspires to be […]; be united enough to exclude some ventures and broad enough to allow for creative growth […]; distinguish a given organisation from all others […]; serve as a framework for re-evaluating both current and prospective activities; [and] be stated in terms sufficiently clear to be widely understood throughout the organisation” (Davies and Glaister 1996: 263).

Mission statements now constitute a commonplace feature of Higher Education Institutions, and as Davies and Glaister (1996: 262) note, universities are keen to adopt and adapt to “the introduction of ideas and methodologies from the business sector”. In this situation mission statements therefore constitute a valid means of assessing how these ideas become translated from “business managerialism” into the arena of academic education.
5.2 The Use of Mission Statements in Higher Education

“It’s – well, it’s hard to say what it is: it’s a kind of cross between an extended dictionary definition of the term ‘university’ and an advertising brochure for an upmarket health club” (Collini 2012: 123).

According to Morphew and Harley (2006), perspectives on mission statements can be split into two main camps. On the one hand, mission statements are seen as little more than corporate window-dressing. Their contents therefore express “vague and vapid goals” which serve a merely rhetorical function written for “accrediting agencies and board members” (Morphew and Hartley 2006: 458), and as Stefan Collini (2012: 87) points out, they are merely a long-winded way of saying “[We] aim to achieve whatever general goals are currently approved of”. As such, unlike the sources of inspiration that Collini (2012: 59) identifies as key moment in the ‘Idea of the university’ genre – “Arnold’s Culture and Anarchy or Mill’s On Liberty or Ruskin’s Unto This Last”; or which have been expressed recently in Les Back’s (2016) Academic Diary – the notion of someone being genuinely inspired by the “empty, portentous prose” (Collini 2012: 87) of “a mission statement composed by committee” (2012: 56) appears ridiculous. The mission statement neither inspires nor does it say very much about what a university actually does in terms of its organizational academic culture (cf. Trowler 1998).

On the other hand, the mission statement can be considered a legitimate “artefact of a broader institutional discussion about [a university’s] purpose” (Morphew and Hartley 2006: 457). In this reading, the mission statement is taken as articulating the aims and values of an institution, placing emphasis on shared meanings and objectives, as well as outlining the responsibilities of the various parties within the institution. As the outcome of a broader conversation about the reality of the institution, the mission statement therefore provides a “focal point for resolving any misunderstandings or conflicts” (Davies and Glaister 1996: 266). In contrast to Collini (2012), a mission statement can indeed operate as a broad source of inspiration when making decisions at a departmental level. As Nader Tavassoli of London Business School (cited in Reisz 2010: unpaged) states, mission statements

“describe what we do and what our purposes are. When you launch a new programme, you can always ask if it is in line with your mission. They become an element of the discussions about whether to go ahead with
something or not. They shouldn't be little slogans we can easily remember, but something we rely on and pull out when making a decision”.

Brian Jones of Leeds Metropolitan University (now Leeds Beckett) supports this claim, arguing that mission statements are "a force for good. They help grow brand value, communicate core university messages, build consent and serve as a totem around which stakeholders, often employees or customers, can rally” (Jones cited in Reisz 2010: unpaged). However, Jones (cited Reisz 2010: unpaged) also identifies how a mission statement might “act as succour, a dummy, a form of reassurance, a message that spells out and justifies business and management decisions”. The mission statement therefore becomes a key actant in the process of institutional justification, as it provides an account of the strategic vision of a university, and offers a public justification of these decisions to relevant parties within and outside a university setting. In this regard, mission statements are significant “carriers of ideologies and institutional cultures” (Swales and Rogers 1998: 225), even if they may not necessarily contain or express the plurality or complexity of organizations.

It is in this sense that Morphew and Hartley (2006) see mission statements as means of bridging a gap between the general and particular, or the specific situation Being one of the ‘rules of the game’, they exist simply “because they are expected to exist” (Morphew and Hartley 2006: 458). Morphew and Hartley (2006: 458) observe:

rather than surfacing values that might guide everyday decision making, colleges and universities fashion mission statements that maximize institutional flexibility. They communicate that nothing is beyond the reach of the organization in question. In doing so, they ignore institutional limitations and sidestep any effort at prioritizing current activities or future initiatives.

In this sense, mission statements have “important legitimizing roles” (468). These as Morphew and Hartley (2006) state are particularly important in large institutional settings where management ostensibly mediates between a variety of constituencies within universities. Assure that colleagues are ‘on message’ and that a consistent message is being delivered both across the university, to potential students, to businesses, to government, and to investors. Both politically and normatively, mission statements have an important role. Morphew and Hartley (2006) state that mission
statements must first of all outline that what is being described is in fact a university, and not some other kind of institution. In other words, “an organisation such as a university succeeds when everyone inside and outside the organisation agrees that it is a university” (2006: 458). As one of the rules of the game, the mission statement serves this broad purpose, as it draws upon terms which are “commonly understood to be form the basis for a higher education mission (e.g. search for knowledge, teaching, service to the community)” (Morphew and Hartley 2006: 458).

On the basis of the above, it is possible to argue that mission statements are attempts to “stabilise interpretations” (Boltanski 2011: 73), and to offer up a definition of reality that limits uncertainty. As I discussed in Chapter Two, for Boltanski, the role of institutions is in defining the “whatness of what is”. Missions statements speak to the general formation of what a university is through particular examples and relate these to a more general sense of what universities as a whole have a responsibility to achieve and deliver. This does not mean that they represent the full plurality of universities. Indeed, just as Boltanski and Chiapello (2007) raises questions concerning the reality of the managerial literature from which they draw, so too is it fair to question the reality of a mission statement.

Mission statements have a broadly prophetic orientation, bringing a selective account of the institution together with a normative focus on what a university ought to achieve. In this regard it pushes the present into the future. As will be discussed below, universities are concerned with articulating this by placing a timeline for the completion of their tasks, which are often of a general nature. In this sense, mission statements are therefore not necessarily constative texts – that is to say, they are not declarations of what is really going on within universities, offering a unique insight into the process of contestation and contradiction identified by Trowler (1998), Wagner (2014) and Chiapello and Fairclough (2002). Rather, they act as prescriptive texts (cf. Boltanski 2008: 58). Much like how Boltanski and Chiapello (2018) view managerial literature, the mission statement becomes constructed in the manner of the exemplum, providing a model which ought to provide a guide to action. As Boltanski and Chiapello (2008: 58) state, prescriptive texts “take from reality only such of its aspects as confirm the orientation to which they wish to give some impetus”. They have the function of
offering “normative rather than utilitarian purposes” (Morphew and Hartley 2006: 459), and present particular cases in so far as they possess some “demonstrative power” (Boltanski and Chiapello 2008: 58).

Collini (2012: 87) is therefore undoubtedly right to refer to the mission statement as “the representative genre of our time” in that it embodies the corporatized and managerial language that suffuses contemporary capitalist formations, and which has made up the focus of my discussion up to this point. However, Collini’s claim that they do nothing is not necessarily one that can be decided in advance. These documents, even if they do constitute a vacuous regurgitation of management speak form statements which justify the purpose of the institutions and draws upon evidence in support of these claims from the existing research culture of universities. To conclude, Morphew and Hartley (2006: 459) state that: “irrespective of which camp is correct, given the amount of time and resources colleges and universities spend in planning and constructing mission statements for audiences like accreditor and prospective students, mission statements are important documents”. Indeed, considering the fact that such documents exist, they nevertheless say something about the institution of the university.

5.3 Method

The following takes a sample of 16 mission statements across Universities in England. This was achieved by selecting from the University League Table from The Complete University Guide 2018, with a sample taken from top, middle and bottom. I place no particular methodological importance on the league table itself here, only that it provided a convenient selection of universities as well as provided some boundary around the texts I could feasibly cover. This does not mean that the selection could be considered neutral. A selection taken from just the top of the league table, or just taken from the bottom may have elicited somewhat different results depending on the kind of questions being asked. Indeed, to speak of a homogenous higher education sector across England would be an error, as the term itself refers to what Collini (2013: 124) has described as “a diverse range of institutions”. These include post-1992 institutions, Russell Group Universities, Redbrick Universities, and more recently a small handful of for-profit providers (Collini 2017, McGettigan 2015). My focus was less on explaining
this diversity and more on establishing a series of common terms which speak to the aim of universities taken as a generic term for tertiary education.

The selection covers the years between 2013 and 2017. In the process of selecting, I came across mission statements that were considerably short, taking up no more than a page on the University’s website, or one side of a pdf document. Others were considerably longer, with an executive summary (most often written by the Vice Chancellor as legitimate representative of the University); case studies covering various facets of the university (including evidence of innovation and entrepreneurship); and supporting statements from students, alumni and/or staff. I have chosen this latter group as it provided more information to draw on.

Indeed, Mission Statement is arguably not even a particularly accurate name for the documents I have assembled. Across this chapter, I have included texts that have a range of titles, such as ‘Our Vision’; ‘Strategic Framework’; ‘Strategic Plan’; ‘Our Strategy’; ‘Mission’, ‘Purpose’; and ‘Corporate Strategy’. The term ‘Mission Statement’, therefore, acts as a shorthand for texts that aim to codify the legitimate practices of an institution. In this sense, it aims to be consistent with existing literature in referring to the genre from which these texts derive. What defines these documents is some general commitment to University principles, both historically and in the present, outlining a programme for future development, and clarifying the values of the institution. Mission Statements in this sense “stand a little apart from the normal recursive processes that produce and reproduce everyday social and institutional customs” (Swale and Rogers 1998: 226).

Within the discussions I move through broad definitions and into values, mission and vision. How universities speak to the past, present and future of their institution will be an aspect of this discussion in so far as they contain moments that confirm but also profoundly contest Bauman’s identification of ‘liquid modernity’ as a simple jettisoning of the past in favour of a promised future. In this chapter I will place these into dialogue with other kinds of writing on the aims, objectives and guiding principles of Universities. Throughout this chapter I view mission statements as an aspect of how university institutions represent themselves. It is undoubtedly limited in what it can say about organisational cultures; how enterprise, employability are enacted or indeed
inculcated in university settings. This is therefore an incomplete picture of university settings, and the extent to which this can say something about specific iterations of enterprise, employability and entrepreneurship is limited. In a similar vein, John Swales and Priscilla Rogers (1995) have also discussed their own difficulties in building on the thematic analysis of mission statements they provide in corporate settings through interviews. For them this was due to their status as “outsiders of the particular corporate culture” (Swales and Rogers 1995: 236) they were investigating. Nevertheless, it constitutes a valid set of literature for exploring the expression of capitalism’s ‘new spirit’ within Higher Education.

5.4 Defining the Institution: Vision, Mission, Values

The mission statement acts a moment of confirmation, and therefore identifies the reality of the institution. The institution here is defined as a “bodiless being” (Boltanski 2011: 75) offering some aspect of semantic security derived from an “institutions seeming independence from corporeal subjects’ particular standpoints” (Browne 2014: 28). The concept of institution is designed as a means of giving some of conceptual reasoning for the coming together of various embodied beings (Boltanski 2011). In this respect, voluntaristic assumptions which take for granted that actors will merely come together to reduce situations of uncertainty derived from a “tacit will to cooperate so that something hangs together” (Boltanski 2011: 54) are questioned. The institution is tasked with saying “what matters” (75) and in doing so brings non-existent entities into being (for example, ‘excellence’ and ‘innovation’) through declaring their value, and provides frameworks through which actors come together in reducing uncertainty in reference to these. These tasks involve “an enormous labour of homogenization of vocabularies and syntaxes and definition of good and bad usage” (Boltanski 2011). Some languages come to have the status of generalisable, and as such valid, statements about the reality of the institution, whilst others retain a jargonistic, or particularistic, quality. These processes have been discussed at length in Chapter Three and Chapter Four.

Mission statements tend to focus on which legitimate representatives of the institution can speak. In the case of mission statements, it is not uncommon for there to be an executive summary, composed (or at the very least signed off by) the Vice Chancellor. As head of the University, and therefore key representative, the Vice-Chancellor
presents an outline and definition of what the university is. The Vice-Chancellor’s statement (described under sections with titles such as ‘Vice-Chancellor’s vision’ (UNI); ‘Vision and Mission’; ‘Forward’; and ‘Introduction and Vision’) acts as such a moment of confirmation, and it is this that distinguishes it (as an official institutional document) from other kinds of publication, for example the disgruntled employee’s twitter thread; the blog post; the anonymous article in a newspaper, and so on as these have the character of *existential tests* which can be written off as expressive of a particularistic, or pathological, stance.

The summaries that I cover here define what the university is, what it achieves, and what it is known for. The mission statements I covered contain what JISC (no date) state is the primary purpose of the mission statement *as such* (that is, as a genre which transcends specific universities and defines the status of The University taken as an ideal type): “Visualising and articulating what it is that your institution exists to achieve (its ‘mission’); what defines its character and ethos (its ‘values’); your opportunity to look to the future, to define your aspirations and to describe the type of organisation you wish to become (its ‘vision’)”.

Through these, mission statements consistently employ the ‘we’ form, with the university characterised as a collective entity maintained by the commitment of each area of the university to their mission. For example, in executive summaries:

**University of Sheffield:** “This is a University with a richly deserved international reputation for outstanding research and teaching, and over a century of achievement across the full spectrum of academic life which, in its turn, has directly improved the lives of people all over the world” (University of Sheffield, 2)

**University of Leeds:** “Increasing knowledge and opportunity in powerful knowledge is, and will continue to be, the defining feature of life at Leeds, distinguishing us from other universities and enabling us to address the challenges of education and research across a broad range of disciplines with energy and confidence” (University of Leeds, 3).

**De Montfort University:** “We can be confident in looking ahead because we do so from a position of strength, built on shared success. To prosper further, we must bring these visions and values to bear on everything we do, every day” (De Montfort University, 3)

**University of West London:** “Our plan promotes excellence in student learning, experiences, and outcomes. It focuses on student success,
employability and improved retention as well as diversity and the advancement of our reputation. Our plan also concentrates on impactful research which can benefit people, society, and the economy and aims to develop student with the career credentials they need for success and leadership in the 21st century” (University of West London, 3).

**University of Birmingham:** “Our challenge is to become a world leading global university. We will achieve this through enhanced research power and reach; the distinctiveness of our exceptional student experience; the breadth and depth of our academic portfolio; our size; and the extent of our global networks (3).

Across the 5 statements cited above, the university is situated as a fundamentally global institution; considered in both its local and international reach. Within this, internationalism, employability, research, and the student experience take central place. In some cases this also involves the ambition to remain in the top 100 universities in the UK. The role that League Tables have come to occupy high status; and all mission statements make some reference to this, weaving together the pragmatic language of capitalist common sense and inspirational imperatives. For example:

**University of Warwick:** “As one of the UK’s top ten universities, and one of the top 100 in the world – the only UK University of its generation to achieve such progress – it is our responsibility to bring together our unique strengths of academic excellence, industrial partnerships, creativity and enterprise to plan with confidence for a more impactful future.”

**Keele University:** “recognised internationally for excellence in education, research and enterprise” (10).

Writing in relation to Community Colleges in the US, David Ayers (2005: 529) has noted how the language of the mission statement must not define its mission, values and vision “solely in terms of earnings and economic productivity”; they must also aim to “address a broad range of human capacities”. Indeed, the blunt language of human capital investment is not foregrounded in the same way as it is in policy-related literature; or rather, it is positioned alongside more general aspirations that universities promote; how they define the specificity of this particular university and how they relate to the broader sense of what all universities should do in pursuit of a common good. Blunt statements of economic reality are therefore not valuable in and of themselves; but must draw on a commitment to ‘non-economic’ values of co-operation, collegiality, knowledge and research. Indeed, in this respect, they pay heed to both an industrial
order, but also an civic order based on the university’s commitment to produce research and teaching with a public good.

For example, within Executive Summaries, University of Sheffield’s Vice Chancellor, Professor Keith Burnett writes in such a way as to appeal to the civilisational values of what Bauman (2000) described as indicative of a now abandoned solid modern education:

Two millennia after Virgil considered man’s practical and political struggle to live well in the world, we continue to agree that a crucial element in human success is the process of ongoing discovery, of understanding underlying causes.

However, these are weaved together with an emphasis on terms which assert the ‘liquid modern’ education. Pollock (1988) also asserted the contradictoriness of such a stance, on the one hand referring back to civilization values associated with classical thinkers and knowledge as a linear process of discovery and invention, connected to an Enlightenment tradition, and on the other asserting that universities do not necessarily dictate what that world should look like but merely respond.

Many of these documents place an emphasis on employability in some capacity, both among students and within staff (It is worth noting, however, that The University of Reading makes only two references to employment). For example:

**University of West London**: “focus on student learning, employability and outcomes”

**University of Leeds**: “equipping them to succeed in a competitive global employment market and to make a difference”.

**University of Reading**: “to put academic excellence to work”

**University College London**: “we will give our students opportunities to gain experience that will prepare them for employment or further study”

**De Montfort University**: “We will […] ensure students develop a broad range of skills for success in academic study, life and employment”.

**University of Birmingham**: “Our University of Birmingham Graduate and University of Birmingham Student Experience will draw together […] induction; an innovative curriculum; participatory scholarship; skills and support to enhance employability; and welfare and support networks”.


As Boltanski and Chiapello (cited in Kempler 2007: 153) observe, the vision of connexionist man is oriented along the following lines:

“He prefers to renounce official power in favour of network forms of power, freed of the constraints of supervision, invigilation, management, representation, and the respect of the state rules regulating the use of goods and the management of human beings. He leaves that to others. For he prefers autonomy to security”.

5.5 Accounting for and Responding to Change

Mission statements are broadly upbeat and optimistic in orientation, but also display a pragmatism concerning the necessity of responding to change. Recalling Bourner et al’s statements on educational priorities as requiring an adjustment to an uncertain future based on the fundamental disposability of all knowledge. Indeed, as Trowler (1998: 13) notes, “Emphasis on the purposes of higher education tends to shift depending on the economic and political situation at the time”. This is not just a recognition of change itself, but involves statements on how the world is changing, and what universities ought to do:

**University of West London**: “Despite the uncertainty surrounding the Higher Education sector, universities continue to embody some of society’s ‘weightiest aspirations and highest deals’ and remain an essential part of the public good. The entire University community is therefore looking forward to the opportunity to take part in this new vibrant strategic plan”.

**Newcastle University**: “Over recent years the scale and speed of change has been dramatic, both in our own sector and in the wider global society. On a national level, the new funding arrangements for higher education in England, and the UK’s slow and tentative emergence from recession, present significant challenges to all universities. They will not, however, distort our institutional vision, or divert our mission, both of which we reconfirm”

**University of Birmingham**: “The future of HE funding is in flux and it is clear that the stable public funding environment of the past is over. The University of Birmingham recognised the challenges posed by these changes early, and, through our Sustainable Excellence programme, developed a robust academic vision that ensured our financial strength was protected”

**Keele University**: “Implementing our strategy for Keele Beyond 2015 will be reliant upon our effective delivery and our ability to flex and adapt to the changing and challenging external context. Flexibility will therefore need to
go hand-in-hand with our ambitious and aspirational agenda to ensure that we can realise our optimistic expectations as we progress towards 2010”.

Again, Ayers (2005) identifies the role of the necessity of adapting to change across five Community College Mission Statements. Whereby “the tyranny of the market is, by default, a natural phenomenon that cannot be contested any more than bad weather can be contested” (Ayer 2005: 542). Indeed, Bournér et al (2008) argued that the pace of social change is accelerating, and as such universities must, out of necessity, learn to keep up with this change, capturing a sense in which time of learning and the time of capital ought be brought into a closer alignment (Rosa 2013). This entails a divesting of responsibility according to Ayers: They “[portray] change as an inevitability but also releases human actors from ethical responsibility for policies and practices that perpetuate distributive injustice and social inequality” (Ayers 2005: 544). To argue that there is no moral content to the claims made within mission statements would be an error, however, and here Ayer’s is clearly mobilisation a narrative of disembedding. Rather, mission statements make appeals to the good sense of university staff. Still, this necessity of change confirms a kind of neoliberal ethic of engagement.

Ayers (2005: 542) also states that broader discourse about the role of education in a national political conversation […] “The choice of the words ‘skills improvement’, a nominalization, seems awkward. It renders the learner conspicuously absent” (Ayers 2005: 542). Learners here become considered as a generic ‘workforce’ and are depersonalised. For Ayer (2005) this was evidence to support the claim that “the discourse of economics colonizes the discourse of pedagogy” (542). This language is present in many of the mission statements I’ve covered, and was undoubtedly a central aspect of the employability discourse that has become more central to HE policy. This was also what Ruth Jonathan (1983) saw in her analysis of the ‘manpower service model of education’ as the submission of pedagogical ambitions to those of industry, as well as Jessica Gerrard’s (2013) analysis of learning and labour.

Most emblematic of this in the mission statements I analysed, however, was The University of Bradford, which provides the bluntest assertion of this position. Asserting the role of the old in relation to the new; the legacy of Britain Moving through sections on ‘the world economy’; ‘the role of universities’; ‘Global challenges’; ‘Britain’s position’; and ‘Britain’s universities’, the University of Bradford mission statement
creates a conceptual linkage between general social formations and the particular situation within Universities in general and Bradford University in particular, affirming that “The nature of the world economy has changed dramatically in the 21st century”. Recalling the character of this change recalls Bourner et al’s (2008), whereby structural changes necessitate, with the emergence of “a global market in information, technological know-how and services” becoming more prominent in the 21st century. The global environment is one in which “most countries are competing aggressively to build up a knowledge economy”.

Echoing Lord Young’s (2014) characterisation of universities (covered in Chapter Three) as needing to embrace enterprise culture, The University of Bradford therefore describes universities as once upon a time being “ivory towers for abstract teaching, reflexive scholarship and fundamental research”. Universities now exist, however, as “the creators of wealth and the motors of social and economic change”. In realising their central role, universities must exist in a close relation to “industry, business and the professions”, with teaching geared towards the formation of “the next generation of world leaders”. Throughout the document, leadership constitutes a persistent theme, however considering the process of massification in higher education provision, the notion of higher education as a system for generating ‘world leaders’ seems to undermine some of the more democratic claims within higher education policy concerning widening access and increasing participation (Charles 2012).

Again, University of Bradford, the UK is a “post-industrial tradition nation that must develop a strong knowledge economy”; “a class-based disdain for engineering, professionalism, money-making and the world of work”; in short, a cultural of distrust towards wealth and hard work, and the consequences of the “legacy of [Britain’s] industrial past”. Articulate strengths “There are great opportunities in UK sectors such as manufacturing and health, and in overseas student and business markets”. Again, Ayer’s (2005: 544) focus on the notion that education ought to meet “specific production demands” is once again present here, giving the impression that the university institution ought to ne
5.6 Summary

In this chapter I have provided an account of university mission statements. In doing so, I have aimed to build on the theories outlined within Part One and applied these to the area of Higher Education. Throughout Chapter Three, I emphasised the increasing role of neoliberalism and the spread of an enterprise culture over the latter years of the 20th century and into the 21st. An intensification of language associated with neoliberal economic here was shown to have reconfigured the notion of a public primarily concerned with growing their stock of human capital. This was developed further in Chapter Four in which I provided an overview of the role of employability and enterprise which, context in which mission statements are written. Whilst the language of neoliberalism is overwhelmingly present in higher education. Employability, enterprise and situation of growing change is certain congruent with the broader shape and direction of public policy.

There is of course a limitation here in terms of the ability to consider the interpretation of such documents with institutional settings themselves, and how different groups respond to, interpret or critique the activity of their institution. Trowler is therefore right to see organizational cultures as not merely homogeneous entities, but as expressing the multiple orders present within university settings. Still, it is apparent to see the enactment of discourses associated with capitalism’s ‘third spirit’ within the mission statements as they aim to speak at a level of generality which sheds little light on what goes on within universities, but function as an almost ritualistic device (or truth test) which asserts reality. The degree to which the formation of reality tests, which aim to test the objectives of an institution in light of its claims about itself (through meetings, staff forums, teaching and research activities and so on), would have to be pursued further with ethnographic sociological research. In this regard, how discourses are drawn upon in university organisational cultures is an area of future research and will be addressed further in the Conclusion.
PART THREE

The Creative Arts
Chapter Six

The Fate of the Artistic Critique

“[W]hat goes on in the world of art beats all for stupidity and degradation – and to such a degree that someone who has some sense of decency and balance can’t help but lower his brow in burning shame when confronted with this childish and pretentious orgy. Oh, those inspired songs to which no one listens! Oh, the connoisseur’s clever talk and their enthusiasm at concerts and poetry readings, oh, the initiations, valorisations, discussions, and oh, the faces of those who recite or listen to poetry and collectively celebrate the mystery of beauty!” (Gombrowicz 2005 [1937]: 74).

6.0 Introduction

The first chapter of Part Three brings the discussion so far into the area of the creative industries, placing particular emphasis on the Creative Arts. Here I consider the way the language of the artistic critique and its absorption into the projective order formed a new way of considering the activity of a section of the knowledge economy hitherto considered on the periphery of economic concerns. Within the New Spirit of Capitalism, creativity becomes manifested as a kind of “imposed self-fulfilment”, and engagement with capitalist pursuits the conditions for the realisation of human freedom. In short, “as encouraging the fulfilment of the promise of the artistic critique” (Boltanski and Chiapello 2007: 425).

Critics of the term creative industries have argued that the creative industries definition has largely comprised of software and IT. As I show below, this undoubtedly made the contribution of creative industries to the economy look more impressive, but also raised questions about the actual contribution of areas such as the Creative Arts (Hewison 2014). Indeed, McGettigan questions whether Creative Arts ought to be playing the game that the creative industries discourse has set, considering these established means of governing their contribution are formed on shaky foundations; those of an economising logic that only promises continued access to the rewards of capitalism in so far as it can contribute through GDP. I leave this evaluation to one-side. The term ‘creative industries’ has altered perceptions regarding the value of culture, and of
creativity more generally (McRobbie 2015), and appears as a set of reference points for constructing justifications of creative activities. I am not therefore concerned with the objectivity of the creative industries term per se, but rather of the way in which public policy has been shaped by this concept, and how the objects under its remit are justified and governed in relation to this discourse (Flew 2012).

6.1 Creativity and the Creative Industries

Once described by Raymond Williams (1961: 19) as being both “consistently positive” in its use but so repetitively deployed so as to “seem useless”, the range of practices and processes associated with creativity have nevertheless become increasingly influential, shaping not only our perception of the range of capabilities possessed by human beings, but also underpinning large swathes of educational, cultural and industrial governance. Indeed, as Gerald Raunig, Gene Ray and Ulf Wuggenig (2011: 1) write in their introduction to Critique of Creativity, “on the resonant conceptual ground of creativity, new social functions are unfolding”. Among one the most powerful of these new functions associated with creativity over the last few decades has been the incorporation of ‘creativity’ into the story of national economic prosperity and growth.

In the first Creative Industries Mapping Document produced under New Labour for the DCMS in 1998, it was found that the creative industries made up 5% of total UK national income, accounted for 500,000 jobs, and that after financial and business services were “London’s second largest economic sector” (Flew 2012: 9). More recent studies show that the creative industries have been shown to produce £71.4 billion per year for the UK economy, accounting also for 2.68 million jobs as of 2012 (DCMS 2014). As of 2017, this figure sore to £268 billion, growing at nearly twice the rate of the economy (DCMS 2018). Demonstrating a rise of productivity within the creative economy, this data has repeatedly been drawn upon to provide evidence contrary to the received wisdom that art and culture are merely a private pursuit which has little to no social or economic impact (Flew 2012). As such, as the terrain of the creative industries was being mapped, the realisation of this area’s economic contribution would provide opportunities for a section of the labour market hitherto considered at worst a drain on public resources, and at best on the margins of the so-called ‘real economy’ (Flew 2012).
Among the benefactors of the celebration of creativity have been the ‘creative class’, emblematic of “post-industrial prosperity and “a paragon of rewarding job opportunity” (de Peuter 2014: 264). As the originator of this term, Richard Florida (2011: 38) defines this socioeconomic group as made up of knowledge-economy professionals in business, science, tech and advertising industries, and whose activity is defined by the creation of “meaningful new forms” through upsetting traditional modes of working, norms and conventions, as much as producing distinct consumer products. Whilst traditional defined Bohemian groups, paragons of the artistic critique, are slightly peripheral to this creative class, they are nevertheless perceived as being part of it, at least more so than any other traditional class formation (Florida 2011). Such creatives are said to bear witness to the success of a continually expanding practice of creative entrepreneurship, in which each individual can maximise their value through a range of savvy and wisely considered decisions, keeping on top of changes in fashion, chasing the flow of cultural capital, as well as challenging the “rhythms patterns, desires and expectations that structure our daily lives” (Florida 2011: viii).

The creative industries have therefore arguably moved from the periphery to the centre of policy-making, and now have a much larger stake in everything from economic growth and sustainability to social cohesion and urban regeneration (Smith 1998; Leadbeater and Oakley 1999; Howkins 2001; Florida 2011). Indeed, as Richard Florida (2011: 30) – champion and guru of the ‘creative class’ – has affirmed,

“what we are doing now is mainstreaming [creative] activities; building an entire economic infrastructure around them. Scientific and artistic endeavours for instance, have become industries unto themselves, and they have combined in new ways to create still newer industries. The joint expansion of technological innovation and creative content work has increasingly become the motor force of economic growth”.

This valorisation of creativity has taken on a global form and become increasingly credible as a form of justification among a wide range of literatures concerning the role and future direction of the ‘knowledge economy’. It has led to the development of new directions within the fields of cultural studies in areas such as ‘cultural policy’ (Flew 2004). The discourse of creativity has also come to underpin the objectives of the UN’s
Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD, 2012), the European Commission’s Cultural and Creative Industries strategies, and also formed the guiding theme for The World Economic Forum in Davos in 2006 under the title ‘The Creative Imperative’.

The celebration of “the new model worker” (Ross 2010: 10) became particularly important towards the end of the 1990s, and in the UK became a central element in New Labour’s strategy of aligning entrepreneurial activity and cultural creativity with economic growth (de Peuter 2011; Ross 2009; Hewison 2014). This would effectively operationalise the vision of the entrepreneur and a renewed enterprise culture within cultural governance (Smith 1997; Beech 2015). Therefore, in the proposals of figures such as Charles Leadbeater (2000), Chris Smith (1998) and others, creative practices were seen as Britain’s way of playing a leading role on the world stage; producing a generation of ‘independents’ or ‘cultural entrepreneurs’ who could adapt to ever new situations, directing their immaterial labour towards socially productive ends (Leadbeater and Oakley 1999). Tony Blair (1999 cited in Flew 2012: 10) would also announce that “the creative talents of all the people” could now be drawn upon “to build a true enterprise economy for the 21st century”. Likewise, according to the Department for Culture, Media and Sport’s (DCMS) Chris Smith (1998 cited in Flew 2012: 11), the burgeoning creative industries were where “the jobs and the wealth of the future” were going to be created, and would have a strong part to play in urban regeneration, social cohesion and the promotion of a national cultural identity.

There would be new incentives for creatives to market themselves within the wider world of the creative industries, forming partnerships with non-governmental agencies and taking part in the growth of an enterprise culture (Hewison 2014). This also took the form of the financial exploitation of creativity through Intellectual Property (Forkert 2009). This would be a means on generating profit/rent from unique cultural products, and therefore become “a source of competitive advantage” (Davies 2014: 113). For Boltanski and Arnaud Esquerre (2016, 2017), this speaks to a new form of value setting in what they term enrichment economies. Indeed, Boltanski and Esquerre (2016) take issue with Florida’s mischaracterisation of a homogeneous ‘creative class’ who have, through their own talents, managed to usher in a new age of innovation, creativity and talent. As they argue, “enrichment economies generate their own class structure, with a
patrimonial class of growing importance on the one hand, and a badly paid, insecure precariat on the other” (Boltanski and Esquerre 2016: 36, f.7). Florida’s analysis therefore bypasses such class disparities in search of a catch-all term that describes a homogenous group experience without paying attention to persistent inequalities that exist within and among this group. Despite the reference to ‘class’ as a significant concept within his work, therefore, it might be fair to describe such terms as indicative of a disavowal of class relations. Although I do not discuss this in great depth here, I will return to this division between high and low earners in the art world in the next chapter.

What becomes valued is an individual who embodies the values associated with creativity, and what are needed are individuals who have the ability to utilise knowledge of local cultures and customs; are able to adapt to ever changing circumstances; to imagine the future in new and imaginative ways (IBM 2010; Anderson et al 2011). As Davies (2014: 146) notes, the ability to adapt to and invent “new combinations” means that “these routine-less individuals possess the ultimate worth in the global economy, because they are not governed by any stable standard, but capable of constant reinvention”. Indeed, it is this definition that often seems to apply to the activity of the artist, and as Neil Moreland (2005), the Cox Review of Creativity in Business (2005) and recent reports from Arts Council England state, those in art and design constitute “an untapped resource available to all sectors of UK industry and commerce” (HEA-ADMSC / NESTA 2007: 92).

As spaces of experimentation art schools have been somewhat peripheral to this story, but for some have nevertheless been seen as an important site in the story of the creative industries (Frith and Horne 1987). One addition to this story comes from Art School, Smart School, produced by Isabel Sutton for Radio 4’s Archives on 4 series, aired on November 14th 2014. Drawing on interviews with those who were inspired by their art school experience, Art School, Smart School tells the story of the rise (and fall) of the British art school, focussing attention on spaces such as Central St Martin’s and Ipswich College of Art. Within their walls the creativity of all was allowed to flourish, producing a culture which valorised experimentation and risk-taking; where the process of making art involved ‘hanging out’ as much as it did working in the studio, and
“where the socially and intellectually marginal could distinguish themselves” (Sutton 2014: no pagination). From the radical experiments of educationalists such as Roy Ascott emerged some of the most well-known creative figures of the second half of the 20th century, inspired by the possibilities that were opened up by their art school education. As Sutton (2014: no pagination) states: “Name any one of the UK’s most famous designers or musicians, never mind artists, and they are likely to have set foot in an art school at one time or other: David Bowie, Pete Townsend, Brian Eno, Vivienne Westwood, John Galliano. I could go on and on”.

Art School, Smart School moves within very similar terrain to that of Simon Firth and Howard Horne’s (1987) Art Into Pop and the related Crossovers: art into pop / pop into art by John A. Walker (1987), both of which align a broadly positive conception of creativity within a small set of figures within the areas of pop music and fashion in order to justify the personal and social goods that art education provides. Like Sutton’s documentary, for Horne and Frith, art schools were a “sanctuary”, a place of “autodidacticism and self-expression” – a haven from the world outside which ultimately allowed one to face that world again with greater courage and creativity. Moving away from the academic art that had preceded, within this area: a need of greater innovation, with art schools being central to this process. Greater economic growth, greater autonomy, relation to a glorious past. The narrative is therefore tinged with regret – that the old spaces of ceramics are now filled with computers; a greater emphasis on digital learning, higher tuition fees put off students from poor backgrounds (Greyson Perry states that everyone in the RSA is actually working class), and the commodification of art.

Within this narrative, “[s]ingular individuals are raised up as example of people who have striven to overcome their material circumstances through culture”, and as such are “marked up for symbolic ascension” (Wuggenig etc 2011: 1]. Figures such as Alexander McQueen and Damien Hirst, in addition to figures with pop and rock music above stand apart from the crowd. Indeed, this is further expressed through the aspirational narratives of films such as The Full Monty and Billy Elliot, expressive of what Angela McRobbie (2011: 32) has referred to this as a kind of “soft cultural neoliberalism”, in which old notions of “art and the artistic” are being subsumed under
new concepts of creativity and creative industry which allow people to transcend their closed-minded environments and ascend to a higher status through embodying the values of the *projective order*. This takes what Nairn and Sing-Sandhu (1969) saw as the worst of the art world which remained mired within the language of the *inspirational order*, and its insistence on the greatness of the individual in contrast to their social circumstances and the humdrum of day to day life.

As Nairn and Sing-Sandhu (1969: 107) had observed of art students in the 1960s, they “tend to be unclubbable. They are rebellious, but in a small, individual way quite refractory to any sort of organisation”. Now those rebellious figures could be “seen as ideally prepared for New Economy workplaces, as they would be willing to take their own initiative” (Forkert 2013: 43). These were not the unionised workers of previous generations, collectivised and offering a bulwark against the savagery of capitalism – at least from the perspective of the social critique – but were defined instead by a spirit of resilience, continual self-improvement, satisfaction, and a passion for creative work (Standing 2011). Indeed, due to their socialisation into the art world as one emphasising the greatness of individual creativity, such groups were arguably already seen as being familiar with constant change and project-based working, in addition having a practical understanding of self-management (Ross, 2004). This connection between the socialisation of artistic and the emergence of the ‘new model worker’ will be explored in more detail further below.

### 6.2 Narratives of Creativity

At the same time as Frith and Horne (1987) were celebrating the individualism of art students who had managed to reconcile the opposition between art and commerce through pop, art historians such as Griselda Pollock (1996 [1986]), TJ Clark (1973) and Linda Nochlin (1988) were questioning the ideological grounds of such celebratory readings of art’s history. As was highlighted in the previous section as early as the 1960s, commentators such as Thomas Nairn and Sing-Sandhu (1968) were drawing similarities between the art school and capitalism, indicating the contradictory position artists found themselves within. The “hard-boiled” competitiveness of art school, the mythic language of artists being “set apart from society by their mysterious inner fire”, and the aggressive pursuit of individual fame and fortune were, they argue, not
antithetical to capitalism, but rather constitutive of it. In prioritising a model of genius, art had unmoored the creative individual from the broader conditions of artistic work (Smith 1989).

The claim that academic art education foregrounds an idealistic vision of the artist as genius or as solitary creator is by no means new, and the critique of this figure within enterprise education overlaps with claims that were made throughout the rise to institutional prominence of Marxist, feminist and sociological analyses of art history during the 1970s and 80s. For instance, Griselda Pollock (1996[1986]: 54) stated that there is a profound mystification that takes place in the education of artists, with the art school sustaining a “powerful sense” of the philosophical foundations of artistic-being without any attendant discussion of what working as one actually entails. The “hard-boiled” competitiveness of art schooling, the mythic language of artists being “set apart from society by their mysterious inner fire”, and the aggressive pursuit of individual fame and fortune are not antithetical to social relations outside of the art school, but rather thoroughly entangled with them (Nairn and Sing-Sandhu 1969). Highlight the degree to which the art student is caught between, on the one hand, the traditional model of the Artist as a selection of creative people “set apart from society by their mysterious inner fire” and on the other the professionalization of practice, in which “youthful fortunes can be made overnight, through the right ideas, the right scene, aggressiveness in the right place” (Nairn and Sing-Sandhu 1969: 106).

At present, however, such models redefine artistic work through what might be called be considered akin to a market or industrial order (Boltanski and Thévenot 2006) due to its insistence on terms and processes which reconfigure art as commodities. For example, Kate Oakley, Brooke Sperry and Andy Pratt (2008) in their report Art of Innovation make a series of claims on the behalf of artists to forge an identity between the activity of researching, and building a business identity, to effectively align the activity of art creation with the knowledge economy. As such, reading a book by Dostoevsky or visiting an exhibition by Louise Bourgeois is understood as “being a cultural consumer”, and demonstrates that artists are “aware of the market”. The terms of reference that were established as being part of the inspirational order, in other words, are significantly downplayed. In fact, the use of existential tests here is
interesting to disqualify a reading of art based on the mystical account which Nairn and Sing-Sandhu (1969) described at the end of the 1960s.

Kirsten Forkert (2013) provides a succinct summary of these conditions. From the late 1700s through to the mid-nineteenth century, the art world saw a significant decline of patronage and the guilds, and the emergence of a “market for artistic and literary goods” (2013: 16). This effectively saw an increasingly individualised art ecology, in which artists, poets and writers were released from the bonds of patronage, but at the cost of increasing precariousness. This contributed “to the broader understanding of artistic careers in terms of individual, rather than collective achievements” (Forkert 2013: 16), setting the pace for how artistic careers would be understood in the subsequent century. No longer made for a specific audience, art became “just another commodity” (Wilson 2003: 17), and the artist was charged with selling their wares to an often hostile and indeterminate audience of buyers. In this new context, the artist was in some circles raised to the figure of a “godlike hero”, whose duty was to “realize himself and his unique vision” (Wilson 2003: 17), rather than create works that represented the dominant traditions and beliefs of society. Could enhance their own status through the successful marketing of their own genius and talent.

Artists did not enjoy the same level of professional autonomy as other professions during this period. As Codell (1995: 171) explains:

> they did not necessarily require institutional training, and the finalarbiter of their success was the non-professional public, unlike arbiters for law or medicine. These conditions kept artists from participating in the professional ideal of economic autonomy from the market based on esoteric knowledge or skills (Codell 1995: 171).

Likewise, Howard Singerman (1999: 25) has noted the relative autonomy from professional associations in the context of American academic art, with those wishing to follow their career beyond the traditions of academic art becoming considerably less secure. As Singerman (1995: 25) explains, following an artists’ graduation, there was an expectation that the artist could be “put to work”. For such artists able to enter into a more commercial sphere, work could be found generally the case for those who could “make paintings and sculptures for architectural commissions […] produce models and illustrations, and to design goods for home and office, as well as their packages and
their advertisements” (1999: 25). Yet, for the other artist “education provides no such guarantee” (Singer 1999: 25).

According to Griselda Pollock (1988), the reification of ‘Art’ as a activity outside of everyday social life, or as a pursuit involving the retreat from social life, was one consequence of this structural change in the situation of artists, and carried on well into the 20th century. This problem of the reification, commercialisation or commodification of culture is one that constitutes a long-standing issue within critical and social theory (Adorno & Horkheimer 1997 [1944/1972]; Held 1990; Lukács 1971 [1923]). Defined as a process “whereby social phenomena take on the appearance of things” (Held 1990: 24), reification becomes a means of obfuscating through cultural means the real social relations which underpin them.

As Pollock (1988) continues, pedagogy was therefore still premised on the belief in artists being fundamentally individuals engaged in a higher calling, requiring a rigid and individualising kind of discipline. Entry into colleges involved selecting “privileged independent spirits” from a pool of applications, and “giving [them] the ‘opportunity’ to “sink or swim” (Pollock 1988: 35). Over the course of their studies the student develops a portfolio of their work - “my work, that previous phrase” (35) - through which the specificity of their practice is embodied. It’s easy to imagine the effect of this as similar to Lucy Lippard (1996 [1981]) has described the experience of disenchantment in the face of the reality of the art world as experienced by artists coming to New York in the 1950s and ‘60s hoping to follow in the footsteps of Jackson Pollock, or just to pursue a life embedded within the hippy or Bohemian cultures at the moment social movements were gaining greater prominence in colleges. As Lippard (1996 [1981]: 9) states, “we wanted to be considered workers like everyone else and at the same time we were not happy when we saw our products being treated like everyone else’s, because deep down we know as artists we are special”. Likewise, Pollock (1988) asserts that the effects of art education were profoundly ambivalent, engendering a situation where students were both encouraged to consider themselves as Artists, but also faced with the everyday need to survive.

As such, the reification of Art in this way is two-fold, involving the kinds of processes described by Adorno & Horkheimer (1997 [1944/1972] as the gradual disenchantment
of art as it becomes absorbed into capitalist relations of production, but also as something which hides real relations of production. It is this way that students become placed at what Pollock (1988: 26) saw as a “scandalous disadvantage vis a vis other students”, as any systematic training in art is replaced with a more open and informal environment where artists are socialised into the competitive, and profoundly androcentric space, with success and failure being a purely personal responsibility and not connected to social processes of institutionalisation.

It perhaps therefore makes sense that a greater focus on employability might demystify the situation of artists by acknowledging the reality of the working worlds they inhabit. However, I would argue that the insistence on artists as entrepreneurs has not overcome this kind of disavowal of the world artists inhabit, but instead has led to a new kind of disavowal of social relations. Rather the way in which the identity of artists has returned through the entrepreneurship and enterprise back to artists through the notion of the creative industries suggests a return to an early, more Bohemian conception of the artist as driven by personal satisfaction, autonomy and the pursuit of the ‘creative life’, but with a more business-oriented spin. As Terry Flew (2004: 162) has very succinctly put it:

> discourses identified as having their origins in the arts have filtered through to business, and now returned to artistic and cultural practice through the concept of the ‘creative industries’, where artists are increasingly expected to view themselves as cultural entrepreneurs, managing their creative talents, personal lives and professional identities in ways that maximize their capacity to achieve financial gain, personal satisfaction, and have fun.

In practical terms, this has meant that creative workers have had to slide into the dominant ways in which self-employed / entrepreneurial work is performed within the conditions of neoliberalism (Lazzarato 2011), involving the normalisation of a working practice in which one is constantly learning the readiness to learn, according to which the subject is thought of as oriented toward the market and increasingly accommodated to changes in conditions. The subject conceptualised in this way holds itself in ready dependency to every situation, and is ‘trained’ in the sense of having its abilities rationalised in strict conformity to the moment. It is contingent and dependent on the context, and at the same time, however, it is expected to perform and make choices autonomously (von Osten 2011: 135).
This certainly recalls Zygmunt Bauman’s (2000) ‘smart missiles’, where the changing notion of what an artist is and what art is for becomes aligned with a particular kind of educational vision, what Gerrard (2018) saw as pertinent to understanding as the alignment of learning and labour in the 21st century.

Within this environment, for the authors of Universities UK’s Creative Prospects (2010: 12) the task for Higher Education Institutions is to convince both the government and the public of the important place that those disciplines aligned with the creative industries have for things such as economic growth, technological innovation and “innovation in business models and creative practice”. For Universities UK (2010: 11) it is the highly networked and “multidisciplinary nature of innovation in the creative economy” which forms the best basis on which to make the case for its continued support. This would not only emphasise the skills that creative disciplines provide, but also foreground research and knowledge exchange between industry and higher education undertaken by students during their time at university. This requires an emphasis on the entrepreneurship of creative workers, where university is no longer a place where the industry demands of students are so to speak suspended, but where they can actively engage in developing their enterprising capacities as a key component to the course of study (HEA–ADM/NESTA 2007). In this way, the creative disciplines may be able to form a new way of affirming their economic and social relevance.

There is a sense therefore in which this figure of the entrepreneur has come to “speak the truth of the subject” (Revel 2009: 48) not only of the nature of human action, but of the activity and relevance of creative workers. The way this has been achieved is largely through the linking up of creativity and entrepreneurialism (HEA–ADM/NESTA 2007), and in some cases the activity of artists has come to be seen as underpinning the nature of work within neoliberalism, acting not as an oppositional narrative or practice, but as a collaborator (Boltanski and Chiapello 2007; Ross 2009; Bauman 2009). As Kirsten Forkert (2013) observes, those within the arts have continually had to think about their activities in terms of human capital investment, investing in skills and training, and adapting to the demands of a changing job market.

The valorisation of creativity as guiding a new age of growth gained increasing credibility among a wide range of people at the end of the twentieth century and into the
twenty-first, leading to the development of new directions within the fields of cultural studies towards areas such as ‘cultural policy’ (Flew 2004); underpinning the objectives of the UN’s Conference on Trade and Development, the European Commission’s Cultural and Creative Industries strategies, and forming the guiding theme for The World Economic Forum in Davos in 2006 under the title ‘The Creative Imperative’. There is therefore an emerging consensus concerning the value of creativity and the creative industries internationally, and its high contribution to the economy has been praised globally (Bakhshi, Freeman, Higgs 2013; Miller 2014).

6.3 Creativity and Education

In the move away from economies of work which defined the post-war consensus towards a flexibilisation of labour contracts and the acceleration of neoliberal governance, there has been a celebration of a more independent and autonomous approach to work, with the ‘artist’, or more generally the ‘creative’, being seen as representative and in some cases formative of these new working practices (Boltanski and Chiapello 2007; Anderson et al 2011). Andrew Ross (2009: 16), for instance, has stated that throughout the 1990s, the work and lifestyles of creatives became the “new face of neoliberal entrepreneurship”, suggesting that “because the self-directed work mentality of artists, designers, writers and performers was so perfectly adapted to the freelancing profile favoured by advocates of liberalisation”, the broad areas of culture and creativity could be absorbed into a new business landscape. Indeed, in their book, The Fine Art of Success, Jamie Anderson, Jorg Reckhenrich and Martin Kupp (2011: viii) claim that whilst business leaders have been content to discuss issues of innovation and strategic management in reference to “traditionally defined private firms and publicly listed corporations” the art world has proven time and again that it offers practical insights that could assist and improve the strategies of CEOs and CMOs.14

14 From Tintoretto to Damien Hirst, the de facto entrepreneurship of artists has been on show: Madonna, for instance, “thought carefully about her market and customers as well as her own unique competences and aspirations to develop a differentiated personal strategy” (x).
In following up the artist Joseph Beuys’ statement that ‘everyone is an artist’, Anderson et al (2011) have even asked whether today every manager is an artist, answering in the affirmative.\(^{15}\) For them, Beuys

…is not about taking up visual arts or writing (though this may be part of it). Rather, it’s about mobilizing everyone’s latent creative abilities – engaging one’s creative thoughts, words and actions and expressing this creativity in meaningful ways to shape and form wherever it is needed. In this sense the statement becomes a deeper sense if extended to “if you risk the debate with yourself”. This means to find out in which area your creativity is mostly developed. Beuys said if you ask yourself who you are and what your very own ability is, everybody could be creative – being an artist in his own field of profession (Anderson et al 2011: 77).

In 2010, Universities UK (2010) took an increasing interest in the relationship between higher education and the creative industries, arguing that educational institutions ought to be seen as pivotal in strengthening the sustainability of the creative industries, producing generations of students capable of finding themselves their place within the ‘knowledge economy’. Universities UK (2010: i) sought to “[urge] the Government to take a wider view of the strategic importance of these subjects and to consider areas which although not science-based, contribute significantly to our economic development, as well as the social and cultural wellbeing of the country”. I centre more on what this has meant for education in the arts in Chapter Seven.

6.4 Summary

This chapter has provided an account of the fate of the artistic critique and role of the projective order within the creative industries, linking it to the emergence of a ‘true’ enterprise culture. The growing tendency to speak of creativity as a primarily economic pursuit has been emphasised, and in doing so the linking up of creativity and enterprise has been acknowledged. In doing, it has been shown how truly entrepreneurial action has been consistently attributed to ‘creatives’, who, according to Elizabeth Lingo and Steven Tepper (2013: 348) have become an increasingly mobile and adaptable group,

\(^{15}\) Associated with the Fluxus movement in the 1950s and ‘60s, Joseph Beuys (1921-1986) was a German artist who championed an expanded conception of art as ‘social sculpture’, emphasising the creative role that art could play within the shaping of politics and culture. Beuys has since become a strong influence on the philosophy and practice of socially engaged art (Helguera 2011).
able to “take responsibility for their careers”, and are “proactive and self-directed, anticipate change, and transform their skills and attitudes to accommodate such change”.

As a kind of reformist critique, this chapter has briefly considered the focus on entrepreneurship as a means of challenging existing depictions of the artist as in some sense ‘special’ or divorced from everyday behaviours. To do this, I concentrated on the work of Pollock, and the identification made by Nairn and Sing-Sandhu (1969) of the alignment of artists with the reifying effects of capitalism. Whilst I remain sceptical that entrepreneurship is as enabling of some forms of working patterns which resolve the problems of previous definitions of art as a special kind of activity, in the next chapter I explore this claim further, and finally consider whether the politicisation of employability, carried out by movements such as Precarious Workers Brigade, may not represent a more convincing attempt to build on the existential tests presented to injustices which occur in the art world.
Chapter Seven

Making (and Refusing) the Artistic Entrepreneur

7.0 Introduction

The focus of this chapter is oriented around four claims concerning contemporary art education made within the literature that foregrounds the role of entrepreneurship in the Creative Arts. I identify this as 1) that entrepreneurship is a generic feature of all forms of creative practice; 2) that the competences and skills associated with entrepreneurship are key to successful artistic careers; 3) that tertiary education has prioritised academic content over these more generic skills and as a consequence of this graduates are unprepared to enter the artist market and/or lead successful artistic careers; and 4) that academic art education ought to take seriously the employment outcomes of its students and implement strategies to boost a student’s employability.

The approach from advocates of explicit forms of enterprise education presents itself as a kind of consciousness raising activity: the artist here occupies the objective condition of entrepreneur and therefore must alter their perspective to these conditions as a matter of necessity. In drawing on I cover literature on art education, and like Chapter Four, consider (albeit in less depth) the formation of the ideology of enterprise within the Creative Arts. These build on the legacy of the discourse of the Creative Industries as an aspect of the knowledge economy. In doing this, I also draw on literature which presents an alternative vision of employability, and which has aimed to build a more politicised understanding of this concept.

7.1 The ‘Failure’ of Art Education

Academic art education has been charged with ‘failing’ to communicate the realities of the job market, raising questions as to whether such an education “adequately prepares students for their professional future” (Bauer et al 2011: 629). In a qualitative study of graduate experiences in the job market, it was found that for many of those graduating from art and design courses, “the ‘fun was over’ at the end of the course, when they had to leave the ‘sheltered’ academic life, and enter a tough labour market” (LaValle, O'Regan, Jackson 2000: 48). Indeed, Kirsten Forkert too has identified how, upon leaving university, art graduates find themselves entering a world governed by an
“accelerated temporal framework of consecration”; a search for the single big hit that will raise their profile embedded within circumstances of competition and uncertainty. Within the MA research I undertook, and which I cited in the Introduction, this was also found to be the case among recent graduate participants. However, Bauer, Viola and Strauss 2011: 626) also emphasise the precarious and competitive market that artists face upon graduation, identifying “[p]rofit-monopolising players, inequality-enhancing mechanisms, low-entry barriers and the constant oversupply of labour on the market” in addition to “a reduction in government sponsorship” as a source of revenue. These, they state, “create intense competitive pressure”, and research on the experience of working in the art world itself has often revealed the experience of exploitation rife within the art world (Banks and Hesmondhalgh 2009: 419; Forkert 2014).

These findings overlap with recent earnings data for Creative Arts graduates. As of 2013, graduates from Creative Arts programmes remain one of the lowest paid groups in the United Kingdom, earning on average £21,944 per year, over £3,000 below the UK average of £25,000 (ONS 2014), often finding themselves working multiple, short-term jobs in order to sustain their practice. In the most recent Longitudinal Education Outcomes dataset (Figure 5, p.148) which also provides a spread of graduate earnings across a wide range of institutions where the Creative Arts is offered as a course of study. This more detailed dataset also provides confirmation of this estimate, with the average again being £21,000. In 2016, the same figure was estimated in reports referred to by Aftab Ali (2016) and Oliver Wright (2016). Again, by 2018 it was still shown that alongside social care and media programmes, Creative Arts students are on average earning “around £20,000 five years after graduation” (Belfield, Britton and van der Erve 2018: unpaged).

As was argued in Chapter Four, the aim of such data is in assessing the relative worth of particular courses at particular institutions and therefore graduates themselves through quantitative means. Such data seems to chime well with a broader discourse concerning the ongoing dismissal of art as a ‘non-priority’ subject too which has raised questions regarding how seriously art ought to be taken as a subject of study, particularly as it can be seen as a somewhat risky pursuit with no immediately obvious private or public benefits (Evans 2005). Changes in the distribution of funding have
produced increasing uncertainty surrounding the status of non-STEM subjects, and despite Vince Cable’s (2010: unpaged) claims that the traditionally defined “arty farty subjects [and] even the much maligned ‘media studies’” have some kind of role to play in economic growth, priority has nevertheless being given to the growth of STEM subject, which still exercise considerable strength.

Therefore, despite the sense of fun attributed to creative work (Smith 1998, Blair 1997, Banks and Hesmondhalgh 2009) the reality of working such an area takes its toll. This unarguably contrasts with the glamorous accounts pursued within Creative Industries literature and the more celebratory accounts of art education as a space for experimentation, creativity and freedom (Sutton 2014). This creates a general crisis of art education. However, for a large group of writers in the area of cultural and educational policy, the role of art education today ought to incorporate and hence expand not only the argument that art and culture are good for the economy and essential to the life of a society, but also that artists should have a greater, more reality-congruent awareness of the working world and thus the challenges they face. This will allegedly sharpen a broad set of psychological capacities and as a result improve artists’ employability (Bauer et al 2011).

7.2 Entrepreneurship and Creativity

Entrepreneurship and artistic creativity are often seen as being worlds apart. Indeed, glancing over the blunt neoliberal account of entrepreneurship one could quite easily come to this conclusion. For Ludwig von Mises (1949: 297) the entrepreneur merely meets a demand of some kind, serving “the consumers as they are today, however wicked and ignorant” (Mises 1949: 297). The entrepreneur acts on no other principle than that of the “absolute democracy of the consumer and hence the functioning of the market” (Dardot and Laval 2013: 105). For von Mises (1949 cited in Dardot and Laval 2013: 105), the entrepreneur has no interest in what is being created, only that it meets a demand of some kind: “it is not the fault of the entrepreneurs that the consumers – the people, the common man – prefer liquor to Bibles and detective stories to serious books, and that governments prefer guns to butter. […] His profits are greater the better he succeeds in providing the consumers with those things that they ask for most intensely”. In the case of artists on the other hand there are a host of qualitative judgements – both
affective and ethical – that exceed purely economic demands, and therefore incorporates work that is “oriented toward cultural, social and not-for-profit activities” (HEA–ADM/NESTA 2007: 58). It is for this reason that Lazzarato (2011) has stated that entrepreneurship has “nothing to do with creativity”, and indeed according to the broad tradition of post-Marxist and ‘accelerationist’ writers, the precondition for the release of a “hitherto repressed creativity” pulsating beneath the surface of capitalism is that “the vampire of capital is lopped off” (Cunningham 2015: 27).

Entrepreneurship can arguably be seen as the continued expansion of capitalism into the art world. Yet, such an approach stifles the possibility of there really being anything outside of such processes of reification, as all become totally subsumed under the power of capital as ‘authentic’ social bonds become impossible to locate anywhere (Raunig 2011). That entrepreneurship contains some kind of hope in the necessity of restoring to art practice the possibility of thinking of the work as precisely that - work (Pollock 1988). It is for this reason that the work of Boltanski (2011) becomes important here as the task of opening the possibility of alternative forms of defining reality is embedded in the activity of ordinary actors immersed in the same situation. As will be shown further below, the entrance of work into art education via entrepreneurship offers up the possibility of politicising education (PWB 2012; 2017) in such a way as to address the real conditions of artist’s lives, and their barriers to achieving personal and professional fulfilment.

According to Ruth Bridgstock (2012), the absolute distinction made between entrepreneurship and creativity overlooks not only the close alliance between creativity and entrepreneurship conceptually, but also bypasses the degree to which artists must necessarily operate as ‘entrepreneurs’ in order to make their practice sustainable. Just as

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16 However, I remain sceptical that this will be the case so long as the murky realities of working in the art world are not addressed (see Section 7.5).

17 The creativity of artists has been said to overlap with the creativity of the entrepreneur. For example, in the work of Joseph Schumpeter, the quasi-heroic status of the entrepreneur, whose counteraction against prevailing norms resists formalisation and hence stasis. In a somewhat Nietzschean vein, both entrepreneur and artist are cast as embodying the movement of becoming over that of being, of fluidity and vitality over a rigid conformism, and who are central to the proliferation of new forms of life (Davies 2014).
the authors of *Creating Entrepreneurship* state that “entrepreneurship is essential to effective creative practice”, so too does Bridgstock (2012) identify the essential quality of entrepreneurship, in addition to a generic set of managerial competences, for success in creative enterprises. Despite having no requirement to develop any professional expertise in such areas as accounting or bookkeeping, artists must nevertheless ask what Bauer et al (2011: 628) see as “simple (entrepreneurial) questions […] such as: who will buy my work? How much do I have to sell to make my living? How much should my work cost?” As a matter of course artists must develop skills associated with planning, coordination, resource management and public relations, negotiating a set of obstacles in order to expand their practice and sell their work, including being able to juggle a number of projects at once whilst keeping to multiple deadlines (Moussetis and Ernst 2004).

Therefore as it was for Michelangelo, Dürer and Rembrandt, so it is for the artists of today (Moussetis and Ernst 2004), and in order to survive artists must understand the context of their work not only in aesthetic terms, but in financial and managerial terms as well. As Forkert (2014) discussed in the previous chapter, the emergence of the lone artist faced with a market generated a new formation of artistic practice. However, for Moussetis (2004), this means that artists not only have to think of their work as involving the details of self-directed activity, but are in their essence, capitalists. As Moussetis (2004) states, “[c]reative artists, perhaps a redundancy of words, function like venture capitalists where they pour their ideas into novel concepts and hopefully one of them will materialize into commercial success”. In Boltanski and Thévenot’s (2006 [1991]) terms, it might be fair to say then that the artist occupies a *market order*, with the *inspirational order* that has traditionally defined art becoming a significantly less significant form of justification. As such, it follows from this that the life of an artist involves more than “just art-specific content; to have a successful (self-employed) career, an artist needs additional competences” (Bauer et al 2011: 639); an artist too must have ‘more than academic attainment’. Creativity and entrepreneurship work hand in hand, nourishing one another towards the ends of personal growth, fostering the conditions for ‘healthy’ competition, and producing satisfactory working lives.
Traditionally, there are two dominant ways of understanding the relationship between entrepreneurship and creative practice: either it is claimed that they are synonymous with one another – in which case, “creativity is thought of as a proxy or synonym for entrepreneurship” (HEA-ADMSC / NESTA 2007: 40) – or it is assumed that the two are completely at odds with each other, containing unique characteristics with no possibility for crossover or comparison (cf. Lazzarato 2011: 11). There is therefore a distinction made between the specificity of the entrepreneur (as relating to business only), and the idea that the entrepreneur is a function embedded within all projects, business or otherwise. For Bridgstock (2012), artistic entrepreneurs cannot be reduced to the mind-set of business pure and simple: “artists tend to want to make art and make a living from it – business entrepreneurs tend to want to run a successful enterprise” (Bridgstock 2012: 128).

7.3 Artists as protean careerists

Drawing on the work of Douglas Hall (1976, 1996), Ruth Bridgstock asserts that artists ought to be understood as ‘protean careerists’. Invoking the figure of the Greek god Proteus, who could change his shape at will, Bridgstock connects the theme of permanent change to that of artistic careers. Again, the necessity of change I foregrounded here, as is adaptation to such change. For Hall, the protean career connects also to a general approach to graduate employability (the teaching of management skills being the transmission of ‘protean skills’). Key to this process is assisting “students to develop the propensity and abilities to take personal responsibility for their own career development in an ongoing way” (2011: 7). This includes “the responsive acquisition and deployment of necessary work skills” (7).

The task for educators, as far as Bridgstock (2012: 127) sees it, is therefore to connect, through entrepreneurship education, “intrinsic ‘protean career’ motivations” with an understanding of how to negotiate and apply oneself within the wider market for creative products. Through doing this, it is hoped that artists will “learn skills and knowledge associated with growing an artistic enterprise, including sales and marketing, legal issues, business strategy and finance” (Bridgstock 2012: 125-126), whilst also being able to create and exploit opportunities for venture creation. There is a need then to foster entrepreneurship education in the core curriculum of art courses, in which not
only the “creation or making” of art itself is valued, but where “education […] is focused on the application, sharing or distribution of art” (Bridgstock 2012: 126). For the authors of Creating Entrepreneurship: higher education and the creative industries (2007) this is not a process which can be seen as necessarily a simple encroachment of a cold rationality onto an otherwise passive HE sector, and although business skills can be seen as “the binary opposite of creativity”, it has been found that “students participating in programmes that include entrepreneurial development see entrepreneurship as a driver for rather than a brake on their creativity” (HEA-ADMSC / NESTA 2007: 72).

Bridgstock (2012: 126), for instance has claimed that art education programmes must engage with the ’being enterprising’ side of art work, meaning they should on “less tangible capabilities such as opportunity recognition, entrepreneurial behaviour, or resilience”. In building on Douglas Hall through Thomas N. Duening’s ‘five minds’ of entrepreneurship model - “Opportunity Recognizing Mind; 2) The Designing Mind; 3) the Risk Managing Mind; 4) the Resilient Mind; 5) the Effectuating Mind” - Bridgstock outlines how certain cognitive dispositions may help facilitate a new kind of more realistic attitude towards the world of work among artists. Bridgstock also draws from Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi’s (1996) work on creativity and flow to assert this point. Yet, the actual process by which such qualities of mind are transformed into practical activities is not described.

Still, Bridgstock (2011) is clear about what is considerably less valuable within art education. Uncertainty and experimentation here are considered ‘vague’, and “influenced by unrealistic or romantic ideas about the world of work in their fields” (Bridgstock 2011: 18). In this regard, commentaries on entrepreneurship in art education have learnt something from Bourdieu (1984) in the extent to which the requirement to succeed in the field requires the use of particular kinds of cultural and symbolic capital that facilitate a smooth entry into the art world. However, Glover et al (2002) builds on this by stating that different capitals can be exchanged for one another. As such, an activity in one area of culture can be translated into another and hence expand one’s networks and increase one’s employability. This, they argue “is fundamental to our understanding of the values and process of education” (Glover et al 2002).
7.4 Enterprise, Employability and Entrepreneurship in Art Education

In England, the demand for entrepreneurial training for a broad pool of ‘creatives’ is one that has made its presence felt, becoming not only a supplementary aspect of the curriculum, but in some cases the main focus of entire programmes (HEA–ADM/NESTA 2007: 37), often working in partnership with other courses in fine art, design, fashion, architecture, performance and business (HEFCE 2014). Among these courses can be included MA Creative Practice (Leeds College of Art, Liverpool Hope, Glasgow School of Art), MA Creative and Cultural Entrepreneurship (Goldsmiths), MA in Entrepreneurship and Creative Practice (Plymouth), and MA Creative Arts Practice (Newcastle University). Indeed, in the case of Goldsmiths, students intending to undertake an MA in Creative and Cultural Entrepreneurship are informed of the following:

“Our collective approach is to integrate entrepreneurship within the development of creative practices and to take a ‘creative’ approach to the development of new businesses and the infrastructure that supports them.

This programme is designed to allow you to continue to innovate, but also to provide the requisite business/entrepreneurial skills and attributes to commercialise your creative and cultural practices and/or knowledge.

You’ll be able to build on a historical and theoretical understanding of cultural and creative industries and the development of a cultural economy to create your own creative initiatives, which might be research-based, policy-based, practice-based, or a combination of any or all of these” (Goldsmiths website).  

Likewise, boasting to be the “first Masters in Creative Entrepreneurship in the UK, linking creativity to entrepreneurship”, prospective students at the University of East Anglia (UEA) are promised that throughout their course they “will develop a full range of key skills to advance [their] creative practice; this will include, copyright and contracts, financial management for self-employment, effective communications, public relations, digital technology and social media strategies”. This basic idea is also

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18 http://www.gold.ac.uk/pg/ma-creative-cultural-entrepreneurship
19 https://www.uea.ac.uk/humanities/ma-in-creative-entrepreneurship
replicated at the University of Leeds\textsuperscript{20} and City, University of London. Entrepreneurial support is also available across Loughborough and Anglia Ruskin, with the latter running a ‘Be Your Own Boss’ seminar in 2014 which brought together the insights of marketers, financial consultants and artists. However, we might also wish to include partnerships between departments, for instance the MA in Cultural Leadership at City, University of London, a course run in collaboration with Cass Business School and which aims to “provide MBA-level professional development specific to the cultural sector, combining business school teaching with guest speakers and case studies from the cultural sector and creative industries”\textsuperscript{21}.

The Institute for Creative and Cultural Entrepreneurship at Goldsmiths explicitly connects their activities to the creative industries, therefore foregrounding the language of economic development:

ICCE is Goldsmith’s response to the growing significance of the creative industries and cultural sector in the UK’s economy. Figures have shown that the creative industries account for 9\% of the UK’s GDP and a rising part of its export trade and total employment. Business skills, management skills and entrepreneurial skills with a specific understanding of the sector are needed to support its continued growth.

The aims and objectives of these courses vary, and as the authors of \textit{Creative Entrepreneurship} (2007) note, the way in which entrepreneurship is used across each may vary. Nevertheless, it is possible to see the presence of a broadly economic account of entrepreneurship across these statements.

\subsection*{7.5 Politicising Employability: The artistic critique revisited}

In assessing the artist critique as it stands today, Boltanski and Chiapello (2007: 476)) make the case that the artist critique has become impotent in the face of the new spirit of capitalism:

[T]he artistic critique is today caught in a dilemma both of whose horns reveal its impotence.

\textsuperscript{20} http://www.pci.leeds.ac.uk/pg/taught-postgraduate/ma-culture-creativity-and-entrepreneurship/

\textsuperscript{21} http://www.masterstudies.co.uk/MA-in-Cultural-Leadership/UK/City-University-London-School-of-Arts/
Either it can pursue the critique in the direction it embarked on in the nineteenth century (denunciation of bourgeois morality, censorship, the grip of the family and religion, constraints on the liberation of mores and sexuality, the conservatism of the dominant cultural institutions) without taking account of capitalism's displacements, and particularly the fact that it is no longer hand in glove with the family or religion, let alone morality. It can even (but in the columns of major newspapers or on television) attack the media conspiracy aimed at silencing freethinking. These are denunciations, incidentally, that the media are quite ready to accept as a commodity like any other which is likely to get people talking - that is to say, in this instance, to get things sold. In order to retain credence in itself, this line of conduct, which constantly tends to collapse in on itself for want of opponents - the most devastating proposals being almost immediately transposed into a well-ordered public debate, and then integrated into cultural supply in a dual dynamic of commodification of by-products and official celebration of their authors - must invent enemies, or credit remaining enemies with a power they have long since lost.

Alternatively, demonstrating a 'lucidity' presented as the only posture still worth adopting in the face of the impending apocalypse (in a tone that often recalls the catastrophist prophecies of the Weimar avant-gardes preceding and heralding the conservative revolution), one can register capitalism's ability to 'recuperate' anything and everything. One can announce the end of all value, and even of any reality (the domination of the virtual), the entry into an age of nihilism, and at the same time, in a rather paradoxical gesture, once again don the aristocratic but utterly threadbare garb of the lampoonist, the solitary 'conscience' confronting cretinized masses. One can then steel oneself in reactionary nostalgia for an idealized past, with its warm human communities (as opposed to individualist isolation), its freely consensual discipline, often dubbed 'republican' (as opposed to educational anarchy and the disorder of the suburbs), its genuine and honest love (as against indiscriminate sexuality), its easel-painting (as against the installation of any old thing), its long-lost landscapes, its solid fare, its country produce, and so on”

To escape from this dead end, perhaps the artistic critique should, to a greater extent than is currently the case, take the time to reformulate the issues of liberation and authenticity, starting from the new forms of oppression it unwittingly helped to make possible.

Boltanski and Chiapello (2007) present a choice here between reactionary nostalgia and a futile rejection of bourgeois morality, with the demand for autonomy persisting within an environment that can more easily circumvent this critique. Instead, they argue that the artistic critique must work to reformulate the issues of liberation and authenticity in a way which account for a new capitalist reality. According to Maurizio Lazzarato (2011), it is this that is ongoing with the art world and makes up a kind of radical
critique of creative labour. It is also here where we need to take seriously the divisions within the homogenous class that Florida (2011) has described as ‘the creative class’, and instead consider the way entrepreneurship itself ends up making it harder to conceptualise the divisions within the art world, between the highly paid members of the insider groups in the art world, and poorly paid pool of precarious workers.

Among instances that have aroused indignation in the art world, we have a few examples. The Serpentine Gallery for example saw protests in December 2013, after an advert for unpaid interns was posted (Page 2013). This came at the same time that the Gallery Director Julia Peyton-Jones and co-Director Hans Ulrich Obrist received boosts in pay of 60%, pushing the latter’s annual income from £80,000 to over £130,000 (Alberge 2013). Likewise, in theatres across the UK the number of voluntary staff increased by 30% in 2011, “up to 35,546 [in 2011] from 27,000 in 2009/9” (Smith 2011: no pagination). This too gave rise to protests. At the Fruitmarket Gallery in 2014, the artist Jim Lambie’s exhibition was also met with opposition, as again unpaid opportunities had been advertised for installation work. The Musicians’ Union also began their Work Not Play campaign after members were “asked to perform for free” at London’s 2012 Summer Olympics (de Peuter 2014: 271).

In addition to this, growing numbers have been encouraged to pursue volunteer positions or low-paid internships, often reinforcing the notion that entrance into the art world is considered a luxury that only those with independent sources of income can pursue (Bishop 2011). However, there are a variety of responses to these conditions, and range from resilience strategies including how to cope emotionally with internships, how to manage heavy workloads, manage fees, as well as global campaigns which aim to resist the new forms of exploitation that have emerged from capitalism’s “third spirit” (Standing 2011; PWB 2013). In a micro level, Emily Speed for instance has suggested that resilient artists “do not complain or bury their heads in the sand even though they don’t find it easy”. It is possible to see in this a logic of self-help which encourages bravery in the pursuit of one’s passions. However, this also sits alongside the process of “naming and shaming organisations with bad labour practices” (PWB 2013: no pagination), as well as campaigning, ala Standing (2014) and Gorz (2010), for a basic income.
The Precarious Worker Brigade in particular have aimed in recent years to ‘politicise employability’. In focusing on the area of employability their stated aim is to offer a guideline for promoting a resistance to the language of neoliberalism. These constitute a means of articulating a critique of reality (defined by employability, enterprise and entrepreneurship) with the creative industries in order to build from the *existential tests* outlined above to present a practical critique of capitalism. In their own 2012 *Training for Exploitation?* guide, the PWB asks such questions as:

> are you unsure what job you will be doing in 3 months? do you freelance but you don’t feel free? Are you anxious during the day and sleepless at night? Has the carrot you were promised gone off? Do you think you will never own a house in your fucking life? If the answer to these questions is yes, then join us.

The approach taken by PWB suggests an overlap with the language of entrepreneurship, taking as its target traditionally defined art education and its failure to deliver on the promise of rewarding work. However, PWB does so in a way which ends up focusing on the greater sense of injustice and indignation that such writers as Bridgstock tended to view as more or less unavoidable, or at least only actionable on an individual level. By placing the situation of artists within the broader context of an absence of stability and security which has been raised by figures such as Guy Standing (2011) as emblematic of wider swathes of precarious employed workers, PWB therefore forge a connection between the lives of artists and a more generalised pool of workers.

As McRobbie (2011: 33) has noted, the language of employability and entrepreneurship makes “no space for trade unions, for collectivity and solidarity, for joint decision making, for rights and entitlements, for workplace democracy, for maternity leave or paternity leave or sickness benefits”. Much of what is emphasised instead becomes purely defined in terms of the acquisition of necessary skills. In bypassing the ordinary aspects which make living well possible, and not only advancing one’s own individual career. “as a result the creative sector finds itself full of young people who are burnt out, exhausted, unable to consider having children and often self-exploiting on the basis of the ‘pleasure in work’ factor”. The carrot of pleasure in work has, as PWB state, gone rotten, and in its place must come a further politicisation of employability in art education.
Most importantly, however, is that PWB do not formulate a critique which aims to abolish the demand for education in employability skills, or work-based learning. Instead, it might be considered a more reformist kind of critique, consistent with the demand to “improve existing reality tests” (Boltanski 2011: 108). In testing the reality of the institution, the promise that the acquisition of skills will engender great personal and professional freedom, the PWB. There is also an absence of messianism in their demands. In taking issue with some of the emerging literature on immaterial labour for its reliance on “a kind of systemist Spinozism” (Gorz 1999: 44), in too much of a hurry to locate a new revolutionary subject, Gorz (1999) states that it fails to create “the cultural and political mediations through which the challenge to the modes and goal of production will emerge”. Such practical action can only emerge “from the culture of resistance, rebellion, fraternity, free debate, radical questioning and dissidence which that activism produces” (1999: 44). As such, although expressing a ‘potential’ movement, there is a failure to consider the actual concrete manner in which these ‘forces’ or ‘flows’ (Berardi 2012) may be, or can be, directed. Indeed, imbued by a critical spirit, the manner in which critique is undertaken within and among creative workers does not appear as a part of empirical analysis.

7.6 Summary

This chapter has considered the way in which artistic labour is understood from the perspective of entrepreneurship education and the position of those within the arts. Within this, writers such as Bridgstock and Bauer have attempted to foreground the role of entrepreneurship in combatting the elitism and romanticism of the art world. In emphasising the development of practical competences they argue that the long-term effects will be a better adjustment among those in the Creative Arts to the new realities of capitalism. In this sense, they also aim to incorporate the reasoning of creative industries discourse into the practice of educating artists. I also drew on new forms of indignation that have emerged within the art world to consider what is left out of affirmations of entrepreneurship. In exploring the formation of protest in response to the injustice of pay inequalities and precarious, low-paid work, I looked at the Precarious Workers Brigade as an example of how these existential tests are being drawn upon to facilitate new language through which to ‘politicise employability’.
Figure 5: LEO data
CONCLUSION
Chapter Eight

A Summary of the Thesis and Suggestions for Future Research

8.0 Overview

In his book on the image between antiquity and the Renaissance period, Hans Belting (1997: 1) cites the words of Patriarch Gregory Melissenos, who, upon encountering the images of Western Europe with his Greek companions in 1483, stated: “When I enter a Latin church, I can pray to none of the saints depicted there because I recognize none of them. Although I do recognize Christ, I cannot even pray to him because I do not recognize the manner in which he is being depicted”. The incident underscores for Belting a kind of iconophilic fear of contamination in the crossover of traditions; the disavowal of the ‘wrong’ representations drawn upon by one in favour of the ‘correct’ representation of the other; of my representations against theirs. It is this perspective that has, according to Konings (2015), characterised certain strands of critical sociology, with the determination of the correct representations of society sliding almost seamlessly into normative judgement about those who have been fooled. Therefore, for Konings (2015) there is a strand of sociological theorising that might be referred to instead as a form of idolatry critique, in which the fetishes of capitalism are exposed and pitted against the authentic bonds of sociality, where wrong representations are replaced with their proper names, and where an inhuman instrumental reason stands opposed to the authenticity of the life world. Here, the well-worn narrative of dis-embedding, the erasure of social bonds, and the reduction of moral sensitivity comes to the fore.

Within this thesis I have attempted to move further in the direction of a sociology which foregrounds the role of moral and critical sources which provide a justification for engaging with capitalism. In this regard, I have considered the contribution that the sociology of critique might make, in dialogue with related literatures, to understanding the formation of enterprise cultures within Higher Education and the Creative Arts. As part of this I have explored the expansion of practices within the area of Higher Education that establish mechanisms and justifications which encourage engagement with capitalism (Part Two), and also considered how this expanded into the area of the
creative arts to work its way back to the source of the *New Spirit of Capitalism*: that is to say, artists.

In the **Introduction** to this thesis, I presented the following questions:

1. How does the work of Boltanski contribute to an understanding of enterprise cultures? If so, how can this be pursued? In what way does it speak to or complement existing accounts of enterprise culture in the areas of Higher Education and the Creative Arts?

2. How do Universities present themselves to different stakeholders in ways that aim to justify strategic decisions and adjustments to new definitions of reality? Peter Wagner (2014) describes the existence of a number of orders of worth within Universities. In this regard, to what extent are these present in mission statements?

3. How do Boltanski and Chiapello (2008) account for the emergence of an artistic critique and is it possible to see the realisation of this in the discourse of the Creative Industries as a circumvention of the critique of enterprise culture?

4. Are there signs of the new spirit of capitalism within English art education? How do they manifest themselves through public literatures?

5. Finally, how are those in the Creative Arts aiming to politicise concepts of employability? Is it possible to see an alignment of the artistic and social critiques as practical activities with the art world?

Each area of the thesis has been connected by a set of common themes to help respond to these questions. Foremost among them has been the expansion of entrepreneurship, employability and enterprise. Each chapter has therefore mobilised sources from relevant areas of sociology in order to build on understandings of the role these play in contemporary capitalist formations.

Across **Part One** of this thesis I provided an overview of the sociology of critique which aimed to respond to the first question concerning the use of some of Boltanski’s work to understanding the formation of enterprise culture. This focused also on the formation of the thesis that underpins *The New Spirit of Capitalism* in order to assemble a conceptual vocabulary for understanding enterprise culture. Here I focused on the
formation of the sociology of critique in relation to critical sociology, and considered the overlap between Boltanski and Chiapello’s (2007) approach to the analysis of capitalism ‘third spirit’ alongside works on neoliberalism including William Davies (2014) and Michel Foucault. What this chapter did was show the way justifications consistent with neoliberalism have become more prominent in articulating the formation of selfhood in the 21st century. Furthermore, it articulated how processes which emphasise the need to constantly readjust oneself to new circumstances have proliferated.

This then led into Part Two, where I pursued the concept of enterprise, in addition to the related notions of entrepreneurship and employability further, foregrounding the role of employability. Here I considered the establishment of new tests of greatness within higher education, and the emergence of critiques which promote the expansion of broadly neoliberal policies and solicit engagement through the appeal to self-fulfilment in addition to national economic prosperity. Harold Silver (1998: 8) notes that

the core changes in the universities and the remainder of higher education in the last three decades of the century concerned the relationships between institutions and the operation and expectations of the world that had once been their context, but had now become part of their daily lives.

Whilst not a surprising claim, what Silver (1998) describes here is the way in which the demographic and funding changes in higher education have produced a new kind of institutional arrangement. As such, once considered to be beyond the groves of academe, economic and industrial processes became a more pressing concern with their walls. In looking at the more recent work on the financialisation and marketisation of higher education, I showed how this relationship has increasingly become mediated by notions of human capital investment, that is to say, that universities function primarily as ways of increasing one’s stock of human capital in such a way as to increase one’s future earnings (McGettigan 2015). Here I outlined the growing concern for labour market outcomes and graduate employability as means of placing the ‘student at the heart of the system’ (DBIS 2011) and considered this as part of this process of a greater alignment between education and economics.

On the basis of this, I produced an analysis of mission statements as instances of institutional confirmation (Boltanski 2011). I argued that the mission statement is itself
a genre which emerges from managerial corporate cultures and therefore an interesting way of considering the expansion of a new spirit of capitalism into the area of Higher Education. I identified the role of employability and enterprise and focused on the manner in which universities conceive of social transformation and the responsibility of adaptation across the university. These mapped on well with how Bourner et al (2011) have grasped the role of higher education, and foreground language that appears across the projective order. One significant limitation here, however, was the ability to put such statements to the test within institutional settings. As I outlined in the Introduction, one intention of the thesis was to use these as a way of providing a context for interviews with participants who lead on Creative Arts programmes which involve entrepreneurship or employability skills in some way. The relative weight of mission statements was intended to be something discussed, and whether the ritualistic function of them had any bearing on how they saw the aim of their university, its purpose and how their own course fitted in with this vision.

Finally, Part Three pursued the analysis further, situating contemporary discussions of the meaning of Creative Arts education in the context of the creative industries discourse that became prevalent at the end of the 1990s, or when Boltanski and Chiapello (2007) see the fruition of capitalism’s ‘third spirit’. Admittedly, the aim in this final part had been initially intended to focus on the adjustment to the new spirit of capitalism within creative arts programmes, and as such bring together the different kinds of evidence I’ve been drawing onto understanding the elision between ‘enacted’ and ‘inculcated’ discourses in education (Fairclough and Chiapello 2011). Nevertheless, considered how the artistic critique became translated into the language of the creative industries in ways that bring artists back into the fold, whilst presenting a critique of traditional art education. Having once been considered the source for capitalism’s ‘new spirit’, this critique has since returned to artists, but in an altered form, situating artists as engaged in fundamentally entrepreneurial activities. I discussed how this discourse effectively fails to address the sources of critique levelled at art education from a less market-led perspective, that is to say, that it remains the preserve of an elite and retains another-worldly character which leads to disenchantment among arts graduates. In this sense, entrepreneurship education presents itself as a properly emancipatory agenda, foregrounding the necessity of teaching practical (managerial and entrepreneurial)
competences in order to address the reality of work in this area. In doing so, I also emphasised the emerging groups which are aiming to politicise employability through a more direct confrontation with precarious labour, a lack of unionisation within the creative industries and the persistence of exploitation. In this sense, these see a re-alignment of the artist and social critique in groups such as the Precarious Workers Brigade, who draw from existential tests to form a critique of capitalism in education and the art world.

I have therefore made in this thesis an original contribution to the areas of social theory – in building on Boltanski’s work and finding points of intersection with theories of neoliberalism; in expanding the conceptual vocabulary of Boltanski and Chiapello’s (2007) New Spirit of Capitalism into the area of Higher Education and the Creative Arts; and through considering the way new ways of working are being explored both within advocates of entrepreneurship education but also within art activist groups.

8.1. The Future

In the transfer exam I had following the first year of my PhD programme I recall being informed that I had taken a too pessimistic stance on higher education, especially on issues such as marketisation and the effects of the structural changes I want to analyse. Foremost among the issues I had taken a deeply pessimistic stance on were how changes to university funding structures alongside a broader redefinition of university education as human capital investment would almost inevitably lead to a gradual erosion in the belief in university education as a training in critical and analytical skills. Warned that this perhaps undermined those who still worked tirelessly to ensure such skills were embedded in their courses and were repeatedly affirmed through the course of both teaching and research, I tried to temper this fatalistic approach. In this sense, I became inspired in the first instance by a section of Italo Calvino’s Invisible City cited by Zygmunt Bauman (2007: 110), which states that one must “seek and learn to recognise who and what, in the midst of inferno, are not inferno, then then make them endure, give them space”. In pursuing a relentlessly pessimistic approach, I had failed to provide ‘who and what is not inferno’ any room to breathe. Boltanski’s approach, therefore, suggested an alternative to this pessimism, as the insistence on the critical
activity of ordinary actors and the existence of a plurality of orders of worth, helped find a way out of this deterministic approach.

Nevertheless, in looking over the pages of this thesis there is considerably more to achieve here, especially as the flames of inferno have seemingly gotten hotter and spread wider in recent years. As the issues I raised in the thesis continue and arguably intensify - the marketisation of higher education is still ever-present, the precarity of those in the creative industries has become exacerbated by the dual threats of a coronavirus pandemic and no-deal Brexit (Windows 2017, Creative Industries Federation 2020), and Boltanskian scholarship continues to be published and made available for me to read in English - I see this as an opportunity to keep building on the range of work I was not able to deal with, and to address issues that I was barely capable of touching upon.

At this time, further research into multiple orders of worth within higher education settings, and the formation of critique within such settings, remains for me a priority. Indeed, as I write this, students are returning to universities, and in the midst of what appears to be the start of a second wave of the coronavirus pandemic. Discussions around the safety of students have, one would think, been a priority. Much of my own year has been devoted to making the transition to online learning, to ‘reskilling’ with minimal support, allaying student worries, and discussing best practice for the coming years in meetings with colleagues.

Within the last week there have already been outcries among students, parents, unions and staff members concerning the relative carelessness with which the coming year has been handled, both by universities and government. Accounts of students suddenly finding themselves in lockdown, potentially with no ability to go home again for Christmas or to visit parents, have been described as akin to ‘prisons’, where students go unsupported and are forced to live in halls despite being effectively mostly being engaged in distance-learning (BBC News 2020; Sanderson 2020). In the context of revising this thesis, it is hard for me not to wonder whether the commitment to ‘excellence’ and ‘competition’ that came through in the university mission statements I looked at have not in fact led to a change in priorities, away from student wellbeing and towards impression management. As Collini (2012: 87) wrote of these sorts of
documents, they may be considered little more than “empty, portentous prose”. However, as I have argued, they also constitute a series of statements about the reality of an institution which must be adhered to, or at least been seen to be adhered to. As *truth tests*, to ask whether expressions of excellence and innovation are in fact embodied within a university serves to weaken the stability of the university, its idea of itself, and opens it up to critique from the *world* (Boltanski 2011). It may be therefore that universities have been more concerned about impression management, a consequence of having to be seen to be competitive and to rely more on students as a source of income, rather than actually ensuring statements about itself are embedded within reality.

What the *existential tests* emerging from students within universities seek to do is expose the university as hypocritical, or unjust. At the very least it questions universities own claims about themselves. Indeed, it may even lead to a more explicitly questioning of what a student is for the university (a question I addressed in Chapter 4), - i.e. are students ‘people’ or are they an ‘income-stream’ for universities and/or private property owners? - and potentially increase the power of alternative definitions of students arising from the values of other orders within university settings (cf. Wagner).

Besides this, there are a range of other issues which emerge from this PhD and build on its original contribution. The Creative Arts have arguably become increasingly diminished in importance as the UK pursues an increasingly self-destructive route out of the EU. George Windsor (2017) speculated for instance that, whilst the creative industries have been considered a ‘British success’, the sector nevertheless hinges upon free movement throughout the EU, and without such movement its capacity to be ‘world-leading’ has been undermined. The high level of funding which creative arts programmes in the UK receive from the EU also leaves the UK under strain, and whilst this funding has continued in some form, at the at the start of 2020, Britain withdrew from the Creative Europe scheme (Hatfield 2020). The lasting effects on this is something that requires further analysis.

Finally, one particular strand of thinking which has emerged from this thesis regards a different area the creative industries, and the ongoing demands for increased security through unionisation and formal protections from exploitation, within it. The videogame
industry is something I have been closely following both as a videogame player and as a sociologist for a number of years, and during 2018 I began assembling some of my observations around the unjust practices of the videogame industry as regards issues of sexual harassment, work-place exploitation, and mass lay-offs, into a more formal piece of scholarly work. Whilst time for this has been minimal, I have begun to build more explicitly from Boltanski and Chiapello’s (2007) insights into the prevalence of the projective order as the common superior principle with capitalism’s ‘third spirit’, and like chapters in this thesis concerning the creative arts have considered the range of existential tests which have been coming out of this industry since at least the early 2000s (De Peuter and Dyer-Witheford 2009). I have also begun following the practical attempt at transforming critique of the videogame industry into more formalised organisations.

There is, in short, a lot of work still to be done concerning the issues engaged with throughout the thesis, and which build on my original contribution to these areas. However, for now, I would like to rest.
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Appendix

University Mission Statements

The Mission Statements that make up the empirical focus of *Chapter Five Confirming the Reality of Institutions: An Analysis of University Mission Statements* are listed below:

De Montfort University, *Strategic Framework 2015-2020*

Keele University, *Our Vision 2010*

Leeds Beckett University, *Strategic Planning Framework 2016-2021*

Leeds Trinity University, *Strategic Plan 2014-2019*

Newcastle University, *Vision 2010: A World-class Civic University*

University of Sussex, *Sussex 2025, Strategic Framework*

University of Bradford, *Defining our vision for the new knowledge economy: our strategy 2015-2025*

University of Buckingham, *website page:*

University of Leeds, *Strategic Plans 2015-2020*

University of Birmingham, *Shaping Our Future: Birmingham 2015*

University of Oxford, *Strategic Plan 2013-18*

University of Reading, *Vision Ambition Strategy 2026*

University of Sheffield, *Mission Vision & Identity*

University of Warwick, *2030: Excellence with Purpose*

University of West London, *Ambition 2018: Strategic Plan 2013-18*

University of York, *University Strategy 2014-2020*