Democratisation from the margins:
The role of cultural policy in post-authoritarian Chile (1990-2010)

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Thesis abstract

While the scholarly literature on cultural diversity, community arts or cultural heritage suggests that culture is relevant to favour or deepen democracy, cultural policy has been little discussed in transitology studies. This thesis proposes to fill this gap by exploring the role of cultural policy in Chile’s process of transition from authoritarian rule to democracy. After Pinochet, the country was characterised by an authoritarian resilience caused by the military regime’s institutional legacy, the existence of elite pacts sealed during the procedure of regime change and a strong influence of conservative sectors in society. This had the consequence for the centre-left coalition that took power in 1990 to have a limited room for manoeuvre in key domains of governance such as economy and transitional justice. This thesis’ main argument is that culture was one of the marginal and alternative policy areas that could favour democratisation in Chile in three areas: elite autonomy, memory, and citizenship. The research shows that cultural policy was utilised to validate the centre-left coalition as an independent and democratic political force, favour civil society’s discussions on the past, deal with the emotions related to the authoritarian era and enhance community development. Overall, this thesis constructs democracy as both a legal and symbolic regime and demonstrates that cultural policy can contribute to democratisation at an institutional and emotional level.
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Declaration

I declare that this thesis is the product of my own work, except the parts acknowledged as references. Some components of this research have been accepted for publication in the *International Journal of Cultural Policy* under the title of ‘Enhancing elite autonomy: the role of cultural policy in post-authoritarian Chile’.
CHAPTER 1 – INTRODUCTION

1.1. BACKGROUND AND RESEARCH AIMS

Between the 1970s and the 1980s, many of the military or totalitarian regimes that were in place across the globe initiated a process that led them to become democracies. This surge of regime transformation would later be known as the ‘third wave of democratisation’ (Huntington, 1991). Starting in the mid-1970s in Southern Europe, the ‘wave’ successively reached Latin America and the Communist countries of Central and Eastern Europe in the late 1980s, while having a lesser impact in the regions of Africa and the Middle East. The study of democratisation usually implies to have an interdisciplinary approach as many intellectual debates intersect when discussing the phenomenon of regime change. From the perspective of political science and comparative politics, it soon became evident that the phenomenon entailed much more than the transfer of power to civilians or actors that were denied access to institutional politics during the non-democratic period. Indeed, looking beyond the procedural dimension and the western-centric analysis of liberalism triumphing over autocracy, democracy appears to be a set of compound state-society interactions and a political regime that has a genuine consideration for citizenship.

The definition provided by the pioneer works of O’Donnell and Schmitter (1986:8) echoes this statement. According to these authors, democratisation is about ‘the processes whereby the rules and procedures of citizenship are either applied to political institutions previously governed by other principles (coercive control, social tradition) or expanded to include persons not previously enjoying such rights and obligations (illiterates, women, youth, ethnic minorities, foreign residents)’. More recently, Grugel and Bishop (2014) suggested that democratisation can certainly not be reduced to free elections and a capitalist economy but would also mean genuinely embracing citizenship and possibly reaching sufficient tenets of socio-economic justice. Yet, definitions only cannot unveil the complexity that lies at the core of democratisation for numerous factors and variables account for its realisation, and for some of the actors involved hold ambivalent positions in the process that leads to democracy.

In order to explain the political shift from authoritarianism to democracy that occurred in distinct parts of the world, scholars have much looked at the role played by elites and civil...
society (Higley and Ghunter, 1992; Linz and Stepan, 1996; Wood, 2000; Haggard and Kaufman, 2016). Put in a schematic way, elites and civil society are the two poles that structure and orient democratisation. On the one hand, political, military and business elites are the main actors in charge of carrying the negotiations, as they search for the best strategic way to secure the return to democratic rule (Huntington, 1991: 165). They are also the ones who decide on the different aspects of politics such as elections, the independence of the armed forces vis-à-vis civilians, and those who have the responsibility to settle any dispute that could damage or put society at risk (Guo and Stradiotto, 2014: 32-33).

On the other hand, it is civil society that pushes towards democratisation. Civil society is defined as ‘the realm of organised social life that is open, voluntary, self-generating, at least partially self-supporting, autonomous from the state, and bound by a legal order or set of shared rules (…) and ‘is an intermediary phenomenon, standing between the private sphere and the state’ (Diamond, 1999: 221). According to Fernandes (2015: 1074), the power of civil society lies in the ‘capacity to make government actions more accountable; the establishment of bonds of trust between citizens; and the enabling of a more inclusive, rational, and deliberative public debate’. Other factors related to elites and civil society possibly help advance democratisation: party organisations and international aid. Political parties are said to be essential for ‘the acquisition of legitimacy by new democracies’ (Pridham, 1995:1). As for foreign aid, it permits to structure or organise national opposition and create international networks to help those exiled during dictatorships (Angell, 2001:175).

The analysis of democratisation also implies to look at the lack of commitment to democracy. In that sense, authors do not only examine the movement towards democracy but also pay interest to what accounts for its failure (Burg, 1997; Cavatorta, 2005; Marples, 2009; Hinnebusch, 2015; Morgenbesser, 2017). Democratisation is a process that is neither rectilinear nor predictable, and democratic stagnation or regression are certainly not uncommon. Besides, as countries have different social, political, economic, and cultural specificities, and are distinctly impacted by international variables, democracy cannot flourish in the same fashion or at the same pace. Even after the restoration of democracy, some countries simply do not comply with the democratic agenda. Indeed, national political actors feel entitled to indefinitely rule the country, either because of the lack of credibility and resilience of the opposition, or because the systematic promotion (or imposition) of democracy by their western counterparts exasperates them and makes them more hostile to it (Ottaway, 2010: 42-43).
Besides, when seeking to identify what accounts for democratisation, more complexity is observed. Sometimes, actors who try to work in favour of democratisation provoke the opposite effect, which shows the many grey zones that exist within different types of regimes. Sahoo (2013:1-3) justly suggests that while civil society is seen as the pinnacle of democratisation, it does not always ‘promote political change’ or bring positive results. Similarly, military elites who were usually involved in the establishment of dictatorships in Latin America and Africa following coups d’état can also intervene to restore democracy as it happened in Portugal in 1974. International aid is also ambiguous as the actors behind it can have a hidden agenda. Hanlon (2004: 759-760) showed that in Mozambique, the World Bank financially supported fraudulent elites as long as they followed its prescriptions, praised the institution’s policies and supported the myth of the Bank striving for successful democratisation.

This thesis follows in the footsteps of scholars of democratisation for it looks at the role of political elites and civil society in the re-establishment of democracy as well as the issue of authoritarian persistence in newly democratic states. The latter aspect is particularly important in this study. Indeed, a close attention is paid to the problem of countries that broke with the scheme of arbitrary rule and state violence but could not completely dismantle institutions of the authoritarian past or expel from the political game, actors who had their interests secured under the dictatorship. Yet, this research represents a shift from the traditional studies of democratisation as it investigates the capacity to recover and promote democracy by resorting to unconventional policy areas that also happen to be less impacted by the heritage of authoritarianism. More precisely, this piece focuses on governments that must deal with past legacies limiting the scope of their action and that consequently resort to uncommon or ancillary strategies to exercise or deepen democracy. The principal argument that will be defended throughout this thesis is that cultural policy, a domain of policy traditionally side-lined in democratisation studies, constitutes one of the alternative means that can support the process of democratisation.

The relationship between cultural policy and democratisation within the existing literature is quite elusive and ill-formalised but nonetheless existent. The main reason that accounts for this situation is that culture as a policy area is insufficiently discussed in studies of politics. As argued by Paquette and Beauregard (2017:22), ‘cultural policy research – as the study of governmental action in arts, culture, and heritage – is relatively marginal in political science’. While many secondary sources in different research areas (Zhang, 2010; Mulcahy, 2011;
Iwabuchi, 2015; Lemasson, 2017; Doak, 2018) provide a valuable glimpse of what cultural policy can achieve both in the social and political realm, focusing on issues as diverse as diplomacy or social inclusion, political scientists continue to underestimate the role of culture. The main contribution of cultural policy to democratisation has mostly been in the area of citizenship (Meredyth and Minson 2000; Skot-Hansen, 2002; Grundy and Boudreau, 2008; Staiger, 2009; Bandhar, 2009; Wang, 2013) and is also one that will be further highlighted in the following chapter of this thesis.

However, the analysis of the role of cultural policy in transition from authoritarian rule has been undeniably scarce. The literature currently links cultural policy to democratisation in post-authoritarian states in two ways: the first one is the consequence of political liberalism and market economy on cultural institutions and funding. The second one is the use of culture to picture the revival of democracy. In studies dealing with post-Soviet societies, cultural policy is examined through the lens of decentralisation, as cultural institutions and competences were transferred from central government to the municipalities and regions (Rindzevičiūtė, 2012; Vojtišková and Lorencová, 2015: 536). Other works show that within Communist states that transitioned to democracy, cultural policy underwent economic liberalisation when ‘state-owned cultural enterprises such as film studios and publishing houses (…) returned to their original owners and heirs’ (Hajek and Smejkalova, 1994, 1998 cited in Vojtišková and Lorencová, 2015: 536). This liberal trend also meant the diversification of funding sources such as philanthropy and private donation to support cultural NGOs (Rindzevičiūtė, 2012: 568) as well as the end of culture’s ‘propagandistic task’ (Ratiu, 2009:26).

More importantly and relevant for this research, some scholars have paid attention to the role of culture and the arts in the process of democratisation itself (Falicov, 2007; Quaggio, 2014) by pointing to the figurative function of cultural policy in the early years of democracy. For example, in Argentina, cinematographic industry served ‘to effectively communicate the aims and the ethos of the young democracy’ (Burucua, 2014: 29), was used as an ‘exorcism of the recent, terrible past’ (Falicov, 2007: 48) and as a ‘collective experience of self-purging’ (Andermann, 2012: 3). This demonstrates the attempt made by political elites and civil society to acknowledge and reflect on their country’s dark memory in order to better embrace the democratic future. In Spain, after the death of General Francisco Franco, paintings that promoted collective understanding, dialogue, and positivity in order to picture democratic
normalisation and glorification were showcased (Quaggio, 2014). Still, these studies on the Argentinian and Spanish cases only dealt with the symbolic role of cultural policy in democratisation. Also, they did not systematically address the relationship between culture, authoritarian legacy and democracy or framed culture as a possible solution to the problems of democratisation.

This research provides a double contribution. One is to analyse more systematically the role of cultural policy in the transition from authoritarianism to democracy, especially in countries where this process was conditioned and monitored by members or supporters of the ex-regime. The other is to show that cultural policy favours democracy at an institutional and at a more symbolic level. As such, the way democracy is understood in this thesis is two-fold. The first is a widespread one in classical democratisation studies as it is elite-centred and institution-focused. The second one is related to memory and different aspects of citizenship. Authoritarianism does not only signify the breakdown of institutions, the interruption of electoral process and the closure of political parties. It provokes psychological trauma, imposes a rigid conception of the nation and damages citizenship through exclusion or violence (Robben, 2005; Kleiner-Liebau, 2009). Consequently, while effective democratisation must pass through the elite capacity to restore the functions of institutions, the rule of law, and the basics of social justice and economic development, it also has to be reached by repairing the image of the country, uplifting the citizens’ morale, giving them the possibility to regain freedom of speech and very importantly, to assess their past.

Culture is a rich and complex policy area. It is therefore more problematic to delineate it as compared to other mainstream domains of public policy. The challenge in providing a definition comes from the broadness of the concept of culture. This one englobes many aspects of artistic, anthropological, and social life, going from the arts to cultural heritage, customs, norms, values, language, people, laws, institutions, ideology, sports, tourism, gastronomy, immaterial heritage, and education. Culture is both tangible and abstract, universal yet specific. The expression defies easy classification and is so polysemous that it was said to be one of the ‘two or three most complicated words of the English language’ (Williams, 2014: 49). Also, the blur that surrounds the notion inevitably ‘leads to the instabilities of cultural policy’ (Tong and Hung, 2012:271).
Indeed, the only consensus that is reached when trying to hazard a definition is that such a consensus hardly exists. As argued by Gray (2010:218), ‘there is no agreed, clearly defined model of what it actually consists of’. According to Vestheim (2012:495) cultural policy is a ‘specific policy field with separate political and administrative institutions like ministries, arm’s length bodies like councils of cultural affairs or specific committees in parliaments with a defined responsibility for a specific policy area named cultural. For Mulcahy (2006: 267), cultural policy revolves around arts as it is about ‘public support for museums, the visual arts, the performing arts, historic preservation and humanities programs such as creative writing and poetry’ but also goes well beyond that, as it also includes ‘publicly supported institutions such as libraries and archives, zoos, botanical gardens, aquariums, parks as well as community celebrations, fairs, festivals, folklore activities, crafts’.

The identification of cultural policy can be problematic for it often has a ‘fragmentary character’ as it is scattered between different agencies (Muñoz Del Campo, 2011: 23). Another difficulty is that cultural policy can exist both at a formal and informal, less rationalised level. Some states do have very unstable cultural policies that are very dependent on the executive, but this does not necessarily signify that they are inefficient or bad; on the contrary, they can still allow a very dynamic cultural production or cultural industries as it is the case in Argentina (Bordat-Chauvin, 2014:524). In that sense, cultural policy can be influential even when it is not very formalised by the state. The typology provided by Ahearne (2009) is helpful in this regard as he distinguishes between ‘explicit’ and ‘implicit’ cultural policy.

According to him, an explicit cultural policy is one that ‘the government labels as such’ while an implicit cultural policy is a ‘political strategy that looks to work on the culture of the territory over which it presides’ (2009:143). Cultural policy is understood in this thesis as “explicit”, one that is based on an intelligible paradigm, has a clear political orientation, and leads to the creation of a coherent set of policies or institutions. Although it should be acknowledged that little institutionalised or uncoordinated operations can also generate political and social effects, the approach chosen in this article is to construe cultural policy as a more cohesive series of actions carried in the domain of culture and the arts, and which are oriented towards a significant political goal. In other words, cultural policy must coincide with a moment when the state through the action and the voice of its political elites eventually decides to recognise culture as a relevant and legitimate issue.
This thesis seeks to demonstrate that cultural policy favours democratisation in post-authoritarian countries that particularly struggle with their dictatorial heritage by bridging different types of literature: transitology, community development, memory, and emotions. These literatures are brought together and summarised in three concepts that will be later unpacked in this chapter: elite autonomy, memory, and citizenship. The present chapter sets the foundations of the thesis argument. It will present the different aspects of the research methodology. The second section will give details about the case study, explaining the problems of democratisation after the end of dictatorship and the characteristics of cultural policy. The third part will present the research questions, the hypothesis and some the concepts used in this thesis. The chapter will subsequently discuss the research methods and the process that led to the collection of data. Finally, the last two sections will set the limitations of the present research and provide the outline of the thesis.

1.2. CASE SELECTION

1.2.1. Chile: from Pinochet to the pacted transition

Chile corresponds to the most suitable case to test the relationship between cultural policy and democratisation and this section will provide justification for this assumption. Before delving into the topic of democratisation, it is important to present Chile’s recent political history, from the years of the dictatorship to the subsequent democratic sequence. Before the return to democracy in 1990, the country was ruled by a right-wing military regime led by General Augusto Pinochet since 1973. Chile’s dictatorship started on September 11 of the same year following a violent coup d’état that deposed Socialist President Salvador Allende, who had governed the country for three years. One of the most distinctive traits of the Pinochet regime was the repression and brutality exercised on the left-wing dissidents, which resulted in the closure of political parties and the ban of trade unions (Rigby, 2001). As this was the case in other countries of the Southern Cone in Latin America in the 1970s and 1980s, killings, disappearances and torture were a common practice. In Chile, we count about 3000 killed or missing people as a result of the terrorist acts performed by the military state (Marchak, 2003: vii). Also, many Chileans were forced to exile. As of late 1970s, about 2% of the population had left the country (Shayne, 2009: xv). This violence was part of the National Security
Doctrine applied by the Armed Forces and was based on the idea that Communism had to be eradicated from the national soil in order to protect Chile’s integrity and interests (Nieto, 2011: 231; Borzutzky, 2017:12). If the regime systematically sought to physically annihilate or expel political opponents, it was also committed, along with its political allies, to delegitimise their struggles. Indeed, the pro-Pinochet media denied human rights abuses or minimised the regime’s violence and overall discredited the struggles of political opponents (La Segunda, 1977).

The other remarkable feature of the Chilean military government was its full adoption of the neoliberal ‘orthodoxy’, which saw ‘tariffs reduced, financial sector deregulated, foreign trade liberalised’ and key sectors such as health and education privatised (Alexander, 2009: 4). The steady implementation of neoliberalism under Pinochet had strong political and ethical contradictions. As explained by Pitton (2007:251), advocates of neoliberalism have long underestimated its noxious effects as well as the ‘the tension between neoliberal theory and practice’, for although it is ‘based on political ideas of human dignity and individual freedom’ the concretisation of free-market ideology in Chile was made possible through coercive means. The neoliberal model inherited from the Pinochet era has often been praised since Chile ‘achieved the highest economic growth rates in Latin America and is regarded as the most stable and solid economy in the region’ of Latin America (Zechner, 2002:213). Yet, the stability of national economy was maintained at a high social cost as there were ‘curtailments of social services, low wages to attract investment and disregard of the environment resulting from the exploitation of natural resources’ (Bresnahan, 2010: 287).

The Chilean authoritarian regime was particularly resilient and organised. Its robustness was due to the popularity of Pinochet himself who was supported by an important part of the population that was anti-Communist and satisfied with the military order (Hickman, 1998: 201). It was very institutionalised and ‘embodied in the figure of Commander-in-Chief of the Army’, that is to say of Pinochet only, while in the other countries of Latin America, there was ‘a rotation within the executive branch’ (Valdivia Ortiz de Zárate, 2010:94). In addition, the regime was strongly legalised, which was a way for the General Pinochet to legitimise it. Its doctrine and ideology were entrenched within and protected by the Constitution. Ratified in 1980, this Constitution was drafted by Jaime Guzmán, the ‘legal advisor’ of the General and gave a legal basis to the security and anti-subversive measures of the military junta as well as
the neoliberal economic model (Massad, 2003:6; Taylor, 2014:32-33). For this reason, it is coherent that the fall of the regime intervened not because the military was completely discredited like in Argentina where the junta lost a war against the United Kingdom but because the Constitution “unintentionally” gave an opportunity to the opposition to defeat Pinochet. Indeed, the Chilean law provided a transitory provision that anticipated the organisation of a referendum in 1988 to decide if Pinochet should maintain himself as President for eight more years or if negotiations to return to democracy should be initiated (Altman, 2011:104). Consequently, as rightly argued by Lawson (2019:121), the demise of Pinochet happened ‘in a period of relative strength with a growing economy and a secure grip on the coercive apparatus’ and was a ‘self-inflicted constitutional defeat’.

The opportunity of the 1988 plebiscite was fully seized by the opposition to the dictatorship. The cycle of protest movements that was initiated in 1982 by trade unions, middle-class people, and shantytown residents as an attempt to destabilize the regime was gradually weakening and the strategy of contentious politics began to show its limits. After 1986, as the regime continued to repress social movements, the Alianza Democrática (AD) (Democratic Alliance), a group of centre-left parties opposed to Pinochet concluded that street protest was not the right path to follow and therefore chose a strategy of electoral politics and accommodation with the regime (Carey, 2009: 88; Uggla, 2009: 162).¹ Fearing more polarisation and possible violence from the military government, the AD finally decided to abide by the rules of the dictatorship and use the regime’s plebiscite in 1988 to legally undo the General (Huneeus, 2009). On October 5, 1988, the referendum was held, and Chileans voted NO at around 56 percent, prompting the end of Pinochet’s rule. A few days after his defeat, on 14 October 14, 1988, the Concertación de partidos por la democracia (Concertation of Parties for Democracy) was officially created. This coalition of centre-left parties was the continuation of the former AD and reunited Socialists, Greens, Christian Democrats, Christians from the left, Humanists and Liberals. The Concertación eventually presented its candidate at the presidential elections of December 14, 1989, the Christian Democrat Patricio Aylwin, who eventually won by gaining 55.1% of the popular vote.

¹ In the 1980s, although political parties were still outlawed, the regime started to become a bit more flexible with regards to censorship and the rights of the opposition. The AD was still continuing its activity but in a less confrontational manner as opposed to the more left-wing or revolutionary organisations. The parties in Chile were re-legalised in 1987, except those that were openly Marxist.
The Concertación’s strategy of re-democratisation was rooted in both concessions and prudence as the coalition carried negotiations with the military regime. Following the defeat of Pinochet, a process of constitutional reforms started which was approved by another plebiscite on June 30, 1989. As the junta proposed a series of constitutional amendments, ‘some provisions that represented the military’s ideal points were eliminated’ while ‘provisions to increase the supermajority thresholds for constitutional amendments and to reduce the first presidential term – widely expected to go to the Concertación – from eight to four years were included’ (Heiss and Navia, 2007:164). Consequently, Chile’s return to democracy was made possible through what is called a “pacted transition”. Gill (2000: 53) defines a pact as ‘an agreement between the soft-liners and the moderates whereby they try to work out some of the details of transition, but each must be careful not to antagonize and provoke the other part of their sides’. In most cases however, a pacted transition signifies that the elites who ruled under the authoritarian government are responsible for leading the process and that they decide on many key issues (Share and Mainwaring, 1986). Nevertheless, pacts have been considered as the guarantee for a long-lasting democratic rule for they carry the right amount of compromise and moderation (Hamann, 1998).

At the end of the bargaining process, the centre-left coalition could secure the suppression of a few arbitrary measures such as the power of the President to dissolve the lower House of Congress, the prohibition of party membership for labour unions leaders and also obtained the weakening of the National Security Council veto power (Loveman, 1995; Siavelis, 1997:323).\(^2\) However, the trade-off remained largely detrimental to democratic actors and overall, the process of transition posed several ethical problems. Following the electoral success of Aylwin, the most striking characteristic of Chilean democracy was the series of legal dispositions that preserved many prerogatives of the actors that ruled or were favoured during the Pinochet era. These have been known as ‘authoritarian enclaves’, an expression coined by Chilean sociologist Manuel Garretón (2003: 47-48) and which refers to legal ‘elements of the previous regime that persist in the democratic regime’.

Authoritarian enclaves were legally rooted dispositions dictated by the Armed Forces, their businessmen allies, and their right-wing supporters, (mainly the Catholic-conservative party

\(^2\) The National Security Council was integrated by ‘military commanders’ as well as by pro-Pinochet members (Wright, 2007: 182).
Unión Demócrata Independiente (UDI) and the Liberal-conservative party Renovación Nacional (RN) to validate the passage from dictatorship to democracy. Among those enclaves were nine appointed senators close to the ex-regime, the continuation of Pinochet as Commander-in-Chief and Senator and a binomial electoral system that favoured centrist coalitions and thus prevented to undo the dictatorship’s heritage (Londregan, 2000:83; Birdsall, 2009:59; Arceneaux, 2017). More generally, the main characteristic of Chilean democracy was the conservation of the 1980 Constitution of the regime that allowed the autonomy of the military and the preservation of the neoliberal economic model. What is argued in this thesis as well is that entering the democratic era with the Constitution of the dictatorship also had an important symbolic weight.

Moreover, although formal mechanisms of democracy were restored, many laws or informal settings of the past regime impeded political decision or reduced citizens’ participation or modes of expression, even years after the victory of the Concertación. Civil society continued to be ineffective and the efforts made by the coalition to reinforce it were too scarce and inconsistent (Ríos-Tobar, 2005:143-144; OECD, 2019:22). Freedom of speech was still an issue for censorship continued to be legal (Human Rights Watch, 1998) and most importantly, the amnesty laws passed in 1978 allowed crime perpetrators who acted under the Pinochet government to avoid trial. Under the presidency of Patricio Aylwin, as it will be further seen in Chapter 7 of this thesis, a Comisión Nacional de Verdad y Reconciliación (National Commission of Truth and Reconciliation) (CNVR) was issued to reveal some of the human rights abuses committed under the dictatorship. However, it ‘did not provide grounds for proceeding with a prosecution’ (O’Rourke, 2013: 85). Consequently, after the end of the military government, the country faced a double challenge. One was to give political autonomy to the democratic party coalition in power and the other was to permit civil society to remobilise again and deal with the reality and repercussions of the dictatorship.

1.2.2. Cultural policy in democratic Chile: The Fund for Cultural Development and the Arts (FONDART)

3 The CNVR was also known as the Rettig Report, as a tribute to Raúl Rettig, a former Ambassador of Chile who chaired the Commission.
In parallel to its limited democracy, Chile was characterised by a well-identified cultural policy and a patent willingness from political authorities to develop this area as part of the new democratic agenda. Several countries of the “third wave of democratisation” share similar traits with Chile such as Brazil, Uruguay, Hungary, and Spain as they all exited authoritarianism via negotiated transition. Nevertheless, these countries do not combine the two characteristics of authoritarian enclaves and explicit state policy in the domain of culture. Although Brazil had quite solid cultural policies since the 1930s, the years following the return to democracy opened a period of institutional instability in this area as President Collor de Mello in 1990, ‘extinguished all government generated support for the arts’ and undid the policies of the previous administration (Miller and Yúdice, 2002:132). Uruguay had a very weak institutional framework for developing cultural policy at the central level, leaving provinces to decide on these matters (Boudreaux, 2015). As for Hungary, it had little formalised cultural policies. In fact, those were and still are ‘characterised by pragmatism, in which there is an absence of basic official documents. The orientation of cultural policies and practices are rarely guided by high level statements, legal acts, strategic plans, or theoretical documents’ (Inkei and Vaspál, 2014).

Overall, even though these countries certainly had cultural policies, those were ‘implicit’, and informal. However, for the convenience of this research, the choice was made in favour of a more coherent and formalised cultural policy. Among all the above cited cases, only Spain comes close to the Chilean one. Indeed, this country went through a similar transition, one marked by pacts and consensus. Also, in Spain, the word “culture” became central in the elite discourse after the death of Franco, and public authorities showed great commitment in making cultural policy a factor of democratic socialisation and European integration (Quaggio, 2014). Nevertheless, civilians quickly gained control over the military in Spain (Sánchez, 2014) whereas Chile took much longer to achieve that goal as this will be seen in Chapter 3. Furthermore, the Spanish transition was managed by Prime Minister Adolfo Suárez who although he came from a pro-Franco organisation did not seek to push for his legacy while ‘in Chile by contrast, those in power at the time of the transition were not reformist but hard-core’ defenders of the status quo (Sánchez, 2003: 76).

The return to democracy in Chile was the opportunity to open the debate on the necessity to make culture a domain of public action after the military regime failed to build a consistent
cultural policy and censored many artists. When President Aylwin took office in 1990, culture rapidly became part of the agenda-setting and an Advisory Commission for Culture headed by sociologist Manuel Garretón was soon created to make various propositions in view to develop a cultural policy (Olavarría Riquelme, 2017:106). This Commission led to the creation in 1992 of the Fondo de Desarrollo para la Cultura y las Artes (Fund for Cultural Development and the Arts), most commonly known as FONDART, whose objective was to support a wide range of artistic initiatives through annual public competition. The idea of implementing a national instrument for cultural policy was due to the absence of a mechanism to finance artistic production and was meant to provide some reparation for artists who had suffered from heavy censorship under the military regime. It is argued in the existing literature that culture officially became a domain of state intervention in Chile with the creation of the Consejo Nacional para la Cultura y las Artes (National Council for Culture and the Arts) (CNCA) in 2003 (De Cea, 2010). Yet at the same time, the FONDART is said to have overshadowed the CNCA and to have been developed at the expense of other instruments of cultural policy (Muñoz Del Campo, 2013).

The position defended within this thesis is that while the CNCA further officialised culture in the political and institutional apparatus, the choice of the Chilean state to fully embrace culture as a policy area started with the creation of the FONDART. This thesis also agrees with the argument of Muñoz Del Campo (2013) that Chilean cultural policy was almost reduced to this sole instrument. Indeed, the fund soon became the most important source of cultural funding and an almost indispensable tool for artists who wished to develop their career in Chile. The FONDART is one cultural fund among three others which are the Fondo del Libro y la Lectura (Book and Reading Fund) created in 1993, the Fondo Audiovisual (Audiovisual Fund) and the Fondo de la Música (Fund for Music) both established in 2004.

However, the FONDART always stood out among them, mainly because it guaranteed an ample definition of arts and culture, therefore increasing creative possibilities for applicants. Because it was the first state instrument for art funding and for many the sole available one, it provoked a “FONDART dependence” in the country. The fund always had more visibility for it financed all types of arts, from cultural industries to performing and traditional arts. It thus

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4 In Spanish, Comisión Asesora de Cultura. Propuesta para la Institucionalidad Cultural Chilena.
crystallised more attention and attracted more participants. Despite the government’s acknowledgement that other channels for developing cultural policy should be developed, the fund conserved its hegemony over the years. For this reason, it is logical and relevant to focus on it in this research. The FONDART was created along with other institutions that just like it, were more marginal on the political agenda of the Concertación but did matter for society, and were at a smaller level, instrumental in the reconstruction of democracy after Pinochet. Nevertheless, this argument made in this thesis is that compared to its other sister institutions implemented in the early 1990s, cultural policy in the context of authoritarian enclaves had a more strategic role. This is what the next sub-section of this chapter will explain.

1.2.3. FONDART: a policy “at the margins”

This subsection aims at setting the basis of the hypothesis by locating cultural policy on the Chilean policy apparatus. As it was previously outlined, from the year 1990, the existence of authoritarian enclaves constituted some important obstacles to exercising democracy. As it was tied to the heritage of the dictatorship and the rules imposed by the former actors of the military government, the Concertación faced challenges to govern without being under tutelage. This was particularly challenging in mainstream areas such as economy, labour, justice, and electoral politics that were “locked” by the military regime’s constitutional legacy. However, some policy aspects ‘were not fundamental to keeping the architecture of the restricted democracy’ such as ‘targeted social spending, education and health reforms’ which allowed ‘more flexible arrangements’ (González, 2008: 152). Building on this observation, this thesis argues that following the election of Patricio Aylwin, different issues were put on the political agenda. This led to the implementation of programmes or institutions that are called in this thesis “policies at the margins”.

The policies at the margins were opposed to traditional and major policy sectors such as economy or justice. They were principally focused on women, indigenous peoples, and environment. The argument made in this thesis is that they corresponded to new policies that did not call into question the pacts and agreements that were decided to secure a smooth transition to democracy – for they were more marginal – and to policies that granted more independent action to democratic elites. The decade of the 1990s corresponded to the
governmental recognition of new such as gender, ecology, and ethnicity (Palominos Mandiola, 2016: 1-2) which were completely overlooked or neglected under the Pinochet era (Silva, 1996) and for which the government provided ‘institutional responses’ (Delamaza, 2014:114). In 1991, the establishment of the Servicio Nacional de la Mujer (National Women’s Service) (SERNAM) paved the way for a legislation increasing women’s rights (Haas, 2006:200). In 1993, the ‘duty (…) to respect, protect and promote the development of Indigenous peoples’ (Law 19.253, 1993) gave way to the creation of the Corporación Nacional de Desarrollo Indígena (National Corporation for Indigenous Development) (CONADI) and in 1994, the creation of the Comisión Nacional del Medio Ambiente (National Environmental Commission) (CONAMA) ‘raised hopes for (…) confronting a legacy of severe neglect’ (Carruthers, 2001:348).

These policies were related to democratisation in two ways. Firstly, they were rooted in the struggle against dictatorship. Indeed, the late 1970s and 1980s were a time of an intense female political activism, with human rights and community survival organisations ‘joining feminists in the repudiation of military authoritarianism’ (Noonan, 1995 :98-99). Indigenous people followed a similar pattern as they strove ‘to defend their communal possession of land’ (Sznajder, 2003:28). In the meantime, ‘many (…) environmental NGOs sprang up, largely as a result of the political repression which purged centrist and left-leaning academics from the universities’ (Silva, 1996: 9). Secondly, the important aspect of those new agencies is that they favoured co-participation in the decision-making process. SERNAM was comprised of leaders that were active in the women’s movement during the dictatorship (Shayne, 2004:107) while the executive council of CONADI was comprised of eight indigenous representatives (Rodriguez and Carruthers, 2008: 6). As for CONAMA, it also had a consultative Council which included members chosen from various groups of society such as scientists from universities, representatives from the business sector and labour community as well as members of NGOs (Onursal and Gautam, 1997:167).

This thesis argues that cultural policy fits into the category of the policies at the margins as it was a way for the Concertación to govern “through other means”, after the coalition had to compromise in most of the core policies that were previously mentioned. Like its policies at the margins counterparts, the FONDART was designed as a participatory structure in which civil society members had an active role. It also sought to give a governmental response to a sector of society which like women and indigenous people was institutionally ignored and
politically depreciated by the military regime. However, it could help the democratisation process in a different and more effective way.

Culture was consensual enough to appeal to the whole political spectrum and to different political tendencies while the implementation of SERNAM, CONADI and CONAMA did generate some problems. The right initially opposed the establishment of SERNAM accusing the Concertación of creating a ‘Ministry of Feminists’ whose project was to ruin the Chilean family structure (Dandavati, 2005: 101). Also, the right-wing sector that represented entrepreneurs’ interests thought that the new environmental laws could hinder their economic activity (Squella Padilla, 2000: 124). As far as indigenous peoples were concerned, when their demands clashed with industrial interests, the Concertación eventually chose to defend private companies (Rodriguez and Carruthers, 2008: 7). This thesis argues that cultural policy was even less contentious within the policies at the margins as it did not threaten the interests of the previous regime’s actors. Besides, culture was an available political space for the centre-left coalition since the Pinochet era was marked by the existence of a severe censorship and the repression of artists. This left a vacuum in the field of culture that the democratic coalition could “easily” fill by improving the conditions of the artistic community, thus marking a break with the past period. Overall, cultural policy could counter the effects of the Pinochet regime by providing a political territory where authoritarian constraints were weaker.

In this thesis, marginal is not a synonym for “unimportant” or “under-valued” but must be understood (as this will be shown later) as less in terms of budget and weaker in terms of contention. Besides, an important observation should be made about the FONDART. In the difficult Chilean context of democratisation, cultural policy was a learning process for those who designed it and implemented it. As the chapters will demonstrate, the fund was also a challenge for them as cultural policy was characterised by a set of tensions. Those included: fostering citizenship despite the rampant bureaucratisation and finding a compromise between favouring artistic quality and citizenship. As such, working through these tensions was an important exercise of democratic learning. As this will be shown in Chapter 5, these difficulties and hesitations surrounding the FONDART were explained by the neoliberal order and the new role played by the Concertación. In that sense, the thesis shows that the democratic process is not a smooth or linear process but a trade-off, a series of disagreements and tensions that political actors seek to overcome.
1.2.4. Time frame

The time frame for this thesis coincides with the four administrations of the *Concertación de partidos por la democracia*, the centre-left coalition that governed the country from 1990 to 2010. The coalition gave four presidents: two Christian-democrats, Patricio Aylwin (1990-1994) and Eduardo Frei (1994-2000) then Ricardo Lagos from the *Partido Por la Democracia* (Party for Democracy) (PPD) (2000-2006) and Michelle Bachelet from the *Partido Socialista* (Socialist Party) (PS) (2006-2010). There are two reasons for covering this period of twenty years. The first is coherence as there was no change of administration during that time. The other reason – which is also one of the arguments in this thesis – is that under the four governments of the Concertación, the roles that the author attributes to cultural policy, as this will be seen in the next subsection, remained constant. Although different milestones happened in Chile and even though some enclaves evolved or were repealed, the function of cultural policy was relatively constant in its contribution of democratisation.

The periodisation of democracy after years of authoritarianism can be problematic. As it will be demonstrated later in this thesis as well, this relates to the debates on the meaning of the concept of “transition”. Indeed, it is often hazardous to determine when a transition ended and when a country has become a mature democracy. Nevertheless, considering that Chile’s authoritarian heritage has been since 1990 particularly well-entrenched and institutionalised, it is logical that the study of the role of cultural policy be assessed during the whole period that saw the former opposition to Pinochet trying to bring on democratisation. Also, because some of the enclaves transcended the legal realm and were not only constraints located on the constitutional apparatus, the problem of authoritarian legacy was not resolved in Chile, even by the time Michelle Bachelet finished her presidential term in late 2009.

1.3. Research questions and hypothesis

1.3.1. Research questions

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5 The new administration only came to power in 2010 with the election of centre-right candidate Sebastián Piñera.
Based on the entire presentation made on democratisation, cultural policy and the Chilean case, three research questions were chosen to orient this PhD thesis:

1. **How did cultural policy contribute to the process of Chilean democratisation?**
2. **To what extent could cultural policy solve the dilemmas of the pacted transition?**
3. **What did the FONDART represent for both political elites and civil society after the return to democracy?**

1.3.2. **Hypothesis**

The hypothesis defended is this research is drawn from the observation that cultural policy often stands at the margins of the political agenda since it has a very low budget in comparison with other policy areas (Hofferbert and Urice, 1985:309) and generally creates less polarisation on the political spectrum (Vestheim 2007: 218). In fact, cultural policy is characterised by an outstanding paradox. As it remains in many countries at the periphery of governmental action, it is less likely to stir antagonisms and disputes between political actors (military forces, trade unions, entrepreneurs, human rights organisations and associations, local and international NGOs etc.). However, it is at the same time powerful enough to be mobilised as a political resource to either support projects of great magnitude (revolutionary state, diplomacy, nationalism) or soothe tensions and trauma after violent episodes (dictatorship, civil war).

The ambiguity that surrounds cultural policy and the dilemma of either treating it as a major or negligible policy area was already underlined (Ahearne, 2009). Nevertheless, this thesis goes further into this direction as it argues that this contrast proves to be convenient for decisionmakers. In the intricate world of politics, with lengthy negotiations and confrontation being a norm, cultural policy can unblock thorny situations when other legal means within the state apparatus might partly fail to do so, for they have a much higher degree of contention. This thesis argues that cultural policy can be used as a substitute to resolve problems or facilitate outcomes when other institutional routes are deadlocked, when mainstream policy
areas prove to be inadequate and political elites are weakened or constrained in the exercise of their power.

Cultural policy allows authorities to govern in a less antagonistic or less costly way, while still being able to enforce social change, extend citizens’ rights and participation, whitewash the past, help victims of past conflicts or diminish the psychological effects of war when an immediate resolution is not possible. Cultural policy also appears as a more seductive or insidious approach to power and domination. It makes up for a state’s loss of influence, for an authority that has deteriorated, an economy that stalled or a political legitimacy that has faltered (Ejea Mendoza, 2009; Saint-Gilles, 2009; Park, 2010) and more generally helps states that undergo any kind of “image crisis” within and beyond their national borders. As such, cultural policy has a dual character and can also be considered a governing alternative.

In Chile, culture was a policy area that was aloof from the negotiations and disputes that surrounded the Chilean procedure of regime change. It also remained remote from the preoccupations of those who held power under the military regime. In that sense, this thesis argues that it was a relatively “enclave-free policy”, a place where the rule of enclaves applied less and where constraints were less strong than in other domains. As this will be shown in this thesis, cultural policy was more enclave-free as opposed to other key areas, but this does not mean that it did not provoke political frictions and disturbances. Yet, cultural policy was more protected from authoritarian enclaves and the debates it created or stirred were insufficient to destabilise democracy. On the contrary, these disagreements were also part of the democratic process. This thesis assumes that cultural policy could widen the space for political intervention when other traditional policy areas could not, for they threatened interests of old powerful actors that still pressured democratic politics. Chilean cultural policy was both an institutional device that helped the elites rise above the intricacy inherited from the Pinochet regime and a “political asset” that validated the Concertación as a more autonomous force with enough leeway to contribute to democratisation. Indeed, culture represented a different route for doing so; one that was politically more accessible and institutionally more feasible. This study posits that cultural policy helped enhance three main aspects of democratisation: 1) centre-left elite autonomy 2) memory and 3) citizenship.
Elite autonomy

In Chile, the Concertación elites found themselves constrained by legal and political pressures which prevented them from acting more extensively or freely in primary domains of policy. The assumption is that cultural policy was among the new policies implemented in the early 1990s from which they could improve democracy and settle their position as autonomous democratic elites. At that time, culture was not the most pressing or heated issue debated in Congress. It also created little confrontation between the government and right-wing opposition parties and did not challenge the interests of entrepreneurs or military officers who retained most of their prerogatives after the end of the dictatorship. In that sense, the FONDART did not alter the political consensus that was deemed essential to maintaining democracy. Elite autonomy is thus understood as the capacity of centre-left political elites to decide themselves and not based on the preferences and pressures of the right-wing or the military. Also, it means the possibility for the Concertación’s to present their ideological identity as distinct from that of the parties of UDI and RN and the country’s image as more progressive and democratic. As the pacted transition and the political evolution of the centre-left produced a decrease of party polarisation, as this will be seen in Chapter 6, the Concertación had the responsibility to recreate differences between itself and the right, and to build an environment that was as less reminiscent as possible of the Pinochet years. Cultural policy, this thesis argues, is one of the tools that was used to reach this goal.

Memory

Memory is a fundamental aspect in post-authoritarian societies as the past often haunts a country, sometimes long after democracy was restored. Most of the time, memory is understood as collective memory, which is ‘the totality of ideas that a collective generates and maintains about its own past’ and what ‘reflects the ideals and the lessons that people draw from history’ (Peporté, 2011:12). The concept is both related and different from history. Memory implies a

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6 Consensus means respecting the accords that allowed to bring back democracy and to some extent preserving social peace. As such, consensus is a fundamental aspect of democracy – as there must be an agreement among all political sides that democracy should be the only legitimate regime. It also means that citizens are ready to be part of a more cohesive and peaceful society but that they are still able to voice their discrepancies, are aware of their differences and accept some amount of confrontation and discussion.

7 C.R. Wright Mills, in his book The Power Elite (1956), understands the term “elite” as the interconnection of corporate, military and political actors that is facilitated by an efficient bureaucracy and organisational structure. In this PhD thesis, the term “elite” is understood in a similar way.
certain human subjectivity while history would mean a more rational, scientific approach to the past. Yet, the two are very close as history can be (re)interpreted according to different perspectives and one’s own political bias. Consequently, even though memory and history might be theoretically different, ‘this distinction is highly contested and difficult to maintain in practice’ (Verovšek, 2016).

Even more important is the tension that lies at the heart of memory. While the building of democracy depends on the capacity to face the reality of what happened yesterday, some tend to argue that confronting the violence of previous events damages democracy as it dwells on the past instead of looking towards the future and being positive in the present (Tismaneanu and Stan, 2018:10). It is certainly true that memory is a challenge for democratisation, but it can also be construed as a solution to improve democracy. The position defended in this thesis is that precisely, cultural policy can attenuate the problems associated with memory as arts allow to discuss negative emotions related to the past (anger, fear or sadness) and do catharsis. Also, because arts are the domain of imagination and creativity, citizens and artists can express their emotions and opinions more freely and in a way that can question or unsettle democracy but that does not destabilise it.

Citizenship

Citizenship is mostly understood as the formal status bestowed on members of a national community who hold equal rights and obligations. It suggests the idea of belonging to a group or set of people, who brought together, shall be given the possibility to play a role in the shaping or transformation of the social fabric (Bellamy, 2008). While citizenship is certainly about the laws that permit to fit in society, it is equally ‘related to the challenge of resolving the problems of (…) identification’ (Tarimo, 2011:75). Also, citizenship creates the conditions that favour egalitarianism and very importantly, ‘holds an emancipatory promise’, meaning that it contains an idea of empowerment and freedom (Risor, 2018:276) that can be found through community development as this will be seen in Chapter 7. Citizenship means recovering some freedom of speech to discuss themes such as cultural identity or challenge a dominant ideology, as this will be further explained in the following Chapter 2. Besides, it is about a certain idea of emotional
well-being, which is as important as legal rights to empower and help citizens. In that sense, citizenship is also about providing optimism to people after the dark period of authoritarianism.

1.4. RESEARCH DESIGN AND DATA SOURCES

This PhD thesis is at the intersection of democratisation and cultural policy studies. It adopts a political sociology approach as it particularly looks at the relation between the state and civil society and seeks to understand how both interact with each other to bring about democratisation. Political sociology is particularly relevant to analyse regime change and political transformation as it takes both into account historical and institutional factors. Moreover, it allows to go beyond the institutional level and understand the political and symbolic uses of a specific policy. Indeed, while institutional or technocratic aspects will be taken into account, this thesis will also examine the issues of memory, citizenship and emotions. Furthermore, the thesis is mainly constructed around the concept of authoritarian enclaves (Garretón, 2003) which will be both updated and expanded in Chapter 3. The research is also based on the case study, which corresponds to a thorough analysis of ‘a particular social unit’ (Kumar, 2008:47). The case study has important advantages. As argued by Gerring (2007:1), ‘sometimes, in-depth knowledge of an individual example is more helpful than fleeting knowledge about a larger number of examples.’ In addition, the case study leans more towards ‘empirical completeness’, ‘conceptual richness and theoretical consistency’ (Blatter, 20008: 69).

The methods adopted in this PhD thesis are qualitative. The author initially relied on the secondary literature from various subfields (cf. Chapter 2). Indeed, the study of culture and the arts is multidisciplinary. Looking at this rich literature allowed to infer and theorise the relationship between culture and democratisation and identify the different layers that compose the meaning of democracy. As for the core data used for this research, it is a set of forty-one semi-structured interviews that were conducted in the capital city of Santiago between March and April 2018. The priority during fieldwork was to interview elites. As argued by Kvale and Brinkmann (2009:147), ‘elite interviews are with persons who are leaders or experts in a community, who are usually in powerful positions.’ Over the six-week and a half period that the author spent in Chile, she was able to reach ex-members of the Concertación who had a direct involvement in cultural policy between 1990 and 2010.
Previous fieldwork experiences have taught researchers that difficulties can be met when trying to obtain elite interviews. Among them are the lack of time of elites due to their high position, the global context that increases managerial tasks and reduces their availability as well as the need to already have contacts to facilitate access (Burnham et al., 2008: 235). The general observation drawn from this fieldwork is that the author did not face any major obstacle to obtain the interviews. This relative facility is explained by the topic of the thesis, which is both “marginal” and weakly contentious. The FONDART discussion did not provoke any tension of instability during the interviews, as most elites engaged with the topic in an open manner. No question was denied response or comments and globally, the elites interviewed played the game of the interview in a rather smooth way and were willing to cooperate. There are a couple of actors that could not be reached but considering the general outcome of the fieldwork and the number of elites who accepted the interview, this was a minor problem that did not impact the research.

Interviews were also carried with artists and juries of the FONDART, cultural managers, academics, and personnel or civil servants from the CNCA and the Division of Cultural Extension of the Ministry of Education that existed in the early years of democracy. As this was the case with elites, all those actors were willing to cooperate and contribute to this research and there was no major incident that could have jeopardised the access to information. Most interviewees were chosen through purposive sampling. The people who were targeted were those who managed culture during the corresponding period and whose names are easily accessible either because they are public figures or because their CV is available on the Internet. Although non-probability sampling was used as well (snowballing method), it was in a much lesser proportion. All the interviews were carried in Spanish and translated into English by the thesis’ author. Most of them were carried in public places such as cafés or in politicians’ offices. Below is the list of the participants to the investigation and the details of each interview. The interviewees’ names were erased, according to the anonymity principle approved by the Ethics Committee of the University of York in 2018 prior to the author’s fieldwork.

Table 1.1. List of interviewees during fieldwork
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Interviewee</strong></th>
<th><strong>Date and Location</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. FONDART recipient</td>
<td>Santiago, Providencia, 15.03.2018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. CNCA civil servant</td>
<td>Santiago, Providencia, 18.03.2018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. FONDART jury</td>
<td>Santiago, Providencia, 19.03.2018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Ex-FONDART Coordinator</td>
<td>Santiago, Providencia, 20.03.2018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. FONDART jury</td>
<td>Santiago, Providencia, 21.03.2018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Cultural manager close to the Concertación</td>
<td>Santiago, Centro, 22.03.2018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Former President of the Republic</td>
<td>Santiago, Providencia, 22.03.2018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Ex-FONDART Coordinator</td>
<td>Santiago, Providencia, 23.03.2018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Ex-Minister of Education</td>
<td>Santiago, Centro, 26.03.2018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. FONDART jury</td>
<td>Santiago, Centro, 26.03.2018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. Former DIBAM</td>
<td>Santiago, Providencia, 27.03.2018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. FONDART recipient</td>
<td>Santiago, Providencia, 28.03.2018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13. FONDART recipient</td>
<td>Santiago, Providencia, 02.04.2018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14. FONDART recipient</td>
<td>Santiago, Ñuñoa, 03.04.2018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15. FONDART recipient</td>
<td>Santiago, Providencia, 04.04.2018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16. FONDART reviewer</td>
<td>Santiago, Providencia, 04.04.2018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17. Academic</td>
<td>Santiago, Providencia, 05.04.2018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18. FONDART recipient and jury</td>
<td>Santiago, Ñuñoa, 06.04.2018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19. Member of cultural private foundation</td>
<td>Santiago, Las Condes, 09.04.2018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20. FONDART recipient</td>
<td>Santiago, Ñuñoa, 10.04.2018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21. FONDART recipient</td>
<td>Santiago, Ñuñoa, 10.04.2018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22. Ex-CORFO Vice-President</td>
<td>Santiago, Centro, 12.04.2018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23. Member of Museum of Memory and Human Rights</td>
<td>Santiago, Quinta Normal, 13.04.2018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24. Ex-FONDART Secretary</td>
<td>Santiago, Centro, 16.04.2018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25. FONDART recipient</td>
<td>Santiago, Ñuñoa, 17.04.2018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26. Ex-member of the CNCA Consultative Committee</td>
<td>Santiago, Providencia, 17.04.2018</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
In order to complement the interview data, the author also relied on policy documents issued by the CNCA which are available on the Chilean’s government repository via the website: http://repositorio.cultura.gob.cl/. This site contains archives from the 1970s to the present day and provides not only factual information but also analysis on different aspects of cultural policy. In that sense, there is much transparency in Chile regarding the theme of culture. Legislative texts (laws and decrees) and policy documents that more precisely discuss the FONDART were also consulted. The latter were obtained via the online system “Request of Access to Public Information” available on the website of the CNCA. However, this procedure was done between 2013 and 2014, years before the start of this research and it is not possible to know if those sources are still accessible today. Newspapers archives were also used to a
lesser extent and were extracted from national and local newspapers: *El Mercurio, La Nación, La Segunda, La Época* and *El Austral de Temuco*. The articles discussing or mentioning the FONDART between 1992 and 2010 were collected (hard copies) from numerous volumes in the National Library of Chile in Santiago. Other twenty-seven articles were downloaded online from the data basis Factiva. Overall, the aim of the author was to diversify data sources as much as possible in order to facilitate triangulation. As explained by Bickman and Rog (1998: xxii), ‘a clear hallmark of applied research is the triangulation of methods and measures to compensate for fallibility of any single method’ and to improve the ‘validity’ of qualitative research. Using interviews of actors holding different positions in the cultural sector was meant to reduce the risk of bias. Moreover, the use of newspapers and policy documents allowed to double-check information, rectify, or complement some of the lacuna present in the interviews.

1.5. **Thesis Limitations**

This thesis shows a certain number of limitations related to data collection. Due to time and financial restrictions, it was not possible to meet certain actors. The CNCA and the FONDART are decentralised institutions and have constantly promoted the country’s regions. However, very few interviews were carried with regional actors, whether they were recipients of the regional FONDART or regional civil servants. Consequently, they could not provide information on how the fund worked at a more local level and what it implied for cultural diversity and indigenous culture. Instead, the author had to rely on actors who acted at a centralised level. Nevertheless, elites who oversaw the FONDART could still provide insights into the theme of regionalism and cultural diversity. Moreover, the policy documents of the CNCA partly compensated this deficit.

The other limitation of this research could possibly be in the lack of partisan diversity. Indeed, most of the interviews were carried with left-wing or centre-left people. The author only talked to elites of the Concertación and artists who have been left-wing supporters. Because of time restriction, it was not possible to interview politicians from centre-right parties, or people that were close to Pinochet, which perhaps could have provided another view or perspective, brought more nuances and more comprehensiveness to what the FONDART meant for democracy. Nevertheless, among the people interviewed during the fieldwork, some
had a quite critical stance as they pointed out the limitations and flaws of the FONDART. In that sense, few people gave a laudatory analysis or description of the fund. Some of them even underestimated the importance of the fund, whether they were elites, recipients, or juries. Consequently, there was not a one-dimensional or excessively positive description of the FONDART and its effects, which in this case helped reduce the risk of bias.

Another possible limit has to do with the methodology of the case-study used in this research. A more comparative analysis (two or more cases) could have led to divergent outcomes when testing the role of cultural policy in democratisation. However, the positive role of culture in democratisation is unlikely to be limited to the Chilean case only and could be generalised. Indeed, even when citizens, militants or dissidents receive public money or live in dictatorships or uneven democracies, they can use arts and culture to criticise the incumbent government. Throughout history, arts have been used to defy the incumbent power and transmit messages that were more acceptable because they were presented in an artistic and folkloric rather than political form (Chirambo, 2001; Bilbija et al., 2005). Therefore, the Chilean case remains representative of culture as a tool for citizenship and for expanding democratisation in different fashions.

1.6. THESIS STRUCTURE

This PhD thesis is made of eight chapters. The present Chapter 1 works as an introduction. Chapter 2 is a literature review and brings to light the connection between cultural policy and democratisation. As this relationship is implicit within the academic production, the aim is to better highlight it and make the role of cultural policy more obvious. While it serves as a state-of-the-art chapter, it also explains in more detail the contribution of this thesis. It shows that although the relation between culture and democracy exists, there is still an important gap that needs to be filled in this regard. Indeed, a systematic approach that connects both concepts, especially in cases of incomplete transition to democracy has been very scarcely done and is precisely what this thesis will seek to do. Chapter 3 consists of the theoretical framework applied to the Chilean case and beyond. The central concept used is the one of authoritarian enclaves but is nonetheless expanded as the author designs a short typology that identifies between solid and fluid enclaves. This typology is fundamental to highlight the different kinds
of authoritarian legacies in new democracies. Moreover, this chapter articulates authoritarian enclaves with the concepts of elite autonomy, memory, and citizenship.

Chapter 4 is a historical background of cultural policies in Chile from 19th century to the end of the 20th century. This overview helps the reader understand how culture progressively became a policy domain independent from other areas and ministries. In the later part of the chapter is explained how arts and artists played a role in the NO campaign for the referendum, showing that culture was already an instrument used by the opposition to the dictatorship. It also details the reasons why the FONDART was strategically more helpful for democratisation than the other policies at the margins. It further sets the history of the FONDART by providing the conditions that led to its creation, showing again that it was designed as an instrument that was in accordance with democratic principles. Chapter 5 is a more detailed analysis of FONDART as an administrative and political object, providing information on its application system, jury selection, budget, and content, but also pointing to the tension between bureaucracy and democracy that the fund produced.

Chapters, 6 and 7 consist of the empirical material that supports this thesis’ main arguments and hypothesis. Chapter 6 develops the concept of elite autonomy by showing that the FONDART and cultural policy in general were not part of the agenda of the right and the military, and that for this reason, the centre-left had more latitude in this domain. Finally, Chapter 7 delves into the topic of memory and citizenship. It first explains the legal and political tools implemented after the return to democracy to “settle the past” while underlining the limits of the actions led by the Concertación in the area of transitional justice. It shows that cultural policy helped civil society deal with memory and sentiments related to the authoritarian era. Lastly, the chapter demonstrates the role of cultural policy in bringing solace and positivity to citizens as well as encouraging freedom of speech and community development. Finally, the thesis ends with Chapter 8 that works as a conclusion.
CHAPTER 2 – LITERATURE REVIEW

INTRODUCTION

The main purpose of this chapter is to bring to the fore the relation between cultural policy and democracy. The literature that deals with this topic is very fragmented – scattered across a myriad of secondary sources – and the connection between culture and democratisation tends to be understated. Consequently, current academic works do not always straightforwardly formalize the positive relationship between the two. On the one hand, different activities, projects, institutions, or social actors that are discussed in the literature and which fall under the category of cultural policy are not always called or identified as “cultural policies”. Instead, numerous studies simply use the words arts, heritage, performing arts, plastic arts or cultural industries (records, books, television, video games) to discuss what in fact corresponds to cultural policies, for they link those artistic practices with specific discussions on politics and society. On the other hand, some activities that improve the quality of democracy are not clearly framed as factors of democratisation, especially in the literature dedicated to education, humanities, or other specific subfields within social sciences. Nevertheless, all the articles and books that discuss or mention social justice, multiculturalism, gender and racial equality or social movements touch the issue of democratisation. Besides, an important amount of scholarly research is dedicated to some symbolic and psychological aspects such as citizens’ morale, mental health or identity construction which, as this will be shown, also contribute to the recovery or deepening of democracy.

The observation made in chapter is that many of the themes developed in existing studies and that will be subsequently presented strongly overlap. Whether it be contentious politics, mental and social empowerment, cultural heritage reconstruction, the recognition of cultural diversity and art education, all these issues intersect with each other and contribute to democratisation. The argument made in this chapter is two-fold. Firstly, all the aspects aforementioned converge towards the same goal and notion. Indeed, they all fall under the wider banner of citizenship. Secondly, citizenship is the key reason why cultural policy plays a relevant role in democratisation. Citizenship, like other concepts in social sciences has generated much debate for its definition is ample, multi-layered, and also evolving. However,
the main point that needs to be underlined is that it goes beyond the legal status of individuals within a given polity as it encompasses formal and immaterial rights. As argued by Helbling (2008:27-28), ‘the relation to the state involves more than (...) extended residence alone’, ‘citizenship is about the symbolic and emotional aspects of full membership, and it is about the questions of who belongs to the sovereign body, of who benefits from equal political rights and, simply, of who belongs to ‘us’’. In that sense, citizenship must be understood as all the actions that allow to increase rights, opportunities, and welfare. As it will be seen in this chapter, cultural policy is crucial for citizenship as policies and initiatives built around culture and the arts foster social cohesion, enable conscious collective action, reinforce integration or inclusiveness, and even spread democratic ideology.

The connection between culture, arts and citizenship can be inferred from a variety of studies in numerous disciplines or sub-disciplines. However, political science studies rarely relate cultural policy to debates on different aspects of citizenship. More importantly, as observed in the previous chapter of this thesis, the role of cultural policy in procedures of regime change or transition from non-democratic to democratic states is little discussed. Cultural policy and democratisation brush against each other and echo each other but scholars do not systematically demonstrate that those can be correlated. The objective of both this thesis and chapter is thus to make more evident the connection between cultural policy and citizenship, understood as the acquisition or extension of legal and symbolic rights. This chapter serves as a pre-theoretical basis for this research. Its different parts not only highlight the link between democracy and culture but also serve to elaborate the author’s own arguments. Overall, the chapter sets the preliminary framework to construct the ways cultural policy contributes to democracy in former dictatorships, which will be further discussed in Chapter 3.

In order to present the various ways culture contributes to democratisation in the current literature, this chapter is divided in three different sections. The first one establishes a link between culture and democracy via three themes: social movements, social empowerment, and democratic values. It shows that culture and the arts are utilised for contesting established orders and re-taking citizen control in situations of arbitrariness or injustice. Art can also become a layout to combat prejudices, racism, and at the same time spread liberal values and tolerance. The last important observation made in this part is that arts and culture are both utilised by members of civil society frustrated in their rights and higher authorities who have
diplomatic or strategical purposes. This confirms that elites and civil society are the two poles that structure democracy as this was seen in Chapter 1. The second section is built around the notion of human rights and identity, highlighting that culture and the arts are used after situations of violence or trauma such as war, genocides, and displacement, in view to fix or relieve the pain caused by the past. The part also shows that culture and the arts provide help or assistance to people or communities struggling with identity issues following a conflict or exile. Finally, culture is examined in relation to community development, arts education, and social welfare, which are also tied to democratisation. Overall, what is put in evidence in this last section is the role of culture and the arts in improving social cohesion and dialogue between citizens, particularly in places plagued by inequality and economic decay.

2.1. ARTS, DEMOCRATIC POWER AND IDEOLOGY

2.1.1. Arts, politics, and protest

As explained in Chapter 1, culture is a rich and complex term that encompasses various definitions. Bell and Oakley (2015: 16-17) argue that the word has two general meanings: ‘culture as set of artistic practices or products and culture as an anthropologic signifying system marking human society off from nature’. In this subpart, the discussion is centred around artistic practices or activities such as songs, music, and films that citizens use to express emotions, circulate messages of awareness or dissent. Shedding light on the role of culture and the arts allows information on their political potential and suggests that governments can also resort to them in a more institutional way for a variety of purposes. Art is not intrinsically democratic. It is rarely devoid of political meaning and in theory can even support, glorify and depict situations, regimes, ideologies, and leaders that are totalitarian (Hoffmann, 1996; Giesen, 2003). However, arts and culture have often been used in citizen mobilisations asking for more democracy. In fact, one striking element within the literature is the link between arts and social movements. Tilly (1978:9) defines a social movement ‘as a group of people identified by their attachment to some particular set of beliefs’. Precisely, the prime role of culture and the arts in social movements is to facilitate the construction of a collective identity, build the sentiment of togetherness and create the imagery of their claims or the symbolism of the cause they defend. Arts and culture have the capacity to publicize a social
movement by making it audible, visible, and memorable and to simply motivate its members. Indeed, ‘arts can shape and move human emotions and gauge political sentiments’ while ‘clichés, slogans, and symbols – the substance of political rhetoric – help mobilise people’ (Chaffee, 1993:4). In addition, they give the opportunity to invent new forms of communication and define group characteristics which is fundamental in a movement to be recognised or identified (McCaughan, 2012:1). Overall, they encourage ‘the masses to fight their course’ (Titus, 2017: 110-125) and reach their objectives.

According to Wilson (1973:8), a social movement is also meant as a ‘conscious, collective, organised attempt to bring about or resist large scale change in the social order by noninstitutional means.’ Indeed, arts have been utilised in many social movements that defied hegemonic structures, as they are an efficient channel to convey alternative content and challenge a dominant system of rules or beliefs. Culture and arts have long played an important role in people’s struggles, from the slave songs to the revolutionary anthems of popular uprisings (Bouzouita, 2013: 281) and have offered an array of political resources to marginalised groups who enjoy little or no access to institutionalised politics (Love and Mattern, 2013: 9). They have been an instrument of protest and a way to increase political capacity in both authoritarian regimes and societies considered discriminatory or unequal. For performers who sought to explain to the masses the logics of domination and oppression, art was part of the resistance against dictatorship and repression (Lénel, 2011: 92). Equally, displaying ‘banners’, singing and performing ‘street theatre’ have been some of the means to denounce violence and torture (Ensalaco, 2000: 66).

Music and performance have been at the heart of revolutions since they have allowed to articulate new political aspirations and grievances (Valassopoulos and Said Mostafa, 2014: 638). They have been ‘central among the different kinds of discourses composing the (...) semiotic structure of the street protest demonstrations’ and some music genres within movements such as western pop are sometimes seen as a powerful tool to challenge political and religious authorities (Leone, 2012:352). According to Mutonya (2004:32) ‘popular songs produced away from the eyes of officialdom provided spaces within which people could not only experience moments of freedom but could also construct their own regimes of truth and meaning in the music’. Songs have also the capacity to confront the enemy or remind the elites in power that ordinary people are a force to be reckoned with and that they are fully part of the nation or society. As Jakes (2013:318-323) explains, in context of enemy occupation, folk
songs were used as a way to resist the occupiers in everyday life, increase the morale of people and inspire them in the fight while in other periods of history they gave ‘disenfranchised citizens an opportunity to participate in civic life’. An analogous analysis is provided on the role of fiction films’ content which favoured ideas of independence and nationalism during the colonial era (Denis, 2007: 42). Overall, this shows that arts often denounce ‘the perceived imperfections of the status quo’ (Mondak, 1988:25).

In that sense, culture and the arts indirectly play a part in social movement framing. As reminded by Olson (2015: 55) ‘framing is the principal activities in which movements activists participate and activists are often involved in framing contests or framing wars with their opponents in an attempt to win the heart of mind of the public’. As they formulate their demands and look to challenge political entities and persons that are more powerful than them, actors indeed engage in framing activities and use different mediums, formats or material such as artistic contents or displays, to give shape to their grievances. An important element to underline is that culture and the arts mostly draw on the imagination and skills of citizens, as opposed to the political competence that is produced within institutional circles.

This aspect is fundamental in this thesis for it highlights the way citizens mobilise to claim back their rights or fight against an unjust power, whether it be embodied by an autocratic regime or a flawed democratic state. What is observed in this subsection is that culture and the arts are seized by citizens when political resources are scarce, unavailable, flawed or simply confiscated by institutional or arbitrary power. This is an important lesson for academics who study societies where democracy is restricted. This thesis will develop the idea that in situations of “authoritarian enclaves”, cultural policy can be compensate for the unsatisfactory and dysfunctional aspects of democracy (excessive partocracy, hegemonic ideology, weak possibility for advancing processes of justice, or lack of political offer due to the feeble polarisation between parties).

2.1.2. Cultural policy and social empowerment

Another idea extracted from the literature is that democratisation entails a sentiment of empowerment. Many studies of social sciences, humanities, psychology, migration studies, education or urban development discuss the capacity of topic of arts to generate positive social behaviour. Numerous authors from various disciplines have paid interest to how citizens who
engage in arts-based activities can develop social skills of communication, socialisation, and empowerment (Travis and Deepak, 2011; Malema and Naidoo, 2017; Northington, 2018; Travis et al, 2019). According to Boraian (2008: 32), ‘empowerment as a social process challenges the fundamental imbalances of power distribution and relation. It is a process of redistribution of power within and between families, societies and a process aiming at social equality’. Indeed, marginalised or impoverished people who have had to deal with mental or physical illness, involved themselves in artistic activities that helped them publicise their problems, socialise with their local community or simply regain some amount of self-esteem.

Levy and Weber (2011: 293-94) demonstrate that ‘arts-based activities are among the most important vehicles’ for bringing people together to ‘discuss their situations and express their feelings, for learning how to learn, and for gaining self-knowledge and social awareness’. These activities function as a socio-pedagogical tool ‘to acquire skills that promote life-long learning and empowerment within a community organisation’ but also as an ‘emancipatory practice’ (Levy and Weber, 2011: 307).

Other studies shed light on how arts and cultural programs seek to encourage ‘social improvement’ and the ‘pursuit of liberation and well-being through community engagement’ for people or communities such as foreigners or women who have been victims of discrimination (Carrasco et al, 2016: 229-230). The cultivation of artistic skill ‘can provide socially valuable roles for marginalised people’ and humanises them ‘despite the stigma’ or help them make decisions ‘individually and collaboratively’ (Morris and Willis-Rauch, 2014:35). For persons who have suffered from harassment or intimidation, participating in artistic initiatives also provides ‘opportunities to work through problems and overcome obstacles, thus contributing to feelings of competency, and ‘giving the participants the ability to imagine themselves having control and influence in their lives’ (Laffier, 2016 :15). The idea that arts empower is essential because in a post-authoritarian context, one of the big challenges is to recreate an environment in which citizens regain confidence as well as a sense of justice. The violence and dogmatism that characterise authoritarian regimes provoke a society atomisation whose effects can be observed even after the return to democracy (McFaul and Treyger, 2004). This causes insecurity among citizens and makes them vulnerable. The literature on arts and social empowerment tells us that culture can increase self-capacity and self-insurance for citizens in atomised societies.
2.1.3 The culture of democracy: ideology and values

Moving from both procedural democracy and non-institutional ways of gaining more freedom and rights, it is possible to observe in the literature another signification of the term democracy which is: a system of beliefs, an ideology that its promoters wish to spread and share. Over the course of history, arts played a role in disseminating democratic ideals or encouraging people who lived in less open societies to adhere to them. In that sense, culture might also contribute to democratisation not as an institutional process but more as a kind of “value enforcement”. As pointed to in Chapter 1, democratisation is not only about demilitarisation and the replacement of authoritarian administrations by democratic ones. Consequently, it also has to do with the familiarisation of populations with a more liberal thought. Films are considered a key instrument to teach citizens the democratic principles that led to the foundation of a nation (Paris, 1998: 87). Some of them particularly emphasised the notion of group as a homogenised mix of individuals from various ethnic and religious backgrounds, united in the struggle against totalitarian regimes (Doherty, 1993 cited in Paris, 1998: 88).

Film policy in the post-war era for example was also used by western powers to “re-educate” the defeated countries whose political system and culture supposedly did not adapt to the ethics of democracy. Films that exalted militarist, anti-foreign or nationalist sentiment were forbidden while productions that showed citizens from all social backgrounds striving to build a pacific nation were supported (Feith, 1992). A similar strategy of “democratisation” through arts policy was put in application during the process known as ‘denazification’ after World War II. The idea for western powers was to restructure in depth the identity and values of Germany, reshape ‘Germaness’ and make it compatible with ‘a nontotalitarian view’ by relying on cultural policy (Goldstein, 2003: 283-287). Another example is how western associations created film societies to introduce Germans to foreign cinema and organise meetings with famous filmmakers, which was considered by the Occupation authorities a way to depart from the Nazi period (Vincent, 2011: 94). Although this is a top-down conception of democracy and an indirect form of indoctrination, it can still provide citizens with a feeling of empowerment, alleviation or well-being after years of dictatorship or violent political rule.
Promoting democracy via films has also been part of the ideological fight against other political systems. This is what happened for example in the Cold War era. During the distant fight between United States and the USSR, all means were mobilised by the west to contain the influence of its Eastern rival. Culture and arts were an important strategic tool to win the battle of ideas. Not only did they help spread liberal values of freedom and democracy, but they also depicted their rivals in a very critical and unflattering way. The American government would then decide the ‘allocation of huge sums of money to Hollywood directors to support the making of anti-Communist films in various regions of the world’ and ‘to vigorously promote American truths about democracy and freedom at home and abroad, declare war on global imperialistic communism, and reveal the “red lies” of Communist propaganda organs’ (Hee, 2018:310-311). Culture can thus part of a wider strategy of power or conquest and in the case of democratic states is a way to develop, influence and construct the idealistic vision of democracy as a regime of liberty, truth, and possibilities.

Also, in the United States, the production of films that glorify wartime heroic exploits and embellish the military experience is another illustration of how the legitimacy of western democratic power is constructed. Wars become honourable and fair since they their goal is to annihilate those who are an obstacle to democracy and to the western way of life (Pollard, 2002). Later in the 20th century, other types of films that had the same purpose of promoting democracy were produced. These were about portraying racist characters as repulsive in order to push the viewer to situate themselves in the anti-racist camp (Finley and Finley, 2004). Likewise, the audience witnessed how the white protagonist gradually became restive to racism and learned to deconstruct the foundations of this undemocratic ideology (Madison, 1999).

Although this thesis does not deal with political propaganda or the promotion of democracy abroad per se, as it is the case within this sub-section, this topic allows the reader to better understand the figurative dimension of democracy. As explained by Mach (1993:105), ‘to create the image of a national, political identity, state elites employ the language of symbols.’ If democracy is a set of legally rooted principles that gives rights and defines the possibilities and conditions for citizenship, it also relies as most regimes do, on an imagery, on a series of clichés, myths or realities that are either polished, enhanced or even manipulated in certain cases (Winddance Twine, 1998; Schulman, 2012; Walzer, 2014). The argument defended in this thesis is that democracy, in order to be fully effective must be exercised but also seen in
more abstract ways. It is not only about its concrete realisation (elections, militant activity, associative life, and grassroots activities) but also about the perception of it. As a matter of fact, it has to do with the feeling or impression of living within a democracy.

Democracy as an imagery is as equally potent as its materialisation in legal rights. Political authorities often need to prove that the country is democratic and that the way they administer it is correct. For this reason, they rely on symbols or some institutions that can give them back democratic credentials. Especially after a period of authoritarian rule, projecting a democratic picture is fundamental, because it creates positivity and reassurance, and conviction that the country is reborn. Indeed, despite the joy and relief of not being in a dictatorship anymore, the shadow of the past and mostly the traces (both physical and psychological) of the authoritarian era linger many years later. According to de Groot (2007: 167), ‘politics deals with human hopes, fears, values and desires as well as material interests’. In this case, feelings and sensations matter the same. In a post-authoritarian context, the reconstruction of a “democratic identity” is therefore essential to dissipate the sensation of repression, arbitrary surveillance, and emotional suffocation. What should be said is that democracy, understood as an idea or set of values can also produce feelings of optimism and empowerment for citizens. The literature does not straightforwardly connect this aspect with citizenship, but the argument made in this thesis is that shaping the image of a positive and democratic country is also a way of favouring democratisation.

2.2. THE CULTURAL POLICY OF DIVERSITY AND HUMAN RIGHTS

2.2.1 Cultural policy as cultural diversity

Culture is in relation to several aspects of human rights. It is at the centre of national and local communities’ identity and is thus constitutive of their physical existence and recognition as specific peoples. According to Hunt (2007:11), ‘human rights are universal and equal, which means that all human beings have certain inherent rights simply by virtue of being human and not by virtue of their status in society whether that is defined by sex, race ethnicity or group of families, a social class, an occupational group or even an entire nation’. Connecting culture with human rights necessarily leads to discuss cultural diversity, ethnic minorities, or
immigration. In the second part of the 20th century, both developed and developing countries further integrated the notions of cultural citizenship, cultural diversity and minority rights to the agendas of their national cultural policies with the pursued objective to strengthen democracy and increase equality. Cultural diversity is produced by ‘intensified migratory movements, transnationalism and the growing importance of communities living multi-sided lives’ (Ballard et al., 2009:11). The principle that underlies cultural diversity is that various minorities can be brought together, regardless of their differences, and coexist with each other if there is a political entity that produces the conditions to achieve so (Fagan, 2018: 87). The discussions on culture and ethnic diversity bring to the fore another important topic which is identity – whether it be constructed as a national or multicultural one. Many countries in the world must deal with identity, either because of the native communities that have been historically present on the territory or because foreign populations recently arrived.

In recent decades, cultural policy’s scope has been widened with the ‘promotion of immigrants’ participation in cultural practices, whether directly through specific cultural mediators or through existent networks in civil society’ (Zapata-Barrero, 2016: 540). In Scandinavian countries, the rights of minority populations were legally guaranteed and some communities ‘were given relatively far-reaching rights in legal and political practice’ (Saukkonen and Pyykkönen, 2008: 52). In countries like Australia, cultural policy gradually embraced the notion of ‘social justice’ and governments gave increased attention to the cultural production of indigenous communities (Wilkinson, 2006: 483). In Taiwan, authorities via the Constitution decided to recognize the society as a multicultural one (Wang, 2013: 100; Wang, 2014: 22). The concepts of ethnicity and cultural diversity which are essential components of cultural policy strongly matter for democratisation in contemporary politics, either because they force authorities to address the challenges of globalisation, colonialism and racial injustice or because they are part of a tradition of national social welfare.

Discussing the integration of cultural minorities leads to look at the way those try to find their place within society, especially after they were displaced or forced to leave their original land. The literature provides details the case of immigrants or exiled communities using arts to deal with their alien condition or preserve their cultural ancestry. It explains the several ways art performance or production can help those populations. Arts facilitate the adaptation to their new cultural environment and perpetuate their own culture, allow them to face the challenge
of reconciling two identities, or handle the confusion or feeling of loss that being away from their native land provokes. For people who have been living away from their homeland, ‘performing traditional songs and dances in a new environment (…) links the performer to his native culture in the host community’ and ‘facilitates identity construction’ for it disseminates knowledge about the refugees’ heritage’ while helping them ‘remember and retain the lives they had lived in their country’ (Smith et al, 2011).

As argued by Linesch et al (2014), ‘the concordance between immigrants and the host majority often results in interpersonal and familial conflict’ and immigrants feel ‘hardships and identity struggles within both cultures’, but ‘creating art’ is a way for them to ‘express fear and reflect on their past lives’. Cultural diversity as argued previously has been a growing concern for several countries, especially in the West and has become one of the most important paradigms of national cultural policy. For example, in a country like the United Kingdom, the main cultural institution (Council or Ministry) can choose to ‘prioritise those who can identify themselves in a way that diverges from what has been considered the dominant, hegemonic majority: white, heterosexual (…)’ and give them ‘particularly favourable responses in the way of institutional support and grants’ (Rotas, 2012:213). Again, the topic of cultural diversity has to do with the country’s identity after the recovery of democracy. It forces both elites and citizens to ask themselves what they want to be as nation and to what extent they wish to support and integrate cultural plurality.

2.2.2. Cultural heritage and reconstruction

Another theme that connects to identity and human rights is cultural heritage. According to Silverman and Fairchild Ruggles (2007:3), ‘heritage is about ‘the preservation of material culture – objects of arts and of daily use, architecture, landscape form – and intangible culture – performances of dance, music, theatre, and ritual as well as language and human memory are generally regarded as a shared common good by which everyone benefits’. Cultural heritage tends to have a universal appeal for most places in the world have material or immaterial traditions and artefacts that they want to protect or perpetuate. Heritage is an important part of cultural policy and plays a fundamental role in the preservation and protection of both communities and individuals’ rights. Cultural heritage is inherent to the rights of peoples, for
it is the physical testimony of their presence and symbolic continuity and for they are entitled
to enjoy it and benefit from it. Heritage conservation is defined as (...) ‘a precondition for
fostering dialogue and understanding across cultures and civilisations and therefore for creating
an environment which enables the promotion and protection of human rights for all’ (OHCHR,
2010 cited in Logan, 2012: 231-232). Besides, heritage is directly related to physical and
emotional reconstruction, national identity, and memory. As argued by Blake (2011:201), ‘one
of the most relevant aspects of cultural heritage for any discussion of human rights is the central
role that it plays in the construction of cultural identity, at the level of the local community,
region or nation’. While the value of heritage is mostly the preoccupation of experts, scientists
and archaeologists, it has nonetheless gained more and more importance in relation to the
benefits it can bring in the context of ordinary life (de la Torre, 2013:160 and McFarquhar,

Damaging or simply ignoring physical traces of a past civilisation is not only a loss of
valuable artefacts but also has an impact on a people’s essence or history and further cuts them
from their origins (Lostal and Cunliffe, 2016:250). It is thus coherent that during wars, cultural
heritage is purposively targeted by enemies or adversaries. Violent or terrorist groups may seek
to ‘culturally cleanse the areas under its control’ and ‘erase tangible and intangible cultural
heritage to establish a single, homogeneous way of life (...) through violence, murder, rape,
destruction and pillage (Matthews et al, 2019:6). Destroying a community’s valuable cultural
property, one that represents its identity and distinctiveness, is considered a violation of human
rights (Lenzerini, 2016: 71). Because of the utter importance of cultural heritage in many
countries that experienced war, it is logical that its reconstruction becomes a crucial part of the
conflict resolution and peacebuilding processes.

Heritage reconstruction becomes indeed a topic of discussion after episodes of violence such
as armed conflict and civil war. Governments must decide what they will restore (or not) as the
repaired heritage might ‘construct a sense of national cohesion and history’ and help start the
‘process of ‘normalisation’ (Viejo-Rose, 2013: 125-126). Post-conflict reconstruction is not
only a material project but also an initiative that is supposed to allow people to mentally
recover. Heritage restoration can reconnect people with what existed before a conflict started
and give them something that reminds them of their past before their routine was interrupted
(Khalaf, 2019:2). Besides, in the aftermath of violent strife, reconstruction of historical
monuments can encourage concord and peace between formerly divided communities (Walasek, 2015: 213). The literature also highlights divergent views on the importance of heritage reconstruction, framing its loss or annihilation as a possible way to recreate a “new” country or as an opportunity to create more history. The disappearance of heritage brings to the fore the dilemma between continuity and renewal. It forces countries to question their collective identity, for destruction and loss can also be seen as a way to redefine the nation and add to their history (Holtorf, 2015).

2.2.3. Memory, trauma and the arts

Discussing the theme of heritage destruction, war and immigration leads to talk about memory. Even before trying to define the concept of memory, it is necessary to clarify some methodological aspects that will guide this research. Memory is both in tight relation to citizenship and a notion on its own that necessitates particular attention. A trivial human faculty and activity that allows individuals to “remember what happened previously”, memory is a posteriori constructed narration of the past that blends factual history and subjective interpretation. As for political memory, it ‘is a crucial part of the national common sense or doxa. It shapes individual’s assumptions about the boundaries of the community, historical allies and enemies, objects of pride and hatred’ (Mihai, 2019:53). Memory becomes a deeper, even problematic issue when it corresponds to an experience of large-scale human rights violations or (civil) war. As suggested by Hirsch (1995:3), memory is not inherently positive; it is a complex blend of history, politics and psychology which means that actors can also use the past and the myths attached to it to perpetuate crimes. Yet, at the same time, memory can bring relief when catharsis is made and the past discussed (Guthrey, 2015:154).

Political memory is in most cases shaped by political authorities and institutions, but other civil society actors also contribute to its forging (Siddi, 2017:467). This means that citizens are also capable of seizing and using memory for a purpose of political justice of for personal healing. The literature provides many examples of how the arts can help people with traumatic experiences. Those studies which focus on the therapeutic function of culture and the arts lie at the intersection of social work analysis, psychology, and neurosciences (Avrahami, 2006; Naff, 2014; Lobban and Murphy, 2018). Trauma refers to any kind of event that has physically or psychologically hurt people: natural catastrophes, sexual violence, war crimes,
displacement, torture or exile. Arts have been utilised at a personal level to “release” negative feelings or at a more community level, in the context of experience sharing with people who dealt with the same distressing events.

For example, the role of music therapy in helping victims is well-documented. It helps surmounting disasters and facilitate the reintegration to society (Davis, 2010). Arts also happen to be a potent means to address political violence and foster dialogue in societies that were deeply divided by racial or political cleavages. As argued by Milton (2014:2-3), they are a method to denounce brutality or violent exactions and restore the lost dignity of those who experienced human rights violations. Arts ‘encourage self-introspection and exploration of participants’ journeys following the abuse they experienced’ and are ‘ongoing tools to help them cope with experiences outside of the group’ while ‘raising awareness and giving voice to survivors in the local community (Murray et al, 2017:196-201). Also, ‘artists are ideally equipped to support the acts of remembrance, to provide opportunities to mourn productively, and to help lay out paths towards reconciliation’ (Turner and Webb, 2016:103).

Arts can have another political purpose which is to fight narratives that are constructed by the state. In that sense, they ‘may help to achieve a fuller expression and better understanding of difficult and contested pasts’ (Milton, 2014:2-3). Artistic expression can propose or reveal truths that contrast with the one imposed by government officials or international institutions. According to the available literature, storytelling is one means to do so. Barnes and Peters (2002) affirm that ‘by allowing the story of trauma to permeate many different levels, it can function to bring about personal healing, community building through the sharing of stories, and even social change by revealing the need for legislative action’. Novels for instance have the function of unveiling different or hidden narratives, ‘resetting new perspectives or new testimonies about murder and crime’, putting forward overlooked stories and more generally providing a revisionist analysis of the past (Vambe, 2012:240).

Likewise, they teach about history and expose pieces of memory within the public space, allowing everyone to learn about history, and thus preventing it from falling into oblivion (Hannum and Rhodes, 2018:355-356). Moreover, artistic expression is not tied to the obligations of factual accuracy as it is the case with legal instruments, which means that it can present divergent opinions, criticise the official discourse or show that the state’s truth is just one truth among many others (de Smet et al, 2015: 228). Besides, one of the key roles of cultural
policy is to create institutions that will tell stories of the past in order to serve as an educational tool, as it is the case with museums. Museums contribute to ‘to raise awareness about the horrors, the devastation of human lives and genocide prevention as well as to influence the formation of a community of consciousness’ and perpetuate a ‘memory that not only respects the victims but will teach future generations to prevent such an evil, to choose to be a witness not a bystander’ (Kulašić, 2015:404-408).

Memory is thus one pivotal aspect of this research. As shown by the existing literature, it is both the remembrance organised by state institutions and the personal recollections of people who “lived the past”. One the one hand, the way memory is addressed in this thesis has to do with the theme of transitional justice. According to Arenhövel (2008:570), transitional justice is ‘about how to cope with the past and how to treat the perpetrators of the former regime’. Cole (2010: x) further adds that ‘devised as a way to cope with the aftermath of systematic and large-scale violations of human rights, transitional justice has achieved its most notable impact via Truth Commissions’ which role is also to indirectly deal with grief, trauma and memory. Indeed, this research explores the initiatives set by governments in the area of transitional justice. On the other hand, this thesis explores the way civil society, expresses, or uses the past. Especially in cases of authoritarian resilience, it is important to study how civil society “defies” the official truth dictated by the state. More generally, this thesis will analyse cultural policy as an alternative way to deal with the issue of memory in a post-authoritarian context.

2.3. ARTS, COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT AND EDUCATION

2.3.1. Arts for community development

This chapter’s last section echoes some of the aspects previously highlighted but is more focused on community development, education and social welfare. As this will be developed throughout the different subsections, the three terms are related to democracy. A large part of the literature is dedicated to explaining why and how culture improves community development (Kay, 2000; Carey and Sutton, 2004; Chung et al, 2009; McGrath and Brennan, 2011; Selkrig, 2011). This connection is summarised in the concept of “community arts” which ‘is defined as art that reaches beyond the scope of professional artists by fostering the participation of the community as audience members, makers of art, or in programming the art activity itself’ (Cho et al, 2016:684). Arts can be found in activities that help create dynamism
in urban spaces and neighbourhoods. They allow to fix a damaged social tissue and recreate favourable life conditions. Art and culture are for example a ‘key vehicle to improve the lives of children’, make their neighbourhoods safer by distracting them away from delinquency and dangerous activities while helping them ‘build marketable job skills and employ neighbourhood artists’ (Zitcer et al, 2016). Community development is also important in rural and remote communities that struggle to maintain historical and cultural distinctiveness and achieve genuine economic competitiveness. Indeed, ‘the arts play an important role in urban revitalisation and community renewal, attracting businesses, visitors, new residents and encouraging broader consumer spending, all creating new economic opportunities and increasing community revenue’ (Grodach and Loukaitou-Sideris, 2007; Richards and Palmer, 2010 cited in Skippington and Davis, 2016:224).

Arts, when they are performed within a group or a community have a capacity to strengthen ties between its members, as they allow them to interact with each other, think together and exchanges on different topics, thus developing social relationships which are seen as positive at the individual and collective level (Lee, 2013:15). Artwork can ‘produce reflective dialogue within group settings, helping members define their fundamental beliefs and values and their use in self-development’ and ‘art-making can encourage a group to define itself in relationship to other groups, (…) bring those groups together, reduce social distance, and reinforce common human experiences’ (Moxley, 2013: 238-240). In other contexts where labour precariousness is very high and isolates or dehumanize individuals, arts projects allow them to present their talents in a ‘non-utilitarian exchange for collective wellbeing’ and gives them a sense of providing ‘an authentic service to the community’ (Chan Fung Yi, 2012 :3748).

2.3.2. Arts and education

Cultural policy and education policy are very intertwined. Many countries around the globe have an institution or a Ministry that combines both Culture and Education (Finland, Uruguay, Japan, Cyprus, etc.) In other cases, when political actors decide to make culture a relevant policy area, education and culture become two separate entities and the division of labour increases, with specialists or experts of cultural affairs emerging. This happened for example in countries like France or Chile (De Cea, 2010; Urfalino, 2004). Yet, the boundary between
culture and education tends to remain quite porous across the world, independently of the institutional framework adopted to manage both culture and education. This frontier becomes even narrower when is discussed the topic of art education. Art education is sometimes framed as a right for citizens and not solely as a leisure or mere extra-school activity, further accentuating the role of arts in democracy and for life improvement. As argued by Kuttner (2015:70-72), ‘arts education is about more than transmitting the skills and knowledge needed to create artistic works.’ It is in relation to citizenship and human experiences as it connects with social issues such as integration and communication.

Art education is said to have a role in social cohesion as it offers experiences and events which serve diverse communities and because it is good for ‘personal flourishing’ (Dickson, 2011:22). Sanderson (2008: 470) goes further as she argues that cutting programmes or opportunities of art teaching in educational contexts is damaging to pupils since they are technically prevented from accessing some of their rights. Art education is also important in societies that have become more multicultural. Indeed, arts can be a bridge between communities as they help communicate despite cultural barriers and differences (Aprill, 2008:116). Likewise, Hulsbosch (2010) develops the idea that artistic education is an efficient method of promoting multicultural democracy, deepening civic behaviour and helping students to understand the transformations of global society.

Education in arts allows young people to understand the nuances of the world, develop their own imagination and exchange with other people who come from very different backgrounds, while with ‘inquiry-based artistic expression’, they develop tools to understand and disagree with others, which in turn provokes thoughtfulness and shapes the civic mind (Morgan, 2018:100-101). Art education enables the opening of ‘spaces for being yourself with others, as well as growing into yourself’ which means that students or pupils learn self-appreciation and understand ‘how they view themselves in relation to other subjects and thereby deal with these’ (Almqvist and Christophersen, 2017: 467). Finally, in some cases as well, art education is not only about daily life socialisation and leisure activity. It is also about spiritual reinforcement when it has a philosophical aim such as improving one’s internal peace, reaching a certain idea of beauty or becoming better as a human being (Tan and Tan, 2016).

2.3.3. Arts and social welfare
Finally, one observation that can be made is that both arts education and community arts are directly or indirectly related to the key concept of social welfare. Social welfare is aimed at ‘enhancing the quality of life of individuals’ (Hoefer, 2008: 331). It is a set of services and aids that seek to improve the health and well-being either of the whole population, when welfare is understood as a universal principle, or of segments of the population that are considered more vulnerable or disadvantaged. Cultural policy undoubtedly includes a social dimension, since cultural and artistic activities have the capacity to foster education, improve social tissue through community development and favour the integration of relevant populations (Duncum, 2011; Foster, 2012; Quinn et al, 2011; Osei-Kofi, 2013). In certain parts of the world, cultural policy is based on the idea that culture as much as economy or politics is a right which every citizen is entitled to. Consequently, it corresponds there to ‘the dissemination of the fine arts to all social groups and geographic areas’ and is ‘to a high degree, aimed at specific target groups such as children and young people, senior citizens, immigrants, and workers’ (Duelund, 2001: 40-42). Also, cultural or arts policy is regularly integrated to programs that combat social exclusion by encouraging community arts in deprived areas or disadvantaged neighbourhoods (Belfiore, 2002; Kawashima, 2006; Hamayon-Alfar, 2011: 122-131).

It is widely recognised in the literature that permitting or expanding access to arts is a key human resource, ‘a way to record history, shape culture, and promote imagination, conceptualisation, and individual and social transformation’ and also combat all the mechanisms that weaken citizens or reduce their rights (Hanley, 2011:420). Art helps expressing injustice and knowledge about historical inequalities between different communities. As argued by Kraehe and Brown (2011:499-507), ‘arts-based inquiry’ for example is a means to raise awareness in educational environments about the ‘inequitable nature of schooling’ while ‘arts-based social justice education can be an effective tool for engaging young people as active and critical participants in the world’ (Dewhurst, 2011: 364-366). Overall, arts programmes that ‘are influenced by a social justice education model (…) can work toward creating a more just society, promoting self-determination and solidarity with others, and working toward ending oppression and healing its effects (Watts and Guessous, 2006, cited in Maguire 2017:51).

Arts do connect with social justice as well when they picture or depict oppression and injustice, expose them in the public space to break down misconceptions about situations or
events, and when they become a tool to improve awareness and knowledge (Dewhurst, 2014; Yuen, 2016). Finally, cultural policy covers a more emotional dimension of welfare when citizens are faced with hardship, trauma, and pain. For example, it can offer entertainment to those who need psychological relief. Cultural policy can even combine the objective of providing emotional solace with the one of economic aid. During war time, it can correspond to boosting the morale of civilians, giving jobs to artists facing the breakdown of entertainment business and organising emergency concerts in centres for homeless people or wounded soldiers as this was the case in the United Kingdom during WWII (White, 1975:226-31; Weingartner, 2012).

**CONCLUSION**

This chapter brought to light the many direct and indirect ways cultural policy and artistic activities can contribute to the democratic agenda. As seen earlier in this thesis, culture, because of its wide definition does matter for all. It has an importance for those who seek development at an individual level, for human communities, for temporarily-constituted groups who get to learn about society and the world through artistic experiences and at a national level, as countries need to build a collective identity in order to have more peaceful societies. Culture and the arts have the capacity to empower those who are left behind, even when their use is punctual or temporary. Everywhere, culture and the arts have been utilised to mobilise, convince, or resist in contexts of social fragility or uneven democracy. Similarly, they bring to light some realities or truths that need to be told or publicly discussed when political elites are not in the capacity or willing to do so. Indeed, culture offers a privilege channel for a civil society that wishes to challenge state dogmas and discourses. Moreover, arts have been used to construct what is missing or reconstruct what was destroyed during unfortunate or violent events. Understood as identity protection, cultural policy gives the possibility to preserve and conserve the past. Yet, it can be a tool to design a new identity, a new history and a new collective narrative, showing that both identity and culture are not necessarily static or backward-looking but can be transformed.

Uncovering the different potentialities of culture teaches readers a fundamental lesson. It shows them that societies that went through experiences of “transition” (like it is the case for most ‘third wave countries’) have had something even more valuable or vital to gain from cultural policy. In places where authoritarian legacy has twisted democracy or weakened civil
society, cultural policy could help fix some of these dysfunctions. In addition, although themes such as economy, development and institutions were political elites’ priorities in the post-authoritarian era, other issues needed to be addressed. While political parties, policies and institutions need to be revamped to fit democratic standards and re-establish the foundations of a healthy society, other needs that are abstract rather than material must be fulfilled. These are freedom of speech, psychological well-being, and the importance of constructing a sentiment of positivity after a dark period. Again, the argument made is that cultural policy can achieve results in these areas, especially when authoritarian enclaves and democratic obstructions remain after the re-establishment of democracy.

As this was presented in Chapter 1, three notions that are connected to each other structure this research: citizenship; memory and elite autonomy. Firstly, citizenship works as an umbrella concept that entails social and political empowerment, democratic identity, cultural diversity, cultural heritage, community development, social welfare, education, solidarity, mental health, which all make society more conscious, more cohesive and more just. Cultural policy crosses all those topics which are very interconnected. Secondly, memory is a very important topic in post-authoritarian contexts, for both legal, political and emotional reasons. The third concept that builds this research is “elite autonomy” which is also connected to the idea of democratic identity. Although it does not appear directly in the literature and is a concept developed by the thesis’ author to study the Chilean case, existing studies suggest a similar idea when they explain that political elites also shape and construct ideals of democracy via arts and symbols. Indeed, after the end of a dictatorship or a civil war, building a democratic image for a country via culture is essential for elites as they need to show that they have broken ties with the dictatorial. Overall, these three concepts seek to theorise more comprehensively the way cultural policy contributes to democratisation.
CHAPTER 3 – OVERCOMING THE DILEMMA OF AUTHORITARIAN ENCLAVES: THE ROLE OF CULTURAL POLICY IN DEMOCRATISATION

INTRODUCTION

As this was already suggested in Chapter 1, democracy has been very scrutinised, from different angles and in relation to many different topics. As a result, it is important to clearly situate this research in the wide sea of democratisation studies. Many works that discuss the phenomenon logically focus on the determinants and factors of democratisation, whether they are economic, cultural, external or historical ones (Hu, 2000; Pridham, 2000: 30; Inglehart and Welzel, 2005; Teorell and Hadenius, 2007:69; Selim, 2015). Academic studies have adopted many different perspectives to analyse democratisation: the state, governance, terrorism, transitional justice, civil society, civil war, religion, international context (Kritz, 1995; Barahona et al., 2001; Cavatorta, 2005; Nyman, 2006; Fasakin, 2015). Otherwise, scholars have been interested in explaining the lack of democratisation: whether they refer to it as deficit, breakdown or interruption (Linz and Stepan, 1978; Barany, 2007; Diamond, 2015; Tomini, 2018).

While some of these points are integrated within this research, the aim is more specifically to examine the “democratic possibilities” in countries that face the problem of dealing with their authoritarian legacy. This thesis seeks to expand and deepen the definition of authoritarian resilience. As argued by Morlino (2011: 166) ‘authoritarian legacy carries key internal dimensions that are strongly related, but which may be only present in the new democratic arrangement: set of beliefs, values and attitudes and one or more public institutions.’ This definition reveals that the resilience of authoritarianism is visible at two levels: in state agencies and actors and in habits, rituals, and discourses. Building on this assertion, it is possible to argue that even when authoritarianism is defeated at the organisational level, its structures dismantled or its institutions more or less “depurated”, some informal settings and symbolic representations of the old regime apparatus remain, with some of them potentially acting at a more cognitive level (emotions, memory, psychology).
This chapter looks to theorise the problem of authoritarian persistence by building an analysis around the concept of “authoritarian enclave” coined by Garretón (2003). One objective is to bring more layers to it in order to show how different sorts of authoritarian legacies impede democratisation. The Literature Review Chapter started to outline the idea that material and abstract elements are both present in the process of democratisation. This signifies that authoritarianism is a violation, destabilisation, or obstruction of the two facets of democracy: material and symbolic. In order to better understand this reality, this chapter identifies two types of enclaves: solid and fluid. The first corresponds to legal, ideological and physical obstacles and the second to more intangible ones related to the country’s reputation and citizens’ emotions.

In addition, this chapter goes further as it does more than just observe the existence of different enclaves or describe situations of democratic shortcomings. It looks at some of the solutions to “untie” or attenuate the heritage of authoritarianism. It consequently designs a theoretical framework that explains the positive relationship between cultural policy and democratisation and how cultural policy, although being a more marginal policy area, can resolve some of the problems caused by authoritarian enclaves. While the framework is built to study the Chilean case, it can be used to analyse many other countries that had a similar trajectory; former military dictatorships in the global south, ex-totalitarian regimes in Central and Eastern Europe or even countries or subnational governments characterised by structural injustice, discrimination or endemic violence.

This chapter is made of three sections. The first one reviews the field of transitology, focalising particularly on the concepts of “transition” and “consolidation” and sets to what extent this thesis embraces them and to what extent it departs from them. It then explains why the concept of enclaves is more relevant in this research. The second part subsequently expands the notion to cover other kinds of realities that transcend the legal realm. It explains that democratic zones or tools always exist even in extreme conditions of authoritarianism or arbitrary rule and then underlines the importance of cultural policy as an area that is free of enclaves. The last part explains how the concepts of authoritarian enclaves, cultural policy and democratisation are related to each other by providing an analytical framework applicable to the Chilean case and many other countries.
3.1. CONCEPTS OF DEMOCRATISATION: A CRITICAL ASSESSMENT

3.1.1. Assessing the concepts of transitology

Most scholars who specialise in democratisation studies must engage with a very wide literature that is commonly called “transitology”. As described by Hoço (2013: 32), ‘the transitology paradigm (…) is considered the universal theoretical approach for understanding the process of democratisation’. It is also a subfield dedicated to the analysis of regime change. Transitology explains the phenomena of transition from one regime to another, especially the passage from authoritarianism to democracy and also focuses on democratic consolidation. Transition is the ‘interval between one political regime and another. Transitions are delimited, on the one side, by the launching of the process of dissolution of an authoritarian regime, and on the other by the installation of some form of democracy’ (O'Donnell and Schmitter, 1986: 6). While it has been a very common paradigm since the 1980s, it has been regularly criticised for its methodological weaknesses (Dobry, 2000; Carrothers, 2002; Dufy and Thiriot, 2013). Grugel (1999:9) argues that ‘transitology does not pay sufficient attention to structural contexts and constraints’, overlooks ‘historical and cultural studies’ and underlines that the definition of democracy has been downgraded, since every single authoritarian regime that ended was suddenly considered democratic (Grugel, 1999:9).

Another critique is that transition is seen by many as a temporary phenomenon. However, some countries in transition might indefinitely remain in a state of limbo, combining repressive and liberal traits; and this is the reason why authors have written about ‘democracy with adjectives’ (Collier and Levitsky, 1997). Indeed, as argued by Carothers (2002:14) ‘what is often thought of as an uneasy, precarious middle ground between full-fledged democracy and outright dictatorship is (…) the most common political condition today of countries in the developing world’. Some pundits, politicians and academics hope for a ‘transition’ to end when countries transition is the only stage that a country can reach. Besides, the concept conveys the idea that transition is an abnormal state, but dysfunctional (old or new) democracies are gradually becoming the norm (Lenard and Simeon, 2012). Consequently, it has become increasingly irrelevant to see post-authoritarian countries as peculiar.
In addition, “transition” is not only an academic concept but also a very politicised one. Indeed, it is often used by politicians who like to claim that they succeeded in making transition complete (Dufy and Thiriot, 2013). In Spain for example, “transition” mostly became a folklore, a tale of glory about rival political sides overcoming their dissensions to lead the country towards reconciliation (Baby, 2015: 47-48). These criticisms are valid. However, despite the limits of the concept, it is not possible to ignore that some remnants of authoritarianism are indeed transitional. Some of them do disappear, because of new legislation, pressure from international organisations or because some political actors lost legitimacy or even died. Moreover, transition remains a useful tool to understand the reasons why dictatorships end as well as the factors that lead to their demise, usually through passive means instead of direct confrontation (Ould Mohamedou and Sisk, 2017).

If transition is an imperfect terminology, “consolidation” presents the same flaws. According to transitology, consolidation is the stage that comes after transition. It means that the ‘degree of institutionalisation of the rules that characterise new regimes’ is sufficient and that these rules are accepted by all actors; which is a proof that democracy is finally mature (Monclaire, 2006:63). Yet, ‘democratic consolidation is an intrinsically teleological concept’ that suggests the idea of ‘inevitable progress’ (Schedler, 1998:95), which is a very linear approach. Indeed, democratic consolidation is often presented as a country’s ultimate political and as its last stage of evolution. The other problem is that democratic consolidation and democratic decay are issues that even exist in established democracies. In contemporary politics for example, anti-terrorist laws, security measures and mass surveillance have been framed as authoritarian practices in old western democracies (Garrigos-Kerjan, 2006:187; Sainati, 2007; Wright and Kreissel, 2015). Besides, one could argue that decreasing political accountability, repression of social movements, and technocratic governance that oversteps citizens’ decisions all constitute challenges for democracy or further democratisation. In that sense, the paradigm has lost some of its relevance as post-authoritarian countries and older democracies now face similar problems. Yet, the concept of consolidation cannot be completely ignored since it is still possible to empirically demonstrate that some democratic practices have been reinstated in the state apparatus and society.

3.1.2. Transitology and pacted transition
The concepts of transition and consolidation must be used with caution, especially when discussing countries where democratic return was made via pacted transition. As outlined in Chapter 1, a pacted transition means that both military and civilian elites sat at the table of negotiations to determine under which circumstances the military would relinquish state power to civilian party elites. Firstly, a pact validates agreements, laws or ideologies that favour actors of the previous regime, without saying anything about their duration, which explains why some of them are still in effect today. Secondly, pacted transition might be doomed to be an unfinished business for, in the situation where democratic return was a relatively conciliatory arrangement, re-building a new society from scratch was never the initial purpose (Vircoulon, 2006). Thirdly, the consensus that goes along with the pacts tends to change the balance of power between social actors, and this on the long term, as the former balance is not re-established after the return to democracy.

Consequently, trade unions, workers and sections of civil society might remain weak after transition (Gutiérrez, 2002:20; Drake, 2003). Finally, within democracies that were born out of pacted transitions, memory can be very difficult issue to deal with. Indeed, the willingness to create consensus prevails in the post-authoritarian era, and because elites want to market transition as “successful”, they prefer to “ignore” this contentious topic; and this tends to slow down transitional justice. Yet, it would be incorrect to claim that the problem of authoritarian persistence has no solution at all. For example, when there is little progress in the area of transitional justice, civil society is still able to take action to compensate for the inaction of political actors, lack of suitable legislation and raise awareness on issues related to human rights violations and impunity. Therefore, the concepts provided by transitology should still be considered relevant as they allow to analyse the democratic advances of a country in various domains.

3.1.3. Using the concept of authoritarian enclave

The existing literature proposes several theoretical tools to comprehend the issue of democratic obstacles. Among them, there are competitive authoritarianism and delegative democracy (Bogaards, 2009: 399-400). Competitive authoritarianism refers to regimes that
partially respect civil liberties, have democratic institutions but unfair practices. While they accept some amount of opposition, they manipulate the rules of the game by using state institutions in their favour and by reducing the opposition’s resources (Levitsky and Way, 2010). As for delegative democracies, they are unlikely to turn into authoritarian regimes but are unable to improve the principle of representation (O’Donnell, 1992). In fact, scholars of democratisation resort to a plethora of concepts and typologies whose goal is to describe more accurately the state of democracy in different countries.

Another established concept in the literature is “illiberal democracy” (Zakaria, 1997). An illiberal democracy is characterised by ‘pseudo liberal architecture and institutions but lack the underlying commitment to core liberal ideas such as limited and accountable government and the rule of law’ (Dickson, 2014:25). The studies that feature all these concepts can help scholars understand enduring authoritarian practices and democratic institutions that follow informal arbitrary rules and illegal procedures (corruption, lack of independent judiciary, state violence, intimidations of journalists etc.). In fact, they discuss regimes or governments that ‘may coexist indefinitely with meaningful democratic institutions as long as they avoid well-publicised rights abuses and do not steal openly elections’ (Levitsky and Way, 2002:58). They also shed light on states that use strategies of co-optation ‘to preserve their monopoly’ (Boubekeur, 2013: 478) and rely on complacent or “façade” civil society organisations to maintain the illusion of pluralism (Lorch and Bunk, 2017: 6-8).

The focus of this research is somewhat different from semi-democracies or hybrid regimes. The objective is to distinguish laws, institutions, routines, and emotions resulting from the ex-authoritarian regime but do remain in democracy, from some government zigzagging between liberal and repressive methods to meet the minimal democratic standards and maintain power. This thesis therefore uses the concept of “enclave” to better identify and define mechanisms and phenomena inherited from the authoritarian era; those that limit the actions of political elites and prevent civil society from being more active in democracy. The concept originally theorises the robustness of authoritarian legacy in democracy (Garretón, 2003). Enclaves are ‘generally found within the state (…) or a particular institution like the military. They may also
be found in social spaces that the state claims to regulate, such as education or the media’ (Gilley, 2010: 389).\(^8\)

However, the original definition of authoritarian enclaves does not explain enough their nuances and ambiguities. Indeed, the validation of these enclaves is the condition to access democracy. Especially in the case of pacted transition, democratic actors have a double obligation that becomes a sort of dilemma. On the one hand, they have to fulfil some of the old regime supporters’ demands to put an end to dictatorship. On the other hand, they have to prove that democracy is not only a smokescreen or a mere formality. Consequently, they face the hard task of promoting change while keeping some structures of the ex-regime. While enclaves are mostly caused by actors or supporters of the former regime, attention should also be paid to the actors who are on the democratic side. Actors of the opposition to the former dictatorship can be part of the “enclaves”, although more indirectly, if they have decided to change strategy, have become less critical of certain traits of the previous regime or if they now find that the accords that they passed with the outgoing elites are convenient. This nuance is important as it avoids the Manicheism analysis of exiting elites being responsible for all the deeds and democratic elites being only victims and having no responsibility in the persistence of authoritarianism. This point is very important point but is overlooked in Garretón’s definition.

Moreover, there is another important element that does not appear in Garretón’s conceptualisation. Although the author does mention ethical and symbolic remnants of the past, his definition remains generic and one-dimensional. As argued by Dabène (2008: 91), enclaves have been mostly reduced to their legal essence, which suggests that more research needs to be carried on other kinds of obstacles. Indeed, the definition of Garretón lacks a proper model that distinguishes between different sorts of enclaves. While some of them are legally rooted, others are not directly related to the institutional field but are more symbolic and psychological. Accordingly, this chapter argues that other types of enclaves do exist, some that have to do with the country’s reputation, the emotional state of its citizens, its capacity to deal with memory and discuss its recent history. As demonstrated in the Literature Review Chapter, un(democratic) situations are not only related to laws, policies, or political actors. Emotional

\(^8\) Most of the time however, enclaves refer in the literature to local authorities or subnational governments that could maintain their arbitrary power despite the democratisation process undergone at the federal level (Diamond, 1999: 133; Giraudy, 2010; Durazo Herrmann, 2016).
pain, taboos or silence related to the past also hinder the process of democratisation because they damage social cohesion, create frustration or resentment, and damage the country’s image. In order to provide a more comprehensive analysis of democratic impediments in post-authoritarian countries, this chapter therefore updates the concept of enclave by dividing it into two categories: solid and fluid.

3.2. FROM AUTHORITARIAN ENCLAVES TO AN “ENCLAVE-FREE” ZONE: THE CONTRIBUTION OF CULTURAL POLICY TO DEMOCRATISATION

3.2.1. A typology of enclaves: solid and fluid

Firstly, this thesis identifies “solid” enclaves.⁹ These are present within the legal apparatus of a country, which makes them more durable and give them some legitimacy. Authoritarian enclaves can be approved by the Constitution, which means that they are “accepted” by all political sides and that they were validated during the bargaining process. Solid enclaves can be found in the electoral system, in constitutional provisions as well as in amnesty laws that impede the course of transitional justice (Garretón, 2003; Jimeno, 2018). They can also be found in any kind of legislation that restricts freedom of speech and prevents civil society from having more autonomy or power. After democracy’s return, actors of the former authoritarian regime can also be solid enclaves if they remain in state administration or continue to hold a strategic position in politics and society. This particularly applies to countries that experienced pacted transitions and where democratic elites act according to the rules imposed by outgoing elites if they judge that this is the only way to bring back democracy. In pacted transition, actors of the ex-regime have the clear intention to secure as much influence as possible in the post-transition era that will soon open (Derdzinski, 2009:27) and for this reason can be considered “solid enclaves”. Solid enclaves are embodied by the actors who ruled during the authoritarian period, but democratic elites can also indirectly act as “enclaves” if they have undergone a process of ideological transformation or have accepted some of the rules and institutions of the former regime. Elites that govern after the return to democracy can “twist” rather than break

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⁹ The notion of solid enclaves is mainly based on the analysis provided by Garretón and other social scientists. Nevertheless, the author seeks to make this concept stronger by also relying on the literature on transition to market economy, intellectual history, state administration, inequality etc. to identify aspects that are similar to enclaves but not necessarily defined as such.
democracy when they contribute to the domination of political parties with ‘low levels of popular adherence’ and perpetuate the politics of transition that damaged political pluralism and weakened civil society (Siavelis, 2009: 11). In that sense, democratic elites can validate or reinforce an ideology, a political system, or even values introduced by the former authoritarian regime either by strategy, opportunism, or conviction.

Moreover, a solid enclave can be the non-replacement under democracy of actors who worked in some areas during the authoritarian period such as: entrepreneurs, technocrats, civil servants or intellectuals. This situation happens when a country does not have the capacity to train new managerial elites or civil servants in the first years of democracy and therefore has to rely on those of the ex-regime. In post-Communist Romania, this is the reason why the technical knowledge of the former regime continued to be used in democracy (even though it was more parsimonious and pragmatic than during the Soviet period) (Sucala, 2015:200). In Tunisia, economic elites close to President Zine Ben Ali have kept their positions and privileges despite the fall of the regime and presented themselves as essential actors to face the economic challenges that the country faced after transition (Kchouk, 2017). In West Germany, due to the lack of personnel and resources to train civil servants, denazification measures were softened to allow the re-integration of those who worked under Nazi Germany, which was problematic, considering the process of depuration and democratisation of public administration that was carried (Schmid, 2016). Intellectual elites also potentially act as “enclaves”, especially those who re-interpreted and lied about the role they had during dictatorship in order to guarantee their continuity or career change in democracy (Dobrila, 2007).

The continuity of all these actors explains why there might be little change within the country’s socio-economic structure after the return or democracy. While the persistence of solid enclaves might guarantee the preservation of social peace, which is important for democracy, they provide a picture in which the lines between the past and the present are blurred. Although the continuity of some of these actors is in some cases inevitable, it can be problematic as it gives the impression that little has changed after the re-establishment of democracy and that the country is trapped in its former ideology or political system.

The other enclaves identified are “fluid” ones. Fluid enclaves are authoritarian legacies that as mentioned before are more symbolic or psychological. They belong to three categories:
image (understood as reputation), silence and negative emotions (fear, frustration, darkness etc.). After transition, countries face the problem of dragging a “bad image” inherited from years of violence, injustice, or repressive laws. Therefore, elites need to prove to citizens and international actors that the state is back on track, that society is plural and liberal, and that the era of dictatorship is closed. As this was outlined in Chapter 2, what is at stake as well is the image of democracy, not only its concretisation through an improved and fairer legal system. In that sense, emotions also matter, as democracy becomes a visual and affective reality. If elites must comply with legal obligations to meet the standards set by part of the international community, they additionally have to “brand” the country as democratic to partly erase, clean or write over the past that tarnished its reputation. As this was written in the previous chapter, the “democratic identity” promoted or shown by a country that went through authoritarianism is also fundamental and the state must “picture” democracy using positive discourses, symbols or even institutions that “design” the new regime and enhance its image.

In cases where transition was pacted, state officials chose the path of forgetfulness and silence to guarantee the stability of the country and not jeopardise consensus between themselves and the actors of the previous regime (Kovras, 2014; Aguilar and Payne, 2017). Also, for citizens, talking about the past is difficult because of the physical and psychological pain caused by the violence of dictatorship. Consequently, the bitterness and sadness related to human rights violations or exile and the lack of political acknowledgment of the past continue to hang over democracy like a shadow. The “unsaid” or citizens’ silence becomes a burden. Also, some emotions such as fear, anxiety, frustration and a feeling of darkness are still hard to deal with despite the return to democracy. While solid enclaves blatantly limit democracy, fluid ones tend to pressure it and provoke insecurity, fear, or discontent among part of the population that was opposed to the dictatorship.

In this thesis, fluid enclaves are mostly defined in relation to the victims and opponents of the dictatorship rather than the supporters of the former authoritarian regime. Indeed, in many countries, victims of the dictatorship are those who suffered from human rights violations, were abused and exiled and later had to deal with post-traumatic stress, depression and difficult memory issues. Yet, supporters of the former authoritarian regimes could also be studied in relation to the past and the loss of the regime they supported and missed after the return to democracy. In Chile for example, Pinochet was backed in the referendum by 44% of the voters. As such, the sentiment of nostalgia and anxiety caused by the fall of the authoritarian regime.
for some citizens could also be framed as a possible fluid enclave. It is known for example that there is a Communist nostalgia in former Soviet states due to the fact the regime gave certain benefits or advantages to citizens such as welfare policies (Holmes, 2009). Yet, in this thesis, the focus is put on the victims because of their more severe trauma and the high level of repression that existed under dictatorship.

3.2.2. Looking for democratic pockets

Authoritarian resilience in post-transition societies can last several decades. Nevertheless, the aim of this thesis is to focus on what is weakly impacted by the legacy of the authoritarian past and can help democratisation. One important observation to make is that in most authoritarian regimes or illiberal democracies, spaces of relative freedom exist. In many places, it is possible to find grassroots movements and even institutions in which the weight of authoritarian rule is less important, either because the regime ignores them or because it genuinely accepts to open these spaces (Bayat, 2007; Al-Saleh, 2016). Opposition parties, subnational governments and municipalities run by the opposition can all be considered pockets of democratic practice or resistance. Likewise, civil society groups can even be tolerated or escape from the vigilance of authoritarian power to create places of civic engagement (Forment, 2003: xi).

Democratic breaches always exist, whether they are created by the regime or exist despite the regime. Gilley (2010: 391) calls these “breaches” ‘democratic enclaves’ which he defines as ‘institutions of the state or (…) regulatory spaces in society where the authoritarian regime’s writ is substantively limited and is replaced by an adherence to recognizably democratic norms and procedures.’ Furthermore, Sharp (2011:108-110) argues that even in a totalitarian country, some institutions or groups never fully obey the dictatorship’s rules despite the risk of violence and punishment. Authoritarian actors are not completely able or willing to repress dissidents and opposition groups can thus rely on organisations, networks, institutions, or intellectual circles to have more latitude. Similarly, pro-democracy agents can use legal loopholes or areas neglected by the authoritarian power at their advantage.
The concept of authoritarian enclaves has been mostly used to analyse the democratic deficit after the end of authoritarian regimes (Galleguillos, 1998; Garretón, 2003; González, 2008). This thesis proposes to study enclaves from the opposite perspective, that is to say, by showing that there are areas where solid and fluid enclaves are weaker. It looks at spaces where democracy was is less limited by actors, legislation and routines of the previous regime. The scholarly literature on democratisation has hardly addressed the way the “enclave system” in a democracy can be possibly overcome. Moreover, academic studies hardly discuss policies that are little impacted by enclaves and can therefore contribute to “unlock” democracy. The hypothesis defended in this research is that culture was one of the policy areas that was little restricted by the heritage of the dictatorship, a “territory” from where democracy could be reinvigorated.

Identifying policy areas where authoritarianism is weaker must lead to discuss the role of the democratic political elites that governed the country after the end of dictatorship. These actors faced the challenge of guaranteeing democratic rule after inheriting structures, bureaucracies, or ideologies from the previous political era. While they knew that they could not radically depart from the previous order, and that their room for manoeuvre was limited due to the existence of enclaves, they still had the responsibility to advance democracy in some areas that were less controlled by the actors of the former regime. The possibility to make decisions despite the existence of authoritarian enclaves is theorised in this research through the concept of “elite autonomy”. Elite autonomy is the ability to create new policies, laws or institutions that improve democracy but do not call into question the accords of transition that were necessary to put an end to the authoritarian regime. Autonomy does not mean absence of accountability or the right to decide without the approval of voters and citizens. Instead, autonomy means the capacity to improve democracy and enhance its image while not endangering the cohesion of the nation and the accords of transition. The idea that free spaces remain despite the enclaves therefore is related to the one that political elites are able to make decisions without the consent of actors of the ex-regime; decisions that will help the country break with the legacy of authoritarianism.

3.2.3. Finding an “enclave-free” zone: the alternative of cultural policy
Although authoritarian enclaves obstruct democratic actors’ decision-making, they must find alternative ways to facilitate democratisation. They can create niche or emergency institutions that will become spaces where democracy can be exercised differently or without provoking the opposition of powerful actors of the previous regime. In a situation of enclaves, this thesis argues, democratic actors can find in cultural policy a convenient and strategic instrument to improve democratisation without putting themselves or the country at risk. As this thesis previously explained, culture is a policy area that is given a small part of state budget and creates less conflict between political parties and key actors of society. This is particularly important in formerly divided or conflicting countries that need some amount of political consensus. Yet, culture and the arts have are often used by political dissidents to send and convey messages that challenge political hegemony and authoritarian structures, as this was shown in the Literature Review Chapter. This makes cultural policy particularly valuable in processes of democratisation.

Nevertheless, the fact that cultural policy is less contentious even in a post-authoritarian context does not mean that it is completely “problem free”. In many countries, some art works financed by the state provoke hostility, rejection, and controversies, and this for several reasons. Some question the legitimacy of the state in funding the arts. They indeed claim that arts are not a priority and that more important policy areas should first receive funding (Throsby and Withers, 1985). Also, the debate revolves around the content of art works and around what should be defined or recognised as artistic (Sabrin, 1993). In that sense, if cultural policy creates tensions, it is because some wonder if it is right to finance “unnecessary” or “immoral” art pieces with taxpayers’ money. Yet, the argument made in this thesis is that all these polemics cannot disrupt democracy or undermine it. Indeed, art provokes controversies and debates even in established democracies. Moreover, this thesis argues that discussions around arts can be positive for democracy as they help publicise issues and topics that question society and its history. It also argues that cultural policy is a “safer” area to advance democratisation when there are authoritarian enclaves. It is a more “enclave free” policy area, a zone where democracy is less impacted by the heritage of the dictatorship.

3.3. THE CULTURAL POLICY-ENCLAVES NEXUS AND DEMOCRATISATION: APPLYING THE ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK IN CHILE AND BEYOND

3.3.1. Authoritarian enclaves: temporality and resilience
Before explaining how cultural policy, enclaves, and democratisation interact with each other, more precision about the concept of enclave should be added. As this was explained earlier, the concept originally coined by Garretón is relevant, but further theorisation is needed. In the first two parts of this chapter, the concept was updated, and a short typology was designed to identify different sorts of obstacles inherited from the authoritarian era. Expanding the concept to fluid and solid enclaves make more explicit authoritarian legacies that are less visible or institutionalised. It also allows to apply the concept of enclave to more cases, that is to say, to many countries that experienced authoritarianism in different ways. Chile is a paradigmatic example of authoritarian resilience as many enclaves in the country were legal and thus “obvious”, but this is not the case in all countries. This section highlights another aspect point that is insufficiently discussed in the original conceptualisation of enclaves, which is their temporality and evolution. Indeed, the existing literature does not discuss the “life expectancy” of enclaves.

Some authoritarian enclaves are transitional. Indeed, it is possible to cancel the most solid ones via constitutional reforms, as this happened in Chile in 2005. However, other enclaves might resist for decades the dynamic of change. While some laws can be repealed, it is more difficult to abolish or put an end to routinised practices and ideologies (unbridled capitalism, structural racism, endemic corruption, or nepotistic system), even if reform is undertaken. In South Africa for example, the end of the apartheid failed to eradicate the racialisation of society. Indeed, despite ‘the adoption of a widely lauded constitution’ that sought to break with the past order, race is still what motivates decision-makers’ political action and is the main perspective through which social problems are addressed (Seekings, 2008:2). In that sense, even substantial legislation change always cannot put an end to the past order since inequality and injustice are too present in social and mental structures (Durrheim et al., 2011:21). The other aspect to consider is that even if some solid enclaves are dissolved, fluid ones might can remain. Indeed, fluid enclaves can be very resilient for they are more insidious and abstract. Memory, which is one of the issues that most relates to fluid enclaves in this study, has no

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10 As explained by Fuentes (2014: 79) ‘the changes include the elimination of appointed senators, including lifelong senatorial appointment for former presidents; a reform of the state of exception; the elimination of several prerogatives of the Armed Forces; restoration of the power of the president to remove the head of the Armed Forces and the Chief of police (…) and a substantial reduction in the power of the National Security Council’. Following these reforms, the military stopped controlling politics and civil-military relations normalised in Chile.
expiry date. It stands the test of time and can be transmitted to future generations while trauma can also last indefinitely.

Democratisation, as this was explained in the first part of this chapter is not a linear process. Nevertheless, in most countries, some milestones can be identified, and some periods are more crucial or difficult than others. For example, the very first few years of democracy can be particularly challenging as ambiguity prevails. The joy felt by part of the population when democracy returns cohabits with a feeling of doubt and insecurity if actors of the ex-regime are still powerful and watch democratic elites. In parallel, political elites might avoid discussion on the quality of democracy because of the necessity to preserve social peace. This situation might be temporary and last until some events reveal ‘deep resentments’ that show that the so-called consensus was mainly a façade (Barton and Murray, 2002:331). Overall, democratisation is a long process that can take even longer, for example when transitional justice is slow. For this reason, several decades can be covered when scholars analyse the topic of authoritarian enclaves. The thesis covers twenty years of the recent history of Chile for reasons of coherence and feasibility, but the time frame could be easily extended. This also implies that cultural policy can support democratisation during this period and even beyond.

3.3.2. Identifying the contribution of cultural policy to democratisation

As shown in the Literature Review Chapter, culture and the arts can enhance democracy in various domains. This thesis bridges some of the previously seen functions of cultural policy and connects them with the process of democratisation in former dictatorial or violent states. The other objective is to frame these different roles of cultural policy as potential solutions to the problem of solid and fluid enclaves. Democracies characterised by authoritarian enclaves often have important levels of social inequality, economic disparities, and a weak civil society, due to the persistence of the dictatorship’s former structures. In addition, their complex and violent past creates even more challenges for democratisation. While studies on transitology have analysed these problems, they have not put them in relation to cultural policy. Also, they have not theorised the relevance of cultural policy to combat authoritarian enclaves.
Based on the findings presented in Chapter 2, this thesis looks to demonstrate that several functions of cultural policy can work as solutions against solid enclaves. Cultural policy is often used in programmes that promote cultural diversity, community development, urban or heritage restoration. This is particularly important in cases where the constitution does little to recognise native populations (Pouessel, 2016) and where the laws of the dictatorship continue to atomise society and encouraging individualism. Cultural policy provides some solutions to these problems. When transitional justice is “locked” by solid enclaves such as amnesty laws, constitutional provisions or even political agreements, and when the ideology of the past regime continues to be hegemonic, citizens have less freedom of speech and struggle to break some political taboos.

In this case, cultural policy can have an important role. Victims or their relatives are able to use arts to publicly denounce the status quo or human rights violations when judicial instances, political parties or deputies take do not take action or hide themselves behind the official discourse of consensus and political amnesia. Cultural policy gives a sense of autonomy to the political elites that are the ones in charge of implementing cultural policy. As argued in the last section, it is the capacity of incumbent elites to govern in a way that differs from the past, without seeking the agreement of influential actors. It is also the capacity to implement policies that are recognised as “theirs” and that allow them to differentiate themselves from their political rivals and appear as more progressive.

The previous chapter also allowed to identify the relationship between cultural policy and fluid enclaves, showing that democracy is not only about institutionalism and organised civil society but also about emotional well-being, which is in this thesis, theoretically linked to citizenship. In post-authoritarian countries that have fluid enclaves, arts can help deal with the tensions provoked by the country’s tragic past such as silence and negative emotions. Cultural policy thus acts at a more symbolic level by loosening the country’s strains. In Spain for example, cultural policy served to display a colourful iconography that represented optimism and vitality and the need for the country to reintegrate ‘modernity’ (Quaggio, 2017: 148). Cultural policy also enhances the reputation of a country that has a bad image because of the years of violence and dictatorial rule. Culture and the arts allow to present the image of a country that is different from what it used to be. Political elites use them to “brand” themselves and their country as new, democratic, and open. This thesis argues that cultural policy can thus contribute to bring more positivity and break with the country’s negative and dark image.
The conclusion that can be drawn is therefore that cultural policy can soothe citizens during the uncanny regime transformation and shape the country’s democratic identity.

Table 3.1. Solid enclaves and the role of cultural policy

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Solid enclaves</th>
<th>Solutions of cultural policy</th>
<th>Domain of democracy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pact hegemony</td>
<td>Civil society’s rights</td>
<td>Citizenship</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elite actors</td>
<td>Freedom of speech</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ideological homogeneity</td>
<td>Sense of change Progressive ideology</td>
<td>Elite autonomy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conservatism</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Incomplete Transitional justice</td>
<td>Unveiling human rights’ violation Narrating (divergent) stories of the past</td>
<td>Memory</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3.2. Fluid enclaves and the role of cultural policy

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Fluid enclaves</th>
<th>Solutions of cultural policy</th>
<th>Domain of democracy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gloominess Fear</td>
<td>Positivity Brightness</td>
<td>Citizenship</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negative image</td>
<td>Democratic identity</td>
<td>Elite autonomy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frustration Trauma</td>
<td>Catharsis</td>
<td>Memory</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3.3.3. Operationalising a triangular relation: cultural policy, enclaves and democratisation
This last section explains how the connection between cultural policy, enclaves and democratisation is operationalised. As they look to advance democratisation, political elites usually have to govern in the areas of economy and justice, which in turn determine other key sectors of governance such as labour policy, social policy and accountability with regards to human rights violations committed in the previous era. However, these sectors are highly controlled by actors of the former regime and democratic party elites were also forced to accept a series of solid enclaves that limit change in these key policy areas. Also, because they willingly gave up on their old ideology and on some principles that led them to oppose dictatorship, they eventually showed little interest or motivation in making substantial change at this level. This path of economy and justice is consequently full of authoritarian enclaves, which means that democratic elites will not do much to overcome them. In order to partly fix this problem, elites can take another path, one that is less contentious. Democratic actors can rely on policy areas that supporters of the past regime little care about and that are relatively enclave-free. Cultural policy is among the little contentious and marginal areas and is conveniently at the intersection of many issues, which increases the possibilities for democratisation.

Because cultural policy is topic little or not discussed at all at the moment of transition, it is not submitted to the same rules and restrictions. Still, peripheral policy areas can paradoxically improve elite autonomy. Autonomy is in turn fundamental to advance democratisation in the areas of citizenship and memory. However, it is important to underline that elites who implement cultural policy do not always do it in a premeditated way, as cultural policy can be seized by civil society and have effects that go beyond the aims or instructions of elites, therefore increasing even more its democratic potential. As this was previously shown, the validation of enclaves during transition is what allows the re-establishment of democracy. However, in order to be acceptable by citizens or even international actors, undemocratic elements that persist after transition have to be counter-balanced by other instruments or policies that support democracy or provide a democratic image of the country. Democratic transition, especially when it is pacted, is about finding a balance between substantial political change and the respect of the agreements that were decided between different political sides. Cultural policy can solve part of this dilemma by bringing by improving elite autonomy, memory and citizenship without breaking the pacts.
This analytical framework can be applied in many countries that have authoritarian legacies (victims of political violence, pending transitional justice, or a pervasive ideology) and more generally solid and fluid enclaves. Enclaves, cultural policy and democratisation form a triangular relationship. The first constrains democracy and the second attenuates its effects, leading to more democracy. As the mainstream route of democracy, economy and justice is unavailable, cultural policy becomes an alternative to advance elite autonomy, memory and citizenship, even though it does so at a smaller scale. Culture has the capacity to trigger democratisation by re-invigorating civil society, re-opening channels of expression, and giving democratic elites an opportunity to appear as democratic without undermining the future of the nascent democracy. In addition, it is important to underline that cultural policy is likely to be accepted by all political parties for it is ultimately good for the image and reputation of a country.

**CONCLUSION**

This theoretical chapter explained the relationship between authoritarian enclaves, cultural policy and democratisation in different post-authoritarian contexts. Firstly, it deepened the concept invented by Manuel Garretón as it identified different kinds of obstacles to democratisation. It also defined more precisely the problem of authoritarian legacy by highlighting that democratic actors also played a semi-active role in it. The aim was to avoid the Manichean analysis of “authoritarian actors” versus “democratic promoters”. The other important point developed in this chapter is the temporality of enclaves, showing that some authoritarian obstacles were temporary and that some have remained until this day. Even though several enclaves were dissolved, others continued to disturb democracy for decades. Consequently, cultural policy has a regular and long-term role to play after the return to democracy.

In newly democratic regimes and even more in countries that experienced pacted transition, political elites face the arduous task of deepening democracy without upsetting actors of the former regime that still hold power after the end of the authoritarian era. They also have overcome the difficulty of dealing with their own contradictions and responsibility in the
persistence of certain aspects of authoritarian rule in democracy. In this post-transition context, incumbent elites are like tightrope walkers, as they must find a balance between stability and effective democracy, which are two notions that complement each other but are also opposed to each other. The chapter showed that solutions can be found and that while obstacles to democratisation seem countless and immutable, alternatives do exist, although they act at a smaller scale. If policies of economy and justice are indispensable to have a functioning democracy, other aspects that are more “secondary” shall not be overlooked or neglected since they are also contribute to the country’s “health”. Cultural policy can help address the transition’s paradoxes for it is itself a paradoxical policy area. In a context of solid and fluid enclaves, culture contributes to democratisation at three levels: by augmenting democratic elites’ autonomy, developing citizenship in multiple ways and by building a channel for discussing the past.
CHAPTER 4 – CULTURAL POLICY IN CHILE: FROM THE BIRTH OF A NATION-STATE TO THE CREATION OF FONDART

INTRODUCTION

While the previous chapters presented the theoretical connection between cultural policy and democratisation and explained in detail the key concepts that will be used, the thesis, starting from this Chapter 4 will analyse the empirical case selected. Indeed, it will provide a historical overview of Chilean cultural policy between the early 19th century and the return to democratic rule in 1990. It argues that culture as a policy area was marked by two developments. Firstly, it went from being a set of initiatives decided by different administrative bodies to a more consciously designed policy that was more autonomous from other areas such as education and labour. Secondly, cultural policy in the second part of the 20th century, excluding the seventeen-year episode of the military regime, was considered relevant for advancing social justice and democratisation. In order to demonstrate these two points and built the narrative of cultural policy in Chile, this chapter is divided in three parts. The first part provides a chronological analysis of cultural policy until the end of the Pinochet regime. It shows that political elites had a narrow conception of culture when Chile was territorially and administratively taking shape as a nation-state in the early 1800s. In this period, culture meant nationhood, territory and elite formation. It also bore a strong educational stance as there was a strong need back then to train the aristocracy who was mostly of Spanish descent.

In the 20th century, the bureaucratic contours of cultural policy were slowly being drawn through a series of initiatives that made culture more directed towards the common good and the welfare state. Nevertheless, culture had not emerged as an independent domain of public action and still was a set of actions taken by different state ministries. Later, as the regime of Pinochet was being installed, part of what had been achieved under the previous administration was deconstructed while other older institutions were kept. If notable progress was made in the 20th century to build the foundations of culture as a policy area, the military government gave an impression of incoherence and neglect in this domain. Although it was not completely inactive in cultural affairs, it had other priorities. Cultural policy under Pinochet was mostly about depoliticising culture and the arts and exhibiting Chilean nationalism.
The second part explains that from the end of the 1980s and the plebiscite campaign for the NO, culture played a part in the re-establishment of democracy. Civil society through the voice of artists used art as a format to vehicle pro-democratic ideas, and to support the centre-left coalition in its quest for regaining control of the state. Also, in the first years of democracy, foreign aid allowed the Chilean political elites to partly reconstruct its artistic institutions. As the Concertación re-took power in the early 1990s, culture gained more importance and a better rationalised cultural policy started to appear, one that had a visible connection with the elites’ plan of democratisation. The coalition passed a series of laws that showed that they were seizing the cultural issue in a more decided way. These actions were motivated by the failure of previous administrations to set culture on the policy agenda and by the importance of repairing the damage caused by the repression of artists during the Pinochet era. This part also focuses on the FONDART by reconstructing its genesis, the ideas and concepts – especially the arms’ length principle borrowed from the United Kingdom – that were behind its creation. Finally, the last part of this chapter situates the FONDART and cultural policy in general within the policies at the margins (women, indigenous peoples and environment) showing that they all had in common the principles of decentralisation and citizenship, but that cultural policy stood among them because of its legal structure and its more grassroots-oriented dimension. Also, the part sets the relationship between the policies at the margins and authoritarian enclaves in order to explain to which extent culture was a relatively “enclave free policy”.

4.1. CULTURE AND THE STATE IN CHILE

4.1.1. “Cultural policy” from the 19th century to the Pinochet regime

Over the 19th century, when Chile was emerging as a nation, the creation of cultural institutions was in close relation to identity construction, territoriality and the consolidation of the unitary state. Back in the 1800s, culture was a project led by the Creole learned elite to shape the identity of what was to become “Chile”. Consequently, education was the priority and was considered the most adequate way to achieve so. This gave way in 1813 to the foundation of the National Institute, a sort of secondary school whose objective was ‘to
inculcate Republican values and strengthen the independent political order’ (Baeza Ruz, 2010: 479-480). In that sense, culture supported the process of nation-building and the education of Chilean elites. Indeed, the National Institute taught theology, civil law and Latin and was about the ‘socialisation and consolidation of the new Republican elite’, a body of ‘aristocrats who believed that they alone constituted the nation’ (Barr-Melej, 2001:144). Moreover, education represented the core aspect of the ‘cultural project’, and was linked to the independence ideals of Republicanism, liberalism, progress and anti-colonialism, even though it implied the formation of a nation that was mostly European and excluded other ethnic groups (Subercaseaux, 2016:208). This was therefore a very elitist and traditionalist vision of culture, one that was limited to history, nationhood and upper social class reproduction.

As this was the case with the National Institute, the state involvement in culture continued to revolve around the creation of distinguishable institutions or buildings that testified to the existence and grandeur of Chile as a nation. The focus was put on cultural heritage and the “historical document”, in accordance with the principles of the Enlightenment. This spurred the foundation of the National Library in 1813, the Chilean National History Museum in 1811 and the National Museum of Natural History in 1830. These museums were ‘an integral part of the process of national construction that followed independence from Spain as heroes of independence wanted to commemorate their deeds in some public and permanent forms and asserting control over the territory by means of a thorough knowledge of its geography, fauna and flora’ (Fraser, 2003:185). Later, in the early decades of the 20th century, institutions that had a similar purpose were created such as the Council of National Monuments in 1925 and the Directorate of Libraries, Archives and Museums (DIBAM) in 1929, under the authority of the Ministry of Education (Benavente and Larrain, 2016: 119-120).

In the 1930s, if cultural policy continued to be mainly linked to education, it was also in relation to other ministries and policy areas. In August 1932, under the Chairman of the Government Junta Carlos Dávila, the Department of Sociological and Cultural Extension, that was attached to the Ministry of Labour was created, and one of its roles was to manage the spare time of workers (Yáñez Andrade, 2016). The Department organised ‘cultural activities’ and ‘conferences’ for workers and children, and overall was very close to trade unions.

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11 The National Archives were also created the same year.
Towards the end of the decade, the country was entering a new economic era via state-led industrialisation. Under the Frente Popular (Popular Front), ‘a typical interwar coalition among Communists, Socialists and middle-class parties’, the Corporación de Fomento a la Producción (CORFO) (Corporation for Development) was created in 1939 (Etchemendy, 2011: 242). This institution was the product of a consensus between all parties of the political spectrum that the state should become more involved in the process of production and development as a response to the Great Depression (Siavelis, 2005:302). This meant that the Chilean state became more interventionist and developmentalist in all sectors, including in culture. The same year was set a ‘culture commission, which was in charge of elaborating a project for a General Direction of Cultural Extension that would depend on the Ministry of the Interior and that ‘absorbed the Department of the Ministry of Labour, and the activities carried out by the School of Fine Arts and the National Conservatory of Fine Arts Music of the University of Chile’ (Subercaseaux, 2016:220). Also, with the emergence of the concept of social welfare in the 1930s, culture also meant improving the life of citizens through ‘literacy campaigns, public health and hygiene programs’ for working-classes and educating Chileans in the sense of being fit and prepared for the world (Miller Klublock, 1998:120-121).

As for more artistic endeavours, they were rather the responsibility of academic institutions between the 1940s and 1970s. Epstein and Watson (1990:84) explain that ‘modern theatre in Chile began with the formation of theatre companies at Santiago’s two main universities, the Experimental Theatre Company at the University of Chile in 1941 (renamed the University of Chile Theatre Institute in 1959) and the Teatro Ensayo at the Catholic University in 1943 (renamed Catholic University School of Theatre in 1979)’. Likewise, the Symphonic Orchestra National and the National Ballet were created respectively in 1941 and 1945 under the initiative of the University of Chile, the most important academic institution of the country. Other initiatives existed as well such as the ‘School of Applied Arts (SAA), an offshoot of the Faculty of Fine Arts of the University of Chile, between 1928 to 1968, whose objective was to channel artistic education towards practical ends, distinguishing itself from traditional artistic education in that its main interest was the popular world’ (…) local culture, and artisanal crafts (Castillo Espinoza, 2009:20). Consequently, from the early 20th century, the contours of a cultural policy that was less elitist, more inclusive and more concerned about the needs of different sectors of

12 The Universidad de Chile (The University of Chile) was founded in 1842.
the population were slowly being drawn. This trend continued in the second part of the 20th century.

4.1.2. Culture, education and the arts under Eduardo Frei and Salvador Allende

In the 1960s and 1970s, the country was experiencing an intense political turmoil – as this will be seen in Chapter 6 – as well as a very important cultural movement of the left. Although there was not a coherent cultural policy yet, in the sense defined in this thesis, artists were very much involved in politics and engaged in artistic production or initiatives that had a very political goal. For instance, the New Chilean Song Movement was ‘one of the most compelling examples of a cultural component helping to accompany a political revolution to power’ and had a strong militant posture as it openly supported the Communist party and the left-wing government of Salvador Allende (1970–1973) (San Román, 2014:2-3). Another relevant example is the development of street paintings. The Ramona Parra Brigades and the Elmo Catalan Brigades were known for doing murals, as a way to campaign for the coalition of the Unidad Popular (Popular Unity) (UP) led by Allende back then (Palmer, 2008:8; Mularski, 2014).

Moreover, one particularly important initiative carried at that time was that of Jorge Hen Peña, a Chilean composer and academic. His “Plan de Extensión Docente” (Educational Development Plan), ‘embodied the ideals of equal access to music and education’ for all children and students, especially the poor ones, and received the support of both Christian Democratic President Eduardo Frei (1964–1970) and Socialist President Salvador Allende since it followed the ‘ideologies of democratisation that were shared by their presidencies through arts education’ (Carlson, 2014). More generally, during that period, public policies of culture or artistic initiatives were oriented towards social progress. Cultural policy thus reflected the general political agenda of that time, one focused on social rights and that was the continuity of the process that had started in the 1930s.

Under Salvador Allende, there were a few notable artistic endeavours whose aim was to accompany the political and cultural revolution of his government. In 1971, the Department of

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13 Musical folk movement.
Culture of the CUT (Central Unitaria de Trabajadores de Chile)\textsuperscript{14} organised the Teatro Nuevo Popular which allowed the diffusion of theatrical representations to workers, trade union organisations, peasants, and poor neighbourhoods, and criticised the ‘bourgeois’, ‘consumerist’ and ‘conformist’ culture to better promote socialist values (Pradenas, 2006: 403). Other projects were led, focused on alphabetisation, pedagogy, and education, in line with its Socialist programme. The publishing house Quimantú allowed to produce very low-priced books, El Tren Popular de la Cultura (The Popular Train of Culture) brought theatre and music to those who did not have access to it, while twenty films for trade unions and mass organisations were produced and a record label called DICAP was created by the Communist Youth (Corvalán, 2003: 30-31). What should be underlined is that between the 1920s and early 1970s, culture and the arts were part of Chile’s process of industrialisation and social development but were not a distinctive policy domain (Bastías, 2008: 18). Artists did not have any public mechanism or instrument of art funding that fulfilled their needs of creative freedom. Culture was very politicised and was used to support the Socialist revolution led by the Popular Unity party coalition.

4.1.3. Public policies of culture in the Pinochet era

When the military regime took over following the coup d’etat of 1973, many Chilean artists were mistreated because of their left-wing linkages. For that reason, the seventeen-year period of the dictatorship was called the apagón cultural (cultural blackout) (Donoso Fritz, 2013). This expression was also coined in relation to the heavy censorship that preventing artists and intellectuals from publicly expressing themselves. The cultural sector was disarticulated, and as academic sections dedicated to arts were shut down, artists were forced to resort to non-state organisations to get funding (Alcides Jofré, 1989). The “blackout” also meant an incapacity or disinterest from state authorities to recognise culture and the arts as a legitimate or well-defined policy area. Indeed, the regime’s priority were the socio-economic issues and, in this context, culture mattered very little. For many left-wing Chileans and for many members of the Concertación, there is no doubt that cultural policy did not exist under Pinochet. According to a FONDART coordinator:

\textsuperscript{14} Chilean Trade Unions.
Under the dictatorship, there was a clearly defined purpose of destruction of the cultural basis of our country; especially from the right-wing world that supported Pinochet. They understood very early that there was an association of the political world and the cultural world, especially with all the *avant-garde* movement. The dictatorship took a role not only in the repression of the cultural producers but also in destroying the foundations, all the system that sustained the artistic production in Chile, like eliminating publishing houses etc. There was no cultural policy at that time. So, we talk about the “cultural blackout” or the *cultura huachaca*, which is an idea that comes from academia. It means that culture became tacky, it was a culture of consumerism, of low-quality content, very much about entertainment and show business.

This quote indeed confirms the widespread thesis of the cultural blackout among the left. However, it also highlights another important aspect that tends to nuance the interviewee’s own statement which is the political right favouring mass culture and entertainment culture. In fact, the concept of *apagón cultural* should be discussed with more nuances, and this for two reasons. Artistic production under the military regime was very abundant despite censorship and was a way to express dissent as well as resistance *vis à vis* state oppression (Agosín, 2008; Adams, 2013). Indeed, art expression was very much alive, with the only difference being that artists entered a form of ‘cultural resistance’ and that their creations became ‘mainly underground’ (Rolston, 2011:118). Moreover, the government of Pinochet did not completely withdraw from cultural affairs as it did promote symbols and values that exalted nationhood such as Chilean military heroes, family, and cultural heritage restoration. Traditional arts such as the National Folkloric Ballet or the *cueca* were still given visibility. Also, the Viña del Mar International Song Festival which had been launched prior to the dictatorship continued to take place every year.

The regime continued to have institutions and official bodies dedicated to culture, mainly, the Department of Cultural Extension attached to the Ministry of Education. Moreover, it ‘created the Cultural Affairs Directorate of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to ensure the dissemination of its activities abroad’, (...) ‘cultural houses and cultural corporations in the country’s main municipalities and ProChile, a technical body aimed at promoting exports and the “country’s image”’ (Antoine, 2015: 163). As for the orientation of cultural policies under the military regime, it was a striking blend of influences and visions opposed to each other. As

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15 *La cultura huachaca* is a book written by Chilean sociologist Pablo Huneeus. Published in 1981, it analyses the introduction of mass culture under the dictatorship through television and the negative effects of it.

16 The *cueca* was declared a national dance by government decree on 18 September 1979.
explained by Preda (2017:88-89), the Department of Cultural Extension (DEC) of the Ministry of Education (MINEDUC) imposed a ‘classicist-traditionalist’, Catholic and elitist vision of the arts combined with a capitalistic mass culture mainly conveyed through television channels.

What should be underlined as well is that the issue of culture was the interest of civil servants but not so much of the state. Those civil servants working in the DEC were given permission to act at a micro-level or via the municipalities, but this meant that cultural policies were more likely to be implemented by the wealthiest communes of Chile such as Las Condes or Vitacura\textsuperscript{15}. In fact, cultural policies were “decentralised” and left to the responsibility of the local and private actors who could either afford it or had a real interest in it. In that sense, culture was not the concern of the military government as there was no national plan of action in this area. In the very last years of the Pinochet government, culture seemed to gain a bit more importance. This led to the creation of the Fondo Nacional de Desarrollo Cultural (National Fund for Cultural Development) (FONDEC) in 1988. The fact of creating a fund in the final years of the military regime can be seen as an initiative from civil servants of the DEC who had a genuine interest in developing tools for cultural development. Also, and this is a very important aspect, it can be seen as an attempt from Pinochet to improve his reputation and compete with the centre-left political opposition that had ties with the artistic community in the context of the referendum campaign (Jara Hinojosa, 2016). In the late 1980s, a FONDEC public competition took place. However, because of the weak decisional power of the DEC, the lack of political willingness to support culture from the top of state hierarchy, and the weak legal basis of the fund, money was not allocated to the FONDEC or to the winners of the competition.\textsuperscript{17}

Overall, the general analysis that should be made regarding cultural policy under Pinochet is that there was a set of values that mattered and were promoted by the regime. There were also some cultural institutions that indicate that the theory of the cultural blackout should be more carefully phrased. Yet there was not an explicit “cultural policy” as defined by Ahearne

\textsuperscript{17} Ibid. It should be said as well that after the return to democracy, the FONDEC episode generated a scandal in the country for winners unsuccessfully claimed their payment to the Division of Cultural Extension of the MINEDUC. Ultimately, because of the impossibility to find a fair arrangement for the recipients, the competition was annulled by the Comptroller which declared it invalid and the FONDEC winners did not receive their money. This came as the prelude of the cultural fund experience, but one that was considered frustrating due to the lack of money that technically made the instrument ineffective.
(2009) and in the way it is understood in this thesis (see Chapter 1). As such, the idea of having a formal and consciously designed cultural policy, one that would be clearly explained by the government and be sustained on the long-term was relatively weak. Most importantly as well, there was certainly not the intention of creating a more ambitious cultural policy that would be at the service of all citizens regardless of their background and that would allow plural expressions.

4.2. CULTURAL POLICY AND THE RETURN TO DEMOCRACY

4.2.1. The NO campaign and the international cooperation in culture

As this was suggested in the previous subpart, most artists in Chile have historically supported the left. Many of them were indeed strong opponents of the Pinochet dictatorship and advocates of Chile’s democratisation. This explains why they were active during the campaign for the NO in 1988 and why they supported the Concertación (El Mercurio, 2018). In the 1980s, many representatives of the artistic community related their creative work to the struggle for democracy. Artists were the face, the symbol, and the content of the resistance against Pinochet in the ultimate phase of the regime.\(^{18}\) In the spot for the NO campaign were featured professional artists, music performers as well as elements of lyre playing, circus arts, and theatre. Also, the spot was supported by a song La alegría ya viene (Joy is coming) composed by musician and TV producer Jaime de Aguirre. Other songs recorded during that period have remained popular to this day such as No lo quiero, no (I don’t like him, no) and Lo he visto yo (I saw him) and Vamos a ganar (We will win). As explained by a former political advisor of the Concertación:

The cultural movement was very important in the resistance to the dictatorship. Those who wanted to end Pinochet’s rule were a community of artists, intellectuals, and politicians. There was a strong communion between them, and this had an influence.\(^{19}\)

The involvement of artists within the campaign for democracy was also crystallised by the event Chile crea (Chile creates), a meeting of artists and intellectuals proposing performances and debates, and which took place in 1988 (Lazzara and Délano, 2002:37). Apart from

\(^{18}\) Interview, member of Museum of Memory and Human Rights, 13 April 2018.

\(^{19}\) Interview, 23 April 2018.
providing public support for the rising Concertación coalition, the event had two other purposes. It was a way of denouncing through a less contentious type of social mobilisation, the human rights violations committed by the regime and a way of exteriorising negative feelings provoked by the dictatorship. The second objective was to connect the dissenter who stayed in Chile with those that had been forced to live out of the country and provide a testimony of the struggle against the dictatorship. Indeed, some of the songs and performances of the event were made by artists in exile (*Chile Crea*, Vol. 1, 1988) and were later recorded on a tape and distributed by the alternative music label *Alerce*, founded in 1975.

Following the election of Patricio Aylwin, art funding was included within foreign aid for it was also considered a component of democratic reconstruction. In Latin America, the government of Venezuela provided money and technical assistance to the Chilean authorities to implement the project of the Youth Symphony Orchestra. In western Europe, both Spain and France provided support by financing punctual initiatives such as street performances. Similarly, the Swedish government funded a project of house façade painting in Valparaíso as well as the Museum of Modern Art in the archipelago of Chiloé. Also, Sweden’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs through its International Development Cooperation Agency contributed to finance the *Fondo de Apoyo a Iniciativas Regionales* (FAIR) (Support Fund for Regional Initiatives) that was created in June 1991. The fund also received money from the Chilean state through the Ministry General Secretariat of Government (MSGG), an organ responsible for the communication of the Chilean government. As for the Secretariat of Communication and Culture of the same MSGG, it acted as an administrator and Coordinator of the fund.

The objective of the FAIR was the development of regional and local cultures and the promotion of decentralisation. Between 1991 and 1993, 77.7% of the projects were financed in regions other than the Metropolitan region of Santiago. The FAIR had a clear democratising function as it also encouraged inclusion by mainly targeting women, young people, and indigenous populations. Likewise, it financed initiatives that had social, economic, or educational impact, and supported the development of local communities through culture and the arts. Besides, the FAIR stimulated civil society for applicants came from various types of

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20 Interview, ex-DEC civil servant, 27 April 2018.
21 Ibid.
private or grassroots organisations: universities, corporations, schools, municipalities, regional NGOS, associations of neighbours, young people and women, ethnic minorities or even parishes. 23

4.2.2. Making culture a policy area under the Concertación

The return to democracy and the election of Patricio Aylwin was an occasion to put culture on the Chilean political agenda. Under the first Concertación government, a series of laws were implemented to start building the cultural institutional apparatus. In 1990, the Law of Donations was passed (18.985), which was a mechanism that stimulated private participation in the funding of cultural projects. 24 In May 1991, a call was made to transform the abandoned Estación Mapocho (Mapocho Train Station) in a cultural centre (Scadrito Calderón, 2005: 91) which was officially inaugurated in 1994. In 1992, the Aylwin government promulgated the Law of Intellectual Property, giving artists the possibility to administer their own works and copyright rights through private corporations, therefore increasing their independence and autonomy (Aylwin, 1992). The same year was passed the Law of National Awards amending the previous legislation of 1988 (Antoine, 2010: 5). It created national prizes for Literature, Journalism, Natural Sciences, Applied and Technological Sciences, History, Educational Sciences, Plastic Arts, Musical Arts, Literary Arts, Representation and Audio-visuals, and Humanities and Social Sciences, to recognise the work of Chileans ‘for their excellence, creativity, transcendent contribution to national culture and to the development of such fields and areas’ (Law 19.169, 1992). In the same period were created the fondos de cultura (cultural

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23 Ibid. The FAIR experience was terminated in 1997 when its funds were reassigned to finance the Concertación’s political communication and electoral campaign. Its short lifespan was also likely due to the rivalry between the MSGG and the Division of Cultural Extension of the MINEDUC that had distinct visions of cultural policy. With the end of the FAIR, the Book Fund and the FONDART became the two main funds that systematically financed culture and the arts. The FONDART more specifically benefitted from sufficient coverage and prestige to the point of becoming the core of Chilean cultural policy, as this will be developed in the subsequent chapters.

24 The Law of Cultural Donations consists of a legal mechanism that stimulates private participation (companies and individuals) in the financing of artistic and cultural projects. This norm – known as Ley Valdés – is formulated in Article 8 of Law 18.985 of the Tax Reform of June 1990. The mechanism consists of donors making monetary contributions being able to deduct 50% of that contribution from the payment of income tax (Global Complementary Tax for individuals; First Category Tax for companies). On the other hand, the potential beneficiaries must be corporations and non-profit foundations as well as state and private universities and professional institutes recognised by the State. The law is applicable only to projects approved by the Committee for the Evaluation of Cultural Donations, which is formed by the Minister of Education, the President of the Senate, the President of the Chamber of Deputies, the President of the National Confederation of Production and Commerce and a representative of the Council of Rectors of State Universities (Ley 18.985, 1990).

The decision of the Aylwin government to design a national cultural policy led to the organisation in 1991 of an “Advisory Commission for Culture”, headed by sociologist Manuel Garretón and which role was to make various propositions in the area (Olavarría Riquelme, 2017:106). As this was underlined in Chapter 1, politicians from the Concertación were aware that action had to be taken in the cultural sector to put an end to the institutional dearth that characterised the cultural sector. As this was said previously as well, they thought that artists deserved to be rewarded for the way they were treated under Pinochet and because many of them had been loyal allies in the referendum campaign of 1988 that allowed to defeat Pinochet. Consequently, political parties from the centre-left considered that they had a debt towards the cultural sector. As acknowledged by a former FONDART Coordinator:

We must understand that the artistic and cultural world was a very important support in the process that led to democratic recovery. For this reason, as well, we had to build a new institution for culture. 25

However, reaching consensus within the parties of the Concertación between those who promoted an institution that was more centralised and those who were in favour of a system that was more transparent and less reliant on state intervention proved to be difficult. Also, making substantial institutional changes would have led to a too long procedure considering the emergency that Chile was facing in the cultural sector (Muñoz Del Campo, 2011:83-85). One of the propositions made by the Commission was the creation of a cultural fund which objective was to support a wide range of artistic initiatives through annual public competition. This option was judged the most feasible by the different actors as it partly resolved the ideological, bureaucratic, and temporal dilemma of that time. Furthermore, political authorities were convinced that the fondo concursable (competition-based fund) was the fairest way to redistribute the meagre budget that the Chilean state had for culture. Indeed, it was considered that opening a competition was the unique way to reach a substantial number of persons with the little amount of available money. 26 This gave way in 1992 to the creation of the FONDART. Like the FAIR and the previously described initiatives, the FONDART was partly the product

25 Interview, 23 March 2018.
26 Interview with cultural manager, 22 March 2018.
of international cooperation. It was inaugurated with a sum of 750 000 000 Chilean pesos and an additional contribution from the Swedish government of 130 000 000 pesos (Scantlebury, 2010:201).27

### 4.2.3. The origin of the FONDART: between emergency and conciliation

The FONDART was born as a structure of emergency and compromise. As seen previously, the impossibility to find a consensus on the structure that should administrate cultural affairs and the necessity to compensate for the lack of an instrument in this area are two reasons that motivated the Concertación to create the fund. The FONDART was probably a conceptual reactivation of the FONDEC which, as it was said previously was never fully implemented under Pinochet. Indeed, both the FONDEC and the FONDART were based on a competition and a system of application in different artistic areas. Most importantly however, the FONDART also originated in the paradigm shift that occurred within centre-left elite circles. The experience of repression and exile led centre-left political actors to reconsider deeply their vision of democracy and to think differently the means to achieve it. Before the dictatorship, the model of inspiration for culture in Chile was the French one, with a consensus among left-wing sectors that the country would eventually choose the path of a Ministry of Culture, like the one created in France in 1959.

The return to democracy was a moment when the validity of this idea was challenged, and Chilean political and institutional references were questioned. On the one hand, direct state allocation as it could happen under Salvador Allende did not seem a reasonable option for it had lost its prestige and credibility because of its politicisation and ideology.28 On the other hand, the experience of dictatorship had taught the Concertación that the risk of an arbitrary allocation of funds or their possible cancellation by the incumbent government should be avoided under democracy. The double aim was thus to prevent state excessive intervention and censorship in order to guarantee free and plural creative content.

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27 This sum allocated by the Chilean government roughly amounts to 2 068 532 US $ while the contribution of the Swedish government was around 358 545 US $ according to the change rate of 1992.

28 Interview with cultural manager, 22 March 2018.
Consequently, elites chose the British model of cultural policy known as *arm’s length* and which consists of funds being allocated via peer evaluation. The system of arms’ length is based on juries that are appointed by government officials to be part of the selection process, based on their expertise in different fields of culture and the arts. However, the role of the state is limited to this task. According to Collini (1992: 8) ‘considerations of partisan politics should not be included in these appointments, counting only general skills and experience’. The aim was to guarantee equity and neutrality and make sure elites and politicians would not be held accountable for the content of the selected projects whether they are acclaimed or polemical. In countries that have cultural policies based on arm’s length, elites usually choose a Council that favours the indirect allocation of funding rather than a Ministry that is more centralised and is more likely to be politicised. In Chile, an Arts Council was created in 2003.

The FONDART as a concept was quite novel in Chile for it meant designing an artistic project that would be submitted to a competent jury. This was uncommon and challenging for artists whose idiosyncrasy was spontaneous creativity. For elites, it was the opportunity to find a balance between state intervention and civil society involvement but also, it was a sort of “learning course” that taught them about the values of fairness and transparency. The objective was to reconcile state intervention with freedom of creation as opposed to the cultural censorship that characterised the Pinochet era. For artists, the FONDART introduced the idea of methodology, structure, and justification of art design since the competition was based on an application form that described the stages of creation and provided a detailed explanation of the costs involved in the project. Overall, the Pinochet dictatorship as well as the interrupted Socialist government of Allende both called into question Chilean elites’ political models. Therefore, the country went from embracing a Latin European (France) model of cultural policy to supporting an Anglo-Saxon (United Kingdom) one.

As in the UK, the idea of the fund came from a more liberal conception of cultural management and from a form of “distrust” towards the state. Yet, the Chilean FONDART had its specificities and was influenced by its own ‘socio-political context’ (Zamorano et al., 2014:10). Indeed, the most notable difference between the two countries is that the UK was an established democracy when it designed its cultural policy while Chile was an “enclave democracy” with many dysfunctions when it implemented the FONDART. Besides, while the
origin of the British Arts Council dates back from 1940 and was created for improving the morale of civilians and troops during World War II) (Weingartner, 2012), cultural policy in Chile was conceived as part of a set of new policies which aim was to facilitate democracy, as this will be studied in the last part of this chapter.

Another aspect considered at that time was the necessity to try to preserve culture and the arts from the market rationality that had pervaded all sectors of Chilean society after the Pinochet’s advisors had completely re-shaped the economic structures of the country. Indeed, Concertación elites thought about the importance to protect Chilean culture from the dangers of globalism. In the early 1990s, an agreement with the public bank BancoEstado was signed to finance full-length films. This contract was based on loans and not on direct financing. However, the artists who benefited from this initiative turned out to be insolvent and ended up being prosecuted. This failed experience taught that the financialisation of culture and the arts was damaging and inefficient. Therefore, Chilean elites via the implementation of the FONDART tried to build a cultural policy that both broke with the cultura oficialista (official culture) and the cultura empresarial (entrepreneurial culture) at the same time.

4.3. THE FONDART: A POLICY AT THE MARGINS

4.3.1. Description of the policies at the margins: SERNAM, CONAMA and CONADI

When cultural policy was set on the political agenda after the return to democracy, it was part of a package of public policies that was called in the introductory chapter “policies at the margins”. These policies must be understood in opposition to policies of economy or justice, and more generally to mainstream policies that were the priorities of powerful political and economic actors (right-wing political sectors and business elites). These policies covered three issues in particular: gender equality, indigenous peoples’ recognition, and the protection of environment. For each of them was created an agency: the National Women’s Service (SERNAM) in January 3, 1991 via the Law N° 19.023; the National Corporation for Indigenous

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29 The initial name of the institution was Council for the Encouragement of the Arts (CEMA). It was changed to Arts Council after WWII.
30 Interview with ex-FONDART Secretary, 16 April 2018.
31 Interview with cultural manager, 22 March 2018.
Development (CONADI), founded in September 28, 1993 via the Law N° 19.253 and the National Commission for the Environment (CONAMA), created in March 1994 via the Law N° 19.300. These policies at the margins were managed by the Ministry of Planning and Cooperation (MIDEPLAN) created in July 1990 and whose role was to ‘take charge of marginalised social groups (women, indigenous people, urban and rural poor)’ (Marques-Perreira, 2007:95).

These three state agencies were based on two fundamental principles which were the participation of civil society and a higher degree of decentralisation. Several programmes of SERNAM were transferred to many comunas (municipalities) which also had an Oficina de la Mujer (Women’s Office) (Matear, 1995: 95-96). The CONAMA ‘was designed to rely upon a national agency for regulatory actions but project-level decision-making occurred (…) through regional branches of the various ministries’ (Tecklin et al, 2011: 886). Its Consultative Committee was composed of scientists, representatives of NGOS and non-profit organisations, entrepreneurs, and workers. As for CONADI, its National Council was composed of eight representatives from four different indigenous communities: Mapuche, Aimara, Atacameña and Rapa Nui. All these policies played a role in introducing new issues that used to be neglected and were little present within the political and public debate (Delamaza, 2014). In addition, they contributed to the recognition of rights that were violated under Pinochet. The intention behind their design was surely to increase consensus between different sectors of society and improve social cohesion that had been damaged by years of dictatorship (Navarrete, 2008: 80). Most importantly and as it was argued earlier in this research, the policies at the margins allowed to widen the scope of democracy without unravelling the accords decided between the Concertación and the military regime. In other words, the coalition could intervene with more autonomy in those areas as they were less likely to cause disputes with the right-wing opposition.

4.3.2. Policies at the margins and authoritarian enclaves

As this was discussed in the precedent chapter, the central problem of Chile as a nascent democracy was the strong ties of the country to its military past; ties that were previously

identified as authoritarian enclaves. When the Concertación took office, democracy was restricted in many domains. Indeed, ‘the Senate and much of the state apparatus (especially the Constitutional Tribunal, the Central Bank, the Comptroller General, the National Security Council, the Armed Forces, and most of the state apparatus remained outside the control’ of the Concertación (Barrett, 2000: 13). Also, the incumbent centre-left elites had to deal with the presence of general Pinochet who was still Army commander-in-chief, as allowed by a constitutional provision (Weeks, 2000: 725). Another important element validated by the Concertación was the continuity of the neoliberal economic model designed by Pinochet’s ministers (Solimano, 2012), a topic that will be further analysed in Chapter 6. All these enclaves severely limited the possibility to carry structural reforms and reduced the autonomy of centre-left elites.

A typical case of autonomy restriction was labour policy. After the return to democracy, due to the continuity of the neoliberal model, changing Pinochet’s legislation in this domain was not possible as the relationship between employers and workers continued to be asymmetric and in large favour of the former (Durán-Palma et al., 2005). As argued by Haagh (2002: 90-92), ‘labour reform was the first area of major legislative pact-making with the right’ while the conservation of the labour code designed under Pinochet ‘increased the facilities for short-term contracting and the discretion of employers in work modifications’. In parallel, discussion about the quality of democracy in Chile was silenced because of the necessity to preserve consensus (Moulián, 1998), leaving many people with unanswered questions and negative emotions regarding the violent past. The coalition preferred to focus on reconciliation in order to avoid judicial procedures and focused on other topics to deviate attention (Wilde, 1999; Loveman and Lira, 2007:69). This shows that both solid and fluid enclaves posed problems for democratisation and that the Concertación had limited action in the three domains that were identified in this thesis: elite autonomy, citizenship, and memory.

This thesis consequently argues that the policies at the margins were an alternative path taken by the Concertación coalition to govern with more latitude. First, SERNAM, CONADI and CONAMA could produce the sense of change that was explained in Chapter 3 as there were new institutions managed by a Ministry that was also new. Plus, they were useful to attenuate the market-oriented model as they worked as a social shock-absorber in an economy almost entirely based on neoliberal rationality. The aim was to ‘find a middle ground between
‘the market and public action’ and more generally enhance ‘social participation’ in the ‘framework of macroeconomic policy’ (…) ‘without disturbing the balance of fiscal budget, the price system and balance of payment (MIDEPLAN, 1990:12). In that sense, they could enhance elite autonomy. Also, some of the policies at the margins were new tools that supported citizenship and inclusion. Indeed, ‘since its establishment in 1993, CONADI, the government’s indigenous people development corporation, has implemented land restitution programs in southern Chile and water rights programs in the Atacama Desert’ (Postero et al., 2018: 209). As for SERNAM, it passed legislation to improve women’s status in general, by reducing their economic precariousness and poverty, fighting sexual abuse, or even repealing Pinochet’s legislation with regards to the right of pregnant teenagers to go to school (Valenzuela, 1998: 63).

Yet, the policies at the margins had important limitations, and this for institutional, technical, and political reasons. Indeed, the three agencies could design and fund projects but those could only be executed by other organs that were more autonomous and powerful. For instance, SERNAM could only carry pilot projects and most of its reforms had to be implemented by other ministries (Matear, 1995). In addition, these agencies remained too institutional and too centred on the career development of feminist activists, as shown by the phenomenon of revolving doors. Indeed, ‘a number of women’ moved between the two realms of SERNAM and the NGO community (Franceschet, 2003: 24). Consequently, the Feminist movement has been co-opted by the state and has progressively become estranged from the grassroots activity (Dandavati, 2005). Also, because of the conservatism of the coalition, mainly that of the Christian Democratic party, SERNAM could not always push the gender agenda further (Macaulay, 2016:103). SERNAM also received opposition from the right-wing sectors as they saw it as Marxist-influenced and more generally was trapped between the country’s Catholic tradition and the political neoliberal agenda (Taylor, 1998:142). As for CONAMA, its credibility has eroded over time because of the turnover of its directors and the clash with big investment projects (Tecklin et al, 2011). Overall, CONAMA, SERNAM and CONADI were since their creation constrained by the rampant technocracy and political pragmatism of the Concertación elites who most of the time favoured business sectors and conservative actors over social and gender citizenship.  

33 The CONAMA was dissolved in 2010 and was turned into the Ministry of Environment under the centre-right government of Sebastian Piñera. SERNAM has remained quite the same, with only its name changing into
4.3.3. FONDART in the “policies at the margins” apparatus

Like its policies at the margins counterparts, FONDART was designed as a participatory structure in which civil society members had a more active role as shown by the peer-evaluation process. It was a governmental response to a sector of society which like women and indigenous people was institutionally ignored and politically repressed by the military regime. As explained previously, artists were ill-treated under Pinochet for they were often left-wing militants that were thus considered subversive by the military regime. In addition, many artists had provided political support to the centre-left coalition and mobilised their artistic skills during the campaign for the NO. However, the argument of this thesis is that despite the similarities that existed between cultural policy and the other policies at the margins, “culture” via the FONDART was marked by a certain peculiarity that put it in a better position to address the dilemmas inherent to the Chilean democracy.

First, while the policies at the margins were all created by law and had a stronger legal foundation in the early years of democracy, the fund was created by ministerial decree, making it an instrument of the executive that depended on the willingness of incumbent governments. Also, the FONDART was a glosa del presupuesto (budget clause) of the Ministry of Education (MINEDUC) that could be validated or not by the Ministry of Finance and be modified by the Parliament. Therefore, it was the product of annual negotiations with the Ministry of Finance and had no guarantee of being renewed. The FONDART was only officially established in 2004 when the law 19.891 that created the CNCA was passed. This means that for more than ten years, the FONDART kept a more fragile status than SERNAM, CONAMA and CONADI and in that sense, was even more marginal.

Although the FONDART was also quite technocratic, especially in its application process, which will be developed in the following chapter, there are reasons to argue that it differed from the other policies at the margins and was more flexible than them. Even though indigenous people, women and environment were apparently low-risk or unproblematic policies compared to labour or justice, they still interfered with big economic interests and political conservatism.

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National Service for Women and Gender Equality. It is now administered by the Ministry of Women and Gender Equality. As for CONADI, it still exists under the same form and is dependent on the Ministry of Social Development.

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Indeed, the environmental agenda was not compatible with the projects of infrastructure construction (hydroelectric power stations etc.) or those involving industrial investment. Feminism and women policy irritated or bothered many conservative political actors. As for the recognition of multiculturalism, although it was supported in the official discourse, the governments of the coalition considered ‘indigenous peoples to suffer from economic marginality rather than from the loss of their political rights as peoples’ and like most politicians of the political spectrum prioritised the principle of the Chilean unitary state (Haughney, 2012: 213-214).

However, cultural policy clashed much less with these kinds of interests or ideology. The thesis argues that culture was a relatively “enclave free” policy for it did not preoccupy or challenge the political and economic actors that influenced Chilean politics, as this will be further explained in Chapter 6. Although it has often been associated with the Left, the term “culture” is vague, imprecise and does not carry the same connotations as words like “women”, “indigenous peoples” and “environment” that sound constraining and disturbing to right-wing sectors. The marginality of the FONDART, combined with the fact that culture as an area of public policy was far from the right-wing elites’ interests (business, the preservation of traditional family and the Chilean unitary state) explains why it was very unlikely to create conflict. Yet, as this will be analysed in the following chapters of this thesis, cultural policy could support citizenship via the publicisation of certain issues (sexuality, gender, memory) in a less risky and potentially more successful way than its “policies at the margins” counterparts.

CONCLUSION

This chapter highlighted two important aspects. It showed the gradual crystallisation of culture as a separate policy area that was no longer the monopoly of national elites and a simple extension of education or other domains. What was underlined as well is the way cultural policy was built in relation to democratisation. Culture and the arts over the course of Chilean history have been an integrant part of social development, democracy, and welfare, especially between the 1930s and the 1970s. However, under the military regime, culture as a concept related to social and political rights ceased to exist at the same time that the whole process of socio-economic justice conducted by previous governments over the century was interrupted.
Nevertheless, the apagón cultural notion is imprecise or partial as it tends to underestimate the reality of cultural policies under the dictatorship. Indeed, the regime of Pinochet still had a vision of culture, one that sailed between the modernity of mass entertainment and the classicism inherited from old western Europe.

After the election of the Concertación in 1990, cultural policy was eventually given a true space on the policy apparatus. Also, it seemed that culture reconnected with its historical function of democratisation and social justice. Yet this was done differently as the coalition was mostly concerned about cultural policy being fair, transparent, and connected to civil society. In that sense, the FONDART came from a more modern understanding of democracy and social rights. The implementation of the cultural fund happened in a wider context of the coalition enforcing a set of laws that helped counterbalancing the hegemony of the Pinochet heritage on the policy apparatus. These laws gave way to the policies at the margins which objective was to advance the progressive agenda, as opposed to the conservatism that prevailed both at the level of economy and values. Culture was one of the policy areas used to attenuate Pinochet’s heritage. Being less contentious than environmental, gender and indigenous peoples issues which fatally clashed with big interests, culture was more likely to deal with the contradictions of Chile’s new democracy. At the same time, it gave more political autonomy to the Concertación elites.
CHAPTER 5 – THE FONDART SYSTEM: BETWEEN BUREAUCRACY AND CITIZENSHIP

INTRODUCTION

This chapter is a two-level analysis of the FONDART. It pays a close attention to both its administrative apparatus and political uses between the year of its creation and the end of the Concertación era. It shows that the development of mechanisms favouring citizenship inside the FONDART was in tension with the bureaucratic logic that was behind its implementation, and that this trend was constant over the period studied in this thesis. Indeed, the concrete application of citizenship was challenged by an overweighed administrative and neoliberal discipline that made the fund very controlled and regulated. As such, the struggles, errors, and tensions that went along with the FONDART design and implementation were part of the elites’ learning process during democratisation. Yet, the argument defended in this chapter is that despite these obstacles, the FONDART did contribute to both citizenship and memory.

This chapter is made of three sections. The first section reviews the different structures and the actors involved in the FONDART and details the process of jury selection and peer-review that enabled the functioning of the fund. The second part highlights the ideology and mechanisms that led the FONDART to become a monopolistic cultural institution in Chile. It also discusses some of the aspects that enhanced citizenship such as regionalism and the procedures of application that improved the access to the fund. The final part of this chapter explains that the fund was mostly designed as an institution oriented towards artistic creation, which coincided with the importance for many Chileans to reconnect with their identity(ies) and with the willingness of elites to forge a more inclusive and democratic nation.

5.1. THE FONDART: INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURES AND ACTORS

5.1.1. Managing the FONDART: from the DEC to the CNCA
Over the whole period analysed in this research, the FONDART was managed by two different administrative entities. The first one was the Division of Cultural Extension of the MINEDUC between 1990 and 2003. Following the restructuration of the Ministry of Education in 1990, the Division was ‘the unit in charge of stimulating cultural development, artistic creation and the increase of the nation’s cultural heritage and of proposing the general norms that tend to such objectives’ (Law 18.956, 1990). The DEC was a relatively small institution. In the mid-nineties, it was a body of 186 people, with 39 permanent civil servants, 86 persons from the artistic area and 40 working in the Executive Secretary of cultural funds (División de Extension Cultural, 1996). However, after the return to democracy and throughout the decade of the 1990s, it was already clear that the DEC would soon become a bigger institution (Garretón, 1991; Ivelic, 1997). At that time, culture was managed by several organs that sometimes had the same roles and there was a high level of institutional dispersion, some conflicts as well as a weak degree of coordination between the different institutions. The challenge for Chilean authorities after the return to democracy was thus to build a modern and efficient cultural institution that would put an end to the administrative dispersion that existed in this area. The Concertación elites advocated the creation of a Council that resulted into the creation of the CNCA in 2003 and the “official” FONDART as this was already outlined in the previous chapters.

The Council further officialised a fund which importance was already evident. In fact, before the creation of the CNCA, Chilean cultural policy was already established via the FONDART (Muñoz Del Campo, 2011). In fact, the fund was following its progression independently of the creation of the CNCA. The CNCA was in fact just a formal act and the evidence that the government finally succeeded in making culture a recognised policy area, but the fund’s structure and function remained quite the same. Indeed, the FONDART certainly evolved in its modalities and lines of application according to the fluctuations of public administration (change of Minister, civil servants replacement, change of administrative structure, etc.) and the modernisation that accompanies society (digitalisation, emergence of new forms of art, etc., rise of cultural managers) but it kept its essence between the early 1990s and the late 2000s. The CNCA was composed of two main bodies. One was the National Directorate which role was to decide on the distribution of FONDART resources and nominate

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34 Among the main institutions in charge of culture were the Ministry of Education, the General Secretary of Government and the Division of Cultural Affairs of the Ministry of External Relations.
people that would be part of the committees of specialists and juries. The Directorate was composed of the Minister of Culture, people from other governmental instances, advisors in cultural affairs, academics, representatives of artists unions and a member of the cultural private sector. The other one was the Consultative Committee, an organ that more closely worked with people from the cultural sector and which aim was to advise and inform the Directorate. Overall, after the creation of the CNCA, few efforts were made to go beyond the FONDART and build a more diversified cultural policy. Consequently, the fund further consolidated its status as shown by the exponential rise of its budget between 1994 and 2009.

Table 5.1. Number and cost of FONDART projects between 1993 and 2009 (Source: Ministerio de Educación; CNCA)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Selected projects</th>
<th>Budget allocated (Chilean pesos)</th>
<th>Sum in US Dollar (According to annual change rate)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>416</td>
<td>1 000 000 000</td>
<td>2 401 817</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>538</td>
<td>1 050 000 000</td>
<td>2 549 838</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>331</td>
<td>1 293 260 000</td>
<td>3 389 100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>333</td>
<td>1 677 322 000</td>
<td>3 961 207</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>380</td>
<td>1 926 316 000</td>
<td>4 233 534</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>615</td>
<td>2 640 395 000</td>
<td>5 662 582</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>703</td>
<td>2 775 031 993</td>
<td>5 135 734</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>747</td>
<td>3 030 275 001</td>
<td>5 404 041</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>819</td>
<td>3 635 001 000</td>
<td>6 329 311</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>863</td>
<td>4 288 971 000</td>
<td>6 446 838</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>911</td>
<td>4 685 361 000</td>
<td>6 302 138</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>812</td>
<td>4 887 531 649</td>
<td>8 266 930</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>637</td>
<td>3 745 257 568</td>
<td>6 496 563</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>714</td>
<td>3 953 663 115</td>
<td>7 659 316</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>710</td>
<td>4 601 267 835</td>
<td>8 496 395</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>723</td>
<td>5 084 100 446</td>
<td>11 141 124</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>761</td>
<td>6 222 931 991</td>
<td>10 319 213</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5.1.2. Concertación elites and the FONDART
During the four governments of the Concertación, the FONDART was directed by members of the PS and the PPD, showing that culture was a sector owned by the Left and which confirms the proximity between the artistic world and left-wing politicians already explained in the previous chapter. This information is also important to understand the degree of elite autonomy in the context of authoritarian enclaves. Indeed, it indicates that the former opposition to Pinochet could keep part of its old identity through the area of culture. As this will be further shown in Chapter 6, those who held more influence in the Concertación were quite conservative in their ideology, which means that those who identified with the left as it existed during the pre-Pinochet era had less political weight within the coalition. Yet, in this context, culture contributed to the continuity of the “left label”. Identifying who precisely was behind the FONDART is more problematic, especially because as seen in Chapter 4, the idea of the fund was not completely novel and was probably developed by the civil servants of the DEC during the Pinochet regime. There is no straightforward or clear information on the identity of those who were behind the FONDART, but a few actors are known for being influential in making culture a recognised policy area and in promoting the fund.

Among them were Ricardo Lagos, Nivia Palma, Agustín Squella and Arturo Navarro. Ricardo Lagos was President of the Republic between 2000 and 2006 and Minister of Education between 1990 and 1993. During his mandates he was one of the actors who most promoted cultural policy. The FONDART was implemented when he was Minister of Education and the CNCA was established under his presidency. He was also involved in different cultural initiatives such as the Foundation of Youth Orchestra in the early 1990s. As for Nivia Palma, she is a Socialist militant, a lawyer, a historical figure of the FONDART and the DEC as well as a spokesperson for the artistic sector. Apart from being the Coordinator of the FONDART between 1992 and 2002, she also was the Executive Secretary of the Book Fund and worked in the DIBAM.

Agustín Squella is a lawyer and was the cultural advisor of Ricardo Lagos. He led in November 2000 the project of the National Direction of Culture that would later give way to the creation of the CNCA. He was thus a key figure in the design of the legal framework that set the cultural institution. He was also a member of the National Directorate of the CNCA. As for Arturo Navarro, he is an academic, a cultural manager and the director of the cultural centre Estación Mapocho. He used to be a member of the National Directorate of the CNCA and can
be considered with Palma as part of the cultural establishment of the Concertación. The other people who were directly in charge of the FONDART were Eugenio Llona from the PS, who later became Chief of the Unit of International Affairs within the CNCA; Marcia Scantlebury, from both the *Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionaria* (Movement of the Revolutionary Left) (MIR)\(^{35}\) and the PS, who was a former member of the Directorate of the National Television of Chile and head of the project that created the Museum of Human Rights; María Eliana Arntz from the PS, who worked in CONAMA and MIDEPLAN and Claudia Toro, a lawyer who mostly pursued her career in the DEC and the CNCA.

5.1.3. Decision-making and peer-review process

If the FONDART was managed by elites and civil servants, the decisions regarding the artistic aspect were mostly made artists. In fact, there was a clear willingness to enhance the participation of civil society in cultural policy. Indeed, as previously explained in Chapter 4, the FONDART followed the British system of arms’ length as it functioned around a Commission and area committees responsible for allocating the funds. Yet there was an evolution with time, as the system of peer-review was improved and became more independent from political decision-makers after the creation of the CNCA. Between 1992 and 2003, the Commission had the role to evaluate and select the projects. It was composed of the Ministry of Education who chaired the commission, the Undersecretary of Education, the Head of the Division of Cultural Extension, a representative of the MINEDUC, a representative for each artistic area the candidates could apply to and two representatives of the private sector.

The representatives of the artistic areas and the private sector were appointed by the Minister of Education.\(^{36}\) The representative for each area was chosen by the Minister based on a short list proposed by artists’ trade union associations. In addition to evaluating the projects and allocating funding, the Commission had the responsibility to appoint members for the committees of each artistic area. These committees existed in each region and were composed of a Regional Intendant, the Regional Ministerial Secretary of Education, and the Head of

\(^{35}\) Extreme-left political organisation created in Chile in 1975.

\(^{36}\) Only the representatives of the Enrichment of Heritage and Cultural Events (see table below) were nominated in consultation with the DIBAM and the DEC.
Culture of the Regional Ministerial Secretariat of Education. There were also composed of four personalities of the cultural field of the region, chosen by the Regional Government based on their prestige and qualities. The responsibility to evaluate and ultimately select projects that would receive the funds was that of the Commission. The reports made by the committees served as a sort of pre-selection to inform the Commission. In this case, it meant that the process of decision-making regarding the project was mostly collaborative but not fully independent from political authority.

When the fund was formally created by law in 2003, the process of selection evolved and became fairer as it gave more autonomy to the juries and decreased politicians’ and civil servants’ involvement. Two categories of juries were created: the evaluadores (reviewers) also known as committees of specialists and the jurados (juries). The reviewers’ role was to check if all the criteria were respected, decide if the project was viable, assess the impact of the project, deal with managerial aspects, identify the potential audience and also deal with financial matters, i.e., deciding if the amount of money asked by the candidate was reasonable. The reviewers also checked if the project corresponded well to the area of application. They looked at 1) the coherence of the project 2) the originality and innovation of the proposal 3) budgetary aspects and 4) the applicant’s CV.

Following the verification of these criteria, a mark was given under the form of a percentage. After that, the reviewers gathered in different groups, according to the quality of proposals and their social, artistic and cultural impact and defended them before giving another overall mark. The committees were composed of a minimum of three members and their role was to preselect the projects. Finally, the juries intervened once the work was done by reviewers and had the responsibly to make the final decision and distribute the resources, still paying much attention to the quality and the potential impact of the projects. The difference between the first FONDART (1992-2003) and the second one, (2003- ) is that in the latter, committees of specialists and the juries were exclusively composed of recognised artists. In order to guarantee more fairness and make sure that the evaluation was mostly based on artistic criteria, there was no presence of civil servants of the CNCA in the evaluation process and no involvement from their part in the allocation of fund. Indeed, in the first FONDART, the Commission which was

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37 At that time Chile had 15 regions in total. The country has now 16.
composed of people from the government were more involved in the final decision while in the “second FONDART”, juries had their decisional power reinforced.

In order to carry the selection process effectively, people were normally chosen according to their expertise in a given area rather than on their political opinion or party affiliation. Over the years, the FONDART was accused of cronyism, as candidates claimed that the competition was biased and constantly favoured the same people. It is true that although the principle of arms’ length is supposed to decrease direct government interference, the state inevitably influences “the rules of the game”. Moreover, as argued by Alexander (2008:1427), the state ‘does not censor art; nevertheless, arts organisations whose activities and displays fit better with government policy objectives are more likely to receive direct funding’. Moreover, juries appointed by the state are not neutral and possibly influence art conception and direction (Pastor Mellado, 2005).38 This said, it is relatively difficult to assess how much politics influenced the appointment of juries and what was the degree of favouritism.

However, it is possible to make two observations. Firstly, many artists in Chile (like in several other countries) are left-wing, as this was already shown in this thesis. This considerably reduces the proportion of right-wing juries in the panels. Secondly, the Chilean artistic field is very small. Consequently, all the actors involved, whether they are artists, performers, cultural managers, or government people working in cultural institutions know each other and each other’s work. The proximity between all those actors makes distance or neutrality more difficult to achieve. Also, interviews indicate that potential juries often turned down the offer because they intended to apply to the FONDART. Indeed, the members of the committees were considered collaborators of the state and for ethical reasons were excluded from participating directly or indirectly in the submitted projects. For this reason, the appointment of juries had much to do with their availability and on their intention to apply to the FONDART or not.

5.2. THE FONDART: BETWEEN NEOLIBERALISM AND CITIZENSHIP

5.2.1. The FONDART: concepts and ideology

38 La Nación, 2005.
If the FONDART was conceived as an emergency institution, the other main reason that explained its durability was its compatibility with the neoliberal ideology inherited from the authoritarian era. As this was previously explained, neoliberalism had to be validated by democratic actors to allow a return to democracy. Since the 1980s, most countries of Latin America had embraced this new economic orthodoxy that resulted in the privatisation of enterprises, drastic reduction of public spending and control of inflation rate (Teichman, 1995; Oxhorn, 2009). In this economic context of liberalisation and “reduction of the state”, governments from the region logically sought to rely on the private sector to partly finance culture and the arts. The experience was previously carried in Brazil in 1986 through the implementation of the Sarney Law that guaranteed fiscal incentives to contributors (Durand, 1996:73). In 1990, the Aylwin government implemented the Law of Donations, which allowed tax deduction for enterprises and people from the private sector who agreed to finance cultural initiatives. However, while the entrepreneurial sector was very influential in Chile, culture was not its main interest and investing capital in this area was too experimental. Consequently, the Law of Donations had a very marginal use. The global economic context that prevailed at that time in Chile and Latin America reduced government expenditures in most sectors, including culture. The FONDART nevertheless emerged as a compromise in this context of neoliberal orthodoxy and lack of private funding. Indeed, the state gave money on the condition that it could narrowly control the spending and be guaranteed that the works it invested in would be produced. 39

In that sense, the funds worked according to the ideology and recommendations of the World Bank. They functioned very much like the conditional monetary transfers (CMT) of the institution which gave financial aid to individuals or families, provided that they agreed on doing certain tasks or fill certain criteria (Debonneville and Díaz, 2013:162; Morais de Sá e Silva, 2017).40 However, it also meant that authorities were not committed to resolve structural problems in a given sector but left to individuals the responsibility of finding solutions and motivation (Petras and Veltmeyer, 2011). Indeed, the FONDART allowed state financing but this was highly conditioned. Also, it meant that as an instrument of funding, the FONDART

39 Interview with ex-CNCA civil servant, 18 March 2018.
40 The CMT are mainly anti-poverty programmes, nevertheless the principle applied to cultural policy is similar to the one that is found in the CMT.
was for individuals in a competition context but was not a more “generalised” or universal type of cultural policy. The fund thus encountered little resistance from right-wing actors and civil society. Indeed, it respected the neoliberal doctrine validated during transition while securing regular funding for the artists. As explained by a former civil servant of the CNCA:

I was arguing with Nivia Palma and I told her: the cultural funds are not a cultural policy; they are an ideology [...]. The FONDART had legitimacy because of the void that existed [in culture]. It was a trickledown effect, but still, it was something. There was some right-wing ideology put inside the Concertación. They just did not want to finance something that was not through a competition. 41

What the above quote suggests is that the FONDART gained some legitimacy for it followed the neoliberal doxa and because it was the sole instrument of cultural policy in the country. The FONDART like many other policies in Chile (including the policies at the margins), followed the principle that consisted in improving or alleviating citizens’ life without disturbing the structural economic foundations that mainstream political parties were not willing to change. Indeed, state funding was approved on the condition that the candidate would able to “compete and win” and abide by the strict discipline of requirements and control of spending. The FONDART therefore worked according to the idea known as “evaluation of projects”, which was popularised by Ernesto Fontaine, a former minister of Pinochet. The “project” which was the basis of FONDART was about the identification of ‘the costs and benefits that can be attributed to the project, measure them and evaluate them in order to make a judgment about the convenience of executing that project’ (Fontaine, 2008:1).

As justly explained by Cardozo Brum (2005: 172), the objective behind it was to “do more with less” and “select the most efficient [projects] and eliminate the unproductive ones”. This vision of implementing policies or programmes according to their costs and benefits is indeed rooted in the neoliberal rationality that was developed in Chile under the military regime and still applied under democracy as part of the transition accords. Yet, it can be argued that the

41 Interview, 18 March 2018. Other interviewees said that cultural policy cannot be limited to a competition-based fund. For example, one has argued that that: ‘FONDART is a mechanism, but it cannot be the only mechanism (…) it has generated a number of benefits, successes and conquests; but the state has to be able to generate other type of strategy that enables subsidies, focused programmes that allow determined actions, or that allow the maintaining or the deepening in specific areas that we can develop but not through a competition. But I say that it’s ridiculous that we have competition for heritage. It can still exist, in specific areas, but we need to have other ways of financing heritage, education, diffusion, with other type of strategy. But that everything be restricted to a competition is strange (Interview, ex-Minister of Culture, 24 April 2018).
cultural fund, despite its excessive control and monitoring allowed to increase transparency and fairness in the decision-process. Also, it was a means to give money to the cultural sector in a country where this possibility did not even exist before the return to democracy. In that sense, the FONDART did make a difference as it helped depart from the past and gave more autonomy to the Concertación.

5.2.2. The concept of the cultural fund: competition and application process

This neoliberal ideology that was behind the funds had an important implication for candidates. As this was said in the previous chapter, the logic of the fund was not usual for Chilean artists and the challenge for them was to adapt to this new way of conceiving artistry. As in any competition or application process, an important amount of bureaucracy was involved. However, the formalism of the fund was regularly denounced as a flaw that could decrease artists’ and citizens’ opportunities. This criticism mainly came from the excessive regulation and accountability of the applicant. Indeed, the FONDART demanded that the objectives and duration of the project be explained in a progress report and a final report, and that the costs induced by the works or activities revolving around the project be duly justified. As this was explained by an artist who won the FONDART multiple times in the 1990s and 2000s, the justification of costs could be quite strict:

I have received grants in other countries a couple of times and the criteria was completely different from the Chilean one. In the United States, I have never had to present a receipt. They were like: “here’s the money, be happy, make your project and next year you tell us how it went”. There is no control there. If you are an artist that receives support and your tooth hurts, meaning that you cannot work, you can use the money for this. The same is true if they cut the light in your studio. Here in Chile you cannot use money for something other than your project or for something that you did not mention in your project. I think that even if there is the impression that the FONDART values culture and the arts, the people in the state apparatus does not necessarily understand these things.

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42 The process of the fund-based competition also existed in domains other than culture, such as entrepreneurship (CORFO funds) and education (FONDECYT), as well as in in the policies at the margins with the Fondo de Desarrollo Indígena of the CONADI and other funds of SERNAM.

43 Interview, 03 April 2018.
This led Chilean art critic Justo Pastor Mellado to describe the situation of art in the country as the *fondarización del arte* ("fondarisation" of art) which signifies that art has been progressively reduced to the "project" and the application form (*La Nación*, 2005). The bureaucratic tendency of the FONDART also gave way to one important phenomenon. It gradually transformed the cultural field into a field of expertise and management. Many individuals and even institutions, mainly universities, have proposed courses on how to obtain the fund since the late 1990s. In other cases, people have been hired to prepare the project for candidates according to the required format and presentation before submitting their application. On the one hand, these controls were required to verify that money was spent fairly since it belonged to Chilean taxpayers. On the other hand, they restricted the possibility or even willingness to apply to the FONDART. Indeed, some candidates interviewed for this research mentioned that these controls demonstrated a lack of trust, a sort of paternalism from the Chilean state that did not give enough autonomy to its citizens.  

The excessive formalism that made the application process sprawling and rigid produced contradictions within the FONDART. If the fund was open to all citizens whether they are experts or amateurs, the process of application could be at the same time restrictive or selective. As it was very codified and procedural, with a type of "language" that was not always accessible to the wider population, there was less room for the randomness and unexpectedness that lie at the heart of artistic creativity. This means that with time, the FONDART became a professional fund, best suited to people who had writing skills, or who knew how to present a project according to the guidelines. People who are well-organised and structured have been advantaged compared to those who only have artistic talent or creative vision. This prevailing of the form over the content and the highly monitored process of application has not only put some candidates on the side-lines but also demoralised some professional artists and emerging ones. The FONDART soon became a technical exercise as well as being a fund for financing artistic production. One former FONDART Coordinator and a former FONDART recipient explain this phenomenon and the fact that this situation has little changed over time. As such, they acknowledge that although the years have passed, the problem has not been dealt with appropriately.

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44 Interviews with FONDART recipients, April 2018.
However, the FONDART apparently had unexpected effects that are complex. It installed the logic of the project. For an artist, sometimes it is not easy, because it is quite technical, and it created a necessity of people that are experts in making projects. It’s one more measure that the General Comptroller of the Republic started to demand… the fulfilment of certain formalities that on the one side assure equality of participation and the possibility to hold a competition but that make heavier the procedure; and slowly the achievement of that formality became more important than the creative idea. This is something we tried to face as we received critics from artists organisations. We tried to reduce the bureaucratic load, simplify as much as possible the forms, tell the juries that what important was the artistic proposal and not the fulfilment of the requirement. We worked on this with Claudio Di Girolamo [ed: former Director of Division of Cultural Extension of the Ministry of Education] permanently with unions. We ended up awarding technique. As a Coordinator, I was conscious of this and I tried to eliminate it. But when the FONDART became a law, this was not resolved in a good way.  

I think that the FONDART has a contradiction in its “soul”. The users of the funds are artists but the language that the FONDART is made of is for lawyers. This is the great pain that goes with the FONDART. Those who use it have always felt that they have a huge weight over their head. In a certain way, this has forced them to become cultural managers. And this is how all these degrees in cultural management and administration started to emerge. The Chilean creative sector became professionalised and industrialised.  

These quote show that the government had difficulty in making the FONDART democratic while respecting the rules of neoliberalism that was part of their new agenda since the return to civilian rule. Concertación elites were not really sure how to deal with the FONDART and its undesirable effects. This was part of the process of democratic learning that elites were going through at that time. The Concertación was re-adapting itself to the rules of democracy and trying to deal with its own contradictions and those of the pacted transition. This was also described as the principle of ensayo y error (trial and error) which means that the centre-left elites who had taken power in 1990 knew that they were “amateurish” in certain sectors and were making mistakes, trying to advance in the new Chilean context of authoritarian enclaves. One of the ex-FONDART Coordinator puts into words the idea that elites were experiencing something completely new with the fund:

I think that the FONDART was a learning process, every year, we were learning from our mistakes. It was never a perfect experience. We cannot idealise it. I think it had internal

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45 Interview, 20 March 2018. Several people who managed the FONDART under the Concertación have a critical position towards the fund. Indeed, those interviewed for this research have recognised its duality. While acknowledging that it has been an undeniable contribution, many stated that the system is flawed by a heavy bureaucracy or have suggested that the fund is for a caste of people that “stay between themselves”. In that sense, it is possible to argue that part of the elites involved in cultural policy is well-aware of the shortcomings of the fund and do not adopt an enchanted official discourse.

46 Interview, 05 April 2018.

47 Interview with cultural manager, 22 March 2018.
tensions, it had very difficult moments. At a personal level, for me the FONDART was a real experience, a huge learning experience.

As this was written in Chapter 3, enclaves were not just a problem for democratisation but also an essential part of the contract signed with the military elites to re-establish democracy. In that sense, the Concertación could not “design” a new country or reform it completely. Also, this subpart showed that the difficulty was not only finding a balance between continuity and change but also dealing with some new knowledge, new concepts and management methods that the coalition was not completely familiar with. 48

5.2.3. Cultural diversity and democracy within the FONDART

Yet, despite the FONDART’s problems and restrictions, citizenship, which is essential for democracy, was much present in the fund. Citizenship was obvious in the way the FONDART favoured cultural diversity, which was clearly part of the democratic agenda after the election of President Aylwin. As argued by Haughney (2013:105), ‘in Chile, both academic opinions and popular notions tended to relegate Indigenous cultures and peoples to the distant past or to (...) remote communities that lacked access to modern civilisation’, but the Concertación ‘represented a major change toward accepting indigenous cultures as real and valuable in modern society’. This was particularly obvious from 1998, when a regional FONDART was created. The reason for doing so was the conviction that cultural diversity should also become part of the project of state development (Palma Manríquez, 2017). This focus on regional cultures allowed to counterbalance the image of a homogenous Chilean nation. However, this agenda of regional promotion already existed before 1998. This “regionalism” was favoured through the share of allocated resources. Between 1993 and 1997, the FONDART decrees stipulated that approximately 55% of the total resources of the fund should be assigned through the Regional Ministerial Secretariats of Education. 49 It was also encouraged via the areas of

48 It should be said that the coalition was very broad, and that consequently, there many different profiles within it: some modern and technocratic and other more traditional politicians. Consequently, it would be wrong to assume that all of them could handle well or were happy with the new situation they inherited after the return to democracy. It was known that there were two camps within the coalition especially in the second part of the 1990s: the *auto-complacientes* (self-complacent), satisfied with the achievements of Chile in the economic area and the *auto-flagelantes* (self-flagellant) who were more critical of the neoliberal economic model (Navia, 2004). There were thus several political lines in the Concertación.

49 Decreto Ministerio de Educación n°62.
application within the competition such as local and traditional cultures as shown in the charts below.

Table 5.2. FONDART areas of application (1992-1998) (Source: Biblioteca del Congreso Nacional de Chile)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ARTISTIC AREA</th>
<th>DESCRIPTION OF AREA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MUSIC</td>
<td>Creation and recording of a musical piece. Diffusion of musical arts through workshops. Events and training activities in musical arts.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PERFORMING ARTS</td>
<td><strong>Theatre</strong>: creation, formation or dissemination of theatrical art.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Dance</strong>: creation, formation or diffusion.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PLASTIC ARTS</td>
<td>Formation and diffusion of painting, sculpture, photography.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TRADITIONAL AND LOCAL CULTURE</td>
<td>Traditional culture: research initiatives, production (editions or recordings) or diffusion of local cultural manifestations specifying what differentiate them from the work of other localities.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AUDIO-VISUAL ARTS</td>
<td>Cinema and video: script, scenario &amp; production.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ENRICHMENT OF CULTURAL AND LOCAL HERITAGE</td>
<td>Preservation of tangible cultural heritage, registration, documentation, research, conservation, restoration and/or value enhancement of both individual heritage assets and collections. Importance to fit educational projects, increase knowledge and appreciation of the national cultural heritage. Cultural infrastructure: initiatives of creation, repair, remodelling of cinemas, theatre halls, museums etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CULTURAL AND ARTISTIC EVENTS</td>
<td>Local artistic and cultural initiatives (national, regional, provincial or communal): initiatives of events in various artistic disciplines, cultural meetings and seminars, all kinds of initiatives in the field of art and culture that serve artistic development may be presented.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LITERATURE</td>
<td>Support of literary creation in any of its genres, for which, a chapter of the work, part of the collection of poems or works that the author has previously written should be attached to</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
the postulation. Book and reading promotion events not financed.

Table 5.3. FONDART areas of application (2004-2009) (Source: CNCA)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ARTISTIC AREA</th>
<th>DESCRIPTION OF AREA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>DEVELOPMENT OF ARTS</strong></td>
<td>Street art, research, visual arts, photography, integrated arts, theatre, dance and music.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>REGIONAL CULTURAL DEVELOPMENT</strong></td>
<td>Training programmes in visual arts, photography, integrated arts, theatre, dance; production and diffusion of cultural events regional or local; Projects of diffusion that develop arts (such as the creation of instances of artistic dialogue, debates, seminars and any kind of initiative aimed at promotion culture at a regional level.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>CONSERVATION AND DIFFUSION OF CULTURAL HERITAGE</strong></td>
<td>Projects in the areas of conservation, recovery and dissemination of tangible heritage assets, furniture and real estate, protected by Law No. 17.288 of National Monuments.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>SCHOLARSHIPS AND INTERNSHIPS</strong></td>
<td>Projects of natural persons in the field of artistic training, artistic creation, cultural heritage and cultural management whose objective is to train, perfect or specialise such persons in national or foreign institutions of recognised prestige.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>CONSERVATION AND PROMOTION OF IMMATERIAL HERITAGE</strong></td>
<td>Projects in the area of handicrafts, traditions and oral expressions, performing arts and social practices, Rituals and Festivities.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>DEVELOPMENT OF INDIGENOUS CULTURES</strong></td>
<td>Research projects; enhancement of ancestral techniques; promotion of multicultural exchange among members of the various indigenous peoples; artistic creation and production of ethnic and cultural manifestations; dissemination of ethnic and cultural manifestations, and ancestral languages and their dissemination.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>CULTURAL INFRASTRUCTURE</strong></td>
<td>Everything related to infrastructure and technical assistance for arts projects</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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However, it was somewhat difficult to promote regions in a way that would also coincide with artistic excellence. In the early years of the FONDART, it was admitted that imposing quotas for selecting projects from regions could be problematic and that it did not necessarily do justice to artistic quality (División de Extensión Cultural, 1996). In that sense, the FONDART promoted art excellence but also had a responsibility of welfare. Because of the absence of official channels for cultural expression and the probable need to make amends for the past, cultural policy inevitably carried a “social mission”. In the mid-1990s already, it was revealed that the fund accumulated different types of demands, hinting that those were more social than artistic (División de Extensión Cultural, 1996). Overall, throughout the years, the FONDART was a fund of artistic quality and a tool of social citizenship at the same time. It had a double dimension for there was a hesitation between making it a professional fund for artistic excellence and a democratic tool accessible for those who did not have sufficient resources. According to a member of the Museum Benjamín Vicuña Macarena:

If we look at the projects that were rejected at the end of the FONDART selection process, many wonderful projects or of great quality got lost, because it was considered that the people already had the means to finance themselves, while others would not find the money.  

This quote shows that on the one side, the state did care about Chile having a cultural sector of quality. On the other side, it was committed to give the opportunity of cultural creation to everyone. As this was mentioned earlier, even in a system of arms’ length, the state still has a political influence, but this does not mean that the aim behind is necessarily malignant. In this case, it was more about making sure the FONDART reaches a sufficient level of equity. As suggested earlier in this chapter, the FONDART mainly remained the same across the 1990s and the 2000s. Over the years, it was amended rather than structurally modified. However,

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50 Interview, 20 April 2018. The artistic field in Chile is characterised by a strong precariousness due to the scarcity of public and private funding. These economic constraints have created a strong dependence *via-à-vis* the FONDART, making it very difficult for an artist to develop their career through alternative channels. According to many artists who won the fund, the FONDART acts as a wage or a short-lived job. For the Chilean state, the FONDART seems to fill a similar role. Indeed, national citizens or residents that were granted a FONDART to finance a project for a several-month duration were not registered as unemployed over this period and were considered by the state as having an economic activity. Moreover, the fund produced some new labour norms aiming at protecting workers that help FONDART recipients in the design or editing phase of their project. As explained by one FONDART recipient: ‘The application forms are not so different from the new ones, the basic structure is the same, everything that has to do with the main data of the curriculum and trajectory, and then there is the formulation of the project, objective, description of activities and expenses’ (Interview, 03 April 2018).
among the important amendments were the various attempts to democratize the fund. Starting from the early 2000s, the FONDART was progressively re-designed in a way that favoured equity between candidates. The process of application started to take more into consideration the different levels and skills of candidates. In some areas, categories based on the trajectory of applicants were created, allowing a fairer access to cultural funding and allowing the FONDART to cover all generations. Emerging artists who had less than five years of experience started to compete in a separate category to avoid that their project be compared with those of established artists who had many years of activity as well as the means, the networks and the technique to compete and win. Following the creation of the FONDART as a law in 2003, there was also more obligation for transparency. Indeed, an explanation of the evaluation’s different steps and a justification in cases of unsuccessful application had to be provided.

5.3. THE FONDART: CREATIVITY, IDENTITY AND DEMOCRACY

5.3.1. The repository of Chile’s creative memory

Finally, this last part starts discussing other aspects of the FONDART that are related to citizenship and which are identity and memory. The two topics will be further analysed in the seventh chapter of this thesis. However, a primary observation can be made, especially with regards to memory. The fund has been since its creation, the repository of Chile’s memory as it has accumulated an impressive amount of works and cultural products. Indeed, the most striking feature of the FONDART is its diversity. In fact, it has virtually financed “everything” since its creation. As shown in the previous charts, it has not only promoted cultural industries (cinema, books, CDs) but also cultures that were more traditional or local (crafts, heritage). The fund is an assemblage of many categories and definitions of culture, giving the candidates unlimited possibilities of creation. In addition, its areas of application have been wide enough to embrace any kind of artistic expression. The fund does not have an editorial line, does not impose any topic and does not have a clear-formalised orientation (La Nación, 2009). It has funded very popular and mainstream works, the same way it has financed very underground and experimental projects. In that sense, it has been a “place” for all creative needs.
Among the immense artistic production partly or fully financed by the FONDART, some pieces have become part of the heritage and history of Chile for being critically acclaimed or popular among the public. Some others were polemical works that have remained in Chilean collective memory. Because of the high number of projects executed during the era of the Concertación, it would be difficult to give a clear view of what was financed and challenging to create some categorisation or ordering. Still, it is possible to provide a sample showing the most famous or polemical FONDART projects. One important observation is that among the most notorious ones, some directly raised some of the important issues addressed in this research: Chilean conservatism, memory in relation to human rights violations, sexuality, indigenous identity and different views on national history (see chart below). In fact, the FONDART’s objective was to fill a creative urge after years of frustration and censorship and to discuss important issues without the approval or intervention of state authorities.

Table 5.4. Key FONDART projects between the 1990s and 2000s

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Art category</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Theme /Background</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>Film</td>
<td>Amnesia Johnny Cien Pesos</td>
<td>Pinochet dictatorship Democratic transition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>Painting Literature</td>
<td>Simón Bolívar Ángeles negros</td>
<td>Homosexuality</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>Documentary</td>
<td>Patio 29</td>
<td>Human rights violations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>Sculpture</td>
<td>Mauchauli</td>
<td>Sexuality</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>Architecture</td>
<td>Nautilus, casa transparente</td>
<td>Female intimacy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>Documentary</td>
<td>Estadio Nacional La Huida</td>
<td>Human rights violations Homosexuality</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>Film</td>
<td>La Hija de O’Higgins La Ultima huella Taxi para tres</td>
<td>Mapuche History</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>Theatre</td>
<td>Prat</td>
<td>Homosexuality and history</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>Film</td>
<td>Machuca</td>
<td>Dictatorship</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>Dance</td>
<td>Cuerpo quebrado</td>
<td>Human rights</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
5.3.2. The FONDART and the continuous focus on creation

Following its implementation in the early 1990s, the FONDART became immediately popular among artists and cultural producers. Being the sole available instrument of cultural financing, the FONDART was quickly “captured” by artists and citizens. For an artistic community who had been condemned to silence or self-censorship, the fund became after the return to democracy, one of the first channels through which messages that were authentic, raw or politically incorrect were sent, as this will be further shown in Chapter 7. The FONDART could often challenge the establishment in a way that the other policies at the margins could not, especially because culture was a relatively “enclave free policy”, more remote from institutional politics. Therefore, it was clear that the main objective of Chilean cultural policy was to open spaces for creative expression. Although the law states that the fund finances creation, development and diffusion, the focus of FONDART was mostly put on creation, which means that other aspects of cultural policy such as diffusion were less developed. In 1996 already, Nivia Palma, the Coordinator of the fund at that time, acknowledged the lack of diffusion as a possible flaw of the FONDART and argued that it was important for citizens to know what was produced in Santiago and other Chilean regions (División de Extensión Cultural, 1996). As of late 2000s, the “problem” was still not solved. Two declarations, one from a FONDART recipient in the 1990s and 2000s and the other from a former Minister of Culture confirm that Chilean cultural policy was limited to creation and not focused on generating infrastructures to access the FONDART production:

The Fondart in diffusion? Terrible! I say it straightforwardly. Diffusion of contemporary art works? Terrible. Why?... because of decision...because of nothing. This is simply something that does not work. It is so bad that when I realised nothing would happen at this level, I did my own work of diffusion.51

With FONDART, the focus is not about maintaining your work, it is on generating other new works. That’s why they all compete, “pass me the money because I want to create, to sustain myself for two months”. The state has to guarantee creation...but not only to create, create, create so that no one sees it. 52

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51 Interview, 10 April 2018.
52 Interview, 24 April 2018.
The lack of diffusion of the FONDART is along with the bureaucratic application process, one of the most recurrent critics raised by artists or government officials. Indeed, as shown in the first quote, the whole diffusion part was left to randomness and to the management capacity of artists who won the fund. Otherwise, it depended on the intrinsic quality of the project, the capacity of the artists in making their work appealing, or on the publicity stunt stirred by the controversial content of the project. However, this possible “dysfunction” of the FONDART also reveals something important about the role of cultural policy for democracy. The state continued to pursue during the years of centre-left governments the objective set in the early 1990s: repairing the damage caused by the military regime by providing a tool that would combine free creation and state intervention in the cultural sector. This meant that for about twenty years, the FONDART’s main task was to reconcile the state with artists and allow them to create without limits. The Concertación just formalised more and updated a fund that was first designed as a temporary instrument in order to respect the obligations of transparency and digitalisation that accompanied the emergence of the 21st century, but the aim was always creation. The FONDART did fill the same democratic role over the two decades that followed the end of the Pinochet regime. It provided a tool to consolidate different forms of expression and also allowed some Chileans to reconnect with their identities and their memory, which are issues that as argued in Chapter 3 have no expiry date. The fund did so through the endless possibility to create.

5.3.3. (Re)defining Chilean identity(ies) through cultural policy

As suggested in the previous sub-sections of this chapter, the FONDART played a role in promoting regional cultures and freedom of speech. This thesis argues that these two aspects are narrowly related to identity, which was also an important issue after the re-establishment

53 Looking at the very recent history of cultural policy in Chile, it is quite telling that at the end of the second Bachelet administration (2013-2017), years after the dissolution of the Concertación, the FONDART was still expanded with a new application line called “Memory and Human Rights”, showing the continuous formalisation of issues that have been present since the return to democracy. ‘The objective of this line of competition is to finance all or part of projects for the creation and production (…) of artistic works that contribute to progress towards full respect for human rights, based on the values of dignity and freedom of individuals and communities, as well as the principles of equality and non-discrimination, considering aspects related to preserving memory and/or carrying out tasks of social commitment to truth, justice and reparation in terms of human rights in Chile’ (Presentation of the line on the website www.cultura.gob.cl)

54 As this was said by one of the interviewees (Interview, 24 April 2018) the FONDART was based on an unlimited possibility of applying to the fund. This meant that all candidates could apply and potentially win it indefinitely.
of democracy. Chilean identity had at least two meanings. First, it meant a sort of unfinished project that had to be renewed, constantly re-expressed and re-defined. According to Claudio Di Girolamo (1998:2), the former Chief of the DCE between 1997 and 2002: ‘it is not possible to expect to arrive to a determined point (…). It is the permanent lack of conclusion that makes our identity always changing, anti-conformist and fertile. (…) Our identity is wonderfully inconclusive’. Secondly, national identity meant a compromise between the genuine acceptance of globalisation, Chile’s cultural homogeneity and cultural diversity. It also signified the harmonious co-existence of these three components. As this was said by former President of the Republic, Ricardo Lagos, in a speech held in May 2000:

National identity and cultural diversity are not incompatible between themselves, in a way that there is no need limit the second in order to preserve the first one in its integrity (…) Cultural identity is not an identity of defence or resistance (…) and the insertion of Chile in a global world does not mean the renunciation of our dreams or the cancellation of our memory as a country.

The argument made in this chapter is that the idea of an “unfinished identity” is linked to the continuity of the FONDART as a quasi-exclusive instrument of creation. Indeed, artistic creation was needed in order to present Chile as a country that has culture, and therefore an identity. This was particularly important since the country has long had a deficit of cultural identity compared to some of its Latin American counterparts; in Chile, multiculturalism was ill-integrated to the concept of nation and immigration did not substantially influence the country (Fazio Vengoa, 2004:23; Subercaseaux, 2011). Finding a Chilean identity has been a constant challenge and even more after years of repression and isolation, hence the necessity to look for it through cultural creation. Also, this identity had to be inclusive and plural to respect the principles of democracy. Three quotes from a former Chilean President of the Republic illustrate these ideas.

I felt that we lived in a world that would always get more globalised and cultural creation was what gave us national identity and therefore, we needed people that would create, that would grow like flowers…This was support, it gave us identity as Chile, as Chilenidad ⁵⁵, and when you develop the whole topic of crafts…this is a way of helping artisans, because this is disappearing in Chile. This woman with horsehair that makes fine handicraft, this is unique in the world and we are losing that if we do not do something. This is the whole sense behind it. It was to protect Chilean creativity. And diversity of course. Chile is a rich country. One day some Peruvian and Bolivian friends were annoyed because I claimed the Aymara culture. But

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⁵⁵ Chileanness.
on the Chilean territory we have Aymara culture! Later when I changed Ministry, I put an installation of stone bed near the modern healthcare centres because the Aymara woman gives birth in it! Our forefathers did this. And we have in Auracanía two or three pharmacopeia that sell natural remedies made by the Mapuche. 56

Look! Here we have independent means, and the market can buy it or not…but do you want to develop your imagination? Here there is some support. 57

I think that the regional FONDART (…), the motivation of the competition served citizenship, [we] understood that there could be creativity in the region. It was a way saying: you can do it as well; you do contribute as well. 58

The analysis that can be made is that cultural policy via the FONDART was able to convey an identity that was accepted by all. In the second quote, the word ‘imagination’ is used, showing that culture had an important symbolic dimension. It contributed to reinvent Chile after the end of dictatorship and gave the possibility to express ideals, including those that the Pinochet regime tried to stifle. The other important idea according to the interviewee is that culture meant integration and the right of all Chileans to belong to the new democratic nation. This is clearly a conciliatory vision of Chile. Indeed, this again marks a compromise between the “nation” and the “region”, between the western Chile and the indigenous Chile, which was fundamental after the divisions and polarisation caused by the authoritarian era. Besides, promoting Chile’s regional cultures instead of a monolithic national culture could even generate consensus with the right and the military because regions were also part of Chile’s identity.

As seen previously, the FONDART allowed different representations of the nation as it financed from crafts to cultural industries and from contemporary arts to traditional ones. All those “identities” could be tolerated by the different political sectors and parties. Indeed, under Pinochet, if cultural homogeneity was held as a truth and encouraged (Frazier, 2007:45), there was still an awareness and an acknowledgement of Chile as a diverse country, with its regional components being part of national culture as well (Departamento de Extensión Cultural, 1986). Finally, the idea of protecting culture from the excesses of globalisation was not very contentious or polemical in a country where right-wing elites, while being pro-market oriented, have always cared about the recognition of the nation and the patria (motherland).

56 Interview, 22 March 2018.
57 Ibid.
58 Ibid.
CONCLUSION

This chapter showed how the FONDART oscillated between a search for social equality and strict bureaucratic rules that were justified by the necessity to guarantee transparency and fairness. In fact, the chapter adopted a critical stance by highlighting the several tensions and ambiguities of the fund while illuminating the way it was connected to democratisation. The FONDART remained the same in its democratic function throughout the Concertación era and its heavy bureaucratisation did not prevent it from promoting democracy at its level. The fund provided spaces for creativity and widened the notions of cultural identity that used to be stiff and homogenous. Moreover, the fact that the FONDART was “stuck” on the creative aspect testified to this vision of favouring cultural expression to help Chileans’ unachieved or incomplete identity. Also, the FONDART was a compromise institution that both respected the political and economic logic validated in the transition agreements and corrected some of its negative effects.

What was evidenced as well is that finding the appropriate tools of governance was a challenge for the Concertación as the coalition was dealing with new instruments that were inevitably flawed and limited since they were implemented in a context of authoritarian enclaves. In that sense, the policies at the margins and the FONDART were part of the learning process of democracy for the centre-left elites. Finally, the chapter outlined an important aspect in relation to culture being a relatively “enclave free” policy area. The fact that the FONDART promoted identity, understood in a very broad way, shows that it could favour consensus between the different political sectors. Culture in the FONDART is regional and national, avant-gardist and conservative, contemporary, and traditional. As such, culture was a low-risk policy area capable of shaping the country’s democratic image and getting the implicit adhesion of the right-wing sectors, which will be further demonstrated in the following chapter of this thesis.
CHAPTER 6 – LOOKING FOR AUTONOMY: POLITICAL ELITES AND CULTURAL POLICY

INTRODUCTION
This chapter discusses the position of right-wing and left-wing Chilean political elites towards cultural policy in order to understand the level of elite autonomy of the Concertación after the return to democracy. The main argument is that culture, as a relatively “enclave-free” area helped the Concertación be more autonomous and contributed to resolve some of the coalition’s internal tensions and loss of identity produced by the years of struggle against the military government and the genuine acceptance of some aspects of the Pinochet’s heritage. The chapter highlights several reasons that accounted for the capacity of cultural policy to improve the Concertación elites’ autonomy and reaffirm their values as distinct from those of the right-wing actors that supported the dictatorship. Culture was a policy area which conservative sectors who had supported the military regime had historically little interest in. Also, it was unlikely to destabilise the neoliberal economic model that was shaped by Pinochet’s ministers. Finally, the FONDART was a marginal institution that provoked no substantial opposition from conservative actors and even gave way to a silent consensus since culture was less contentious than other sectors.

In order to support this argument, this chapter is divided into three parts. The first one is a historical review of the process of right-wing elite transformation that started in the years preceding the coup d'état of 1973 and which led to an ideological synthesis between economic liberalism and conservative values. The second part proceeds by arguing that the new right that emerged in the second part of the 20th century gave little importance to culture as a policy area due to its focus on the economy. It further shows that the FONDART was not a threatening or challenging issue for right-wing elites, and that they could to some extent validate it. The last section explains how the struggle against dictatorship in the 1980s led centre-left elites of the opposition to rethink their strategy, renovate their intellectual thought and eventually approve or “internalise” some of the authoritarian enclaves after the return to democracy. The other point that is demonstrated is that the FONDART had a beneficial role inside the coalition, as it “taught” its members more about creative freedom and how to combat their own ambiguities towards democracy. Besides, as both right-wing forces and the Concertación consented that market economy was key in securing the country’s democratic stability and growth, ideological polarisation was significantly reduced. In this situation, cultural policy could help recreate difference between the two camps.

6.1. ELITE TRANSFORMATION AND THE RISE OF A NEW RIGHT IN CHILE
6.1.1. Ideological polarisation and student mobilisation in the 1960s and 1970s

In order to situate the topic of culture on the right-left spectrum and understand why the Concertación had more autonomy in this area, it is necessary to present the historical background prior to the *coup d’état* that toppled Salvador Allende from power, as it explains the evolution of the political right in Chile and therefore its position towards culture and the arts. Indeed, it is important to look at the 1960s and early 1970s as those years were a turning point in the history of Chile and because they determined il large part what happened in the mid-1970s and 1980s. This period was marked by a high polarisation as well as by the struggle of the Chilean upper classes against both the direction taken by the Christian Democrat government of Eduardo Frei and the Socialist government of Salvador Allende. Although the right-wing sectors supported Frei in the 1964 presidential elections to avoid Salvador Allende’s victory, they grew disenchanted as the then President implemented social policies that went against their interests (Pollack, 1999; Power, 2010). Indeed, the Frei’s government programme named the *Revolución en Libertad* (*Revolution in Liberty*) included substantial social measures such as ‘the minimum wage, slums clearance, housing development and the integration of peasants into the political process, but most importantly an agrarian reform’ (Sarget, 1996:146). The other important reform was the ‘expropriation of private property’ was considered by the ‘Chilean landed elite’ an ‘unacceptable betrayal’ (Hite, 2005:63).

In parallel to the more left-wing measures of the Frei administration, the creation of the MIR in 1965, as well as the radicalisation of the Socialist Party that officialised its Marxist-Leninist stance in 1967 at the Chillán Congress, further increased the anxieties of the conservative sectors of Chilean society. Over the same period, Chile was going through important student mobilisations that were symptomatic of the conflict between the reformist and the conservative sectors of society. The reformist and social orientations of the Revolution in Liberty were supported by universities that increasingly demanded a democratisation of higher education, a better inclusion of the poor social strata and the *Cogobierno*, namely, the right of students and administrative staff to participate in university elections (Moraga Valle, 2006; Moncada Durruti, 2006: 42).

6.1.2. A countermovement within the Catholic University: the alliance of the Chicago Boys and Jaime Guzmán

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Among the strongest opponents of the reform was a group of Chilean professors within the Catholic University who studied economics at the University of Chicago as part of an exchange program called the “Chile Project” between the 1950s and the 1960s (Valdés, 1995). In the United States, these Chilean students – that would be later known as the Chicago Boys – learnt a new conception of economic science based on technical rationality and mathematical formalisation. Upon their return to their home university, they taught courses to the students of the *Católica* ⁵⁹ that focused on the main aspects of neo-classical economics such as monetary theory or price theory (Fontaine, 2009: 58). The Chicago Boys’ conception of economic science was very dogmatic and any opposition to it was discredited by being branded ideological or partisan (Gárate, 2010). At a time when economics in Chile and Latin America was dominated by ECLAC ⁶⁰ theories of statism and structuralism (Parmar, 2012; Font, 2015), the rhetoric of expertise that surrounded Chicagoan economic science and its high level of scholarly abstraction allowed the Chicago Boys to discredit the then orthodox economic thought and establish themselves as the sole holders of legitimate knowledge.

Another strong opponent to the university reform was Jaime Guzmán Errázuriz, a Law professor at the Catholic University who saw it as a dangerous politicisation of university caused by the reforms led by the left and the Christian democrats (Kaufman, 2001; Stern, 2006). Guzmán was initially a supporter of the Church’s social doctrine that advocated the principle of subsidiarity (Contreras Osorio, 2007). According to this concept, intermediary organisations, such as family, enterprises or trade unions should carry out activities within society while the state should only be responsible for justice, defence, and security etc. The Catholic Church doctrine showed interest for social issues but did not encourage socialism and defended private property as a natural right. Nevertheless, the Church simultaneously rejected any individualistic and materialistic conception of liberalism. It stated that ‘just as the unity of the social body cannot be founded on the opposition of classes, we cannot expect from the free play of the competition the advent of a well-ordered economic regime, free competition is a legitimate and useful thing, but it can never serve as a regulatory standard for economic life’ (Encyclical *Quadragesimo anno*, 1931).

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⁵⁹ Colloquial name of the Catholic University.
⁶⁰ United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean.
The Student Federation of the Catholic University (Federación de Estudiantes de la Universidad Católica de Chile) (FEUC) had been controlled since the end of 1959 by the Christian Democracy, which in accordance with the Second Vatican Council and the Catholic social doctrine was in favour of a third way between capitalism and Marxism. However, it was precisely on this aspect that Guzmán disagreed the most with the Partido Demócrata Cristiano (Christian Democratic Party) (PDC) as he saw in this compromise a risk of Communist penetration (Mansuy, 2014: 214). As a reaction to the reformist movement of the university, he founded a countermovement named *Gremialismo* that asked for the depoliticisation of academic institutions and the independence of all intermediate organisations from ‘governments or political parties’ (Fischer, 2009:312). However, despite its defence of a-politicism, the *Gremialista* movement was mostly a political opposition to what it saw as a growing proximity between the Christian Democrats and left-wing parties. Both the rejection of the reform and the disagreement with the PDC’s new political line prompted the alliance of the *Gremialistas* and the Chicago Boys. Finally, what should be underlined is that the renovation of the right-wing ideology in Chile could be achieved because the traditional right-wing party (Partido Nacional) was falling apart, and because the PDC was not being a shield against the left anymore, forcing the right to radicalise and find a new project to defend its interests (Boisard, 2015).

6.1.3. Ideological refoundation and the emergence of a new right

As Guzmán was progressively dismissing the Catholic Church social doctrine, the primacy he gave to individualism and liberty led him to evolve towards a resolutely more liberal form of capitalism (Cristi, 1999). Indeed, the vision of the Chicago economists for whom individual freedom resulted from economic liberalism resonated with his intellectual thought. Moreover, the shared moral and social characteristics of the Chicago Boys and Guzmán: a Catholic upbringing, a ferocious disapproval of Marxism and the conviction that political parties were damaging to society for they conveyed ideology and encouraged demagogy, led to the creation of an intellectual synthesis between nationalism, Catholicism and economic liberalism. Also, for Guzmán, although freedom was essential, it could only exist within a protected environment, namely in an authoritarian context where the state would protect individual freedoms and the market (Cristi, 2011). The vivid opposition of the *Gremialistas* to the
reformist movement eventually helped them getting elected at the head of the FEUC in 1968 in order to lead the struggle against Allende in the early 1970s and to further spread the *gremialismo* student movement throughout Chile (Pollack, 1999: 35-36). In this sense, the Catholic University became in the 1960s, the epicentre of the Chilean conservative revolution.

However, the ideology defended by the *Gremialistas* and the Chicago Boys was not limited to the academic realm. Between the 1960s and 1970s, the Chicago Boys were very active in the think-tank *Centro de Estudios Socio-económicos* (CESEC) and the Monday Club which both worked as informal networks for pro-neoliberal actors. Indeed, during the years of the Popular Unity (1970-1973), leaders of several major conglomerates started the Monday Club to organise the business sector opposition to Allende, develop pro-market ideas and work with military opponents to the government (Clark and Clark, 2016:30-31). This organisation allowed the Chicago Boys to find an echo among the most influent circles in the country and helped them build ties with industrialists, editorialists, businessmen or members of the Armed Forces who all subscribed to the “Chicago proposition”. The turning point happened when the Admiral Roberto Kelly asked the Chicago economists in 1972 to work on the development of an alternative economic programme, in the perspective of a *coup d’état*. This gave way to a document untitled *El Ladrillo* (The Brick) that encouraged pro-market measures and laid the foundations for the future economic policy of the dictatorship (Teichman, 2001:71).

When the Armed Forces took power in September 1973, the economic line of the military government was neither homogenous nor well-articulated as some supported a gradual move towards liberalism while the Chicago Boys lobbied for a more radical set of market-oriented policies (Winn, 2004:26: López, 2015: 5). Soon however, ‘the massive balance of payments crisis of 1975 provided the opportunity for the Chicago Boys to secure backing of general Pinochet’ (Herreros, 2009:58). This crisis also proved to be a chance for the defenders of neoliberalism and Pinochet himself who as he was seeking to consolidate his personal power, chose to favour international financial conglomerates and free-market campaigners. The aim behind this strategy was to isolate the officers who had ties with the business community and the traditional entrepreneurs who had built their wealth through the old statist model during democracy (Silva, 1996). His ensuing decision to appoint the Chicago Boys as ministers was

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61 The Great Depression of 1929 forced Latin American countries to reconsider their place in the world economic system. They thus chose back then, the import substitution industrialisation model (ISI) to replace previously
due to their position of technocrats who claimed to apply “scientific” rather than political solutions to social problems such as unemployment, poverty and inflation. As he relied on monetarist economic theories that were promoted as both modern and apolitical, Pinochet sought to give more legitimacy to his arbitrary rule and make political parties look old-fashioned and irrelevant.

The subsequent adhesion of the upper classes to both gremialismo and the Chicago economy was a reflex of class defence as they were disappointed by the Christian Democracy and were completely hostile to the Popular Unity’s agenda. Neoliberalism represented for them an appealing project that was both reactionary and innovative. Also, the new democratic and pro-equality posture of the Catholic Church and the PDC threatened their high social position and forced them to look for an alternative political and economic model (Gárate, 2011). As a result, the elite that started to emerge between the 1960s and the military government was resolutely more entrepreneurial and more oriented towards economic growth. As the Pinochet ministers implemented a series of privatisations, a class of empresarios benefitted from the sale of state-owned companies to build their fortune (Undurraga, 2011:6).

Also, the Chicago Boys represented values that suited both the upper classes and the military junta since they were centred on merit, personal effort, and Anglo-Saxon postgraduate degrees, especially in “apolitical” subjects such as economics and management. Prior to this, social recognition in Chile was principally achieved through family ties. As argued by Cubitt (1995: 106), ‘large families and the recognition of a wide network of kinship ties is a feature of Latin American life’ where ‘names demonstrate aristocratic status’ and ‘family networks are manipulated in the course of politics and business.’ However, gradually, the Chilean elite was not solely relying on heritage and family descent but also on the legitimacy of technical knowledge, work, and professional success to validate their position within society. Finally, the elite combined this new managerial ethos with some traits that had long characterised the traditional elite which were strong conservative values, a Catholic background, and an affection for patriotic symbols. The only difference was that, as the upper classes did not recognise

imported manufactured goods with local production; Chile then relied on protectionist measures to preserve its local industries from foreign competition (Baer, 1972). This new industrialisation policy was largely encouraged by the (Marxist) theorists of dependence, whose main representatives were the Argentinian economist Raúl Prebisch and the Chilean economist Aníbal Pinto.

Entrepreneurs.
themselves in the new rhetoric adopted by the Second Vatican Council, they turned to other religious organisations such as Opus Dei and the Legion of Christ that were more elitist, more anti-Communist and more complacent towards market economy (Blofield, 2006:29; Han, 2012: 195; Cox and Imbarack, 2017: 237).

6.2. FROM THE PINOCHET REGIME TO DEMOCRACY: RIGHT-WING POLITICAL ELITES AND CULTURAL POLICY

6.2.1. Culture: between traditionalism and disinterest

The reaction of right-wing sectors to the policies of Frei and Allende ultimately led to the emergence of a new economic elite that started to co-exist with the traditional landowning one (Grugel, 1999: 60). Part of the upper classes after the coup d’etat of 1973 built their social legitimacy through business, ‘foreign capital’, academic degrees obtained abroad and through the full adhesion to market economy (Bartell, 1995: 60-61). The argument made in this chapter is that while this elite still held tight to its religious and traditional values, its new neoliberal stance further decreased its interest in having public policies dedicated to culture and the arts. When the military regime took over, cultural policy was at the bottom of the government’s priorities for Pinochet and his ministers mostly cared about economic matters and about shaping a society that would be business-oriented.

As this was outlined in the previous chapter, the military regime rather promoted symbols and values that exalted nationhood such as Chilean military heroes and cultural heritage (Errázuriz, 2009; Bawden, 2016). Otherwise, cultural policy back then consisted more in promoting values that are coherent with an authoritarian government such as Christianity, tradition, and discipline. Moreover, the military regime sought to impose ‘hierarchy, authority, (...) duty and sobriety’ within society (Errázuriz, 2006:76). Rather than having a formalised cultural policy, the government relied upon imageries and allegories. “Cultural policy” mainly consisted of an ideological vision of order and in the development of an aesthetics that put great
emphasis on historical figures, hygiene, and colour cleansing (Errázuriz and Gonzalo Leiva, 2012).  

The military regime and its right-wing allies concentrated most of their efforts on economic growth, the creation of enterprises and the preservation of traditional values, thus showing little interest in designing a more elaborated cultural policy. During the dictatorship, all areas of society became subordinated to neoliberal rationality as public services, state-owned resources, education, health, pensions, social security, and the banking system were all privatised (Oppenheim, 2007; Kikeri and Nellis, 2002). Culture, however, was not considered a potentially lucrative domain by the new neoliberal and pro-market right-wing elite. The economic dogmatism that characterised the Chicago team is what made them strongly in favour of profit and consumption. Culture in this sense was deemed neither a strategic nor a productive sector and this explains the weak, almost absent proposition for cultural policy during the military regime. Also, it appears that the right had few ideas in terms of culture and little creativity to develop a full proposition in this area. As explained by an ex-FONDART jury and cultural manager as well as by a former FONDART recipient:

The Chicago Boys resolved everything through privatisation…pensions, education. But for culture, they did not have a solution. They were just not interested; it was not something important for them. They left this task to us [the left-wing]. The world of economists and entrepreneurs knows much about economy, but they are not very enlightened. Our economic elite is just not cultivated.  

The right was not interested in cultural policy at all. Even in Bolivia or Peru, I think, there is more boldness from right-wing entrepreneurs. In Brazil they have art collectors who buy impressionist paintings, here we buy garbage from Europe. The museums and galleries in other parts of Latin America have awesome paintings, here we buy second-hand stuff. The right likes to go to Acapulco, they like going to holidays rather than buying paintings. I think that they did not even have arguments to oppose [cultural policy].

63 In parallel, the decree archives of the period show a repeated interest in religion and sports. The valorisation of heritage was correlated to the nationalist stance adopted by the military regime while the support for religion mostly consisted into providing legal status to Evangelical churches. Indeed, in order to counter Catholic authorities that were hostile to the military regime, Pinochet decided to frequently back and co-opt the Protestant community (Stoll, 1990:316). As for sports, they fitted with the regime’s willingness to provide entertainment and recreational forms of culture that bore little ideology.
64 Interview, 22 March 2018.
65 Interview, 02 April 2018.
Besides, for the military and civilian actors close to the regime, culture was a *foco marxista* (Marxist source) that they looked at with a mixture of contempt and disinterest. Another important point is that, although these elites seemed to have a cultural and ideological proximity with North America because of their Anglo-Saxon degrees and because they fully embraced capitalism, they did not develop a tradition or a trend of philanthropy as it has existed in the United States where industrialists and entrepreneurs donate money from their personal fortune to fund culture and the arts.\(^\text{66}\) Therefore, whether it was through a private or public system of financing, these elites did not have a conception of culture that would serve the community or be intended to the public good. After the return to democracy in 1990, most of centre-right politicians as well as the business elites who supported them continued to simultaneously embrace unrestricted capitalist accumulation and societal traditionalism. In parallel, they still had little interest in cultural policy which was neither part of their social history nor part of their immediate political agenda. They logically remained unsympathetic to the theme of culture and kept a distant relationship with the artistic community. Consequently, during the first decade of democratic rule, cultural policy was little present on the right-wing agenda.

During the presidential campaigns that took place between 1989 and 1993, the right-wing candidate propositions for cultural policy were minimal and targeted the same areas: cultural heritage, family, and sports. In 1989, Hernan Büchi, the former Minister of Finance of Pinochet between 1985 and 1989 presented a very short proposition for cultural policy. It was almost identical to that of the military regime as he proposed an expansion of the FONDEC, an improvement of private donations to finance the arts and focused both on ‘moral and aesthetical values’ and on the ‘strengthening of national identity’ (Büchi, 1989:26). Besides, it emphasised the role of sports in fostering family, intelligence and morality. As for the programme of presidential candidate Arturo Alessandri Besa in 1993, it combined a 19th century vision of culture (cultural heritage, museums, archives and the conservation of historical buildings) with an entrepreneurial bias, advocating the economic participation of enterprises in sports (Besa, 1993: 14). Between 1999 and 2005, right-wing candidates Joaquín Lavín and Sebastián Piñera followed the same lines, with the only difference being that they included within their programme (although briefly) the issue of indigenous peoples. Overall, their propositions

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\(^{66}\) Ibid.
remained short as both intended to improve existing cultural institutions through a plan of modernisation.\footnote{Joaquín Lavín (Programa de gobierno, 1999); Sebastián Piñera (Programa de gobierno, 2005). Available on www.archivochile.com}

6.2.2. The Chilean political right and the FONDART

The left-wing actors who oversaw cultural policy during the relevant period suggested that the right did not oppose the implementation of the FONDART in the early 1990s. \footnote{Interview, 22 March 2018; Interview, 23 March 2018.} This relative consent of the political opponents of the Concertación had to do with the fact that the FONDART did not jeopardize the neoliberal discipline. Indeed, cultural policies as a whole represented a very small part of the national budget. Therefore, it did not clash with powerful right-wing actors and did not even raise their attention.\footnote{Benavente and Larraín (2016:117-118) explain that ‘with respect to Chile’s cultural public expenditure, there are no precise estimates’ due to the ‘institutional dispersion in the sources of information on public expenditure’. By taking into account the ‘budgets of services of the central level of the State, such as are the CNCA, the Directorate of Libraries, Archives and Museums (Dibam) and the Directorate of Cultural Affairs of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Dirac) and the 2016 Budget Law, they find out that the budget for that year represents 0.55% of public spending. By extricating data from the 2009 national budget, the author calculates that the money allocated to the CNCA at the end of the Bachelet administration amounts to 0.23% of the national expenditures, and this, knowing that the FONDART budget has grown every year since 1992.' Interview, April 05, 2018.} The other reason oscillates between a sentiment of antipathy and neglect \emph{vis à vis} culture as a domain of public action. Some of the arts financed by the FONDART, especially in the early 1990s were quite anti-conformist and the right-wing sectors were not very permeated by the culture of dissidence and \emph{avant-garde} that had a more left-wing connotation. However, rather than fighting what they considered a Marxist manifestation, their reaction was more one of disregard and indifference. Overall, the low financial cost of the FONDART and the unconventional artistic expressions it funded explained the initial indifference of the right towards it. As summarised by a former FONDART recipient and jury:

Right-wing parties at first did not notice the FONDART, for them it was just something that financed clowns and that received five thousand pesos, it was something eccentric.\footnote{Interview, 05 April 2018.}

Therefore, cultural policy was less obstructed by solid enclaves and was hardly opposed by the right-wing opposition. Politicians from UDI and RN as well as the military were more
dedicated to blocking any measure that could have reformed the most radical aspects of the neoliberal model or facilitated the prosecution of those responsible for human rights violations (Álvarez Vallejos, 2011:126-127). Culture was not part of their agenda and was a topic that they would look at from afar, intervening only when they judged that some of their cultural references were being ridiculed or their honour tarnished.

Indeed, the few debates that revolved around the FONDART had more to do with moral values rather than political or economic issues. When the right-wing deputies had something to say about the FONDART, it was in relation to the “integrity” of the Chilean nation or to moral issues such as sexual decency. The fund did provoke some scandals that have so far remained emblematic in Chile’s recent history. A particularly famous one is the theatre play Prat financed by FONDART and performed in 2002. Arturo Prat, a 19th century Chilean Navy officer killed during the War of the Pacific that saw Chile, Peru and Bolivia battling each other, has been considered a sacred historical figure, one that has been cherished and admired by former pinochetistas and part of the military factions. The piece written by playwright Manuela Infante portrayed the Chilean naval combatant as a weak man, an alcoholic and according to conservative critics, as a homosexual. Right-wing politicians strongly condemned the work that according to them damaged the national’s hero image and reputation. 71 Also, they lamented the existence of such a “distasteful” and were scandalised by the fact that it was financed with taxpayers’ money. At the same time, the Chilean admirals stood up in defence of the honour of Arturo Prat, pressuring authorities to prevent the play from being premiered. However, despite the much-publicised scandals, the FONDART was never threatened in its existence and its legitimacy as the sole mechanism of cultural funding was never denied.

Also, Prat and most of the polemical FONDART projects that stirred controversies in Chile were all financed and executed. In fact, right-wing politicians never explicitly opposed the FONDART as an institution but only saved their punctual complaints for art works that they found offensive or disrespectful. The kind of debates that took place between the right and the government in the early 2000s were similar to those found in any established democracy. As this was said in Chapter 3, even in democratic regimes, artists cause scandals and arts provoke

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71 Senado, sesión ordinaria N° 2, 2 October 2002.
repulsion and outcry while stirring debates on its legitimacy. In that sense, publicly discussing
the role of art and creative freedom is therefore, also part of the democratic exercise.

In the case of Chile, the FONDART had a similar function. The last reason that made the
fund acceptable is that, as this was suggested in the previous Chapter 5, it was divided in many
lines of application, guaranteeing a broad and inclusive definition of culture and the arts.
Consequently, even though public money was invested in contemporary, popular or indigenous
arts that were not part of the right-wing sectors’ spheres of interest or political priorities, the
FONDART also financed many projects of protection and reconstruction of the Chilean
heritage (*patrimonio*), a theme that was dear to the Chilean right. In that sense, the FONDART
valorised Chilean history, in accordance with the principles defended by the most conservative
elites who therefore had no real reason to oppose it.\(^{72}\) Also, cultural policy was ultimately good
for the image of the country. As argued by someone who works in the Museum Benjamín
Vicuña Mackenna in Santiago and by a former FONDART recipient:

Part of the [Chilean] right, let’s say the most ideological, thinks that having a FONDART or
even a Ministry of Culture is not necessary, that whoever wants to develop culture should do it
through their talent only (…) the right was never very enthusiastic about it, but they accepted
it. They did not oppose it. When they took charge of the Council [of Culture and the Arts] they
developed new lines of work that had to do with material heritage, buildings, architecture,
religious art, and after the 2010 earthquake money was spent to rebuild churches through the
FONDART and other things, that’s their vision.\(^{73}\)

In Chile what really matters is the relationship between enterprise and work, work regulation,
growth. In the Parliament, no one has questioned the FONDART because it is always good for
a country to have culture, I mean, for its image, it is well-seen. It brought something to the
country. But I would say that the theme on culture has never been among the priority debates
in the last five presidential elections. Culture (…) passed almost in an invisible way. No one
is going to get involved in a discussion for such a tiny part of the budget. Now perhaps
politicians of the right and the left pay a bit more attention to it because they have started to
associate it with entrepreneurship since there is this idea that tourism and culture are
complementary.\(^{74}\)

\(^{72}\) Indeed, the FONDART was positive for the image of Chile in general. Films build the picture of a talented and
open nation, one that also has intellectual credentials and allows citizens to reflect on their own society and even
on its dark past. The fund gave a polished and successful image of Chile abroad. It has received positive feedback
in other countries of Latin America where a similar mechanism does not exist. Therefore, it could be easily
validated by all political parties in Chile.

\(^{73}\) Interview, 20 April 2018.

\(^{74}\) Interview, 05 April 2018.
In that sense, culture was little contentious and could even contribute to preserve national culture and identity, as this was outlined in the previous chapter. Indeed, what is classified as cultural heritage: ancient buildings, monuments, national libraries, or museums is usually the most constitutive and visible aspects of a nation, being its historical and symbolical testimony. For this reason, and as shown by the above quote, the right could even use it at its own advantage. What can be argued as well is that the fund allowed Chile to be seen under a positive light abroad. Films financed by the FONDART such as Chacabuco: memoria del silencio (2001), Machuca (2004), Mi mejor enemigo (2005), En la cama (2005) gained international visibility for being praised or awarded in European film festivals. The export of local artistic commodities or creative industries is one of the key tools through which countries sell their image and reinforce their credibility. Therefore, it made little less sense for the right-wing to oppose the FONDART.

6.3. Culture: an “enclave-free policy area” for centre-left elites

6.3.1. The impact of the Pinochet dictatorship on the Chilean centre-left

As explained previously, the right-wing elites started a process of ideological transformation that was rooted in the struggle against Communism and the necessity to preserve their class privileges. However, they were not the only ones to undergo a political mutation as in parallel, the Pinochet dictatorship and what it implied: exile, repression, party prohibition and censorship had an important impact on left-wing parties and the plans adopted by its leaders in the 1980s. Firstly, the Socialist Party in its initial radical form ceased to exist. On the one hand, as its leaders and militants were either killed, put in prison or expelled from the country, the organisation was greatly weakened. On the other hand, its strong internal dissensions on how to oust Pinochet provoked in 1979 the split of the party in two branches: the democratic and reformist one, defended by Carlos Altamirano, the General Secretary of the Party and the more...

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75 After the end of the Concertación era in 2010, the centre-right administration of Sebastián Piñera expanded the FONDART with new areas of application: design, new media, circus arts and architecture. Four months after taking office, the Minister of Culture Luciano Cruz-Coke evoked the willingness of the government to open a new line of cultural infrastructure development to specifically support the reconstruction of existing cultural spaces as well as one for the conservation and dissemination of cultural heritage.

By the end of the 1980s, the PS eventually completed its transformation as a result of its continued journey ‘towards the centre’ (Angell, 2007:39). In 1987, as the military government lifted the ban on non-Marxist political parties, Ricardo Lagos, who was a leader of the PS, founded the PPD, a party that emerged from the renovated faction of the PS, composed of centre-right personalities who had taken their distance with the old right, people from both the secular tendency and the Christian circles as well as former Communists and Socialists (Picazo Verdejo, 2001:293). The PPD erased most of its leftist stance to instead gather all the people whose priority was to defeat Pinochet at the 1988 referendum. Its creation exemplified the strategy of downplaying ideological dissensions and focusing on the return to democracy. This is what prompted a wide array of political forces to join each other and form the Concertación. Cemented by a common objective, the coalition became a very heterogeneous group that aimed at ending dictatorial rule.

Secondly, the transformation of politicians into social scientists and technocrats had a substantial impact on left-wing sectors. Because many Chilean intellectuals and politicians were excluded from public universities and because their political organisations were closed by the Pinochet regime, they increasingly relied on private foundations and research centres financed by foreign governments (Petras, 1990:102-103). As they integrated these networks, they embraced a resolutely more technocratic approach to social sciences and politics that was accepted by the authoritarian regime for it was ‘carefully formulated in academic terms and presented in an abstract manner’ (Silva, 1991:401-402). In addition, many exiled political leaders had an experience in foreign academia, especially in North American universities where the teaching of the new orthodox economy coincided with an exaltation of democratic and human rights ideals (Garth and Dezalay, 2002). Even among the Chilean left, traditional politics became discredited as the experience of its leaders convinced them that “over-politicising” the debate was dangerous. Overt confrontation and social movements were increasingly considered obsolete and unhelpful. Therefore, the politics of technocracy and expertise was not the monopole of the political right anymore.
The transfer of power from the military to civilians in 1990 consolidated the influence of foreign-trained economists and engineers within state administration (Silva, 2008). Part of the decision of President Aylwin to surround himself with technocrats was due to the politics of agreements and consensus building that shaped the transition. For the rest, Christian Democrats after the end of dictatorship agreed with several aspects of the Chicago doctrine. As argued by Hojman (1990:25), during the Aylwin presidency (1990-1994), ‘many of the free-market policies were recommended by the Christian Democratic economists and other social scientists.’ Consequently, like their counterparts of UDI and RN, numerous politicians of the Concertación eventually adhered to the principle of economic growth and neoliberal governance. Like the right as well, in the early phase of democracy and even after, the coalition’s main concern was reassuring the business actors (Haagh, 2002).

6.3.2. Learning to overcome discrepancies: the fund and the parties of the Concertación

The ideological diversity within the Concertación coalition and the transformation of the left under the pressure of rapid democratisation necessarily implied some policy-making challenges and discrepancies, including in the domain of culture. Although the parties that composed the coalition agreed between themselves on the necessity for Chile to have a cultural policy, several issues created divergences, particularly the choice of bureaucratic structure. According to a former advisor of the Concertación, inside the coalition:

There was never much consensus. Some defended a more traditional vision, with the state having hegemony, a certain control, and a certain capacity for planning culture. Others were more liberal; they thought that culture should be freer and more independent. This tension has always existed.  

The FONDART appeared however as the instrument capable of softening some of the discrepancies within the Concertación, as well as the quickest and more consensual way to fix the damage done by the dictatorship in the area of culture as this was previously said in this thesis. Indeed, the FONDART helped reach a ‘certain consensus in the debate on culture, ‘advance in the conquest of a legitimation of [its]action’ and ‘soothe emerging tensions’ between the Socialists that were in favour of state planning in the area of culture and PPD politicians that defended the idea of a more decentralised institution (Muñoz del Campo, 2011: 76

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76 Interview, 23 April 2018.
90). However, it is also possible to interpret the early implementation of cultural policy as a means to revive the most left-wing sectors of the Concertación that after the re-establishment of democracy did not succeed in regaining the level of influence they used to have before the coup d’état and as a means to find a balance between the different ideological factions of the coalition. As it was clear that the PDC had a major role in the Concertación, for it played a key role in the opposition to Pinochet between 1973 and 1990 (Huneeus, 2003: 121) and for it was at the head of the coalition after the return to democracy, an internal compromise had to be found. The Christian Democrats, although they genuinely agreed on the necessity to implement a national cultural policy were more in a position of “granting” the area of culture to the more marginal left-wing sectors of the coalition for both political and more symbolic reasons. According to an academic and militant of the PDC:

Culture and the FONDART were a way to make amends and ask for forgiveness to left-wing sectors because some sectors of the Christian Democracy – although not all of them – including Patricio Aylwin supported the coup d’état in 1973 against Salvador Allende.77

Culture was an object of reconciliation within the Concertación, thus contributing to consolidate the relationship between the different parties of the coalition. From this moment, the left-wing parties “owned” the area of culture within the coalition as all the key posts in this area were held by personalities coming from the PPD and the PS (see Table below). The coalition’s heterogeneity necessarily had an impact on its consideration for culture but also on its tolerance towards the principle of total creative freedom. As discussed previously, many politicians in the coalition were professional and technical elites characterised by high levels of study (mainly masters and PhDs). This thesis argues that like right-wing elites, some of them were experts in a specific field but were not necessarily sympathetic to the cultural issue. Others even had a conservative background and could be disturbed by the artistic manifestations of the FONDART. According to a former Coordinator of the fund:

The topic of FONDART (…) put in tension even those who believed in freedom of expression. I was a member of the Socialist Party and certain people from [it] called me and asked me how I could support works that called into question Salvador Allende? The topic of censorship is a topic that goes way beyond dictatorship.78

77 Interview, 21 April 2018.
78 Interview, 20 March 2018.
Also, when some of the projects touched issues related to the themes of national identity or the Chilean Army, the coalition was shaken, and discrepancies appeared between different sectors of the coalition, especially in the 1990s and early 2000s. In 2002, the theatre play, Prat led to the protest of the military and right-wing deputies but also provoked an internal dispute in the government between Nivia Palma, the FONDART Coordinator for ten years and a historical figure of the DEC and the then Minister of Education Mariana Aylwin, eventually leading to Palma’s resignation. Cultural policy did create some disturbances within the Concertación, who had yet to decide even twelve years after the re-establishment of democracy whether freedom of speech was unconditional or limited. Nevertheless, the argument made in this chapter is that the debates around the play were an evidence of the progressive rekindling of Chile with democracy, as its elites were learning to combat residual reflexes of the censorship that characterised the Pinochet era. By putting to the test their own openness and tolerance vis à vis creative freedom, the fund taught elites to familiarise with the theme of culture and freedom of speech while allowing a more plural representation of Chilean society and identity. In this case again, it was a learning process for centre-left elites that was not free of tensions. According to a former FONDART Coordinator:

At the internal level, it was complex. When there was the project of the “glass house” for example, someone in La Moneda (Presidential Palace) told me to terminate this project. And I said no way. I have to be honest, this created tension including in the Division of Culture. Not everyone in the Division was buying this story of freedom of speech that the FONDART had. This explains why I had to resign when there was the incident with Prat. It was weeks of tensions, the group of artists received death threats, and Mariana Aylwin [Minister of Education at that time] called me to tell me to stop the play, to prevent it from being premiered, to call the jury and tell them that they had been mistaken. When Aylwin told Claudio Di Girolamo that I should not go to the play, he did not have the courage to tell me. This is the moment when I decided to resign. In that moment, there was not a lot of solidarity in the Division of Culture. There was only support from the team of the FONDART and of course from many Chilean artists.

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79 The debate on Prat generated tensions within the Concertación. Nivia Palma accused the Ministry of Education and Mariana Aylwin in particular of favouring censorship by not allowing her to attend the play’s premiere as a result of the pressures exercised by the right-wing association Corporación 11 de septiembre. Following this argument, Palma resigned. She however attended the premiere of Prat and publicly supported the Theatre Company that won the FONDART and produced the play.

80 Interview, 20 March 2018.
### Table 6.1. Key cultural positions under the Concertación (1992-2010)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NAME</th>
<th>POST</th>
<th>PARTY AFFILIATION</th>
<th>PERIOD</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Eugenio Llona</td>
<td>Chief of Division of Cultural Extension</td>
<td>PS</td>
<td>1992-1993</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marcia Scantleburry</td>
<td>Chief of Division of Cultural Extension</td>
<td>PS</td>
<td>1993-1997</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Claudio Di Girolamo</td>
<td>Chief of Division of Cultural Extension</td>
<td>Civil society (artist)</td>
<td>1997-2003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nivia Palma</td>
<td>Coordinator of FONDART</td>
<td>PS</td>
<td>1993-2002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>María Eliana Arntz</td>
<td>Coordinator of FONDART</td>
<td>PS</td>
<td>2003-2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Claudia Toro</td>
<td>Executive Secretary of FONDART</td>
<td>PS</td>
<td>2006-2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>José Weinstein</td>
<td>Minister of CNCA</td>
<td>PPD</td>
<td>2004-2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paulina Urrutia</td>
<td>Minister of CNCA</td>
<td>Civil society (artist)</td>
<td>2006-2010</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

6.3.3. Out of the range of enclaves: culture as a safe “left-wing” policy area

As explained previously, the FONDART was insignificant for the Chilean right as their principal concern was making sure the economic model was not structurally modified. This lack of interest in cultural policy opened a space for the centre-left which could enjoy more autonomy in this regard and expand its decision-making capacity. Because it was remote from the preoccupations of the military and the Chicago Boys under the Pinochet regime, culture was left “blank” and constituted a breach in which progressive forces could enter after the return to democracy. Although institutions for culture existed under the dictatorship, cultural policy was not formalised enough and consequently, right-wing actors and the military did not impose any policy continuity in this area. This relative programmatic void allowed the Concertación and its cultural advisors to have more leeway in the area of culture. The other
reason why culture was so weakly impacted by solid enclaves is that it was more an object of
debate inside the Concertación rather than between the centre-left and the centre-right parties.

Parliamentary discussions between the Concertación and the opposition happened during
the legislative process that led to the creation the *Consejo Nacional de la Cultura y las Artes*
(CNCA) (Arts Council) in the early 2000s. At that time, the FONDART was already a
legitimate institution and Chile’s main cultural policy. The foundation of the Arts Council only
confirmed the status quo. The right publicly expressed its concern over the *gobierno de turno*
(incumbent government) politicising the Council and having control over creative content.
Nevertheless, this fear already existed among the Concertación, and for this reason the
FONDART was conceived as an institution that had a participatory structure.81 Most of the
right-wing deputies voted in favour of the law that created the CNCA in 2003. Over the years,
cultural policy gave way to a “silent consensus” across the political spectrum and its legitimacy
was not called into question.

As for the Concertación, cultural policy gave it the opportunity to create difference with
their political rivals. Because of the enclaves, polarisation between the right and the left was
considerably reduced. As a result of the “politics of transition” and the transformation of elites
that occurred during the Pinochet years, the Concertación kept the foundations of the Chicago
model. The continuation of the conservative ideology, which was a solid enclave, gave the
impression that little had changed after the end of the Pinochet era. Cultural policy allowed to
pursue a more left-wing agenda in a right-wing political and economic framework inherited
from the dictatorship. With its open structure of application, the creative freedom it guaranteed,
and its new form of decision-making that voluntarily kept political officials at bay, the
FONDART seemed like an instrument that favoured citizenship, which contrasted with the
institutions that existed under Pinochet.

Moreover, the FONDART had a highly symbolic dimension. As this was explained in
Chapter 4, artists were connected to the left under Frei and Allende and were active during the
NO campaign to help the centre-left opposition to the dictatorship. It is important to underline
as well that some artistic figures were victims of the dictatorship. Musician Victor Jara and

81 The FONDART was based on a system of peer-review as artists judged other artists’ work. As such, the
FONDART aimed at giving more decisional power to civil society. Also, the FONDART was open to all Chilean
citizens, regardless of their background and their artistic trajectory.
music band Quilapayún who represent Chilean culture at home and abroad were either killed or exiled. As such, cultural policy was a way to symbolically reconnect with this imagery of the old left and compensate for the right-wing orientation of the Concertación in the economy contributed to situate the Concertación more closely to the traditional left-wing ideology. As argued by a former jury of the FONDART:

The Concertación never was left-wing at the economic level, they were never able to twist the arm of those who held influence in Chile, because they are too powerful. FONDART and the cultural institution [CNCA] was their little hobbyhorse to offset [the influence of] economic groups. The only way that the Concertación had to display its left-wing was through culture.\textsuperscript{75}

What the above quote shows is that between 1990 and 2005, because of the appointed senators, the Concertación did not have the majority in the Senate. This was essential to pass laws that could have reverted the political and economic system shaped under Pinochet (Hartlyn and Valenzuela, 1998:49; Garretón, 2000:74-75). Yet, as it was previously explained, the Concertación underwent a political and intellectual mutation that led many of its members to partly embrace the previous regime’s ideology. Indeed, the coalition’s intellectual evolution ‘exacted major modifications in the political principles’ it held in the 1980s (Petras and Leiva, 1994:55). Some enclaves were consequently related to the centre-left’s lack of political willingness and not only to the pressures exercised by right-wing sectors. For example, between 2000 and May 2002, the Concertación had a majority both in the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate and did not present any project that could have substantially modified Pinochet’s heritage in key policy areas (Portales, 2000:18).

Besides, the quote indirectly shows that in the post-authoritarian context, this identity loss, evidenced by the renunciation of the left-wing ideology in crucial areas was problematic for the image of the coalition and consequently for that of democracy. Yet, because cultural policy was “left-wing connoted”, it gave an impression of breaking with the previous right-wing order. This is particularly true in Latin America where culture is associated with left-wing political protest and the critique of the established order as it is the case with street art (Tarragoni, 2016). Even in periods of neoliberalism, culture can be added on the political agenda, precisely to soften the harsh image of economic austerity. Cultural institutions can be created at the moment when market reforms are introduced, and the budget of the Ministry of Culture can even be increased, in order to favour the image of a progressive and left-wing government (Lang, 2011;
Flores Olea cited in Ejea Mendoza, 2009:23-24). The argument made in this chapter is that under the Concertación, a similar phenomenon happened.

Finally, it is important to underline that even though democracy was back, some fluid enclaves remained. Indeed, Chile, because of its authoritarian and violent past, had to deal with a bad reputation. The argument defended in this chapter is that culture and the arts were some of the means used to create Chile’s democratic identity and increase the perception of elite autonomy. In 1992, the Universal Exposition was held in the Spanish city of Seville, where the Chilean government presented ‘a twenty-eight-foot-tall installation composed of several smaller pieces of iceberg from Chile’s Antarctic territory’ (Korowin, 2010:48). The purity of the iceberg’s whiteness was likely to be a metaphor for a new beginning but could potentially have other interpretations related to memory and transition. Besides, according to Gómez-Barris (2009:2), it was an ‘effort to rehabilitate the country’s international image’. In that sense, art symbolised the regeneration of Chile that was ready to embrace democracy and depart from the austere Pinochet era. The FONDART as the main tool of cultural policy also played this function, especially in the first decade of the Concertación era. This point will be further developed in the following and last chapter of this thesis.

CONCLUSION

This chapter explained how cultural policy emerged as a relatively low-risk area in post-authoritarian Chile. It showed that culture was relatively protected from authoritarian constraints as well as from the military and entrepreneurial sectors who kept holding much power after the end of dictatorship and who were successful in imposing their values and political vision in the country. The right did have its own cultural tastes and codes. Those revolved around fine arts and the preservation of cultural heritage – which is usually the historical and symbolic testimony of the nation – and apolitical television programmes such as sports or farándula (show business). For right-wing politicians, culture as a category of public action was rather associated with leftist propaganda, Marxism and ideological bias. For those sectors who were more concerned by business, growth and investment and in exalting the greatness of Chilean history and its heroes, there was little time to dedicate to the design of a
cultural policy. While they were at times critical of left-wing culture in democracy, branding it as a *nido de marxistas* (Marxist nest) or a waste of public money, they never considered that it was worth fighting against, as it did not threaten neither their position, nor their interests.

However, if cultural policy was not part of the right-wing agenda, it would be partly incorrect to assume that all the centre-left politicians were at ease with the theme of culture and that they all knew how to handle the implementation of cultural policy simply because of their links with the artistic community and the fact that many of its representatives supported the coalition in the NO campaign. In addition, culture and the arts were not devoid of tensions and scandals. However, it is argued that the heated arguments that were provoked by the FONDART were not the mark of an authoritarian regression but rather the sign of Chile’s reconnection with democracy. This chapter made sure to distinguish between the polemics and intra-party disagreements that artistic expression sometimes provokes from authoritarian enclaves that could have blocked democratic legislation in the cultural area. Consequently, the argument made is that the debates around the FONDART did help democracy rather than restrict its exercise. Finally, cultural policy appeared as a relevant domain for Concertación’s elites who could use it to temper the coalition’s own socioeconomic resemblance with the right-wing parties of RN and UDI. Apart from helping the centre-left elites differentiate themselves from right-wing parties, cultural policy also allowed civil society to re-mobilise and re-conquer spaces of expression despite the persistence of authoritarian enclaves in democracy. This is the aspect that will be addressed in the next chapter of this thesis.
CHAPTER 7 – RE-BUILDING A MORE DEMOCRATIC CHILE AFTER PINOCHET: FONDART, MEMORY AND CITIZENSHIP

INTRODUCTION

This last chapter connects the problem of authoritarian persistence with the role of cultural policy between 1990 and 2010 in Chile. It highlights the utility of the FONDART in helping citizens deal with the burden of memory and in favouring citizenship. While the connection between cultural policy, memory and citizenship was already outlined in previous chapters, this one provides a more in-depth empirical analysis of the relationship between these three concepts. Indeed, it shows more in detail why and how cultural policy was one of the means after the re-establishment of a democracy restricted by both solid and fluid enclaves to deal with memory and the emotions related to the past, re-open channels of expression and enhance community development. The chapter is made of three parts that cover the different functions of cultural policy under the twenty years of centre-left administration.

The first part explains why memory was a challenge after the Concertación took power in 1990. Indeed, it shows that the discussion on memory and the possibility to look at the past with critical distance and appeasement was difficult because of the ideological cleavages that made the interpretation of the authoritarian period inevitably conflicting. It further highlights that the challenges surrounding memory were constant throughout the Concertación era and were not limited to the early period that followed transition, namely that of the Aylwin presidency. Initiatives that set transitional justice, noteworthy events and even failures to fully address the issue of human rights violations characterised the two decades of centre-left administration. The closing sub-section focuses on the issue of silence, by first providing a definition of it and then explaining its causes and implications for democracy. The second part of this chapter elaborates on the theme of memory but focuses more on the dimension of emotions, catharsis and transitional justice. It explores how the FONDART played a role in “exhuming the past”, despite all the impediments and tensions that revolved around the topic of memory and the limitations of transitional justice.
The last part deals with the role of cultural policy in developing citizenship. It first explains that after the return to democracy, for part of the population, the country was “clouded” by the negativity inherited from the dictatorship. For those who were opposed to the Pinochet regime, seventeen years of oppression and restrictions of civil liberties had a strong impact on their lives. Underlining the fact that psychological well-being was a key component of democratic reconstruction, it argues that cultural policy could help Chileans by bringing more positivity and colour to their lives as well as a sense of “democratic possibility”. The part further explains that because of the authoritarian regime, a narrow conception of Chilean identity was imposed, limiting the possibility of citizens to mobilise and voice their concerns, claims or critics after the return to democracy. It subsequently argues that cultural policy helped civil society reclaim spaces of expression. Indeed, the FONDART provided a solution to improve freedom of speech by breaking some of the societal taboos of Chilean society and by giving people the possibility to discuss and show cultural diversity. Finally, it shows that the FONDART allowed a more active participation of citizens at a grassroots level by favouring community development in a country where civil society was atomised and demobilised due to years of dictatorship.

7.1. THE CHALLENGE OF MEMORY IN POST-AUTHORITARIAN CHILE

7.1.1. The difficulty of addressing the past after Pinochet

As explained in Chapter 1, Chile exited authoritarianism through a process of negotiations. In a transition that was carried via negotiation and agreements, political elites usually choose the path of compromise and moderation. Moreover, it is often argued that a pacted transition is more likely to create political stability (Karl, 1990; Buxton, 1999; Way, 2014). Although the notion of “stability” often appears in the literature on democratisation, it is not always clear what it means or entails. It seems that the word is an evident synonym for democracy. Nevertheless, the term is more ambiguous and the fact that it is often associated with democracy is questionable. The argument that can be formulated is that stability is found in all kinds of regimes, including in authoritarian ones. If its institutions work well, if its economy is good, and if the country is not in a period of war – at least not officially – even a dictatorship can be deemed “stable”. Therefore, the regime of Pinochet, despite its violations of human rights and oppressive rule, was also characterised by some amount of stability. In the case of a recent
democracy, stability would be defined as the end of arbitrary rule, targeted killings, torture or any kind of large-scale human rights violations.

Yet, the long absence of massive abuse or excessive discretionary power is not enough to ensure democracy. Likewise, this kind of stability is not enough to develop citizenship or solve the thorny issue of memory. The argument made in this sub-section is that democracy also means convincing all the different segments of the population to support the democratic project and not only the elites who negotiated transition. However, in Chile, despite the violence of the regime and its discredit abroad, the acceptance of democracy at the domestic level was not self-evident. Indeed, as this was suggested in the introductory chapter of this thesis, the military regime was not only about the Armed Forces and the powerful businessmen being content with the political order and enjoying the benefits of the new liberal economy; it was also about an important part of the civilian population supporting Pinochet and his achievements (Puryear, 1994: 137).

After the defeat of Pinochet at the 1988 plebiscite and the subsequent election of Patricio Aylwin, Chile was a very divided country. The topic of the military era provoked great polarisation as very antagonistic sentiments were expressed towards Pinochet who was seen as a despot and a protector at the same time (Palacios, 2009). For all these reasons, addressing the past was a complex and risky endeavour. Memory was conflicting and interpreted according to the different ideological positions that existed among the population. For some of the right-wing actors, the military regime could not be defined by its brutality and its human rights violations only. Instead, it was a necessary parenthesis that saved the nation from the hostility and threat emerging from leftist ranks. Indeed, many supporters of Pinochet ‘saw memory and memorialisation as a political tool of the left that ignored their necessary war against communism’ (Sodaro, 2018: 119). As for the victims of the dictatorship and their relatives, the politics of consensus prevented the research for truth and justice, which therefore meant the impunity of those who committed crimes during the Pinochet era. As explained by a member of the Museum of Memory and Human Rights in Santiago de Chile:

From the perspective of the victims, there was a lot of questioning. (…) During the government of Aylwin, we had Pinochet sitting in the Congress and this is an agreement because after all, a dictator cannot be in Congress. The victims of torture or the families of the disappeared could not understand that we had him sitting as Senator. There were other situations that were the
consequence of agreements made with the Armed Forces and this, in the logic of many left-wing groups, did not make sense. That image of having him sitting there is very powerful. It is too much for people who have suffered because of the dictatorship.\footnote{Interview, 13 April 2018.}

The quote is a reference to the early period of democracy in the country, when Pinochet was \textit{senador vitalicio} (Senator for life) which ‘guaranteed him immunity in Chilean courts’ (Alija Fernández, 2018: 270).\footnote{Pinochet was also Commander-in-Chief between 1990 and 1998.} It shows that soon after the end of the military regime, incredulity prevailed among part of the population – the one opposed to Pinochet and who most directly suffered from the violence of his rule (death of relatives, disappearance, torture or exile). The interviewee also unveils the dysfunctions of Chilean democracy by talking about the continuity of the former General in the political and institutional arena. His presence increased the perception that the democratic era bore resemblance with the past, even though the military returned to their barracks and civilian political elites governed the country. As justly argued by Stern (2010:2), ‘the memory question confronting democratic Chileans was personalised in the figure of Pinochet’. More generally, what is implicitly revealed through this quote is that pacted transition is ill-born, marked by a forceful acceptance of decisions that are taken from above and that do not carry the seal of popular or collective will. After the return to democracy, Pinochet embodied the issue of unsettled memory. Yet, there were many other events, successful and failed initiatives in relation to memory and transitional justice that continued to perturb Chilean democracy throughout the 1990s and 2000s. Overall, elites and citizens were continuously the witnesses of an unresolved past. This is what the following sub-section will show.

\textit{7.1.2. Silencing the past in democracy}

Following the return to democracy in 1990, the main axis chosen by the Concertación was the one of reconciliation and consensus (Hiner and Azócar: 47). As this was previously said in this thesis, the outcome of this pacted transition was that the Armed Forces kept some autonomy and the political right gained much legislative weight due to the approval of the authoritarian enclaves. However, this method of consent and compromise, while being a
prudent and peaceful way of rekindling with democracy also implied a denial of the truth and an absence of prosecution. In that sense, most pacted transitions tend to deny the past rather than confront it (Alonso and Muro, 2011). The reason behind this choice was the fear of further dividing the country, re-entering the logic of ideological contention and exacerbating bitterness. While pacted transition was a non-violent process in Chile, since Pinochet was defeated by the ballots, and for it was based on accords decided between former rulers and members of the opposition, it also carried silence and fractional truths that were considered necessary by elites to reach normalcy.

Silence in post-authoritarian regimes is usually associated with ‘unasked, unanswered or unanswerable questions, censorship, disappearance or taboo topics’ and refers to ‘subjects that defy expression such as torture or the legacy of large-scale disappearance’ (Gates-Madsen, 2016:4). After the end of the Pinochet regime, ‘silence prevailed among the governing elite (…) as left leaders resisted proactive stances on coming to terms with the past’ (Hite, 2005: 57). As for the right, it was seeking to push the past towards oblivion (Natzmer, 2002: 162). Silence, however, was not only a top-down decision that elites imposed on society. It was also self-imposed by the victims of the dictatorship and more generally by citizens who kept to themselves the grief related to this dark period of national history. The silence of victims was therefore the consequence of their psychological wounds (Vora, 2012; Fried Amilivia, 2016). Following the return to democracy, “the unsaid” hang over Chile, making it difficult for many Chileans to verbalise the violence that befell them. In accordance with what was theorised in Chapter 3, this silence was one of the most resilient fluid enclaves. As this was argued in this chapter as well, fluid enclaves were pressures that weighed on the new democracy. They were the result of the emotional ordeal caused by the dictatorship rather than the direct consequence of its legislation. Still, silence blocked the discussion of memory and prevented some of the realities and narratives of the past from being revealed, or simply discussed.

7.1.3. Intrusive memory and the hindrances to transitional justice

Although pacted transition usually goes along with an official or self-imposed silence, memory remains visible and present. Regardless of the efforts made to “erase” it, there are always events, incidents, discourses or even institutions that lead to its manifestation. Chile
after Pinochet was no exception. Memory can be both understood as memorialisation, namely, the institutionalised expression of the past (memorials, museums, monuments) and a series of more spontaneous or unexpected incidents that push or force citizens and authorities to face their history. Memory evokes both personal recollections and a collective awareness of events that disturbed or damaged social cohesion. It is both official and unofficial and just like history, is contested and conflicting. Over the twenty years of the Concertación governments, memory resurfaced at different occasions, through initiatives taken by the centre-left coalition and through unforeseen events that showed that dealing with the past was still a pending task. As this will be shown below, the 1990s were the most critical phase in relation to memory and transitional justice. During that decade, the tension was palpable and the Concertación had a duty to make amends for the past while securing national concord.

The election of Aylwin was a clear sign that the issue of human rights violations would start being addressed (Carmody, 2018). Yet, the then President was candid about the fact that the road towards truth and justice would be difficult as he declared that this would happen ‘en la medida de lo posible’ (to the extent possible) (Skaar, 2011; Han, 2012:95). In 1991, the National Commission for Truth and Reconciliation (CNVR) was created under his initiative. A committee carried interviews for a period of nine months with persons having familiar ties with people killed or left missing during dictatorship and issued a 1350-page report listing 2,400 cases (Paley, 2001:127). The CNVR was a very important milestone after almost two decades of state violence. As he announced the results of the Commission on national television, President Aylwin asked for ‘official forgiveness and recognised the responsibility of the state’ (Ross and Lachartre, 2003:22). The CNVR was thus a public acknowledgement of the murders committed under Pinochet and constituted an important moment in the history of Chilean democracy.

However, it had some evident limitations. As this was mentioned in the introduction of this thesis, it was mainly focused on truth, namely, the circumstances that led to persons’ death, but its drafting did not lead to criminal trials for the perpetrators (Freeman, 2006:71). The other limit of the report is that it only named the victims and not the culprits and provided a restrictive definition of victim as it did not investigate the cases of torture (Cleary, 1997: 19-20). A few months later, an event contributed to deviate the attention from the results of the report and discredit the reality of state violence under the military regime. Indeed, the assassination of
UDI senator Jaime Guzmán decreased the scope and importance of the commission and gave an excuse to the right-wing politicians to further question the reality of human rights violations under Pinochet and denounce the violence of extreme-left militants (Hiner, 2009:59).  

In May 1993, an incident with the military sent a warning to the incumbent government that revived the fear of a coup d’État. The Armed Forces paraded around the presidential palace of La Moneda to protest against judicial affairs involving the family of Augusto Pinochet. This episode was called the Boinazo and was a tense moment during the Concertación era. Indeed, it was the sign that democracy was still fragile, and that the recent history was still haunting the country. As affirmed by Barahona de Brito (2003: 186), ‘the Boinazo had its desired effects. For a while, at least, the human rights issue disappeared from the political agenda’ and the ‘Supreme Court became more assiduous in closing cases’. However, in 1998, the arrest of Pinochet in London based on provisions of International law re-opened the debate on the accountability of perpetrators (Michel, 2018). Although British authorities made the decision to release and send him back to Chile due to his illness (Martín-Cabrera, 2011:1), it was clearly a turning point as it showed the progress made in the international prosecution of high-ranked politicians (Davis, 2003). At a national level, it also had a judicial impact as ‘by the end of 2000, Chilean courts had convicted twenty-eight individuals for authoritarian-era human rights violations’ (Hilbink, 2007:178).

Capitalising on the Pinochet case, victims and their families mobilised and asked for more action from the government (Cuadros Garland, 2008:76). This led in 1999 to the creation of the Mesa de Diálogo (The Round Table Dialogue) under the government of Eduardo Frei. This was a ‘series of meetings or conversations between representatives of the Armed Forces, different churches, victims, human rights lawyers as well and historians and psychologists’ whose aim was to collect information on forced disappearances (Borzutzky, 2017:112). However, the information provided by the military remained incomplete or unclear and left those seeking for truth and justice partly frustrated (Aguilar, 2002). In 2004, another initiative was taken in the area of transitional justice. Under the mandate of President Ricardo Lagos, the Valech Commission was organised. It had the same ‘modus operandi’ of the Rettig Commission (Ferrara, 2015:173) but was focused on the investigation of victims of torture and

84 Guzmán was allegedly killed by members of the Frente Patriótico Manuel Rodríguez (FPMR), a Marxist guerrilla organisation.
political imprisonment. The military provided some information on where the disappeared had been buried or thrown (Aguilar, 2002:418). Like the CNVR however, it was about disclosing the identity of victims of torture rather than culprits, and prosecutions were very restricted, since the testimonies and the identity of torturers were classified for a period of fifty years (Borzutzky, 2017).

This sub-section showed that because of the persistence of the heritage of the dictatorship, the discussion of memory and the advance of transitional justice were limited. Despite the different milestones of Chilean democracy: the CNVR, the fall of Pinochet, and the information collected on the victims, the conflict over memory continued over the years. The existence of amnesty laws and the lack of willingness of politicians more concerned about “stability” and consensus than justice were important obstacles. Therefore, citizens who had lived brutal or traumatic personal experiences were left with little possibility to deal with the consequences of the dictatorship. The post-authoritarian period produced ‘suffering, pain, anguish, (…) broken lives’ and ‘silence held in for years’ (Zapata-Sepúlveda, 2015:79). All these negative emotions had to be dealt with in order to help advance democracy, and cultural policy could help at this level. This is what will be discussed in the following part of this chapter.

7.2. CULTURAL POLICY, MEMORY AND THE SHORTCOMINGS OF TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE

7.2.1. Doing emotional catharsis through the FONDART

As argued by Hutchison and Bleiker (2014), emotions are an intrinsic part of the social and political realm. Consequently, feelings and sentiments also matter for democratisation, as this was argued previously in this thesis. Nussbaum (2013:2) argues that ‘public emotions (…) have large-scale consequences for the nation’s progress towards its goal. The aim for Chile was to rebuild democracy and a genuine sense of cohesion, rather than an artificial consensus built by elites. However, in order to fulfil this objective, the issue of emotions had to be taken care of. As this was outlined in Chapter 1, the Pinochet years were marked by a fierce repression of its opponents, mainly left-wing dissidents within political parties, trade unions and labour organisations. The military regime imposed a state a siege, a curfew and forbade any ‘public gathering of more than three individuals’ in order to neutralise protest and resistance
In addition, the militarisation of Chilean society was accompanied by a general sense of fear provoked by the risk of being accused of subversion, treason, simply based on suspicion or political acrimony (Cooper, 2001). Consequently, the authoritarian period was one of both physical persecution and psychological pressure. This information is fundamental to understand the trauma and emotional stress that existed in Chilean society after the end of the military regime.

In a post-conflict or post-authoritarian society, the victims’ healing process and emotional recovery are crucial in order to reconstruct society. However, the character of the Chilean transition prevented citizens from fully expressing their sentiments vis-à-vis the past and deal with all the emotional struggles caused by the military regime. Discussing the past openly was a challenge throughout the years, and this also contributed to degrade the quality of democracy. Since the arrest of Pinochet, it became clear that the consensus was a political elites’ discourse that silenced any opposing view on Chile’s recent history (Richard, 2001:18). Yet, the official discourse was not enough to build a healthy society. Many citizens had few resources to face the mourning and the agony caused by the human rights violations. As this was seen and discussed in Chapter 2, cultural policy can function as an emotional outlet in many cases of trauma or abuse and this is one of the roles it has contributed to fill in post-authoritarian Chile.

In Chile, the FONDART became a method to express the unsaid and the negative emotions related to the authoritarian period. It gave the possibility for artists and citizens to have more freedom of creation. One that was guaranteed by the state and that allowed them to address the past. With the return to democracy, the cultural funds became one of the alternative means to discuss the issue of memory that elites too timidly addressed. One role of the FONDART was to help some Chileans do catharsis. Catharsis is the process of emotional discharge which brings relief to (...) tension (Scheff, 1979:47). It is the idea of purging or releasing bad emotions through performing arts or artistry. Catharsis has been a recurrent pattern in the

85 During the administration of Aylwin, the Law 19.123 was passed on February 3, 1992. It ‘established a monthly reparations pension for the families of the victims of human rights violations or political violence identified in the report of the CNCR’ but these reparations were contentious since the right-wing sectors who saw this as an illegitimate way of getting public money (Lira, 2006:59-63). What can be understood is that the issue was too problematic when addressed by conventional policies or ministries. Indeed, the programme was implemented by the Ministry of Interior.
literature on trauma and arts (Wadeson et al., 1989; Meijer-Degen, 2006; Levine, 2009). Cinema in particular has ‘served as a catharsis for audiences and worked to discredit the past regime’ (Falicov, 2007:65). In Chile, arts in general and the FONDART in particular played a role in helping some citizens handle trauma and frustration while expressing emotions that broke with the consensual and polished narrative that elites promoted or imposed. Three interviewees: a Chilean academic, an employee of the Museum Benjamin Vicuna Mckenna, and a former civil servant of the Department of Studies and Documentation of the CNCA underlined the fact that memory and arts were closely connected to each other:

I think that one of the most recurrent themes in the years of transition was the one of memory. Everywhere, in Chilean films, in painting, in literature, in poetry, in series and even in ads. As a child I was really raised with this and I give a lot of value to historical memory, although I do not know if the next generations will grow up with this. 86

There was in the Book fund a line of memory. In the FONDART, especially in performing arts and visual arts shows, there were certainly many works dealing with memory. Memory is a recurrent theme of artistic creation in Chile in the last twenty years, it is a very strong topic in the country. 87

With the Book Fund and the FONDART, there were many elements of memory. There were themes about dictatorship and post-dictatorship, always in relation to violation of human rights, memory sites etc. Although memory did not exist as a formal line of application, it absolutely existed as a theme. It helped everyone doing catharsis…it was an absolute catharsis.88

As this was argued in Chapter 5, many works financed by the FONDART were about human rights and memory. In that sense, they had for some citizens a cathartic function as it allowed them to confront the past and the anxiety that accompanied democratic transition. Some of these productions had critical and even popular success, which gave them important exposure. According to Andrés Wood, the director of the film Machuca, the cinematographic piece proved to be ‘cathartic’ (Matheou and Wood, 2010).89 The movie partly financed by the FONDART even produced an emotional reaction among some the elites of the Concertación as it had for them the same effect of catharsis, bringing them back to the period, and provoking recollections and identification with the film’s main character (Alamo, 2013). As argued by

86 Interview, 27 April 2018.
87 Interview, 20 April 2018.
88 Interview, 18 March 2018.
89 The film Machuca was released in 2004. It set the story of a friendship between two boys in the pre-Pinochet era, shortly before the coup d’état. One is from the bourgeoisie and the other from the shantytowns. The director pictures throughout the film the polarisation and tensions of the period. The film gained success both at home and abroad.
Martín-Cabrera and Voionmaa (2007), the film allowed a national debate to take place via the newspapers *El Mercurio* that published the comments and critics of readers. The two authors also argue that generally, *Machuca* provoked discussions on the period that preceded the *coup d’état* and the challenges of Chile in the 21st century and underlined the fact that the amount of attention garnered by the film was unprecedented.

Other cinematographic works financed by the FONDART had a similar cathartic function. As pointed to by Traverso (2010:187), the documentary *Estadio Nacional*, financed by FONDART in 2000 ‘dwell in the acting out of trauma by including the testimonies of men and women who survived torture and rape’, immerses the audience in the ‘bodily revelation of the trauma or horror’, and pushes it into ‘working through the traumatic recollections’. As this was outlined in Chapter 5, memory was the essence of the FONDART as it was a testimony of the past, a way of reflecting on the period of the dictatorship, but not only. It was also a flow of expressions and emotions that were unleashed throughout the years and that testified to the need of Chileans to simply reconnect with their past and question their society. This aspect will be further explored in the last part of this chapter.

7.2.2. Unveiling the past from the margins: the role of the FONDART

The previous sub-part highlighted the cathartic effect of culture and the arts financed by the FONDART. In this sub-section, the focus is put on the strategic role of the fund in compensating for the flawed transitional justice and for transiting memory from an alternative channel. As argued by Lessa (2013:24), ‘transition by negotiation is the least conducive to transitional justice as old regime can dictate the terms of transition’ which further impedes democratisation. When authoritarian rule came to end in Chile, some aspects revolving around memory – from judicial prosecutions of perpetrators to the public acknowledgement of violence committed under Pinochet remained unresolved. The politics of agreements that were at the core of the Chilean transition only allowed a partial revelation of the abuses committed under the government of Pinochet. Furthermore, because the topics of human rights and memory were too quarrelsome, it was necessary to pass them through another channel, one that was less contentious. It is important to underlie that the process that led to the CNVR in Chile, unlike what happened in South Africa, was not made public but was short, secretive and most importantly top-down, giving little or no role to civil society (Amstutz, 2005:161).
Consequently, elites controlled and monopolised transitional justice throughout the two decades of the Concertación. Also, as this was explained in the first part of this chapter, institutional means to reveal or denounce what happened under authoritarian rule did exist but were either blocked when trying to go further into the investigation process or delegitimised by some political sectors.

This trend was observed under the governments of Aylwin, Frei and Lagos. Under Bachelet, many problems remained as well. The actions taken by her government between 2006 and 2010 did little to enforce ‘accountability’ (Collins, 2010:96). Indeed, the last President of the Concertación failed ‘to respect the ruling by the Inter-American Court of Human rights that Chile 1978 amnesty law was in violation of international legislation’ (Robben, 2011: 199). However, towards the end of her mandate was inaugurated an important site of memory that exposed the violence of the military period, which was the Museum of Memory and Human Rights of Santiago opened in January 2010. This institution however has been constantly questioned by the right. 90 Overall, the museum was a ‘polarising’ institution even after the end of Bachelet’s mandate and was criticised by ‘high level members of the following centre-right Piñera administration’ (McKinnon, 2014:69). The idea of the museum emerged in 2006-2007, after the constitutional reforms of 2005. Yet, the topic of memory continued to be a strain on Chilean democracy. This had to do with the solid enclaves that were actors of the military regime, complacent elites of the Concertación and the persistence of amnesty laws.

What this shows is that institutional or traditional tools of memory are usually contentious and transitional justice too elite-centric. In such a context, it is important for civil society to have alternative means that can make up for this deficit. As suggested previously, art and culture are an efficient vehicle to express the grief related to a period of dictatorship or violence, showing their cathartic effect. As argued by Waldman (2009:122), ‘in contrast to the politics of memory that privileges amnesia for the sake of public order’, art may function as an alternative means to the elite discourse (that tends to privilege forgetfulness) and is a way to unleash the unsaid that weigh on democracy. Arts have also another purpose, which is exposing the failures, the limits or the inconclusive results of the transitional justice obstructed by solid

90 Interview with member of Museum of Memory and Human Rights, 13 April 2018.
enclaves. As explained by someone who works in the Museum of Human Rights in Santiago de Chile:

With the return to democracy, because of the phenomenon of agreements, justice was delayed and took a long time. There are many artists who put in evidence through their work that justice was not being fulfilled or who tried to reveal certain cases of human rights violations. There is a lot of debt towards society in this regard; the artist takes care of this and expresses it. Artistic work has a function of complaint regarding the fact that things did not advance or show who the torturers were.  

In Chile, the FONDART had a similar role for it punctually helped short-circuit the slowness of transnational justice by letting memory penetrate the public sphere. Presenting memory under the artistic form was less threatening and less disruptive than justice or debate within official instances such as the Parliament or political parties. Besides, in the process of the FONDART application, memory was not necessarily defined or framed as such but passed through a terminology that was very broad, and that was not as politicised as the term “memory” that systematically created tensions and deepened cleavages. Indeed, between 1992 and 2010, i.e. for the whole period studied in this thesis, the FONDART did not have an official memory line. Still, the fund was a channel through which disseminate content on memory, history and human rights violations.

As argued in the previous sub-section, documentaries in particular, contributed to the effort of transitional justice even though they acted at a more symbolic level. As explained by Traverso (2019:590), they ‘systematically embraced Chile’s public memory project, exposing state-sponsored atrocities and their perpetrators, recovering survivors’ memories of loss, suffering and resilience, while continuing to challenge the collective conscience of Chileans’. The FONDART juries could even note in the application process the willingness of some Chileans to reconnect with their history and ‘recover their memory’ (División de Cultura, 2000). Those documentaries relied on tools that were quite similar to those used in transitional justice: investigation, testimonies collection and reconstruction of events through footage of the authoritarian period. Those pieces even compensated the lack of coverage and information

91 Interview, 13 April 2018.
92 From the year 2004, the FONDART stopped financing the cinematographic area but only because a sectorial fund was created: the audio-visual fund. The same happened with the area of music. Yet, this does not mean that the state stopped financing documentaries or fictions dealing with memory. There were simply financed by other funds which system was exactly the same as the FONDART’s since they were also competition-based funds. Besides, the FONDART still complied with its role of memory in the other artistic areas.
on the topic at that time while still being framed as “art” (*El Austral de Temuco*, 2004). Overall, some of the FONDART projects that had memory as their main topic were regularly present in different areas of application and therefore contributed to give visibility to the issue.\(^\text{93}\) Yet, they did so in a way that did not directly threaten political elites or even the accords passed between right-wing and centre-left politicians. According to a former FONDART reviewer and a former recipient and jury who works at the Catholic University of Chile:

There was a cultural hegemony imposed by the Concertación...because of an accord of transition that was very elitist and very favourable to economic groups. In this alliance of Concertación, military and economic groups, there was the idea that talking about dictatorship was not well-seen. The topic of memory has always existed but for the Concertación, talking about the dictatorship was talking about the same thing over and over instead of looking to the future. Memory was not a topic for the elites but for the artists, it is, and it always will be. \(^\text{94}\)

When democracy started, one of the most sinister agreement was that this memory had to be locked in the past, consequently, this FONDART constituted the bridge towards the past, to get back this memory, let’s say, forbidden by the politics of agreements and the post-transition. We had to transit this memory not in a directional way but rather in a curvilinear way to get back – not memory – but heritage for the topic of heritage is one that has always interested the right-wing parties. \(^\text{95}\)

The two quotes discuss the existence of solid enclaves that obstructed memory which were the agreements of the pacted transition and the lack of transitional justice. They also show that for the right-wing parties and the Concertación, memory was a dangerous topic that put them uncomfortable, hence the difficulty for many Chileans to discuss memory. Yet, cultural policy could help bypass these obstacles. The second interviewee in particular explains that the FONDART represented an alternative way of conveying memory. As this was said in the previous chapter, cultural heritage was appreciated and recognised by the Chilean right and was therefore less contentious. While the interviewee focuses indeed on the area of heritage, the whole FONDART could be considered as having the function of transiting memory from

\(^{93}\) Some of the FONDART works on memory were highlighted in Chapter 5. However there are many others in different areas. *Panfletos: Poniendo el grito en el suelo* (Fondart Regional 2003) by the Biblioteca Nacional de Chile; *De victimas a santos: detenidos desaparecidos y ejecutados politicos, proceso de santificacion y sacralizacion de personas y lugares de muerte* (Fondart 2003) by Olivia Macarena López y Esteban Aguayo Sepúlveda (Book) ; *Actores secundarios* (Fondart 2004) by Pachi Bustos and Jorge Leiva (Documentary) ; *La Potencia de la memoria* (Fondart 2004) by Gonzalo Leiva (Book) ; *Fragmento fotográfico: arte, narración y memoria Chile, 1980-1990* (Fondart 2006) by Kena Lorenzini (Photography); *Ex presos politicos y Teatro Aleph: Recuperación de la Memoria para la formación y sanación social* (Fondart 2009) by Teatro Aleph (Theatre).

\(^{94}\) Interview, 25 April 2018.

\(^{95}\) Interview, 13 April 2018.
the margins, for culture is less contentious than other domains of policy. Consequently, it was easier for citizens and artists to seize this instrument to send messages related to the past, criticise the lack of transitional justice or unveil its flaws.

7.3. **Enhancing Citizenship in a Context of Enclaves: Emotional Well-being, Cultural Identity and Community Development**

7.3.1. *The light after darkness: cultural policy and positivity after Pinochet*

What was highlighted in the previous sub-sections is that cultural policy could help circulate the untold memory when transitional justice was too limited. Indeed, the sole evocation of the past provoked political tensions among the political class and society. The right-wing actors were strongly opposed to any institutional tool or discussion that would condemn the authoritarian era. In this context of solid enclaves, the FONDART was therefore one of the available means to “save” memory, to prevent it from being thrown into oblivion or being “buried” under the official discourse of elites. In that sense, the fund helped bypass the silence and denial imposed by the agreements made during the transition. As shown previously as well, the fact of discussing the past via the FONDART acted as a method of catharsis for some Chileans. Emotions were thus clearly at stake in the Chilean process of democratisation. While the precedent part showed the importance for some Chileans to release the tension of the past, this sub-section deals more with the positivity that cultural policy brought through the FONDART. Despite the democratic election of President Aylwin, there was still anxiety and insecurity for part of the Chilean citizens who were opposed to the dictatorship. This negative feeling was mostly present in the first eight years of the democracy when Pinochet was still senator and when the impunity of perpetrators was complete.

The argument made in this sub-part is that after the return to democracy, for some there was a sentiment of gloominess that still lingered. Indeed, during the authoritarian era, Chile was literally plunged into darkness as ‘nocturnal curfew’ prevented Chileans from going out at night (Preda, 2017:311). As argued by Bruey (2018:59), the pattern of obscurity appears in the stories told by the victims for whom the night stands for ‘fear and insecurity’; and is explained by the
fact that ‘the regime imposed night-time curfews (…) to monopolise the dark and the opportunities for dominance and impunity it provided’. The existing literature that discusses democratisation also associates authoritarianism with a dimness (Guo and Stradiotto, 2014), ‘gloom and stagnation’ (Lindberg, 2006:52) felt by for part of the population. As recalled by a Chilean academic, there was indeed a feeling of obscurity and anxiety under Pinochet:

I personally have images of myself being very little in the times of dictatorship when all adults were very sad and spoke in a very low voice, with no light at night, and hearing gunshots. For me, the dictatorship was grey and red, like blood.

In Chile, the dictatorship caused suicide among exiles and depression among those who remained in the country (Wright, 2007:69), further showing the psychological struggles and the obscurity in which some people continued to live. The argument is that the period of dictatorship contributed to create an atmosphere of darkness that despite the return to democracy was still present in the psyche of some Chileans. As this was theorised in Chapter 3, this emotional greyness and absence of light in the early post-authoritarian era were fluid enclaves.

Based on this reasoning, it is possible to argue that the left-wing militants and the organised opposition to Pinochet were aware of this emotional and symbolic reality. An evidence of this is the way the NO campaign was designed. Indeed, as this was argued in Chapter 4, the coalition used the pattern of the arts for their propaganda. The slogan and song of the spot, *La alegría ya viene* (Joy is coming), worked as a contrast to the period of fear and darkness that prevailed during the military regime. Furthermore, the spot was quite dynamic, playful and musical as opposed to the one of the military regime that was very austere, static but also very negative as it focused on the violence and chaos that could happen if Pinochet left power. The Concertación included culture and the arts as part of the “democratic visuals” and contributed to manufacture this image of happiness and contentment of a country that looked forward instead of backward. Liveliness and colourfulness could already be seen in the Concertación’s emblem. The coalition was represented by a rainbow that symbolised positivity and gave the impression that Chile would soon become a pleasant place to live (Moruno, 2015). The iconography of the rainbow also represented clarity ‘after the storm’ and conveyed a message of hopeful ingenuity
Moreover, during the campaign against Pinochet, the event Chile crea that was already discussed in Chapter 4, also had this function of purging negative emotions or bringing on optimism through the arts. Later, after the victory of the NO at the plebiscite, Aylwin continued his electoral campaign by using the theme of happiness (Sigmund, 1993).

Despite the defeat of Pinochet, for some the hardship continued, accompanied by a feeling of melancholy and insecurity as they saw even within democracy, an impossibility to reach normalisation (Martín-Cabrera, 2011:11). In the early years of the Concertación, the anxiety was indeed justified as there was no guarantee yet that democracy would be a permanent state. There was even the possibility that the Armed Forces might resort to violence again, as this was shown by the Boinazo. For this reason, one of the fluid enclaves present after the end of dictatorship was fear. Indeed, many Chileans were ‘changed, disillusioned, physically or psychologically broken’ (Passmore, 2016). Also, fear continued to haunt in democracy those who lived under harsh conditions under Pinochet (Barbera, 2009). As explained by a Chilean academic, this feeling of uncertainty was very strongly felt by part of the Chileans.

I think that I would call transition the period that starts with democracy between 1990s and 2000s. At first, a feeling of uncertainty and concern prevailed for about how to install and affirm democracy. Pinochet was still there as Commander-in-Chief of the Army and the military structure pervaded many institutions. There was uncertainty about the possibly of creating a free society and if there could be justice after all the human right violations.97

The argument made in this part is that cultural policy could support democratisation by helping some Chileans combat their undesirable emotions. In situations of emotional oppression and stress, cultural policy can have a positive role. According to El Maarouf (2013:73), arts become tools of counter-terror to reunite people after the sadness and fright caused by political violence or punctual brutality exercised by isolated actors such as terrorists. In that sense, cultural policy inaugurates a time where relief and cheerfulness come after dreariness and austerity. In Chile, for some citizens, cultural policy via the FONDART helped attenuate the darkness and anxiety felt after dictatorship while it played a role in soothing the tension of post-transition. According to the testimony of a Chilean academic who also experienced exile:

96 The anthem used in the spot had the following lyrics: ‘porque nace el arcoíris después de la tempestad’ (because the rainbow is born after the storm).
97 Interview, 27 April 2018.
We had to look for a place to do catharsis and culture is a place for doing so. It is not only about political repression but also about sensorial repression. All the memories I have had of the Chile of the 1980s were in black and white, and [after dictatorship] suddenly, colour appeared. The FONDART despite all its flaws brought us colours. The official reason for creating cultural policy was the reopening of the country’s cultural channels but one of the unofficial reasons was to have spaces for memory. In the first years especially under Aylwin, the possibility of an authoritarian return was not a joke. Before Manuel Contreras was convicted [former chief of the DINA, the police of the military regime], there were very tense moments. I remember very well, the fear we had, and more strongly, we had doubt. The world of culture maintained memory present.

This quote shows the sentiment of fear that was felt even after dictatorship. It confirms the impact of the Pinochet regime on part of the population’s emotional state and the idea of light after darkness. While the interviewee mentions the capacity of culture and the arts to bring brightness after a period of gloom, it also encompasses other aspects mentioned in this chapter. Indeed, he evokes catharsis and the capacity of cultural policy to act as a way of discussing memory. What is explicit in the quote as well is that cultural policy was an unofficial way of preserving and dealing with memory as the elites never presented the role of the FONDART in such terms. Instead, some citizens had to take this initiative themselves. Overall, the quote covers the different aspects of fluid enclaves: the frustration accumulated during dictatorship, the silence that impeded the disclosure of the past and the absence of colour inherited from the authoritarian era. A FONDART recipient also recalls the positivity and the pleasure that surrounded the creation of the FONDART in the early 1990s. Another interviewee proposed a more nuanced explanation and evoked the fact that happiness came from the fact that under Pinochet, there was no such tool of cultural funding. According to them:

At the beginning, it was impressive. There was a government that for the first time after years of complete obscurantism allowed funding for avant-garde artists, above all. For them, the FONDART was very important and very much loved.

The FONDART created an institution that before did not exist, with all the good things and bad things that this implies. I would put this in parallel with the fact that in the early 1990s a democracy is built, which did not exist before. I would say that [the FONDART] brought good things, but also it showed a bureaucratised form of life that followed the canons and criteria of the “project”.

98 Contreras was convicted in November 1993.
99 Interview, 21 April 2018.
100 Interview, 10 April 2018.
101 Interview with Chilean academic, 27 April 2018.
What is emphasised in the first quote as well is the idea of darkness associated to the period of the Pinochet dictatorship. The word ‘obscurantism’ that the interviewee uses goes back to the concept of “cultural blackout” already referenced and discussed in Chapter 4. For many artists, the creation of the FONDART brought much enthusiasm after seventeen years of cultural void and darkness. It consequently allowed the artists that faced censorship and violence to reconnect with something positive and joyful. The interviewee mentions avant-gardist art, which is also another contrast to the classicism and austerity of the Pinochet regime that was barely interested in this topic. Indeed, at that time, experimental and imaginative art was only possible at the under-ground and clandestine level. If the FONDART brought joy and relief to part of the population, it also had an important function which was the re-mobilisation of civil society through the possibility to question, criticise or contribute to the Chilean identity. This is the issue that will be discussed in the following sub-part. The last quote shows that the happiness came from the fact that the FONDART filled a void, and this satisfied the artists but to some extent only, as the positive aspects of the FONDART came with a burden of administrative requirements and much pressure to design art according to the technical rules of the competition, which was discussed in Chapter 5 already.

7.3.2. Discussing cultural identity and society via the FONDART

Chile under Pinochet was conceived as a nation built upon myths and ideas of heroism, bravery, patriotism, and Christianity (Cuevas Valenzuela, 2014). More generally, the military regime led to the deep penetration of liberal-conservative values within society and institutions, making the existence of other political models less legitimate. After the end of the authoritarian era, Chile’s national identity continued to be conservative and rigid. Indeed, the country’s legislation barely allowed progressive policies on societal issues such as family, gender, divorce or sexual orientation. As civilians elites were taking political and administrative control of the state in 1990, the possibility to voice divergent views on society continued to be met with little enthusiasm by representatives of both centre-right and centre-
left parties or could even be sanctioned by laws inherited from the military regime. Until 2001, Chileans could be prosecuted based on the Article n°6 of the Penal Code for publicly insulting or offending high authorities such as the President of the Republic, Ministers, Senators and Deputies (Mason, 2012: 374-375). Moreover, Chile was characterised by a limited pluralism as the media conglomerate COPESA had the quasi-monopoly of mainstream newspapers while the alternative press went to bankruptcy for the Concertación, sticking to market logic, did not intervene to prevent its financial demise (Bresnahan, 2003: 39-49). The situation of the national press and the ongoing criminalisation of dissenting expressions under democracy decreased the possibilities to provide another image of Chile or to question more openly its society and politics.

Therefore, solid enclaves continued to strongly limit or prevent citizens from claiming more emancipatory forms of expression and adopting stances that defied or criticised state institutions. Moreover, as this was discussed previously, after the re-establishment of democracy, fluid enclaves were still present and were also ‘habits of self-censorship (…) fostered by fears of political instability’ that continued to oppress citizens and reduce their public expression (Stern, 2010:223). In this context of restricted liberties and moral tensions, the FONDART constituted a tool to shed light on matters that were bubbling in Chilean society but had very limited legal and political existence or weak social legitimacy. The fund highlighted the multiple dimensions that constituted Chilean identity, calling into question the country’s ethical and political uniformity. According to a former Coordinator of the FONDART:

Every year the FONDART was a scandal as El Mercurio, La Segunda and La Tercera would say back then. It was very curious. We were permanently on the front page of the media. The FONDART succeeded in giving a space to creadores, in order to put in discussion many topics the topic of sexual diversity, the idea of being a mestizo country. In the period of transition – we need to remember – Pinochet was still Commander in Chief of the Armies, that after that, he was appointed senator, that the Armed Forces were still intact, that there were no trials for those who had violated human rights, that there was a civil-military tension. In that period, the FONDART played a role so the debate could be held, and things expressed.

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104 This was known in Chile as the desacato law (contempt law), which was mostly repealed in 2001 under the presidency of Ricardo Lagos.
105 COPESA is a major media conglomerate in Chile and is headed by the Chicago Boy Alvaro Saieh, who occupied a position at the Central Bank under the era of Pinochet.
106 Cultural producers.
107 Mestizo in Spanish means racially mixed.
Consequently, some of the FONDART projects attacked the ideological foundations and the persistence of authoritarianism in a less frontal way, challenging long-established social and political realities by using the less dangerous weapon of the arts. At the same time, it helped re-position Chile’s civil society in a pluralist framework as the debates it stirred were also part of the democratic practice. The FONDART through some of its polemical art pieces directly clashed with the position that right-wing parties have had on the issues mentioned in the previous quote. The FONDART vexed the most conservative segments of Chile and displayed an offbeat image of society but in a way that did not violate Chilean laws. This phenomenon was recalled by a cultural manager and FONDART jury who selected a controversial project in 1994:

I was a FONDART jury in the literature era. I got a project called anthology of gay stories. I approved the project as it had literary quality. It was a scandal. It came out on the cover page of La Segunda: “FONDART funds gay project”. They interviewed me, and I said; “I approved this project because I looked at the literary quality, not at the sex or the non-sex of the author’s project or the other authors who were part of the anthology. This is the fight: that is what the FONDART did, it opened the door to art and diversity. After, there was the “Machali phallus”, a sculpture that had the shape of male genitals. Scandal! How is that possible? said the right-wing press back then (…). How is it possible? And with public money! Afterwards, the gay Simón Bolívar\textsuperscript{109}, then the glass house\textsuperscript{110}. The FONDART was plagued with scandals but what a blessing! It allowed to educate this society and to show that we were supporting art creation without distinction, without prejudice without anything. This is the job that the FONDART has done.\textsuperscript{111}

Soon after its implementation, the FONDART was used by numerous citizens – mostly artists – to express dissonant voices in a country locked by authoritarian enclaves. Indeed, the fund helped Chileans re-gain their voice after years of silence imposed by the dictatorship. This was an essential part of citizenship as it showed that part of civil society could mobilise again through artistic expression. The FONDART provided opportunities for citizens to be heard, to express themselves freely and in a way that contrasted with or challenged the dominant ideology. In the context of authoritarian enclaves, cultural policy became allowed to circulate

\textsuperscript{109} FONDART project executed in 1994 in which appeared the historical figure of Simón Bolívar painted with feminine traits. It stirred a diplomatic incident with Venezuelan authorities.

\textsuperscript{110} FONDART project carried in 2000. It was based on an experiment involving a young woman living in a glass house, exposing her daily life and intimacy. It is one of the most famous “FONDART scandal” in Chile.

\textsuperscript{111} Interview, 22 March 2018.
alternative content and favour representations or views within Chilean society that were bold
and discrepant. What is argued is that the FONDART, via the projects it funded, contributed
to open new debates, and give coverage to issues that were not openly discussed during but
also prior to the dictatorship.

After the end of authoritarian rule, Chile continued to have a very morally regulated society
that limited the emergence of more daring initiatives and permissive ideologies. As political
parties and media constituted the acme of institutionalism, cultural policy introduced a new
idea of citizenship. In the sterilised environment of transition politics and right-wing vigilance,
the FONDART appeared as a democratic “anomaly” capable of reflecting some of the trends
and aspirations that existed within society but that official instances refused to or could not
represent. In that sense, the FONDART was a bulwark against the conformism of political
elites and the pacted transition. The FONDART in the 1990s had an “anti-establishment” image
and a libertarian character for it provoked noise and dissonance in a society that had been
dominated by repression and conventionalism. As analysed by a former FONDART winner:

When the fund started in the 1990s, it represented the emerging culture. FONDART was new
content, new media, it was meritocratic, it had political prestige and political capital. It was
irreverent in terms of freedom of speech because it contributed to it after having a very
repressed country. With the FONDART started to appear theatre plays that were completely
punk, companies that were completely crazy. It had a rebel spirit.  

Likewise, the FONDART was a way of criticising right-wing parties, their ‘puritanism and
double standards’ and a way to defy censorship (La Epoca, 1994). The fund stood for liberty
and irreverence while politicians of the right and the Concertación dedicated themselves to
provide an artificially consensual image of Chile, concealing the tensions and gaps of society
under the narrative of a smooth transition and an economically successful country. It helped
the artists crack this excessively slick and conventional picture. It allowed them to emancipate
themselves from the excessive conservatism that the military regime had imposed as a sole
ideology and that some of the centre-left elites had embraced as well, as this was explained in
Chapter 6. As explained by a former FONDART coordinator:

[FONDART] put in tension many topics such as authoritarianism and the ideological control
of part of the media. The artists in the good sense of the term untied themselves. In all fields,

112 Interview, 05 April 2018.
in theatre, in visual arts, in cinema and literature, very controversial works were created. Very controversial ones. The records of that time are very interesting from the artistic point of view but also in terms of the debate that it has provoked within the Chilean society. It put in discussion many dimensions that today are obvious, but that were not so obvious at that time.113

The unconventional character of the FONDART was explained by the fact that it was a brand-new institution mainly piloted by artists. In the 1990s, the Division of Cultural Extension of the MINEDUC that managed the FONDART was a small organ, with some reduced personnel and a quite informal character, which meant that its civil servants had more leeway and more room for creativity. Also, during the same decade, the DEC was led by Claudio Di Girolamo, an artist who although being a left-wing sympathiser did not come from partisan or institutional politics and whose initiatives while he was the Chief of the Division mainly consisted in linking culture and the arts to citizenship. This situation explains why some actors of cultural policy consider the 1990s version of FONDART as a “handcrafted” fund. Although it was implemented by the Concertación administration, it turned out to be an institution that was critical of the still influential right-wing actors and capable of keeping a degree of autonomy from the centre-left political class. Consequently, the FONDART with its low hierarchy level and its significant involvement of artists in the decision-making process induced more audacity in artistic and citizen manifestations.

Besides, the FONDART introduced the theme of cultural diversity in the country. The process of state construction in Chile and the official discourse that prevailed over the 19th and 20th century were both based on the forced assimilation of all the land’s inhabitants. Indeed, all individuals living on the territory were assigned to the Chilean identity, leaving less room for the acknowledgement of native peoples’ specificity for example. The indigenous population of Chile amounts to 8.8% of the national population, having one of the highest rates within the OECD countries, only surpassed by Mexico and Australia (OECD, 2017:107).114 Yet, as opposed to some of its regional neighbours that ‘embraced the history and inheritance of pre-Hispanic peoples, Chile’s national narrative emphasised the civilising influence of the settler’ (Carter, 2010:62).

113 Interview, 20 March 2018.
114 In Latin America however, Chile is surpassed by Peru (30%) in terms of indigenous population rate, while in Bolivia, it is estimated at around half of the population.
Under Pinochet, homogenisation was encouraged through policies and measures that pushed towards forced assimilation or led to the weakening of the indigenous identity (Wolfram Heise, 2001; Sarat, 2011). Consequently, Chilean identity was mostly promoted as a standardised and western-influenced one that hardly recognised the indigenous heritage of the country and its ethnical or cultural diversity. Consequently, a theme such as indigenous culture and rights was still a rarity in Chile. After the return to democracy, the right-wing deputies opposed in Parliament the constitutional recognition of indigenous peoples, as they feared that the integrity of Chile as an undivided nation would be jeopardised (García, 2014: 130-131; Fuentes and De Cea, 2017:10-11). Until this day, the Chilean Constitution still does not recognize the distinct political and cultural identities of indigenous peoples within the country (Breidlid, 2013:173).

As such, the FONDART played an important symbolic contribution. Indeed, it showed the existence of another Chile, one that is more concerned about indigenous customs and regionalism than before, thus attenuating the colonial Spain-influenced, centralised and elitist image of Chile that was reinforced during the Pinochet era. As this was seen in Chapter 5, there were some clear efforts made regarding the recognition of local and indigenous culture since the creation of the fund in 1992, through the lines of application and the establishment of the Regional FONDART in 1998. In the 2000s, The FONDART did give some visibility to native peoples with the creation in 2004 of the “indigenous culture” line. Some of the juries interviewed for this research acknowledged that there was always an interest in encouraging initiatives that involved indigenous peoples. According to them, there was a progressive awareness about what is called today “minorities” as the FONDART did try to take this issue more into account. Yet, it was not without difficulties and challenges. As revealed by a former FONDART coordinator, the fact that the Concertación elites were centre-left did not make the issue of indigenous peoples more evident for them but the FONDART did help some of them to be more aware of its importance:

I learned more about the topic of indigenous peoples. That was something very strong for me. The thing is that we – the Chilean left – I mean in our history, this topic never really existed, not even in the programme of Salvador Allende. I say it and I am super Allendista 115 but it is good to be honest about it. The Chilean left did not have this in its ideological matrix, not even at the time of dictatorship. For me, the FONDART was an eye-opener and it helped me understand many things and the fact that Chile a has a deep diversity. Even the left had bought the vision of 19th century Chile: that of the unitary and homogenous Chile.

115 Allendista: pro-Salvador Allende.
The growing visibility of the indigenous peoples issue after the end of dictatorship was also part of the process of democratisation. It challenged and deconstructed a belief that was well entrenched in right-wing parties’ ideology but also in part of the left-wing sectors; the one that the Chilean nation was mostly the product of the 19th century aristocracy’s vision, as this was explained in Chapter 4. Cultural policy, at its level, compensated for the general legislation that was not always favourable to the indigenous peoples. As this was said earlier in this thesis, there was much clash with business interests when it came to the protection of indigenous peoples’ lands. The issue of native people’s recognition and rights provoked permanent tension in Chile. In addition, the government still resorted to the legislation of the military regime to undermine native peoples. Even in the last phase of the Concertación era, President Bachelet kept using the Antiterrorist Law and the Security of National Law implemented under Pinochet, which allowed to resort to police violence and criminalize Mapuche actions (Donoso, 2010:234). Nevertheless, cultural policy was a way of promoting cultural diversity despite the persistence of enclaves and the obstacles to a more pro-indigenous legislation. Two former FONDART coordinators discuss the topic of indigenous peoples and while having different visions on the issue do acknowledge that the return of democracy was an occasion to put the indigenous peoples issue on the agenda.

The fund played a very important role in the cultural transition of democracy. It was the first organ to create a specific area for native peoples’ projects. In that sense, I think that the fund contributed to their recognition. Then there was the creation of the regional FONDART, recognising the cultural diversity that existed throughout the territory. We introduced the notion of popular culture that was not even a topic of discussion within universities. I really think that the FONDART was an important instrument for democracy.

A line that promoted material and immaterial heritage and that financed initiatives for indigenous peoples did exist, but if you ask me if there was the funding of a critical mass of projects that were significant and that led to a strategy to make the indigenous peoples more visible, I think that this was little the case. Some efforts were made though, as the Council of the CONADI had to agree on the rules of the [FONDART] competition; CONADI and FONDART did work together, but the law did not give them authorisation to allocate the fund, only to define the rules of the competition. I think that all this was symbolic more than giving the possibility of generating a significant change in the scheme of cultural production. Obviously, you cannot compare the indigenous peoples lines with other areas of application like theatre or cinema.

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116 Native populations in Chile.
117 Interview, 20 March 2018.
118 Interview, 23 March 2018.
The first interviewee gives more credit to the FONDART in favouring the recognition of the indigenous peoples in Chile while the second one is more critical. Although the second interviewee does acknowledge the limits of the FONDART in helping the native peoples, she also says something important with regards to the efforts made with the CONADI to push for the indigenous peoples agenda and about the fact that the FONDART had a symbolic role in the native peoples’ recognition. As already argued in this thesis, both the institutional and the symbolic dimensions matter for democracy and cultural policy can be used at both levels. Overall, what can be argued is that in the decade of the 1990s, the FONDART played a role in loosening the strains that persisted in the country, those that had to do with freedom and speech and identity. Despite the authoritarian enclaves, the fund provided a venue for allowing some Chileans to release all the frustration and censored feelings or opinions that they had kept for many years.

The FONDART as a state institution was nonetheless able to confront – although at a smaller level than other policies – the state and its rigidity, as well as the unfairness of certain Chilean laws in the 1990s, and this was very important during this decade of democratic insecurity and uncertainty. As Chile was entering the 21st century, it is true that the FONDART gradually lost its “avant-garde” character for it became more institutionalised and routinised in the 2000s, mostly because of the phenomenon of bureaucratisation, as this was analysed in Chapter 5. However, it would be wrong to assume that the FONDART only had a role in the process of democratisation in the 1990s. As said in Chapter 3 of this thesis, cultural policy in a democracy of enclaves has a long-term role. Moreover, other dimensions of citizenship such as social inclusion and community development were continuously promoted throughout the years, until the last mandate of the Concertación and beyond. This is the aspect that will be examined in the last sub-section of this chapter.

7.3.3. The FONDART: social inclusion and community development

Under Pinochet, state violence was used in a systematic way to avoid upheavals and revolt. The authoritarian regime also completely reshaped the country’s social and economic structures with the objective of further demobilising society. The model implemented from the
early years of the military regime caused an important weakening of Chilean civil society. As the state ceased to be an actor in the resolution of social conflicts, in accordance with the market logic, this became the responsibility of individual actors who would rely on personal efforts and struggles to fix the dysfunctions of society that used to be sorted out through collective action (Contreras Osorio, 2007). This model implemented by the Chicago economists also had the consequence of further undermining vulnerable groups of the population such as the native communities present on the territory since the pre-Columbian era as the state regularly conceded their land to private companies (Scholsberg and Carruthers, 2010). Overall, the authoritarian regime caused the disarticulation of popular sectors, grassroots organisations, and associations due to repression, and the fear that destroyed or hindered community development (Collier and Handlin, 2009; Barbera, 2009).

After the electoral victory of the Concertación, the coalition partly thought that the guarantee of having an efficient and serene democracy lied in a demobilised and consumerist population as well as in a ‘weak associational life’, even though this paradoxically represented a risk for the development of citizenship (Pearce, 2004:113-114). The model of society implemented by the centre-left coalition was consequently in line with Pinochet’s era of harsh capitalism as it was focused on ‘individualism rather than on political mobilisation and solidarity’ (DiGiovanni, 2019:54). In a country where democratic transition was mainly carried by elites, and in which political parties were almost the sole vehicle through which express social demands and influence political action (Couffignal, 2011), civil society consequently remained atrophied under the Concertación. In this context of restriction of civil society, it was important to find alternative tools to reduce the nocuous effects of the Pinochet era and to counter-balance the fact that neoliberalism was an almost untouchable solid enclave under democracy.

Even before the creation of the CNCA and the official creation of the FONDART in 2003, the Chilean state authorities were dedicated to the promotion of citizenship via cultural policy. They indeed focused on the promotion of artistic creation within the municipalities and remote territories and insisted on the fact that arts should be taken out of elitism (División de Cultura, 2001). As this was suggested in Chapter 5, under the Concertación, culture and the arts were inevitably connected to social welfare, although this tendency clashed with the bureaucracy of the fund and the objective of promoting artistic excellence. It concretely meant that the FONDART and cultural policy in general had the role of helping society. Indeed, the
government clearly recommended that culture be oriented towards most marginalised sectors such as young people, rural populations and the elderly, but also towards those who lived in particularly harsh conditions, confronted with criminality and drug trafficking (División de Cultura, 2001). Cultural policy helped re-build social cohesion through the participation of usually excluded groups into society, by enhancing community development or giving citizens the opportunity to escape their difficult life conditions. The line “cultural infrastructure” for example, although initially meant for providing material for artists also went in this direction. According to an academic that acted as a FONDART jury in the mid-2000s:

[The line infrastructure] is not only about people linked to culture but also people from the social world. This is about citizen participation. In a small village of let’s say 20 000 inhabitants, a local football club can mobilise and ask money to the FONDART, not only to make jerseys but also to entertain the people in town. It is possible to do social football, organise festivals; in fact, it is about citizens that commit to their community. When I was a jury, there were things like centres for mothers, neighbours and friends’ gatherings, dance and theatre groups. It was a system of integration. ¹¹⁹

The quote brings into light the social aspect of the FONDART already outlined in Chapter 5. The area of cultural infrastructure was developed in the mid-2000s, but in fact, it further extended the logic of culture and the arts at the service of citizenship that already existed since the implementation of the fund. The quote puts into evidence the principle of arts for the community, for creating bonds between citizens and contributing to make their neighbourhood or the urban space they live in more lively and its people more connected to each other. This was very important in Chile considering that the social tissue was severely damaged under dictatorship and needed to be re-constructed under democracy. What can be understood is that under the Concertación, cultural policy was construed as a combination of rights that were at the intersection of the social and the artistic realm. It sought to have people involved in the community through artistic creation or organisation. For this reason, the FONDART supported projects that helped segments of society that were underprivileged, especially since Chile in general and Santiago in particular have been marred by socio-economic disparities and class discrimination. One former FONDART jury that participated in the selection of tales written by children provides an example of how cultural policy in the country enhanced social participation and integration:

¹¹⁹ Interview, 13 April 2018.
Santiago is a city that is very socially and culturally stratified. Geography accounts for social and cultural capital. It was interesting to realise that the FONDART was given to people coming from Cerro Navia. Cerro Navia is the poor part of the city. And you realised by the content, that the things that worried those children had to do with their reality, they did not invent. It was about their social reality, about poverty, criminality, drugs. They made stories on what that hurt them or surprised them. Some of them even asked if they could read their tales publicly in the presence of the Mayor and the people that lived in the town. This is also participation. Citizen participation. What I think is that the FONDART gave spaces of public expression and allowed more people to have a voice.

What should be underlined is that cultural policy, social cohesion, and participation are related to each other and overlap. According to Jeannotte (2000:100-103), culture and the arts do have a clear function ‘in building cohesive and sustainable societies’ as cultural policy considers participation as ‘active involvement in the creative process’ while social cohesion frames it as ‘volunteerism in the life of the community’. The FONDART clearly had the same purpose. Initiatives analogous to the ones described by the interviewees were regularly financed by the FONDART. Indeed, over the years, the fund financed projects such as school workshops located in poor towns or geographical areas. Similarly, it gave money to artistic ventures that contributed to the rehabilitation of teenage convicts or that had for them a therapeutic function. It also supported projects that had a more associative nature such as organisations that worked for disabled people or ventures that had blind and deaf children involved in art activities. Other initiatives included theatrical improvisation open to everyone, cultural participation for neighbours and families to strengthen municipal activities or artistic workshops for children in situation of social vulnerability. Overall, the FONDART favoured types of cultural manifestations that generated local audiences and pushed citizens to be active within their town or neighbourhood. In that sense, it had to a certain extent, a capacity for encouraging the creation of grassroots movements.

Finally, one more important aspect that connected cultural policy to citizenship in Chile was the application form of the FONDART. Although the fund was initially conceived for artistic development, applicants were increasingly asked via the rules and regulations of the competition to connect their arts with society, i.e., to reflect on the positive impact that their project would have on the community. Indeed, the FONDART application system gradually

120 Interview, 26 March 2018.
121 In 2009 for example, the Agrupación de Folcloristas de la provincia de Quillota executed a FONDART project to teach deaf children to dance the cueca. Very recently, in 2017 and 2018, the FONDART continued to finance similar initiatives.
imposed the notions of social responsibility and social retribution by asking winners to “give back” a little of what they had received through taxpayers’ money. In the early 2000s, the idea to generate a “plan of diffusion” for each FONDART application started to emerge. In that sense, the competition was not only about the content anymore but also about the social utility of the art works.

Candidates were gradually asked to present a plan of development that explained the relevance of their work and were encouraged to share their art piece with the public. They had to detail what was the objective behind their project and spell out how it positively connected to society. Concretely, artists would provide details about the place where the project would be presented and say what type of population or audience it would target. In most cases, this meant exchanging with local communities, schools, or segments of the population that had generally little contact with the artistic world. This measure was made visible within the application process of the FONDART in the 2000s but was not an obligation back then. It however became an official requirement after 2010. As such, the concept of citizenship progressively took more space in the FONDART application. Also, as they were making efforts to connect cultural policy to citizenship, the Concertación elites encountered obstacles and underwent the same process of trial and error that was previously explained in this thesis. As explained by a former FONDART recipient and an ex-FONDART coordinator:

With the FONDART there is the topic of the educational role of the artist, the idea that the artist also educates, and this a political topic obviously. In the 1990s, it was more about content only (…). Now it is more mixed. They included more concepts like cultural mediation, audience, etc.

We have started to think about the idea of artists giving part of their work. We started with visual arts. According to me, this was a disaster. Because it was very complex defining which artwork should be shown or given; sometimes it was difficult to divide, because there were many pieces within a specific work. There was no place to create a good catalogue or (…) temporary exhibitions. (…) I think it was better in the area of performing arts, they [artists] gave us a certain number of entrance tickets and then we invited teachers, social actors, and a lot of people went to the theatre thanks to this. Artists who saw it badly at first, started to see this as an opportunity. In cinema, there was some authorisation to show the film to a certain

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122 As this was said in Chapter 5, the diffusion of FONDART projects was the “weakness” of the fund. In this chapter, the discussion is more about presenting punctually a work to citizens or sectors that would benefit or learn something from it. The focus of FONDART as argued previously, was still very much the creative aspect but the plan of diffusion was a about pushing the candidate to think about arts as something good for the community.
part of the population and people could chat with the director and the actors. And I think that this could be an opportunity so the FONDART could exchange with citizens.123

In the first quote, the interviewee explains that there was a gradual change in the FONDART as over the years, the fund became more and more a tool of citizenship rather than being a creative instrument only. As this was argued in Chapter 5, the idea that culture serves the community has always existed in the FONDART but with time, linking arts to citizenship has become a necessity and something compulsory for the FONDART recipients. This also confirms what was argued in the literature review chapter: that cultural policy is very much linked to education, community development and social inclusion. In the second quote, the interviewee gives more detail about sharing arts with the community and making arts socially useful in Chile. Also, the former FONDART coordinator clearly emphasises the fact that this process was imperfect and that this as well, was part of the democratic learning process.

CONCLUSION

This last chapter combined an explanation of the impact of authoritarian enclaves with an analysis of the solutions of the FONDART to undo or loosen some parts of the dictatorship’s legacy. It showed that in Chile, the democratic path full of pitfalls. Nevertheless, cultural policy was one way of promoting democratisation. As this was pointed in Chapter 3, the paradox of authoritarian enclaves is that they are elements that secured the re-establishment of democracy but that undoubtedly remained an obstacle for improving citizenship and dealing with memory. The fund did provide some solutions to deal with this dilemma as it helped discuss the country’s memory and issues related to its recent history. The FONDART constituted, for some Chileans, in the early phase of democracy, a remedy against fluid enclaves (trauma, darkness, and negative emotions). Another one of its important contributions was reclaiming the country’s different identities, whether they were political, ethnical, or sexual. In that sense, the fund was a device to bypass obstacles that limited freedom of expression. As restrictions on freedom of speech and the conservatism that had penetrated parties and institutions during the military government still put strains on Chilean society, cultural policy in the 1990s contributed to unbridle forms of expression that were still prohibited or frowned upon even after the military relinquished power to civilian political elites.

123 Interview, 20 March 2018.
The FONDART in Chile worked as a window of opportunities and as an instrument of relief and assistance within a country that was very unequal and in which class mobility was very difficult to achieve. The fund gave some possibilities to vulnerable sectors to increase their visibility and provided punctual help to improve citizens’ everyday life. Overall, the FONDART worked as a small tool of social development in a country where neoliberalism remained the dominant paradigm and where some authoritarian enclaves still reduced the scope of democracy, even after the constitutional reforms of 2005. Indeed, by the time of the Bachelet administration, Chile had not fully come to terms with the social, political, and cultural inheritances of the dictatorship. Her administration extended the heritage of Pinochet in areas as diverse as: transitional justice, education or indigenous peoples’ rights. The FONDART respected and left untouched the accords of the pacted transition that both the right-wing parties and the Concertación were not ready or willing to cancel. In the meantime, however, it worked as a tool of citizenship for the hundreds of Chileans involved in the fund’s projects each year. As this was suggested earlier in this thesis, cultural policy, thanks to its multidimensional character has the capacity to spawn any kind of social or political manifestation. This means that the FONDART did play a part in many areas and at several levels: psychological, social, and political, or even the three at the same time.
CHAPTER 8 – CONCLUSION

This final chapter works as a conclusion of the thesis. It has two different objectives. One is to further explain the aims and findings of this research. The other one is to present the potential avenues for future academic investigation on cultural policy. This thesis was the occasion to re-open the debate on transitology. More specifically, the research focused on the issue of authoritarian resilience in countries that returned to democracy. The thesis proposed an original contribution by framing cultural policy as an alternative and a “marginal” solution for democratic countries (in particular those that underwent a pacted transition) that dragged for many years the load of the old authoritarian regime. Also, it showed that cultural policy can support the process of democratisation at a legal, emotional, and symbolic level. Indeed, free political parties, robust institutions, and fair and transparent elections are not enough to build a democratic regime. Likewise, such a formal description of democracy might not be sufficient to address citizens’ needs or demands. Drawing from this observation, the thesis claimed that in parallel to institutions, emotions also matter in democracy.

Looking at the literature on democratisation, it was considered by the author that the pattern of “continuity” was not completely sufficient to understand how authoritarianism continued to block democracy even two or three decades after its re-establishment. For this reason, the focus was put on the concept of enclaves, as it provided a better picture of the long-term effects of authoritarianism. Also, the notion was used to consider the variety of reasons that accounted for the endurance of authoritarian remnants within democracy. Indeed, the notion of solid enclaves coined in this thesis allowed to point to the immobility of democratic actors who can behave quite complacently towards actors of the old authoritarian system and perpetuate the dysfunctional democracy. In that sense, what was explained is that democratic incompleteness is not only due to actors of the previous authoritarian regime but also to democratic elites themselves, which allows to provide a more nuanced picture of the process of democratisation. By focusing on the notion of enclaves, the thesis sought to comprehend the phenomenon of democratisation in a more comprehensive fashion. As such, the definition of both authoritarian resilience and democracy was extended to symbolic and emotional aspects. Therefore, this research also addressed more subjective and psychological obstacles that were called fluid enclaves.
By delving into the multidisciplinary literature, it was possible to identify the different contributions of cultural policy and apply them to the Chilean case. The method was to bridge the different bodies of literature on culture and the arts (arts and memory, arts and democratic values, arts and education, arts and cultural diversity, as well as trauma, identity and community development) and connect them to the topic of democratisation. The different roles of cultural policy were then merged and summarised under the concepts of elite autonomy, memory and citizenship which combined legal and symbolic dimensions of democracy. This methodology had the advantage to bring to the fore the functions of cultural policy with more clarity and detail, and consequently better show its relevance.

The study of post-authoritarian Chile confirmed that the theme of memory (understood as discussion on the past, truth about it and the healing process associated with it) is one of the key functions of cultural policy, especially when transitional justice is uncertain. Indeed, what was revealed is that when justice does not advance, art can become a method to ‘push for rights claims and help ensure recourse for survivors of human rights’ (Siddiqui and Joffre-Eichhorn, 2014). Victims or their relatives can express and claim through artistic expression what judicial instances or political organisations sometimes cannot. In some cases, arts can be used to highlight the ‘inadequacies of the Truth Commission and Reconciliation’ (Moyer-Duncan, 2013: 277-282). Also, and this is very important, culture and the arts allow to discuss negative emotions and thus contradict the elite narrative of the past. As such, discussing sadness, anger, or resentment in relation to the past can also be a healthy for democracy.

In Chile, a similar pattern happened as the FONDART served to address different issues related to memory and transitional justice. As for citizenship, it is a key, even pivotal function of cultural policy and arts more generally. Arts have had a key role in movements and initiatives for democracy such as social protest or community development. They have favoured marginalised groups’ empowerment by expressing grievances in relation to class, race, or gender inequality. In fact, culture and arts are also part of a society’s development as they offer new routes to address problems as diverse as identity, injustice, psychological issues, domination, and violence. In Chile, the FONDART was involved in most of these issues, proving its capacity to enhance citizenship and give some solutions to a weak civil society.
The Chilean case also allowed to bring on the novel concept of elite autonomy, which theorises how politicians find a way to govern with more latitude, push for the democratic agenda and make amends for the past while trying to redeem themselves. This is especially the case when they know that despite their attachment to democracy, they abandoned some principles that could have further improved it. In that sense, elite autonomy means creating institutions (like the cultural funds and more generally like the policies at the margins) that help citizenship but also that polish the image of the elites and the new regime, as both need to be shown as progressive and different from the previous authoritarian government.

Now that the aims and main findings of this thesis have been summarised, it is important to outline the future research axes that could possibly be derived from it. Indeed, more could be said about the relation between cultural policy and democratisation. The thesis chose to focus on three different aspects of democratisation that cultural policy could simultaneously contribute to. Therefore, it sought to present a broad picture of what cultural policy can do, putting the focus on its versatility. However, any of these three concepts could be analysed separately and more in depth in relation to cultural policy by using cases of former dictatorships that still have to deal with their past heritage. The concept of elite autonomy can be further investigated, especially in its symbolic dimension. Memory, in particular, is a theme that is wide enough to produce a whole body of work linked to both cultural policy and democratisation. In this case, the focus would be put both on civil society and elites. Indeed, memorialisation is a tool of the elites to politicise the past or impose a certain vision of history while memory is also the conscience of citizens and their personal experience of national history. Both aspects of memory could be framed as being related to democracy or lack thereof. The same observation and suggestions could be made about citizenship.

In this research, the aim was to focus on a former military regime, a country that used to have a very institutionalised type of authoritarianism and that was known for enforcing undemocratic practices, violating human rights, as well as dismembering civil society. Therefore, the objective was to understand the use of cultural policy in a context where this heritage was still heavily present after the return to democracy. Chile remains a paradigmatic case of authoritarian enclaves, but the notion could surely be applied to many other countries that fit into the category of the third wave of democratisation. Latin America is a fertile ground to study the relationship between arts and authoritarian remnants (both solid and fluid).
The same could be applied to former Communist countries and Southern European states, where the legacy of dictatorship or totalitarianism continues to weigh on national politics. Nonetheless, the connection between cultural policy and democratisation can be examined in other types of situations as well. It can be studied in relation to the consequences of civil wars, episodes of violence or more punctual experiences that shattered or destabilised democracy such as terrorism, extreme ideology, or even deep economic crises that had a negative impact on the institutions and social cohesion. Similar research could be carried in illiberal democracies that did not have a military or totalitarian regime but that currently have a weak rule of law, flawed accountability and have an ambiguous position regarding human rights.

Even more interestingly, cultural policy and the three concepts that were proposed in this thesis could also be tested in cases of established democracies, where citizens’ political dissatisfaction is very high, where neoliberalism and technocratic governance affect citizenship or where representative democracy is “worn” or fails to reinvent itself. The relationship between elite autonomy and cultural policy could be explored to understand the dilemma of national elites and their strategy to deal with the fact that their power is increasingly dependent on or restricted by private governance, supranational institutions, financial powers or international actors and organisations. In this context, cultural policy should be analysed to determine how elites react to the lack of democracy or to what their citizens perceive as such.

Put differently, it would possibly show how elites deal with their constraints by using culture which gives them more latitude than other policies that are limited or hindered by both national and external factors. The concept of autonomy would help understand how elites manage to build the image of a renovated democracy. This would also lead to discuss citizenship. Indeed, if nowadays liberal democracies are characterised by economic insecurity, citizens also tend to feel pressure or tension with regard to their cultural values and way of life, regardless of their ethnic background or gender. In western countries more specifically, the issues of mass immigration, displacement and integration are particularly heated and provoke tensions. Cultural policy would possibly provide a solution in this domain by handling the thorny topic of identity. This idea could be potentially explored as well in future academic works.

Likewise, cultural policy could be potentially used to promote freedom of speech, encourage the plurality of opinions through arts and intellectual production. In recent years, the
intellectual and political debates in old democracies seem to have become more homogenous and consensual. Could cultural policy provide a channel to enhance freedom of speech? Likewise, there is a need for emotional well-being even in democracies as those are increasingly characterised by social injustice, have territories that are not well-integrated to the nation, while there the phenomenon of globalisation makes peoples more insecure about their future and their welfare. Again, as shown by this thesis, there are valid reasons to argue that cultural policy can achieve relevant goals in these societies. For academics of both cultural policy and democratisation, it would be pertinent to approach democracy as a regime that should not be taken for granted, including in countries where it has been a historical and political norm. Even liberal democracies are challenged by authoritarian practices, even if these are more sporadic and more insidious. An even liberal democracies need cultural policy for political, social, and emotional reasons.

Finally, what should be raised in this final chapter is that other uses of cultural policy can be made. While this research was about democratisation, transition from authoritarian rule and the presence of enclaves in a democratic regime, there are multiple ways for culture to contribute to politics and society. At the same time, this thesis was an opportunity to show the readers the relevance(s) of cultural policy and give them a better sense of what it is. Prior to discuss how culture as a policy area works in relation to politics and society, the challenge is always to delimitate its contours. As this was hinted in Chapter 1 already, cultural policy tends to be a floating category. According to Miller and Yúdice (2002:1), ‘it refers to the institutional supports that channel both aesthetic creativity and collective ways of life – a bridge between the two registers.’ This study particularly insisted on artistic creation and the institutional means to allow and promote it. Nevertheless, it also showed that cultural policy had an impact on the ‘collective way of life’, as it contributed to (re)define and influence cultural identity as well as to enhance community and cohesion. By focusing on a cultural fund, the FONDART, the author sought to identify more clearly what is cultural policy, how it works, in which contexts, and what it can achieve for both elites and civil society.

In that sense, the thesis sought to provide an answer for the following questions: why does cultural policy matter? What does it achieve? The idea found in this academic piece was not solely the process of designing and implementing public policies of culture for the sake of democracy but also the one of governing through culture, i.e., reaching political goals using
culture and the arts. As a result, what emerged is a more precise understanding and an empirical application of cultural governance. Governance consists into the different mechanisms through which ‘power and influence are put into practice’, it is how ‘outcomes are shaped, (…) decisions made and implemented, and broad social political, economic trends managed (…) by a range of actors’ (Cerny, 2014: 48).

As for the concept of cultural governance, if it is already present in cultural policy studies, it is less in other fields of social sciences. The idea of a cultural governance ran throughout this study. It showed how elites and civil society used culture and the arts with the objective to ameliorate and correct Chile’s dysfunctional democracy. Cultural governance should be understood as any endeavour meant to organise power or society by relying on culture and the arts in view to either provide goods or lead the national or local community to a certain outcome. It could also be simply understood as any decision made in the realm of culture and the arts, whether it is at the government level, civil society or the two at the same time. In that sense, cultural governance can lead to objectives that serve civil society or possibly support elites themselves. For example, cultural governance could refer to ‘developments in the arts and culture, tourism, information technology, broadcasting and new media (…) that result in increased economic growth (…) and social participation (Yue, 2006:18).

While the idea that cultural policy is related to political governance is apparently uncontroversial, the connection between the two remains in large part a blind spot within political science research. Culture for being a wide concept encompasses or involves numerous issues that are likely to concern, interest or fall into political authorities’ institutional responsibilities or moral duty, meaning that the state does have clear incentives to develop a cultural policy. As reminded by Vestheim (2007:226), ‘cultural policy by definition is instrumental’ and its aims ‘are always beyond culture itself’. Yet, this instrumental use of cultural policy could be further investigated in order to discuss many important themes within political science; or study key events or milestones that are common to many countries in different regions of the world.

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124 Political governance emphasises the way governmental institutions, political parties, along with other actors of civil society such as NGOs, associations, intellectuals, and the private sector seek to regulate or control society.
Although the close relationship between culture and political governance exists in the literature, it is more often suggested than used as a core argument. In order to make this connection more clear-cut and more analytical, it would be for example possible in future research to draw a typology that classifies cultural policy according to its different functions. Such a categorisation would partially solve the methodological problems that one encounters while undertaking research in cultural policy. As it lies somewhere between institutionalism and anthropology, it can be arduous to distinguish culture as an object of governmental rationalisation from culture as a consequence of customs shaped by historical contingences and autonomous creative initiatives. A typology would reaffirm culture as ‘a category of public intervention’ (Dubois, 1999) and would show that the plasticity of the concept is what makes it embrace numerous issues that are likely to be part of the governments’ institutional prerogatives. Moreover, by showcasing the diversity of cultural policy’s roles in both democracies and dictatorial regimes, attention of scholars of politics and sociology could be raised on the topic of cultural governance. A typology would also have other advantages.

Firstly, it would structure and render explicit what is mostly dispersed or hinted in the literature. Secondly, it would give more body to cultural policy which tends to be a hazy category, allow to better identify it as a policy area that has distinguishable targets, and not as a package of disparate measures that provoke incidental or cosmetic effects. Finally, a typology would shed light on the plentiful assets and the impressive flexibility of cultural policy, which is involved in different domains such as nation-building, ideology spreading, social policy and development, foreign policy, or post-war reconstruction. Overall, it could deepen the existing theory of cultural policy’s instrumentalism by proposing a model for how culture and the arts interact with politics in multiple contexts, showing that cultural policy is both a paradoxical policy area and an alternative means to pursue political agendas, as this was shown throughout this PhD thesis.

The typology could unfold at least five functions of cultural policy that cover a broad range of issues, from diplomacy to memory, illustrating how governments in different regimes exploit culture and the arts in a very heterogeneous fashion. Those functions could be potentially selected based on issues that are recurrent in studies of political science and political sociology and would be the following: 1- cultural policy as diplomacy 2- cultural policy as reconciliation 3- cultural policy as revolution 4- cultural policy as national identity 5- cultural policy as social welfare. They would also illuminate different sides of power, oscillating
between hard and soft, democratic practices and more authoritarian ones as well as material and psychological matters.

Culture, as it is already known, has a key role in diplomacy. Indeed, its use for diplomatic purposes is commonly referred to as cultural diplomacy which is ‘underpinned by an instrumental application of culture by governmental actors for the advancement of various national interests’ (Kang, 2015: 433). As most countries seek to increase their influence abroad, culture is one of the main vehicles through which to achieve these goals. Cultural policy can also intervene in processes of reconciliation. In such processes, ‘it is expected that there will be institutional and society-led mechanisms for dialogue, truth recovery and narrative construction about the past of a conflict, combined with legal processes of settling accounts for past wrongdoings’ (Hugues and Kostovicova, 2018:618).

Among the possible ‘society-led mechanisms’ that help rebuild a society that experienced conflict is cultural policy. Indeed, it can develop understanding between communities in countries that were plagued by criminality but also to bridge differences in places marked by deep social cleavages. In some cases, conflict resolution and social rehabilitation happen to be the prime paradigm on which cultural policy is seated (Dermer Wodnicky, 2015: 111). For this reason, it should be seen as relevant within the field of International Relations as arts can be used in conflict resolution and peacebuilding. Indeed, ‘art as form of social resistance during conflict’, as a tool for ‘survival and for retaining some sense of normality during conflict’ or as a means for ‘helping to repair and restore individual and group relationships’ are some of the possible roles that cultural policy can achieve (Zelizer, 2003 cited in Kollontai, 2012:230).

Culture is also a strong and efficient tool in revolutionary states. Indeed, it accompanies political processes that are very transformative as in socialist countries, making it directly related to an ideological project and oriented towards education and increasing social justice. In revolutionary states, cultural policy revolves around the implementation of ‘literacy campaigns’, the involvement of low-class populations in artistic activities and around the establishment of ‘poetry workshops’ in poor suburbs (Ross, 1990: 111-112). Another case that could be further developed is the relationship between cultural policy and national identity. As pointed to by Chong (2010: 132), ‘cultural policy is taken to mean the ideological role
prescribed by the state for arts and culture in the greater nation-building project’ and is ‘subordinate to the ideologies, values and interests of the ruling elite’. The use of culture by political instances can be traced back to several centuries ago and ‘the history of cultural policies has been closely tied-up with the development of (...) nation-states’ (Bennett, 2001: 27). Finaly, and as this was seen already in this thesis as well, cultural policy undoubtedly includes a social dimension, since cultural and artistic activities have the capacity to foster education, improve social tissue through community development and favour the integration of relevant populations. This could give way to more elaborated studies on the theme of cultural policy and welfare.

Still, many other functions for culture and the arts could be identified and investigated. Also, it is important to remember that cultural policy’s functions can be used simultaneously. In the ones that were proposed above for a possible typology, many could indeed be utilised at the same time as cultural policy has rarely a unique role, due to its multidimensional character that was already underlined in this thesis. Overall, culture can contribute to the (re)definition of identity(ies), complement social welfare or help coming to terms with a cumbersome or traumatic past. Playing a key role in perceptions, emotions and reputation, the use of culture and the arts to picture a good image of a country or to improve its attractiveness has also been quite common over the course of history. Likewise, culture can break the sentiment of isolation of a nation and even compensate for a faltering political legitimacy. In that sense, the power of culture is almost unlimited.
List of abbreviations

AD: Alianza Democrática

CESEC: Centro de Estudios Socio-Económicos

CNCA: Consejo Nacional de La Cultura y las Artes

CNVR: Comisión Nacional de Verdad y Reconciliación

CONADI: Corporación Nacional de Desarrollo Indígena

CONAMA: Comisión Nacional del Medio Ambiente

CORFO: Corporación de Fomento a la Producción

CUT: Central Unitaria de Trabajadores de Chile

DEC: Departamento de Extensión Cultural

DEC: División de Extensión Cultural

DIBAM: Dirección de Bibliotecas, Archivos y Museos

ECLAC: The United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean

FAIR: Fondo de Apoyo a Iniciativas Regionales

FEUC: Federación de Estudiantes de la Universidad Católica de Chile

FONDART: Fondo para el Desarrollo de la Cultura y las Artes

FONDEC: Fondo Nacional de Desarrollo Cultural

MIDEPLAN: Ministerio de Planificación y Cooperación

MINEDUC: Ministerio de Educación

MIR: Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionaria

MSGG: Ministerio Secretaría General de Gobierno

PPD: Partido por la Democracia

PS: Partido Socialista

PDC: Partido Demócrata Cristiano
RN: Renovación Nacional

SERNAM: Servicio Nacional de la Mujer

UDI: Unión Demócrata Independiente

UP: Unidad Popular
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