Regional Intellectual Hegemony and Regional Connectivity: 
Japan's Norms of Development, International Research Organisations and Network-Building in Southeast Asia

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Submitted in accordance with the requirements for the degree of 
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The University of Leeds
School of Languages, Cultures, and Societies

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The candidate confirms that the work submitted is his/her own and that appropriate credit has been given where reference has been made to the work of others.

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Abstract

This thesis aims to analyse how the Japanese government supports Southeast Asian transport development by allocating assistance through the works of the Economic Research Institute for ASEAN and East Asia (ERIA), the Institute of Developing Economies of Japan External Trade Organisation (IDE-JETRO), and the Asian Development Bank Institute (ADBI). It questions the process through which the ideas and norms of Southeast Asia’s regional transport development were constructed, cascaded, and internalised in Southeast Asia. This thesis applies Finnemore and Sikkink’s ‘norm life cycle’ framework as an analytical framework. It analyses the norm life cycle of regional transport development by integrating information and opinions from documentary research and in-depth interviews with officials and intellectuals in both Japan and Southeast Asia.

The arguments of this thesis are threefold. First, the Japanese governmental agencies (i.e. MOFA, METI, MOF, JICA, JETRO, ERIA, IDE-JETRO, and ADBI) work together as a ‘norm entrepreneur’ – or a ‘regional intellectual hegemon’ (RIH) – to construct ideas and norms and further cascade them to Southeast Asian intellectuals’ and government officials’ professional and institutional connections. The governments in Southeast Asia and the ASEAN Secretariat then internalise these ideas and norms into their transport development schemes. Second, IROs are research organisations that construct ‘practical knowledge’ as recommendations for Southeast Asia on how to connect the region by regional transport networks. Third, the ideas and norms of regional transport development constructed by the ERIA, IDE-JETRO, and ADBI are composed of (1) ideas of infrastructure development, (2) spatial and connectivity norms, (3) norms of economic activities, (4) norms of knowledge sharing, and (5) ideas and norms of environmental protection and sustainable development. These ideas and norms help the region to become connected both physically and institutionally whilst paying attention to social development.
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<td>ACCC</td>
<td>ASEAN Connectivity Coordination Committee</td>
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<td>ADB</td>
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<td>Asian Development Bank Institute</td>
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<td>ADF</td>
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<td>AHA Centre</td>
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<td>AHN</td>
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<td>ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community</td>
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<td>ASEAN</td>
<td>Association of South-East Asian Nations</td>
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<td>ASEAN CPR</td>
<td>ASEAN Committee of Permanent Representative</td>
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<td>AVLRC</td>
<td>ASEAN Visual Learning Resources Centres</td>
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<td>BIMP-EAGA</td>
<td>Brunei Darussalam-Indonesia-Malaysia-Philippines East ASEAN Growth Area</td>
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<td>CADP</td>
<td>Comprehensive Asia Development Plan</td>
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<td>Central Asia Regional Economic Co-operation</td>
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<td>CBTA</td>
<td>Cross-Border Transport Agreement</td>
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<td>Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, Vietnam</td>
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<td>East Asian Industrial Corridor Team</td>
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<td>Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East</td>
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<td>FOIPS</td>
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<td>GIH</td>
<td>Global Intellectual Hegemony</td>
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<td>GMS</td>
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<td>IAI</td>
<td>Initiative for ASEAN Integration</td>
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<td>ICT</td>
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<td>IDE/ERIA-GSM</td>
<td>IDE/ERIA-Geographical Simulation Model</td>
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<td>International Monetary Fund</td>
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<td>IMG-GT</td>
<td>Indonesia-Malaysia-Thailand Growth Triangle</td>
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<td>IPNs</td>
<td>International Production Networks</td>
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<td>Japan Overseas Infrastructure Investment Corporation for Transport and Urban Development</td>
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<td>KIEP</td>
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<td>MLIT</td>
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<td>MNCs</td>
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<td>NEAT</td>
<td>Network of East Asian Think-Tanks</td>
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<td>NSEC</td>
<td>North-South Economic Corridor</td>
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<td>NSWs</td>
<td>National Single Windows</td>
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<td>NTU</td>
<td>Nanyang Technological University</td>
<td>Singapore</td>
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<td>ODA</td>
<td>Official Development Assistance</td>
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<td>OECD</td>
<td>Organisation for Economic Co-operation and</td>
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<td>REITI</td>
<td>Research Institute of Economy, Trade and Industry</td>
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<td>RIH</td>
<td>Regional Intellectual Hegemon</td>
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<td>RoRo</td>
<td>Roll-On/Roll-Off</td>
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<td>SAARC</td>
<td>South Asian Association Regional Co-operation</td>
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<td>SCAP</td>
<td>Supreme Commander for the Allied Power</td>
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<td>SEZs</td>
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Chapter 1: 
Introduction

“In order to fulfil ASEAN’s potential while making use of ‘diversity’ and strengthening unity, it is important to enhance ‘connectivity’.”

H.E. Mr. Kishida Fumio
Minister for Foreign Affairs of Japan (MOFA, 2016)

1.1 Research Background

This section explains how I became interested in this research topic. After that, it provides an overview of how Japan’s contributions to Southeast Asian transport development have progressed. Then, it elaborates on how these issues inform the research questions for this thesis.

In 2006, one of my classmates in Bangkok asked me if I had any idea why Japan is interested in the development of the East-West Economic Corridor (EWEC), a road that links Myanmar-Thailand-Laos-Vietnam, supported by the Asian Development Bank (ADB). At the time, I did not have any idea as I was writing a paper on the role of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) in addressing the issue of pirates in the Strait of Malacca. So, I said nothing. After I finished my undergraduate studies, I pursued my post-graduate programme and took a module named ‘Thailand in Globalisation’, for which I wrote a paper on how Thailand’s economic relations with the US and Japan changed during the Cold War, and how such relations shaped Thailand’s National Economic and Social Development Plan (NESDP). I further studied why and how Thailand commenced planning of the Eastern Seaboard development scheme, a plan to develop the Eastern part of Thailand to attract Thai and international investors. I developed that paper into my thesis, which aimed to analyse how US-Japan relations shaped Southeast Asian regionalism and the Greater Mekong Subregion (GMS).¹ I found that Thailand shifted its economic and

¹ This thesis differentiates the use of the words ‘Northeast Asia’, ‘Southeast Asia’ and ‘East Asia’. Northeast Asia refers to three sovereign states, including PRC China (hereafter China), Japan, and the Republic of Korea (ROK) (henceforth South Korea); Southeast Asia refers to the geographical area that covers eleven sovereign states, including, Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Timor-Leste (henceforth East Timor), and Vietnam.
infrastructure development plan in tandem with the regional and international environments, which were dominated by the US.

From that thesis, I learned that one of Thailand’s infrastructure development plans was to support the EWEC, which also received significant contribution and engagement from Japan. I studied the EWEC further by investigating Japan’s foreign policy documents, statements, publications, and website. Many of these resources were published by the Institute of Developing Economies, Japan External Trade Organisation (IDE-JETRO), a research organisation financed by Japan’s Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry (METI). Upon finishing my thesis, I submitted it to my university and in 2010 moved to Chiang Mai to start my career.

In Chiang Mai, I taught modules titled ‘GMS Studies’ and ‘Politics of Sub-Regional Economic Co-operation in Asia-Pacific’ and commenced research on Japan’s contribution to the EWEC, and on the US’s role in the formation of Southeast Asian regionalism. Throughout this journey, I observed that I was paying too much attention to the ‘technical issues’ of the EWEC, such as border trade management, financial support, and road construction. Most importantly, I observed that most of the resources I was reading were produced by Japanese scholars. Many meetings and conferences on the development of GMS transport in Thailand were also organised by Japanese organisations, such as the Economic Research Institute for ASEAN and East Asia (ERIA), the Institute of Developing Economies of Japan External Trade Organisation (IDE-JETRO), the Asian Development Bank Institute (ADBI), and the Embassy of Japan in Bangkok. I then realised that maybe I was not looking at the right issue, or maybe I should be looking at something else to better understand the development of GMS transport. I started to question the impacts and influence of the knowledge distributed and communicated through publication and research-related activities conducted by Japanese organisations. I asked myself how I, as a Thai scholar, and maybe other Thai or Southeast Asian scholars, would utilise those research publications and analyses? What are the ideas and norms presented in those studies or activities? Why and how were those ideas and norms constructed? How

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East Asia refers to the geographical area that includes Northeast and Southeast Asia altogether. Moreover, the term ‘region’ is used to denote the whole geographical area of Southeast Asia which comprises eleven countries; whilst ‘subregion’ signifies just five countries in mainland Southeast Asia, including Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, Thailand, and Vietnam.
were the ideas and norms in the research perceived by ‘readers’ or ‘users’ in Southeast Asia? How did the academics perceive, interpret, and translate the Japanese-constructed research results or analyses to communicate or transfer the ideas in their respective national languages? And, how can such contributions support the work of their governments?

I began to question why the Japanese government has continuously mentioned the importance of GMS transport development. I wondered what Japan’s economic and political interests are in the Mekong area? Why are the Japanese government-funded think tanks, such as IDE-JETRO, interested in the GMS area? How have IDE-JETRO and other Japanese research organisations contributed to the knowledge of Southeast Asian transport development? What are the important ideas, norms, or messages that they are trying to promote to GMS governments? How has Japan’s ODA been utilised in tandem with its contribution to the GMS regional transport development scheme? I then used all of these questions to frame my PhD thesis, focused on comprehending Japan’s intentions and engagement in GMS transport development.

The aims of this thesis, therefore, are to analyse Japan’s contribution to Southeast Asian transport development schemes. It seeks to answer the following questions: what are the motives of the Japanese government in supporting the development of international transport infrastructure in Southeast Asia? How did Japan cascade the ideas and norms of regional development in the research conducted by ERIA, IDE-JETRO, and ADBI to support Southeast Asia’s regional transport development schemes? And, how are the norms internalised in domestic and regional transport development schemes in Southeast Asia?

To answer these questions, I needed a framework to identify the actors involved in the construction of ideas and norms, and those involved in the cascade process, as well as a framework that could help analyse how such ideas and norms are internalised by Southeast Asian scholars, governments, and the ASEAN Secretariat. Accordingly, I chose Finnemore and Sikkink’s ‘norm life cycle’ framework (1998) as a tool to analyse the process of how the ideas and norms are constructed, and further cascaded, by Japanese government agencies and ERIA, IDE-JETRO, and ADBI.

Japan’s intellectual contributions to Southeast Asia are scarcely stated in existing literature. The studies on Japan-Southeast Asia relations generally focus on
economic and political relations after 1945. The existing literature within the International Relations (IR) discipline on Japan-Southeast Asia relations primarily applies the concepts of neorealism, neoliberal institutionalism, and social constructivism to comprehend the nature and development of such relations. Realists focus on Japan’s material power by stating that its political and economic power consequently help the Japanese government to initiate regional co-operation between Japan and Southeast Asia (Calder, 2000; Dent, 2008b; Katada, 2002b; García, 2016; Melissen & Sohn, 2015; Park, 2012; Soeya, 2015; Son, 2014). They also study how the Japanese government utilises official development assistance (ODA) to support Southeast Asian infrastructure, economic development, and human development while enhancing Japan’s economic interests (Cheow, 2003; Maswood, 1994, 2001a, 2001b; Rix, 1993b; Shiraishi & Kojima, 2014; Sudo, 2015; Terada, 1998). Neo-liberal institutionalists, on the other hand, focus on Japan’s contributions to regional institutions and co-operation in development through the allocation of a significant amount of ODA to support regional development (Tanaka, 2017; Sudo, 2015; Verbiest, 2013). Furthermore, social constructivists focus on how normative power constitutes regional co-operation and Southeast Asian regionalism by emphasising the power of ideas and norms (Terada, 2003; Rittberger et al., 1997) (see Chapter 2). For the term “norms”, this thesis adopts the definition used by Finnemore and Sikkink (1998) who define a norm as a “standard of appropriate behaviour for actors with a given identity” (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998, p. 891).

The mentioned studies have contributed to an understanding of Japan-Southeast Asia relations from varying theoretical perspectives: realists pay attention to material power (Wendt, 1999, p. 19), neo-liberals emphasise co-operation and institution (Wendt, 1999, p. 92), and social constructivists stress the importance of identities, ideas, and norms (Wendt, 1999). In other words, realists focus on the importance of material power, which places Japan in the leading role, whereas neo-liberals stress the benefits of joining regional co-operation and institutions. However, the explanations by realists and neo-liberals do not take the normative aspects into account, as they state that the actors are rational. Wendt (1999) states that “rationalists are interested in how incentives in the environment affect the price of behaviour” (Wendt, 1999, p. 34). In contrast, social constructivists assert that identities built on ideas, norms, or beliefs can shape state behaviour as national
identities and national interests can be interpreted and translated in different ways (Wendt, 1999, pp. 237-238).

As can be seen from the discussion so far, social constructivists emphasise ideas and norms, while questioning their source. Why does a state or an international organisation follow the ideas proposed by an agent in the international system? In response, Finnemore and Sikkink’s *International Norm Dynamics and Political Change* (1998) applies social constructivism to analyse how ideas and norms are ‘constructed’, ‘cascaded’, and ‘internalised’. They call this the ‘norm life cycle’ process. They look at the phenomenon of ‘norm emergence’ by analysing how ‘norm entrepreneurs’ construct ideas and norms in different ways and cascade them through international organisations or official channels, as well as how the norms are interpreted and translated into national or regional policies (see Chapter 2).

The application of Finnemore and Sikkink’s norm life cycle can be seen in Dobson’s work (2003). Dobson seeks to explain the domestic and international contexts that construct the norms of Japan’s engagement in a UN peacekeeping operation (Dobson, 2003, p. 31) (see Section 2.3.2 of Chapter 2). Dobson investigates parliamentary debates, official publications, newspapers and magazines, books, articles, and dissertations, both in English and Japanese. He points out that the norm entrepreneurs include the UN Secretary-General (Dobson, 2003, p. 51), university professors (Dobson, 2003, p. 51), and the Japanese government (Dobson, 2003, pp. 52-56).

Another example of Japan’s contribution to Southeast Asia can be seen in Hatakeyama’s work (2008), which states that Japan is an ‘intellectual and economic leader’ (Hatakeyama, 2008, p. 364). Hatakeyama studies the Japanese government’s endeavours to create the ‘Initiative for Development in East Asia’ (IDEA) as a platform for aid donors to discuss the ideas and philosophy of ODA giving (see section 2.3.2 of Chapter 2). He, nevertheless, did not conduct an in-depth study on how the Japanese officials and intellectuals worked together to construct and disseminate the ideas of ODA giving through IDEA’s meetings and conferences.

Dobson (2003), Hook et al. (2012) and Maslow (2018) also acknowledge the contributions that intellectuals made to Japan’s foreign policy-making process. They state that intellectuals (e.g. university professors, researchers) and think tanks are additionally important as they help the Japanese government to obtain information, research results, and analyses, which are conducted by the intellectuals themselves
or research institutions. Although there are many think tanks in Japan, Abb and Köellner (2015) state that Japanese think tanks are not influential because the Japanese government prefers not to rely on policy recommendations from private think tanks, while Maslow (2013) and Ueno (2004) state that the Japanese government does not prioritise the policy research industry (see Section 2.4 of Chapter 2). Moreover, the studies on intellectuals, either as an individual or as a network, have not been elaborated. The connections between intellectuals and research organisations that help the Japanese government to establish professional and institutional connections have not been meticulously investigated.

That being said, the Japanese government still supports the establishment of new research institutes, both in Japan and in Southeast Asia. ERIA is a Japanese government-funded research organisation, established in 2008. The Japanese government anticipated that financial contribution to ERIA’s research activities would facilitate economic integration in ASEAN and narrow the development gap. Meanwhile, the Japanese government allocated a venue in the Kasumigaseki Building – a modern building surrounded by Japanese ministries in the heart of Tokyo – to be the headquarters of the Asian Development Bank Institute (ADBI). At the same time, the Japanese government supported the Institute of Developing Economies, Japan External Trade Organisation (IDE-JETRO) to look after the establishment of ERIA and its functions. Accordingly, the question is if the Japanese government does not recognise the works of Japanese think tanks, as stated by Abb and Köellner (2015), Maslow (2013), and Ueno (2004), why does the Japanese government still support the establishment of new research organisations, both inside and outside Japan (see Chapter 5)?

Kodera Kiyoshi (2016), Vice-President of Japan International Co-operation Agency (JICA), states that the role and intention of the Japanese government to facilitate and persuade the international research organisations to base their headquarters in Tokyo reflect its attempt to become the centre of knowledge and research in Asia. Kodera states that this further reflects the attempts of the Japanese government to establish itself as a regional and global knowledge leader (Kodera, 2016, p. 29). In Kodera’s opinion, the Japanese government tries to utilise its financial and intellectual power to play a leading role in East Asia. This thesis, accordingly, will attempt to apply the norm life cycle framework to analyse how ideas and norms are constructed by Japan so that we can see how Japan has exercised
its intellectual contribution to Southeast Asia. This thesis proposes that in order to understand the whole process, we should look at how Japan has been exercising its status as the ‘regional intellectual hegemon’ (RIH) in Southeast Asia.

RIH is a framework that applies the norm life cycle framework to understand Japan’s intellectual contributions to East Asia. First, at the norm emergence stage, RIH looks at how the norm entrepreneurs in Japan work simultaneously or collaboratively to construct certain ideas and norms through connections between people (e.g. officials and intellectuals) and governmental agencies. The norm entrepreneurs that collaborate can collectively be called ‘RIH’. It also looks at the norm cascade process, particularly how RIH cascades ideas and norms through publications, meetings, conferences, research results, and capacity-building programmes. Finally, it looks at how ideas and norms are interpreted and internalised into the development schemes of each country and of various international organisations.

The intellectual contributions require financial support because academic research and development utilise financial capital to facilitate their activities. Japan’s Ministry of Finance (MOF) allocates a significant amount of financial support through ODA, which mainly focuses on Southeast Asian development. This thesis will, thereby, utilise RIH to understand how the Japanese government allocates its ODA to contribute to Southeast Asian development and how the contributions constitute Japan’s position as the intellectual leader in Southeast Asia. To do so, this thesis selects ASEAN’s regional transport development as a case study because it is one of the top bilateral and multilateral co-operation themes between Japan and Southeast Asia. We will see in Chapter 4 that Japan has been helping Southeast Asia to construct regional development schemes through use of the research conducted by Japanese government-funded think tanks. One of the most dynamic issues of the regional development scheme is regional transport development. Japan, China, and the U.S. have been supporting the development of regional transport in Southeast Asia because it is considered to be one of the critical factors that play a pivotal role in the economic regionalisation process in Southeast Asia (Bhattacharyay, 2010a, 2010b; Nakano, 2015).

To summarise, I will analyse why and how the Japanese government contributes to and engages in Southeast Asian transport development through provision of financial support to ERIA, IDE-JETRO and ADBI. The Japanese
government has been allocating its ODA to support the work of these three research organisations to intellectually construct a ‘practical knowledge’ embedded with the norms of regional transport development, and to cascade it to publications, meetings, conferences, research-related activities, and capacity-building programmes. I will analyse Japan’s foreign policy toward Southeast Asia (see Chapter 4) while scrutinizing the intellectuals’ professional and institutional connections (see Chapter 5 and 6).

1.1.1 Regional Connectivity

Regional connectivity catalyses inclusive economic activities because it generates linkages between terrains by the connection of physical infrastructure (JBIC, 2005, p. 2). Along with the improvement of infrastructure, it also conveys broader and deeper co-operation among involved actors, for example, the enhancement and standardisation of regulations and laws to support economic activities along the connections. Nakao Takehiko, President of ADB, states that infrastructure investment is one of the most ‘essential conditions’ for economic development in Asia (Nakao, 2015). This reflects that ADB recognises the vitality of the enhancement of infrastructure development.

States, regional co-operations, and organisations expect that regional connectivity will bring economic opportunities to the poor, eliminate poverty, support private manufacturers, and bring economic prosperity to the region (World Bank, 2017, p. 30). Regional connectivity in Southeast Asia is supported politically, financially, and/or intellectually not merely by the governments in the region, but also by external actors (such as ERIA, IDE-JETRO and ADBI) and the governments of external actors (such as Japan, China, the US, South Korea, India).

The regional transport infrastructure needs ideas to support and sustain it. The support must come from the domestic and international authorities that have the power and influence to plan, implement, monitor, and control the development. At the domestic level, infrastructure-development-related offices exist in every country. Moreover, at the international level, international organisations and international co-operation also have roles to play in this respect.

One of the most active and significant contributors to infrastructure development is ADBI – the research arm of the Asia Development Bank (ADB). ADBI states that the development of infrastructure will foster economic activities by
lowering production costs and add more value to the products and services because it amalgamates existing networks into comprehensive linkages. In other words, it expands global production networks (Brooks, 2009). This recognition can also be seen in the World Bank’s *The Status of Infrastructure Services in East Asia and the Pacific* (2017), which estimates that a 10 per cent increase in infrastructure development would contribute to 1 per cent economic growth in the long run (World Bank, 2017, p. 31). ADB and ADBI’s *Infrastructure for Seamless Asia* (2009) also states that while Asia has more than 900 million people, it needs to better develop its infrastructure to improve people’s living standard as 1.5 billion still cannot access basic sanitation, 640 million cannot access clean water, and 930 million still live without electricity. The advancement of people’s living standard can be achieved through the enhancement of regional connectivity to reduce the cost of regional trade, promote regional integration, reduce poverty, narrow the development gap, promote more efficient use of regional resources, promote sustainable development, and create a single Asian market (ADB & ADBI, 2009, pp. 22-23).

Japan’s contributions to Southeast Asian connectivity come in two forms. The first one is allocation of ODA and other political assistance. The second is from the intellectual research contributions via research organisations in Japan and Southeast Asia. These intellectual contributions constructed ideas of development and knowledge of connectivity. ADB is an example of an international organisation that promotes connectivity by providing financial assistance and technical assistance to recipient countries. One of the most progressive projects under the supervision of ADB is the Greater Mekong Subregion (GMS) Economic Co-operation Programme (hereafter ‘the GMS Programme’) which was initiated in 1992. The GMS Programme aims to support the construction and the improvement of hard and soft infrastructure in the GMS area that comprises Myanmar, Laos, Thailand, Cambodia, Vietnam, and two provinces in the southern part of China (Yunnan Province and Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region). Since its inauguration, the development of hard infrastructure, especially the development of transport networks in the region, gained significant attention from the GMS Programme (ADB & ADBI, 2009, p. 35). Since 2000, three main economic corridors were proposed and constructed in mainland Southeast Asia, including the East-West Economic Corridor (EWEC), the North-South Economic Corridor (NSEC) and the Southern Economic Corridor (SEC). These corridors are expected by their members to facilitate and accelerate
cross-border economic activities in the subregion (ADB & ADBI, 2009, p. 89; ADBI, 2015, pp. 56-57; Ishida, 2008, p. 116) (see Chapter 4 and 5).

Another scheme that was initiated to help the connectivity in the region is ‘ASEAN Regional Connectivity’. Before 2009, ASEAN had never initiated an inclusive and comprehensive plan for the connectivity in the region. However, this changed in 2009 during the 15th ASEAN Summit in Hua Hin, Thailand, when the Thai government, under the then incumbent Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva, proposed the idea of constructing regional linkages in the meeting. ASEAN leaders agreed to adopt the Statement on ASEAN Connectivity after the 15th ASEAN Summit. The ASEAN Connectivity plan was developed into the ‘Master Plan on ASEAN Connectivity’ (MPAC), which outlines an inclusive infrastructure development plan for transportation and other relevant facilities in the region. Until March 2019, there were two MPACs. The first MPAC was officially submitted and adopted during the 17th ASEAN Summit in 2010 by ASEAN regional member states, anticipating that the MPAC would help to build inclusive regional connectivity within the entire region, not only within mainland Southeast Asia (ASEAN, 2011). This would also facilitate and strengthen the formation of the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC). MPAC intends to build a wide range of networks throughout the region, standardise cross-border trade regulations, and facilitate the free flow of people (Das, 2013b, pp. 5-6). This project requires comprehensive collaboration between regional governments, the business sector, various stakeholders, and local communities to join discussions regarding the plan and its potential impacts. Along with the planning of regional connectivity programmes, the governments, the private sector, and external regional actors are also involved in the planning of physical and institutional development in Southeast Asia.

MPAC 2010’s strategic plans cover three main areas of connectivity, including physical connectivity, institutional connectivity, and the connectivity of people (see Chapter 5). It seeks to help the region connect, both physically and institutionally, while supporting people’s mobilisation throughout the region.

After the launch of the first MPAC in 2010, the Japanese government engaged in cooperative activities and initiated supportive schemes to complement the MPAC’s strategic plans (see Chapter 5). The MPAC 2010 was to be implemented between 2010 and 2015, and when this phase ended, the ‘Master Plan on ASEAN Connectivity 2025’ (hereafter ‘MPAC 2025’) was signed and adopted in 2016 by
ASEAN member states in Vientiane, Laos. MPAC 2025 aims to continue the goals of MPAC 2010, i.e. to link the region together through physical infrastructure and institutional development and to support people-to-people connectivity. However, ASEAN was confronted with many challenges that constrained connectivity, such as financial support, demography, class, urbanisation, and political issues. International and domestic political dynamics have forced ASEAN to integrate multi-dimensional concerns regarding ASEAN connectivity (ASEAN, 2016a). Accordingly, MPAC 2025 outlines broader and deeper resolutions to address such challenges and concerns. It seeks to deal with sustainable infrastructure, digital innovation, seamless logistics, regulatory excellence, and mobility of people (ASEAN, 2016a; Cheen, 2018) (see Section 5.2 of Chapter 5). Aiming to address these constraints, the ASEAN Secretariat, ASEAN member states, and external countries, such as Japan, China, the US and India, have proposed to support and assist ASEAN to further develop regional transport in line with MPAC 2025.

1.1.2 Japan and Hard and Soft Infrastructure Development in Southeast Asia

As mentioned earlier, the Japanese government has been supporting regional transport development by providing financial and technical support for large infrastructure projects because the Japanese government is aware that the improvement of infrastructure will induce industrialisation and, in turn, improve the Japanese economy (Söderberg, 2012). When we look back to the starting point of the Japanese government’s engagement in regional transport development, we can see that the Japanese government stepped in around 1945. The post-war US-dominated system has triggered Japan-Southeast Asia relations, as the US government aimed to contain communism it supported regional economic co-operation in various parts of the world (Borden, 1984, pp. 18-21). The US government also wanted to link Japan and Southeast Asia together to make Southeast Asia an accessible market for Japan. This led to the creation of regional organisations and initiatives, such as the ADB (1966), ASEAN (1967), and the GMS Programme (1992) (see Chapter 4). The US and Japanese governments anticipated that such programmes would support economic development in Southeast Asia through infrastructure development.

Ideas and norms of how regional transport should develop come from many sources. For example, the ideas and norms of Southeast Asian infrastructure and
transport development were created by local communities, universities, research institutes, governments, superpowers, and international organisations. Norms of regional transport include the ideas of globalisation, free flow of goods and services, trade facilitation, and liberalisation. They are constructed, emphasised, cascaded, and internalised into various Southeast Asian governments’ transport development schemes, and that of the ASEAN Secretariat (see Chapter 3 and 6).

The development of infrastructure supports economic development as it is expected that such development will reduce poverty and improve the living standard of local people (Kessides, 1993). The expectations do not, nonetheless, come merely from Southeast Asian countries, but also from the ASEAN Secretariat and the Japanese government. One of the reflections on this can be seen in Private Sector Perspectives in the Greater Mekong Subregion, published by the United Nations (UN) in 2000. It states that Japanese businesses and companies recognised the importance of the development of hard infrastructure, both in Southeast Asia and the GMS area. They proposed that an approachable economic environment was required for better business operation, so they placed requests with regional governments and asked the Japanese national government to engage with development in the region. Companies such as the Honda Motor Co., the Hitachi Ltd., the Itochu Corp., the Mitsui & Co., the Electric Power Develop Co., the Federation of Economic Organisations (Nippon Keidanren), and the Japanese Chamber of Commerce and Industry (JCCI) strongly stress that the improvement of hard infrastructure in the region must be supported and improved as fast as possible (UN, 2000, pp. 111-127).

At present, the Japanese government’s attempts to engage in and contribute to infrastructure construction regularly appear in official documents, especially in Japan’s ODA White Paper. For example, the 2011 ODA White Paper states that following the Great East Japan Earthquake in 2011, strong economic growth in Southeast Asia would help Japanese economic recovery and reconstruction (MOFA, 2011, p. 18). The revitalisation and construction of regional connectivity in Southeast Asia, therefore, are significant factors for the activities of Japanese companies in the region (MOFA, 2011, p. 9). In this sense, Southeast Asian economic, political, and security issues are closely connected with the Japanese economy. The linkages between economic relations and Japan’s foreign policy in Southeast Asia are one of the crucial factors that determine official relations between the two regions.
Japanese government agencies, such as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA), METI, the Ministry of Finance (MOF), JICA, and Japan External Trade Organisation (JETRO) have contributed significantly to the MPAC. They facilitate the meetings, provide financial support, and create mechanisms, such as the Japanese Task Force, to support ASEAN Connectivity and to foster collaboration between Japan and the ASEAN Connectivity Coordination Committee (ACCC) (see Chapter 5).

The endeavours made by Japanese governmental agencies were executed through official mechanisms and platforms. Meanwhile, the intellectuals (e.g. university professors and researchers) also help the government officials to construct and disseminate ideas and knowledge through the work of research organisations in order to justify certain ideas and make the most of their expertise.

1. 1. 3 International Research Organisations (IROs) and Regional Development

Apart from Japan’s contributions to regional transport development in Southeast Asia, research organisations also contribute intellectually to the decision-making process. Prominent research centres in East Asia that contribute to ASEAN Connectivity include ERIA, IDE-JETRO, and ADBI. Their research mainly focuses on macro-economics and regional economies of Southeast Asia and Asia. They have various research topics and themes that are concentrated on spatial economics, political issues, development studies, finance, small-medium enterprises (SMEs), education development, social aspects of development, and the development of infrastructure as a tool to support economic development. They ask questions about how to improve the international transportation and logistics networks in the region, how to facilitate access to natural resources, and how to create a viable market and exterminate obsolete or deficient regulations or laws on cross-border trade.

ERIA and IDE-JETRO were inaugurated, financed, and supported by the Japanese government. ERIA is an organisation that was established by METI and currently works closely with IDE-JETRO. ERIA has been receiving a significant number of financial contributions from METI, which receives financial support from Japan’s MOF. IDE-JETRO also collaborates with METI, which has been supporting IDE-JETRO since its establishment. METI anticipates that IDE-JETRO will conduct research that supports understanding and contributes to the knowledge of
development studies in Japan and Asia. ADBI is a research body of the ADB, which the Japanese and US governments have significantly supported (Dutt, 1977, 2001; Krasner, 1982; Yasutomo, 1983) (see Chapter 5).

The close relations between the Japanese government and ERIA, IDE-JETRO, and ADBI provide opportunities for the Japanese government to influence these organisations. ‘Influencing’ here refers to the ability to affect the judgements made within the organisation and the ability to dominate the direction of its activities including research themes or topics of research activities. The need for financial support paves the way for the Japanese government to become involved. The Japanese government’s support of the establishment and financial matters of these organisations controls the research trends and agendas of ERIA, IDE-JETRO, and ADBI. In example, one of the agendas studied by the ERIA, IDE-JETRO, and ADBI is Southeast Asian regional connectivity.

ERIA, IDE-JETRO, and ADBI support the idea of commencing regional connectivity. Generally, these three research bodies can be categorised as ‘think tanks’. Rich (2004) defines think tanks as “independent, non-interest-based, non-profit organisations” (Rich, 2004, p. 11 cited in Maslow, 2013, p. 300) that contribute to the production and dissemination of knowledge and ideas that are accumulated from research and then use them to “influence policy-making process” (Rich, 2004, p. 11 cited in Maslow, 2013, p. 300). However, ‘think tank’ is a very ambiguous concept. It has been widely used to describe a research entity, or non-partisan, non-profit organisation and signifies an organisation that aims to propose ideas or suggestions to policymakers (Stone, 1996, 2004a, 2004b; Weaver, 1989). Yet, knowledge-based and research-based organisations exist in various forms and function in different ways. Their legal status can vary from independent research organisations (e.g. ERIA, ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute), government-related organisations (e.g. IDE-JETRO, the Japan International Co-operation Agency Research Institute (JICA-RI), or research bodies of international organisations (e.g. ADBI). Additionally, the word ‘think tank’ also signifies the institutionalisation of the research body. It stresses formality and institutionalisation and together de-emphasises the fact that they could work collectively as research networks. The characteristics of ERIA, IDE-JETRO, and ADBI are slightly different from the orthodox definition of think tanks.
The orthodox definitions and characteristics of think tanks are dominated by the work on Western think tanks, which focus on regime dissemination (Carnoy, 1984; Domhoff, 1983; Newsom, 1996; Pautz, 2011; Stone, 1996). However, ERIA, IDE-JETRO, and ADBI’s works, publications, and research-related activities simultaneously generate a practical set of knowledge that supports the economic and political objectives of Japan towards Southeast Asia. ERIA, IDE-JETRO, and ADBI work by forming professional and institutional connections between intellectuals and organisations in the region to cascade practical knowledge constructed by researchers to the officials in Southeast Asia.

To understand the characteristics of ERIA, IDE-JETRO, and ADBI, I propose that we call them ‘international research organisations’ (IROs). The concept of IROs here in this research is slightly different from the concept of think tanks, which have been elaborated on in existing literature (Stone 1996; Weaver 1989). The ultimate objectives of think tanks are to study issues and give policy recommendations or influence the decision-making process in the affiliated countries or territories. IDE-JETRO is a national think tank in this case, as it is a research body that is associated with JETRO, which is also affiliated with METI. However, the cases of ADBI and ERIA are different. ADBI is a research body within the ADB, whilst ERIA is an international research organisation is not affiliated with any particular governmental organisations. Still, ERIA’s revenue is provided by IDE-JETRO. The main characteristic that the three research organisations share is their institutionalisation, but their objectives and affiliations are different. It is, therefore, problematic to generalise what organisations should be called think tanks, particularly when some do not consider themselves think tanks. IDE-JETRO firmly states that they are not a think tank and that they do not help the Japanese government with the policy-making process.

How were those IROs influenced by the Japanese government? How did those influences affect infrastructure development trajectories in Southeast Asia? These questions cannot be answered by state-centric theories. Albeit structural realists offer us a lens to understand the role of the Japanese government in Southeast Asia by focusing on the philanthropist role, structural realism still cannot provide us with a lens to further comprehend the role of the Japanese government toward IROs that are capable of constructing the norms of development. Social constructivism offers a promising tool in the discipline of IR, as it opens the floor for discussion
about the normative roles of superpowers and transformations in certain areas and issues. In the case of this thesis, the development of international transport and cross-border trade regulations in Southeast Asia could gain tremendous benefit from the contribution of social constructivism. As what we have seen from the previous section, the Japanese government has the *structural power* to influence IROs, and Japanese national interests are translated and interpreted into Southeast Asia’s regional objectives. From this perspective, not only is *national interest* socially constructed (Wendt, 1999), but *regional interest* is as well. Nevertheless, to legitimise regional interests, authority is necessary to push them forward and to act on their behalf. In this case, knowledge from norms-embedded research gains legitimacy.

To understand the ends and the means of the Japanese government *vis-à-vis* Southeast Asia regarding regional transport development, we need to understand Japanese politics and foreign policy (see Section 4.2 of Chapter 4). The domestic politics of Japan that we need to comprehend by pluralistic approach. This can be done by integrating the understanding of Japanese intellectuals and think tanks that also play vital role in helping the Japanese government to think about foreign policy. This suggests that Japanese foreign policy is constructed through one main process, with many participants including government agencies, the business sector, political parties, media, think tanks, and research communities (Hook et al., 2012; Zakowski et al., 2018). This thesis pays particular attention to the Japanese government’s role in ERIA, IDE-JETRO, and ADBI by analysing how the Japanese government influences the research conducted by these three IROs and how the research could influence the development of international transport in Southeast Asia.

Furthermore, I seek to analyse the requests from Japanese companies, particularly those that have factories in Southeast Asia, because such requests play a vital role in the foreign policy-making process. The requests of the Japanese Chamber of Commerce (JCC) in Southeast Asia, and of other Japanese companies, may be reflected in MOFA or METI, two organisations that implement foreign policy. Foreign policy would then be translated into policy recommendations that would be given to ERIA, IDE-JETRO and ADBI.

This thesis will study the roles of ERIA, IDE-JETRO and ADBI as norm entrepreneurs, along with MOFA, METI, JETRO, and JICA, that construct the norms of international transport and attempt to disseminate these norms through research
(see Figure 1 in Chapter 3). At the same time, supporting the research and simultaneously working closely with the IROs, the Japanese government also implements policy through use of its ODA via JICA. The norms, then, are not only suggested to Southeast Asian governments, but also to the ASEAN Secretariat.

To summarise, as we have seen thus far, the ideas of Southeast Asian regional transport development were constructed through the work of norm entrepreneurs including ERIA, IDE-JETRO, and ADBI, which work with MOFA, METI, MOF, JICA, JETRO. They constructed ideas and norms pertaining to regional transport in order to support regional linkages. The norms support the vista of development in the region and give hope to countries that accept these norms. In this respect, I argue that Japan is a RIH in Southeast Asia, as it can influence norm construction within the IROs and can use IROs as tools to influence developmental paths in Southeast Asia.

1.2 Research Questions

As pointed out above, this thesis endeavours to analyse the relations between the Japanese government and ERIA, IDE-JETRO, and ADBI. There are three main research questions that this thesis aims to answer:

1. Why has the Japanese government been supporting the development of regional transport infrastructure in Southeast Asia?
2. How can we utilise Finnemore and Sikkink’s norm life cycle framework to analyse how Japan constructed and cascaded the norms of regional development in the research conducted by ERIA, IDE-JETRO, and ADBI?
3. How are these norms internalised in domestic and regional transport development schemes in Southeast Asia?

Sub-research questions are:

1. What are the ideas and norms of regional transport development that ERIA, IDE-JETRO, and ADBI constructed; and why?
2. How were the ideas and norms of regional transport development constructed and cascaded through professional and institutional connections?
1.3 Aims

This thesis aims to analyse four areas, including:

1. *The understanding of Japan’s intellectual role in Southeast Asia:* As this thesis seeks to analyse Japan-Southeast Asia relations, it will investigate not only the economic and political relations, but also Japan’s intellectual contribution, which helped Southeast Asian governments and the ASEAN Secretariat to conceive of the idea of regional connectivity. This will provide the research with a broader understanding of how the Japanese government endeavours to utilise its economic strength to support intellectual contributions, which in turn help the Japanese economy (see Chapter 4). Moreover, as this thesis seeks to analyse Japan's engagement in Southeast Asian transport development, Chapter 6 provides an in-depth look at how the Japanese government plans to link Southeast Asia, particularly the GMS area, to South Asia; and how these linkages will help Japan to achieve its economic and political interests in Asia.

2. *The understanding of how IROs work with Japanese government agencies:* The work and contributions of ERIA, IDE-JETRO, and ADBI are briefly mentioned in the existing literature, which states that the Japanese government supported their establishment. Nevertheless, intellectual contributions of ERIA, IDE-JETRO, and ADBI in the existing literature are still underexplored. This thesis will study how the intellectuals, including university professors and researchers, work with MOFA, METI, other government agencies, and researchers in Southeast Asia. This will help us to see the linkages between professional and institutional connections that the intellectuals have formed, as well as how these connections support Japan’s foreign policy (see Chapter 5 and 6). This thesis will obtain the relative information from interviews with staff members of MOFA, METI, JICA, JETRO, ERIA, IDE-JETRO, and ADBI, which will help us to understand their opinions and their research experience.

3. *Theoretically:* This thesis will apply Finnemore and Sikkink’s norm life cycle framework, positing Japan as a norm entrepreneur, by examining the relations between intellectuals of ERIA, IDE-JETRO, and ADBI and officials of MOFA, METI, JETRO, JICA, and researchers in Southeast Asia.
This application will show how the norms are constructed, while Chapter 6 will point out some sui generis issues in the process of norm cascading from this thesis’s case study.

4. Area studies: This thesis will give another example of how the regional transport development schemes of Southeast Asia were developed and supported by Japan. This will help us to see the dynamics of development in Southeast Asia, as well as the role of a superpower such as Japan and how it can contribute to regional development.

1.4 Structure of the Thesis

This thesis is arranged according to the following structure. Chapter 2 will review four sets of existing literature, including Japan’s foreign policy-making process, norms and development norms, Japan as norm entrepreneur in Southeast Asia, and think tanks and the development of norms. The first set is the review of Japan’s foreign policy-making process. It will draw attention to the existing literature on how Japan’s foreign policy is formulated by emphasizing Japan’s domestic politics. The second set is the review of how the literature on norms has been studied. It will start by reviewing the existing literature on norms. Then, it will elaborate Finnemore and Sikkink’s norm life cycle (1998) and exemplify the literature that has applied the norm life cycle framework. It will point out the main gap in norm life cycle literature, which is that the role of think tanks and intellectuals has not been studied in-depth. After that, it will review the literature on Japan as a norm entrepreneur in Southeast Asia. It will first look at the literature that has applied social constructivism to comprehend Japan’s role in Southeast Asia. After that, it will elaborate on the existing literature that designates Japan as a norm entrepreneur. It will additionally highlight the point at which this thesis can contribute to the understanding of Japan’s role as a norm entrepreneur in Southeast Asia. Finally, it will review the literature on think tanks. This section will provide explanations of the existing definitions and characteristics of think tanks. It will then elaborate on how the definitions and characteristics should be expanded to help us understand more about ERIA, IDE-JETRO, and ADBI.

Chapter 3 is the thesis’ analytical framework. As we have seen the reviews of the existing literature on norm life cycle and Japan’s role in Southeast Asia in
Chapter 2, this chapter will explain how this thesis applies the norm life cycle framework to analyse norm emergence and the processes of cascading and internalisation. This chapter will show a figure, which highlights the norm entrepreneurs in the norm emergence process so that we can see which agencies will be studied in the thesis. Moreover, it will explain the research methodology, elaborating on the documentary research and in-depth interviews that I conducted in 2016. The chapter will then explain the other two main arguments of the thesis. Firstly, it will expand on the definition and characteristics of IROs. I will endeavour to show the distinction between ‘think tanks’ and ‘IROs’ and how the IROs construct ‘practical knowledge’. The next section of this chapter will be about intellectuals and foreign-policy making. I will discuss the importance of bringing ‘intellectuals’ into the analytical framework and how this thesis is going to integrate intellectuals’ contributions to Japan’s foreign policy by utilising the data and opinions from my field research to help me in the analytical process.

Chapter 4 is focused on Japan-ASEAN relations since 1945. This chapter will answer the main question of this thesis: what are the motives behind the Japanese government’s support of regional transport development in Southeast Asia? This chapter is divided into the main three sections. The first section is the international background of Japan-ASEAN relations. It will explain the structure of the international system since 1945 and how this structure shaped the relations between Japan and Southeast Asia. The second section will investigate the dynamics of Japan’s domestic politics. It will start with the importance of Southeast Asia to the Japanese economy, followed by the role of the business sector in Japan’s foreign policy. The third section will be about Japan’s foreign policy towards Southeast Asia. It will study the role of Japan’s ODA and the governmental relations between Japan and regional organisations, which are ASEAN and the GMS. This chapter will provide the background of Japan-ASEAN relations so that we can comprehend how and why the Japanese government is interested in Southeast Asian regional transport development.

Chapter 5 is about Japan’s contribution and engagement in ASEAN’s MPAC. This chapter will try to answer the second sub-question of this thesis: how have the Japanese government and ERIA, IDE-JETRO, and ADBI worked together to develop regional transport networks in Southeast Asia? This chapter will start with the historical background of the development of MPAC by emphasising the role of
the ASEAN Secretariat. After that, it will explain how the Japanese government contributes to the work of MPAC. Next, it will study the roles of ERIA, IDE-JETRO, and ADBI in MPAC. Lastly, it will explain the background of the three institutes and their organisational structures so that we can understand the politics behind the work of these three IROs.

Chapter 6 is on Japan’s role in the norm life cycle of Southeast Asian transport development. This chapter will answer the remaining three questions of this thesis: how Japan, as a RIH, contributes to and shapes certain ‘norms of development’ – including the development of transport infrastructure – in the research conducted by ERIA, IDE-JETRO, and ADBI? To what extent are transport networks influenced by norms of development and especially those norms advanced by ERIA, IDE-JETRO, and ADBI? How have the Japanese government and ERIA, IDE-JETRO, and ADBI worked together to develop regional transport networks in Southeast Asia? This chapter, thus, is divided into four sections. The first section will look at the norm construction process. It will analyse how the professional and institutional connections between intellectuals in Japanese government agencies, universities, and IROs were formed. It will then analyse the norm cascade process. It will additionally analyse the power of publications, research, trainings, and capacity-building programmes. After that, it will analyse the norm internalisation process by looking at how the ideas and norms of regional transport constructed by ERIA, IDE-JETRO, and ADBI were translated into ASEAN’s regional transport development schemes.

Chapter 7 is the conclusion of the thesis. It will summarise the research findings by presenting the analyses in four main sections. The first is the analyses of Japan as a RIH. It will explain how the thesis’s analytical framework helps us to understand Japan's regional intellectual role and how this understanding helps us to further comprehend the role of Japan in Southeast Asia. Next, it will summarise how the research findings on ERIA, IDE-JETRO, and ADBI help us to comprehend the role of research entities in the international system and how this understanding might contribute to future research. After that, it will summarise how Japan helps Southeast Asia to have a shared understanding and vision of regional transport development, which helps not only Southeast Asia to have a common regional transport development plan, but also helps Japan to achieve its economic and political interests in the region. Finally, I will explain this thesis’s contributions to the IR discipline,
then propose the implications for future research development by discussing the research methodology and research themes or issues that could be investigated further.
2.1 Introduction

To understand the process of how Japan contributes to the ideas and norms of regional transport development schemes, this chapter starts by looking at how the existing literature in the field of International Relations (IR) has explained the importance of ideas and norms. This chapter reviews the relevant literature, which can be categorised into four groups. The first group is the literature on Japan’s foreign policy making. This part seeks to elaborate the existing literature on Japan’s politics and foreign policy, and how IR scholarship explains Japan’s foreign policy. It also explores how the existing literature explains Japan’s role in Southeast Asia from different theoretical perspectives. The last part of this section will point out how the existing studies on Japan’s model of foreign policy making could be improved as the existing studies are not pluralistic enough. The second group is the literature on the role of norms in international relations. It starts by exploring how realism, liberalism, and social constructivism explain Japan’s foreign policy. It points out the emphasises of each theory and states why social constructivism can help us to comprehend Japan’s role in Southeast Asia. After that, it studies the literature on IR theories of Japan-Southwest Asia relations and their contributions to the study of norms in IR. This helps us to understand the existing literature that explains how norms can influence development, especially how the norms of infrastructure development can contribute to regional economic integration. The third group is the literature on the role of Japan as a ‘norm entrepreneur’ in the international system. This part reviews how the existing literature has applied the norm life cycle framework to understand the role of Japan in different contexts, such as anti-whaling and UN decisions. However, the existing literature focuses on the process of norms creation and has not explained how individuals, such as intellectuals and officials, are involved in the norms creation process. The fourth group is the literature on the engagement and influence of think tanks in the international system. This section studies the definition and characteristics of think tanks as explained in the existing literature, pointing out characteristics that have
been left unexplained. As a result, the analysis will determine how this thesis expands upon the current understanding of ‘think tanks’ in Japan and Southeast Asia.

2.2. Japan’s Foreign Policy Making and Its Relations with Southeast Asia

This section explores the existing literature focused on Japan’s foreign policy, as explained using different IR theories, including structural realism, neoliberal institutionalism, and social constructivism. It explains how the existing studies have applied these theories to explain Japan’s foreign policy. After that, it elaborates on the strengths and weaknesses of each theory and points out the reasons why this thesis decided to use social constructivism in order to explain Japan-Southeast Asia relations. Finally, it revisits the existing model of Japan’s foreign policy making.

2.2.1 Realism

In the study of foreign policymaking processes, realism seems to gain attention from scholars as it focuses on materialistic power and national interests, which is what practitioners are particularly concerned with. Realism emphasises power relations in the international system and how such relations create the conditions for power distribution. IR scholarship demonstrates how realism dominates the way that the state thinks about its foreign policy, in terms of obtaining and exercising power to serve its own interests. For classical realists, human nature is the primary source of conflict (Carr, 1939; Morgenthau, 1978), and because humans strive for power, this leads to power-seeking behaviour (Elman, 2007, p. 12). As every state has its own power and sovereignty, there is no central authority. This condition is called ‘anarchy’. Furthermore, classical realism, as described by Jackson and Sørensen (2010, p. 59), has four fundamental assumptions: (1) human nature is evil, and accordingly, the classical realist is pessimistic; (2) international relations is always conflictual because human nature is evil; (3) states always seek power and national interests; and (4) there is progress in international politics just like progress in domestic politics.

Expanding upon the argument of classical realists, which is focused on the nature of the state and anarchy, structural realists add that the international system is the most critical factor for peace and stability (Jørgensen, 2010, p. 84).
international system of anarchy encourages states to pursue power and assert their dominance (Mearsheimer, 2014; Viotti & Kauppi, 2012; Waltz, 1979). Various assumptions can be made from classical realism and structural realism, as shown by Viotti and Kauppi’s (2012, pp. 35-42) statement that there are four principle assumptions of realism. First, both classical and structural realism believe that the international system is anarchic. Second, the state is viewed as a unitary actor, just as Zakowski (2018, p. 1) explains that the studies of states’ behaviour treats states as ‘black boxes’, reflecting that their national interests are definable. Third, the state is assumed as a rational actor because the state is assumed – as previously mentioned – to have national interests and objectives, and thus, will act rationally to reach its goals. Finally, as the international system is anarchic, the state will do anything to protect its security. Hence, both national and international security is prioritised.

We have seen from the above how realism perceives the world. In the context of Japan’s foreign policy, Sato and Hirata (2018b, p. 3) point out that structural realism has remained a dominant theory because it explains how Japan’s relations with other countries are driven by Japan’s national interests, which evolved particularly from Japan-US relations. Japan’s security- and economic-focused relations with the US shaped Japan’s international engagement after the Second World War in various ways. For example, Dobson (2003, p. 9) points out that realists’ explanations of Japan’s foreign policy focus on Japan-US bilateral relations, which developed significantly after the Second World War. Dobson explains how the international environment has had the power to influence Japan’s foreign relations since the Meiji Restoration (Dobson, 2003, p. 9). When Japan was defeated in 1945, the bilateral relations between Japan and the US developed tremendously, which led Japan to depend on the US for its security and protection (Mochizuki, 1997, p. 11). This dependency established Japan as what Calder (1988, p. 518) describes as a ‘reactive state’, or a condition in which Japan could not maintain an ‘active role’ in the international arena. Calder further explains that Japan could not aim to be a hegemonic leader due to its dependency on the US security system. Berger (2007, p. 290) reiterates this argument by stating that Japan ‘is not an independent actor’ and that Japan has its own agenda. Jain and Inoguchi (1996) also metaphorically describe Japan’s foreign policy as ‘karaoke diplomacy’, in which the US-dominated international system is the background music and all Japan has to do is follow the background music. Pyle’s Japan Rising (2007) is also a good
example of how structural realists explain how the international system shaped Japan’s domestics politics and foreign policy. Pyle pointed out that the perception of Japan as a ‘reactive country’ was based on Japan’s adaptation to its external environment after 1945 (Pyle, 2007, p. 19).

However, Sudo (2015, p. 13) argues that Japan became more ‘active’ around the end of the 1990s when the financial crisis hit East Asia. The Japanese government took a leading role in helping East Asia to initiate financial mechanisms, such as the New Miyazawa Plan and Chiang Mai Initiative (CMI). Meanwhile, Hagström (2010) proposes that Japan is active in the international system by pointing out that Japan strives to achieve a leading role in international relations, as witnessed from both its active contributions to the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) in an effort to gain a permanent seat and its attempts to revise Article 9 of the national constitution.

Nonetheless, as the above paragraphs show, there are many debates regarding Japan’s foreign policy engagement in the world. Potter and Sueo (2003, p. 319) propose that in order to understand Japan’s role in the international system, we should alter the debate from being focused on Japan’s ‘reactive’ or ‘active’ status to instead focus on other theoretical debates. They propose that as “Japan was never completely reactive or passive” (Potter & Sueo, 2003, p. 320) and we have witnessed the growing role of Japan in the world, there are many ways to think of Japan’s foreign policy. For example, Hook et al. (2001) refers to Japan’s diplomacy in the world as ‘quiet diplomacy’, or a more low-key diplomacy. Meanwhile, the ‘reluctant realism’ perspective proposed by Green (2003) emphasises Japan’s changing role in the post-Cold War era, showing that Japan has been seeking a more active role, but remains ‘reluctant’ to commit to an independent role.

The study of Japan’s foreign policy towards Southeast Asia is dominated by structural realism. The existing structural realism-influenced literature on Japan-Southeast Asia shows that the dynamics of the international system have shaped Japan’s relations towards Southeast Asia in different ways, including Japan’s proactive role within Southeast Asia and Japan’s leading role in Southeast Asian regionalisation processes. The former focuses on the more active role of Japan within Southeast Asia, including Japan’s official development assistance (ODA) allocation to the region. For example, Katada (2002b) and Miyashita (1999) look at how the role of Japan in East Asia had decreased significantly before it re-emerged again when the Japanese government started giving financial assistance to Southeast Asian
countries instead of paying war reparations. For some scholars, the Japanese government has supported many economic mechanisms and co-operations at various levels throughout the region. In terms of bilateral relations, the Japanese government has granted economic assistance to developing and underdeveloped countries via official mechanisms, such as ODA (Kato et al., 2016; Rix, 1993a, 1993b; Söderberg, 2011). Hale (2008, p. 64) states that the Japanese government’s decision to start granting ODA to Southeast Asian countries helped Japan to obtain a leading status in Southeast Asia. At the regional level, Japan also supports economic multilateralism in both Northeast and Southeast Asia by supporting and facilitating the establishment of economic co-operation, particularly during the regional financial crises of 1997 and 2008 (Otsuji & Shinoda, 2014; Severino, 2014; Thuzar, 2014).

Nonetheless, focusing on economic and political tools and objectives leave some questions remaining, such as how and why Southeast Asia and the ASEAN Secretariat accepted the ideas and assistance from Japan; and how the Japanese government managed to propose solutions to certain issues (e.g. regional financial co-operation, infrastructure development through ODA).

As previously mentioned, structural realism also focuses on Japan’s contributions to the Southeast Asian economic regionalisation process after 1945. This set of literature emphasises Japan’s materialistic power after the Second World War in its observations of Japan’s active role in Southeast Asia. For instance, Fukushima (2009) states that Japan tried to re-engage with Asia, particularly Southeast Asia, in an effort to revive its image following the Second World War by providing ODA and supporting regional economic initiatives. Fukushima (2009, p. 112) further states that Japan’s intention to support economic regionalisation in Southeast Asia was due to economic interest, particularly Japan’s increasing trade and investment volume in Southeast Asia. Moreover, Shiraishi (1997) also explains Japan’s role using a realism-dominated perspective. Shiraishi states that Japan’s relations with Southeast Asia were developed based on US-Japan relations, and that Japan’s contribution to Southeast Asian economic regionalisation was aimed at helping Japan’s geo-political power relations with the US and to offset China. These studies, therefore, propose that the driving force of Japan’s support for Southeast Asian regionalisation was its own materialistic interest in the region.

As these two sets of literature focus on Japan’s foreign policy under the changing international system, they pay attention to material power, or economic and
political power, whilst normative factors are put aside. With a lack of understanding of the normative approach, structural realism is unable to explain how the Japanese government used its power to shape or influence the perspectives of Southeast Asian governments in the regional developmental trajectory. Structural realism pays attention to material power, but it does not pay attention to how the country’s leading status can shape or influence other actors’ perceptions and understandings. Moreover, structural realism tends to downplay the role of other actors in society, including think tanks, which have played a significant role in Japan’s foreign policy.

Thus far in this thesis, we have touched upon the materialistic power of Japan, and particularly Japan’s ODA contributions to Southeast Asia. I am aware that Japan’s ODA is one of its most vital economic and political tools, yet there is a lack of theoretical understanding regarding how ODA and the idea of Southeast Asian regional development was integrated into Japan’s ODA. In other words, how have Japan’s governmental agencies integrated the ideas of regional development into its ODA allocation scheme? How have Japan’s governmental agencies worked together to construct the ideas of how Southeast Asia should develop? Accordingly, although structural realism sets a strong foundation acknowledging the importance of Japan’s ODA, it does not provide a systematic approach to understand how the ideas of Southeast Asian development were determined and later integrated into Japan’s foreign policy.

2.2.2 Liberalism

Liberalism, on the other hand, focuses on co-operation. It starts its assumptions based on optimistic worldview. Liberalists pay attention to the domestic situation and argue that the preferences of domestic actors (e.g. private companies, non-governmental organisations (NGOs), and interest groups) are capable of shaping foreign policy (Dobson, 2003, pp. 11-10; Katagiri, 2018, p. 327; Neack, 2018, pp. 150-149; Zakowski et al., 2018, p. .2The idea of liberalism originated in Greece, with the belief that humans are rational actors. Liberalism has influenced many thinkers, including Immanuel Kant who believed that international anarchy and war could be prevented by the formation of collective action bodies, such as federations or republics (Mingst, & Arreguín-Toft, 2017, p. .83

Liberalism was adopted into the IR discipline to explain the diverse channels by which state and non-state actors engage in foreign policymaking processes. The
government, transnational actors, and domestic actors are all taken into account in order to understand how they contribute to the formulation of foreign policy. Liberalists also believe in the role of international organisations (IO) within the international system, as they believe that IOs can help to establish international order (Dobson, 2003, p. 11).

Neo-liberal institutionalism further developed the assumptions that were based on liberalism, which believes in co-operation. Neack (2018, p. 149) states that liberal institutionalism, is sometimes called ‘neoliberalism’, however, McLean (2020, p. 67) states that neo-liberalism is the main sub-branch of liberalism. Liberal institutionalism also shares the same basic assumption with structural realism that the international system is in a state of anarchy. Yet, liberal institutionalists argue that anarchy can also lead to co-operation because actors often establish international institutions to manage international co-operation, which guarantees reciprocal benefits for everyone (Neack, 2018, p. 149).

So far, this chapter has looked at the theoretical assumptions of neo-liberal institutionalism and will now turn its attention to how the existing literature has applied neo-liberal institutionalism in an effort to comprehend Japan-Southeast Asian relations. The studies that utilise neoliberal institutionalism focus on the institutions, mechanisms, and non-state actors that contribute to Japan-Southeast Asia relations. These studies look at various issues, such as regional security institutions (Kawasaki, 1997; Yuzawa, 2005) and regional economic co-operation (Tanaka, 2017; Thuzar, 2014; Verbiest, 2013).

Examples of the studies focused on regional security institutions include the works of Yuzawa (2005) and Kawasaki (1997). Yuzawa (2005, p. 466) proposes that Japan sought to establish a regional security institution in order to help secure its political role in the region and to develop regional co-operation after the Cold War. However, as regional political and security issues changed due to the rearrangement of regional politics, such as the rise of China and political rivalries between superpowers, Japan also changed its political and security approaches to Southeast Asia. The Japanese government saw the role of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) as a mechanism that could “educate Asian neighbours about the importance of military transparency for maintaining regional stability” and could help to bring “non-like-minded countries to make co-operation” (Yuzawa, 2005, p. 468). Japan also saw the potential of the ARF to help constrain China and to foster political co-
operation in an effort to cope with regional disputes and conflicts (Yuzawa, 2005, p. 468). This study shows that the Japanese government viewed the ARF as a vital regional institution that could contribute to regional security.

Kawasaki (1997, pp. 485-488) studies Japan’s political and economic objectives toward the establishment of the ARF, including the domestic actors that contributed to Japan’s foreign policy toward Southeast Asia by categorising them into three groups: idealists, realists, and liberals. Kawasaki states that the first is a group of people, including lift-wing politicians, progressive academics, and peace activists, who recognised the ARF as the first step to free Japan from the US military umbrella. Realists see the ARF as a policy mechanism to balance the power between Japan and China in Southeast Asia (Kawasaki, 1997, pp. 488-490). Liberals include representatives from the MOFA, as well as many academics and analysts who work closely with the MOFA. They see the ARF as a platform that can strengthen Japan-ASEAN relations through co-operation on common political and security interests (Kawasaki, 1997, pp. 491-494).

Studies focused on regional economic co-operation include those of Tanaka (2017), Maswood (2004), Thuzar (2014) and Verbiest (2013). These studies pay attention to Japan’s endeavours to support Southeast Asian regional financial co-operation in two different areas. The first area is Japan’s ODA contributions to Southeast Asia. For instance, Shida (2017) states that the Japanese government uses ‘values diplomacy’ to assist other countries, which refers to a values-based approach focusing on freedom, democracy, fundamental human rights, the rule of law, and a market-oriented economy (Shida, 2017, p. 2). Shida studies Japan’s economic contributions to Myanmar through its ODA allocations focused on helping Myanmar develop peoples’ livelihoods, initiating capacity building programmes, and improving infrastructure. He also studies how Japanese philanthropist organisations, such as the Nippon Foundation, have helped improve peoples’ lives in Myanmar. He states that liberalism-oriented foreign policy helped Myanmar to develop whilst simultaneously helping Japan to play a more active role in the region. Additionally, the studies on Japan’s contributions to Southeast Asian economic co-operation also pay attention to Japan’s contributions to subregional initiatives through political and economic contributions (Lam, 2013b; Ogasawara, 2015; Thuzar, 2014). For example, Verbiest (2013, p. 156) states that the Japanese government contributes to the development of the Greater Mekong Subregion (GMS) – a subregional initiative
initiated by the Asian Development Bank (ADB) in 1992 – as it is important to Japan's economy due to its geography, natural resources, and the relocation potential for Japanese production businesses. Furthermore, these studies focus on Japan's government-supported mechanisms that contribute to subregional development by elaborating on the financial and political contributions and support of the Japanese government whilst also emphasising regional institutions that facilitate co-operation (Lam, 2013b; Ogasawara, 2015; Yamamoto, 2006).

Another field of research on Japan-ASEAN relations, particularly after 1997, focuses on regional financial crises. Such crises entailed the emergence of regional economic co-operation and relative mechanisms, as Japan saw that these were necessary to cope with regional financial issues that the International Monetary Fund (IMF) did not understand because of the uniqueness of the region (Tanaka, 2017, p. 188; Maswood, 2004, p. 44). Accordingly, Japan eagerly stepped in to help the region to establish regional financial mechanisms in order to further support ASEAN economic regionalisation (Rüland, 2000; Sudo, 2015, p. 173; Terada, 2004).

Apart from the liberal-influenced studies that take domestic actors into account, there are some studies that explain Japan’s foreign relations vis-à-vis Southeast Asia by focusing on the efforts to establish international co-operation and regional initiatives. In the case of Southeast Asian economic regionalisation, Japan has contributed to and participated in such efforts quite significantly. Japan’s government, and its business community, engage in the economic and political development of Southeast Asia in many aspects. One such aspect is the allocation of financial and political support for Southeast Asian regional economic co-operation. Those contributions have supported the institutionalisation process and helped Southeast Asia to establish regional linkages, both structural and physical. This can be seen in the studies conducted by Hatch and Yamamura (1996), Kimura and Obashi (2011), and Pempel (1997), which detail Japan’s economic and political contributions to the development of regional transport networks that assist the international production networks (IPNs) within Southeast Asia. These studies look at the open market-driven incentives that drove Japan to allocate financial assistance and increased ODA to Southeast Asia in order to improve the transport networks and increase trade and investment volumes in order to further support economic facilitation and open up the business environment. This reflects how the liberal approach looks at foreign policymaking in a broader view.
In another example, Pempel (1997) looks at the role of domestic actors, such as the business sector, and sees their economic and political contributions as a tool to expand regional economic connectedness. The structural linkages include cooperation between economic and political institutions, whilst the physical linkages are those of infrastructure throughout the region. The Japanese government has played the leading role in allocating financial assistance and facilitating regional mechanisms that bring regional members together to discuss infrastructure schemes. Moreover, Japan also finances and supports research organisations within Southeast Asia to conduct research on international transport development. Hatch and Yamamura (1996) propose that Japan’s contributions to Asian production networks have helped Japan to take control of IPN development trajectories. They further emphasise how non-state actors, such as private companies, also play a role in IPN development.

Nonetheless, neo-liberal institutionalism cannot explain the reason why some states share the same ideas of regional development or regional co-operation. In other words, it is true that the international system is in an anarchic state, and, thus, that states are rational enough to evaluate the costs of co-operation. Yet, states must have a basic common understanding of their development trajectories. Therefore, while neo-liberal institutionalism can explain the reasons behind co-operation, it cannot explain how the ideas of co-operation are constructed. Where does the idea come from?

2.2.3 Social Constructivism

In the previous sections, we were introduced to studies that employed structural realism and neo-liberal institutionalism. For social constructivists, however, realism and liberalism have not given adequate explanations of ideational power in international politics. They argue that what should be taken into account is ideational power (e.g. norms, ideas, beliefs, identity formation) because the ideas of national interests are ‘socially constructed’, and thereby the understanding of how these ideas are constructed would help us to understand their potential implications and significance (Wendt, 1999, p. 5).

For social constructivism, ideas and norms play an important role in the international system. Alexander Wendt – a prominent social constructivist in IR – proposes that realism and liberalism take national interests for granted (Wendt, 1999,
pp. 233-238); accordingly, they cannot explain the circumstances under which the state may change its national interests. How did the ideas of national interests come about in the first place? How have national interests changed over time? Social constructivism agrees that states are important actors in the international system, but that there are also other actors who play significant roles and help to exchange ideas within the international system. Accordingly, subjective and intersubjective exchanges are emphasised by social constructivists (Viotti & Kauppi, 2012, p. 278). They assert that in order to understand how things are in the world – or how the ‘social facts’ (Fierke, 2010, p. 171) are constructed – we must try to understand ‘how’ these ideas are constructed and ‘who’ helped to construct them.

Social constructivism has been emerging in the field of Southeast Asian regionalism and Japan-Southeast Asia relations. For example, Acharya (2001, 2004, 2009) – a prominent social constructivist scholar who studies ASEAN regionalism – analyses ASEAN regionalisation by employing social constructivism and paying attention to the role of norms and identity in regionalisation process. Yet, Acharya has not touched upon the role of external regional powers, including the US, Japan, and China, in helping to facilitate the regional identity process or how the US, Japan, and China help Southeast Asia to construct its ideas and norms of regional development.

Social constructivists argue that realism and liberalism emphasise the importance of Japan’s materialistic power, which helped it to obtain a leading role in the international system, and its co-operative approach vis-à-vis Southeast Asia relations. For instance, Terada (2003) studies Japan’s role in the 1997 East Asian financial crisis and states that this crisis was the vital turning point in bringing the region together. When the financial crisis occurred, ASEAN, Japan, China, and South Korea recognised the importance of establishing a regional body of countries in order to help one another. Accordingly, Southeast Asian countries started to think of creating financial mechanisms and other regional projects that would support regional economic functionality (Terada, 2003). In this case, Terada’s work shows that instead of focusing on Japan’s mechanisms and national interests in helping Southeast Asia, we can turn our attention to the ideas of regional co-operation, which emerge from the idea of regional identity.

Lee (2006) studies Japan’sendeavour of establishing the Asian Monetary Fund (AMF) and states that Japan aimed to establish the AMF because it sought to
“defend the Asian model of economic development against the US-led IMF” (Lee, 2006, p. 339). Lee analysed Japan’s intentions by developing a social constructivism-influenced ‘identity-intention analytical framework’ (Lee, 2006, p. 341). This study shows that the regional initiative, which was established to tackle the financial crisis, was based on regional identity.

Another example is the work of Terada (2004), who proposes that the leading roles of Japan and China in Southeast Asian regionalism could be called ‘directional leadership’ (Terada, 2004). Terada asserts that directional leadership is a leading style based on the ability of a country to lead “other countries’ behaviour to promote collective goals” (Terada, 2004, p. 65). The constructed ideas, then, were either created by ASEAN as an international organisation, or by a leader in the region, which at the time was Japan (Terada, 2004, p. 65). Japan’s directional leadership helped ASEAN regional co-operation to expand, initiating the ASEAN+3 and East Asian Community (EAC) bodies. Earlier studies on the role of Japan in East Asian regionalism focus on Japan’s contributions to East Asian economic institutions, especially during the financial crisis of 1997, as that is considered to be the turning point of when Japan eagerly stepped in to ASEAN regionalisation (Rüland, 2000; Sudo, 2015, p. 173; Terada, 2004). Japan also contributed financial and political support by way of the Asian Monetary Fund (AMF) and Miyazawa Plan. Both schemes were later adopted as the Chiang Mai Initiative (CMI) in 2000.

Social constructivism also highlights the significance of social construction at the regional level. It focuses on the roles of social and cultural movements within the region that can unite people in a feeling of regional identity. In this respect, pop culture from Japan, China, and Korea, in addition to other cultural exchanges between East Asian countries, could help to facilitate that feeling and to form a new identity (Pempel, 2005, p. 24).

As we have seen from above, the studies based in social constructivism contend that normative power has had a significant impact on the transformation of Southeast Asia. The East Asian financial crisis triggered the feeling of a regional identity. It brought East Asian countries together to consider regional solutions and mechanisms that would support the regional economy. Albeit the existing studies that employed social constructivism have explored the power of Japan as a regional leader that helped the region to create a regional identity, they have not studied the mechanisms that Japan or ASEAN utilises to create and diffuse the norms. In other
words, it is necessary to acknowledge that norms are constructed and cascaded through various channels. What we could study more is the role of intellectuals and think tanks in Southeast Asia that have helped the region to construct these norms.

Thus far, we have seen that structural realism focuses on the international structure, which has played a significant role in shaping Japan’s foreign policy since the end of the Second World War. Structural realism helps us to focus on the transformation of the international structure. Nonetheless, the most important point that structural realism tends to overlook is that of the domestic dynamic. Neo-liberal institutionalism, thus, argues that to understand foreign policy, we need to take the role of domestic actors into account. Additionally, neo-liberal institutionalism also stresses the importance of the ideas behind development, which Japan has embedded since the end of the Second World War. Liberal-influenced studies focus on how the Japanese government consistently allocates financial support to Southeast Asia in an effort to establish physical and institutional linkages within the region. However, liberalism also has its flaws. It cannot explain how the ideas of regional development were constructed, disseminated, or embedded into other international organisations or countries. Social constructivism, thereby, provides us with a framework to explain this phenomenon. It emphasises the role of ideas, norms, and beliefs within the international system, further helping us to understand the process of how the Japanese government constructed the ideas of regional development and disseminated those ideas through international organisations.

2.2.4 Reconsidering Japan’s Foreign Policy Making

Thus far, we have seen how the existing literature explains Japan’s foreign policy. If we look at the processes of foreign policymaking, however, we will see that the existing literature addressing Japan’s foreign policy has some limits.

While the existing literature focuses on external factors, such as Japan’s relations with the US, economic interdependence, and military power, structural realism turns its focus to the international structure. As we have seen in Section 2.2.1, the literature detailing Japan’s foreign policy primarily pays attention to how Japan-US relations have impacted Japan’s ‘active’ or ‘reactive’ actions within the international community. In contrast, structural realism pays attention to how the distribution of power in the international system is managed, but it does not look into the ‘black box’. This missing point is crucial because in order to understand how
Japan’s foreign policy is formulated and further integrated with the work of other government agencies, we need to find the thinkers and collaborators. In other words, the existing literature, which pays attention to how Japan’s foreign policy is made, has not paid enough attention to the ideas underlying Japan’s foreign policy. For social constructivism, to understand how the ideas behind foreign policy are constructed is vital, as it can help us to better explain the dynamics of foreign policy.

There are various internal factors that impact Japan’s foreign policy, including domestic politics, institutional settings, policy cohesion of the Kantei (Prime Minister and his/her colleagues) (Zakowski, 2018, p. 5), and pressure groups, such as the Iron Triangle. It can be said that the existing studies of Japan’s foreign policy have not utilised the pluralism approach effectively. Although there are many domestic actors in Japanese society, there remains a significant gap in the literature to explain how domestic actors and factors play a role in Japan’s foreign policymaking processes. For example, the political-economic approach that studies Japan’s economy pays attention to the Iron Triangle, which refers to the relations between bureaucrats, politicians, and business elites (Colignon & Usui, 2001, p. 866; McCormack, 2002). The Iron Triangle reflects how the interests of each group overlap, facilitating their negotiation and collaboration. This group was formed after the Second World War and has had a significant impact on Japanese economic development (Colignon & Usui, 2001). Although these relations play an important role in Japan’s economy, their role in shaping Japan’s foreign policy has not yet been explained in-depth.

Furthermore, the role of intellectuals and think tanks is barely touched upon by the existing studies of Japan’s foreign policymaking processes. As we have seen from above, although there are many studies that explain Japan’s role within Southeast Asia, such studies have not yet touched upon how the role of intellectuals and think tanks help Japan to construct and disseminate ideas and norms to the rest of the world. Moreover, although there are many studies on the Iron Triangle, they have not explored how it has shaped or influenced Japan’s foreign policy, resulting in a large academic gap. In the case of this thesis, as Chapter 1 explains, regional transport development in Southeast Asia has been significantly supported by Japan in various ways. However, the role of intellectuals and think tanks has not been studied, particularly how these intellectuals and think tanks help the Japanese government to construct ideas and norms regarding how the region should develop.
The importance of ideas and norms is reflected in Bailey’s work (2008), which studies how the epistemic community can help foreign policy to succeed. Bailey emphasises that the lack of an epistemic community to support norms is likely one of the factors that led to the failure of the anti-whaling norm. Bailey’s work further reflects the importance of an epistemic community that can contribute to the processes of norm construction and cascading, which can help to establish a common ground in the international community. In this regard, the ideational power, material power, and power of knowledge should be taken into account together in order to understand Japan’s foreign policy from a more pluralistic approach.

Moreover, the existing studies that have paid attention to the intellectual role of Japan within the international system are limited. This can be seen in the seminal work of Hook et al. (2012, p. 32) and Zakowski et al. (2018), which touch upon the role of think tanks in foreign policymaking processes. However, Hook et al. (2012) and Zakowski et al. (2018) have not provided deep detail regarding how intellectuals are involved in the policymaking process, or how intellectuals are involved in Japan’s foreign relations. A monograph entitled ASEAN-Japan Relations, edited by Shiraishi and Kojima (2014), which focuses on Japan-ASEAN relations, is another example of how the explanations of Japan-ASEAN relations are primarily dominated by realism. This monograph looks at Japan-Southeast Asian economic and political relations by emphasizing Japan’s foreign policy and its economic and political interests. In the monograph, Severino (2014, pp. 27-28) touches upon the role of think tanks and intellectuals that have helped further the work of the Japanese government. Severino mentions the ERIA as one of the research institutions that supports East and Southeast Asian regionalism. The work of Otsuji and Shinoda (2014, p. 151) in the same monograph mentions the ERIA as one of the actors that has intellectually helped Southeast Asia to develop regional integration. However, they have not explained how the ERIA and other Japanese government-funded research institutes help to support the Japanese government’s foreign relations. They also have not paid attention to the linkages between intellectuals (e.g. professors or researchers) in Japan and other countries in Southeast Asia.

The lack of focus on the roles of intellectuals in Japan’s foreign policymaking processes can also be seen in the work of Zakowski et al. (2018), which emphasises the role of the prime minister, the MOFA and zoku – parliamentary tribes – in the Diet (Zakowski et al., 2018, Ch. 2). Zakowski et al. (2018, p. 7) instead emphasise
the relations between Japan’s central government reform and the improvement of the prime minister’s relative position vis-à-vis competitive foreign policymaking venues. Their study was conducted by examining Japan’s ministerial documents, politicians’ and bureaucrat’s memoirs, and research monographs, and by conducting interviews with decision-makers (Zakowski et al., 2018, p. 7). Through their methodology, we can see that they did not interview intellectuals who might be involved in the foreign policymaking process, or who might have the opportunity to work directly with Japan’s MOFA. These studies, therefore, reflect that the role of intellectuals and think tanks has not been thoroughly considered. Although existing studies, such as the work of Hook et al. (2012), briefly acknowledge the role of think tanks, they have yet to demonstrate how the think tanks and intellectuals (e.g. researchers, professors, or administrative staff) work to help the Japanese government form its foreign policy.

We can see that these studies focus on how Japan’s security and economic identities were shaped and transformed over a period of time, depending on the domestic and international circumstances. These studies provided us with a broad understanding regarding the importance of how norms were constructed and how they shaped Japan’s engagement in the international system. In this respect, social constructivism takes state identity into account by paying attention to the formation of identity and norms. Moreover, it helps us to understand and rethink the development of norms in international relations (Reus-Smit, 2013, p. 234). Nevertheless, these studies have their limitations. First, they have not paid attention to the agencies within and outside of Japan that may contribute to the norm construction process. Although the international structure, particularly the geopolitical superpower rivalries, were taken into account, the studies did not pay sufficient attention to other actors that also have power and influence (e.g. think tanks). Second, they have not paid attention to the processes of how norms are constructed, cascaded, and embedded into other agencies. This thesis, accordingly, will take both the international structure and the role of intellectuals and think tanks into account in an effort to apply a more pluralistic approach (see Chapter 3 for more details on the analytical framework).
2.3 Norms and Development Norms

The existing literature, which applies social constructivism within the IR discipline, focuses on the role of norms in the international system. Norms are interpreted and translated from ideas. For international organisations such as the United Nations (UN), ideas are one of the most vital driving forces in the world (Emmerrij et al., 2001, p. xi). Ideas can change the world by offering a new way of thinking about issues (Emmerrij et al., 2001, p. 3). Ideas can also be one of the most critical factors in the process of development because ideas can frame the developmental trajectory. States, international organisations, think tanks, and any established public figures can be a source of ideas. In the case of international organisations, Bøås and McNeill (2004, p. 1) contend that multilateral institutions can play an important role in ‘framing’ and ‘disseminating’ ideas of development in two ways. First, they can draw attention to important issues. Second, they can ‘determine’ how those issues should be viewed by other actors. Bøås and McNeill argue, therefore, that multilateral institutions hold the power to frame development according to the control of their main financial donors, for example how the US holds power over the IMF or World Bank.

This thesis utilises Finnemore and Sikkink’s definition of norms (1998, p. 891), which states that norms are a “standard of appropriate behaviour for actors with a given identity”. Finnemore and Sikkink argue that “norms do not appear out of thin air; they are actively built by agents having strong notions about appropriate or desirable behaviour in their community” (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998, p. 896). Another definition provided by Katzenstein (1996b, p. 5) describes norms as “collective expectations for the proper behaviour of actors with a given identity. In some situations, norms operate like rules that define the identity of an actor, thus having ‘constitutive effects’ that specify what action will cause relevant others to recognise a particular identity”. With these definitions in mind, norms help agents within the international system to obtain a set of economic or political ideas, practices, and standards to follow, such as economic liberalism, democratisation, or the protection of human rights.

Finnemore and Sikkink (1998) propose that in order to understand the meanings of objects, norms, and ideas in the international system, one must understand the ‘norm life cycle’ which comprises three stages, including norm construction, norm cascade, and norm internalisation. They explain that in the first
stage, a ‘norm entrepreneur’ will try to propose new norms to other states so that those other states can become norm followers. The ‘norm entrepreneur’ is an important agent for ‘norm emergence’ as it will persuade other agents within the structure to pay attention to certain issues. Norm entrepreneurs will try to advocate for certain ideas or issues, often aligned with their own interests. Norms at the international level will be promoted through organisational platforms, such as non-governmental organisations (NGOs) or international organisations (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998, p. 899). Organisations exercise their power to create norms by using their ‘expertise and information’ (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998, p. 899) in order to change other states’ behaviour. Finnemore and Sikkink also contend that norms are constructed within ‘organisational platforms’. They argue that “all norm promoters at the international level need some organisational platforms from and through which they promote their norms” (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998, p. 899). They state that some platforms are specifically established to construct and cascade particular norms, such as Greenpeace, the Red Cross, the World Bank, the United Nations (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998, p. 899). Organisational platforms serve as channels through which the agents can exchange their knowledge about particular issues, as the expertise helps the organisation to justify their persuasion of other actors and the subsequent changes in behaviour (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998, p. 899).

The second stage of the norm life cycle is the ‘norm cascade’ process in which norms are proposed, internalised, and socialised to other states. The norms are proposed by norm entrepreneurs (e.g. states and international organisations) during and through activities, meetings, or conferences. At this stage, norms will be introduced to other states by way of socialisation or pressuring, in hopes that they will in turn become norm followers (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998, p. 902). Norm followers will often adopt newly proposed norms because they perceive their identities “as members of international society” (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998, p. 902). In this sense, new followers comply with new norms due to peer pressure from other countries in the international system (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998, p. 903). Finnemore and Sikkink add that the motivational factors driving new followers include legitimation, conformity, and esteem (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998, p. 903). Legitimation is important for governments in terms of their perception, as citizens will judge their country in comparison to others. If the legitimacy of the government of their country is accepted in the international system, the government will also be
accepted by and receive legitimacy from its citizens. Thus, it is important for the government to comply with international standards in order to maintain its power (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998, p. 903). Conformity and esteem are also important factors that drive the new follower. These factors are psychological needs of the state that relate to its desire to be part of the international community and to establish a positive reputation, both with other countries and with itself (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998, p. 903). Put differently, state leaders follow norms because they seek to avoid “the disapproval aroused by norms violation” (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998, p. 904).

At this stage, norms are cascaded to other countries or international organisations. As we have seen from the first stage, international organisations are platforms or channels that help to cascade the norms that have been constructed. The research, publications, and other research-related activities (e.g. seminars, workshops, conferences, and training programmes conducted by the international organisations) have the power to influence, guide, suggest, or direct other agents to follow. People and organisations are also important domains for the norm cascade process. In other words, organisations help norms to be accepted and cascaded through their authority of expertise and institutional connections, linking institutions and researchers together. Officials and intellectuals (i.e. researchers or university professors) who are involved in the norm construction process – either in the capacity of decision-makers, researchers, or stakeholders – help to disseminate the norms in many ways. For example, they might cascade the ideas through mechanisms such as academic conferences, research consulting, human capacity-building programmes, or professional connections.

The last stage of the norm life cycle is called ‘internalisation’ (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998, p. 904). In this stage, norms are institutionalised by the states. Finnemore and Sikkink argue that once the norms are introduced into a country, they will not be questioned (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998, p. 904).

Finnemore and Sikkink’s norm life cycle framework has been applied in some IR literature that seeks to understand how norms are constructed and cascaded within the international system. For example, Bailey (2008) applies the norm life cycle framework to analyse why the norm of anti-whaling has failed. He explains that the norm entrepreneurs are animal activists and big states, such as the US, who are against whaling and points out that the norm cascade through international cooperation failed for many reasons. First, some countries, including Iceland, Japan,
the Soviet Union, and Norway did not favour the anti-whaling norm because of the “lack of clarity and specificity from the outset” (Bailey, 2008, p. 300). Moreover, Japan and Norway argued that whaling is part of their cultures. Another important factor is the lack of an epistemic community that could support antiwhaling norms at international conferences, as most scientists from Norway and Japan believed that whaling is not wrong (Bailey, 2008, p. 307). Bailey’s work (2008) points out that the lack of common acceptance in terms of cultural relativism and the lack of an epistemic community are the main reasons for failure. In this case, Bailey’s work (2008) reflects one crucial factor for norm conformity, which is an epistemic community. The epistemic community can use their expertise to persuade other actors to follow the norms. Accordingly, Bailey’s work reminds us that further study regarding the role of the epistemic community, in both the norm construction and cascade processes, is necessary.

Karlsurd (2018, Ch. 4) applies Finnemore and Sikkink’s framework to understand how the norms of UN peacekeeping are constructed by focusing on individuals, officials, academics, researchers, social activities, and think tanks. In his work, he asserts the importance of think tanks, research institutes, and academics as policy entrepreneurs outside of the UN in that they can highlight and identify specific issues to present to the UN.

To summarise, authorities, such as experts, governments, and think tanks, have the power to construct norms. Nevertheless, the existing literature has not paid enough attention to the role of individuals or institutions in the norm construction process. Finnemore and Sikkink (1998) provide us with a framework that focuses on how norms are constructed, cascaded, and internalised into a society. Nonetheless, although this framework has been applied to analyse the role of international organisations, it has not been directly applied to examine the role of think tanks in the international system. Furthermore, the literature that applies Finnemore and Sikkink’s framework has not focused on the role of think tanks as a case study. As current IR literature does not provide detailed explanation of the role of think tanks and intellectuals, this thesis will try to fill that methodological gap by bringing think tanks and intellectuals into the analysis, allowing us to observe more linkages between the actors in the norm life cycle. Accordingly, Chapter 3 will elaborate on how this thesis will apply the work of Finnemore and Sikkink to analyse the role of Japanese government-funded think tanks in Southeast Asia. It will also detail how
we can apply the norm life cycle framework in order to understand the processes of norm construction, cascade, and internalisation more thoroughly.

2.4 Japan as a Norm Entrepreneur in Southeast Asia

In the previous section, we touched upon Finnemore and Sikkink’s norm life cycle framework, pointing out that ideas can be translated into norms. As a set of norms can constitute a regime, the power of ideas and norms in the international system are significant. This section will review the existing literature in the field of IR that has examined the role and influence of Japan within Southeast Asia.

2.4.1 The Application of Social Constructivism to Japan’s Foreign Policy

The application of social constructivism to the analysis of Japan’s foreign policy can be categorised into two groups. First is the application of social constructivism to analyse how Japan’s ‘identity’ and ‘norms’ were shaped. This can be seen in some of the previous studies, including the book edited by Sato and Hirata (2008a) entitled Norms, Interests, and Power in Japanese Foreign Policy. In this book, the contributors provide case studies on how Japan’s foreign policy was shaped by identity, which changed over time. This book also provides many case studies on how Japan's norms were shaped and constructed on different issues, for example, the pacifist foundation (Miyashita, 2008) and Japan's aid policy (Tarte, 2008). In the case of Miyashita (2008, p. 23), his study explores the relations between material and ideational power that shaped Japan's foreign policy, as well as how public opinion shaped Japan's pacifist norm after the Second World War. On the other hand, Tarte (2008) focuses on the formation of Japan's aid policy norms, explaining that the relations between the domestic and international environments shaped Japan's foreign aid engagement.

Second is the application of social constructivism to analyse how the Japanese government uses norms and identities as its foreign policy tools. Berger (1996, pp. 318-319) explains the ‘noncultural factors’ (e.g. political-military culture) that can shape Japan’s security norm, stating that the ‘cultural-institutional context’ triggered the formation of Japan’s security norm (Berger, 1996, p. 318). Furthermore, Katzenstein (1996c, p. 18) explores the relations between ‘constitutive norms’, which “express actor identities that also define interests and thus shape
behaviour”, and Japan’s security culture. He examines why the Japanese government was reluctant to abandon its peaceful approach in order to support and engage in peace-oriented activities within the international system.

We have seen thus far that the studies on how Japan proposes ideas and identity, and utilises them to forge regional co-operation and establish organisations, reflects the power and importance of norms and identities. Yet, the processes by which norms are constructed and cascaded to other regional members have not been examined, as the existing literature primarily emphasises the institutional aspects. Additionally, this literature has not considered how norms are constructed within Japanese governmental agencies, nor how they integrate their goals with other government-supported research organisations in support of Southeast Asian regionalism.

2.4.2 Japan as a Norm Entrepreneur

In the previous section, we reviewed social constructivist explanations of Japan’s foreign policy. However, the existing literature pays more attention to the work of Japanese governmental agencies than to the understanding of how these agencies work together with intellectuals to develop foreign policy. In other words, although the existing literature has taken ideas and norms into account, it has not thoroughly explained the process of how the actors – or, to use Finnemore and Sikkink’s term, norm entrepreneurs – in the foreign policymaking process work together.

We have seen in Section 2.3 that many case studies have utilised Finnemore and Sikkink’s (1998) framework to analyse the norm construction and cascade processes. One such study is that of Dobson (2003), who uses the framework to analyse the domestic and international contexts in which the norms were constructed that in turn impacted Japan’s engagement in a UN peacekeeping operation (Dobson, 2003, p. 31). He examines parliamentary debates to see how the politicians discussed the norms of anti-militarism and UN internationalism, and how these debates change over time (Dobson, 2003, p. 50). The debates were observed by way of official publications, newspapers and magazines, books, articles, and dissertations, in both English and Japanese. Dobson argues that while Japan has does not have a permanent seat in the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), it maintains the power to contribute “shared values, norms and principles of liberal democracies” (Dobson,
These norms can be witnessed from Japan’s engagement in the establishment of democracy and the market economy throughout the Eurasian continent (Dobson, 2003, p. 41). Although Dobson has not explained the application of the norm entrepreneur concept in-depth, we can still see that Japan is a norm entrepreneur in the sense that it disseminates the norms of democracy and market economies into the world.

Dobson (2003, p. 34) states that the domestically-embedded norms in Japan's foreign policy are those of ‘anti-militarism’. These norms were constructed by intellectuals, social movements, and political parties after 1945 (Dobson, 2003, p. 34) and are reflected in the Japanese Constitution, Article 9, which constrains Japan's engagement in war or conflict-prone activities. Another norm that affects Japan is ‘US bilateralism’ (Dobson, 2003, p. 37), as Japan’s security dependency on the US is another important characteristic of Japanese security culture. Dobson also argues that ‘East Asianism’ is another vital Japanese norm and that accordingly, Japan’s active engagements within the region are based on its regional identity (Dobson, 2003, pp. 38-39). Lastly, Dobson contends that ‘UN internationalism’ is an important norm in Japan’s security culture (Dobson, 2003, p. 39). Applying the norm life cycle framework, Dobson analyses Japan’s engagement in peacekeeping operations by looking into Japanese domestic politics after the war and analysing the relative actors. He specifically studies how the Japanese Socialist Party (JSP), UN Secretary-General, intellectuals (e.g. university professors), MOFA, and other actors reflect their thoughts about how Japan’s security issues should be framed (Dobson, 2003, Ch. 2).

Dobson’s analysis focuses on the interactions between domestic and international circumstances that shaped Japan's peacekeeping operation. He identifies the actors who can be considered as norm entrepreneurs in the norm construction process, for example, the UN Secretary-General (Dobson, 2003, p. 51), university professors (Dobson, 2003, p. 51), and the Japanese government (Dobson, 2003, pp. 52-56). His study implicitly suggests that to comprehend Japan as a norm entrepreneur, apart from the role of the government, we must take the role of international actors and intellectuals into account (Dobson, 2003, p. 51). This notion reminds us that academic contributions of intellectuals (e.g. university professors and researchers) are a significant method by which norms are cascaded to other actors. It also reminds us to integrate the role of intellectuals, such as universities professors,
as an element in Japan’s foreign policymaking process. Chapter 3 will identify the actors that act as norm entrepreneurs, and it will explain the existing relations between those norm entrepreneurs.

The studies that focus on the role of Japan as a norm entrepreneur justify this description based on the country’s intellectual contributions. The role of Japan in Southeast Asia was observed by Hatakeyama (2008) and Park (2012), who argue that Japan has the capacity to act as an ‘intellectual and economic leader’ (Hatakeyama, 2008, p. 364) or to take on the role of ‘intellectual leadership’ (Park 2012, p. 309). Hatakeyama contends that Japan’s Ministry of Finance (MOF) and MOFA are two crucial actors that support intellectual and economic contributions within Southeast Asia.

Hatakeyama (2008) studies the attempts of the Japanese government to dominate the debates on development by establishing the ‘Initiative for Development in East Asia’ (IDEA), which was proposed by Prime Minister Koizumi in 2002. He states that after the 9/11 incident, the ideas and perceptions of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) regarding aid provision had dramatically changed. As Japan’s ODA primarily focused on large infrastructure development, it was no longer aligned with the World Bank and IMF focuses on terrorism, human security, and other relative issues (Hatakeyama, 2008, pp. 347-348). Japan also suffered from financial constraint, which negatively impacted ODA allocation. Accordingly, to deal with these challenges, the Japanese government established the IDEA and anticipated it to be a platform for Japan to disseminate the ideas of economic development to Southeast Asia. As Koizumi stated, the role and objectives of the IDEA are:

The first is to disseminate development experiences and expertise of the region to the international community for the sake of other regions such as Africa where it attracted international attention; the second is to shift the ongoing aid discussion and the third is to strengthen regional ties. (Hatakeyama, 2008, p. 349)

The IDEA focused on three main issues, including (1) building economic infrastructure, (2) human resource development, and (3) enhancing institutional
capacities (MOFA, 2002). Hatakeyama asserts that Japan endeavoured to be the leader of East Asia by extending its experience to the region. However, due to the economic crisis in Japan, the IDEA was not successful as Japan lacked financial credibility (Hatakeyama, 2008, p. 349). Hatakeyama argues further that “Japan created IDEA to market its development approach.” (Hatakeyama, 2008, p. 349). This argument seems to focus on the process of how the ideas of development were constructed and then cascaded both in and by the IDEA. However, Hatakeyama did not identify the officials, intellectuals, or any other actors in the process.

Hatakeyama observes that when the IDEA failed, the Japanese government shifted its endeavours to other countries, such as Vietnam. Hatakeyama points out that Japan tried to help Vietnam develop its economy because Japan wanted to “manifest intellectual leadership within the trend of global assistance and communicate and mainstream Japanese philosophy on development and assistance in the international community” (MOFA, 2004, p. 14). Japan did so by providing ‘intellectual support’ (Hatakeyama, 2008, p. 350), along with financial support, through the ‘Ishikawa Project’ in 1995. This project was proposed by Professor Shigeru Ishikawa from Hitotsubashi University, and focused on (1) agriculture and rural development, (2) trade and industry, (3) fiscal and monetary issues, (4) state-owned enterprise (SOE) reform, and (5) the development of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). Hatakeyama also stresses the role of university intellectuals in the economic development of Vietnam by conducting documentary research (both official and secondary resources) and interviews (with a secretary of a politician, an official of JICA, and a Japanese intellectual) between 2005 and 2006. He concludes that Vietnam’s economic development strategy benefitted from contributions by both Japanese intellectuals and ODA. This study, therefore, provides us with a good example of how Japan has encouraged intellectuals to work on and contribute to the economic development of another country. However, as Hatakeyama focuses only on the relations between Japan and Vietnam, it is necessary, thus, to explore more about the role of Japanese intellectuals in other countries. While Hatakeyama has provided us with another lens through which we can see how the Japanese government exercises its intellectual power to support national interests, the case study focuses on Vietnam only and cannot be applied generally to Southeast Asia as a whole.
Hatakeyama’s work (2008) also provides us with a methodological framework. To understand how Japan is pursuing its intellectual relations with Southeast Asia, we can combine documentary research, to understand the official position, with information obtained from interviews conducted with various groups informants. This allows us to triangulate the information through analysis of in-depth opinions and perspectives from various persons who have first-hand experience.

Another study that touches upon Japan’s intellectual leadership is that of Park (2012, pp. 292-293), which contends that regional leadership is one of the most significant roles to facilitate and shape regionalism. Park briefly touches upon the role of Japan in East Asian regionalism by arguing that the Japanese government provided ‘intellectual leadership’ for East Asia through financial allocations to the research work of local intellectuals by launching the ‘Issue Paper’. The main objective of the Issue Paper was to lead the discussion at the 2004 East Asian Summit (EAS) (Park, 2012, p. 310). Although Park has not provided a theoretical debate on intellectual leadership, the study provides a notion of the importance of ‘intellectuals’. To put it another way, Park has not elaborated on how the power of the knowledge constructed by Japan was ‘formed’ or ‘constructed’. Thus, this thesis will attempt to explore the knowledge construction process by gathering information from officials and researchers in both Japan and Southeast Asia. It will analyse how Japanese governmental agencies (e.g. MOFA, JICA, and the Ministry of Economy Trade and Industry [METI]) support think tanks and academics to construct and disseminate ideas of regional transport development within Southeast Asia.

In summary, this section reviewed existing studies that explain the role of Japan as a norm entrepreneur in the international system. They have applied the norm life cycle framework to analyse Japan’s foreign policy toward different regional issues, particularly the processes of norm construction and cascade. There are also studies that detail how Japan’s identities were shaped and how these identities in turn shaped Japan’s foreign policy. Dobson’s work (2003) provides the best picture of an analytical framework by identifying the actors that are involved in the norm construction process and how norms shape Japan's foreign policy. This thesis will, accordingly, utilise Dobson’s work, which takes the role of university professors and researchers into account. It will further study the role of Japan as a norm entrepreneur by looking into the networks between officials and intellectuals. The work of Hatakeyama (2008) also touches upon the contributions of Japanese intellectuals to
international development, however, it does not elaborate theoretically on the role of intellectuals, nor does it explain regional phenomenon. Moreover, Park (2012) has pointed out the Japanese government’s endeavour to become an intellectual leader within the region. Nevertheless, Park has not elaborated theoretically on the process of how the government has progressed thus far. With this in mind, the analytical framework of this thesis will be further elaborated in Chapter 3.

2.5 Think Tanks and the Development of Norms

The previous sections have reviewed the literature on the roles of norms and development, as well as the role of Japan as a norm entrepreneur in East Asia. They have examined Japan’s role in the international system by focusing on the role of the government. However, Hook et al. (2012, p. 37) state that if we want to understand Japanese politics, we should pay more attention to the dynamics within the country. This means that apart from paying attention to the role of the government, we should also investigate the role of other actors in the country, such as interest groups and pressure groups. They argue that to understand state behaviour, the domestic dynamics (e.g. interest groups, pressure groups, and think tanks) should also be taken into account, as the international system is not the only decisive factor for state behaviour. In the case of Japan-ASEAN relations, Japanese think tanks and Japanese government-funded think tanks in East Asia also play an important role.

Japanese think tanks are those based in Japan, which can be privately funded or funded by the government. They help the Japanese government to form foreign policy by providing studies and research and are a significant actor in international politics. In the past, conventional definitions of think tanks were developed from think tanks studies in the 1980s and 1990s (Pautz, 2011, p. 420). These studies primarily paid attention to the role of Western think tanks that focused on the diffusion of economic doctrines, especially during the Cold War (Stone, 2004a, p. 2). However, this definition is problematic.

Before the word think tank was first used in the 1940s, there were studies of other research-oriented entities that aimed to propose policy recommendations to the government. The studies on think tanks, however, define them differently based on cultural variations, as not every think tank is able to contribute to the policymaking process (Stone, 2004a, p. 2). The political culture in each country affects the relations
between think tanks and the government. Nonetheless, Zimmerman (2016, p. 2) contends that although some scholars argue that East Asian think tanks are not influential, there have been growing opportunities for them to support and facilitate the work of the national governments.

The existing literature on think tanks use various terms to describe think tanks, such as ‘imperial brain trust’ (Shoup & Minter, 1977), ‘public policy research institute’ (Polsby, 1983; McGann, 1992; McDowell, 1994), ‘policy discussion groups’ and ‘research institute’ (Domhoff, 1983), ‘policy planning organisations’ (Peschek, 1987) and ‘independent public policy institute’ (Stone, 1991). Typically, a think tank is defined as a non-partisan, non-profit organisation or research entity that aims to propose ideas or policy recommendations to policymakers (Abelson et al., 2017; Stone, 1996; Shoup, 2015). McGann and Johnson (2005) point out that the fundamental problem of studying think tanks is the lack of consensus amongst scholars about how to define think tanks (McGann & Johnson, 2005, p. 11). While McGann and Weaver (2000, p. 4) define think tanks as “non-governmental, not-for-profit research organisations with substantial organisational autonomy from government and societal interests such as firms, interest groups, and political parties”, Abelson and Brooks (2017a, p. 3) have broadened this definition. They contend that interest groups, lobbyists, and lobbying activities could also be considered as think tanks because lobbying could be considered as an activity that is based on research results and aims to push policy recommendations to policymakers.

The studies on think tanks are multidimensional. In the past, these studies were dominated by three main approaches, including the pluralist approach, elite approach, and neo-Marxist approach. Pluralists believe that in a free society, independent think tanks can contribute to the policymaking process through the competition to influence policy (Gellner, 1995; McGann, 2007; Waterloo, 2014). Pluralists maintain an optimistic view of the participation of think tanks in society, contending that as society allows think tanks to compete freely, public policy is thus a result of this competition. However, the competition is still based on the interests of specific interest groups that support the think tanks. Thereby, public policy reflects the interests of interest groups (Newsom, 1996; Pautz, 2011, p. 424; Stone, 1996, pp. 27-29).

For elite theory adherents, the studies on think tanks focus on the relations between think tanks and societal elites. They attempt to analyse the relationships
between politicians, academics, researchers, the business sector, and the military (Domhoff, 1983, p. 83; Keskin & Halpern, 2005; Savage, 2016; Stone, 1996, pp. 29-31). Nonetheless, the flaw of the elite approach is that it focuses too much on the backgrounds of and connections between elites.

In contrast to the elite approach, neo-Marxists focus on the ideology behind the role of think tanks (Arin, 2014, p. 46; Carnoy, 1984, p. 69; Stone, 1996, pp. 31-32; Stone & Mark, 1998, pp. 13-14). They state that think tanks can be controlled by the incumbent group, as they have to power to set the agenda and attract media attention. Neo-Marxist studies emphasise how think tanks are used by powerful people to try to cascade ideologies, particularly capitalism. Research that utilises this approach is primarily that of American or British think tanks (Levitan & Cooper, 1984; Smith, 1991), and focuses on how think tanks were inaugurated, supported, and used by the US to spread the idea of the liberal economy throughout the world (O’Neill, 2008; Pirie, 2012; Rich, 2014; Shoup, 2015; Smith, 1991). The studies in the neo-Marxist group, therefore, mainly pay attention to the power of the American-dominated liberal economy.

Unlike the substantial role of American think tanks, the studies on Japanese think tanks and Japanese government-funded think tanks do not utilise these three approaches. Ueno (2004) contends that the development of Japanese think tanks can be divided into three waves. The first wave was during the 1970s when relations between the Japanese government and business sector grew closer in co-operation for economic development. Within this decade, the Japanese government established various government-affiliated think tanks to conduct research in an effort to improve the government’s policymaking process, including the Mitsubishi Research Institute (MRI), the Japan Research Institute (JRI), and the Nikko Research Centre, Nomura Research Centre (NRI), (Ueno, 2004; Maslow, 2018, p. 102). The second wave was between 1985 and 1988. During this period, the think tanks that were established in Japan were profit-oriented, such as the Asahi Bank Research Institute, the Sakura Institute of Research, and the Sumitomo Trust Bank Research Institute. The third wave was after the 1980s, when Japan started to establish non-profit and independent think tanks, including the 21st Century Public Policy (which was established by Keidanren) and the Tokyo Foundation (which was established by a group of researchers who are not affiliated with governmental agencies) (Ueno, 2004, pp. 164-167).
The studies of Japanese think tanks tend to focus on the comparative aspect, which contends that Japanese think tanks are not as powerful as those from the West (Maslow, 2013; Nippon.com, 2015; McGann & Johnson, 2005; Ueno, 2004). Brown et al. (2014, p. 23) argue that many variables affect the potential impacts of think tanks’ policy recommendations. The first variable includes the political and economic factors, as the environment that permits the engagement of think tanks with the government varies in each country. If the political and economic environments are open and free, the engagement and expectations of the think tanks will be higher. Second, the factor of funding is also important, as the influence of the funding organisation also affects both the agenda setting and subsequent research. The factor of funding can further affect research trends and the impact of the research. Third is the factor of civil society engagement in the work of think tanks, as an open society will allow think tanks to engage more with public issues. Fourth, the intellectual climate also affects the work of think tanks. Should the society have a high level of investment in education and research capacity development, the think tanks will have a better chance of acquiring high capacity researchers and a more supportive research environment (Brown et al., 2014; Köellner et al., 2018, p. 12).

In the case of Japan, think tanks do not have strong impacts on policymaking, nor does the Japanese government prioritise the policy research industry (Maslow, 2013; Ueno, 2004, p. 177). Moreover, Abb and Köellner (2015, p. 596) and Köellner et al. (2018, p. 17) argue that Japanese think tanks are not influential because the Japanese government prefers not to rely on policy recommendations from private think tanks. Therefore, both affiliation and regulatory restrictions are significant conditions that limit the role of Japanese think tanks. The affiliation of think tanks with particular domestic organisations or business groups constrains the role of think tanks to a limited number of issues. Furthermore, Japanese law does not facilitate the establishment of think tanks, especially compared to that of other countries. The think tank processes provided for by the law are confronted by complicated regulations on funding and taxation, making it difficult to establish new ones. Another challenge for think tanks is the legal regulation hindering them from working as independently and freely as other actors in society (Nippon.com, 2015). Apart from structural constraints, McGann and Johnson (2005, p. 183) also observe that Japanese think tanks often conduct research for specific clients. When think
tanks are hired by private companies for private matters, the research results, thereby, will be skewed in the interest of the company and cannot be accessed by the public.

Nonetheless, Maslow (2018, p. 93) asserts that although the previous studies suggest that Japanese think tanks are not influential, the importance of Japanese think tanks has increased. He contends that when we investigate the database of the National Institute for Research Advancement (NIRA), there were 286 policy research organisations in Japan in 2014; however, less than ten institutes were reported to work on foreign policy (Maslow, 2018, p. 101). The growing demand for knowledge of the changing domestic and international environments triggered Japan to establish more think tanks. Maslow (2018, p. 106) points out that the “Expert Panel on the State of Foreign Policy and Security Think Tanks” was convened to call for the establishment of ‘Japanese-style’ think tanks to further increase Japan’s presence in the international system. Nevertheless, although Maslow (2018, p. 110) states that the increasing number of think tanks in Japan signifies their importance, the interviews conducted by Maslow reveal in contrast that Japanese think tanks are still not influential, as they cannot make any significant impact on national policy.

Although the role of Japanese think tanks is debatable, we still see the Japanese government supporting, and funding, the establishment of think tanks in both Japan and other countries. Meanwhile, the Japanese government also aims to establish Japan as a centre for think tanks (Kodera, 2016, p. 29). However, if the existing literature argues that the Japanese government does not recognise Japanese think tanks, then why does the government still support the establishment of new think tanks? Afterall, the Japanese government supported the establishment of the Asian Development Bank Institute (ADBI), opened a disaster risk management hub for the Global Development Learning Network (GDLN) (which was initiated by the World Bank to support capacity-building activities in developing countries), and allocated a venue at the Kasumigaseki Building to be the headquarters of the ADBI. Kodera, the Vice-President of JICA and former Executive Secretary of the Development Committees of the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF), states that the Japanese government supports research institutes to be established or based both inside and outside of Japan (Kodera, 2016). Kodera, therefore, sees the role of Japan as a ‘regional intellectual and global knowledge leader’ (Kodera, 2016, p. 29).
There are some think tanks that conduct research and release publications on the topic of Japan-Southeast Asia relations in order to support the work of the government, such as the Research Institute of Economy, Trade, and Industry (RIETI), the Japan International Co-operation Agency Research Institute (JICA-RI), and the Japan Institute of International Affairs (JIIA). For example, the RIETI conducted a significant amount of research that contributed to regional economic and monetary co-operation (Munakata, 2010), as well as the connectivity between ASEAN and India, or what is referred to as ASEAN regional integration (Kondo, 2012; Nishimura, 2013). Meanwhile, the JIIA conducted research on Japan-ASEAN co-operation, Japan’s maritime security (Raj, 2009), Japan’s ASEAN policy (Shimizu, 2018), and Japanese diplomacy in the Indo-Pacific Age (Easton, 2018).

The existing literature on Japan-ASEAN relations emphasises the economic, political, and diplomatic aspects, however, they have not used think tanks as the main unit of analysis. Although think tanks help the ASEAN Secretariat and governments in Southeast Asia to access in-depth information and analyses, they are not typically chosen as case studies. We have seen in the previous section that Dobson’s work (2003) utilises Finnemore and Sikkink’s framework (1998) to emphasise the role of intellectuals (e.g. university professors) in Japan’s foreign policymaking process. The gap this thesis seeks to fill, thereby, is how the Japanese intellectuals and officials work together to support Japan-ASEAN relations.

This thesis selects three think tanks that engage in regional development, which are the ERIA, IDE-JETRO, and ADBI. The existing literature on the ERIA defines it as a Japanese government-funded think tank that supports the development of regionalism within East Asia (Kitano, 2014; Otsuji & Shinoda, 2014; Severino, 2014; Yoshimatsu, 2012). Yoshimatsu (2012) explains that the reason why the Japanese government initiated the ERIA was that Japan wanted to balance its role in intellectual contributions with that of the Network of East Asian Think-Tanks (NEAT), which was strongly supported by the Chinese government in 2003 (Yoshimatsu, 2012, p. 370). Yoshimatsu contends that the Japanese government is aware that Southeast Asian countries did not welcome the image of Japan during the Second World War, but that its economy and knowledge are well-recognised around the world. Accordingly, the Japanese government has tried to use the ERIA as a tool to spread its ideas regarding the regulation of the liberal economy through the ‘peer-pressure and benchmarking’ approach (Yoshimatsu, 2012, pp. 369-370). Severino
points out the roles of JETRO and the ERIA in Southeast Asian regionalisation, explaining that these organisations support economic co-operation, particularly within ASEAN+3 countries. However, while Severino explores the contributions of JETRO, he does not give any information or analysis of the influence of the IDE-JETRO in their work.

Furthermore, the existing literature studies the ERIA and IDE-JETRO utilising documentary research to understand engagement. However, the researchers have not conducted in-depth interviews with officials or researchers in either Japan or Southeast Asia regarding their contributions to the research or their perceptions of the impact. Chapters 5 and 6 seek to fill this gap by integrating documentary research with in-depth interviews to better comprehend the engagement of officials and researchers in the policymaking process.

The ERIA, IDE-JETRO, and ADBI should be considered in the analysis of Japan’s role in Southeast Asia, as they are funded and supported by the Japanese government. Their research results are used to further the work of the ASEAN Secretariat, government officials, and scholars in regard to foreign policy and regional development. Although these organisations have conducted research that helps the Southeast Asian governments and the ASEAN Secretariat to develop a common regional development plan, they have yet to be studied in-depth.

In summary, the existing studies have provided a lens through which to analyse the role of think tanks in societies. They employed different approaches in an effort to comprehend various case studies. Although they have contributed to the understanding of the role of think tanks in economic, political, and social development, particularly in specific countries, such theories have not yet provided a lens through which to understand the role of think tanks at the regional or international level.
2.6 Conclusion

In this chapter, we have reviewed three relevant issues: the application of IR theories to Japan’s foreign policy and its relations with Southeast Asia; the role of norms in the international system; and the roles of Japan as a norm entrepreneur and of think tanks, both in general and in the case of those that contribute to Japan-ASEAN relations. We have also seen that the existing literature focused on Japan’s foreign policymaking process has three main narratives. The first narrative uses realism to explain the ‘black box’ and views Japan as a unitary state in which foreign policy takes national interests for granted. It emphasises the role of the government and minimizes the role of other actors in society. The second narrative uses liberalism to explain the formation of foreign policy by looking at various actors in society and focusing on the liberal values embedded in Japan’s foreign policy. However, the second narrative cannot explain how the Japanese government persuades, influences, or sets the development agenda in the international arena. The third narrative, which uses social constructivism, focuses on the power of regional development ideas and norms in order to explain how Japan frames regional development in Southeast Asia.

We have also explored the literature that focuses on the definition of norms and how norms are one of the most critical factors in international relations. This thesis selects Finnemore and Sikkink’s norm life cycle framework (1998) as its analytical framework, anticipating that it will provide a better understanding of how norms are constructed, cascaded, and internalised into other countries.

After detailing the norm life cycle framework, the chapter reviews some of the existing literature that focuses on Japan as a norm entrepreneur within the international system. We have seen already that ideas and norms help agents in the international structure to have a common set of standards to follow. We have also seen the application of Finnemore and Sikkink’s framework in Dobson’s work (2003), which analyses the domestic and international actors and factors that affect the construction of norms in Japan. Dobson further provides us with an example to help identify agencies that influence Japan’s foreign policymaking process, emphasising individual and collective norm entrepreneurs that are significantly involved in the norm construction process. Dobson conducted this research by analysing official documents and newspapers, and by conducting some interviews.

Moreover, the works of Hatakeyama (2008), Park (2012), and Kodera (2016) explain Japan’s attempts to establish itself as a regional intellectual leader. While
they touch upon the leading intellectual role of Japan, they have yet to elaborate how ODA is utilised in support of such effort. Accordingly, this thesis examines Japan as an intellectual leader by looking at the roles of its officials, intellectuals, foreign policy, and ODA. Thereby, the next chapter will propose a framework to help analyse Japan’s role as a regional intellectual leader.

Another important issue reviewed in this chapter is the role of think tanks in the international system. However, the definition of think tanks itself is problematic. East Asian think tanks have different characteristics than those from the West, which can be seen in their objectives and founding members. Chapter 3 will further explore the definition of think tanks and how the studied definition should broaden based on our understanding of think tanks within the region. Japan’s leading role in the international system, apart from its material power, can be understood through its intellectual power, which is exercised through Japanese government-funded think tanks. This thesis selects the regional transport development schemes that were proposed by the ERIA, IDE-JETRO, and ADBI and are supported by the Japanese government as case studies to examine how the Japanese government exercises its economic, political, and intellectual power to support its economic interests. The next chapter will synthesise the concept of regional intellectual power while operationalising the norm life cycle framework to understand the role of Japan. It will also elaborate more on the current characteristics of Japanese government-funded think tanks, as well as how we should broaden the definition and characteristics of think tanks within the region.
Chapter 3:
Analytical Framework

3.1 Introduction

In Chapter 2, we reviewed the existing literature on Japan’s foreign policy and IR theories, the role of norms in the international system, the role of Japan as a norm entrepreneur, and the role of think tanks. The existing literature has examined the role of norms as one of the elements that encourages governments to have a common understanding of certain issues, for example, the norms of anti-whaling (Bailey, 2008) or peacekeeping operations (Dobson, 2003). Finnemore and Sikkink (1998) call the process of norm construction, cascade and internalisation a ‘norm life cycle’. After that, we reviewed the literature on the role of Japan as a norm entrepreneur. Additionally, we examined Dobson’s work (2003), which applies the norm life cycle framework to understand the norm construction process through the study of parliamentary meetings, conferences, debates, and newspapers, to further understand the norms in Japanese society.

Also, we have reviewed the definition, characteristics, and importance of think tanks in the international system. We have seen in some existing literature that the Japanese government does not recognise think tanks’ research results (Maslow, 2018; Ueno, 2004; Abb & Köellner, 2015). However, the Japanese government still supports the establishment of new regional research institutes, such as the Economic Research Institute for ASEAN and East Asia (ERIA), and facilitates the venue for the Asian Development Bank Institute (ADBI), based in Tokyo.

This thesis defines ‘regional transport development norms’ as a set of standard beliefs and ideas that relate to the improvement of hard and soft infrastructure, as well as to the improvement of the economy and society. This further includes the issue of how to construct physical linkages, and how to synchronise existing transport-related schemes and mechanisms together through ideas and norms. By this definition, this thesis seeks to understand how the Japanese government constructs and utilises regional transport development norms to comprehensively plan the regional transport development scheme. Such norms include the beliefs and ideas of regulatory practices and physical linkages through
transport systems. This thesis selects regional transport development as a case study because it is one of the issues that the Japanese government supports through its bilateral and multilateral co-operations, such as the establishment of the High Level Task Force on ASEAN Connectivity (HLTF-AC), Japan-ASEAN Integration Fund (JAIF), and the Mission of Japan to ASEAN, which reflects the close economic and political relations between Japan and ASEAN. Moreover, apart from financial and political support, the Japanese government also intellectually supports regional transport development by supporting the work of ‘international research organisations’ (IROs), which include the ERIA, IDE-JETRO, and ADBI, to construct knowledge of regional connectivity, regional transport, and regional integration. This thesis refers to these leading intellectual contributions as a ‘regional intellectual hegemon’ (RIH).

This thesis asks three main research questions, including why the Japanese government has been supporting the development of regional transport infrastructure in Southeast Asia; how we can analyse Japan’s construction and cascading of regional development norms in the research conducted by ERIA, IDE-JETRO, and ADBI; and how the norms were internalised in domestic and regional transport development schemes within Southeast Asia. This chapter will elaborate on how Finnemore and Sikkink’s norm life cycle was applied and how the data collected from documentary research and interviews was integrated to analyse the role of Japan as a RIH in Southeast Asia. Moreover, this chapter will explain the nature and characteristics of the IROs involved in Japan’s economic and political strategies in the region.

The rest of this chapter is divided into two sections. The first section explains the norm life cycle framework, which will be applied to this research in order to comprehend the process of norm emergence and norm cascade. It also explains the application of the norm life cycle to understand the role of Japan in Southeast Asia. The second section elaborates on the role of intellectuals in the foreign policy-making process.
3.2 Norm Life Cycle Framework

This thesis selects Finnemore and Sikkink’s norm life cycle framework (1998) to analyse Japan’s role as a RIH that helps to facilitate the adoption of regional transport development ideas and norms within Southeast Asia. To understand Japan as a RIH, we will first look at the process of how Japan can be a leading knowledge or norm entrepreneur. This section has two sub-sections. The first sub-section will explain how we can operationalise the norm life cycle to comprehend the role of Japan as a RIH. The second sub-section will deal with the role of RIHs and how a RIH can construct practical knowledge of regional transport development.

3.2.1 Norm Entrepreneur and Regional Intellectual Hegemon (RIH)

The first issue that needs to be addressed is the definition of norms. In Chapter 2, we were introduced to Finnemore and Sikkink’s definition of norms as ideas that help regional actors to acknowledge and understand common practices. Chapter 2 has shown that norms are constructed, cascaded, and embedded through the support of norm entrepreneurs. The first stage is the norm emergence process. Finnemore and Sikkink explain that at this stage, a ‘norm entrepreneur’ plays a significant role in the norm emergence procedure by persuading other agents in the structure to become interested in certain issues or things. They explain further that norms are first constructed in organisational platforms, e.g. Greenpeace, the Red Cross, World Bank, or the United Nations (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998, p. 899). Then, once the norms are constructed, they will be cascaded to other agents within the system. There are many ways by which norms are cascaded, such as through state socialisation in the international system, or by drafting laws and treaties. Still, although Finnemore and Sikkink discuss the norm cascade process, they have not theoretically elaborated on the methods or agents that play a role in the process, such as the role of international organisations, individuals, or activities. The final stage is the internalisation process. Finnemore and Sikkink state that once norms are introduced, or cascaded, to other agents, including states and international organisations, the norms will be received and internalised into the organisations, or into the larger societal context.

One of the ways the Japanese government has been exercising its leading role in Southeast Asia is through the construction of regional transport development norms and the promotion of these norms through IROs. The existing literature on
Japan as an intellectual leader has described Japan in many ways, for example, as an ‘intellectual and economic leader’ (Hatakeyama, 2008), as demonstrating ‘regional leadership’ (Park, 2012), and as the ‘regional intellectual and global knowledge leader’ (Kodera, 2016, p. 29). While such research has detailed how Japan intellectually engages with Southeast Asian countries and regional organisations, they have not elaborated on the theoretical frameworks behind their arguments.

**Figure 1: The Application of Analytical Framework**

Figure 1 was generated by the application of Finnemore and Sikkink’s norm life cycle framework. First, the relations between norm entrepreneurs were analysed, including the relations between various Japanese government agencies, namely the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA), the Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry (METI), the Ministry of Finance (MOF), Japan International Co-operation Agency (JICA), and the Japan External Trade Organization (JETRO).
(JICA), and Japan External Trade Organisation (JETRO). As I conducted documentary research and in-depth interviews with officials and researchers in Japan and Southeast Asia, I analysed the relations between Japan’s officials and intellectuals with other actors in the region, such as researchers, academics, and government agencies. I collected information and data using an inductive approach and utilised a grounded method through documentary research and semi-structured interviews with researchers and officials of MOFA, METI, JICA, JETRO, ERIA, IDE-JETRO, and ADBI.

I read unpublished official documents, research, surveys, annual reports, Japan’s Diplomatic Bluebooks, Japan’s ODA White Papers, and official documents from ASEAN, ERIA, IDE-JETRO, and ADBI. I also studied interviews published online, journal articles, book chapters and monographs, and the official web pages of ASEAN, ERIA, IDE-JETRO, and ADBI. The documentary research was conducted both before and after the field research, which was conducted between February and June 2016. I studied various documents to find objectives, goals, and information about construction projects that were proposed or supported by the MOFA, METI, or MLIT. I also looked at how the norms of regional transport were discussed in these documents to further understand how the Japanese government agencies use these norms to support their projects and engagement.

Apart from documentary research, I also integrated in-depth interviews to help uncover opinions and information, as Richard (1996) recommends, obtaining first-hand experiences, unrecorded information, and personal opinions and comments in order to triangulate documentary information. He further explains that interviews are an effective way of finding and obtaining information from informants. I conducted semi-structured interviews with the government officials, researchers, academics, and NGO representatives in five countries, including Japan, Indonesia, Singapore, Malaysia, and Thailand between February and June 2016. The interviews also supported the process of selecting and distinguishing important written documents (Seldon & Pappworth, 1983).

I selected the interviewees through the purposive sampling method. The interviews were conducted in a one-on-one setting at the interviewees’ preferred venue. The medium of the interviews was English when conducted in Japan, Indonesia, Singapore, and Malaysia, whereas both English and Thai were used when
I conducted interviews in Thailand. In some cases, the non-native Thai-speaking interviewees in Japan used Thai as a medium.

The criterion applied in the selection of interviewees is as follows:

1. Their positions as a researcher, CEO, Dean, President, Fellow, Director, Manager, or another leading position within the organisation. The interviewee should be a person who holds the authority to reflect the organisation’s views, objectives, roles, and strategies.

2. Their responsibilities must pertain to ASEAN Connectivity, international transport, or logistics in Southeast Asia.

3. Their research or academic interests must be focused on ASEAN Connectivity, international transport, logistics in Southeast Asia, politics of assistance, and Japanese foreign policy.

The interview questions were constructed and based on two topics, which are:

- **Professional connections and experience:** The interviewees were asked about their educational backgrounds and their working experience with researchers and officials from different organisations in different countries. Such questions were aimed at obtaining information that would help in analysing how connections between certain people were formed and how those relations facilitate or support the linkage of ideas and norms between IROs. These questions helped to analyse how the professional and institutional connections between intellectuals and officials formed linkages between agencies. The information collected from the responses helped to further comprehend how ideas and norms are linked by professional connections.

- **Research-related activities:** The interviewees were asked about their experience that pertains to research activities, such as the dissemination of research results and involvement in seminars, conferences, workshops or capacity-building programmes. They were also asked about how the ideas of international transport were incorporated into their institutions’ research agendas and how these ideas were debated within their organisations. These
questions helped in the analysis of how ideas and norms are integrated and debated within IROs. The information collected from the responses also helped to further understand the process of how ideas and norms are cascaded in the region by observing the activities of IROs.

These two sets of interview questions helped to comprehend how intellectuals began participating in ERIA, IDE-JETRO, and ADBI’s research activities. They also helped to answer the first two main research questions, which focused on the work and collaboration between the Japanese government agencies and ERIA, IDE-JETRO, and ADBI.

The interviewees were approached by either email or phone call. The interviewees were then provided a research information sheet, which explained the background of the research project, the nature of the interview, their rights and confidentiality, and my contact details (address, telephone, email address, and website). The provided research information sheet also informed interviewees about the recording and transcription method, and that they could ask not to be recorded.

The recorded interviews were encrypted and stored in a secure system provided by the University of Leeds. I conducted the transcriptions solely by myself, as some opinions are personal or confidential. The transcripts were also kept in the secured system and once the transcription was finished, the recordings were destroyed.

**Table 1:** A Complete List of Interviewed Government Agencies, Research Institutions, Universities and Organisations.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Countries</th>
<th>Organisations</th>
<th>Code</th>
<th>Number of Interviewees</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Japan</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1 Feb-31 March 2016)</td>
<td>1. Institute of Developing Economies, Japan External Trade Organisation (IDE-JETRO)</td>
<td>IDE-JETRO (1)-(4)</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. Asian Development Bank Institute (ADBI)</td>
<td>ADBI (1)-(3)</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3. Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA)</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4. Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry (METI)</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5. Japan External Trade Organisation (JETRO)</td>
<td>JETRO (1) and (2)</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Countries</td>
<td>Organisations</td>
<td>Code</td>
<td>Number of Interviewees Each</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>6. Japan International Co-operation Agency (JICA)</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>7. Universities in Japan</td>
<td>ERIA (1) and (2)</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>8. Economic Research Institute for ASEAN and East Asia (ERIA)</td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>9. University of Indonesia (UI)</td>
<td>UI (1) and (2)</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>10. Habibie Centre</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>11. ASEAN Secretariat</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>12. Permanent Mission of Thailand to ASEAN</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>13. Mission of Japan to ASEAN</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Singapore</td>
<td>14. ISEAS - Yusof Ishak Institute</td>
<td>ISEAS (1) and (5)</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>15. Nanyang Technological University (NTU)</td>
<td>NTU (1) and (2)</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malaysia</td>
<td>16. Institute of Strategic and International Studies (ISIS)</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>17. Malaysian Institute of Economic Research (MIER)</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>18. Ministry of International Trade &amp; Industry (MITI)</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>19. University of Malaya (UM)</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>20. Ministry of Transport</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>21. Universities in Thailand</td>
<td>ThUni (1) and (7)</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>22. Japanese Chamber of Commerce (JCC)</td>
<td>JCC Bangkok (1) and (2)</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>23. Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA)</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>24. Ministry of Commerce</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>25. Ministry of Transport</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>26. Thailand Development Research Institute (TDRI)</td>
<td>TDRI (1) and (2)</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>27. ADB, Thailand Resident Mission Office</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>28. Mekong Watch</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>50</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The code column in Table 1 aims to identify the interviewees, as I often interviewed more than one person in some organisations in one day, and therefore
the reference date in the footnotes might confuse readers as to who the informant was. Accordingly, I indicated the interviewees in Chapters 5 and 6 by their code so that the reader can easily note that the informants are different persons. The pattern that will be used in the footnotes is: “Interview, a staff of ISEAS (1), Jakarta, Indonesia, 8 April 2016”. In the case that there is no number identified, it means that there was only one interviewee from that organisation.

In Thailand there were several university scholars that had experience working with ERIA, IDE-JETRO, and ADBI, but I did not include the provinces where these universities are located as it could imply the informants’ identities. The pattern used for Thai scholars in the footnotes, thereby, is “Interview, a staff of ThUni (1), 3 May 2016”.

The informants’ information, comments, analyses, and opinions are quoted anonymously in this thesis. The management position of the informants was not revealed. Additionally, any information that might lead to the informants’ identification, such as gender, age, or nationality, was kept unidentifiable, unless otherwise indicated specifically to support the argument.

The information, facts, and relevant opinions regarding the establishment of the ERIA, IDE-JETRO, and ADBI, and the background of Japan-ASEAN’s transport-focused relations will be explained in Chapter 5. These facts and opinions will help us to understand the reasons why the Japanese government has supported the establishment of IROs, both in Japan and in Southeast Asia.

Next, we will look at norm cascade process. In order to do so, I first analysed how Japanese researchers and university professors work together with MOFA, METI, and JICA to construct ideas of Southeast Asian transport development. I then analysed the mechanisms that ERIA, IDE-JETRO, and ADBI utilised to cascade the regional transport development norms to Southeast Asian countries and the ASEAN Secretariat. I also investigated the professional relationships between intellectuals and officials, both in Japan and Southeast Asia. These analyses will help us to identify the professional relationships between intellectuals and officials and how those relationships influence the work of IROs.

Chapter 6 looks at meetings, agreements, assistance provided, and professional connections. I will explore the meetings and agreements that have happened in the past, as well as Japanese ODA as provided through JICA and
ministerial assistance. This will help to comprehend how ODA works together with Japan’s economic and political strategies.

Finally, I will analyse the norm internationalisation process. I first looked at ‘norm receivers’, which are government officials and intellectuals in Southeast Asia and the ASEAN Secretariat, to study how they integrated the norms cascaded by ERIA, IDE-JETRO, and ADBI into their regional transport development schemes. I then looked at publications from Southeast Asian governments and the ASEAN Secretariat to analyse how the ideas of regional transport development are interpreted and how they have influenced regional transport development schemes. Additionally, I conducted interviews with researchers, scholars, and officials throughout Southeast Asia to analyse their relationships with the relevant governments. This helped me to develop an idea of how these relations have shaped the development of regional transport systems in Southeast Asia; how scholars and officials in Southeast Asia have interpreted the norms; and how their interpretations are translated into policies, both in their respective countries and at the regional level.

3.2.2 International Research Organisations (IROs) and Practical Knowledge

The previous section introduced the analytical framework, which will be applied to the analysis of Japan’s intellectual contributions to Southeast Asian transport development. This framework also acknowledges the role of institutional and professional relations. As the introduction to this chapter briefly mentioned the influential power of IROs and practical knowledge, this section will elaborate more on these issues. As shown in Chapter 2, although Maslow (2018), Ueno (2014), and Abb and Köellner (2015) state that Japanese think tanks are not influential and that the Japanese government is not interested in their research, the government still supports and facilitates the establishment of new think tanks. This signifies that the government nonetheless recognises the power of their knowledge creation.

When we look at the nature and objectives of think tanks, there are some differences between the more traditional, orthodox organisations and the newly established research organisations. The existing definitions of think tanks are deeply influenced by the West (Carnoy, 1984; Domhoff, 1983; Newsom, 1996; Pautz, 2011; Stone, 1996). The nature and objectives of the Japanese government-funded think tanks, however, are different. Thereby, to understand the role of Japanese
government-funded think tanks in Southeast Asia and Japan, we must first expand our understanding of think tanks, and then reconceptualise the present phenomenon regarding how think tanks are manifesting their role in the current economic and political contexts. To do this, I analysed the data collected from MOFA, METI, ERIA, IDE-JETRO, and ADBI to understand both their perceptions of themselves, and how researchers and officials in Southeast Asia view them.

The concept of think tanks conveys a research entity that is non-partisan, non-profit, and aims at proposing ideas or suggestions to policymakers (Stone, 1996, 2004a, 2004b; Weaver, 1989). Stone (2004) states that think tanks’ activities are not as diverse as universities’ activities because they are not involved in political activities and do not pressure politicians. This definition stresses the formality and individual institutionalisation, while at the same time de-emphasising the fact that they are working as a research network. Nonetheless, the roles of the ERIA, IDE-JETRO, and ADBI in the context of Southeast Asian transport development are different. They do not try to explicitly convey any economic or political ideas; instead, they endeavour to influence other actors within Southeast Asia. I thereby tried to analyse their characteristics and objectives by utilising documents and information received from the interviews with staff members of MOFA and METI, and with researchers of ERIA, IDE-JETRO, and ADBI.

I propose that in order to understand the Japanese government-funded think tanks in Japan and Southeast Asia, we can perceive IROs as a tool to comprehend the knowledge-based organisations. Accordingly, what should be focused on is not the development of the concept of think tanks itself, but rather how the existing concept is incapable of explaining the present situation.

In this thesis, IROs are organisations that conduct research or academic activities and contribute to the policy-making processes of countries and international organisations. The main research themes or interests of IROs tend to focus more on regional and transnational issues. While IROs may not have official arrangements or agreements between their organisations, their tasks and research reinforce each other’s. Figure 1 shows that there are many norm entrepreneurs that work together, both under and for the Japanese government. As ERIA, IDE-JETRO, and ADBI are included in this group, they also work in tandem with Japan’s foreign policy because they are financed by the Japanese government. To further understand how ERIA, IDE-JETRO, and ADBI are working for Japan’s foreign policy, I
analysed the interviews conducted with researchers of ERIA, IDE-JETRO, and ADBI, focusing on their engagement and contributions to research activities and triangulated the results with the information I received from researchers and government officials in Southeast Asia. I also asked them how they have contributed to or engaged in any activities organised by MOFA, METI, or JICA.

What makes IROs different from think tanks is their objectives. IROs endeavour to influence not only the governments, but also researchers and international organisations. IROs focus on both domestic affairs and transnational issues; on the contrary, think tanks tend to focus on domestic issues. IROs aim to influence policymakers at the domestic and regional levels while raising awareness in regional countries or international organisations, particularly regarding transnational issues; think tanks, on the contrary, expect to influence policymakers and gain public attention within their own countries (Selee, 2013, pp. 48-64; Stone, 1996, pp. 15-16). Some think tanks, nevertheless, also focus on international issues, such as the Brookings Institute, Hoover Institution, and RAND Corporation. The research that IROs conduct seeks to analyse the regional dynamics (e.g. regional economic challenges, Public-Private Partnership (PPP), trans-boundary environmental issues) that might affect individual states, or the region as a whole. Additionally, IROs make a concentrated effort to disseminate their research results to international organisations so that they can be used in policy formulation.

The power to influence other actors in the region is another significant characteristic of IROs. When IROs try to influence or dominate policymakers, they utilise practical knowledge embedded with ideas, norms, and values, including research results, network-building schemes, and publications. On the other hand, think tanks use political tools such as professional connections and business interests to promote their agenda (Abelson & Brooks, 2017; Barnett & Finnemore, 2004; Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998; McGann, 2007, p. 45; Stone, 2000, p. 36).

Language is another important characteristic of IROs. Generally, in non-English speaking countries, think tanks conduct research and release publications in their national language. However, IROs, such as ERIA and ADBI, publish every document in English. This signifies that the ERIA and ADBI aim to disseminate their research results within the larger international arena. Meanwhile, think tanks in

2 IDE-JETRO has both Japanese and English publications.
non-English speaking countries often publish most of their research in their national language, except for collaborative research projects that involve international researchers, or for the sake of international outreach.

The work of IROs is led by intellectuals. They are typically researchers or university academics that have authority in the field of area studies, development studies, or international relations. As we will see in Chapter 6, the information presented about the roles of intellectuals was derived from in-depth interviews. This will help us to comprehend how intellectuals help ERIA, IDE-JETRO, and ADBI to obtain information and to build research networks throughout the region. They also help the Japanese government to construct its foreign policy and support the government in achieving Japan’s goals and national interests.

Most importantly, ‘practical knowledge’ sets IROs apart from think tanks. Think tanks tend to support economic or political ideologies. They have spread ‘knowledge regimes’ (Campbell & Pedersen, 2014, 2015) or economic and political regimes (McGann, 2007; Smith, 1991) in many countries. On the contrary, however, the recommendations and research from ERIA, IDE-JETRO, and ADBI seem to be less ideological.

These features of IROs make them different from think tanks. The objectives, target groups, and expected outcomes have given IROs a vital role in the international system. To evaluate the objectives, target groups, research contributions, and potential impacts of the ERIA, IDE-JETRO, and ADBI, I studied official documents from ASEAN and Southeast Asian governmental agencies (e.g. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and Ministry of Transport). I thereby could understand how the research results and the research-related activities, such as conferences, meetings, or capacity-building programmes, contributed to the works of other actors.

3.3 Intellectuals and Foreign Policy-Making

In the previous section, I have elaborated on the RIH concept, emphasising the point that existing literature has not paid attention to people in the policy-making process (e.g. officials, researchers, or scholars). Although they play a significant role as ‘norm entrepreneurs’ in the norm life cycle process, existing literature in the IR discipline has not studied their roles in-depth. Accordingly, this thesis will include the role of intellectuals in ERIA, IDE-JETRO, ADBI, and Japanese and Southeast
Asian universities into the analysis, in order to develop a more comprehensive view of the agents involved in the norm construction and cascade processes.

The first issue that we should study is the role of people in the policy-making process and how they contribute to the work of the MOFA, MOF, and METI. To understand how foreign policy is formulated, we must first understand Japan's foreign policy construction. Foreign policy formulation involves many actors, including government officials, the business community, intellectuals, and non-governmental actors. There are four stages of the decision-making process in foreign policy, including (1) intelligence (collect information and identify problems), (2) design (identify alternatives and select criteria), (3) choice (use criteria to evaluate alternatives and make decisions) and (4) implementation (put decisions into effect and allocate resources) (Mintz & Derouen, 2010). There are many actors and stakeholders participating in each stage. During the first stage of collecting data, policymakers need sufficient information, data, and recommendations from supporting organisations, including non-governmental organisations (NGOs), working groups, think tanks, and research institutes. They can help in the foreign policy-making process by setting the agenda, and by manipulating information, as well as the flow of information. They can also act as gatekeepers to control what information goes into the decision-making process (Mintz & Derouen, 2010). The advisory groups – such as university professors, researchers, or NGOs – can, explicitly or implicitly and directly or indirectly, influence the agenda in the early stages of foreign policy-making by shaping, controlling, and influencing the data and information that may have potential impact.

Green (2003, p. 8), Hook et al. (2012), and Zakowski et al. (2018) explain that Japan's foreign policy-making process involves many actors. Government agencies, the business community, media, think tanks, and NGOs are all involved in policy formulation. Before issuing foreign policy decisions, policymakers propose their positions, studies, analyses, and strategies to the central bureaucracy. Many ministries such as the MOFA, METI, and MOF engage in the policy-formulation process while also competing with each other for the leading role in foreign policy (Miyashita, 2003; Sueo, 2015, p. 24). Moreover, the business community, including Nippon Keidanren, an economic organisation that is composed of representatives from Japanese private companies, is also engaged in the policy-making process. Keidanren provides position papers that reflect their needs so that the government
can be aware of the needs of the business community (Blechinger & Legewie, 2000b; Yoshimatsu, 2017, 2018). Nonetheless, although existing studies have applied social constructivism to explain how the actors involved in foreign policy-making have contributed to the construction and dissemination of ideas and norms on different issues, they have not paid attention to the role of intellectuals. The engagement of academics and the research community helps the government to obtain research results that support the decision-making process. This thesis, accordingly, expands upon the knowledge of Japan’s foreign policy in Southeast Asia by acknowledging the role of intellectuals. Haas (1992) contends that the contribution of research and the academic community can together be referred to as an ‘epistemic community’. Haas defines an epistemic community as “a network of professionals with recognised expertise and competence in a particular domain and an authoritative claim to policy-relevant knowledge within that domain or issue-area” (Haas, 1992, p. 3). The epistemic community, then, comprises professionals, experts, scholars, and researchers, whom can be collectively labelled as ‘intellectuals’. Nevertheless, the definition of intellectuals remains broad and is mainly used to identify the role of an individual or a group of people in society. For example, Alatas (1997) defines ‘intellectual’ as a person who thinks about things by reason (Alatas, 1997, p. 8). Meanwhile, Mannheim (1991) sees the ‘intellectual’ as a group of people in society that can interpret the meaning of the world around them (Mannheim, 1991, p. 9). In line with these examples, this thesis refers to ‘intellectuals’ as people who are working in universities or research institutes who have expertise and authority in certain areas or issues.

Chapter 2 have pointed out that Hook et al. (2012) and Severino (2014) both state that think tanks and the epistemic community help the Japanese government to form Japan’s foreign policy, yet studies of Japan’s foreign policy tend to focus on the role of the government. However, both Hook et al. (2012) and Severino (2014) have not elaborated how the intellectuals and think tanks engage in policy formulation. Thereby, to understand the role of intellectuals in foreign policy relations, I will analyse both secondary sources (e.g. journal articles, monographs, and presentations) and the information that I received from interviews. In Chapter 6, we will look at how the researchers and staff members of the ERIA, IDE-JETRO, and ADBI work with the MOFA, METI, and JICA, or JETRO.
3.4 Conclusion

This chapter explains how this thesis will apply Finnemore and Sikkink’s norm life cycle framework (1998) to analyse the process of norm construction, cascade, and internalisation in Figure 1. It also explains the actors in each process. The first process is that of norm construction, and the actors involved include the MOFA, METI, MOF, JICA, and JETRO, as will be detailed further in Chapter 5. Starting with an investigation of the norm entrepreneurs who comprise Japan’s government agencies and ERIA, IDE-JETRO, and ADBI, Chapter 5 will also explore the background of each IRO and how these IROs engage in Southeast Asian transport development.

The second and third processes are norm cascade and norm internalisation. Chapter 6 will look at the process of how norms are cascaded through research results, publications, professional networks, and institutional connections, as well as how officials and researchers in Southeast Asian countries and the ASEAN Secretariat interpret these norms and translate them into transport development plans.

The information and opinions that will be used in the analysis are derived from both documentary research and in-depth interviews conducted with researchers and officials in Japan and Southeast Asia. The analysis seeks to understand Japan’s objectives and provided support. It will also reflect the opinions, understandings, and perceptions of officials and intellectuals in Southeast Asia regarding the roles of the ERIA, IDE-JETRO, and ADBI in regional transport development. This will help us to see how Japanese government agencies use the intellectual knowledge constructed by the ERIA, IDE-JETRO, and ADBI to support its intellectual contributions in Southeast Asia.
Chapter 4:
Japan-ASEAN Relations

4.1 Introduction

This chapter aims to provide the background of Japan-ASEAN relations since 1945 and seeks to analyse how these relations shaped Japan’s foreign policy towards the Greater Mekong Subregion (GMS) area where there are a significant number of Japanese factories. The economic and political engagement of Japan vis-à-vis Southeast Asia and the ASEAN Secretariat helps the region to develop from both the financial and technical assistance provided by Japan's official development assistance (ODA) mechanism. Moreover, Japan also contributes knowledge and intellect to the region in various ways.

The rest of this chapter is divided into two main sections. The first section will outline a brief economic and political background of the relations between the two regions that formed in the context of the international environment starting in 1945, focusing on how the relations developed and their current status. After that, the second section will elaborate on the reasons that Japan is interested in ASEAN and the GMS transport development schemes, emphasising the influence of business, political, and geographical factors.

4.2 Historical Background of Japan-ASEAN Relations since 1945

Before the establishment of ASEAN in 1967, the relations between Japan and Southeast Asia were primarily bilateral. One of the driving forces that helped Japan to construct relations with Southeast Asia was the US-dominated international system. Accordingly, to comprehend how Japan-ASEAN relations were formed, we should look at the impact of the international structure. Therefore, this section has two sub-sections. The first focuses on the relations between Japan and Southeast Asia in the US-dominated international system and will explain how the international system after 1945 has had an impact on Japan-ASEAN relations. The second is regarding the relations between Japan and Southeast Asia, which will further explain the development of Japan-ASEAN relations.

4.2.1 Japan-Southeast Asia Relations in the International System after 1945
Before we analyse the relations between Japan and Southeast Asia, we need to acknowledge the factors that impacted such relations. The US-dominating international system that began after 1945 was one of the main factors that gave rise to Japan’s interest in Southeast Asia. After 1945, the ultimate objective of the US government was to contain the spread of communism. This goal informed the relations between the US and other countries around the world. To ensure that communism would not have the opportunity to penetrate other countries, the US government supported many schemes and collaborations that would render such a scenario infeasible. Accordingly, the US supported strategies to prevent ‘destructive nationalistic political conflicts’ (Borden, 1984, p. 19) and to create regionalism around the world (Borden, 1984, pp. 18-21).

After the defeat in the WWII, the US government occupied Japan and imposed various plans that would structurally change Japan into a democratic country. However, after communism intensified, the cost of maintaining economic and political stability in Japan during the Occupation was too high, so the US government altered its policies, which had been imposing upon Japan. It changed the policies that supported Japan’s active and engaged role in Southeast Asia to instead support Southeast Asian economic regionalism, ensuring that Japan would have access to natural resources and trade markets (St John, 1995). In 1954, Yoshida Shigeru, the then incumbent Prime Minister, proposed two important ideas. The first was that Japan’s security was reliant on US-Japan collaboration, and the second was an emphasis on Japan’s economic recovery and development. This is known as the ‘Yoshida Doctrine’, which stressed that if Japan could contribute to the economic development of the region, it would in turn support the development of the Japanese economy as it would narrow the development gap in Southeast Asia (Stockwin, 2008, p. 60; Sudo, 2002, p. 2). The US government welcomed the Yoshida Doctrine, as the idea was also aligned with the strategy to contain communism (Dower, 1979, p. 477).

Meanwhile, during the 1960s, the political and economic situation in Southeast Asia was in turmoil due to the Vietnam War. As the US government was concerned about the Vietnam War and the spread of communism in Southeast Asia, it began to support economic regionalism in Southeast Asia, anticipating that economic regionalism would influence Southeast Asian governments to turn away from communism (Mendl, 1995, p. 97). Dixon (1991) states that there were three
reasons why the US government supported economic regionalism in Southeast Asia. First, economic regionalism in Southeast Asia would allow the US government to access markets in the region, benefitting industrial and strategic commodities and dairy products from the US. Second, Southeast Asia is well known for its abundant natural resources, which are useful for production in the US and Japan (Dixon, 1991, pp. 9-12). The US support of economic regionalism would help Japan to access natural resources, further supporting Japan’s economic development. In turn, Japan’s economic dependency on the US would decrease, which would lessen the burden on the US government (Shiraishi, 1997, p. 175). Lastly, the US government was seeking political and strategic alliances, which was an essential objective as each country in Southeast Asia was using different political systems. If the US could establish diplomatic and political relations with various countries in Southeast Asia, the alliance supporting the spread of democracy and capitalism would also be strengthened (Sornsri, 1986, p. 163).

In 1963, President Lyndon B. Johnson demonstrated his concern regarding the expansion of communism in Asia. He initiated a scheme to support economic development and regionalism in the lower Mekong River area to further support economic growth within the region. Johnson appointed Eugene Black, the then incumbent President of the World Bank, to be the leader of the development project. In his book entitled ‘Alternative in Southeast Asia’ (1969), Black reflects the idea that communism was a threat to the US (Black, 1969, pp. 8-12), stating that:

Regionalism is more important to us in Southeast Asia precisely because it does reflect a real national interest of ours and because the prosperity exists for pursuing that interest in ways compatible with the interests of the governments of Southeast Asia as those governments see them. (Black, 1969, p. 28)

The lower Mekong River development scheme highlighted the importance of the development of ‘hard infrastructure’ that would support economic regionalism in the other parts of Southeast Asia, such as Malaysia and Singapore. Black (Black, 1969, pp. 105-109) stated that the co-operation between the US and Southeast Asia should focus on the development of transport and
telecommunication systems. Black also pointed out the significance of the security problem in the Strait of Malacca, as it closely impacted Japan’s economic and energy security. This reflects how the US saw the implication of Southeast Asia as a strategic area, in addition to its importance to Japan’s economy.

The US government expected that Japan would support and join any arrangements and schemes that supported the US. Black also stated that Japan should try to adjust its economic and political objectives to match those of the US to enhance their partnership, and that those adjustments should also reflect its responsibilities in East Asia. He stressed that Japan should provide economic assistance to Southeast Asian countries in order to support regional development (Black, 1969, p. 69). Black’s opinions reflect that the US government recognised that the political and economic transformation of Southeast Asia was at risk. If communism were to spread into Southeast Asia, it could be a threat to the international system. Therefore, to prevent Southeast Asia from turning to communism, the US government-initiated schemes that would support economic development and the creation of economic regionalism in Southeast Asia. One of the most important legacies from such US strategies is the 1966 creation of the Asian Development Bank (ADB). The US government expected that the ADB would be a mechanism to support economic development in Asia and to re-establish the role of Japan in the international community (Black, 1969, p. 101; Yasutomo, 1983, p. 66).

In 1967, just one year after the establishment of ADB, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) was also established. The first five countries that joined ASEAN were Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, and the Philippines. The US government strongly supported the creation of ASEAN, expecting that it would further economic development within the region (Mahapatra, 1990). The first five ASEAN member states maintained intimate relations with the US government. This demonstrates that ASEAN was initiated with the intention of supporting regionalism and strengthening diplomatic relations with the US.

The post-1945 international system, as dominated by the US, was one of the main factors that triggered Japan’s engagement in Southeast Asia. In the next subsection, we will look at how the Japanese government initiated its official relations with Southeast Asia and with ASEAN.
4.2.2 Japan-Southeast Asia Relations

We have seen from the previous section that the US-dominated international system provided a supportive economic and political environment for the development of Japan-Southeast Asia relations. This section, then, will explore the dynamics of Japan’s attempts to reconstruct economic and diplomatic relations with Southeast Asian governments.

A significant milestone that changed Japan-ASEAN relations was after 1945, particularly when the Japanese government decided to re-establish its positions in the international system and the East Asian region. The Japanese government started to utilise war reparations as a diplomatic tool to reconstruct official relations between Japan and Southeast Asia (Araki, 2007, pp. 18-20; Hook et al., 2012, p. 184). The Japanese government allocated war reparations worth $1.6 billion USD to Burma, the Philippines, Indonesia, and (South) Vietnam. After that, a total of 245.27 billion yen was provided to Cambodia, Malaysia, Singapore, South Korea, and Thailand. However, while the war reparations seemed to be a significant amount of money, the proportion of the reparations was only two per cent of the Japanese annual budget (Hellmann, 1972, p. 105). Nevertheless, some scholars attribute the reconstructed regional relations to these war reparations, which further facilitated Japan’s regained access to economic and political opportunities in the region (Akira, 2007; Katada, 2002b; Miyashita, 1999; Rix, 1993).

Japan’s ODA is one of the most significant elements of Japan-ASEAN relations. Tanaka Akihiko, President of Japan International Co-operation Agency (JICA), points out that Japan’s provision of ODA to Southeast Asia was used as ‘quasi-reparations’ to reconstruct friendship and trust between the two regions (Tanaka, 2014). Kato (2016) states that provision of foreign aid signalled the starting point of Japan’s willingness to re-engage in the international community. Many scholars analyse war reparations from this period as tools to promote Japanese exports (Zhou, 1991; Arase, 1994; Fujisaki et al., 1996; Kim, 2011).

Southeast Asian countries have continuously been major recipients of Japan’s ODA due to its close geographic proximity and significant amount of economic and trade relations with Southeast Asia. Nevertheless, although economic relations between the two were formed even before the Second World War, the hostile atmosphere that was caused by the Second World War led Southeast Asian countries to perceive Japan as an unfriendly country. Rix (Rix, 1993, p. 135) states
that in response to the hostility between Japan and Southeast Asia, the Japanese government utilised ODA as a form of diplomacy to establish its ‘return to Asia’.

Before Japan’s ODA programme was initiated in the 1960s, financial assistance was provided in the form of foreign aid. The Japanese government began providing foreign aid in 1945 following its surrender. Foreign aid was used as a tool to pay war reparations to Southeast Asia, a task assigned to the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI). Thus, it was considered as economic and diplomatic tools that have close relations with the economic aspect of Japan. They state that reparations were used to support economic recovery in Southeast Asia so that it could regain its economic power to purchase Japanese goods.

Although ODA has been utilised as a main channel of Japan’s foreign policy, Arase (1995), Ensign (1992), and Lincoln (1993) propose that ODA is a form of support from behind. Unlike economic or political engagement that can be seen more obviously, ODA is sometimes considered as ‘faceless’ or ‘quiet’ diplomacy, which means that the Japanese government supports the work of international organisations or missions without playing an explicitly obvious role. Severino (2014) and Söderberg (2011) observe that the Japanese government allocated a significant amount of ODA to Southeast Asia because ODA is closely integrated in Japan’s foreign policy. This observation is also made by other scholars who further state that ODA helps Japanese firms to access Southeast Asian markets (Fukushima, 2000, p. 156; Kato, 2016, pp. 1-2).

Along with the utilisation of ODA, the Japanese government also attempted to re-establish economic and political with Southeast Asia again. In 1954, Yoshida Shigeru, former Prime Minister of Japan, stated that Japan must help Southeast Asia to fight against communism by supporting the region’s economic development (Dower, 1979, pp. 473-280). The US and Japanese governments’ perception of the threat of communism also affected the development of Japan-Southeast Asia relations, leading to ‘keizai gaiko’ or ‘economic diplomacy’ between Japan and Southeast Asia.

In 1957, Kishi Nobusuke, former Prime Minister of Japan, emphasised ‘Asia-Centred Diplomacy’, and in 1958 he initiated a research institute that focuses on Asia called the ‘Asia Economic Research Institute’, or ‘Ajia Keizai Kenkyujo’ or ‘Ajiken’. The institute, however, conducted an institutional re-organisation in 1960 and moved to be under the supervision of MITI (Olson, 1970, pp. 67-68). Ajiken then changed
its name to IDE-JETRO in July 1998. During his term, Kishi also visited many countries in Southeast Asia, which established him as the first Prime Minister of Japan to travel to Southeast Asia after the war. The purpose of the visits was to strengthen economic and political relations between Japan and Southeast Asia. Kishi also initiated the ‘Southeast Asian Development Fund Plan’, or ‘Tonan Ajia Kaihatsu Kyokoku Kika’, to allocate Japan’s financial and human resources to support Southeast Asia.

During the 1960s, both the Japanese and Southeast Asian economies gradually recovered from the war. In 1964, Japan was admitted to the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) that was established by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). Japan’s position, then, was changed to a donor country. Seeking to increase its support for economic development in Southeast Asia, Japan initiated an ‘income doubling policy’ to support economic growth. The US agreed with and welcomed this policy as a mechanism to support economic development, which would in turn constrain the proliferation of communism into Southeast Asia. This led to various economic and societal development schemes. The relations between Japan and the US during the 1950s regarding the development of infrastructure and international transport started to emerge. It was anticipated that such relations would facilitate the regional integration of mainland Southeast Asia. By the end of the 1960s, Japan had allocated financial assistance to Thailand, Cambodia, Laos, South Vietnam, and Indonesia. Accordingly, from 1960 to 1970 Japan’s assistance focused on the development of large infrastructure and energy projects (Dauvergne, 2001, p. 53).

When Ikeda Hayato was prime minister, Japan’s engagement in international political issues was quite low compared to previous years due to domestic issues in Japan regarding the amendment of the Japan-American security agreement. Nevertheless, Japan still helped Southeast Asia to address regional issues, such as the conflict between Malaysia and Indonesia over the establishment of the Malaya Federation (Nishihara, 1979).

Meanwhile, the regional economic and political environment was confronted with political transformation. In 1966, the Japanese government attempted to help Southeast Asia establish a regional mechanism called the ‘Ministerial Conference for Economic Development in Southeast Asia’ (MEDSEA) to support regional economic co-operation. One year after that, in 1967, the Southeast Asian
governments agreed to establish ASEAN. When ASEAN was established, there were only five member countries, including Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, and the Philippines. Sato Eisaku, former Prime Minister of Japan, was interested in making Japan a member of ASEAN, yet the request was rejected by ASEAN as Japan is not located in Southeast Asia.

The US and Japanese governments anticipated that regionalism, or regional co-operation, would support economic growth and fight against communism. Japan’s MITI and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA), however, were concerned that ASEAN’s objectives and operations might not support Japan’s economic interests. Moreover, ASEAN might become an economic competitor with Japan (Hook et al., 2012, p. 186).

When ASEAN began functioning as a regional organisation, it changed Japan’s approach from focusing on bilateral relations to multilateral relations. In one example, Southeast Asian governments requested Japan to decrease its synthetic rubber production so that the demand for Southeast Asian rubber would increase. The Japanese government agreed to the requests, as the production of synthetic rubber was not suitable to the oil crisis of the early 1970s. Originally, after 1945, the Japanese government attempted to re-establish its economic relations with Southeast Asia benefitted the growing number of Japanese products in the region. However, in the early 1970s, people in Southeast Asia did not feel comfortable with Japanese economic presence in the region, which led to demonstrations against Japanese products in both Thailand and Indonesia.

Japan’s ODA policy changed in the 1970s for two reasons: first, due to the US ban on Japanese soybeans and second, the oil crisis. The Japanese government realised that Japan had to diversify its sources of food security and natural resources by seeking them in other areas. This led to the 1974 establishment of JICA under the supervision of MOFA. JICA commissioned ODA to be allocated to other regions apart from Southeast Asia, broadening JICA’s outreach to be more active and inclusive. Another incident that changed the Japanese provision of ODA was the visit of Prime Minister Tanaka Kakuei to Southeast Asia in 1974, triggering protests in Bangkok and Jakarta regarding the over-presence of Japanese companies in Southeast Asia (Kato, 2016, p. 2). The Japanese government responded to the protests with the visit of Fukuda Takeo in 1977, resulting in significant changes to Japan’s strategies towards Southeast Asia. Fukuda announced that Japan would not
strive for military power and that it would develop positive relations with Southeast Asia, pursuing peace and prosperity in the region by supporting the development of ASEAN countries (Lam, 2013a; Pressello, 2014; Sudo, 1988, 2015).

In the mid-1970s, when the communist system ruled Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos, the Japanese government started to worry about the region’s economic and political situation. Japan began to rethink how to strengthen the relations between the two regions so that economic co-operation could fight against communism.

Japan-ASEAN relations started to officially formalise in 1977 when the first ASEAN-Japan Summit was held in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. Fukuda Takeo participated in the Summit and established Japan-ASEAN relations by announcing the following three principles: (1) Japan will not try to become a military power in the region and it will not try to produce nuclear weapons, (2) Japan will strengthen the relations by focusing on ‘heart-to-heart’ approach with Southeast Asian countries, and (3) Japan will treat Southeast Asian countries as an equal partner. These three principles are collectively called the ‘Fukuda Doctrine’ (Shiraishi & Kojima, 2014b, pp. 2-5). The Fukuda Doctrine also aimed to help the Japanese government to fight against communism and to support the economic interests of Japan in Southeast Asia (Khamchoo, 1991, pp. 9-10).

In the 1980s, as relations between Japan and Southeast Asia developed, the international political context that confronted Japan was its economic relations with the US. Their relations were primarily shaped by US foreign policy in Asia, particularly during the Korean and Vietnam Wars. Borden (1984) states that the wars in the Korean peninsula and Vietnam improved the Japanese government and businesses. The Korean War triggered the growth of the Japanese economy because of the special procurements of strategic commodities from the US military. The procurements improved Japanese industries and boosted export volumes. The relatively high growth of the Japanese economy and the trade surplus facilitated by regional conflicts stimulated dissatisfaction from the US government. The US considered Japan as a ‘free-rider’ who benefited from the US-constructed peaceful regional order (Borden, 1984). This exasperation from the US government led to the commencement of the G5 meeting in 1985, where the Plaza Accord was signed between the governments of France, West Germany, Japan, the US, and the UK. The Plaza Accord was set to depreciate the US dollar in relation to the Japanese yen and German Deutsche marks by intervening in currency markets. The Plaza Accord
brought a significant impact on Japanese production. Verbiest (2013) and Severino (2014) state that the Plaza Accord triggered the relocation of Japanese manufacturers to Southeast Asia because the Accord had appreciated the US dollar, which impacted the cost of production in Japan. After the Plaza Accord was signed, due to the devaluation of the yen, it structurally forced Japanese companies, which at the time based their factories in Japan, to consider moving their factories to Southeast Asia to lower production costs. We will see in Chapter 5 that when Japan’s manufacturers relocated to Southeast Asia, it also affected the economic development of Southeast Asian countries, increased urbanisation, and facilitated the creation of special economic zones. This led to the development of both hard and soft infrastructure, particularly in the field of regional transport development.

During the 1980s and 1990s, the situation in Japan and in the international environment affected the Japanese economy and its foreign policy towards Southeast Asia. It can be contended that the 1980s to the early 1990s were the most important period of changes in the relations between Japan and Southeast Asia. There were three significant incidents that affected the philosophy and the work of Japan's ODA.

The first incident was the change in Japan-US relations due to Japan’s economic recovery, which led to its trade surplus. We have seen from above that the Plaza Accord devalued the yen, triggering the relocation of Japanese factories to Southeast Asia. To support Japanese factories abroad, the Japanese government started to emphasise the importance of infrastructure development in Southeast Asia (Hatch, 2010, pp. 74-85; Kawashima, 2005, p. 123; Yoshimatsu, 2017, p. 495). Therefore, the ODA framework and infrastructure development in Southeast Asia started to be organised systematically beginning with the relocation of Japanese factories after 1985. Furthermore, Japan not only emphasised the importance of hard infrastructure development, but also the development of human resources, or ‘soft’ infrastructure, in ASEAN countries. This is demonstrated by the Japanese government’s announcement in 1981 to allocate $100 million USD to establish a human resource development centre in each of the ten ASEAN member states (Kato, 2016, p. 2; Ohtsu & Imanari, 2001, p. 135). Between 1980 and 1990, MITI strongly pushed Japanese firms to go abroad, expecting that the relocation of Japanese firms would also help establish and strengthen East Asian regionalisation (Hatakeyama, 2008, p. 361). Additionally, during 1980 and 1990, the Japanese government started to support the construction of the Eastern Seaboard Industrial development project.
in Thailand – a Thai industrial development project which focused on deep seaport in the Eastern part of Thailand which aimed to help attract international investment, increase economic development in Thailand. These phenomena illustrate the process of forming East Asian regionalism, infrastructure, and human resource development. They are all interrelated as they are each an aspect of economic development.

Second, the collapse of communism in 1991 was another important milestone that triggered changes in Japan’s ODA. The international environment in the early 1990s facilitated an increase in co-operation amongst Southeast Asian countries. The international political rivalries between the US and the Soviet Union also stopped. The transformation of the international political and economic environments allowed Japan to initiate a more active foreign policy. The political situation in Southeast Asia also changed after the collapse of the Soviet Union, shifting to a more amicable economic environment.

Third, Japanese ODA challenged many issues in Japan’s society. For example, when the Japanese government wanted to increase the ODA budget, it brought the debate to society. ODA was questioned by Japanese people and by recipients about its philosophy. It was also criticised by the Japanese community, which asserted that ODA lacked philosophical groundings and tended to align with US strategic interests (Kato, 2016; Hatakeyama, 2008, p. 357; Jain, 2016, p. 98; Trinidad, 2007, p. 96). Japanese people wanted to understand why the government had to provide economic assistance to other countries. At the same time, the recipients questioned the economic and political agendas that influenced Japanese aid. Moreover, the lack of a central authority to manage Japan’s ODA was also questioned. The direction of ODA provision was not unified because each ministry managed its ODA differently (Dauvergne, 2001, p. 54; Hirata, 1998; Sayuri, 2007, pp. 151-156). This reflected the lack of philosophy underpinning ODA, which led to the 1992 publishing of the first ODA Charter, outlining its aid philosophy (Potter & Belle, 2004, p. 116; Sawamura, 2004, p. 27). Japan's MOFA had to clarify the intention that:

This stance towards aid has been criticised as lacking a philosophical basis. Yet Japan has also been praised for its efforts to respect the autonomy and self-help efforts of recipient nations. Many see the Japanese way as the
approach that most closely reflects the essential role of development assistance. All recipient nations place a high value on the fact that Japanese aid does not entail political and economic conditions. (MOFA, 1990, p. 19)

The Japanese government emphasised Japan’s philosophical basis for aid in the 1992 Charter, which includes (1) humanitarian considerations, (2) recognition of interdependence in the international community, and (3) environmental conservations (MOFA, 1992). In the 1992 Charter, the philosophy further stresses the importance of ‘self-help’ efforts (Rix, 1993a, pp. 15-16; Sawamura, 2004, p. 29). It states that MOFA ‘supports self-help’ efforts, which “reflects the belief in Japan that true development, with economic independence, can be achieved only when a recipient country promotes development strategies through its own self-help efforts” (MOFA, 1996, p. 45). Nevertheless, although the 1992 Charter did not mention the development of infrastructure in its philosophy, we can see in the ‘Issues’ section that it stresses the importance of infrastructure improvement as “a prerequisite to socio-economic development” (MOFA, 1992).

In the 1990s, although Japan was the biggest donor in the world, domestic economic problems caused Japan to slow down its engagement in the international system. During this time, the geopolitical situation in the Middle East and Iraq's invasion of Kuwait reflected the inability of Japan to contribute to an international crisis. Although the Japanese government allocated financial assistance to help alleviate the situation, it was not enough, and it was thought to be too late. This inadequate response is called ‘chequebook diplomacy’ because the Japanese government only allocated financial support without providing sufficient strategic and political assistance to mitigate the crisis (Funabashi, 1991; Purrington, 1992). Japan’s bubble economy restricted the country from becoming the biggest donor, as MOFA states that:

In recent years, however, many Japanese have become critical of Japan's ODA due to the severe domestic economic and fiscal conditions. According to the Public Opinion Survey on Foreign Policy conducted by
the Prime Minister’s Office, nearly 70 per cent of the Japanese public still supports Japanese ODA at least to some extent. However, the percentage of respondents who believe that ODA expenditures should be reduced as much as possible or stopped altogether has increased from about 10 per cent a decade ago to about 30 per cent today. (MOFA, 2001, Chapter II - Section 3)

Moreover, at the end of the 1980s and in the beginning of the 1990s, the regional economic and political environments shifted due to the fall of communism. In 1991, Kaifu Toshiki – former Prime Minister of Japan – travelled to Southeast Asia to strengthen and reaffirm diplomatic relations between Japan and Southeast Asia. Kaifu stressed the strategy of Japan vis-à-vis Southeast Asia. He emphasised that Japan would not try to become a militaristic power and that Japan would try to strengthen its partnership with Southeast Asia (Feng, 2002, pp. 218-219). In 1992-1993, another significant event that triggered Japanese engagement was the turmoil in Cambodia, which led to Japanese support of the peacekeeping operation (PKO). Miyazawa Kiichi travelled to Southeast Asia and announced the ‘Miyazawa Doctrine’, which stressed the importance of multilateral security dialogue, economic liberalisation in Asia-Pacific, the process of democratisation in the region, and the revival of diplomatic relations with Indo-China countries (Brown, 1994; Tanaka, 2017, pp. 64-81).

The 1992 issuance of the ODA Charter serves as another significant milestone of Japan’s relations with Southeast Asia. Before 1992, the philosophy underpinning ODA was not clearly articulated, if it ever existed. At the time the first ODA Charter was introduced, Japanese ministries lacked a shared philosophy of ODA provision. The 1992 ODA Charter announced that it would focus on recipients’ self-help efforts, the promotion of sustainable economic growth, and the development of human security (Kishida, 2014). However, the philosophy has changed over time. Currently, the philosophy focuses more on an open approach, yet emphasises peace and stability of the international community. Japan anticipated that through provision of ODA it would lead global issues; support peace, stability, and security as sources for development; and strengthen partnerships with different
actors around the world (Kishida, 2014). The next part will explore the historical development of Japan’s ODA to see how it has changed over time.

In 1997, when Southeast Asia was confronted with the financial crisis, the Japanese government under Obuchi Keizo stepped in to alleviate the situation by allocating financial assistance, totalling $16 million USD, to the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Following this commitment, Mitsuzuka Hiroshi, the then incumbent Minister of Finance, proposed to establish the ‘Asian Monetary Fund’ (AMF) as a mechanism to deal with Asian financial crises in the future (Tanaka, 2017, p. 186). However, the US opposed his proposal as the AMF might de-emphasise the work of the IMF, which is dominated by Western economic order (Sudo, 2015, p. 173). When Miyazawa Kiichi took over as Minister of Finance in 1999, he announced the allocation of $3 billion USD in financial assistance to Southeast Asia to further address the financial crisis. The Japanese government then announced the ‘New Miyazawa Initiative’, aimed at establishing the Asian Currency Crisis Support Facility (ACCSA) at the ADB (Katada, 2002b, p. 97). The New Miyazawa Initiative proposed a set of supportive measures totalling $30 billion USD to help Southeast Asian countries recover from the financial crisis.

Along with the development of Japan-Southeast Asia bilateral relations, ASEAN also developed as a regional organisation that aims to support economic integration in the region. Following the announcement of the ‘Fukuda Doctrine’ at the First ASEAN-Japan Summit in 1977, the two regions organised a Second Summit in 1987 and a Third Summit in 1997. Moreover, the First ASEAN Plus Three (Japan, China, and Korea) Summit was also held in 1997. The Japanese government additionally joined the Treaty of Amity and Co-operation in Southeast Asia (TAC) in 2004.

In 2009, the governments of ASEAN member countries agreed to establish the ASEAN Community by 2015 as a regional arrangement that comprises three ‘pillars’ including the ASEAN Political-Security Community (APSC), the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC), and the ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community (ASCC). This endeavour was welcomed by the Japanese government because there are a considerable number of Japanese companies in Southeast Asia, establishing Southeast Asia an important trade partner. This is further demonstrated by the fact that between 2013 and 2015, $20 billion USD of ASEAN’s inward FDI came from Japan (JETRO, 2016).
Table 2: The Number of Japanese Companies in Southeast Asia (2015)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>1,642</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vietnam</td>
<td>1,463</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Singapore</td>
<td>832</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>745</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>743</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malaysia</td>
<td>607</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Myanmar</td>
<td>239</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cambodia</td>
<td>192</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Laos</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brunei</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: JETRO (2015)

Moreover, US foreign policy towards Southeast Asia after the Cold War further influenced Japan’s economic and political strategies in Southeast Asia. Japan’s trade surplus with the US during the 1980s led to the Plaza Accord, which facilitated relocation of many Japanese manufacturers (Severino, 2014, p. 24). The engagement and contribution of the Japanese government and the private sector in the development of international transport in Southeast Asia began during the Cold War (Hatch, 2010, pp. 74-85; Yoshimatsu, 2017, p. 495). This was particularly noticeable after the Plaza Accord was signed, as the Japanese government began their support of the relocation of Japanese manufactures to Southeast Asia in an effort to help develop both the Japanese and Southeast Asian economies (Yoshimatsu, 2017).

4.3 Japan’s Interest in Regional Transport Development in ASEAN and the GMS

The previous section provided a brief overview of the development of Japan-ASEAN relations. The first sub-section explained that the international system was dominated by the US, which influenced the relations between Japan and Southeast Asia. This was primarily due to the US government’s anticipation that Southeast Asia would establish economic co-operation to support regional economic activities, which would in turn help Japan to access regional markets. The second sub-section explained how Japan developed its co-operation with ASEAN.

While there are some multilateral initiatives between Japan and Southeast Asia, it is mostly Southeast Asian regional initiatives between member countries that
developed significantly after the Second World War. Furthermore, there are both regional and sub-regional initiatives in the region. While the primary regional initiative is ASEAN, there are three main sub-regional initiatives in the region, including:

*Mainland Southeast Asia*
- Greater Mekong Subregion Economic Co-operation Programme (GMS)

*Maritime Southeast Asia*
- Indonesia-Malaysia-Thailand Growth Triangle (IMT-GT)
- Brunei Darussalam-Indonesia-Malaysia-Philippines East ASEAN Growth Area (BIMP-EAGA)

Why is the Japanese government interested in regional transport – or infrastructure as a whole – in Southeast Asia? According to the Japan International Co-operation Agency (JICA)’s explanation, the importance of transport development is recognised in their statement that access to transport is one of the fundamental keys to facilitate the mobility of people and promote economic activities (JICA, 2014). Apart from JICA, the ADB also recognises the importance of hard infrastructure development. For example, Nakao Takehiko, the President of ADB, states that infrastructure is one of the essential conditions for economic development. He contends that if a state wants to increase its economic development, it should focus on infrastructure investment, education and health, macro-economics, liberalisation of trade and investment, public governance, social inclusiveness, vision for the future, and political stability and security issues. He also states that sufficient infrastructure can attract investors, increasing foreign direct investment (FDI), triggering further economic development and improvement of local people’s living standards (Nakao, 2015). In this sense, Nakao believes that infrastructure development will attract investors to Southeast Asia.

The Japanese government has continuously supported two main regional economic initiatives: ASEAN as a whole, and the GMS Programme. ASEAN’s ultimate goal is the creation of the ASEAN Community to comprehensively connect the region through political, economic, and social co-operation. On the other hand,
the GMS Programme was established in 1992 to respond to economic opportunities. The GMS Programme includes six countries: Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, Thailand, Vietnam, and two provinces of China: Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region and Yunnan Province. The GMS Programme aims to support subregional co-operation and economic development in a specific geographical area. When the GMS was first established, it was composed of nine sectors of co-operation, including transport, energy, communication, environment, human resources, tourism, trade, public investment, and agriculture. However, as of 2019 these nine areas of co-operation have changed to include agriculture, energy, environment, health and human resource development (HRD), information and communication technology, tourism, transport, transport and trade facilitation, and urban development. The changes in the areas of co-operation reflect how the economic and political environment has changed in the past twenty-seven years. For example, information and communication technology and urban development have been added to address the challenges that are caused by telecommunication development and urbanisation.

The GMS Programme project that has progressed the most is the development of economic corridors. From Figure 2, we can see that there are three main economic corridors, which are:

1. **The East-West Economic Corridor (EWEC):** The EWEC links Mawlamyine (Myanmar) – Myawaddy (Myanmar) – Mae Sot (Thailand) – Phitsanulok (Thailand) – Mukdahan (Thailand) – Kaysone Phomvihane (Laos) – Dansavanh (Laos) – Lao Bal (Laos) – Don Ha (Vietnam) – Hue (Vietnam) – Da Nang (Vietnam)

2. **The North-South Economic Corridor (NSEC):** There are three subcorridors, including

   a. The Western Subcorridor (Kunming–Chiang Rai–Bangkok via the Lao PDR or Myanmar)
   b. The Central Subcorridor (Kunming–Ha Noi–Hai Phong)
   c. The Eastern Subcorridor (Nanning–Ha Noi via Pingxiang in the PRC and Dong Dang in Viet Nam, or via Fangcheng and Dongxing in the PRC and Mon Cai in Viet Nam)
3. **The Southern Economic Corridor (SEC):** There are four subcorridors, including
   
a. The Central Subcorridor (Bangkok–Phnom Penh–Ho Chi Minh City–Vung Tau)
   
b. The Northern Subcorridor (Bangkok–Siem Reap–Stung Treng–Ratanakiri–O Yadav–Pleiku–Quy Nhon)
   
c. The Bangkok–Trat–Koh Kong–Kampot–Ha Tien–Ca Mau City–Nam Can (Southern Coastal Subcorridor)
   

These economic corridors are financially supported by the ADB, member countries, and the Japanese government. Japan’s MOFA states the importance of the GMS area is that its potential for economic and business prospects is one of the highest in Asia. The Japanese government focuses on two specific economic corridors, which are the EWEC and SEC (Ishida, 2007, p. 1; Lauridsen, 2019, p. 229; MOFA, 2001a). IDE-JETRO’s Ishida Masami shows that there are many Japanese government-supported projects that aim to help the EWEC and SEC, for example:

- The Hai Van Tunnel on National Road No. 1 in Vietnam
- The Second Mekong International Bridge between Thailand and Laos
- Road Pavement of No. 9 Road in Laos (Ishida, 2007, p. 1).

Ishida also shows that in 2006 there were more than 1,575 Japanese companies in Thailand, which ranks the highest compared to other countries in the region (Ishida, 2007, p.2). Even as recently as 2015, as shown in Table 2, Thailand still has the number of Japanese investors. The Japanese investors in Thailand are mainly parts and components companies located nearby Bangkok and the Eastern Seaboard area. Compared to the EWEC and SEC, the Japanese government is less interested in the NSEC because the Chinese government pays significant attention to the NSEC (Ishida, 2007, p. 1). We can see from Figure 2 that the NSEC links
Yunnan, a land-locked province of China, to Thailand, which has deep-sea ports. This provides China with more opportunities to export, as well as opening access to both the markets and natural resources in Southeast Asia (ADB, 2010; Charoensri, 2010a; Takao, 2009; Vu, 2014).

The economic corridors evolved in three stages, with the first stage between 1992 and 1997. When the GMS Programme was first initiated in 1991, the GMS member countries identified the regional transport problems that needed to be addressed regionally. In 1994, the research group proposed a study entitled ‘Subregional Transport Sector Study for the GMS’ to the Third GMS Ministerial Conference held in Hanoi. The final report was then endorsed at the Fourth GMS Ministerial Conference in 1994. The second stage was between 1998 and 2007, during which GMS member countries adopted the economic corridors approach and designation of the EWEC, NSEC, and SEC. The third stage began in 2008 after the formulation of strategies and action plans (SAPs) for the EWEC, NSEC and SEC (ADB, 2018, pp. 4-7).

Another important aspect of Japan’s engagement in the development of transport infrastructure in Southeast Asia is that the Japanese government seems to have a comparatively clearer vision of the development projects in mainland Southeast Asia (see Figure 3 and 4) when compared to that of the Chinese government (Charoensri, 2016). Japan integrates the work of MOFA, Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry (METI), METI and ERIA, IDE-JETRO, and ADBI so that they support each other. The outcome of such integrated work is the focus of the Comprehensive Asia Development Plan (CADP) that seeks to link the GMS with the rest of South Asia (see Chapter 5 and 6). China’s Belt-Road Initiative (BRI), on the contrary, does not focus on land transport in the GMS area, but rather emphasises the maritime Silk Road. Furthermore, although the Chinese government initiated the Lancang-Mekong Co-operation (LMC) in 2014, a regional initiative between five GMS member countries and China, their co-operation is more focused on human resource development (HRD), growth economy, agriculture, water resource management, and rural management than transport development.
Proximity is another factor that plays an important role in Japan’s interest in the GMS area. Japan’s location in the Pacific Ocean has consequently led to a scarcity of natural resources, particularly petroleum and gas. Almost 80 per cent of Japan’s oil, gas, and other products imported from Europe, Africa, or the Middle East must be shipped through the Strait of Malacca, which is located between Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore (Raj, 2009). As Japan depends heavily on the import of natural resources (e.g. food, petroleum, gas) and other commodities from abroad, the
transport route must be secure and protected by the utilisation of various initiatives that support mechanisms in international organisations. The Strait of Malacca, which links the Indian and the Pacific Oceans, is one of the busiest sea-lanes in the world. However, pirates around the strait cause concern for the Japanese economy because if the ships were to be pirated, both the imported commodities and Japan’s energy security would be threatened (The Nippon Foundation, 2014; Graham 2006). This situation led the Japanese government to seek an alternative way to transport goods and products from one side of mainland Southeast Asia to the other, resulting in their focus on land transport. As shown in Figure 4, the EWEC on mainland Southeast Asia provides an alternative shipping route.

**Figure 3: The Linking Passage between the Indian and the Pacific Ocean on Mainland Southeast Asia**

*Figure 3 was derived from the MOFA’s official website. It shows how the Japanese government views the development of international transport in Southeast Asia.*
Asia, particularly how the region can link two oceans by way of mainland and maritime transport networks. Japan’s expectation of Southeast Asia, both from the government and the business sector, is the creation of extensive transport networks. Mainland and maritime Southeast Asia require different strategies that can support construction of each network. The primary strategies that the Japanese government and business sector have been supporting are the creation of physical infrastructure and the standardisation of regulations and laws in Southeast Asia. The Japanese government is aware that a gap between countries, in terms of either hard or soft infrastructure development, might constrain economic regionalism and the creation of IPN in the region. Thus, the financial and technical support provided by Japanese governmental agencies has been granted to multiple Southeast Asian countries, ASEAN, and the GMS Programme. There are numerous other actors involved in providing assistance to Southeast Asia, including Japan’s ministries and research organisations, such as the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism (MLIT) and Japan Institute of International Affairs (JIIA). Further elaboration on their contributions to Japan’s role in the development of Southeast Asia will be detailed in the next section.

Figure 4: Japan’s Vision of ASEAN Connectivity

The MOFA anticipates that the comprehensive development of land transport will link the Indian and the Pacific Oceans so that ships do not have to pass through the Strait of Malacca. In this respect, the governments of GMS member countries expect the economic corridors of the GMS Programme, particularly the EWEC, to help facilitate this cross-continent connectivity (TRF, 2010, p. 3). Figure 5 also emphasises the idea of transportation between East and West mainland Southeast Asia, as well as the establishment of maritime networks. Moreover, these linkages require not only the comprehensive construction of physical roads, airports, and deep-sea ports, but also the development of regulations and laws. The MOFA has allocated ODA to support hard infrastructure development in the GMS based on the requests of Japanese companies in the area (MOFA, 2012, p. 29) and anticipates that the provision of ODA will encourage Japanese companies to increase their investments in ASEAN and the GMS area (MOFA, 2013, p. 13). Examples of such hard infrastructure development projects include the Lach Huyen Port Infrastructure Construction Project (Vietnam), the Utility Management of Environment-Friendly Industrial Parks and Water Supply Project in Long An Province (Vietnam), and the survey for the Long Thanh International Airport construction in Vietnam (MOFA, 2012, p. 29).

Geopolitical factors also impact Japan-ASEAN relations. Japan’s MOFA recognises the geopolitical importance of the GMS, as it is centrally located and can act as the hub of regional initiatives in both East Asia and Southeast Asia (MOFA, 2016, p. 3). The perspectives through which Japan’s government agencies view regional transport development in Southeast Asia are outlined by JETRO, which explained that there are two major areas for development: mainland and maritime Southeast Asia. On the mainland, regional transport development and the creation of an international production network (IPN) in Southeast Asia have been focusing Thailand. This is because in the GMS area, the level of competitiveness in each country is comparatively low. For instance, in 2014, the competitiveness of Thailand was ranked as 35th, whilst Vietnam (48th), Cambodia (83rd), Laos (131st) and Myanmar (145th) are ranked even lower (JETRO, 2015a, p. 29). These numbers reflect the fact that although the development of hard and soft infrastructure is ongoing, the GMS area could still work to advance its competitiveness at the regional and global levels in order to enhance its economic prospects. Additionally, the prospect of the GMS area as an investment destination for Japanese manufacturers
is also reflected by the Federation of Japanese Chambers of Commerce and Industry in ASEAN (FJCCIA), which states that the GMS area has business potential, particularly Thailand as it has the highest number of FJCCIA members compared to other Southeast Asian countries. In 2015, there were 1,624 FJCCIA members in Thailand, followed by Vietnam (1,463), Singapore (832), the Philippines (745), Indonesia (743), Malaysia (607), Myanmar (239), Cambodia (192), Laos (77), and Brunei (3), respectively (JETRO, 2016, p. 5). These numbers reflect the significance of Thailand as a hub for Japanese investment in mainland Southeast Asia.

Moreover, the GMS’s geopolitical factor is also reflected in 2007 when Abe Shinzo initiated the ‘Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy’ (FOIPS), which geographically sought to link the Indian and Pacific Oceans together and to create a free and open market, business opportunities, and a socio-political environment that would support sustainable development in Southeast Asia, South Asia, Middle Asia, and Africa (International Co-operation Bureau, 2017, p. 4). Apart from Southeast Asia, South Asia, and Africa, the FOIPS also mentions the GMS as a specific part of the strategy. The Japanese government aims to link the EWEC with other regional initiatives in Asia, such as the South Asia Subregional Economic Co-operation (SASEC), the South Asian Association Regional Co-operation (SAARC), and the Central Asia Regional Economic Co-operation (CAREC) (MOFA, 2017a). This reflects how Japan is attempting to integrate the GMS area into its comprehensive regional connectivity strategy.

The number of Japanese manufacturers and companies in the region is also a factor that influenced Japan’s interest in Southeast Asia. As ASEAN is a large region, its significant population of 600 million people and growing economies are two important factors that facilitate ASEAN to have promising potential for economic opportunities (MOFA, 2016, p. 3). Following China, ASEAN is Japan’s second largest trade partner. In 2014, ASEAN held 14 per cent of trade proportion with Japan, whilst China held 20.5 per cent (MOFA, 2016, p. 3). At the same, Southeast Asia is Japan’s most significant investment destination within East Asia. In 2015, ASEAN held 15 per cent (MOFA, 2016, p. 3) or 2.15 trillion yen (METI, 2016, p. 3) of the number of Japanese investments. This proportion is higher than in China and Hong Kong, which held 7.5 per cent and 1.8 per cent respectively (MOFA, 2016, p. 3). Additionally, considering the number of Japanese companies in the region, METI states that in 2015 ASEAN was home to 9,071 Japanese companies, and that
177,075 Japanese nationals live in ASEAN (METI, 2016, p. 3). The Federation of Japanese Chambers of Commerce and Industry in ASEAN (FJCCIA) states that in 2015 there were approximately 6,543 Japanese companies in Southeast Asia (see Table 2) (JETRO, 2016). This reflects the overall high number of Japanese companies in the region, demonstrating that Southeast Asia is an important destination for Japanese investors.

The relocation of Japanese factories brought a significant number of companies and personnel to Southeast Asia. When the companies sought to expand their factories abroad and endeavoured to link their production bases in other countries, they reflected such interests to their local governments, particularly regarding the development of infrastructure and the coordination of regulations and laws. The relocation of Japanese manufacturers since the mid-1980s brought an increasing number of factories to Southeast Asia. Amongst the strategies regarding the development of ASEAN and the GMS Programme, the construction and development of international transport networks in Southeast Asia gained the most attention from both Japan and Southeast Asian countries. Japanese companies took this opportunity to reflect on their perceptions of hard and soft infrastructure development. Ishida (2007) states that there were growing interests in the Japanese media on the development of hard and soft infrastructure in the GMS area. This was not because of an increased allocation of Japanese ODA to the subregion, but instead “because several logistic companies in Japan have discovered new business opportunities” (Ishida, 2007, p.3). We can see the allocation of Japanese ODA in support of ASEAN’s MPAC starting in 2010. Beginning in 2011, ODA White Paper onwards, MOFA states the close relationship between Japan and the ERIA in an effort to initiate the ‘Comprehensive Asian Development Plan’ (CADP) (see Chapter 5), and to support ASEAN’s MPAC (MOFA, 2011, p. 105; MOFA, 2012, p. 122; MOFA, 2013, p. 111; MOFA, 2014a, p. 111).

However, the 2015 JETRO survey of 116 Japanese companies in the GMS area revealed their dissatisfaction with regional soft infrastructure (see Table 5) (JETRO, 2016, p. 10). The region’s underdeveloped soft infrastructure constrained companies from engaging in free flow transportation of raw materials and goods. The survey further revealed that the concerns of Japanese companies in Southeast Asia were mainly focused on structural obstacles including unofficial payments at the borders, ineffective operation of e-customs, issues regarding FTA utilisation,
insufficient capacity of customs officers, lack of and/or ambiguous operation of the bond system, time-consuming procedures, cumbersome customs procedures, and the existence of back-taxes (JETRO, 2016, p. 11). JETRO (2016) then proposed that GMS countries should work to improve soft infrastructure through the clarification of rules and regulations on cross-border transactions, establishment of an early notification system, disclosure of information, and implementation of the Cross-Border Transport Agreement (CBTA). An additional issue revealed by the survey was the need for improved productivity, as JETRO’s research demonstrated that the skills and capacities of human resources in the region should be enhanced significantly. Furthermore, regional supply chains needed to be strengthened through the development of sophisticated logistics infrastructure and support for the manufacturing-related service sector (JETRO, 2016, p. 16).

**Table 3:** The Opinions of Japanese Companies in Mekong Countries, Japan and Singapore on Business Situation in the Mekong Area

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Score</th>
<th>Classification</th>
<th>Score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Issues on Customs / Cross-Border Procedure</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>Infrastructure (Soft Infrastructure)</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Infrastructure (Hard Infrastructure)</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Other Issues</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Issues on Logistics</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>Logistics Services</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Logistics Infrastructure (Hard Infrastructure)</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Logistics Infrastructure (Soft Infrastructure)</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Overall / Structural Issues</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Issues on Procurement</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>Local Procurement</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Procurement from Foreign Countries</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Procurement on Production Materials</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Issues on Production</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>Labour</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Utility Infrastructure</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Production Cost</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Cash Management</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Issues on Sales</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>After Services</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Marketing</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Finance</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Quality</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Issues</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>Rules and Regulations</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: JETRO (2016, p. 10)*
While it was earlier stated that land transport development seems to receive a comparatively higher amount of attention from ASEAN and Japan, a significant amount of attention is also given to Southeast Asian maritime transport systems (see Figure 8). The Japanese government is interested in the construction of a ‘Maritime ASEAN Economic Corridor’, which aims to consolidate maritime connectivity between Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia, Brunei, and the Philippines. There are two major projects in which Japan participated, including (1) the development of Roll-On/Roll-Off (RoRo) Networks and short-sea shipping, and (2) the development of the vessel traffic service system (MOFA, 2016, p. 9). Nevertheless, maritime economic corridors have received comparatively less attention from ASEAN, Southeast Asian countries, and Japan. This might be because the Japanese manufacturers are located on different islands and physical linkages between the islands are more challenging to establish (Das, 2013, p. 176).

The importance of hard infrastructure development is also reflected by other various actors. For example, Hashima Toshihide, Director of the Japanese Chamber of Commerce (JCC), states that the main hindrance of establishing viable markets in the subregion is the lack of proper transport. Furthermore, there are still some structural obstacles, such as laws and regulations that need to be amended (Thansettakij Newspaper, 2008). Jean-Pierre Verbiest, the first country Director of Asian Development Bank’s Thailand Resident Mission, states the same concern regarding the development of basic infrastructure in Southeast Asia by saying that the creation of basic infrastructure in the subregion is key to opening the door to neighbouring countries. He further explains that the ADB wanted to support a comprehensive road network in the subregion (Logistics Corner, 2008). From these statements, we can see that the opinions reflected by JCC and ADB share a similar standpoint, which is that hard infrastructure development will help the region to integrate more based on connectivity and economic activities.

Southeast Asia is also important for the Japanese economy because there are many Japanese manufacturers in the region. When we look at the number of Japanese factories outside of Japan, Southeast Asia is the main destination of Japanese manufacturers. This is further demonstrated by the fact that between 2013 and 2015, $20 billion USD of ASEAN’s inward FDI came from Japan (JETRO, 2016).
Although there are many Japanese manufacturers throughout Southeast Asia, there are some particular countries in which Japanese manufacturers are most concentrated. However, as regional and domestic factors change (e.g. political and economic environment), Japanese manufacturers may consider relocating from one country to another country. Between 2012 and 2015, the top five target countries where Japanese manufacturers wanted to ‘expand’ their production bases (see Table 3), included three Southeast Asian countries: Indonesia, Thailand, and Vietnam. Additionally, a study from the Japanese Chamber of Commerce (JCC), which sought to predict the movements of Japanese companies in the region, placed Indonesia as having received the most attention, followed by Vietnam and Cambodia respectively (JCC, 2015). Vietnam and Cambodia have recently become more attractive because the minimum wage requirement for labour-intensive industries is lower than that of other countries in Southeast Asia. Nevertheless, the major obstacles of expansion remain: limited infrastructure and uncoordinated regulations. These issues can also be observed from JETRO’s studies, which show that Japanese companies in the region are worried that there are still insufficient, uncoordinated regulations and laws, and a lack of comprehensive infrastructure or logistics system in Southeast Asia (JETRO, 2016, p. 10).

### Table 4: Japanese Manufacturing Companies’ Target Countries/Areas

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>2012</th>
<th>2013</th>
<th>2014</th>
<th>2015</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rank</td>
<td>Country</td>
<td>Rate (%)</td>
<td>Rank</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>China</td>
<td>62.1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>India</td>
<td>56.4</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>41.8</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>32.1</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Vietnam</td>
<td>31.7</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>25.7</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>14.0</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>USA</td>
<td>10.3</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Myanmar</td>
<td>9.9</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Malaysia</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Korea</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Taiwan</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>Singapore</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>Cambodia</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>Bangladesh</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Japan Bank for International Co-operation (JBIC) (cited in METI, 2016, p. 6)
Before ASEAN’s first Masterplan on Connectivity (MPAC) was issued in 2010, suggestions from Japanese companies in Southeast Asia had increased. For example, Toyota Company urged the governments of GMS member countries to construct an international logistics system so that the transport system could further support economic activities throughout the region (Marumatsu, 2000, pp. 111-127). Moreover, when we examine the requests and concerns of Japanese companies in the GMS area (see Table 5), they tend to be more worried about the development of soft infrastructure than hard infrastructure (JETRO, 2016, p. 10). For example, they demonstrated various concerns about the issues of customs and cross-border procedures. Additionally, when we look at the scores respondents gave to the ‘challenges’ in the region, JETRO’s study reflects that the Japanese companies were very worried about soft infrastructure (76 points), while the development of hard infrastructure was far behind (7 points) (JETRO, 2016, p. 10). This means that the development of hard infrastructure has reached an acceptable point, but regional coordination and understanding of soft infrastructure and international transport have yet to be achieved. Meanwhile, another issue that the companies are concerned with is logistics. From Table 4, we can see that the issue of logistics services, in terms of both hard and soft infrastructure, was also a significant concern of companies in the GMS area.

Table 5: The Concern of Japanese Companies in the GMS Area

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Score</th>
<th>Classification</th>
<th>Score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Issues on Customs / Cross-Border Procedure</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>Soft Infrastructure</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Hard Infrastructure</td>
<td>7</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Other Issues</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Issues on Logistics</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>Logistics Services</td>
<td>51</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Logistics Infrastructure (Hard Infrastructure)</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td>Logistics Infrastructure (Soft Infrastructure)</td>
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<tr>
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<td>31</td>
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<td>Procurement from Foreign Countries</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Procurement on Production Materials</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Issues on Production</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>Labour</td>
<td>55</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Utility Infrastructure</td>
<td>14</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>Production Cost</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Category</td>
<td>Score</td>
<td>Classification</td>
<td>Score</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cash Management</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>After Services</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marketing</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Finance</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quality</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Issues on Sales</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>Other Issues</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>After Services</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Rules and Regulations</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: JETRO (2016, p. 10)

We have seen thus far why the Japanese government is interested to develop economic corridors in ASEAN and the GMS. Within the GMS area, Thailand is one of the biggest destinations for Japanese manufacturers to invest. Looking more closely, Thailand also receives so much attention not only because of the significant number of Japanese companies, but also because of its valuable location.

**Figure 5**: The Location and R&D Centres of Japanese Automobile Industry in Thailand

Figure 5 shows that *Samutprakarn* is the primary area where Japanese automobile factories are located. Moreover, Figure 5 also shows that Japanese
manufacturers are mainly located in the East of Thailand. *Pathumthani* is located in the North of Bangkok; *Chacheognsao, Prachinburi, Chonburi, and Rayong* are located in the East of Thailand; *Samutprakarn* is located in the Southeast of Bangkok; and *Nakorn Ratchasima* is in the Northeast of Thailand. These manufacturing bases have been established since the fifth NESDP. Additionally, 52 per cent of Japanese manufacturing headquarters are located in Bangkok, while 12 per cent are in *Chonburi* and 11 per cent are in *Samutprakarn* (Anuroj, 2017, p. 33).

The eastern part of Thailand is crucial to the GMS economic system considering that Japanese companies relocated their factories to Southeast Asia, particularly Thailand, after the Plaza Accord. Thailand’s National Economic and Social Development Plan (NESDP) shows that the influx of Japanese companies after 1985 has played a role in shaping Thailand’s transportation and urbanisation.

Prior to the Fifth NESDP, the international economic and political environment was never considered as a level of analysis in the development of the NESDP. The international milieu was first explicitly considered as a surrounding context that affects the Thai economy and social changes in the fifth NESDP (1982-1986). The Fifth NESDP states that the 1973 oil crisis impacted both the global and domestic Thai economies and trade volumes, leading to a trade deficit in the Thai economy. During this period, Thailand also confronted the Indo-China crisis, which caused the Thai government to spend a considerable sum of money on national security (NESDB, 1982, pp. 8-9). Additionally, the Fifth NESDP was the first to outline the plan to develop an industrial area in the Eastern part of Thailand. It aimed to construct a deep seaport in order to support the expansion of international trade volumes and to develop the rural area. In particular, it was anticipated that the development of the Eastern part of Thailand would further stimulate economic development in the North-Eastern area of Thailand – the poorest region in Thailand – as the two regions are located within close proximity to each other (NESDB, 1982, pp. 8-9).

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3 The first plan was called the ‘National Economic Development Plan’ (NEDP) and was initiated in 1961 with two phases. The first phase was between 1961 and 1963, and the second phase was between 1964 and 1966. After the first plan, the name was changed to the ‘National Economic and Social Development Plan (NESDP), adding the word ‘social’. When the Second NESDP (1967-1971) was issued, not only the idea of a new airport was proposed, but also the idea of constructing a new deep seaport in the East of Thailand that was expected to support the maritime shipping between Thailand and Japan (NESDB, 1967, p. 52, 163).
The Eastern region was selected because of its location, which is both not too far from Bangkok and next to the Gulf of Thailand, presenting a good opportunity to develop maritime trade routes. Additionally, the abundance of natural resources and labourers provided great potential that could support the anticipated development (NESDB, 1982, p. 128).

The Sixth NESDP stated that one of Thailand’s objectives was to become the aviation hub of Southeast Asia (NESDB, 1987, pp. 276-277). After that, the Seventh NESDP (1992-1996) recognised additional opportunities that Thailand might benefit from as the centre of the region. It explained various international factors that affected the Thai economy such as the expansion of the European Community and the initiation of the North American Free Trade Area (NAFTA). Additionally, it also mentioned that the growing markets in Japan and the Asian Newly Industrialised Economies (NIEs), the growing markets in the Middle East and South America, and re-emerging Indo-China could bring promising economic opportunities to the Thai economy (NESDB, 1992, p. 5). As there was a strong possibility that industrial production, particularly the petrochemical, engineering, and electronic industries, would relocate from Japan to Southeast Asia, Thailand recognised the importance of preparing both hard and soft infrastructure (NESDB, 1992, pp. 6-7).

Moreover, the Eastern Seaboard of Thailand gained further attention from the government, as can be seen from the Seventh NESDP in which the Thai government established the ‘Eastern Seaboard Development Zone’ as a major industrial base.\(^4\) The Eastern Seaboard is located in the East of Thailand, covering the areas of \textit{Laem Chabang} and \textit{Map Ta Phut}. The Thai government hoped that the development of the Eastern Seaboard would help the Northern and North-Eastern areas of Thailand to become more integrated in international trade (NESDPB, 1992, pp. 108-109).

The Eighth NESDP (1997-2001) aimed to help Thailand become a centre of finance, tourism, telecommunication and ICT, and transportation. It focused on the development of the EWEC and other land transportation networks. This plan also stressed the vitality of communities at the border as potential areas that could link domestic markets with neighbouring countries. The plan emphasised three subregional initiatives, including the IMT-GT, the GMS Economic Co-operation

Programme, and the Bangladesh-India-Myanmar-Sri Lanka-Thailand Economic Co-operation (BIMSTEC). The IMT-GT was expected to help develop the Southern Thai economy, GMS was expected to help the people in the North, North-East, East, and West of Thailand, and the BIMSTEC was expected to improve the local economies in Southern Thailand and Western Thailand (NESDPB, 1997, p. 80). To reach these goals, the NESDP planned to construct hard infrastructure (i.e. roads, port, telecommunication) in support of development, in addition to a transport network in Myanmar to further develop their domestic energy sector (NESDPB, 1997, pp. 82-83).

Figure 6: Eastern Seaboard and EWEC

![Image of Eastern Seaboard and EWEC](Image)

Source: Charoensri (2010c)

We have seen from above that the relocation of Japanese manufacturers after 1985 to Southeast Asia was primarily to Thailand. The Thai government adjusted its NESDP to support the relocation by initiating various hard infrastructure development plans that would support economic activities in the areas that had a high concentration of Japanese manufacturers. Figure 6 shows that the when the Eastern

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5 BIMSTEC, however, renamed their organisation to the “Bay of Bengal Initiative Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Co-operation” to embrace Nepal and Bhutan as members whilst maintaining its commitment to regional co-operation.
Seaboard was established in Thailand’s NESDP, the EWEC was proposed and advocated for by the Japanese government in an effort to link the East and West parts of mainland Southeast Asia, further facilitating cross-border trade (Charoensri, 2010c). As mentioned above, pirates in the Strait of Malacca have become a security issue in Southeast Asian maritime transport. Therefore, mainland cross-border transport via the EWEC provides an additional, and potentially more secure, logistical option for Japanese companies.

**Figure 7: Alternative Routes in Southeast Asia**

Figure 7 shows the routes that Japan’s shipping companies can utilise. Route No. 1 is a sea-lane, which requires cargo ships to sail through the Straits of Malacca where pirates are still a problem. Ships may choose to go through other Indonesian
sea-lane, however this option would increase the cost and duration of shipping. As further demonstrated in Figure 4, the Japanese government views land transport in the GMS area as a viable option for trade.

Apart from the MOFA, METI also contributes to the economic and industrial development of the GMS area. METI initiated the ‘Mekong Industrial Development Vision’ in 2015 to support production and markets in the region by integrating the ‘Mekong region’ with China and India through a regionally integrated value chain (METI, 2015a). METI acknowledges the ‘unique advantages’ of each country in the GMS area, which are:

- **Cambodia and Myanmar**: Labour intensive work including agro and cutting and making trimming (CMT)
- **Lao PDR**: Abundant water resource and fertile soil
- **Thailand**: Exiting automotive and electronic industry cluster
- **Vietnam**: Good access to the US, EU, and South China (METI, 2016, p. 32)

METI then initiated collaboration with JICA, JETRO, the ASEAN-Japan Centre, ADB, and ERIA to work on the specific ways in which Japan could support its own investors to make use of the available opportunities in the GMS (METI, 2015b, p. 15). The Mekong Industrial Development Vision focuses on many regional development issues, including trade structures, Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), local business collaboration, Research and Development (R&D) activities, competitive SMEs, regional connectivity, energy supply and environment, and Human Resources and Development (HRD) (METI, 2015b). METI recognises that the GMS region needs to improve the EWEC and SEC so that the region can link and integrate with the Middle East and India (METI, 2015, p. 13), a vision that is also reflected in ERIA’s CADP, which seeks to connect the regions both physically and institutionally (see Chapter 5).

### 4.4 Conclusion

This chapter provides elaboration on how regional and international environments have influenced Japan-Southeast Asia relations. This chapter set out
to answer the question of why the Japanese government has been supporting the development of regional transport in Southeast Asia. Two important factors were identified: (1) the regional and international structures, and (2) political, economic, and geographical factors. Chapter 5 will expand upon these factors through discussion of official government agencies’ integration with the ERIA, IDE-JETRO, and ADBI.
Chapter 5:
Japan and the Master Plan on ASEAN Connectivity (MPAC)

5.1 Introduction

Chapter 4 provided a background of the Japan-ASEAN economic and diplomatic relations that have developed since the end of the Second World War. It was noted that the Japanese government established relations with ASEAN, through utilisation of its official development assistance (ODA), in order to help Japan regain its position in the region. Moreover, the multilateral relations (e.g. Japan-ASEAN relations and the GMS Programme) that Japan has pursued focus on supporting ASEAN’s work, which is also one of Japan’s foreign policy platforms. Chapter 4 further explained that Japan’s economic and business interests in the Greater Mekong Subregion (GMS) area are strongly influenced by the historical relocation of Japanese manufacturers after 1985.

One of Japan’s most active engagements in ASEAN is its contribution to regional transport development, particularly infrastructure development (e.g. transport, telecommunications, and energy). When ASEAN developed regional transport development plan, called the Master Plan on ASEAN Connectivity (MPAC), in 2010, Japan worked closely to support ASEAN’s MPAC by initiated Japan’s supportive mechanism. The MPAC set to prepare and plan a common transport development strategy by outlining how each country’s government could incorporate it into their national policy. ASEAN’s MPAC was supported by the work of the Economic Research Institute for ASEAN and East Asia (ERIA), the Institute of Developing Economies – Japan External Trade Organisation (IDE-JETRO), and the Asian Development Bank Institute (ADBI). These three international research organisations (IROs) helped ASEAN officials and intellectuals, both in individual member states and the Secretariat, to obtain information and analyses through their research results, meetings, conferences, and capacity-building programmes. As these three IROs are supported by the Japanese government, they work closely with Japan and help Japan to reflect its opinions and to contribute to MPAC’s works.

This chapter aims to answer the first sub-question of this thesis: how has the Japanese government created mechanisms to support Southeast Asian regional
transport development schemes? Accordingly, this chapter is divided into two main parts. The first part will give information about Japan’s role in Southeast Asian transport development by explaining how the Japanese government has contributed to and engaged in ASEAN’s MPAC, as well as other regional transport development schemes. The second part will elaborate on the background, structure, and work of ERIA, IDE-JETRO, and ADBI, as the Japanese government also supports their research on Southeast Asian regional connectivity. This section will also explain the collaboration of ERIA, IDE-JETRO, and ADBI with the governments in Southeast Asia, the ASEAN Secretariat, and intellectuals to construct and disseminate practical knowledge throughout the region. Together, these two sections will provide an overview of how the Japanese government created mechanisms and conducted research with the ERIA, IDE-JETRO, and ADBI. This will further demonstrate how they are organically connected.

The chapter draws on the interviews conducted in Japan, Indonesia, Singapore, Malaysia, and Thailand in 2016. As shown in Chapter 3, I interviewed intellectuals who work with ERIA, IDE-JETRO, ADBI in order to understand their contribution to Japan’s engagement in regional transport development in the GMS. I also interviewed think tanks, government officials and university scholars in Southeast Asia to comprehend their contribution and opinion on IROs’ engagement.

5.2 ASEAN Connectivity and the MPAC

To understand Japan’s engagement in ASEAN connectivity, I will first provide a brief background of ASEAN’s MPAC so that we can understand the development of the ASEAN Connectivity scheme.

The MPAC has played an important role in facilitating ASEAN’s regionalisation as a scheme that aims to construct and synchronise hard and soft infrastructure to support the building of the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC). Since its establishment in 1967, ASEAN has progressively developed its economic and political co-operation. In 2003, at the 9th ASEAN Summit in Bali, Indonesia, the leaders of ASEAN agreed that ASEAN should expand and deepen its regional co-operation. After the Summit, the leaders issued the ‘Declaration of ASEAN Concord II’ which is also known as the ‘Bali Accord II’. The Bali Accord II states that ASEAN would establish an ‘ASEAN Community’ by 2020. However, although the
initial plan was to create the community by 2020, the international and regional environment catalysed the process because the degree of regional economic interdependence had increased and economic competition between various economic regions had also intensified globally. This can be seen from the proliferation and the deepening of regional initiatives around the world such as the establishment of many new regional economic initiatives. Thereby, ASEAN agreed to change its goal from establishing the ASEAN Community in 2020 to 2015 so that the region could ensure its competitiveness.

In order to comprehensively develop the region, it is necessary to have integrated development plans that consider economic, political, and social dimensions together. The ASEAN Community comprises three ‘pillars’, including the ASEAN Political-Security Community (APSC), the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) and the ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community (ASCC). Each pillar has its own individual development projects that focus on different dimensions and areas. One of the strategies that the ASEAN Community sees as a mechanism to strengthen the ASEAN Community is regional connectivity, which was later translated into the ‘ASEAN Connectivity’ scheme.

Regional connectivity is multi-dimensional. In the past, the ASEAN Connectivity scheme was part of the AEC, but later the ASEAN Secretariat decided that regional connectivity is not only related to the ‘economic aspects’ of ASEAN. Instead, connectivity helps create linkages between communities in various countries, which relates to many issues, including political and security issues (e.g. border management, migration, drug trafficking, human trafficking) and social issues (e.g. transboundary disease, road safety, environmental issues). Accordingly, regional comprehensive connectivity needs to integrate political, economic, and social dimensions so that it is able to support the region inclusively and effectively. Thereby, the ASEAN Secretariat established an individual department to take responsibility for this effort in 2011, called ASEAN Connectivity.6

ASEAN Connectivity serves as both the means and the ends for ASEAN in its attempt to establish a comprehensive regional transport network in the region. Since 2010, when ASEAN Connectivity was accepted in the 17th ASEAN Summit, each country provides financial support to accomplish this goal. The most significant

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6 Interview, a staff of ASEAN Secretariat, Jakarta, Indonesia, 13 April 2016.
projects of the regional connectivity scheme are the economic corridors in mainland Southeast Asia. There are three main corridors, namely, the East-West Economic Corridor (EWEC), the North-South Economic Corridors (NSEC), and the Southern Economic Corridor (SEC). The expected outcomes of establishing comprehensive connectivity in Southeast Asia are not only the elimination of poverty and increased economic opportunities for local people through the provision of accessible markets, but also the advancement of diplomatic relations and political friendships amongst member states (Bhattacharyay, 2010). The three economic corridors were first developed by the GMS Programme at the 8th GMS Summit in 1998 where ASEAN leaders initiated the idea of constructing the EWEC, NSEC, and SEC in hopes that the corridors would support increased economic activities in the Greater Mekong area.

The development of the logistic system in Southeast Asia not only decreases the costs of cross-border transport, but also facilitates the international division of labour in Northeast Asia, which ensures the effective allocation of natural resources in the region (Fujita et al., 2008). As was discussed in Chapter 4, the relocation of Japanese factories to Southeast Asia resulted in many requests for improved hard infrastructure in the region to create more effective networks. Regional transport development not only brings the region together physically by providing plans for hard and soft infrastructure, but also changes the way member states perceive the region’s potential in terms of its location and abundant natural resources. This potential, moreover, can be achieved by regional organisations and by constructive engagement with wealthier countries or organisations.

The development of ASEAN Connectivity integrates two parts of Southeast Asia: mainland and maritime. Before the ASEAN Development scheme was initiated, it seemed as though each department’s regional transport development plans were not integrated because each one had different strategies. Overall, when we look at the number of regional transport development projects, mainland Southeast Asia seems to receive comparatively more attention from both ASEAN member states and external actors, as the mainland is a broad geographical area that links five countries (Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, Thailand and Vietnam), and is in close proximity to India and China (Charoensri, 2016). While all five countries in mainland Southeast Asia are also known for their comparatively cheap labour and natural resources, Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, and Vietnam – or CLMV countries –
are also recognised as least-developed countries (LDCs). Nonetheless, although mainland Southeast Asia has great potential for competitiveness, the insufficient development of infrastructure remains one of the critical factors obstructing regional economic development. Zen, an ERIA researcher, argues that LDCs need structural and physical support from other countries in order to develop their basic infrastructure, which is an essential condition for national and international investors (Zen, 2014, pp. 16-17).

In order to create a more comprehensive infrastructure development strategy, the ASEAN Secretariat issued the MPAC in 2010 to better coordinate regional collaboration and to effectively synchronise the existing plan with its objectives. MPAC 2010 has three significant schemes that aim to achieve regional connectivity. The first is physical connectivity, which intends to link transport, information and communications technology (ICT) infrastructure, and energy infrastructure. The second scheme is to build institutional connectivity. The third scheme is to connect people, or ‘people-to-people connectivity’ (Das, 2013, pp. 4-6). Moreover, ASEAN also established the ‘ASEAN Connectivity Coordination Committee’ (ACCC), consisting of representatives from ASEAN countries to look after the coordination of the three main MPAC 2010 schemes. The representatives, or national coordinators, are appointed individually by each country.

After ASEAN’s MPAC 2010 had been implemented for five years, the ASEAN Secretariat then considered new goals and strategies for ASEAN Connectivity and hired the McKinsey Company and the AlphaBeta Company to conduct research. The results of the research helped the ASEAN Secretariat to draft the ‘MPAC 2025’ that was launched in September 2016 (MFA, 2015). The research was funded by the Australian government, which maintains significant interests in ASEAN Connectivity and the Initiative for ASEAN Integration (IAI) (ASEAN, 2016b). When I interviewed a staff member of Thailand’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) about the Australian government’s engagement in the development of the MPAC 2025, the interviewee stated that the role of the Australian government to financially support the research behind the MPAC 2025 was motivated by its interest in gaining access to the raw data and information from the research.  

7 Involvement in the drafting of the MPAC 2025 also allowed the Australian
government to learn about the problems in the previous MPAC. It also reflects the Australian government’s commitment to diplomatic engagement with ASEAN and provision of economic assistance. Interestingly, when I interview a staff member of Japan’s MOFA about Japan’s contribution to the drafting process of the MPAC 2025, the interviewee mentioned that the Japanese government did not take part in the process at all. This was because the ASEAN Secretariat wanted the draft to not be influenced by external regional actors such as Japan or China.

The MPAC 2025 was revised to deal with many of the structural problems present in the MPAC 2010. One of the most critical issues was that the MPAC 2010 was too ambiguous and did not establish a specific administrative body in each country that would act as the centre of coordination. Financial capacity was also an issue, as the private sector in Southeast Asia wasn’t interested in investing money in the project due to the lack of information about the potential returns (ASEAN, 2016a). The MPAC 2025, accordingly, aims to narrow the institutional and capacity gaps. The original three strategic areas of the MPAC 2010 were expanded on in the MPAC 2025 to achieve five strategic areas including sustainable infrastructure, digital innovation, seamless logistics, regulatory excellence, and people mobility (see Table 6).

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8 Interview, a staff of MFA, Bangkok, Thailand, 2 June 2016.
9 Interview, a staff of MOFA, Tokyo, Japan, 25 March 2016.
10 Interview, a staff of MOFA, Tokyo, Japan, 25 March 2016.
### Table 6: ASEAN’s MPAC 2025 and 5 Strategic Areas

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strategic Areas</th>
<th>Initiatives</th>
<th>Intended Outcomes in 2025</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sustainable Infrastructure</strong></td>
<td>• Establishment of infrastructure pipeline</td>
<td>• Increase public and private infrastructure investment across the ASEAN member states</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Framework and strategies on infrastructure productivity</td>
<td>• Enhance infrastructure productivity in ASEAN through better delivery</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Development of sustainable urbanisation strategies</td>
<td>• Increase the deployment of smart urbanisation models across ASEAN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Digital Innovation</strong></td>
<td>• Enhance MSMEs adoption of digital technologies</td>
<td>• Increase the adoption of technology by MSMEs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Expansion of digital financial services</td>
<td>• Support access to financial services through digital technologies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Establishment of open data network</td>
<td>• Enhance the impact of open data across ASEAN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Development of digital data governance framework</td>
<td>• Improve data-management practices and more cross border data across ASEAN member states</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Seamless Logistics</strong></td>
<td>• Development of logistics database</td>
<td>• Lower supply-chain costs in each ASEAN member states</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Enhance supply chain efficiencies by addressing chokepoints</td>
<td>• Improve the competitiveness of ASEAN member states</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Regulatory Excellence</strong></td>
<td>• Harmonise or mutually recognise the product, conformance, and technological standards in key sectors</td>
<td>• Lower the cost of doing business in ASEAN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Enhance transparency and streamline non-tariff measures</td>
<td>• Attract more investment into ASEAN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>People Mobility</strong></td>
<td>• Enhance tourism digital platform</td>
<td>• Support ease of travel throughout ASEAN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Ease ASEAN travel by facilitating visa processes</td>
<td>• Increase the intra-ASEAN mobility of university students</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Establish new convocational training programmes and common qualification, in accordance with national circumstances of ASEAN member states</td>
<td>• Reduce the gaps between convocational skills demand and supply across ASEAN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Support higher education across ASEAN member states</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Cheen (2018, p. 2)

Hitherto, we have seen a brief background of ASEAN’s MPAC. It was first initiated in 2010, and a new version was launched in 2015. The ASEAN Secretariat expected that the MPACs (both 2010 and 2025) would help the region to establish a common regional transport development plan. The Japanese government engages in
the drafting of the two MPACs by providing financial assistance and intellectual support through the work of the ERIA, IDE-JETRO, and ADBI. The next section will explain further about how the Japanese government helped ASEAN to draft the MPAC.

5.3 Japan’s Contribution to ASEAN’s MPAC

The Japanese government initiated two main mechanisms to support the MPAC and Japanese investors in the GMS area, including the Mission of Japan to ASEAN (hereafter, the Mission) and the Japanese Task Force to Support on ASEAN Connectivity (hereafter, the Japanese Task Force). The former is the main body that oversees collaboration and facilitation between Japan and ASEAN. The latter comprises both committees and the Japanese ministries that are involved in ASEAN Connectivity projects and schemes.

5.3.1 The Mission of Japan to ASEAN

The Mission was established in 2011 – only one year after the launch of MPAC 2010 – to work with the ‘ASEAN Committee of Permanent Representative’ (ASEAN CPR) that was convened according to the ASEAN Charter. ASEAN CPR is a committee that comprises ambassador-level representatives from ASEAN member states and dialogue partners. After the establishment of ASEAN CPR, the US assigned the first ambassador to ASEAN in 2008 and opened its diplomatic relations with ASEAN in 2010. At the same time, Japan also assigned its first ambassador to ASEAN in 2010 and established the Mission in 2011. The Mission is responsible for a significant number of tasks and arrangements, such as following up on the agreements that Japan and ASEAN have signed. The Mission also aims to support the ASEAN integration process by providing financial support and establishing mechanisms, such as the Japan-ASEAN Integration Fund (JAIF), the co-operation in disaster management to support the work of the ASEAN Coordinating Centre for Humanitarian Assistance (AHA Centre), and MPAC support. Moreover, another objective of the Mission is to facilitate and oversee ASEAN-related meetings (e.g. ASEAN-Japan, ASEAN+3, EAS and ARF meetings).
5.3.2 The Japanese Task Force on ASEAN Connectivity

The Japanese Task Force is another mechanism that Japan initiated to support ASEAN Connectivity. When the MPAC was launched in 2010, the Japanese government firmly endorsed the idea of linking Southeast Asia together by initiating schemes that would place Japan in a vital role, hoping that their contribution would support development and strengthen the MAPC (Ishikane, 2013). Japan had originally assigned the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) to act as the main coordinating body for Japan’s government agencies. However, only one month after the adoption of the MPAC at the 17th ASEAN Summit in Vietnam in October 2010, the Japanese government established the Japanese Task Force, comprised of various Japanese ministries, including:

- the Ministry of International Affairs and Communications (MIC)
- the Ministry of Finance (MOF)
- the Ministry of Economic, Trade and Industry (METI)
- the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism (MLIT)
- the Japan International Co-operation Agency (JICA)
- the Japan Bank for International Co-operation (JBIC)
- Keidanren
- the Japanese Chamber of Commerce (JCC).

The Japanese Task Force is chaired by the MOFA and organised its first meeting in November 2010 in Tokyo. The second, third, and fourth meetings of the Japanese Task Force were held in Dec 2010, March 2011, and June 2011, respectively. The first official meeting between the Japanese Task Force and the ACCC was organised on 1 July 2011. In the same year at the 14th Japan-ASEAN Summit in November 2011, the Japanese government proposed 33 flagship projects that aim to support the ASEAN Connectivity scheme. Japan also demonstrated its willingness to grant financial assistance of approximately 2 trillion yen (or approximately 25 billion USD) (Ishikane, 2013, p. 4).
As seen in Figure 9, the ACCC acts as a collaborator that receives requests from ASEAN member states and other relevant mechanisms. Moreover, the ACCC also works with external actors – such as Japan, China, and Korea – that expect to support the MPAC by providing financial and technical assistance.

The role of the Mission is recognised as one of the main factors that facilitated Japan’s engagement in ASEAN Connectivity. When I conducted interviews in 2016, the staff members of the MOFA and METI stressed the importance of the Mission to the Japanese Embassy in Jakarta by stating that the Japanese government has allocated almost an equal number of staff members to the Mission as the Embassy. The Mission has 14 full-time officials, whereas the Embassy of Japan in Jakarta has 13 full-time officials (Mission of Japan to ASEAN, 2015, p. 10). Staff members of the Mission come from various governmental ministries, including the MOFA, METI, MLIT, MOF, MIC, the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology (MEXT), the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries (MAFF),

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11 Interview, a staff of MOFA, Tokyo, Japan, 25 March 2016; Interview, a staff of METI, Tokyo, Japan, 25 March 2016.
the Ministry of Defence (MOD), the National Police Agency (NPA), and the Japan Fair Trade Commission (JFTC).

Apart from the work of the Mission and the Task Force, other Japanese government agencies such as the MOFA, METI, MOF, MLIT, JICA, JETRO, and the Ministry of Health, Labour, and Welfare (MHLW), are also associated with the MPAC. When the MPAC 2010 was issued, the Japanese government assigned MOFA to act as a coordinator and to collect proposals from other organisations. The MOFA then called for project proposals from other Japanese government agencies that may be interested to take part in supporting the MPAC by providing development projects based on their expertise. The objective was to provide the Japanese government an opportunity to engage with the MPAC by contributing financial assistance and transferring knowledge. Additionally, the Japanese government could potentially win infrastructure development procurement in Southeast Asia.\textsuperscript{12} Any interested Japanese ministries that were interested in becoming involved in the infrastructure projects had to submit project proposals to the Japanese government, including an explanation of the proposed project’s relevance to the MPAC. After that, the MOFA would propose suitable proposals to the ASEAN Secretariat, explaining the recommended projects’ importance and relevance, including how the projects would inclusively boost the development of ASEAN Connectivity. However, some proposed projects might be rejected if the ASEAN Secretariat considered the project to be irrelevant to the MPAC.\textsuperscript{13}

The projects that were selected by the ASEAN Secretariat were varied in their objectives. The projects proposed by the Japanese government ministries included the development of both hard infrastructure and soft infrastructure. The scope of the projects ranged from concentrating only on one country to including multiple Southeast Asian countries (see Table 7).

\textsuperscript{12} Interview, a staff of MOFA, Tokyo, Japan, 25 March 2016.

\textsuperscript{13} Interview, a staff of MOFA, Tokyo, Japan, 25 March 2016.
Table 7: Flagships Programmes Proposed by the Japanese Government to Support ASEAN Connectivity at the 14th ASEAN Summit (November 2011)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Hard Infrastructure</th>
<th>Soft Infrastructure</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Vision 1: Formation of the Vital Artery for East-West and Southern Economic Corridor</strong></td>
<td><strong>Vision 2: Maritime ASEAN Economic Corridor</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Mekong Region:</strong></td>
<td><strong>Indonesia:</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Study to Realise New Economic Corridor (Land Bridge)</td>
<td>- Cilamaya New Port Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Vietnam:</strong></td>
<td>- Improvement and Expansion of Tanjung Priok Port</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Lach Huyen Port Infrastructure Construction</td>
<td>- Jawa-Sumatra Interconnection Transmission Line Project</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Terminal 2 Construction Project of Noi Bai International Airport</td>
<td>- Connectivity Development Policy Loan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Cai Mep-Thi Vai Infrastructure Port Construction</td>
<td><strong>Philippines:</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Project for Disaster and Climate Change Counter-Measures Using Observation Satellite</td>
<td>- Maritime Safety Capacity Improvement for the Philippine Coast Guard</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Cambodia:</strong></td>
<td><strong>Malaysia:</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Cambodia National Road No.5 Rehabilitation</td>
<td>- Protect on Enhancing Practical Capacity for Maritime Safety and Improving Education and Training Education Programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Construction of Neak Loeung Bridge</td>
<td><strong>Malaysia and Indonesia:</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Sihanoukville Port Multipurpose Terminal Development</td>
<td>- Melaka-Pekan Baru Interconnection</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Lao PDR:</strong></td>
<td><strong>Indonesia, Philippines:</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Southern Region Power System Development</td>
<td>- F/S on the Roll-on/Roll-off (RORO) Network and Short-Sea Shipping</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Improvement of National Road No.9 as East-West Economic Corridor of the Mekong Region</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Myanmar:</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Infrastructure Development in Thilawa Area Phase I</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>- Yangon-Mandala Railway Improvement</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Soft Infrastructure</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Assistance for Harmonisation of Automotive Regulations and Mutual Recognition</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>- ASEAN Smart Network Initiative</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>- Assistance for ASEAN Single Aviation Market</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Logistics Enhancement Support Project, Sea-Land Intermodal Transport through the Use of Express RORO Vessel</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Supporting Programme for ASEAN Common Skill Standard Initiative for ICT Professionals</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- ASEAN University Network / Southeast Asia Engineering Education Development Network</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Disaster Management Network for ASEAN Region</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>- Trade Facilitation in Asia, Promotion of Port Electronic Data Interchange (EDI)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Project for Establishing Food Security Network</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>- Project for Strengthening Food Value Chain</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Establishment of Supply Chain Visibility Platform for ASEAN Countries</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Project for Capacity Building and Implementation of International SPS Standards in ASEAN Countries, as well as Prevention and Control of Major Trans-Boundary Animal Diseases in Asia</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Source:** Mission of Japan to ASEAN (n.d.)
The interviews with the Mission of Japan reveal that despite receiving interest from many ministries, not every departments’ expertise could contribute or appeal to the ASEAN Secretariat. There were some cases in which ministries were able to persuade the MOFA that their proposals were relevant to the MPAC, but when it was presented to the ASEAN Secretariat, the project did not attract ASEAN member states. For example, the MHLW proposed a project concerned with health issues that might be caused by the development of hard infrastructure in the region, but the ASEAN Secretariat determined that the proposal was not directly relevant to the MPAC and rejected it. Some ministries that have skills and knowledge regarding particular issues offered their expertise to ASEAN instead of proposing a specific development project, such as the MLIT and MIC. In particular, as the MLIT has many professional engineers and construction experts, it was often called on by the MOFA and JICA to advise construction projects. Their expertise in road and bridge construction was further applied to Southeast Asian development projects. For example, the MLIT and the Mission both joined the 27th ASEAN Transport Facilitation Working Group Meeting in Jakarta, Indonesia in 2014, at which they discussed the issues of improving transport development in ASEAN and the possibility of linking ASEAN with South Asia (Mission of Japan to ASEAN, 2014).

The collaboration between the MOFA and JICA is very close. As MOFA was designated by the government to act as a coordinator for the ASEAN Secretariat and as a collaborator between Japanese ministries, the MOFA was responsible for receiving proposals, projects, and comments from other organisations and seeking ways to justify the projects’ relevancy to the MPAC. However, the consultation for such projects, and their implementation, may be assigned to other agencies such as JICA.

Hitherto, we have seen the mechanisms that the Japanese government utilises to support ASEAN’s MPAC. The previous section explained that the ASEAN Secretariat issued the MPAC in 2010 and re-issued the MPAC with a new vision in

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14 Interview, a staff of the Mission of Japan to ASEAN, Jakarta, Indonesia, 13 April 2016.
15 Interview, a staff of the Mission of Japan to ASEAN, Jakarta, Indonesia, 13 April 2016.
16 Interview, a staff of the Mission of Japan to ASEAN, Jakarta, Indonesia, 13 April 2016.
17 Interview, a staff of JICA, Tokyo, Japan, 24 March 2016.
18 Interview, a staff of MOFA, Tokyo, Japan, 25 March 2016.
When MPAC 2025 was issued, the Japanese government endorsed the new Master Plan, further stating that it would be a sincere partner for ASEAN in terms of peace and stability, prosperity, and quality of life (Sunaga, 2016, p. 3). The development of economic corridors in the GMS area is one of the most interesting issues that the Japanese government has been paying attention to (Sunaga, 2016, p. 6). The Japanese government has proposed several projects in tandem with the new themes present in MPAC 2025. For example, in line with sustainable infrastructure development, Japan plans to mobilise its resources to work with the ADB and the World Bank to promote infrastructure development, including the development of economic corridors in the GMS area and the development of soft infrastructure (e.g. the Join Hydrographic Survey of the Straits of Malacca and Singapore, the Development of Vessel Traffic Service Operator’s Capacity, the Joint Research on Road Technologies for ASEAN Cross-Border Corridors) (Sunaga, 2016, p. 7). Japan also aims to contribute to MPAC 2025’s digital innovation by working with ASEAN to enhance data management through ICT capacity building programmes, technical assistance, and infrastructure development (Sunaga, 2016, p. 15). Another new theme in MPAC 2025 is seamless logistics, for which Japan hopes to assist ASEAN in improving the speed and reliability of logistical services (Sunaga, 2016, p. 17). Japan also anticipates working to enhance the capacity of human resources and infrastructure (Sunaga, 2016, p. 15). For MPAC 2025’s theme of regulatory excellence, Japan expects the legal systems related to economic activities to be further developed in order to better support their investors (Sunaga, 2016, p. 20). Lastly, Japan plans to provide information for Japanese tourists who want to come to ASEAN and help to facilitate their trips. Japan hopes that Japanese tourists will start to see ASEAN as one single destination (Sunaga, 2016, p. 22).

The Japanese Chamber of Commerce (JCC) is also a key player in helping the Japanese government to receive requests from Japan’s overseas manufacturers. For example, the Japanese Chamber of Commerce in Bangkok (henceforth ‘JCC Bangkok’) plays a substantial role in reflecting the needs of Japanese companies to the Thai government. JCC Bangkok conducts a business survey every year, the results of which inform their requests of the Thai government. For instance, one survey showed that 57 per cent of Japanese companies in Thailand ‘requested’ the Thai government to support the “promotion of economic measures (public infrastructure development)” (JCC Economic Survey Team, 2015, p. 3). The
requests can be seen in Table 8, which shows that the first issue the respondents sought to have addressed was not the improvement of the “logistical infrastructure development linking Thailand with neighbouring countries (CLMV and India)”, but rather the “promotion of economic measures (public infrastructure development)” (JCC Economic Survey Team, 2015, p. 3).

Human resource capacity-building programmes are crucial for economic development. For example, when I interviewed a JCC Bangkok staff member and asked about the obstacles that might impact the regional integration process, the interviewee stated that the most critical factor that would lead Thailand to improved economic development is to increase the number of university students studying engineering. Lacking a sufficient number of engineers causes an enormous delay in the development of innovation in Thai society. This reiterated by Table 8, which shows that one of the requests from Japanese investors is the improvement of human resources and development.

Table 8: Requests of Japanese Manufacturers to the Thai Government

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ranking</th>
<th>Previous Time</th>
<th>This Time</th>
<th>Requests to the Thai Government</th>
<th>Manufacture</th>
<th>Non-Manufacture</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Promotion of Economic Measures (e.g. Public Infrastructure Development)</td>
<td>163 (58%)</td>
<td>128 (56%)</td>
<td>291 (57%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Stability of the Political Situation</td>
<td>161 (57%)</td>
<td>129 (57%)</td>
<td>290 (57%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Customs-Related Systems and Their Implementation</td>
<td>124 (44%)</td>
<td>84 (37%)</td>
<td>208 (41%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Public Security and Safety</td>
<td>109 (39%)</td>
<td>96 (42%)</td>
<td>205 (40%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>Development of Transport Infrastructure in the Bangkok Metropolitan Area</td>
<td>106 (38%)</td>
<td>97 (43%)</td>
<td>203 (40%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>Relaxation of the Foreign Business Act</td>
<td>55 (20%)</td>
<td>92 (41%)</td>
<td>147 (29%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>Stability in Foreign Exchange Rates</td>
<td>82 (29%)</td>
<td>39 (17%)</td>
<td>121 (24%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>Implementation of Tax-Related Systems</td>
<td>60 (21%)</td>
<td>47 (21%)</td>
<td>107 (21%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>Work Permit / Visa-Related Systems</td>
<td>35 (12%)</td>
<td>65 (29%)</td>
<td>100 (20%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>Improvement of Education / Human Resource Development</td>
<td>62 (22%)</td>
<td>35 (15%)</td>
<td>97 (19%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>11</td>
<td></td>
<td>Logistical Infrastructure Development Linking</td>
<td>36 (13%)</td>
<td>49 (22%)</td>
<td>85 (17%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

19 Interview, a staff of JCC Bangkok (2), Bangkok, Thailand, 18 May 2016.
The interviews with staff members of JICA, METI, and MOFA, reveal that ASEAN Connectivity is one of Japan’s national interests because the GMS area is recognised by both the Japanese government and Japanese investors as a high potential market. Nevertheless, one issue that hinders the region from achieving its potential is the lack of good quality, comprehensive hard infrastructure (ADB & ADBI, 2009, pp. 22-23). Furthermore, the region is also confronted with inadequate standardisation of laws and regulations between countries, which obstructs the free flow of goods and regional transport, and maintains the gap in living standards (ADB, 2017; Bhattacharyay, 2010a, 2010b; Kessides, 1993; Nakao, 2015). A JICA staff member also stated that the improvement of ASEAN’s hard and soft infrastructure would promote FDI and would facilitate an increase in the region’s trade volume. It is, then, vital for the GMS area to emphasise soft and hard infrastructure development in order to support economic activities.

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20 Interview, a staff of JICA, Tokyo, Japan, 24 March 2016; Interview, a staff of METI, Tokyo, Japan, 25 March 2016; Interview, a staff of MOFA, Tokyo, Japan, 25 March 2016.

21 Interview, a staff of JICA, Tokyo, Japan, 24 March 2016.
The notion of the economic and political benefits that would come from connecting Southeast Asia through the improvement of hard infrastructure, along with the enhancement of soft infrastructure, was mentioned in interviews with staff members of the MOFA, METI, JICA, and JETRO. They are aware that transport development will not only directly impact the level of development in Southeast Asia, but will also have a positive impact on Japan’s economy. In order to assist with the development of hard and soft infrastructure in ASEAN, the Japanese government acts as a coordinator that collaborates with other relevant Japanese governmental agencies to support the MPAC. There are two groups of actors from Japan that have been involved in the MPAC, including governmental organisations and international research organisations (IROs). In the following sections, we will look at how Japan’s governmental organisations and IROs work to help the Japanese government support ASEAN’s MPAC.

5.4 ASEAN Connectivity and ERIA, IDE-JETRO, and ADBI

The previous section discussed the role of the Japanese government as a norm entrepreneur that supports ASEAN Connectivity and provides financial support to research organisations to help frame ASEAN’s development scheme. This section will provide the background of the three main IROs with which the Japanese government works.

5.4.1 ERIA

The first conceptualisation of the ERIA appears in METI’s ‘Global Economic Strategy’ (2006), which sought to determine the strategic approaches that Japan should use in order to advance its national interests in the age of globalisation (METI, 2006, p.3). The document stated that the international political and economic systems were changing rapidly; accordingly, in order to benefit from the international environment, Japan should endeavour to utilise its power in three dimensions. First, Japan should try to support and promote the “free and open economic area in Asia”

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22 Interview, a staff of JICA, Tokyo, Japan, 24 March 2016; Interview, a staff of METI, Tokyo, Japan, 25 March 2016; Interview, a staff of MOFA, Tokyo, Japan, 25 March 2016; Interview, a staff of JETRO, Tokyo, Japan, 28 March 2016; Interview, a staff of JETRO, 29 March 2016.
Second, Japan should use its soft power by allocating scholarships and intellectual creativity to people from abroad to come to Japan. This would help Japan to benefit from exchange students who may come to Japan and create new outputs (METI, 2006, pp. 4-5). Third, Japan should try to play a leading role in bridging the international and regional systems. As the international system was confronting political, economic, and societal transformation, there were many challenges to overcome. Japan should, therefore, attempt to be a linchpin to help the world confront those challenges by providing experience and expertise (METI, 2006, pp. 5-6).

In the document, METI proposed that Japan should promote the economic integration of ASEAN by providing intellectual inputs to the region (METI, 2006, p. 16). It also proposed that Japan should create a research institute that would contribute to research and activities that aim to promote such regional economic integration (METI, 2006, p. 16).

Following the Global Economic Strategy, the idea to establish the ERIA was first proposed by Nikai Toshihiro, Minister of METI, in 2006 during the 13th Consultation held between the ASEAN Economic Ministers and METI (AEM-METI) in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. The ERIA working group was formed, comprising of specialists from 16 member states of the East Asia Summit (EAS) and representatives from the ASEAN Secretariat. The working group discussed the organisational structure, research themes, and potential activities of ERIA (Oba, 2014, p. 63). In 2007, during the Second EAS held in the Philippines, the idea of the ERIA was proposed again by Abe Shinzo. The working group’s discussion was presented and helped other member states to better understand the role of the ERIA. The ASEAN Secretary, Surin Pitsuwan, endorsed the ERIA prior to its official 2008 establishment by calling it the ‘Fukuda-Two Doctrine’ (BBC Monitoring Asia Pacific, 2008). He stated that Fukuda Takeo, a former Prime Minister and father of Fukuda Yasuo, had once initiated the framework that would strengthen relations between Japan and Southeast Asia. The establishment of the ERIA, in Surin’s opinion, would be another milestone through which Japan, under Fukuda Yasuo, would strengthen relations with Southeast Asia (BBC Monitoring Asia Pacific,
The first official inaugural meeting of the ERIA was held the following year at the ASEAN Secretariat in Jakarta. The ERIA’s Governing Board is composed of seventeen members, including representatives of EAS member states and the ASEAN Secretary General.

**Figure 10:** ERIA’s Organisational Structure (2016)


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In 2017, the member states of the ERIA included ASEAN member states and Japan. China and South Korea, however, were not yet the members of the ERIA.
Figure 11: ERIA’s Organisational Structure (2019)


Figure 11 shows that as of 2019, the ERIA has four main departments, namely (1) General Affairs and Personnel Department, (2) Outreach Department, (3) Research Department, and (4) Policy Design Department. The primary changes in the organisational structure of the ERIA are within the departments. Comparing Figures 10 and 11, we can see that there was no Policy Design Department in 2016. Moreover, a Research Department was added the East Asian Industrial Corridor Team (EAIC), incorporating the Agriculture Unit and the Health Unit into its areas.

24 When I conducted field research in 2016, the ERIA’s organisational structure was different. There was no Policy Design department in 2016.
of research. The emergence of the EAIC within the ERIA reflects the significance of economic corridors and regional transport development in Asia and Southeast Asia.25

The location of the ERIA headquarters was debated both before and after its official establishment. It was anticipated that the headquarters would be based in one of three nominated countries, which were Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand (Jiji Press English News Service, 2007, 2009). However, even after the official inauguration in 2008, the issue remained unsettled. At present, the headquarters of the ERIA is located at the Sentral Senayan Building in the heart of Jakarta, Indonesia. My interview with Thailand’s TDRI staff member, who helped Thailand to collaborate with the ERIA at the time, revealed that the ERIA’s Japanese staff members were interested in establishing the headquarters in Bangkok. However, the ERIA committee was not impressed by Thailand’s offer for various reasons. Firstly, the Thai coordinator proposed the headquarters to be based in an office at the National Institute of Development Administration (NIDA), which is not in the centre of Bangkok and would likely be inconvenient for international staff members to commute every day.26 Next, the ongoing political instability in Bangkok led to a number of safety concerns.27

Furthermore, public transportation in Bangkok is not well connected. The Thai official who proposed to establish the ERIA headquarters at NIDA reasoned that it is not far from Suvarnabhumi Airport – the main international airport of Thailand. However, a possible underlying motivation was that the official was serving in an administrative position at NIDA at the time and may have wanted to persuade the ERIA in a politic dimension. The ERIA finally decided to establish its headquarters in Jakarta, Indonesia instead.28 Furthermore, hosting the ERIA headquarters in Jakarta could better facilitate the ERIA’s work, which is closely tied with that of the ASEAN Secretariat, because the two organisations would be in close proximity.29

25 However, as this field research was conducted in 2016, this research will not focus on the role of EAIC.
26 Interview, a staff of TDRI (2), Bangkok, Thailand, 16 June 2016.
27 Interview, a staff of TDRI (2), Bangkok, Thailand, 16 June 2016.
28 Interview, a staff of TDRI (2), Bangkok, Thailand, 16 June 2016.
29 Interview, a staff of TDRI (2), Bangkok, Thailand, 16 June 2016.
There are many reasons why the ERIA was established. First, the ERIA was expected to promote a “more rational form of economic integration in Asia” (Oxford Analytica Daily Brief Service, 2008b). This is a good reflection of Japan’s economic strategy as evidenced by the Global Economic Strategy (2006), which states that Japan endeavours to play a leading role in East Asian regional economic integration (METI, 2006, p. 11). The creation of the ERIA, then, would promote regional economic integration by facilitating the opportunity for Japan to provide expertise in Northeast Asia and Southeast Asia. Second, the ERIA was expected to also act as a think tank that would conduct research in support of ASEAN’s “regional public goods”.

Furthermore, Fukuda Yasuo anticipated that the ERIA would eventually evolve into the “OECD of Asia” (Jiji Press English News Service, 2009; Otsuji & Shinoda, 2014; p. 151); the OECD being the organisation that helped European countries to fortify their economies and address social issues (Asia News Monitor, 2009). Apart from the listed reasons, the establishment of the ERIA was also influenced by a political agenda – Japan’s role in the international system. Before the establishment of the ERIA, Japan had significant influence in the ADB’s work, which has been criticised by major, non-regional shareholders and scholars (Dutt, 1977, 2001; Oxford Analytica Daily Brief Service, 2008a; Yatsutomo, 1983). Through the establishment of the ERIA, Japan was attempting to create a new channel by which it could support regional economic integration (Oxford Analytica Daily Brief Service, 2008b). Additionally, Oba Mie reiterates that Japan supported the establishment of the ERIA because it was seeking to simultaneously promote economic integration in East Asia and further expand its role in the region (Oba, 2014, p. 63).

Both government officials and the business community welcomed the establishment of the ERIA. For example, Surin emphasised that the intellectual role of the ERIA would contribute to regional co-operation with organisations and sustainable development in ASEAN, as well as Asia as a whole (BBC Monitoring Asia Pacific, 2008). It was also welcomed by the Japanese business community, which was evident in the meeting between Surin and Edano Yukio, Japan’s minister of METI, in September 2011. Surin praised the ERIA as an organisation that has helped ASEAN to conduct critical research, which informs new strategies for East Asian co-operation, facilitation, and liberalisation (Asia News Monitor, 2011).
Amari Akira, Minister of METI, Mitarai Fujio, Chairman of Japan Business Federation, and other political and business leaders stated that the ERIA would help the region to create the ‘world largest business space’ (BBC Monitoring Asia Pacific, 2008).

One of the main supporters of the ERIA is Japan’s IDE-JETRO, which assists in the research activities of the ERIA, particularly those concerned with economic development in Asia and the development of the Japanese economy, by promoting strong collaboration between relevant organisations, including the METI. The ERIA aims to assist in the promotion of East Asia’s economic integration through survey analyses and policy proposals that target specific research areas such as deepening economic integration, narrowing development gaps, and sustainable development. However, since the ERIA was established under Japan’s initiative and has been managed with funds mostly provided by the Japanese government, its activities have been focused on enhancing the functionality of the EAS.

The ERIA also has another advisory board called the ‘Research Institute Network’ (RIN), which was established in 2010. The RIN acts as a central mechanism that facilitates research networks and research institutes in the East Asian region.\(^3\) It aims to support the research activities of the ERIA by providing research findings on individual countries, consultations regarding ERIA’s research themes, and policy recommendations. Additionally, the RIN also helps to disseminate the ERIA’s research findings to policymakers, opinion leaders, and politicians who might, to some extent, be associated with or involved in policy implementation.

The ERIA has published many articles, research papers, and books on ASEAN’s transport development, for example, *The Comprehensive Asian*

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\(^3\) The Australian National University (ANU), the Brunei Darussalam Institute of Policy and Strategic Studies (BDIPSS), the Cambodian Institute for Co-operation and Peace (CICP), the Chinese Academy of Social Science (CASS), the Research and Information System for Developing Countries (RIS, India), the Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS, Indonesia), IDE-JETRO, the Korea Institute for International Economic Policy (KIEP), the National Institute of Economic Research (NIER, Laos PDR), the Institute Strategic International Studies (ISIS, Malaysia), the Yangon University of Economic (YUE), the New Zealand Institute of Economic Research (NZIER), the Philippine Institute for Development Studies (PIDS), the Singapore Institute of International Affairs (SIIA), the Thailand Development Research Institute (TDRI) and the Central Institute for Economic Management (CIEM).
Development Plan (CADP) (ERIA, 2010a), and the Comprehensive Asia Development Plan 2.0 (CADP 2.0): Infrastructure for Connectivity and Innovation (ERIA, 2015a). The ERIA proposed the CADPs to the ASEAN Secretariat and anticipated that these plans would help the Secretariat and Southeast Asian governments to establish a common strategy for development of transport networks. ERIA staff members also worked with IDE-JETRO to develop an economic model to analyse the impact of transport development in Asia. This economic simulation model is called ‘IDE/ERIA-Geographical Simulation Model (GSM)’ (Kumagai, 2010; Kumagai & Isono, 2011; Kumagai et al., 2013) and is utilised by the researchers who conducted research for, and implemented, the CADP.

Nishimura Hidetoshi, the Executive Director of the ERIA, explained that ASEAN’s ACCC had commissioned the ERIA to be a ‘perennial supporter’ (Nishimura, 2014, p. xii), which is why the ERIA is engaged in ASEAN’s MPAC and with regional connectivity. Chapter 6 will provide further explanation and analysis of how ERIA intellectuals collaborate with intellectuals in IDE-JETRO, other research institutes, and international organisations in an effort to construct practical knowledge and cascade the ideas and norms of regional transport development to Southeast Asia.

5.4.2 IDE-JETRO

IDE-JETRO is a Japanese research institute that emphasises area studies. The organisation has long been focused on conducting research in order to provide academic contributions to society. IDE-JETRO is located in Chiba prefecture, which is approximately 45 minutes away from Tokyo by train. The headquarters of IDE-JETRO used to be in Tokyo, but due to governmental reformation, the IDE-JETRO headquarters moved to Chiba as part of the government’s 1988 plan to promote ‘Multi-Polar National Land Reformation’.

The fact that IDE-JETRO perceives itself as an academic-oriented institution was reiterated by other organisations. A JETRO staff member stated that the way IDE-JETRO works is much more academically-oriented compared to the JETRO research department itself, as JETRO is more business-oriented.31 A JETRO staff member additionally revealed that JETRO does not use IDE-JETRO’s research

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31 Interview, a staff of JETRO, Tokyo, Japan, 28 March 2016.
findings to support their work, as it is focused on very specific issues and does not reflect the needs of the business sector.\textsuperscript{32} A JETRO research department staff member explained that IDE-JETRO might contribute their research to the Japanese government, but not directly to JETRO for the above listed reasons.\textsuperscript{33}

The history of IDE-JETRO can be traced back to the 1960s. In the late 1950s, a semi-governmental body was established, called the ‘Institute of Developing Economies’ (IDE), which, during that period, focused on the economies of developing countries and contributed considerably to the development of area studies in Japan. In 1955, the Japanese cabinet decided to merge IDE with JETRO to better align with the government’s administrative reform programme. Since merging, IDE-JETRO has conducted research based on both specific issues and broader development studies, meaning that the new reincarnation of IDE as IDE-JETRO has not changed its work or direction. IDE-JETRO also constructs linkages with many overseas institutions\textsuperscript{34} and, as a member of ERIA’s RIN, shares the same institutional connections with RIN’s research network.

The research that IDE-JETRO conducts is divided into three main categories: (1) policy proposal research, (2) analytical research that contributes to policy proposals, and (3) basic, comprehensive research that informs the policy proposal research (IDE-JETRO, 2014). In comparison, the overall objective of JETRO is to help promote mutual trade and investment between Japan and the rest of the world. When field research was conducted in 2016, the president of IDE-JETRO was Shiraishi Takashi, who was also holding a position as Professor and President of the

\textsuperscript{32} Interview, a staff of JETRO, Tokyo, Japan, 28 March 2016.

\textsuperscript{33} Interview, a staff of JETRO, Tokyo, Japan, 29 March 2016.

\textsuperscript{34} The Indonesian Institute of Science (LIPI), the National Institute of Economic Research (NIER, Laos PDR), the Research and Information System for Developing Countries (RIS, India), SOAS University, the Commerce Development Research Institute (CDRI, Taiwan), the University of International Business and Economics (China), the Institute of Agricultural Economics and Development (CASS, China), the Shanghai Academy of Social Science (SASS, China), the Institute of Sociology, Academia Sinica (Taiwan), the Centre of Excellence in Management, College of Business Administration (Kuwait), the United Nations Industrial Development Organisation (UNIDO, Austria), the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies (ISEAS, Singapore), the El Colegio de Mexico (El Colegio, Mexico), the Trade Research Institute, Korea International Trade Association (TRI-KITA, Korea). The Centre for International Forestry Research (CIFOR, Indonesia), the Korea Institute for International Economic Policy (KIEP, Korea).
National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies in Japan. Now (2019), however, the president of IDE-JETRO is Fukao Kyoji, a professor in economics from Hitotsubashi University.

**Figure 12:** IDE-JETRO’s Organisational Structure (2016)

![Organisational Structure Diagram](https://www.ide.go.jp/English/Info/Profile/chart.html)

Figure 13: IDE-JETRO’s Organisational Structure (2019)

When we compare the organisational structures of IDE-JETRO from 2016 (Figure 12) and 2019 (Figure 13), we can see that the research interests were changed in the Development Studies Centre and the Inter-Disciplinary Studies Centre. The former focuses on economic models and regional integration, while the latter added gender analysis and value chains to its themes. These changes reflect the institute’s research dynamics in which the research themes change according to regional and international trends.

When I conducted field research in 2016, the research being conducted by IDE-JETRO at the time covered a wide range of geographical areas and topics. The institute divides area studies into four main areas, including Asia, the Middle East and Central Asia, Africa, and Latin America. IDE-JETRO categorises its research into four main topics, which are economics, society, politics, and law. The economics topic includes five subtopics, which are (1) intellectual property rights, (2) public finance, (3) microfinance, (4) international input-output analysis, and (5) spatial economics. The topic of society includes six subtopics, which are (1) education and human resources, (2) gender, (3) globalisation: culture and society, (4) social security, (5) poverty and inequality, and (6) health. The politics topic emphasises five subtopics, which are (1) African politics, (2) social movement, (3) political parties and elections, (4) conflict and peace building, and (5) democratisation. The last topic is law, which has only one subtopic: ‘law and institutions’. The research carried out by IDE-JETRO, then, likely has some overlap in themes and topics.

IDE-JETRO also has platforms that facilitate research mobility, activities, and increase interaction between researchers and practitioners around the region. The first is the ‘Research Fellows’ programme that accepts researchers in area studies and development studies. The second channel is the ‘visiting research fellows’ (VRF) programme through IDEAS. Under the VRF programme, there are two groups of research. The first is the ‘IDE-Supported Fellowship Programme’ and the other is the ‘Self-Supporting Fellows Programme’ (IDE-JETRO, 2016). To be eligible for the VRF programme, applicants should have expertise in economics, law, and political and social issues that relate to developing countries or regions (IDE-JETRO, 2016). The first important criterion for application is to be employed by a university, research institute, or the government in the applicant’s country (IDE-JETRO, 2016). Additionally, the applicant must also hold a PhD in a relevant filed, reflecting how IDE-JETRO endeavours to build a network with the applicants. This further implies
the high possibility that the applicant is associated with at least one academic institution in their home country. Through these programmes, IDE-JETRO not only diversifies their research, but also builds a network with different institutions in various countries. The VRF programme is an effective channel to bring newcomers into the research circle, also helping intellectuals to construct new connections or brush up on existing relations. The VRF programme additionally helps scholars to sustain these professional and institutional connections as the eligibility criteria are more suited to established intellectuals who already have strong research experience and connections with people or organisations in their home countries.

IDE-JETRO’s method of developing its researchers is referred to as ‘三現主義’ or ‘sangenshugi’, literally translated as the ‘three existing doctrines’. However, ‘sangenshugi’ is not a working style unique to IDE-JETRO. Rather, it is a philosophy of work that was developed by the Toyota Company. Other Japanese companies, including Honda, have also applied this philosophy. Sangenshugi stresses the importance of ‘genba’ (the actual place or frontline), ‘genbatsu’ (the actual elements and situation), and ‘genjitsu-teki’ (realistic) (Nonaka & Toyama, 2007, p. 385). This doctrine is the method by which IDE-JETRO prepares its researchers’ career prospects and expertise through provision of at least two research experiences during their time at the institute.

The first period begins when a new researcher – typically with a political science or area studies background – joins the Institute. In the case that the new researcher specialises in a particular country or area, the researcher would be sent to that country for two years, expecting that the researcher would obtain three important things: (1) local language skills, (2) local connections, and (3) local experiences. These elements cannot be achieved in the library or by conducting documentary research. These first-hand experiences can only be acquired in country, through real experiences and with local people. One IDE-JETRO staff member states that IDE emphasises ‘localism’ as a means by which the researcher is able to obtain in-depth knowledge by acquiring both the local language and local connections.35 IDE-JETRO expects this first-hand experience to provide the researcher a comprehensive understanding of the local context and to establish informal and formal professional

35 Interview, a staff of IDE-JETRO, Chiba, Japan, 29 March 2016
connections with local people. The second period begins when the researcher becomes a senior researcher. They are sent back to the country of study again for two years in order to maintain their connections and to expand their research opportunities. This allows researchers to maintain their official and professional connections, whilst also expanding upon them, and to maintain their local knowledge. This thesis mentioned that the research culture of IDE-JETRO is different from that of the ERIA and ADBI. However, this difference is understandable as the ERIA and ADBI employ a wide range of international intellectuals from around the world.

Unlike the ERIA, IDE-JETRO is not directly involved in the work of the ASEAN Secretariat. As mentioned earlier, Kumagai Satoru, a staff member of IDE-JETRO, worked with the ERIA to develop an economic simulation model called ‘IDE/ERIA-GSM’. Meanwhile, Ishida Masami leads IDE-JETRO’s contributions to the development of transport networks in the GMS area. His works include *Evaluating the Effectiveness of GMS Economic Corridors: Why is There More Focus on the Bangkok-Hanoi Road than the East-West Corridors* (Ishida, 2007), *GMS Economic Co-operation and Its Impact on CLMV Development* (Ishida, 2008), *Intra- and Inter-City Connectivity in the Mekong Region* (Ishida, 2011), *Emerging Economic Corridors in the Mekong Region* (Ishida, 2012), *Five Triangle Areas in the Greater Mekong Subregion* (Ishida, 2013a), *Border Economies in the Greater Mekong Subregion* (Ishida, 2013b), and *Economic Effects of Road Development and Its Challenges* (Ishida, 2017).

IDE-JETRO’s institutional network helps the institute to strengthen its connections with other regional institutes, as well as the professional connections between its researchers, Japanese officials, and Southeast Asian intellectuals. These connections help to disseminate IDE-JETRO’s ideas about regional transport development (e.g. research training and capacity-building programmes) to other regional actors.

5.4.3 ADBI

The ADBI is a research institute affiliated with the Asian Development Bank (ADB). The history of the ADB can be traced back to the period of the Cold War when the US strongly supported the establishment of multilateral development banks (MDBs). Previous understandings of the ADB, then, have focused on the influence
of the US and the Japanese government (Dutt, 1977, 2001; Krasner, 1981; Yasutomo, 1983). The relationship between the Japanese government and the ADB raises the question of Japan’s power to influence the ADB, as the two most significant financial contributors to the ADB have been Japan and the US, which gives them the most substantial voting powers in the organisation. Moreover, the presidents of the ADB have only been Japanese since its establishment. These factors have raised the question of Japan’s influence in the organisation as both the financial and administrative powers are under the Japanese authority (Dutt, 1977, 2001; Krasner, 1981; Yasutomo, 1983).

The ADB was originally established in 1966, whereas the ADBI was founded in 1997. The objectives of the ADBI are to build capacity, skills, and knowledge related to poverty reduction and to conduct other supporting activities that will help enhance long-term growth and competitiveness in the Asia-Pacific region.

The relations between the Japanese government and the ADB are still strong. Japan’s MOFA highlights the importance this relationship as a contribution to Asia’s sustainable development by prioritising the development of basic infrastructure, facilitation of investment in environmental policies, and capacity-building programmes. It is also stresses that such development could bring more international investors to Asia. Moreover, the national border should not be an obstacle for international trade anymore. Instead, ‘infrastructure beyond borders’ should be constructed to facilitate regional co-operation and integration (MOFA, 2007). Another area that the Japanese government prioritises in their contribution to the ADB is energy efficiency. The Japanese government recognises the importance of supporting Southeast Asian countries to access and develop technologies that could help to reduce their CO₂ emissions (MOFA, 2007).

The ADBI organises annual meetings between various think tanks in Asia to share ideas regarding Asian development with its 26 member institutes.³⁶

³⁶ ADBI, the Bangladesh Institute of Development Studies (BIDS), the Brookings India, the Centre for Economic and Social Development (CESD, Azerbaijan), the Centre for International Relations and Strategic Studies (CIRSS, the Philippines), the Centre for Policy Dialogue (CPD, Bangladesh), the CFA Institute (Hong Kong), the Economic Policy and Competitiveness Research Centre (EPCRC, Mongolia), the Economic Policy Research Foundation of Turkey, ERIA, the Foreign Service Institute for International Relations and Strategic Studies (FSICIRSS, the Philippines), the Indian Council for Research on International Economic Relations, the Institute for Integrated Development Studies
Nevertheless, only four Southeast Asian countries are members of this network, which are the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam. While there are not many researchers in the organisation, the diversity of their nationalities is one of the ADBI’s strengths. The ADBI is composed of three main departments: (1) the research department, (2) the capacity-building programmes, and (3) the administration. The research department houses approximately 4-5 researchers who come from various countries. Their first contract is for three years and after that, the researcher can sign a second contract for two additional years. All researchers have academic backgrounds in economics. They are hired to conduct research on the year’s relevant themes and topics and are expected to take part in the capacity-building programmes.

The ADBI contributes to the understanding of ASEAN’s regional connectivity through its research, publications, and capacity-building programmes. Its seminal works on Southeast Asian regional transport development include *Infrastructure for Seamless Asia* (ADB & ADBI, 2009), *Connecting East Asia: A New Framework for Infrastructure* (ADBI & JBIC, 2005), and *Connecting South Asia and Southeast Asia* (ADBI, 2015). These publications discuss why and how regional transport is important. For example, for the ADB, ADBI, and JBIC, regional transport development is one of the major determinants of economic integration (ADB & ADBI, 2009; ADB & JBIC, 2005; Vickerman, 2002b).

The ADBI’s work is not only focused on hard infrastructure, but also pays attention to finance. This could be because the Dean of the ADBI is a professor in economics; thereby, its research trends have been more focused on economic and financial issues. For example, ADBI’s *Infrastructure Investment, Private Finance, and Institutional Investors: Asia from a Global Perspective* (Inderst, 2016) was utilised by ASEAN in the development of MPAC 2025 (ASEAN, 2016a, p. 47).

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(IIDS, Nepal), the Institute of Policy Studies of Sri Lanka, the ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute, the Korea Institute for International Economic Policy, the Lowy Institute for International Policy (LIIP, Australia), the National Centre for Socio-Economic Information and Forecast (NCIF, Vietnam), the New Zealand Institute of Economic Research, the Philippine Institute for Development Studies, the Policy and Management Consulting Group (PMC, Georgia), S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS, Singapore), the Sustainable Development Policy Institute (SDPI, Pakistan), the Thailand Development Research Institute (TDRI), the Asian Foundation, and the TTCSP.
Unlike the ERIA and IDE-JETRO’s research that contributed directly to the development of ASEAN’s MPAC, ADBI’s work focuses more on the vision of how Southeast Asian can physically link with South Asia, as seen in *Connecting South Asia and Southeast Asia* (ADBI, 2015). Moreover, while the ADBI seeks to recommend ways in which Southeast Asia can make physical linkages with South Asia, it has not yet published any research that focuses on the linkages between Southeast and Northeast Asia. This might be because in order to link Southeast and Northeast Asia, the route must physically pass through China. That being said, the ADBI has likely focused its research on helping Southeast Asia to link with South Asia, rather than passing through China.

### 5.5 Conclusion

This chapter has explained the background of ASEAN’s MPAC, first initiated in 2010 and revised again in 2025. When the MPAC was being drafted, the Japanese government was eager to support ASEAN’s projects to physically link the region through construction of hard infrastructure. After MPAC 2010 was issued, the Japanese government established two main mechanisms, the Japanese Task Force and the Mission of Japan to ASEAN, to support ASEAN Connectivity. These engagements reflect the importance of Southeast Asia as a region where Japanese businesses have been based since the mid-1980s. Apart from their official contributions, the Japanese government also supports the work of the ERIA, IDE-JETRO, and ADBI to construct knowledge of regional transport development and to disseminate it within Southeast Asian countries and the ASEAN Secretariat.

Chapter 3 discussed how business interests are one of the driving factors influencing the Japanese government position itself as a regional leader. Japan’s intellectual contributions are another example of how the Japanese government exercises its academic and financial powers in order to achieve this leading position. Chapter 6 will explain further how the norm entrepreneurs, including the MOFA, METI, JICA, ERIA, IDE-JETRO, ADBI, construct the knowledge of Southeast Asian transport development and disseminate that knowledge to other actors in the region.
Chapter 6:
Japan’s Role in the Norm Life Cycle of Southeast Asian Transport Development

6.1 Introduction

While Chapter 4 explored the post-World War II international environment that shaped relations between Japan and Southeast Asia, Chapter 5 focused on the history of the regional transport system networks in Southeast Asia within the scope of the ASEAN Secretariat’s work and Japan’s contributions. We have seen that since 1945, official development assistance (ODA) was utilised by the Japanese government as a primary mechanism to reconcile economic and diplomatic relations with Southeast Asia. This is further reiterated by the fact that between 1960 and 2011, 39.4 per cent of Japanese ODA was allocated to ASEAN member countries (JICA, 2013, p. 11). Moreover, Japan-ASEAN economic and political relations have also been strengthened by the intellectual contributions of ‘international research organisations’ (IROs), including the Economic Research Institute for ASEAN and East Asia (ERIA); the Institute of Developing Economies, Japan External Trade Organisation (IDE-JETRO), and the Asian Development Bank Institute (ADBI). The Japanese government initiated and supported these organisations in order to promote economic development and regionalism in Northeast and Southeast Asia. This chapter will detail further how the IROs serve as channels for the Japanese government to spread ideas about Southeast Asian regional transport development and economic integration. Such IROs work with Japanese ministries and agencies to construct particular connectivity ideas (e.g. globalisation, free trade, mobilisation, trade liberalisation, and seamless logistics) and to disseminate this discourse through publication and research-related activities including seminars, meetings, conferences, and capacity-building programmes.

This chapter will examine the process by which the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA), the Ministry of Economy Trade and Industry (METI), the Ministry of Finance (MOF), the Japan International Co-operation Agency (JICA), the Japan External Trade Organisation (JETRO) work with the ERIA, IDE-JETRO, and ADBI to construct norms and ideas. Therefore, this chapter aims to address the remaining three research questions, which are listed as follows:
4. What norms and ideas have the ERIA, IDE-JETRO, and ADBI constructed about regional transport development and why?

5. How were the norms and ideas about regional transport development constructed and how were they cascaded through professional and institutional connections?

6. How were these norms and ideas internalised within domestic and regional transport development schemes in Southeast Asia?

Utilising Finnemore and Sikkink’s norm lifecycle framework (1998) shown previously (see Chapter 3), this chapter will analyse how norms are constructed by examining the professional and institutional connections that help Japanese intellectuals and officials to form relationships. This analysis will also help to demonstrate how Japanese government agencies work with the ERIA, IDE-JETRO, and ADBI, and will reflect their perceptions of Southeast Asian transport development. An explanation will then be provided of norm entrepreneurs, including Japanese governmental agencies and IROs, their opinions regarding how the region should be developed, and how professional and institutional connections help to cascade the norms of Southeast Asian transport development.

The remainder of this chapter is divided into four sections. The first section will analyse the norm construction process, further investigating professional connections between intellectuals who work for the ERIA, IDE-JETRO, and ADBI, as well as the linkages that strengthen their academic affiliations. This section will provide an overview of what norms the ERIA, IDE-JETRO, and ADBI have constructed and why. In the second section, we will look at the norm cascade process by analysing the power of publication, research, training, and capacity-building programmes. Third, we will analyse the norm internalisation process by examining which norms and ideas as proposed by the ERIA, IDE-JETRO, and ADBI are also stated in policy documents of ASEAN member countries or the ASEAN Secretariat. The last section will summarise and conclude this chapter’s discussion.
6.2 Norms Construction

This section will begin by looking at the first stage of the framework — the norms construction process. We will look at how norm entrepreneurs, including the MOFA, METI, MOF, JICA, JETRO, ERIA, IDE-JETRO, and ADBI, interact with each other. An analysis will also be provided regarding what type of norms and ideas have been constructed about regional transport development.

To support the full establishment of a regional transport system, Japan needs not only a plan that will create a common understanding of how regional infrastructure should be developed, but also the norms that will support the notion of such development. This section will look at how Japanese governmental agencies work to construct those norms. Chapters 2 and 3 have already reviewed the roles of actors that are involved in Japan’s foreign policy-making process, including governmental agencies, mass media, think tanks, the academic community, sub-state political authorities, pressure groups, NGOs, and social movements. These actors all reflect their perceptions, ideas, and policy-recommendations to the cabinet in order to participate in the formation of foreign policy.

On the other hand, intellectual contributions come as the result of connections between individuals and institutions, as Haas (1992, p.3) proposes that intellectuals and epistemic communities are those that contribute their expertise to the public. However, as discussed in Chapter 2, the existing literature on Japan’s intellectuals does not provide much elaboration. Moreover, the literature on Japanese think tanks does not detail the relationships between intellectuals, researchers, and officials in Japan or their relationships with intellectuals outside Japan. The lack of understanding about the relationships between intellectuals and institutions is one gap that should be studied further. This section will, thereby, analyse how professional and institutional connections facilitate the emergence of norms and how such norms are embedded into ‘practical knowledge’. It will focus on two major platforms that are involved in the emergence of norms: (1) professional connections and (2) institutional connections.

6.2.1 Professional Connections

The development of Southeast Asian transport system was due, in part, to the collaboration between many actors in various countries, including officials, intellectuals, JETRO, Japanese Chamber of Commerce (JCC), and NGOs. The
relationships between the Japanese officials and the intellectuals in IROs facilitate norm emergence as the involved intellectuals contribute their expertise and perspectives to the government officials. This section, then, will analyse how professional connections between officials and intellectuals support the construction of norms that become embedded in practical knowledge.

The data obtained from field research shows that professional connections are mainly formed in four ways: (1) selection, (2) invitation, (3) recommendation, and (4) application.

1. **Selection**: The most common way that intellectuals join research activities is through selection. Often, they are selected based on their position in their organisation, for example their status as a researcher, Director, or Dean of an institution. Their position justifies their engagement due to the requirements of the position itself; before they gained this position, they likely had to meet eligibility criteria, such as academic background or work experience.

2. **Invitation**: A group of people or individuals are invited to join the meetings based on their expertise and professional connections. They are also invited to join research projects and activities. This helps not only to construct a network, but also to expand the connections between intellectuals and organisations.

3. **Recommendation**: Recommendation is another unofficial channel to help introduce new intellectuals to one another. The newcomers are introduced by way of professional connections between intellectuals and officials.

4. **Application**: Calls for applications can also be a channel that newcomers use. A new scholar can apply to join the team as a researcher, providing the newcomer with the opportunity to form professional connections with other experts and organisations.

Out of these four methods of bringing like-minded intellectuals to join the research programmes, the most common are selection, invitation, and recommendation.\(^{37}\) Intellectuals are then accepted to the research programmes as they have personal connections or recommendations from colleagues in the team.

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\(^{37}\) Interview, ISEAS (1), Singapore, 18 April 2016; Interview, a staff of ThUni, 3 May 2016.
For example, IDE-JETRO established research networks with professors from Thammasat University’s business school38, ABAC University’s business school39, and with researchers from the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies (ISEAS)-Yusof Ishak Institute40. The application channel, nonetheless, is slightly different because the applicants likely have their own personal academic interests. The objective of accepting applicants, then, is the expectation of broadening their research networks.

6.2.1.1 ERIA

In the case of the ERIA, research staff members are selected, invited, and recommended. The organisational structure of the ERIA is divided into three main departments, which are (1) communication, publication, and outreach department, (2) research department, and (3) administration and personnel department. Every researcher in the ERIA’s research department is an economist. Under the research department, there is an energy research unit, which consists of four researchers whose expertise is energy economics. The research themes of the ERIA change almost every year.41

The researchers who are involved in setting the research theme are three Japanese professors: Nishimura Hidetoshi, Kimura Fukunari, and Urata Shujiro. To analyse how intellectuals have influenced the research, we should examine the personal backgrounds of the Japanese researchers who determine the research agenda of the ERIA. When the field research for this study was conducted in 2016, the president (Nishimura Hidetoshi) and the leading researchers (Kimura Fukunari, and Urata Shujiro) of the ERIA were Japanese.42 They have strong academic backgrounds, experience of working in universities, and professional connections with many international organisations.

Nishimura graduated from the Faculty of Law at the University of Tokyo and is now a Professor of Law. Before his assignment as president of the ERIA in 2008, he had served in many roles in various Japanese governmental agencies. The close

38 Interview, a staff of ThUni, 9 May 2016.
39 Interview, a staff of ThUni, 3 May 2016.
40 Interview, a staff of ISEAS (1), Singapore, 18 April 2016.
41 Interview, a staff of ERIA, Tokyo, Japan, 18 March 2016.
42 He is still the President up until the present (February 2019).
connections between his professional background and his various official positions, led ASEAN member states to believe that his experience and connections would contribute to the work of the ERIA.

Kimura is the Chief Economist at the ERIA. He received his PhD in economics from the University of Wisconsin-Madison, USA and is now a Professor of Economics at Keio University, Japan. His expertise covers a wide range of economic areas, such as international trade, development economics, economic growth theory, applied microeconomics, and Japan and Asian economies. Before joining the ERIA in 2008, he had worked with many organisations, including the Malaysian Institute of Economic Research (MIER), the Academia Sinica (Taiwan), and the World Bank.

Urata is a Senior Research Advisor to the Present of the ERIA. He received his PhD in Economics from Stanford University, USA and is now a Professor of Economics at the Graduate School of Asia-Pacific Studies at Waseda University, Japan. Before joining the ERIA in 2009, he contributed research to organisations including the Research Institute of Economy, Trade and Industry (RIETI), the World Bank, and the Brookings Institution in Washington, DC.

These three researchers were selected by METI based on their academic experience, expertise in economics, and experience working with international organisations, which could help the ERIA to build both professional and institutional connections. Their strong academic backgrounds and current work as professors in established and well-known universities further permit them to pursue professional connections with intellectuals, both Japanese and international. Furthermore, their positions facilitate the opportunity to meet intellectuals and organisations abroad.

Nishimura, Kimura, and Urata’s professional contributions to the work of IROs can be seen in their engagement with Japan’s governmental agencies and in their many research-related activities. For example, Nishimura held positions in many Japanese organisations (ERIA, 2018a).43 The interview with an ERIA staff

43 Including Representative of the Asia-Pacific Region of the Japan Overseas Development Corporation, Director of the Southeast Asia and Pacific Division of the Trade Policy Bureau, Vice Governor for International Affairs of Ehime Prefecture, Director-General of the Business Support Department of the Small and Medium Enterprises Agency, Executive Managing Director of the Japan-China Economic Association, and President of the Japan-China Northeast Development Association.
member also revealed that the professional connections between Nishimura and other officials are strong because Nishimura used to work with METI and therefore has close relationships with METI’s officials.\footnote{Interview, a staff of ERIA, Tokyo, Japan, 22 March 2016.}

Kimura and Urata are both Professors in Economics and have worked with many research organisations, ministries, and international organisations. They contributed to the ERIA by utilising their professional connections with Japan’s governmental agencies to send staff members on joint research projects.\footnote{Interview, a staff of ERIA, Tokyo, Japan, 22 March 2016.} Such connections have further expanded the ERIA’s research networks, both domestically and internationally.

While individual professional connections are not detailed in published documents, reflections from researchers who have worked with particular individuals can reflect on their connections and on how certain professionals are linked. For example, in the field work for this study, a professor in Thailand explained that prior to the ERIA’s establishment, a group of ERIA researchers and administrative staff approached the interviewee about support from Thai universities.\footnote{Interview, a staff of ThUni, 19 May 2016.} This shows that the ERIA has been utilising professional connections between ERIA researchers to develop both professional and institutional networks ever since its establishment. Two other Thai professors (Interviewees No.16, No.21) also shared a similar experience, that Urata and Kimura asked them to join a research project primarily because the interviewees had been members of previous research projects.\footnote{Interview, a staff of ThUni, 3 May 2016; Interview, a staff of ThUni, 24 May 2016.} A researcher from the Institute for Strategic and International Studies (ISIS) (Interviewee No.14) in Malaysia also shared that ‘Interviewee No.14’ joined a research project headed by Urata. Once the research was complete, the professional connection that ‘Interviewee No.14’ developed with Urata helped to expand their research networks.\footnote{Interview, a staff of ISIS Malaysia, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, 26 April 2016.} Meanwhile, a researcher from ISEAS-Yusof Ishak stated that Kimura used his connections to set the research trends in Southeast Asia.\footnote{Interview, a staff of ISEAS-Yusof Ishak, Singapore, 21 April 2016.} These reflections demonstrate that ERIA research networks have formed academic linkages between researchers and institutions.
The concept of regional transport is supported by liberal economic ideas. The work of the ERIA on Southeast Asian regional transport is based on the ideas of economic liberalisation and trade facilitation. Economists like Nishimura, Kimura, and Urata have optimistic views and opinions about economic liberalisation. They believe that if the ERIA is able to help Southeast Asia to enjoy the benefits of liberalisation and facilitation, the region will gain significant economic opportunities. During interviews with Nishimura, Kimura, and Urata, one of them stated that the organisation must promote the concept of globalisation as ‘something good’ to Southeast Asian people, believing that the development of infrastructure, the elimination of poverty, and the access to financial assistance will benefit those in need. The ideas of economic liberalisation and trade facilitation are strongly supported by the ERIA’s research themes and trends as set by the three chief researchers. This can also be seen in the ERIA’s work, which emphasises the importance of trade facilitation and economic activities, as reflected in the ‘Comprehensive Asia Development Plan’ (CADP) (see section 6.3.1.1 and 6.4.1). The way the three chief researchers of the ERIA perceive economic development trajectories is shared by economists and scholars throughout Southeast Asia. A Thai economist reflected that the staff members of the ERIA, particularly those who obtained a doctoral degree in economics, are optimistic and eager to promote the concepts of globalisation, free trade, mobilisation, and liberalisation as concepts to open channels for regional economic collaboration. Such reflections were also shared by a researcher of the MIER.

Nevertheless, Nishimura, Kimura, and Urata are cautious of the engagement of Japanese intellectuals in the ERIA’s work, as the image of the Japanese government having influence over the ERIA might lead to dissatisfaction amongst Southeast Asian countries. This is important because the work of Japanese researchers in the ERIA should not favour any certain country. Therefore, the level of engagement from Japanese researchers should be limited so that the research does

50 Interview, a staff of ERIA, Tokyo, Japan, 18 March 2016.
51 Interview, a staff of ERIA, Tokyo, Japan, 18 March 2016.
52 Interview, a staff of ThUni, Bangkok, 13 May 2016.
53 Interview, a staff of MIER, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, 26 April 2016.
54 Interview, a staff of ERIA, Tokyo, Japan, 18 March 2016; Interview, a staff of ERIA, Tokyo, Japan, 22 March 2016.
not seem biased toward Japan. During the field research, one of the three Japanese researchers, Interviewee No.5, shared their personal experience stating that if a Japanese representative was participating in an ASEAN meeting or conference, this often set an awkward and uncomfortable tone. Accordingly, in order to ease such tension, ‘Interviewee No.5’ decided not to attend the meeting at all. Instead, ‘Interviewee No.5’ would assign an ERIA staff member, whose nationality is from an ASEAN member country, to participate in the meeting on behalf of the ERIA in an effort to avoid the perception that the ERIA is only represented by Japan. This further demonstrates that the ERIA’s Japanese staff members are aware of the impact that Japanese personnel holding roles in the ERIA may have, particularly as both the Director and the Head of the Research Department are all Japanese. The involvement and engagement of Japanese staff members in regional activities, thereby, must be politically correct.

Professional connections help intellectuals to share and discuss ideas through their research-related activities. When Japanese researchers join an organisation, they help the ERIA to build professional connections with other researchers in the region, both by invitation and recommendation. The invitation for researchers from Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, and Thailand to join research projects is encouraged, not only so that the ERIA can access local language resources, but also to build professional and institutional connections. Once professional connections are established, researchers will often recommend new intellectuals to ERIA-supported networks and research projects in order to gain more connections throughout the region. For example, a university professor in Thailand, whose expertise is international and regional transportation and logistics, was invited to join a research team made up of people with similar expertise. Once the research was complete, the results were disseminated through various seminars, workshops, and conferences in Bangkok.

55 Interview, a staff of ERIA, Tokyo, Japan, 18 March 2016.
56 Interview, a staff of ERIA, Tokyo, Japan, 18 March 2016.
57 Interview, a staff of ThUni, 9 May 2016.
58 I will not reveal the information of these activities because by doing so, it will identify the interviewee.
Whilst the ERIA utilised only invitation and recommendation, the researchers of IDE-JETRO contributed their expertise by selection, invitation, recommendation, and application. As IDE-JETRO is a research institute, there are many in-house researchers whose expertise are economics, development, and area studies. Like many other research institutes, IDE-JETRO accommodates both in-house researchers and visiting researchers from around the world, providing research opportunities for intellectuals whose expertise include area studies and development studies. A staff member of IDE-JETRO restated the importance of personal connections by explaining that when researchers conduct research over a period of time, it develops the ‘personal connections’ between researchers, which helps them to further expand their connections for future research.  

6.2.1.2 IDE-JETRO

IDE-JETRO is different from the ERIA as IDE-JETRO has channels that allow for interested intellectuals to engage in its research. As explained in Chapter 5, the first channel for doing so is the ‘Research Fellows’ programme and the second channel is the ‘visiting research fellows’ (VRF) programme through IDEAS. Under the VRF programme, there are two categories of research, including the ‘IDE-Supported Fellowship Programme’ and the ‘Self-Supporting Fellow’s Programme’ (IDE-JETRO, 2016). Candidates for the VRF programme should have expertise in economics, law, and political and social issues that relate to developing countries or regions (IDE-JETRO, 2016). These two channels of engagement allow IDE-JETRO to utilise researchers from a broad range of disciplines to further contribute to its research activities.

The comprehensiveness of IDE-JETRO’s research is reflected in its organisational structure (see Figure 13 in Chapter 5). IDE-JETRO houses many researchers in each research group, including people from various academic backgrounds with specialities in both economics and development studies. As IDE-JETRO has broader research themes and provides opportunities for researchers both in Japan and abroad, its research has much wider coverage. Furthermore, IDE-JETRO allows their researchers to build connections through two main methods, with individual intellectuals and with institutions (see Chapter 5).

59 Interview, a staff of IDE-JETRO, Chiba, Japan, 9 February 2016.
One researcher at IDE-JETRO, Ishida Masami, contributes considerably to the development of Southeast Asian transport. Ishida joined IDE in 1993 with expertise on the Indonesian economy. His interest in the GMS area started in 2000 when he was assigned by the Institute to conduct research on that particular region. He published and edited publications about GMS studies, particularly on the topic of regional transport (inter alia, Ishida 2007, 2008, 2011, 2012, 2013a, 2013b). While he was conducting research in the GMS area, he made broad connections with intellectuals and officials, including various persons at Thai, Cambodian, and Vietnamese universities, and brought together intellectuals from other countries to conduct field research for data collection. Moreover, Ishida’s research, publications, and analyses provided information about the development of the GMS to officials and intellectuals throughout Southeast Asia via the IDE-JETRO online system, research seminars, and conferences. Ishida also contributed his professional connections to IDE-JETRO. One interviewee – who is a Thai university professor (Interviewee No.16), was introduced by Ruth Banomyong, a professor in international transport at Thammasat Business School – to join Ishida’s research project. After that, ‘Interviewee No.16’ gained the opportunity to expand research connections into many projects with Ishida. ‘Interviewee No.16’ stated that Ishida expected to make connections with local researchers in order to access local language publications and translate interviews. In 2019, IDE-JETRO appointed Ishida as Director General for the ERIA Support Office, which is based in IDE-JETRO’s headquarters. This reflects that IDE-JETRO recognises that Ishida’s expertise and professional connections will strengthen the institutional connections between IDE-JETRO, the ERIA, and other research and government agencies in Southeast Asia.

IDE-JETRO professional connections are also initiated by ex-researchers. A staff member of IDE-JETRO stated that even when researchers quit or retire from

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60 Interview, a staff of IDE-JETRO, Chiba, Japan, 18 February 2016.
61 Interview, a staff of IDE-JETRO, Chiba, Japan, 18 February 2016.
62 Interview, a staff of IDE-JETRO, Chiba, Japan, 18 February 2016; Interview, a staff of ThUni, 9 May 2016; Interview, a staff of ThUni, 3 May 2016.
63 Interview, a staff of ThUni, 3 May 2016.
64 Interview, a staff of ThUni, 3 May 2016.
65 Interview, a staff of ThUni, 3 May 2016.
IDE-JETRO, they were sometimes still asked to join research projects. This helps IDE-JETRO to maintain professional connections between institutions.  

6.2.1.3 ADBI

ADBI connects intellectuals through selection, invitation, recommendation, and application. ADBI is located in Tokyo, far away from the ADB headquarters in Manila, Philippines. ADBI mostly employs in-house researchers whose expertise are in economics. Researchers who work at ADBI have various academic backgrounds, but focus primarily on economics. In-house researchers work on the institute’s designated research themes, both individually and as part of a team with other international researchers.

Although ADBI has a wide range of researchers, the most prominent intellectual who leads the institution in establishing connections and research impact is the ‘Dean’. When I conducted field research in 2016, the Dean of ADBI was Yoshino Naoyuki, a professor of economics at Keio University, Japan. He was appointed by MOFA to supervise ADBI. Yoshino helped ADBI to connect with other research institutes in the region while also representing the organisation in the media. Moreover, the director of the administrative department of ADBI is also recommended by Japan’s MOFA. The close relationship between the Dean and Japan’s government officials builds institutional connections with other Japanese ministries.

Professional connections between intellectuals in IROs are formed through different channels and methods. After connections are initially established, professional networks with governmental officials and other institutional connections are consequently developed. In the next section we will look at institutional connections and try to comprehend how IROs and intellectuals contribute to the institutions’ work at the regional level.

66 Interview, a staff of IDE-JETRO, Chiba, Japan, 9 February 2016.
67 Yoshino Naoyuki remains President as of January 2019.
6.2.2 Institutional Connections

Professional connections provide a platform to develop linkages between intellectuals and officials, as well as between intellectuals and other institutions. Such connections work within and between institutions. Many intellectuals from the ERIA, IDE-JETRO, and ADBI also engage in regional institutional platforms, which were established in order to develop a regional transport network. There are various regional institutional platforms through which professionals and intellectuals can work closely together on important issues. Institutional connections can be categorised into two platforms:

1. **Southeast Asian Platforms**: These platforms facilitate the bilateral and multilateral relations between ASEAN and its dialogue partners to further regional transport development. They include economic and political platforms where intellectuals can present their research and propose policy recommendations to officials.

2. **IROs Platforms**: IROs are ‘intellectual’ platforms through which intellectuals can discuss research that supports regional transport development. The ERIA, IDE-JETRO, and ADBI provide institutional support for research activities and report the findings to policymakers.

This section will analyse which institutions are involved in the process of constructing norms and how these institutions, as norm entrepreneurs, help IROs to create practical knowledge that is embedded with the created norms. It will also describe how relations between the Japanese government and intellectuals were formed.

6.2.2.1 Southeast Asian Platforms

Southeast Asian platforms introduce norms into the discussion by receiving and utilising the research results of the ERIA, IDE-JETRO, and ADBI. Section 6.3 will further detail how such platforms integrate the work of these three IROs into their policy and research.

Many regional platforms support Southeast Asian transport development. The ASEAN Secretariat plays a significant role at the regional level, supporting dialogue such as the ASEAN Transport Ministers (ATM) Meeting. As Chapter 5 has
explained, Japan engaged in the development of Southeast Asian transport through the ASEAN-Japan Transport Ministers Meeting before the establishment of MPAC. The first meeting was held in Yangon, Myanmar in 2003 and included participants from the Ministries of Transport and Ministries of Communications in ASEAN member countries, whilst Tsuruho Yousuke, Parliamentary Secretary for MLIT, represented Japan. The meeting discussed the transport system, shipping, and collaboration on human resource development (ASEAN, 2003). Following this meeting, it was decided that the ASEAN-Japan Transport Partnership Information Centre (AJTP Information Centre) would be established at MLIT in Japan. The ATM-Japan meetings focus on five main areas: (1) transport facilitation, (2) air transport, (3) maritime transport, (4) land transport, and (5) other areas, such as the Transport Policy Officials Training in Japan and the Transport Information Platform Project. Through their emphasis on practical issues of regional transport, logistics and transport safety, and transport security, many schemes have been initiated to address security issues. Some such schemes include the ‘ASEAN-Japan Transport Logistics Improvement Plan’, the ‘ASEAN-Japan Ministerial Declaration on Transport Security’, and the ‘ASEAN-Japan Regional Road Map for Aviation Security’. A significant milestone of these meetings was at the 2008 meeting in the Philippines where the participants agreed to initiate the ‘Manila Action Plan for the ASEAN-Japan Transport Partnership’ (AJTP) (2009-2013), which aims to advance regional economic integration by promoting transport logistics, safety and security, environmental regulations, and common infrastructure (AJTP, 2008, p. 1).

At the 2010 meeting in Brunei it was determined that a ‘Public-Private Join Forum’ would be held the following year in response to the increasing importance of economic activities and globalisation in the region. At the 10th ATM-Japan meeting in Indonesia, MPAC was mentioned for the first time when the Japanese government’s engagement and contribution to ASEAN’s MPAC was recognised (AJTP, 2012, p. 1). Additionally, Japan’s contributions to the promotion of ‘quality transport’ were also welcomed (AJTP, 2012, p. 2). From the examples provided here,

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68 In 2019 there were three Parliamentary Secretaries, including Nagayasu Takashi, Fujimoto Yuji, and Tsugawa Shougo. They are associated with the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism (MLIT).
we can see that Japan’s governmental agencies engage in ASEAN Connectivity schemes in various ways.

Another main regional platform is the ‘ASEAN Coordinating Committee on ASEAN Connectivity’ (ACCC), which was established at the 17th ASEAN Summit in 2010 and held its first meeting in April 2011. The ACCC is composed of appointed representatives from ASEAN countries and the Permanent Representative to ASEAN. The chairman of the ACCC is the same as the chairman of ASEAN. It was expected that the ACCC would support and promote the objectives of ASEAN’s MPAC, including (1) promote economic growth, (2) narrow development gaps, (3) enhance ASEAN integration and community building process, (4) enhance competitiveness of ASEAN, (5) promote more profound social and cultural understanding and mobility of people, and (6) connect ASEAN member states together and with the rest of the world (ASEAN Coordinating Council, 2011, p. 1). The ACCC monitors, evaluates, and reviews the implementation of MPAC objectives, ensuring that projects and arrangements in different countries are relevant to and align with the MPAC.

Moreover, the ACCC should be able to identify issues and challenges that the MPAC might confront. It then makes the appropriate recommendations to the ASEAN Summit through the ASEAN Coordinating Council. Furthermore, the ACCC is responsible for determining new strategies that will promote and strengthen connectivity between ASEAN and other regions (ASEAN Coordinating Council, 2011, pp. 1-2).

The ACCC is responsible for writing reports that then are submitted to the ASEAN Coordinating Council meeting. The Council will then consult with the ASEAN Political-Security Community Council, the ASEAN Economic Community Council, and the ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community, to draft recommendations for the ASEAN Summit (ASEAN Coordinating Council, 2011, p. 2). Additionally, there are other organisations that are sometimes invited to join the activities of the ACCC, such as the Asian Development Bank (ADB), World Bank, ERIA, the United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (UNESCAP), the private sector, and representatives of dialogue partners (ASEAN Coordinating Council, 2011, p. 3). The ACCC works with the ERIA and other regional organisations to facilitate the ASEAN Connectivity Symposium, which is another crucial meeting. The Symposium was first started in 2011, one year after the implementation of
ASEAN’s MPAC in 2010. It is organised by the ACCC, ERIA, ASEAN-Australia Development Co-operation Programme (AADCP), ASEAN Secretariat, and the country Chairs of ASEAN. The ASEAN Connectivity Symposium is an annual platform that aims to bring relevant stakeholders together to discuss issues related to Southeast Asian transport. ERIA anticipated that the outcomes of the symposium will be reflected in the work of ASEAN’s connectivity scheme. The symposium focuses on various issues, such as cross-sector coordination, national implementation of regional initiatives, mobilisation of infrastructure finance, and monitoring and evaluation. The ACCC’s recommendations are based on the issues of infrastructure development, the implementation and enforcement of laws and regulations, and the dissemination of specific technical workshops. In this respect, we can see that the ERIA engages with officials, providing ERIA researchers with opportunities to present their research results, opinions, and policy-recommendations directly to the regional platform, which focuses on the development of regional connectivity.

As we have seen thus far, the regional platforms were established to help Southeast Asian governments address challenges related to regional connectivity. Japan’s MLIT and its contributions to the ASEAN Connectivity development scheme have facilitated Japan’s engagement in various platforms. These platforms have significantly contributed to the development of regional connectivity as they provide a space for governments to discuss and plan together. Nonetheless, the Japanese government established IROs in order to help facilitate the creation of norms and ideas to ‘frame’ the direction of regional development and its trajectories. The next section will provide a deeper look into these ‘intellectual platforms’.

6.2.2.2 IROs Platforms

The ERIA, IDE-JETRO, and ADBI have provided platforms for intellectuals and officials to discuss issues and challenges related to regional transport development. They provide opportunities to researchers from throughout the region to conduct research for their projects or positions from within the organisations. Each organisation has a research department that determines the specific themes and issues to focus on each year. They also provide opportunities to gain research experience for interested intellectuals by opening applications for positions in the research department.
6.2.2.1 ERIA

The ERIA contributes its expertise through collaboration with other research organisations and researchers throughout the region. The ERIA’s studies have filled the gap left by the ASEAN Secretariat as the Secretariat has approximately 300 staff members in total, which is inadequate not only to operate its routine work covering ten countries, but also to operate research-related activities.\(^\text{69}\) In this respect, according to the opinion of the METI official, the ERIA has done its job very well and has satisfied those involved in the work of ASEAN and the EAS because it has helped METI to obtain information and conduct analyses that support METI’s policy-making process.\(^\text{70}\) While, the ERIA is recognised for its policy-oriented research that contributes to the EAS, some researchers in Southeast Asia recognise the ERIA as an academic-oriented research organisation rather than a policy-oriented one.

Moreover, the ERIA also has ‘advisors’ who are selected by the METI, which reflects the close relationship between the METI and the ERIA. The advisors are typically staff members of private Japanese companies who are contracted with the ERIA for two years. During the field research in 2016, one ERIA staff member (Interviewee No.9) revealed that the advisors were from Sojitz Corporation, Japan Railway (JR), EHIME Bank, and Nippon Electric Corporation (NEC Corporation).\(^\text{71}\) They were assigned by the METI to advise the ERIA, as well as to provide recommendations. Sojitz Corporation was assigned to help with economics and trade, JR focused on infrastructure development, EHIME Bank focused on finance, and NEC Corporation focused on IT infrastructure. ‘Interviewee No.9’ explained that before 2016, the selected companies were Hitachi, Mizuho Bank, and Nippon Life Insurance.\(^\text{72}\) They helped the ERIA to prepare the CADP. This also reflects how the Japanese government helps Japanese companies to have a role in the decision-making process and development planning by providing opportunities for big Japanese companies to participate in the ERIA.

\(^\text{69}\) Interview, a staff of ERIA, Tokyo, Japan, 18 March 2016.
\(^\text{70}\) Interview, a staff of METI, Tokyo, Japan, 25 March 2016.
\(^\text{71}\) Interview, a staff of ERIA, Jakarta, Indonesia, 5 April 2016.
\(^\text{72}\) Interview, a staff of ERIA, Jakarta, Indonesia, 5 April 2016.
Furthermore, the ERIA builds connections between institutions through its ‘Research Institute Network’ (RIN) and ‘Energy Institute Network’. The RIN formed institutional connections with various institutes in 15 countries. The norms that RIN supports can be seen in its official statements. For example, in the RIN’s first statement, which was issued in January 2012, it emphasises the importance of “fair, reasonable, and non-discriminatory” as the norms that should be advanced in the region (ERIA RIN, 2012a, p. 18). However, although RIN has issued six statements, only the first statement explicitly uses the word ‘norm’. The following statements did not explicitly use the word ‘norm’. Nevertheless, the ideas of regional economic and trade support are still mentioned as follows:

- Infrastructure connection (ERIA RIN, 2015, p. 4)
- People-to-people (ERIA RIN, 2012b, p. 2)
- People-oriented, People-Centred (ERIA RIN, 2017, p. 3)

The norms and ideas of regional connectivity are used widely throughout the ERIA’s work. These are further translated into policy recommendations and ‘cascaded’ through research studies and research-related activities, a process that will be discussed more in the latter part of this chapter.

6.2.2.2.2 IDE-JETRO

IDE-JETRO provides intellectuals with a space to construct both institutional and professional connections. Professional connections are constructed through the support of field-research. At the same time, IDE-JETRO also facilitates institutional connections through its research networks, comprised of three schemes, including:

- The Research Networks and Partnership / Joint Organised Events (Symposium, Seminars)
• The Visiting Research Fellow Programme / Other Programmes of Acceptance
• The Research Fellows Sent Abroad

These schemes are managed by different departments of IDE-JETRO. The first scheme is managed by the Institutional Co-operation and Networking Division, the second scheme is managed by the International Exchange and Training Department, and the third scheme is managed by the Research Personnel Division. This demonstrates that IDE-JETRO has mechanisms that can support both professional and institutional levels.

The norms and ideas related to Southeast Asian transport development can be determined from IDE-JETRO’s research seminars and networks. For example, the policy recommendation seminar, “Logistics Cost in Lao PDR”, which was jointly organised by IDE-JETRO and the National Institute of Economic Research (NIER, Lao PDR), presented many ideas and norms that could help the Laos government to achieve the regional transport development objectives, such as logistic conditions (IDE-JETRO, 2017) and road improvements (Ishida, 2017). At the seminar, the norms and ideas regarding road improvements were the main supporting factors that could facilitate an increase in economic activities and living standards for the local people (IDE-JETRO, 2017, p. 36).

6.2.2.2.3 ADBI

ADBI also has institutional networks, such as the Asian Think Tanks Secretariat (hereafter, Think-Asia), which is an initiative of ADBI and the Think Tanks and Civil Society Programme (TTCSP). One of the research themes that Think-Asia focuses on is infrastructure development. ADBI recognises infrastructure development as one of the main priorities for regional co-operation as it facilitates regional connectivity. However, unlike the norms that the ERIA and IDE-JETRO emphasise, ADBI focuses primarily on financial issues.

Think-Asia helps its member institutes to conduct a significant amount of research that seeks to provide policy recommendations to Southeast Asian governments. Think-Asia’s research focuses on some ideas and norms related to regional transport development, such as connectivity, transport infrastructure
development, sustainable infrastructure, and financing infrastructure (Bhattacharyay, et al., 2012; Rillo & Ali, 2017). The most significant regional financial issues proposed by Think-Asia evolved into the question of how the region could find sufficient financial sources to support such development. Accordingly, ADBI collaborates with other Asian think tanks and IROs to conduct research in an effort to determine ways that each country, and the region as a whole, can implement appropriate solutions.

ADBI also has institutional connections with various institutes, such as the Asian Development Bank (ADB) and the Japan Bank for International Co-operation (JBIC). ADBI established research connections with ADB and JBIC to further study how Southeast Asia should develop its infrastructure and to seek financial support for the facilitation of its construction. They released three important publications that outline their recommendations for Southeast Asia, including Infrastructure for Seamless Asia (ADB & ADBI, 2009), Connecting South Asia and Southeast Asia (ADBI, 2015), and Connecting East Asia: A New Framework for Infrastructure (ADB & JBIC, 2016). These studies emphasise the importance of PPP, as they argue that PPP can support regional infrastructure facilities and that it is a fundamental element of infrastructure investment (ADB & ADBI, 2009, p. 159; ADBI, 2015, Ch. 1).

Hitherto, this chapter has introduced norm entrepreneurs and how they initiate the ideas and norms related to regional transport development. It then studied the relevant actors and the ideas or norms proposed by intellectuals and organisations through document analysis and field interviews. The results found that the ideas and norms regarding Southeast Asian regional transport development pertain to five main issues, as follows:

1. The ideas of infrastructure development are emphasised as the ERIA, IDE-JETRO, and ADBI focus much of their work on supporting infrastructure development, whilst maintaining the notion of sustainable development within their framework (Bhattacharyay, et al., 2012; ERIA RIN, 2012b; Rillo & Ali, 2017; ERIA, 2010a, 2015a). Additionally, the ERIA, IDE-JETRO and ADBI also focus on financial issues, particularly ADBI (ADB & ADB, 2009; ADBI, 2015; ADBI & JBIC, 2005; ERIA, 2010a, 2015a; IDE-JETRO, 2017; Zen, 2014). In doing so, ADBI emphasises PPP as a sustainable way to
facilitate regional development through collaboration between public and private sectors (ADB & ADBI, 2009; ADBI, 2015; ADBI & JBIC, 2016).

2. The spatial and connectivity norms are based on the ideas of the movement of goods, services and people, including globalisation, seamlessness, connectivity, mobilisation, and common infrastructure (ADB & ADBI, 2009; ERIA, 2010a, 2015a; Ishida, 2012). These norms play a significant role in the perception of how the movement of goods, services, and people should be structured by focusing on the concept of connection without any barriers (or ‘seamless’ connection) as facilitated by the power of economic globalisation (ADB & ADBI, 2009). The ERIA’s CADP is an example of how the ERIA frames regional transport development schemes by recommending that the region should link together through the development of hard infrastructure, whilst synchronising and improving soft infrastructure (ERIA, 2010a, 2015).

3. The norms of economic activities are also significant elements that help regional transport development as these norms establish common practices based on how the region should think of its objectives. For example, transport development should support economic growth (ERIA, 2015, p. 21), narrow the economic and development gaps (ERIA, 2015, p. 1), enhance regional integration and liberalisation, increase trade facilitation and competitiveness, and open the markets (ASEAN Coordinating Council, 2011). These fundamental concepts of the liberal economic market are also seen in the ideas presented by the ERIA’s intellectuals who support economic globalisation. Nevertheless, Chapter 3 has pointed out that unlike other hegemons, while Japan does play a leading intellectual role, it is not trying to construct an economic ‘regime’. Rather, the Japanese government is seeking a leading role in the region through contribution of its intellectual power. Thereby, the work of the MOFA, METI, MOF, JICA, ERIA, IDE-JETRO and ADBI help the Japanese government to construct practical knowledge, which is focused on practical recommendations rather than the construction of economic or political regimes.

4. The norms of knowledge sharing help to maintain the existing knowledge of IROs and cascade it to other agents in the region (ADB & ADBI, 2009, p. 123; ADBI, 2015, p. 5; ERIA, 2015, p. 69). This further helps the ERIA, IDE-
JETRO and ADBI to cascade their practical knowledge to other receivers. It also establishes the value of knowledge, which justifies the expertise of the ERIA, IDE-JETRO and ADBI because it highlights the intellectual power of research-based recommendations.

5. Finally, *environmental protection* and *sustainable development* norms are also important because, apart from economic development, these norms encourage the region to take environmental issues seriously (ADB & ADBI, 2009, p. 22; ERIA, 2015, p. 60).

The next two sections will elaborate further on how the ERIA, IDE-JETRO and ADBI have cascaded their ideas and norms through publications and research-related activities.

### 6.3 Norms Cascade

As the Japanese government supports the ERIA, IDE-JETRO and ADBI to conduct research on ASEAN connectivity, it is important to examine how regional organisations receive the practical knowledge that is embedded in the norms related to regional transport. Norms cascade is the process by which ideas and norms are disseminated through various channels and platforms. Prior to the first MPAC in 2010, there was no masterplan to guide how Southeast Asian regional transport should be. This emphasises the role of IROs in establishing regional transport development norms by which regional strategies are formed.

The ERIA, ADBI and IDE-JETRO cascade the norms of regional transport development in similar ways. They utilise mechanisms that allow the norms to be presented to other countries. Such mechanisms include:

- **Research and Publication**: Research and publications are the most important methods utilised by IROs to disseminate their ideas. Research findings, arguments, theories, and policy recommendations are proposed in an academic fashion, further justifying their credibility.
• **Training and Capacity-Building Programmes:** Two more fundamental and influential methods of disseminating ideas are training and capacity-building programmes. Through such programmes, participants obtain significant information by engaging in research-related activities, such as seminars, conferences, and workshops.

This section will analyse how the research and publications of the ERIA, IDE-JETRO and ADBI disseminate the norms of regional transport development. It endeavours to identify the norms in the publications by first examining the ideas and norms related to regional transport. It also looks at how research and publications are disseminated, used, and interpreted. This will help us to understand how the IROs, as norm entrepreneurs, construct the practical knowledge that is embedded within those norms.

6.3.1 Research and Publication

Research is the most important factor, as it guides the other relevant activities, including publications, seminars, conferences, and capacity-building programmes. Research and publications play their role not only in providing policy recommendations, but also in outlining the narrative of how the region should be developed. Research and publications also influence the research of others, as intellectuals around the world conduct research using the Internet as a main resource to obtain information such as news, analyses, and academic peer-reviewed journals. The Internet significantly supports the current academic world with many free resources that are easily accessible. Intellectuals can access full research articles, reports, and executive summaries for free and without leaving home. Many organisations have started to post their research on their websites, which facilitates access on a global level.

The research conducted by the ERIA, IDE-JETRO and ADBI are also embedded with ideas and norms. Chapter 3 pointed out that what the ERIA, IDE-JETRO and ADBI have constructed and disseminated should be called ‘practical knowledge’. This ‘practical knowledge’ is a set of explanations of practical issues that serve as a guide to other countries or organisations. In this section, we will analyse how research leads to an understanding of regional transport development.
6.3.1.1 ERIA

For the ERIA, the research that has the most significant impact on ASEAN’s regional transport development is CADP. As explained in Chapter 5, CADP recommends how the region should develop its infrastructure and regulations, focusing on basic infrastructure development, regional transport systems, and industries. CADP anticipated that coordinated development would improve economic development in both ASEAN and East Asia (ERIA, 2015, p. 1). It emphasises that the development of regional transport networks in Southeast Asia is crucial because they will help to construct and improve the regional production network (ERIA, 2015, p. 8). CADP states that if the regional transport system is constructed comprehensively, it could help to develop the region’s economies, reduce the economic gap, and increase the region’s global competitiveness (ERIA, 2015, p. 8.). Additionally, if the Southeast Asian transport network can link with other regions, such as South Asia, it will undoubtedly boost the region’s economy. The regional impacts of CADP will be analysed in Section 6.4.1.

The ERIA separates its transport-related research themes into two subcategories. The first is ‘connectivity’ and the second is ‘infrastructure’. Some ideas and norms related to regional connectivity can be seen in various publications, such as:

1. Resilience connectivity (Shibasaki et al., 2018)
3. Financing connectivity (Zen & Regan, 2014)

When we compare a larger number of studies, however, it appears there are significant differences between the research that focuses on connectivity and that which focuses on infrastructure. The former has approximately 20 research studies, whilst the latter has around 58 research studies. Additionally, not every study within these two themes is related to Southeast Asia; instead, some studies compare Southeast Asia to Africa or to South Asia, such as:

1. Asia Africa Growth Corridor: Development Co-operation and Connectivity in the Indo-Pacific (Prakash, 2018b)
2. ASEM Connectivity Inventory (Okano-Heijmans et al., 2018)

4. Asia Africa Growth Corridor: Partnership for Sustainable and Innovative Development (This research is a collaboration between ERIA, IDE-JETRO and RIS.)

Although the ERIA has many research themes and while there are more than 200 studies on ASEAN, the research that receives significant interest from the ERIA is CADP. This can easily be seen from the ERIA’s official website, where there is a specific banner dedicated to CADP. Additionally, CADP has been constantly mentioned by the ERIA in its statements and publications as related to its research on ASEAN Connectivity. Section 6.4.1 will further explore CADP’s ideas and impacts.

6.3.1.2 IDE-JETRO

IDE-JETRO anticipates that its research would help the Japanese government to form its foreign policies with other countries and its policies concerning regional co-operation. The research conducted by this institute is, therefore, for both academic and public purposes.

Compared to the ERIA’s CADP, IDE-JETRO does not have any particular research that is primarily focused on Southeast Asian transport development. Instead, IDE-JETRO’s most significant contribution to Southeast Asian transport development is its geographical simulation model called ‘IDE/ERIA-GSM’, developed by Kumagai Satoru and staff members of the ERIA (Kumagai, 2010; Kumagai & Isono, 2011; Kumagai et al., 2013). The model is “designed to predict the effects of the regional economic integration, especially the development of transport, infrastructure and reduction in border costs” (Kumagai et al., 2008, p. 361). The IDE/ERIA-GSM model was utilised by the ASEAN Secretariat to support the drafting of the ERIA’s CADP (ERIA, 2015a, pp. 183-184) and to support research on physical connectivity and infrastructure development between ASEAN and other regions. Such studies include The Comprehensive Asia Development Plan (2010a) and ASEAN-India Connectivity: The Comprehensive Asia Development Plan, Phase II (Kimura & Umezaki, 2011).
IDE-JETRO’s work on ASEAN Connectivity focuses mainly on the GMS area. As mentioned in the section about professional connections, Ishida and other researchers have contributed greatly to the studies of economic corridors and trade and investment in the GMS area. Some examples of IDE-JETRO’s publications that focus on the GMS are:

1. GMS Economic Co-operation and Its Impact on CLMV Development (Ishida, 2008)
2. Economic Impacts of the Economic Corridor Development in the Mekong Region (Isono, 2010)
3. Intra- and Inter-City Connectivity in the Mekong Region (Ishida, 2011)
4. Emerging Economic Corridors in the Mekong Region (Ishida, 2012)
5. Five Triangle Areas in the Greater Mekong Subregion (Ishida, 2013a)

The focus of these publications is primarily on GMS economic corridors. Unlike the ERIA’s research, which is focused on a broader and more comprehensive picture of how Southeast Asia should link with other regions by developing its infrastructure, IDE-JETRO’s research focuses more on specific and technical issues.

6.3.1.3 ADBI

While the ERIA pays more attention to building an understanding of regional development through CADP, ADBI seems to be more specifically interested in the linkages between South and Southeast Asia. This can be seen in the titles of two important publications from ADBI, which are:

1. Connecting South Asia and Southeast Asia (ADB, 2015)
2. Connecting Asia: Infrastructure for Integrating South and Southeast Asia (Plummer, et al., 2016a).

ADBI’s work emphasises that development of hard and soft regional transport infrastructure will help both South and Southeast Asia to benefit from the resulting economic liberalisation, connectivity, and other regional changes (Plummer et al., 2016b, p. 1).
As previously mentioned, South Asia seems to garner noticeable attention from both the ERIA and ADBI. The ERIA’s CADP discusses the potential opportunities that the ‘extended Mekong’ area could access if it were to expand its regional transport networks from Southeast Asia to South Asia. At the same time, ADBI’s research also mentions the potential opportunities for the two regions and how to link them.

### 6.3.2 Training and Capacity-Building Programmes

Apart from the dissemination of research results through publication, researchers can also disseminate their research results, ideas, and policy recommendations through workshops, seminars, conferences, or capacity-building programmes. These are also vital channels that the ERIA, IDE-JETRO and ADBI use for practical application of their research results in various countries and organisations. Capacity-building programmes provide opportunities for intellectuals and officials to meet and discuss issues, further expanding their professional connections and building their networks. Professional connections between intellectuals and officials are formed both through their jobs and through the linkages inherent in various settings. Such connections facilitate the norms cascade because they bring people together who will often invite other people from the same field to work together.

#### 6.3.2.1 ERIA

The ERIA conducts many research-related activities, including the provision of training and capacity-building programmes. An interviewee from the ERIA (Interviewee No.6) recognised the importance of the training and capacity-building programmes by explaining that the training topics are generally requested or suggested by least developed countries, such as Cambodia, Laos, or Myanmar.73 ‘Interviewee No.6’ states that these programmes help the participants to learn from the research results and exposes them to new knowledge. Moreover, these activities also help the participants to make and/or broaden their professional connections.74

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73 Interview, a staff of ERIA, Tokyo, Japan, 22 March 2016.
74 Interview, a staff of ERIA, Tokyo, Japan, 22 March 2016.
This reflects that capacity-building programmes and workshops help researchers not only to cascade ideas, but also to expand connections.

The ERIA also builds connections between East Asian think tanks, particularly through the RIN, as mentioned previously (ERIA, 2019). The RIN helps the ERIA to share the research themes and activities of other think tanks. The ERIA hopes this will help it to establish a broader understanding of the research issues and trends prevalent in Southeast Asia so that the ERIA can ensure that its research projects cover those topics.

### 6.3.2.2 IDE-JETRO

IDE-JETRO offers training programmes through the ‘IDE Advanced School’ (IDEAS). This school is a channel through which IDE-JETRO aims to disseminate knowledge of development-related issues, both to Japanese and non-Japanese officials and scholars. IDEAS anticipates that participants from abroad will already have a base knowledge of development and Japan’s ODA. Meanwhile, IDEAS also aims to improve Japanese officials’ knowledge of international development. However, the courses that IDEAS offers are quite broad, focusing on international trade, investment, finance, development studies, energy, environment, Japanese industries, and current issues on development (IDE-JETRO, 2017). In this respect, IDEAS’s training programmes do not pay specific attention to regional transport development. The reason might be that IDE-JETRO’s research themes focus on development studies and economics, and that the institute aims to study a wide range of issues related to regional transport development.

### 6.3.2.3 ADBI

ADBI’s capacity-building programmes are focused principally on disseminating the knowledge acquired from its research findings. The Institute’s advisory committee decides the annual research themes, and thereby the topics for the capacity building programmes. The main target group for these programmes is officials from Asian countries. The Institute expects to teach the knowledge that participants from varying countries ‘should know’ and to encourage them to bring that knowledge back to their home countries.75 However, in the interview with a staff

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75 Interview, a staff of ERIA, Tokyo, Japan, 22 March 2016.
member of the ASEAN Secretariat (Interviewee No.11) regarding the effectiveness and intellectual contribution of ADBI’s capacity-building programmes, ‘Interviewee No.11’ stated that the programmes were not able to help the work of the ASEAN Secretariat, as the programmes were aimed to respond to the objectives of the ERIA more so than those of the ASEAN Secretariat.76 From this explanation, the argument can be made that there are some obstacles in the norms cascade, particularly for ADBI. Such obstacles will be explained further in Section 6.3.3.

As ADBI’s research themes and topics focus on macro-economics, ADBI seeks to study macro-issues, or regional issues. Compared to IDE-JETRO’s research focus on very specific issues, ADBI instead concentrates on regional financial matters, regional connectivity, PPP, financing, and SMEs. When I interviewed a researcher from ISEAS (Interviewee No.12) and a Thai university lecturer (Interviewee No.18) about their experiences conducting research with ADBI, they expressed that ADBI’s research themes are not consistent and have no real long-term direction as they are dependent on the Dean’s interests during that given period.77 However, these opinions should be studied further, as more time is required to determine the trends and dynamics of the organisation so that we can understand the changing pattern of research trends and themes.

Apart from research and publications, ADBI’s capacity-building programmes also play important role in cascading the norms and ideas of international transport development within Southeast Asia. ADBI capacity-building programmes offer courses for member country’s officials that relate to their research projects. The advisory council chooses the topics of the capacity-building programmes each year.

76 Interview, a staff of ASEAN Secretariat, Jakarta, Indonesia, 13 April 2013.
77 Interview, a staff of ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute, Singapore, 18 April 2016; a staff of a Thai University, Bangkok, 13 May 2016.
Table 9: Ranking of ERIA, IDE-JETRO and ADBI ranked by the Think Tanks and Civil Societies Programme (TTCSP) at the University of Pennsylvania

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>ERIA</th>
<th>IDE-JETRO</th>
<th>ADBI</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Top Think Tanks World Wide (Non-US)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Top Think Tanks World Wide (US and Non-US)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Top Think Tanks in China, India, Japan, and the Republic of Korea</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Top Think Tanks in Southeast Asia and the Pacific</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Top International Economic Policy Think Tanks (Top International Economics Think Tanks)</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Top International Development Think Tanks</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Best Think Tanks Network</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Best Transdisciplinary Research Think Tank</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Best Government Affiliated Think Tanks</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
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<tr>
<td>Best Managed Think Tanks</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Best New Idea or Paradigm Developed by a Think Tank</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Best Think Tank Conference</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Source:** Accumulated from the TTCSP Global Go To Think Tank Index Reports, 2015, 2014, 2013, 2012, 2011, 2010
6.3.3 Problems of IROs’ Norms Cascade

While the general process of the norms cascade has been outlined, there are some points that should be addressed from my studies and analyses. Although Finnemore and Sikkink’s norm life cycle framework (1998) states that the norms cascade process is a mechanism that norm entrepreneurs use to cascade their ideas and norms, there are three main problems, as demonstrated in the context of this research, that slow down the norms cascade process. These include (1) image, (2) location, and (3) economic and social factors.

(1) Image: Although the ERIA gains recognition from the ASEAN Secretariat, from an intellectual’s perspective, the work of the ERIA might not have a good impact on regional transport development because it may not be translated into policy in each country due to the perceptions of Southeast Asian researchers and officials. As Chapter 5 has stated, intellectuals and officials in both Japan and Southeast Asian countries see the ERIA as an organisation that is strongly influenced by Japan. This perception is attributed to Japan’s financial support and assignment of staff to the ERIA. In contrast to the way most Japanese staff members of the ERIA see themselves, a local staff of the ERIA expressed some straightforward comments regarding the role of the Japanese government and Japanese staff members in the ERIA. Interviewee No.9 showed concern about the Japanese officials’ influence on the decision-making process in the ERIA 78. ‘Interviewee No.9’ further reflected that as the ERIA was established for ASEAN and East Asia, all member countries should be involved in decision-making processes, whether administrative matters or research activities 79.

(2) Location: The ERIA is based in Jakarta, which is far from other member countries, and there are no other offices or facilitators who could work as a liaison between the ERIA and the governments of other countries. In other words, there is a missing link between the governments and the

78 Interview, a staff of ERIA, Jakarta, Indonesia, 5 April 2016.
79 Interview, a staff of ERIA, Jakarta, Indonesia, 5 April 2016.
ERIA. This assertion aligns with an observation from a staff member of the University of Indonesia who reflected that the lack of ERIA ‘country offices’ in other countries might cause problems for the ERIA, as it will be difficult to communicate and collaborate from such a distance.\(^{80}\)

The locations of IDE-JETRO and ADBI are also obstacles as they are both located in Japan. Additionally, the meetings, conferences, workshops, and capacity-building programmes are generally organised in Japan. This limits the opportunities for Southeast Asian researchers and officials to participate in such research related activities unless they are organised in collaboration with organisations outside of Japan.

(3) Economic and Social Factors: From my observation and research experience, there are two more obstacles that slow down the norms cascade process: language and financial barriers. Generally, the research conducted by the ERIA, IDE-JETRO and ADBI is either in English or Japanese. For the ERIA and ADBI, all of their research is in English, however IDE-JETRO’s research is published in both English and Japanese. This limits the reach of the research and the subsequent knowledge it seeks to disseminate if language barriers block the target audience from being able to access it. Moreover, if readers are not affluent, it is unlikely that they will have access the Internet or can afford the English publication, further highlighting the complexity between language barriers and financial constraints. With this in mind, those who are most likely to be able to access the research are those who can read English. It can be assumed that they were able to afford a good education and therefore had comparatively better opportunities to study and practice English; that they work with government agencies and know about the ERIA, IDE-JETRO and ADBI; or that they have had opportunities to visit or join research-related activities organised by those three IROs.

\(^{80}\) Interview, a staff of ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute, Singapore, 18 April 2016.
6.4 **Norms Internalisation**

One of the main questions of this study is ‘how are the norms internalised in Southeast Asian domestic and regional transport development schemes?’ As shown in the previous section, the norms of regional transport development are constructed within and cascaded through various IRO mechanisms. This section will analyse how the ideas and norms of the ERIA, IDE-JETRO and ADBI are internalised in the actual policy outcomes.

Analysing the internalisation of norms and ideas is difficult because the minutes of every official meeting or policy formulation process are not publicly accessible. During my field research, I asked various interviewees how they became involved in the policy-making process or what they observed from any related activities; however, they did not provide detailed information. Thereby, the analysis will focus on the norms and ideas that are stated in the policy outcomes instead of focusing on the process of how the ideas and norms are proposed or discussed in meetings and workshops.

The Think Tanks and Civil Societies Programme of the University of Pennsylvania (TTCSP) ranks the impact of the research conducted by the ERIA, IDE-JETRO and ADBI as amongst that of the most active and influential research organisations in East Asia. Their research activities on development and other issues in Southeast Asia are recognised and valued amongst many scholars and policymakers (see Table 9). The TTCSP ranked the think tanks based on various criteria, including their overall quality and leadership commitment, the reputation of the staff members, the reputation of the research and analyses, the ability to recruit and retain elite scholars and analysts, academic performance, the number and reach of its publications, the impacts of its policy recommendations, and the reputation with policymakers (McGann, 2017). The TTCSP study reflects that think tanks and IROs can contribute to the world through their intellectual and policy-related impacts. However, these studies did not acknowledge the ‘process’, or, as Finnemore and Sikkink termed it, ‘cascade’.

Chapter 2 explained that to understand the transformation of the regional transport system, it is vital to recognise how ideas and norms are internalised. The ideas of regional transport proposed by IROs are not that of an economic regime, but rather of the practical knowledge that Southeast Asian countries should follow. A staff member of MIER (Interviewee No.15) reiterated this by explaining that the
ERIA, IDE-JETRO and ADBI are not cascading regimes; instead, they provide a ‘template’ for other countries or organisations to follow.\textsuperscript{81} This section will, thereby, elaborate on the process of how norms and ideas related to regional transport development are cascaded, as well as their impacts.

\textit{6.4.1 ERIA}

In the case of the ERIA, the personal and professional connections between intellectuals and officials formed through research-related activities have provided opportunities for the ERIA to display its research publicly. For example, a staff member of the ERIA (Interviewee No.1) highlighted that from the interviewee’s experience, ‘Interviewee No.1’ had witnessed METI and MOFA requesting staff members of IDE-JETRO to give information, recommendations, and opinions on certain countries or situations.\textsuperscript{82} Additionally, from the perspective of an ERIA researcher (Interviewee No.6), the ERIA contributes knowledge and opinions to the policy-making process in Japan.\textsuperscript{83} The perception, then, of Japan’s intellectual contributions is linked to its foreign policy. A researcher from the ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute (ISEAS) (Interviewee No.12) called the ERIA a mechanism of Japan’s ‘soft diplomacy’.\textsuperscript{84} This opinion was further supported by an ERIA staff member (Interviewee No.6) who stated that the ERIA is Japan’s attempt to spread its ‘soft power’.\textsuperscript{85} From their opinions, we can see that intellectuals in Southeast Asia are aware of Japan’s engagement in ASEAN Connectivity development. Moreover, they acknowledge that the engagement is economically and politically motivated.

The research and publications of the ERIA also impact the development of regional transport. For example, the ERIA published CADP as a flagship publication to help the region strategies its development of regional transport networks, particularly in mainland Southeast Asia. According to CADP, there is one main area and two regional initiatives that the region should focus on, which are (1) ‘the extended Mekong’ area; (2) the Brunei-Indonesia-Malaysia-Philippine – East

\textsuperscript{81} Interview, a staff of MIER, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, 26 April 2016.
\textsuperscript{82} Interview, a staff of IDE-JETRO, Chiba, Japan, 9 February 2016.
\textsuperscript{83} Interview, a staff of ERIA, Tokyo, Japan, 22 March 2016.
\textsuperscript{84} Interview, a staff of ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute (1), Singapore, 18 April 2016.
\textsuperscript{85} Interview, a staff of ERIA, Tokyo, Japan, 22 March 2016.
ASEAN Growth Area (BIMP-EAGA); and (3) the Indonesia-Malaysia-Thailand Growth Triangle (IMT-GT) (ERIA, 2015, pp. 67-82).

This perception of how the region should be built by focusing on one area and two cooperative initiatives is crucial. First is that CADP separates the ‘extended Mekong’ in order to focus on the linkages this area can establish with other regions, such as South Asia. Moreover, CADP does not pay attention to the GMS Programme as it is widely perceived within the region as an organisation that is influenced by the Japanese government (Charoensri, 2008, 2010a, 2010b, 2013; Verbiest, 2013; Yamamoto, 2006). Furthermore, although CADP suggests that the extended Mekong area should link to South Asia, it does not recommend a specific linkage between Southeast Asia and the South of China. This may be due to both geographical constraints and that the linkage would only benefit China, leaving Japan and South Korea without any economic gain from the development. Another factor could be that Japan’s economic and political relations with India are more amicable than those with China. Thereby, the recommendations in the ERIA’s CADP focus not only on linking the region, but also on how Japan could benefit from linking its production networks to South Asia. We will examine how IDE-JETRO and ADBI expressed interest in South Asia later in this section.

Meanwhile, the BIMP-EAGA and IMT-GT will support the linkages within Southeast Asian maritime production networks. This helps Southeast Asian governments consider both how to construct a missing link and how to improve the existing networks between maritime and mainland Southeast Asia (ERIA, 2015, pp. 90-91).

The ‘extended Mekong’ area receives more widespread attention than does the BIMP-EAGA and IMT-GT. The policy recommendations in CADP regarding which projects should be initiated in the extended Mekong area is far higher than that of the BIMP-EAGA and IMT-GT. Whilst CADP recommended 452 projects in the extended Mekong area, the BIMP-EAGA recommended 190 projects and IMT-GT recommended only 61 projects (ERIA, 2015, p. 67). This illustrates how important the ERIA perceives the region, reflecting further that the ERIA pays more attention to mainland Southeast Asia because it has a high number of Japanese production factories and because there are existing construction projects and mechanisms that can support CADP. The existing construction projects include the East-West Economic Corridors (EWEC), the North-South Economic Corridor (NSEC), and the
Southern Economic Corridor (SEC), under the supervision of the GMS Programme (see Chapter 4 and 5). Moreover, there is high potential within the extended Mekong area to link Southeast Asia with South Asia via the ‘Mekong-India Economic Corridor’ (MIEC) (ERIA, 2015, p. 75; Nishataneja, 2014) (see Figure 14).

**Figure 14:** The International Transport System in Mainland Southeast Asia

![Image](image.png)

Source: ERIA (2015, p. 75)

Upon closer examination, the norms related to regional transport are significantly embedded in the CADP. It emphasises the concepts of connectivity (ERIA, 2015, pp. 7-30), liberalisation (ERIA, 2015, p. 76), facilitation (ERIA, 2015, p. 76), and globalisation (ERIA, 2015, p. 20) as those that can help us to imagine a ‘free-er’ and more connected region.

The ASEAN Secretariat’s recognition of the ERIA’s research contributions strengthens the legitimacy of their impact on the development of regional transport. Before the MPAC was first issued in 2010, the ASEAN Secretariat started to recognise the importance of the ERIA as a think tank that provides information and policy recommendations. In 2009, the ASEAN Secretariat mentioned that the ERIA was expected to begin work with a to-be-established ASEAN High Task Level Task Force (HLTF) on ASEAN Connectivity (ERIA, 2009). One year after that, when ASEAN’s MPAC was launched, the Secretariat stated:
We also appreciated the intellectual contribution of the Economic Research Institute for ASEAN and East Asia (ERIA) as well as the Asian Development Bank and UNESCAP in supporting the completion of the ASEAN Connectivity Master Plan [sic]. (ERIA, 2010b)

Following the introduction of the MPAC to the region, the ERIA initiated its intellectual contributions. For example, in 2011 the ERIA submitted a set of recommendations to the 19th ASEAN Summit in Bali, Indonesia, in support of ASEAN Connectivity (ERIA, 2011). In 2016 the ERIA presented the ‘CADP 2.0’ – the second version of the CADP that was first issued in 2010 – in an effort to coordinate the existing frameworks, including the ‘Phnom Penh Initiatives for Narrowing Development Gap’, the ‘Myanmar Comprehensive Development Vision’, and the ASEAN Connectivity Plan (ERIA, 2015b). Another example is from 2017, when, after two years of CADP 2.0, the ASEAN Secretariat recognised the intellectual contribution of the ERIA to the ‘ASEAN Connectivity 2025’ strategy (ERIA, 2017). These examples demonstrate how the ASEAN Secretariat appreciates the intellectual contribution of the ERIA. In fact, the ERIA has contributed policy recommendations for various issues, but their top priority seems to be regional transport development, as developed by the CADP.

The ERIA emphasises that the research they conduct should provide policy recommendations that would support the EAC, as the ASEAN Secretariat, intellectuals, and member countries’ officials welcome such results. We have seen the ASEAN Secretariat’s recognition of the ERIA above. Additionally, regional member countries also anticipate that the ERIA will help to facilitate economic development and regionalism. For example, during the visit of Ongart Klampaiboon, the Thai Minister to the Prime Minister’s Office, to the head office of the ERIA in 2010, he stated that the ERIA’s research would be translated in order to enhance Thai economic and social development. He asserted that collaboration between the ERIA and TDRI would help Thailand to obtain information about energy, transport, and logistics, which are three main research areas of the ERIA. This would help TDRI and Thailand to develop its social and economic strategies to further decrease development gaps (Asia News Monitor, 2010). This is just one example of how an
official from a regional member country anticipates utilizing the intellectual contributions of the ERIA.

Meanwhile, apart from official’s expectations, the recognition of the intellectual contribution of the ERIA and CADP to the development of regional transport can be witnessed in the utilisation and application of CADP on various occasions. The CADP is used because it provides a theoretical framework and economic formulation to evaluate the costs and benefits of development. For example, the ERIA utilised the CADP to help in the drafting process of the Brunei Action Plan (BAP) (2011-2015) – the action plan for transport development in Southeast Asia – and the ASEAN Transport Co-operation five-year plan (Umezaki, 2012, p. 2). Moreover, the High-Level Task Force (HLTF) invited the ERIA to help the ASEAN Secretariat draft the ASEAN MPAC in both 2010 and 2025. For the MPAC 2010, CADP was used and the resulting recommendations were integrated in ‘Chapter 2: Achievements of, and Challenges and Impediments to ASEAN Connectivity’ and ‘Chapter 3: Key Strategies for Enhanced ASEAN Connectivity’ (Umezaki, 2012, p. 2).

Furthermore, when the MPAC 2025 was being drafted, CADP 2.0 was incorporated into the working process to help ASEAN to see the current regional transport and development situations (ASEAN, 2016a, p. 46). This reflects how the ERIA has contributed its research results to official regional projects. The norms that CADP disseminated through the work of other regional projects include connectivity and facilitation of trade and services, focusing on the development of hard infrastructure and the improvement of soft infrastructure (ASEAN, 2016a; Umezaki, 2012).

Nevertheless, it is difficult to obtain information about the discussions that occur in the ASEAN Secretariat meetings and conferences on regional transport development. The interviewees did not elaborate on the meetings’ agenda, atmosphere, or the issues discussed. However, from the available published documents, it can be interpreted that the ERIA has provided CADP to many regional meetings on regional transport development.

A local staff member of the ERIA (Interviewee No.9) expressed concern about the Japanese influence in the ERIA. ‘Interviewee No.9’ reflected that the ERIA has been under very close supervision and guidance of the METI since its inauguration. The METI continuously assigns preferred persons to sit in the
administrative positions, furthering the influence of the Japanese government on the ERIA. 86 This concern shares similar characteristics with comments made by a staff member of ISEAS (Interviewee No.12), who sees the ERIA as a tool of the Japanese government. 87 ‘Interviewee No.12’ stated that the Japanese government assigns and supports the committee of the ERIA, hence, whenever the committee wants to propose something to EAS, it is very likely that other member countries will follow their recommendations as they view Japan as a good example, often due to their ‘expertise’. 88 The perceptions of the influential role Japan plays in the ERIA, in this respect, are that the Japanese government is utilising its financial contributions and the allocation of Japanese personnel to the ERIA to influence the research that seeks to make an impact on Southeast Asian development.

Having said that, a Thai university lecturer (Interviewee No.16) argued that although the ERIA works closely with ASEAN, scholars from ASEAN do not take the ERIA seriously because the ERIA’s policy recommendations are unable to be implemented. 89 ‘Interviewee No.16’ expressed that while the ERIA might contribute intellectually to ASEAN, ASEAN itself has no legal authority to implement policies within its member states. Thereby, the studies conducted by the ERIA may not be significantly influential. 90

Another important aspect of the ERIA’s work is capacity building programmes. The capacity building programmes aim to disseminate the knowledge gained from the research conducted by the ERIA. The primary participants in the programmes are officials from Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, and Vietnam. The ERIA anticipates that the participants will view the development of the region from the same perspective. However, a staff member of ISEAS (Interviewee No.12) observed the programmes and questioned if the participants could understand the content of the research. ‘Interviewee No.12’ also questioned if the participants would take the knowledge back to their home country, as ‘Interviewee No.12’ believes that they

86 Interview, a staff of ERIA, Jakarta, Indonesia, 5 April 2016.
87 Interview, a staff of ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute (1), Singapore, 18 April 2016.
88 Interview, a staff of ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute (1), Singapore, 18 April 2016.
89 Interview, a staff of ThUni, 13 May 2016.
90 Interview, a staff of ThUni, 13 May 2016.
may not apply the research as intended. The impact of the capacity-building programmes, thus, should be studied further in the future.

To conclude, the ERIA’s research results, particularly CADP, have significantly contributed to regional transport and infrastructure development. Not only are the research results translated into regional development policy, but capacity building also helps Japanese and Southeast Asian intellectuals to form both professional and institutional connections.

6.4.2 IDE-JETRO

Unlike the ERIA and ADBI, there is no flagship study on regional transport development produced by IDE-JETRO. This is because IDE-JETRO, as previously stated, focuses more on technical issues or challenges, and does not emphasise comprehensive regional development.

Additionally, the impact of IDE-JETRO’s studies on Southeast Asian transport development is not as explicit as that of the ERIA. IDE-JETRO’s studies pay attention to specific yet practical issues of regional transport development in Southeast Asia. As we have seen from the professional network section, the research conducted by Ishida Masami – a prominent researcher whose expertise is the GMS area – helped to form a network of intellectuals whose interest is mainland Southeast Asia. During interviews with intellectuals in Japan and Southeast Asia, some (Interviewees No.16, No.10, No.18) reflected that working with IDE-JETRO helped them to expand their research and academic networks.

Nevertheless, when we consider the number of publications on regional transport development, we can see that between 1970 and 2017, IDE-JETRO published 27 studies and reports on issues including geography (Fujita & Mori, 2005), the GMS area (Ishida, 2008, 2011, 2012), border industry (Kudo, 2007), and border economies (Ishida, 2013b). These studies focus on the dynamic of regional transport, the movement of people across the region, and how this phenomenon impacts regional development and integration. Furthermore, these studies are aimed

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91 Interview, a staff of ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute (1), Singapore, 18 April 2016.
92 Interview, a staff of the University of Indonesia, Jakarta, Indonesia, 6 April 2016.
93 Interview, a staff of ThUni, 3 May 2016; Interview, a staff of the University of Indonesia, Jakarta, Indonesia, 6 April 2016; Interview, a staff of ThUni, 13 May 2016.
to help JETRO and the Japanese government to obtain information and transform trends in the region, rather than providing a regional framework for regional transport development.

IDE-JETRO contributes its expertise to support regional transport development in many ways. For example, in 2012 IDE-JETRO and the ERIA organised a symposium titled ‘Toward Economic Integration in ASEAN and East Asia’ in Tokyo, emphasising the importance of comprehensive production networks in the region (ERIA, 2012). The ERIA expected the symposium to enhance the understanding of ASEAN Connectivity and the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) for Japanese officials, businessmen, and stakeholders (ERIA, 2012). This allows IDE-JETRO to disseminate knowledge to the public whilst working with other research institutes in the region.

Although IDE-JETRO’s researchers do not recognise a significant academic contribution to the Japanese government, a staff member of JETRO (Interviewee No.2) reflected that IDE-JETRO has contributed to policy formation related to Southeast Asian transport development. ‘Interviewee No.2’ explained that in July 2015 JETRO conducted research on development in Laos and was asked to provide policy recommendations to the Laos government. The research was first requested by the Laos Prime Minister who asked JETRO to conduct a study that would result in policy recommendations to further capital liberalisation (in the service industry), and to support local SMEs (JETRO, 2016, p. 18). The research culminated in two sets of policy recommendations. The first set was proposed by IDE-JETRO and the second set was proposed by JETRO. IDE-JETRO proposed industry-focused policy recommendations, including (1) decreasing logistic costs (both in expenditures and time) with neighbouring countries and in the facilitating procedures, (2) enhancing value chains, (3) closing the gap between laws and operations, and (4) improving the business environment to further attract Japanese companies that could potentially benefit Laos (JETRO, 2016, p. 18). For the second set of policy recommendations, JETRO focused on the overall improvement of the business environment, including (1) promoting liberalisation in the service industry, (2) reforming investment procedures to increase foreign direct investment (FDI), (3) nurturing Kaizen culture.

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94 Interview, a staff of IDE-JETRO, Chiba, Japan, 10 February 2016.
and the 5S\textsuperscript{95} while facilitating international mobility of engineers, and (4) utilising the cluster effect to strategise industrial locations (JETRO, 2016, p. 18). Here we can see that although IDE-JETRO does not have flagship research or publications focused on Southeast Asian transport development, IDE-JETRO staff members are still involved in making policy recommendations.

However, the question of how IDE-JETRO’s research has made an impact on development is still relevant. During my interviews with two IDE-JETRO researchers (Interviewees No.2 and No.3), they did not hesitate to articulate that they do refer to IDE-JETRO as a ‘think thank’.\textsuperscript{96} From their perspectives, a think tank is a research organisation that focuses on conducting policy-oriented research. Interviewees No.2 and No.3 expected that the research results will be proposed as policy recommendations to the policymakers of a particular country, or of an international organisation, for future implementation. IDE-JETRO, on the contrary, has remained firm in stating that the research they conduct is for ‘academic purposes’.\textsuperscript{97} However, it is unclear what the IDE-JETRO researchers are insinuating with this statement, as it is deniable that the process of setting research themes is independent or solely for academic purpose, as was stated several times by the interviewees from IDE-JETRO.

Nonetheless, conducting research ‘for academic purposes’ may simply be amorphous. Interviewee No.2 explained that upon completion of the research, policymakers and scholars – both in Japan and elsewhere in the world – could freely utilise, interpret, and translate the research for their own use.\textsuperscript{98} This implies that the researchers chose the research topics and that their objectives for choosing such topics may not be for the sake of policy-making, but rather based on the researchers’ interests.

\textsuperscript{95} ‘5S’ refers to ‘sort, straighten, shine, standardise and sustain the discipline.
\textsuperscript{96} Interview, a staff of IDE-JETRO, Chiba, Japan, 10 February 2016; Interview, a staff of IDE-JETRO, Chiba, Japan, 29 March 2016.
\textsuperscript{97} Interview, a staff of IDE-JETRO, Chiba, Japan, 10 February 2016; Interview, a staff of IDE-JETRO, Chiba, Japan, 29 March 2016.
\textsuperscript{98} Interview, a staff of IDE-JETRO, Chiba, Japan, 10 February 2016.
Moreover, Interviewee No.2 and No.8 from IDE-JETRO do not believe that they contribute to the policy-making process of the Japanese government.\textsuperscript{99} While they do believe that their research contributes to the decisions of policymakers to some extent, the research itself was not originally intended to support the policy-making process.\textsuperscript{100} IDE-JETRO recognises that they cannot measure the impact of their research, as a senior staff member of IDE-JETRO (Interviewee No.2) reflected:

Frankly speaking, we cannot measure our impact. So instead we try to find another indicator, such as a number of seminars, a number of downloads or research papers.\textsuperscript{101}

In summary, although IDE-JETRO staff members do not see the impact of their contributions to Japan’s policy-making process, their research and publications still help JETRO and the Japanese government to obtain information and conduct analyses that support the decision-making process.

\textit{6.4.3 ADBI}

Similarly, ADBI’s intellectual contributions are less than obvious, as ADBI also does not have a flagship study. ADBI’s contributions to the development of ASEAN Connectivity face limitations for various reasons, including its location and its engagement with Japanese scholars.

In terms of location, ADBI has only one main office in Tokyo and does not have any country offices. An interviewee from ADB (Interviewee No.20) asserted that ADBI does not work in close collaboration with ADB, nor does it contribute research to ADB, as the research conducted by ADBI is primarily academic and cannot be adapted into policy recommendations.\textsuperscript{102} I would argue that there are two reasons for this. The first reason is the location of the headquarters in Tokyo, as an

\textsuperscript{99} Interview, a staff of IDE-JETRO, Chiba, Japan, 10 February 2016; Interview, a staff of IDE-JETRO, Chiba, Japan, 29 March 2016.

\textsuperscript{100} Interview, a staff of IDE-JETRO, Chiba, Japan, 10 February 2016; Interview, a staff of IDE-JETRO, Chiba, Japan, 29 March 2016.

\textsuperscript{101} Interview, a staff of IDE-JETRO, Chiba, Japan, 10 February 2016.

\textsuperscript{102} Interview, a staff of ADB, Bangkok, Thailand, 23 May 2016.
interviewee from Singapore (Interviewee No.12) also commented that this obstructs opportunities for ADBI to communicate with other member countries.\textsuperscript{103} Moreover, one interviewee (Interviewee No.4) elaborated that the ADBI office is located in the Kasumigaseki building, which is shared by many Japanese governmental agencies, helping to facilitate communication, but limiting the participation of member countries.\textsuperscript{104} It is important to consider the location of the ADBI office as it could provide better access for member countries to communicate their needs and ask questions. But, as ADBI does not have any other offices outside of Tokyo, the communication between headquarters and member country governments is more challenging.

The second reason is the engagement of Japanese scholars in ADBI’s work, as ADBI claims that its management and research activities are not influenced by the Japanese government.\textsuperscript{105} The Japanese government’s contributions to ADBI are justified by a senior staff member of ADBI (Interviewee No.4) who explained that the Japanese government does not try to influence the work of ADBI, but rather benefits from supporting ADBI by building positive rapport in the international system.\textsuperscript{106} Unlike what we have witnessed in the ERIA and IDE-JETRO, Japanese scholars are comparatively less engaged in ADBI’s research activities. This means that ADBI has fewer opportunities to disseminate its ideas or engage in research-related activities.

\section*{6.5 Conclusion}
This chapter has applied Finnemore and Sikkink’s norm life cycle framework to analyse how the ERIA, IDE-JETRO, and ADBI construct and cascade ideas and norms related to regional transport development to Southeast Asia. Furthermore, this chapter was also dedicated to analysing the norm internalisation process with specific attention to how norms are cascaded through three IROs and how they are internalised in the work of the ASEAN Secretariat and other research units.

\textsuperscript{103} Interview, a staff of ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute, Singapore, 18 April 2016.
\textsuperscript{104} Interview, a staff of ADBI, Tokyo, Japan, 23 February 2016.
\textsuperscript{105} Interview, a staff of ADBI, Tokyo, Japan, 23 February 2016.
\textsuperscript{106} Interview, a staff of ADBI, Tokyo, Japan, 23 February 2016.
The norm entrepreneurs, including staff members of the ERIA, IDE-JETRO, ADBI, MOFA, METI, JICA, and JETRO, utilise their professional and institutional connections to make academic linkages, conduct research, and organise research-related activities. The publications, research results, dissemination methods, and capacity-building programmes were used as platforms to cascade the relevant ideas and norms.

We have seen that the ideas and norms related to regional transport development as constructed by the ERIA, IDE-JETRO, and ADBI are composed of (1) ideas of infrastructure development, (2) spatial and connectivity norms, (3) norms of economic activities, (4) norms of knowledge sharing, and (5) ideas and norms of environmental protection and sustainable development. These ideas and norms were introduced to ASEAN regional initiatives and transport development programmes. Judging by the policy outcomes, it can also be said that the ideas and norms were embedded into regional transport development schemes as such schemes included the IRO-contributed ideas and norms in their official statements.

In the following chapter, I will summarise the research results of this thesis and explain how the norm life cycle framework has helped us to understand the role of Japan as a RIH in Southeast Asia. Moreover, after having examined the role of the ERIA, IDE-JETRO, and ADBI, I will propose how the definition and characteristics of IROs should be reconsidered.
Chapter 7:
Conclusion

7.1 Review of the Research Result

This thesis began its journey asking three main questions: what are the motives of the Japanese government to support the development of international transport infrastructure in Southeast Asia; how has Japan, as ‘regional intellectual hegemon’ (RIH), constructed and cascaded the norms of regional development via research conducted by ‘international research organisations’ (IROs), which are the Economic Research Institute for ASEAN and East Asia (ERIA), the Institute of Developing Economies of Japan External Trade Organisation (IDE-JETRO), and the Asian Development Bank Institute (ADBI); and how are the norms internalised in domestic and regional transport development schemes in Southeast Asia? It also asks three sub-research questions: how has the Japanese government created mechanisms to support Southeast Asian regional transport development schemes; what are the ideas and norms of regional transport development that ERIA, IDE-JETRO, and ADBI constructed and why; and how were the ideas and norms of regional transport development constructed and cascaded through professional and institutional connections?

In this chapter, I will recapitulate my arguments and the implications of this thesis to the study of Japan-Southeast Asia relations, the role of international research organisation (IROs) in Southeast Asia, and Japan’s role as a Regional Intellectual Hegemon (RIH) in regional transport development. After that, I will point out the research contributions of this thesis. Finally, I will identify the limitations of the study and propose some recommendations for future research.

7.1.1 Japan and Regional Transport in Southeast Asia

For the first thesis question, I argued in Chapter 4 that there are three significant factors that motivate the Japanese government to support the development of international transport infrastructure in Southeast Asia. These three factors are the regional and international systems after 1945, the relocation of Japanese manufacturers in the mid-80s, and the location of Southeast Asia. The US-Japan
relations that formed after 1945, as well as the Plaza Accord of the mid-80s, triggered many conditions that led Japanese manufacturers to relocate to Southeast Asia. The relocation mainly targeted Thailand due to its location in the heart of mainland Southeast Asia. As this relationship developed, the Japanese government started to support many regional transport development schemes whilst the Thai government began to adjust its National Economic and Social Development Plan (NESDP) to better support and facilitate Japanese investors.

From the 1980s onwards, Southeast Asian regional transport development received a significant amount of support from the Japanese government. The collaboration between Japan and the Asian Development Bank (ADB) to initiate the Greater Mekong Subregion (GMS) Economic Co-operation Programme in 1992 was the starting point of Japan’s engagement in the development of economic corridors. Chapter 4 shows that amongst three economic corridors, including the East-West Economic Corridor (EWEC), Southern Economic Corridor (SEC), and North-South Economic Corridor (NSEC), the EWEC and SEC receive the most significant interest from the Japanese government as they can facilitate ships from the Indian Ocean to sail to Japan without encountering pirates in the Straits of Malacca. These particular corridors also help Thailand-based Japanese manufacturers to transport their products and goods to deep-seaports in Myanmar, Vietnam, and Cambodia. This helps Japan to establish comprehensive regional production networks in mainland Southeast Asia.

7.1.2 Japan as a Regional Intellectual Hegemon (RIH)

Chapters 5 and 6 answered the second and third thesis questions and sub-research questions. Chapter 5 paid attention to the details of Japan’s engagement in Southeast Asian transport development, particularly the ASEAN Master Plan of ASEAN Connectivity (MPAC). Chapter 5 also pointed out the mechanisms that the Japanese government initiated to support ASEAN connectivity, including the Mission of Japan to ASEAN and the Japanese Task Force on ASEAN Connectivity. I further explained the backgrounds of the ERIA, IDE-JETRO, and ADBI, as well as how they are involved in ASEAN connectivity.

In Chapter 6, I used Finnemore and Sikkink’s norm life cycle framework (1998) to analyse how the Japanese government agencies worked together to construct the knowledge of regional transport development in Southeast Asia. This
framework was chosen because it provides us with a systematic way to identify norm entrepreneurs in the norm emergence process and to analyse how the norms are cascaded whilst looking at the norm internalisation process. The framework also goes beyond realist and liberal approaches, and does not take the power of ideas and norms for granted. Chapters 3, 5, and 6 elaborated the three stages of the norm life cycle framework and how the framework incorporates both documentary research and in-depth interviews. Japan is a RIH in Southeast Asia because it uses financial strength to support the work of IROs in the construction and cascading of ideas and norms in the region.

There are many norm entrepreneurs in norm emergence process. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) initiates collaboration between other Japanese ministries to facilitate co-operative regional transport projects. For example, the MOFA works with the Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry (METI), the Ministry of Finance (MOF), the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport, and Tourism (MLIT), Japan International Co-operation Agency (JICA), and Japan External Trade Organisation (JETRO) to support ERIA, IDE-JETRO, and ADBI in their research on Southeast Asian transport development schemes. Chapter 6 shows that the ideas and norms presented in the research results and analyses provided by the three IROs have been internalised into ASEAN’s transport development scheme.

Prior to meeting with staff members of the MOFA and METI, I conducted in-depth interviews with staff members of IDE-JETRO and ADBI. These interviews provided me with an overview of the relationships their organisations have with the MOFA and METI. The interviews not only illuminated the institutional connections that IDE-JETRO and ADBI have with MOFA and METI, but also the professional connections between officials and intellectuals. After meeting with the MOFA and METI, the interviews with staff members of JICA and JETRO helped me to see the linkages between Japan’s ODA policy and the Japanese business community’s expectations regarding the allocation of ODA to support economic relations between Japan and Southeast Asia.

Interviews with ERIA staff members in Tokyo also showed that the professional connections between Japanese officials and intellectuals have helped the MOFA and METI to work with Japanese and Southeast Asian officials and the ASEAN Secretariat. They established formal and informal relationships between actors and institutions, which have helped the ERIA, IDE-JETRO, and ADBI to
conduct research with Southeast Asian researchers and to cascade ideas and norms through publications, meetings, conferences, workshops, and capacity-building programmes. For example, the president or head of the research department in each IRO collaborates with other organisations. Furthermore, Chapter 3 shows that the heads of IROs are essential because they control the IROs’ research agenda and direction. They can help IROs to form professional or institutional connections between countries or other organisations. Another example is of research connections, which are established by collaborative research, such as ERIA’s Research Institute Network (RIN), the research fellowship that IDE-JETRO offers.

After conducting field research in Japan, I travelled to Indonesia, Singapore, Malaysia, and Thailand (between April and June 2016) to collect data from officials, researchers, and NGOs. This research visit helped me to collect and triangulate the information that I obtained in Japan whilst gathering additional opinions from officials and researchers in Southeast Asia. What I learned from the research visit was not only new insights into the information and opinions I had already collected, but also the notions of how researchers who utilise ERIA, IDE-JETRO, and ADBI’s publications and analyses view the influential role of Japanese intellectuals. We have seen in Chapter 6 that the perception of Japanese intellectuals is both optimistic and pessimistic. These researchers, however, see the contributions of Japanese intellectuals differently. Some Southeast Asian researchers and officials see Japan’s intellectual contributions as dubious because of the economic interests that are embedded in policy recommendations. On the other hand, some Southeast Asian researchers and officials are aware of the influence but find it acceptable because both Japan and Southeast Asia receive benefits. In other words, it is a win-win situation. They reflected that, at least, the research, publications, and research-related activities have helped them to develop a better understanding of regional transport development.

Chapters 5 and 6 set out to answer the thesis’s third research question, showing that professional connections play an important role in the foreign policy-making process. As Chapter 2 pointed out, although the research conducted by intellectuals and think tanks are essential elements in the foreign policy-making process, existing literature has not deeply explored their level of involvement. For example, Yoshimatsu (2012) mentioned ERIA’s intellectual contributions toward East Asian development, however, Yoshimatsu did not study the role of intellectuals
in-depth. And while Severino (2014) mentioned the contributions of both the ERIA and JETRO, he did not examine IDE-JETRO. Thereby, I have expanded upon their observations by analysing how the IROs’ institutional and professional connections have helped Southeast Asian governments to develop common regional transport development schemes. We can expand our understanding of foreign policy-making further by looking deeper into professional and personal relations.

After applying Finnemore and Sikkink’s norm life cycle framework (1998), I showed in Chapter 6 that norm entrepreneurs in Japan, namely the ERIA, IDE-JETRO, and ADBI, have constructed five major ideas and norms, including (1) ideas of infrastructure development, (2) spatial and connectivity norms, (3) norms of economic activities, (4) norms of knowledge sharing, and (5) ideas and norms of environmental protection and sustainable development. These ideas and norms are stated in various publications, research, meetings, conferences, and other research-related activities. They are also cascaded and internalised in the work of Southeast Asian governments, and that of the ASEAN Secretariat, which can be seen through interviews, official documents, and regional transport development schemes.

7.1.3 The Role of IROs in Regional Politics

Another issue that this thesis explored is the role of IROs in Southeast Asia. As I mentioned in Chapters 2 and 3, although the existing literature on Japan’s foreign policy-making process acknowledges the engagement of think tanks, or the epistemic community, those studies have not elaborated the role of think tanks, or other research entities, in Japan’s foreign policy-making process.

The existing literature focused on the study of IROs helped me to answer the second and third thesis questions, which were analysed in Chapters 5 and 6. I found that the ERIA, IDE-JETRO, and ADBI’s research focuses on different themes and issues. From the viewpoint of the ‘readers’ or ‘users’, the ERIA’s research and publications focus on regional infrastructure development, regional integration, energy, SMEs and, most importantly, a broad picture of how the region should build networks and construct hard infrastructure to support economic development and regional integration. Chapters 5 and 6 elaborated and analysed the ERIA’s Comprehensive Asian Development Plan (CADP), which focuses on regional connectivity and provides policy recommendations to ASEAN in order to physically and institutionally link Southeast Asia with South Asia and beyond. CADP also aims
to support economic development and to increase competitiveness in the region (ERIA, 2010, 2015). In contrast, IDE-JETRO’s research on Southeast Asia focuses on specific challenges in trade and development, emphasising small practical issues and problems of international transport development, such as special economic zones and border management. ADBI’s research and publications focus mainly on Public-Private Partnership (PPP), financing, macro-economics, and overviews of the region, whilst stressing the technical issues of regional integration.

However, these studies do not pay sufficient attention to how Southeast Asia can utilise the potential benefits of linking to South Asia. Although the ERIA, IDE-JETRO, and ADBI’s research pays attention to different issues, they endeavour to collaborate in order to be more effective. For example, Chapters 5 and 6 show that IDE-JETRO’s IDE/ERIA-GSM was utilised and applied in ERIA’s CADP (ERIA, 2015a, pp. 183-184). Section 6.5 also shows that CADP has impacted how the region sees the development of international transport systems, which reflects that the ERIA and IDE-JETRO have both professional and institutional connections as the ‘IDE/ERIA-GSM’ was intellectually developed in collaboration between the two organisations. Moreover, both the ERIA and IDE-JETRO hold many conferences and meetings in Tokyo to discuss Southeast Asian regional integration and ASEAN Connectivity, including the 2018 roundtable on connectivity and innovation (ERIA, 2018b).

Amongst the three IROs, the ERIA holds the most influential power in the field of Southeast Asian regional transport development due to the CADP, followed by IDE-JETRO and ADBI, respectively. Moreover, the ERIA has comparatively closer connections with the ASEAN Secretariat in order to present its research and policy recommendations to policymakers. This is because the ERIA’s headquarters are located near the ASEAN Secretariat in Jakarta, providing ERIA’s intellectuals with more opportunities to present, discuss, or share their ideas with the Secretariat.

Furthermore, I argued in Chapter 3 that IROs are different from think tanks. The findings demonstrate that the ERIA, IDE-JETRO, and ADBI do not try to construct political or economic regimes. Instead, they conduct research to solve problems that the region is confronting. They produce practical, technical solutions for governmental use rather than theoretical, philosophical knowledge for academia. The ERIA, IDE-JETRO, and ADBI propose theories or models, such as ‘IDE/ERIA-GSM’ (Kumagai, 2010; Kumagai & Isono, 2011; Kumagai et al., 2013), to
governments as mechanisms to address the problems they are facing. Whilst the research conducted addresses both the economy and politics, it does not focus on activities that could be considered as political projects of the hegemon. Instead, they offer solutions using systematic explanations and methods. Their political and economic agendas may not be as apparent as the role of think tanks in the international system.

Chapter 6 shows that the ideas and norms proposed by the ERIA, IDE-JETRO, and ADBI emphasise how Southeast Asia should focus on facilitating and supporting regional transport networks. Moreover, the economic and political regimes were not discussed by Japanese government officials and intellectuals in the documentary research or the interviews. They elaborated on many projects that they recognised as essential projects or as elements that can support regional transport development, but did not mention any economic and political ideas. I, thereby, refer to the elements they are trying to communicate or cascade to other actors as ‘practical knowledge’.

Practical knowledge is neither knowledge nor a regime. Rather, it is something in between. When we look at the existing definitions of knowledge and regimes, practical knowledge is different. Authorities typically construct knowledge in either one country, one political context, or one societal domain. Knowledge is developed through scientific observation and experiment. The historical background of specific sets of knowledge helps to attribute authority and legitimacy to the explanations they provide about the relevant issue (Kim, 2014; Stone, 1996, pp. 113-115). Practical knowledge, on the other hand, does not try to propose economic or political regimes. Rather, it aims to propose practical recommendations that other actors in the region should follow without mentioning economic or political ideas.

While their research interests and practical knowledge differ, as argued in Chapter 3 (section 3.2.2), the ERIA, IDE-JETRO, and ADBI work simultaneously to support Southeast Asian transport development and therefore their ideas and constructed norms are similar. Chapter 6 shows that personal connections between intellectuals facilitate opportunities and platforms to share and exchange ideas and norms. The intellectuals who work for the ERIA, IDE-JETRO, and ADBI help the Japanese government to form foreign policy in two ways. First, they provide their expertise through research and advice (see Chapter 5). These intellectuals are often invited or assigned to positions that can lead the direction of the organisation’s
research agenda and activities in collaboration with the Japanese and Southeast Asian
governments, as well as the ASEAN Secretariat. Thereby, they contribute to research
and activities that support the strengthening of East Asian regionalism (see Chapter 6). Second, the government also assigns these intellectuals to positions that work
with the Japanese government, other countries, research institutes, and international
organisations. For example, many university professors have been appointed as the
heads of research departments to help IROs frame their research agendas. This also
helps the IROs to access, build, and strengthen their academic and research
collaborations with institutions and governmental organisations in Southeast Asia
(see Chapters 5 and 6).

7.1.4 RIH and Southeast Asian Regional Transport System Development

After answering all of the main questions, I arrived at my conclusion about
Japan’s role in Southeast Asian regional transport development, which is that the
Japanese government uses its economic power through ODA to support the work of
IROs in Japan and Southeast Asia in order to help Japan become a ‘regional
intellectual hegemon’ (RIH) in Southeast Asia. The norms-embedded practical
knowledge constructed by the ERIA, IDE-JETRO, and ADBI helps Japan to play a
leading role within Southeast Asia because Japan can utilise its own ODA to manage
Southeast Asian development schemes through Japanese government-supported
IROs.

I show in Chapters 4, 5, and 6 that the ERIA, IDE-JETRO, and ADBI have
high expectations regarding the role of infrastructure in the eradication of poverty
(ADB, 2010; ADB & ADBI, 2009; Brooks, 2010; Brooks & Hummels, 2009; Brooks
& Menon, 2008; ESCAP, 2014). Japan’s definition of development further
emphasises the importance of infrastructure, as Söderberg (2012, p. 6) states that
Japan sees development from the perspective of emphasising industrialisation. The
Japanese government focuses on large-scale infrastructure development as a
mechanism to support sustainable economic development, influenced by its
promotion of infrastructure development to eliminate poverty (Hatakeyama, 2008,
p. 347; Rix, 1993a, pp. 15-16; Watanabe, 2006, p. 18). Moreover, such development
will facilitate and support the recipients to help themselves by utilising sufficient
infrastructure. It will also help people in recipient countries to develop their
capacities by accessing better public services (e.g. schools and hospitals). People’s
quality of life will improve with increased access to supportive environments, such as decent and comprehensive transport networks (e.g. roads, railways, bridges, ports), electricity, and clean water (MOFA, 2003; Söderberg, 2002). Accordingly, the Japanese government consistently allocates ODA to the development of infrastructure in Southeast Asia.

Japan’s emphasis on large infrastructure development led to Japan’s major contributions to the development of Southeast Asian transport infrastructure. The ERIA, IDE-JETRO, and ADBI are IROs that help Japan to construct ideas and norms about regional transport and infrastructure development, and further, to cascade these ideas and norms through their professional and institutional connections. After the Japanese government allocated ODA to the ERIA, IDE-JETRO, and ADBI to conduct research and disseminate the results across various platforms, the impacts of their recommendations were measured by the CADP.

One of the questions, however, that I was asked by my informants was: how have the policy recommendations proposed by the ERIA, IDE-JETRO, and ADBI impacted regional integration, poverty elimination, or infrastructure development? And how can we measure that? These questions are indeed relevant and important. The research findings demonstrate that the ideas and norms of regional transport development were constructed, emphasised, and cascaded through publications, research, meetings, conferences, and professional and institutional connections. The ideas and norms were also cascaded through workshops, capacity-building programmes, and other research-related activities. However, this thesis does not attempt to measure impact through a quantitative approach. When the informants were asked in return about how their organisations measure research impact, most of them said they do not have a method of measurement as well. Accordingly, one of the ways to observe impact is to look at how ideas and norms are stated in policy-focused outcome documents. This, at least, reflects how ideas and norms are cascaded from IROs to policy outcomes.
7.2 Research Contribution

In this thesis, I touch upon many theoretical issues and debates that relate to the understanding of how Japan aims to shape and direct the ideas and norms of regional transport development in Southeast Asia, and how such engagements and contributions have helped Japan to gain ‘RIH’ status.

Chapter 2 shows that there are four main groups of literature. The first group includes the literature that explains how Japan’s foreign policy-making process is different from other IR approaches. It points out how social constructivists argue that structural realism and neoliber alism institutionalism take national interests for granted and do not focus on how the national interests are constructed (Wendt, 1999, p. 5). Meanwhile, structural realism and liberalism institutionalism do not pay attention to the role of intellectuals and think tanks in foreign policy, nor how these intellectuals help to construct and disseminate ideas and norms to other actors in the system. The pluralistic approach that integrates the role of intellectuals and think tanks into Japan’s foreign policy study expand the understanding of how Japan’s foreign policy is formulated and integrated with and through ideas and norms.

This thesis, therefore, makes use of Finnemore and Sikkink’s norm life cycle framework (1998) to analyse how intellectuals help Japan to work with the ERIA, IDE-JETRO, and ADBI – the Japanese government funded IROs – in order to construct ideas and norms. I develop the IRO concept to further understand the contributions of the ERIA, IDE-JETRO, and ADBI to regional transport development schemes in Southeast Asia.

As shown in Chapter 6, I observed that although IROs attempt to disseminate constructed ideas and norms to other actors in the region, there is language barrier that constrains the receivers’ understanding. The existing literature that uses the norm life cycle framework generally does not take this language barrier into account as many case studies are domestic, or it is taken for granted that there is no language barrier between the norm entrepreneurs and norm receivers. This observation was made when I conducted interviews in Southeast Asia, and thereby, could be another point for future research in terms of how language barriers constrain the norm cascade process and could be studied using a quantitative approach. For example, it could be measured using questionnaires focused on how norm receivers (e.g. seminar or workshop participants) receive the norms that are cascaded. This also opens the
floor for future research to develop theoretical debates on how to measure the impact that norm entrepreneurs have.

The second group of literature includes that of norms and development norms. Chapter 2 points out that existing literature applies social constructivism to comprehend how ideas and norms are constructed, cascaded, and internalised to other actors, and further emphasises that existing literature has not paid attention to the role of people or institutions in the norm construction process. In this thesis, I explain how Japanese intellectuals who work in Japanese universities and have professional connections with government agencies help the ERIA, IDE-JETRO, and ADBI to shape the ideas of Southeast Asian transport development by integrating Japan’s national interests. Chapter 6 shows that the contributions of intellectuals through both professional and institutional connections have created channels through which intellectuals can link with other intellectuals in the region. Such channels have opened spaces to conduct research, discuss ideas, and construct and disseminate the ideas of regional transport development to other actors. This thesis shows that in order to understand how ideas and norms are constructed, as social constructivists argue, studies that focus on how the intellectuals construct the ideas and create connections can also help us to understand the norm construction and cascade processes.

The third group of literature focuses on Japan’s role as a norm entrepreneur in the international system. I point out that existing literature applies the social constructivist idea of a ‘norm entrepreneur’ in many case studies, including Japan’s contributions to international security and international development (Sato & Hirata, 2008a). Nonetheless, such literature does not elaborate in-depth about the ideas and norms constructed by intellectuals. Therefore, this thesis was developed based on the ideas of the exiting literature and contributes to the study of how intellectuals help to construct ideas and norms through the use of international transport development in Southeast Asia as a case study. For example, I found that intellectuals also play an important role in Japan’s foreign policy by bridging theorists and practitioners together. They help to shape foreign policy and, at the same time, work with other actors to disseminate the ideas that serve Japan’s national interests and goals in the international system. Chapter 6 outlines the roles of intellectuals in the research-related activities of the ERIA, IDE-JETRO, and ADBI, arguing that the contributions they have made to research and organisational themes include the internalised norms
and ideas of regional transport development, as these intellectuals maintain close relations with Japan’s governmental agencies. In sum, this thesis extends the boundaries of the study of Japan-Southeast Asia relations by integrating the concept of ‘norm entrepreneur’. I hope that the application of the ‘norm entrepreneur’ concept will pave the way for future research on Japan-Southeast Asia relations, and that it can also be applied to other countries’ relations, such as that between China and Southeast Asia.

The last group of literature focuses on the role of think tanks and development norms. I show in Chapter 2 that the existing literature on think tanks explains their characteristics and influence on international relations by applying the same literature that was produced to analyse Western think tanks in the 1990s (Carnoy, 1984; Domhoff, 1983; Newsom, 1996; Pautz, 2011; Stone, 1996). However, the current phenomenon of how think tanks are institutionalised and how they operate their research activities has changed since that time. I pointed out previously that the characteristics and roles of the ERIA, IDE-JETRO, and ADBI do not match the traditional concept of think tanks. Rather, as they have unique characteristics, I have accordingly proposed that such characteristics should be reconsidered. I developed ideas to look at the characteristics of ‘think tanks’ through the concept of ‘IROs’, which explains my observations about research organisations in the context of international politics.

In sum, I developed this thesis based on the literature that explains Japan-Southeast Asia relations and the studies that are focused on the influence of ideas and norms in international relations. This thesis contributes to the understanding of Japan-Southeast Asia relations by proposing that one way to understand how Japan engages in regional transport development in Southeast Asia is through IROs, and that we can apply social constructivism to comprehend the role of intellectuals, as well as their professional and institutional connections. These connections, in return, attribute the status of ‘RIH’ to Japan. This thesis, then, arguably opens a new space for discussion in IR scholarship to understand and explore more about the roles of intellectuals and IROs in IR. The contributions of this thesis can be studied further, particularly the issue of how Japan uses its intellectual power to influence development abroad.
7.3 Research Limitation and Future Development of the Research

This thesis is the first to study Japan’s intellectual contributions to Southeast Asian regional transport development. It applies the norm life cycle framework to analyse how the ideas and norms of regional transport have been constructed, cascaded, and internalised.

My understanding and analysis of the ERIA, IDE-JETRO, and ADBI’s professional and institutional connections was significantly limited by the language barrier. Although I have basic proficiency in Japanese, it was not enough for me to access Japan’s official documents, which may have helped me to develop a broader understanding of how the Japanese intellectuals in the ERIA and IDE-JETRO have disseminated their opinions in Japanese society. While English could be used to understand the ideas presented in the ERIA’s publications and research work, some research-related activities were organised in collaboration with IDE-JETRO and MOFA in Tokyo. Therefore, in-depth study of the debates between Japanese officials and intellectuals in meeting minutes, public interviews, published op-eds, and articles can be investigated in the future.

While the MLIT’s contributions to the work of the MOFA and JICA were mentioned in Chapter 4, it was not elaborated how its staff members have contributed intellectually to Southeast Asian transport infrastructure construction projects. Studies of Japan-Southeast Asia relations tend to focus on the MOFA and METI, but the MLIT has yet to be studied in-depth; accordingly, future research on the MLIT would contribute meaningfully to the field of IR.

I also would like to state that I confronted some difficulties in conducting the field research. First, I arrived in Tokyo on 1 February 2016, but could not make a significant number of interviews in February because it was the end of the Japanese fiscal year and the expected interviewees that I approached were busy with administrative matters. Although I emailed and called the interviewees in advance, the process of accepting my interview request took quite some time. I even approached the METI reception desk and talked to a receptionist directly, but it still took almost two weeks for them to respond. Thus, most of the interviews in Japan were conducted within the last two weeks of March 2016. Accordingly, the delayed timing of the interviews did not permit me to have a broader opportunity to talk to people in Japan.
Second, most of the Japanese interviewees’ email addresses were not posted on the internet. The only way to contact the expected interviewees was, thus, via institutional contact addresses (i.e. ‘contact us’ or ‘general queries’) or online forms. When using these channels, I did not know if the webmasters would take my request seriously and forward it to the relevant staff members or not. This is, however, understandable, as there are many staff members in the various ministries and information about staff members should not be posted online. In contrast, Southeast Asian intellectuals’ email addresses could be found on the internet or in journal articles. This meant that there were more opportunities to conduct interviews with Southeast Asian intellectuals. The limitation in obtaining the MOFA, METI, and JICA staff members’ email addresses meant that I could not select the interviewees myself and thereby, had to conduct interviews with designated officials.

Third, the ‘snowball effect’ methodology did not work in Japan. Although I asked some Japanese researchers and professors to introduce me to MOFA and METI staff members, they hesitated to give me their email addresses. In contrast, researchers and professors in Southeast Asia were more willing to introduce me to other relevant persons by giving me their email addresses or contact numbers so that I could extend my connections.

Fourth, a common attitude that I found was that my research was going to destroy the reputations of the ERIA, IDE-JETRO, and ADBI. Before I went to Japan, I emailed one of IDE-JETRO’s researchers whom I have known for many years to talk about my research. This researcher introduced me to another London-based researcher whose expertise is South Asia. I, thereby, travelled to London to seek an opportunity to be linked personally with someone from IDE-JETRO. Upon arriving in London and discussing my thesis, the researcher explicitly rejected my argument and asserted that my thesis was going to defame IDE-JETRO. I also confronted this attitude again when I interviewed an IDE-JETRO researcher in Japan. After the interview was conducted, the researcher emailed me that night to state that my research would destroy IDE-JETRO’s reputation. The researcher further asserted that IDE-JETRO’s researchers have a significant amount of research experience whilst I am just a young scholar. This attitude was also found in my interviews with staff members of the ERIA and ADBI, however, they seemed to be more open about my thesis. They stated that if my thesis research was conducted in a scientific way they would accept the result. This attitude sometimes made for a negative impression
before the interviews were even conducted. I, hence, had to ensure that the thesis’s objectives were not intended to harm the relevant organisations’ reputations.

Fifth, unexpectedly, the consent form made some interviewees feel uncomfortable. Many Japanese interviewees refused to sign the consent form. I had to explain to them and ensure that their identities would not be revealed in the thesis. Sometimes, these uncomfortable moments made the interviews start off with an awkward ambience.

Finally, recording the interviews made some interviewees hesitant and reluctant to respond. Some interviewees did not allow me to use a recorder because they wanted to reflect their personal opinions about their organisations. Although I had to take extensive notes during such interviews, the interviewees were more relaxed.

Future studies can contribute further by expanding the case study. While I have studied regional transport development in the GMS area, I have not yet studied Japan’s contributions to Southeast Asian maritime transport development, which also helps ASEAN to complete its regional production network in the Southeast Asian archipelago. However, as Chapter 4 pointed out, economic corridors throughout the GMS have received significant interest from the Japanese government and the three studied IROs. Chapter 5 also demonstrated that the ERIA’s CADP emphasises the development of land transport in the region, whilst IDE-JETRO focuses on the technical issues of cross-border transport and ADBI focuses on financial issues. Therefore, I did not study, for example, how the ERIA, IDE-JETRO, and ADBI work with the MOFA, METI, and JICA to construct ideas about maritime transport development in light of China’s maritime silk road.

This study can also be used to analyse how co-operation between Japan and other regions is linked by Japan’s ultimate economic and political objectives. This thesis shows Japan’s contributions to the GMS area, but has not explained how Japan’s relations with South Asia, or Japan’s foreign policy on the Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) strategy, are linked. Therefore, further studies about such relations might lead to a more significant and comprehensive understanding of Japan’s strategies within the international system.

The study of professional connections is another area that would benefit from future research. Although this thesis stresses the importance of professional connections between Japanese intellectuals in the ERIA and IDE-JETRO, an in-
depth investigation of how these intellectuals contributed their ideas to meetings and conferences could be conducted in the future. This could be done by analysing meeting minutes or by conducting in-depth interviews with the intellectuals.

Finally, future research can compare the roles of Chinese and Japanese think tanks or IROs in the development of Southeast Asian regionalism and regional transport. The Chinese government has been consistently promoting the idea of the Belt Road Initiative (BRI), but there is a limited number of studies focused on how Chinese think tanks contribute to the work of the Chinese government. Additionally, as this thesis argues that the characteristics and work of the ERIA, IDE-JETRO, and ADBI are different from those of ‘conventional’ think tanks, we can look to Chinese IROs in order to compare their characteristics and challenge this thesis’s argument.
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