Analysing the Use of Compellence during Peace Operations

Ken Ohnishi

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The candidate confirms that the work submitted is his own and that appropriate credit has been given where reference has been made to the work of others.

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Abstract

Compellence is a strategy that employs pressure to induce others to take specific actions. Contemporary international peace operations are expected to use force, if necessary, to protect civilians and/or maintain and restore order in the very volatile environment of post-civil war states. This challenging task requires peacekeepers to proactively change the status quo through compelling local warring factions to stop violence, disarm, and join peace processes. This thesis adopts a comparative case study approach, systematically analyses peace operations in East Timor, Sierra Leone, and Somalia, and identifies conditions under which compellence is likely to succeed in peace operations.

The overall finding of the thesis is that there are five conditions which favour the success of compellence in peace operations: the use of the gradual-turning-of-the-screw strategy; the actual use of force as the source of credibility; the achievement of counter-coercion negation as a form of denial; the achievement of stronghold neutralisation, which is another form of denial; and the absence of third-party support on the target side. Thus, a clearly one-sided situation in favour of compellers is necessary because target armed groups are evasive, and they have higher interests and stronger motivation than compellers in what is in dispute.

This thesis provides the first systematic attempt to specifically analyse conditions for the success of compellence in international peace operations. This study contributes to the literature of compellence by identifying conditions for its success, focusing on the understudied context of compellence against non-state actors. The study also contributes to the field of peace operations by demonstrating how compellence can be a causal mechanism for achieving their objectives and when it is likely to work. The findings have practical implications as well. The conditions indicate what practitioners should achieve to successfully employ the strategy in peace operations.
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<td>AFISMA</td>
<td>African-led International Support Mission in Mali</td>
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<tr>
<td>AFP</td>
<td>Agence France Presse</td>
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<td>AFRC</td>
<td>Armed Forces Revolutionary Council</td>
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<td>AP</td>
<td>Associated Press</td>
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<td>APC</td>
<td>All People’s Congress</td>
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<tr>
<td>ASF</td>
<td>Auxiliary Security Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>CAVR</td>
<td>Timor-Leste Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation</td>
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<tr>
<td>CDF</td>
<td>Civil Defense Forces</td>
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<tr>
<td>CMRRD</td>
<td>Commission for the Management of Strategic Resources, National Reconstruction and Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CNDP</td>
<td>National Congress for the Defence of the People</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CNN</td>
<td>Cable News Network</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CTF</td>
<td>Commission of Truth and Friendship</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DDR</td>
<td>disarmament, demobilisation, and reintegration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DFAT</td>
<td>Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DFS</td>
<td>Department of Field Support</td>
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<td>DOD</td>
<td>Department of Defence</td>
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<tr>
<td>DRC</td>
<td>Democratic Republic of Congo</td>
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<tr>
<td>ECOMICI</td>
<td>ECOWAS Mission in Côte d’Ivoire</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECOMIL</td>
<td>ECOWAS Mission in Liberia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECOMOG</td>
<td>ECOWAS Cease-Fire Monitoring Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECOWAS</td>
<td>Economic Community of West African States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUFOR Chad/CAR</td>
<td>European Union Force Chad/Central African Republic</td>
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<tr>
<td>EUFOR RCA</td>
<td>European Union military operation in the Central African Republic</td>
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<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<tr>
<td>FALINTIL</td>
<td>Armed Forces for the Liberation of East Timor</td>
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<tr>
<td>FDLR</td>
<td>Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FRETILIN</td>
<td>Revolutionary Front for an Independent East Timor</td>
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<td>HIPPO</td>
<td>High-level Independent Panel on Peace Operations</td>
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<tr>
<td>HRW</td>
<td>Human Rights Watch</td>
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<tr>
<td>ICG</td>
<td>International Crisis Group</td>
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<tr>
<td>ICRC</td>
<td>International Committee of the Red Cross</td>
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<tr>
<td>IEMF</td>
<td>Interim Emergency Multinational Force</td>
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<td>IFOR</td>
<td>Implementation Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>INTERFET</td>
<td>International Force for East Timor</td>
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<tr>
<td>KFOR</td>
<td>Kosovo Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>LURD</td>
<td>Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy</td>
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<tr>
<td>MIF</td>
<td>Multinational Interim Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MINURCAT</td>
<td>United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MINUSCA</td>
<td>United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic</td>
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<tr>
<td>MINUSMA</td>
<td>United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali</td>
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<tr>
<td>MINUSTAH</td>
<td>United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti</td>
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<tr>
<td>MISCA</td>
<td>African-led International Support Mission in the Central African Republic</td>
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<td>MNF</td>
<td>Multinational Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>MNLA</td>
<td>National Movement for the Liberation of the Azawad</td>
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<td>MONUC</td>
<td>United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo</td>
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<tr>
<td>MONUSCO</td>
<td>United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo</td>
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<tr>
<td>MPR</td>
<td>People’s Consultative Assembly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>NEO</td>
<td>non-combatant evacuation operation</td>
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<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<tr>
<td>NPFL</td>
<td>National Patriotic Front of Liberia</td>
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<td>NPRC</td>
<td>National Provisional Ruling Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>ONUB</td>
<td>United Nations Operation in Burundi</td>
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<tr>
<td>ONUC</td>
<td>United Nations Operation in the Congo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PANA</td>
<td>Panafrican News Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PBS</td>
<td>Public Broadcasting Service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PKBPU</td>
<td>Peacekeeping Best Practice Unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PMC</td>
<td>private military company</td>
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<tr>
<td>PPI</td>
<td>Integration Fighters’ Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>PPTT</td>
<td>East Timorese Fighter Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>QCA</td>
<td>Qualitative Comparative Analysis</td>
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<tr>
<td>QRF</td>
<td>Quick Reaction Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>RUF</td>
<td>Revolutionary United Front</td>
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<tr>
<td>SAS</td>
<td>Special Air Service</td>
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<tr>
<td>SCSL</td>
<td>Special Court for Sierra Leone</td>
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<td>SFOR</td>
<td>Stabilisation Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>SLA</td>
<td>Sierra Leone Army</td>
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<tr>
<td>SLTRC</td>
<td>Sierra Leone Truth &amp; Reconciliation Commission</td>
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<tr>
<td>SLW</td>
<td>Sierra Leone Web</td>
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<tr>
<td>SNA</td>
<td>Somali National Alliance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SRSG</td>
<td>Special Representative of the Secretary-General</td>
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<tr>
<td>TF</td>
<td>Task Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>ULIMO</td>
<td>United Liberation Movement of Liberia for Democracy</td>
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<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNAMET</td>
<td>United Nations Mission in East Timor</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNAMID</td>
<td>African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur</td>
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<td>UNAMIR</td>
<td>United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNAMSIL</td>
<td>United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNDPI</td>
<td>United Nations Department of Public Information</td>
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<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNDPKO</td>
<td>United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNEF</td>
<td>United Nations Emergency Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNISFA</td>
<td>United Nations Organization Interim Security Force for Abyei</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNITAF</td>
<td>United Taskforce</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNMIBH</td>
<td>United Nations Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNMIH</td>
<td>United Nations Mission in Haiti</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNMIK</td>
<td>United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo</td>
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<td>UNMIL</td>
<td>United Nations Mission in Liberia</td>
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<td>UNMIS</td>
<td>United Nations Mission in the Sudan</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNMISET</td>
<td>United Nations Mission of Support in East Timor</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNMISS</td>
<td>United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNOCI</td>
<td>United Nations Operation in Côte d’Ivoire</td>
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<td>UNOMSIL</td>
<td>United Nations Observer Mission to Sierra Leone</td>
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<td>UNOSOM I</td>
<td>United Nations Operation in Somalia</td>
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<td>UNOSOM II</td>
<td>United Nations Operation in Somalia II</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNPROFOR</td>
<td>United Nations Protection Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNSC</td>
<td>United Nations Security Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNTAET</td>
<td>United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor</td>
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<tr>
<td>US</td>
<td>United States</td>
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<tr>
<td>USACMH</td>
<td>United States Army Center of Military History</td>
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<tr>
<td>USC</td>
<td>United Somali Congress</td>
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<tr>
<td>WSB</td>
<td>West Side Boys</td>
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</table>
Introduction

The use and utility of force has been one of the most popular issues in international relations research. During the Cold War, much of the interest was directed towards deterrence. The major reasons behind this were the bipolar international structure that was based on the rivalry between two superpowers and the invention and accumulation of nuclear weapons. The prevention of nuclear war became one of the most important policy problems of the era and thus fuelled research on deterrence (Jervis, 1979, p.290; Sperandei, 2006, pp.255, 257; Art and Greenhill, 2018, p.3).\(^1\)

The post-Cold War era, however, has witnessed increased interest in another type of use of threat and force – namely, compellence. The United States (US) and other Western states realised the utility of compellence in responding to regional conflicts, and this led to increased attention to compellence research (Sperandei, 2006, pp.253, 257; Art and Greenhill, 2018, pp.3-4). Post-Cold War security problems have been characterised by multiple threats that occur at various places, in contrast to those of the Cold War era, which centred on a clear rival structure. As a result, the prominent challenge has shifted from preventing conflicts to responding effectively to those that have already occurred and are ongoing. This requires action in a proactive and often robust manner in order to alter the undesirable behaviour of the protagonists involved and restore the original condition that has been disrupted. For these purposes, compellence is more appropriate than deterrence.

Compellence is an attractive strategy. In contrast to deterrence, which is a strategy to maintain the status quo, compellence aims to alter it, thereby enabling actors to pursue objectives in a proactive manner. Moreover, compellence seeks to achieve this by persuading others through the utilisation of pressure instead of defeating them. This means that the

\(^1\) Regarding the history of deterrence theory and policy, see, for example, Jervis (1979) and Freedman (2004).
strategy, if successfully employed, can achieve objectives with less – or even no – destruction and casualties compared to war (George, 1994a, p.9).

The literature in this field has mainly focused on bargaining between states during crises and wars, in particular those involving the US and its allies. However, the logic of compellence is quite general and can be applied to various contexts. Any dispute or confrontation in which one side demands the other to change its behaviour, such as trade frictions, can be analysed from the perspective of the strategy, and the actors involved can be other than states.

One such promising but under-explored application is the use of compellence in peace operations. Once non-coercive endeavours to assist in the maintenance of ceasefires that had already been realised in interstate conflicts, peace operations have evolved into more complex undertakings to stabilise and reconstruct states during or following intrastate conflict. In the course of this transformation, international forces in peace operations have come to be expected to use force, if necessary, to protect civilians and/or maintain and restore order in the very fragile environment of post-civil war states. This means that “peacekeepers” are often deployed into environments in which no peace to keep exists, and they have to proactively change the status quo through influencing local parties.

Creating a peaceful security environment, rather than merely keeping it peaceful, represents a significant challenge for recent operations. For example, peacekeepers were not ready to confront the hostile rebel forces in Sierra Leone, and the operation was pushed to the verge of collapse. Peace operations in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) have not been able to establish a secure environment and prevent attacks on civilians by armed groups despite the repeated use of force by peacekeepers. A United Nations (UN) review report points out that between 2010 and 2013, peacekeepers failed to provide immediate responses in 80% of cases in which civilians were under the threat of physical violence (UN, 2014a, paras.18-19). Peacekeepers even struggle to protect themselves. As of 30 June 2020, more than 130 peacekeepers have been killed by malicious acts in Mali, where they have been under attack repeatedly since their deployment in
2013 (UN, 2020). In spite of these difficulties, the international community continues to authorise peace operations to employ force if necessary under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, which is the provision for forceful measures to maintain and restore international peace and security. Intervening forces in peace operations can no longer stick to the traditional mode of the non-use of force; they have to find an effective way to employ force instead. However, a doctrine or clear guidance for peacekeepers on how to use force under new enlarged authorisations is still lacking (Nsia-Pepra, 2014, pp.60-61; de Coning et al., 2017).

It is therefore imperative to understand the conditions under which the threat and use of force can be effective in the context of peace operations. Research on peace operations has so far been relatively under-theorised, and studies focusing on the “robust” type of operation that is authorised to use force beyond self-defence are especially needed in light of the difficulty that peace operations have in using force. Here, the theory of compellence can provide causal logic as to how peace operations can achieve objectives through the threat of and actual proactive use of force. The theory also provides a starting point for the exploration of the conditions under which such an approach is likely to work.

This is the topic of this thesis. It analyses cases of peace operations from the perspective of compellence and explores the conditions in which the strategy is more or less likely to succeed. Such an investigation provides practical implications for international military interventions into civil wars, which is one of the major contemporary security challenges, and promotes the theorisation of robust peace operations.

Moreover, such an examination is also beneficial to the field of compellence. First, compellence against non-state actors is still understudied, despite the prominence of these groups in today’s security environment, and compellence in the context of peace operations provides a good opportunity to examine the characteristics and utility of the strategy against non-state armed groups. Second, the context-based study of compellence deepens the understanding of conditions for success in a specified manner. As compellence can be employed in various settings for diverse objectives,
there is a natural limitation on the specificity of arguments about conditions for success or mechanisms if trying to cover compellence in general. This thesis promotes our understanding of these aspects of compellence by empirically examining which part of the existing arguments on compellence applies to the specific context of peace operations. In this way, the thesis also contributes to the development of the theory of compellence.

While some studies have applied the concept of compellence and insights from the field to peace operations, there has been no dedicated, systematic attempt to analyse the conditions for the success of compellence in peace operations. This thesis fills this gap.

Research Questions and the Contributions of the Thesis

This thesis is guided by the following three research questions. The overall research question is as follows:

- Under what conditions is compellence in peace operations more likely to succeed?

This study addresses the question by applying the theory of compellence to the context of peace operations; thus, the main question can be rephrased as follows:

- Do the conditions for success shown in the theory of compellence correctly predict and explain the results of compellence in peace operations?

This application of the theory of compellence to the context of peace operations is not straightforward, for the theory was built on interstate crises and conflicts, while the actors involved in peace operations are usually coalitions of states and non-state armed groups. Hence, a further question has to be asked to understand compellence in peace operations:
How do the unique features of the context of peace operations affect the form or requirement for the success of compellence?

The first question is important because compellence should be employed based on insights into when it is likely to work. Compellence is not an easy strategy and is generally believed to be more difficult than deterrence for a number of reasons. First, while deterred targets can deny the effect of threats and claim that they have no intention to challenge the status quo, accepting demands to take specific actions under pressure – that is, to submit to compellence – is more visible as a form of capitulation and entails greater political costs for targets (Schelling, 1966, pp.82-83). Second, compellent demands can easily be open-ended, and it can be difficult to convince targets that there will be no additional demands after accepting immediate ones, while deterrent demands are relatively clear and finite, for they are connected to the status quo (Schelling, 1966, pp.72-75). Third, compellence settings are likely to make targets more risk acceptant and therefore resilient to pressure. Prospect theory, which is based on empirical patterns found in psychological experiments, argues that people who try to prevent losses tend to perceive the value of issues in dispute as greater and become more risk acceptant than those who try to increase their gains. Deterrence is an attempt to prevent others from changing the situation in their favour, so the target side is trying to increase its gain. On the contrary, compellence aims to change the status quo in favour of compellers in a way that sacrifices the interests of targets, so the targets tend to become more resolved in trying to avoid loss (Schaub, 2004, pp.401-402; Levy, 2008, pp.542-543).

Although it is difficult to identify all cases of compellence and deterrence, a dedicated dataset of compellence shows the full-compliance success rate of interstate compellence between 1918 and 2001 as 41.4%, which is lower than the success rate of extended deterrence shown in other
Another study identifies 36 cases of coercive diplomacy employed by Western states between 1990 and 2008, with nine temporary successes, three “costly” successes, and three “cheap” successes; this is, once again, not a very high success ratio (Jakobsen, 2010, pp.287-291, 296).

Compellence is not risk free. If opponents do not accede to demands in spite of pressure, compellers have to decide whether to give up objectives and back down or pursue the objectives forcibly (George, 1994a, p.9). Moreover, employing the pressure of force in crisis situations, which are full of miscommunications and misunderstandings, entails the risk of escalation, which can result in inadvertent armed confrontations (Lebow, 1981; George and Simons, 1994a, p.290).

Nevertheless, studies on compellence have not yet been sufficiently developed to provide useful guidance on the employment of the strategy. As will be shown in Chapter 1, a number of factors can affect the result of the strategy, and there is no consensus on the conditions for success. Moreover, compellence against non-state actors is an especially under-explored aspect of the strategy. Therefore, there is no useful analytical framework for the use of compellence in peace operations, and this research begins by establishing one.

One of the reasons why consensus has not yet been reached on the conditions for success is the scope of the existing studies. Major existing studies on compellence have no explicit scope for their arguments (see Chapter 1). However, the logic of compellence is quite general and can be applied to a broad range of situations, from trade frictions to bargaining

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2 Based on an examination of international crises between 1823 and 1973, Petersen (1986, pp.283-284) argues that compellence is not more difficult than deterrence. Sechser (2011, pp.393-394), however, points out that Petersen’s coding is inadequate, because he assumes that all wars are preceded by compellence and regards faits accomplis as compellence. In addition, Sechser’s dataset includes more cases than Petersen’s.
during wars. This broad applicability renders it difficult to pin down conditions for success in a concrete manner when one is attempting to cover compellence in general. Instead, narrowing the scope can be beneficial to the improvement of the theory’s accuracy in exchange for generality. By focusing on compellence employed in a specific context, studies can shed light on the factors that affect the results of the strategy in a more detailed and specified manner, thereby contributing to the further development of the theory.

In other words, this is an attempt to develop a “middle-range theory” of compellence with a focus on a specific subset of the strategy. Middle-range theories sit between two extremes of general theories that try to explain all or a vast range of phenomena in a field and particular descriptions of something without any generalisation (Merton, 1968, pp.39, 45). Instead, middle-range theories aim to explain limited subcategories of events through conditional generalisation (George and Bennett, 2005, p.266). Of course, what constitutes “middle” or “subset” is relative and depends on how one defines or categorises a field of study (Mahoney, 1980, p.327). In fact, the theory of compellence itself is a middle-range theory of international relations or foreign policy (George and Bennett, 2005, p.268). However, it is possible to develop a middle-range theory of compellence because of the concept’s generality.

In light of the difficulty of further developing a theory covering compellence as a general phenomenon, developing its middle-range theories can be fruitful. Some analysts have observed that the focus on middle-range theories entails the risk of generating fractured and incompatible hypotheses (Merton, 1968, p.51; Morrow and Muchinsky, 1980, p.36). However, the specification of arguments of general theories is a valid rationale for the development of middle-range theories (Mahoney, 1980, p.331). In addition, although the scope of each of these subset-focused theories is small, they can, as a whole, provide a better understanding of the strategy when combined. Such a collection of middle-range theories can be developed into a typological theory by reorganising and integrating them based on common independent and dependent variables (Lepgold, 1998a, pp.56-57; George and Bennett, 2005, ch.11).
Therefore, the application of the theory of compellence to peace operations can be beneficial to the development of the theory. By focusing on a specific context, the theory of compellence can be refined in terms of the conditions of success and the specific forms of coercive mechanisms.

The exploration of conditions for the success of compellence in peace operations is beneficial to the field of peace operations as well. As will be shown in Chapter 1, although the field has a long research history, explanatory theories have developed only recently and are still in need of additional studies. In particular, the utility of peace operations in terms of halting ongoing violence and the causal mechanisms involved in how peace operations work are under-explored. Moreover, because peace operations have come to perform such a wide variety of activities throughout all phases of response to conflicts, it is difficult to build theories covering peace operations in general. Therefore, formulating middle-range theories focusing on a specific subtype would also be fruitful in this field (Bures, 2007).

Considering the challenges that peace operations face, as discussed earlier, the natural focus would be on the robust type of peace operations. Contemporary peace operations are struggling to implement security-related tasks in violent environments. Their tasks are now to create peace and stability – that is, to change the status quo on the ground, including the employment of threats and force if necessary. This means that international troops need to compel local warring factions to abandon violence and join peace processes. Therefore, the perspective of compellence can advance the theorisation of the field through the provision of causal logic of how robust peace operations achieve objectives and insights regarding when it works. Such theoretical insights are expected to provide practical implications regarding what kind of factors and conditions practitioners should pay attention to and manipulate to successfully conduct robust peace operations.

In spite of the practical and theoretical utility of such a study, there has been no dedicated, systematic attempt to explore the conditions under which compellence is likely to succeed in peace operations. As Chapter 1 will show, there have been studies that combine compellence and peace
operations. However, some of them are descriptive, and other explanatory studies are based on a single case study or a comparison with cases other than peace operations, or they do not systematically examine the conditions for success. Therefore, existing studies do not provide a sound answer to the question of success conditions. This study will address this question.

Sceptics may wonder whether a theory that is developed based on interactions between states can be applied to those involving non-state actors. Nonetheless, the logic of coercion itself is applicable to a wide range of situations. Sayigh (1998, p.213) argues that “[c]oercion … pervades all human relations, whether those of the family, wider polity, or international society”. In discussing deterrence, Morgan (2003, pp.58-59) points out that sending threats is a simple method of communication that is understandable even by targets who have little rationality, such as children or animals, and that such a simple form of communication can work against targets about whom the deterrers know little. In a similar vein, Quinlan (2004, p.11) points out that deterrence is based on “basic and permanent facts about human behaviour” – that is, people choose their behaviour based on anticipated results, thus avoiding behaviour that seems to bring more losses than gains, and this calculation can be influenced from the outside. These arguments apply not only to deterrence but also to compellence. Payne et al. (2008) also argue that non-state actors are coercible and that it is wrong to think that they are irrational or have nothing to be threatened about and therefore cannot be coerced. Non-state actors in conflicts also behave strategically and use violence as a tool to pursue political objectives (e.g. Duyvesteyn, 2005; Greenhill and Major, 2006/07; Berrebi, 2009). In light of these commonalities, the theory of compellence can be applied to contexts involving non-state actors, such as peace operations.

Of course, this application to a new context requires the appropriate modification and extension of the theory; therefore, the second and third research questions need to be asked. Some of the insights from the existing studies on the conditions for the success of compellence may apply straightforwardly to compellence in peace operations, but others may not. This should be empirically examined, but the conditions may well be different, taking into account the uniqueness of the context. For example, non-state
armed groups are usually less organised and cohesive than states, and the groups’ leaders may not have tight control over their followers. This means that persuading or making a deal with leaders may not be sufficient for success, and additional efforts to persuade followers may be required (Byman and Waxman, 2002, pp.192-193). In addition, the compellers in peace operations are usually coalitions of states, rather than a single state. Therefore, both the advantages and disadvantages of coalitional compellence are likely to appear in compellence in peace operations (Posen, 1996, pp.83-84; Byman and Waxman, 2002, ch.6). Moreover, one of the most important features of the context is that compellers intervene in civil war as third parties, which means that the target side is expected to have much stronger interests in and motivation regarding the issues they confront the compellers (Posen, 1996, pp.82, 84; Byman and Waxman, 2002, p.190; Crawford, 2009, p.288). These and other features of the context of peace operations must affect the modality of compellence.

Therefore, this study deductively derives the conditions for success of compellence in peace operations based on insights from the literature while paying attention to the unique features of peace operations. The validity of the conditions is examined empirically through a comparative case study, and the findings from the empirical examinations provide answers to the three research questions.

The Structure of the Thesis

The thesis proceeds as follows. Chapter 1 reviews the literature of compellence and peace operations. It introduces the concepts and theoretical frameworks that are relevant to the topic and identifies the remaining gaps in knowledge to which this research can speak, as well as its overall original contribution. The chapter points out that previous studies have not examined the conditions for the success of compellence in peace operations in a dedicated and systematic manner and explains the expected benefits of such research.

Chapter 2 establishes the analytical framework for the thesis. The chapter first clarifies the scope of this research. There are some variations in
compellence in peace operations – for example, whether the target is a state or a non-state armed group – and this study restricts its scope to a specific subtype among them. The scope of this research is explicit military compellence in UN-related peace operations that is employed against non-state armed groups and accompanied by the heaviest type of demands. This focus is necessary so that more valid findings can be drawn from comparable cases.

Following the clarification, the chapter deductively derives the conditions that are expected to favour the success of compellence in peace operations, drawing on insights from existing studies. This process takes into account the unique features of the context of peace operations, and the conditions are expressed in the form of hypotheses to be examined empirically.

There are five such conditions. The first is that the balance of troops is in favour of compellers. Compellence is expected to be more likely to succeed if the compellers have a larger force than the opponents, because target armed groups facing stronger forces must anticipate that they are likely to be defeated and suffer great costs.

The second is the use of the gradual-turning-of-the-screw strategy combined with the carrot-and-stick strategy. Regarding how to apply pressure, specific coercive strategies can be largely divided into an ultimatum and the gradual turning of the screw – that is, a strategy of gradually escalating pressure – and each can be combined with the use of positive inducements. Considering that it would be difficult to defeat non-state armed groups quickly, it is expected that gradually increased pressure, combined with the use of carrots, is more effective than an ultimatum.

The third condition is the actual use of force as a source of credibility. This research examines four possible sources of credibility: national interests, strong domestic support, previously acquired advantageous reputation, and the actual use of force. Among them, it is expected that the demonstration of competence through the actual use of force in the theatre of operation is required in order to make subsequent threats credible, because highly
resolved armed groups are unlikely to succumb to mere threats short of using force.

The fourth condition is the achievement of counter-coercion negation by peacekeepers as a form of denial. Regarding the kind of pressure, the denial type is expected to be more effective than punishment. This research identifies four specific ways to achieve denial that can be applied in peace operations. They are attrition, stronghold neutralisation, decapitation, and counter-coercion negation. Among them, counter-coercion negation is expected to be necessary, because highly motivated armed groups would try to drive back compellers in the contest of endurance, and their counter-moves will need to be contained so that they are deprived of the hope to win.

The fifth and final condition is the absence of third-party support on the target side. It is expected that the existence of support from outside would enhance target armed groups’ resilience against compellent pressure, so the absence of this would constrain or reduce their combat capabilities and demoralise them, thereby facilitating the success of compellence.

Following this, Chapter 2 discusses methodological issues to design an appropriate empirical framework. A comparative case study approach is the best available one for this study, and the chapter introduces three methods of analysis: the congruence method, the most-similar-design comparison, and the cross-case analysis. The chapter also discusses how the cases are selected.

Chapters 3 to 5 are case studies. Chapters 3 and 4 analyse the most successful cases of compellence in peace operations: the interventions in East Timor by an Australian-led multinational force, the International Force for East Timor (INTERFET), and in Sierra Leone by the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) and the United Kingdom (UK) forces. In turn, Chapter 5 analyses the case of apparent failure: the intervention in Somalia by the United Nations Operation in Somalia II (UNOSOM II) and the US forces. Each chapter employs the congruence method to examine whether the expectation of the hypotheses coincides with what actually happened in the cases. In addition, Chapter 4 employs the most-similar-
design comparison by dividing the protracted case of compellence into phases and analysing the shifts of conditions and consequences.

The findings from these within-case analyses are put together, and patterns among them are examined in Chapter 6, which conducts cross-case comparisons. The analysis finds that the empirical cases provide support for three hypotheses, partial support for another, and little to no support for the other.

The overall finding of the thesis is that there are five conditions which favour the success of compellence in peace operations: the use of the gradual-turning-of-the-screw strategy; the actual use of force as the source of credibility; the achievement of counter-coercion negation as a form of denial; the achievement of stronghold neutralisation, which is another form of denial; and the absence of third-party support on the target side. A successful case examined in the thesis demonstrates that all five conditions constituted a collective sufficient condition for success. Another successful case demonstrates that four of them in combination were sufficient and that the stronghold neutralisation was not necessary for success. Stronghold neutralisation seems to be necessary when target armed groups are self-sustainable because of the strongholds and have an interest in the continuation of the conflict.

The above result demonstrates that some factors that are regarded as important in existing studies are also important in compellence in peace operations, while others are not. Among the factors that are not confirmed to be important, some are expected to be unimportant when the hypotheses are derived, but others turn out to be unimportant unexpectedly. The latter includes the non-support of the compellers’ numerical advantage over the targets and the use of positive inducements. In a sense, it is not surprising that different factors turn out to be important in different settings. At the same time, the finding is counter-intuitive because these factors are thought to be important in the literature and at least logically seem to play important roles in the context of peace operations as well. However, this study finds that compellence in this context can succeed without these conditions being met provided that other conditions for success are satisfied.
The collective sufficient conditions indicate that compellers need to create a clearly one-sided advantageous situation to compel armed groups to accept the heaviest type of demands. The thesis argues that this demanding requirement is the result of the unique features of the context of peace operations. The targets of compellence are resilient and evasive armed groups, which are difficult to defeat quickly. Moreover, because international forces intervene in others’ wars, local conflicting parties have much larger interests in and motivation regarding what is in dispute. This means that compellers in the context cannot fulfil one of the most important conditions for success pointed out in the literature: the asymmetry of motivation in favour of compellers. Given these disadvantages, compellers in the context of peace operations have to create a clearly advantageous situation so that target armed groups are deprived of any hope to withstand the compellence.

The identification of collective sufficient conditions for the success of compellence in peace operations is a meaningful contribution to the literature of compellence. As discussed above, the conditions for success in this context are somewhat different from those for successful compellence in general; not all conditions that are regarded as important for success in the literature turned out to be so in the context of peace operations, and some are even hard to satisfy. The approach of focusing on a specific context enabled this study to identify the conditions with more specificity. Studies of compellence have largely focused on cases between states and the utility of the strategy against non-state actors is under-explored. This study reveals the conditions for the success of compellence in peace operations in a dedicated manner based on a systematic empirical examination.

Another contribution to the literature is the identification of effective ways to apply compellence by denial in the context of peace operations. In terms of coercive mechanisms, the literature largely agrees that compellence by denial is more effective than that by punishment. However, because how denial is achieved depends on the opponents’ objectives and strategies, specific approaches to denial can differ from context to context. This study identifies four such approaches that are employable in the context of peace operations and finds counter-coercion negation to be especially effective,
while stronghold neutralisation also plays an important role under certain circumstances.

This study contributes to the field of peace operations as well. Compellence theory provides a causal mechanism for the success of robust peace operations and demonstrates when such an approach is more likely to work. As the development of explanatory theory in the field of peace operations is still insufficient, the application of compellence theory promotes the theorisation of the field.

The findings also have practical implications. How to manage ongoing violence is one of the gravest challenges for contemporary peace operations. This study demonstrates that compellence can be an approach to this task. Its findings will be of value to practitioners by indicating what must be realised to successfully employ the coercive approach in peace operations.

Of course, a piece of research cannot fill the gaps in the fields completely; additional research is required. The thesis concludes by considering potential topics and areas for further research.
Chapter 1
Compellence and Peace Operations:
Concept, Theory, and History

This chapter defines key concepts used in the thesis and reviews the literature on relevant topics. First, the chapter reviews the concept of and previous research on compellence. Second, it reviews the development of and related research on peace operations, especially regarding their effectiveness in civil wars. Finally, it explains the applicability of the theory of compellence to the context of peace operations and reviews existing studies that take similar approaches.

1.1 Compellence

1.1.1 The Concept of Compellence

Compellence is a strategy which employs pressure, including the threat and/or actual use of force, to induce others to take actions as demanded. Compellence is a type of coercion. Johnson et al. (2002, p.7) define coercion as “causing someone to choose one course of action over another by making the choice preferred by the coercer appear more attractive than the alternative, which the coercer wishes to avoid”. In affecting others’ choices, coercers can employ various incentives and pressure, including the threat and actual use of force. Even if force is used, however, coercion is different from achieving one’s objectives forcibly. Freedman (1998) emphasises that the central feature of coercion is that it leaves a choice on the target side (p.16). The aim of coercion is to induce the target to behave as demanded by the coercer, not to defeat the target and impose the coercer’s will. Coercion is also different from total consent or peaceful persuasion. If coercion succeeds, the opponent chooses to behave as the coercer demands, but the choice is what the opponent would not have made if it had not been under pressure by the coercer. Coercion, therefore, can be
understood as occupying the spectrum with consent and control on each end (Freedman, 1998, p.16).

Coercion can be divided into two strategies: deterrence and compellence. Both back up the coencer’s demands with threats for noncompliance, but the nature of the demands differs. In deterrence, the coencer demands that the target refrain from taking a particular action (Johnson et al., 2002, p.10). Conversely, in compellence, the coencer demands that the target take a particular action, such as to initiate something, change the course of or stop what the target is doing, or undo what it has done (Schaub, 1998, pp.44, 47-49; Johnson et al., 2002, p.13). In other words, deterrence is a strategy to maintain the status quo, while the aim of compellence is to change it (Schaub, 1998, pp.37-38).

Deterrence and compellence also differ regarding the role of the actual use of force. Deterrence is a passive and static strategy: Actors draw lines; demand that targets not cross them, with threats being invoked if they do; and wait with the hope that the targets will never do so (Schelling, 1966, pp.71-72). Deterrence fails when targets defy demands and deters put threats to use force into practice (Art, 2003a, p.8). If force is used, the effort has shifted from deterrence to compellence to induce the targets to stop and/or undo their actions, or to defence to forcibly prevent the targets from continuing their actions. Conversely, compellence can entail both the threat and the actual use of force. As the status quo is unfavourable to compellers, it is compellers who have to take the initiative and proactively put pressure on targets (Schelling, 1966, p.72). This pressure “often requires that the punishment be administered until the other acts … This is because often the only way to become committed to an action is to initiate it” (Schelling, 1966, p.70).

Previous research on compellence does not reflect consensus in terms of whether and to what extent the actual use of force should be included in the concept of compellence. Pape (1996), for example, focuses on the use of compellent air power in major wars, and he regards the use of massive amounts of force as compellence. In contrast, George and his colleagues (George and Simons, 1994b) make much of the diplomatic side
of compellence in their study and use the term “coercive diplomacy”. They argue that only the limited use of force for the purpose of demonstrating one’s resolve should be included in coercive diplomacy. Art (2003a, pp.9-10) divides compellence into three types: “diplomatic use”, which involves only the threat of force; “demonstrative use”, which contains “the exemplary and limited use of force”; and “full-scale use”, which is identical to war and whatever force is employed as far as necessary to secure compliance with demands. He regards the first two categories as coercive diplomacy, and he argues that the use of force exceeding limited use means the failure of coercive diplomacy. Schaub (1998, pp.42-44) also regards compellence as being basically composed of the threat of force, and regards its execution, termed as offence, as the failure of compellence, though he accepts the possibility of “[t]he demonstrative use of force” in compellence.

The distinction between the limited and full-scale use of force, however, leaves the question of how to define “the limited use of force”. Art (2003b, p.360) admits that making such a distinction can be difficult and claims that whether the line is crossed should be judged based on the level of destruction that is suffered by the target, rather than that of the force employed. Freedman (1998, pp.21-22) points out that the amount of force that is necessary to secure the acceptance of demands is determined by the target’s capability and that the considerable application of force can be necessary to demonstrate one’s resolve. He instead proposes that focus be placed on the previously mentioned difference of control and coercion – that is, whether the target retains a choice or not. In line with this argument, Jakobsen (1998a; 2011) defines the limited use of force as that which leaves a choice to the target. This definition, he argues, includes the use of conventional air and sea power per se, assuming that it cannot bring about decisive effects when used alone, and limited ground invasions short of attaining one’s objectives forcibly. In contrast, he regards the use of land power, as well as air and sea support, for the purpose of decisively resolving disputes as the full-scale use of force, and their use thus indicates the failure of compellence. However, the use of air power can be decisive, as Jakobsen himself admits, when the objective is the destruction of the target. In addition,
labelling substantial airstrikes as “limited” is curious, which is again a point that Jakobsen himself admits (Jakobsen, 2011, pp.162-163).

Rather than sticking to the notion of the limited use of force, the line should be drawn at whether force is used at all. The actual employment of force is a major decision. Compellence with mere threats remains in a purely diplomatic realm, and it is a great success of compellence if the compellers are able to induce the targets without recourse to the actual use of force.

With that being said, the use of force per se should not be regarded as a failure of compellence. As Freedman (1998) argues, as long as the target retains choice, the use of force remains in the domain of compellence no matter how much and what kind of force is used. According to this definition, almost all kinds of application of military force can fall into the realm of compellence. Those that are excluded from compellence are limited to those achieve objectives regardless of the intent of the targets, such as the creation of faits accomplis; annihilation wars; surgical strikes to eliminate certain targets, such as the Osirak airstrike carried out by Israel; and hostage-rescue operations executed by special forces (Pape, 1996, p.12; Mueller, 1998, pp.184-185; Jakobsen, 2011, pp.162-163).

Under this rather broad definition, research on compellence should pay attention to two aspects. One is the evaluation of outcomes. First and foremost, it must be asked whether the demands of the compellers were accepted by the targets. However, this question is not enough, and the matter of how the compellers brought the targets to the point must be considered. If the targets capitulate at the threat stage, this is clearly the most successful form of compellence. Once force is actually employed, however, it complicates the evaluation: Although capitulation after the massive use of force can still be regarded as a success of compellence, for the target selected to capitulate, this is different from securing acquiescence only with the very minor use of force. Byman and Waxman (2002, pp.4-5) point out that it is expected that the more destruction inflicted on targets, the less freedom of choice left to them. The simple success–failure dichotomy based on whether or not demands are met cannot take this difference into account and is inappropriate. Rather, the successfulness of compellence
should be evaluated in degree (Pape, 1996, p.15; Bratton, 2005, pp.110-111; Jakobsen, 2019, pp.291-293); for example, based on the aforementioned spectrum of coercion, compliance secured near the end of consent on the spectrum should be regarded as an outright success, but if it is secured near the end of control, it should be regarded as almost a failure.

The other aspect to pay attention to is the contexts in which compellence is employed. From the perspective of understanding strategy as being composed of ends, ways, and means (Lykke, 1989; Yarger, 2012), the defining feature of compellence lies in the “ways” – namely, how the objectives are achieved – and it can be combined with various ends, as well as instruments and resources. In fact, the logic of compellence – that is, employing pressure to affect others’ decision-making and shape their choice – can be applied to a wide variety of situations, from major wars to international economic disputes, as long as they entail bargaining or other kinds of communication to persuade others. In addition, its applicability is not limited to international relations; it can be applied to contexts such as domestic crime control, how to discipline one’s children, and other interpersonal relationships involving the use of pressure. Because of this generality, when research on compellence is being conducted, one should be aware of the applicability of its findings. Some findings may apply to a wide range of contexts related to the logic of compellence, but others may apply only to a certain type of compellence or context.

1.1.2 Previous Research on Compellence

There are two seminal bodies of work on compellence. One is by Thomas Schelling, the pioneer of the field who coined the term and elucidated the concept. Schelling (1966) distinguishes two ways to achieve objectives through force: one is brute force – that is, achieving objectives forcibly – and the other is coercion. He categorises the function of force into four areas by combining the above distinction and whether the objective is to change or

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3 Hirst (1998) provides an example of a study on the use of compellence in regard to economic issues.
maintain the status quo. Compellence is the label he attaches to coercion to change the status quo, and he logically describes its characteristics based on insights from game theory. He explores a number of issues such as credibility, commitments, reputation, the manipulation of risks, and the link between threats and assurances. However, he uses only historical examples as illustrations and does not test his argument empirically.

The other body of work is by Alexander George and his colleagues (George et al., 1971; 2nd ed., George and Simons, 1994b). They distinguish the offensive and defensive use of compellence, referring to the former as a “blackmail strategy” and the latter as “coercive diplomacy” (George, 1994a, pp.7-8). They focus on the latter in their comparative case study and inductively identify a number of conditions which affect the result of coercive diplomacy. Within this, “contextual variables” include factors such as the kind of challenges that coercers face, the image that protagonists have about war, the use of coalitions, and the isolation of targets. In addition, there are other “conditions that favor coercive diplomacy”: “clarity of the objective”, “strength of motivation”, “asymmetry of motivation”, “sense of urgency”, “strong leadership”, “adequate domestic and international support”, “unacceptability of threatened escalation”, and “clarity concerning the precise terms of settlement of the crisis”. Though they do not argue that any of them is a necessary or sufficient condition for the success of the strategy, they regard “asymmetry of motivation”, “sense of urgency”, “unacceptability of threatened escalation”, and “clarity of settlement terms” as especially important among those conditions favouring success (George and Simons, 1994a, pp.270-274, 279-287).

Despite their focus on the defensive use of compellence, the applicability of their findings can be wider than this. Freedman (1998, p.18) criticises the distinction between the offensive and defensive use of compellence, because George includes as a type of coercive diplomacy the demands to alter the behaviour of targets by changing the members of their regimes, which seems to be one of the most offensive demands. Art (2003a, p.19) points out that what is offensive and defensive can change depending on the perspectives of the protagonists. In addition, Levy (2008, pp.542-543)
argues that the conditions that George developed can be applied to the offensive use of coercive diplomacy.

After these seminal bodies of work, researchers have accumulated knowledge on compellence. First, the understanding of the concept itself has been deepened. As mentioned in the previous section, Freedman (1998) clarifies the concept of coercion by placing it between consent and control. He also points out that coercion is a mutual interaction and that targets try to increase the coercers’ enforcement costs through counter-coercion (Freedman, 1998, p.30).

The interactive nature of coercion is further explored by Byman and Waxman (2002, pp.37-38). They emphasise that coercion is a dynamic interaction between the coercers and opponents. The opponents take countermeasures to mitigate or neutralise the costs inflicted on them and to inflict costs on the coercers. Regarding the specific counter-coercive strategies that Western powers often face, Byman and Waxman (1999, pp.111-116) raise three: “civilian suffering-based strategies”, which exploit the sensitivities to casualties suffered by civilians in the target states; “coalition-fracturing strategies”, which exploit the difficulty of maintaining unity among the coalition members; and “casualty-generating strategies”, which exploit the sensitivities to casualties suffered by their own nationals.

Second, studies have explored the conditions for the success of compellence. This is the part of the literature that is most relevant to this thesis, but unfortunately, consensus has not yet been reached regarding success conditions.

Some of these studies do not include empirical examinations. Schaub (1998, pp.47-57) argues that the following factors affect the result of compellence: the value of what is demanded for the targets (stopping something that is ongoing is easier than undoing something that has already been achieved or initiating something new, and the demands related to domestic issues are more difficult to accept than those related to diplomatic policies), whether the compellence is driven by need or opportunity (need-driven compellence is more credible but more inflexible than opportunity-driven compellence), the clarity of the demands and threats (clarity facilitates
compellence), and whether demands are made publicly or secretly (publicity hinders compellence). According to Schaub, the necessary type and amount of the military capability depend on the content of the demands and threats, and whether the actual employment of force militates for or against compellence is unclear.

Johnson et al. (2002, p.19) discuss conventional coercion. They raise four factors as the determinants of the effectiveness of coercion: the perceived capability of the coercers, the credibility of the threats, the severity of the threats compared to what is at stake, and the availability of counter-coercion by the opponents.

From the viewpoint of coercion as dynamic interaction, Byman and Waxman (2002, p.30) maintain that the two factors are important for the success of compellence. One is to identify and threaten the opponents’ “pressure points”, or “areas the adversary cannot impenetrably guard”. The other is to establish escalation dominance, or “the ability to increase the threatened costs to an adversary while denying the adversary the opportunity to neutralize those costs or to counterescalate”.

Other studies combine theoretical discussions with empirical examination. Kagan (1998) reorganises the conditions identified by George and his colleagues into two groups: “situational factors” and “tactical factors”. The former are factors that the coercers cannot manipulate in the short term, and they include the balances of power and interests, restraints on the coercers based on domestic factors, the responses of other states, and the stubbornness of the targets (p.91). The latter are those that the coercers can select in the implementation of the strategy, and they include the level of the demands; the extent of the urgency put on the demands; the extent, explicitness, and publicness of the threats; the use of exemplary force; and the use of carrots (pp.94-95). She argues that the situational factors have a stronger explanatory power regarding the results of coercion than the tactical factors, and she demonstrates this through two case studies.

Blechman and Wittes (1999) analyse the limited use of force by the US during the Bush senior and Clinton administrations. The factors they examine are the existence of a historical precedent, public and international
support, the urgency put on demands, tangible actions in addition to threats, the clarity and degree of demands, the visibility of compliance, the use of positive incentives, and the potency of threats (pp.7-11). Based on the analysis of eight cases during the two administrations, they argue that the level of demand, the visibility of compliance, positive inducements, domestic support, and the potency of threats are important factors affecting the results of the use of threats and limited force (pp.26-27).

Treverton (2000, p.12) argues that compellence is more likely to succeed when the following conditions are satisfied: the opponents are non-democratic and are adversaries rather than friends of the compellers; the opponents lack domestic support; the power base of the target regimes can be effectively threatened; the balance of interest and resolve is in favour of the compellers; a clear and accepted status quo exists; a successful precedent exists; compliance with demands is verifiable; the compellers’ security interests are involved; the compellers have strong domestic support; the compellers act unilaterally rather than as a coalition; the compellers use direct, clear, and proportional threats; and the compellers regard compellence as a campaign rather than as a one-off attempt. He examines the validity of the conditions using three cases of US compellence.

Art and his colleagues add eight new cases of coercive diplomacy to the work by George and Simons (Art and Cronin, 2003). Based on the examinations of US coercive diplomacy in the 1990s and the early 2000s, Art (2003b) concludes that the conditions that favour coercive diplomacy identified by George and his colleagues are supported. He argues that two of the conditions are critically important – namely, making opponents fear escalation and ensuring that the balance of motivation is in favour of the coercers (pp.372, 383). He further finds that the provision of carrots corresponds with the success of coercive diplomacy, while the type of demand does not (p.401).

In addition to a case study approach, a quantitative approach is used in studies on compellence. Based on the Militarized Compellent Threats dataset, a newly constructed dataset of interstate compellence between 1918 and 2001, Sechser (2011, pp.389-391) finds that compellers seem to
succeed more often when they resort to the show of force in compellence. Conversely, the compellers that have a larger military expenditure than the targets, possess nuclear weapons, or are democratic do not have a better chance at being successful in compellence. Post (2019) combines Sechter’s dataset with information about the type of force involved in threats and finds that the demonstration of air power is less effective than the show of force involving land or sea power. According to him, this is because the use of air power is cheaper and less risky than the use of other types of force and therefore does not strengthen the perceived resolve of the compellers.

These studies discuss compellence without a specific scope, but Jakobsen (1998a; 1998b) explores conditions for success, focusing on the specific context of compellence by coalitions of states against opponents who have already used force. In the first attempt (Jakobsen, 1998b), he modifies the conditions identified by George and his colleagues, and uses them to interpret the failure of coercive diplomacy in the Kuwait crisis. The conditions are “image of war”, “isolation of adversary”, “adversary cohesion”, “clear demand”, “use of ultimatum”, “threaten to defeat the adversary with little cost”, “usable military options”, “strong leadership”, “domestic support”, “international support”, “assurance against future demands”, and “use of carrot” (pp.75-79). In a later attempt (Jakobsen, 1998a), he builds a more parsimonious framework based on arguments by Schelling while incorporating the conditions that George and Simons regard as especially important. He calls the framework “ideal policy”, in the sense that it is what states can do for the best. It is composed of “a threat of force to defeat the opponent or deny him his objectives quickly with little cost, backed by the necessary capability”; “a deadline for compliance”; “an assurance to the adversary against future demands”; and “an offer of carrots for compliance” (pp.30, 32). He tests the framework in three cases and demonstrates that it predicts their results well (pp.131-132). He also argues that states implement the ideal policy when they have the will to use force based on the combinations of the levels of interest involved, the likelihood of military success, and the extent of domestic support (pp. 43, 136-137).

Another study focusing on a specific context explores the use of compellence which demands regime change (Downes, 2018). Despite
regime change being one of the heaviest possible demands, the Militarized Compellent Threats dataset shows that compellence demanding regime change tends to succeed more frequently than compellence involving other weaker demands. Downes explains that the counter-intuitive pattern is the result of the selection effect: States tend to demand regime change only when such an attempt is likely to work. He argues that the factors leading to the success of compellence demanding regime change are overwhelming relative material power, geographic proximity, the isolation of target states, the show of force, and the assurance of the outgoing leader’s security.

Related to the conditions for the success of the strategy, several recent studies examine why major powers often fail to compel weaker states. Haun (2015) explains that the counter-intuitive phenomenon occurs because the huge advantage in relative power tends to drive major powers to issue demands that are unacceptable for the targets, such as territories or regime change. His study suggests that the level of demand has critical importance for the success of compellence. Sechser (2010; 2016; 2018) answers the same question, focusing on weak target states’ concern regarding future compellence. If weak states expect that they will be targets of compellence again, they have an incentive to resist the demand they are facing now for the sake of building a reputation that they are stubborn and willing to accept high costs. The explanation highlights the importance of the assurance that no additional demand will be made. Chamberlain (2016) proposes another alternative explanation. She argues that weak target states reject US demands and keep rejecting them even after the launch of military strikes, because the weak states believe that the US would not proceed to the brute-force realisation of objectives through a costly war. Chamberlain’s argument emphasises the importance of the resolve to accept costs and the potent threats to defeat stubborn targets.

As a whole, these studies examine similar factors which can affect the cost–benefit calculations of targets and compellers. They cover factors related to what is demanded, what is threatened in what manner, and what kind and number of resources are available for compellers and targets. Multiple studies argue for the importance of such conditions as the stronger interests and motivation on the side of the compellers, the potency and
credibility of the threats, the assurance against future demands, the use of positive inducements, the existence of domestic support, the existence of strong leadership, and the lack of external support on the target side. At the same time, the studies draw seemingly contradictory conclusions about the importance of the relative ease, clarity, and publicness of the demands; the urgency accompanying the demands; the use of exemplary force; and the existence of international support.

These disagreements stem in part from the use of cases in different contexts in the assessments; factors that affect the results of compellence in one context can be unimportant in other circumstances. Among the studies dealing with compellence in general, George and Simons (1994b), Blechman and Wittes (1999), Treverton (2000), and Art and Cronin (2003) analyse cases of US compellence, but their empirical examinations mix quite different contexts. What they have in common is the examination of compellence against a weaker power (e.g. Libya, Iraq, and North Korea) and in regard to a humanitarian intervention (e.g. Somalia, Yugoslavia, and Haiti). However, the cases that George and Simons (1994b) use include compellence involving two superpowers (Cuba and Laos), that during the World War II (Japan just before Pearl Harbour), and that in a limited war (Vietnam). In turn, Treverton (2000) includes compellence against a non-hostile country (India over nuclear development), and Art and Cronin (2003) include compellence against terrorists in their cases. Kagan (1998) employs two cases of European major powers’ compellence against small states in the pre-World War I era, and Sechser (2011) covers 210 cases of interstate compellence between 1918 and 2001 dealing with versatile protagonists and issues.

If these cases in diverse contexts had the same conclusion, their findings would be valid as conditions for the success of compellence in general; however, the existing studies did not reach a consensus on the conditions. Consensus seems difficult to achieve if the studies deal with versatile contexts simultaneously.

Contextual differences are expected to affect the conditions for success. For example, the conditions for the success of compellence in a
situation in which one or both sides have already resorted to force, such as compellence during interstate or civil wars, may be different from those in crises where neither side has actually used force. If the protagonists have huge sunk costs from using force, they may be more difficult to compel and may require additional conditions to be satisfied compared to compelling targets that have no sunk costs. Another difference related to context is the possibility of nuclear war. Actors may behave differently (being more risk acceptant, for example) if there is no possibility that their confrontation will escalate to nuclear war. Therefore, success conditions for compellence between conventional powers or in regard to humanitarian interventions may be different from those for compellence between nuclear superpowers. A further example of different contexts is compellence between states and against non-state actors. As non-state actors seldom have solid organisations and their leaders’ control over members tends to be weak (Byman and Waxman, 2002, p.192), successful compellence against non-state actors may require conditions that enable compellers to obtain a clear upper hand that is obvious to the rank-and-file members in addition to their leaders.

Moreover, whether compellers can manipulate factors that affect the results of compellence also differs from context to context. For example, the balance of force is basically fixed in interstate crises because states cannot increase their overall force suddenly. In peace operations, however, the size of the intervening force can be increased or decreased in the short term. Of course, when organising peace operations, the assembly of troops is not an easy task, and the size of the force is beyond the control of any actor. Yet, because the troops of multinational forces are drawn from a far larger potential pool of states in the international community, there is a realistic possibility of increasing the size of the forces if the need arises. In contrast, the balance of interest is a factor that states can manipulate when they select issues and demands in using compellence. However, this factor is fixed in regard to peace operations because they intervene in others’ wars and local warring parties – namely, targets of compellence – have far larger stakes (Posen, 1996, pp.82, 84; Crawford, 2009, p.288). If the target side has a stronger interest in the issue in dispute, the compellers can limit their
demands so that they do not harm the vital interests of the target, thereby making the demands more acceptable. However, this is a difficult option for peace operations because their mandates are given by the UN Security Council (UNSC) and they cannot change the mandates by themselves. The UNSC is a collective body that is composed of 15 member states; therefore, the council’s decision is a result of political negotiations and compromise among them and is therefore inflexible, although there may be some room for manoeuvre. Moreover, it is unlikely that the council would retract demands such as the halt of violence or disarmament, which are fundamental to conflict resolution and stabilisation and have to be realised somehow. Hence, peace operations have to employ compellence without satisfying one of the factors that the existing studies regard as very important for the success of the strategy.

Whether compellers can manipulate factors has different practical implications. If the conditions for success are factors that are beyond the compellers’ realm of manipulation, the compellers should pay attention to diagnosing and deciding on the correct situation in which to employ compellence. If the conditions are factors that the compellers can manipulate, then they should pay more attention to formulating the appropriate policy and strategy of compellence.

Given the differences between contexts, it can be fruitful to narrow down the scope of a study to a specific context when examining the relative importance of the factors that can affect the result of the strategy. Such middle-range theories are expected to identify success conditions in a more specified manner in exchange for the width of their applicability. Among the studies reviewed, those conducted by Jakobsen (1998a; 1998b) and Downes (2018) fall into the approach of building a middle-range theory. In this respect, the approach of this thesis is similar to that used in their studies. This research is a part of such efforts to build a middle-range theory, focusing on the compellence that is carried out in peace operations.

The third aspect of compellence that has been explored in the literature is coercive mechanisms. From the perspective of coercive mechanisms, pressure used in compellence, like that used in deterrence,
can be largely divided into two categories: punishment and denial. Both try to manipulate the cost–benefit calculations of the targets and convince them that defiance against the compellers’ demands will result in the overall costs exceeding the benefits of the defiance. The two types of pressure, however, work on different sides of the calculation. Compellence by punishment threatens to increase the costs of defiance, while compellence by denial threatens to reduce the possibility of attaining the benefits of defiance (Pape, 1996, p.18; Johnson et al., 2002, pp.16-17). As Freedman (1998, pp.29-30) explains, punishment in its pure form does not hinder the capability of targets to pursue their original courses of action, and the execution of the threat of punishment does not lead to control. Conversely, the execution of the threat of denial directly affects the targets’ capability to pursue their objectives and leads to control at the end. Therefore, the difference between compellence by denial and brute force is that of degree (Byman and Waxman, 2002, p.78). In reality, of course, both types of pressure are often employed in a mixed manner.

The most extensive study on coercive mechanism is that by Pape (1996), who focuses on the use of air power. He examines the effectiveness of denial and punishment by analysing 33 cases of the application of strategic air power, and he concludes that denial has a better chance of success than punishment. Despite agreeing that denial is a potent form of compellence, Mueller (1998) points out that Pape focuses on compellence over vital stakes for targets, and his conclusion that punishment does not work may not apply to cases that involve non-vital issues. Dekker (2011) improves Pape’s denial model from the perspective of interactions between compellers and targets. He argues that what is important in denying targets’ military strategies is to negate their counter-coercive efforts, and he demonstrates the importance of this factor through a case study of bombing campaigns in the Vietnam War.

Not limited to air power but also discussing the use of coercion in general, Byman and Waxman (2002, p.78) argue that denial makes coercion more likely to succeed, although they do not conduct an empirical test. Art (2003b, pp.399-401) finds that the use of the strong denial type of pressure was more effective than other forms of pressure in the cases of US coercive
diplomacy. Examining 28 cases, de Wijk (2014) also finds that the threat or use of ground forces and the pursuance of control, which is pressure of the denial type, correlate with the success of coercive attempts (pp.124-125). However, he regards victories secured through brute force, such as the forcible regime change in Iraq, as the success of coercion (p.324), although he defines coercion as an attempt to “manipulate and influence” the choice of other actors (p.16). Therefore, his conceptualisation and its application to empirical cases contain some problems.

In these studies, it is largely agreed that denial is a more reliable form of compellence than punishment. This is expected to also apply to compellence in peace operations, because, as Posen (1996, pp.86-108) argues, the opponents in such a context seldom have assets that can be threatened as a form of punishment.

However, it is expected that the specific ways in which compellers can achieve denial differ from context to context. Denial aims to negate opponents’ strategies; thus, its specific form depends on the opponents’ objectives and how they try to achieve them (Mueller, 1998, p.214). This means that different kinds of denial can work in different contexts, and again, focused studies on specific contexts can be fruitful for the advancement of the understanding of coercive mechanisms.

Finally, there are some studies that explore aspects of compellence that became important after the end of the Cold War. One such aspect is the use of coalitions. This is strongly related to compellence in peace operations, for it is usually carried out by multinational forces. Coalitions entail both advantages and disadvantages. Regarding the advantages, coalitions gather more military resources and intelligence; isolate targets diplomatically; and bring legitimacy to operations, thus strengthening domestic support. The disadvantages include the difficulty of coordination among members in terms of interests and objectives, the possible lack of unity regarding messages sent to targets, and inefficiency in military operations caused by additional decision-making requirements and procedures. All of these disadvantages damage the credibility of the threats that are issued by the coalitions (George and Simons, 1994a, p.273; Waxman, 1997, pp.39-44; Byman and
Waxman, 2002, pp.154-169; Morgan, 2003, pp.178-186). Byman and Waxman (2002, pp.170-171) argue that the unity of coalitions is crucial in successfully conducting coalitional coercion. Unity brings potency and credibility to pressure, as well as resiliency against adversaries’ counter-coercion. Success or failure at the tactical level is expected to create positive or negative spirals, respectively. Tactical success strengthens the unity of coalitions, which makes following threats more credible and adversaries more likely to be restrained. In contrast, tactical failure undermines the unity of coalitions and thus damages the credibility of following threats, which makes adversaries more likely to challenge coencers.

The other aspect of compellence becoming more important in the post-Cold War era is the use of the strategy against non-state actors. The majority of studies on coercion against non-state actors focus on terrorism and usually use the concept of deterrence, but the arguments also tend to include compellence in their scopes. Although they do not address compellence in peace operations, their discussions provide useful insights that are adaptable to it.

The first point that the researchers in this group of studies raise is that coercing terrorists is difficult for various reasons. Terrorists have strong motivation, and confrontation against them tends to fall into a zero-sum one, which hinders the use of reassurances and carrots (Lepgold, 1998b, pp.139, 141-142; Davis and Jenkins, 2002, pp.4-5; Crenshaw, 2003, pp.310-311, 313; Bowen, 2004, p.64). It is difficult to understand terrorists’ perspectives because of their different values and cultural systems, as well as the lack of information (Crenshaw, 2003, p.311; Bowen, 2004, pp.56, 59). Terrorists also have loose intra-organisational control, and using force against them can be difficult due to the scarcity of appropriate targets or can even be counterproductive, leading to the enhancement of enmity against Western governments and of the legitimacy of the terrorists (Treverton, 2000, pp.28-29; Crenshaw, 2003, pp.310, 312; Bowen, 2004, pp.62-63). In addition, terrorists also respond and adapt to counterterrorism measures and try to counter or circumvent them (Harvey and Wilner, 2012).
Nevertheless, the researchers argue that coercing terrorists is possible. One feature of the argument is the focus on the utility of denial. Nuclear deterrence theory is centred on the threat of punishment, but punishment is difficult to apply against terrorists due to the lack of targetable valuable assets. Therefore, researchers instead explore how the threat of denial can be applied against terrorists. For example, enhancing the security of possible targets makes them more difficult for terrorists to attack. The interception of materials or other support provided for terrorists can reduce their capabilities. Measures to mitigate the effects of terrorists’ attacks also prevent terrorists from achieving the desired effects and responses (Bowen, 2004, pp.61-62; Lebovic, 2007, pp.162-167; Smith and Talbot, 2008, pp.56-59; Wilner, 2011, pp.22-23; 2015, pp.61-66). Geipel (2007) provides empirical support that terrorism in Europe during the Cold War was restrained and defeated as they lost hope because of the denial measures employed by governments.

Another feature of the studies of the field is their understanding of coercion against terrorists as cumulative effects rather than as a one-off, all-or-nothing attempt. They refer specifically to the Israeli strategic concept of “cumulative deterrence”. This concept assumes the existence of persistent violent challenges and seeks to reduce them through repetitive forceful reactions rather than to prevent violence completely through the use of mere threats (Bar-Joseph, 1998, pp.156-157; Almog, 2004; Bar, 2008, pp.36-38; Rid, 2012). This concept is called deterrence, but what it represents is in effect compellence: Coercers try to halt violence by using force successfully and thereby affecting the calculation of the perpetrators.

The empirical examinations of cumulative deterrence have provided contradictory results. Hafez and Hatfield (2006) find that Israel’s targeted

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4 Some researchers argue that the punishment type of pressure can be applied if the target is seen as a wider system. For example, punishment is easier to apply against patron states of terrorists (Lepgold, 1998b, pp.142-143; Bowen, 2004, p.65; Kuperwasser, 2008, p.131; Wilner, 2011, pp.14-17; 2013, p.750).
killings of Palestinian leaders and cadres neither reduced nor increased Palestinian violence. Maoz (2007) statistically examines the effect of Israel's limited use of force against Arab states and non-state actors and concludes that the cumulative deterrent effect is not confirmed. In contrast, Byman (2006) and Bar (2012) argue that Israel's targeted killings contributed to constraining Palestinian terrorists and reduced the effectiveness of their attacks. Wilner (2010; 2015) examines the targeted killings of terrorists in Afghanistan. He finds that successful targeted killings hindered the operation of the Taliban, degraded its attacks to less sophisticated forms, and weakened the motivations of its members.

Payne et al. (2008) also argue that coercing non-state actors requires a variety of approaches and a long period of trial and error. They examine 10 cases of coercion by states against non-state actors, from historical pirate problems to post-World War II counterterrorism. The authors find that punishment alone was ineffective and denial was required. The states often tried to defeat the non-state actors, and this attempt could have coercive effects even if there was a failure to defeat them. The states also used carrots in addition to pressure, and they were effective when the objectives of the non-state actors were limited. The authors also emphasise the importance of obtaining up-to-date information about non-state actors to design effective coercion. Based on the case studies, they argue that coercion is more likely to succeed when target non-state actors have strong leadership and limited goals and have no foreign support nor sanctuaries.

These studies show that the concepts of compellence and deterrence are applicable and useful in analysing confrontation with non-state actors. Although the number of studies on this aspect of compellence is still small and further systematic empirical examination is required, the theoretical arguments and empirical findings reviewed here imply that the denial type of pressure seems to play a larger role, and the repetitive employment of force is likely to be required in compelling non-state armed groups. These findings may well apply to compellence in peace operations.

In addition to the studies dealing directly with compellence that have been reviewed so far, there are others that do not focus on compellence but
discuss issues related to it. One such issue is how to make threats credible in coercion. As leaders have an incentive to misrepresent their resolve to fight wars to make opponents back down in crises, mere statements do not constitute credible threats (Fearon, 1994a, p.578). How to make threats credible is also a critical issue in compellence in peace operations, so these studies can be helpful for this research.

The conventional wisdom is that the relative balances of power and interests between protagonists determine the effectiveness of threats. Some studies argue that both are important. Huth and Russett (1984) find that deterrers' interests and the local balance of force effectively explain the result of extended-immediate deterrence. Danilovic (2001) similarly finds that the balance of interest effectively explains the result of extended-immediate deterrence and that power balance also corresponds with the result. Regarding extended-general deterrence, Johnson et al. (2015) find that allies with better capabilities and stronger links are less likely to face aggressions. Press (2005) also argues that leaders evaluate the credibility of opponents' threats based on the power and interests they perceive the opponents to have. Others contend that either of the balance of force or interests is important. Huth (1988) finds that the short-term and immediate balance of force affects the result of extended-immediate deterrence. George and Smoke (1974, pp.558-561) argue that the credibility of deterrence depends on deterrers’ national interests involved in the issues in dispute rather than on the commitment techniques that they employ. Maoz (1983) finds that the results of international crises do not depend on relative capability but on the balance of resolve.

Fearon (1994b, pp.245-248) argues that the effectiveness of threats in regard to immediate deterrence depends on the challengers’ prior expectations about these two factors. If the actors challenge the defenders despite knowing that the latter have stronger interests in the issues that are in dispute, the challengers must also have a very strong motivation to risk wars; thus, immediate deterrence hardly works. Conversely, if the challengers act opportunistically, believing that the defenders' interests are small, then the deterrent threats reveal the defenders’ strong resolve and should work. Similarly, rational actors challenge stronger defenders only on
issues that the challengers think the defenders have no resolve to defend. Therefore, deterrent threats signal the defenders’ true resolve and should be effective. Fearon re-evaluates data used by Huth and Russett and confirms that his hypotheses fit the data better.

In addition to the balances of power and interests, there are two other factors that researchers have discussed extensively as sources of the credibility of threats. One is audience costs. Fearon (1994a) contends that the credibility of threats in crises depends on the cost that domestic audiences would impose on their leaders when they fail to execute the threats they made in public, because such acts hurt their countries’ honour and reputation. He argues that the balance of capabilities and interests cannot affect the results of crises, because rational protagonists must have considered them when deciding to challenge or resist the challenge unless they are unobservable. He instead claims that audience costs are the key determinant of who wins in crises; the side with the greater audience costs – for example, democratic states – can better signal its resolve and is less likely to back down.

Some researchers support and extend Fearon's argument. Eyerman and Hart (1996), Partell and Palmer (1999), Gelpi and Griesdorf (2001), and McManus (2014) statistically examine the hypotheses drawn from Fearon's argument and conclude that they are supported. Smith (1998) explores the logic of how audience costs are generated assuming that leaders’ performance in crises reveals their competence and thereby affects their chances of re-election. Schultz (2001) instead argues that democratic states can send credible threats because of the openness of domestic discussion and the genuine domestic support that it can show.

However, others pose questions about and point out some problems with the audience cost theory. The first critique is that with regard to deciding whether to punish their leaders, people make much of the substance of policy or the salience of the issues in dispute, rather than of the consistency between their leaders' words and deeds (Clare, 2007; Snyder and Borghard, 2011). Second, in reality, leaders usually make their threats vague enough to ensure that they avoid the consistency problem (Snyder and Borghard,
Third, autocratic states do not understand the domestic dynamics of democratic states and the audience costs that democratic leaders suffer (Snyder and Borghard, 2011; Mercer, 2012). Fourth, the information citizens can obtain on foreign policies is limited and can be manipulated, which makes it difficult for the citizens to play the role of punisher (Gartzke and Lupu, 2012; Mercer, 2012). In addition, Downes and Sechser (2012) point out that the two databases – the Militarized Interstate Dispute and the International Crisis Behavior – that are commonly used to test the audience cost theory are not suitable for this purpose because the majority of the cases included in these datasets do not involve coercive threats. The authors use the Militarized Compellent Threats dataset instead and conclude that democratic states do not perform better in compellence, contradicting the key prediction of the audience cost theory.

Gartzke and Lupu (2012) point out that the audience cost theory is inherently difficult to test because leaders would not document their exploitation, if any, of audience costs. Several researchers try to cope with this difficulty through the use of an experimental approach (Tomz, 2007; Levendusky and Horowitz, 2012; Davies and Johns, 2013). However, experiments do not confirm that people actually vote against leaders who have backed down in crises and generate audience costs nor that this is advantageous in international bargaining. In sum, the debates over the effectiveness of audience costs are ongoing (Levy, 2012).

The other possible source of threat credibility that has attracted great attention is reputation. Traditionally, researchers have regarded reputation as an important factor affecting the credibility of threats. For example, Schelling (1966) regards commitments as interdependent, and the failure to protect one of them renders it difficult to make adversaries believe that the state will protect other commitments (p.55). He therefore contends that “face” in the sense of states’ “reputation for action” is “one of the few things worth fighting over”; at the same time, he warns against staking it on every occasion (pp.124-125). In a similar vein, Blechman and Wittes (1999, pp.27-28) argue that US performances in Vietnam, Lebanon, and Somalia make the targets of US compellence stubborn, believing that they can defeat the US. Lieberman (1995, pp.898-899) argues that reputation is context
dependent and that a state’s previous performance affects its opponents’ calculations only if the context of the confrontation is similar.

States’ leaders care deeply about their own reputations and act to defend them, to the extent that one researcher describes such a tendency as a “cult” (Tang, 2005). According to some studies, this concern for reputation even drives states to proactively initiate and escalate confrontations or fight wars that they are likely to lose for the purpose of reputation building when they expect future confrontations (Clare and Danilovic, 2010; Sechser, 2010; 2016; 2018).

Some researchers, however, cast doubt on this conventional belief. They agree that reputation is not worth fighting for, but their arguments vary regarding whether states can have reputations at all and, if so, what kinds. Some argue that only a certain type of reputation can be earned. Mercer (1996, pp.46-47) contends that adversarial states do not earn a reputation for lacking resolve. Owing to psychological biases, dispositional explanations tend to be provided when others behave in an undesirable manner, while desirable behaviours tend to be attributed to situations. Mercer argues that this tendency suggests that a state that in an adversarial relationship with another can earn a reputation for resolve, because being resolved is undesirable for the opponent, but it can hardly ever earn a reputation for weakness, because being weak is desirable for the opponent.

In contrast to Mercer, Shannon and Dennis (2007) contend that a reputation for lacking resolve can be earned while that for having resolve is difficult to attain, and such a reputation can be situation specific. Actors tend to have a negative image, such as that of a paper tiger, of their enemies and they interpret new information with a bias that enhances this image. In a similar vein, Fettweis (2007/08, pp.625-627) regards Al-Qaeda’s frequent reference to the US’s lack of resolve as unchangeable not only because the former uses such rhetoric as a tool of recruitment but also because the asymmetric power balance forces the former to believe in the weakness of the latter’s resolve regardless of the truth.

Tang (2005) and Press (2005) argue that reputation cannot be obtained nor does it matter. Tang (2005, p.50) argues that because of the
uncertainty that is derived from anarchy, states have to assume the worst-case scenario – that is, their adversaries are resolute in every crisis – and behave accordingly. This necessity makes the past behaviour of adversaries irrelevant; therefore, no reputation is formed. Press (2005, pp.22-23) similarly argues that states’ leaders do not rely on the past behaviour of adversaries when they assess the credibility of the threats made by the adversaries. This is because the anarchy of the international environment forces leaders to be careful, every crisis is unique, and people tend to make decisions cautiously and analytically when faced with serious ones.

As each of the above bodies of work has its own supporting evidence, the debate is unresolved. With regard to peace operations, Morgan (2003, pp.191-192) is sceptical of the idea that collective actors can earn reputation, especially if the targets of coercion differ from case to case. Similarly, Crawford (2009, pp.286-287) argues that reputation does not work in collective UN operations, because the member and context of each operation differ and the connection between past and future operations is weak. However, there seems to be a possibility that reputation also plays a role in peace operations. The UN, peace operation as a whole, or specific troop-contributing countries may have a certain type of reputation, which can affect the credibility of threats to use force in peace operations, or they may have no reputation. This point is worth examining as a possible factor which can affect the result of compellence in peace operations.

Another issue that is deeply related to compellence is the utility of rewards or positive inducements. These are another type of leverage that is frequently used to influence others. Moreover, studies on deterrence and compellence have pointed out the utility of combining threats with positive inducements, which can compensate for the damage that targets suffer or can work as a face-saving measure (George et al., 1971; George and Smoke, 1974; 1989; Jervis, 1979; George and Simons, 1994b; Byman and Waxman, 2002; Art and Cronin, 2003). Although the utility of positive inducements has attracted less attention than that of threats, some researchers have studied the topic.
It is important to distinguish positive inducements or rewards from assurances. Positive inducements bring the increase of value for targets compared to the expectations they hold. Conversely, an assurance is a “conditional commitment neither to reward nor punish” (Baldwin, 1971, pp.23, 26). For threats to be effective, they must be accompanied by assurances that threats will not be carried out if the targets accept the demands (Schelling, 1966, pp.4, 74). In the same way, the conditional promises of rewards must also be accompanied by assurances that rewards will not be provided in cases of noncompliance (Baldwin, 1971, p.26).

Rewards are thought to have some advantages in comparison to threats. Negative pressure derives negative responses, such as fear and resistance, from targets and can hinder cooperation in other issues, while positive inducements derive amicable responses, such as hope and attraction, which can facilitate further cooperation (Baldwin, 1971, pp.32-33). Threats from the outside may also increase support for target regimes because of the “rally-round-the-flag” effect (Nincic, 2006, pp.323-324; 2010, pp.144-145; 2011, p.23). Moreover, when promises are used for the purpose of compellence, the structure turns into one that is similar to that of deterrence by threats – that is, make demands, show promises, and wait. This absolves the compellers from taking initiatives and related risks and can thus be more efficient than relying on threats. Furthermore, the targets of compellence must suffer fewer political costs in accepting demands with rewards than doing so under threat (Davis, 2000, pp.24-25).

At the same time, the use of positive inducements has its own difficulties. First, providing rewards for actors who perform malicious acts, such as large-scale human rights violations, would be morally wrong and inappropriate (Cortright, 1997, pp.278-279). Second, providing rewards tends to be regarded as a sign of weakness and punishment as strength, and the latter can attract stronger support in domestic politics (Baldwin, 1971, p.34; Milburn and Christie, 1989, p.632; Leng, 1993, pp.169-171). Third, the provision of rewards to halt unwanted behaviour can lead to moral hazards and contrarily facilitate the unwanted behaviour with the aim of obtaining additional rewards (Baldwin, 1971, p.36; Cortright, 1997, pp.277-278). This concern is considerable, especially when rewards are used for the purpose
of deterrence (Davis, 2000, p.24). Fourth, in adversarial relations, the intentions behind the offers of rewards can be perceived sceptically or even suspected of being plots (Milburn and Christie, 1989, pp.630-631). Fifth, it is often difficult to match demands with proposed rewards. What providers think of as rewards may not be perceived as such by targets, because of differences in preferences or values (Baldwin, 1971, p.24; Milburn and Christie, 1989, pp.628-629). Moreover, although the demands are often political in nature, the proposed rewards tend to be economic or symbolic, and this asymmetry makes it difficult to reach agreements (Nincic, 2011, pp.62-63, 174-176).

Therefore, neither threats nor rewards are superior to one another. Their utilities depend on the situation (Baldwin, 1971, pp.34-35), and some researchers point out the utility of combining them. Nincic (2010, p.181; 2011, p.88) argues that sanctions weaken target regimes and make them more susceptible to rewards if they are seen in a longer timeframe, while pressure from the outside can strengthen regimes in the short term. Leng (1993, p.149) analyses 40 international crises and finds that the combination of negative and positive inducements employed in a reciprocating manner tends to end crises in concessions or diplomatic victories, while sole reliance on coercive inducements tends to escalate crises into wars far more frequently. Art (2003b, pp.388-389) also raises positive inducements as a facilitating factor of compellence and argues that they should be provided after compellers have employed pressure in order to avoid carrots being misunderstood as a sign of weakness. In examining the use of coercion against non-state actors, Payne et al. (2008, pp.22-24) also find that combining positive inducements with pressure has utility. However, they warn that simply giving what is demanded can be ineffective or even harmful for coercers, citing examples of when accepting the demands of terrorists did not lead to them ceasing their activities.

In sum, positive inducements can facilitate compellence when combined with pressure. Regarding compellence in peace operations, positive inducements can also be employed as a leverage. Although the identification of the optimal use of positive inducements requires further empirical examination, the studies on positive inducements are also helpful
in deriving hypotheses about the conditions for the success of compellence in peace operations.

This section has reviewed the literature on compellence and its related studies. Starting from the two seminal works – one by Schelling and the other by George and his colleagues – researchers have explored issues such as conditions for the success of compellence, coercive mechanisms, the impact of using coalitions and targeting non-state actors in employing the strategy, the sources of threat credibility, and the utility of positive inducements. However, the discussions on all of these aspects are inconclusive and require additional studies.

The most significant gap in the literature regards the disagreement about the conditions for the success of compellence. Existing studies draw contradictory conclusions about the relative importance of some factors that can affect the result of compellence. As the strategy is useful but risky, an improved understanding of this aspect is desired. One reasons for the disagreement is the mix of cases from different contexts in the empirical examinations. Compellence is applicable to a wide range of contexts, and different factors can be important in different settings. In addition, whether conditions are manipulable by compellers differs from context to context. Therefore, to further specify the conditions of success, narrowing down the scope of research and focusing on a specific context can be fruitful.

This approach of limiting the scope can also be fruitful in advancing the understanding of coercive mechanisms. The literature largely agrees that the pressure of denial is more effective than that of punishment. However, the logic of denial can encompass diverse measures, depending on the opponents' objectives and strategies. Therefore, again, narrowing down the scope is expected to be helpful for identifying the usable style of denial in specific situations.

Consequently, a study of compellence focusing on the specific context of peace operations is expected to contribute to the specification of the conditions of success and coercive mechanisms. Moreover, the context provides an opportunity to advance the understanding of coalitional compellence against non-state actors. The review shows that the number of
studies on compellence by coalitions and against non-state actors remains small despite these being the major players of the current strategic environment. Moreover, the existing studies on compellence against non-state actors focus on counterterrorism and are even less explored in other contexts. A study of compellence in peace operations would be a valuable contribution to improving the understanding of the utility of the strategy against non-state actors. The insights from the reviewed studies of compellence and its related issues provide a starting point for building the analytical framework for this study. However, the framework also needs to integrate insights from studies on peace operations.

1.2 Peace Operations

1.2.1 The Concept and Development of Peace Operations

In this thesis, the term “peace operations” is defined as field operations that are deployed to manage and/or resolve violent conflicts. This is a modified version of the definition provided in the UN document so-called the Capstone Doctrine: “Field operations deployed to prevent, manage, and/or resolve violent conflicts or reduce the risk of their recurrence” (United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations [UNDPKO] and Department of Field Support [DFS], 2008, p.98). The term peace operations is usually used as an umbrella concept which embraces all phases of international involvement in conflicts, such as conflict prevention, peacekeeping, peace enforcement, and post-conflict peacebuilding. However, the focus of this research is the use of force in peace operations; therefore, the scope of the term is limited here to realms which can involve combats by dropping words related to prevention and recurrence from the definition. With regard to actors who conduct peace operations, this definition does not exclude non-UN operations carried out by regional organisations, coalitions of the willing, nor individual states. In fact, one of the features of contemporary peace operations is cooperation among various actors. In particular, non-UN forces cooperating with UN operations in the form of the sequential division of labour and/or co-deployment tend to carry out operations that involve the use of force, so it is important to include them in the scope of this research.
The expected role of force in peace operations has changed drastically over the course of its development, from no expectation for combat capability to the possible substantial use of force. Typical peace operations during the Cold War, now referred to as “traditional peacekeeping”, were activities which deployed neutral international forces under the command of the UN with the consent of conflicting parties to maintain ceasefires in interstate conflicts. Against the backdrop of the paralysis of the UNSC, which made it impossible to activate Chapter VII of the UN Charter, traditional peacekeeping was non-coercive in nature and operated based on the so-called traditional principles of peacekeeping: the consent of conflicting parties, neutrality, and the non-use of force except self-defence. In traditional peacekeeping, the peacekeepers were not expected to use force in performing their duties under the assumption that the conflicting parties would cooperate with them.

However, at least at the conceptual level, the occasions on which peacekeepers could use force under the concept of “self-defence” expanded steadily during the early days of peacekeeping. In the first major armed peacekeeping operation, the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF), self-defence meant the protection of peacekeepers themselves and shooting back if they were fired on or under the clear threat of being attacked. In the “summary study” of UNEF, the then UN Secretary-General, Dag Hammarskjöld, showed his understanding of self-defence as not taking the initiative regarding the use of force (Findlay, 2002, pp.34, 41, 47; Sloan, 2011, pp.23-25).

During the second major peacekeeping operation, the United Nations Operation in the Congo (ONUC), self-defence came to include not only resistance against forceful attempts to disarm and/or capture UN personnel, property, and positions but also resistance against forceful attempts to hinder the peacekeepers from “carrying out their responsibilities” and securing their freedom of movement (Findlay, 2002, pp.60-61, 64; Chesterman, 2005, p.104). Later, the UNSC authorised ONUC to use force beyond self-defence, and ONUC conducted proactive military operations. The UN maintained that ONUC’s use of force was an act of self-defence
Although the Congo experience was considered an aberration that should not be repeated, the interpretation of self-defence in a subsequent mission, the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus, did not revert to that in UNEF and remained in line with the understanding in ONUC (Findlay, 2002, p.92; Sloan, 2011, pp.27-28). Moreover, in establishing another peacekeeping mission, UNEF II, the then UN Secretary-General, Kurt Waldheim, proposed that instead of “responsibility”, “[s]elf-defence would include resistance to attempts by forceful means to prevent it from discharging its duties under the mandate of the Security Council”, and this was approved by the UNSC (Findlay, 2002, p.100; Sloan, 2011, p.28). All subsequent missions were given guidelines including the defence of mandate as part of self-defence (UNDPKO, 1995, p.20).

This wider concept of self-defence, which included the defence of mandate, could be problematic because it could entail almost any kind of use of force (Findlay, 2002, p.19; Sloan, 2014, p.684). If the mandates were broad, the peacekeepers’ use of force in self-defence could be almost indistinguishable from enforcement activities (Cox, 1999, p.255). However, as a matter of fact, this conceptual enlargement of self-defence did not bring about an increase in peacekeepers’ use of force (Roberts, 1995, p.14). Force commanders on the ground made a realistic judgement that they needed cooperation from conflicting parties and peacekeepers’ arms were not strong enough to defeat the parties (Goulding, 1993, p.455).

The end of the Cold War and subsequent developments made a huge impact on peace operations and forced their transformation. In the post-Cold War era, intrastate conflicts became a major international security problem. Accordingly, peace operations also came to be used as a tool to intervene in civil wars with the tasks of stabilising the situations and mitigating humanitarian suffering. However, functioning in the traditional mode, the peacekeepers soon faced difficulties in carrying out their mandates in the harsh environment. Peace agreements in civil wars are precarious, and conflicting parties tend to break them very soon after they are signed.
Conflicting parties often manipulate their consent for peacekeeping, and some parties, called “spoilers”, actively obstruct peace processes and peacekeepers’ activities using violent means.

Against this backdrop, arguments emerged that the international forces that were involved in peace operations should be prepared to use force. This new trend firstly surfaced in “An Agenda for Peace”, which is a document that was prepared by the UN Secretary-General at the time, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, as a response to the expectation that the UN would have a larger role in international security in the post-Cold War world. In the document, Boutros-Ghali showed his intention for the UN to become actively involved in all phases of conflict resolution from preventive diplomacy to post-conflict peacebuilding. He proposed the establishment of peace enforcement units, which would be “more heavily armed than peace-keeping forces” and would work “to restore and maintain the cease-fire”, which was a task that was deemed too heavy for peacekeeping (UN, 1992, para.44).

However, it soon became clear that it is difficult to put the concept of peace enforcement into practice. In Somalia, the peacekeepers tried to forcefully disarm warring factions but had to withdraw without achieving the objective after suffering huge casualties. The peacekeeping operation that was deployed to Bosnia was given a mandate to protect “safe areas”, but the peacekeepers could not prevent ethnic cleansing in Srebrenica. Moreover, hundreds of peacekeepers themselves were taken hostage by a conflicting party, and military action by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was required to end the conflict. As a result of the failures, strong arguments arose that peacekeeping should remain in traditional non-coercive mode. Boutros-Ghali himself also admitted that the UN did not have the capability to conduct enforcement operations, except very limited ones, and that the traditional principles of peacekeeping should be adhered to (UN, 1995, paras.33-36, 77).

Nevertheless, from around the turn of the century, peacekeeping started to once again embrace a more forceful approach, thereby blurring the distinction between peacekeeping and peace enforcement. This is because going back to neutral peacekeeping did not provide a solution for
coping with the severe environment of civil war. This was vividly demonstrated in Rwanda, where peacekeepers in traditional mode could not prevent and stop the genocide.

One of the resulting trends has been the expansion of non-UN peace operations conducted by regional organisations, coalitions of the willing, and even a single state. Regional organisations, such as NATO, the European Union (EU), the African Union, and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), have conducted multiple peace operations. Western states sometimes lead coalitions of the willing (e.g. the US and Australia) or individually launch military operations in support of other peace missions (e.g. the UK and France). These non-UN missions tend to engage in high-intensity operations against specific warring factions that are violently disrupting peace processes. The operations are usually sanctioned or acknowledged by the UNSC and cooperate with UN missions either by preceding, co-deploying with, or succeeding them (Bellamy and Williams, 2005; Sloan, 2011, pp.51-54; Diehl and Balas, 2014, pp.79-80, 85-106; Bara and Hultman, 2020).

The other trend has been the militarisation of UN peace operations (Sloan, 2011). The necessity for peacekeepers to use force if required is strongly advocated in the “Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations” (UN, 2000a), or the so-called Brahimi Report, which was named after the chair of the panel. Among the recommendations, which cover a broad range of topics, the report states that peacekeepers should be able to defend mission mandates and contingents and should be allowed to use sufficient force to “silence a source” of attacks so that peacekeepers do not “cede the initiative to their attackers” (para.49). In addition, the report differentiates between neutrality, which it defines as the “equal treatment of all parties in all cases for all time”, and impartiality, which it defines as the “adherence to the principles of the Charter and to the objectives of a mandate that is rooted in those Charter principles”, and it notes that the latter should be an operational principle for peacekeeping (para.50). In this context, the report calls for peacekeepers to protect civilians, even by using force, although it stresses the danger of giving them such a task without providing the necessary resources (paras.50, 62-63). In sum, the Brahimi Report calls
for militarily capable forces “with robust rules of engagement” (para.55) for peacekeeping and expects them to use force if necessary to carry out their mandates and protect civilians.

In fact, the vast majority of the peacekeeping operations established after the Brahimi Report have been given mandates under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, as well as the task of protecting civilians. This robust posture in peacekeeping is positively self-evaluated by the UN in the Capstone Doctrine, which states the following:

the Security Council has given United Nations peacekeeping operations “robust” mandates authorizing them to “use all necessary means” to deter forceful attempts to disrupt the political process, protect civilians under imminent threat of physical attack, and/or assist the national authorities in maintaining law and order. By proactively using force in defense of their mandates, these United Nations peacekeeping operations have succeeded in improving the security situation and creating an environment conducive to longer-term peacebuilding in the countries where they are deployed (UNDPKO and DFS, 2008, p.34).

However, this movement towards robust peacekeeping is not without criticism. The first major concern is the lack of resources. Robust peacekeeping requires combat capabilities and the will to take risks so that even in vast areas of operations, including difficult terrains, the peacekeepers can protect themselves and the civilians under threat. In reality, peace operations are often short of troops who are ready to take risks. They are also short of critical equipment, including armoured vehicles and helicopters, and such capabilities are difficult to achieve (Gowan and Tortolani, 2008; Sloan, 2011, pp.283-288; Tardy, 2011, pp.160-161; Nsia-Pepra, 2014, pp.64-68; Nadin et al., 2015, pp.93-98). This is especially the case when peacekeepers are faced with increasingly capable spoilers, who employ sophisticated means and tactics (Gowan and Tortolani, 2008, pp.52-53; Sheeran, 2015, pp.106-108; Rhoads, 2016, pp.177-178). International troops need to protect themselves, the civilian components of the missions, and the local residents from likely retaliatory attacks (Sloan, 2011, p.290; Hunt, 2017, pp.115-118). Raising expectations by promoting robust missions
and then failing to implement them on the ground will expose civilians to even greater risks and tarnish the credibility of the UN and its peacekeeping efforts (Sloan, 2011, p.290; Nsia-Pepra, 2014, p.61; Rhoads, 2016, pp.105, 173-177).

The second criticism, which is related to the first, is the imbalance or unfairness of burdens. Developing countries, which provide the vast majority of troops for peacekeeping, have a grievance that developed countries including the US, the UK, and France, which are permanent members of the UNSC, promote and decide on robust mandates without bearing the burden of their implementation in terms of the provision of troops for such missions. Some developing countries are critical of the concept of robust peacekeeping itself, regarding it as a threat to their sovereignty, and they call for peacekeeping to remain within the realm of traditional principles (Benner et al., 2011, p.18; Tardy, 2011, pp.158-159; Nsia-Pepra, 2014, pp.59-60; Rhoads, 2016, pp.97-101).

The third concern is the inherent ambiguity in the new understanding of impartiality. The concept of impartiality, in keeping with the Brahimi Report, hinges upon the distinction between right and wrong based on international norms. However, this distinction is difficult to apply on the ground, because the positions of the perpetrators and victims of violence would differ depending on perspective and could change from one day to the next. Such judgement requires a clear understanding of the situation based on sufficient information, which is difficult to obtain (Williams, 2010; Rhoads, 2016). Moreover, peace operations inherently tend to take sides with governments, as evidenced by the fact that peacekeepers are frequently tasked with supporting the efforts of local governments to re-establish and extend their authorities and governance within their territories (Nadin et al., 2015, p.13; Peter, 2015, p.359; Aoi et al., 2017, pp.18-19). In fact, governments or their security forces can be perpetrators of violence. However, peacekeepers usually cannot take forceful measures against host governments due to their fear of losing consent and cooperation (Sloan, 2011, pp.288-289; UN, 2014a, para.40). Taking actions, including the use of force, based on such dubious impartiality can lead to biased behaviour by peacekeepers (Tardy, 2011, p.163; Rhoads, 2016). Moreover, peacekeepers would be unable to be
impartial mediators between conflicting parties if international troops employ force against one of the parties (Peter, 2015, p.364; Rhoads, 2016, p.78). These concerns have led to calls for more attention to be paid to politics rather than employing solutions that involve force based on such a skewed simplification (Tardy, 2011, p.156; Rhoads, 2016).

The report of High-level Independent Panel on Peace Operations, or the so-called HIPPO Report, which is another UN review report published in 2015, also shows some reservations about the robust trend of UN peace operations. It emphasises that for UN peace operations with the mandate to protect civilians, every effort, including the use of force, should be made to implement it, and it argues that peacekeepers should be able to use force “ranging from containment via deterrence and coercion to direct confrontation” to defend their mandates (UN, 2015, paras.83, 90, 92, 128). However, it warns that the expectation for peace operations to protect civilians has grown so high that they have not been able to live up with it (paras.27, 84, 91). The report draws attention to the limitations of peace operations and points out the necessity to adjust the mandates to the existing capabilities and to control expectations (paras.38, 95, 97, 103). Despite acceptance of the possibility that UN peace operations are given enforcement mandates, the report claims that such measures should be exceptional and that a better option is to use coalitions of the willing or regional actors (paras.113, 117-123).

As these critiques indicate, the current trend of robustness in peace operations faces some challenges. Nevertheless, this does not mean that peace operations should revert to the traditional basics, as this would simply repeat the course of the 1990s. No one can deny the importance of employing a political approach, but the protection of civilians who are in imminent danger cannot wait for the fruition of political processes; it requires an immediate physical response on the ground (Nadin et al., 2015, p.109). The necessary resources and capabilities are not guaranteed but are sometimes provided, and the missions subsequently succeed, as some cases reviewed in Chapter 2 indicate. The legitimate grievances of rebels or the communities they are based should be considered seriously, but this does not eliminate the necessity to contain their violence. Moreover,
sometimes there are clear perpetrators of violence and violators of peace processes who need to be confronted. Peace operations are expected to remain one of the most frequently used tools in conflict management (Aoi and de Coning, 2017, p.308), and provided that the international community makes much of the execution of missions and the prevention of humanitarian disasters, the international forces that are involved in peace operations have to be prepared to use force. In fact, African countries call for more robust missions on their continent to halt civil war violence (Abiola et al., 2017, pp.159, 167-168; Karlsrud, 2018, pp.123-124, 129-130). The HIPPO Report also expects that the UN will continue to be assigned conflict management tasks (UN, 2015, para.115).

Of course, robust peace operations entail greater risks for peacekeepers, and caution is necessary. However, a recent UN report, the so-called Cruz Report, points out that peacekeepers mostly suffer casualties because of inaction rather than due to taking actions, and it strongly emphasises the necessity to discard the “Chapter VI Syndrome”. The report urges peacekeepers to take proactive and even preemptive stances in terms of force protection and responses to attacks, and it warns that the failure to do so invites further attacks (dos Santos Cruz et al., 2017).

Therefore, peace operations need to be adapted to new standard tasks and operational environments through the adoption of more proactive stances. What is required for research in the field is to identify the conditions under which such a robust approach is likely to succeed in halting ongoing violence.

1.2.2 Previous Research on Peace Operations

Research on peace operations has a long history, and a vast number of studies in this area exist. Nevertheless, they have tended to be historical/descriptive or legal/normative arguments, and the field has long lacked explanatory theories that are based on systematic analysis. However, since around the year 2000, studies have started to provide a systematic analysis of the effects of peace operations (Fortna and Howard, 2008). Previous studies reveal through statistical analysis that peace operations have contributed to maintaining peace after civil wars (Doyle and Sambanis,
2000; 2006; Fortna, 2003; 2004; 2008; Gilligan and Sergenti, 2008) and preventing the spread of conflicts (Beardsley, 2011; Beardsley and Gleditsch, 2015).

These positive effects of peace operations can be spurious if the international community selects easy cases when launching operations (Fortna, 2008, p.3). However, studies on where peace operations tend to be deployed have found some evidence that they are sent to deal with difficult cases rather than easy ones. Gilligan and Stedman (2003) find that wars with higher casualties tend to attract UN peace operations. Similarly, Hultman (2013) finds that UN operations, especially robust ones, are more likely to be deployed to deal with cases that involve high civilian casualties. Although Fortna (2004; 2008) does not find that the death toll affects the likelihood of peace operations, she finds that UN operations authorised under Chapter VII are more likely to be deployed in cases in which previous ceasefires or peace agreements have collapsed and multiple factions are at war. Even when it comes to peace operations by individual states or coalitions of states, Rost and Greig (2011) find that states are more likely to deploy missions when conflicts kill more people in battles and generate more refugees. Major powers also tend to send operations when multiple factions are engaged in conflicts.

However, the discussion is not conclusive, as studies have shown contradictory findings on the effects of factors such as the duration of wars, ethnic rivalry, and mountainous terrain (Gilligan and Stedman, 2003; Fortna, 2004; 2008; Mullenbach, 2005; Rost and Greig, 2011; Hultman, 2013). Other strategic factors, such as the geographical locations, the size of the target states’ military forces, ethnic and economic ties, and the involvement of major powers, also affect the likelihood of peace operations (Gilligan and Stedman, 2003; Fortna, 2004; 2008; Mullenbach, 2005; Rost and Greig, 2011); therefore, peace operations are not determined solely by humanitarian factors nor by the needs of the states that are in conflict. Nevertheless, with regard to the decision to send peace operations, at least it can be said that the international community does not systematically pick easy cases.
Researchers disagree on the effect of peace operations on ongoing violence. Regan (2002) finds that neutral interventions prolong civil wars and that interventions under international organisations do not have a significant effect on the duration of civil wars. Heldt (2001) and Gilligan and Sergenti (2008) also find that UN operations are not effective at stopping ongoing civil wars. However, they do not distinguish between different types of peace operations, and there remains the possibility that a certain kind of operation is effective at curtailing civil wars. Costalli (2014) analyses violence at the regional level in the Bosnian civil war and finds that the deployment of peacekeepers does not affect the level of violence. This is an interesting study which analyses data at the subnational level, but it deals with only one conflict and requires additional research to generalise the findings.

Other studies show that some types of intervention can mitigate ongoing violence. Krain (2005) finds that partial interventions against perpetrators, rather than neutral ones, are effective at reducing the severity of state-supported genocides and politicides. Hultman (2010) and Nsia-Pepra (2014) find that robust peace operations with a civilian protection mandate have an effect on reducing violence against civilians. Studies have also found that peace operations with larger troop numbers are more effective in terms of protecting civilians (Hultman et al., 2013; 2019; Nsia-Pepra, 2014; Kathman and Wood, 2016; Bara and Hultman, 2020), reducing casualties on the battlefield (Hultman et al., 2019), and realising negotiated settlements (Kathman and Benson, 2019). Haass and Ansorg (2018) find that not only the number of troops but also their quality affect the performance of peacekeepers with regard to protecting civilians from violence. Several recent studies analysing the subnational-level data of multiple UN missions in Africa also find that the deployment of peacekeepers shortens the duration of ongoing conflict (Ruggeri et al., 2017) and reduces violence by rebels (Fjelde et al., 2019; Phayal and Prins, 2020). These studies suggest that appropriately authorised and capable interventions focusing on the perpetrators of violence can make a difference on the ground.

Researchers have also explored conditions for the success of peace operations. These studies have different scopes, use various success
criteria, and raise a number of factors as the conditions. These factors can be largely divided into two groups.

The characteristics of conflicts or conflicting parties are the focus of some studies. For example, Heldt (2001) argues that structural factors related to the characteristics of civil wars, such as the level of ethnic polarisation and economic development, as well as whether the host state is a democracy, have greater influence on the outcomes of the missions than the nature of the missions. Gromes (2019) also finds that non-robust peacekeeping missions can maintain peace only after relatively benign civil wars, such as those that are non-ethnic, are less intensive, or ended with a peace agreement or a victory for one side. Environmental factors must affect the results of peacekeeping, but peace operations are often deployed to areas in which there are difficult situations and it is necessary to explore how they can work in a harsh environment. Regarding conditions for success, some other researchers raise conflicting parties’ cooperation regarding UN missions, their willingness to solve problems through non-violent means, and the existence of peace agreements (Bratt, 1997; Pushkina, 2006; Adebajo, 2011). However, these insights are not helpful in coping with one of the most serious challenges in contemporary peace operations: how to deal with spoilers who do not cooperate with and even employ violence against peacekeepers and peace processes.

The other type of factor is related to the characteristics of peace operations. This includes adherence to the traditional principles of peacekeeping (Bratt, 1997), good leadership of UN missions (Adebajo, 2011), and organisational learning during operations (Howard, 2008). However, the traditional principles are not helpful in today’s usual missions, which are given robust mandates and are expected to confront spoilers when necessary. In addition, leadership and learning are too general as explanatory factors, although the adaptability and flexibility of missions are important. Without a clear explanation of causal mechanisms, these arguments indicate little about the factors that are necessary for success.

Among the conditions the studies raise, the provision of sufficient resources for peace operations (Bratt, 1997; Pushkina, 2006; Koko and
Essis, 2012) and the absence of external support for warring factions (Bratt, 1997; Pushkina, 2006; Adebajo, 2011) can also be relevant for robust peace operations. These factors must be directly related to the cost–benefit calculations of relevant actors and can thus affect the outcomes of operations.

Peace operations entail various objectives and are thus expected to function based on multiple mechanisms. Some objectives, such as distributing humanitarian aid, building infrastructure, and training local police, can be directly achieved by the acts of peacekeepers. In contrast, military-related objectives, such as the maintenance of ceasefires, the restoration of security, and the disarmament of warring factions, are difficult to achieve directly. These objectives require certain acts of conflicting parties, and peace operations achieve the objectives by affecting the parties’ behaviour. Therefore, at least regarding the latter type of objectives, an understanding of the mechanisms governing how peace operations can affect conflicting parties is necessary for the exploration of the conditions for success. Without this identification, such an exploration remains atheoretical, has no causal logic, or has logic that is too general.

Some studies start to shed light on the causal mechanisms of peace operations, but this aspect of the field is especially under-explored. Among the existing research, a study by Fortna (2008) is the most systematic attempt to illustrate the causal mechanisms. However, her interest lies in how peacekeepers can help maintain a ceasefire that has already been achieved. Therefore, she raises deterrence as one of the possible mechanisms but does not explore the use of force to change the status quo.

Regarding mechanisms that stop ongoing violence, previously mentioned studies provide some assumed logic. Krain (2005) assumes that partial interventions against the perpetrators of genocides work through two mechanisms. One is that interventions signal the resolve of the international community not to accept genocides, and the other is that interventions force the perpetrators to use their capabilities to counter the interventions and thus constrain their ability to commit genocides. Hultman et al. (2019) assume that peacekeepers reduce violence in civil wars through two mechanisms: by
increasing the cost of using violence and by facilitating the commitment to peace. They argue that these mechanisms are brought into play through the activities of peacekeepers, such as the separation of conflicting parties, disarmament, the verification of compliance with peace processes, and policing. However, these proposed mechanisms are not empirically examined, and further studies are required. Nsia-Pepra (2014) argues that robust peacekeeping, which has potent military capabilities, stops violence against civilians by raising the expected costs of using violence. He inappropriately calls the function as deterrence, but what he describes is, in effect, compellence.

Another major work on the mechanisms of peacekeeping is a recent book by Howard (2019). She categorises the power that UN peacekeepers exercise to change local parties’ behaviour into persuasion, inducement, and coercion. Her list of specific forms of coercion includes compellence, as well as deterrence, defence, surveillance, and arrest (p.134). However, she especially emphasises that peacekeepers do not and cannot resort to compellence because of the three principles of peacekeeping and capacity limitation (pp.129-130, 199). She contends that the use of compellence makes peacekeepers a party to conflict and that peacekeepers therefore cannot resort to compellence by definition (pp.140-141).

Her argument, however, has limitations. While her scope is UN peacekeeping, peace operations as a whole, including peace enforcement and non-UN operations, can and do resort to compellence. In fact, she positively evaluates the combination of such non-UN operations and UN peacekeeping (Howard, 2019, pp.194-196). Moreover, UN operations have also employed compellence in some cases. Howard refers solely to the defeat of M23 as an exceptional case of compellence by a UN operation (p.136), but there are other cases of compellence by UN operations, as shown in the next chapter. While it is debatable how to label these operations – peacekeeping, peace enforcement, or others – UN review papers, as well as the African countries that suffer most from civil wars, call for robustness of peace operations, as mentioned in the previous section. It can be said that at least there remains a necessity to look into the conditions under which compellence can work in the context of peace operations.
In fact, compellence can be one of the causal mechanisms that work in peace operations, especially those used to affect the behaviour of conflicting parties and thereby achieve the security-related objectives. Of course, not all peace operations employ compellence. The strategy is based on the proactive use of pressure and can be relevant to only certain types of peace operations – namely, robust peacekeeping and peace enforcement.

As with the study of compellence, narrowing down the scope to a specific type of peace operation can be helpful in advancing the study of peace operations. While it is important to evaluate and analyse peace operations from a holistic viewpoint, doing so is not easy because of the diversity of tasks they perform and the actors involved (Diehl and Druckman, 2018). Bures (2007) points out that peace operations have become too diverse to build a general theory and calls for middle-range theories which focus on a specific type of peace operation. An example of research in this direction is that conducted by van der Lijn (2006; 2009), who focuses on peacebuilding operations. He finds that impartiality and the non-use of force – factors that are traditionally said to be important for success – are not important in this type of mission. Instead, other factors that have not been featured in past studies, such as conflicting parties’ perceived feeling of security and the treatment of the root causes of conflicts, are more important for peacebuilding missions to be successful. Different types of peace operations at different phases of conflict with different objectives naturally rely on different kinds of mechanisms to achieve the objectives; thus, different conditions can be important for their success.

To address peacekeepers’ challenges in dealing with ongoing violence, more focused and dedicated theory development about robust operations can be fruitful, and the theory of compellence can be helpful for this effort. Having said that, the theory of compellence is not a middle-range theory of robust peacekeeping itself, because robust peacekeeping operations are multidimensional. Their mandates usually include not only the maintenance or restoration of security and the protection of civilians but also peacebuilding tasks. This means that robust peace operations rely on multiple mechanisms, and compellence can be only one of them. Still,
compellence can be a very important or even the central mechanism of robust peace operations, as it deals with their core security-related tasks.

In the context of robust peace operations, international troops are expected to confront the perpetrators of violence. Therefore, another important field of study related to this research is that of violence in civil wars. In this field, some researchers have studied so-called spoilers – that is, “leaders and factions who view a particular peace as opposed to their interests and who are willing to use violence to undermine it” (Stedman, 2008, p.147). Spoilers are not limited to rebel forces; rather, actors on the government side, such as the military, militias, or even the government itself, can be spoilers (Höglund and Zartman, 2006). These spoilers would be the targets of compellence in peace operations.

Researchers have explored coping strategies against spoilers, as well as spoilers’ various objectives and motivations. Stedman (1997, pp.10-16) proposes a typology composed of three types of spoilers: limited spoilers, greedy spoilers, and total spoilers. A response to limited spoilers can be inducements, or providing what they demand, if their objectives are acceptable to others. If not, they have to be dealt with through socialisation – that is, changing their behaviour through a mix of carrots and sticks, as well as the use of persuasion to accept new norms – or through coercion, which includes the use of coercive diplomacy. Total spoilers pursue total power in an all-or-nothing manner, and it is impossible to affect their preferences. Therefore, the appropriate coping strategies are to defeat them or to marginalise them through spurring peace processes while protecting the participants in these processes. Greedy spoilers fall between the two, and their objectives extend or shrink according to the costs and risks of pursuing them. Socialisation is adequate in dealing with them in the long term, but a mix of coercion and inducement can be effective in the short term.

Some define spoilers in a broader manner to include entities other than parties to conflicts; these include diaspora groups or multinational corporations (Newman and Richmond, 2006, p.4).
Some researchers emphasise the importance of differentiating between spoiling to derail peace processes and doing so to shape them (Newman and Richmond, 2006, p.18; Zahar, 2006, pp.38-39). Darby (2001, pp.47-49, 58-61) argues that confidence building is required when participants in peace processes are spoilers. Regarding spoiling by outsiders, he calls for isolation and criminalisation if they try to destruct peace processes, while arguing that persuasion through pressure is adequate for opportunistic spoilers who try to influence the processes. Zahar (2006, pp.38-45; 2008, pp.162-170; 2010, pp.270-272) argues that both the insiders and outsiders of peace processes can use violence for the purpose of derailing, as well as to shape the processes. Zahar contends that all parties that resort to violence have to think of the costs, capabilities and opportunities, and that potent foreign military interventions can constrain them.

Pearlman (2008/09, pp.84-85) points out that spoilers can also use violence to their benefit in intra-factional rivalries. Peace agreements can be advantageous for some groups in a faction but not for others. She argues that a group can employ violence based on intra-factional political motivation when the faction does not have a commonly accepted representation system and when the group is not leading the faction.

Some researchers who regard it as impossible to diagnose the objectives of spoilers focus solely on their capabilities and opportunities. According to Stepanova (2006, pp.90-96), spoilers with potent capabilities, especially those equipped with decentralised organisations and radicalism that rationalise violence, use terrorism strategically to achieve their objectives. Spoilers with potent capabilities are too important to marginalise and have to be dealt with through politicisation so that their organisations become hierarchical and thus lose the capability to conduct terrorism. Conversely, spoilers who are smaller in scale can be dealt with at the operational level and marginalised or defeated. Greenhill and Major (2006/07, pp.9-14, 37-39) argue that all spoilers seek to maximise their benefits, and their objectives shift according to their opportunities. Therefore, what matters is the balance of power; every party to a conflict can be a spoiler, but only those with power can be problematic. Third-party interveners should reduce
the gain from spoiling and increase that from peace, and the success or failure of this depends on the availability of sufficient carrots and sticks.

All the reviewed studies argue that spoilers behave strategically, and this means that they can be influenced from the outside. Spoilers employ violence as a tool for political purposes, whether the objectives are intra-factional or to shape or derail peace processes. As long as their acts are purposeful, it is possible to affect them using leverage. Their susceptibility differs according to the strength of their resolve; less resolute spoilers can be relatively easily manipulated by carrots and sticks, while strongly resolute ones may have to be forcefully contained or eliminated.

Compellence can be an effective strategy for spoiler management. A review article of spoiler studies points out that there are very few studies about how to manage existing spoilers, in comparison to studies on the emergence of spoilers or the concept itself (Nilsson and Kovacs, 2011, pp.619, 622). Although the authors of the article are cautious about the utility of force in spoiler management (p.622), there must be situations in which only force can be used to cope with spoilers; hence, it is important to explore the conditions under which force can be an effective response. The expected function of force is likely to be compellence, for intervening forces have to confront the ongoing violence by spoilers, which means that the purpose of the use of force is to change the status quo. The study of compellence in peace operations is also desirable from this perspective.

In short, studies on peace operations have gaps in their theoretical bases. The field has been relatively under-theorised, and the subject is now too diverse to enable the building of a general theory covering the conditions of success for all types of operations based on sound causal logic. Rather, theory building should focus on a specific type of peace operation, and bearing in mind that one of the biggest challenges of contemporary peace operations is how to cope with ongoing violence by spoilers, a middle-range theory on robust peace operations is desired. The theory of compellence can be useful for such an effort; it can provide the field with causal logic regarding how peace operations can affect the behaviour of spoilers and
achieve the objectives of operations. The next section explores what this synthesis looks like.

1.3 Compellence and Peace Operations

1.3.1 The Application of the Concept and Theory of Compellence to Peace Operations

To carry out mandates in precarious civil war environments, international forces often have to use force proactively rather than passively. If a ceasefire is realised and no attack on civilians happens when international forces intervene, the task of the latter will be to maintain the status quo. In this case, the expected function of force is deterrence. However, if a ceasefire breaks down and civilians are under attack, which often happens, there is no peace to keep, and the task for the intervening forces will be to change the status quo. Deterrence, a strategy to maintain the status quo, is not applicable for this purpose, and the international forces have to take the initiative and act proactively instead.

There are two ways to use force to change the status quo. One is to achieve the objective through brute force. International forces can defeat spoilers by killing or detaining them. This may be necessary at the tactical level, but doing so at the operational level may not be desirable. Assuming that all the conflicting factions have to reconcile with each other and live together after civil wars, defeating one of them completely can be counterproductive. The other way is compellence. As a strategy to change the status quo, but short of defeating the enemy completely, compellence seems to be a suitable strategy for international forces to use when dealing with spoilers. Successful compellence enables international forces to achieve their objectives with less destruction.

The targets of compellence in peace operations can be states, non-state actors, or both. Peacekeepers’ usual targets, especially regarding the use of force, are non-state armed groups. These include rebels, pro-government militias, armed gangs, and terrorists. States can be targets when they are spoilers or when they provide support for non-state spoilers.
The latter case is indirect compellence against non-state actors and may be employed against them simultaneously with direct compellence.

Compellence in peace operations can employ both the pressure of denial and punishment. For example, compellence by denial for disarming a warring faction can proceed as follows. Intervening forces demand an armed faction to disarm – maybe with a deadline – and threaten the faction that if it does not do so voluntarily, the troops will forcibly disarm the faction’s members. If the mere threat works and the armed faction disarms, this is the success of compellence without the actual use of force. If the faction does not disarm by the deadline, the international forces put the threat into practice and start cordon-and-search operations. If the members of the armed group that encounters the combat-ready foreign troops suddenly surrender their arms, believing that resistance would end in vain, this is again the success of compellence at the tactical level without the use of force. In contrast, if the armed elements decline to disarm and resist by force, the international forces have to suppress the resistance by killing or detaining them. This is the fulfilment of the objective through brute force at the tactical level. If the news of this defeat spreads among other members of the armed faction and makes them believe that sooner or later they will be forcibly disarmed, this can lead to a tide of voluntary disarmament. In this case, a single tactical defeat affected the decisions of many other members and can therefore be regarded as successful compellence at the operational level with the minor use of force. If the single defeat does not affect other members of the armed group, the intervening forces have to continue the effort to disarm them. The more tactical defeats the international forces need to induce the remaining members of the armed group to disarm, the less successful the compellent attempts of the forces. If the intervening forces end up forcibly clearing all the areas held by the armed group, this is brute force and the failure of compellence.

The protection of civilians or the restoration of order in general can also proceed similarly. To stop prevailing violence in a certain area, international forces can launch intensive patrols. Spoilers who exploit the security vacuum may stop their violence due to the mere fact that the intervening forces start to patrol, as they fear the risk of being detained or
killed when they encounter these patrols. This is the success of compellence with only threats. If the spoilers are more determined and do not stop plundering or attacking civilians, the patrolling units have to confront the spoilers. Contact can happen in the form of encounters between patrols and spoilers, deliberate attacks by spoilers against patrols, or patrols’ investigations of or assaults on the bases of spoilers. Although the defeat or detention of spoilers in each battle is a recourse to brute force, if these defeats discourage other spoilers from continuing activities in the area, this is the success of compellence at the operational level with the actual use of force.

If intervening forces employ defensive measures in protecting civilians, such as the deployment of protection units in villages or the establishment of guarded safe areas, the distinction between compellence and deterrence, as well as between compellence and brute force, can become blurred. If the threat of attacks against civilians exists but the attacks are not yet realised when the protective measures start, and if attacks do not happen subsequently, this is the success of deterrence. However, if these measures are taken as a response to frequent attacks against civilians, and if the measures succeed in preventing new attacks, this can be regarded as the success of compellence in the sense that the acts of intervening forces stopped what was happening rather than preventing something from happening in the first place. If armed groups attack the protected sites and the international forces repel the attack, this is the successful defence of the sites through brute force. However, if the perpetrators attempt repeated attacks against the sites if the defensive measures do not exist, this halt of the attack after the defeat can be regarded as the success of compellence because the defeat changed the minds of the perpetrators and made them choose not to repeat the attacks. The difference in evaluation depends on the aims and intents of the perpetrators.

Pressure other than the use of force can be put on spoilers. For example, if spoilers exploit the natural resources of the territories they control and earn from exporting them, curbing the trade can be the pressure of punishment. If the spoilers depend on the revenue from the natural resources to enable them to continue their rebellion or if the groups are
rather criminal in nature and their purpose is to exploit the resources, the pressure to curb the trade constitutes denial. The curbing of illicit trade in real cases is expected to have both characteristics of punishment and denial.

Another non-military form of pressure is the political one. When a goal of spoilers is to obtain political power, denying it can constitute pressure against them. However, it is necessary to distinguish between the application of a negative inducement and the withdrawal of a positive one (Baldwin, 1971, pp.25-26). The denial of access to political power can be the former and is thus compellence only when access is taken for granted. In this case, because having such access is the status quo, the deprivation of opportunities for political participation is the decrease in utility and thus negative pressure for the spoilers.

For example, when a rebel force joins a peace process that includes the holding of an election, the rebel force perceives its participation in the election as secured, and this constitutes the rebel force’s reference line. If the peace agreement also contains provisions for disarmament but the rebel force refuses to follow them, a peace operation can threaten the rebel force by indicating that the operation will not allow the rebel force’s participation in the election if it does not comply with the disarmament. In this case, the threat of exclusion from the election is the application of a negative inducement: The rebel force is threatened with the reduction of utility from the reference line.

In contrast, if a rebel force remains outside of a peace process, its reference line is having no access to political power. In this case, an offer to join an election is the provision of a positive inducement, which increases the utility of the rebel compared to the status quo. If this offer is conditional and linked to disarmament, the offer is accompanied by another message that the provision will be withheld if the rebel does not accept the condition. This is similar to the former example, but it differs on the point that the denial of the rebel’s political participation is the non-realisation of the increase of utility, rather than the decrease of it, from the reference line. Therefore, this is not compellence but a different strategy that relies on the carrot.
Economic and political pressure is a common choice when peace operations and the international community supporting them exert pressure on governments. Governments can be the main targets of compellence or can be the subjects of pressure in the form of indirect compellence against the non-state actors that the governments are supporting. Such pressure is punishment in either case.

As illustrated, it is possible for compellence to achieve the objectives of peace operations in a proactive manner with minimal destruction, but military compellence is not risk free. If spoilers do not capitulate despite pressure, international forces have to choose between defeating them or giving up fulfilling objectives. In addition, the substantial use of force may be necessary before securing acquiescence. In some cases, spoilers can simply be so determined that compellence does not work. As will be shown in the next section, previous research emphasises the difficulty of employing compellence in peace operations and humanitarian interventions.

Nevertheless, some past peace operations succeeded in compelling parties to conflicts to stop destructive behaviour or to abide by peace agreements, so it is not impossible (see Chapter 2). As long as peace operations are assigned tasks to change the status quo, intervening forces cannot remain in a passive mode and have to think about the employment of compellence. To maximise the prospect of success and minimise the risk, it is necessary to explore the conditions under which compellence is more likely to succeed in the context of peace operations.

1.3.2 Previous Research Combining Compellence and Peace Operations

There have been some bodies of work in which the concept of compellence has been applied to peace operations and humanitarian interventions, but this field is basically under-explored. The existing studies discuss both the difficulties and utilities of compellence in such contexts, and some explore conditions for success.

Posen (1996), Byman and Waxman (2002), and Morgan (2003) discuss the difficulties of compellence in peace operations. Humanitarian
military action tends to take the form of compellence rather than deterrence because humanitarian crises are difficult to predict and proceed at high speed; thus, forces intervene to respond to crises that have already happened rather than to prevent them (Posen, 1996, pp.80-82; Morgan, 2003, pp.280-281).

Many factors militate against interveners and undermine the credibility of threats. The local parties have greater interests than the interveners, as the former are prompted by threats, while the latter’s motive is usually humanitarian. Interventions are usually conducted in coalitions, which are difficult to maintain when no vital interest is involved. It is also difficult to credibly threaten that the interveners will mobilise enough capability to confront the local parties (Posen, 1996, pp.82-85; Byman and Waxman, 2002, pp.175-176, 183-190). Because of these difficulties, mere threats are not likely to work, and interveners have to be prepared for actual combat (Posen, 1996, p.86).

Interveners also face problems in using force. The restrictions discussed above, as well as the unacceptability of casualties, weak domestic support, need to maintain impartiality and refrain from causing damage, and the difficulty of distinguishing combatants from civilians, hinder the actual use of force; thus, it is difficult to realise escalation dominance (Byman and Waxman, 2002, pp.175-176, 183-189; Morgan, 2003, pp.280-281).

Coercive mechanisms also entail difficulties. The weak organisation of non-state actors can hamper the work of coercive mechanisms, because even if leaders are successfully coerced, this does not guarantee that subordinates will follow the decisions of their leaders (Byman and Waxman, 2002, p.192). Punishment by strategic bombing is difficult to apply because opponents seldom have valuable targets that can be bombed. The more likely responses are the establishment of protected safe zones, the enforcement of ceasefires, and the conduct of thorough disarmament, all of which constitute denial and require a substantial amount of force (Posen, 1996, pp.86-108; Byman and Waxman, 2002, pp.190-191; Morgan, 2003, p.281).
Moreover, non-state adversaries employ counter-coercion to deny coercers from achieving their objectives and to undermine their domestic support and the unity of coalitions. Non-state adversaries try to survive pressure from coercers, inflict casualties on intervening forces, and provoke the generation of collateral damage. Given the weak motivation of coercers, their combination can severely degrade domestic support and create rifts in coalitions, which can lead to the termination of interventions (Byman and Waxman, 2002, pp.194-198).

In spite of these difficulties, some existing studies point out the utility of compellence in peace operations and try to explore its characteristics, including its conditions for success. Ruggie (1996) calls for a middle option between peacekeeping and enforcement and raises coercive diplomacy as an appropriate concept. Daniel and Hayes (1996, pp.108-119) also point out the necessity of a middle option that is similar to coercive diplomacy, referring to it as “inducement”, and they argue that credible force is necessary for its success. They consider the UN incapable of carrying out this type of intervention, except a small one, and claim that outsourcing to coalitions of the willing is desirable. However, these studies do not engage with empirical evidence to explore related questions on the use of coercive strategy in peace operations.

There are empirical studies as well. Some of them are rather more descriptive than explanatory and mention actual cases for exemplary or illustrative purposes. For example, in exemplifying the application of compellence, Johnson et al. (2002) include the cases of peace operations in Bosnia and Somalia. Sayigh (1998) describes compellence by and against the Palestine Liberation Organization in Lebanon including a Syrian intervention. Gow (1998) and Thies (2003) discuss compellent attempts against Yugoslavia. Adibe (1998) examines the use and non-use of compellence in interventions in civil wars in Liberia, Somalia, and Rwanda. Daniel et al. (1999) look into the use of compellence, which they refer to as “coercive inducement”, in peace operations in Bosnia, Somalia, Rwanda, and Haiti. Larsdotter (2019) analyses mandates given to the two UN missions in the DRC from the viewpoint of Schelling’s four categories, which include compellence. Although these studies demonstrate that the concept
of compellence is applicable to peace operations and the actions of or against non-state actors, they do not engage with theoretical questions.

In other bodies of work, compellence in peace operations is approached from an explanatory perspective. These studies can be largely divided into three groups. The first analyses cases of non-military compellence in peace operations (Stedman, 1997; Khong, 1998). Although they are interesting studies that examine the utility of non-military coercive measures, they do not shed light on the problem of the use of force in peace operations.

The second group deals with military compellence in peace operations but treats the use of compellence as an independent variable to explain the results of cases (Martin-Brulé, 2012; Beadle and Kjeksrud, 2018; Kjeksrud, 2019). However, this explanation is insufficient because results vary among cases in which compellence is employed, as will be shown in the following chapter. A number of factors can affect the outcome of compellence; therefore, it is necessary to look more closely at these factors.

The third group explains conditions under which military compellence is more likely to succeed in peace operations; it therefore contains the studies that are most relevant to this project. The factors and cases being examined in these studies vary from study to study, as do the studies of compellence in general.

Harvey (1997) and Jakobsen (2000) analyse multiple instances of coercion in the Bosnian civil war. Harvey (1997) raises four conditions for the success of deterrence and compellence: the communication of the undesirable behaviour and threats, the significance of the threats, the existence of the capability to carry out the threats, and the demonstration of resolve (p.186). He analyses eight coercive attempts during 1993 and 1994 and shows that coercion succeeded when all the conditions were satisfied. Jakobsen (2000) analyses six coercive interactions in Bosnia from the viewpoint of eight facilitating conditions. The conditions are as follows: the use of denial, the possession of the capability to carry out threats, the use of deadlines, the taking of steps to signal the coercers’ resolve, the possession of a reputation for carrying out threats, the demonstration that the
enforcement cost is acceptable for the coercers, and the use of assurances and carrots (pp.4-6). As a result of these empirical examinations, he emphasises the importance of the use of assurances and positive inducements in addition to the credibility of threats (pp.18-19).

Other studies in the third group use multiple cases in their examinations. These studies include those reviewed in the first section of this chapter. Jakobsen (1998a) uses the former Yugoslavia, and Blechman and Wittes (1999) use Somalia and Bosnia as part of their multiple case studies for examining the conditions for the success of compellence. Two chapters of Art and Cronin’s (2003) work also deal with Somalia and Bosnia. Bensahel (2003) analyses two operations in Somalia: the United Taskforce (UNITAF) and UNOSOM II. She attributes the former’s success to its strong military capability, maintenance of impartiality, and limited objectives, while she attributes the latter’s failure to its weak capability, perceived lack of impartiality, and broad objectives that violated the vital interests of the local factions (pp.32-33, 35-37). Burg (2003) compares compellence in Bosnia and Kosovo. He raises the creation of stalemate on the ground, the use of positive inducements, and the pressure of air power as the factors that facilitated success in Bosnia (pp.65-66). Art (2003b) compares these cases with others to examine the conditions of success. De Wijk’s (2014) work also includes peace operations in Somalia, the former Yugoslavia, East Timor, Sierra Leone, and Mali among the 28 cases it analyses. He finds that the punishment type of pressure and airstrikes tend to be ineffective and that the occupation of territories by ground forces is necessary for compelling non-state actors (pp.142-143). However, his examination does not distinguish between coercion against non-state actors in peace operations and its use in other contexts, such as counterinsurgency, and, as previously mentioned, his evaluation of success and failure as coercion is problematic.

Tanner (1996, pp.131-132, 135-138) argues that disarmament in civil wars requires compellence by peacekeepers at the tactical level while the consent of parties is maintained at the strategic level. Regarding the necessary conditions for the success of compellence, he raises the possession of military capability that is sufficient for tactical superiority, the maintenance of legitimacy and impartiality, autonomy and flexibility at the
tactical level, a clear mandate, and domestic and international support. These arguments are based on his observations of peace operations in the 1990s. Although he assumes that consent for the disarmament of warring factions is obtained from the leaders, this is one of the challenges of compellence, and the strategy is applicable at both the strategic and tactical levels.

Carment and Harvey (2001, ch.4) propose four conditions for success: the clear definition of unacceptable behaviour, the communication of commitment to carry out threats in the case of noncompliance, the possession of the capability to implement the threats, and the demonstration of resolve. They apply the framework to coercive attempts in Bosnia, which are divided into fourteen instances, and in Kosovo, which are divided into three instances. They conclude that the conditions effectively explain the success and failure of the attempts.

Seybolt (2008, pp.39-45, 180-183) analyses humanitarian interventions in Iraq, Somalia, Bosnia, Rwanda, Kosovo, and East Timor. He largely divides the objectives of interventions into four categories: “assist aid delivery”, “protect aid operations”, “save the victims”, and “defeat the perpetrators”. These objectives can be pursued using five strategies: avoidance,6 deterrence, defence, compellence, and offence. He emphasises the importance of matching objectives and strategies with problems on the ground and explores the conditions under which each strategy works well. Regarding compellence, he states that the following factors affect its results: the clear communication of the interveners’ intention, the taking of action to back up their words, the acceptance of the risks and costs involved, the use of sufficient military capability, the imposition of deadlines and the seizure of the initiative if they are ignored, the support of the population in operational areas, and the effects of the geographical features and infrastructure of the operational areas.

6 The aim of the strategy of avoidance is to avoid confrontations with opponents, and intervening forces focus on the provision of humanitarian aid (Seybolt, 2008, pp.40-41).
The reviewed studies discuss similar factors to those addressed in the literature of compellence in general. The factors that are regarded in multiple studies as being important for the success of compellence in peace operations include the existence of the capability to carry out threats, the demonstration of resolve, the use of denial, the use of deadlines, the demonstration of cost tolerance, the use of positive inducements, and the maintenance of impartiality. The final factor of impartiality is unique to the context of peace operations, but others constitute a subset of the conditions examined in the studies of compellence that have broader scopes.

These studies provide a valuable contribution to the under-explored aspect of compellence. They demonstrate that compellence can succeed in peace operations despite the difficulties, and they provide clues about understanding when the strategy is likely to work in this context. They also suggest that existing knowledge – or at least part of it – about compellence in general applies to compellence in peace operations.

However, these studies also have shortcomings. Besides the specific problems mentioned in several of the reviewed studies, another major shortcoming of the studies is their limited empirical base. Harvey (1997) and Jakobsen (2000) rely on within-case comparisons and do not examine other cases. Other studies examine multiple cases, but they compare the cases of peace operations with those of other contexts, such as humanitarian interventions other than peace operations and compellence between states; they are not focused specifically on the use of compellence in peace operations. Moreover, Tanner (1996) and Seybolt (2008) do not provide explicit and systematic comparisons of the cases from the perspective of the conditions for success.

In sum, there is no study which examines conditions for the success of compellence in peace operations based on the systematic comparison of multiple cases in a dedicated manner. The study of compellence in peace operations is largely under-explored. Existing studies emphasise the difficulty involved in it, but it is neither impossible nor undesirable. On the contrary, as will be shown in the next chapter, there were some cases of successful compellence in peace operations, and such an approach is
necessary if the international community hopes to pursue objectives to change the status quo in a volatile environment. To successfully employ compellence in peace operations, it is imperative to find out under what conditions the strategy is more likely to succeed. However, the existing studies do not provide a sound answer. Some studies are simply descriptive and do not explore explanatory questions. Others deal with the problem and propose various factors as the conditions for success. While these are a valuable contribution to the literature, their empirical base is limited. The studies are based on either within-case comparisons without further cases, comparisons between multiple cases but including cases other than peace operations, or unsystematic comparisons focusing on multiple cases of peace operations. Therefore, to explore the conditions for success, more systematic and focused studies on compellence in peace operations are required.

This study makes such an effort. Through the systematic examination of compellence in peace operations, it contributes to both fields of study. Regarding compellence, it helps to advance the understanding of the strategy’s conditions for success, as well as coercive mechanisms in a specific context. The context of peace operations is especially useful for examining the strategy’s utility against non-state actors. Regarding peace operations, this study helps to advance the theorisation of the field by showing a possible causal mechanism and when it is likely to work. In this way, this study addresses the gaps in the fields of compellence and peace operations. Moreover, in light of the difficulty that peacekeepers face in coping with violent challenges, this study is important not only academically but also practically. The findings are expected to help practitioners identifying the factors to which they should pay attention when conducting robust peace operations.
Chapter 2
Analytical Framework

This chapter sets up the analytical framework for this thesis. First, it specifies the scope of this research. Compellence in peace operations is versatile in its targets and the type of pressure that is employed, as illustrated in the previous chapter. Therefore, further clarification of the scope is required. Second, the chapter derives the conditions that favour the success of compellence in peace operations. The conditions are based on insights from existing studies and take into account the unique features of peace operations. The derived conditions are stated as hypotheses to be examined empirically. Third, this chapter discusses the methodological aspect of the research. The chapter shows that the best available option is a comparative case study and explains three specific methods of analysis that are employed in this research. Finally, the chapter identifies the pool of relevant cases and selects cases for detailed examination.

2.1 The Clarification of the Scope of the Research

Compellence can be applied in various ways in peace operations. However, it is difficult to examine all of them at once due to practical limitations; therefore, it is necessary to limit the scope of this research to a specific type of compellence in peace operations.

To begin with, this research focuses on compellence against non-state actors and excludes compellence whose main targets are states. This is because, first, the usual targets of compellence in peace operations are non-state armed groups and, second, the existing studies have already examined compellence against states, as reviewed in Chapter 1. This focus does not exclude compellence against pro-government militias that act as the proxies of governments. Militias may receive official or legal recognition from governments, as well as cooperation from states’ regular forces, and the members of regular forces may even directly participate in militias. However, pro-government militias are treated as non-state armed groups as
long as they have organisations that are distinguishable from states’ regular forces and thus have some extent of autonomy (Francis, 2005, pp.4-5; Hofmann and Schneckener, 2011, pp.604-605; Carey et al., 2012, pp.250-251).

Regarding pressure, although various kinds of pressure are employable in compellence, this research focuses on compellence that entails explicit proactive military pressure. There are two reasons for this. First, the development of the theory of compellence has largely focused on the use of military pressure. It is therefore natural to start from the analysis of the utility of force when applying the theory to new, under-explored contexts. Second, stopping ongoing violence, an objective that is supposed to be pursued by compellence in peace operations, requires measures with quick effects to protect the lives of victims. Military leverage is expected to be compared to more modest types of pressure, such as economic sanctions.

The scope is also limited to cases with heavy demands. This study distinguishes two categories of demands: those of the heaviest type and those that are limited. The former consists of demands against targets to cease to exist as independent armed groups, such as complete disarmament, or to cease armed activities and give up their objectives. In this research, all demands short of these, such as to disarm a specific type of weapon or to cease activities in a specific area, are regarded as limited.

There are two reasons for this focus on the heaviest type of demands. One is that the conditions of success in difficult settings are also supposed to be sufficient for easier cases. The other is the practical difficulty of identifying cases with limited demands. The heaviest type of demands are usually stated in the UNSC’s resolutions as overall objectives of missions and are therefore easy to identify. However, cases of compellence with limited demands may emerge locally on a small scale, and their identification requires a thorough review of all the possible relevant cases. This is unfeasible for this piece of research, because it would necessitate conducting dozens of case studies.

Although compellers can usually change the extent of their demands based on the response of the targets, it is expected that peace operations
that put the heaviest type of demand on warring factions do not easily compromise on their demands. This is because the mandates of peace operations are decided and given by the UNSC, and peace operations on the ground cannot change their core objectives by themselves. The UNSC has the authority to change the demands against warring factions in civil wars and the mandates of peace operations accordingly. However, the council is also expected not to retract the demands for the termination of violence and disarmament, because these are so fundamental to stabilising countries suffering from civil wars that they have to be fulfilled. Therefore, it is expected that the cases of peace operations that put the heaviest type of demands on targets remain so once they fall into the scope.

Finally, this research limits its scope to peace operations conducted by the UN and those conducted by non-UN actors in cooperation with UN missions. As mentioned in the previous chapter, a trend in post-Cold War peace operations is an increase in non-UN peace operations conducted by regional organisations, coalitions of the willing, and single states. On the one hand, it is desirable to include these non-UN missions in the scope of this research, because they tend to conduct higher-intensity operations than the UN ones and are likely to be relevant to compellence. On the other hand, it is also necessary to exclude partial interventions into civil wars whose purpose is not the promotion of peace through managing and/or resolving violent conflicts. Therefore, regarding non-UN missions, this research limits its scope to those conducted in cooperation with the UN. More specific criteria are discussed later in another section of this chapter.

It is also necessary to elaborate on how to evaluate the outcomes of cases in this research. How to evaluate peace operations is itself a major topic of the field (Diehl and Druckman, 2010), but this research focuses on the utility of compellence in peace operations. The evaluation of the results of compellence is also a complicated issue, especially with the current focus on compellence against non-state actors. In studies dealing with compellence against states, success or failure is determined based on whether the target states comply with demands made by compellers. The compliance usually means the explicit or tacit acceptance of the demands by
the leaders of the states and the actual change of the states’ or governments’ behaviour.

The evaluation of compellence against non-state actors should also focus on their leaders and on groups as collective entities. The acceptance of demands by leaders is an important criterion for the success of compellence. However, this cannot be the sole criterion, because the leaders may not effectively control their followers (Byman and Waxman, 2002, p.192). In addition, an armed group may not have a clear leader. Thus, it is also necessary to look at whether other members of the groups accept the demands. Here, what is examined is the behaviour of groups as collective entities rather than that of individual members. Information on the latter is difficult to obtain and practically impossible to examine. Therefore, the actual change of behaviour as groups should also be used as a criterion for the evaluation of results.

It should be noted that the success of compellence does not necessarily mean the success of peace operations from other perspectives. Compellence focuses on rather short-term demands in the stabilisation phase and does not deal with the long-term peacebuilding aspect of peace operations. Therefore, a case is regarded as a success as long as local armed groups agree to disarm under military pressure from intervening forces regardless of whether the state can establish a stable government and prevent the recurrence of violence thereafter. This of course does not mean that long-term peacebuilding is unimportant, but, rather, that it merely represents a difference in focus. In addition, this focus on compellence with proactive military pressure does not mean that the use of force per se is desirable. On the contrary, as discussed in Chapter 1, the less force, if any, that is used in changing opponents’ behaviour, the better the success of compellence.

In sum, this study deals with cases of explicit military compellence in UN-related peace operations that are employed against non-state armed groups and accompanied by the heaviest type of demands. While this scope does not cover all cases of compellence in peace operations, the limit is
necessary to ensure the homogeneity of the cases and to derive sound findings from the comparisons.

2.2 Conditions Favouring the Success of Compellence in Peace Operations

In this section, hypotheses about the conditions leading to the success of compellence in peace operations are formulated by modifying or extending the existing arguments. Existing studies have examined the conditions for the success of compellence, as discussed in the previous chapter, but there is no study that analyses such conditions in the context of peace operations based on a systematic comparison of multiple cases in a dedicated manner. Therefore, it is necessary to start by constructing an analytical framework for compellence in peace operations.

The reviewed studies raise a number of factors that can affect the outcome of compellence, as summarised in Table 2.1. The conditions that are discussed in existing studies dealing with compellence in peace operations are basically a subset of the conditions that are examined in the studies of compellence with broader scopes. While there are conditions that multiple researchers on compellence or coercion regard as important for success, there remains some disagreement about the importance of other factors.
Table 2.1 Conditions for the Success of Compellence Discussed in Existing Studies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Factors that multiple studies regard as important</th>
<th>Compellence in general</th>
<th>Compellence dealing with peace operations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>stronger interests and motivation on compeller side</td>
<td>• stronger interests and motivation on compeller side</td>
<td>• capability to carry out threats</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>potency and credibility of threats</td>
<td>• potency and credibility of threats</td>
<td>• demonstration of resolve</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>assurance against future demands</td>
<td>• assurance against future demands</td>
<td>• use of denial type of pressure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>use of denial type of pressure</td>
<td>• use of denial type of pressure</td>
<td>• use of deadlines</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>use of positive inducements</td>
<td>• use of positive inducements</td>
<td>• demonstration of cost tolerance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>domestic support for compellers</td>
<td>• domestic support for compellers</td>
<td>• use of positive inducements</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>strong leadership</td>
<td>• strong leadership</td>
<td>• impartiality</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>lack of external support on target side</td>
<td>• lack of external support on target side</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Factors that studies disagree about their importance</th>
<th>Compellence in general</th>
<th>Compellence dealing with peace operations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>relative ease, clarity, and publicness of demands</td>
<td>• relative ease, clarity, and publicness of demands</td>
<td>• capability to carry out threats</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>urgency accompanying demands</td>
<td>• urgency accompanying demands</td>
<td>• demonstration of resolve</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>use of exemplary force</td>
<td>• use of exemplary force</td>
<td>• use of denial type of pressure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>international support for compellers</td>
<td>• international support for compellers</td>
<td>• use of deadlines</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>reputation of compellers</td>
<td>• reputation of compellers</td>
<td>• demonstration of cost tolerance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>audience costs of compellers</td>
<td>• audience costs of compellers</td>
<td>• use of positive inducements</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It is necessary to consider which of the above factors can be relevant to compellence in peace operations, because some of them are expected to be fixed across cases or irrelevant, given the context and scope of this study. First, the balance of interest, a factor that existing studies regard as very important for the success of compellence, is always unfavourable to compellers in the context of peace operations. This is because international forces intervene in others' wars as third parties, and the target side has far larger stakes in the issues that are in dispute (Posen, 1996, pp.82, 84; Crawford, 2009, p.288). This unfavourable balance of interest constitutes a basic assumption in the formulation of the following hypotheses. Second, as explained in the previous section, the scope of this study is limited to compellence accompanied by the heaviest type of demands. These
demands are usually clearly and publicly stated in the UNSC resolutions; therefore, the relative ease, clarity, and publicness of the demands are also fixed. Third, assurance against future demands is likely to be irrelevant because of the scope. The assurance that additional demands will not be made is important when targets perceive that there is a realistic possibility of another compellence being employed against them (Schelling, 1966, pp.74-75; Jakobsen, 1998a, pp.29-30; Sechser, 2010; 2016; 2018). As this study focuses on cases in which compellers demanded armed groups to completely disarm or halt violence and give up their objectives, the targets were expected to be non-threatening after accepting the demands and therefore unlikely to be targets of compellence again. The problem for the targets was not future demands, but the very heavy demands they were faced with. Finally, because the scope is also limited to UN-related missions, the cases examined in this research are expected to be impartial interventions and have international support; therefore, these factors are also fixed.

The remaining factors are the candidates of the conditions for the success of compellence in peace operations, and this study reorganises them into five sets of factors: troop numbers, the strategy of compellence, credibility, denial, and third-party support. All of these factors are expected to affect the cost–benefit calculations of the targets of compellence. The factors are presented in five hypotheses that state the expectations about the conditions under which compellence in peace operations is likely to succeed. The hypotheses are formulated in connection with the basic features of the context of peace operations; these include coalitional compellence, targets as non-state actors, and the target side having much stronger interests in the issues in dispute.

2.2.1 Troop Numbers

The first hypothesis focuses on troop numbers as a factor related to the potency of threats. The consequence of defiance must be costly enough to persuade the targets to accept the demands. The balance of force is a major factor in realising this, because target armed groups that are facing stronger forces must anticipate that their probability of winning the conflict is low.
Therefore, it is expected that compellence is more likely to be successful if the compellers have a larger force than the opponents.

It may seem too simplistic to focus on troop numbers in examining the costs that targets expect to suffer, but this is a reasonable factor to take into account. First, the quality side of force is dealt with in another hypothesis. It is better to take into account both the quantity and quality of forces in examining the balance of force between protagonists. Quantity is a relatively straightforward factor to measure, but measuring quality is difficult. It goes without saying that troops with a higher quality are better, but there remains the question of what kind of quality is desirable and the answer differs from context to context. Therefore, this hypothesis focuses on the quantity side of force; the quality side is discussed in another hypothesis that deals with how to apply the denial type of pressure. Second, it would be better if the balance of whole material power could be taken into account in examining the quantity aspect of the balance of force, but this is infeasible. It is difficult to obtain the inventories of protagonists’ armories – in particular those of the armed groups. Moreover, armed groups usually use guerrilla tactics and do not possess a substantial amount of heavy equipment. Peace operations are also basically conducted by ground troops which are mainly composed of infantries. Therefore, in the context of peace operations, both sides rely on foot soldiers as the core of their forces, so it is reasonable to focus on the balance of troop numbers in examining the balance of force.

Existing studies in relevant fields have focused on the numerical aspect of force in a different manner. Some studies on coercion incorporate the numerical balance of troops between protagonists as a factor in examining what leads to the success of the strategy (e.g. Maoz, 1983; Huth 1988). Quantitative studies on peace operations tend to focus on the size of missions and argue that operations with larger numbers of troops are more effective (e.g. Ruggeri et al., 2012; Hultman et al., 2013; 2019; Kathman and Wood, 2016; Bara and Hultman, 2020). Studies on counterinsurgency usually examine the ratio of troops to local population rather than to insurgents, because it is difficult to know the number of insurgents, and because the literature emphasises the importance of the residents’ roles (e.g. McGrath, 2006; Knece et al., 2010). Some studies of peace operations also
adopt this approach and analyse cases using the troop-to-population ratio (Jones et al., 2005; Gowan and Tortolani, 2008; Williams, 2010; Anderson, 2014).

This study focuses on the balance of troops between compellers and targets, rather than on compellers’ absolute number or the troop-to-population ratio. The main reason for this is that the logic of compellence focuses on confrontations between armed entities and how to affect opponents’ cost–benefit calculations. Measuring the balance of force, therefore, is the most straightforward approach in terms of taking into account the numerical aspect of force. Quantitative studies can examine the marginal effect of the increase in troops, but this study cannot take this approach because it adopts a comparative case-study strategy, as will be explained in the following section. Regarding the troop-to-population ratio, Moore (2013) criticises the widely used criterion of 20 troops per 1,000 population, maintaining that it is not adequate. Moreover, the assumption behind this approach is that the insurgents depend on the support that is provided by the population, but this does not necessarily apply to peace operations. Contemporary peace operations have some similarity with counterinsurgency (Mockaitis, 1999; Friis, 2010), and the assumption would be valid if they intervened in full-fledged insurgencies. However, the spoilers that peace operations face may be armed gangs, criminal groups, or rebels relying on foreign support. Therefore, for this research, an examination of the balance between compellers and targets in terms of troop numbers is the most appropriate approach.

The calculation also takes into account the strength of local forces who are friendly to peace operations. Under the concept of impartiality, which is distinguished from neutrality, intervening forces may have to confront one or more local factions, which can lead to effectively taking sides with others (Nadin et al., 2015, pp.79-80; Rhoads, 2016). From the viewpoint of the targets of compellence, the local forces cooperating with the international forces are also threats. Therefore, in examining the balance of troops, it is appropriate to include these de facto local auxiliary forces on the side of the compellers.
H1: Compellence in peace operations is more likely to succeed if the balance of troops is favourable to the compellers.

2.2.2 The Strategy of Compellence

The nature of pressure may also affect the result of compellence in peace operations. A possibly relevant aspect of pressure is how to put it on targets – namely, the strategy of compellence. The second hypothesis is that the gradual-turning-of-the-screw strategy combined with positive inducements is more effective than other strategies.

George (1994b, pp.16-19) identifies five specific forms or strategies of coercive diplomacy. Four are distinguished based on the extent to which they try to convey urgency. The first is the classic ultimatum, which is composed of demands, a deadline for compliance, and clearly stated threats for cases of noncompliance. The second is the tacit ultimatum, which is the use of a threat that lacks one of the three components of an ultimatum. The third strategy is the gradual turning of the screw, which is the gradual escalation of pressure. The fourth strategy, “try and see”, refers to the application of a limited threat or pressure to see the response of the target. Among these strategies, the classic and tacit ultimatum aim to create a strong sense of urgency on the side of the target through the use of an explicit deadline or other means. The gradual turning of the screw conveys weaker urgency because it lacks a deadline and applies pressure in the form of a step-by-step escalation. The urgency created by the try-and-see strategy is even weaker, for it does not elaborate on what will follow after a probing move. The fifth strategy that George raises is the “carrot and stick”, which is defined by the use of positive inducements in addition to threats. Therefore, it can be combined with any of the above four strategies. Past studies largely regard the use of carrots as one of the factors favouring the success of compellence (e.g. George and Simons, 1994b; Byman and Waxman, 2002; Art and Cronin, 2003).
There is a possibility that one of these strategies is more effective than the others. In the context of peace operations, the try-and-see strategy does not seem to work. This is because the targets in this context clearly have stronger interests and motivation. The application of limited probing pressure by the weakly motivated side is expected to be ineffective.

The question is which of the stronger variants is more effective in peace operations. The ultimatum type of pressure may be effective because of its power to convey strong urgency. Nadin et al. (2015, p.84), for example, argue that “[t]he ultimatum forms a central element of robust peacekeeping”. However, in the existing studies on compellence, there are different opinions on the utility of ultimatums. Jakobsen (1998a; 1998b) regards an ultimatum with an explicit deadline as the most effective form of coercive diplomacy. Morgan (2009, p.173) takes the same position, arguing that collective coercion tends to turn into gradually increased pressure and is therefore likely to be ineffective. In their studies on compellence in peace operations, Jakobsen (2000) and Seybolt (2008, p.183) also raise the use of deadlines as a condition for success. George and co-authors raise urgency as one of the important conditions for success when an ultimatum is employed, but they refrain from arguing that it is the most effective strategy, and they point out some risks that it entails (George and Simons, 1994a, pp.274-277, 287-288; Lauren, 1994, pp.44-45). Kagan (1998) argues that the choice of strategy is not important for successful compellence. Similarly, Blechman and Wittes (1999) find no correlation between the existence of urgency and the outcome of compellence. If the ultimatum type of pressure is effective, the target should accept the compeller’s demand by the deadline or following the initial implementation of the threat soon after the deadline.

However, taking into account the nature of non-state armed groups, the gradual turning of the screw is expected to be more effective than an ultimatum in peace operations. When a deadline is set, it should be accompanied by dire threats for noncompliance – hopefully that of decisive military defeat, which Jakobsen (1998a; 1998b) calls for. When confronting non-state armed groups, however, it is very difficult to envision their quick and decisive defeat (Jakobsen, 2010, pp.293-294). They are usually evasive guerrillas, gangs, or terrorists. Except when confronting small groups,
military operations against non-state armed groups are expected to be prolonged. Therefore, it is highly likely that a deadline does not convey urgency to targets. Without the fear of a quick defeat, non-state armed groups can resort to a try-and-see strategy of their own by trying resistance and seeing how well they can cope with the intervening forces. Without the possibility of defeating the opponents quickly, the only viable approach is to escalate pressure gradually until the non-state armed groups realise that the threat is serious. This may be achieved relatively quickly – for example, in weeks or months – or may take years. Even in a prolonged case, pressure can be understood as the gradual turning of the screw if it is applied in successive ways, and it may well include options other than the use of force, such as an arms embargo or other sanctions. If the gradual-turning-of-the-screw strategy is effective, the targets should accept the compellers’ demands only after pressure has been applied repeatedly and its effect has accumulated.

Of course, these two strategies are not mutually exclusive, and compellers may employ both to compel the same target. Even in such a case, the empirical evaluation of each strategy’s effectiveness would not be difficult if the compellent attempt is clearly separated into phases and each strategy is employed in distinct phases. Even if the two strategies are employed consecutively, if an ultimatum fails to compel the target to capitulate soon and other pressure accumulates, this would be regarded as a case of the gradual turning of the screw. A case that is harder to evaluate would be one in which the compeller’s use of the gradual-turning-of-the-screw strategy is followed by an ultimatum and then the capitulation of the target. In such a case, the ultimatum may function as a part of the gradually increased pressure and be the final straw that induces the target. If this is the case, the success would be attributed to the use of the gradual-turning-of-the-screw strategy. However, if the final use of the ultimatum has a qualitatively different impact on the target, such as creating a strong sense of urgency, the success would be at least partially attributed to the use of the ultimatum. Such a case would require careful examination.

Regarding positive inducements, their use can be effective in peace operations as well. Jakobsen (2000) and Burg (2003) argue that positive
inducements contributed to the success of compellence in Bosnia. In addition, Paul et al. (2013, pp.109-111) reveal that the provision of carrots correlates with the success of counterinsurgency. Peace processes in intrastate conflicts often involve power sharing, the provision of amnesty for acts during wars, and the provision of various material and other support for combatants in disarmament, demobilisation, and reintegration (DDR) programmes. Such positive inducements can facilitate the acceptance of compellers’ demands by targets by somewhat mitigating or compensating for the damage they suffer from doing so. Taken together, the most effective strategy is expected to be a combination of the gradual turning of the screw and the carrot and stick.

H2: Compellence in peace operations is more likely to succeed if the compellers employ the gradual-turning-of-the-screw strategy in combination with the carrot-and-stick strategy.

2.2.3 Credibility

The third hypothesis covers factors related to another aspect of pressure: the credibility of threats. This is what the compellence literature regards as an important condition of success. Considering the insights from the studies that were reviewed in Chapter 1, there are four possible sources of credibility: national interests, strong domestic support, previously acquired advantageous reputation, and the actual use of force. The hypothesis is that

[...]

7 The thesis does not examine the effect of audience costs. Audience cost theory assumes that the balance of capabilities and interests are taken into account when decisions are made to challenge others; thus, both sides in the crises are highly resolved and audience costs as third factors become important (Fearon, 1994a; 1994b). However, in the context of peace operations, the targets of compellence have a very clear advantage in the relative balance of interests against compellers. With this highly intuitive advantage, non-state actors in civil wars do not
compared to other sources, the actual use of force is more effective in regard to making compellent threats credible in peace operations.

How to understand national interests – the first possible source of threat credibility (e.g. George and Simons, 1994a; Schaub, 1998; Treverton, 2000) – is a big issue in the field of international relations. According to realist theories, national interests are the accumulation of power and the survival of state (Burchill, 2005, ch.2). Other branches of theories present different views and include wider issues in national interests, such as the pursuance of international common interests (Burchill, 2005, pp.162-170) and even value-based moral behaviour, depending on the identities of states (Nye, 1999; Burchill, 2005, pp.195-201).

However, what is discussed here is national interests that can increase the credibility of the threats to use force, seen from the eyes of the targets of compellence. Jervis (1979, p.314) categorises interests into three types: intrinsic interest, strategic interest, and commitment. Similarly, Press (2005, pp.25-26) divides interests into vital interests, important interests, and concerns. Even the proponents of a wider understanding of national interests rank the types of interests and regard the strategic ones as more important than the others (Burchill, 2005, pp.175, 183). This directly relates to whether states should be ready to use force to pursue different kinds of interests, and there are arguments that force should be considered only when more important strategic interests are at stake in the issues at hand (Nye, 1999, p.32; Walton, 2009). Moreover, in the context of compellence in peace operations, the target local factions have stronger interests in the issues that are in dispute. Taking these points into account, it is unlikely that the involvement of weaker variants of interests strengthens the credibility of the threats to use force.

Therefore, this study focuses on the narrow strategic interests of the intervening states that can directly affect their security or their accumulation seem to pay attention to the domestic audience costs of intervening states as a sign of resolve. Therefore, this study does not focus on audience costs as a source of credibility.
of power. If such strategic interests of compellers are involved, compellent threats can be credible. Whether compellers’ national interests are involved or not is fixed from the initiation of compellence, unless new countries join the peace operations later. Hence, if compellers’ strategic interests lend credibility to threats, the threats should be effective from the beginning, assuming that the targets of compellence are aware of the salience of the issues to the compellers.

The second possible source of credibility is compellers’ domestic support. The existing studies on compellence regard this factor as facilitating the success of the strategy (e.g. George and Simons, 1994a; Blechman and Wittes, 1999; Treverton, 2000), and it can be important in peace operations as well. Strong domestic support for participation in peace operations can increase the costs and risks that states can bear, enabling the states’ leaders to adopt a robust stance on the use of force. Therefore, if the targets of compellence are aware of this fact, the existence of strong domestic support may directly enhance the credibility of the threats by the intervening forces.

If domestic support plays a major role in affecting the credibility of threats, then threats should be effective when compellers receive strong domestic support. The domestic support that compellers receive for participating in a peace operation can fluctuate during the operation for various reasons, which include not only how well the operation is going but also factors that are irrelevant to the operation. The existence of domestic support in participating states can be confirmed through polls or the discussions or resolutions of national congresses.

The third factor that can affect credibility is the reputation of the compellers based on their past behaviour. As discussed in Chapter 1, in the existing studies on reputation, there is disagreement over whether actors can have a reputation at all and if so, what kind (e.g. Mercer, 1996; Shannon and Dennis, 2007; Press, 2005). If the UN as a whole or specific troop-contributing countries have a strong reputation for having resolve or capabilities, such a reputation can enhance the credibility of threats by raising the expectation that similar robust actions will also be taken in the
current operation. In contrast, having a reputation for lacking resolve or being weak can hinder compellence by impairing the credibility of threats.

By definition, the existence of a previously acquired advantageous reputation, which is based on the actor’s past activities, is fixed from the initiation of compellence in the same way as the national interests discussed above. Therefore, if a reputation based on past behaviour generates the credibility of threats, the threats should be effective from the beginning. Even though it is difficult to observe the existence of a strong reputation, the targets’ statements or other information can indicate what kind of image the targets have about the interveners or their past operations.

The fourth method of increasing credibility is the actual employment of force by compellers. In the past studies reviewed in Chapter 1, there is disagreement over the utility of the exemplary use of force (e.g. George, 1994a; Kagan, 1998; Schaub, 1998; Byman, 2006; Wilner, 2010). However, actually demonstrating that compellers can follow through with their threats must be the strongest way to back up the threats. Actors can not only have a reputation based on their past behaviour but can also build a reputation for having resolve and capabilities by actually using force in a theatre of operation (Tang, 2005, pp.38-39). The precedents of the use of force by international troops in the current operation, especially the successful use of force resulting in the defeat of target armed groups, demonstrates the competence of the troops. Such use of force impresses targets with the capability and will of the intervening forces and thus makes subsequent threats more credible. As Schelling (1966, p.70) writes, “often the only way to become committed to an action is to initiate it”.

Among these four sources, it is expected that the actual use of force is more effective than the others and is required in lending credibility to compellent threats in peace operations. The balance of interests is clearly against the intervening forces, and non-state actors are likely to assume that the intervening forces do not have the resolve to confront them. Moreover, the coalitional nature of peace operations undermines the credibility of their threats. Therefore, mere threats by international forces are unlikely to work even if they are supported by other sources of credibility, short of the actual
use of force. Rather, as argued in studies on the deterrence of terrorism and cumulative deterrence, the credibility of pressure in compellence against non-state actors is expected to hinge upon the repeated execution of threats and the accumulation of tactical victories to impress intervening forces’ competence and resolve on the targets.

H3: Compellence in peace operations is more likely to succeed if the credibility of the compellers’ threats is supported by the actual use of force.

2.2.4 Denial

The fourth hypothesis focuses on the other aspect of pressure – namely, its type. As discussed in Chapter 1, compellence by denial is likely to be more effective than compellence by punishment, particularly against non-state actors (e.g. Pape, 1996; Posen, 1996; Byman and Waxman, 2002; Art, 2003b; Geipel, 2007). However, how to apply the denial type of pressure is highly context dependent, as Mueller (1998, p.214) points out, so the following question remains: What is the most effective way to achieve denial in the context of peace operations?

It is possible to think of four approaches to denial that are generally applicable to peace operations. Although all of them can possibly reduce the capability of targets and hinder their strategies for achieving their objectives, the hypothesis is that the approach that blocks opponents’ counter-coercive moves is especially required in the context of peace operations.

The first possible approach to achieving denial is attrition. Whatever purpose armed groups pursue, they need fighting forces. Hence, manpower is one of the necessary resources for insurgents (Mets and Millen, 2004, pp.7-8). Attrition aims to reduce the number of opponent combatants by means of killing and wounding, thereby hindering the opponents’ strategy.

The second is stronghold neutralisation. This approach seeks to disturb the opponents’ operations by capturing or destroying their strongholds. The importance of strongholds or safe havens for armed groups
has been acknowledged in the studies of insurgency (Connable and Libicki, 2010, pp.34-49; Treistman, 2012). Safe havens within the state in which the insurgents are operating or in neighbouring states are thought to be one of the necessary assets of insurgents (Mets and Millen, 2004, pp.7-8). A study on the use of coercion against non-state groups also raises the absence of sanctuaries as one of the conditions for the success of the strategy (Payne et al., 2008, p.29). Therefore, this approach can be effective in peace operations as well.

The third is decapitation. Decapitation seeks to neutralise the opponents' leaders by killing or capturing them, and this can create compellent effects based on denial and punishment in several different ways (Pape, 1996, pp.55, 80). One is to threaten the incumbent leaders. The threat of murder can affect their calculations and lead to a change in the target-groups' behaviour (Hosmer, 2001, pp.2-3; Byman and Waxman, 2002, pp.72-73). This pressure falls under punishment; it threatens the leaders' lives, which are their most valuable assets (Mueller, 1998, p.218). Other forms of decapitation seek to manipulate the behaviour of succeeding leaders and target organisations by killing or detaining current leaders. The actual neutralisation of leaders constitutes brute force rather than compellence for the leaders themselves (Byman and Waxman, 2002, p.72). However, for opponents in the form of groups, the elimination of their leaders would hinder their operational capabilities and thus make it difficult for them to achieve their objectives (Hosmer, 2001, pp.3-4; Wilner, 2011, p.20). If they capitulate because of this difficulty, this constitutes successful compellence by denial (Pape, 1996, p.80; Mueller, 1998, p.218). In addition, the successors of the eliminated leaders may take an amicable stance towards the compellers and accept their demands. If this change comes from the fear of suffering the same fate as their predecessors, this is also successful compellence by punishment (Pape, 1996, p.80). Conversely, if the new leaders are more susceptible to pressure than their predecessors, it may be easier to persuade them of the futility and pessimistic prospects of their armed struggles. This is also successful compellence by denial. Of course, these are logical distinctions and several of them are likely to operate simultaneously in reality. Some researchers are sceptical about the
utility of decapitation (Hosmer, 2001; Hafez and Hatfield, 2006; Jordan, 2009), while others support it, albeit with caveats (Geipel, 2007; Lebovic, 2007; Cronin, 2009; Long, 2010; Johnston, 2012). Therefore, the literature is divided on the utility of this approach, but at least there is a possibility that decapitation works in peace operations.

The last possible approach to denial is counter-coercion negation. The previous three approaches aim to inflict damage on the opponents. Compellence, however, is mutual interaction, and the target side also tries to inflict damage on the compellers. Even when the targets of compellence suffer considerable damage, they may not succumb to pressure as long as they can maintain their hope of repelling the compellers by means of their own compellence. Therefore, denying opponents’ counter-coercive attempts can be effective in regard to making them realise the improbability of achieving their objectives.

Regarding the specific counter-coercive strategies that opponents can use, Byman and Waxman (1999, p.111) identify three: “civilian suffering-based strategies”, “coalition-fracturing strategies”, and “casualty-generating strategies”. In civilian suffering-based strategies, armed groups try to hinder the compellers’ offence or undermine support for them by putting civilians in danger – for example, by using them as human shields or launching retaliatory attacks against civilian populations (Byman and Waxman, 1999, pp.111-113; Nadin et al., 2014, pp.91-92). The aim of coalition-fracturing strategies is to hinder compellence by exacerbating the rifts among compellers, which cannot be eliminated as long as states with different interests and priorities form coalitions. For example, the fake amicable stances of target armed groups may increase some coalition members’ doubts regarding the necessity to escalate pressure. Mounting casualties may also create and compound disagreements within coalitions (Byman and Waxman, 1999, pp.113-114; Morgan, 2003, pp.183-185). Finally, in casualty-generating strategies, target armed groups try to inflict casualties on intervening forces and thereby induce them to halt their compellence. As the compellers seldom have any vital interests in the conflicts in which they are intervening, suffering casualties may break their will to continue the intervention (Byman and Waxman, 1999, pp.114-116). Some studies point
out the importance of counter-coercion negation (Byman and Waxman, 1999; Johnson et al., 2002, pp.22-23; Dekker, 2011; Harvey and Wilner, 2012).

Among the four approaches to achieving denial, counter-coercion negation is expected to be necessary in the context of peace operations. In this context, local armed groups have stronger motivation than intervening international forces and have typically been fighting civil wars for years. These features suggest that the target side is ready to accept high costs. This must be especially so based on the hope that international forces are not strongly resolved and can thus be compelled to withdraw. Based on this hope, local armed groups may well expect to win the contest of endurance. If they are deprived of the hope to win, the targets must become more susceptible to pressure. Therefore, to compel targets with such characters, it is likely to be necessary to crush their hopes by denying their counter-coercive attempts.

H4: Compellence in peace operations is more likely to succeed if the compellers achieve counter-coercion negation as a form of denial.

2.2.5 Third-Party Support

The fifth and final hypothesis covers third-party support for the targets of compellence, and it is expected that compellence is more likely to be successful if such support is absent. The studies on compellence that were reviewed in Chapter 1 point out the importance of the lack of external support on the target side for the success of the strategy (e.g. George and Simons, 1994a; Kagan, 1998; Downes, 2018). Studies on insurgencies also acknowledge the importance of foreign support for insurgents. Such support can take various forms, including moral, political, and material support, as well as the provision of sanctuaries (O’Neill, 1990, pp.114-119). A study points out that the majority of successful insurgencies received foreign support (Connable and Libicki, 2010, pp.62-75). Another study reveals that insurgencies are likely to fail when they are cut off from supporters,
regardless of whether they are domestic or foreign, and that the existence of foreign support correlates with the failure of counterinsurgency (Paul et al., 2013, pp.130-133, 151). Taking into account that targets are non-state armed groups, these arguments imply that the absence of third-party support facilitates the success of compellence in peace operations as well. In fact, Pushkina (2006, pp.139-140) finds that the lack of foreign support for local warring factions correlates with the success of peacekeeping.

Third-party support is likely to make targets more resilient to compellent pressure. With more weapons, sanctuaries, and other war matériel provided by their supporters, armed groups can fight back against international troops and continue to pursue their objectives. Therefore, the absence or cessation of third-party support is expected to constraint or reduce the combat capability of targets and facilitate denial. This is especially so when target armed groups are heavily dependent on their supporters.

The cessation of political support from a third party may also demoralise armed groups when it makes their objectives unattainable. For example, assume that an ethnic armed group fights a civil war with support from a neighbouring country with the same ethnicity, and it pursues secession from the current state and potential integration with its neighbour. If the support from the neighbour is halted, this will be a severe blow to the ethnic armed group not only militarily but also politically, effectively signifying an abandonment, which makes the integration almost unattainable. In such a situation, the armed group is expected to be demoralised and more susceptible to compellent pressure.

Whether third-party support exists or not tends to be regarded as an environmental factor, but it is also manipulable by compellers (Crawford, 2018). If target armed groups receive third-party support, peace operations or the wider international community can employ positive and/or negative inducements to persuade the supporter to halt the support.

**H5: Compellence in peace operations is more likely to succeed if the targets receive little support from third parties.**
2.3 Methodology

The hypotheses should be empirically tested so that the validity of the conditions can be examined. After considering other methodological options, this section discusses why a comparative case study is the most feasible approach for this research, and it explains three specific methods of analysis.

A possible approach to examining the hypotheses is to use statistical analysis, which would shed light on whether and how much impact each condition of interest has on the result of compellence. However, the approach is difficult to apply to this research because of the relatively large number of conditions and the small number of available cases, as identified in the next section. Of course, it is possible to apply statistical analysis by reducing the variables or expanding the scope of the study and thereby increasing the number of relevant cases. This approach directs a study towards producing a general theory that tries to explain a wide range of phenomena in a parsimonious manner. However, such an approach does not correspond to the aim of this research, which is to build a middle-range theory that explains a specific subset of a phenomenon with a relatively large number of variables to avoid excessive simplification.

Another possible method is Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA). QCA aims to find sufficient and necessary conditions by analysing all possible combinations of independent variables and the responding results of the empirical cases for each combination (Ragin, 2000; 2014, chs.6-7). QCA is especially suitable when an examined phenomenon is expected to have conjunctural causation – that is, when a specific combination of factors, rather than a single factor, has a causal effect – and equifinality, which is when different (combinations of) factors can lead to the same result (Ragin, 2000, chs.5, 9; 2014, pp.24-26, 101; Schneider and Wagemann, 2012, pp.12, 78-79). If these expectations are met and conjunctural sufficient conditions are expressed in a minimal or non-redundant way, this means that each individual factor composing a conjunctural sufficient condition is an INUS condition, or "an insufficient but necessary part of a condition which is itself unnecessary but sufficient for the result" (Mackie, 1965, p.245; Mahoney, 2008, pp.418-419; Schneider and Wagemann, 2012, p.79).
Mackie (1965, p.245) provides an example of the cause of a fire in explaining the concept of INUS condition. Supposing that a house caught fire and a later investigation revealed that an electrical short circuit caused it, he points out that the factor was neither necessary nor sufficient to cause the fire and that its causal role should be understood in combination with other factors. For the short circuit to cause the fire, there must have been a flammable item close enough to it, a sprinkler system must have been absent, and other factors may also have been necessary. In this example, each of the factors was indispensable to cause the fire. Without the short circuit, the flammable item would not have been ignited. Without the flammable item, the short circuit would have ignited nothing. If there had been a sprinkler system, the fire would have been extinguished before flaming up. Moreover, because a fire has many causes, this combination of factors is sufficient but not necessary for causing the fire; different (sets of) causes could also have set fire to the house at the time. He proposed that a factor such as the short circuit in the example should be called an INUS condition.

It seems appropriate to assume that causality in compellence has such features. As compellence is a very complex phenomenon, none of the conditions derived in the previous section is expected to be individually sufficient for the success of the strategy. This expectation is in line with the studies reviewed in Chapter 1, which suggest that multiple factors can positively affect the outcome of the strategy. Rather, it is expected that the above conditions’ combined effect leads to a successful result; therefore, they collectively constitute a sufficient condition for success. This means that each condition is likely to be an INUS condition. Moreover, different combinations among them or with other factors can lead to success.

QCA accordingly seems to be an attractive method for this study, but it requires a considerable amount of work. An in-depth understanding of each case is necessary to assess whether each condition is satisfied in the cases examined. The criteria used for the assessments themselves are also subject to change based on empirical data (Ragin, 2000, ch.11; 2014, pp.120-121; Rihoux and Lobe, 2009). This dialogue between theory and data may end in the conducting of full-fledged case studies (Vogt et al., 2014,
QCA has another strength: It can systematically analyse mid-sized numbers of cases, which tend to fall into the void between small- and large-N studies (Vogt et al., 2014, p.308). The number of relevant cases for this study is also mid-sized – a dozen cases as identified in the next section – but examining all of them is not feasible for this body of research as a result of the time and resource that would be required.

Therefore, a comparative case study is the best available option for this research. A case study approach has its limitations. As the number of cases examined is small, studies can draw different and biased inferences depending on which cases they examine. To make reasonable causal inferences, cases should be selected carefully.

To mitigate the weakness of comparative case studies, this body of research employs three different case study methods for its empirical analysis. The first is the congruence method, which is a comparison between a hypothesis and a case. If the prediction of a hypothesis is consistent with the result of a case, this strengthens the confidence in the hypothesis (George and Bennett, 2005, p.181). Confirmation in multiple cases further strengthens this confidence, like multiple experiments that replicate findings. The greater the number of replications, the more reliable the hypothesis (Yin, 2014, pp.57, 61). In its simplest form, the method is used to determine whether a certain value of the independent variable corresponds with the expected value of the dependent variable in a case (George and Bennett, 2005, pp.181-183). In addition, if a theory specifies a causal mechanism and its observable implications are observed in a case as expected, this would be strong confirmation of the theory (Beach and Pedersen, 2016, ch.8). The method can also be used to decide which of the competing theoretical claims better fits and explains a case (Blatter and Haverland, 2012, ch.4).

As this research aims to identify the conditions for the success of compellence in peace operations, the congruence method should be applied to cases of success and failure to demonstrate that the conditions can explain the differences in the results. Examining cases with different values on the dependent variable prevents selection bias that estimates causal effects weakly, which happens when comparative case studies examine only
cases that have similar results (King et al., 1994, pp.129-130; Collier and Mahoney, 1996; Collier et al., 2004, pp.94-95).

In particular, the hypotheses should pass this test in the cases of outright success and failure – that is, exhibit extreme values on the dependent variable – because extreme values on variables provide clear predictions (Eckstein, 1975, pp.119-120). The conditions are expected to be satisfied in the case of outright success, and they are expected to be absent in the case of outright failure. In addition, the effects of the independent variables are expected to appear strongly in cases with extreme values on the dependent variables (King et al., 1994, pp.141-142; Evera, 1997, pp.79-81). The effect of the confirmation or disconfirmation of propositions in cases with extreme values on variables is stronger than in other cases with moderate values (Lijphart, 1971, p.692).

The second method is the most-similar-design comparison. The comparison of cases that have few differences but quite different results suggests that the few differences are the cause of the different results, because other factors are controlled (Mill, 1973, p.391; Evera, 1997, p.57; Gerring, 2007, pp.131-139). In the real world, each case of any social phenomena is unique and it is difficult to find cases that are similar enough to compare based on this approach. One of the best possible ways to employ this method is to make a comparison between two or more phases within a case. This temporal comparison makes it possible to examine the effects of changes in independent variables on the dependent variable while keeping environmental conditions more or less constant (Lijphart, 1971, p.689; Evera, 1997, pp.82-83; George and Bennett, 2005, pp.166-167). Therefore, a case of protracted compellence should be analysed so that the effects of changes in variables of interest can be observed.

The final method is cross-case comparisons. The previous two methods are forms of within-case analysis. After these examinations, all cases should be analysed jointly to determine whether any patterns emerge across them. It is problematic that cross-case comparisons cannot rule out the possibility that the patterns found are caused by exogenous factors, because they are not controlled in the examination. However, the reliability
of cross-case comparisons can be enhanced by combining them with insights from within-case analyses. Even though the comparison cannot be ideally controlled, any consistency that is found can provide additional support or non-support for the hypotheses.

This study relies on both primary and secondary sources. They include two interviews – one with Lord David Richards, who was a British force commander in Sierra Leone, and the other with Dr David Kilcullen, who was a company commander of the Australian force in East Timor – conducted by the author; documents released by the UN, governments, and humanitarian organisations; the records of international trials; and media articles, which include reports from the ground and interviews with the people involved. Some published works also provide firsthand accounts of the cases.

In sum, this body of research conducts a comparative case study. More specifically, it combines three case study methods: the congruence method, which compares the expectations of the hypotheses and what actually happened in a case; the most-similar-design comparison, which compares different phases of a case in a before-and-after manner; and cross-case comparisons, which looks for consistency across the examined cases. These three types of analysis complement each other and provide valuable insights into the causality of compellence in peace operations.

2.4 Relevant Cases

This section identifies cases that are relevant to this research. As shown in Chapter 1, this research defines peace operations as field operations that are deployed to manage and/or resolve violent conflicts, regardless of whether the executants are the UN or other entities. However, not all peace operations employ compellence in carrying out their mandates; therefore, it is necessary to identify cases that can be used for testing the hypotheses. As clarified earlier in this chapter, the scope of this research is UN-related peace operations that issued the heaviest type of demands and employed threats or force proactively against non-state armed groups. This section
identifies which of the post-Cold War peace operations fall into the scope and selects those used in case studies.

With regard to UN operations, they must be authorised to use force beyond self-defence to employ compellence, because compellence requires threatening targets by indicating that their noncompliance with demands will lead to escalated pressure. Peace operations in the traditional mode can use force in self-defence only; this cannot exert proactive pressure. Therefore, UN operations that are authorised under Chapter VII of the UN Charter to use all necessary means – namely, force beyond self-defence – to carry out their mandates can be relevant.

With regard to non-UN operations, the scope of this research is technically limited to cases related to UN operations so that cases of partial intervention in civil wars can be excluded. More specifically, the relevant non-UN operations are those that are authorised by the UNSC and are preceded, co-deployed with, or succeed UN operations. As with UN operations, they also have to be authorised to use force beyond self-defence to employ compellence. However, there are a few cases in which states intervened without explicit authorisation from the UNSC and supported peace operations on the ground. This research also regards these as peace operations as long as they were co-deployed and cooperated with explicitly authorised operations, because such interventions are usually appreciated and supported by the UNSC, and it is difficult to distinguish their effects from those of authorised operations.

In sum, there are three categories of peace operations that can be relevant to this study: (1) UN operations that were authorised to use all necessary means under Chapter VII of the UN Charter; (2) non-UN operations that were authorised to use all necessary means under Chapter VII of the UN Charter and were preceded, co-deployed with, or succeeded UN operations; and (3) non-UN operations that were not authorised by the UNSC but were co-deployed with and assisted operations that fell into categories (1) or (2). The peace operations that deployed to civil wars after the end of the Cold War and satisfy the above conditions are listed in Table 2.2.
Table 2.2 Potentially Relevant Missions

Missions with * were not authorised to use force beyond self-defence under Chapter VII of the UN Charter and are not included in the list. Missions are listed in the order of their authorised dates, followed by related missions regardless of authorised date.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Names of Missions</th>
<th>Category</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Implementation Force (IFOR)</td>
<td>2, succeeded UNPROFOR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Taskforce (UNITAF)</td>
<td>2, preceded UNOSOM II</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Nations Operation in Somalia II (UNOSOM II)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US forces (Quick Reaction Force [QRF] and Task Force [TF] Ranger)</td>
<td>3, co-deployed with UNOSOM II</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multinational Force (MNF) in Haiti</td>
<td>2, preceded United Nations Mission in Haiti (UNMIH)*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operation Turquoise</td>
<td>2, co-deployed with United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR)*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stabilisation Force (SFOR)</td>
<td>2, co-deployed with United Nations Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (UNMIBH)*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kosovo Force (KFOR)</td>
<td>2, co-deployed with United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK)*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Force for East Timor (INTERFET)</td>
<td>2, preceded UNTAET</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK forces</td>
<td>3, co-deployed with UNAMSIL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interim Emergency Multinational Force (IEMF)</td>
<td>2, co-deployed with MONUC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU Force R. D. Congo</td>
<td>2, co-deployed with MONUC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Nations Mission of Support in East Timor (UNMISET)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECOWAS Mission in Liberia (ECOMIL)</td>
<td>2, preceded United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL)*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECOWAS Mission in Côte d’Ivoire (ECOMICI)</td>
<td>2, preceded UNOCI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>French forces (Operation Licorne)</td>
<td>2, preceded and co-deployed with UNOCI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Nations Operation in Côte d’Ivoire (UNOCI)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
However, not all of these operations actually employed compellence. They were authorised to use force in a proactive manner in carrying out their mandates, but a significant number of them refrained from doing so or threatening to do so. Many of these missions used force in self-defence but not proactively. In fact, information obtainable from the reports of the UN Secretary-General on UN operations, reports on non-UN operations submitted to the UNSC by executants, and some other studies indicate that
Operation Turquoise, as well as the Stabilisation Force (SFOR), Kosovo Force (KFOR), EU Force R. D. Congo, United Nations Mission of Support in East Timor (UNMISET), ECOWAS Mission in Liberia (ECOMIL), Multinational Interim Force (MIF), United Nations Operation in Burundi (ONUB), United Nations Mission in the Sudan (UNMIS), African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID), United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad (MINURCAT), European Union Force Chad/Central African Republic (EUFOR Chad/CAR), United Nations Organization Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA), United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan (UNMISS), and European Union military operation in the Central African Republic (EUFOR RCA), did not or have not used the proactive pressure of force and thus are not cases of compellence. On at least one occasion, the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) launched a proactive operation to capture terrorists (de Cherisey, 2017). However, this is an exception, and the mission as a whole has not been proactive in exerting pressure. Therefore, MINUSMA is also not regarded as a case of compellence in this study.

There are other missions that cannot be used in this study. First, peace operations in the Central African Republic are ongoing, and the outcome is pending. Hence, although the African-led International Support Mission in the Central African Republic (MISCA), United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA), and French forces under Operation Sangaris employed threats and actual force in a proactive manner (e.g. UN, 2014b; 2017; 2018), they cannot be used for this research.

Second, several peace operations employed compellence against governments and therefore are not suitable for this research. This category includes the Multinational Force (MNF) in Haiti, the ECOWAS Mission in Côte d’Ivoire (ECOMICI), the United Nations Operation in Côte d’Ivoire (UNOCI), and the French forces under Operation Licorne.

The remaining missions employed compellence against non-state actors in carrying out their mandates. However, some of them put limited
demands on their targets and are thus outside the scope of this research. These are UNITAF, the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR), the Implementation Force (IFOR), and the Interim Emergency Multinational Force (IEMF).

The rest of the operations constitute the pool of relevant cases for this research. The first compellent attempt in post-Cold War peace operations happened in Somalia in response to a humanitarian crisis caused by a severe civil war. After UNITAF, a US-led multinational force, temporarily restored security for humanitarian assistance, UNOSOM II was deployed in 1993 with wide-ranging tasks, which included the disarmament of warring factions (UNSC, 1993a). The factions were not ready to disarm, and in particular, the Somali National Alliance (SNA), the faction led by Mohamed Farah Aidid, forcefully resisted disarmament. UNOSOM II and supporting US forces fiercely engaged with the SNA, but the compellers could not compel the faction to disarm, and after suffering casualties, they had to relinquish compellence without achieving their objectives (e.g. Bensahel, 2003).

The next relevant cases are two missions in East Timor. The first was INTERFET, an Australian-led multinational force that was deployed in 1999 when the pro-integration militias resorted to massive violence and destruction after residents chose independence from Indonesian rule in a referendum. The demand of the compeller was to stop the violence (UNSC, 1999a), effectively meaning to accept the independence of East Timor, which was a total defeat for the militias. INTERFET was deployed throughout East Timor and engaged with the militias several times, but it used only a small amount of force in the course of the operation (Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade [DFAT], 2001, pp.147-148, 153-154). The militias fled to West Timor, an Indonesian territory, and largely ceased violence while they continued small-scale infiltrations and attacks from there (UN, 2000c, paras.2, 22-23). INTERFET could largely achieve its objective with little use of force; therefore, the compellence was almost successful.

The United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET), which succeeded INTERFET, also employed compellence against the remnants of pro-integration militias. The infiltration and activity of
the militias expanded to inner regions in July 2000, although the number of militias operating inside of East Timor was estimated to be a maximum of 150 (UNSC, 2000d, pp.2-3; 2000e, p.4). In response, UNTAET launched proactive operations against them, demanding surrender and disarmament (Friel, 2000a; UNSC, 2000e, p.4; UNTAET, 2000). While some of the militias surrendered, many fled back to West Timor after the operations (Agence France Presse [AFP], 13 Nov 2000; UN, 2000k, para.9; UNSC, 2000e, p.4). Thereafter, the militias’ infiltrations from West Timor and their attacks in the border area still persisted on a smaller scale (Greenlees, 2001; UN, 2001d, paras.22-23; 2001f, para.27). Therefore, the compellence was a limited success.

Sierra Leone also experienced compellence by peace operations from 2000 to 2001. After almost a decade had passed since the outbreak of a civil war in the country, UNAMSIL was deployed to Sierra Leone in 1999 in accordance with the Lomé Peace Agreement between the government and the main rebel force, the Revolutionary United Front (RUF). However, the RUF reneged on the agreement by rejecting disarmament and launching an offensive towards the capital in May 2000 (UN, 2000e, paras.56-64; Prince, 2002, pp.195-196). Against this background, the UK intervened and assisted UNAMSIL and the Sierra Leone government to push back the RUF (Dorman, 2009, pp.79-80, 92-94). The compellers demanded that the RUF disarm and demobilise in accordance with the peace agreement (UNSC, 1999b). After being exposed to various forms of pressure, as well as negotiations, the RUF acceded to disarmament in 2001 (UN, 2001e, paras.2-3; UNAMSIL, 2001i). In the process, the compellers experienced a number of substantial engagements with the RUF, so the compellence was not an ideal success but was still a major one.

In addition, the intervening forces and the Serra Leone government also compelled another armed group called the West Side Boys (WSB). The WSB took the side of the government and fought against the RUF when it advanced towards the capital in May 2000. However, the WSB soon came to cause frictions, including armed clashes, with other pro-government forces and preyed on civilians. The Sierra Leone government demanded that the WSB disarm, but it refused to do so despite UNAMSIL launching an attack
on it (UN, 2000g, paras.22-23). In August 2000, the WSB kidnapped UK soldiers who were in Sierra Leone to train the new government army. The UK, with the assistance of UNAMSIL and the government army, launched a hostage-rescue operation the following month and destroyed a WSB camp while inflicting substantial casualties on the WSB’s fighting forces and capturing its leader. After the operation, the remaining WSB members joined a disarmament programme en masse, and the group collapsed (UN, 2000i, para.17). This case can be regarded as rather successful compellence.

The DRC, the next country in which peace operations employed compellence, is one of the places to which most robust peace operations have been deployed. There are two regions which witnessed compellence: Ituri and Kivus.

In Ituri, inter-ethnic violence between the Hema and Lendu flared up from 1999 against the background of the lack of governance due to a civil war at the state level. The United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC), the UN mission operated in the country, first failed to respond to the violence. However, after the IEMF, a French-led EU operation, intervened to manage the humanitarian disaster in the regional capital, Bunia, in 2003, MONUC came to adopt a robust approach against armed groups in Ituri and tried to disarm them in support of the DRC government. MONUC, which deployed a brigade-sized force in Ituri, had to launch proactive operations many times before the government could persuade the armed groups to accept the demands through negotiations (International Crisis Group [ICG], 2004; 2008; Isberg and Tillberg, 2012). The leaders of major Ituri armed groups agreed to be integrated into the national army in 2006 and actually did so in 2007. However, some of the rank and file did not follow the decision and continued resistance (ICG, 2008, pp.3-4, 34-35; Tamm, 2013, pp.36-37). Taken together, the outcome was rather successful; targets largely accepted the demands but only after the substantial use of force.

Peace operations in the DRC have also employed compellence in Kivus. One of the targets was the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR), the Rwandan Hutu rebel operating in the DRC. Peace
agreements of the civil war in the DRC demanded that the Hutu rebels disarm and return to Rwanda (UN, 1999e; 2002c; UNSC, 2002). After voluntary disarmament efforts were made, MONUC started to use compellence in cooperation with the DRC army from 2004 and repeatedly conducted proactive military operations against the FDLR (e.g. UN, 2005a, para.34; Isberg and Tillberg, 2012, p.156). As a result, the leader of the FDLR declared its willingness to disarm, and some FDLR members joined the disarmament programme (UN, 2005a, paras.43-44; 2006b, para.57; ICG, 2009, p.19). However, the FDLR as a group never disarmed, and it maintained its operational capability (e.g. UN, 2005b, paras.26-28; 2006a, paras.27-28; 2007, para.16). The compellent attempt waned without realising the disarmament and repatriation of the FDLR as the focus of MONUC and the DRC government shifted to an election in 2006 (ICG, 2009, p.20). Therefore, the compellence against the FDLR was unsuccessful.

Another target of compellence in Kivus was a Tutsi-based rebel group, the National Congress for the Defence of the People (CNDP), which was led by Laurent Nkunda. In November 2006, a Tutsi businessman was murdered by police in Sake, and Nkunda invaded the town with his force in retaliation (Stearns, 2012, p.29). The CNDP further advanced to the regional capital, Goma, and MONUC responded by attacking and inflicting substantial damage on the CNDP, which halted its offence and enabled the Congolese army to recapture Sake (ICG, 2007, p.8; Stearns, 2012, p.29; Nadin et al., 2015, p.75). The DRC government and the UN demanded that the CNDP halt its violence and accept integration into the army (Radio Okapi, 2006; UNSC, 2006), but some clashes continued between the army and the CNDP (e.g. IRIN, 2006a; 2006b; ICG, 2007, p.8). The subsequent negotiation led to an agreement with a major compromise on the side of the government in January 2007. The CNDP was to be integrated into the national army, but this was to be done in a manner that preserved much of its command-and-control structure. Moreover, the scheme collapsed within months (ICG, 2007, pp.8-11; Stearns, 2012, p.30). In sum, the compellence against the CNDP was partially successful: An agreement was reached after a major compromise and the substantial use of force.
The other compellent attempt in the DRC was exerted by the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO), the mission following MONUC, and the DRC government against the M23, which was the successor of the CNDP. The failure of integration of the CNDP into the national army led to the defection of ex-CNDP soldiers and the creation of the M23 in May 2012 (Stearns, 2012, pp.43-44). In response, MONUSCO’s newly established intervention brigade and the DRC government resorted to offensive military operations against the rebels from mid-2013. The demand against the M23 was that it was to cease the rebellion and demobilise (UNSC, 2013). The compellers conquered all the M23’s strongholds after several fierce battles, and the armed group declared the end of the rebellion and fled to Uganda and Rwanda (UN, 2013b, paras.19-20). Subsequently, the government and the M23 signed declarations after peace talks (UN, 2013b, para.35; 2013c, para.11). The case ended with the target’s acceptance of the compellers’ demands, but it should be regarded as only barely successful, because the compellers’ objectives were achieved almost forcibly.

The last remaining case from Table 2.2 is an intervention in Mali. The turmoil in Mali was triggered by the rebellion of the National Movement for the Liberation of the Azawad (MNLA), a Tuareg armed group, in January 2012. The MNLA launched the rebellion in cooperation with regional and domestic Islamic extremist groups, but the Islamic extremists soon marginalised the Tuareg rebels, and the rebel-held areas fell into the hands of the extremists (Shurkin, 2014, pp.5-6). Against this background, the African-led International Support Mission in Mali (AFISMA) and France intervened in 2013. The objectives of the intervention were to recover the northern part of Mali and to “[d]estroy” terrorists (UNSC, 2012; Shurkin, 2014, pp.7-8; Tramond and Seigneur, 2014, p.79). The French forces, AFISMA, and the Malian forces pushed back the Islamist forces, secured major population areas, and cleared their strongholds (UN, 2013a, para.18; Tramond and Seigneur, 2014, pp.79-83). Thus, the compellers were able to restore the occupied northern part of Mali, but only after using a substantial amount of force and defeating the Islamist forces. Moreover, despite suffering substantial damage, the Islamic extremists did not disappear and
continued attacks, including suicide bombings, against the French and Malian forces, as well as AFISMA and the succeeding MINUSMA (e.g. UN, 2013a, paras.24-25; 2014c, para.14). Therefore, the operation in Mali was a failure in terms of compellence: It achieved one objective forcibly and failed to achieve the other.

Finally, there is another mission that should be added to the pool of relevant cases. It is the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH), which was established under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. However, it was not authorised to use all necessary means to carry out its mandates (UNSC, 2004) and was therefore not included in Table 2.2. As a matter of fact, MINUSTAH employed threats and force proactively to counter the threats of the heavily armed gangs that were prominent in the shantytowns of the capital, Port-au-Prince, after a rebellion led to a regime change.

MINUSTAH’s compellence against the gang groups can be divided into two phases. The first phase is from 2004 to the presidential election in 2006, and the second is from late 2006 to 2007. Both the transitional government in the first phase and the newly elected government in the second phase demanded that the illegal armed groups disarm (Reuters, 2004; UN, 2004, para.11; Cockayne, 2014, p.750). The first phase ended in failure. MINUSTAH and the Haitian police launched multiple operations to secure the shantytowns and killed or arrested a number of gangs, but they could not disarm the gangs or contain their violence (Cockayne, 2014, pp.746-748). The gangs significantly decreased their violent activities immediately before the election, but this was because they supported René Préval, the frontrunner in the presidential election (ICG, 2006, p.1). The lull in violence ended several months after the election of Préval (Anon, 2006, p.13), and MINUSTAH and the Haitian police force again engaged in fierce battles with gangs and cleared their strongholds (Cockayne, 2014, pp.752-753). The gangs were killed, arrested, or dispersed, and the security of the urban areas was restored (Dziedzic and Perito, 2008, p.5). The second phase of compellence was successful, but only barely so; it involved the substantial use of force and was rather close to falling into the category of control.
These 12 cases constitute the pool of relevant cases – that is, UN-related peace operations’ compellence against non-state armed groups accompanied by the heaviest type of demands. The above overview is summarised in Table 2.3.

**Table 2.3 Relevant Cases**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Compeller(s)</th>
<th>Target(s)</th>
<th>Year(s)</th>
<th>Result</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UNOSOM II and US forces</td>
<td>SNA</td>
<td>1993</td>
<td>Failed (Compellence ceased and the operation withdrew)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INTERFET</td>
<td>Pro-integration militias</td>
<td>1999–2000</td>
<td>Almost successful (Demands were almost accepted; little force was used)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNTAET</td>
<td>Pro-integration militias</td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>Partially successful (Demands were partially accepted; little force was used)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNAMSIL, UK forces, and Sierra Leone government</td>
<td>RUF</td>
<td>2000–2001</td>
<td>Almost successful (Demands were accepted; substantial force was used)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNAMSIL, UK forces, and Sierra Leone government</td>
<td>WSB</td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>Rather successful (Demands were almost accepted; substantial force was used)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MONUC and DRC government</td>
<td>Ituri armed factions</td>
<td>2003–2007</td>
<td>Rather successful (Demands were almost accepted; substantial force was used)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MONUC and DRC government</td>
<td>FDLR</td>
<td>2004–2006</td>
<td>Failed (Compellence ceased)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MONUC and DRC government</td>
<td>CNDP</td>
<td>2006–2007</td>
<td>Partially successful (Agreement was reached after major compromise; substantial force was used)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MONUSCO and DRC government</td>
<td>M23</td>
<td>2013</td>
<td>Barely successful (Objectives were achieved almost forcibly)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MINUSTAH</td>
<td>Armed gangs</td>
<td>2004–2006</td>
<td>Failed (Compellence ceased)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MINUSTAH</td>
<td>Armed gangs</td>
<td>2006–2007</td>
<td>Barely successful (Objectives were achieved almost forcibly)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>French forces, AFISMA, and Malian government</td>
<td>Islam extremists</td>
<td>2013</td>
<td>Failed (Objectives were achieved partially and forcibly)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It is infeasible to use all 12 cases in a comparative case study, so it is necessary to select a few for detailed analysis. As discussed in the previous section on methodology, cases of outright success and failure should be examined using the congruence method. Among the relevant cases, those
that ended in the highest degree of success are INTERFET in East Timor and UNAMSIL and the UK forces in Sierra Leone. In contrast, the case that ended in the clearest failure is UNOSOM II and the US forces in Somalia. These are the most suitable cases for the use of the congruence method. The derived conditions for success should be present in the cases of INTERFET and UNAMSIL and the UK forces, and they should be absent in the case of UNOSOM II and the US forces. In addition, a prolonged case should be examined so that the most-similar-design comparison can be applied. Of the above three, the Sierra Leone case constituted prolonged compellence and can be divided into multiple phases, which makes the before-and-after temporal comparison between them possible. Therefore, the three cases satisfy the methodological requirements and are suitable for case studies.

This chapter has set up the analytical framework of this research. First, it has clarified the study’s scope: cases of explicit military compellence in UN-related peace operations that are employed against non-state armed groups and accompanied by the heaviest type of demands. Second, the chapter has outlined the conditions for the success of compellence in peace operations based on existing studies while taking into account the contextual features. The conditions have then been formulated into five hypotheses. Third, it has explained the methodology of this study. The study conducts a comparative case study and, more specifically, employs three analytical methods: the congruence method, the most-similar-design comparison, and cross-case comparison. Finally, the chapter has reviewed post-Cold War peace operations and identified the cases that fall into the scope of this research. Among the relevant cases, the chapter selected three for detailed case studies – INTERFET, UNAMSIL and the UK forces, and UNOSOM II and the US forces. The following three chapters will analyse the cases one by one, and then Chapter 6 will combine the findings and provide cross-case analyses.
Chapter 3
East Timor: INTERFET

This first empirical chapter deals with compellence in East Timor from 1999 to 2000. The compeller of the case was INTERFET, an Australian-led multinational force, and the target was pro-Indonesian militias. This chapter employs the congruence method and determines whether the predictions of the hypotheses correspond with the actual events. As mentioned in the previous chapter, this is one of the most successful cases of compellence in peace operations, which means that at least some of the conditions for success are expected to be fulfilled in it. The chapter first reviews the event leading to the deployment of INTERFET and its activities, followed by an examination of how closely the hypotheses coincide with what actually happened. The chapter concludes with a summary of the findings.

3.1 Background

In 1975, East Timor, which was a Portuguese colony, entered into a civil war between political factions that pursued different ways of decolonisation and development. Among these factions, Revolutionary Front for an Independent East Timor (FRETILIN) with a leftist stance got the upper hand in the war (United Nations Department of Public Information [UNDPI], 2000, p.3; Commission of Truth and Friendship [CTF] Indonesia-Timor-Leste, 2008, pp.35-36; The Timor-Leste Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation [CAVR], 2013, pp.169-171, 182-187).

However, the result of the civil war was not independence but, rather, a long occupation by Indonesia. Indonesia, whose territory included the western half of Timor Island and who shared borders with East Timor, hoped to prevent the emergence of a small independent state that was vulnerable to the influence of communist powers (Greenlees and Garran, 2002, pp.8-9; CAVR, 2013, pp.162-163). Given the failure of its covert influence operations and the independence declaration of East Timor by the leftist FRETILIN,
Indonesia launched a full-scale invasion in late 1975. Although Indonesia occupied the entire territory by 1979, FRETILIN’s guerrilla resistance through its armed wing, Armed Forces for the Liberation of East Timor (FALINTIL), continued, and the political front developed into a nationalist independent movement. Indonesia responded with violent suppression, and international attention and concern increased (UNDPI, 2000a, pp.3-5; CTF, 2008, pp.48-49; CAVR, 2013, pp.174-176, 202-210, 228, 235-246, 254-257, 265-269).

The situation started to change in the late 1990s. Indonesia suffered severely from the currency crisis in 1997, and the Suharto regime collapsed the following year. In June 1998, the new president of Indonesia, Bacharuddin Jusuf Habibie, announced his intention to propose an autonomy deal to the East Timorese. Furthermore, in January 1999, he even offered separation from Indonesia if they rejected the autonomy (UNDPI, 2000a, pp.6-7; Greenlees and Garran, 2002, pp.25, 101). The decision seems to have been driven by a number of factors, including the need to improve Indonesia’s international image to secure financial assistance that was vital for economic recovery, the desire to solve the burdensome East Timor problem once and for all, and the expectation that the East Timorese would choose to remain a part of Indonesia (Moore, 2001, pp.33-34; Greenlees and Garran, 2002, pp.56-57, 99-101; van Klinken et al., 2006, p.72).

After negotiations took place between Indonesia, Portugal, and the UN, the decision was made on 5 May 1999 to hold a “popular consultation” – that is, an effective referendum – in East Timor to ask people whether they would accept the autonomy plan. If the plan was rejected, the territory was to be independent under the support of the UN (Marker, 2003; UN, 1999a). The UN subsequently established the United Nations Mission in East Timor (UNAMET) to organise the referendum (UNDPI, 2000a, pp.17-18).

However, the Indonesian military was not ready to accept the independence of East Timor. It had spilt a great amount of blood to quell the resistance, had made much of the unity of the nation, and was concerned about the effect of independence on other separatist movements in the country (Sherlock, 1999, p.16; Cotton, 2004, pp.62-64; Robinson, 2010,
Some East Timorese who had vested interests in Indonesian rule, such as the officials of the provincial government, also feared independence, as it would mean abandonment by Indonesia (Kammen, 2001, p.181; van Klinken et al., 2006, p.73; Cristalis, 2009, p.139).

To prevent independence, they recruited East Timorese and organised pro-integration militias, and they initiated a violent intimidation campaign so that the referendum would end in the acceptance of autonomy (Greenlees and Garran, 2002, pp.136-140; KPP HAM, 2006, pp.29, 39-40). However, their violence failed to achieve the desired effect. Despite the poor security conditions, the referendum was successfully held by UNAMET on 30 August 1999. The result was overwhelming support for independence, with 78.5% of voters rejecting the autonomy plan with a voter turnout of 98.6% (UNDPI, 2000a, pp.38-40).

Violence by the pro-integration militias and the Indonesian security forces flared up on large scale all over the territory after the announcement of the voting result on 4 September. They killed independence supporters, clergy, local UN staff, and their families. Some indiscriminate massacres also happened in places such as churches, to which people escaped (KPP HAM, 2006, pp.35-36; CAVR, 2013, p.1081). Their atrocities also included the arson and destruction of buildings and infrastructure, as well as the forceful deportation of people to West Timor and other parts of Indonesia (Dolan et al., 2004, p.12; KPP HAM, 2006, pp.35-39). Of the population of 800,000, an estimated 1,400 to 1,500 were killed (CAVR, 2013, p.1058), 250,000 to 280,000 moved out of East Timor under coercion or voluntarily, over 300,000 were internally displaced and went into hiding in hills and forests, and about 70% of the territory's buildings and infrastructure were destroyed (Dolan et al., 2004, p.12).

Besides killing and destruction as punishment for the choice of independence, the post-ballot violence is understood to have been employed strategically. One of the perceived purposes was the delegitimisation of the ballot result through the creation of a massive flood of people to West Timor. This population movement was falsely presented as a voluntary one that occurred because people wanted to remain under
Indonesian rule (Reuter, 1999a; KPP HAM, 2006, p.41). Another major objective seems to have been to clear out independence supporters and divide the territory into two parts, with the western half remaining a part of Indonesia. From before the vote, East Timor Governor Abilio Soares and notorious militia leader Eurico Guterres had repeatedly claimed that East Timor should be partitioned if independence was selected in the vote (Dodd, 1999a; Kristalis, 1999; Murdoch, 1999a; Djajamihardja, 2000, p.111). They continued to argue for the separation after the vote, referring to the 21% vote for autonomy and claiming that people in the western region supported the integration (AFP, 22 Sep 1999; Suwastoyo, 1999).

3.2 The Deployment and Activity of INTERFET

The widespread violence naturally provoked harsh criticism against the Indonesian government, which was responsible for maintaining the security of East Timor under the agreement between Indonesia, Portugal, and the UN on 5 May. Despite international calls to accept an international peace operation, the government repeatedly rejected it (e.g. Martinkus, 1999a; Riley, 1999). The Indonesian government sent in reinforcement troops and imposed martial law on 7 September, but the rampage continued (McInerney, 1999a; Reuters, 1999b; The Jakarta Post, 1999d; UNDPI, 2000a, p.46; Greenlees and Garran, 2002, p.229). To persuade Indonesia to accept a peace operation, some countries, including the US and the UK, halted their military assistance to Indonesia, and some international financial organisations implied that they would halt their financial assistance, which was vital for Indonesia to recover from the currency crisis (Wheeler and Dunne, 2001, pp.818-820; Jago, 2010, pp.385, 387). Finally, on 12 September, the Indonesian government consented to the deployment of an international force to restore security in East Timor (Thatcher, 1999; The Jakarta Post, 1999e).

Taking the urgency into account, it was agreed to dispatch a multinational force led by Australia, which had expressed its willingness to assume the leading role (Cumming, 1999; Nelson, 1999), rather than a UN operation that would take months to be deployed. On 15 September, the
UNSC adopted Resolution 1264, which authorised the establishment of the multinational force with the following tasks: “to restore peace and security in East Timor, to protect and support UNAMET in carrying out its tasks and, within force capabilities, to facilitate humanitarian assistance operations”. The force was also authorised “to take all necessary measures to fulfil this mandate” under Chapter VII of the UN Charter (UNSC, 1999a).

After its acceptance of an international force, the Indonesian government started to pull out its armed forces from East Timor, and the militias fled with them (Firdaus, 1999a; Lagan, 1999; United Press International, 1999). This made the capital, Dili, much quieter than before, and widespread killings wound down (Firdaus, 1999b; Moerdijat, 1999; Smith and Jarvis, 2018), but some militias remained in the territory and continued to perpetrate violence and destruction (Firdaus, 1999c; Johnston, 1999a; CAVR, 2013, pp.1103-1116, 1320-1332).

INTERFET commenced its operation on 20 September. A 1,100-strong force from Australia, New Zealand, and the UK secured Dili’s airport and port on the first day (McInerney, 1999b; DFAT, 2001, p.145). The following day, further troops arrived, increasing the force to some 2,300, and moved to secure various parts of Dili. On 22 September, INTERFET secured another airport in Baucau (Spencer, 1999a; DFAT, 2001, p.146). The commander of the local Indonesian forces handed over the responsibility for security to the commander of INTERFET on 27 September (Dodd, 1999b; Cosgrove, 2006, pp.211-212). The INTERFET troops started to disarm the militias in the streets from the day one and carried out sweeping operations in the capital (e.g. Friel, 1999; Spencer, 1999a).

Violence continued outside Dili while INTERFET was concentrating on the city, and stabilisation required forceful responses by INTERFET. After securing Dili, INTERFET was deployed to other towns in the east and west, where the force also disarmed or chased away the militias. From early October, INTERFET moved to secure the western border area of East Timor (Cosgrove, 2006, pp.217-218). The militia leaders claimed that East Timor’s western region should remain a part of Indonesia, and the area was thought of as the stronghold of the militias. Up until that point, INTERFET did not
have to actually use force, but it experienced some engagements with the militias during stabilisation operations in the western area. As elaborated below, INTERFET defeated the militias on each occasion. INTERFET was deployed to Oecussi, an enclave in West Timor, in late October and established its presence all over East Timor (DFAT, 2001, p.148; Cosgrove, 2006, pp.247-249). In Oecussi, INTERFET was also challenged by the militias and had to use force. The strength of INTERFET increased to 9,400 in November and reached 11,500 at its height (DFAT, 2001, pp.148, 153).

Even though a tense situation continued in the western border area and Oecussi, INTERFET largely restored security in most of the territory by the end of 1999 (UN, 1999j, p.4; 1999l, p.4; Breen, 2001, p.88; DFAT, 2001, p.148). Joao Tavares, the supreme commander of the militias’ umbrella organisation, the Integration Fighters’ Force (PPI), declared the disbandment of the militias on 13 December (AFP, 14 Dec 1999; The Jakarta Post, 1999m). Meanwhile, the Indonesian People’s Consultative Assembly (MPR) had formally accepted the result of the referendum and decided the secession of East Timor on 20 October (UNDPI, 2000a, p.56; DFAT, 2001, p.156). The UNSC adopted Resolution 1272 on 25 October and thereby established UNTAET (UNSC, 1999c), which took over the security responsibility from INTERFET on 23 February (DFAT, 2001, p.153). Following the UN administration, East Timor became independent on 20 May 2002.

3.3 The Examination of the Hypotheses

It is understood that the military pressure of INTERFET induced the militias to halt their violence (e.g. Smith and Dee, 2006, pp.417-418; Seybolt, 2008, pp.254-261; Robinson, 2010, p.205). As the militias were using violence and INTERFET exerted pressure to change their behaviour, rather than to prevent something from happening, the pressure constituted compellence. After being pressured by INTERFET, the militias stopped their violence and resistance in East Timor despite retaining the capability to keep doing so. In fact, a small number of militias continued their armed activities during UNTAET (DFAT, 2001, p.169; Smith and Dee, 2003, pp.68-71; Breen and
McCaulay, 2008, pp.125-147). This means that the compellence by INTERFET was not a complete success, but it succeeded in compelling the vast majority of the militias and did so using only a very small amount of force. Therefore, the compellence by INTERFET can be regarded as a major success.

The following section analyses the case from the perspective of each hypothesis. This chapter employs the congruence method and examines how closely the hypotheses coincide with what actually happened.

3.3.1 Troop Numbers

The first hypothesis to be examined (i.e. H1) is the troop numbers hypothesis. It expects that compellence is likely to succeed if the compellers have a numerical advantage over the target armed groups. INTERFET, however, succeeded without having a numerical advantage, so the case was inconsistent with the expectation.

At its peak, INTERFET had some 11,500 troops (Collins, 2000a; DFAT, 2001, p.153), but the real number of troops who were prepared for combat and could thus be used for compellence was much smaller than the total strength of INTERFET. First, its strength gradually increased, and it had fewer troops in the early phase. The international units that landed on 20 September, the first day of the operation, had some 1,100 troops (DFAT, 2001, p.145). This number increased to 2,300 the next day (Government of Australia, 1999). At the end of September, the overall strength of INTERFET reached 4,300 troops, of which 3,300 were from Australia (INTERFET, 1999a). The number steadily grew to 5,000 as of 9 October (INTERFET, 1999b) and to over 9,000 by the end of October (INTERFET, 1999c).

Moreover, security operations in precarious areas were mostly carried out by contingents from Australia, New Zealand, and the UK (Ryan, 2000, pp.64-65; Ballard, 2008, p.84), so only a part of the international force was relevant to compellence. Troops from other countries were small in scale or were mainly composed of humanitarian and logistics support units. In addition, Southeast Asian countries requested INTERFET not to assign their units to the volatile western border area, fearing the risk of confrontation with
the Indonesian forces and of suffering casualties (Shenon, 1999; Ryan, 2000, pp.48-53; Greenlees and Garran, 2002, pp.277-278). At the peak, Australia provided some 5,500 troops (DFAT, 2001, p.153). New Zealand and the UK deployed around 830 (Controller and Auditor-General, 2001, p.14) and 300 (Hansard HC Written Answers, 2 December 1999; Reuters, 1999g), respectively. Their contributions included special operation forces from the Australian Special Air Service (SAS) Regiment, New Zealand SAS Regiment, and British Special Boat Service, and they composed the Response Force, whose strength was around 200 troops (Horner, 2002, p.490; Thompson, 2015, p.147). In sum, the total strength of the troops from the three countries was some 6,600 at peak.

Regarding the potential local auxiliaries, there were some 670 pro-independence FALINTIL guerrillas, but they did not play a role in compellence. Despite the widespread violence in the pre- and post-ballot phases, FALINTIL agreed to stay at cantonment sites after August and did not retaliate so as to avoid legitimising the violence by the pro-integration militias and the supporting Indonesian security forces (Martin, 2001, pp.72-73; CAVR, 2013, p.296). Although INTERFET requested some help from FALINTIL to guide the deployment of INTERFET units (Horner, 2002, pp.501, 508; Cotton, 2004, p.137), the multinational force tried to keep the guerrillas at their bases so that no armed element other than INTERFET would remain operative (UN, 1999h, p.5; Cosgrove, 2006, pp.230-231; Kilcullen, 2009, p.205). Although there were some reports that FALINTIL clashed with the militias or the Indonesian military (e.g. AFP, 29 Sep 1999; Dodd, 1999c), it did not participate in putting pressure on the pro-integration militias. It can be said that the compellers did not use auxiliary forces in this case; therefore, the number of FALINTIL guerrillas should not be added to the size of the compeller.

Hence, the relevant compeller troop numbers were those of Australia, New Zealand, and the UK, and the total changed over time. At first, the figure was as small as some 1,100 but was later increased to some 6,600. However, again, not all these troops were positioned in areas in which compellence was employed, and locally focused examination is required.
Regarding the target side, the true number of the militias is unclear and inevitably becomes a matter of conjecture to some extent. Militia leaders, including the top militia leader, Tavares, and another notorious leader, Guterres, claimed that the strength was 13,000 and later that it was even as high as 50,000 (AFP, 25 Feb 1999; Antara, 1999a; Reuter, 1999c; DFAT, 2001, p.60). Some analyses adopt the speculation of 15,000 (Frost and Cobb, 2000, p.10) or 20,000 (Dunn, 2002, p.73), but other estimates show much smaller figures. For example, a DFAT publication estimates that the figure was several thousands (DFAT, 2001, p.60). This seems to have been the estimation that was made by the Australian government at the time. An Australian official stated that the strength of the militias was at least 6,000 (Garran, 1999a), and a pre-deployment news article reported that the Australian Defence Force estimated that the core members of the militias totalled 5,000 to 7,000 (Daley, 1999a). In an analysis report submitted to the Australian parliament, it was estimated that the number of trained and committed militias was 2,000 to 5,000 (Cobb, 1999, p.7). A news report covering a training camp of the militias reported the militias’ whole strength as some 7,000 (Pereira, 1999a), and another article similarly reported that the figure was 7,000 at maximum, citing the view of a Western intelligence source (Djalal, 1999). The commander of INTERFET, Major General Peter Cosgrove, showed his estimate to be about 5,000 in early November (Johnston, 1999c), while in early December, INTERFET reported to the UN its estimation that 1,000 to 2,000 militias were in West Timor and that fewer than 100 remained in East Timor (UN, 1999l, p.4). Based on these different views, the best estimate of the militias’ strength seems to be between 5,000 and 7,000, while the number must have fluctuated, and hard-core elements could have been smaller.

A factor complicating the comparison is Indonesian troops, but their number should be excluded from the size of the target side. When INTERFET started its deployment, as many as 15,000 Indonesian troops remained in East Timor (Naughton, 1999; Breen, 2001, p.58). They were in the process of withdrawal, and the number quickly shrank to some 1,300 in about a week (Breen, 2001, p.58; Cosgrove, 2006, pp.211-212). However, a significant number of Indonesian troops existed in Dili during the first week of
INTERFET, including those passing there on their way to West Timor. Some of them were cooperative with INTERFET, but others, especially those who had been in East Timor since before the ballot, were hostile and often provoked the international troops (Kilcullen, 2000, p.132; Breen, 2001, pp.31, 34, 43, 48, 55). Nevertheless, the Indonesian military was not an object of compellence by direct military pressure. This was an intervention with the consent of Indonesia, and the Indonesian troops were naturally excluded from the target of disarmament by INTERFET (UN, 1999h, p.5; Cosgrove, 2006, p.202). The two forces tried to avoid confrontation. Major General Cosgrove flew to Dili the day before the commencement of INTERFET and coordinated the deployment of the force with Major General Kiki Syahnakri, the local commander of the Indonesian forces (Eccleston, 1999; Cosgrove, 2006, pp.179-186). They maintained coordination after the deployment of INTERFET through daily Joint Security Coordination Group meetings (Dickens, 2001, p.226; Cosgrove, 2006, pp.194-195). Therefore, it is appropriate to exclude the number of Indonesian troops when analysing the balance of force. The effects of their support to the militias is analysed in a different section dealing with third-party support.

The balance of troops between the compeller and the target can be analysed locally at each phase of the operation: Dili, the western border area, and Oecussi enclave. In Dili, INTERFET soon achieved a numerical advantage over the militias. On its first two days, INTERFET deployed more than 2,300 troops that were mainly composed of two Australian battalions, a British Gurkha company, and the Response Force, as mentioned above. The militia group that operated in Dili was Aitarak, led by Guterres, and its strength was thought to be about 1,500 (CAVR, 2013, p.291; Robinson, 2013, p.2749). It was reported that the militias fled from Dili in advance of the deployment of INTERFET (Firdaus, 1999a; Lagan, 1999), so the actual number of militias who remained in Dili seems to have been smaller than 1,500. The existence of large Indonesian troops at the time prevented INTERFET from simply dominating Dili, but INTERFET had a larger number of troops than the militias. This rapid insertion of substantial forces could have been one of the factors that caused the initial success of compellence in Dili.
In the western border area, however, INTERFET was outnumbered by the militias. Initially, INTERFET deployed a force of around 1,000, whose main body was an Australian battalion which had some 700 troops (Cosgrove, 2006, pp.184, 217-218; Kilcullen, 2010, p.111). Almost all the militias were thought to have retreated to West Timor, and it was estimated that its overall strength was 5,000 to 7,000, as discussed above, which was significantly larger in number than INTERFET in the western area. After mid-October, two more battalions – one from Australia and the other from New Zealand – were deployed to the western area, and the strength of INTERFET there increased to 3,000 troops (Shenon, 1999; Breen, 2001, pp.63, 67; Greenlees and Garran, 2002, pp.286-287; Burnett, 2015, pp.215-216). Even with this reinforcement, however, the numerical balance of force there was still unfavourable to INTERFET. Moreover, one of the Australian battalions was relocated to Oecussi in mid-November, and the presence of INTERFET in the western border area was reduced to two battalions (Breen, 2001, pp.79, 89; Crawford and Harper, 2001, p.96; Blaxland, 2008, p.311).

In Oecussi, INTERFET effectively had a numerical advantage over the militias. At first, INTERFET deployed a force of an around 200 to Oecussi and later replaced it with an Australian battalion (Breen, 2001, p.115; Cosgrove, 2006, p.247). Oecussi is an enclave surrounded by Indonesian West Timor and the sea, so the militias could concentrate their forces there if they chose to do so. This means that INTERFET could have been outnumbered by the militias there. However, the militias who were active in the area were those from the group named Sakunar. It had at least 200 members in September (Robinson, 2013, p.2844), and the number probably decreased later (Greenlees and Garran, 2002, pp.292-293). Therefore, at least after the deployment of a battalion, INTERFET had a numerical advantage. However, this small Sakunar force did not challenge the initial small contingent of INTERFET (Crane, 2015, p.174), but it launched attacks against a larger force of a battalion in January, as elaborated in the following sections.

The above analysis demonstrates that INTERFET did not always have the favourable balance of troops, and the fact that the case ended in success without numerical advantage contradicts the expectation of the
hypothesis. INTERFET soon established a numerical advantage over the militias in Dili, and this may have contributed to the initial success of compellence. However, INTERFET was outnumbered by the militias in the western border area, where most of the resistance by the militias occurred. Nevertheless, INTERFET was able to successfully compel the militias to give up their objectives. Moreover, a small local militia group kept up its activity and even challenged a larger INTERFET force in Oecussi. With this evidence, it can be said that the favourable balance of troops was not necessary for the success of compellence in this case. Therefore, the case is not consistent with H1.

3.3.2 The Strategy of Compellence

The next to be examined is H2 – that is, the strategy hypothesis – which focuses on how compellers apply pressure. The expectation is that the combination of the gradual-turning-of-the-screw strategy and the carrot-and-stick strategy is more effective than an ultimatum. The East Timor case demonstrates that the gradual turning of the screw was effective, but without any positive inducements used by the compeller. Therefore, the case partially corresponds with the hypothesis.

INTERFET employed the gradual-turning-of-the-screw strategy. The gradual escalation was carried out geographically, rather than increasing the level of threats or destruction capabilities. The mandate of the force did not change from that given in UNSC Resolution 1264, which provided blank-check authorisation to use all necessary means to achieve the broad objective of the restoration of order. Immediately before the commencement of the operation, Major General Cosgrove told the media, “I think the best thing for the militias would be to surrender their weapons and become peaceful, law-abiding Timorese. If that is not to their liking, then maybe they need to leave East Timor” (Cole-Adams, 1999). He also emphasised that the multinational force would be ready to “respond robustly” if the militias directed their violence against local and international civilians in East Timor, as well as INTERFET itself (Zannuba et al., 1999). He repeated a similar warning after the first firefight between INTERFET and the militias on 6 October, saying, “I feel some sadness for those who attacked Interfet
soldiers. They obviously came off worse and that will continue to be the case until they negotiate and surrender their weapons” (The Australian, 1999). In sum, from the beginning, the compeller threatened the militias with lethal force if they did not disarm or leave and stop violence.

The type of military capability deployed was also constant. The main source of pressure was infantry backed by armoured vehicles and utility helicopters. Higher-end platforms, such as naval vessels and fighter aircraft, were put on standby in Australia or deployed near East Timor but were not used in combat. They were deterrents against the Indonesian regular forces rather than constituting compellent pressure against the militias (Cobb, 1999, p.5; Dickens, 2001, pp.222-225; McDonald, 2001).

With these constant threats and pressure, INTERFET gradually expanded its area of deployment. In fact, it had to establish its presence and demonstrate its capability in the whole territory before successfully compelling the militias, and this seems to have been because the pro-integration militias were fragmented. There were more than 20 militia organisations (Robinson, 2010, p.100), and the connection between them was loose, although there was an umbrella organisation – the PPI (Crouch, 2003, p.151). The supreme commander of the PPI, Tavares, did not seem to fully understand or control the whole organisation (Bartu, 2001, p.78). Its looseness of command and control could be seen in the fact that a subgroup of the Halilintar militia led by a local commander disobeyed the order to retreat to West Timor and remained at Aidabasalala, a village in the western region within East Timor (Kilcullen, 2000, pp.131, 135-136). Similarly, militia activities continued around the Oecussi enclave after January 2000, although Tavares had declared that the militias would give up armed resistance and would disarm and disband the militia organisations in December 1999, as mentioned earlier. Guterres also refused the disbandment and claimed to maintain his militia group, although he agreed to relinquish the guerrilla war option (Murdoch, 1999d; Reuters, 1999h; Martinkus, 2000a).

In dealing with these fractured militias, INTERFET had to demonstrate its capability in the whole operational area before stabilising the situation.
Although the majority of the militias fled to West Timor with the retreating Indonesian forces, some remained in East Timor or infiltrated back from West Timor and continued violence until INTERFET arrived in their areas.

In its first days, INTERFET focused on securing Dili, where it detained a number of militias and confiscated weapons (Spencer 1999a; Breen, 2001, pp.42-43, 49-50, 53; Cosgrove, 2006, pp.191-192). INTERFET carried out an extensive cordon-and-search operation in Dili on 24 September, after which the provocation and threats by the militias and the remaining Indonesian troops there decreased significantly (Breen, 2001, pp.55-56; Cosgrove, 2006, p.209).

However, this demonstration of assertiveness did not halt the violence and destruction outside Dili. For example, the withdrawing Indonesian forces and the militias continued burning buildings in the countryside (Struck, 1999). Murder also continued in the central and eastern regions of East Timor; for example, at least eight passengers of a car and a passerby on the road between Lautém and Baucau in the eastern area were murdered on 25 September (Dillon, 1999; CAVR, 2013, pp.1092, 1114, 1116).

The militias in the eastern town of Com also tried to continue the forcible deportation of residents, which was prevented by INTERFET. On 27 September, INTERFET received a report that the militias were apprehending a large number of people at Com and trying to deport them. The Response Force was soon deployed to the town and demanded that the militias surrender. The militias tried to escape, but the Response Force interdicted and arrested them. This intervention freed hundreds of hostages (Horner, 2002, pp.499-500; Cosgrove, 2006, pp.212-213; McPhedran, 2007, pp.81-87). A few days later, INTERFET once again rescued residents who were held hostage by the militias there (Watts, 1999; Richards, 2014, pp.116-117).

The militias remained active in the western area of East Timor as well, staying there or infiltrating back from West Timor. Killings and the forceful movement of residents continued in Bobonaro, Covalima, and Ainaro in late September and October (Martinkus, 1999b; CAVR, 2013, pp.1094, 1104-1110). Arsons also continued in Ainaro, Balibo, Maliana, and Ermera (Dodd, 1999d; UNDPI, 1999a; Windhausen, 1999).
To stop the violence, INTERFET had to exert pressure in the western area. A numbers of militias remained in the town of Liquica, and they fled only after INTERFET dropped warning leaflets just before its actual deployment in late September (Murdoch, 1999c; Mydans, 1999). Others were more stubborn, and INTERFET’s stabilisation operations in the western area, which were launched from early October, did not go as smoothly as its previous operations. The militias directly challenged INTERFET in the area, and they exchanged fire several times, as elaborated in the next section. An example of such stubborn militias was the subgroup of Halilintar, which remained at Aidabasalala and continued its killing and other violence. The group fled to West Timor only after being defeated by INTERFET in contacts (Kilcullen, 2000, pp.135-136; Martinkus, 2001, p.401). It took some time before the militias learned the competence of the international force, but repeated defeats gradually led to the end of major security incidents in the area.

Again, these operations by INTERFET were not sufficient to stop the militias in the last place in which the force was absent – the Oecussi enclave. On 23 September, hundreds of militias started a large-scale hunt for independence supporters hiding there (The Jakarta Post, 1999i). The murders by the militias and Indonesian soldiers continued throughout late September and October (CAVR, 2013, pp.1097, 1116). The militias fled only after INTERFET arrived in the enclave in late October, and infiltrations from West Timor continued even after that (Aglionby, 1999; Pristel, 1999; Breen, 2001, p.109). INTERFET had to fight back those infiltrating militias and exert pressure on the ground in this area too, as elaborated in the next section.

As has been discussed, INTERFET applied pressure against the militias using gradual escalation rather than an ultimatum, and this method was effective in this case. INTERFET expanded deployment to the whole East Timor in sequence to stop violence. This was necessary because the militias were fragmented. As there was “not one brain”, INTERFET had to accumulate the effect of locally applied pressure to convince the bulk of the militias (Kilcullen, 2019).
This development corresponds with the expectation of H2 regarding the point that the gradual turning of the screw is effective. However, the case’s correspondence to H2 remains partial, because INTERFET did not use any positive inducements. The use of carrots was not necessary for success in this case.

3.3.3 Credibility

The next hypothesis, H3, deals with the credibility of threats. As discussed in Chapter 2, there are four possible sources of threat credibility: national interests, strong domestic support, a previously acquired advantageous reputation, and the actual use of force. The hypothesis is that the actual use of force is most effective among them. Although all the potential sources existed in this case (pre-earned reputation was mixed, and the condition was met only partially), it demonstrates that the actual use of force was necessary for success.

The first source that will be examined is the salience of the issues to the compellers. For Australia, regional stability was at stake in this case, so the country’s national interest was involved. In his speech just before the launch of INTERFET, Australian Prime Minister John Howard stated the following:

*We decided to do it, not only because it was right but also because it was in our national interest to do so. Continued instability, of the kind we have so recently witnessed, in a territory so close to Australia could have serious consequences for us in the longer run (Howard, 1999).*

Australia regarded the Asia-Pacific region, particularly its immediate neighbourhood, as strategically important (Australian Department of Defence [DOD], 1994, pp.16, 86-87; 1997, pp.7-10; 2000, pp.29-31; DFAT, 1997, pp.1-2). The experience of Japanese invasion through neighbouring islands during World War II drove Australia to be vigilant against instability in the region that may be utilised by hostile powers and elements as a launching pad to attack Australia (Australian DOD, 1997, p.10; Breen, 2009). There was also the risk of refugee flows (Cotton, 2004, p.5). Thus, if East Timor
would be independent, its stability was a big stake for Australia (White, 2008, p.75).

In fact, Australia started preparation for force deployment soon after the announcement of Habibie’s decision. When East Timor plunged into chaos after the vote, Australian Foreign Minister Alexander Downer stated on 4 September that a coalition of the willing–style multinational force would be necessary before a UN peacekeeping operation and that Australia could lead it (Cumming, 1999; Greenlees and Garran, 2002, pp.237-238). On 6 September, UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan called Prime Minister Howard to ask to lead a multinational force, and Howard accepted it (DFAT, 2001, p.133; Henry, 2013, p.104).

The target side also perceived that the strategic interests of Australia were involved, although the connotation was negative. There were discussions in Indonesia that Australia had ulterior motives, such as its interest in the oil in the Timor gap, and that this was why it was taking the initiative regarding the international force (Republika, 1999; The Jakarta Post, 1999f). The militias shared this view and denounced the intervention as a neo-colonialist attempt or as being based on territorial ambition (Kompas, 1999; Kyodo News Service, 1999; Reuter, 1999d; RTP Internacional TV, 1999).

The second possible source of credibility is domestic support, which was strong in this case. Opinion polls by Australian newspapers showed that Australia enjoyed strong domestic support. Two pre-deployment opinion polls showed over 70% support for sending troops to East Timor (Henderson and Nason, 1999; Wright, 1999), and a post-deployment one showed over

8 In February 1999, the Australian government decided to raise the readiness status of a brigade so that it could deploy two brigades at short notice by June. The Australian Defence Force soon started planning for participation in a peacekeeping operation, initially assuming that it would be a UN-led one, and for non-combatant evacuation operations from May, based on a UN request (White, 2008, pp.75-76, 80-81; Henry, 2013, pp.92-93,101).
80% support (Rollins, 1999). Australian participation in INTERFET received higher domestic support than any other overseas military deployment after World War II (Greenlees and Garran, 2002, p.270). This widespread support was a product of the extensive coverage of pre- and post-ballot violence by the media, which generated great attention to and humanitarian concern about East Timor among the Australian public. This concern was also expressed in the forms of mass demonstrations, as well as a large number of phone calls and other contact with politicians to urge action (Tapsell and Eidenfalk, 2013, pp.587-591). The parliament also provided strong support. Even though the opposition criticised the government’s management of the crisis, the decision to send Australian troops to East Timor was supported by a bipartisan motion (Daley, 1999b; McGregor, 1999). This wide domestic support provided the government with flexibility in its moves, as well as pressure to “do something” (White, 2008, p.81; Connery, 2010, pp.51-55).

The third possible source of credibility is reputation based on previous behaviour. In this case, the compeller had a mixed reputation, but it was not based on past Australian behaviour.

Australia’s most recent experience of similar missions at the time was UNITAF in Somalia, and Australian performance in the mission could have built an advantageous reputation. An Australian battalion group that joined UNITAF was deployed to an area around the southwestern city of Baidoa. Despite US hesitation about disarming warring factions during UNITAF, the Australians took risks and proactively disarmed the Somalis. The Australians suppressed violence by actively patrolling and robustly responding to attacks, and they successfully stabilised Baidoa (Mellor, 1995; Patman, 1997; Hardy, 2007). Australian activities in Baidoa were an exceptional success in Somalia, and they demonstrated the Australian troops’ potency in stabilisation operations and their will to take risks.

However, the Australian performance in Somalia did not lead to an advantageous reputation in the eyes of the militias in East Timor. The militias regarded INTERFET as a capable force but one that they could cope with using irregular tactics. Guterres, a notorious militia leader, said that INTERFET had “sophisticated weapons” (Spencer, 1999b), and another
recruited militia described the force as “professional soldiers” (Pereira, 1999a). At the same time, the militias thought that they could counterbalance this advantage of INTERFET. Guterres stated, “[INTERFET does] not know East Timor as well as the militias. It is not possible for the tanks to go into the jungle” (Spencer, 1999b). The other militia mentioned above also added, “We are fighting a war on our own turf. We know every corner of East Timor much better than our enemies and can easily cause problems for them” (Pereira, 1999a). An Aitarak company commander also stated that the militias could wage a guerrilla war and inflict pain on Australian troops, while admitting that there was no chance to compete with them in a conventional war (Pereira, 1999b). Despite Australian troops demonstrating their capabilities to counter irregular threats in Somalia, the militias did not have such an image about INTERFET. Rather, the militias’ image about the capabilities of the Australian forces seems to have been based on a general image about the militaries of Western developed countries.

In addition to capabilities, the militias’ perception of INTERFET’s resolve was not based on Australian troops’ past behaviour. An Aitarak platoon commander stated, “Psychologically, we are prepped up more than the average Australian soldier, who is probably thinking about what a nice life he left behind in Australia for the horrors in East Timor” (Pereira, 1999a). This implies that the militias thought that Australians’ resolve was weak. Not a militia but a politician, Abdurrahman Wahid, later president of Indonesia, had a much clearer image about Australians’ resolve. He said, “It will be like Somalia”, and he added, “When 10 [Australian soldiers] are hit, that will change public opinion in Australia” (Richburg, 1999a). According to Ball (2006, p.196), an Australian intelligence agency reported that the Indonesian military and the militias also regarded INTERFET as weakly resolved by analogy with the case of Somalia. The above information indicates that the target of compellence constructed the image of Australians’ resolve not based on their behaviour in Somalia but on more famous US behaviour. The Australian forces’ demonstration of their willingness to take risks in stabilising Baidoa did not lead to an advantageous reputation.

In sum, Australia had a somewhat favourable reputation in terms of capabilities but did not have a good reputation in terms of resolve. Despite
the successful performance of the Australian troops in Somalia, the militias did not construct their image of INTERFET based on the Australians’ past behaviour. Rather, the militias’ image was based on a general image about Western developed states or more famous US experience.

It is difficult to obtain information about the militias’ perceptions of these factors and their effects. However, the comparison between the actual course of events and the prediction of the hypothesis provides insights into these factors’ impacts on the success of compellence. In the case of INTERFET, the salience of the issue for Australia and the domestic support it had were constant during the intervention. Its pre-earned reputation was also constant by definition. Therefore, if these factors had made the threats credible and thereby led the compellence to success, the compellence by INTERFET should have been successful from beginning to end. Or, if the three factors per se had not been enough and other conditions had been necessary for the success, the compellence by INTERFET should have turned from initial failure to success as the additional conditions came to be satisfied.

As it was, the East Timor case showed a different pattern: The compellence initially went smoothly and then faced some resistance, but it finally succeeded. INTERFET faced only very small resistance in its first two weeks. There was at least one attempt to point a weapon at INTERFET troops (Murdoch, 1999b), one sniper-fire incident (Spencer, 1999a), and several standoffs involving not only the militias but also the Indonesian troops, but the militias usually surrendered without resistance when challenged by INTERFET during its operations in Dili and the eastern area.

On 21 September, standoffs erupted when a convoy of withdrawing Indonesian troops was stopped at checkpoints that had been established by INTERFET. INTERFET let the convoy go through after tense confrontations (Breen, 2001, pp.44-47; Cosgrove, 2006, pp.201-204). On 25 September, a small team led by the Response Force visited Tibar village to investigate a mass grave. The team encountered the militias there, and the troops detained some of them. However, soon,
Despite a promising start, INTERFET faced resistance by force when it moved into the western border area. As discussed in detail below, starting with an incident on 6 October, INTERFET experienced at least eight engagements, including those occurred in Oecussi. To understand the change in the militias’ response, it is necessary to take their objectives into account. The militias and other integrationists repeatedly claimed before and after the ballot that East Timor should be partitioned and that the western part should remain in Indonesia. The western area bordering West Timor had been relatively pro-Indonesia, and the militias believed that the support for autonomy was the majority vote there, although the regional ballot results were not announced (AFP, 22 Sep 1999; Suwastoyo, 1999; Djajamihardja, 2000, p.111; Kilcullen, 2000, pp.133, 150). It can be said that the militias were committed to keeping the western area under their control. In fact, Guterres declared that the intervening force should not enter western eight districts out of thirteen in total in East Timor (Cole-Adams and Skehan, 1999; Garran, 1999b).

The three sources of credibility were not sufficient to compel the militias to stop their violence in the western area. The three seem to have been effective in terms of compelling the militias to stop their activities in the eastern and central areas, but mere threats, despite being supported by the three factors, could not induce the militias to give up their more committed objective.

What was needed was the actual use of force and the demonstration of compeller’s competence – the fourth source of credibility. As described below, INTERFET had to resort to force in the western area and Oecussi. These combats and defeats were necessary for the militias to realise the futility of their resistance.

The first use of force by INTERFET occurred on 6 October. That day, the Response Force raided the western town of Suai, which was used as the

three trucks full of Indonesian troops and militias appeared, and a standoff ensued. It ended as the Indonesians retrieved the detained militias and left the scene (Breen, 2001, p.57; Horner, 2002, 498-499).
militias’ supply route. During the operation, a bus and a truck full of militias coming from West Timor attempted to drive through an INTERFET roadblock. The troops stopped the vehicles by firing at the tyres and engine of the truck, wounding six militias. The Response Force detained more than 100 militias that day and transferred 10 detainees, who had either been wounded or were thought to be as important, to Dili. The troops decided to send the remaining militias back to West Timor, but on the way, the escorting convoy was ambushed by another group of militias. Two SAS soldiers were wounded by the first burst, but the troops took cover and returned fire. Soon, the reinforcement with armoured vehicles arrived from Suai and repelled the attackers. Two militias were killed in the contact (Horner, 2002, pp.503-505; Cosgrove, 2006, pp.222-223; McPhedran, 2007, pp.90-98).

The Response Force had another small contact with the militias on 9 October. The militia groups approached the unit’s observation post near Alto Lebos and probed the area by firing. One of them pointed his gun at the observation post, so the troops shot and killed him. The remaining militias fled to West Timor as an INTERFET helicopter arrived on the scene (Johnston, 1999b; Horner, 2002, p.506).

On 10 October, INTERFET experienced a fierce firefight with the regular Indonesian security forces and the militias at Motaain, a village on the border between East and West Timor. An Australian battalion received information about the presence of the Indonesian forces and the militias at Motaain and dispatched a patrol to check the situation. As a matter of fact, the village was on the West Timor side of the border, and the militias training there with the Indonesian army and police opened fire on the patrol when it approached the village.\(^\text{10}\)

The patrol took cover and returned fire. An element

\(^{10}\) The leading element of the patrol was almost about to cross the border according to the map used by INTERFET and had just crossed it according to the one used by the Indonesian security forces (UN, 1999i, Appendix B). The Indonesian side denied the presence of the militias on the scene, and the UN investigation that followed also adopted the idea (UN, 1999i, p.11). However, the INTERFET troops observed people in
of the militias tried to outflank the patrol but was repelled by its rear guard. During the firefight, the militias started to retreat from the scene by truck under the regular forces’ cover. Eventually, the firing dwindled, and a linguist communicated with Indonesians to establish a ceasefire. This engagement killed an Indonesian police officer and wounded several others, while INTERFET suffered no casualty (UN, 1999i, Attachment 1, pp.2-13; Kilcullen, 2010, pp.114-127).

A Response Force patrol reconnoitring a militia route near the village of Aidabasalala also had a major battle on 16 October. Five or six militias found the six-man patrol, and one of the militias tried to point his weapon at the troops. The SAS troops shot more quickly and downed three of the militias. More militias appeared and attacked the troops, seemingly trying to surround them, so the patrol broke contact and retreated while inflicting casualties on the attackers. After a while, two INTERFET helicopters arrived and retrieved the patrol. The series of contacts lasted some 90 minutes, and four or five militias were killed and three wounded (Kilcullen, 2000, p.136; Horner, 2002, pp.506-508; Cosgrove, 2006, pp.238-239).

An Australian company experienced another contact in the vicinity of Beluluk Leten village near the border the following week. Helicopter flights over the area had been fired upon repeatedly from the ground on the previous day, and another flight was used as a lure. Some 30 militias soon started firing at the helicopter, and the company challenged the militias. However, the militias were accompanied by women and children, who were being used as human shields, and only snipers could engage. The sniper shots missed their targets but still caused the militias to flee back to West Timor (Breen, 2001, p.87; Blaxland, 2008, p.311).

The militias’ activities weakened after these defeats. The western border region remained tense, and small-scale incursions did not cease completely (Ansley, 1999; Ware, 2000). Security incidents happened in the militia T-shirts on the scene (UN, 1999i, Attachment 1), and moreover, a militia who was involved in the incident was later detained by INTERFET (Kilcullen, 2000, pp.118-119; 2010, pp.135-136).
inner regions as well (UNDP, 1999b). However, no major security incident happened thereafter (UN, 1999j, p.4; 1999l, p.4; Breen, 2001, p.88), and then the overall leader of the militias, Tavares, announced the disbandment of the militias on 13 December.

INTERFET had to use force in Oecussi too. While international troops initially detained a number of militias without using force there (Breen, 2001, pp.115-118; Horner, 2002, pp.508-509), the militias remained active to the end, even after Tavares announced the militias' disbandment. On 17 January, some 40 militias confronted and shot at civilians and burnt houses in Mahata. The militias retreated when INTERFET arrived at the scene. In another incident on the day, INTERFET was attacked by some 20 militias near Passabe. INTERFET repelled the attack, and a militia was wounded. The militias later attacked INTERFET again in the same area but retreated after a counterattack (UN, 2000c, para.22; Breen, 2001, p.120). The next day, the militias intruded into the area near Mahata on two occasions. In one case, the INTERFET soldiers fired at and drove away the militias after the latter directed their weapons at the troops. In the other case, the militias retreated without a clash with INTERFET (UN, 2000c, para.23; Breen, 2001, p.120). In February, the local militia leader responsible for these and other troubles was arrested by the Indonesian authorities, leading to the end of the militia group (Breen, 2001, p.120; Greenlees and Garran, 2002, pp.293-294; Cosgrove, 2006, pp.304-305).

In sum, the actual use of force, albeit a small amount as a whole, was necessary to compel the militias. According to the Australian DOD, 13 incidents occurred and resulted in seven killed and thirteen wounded in total. All the casualties were suffered by the militias, except for two Australian troops who were wounded and an Indonesian police officer who was killed (Dodd, 2000b). These engagements and the actual killing of those who refused to halt their violence were necessary to underline the message of INTERFET's threats (Kilcullen, 2019). According to Breen and McCauley (2008, p.124), intelligence showed that the perception that the border area was dangerous spread among the militias after these engagements. Mere threats based on other sources of credibility were not enough to compel the militias to give up the partition of East Timor. It was only after the actual use
of force that the militias learned the futility of their effort and accepted the reality. The course of events corresponds well with the expectation of H3.

3.3.4 Denial

The denial hypothesis, H4, is the next to be examined. There are four generally applicable ways to achieve denial in peace operations: attrition, stronghold neutralisation, decapitation, and counter-coercion negation. The hypothesis is that counter-coercion negation is the most effective among them. INTERFET achieved denial mostly through counter-coercion negation, so this case is consistent with the hypothesis.

The first approach to denial is attrition. INTERFET inflicted casualties on the militias, but the number was too small to call this attrition. As mentioned above, INTERFET killed only six militias and wounded only eleven. Even if the militias suffered more casualties that were officially unconfirmed, the amount would not exceed a few dozen. With this small number of casualties, attrition cannot be the mechanism that worked in this case.

The second approach, stronghold neutralisation, was only partially achieved. INTERFET neutralised the militias’ strongholds in the western area of East Timor after October, and this must have constrained the militias’ operational capability. Because of its geographical location, the stance of regional officials, and the long history of the pro-Indonesian people’s network, the western region of East Timor was the stronghold of the militias (Cristalis, 2009, p.86; Robinson, 2013, pp.2691-2694). The PPI leader, Tavares, also had his base in Bobonaro, one of the western districts (Bartu, 2001, p.76). In addition to Tavares’s Halilintar, Mahidi and Besi Merah Putih, which were infamous militia groups, were from the western region (Antara, 1999a; Bartu, 2001, p.80). The militias’ operations there were more active than in other regions; over 70% of the violence reported to the CAVR happened there (CAVR, 2013, pp.509, 550).

However, the militias obtained new strongholds in West Timor. It seems that the militias’ game plan was to launch a guerrilla war from the safe havens in West Timor rather than to hold and resist in the western
border region. In fact, most of them quickly retreated to West Timor even before INTERFET reached the western area. The militias first held their coordination meetings in Dili but relocated their nerve centre to Atambua in West Timor (Radio Renascenca, 1999; Reuter, 1999e; Bartu, 2001, pp.87-88). They dominated refugee camps and created military camps in West Timor, from where they launched cross-border attacks (e.g. Hawksley, 1999; Pereira, 1999a; Richburg, 1999b). They were left at large in West Timor, and the militias’ control of the camps continued well into the year 2000 (e.g. Richburg, 1999c; Martinkus, 2000b; Mydans, 2000). As Major General Cosgrove admitted, INTERFET could not completely seal the border because of its terrain (Chandrasekaran, 1999; Marshall, 1999a; 1999c). Therefore, infiltrations into East Timor became harder but were not impossible for the militias, and they could continue their attacks against the INTERFET border patrols and positions if they wanted to. In sum, stronghold neutralisation must have worked against the militias but does not seem to have been critical as a source of denial when taking into account the existence of their new strongholds in West Timor.

The third method of denial is decapitation, but this was not applied against the target in this case. An exception was the leader of Sakunar in Oecussi, Moko Soares. He was arrested by the Indonesian authorities after INTERFET’s strong demand to take action against him (Greenlees and Garran, 2002, pp.293-294; Cosgrove, 2006, pp.304-305). However, he was merely a local militia leader, and the PPI leader, Tavares, and his deputy, Guterres, remained intact. It can be said that the role decapitation played was small.

The final type of denial to be examined is counter-coercion negation, which INTERFET exercised very well. The militias employed casualty-generating and civilian suffering-based strategies, but INTERFET could effectively negate these attempts.

The militias’ main counter-coercion strategy was casualty generation. They attacked INTERFET units and tried to inflict casualties, as described in the previous sections. However, INTERFET suffered only two wounded
casualties from hostile actions (Dodd, 2000b), and the militias’ attempts failed.

INTERFET had good force protection owing to some factors. First, the commander of the force, Major General Cosgrove, took a cautious approach to troop deployment. He made much of force protection and adopted a phased expansion so that the force would not be overstretched. He initially concentrated on securing Dili and proceeded to the expansion of troop deployments towards the west only after he became confident that he had enough troops (Cosgrove, 2006, pp.215-217). Although he took a risk when he deployed a small contingent to Oecussi before he could prepare a force of adequate size, the commander of the contingent mitigated the risk by limiting its area of operation in the enclave so that the small force would not be overstretched (Cosgrove, 2006, pp.247-248; Crane, 2015, pp.174-175).

Second, INTERFET had troops of high quality. Soldiers from Australia, New Zealand, and the UK, which bore the burden of security operations, were highly trained and were deployed to East Timor assuming that combat would ensue. The Australian troops who were deployed were “probably the best trained army that Australia [had] put into the field at the beginning of an operation” (Kilcullen, 2019). When attacked, they demonstrated well-practised procedures and swiftly took cover, which was followed by counterattacks (Kilcullen, 2010, p.139). During the ambush on 6 October, the troops dragged their wounded mates to a safer place, recovered a medical kit from their vehicle, and gave first aid to the wounded, all while under fire (Horner, 2002, p.505; Cosgrove, 2006, p.223; McPhedran, 2007, pp.91-93). In addition, in multiple contacts, small teams of elite special forces were able to survive battles with numerically superior adversaries.

Third, INTERFET also possessed valuable assets for force protection. One was armoured vehicles. INTERFET deployed them from day one, and the militias did not possess anti-armour weapons, so the armoured vehicles provided foot soldiers with reliable shields and fire support. During ambush on 6 October, the armoured vehicles that were deployed to Suai rushed to the ambush site in five to ten minutes and quickly repelled the attackers (Horner, 2002, p.505). Another useful asset was helicopters, which were
used for medevac, as well as the insertion and extraction of troops. Two soldiers who were wounded in the ambush were evacuated to Dili by helicopter and were able to receive treatment (Horner, 2002, p.505; Cosgrove, 2006, p.223). The Response Force, which was composed of special forces, kept at least two patrols with two helicopters ready to move in 30 minutes as an immediate response team (Horner, 2002, pp.490, 494; Thompson, 2015, p.144). The quick send-in of reinforcements and pull-out by helicopter helped the outnumbered troops.

Finally, the lack of skill on the side of the militias was fortunate for INTERFET. As mentioned repeatedly, the INTERFET troops were ambushed and/or outnumbered in many of the contacts they experienced, and more capable opponents could have inflicted more casualties on the international force. Kilcullen, who was a company commander of INTERFET, states, “We were very lucky not to lose quite a few people”, taking into account the fact that INTERFET experienced multiple engagements including heavy ones (2019). In particular, the engagement at Motaain ended with no casualties on the INTERFET side, but the first burst of fire took the troops by surprise. Cosgrove (2006, p.234) states that it was “a minor miracle that none of them was hit”. A factor that contributed to the miracle was that the fire that was directed at them was aimed too high to hit the targets (Kilcullen, 2010, pp.127, 139). At least in the Motaain incident, INTERFET could have suffered more casualties if the militias had been a bit better at marksmanship or luck had militated against the troops; they were fortunate.

The militias also employed civilian casualty generation in a limited manner, but INTERFET effectively countered this attempt as well by good discipline. The majority of the engagements with the militias happened outside populated areas. In Oecussi, the militias intruded near to the populated areas, so the INTERFET troops had to be careful in the application of force (Cosgrove, 2006, p.306). There was at least one case of the militias using human shields in the western border area, but the INTERFET unit that was involved in this case avoided harming civilians by using only sniper fire (Breen, 2001, p.87). The good discipline of the troops
enabled the avoidance of collateral damage and provided the militias with no opportunity to exploit the troops’ misconduct.

In sum, INTERFET relied on counter-coercion negation and, to a lesser extent, stronghold neutralisation in achieving denial. Other forms of denial did not play a major role. The militias, including those in command positions, became demoralised because of the lack of progress regarding their struggle (Djalal, 1999). The militias were deprived of hope for the success of resistance by the effective denial by INTERFET. As H4 is that the most effective method of denial is counter-coercion negation, the case is consistent with the hypothesis.

3.3.5 Third-Party Support

The final hypothesis to be examined is H5 – the third-party-support hypothesis. This hypothesis is that compellence is likely to succeed if target armed groups do not receive third-party support. In this case, Indonesia, especially its security forces, provided substantial support to the militias, but the support became increasingly weaker. The abandonment by Indonesia affected the militias’ decision to give up resistance, so the case corresponds with the hypothesis.

The pro-integration militias enjoyed substantial support from the Indonesian government in the pre-ballot phase. During its rule over East Timor, Indonesia had organised local residents into various paramilitary groups – from formal militias to death squad–style gangs – and utilised them to oppress independence movement and counterinsurgency operations. Some pro-integration militias which were active in 1999 were the continuation of these paramilitary groups, and others were newly organised with the members of these past groups (Robinson, 2001, pp.296-301, 306-313; KPP HAM, 2006, pp.29-30; CAVR, 2013, pp.368-381). These militias were trained, armed and financed by the Indonesian military and civilian authorities, and they operated in cooperation with the Indonesian security forces (KPP HAM, 2006, pp.32-34, 39-41; CTF, 2008, ch.7; CAVR, 2013, pp.381-387). Some regular Indonesian soldiers were the members or even leaders of the militias (KPP HAM, 2006, p.30; CAVR, 2013, p.385; Robinson, 2013, pp.2721-2724).
There were various motives for individuals to join the militias. Some were the members of formal civil guard organisations and had been trained by the Indonesian forces. Others were violence-prone thugs and criminals who were attracted by economic or other material benefits, such as drugs and alcohols. There were also members who were forcefully recruited with death threats or peer pressure (DFAT, 2001, p.59; Kilcullen, 2000, pp.134-135, 137, 139; 2009, p.201; KPP HAM, 2006, p.32; Robinson, 2013, pp.2721-2722).

The pre-ballot activities of the militias seem to have been well controlled and coordinated by Indonesia. In fact, scores of instances of militia violence were carried out with the active and tacit participation of the Indonesian security forces (CAVR, 2013, parts 7-8; Robinson, 2013, pp.2726-2728). Moreover, there was a lull in the violence when UNAMET started voter registration, suggesting that it was controlled like “a water faucet that could be turned on and off at will” (Robinson, 2010, p.131). At this stage, the intention of the Indonesian government was to influence residents to vote for integration, and the government and the militias worked towards the same objective.

Even in the post-ballot phase, the rampaging militias still enjoyed the active and tacit cooperation and support of the Indonesian security forces on the ground. A number of people also witnessed Indonesian military and police personnel directing, observing, and assisting with the killing, destruction, and forcible movement of people in this period (Human Rights Watch [HRW], 1999; CAVR, 2013, parts 7-8; Robinson, 2013, pp.2687, 2728-2729). The scale of the destruction and the logistic operation for the massive population movement also indicate that organisational support and cooperation continued (HRW, 1999; Greenlees and Garran, 2002, pp.202-203).

After the ballot, however, against the background of mounting international pressure, Jakarta’s interest shifted, and it tried to prove it could control the situation. Both President Habibie and the defence minister/commander of the Indonesian National Armed Forces, Wiranto, wished for political survival, so they had to avoid international criticism and
sanctions that would be a fatal blow to their careers (Greenlees and Garran, 2002, pp.205-206, 260-262). Habibie’s government accepted the result of the vote and called for Indonesians and East Timorese to do so too (The Jakarta Post, 1999b; DFAT, 2001, p.125). On 7 September, Wiranto issued a written order to the military to use all available means to stop violence by the militias (Greenlees and Garran, 2002, p.226). Wiranto also told the militia leaders to stop their violence (Antara, 1999b; Imanuddin, 1999; Crouch, 2003, p.165). However, these measures were not effective in curtailing the violence, and the Indonesian government was compelled to accept an international force.

There is a possibility that these efforts were ungenuine and that all the violence was intentionally orchestrated by Jakarta, but there is no firm evidence supporting such an interpretation. Recovered internal documents show that the Indonesian military prepared contingency plans, including mass evacuation, and it openly admitted the existence of such plans (The Jakarta Post, 1999a; Moore, 2001, pp.41-43). However, these did not contain a scorched-earth operation nor forceful deportation that actually happened, and there is no direct evidence that Habibie or Wiranto planned and ordered the atrocities (Crouch, 2003, pp.157-158; Robinson, 2013, pp.2698-2705). The Indonesian military was highly factionalised, and Wiranto, let alone Habibie with his weak power base, had no effective control over the entire force (Schulze, 2001; Greenlees and Garran, 2002, pp.53-55, 61-63, 165). There is a view that generals and officers belonging to or with a background of service in special operation forces or an intelligence organisation moved rather independently and directed the militias to continue the atrocities despite the efforts of Habibie and Wiranto to change the course (McDonald, 2002a; 2002b; Smith and Jarvis, 2018, p.19).

What is clear is that the support the militias enjoyed faded away after the Indonesian government decided to accept an international force and started to pull out its military force from East Timor. Wiranto sent in reinforcement units under his control, and the new commander on the ground, Major General Syahnakri, initiated the withdrawal of the existing units to West Timor. Although these newly sent units also did not confront the militias, the replacement gradually led to better control of the situation by
Wiranto through Syahnakri (Greenlees and Garran, 2002, pp.228-229, 280; Smith and Jarvis, 2018, pp.17-20). A significant number of Indonesian troops still remained in East Timor when INTERFET arrived, but the number quickly shrunk to only some 1,300 by 27 September. They remained only to secure some key facilities in Dili, and they withdrew at the end of October (Lague, 1999; Breen, 2001, p.58; Cosgrove, 2006, pp.211-212). As a result, although a small number of elements of the Indonesian special forces may have remained with the militias (Kilcullen, 2000, pp.120-121), the militias who stayed in East Timor were basically isolated when they encountered INTERFET.

In contrast, the militias that fled to West Timor with the withdrawing Indonesian army still received support from the elements of the Indonesian security forces on the ground. Even though Wiranto and the governor of West Timor stated that the militias should not use West Timor as a base for resistance against INTERFET (The Jakarta Post, 1999g; 1999h), the militias were left at large and turned there into their new strongholds, as discussed above. An example of the support given to the militias by the Indonesian military in West Timor can be seen in the engagement between INTERFET and the Indonesian security forces in Motaain on 10 October. The engagement erupted when the militias training with the Indonesian army opened fire on an INTERFET patrol (Kilcullen, 2000, pp.118-119; 2010, pp.129, 135-136).

However, this remaining support also dwindled, if not completely ceased. Wiranto reiterated that he would not let the militias use West Timor as their base (The Jakarta Post, 1999j), and the Indonesian military replaced local militia-friendly units and commanders with Major General Syahnakri and those who were ready to cooperate with INTERFET (Daley, 1999c; Garran, 1999c). The militias were moved away from the border, and border control on the Indonesian side became stricter (Kilcullen, 2000, pp.119-120, 125; 2010, p.136). The military spokesperson in Jakarta spoke of the militias as a nuisance, and the top of Indonesian military told the militias’ leaders, “Be realistic ... It’s useless” (Richburg, 1999c). The Indonesian security forces tightened their grip on the refugee camps and disarmed the militias, though not completely (Madjiah, 1999; Marshall, 1999b; Timberlake, 1999).
To deal with Soares, the leader of a militia group that remained active around the Oecussi enclave to the end, Syahnakri reinforced Indonesian units on the border, transferred the local army commander who had not stopped Soares, and arrested the leader (Dodd, 2000a; The Jakarta Post, 2000a; Cosgrove, 2006, pp.304-305). After the engagement in Motaain, in which the Indonesian troops and police officers fought poorly, the militias also became distrustful of the Indonesian regular forces (Kilcullen, 2010, p.136). Kilcullen (2019) describes the support from Indonesian regular troops as the militias’ “centre of gravity”. The militias believed that the regular troops would protect them, but this belief was crushed when INTERFET actually killed the regular troops in Motaain. He regards the loss of their protector as one of the biggest blows to the militias.

The end of Indonesian support was formalised when the MPR endorsed the result of the popular consultation, which was necessary as an Indonesian domestic legal procedure. Although the vote was clear support for independence, and the Habibie government accepted the result, there was no guarantee that the MPR would do so too (The Jakarta Post, 1999c; Marker, 2003, p.134). In fact, East Timor governor, Soares, claimed that he rejected the ballot result and that East Timor would still be an Indonesian territory until the MPR endorsed the result (The Jakarta Post, 1999c). Pro-integration factions appealed to the MPR to reject the result, claiming the vote was flawed because of UNAMET’s bias (DFAT, 2001, p.125). However, on 20 October, the MPR accepted the result of the vote and adopted a decree to separate East Timor from Indonesia (Reuters, 1999f; DFAT, 2001, p.156). That same day, Wahid was elected as the new president of Indonesia, and in a letter delivered on 28 October, his government formally requested that the UN take over East Timor (The Jakarta Post, 1999k; 1999l; DFAT, 2001, p.156). This formal recognition by the Indonesian government of the independence of East Timor surely affected the militias. The PPI
commander, Tavares, referred to the MPR decree as one of the reasons he decided to disband the umbrella militia organisation (AFP, 14 Dec 1999).\textsuperscript{11}

As has been discussed, Indonesian support to the pro-integration militias greatly decreased from full support and utilisation as proxies to abandonment. Some local Indonesian military elements were believed to have continued to assist the remaining militias in a limited manner even thereafter (Friel, 2000c; Thompson, 2015, pp.149-150). However, it was no longer the full organisational support that the militias had enjoyed. As the militias depended heavily on the support of the Indonesian military, the end of the support significantly affected the militias’ behaviour and led to the success of compellence. This case, therefore, corresponds well to H5.

\subsection*{3.4 Conclusion}

The chapter has analysed the INTERFET intervention in East Timor. The Australian-led multinational force successfully compelled the pro-integration militias to halt their violence. The deductively derived conditions for success, if they are valid, are expected to be fulfilled in this case, which is one of the most successful cases of compellence in peace operations. The analysis suggests that four conditions constitute a conjunctural sufficient condition: the use of the gradual-turning-of-the-screw strategy, the actual use of force, the achievement of effective counter-coercion negation, and the lack of third-party support on the target side.

The expectations of some hypotheses match the actual course of events in the case. The militias gave up resistance only after INTERFET actually employed force, although the amount was small, and this corresponds with H3. From the beginning, Australia was equipped with national interest and strong domestic support. Its previously acquired

\footnote{In the statement, Tavares referred to the organisation as the PPTT, which stands for the East Timorese Fighter Force. It was used in the same as PPI to refer to the umbrella organisation of the militias (HRW, 1999).}
reputation was mixed: somewhat favourable regarding its military capability, but unfavourable with regard to its resolve. If these three sources of credibility had been necessary but needed to be combined with other conditions, the operation should have turned from initial failure to later success as additional conditions were being fulfilled. However, the operation initially went smoothly – successfully compelling the militias in Dili and in the eastern area without using force – and then faced resistance in the western area but finally succeeded after using force. This development strongly suggests that mere threats were not enough and that the actual use of force was indispensable. The militias learned the competence of INTERFET in the engagements and came to perceive the border area where INTERFET was deployed to be dangerous for them. While other sources of credibility may have been effective in compelling the militias to give up Dili and the eastern part of East Timor, INTERFET had to actually use force to compel the militias to give up their more committed objective of retaining the western half of East Timor.

As expected based on H4, the achievement of effective counter-coercion negation by INTERFET led to the success of compellence. The militias tried to inflict casualties on the international force, but good force protection, the lack of skill on the militia side, and some fortune prevented this outcome. INTERFET suffered a total of two wounded in engagements, but no combat fatalities. The international force also avoided civilian casualties when the militias used civilians as human shields. With their countermeasures foiled, the militias lost momentum and became demoralised.

In addition, H5 corresponds well to what happened in the case. The severest blow to the militias was the halt of third-party support. As the militias were created and used as proxies by Indonesia, their operation depended heavily on Indonesian support. However, as the interest of the Indonesian government shifted after the popular consultation, its support of the militias became increasingly weaker, to the point of abandonment. The top militia leader, Tavares, directly referred to the change in the Indonesian stance as a reason to dissolve the militias.
This case also partially corresponds to H2. INTERFET had to increase pressure by expanding its area of deployment and accumulating tactical victories to compel the militias. Although the compeller did not employ an ultimatum in this case, it is unlikely that the strategy would have worked even if INTERFET had tried it. The militias were highly fragmented, with more than 20 organisations, and Tavares exerted only limited control. At least some of the militias must have disobeyed his command even if he had succumbed to the ultimatum. Moreover, the terrain and the limit on its resources prevented INTERFET from quickly dominating the entire operational area. The militias envisioned guerrilla-style operations (Antara, 1999c; Kyodo News Service, 1999; Pereira, 1999b) and had no reason to give up resistance without trying first. Taking these points into account, it is highly likely that the compeller needed to resort to the gradual-turning-of-the-screw strategy. However, the correspondence to H2 remains partial because INTERFET used no positive inducements. The carrot-and-stick strategy was not necessary to bring success in this case.

Inconsistent with H1, the numerical advantage was not necessary for the success either. INTERFET did not always have a favourable balance of force in terms of troop numbers. The force was outnumbered in the western border area and initially in Oecussi but could successfully compel the militias. Therefore, the East Timor case does not correspond to H1. The case shows that compellers that have fewer troops than targets can compel the latter if other conditions are satisfied.

Summing up, the case is not consistent with H1, only partially consistent with H2 on the necessity of the gradual-turning-of-the-screw strategy, and consistent with H3 to H5. The case therefore suggests that the use of the gradual-turning-of-the-screw strategy, the actual use of force, the achievement of effective counter-coercion negation, and the lack of third-party support on the target side constitute a collective sufficient condition for the success of compellence in peace operations.

Moreover, each of the four components of the conjuncture seems to have been indispensable in this case. This means that they are likely to have been INUS conditions for the success.
As discussed, the application of gradually increased pressure is likely to have been necessary regardless due to the nature of the target, and this is so even the three other components existed. At least the hard-core elements of the militias in the western area would have challenged INTERFET by themselves in the jungle even if INTERFET had used force in Dili in its early phase of operation without suffering casualties. For example, the militias in Aidabasalala did not leave there although INTERFET had already defeated other militias in contacts, and they even successively attacked the INTERFET patrol despite suffering casualties. Other militias also showed aggressive efforts regarding cross-border intrusion from West Timor in October (Boey, 1999). The Indonesian authorities were not able to seal the border nor establish control over the refugee camps in West Timor until long after late 1999 (Friel, 2000b; The Jakarta Post, 2000b; Arieff, 2001), so hard-core militias must have been able to challenge INTERFET even if Indonesian support had faded away much earlier. Therefore, the satisfaction of the other three conditions would not have relieved INTERFET from the necessity of applying pressure on the ground in the western border area.

The course of events in this case also indicates that the actual use of force was necessary. Although other sources of credibility existed from the beginning (pre-earned reputation was mixed), INTERFET had to use force later, and this would not have been affected by the existence of the other three conditions. In fact, when INTERFET was deployed to the western area and had to use force, the only condition that had been unmet was the halt of third-party support. As discussed above, the militias would have challenged INTERFET even if Indonesian support had faded away earlier. Therefore, INTERFET would have to use force to stabilise the western area regardless.

Counter-coercion negation was also indispensable, because its absence would have made the militias bolder (McPhedran, 2007, p.86) and their attacks more persistent. The militias intended to take on opponents if they could cope with them. In fact, to check the new UN force’s competence, the remaining militias launched probing attacks against UNTAET just after it succeeded from INTERFET (Collins, 2000b; UN, 2000f, para.52; Greenlees and Garran, 2002, p.321). If INTERFET had had poor force protection and
had been vulnerable, as UN peace operations often are, the militias would have kept attacking INTERFET. The fact that INTERFET was using force in every area in which it was deployed would not have prevented hard-core elements from attacking it, as discussed above. In addition, the militias' probing attacks against UNTAET happened although Indonesian support had almost halted, so even if Indonesia had withdrawn its support much earlier, the militias would have tried to exploit the weakness of INTERFET. The absence of effective counter-coercion negation and resulting persistent attacks against INTERFET would have kept the western area unstable.

Finally, the continuation of Indonesian support would have made the militias most intractable. As INTERFET’s mandate ended at the border and could not move into West Timor, the militias' attacks in the border area and infiltrations from their safe heavens in West Timor would have been much more difficult for INTERFET to manage if the militias had continued to enjoy Indonesian support. Moreover, organisational support from the Indonesian military would have increased the chance of inflicting casualties on INTERFET, thereby making the condition of effective counter-coercion negation more difficult to satisfy.

In sum, each component of the conjunctural sufficient condition seems to have been indispensable. This means that each component is likely to have been an INUS condition for the success. Of course, the examination depends heavily on counterfactual thought experiments, and the conclusion cannot be as robust as that supported by observations in the real world. However, if the same conclusion can be derived from other cases, the reliability would be strengthened. The validity of the findings from the East Timor case should be examined in combination with those from other cases.
Chapter 4
Sierra Leone: UNAMSIL and the UK Forces

The second empirical chapter analyses compellence in Sierra Leone. The compellers were UNAMSIL, a UN peace operation, and the armed forces of the UK, which intervened unilaterally. The target was a rebel force called the RUF. As explained in the case-selection section, this is one of the most successful cases of compellence in peace operations, which means that at least some of the conditions for success are expected to be fulfilled in it. Therefore, the hypotheses based on deductively derived success conditions should be supported if they are valid. To elaborate the validity, this chapter employs two methods: the congruence method and the most-similar-design comparison. Compellence in Sierra Leone lasted for about a year, and it can be divided into three phases. Therefore, it is possible to not only check the congruence between the expectation of the hypotheses and the actual course of events but to also conduct within-case temporal comparison between the phases. A comparison between phases two and three is the most well-structured within-case comparison with the same protagonists and demand for disarmament, and it is possible to examine how the changes in the conditions affected the result while keeping other (time-invariant) factors basically constant. The first phase involved different demands, and the control of factors is not ideal, but it can still provide a relatively better controlled environment than cross-case comparisons. These two methods in combination provide valuable insights into the validity of the hypotheses.

4.1 Background

The civil war in Sierra Leone, a former British colony, started in 1991, when the RUF, led by Foday Sankoh, launched an invasion from neighbouring Liberia. The RUF aimed to defeat the All People’s Congress (APC) government, which had ruled the country under one-party dictatorship since 1978. The RUF received support not only from Liberia but also from Sierra Leone people who were frustrated with the APC rule, and the rebels fought
well against the small and incapable Sierra Leone Army (SLA) (Sierra Leone Truth & Reconciliation Commission [SLTRC], 2004a, chs.1-3; Berman and Labonte, 2006, pp.143-145). The APC government requested military support from Nigeria and Guinea, and they intervened on the government side (SLTRC, 2004a, p.151; 2004b, pp.63, 65-66).

The APC government collapsed in 1992, when a group of SLA soldiers, led by Captain Valentine Strasser, carried out a coup d’État and established the National Provisional Ruling Council (NPRC). In countering the RUF, the NPRC expanded the SLA, contracted with private military companies (PMCs), and secured the continuation of Nigerian support. The NPRC’s counterattack pushed the RUF to the verge of defeat, but the RUF survived (SLTRC, 2004a, pp.152, 159, 175-179; 2004b, pp.66-69; Gberie, 2005, pp.80, 91-94; Berman and Labonte, 2006, pp.145-146). The RUF shifted its effort to guerrilla warfare, established a network of jungle bases, and intensified its plundering and violence against civilians to inflict costs on the government (SLTRC, 2004a, pp.182-186, 191-196; Marks, 2019). Poorly situated and undisciplined government soldiers also preyed on civilians and were called “sobels”, a coined term that mixed the words “soldiers” and “rebels” (Gberie, 2005, pp.81-82; Keen, 2005, chs.7-8).

Sierra Leone experienced three major political changes in 1996, but none led to peace. First, against the background of the NPRC’s internal disputes about a transition to civilian rule, Strasser was ousted by the mutiny of his staff Julius Maada Bio in January (Abraham, 2001, p.211; SLTRC, 2004a, pp.219-228). Second, Bio agreed to hold an election and Ahmed Tejan Kabbah was elected president. The RUF brutally demonstrated its objection to the election by performing mass amputations of the limbs of civilians. Third, a peace agreement was signed between the Kabbah government and the RUF. Kabbah countered the RUF with a contracted PMC and community-based hunter militias, such as Kamajors, and the pressure persuaded the RUF to sign the Abidjan Agreement in November (Abraham, 2001, pp.211-213; Berman and Labonte, 2006, p.146; Hough, 2007, p.11). However, Sankoh was not committed to the peace agreement and prepared to resume the insurgency. He was arrested in Nigeria when he

Another coup hit Sierra Leone in May 1997, and President Kabbah was ousted from the capital, Freetown. Mutinied SLA soldiers established the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) with Major Jonny Paul Koroma as its head. Koroma invited the RUF to join the junta, and the latter accepted the invitation (Gberie, 2005, pp.95-96; Berman and Labonte, 2006, p.148).

The restoration of the Kabbah government was realised by a regional power – Nigeria. Nigeria, which had stationed its units in Sierra Leone since 1991 in support of the Sierra Leone government, launched a military operation to thwart the AFRC in June 1997. The offensive, however, failed to topple the junta (The Sierra Leone Web [SLW], 1997; Adeshina, 2002, pp.14-17; SLTRC, 2004b, pp.65-66). After sanctions were imposed by ECOWAS and the UN, Koroma signed the Conakry Agreement in October 1997 and agreed to the reinstallation of the Kabbah government, but the junta did not implement it. Against this background, the hunter militias, now calling themselves the Civil Defense Forces (CDF), started counterattacks from late 1997, and Nigeria launched a full-scale military intervention in February 1998 with Kabbah's agreement and the authorisation of ECOWAS. The Nigerian-led ECOWAS Cease-Fire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) soon kicked out the AFRC/RUF from Freetown, and the Kabbah government was reinstalled in March (Adeshina, 2002, pp.21-25; SLTRC, 2004a, pp.283-284, 289-291; Berman and Labonte, 2006, pp.148-155).

ECOMOG, however, could not defeat the rebels. ECOMOG’s subsequent offensive went as far as capturing Kono District in the eastern area, which was the RUF’s stronghold, in April (Adeshina, 2002, ch.3; Keen, 2005, p.219). However, the offensive had to stop due to the lack of troops and logistics, and ECOMOG lost almost all territories it secured to the rebels in their counter-offensive in December (Adeshina, 2002; Keen, 2005, pp.220-221). The AFRC/RUF’s counter-offensive culminated in the reinvasion of Freetown in January 1999. After some initial confusion, ECOMOG’s counterattack was able to repel the rebels again, but severe
damage was inflicted on the capital, including the killing of 5,000 to 10,000 citizens (SLTRC, 2004a, pp.326-330; Berman and Labonte, 2006, p.155).

The military deadlock drove the protagonists to sign another peace deal in Lomé. Kabbah was reluctant but had to accept the conciliatory approach after being pressured by the US and ECOWAS states to seek a negotiated settlement with the RUF. This was because the new government of Nigeria was moving to shrink its involvement in Sierra Leone, and Kabbah needed alternative international support (Rashid, 2000, pp.27-28; Harris, 2014, pp.112-113). A ceasefire was agreed in May 1999 (UN, 1999b), and the Lomé Agreement was concluded two months later. The Lomé Agreement provided power sharing with the RUF, including the appointment of Sankoh as the chair of the Commission for the Management of Strategic Resources, National Reconstruction and Development (CMRRD). It also provided general amnesty, and the RUF was to be transformed into a political party. The agreement called for the monitoring of the ceasefire and the disarmament of combatants by ECOMOG and the United Nations Observer Mission to Sierra Leone (UNOMSIL), which had been established in July 1998 (UNSC, 1998; UN, 1999d).

4.2 The Deployment and Activity of UNAMSIL and the UK Forces

To bear the responsibility put on it by the Lomé Agreement, the UN replaced UNOMSIL with UNAMSIL. UNAMSIL was established by UNSC Resolution 1270, and its various tasks included ceasefire monitoring and the support of DDR. It was authorised to use force to protect civilians and to secure its personnel and the freedom of movement (UNSC, 1999b). ECOMOG in parallel provided security to some key areas, but Nigerian President Olusegun Obasanjo soon expressed his intention to withdraw Nigerian troops from ECOMOG because of its huge cost (UN, 1999g, paras.36-38; Cunliffe-Jones, 2000a). The UNSC responded by adopting Resolution 1289 and thereby expanding UNAMSIL from 6,000 to 11,100 troops and assigning new tasks, including the provision of security for key areas and DDR sites with the authority to use force (UNSC, 2000a).
However, as with previous agreements, the Lomé Agreement did not bring peace to Sierra Leone. Although the RUF political leaders supported the agreement, the RUF military commanders were against it because they felt that they were being sacrificed for the sake of power sharing that would benefit only political leaders (SLTRC, 2004a, pp.335-339). The RUF was also resentful that the government had not allocated the RUF important cabinet and other posts as has been agreed. Sankoh and other RUF members in the power-sharing government complained that they were treated worse than their equivalents from other parties (SLW, 1999b; Bright, 2000, p.38; Sankoh, 2000; SLTRC, 2004a, p.349; Hayner, 2007, pp.21-22; Binningsbø and Dupuy, 2009, p.97). Moreover, there were some armed clashes involving the RUF, the AFRC, the CDF, and ECOMOG even after the signing of the peace agreement (IRIN, 1999a; 1999b; SLW, 1999b; 1999c; 1999d; Smith et al., 2004, pp.281-283, 373).

Frictions between UNAMSIL and the RUF also increased. Initially, Sankoh cooperated somewhat in disarming his troops (e.g. SLW, 1999b; 1999c; 2000a; AFP, 10 Jan 2000; Smith et al., 2004, p.282). At the same time, he was sceptical about the UN from the beginning and repeatedly criticised it and UNAMSIL (SLW, 1999a; 2000b; Gberie, 2005, p.163). The RUF started to harass UNAMSIL in January 2000. The RUF challenged and disarmed the UNAMSIL units and blocked their movements on multiple occasions (AFP, 7 Feb 2000; API, 2000a; Conteh, 2000a; IRIN, 2000b; Lynch, 2000; UN, 2000d, paras.11-14; UNDPI, 2000c; 2000d; 2000e). Although UNAMSIL demanded that Sankoh stop the harassment, with the threat of a “forceful response” (AFP, 14 Feb 2000; IRIN, 2000c; SLW, 2000b; UNDPI, 2000b), he blamed the government and UNAMSIL in return. He instructed his combatants not to disarm, and using the threat of execution, the RUF commanders prevented the members from disarming (Hule, 2000a; Jalloh, 2000a; Roy-MacAulay, 2000c; SLW, 2000c; The Progress, 2000a; Gberie, 2005, pp.163-164).

The situation deteriorated rapidly in May 2000 as the RUF exploited a security vacuum created by the withdrawal of ECOMOG (Peacekeeping Best Practice Unit [PKBPU], 2003, p.5). After the completion of ECOMOG withdrawal in early May, RUF units attacked DDR sites and a number of
firefights erupted between UNAMSIL and the RUF. UNAMSIL suffered casualties and had to retreat from the sites. The RUF also apprehended as many as over 500 peacekeepers and advanced towards Freetown (SLW, 2000d; UN, 2000e, paras.56-64; Prins, 2002, p.196; SLTRC, 2004a, pp.356-358).

However, for Sankoh, the violent challenge against UNAMSIL and the Lomé Peace Agreement, came at a price. The RUF’s action incited an anti-RUF demonstration in Freetown on 8 May, and a mob surged ahead to the residence of Sankoh. The provoked guards of the residence fired into the crowd, and some 40 people were killed in the ensuing firefight between the RUF and the mob (SLTRC, 2004a, pp.416-435; Higbie and Moigula, 2017, p.83). Sankoh escaped from the scene but was detained on 17 May (Onishi, 2000c; SLTRC, 2004a, p.446).

The crisis in Sierra Leone led to a British intervention. The intervention's initial objective was a non-combatant evacuation operation (NEO), but the British forces remained there after the NEO and provided assistance in the form of logistics, advice, and intelligence to UNAMSIL and the local forces supporting the Kabbah government. The British forces also secured the airport in Lungi and its surrounding area. The RUF advanced to the area and clashed with the British troops on 17 May, but the British forces repelled the RUF and killed more than 30 without suffering any casualties (Prins, 2002, pp.202-203; Dorman, 2009, pp.79-80, 92-94).

The pro-government local forces supported by British troops and UNAMSIL counterattacked and pushed back the RUF. They fought for the control of strategic places around and beyond the Freetown peninsula (UN, 2000g, para.21; Smith et al., 2004, pp.210-211). Most of the UNAMSIL peacekeepers who had been held as hostages by the RUF were released after the mediation by Liberian President, Charles Taylor, but an Indian unit was left under siege (Paye-Layleh, 2000; UN, 2000g, paras.24-25). In July, UNAMSIL launched Operation Khukri, an offensive to break the encirclement, and rescued the besieged unit (UN, 2000g, paras.26-27; Jetley, 2007a; 2007b).
The British forces conducted another assault in September, but the target was another armed group in Sierra Leone – the WSB. With the arrival of reinforcements for UNAMSIL, the UK withdrew its major combat units in mid-June, but it continued to deploy smaller detachments to train the SLA (UN, 2000g, para.20; Dorman, 2009, p.99). In August, 11 UK troops stationed in Sierra Leone and an SLA soldier were detained by an armed group of ex-AFRC soldiers called the WSB. After realising the release of some troops in negotiation, the UK launched a hostage-rescue operation on 10 September and rescued all the remaining hostages (Woods and Reese, 2008, pp.65-71; Dorman, 2009, ch.6). After this operation, more than 200 WSB members surrendered to UNAMSIL (UNDPI, 2000q).

The military situation came to a stalemate as both the pro-government forces and the RUF failed to achieve major advancements, and the battles subsided in late August (UN, 2000i, paras.13-15). The RUF in particular resisted strongly in its strongholds and in the diamond-mining areas of the eastern and southern parts of the country (Woods and Reese, 2008, p.72). UNAMSIL also defended its positions effectively and repelled the RUF’s attacks repeatedly in cooperation with the pro-government forces.

Meanwhile, the RUF side had two major changes in its situation. First, the RUF elected Issa Sesay as an interim leader in August to replace the arrested Sankoh (UN, 2000h, para.10). Second, in early September, the RUF, along with Liberian forces, opened a new front with an attack on Guinea (UN, 2000i, para.5; Amnesty International, 2001; Milner, 2005, pp.148-151).

The offensive against Guinea was a bad move, as Guinea’s armed forces and the CDF counterattacked fiercely. In addition, Guinea boosted its support for the Liberians United for Reconciliation and

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Taylor was hostile to Guinea, which participated in ECOMOG in Liberia and supported the Liberian dissidents (Gberie, 2001, p.10). Guinea intervened in Sierra Leone on the government side, as mentioned earlier, and joined ECOMOG in Sierra Leone (Adeshina, 2002). The RUF had infiltrated Guinea in 1999 as well (Smith et al., 2004, pp.149-150, 155-160, 372).
Democracy (LURD), a Liberian rebel group which fought against President Taylor (Gberie, 2001, p.11; Smith et al., 2004, pp.161-162, 375-376; Milner, 2005, pp.149-154; Reno, 2007, pp.76-78).

The mounting pressure gradually choked the RUF, but additional time and pressure were required to induce the rebels to give up arms. In October, the RUF expressed its interest in returning to the peace process to UNAMSIL and ECOWAS. The Sierra Leonean government and the RUF signed the Abuja I Cease-Fire Agreement on 10 November, but the RUF did not cease its military activities (UN, 2000j; 2000n, para.2; SLTRC, 2004b, p.82). The rebels refused to disarm until an interim government was established, and they implemented the agreement only to the extent that they could maintain their military capabilities and mining activities (UN, 2001a, paras.8, 12, 97).

Against the background of the CDF’s offensive against the RUF’s strongholds and dwindling Liberian support, the Sierra Leonean government, the UN, and ECOWAS met the RUF in Abuja again on 2 May 2001, and they agreed to the simultaneous disarmament of the RUF and the CDF (UN, 2001e, paras.2-3; UNAMSIL, 2001i). This Abuja II Agreement was followed by a series of meetings starting with the one in Freetown on 15 May and the parties consulted on concrete plans for disarmament. DDR resumed on 18 May, and substantial disarmament was finally realised (UN, 2001e, paras.7-11). The disarmament proceeded step by step, and the parties declared the completion of disarmament on 17 January 2002 (UN, 2002a, para.12; Thusi and Meek, 2003).

4.3 The Examination of the Hypotheses

It is understood that pressure from the UK, UNAMSIL, local pro-government forces, and Guinea induced the RUF to accept disarmament (e.g. Richards, 2004, p.16; Gberie, 2005, pp.177-178; Ucko, 2016). As pressure was employed to change the status quo, their attempts constituted compellence. The RUF resisted disarmament, despite signing the Lomé Agreement, and launched another offensive against the capital. The intervening forces in cooperation with the pro-government forces thwarted the offensive; put
further pressure on the RUF; and, with the help of Guinean pressure, finally succeeded in making the RUF commit once again to disarmament after new negotiations in Abuja. Therefore, Sierra Leone can be regarded as a successful case of compellence.

The compellence against the RUF was protracted. To conduct a temporal within-case comparison, this study divides the case into three phases with different demands and results.

The first compellent attempt was in February 2000. In the first phase, UNAMSIL tried to halt the RUF’s harassment of peacekeepers. The RUF had disarmed peacekeepers at least three times in January (Lynch, 2000a; UN, 2000d, para.11), and it had built roadblocks and hindered the movement of international troops many times (UN, 1999k, para.10; AFP, 6 Jan 2000; API, 2000a; Conteh, 2000a; IRIN, 2000b; SLW, 2000a; 2000b).

Against the background of these incidents, Oluyemi Adeniji, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) of UNAMSIL, demanded that Sankoh stop acts contravening the Lomé Agreement, such as seizing weapons from peacekeepers or erecting roadblocks and hindering the move of peacekeepers.13 This demand, which was issued in a meeting on 12 February, was accompanied by a warning that the continuation of such acts would “invite a forceful response”. Adeniji demanded immediate compliance and issued a clearer deadline stating that he expected to see concrete signs of obedience within 24 hours. In the talk with Adeniji, Sankoh

13 This “do not repeat it” type of demand sits on the border between deterrence and compellence. If events are viewed separately, “do not repeat it” means “do not do it again in the future” and is thus a deterrent demand. Conversely, if events are seen in a continuous way, such as a campaign, “do not repeat it” means “stop doing it” and is thus a compellent demand. In this case, the RUF repeatedly seized weapons from and hindered the movement of peacekeepers within a few months, and it showed continuity. Therefore, it can be said that the demands by UNAMSIL had some characteristics of compellence, as well as deterrence.
agreed to order his troops to return peacekeepers’ weapons and accept UNAMSIL’s free movement (AFP, 14 Feb 2000; IRIN, 2000c; SLW, 2000b; UNDPI, 2000b).

Nevertheless, none of UNAMSIL’s demands was fulfilled, so the first compellent attempt was unsuccessful. While the RUF stopped robbing weapons from peacekeepers for a while, it soon resumed hostile acts, including the detention and disarmament of peacekeepers on a much larger scale in May. The other demand regarding the peacekeepers’ freedom of movement ended in a much clearer failure. Even just after Adeniji’s threat, the RUF did not permit the UNAMSIL patrol to enter Koidu (AFP, 15 Feb 2000; IRIN, 2000d; SLW, 2000b; Ashby, 2003, pp.142-151). Two UNAMSIL companies also had to retreat after a standoff with some 300 RUF members who blocked the peacekeepers’ way near Bendu in the eastern area (AFP, 25 Feb 2000; IRIN, 2000f; SLW, 2000b; The Associated Press [AP], 2000a). The RUF continued to establish new roadblocks (Jalloh, 2000b; Momodu, 2000a) and disturbed UNAMSIL’s movement (AP, 2000b; IRIN, 2000g; Roy-MacAulay, 2000a; 2000b; SLW, 2000b; 2000c). Therefore, despite the threat, the RUF did not change its behaviour. In sum, the first stage of compellence ended in partial and temporary success in the short term and was a failure from a longer-term perspective. UNAMSIL did not put its threat into practice in the face of the defiance and instead emphasised dialogue and negotiation (Africa News, 2000a; Conteh, 2000c; Roy-MacAulay, 2000b).

The second phase of compellence covers the period from the May crisis to the Abuja I Agreement in November 2000. The overall demand against the RUF was to disarm in accordance with the Lomé Agreement. This demand, also directed to other warring factions, was repeatedly stated in UNSC resolutions (UNSC, 1999b; 2000a), and the Sierra Leone government also demanded that the RUF disarm (AFP, 20 May 2000; Orjollet, 2000b; SLW, 2000d). In addition, during the May crisis the UN demanded the halt of attacks and the release of hostages as well (AFP, 2 May 2000; 8 May 2000a; Roy-MacAulay, 2000d; UNDPI, 2000g; 2000h). This phase entailed the intervention of the UK and the direct use of force by UNAMSIL, the UK forces, and the local auxiliary forces. In the Abuja I Agreement, the compellers were able to persuade the RUF to accept a
ceasefire and to resume disarmament. Although the RUF abided by the ceasefire, it did not start disarmament, and it demanded the release of detained RUF members and the establishment of an interim government. Moreover, its members were actively involved in attacks against Guinea. Therefore, despite the intervention of the UK forces and the enhanced posture of UNAMSIL, the pressure did not yield quick success.

The third and final phase covers the period between the Abuja I and II Agreements. The demand against the RUF was to disarm – the same as for phase two. While the RUF was refusing to commit to disarmament, further pressure was applied to it, including the threat of attack on its strongholds and sanctions against Liberia. Against the background of this pressure, new negotiations were held, and the Abuja II Agreement was struck in May 2001. The RUF finally committed to disarmament, and thereafter, full-scale disarmament was realised. After a prolonged effort, the compellence ended in success.

The following section analyses the case from the perspective of each hypothesis and examines the congruence between its prediction and what actually happened. Based on the result, the most-similar-design comparison between the phases is conducted in the conclusion.

4.3.1 Troop Numbers

The first hypothesis to be examined is H1, which is that the favourable balance of troops leads to the success of compellence in peace operations. The compellers constantly had a numerical advantage over the target in this case, but compellence did not succeed until the third phase. Therefore, the case is not consistent with the hypothesis.

The examination should include the strength of the SLA and the CDF, which operated as the local auxiliary forces of the compellers. The SLA was impotent and unreliable, as demonstrated by the AFRC coup, but some loyal troops fought for the Kabbah government, and their quality improved after they received equipment and training from the UK. The CDF was regarded as more competent and reliable than the SLA in regard to resisting the rebels. Its core was composed of traditional hunters from communities, who
formed vigilante groups against the RUF and “sobels” (Keen, 2005, pp.90-91; Okano, 2019, ch.6). They started to call themselves the CDF during the AFRC period, and they cooperated with ECOMOG to restore the Kabbah government. The government kept relying on the CDF and made it more formalised, but it remained a collection of groups based on patron–client networks rather than a modern military organisation (Hoffman, 2007; Okano, 2019).

The international forces had over 10,000 troops in the first phase of compellence. In January 2000, UNAMSIL had some 4,820 troops comprising of five battalions, a reaction force, and administrative components (UNSC, 1999d, p.4; 2000b, para.17). ECOMOG’s strength on 7 February was 5,500 (UNSC, 2000c, p.2), so the total strength of the peacekeepers was some 10,320. As of 1 March, UNAMSIL expanded to some 7,390 troops with three additional battalions. This meant an increase of some 2,570 troops, but the two Nigerian battalions were transferred from ECOMOG, and the net increase of the overall peacekeepers, excluding in-theatre re-hatting, was much smaller. This can be calculated as some 880 by subtracting 1,690 – the increase of Nigerian troops in UNAMSIL – from 2,570 (UN, 2000b, p.11; 2000d, pp.5, 17). Therefore, the overall strength of the peacekeepers, combining UNAMSIL and ECOMOG, is calculated as 11,200 in early March. In sum, the peacekeepers’ strength during the first instance of compellence in February 2000 was between some 10,320 and some 11,200.

The estimation of the size of pro-government local forces in the first phase requires some calculations. The UN estimated that the SLA had 7,000 troops in September 1999 (UN, 1999g, para.30), and about 3,800 of them were disarmed by 23 January 2000 (IRIN, 2000a). Therefore, there were some 3,200 SLA troops during the first phase of compellence. The strength of the CDF was estimated at 15,000 in September 1999 (UN, 1999g, para.30), and some 3,350 were disarmed by 16 February 2000 (IRIN, 2000e). Therefore, there were some 11,650 CDF troops at the time of the first phase of compellence.

A similar calculation applies to the target side as well. The RUF was estimated to have about 15,000 troops in September 1999 (UN, 1999g,
para.30), and some 3,500 were disarmed by 16 February (IRIN, 2000e). Therefore, the strength of the RUF at the time of the first phase of compellence is estimated as 11,500.

The above examination shows that the balance of troops in the first phase was against the RUF. The international forces numerically matched the RUF, and the compellers had even larger auxiliary forces. As a result, the RUF was outnumbered two to one by potentially hostile forces. Despite this numerical weakness, the RUF did not accede to the demands of UNAMSIL. This does not coincide with the expectation of the hypothesis.

The situation changed little in the second phase. The compellers maintained a numerical advantage over the target, but compellence remained unsuccessful.

UNAMSIL and the RUF had similar-sized forces at the beginning of the second phase. When the May crisis erupted, UNAMSIL had some 8,500 troops, while a battalion composed of about 700 to 800 troops was at Lungi and had not yet been deployed to its position (UNAMSIL, 2000). ECOMOG had just left Sierra Leone, so this was the total strength of the intervening force on the ground. On the target side, some 4,500 to 5,000 RUF had disarmed by early May (AFP, 5 May 2000; SLW, 2000d; UN, 2000e, para.26). Subtracting this figure from the estimated original strength of 15,000 reveals that the estimated strength of the RUF at the time of the May crisis was around 10,000. The US estimation was some 6,000 (Perlez and Wren, 2000), and the UK forces commander’s was 5,000 to 10,000 (Zavis, 2000b). An article says that the RUF had some 4,000 well-armed members and more others (Ucko, 2016, p.850). These figures mean that the overall balance of troops between UNAMSIL and the RUF was more or less equal or one of the sides had a slight advantage.

However, the strength of the international forces rapidly increased after the May crisis. First, the UK launched a military intervention, and a parachute battalion of 600 troops and about 40 SAS troops were deployed to Sierra Leone by around 8 May (Evans and Butcher, 2000; Dorman, 2009, pp.72-80; Richards, 2014, pp.142-144, 149). The UK also deployed a flotilla of naval vessels with 800 marines on board (Evans, 2000a; Sengupta,
which arrived in Sierra Leone on 13 May (API, 2000b; Orjollet, 2000b). However, these were short-term deployments, and the paratroopers and the marines left Sierra Leone in late May and mid-June, respectively (AFP, 23 May 2000a; Cunliffe-Jones, 2000f; McGreal, 2000c). Thereafter, the UK deployed some 250 troops to train the SLA (Anon, 2000; Barnes, 2000; Dorman, 2009, p.99). Second, UNAMSIL also expanded. The UN hastily gathered additional forces for the mission in the face of the crisis, and UNAMSIL’s strength increased to 11,280 by the end of May (UNDPI, 2000j). The troop numbers reached 12,428 on 22 July 2000, and this number remained at about 12,500 thereafter (UN, 2000g, para.29; UN, 2000p). Therefore, the total size of intervening forces was at least equivalent to and then surpassed that of the RUF.

Moreover, there were pro-government local forces. Some 3,800 SLA members and 8,700 CDF members disarmed by the beginning of May (SLW, 2000d); subtracting these figures from the original estimated strengths of 7,000 and 15,000, respectively (UN, 1999g, para.30), leaves 3,200 SLA members and 6,300 CDF members at the time of the May crisis. An article shows a similar figure of 2,000 to 3,000 as the size of the SLA at around this time (Ucko, 2016, p.852). The addition of local auxiliaries increases the overall strength of the compeller side at the time of the May crisis to some 16,800 to 18,000, so the compellers had a large numerical advantage over the target. This advantage was further strengthened by the expansion of the international forces mentioned above and the new recruitment that was undertaken by the SLA and CDF.

In sum, the balance of troops was favourable to the compellers in the second phase too. The RUF did not commit to disarmament in this phase, and this contradicts the hypothesis.

In the third phase, the balance of the troops changed little, but the result of compellence changed from unsuccessful to successful. As the balance had been constantly favourable from the first phase, the change of the result cannot be explained by this factor.

The international forces experienced a slight temporary reduction and then an increase in the number of troops in phase three. The reduction was
because of the withdrawal of UNAMSIL’s Indian and Jordanian contingents, which were composed of some 3,200 and 1,800 troops, respectively, at the end of October 2000 (UN, 2000p). The withdrawal started just after the Abuja I Agreement (UNAMSIL, 2000q), and as a result, the number of UNAMSIL troops dropped to around 10,400 in December 2000 (UN, 2000p; 2001h). However, as the withdrawal progressed gradually and other states provided additional troops, the size of the force returned to some 12,000 in March 2001 and remained at that level until June, when the scale increased to some 12,700 (UN, 2001e, para.18; 2001h; UNAMSIL, 2001h). The reduction in the size of UNAMSIL was also mitigated by the short-term deployment of British troops. The UK deployed 500 marines with naval vessels to Sierra Leone on 12 November, but they stayed there for only about a week (McGreal, 2000f; O’Loughlin, 2000; SLW, 2000j; Dorman, 2009, p.119). Therefore, the size of the intervening forces at the timing of the Abuja II Agreement was some 12,000, differing little from when the Abuja I Agreement was agreed.

The size of the RUF does not seem to have changed greatly from the second phase. UNAMSIL estimated the strength of the RUF as 12,000 in February 2001 (UNAMSIL, 2001f). A media report also showed somewhat similar estimates of between 8,000 and 12,000 (Smith, 2001). The RUF itself reported its strength as 10,000 when DDR resumed in May 2001 (UN, 2001e, para.26). Although the final number of RUF members who were disarmed after the resumption of the disarmament programme in May 2001 reached 19,183 (UN, 2002a, para.13), it seems that the RUF’s effective fighting force during the third phase of compellence was around 10,000. This means that the international forces were roughly equivalent in number to or somewhat larger than the RUF during this phase.

The local pro-government forces expanded. The UK provided training and equipment to restructure and enhance the SLA. The UK-trained and -equipped SLA reached 3,000 by October 2000 and 6,000 by January 2001 (AFP, 1 Jan 2001; API, 2001; Ucko, 2016, p.864). The commander of the UK forces deployed in this phase recalls the overall size of the SLA as 14,000 (Riley, 2006, p.2). A minister of the Sierra Leone government stated that the size was about 12,000 in early April (Chanda, 2001). The same
minister said the CDF had 90,000 personnel (Chanda, 2001), but this seems to have been an exaggeration. The CDF itself declared its strength as 15,000 to 20,000 at the time of the resumption of disarmament in May 2001 (UN, 2001e, para.26). This means that the international forces were accompanied by 27,000 to 32,000 friendly forces when the Abuja II Agreement was concluded.

If this large local auxiliary force is combined with UNAMSIL’s own 12,000 troops, the compeller had a large numerical advantage over the RUF by a ratio of almost four to one. Even if the RUF had some 20,000 fighters as its final figure for disarmed personnel, the compellers still had a larger force by a ratio of two to one. This balance of troops in favour of the compellers and the success of compellence correspond with the expectation of H1. However, because the compellers had a larger force from the beginning, this belated correspondence in the third phase does not provide strong support for the hypothesis.

In sum, the case was not consistent with the hypothesis. When the local friendly forces are taken into account, the compellers had a numerical advantage over the RUF throughout the entire period of compellence. Nevertheless, compellence did not succeed until the third phase, so this suggests that the favourable balance of troops per se is not an important condition for the success of compellence in peace operations. As a result, the Sierra Leone case does not provide support for H1.

However, there remains a possibility that the favourable balance of troops was a necessary part of a conjunctural success condition – that is, an INUS condition. In other words, the numerical advantage alone did not bring a success, but it remains possible that it was a factor that was necessary for compellence success in combination with other success conditions. This possibility is further examined in the conclusion.

4.3.2 The Strategy of Compellence

The next hypothesis is H2. It predicts that the combination of the gradual-turning-of-the-screw strategy and the carrot-and-stick strategy is more effective than an ultimatum. The course of events in the case casts doubt on
the utility of ultimatums and demonstrates that the application of gradually increased pressure was necessary for success. However, positive inducements did not play a major role in the case. Therefore, the correspondence between the hypothesis and the case is partial.

UNAMSIL employed an ultimatum in the first phase of compellence with an unsuccessful result. From the beginning, UNAMSIL was authorised under Chapter VII of the UN Charter to “take the necessary action” to protect civilians and itself and secure its freedom of movement (UNSC, 1999b). In addition, UNSC Resolution 1289, adopted on 7 February 2000, expanded UNAMSIL’s tasks, including the provision of security for important locations and DDR sites, for which it could “take the necessary action” (UNSC, 2000a). Against this background, when SRSG Adeniji demanded that the RUF stop seizing weapons from peacekeepers and obstructing their movement, he threatened a “forceful response” if the RUF did not comply with the demands, and he set a deadline by which the RUF had to show its compliance (AFP, 14 Feb 2000; IRIN, 2000c; SLW, 2000b; UNDPI, 2000b). This pressure had the three components of a full-fledged ultimatum: demand, clear threat, and time limit. The ultimatum did not work well; the RUF continued to hinder the movement of the peacekeepers, and UNAMSIL did not resort to a “forceful response” (Africa News, 2000a; Conteh, 2000c; Roy-MacAulay, 2000b). This unsuccessful result of the ultimatum corresponds with the expectation of H2.

In the second and third phases, the compellers as a whole employed the gradual-turning-of-the-screw strategy. The accumulation of pressure throughout the phases induced the RUF to accept the demand for disarmament, so the application of the strategy was necessary for success.

UNAMSIL employed proactive pressure and several threats. For example, just after the eruption of the May crisis, Major General Vijay Kumar Jetley, the force commander of UNAMSIL, issued a threat that force could be used as a last resort to retrieve hostages and stated that UNAMSIL was capable of enforcing a ceasefire (AFP, 2 May 2000; Roy-MacAulay, 2000d). In June, UNAMSIL took some proactive moves to secure the Horseshoe Road, which connected the capital to Lungi airport, by expelling the RUF as will be discussed in more detail later. SRSG Adeniji stated that the RUF
should be forced to retreat to the line before the aggression and that the Lomé Agreement should be enforced (Cunliffe-Jones, 2000c). The UNAMSIL spokesperson also stated that UNAMSIL would respond to force with force and would be deployed anywhere freely (Sengupta, 2000b). In July, UNAMSIL launched Operation Khukri, which was its most offensive move. Major General Jetley stated that he hoped that the operation demonstrated the military capability of the force, and he called on the RUF to disarm (UNAMSIL, 2000j).

At the same time, this proactive pressures was always accompanied by restraining and deescalating remarks. Throughout the second phase, UNAMSIL repeatedly issued remarks emphasising that it was a peacekeeping force, and it denied that it would achieve objectives by using force (e.g. UNAMSIL, 2000b; 2000d; 2000e; 2000h; 2000o; 2000u). UNAMSIL also demanded that the pro-government forces’ counter-offensive be halted out of the concern for the detained peacekeepers’ safety (Farah, 2000c; McGreal and Norton-Taylor, 2000a; Orjollet, 2000c; UNAMSIL, 2000a). Operation Khukri’s purpose was to rescue besieged fellow troops, and it was a one-off operation, as Jetley later denied the need for another military operation (UNAMSIL, 2000m). Therefore, the message from UNAMSIL was mixed at best.

In contrast, the UK was more proactive in putting pressure on the RUF but was reluctant to confront the rebels directly with its own force. After conducting a NEO, the UK government announced that it would provide technical and logistic support to UNAMSIL and secure Lungi airport so that UN reinforcement troops could be deployed. Although the government emphasised that the purpose of the UK forces on the ground was not combat, it also warned that the forces would defend themselves (AFP, 8 May 2000b; 10 May 2000a; 11 May 2000a; Ellison et al., 2000; Orjollet, 2000b; Waugh, 2000). In fact, the forces’ commander, Brigadier Richards, lured the RUF into a direct military confrontation near Lungi and defeated the attackers (Richards, 2014, pp.167-170). The UK forces also conducted some demonstration of force, including a gunfire exercise and flyovers by aircraft deployed on a carrier (Evans, 2000c; 2000d; McGreal, 2000b; SLW, 2000d; Richards, 2014, pp.165-166).
The main tool that the UK forces used to tighten the screw was the assistance they gave to the SLA and other local pro-government forces which carried out counter-offensive against the RUF. Brigadier Richards helped to gather and organise these local forces into what he dubbed an “Unholy Alliance”, and UK officers coordinated the coalition’s operations and logistics (AFP, 23 May 2000b; McGreal, 2000b; McGreal et al., 2000; Richards, 2014, pp.145-147, 153-160). In addition, after thwarting the RUF’s offensive in May, the UK constantly dispatched the Short Term Training Team and provided six-week training programmes for some 1,000 SLA troops each time (AFP, 30 Jan 2001; Stone, 2001; Nelson-Williams, 2010, pp.132-133). Starting with the completion of training for the first batch of SLA troops in late July 2000 (Thomas, 2000b; Dorman, 2009, p.99), the UK-trained and -equipped SLA increased steadily, and its number reached 6,000 by January 2001 and over 10,000 by January 2002 (AFP, 1 Jan 2001; API, 2001; Malan et al., 2002, ch.8). The UK also provided training for SLA commanders (SLW, 2000f; The Progress, 2000c; Diggins, 2001; Nelson-Williams, 2010, p.132), equipment (Berman, 2000, p.23; 2003, pp.209-210; SLW, 2000i), and operational support by seconding personnel to the SLA (AFP, 15 Jun 2000a; Cunliffe-Jones, 2000e; SLW, 2000e; Malan et al., 2002, ch.3; Le Grys, 2010, p.56).

Meanwhile, the UK commanders repeatedly warned the RUF that it would be defeated. Brigadier Richards issued the commander's intent, stating that the objective was to make the RUF realise the inevitability of defeat. Accordingly, he employed radio programmes extensively to propagate the view that the British troops were there to defeat the RUF and that the latter had no future. The message was supported and enhanced by actions such as firepower demonstration, flyovers, and the contact at Lungi Lol, mentioned above (Richards, 2016). Brigadier Gordon Hughes, who succeeded Brigadier Richards in June, demanded that the RUF stop fighting, saying that the RUF would discover the futility of the military option sooner or later (Leighton, 2000a). UK Chief of the Defence Staff, Charles Guthrie, also warned the RUF that the training of the SLA was proceeding so well that the RUF would be defeated unless it accepted disarmament (API, 2000c). When he was deployed to Sierra Leone again in November, Brigadier Richards
also warned that it was in the interest of the RUF to return to the peace process or be defeated (SLW, 2000). During this November deployment, the UK forces again conducted an intimidation campaign, which included flyovers over RUF positions and live-fire exercises (SLW, 2000j; ICG, 2001, p.2; Richards, 2014, pp.176-177).

Therefore, the UK’s strategy to compel the RUF to disarm was the gradual turning of the screw. The UK threatened that the RUF would be defeated and indirectly applied gradually increased pressure by strengthening and assisting the pro-government forces – mainly the SLA. Brigadier Richards received intelligence that the RUF was becoming worried because of the growing pressure and the deteriorating situation (Richards, 2016). The RUF repeatedly demanded the withdrawal of the UK forces (SLW, 2000j; The Progress, 2000j; UNAMSIL, 2000r; AFP, 3 May 2001; Chanda, 2001), and this fact also shows that the RUF was worried about their presence and activity.

In addition, the compellers used positive inducements in this case, but their effect requires cautious evaluation. This is because the Lomé Agreement of 1999 was generous to the RUF, and the rebels seemed to have set it as a reference line. The Lomé Agreement granted the RUF various governmental posts, including the chair of the CMRRD, whose status was equivalent to that of vice president, four ministers, and four deputy ministers; support to transform the RUF into a political party; and amnesty for acts carried out before the agreement (UN, 1999d). Although ministers were appointed from the RUF and Sankoh himself assumed office as the chair of the CMRRD, he had an unsatisfactory feeling that the government had not lived up to the agreement. In the May crisis, the ministers and later Sankoh were arrested by the government, and the power sharing collapsed.

Despite the resumption of violence, the RUF maintained that it was committed to the Lomé Agreement and demanded that the government implement its promise according to the agreement (AFP, 19 May 2000; 7 Jun 2000a; Panafrican News Agency [PANA], 2000c; The Guardian, 2000; UNAMSIL, 2000e; SLW, 2001c). In addition, the RUF demanded the release of its detained members, including Sankoh; the establishment of an interim
government; and support for its transformation into a political party (AFP, 19 May 2000; 9 Jun 2000a; 3 May 2001; Dumbuya, 2000b; PANA, 2000c; SLW, 2000e; 2001b; 2001c; Chanda, 2001; UNAMSIL, 2001f; 2001g). The RUF maintained that its political demands needed to be addressed before it disarmed (IRIN, 2000m; SLW, 2000j).

The compellers, however, rejected most of these demands. The Sierra Leone government claimed that the RUF lost its benefit in the Lomé Agreement because of the contravention (Jalloh, 2000h; SLW, 2000e). The government firmly rejected the release of Sankoh from the beginning, and the UN and the UK took the same line (Crossette, 2000; Sullivan, 2000a; Waugh, 2000). The government released only some of the RUF detainees when Sesay was elected as the new RUF leader (AFP, 21 Aug 2000; Roy-MacAulay, 2000h). The government also rejected the call to establish an interim government, citing the lack of a constitutional basis for such a measure, and extended the term of the existing one. President Kabbah included no RUF members in the reshuffled cabinet (AFP, 15 Feb 2001a; Concord Times, 2001b; Roy-MacAulay, 2001a; UN, 2001a, paras.12-14). The government claimed that political issues could be discussed only after the RUF implemented the Abuja I Agreement (Roy-MacAulay, 2001b; SLW, 2001c; 2001d). The Abuja I Agreement referred to the Lomé Agreement as “the most appropriate framework” for resolving the conflict, but it did not provide any specific carrots for the RUF (UN, 2000j).

In the Abuja II Agreement, the government agreed to “consider” the release of detained RUF members and to provide support for the RUF regarding legal and property issues to transform it into a political party (UNAMSIL, 2001i). The government emphasised to the RUF in the negotiation that the release depended on the RUF’s compliance with the agreement and was not a precondition for disarmament (Concord Times, 2001e). The remaining detainees, including ex-minister members from the

14 The RUF had difficulty finding a property on which to locate its headquarters, which was a requisite for its registration as a political party (Jalloh, 2000c; MacJohnson, 2001).
RUF, were set free only after the disarmament resumed and got on track (AFP, 5 Sep 2001; 7 Nov 2001; IRIN, 2001d; Roy-MacAulay, 2001c; Richards and Vincent, 2008, p.87). The actual support for the RUF to transform into a political party also came only after the signing of the Abuja II Agreement (Concord Times, 2001i; Roy-MacAulay, 2001d; Standard Times, 2001; Malan et al., 2002, ch.7).

Therefore, the carrots provided for the RUF were far smaller than those provided in the Lomé Agreement and could not have been attractive for the RUF. The RUF lost the benefit of power sharing and instead received more uncertain promises regarding the release of the detainees and support for the establishment of a political party. Taking into account the RUF’s demands based on the Lomé Agreement, these positive inducements accompanying compellence cannot be regarded as a major factor in persuading the RUF to give up arms.

Hence, the course of events in the second and third phases partially correspond to H2. The UK employed the gradual-turning-of-the-screw strategy throughout the second and third phases, and the pressure against the RUF increased gradually, supplanted by the occasional proactive moves by UNAMSIL. Therefore, the overall strategy of the compellers was the gradual turning of the screw. In addition, the compellers used positive inducements. The combination of the two strategies and the successful result of compellence in the third phase correspond with the expectation of H2. However, the small carrots do not seem to have played a major role in compelling the RUF, so the correspondence to the hypothesis is partial.

This section has reviewed the strategies that the compellers employed against the RUF. In the first phase, UNAMSIL employed an ultimatum. Although the demands were limited, it failed to fully persuade the RUF. In the second and third phases, the compellers employed the gradual-turning-of-the-screw strategy combined with positive inducements, and the compellence ended in success. However, because the impact of positive inducements seems to have been small, the congruence with H2 is partial. The course of events in this case demonstrates that the application of
gradually increased pressure was necessary to compel the resilient rebels, while ultimatums and carrots were not.

4.3.3 Credibility

The next to be examined is the credibility hypothesis – H3. There are four factors that can be the source of threat credibility: national interests, strong domestic support, previously acquired advantageous reputation, and the actual use of force. As discussed in Chapter 2, although each has its rationale for enhancing the credibility of threats, the hypothesis is that the actual use of force is the most effective way to support credibility, taking into account the characteristics of the context of peace operations. The compellers extensively and effectively employed force in the second phase, and there is some evidence which indicates that the RUF was affected by the actual use of force. Therefore, this case is consistent with the hypothesis.

The first factor to be examined is whether the compellers’ national interests were involved. There are three states to be examined: Nigeria, which was a major troop contributor to UNAMSIL; India, which provided the first force commander and a large number of troops for UNAMSIL; and the UK. In this case, only Nigeria had strategic interests in Sierra Leone.

For Nigeria, regional stability was at stake in the conflict in Sierra Leone; thus, its national interest was involved. It was feared that creating a precedent of power grab by a rebel may lead to rebellions in other regional countries. Another concern was the flow of refugees, which could also destabilise the region (Fawole, 2001, pp.14-18; Okolie, 2010, pp.114-115; Harris, 2014, pp.107-108; Mohammed, 2015, pp.397-398). There were also temporary interests, such as the need to keep the Sierra Leonean contingent of ECOMOG in Liberia so that the force could maintain an international look and the hope of Nigeria’s military regime to distract from the criticism against its hold on power (Adeshina, 2002, pp.6-7; Adebajo, 2008, pp.193-194; Harris, 2014, p.108). These temporary interests had already disappeared in 2000, but regional stability remained important for Nigeria (IRIN, 2000i).

India did not have any specific national interests in Sierra Leone. India is an active troop contributor to peace operations, and the motivations
behind such activeness are thought to include sympathy to non-aligned states; practical merits, such as operational experiences; competition with regional rival states; and regional stability in some missions (Bullion, 2005, pp.198-199). A somewhat more concrete interest at the time of UNAMSIL was the country’s ambition to be a permanent member of the UNSC. This desire promoted India to participate in a new peace operation to increase its international presence (Bullion, 2005, pp.199-202; Banerjee, 2013, p.240). However, this was a rather general interest and not specific to Sierra Leone. In fact, the foreign minister and retired senior military figures of India stated explicitly that no Indian interest was directly involved in Sierra Leone (AFP, 16 Jul 2000; Bullion, 2005, pp.202-203).

The UK also had no strategic interests in Sierra Leone. In the “Strategic Defence Review” issued in 1998, Sierra Leone and West Africa received no specific reference. According to the document, the UK government regarded European security as most important and referred to the Middle East as a region which could also have a direct impact on British interests. Although the document recognised the importance of international stability for the UK, it stated that other regions posed small risks to specific British interests (UK Ministry of Defence, 1998, ch.2). Therefore, Sierra Leone posed a risk to the British general interest of international stability, but not to a more specific, strategic interest.

Regarding the motivations for British intervention, there was a need to evacuate its own nationals. Beyond this necessity, factors such as the responsibility as the former colonial power, humanitarian concern, and a general interest in supporting democratic governments and preventing the UN’s failure seem to have worked in deciding the intervention (AFP, 11 May 2000a; 13 May 2000a; Ellison et al., 2000; Government of the UK, 2000; MacAskill and Norton-Taylor, 2000; McElderry, 2000; Williams, 2001, pp.154-162; Kargbo, 2006, pp.298-299; Dorman, 2009, pp.58, 64-65). However, these cannot be regarded as specific UK strategic interests.

Therefore, the only national interest of the compellers involved in the case was that of Nigeria, and this fact does not seem to have increased the credibility of the compellers’ threats. As it existed from the beginning, the
compellence in Sierra Leone should have succeeded from the start if the factor had been important for the success of the strategy. In fact, the first phase of compellence ended in limited success and long-term failure. The compellence succeeded at last, but only after lengthy efforts throughout the second and third phases. This result casts doubt on the importance of national interests and corresponds with the expectation of H3. Logically, there remains the possibility that this factor was an INUS condition for success and required other conditions to be fulfilled to achieve success. However, while the Nigerian contingents fought to defend their positions, they did not participate in UNAMSIL’s proactive operations, as discussed below. Hence, it is unlikely that Nigerian national interests enhanced the credibility of the threats.

The second possible source of credibility is domestic support. None of the three states had strong domestic support for the intervention in Sierra Leone, so this factor could not have been a source of the threats’ credibility in this case.

Nigerian domestic support was weak from the beginning. The Nigerian government’s National Security Council was against the involvement of Nigerian armed forces in Sierra Leone in addition to Liberia, and the then President, Ibrahim Babangida, had to emphasise that the role of the dispatched Nigerian battalion was defensive (Kargbo, 2006, pp.168-169). This weak support became even weaker because of the costs Nigeria suffered in the intervention. It is said that Nigeria lost more than 700 troops in Sierra Leone by mid-1999 (Adebajo, 2002, p.95). In addition, Nigeria suffered large casualties in the preceding intervention in Liberia – the casualties of the two interventions totalled more than 1,500 – and spent over eight billion dollars (Adebajo, 2008, p.196). The Nigerian people did not see why their soldiers had to go there and be killed, and they questioned whether the intervention was merited (IRIN, 2000i; Lington, 2000a). The unpopularity of the intervention led all major presidential candidates in the 1999 election to promise withdrawal from Sierra Leone; this promise was also made by Obasanjo, who won the election (Bangura, 2000, p.562-563; Howe, 2005, p.188). The Nigerian people thought that Nigeria should concentrate on its domestic affairs (Howe, 2005, p.188). When the Obasanjo
government agreed to send reinforcement troops to Sierra Leone to join UNAMSIL, Nigerian parliament members condemned the decision, pointing out the enormous burden (Isibor, 2000). It can be said that Nigeria did not have domestic support for its involvement in Sierra Leone.

India also lacked domestic support for its participation in UNAMSIL. The withdrawal of the Indian troops from UNAMSIL was decided by Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee. His decision was prompted by mounting criticism of the participation made by the parliament and the military (Bullion, 2005, p.197). Hostage taking, including of Indian peacekeepers by the RUF, strengthened domestic discontent with the risk in a faraway country (Bullion, 2001, p.81).

The UK lacked strong domestic support as well. Although the British public was aware of the humanitarian misery in Sierra Leone, there was no public call to intervene there militarily (Kargbo, 2006, pp.132-133, 304-305). The oppositions in parliament were also sceptical about the Blair government’s method of intervention. The Conservative Party supported the NEO but continuously criticised the continuation of intervention without clear objectives as mission creep (e.g. Baldwin and Binyon, 2000; Evans, 2000b; Schaefer, 2000a; 2000b; The Times, 2000). After the hostage-rescue operation from the WSB, the party called for the withdrawal of British training team and criticised the dispatch of marines and naval vessels in November (Abrams, 2000b; Kiley et al., 2000; Roberts, 2000).

Therefore, none of the states had domestic support, and the fact that compellence succeeded without this factor demonstrates that it was not necessary for the success of the strategy in this case. This is in line with the expectation of H3.

The third possible source of credibility is previously acquired reputation. Similar to domestic support, a favourable reputation based on the compellers’ past behaviour seems to have been absent in this case. Therefore, this factor could also not have increased the credibility of threats.

Nigeria could not have had a good reputation, taking into account its poor performance during ECOMOG. As Nigeria had long engaged with the RUF throughout the civil war, the RUF knew the capability and resolve of the
Nigerian forces. On the one hand, the Nigerian forces inflicted many defeats on the RUF and sustained the costly intervention for years. On the other hand, the RUF could push back Nigerian forces to the point of re-invading Freetown, and Nigeria finally gave up and handed over the mission to the UN. Therefore, the RUF could compete with the Nigerian forces, and the latter’s resolve waned.

India also does not seem to have built an advantageous reputation for supporting the credibility of threats. India had participated in many UN peace operations, but the post-Cold War missions that it joined before UNAMSIL did not resort to the proactive use of force. An exception was UNOSOM II in Somalia, to which India sent some 5,000 troops. However, the Indian troops did not conduct compellence in the mission; they only arrived in Somalia in September and became operational in October, but the mission had abandoned its coercive approach by that time (Howe, 1995, p.53; Nambiar, 2009, pp.263-264).

The UK’s activities in Bosnia could have militated for building an advantageous reputation. The UK was one of the major troop contributors to UNPROFOR. Although UNPROFOR lacked capabilities and was cautious about using force at first, the UK along with France and the Netherlands established the Rapid Reaction Force, which comprised some 12,500 troops and was equipped with artillery, in the summer of 1995. The Rapid Reaction Force engaged with the Bosnian Serbs in tandem with NATO’s air strikes (Dodd, 1995; Berdal, 2000, pp.63-66; Findlay, 2002, ch.7; Smith, 2008, pp.357-358, 367-371). This precedent of proactive military action could have built an advantageous reputation for the British forces.

However, the RUF seemed to view both UNAMSIL and the UK forces as having weak resolve. At the very early stage of the May crisis, one of the UN observers heard the RUF saying that it intended to repeat Somalia (Ashby, 2002, p.194). Sankoh also stated that UNAMSIL was a paper tiger (AFP, 1 Dec 1999; Keen, 2005, p.263). A local news article also reported that Sankoh regarded UNAMSIL as a “toothless bulldog” and thought that killing a few of its members could force it to retreat (Lington, 2000b). After the UK launched an intervention, the RUF also tried to “do a Somalia”
against the UK forces (McGreal and Norton-Taylor, 2000b; Smith, 2000a; Ashby, 2002, p.299). The RUF sought an opportunity to kill British troops, and according to Richards (2014, p.166), it was called “Operation Kill British”. The above information suggests that the RUF constructed the image about UNAMSIL and the UK based on the precedent of Somalia.

This reputation for weak resolve cannot have strengthened the credibility of the threats. Compellence succeeded without a favourable reputation, and this corresponds with the expectation of H3.

The final source of credibility is the actual use of force. The compellers employed force extensively in the second phase of compellence. The use of force seems to have demoralised the RUF and induced the rebels to disarm, so the case is consistent with the hypothesis.

UNAMSIL had a small firefight in the first phase of compellence, but it did not lead to the success of the ultimatum. On 23 February, a Nigerian contingent of UNAMSIL engaged with and repelled a RUF group who assaulted a village on Pepel Island (AP, 2000a; Conteh, 2000c; UN, 2000d, para.13). This use of force occurred about 10 days after Adeniji issued his threat that a “forceful response” would be taken if the RUF obstructed UNAMSIL. Therefore, there was a possibility that the use of force gave some credibility to the threat. However, as discussed above, the RUF continued to erect roadblocks and to disturb UNAMSIL’s movements. This result indicates that the actual use of force per se does not guarantee the success of compellence.

The compellers’ major use of force started in the May crisis – namely, the second phase of compellence. The compellers in cooperation with local auxiliary forces used force both passively and proactively. It is this extensive use of force that seems to have lent credibility to threats by establishing precedents of the defeat of the rebels.

At first, UNAMSIL fought back when attacked by the RUF but could not hold its positions and had to retreat. The RUF attacked DDR sites in Magburaka and Makeni on 2 May. The Kenyan contingents guarding there resisted, and reinforcements were sent in, but all had to relinquish their positions and retreat in a week (AFP, 11 May 2000b; UN, 2000e, paras.59,
As the RUF launched an offensive towards Freetown and attacked Rogberi on 6 May and Masiaka on 7 May, the UNAMSIL units in these places also retreated after firefights (AFP, 9 May 2000; Jourand, 2000; T’Sas, 2000; Zavis, 2000a; Ashby, 2002, pp.305-306).

After the UK intervention, UNAMSIL and the pro-government forces receiving UK support came to resist the RUF’s attacks robustly. The RUF’s southward advance towards Freetown was stopped at Newton by 12 May and was pushed back by UNAMSIL, the SLA, and other pro-government forces (di Giovanni, 2000; Farah, 2000b; McGreal, 2000a; Onishi, 2000a). The pro-government forces advanced and engaged with the RUF to retake towns on the Horseshoe Road connecting the capital to the Lungi airport (AFP, 10 May 2000b; Kahler, 2000a; Moreno, 2000b; Roy-MacAulay, 2000e; SLW, 2000d; Sullivan, 2000b; Smith et al., 2004, p.211). UNAMSIL and the SLA also defended their positions in Mile 91 and Kabala from the RUF’s attacks (AFP, 7 Jun 2000b; 9 Jun 2000b; Jalloh, 2000f; SLW, 2000d; 2000e; UNDPI, 2000l).

The compellers also prevented the RUF’s westward advance heading to Lungi airport. The RUF repeatedly attacked Port Loko after 10 May, and UNAMSIL’s Nigerian contingent and the SLA repelled the rebels (AFP, 13 May 2000b; 15 Jun 2000b; IRIN, 2000h; Orjollet, 2000a; The Progress, 2000d; UNAMSIL, 2000a; 2000f; UNDPI, 2000i; Smith et al., 2004, pp.210-212). The UK forces also had direct contact with the RUF near Lungi airport. Richards had deployed a pathfinder platoon composed of 27 troops to Lungi Lol, a village on the approach to the airport, and a group of about 100 RUF attacked the platoon’s position on 17 May. The paratroopers fought back and killed some 30 rebels while suffering no casualties (McGreal and Norton-Taylor, 2000a; Dorman, 2009, p.94; Richards, 2014, pp.166, 169-170).

In addition to these passive uses of force, the compellers used force proactively. UNAMSIL took a few proactive moves to secure the Horseshoe Road. On 2 June, two UNAMSIL Indian companies accompanied by a helicopter advancing to Rogberi were attacked by the RUF. The UN troops fought back, broke through the RUF’s roadblocks, and secured the town.
On 3 July, UNAMSIL dispatched the Indian quick reaction company and Jordanian troops to secure Masiaka, and they repelled the RUF after an engagement without suffering casualties (UN, 2000g, para.21; UNAMSIL, 2000i; UNDPI, 2000m).

The SLA also struck RUF positions, including those in inner land, using an attack helicopter. The pro-government forces’ counter-offensive towards RUF-held areas was stopped at Lunsar (McGreal, 2000e; SLW, 2000d; 2000e; UNAMSIL, 2000g). The gunship was therefore the SLA’s only available means to attack RUF positions behind the front. The SLA’s helicopters were operated by PMC contractors, and the British forces coordinated the gunship’s operation and provided support (Abrams, 2000a; Venter, 2012, pp.243-244; Richards, 2014, p.160). The British forces penetrated the RUF’s radio network and sent threatening messages stating that they knew where the rebels were. Then, they made the attack helicopter attack known RUF positions just a few minutes after sending the message so that the attacks had a greater psychological impact (Richards, 2016). In addition to the provision of air cover for ground battles and the interceptions of the RUF’s moves (Prins, 2002, pp.205-206; Ross with Marafono, 2011, pp.142-144; Venter, 2012, ch.16), the attack helicopter raided RUF positions in inner areas, such as Makeni, Tongo, and Kenema (Concord Times, 2000a; Jalloh, 2000g; McGreal, 2000d; McKenzie, 2000; Momodu, 2000b; SLW, 2000f; The Progress, 2000e; Tostevin, 2000; Venter, 2012, pp.214, 219-220).

UNAMSIL’s most proactive use of force was Operation Khukri in July. The RUF had seized two companies of UNAMSIL’s Indian battalion at Kailahun since the May crisis (Raman, 2002). The denial of supply, the release of other hostages, the deadlock in the release negotiations, and the arrival of reinforcements led UNAMSIL to launch a rescue operation (UNAMSIL, 2000j; Jetley, 2007a). The operation commenced with the air extraction of military observers, as well as the wounded and sick troops, from Kailahun town using two UK helicopters on the morning of 15 July. The next move was preemptive attacks against known RUF positions on the route between Daru and Kailahun using artillery and attack helicopters.
Three manoeuvres followed. The first was the forceful breakout of a siege by the trapped troops, and they moved towards Pendembu, which sits between Kailahun and Daru. Attack helicopters and reinforcements, including elements of special forces inserted by air on the route, provided cover for the move. The second manoeuvre was the advancement of Indian units from Daru to Pendembu to link up with the troops from Kailahun. Both columns had to fight fiercely on their way to and when securing Pendembu, where the RUF had its brigade headquarters. The third manoeuvre was the advancement of two Ghanaian companies to Bendu Junction with the purpose of pinning down the RUF’s reserve force. The RUF did not resist this move. The units rendezvoused in Pendembu and stayed there for a night, repelling the RUF’s attacks. They retreated to Daru by air and land the next day, again repelling the RUF’s ambushes along the way (Raman, 2002; Jetley, 2007a; 2007b; Nambiar, 2009, pp.389-392). In the operation, Indian units suffered casualties – one killed and seven wounded. Regarding the RUF, 34 were killed and 150 wounded (Jetley, 2007b).

The RUF’s attacks against the compellers, however, continued even after Operation Khukri, despite its extensiveness, and the compellers also forcefully responded to them. The RUF repeatedly attacked Port Loko, and UNAMSIL and the pro-government forces had to repel the rebels many times until September (AFP, 24 Aug 2000; AP, 2000c; SLW, 2000g; UNAMSIL, 2000n; 2000p; UNDPI, 2000p; Smith et al., 2004, p.212). They also engaged around Rogberi Junction on 16 July and 30 September (SLW, 2000i; UN, 2000g, para.21; UNAMSIL, 2000k). The SLA expanded its control area around the northern town of Kabala (SLW, 2000f; The Progress, 2000f) and defended the town and nearby villages from the RUF’s attacks in August and September (AFP, 20 Aug 2000; SLW, 2000g; Thomas, 2000c; UNDPI, 2000o). In the northwestern area, the SLA and the RUF fought against each other around Kambia. On one occasion, the SLA’s attack helicopter targeted RUF troops trying to cross a river and killed some 25 (SLW, 2000g; UN, 2000i, para.14). In the eastern area, the pro-government forces advanced towards Koidu in Kono and engaged with the RUF in the surrounding areas in August (AFP, 20 Aug 2000; Africa News, 2000i; Momodu, 2000d; SLW, 2000g; UN, 2000i, para.14). RUF hardliners continued to conscript civilians
as fighters and enhanced the defence of their positions (Concord Times, 2000b; 2000c; Koroma, 2000; Momodu, 2000c; The Progress, 2000k; Thomas, 2000d). Although the rainy season temporarily reined in the RUF’s activities, it continued to attack villages and the pro-government forces (AP, 2000d; SLW, 2000i).

There is evidence indicating that the extensive use of force in the second phase affected the target, and this is in line with H3. About 80 RUF combatants disarmed within two weeks after Operation Khukri (UNAMSIL, 2000l). The total number of RUF combatants who joined the DDR programme between 7 May and 8 September was 90 (SLW, 2000h), so most of them did so after the operation. There is also a report that RUF members in Makeni started to desert after the operation (The Progress, 2000g). The SLA’s offensive in Kono demoralised some RUF members and reportedly led to desertion and even internal conflict between those who wanted to surrender and those who tried to prevent them from doing so (AFP, 16 Aug 2000; SLW, 2000g; The Progress, 2000h). In addition, RUF members also referred to the impact of the UK raid against the WSB in September as a factor for changing their course (Keen, 2005, p.272). The fact that the RUF accepted demands after the demonstration of the compellers’ competence through the use of force corresponds with H3.

At the same time, after these uses of force in the second phase, it took long for the RUF to agree to disarmament in the third phase, so other conditions also had to be fulfilled to achieve success. In the third phase of compellence after the conclusion of the Abuja I Agreement, a ceasefire was generally observed, and the compellers did not use force (UN, 2000n, para.22; 2001a, para.17; 2001e, para.2; UNAMSIL, 2001b). Fighting between the Guinean forces and the RUF continued for months in this phase, but it was out of the control of the compellers. Although the RUF must have learned the compellers’ competence and the reputation must have been maintained in the third phase as well, because the use of force in the second phase was extensive and the distinctions between the phases are artificial, the credibility of threats had to be combined with other factors to induce the RUF to give up arms.
In sum, the demonstration of the compellers’ competence through the actual use of force was necessary in the Sierra Leone case, and this is consistent with H3. The four possible sources of threat credibility were basically constant in this case: domestic support and pre-earned advantageous reputation did not exist throughout the case, Nigeria’s national interest was involved from the beginning, and the compellers used force from phase one. As the variations of the variables were concurrent, temporal comparison cannot indicate the relative importance of national interests and the actual use of force. However, there is some evidence that the extensive use of force by the compellers affected the RUF, while there is no evidence indicating that Nigeria’s national interest increased the credibility of the threats. Moreover, UNAMSIL’s proactive operations were mostly conducted by Indian contingents, and Nigeria did not play a major role in putting pressure on the RUF. Therefore, Nigerian national interest is not likely to have affected the credibility of the compellers’ threats. In conclusion, the case is in line with H3; the actual use of force seems to have been effective in compelling the RUF. The other sources of credibility were not important in this case.

4.3.4 Denial

The next hypothesis, H4, focuses on how to realise denial. There are four approaches to denial that are generally applicable to peace operations: attrition, stronghold neutralisation, decapitation, and counter-coercion negation. The hypothesis is that counter-coercion negation is the most effective of the four. The Sierra Leone case involved the application of all four approaches against the RUF. The course of events demonstrates that counter-coercion negation facilitated the success, so the case corresponds with the hypothesis. However, decapitation and stronghold neutralisation were also effective in this case, and a temporal comparison between the phases indicates that stronghold neutralisation was especially important.

The first type of denial that is applicable to peace operations is attrition. The compellers inflicted a relatively large number of casualties in the context of peace operations – at least several hundred and possibly
more – on the RUF, but it is unlikely that attrition worked against the RUF, given its large manpower of some 10,000 or more.

A substantial amount of force was used in the second phase of compellence, and the RUF suffered a relatively large number of casualties. According to Jetley (2007b), 34 RUF were killed and 150 wounded in Operation Khukri. The UK forces are thought to have killed some 30 rebels in a contact near Lungi Lol (Dorman, 2009, p.94; Richards, 2014, p.170). The accumulated number of reported casualties that the RUF suffered in contacts with the compellers easily exceeded 300, even excluding the above two engagements. Moreover, there are other reports which, without providing specific numbers, indicate that the RUF suffered heavy casualties. Of course, this type of information is unreliable, and it is impossible to know the exact number of RUF casualties. However, at least it can be safely said that the RUF suffered more than several hundred casualties in contacts with the compellers.

Although the RUF suffered substantial casualties in phase two, this was not enough to threaten the RUF’s war-fighting capabilities. The estimated strength of the RUF was around 10,000, and it had enough manpower to continue the war even after losing several hundred members. Moreover, it was reported that the RUF forcefully conscripted new recruits to compensate for its lost fighting force (Concord Times, 2000b; 2000c; Momodu, 2000c). Therefore, attrition does not seem to have worked in the second phase.

The RUF suffered additional attrition from the Guinean attacks in the third phase. The specific number of casualties that the RUF suffered is even less clear, because the rebels who fought against Guinea included other factions, such as Guinean dissidents (UN, 2001g, paras.132-134). Guinea not only fought back against the invasion by the RUF and other rebels within its territory but also launched fierce reprisal attacks against northern Sierra Leone using artillery fire, air strikes, and ground raids (AFP, 22 Dec 2000; Dumbuya, 2000a; IRIN, 2000l; Roy-MacAulay, 2000i; SLW, 2000h; 2000j). The Guinean forces reportedly killed over 200 rebels, including RUF members, in December alone (AFP, 8 Dec 2000; 12 Dec 2000; 22 Dec
The Guinean counterattack even intensified after January 2001 and inflicted heavy damage on the rebels (Barrie, 2001; Concord Times, 2001c; SLW, 2001a). The rebels also suffered heavy casualties in engagements within Guinea. It is reported that 83 were killed in January and hundreds in March (Bah, 2001a; 2001b; 2001c).

Although the RUF seems to have felt strong pressure from the Guinean attacks, the additional attrition in the third phase could not have threatened its fighting capability. The RUF explicitly called for UNAMSIL’s deployment to Kambia District, where Guinea attacked it intensively (UNAMSIL, 2001a). The RUF claimed that this request was to prove that it was not recruiting civilians rather than to use UNAMSIL as a shield (Concord Times, 2001a; UNAMSIL, 2001e). However, it was agreed in the Abuja II Agreement, in the clause titled “Cross-border attacks in Kambia”, that the SLA would be deploy to the border area and that UNAMSIL would increase its patrols (UNAMSIL, 2001i). Therefore, it seems that the RUF’s intention was to utilise UNAMSIL and the SLA as shields against Guinea (Keen, 2005, p.269). This means that the RUF was afraid of the Guinean attacks and hoped to stop them. Nevertheless, once again, the number of casualties that the RUF suffered does not seem to have been substantial enough for it to lose its fighting capabilities, taking into account its overall strength of over 10,000 and possibly some 20,000.

In sum, although the compellers and Guinea inflicted large casualties on the RUF, the effect of attrition must have been modest at best. The RUF had large manpower and could also resort to forceful recruitment to offset the loss. The ineffectiveness of attrition is congruent with H4.

The second method of denial is stronghold neutralisation. Although this is not the type of denial that the hypothesis predicts is the most effective, the course of events in this case indicates that stronghold neutralisation was a factor that turned unsuccessful compellence into successful compellence.

The RUF had strongholds in the eastern and northern areas of Sierra Leone. The RUF set up its headquarters in Buedu in Kailahun District, located in the eastern area of the country, after 1998, and in Makeni in Bombali District, in the northern area, after 1999 (Smith et al., 2004, p.46).
Neighbouring to Liberia, Kailahun District was vital as a supply route, and the RUF maintained its presence there throughout the war (Smith et al., 2004, pp.251, 279-280). When the Lomé Agreement was struck, the RUF kept a large portion of eastern and northern Sierra Leone, including the diamond-mining areas, under its control (UN, 1999c, para.19; 1999f, para.25; SLTRC, 2004a, pp.350-352). These were the RUF’s strongholds.

The compellers did not threaten the RUF’s strongholds during the first stage of compellence. UNAMSIL deployed its units not only to the western areas, such as Freetown and Lungi, but also to the RUF’s strongholds, including Makeni and nearby Magburaka in the northern area and Kenema, Daru, and Kailahun in the eastern area (UN, 2000b, para.17; UNDPI, 2000f). ECOMOG also had a presence in Mano Junction near Kenema (UN, 2000b, para.15). Although this means that the compellers existed near the strongholds of the RUF, they were not trying to take control of the area, and their presence was not threatening to the RUF.

The compellers put some pressure on the strongholds in the second phase, but not to the extent of threatening their safety. The compellers’ presence in the second phase was mainly constrained to the western area. In the May crisis, UNAMSIL had to retreat from Makeni and Magburaka and lost its presence in the northern area. In the east, the UNAMSIL units in Kailahun were besieged by the RUF and were rescued in Operation Khukri. After this retreat, UNAMSIL maintained its positions in Daru and Kenema in the eastern area (UN, 2000g, para.30; UNAMSIL, 2000o), but UNAMSIL did not push into the RUF strongholds during the second phase. Regarding the local pro-government forces, their advance northwards halted at Lunsar, and they had to retreat from there after fightings broke out within the forces. The SLA conducted airstrikes against Makeni and Magburaka using a helicopter, but they did not expel the RUF from there. Therefore, the compellers were not in a position to threaten the RUF’s northern strongholds. In the eastern area, the pro-government forces advanced towards Koidu in Kono, and this caused some disturbance within the RUF, as mentioned above. However, the RUF strengthened its defences in Kono and kept the area under its control. Therefore, although the pro-government forces put some pressure
on the RUF’s strongholds, there was no immediate threat that they would be overrun.

UNAMSIL’s expansion of its deployment in the third phase was not threatening. UNAMSIL expanded its deployment to the RUF’s strongholds after the Abuja I Agreement, but the RUF had repeatedly expressed its readiness to accept UNAMSIL and even requested its deployment to specific areas (e.g. UNAMSIL, 2000t; 2001a; 2001c; 2001d; 2001g; UNDPI, 2000r). In fact, RUF commanders told a journalist that one of the reasons why they allowed UNAMSIL to be deployed into their areas was to prevent attacks by the SLA or the UK forces (Farah, 2001b). These remarks indicate that the expansion of UNAMSIL’s deployment cannot be considered an exertion of pressure.

Threats to the RUF’s strongholds came from Guinea and the CDF. In January and February 2001, the CDF attacked the RUF in the northern part of Kono District, and the RUF retreated from the area (Smith et al., 2004, p.375). The Guinean forces and the CDF supported by Guinea invaded Kono and Kilahun in March and April 2001 and further advanced inwards (Concord Times, 2001d; IRIN, 2001b; SLW, 2001d; Smith et al., 2004, pp.375-376). In Kono District, the CDF launched an offensive from the east towards Koidu, the headquarter town of the district, and drove off the RUF in battles. The CDF advanced to the point of about 10 kilometres from Koidu and was intending to launch an assault on the town. However, UNAMSIL arrived at the theatre in early May and persuaded the CDF to halt its offensive and abide by the ceasefire agreement (Smith et al., 2004, pp.375-376). The CDF also attacked Tongo near Koidu (AFP, 20 Apr 2001; IRIN, 2001c; Pitman, 2001a; SLW, 2001d; UNSC, 2001b, pp.4, 31). Another group of the CDF attacked towns in Kailahun District and threatened the line of communication between Kilahun town and Kono District (Smith et al., 2004, p.286). Therefore, the RUF’s strongholds in the east were under graver threats than ever in the third phase of compellence. These attacks did not overrun the strongholds in Kilahun and Kono, but the CDF supported by Guinea was on the offensive and must have posed a serious threat to the RUF.
This threat of stronghold neutralisation seems to have played an important role in compelling the RUF, because the rebels accepted disarmaments only after this type of denial was applied in the third phase. Based on H4, this approach to denial is not expected to be the most effective, but the Sierra Leone case suggests otherwise. Moreover, this pressure was not applied by the compellers. Although the CDF offensive seems to have been carried out with the consent of the Sierra Leone government (Smith et al., 2004, pp.375-376), the government was not able to fully control the militias, particularly those called Donsos, that participated in the offensive (Concord Times, 2001f; 2001g). Guinea, of course, was acting independently, so the offensive was beyond the control of the Sierra Leone government, let alone the intervening international forces. Therefore, the threat of stronghold neutralisation was realised by forces other than the compellers. In this sense, the compellence in Sierra Leone was assisted by fortune.

The third type of denial is decapitation. It seems that decapitation also contributed to the success of compellence in this case. Decapitation was applied against the RUF in the second phase, and Sankoh was removed from its head, but the application was not fully intentional. The trigger event which eventually led to the decapitation was the mass protest in front of Sankoh’s residence on 8 May. Sankoh fled from his residence when bloodshed erupted after the RUF guards at the residence fired upon the demonstrators. Sankoh was detained by a pro-government militia by chance when he sneaked into Freetown on 17 May (Onishi, 2000; SLTRC, 2004a, p.446). Therefore, the arrest of Sankoh was a result of events beyond the control of the compellers.

That being said, the compellers seized this opportunity and deliberately moved to replace the head of the RUF. The UN, the Sierra Leone government, and the UK government remarked that they lost confidence in Sankoh and that he could no longer be an interlocutor in the peace process (Crossette, 2000; Harispe, 2000a; 2000b; Jourand, 2000; Toros, 2000; Waugh, 2000). They kept Sankoh under arrest and moved to try him in court (Jourand, 2000; Leighton, 2000b; The Progress, 2000b). On behalf of the parties involved, the ECOWAS leaders, including Taylor,
conveyed to the RUF that the RUF needed to elect a new leader. Persuaded by them, the RUF elected Sesay as its interim leader, effectively replacing Sankoh. The presidents of Nigeria and Mali let Sankoh know of this decision and confirmed his acceptance (AFP, 27 Jul 2000; IRIN, 2000k; PANA, 2000b; Roy-MacAulay, 2000g; SLW, 2000f; Special Court for Sierra Leone [SCSL], 2007b, pp.56-61; Olonisakin, 2008, p.77).

This decapitation worked positively for compellence. Sankoh was obsessed with obtaining power, and it was difficult to persuade him to give up arms. As discussed earlier, he was distrustful of the UN and instructed his combatants not to disarm. It is said that he was not committed to disarmament due to the fear of losing an election and his dissatisfaction regarding the government’s implementation of the Lomé Agreement (Conteh, 2000b; Farah, 2000a; SLW, 2000c; Thomas, 2000a). It seems that the May crisis started because of the reckless behaviour of the local RUF commanders in Makeni and Magburaka rather than because of an order from Sankoh, but he did not rein them in and let the situation exacerbate (UN, 2000e, paras.58, 70, 73, 95; Ashby, 2002, p.198). Moreover, it is said that Sankoh was planning a coup to grab total power of the state (MacJohnson, 2000; SLW, 2000d; Smith and Dillon, 2000). Sankoh’s strong desire for power made him an intractable target of compellence.

However, the succeeding Sesay was a relatively modest figure within the RUF and was more susceptible to pressure than Sankoh. Of course, being a moderate person in the RUF does not mean that Sesay was a peaceful man. Sesay, who was one of the early recruits (SLTRC, 2004a, p.105), had fought the war for a decade and led battles as a commander (e.g. SLW, 1999b; SCSL, 2009, pp.255-256, 275-278). He was second in command of the RUF from December 1999, and his unit blocked and disarmed peacekeepers in January 2000 (SLW, 2000a; SCSL, 2009, pp.217-218, 292). He also stated that white people always caused trouble, and he conducted a mock execution of a UN observer who had been detained in the May crisis (Smith, 2000b).

Therefore, pressure from outside was necessary, but it worked on him. According to Richards (2004, p.16), Sesay admitted that the UK intervention
and the ensuing enhancement of UNAMSIL convinced the RUF to give up arms. He was said to be reasonable, and he supported negotiation from as early as just after the May crisis (IRIN, 2000j; Jalloh, 2000d; 2000e; Farah, 2001b). He was also the main interlocutor in the release of UNAMSIL hostages (Farah and Mufson, 2000a; Rupert, 2000). Unlike the haughty Sankoh, Sesay obeyed Nigerian President Obasanjo when Obasanjo reproached him and demanded that Sesay stop making people call him a general (Concord Times, 2001h; SCSL, 2008, pp.34-35). President Kabbah testified in the Special Court that Sesay was very cooperative and made an important contribution to the disarmament (SCSL, 2008, pp.31, 33-34, 40, 104). The UN spokesperson also praised Sesay’s contribution to the promotion of disarmament (SLW, 2002).

Therefore, it can be said that decapitation worked positively in Sierra Leone. The replacement of the intractable Sankoh with the relatively moderate Sesay facilitated the success of compellence. Based on H4, decapitation is not expected to be the most effective method of denial, so the relative importance of this factor requires further examination in the conclusion.

The final denial style to be examined is counter-coercion negation. At first, UNAMSIL had difficulty protecting itself, but it later came to achieve effective counter-coercion negation. The success of compellence after the fulfilment of the condition corresponds to the expectation of H4.

The RUF employed all three counter-coercive strategies: civilian suffering, coalition fracturing, and casualty generating. The RUF’s main strategy was casualty generation. As discussed above in the section on reputation, the RUF intended to repeat Somalia and thought that inflicting casualties on the peacekeepers would lead to their retreat.

While the British forces performed good force protection from the beginning, as demonstrated in the battle in Lungi Lol, UNAMSIL was vulnerable to the RUF’s threat to inflict casualties on the force until the end of the May crisis. In the first phase of compellence, the RUF did not kill UNAMSIL troops but threatened to attack when it blocked the troops’ movements. The UNAMSIL units that were involved were heavily
outnumbered or were not ready to resist, and they were disarmed or had to retreat (e.g. Africa News, 2000a; AP, 2000a; Lynch, 2000a; SLW, 2000b). Initially, UNAMSIL could not effectively defend itself in the second phase.

The RUF’s attacks killed two Kenyan soldiers at the DDR site in Makeni (The Nation, 2000; SCSL, 2009, pp.539-540), another two Kenyan soldiers when they were retreating (SLW, 2000d; The Nation, 2005; SCSL, 2009, pp.540-541), and two Nigerian and four Zambian soldiers in Logberi (Jourand, 2000; T’Sas, 2000; Ashby, 2002, pp.305-306). Between 25 and 30 troops were injured by the end of May (UNAMSIL, 2000c). Moreover, scores of UNAMSIL troops were detained and disarmed by the RUF. More than 100 Nigerian troops were briefly detained and disarmed by the RUF in Kambia on 3 May (Hule, 2000b; UN, 2000e, para.61). Over 400 Zambian peacekeepers were detained without resistance after being tricked to proceed into the RUF’s trap in a piecemeal manner (Holloway, 2000b; PANA, 2000a; UN, 2000e, para.62; Ashby, 2002, pp.216-218). Detention in other places brought the number of total detainees to near 500. Some 460 of them were released by the end of May, and the remaining 20 or so were released at the end of June (Kahler, 2000b; Paye-Layleh, 2000; SLW, 2000d; UN, 2000g, para.24).

The failure of self-protection occurred because the troops were not ready for combat. They were prepared under best-case assumptions, and some contingents did not understand the mandate and the rules of engagement. They also lacked training, equipment, and logistics (Farah, 2000d; UN, 2000g, para.54; Ashby, 2002, p.282; PKBPU, 2003, pp.34-38; Gberie, 2005, p.165; Olonisakin, 2008, pp.62-63). UNAMSIL was to be equipped with attack helicopters, but they had not yet arrived when the crisis erupted (Perlez and Wren, 2000; Nambiar, 2009, p.380).

It was difficult to prevent casualties completely, even after UNAMSIL recovered from the initial shock, because the RUF was equipped with highly lethal weapons. A Nigerian was killed and six others wounded when the RUF attacked Port Loco with mortars on 16 May (UNAMSIL, 2000a; 2000b). A Jordanian peacekeeper was killed and four others wounded in an ambush by the RUF using an anti-tank rocket near Mile 91 on 30 June (Africa News, 2000b; SLW, 2000f; UNDPI, 2000i). A Nigerian peacekeeper was killed in another ambush near Rogberi Junction on 16 July (UN, 2000g, para.21;
In Operation Khukri, an Indian soldier was killed by an anti-tank rocket, and seven other peacekeepers were wounded (Jetley, 2007b). Two Nigerians were also wounded when the RUF attacked their position near Port Loko on 23 August (AP, 2000c; SLW, 2000g).

That being said, UNAMSIL came to defend itself more effectively after the May crisis. Troops were redeplored in defensive positions, and additional troops and equipment arrived (UN, 2000g, para.57). The reinforcements sent from India were battle-hardened troops who had served in Kashmir (AFP, 10 May 2000c; Nambiar, 2009, 387). UNAMSIL still suffered several casualties, as mentioned above, but the number was smaller, and there were no more hostages. For example, the Indian units showed very good force protection during Operation Khukri. The use of armoured vehicles and attack helicopters was invaluable in supressing the RUF’s attacks, and utility helicopters enabled the medevac of casualties. In addition, the compellers gathered intelligence on the RUF’s strength and positions beforehand and during the operation. This enabled the Indian units to preempt and prepare for engagements with the RUF (Raman, 2002). Between late August and October, UNAMSIL experienced several engagements but did not suffer any casualties (UN, 2000i, para.15). In sum, the compellers came to achieve largely effective force protection by the end of phase two.

The RUF also tried to exploit civilian casualties generated by the compellers, but the effort was ineffective. UNAMSIL paid attention to avoid collateral damage. For example, in Operation Khukri, artillery fire was preceded by smoke shells to warn civilians, and targets were limited to known RUF positions (Jetley, 2007b). Regarding the SLA, its helicopter attacks generated collateral damage, and the RUF exploited them. At least seventeen civilians were killed when the SLA’s gunship attacked Makeni (McKenzie, 2000). The HRW reports that the helicopter attacks in Makeni, Magburaka, and Kambia cost the lives of at least 27 civilians, and some 50 were wounded in May and June 2000 (HRW, 2000b). The RUF told the civilians in Makeni not to leave and hid among them when the helicopter raids were launched (HRW, 2000b; McKenzie, 2000). Although the collateral
damage drew criticism (HRW, 2000b), the Sierra Leone government kept operating the gunship. Guinea, which was not a part of the compellers, also continued its attacks despite being widely accused of causing civilian suffering (AFP, 5 Feb 2001; 19 Feb 2001; HRW, 2001). Therefore, civilian casualties did not hinder compellence. This was largely because the civilian casualties were inflicted by local actors rather than by intervening international forces. The governments of Sierra Leone and Guinea were less sensitive to collateral damage and were able to continue their military operations.

Finally, the RUF also tried to split the coalition, but this also failed. The RUF demanded the withdrawal of the UK forces, calling them mercenaries (SLW, 2000j; 2001d; UNAMSIL, 2000r). There was a possibility that this coalition fracturing worked, because UNAMSIL and the UK forces took different stances on the RUF, which caused some friction (Malan et al., 2002, ch.8). The UK was pursuing the defeat of the RUF in cooperation with the Sierra Leone government. The UK was reportedly frustrated by UNAMSIL’s timid approach and urged it to take more proactive moves (Farah, 2000g; Onishi, 2000d; Olonisakin, 2008, p.66). In contrast, UNAMSIL made much of dialogue and was not active in putting military pressure on the RUF. A senior UN officer stated, “If the British want war, they can have it and we will leave” (Farah, 2000g). UNAMSIL and in particular Nigeria were also frustrated that the UK’s role was heavily featured, while UNAMSIL’s contribution was under-evaluated (Kamara, 2000b; Olonisakin, 2008, pp.65-66). The outgoing acting force commander of UNAMSIL, Brigadier Mohammed Garba, a Nigerian, criticised the UK forces’ amphibious-landing exercise in Freetown just after the conclusion of the Abuja I Agreement, stating that it was threatening (API, 2000d; SLW, 2000j). However, the friction was not strong enough to destroy the coalition, and the UK remained involved. A UNAMSIL spokesperson downplayed the remark by Brigadier Garba (UNAMSIL, 2000s), and the UN and the Nigerian government also distanced themselves from the remark, admitting the positive role played by the UK forces (API, 2000d; Concord Times, 2000d).

In sum, the compellers effectively negated the RUF’s counter-coercion. At first, UNAMSIL could not deny the RUF’s casualty generation,
but it came to defend itself effectively from the middle of the second phase. Civilian suffering did not work, because civilian casualties were inflicted by the governments of Sierra Leone and Guinea, which were insensitive to collateral damage. The RUF also could not split the coalition. Although there was a crack between UNAMSIL and the UK, they managed the difference and prevented the RUF from exploiting it. The Sierra Leone case ended in success after the achievement of effective counter-coercion negation, so the case corresponds to H4.

This section has reviewed how the compellers achieved denial. None of the four specific forms of denial was realised in the first phase. Three were applied in the second phase, but these were not enough to compel the RUF to restart disarmament. The impact of attrition in the order of hundreds on its war-fighting capabilities could not have been serious, taking into account the size of the RUF. Decapitation replaced the stubborn Sankoh with the moderate Sesay, but some commanders preferred to continue to fight than to negotiate and did not obey his direction (Momodu, 2000e; 2000f; Chanda, 2001). The effective counter-coercion negation reduced the attacks against the peacekeepers, but the RUF did not give up arms. To compel the RUF to disarm, additional pressure during the third phase was necessary. One form of additional pressure was the further attrition that was inflicted on the RUF by Guinea and the CDF. However, because the RUF had over 10,000 members, the attrition does not seem to have had a huge impact. The other form of pressure was the threat of stronghold neutralisation by the offensive of the Guinean forces and the CDF. This came to be applied in the third phase only, and from the denial perspective, it seems to have been the cause of the different results between the second and third phases. These attacks by Guinea and the CDF, however, were not under the control of the intervening forces. Therefore, the compellence was facilitated by powers other than the compellers.

The success of compellence after achieving the effective negation of counter-coercion corresponds with the expectation of H4, but the relative importance of this type of denial compared to other types requires further examination. The spokesperson of the RUF stated in April 2001 – that is, near to the end of the third phase – that the RUF returned to the peace
process because it found that military victory was no longer possible. He stated, “We are in a stalemate … We are not defeated but we can’t take power” (Farah, 2001b). This remark indicates that effective counter-coercion negation facilitated the success of compellence. However, it is not clear whether this was the most effective method of denial, as predicted by H4, because the case also demonstrates that decapitation and stronghold neutralisation can work positively in peace operations. In particular, stronghold neutralisation, which came to be applied in the third phase only, seems to have been a key in terms of turning the case from unsuccessful to successful. This point is further discussed in the conclusion.

4.3.5 Third-Party Support

The final hypothesis to be examined is H5. It predicts that compellence in peace operations is more likely to succeed if targets do not receive support from third parties. Liberia had provided substantial support to the RUF, and the effective end of the support under international pressure caused a great damage to the RUF. This condition came to be fulfilled in the third phase, and then the compellence became successful. Therefore, the case corresponds well to the hypothesis.

The RUF had received support from neighbouring Liberia, led by Taylor, for a long time – even from before the launch of the rebellion. Both Sankoh and Taylor, as well as other Sierra Leonean and Liberian dissidents, received training in Libya and agreed to cooperate with each other to realise revolutions in the two countries (Abdullah, 1998, pp.220-221; SLTRC, 2004a, pp.93-95; 2004b, p.60). Taylor led the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) and commenced a civil war in Liberia in 1989. Sankoh joined the NPFL and fought alongside Taylor in Liberia. Meanwhile, Sankoh also set up training camps in Liberia and trained his own rebels (SLTRC, 2004a, pp.96, 100-109; 2004b, p.61; Higbie and Moigula, 2017, pp.26-27).

Taylor had some incentives to support Sankoh. Taylor hoped to make Liberia as prominent in the region as Nigeria was, and his envisioned sphere of influence included Sierra Leone and Guinea (Olonisakin, 2008, p.73; Harris, 2014, p.84). Moreover, Sierra Leone let ECOMOG, which intervened in the Liberian civil war, use an airport and contributed troops to the force. In
1991, ECOMOG was thought to be planning the build-up of forces in Sierra Leone near the border with Liberia. In addition, elements supporting the Liberian government had escaped to Sierra Leone and prepared for a counterattack. Taylor wanted to crush these counter-moves before they became serious threats against him (Byman et al., 2001, pp.75-76; SLTRC, 2004a, pp.96-99, 118-119).

Sankoh commenced his insurgency against the Sierra Leone government with substantial support from Taylor. The majority of the initial invasion force were NPFL fighters; among the 2,000-strong force, some 1,600 were NPFL combatants, and the initial strength of the RUF was only 360 to 370 personnel (SLTRC, 2004a, pp.118-123). This provision of NPFL fighters ended in 1992 when violent clashes erupted between them and the RUF (SLTRC, 2004a, pp.142-144, 170-174; Keen, 2005, pp.38-39).

The cooperation between Sankoh and Taylor continued despite the friction, but Liberian support was interrupted for several years from around 1993. This is because a Liberian anti-Taylor force – the United Liberation Movement of Liberia for Democracy (ULIMO) – and the SLA occupied the border area and cut the supply line between the RUF and Taylor (Smith et al., 2004, p.268; Keen, 2005, pp.39, 116; SCSL, 2012, pp.850-853; Marks, 2019, pp.5, 9). Thereafter, the RUF obtained arms and ammunition by grabbing from opponent forces or trading robbed cash crops and diamonds with Guineans and corrupt and undisciplined “sobels” (Smith et al., 2004, p.271; Keen, 2005, pp.121, 134; Marks, 2019, pp.5-6).

Liberian support for the RUF resumed on a large scale after Taylor became the country’s president in 1997 (Keen, 2005, p.216). He provided and facilitated financial, training, and other operational support, as well as weapons, ammunition, and other war matériel, while the RUF provided diamonds in return (UN, 1999c, para.13; 1999m, paras.10-11; 2000l, paras.32, 40; 2000m, pp.33-37; Berman, 2000, p.14; HRW, 2000a; Smith et al., 2004, p.277; SCSL, 2012, pp.1374-2156). Diamonds were attractive for Taylor as a financial source for his own war, and he established a smuggle network for the trade of diamonds and weapons (Woods and Reese, 2008, p.18). According to documents that were found in Sankoh’s home, Taylor
took the majority of the profit from diamond sales (AFP, 12 Jun 2000; Farah, 2000e). Besides for his personal needs, Taylor seemed to need money to repay Libya the debt from its support for his insurgency (Buchan et al., 2000). Strategically, Taylor expected the RUF to secure the border areas to prevent hostile powers and dissidents from using there (Rupert and Farah, 2000; Keen, 2005, p.249).

It is said that Liberia’s support for the RUF even strengthened in 2000 (Berman, 2000, p.15). The UK media reported that truckloads of weapons and other materials were sent from Liberia to the RUF in mid-2000 (Berman, 2001, p.8; Kargbo, 2006, p.215). RUF commanders made trips with Taylor, and Liberia provided the RUF with arms, ammunition, and other supplies on multiple occasions in June 2000 (UN, 2000l, paras.46-48; 2000o, para.22). The SCSL (2012, pp.1787-1823) found that the RUF obtained weapons and ammunition from Liberia on multiple occasions throughout 2000.

However, of course, Taylor acted based on his own interests. His aims of cooperating in regard to the release of UNAMSIL hostages were to obtain development assistance and lift the sanctions which had been imposed against Liberia during its civil war (Farah and Lynch, 2000; Lington, 2000b; Onishi, 2000b). The RUF returned the hostages through Taylor, and he showed the strong influence that he had on the RUF (AFP, 15 May 2000; Holloway, 2000a; Paye-Layleh, 2000; Rupert, 2000; UN, 2000g, para.24; Zavis, 2000b; SCSL, 2007a, pp.87-92).

Contrary to his expectation, Taylor faced mounting international pressure to stop supporting the RUF after the release of the hostages. In particular, Liberia’s involvement in the trade of conflict diamonds from Sierra Leone attracted a great deal of attention, because it had exported a much larger number of diamonds than it had produced (Smillie et al., 2000, pp.18, 34, 48-49). This increased concern about conflict diamonds and the fear of a consumer boycott affected the diamond industry and trading governments (Masland et al., 2000; Campbell, 2004, pp.115-116; Grant and Taylor, 2004, pp.389-392; Wright, 2012, p.183). They held international meetings to discuss measures to block conflict diamonds, starting with the one held in Kimberley in South Africa in May 2000 (Grant and Taylor, 2004, pp.392-394;
Wright, 2004, pp.698-699). Against the background of this move, the international community also imposed measures specifically targeting diamonds from Sierra Leone. The UK took the initiative to impose a ban on diamonds from Sierra Leone, and the UNSC resolution imposing the ban mentioned Liberia as a conduit of such diamonds (UNSC, 2000b; Kargbo, 2006, p.216).

The threat and application of sanctions against Liberia followed. The EU froze development assistance for Liberia because of its support for the RUF (Fletcher, 2000; Osborn, 2000; Osborn and MacAskill, 2000). The US and the UK also threatened Liberia that it would face sanctions if it did not stop supporting the RUF (AFP, 17 Jul 2000; 31 Jul 2000; Farah and Mufson, 2000b; Kahler, 2000c; Lederer, 2000; Lynch, 2000b; SLW, 2000f). The US imposed unilateral diplomatic sanctions on Liberia in October 2000 (Farah, 2000f; Kamara, 2000a; Nubo, 2000). The UN committee monitoring the ban on arms exports to Sierra Leone pointed out that the Liberian government had been involved in the illicit diamond trade and the provision of arms to the RUF, and it recommended the strengthening of sanctions against Liberia (UN, 2000m, paras.87-89, 193, 202, 270-273). The US and UK governments further pushed for sanctions against Liberia in line with the recommendation of the committee (The Perspective, 2000; Winfield, 2001).

Facing the threat of new sanctions, President Taylor moved to detach himself from the RUF and tried to avoid the sanctions. He announced that the RUF members in Liberia had left the country, that the RUF’s office in Monrovia had closed, and that he would no longer provide any support to the RUF (AFP, 12 Jan 2001; 7 Feb 2001; Farah, 2001a; Holloway, 2001). He also claimed that Liberia had landed all aircraft that were accused of involvement in the illicit arms trade (Farah, 2001a; Adebajo, 2002, p.72). The UK and the US argued for the immediate imposition of new sanctions, but France and the African states called for a moratorium (Lederer, 2001a; 15 This Kimberley Process culminated in the international certification scheme on diamonds, which was adopted in 2002 and put into effect in 2003 (Grant and Taylor, 2004, pp.393-394; Wright, 2004, pp.699-700).
The UK and US conceded, and the UNSC adopted the resolution to impose new arms sanctions on Liberia immediately and a diamond ban and travel sanction in two months if it did not cut ties with the RUF (UNSC, 2001a).

After the adoption of the resolution, President Taylor took further steps to avoid the implementation of the sanction. He announced a halt in the exportation of diamonds, the closure of the border between Liberia and Sierra Leone, and the closure of Sankoh’s bank account (AFP, 20 Mar 2001; IRIN, 2001a; Lederer, 2001c; Paye-Layleh, 2001a; 2001b; UN, 2001b). However, the ECOWAS investigation concluded that doubt remained regarding whether Liberia had actually and thoroughly implemented what it had said it had done (UN, 2001c). Without clear evidence that Liberia had complied with the demands of the sanction resolution, the UNSC decided not to halt the implementation of the sanctions, and they were put into practice (Cooney, 2001; Lederer, 2001c).

The relationship between the RUF and President Taylor continued in 2001, but the character of the relationship changed. It was reported in December 2000 that Liberian support for the RUF was decreasing because of international pressure on Liberia and due to its economic collapse. What made matters worse for Taylor was the resurgence of insurgency in his own country, and the military operations against the insurgents were an added burden on him (Farah, 2000g). The LURD progressed to the area neighbouring Kailahun and thereby severed the supply line between the RUF and Taylor (ICG, 2002, p.5; Harris, 2014, p.116). The trade of diamonds and arms still continued between the RUF and Liberia in 2001 (AFP, 13 Feb 2001; 15 Feb 2001b; UN, 2002b, para.116; SCSL, 2012, pp.1787-1797, 1807-1816, 2110-2138), but the diamond ban on Liberia made it difficult and less profitable for the RUF to trade the diamonds it mined compared to before (Keen, 2005, pp.271-272). Moreover, the struggling Taylor used RUF fighters for the war in Liberia (Astill, 2001; Gberie, 2001, p.11; ICG, 2002, p.6; Keen, 2005, p.288). He continued to provide support for the RUF for this purpose, even after the conclusion of the Abuja II Agreement, and the RUF moved its weapons into Liberia instead of surrendering them for DDR (ICG, 2001, p.4; UN, 2001g, paras.112-123).
Therefore, although it may not have ended completely, Liberia’s support for the RUF surely dwindled. The sanctions affected President Taylor’s capabilities and willingness to support the rebels (Pitman, 2001b; PKBPU, 2003, p.7; Harris, 2014, p.116), and he even drained some resources from the RUF to fight insurgents in Liberia. The third-party support for the RUF decreased in the third phase of the compellence, and the RUF accepted disarmament. This course of events corresponds well with H5.

### 4.4 Conclusion

The chapter has analysed the compellence in Sierra Leone from the perspective of each hypothesis. As this is one of the most successful cases of compellence in peace operations, the derived conditions are expected to be satisfied in the case. The result of the examination is summarised in the table below.

**Table 4.1 The Summary of the Sierra Leone Case Study**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Phase 1</th>
<th>Phase 2</th>
<th>Phase 3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Result</strong></td>
<td>Partially successful/failed</td>
<td>Unsuccessful</td>
<td>Almost successful</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Demand type</strong></td>
<td>Limited</td>
<td>Heaviest</td>
<td>Heaviest</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Favourable balance of troops</strong> (H1)</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Strategy (H2)</strong></td>
<td>Ultimatum</td>
<td>Gradual turning of the screw</td>
<td>Gradual turning of the screw</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Credibility (H3)</strong></td>
<td>National interest ✓ (only Nigeria)</td>
<td>✓ (only Nigeria)</td>
<td>✓ (only Nigeria)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Domestic support –</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Previously acquired advantageous reputation –</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Actual use of force ✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓ (continuing effect from the second phase)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Denial (H4)</strong></td>
<td>Attrition –</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Stronghold neutralisation –</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Decapitation –</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓ (continuing effect from the second phase)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The protracted case of Sierra Leone can be analysed using the most-similar-design comparison. As the compellence succeeded in phase three, the factors that did not exist in the first two phases but came to exist in the third seem to have caused the difference in the results.

There are two such factors: stronghold neutralisation as a form of denial and the absence of third-party support on the target side. Stronghold neutralisation was applied by the Guinean forces and the CDF during phase three. They did not actually neutralise the RUF’s strongholds, but they threatened to do so when they invaded the RUF’s eastern strongholds. The strongholds threatened by the offensive included diamond-mining areas and the RUF headquarters in a region neighbouring Liberia which was important as a supply route. The other condition that came to be satisfied in the third phase was the halt of third-party support. The RUF had received support from Taylor in Liberia, but this support dwindled as international sanctions were imposed on Liberia and a new insurgency intensified there.

These two factors seem to have been necessary in compelling the RUF. The RUF had already been in an unwinnable situation by the middle of the second phase of compellence. By this time, UNAMSIL, which was occupying the western part of Sierra Leone, including the capital, had begun to defend itself effectively. The RUF must have realised this, because its repetitive attacks against the UNAMSIL positions were repelled each time. However, the RUF still had half of the country under its control and could maintain the war as long as it had diamond-mining areas and support from Liberia. As these were fundamental for the RUF, the stronghold neutralisation and the halt of third-party support in the third phase posed serious threats to the RUF’s capability to continue the war. The offensive against the RUF’s strongholds and the increasing pressure against President Taylor raised the prospect of the RUF’s defeat if the trend continued. This

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Counter-coercion negation</th>
<th>–</th>
<th>– → ✓</th>
<th>✓</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Absence of third-party support (H5)</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>✓ (largely)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Note) ✓ : present, applied, or fulfilled   – : absent
shift from “unable to win” to “likely to be defeated” seems to have been the difference between phases two and three, and the shift compelled the RUF to accept disarmament.

Therefore, the most-similar-design comparison provides clear support to H5 but seems to force reconsideration of H4. H4 predicts that the most effective method of denial for compellence in peace operations is counter-coercion negation. However, the above analysis indicates the importance of stronghold neutralisation as a form of denial. UNAMSIL was vulnerable to the RUF’s counter-coercion until the May crisis but came to be able to defend itself after the UK intervention. Other counter-coercive efforts by the RUF also did not bear fruit, so the compellers had achieved effective counter-coercion by the end of phase two. Nevertheless, the compellence did not succeed until phase three. Does this mean that counter-coercion negation was unimportant?

Although there is a logical possibility that stronghold neutralisation and the absence of third-party support were not only necessary but also sufficient for the success of the case, the results of the examination of the pre-UNAMSIL period of the conflict negate this possibility. As mentioned earlier, the RUF lost the supply line with Taylor as ULIMO occupied Liberia’s border area with Sierra Leone around 1993. Nevertheless, the RUF sustained its guerrilla operations through robbing or trading arms and ammunition until Liberian support resumed on a large scale after Taylor became president in 1997. Therefore, the halt of third-party support per se did not bring an end to the RUF. The RUF also experienced the loss of or pressure against its strongholds, but it did not cease its activities. Pro-government forces under the support of a PMC took Kono, destroyed the RUF’s main camp called Zogoda in the southeast, and attacked the northeast strongholds in Kailahun in 1995 and 1996 (Smith et al., 2004, pp.23, 29, 274, 314-315; Keen, 2005, pp.151-152, 194). This pressure compelled the RUF to sign the Abidjan Agreement, but the RUF was not committed to disarmament. In contrast, utilising the agreement, Sankoh expelled the PMC and continued the efforts to purchase arms (Abraham, 2001, pp.212-214; Penfold, 2012, p.13; Higbie and Moigula, 2017, pp.52-53). In 1998, ECOMOG’s offensive went as far as securing Kono and attacking
Kailahun. However, the RUF survived the attacks and launched a counter-offensive at the end of the year, resulting in the invasion of Freetown in early 1999 (Adeshina, 2002; Smith et al., 2004, pp.34, 36, 278-281; Higbie and Moigula, 2017, p.67). Therefore, the pressure of stronghold neutralisation per se was also not sufficient to compel the RUF to disarm. Moreover, the combination of stronghold neutralisation and the absence of third-party support was not sufficient either, because the RUF did not have Liberian support when its strongholds were threatened in 1996. Hence, the two factors were not sufficient conditions for the success of compellence; other factors were necessary as well.

As other factors existed at least from phase two, the most-similar-design comparison does not indicate anything about their importance. However, the congruence analysis so far and some additional counterfactual examinations indicate which factor was necessary for success.

First, the above examination demonstrates the indispensability of effective counter-coercion negation. As this was absent, the RUF was able to rob weapons from opponent forces and to fight back when its strongholds were threatened. The same could have happened in the third phase of the compellence if the compellers had been vulnerable. In fact, the RUF grabbed about 1,000 firearms, tons of ammunition, and even armoured vehicles from UNAMSIL by the end of the May crisis (Berman, 2000, pp.19-20; Anon, 2001, p.237). If UNAMSIL and the SLA had remained weak to counter-coercion, the RUF would not have given up armed resistance, believing that it could push back the compellers. The effective counter-coercion negation made the RUF realise that it could no longer achieve military victory, as the RUF spokesperson stated (Farah, 2001b). It can be said that the effective counter-coercion negation enabled the stronghold neutralisation and the halt of third-party support to choke the RUF. Therefore, effective counter-coercion negation was necessary for the success of this case, and the case is consistent with H4 despite the result of the most-similar-design comparison.

Regarding the remaining two forms of denial, it is not clear whether decapitation was necessary for the case to be successful, although it worked
positively in this instance. The compellers conducted decapitation as Sankoh was detained by chance and the RUF was urged to elect a new leader. The succeeding interim leader, Sesay, played an important role in the acceptance and implementation of disarmament, so the change of the RUF’s leadership from Sankoh to Sesay surely facilitated the success of compellence. Sankoh was stubborn and seems to have been obsessed with taking total power of the state. Even after accepting the power sharing that was stipulated in the Lomé Agreement, it is said that he planned to stage a coup in May 2000, although the plan was foiled by the demonstration and subsequent violent confrontation on 8 May that forced him to escape from the capital (MacJohnson, 2000; SLW, 2000d; Smith and Dillon, 2000). If he had made up his mind to take power at all cost, it may have been impossible to compel him to accept total disarmament, and therefore he had to be removed. However, it is not clear whether this was the case. He initially cooperated with disarmament under the Lomé Agreement and he even moved to expel the senior RUF second in command for his objection to the disarmament (UN, 1999k, paras.13-14; TRC, 2004a, pp.337-338; SCSL, 2009, p.289; Penfold, 2012, pp.164-165). This implies that he was able to accept disarmament under certain conditions or based on certain calculations. In particular, if the RUF was cornered and on the verge of defeat due to effective counter-coercion negation, stronghold neutralisation, and the halt of third-party support, even Sankoh could have chosen to give up arms and obtain whatever small carrots were being provided. Therefore, it is not clear whether the elimination of Sankoh was necessary. What this case demonstrates is that decapitation can work and facilitate compellence in peace operations.

Regarding attrition, its contribution to the success of compellence must have been modest at best and cannot be regarded as a necessary factor. The compellers, pro-government forces, and Guinean forces killed hundreds of RUF members in contacts. These are substantial casualties in the context of peace operations, but not to the extent that they threatened the RUF’s war-fighting capability, taking into account its large manpower and the availability of replacements.
Moving to other hypotheses, the use of the gradual-turning-of-the-screw strategy seems to have been necessary for success, and this partially corresponds to H2, which predicts that the use of the gradual-turning-of-the-screw strategy combined with the carrot-and-stick approach is effective. UNAMSIL employed an ultimatum in the first phase and failed to achieve RUF compliance, despite the limited demands. The compellers did not employ an ultimatum in the second and third phases. However, taking into account the fact that it failed to derive compliance even for the limited demands in the first phase, it is easy to imagine that an ultimatum would not have worked even if it had been tried. The rebels had fought the war for a decade, sometimes resurging from a near defeat. Such a resilient armed group would not have given up arms before trying resistance. In the second and third phases, the compellers employed the gradual-turning-of-the-screw strategy, and the case ended successfully. The UK continuously provided training and equipment to the SLA and supported the pro-government forces’ offensive against the RUF. This increasing pressure was supplanted by the occasional show of force by the UK forces and UNAMSIL’s proactive operations. The failure of an ultimatum and the success of the gradual-turning-of-the-screw strategy correspond with the expectation of H2.

However, carrots did not play a large role in this case, and this thus contradicts the latter half of the hypothesis. When the RUF accepted disarmament, it had lost the generous power sharing and amnesty provided in the Lomé Agreement. Instead, the RUF obtained support to transform itself into a political party, which was also included in the Lomé Agreement, and the consideration of RUF detainees’ release, depending on the implementation of the Abuja II Agreement. The RUF kept demanding the provision of the carrots that had been agreed to in Lomé, so the far-reduced positive inducements that were actually provided could not have been attractive for the RUF in terms of encouraging it to accept the disarmament. Therefore, this case indicates that compellence can succeed without substantial carrots if threats are serious enough.

In making the threats credible, reputation building through the actual use of force also seems to have been necessary in this case. The fact that the compellence succeeded after the compellers’ use of force corresponds
with H3. As discussed in the section on credibility, there is some evidence that the demonstration of the compellers’ competence through the substantial use of force drove the RUF members to choose disarmament and caused frictions between those who wanted to disarm and those who tried to prevent it. Regarding the other sources of credibility, Nigeria’s national interest was involved. However, Nigeria did not play a role in putting proactive pressure on the RUF; thus, this factor does not seem to have increased the credibility of the threats. The other two sources of credibility – domestic support and previously acquired advantageous reputation – did not exist in this case.

Finally, the course of events does not correspond to H1, which predicts that compellence succeeds if the compellers have larger forces than the targets. Throughout the case, the balance of troops was always favourable to the compellers combined with the local auxiliary forces. Therefore, it does not match the shift in results from unsuccessful to successful.

Although this inconsistency does not negate the possibility that the factor was an INUS condition and had to be combined with other conditions to make the case successful, the numerical advantage does not seem to have been necessary to fulfill any of the above factors that were necessary for success. The CDF’s offensive against the RUF’s stronghold in Kono in the third phase was conducted by a small force that was composed of some 200 militias (Smith et al., 2004, p.376). Although they had Guinean support, this shows that a small force could threaten the RUF’s strongholds if it was well supported. The end of Liberian support had nothing to do with the size of the international forces on the ground. Therefore, the two factors which are found important in the most-similar-design comparison did not rely on numerical advantage.

Effective counter-coercion negation and the effective use of force also did not require a larger force than the target of compellence. This was well demonstrated by the British platoon that repelled the attack by about 100 RUF in Lungi Lol without suffering any casualties. The arrival of reinforcements surely helped UNAMSIL to realise good force protection, but
this does not necessarily mean that UNAMSIL was unable to defend itself when it faced larger opponents. A part of a Kenyan company, composed of 70 troops, that was surrounded by hundreds of RUF members in Makeni in the May crisis could repel attacks and defend its camp, although the lack of ammunition and other supplies forced them to abandon the position later (Ashby, 2002, pp.203-213, 308). This indicates that UNAMSIL could have been able to defend itself if it had been appropriately prepared even before receiving reinforcement; the problem was posture – that is, deploying under the best-case scenario and being unprepared for combats – rather than number.

Finally, regarding the gradual turning of the screw, the training of the SLA by the British forces was an important component, but here again, what mattered more in regard to pressure on the RUF seems to have been the improvement of its quality rather than the increase of its size. As discussed in the section on the strategy of compellence, the UK-trained SLA steadily increased after British intervention. However, the SLA had already experienced quick and massive expansion and had over 10,000 troops during the NPRC’s rule, and the RUF, which was a much smaller force of several thousand at the time, could fight against it because of the undisciplined SLA’s incompetence. In fact, many of the government soldiers became “sobels” and later joined the rebel force as AFRC (Howe, 2001, pp.200-201; SLTRC, 2004a, pp.159, 161-163; Gberie, 2005, pp.77-82, 102-103; Woods and Reese, 2008, pp.27-28). Therefore, the RUF could cope with the SLA if it merely swelled in size. What was new in the British training was the enhancement of the SLA’s quality. The SLA was becoming much more competent owing to the training (Barnes, 2000; Stone, 2001; Webber, 2001), and this fact must have threatened the RUF.

In conclusion, the Sierra Leone case is not consistent with H1, is partially consistent with H2, and is consistent with H3 to H5. The conditions represented by the congruent hypotheses – that is, the use of the gradual-turning-of-the-screw strategy, the actual use of force to support the credibility of threats, effective counter-coercion negation to achieve denial, and the absence of third-party support – were individually necessary for success. In addition, the examination demonstrates that stronghold neutralisation was
also necessary, which is related to H4. These five conditions were INUS conditions for the success of the case and constitute the collective sufficient condition for its success. Decapitation, another factor related to H4, also contributed to the success, but it is not clear if it was necessary for the success.
Chapter 5
Somalia: UNOSOM II and the US Forces

The final empirical chapter explores compellence in Somalia. The compellers were UNOSOM II, a UN peace operation, and the armed forces of the US which supported the UN mission. The target was a Somali armed group called the SNA. Somalia is a case of failed compellence, which means that the conditions for success are expected to be absent. This chapter employs the congruence method, which checks whether the prediction of each hypothesis corresponds with the actual course of events. Although UNOSOM II was preceded by a US-led multinational force called UNITAF, the limited nature of the demands made by UNITAF keeps its compellence out of the scope of this research. Therefore, the hypotheses are examined with a focus on the UNOSOM II period.

5.1 Background

Somalia had been under the dictatorial rule of Mohammed Siad Barre, who took power by a coup in 1969. The deterioration of economic and social conditions, the loss caused by a war with neighbouring Ethiopia in 1977 and 1978, and Barre’s repressive policies led to rebellions by multiple groups from around 1980 (Lyons and Samatar, 1995, pp.14-19; Boutros-Ghali, 1996, pp.9-11; Elmi and Barise, 2006, pp.34-35; Kapteijns, 2013a, ch.2). One of the rebel organisations, the United Somali Congress (USC), rallied several other rebel movements; attacked the capital, Mogadishu, in December 1990; and successfully ousted Barre the next month (Boutros-Ghali, 1996, p.11; Kapteijns, 2013a, pp.97-99, 121-130).

The end of Barre’s regime did not bring stability but instead brought chaos that led to international interventions. The USC was based on the Hawiye clan but was divided by two leading figures from different sub-clans of Hawiye. One was Mohammed Farah Aidid, who was the chair of the USC and played a leading role in its military campaign. The other was Ali Mahdi
Mohamed, who did not accept Aidid’s election to the chair and declared himself as the interim president of the country, a move that Aidid strongly rejected in turn. Their rivalry culminated in a destructive battle over the control of Mogadishu (Drysdale, 1994, pp.15-16, 23-38; Boutros-Ghali, 1996, pp.11-12). The battles between the resisting Barre’s forces and Aidid’s forces continued in the southern part of Somalia, and other factions also fought against each other for power (Hirsch and Oakley, 1995, pp.12-13). These battles were accompanied by clan-based violence against civilians (Bakonyi, 2009, pp.446-448; Kapteijns, 2013a, ch.3). The nonexistence of government led to the deterioration of general security, including the proliferation of heavily armed bandits. The violence forced people to flee, and this, combined with a drought, led to a dramatic drop in food production. With the dysfunctional governance and the civil war disturbing international aid, Somalia plunged into famine (Hansch et al., 1994, pp.3-4; Boutros-Ghali, 1996, pp.12-14). It is estimated that the number of Somali deaths caused by the violence and famine exceeded 210,000 by the end of 1992 (Hansch et al., 1994, p.24).

A ceasefire was established between Aidid and Ali Mahdi in March 1992 under the mediation of the UN, and the UNSC decided to establish the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM I) to monitor the ceasefire and provide security for humanitarian relief activities (Boutros-Ghali, 1996, pp.18-20). UNOSOM I, a 500-strong traditional peacekeeping operation, started its deployment in September 1992, but it faced strong opposition from Aidid. He and his newly formed faction, the SNA, started to attack UNOSOM I, and the latter was unable to carry out its tasks (Wagner, 1992a; Hirsch and Oakley, 1995, pp.26-27; Boutros-Ghali, 1996, pp.26-28; Rutherford, 2008, p.70). Meanwhile, armed factions and bandits attacked and looted international humanitarian agencies (Boutros-Ghali, 1996, p.29; Natsios, 1996, pp.74-77).

Against the background of rising concern and public calls to respond to the humanitarian crisis in Somalia, the US offered to lead a multinational force to enable humanitarian relief activities there (Hirsch and Oakley, 1995, pp.35-44; Poole, 2005, pp.15-20). In December 1992, the UNSC adopted Resolution 794, which authorised UN member states “to use all necessary
means” under Chapter VII of the UN Charter “to establish as soon as possible a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations in Somalia” (UNSC, 1992).

The US-led multinational force, UNITAF, started its deployment within a week of the adoption of the resolution and worked on stabilisation. Aidid had expressed that he would welcome the US intervention, while strongly criticising the UN (e.g. AFP, 28 Nov 1992; Wagner, 1992c), and the members of armed factions and bandits had already started to hide their weapons or leave the capital even before UNITAF had arrived (AFP, 4 Dec 1992; Cable News Network [CNN], 1992b; Perlez, 1992a). US special representative Robert Oakley secured the agreement of Aidid and Ali Mahdi on the deployment of UNITAF, and the armed factions stayed away from the force (AFP, 8 Dec 1992; Hirsch and Oakley, 1995, p.54). UNITAF secured several major cities in the southern part of the country, and the security situation improved (e.g. AFP, 26 Dec 1992; Perlez, 1992b; Richburg, 1992d; UN, 1993a; 1993b, para.21). Humanitarian assistance progressed in full scale, and the famine ceased, although international assistance was still indispensable (Abrams, 1993a; AP, 1993a; Boutros-Ghali, 1996, p.35).

However, UNITAF did not commit to conducting a large-scale disarmament programme in Somalia. Somali armed factions agreed to a ceasefire and disarmament at UN-sponsored conferences in January 1993. The agreement stipulated that all heavy weapons would be handed over to UNITAF and the UN and that armed faction members would be encamped and disarmed (UN, 1993b, Annex III; Boutros-Ghali, 1996, p.38). Some cantonment sites were established, and factions brought in their heavy weapons. The factions still controlled the sites, but the international troops inspected them (UN, 1994a, p.13; Boutros-Ghali, 1996, p.39; United States Army Center of Military History [USACMH], 2003, p.86). The then UN Secretary-General, Boutros-Ghali, requested that UNITAF carry out the thorough disarmament of Somalia, but the US interpreted the mandate as not including disarmament (Graham, 1992; P. Lewis, 1992; Boutros-Ghali, 1996, pp.40-41). From the beginning, the US thought of the multinational force as a temporary measure with the limited task of establishing minimal security for humanitarian assistance, and it expected that a UN
peacekeeping mission would soon succeed its operation (e.g. AP, 1992; Connell, 1992; LaFraniere, 1992; Oberdorfer and Rowe, 1992). Therefore, the issue of disarmament was left for the follow-on peacekeeping operation.

5.2 The Deployment and Activity of UNOSOM II and the US Forces

As the follow-on force, the UNSC established UNOSOM II with its Resolution 814, which was adopted in March 1993. The resolution authorised various tasks under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, including the prevention of any violence “and, if necessary, [taking] appropriate action against any faction that violates or threatens to violate the cessation of hostilities”; the control of heavy weapons; disarmament, including small arms; the provision of security of ports, airports, and the lines of communications necessary for humanitarian assistance; and the protection of personnel and materials of UN and other humanitarian agencies by taking “such forceful action as may be required to neutralize armed elements that attack, or threaten to attack, such facilities and personnel”. The rules of engagement were to permit “to take certain specific actions if they were judged necessary to fulfil the mandate”. The authorised size of the force was 28,000 troops (UN, 1993c, paras.57, 71, 88; UNSC, 1993a).

UNOSOM II formally succeeded the command on the ground from UNITAF on 4 May 1993, and the US thereafter provided the Quick Reaction Force (QRF), composed of some 1,300 troops as an independent supporting force for UNOSOM II (Alexander, 1993b; Richburg, 1993b). According to the terms of reference between the US and UNOSOM II, the QRF’s mission was to “counter specific threats that exceed the capability of UNOSOM II units” as a rapid-response combat capability (Department of the Army, 1994, p.70). The QRF composition included a light infantry battalion, four attack helicopters, eight scout helicopters, and 15 utility helicopters (USACMH, 2003, p.119).

Only one day after the adoption of UNSC Resolution 814, the leaders of Somali armed factions adopted the Addis Ababa Agreement at another UN-sponsored conference. In addition to an outline of how to rebuild
governing structures, the agreement contained the armed factions’ renewed commitment to a complete and simultaneous disarmament in accordance with their agreement in January. The agreement called for the assistance of UNITAF and UN troops in the disarmament and the application of “strong and effective sanctions against those responsible for any violation of the Cease-fire Agreement of January 1993” (UN, 1996b, pp.264-266).

Although he signed the agreement, Aidid did not abide by it. His aim was to be the president of Somalia; he thought he was entitled to the presidency because of his principal role in ousting Barre from the position (Hirsch and Oakley, 1995, p.13; Durch, 1997, p.351; Daniel et al., 1999, p.84). Aidid was against any foreign intervention that would obstruct his ambition (Richburg, 1992a; Clarke, 1997, p.8).

He disliked Boutros-Ghali because he was a foreign minister of Egypt, which supported Barre and Ali Mahdi, and opposed UN involvement from the beginning (Richburg, 1993a; Hirsh and Oakley, 1995, pp.15, 19). Some UN moves also exacerbated his hatred. The UN tried to empower communal leaders, including women, in re-establishing a governing system. This orientation conflicted with the desires of the leaders of warring factions, including Aidid, who wanted to dominate state power (Eknes et al., 1995, V-4; Hirsch and Oakley, 1995, pp.135-136; Lyons and Samatar, 1995, p.55; Halim, 1996, pp.72-74; Durch, 1997, p.331). UNOSOM II started an initiative to re-establish the judicial system, but this also conflicted with the de facto system in Mogadishu, in which the SNA had appointed judges (UN, 1994a, pp.17-18; Eknes et al., 1995, VI-6; Halim, 1996, p.76). In addition, when Aidid tried to obtain UNOSOM II’s support on holding a peace conference, they had disputes over who should convene it, who should participate in it, and what the agenda should be. They ended up holding two separate conferences (Clarke, 1993, pp.52-53; Drysdale, 1994, pp.167-173, 176-177; UN, 1994a, pp.18-19; Eknes et al., 1995, VI-6).

Aidid’s stance on the US had also soured by the end of UNITAF. In contrast to his vocal opposition to the UN, Aidid welcomed the US intervention at first, because he expected that he could align with the US to strengthen his position (AFP, 28 Nov 1992; Wagner, 1992b; Stevenson,
1995, p.26). However, he came to be disillusioned as it became clear that the US was trying to diminish the power of armed factions (Stevenson, 1993, p.140; Eknes et al., 1995, V-4; Lyons and Samatar, 1995, p.48). In particular, Aidid was disgruntled when UNITAF failed to prevent an attack on Kismayo, a southern city, by an armed faction that drove out his allied faction from there (Drysdale, 1994, pp.111-113; 1997, pp.130-131; Prunier, 1997, p.142). Moreover, UNOSOM II forcefully pushed back Aidid’s allies who tried to enter the city later (UN, 1994a, p.18; USACMH, 2003, p.84). Thus, Aidid was frustrated by the perceived bias of the US and UNOSOM II against him.

Because of these troubles, the relationship between UNOSOM II and the SNA deteriorated badly by June, when the first violent confrontation between them in Mogadishu erupted. In accordance with Resolution 814 and the Addis Ababa Agreement, UNOSOM II carried out inspections of weapons storage sites belonging to the SNA on 5 June. In return, the SNA ambushed Pakistani troops who were returning from the inspection, and it attacked another Pakistani unit that was providing humanitarian assistance, killing 24 and wounding some 60 troops (Richburg, 1993c; UN, 1993d, paras.5-9; 1994a, pp.23-24). The UNSC responded by adopting Resolution 837 the next day. The resolution reaffirmed that the Secretary-General was “authorized under resolution 814 (1993) to take all necessary measures against all those responsible for the armed attacks” on Pakistani peacekeepers (UNSC, 1993b).

The attack triggered a series of reprisals between UNOSOM II and the SNA. Despite warnings from UNOSOM II, Aidid denied the SNA’s involvement in the attack against the Pakistani troops and demanded the establishment of an independent investigative commission, while the SNA continued its anti-UN propaganda (AFP, 7 Jun 1993a; Richburg, 1993d; UN, 1993d, para.12). Accordingly, the QRF and UNOSOM II launched attacks against the SNA’s weapons storage sites from the air and ground and destroyed and seized its weapons (Richburg, 1993e; Schafer, 1993; UN, 1993d, paras.19-28). In addition, SRSG Jonathan Howe issued an arrest warrant for Aidid (AP, 1993d; UN, 1993d, para.32). The SNA, however, continued to attack the international troops, and the southern part of Mogadishu, which was the stronghold of Aidid, became a battleground
between UNOSOM II and the SNA. Frequent engagements produced mounting casualties not only on both sides but also on civilians who were caught in the cross-fire, as well as those who had been used as human shields by the SNA (UN, 1993e, paras.63-68, 73; 1994a, annexes 4 and 5; Boutros-Ghali, 1996, pp.51-53). Aidid probed the possibility of holding negotiations with the UN; his efforts included sending a letter to former US president Jimmy Carter, in which he again demanded the establishment of a neutral investigative commission (Blumenthal, 1993; N.A. Lewis, 1993; The Atlanta Journal and Constitution, 1993; Rutherford, 2008, p.156), but he did not commit to disarmament.

The conflict between the international forces and the SNA came to an end when one of the interveners’ operations ended in a fiasco. To apprehend fugitive Aidid, the US deployed special forces to Mogadishu in August. They launched some airborne raids and apprehended some of Aidid’s aides, but Aidid himself remained at large. The deadlock forced the US government to reconsider its approach, and it came to emphasise the importance of the political process (AFP, 17 Sep 1993; Devroy and Williams, 1993; Hunt, 1993a; Sciolino, 1993). However, arresting operations continued, and while Aidid’s aides were being successfully apprehended during a raid on 3 October, catastrophe struck when two helicopters were shot down, and the special forces troops and rescuing units from the QRF and UNOSOM II had to fight against the swarming Somalis overnight. This battle left eighteen US and one Malaysian soldier dead; over ninety US, Malaysian and Pakistani soldiers wounded; and one US pilot captured by the SNA. The Somali casualties from the battle are thought to total over 300 killed and over 700 wounded (Atkinson, 1994a; 1994b; UN, 1994a, p.88; Boutros-Ghali, 1996, pp.53-54).

The casualties, the video footage of a dead US soldier being dragged through the street, and the captured pilot caused a backlash in the US and led to US disengagement. Torn between mounting domestic pressure to withdraw from Somalia quickly and the concern that a hasty US withdrawal would lead to the collapse of the UN mission and the re-emergence of the famine, the US government decided to send in reinforcements but to also withdraw US troops by the end of March 1994 (AP, 1993g; Jehl, 1993b;
Marcus and Devroy, 1993). The reinforcement was aimed at force protection, and President Bill Clinton instructed that offensive action against Aidid should be halted (Hirsch and Oakley, 1995, pp.128-129; Stewart, 2003, p.13). He felt that the situation was out of control and that there was no domestic support for the operation (Public Broadcasting Service [PBS], no date a). Washington also indicated that African leaders should decide who would participate in a renewed political process and that the US would not object to the involvement of Aidid (AFP, 9 Oct 1993a; Hunt, 1993c). The US also proposed the establishment of an independent commission to investigate the violence in Somalia; this was what Aidid had called for (AFP, 9 Oct 1993a; 9 Oct 1993b).

On 9 October, two days after the US announcement, the SNA declared a unilateral ceasefire (AFP, 9 Oct 1993b; Richburg, 1993m; Boutros-Ghali, 1996, p.61). Aidid later explained that he decided to do so because of the mediation effort by Ethiopia, Eritrea, and Italy (Drysdale, 1994, p.212).

Following the US turnabout, the UN also agreed to relinquish the coercive approach (Jehl, 1993c; Richburg, 1993n; Hirsch and Oakley, 1995, p.130). The UNSC adopted Resolution 885 on 16 November and decided to suspend any actions to arrest those who were responsible for the attacks on peacekeepers; meanwhile, it established a commission of inquiry to investigate the attacks (UNSC, 1993d). The subsequent Resolution 897, adopted on 4 February 1994, redefined the tasks of UNOSOM II. They included the protection of ports, airports, and the lines of communications necessary for humanitarian and reconstruction assistance, as well as the protection of the personnel and materials of the UN and other humanitarian agencies. However, they no longer included authorisation to use force beyond self-defence (UNSC, 1994a).

Thereafter, inter-clan fighting and banditry intensified, while negotiations between the clans produced no substantial progress (Hirsch and Oakley, 1995, pp.144-148; Boutros-Ghali, 1996, pp.68-71). The deterioration of security and the lack of progress in reconciliation finally exhausted the patience of the international community, and the UNSC

5.3 The Examination of the Hypotheses

Peace operations in Somalia resorted to multiple compellent attempts with different demands, but not all of them fall within the scope of this research. The demands in compellence by UNITAF were limited. UNITAF tried to compel armed groups in Mogadishu to confine their heavy arms to designated areas and to stop brandishing weapons, and it succeeded to some extent (AFP, 31 Dec 1992; Oberdorfer, 1992b; Mitchell, 1993; Hirsch and Oakley, 1995, pp.58-59, 81). UNITAF also employed compellence several times in a southern city of Kismayo to stop conflicts between armed factions who were fighting for the control of the city (AP, 1993b; Schemo, 1993a; 1993b; Hirsh and Oakley, 1995, pp.76-77). UNITAF did not demand that armed factions should disarm completely nor that they should give up their struggle for power at once. Although UNITAF tried to bring about stability for humanitarian activities and restricted some movements of armed factions, they could continue to hold weapons and operate where UNITAF was not deployed. Therefore, demands in the UNITAF phase did not belong to the heaviest type, and the compellence by UNITAF is outside of the scope of this research.

Compellence by UNOSOM II and supporting US forces was accompanied by the heaviest type of demands against the SNA. UNSC Resolution 814, which established UNOSOM II, demanded that warring factions commit to disarmament, as they agreed in January 1993 (UNSC, 1993a). Resolution 837, which was adopted after the SNA’s attack against the Pakistani peacekeepers, repeated the same demand (UNSC, 1993b). After the attack, SRSG Howe also addressed a letter to Aidid, in which he emphasised that weapons should not be brandished and demanded full cooperation with reagrad to disarmament (UN, 1993d, para.18). The SNA resisted disarmament with violence, and UNOSOM II and the US forces put
pressure on the SNA by pursuing Aidid in person, as well as destroying the SNA’s weapons depots and other facilities. However, the SNA did not capitulate and countered the pressure by inflicting costs on peacekeepers. When the cost exceeded the extent that the compellers could bear, they backed down and abandoned the coercive approach. Thereafter, the intervening forces did not employ compellence, and disarmament was not realised, so the compellence ended in failure.

In the following section, compellence by UNOSOM II and the US forces against the SNA is analysed from the perspective of each hypothesis. Each section examines whether the expectation of a hypothesis corresponds with the course of events.

5.3.1 Troop Numbers

The first hypothesis to be examined is H1. This hypothesis predicts that compellence in peace operations is more likely to succeed if the balance of troops is favourable to compellers. Despite the compellers having an advantageous balance of troops in Mogadishu, the case ended in failure. Therefore, the case does not correspond to the hypothesis.

UNOSOM II, whose initial authorised strength was 28,000, had some 20,000 troops when it started its operations on 4 May (AP, 1993c; Richburg, 1993; Eknes et al., 1995, VI-1). However, the number decreased to some 16,400 at the end of the month, as Australia, Canada, and the US reduced their participation as planned in the transition from UNITAF (UN, 1993f; Howe, 1997, p.179; USACMH, 2003, p.75). The US provided a QRF of some 1,300 in support of UNOSOM II (Alexander, 1993b; Richburg, 1993).

The international troops did not have any local auxiliary forces to count on in this case. To relief itself of the burden of law enforcement in the streets, UNITAF established the Auxiliary Security Force (ASF) as a local police force. The ASF was composed of former police officers and had some 3,000 officers in Mogadishu when UNOSOM II succeeded UNITAF. They performed various policing functions but were only lightly armed and had no capability to confront heavily armed factions (Hirsch and Oakley, 1995, pp.87-92; Ganzglass, 1997, pp.24-25; Thomas and Spataro, 1998, pp.189-
197, 202-204). Therefore, the analysis does not include the ASF among the compellers.

Accordingly, the compellers had some 17,700 troops, composed of UNOSOM II and the QRF, when they started to use compellence in mid-June. The scale of compellers continued to increase thereafter. UNOSOM II had some 18,400 troops at the end of June, some 20,300 at the end of July, some 23,300 at the end of August, and some 26,100 at the end of September (UN, 1993f). In addition, the US sent in special operation forces as Task Force (TF) Ranger, which was composed of some 440 troops and was given the tasks of hunting down Aidid and his top lieutenants (Warner and Levin, 1995, p.29; Ecklund, 2004, p.50; Poole, 2005, p.48).

The compellers concentrated the majority of their force in Mogadishu, where the confrontations with the SNA occurred. Between 10,000 and 11,000 troops, out of some 18,000 in total, were redeployed to the city when the offensive against the SNA commenced in mid-June (AFP, 11 Jun 1993a; Alexander, 1993d). UNOSOM II troops in Mogadishu numbered some 13,000 by mid-July and some 15,000 in August (AFP, 11 Jul 1993; Lorch, 1993e; Miller, 1993b). In September, the number dropped to some 12,000 (Leopold, 1993).

The size of the SNA, the target of compellence, is uncertain at best. The US estimated in late 1992 that the strength of the SNA was 20,000 in total and that it had 5,000 to 10,000 fighters in Mogadishu (Mroczkowski, 2005, p.22; Harned, 2016, p.21). After June 1993, US and UN officials estimated that the number of hard-core fighters that Aidid could mobilise in Mogadishu was between 300 and 1,000 (e.g. Abrams, 1993c; Lippman, 1993; Lorch, 1993b; Shaw, 1993c). After the battle on 3 October, former US president Carter told the media that he had been informed by Eritrean delegates that Aidid had 2,000 to 3,000 capable fighters in Mogadishu (CNN, 1993h). Another news article cites SNA sources, stating that the figure as about 12,000 (Atkinson, 1994a). The US “After Action Report” includes an estimation that the SNA had 5,000 to 10,000 fighters in total and had some 1,500 in Mogadishu (USACMH, 2003, p.65).
As a whole, it can be said that the compellers had almost the same or a larger number of troops than the target in Somalia. When compared to the largest estimated number of the SNA – 20,000 in total – the compellers had smaller troops at first. However, the compellers had some 19,700 troops at the end of June, and their strength soon surpassed 20,000. Moreover, if the comparison focuses on Mogadishu, the compellers had almost the same or a larger number of troops from the beginning in comparison to the largest estimate of the SNA’s fighters, which is 12,000, and the numerical advantage expanded as reinforcements arrived. The advantage is much larger if the comparison is made with more moderate estimates of several thousand.

The fact that compellence failed even though the compellers had a numerical advantage casts doubt on H1. This does not necessarily mean that the scale of the force did not matter. A commander of the SNA stated in an interview that UNOSOM II was too large to fight squarely (PBS, no date b). However, the SNA was able to fight an urban guerrilla war against a larger opponent in its stronghold and compelled the international forces to retreat. Therefore, the Somalia case is inconsistent with H1. Of course, there remains a possibility that a numerical advantage was an INUS condition and that other factors had to be fulfilled to achieve compellence. This possibility needs to be confirmed in successful cases, but the two cases examined in previous chapters indicate that a numerical advantage was not an INUS condition for their success. Hence, the balance of troops in favour of compellers is not likely to be an INUS condition, and this point is further discussed in the cross-case analyses in Chapter 6.

5.3.2 The Strategy of Compellence

The next hypothesis to be examined is H2, which predicts that the gradual-turning-of-the-screw strategy in combination with the carrot-and-stick strategy is more likely to succeed than an ultimatum. The compellers first employed an ultimatum and then turned to the gradual-turning-of-the-screw strategy, but they did not use any positive inducements. The unsuccessful outcome corresponds to the hypothesis because the compellers did not employ the strategy that was expected to be effective – namely, the
combination of gradually increased pressure and carrots. However, because this correspondence is based on the absence of positive inducements, their utility should be confirmed in cases that ended in success. On the contrary, the two successful cases examined in previous chapters demonstrate that compellence can succeed without carrots. The two cases suggest that the use of the gradual-turning-of-the-screw strategy is an INUS condition, and the outcome of the Somalia case is also consistent with this view.

In the beginning, UNOSOM II did not employ compellence in promoting disarmament, although UNSC Resolution 814 endorsed Boutros-Ghali’s idea that the disarmament programme which warring factions agreed to should be enforceable and that the weapons of noncompliant parties should be confiscated or destroyed (UN, 1993c, paras.63-64; UNSC, 1993a). In fact, the purpose of UNOSOM II’s inspection of the SNA’s weapon storage sites on 5 June was only to survey the latest situation at the sites, because the former had received information that the latter had moved out its stored weapons (UN, 1994a, p.22; Adibe and Potgieter, 1995, p.93; USACMH, 2003, pp.87-88).

UNOSOM II came to employ compellence after the inspection triggered a violent confrontation between UNOSOM II and the SNA. First, the compellers issued a tacit ultimatum just after the attack against Pakistani troops on 5 June. SRSG Howe sent a letter to Aidid demanding that he change his behaviour and cooperate with the peace process, stating that this was his last chance (Lorch, 1993a; UN, 1993d, para.13). A few days later, Howe sent another letter to Aidid, in which he emphasised the prohibition against brandishing weapons and the need to adhere to the disarmament programme (UN, 1993d, para.18). This demand to comply with the peace process and disarmament was accompanied by the heightened prospect of

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16 UNOSOM II, however, intended to forcibly carry out the inspection even if the SNA refused it (UN, 1994a, p.22; USACMH, 2003, p.89). The inspection found that the actual stockpile differed greatly from the inventories created by UNITAF (UN, 1993d, para.7; USACMH, 2003, p.90).
reprisal attacks by the international forces against the SNA. UNSC Resolution 837 was adopted on 6 June, and in addition to the restatement of the demand for the warring factions to abide by the Addis Ababa Agreement, it was a reminder that UNOSOM II could “take all necessary measures against all those responsible for the armed attacks” on Pakistani peacekeepers, including “their arrest and detention for prosecution, trial and punishment” (UNSC, 1993b). Although neither Aidid nor the SNA was directly named as assailants in the resolution, it was clear that the compellers regarded the SNA as responsible (AFP, 6 Jun 1993b; Katell, 1993; Richburg, 1993c). The following week, UNOSOM II concentrated more than half of its total force in Mogadishu, and the US sent in four AC-130 gunships as reinforcements (AFP, 11 Jun 1993a; Jehl, 1993a). Howe stated on the radio that “appropriate steps will be taken against those responsible” (Lorch, 1993a).

This tacit ultimatum, however, did not make the SNA comply with the demand of the compellers. Aidid denied the SNA’s involvement in the 5 June incident, claiming that it was UNOSOM II who fired on Somali demonstrators first and that the attack against the force was a voluntary and spontaneous reaction by angry citizens. He also demanded the establishment of a neutral commission to investigate the incident (AFP, 7 Jun 1993a; Richburg, 1993d). Just after the attack, he broadcasted anti-UN messages on the radio and warned that more violence would ensue if his demands were not met (UN, 1993d, para.12). A pro-Aidid newspaper and radio criticised the UN and the US as trying to colonise Somalia and demanded that UNOSOM II leave the country immediately, while warning that Somalis would fight until the end (AFP, 8 Jun 1993; 9 Jun 1993). Although Aidid also showed some conciliatory stances by stating that he was ready to cooperate with the UN and releasing a Pakistani soldier detained in the engagement on 5 June, he did not commit to disarmament and continued to blame the UN (Alexander, 1993d; CNN, 1993a; Richburg, 1993d). This failure of the tacit ultimatum is concurrent with H2.

In the face of the defiance, the compellers resorted to the gradual-turning-of-the-screw strategy and pressured the SNA through continual military operations. As further discussed in the following sections, the
international troops attacked and destroyed the SNA’s weapons storage sites, a radio station, and headquarters, including Aidid’s residence in Mogadishu, in the first wave of the offensive. SRSG Howe announced via radio that UNOSOM II would enforce disarmament and warned that those who resisted would “be firmly dealt with” (AFP, 12 Jun 1993). UN and US officials explained that the aim of the attacks were to eliminate heavy weapons and diminish the SNA’s capability so that it would be unable to disrupt UN operations (AFP, 17 Jun 1993b; CNN, 1993c; Richburg, 1993g). UNOSOM II also issued an arrest warrant for Aidid and distributed leaflets indicating that a reward – later announced as 25,000 dollars – would be paid for cooperation in capturing him (AFP, 26 Jun 1993; 10 Jul 1993; Susman, 1993e; UN, 1993d, para.32). The compellers continued their military operations, and the US even deployed TF Ranger in August and intensified its effort to capture Aidid and his top lieutenants.

The response of the SNA to this growing pressure was a mix of counter-coercion and a search for negotiation. The SNA attacked UN and US troops almost daily after July (UN, 1994a, pp.60-67; USACMH, 2003, p.96). It also countered the arrest warrant for Aidid with its own warrant for Howe with a reward of a million dollars (AFP, 26 Jul 1993; Susman, 1993f). In addition to these countermeasures, the SNA showed some willingness to negotiate with the compellers. SNA senior members requested a US official who was visiting Somalia to restart negotiations (Shaw, 1993d). The SNA also issued a message which expressed its expectation regarding mediation by former US president Carter (AFP, 21 Aug 1993), as well as another message calling for mediation by other third parties (AFP, 28 Aug 1993). Aidid contacted Carter and sent him a letter in August, in which he expressed his hope to have a neutral commission established to investigate his involvement in the attacks against the international troops (Blumenthal, 1993; N.A. Lewis, 1993; The Atlanta Journal and Constitution, 1993; Rutherford, 2008, p.156).

The compellers’ side also came to embrace the idea of a political solution. While UNOSOM II rejected negotiations with certain SNA members, including Aidid and his aides (AFP, 26 Aug 1993; 28 Aug 1993), UNOSOM II and the SNA moved to have a dialogue between them. They held a meeting
on 4 September and discussed a ceasefire. However, a major combat occurred between Nigerian troops and the SNA the next day, and this stalled the initiative for dialogue (Drysdale, 1994, pp.207-208; Poole, 2005, p.49). At the same time, being faced with the lack of a breakthrough in the military approach, the Clinton administration started to emphasise the necessity of a political track. The US envoy to Somalia and the National Security Advisor recommended a political solution to President Clinton (Rutherford, 2008, p.156). During their meeting, the US secretary of defence and Italian defence minister agreed on the importance of political solution (AFP, 12 Sep 1993; The Washington Post, 1993), and President Clinton and Italian Prime Minister Carlo Ciampi agreed on the necessity of a political initiative (AFP, 17 Sep 1993; Devroy and Williams, 1993; Hunt, 1993a). The US set a new policy to deprioritise the arrest of Aidid and to instead promote political reconciliation in Somalia without Aidid (Sciolino, 1993).

Nevertheless, this did not mean that the UN and the US ceased compellence, and military pressure continued. While UNSC Resolution 865, adopted on 22 September, urged “the Secretary-General to re-double his efforts” towards achieving “national reconciliation and political settlement”, it did not change the mandate of UNOSOM II (UNSC, 1993c). Boutros-Ghali persisted with the goal of arresting Aidid when he was told that the new US policy was to deemphasise doing so (Sciolino, 1993), and US Secretary of State Warren Christopher also maintained that the US supported the mandate of UNOSOM II and that Aidid should be arrested (AFP, 28 Sep 1993; Fournier, 1993). Despite the increasing emphasis on a political approach within the US administration, no new direction was given to the forces on the ground, and they continued their operations against the SNA (USACMH, 2003, p.107; Poole, 2005, p.55).

However, the escalating pressure under the gradual turning of the screw also failed to compel the SNA. In return, the SNA escalated its attacks against the international troops, and Aidid escaped the hunt. The military pressure continued until the engagement on 3 October but ended when the compellers gave up compelling the SNA.
Regarding positive inducements, the compellers did not use any in this case. In fact, UNITAF examined the possibility of collecting weapons in exchange for cash or food and launched an experimental programme in a section of Mogadishu for a short period. However, UNITAF decided not to expand the programme due to its limited effectiveness and to concerns such as costs and the possibility that it would disarm weaker people who needed food rather than affecting predatory armed factions (Lorenz, 1994, pp.414-415; Adibe and Potgieter, 1995, p.87; Patman, 1997, pp.514-515). Therefore, UNOSOM II and the US did not provide any positive inducements for the SNA.

The fact that the compellers did not employ the combination assumed in H2 and the case ended in failure is consistent with the hypothesis, but requires cautious evaluation. The compellers first employed a tacit ultimatum and then the gradual-turning-of-the-screw strategy without any positive inducements. Both attempts failed to compel the SNA, and this result is concurrent with the expectation of H2. Although this concurrence can be interpreted as providing support for H2, such an interpretation assumes that positive inducements play an important role in the success of compellence, and this needs to be confirmed with positive cases indicating that the factor actually promotes success. On the contrary, the previous two case studies demonstrate that compellence in peace operations can succeed without positive inducements. Therefore, the cases examined in this study do not provide evidence that supports this interpretation.

The Somalia case does not contradict the other possible interpretation that the two successful cases suggest: The use of the gradual-turning-of-the-screw strategy is an INUS condition that needs to be combined with other factors to achieve success. The two cases examined in the previous chapters provide support for the utility of the gradual-turning-of-the-screw strategy regarding H2, and the analyses indicate that the strategy was a necessary part of the conjunctural sufficient conditions. The fact that the compellers in Somalia employed the gradual-turning-of-the-screw strategy and the case ended in failure does not contradict this finding. The insights from the previous chapters suggest that the failure was because of the absence of other factors that had to be combined with the use of the
gradual-turning-of-the-screw strategy to achieve success. This point is further discussed in cross-case comparisons in Chapter 6.

5.3.3 Credibility

The next hypothesis, H3, is about the credibility of threats. There are four factors that can be the source of threat credibility: national interests, strong domestic support, previously acquired reputation, and the use of force. The hypothesis predicts that the actual use of force is the most effective way to lend credibility to threats. However, the case ended in failure despite the massive use of force by the compellers. There are two possible interpretations of the result. One is that rather than the use of force, any or all of the other three sources, which were absent in this case, were necessary for success. The other is that the actual use of force was necessary but needed to be combined with other conditions to achieve success. Insights from the other two case studies suggest that the latter is likely to be the case, meaning that the case does not contradict the hypothesis.

The first possible source of credibility is the compellers’ national interests. There are two states to be examined: the US, which led the proactive military operation against the SNA, and Pakistan, which provided the largest contingent and was in charge of southern Mogadishu, where the confrontation between the compellers and the SNA erupted.

No US strategic interest was involved at the time of the intervention, although Somalia was strategically important to the US during the Cold War. Barre took the side of the Soviet Union in the context of the Cold War and obtained various forms of support, including military equipment. However, when he launched a war with Ethiopia, counting on Soviet support, the Soviets instead supported the newly formed Marxist regime of Ethiopia. The Cold War logic worked, and Barre turned to the US. The US, in turn, found Somalia, especially its port and airfield, valuable in countering Soviet expansion in the region and the Middle East, and it provided economic and military assistance to the country (Clarke, 1992, pp.3-4; Hirsch and Oakley, 1995, pp.6-7; Stevenson, 1995, pp.15-21). However, the withdrawal of the Russians and Cubans from the region and the end of the Cold War had
changed the strategic setting, and any past US strategic interests were no longer involved there (Oberdorfer, 1992a; Natsios, 1996, p.69; Woods, 1997, p.151). The US decision to deploy UNITAF was based on President George Bush’s humanitarian concern and was facilitated and pushed by domestic calls to respond to the humanitarian crisis (Johnston and Dagne, 1997, p.195; Woods, 1997, p.158; Western, 2002; Briggs and Soderlund, 2008, pp.69-70).

Pakistan also had no narrow strategic interests in Somalia. The Pakistani government raised its strong support for the UN and Islamic linkage in explaining the reasons for the country’s participation in the missions in Somalia (Delvoie, 1996, p.140; Krishnasamy, 2002, p.99). It is also pointed out that the government had more specific interests. The first was the enhancement of its relationships with the US. The end of Soviet intervention in Afghanistan and the Cold War itself decreased the value of Pakistan as “the ‘front-line’ state”. This led the US to criticise Pakistan and freeze aid to it because of its nuclear development programme, to which the former had turned a blind eye in the context of the Cold War. Moreover, the US was moving towards rapprochement with India, which was the rival of Pakistan. These changes in the strategic setting drove Pakistan to re-establish relations with the US, and the expansion of its commitment in Somalia was a part of this effort. The second Pakistani interest was the improvement of its international image. Pakistan was also accused of supporting terrorists, and the government wanted to change this image by confronting Aidid, who used terror tactics. The third interest was to win a competition with India regarding peace operations. India had been a proactive participant in UN peacekeeping, and Pakistan wanted to compete with its rival in this area as well (Krishnasamy, 2002, pp.99-101). However, these interests do not constitute the type of national interests dealt with in this research, which focuses on narrow strategic interests that can directly affect interveners’ security or the accumulation of power. The above interests could lead to an increase in Pakistani power only indirectly – for example, by strengthening its relationships with the US or the wider international community – but were not specific to Somalia. Therefore, it can be said that no Pakistani national interests were involved in this case.
In sum, the compellers had no national interests in Somalia. The strategic value of Somalia for the US had disappeared by the end of the Cold War, and the US had intervened based on humanitarian concerns. Pakistan had some expected benefit from participating in the missions, but it had no narrow, strong national interest that could support the credibility of the threat to use force.

The second source of credibility is domestic support. Both the US and Pakistan lacked this factor during UNOSOM II. The US had widespread domestic support during the UNITAF phase, and the SNA was aware of this (AFP, 28 Nov 1992). President Bush briefed some key members of Congress and secured broad bipartisan support when he decided that the US would lead a multinational force to Somalia, although a few members expressed concern about the nature of the operation (CNN, 1992a; Devroy and Cooper, 1992; Schafer, 1992; Johnston and Dagne, 1997, pp.195-197).

However, Congressional support was weakened by the launch of UNOSOM II in March 1993. The Senate passed a resolution which supported the US participation in UNITAF in February 1993, but it took several months to go through the House because of a heated debate about the objective of the operation. The House passed the resolution by 243 to 179 in May, with an amendment to add support for the use of US forces in the implementation of UNSC Resolution 814, which established UNOSOM II. On the one hand, the House resolution showed explicit support for US participation in UNOSOM II. On the other hand, the resolution did not obtain unanimous support, as shown by the vote result and the objections expressed by the minority. Moreover, the Senate did not discuss the amendment made by the House and did not show the same support for participation in UNOSOM II (Abrams, 1993b; Johnston and Dagne, 1997, pp.198-199; Delaney, 2004, pp.38-39). Therefore, the Congressional support at the time of UNOSOM II’s initiation was partial at best.

In July, several sceptical Congress members started to raise their voices against US involvement in Somalia. The most prominent was Senator Robert Byrd, who insisted that the US forces should withdraw because their mission had changed without the consent of Congress (CNN, 1993f; Shaw,
As four US troops were killed and reinforcements were sent in August, several more Congress members came to express their concerns about the mission and increasing commitment (Abrams, 1993d; R. Burns, 1993; Duke, 1993). In Congress, debates on Somalia arose again in September during the examination of the Defense Authorization Act of 1994. Some senators vocally questioned the role of US forces in Somalia, claiming that their mission had been expanded too much and should be withdrawn soon. They somewhat softened their stance after a consultation with the Senate leaders, and the Senate passed the act, which included a provision calling on the president to clarify the US mission in Somalia by submitting a report to Congress by 15 October and to obtain the approval of Congress by 15 November to continue the operation. This course was followed by the House, and it passed the Defense Authorization Bill with an identical provision in the same month (Warner and Levin, 1995, pp.36-37; Johnston and Dagne, 1997, pp.199-200).

The battle of 3 October completely crashed the shaky support in the Congress. Hundreds of calls came from angry constituents who had watched the video of a US soldier’s body being dragged through the streets of Mogadishu. This drove many Congress members to call for immediate withdrawal from Somalia (Cassata, 1993; Logan, 1996, p.159; Johnston and Dagne, 1997, p.200; MacKinnon, 2000, p.78). On 7 October, President Clinton set new tasks for the US forces in Somalia and announced that they would be withdrawn by the end of March 1994. Senators debated the president’s position heatedly, with some demanding earlier withdrawal, but in the end, the Senate passed a resolution that accepted the president’s withdrawal date while limiting the US forces’ mission to humanitarian assistance (Johnston and Dagne, 1997, p.201). The House passed a resolution which called for the withdrawal by the end of January, followed by another resolution affirming the end-of-March deadline (Johnston and Dagne, 1997, pp.201-202).

US public support was also strong during the UNITAF phase but became weaker thereafter. The US public supported the military intervention at a rate of over 70% in December 1992 and January 1993 (Larson, 1996, p.118; Klarevas, 2000, pp.532-534). However, this support soon started to
decline. In March, support fell to about 50% (Delaney, 2004, p.38). In another poll, US public support remained at the same level of about 50% in late June, a period just after the compellers started proactive military operations. Two polls in September showed some 40% support, so there existed only partial support for the offensive. The polls in October showed about 30% support (Larson, 1996, p.118; Logan, 1996, pp.160-161; Klarevas, 2000, pp.532-534).

The polls also showed the lack of strong support for the tasks of disarmament and the establishment of peace. Although differently worded questions drew somewhat inconsistent results, the US public was divided over whether the troops should focus on food delivery or also engage in disarmament and/or the establishment of peace during the UNITAF phase. In December 1992 and January 1993, each of the positions earned about 40%–50% support in polls (Logan, 1996, p.163; Klarevas, 2000, pp.535-536). In September 1993, however, some 70% supported food delivery, while only some 20% thought the troops should pursue disarmament (Klarevas, 2000, p.536).

The attempt to capture Aidid received two-third support according to polls conducted in mid- to late June (Larson, 1996, p.67; Klarevas, 2000, p.536; Baum, 2004, p.215). In a poll in September, however, over 50% showed concern that the US was too involved in Somalia, and another poll in the same month showed that 57% felt that the US should halt its active military involvement (Larson, 1996, p.68; Klarevas, 2000, p.537).

Pakistan also lacked strong domestic support. When Pakistani troops suffered heavy casualties in the attack on 5 June, some members of parliament called for the withdrawal of the troops from Somalia (AFP, 7 Jun 1993b). An Islamist political party which demanded the withdrawal organised rallies and demonstrations and condemned not only the killing but also the Pakistani government, arguing that the government had sacrificed the troops for American interest (AFP, 11 Jun 1993b). The party also criticised the following offensive against the SNA, arguing that Pakistan should focus on humanitarian activities and should not engage in offensive operations against Muslims (Krishnasamy, 2002, p.98).
In short, the compellers did not have strong domestic support. US domestic support was partial at best when the compellence started in June 1993, and it continued to decline. As US troops became involved in more military actions and fewer humanitarian activities, the operation lost the support of the Congress and public. Aidid must have known of the declining support, because he is said to have watched international satellite broadcasts (CNN, 1993i). The Pakistani government also received criticism as Pakistani troops suffered large casualties and conducted offensive operations.

The third factor that can support the credibility of threats is reputation based on the compellers’ past behaviour. The behaviour of the compellers during UNOSOM I and UNITAF damaged their reputation, so this factor was also absent in this case.

The US had an advantageous reputation on account of its military capability when it intervened in 1992. When he met with Aidid at the beginning of UNITAF, US special representative Oakley mentioned the enormous firepower that the US had employed and its victory over the large Iraqi army in the Gulf War the previous year (Hirsch and Oakley, 1995, p.55; Peterson, 2000, p.58). Aidid seemed well aware of this fact, as was the wider Somali public (CNN, 1992c; Richburg, 1992c; Sommer, 1994, p.75; Rutherford, 2008, p.181).

However, this advantageous reputation was damaged as it became clear that UNITAF would not work on forcible disarmament. Observing that the US would not enforce disarmament, Somalis became emboldened and dared to challenge the US forces (Sommer, 1994, p.75; Eknes et al., 1995, IV-2). Therefore, it can be said that the reputation of the US forces had waned when the compellence commenced in the UNOSOM II phase.

In addition, the UN and especially Pakistani troops earned a poor reputation because of their ineffectiveness and the lack of forceful response against local armed groups during UNOSOM I (Claiborne, 1992; CNN, 1992c; Alexander, 1993a; Williams, 1993a). Aidid and the SNA regarded Pakistani capabilities as weak. Aidid’s troops sneered at the obsolete equipment that the Pakistani troops had when they arrived (Peterson, 2000,
Aidid and the SNA thought that they could push around the less capable and less prepared UNOSOM II, in comparison to UNITAF, and win over the UN force by inflicting casualties (Hirsch and Oakley, 1995, pp.114-115; Poole, 2005, p.44). Aidid was reported as saying that he would be able to drive UNOSOM II “into the ocean” (Woods, 1997, p.169).

Therefore, the compellers did not have a pre-earned advantageous reputation. Although the US had a good reputation in terms of capabilities at first, this was damaged by the time UNOSOM II started. The UN troops did not have a good reputation from the beginning.

The final factor that can support the credibility of threats is the actual use of force. Although the compellers employed a massive amount of force, as described below, the compellence ended in failure in Somalia. This does not match the expectation of H3; therefore, it is necessary to consider the implication of this case with regard to the hypothesis.

UNOSOM II’s first major use of force happened in Kismayo, and the compellers successfully inflicted a defeat on an allied group of the SNA. On 6 May, just two days after the transition from UNITAF to UNOSOM II, local warlord Omar Jess’s force attacked Kismayo, and the Belgian troops stationed in Kismayo repelled the attack. A Belgian officer was wounded, and some 40 members of the armed faction were thought to have been killed or injured in the battle (Alexander, 1993c; Miller, 1993a; USACMH, 2003, p.84). As SRSG Howe (1995, p.53) writes, “UNOSOM II had met its first military test successfully”. As Jess’s faction was part of the SNA, this successful use of force could have had the effect of strengthening the credibility of threats by demonstrating the competence of the compellers.

However, a month later, the SNA carried out a large-scale attack against UNOSOM II in Mogadishu as a response to its weapons storage sites inspection. The SNA ambushed Pakistani troops returning from the inspection and attacked another Pakistani unit guarding a soup kitchen. The UN troops fought back but suffered large casualties, with 24 killed and some 60 wounded (Richburg, 1993c; UN, 1993d, paras.5-9; 1994a, pp.23-24).

After this incident, UNOSOM II and the QRF launched a campaign of proactive use of force. The campaign mainly targeted the SNA’s command-
and-control and weapons storage facilities. On 6 June, US helicopters destroyed the SNA’s artillery pieces (AFP, 6 Jun 1993a; Susman, 1993a; UN, 1994a, p.60). On 12 June, AC-130 ground attack aircraft, attack helicopters, and the QRF destroyed a factory building that had been used for the ambush on 5 June, the SNA’s weapons storage sites in Mogadishu, and Aidid’s radio station. The QRF also secured another radio facility that had been controlled by Aidid (UN, 1994a, p.72; Evans, 2000, pp.39-41; USACMH, 2003, p.93). On the following two days, AC-130 again carried out air strikes on the SNA’s hidden arms depots and the manufacturing facilities of the so-called “technicals” (UN, 1993d, para.21; UN, 1994a, p.72; USACMH, 2003, p.93).17

On 17 June, the international force conducted another large-scale offensive. AC-130 attacked multiple targets that included not only hidden weapon sites but also the residences of Aidid, Jess, and Osman Atto, who was one of Aidid’s top lieutenants. A cordon-and-search operation by troops from Pakistan, Italy, Morocco, and France followed to clear the targets. Although the international troops suffered casualties in the engagements – six killed and over forty wounded – they successfully secured the targets (Lorch, 1993c; UN, 1994a, pp.28, 73-74; USACMH, 2003, pp.94-95). Frequent strikes and raids by UNOSOM II and the QRF against the SNA’s weapons stockpiles continued thereafter (Shaw, 1993a; Susman, 1993g; UN, 1994a, pp.60-61; USACMH, 2003, p.95).

Despite the repeated use of force by the compellers, the SNA did not give in; rather, it intensified its own attacks against the international forces. On 28 June, a Pakistani contingent conducting a search operation around an SNA facility was attacked and suffered casualties, with two killed and three wounded (UN, 1994a, p.75). On 2 July, 500 Italian troops returning from a

17 Technicals refer to trucks, land cruisers, and other vehicles which are modified to carry mounted weapons, such as machine guns, anti-aircraft guns, or rocket launchers. The name came from the way in which humanitarian operators described the expense of hiring armed guards as “technical assistance” (Richburg, 1992b).
cordon-and-search operation were attacked, and a heavy firefight ensued. While the counterattack was thought to have inflicted heavy casualties – possibly hundreds – on the assailants, the Italian unit also suffered casualties, with three killed and over twenty wounded. Moreover, the Italian contingent withdrew from its outposts near the site (UN, 1994a, pp.28, 76-77; Ignazi et al., 2012, p.103). Starting in July, the SNA conducted attacks almost daily, such as ambushing vehicles, sniping, and firing mortars and anti-tank rockets at the compounds of the international troops (AFP, 11 Jul 1993; UN, 1994a, pp.30, 61; USACMH, 2003, p.96).

In response, the QRF conducted a further escalatory strike on 12 July. The target was a command-and-control centre of the SNA called “Abdi House”. Upon receiving information that SNA leaders would hold a meeting there, the QRF attacked the house using helicopters and ground troops. This strike was different from previous ones in that no prior warning was provided; this is because the operation aimed to degrade the SNA’s command-and-control capabilities by neutralising its leadership rather than destroying its facilities and weapons. The number of Somali casualties is in question. UNOSOM II announced that 20 SNA members were killed. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) announced that 54 were killed and 161 wounded. The SNA claimed that 73 were killed and hundreds were wounded (UN, 1994a, pp.30, 79-80; Evans, 2000, pp.44-46). Beside this raid, the QRF conducted four other weapons sweep operations in July (UN, 1994a, p.61). In addition, the Pakistani contingent received the reinforcements of tanks and started routine weapons searches (USACMH, 2003, p.97). UNOSOM II and the QRF conducted at least four weapons searches in August (AFP, 5 Aug 1993; UN, 1994a, p.62).

Although it was reported that these proactive moves and weapons searches at checkpoints led to the reduction of attacks (USACMH, 2003, p.97), the SNA’s attacks continued and even escalated to using command-detonated mines to attack vehicles and firing anti-tank rockets at helicopters (UN, 1994a, pp.30-31, 62-63; USACMH, 2003, p.98). On 5 September, the SNA launched another large-scale attack against UNOSOM II’s Nigerian outpost in Mogadishu. The Nigerian reinforcements that were sent to the outpost fell into an ambush on the way and suffered heavy casualties, with
seven killed and eight wounded. One Nigerian was also captured. A Pakistani unit moving to reinforce the Nigerians was also attacked, and two Pakistanis were wounded (UN, 1994a, pp.81-83; USACMH, 2003, p.103).

In September, the compellers used force on multiple occasions when they tried to remove the roadblocks that were obstructing their supply routes. On 9 September, the SNA attacked a peacekeepers’ convoy that included tanks and armoured vehicles that were stopped by a roadblock using recoilless rifles and anti-tank rockets. The Pakistani counterattack, backed by QRF helicopters, was able to repel the attackers. The convoy fell under attack again when the peacekeepers tried to remove another roadblock. This time, the SNA mobilised a mob of over 1,000 people, including women, and the Somalis fired heavily from the crowd, as well as from their positions in nearby buildings. The Pakistani troops and QRF helicopters again repelled the attack but inflicted heavy casualties on the Somalis, including women, and were thus criticised. On the side of the compellers, a Pakistani tank was destroyed, a Pakistani was killed, and two Pakistani and three US troops were wounded (CNN, 1993g; Richburg, 1993j; UN, 1994a, pp.83-84; USACMH, 2003, p.104). On 16 September, Pakistani troops removing another roadblock came under fire. They returned fire and destroyed the SNA’s position (UN, 1994a, p.65; USACMH, 2003, p.104).

The compellers also proactively searched for weapons and confiscated hidden stockpiles. On 13 September, the QRF, conducting one such operation near a hospital used by the SNA as a firing position, confiscated a number of weapons and ammunition, including mortar rounds. As they withdrew, however, the SNA started to attack the force, and a heavy firefight ensued. The QRF suffered three wounded in the two hours of engagement, while Aidid claimed that 25 to 60 SNA members were killed (Patterson, 1999; Baumann, 2003a, pp.125-130; USACMH, 2003, p.105; Whetstone, 2015, pp.81-92).

In addition, TF Ranger’s seventh raid developed into the fiercest battle in the case. On 3 October, TF Ranger raided a building in Mogadishu based on intelligence that SNA senior members were gathering there. The targets were arrested, but the SNA shot down a helicopter covering the
ground operation, and a heavy combat ensued as TF Ranger and the QRF tried to rescue the crew of the downed helicopter. The US troops secured the crash site and kept beating back swarming armed Somalis, but another helicopter was shot down, thus exacerbating the situation. The US convoys were unable to approach the second crash site because of heavy attacks and the complicated urban terrain, which was full of hastily built roadblocks. After several failed attempts, a new convoy was formed with additional units from Pakistan and Malaysia, who were equipped with armour. The convoy fought its way to the crash sites and rescued the troops who had been pinned down at the first one, but no one had been left at the second (Atkinson, 1994a; 1994b; Bowden, 1999; Baumann, 2003b, pp.142-155; Whetstone, 2015, pp.124-193). In total, 19 soldiers, including 18 US soldiers, were killed and over 90 were wounded. A US helicopter pilot was captured by the SNA. On the Somali side, the casualties were understood to be over 300 killed and over 700 wounded (UN, 1994, p.88; Stewart, 2003, p.13; USACMH, 2003, p.106).

H3 predicts that the actual use of force is the most effective way to enhance the credibility of threats and that other sources would be ineffective, but this case does not match that expectation. As has been described, the compellers repeatedly employed heavy force in a proactive manner in this case. Nevertheless, the compellence failed. Moreover, other three possible sources of credibility – national interest, domestic support, and previously acquired advantageous reputation – were absent in this case, so the result cannot deny the importance of any of these.

There are two possible interpretations of the result in relation to the hypothesis. One is that, contrary to the prediction of H3, the use of force was not important as a source of credibility and one or more of the other three sources were important. The other interpretation is that the case does not contradict H3; the use of force was an INUS condition and factors other than the credibility of threats had to be present to realise the success of compellence.

The appropriateness of these interpretations needs to be confirmed by the examination of successful cases. In fact, the two successful cases
examined in previous chapters suggest that the latter interpretation is appropriate; the two cases demonstrate the necessity of the actual use of force. The Somalia case ended in failure in spite of the heavy use of force, but this does not contradict H3 if the factor is an INUS condition. The cross-case analyses in Chapter 6 come back to this point.

5.3.4 Denial

The next hypothesis is H4, which addresses denial. There are four generally applicable ways to achieve denial in peace operations: attrition, stronghold neutralisation, decapitation, and counter-coercion negation. The hypothesis predicts that counter-coercion negation is the most effective among them. The compellers in this case failed to achieve counter-coercion negation, and the case ended in failure. Therefore, the case is consistent with the expectation of the hypothesis.

The first option to achieve denial is attrition. There is no reliable information about the exact number of casualties that the SNA suffered in the combats with the international troops, but the figure seems to be quite large. The fact that the compellence ended in failure despite the application of attrition casts doubt on the effectiveness of the approach and is consistent with H4.

The available information indicates that the SNA suffered large casualties in the first month of the compellent military campaign. At least three SNA gunmen were killed, and some 40 were detained in the QRF’s attack on 12 June (Evans, 2000, p.40). The UN estimated that “dozens” of SNA combatants were killed or wounded in the engagement on 17 June (Lorch, 1993c), while initial reports estimated that more than 150 combatants were killed (UN, 1994a, p.74; USACMH, 2003, p.94). According to a UN report, 67 Somalis were killed and 103 wounded in the engagements on 2 July that involved Italian troops and the QRF (UN, 1994a, p.77). The number of Somali casualties was possibly in the hundreds (Ignazi et al., 2012, p.103).

The ensuing engagements also inflicted casualties on the SNA. For example, a US convoy was ambushed on 7 August, and the US counterattack killed five gunmen, wounded fifteen, and captured more (AFP,
8 Aug 1993a). The Somali side reportedly suffered some 30 casualties in the engagement between the Nigerian contingent and the SNA on 5 September (Miller, 1993c; Richburg, 1993i). Between 25 and 60 SNA combatants were also killed in the engagement with US QRF on 13 September (Patterson, 1999, p.10).

The number of SNA casualties resulting from some other battles was also thought to be large, but the use of human shields by the SNA makes it difficult to distinguish the combatants from the civilians in terms of the number of casualties. The Somali casualties in the engagement on 9 September included women and possibly children who were mobilised by the SNA. The SNA claimed that over 150 were killed, but they initially claimed some 200 were killed and some 350 were wounded. The ICRC maintained that 107 were wounded but was unclear about those who were dead, and the local hospital staff stated that 24 to 29 were killed and 117 wounded (AFP, 11 Sep 1993; 15 Sep 1993). The battle on 3 October surely inflicted the largest casualties on the Somali side in the compellent campaign. The US and UN estimated that 300 to 500 Somalis were killed and over 700 wounded (UN, 1994a, p.88; USACMH, 2003, p.106). The ICRC also put the number of wounded Somalis at over 700 and said that one-third were women and children. The SNA maintained that some 300 Somalis were killed and some 800 wounded (Miller, 1993d). A sectoral commander of the SNA later said in an interview that 133 SNA fighters were killed in the battle (PBS, no date b).

Summing up the above information, the compellers inflicted quite substantial casualties on the target side, but the compellence nevertheless ended in failure. Even a conservative estimate would bring the number of SNA combatants killed in engagements with the compellers to more than 250. This number could have been much larger, and there must have been hundreds more wounded. The fact that the compellence failed despite the SNA suffering significant casualties casts doubt on the effectiveness of attrition and is concurrent with the expectation of H4.

The second possible form of denial is stronghold neutralisation. The compellers tried to achieve it but failed to do so. As the hypothesis did not
predict this approach to be most effective, the absence of stronghold neutralisation in a failed case of compellence does not reveal much about the hypothesis.

The southern part of Mogadishu was the stronghold of the SNA. Aidid and the SNA had continued to fight for control of Mogadishu before and after the fall of Barre (Duyvesteyn, 2012, pp.94-99). Mogadishu, which had a port and an airport, was the central entry point for relief goods, and controlling the goods meant having enormous power and wealth (Maren, 1996, p.204).

The compellers attempted to bring Mogadishu under their control, but the attempt was unsuccessful. The aim of the UNOSOM II offensive in June was to destroy the SNA facilities in south Mogadishu and flush it out by means of search-and-clear operations (CNN, 1993e; USACMH, 2003, p.129; Cassidy, 2004, p.157). The compellers destroyed the SNA’s command-and-control centres and arms depots, but the SNA did not leave the capital and continued resistance there. After the attack on Pakistani troops in early June, the UN troops lost their will to leave their compounds, especially without US support, and almost stopped patrolling the streets (Richburg, 1993h; Anderson, 1995, pp.274-275; Warner and Levin, 1995, p.17; USACMH, 2003, p.64). Despite repeated military operations, 40% of Mogadishu was off limits for UN troops by mid-July (AFP, 19 Jul 1993; Shaw, 1993c). The compellers were not able to secure even major communication roads, which were coloured red on a Pentagon map, which meant that they were under high threat (Gellman, 1993). Of course, the major presence of international troops in Mogadishu itself could mean that the SNA’s stronghold was under pressure, but the situation was far from neutralised. Therefore, stronghold neutralisation was not achieved in this case.

The third form of denial is decapitation, which ended in failure despite the compellers’ explicit and extensive effort. As with stronghold neutralisation, the failure of decapitation in a failed case does not say much about the hypothesis, because H4 does not predict that it will be the most effective form.

The effort of decapitation started soon after the SNA’s attack on Pakistani troops on 5 June. The UNSC adopted Resolution 837 the next day
and emphasised that UNOSOM II could arrest those who were responsible (UNSC, 1993b). The UN reportedly requested the detention of Aidid and his aides before the initial offensive against the SNA commenced (CNN, 1993b; Schafer, 1993). On 17 June, SRSG Howe publicly announced that he had ordered the arrest of Aidid and called on him to surrender (AFP, 17 Jun 1993a; AP, 1993d). On the same day, international troops raided some SNA facilities, including the residence of Aidid (Lorch, 1993c; UN, 1994a, pp.28, 73-74; USACMH, 2003, pp.94-95), but he escaped and remained at large thereafter.

The compellers employed three major steps for decapitation after Aidid went underground. The first was to offer a prize for his head. UNOSOM II announced that 25,000 dollars would be paid for information that led to the capture of Aidid, and it distributed wanted posters (AFP, 26 Jun 1993; 10 Jul 1993; Susman, 1993e). The prize was offered to show the local people the seriousness of the attempt to capture Aidid, and the UNOSOM II leaders hoped to offer an even higher prize if possible (Warner and Levin, 1995, pp.15, 23; PBS, no date c; no date d). However, the lack of intelligence on the whereabouts of Aidid kept hindering the effort to arrest him.

The second step was the attack against “Abdi House” on 12 July. As explained earlier, the operation aimed to degrade the SNA’s command-and-control capabilities by neutralising its leadership. The attack was based on information that Aidid would attend the meeting, but he was not there, because he had another appointment (Drysdale, 1994, pp.202-203). Moreover, the identities of attendees remain in question. The US claimed that those who gathering there were hard-core, anti-UN SNA leaders who were planning future attacks against the international troops (Peterson, 2000, p.130; USACMH, 2003, p.132). The other view was that they were leaders of the SNA and the sub-clan to which Aidid belonged and that they were discussing the resumption of dialogue with UNOSOM II (Drysdale, 1994, pp.199-204; Bowden, 1999, pp.71-72; Peterson, 2000, pp.117-120). The compellers recognised the necessity to distinguish and alienate Aidid from the clan to which he belonged (USACMH, 2003, pp.96, 99). However, it is understood that the attack and killing of moderate clan leaders drove non-
supporters of Aidid to support him; thus, the attack was counterproductive (Hirsch and Oakley, 1995, pp.121-122; Kaempf, 2012, pp.403-404).

The third step of the decapitation was the deployment of TF Ranger. SRSG Howe requested that the US government deploy special operation forces just after the attack on Pakistani troops in early June, but the government was reluctant at first (Warner and Levin, 1995, p.24; Howe, 1997, p.181; Poole, 2005, p.43). It decided to deploy TF Ranger only after four US soldiers were killed on 8 August; these were the first US fatalities after the transition to UNOSOM II (Warner and Levin, 1995, pp.25-27; Findlay, 2002, pp.197-198; Poole, 2005, p.48).

TF Ranger conducted raids with the aim of detaining Aidid and his aides, and it succeeded to some extent but ultimately failed. The first raid on 30 August did not capture any targets. The second operation, on 7 September, captured 17 SNA fighters. Two US soldiers were slightly wounded in the operation. The third one, on 14 September, followed the wrong target. TF Ranger arrested 39 people, including a man who was supposed to be Aidid, but he turned out to be a Somali police chief who was cooperating with the UN. On 16 September, TF Ranger raided an SNA compound and detained several people while killing another. The fifth raid, on 18 September, targeted one of Atto’s garages and captured eight people, but Atto was not there. Atto was arrested along with his three bodyguards in the sixth raid, on 21 September. The SNA attacked TF Ranger helicopters with anti-tank rockets, and TF Ranger’s counter-fire inflicted casualties on the SNA (Atkinson, 1994a; USACMH, 2003, p.138). In the seventh raid, on 3 October, captured twenty-four people, including three senior aides of Aidid, were captured (Bowden, 1999, pp.32, 50). However, the operation ended in a fiasco, and the hunt for Aidid ceased thereafter.

In the end, the compellers were not able to capture Aidid despite their extensive efforts. He changed his location every night, disguised himself when he moved, used only low-power radio, and changed its frequencies to prevent detection (Sinai, 1993a; Peterson, 2000, p.96; Kaempf, 2012, p.396). Although the compellers forced Aidid to go underground and detained some senior SNA members, this did not lead to the degradation of the SNA’s
combat capability. On the contrary, the SNA introduced new techniques and improved its attacks against the international troops, as discussed below. In sum, the compellers tried decapitation but failed to achieve it.

The final form of denial is counter-coercion negation. The SNA countered the compellence by employing all three possible strategies – casualty-generating strategies, civilian suffering-based strategies, and coalition-fracturing strategies – and the compellers failed to counter these counter-strategies. The fact that effective counter-coercion negation was absent and the case ended in failure corresponds well to H4.

The compellers sustained heavy casualties from the SNA’s attacks throughout the period of compellence. The first large-scale UN casualties occurred during the weapon-site inspection on 5 June. Despite receiving a warning from a notified SNA senior member that the planned inspection would bring about “a war”, UNOSOM II went through with the inspection. UNOSOM II judged that the warning was a bluff based on the past behaviour of the SNA, which had repeated such bold words but had not carried them out. Based on intelligence and the experience of UNITAF, UNOSOM II supposed that the worst possible situation would be armed riots (USACMH, 2003, pp.87-88). However, the SNA followed through with its threat. The SNA fired heavily on the returning inspection team, which was pinned down by roadblocks; overwhelmed about a dozen Pakistani troops, who were manning a feeding site; and ambushed the reinforcements who had been sent in (AFP, 7 Jun 1993c; Lorch, 1993a; Richburg, 1993c; UN, 1994a, pp.23-24, 69-70; Evans, 2000, pp.37-38). In total, 24 Pakistani troops were killed and some 60 troops injured (AFP, 8 Aug 1993b; UN, 1994a, pp.24, 70).

Subsequent engagements also generated casualties on the side of the international forces. Between 6 June and 12 July, 11 UNOSOM II troops were killed and 137 wounded (AFP, 12 Jul 1993a). The number, including the casualties on 5 June, increased to 39 killed and over 160 wounded by 8 August (Shaw, 1993e). The total number of casualties since the handover in May reached 47 killed and 175 wounded by 6 September (C. Burns, 1993). By the end of the month, the number further increased to 56 killed and over 200 wounded (Richburg, 1993k). The US Forces suffered the heaviest
casualties in the battle on 3–4 October, in which 18 US soldiers were killed and 84 wounded. A Malaysian was also killed, and more UNOSOM II troops were wounded in the battle (UN, 1994, p.88; USACMH, 2003, p.106). By 7 October, when President Clinton announced a new US policy on Somalia, the total casualties of the compellers had reached 77 killed and 301 wounded. Six US troops were missing and were later confirmed dead, and a US and a Nigerian soldiers were detained by the SNA (AP, 1993h).\footnote{The two captured soldiers were later released (Hirsch and Oakley, 1995, p.131).}

The lack of armour surely worsened the situation. The majority of the casualties on 5 June occurred when Pakistani reinforcements tried to reach the trapped units in soft-skin vehicles (UN, 1994a, p.71). The TF Ranger and the QRF, unequipped with armoured vehicles, also struggled to rescue trapped troops on 3–4 October and had to receive assistance from other countries’ armoured units.

However, because of the abundance of anti-armour weapons, having armour did not necessarily mean being safe. For example, a Pakistani tank was destroyed by the SNA using recoilless rifles on 9 September (CNN, 1993g; Richburg, 1993j). On 21 September, a Pakistani armoured vehicle was destroyed by an anti-tank rocket and suffered casualties, with three killed and seven wounded (UN, 1994a, pp.84-85; USACMH, 2003, p.104). On 27 September, Pakistani armoured vehicles were ambushed in two separate attacks. One of the vehicles was hit by an anti-tank rocket, and two Pakistani were wounded (UN, 1994a, p.85). Finally, three or four Malaysian armoured vehicles were destroyed in the rescue operation on 3–4 October (Casper, 2001, p.81; USACMH, 2003, p.106). The SNA possessed hundreds of anti-tank rockets and fired more than 200 in that battle (Whitney, 1993; Atkinson, 1994a).

Mortars posed a challenge to the compellers that was difficult to counter. Mortar attacks killed one and wounded nineteen in total (UN, 1994a, p.30). The SNA started to use mortars in its attacks on the compounds of the international troops in July (UN, 1994a, pp.61-67). At first, the compellers
used helicopters to counter the mortar fire. Later in September, the international troops came to use its own mortar fire in counterattacks. The use of mortar, however, had restrictions regarding the avoidance of collateral damage. The counterattacks were able to reduce the intensity of the attacks but could not stop them (USACMH, 2003, p.105).

Command-detonated mines also inflicted casualties on the compellers. On 8 August, a vehicle on patrol was blasted by a command-detonated mine, and four US soldiers were killed (UN, 1994a, pp.80-81; USACMH, 2003, p.98). The attack on 19 August using the same type of weapon wounded four US soldiers, and another on 22 August, combined with an ambush, wounded six US soldiers (UN, 1994a, pp.62-63, 81; USACMH, 2003, p.98). In addition, on 3 October, a US vehicle was hit by a command-detonated mine, and three US soldiers were wounded (UN, 1994a, p.86). The compellers tried to prevent and find mines by patrolling major roads, and they actually found and destroyed some (USACMH, 2003, p.134). However, as indicated by the incidents just noted, it was difficult to completely prevent damage caused by this type of attack.

Helicopters were also not invincible. Aidid regarded helicopters as the vulnerability of the international troops. Whenever he held a meeting, he made his combatants deploy on rooftops around the venue and instructed them to concentrate their fire on helicopters if they appeared (PBS, no date e). The SNA started to use anti-tank rockets against helicopters in August. The first hit occurred on 25 August, but the damage was slight (USACMH, 2003, p.98). The SNA shot down the first helicopter on 25 September. The armed group used anti-tank rockets, and three crew members were killed and two wounded. The troops who were sent to rescue the crew members also suffered casualties in the firefights (UN, 1994a, p.85; Casper, 2001, pp.25-28; USACMH, 2003, p.105; Whetstone, 2015, pp.97-114). The US troops regarded it as just a lucky shot and kept believing that the risk could be managed in a way that enabled them to avoid being shot down. However, it turned out that they underestimated the SNA’s adaptability, as demonstrated on 3 October (Ecklund, 2004, pp.56-57). That day, the SNA shot down two helicopters and severely damaged two others (Atkinson, 1994b).
In sum, the compellers were not able to prevent nor limit casualties. Using guerrilla-style attacks, the SNA not only kept the compellers bleeding but also advanced its attack capability by introducing new weapons, such as mortars and remote-controlled mines, and new techniques, such as the use of anti-tank rockets against helicopters.

The SNA also fully exploited the compellers’ inclination to avoid civilian casualties. The SNA used human shields in engagements on 5 and 17 June (AFP, 7 Jun 1993c; Lorch, 1993c; Richburg, 1993c; USACMH, 2003, pp.89, 94). A hospital building was used as a cover in the latter case, and the SNA repeated the practice, as seen in the engagement on 13 September (Lorch, 1993c; Susman, 1993d; Baumann, 2003a, p.126; USACMH, 2003, p.94). The SNA also used hospital compounds or vicinities as the firing positions from which they used mortars to attack the UN compounds (AFP, 19 Sep 1993; LaBelle, 1993; UN, 1994a, p.86). The use of human shields and hospitals constrained the peacekeepers from firing back and increased their casualties (AFP, 8 Jun 1993; Lorch, 1993c; Susman, 1993d; Kaempf, 2012, pp.396-397).

The SNA’s use of human shields put the international troops in a difficult situation when the troops faced mobs. On 13 June, a demonstration of 1,500 to 3,000 citizens – mainly women and children – approached an outpost of Pakistani peacekeepers. According to the UN, the Pakistani troops fired warning shots in vain, and then Somali gunmen within and around the mob started to fire upon not only the Pakistani troops but also the civilians. The incident is understood as a plot to create a scene of massacre by peacekeepers. The number of casualties is unclear, but it is thought that eight people were shot (UN, 1993d, paras.23-24; 1994a, pp.27-28, 72-73; Peterson, 2000, pp.85-86). Journalists on the ground, however, told a different story. They reported that Pakistani troops started to shoot into the crowd without warning shots and did so without being fired at (Alexander, 1993e; Richburg, 1993f; Peterson, 2000, pp.84-85). The facts are unclear, but the incident drew criticisms from international human rights organisations (AFP, 31 Jul 1993; UN, 1994a, p.73). Similarly, the compellers were criticised for firing into a crowd when they were attacked on 9 September, as mentioned earlier.
The SNA repeatedly claimed that the attacks by the international troops generated civilian casualties. For example, the SNA claimed that the QRF attack on the SNA’s command-and-control centre on 12 July killed 73, including women and children, and wounded hundreds, including bystanders (UN, 1994a, p.79). The SNA also blamed the Nigerian contingent, stating that the engagement on 5 September erupted because the UN troops fired on civilians, killing 23 and injuring 56 (AFP, 6 Sep 1993). After the engagement with the QRF on 12 September, the SNA claimed that the Somalis suffered casualties – 37 killed and 62 wounded – most of whom were women and children (AFP, 13 Sep 1993).

The compellers recognised the importance of avoiding collateral damage. The QRF utilised staff judge advocates in its operations so that force was used in accordance with the rules of engagement and the risk of collateral damage was assessed (Baumann, 2003a, pp.130-131). In the early phase of their operations, the compellers issued warnings before conducting air strikes so that non-combatants could evacuate the target areas (CNN, 1993d; Susman, 1993c; 1993g; USACMH, 2003, p.130). The compellers deviated from this practice when they carried out the strike against “Abdi House” on 12 July without providing any warning (USACMH, 2003, p.132). This was because the aim of the attack was decapitation, but it resulted in the killing of non-SNA participants at the meeting.

Collateral damage was unavoidable even with preventive effort. For example, an airstrike on 14 June killed a boy who happened to be sleeping against the wall of a target compound, and a woman was killed and a dozen others wounded in another airstrike that day (Susman, 1993b; Peterson, 2000, pp.86-87). In a large-scale engagement on 17 June, a missile fired from a helicopter missed its target and struck a relief agency facility. One person was killed, and seven were wounded (Lorch, 1993c). A counterattack against SNA gunmen who took cover in a refugee camp resulted in two civilians being killed (Susman, 1993h). The number of civilian casualties on 3 October is unclear. Hundreds of Somalis were thought to have been killed or wounded, and civilians must have been included among them, because the battle was fought extensively in one of the busiest areas in Mogadishu (PBS, no date b).
The total number of civilian casualties is unclear. Aidid claimed that 13,000 Somalis were killed by the international troops. Oakley estimated that 6,000 to 10,000 Somalis were killed or wounded. A journalist estimated that the number of Somali casualties was less than 2,000 (Peterson, 2000, p.88). Subtracting the estimated number of SNA casualties, which is also ambiguous, from that of the overall Somali casualties would give an estimated number of civilian casualties that might be huge. The SNA intentionally created civilian casualties and exploited those that the compellers inflicted, which undermined support for the mission (AFP, 31 Jul 1993; 12 Aug 1993).

Finally, the international coalition was not cohesive, and the SNA exploited this too. The main fissure emerged between the US and the UN on the one hand and Italy, a former colonial power, on the other. Italy provided the Barre regime with military and economic aid, and due to corruption there were Italian politicians who benefitted from such aid programmes (Achtner, 1993; Prunier, 1997, pp.137, 142-143; Tripodi, 1998, pp.60, 62). Italian participation in the Somalia was a move that was taken to depart from Italy’s dirty past in the context of a nationwide anti-corruption investigation. Italy tried to join UNITAF in its earliest stage. However, the US was concerned about Italy’s relations with Somalia and thus delayed acceptance, which frustrated Italy (Simpson, 1992; Prunier, 1997, p.137). The Italian government made much of showing its domestic audience its departure from past regimes. When the international forces intervened, the ex-finance minister from the Barre regime, with whom Italian politicians had corrupt relationships, aligned with Ali Mahdi. This fact led Italy to be amicable to the side that was opposed to Ali Mahdi – that is, Aidid (Prunier, 1997, pp.142-143).

The US and the UN pursued military confrontation with Aidid, but Italy was critical of this approach. Italy regarded the approach as belated. It also did not want to benefit Ali Mahdi by confronting and weakening Aidid. Italy disobeyed the UNOSOM II commander’s order to forcefully take a position occupied by the SNA, and it relied on negotiations with the faction (UN, 1994a, p.29; Prunier, 1997, p.143; Ignazi et al., 2012, p.104). Italy called for restraints after Pakistani troops fired on demonstrators on 13 June and for
the halt of offensive operations after the QRF attacked “Abdi House” on 12 July (AFP, 15 Jun 1993; 12 Jul 1993; AP, 1993e). It also demanded the redeployment of its troops from southern Mogadishu (AFP, 13 Jul 1993; AP, 1993f). Discontent with the aggressive posture against Aidid, Italy demanded that its officer be given a senior post at UNOSOM II headquarters. Italy’s demand strengthened, especially after it suffered casualties in a weapons-search operation. However, the US did not agree to weaken the pressure against Aidid (AFP, 13 Jul 1993; Lorch, 1993d; Rutherford, 2008, pp.145-146).

The friction between the UN and the US on the one hand and Italy on the other culminated in the UN’s demand to change the commander of the Italian contingent. Italy rebuffed the demand (AFP, 15 Jul 1993; Wakin, 1993; Prunier, 1997, p.143), but it was later announced in August that Italian troops would be redeployed out of Mogadishu and that the commander would leave Somalia at the time of rotation, which was the end of August (AFP, 13 Aug 1993; Reuter, 1993). Italy continued to criticise UNOSOM II when Pakistani and US troops fired into a mob on 9 September (AFP, 10 Sep 1993; Rutherford, 2008, p.155).

The suffering of casualties and killing of civilians in incidents involving the SNA widened the crack in the international coalition. The SNA intentionally focused its attacks on US and Pakistani troops and avoided attacking other coalition members who were critical of the heavy-handed approach (PBS, no date b). As the situation deteriorated, Italy and other coalition members asked for instructions from their respective capitals before implementing orders from the UNOSOM II commander, and this hindered timely operations. Many also refused to deploy to Mogadishu, the most dangerous place in the theatre of operation (UN, 1994a, pp.45, 78; Hirsch and Oakley, 1995, p.119; Bir, 1997, p.24; Rutherford, 2008, pp.142-143). It can be said that the coalition members were unable to unite their efforts in compellence.

To sum up, the compellers failed to achieve counter-coercion negation. The SNA kept inflicting casualties on the international troops by improving its attack capability. It also utilised civilians to constrain the
compellers’ responses and the actual or claimed civilian casualties to delegitimise the operation. The casualties of the troops and civilians deepened the split among the participating countries of the mission, so the armed group exploited the weakness of the coalition as well. The absence of counter-coercion negation in the failed case is consistent with the expectation of H4.

This section has examined the different types of denial pressure that compellers can employ in peace operations. In Somalia, the international troops applied attrition and inflicted heavy casualties on the SNA. Despite this, the compellence failed, and this fact casts doubt on the utility of attrition. The compellers also tried to achieve stronghold neutralisation and decapitation but failed to do so. The entire confrontation between the international troops and the SNA can be understood as a contest over the control of Mogadishu, and the compellers could not achieve this. The compellers also extensively pursued the capture of Aidid and his top aides, but Aidid remained at large, and the SNA’s combat capability did not suffer a severe blow because of this effort. The fact that these two types of denial were absent in the unsuccessful case of compellence leaves open the possibility that a compellent effort can succeed if they are achieved. Insights from other cases are required to examine this possibility, and this issue is further discussed in the cross-case analyses in Chapter 6. Finally, the compellers failed to achieve counter-coercion negation. The SNA employed all the casualty-generating strategies, civilian suffering-based strategies, and coalition-fracturing strategies, and the compellers ended up suffering from them until the end. H4 predicts that counter-coercion negation is the most effective form of denial, so the case of Somalia, which ended in failure, is concurrent with the prediction.

5.3.5 Third-Party Support

The final hypothesis to be examined is H5, which predicts that the absence of third-party support on the target side will lead to the success of compellence in peace operations. The SNA received support from actors in other countries, and the compellence ended in failure. Therefore, the case is consistent with the hypothesis.
Ethiopia was a source of weapons for the SNA. Somalia had a huge stock of weapons supplied by the Soviet Union and the US during the Cold War, and warring factions used them in the civil war (Gordon, 1992; Eknes et al., 1995, II-2). In addition, the uncontrolled border between Somalia and Ethiopia enabled weapons to move freely through it. Ethiopian soldiers sold their weapons to Somalis after the Ethiopian Mengistu regime collapsed (Adibe and Potgieter, 1995, pp.70-71; Natsios, 1996, pp.76-77; Duyvesteyn, 2012, p.59). Aidid imported new weapons, including heavy ones such as recoilless rifles, from Ethiopia. The compellers were aware of the flow of weapons from Ethiopia to Mogadishu, but the contingents under the French command that was in charge of the area could cover only the major roads, thus leaving other routes unchecked due to the lack of troops (Richburg, 1993l).

Sudan was also accused of supplying Aidid with weapons and training, but the government denied it (Osman, 1993; Sinai, 1993b). US intelligence showed that Sudan and Iran, which supported Sudan, provided Aidid with weapons, including remote-controlled mines, and the training to use them (Hunt, 1993b; Sinai, 1993b; Williams, 1993b). Sudanese Islam fundamentalists who fought in Afghanistan are said to have trained SNA combatants on how to attack helicopters with anti-tank rockets (Bowden, 1999, pp.110-111; Ecklund, 2004, p.56). Other Islamic states also seem to have supported the SNA. A local commander of the SNA said in an interview that most SNA combatants were trained in Islamic countries, including Libya (PBS, no date b).

Ironically, the presence of international actors, including the compellers, helped Aidid to obtain support from other countries. The US, UN, and non-government organisations located their headquarters and offices in the southern part of Mogadishu, which was under the control of Aidid, because the area possessed a port, an airport, and the US embassy building. This resulted in the pouring of a huge amount of money into the SNA through payment for properties, armed guards, and other services, and it is understood that the SNA used the income to obtain weapons (Sommer, 1994, pp.86, 116; Augelli and Murphy, 1995, pp.346-347; Farrell, 1995, p.198; Kapteijns, 2013b, p.426).
In sum, the compellers were not able to prevent the SNA from receiving support from third parties. The SNA smuggled weapons and received training from foreign actors, and this improved their combat capabilities. The international troops could not control the border areas, and let the smuggling continue. Moreover, the wider international presence even had the effect of providing the SNA with funds to obtain weapons. The compellence failed in a situation in which the target received third-party support, and this is concurrent with the expectation of H5.

5.4 Conclusion

This chapter has analysed whether the course of events in Somalia was concurrent with the hypotheses. As this is a case of outright failure, the conditions for success are expected to be absent. The analysis indicates that the case is consistent with three hypotheses, while one of them requires cautious evaluation, and it is inconsistent with the other two.

The Somalia case is in line with H4 and H5. H4 predicts that achieving counter-coercion negation as a form of denial makes compellence likely to succeed. The compellers failed to achieve this and kept suffering from the SNA’s counter-coercion. The case ended in failure, so it corresponds to the expectation of H4. Regarding other types of denial, the case casts doubt on the utility of attrition, which the compellers applied extensively, but neither supports nor denies stronghold neutralisation and decapitation, which the compellers tried but failed to achieve.

This case also corresponds with H5, which predicts that compellence is likely to succeed if the targets do not receive third-party support. In the case of Somalia, the SNA imported weapons and received training from foreign actors. The compellers could not prevent this, and the case ended in failure, so what happened in the case was concurrent with the expectation of the hypothesis.

The case is consistent with H2 as well, but with caveats. H2 predicts that compellence is likely to succeed if compellers employ the gradual-turning-of-the-screw strategy combined with positive inducements. In the
Somalia case, the compellers employed a tacit ultimatum and the gradual-turning-of-the-screw strategy, but did not give any carrots to the SNA. The combination which H2 predicts to be most effective did not materialise, and the compellence ended in failure, so the result corresponds with the expectation of the hypothesis.

Although this correspondence can be interpreted as support for the effectiveness of the combined strategy represented in H2, this interpretation contains a problem. Given that the compellers employed the gradual-turning-of-the-screw strategy in this case, such an interpretation assumes that positive inducements play an important role in compellence, and this should be confirmed in successful cases of compellence. However, the other two studies of successful cases cast doubt on the utility of positive inducements. They rather indicate that compellence can succeed without providing carrots if the use of gradually increased pressure is combined with other conditions.

The Somalia case does not contradict the finding from the other two case studies that the use of the gradual-turning-of-the-screw strategy is an INUS condition. If the use of the strategy is a necessary part of a conjunctural sufficient condition, the unsuccessful result after the use of the strategy does not negate the importance of the strategy; the likely cause of the failure is the absence of other conditions. This point is further discussed in the next chapter.

The expectations of the remaining two hypotheses – H1 and H3 – do not coincide what happened in Somalia. H1 predicts that the favourable balance of troops for compellers is likely to lead to the success of compellence. The case casts doubt on this hypothesis because it ended in failure despite the compellers’ numerical superiority over the SNA in Mogadishu. Logically, there is a possibility that numerical superiority is an INUS condition and that other conditions also have to be fulfilled to achieve success. However, the two successful cases examined in previous chapters negate this possibility.

H3 predicts that compellence is likely to succeed if the credibility of the threats is supported by the actual use of force. The compellence in Somalia ended in failure in spite of the massive use of force by the
compellers, and this casts doubt on the hypothesis. This result can be interpreted in two ways. One is that the importance of the use of force is denied and other sources of threat credibility that were absent in this case are important. The other is that the actual use of force is an INUS condition and needs to be combined with other conditions to achieve success. The two previous case studies support the latter interpretation, which will be discussed further in the next chapter. Therefore, the Somalia case does not contradict the hypothesis.

In conclusion, the Somalia case corresponds well to H4 and H5; corresponds to H2 as well, but this result requires evaluation based on insights from other cases; and does not contradict H1 and H3 if the conditions represented in the hypotheses are understood as INUS conditions. The cross-case analyses in the next chapter discuss what the findings mean for the validity of the derived conditions for success.
This chapter puts together the findings from the three case studies and conducts cross-case analyses. The previous three chapters have performed within-case analyses of three cases using the congruence method, which checks the congruence between the hypotheses and what actually happened. The most-similar-design comparison has also been applied to the prolonged case of compellence in Sierra Leone, and the temporal comparison between phases has provided additional insights into the derived conditions for success. This chapter looks into the patterns and consistencies between the three cases. Such consistency provides additional support for the findings of each case study, which are summarised in Tables 6.1 and 6.2.

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As explained in Chapter 2, this study assumes that compellence has conjunctural causation. Conditions are expected to work in combination to derive the success of the strategy, and there can be multiple combinations of conditions that lead to the same result – namely, equifinality. If a condition composing a conjunctural sufficient condition is indispensable for that conjuncture, that component condition is an INUS condition. The following analysis, like the case studies, examine the validity of the derived conditions for success based on these assumptions.

As summarised in the tables, the results of the three case studies show some consistencies. The congruence method finds that all three cases are congruent to H5. Substantial third-party support provided to target armed groups turned out to be largely absent in two successful cases. Pro-integration militias in East Timor were proxies created by the Indonesian military, and they received weapons, training, and operational support from the Indonesian authorities. However, as Indonesian interests changed under
international pressure, the support shrank to the point of effective abandonment. As the militias depended heavily on Indonesian support, its disappearance was a severe blow to them. The RUF in Sierra Leone was supported by Taylor of neighbouring Liberia. The RUF received arms and ammunition from Taylor and traded diamonds with him. Taylor’s support also dwindled after international sanctions were threatened and applied to the country, and a new insurgency threatened his regime. In contrast, the SNA in Somalia continued to receive third-party support, and the case ended in failure. Weapons flowed from Ethiopia, Sudan, and Iran, and they included heavy weapons, such as recoilless rifles and command-detonated mines. Sudanese Islamic fundamentalists are also said to have trained the SNA to attack helicopters with anti-tank rockets. The support enhanced the SNA’s combat capabilities and it kept fighting against the compellers.

In addition to the congruence method, the most-similar-design comparison of the Sierra Leone case provides further support to this consistency. The end of Liberian support was one of the two factors that emerged in the final phase of compellence. In combination with the other factor, the cessation of Liberian support enhanced the prospect that the RUF would be defeated. As the acceptance of disarmament by the RUF followed only thereafter, the course of events indicates that the absence of third-party support was necessary for success.

Similarly, a counterfactual thought experiment in the East Timor case also suggests that the factor was necessary for the success. The pro-integration militias escaped to West Timor, which is an Indonesian territory, and launched cross-border attacks against INTERFET. As the mandate of INTERFET covered East Timor only and the force could not move into West Timor, the continuance of Indonesian support would have enabled the militias to persistently maintain their resistance against the compeller.

Overall, the three cases provide the clearest support for H5 among the hypotheses. All three cases were consistent with the hypothesis, and the two successful cases indicate that the absence of third-party support was an INUS condition for the success.
On the contrary, all three cases contradict H1. The inevitable uncertainty over the size of non-state armed groups poses some difficulty for the examination, but the comparison between the best estimation of this and the size of compellers does not match the prediction of the hypothesis. The compellers had a larger number of troops than the targets not only in the successful case of Sierra Leone but also in the failed case of Somalia. The overall size of UNOSOM II and the supporting US forces was smaller than the largest estimate of that of the SNA at first, but the compellers’ size soon surpassed that of the target as reinforcements arrived. Moreover, if the comparison is focused on Mogadishu, where the compellence was conducted, the balance was almost equal from the beginning, and the compellers soon came to have larger force. If the comparison is made with more moderate estimates of the SNA’s size, the compellers’ numerical advantage become even larger. Despite the favourable balance of troops, the compellence ended in failure.

The Somalia case does not negate the possibility that the favourable balance of troops was an INUS condition and that other conditions had to be fulfilled to derive success, but the other two cases do not support this interpretation. The compellers also maintained a numerical advantage in Sierra Leone from the beginning, but the compellence did not succeed until the final phase. The balance between the international troops and the RUF had been roughly equal throughout the phases. The international forces had local friendly forces, the SLA and the CDF, and their inclusion almost doubled the size of the compellers in phases one and two. In phase three, the size of the SLA and the CDF even swelled, and the ratio between the compellers and the target was at least two to one and possibly four to one, depending on the estimation of the RUF’s size used in the calculation. Therefore, the compellers had a clear and constant numerical advantage over the target. The fact that compellence did not succeed until the third phase in spite of the advantage does not match the expectation of H1. Moreover, the numerical advantage was not necessary to fulfil other conditions. Hence, the factor was not an INUS condition for the success of the case.
INTERFET also demonstrates that having a larger number of troops than the target is not necessary for successful compellence. INTERFET quickly deployed more troops than the number of militias who remained in Dili, but the force was outnumbered in the western border areas because only combat-ready troops from Western countries could be deployed to the area, and almost all the militias retreated to West Timor. The border area was where most of the confrontations between the compeller and the target took place, but the multinational force could compel the militias to give up violence despite the numerical disadvantage. This means that other conditions were sufficient to achieve success and that the favourable balance of troops was not a necessary part of the conjuncture. Therefore, the three cases examined do not provide support for H1.

The three cases do not indicate consistency regarding H2; the Somalia case is consistent with the hypothesis, but the other two cases are only partially so. The Somalia case corresponds with the hypothesis because the case ended in failure in the absence of the combination of the strategies that were expected to be effective based on the hypothesis. The compellers employed a tacit ultimatum and later tried the gradual-turning-of-the-screw strategy but did not provide any positive inducements for the SNA. The congruence can be interpreted as providing support to the hypothesis, but such support depends on the lack of a carrot. As this is a negative case, the factor’s impact should be confirmed by positive cases.

The two successful cases, however, do not confirm the importance of positive inducements. The compellers employed the combination of the gradual-turning-of-the-screw strategy and the carrot-and-stick strategy in Sierra Leone, and the case ended in success. However, the RUF obtained only a very small carrot when it agreed to disarm despite its claim for far greater positive inducements that were granted in the Lomé Agreement, which it had overturned earlier. Therefore, it seems that the carrot played a modest role at best and that the success mostly depended on the application of gradually increased pressure. Moreover, INTERFET did not employ any positive inducements, but the gradual-turning-of-the-screw strategy could derive success. Therefore, the two successful cases demonstrate the utility
of the gradual-turning-of-the-screw strategy but not that of the carrot and stick.

The result indicates that the use of carrots is not necessary for the success of compellence in peace operations. However, this does not deny the possibility that the provision of carrots plays a positive role. In fact, if the wider pool of cases is considered, the case of Ituri in the DRC involved the substantial use of carrots to induce armed groups to disarm (ICG, 2008; Tamm, 2013). The use of carrots combined with other sets of conditions that are different from those observed in this research may lead to the success of compellence, and the exploration of this possibility requires additional empirical studies.

Regarding the use of an ultimatum, the compellers employed the strategy in the Somalia case and the first phase of the Sierra Leone case, but they failed to compel the targets. In particular, the failure of the ultimatum in the first phase of the Sierra Leone case casts doubt on the utility of the strategy, because the compeller’s demands were limited. Moreover, there are additional cases, such as MONUC in Ituri and MINUSTAH, in which the use of ultimatums did not compel the targets if the wider pool of cases is considered (ICG, 2008, pp.31-32; Cockayne, 2014, pp.750-752). Of course, there remains a possibility that an ultimatum can be effective if it is combined with other specific conditions, but again, additional empirical studies are required to examine this possibility.

What this study shows is that the use of the gradual-turning-of-the-screw strategy was indispensable to the two most successful cases of compellence in peace operations. INTERFET had to exert pressure against the pro-integration militias from region to region to quell the violence. The compellers in Sierra Leone also had to increase the pressure until the RUF accepted disarmament. Therefore, the case studies suggest that the use of the gradual-turning-of-the-screw strategy was an INUS condition for the success. The compellers also employed the strategy in Somalia and in the second phase of Sierra Leone case without success, but this does not contradict the understanding that the use of the strategy was an INUS
condition. In sum, the empirical examination provides support for the first half of H2 but not for the other half.

The three cases also do not completely match the expectation of H3. The compellers used actual force not only in the successful cases but also in the failed case of Somalia and the unsuccessful phases of the Sierra Leone case.

However, the analyses of the two successful cases demonstrate that the actual use of force was necessary for the success, and the Somalia case does not contradict this understanding. Although all the other sources of credibility existed from the beginning in the East Timor case (pre-earned reputation was mixed), the compeller’s mere threats could not compel the militias to give up their objective of retaining the western part of East Timor. INTERFET had to actually employ force and inflict tactical defeats on the militias to make them realise the futility of resistance. Similarly, in Sierra Leone, the actual use of force by the compellers demoralised and facilitated the disarmament of the RUF. Taking into account the fact that the RUF had fought a prolonged civil war, the rebel group was unlikely to be induced to disarm without resisting the compellent attempt. Therefore, in this case too, the actual use of force and the accumulation of tactical defeats were necessary for the success of compellence. These courses of events correspond with the prediction of the hypothesis, and the fact that the failed compellent instances also involved the actual use of force does not contradict the understanding that the factor was necessary for the success of compellence.

In fact, in light of other cases, the actual use of force seems to be a necessary condition, rather than an INUS condition, for the success of compellence in peace operations if the scope is limited to compellence with the heaviest type of demands. Table 2.3 shows that all the cases that ended in success involved the actual use of force, and combined with the insights from the case studies, this factor can be regarded as a necessary condition. If the scope is expanded to the cases with limited demands, there are at least a few cases of successful compellence without the actual use of force. For example, during the civil war in Bosnia, NATO in support of UNPROFOR
issued an ultimatum against all parties to the conflict to remove their heavy weapons from the surrounding areas of Sarajevo or hand them over to UNPROFOR, and the armed factions acquiesced to the demand (Daniel et al., 1999, pp.57-60). NATO-led IFOR also successfully employed threats to compel Bosnian Serbs to accept the inspection of a weapons site (UN, 1996a, para.6; Baumann, 2004). The United Nations Transitional Authority in Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium also compelled a Serb armed group called Scorpions to retreat from the oil fields they occupied without the actual use of force (Boothby, 2004, pp.45-46; Howard, 2008, p.239). Therefore, there is a possibility that compellence succeeds only with threats and without actually using force if the demands are limited. However, if the demands are those of the heaviest type, the actual use of force is highly likely to be necessary. As Kilcullen (2019) states, “[T]here is always a language barrier and people don’t trust you when you first arrive. The actions speak much louder than words. So, if you can act in such a way as to demonstrate a message, it’s always more powerful than just words”.

The three cases do not confirm the importance of the other three possible sources of credibility. The East Timor case leaves open the possibility that they are also INUS conditions, but the Sierra Leone case denies the possibility. Domestic support and previously acquired advantageous reputation were absent in Sierra Leone, so they were not necessary for the success. Regarding national interests, those of Nigeria were involved in the case, but contingents from the country did not play a part in the application of proactive pressure. Therefore, this factor is unlikely to have enhanced the credibility of the threats. Moreover, if the wider pool of cases is considered, there is at least a successful case in which the compellers’ national interests were absent. It is the case of Ituri in the DRC, in which the countries that constituted the Ituri Brigade, which were Pakistan, Uruguay, Nepal, and Bangladesh, did not seem to have any strategic
interests. This case also raises doubts about the importance of this factor as a source of credibility.

Finally, all three cases are congruent to H4, but the utility of methods other than counter-coercion negation to achieve denial requires further examination. The congruence method shows that the cases of East Timor and Somalia correspond with the prediction of the hypothesis. In East Timor, INTERFET achieved counter-coercion negation very well. It suffered only two wounded in attacks by pro-integration militias and was also able to prevent civilian casualties and coalition fracturing. INTERFET also achieved stronghold neutralisation but only partially; the militias abandoned their strongholds within East Timor as a part of their game plan and instead established and maintained new strongholds in West Timor. Therefore, INTERFET denied the militias’ victory mainly through containing their counter-coercion.

The necessity of counter-coercion negation is clearly illustrated in the Somalia case, in which the condition was not fulfilled. In Somalia, the compelllers continued to suffer casualties due to SNA attacks, and the SNA exploited the civilian casualties and the rifts among the compelllers. The SNA’s effective counter-coercion turned the situation into a contest of endurance and finally led to the withdrawal of the compelllers.

Counter-coercion negation was also achieved in the Sierra Leone case, but the timing of the achievement does not completely correspond with the prediction of the hypothesis. UNAMSIL could not protect itself from the RUF’s obstructions and attacks at first. UNAMSIL came to be able to do so after the British intervention, and counter-coercion negation was achieved by the end of phase two of the compellence. However, the compellence did not succeed until phase three, and other conditions needed to be fulfilled. Therefore, the achievement of counter-coercion negation did not automatically lead to the success of compellence in Sierra Leone. Nevertheless, a counterfactual thought experiment suggests that the factor

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19 Regarding MONUC’s operation in Ituri, see, for example, Isberg and Tillberg (2012).
was necessary for success. The RUF sustained itself by robbing weapons and ammunition from weak hostile forces when support from Taylor was unavailable for several years in the middle of the decade-long civil war. The RUF would have done the same to the compellers and kept resisting disarmament if they had remained vulnerable to attacks. In fact, the rebels could grab tons of arms and ammunition from the peacekeepers before the British intervention. Effective counter-coercion negation was indispensable to denying the RUF of any hope of driving back the compellers, and this factor enabled the other two factors that emerged in the third phase to choke the rebels. Hence, all three cases provide support for H4 and suggest that counter-coercion negation was an INUS condition.

With regard to other types of denial, attrition did not work in all cases. The compellers did not use it in East Timor, and the Somalia case ended in failure although the compellers inflicted huge casualties on the target side. The compellers also killed or injured a relatively large number of rebels in Sierra Leone, but because of the size of the RUF and the availability of new recruits, their impact was not immense. Attrition is not likely to work unless the target armed groups are small in scale and have difficulty replacing lost personnel.

The Sierra Leone case demonstrates that decapitation can work positively. The replacement of power-greedy RUF leader Sankoh by more modest Sesay facilitated the RUF’s acceptance of disarmament. However, the success of INTERFET without decapitation shows that it is not an INUS condition for success. Even in Sierra Leone, it is not clear whether decapitation was necessary for success. Sankoh might also have accepted disarmament if the RUF’s defeat had become unavoidable. Moreover, the Somalia case vividly illustrates the difficulty of decapitation. The whereabouts of the target leader is difficult to determine. In addition, the apprehension or killing of the leader can be difficult even if the compellers know his or her location.

The two successful cases provide contradictory results over the necessity of stronghold neutralisation. The most-similar-design comparison of the Sierra Leone case indicates that stronghold neutralisation was
necessary for the success of the case. This was a factor, along with the absence of third-party support, that came to be achieved only in the third phase of the compellence, and it seems to have led to the difference in results compared to those of the earlier phases. In fact, the threat of attack on the RUF’s strongholds seems to have worked as a final blow which convinced it to accept disarmament. In contrast, the East Timor case ended in success despite the pro-integration militias maintaining their new strongholds. INTERFET only partially achieved stronghold neutralisation, as the militias abandoned their strongholds in the western areas of East Timor, which INTERFET then occupied. The militias retreated to West Timor, an Indonesian territory, and turned the military and refugee camps that had been set up there into their new strongholds. The fact that the compellence ended successfully despite the new strongholds demonstrates that their neutralisation was not an INUS condition for the success of the case.

The difference of success conditions between the two successful cases examined is seemingly caused by the differences in the situations. In the East Timor case, the militias’ new strongholds were outside of East Timor, so the persistence of the strongholds and the cessation of violence in East Timor – the compeller’s demand against the militias – were compatible. Other conditions were sufficient to make it difficult for the militias to sustain their struggle against INTERFET, especially because Indonesia ceased to support the militias, and the multinational force achieved high-level counter-coercion negation. In contrast, the RUF in Sierra Leone was highly resilient, and its strongholds included diamond-mining areas. As long as the RUF held the area under its control, it was able to sustain its activities. Moreover, although the RUF’s objective was to take over national power, the rebels were mostly composed of socially marginalised youth, and they were in a better position than in peacetimes by having arms (Abdullah, 1998; Bøås, 2007; Peters, 2011). Therefore, the continuance of conflict itself was in the rebels’ interest even though national power had become unattainable. In such a situation, it was indispensable to threaten the rebels with defeat and the loss of diamond-mining areas to induce them to end the rebellion. The case indicates that stronghold neutralisation is likely to be necessary when
the target armed groups of compellence are self-sustainable because of the strongholds and have an interest in the continuation of the conflict.

As compellence is a complicated phenomenon, equifinality is expected in causal relationships, as discussed in Chapter 2. In other words, different sets of conditions can derive the same result of success. Each of the two conjunctural sufficient conditions with and without stronghold neutralisation may represent two different paths to the success of compellence in peace operations. Another possibility is that either case is a deviation. The success of one of the two cases may be a rare, exceptional occasion, and the other case may represent the usual set of conditions for success. The confirmation of either possibility requires additional empirical examinations of wider patterns among the relevant cases.

In conclusion, the empirical examination provides support for H3 to H5, partial support for H2, and little to no support for H1. The cases examined indicate that there are five conditions which favour the success of compellence in peace operations: the use of the gradual-turning-of-the-screw strategy; the actual use of force as the source of credibility; the achievement of counter-coercion negation as a form of denial; the achievement of stronghold neutralisation, which is another form of denial; and the absence of third-party support on the target side. All of them constituted the conjunctural sufficient condition of success in Sierra Leone, and four of them, other than stronghold neutralisation, constituted that in East Timor. Stronghold neutralisation is likely to be necessary when the target can sustain itself due to the strongholds and has an incentive in the continuation of the conflict. Each component of the conjunctures is at least an INUS condition, and the actual use of force is a necessary condition.

The applicability of this finding to other relevant cases should be confirmed through additional empirical studies. The finding is expected to apply to other cases that fall into the scope of this research: explicit military compellence in UN-related peace operations that is employed against non-state armed groups and accompanied by the heaviest type of demands. Of course, this does not negate the possibility that other conjunctures of conditions also lead to the success of compellence in peace operations. For
example, the above examination leaves open the possibility that the use of carrots, an ultimatum, and decapitation play a positive role in compelling armed groups. The exploration of the roles of other conditions also requires additional empirical studies.
Conclusion

This research has explored the conditions under which compellence is likely to succeed in the context of peace operations. Compellence, a strategy for altering the status quo by putting pressure on opponents, is a widely employed strategy, along with its sibling – deterrence. Despite its utility and wide applicability, compellence has been less recognised and explored than deterrence, and there remain a number of issues to be studied to enable the strategy to be employed more effectively and reliably. The identification of conditions for success is one of the remaining gaps, and this research is an attempt to promote understanding of this aspect of the strategy. As the lack of consensus on the conditions for success is at least partly due to the mixing up of empirical data from different contexts in research studies, this study narrows its scope to a specific context in which compellence is employed so that the conditions can be better specified in exchange for their generalisability.

The focus of this research is peace operations, which have transformed from the consent-based and non-coercive deployment of international troops for ceasefire monitoring to robust, potentially coercive, and ambitious interventions aimed at stabilising states suffering from civil conflicts. Contemporary peace operations, authorised to use force if necessary, have difficulties carrying out their missions, such as the restoration of order and the protection of civilians. What contemporary peacekeepers are expected to do can be understood as compellence – that is, inducing spoilers to stop violence and disarm by putting pressure on them – and the application of the compellence theory to peace operations seems useful in enabling a better understanding of the utility of force in the field. This combination is expected to be beneficial to the field of compellence as well, because its application against non-state actors is one of the least explored aspects of the strategy.

To find out the conditions for the success of compellence in peace operations, the study has proceeded as follows. First, it has clarified the
scope of the study. Because of feasibility and the necessity to ensure the homogeneity of cases so that sound findings can be derived from comparison, the study limits its scope to the cases of explicit military compellence in UN-related peace operations employed against non-state armed groups and accompanied by the heaviest type of demands. Then, it has deductively derived the conditions favouring the success of compellence that have been specifically modified to the context of peace operations based on insights from the literature. The conditions are represented in five hypotheses, and they have been empirically examined in a comparative case study using three specific methods: the congruence method, the most-similar-design comparison, and cross-case comparison. The cases examined are the two most successful ones in East Timor and Sierra Leone, and the apparent failure in Somalia.

The empirical examination has provided answers to the three questions that have guided this research. The first and overarching question is the following: Under what conditions is compellence in peace operations more likely to succeed? The three cases examined demonstrate that there are five conditions which favour the success of compellence in peace operations: the use of the gradual-turning-of-the-screw strategy; the actual use of force as the source of credibility; the achievement of counter-coercion negation as a form of denial; the achievement of stronghold neutralisation, which is another form of denial; and the absence of third-party support on the target side.

One of the successful cases examined indicates that all of them constituted a conjunctural sufficient condition for its success, and the other successful case demonstrates that only four, other than stronghold neutralisation, were sufficient for its success. Stronghold neutralisation is likely to be necessary when the target armed groups of compellence are self-sustainable because of the strongholds and have an interest in the continuation of the conflict. Each condition composing the two conjunctures is an indispensable part of each conjuncture – namely, an INUS condition. In other words, if any of them is missing, the other components of the conjunctures would not be sufficient for deriving success. However, this is not to deny the possibility that other combinations of factors also lead to
success. As compellence is a complicated phenomenon, its causal relationships are expected to involve equifinality. Nevertheless, any collective sufficient condition is expected to include the actual use of force. Among the factors examined in this study, the pool of relevant cases demonstrates that the actual use of force is a necessary condition for the success of compellence in peace operations if the scope is limited to cases with the heaviest type of demands. The identification of other such conjunctural conditions for success requires additional empirical research.

This result also provides an answer to the second research question: Do the conditions for success shown in the theory of compellence correctly predict and explain the results of compellence in peace operations? The answer is yes and no. The existing theory of compellence provides a good starting point, and appropriate modification enables the theory to be applied to the context of peace operations. Overall, this study provides support for three of the five hypotheses based on the existing studies and provides partial support for another. Some factors regarded as important in existing studies turn out to be important in compellence in peace operations as well. Other factors are not confirmed to be important; some of them are expected to be unimportant when the hypotheses are derived, but others turn out to be unimportant unexpectedly.

This study enhances the existing belief that the lack of third-party support on the target side is important for the success of compellence (e.g. George and Simons, 1994a; Kagan, 1998; Downes, 2018). This factor, which is also regarded as important in the literature of peace operations and counterinsurgency (e.g. Pushkina, 2006; Connable and Libicki, 2010; Paul et al., 2013), received the clearest support in the empirical examination of this study.

The result also demonstrates the importance of the actual use of force, as the literature of cumulative deterrence has discussed. In the existing studies of compellence, there is disagreement over the utility of the exemplary use of force, as discussed in Chapter 1 (e.g. George, 1994a; Kagan, 1998; Schaub, 1998). However, the empirical examination in this study indicates that it is actually a necessary condition for success in the
context of peace operations if compellence is accompanied by the heaviest type of demands. This finding is in line with the argument of cumulative deterrence that has developed based on Israeli experience (Bar-Joseph, 1998, pp.156-157; Almog, 2004; Bar, 2008, pp.36-38; Rid, 2012). When compellers are faced with persistent threats by non-state armed groups, compellers need to demonstrate their competence through the actual use of force and by accumulating tactical victories.

Building on the consensus in the literature that the denial type of pressure is more effective than that of punishment (e.g. Pape, 1996; Byman and Waxman, 2002; Art, 2003b), this research has explored the most effective way to achieve denial in the context of peace operations; it has found that counter-coercion negation is most effective. This is in line with some studies that point out the importance of countering the efforts at resistance by the target side (Byman and Waxman, 1999; Johnson et al., 2002, pp.22-23; Dekker, 2011; Harvey and Wilner, 2012). Compellence involves interaction between the compellers and the targets, and either side tries to affect the other. The importance of containing the opponents’ counter-moves applies to compellence in peace operations too.

In contrast, the study finds that an ultimatum is not effective in compellence in peace operations despite some existing studies of compellence emphasising its utility (e.g. Jakobsen, 1998a; 1998b; 2000; Seybolt, 2008). Morgan (2009, p.173) argues that the gradual increase in pressure by collective actors is expected to be ineffective, and Nadin et al. (2015, p.84) regard an ultimatum as “a central element of robust peacekeeping”, but this study disagrees with these views; it instead finds that the use of the gradual-turning-of-the-screw strategy is necessary for success. This lack of support for an ultimatum is as expected, taking into account the feature of non-state armed groups. To make an ultimatum credible, it is necessary to threaten to inflict a quick and decisive defeat, but this is hard to achieve in compellence against non-state actors (Jakobsen, 1998a; 1998b; 2010). In compelling evasive and resilient non-state armed groups, compellers usually have no choice but to apply pressure gradually and continually until the targets accede to demands, which can be a prolonged process.
The three sources of credibility for threats other than the actual use of force also turn out to be ineffective, as expected. Although the national interests and domestic support of compellers are factors that multiple studies of compellence regard as important for success (e.g. George and Simons, 1994a; Blechman and Wittes, 1999; Treverton, 2000), this study demonstrates that their existence does not guarantee nor is it necessary for the success of the strategy in the context of peace operations. The utility of reputation based on past behaviour as a source of credibility is a major issue of debate in the literature (e.g. Mercer, 1996; Shannon and Dennis, 2007; Press, 2005), but this study does not find it important in compellence in peace operations. Although only limited information is available, the empirical cases examined in this study indicate that armed groups had an image of weak resolve about international forces. However, the armed groups in East Timor and Sierra Leone built such an image based on the famous episode in Somalia rather than on the actual past behaviour of each troop contributor. An image of advanced capability that militias had about Australian troops also seems to have been based on a general image of developed countries rather than on Australia’s own past operations. The available evidence, therefore, suggests that armed groups do not pay attention to each compeller’s past behaviour but, rather, construct an image about their opponents based on well-known events or general impressions. Moreover, compellence could succeed in the absence of an advantageous reputation. Hence, the three factors do not play an important role in enhancing the credibility of threats in compellence in peace operations.

In addition, there are two conditions that turn out to be unimportant for success, in contradiction to the predictions of the hypotheses – namely, compellers’ numerical advantage over the targets and the use of positive inducements. In a sense, this should not be surprising, because the existing theory has been developed based on insights from compellence between states, and different conditions can be important in different contexts. Still, the non-support of the predictions is counter-intuitive.

The result indicates that the mere presence of a large force does not guarantee success and that quality, rather than quantity, matters. If a small force can satisfy the above success conditions, that small force is expected
to achieve success. Of course, this does not necessarily mean that a small force is always enough; a quite large force may be necessary to fulfil the conditions depending on the situation. Nevertheless, however large a force is, it cannot achieve success if it cannot satisfy the success conditions. Studies of peace operations – in particular quantitative ones – tend to focus on the number of troops (e.g. Ruggeri et al., 2012; Hultman et al., 2013; 2019; Kathman and Wood, 2016; Bara and Hultman, 2020), but the result of this research implies that it is necessary to take into account the quality of troops in addition to their quantity.

An even more counter-intuitive finding may be the lack of support for the utility of positive inducements. The two most successful cases did not involve any substantial positive inducements despite the wide support for their utility in the literature (e.g. George and Simons, 1994b; Byman and Waxman, 2002; Art and Cronin, 2003). The result indicates that negative inducements, or pressure, play a much more important role than positive inducements in compellence in peace operations. This may be because of the intrinsic difficulty of providing carrots for spoilers. The provision of positive inducements for spoilers who renge on and violently disrupt peace processes would be perceived as rewarding malicious acts and would be hard to accept locally and internationally. Since the principle of peace operations shifted from neutrality to impartiality, it has become even more difficult for peace operations to compromise with illegitimate parties. Even in the Ituri case, which is an example of the substantial use of carrots mentioned in the previous chapter, several of the armed groups’ leaders who were offered high-ranking posts in the national army were later arrested and tried in the International Criminal Court (ICG, 2008, pp.20-21). Although doing so was desirable from the perspective of avoiding impunity and building up deterrent effects on future violence against civilians, such a precedent of revocation would harm the credibility of future promises to give positive inducements. Nevertheless, the Ituri case indicates the possibility that the use of substantial carrots combined with other factors can facilitate the success of compellence. Although there are problems discussed above, if lives are saved by the earliest possible cessation of violence, it can still be valuable to provide the targets of compellence with positive inducements.
Therefore, it would be useful to further investigate the utility and limitation of positive inducements in compellence in peace operations.

As has been discussed, compellence in peace operations are somewhat different from that between states, and this is the issue addressed by the third research question: How do the unique features of the context of peace operations affect the form or requirement for the success of compellence? The assumed features in deriving the hypotheses are that it is coalitional compellence employed against non-state actors, and the balance of interest, a factor that literature considers to be one of the most important conditions for success, is unfavourable for compellers. The targets of compellence in this context are risk- and cost-acceptant and evasive armed groups, which are difficult to defeat quickly. Therefore, peace operations have to rely on gradually increased pressure including the actual use of force, rather than an ultimatum, to convince the target armed groups that their defeat is inevitable. In doing so, international forces have to achieve counter-coercion negation so that target armed groups cannot turn the situation into a contest of endurance. Here, the coalitional nature of peace operations poses a unique challenge. Ad-hoc coalitions often have contingents whose preparation is not sufficient to cope with operational environments, and they tend to be harassed and preyed upon by target armed groups. Target armed groups may also try to estrange coalition partners by exploiting the rifts between them. Peace operations need to manage these challenges so that target armed groups do not harbour the hope of driving back international troops. The absence of third-party support also contributes to denying the hope of the target side. Non-state armed groups often cannot produce weapons and other war matériel by themselves and require support from outside. To deprive the armed groups of their hope to prevail, the international forces need to create a situation in which the targets do not receive support from third parties.

In other words, the features of the context of peace operations require the compellers to gain the clear upper hand, leaving no doubt about the fate of the targets if they continue their resistance. Peace operations have to corner target armed groups to the point that they are cut off from their supporters, their counter-moves are contained, and increasing pressure can
be brought to bear. This clearly one-sided situation is necessary, because the target is evasive armed groups and they have far larger interests and stronger motivation in what is in dispute.

Of course, there is the possibility that other sets of conditions also lead to the success of compellence in peace operations. For example, the scope of the above discussion is limited to compellence with the heaviest type of demands. As mentioned in the previous chapter, some cases ended in success without using force if the scope is expanded to compellence with limited demands, and they suggest that different sets of conditions that do not include the actual use of force can derive success when demands are limited. Even in compellence with the heaviest type of demands, the substantial use of positive inducement, for example, combined with other conditions may lead to success. These possibilities deserve further exploration.

That being said, the specification of sets of conditions that are expected to lead to the success of compellence in peace operations constitutes a meaningful contribution to the literature. Studies of compellence have largely focused on interstate compellence and have shed little light on that against non-state actors. The existing studies on compellence in peace operations have not explored the conditions for the success of the strategy in a dedicated and systematic manner. This study fills the gap; this is the first attempt to identify the conditions for the success of compellence in the context of peace operations based on the existing insights of the field and a systematic empirical examination.

This research demonstrates the utility of context-specific middle-range theories as well. The findings of this study indicate that the conditions for the success of compellence focusing on peace operations are somewhat different from those for compellence in general. As has been discussed, some conditions that are regarded as important for success turned out not to be so in the context of peace operations. Some are even hard to satisfy in the context. Taking into account the lack of consensus on the conditions for the success of the strategy, narrowing the scope and building middle-range
theories focusing on specific contexts is a viable approach to promoting the understanding of the conditions.

The focus on a specific context is also useful in advancing the understanding of coercive mechanisms by identifying effective ways to achieve denial. Although it has been generally agreed in the literature that denial is a more effective coercive mechanism than punishment, the specific forms of denial depend on what aims the targets of compellence are pursuing and how. This study identifies four possible approaches to denial that are employable in the context of peace operations and finds counter-coercion negation to be especially effective, while stronghold neutralisation also plays an important role under certain circumstances. A narrow focus on a specific context enables a study to examine the relative utility of different approaches to denial in a more concrete manner.

The findings of this research on the conditions for success and coercive mechanisms contribute to the literature of compellence by improving the specificity of the theory focusing on a specific context. If such middle-range theories are developed for various contexts, they advance the understanding of not only compellence in each context, but also of compellence in general by combining the findings of these middle-range theories.

This study also contributes to the field of peace operations, which is still suffering from a paucity of causal theories and continues to face practical difficulties. The application of compellence theory facilitates the theorisation of peace operations. Compellence provides a causal mechanism that can work in robust peace operations that are tasked with stabilising conflicts and stopping violence by using force if necessary. This research demonstrates the conditions under which such a mechanism is expected to work in peace operations. Of course, compellence covers only a part of the versatile tasks and activities of peace operations. However, the part it can cover is one of the most challenging parts, and insights are needed.

The contribution of this research is not limited to academics; it also has practical implications. Contemporary peace operations have difficulty in managing ongoing violence, and the identified success conditions are
expected to be a guide for practitioners when they employ the coercive approach. The conditions for success are at least somewhat manageable by the intervening international forces and the wider international community, so they are an indication of what practitioners should try to achieve.

The conditions may not be a surprise for practitioners, because they share some commonalities with existing recommendations. The importance of sound force protection has been emphasised in past review reports, such as the Brahimi Report, the HIPPO Report, and the Cruz Report (UN, 2000a; 2015; dos Santos Cruz et al., 2017). Although self-preservation is a natural requirement and its importance is obvious, this research indicates that it is also important for pursuing more proactive purposes. Effective counter-coercion negation is a prerequisite for the success of compellence. The study also demonstrates that international troops should be prepared for the actual use of force, as the above review reports recommend too. Unless intervening forces demonstrate their potency and credibility by actually employing force, it is unlikely that armed groups will give up their objectives and accept disarmament.

There are sceptics and critics of such a coercive approach to peace operations. In fact, as discussed in the introduction, compellence is neither easy nor risk free, and it is thought of as more difficult than deterrence. If the compellent pressure cannot achieve the acceptance of the demands, the compellers have to choose whether to pursue the objectives by brute force or give them up and leave. The risk of escalation was vividly demonstrated in the case of Somalia. The compellent attempt failed to induce a target armed group to disarm, and the exchange of attacks turned the situation into a contest of endurance. The compellers lost the contest and left the country without achieving their objectives. If compellers are not able to fulfil the conditions for success, the cost of failure can be huge in terms of lives and finances.

Therefore, compellence should not be tried without preparation. Before launching an operation, the situation should be assessed to determine whether the conditions for success are fulfilled or expected to be fulfilled given reasonable efforts. If there is no such expectation, it would be
better not to try the approach. However, if the international community hopes to halt violence in intrastate conflicts and expects peace operations to bear the responsibility for this task, they need to be ready to employ compellence. Such a task requires the status quo on the ground to be changed rather than maintained, and operations in passive mode do not lead to the achievement of the objective. To induce warring factions to change their behaviour, compellence is required.

Taking into account the limitation of UN operations, the division of labour with coalitions of the willing and regional organisations can be a more realistic approach (e.g. Mockaitis, 1999, pp.54-55; Sloan, 2011, p.295; Howard, 2019, pp.194-196). In fact, one of the most successful cases of compellence in peace operations was carried out by an Australian-led multinational force, and the other also had support from unilaterally intervening British forces. If a militarily potent multinational force takes charge of the security tasks or cooperates with a UN operation in carrying them out, this increases the prospect of fulfilling the conditions for success.

At the same time, UN operations will not be able to abstain from robust missions. Local actors and especially spoilers, who are the targets of the robust approach, would not distinguish UN missions from non-UN missions operating in parallel; both of them are international forces intervening from the outside (Hunt, 2017, p.114). UN operations would inevitably be involved in confrontations with spoilers if they were deployed into situations of ongoing violence. In fact, despite the increase in the use of multinational force for high-intensity peace operations, UN peace operations also have been “militarised” in the past two decades (Sloan, 2011). Coalitions of the willing and regional organisations tend to try to hand their missions over to the UN as soon as possible because they cannot sustain the missions financially (Aoi and de Coning, 2017, p.302). UN missions have expanded their involvement in security-related tasks and actually used progressively more military force in their implementation. There are precedents; it would be difficult to reject and ignore calls for forceful interventions from those who are suffering (Hunt, 2017, p.125).
Recently, some scholars have argued that there should be a new category of UN peace operations called “stabilisation operations” to distinguish them from peacekeeping (Aoi and de Coning, 2017; Karlsrud, 2018, pp.100-101). Such a new category may be helpful for making it clear that these operations require robust military capabilities and need to act proactively in carrying out their mandates. However, the distinction problem is also applicable here; it is doubtful whether local factions distinguish UN stabilisation operations from normal peacekeeping (Peter, 2015, p.363).

Moreover, the creation of a new category of mission may not relieve the normal UN peacekeeping ones from performing robust tasks. If it is obvious that the local security situation is volatile in the planning phase, the UN would try to assemble and deploy a stabilisation mission from the beginning. However, if the situation is assessed as manageable by a normal peacekeeping mission at the time of deployment but the security deteriorates and violence resurfaces later, the normal peacekeeping mission on the ground would face the same problem it has today. Once peace operations are deployed, the UNSC seldom withdraws them, even if the local security situation deteriorates. Therefore, the UN would try to send reinforcements of a stabilisation mission, but it may take a long time to assemble such a force, or it may not be realised at all. If the reinforcements do not arrive, the normal peacekeeping mission on the ground would be required to respond to and handle the violence. It would be better to assume that UN peace operations, whatever they are called, can be requested to perform compellence.

Discussions about peace operations often fall into normative arguments, such as the traditional principles of peacekeeping, but peace operations are a type of military operation that is undertaken to achieve specific objectives. Therefore, peace operations require strategic thinking just the same as other military operations. Insights from the studies of compellence promote the understanding of peace operations from a strategic perspective, and the utility and limitation of compellence in peace operations deserve further studies.

There are some potential topics for further research. First, the generalisability of this study’s findings should be empirically examined. The conjunctural sufficient conditions that study identifies are expected to be
valid in other cases of compellence with the heaviest type of demands. This expectation deserves further empirical study. Second, other sets of conditions that can bring success should be searched for as well. As compellence is a complex phenomenon, it is expected to entail equifinality or multiple causal paths for the same result. Additional case studies and QCA will be helpful in exploring these points.

Third, compellence with limited demands in peace operations also deserves to be studied. Because of practical limitations, this type of compellence is outside the scope of this research. In contrast to compellence with the heaviest type of demands, compellence with limited demands may succeed without the actual use of force. This is better success of compellence, and the analysis of such cases can provide insights to advance the theory of compellence. Such studies will also be practically useful, because inducing conflicting parties to comply with demands short of total disarmament must be a frequent challenge for peacekeepers on the ground.

Finally, the wider applicability of this study’s findings to contexts beyond peace operations should be examined. Although the focus of this research is peace operations, the findings may also apply to similar contexts, such as counterinsurgency. Further expansion would entail application to cases of compellence against states by coalitions of states in which the targets have clearly larger interests and stronger motivations. An examination of these contexts will be helpful in understanding the commonalities and differences between compellence in different contexts and will promote the understanding of the strategy as a whole.
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