A Comparative Study of the National Security Initiatives of Koizumi and the Second Abe Administrations

By:

Ka Mei Samantha Ma

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Abstract

This research conducts a study of the national security strategies introduced by the Koizumi administration (2001-2006) and the second Abe administration (2012-). Based on the common themes of ‘normalization’, constitutional revision, in particular Article 9 and the right of collective self-defence, it examines through the theory of neoclassical realism how and why the national security initiatives of the two administrations are different in their extent of normalization of Japan.

This dissertation has argued, using the approach of neoclassical realism, it was with the primary forces of international structural factors, together with the influence of domestic variables, that contributed to the enactment of the national security initiatives of Japan in different extent during the Koizumi and the second Abe administrations. Findings from the comparative study of the two administrations showed that the international environment surrounding Japan in the second Abe administration was more precarious with a heightened sense of threat perception than that of the Koizumi administration. The China threat and the North Korea threat was much more intense in the second Abe administration as compared to the Koizumi administration. The pressure from the United States on Japan to shoulder greater responsibility for self-defence and international security also weighed more heavily on Japan in the second Abe administration as compared to the Koizumi administration. These differences provided the international background which contributed to enactment of the package of national security initiatives resulting in greater degree of normalization in the second Abe administration than the Koizumi administration.

In the domestic arena, analysis of the domestic variables under the Hilsman’s concentric circle of influence include consideration of the role and ideology of Prime Minister and Cabinet, the views of the ruling elite and opposition parties through Diet deliberations and elite interviews. The first major and striking difference between the two administrations is the personal ideologies of the Prime Ministers. Compared to Koizumi, Abe was more a nationalist with the conviction to revise the Constitution, in particular Article 9. Koizumi’s national security initiatives were however more the result of the reliance and support of the U.S. ally than an independent motive to pursue constitutional revision. The views of the LDP ruling elite in the second layer of the concentric circle of influence has been giving persistent support to the
national security initiative of the Prime Minister with the Komeito displaying limited reservation on the policy initiated by the government in the two administrations. The opposition parties in the two administrations have also been persistent in opposing the government initiatives. Thus, analysis of the domestic variables under the Hilsman’s concentric circle of influence showed that the single most important difference in the domestic variables is the different Prime Minister in the two administrations who directed different course of national security initiatives which in turn led to greater extent of normalization in the second Abe administration as compared to the Koizumi administration.
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### Abbreviations

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<tr>
<td>AIIB</td>
<td>Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank</td>
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<td>ARF</td>
<td>ASEAN Regional Forum</td>
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<td>DPJ</td>
<td>Democratic Party of Japan</td>
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<td>HNS</td>
<td>Host Nation Support</td>
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<td>JCP</td>
<td>Japanese Communist Party</td>
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<td>JSP</td>
<td>Japan Socialist Party</td>
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<td>LDP</td>
<td>Liberal Democratic Party</td>
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<td>NCP</td>
<td>New Conservative Party</td>
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<td>NMD</td>
<td>National Missile Defence</td>
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<td>NSS</td>
<td>Nuclear Security Summit</td>
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<td>ODA</td>
<td>Official Development Assistance</td>
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<td>PKO</td>
<td>Peacekeeping Operations</td>
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<td>SDF</td>
<td>Self-Defence Forces</td>
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<td>SDP</td>
<td>Social Democratic Party</td>
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<td>TMD</td>
<td>Theatre Missile Defence</td>
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<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<td>US</td>
<td>United States of America</td>
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Chapter 1  Introduction

Both the Junichirō Koizumi administration (2001-2006) and the second Shinzō Abe administration (2012-) were marked by a significant shift in national security policies. It enlivened the debate of ‘normalization’ and constitutional revision, in particular Article 9 and the right of collective self-defence. The shift in national security policies can be attributed to the changes in international security environment and domestic politics, with the personal ideologies of the Prime Ministers at the centre of domestic decision making.

The international environment underwent significant changes in post-Cold War Japan. The direction of foreign policy in post-war Japan was governed by the Yoshida doctrine, which gave primacy to economic development while relying on the United States for security protection (Edström, 2004). With the relative decline of Japan as a result of the burst of economic bubble in the early 1990s, coupled with the rise of China and the North Korean threat, the national security policy of Japan, in particular the U.S.-Japan Security Alliance, has been revised several times to place increasing roles and responsibilities on Japan to shoulder part of the burden of her own national security as well as regional security at large, it can be seen that Japan has taken a more active role in the international scene (Armitage and Nye, 2012).

In the domestic arena, the changes in political institutions of Japan were a major catalyst which empowered Prime Minister Junichirō Koizumi and later Shinzō Abe to pursue a national policy with rigor and persistence. During the LDP one-party rule from 1955-1993, there were powerful factional politics with some factional leaders wielding more significant influence than the power of the Prime Minister. Lack of strong leadership and political corruption were cited as some of the shortcomings of the one-party rule. However, the 1994 electoral reform and administrative reforms of 2001 have minimized factional politics, reduced the influences of bureaucrats and hence strengthened the position of the Prime Minister and the Cabinet (Shinoda, 2007; Uchiyama, 2010). It was against this institutional change that the domestic scene of the Koizumi administration and beyond was laid.

Apart from the domestic institutions and international environment, the domestic norms also impacted the course of foreign policy of Japan. Antimilitarism was rooted in Japan as a result of the combined effect of the defeat in World War II, the atomic bombings and the constraint
imposed by Article 9 of the Constitution. The prevalent norm of antimilitarism was met by revisionist conservatism and proactive internationalism, however, which has resulted in varying policy outcomes in different international environment (Izumikawa, 2010).

During the Koizumi administration, there was a shift in national security strategy as a result of the changes in the international and domestic arena. The international environment was characterised as the rise of China, threat from North Korea and the war against terrorism and the persistent pressure from the U.S. ally. Domestically, the power of the Cabinet and Prime Minister was bolstered by the revised administrative regulation, when internationally the world was beset with the war against terror. Against this background, the Koizumi administration enacted several important national security laws such as the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Legislation (2001), three Emergency-related laws (2003) and the Iraq Reconstruction Special Measures Legislation (2003). It was also during the Koizumi administration that the government initiated the constitutional reform discussion and the LDP has published a draft Constitution in 2005. There was also a significant and controversial leap in the U.S.-Japan Security Alliance with Japan’s dispatch of the Self-Defence Forces (SDF) to the Iraq War in 2003 and signing of the US-Japan Realignment Agreement of 2006. All these national security initiatives during the Koizumi administration were regarded by some scholars as ‘revolutionary’ (Kabashima and Steel, 2007; Kersten, 2011).

During the second Abe administration, what stood out from previous administrations was the gaining of power by a revisionist Prime Minister, Shinzō Abe. “Departure from the Postwar Regime” is the political slogan of his first administration (2006-2007). In his second administration (2012-), he has continued his unfinished business by ushering in a series of national security reforms, such as the establishment of the National Security Council, the promulgation of the first National Security Strategy, continued increase in defence budget since 2014 (Ministry of Defence of Japan, 2014; 2015b; 2016a), the Three Principles on Transfer of Defence Equipment and Technology, the revised ODA charter, the signing of the Second U.S.-Japan Defence Guidelines 2015, and above all, a package of ‘legislation of peace and security’. The second Abe administration also established an Advisory Committee on Constitutional Reform. However, the second Abe administration, instead of overcoming the constitutional procedural hurdle of obtaining a two-thirds majority of both Houses and a majority in a national referendum, resorted to the easier route: reinterpretation of the Constitution. In September 2015, the Legislations for Peace and Security were passed. It allowed Japan to exercise the right of
collective self-defence under three basic principles, overturning the official interpretation of the Cabinet Legislation Bureau banning the exercise of the right of collective self-defence in 1972 (Watanabe, 2015a). There have been protests from the opposing political parties, constitutional academics and the citizens, arguing that the legislations were unconstitutional, and there are pending lawsuits challenging the constitutionality of the peace legislations (Japan Times, 2015). Alongside voices of opposition domestically were sentiment of suspicion and worry among neighbouring East Asian countries such as China, which alleged that Japan fabricated “China threat” as an excuse to achieve its political goal of expanding military power (Ministry of Defence of Japan, 2015b).

The national security initiatives of these two administrations were chosen because of the significant changes in Japan’s security policy caused by those initiatives and a long tenure of both administrations. Both Prime Ministers were pragmatic in their policy choice thus have won a broad base of public support. Therefore, these two administrations distinguished themselves from the short-lived Japanese administrations after the first Abe administrations in 2007, when long-term security strategy could not be easily formulated or enforced.

The changes in domestic political environment was another factor that led to the decision to choose these two administrations for this research. Both administrations were in place after the electoral and administrative reforms in the 1990s and early 2000s. It led to the declining influence of factional politics, thus the power and influence of the Prime Minister and the Cabinet office was strengthened. It was against this domestic background that when a strong-willed Prime Ministers, such as Koizumi and Abe assumed office, they could deliver their own policy preference with persistence and rigour.

A comparative analysis of the two administrations is worthwhile as both Prime Ministers share a similar background. Both Prime Ministers belonged to the most right-wing faction of the Liberal Democratic Party and both are political blue bloods. Koizumi’s father was a director general of the Japan Defense Agency and Abe’s father, Shintaro Abe, was Japan's longest reigning postwar foreign minister. Abe’s grandfather, Nobusuke Kishi, was a former Prime Minister and was notorious as a Class-A war criminal and for his controversial revision of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty which was passed in 1960 in the midst of public protest. The two Prime Ministers, both nationalists, were affiliated with the same faction of Seiwa Seisaku Kenkyūkai. It is a conservative and nationalist faction of the LDP initiated by former Prime
Minister Takeo Fukuda in 1962. It is also a faction of the LDP in which both Junichirō Koizumi and Shinzō Abe, as well as his late father Shintaro Abe, have been ex-leaders (Seiwa, 2016).

Despite similar characteristics, both Prime Ministers possessed different policy agenda for Japan. Koizumi is most well-remembered for his achievement in domestic policies. He did not pursue an active foreign policy and his foreign policy is best characterized as a close ally of the United States. Prime Minister Koizumi dispatched the SDF overseas to showcase to the world that Japan was willing to shoulder its responsibility as a member of the international community and as a display of friendship to its American ally. Prime Minister Abe, on the other hand, was a revisionist who had a deep-rooted historical mission to revise the constitution. Abe shared the same values and beliefs as his grandfather and a former Prime Minister, Nobusuke Kishi, in that he has a mission to bring Japan out from the shadow of the post-WWII era and revive the past glory and achieve real independence of Japan as a great and respectable power in the world. For Abe, it was more about the great power status of Japan than purely for the sake of the national security when he planned the national security policy and strategy of Japan. Abe has been closely affiliated with revisionist right-wing political organizations such as Nippon Kaigi and Sousei Nippon (Create Japan) and thus has many political supporters to defend his nationalist and revisionist agenda. His administration displays a mix of pragmatism and ideology. He has an active foreign policy agenda but he tactfully maneuvered his domestic economic policies as a way to divert the attention of the public from his political agenda and hence won general support of his administration during the early period of his administration.

1.1 Research Questions and Main Arguments

This dissertation conducts a study of the evolving national security strategies introduced by the Koizumi administration (2001-2006) and the second Abe administration (2012-). The main research question is how and why the national security initiatives of the two administrations are different in the extent of normalization, with the second Abe administration achieving far greater extent of normalization by legitimatizing the right of collective self-defence.

This dissertation is going to answer this research question by examining the possible explanatory factors accounting for the differences which include international structural factors, ideology of Prime Minister and political cohesion. The argument of this dissertation is that the
differences in the gravity of the external structural factors together with the differences in the political ideologies of the Prime Minister Koizumi and Abe accounted for the extent of normalization unforeseen in historical administrations of Japan.

1.2 Brief Summary of the Relevant Literature

The literature review is broadly divided into two parts – international and domestic. The first part of the literature review examines the existing literature on the foreign policy and international relations of Japan. It will critically analyze different international theoretical approaches such as neorealism (Waltz, 1979), neoliberal institutionalism (Keohane, 1984; 1989; 2001), constructivism (Katzenstein, 2008; Wendt, 1992) and neoclassical realism (Rose, 1998). Neorealism recognized the importance of international structural factors as the primary driving force for international relations, but it is submitted that domestic politics also matter. The theory of neoliberal institutionalism asserted that the world is a state of complex interdependence in which the state actors were not only influenced by military and security matters as argued by neorealists but was surrounded by various interests like economic interests, energy and environmental concerns. It showed the inefficiency of the use or threat of force in solving international disputes but that states resolve disputes or matters of interests through diplomatic means or international institutions such as alliances or transnational organizations. It is submitted that the theory of neoliberal institutionalism may not be appropriate to answer the current research question as Japan was in an era of intense international threats during the two administrations and international institutions without the strengthening of military power failed to ensure the national security of Japan. The literature review further reviewed the literature on the approach of constructivism which emphasized the ideology and interests in shaping the national security policy of Japan. A review of the literature showed that post-cold war Japan was clouded with a strong sense of antimilitarism which detested the use of military might in the settling of international disputes as enshrined in Article 9 of the Constitution. However, the intense security climate in the two administrations showed that the ruling LDP politicians were more inclined to strengthen the military power and hence march towards a more ‘normal’ country amidst declining influence of the antimilitarist sentiment of the public. It is submitted that it is the theory of neoclassical realism which considers the primacy of international structural factors and also domestic variables which is the best tool to answer the research questions of how and why the extent of
normalization of the two administrations are different. International structural factors are very important notwithstanding, the two administrations witnessed two very proactive and nationalistic Prime Ministers with strengthened Cabinet which paved the way for Japan to march towards the normalization journey.

The second part of the literature review will embark on a review of the domestic factors in shaping foreign policy (Shinoda, 2007; Uchiyama, 2010). In exploring the role of national leaders in policy making, Shinoda (2007) revised the Hilsman’s model of concentric circle and adapted it to the case of the foreign policy of the Koizumi administration. In the revised model, Prime Minister with the bureaucracy of Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Defence is at the core of the concentric circle, with the LDP in the second layer, and the coalition partners, opposition parties, media/interests groups and the public in the outer layers of the circle respectively (See Figure 2-1). This model of analysis is useful for understanding the complexities of government decision making process, with Kantei initiating policy proposals and seeking support and compromises from the outer layers of the concentric circle. Uchiyama (2010) further rightly identified ‘interests’ and ‘ideas’ as important factors in domestic politics. The literature review ends with the review of the literature on constitutional reform and the debate of normalization (Singh, 2002; Soeya et al., 2011; Winkler, 2011), which was initiated by a former powerful LDP politician Ichiro Ozawa in 1994 (Ozawa, 1994) and became very much lively again during the constitutional reinterpretation of the second Abe administration. This dissertation attempts to contextualize the debate on the basis of the historical literature and discussion on the constitutionality of collective self-defence.

1.3 Methodology

This dissertation will analyse the package of national security initiatives of the Koizumi and the second Abe administrations. For each administration, it will analyse under the heading of the possible explanatory factors for the differences in the extent of normalization of the two administrations. These include international structural factors and the domestic variables of ideology of Prime Minister and political cohesion.

This dissertation will take the theoretical approach of neoclassical realism. The justification of taking this approach is that in answering the research questions, there is a primacy of the
international structural factors, while the domestic variables act in the context of the international security environment in pushing forward the national security initiatives in question.

This dissertation will primarily adopt a textual analysis of official government documents published in Japanese and English. On the analysis of the international structural factors of the two administrations, this dissertation will consult the annual White Paper and the Defence Budget issued by the Ministry of Defence, and the Diplomatic Bluebook issued by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs from 2001 to 2019 to understand how the international security environment of the two administrations were and how they were perceived by the Japanese government. The “NIDS China Security Report” 2010-2015 issued by the National Institute for Defence Studies of the Ministry of Defence will be used to understand the views of the Japanese government on China. The website of a U.S. public policy think-tank, Centre for Strategic and International Studies, provides useful insights on U.S.-Japan foreign policies. English literature of all sources, primary and secondary alike, will be consulted on western and international relations concepts and theories.

For the analysis of the ideology of Prime Minister, it will use the primary source of the books written by Koizumi himself and the book “Towards a Beautiful Country: My Vision for Japan” written by Shinzō Abe to understand the ideology of the two Prime Ministers. Books written by other people on the two Prime Minister will also be consulted as secondary source of the views and ideology of the Prime Ministers. Public speeches of Prime Minister and Diet debates will also be analysed to understand their views of the various national security initiatives of their administrations.

For the analysis of the political cohesion, it will primarily be based on the Diet debates and personal interviews conducted by the author. Interviews were chosen as the methodology as the topic of enquiry of national security initiatives involved the collection of in-depth information on opinions and thoughts of political elite and requires complex questioning and considerable probing. Interviews of current Diet members can gather the direct and personal views of political elite of different political affiliations on the national security initiatives of Japan. Interviews have been conducted with Japanese politicians, bureaucrats and academics to solicit their views on different foreign policies of Japan. The interviewees are primarily members of the House of Representatives and the House of Councillors who sit in the
Commission on the Constitution and the Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defence. As the profile of members of both Houses of the Diet are publicly available on Japanese government official website and that the majority of the members of both Houses of the Diet have their own official webpage with their contact details, such information provides the information for initial contact with the potential interviewees. The selection of the potential participants was based on their membership in different councils/committees of the Diet. Priority was given to interviewees who sit in the Commission on Constitution or the Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defense. Members of the Diet from different political parties were selected in order to understand the diversity of views among the different political parties. The interviewees with right-wing organization such as Nippon Kaigi were highlighted to show how right-wing activists dominated the representation in the Diet. The interviews took a semi-structured format with a list of prepared open-ended interview questions. Interview questions covered topics starting from questions on the views on the overall security environment of Japan and narrowed down to Japan’s national security policy such as their views on merits and inherent risks of the recently passed national security bills as well as the right of collective self-defence. Questions were also asked about their views on Japan’s role and responsibility in the U.S.-Japan Security Alliance, and the impact of the rise of China and the North Korean threat on Japan’s security threat consciousness. Lastly, questions on their personal views on the policy and beliefs of Prime Ministers Koizumi and Abe were also solicited in order to probe into the beliefs and ideologies of the two Prime Ministers. It is anticipated that through interviewing the LDP-led coalition politicians as well as politicians from the opposition parties, this dissertation will further illuminate the ideological battle on the national identity of Japan in contemporary international affairs. The dissertation also intends to see how far national identity has been reflected in the actual national security measures passed by the government.

However, the political sensitivity of the topic has resulted in only 9 interviews being conducted. Nevertheless, the quality of the interviews was acceptable as it involved representatives from the ruling LDP and the opposition parties which has captured the picture of the political views of contemporary Japan. It provided sufficient source of original data for the analysis of the views of the political elite of the second Abe administration. In an attempt to supplement the limited interview data, it was supplemented by an analysis of the Diet debates. The dissertation has structured the analysis of Diet debates which are analyzed and organized in terms of their political affiliation. The dissertation includes an extensive use of the Diet debates to understand
the views of the different political parties on the package of national security initiatives. Data collected from the interviews and Diet debates provided the source for the analysis of the domestic variable of political elite which is at the outer layers of the concentric circle of influence of the Hilsman’s model.

Textual analysis of formal government documents were supplemented by an analysis of the publications on youtube. Firstly, there are many interviews, debates and conferences of Japanese politicians, academic scholars and policy think-tanks available on youtube with respect to the constitutional reinterpretation in 2015, defence strategy and foreign relations of Japan. In this connection, Prime Minister Shinzō Abe has made several personal interviews broadcast live on youtube to explain his political views. Views of politicians are important to understand their objectives behind their various government policies. Views of academic scholars are also important to understand their personal views on the changing security posture of Japan in the course of history. Secondly, youtube also serves as another channel of publication by governments and political parties as there are official youtube channels by the Cabinet of Japan, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Defence, the Self-Defence Forces, the Liberal Democratic Party and Nippon Kaigi. Thirdly, youtube has become an important channel for archiving international conferences and seminars, which provides a rich source of divergent views on Japan’s foreign policy. I, in particular, consulted the youtube channel of the Foreign Correspondents’ Club which held periodic seminars on various issues of Japan.

1.4 Contributions of Research

The primary contribution of this dissertation is that it shows the importance of the role of Prime Ministers in dictating the course of foreign policy of Japan. The two proactive Prime Ministers Koizumi and Abe who are distinguished from the historical majority of reactive Prime Ministers in Japan. The administrative reform in 2000s has enhanced the role of the Cabinet with Prime Minister as the leader. Koizumi was the first Prime Minister who exercised decisive leadership after the reform. It was through a comparative study of the national security initiatives of the two administrations that this dissertation investigated in which these two Prime Ministers shared so much similarities as political blue blood and proactive leader and yet Prime Minister Abe achieved much broader and more significant national security
initiatives than Prime Minister Koizumi because Abe was much more nationalistic and have an ideology and historical mission to revise the Constitution against the background of a much more intense international structural environment in the Abe administration as compared to the Koizumi administration. This dissertation highlighted the important and indispensable role of Prime Minister in directing the course of foreign policy of Japan.

Another contribution of this dissertation is that it is one of the first adoption of the theory of neoclassical realism to the comparative study of the national security initiatives of the two administrations which analyzed the primary influence of international structural factors as well as the domestic variables of influence of Prime Minister and political elite. While recognizing the pivotal role played by Prime Ministers, this dissertation acknowledged the primary and indispensable role of international structural drivers in directing the course of foreign policy of Japan. Prime Ministers did not act in the vacuum. Without the intense security environment that Japan was facing, both Prime Ministers could not pursue their desired foreign policy of their liking. This dissertation gives credit to the value of the approach of neo-classical realism in understanding the foreign policy of contemporary Japan.

1.5 Structure of the Dissertation

This dissertation is divided into seven chapters. The next chapter will give a detailed literature review of the ‘international’ and ‘domestic’ forces shaping Japan’s foreign policy, as well as the ‘normalization’ and constitutional reform.

In the third chapter, the dissertation will provide a factual background of the domestic and international settings for the ensuing discussion of the foreign policies of two LDP Prime Ministers, Junichirō Koizumi and Shinzō Abe. On the domestic front, the chapter will analyse how the end of the 1955 LDP dominant party system in 1993 and the administrative and electoral reforms from 1994 laid the background for the decline of factional politics and dominance of Prime Minister and Cabinet-led government since the Koizumi administration. In the international arena, the chapter will provide a background of the changes in the international environment such as the rise of China and the North Korean nuclear and ballistic
missile threat. The prevalent influence of the United States as Japan’s security ally will also be studied.

The fourth chapter will be the first main chapter. It will first provide an overview of the key national security initiatives of Japan during the Koizumi administration such as the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law, Three Emergency Related Legislations and Iraq Humanitarian and Reconstruction Law and the Constitutional Reform proposal of 2005. It will then examine the national security initiatives of the Koizumi administration under the headings of the international structural factor, as well as the domestic variable of ideology of Prime Minister and political cohesion.

The fifth chapter will follow the format of the preceding chapter by first providing an overview of the key national security initiatives of the Second Abe administration, which include the establishment of the National Security Council, the promulgation of the first National Security Strategy, continued increase in defence budget since 2014, the Three Principles on Transfer of Defence Equipment and Technology, the revised ODA charter, the signing of the Second U.S.-Japan Defence Guidelines 2015, and above all, a package of ‘legislation of peace and security’. Japan also enacted the anti-conspiracy law establishing 277 criminal acts deter crimes planning terrorist attacks. The second Abe administration also established an Advisory Committee on Constitutional Reform and advocated constitutional revision by 2020. These series of national security initiatives have enabled Japan to take a giant step towards normalization. The second part of the chapter will examine the above national security initiatives of the Second Abe administration under the same three explanatory factors as the Koizumi administration.

The sixth chapter will be a comparative chapter which will involve a comparative analysis of the national security initiatives of the Koizumi and the second Abe administration. It aims to answer the research question of why the Second Abe administration achieved greater extent of normalization through the lens of the international and domestic explanatory factors.

The seventh and final chapter will be a concluding chapter. It will present a summary of findings, strengths and limitations of research as well as the significance and implications of the research for the study of the international relations of Japan and in East Asia.
Chapter 2  Literature Review

2.1 Introduction

This chapter first conducts a review of the literature on major international relations theories to see which of the theories best answer the research question of this dissertation. The next section of the literature review will review the literature on the domestic politics in order to understand the domestic variables that affected the course of foreign policy of Japan. The final section will be a literature review of the ‘normalization’ debate and constitutional reform of Japan to understand the literature of the explanatory power of variables of normalization. This review will lay the theoretical and empirical context and show the gap in the existing literature which this dissertation intends to fill in.

2.2 Major International Relations Theories and the International Relations of Japan during the Koizumi and the Second Abe Administrations

This section will review the literature of the study of the international relations of Japan through the lenses of four international relations theories: neorealism, neoliberalism, constructivism and neoclassical realism. It will then conclude with which theory best helps in answering the research question of this dissertation.

2.2.1 Neorealism

Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679), a founder of political philosophy, defined international relations on the basis of international anarchy and human nature (Burchill, 2005, 32-33). The international world as an anarchy later formed the basis of the realist theory. From the 1970’s onwards, neorealism became the mainstream realism theory under the influence of Kenneth Waltz (Waltz, 1979). Neorealists view the international world as an anarchy in which states’ actions are driven by considerations of and struggle for power, interests and security. In an anarchic world, states tend to ‘balance’ against the threat of a strong neighbouring country through internal balancing (strengthening national security) and external balancing (forming
alliances). This resulted in a ‘security dilemma’, as security measures taken by one state is perceived as a threat by another country which will in turn take steps to protect itself (Jervis, 1978). Neorealism has two branches: defensive realism led by Kenneth Waltz and offensive realism led by John Mearsheimer. The basic distinction between the two streams of neorealism is that Waltz argued that states tend to take security measures to defend their own security, while Mearsheimer claimed that states were perplexed by the uncertain intention of other states and the world was dominated by a perpetual struggle for power dominance (Mearsheimer, 2001).

In the case of Japan’s foreign policy, Hughes (2004) analysed its shift during the Koizumi administration from a neorealist perspective and examined her participation in the ‘war on terror’ and the concern about the proliferation of ‘weapons of mass destruction’ (Hughes, 2004). He claimed that Japan has become ‘a more assertive military power’ and was on the road to become a more ‘normal’ power in international affairs (Hughes, 2004, 427). Hughes, however, identified in Japan’s foreign policy an ‘incremental’ change instead of a radical shift from its traditional security policy (Hughes, 2004, 431). He argued that Japan, having a high sense of the fear of ‘entrapment’ in U.S.-led contingencies in a global scale, stressed the importance of a U.N. Security Council mandate as a precondition for the dispatch of the SDF overseas and that they would only be deployed in non-combat zones (Hughes, 2004, 435-436). Hughes also concluded that Japan was not yet a trusted ally of the United States like ‘Britain of the Far East’, as the closer military alliance with the United States was more motivated by the security challenges and threat posed by North Korea and China (Hughes, 2007, 325). Hughes (2007) correctly analyzed and emphasized the security threats of Japan in the international environment such as threat of terrorism, the nuclear proliferation issue of North Korea and the military rise of China in accounting for the increasing military build-up and tightening of security partnership with the United States during the Koizumi administration. Hughes (2007) has identified all these important international structural factors contributing to the foreign policy change of Japan.

Other authors also concurred that Japan has taken a more realist perception in the national security outlook. In Sheila Smith’s latest book in 2019, she analysed the national security policy of Japan from the Cold War to the second Abe administration (Smith, 2019). She recognized the historical perceptions of postwar Japanese leaders limiting the use of military power has gradually evolved to recognizing military power as an instrument of foreign policy
for Japan to contribute to international security challenges (Smith, 2019, 225-226). She argued that such change was also attributed to the increasing doubts about the reliability of the U.S. ally in coming into Japan’s aid in a potential military conflict with China over the disputed Senkaku islands or other contingencies in East Asia with the dawn of the Trump administration. The security priorities of the U.S. and Japan sometimes differed in their foreign policies in Northeast Asia (Smith, 2019, 229). This was coupled with the heightened sense of threat and military readiness of neighbouring countries in East Asia which motivated Japan “from being a hesitant partner to being an advocate for military readiness (Smith, 2019, 231). It can be seen that Smith has recognized the intense security environment and the increasingly uncertain U.S. ally as the driving force for Japanese leaders to be more inclined to use military power as an instrument of national security policy as evidenced in the package of national security initiatives of the second Abe administration.

Sakai (2019) has analysed the security discourse in Japan and found that ‘military realists’ represented by Hisahiko Okazahi, Shinzō Abe’s strategic mentor, has become the mainstream narrative in Japan’s security discourse in Abe’s Japan in place of political realists, unarmed neutrality and Japanese Gaullists (Sakai, 2019, 301). ‘Military realists’ emphasized the importance of geopolitics and military balance. For military realists, Japan is geographically proximate to the Korean Peninsula, Taiwan Strait and China, so security in the Korean Peninsula, importance of the Taiwan Strait and the military and economic rise of China determined the course of security policy of Japan. In terms of military balance, it stressed the importance of the U.S.-Japan Security Alliance and advocated Japan’s right to exercise the right of collective self-defence to counterbalance the military and economic rise of China (Sakai, 2019, 302-303). Toshiyuki Shika, the successor of Okazahi has warned about the threat from China as including China’s possible invasion of Taiwan and the potential armed conflict in Senkaku islands (Sakai, 2019, 308). Following Okazahi’s military realists narrative, Chikako Ueki emphasized the challenges of China’s rising sea power capabilities as a threat to the security of Japan (Sakai, 2019, 308). Sakai reasoned that the rise of ‘military realists’ in Japan’s security discourse as the fact that the ‘two lost decades’ since the 1990s has showed the limitation of economic power which was at the core of the Yoshida doctrine. With the fading importance of economic power, geopolitics which are immutable has gained growing importance. For Sakai, in addition to the stability in the Korean Peninsula, the single most important factor in geopolitics in Japan’s security discourse is the military and economic rise of China which not only challenged Japan but also the supremacy of the United States in Asia-
Pacific region (Sakai, 2019, 317). Sakai’s analysis of Japanese narratives of security discourse has clearly demonstrated the importance of geopolitics in the minds of Japanese analysts and Prime Minister Abe which led to the enactment of the Legislation for Peace and Security legitimizing Japan to exercise the right of collective defence.

It can be seen from Hughes (2007), Smith (2019) and Sakai (2019) that the Japanese security policy was greatly affected by the neorealist perception with a number of international structural factors such as the rise of China, nuclear and missile threat from North Korea, threat of terrorism and the fear of entrapment and abandonment of the U.S. ally. Both Smith (2019) and Sakai (2019) argued that there is a rise of ‘military realists’ in the security discourse of Japan in the second Abe administration. The following section will examine each of these international structural factors and see how these structural factors have been analysed in the literature.

2.2.1.1 U.S.- Japan Security Alliance

According to neorealism, states engage in ‘internal’ and ‘external’ balancing. Japan’s security alliance with the United States was regarded as ‘external’ balancing but the role of the United States was much more than a security partner and played an important role in shaping Japan’s foreign policy making.

The U.S. factor has historically been at the core of Japan’s security decision. The U.S. factor has brought the ‘hegemonic stability theory’ into the picture. Waltz (1993) claimed that peace can sometimes be attributed to the presence of a hegemonic power or a balance of power among states (Waltz, 1993, 77). In the aftermath of the collapse of the bipolar structure of the Cold War, the United States has enjoyed unparalleled power in military, geopolitical, economic and technological realms. According to the ‘hegemonic stability theory’, a ‘benign’ hegemon was conducive to the development of a stable and peaceful international environment since all states, small or medium, can benefit from the provision of ‘public goods’ of international stability by the hegemon which possesses sufficient strength and power (Webb and Krasner, 1989, 184). The unipolar system under the lead of the United States in post-Cold War was argued as contribution to prolonged peace instead of security competition among other states because the costs of balancing outweigh the benefits (Brooks and Wohlforth, 2002; Wohlforth, 1999). Wolf (2001) claimed that the United States has assumed the role of a military protector rather than
exploited her allies and other small and medium countries and it was also a reason for U.S. unchallenged hegemony (Wolf, 2001, 657). However, there are neorealists who argued that unipolarity is the least stable international structure which drives balancing acts by other states. Layne (1993) argued that unipolarity or hegemony will ultimately lead to the emergence of new great powers because of the anarchic structure of the international system and the different pace of growth among great powers (Layne, 1993, 7-9).

In the twenty first century, the most prominent potential challenger to the hegemonic status of the United States was the rise of a new great power of China. Wolf (2001), however, argued that China was unable to challenge the hegemony of the United States, as China’s economic and military progress would lead to balancing acts by regional powers such as Japan. He argued that the concerns for East Asian countries such as the rise of China would contribute to more regional equilibrium and stability rather than global hegemony (Wolf, 2001, 655-656). It was submitted that the decades old literature of Wolf (2001) should be read in light of the prominent rise of China in the international scene during the past few decades. The international world is witnessing a multipolar world with China challenging the hegemony status of the United States.

The later literature shows that the changing perception of the importance of the U.S.-Japan alliance to Japan’s national security strategy. Bisley (2008) has analysed the transformation of the U.S. Security Alliance from the 1990s to 2007. He found that there was tightening and enhancement of the alliance from 1990s to 2007. He attributed the changes primarily as a result of the more intense regional and global security environment such as the military modernization of China and the nuclear and missile development of North Korea, as well as a broad range of new security challenges like terrorism, piracy and energy security (Bisley, 2008, 82). Thus, Bisley found that the relative importance of the U.S.-Japan Security Alliance on Japan is declining.

In a special issue of the Pacific Review in 2018, the authors devoted to the research question of whether the U.S.-Japan Security Alliance remained central in Japan’s security policy or whether Japan is ‘decentering’ from the centrality of the U.S. ally and came to embrace other regional partners. Hughes (2018) analysed Japan’s securing new strategic partnerships outside the U.S.-Japan Alliance through lifting its ban on arms export as a way to hedge within and outside the U.S.-Japan Security Alliance (Hughes, 2018). Other authors in the special issue discussed Japan forming security partnerships with ASEAN (Midford, 2018), EU (Vosse,
2018), Australia (Wilkins, 2018), India (Ishibashi, 2018) and the Philippines and Vietnam (Grønning, 2018). All the articles in the special issue agreed that Japan has ‘decentered’ from the exclusive reliance on the U.S. ally by diversifying its strategic partnerships with other regional partners, notwithstanding the fact that the U.S.-Japan Security Alliance remained a core of Japan’s security strategy.

The above literature on the view of the neorealists of the U.S.-Japan Alliance showed that the influence of the U.S.-Japan Security Alliance has been persistent on Japan’s national security strategy in the post-Cold war period. In the past few decades, the world was changed from an unipolar world under U.S. hegemony to a multipolar world with China being a challenger not only to the U.S. hegemony but also to the national security of Japan. While acknowledging that the influence of U.S. on Japan is important and persistent, this dissertation will not engage in a comparative study of the U.S. factor in the two administration as it remains a relatively constant factor in Japan’s security policy in the course of history of the U.S-Japan Security Alliance, not to mention the two administrations under this research.

2.2.1.2 Rise of China

Previous literature took a more balanced view of the impact of the rise of China on Japan. ‘Engagement’, ‘balancing’ and ‘containment’ are major recurring themes in the literature analysing China’s rise (Hughes, 2009a; Matsuda, 2012; Mochizuki, 2007b; Watanabe, 2015b). In analysing the foreign diplomacy of Japan towards China from 1972 to 2006, Mochizuki commented that Japan’s China policy has shifted from ‘friendship diplomacy’ in the early period of normalization of bilateral diplomatic relationship to a mixed strategy of engagement and balancing from 1996 to 2006 (Mochizuki, 2007b). Engagement refers mainly to the economic realm through bilateral investment and economic aid by means of ODA from Japan to China (1979-2008). Militarily, Mochizuki described Japan as engaging in ‘internal balancing’ through military build-up and ‘external balancing’ by strengthening the U.S.- Japan Security Alliance in order to hedge against the rise of China. By ‘external balancing’, it has the effect of making the U.S. factor looming large in Japan’s foreign policymaking (Mochizuki, 2007b, 742). Japan also appeared to ‘contain’ China by strengthening the security ties not only with the United States but also with other East Asian countries (Hughes, 2009a, 845-853). The Trans-Pacific Partnership, in which Japan is a signatory, was also alleged to be a means to ‘contain’ China’s rise not just economically but to achieve political and strategic ends (Backer,
Jerdén and Hagström (2012) even argued that Japan has ‘accommodated’ or facilitated the rise of China. They argued that Japan did not view China as a threat but an ‘opportunity’ (Jerdén and Hagström, 2012).

More recent literature analysed China’s rise from the theory of defensive neorealism, which claimed that states strive to maintain status quo but they are suspicious of others’ intentions and thus lead to a security dilemma of engaging in a vicious circle of arms race (Liff and Ikenberry, 2014, 58). The past few decades have witnessed a shift in the balance of power between China and Japan, with the economic and military rise of China and the relative decline of Japan. Liff and Ikenberry (2014) argued that the rise of China has accelerated the ‘security dilemma’ and arms race in the Asia-Pacific region. The increasing military build-up coupled with non-transparency of foreign defence policy of China have triggered mistrust and suspicion among neighbouring states of the real intentions of China, irrespective of whether China merely entertains defensive intentions. In hedging against the threat from the rise of China, Ishibashi (2018) argued that Japan has strengthened her ties with India in concert with the U.S.-led effort to engage India to counterbalance the growing Chinese naval activities in the Indo-Pacific region (Ishibashi, 2018, 516). On the other hand, China viewed the U.S. security alliances in the Asia-Pacific and their tightened military and security cooperation as a sign to ‘contain’ China, which in turn intensified the pace of China’s military enhancement. This resulted in a vicious circle of military competition between China and other states in the Asia-Pacific, including Japan (Liff and Ikenberry, 2014, 66). Liff and Ikenberry (2014) concluded that a major driver of Japan’s military enhancement was the perceived threat from the rise of China (Liff and Ikenberry, 2014, 76).

The above literature review showed that there is a shifting attitude towards the rise of China in the past few decades. China has emerged more as a security threat than an opportunity. This dissertation acknowledged the views of neorealists that China was a security threat to Japan and East Asia at large but it is submitted the domestic variables such as perception of leaders and the ruling elite also contributed to the direction of foreign policy of Japan.

2.2.1.3 North Korea Nuclear and Missile Threat

Apart from the threat of the rise of China, North Korea is another destabilizing factor in East Asia security discourse. The North Korean ballistic missile programs and nuclear threat is
another factor affecting the change in foreign policy of Japan from a neorealist perspective. Cronin (2005) argued that the North Korean threat was a main catalyst driving growing consciousness of the Japanese on security concerns and hence leading to the tightening of the U.S.-Japan Security Alliance. The major reason for the revision of the U.S.- Japan Defence Cooperation Guidelines in 1996-1997 was the North Korean nuclear crisis (Cronin, 2005, 56). North Korea’s launch of the ballistic missile over Japan’s main island in 1998 also led to a heightened risk perception in Japan. Hence, it led to defence modernization of Japan and closer cooperation with the United States as a military ally (Cronin, 2005, 57). Cronin (2005) argued that Japan’s participation in the invasion of Iraq with the United States in 2003 was to ensure the viability of the U.S.- Japan Security Alliance to defend against the North Korean threat (Cronin, 2005, 58). Cronin (2005) thus analysed from a neorealist perspective the influence of the North Korean factor as the shaping force of the various foreign policies initiative of Japan during the post-Cold war era.

Unlike Cronin (2005) who analysed solely the North Korean factor, Hughes (2009) took a more balanced view and explained the impact of the North Korean threat on the changing security posture of Japan as multi-layered. He elaborated four dimensions of the North Korean threat. The first dimension is plainly the military and nuclear threat of North Korea but this military threat alone could not lead to changes in the security policy of Japan. Hughes argued that the other dimensions contributed to ‘supersizing” the North Korean threat. The second is the twin fear of entrapment and abandonment of the U.S.-Japan alliance, which pushed Japan to take a more proactive role in international security issues. The third is the North Korea abduction of Japanese citizens which were labelled as a ‘domestic threat”. The fourth is that the North Korean threat was a ‘proxy threat’ when the real and long term threat of Japan came from China (Hughes, 2009b, 293-294). Hughes (2009) commented that the four dimensions of the North Korean threat has ‘multiplied’ the threat as a major driver pushing Japan’s normalization agenda (Hughes, 2009b, 294).

The literature review shows that the North Korea factor has been a constant threat during the two administrations, but the world has witnessed a more provocative North Korean leader Kim Jong-Un as compared to his late father. The author of this dissertation agrees with the scholars like Hughes (2009) that the real and long term threat of Japan comes from China instead of North Korea.
While the neorealist perspective provided explanations for the enhanced military build-up and heightened U.S.-Japan military cooperation as a result of security threat from the rise of China and the threat of North Korea, I think that the foreign policy of Japan was not dictated by realist considerations alone. In Li’s article, he critically commented that political leaders matter more than the structure in the analysis of the security environment in East Asia. Li (2015) has four core arguments that (1) foreign policies are made by leaders; (2) different leaders make different decisions; (3) leaders are better informed than other elites; and (4) only leaders are in a position to influence international politics (Li, 2015, 159). The merits of Li’s arguments are that the leaders do matter and individuals differ, but it has disregarded the influence of international structural factors argued by neorealists which shaped and influenced the decision and perception of individual leaders. Hence, both neorealist perspective and a pure analysis of political leadership only paint half of the picture. As suggested in the section 2.2.4 on neoclassical realism, the theory of neoclassical realism which combined the study of both structural factors and domestic variables can better explain the different foreign policy options that Japan can take.

2.2.2 Neoliberal Institutionalism

The theory of neoliberal institutionalism was developed by Robert Keohane (1984) as a critique of the theory of neorealism (Keohane, 1984). According to Keohane, neoliberal institutionalism shared similar assumptions with neorealism: states as the primary actors, the dominance of power and interests in world politics and the anarchic nature of the international system. The core focus of neoliberal institutionalism is, however, the important role played by international institutions in shaping international relations. International institutions are interpreted as originating from the interests and motivations of individual state actors (Keohane, 1989, 6). Keohane (1989) claimed that the state actors were not only influenced by military and security matters but were surrounded by various interests like economic interests, energy and environmental concerns. The world is in a state of ‘complex interdependence’ so that when the state actors share similar and mutual interests, inter-state and international cooperation is possible (Keohane, 1989, 9). Keohane (2001) elaborated that the notion of ‘complex interdependence’ was important to show the inefficiency of the use or threat of use of force in solving international disputes as economic and ecological concerns may become more important (Keohane, 2001). Military power was the dominant goal of states in a neorealist
perception but a neoliberal institutionalist perspective views the world as a complex web of various issues and interests without hierarchical order, with military power as one of them. Hence, institutionalization came into play when states resolve disputes or matters of interests through diplomatic means or international institutions such as alliances or transnational organizations. According to Keohane (1989), alliance was a means for cooperation as opposed to the neorealist claim of a means to achieve balance of power (Keohane, 1989, 9). Thus, it was both the material interests of the state actors as well as the ‘subjective self-understanding’ of the statesmen that contribute to the understanding of world politics (Keohane, 1989, 2).

While neorealists perceive the U.S - Japan Security Alliance as a check against the threat of the rise of China and North Korea nuclear threat, neoliberal institutionalists view the U.S.-Japan Security Alliance as providing an institutional framework for Japan to pursue pacifism and international peace-keeping. Berger (2007) reasoned that Japan’s military build-up was not the result of the structural pressure from external threats but because of her yearning for the promotion of peace and stability in international security and order. It was because of the existence of the institutional framework of the bilateral alliance that Japan could promote mutual interests with the United States in maintaining global order. Berger (2007) argued that Japan’s growing military strength was not the outcome of balance of power game but her efforts in becoming a ‘regional stabilizer’. Japan aimed at achieving regional and global security to adjust and ‘adapt’ to the emergence of new security threats such as the rise of China and nuclear proliferation in post-Cold War (Berger, 2007, 275-279).

The neoliberal institutionalists also held different perception about the rise of China. Mochizuki (2007) claimed that the security threats from China has not dampened Japan’s efforts to engage China. Both countries have held security dialogues and defence exchanges to promote greater military transparency and enhance mutual confidence building (Mochizuki, 2007a, 248). Mochizuki (2007) acknowledged the complexities of the Sino-Japanese relationship which has been perpetually perplexed by the history problems, territorial disputes, mutual distrust and suspicion. Nevertheless, the bilateral economic interdependence and merging of interests in certain transnational matters such as environmental and energy concerns have been reasons for both countries to maintain a cooperative relationship rather than military confrontation (Mochizuki, 2007a, 251).
ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), established in 1994, is arguably another response of the international community to the rise of China. Emmers (2001) claimed that ARF aimed at addressing the balance of power in Asia-Pacific. He argued that the ARF aimed at ensuring the continued presence of the United States in the Asia-Pacific and constraining the behaviour of China through diplomatic rather than military means (Emmers, 2001, 283). Japan viewed the ARF as a response to the rise of China. Yuzawa (2005) analysed the perception of Japan towards the ARF and concluded that Japan’s perception has changed from ‘optimistic liberal’ to ‘pessimistic realistic’ (Yuzawa, 2005). Japan was one of the founding members of the ARF. At its inception, Japan viewed the ARF as a diplomatic tool to engage ASEAN countries, and China, in particular, in a multilateral framework to ensure regional security and stability. Japan hoped that through dialogue and consultation, security issues involving the territorial dispute in the South China Sea and the North Korean nuclear and missile threat can be resolved. Japan expected this multilateral framework, together with the U.S.- Japan Security Alliance, would be able to facilitate resolution of regional disputes and conflicts (Yuzawa, 2005, 475-476). However, Yuzawa (2005) concluded that Japan’s experience showed that such a neoliberal institutionalist perspective of the ARF failed to achieve significant progress. The ARF failed to exert sufficient pressure on China to restrain her behaviour in the South China Sea or the resolution of the North Korea threat. At best, the ARF has only managed to provide a minimum level of confidence building and a talk shop. Yuzawa (2005) argued that Japan’s passion for Asia-Pacific security multilateralism has diminished and that Japan could only count on the strengthening the U.S.- Japan Security Alliance to secure her own national security and regional stability in East Asia (Yuzawa, 2005, 488). Yuzawa (2005) thus highlighted the limitation of the theory of neoliberal institutionalism in the face of the severe international threats in contemporary Japan.

In the twenty-first century, the trilateral relationship between the United States, Japan and China was one of the most important ones which determine the regional stability in East Asia. Chu (2008) took a neoliberal institutionalist perspective of the trilateral relationship (Chu, 2008). The most important shared interests among the three countries is the economic relationship. The United States is China’s largest trade partner while China is the third largest trade partner of the United States. China and the United States are the first and second largest trade partners of Japan (Central Intelligence Agency, 2016). These close economic ties and common interests have provided a solid foundation for cooperation in other issues such as environment, energy and terrorism. Chu (2008) argued that the twenty-first century will not be
dominated by a single power but that international cooperation and consultation through bilateral and multilateral framework is the preferred mode to secure peace and stability. Bilateral security dialogues between the United States and Japan, Japan and China, and China and the United States are important channels to resolve issues of common interests and conflicts (Chu, 2008). However, during the two administrations of this research, the intense security environment with growing threats from the military and economic rise of China which make Japan emerged as a huge security threats to neighbouring countries and to the world at large, bilateral and multilateral security dialogues have proved to be an ineffective means of resolving international issues such as the territorial disputes between China and the Asian countries in the East and South China Sea. This again showed the limitation of the neoliberal institutionalist approach in addressing the China’s threat.

According to neoliberal institutionalists, the six-party talks was one of the most prominent examples of the efforts of the relevant countries to deal with international relations issues through ‘institutions’ and ‘dialogue’. As a close neighbour, the North Korea nuclear threat weighed greatly on Japan. The bilateral relationship was further aggravated by the abduction issue. In the face of the threat from the North Korea nuclear issue, the six-party talks were launched in 2003, in which the United States, China, North and South Korea, Japan and Russia held dialogues to address the issue. Contrary to the neorealist predictions that nuclear threat would be met by rearmament, the six-party talks showed the attempt to use an ‘engagement’ and ‘dialogue’ approach by the countries concerned. The Nuclear Security Summit (NSS), a world summit first held in 2010, also showed the efforts of countries around the world to resolve the issue of nuclear proliferation not through the development of nuclear weapons themselves but through international negotiation and cooperation (Choi and Moon, 2010, 358). Nakato (2013) also analysed that in the face of the North Korean threat, Japan has taken the approach of ‘responsive engagement’ during the Koizumi administration (Nakato, 2013, 54-56). However, the six-party talks have proved to be a futile attempt in addressing the issue of denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. The world has witnessed a more provocative North Korea under the leadership of Kim Jong-Un. It again displayed the inability of the theory of neoclassical realism in dealing with the threat from North Korea.

The above account of the foreign policy of Japan in the post-Cold War era from the neoliberal institutional perspective has shown that Japan has adopted an engagement and consultation means to address the shifting balance of power and security threats in East Asia. Neoliberal
institutionalism has emphasised that institutions provided a channel of consultation and communication among countries concerned. However, some scholars have doubted the fruitfulness of the neoliberal institutional approach in explaining the existence of regional conflicts and disputes. Neoliberal institutionalism may be inadequate in explaining Japan’s behaviour in the case of territorial disputes with China and South Korea, for example. The theory of neoliberal institutionalism may well explain the closer economic cooperation and international cooperative peace effort, the theory however could not provide satisfactory explanation to answer the research questions of this dissertation. The two administrations in this research are characterized by an intense security environment, hence in answering the research question of this dissertation, it necessitates the analysis of the international structural imperatives together with the domestic variables with two very proactive Prime Ministers at the centre of decision making. During the two administrations under this research, Japan could not deal with the international threats through diplomatic means or international institutions such as alliances or transnational organizations. In this research, it is not the international institution but rather the combined force of international structural factors and domestic institutional framework and Japanese leaders who are the relevant actors in contributing to the negotiation and discussion of the package of national security initiatives of the two administrations. While not dismissing the importance of the theory of neoliberal institutionalism in the study of international relations, it cannot address the research question of this dissertation.

2.2.3 Constructivism

In addition to the neorealist and neoliberal institutionalist approaches, constructivism is another mainstream international relations theory which has been used by scholars in analysing the international relations of Japan. Alexander Wendt (1992) is one of the main constructivists who developed the theory to fill in the gap left by neorealists and neoliberal institutionalists in explaining international relations (Wendt, 1992). Wendt (1992) argued that there are equally important factors such as the role of the state identity in shaping the foreign policies of the state, instead of the structural material factors as argued by neorealists and neoliberal institutionalists (Wendt, 1992, 394). Wendt (1992) claimed that state identities were developed from its history of inter-state interaction which in turn determined the state interests and the national security strategy (Wendt, 1992, 406).
Adopting a constructivist approach, Singh (2013) analysed the foreign security policy of Japan from the Cold War to the post-Cold War period (Singh, 2013). He analysed three factors which shaped the national security identity of Japan: the territorial conception of national identity; Japan’s involvement in regional and international environment; and the domestic security policy-making regime (Singh, 2013, 69-71). He concluded that the national security identity of Japan was not static but has evolved from an antimilitaristic ‘peace identity’ in the Cold War period to the identity of ‘an international state’ in the post-Cold War period. In the post-Cold War period, Singh (2013) concluded first that Japan began to take a broad conception of national security to embrace security beyond her territorial borders, and second that Japan became more involved in international peace-keeping missions and the war against terrorism. Thirdly, at the domestic level, the rise of ‘revisionist’ leaders and politicians also contributed to this shift in national security identity of Japan to an ‘international state’. Singh (2013) has captured the essence of the evolution of Japan’s national security identity, with Japan taking a more ‘international’ perspective of national security policy. Singh’s conception of ‘an international state’ is an important contribution to the analysis of the state identity of Japan, as the principle of unarmed pacifism is no longer applicable to the understanding of the contemporary international relations of Japan. By adopting a constructivist approach, Singh (2013) has given consideration of the impact of ‘ideological’ factors on Japan’s foreign policy making which was evolving in the course of history. However, the author does not agree with the weight of ideational factors given by Singh (2013). International structural factors notwithstanding, domestic politics with Prime Minister and the consensus and confrontation of different political parties including the ruling elite which are at the centre of the decision making of the government also drove Japan to take a particular foreign policy and hence a step towards greater normalization.

Constructivism has emphasized the important role of ‘ideology’ in foreign policy decision. Apart from the state identity and personal ideology of the statesman, history also shaped the nationalism and hence changes in foreign policy. In discussing the impact of the rise of China on Japan’s foreign policy, constructivism is also a useful tool of analysis. The long-standing historical and cultural ties between Japan and China has rendered ‘state identity’ one of the determining factors of the bilateral relationship (Rozman, 2013; Suzuki, 2015; Wan, 2015). Suzuki (2015) examined how the Japanese Left and Right portrayed China as having replaced the United States as the focal point of nationalism with the rise of China from the 1990s. The
Japanese Left and Right have traditionally viewed China differently, with the political Right alleging that China has kept playing the history card so a 'weak' Japan must rearm herself, while the political Left labelled China as a 'victimized' country to highlight the peaceful aspirations of Japan of not repeating the wartime aggression. With the rise of China, the Japanese political Left and Right began to converge on perceiving China as ‘arrogant’ and ‘bullying’ and imposed unreasonable demands on Japan. The Japanese Left also became aware of the unrealistic ideals of maintaining unarmed neutrality in the face of security challenges in the region such as the rise of China and the North Korean missile threat. Hence, Suzuki (2015) argued that the rise of China has become a focal point of nationalism of both Japanese Left and Right, which impacted the foreign policy of Japan (Suzuki, 2015).

Nationalism is closely linked with the national identity of a country and is also an issue explored by constructivists in determining the course of foreign policy of Japan. Kuroki (2013) argued that ‘nationalism’ has been manipulated by Japanese leaders to achieve their policy goals and marginalize their rivals during the Koizumi administration (Kuroki, 2013). In the case of the foreign policy towards China, Kuroki (2013) used Koizumi’s annual visit to the Yasukuni Shrine as a case study to show that Prime Minister Koizumi manipulated this historical card to win the support of the right-wing conservatives for his LDP presidential election purpose (Kuroki, 2013, 95). Kuroki (2013) argued that the Yasukuni Shrine visit was also used by Koizumi to show to the international world that Japan would pledge not to repeat war imperialism and maintain the postwar ‘peaceful identity’ (Kuroki, 2013, 107).

Kuroki (2013) also utilized the theory of constructivism to study the relations between Japan and North Korea. North Korea remained the only country that Japan did not achieve diplomatic normalization in the post-WWII. Kuroki (2013) reasoned that Japan’s identity towards North Korea was a ‘victimiser’ in WWII and the colonial period and that diplomatic normalization would be viewed by Japan as a kind of ‘war settlement’ to realize her ‘peaceful’ state identity free from colonial past aggression. Besides, Kuroki (2013) claimed that Japan deemed North Korea not only as a nuclear threat in a close neighbourhood but also a poor country in need of assistance. Hence, Kuroki (2013) argued that this ‘peace identity’ has driven Japan to achieve diplomatic relations with North Korea (Kuroki, 2013, 144). Though Japan now acquires the identity as a ‘victim’ and North Korea became the ‘victimiser’ in the abduction and missile and nuclear threat issues, Japan during the Koizumi administration practised the policy of ‘proactive engagement’ with North Korea to achieve peace and denuclearization in Northeast
Asia. All these efforts were motivated by the ‘peace identity’ developed in the postwar period (Kuroki, 2013, 150-152).

The theory of constructivism is not devoid of critics as failing to account for the changes in the security policy of Japan. Lind (2004) tested two competing theories of constructivism of antimilitarism and realist theory of buck-passing to understand the continuities and changes of the security policy of Japan (Lind, 2004). She agreed that Japanese society was imbued with a high sense of antimilitarism but she argued that it did not constrain Japan from building its military might (Lind, 2004, 102). Instead, she claimed that the reason for Japan to practise a highly constrained foreign policy was not because of constructivism but was based on the realist theory of buck-passing which recognized the need to balance against external threat but it was achieved by as little as effort from itself and rely on the effort of others (Lind, 2004, 103). Lind (2004) preferred the latter theory as Japan has counted on the military protection from the United States to defend against external threats hence it spent little effort in strengthening its military might. Lind (2004) dismissed the theory of constructivism as accounting for the light military build-up of Japan by relying on realist theory of buck-passing. 

Decades have passed since Lind (2004) published the article. in the Koizumi and second Abe administration, there were increasing demands from the United States on Japan to shoulder more responsibility for its national defence and the intense international security environment, thus I found that Lind’s arguments whilst still holds true in dismissing the theory of constructivism as accounting for the changes in national security policy of contemporary Japan, the realist theory of buck-passing could not be read in the same light decades ago and in the contemporary Japan as Japan began to rely more on beefing up its own national defence capability in the Koizumi and second Abe administration, it is more the neorealist theory of balance of power which provided the international structural driving force.

Miyashita (2007) also has made a critique of the theory of constructivism on the understanding of the security relationship of Japan. He disagreed with constructivists who downplayed the importance of material and structural factors (Miyashita, 2007, 116). Instead, he argued that Japan’s long period of postwar climate of antimilitarist norms and identities were inseparable from the material and structural factors. He cited for instance that the pacifist ideals of the JSP and Komeito have at times been sacrificed because of their position as a coalition partner with the LDP. Hence, he argued that the pacifist norms of postwar Japan was influenced by power and interests (Miyashita, 2007, 113-115). He argued that the international security environment,
the U.S. security guarantee, domestic political conditions, threat perception, political stability as well as economic prosperity are other factors which led to the prevalence of antimilitarism in postwar Japan (Miyashita, 2007, 107). I concur with the critique of Miyashita (2007) on the approach of constructivism in the analysis of security identity of Japan. This dissertation will analyse in the context of the intense international security environment and the domestic variables in the Koizumi and second Abe administration which can show that the security identity of pacifism did not exist in the abstract but was heavily shaped by material and structural factors.

In fact, back in 1993, Berger’s comment is insightful of the limitation of the theory of constructivism in understanding the security policy of Japan for the current research. Berger (1993) rejected the theory of constructivism as failing to explain why Japan did not remilitarize in the 1990s. He attributed such reluctance to Japan’s culture of antimilitarism as a result of the collective memories of the war defeat in WWII. He cited the example of Japan’s refusal to expand the military role in the Gulf Crisis in 1991 as the influence of the norm of antimilitarism notwithstanding the demand from the international community and the risk of damaging Japan’s relation with the United States. (Berger, 1993, 129, 131) Berger’s analysis more than twenty years ago remain relevant for the discussion of national security of contemporary Japan for his comment that “Japan’s anti-militarism in its present form could not survive both a weakening of its alliance with the United States and the emergence of a new regional security threat” (Berger, 1993, 120) Berger thus acknowledged implicitly that the norm of antimilitarism survived because of a long period of postwar international peace and prosperity. The influence of antimilitarism on national security policy of Japan will be undermined in the face of external threats in the international security environment. Hence, in the case of the research of the national security initiatives of Koizumi and second Abe administration of this dissertation, it is submitted that the tool of constructivism cannot answer the research question. It is submitted that it is only with the consideration of the material and structural imperatives together with domestic variables which could account for the enactment of the national security initiatives in the two administrations.
2.2.4 Neoclassical Realism

The theory of neoclassical realism was examined by Gideon Rose in 1998 (Rose, 1998). As its name suggests, this theory is a combination of the theory of neorealism pioneered by Waltz and classical realism by Hans Morgenthau. Rose explained that it was “realism” in that the theoretical basis of the theory of neoclassical realism begins with Waltz’s theory of neorealism that the world is an anarchy and states struggled to maximize relative power capabilities in order to survive in the face of external threats. The theory of neoclassical realism moved beyond Waltz theory of neorealism in that it examined the “intervening variables at the unit level”, which was why it was called “classical” (Rose, 1998, 146). Rose (1998) said that there were two intervening variables through which the external pressures must be filtered. The first was the perception of the decision makers and the relative wealth and power capabilities of a state (Rose, 1998, 157). The second intervening variable was the ability of the state to mobilize national resources, including overcoming domestic resistance from the public (Rose, 1998, 161).

Scholars have interpreted and elaborated on the intervening variables of the theory of neoclassical realism. Schweller (2004) discussed the first intervening variable of elite consensus/disagreement in influencing foreign policy decisions (Schweller, 2004). Schweller (2004) said the existence of an external threat alone did not mean that the state would adopt balancing actions to counteract the threat. The elite perception of the existence will affect how and the extent in which a state would mobilize resources to deal with the external threat. The elites’ “risk-taking preferences, their time horizons, and how they discount costs and benefits” are factors which lead to the differences in elite perception of the external threat (Schweller, 2004, 170-171). In the absence of an elite consensus of the external threat, the state may adopt alternative foreign policies such as appeasement or under-balancing in order to appeal to broader interests across the political spectrum and the domestic populace. Hence, Schweller argued that democratic societies have historically been slow to react to or balance against external threats until the threat became imminent, as the Diet debates among different political camps would prolong the formation of elite consensus (Schweller, 2004, 172).

Taliaferro (2009) elaborated on the second intervening variable of resource extraction (Taliaferro, 2009). He discussed the concept of resource extraction in comparing the different
responses of China and Japan in the mid 19th century in the face of western imperialism. Both Japan and China were faced with the external threat from western imperialism and their demand of opening their countries to foreign trade and commerce. Taliaferro (2009) argued that the two countries responded differently because of their different ability and capacity to mobilize domestic resources. Taliaferro (2009) elaborated that the external threat is an independent variable. The intervening variable is the state power as seen in its ability to mobilize domestic resources. The institutions of a state, nationalism and ideology may influence the level of a state power. The dependent variable is the differing responses of a state in response to an external threat (Taliaferro, 2009, 213). A state has three possible responses in the face of an external threat, either continue with the existing military or strategic arrangement, try to emulate the advanced state, or to innovate new institutions. The strategy of emulation and innovation required the reallocation of existing resources. States in possession of a high level of extraction and mobilization of resources better equipped to emulate in the face of a high risk of external threat, while States with a relatively lesser power of extraction and mobilization capacity less willing to emulate or innovate in the face of external threat (Taliaferro, 2009, 201).

Taliaferro (2009) further elaborated on the components of a state power which included ‘political-military institutions’, ‘state-sponsored nationalism’ and ‘ideology’. He explained that the political-military institutions of a state form the core of a state power. The institutions determine how much power the central decision makers have in utilizing domestic resources for the end of national security (Taliaferro, 2009, 215-217). The second determinant of a state power is ‘state-sponsored nationalism’ which can create social cohesion and hence the identification of individuals with the goal of the state, which can in turn facilitate the leaders’ ability to mobilize domestic resources (Taliaferro, 2009, 219). The third determinant of a state power is ‘ideology’ which Taliaferro referred to as widely held beliefs which may either facilitate or inhibit the leaders in mobilizing resources depending on whether the beliefs of the elite and the public coincide (Taliaferro, 2009, 221).

Schweller (2004) and Taliaferro (2009) have elaborated the two intervening variables through which the external pressures must be filtered. They thus further refined the approach of neoclassical realism first formulated by Rose (1998). Later literature has considered other intervening variables. Lai (2014) analyzed “nationalism” as an another intervening variable under the analysis of theory of neoclassical realism (Lai, 2014). Lai (2014) said that
nationalism can be mobilized as a political instrument by the ruling elites in foreign policy making. Nationalism can also affect foreign policy making through public opinion and non-government pressure on the ruling elites. Lai (2014) analyzed in his book how the intervening variable of nationalism, state institutions and domestic politics interacted with the external variables, namely the international security environment, alliance commitment, diplomatic leverage and interdependence in the Sino-Japanese relationship (Lai, 2014, 38).

Since its introduction, the theory of neoclassical realism has been applied by scholars in the study of various international relationships, such as the relationship of the United States with countries like Japan and South Korea (Cha, 2000), North Korea (Davidson, 2008) and China (He, 2017). There were also a number of works which discussed Japan’s international relationship from the perspective of the theory of neoclassical realism, such as Japan’s overall security policy (Saltzman, 2015), Japan’s China Policy (Sherrill and Hough, 2015; Yoshimatsu, 2012) and missile defence polices in Japan and South Korea (Hyon, 2012).

Saltzman (2015) has made a recent attempt to discuss Japan’s security relationship in the second Abe administration from the lens of neoclassical realism. In analysing the intervening variable of resource extraction, Saltzman (2015) analysed the factors of enhanced military preparedness, better economic performance, and greater political and public support in understanding the initiative of legitimizing the right of collective self-defense during the second Abe administration (Saltzman, 2015, 513). Saltzman (2015) has elaborated on these important intervening variables in shaping the policy of the second Abe administration but he missed out the equally if not more important variable of elite perception, in particular the perception and beliefs of Prime Minister Shinzō Abe and the right wing organization, such as Nippon Kaigi. How the political elite perceived or manipulated the extent of the external threat and hence mobilized domestic resources to balance the threat is a gap in the literature that this essay intends to fill in.

In fact, there was many literature which analysed the international relations of Japan not in the name of the neoclassical realism but recognized the importance of the influence of both international structural factors and domestic variables. Grønning (2018), though not explicitly adopting the approach of neoclassical realism, reasoned that such changes in the direction of Japan’s security policy was ‘fundamentally informed by the international context’, while noting that the domestic forces are also important (Grønning, 2018, 543). He analysed the
security relationship of Japan and found that it has gradually moving from the sole U.S.-Japan security to embrace other security cooperation such as the Philippines and Vietnam (Grønning, 2018). Grønning (2018) attributed the changes in the international security environment as primarily stemming from the military and naval rise of China. Like Japan, the Philippines and Vietnam were also confronted with the maritime revisionism of China, which pushed Japan to seek security cooperation with them on top of the U.S. ally. For the domestic factors, he considered elite nationalism, as well as domestic, constitutional, security, legislative and paralegal reforms as indispensable forces which have broadened the scope of security cooperation between Japan and the Philippines and Vietnam (Grønning, 2018, 543-544). However, Grønning noted there were constraints and limitations of the security cooperation between Japan and Vietnam and the Philippines. The first and foremost constraint in further developing the security cooperation is the antimilitarist sentiment of the public. Further, the significant gap in GDP and military expenditure of Japan as compared to Vietnam and the Philippines is another constraining factor of how far Japan can materially benefit from the security cooperation to counterbalance the threat from China (Grønning, 2018, 545-546).

Grønning has aptly attributed the move of Japan to secure security partnerships beyond the U.S. ally since the 2010s to both international structural factors and domestic variables. However, Grønning did nothing other than a superficial naming of the domestic variables such as elite nationalism without any in-depth analysis of how they contributed to the course of security policy of Japan. This dissertation, while noting elite nationalism is among one of the domestic variables contributing to the changes in the security policy of Japan in the second Abe administration, will study the ideology and nationalism of political elite with a particular focus on that of Prime Ministers in an attempt to understand how it, together with other domestic variables, led to changes in the national security strategy against the background of the precarious international security environment.

In similar vein, Bisley (2008), while recognizing the primary force of international structural factors to the tightening of U.S.-Japan Security Alliance, also noted the importance of domestic political change with strengthened Cabinet and the domestic consensus in support of the tightening of the U.S.- Japan Alliance (Bisley, 2008, 83). Bisley (2008) acknowledged that the personalities of key decision makers, such as the rapport between President George W. Bush and Koizumi have been crucial to the timing of this change. This dissertation will build on the
arguments of Bisley (2008) and understand how the key decision makers, namely Koizumi and Abe, has shaped the changes in the national security policy of the two administrations.

Oros, while not applying expressly the theory of neoclassical realism, also acknowledged that Japan’s security identity of antimilitarism was structured and affected by both the international structural factors proclaimed by realists, and reinterpreted and renegotiated by domestic political actors (Oros, 2008, 69). Oros (2008) analysed the security identity of Japan in postwar period. He focused his analysis on three elements of Japan’s security identity: (1) no possession of traditional armed forces; (2) no use of force except for self-defence; and (3) no Japanese participation in foreign wars (Oros, 2008, 4-5). He said that security identity is not static but will be reinforced through human action. Oros analysed how Japan’s security identity was constructed and how it became institutionalized in the political process by political actors.

In a decade later, Oros (2017) innovatively used the metaphor of European Renaissance that began in the late 14th century to describe the security policy of Japan in the twenty first century. He argued that the first parallel with the European Renaissance was that Japan’s security discussion was once a taboo topic in Japan but there are now more political and public discussion (Oros, 2017, 3). The second parallel with the European Renaissance was that Japan’s security policies in the twenty first century was the result not only against the above backdrop of historical legacies but also when Japan was experiencing great change in geopolitical environment such as rise of China and its strained relations with South Korea (Oros, 2017, 4). The third parallel with the European Renaissance was a nostalgia to the past when some far right romanticizing the imperialist Japan with others looking at the recent past of security doctrine within confines of a pacifist constitution (Oros, 2017, 5). The fourth parallel with the European Renaissance was the cheap and easy means of spreading of ideas as the twenty-first century world was an era when the internet and the social media have allowed easy flow of knowledge and information and hence the government policies are more than ever transparent and under the public eye (Oros, 2017, 6). Oros argument was that the security strategies of Japan in the twenty first century was shaped by its historical legacies, the external security environment as well as the twenty first century world of information super highway.

Oros (2017) looked at the international-domestic dynamics in his analysis of the security policies of Japan in the period 2006-2016. He considered the principal international drivers of Japan’s security policy as the economic and military rise of China, an escalated North Korea
military threat, global financial crisis of 2008, together with the fear of U.S. economic and military decline coupled with the economic and political rise of other states relative to the decline of Japan (Oros, 2017, 13). He deployed the neorealist theory to understand how changes in the international security environment shaped the domestic response. However, he acknowledged that a pure neorealist perspective is incomplete, so he also adopted the approach of constructivism to understand how Japan’s security identity shaped the policy responses of Japan against the background of the international security environment (Oros, 2017, 18). In the domestic arena, Oros (2017) considered the shift in attitudes of domestic political parties such as LDP, DPJ, Komeito and other new political parties as well as the rise of media of communication and social media as factors which contributed to the direction of security policy of Japan (Oros, 2017, 22-24). Oros (2017) stated importantly that the three historical legacies of Japan namely the WWII wartime memories, antimilitarist sentiment and U.S.-Japan Alliance as constraining factors which set the boundaries for Japan’s policy makers to frame their responses in national security strategies (Oros, 2017, 126).

It can be seen from the above literature review that many authors analysed the international-domestic interactive influence on the national security policy of Japan while not expressly adopting the approach of neoclassical realism. This dissertation is also going to fill in the gap in the literature by adopting the approach of neo-classical realism which gives primacy to the force of international structural factors as the underlying and most important background and driving force of the national security initiatives of Japan while considering the domestic variables. The second gap this dissertation intends to fill in is the role of Prime Minister Abe. While Oros (2017) commented that “any Prime Minister, not just Abe, would have enacted a similar policy program in response to Japan’s changed international environment”, this dissertation is going to conduct an in-depth analysis of Abe himself as well as his closely affiliated right wing organization Nippon Kaigi to show the indispensable and unique role of Abe in contributing to the enactment of the various national security initiatives during the second Abe administration (Oros, 2017, 127).

Among the international theories discussed in the previous sections, I found that the theory of neoclassical realism provides the best tool of analysis, notwithstanding the criticism of Waltz himself against the consideration of ‘infinite proliferation of variables’ which makes for ‘endless arguments’ and are ‘inconclusive’ (Waltz, 1979, 65). While giving due respect to the theory of neorealism developed by Waltz who advocated the primacy of structural imperatives
and the balance of power theory, it is submitted that while the contemporary international politics involved democratic countries under the primacy of the international driving forces, the domestic institutions and ideologies also shaped the course of foreign policy of a country. Addressing the criticism of Waltz against ‘infinite proliferation of variables’, I agree that the domestic variables are really infinite because it depends on the domestic situation of a particular state at a particular point of history. There is no exhaustive list of domestic variables which need to be considered under the theory of neoclassical realism. The domestic variables will be selected depending on the cases under research. For the present research, the domestic variables will be considered by adopting the Hilsman’s concentric circle of influence, namely the role of Prime Minister and political cohesion.

2.3 Domestic Politics in Japan

In understanding the international relations of Japan, domestic politics also plays a pivotal role, as pointed out in the theory of neoclassical realism. Shinoda (2007) analysed the foreign policy of the Koizumi administration from the perspective of the influence of ‘domestic’ factors (Shinoda, 2007). Shinoda (2007) pointed out the limitations of the neorealist perspective which assumed that the changes in international security environment was the most important driving force of the shift in the security policy of Japan. Shinoda (2007) rightly pointed out that neorealists have ignored the role played by domestic politics in shaping foreign policy of Japan (Shinoda, 2007, 9).

Shinoda (2007) analysed the ‘exceptional’ domestic characteristics of the administration under Prime Minister Koizumi. Shinoda (2007) focused his analysis on the foreign policy of the Koizumi administration and the institutional structure which facilitated Koizumi to take a strong political leadership. In addition to pointing out the importance of intraparty and interparty politics, he argued that the answer to the shift in national security of Japan from the Koizumi administration lies in the ‘Kantei-led (Cabinet-led)’ policy making (also known as ‘Kantei diplomacy’), which was introduced after the administrative and political reforms initiated by the Hashimoto administration. Junichirō Koizumi was the first Prime Minister to enjoy the fruits of the reform (Shinoda, 2007, 9).
Shinoda (2007) adopted a broad definition of ‘Kantei’ to include the Cabinet Secretariat with the Prime Minister as the leader and placed pivotal importance on the leadership role of the Prime Minister in shaping foreign policy (Shinoda, 2007, 10). In exploring the role of national leaders in policy making, he revised the Hilsman’s model of concentric circle and adapted it to the case of the foreign policy of the Koizumi administration. In the revised model, Prime Minister and the bureaucracy of Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Defence is at the core of the concentric circle, with the LDP and the in the second layer, and the coalition partners, opposition parties, media/interests groups and the public in the outer layers of the circle respectively (See Figure 2-1). This model of analysis is useful for understanding the complexities of government decision making process, with Kantei initiating policy proposals and seeking support and compromises from the outer layers of the concentric circle. It is a top-down decision making process as opposed to the bottom-up decision making process in the 1955 system prior to the electoral and administrative reforms in the 1990s. However, while Shinoda (2007) rightly pointed out the pivotal role occupied by the Prime Minister in the concentric circle, he did not look into the ideologies, personal convictions or beliefs that drove Prime Minister Koizumi to pursue a particular foreign policy. This dissertation intends to fill in the gap by analysing how the personal convictions and ideologies of Koizumi, as well as Abe, have skilfully exercised their influence as being members of the innermost circle of the concentric circle, and dictated the course of national security policies of Japan during the two administrations.
Uchiyama (2010) also analysed the domestic and foreign policy of the Koizumi administration by examining Japan’s domestic politics (Uchiyama, 2010). He argued that the domestic policies of the Koizumi administration were carried out robustly and successfully. However, in foreign policy, Uchiyama (2010) argued that Koizumi did not have a coherent national security strategy for Japan. His policy of dispatching SDF to Iraq was spurred by his close relationship with then President George W. Bush of the United States. He argued that the Koizumi administration inherited the negative legacy of the 1955 system in passively following the leadership of the United States in foreign affairs without an independent strategy of its own (Uchiyama, 2010, 17). While agreeing with Uchiyama (2010) that the Koizumi administration has leant unduly on the United States, this dissertation with further analyze the domestic political players in addition to Prime Minister himself.

In analysing the foreign policy of Japan from a domestic perspective, Uchiyama (2010) also noted that ‘interests’ and ‘ideas’ were both important factors in domestic politics. Politicians were driven by personal interests such as winning re-election, personal fame or status elevation.
As for ideas, Uchiyama (2010) categorized four historical ideological confrontations among political parties: (1) ‘political realism’, which counts on the United States for national security matters and concentrates on economic development; (2) ‘military realism’, which seeks to expand the military capability of Japan and strengthen the military alliance with the United States; (3) ‘unarmed neutralism’, which upholds a strict interpretation of constitutional ban on possession of armed forces; and (4) ‘Japanese-style Gaullism’, which is aimed at the pursuit of an autonomous foreign and defence policy independent of the United States (Uchiyama, 2010, 120). He claimed the postwar period was dominated by the conservative mainstream of ‘political realism’ until the beginning of the 1990s, when ideological confrontation began to emerge, and he argued that such confrontation became more acute during and after the Koizumi administration. This dissertation intends to understand from the consideration of the Diet debates the consensus and confrontation of ideologies of ruling LDP, Komeito coalition party and the opposition parties which was developed in the Koizumi and second Abe administration and hence shaped the final foreign policy outcome.

Domestic politics involve a study of the domestic institutional structure and policy making style with the Prime Minister and the Cabinet Office as the leader. As rightly captured by Elgie (1995), there were different types of political leaders, such as ‘uncompromising’ leaders and ‘malleable’ leaders. There are leaders who have his own vision and ambitions and those who emphasize more on cohesion and maintaining status quo (Elgie, 1995b, 11). In all types of political leaders of a democratic country like Japan, the Prime Ministers, despite their own likes and preferences, have to act within the boundaries and scope of duties set by the Constitution and the law. Hence, Elgie (1995) suggested an interactionist approach to the study of political leadership which not only studied the ‘personal’ traits and aspirations of the leader but also the ‘environment’ which the leader operates. The environment includes consideration of the institutional structures, historical legacy, social, economic and political demands (Elgie, 1995b, 23)

Elgie (1995) has conducted a study on the political leadership of Japan from 1955 to 1993. Elgie (1995) found that the domestic politics in Japan during that period was dominated by factional conflicts within LDP and a strong bureaucracy. Factional politics not only determined the selection but also the dismissal of Prime Minister, with the result that the Prime Ministers during the period were characterised as ‘reactive’ leadership. Prime Ministers were usually a compromiser who managed to build coalitions and consensus among the LDP factions (Elgie,
Prime Ministers during the 1955 system rarely took a central role in decision making and domestic politics.

Hayao (1993) in his book on the study of Japanese Prime Ministers also agreed that the Japanese Prime Minister is a ‘reactive leadership’. Hayao (1993) reviewed the literature and attributed the image of weak and passive political leadership in Japan as the result of Japanese culture of consensus, harmony and groupism instead of individuality. Japan practised a bottom-up decision making style where consensus was reached at the bottom level with the leader at the top merely adopting the decision (Hayao, 1993a, 6) In spite of the fact that Japan did not have a strong and assertive leader, Hayao (1993) recognized that Japan’s Prime Minister can play an important role in policy making with all issues being already on the agenda and the role of Prime Minister was to ‘react’ in response to foreign pressure on trade and security policies, domestic problems, political scandals or diplomatic crisis (Hayao, 1993a, 27).

In spite of the image of a weak and ‘reactive’ Prime Minister, in the course of Japanese history, there were a few exceptional Prime Ministers. Hayao (1993), for instance, studied Yasuhiro Nakasone’s achievements in educational reform and tax reform (Hayao, 1993b; c). Hayao (1993) commented that Nakasone was an ‘activist’ and stood out from his predecessors in exercising forceful top-down leadership and can influence the policy making process (Hayao, 1993b, 47). Envall (2008) studied three post-war Prime Ministers by comparing Prime Ministers Shigeru Yoshida and Kakuei Tanaka with Prime Minister Koizumi. Envall’s evaluation of Yoshida was that he was an opportunist skilful in balancing competing interests and maximizing opportunities (Envall, 2008, 232). Tanaka was a ‘charismatic’ politician with an exceptional trait of being a motivator of the bureaucrats (Envall, 2008, 234). Koizumi was a ‘transformational’ leader as seen in the series of reforms he carried out during his administration (Envall, 2008, 236). Envall (2008) concluded that these three Prime Ministers were not ‘reactive’ leaders. They both ‘reacted’ and ‘shaped’ policies in response to their political environments (Envall, 2008, 237-239).

Buszynski (2006) has analysed the security policy of Japan during the Koizumi administration, and recognized the important influence of Koizumi as a young generation of leaders who advocated for a more prominent role of Japan in international affairs through cooperation with the U.S.-Japan Security Alliance. He rightly noted that the intense security environment notwithstanding, Japan’s security policy should be understood in the context of domestic and
regional constraint, including the foremost pacifist constraint under Article 9 of the Constitution. At the core of the domestic scene laid Prime Minister Koizumi himself who aspired a close relationship with the U.S. ally but was still constrained from being a full-fledged ally of the United States because of the domestic constitutional constraints (Buszynski, 2006, 106).

On the study of Prime Minister Abe, Hughes (2015) has analysed Prime Minister Abe himself by focusing on his ‘revisionist ideologies’ (Hughes, 2015). He attributed the national security initiatives of the second Abe administration to Prime Minister Shinzō Abe’s ‘revisionist’ ideologies, which advocated for the end of the post-war regime and the regaining the international power status for Japan. Hughes (2015) analysed the ‘revisionist’ ideologies through Abe’s policies on constitutional revision, patriotic education, ‘comfort women’ issue, and the Yasukuni Shrine visits. Hughes (2015) has been highly critical of Abe’s foreign and security policies and regarded them as ‘radical, assertive, high-profile and high risk’ (Hughes, 2015, 2). Hughes (2015) recent analytical approach has displayed the unique importance of Prime Minister Abe’s ‘revisionist’ sentiment in dictating the foreign policy of Japan during his second administration. It reinforces the importance of studying Prime Ministers’ political ideologies in the understanding of foreign policy of Japan.

Pugliese (2017) also examined the role of Prime Minister Abe by examining the hybrid leadership model of the second Abe administration (Pugliese, 2017). He noted that Prime Minister did not work alone. His particular focus was laid on Abe who was assisted by a circle of hand-picked foreign policy executives personally chosen by Prime Minister Abe himself, including the appointment of Shotaro Yachi as a special advisor to the Cabinet, who was regarded as the foreign policy brain of the second Abe administration (Pugliese, 2017, 159). Pugliese argued that the personal attributes of Abe together with his team of confidants have weighed heavily on the foreign policy outcome of the second Abe administration. It thus highlights the importance of studying Prime Minister Abe who were different from previous reactive leaders who only react to the call of the circumstances.

The above studies of Prime Ministers were assessed without any objective yardstick. However, Bennister (2015) developed the Leadership Capital Index as a tool to systematically compare the political fortunes of leaders. He developed ten indicators in three areas to assess the political stock of a leader, namely skills capital, relational capital and reputational capital (Bennister,
2015). Burrett (2016) then adopted the Leadership Capital Index to explain the rapid succession of Japanese Prime Ministers from 2006 to 2012. He particularly used the index to highlight the long tenure of Prime Minister Koizumi and Second Abe administration. The author thinks that the Leadership Capital Index may be useful in understanding the reason why a leader has long tenure as opposed to other short-lived leaders. However, as this dissertation aims to understand from a comparative perspective the foreign policy of Koizumi and Second Abe administration which are both long serving administration, this Leadership Capital Index may not be an adequate tool to be adopted in this research.

In relation to the methodology of examining the influence of Prime Ministers on foreign policy making, Kaarbo (1997) can provide important insights (Kaarbo, 1997). Kaarbo translated the variables in the literature in the study of U.S. Presidents into the study of Prime Ministers in Britain and Germany. The variables are: (1) interested and experienced in foreign policy; (2) policy goal task orientation; (3) consensual strategy for managing conflict; (4) involved in managing information with independent sources; and (5) competitive strategy for managing party relations. These variables are then analysed in relation to three levels of dependent variables: (i) decision process; (ii) decision outcome; and (iii) foreign policy output. (See Table 2.1) The five variables of leadership style may individually and in combination directly or indirectly affect the three dependent variables of foreign policy outcome. (Kaarbo, 1997, 574) Kaarbo acknowledged the linkage between prime minister leadership style and the dependent variables of foreign policy outcome were necessarily speculative and its value has yet to be tested in future research. However, he correctly pointed out the value of studying the leadership style of Prime Minister away from a limited focus on the structural environments and constraints surrounding the Prime Minister office and policy making. (Kaarbo, 1997, 577). As there is no concrete formulas for assessing the influence of Prime Minister on foreign policy making, Kaarbo’s list of variables can at least provide guidelines for making an objective comparison of the leadership style of Prime Minister Koizumi and Abe. Hence, the dissertation will attempt to use these variables suggested by Kaarbo in assessing why Abe could achieve greater degree of normalization than Koizumi in the comparative chapter.
In addition to the Kantei with Prime Minister as the centre, the literature shows that other domestic actors such as politicians also have a bearing on the foreign policy outcome. Hook et al. (2012) noted that while recognizing the centrality of the U.S.- Japan bilateral relationship in the security policy of Japan, the domestic actors, such as the LDP and the Ministry of Defence, manipulated the U.S. pressure to pursue their own interests and domestic norms (Hook et al., 2012, 129). In analysing the domestic policy making, Hook et al. (2012) referred to the tripartite elite model including the central bureaucracy, big businesses and the governing party (Hook et al., 2012, 39). They argued that the domestic actors and other political agents may seek to pursue their own interests by conforming with or counteracting the constraints imposed by the international structures.

A literature review shows that authors like Catalinac (2016), Hikotani (2018), Uchiyama (2010) and Schulze (2018) have concurred on the importance of the views of the political elite of Japan.
in directing the course of the national security of Japan. Catalinac (2016) also analysed how domestic politics affected foreign policy making in Japan. She used 1997 as the cutting point and argued that the costs of politicians to bear in pre-1997 in advocating national security agenda was too high and prohibitive. The costs were lowered after the 1994 electoral reforms when politicians began to pay more attention to security policy. Her thesis has contributed to the literature that domestic politics do matter and have a bearing on the national security policy (Catalinac, 2016). In similar vein, Hikotani (2018) also acknowledged the growing importance of the views of Diet members in security related matters (Hikotani, 2018). Kai Schulze (2018) also analysed how the Japanese foreign policy elite perceived China in their security discourse from the early 1990s to 2010 through analysing the official government publications such as the Defense White Papers, Diplomatic Bluebooks, National Defense Program Guidelines and speeches by government foreign policy officials (Schulze, 2018, 224). Schulze (2018) demonstrated through textual analysis of the official government documents that Japan has become increasingly securitized China’s threat after the upgrading in 2007 of the Japanese Defence Agency to the Ministry of Defence, which finally entered the ‘inner circle’ of Japan’s foreign policy institutional framework overshadowing the significance of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Schulze, 2018, 230).

It can be seen from the above literature review that authors like Catalinac (2016), Hikotani (2018), Uchiyama (2010) and Schulze (2018) have all recognized the importance of studying the views of the political elite of Japan to see how they directed the course of the national security of Japan. Hence, this dissertation will study minutely the Diet debates of politicians of different political affiliations as one of the domestic variable directing the course of foreign policy of Japan.

One further variable of domestic politics is the views of the public. There are two approaches to the study of public opinion, the elitists and the pluralists. The elitists approach suggested that public opinion is “unstable, uninformed” and is able to be ‘manipulated’. The elites can “lead, mold or ignore” public opinion. The pluralists on the other hand argued that public opinion is stable and informed. The elites should educate the public and then listen to and incorporate public opinion in their policies. Literature suggested that western study and Japanese study of public opinion generally preferred the elitists school (Eldridge; and Midford, 2008a, 3-4). This elitists approach is especially relevant to study of the Koizumi administration who claimed that he ‘lead rather than follow public opinion’ (Eldridge; and Midford, 2008a,
5). In fact, one of the attributes of the success of Koizumi was his skillful manipulation of public opinion. In a democratic Japan, in spite of the degree of elite molding or manipulation of public opinion, the voice of the public still has a bearing on the government policy making.

In a study of the public opinion and the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Legislation by Midford, he concluded that the public opinion of Japan has gradually evolved from a rigid perception of antimilitarism or pacifism to defensive realism, by which he meant that the Japanese public believed that Japan can resort to military force for national defense, national security and international humanitarian and reconstruction projects. Hence, they expressed skepticism about the use of military force to counteract terrorism (Midford, 2008, 11-13). Midford thus concluded that there was a gap between the public opinion towards defensive realism beliefs and the national security policy which may favour a more proactive foreign policy in deploying military power not for the sake of national defence of Japan. As the public opinion was at the outermost layer of the concentric circle, it has little influence on the final enactment of the national security initiatives of the two administrations so this dissertation will not examine this domestic variable.

2.4 Debate on ‘Normalization’ and Constitutional Revision

The single theme running through the foreign policy of Koizumi and the second Abe administrations was the ‘normalization’ debate. The debate of ‘normalization’ of Japan can be traced back to 1994, when Ichiro Ozawa (1994) first initiated the concept and it has become very much alive again since the Koizumi administration’s dispatch of the SDF to the Iraq War as well as the constitutional reinterpretation of the right of collective self-defence in the second Abe administration. In his book, ‘Blueprint for a New Japan: The Rethinking of a Nation’ (Ozawa, 1994), Ozawa (1994) shared the neorealist perception that the international environment surrounding Japan had become all the more dangerous with China and the Korean peninsula posing the greatest security threats to the stability of the Asia-Pacific. Hence he argued that Japan must become a ‘normal’ nation by shouldering the responsibilities common to all nations in the world through contributing to international security and a sustainable world (Ozawa, 1994, 103). He argued that Japan was incapable of assuming the defence of her own security, thus the more rational choice for Japan was to contribute to her own security and to world peace through cooperation with the United States and a United Nations-centered security...
strategy for peace (Ozawa, 1994, 104). Ozawa (1994) also outlined a proposal for constitutional revision which included the establishment of a UN reserve force and stipulated the international obligation of Japan in participating in peacekeeping operations of the United Nations (Ozawa, 1994, 110-111). Ozawa’s book had considerable impact on the ongoing constitutional debate and remains influential in shaping the contemporary national security strategy of Japan. He initiated the ‘normalization’ argument when Japan was not ‘normal’ in the sense that she was constitutionally barred by Article 9 from exercising the right of collective self-defence possessed by every nation in the world.

What is a ‘normal’ Japan in the ‘normalization’ debate? Hagström (2015) analysed the meaning of ‘normal’ given from the political left and political right. He said that the political left regarded that the post-war pacifism made Japan ‘abnormal’ and ‘exceptional’ and it is a treasure that Japan must value and is unique to Japan. The political right, however, regarded ‘pacifism’ as rendering Japan ‘illegitimately different and dangerously abnormal’. Thus, the political right strived for constitutional revision and reinterpretation to remove the constitutional ban so that Japan could exercise self-defence and collective self-defence just like every other nation in the world. For the political right, ‘normalization’ is a means to secure the national security of Japan (Hagström, 2015, 129). It is submitted that the views of the political left and the political right is not static. This dissertation is going to fill in the gap in the literature by elucidating the views of the political left and political right on constitutional revision in the Koizumi and second Abe administrations.

Soeya et al. (2011) stated that Japan was constrained from becoming a normal country because of the internal and external constraints. ‘Internal’ constraints include the constitution, antimilitarism sentiment and domestic bureaucratic and government constraints. Externally, becoming a ‘normal’ country will raise fear and suspicion among neighbouring countries such as China, South Korea and other East Asian countries (Soeya et al., 2011, 4-8). Strong embrace of the ‘normalization’ journey of Japan comes from the United States, which welcomes Japan to take up more responsibility for its own national defence as well as the multilateral peacekeeping internationally. Conservatives within Japan also supported the development of a ‘normal’ Japan but at different degrees (Park, 2011). A ‘normal’ country can take the form of Shintaro Ishihara’s concept of a Japan that is independent from the influence of the United States (Ishihara, 1991), or the concept of Yasuhiro Nakasone who made positive remarks about the United States as an ally and took ‘defensive’ national strategy as a deterrence (Park, 2011,
This dissertation will see how these ‘internal’ and ‘external’ constraints have been loosened or intensified during the two administrations.

In another chapter of the same edited book, Soeya (2011) came up with three dimensions of Japan’s normalization journey (Soeya, 2011). The first dimension was the domain of international security. The Gulf War of 1990 reminded the Japanese government of the reality of participation in international peacekeeping operation under the lead of the United States and the United Nations. The second dimension of Japan’s normalization journey was the reaffirmation of the United States - Japan Security Alliance. The several revisions of the Alliance were triggered by the changing international situation such as the Korean nuclear crisis of 1994 and later the rise of China. The last dimension of Japan’s normalization journey was the reform and change in national defence in a way that Japan would be able to develop a defence system and strategy with more independence from the United States (Soeya, 2011, 80-87). The three dimensions of Japan’s normalization journey as elaborated by Soeya (2011) still rings true in the Koizumi and second Abe administrations. This dissertation will see how far Japan has proceeded in the normalization journey during the two administrations.

As for the effect of Japan’s ‘normalization’ journey, Singh (2002), by analysing events from 1998 to 2002, pointed out that there was enhanced cooperation between Japan and the United States, including Japan’s participation in the Theatre Missile Defence (TMD) project, constitutional revision initiative and Japan’s bid for a permanent seat in the United Nations Security Council. Singh (2002) stressed that Japan’s move towards normalization did not mean that it would return to her militaristic past but was just an attempt to become a more responsible member of the international society (Singh, 2002, 94). He commented that while Japan could fit better in the overall East Asia strategy of the United States, it would also lead to worsening of the Sino-Japanese relations and increasing tensions. Singh (2002) reasoned that the enhanced political influence as a result of normalization would challenge the emerging influence of China in the region and the historical animosity between the two nations would forever haunt the bilateral relationship unless both nations could appreciate the respective new role in the international society (Singh, 2002, 95-96). In similar vein, Soeya (2011) also acknowledged that Japan was in the process of becoming a ‘normal’ country, he concluded that Japan would not develop into a traditional great power but only a ‘middle’ power by contributing to international peacekeeping and humanitarian relief (Soeya, 2011, 88-91). This dissertation will analyse the effect of Japan’s progress in normalization in the two
administrations on the national security strategy of Japan and its implications for the international security environment, in particular in relation to the balance of power in East Asia and Japan’s relationship with the neighbouring Asian countries.

Central to the ‘normalization’ debate is constitutional revision. Winkler (2011) conducted a comprehensive historical research on constitutional reform proposals from 1980 to 2009 (Winkler, 2011). In analysing the constitutional revision proposals on Article 9 of the Constitution, he noted a minimalist approach versus a radical revision approach. The minimalist approach throughout the 1980s and the early 1990s because of the scepticism of the public against efforts of constitutional reform. With lesser resistance from the public about discussion of constitutional reform in the twenty first century, the proponents for radical revision approach outnumbered their counterparts. (Winkler, 2011, 191). He traced the common threads in the constitutional revision proposals which included enabling Japan to assume a more assertive role in international peacekeeping operations, enhancing the strategic relationship with the United States, legitimatization of the SDF in the Constitution and the explicit or implicit provision of the right of collective self-defence in the Constitution (Winkler, 2011, 38-39). The research findings of Winkler (2011) has given us an overall picture of the constitutional revision proposals from the 1980s to 2009 at the academic circle, the media and the public. Constitutional revision proposals have changed from being a taboo in public discourse to a topic receiving wide attention and discussion from the public in the twenty first century. Notwithstanding the discussion at the public arena, it is stipulated in the Constitution that a constitutional revision can only be realized both with the initiative of the government together with the support of the public which will vote at the public referendum. Hence, the views of the public which will cast the decisive vote of approval is indispensable to the fate of constitutional revision movement. It is however beyond the scope of this dissertation to understand the views of the public on constitution revision.

There are proponents of the need for constitutional reform, in particular Article 9. Middlebrooks strongly argued that Japan must abandon Article 9 of the Constitution or ‘face a future it likely will be unable to defend its territory or its interests’ (Middlebrooks, 2008, xiii). Mori (2014), in an article analysing the arguments for constitutional reform put forward by Tetsuya Kataoka, concluded that constitutional amendment is an urgent task of Japan to terminate her position as a ‘dependent’ state and establish her status as an equal ally of the United States. Japan’s constitutional revision, in particular revision of Article 9, can enhance
rather than worsen the regional security in East Asia (Mori, 2014, 25). Kitaoka (2013) has been a staunch proponent of the revision of Article 9 of the Constitution, in particular the exercise of right of collective self-defence. He claimed that the exercise of this right would not pose a threat to the neighbours, as Japan would never ‘return to the bad old days’. The right of collective self-defence is a right possessed by every nation in the world under Article 51 of the United Nations Charter and it is natural that Japan should possess it (Kitaoka, 2013, 84). Kitaoka (2013) further stated that neighbouring countries like South Korea and China should not feel threatened as they too possess the right of collective self-defence. Enabling Japan to possess this right, he argued, would simply provide an additional option for Japan to defend herself (Kitaoka, 2013, 93). Similar arguments have been echoed by Choong (2015), who believed that Japan’s possession of the right of collective self-defence would contribute to regional security, but he pointed out that the main concern was the doubts and distrusts of the neighbouring East Asian countries in relation to Japan’s security gesture (Choong, 2015, 188).

Even among proponents for revising Article 9 of the Constitution, one major criticism was directed against the government’s resort to ‘reinterpretation’ which bypassed the route to formally revise the Constitution. Back in 2007, Martin (2007) has argued against ‘reinterpretation’ of the Constitution based on the principle of ‘constitutionalism’, as the meaning of the Constitution was changed not through a formal amendment but through a governmental reinterpretation (Martin, 2007). In the aftermath of the constitutional reinterpretation of 2013, Wakefield & Martin (2014) fiercely criticized such move as undemocratic and set a bad precedent for further loosening the constitutional constraint on the government. The constitutional reinterpretation was an executive decision issued without consultation with the public or a referendum (Wakefield and Martin, 2014).

On the other side, opponents to constitutional revision such as Mito (2008) dismissed the arguments of the conservatives that constitutional revision of Article 9 could enhance the independence and international status of Japan (Mito, 2008, 68). Instead, he claimed that constitutional revision would render Japan further subordinated to the military leadership of the United States (Mito, 2008, 68). Kelly (2007) argued that Article 9 should not be changed, as Japan has not shown post-war remorse as Germany undertook with her neighbours. Thus, Kelly (2007) believed Article 9 should be preserved until Japan has shown by deed and by action that she has genuinely repented for past misdeeds (Kelly, 2007, 505).
Japan’s constitutional revision debate has received so much academic and public interests because it has never been revised. Boyd and Samuels (2005) examined the factors why the Constitution of Japan has survived without a change for over seventy years notwithstanding the fact that debates of constitutional reform was so intense in recent years (Boyd and Samuels, 2005). They argued that the retention of the constitution was the result of domestic politics. The domestic politics of Japan was composed of basically three camps: the conservative politicians who favoured constitutional revision; the pragmatic conservatives who favoured retention of Article 9 to withstand from U.S. demands for military build-up; the intellectuals and leftists who supported the idea of a ‘peace nation’. Boyd and Samuels (2005) claimed that the preservation of Article 9 was contingent upon the support of at least two of the above three camps. The support of pragmatists and pacifists has thus preserved the constitution for decades up to 2000s (Boyd and Samuels, 2005, 17-26). Boyd and Samuels (2005), however, noted the rise of revisionism during the Koizumi era due to the failure of the leftist to redefine their goals as well as the domestic institutional reform which strengthened the role of Prime Minister, and above all, the assumption of office by Prime Minister Koizumi. Boyd and Samuels (2005) argued that it was the leadership of Koizumi which has pushed the Article 9 revision to the forefront of the political agenda (Boyd and Samuels, 2005, 35). For revisionists, the constitution was a humiliation imposed by the victors of the war on Japan and constitutional revision was an attempt to regain sovereignty and international prestige (Tadokoro, 2011). Hence, Ryu (2018) argued that part of the motivation for constitutional revision was socio-psychological dimension relating to national pride which emphasized Japan’s tradition and culture (Ryu, 2018, 658-659). The rise of constitutional revisionism is at its peak during the second Abe administration which will be explored in this dissertation.

The above literature reviews show that there was a wealth of existing literature discussing the normalization debate and constitutional revision, with supporters and opponents on both sides. This dissertation intends to fill in the gap in the literature by considering not only the domestic supporters and opponents of normalization debate and constitutional revision, but also by considering the equally, if not more, important factor of the international structural factors driving the pace and direction of the normalization debate and constitutional revision. The pivotal role of the ideologies of the two Prime Ministers will be demonstrated in this dissertation.
2.5 Conclusion

The literature review shows that the foreign policy of Japan has been shaped by the interaction of the international and domestic factors and that Japan was on the track to ‘normalization’. Neorealists have captured part of the picture of the reality of Japan’s international relations with its alliance with the United States, the rise of China and the North Korean threat as the ‘external’ factors that have affected the course of Japan’s foreign policy. Neoliberal institutionalists have painted the objective reality of contemporary world that international affairs and disputes were commonly resolved through international consultation and cooperation based on political and economic institutions that coordinate the multiplicity of interests involved. The use or threat of use of force alone was argued by neoliberal institutionalists as inefficient in dealing with the current state of world affairs. Theory of neoliberalism was not appropriate to answer the research question of this dissertation because international institutions failed to address the security threats in the international security environment of the two administrations. In addition to the neorealists and neoliberal institutionalists’ arguments, constructivists have given due credit to the influence of ‘ideological’ and ‘historical’ factors. Constructivism which only considered ideational factors has underestimated the prevailing influence of the security threats to the balance of power in the two administrations and hence the step towards greater degree of normalization. Instead, the approach of neoclassical realism was adopted because the Koizumi and the second Abe administration were situated at a time when there were both intense international security environment and both strong-willed and nationalistic Prime Ministers. It thus necessitates the study of the national security initiatives of the two administrations by adopting the approach of neoclassical realism which not only gives primacy to the force of international structural factors as the independent variable but also the domestic politics, elite perception and ideology as the intervening variables, which led to the different course of foreign policy adopted by Japan in the Koizumi and the second Abe administrations. The literature review shows that there is insufficient literature discussing the influence of the rise of revisionist right-wing activists against the background of public antimilitarism in shaping the national security initiatives of Japan during the two administrations. Hence, this dissertation adopts the theory of neoclassical realism to show how both the external threat of rise of China and North Korea nuclear threat, combined with the domestic variable of ideologies of Prime Ministers and views
of the political parties have played an important role in shaping the policy making of the two administrations.

The ensuing substantive chapters will discuss the national security initiatives of the two administrations. In order to lay the scene for the substantive chapters, however, the next chapter will provide a background of both the international and domestic environment of the two administrations.
Chapter 3 International and Domestic Background of the National Security Initiatives by the Koizumi and the Second Abe Administrations

3.1 Introduction

This chapter will analyze both the international and domestic factors which shaped the national security strategy of Japan. In order to lay the scene for the ensuing chapters, this chapter intends to provide the background information about the international and domestic environment surrounding Japan before the Koizumi administration. In the international arena, Japan’s relation with countries such as China, the United States and North Korea will be studied. In the domestic arena, the Yoshida doctrine and Article 9 of the Constitution, the domestic politics, including the end of the 1955 system and the administrative and electoral reforms in the 1990s and early 2000s will be examined.

3.2 International Environment

The security environment surrounding Japan in the postwar era has been characterized by her relation with three countries: China, North Korea and the United States. The balance of power in East Asia, and more importantly between Japan and China, has been changing with the economic, political and military rise of China and the relative decline of Japan. Accompanying the rise of China is a more assertive China in relation to territorial disputes. China’s WWII war memory revived time and again as a constraining factor of Japan’s pursuit of greater role in international affairs. Another source of threat to East Asian security and to Japan is a provocative North Korea with threats of nuclear testing and missile threat. Lastly, the United States factor has always been both a blessing and headache which acts both as a brake and a catalyst for Japan’s foreign policy.

3.2.1 Rise of China

The rise of China has been one of the most destabilizing factors in the international relations of East Asia, in particular her relations with Japan. The United States first identified the phenomenon of the rapid rise of China in its 2005 Annual Report on the Military Power of
China (Office of the Secretary of Defense of the United States, 2005, 2). Callahan attempted to quantify China’s rise as a political, economic and military power in terms of China’s GDP, foreign reserves and national defense budget and the number of missiles pointing at Taiwan (Callahan, 2005, 702). In terms of the GDP, China superseded Germany as the third largest economy in the world in 2007 (World Bank, 2016) and overtook Japan as the second largest economy in 2011 and is able to secure its position as of the time of writing (World Bank, 2015). According to 2015 estimates, China has the world’s largest foreign reserves, and more than doubled those of Japan, which ranked the second in world foreign exchange reserves (International Monetary Fund, 2016).

Alongside the economic rise of China is the gradual military buildup. China has often been criticized as being non-transparent in its military capabilities by countries such as the United States and Japan. Nevertheless, even based on government figures published by China, it possesses the largest army in the world and a formidable navy and has been increasing its military spending annually for over two decades. As of 2016, China’s military spending is only second to the United States (Office of the Secretary of Defense of the United States, 2016, 77).

After decades of economic and military modernization, China has taken a more prominent role in international affairs. China’s entry into the World Trade Organization (“WTO”) in 2001 was an important step taken by China to join the international trade system and abide by and play by the rules of international trade. By attending the finance ministers meetings of G8 in 1998 and attended the G20 in 2008, China was recognized as one of the major economies in the world and agreed to formulate rules of international trade and policy collectively with other major economies in the world. China also hosted the Olympics in 2008 and the World Expo in 2010, which were just a few examples that China has become more actively engaged in the international community. In 2015, China initiated the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (“AIIB”) to provide financing capital for infrastructure development in the Asia-Pacific region. China also conceived the strategy of the “Silk Road Economic Belt and the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road”, commonly referred to as “The Belt and Road” from the idea of the historical “Silk Road”. President Xi Jinping advocated this strategy to foster economic cooperation among countries along “The Belt and Road” (National Development and Reform Commission, 2015)
It can be seen that after decades of reform and development, China has emerged as one of the major powers in the world in the economic, military and political spheres. With China’s rise as a great power, there are two contradicting perceptions: the ‘peaceful rising’ argument and a “threat” to international peace and security. Back in 1999, Chinese then Premier Zhu Rongli commented China was an “opportunity” rather than a “threat” (Peng, 1999). In 2003, Wen Jiabao, then Premier of China, proclaimed the idea of “peaceful rising” or “peaceful development” of China, that China’s emergence as a great power would contribute to global peace instead of posing security threats to international security. China will resort to peaceful means in development and will not upset the status quo or seek to achieve hegemony (Pan, 2006). In 2005, State Council of China published a White Paper, “China’s Peaceful Development Road” (State Council of China, 2005). It reiterated China’s conviction of pursuing sustainable development through peaceful means and join hands with other nations to achieve world security. In 2014, President Xi Jinping also restated China’s peaceful diplomacy (Xi, 2014b). In his speech titled “New Asian Security Concept for New Progress in Security Cooperation”, President Xi elaborated a new security concept as encompassing ‘common security’, ‘comprehensive security’, ‘cooperative security’ and ‘sustainable security’. As security means security for all, he said that China will not achieve security at the expense of other countries (Xi, 2014a).

Chinese academics also sternly defended against the claim of “China’s threat”. Chinese elites refuted the China threat argument by asserting that China is “a victim of foreign conspiracy” (Callahan, 2005, 709). They are aware that the United States and Japan are the main proponents of the China threat theory. Chinese academics argued that the United States fabricated the China threat theory to halt the rise of China and secure her military supremacy, while Japan used China’s threat as her excuse to pursue military expansionism and the strengthening of the United States-Japan Security Alliance (Tao, 2015a, 8). He also shattered the claim of China threat theory by recalling the long history of China with no record of foreign aggression. Since China was embroiled in a war conflict in the Opium War, China has well remembered the Confucius saying that “Don't do unto others what you don't want others to do unto you.” Hence, he argued that China’s rise will not threaten the security of other countries. Great power does not necessarily entail hegemony. In fact, in the preamble of the Constitution of China, it stated that “China consistently opposes imperialism, hegemonism and colonialism” (National People's Congress of China, 2004). China’s rise enables it to pursue “China’s dream” by creating a peaceful, harmonious and prosperous world order (Tao, 2015b).
On the other hand, there is no shortage of literature in the West and Japan, in particular, that China’s rise poses a threat to other nations. China’s sheer size of population and growing military might, as well as the ideological confrontation of a ‘Communist’ China as opposed to the liberal democracy in other nations poses a threat. There is also an argument that ‘nationalism’ at home may drive China to pursue a more aggressive foreign policy to the detriment of other nations (Xia, 2006).

Perception of threat does not exist in the abstract. One of the most prominent manifestations of China’s threat is its increasing assertiveness in its maritime and territorial disputes with her South East Asian neighbours in the South China Sea and Japan in the East China Sea. Notwithstanding the legal and historical assertions of China in support of her claim in the aforesaid maritime disputes, it has been argued that the maritime disputes were not simply about a struggle for energy resources, it was seen as China’s “creeping expansionism” of the stretch of its navy from East and South China Sea and well into the Pacific Ocean (Manicom, 2008, 460). In Japan’s Annual Defense White Paper 2016, Japan alleged that China has attempted to “change the status quo by coercion” by its repeated intrusions in the territorial waters and the airspace of Japan (Ministry of Defence of Japan, 2016b, 5, 52-56).

The world also witnessed the rise of naval activism in China in recent years. There is a saying that ‘the 21st century is the century of the sea”. In this respect, China has also modernized and expanded her naval capabilities to join the ranks of great naval powers. China commissioned “Liaoning”, its first aircraft carrier in 2011 to have its first sea trial (Chang, 2012). In 2016, the combat capability of “Liaoning” has been greatly enhanced and advanced into the west of the Pacific Ocean for the first time as a training exercise to showcase its naval capabilities and advancement (Ogura, 2016). It stirred alarm in neighbouring countries such as Japan and Taiwan. In Japan, Chief Cabinet Secretary, Yoshihide Suga, responded in the press conference that the MSDF noted the advance of China’s aircraft carrier from the East China Sea to the Pacific Ocean and Japan would closely monitor the situation (Cabinet of Japan, 2016). Hence, these Chinese activities have fueled the argument that China is taking steps to alter the status quo in maritime disputes.

While there is no objective yardstick to characterize whether the argument of China’s opportunity or China’s threat holds true, the purpose of this dissertation is to understand the
subjective perception and judgment of Japan. The later chapters of this dissertation will seek to understand the rise of China phenomenon from a Japanese perspective and how Japanese leaders have responded to it through national legislations and security strategies during the Koizumi and second Abe administrations.

3.2.2 North Korea Nuclear and Missile Threat

Alongside the phenomenon of China’s rise is the lurking North Korea nuclear threat which has for decades perplexed the leaders of East Asian countries and the United States. World leaders have resorted to the diplomacy of negotiations and the imposition of economic sanctions to deal with the North Korean threat but the world is now seeing a more provocative and threatening North Korea as Kim Jong-Un became the leader in 2011.

The Korean peninsula is geographically located at the heart of East Asia and surrounded by big powers around her such as Russia, China and Japan. It was said to be ‘a hammer ready to strike at the head of China’ and ‘a dagger pointed at the heart of Japan’ (Hong, 2011, 98). Its geopolitical significance has driven the Korean Peninsula to be subject of colonial aggression historically. At the end of the WWII, there was the division of the North under the administration of the Soviet Union and the South under the administration of the United States. The tension between the North and the South intensified with the end of the administrations from the Soviet Union and the United States and the formation of the respective separate governments in 1948.

The most perplexing contemporary problem stemming from North Korea is its nuclear threat. North Korean nuclear threat has undergone several stages. North Korea originally perceived the use of nuclear power as a source of energy. It gradually became aware of the strategic value of nuclear deterrence. It withdrew from the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons in 2003 (The Guardian, 2003). Its nuclear ambition was then unleashed as it began its first test for nuclear device in 2006 and has ever since conducted five times in total, the latest being September 2016 (BBC, 2017c). During the first official meeting of the newly elected President Donald Trump of the United States and Prime Minister Shinzō Abe of Japan in February 2017, North Korea tested a medium-to-long range ballistic missile across the Sea of Japan. It was believed that it was a test to see how far the United States was committed in
the U.S.-Japan Security Alliance after the new U.S. administration assumed office (Johnson, 2017). In response, Trump and Abe issued a joint statement affirming the commitment of the U.S.-Japan Alliance to safeguard the security of Japan as well as the peace and prosperity of the Asia-Pacific region (The White House, 2017). Since 2013, nuclear weapons became non-negotiable to North Korea as it declared in its constitution that North Korea is a nuclear power. Military first strategy (Songun) is the national security strategy of North Korea with nuclear power at the core (Office of the Secretary of Defense of the United States, 2015, 5).

North Korea's nuclear threat has tightly bounded the security atmosphere of East Asia and the United States. The main audience of North Korea nuclear threat included the United States, South Korea, Japan, China and above all, her own domestic nationals. The North Korean domestic population is arguably the main target of North Korean nuclear threat. North Korea is a totalitarian state and the resort to military means, including the use of nuclear weapons, is a signal to the North Koreans that their country is a strong country. It is also a national security strategy to safeguard the survival of the regime and to protect the country from being overthrown by an outside power. The nuclear-centric military strategy is the primary national strategy of North Korea that drives the nation. It takes priority over other domestic or economic policy which tackle the poverty-stricken livelihood of the people (Choi, 2015, 33).

China is the closest ally of North Korea. China is the largest trade partner of North Korea and provided food and energy supplies to North Korea (Ministry of Defence of Japan, 2016b, 34). Such relationship has developed since the Korean War (1950-1953) when China provided military support to North Korea. There are ups and downs in the relationship and China initiated the Six-Party Talks to deal with the North Korean nuclear issue in a diplomatic and peaceful manner. Time and again, China has also supported various UN sanctions to penalize North Korea for staging nuclear and missile tests (Ministry of Defence of Japan, 2016b, 34). The predominant goal of China’s North Korea policy was to maintain the stability of the North Korea regime. During the administration of Kim Jong-Un, North Korea has sent a very clear message to China that notwithstanding the close economic and diplomatic ties, North Korea is a politically independent state that has its own agenda to secure her national security, including the development of nuclear weapons. The economic incentives and friendly diplomatic relationship with China has shown to be unable to curb the appetite of North Korea in pursuing the deployment of nuclear weapons. Such pursuit of nuclear power poses a threat to China as it threatened to disrupt the political stability in East Asia and may lead to nuclear arms.
armament in the neighbouring countries.

Another group of targets of North Korean nuclear threat are South Korea, the United States and Japan. While non-proliferation of nuclear weapons is the primary aim of the United States, in response to the North Korea nuclear threat, the United States has continued to strengthen her military alliance with South Korea and Japan and performed regular joint military training exercises as a nuclear deterrent. There is a Chinese scholar who argued that the extent of military buildup of the alliances has far exceeded the level of protection for their own security and it may adversely enhance the threat perception and distrust of North Korea, hence leading to the vicious circle of mutual threat and arms race (Jin, 2017, 45).

The North Korea nuclear threat issue is one of the major destabilizing factors of the political stability in East Asia. After years of futile attempt of the Six-Party talks and the repeated imposition of economic sanctions to penalize North Korean nuclear tests, the resolve of North Korea to become a nuclear power does not seem to be dampened. The North Korea issue has also bred distrust in the U.S.-China relationship and there is a perception that U.S. strategy against North Korea is a broader attempt to ‘contain’ China (Choi, 2015, 33). The North Korea nuclear issue, however, experienced a swift turn in 2018 when Kim Jong-Un became the first North Korean President to visit South Korea since 1953. Kim also paid several visits to China, meeting President Xi Jinping of China, and later with President Donald Trump of the United States. In these talks, Kim has signified its intention to denuclearize (BBC, 2018; Xinhua, 2018b). The most important significance of the seemingly cooling down of the North Korea nuclear threat issue was that Japan was completely left out of the picture. Hence, to Japan, the North Korea nuclear issue has not diminished with the bilateral talks of Kim with leaders of China and the United States, but has loomed larger with China taking the leadership position in talks with North Korean leaders. The North Korea nuclear issue have thus mingled with the issue of rise of China as the most pressing security concern of Japan. It is against this backdrop of the rise of China and North Korean nuclear threat that the ensuing chapters of this dissertation will examine how Japan has responded to this precarious international environment through reformulating her national security strategy and accompanying legislations and policies.
3.2.3 U.S.-Japan Security Alliance

The relationship between Japan and the United States were one of the most important bilateral relations in East Asia. The Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security (‘U.S.-Japan Security Treaty’) was first signed in 1951 and was then substantially rewritten in 1960, which formed the basis of the bilateral security relationship between Japan and the United States (Governments of Japan and the United States of America, 1951; 1960b). It was reported as the longest alliance between two great powers since the 1648 Peace of Westphalia (Packard, 2010, 92). The U.S.-Japan Security Alliance is composed of three limbs: security, politics and economics. For Japan, it forms the backbone of Japan’s foreign and security policy. To the United States, it is an important safeguard to secure peace and stability in East Asia.

At its inception, it was an unequal treaty in which the United States was labelled as the patron and Japan as the client. The patron was committed to the defense of the client which contributed little in return (Shinn, 1997, 425). According to Article V of the 1960 Treaty, each party will come to each other’s assistance in the case of an armed attack in the territories within the administration of Japan. As Article 9 of the Constitution then prohibited Japan from exercising the right of collective self-defense, Japan did not have reciprocal obligation to come to the aid of the United States if the United States was attacked in areas outside the territory of the administration of Japan.

Another ‘unequal’ aspect of the bilateral security treaty was that Article VI provided for the stationing of U.S. forces in land, air and navy in Japan. Detailed arrangements were provided for in a separate agreement called “Agreement Under Article VI of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security Between Japan and the United States of America, Regarding Facilities and Areas and the Status of United States Armed Forces in Japan” (“Status of Forces Agreement”) in 1960 (Governments of Japan and the United States of America, 1960a). Though Japan established a Self-Defense Forces in 1954, the stationing of U.S. forces in Japan was important because it maintained a U.S. military presence in Japan to act as a deterrence against aggression towards Japan and to secure the peace and security in the Asia-Pacific (Ministry of Defence of Japan, 2016b, 253).
Alongside the Status of Forces Agreement was the Host Nation Support (HNS), which provided for the sharing of expenditures relating to the stationing of U.S. forces in Japan. In 1987, Japan and the United States signed the “Agreement between Japan and the United States of America concerning Special Measures relating to Article XXIV of the Agreement under Article VI of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between Japan and the United States of America, regarding Facilities and Areas and the Status of United States Armed Forces in Japan” (‘Host Nation Support Agreement’), which was revised and renewed from time to time (Ministry of Defence of Japan, 2016b, 255). As years passed by, Japan gradually bears greater share in HNS. According to the HNS Agreement signed in 2016, Japan was expected to bear 189.9 billion yen by year 2020 (Governments of Japan and the United States of America, 2016); (Ministry of Defence of Japan, 2016b, 256).

In order to provide detailed guidelines for the bilateral defense cooperation, Japan and the United States signed the ‘The Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation’ in 1978 which has so far been revised in 1997 and 2015 (Governments of Japan and the United States of America, 1978; 1997; 2015). It provided guidelines for joint defense cooperation under normal circumstances, when Japan was under armed attack and when areas surrounding Japan were having situations which threatened peace and stability of Japan. The geographical scope of joint defense cooperation has gradually expanded with each revision of the guidelines. It was geographically defined as covering areas in “the Far East” in the 1978 Guidelines (Governments of Japan and the United States of America, 1978, Article III). In the 1997 Guidelines, it was expanded to cover ‘areas surrounding Japan without geographical constraint (Governments of Japan and the United States of America, 1997, Article V). In the 2015 Guidelines, it was further broadened to include cases when the United States or a third country other than Japan was attacked. It in effect announced the right of exercise of collective self-defense of Japan.

The nature and role of the bilateral alliance was subject to external influences in the international environment in the past few decades. During the Cold War, the Alliance acted as a bulwark against the Communist Bloc. With the end of the Cold War, a divided Korean peninsula and the Russian occupation of the Northern Territories perplexed Japan. The stability of North Korea and the military rise of China were international factors which provided for the basis of the continued relevance of the U.S.-Japan Security Alliance after the end of the Cold War. A more provocative North Korea and the military build-up of and a more assertive China
in the East and South China Sea have reinforced the importance of the presence of U.S. military forces in Japan and hence the enhanced role and cooperation of Japan and the United States in securing peace and stability in the Asia Pacific. For Japan, the Alliance was important to avert a direct conflict between Japan and China. For the United States, the Alliance allowed her to deeply engage in East Asia and hence to hedge against the rise of China (Giarra, 1997, 18).

In the few decades since the formation of the U.S-Japan Security Alliance, the nature and role of the Alliance has been changing in tandem with the changing international relations. It was only in 1981 during the Reagan-Suzuki meeting that the bilateral relationship was for the first time characterized as an ‘alliance’ (Deming, 2004, 59). It hinted at the beginning of a military dimension of the bilateral relationship. In 1990-91 Gulf War, Japan merely made monetary contribution instead of sending troops on the ground and was derided by the United States as taking a ‘free ride’ on the bilateral alliance (Middlebrooks, 2008, 39). Such criticism hit sharply on Japan that it prompted Japan to pass the “Act on Cooperation for United Nations Peacekeeping Operations and Other Operations (the International Peace Cooperation Act) in 1992 (Cabinet of Japan, 1992). It provided the legal basis for Japan to participate in international peacekeeping missions within the defence-oriented foreign policy and the constraints imposed by Article 9 of the Constitution. As of 2015, Japan has dispatched personnel to thirteen United Nations Peacekeeping Operations and five International Humanitarian Relief Operations (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 2015). As time passed, the unequal patron-client relationship has gradually moved into a more equal partnership with greater participation of Japan in the international peacekeeping operations.

In the twenty-first century, there were global proliferation of ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction, hence the U.S.-Japan Security Alliance also devoted much joint effort in developing theater missile defense (TMD). In 1998, Japan and the United States signed a memorandum of agreement to conduct joint TMD research (Mitchell, 2001, 99). Green summed up the strategic value of TMD to Japan and the United States (Green, 1997). It acted as an extended nuclear deterrent of the United States, thus obviating the need for Japan to consider nuclear armament. TMD could also contribute to non-proliferation of ballistic missiles by building an effective entrance barrier (Green, 1997, 112-113).

Russia and China were the most vocal in their opposition to Japan’s TMD programme. In 1999, Sha Zukang, Chinese diplomat who served as the United Nations Under Secretary General,
said that the TMD would threaten peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific. His arguments were four-fold. First, the TMD would be integrated and become the forefront of U.S. National Missile Defence (NMD) system. Second, it would change the bilateral alliance from one-way military assistance from the U.S. to Japan, to mutual military assistance in time of need. Third, it would provide a way for Japan to re-embark on the road to militarism. Four, it would exacerbate the growing tensions in the Korean peninsula (Sha, 1999). In 2000, Minister of Foreign Affairs of China, Tang Jiaxuan, in a Japan-China Foreign Ministers' Meeting, also expressed that the Chinese public were very concerned about the TMD and queried whether it included Taiwan (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 2000). Russia also joined China in accusing the TMD programme as infringing the Anti-ballistic Missile Treaty between the United States and Russia in 1972 which put a limitation on the development of anti-ballistic missile (The Japan Times, 2000).

In more than fifty years since the signing of the U.S.-Japan Security Alliance, the external tensions have changed from the bipolar hostility in the Cold War to the various destabilizing factors in the East Asia and the world as a whole. Hence, the role of each party in the bilateral alliance has also changed, so did the nature of the Alliance. The Alliance has changed from a narrow scope of catering for the national defence of Japan to peacekeeping operations and collective security. The military capability of the Alliance was enhanced as a result. It would undoubtedly be one of the contributing factors to increasing threat perception from China and North Korea.

3.3 Domestic Environment

In addition to the international environment, the domestic context of Japan also contributed to the different course of foreign policies taken by Japan. The most important and persistent constraints on the foreign policy of Japan were the Yoshida doctrine and Article 9 of the Constitution. Domestic politics and the administrative and electoral reforms in the 1990s and early 2000s which led to the Cabinet-led administration also shaped the changing foreign policy options of Japan.
3.3.1 Yoshida Doctrine and Article 9 of the Constitution

The postwar foreign policy of Japan was guided and constrained by Article 9 of the Constitution and the Yoshida doctrine. The U.S.-Japan Security Treaty was concluded in 1951 during the administration of Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida. As Kenneth Pyle puts it, Yoshida has manipulated both domestic politics and the U.S. pressure to pursue the ‘national purpose’ of postwar Japan (Pyle, 1996, 42). The national purpose of Japan was commonly referred to as “Yoshida doctrine”. The main tenets of the Yoshida doctrine provide that economic recovery and the pursuit of a great trading nation should be the national goal of postwar Japan. Japan should be lightly armed and counted on the United States to provide the security umbrella for the national defence of Japan. Japan also agreed to provide bases for the U.S. to station army, navy and air force (Pyle, 1996, 41).

It was during the administrations of two Prime Ministers, Ikeda Hayato (1960-1964) and Sato Eisaku (1964-1972), both successors of the Yoshida school, that the Yoshida doctrine became institutionalized. Ikeda implemented the double national income plan which aimed at enhancing the economic livelihood of Japan (Liberal Democratic Party of Japan, 2017a). During the term of Sato Eisaku, he institutionalized the Yoshida doctrine by embracing the nuclear strategic issues. In 1967, he announced the three non-nuclear principles, that “My responsibility is to achieve and maintain safety in Japan under the Three Non-Nuclear Principles of not possessing, not producing and not permitting the introduction of nuclear weapons, in line with Japan's Peace Constitution.” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 1967b). He clarified at a Diet session that the three non-nuclear principles were proclaimed because Japan was protected by the nuclear umbrella of the United States. The non-nuclear principle was further consolidated when Japan ratified the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons in 1976, in which Japan affirmed its intention never to "develop, use, or allow the transportation of nuclear weapons through its territory” (Nuclear Threat Initiative, 2017).

Sato further elaborated the Yoshida doctrine by announcing the three principles of arms export, which provided that Japan would not export arms to “the Communist countries, countries covered by UN resolutions on arms embargoes, and to countries likely to be involved in armed conflicts” in 1967 (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 1967a). By the end of Sato’s
administration, the Yoshida doctrine has been formalized into a national purpose and a foreign policy receiving national consensus. In 1976, it became the mainstream foreign security policy of Japan from the 1960s to 1980s.

A core of the Yoshida doctrine was limited defense. A Self-Defence Forces was established in 1954 (Japan Maritime Self-Defence Force, 2017). In the National Defence Program Guidelines promulgated in 1976, the national defence strategy of Japan was set as the pursuit of ‘basic level of defence’ (National Defence Council of Japan, 1976, Article 3). It enunciated the principle of 1% cap on annual defense spending. The cap has generally been followed but was breached in 1987 during the Yasuhiro Nakasone Cabinet (Haberman, 1987).

In the 1990s, the continued relevance of the Yoshida doctrine which depended on the United States for national defense came to the spotlight. Article 9 which provided the legal rationale for Japan to pursue pacifism and exercise limited right of self-defense has also been the subject of debate of revision.

3.3.2 Constitutional Revision Initiative

Japan’s first Constitution was the Meiji Constitution of 1868 with the Emperor as the Head of the State to declare war and peace (Ito Miyoji (translator), 1889). It was during the U.S. occupation of Japan after WWII that the second Constitution (the current Constitution) was borne. It was only in the Constitution of 1947 that the principle of pacifism as enshrined in Article 9 first appeared in the Constitution of Japan. The war renouncing clause of Article 9 aimed at disarming Japan such that Japan would not wage war again and repeat the mistakes of WWII. 2017 marked the seventieth anniversary of the Constitution and it has still not been revised once, unlike every other Constitution in the world which are subject to constant revision and update to suit the changing social and political climate.

As years passed by, Article 9 of the Constitution was under various assaults. The onset of the Korean War in 1950 has led to the creation of National Police Reserve which later was renamed as Self-Defence Forces in 1954, with ground, maritime and air forces. There were voices that the possession of a self-defence forces was a contravention of Article 9 of the Constitution. In an attempt to contain the growing military, the government announced in 1976 that the defense
budget should be capped at the ceiling of 1 percent of GNP (National Defence Council of Japan, 1976). It was the government position that the SDF was constitutional because the SDF was a minimum arm force necessary for self-defense. Japan possesses the right of self-defense as every other nation in the world and SDF was operated on a defense oriented strategy Constitution (Ministry of Defence of Japan, 2016b, 165).

However, the constitutionality of SDF did not go unquestioned. Back in 1960s, there were serious protests of the constitutionality of SDF and the US.-Japan Security Treaty (Sasaki-Uemura, 2001, 15-16). The constitutionality of SDF was also tested in courts, such as the Sunagawa case of 1959, which upheld the legality of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty while saying that the constitutionality of the SDF was a matter of highly political nature that its nature should more appropriately be dealt with by the executive or legislative organ instead of by the judiciary (Matsui, 2011, 143).

Doubts about this government position has been raised when the 1997 revision to the Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation stipulated that the SDF could operate in “areas surrounding Japan” (Governments of Japan and the United States of America, 1997). More doubtful was Japan’s action in passing the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Legislation and Iraq Reconstruction Law which were related to the rendering of assistance to the U.S. ally in the face of attack from the Middle East countries. It has arguably unduly stretched the meaning of self-defence to make the acts of SDF constitutional. No wonder that voice of constitutional reform came up time and again but not every Prime Minister was brave enough to bring up the task of constitutional revision in the face of opposition from pacifists.

Constitutional reform has been at the core of the LDP party platform since its inception in 1955 but it has also been a taboo topic in the prevalent climate of antimilitarism in Japan (Sato, 1990, 97). Nevertheless, there have been several futile attempts at constitutional revision. In 1956, there was a constitutional revision proposal but it failed to get two-thirds majority of both Houses (Pence, 2006, 376). In 1964, there was a final report of Commission on the Constitution but it failed to reach consensus on whether to amend the Constitution (Pence, 2006, 376). The wave of constitutional reform then disappeared but then resurfaced again in the 1980s to 2000s with various constitutional drafts by university professors, former bureaucrats and newspapers (Winkler, 2011, 60-94).
3.3.3 The End of the 1955 System and Japanese Domestic politics

The domestic scene of the Koizumi and second Abe administration was marked as a period in the post-1955 system. The 1955 system refers to the 38-year rule by the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) as the ruling political party and the Japan Socialist Party (JSP) as the largest opposition party from 1955 to 1993, apart from the coalition government of LDP with New Liberal Club from 1983 to 1986 (Stockwin, 2008d, 137). In the nine months from August 1993 to April 1994, Japan was run by an eight-party coalition government in which the LDP for the first time since its formation became the opposition party (Stockwin, 2008a, 82). It was during the short-lived coalition government that an important electoral reform of the Lower House Election was passed. It was a milestone reform which radically changed the domestic politics in Japan.

There were many reasons for the collapse of the 1955 system. The first and foremost is the end of the Cold War. Traditionally, there was an ideological confrontation between the LDP and the JSP over Japan’s participation in the Cold War conflict. The JSP was also called Japan Peace Party as it was a staunch supporter of the preservation of Article 9 of the Constitution and supported the notion of ‘unarmed neutrality’ and an end to the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty (Rosenbluth; and Thies, 2010, 59). However, in the 1990s, the world has changed. The Communist threat has ended but the JSP still maintained the traditional stance of unarmed neutrality, as seen in its blockage of a legislation for Japan to send the SDF to the Gulf crisis. It showed that the policy platform of the JSP was increasingly out of touch with reality and had dwindling support even from its traditional supporters (Schoppa, 2011, 30). In this way, one limb of the 1955 system was faltering.

Money politics was another reason that contributed to the breakdown of the 1955 system. There were numerous reports of corruption scandals in 1988-1993 that voters often believed that a reform of the electoral reform was the only remedy to clean out the dirty politics and contribute to the development of parliamentary members who are more accountable to the voters (Blechinger, 2000, 533). Prior to the electoral reform in 1994 which provided for public financing of electoral elections, the parliamentary candidates were mostly sponsored and financed by big businesses. Thus the elected members naturally tended to serve the interests of their sponsors (Blechinger, 2000, 537). Corruption and money politics thus contributed to
increasing loss of confidence of the public on the LDP rule and ultimately led to its downfall from the 38-year rule as the dominant political party in Japan.

Factional politics was another prominent feature of Japan’s political party. Joining a faction served two functions. The first is a source of finance for political campaign and another was the pursuit of power and positions in party and in the government (Felter, 2005, 7). Factional politics was institutionalized in a large political party such as the LDP in which personal ties and connection had a great influence on the future prospect of a LDP member. The 1994 electoral reform may have reduced the influence of factional politics to a certain extent but even as of today, factions still exist in Japan.

The “iron triangle” phenomenon was another salient feature of the 1955 system. It refers to the coalition between politicians, senior bureaucrats in powerful ministries and major business corporations. The large businesses provided monetary funding to politicians which provided the incentive for politicians to protect the business interests in the Diet. The bureaucrats who were responsible for the policy formulation will be rewarded in post-retirement posts in the business sector. This mechanism of mutual sharing of benefits and interests among the politicians, bureaucrats and businesses was known as the ‘iron triangle’, which was widespread and comprised of different sectors of businesses and various different government ministries (Rakmanko, 2011, 9-10).

The 1994 electoral reform aimed at wiping out the problems plaguing domestic politics of Japan under the 1955 system. It included money politics, faction politics, personality voting, and the influence of the iron triangle. The pre-1994 electoral system was referred to as a ‘single, non-transferable vote in multi-member constituencies (Stockwin, 2008b, 167). Under this system, each voter can cast only one vote but several members can be elected in a single constituency. It led to intra-party competition and large factions spent a large amount of money and resources to support their candidates.

In 1994, the Diet introduced four related electoral reform bills. In the area of electoral reform, each voter was given two votes, one for the local constituency and another for the regional constituencies under the system of proportional representation (Stockwin, 2008b, 167-168). Money politics and personality voting were closely intertwined under the pre-1994 system. The high costs of election campaign to obtain personal votes under the pre-1994 system led to
the spread of corruption. The reform package thus introduced government funding for political parties and new regulations on political donations. These measures were introduced to curb money politics and corruption (Blechinger, 2000, 539-540). The 1994 electoral reform also aimed at a shift from personality voting to party voting. By eliminating intra-party competition among candidates, the voters could vote according to the different party platforms of individual political party. The electoral reform also achieved a more responsible and representative political environment in which the elected representatives were more concerned about issues of public good and welfare instead of private interests of big businesses (Rosenbluh; and Thies, 2010, 157).

Another problem of Japanese politics in the 1955 system was the weakness of the Cabinet and hence the Prime Minister, together with the strong power of civil servants which were appointed but not elected. In 1996, Prime Minister Hashimoto Ryutaro set up an Administrative Reform Council which aimed at introducing a series of administrative reforms to strengthen the position of the Cabinet, and the Prime Minister and hence reduction of the power of the bureaucratic politics (Kabashima; and Steel, 2010, 106). The administrative reforms also streamlined and reorganized ministries of the Central government to enhance its efficiency. The administrative reforms became effective in 2001 and Prime Minister Koizumi Junichirō enjoyed the fruits of the administrative reform and hence exercised strong leadership.

Apart from the 1994 electoral reform and the Hashimoto administrative reforms, another important political background of the Koizumi and second Abe administration was the new party systems in the post-1955 system. The JSP, the 38-year opposition party under the 1955 system, disappeared from the political scene in 1996. Other political parties emerged as important players of domestic politics and two that were worth mentioned were the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) and Komeito. Their political stances and ideologies were important in affecting how the LDP has worked hand in hand or in opposition with these two political parties which may sometimes share similar or different policy objectives.

The DPJ was formed in 1996 as a viable alternative to the LDP. It was formed by former members of the JSP, LDP defectors and some other small parties. It has become the strongest opposition party to the LDP. It even became the ruling party from 2009 to 2012. On security and foreign defence issues, the DPJ was a staunch supporter of the preservation of Article 9 of
the Constitution. It generally took a critical attitude of the foreign policy of the LDP and Japan’s role in the U.S.-Japan Alliance (Stockwin, 2008c, 196).

Komeito was another important political party that cannot be ignored. It was formed in 1964 and was the third oldest political party after the Japanese Communist Party and the LDP. Komeito positioned themselves as a political party between the LDP and the DPJ but titled towards the conservative side of the LDP. In the 1990s, it gained political prominence first in joining the ruling coalition in 1993 under the Hosokawa Morihiro. It has shifted gradually from a LDP opposition to adopt a more conservative policy agenda and worked hand in hand with the LDP in forming a coalition government from 1999 to 2008 and from 2012 till the time of writing (Komeito, 2017). As a junior partner of the LDP-coalition government, it has exercised a limited degree of influence on LDP policy, such as a brake on LDP’s move to revise the Constitution and a more active foreign defence policy (Stockwin, 2008c, 197).

3.4 Conclusion

The national security strategy of Japan has always been shaped by both domestic and international factors and it was the combination of both forces that determined the path that Japan has taken in the realm of national security and defence. Japan took a pacifist and antimilitarist approach in national security and foreign defence in the post-Cold War period both because of the changes in domestic politics and the international environment, including the emerging international threats to national security as well as the changing demands from the U.S. ally. Having provided the domestic and international background of Japan’s national security, this dissertation will conduct the first substantive case study on the Koizumi administration in the next chapter. It will discuss how the domestic and international factors shaped the foreign and security policy during the Koizumi administration.
Chapter 4  National Security Initiatives of the Koizumi Administration

4.1 Introduction

There were a number of national security laws and initiatives adopted by the Koizumi administration. These cannot be realized without the twin forces of international and domestic influences. Hence, the following discussion analyzed from the theory of neoclassical realism. On the international structural factors, less than five months after Prime Minister Junichirō Koizumi took office, there was a 9-11 terrorist attack on the United States. It spurred the administration to consider various bills to counteract terrorism and other states of emergency. During the Koizumi administration, there were also a constant threat from the rise of China and the nuclear threat from North Korea. There was also a persistent influence from the United States which was both an ally and security guarantor of Japan and a hegemon in East Asia. In the domestic arena, the LDP formed a coalition government with New Komeito and the New Conservative Party which acted as a brake on the foreign policy pursued by the LDP. Prime Minister Koizumi’s close ties and personal relationship with the United States, in particular, the then President George W. Bush, was another important factor in domestic politics which determined the course of national security policy of the Koizumi administration. Koizumi’s personal upbringing and a nationalist right-wing leader was another important factor. There was generally elite consensus of the various national security initiatives taken during the Koizumi administration and hence the accomplishment of the respective national security initiatives.

The Koizumi administration marks an important milestone in the development of the national security initiatives of Japan in the post-Cold War period. The domestic legal framework governing the means of response that Japan could take in cases of national security crisis and international peace operations include, first and foremost, Article 9 of the Constitution, the Self-Defense Forces Law ("SDF Law") (Cabinet of Japan, 1954), Act on Cooperation for United Nations Peacekeeping Operations and Other Operations (Cabinet of Japan, 1992) , and Act on Measures to Ensure the Peace and Security of Japan in Perilous Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan (Cabinet of Japan, 1999).
This chapter will conduct an analysis of the package of national security initiatives of the Koizumi administration which led to incremental steps towards the normalization journey during the Koizumi administration. The package of legislations included the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Legislation of 2001, the three Emergency related laws which deal with situations of an armed attack against Japan, covering not only traditional means of armed attack on Japanese soil but also threats of terrorism, the Law concerning the Special Measures on Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance in Iraq in 2003 which was an ad hoc attempt to address the situation in the aftermath of the Iraq War, as well as the constitutional revision of Article 9. This chapter will begin with a brief description of the relevant legislations. In this chapter, I will engage in a theoretical discussion from the lens of neoclassical realism, looking not only at the international structural forces which drove the enactment or coming into force of the national security initiatives but also the domestic factors. The domestic variables will be analyzed based on the Hilsman’s concentric circle of influence with the Prime Minister and bureaucrats at the innermost layer of influence and the LDP, coalition parties and opposition parties at the outer layers of influence.

4.2 Brief Overview of the Major National Security Initiatives of the Koizumi Administration Leading to Enhanced Degree of Normalization

4.2.1 Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Legislation (2001)

Having learned the bitter lesson of being criticized as acting ‘too late and too little” in the Gulf War in 1991, Japan acted swiftly and proactively to respond to the terrorist assaults to the United States on 11 September 2001. Prime Minister Koizumi held a press conference 12 hours after the 9-11 tragedy, expressing condolences to the people of the United States and criticized that the terrorist acts were unforgivable (Koizumi, 2001a). On the same day, the United Nations also passed unanimously the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1368 which condemned the 9-11 terrorist attacks and called for the international community to act individually or collectively to combat terrorism (United Nations Security Council, 2001). One
month after the terrorist attack, the United States and Britain began air raids on Afghanistan with the aim of driving out the roots of terrorism and the Taliban government (New York Times, 2001). In response, the Japanese government initiated the Diet debates of Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Bill so as to allow Japan to dispatch the SDF overseas to combat terrorism within the constitutional constraints of ‘not resorting to force’.

The significance of the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Legislation was that it provided the legal basis for the SDF to provide logistic support to U.S.-led military actions and is a major step towards normalization. The Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Legislation was a special ad-hoc measure valid for a period of two years, subject to extension. It has been extended twice and lasted for 6 years and ended in November 2007 (Cabinet of Japan, 2001a, Article 11(3)). Unlike the previous U.N. Peacekeeping Activities Cooperation Law where the SDF could provide logistic support to UN peacekeeping activities in areas which had ceased-fire, the Act on Measures to Ensure the Peace and Security of Japan in Perilous Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan 1999 authorized the SDF to participate when there was an ongoing armed conflict and combat missions, provided the SDF only operated in non-combat zones. The Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Legislation further expanded the geographical scope of the Act on Measures to Ensure the Peace and Security of Japan in Perilous Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan 1999 from ‘areas surrounding Japan’, which were generally referred to as the Far East region, to practically all parts of the world where U.S. forces were deployed. A senior Defense Agency official justified the geographical expansion on the basis that the number of potential enemies have expanded from the time when the SDF Law was first envisaged (Yomiuri Shimbun, 2001).

4.2.2 Emergency Legislations (Yuji-Hosei) and the Framework for Responses to Armed Attack Situations (2003 and 2004)

The framework for emergency situations where Japan faced an armed attack was established during the Koizumi administration. Firstly, three Emergency related laws were enacted in June 2003. It was consisted of three laws: a law concerning measures to ensure national independence and security in a situation of armed attack (“Armed Attack Situation Response Law”); a law to amend the Self-Defense Forces Law; and a law to amend the Security Council
Establishment Law. Then in 2004, seven individual legislations under the Armed Attack Situation Response Law were enacted, namely Civil Protection Law, Maritime Transportation Restriction Law, U.S. Military Actions Related Measures Law, Amendment of the SDF law in conjunction with Amendment to the Acquisition and Cross-Serving Agreement (ACSA), Law regarding use of specific public facilities, prisoners of war law, and Law concerning punishment of grave breaches of the international humanitarian law. In addition, three related treaties were ratified in 2004, namely ACSA, Protocol additional to the Geneva Conventions, Protocol I and Protocol II. (Ministry of Defence of Japan, 2013, 214). By 2004, the basic framework of emergency situations which threatened the peace and security of Japan was established.

The debate on the necessity of an emergency law could be dated back to 1965 when there was a “Three Arrows Study” (Mitsuya Kenkyu) which was a study by the SDF on Japan’s response to potential contingencies in the Korean peninsula. When the study became public knowledge at a Lower House Budget meeting, the opposition party, a member of the Socialist Party fiercely attacked the study as a return to the authoritarian state. The study commissioned by the SDF was also criticized as a disregard of the principle of ‘civilian control’. In the face of severe criticism, further discussion of Japan’s response to emergencies and contingencies was shelved (Eldridge, 2017, 141-143).

In 1977, Prime Minister Fukuda commissioned the Defense Agency to conduct the study of an emergency legislation. After 25 years, Prime Minister Koizumi resumed the debate of the emergency law in 2003 in the wake of the terrorist attack in 2001. The Armed Attack Situation Response Law provided for the framework that, in the face of an armed attack against Japan, an anticipated armed attack on Japan, or an emergency situation other than an armed attack, the fundamental principles for the local government and designated public institutions with the cooperation from the general public to act in repelling, while providing for the respect of the rights and freedom of the people guaranteed in the Constitution (Ministry of Defence of Japan, 2006, 125)

On the meaning of an armed attack, Gen Nakatari, then head of the Defence Agency, said that it should be determined in accordance with the actual international situations. Armed attack situations referred to those worst and extreme situations to a nation which impinged upon the fundamental national security of a nation. Situations of unidentified vessels and terrorism may
accelerate to the level of an armed attack (House of Representatives of Japan, 2002a, 4). A more puzzling issue was the circumstances where the SDF would be mobilized. The Three Emergency Related Legislations stipulated that an armed attack included three situations: (1) Japan has been attacked from abroad; (2) an attack is imminent; or (3) an attack is anticipated. In the Diet meeting, Prime Minister Koizumi clarified that the SDF would only be mobilized in the first scenario where there was a direct armed attack on Japan, and no force would be used if the attack was only imminent or anticipated (House of Representatives of Japan, 2002a, 27).

Ministry of Foreign Affairs outlined the significance of the Three Emergency Related Legislations as enhancing the reliability of the Japan-U.S. security arrangement, observing international humanitarian law and hence increased international trusts, as well as increasing the transparency of Japan’s response in the case of an armed attack (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 2003). The Three Emergency Related Legislations also signified a major step towards normalization as the government has, after decades of reservation, enacted the emergency legislations which authorized the SDF to respond in cases of an actual or contingent armed attack against Japan.

4.2.3 The Law concerning the Special Measures on Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance in Iraq (2003)

On 17 March 2003, the U.S. President George W. Bush issued a 48-hour ultimatum to Iraq to demand Saddam Hussein and his sons to leave Iraq. He recalled the UN resolutions 678, 687 and 1441, finding that Iraq did not comply with the UN resolution to disarm and to get rid of weapons of mass destruction (Office of the Press Secretary of the United States Government, 2003). The day after the release of the statement, Prime Minister Koizumi expressed at an interview full support of the position of the United States, citing the importance of the U.S.-Japan Security Alliance and international cooperation. However, Koizumi reiterated Japan’s position that she would not participate in the war even if the United States resorted to military action to deal with Iraq (Koizumi, 2003a). On 20 March 2003, the United States led coalition forces to engage in military action in Iraq. It was when the major combat military operations had ended that the Japanese Diet began the debate of the bill to provide humanitarian and
reconstruction assistance to Iraq. It was the first time in history when Japan sent the SDF overseas which was not engaging in a UN peacekeeping operation. It showed that Japan has taken a giant step towards military normalization and SDF expanded its scope of engagement in international security affairs.

4.2.4 Introduction of Ballistic Missile Defence Systems

Against the background of the international proliferation of ballistic missiles weapons of mass destruction, the Cabinet approved the introduction of the Ballistic Missile Defence System into Japan’s defence posture in 2003. The then State Minister reiterated in the Diet session that Japan maintained a defence-oriented foreign policy, so he dispersed the doubts of a LDP member at the Diet session that the development of BMDs would pose a threat to neighbouring East Asian countries (House of Councillors of Japan, 2005, 6). Nevertheless, it signified a major step of normalization of Japan when Japan developed its own defence shield on top of its dependence of the United States for defence protection. The combined effect of the nuclear umbrella from the United States as well as BMDs have thus enhanced drastically the defence capability of Japan. However, there have been worries that BMDs is a ‘double-edged sword’ and may lead to arms race of the neighbouring countries and hence stirring instability in the region. (Namatame, 2012, 14)

4.2.5 Attempts to Revise Article 9 of the Constitution of Japan

During the Koizumi administration, the government has taken initiatives in constitutional reform. The House of Representatives Research Commission on the Constitution started discussion on various articles of the Constitution on 8 February 2003 and submitted its final report in January 2005. On 22 November 2005, the LDP released a draft Constitution. The most important proposal relating to national defense in the draft was the revision of Article 9 of the Constitution. First and foremost, the second chapter of the Constitution was renamed from “Renunciation of War” to “National Security”. It embraced a broader and more elastic concept to cover military potential for self-defence such as the SDF. The title of Article 9 was renamed “Principle of Pacifism”. The first paragraph of original Article 9 which renounced war as a means of settlement of international disputes was kept intact. The second paragraph of the original Article 9 was significantly revised to allow Japan to possess military power for
self-defense under the supreme commander of the Prime Minister. It also explicitly provided that the SDF would engage in international cooperation for the purpose of securing international peace and permitting the formation of military alliances. (Liberal Democratic Party of Japan, 2005a).

The Constitutition Review Committee has held meetings from 1957 to 1964 with the delivery of a final report. However, because of fierce opposition from the public against constitutional revision, it became a taboo for thirty years until 1999 when the House of Representatives established a Constitution Review Committee which delivered a final report in April 2005. In part 4 of Chapter 3 of the report, a section was devoted on provisions of Constitution relating to national security and international cooperation. It consolidated the views of the members of the House of Representaties on seven broad topics: Article 9, self-defence and SDF, collective self-defence, U.S-Japan Security Alliance, U.S. military bases in Japan, abolition of nuclear weapons, and international cooperation (House of Representatives of Japan, 2005, 222).

On a general comment of Articl Article 9 from members of the House of Representitaves, they generally recognized the value of Article 9 to the peace and development of post-war Japan. It has prevented Japan from becoming a military power, while enabling Japan to pursue pacifism and actively contributed to peace and security in East Asia. Article 9 denied the use of military means to settle international disputes. However, there were views that suggested Article 9 did not keep pace with the development of the international society, so there was a need for review (House of Representatives of Japan, 2005, 301).

In relation to the right of self-defence and SDF, there were views that the right of self-defence and SDF should be expressly provided for in the Constitution. The proponents said that Japan was facing the terrorist and missile threat, thus it was inappropriate to believe purely on peaceful diplomacy without the resort to military force. While the first limb of Article 9 which recognized the renouncement of war should be maintained, the proponents supported amendment of the Constitution to expressly provide for Japan to exercise the right of self-defence and recognize the legitimacy of the SDF. It further elaborated that the exercise of self-defence should be the minimum level necessary for national security and that the SDF should be maintained under civilian control (House of Representatives of Japan, 2005, 303-304).
There were members of the House of Representatives who opposed to provide for the right of self-defence and SDF in the Constitution. They believed that peace should be pursued without the use of force. Renouncement of war, no maintenance of war potential and denial of the use of force were the essence of pacifism and were the reason why the current Constitution was treasured by the world. Preserving Article 9 could prevent Japan from becoming a military power and Japan should endeavour to resolve international disputes through peaceful means. They maintained that Japan should exercise the right of self-defence without the resort to military means as warfare would lead to human casualties and sacrifices of financial assets. They also believed that if Japan were to amend Article 9, it would intensify the military tension in Asian region. On the status of SDF, these members opposed to expressly stating it in the Constitution. While recognizing that the SDF has participated in many disaster relief, they noted that it has also participated in overseas missions which overstepped the boundary of the Constitution and hence its character has evolved into more like a military army (House of Representatives of Japan, 2005, 303-304).

On the right of collective self-defence, there were three different views. The first group agreed Japan should exercise the right of collective self-defence without stating the limit, the second group agreed with the former provided that it should be exercised with limit. The third group did not agree that Japan should exercise the right of collective self-defence. The first group believed that Japan should exercise the right of collective self-defence because the intense international security environment demanded Japan to closely operate with the United States ally in the smooth and effective conduct of international cooperation which contributed to the development of a more equal alliance partnership. It also believed that the exercise of collective self-defence is a natural right of a nation as stated in the UN Charter. The exercise of right of collective self-defence can allow Japan to exercise more options in regional security in Asia. The second group of members believed that Japan should exercise the right of collective self-defence within three limits: among allies; among East Asian region; and necessary for the national defence of Japan (House of Representatives of Japan, 2005, 308-309).

There were also opponents to the exercise of collective self-defence among members of the House of Representatives. First and foremost, they said that it has long been the interpretation of the government that though Japan possesses the right of collective self-defence in international law, it could not exercise it under the constraint of Article 9. Besides, they said that basing the decision to participate in military action on assistance of a military ally was no
different from an armed attack. The exercise of collective self-defence may also drag Japan into global warfare led by the United States. Lastly, they said that the exercise of collective self-defence would create threat and suspicion among Asian neighbours (House of Representatives of Japan, 2005, 309-310).

Further, in the Small Committee of National Security and International Cooperation of Constitution of the House of Representatives in 2003, there was a session specifically devoted to the discussion of Article 9 of the Constitution. Various Diet members expressed their views on the Constitution and the national security protection of Japan. In a 2005 poll of Yomiuri Shimbun, eighty percent of elected legislators supported constitutional revision (Yomiuri Shimbun, 2005). It showed that there was a certain degree of elite consensus on constitutional revision but there were still views from the pacifist opposition parties of whether Article 9 should be revised, in particular whether self-defence, SDF and collective self-defence should be expressly provided for in the Constitution.

4.3 Application of Neoclassical Realism and the Hilsman’s Model

According to the theory of neoclassical realism first elaborated by Rose (1998), the international relations was driven primarily by international factors as well as the domestic intervening variables (Rose, 1998). According to neorealism, the world is an anarchy where the states have to struggle for their own survival in the face of the security threats from other states. States have to balance their own power relative to other states through internal and external balancing in order to survive. It may thus lead to ‘security dilemma’ in which states increase their power in the face of threats, which in turn spurs other states to build up their own strength in response (Keohane, 2001). For the domestic intervening variables, this dissertation will consider from the Hilsman’s concentric circle of influence by analyzing the role of Prime Minister which is at the innermost circle of influence, followed by the views of the political elite which is at the second to fourth layers of the circle of influence. The media and the public which are at the outermost layers of the circle of influence having relatively dwindling influence is thus excluded from the analysis of this dissertation.
4.3.1 International Structural Factors

In conducting an analysis through the lens of neoclassical realism, I first consider the international structural factors. After the end of the Cold War, there was lesser chance of the outbreak of a global war. Instead, regional conflicts of smaller scale and more frequency, as well as new mode of threat such as terrorist attack increased. The proliferation of nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destructions have become a growing concern. In the Defense White Paper published by the Ministry of Defence in 2002, the Japanese government for the first time devoted a whole section on the responses to terrorist attack. It recognized that security was not a domestic issue but an international concern (Ministry of Defence of Japan, 2002, Chapter 1.1). Hence, there was also a change in the national security strategy of Japan. It was not only necessary to safeguard the security of her own country, but it was equally important to ensure the security of the ally and the stability of the international community. The closer cooperation and diplomatic relationship with allies and other friendly nations was the means to achieve such ends.

During the Koizumi administration, the external threats to the security of Japan were three-fold. There were three major threats to national security, which included terrorism, nuclear and missile threats from North Korea and the military rise of China. The first was the 9-11 terrorist attack. During the Koizumi administration, Before the terrorist attack of 11 September 2001, Japan was not prepared for a terrorist attack. It was only after 2001 that terrorist attacks appeared to be a real security threat to Japan. Though the terrorist attack was an assault from the Middle East, it was still a threat that mattered to Japan because Japan needed the assistance from the United States in the face of the military rise of China and the nuclear and missile threat from North Korea. To Japan, the terrorist assault on the soil of the United States ally was an immediate cause which spurred Japan to enact the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Legislation of 2001 to counteract terrorism. However, the more imminent threats to Japan’s security remained the military rise of China and the nuclear threat from North Korea.

The second was the North Korea issue. There was the entry of unidentified North Korean vessels into Japan’s exclusive economic zones in December 2001. In January 2003, North Korea withdrew from the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty which enhanced the threat perception of Japan that North Korea had engaged in the research and development of nuclear
weapons. North Korea also fired a missile into the Sea of Japan in February 2003. There were doubts if North Korea was developing chemical weapons and weapons of mass destruction, as well as conducting the research on the development of long range missiles in 2003 (Ministry of Defence of Japan, 2002, Chapter 3.2). These incidents awakened and convinced the Japanese that there were real and tangible security threats impinging on the national security of Japan. According to neorealism, these threat perceptions were a catalyst for the discussion and final enactment of the three Emergency related legislations such that Japan could be better prepared in the face of an armed attack on the territory of Japan.

In the Defence White Paper published by the Defence Agency of Japan in 2002, China ranked the second behind North Korea in the section on the military development of countries in the Asia-Pacific. It showed China was then another country which merited the attention of Japan (Ministry of Defence of Japan, 2002, Chapter 3.4). China’s military modernization in land, sea and air forces, and its growing military budget were growing concerns to Japan. In the years 1999-2001, there were 50 Chinese coastguard vessels entering the Sea of Japan. The territorial disputes between China on the one hand and Japan and ASEAN countries on the other in the East and South China Sea respectively also increased the sense of insecurity to Japan of the growing territorial ambition of China (Ministry of Defence of Japan, 2002, Chapter 3.4). According to neorealism, this increasing threat perception of Japan and the suspicious intention of China has provided fertile ground and support for the Koizumi administration to enact the three Emergency related legislations to protect Japan in the face of an armed attack on Japan.

The United States hegemony in East Asia and the pull and push force of the US-Japan Security Alliance was another important international structural factor driving the national security initiatives of the Koizumi administration. In order to safeguard its security from the threat from North Korea and the rise of China, Japan has acted proactively as an ally of the United States in the aftermath of the 9-11 attack so that the United States, being the hegemon in East Asia, could safeguard the national security of Japan. “A friend in need is a friend indeed”. Japan’s swift enactment of the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Legislation in response to the terrorist attack on U.S. soil was a show of friendship and commitment of Japan to the Alliance. Hence, the terrorist attack from the Middle East mattered not only to the United States but also closely concerned the security of Japan in East Asia. It was because of the constant fear of abandonment from the United States to deal with the imminent threats in East Asia that the security of the United States was viewed with equal importance to Japan as her own threats in
East Asia. In addition to external balancing through strengthening the U.S.-Japan Security Alliance, Japan also adopted the strategy of internal balancing in the Koizumi administration. Discussion on the enactment of the three Emergency related legislations has always been a taboo in Japan as there were voices from pacifists that these legislations represented a revival of militarism in Japan (Shinoda, 2007, 99). However, the international environment has become all the more precarious to Japan which, according to neorealism, led to the negotiation and finally enactment of three Emergency related legislations. In addition to the act of internal balancing through the enactment of the three Emergency related legislations, Japan also introduced the Ballistic Missile Defence System in 2003 so she could beef up its defence posture on top of the nuclear umbrella from the United States. It can be seen from the defense budget of the Koizumi administration (FY 2001 to FY 2006) that the budget was quite steady and even declined from 2003 to 2006 (Figure 4-1). Despite repeated requests from the United States to shoulder the due proportion of her own defense, Japan was far from being able to defend her own territory independent of the protection and support from the United States. It was only through the concerted effort of the enactment of the three Emergency related legislations, the introduction of the Ballistic Missile Defence System and the security protector from the U.S. ally that Japan could hope to safeguard her own security in the face of an armed attack.

In fact, Japan’s dispatch of the SDF to Iraq could not be clearly understood outside the context of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty. Though Koizumi stated in the Diet debates that Japan decided its own course of action, he staunchly denied that there was an agreement with the then President George W. Bush on Japan’s support for the dispatch of the SDF to Iraq prior to Diet debates (House of Representatives of Japan, 2003a, 23). In response to an interview question posed by the author to one of the LDP House of Representatives members in 2017, he said in the affirmative that Japan’s decision whether to dispatch the SDF to Iraq War was a decision made by Japan herself, independent of the influence or pressure from the United States (interview 6, 2017) Despite the official position of the LDP, however, international environment and in particular, the role of the United States played a very significant role in shaping the course of action of Japan during the Koizumi administration. For Japan, the interests of the United States coincided with those of Japan in many ways and the nuclear umbrella from the United States was so important to Japan that the U.S.-Japan relationship is placed at the core of Japan’s own national security strategy. The U.S. factor is the single most
important international factor contributing to Japan’s participation in the humanitarian relief assistance to Iraq.

The international structural factors also carried great significance to the constitutional revision initiative. Constitutional revision is a matter of domestic politics but in the case of Japan, it also carries significance to international politics. The principle of pacifism enshrined in Article 9 of the Constitution was to ensure that Japan would not repeat the history of WWII of engaging in military conflict with other states. As the security environment surrounding Japan became all the more severe, voices of constitutional revision came up time and again. During the Koizumi administration, Japan was bound by Article 9 when discussing participation in the war against terrorism and the Iraq war. Nevertheless, issues of collective self-defense, which Japan could not exercise until recently, became the focus of discussion. The intense security environment surrounding Japan put pressure on the government to continue the debate of constitutional revision. Time and again, Japan received pressure from the United States to revise the Constitution so that Japan could shoulder more responsibilities for her own defense and international security. For instance, Ambassador Armitage and Dr. Nye issued a report "The United States and Japan: Advancing Toward a Mature Partnership" in October 2000. It concluded that Japan’s constitutional constraint on exercising the right of collective self-defense prevented Japan from being an equal partner of the bilateral alliance. It recommended that the U.S-Japan Security Alliance be modelled on the special relationship between the United States and Great Britain where the United States reaffirmed its commitment to the defense of Japan, including the Senkaku islands and closer and more efficient cooperation in armed services, as well as broader participation in humanitarian and peacekeeping services. It thus called for Japan to revise the Constitution to allow Japan to exercise the right of collective self-defence though it conceded that it is a domestic decision for Japan (Institute for National Security Studies, 2000). While the fear of abandonment from the United States has led the ruling elite to favour constitutional revision, the corresponding fear of entrapment into U.S.-led warfare forever constrained Japan from putting into practice the task of constitutional revision.

The international environment surrounding Japan was both a stimulus and a brake on the progress of constitutional reform. The threat from rise of China and the North Korea nuclear threat has put the national security of Japan at stake. Japan hence had to beef up her own self-defense to balance against external threats. The constitutional revision could legitimize and
provide for a more comprehensive concept of national security and defence. However, the international environment also hindered the pace of Japan’s constitutional reform. During the Koizumi administration, the bilateral relationship between Japan and China turned sour because of the frequent visits of Prime Minister Koizumi to Yasukuni Shrine. Issues left by WWII such as the history textbook controversies and comfort women issues have forever haunted the relationship of Japan with her Asian neighbours such as China and South Korea. It stirred up anti-Japanese feelings in China as well as South Korea and voices of revival of militarism in Japan. Hence, constitutional revision was viewed with suspicion and worry from Asian neighbours who deemed Japan’s constitutional revision as an attempt to disturb the status quo and the established balance of power in East Asia.

4.3.2 Domestic Variables

In the analysis of the domestic variables, this dissertation will adopt the Hilsman model in which the Prime Minister is at the core of the concentric circle, with the LDP in the second layer, and the coalition partners, opposition parties, media/interests groups and the public in the outer layers of the circle respectively. Because of the gradual diminishing degree of influence in the outer layers of the concentric circle of influence, this dissertation will only concentrate on the role of Prime Ministers and the views of the political parties which have the primary influence on the foreign policy making of Japan. I will start with analysis of the domestic variable of Prime Minister in the journey of normalization of Japan.

4.3.2.1. Prime Minister

As elaborated by Elgie, political leaders have individual ambitions and personal styles. Their actions are also constrained by the political infrastructure and the leadership environment including the historical legacy, social, economic and political demands (Elgie, 1995b, 8). However, Japanese Prime Ministers have historically been characterized as ‘reactive’ with the Prime Minister taking a passive role in policy making (Elgie, 1995a; Hayao, 1993a). In this respect, Koizumi stood out from most of his predecessors and successors before the second Abe administration.
Unlike his predecessor Prime Ministers under the 1955 system who were mostly elected by the factions in the LDP, Koizumi was the first Prime Minister who was not backed by Hashimoto faction, the largest faction of LDP since Prime Minister Kakuei Tanaka in the early 1970s (Japan Times, 2001). Hence, he was free from factional politics and can be a reformist. At the LDP party presidential election in 2001, the slogan of Koizumi was “Change LDP, Change Japan” (Iljima, 2006, 19). Though Koizumi was the leader of the LDP which was a conservative party, he was able to embark on radical reforms, most notably the postal reform. It was because he had a vision of Japan that Japan must reform in order to meet the needs and demands of the society. In spite of being characterized as a ‘transformational’ leader by Enwall in domestic arena, Koizumi’s foreign policy has displayed less as a reformist than his domestic policy (Envall, 2015).

(a) Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law

Koizumi’s personal character and unique upbringing contributed to the enactment of the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Legislation. This comment was supported by an interview with a professor in international relations in a university in Tokyo, who concurred that the convictions and ideologies of Koizumi had an important bearing on the course of foreign policy of Japan during his administration (interview 2, 2017). Koizumi was a political blue blood in that his grandfather Matajiro Koizumi was the Minister of Posts and Administration while his father Junya Koizumi was a Director General of the Japan Defense Agency. He did not have a strong foreign policy agenda nor diplomatic experience before becoming the Prime Minister as he was a graduate in Economics at Keio University. However, he did have an international perspective due in part to his love for western culture and his postgraduate education in London. He was known to be a person of strong will and character and his wills cannot be changed easily (Iwasaki, 2006, 13). These character traits and upbringing of Koizumi may have heavily influenced the foreign policy direction of Japan which leaned heavily to the United States.

In relation to the leadership environment, what distinguished Koizumi from his predecessors was the top-down Cabinet-led government of the Koizumi administration on foreign affairs, as opposed to the bottom-up decision making process by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Forty minutes after the news of the 9-11 attack, Koizumi initiated the establishment of a liaison office at the Cabinet office to gather information, which was further accelerated to be the Emergency Anti-Terrorism Headquarters in which Koizumi himself was in charge (Shinoda, 2007, 90).
can be seen that Koizumi himself has taken the lead in initiating a response action to the terrorism attack in the twin towers.

It is also a break from the traditional and historical stereotype Japanese policy making style which emphasized on consensus building from the bottom. It contributed significantly to the speedy enactment of the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Legislation. During the Koizumi administration, after a draft legislation was in place, Prime Minister Koizumi first sought an agreement with the coalition parties before consulting LDP policy committees and putting the bill for Diet deliberations (Shinoda, 2007, 95). It helped smooth the Diet debates and speeded up the process in order to avoid the same criticism as the Gulf War of being ‘too late, too little’. The role of Prime Minister thus emerged more as a leader who rules rather than just the person who gave final stamp of approval to the enactment of a legislation or policy.

Another contributing factor of Koizumi’s influence in enacting the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Legislation was his high public support rating. An objective yardstick for the measurement of the degree of support from the public was the national poll. In this respect, the public poll showed that the approval rate of Koizumi when he came to office was around 80 per cent in both Asahi and Nikkei newspapers poll and had an average of 50 per cent approval rate throughout the administration (Figures 4-2 and 4-3). The Nikkei poll of September 2001 showed around 70 per cent approval rate of government anti-terrorism measures (Figure 4-4). As Koizumi had relatively little support from the LDP itself, the support from the public became an important means to help to successfully implement his policies (Sadou, 2016, 428). Koizumi gained such high approval rates because he worked very hard at winning public and media support. He published a weekly e-mail magazine for 250 series in which Koizumi himself was the general editor (Cabinet of Koizumi, 2001). It was published at a peak volume of over 2 million copies while the regular subscribers was around 1 million (Iljima, 2006, 35). Koizumi also started the Koizumi radio channel from January 2003, which lasted for 10 minutes every third Saturday monthly. It has been broadcasted 39 times in total (Koizumi, 2003b) . It appeared that Koizumi has mimicked the practice of the United States’ President weekly Saturday radio broadcasts. The e-mail magazines and radio broadcasts acted as a channel for Koizumi to reach the public directly to clarify and promote his reform agenda and the various policy initiatives and hence sustained the high approval rate as the Prime Minister.
A study of the Diet discussion in the special committee of the House of Representatives of the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law can reveal further the views of Koizumi. Perhaps the most significant revelation from the Diet concession on Koizumi’s position concerned his views on the right of collective self-defence and Article 9 of the Constitution. Article 9 prevents Japan from exercising the right of collective self-defence. Ryuichi Izawa, professor of University of Shizuoka, claimed that the SDF was assisting foreign armies thus was an exercise of collective self-defence. In response to the claim of the exercise of collective self-defence, Prime Minister Koizumi reiterated that Japan was constitutionally bound not to exercise force, that Japan would not participate in combat actions but was willing to provide support and assistance in other areas than the U.S.-Britain air raids force. Koizumi further maintained that Japan could not and did not exercise the right of collective self-defence. What Japan could do was international cooperation. Nevertheless, Koizumi recognized that the SDF in fact did have the power to exercise force but few political parties still maintained the position that the SDF was unconstitutional. It shows that the interpretation of the bounds of the Constitution prohibiting the exercise of force has been relaxed over the years.

Koizumi’s contribution to the enactment of the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law was indispensable. He himself initiated the legislative process. However, a Prime Minister did not work in a political vacuum. The historical legacy of unfavourable comment from the international community of Japan’s failure to act in the Gulf War was the historical background for Koizumi to act promptly and swiftly in post 9-11. It can be that Koizumi’s role in the enactment of the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law was indispensable and had helped Japan march towards the normalization journey.

(b) Three Emergency-Related Legislations

Another significant move towards the normalization journey of the Koizumi administration was the three Emergency-related legislations. The three Emergency-related Legislations which have been shelved for decades would not have been passed if not for the strong convictions and motivations of Prime Minister Koizumi himself. He had the historical mission to enact the three Emergency-related legislations. Koizumi’s father was a Director General of the Japan
Defense Agency when the “Three Arrows Study” (Mitsuya Kenkyu), the predecessor of the three Emergency related legislations, were first discussed in February 1965. The “Three Arrows Study” discussed the response of Japan in the event of the outbreak of the second Korean war (Iwasaki, 2006, 110). As the wartime memory was then still fresh in the minds of the public, it became a taboo to hold any discussion on the responses and emergency legislations in the case of an armed attack on Japan. The fact that the discussion of the three Emergency related legislations resurfaced a few decades later in the Koizumi administration may, as argued by Iljima and Iwasaki, be because Koizumi was heavily influenced by his father to continue the unfinished business left by his late father (Iljima, 2006, 135-136). Hence, in Koizumi’s first policy address in May 2001, he announced his plan to deliberate on the enactment of the Emergency Legislation (Koizumi, 2001b).

One of the strategies employed by the Koizumi Cabinet was to gain the support from the opposition parties. Around one year before the draft legislation was put to the Diet for debate, the Cabinet announced that as the three Emergency-related legislations was a fundamental concern of a nation, it was highly desirable to obtain consensus from the opposition parties (Uesugi, 2006, 172). It was an important tool and practice for the Koizumi Cabinet not to push ahead with the legislations without the support of the weaker opposition parties. As Koizumi mentioned his philosophy in one of his books when he was the Minister of Posts and Communications, power should rest ‘on the people’ instead of ‘on the government’, which was the fundamental principles of democracy (Koizumi, 1996, 3). Thus, Koizumi would not push forward legislations and policies without listening to the voices of the opposition parties or the public opinion. Hence, he tried various channels such as radio and TV broadcasts to explain his policies to the public in order to win their hearts.

With the effort of Koizumi, the three Emergency-related Legislations were passed in 2003 with the support from the largest opposition party, the DPJ. Nevertheless, there were heated debates in the Diet of the detailed provisions of the three Emergency Legislations. In response to the question of the need for the enactment of the Emergency Law, Prime Minister Koizumi said that it was important for a nation to prepare for crisis at times of peace. He recalled that nobody predicted the outbreak of the 9-11 terrorist attack, so Japan as a responsible nation must establish a system to prepare the country for emergency crisis (House of Representatives of Japan, 2002a, 2). It showed that Koizumi has acted against the backdrop of the precarious international security environment to pursue his long desired three Emergency Legislations.
The Three Emergency-related legislations which enabled the SDF to respond swiftly in cases of an armed attack on Japan is a major step towards normalization of Japan and the role of Koizumi himself is unquestionable.

(c) The Law concerning the Special Measures on Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance in Iraq (2003)

The participation in the humanitarian and reconstruction of the Iraq war was another sign of normalization of Japan during the Koizumi administration and it can, to a great extent, attributed to the decision making of the Prime Minister Koizumi and the Cabinet Office which are at the innermost circle of the policy making. Koizumi’s close personal relationship with then U.S. President George W. Bush and his treasure of the U.S.-Japan alliance has a pivotal importance on leading to the final conclusion of the Bill. The U.S.-led war in the Middle East has, on the surface, a remote connection to the national security of Japan but Koizumi has pledged support to the United States at the beginning of the Iraq War even before careful Diet deliberations or consideration by relevant ministries. It showed that the importance of the U.S. ally took precedence over the merits of the war (Shinoda, 2007, 114). It was more the drive to preserve the U.S-Japan Security Alliance that was the underlying reason for Koizumi to dispatch SDF to Iraq to participate in humanitarian and reconstruction assistance.

The enactment of the Bill on Humanitarian and Reconstruction to Iraq was passed with top-down decision making process of the Koizumi administration, with the Prime Minister, the Cabinet Office and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs at the inner circle of the government decision making process. At the intermediate circle were the bureaucratic branches relevant to the issue, including the Japan Defense Agency and the SDF, the economic ministries including the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry and the business circle and the LDP ruling coalition parties. At the outer circle of the decision making process were the opposition parties, the public and media. The inner circle grasped the greatest say and influence with the public at the outer circle wielding less voice in the final outcome of the Bill.

With the will and conviction of the Prime Minister and the Cabinet Office at the inner circle to pass the Bill, the parties at the intermediate and outer circle had dwindling influence. The broad agenda having been set by the Prime Minister and the Cabinet Office, the role of the intermediate circle such as the economic ministries were left to decide the amount of economic
assistance that Japan could offer (Miyagi, 2009, 358). In fact, there were opposition from within the LDP itself but Koizumi was able to bypass the traditional consensus building process within the LDP before putting the Bill for Diet debates.

The views of the LDP and its coalition parties, as well as the opposition parties have allowed for refinement of the scope of the Bill within the broad framework and direction set by the Prime Minister and the inner circle decision making power. At the beginning of the Diet session on the Bill on Humanitarian and Reconstructions Assistance to Iraq, Prime Minister Koizumi provided the basis for the enactment of the Bill when he said that the time for cooperation had come and Japan should participate in the postwar recovery and rehabilitation instead of military actions. He said that Japan should act in proportion to its state power as the world second largest economy and a responsible nation of the international world (House of Representatives of Japan, 2003a, 1-2, 12). Koizumi also said that the Bill did not contravene the Constitution as it authorized the dispatch of the SDF overseas for regional peacekeeping activities, not for participating in a war (House of Representatives of Japan, 2003a, 11). When posed a question of whether Prime Minister Koizumi had a prior agreement with the U.S. President George W. Bush that Japan would dispatch the SDF to Iraq, Koizumi denied it completely and emphasized that whether to dispatch the SDF was a question for Japan to consider herself (House of Representatives of Japan, 2003a, 23). All these showed the indispensable role of the Prime Minister Koizumi in pushing forward the Bill on Humanitarian and Reconstructions Assistance to Iraq amidst the influence of the international structural factors including the influence of the United States.

(d) Constitutional revision

Though constitutional revision was not at the top of the agenda of the Koizumi administration, it was on the list. In the first speech of Koizumi since inauguration as a Prime Minister on 27 April 2001, he has expressed his view on constitutional revision of Article 9 in relation to the status of SDF and the right of collective self-defence. Firstly, on the status of SDF, Koizumi said that it was an unnatural phenomenon that the status of SDF was not recognized in the Constitution. If Japan is attacked, SDF which has not undergone regular training could not protect the general public. Hence, it showed that the government was very irresponsible. The existence of SDF was thus to safeguard the national defence of Japan and should be recognized in the Constitution. Secondly, in relation to the right of collective self-defence, Koizumi
recognized that it has long been the interpretation of the Japanese government that Japan did not have the right to exercise collective self-defence. However, Koizumi believed that the fact that Japan could not exercise the right of collective self-defence has an impact on how to safeguard the continued existence of the U.S-Japan friendly relationship and how to ensure the effective operation of the U.S-Japan Security Alliance, notwithstanding the existence of the principle that there should not be exercise of force outside the territory of Japan. Koizumi queried whether it was appropriate that Japan did nothing in the face of an attack of the United States. While giving due respect to the current constitutional interpretation of the government, Koizumi thus believed that there should be thorough discussion and research on whether Japan needs to exercise the right of collective self-defence (Cabinet of Japan, 2001b).

Koizumi’s intention to revise the Constitution may also be attributed to some extent to the experience of Koizumi’s father, Junya Koizumi. Junya Koizumi was also known as the “Anpo Man” (Anpo Otoko) as during his position as the Director General of the Japan Defense Agency in the 1960s, he actively advocated the merits of the revision of the Security Treaty between Japan and the United States and the revision of the Constitution, claiming that a strengthened US.-Japan relationship can contribute to the economic development of Japan (Iwasaki, 2006, 108-109). In similar vein, Prime Minister Koizumi treasured the importance of the U.S.-Japan relationship. Constitutional revision was also one of the items on the to-do-list of the Koizumi administration though both the international structural factors and the domestic variables such as the views of the ruling elite was not supportive of such a daunting initiative.

4.3.2.2  LDP

(a) Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law

The Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law could not be passed without the support of the LDP. A study of the Diet debates can reveal the views of the ruling elite on the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Legislation. At the Special Committee on Prevention of International Terrorism and Japan's Cooperation and Support of the House of Representatives in October 2001, various issues were raised in connection with the enactment of the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Bill and the U.S.-Britain joint air raids mission. First, Seishiro Eto, a LDP committee member, questioned whether the air raids on Afghanistan was a U.S-Britain mission without the mandate of the United Nations which was a precondition for the dispatch of SDF
for overseas mission. In response, Makiko Tanaka, then Minister of Foreign Affairs, said that the U.S.-Britain mission was an exercise of the right of collective self-defence in accordance with Article 51 of the UN Charter, thus it was not an infringement of the international law (House of Representatives of Japan, 2001a, 2). In spite of the response from the Japanese government representative at the Diet, the international community has seriously doubted the legitimacy of the U.S.-Britain joint raids and there were mass protests across the world (Ross, 2011).

On the right of collective self-defence, Eto advocated that as a real ally of the United States, Japan should exercise the right of collective self-defence as there was an attack on the United States ally. He wondered if there was a need to further investigate the issue of the right of collective self-defence. In response, Koizumi showed reservation on allowing Japan to exercise the right of collective self-defence. Koizumi stressed at the foremost that it is of utmost importance to understand what was permitted within the bounds of the Constitution. According to the historical government interpretation of Article 9 of the Constitution, Japan possessed the right of collective self-defence but could not exercise it. Koizumi reinstated his respect for this constitutional interpretation. He thus considered what Japan could do within the confines of the Constitution in providing support to the United States and other countries to counteract terrorism (House of Representatives of Japan, 2001a, 3). Nevertheless, Eto has reinstated clearly the position of the LDP that the official constitutional interpretation prohibiting Japan from exercising the right of collective self-defence has persisted for a long time and the time has come for the legitimization of the right of collective self-defence otherwise Japan could not gain the trust of the U.S. ally (House of Representatives of Japan, 2001a, 4). It showed the LDP holds a more liberal view of Japan’s right to exercise the right of collective self-defence than Koizumi himself.

Eto further questioned whether Japan could exercise the right of self-defence in view of the fact that the terrorist attack was an assault on the freedom of all democracies in the world, including Japan. He suggested that in the face of terrorist attack, Japan should, based on the right of self-defence, work hand in hand with the United States to fight against terrorism. In response, Koizumi said that there were three preconditions for Japan to exercise the right of self-defence but in the case of the 9-11 terrorist attack, the condition that there was an imminent and illegitimate act of aggression was not satisfied, thus Japan could not exercise the right of self-defence (House of Representatives of Japan, 2001a, 3). It shows that even in the case of
the right of self-defence, Koizumi has guarded against LDP’s attempt to extend the interpretation of self-defence.

On the use of weapons, Article 10(1) of the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Bill provided that the SDF “may proportionately use weapons when an unavoidable and reasonable cause exists for use of weapons to protect lives and bodies of themselves”. Article 10(4) further stipulated that “The use of weapons stipulated in (1) above shall not cause harm to persons, except for cases falling under Article 36 (self-defense) or Article 37 (act of necessity) of the Penal Code.” (Cabinet of Japan, 2001a). Eto stressed that the current SDF mission was different from previous ones as it could not exclude the possibility of the civilians becoming rioters in the terrorist attack, thus it was important for the SDF to be equipped with weapons and be able to use it so as to protect their own safety against the attack of others. Eto doubted whether it was enough to confine the possession and use of weapons only to the situations of self-defence and act of necessity. In response, Makiko Tanaka, then Minister of Foreign Affairs has affirmed the position of the law that use of weapons is limited to protection of one’s lives and self-defence and that it is necessary in the circumstances (House of Representatives of Japan, 2001a, 4).

A study of the diet debates of the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law showed that the LDP was in full support of the Legislation. Their position and interpretation on the right of collective self-defence was even more hawkish than Koizumi who has shown reservation and respect for historical constitutional interpretation that Japan is refrained from exercising the right of collective self-defence within the limits of Article 9 of the Constitution. The LDP ‘s position on the use of weapons of the SDF to protect the safety of SDF was also broader than the government position that the use of weapons should be limited to protection of one’s lives and self-defence and that it is necessary in the circumstances.

(b) Three Emergency-related Legislations

The Three Emergency-related Legislations received unwavering support from the LDP members. Shigeru Ishiba, an LDP member explained in the Diet session his reasons for the support of the Legislation. He said that the three Emergency-related Legislations were necessary for a democratic country as opposed to an autocratic country. In a democratic country like Japan where there is separation of powers and that the respect of basic human rights was
guaranteed in the Constitution, it was important for the country to have Emergency Legislations which stipulated expressly the circumstances where the rights of the citizens would be curtailed in the event of the outbreak of an emergency situation. He said that after the end of the Cold War, there was still a Cold War in Asia. There were regional and territorial disputes in Asia. Thus it was important for Japan to possess deterrence capability to deter attack from other countries. (House of Representatives of Japan, 2002c, 8-9).

Takeshi Iwaya, a member of the ruling LDP responded to several arguments against the three Emergency-related Legislations at the Diet. He noted the arguments in the Diet session that the three Emergency-related Legislations have been given too much power. He doubted whether it was correct but he said that it was important to expressly stipulate in the legislation a commander system with a high concentration of power in order to deal with unexpected circumstances (House of Representatives of Japan, 2002c, 21). Iwaya further noted another argument that the three Emergency-related Legislations was framed in the context of a traditional warfare while he was aware of other emergency situations such as terrorism and unidentified vessels. He said that Japan did not have an Emergency Legislation in place at that time so it must start from scratch and stipulated for the situations of a traditional warfare and continue to improve it to cover more broader scope (House of Representatives of Japan, 2002c, 22).

Seishiro Etou, another LDP member, raised at the Diet debate the issue of how the SDF and the U.S. should respond in the event of an armed attack on Japan as well as situations in areas surrounding Japan. Nakatani responded that there would be a joint action between the U.S. and the SDF, while the SDF would exercise the right of self-defence within three constraints, namely an armed attack against Japan, no other appropriate means to repel the attack; and the use of minimum force necessary. Etou further queried why the role of the United States was not specifically provided for in the three Emergency-related Legislations, which was the same case when the same legislation was debated in the Fukuda administration. In response, Nakatani noted the absence of the provision of the role of the United States in the three Emergency-related Legislations was because the action and the role of the United States was well provided for in the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty (House of Representatives of Japan, 2002a, 4)
The views of the LDP in the Diet session of the discussion of the Emergency Legislations showed they fully supported the initiative of Koizumi to enact the three Emergency-related Legislations. Their support was a very important domestic factor leading to the final enactment of the Legislation without which it could not be passed by a vote of majority in the Diet. As the three Emergency-related Legislations operated hand in hand with the U.S.-Japan Security Guidelines in stipulating the action of the U.S. and Japan in response to an armed attack against Japan, it contributed a major step towards the military normalization of Japan.

(c) The Law concerning the Special Measures on Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance in Iraq (2003)

The LDP wholeheartedly supported the Legislation which marked a further deepening of the degree of normalization of Japan. At the Diet session, LDP members sought clarification on various issues of the Bill. On the right to transport weapons, Katsuhito Asano, an LDP member, doubted why such right was prohibited in the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Legislation but it was then recognized in the Law of Humanitarian and Reconstructions in Iraq. In response, Yasuo Fukuda, then the Chief Cabinet Secretary, said that transporting weapons did not amount to the exercise of force as the activities of the SDF would be confined to non-combat zones (House of Representatives of Japan, 2003a, 4). As the Iraq Reconstruction Law stipulates that the SDF may use ‘weapons’ in the course of reconstruction measures in a foreign territory, there were doubts as to the potential contravention of the Three Principles on Arms Export. In a statement by the Chief Cabinet Secretary in June 2003, he clarified the government position that the Three Principles on Arms Export would not be applicable to the Iraq Reconstruction Law and stated three limitations of the Iraq Reconstruction Law. First, the Law should only be confined to humanitarian and reconstruction measures of Iraq. Second, the arms exported shall be strictly managed by the SDF and be returned to Japan after the end of the duties. Strict adherence to the stipulations of the Law was required. Third, for the arms exported, the use of them shall be in compliance with the UN charter and the international agreements, and shall not be exported to a third country without the consent of Japan (Chief Cabinet Secretary of Japan, 2003). It can be seen that the Three Principles on Arms Export has been relaxed in the Iraq Reconstruction Law but the government of Japan was at pains to subject them within strict constraints.
Asano also raised another question with respect to the Diet approval after the dispatch of the SDF. In response, Fukuda replied that the aim of the Law was very clear to be for the purpose of reconstruction and humanitarian assistance and there was a need for speedy assistance activities to be carried out, hence there was no problem with obtaining the Diet approval after the dispatch of the SDF (House of Representatives of Japan, 2003a, 4).

The above analysis of the Diet debates showed LDP’s full and unwavering support of Koizumi’s historical move to deploy SDF overseas which was not a UN peacekeeping operations. The support of LDP was an important domestic variable that contributed to the extent of normalization of Japan unseen in previous administrations.

(d) Constitutional revision

In the Diet meeting, Motohito Kondo, an LDP member, first noted the severity of the international situation, such as the abductees problems, and the firing of missiles and development of nuclear weapons by North Korea which posed an increasing threat to Japan. He also drew attention to the fact that the United States being the superpower of the world was the subject of the 9-11 terrorist assault in 2001. Having said that, he maintained that Japan possessed the right of collective self-defence based on Article 51 of the United Nations Charter but was constrained from exercising it. He suggested that it was important for the national interests of Japan that Japan be able to exercise the right of collective self-defense such that there could be an equal bilateral relationship between the United States and Japan (House of Representatives of Japan, 2003d, 2).

On constitutional revision, LDP Diet member Kondo raised three suggestions. First, he stressed that it was important to strictly abide by the principle of no war of aggression of the first paragraph of Article 9. Second, he recommended revising second paragraph of Article 9 by recognizing that Japan should possess both the right of self-defense and collective self-defence and that the SDF will play the major role in national defence and international contribution. Third, Article 9 should provide for the contingencies such as war attack and major disasters (House of Representatives of Japan, 2003d, 3).

Hirohisa Fujii, another LDP Diet member pointed out three features of existing national security situation of Japan. First, he mentioned a deficiency in the Constitution in that it is a
fundamental mission of a nation to safeguard the safety of a nation and the lives and properties of its citizen in the face of an attack by other nations but there was no express provision provided for it in the Constitution. Second, he stressed the importance of the bilateral relationship with the United States not only to the national security of Japan but also in economic and cultural planes. It provided the basis for the peace and prosperity of Japan. Third, the international peacekeeping operations under the leadership of the United States formed the basis of peace and security of the international community. It thus follows naturally that Japan, being an important member of the international community, must take an active role in it. In discussing the constitutional revision, Fujii said that the Constitution should expressly provide for the peacekeeping activities of the United Nations, in particular that Japan should participate in collective security protection of the international community (House of Representatives of Japan, 2003d, 5).

Gen Nakatani, then Director General of Defense Agency, said in the Diet meeting that the international environment surrounding Japan and the more active overseas missions of the SDF showed that Article 9 had deviated from the reality of the international community. He hence recommended several revision proposals of Article 9. First, the role of the SDF should be expressly provided for in the Constitution. Second, international contribution based on international law and customs should be clearly stipulated. Third, the idea of pacifism and United Nations centered ideology should remain at the heart of Article 9 (House of Representatives of Japan, 2004, 3).

In the Prime Minister Election of 2003, the LDP manifesto stated that the LDP planned to issue a draft Constitution in 2005 which marked the 50th anniversary of the Constitution, to be followed by Diet debates. In December 2004, Chairman of the LDP, Koizumi, commissioned the establishment of the LDP New Constitution Drafting Committee which held its first meeting in January 2005. In its first report on 7 July 2005, in relation to provision on national security of the Constitution, there was a consensus among LDP that Japan should possess a self-defence force for national defence. The SDF should be under the supreme commander of the Prime Minister and should observe the principle of civilian control. Other possible provisions to the Constitution to be further debated included a military tribunal, emergency provisions, basic law on national security and basic law on international cooperation (Liberal Democratic Party of Japan, 2005b, 3).
4.3.2.3 New Komeito

Komeito was formed in 1964 as a political wing of the Buddhist organization Soka Gakkai. Instead of leaning either left or right, it is more aptly categorized as ‘centrist’. They aspired to look after “an individual’s well-being and social prosperity” which are “inseparable and mutually dependent” as stated in their official website as the platform of the party (Komeito, 2018). In other words, it is the pursuit of the ideals of individual well-being and social prosperity instead of any kind of ideology or beliefs which drives the political party. In the postwar history of Japan, LDP mostly represented the interests of large corporations while the JSP primarily stood for the interests of the labour unions. Komeito is the political party which stood for the mass public, with the platform of the party embracing all social strata of Japan (Komeito, 2018). Komeito has, since its inception in 1964, instrumental in its diplomatic efforts in promoting good relationships with China and is a major party promoting the normalization of Japan-China relationship in the 1970s (Fisker-Nielsen, 2016, 2).

(a) Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law

Masatomo Kawai, a representative of the New Komeito at the Diet session first raised doubts as to the legitimacy of the whole mission. Kawai doubted why Japan needed to support the use of military action to resolve the attack on the United States. Koizumi responded that the terrorist attack happened on the U.S. soil but it affected the whole world. Japan was not only assisting the United States, it worked with the world to counteract terrorism as Japanese civilians have also been sacrificed in the attack (House of Representatives of Japan, 2001a, 8).

Kawai further pressed the Prime Minister Koizumi on the basis of the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Legislation noting the fact that the pacifist Constitution prohibits the resort of military force. Kawai in particular noted the news report that the U.S. President George W. Bush was engaging in revenge action. Koizumi responded that there was a prior condition of the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Legislation that Japan will not exercise the use of force and would strive to provide assistance within the confines of the Constitution. Koizumi reiterated that military action was the last resort. While the U.S.-led mission resorted to military action, Japan maintained the principle of not using force (House of Representatives of Japan, 2001a, 8).
Having queried the foundation for the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Bill, Kawai stated the position of New Komeito on the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Bill. First, the objectives of the Bill were to provide assistance to counteract terrorism on the basis of UN resolution and to provide humanitarian assistance to refugees. Second, the Bill shall have a two year time limit. Third, the activities of Japan SDF will be confined to non-combat zones (House of Representatives of Japan, 2001a, 9).

In the debates of the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Legislation, the most notable contribution of the New Komeito, an ant militarist leaning party, was its attempt to constrain the government by raising the initial objections to the transportation of arms and ammunition to U.S. military during the initial draft of the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Bill. In response to Kawai’s objection to Japan transporting arms and ammunition to the U.S. army, Koizumi responded that Japan not only transported arms and ammunition, but also other logistical goods. It was part of the concerted effort to drive out terrorism (House of Representatives of Japan, 2001a, 9). However, New Komeito, as a junior coalition partner which for the sake of staying in the coalition, did not adhere firmly to its founding ideologies of pacifism and has supported the passage of the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Legislation which has led to a more liberal interpretation of the pacifist principle of Article 9 of the Constitution.

(b) Three Emergency-related Legislations

It was also very important that the New Komeito as a coalition party supported the enactment of the Three Emergency-related Legislations. In the Diet session, Masahiro Tabata raised several fundamental clarifications of the Emergency Legislations. First, he stressed at the foremost that it was important to respect the principles that there will not be an exercise of the right of collective self-defence and that the limitations of the rights of the citizens would be kept to the minimal (House of Representatives of Japan, 2002c, 28).

Furthermore, Tabata has sought an important clarification on the connection between Act on Measures to Ensure the Peace and Security of Japan in Perilous Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan 1999 and the Emergency Legislations. He gave the scenario where Country A was attacked by Country B, then the United States dispatched troops to counter the attack. This was the situation where Japan could provide logistical support to the United States based
on the Act on Measures to Ensure the Peace and Security of Japan in Perilous Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan 1999. Tabata wondered the situation where there was also imminent attack of Japan which was the situation provided for in the Emergency Legislations, how Japan should respond. Shinzō Abe, then Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary, replied that in such situation, Japan would not exercise force as Japan was not under armed attack (House of Representatives of Japan, 2002c, 29).

In fact, the Three Emergency-related legislations have received overwhelming support of most political parties, including not only New Komeito but also majority of opposition parties. In the Diet session, diet member of New Komeito merely sought clarification of the scope of the application of the Three Emergency-related registrations without posing any objections to the final passage of the legislation.

(c) The Law concerning the Special Measures on Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance in Iraq (2003)

New Komeito, the LDP coalition partner, has also shown support to the Bill concerning Special Measures on Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance in Iraq while making several doubts about the legitimacy of the operation. Masao Akamatsu, a member of the New Komeito first raised at the Diet debate about the legality or legitimacy of the Iraq War. He doubted whether there were really weapons of mass destruction in Iraq and whether the U.S.-led coalition forces were acting in compliance with international law. Koizumi replied that the U.S.-led coalition forces were acting on the basis of UN resolutions 1441, 678 and 687, thus there was no question of illegitimacy or contravention of the international law (House of Representatives of Japan, 2003a, 8).

Shigeki Satou, another member of the New Komeito first talked about the objectives of the Iraq reconstruction mission in the Diet session. He said Japan dispatched SDF on the basis that it was the second largest economy in the world thus it bore the responsibility to the international community to reconstruct Iraq as a humanitarian effort. He further questioned the government official about the definition of combat and non-combat zones. The government official responded that the distinction was determined on a case by case basis, on consideration of the internationality, planning, organization and persistence of the action. The third issue which Satou raised related to the transportation of weapons. He was worried that weapons would be
transported to areas which was classified as non-combat zones but was in chaotic public order. He wondered whether such stipulations comply with the Constitution. The government official responded that it did not contravene Article 9 of the Constitution which prohibits the use of force for the settlement of international disputes. The SDF would be engaging in the support and assistance operation which would not generate the problem of integral to the use of force in contravention to Article 9 of the Constitution (House of Representatives of Japan, 2003c, 3-4).

New Komeito has shown overall support to the enactment of the Law concerning the Special Measures on Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance in Iraq though it raised initial doubts about the distinction between combat and non-combat zones and the issue of transportation of weapons which may arguably be an exercise of the use of force thus contravening Article 9 of the Constitution.

(d) Constitutional Revision

In the Diet session devoted to Article 9 of the Constitution in 2003, Kazuyoshi Endo of the New Komeito expressed his views on Article 9 of the Constitution. He said at the foremost that it is the government interpretation that Japan could not exercise the right of collective self-defence. On collective security, he said that paragraph 1 and 2 of Article 9 of the Constitution should remain intact while adding the third paragraph which specifically stipulated for Japan’s right to participate in collective security action under the U.N (House of Representatives of Japan, 2003d, 8-9). It thus remained the position of the New Komeito that Article 9 should not be revised.

4.3.2.4 Opposition parties

(a) Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law

At the Diet debate, the opposition parties have expressed their doubts and reservations about the Legislation. Jun Azumi, a member of the DPJ, first raised a fundamental question in the Diet session of the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Bill that the Constitution prohibited the use of force, so the Bill was in effect a violation of the Constitution. Koizumi responded that the terrorist attack was something which could not be anticipated at the time of the drafting of
the Constitution. The power and status of Japan was different from the time when the Constitution was drafted but Japan was then the second largest economy in the world and has responsibility to the international community in the post-terrorist attack in 2001. Koizumi reasoned that there were times when the SDF was considered as unconstitutional. In time, there were overseas dispatch of SDF which has performed their missions without the use of force. Hence, the interpretation of the Constitution has evolved over time (House of Representatives of Japan, 2001a, 19).

Another fundamental question raised by Azumi was the legal basis for the enactment of the Bill. While the United States exercised the right of self-defence, Azumi questioned the legal basis for Japan to participate in the war against terrorism. Koizumi cited the objectives of the United Nations as well as the effort to counteract terrorism in the international community in which Japan was a member as the legal basis for Japan to participate in the war against terrorism (House of Representatives of Japan, 2001a, 20).

Another query at the special committee session related to the proposed Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Bill which allowed the SDF to transport U.S. weapons and ammunition. Katsuya Okada, a member of the DPJ, suspected that it constituted the use of force on the part of Japan and hence a breach of Article 9 of the Constitution (House of Representatives of Japan, 2001b, 16). In reply to the same question asked by Kenji Kodama, a member of the Japanese Communist Party, Prime Minister Koizumi replied that the SDF was merely transporting U.S. weapons and ammunitions for the use of the U.S. army. Japan also transported water and medical supplies. Koizumi refuted the argument that such action would drag Japan into war. Japan was not using force and did not come to the combat zones but were merely participating in the international cooperation to combat against terrorism (House of Representatives of Japan, 2001b, 31). In the end, the LDP-coalition government partly conceded to the concern from the DPJ. Article 4(1)(iii) of the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Legislation forbade the transportation of weapons and ammunition on foreign soil but it was allowed on international space and waters (Eldridge; and Midford, 2008b, 137).

A further point of discussion at the Diet session was the requirement for Diet approval. Article 6 of the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Bill stipulated that Diet approval was required to be obtained ‘within 20 days of the initiation” of the dispatch of the SDF. Ryuichi Izawa, professor
of University of Shizuoka, stated that the requirement for Diet approval ‘after’ the dispatch of SDF was a disrespect of democracy and the Diet system (House of Representatives of Japan, 2001c, 8). Kazuhisa Ogawa, a military analyst, commented at the Diet session that it was important to respect the basic principle of obtaining Diet approval prior to the dispatch of the SDF but he also noted the necessity of acting speedily in the face of an emergency (House of Representatives of Japan, 2001c, 10). Yukio Hatoyama, leader of the DPJ, stated prior Diet approval and prohibition of transportation of arms as the preconditions for their party’s support of the Bill. In the end, a compromise was reached with the DPJ in which it conceded to government’s stance of post Diet approval as the government agreed to the requirement of prohibition of transportation of arms and ammunition in land. Such concession was fiercely opposed by the Komeito, LDP coalition partner, but as even the largest opposition party, DPJ, agreed with the government opposition, Komeito did not insist on the requirement of prior Diet approval for fear of being driven out from the coalition by the Koizumi government (Shinoda, 2007, 97).

The views of the opposition parties in the Diet debate were worthy to note. Though it did not affect the outcome of the final enactment of the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law, it has led to refinement of Bill which forbade the transportation of weapons and ammunition on foreign soil but it was allowed on international space and waters.

(b) Three Emergency-related Legislations

A salient feature of the three Emergency related Legislations was that it received high support from political parties. They were endorsed not only by the ruling coalition (which included the LDP, the New Conservative Party and New Komeito), but also by two opposition parties, the DPJ and the Liberal Party, while only members of the JCP and the Social Democratic Party (SDP) opposed the legislation, arguing that it contravenes the pacifist Constitution and drives Japan towards remilitarization (Shimoyachi and Yoshida, 2003).

Katsuya Okada, a member of the DPJ, the leading opposition party, first and foremost questioned at the Diet session the basis for enacting the legislation in view of the lack of a real danger. Koizumi responded that after the end of the Cold War, there was a view that there would not be an armed attack. However, in all points of history, it is the responsibility of the government to be prepared for an emergency situation. In fact, DPJ agreed with the view of
Koizumi that there was a need for an Emergency Legislation. Okada understood that there was the missile threat and terrorism as well as the intense security environment in East Asia. The issue worried most by the DPJ was that in the case of an emergency situation, with the mobilisation of the SDF, there would be a limitation of the rights of the citizens. DPJ doubted how Japan as a country of rule of law established rules not to unduly limit the rights of the citizens. He wanted Koizumi to clarify at the Diet session the relationship between the power of the country and the rights of the citizen. Koizumi assured him that a country existed for the citizens, thus it was the responsibility of the country to safeguard the basic human rights of its people and they were well provided for in the Constitution (House of Representatives of Japan, 2002a, 8).

Okada further sought clarification from the government official at the Diet session the distinction between the situation where an attack was imminent and where an attack was anticipated. Gen Nakatari, then head of the Defence Agency replied that in the case of an attack which was imminent, it can be objectively ascertained from the international situation and the intention and military action of the other countries that there was an imminent danger that Japan would be under armed attack. For an attack which was anticipated, it referred to the situation where in the international environment which Japan was in, it can be anticipated that an order for taking defence action would be issued. Such anticipation was determined by the Cabinet and the Diet that it was necessary to take defence action by dispatching the SDF (House of Representatives of Japan, 2002a, 10).

Kansei Nakano, another DPJ member, also expressed his support to the enactment of the three Emergency-related Legislations at the Diet session. He said that the emergency provisions should originally be provided for in the Constitution. In many other countries such as France, Germany, South Korea and the Philippines, the emergency provisions are stipulated for in the Constitution which expressly provided for the power of the Prime Minister as the head of the country in the Constitution with individual legislations stipulating the detailed provisions. Nakano said that it was the ideal way to stipulate for the emergency provisions in the Constitution but the reality in Japan was that it was a difficult task to amend the Constitution, thus it was necessary to enact the basic national security legislation which stipulated where there was an emergency situation, the power and responsibility of the Prime Minister, Ministers, local authorities, rights and duties of the citizens, cooperation between the United States and
Japan, as well as the cooperation with the UN (House of Representatives of Japan, 2002d, 14-15).

The Liberal Party also supported the legislation. Takeshi Hidaka of the Liberal Party said it was a belated attempt to discuss the enactment of the Emergency Legislations in 2002. He said that it was important for Japan as an independent nation to stipulate for the emergency situations such as terrorist attack or large scale disaster as a national security protection (House of Representatives of Japan, 2002b, 29).

JCP and SDP were two opposition parties which opposed to the enactment of the Emergency Legislations. Kazuo Shii, a member of the JCP, criticized the Emergency Legislation as opening the gateway for Japan to pursue pre-emptive attack as the definition of armed attack included an imminent and anticipated armed attack (House of Representatives of Japan, 2002a, 32). In fact, the definition of an armed attack that includes an imminent or anticipated threat is a bit worrying as it is a subjective perception of threat of armed attack which may trigger an unanticipated response from the other side.

SDP also opposed to the three Emergency-related legislations. Mitsuko Tomon, a member of SDP noted that the three Emergency-related Legislations would limit the rights of the citizens as provided for in Article 13 of the Constitution, thus she claimed that the three Emergency-related Legislations were in great contradictions with Article 13 of the Constitution. Yasuo Fukuda, then Chief Cabinet Secretary responded that it was a fundamental principle of the Emergency Legislation to respect the freedom and rights of the citizens. It was only within the minimum necessary level that the rights of the citizens would be constrained in emergency situations (House of Representatives of Japan, 2002d, 35). Further, Tomon also expressed a concern that the determination of an imminent or anticipated attack would be the subjective and arbitrary perception of the government which may rely on the determination of the experts of the military. So she argued that there would be a risk of the military control as opposed to civilian control. Gen Nakatani, then Director General of Defense Agency, assured that the determination of an emergency situations would be made in accordance with the direction of the Cabinet in accordance with the procedure of the Diet so that there would no doubt be civilian control (House of Representatives of Japan, 2002d, 36).
The above analysis of the Diet debates showed that the three Emergency-related Legislations were supported by two opposition parties, the DPJ and Liberal Party but were only opposed by JCP and SDP. Hence, it showed that a high level of elite consensus in enacting the Legislation.

(c) The Law concerning the Special Measures on Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance in Iraq (2003)

The opposition parties fiercely opposed to the Bill. The DPJ maintained a strong stance that the U.S. invasion of the Iraq was embarked without a U.N. resolution so Japan’s participation in the postwar reconstruction should be conditional upon a new U.N. security council resolution. Seiji Maehara of the DPJ questioned at the Diet session the legitimacy of the U.S. invasion of Iraq. He said that Article 1 of the Legislation said that the objectives of the Legislation were based on 678, 687 and 1441 of UN resolutions but nothing in the resolutions authorized the use of an armed attack. He further elaborated that the invasion of Iraq was aimed at two objectives. The first was to drive Iraq away from Kuwait and the second was the eradication of weapons of mass destruction. Maehara drew attention to the fact that the weapons of mass destruction could not be found, thus he found the legitimacy of the U.S. invasion of Iraq to be highly doubtful. Yoriko Kawaguchi, the Foreign Minister responded that the problem of weapons of mass destruction was a great threat to the international community. As Iraq did not respond to the request for inspection, it was important to exert pressure on Iraq through the use of force. The government position thus maintained that the threat of weapons of mass destruction could not be eradicated without the use of force (House of Representatives of Japan, 2003a, 13-14).

Eisei Ito, another DPJ member, also wondered whether the U.S. invasion of Iraq contravened the preamble and Article 2 of the UN Charter in which members should refrain from resorting to the use or threat of use of force in settling international disputes. Kawaguchi responded on behalf of the government that the reconstruction of Iraq was based on UN resolution 1483 which was passed unanimously in the UN (House of Representatives of Japan, 2003a, 21-22).

The DPJ member further suspected the influence of the personal rapport between Koizumi and George W. Bush on the decision to dispatch SDF to Iraq. Ito asked Prime Minister Koizumi if there was any request from the then President George W. Bush or prior agreement between them for Japan to dispatch SDF to Iraq. In response, Koizumi steadfastly denied any request
from the American President to dispatch SDF to Iraq. Koizumi stated that whether to dispatch SDF was a question for Japan to consider on her own, on what she can contribute to the international community (House of Representatives of Japan, 2003a, 23). Such simple answer from Koizumi could not disperse the suspicion that the personal relationship between the two leaders weighed heavily on Japan’s decision to dispatch SDF for Iraq reconstruction.

Akihiro Ohata, another DPJ member, raised at the Diet the question of whether Japan maintained a U.S.-centred foreign policy or UN-centred foreign policy. Yoriko Kawaguchi, then Foreign Minister responded that the two were not mutually exclusive or contradictory. She said that the foreign policy of Japan should aim at the peace and security of Japan which in turn was based on the environment of peace and stability in the international community. Hence, Japan should both maintain the ally relationship with the U.S. and contributed to the peace and stability of the international community with the UN as the centre. Both were important to Japan’s foreign policy. However, Ohata doubted why the current bill showed a preference of Japan for the United States over the UN (House of Representatives of Japan, 2003b, 11-12).

On the content of the Legislation, the first major concern raised by the DPJ was the definition of combat and non-combat zones. As the Bill stipulated that the SDF would only be operated in non-combat zones, there were repeated concerns from the Diet members whether it was realistic and practically possible to distinguish between combat and non-combat zones such that the safety of the SDF could be guaranteed. The distinction was also important because of the constitutional constraint of not resorting to force in overseas territories (House of Representatives of Japan, 2003a, 19). Even in a Diet meeting of the Constitution Committee, Azuma Kono, a member of the DPJ, doubted whether it was ever possible to distinguish between combat and non-combat zones. He recalled the fact that even after the announcement of the end of major warfare in the Iraq war, there were still reported figures of 63 casualties of American soldiers. He hence argued that sending the SDF to combat zones was a contravention of the Constitution. He further stated that the interpretation of Article 9 of the Constitution by the Koizumi administration did not respect the principle of constitutionalism (House of Representatives of Japan, 2003d, 7). In response, Koizumi stressed that the major warfare in Iraq had ended before the SDF would be dispatched to Iraq thus the SDF was not exercising force in a combat zones and was thus acting within the bounds of the Constitution (House of Representatives of Japan, 2003a, 27). In distinguishing between combat and non-combat zones,
Koizumi said that it would be determined on the basis of the intelligence information collected by Japan and from other countries but he admitted that it was not practically feasible to identify non-combat zones from combat zones (House of Representatives of Japan, 2003a, 32).

On the seventh session of the Diet debate of the Bill, DPJ proposed three amendments to the Bill. First, it proposed that a provision which stipulated that the legitimacy of the Iraq attack based on UN Security Council resolutions 678, 687 and 1441 be deleted. Second, it said that because of the difficulty in distinguishing between the combat and non-combat zones with the risk of “ittaika” and that the SDF may work in areas of the occupation forces, the DPJ proposed that the stipulations regarding the activities of the SDF be deleted. Third, while the bill stated it will lapse in four years, the DPJ proposed that it should be limited to two years (House of Representatives of Japan, 2003c, 20).

The other opposition parties such as the SDP and the JCP were opposed to the Bill on their adherence to antimilitarist ideals and U.N.-centred international norms. Masami Iwagawa, a member of SDP also held the same position as the DPJ that it did not support the war on Iraq on the ground that it was embarked without a UN resolution. He said that the U.S. initiated the war on the pretext that Iraq possessed weapons of mass destruction but he argued that the real intention of the U.S. was to drive out the Hussein regime in Iraq (House of Representatives of Japan, 2003a, 41).

Seiken Akamine, a JCP member, opposed the Bill on the ground that the dispatch of SDF was not for humanitarian and reconstruction purpose but for the security assistance to the U.S.-led troops and the SDF would be sent to the area where there was a strong sense of anti-American sentiment. Koizumi refuted this argument and said that the SDF would only be dispatched to non-combat zones. Such answer from Koizumi was fiercely rejected by Akamine as not answering the question that the dispatch of SDF was for security assistance rather than for humanitarian and reconstruction purpose (House of Representatives of Japan, 2003a, 38).

Hideo Kijima, another JCP member, also opposed the Bill as he doubted the legitimacy and legality of the US-Britain occupation forces in Iraq under international law. He reasoned that the use of force is only legitimate and legal under the UN Charter in cases of self-defence and the recognition of the existence of threat to international security that there was a UN Security Council resolution which authorized the use of force. He argued that US-Britain forces were
in the instance exercising force not in compliance with the stipulations of the UN Charter (House of Representatives of Japan, 2003c, 39). Ryoko Kawaguchi, the State Minister, maintained steadfastly the legitimacy of the occupation forces on the basis of UN Security Council resolution 1483 (House of Representatives of Japan, 2003c, 40).

The above analysis of the Diet debates showed that there were voices of dissent from the opposition parties mainly on the legitimacy of the US-Britain led military operation which was the use or threat of use of force in settling international dispute in contravention with the U.N. Charter. However, the political reality that the opposition parties do not carry insufficient seats in the Diet did not have determinative effect on the final passage of the (Miyagi, 2009, 359).

(d) Constitution revision

In the Diet session of Constitution Review Committee in 2004 devoting on the study of Article 9 of the Constitution, Takeaki Matsumoto of the DPJ expressed his views on collective self-defence and collective security under the UN. On collective self-defence, he said at the foremost that the right of collective self-defence was an inherent right of Japan but she could not exercise it under the current Constitution. Under the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty, there was an imbalance of responsibility between the two parties, thus the scope of responsibility that Japan could shoulder within the framework should be reviewed. On collective security, he said that it is necessary to review the Constitution on the collective security action such as peacekeeping activities and logistical support which may have difficulty in fitting smoothly with the current Constitution. He recommended Article 9 of the Constitution be amended to expressly stipulate for the right of self-defence, SDF and the international peace-keeping activities (House of Representatives of Japan, 2004, 4-6).

JCP, another opposition party, opposed to the stipulation of the right of collective self-defence in the Constitution. In the Diet session of Constitution Review Committee in 2004, Tomio Yamaguchi of JCP stressed that the Constitution did not recognize the right of collective self-defence. He further said that there was overwhelming majority of countries around the world which did not participate in the action of military alliance. Thus, he doubted whether Japan should exercise the right of collective self-defence in view of the global trend of not exercising it (House of Representatives of Japan, 2004, 10).
In sum, the opposition parties are opposed to the stipulation of the right of collective self-defense in the Constitution though there were differing views on whether and the extent to which Article 9 should be revised.

4.4 Conclusion

An analysis of the package of national security initiatives of the Koizumi administration from the lens of the theory of neoclassical realism showed that it was the primary influence of the international structural factors with the influence of the domestic variables which enables the Koizumi administration to take a giant step in the degree of normalization of Japan.

The international structural factors consisted of the threat of terrorism, military rise of China and the nuclear threat from North Korea, US hegemony in East Asia and the US-Japan Security Alliance. Though terrorism was arguably a remote threat to Japan during the Koizumi administration, the terrorist attack on the United States’ soil was viewed with equal importance to Japan as the balance of power and regional security in East Asia could not be achieved by Japan alone but must be guaranteed by the indispensable help from the US ally. It hence led to the enactment of the laws in the first and third case studies: Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Legislation and Iraq Reconstruction Law. The threat from the rise of China and nuclear threat from North Korea were the immediate external threats which led to the enactment of the three Emergency Legislations. Though the last case study of constitutional reform was not realized during the Koizumi administration, it was discussed at the background of the external threat in East Asia and it was emphasized that Japan should play a more active role in the U.S.-Japan Security Alliance for fear of abandonment from the United States.

At the core of the domestic environment is the indispensable role of Prime Minister Koizumi, without whom Japan would not have taken such a giant step in securing her own security and due respect and place in the international community. In the domestic economic doldrums that Japan was in at the Koizumi administration as in previous decades and the climate of forever strong sentiment of antimilitarism, it was only because of Koizumi himself, with his personal conviction, charisma, popularity and personal strategy, as well as his close connection with the United States and then President George W. Bush, that such series of national security strategies could be passed despite opposition. No other Prime Minister in the same situation
could have accomplished what he has achieved during his administration. What he achieved was not even an ordinary LDP Prime Minister could achieve. The Three Emergency-related Legislations, for instance, has been on shelf for decades before it was really put into effect precisely because of the conviction of Koizumi himself. Another indispensable variable is the views of the ruling political elite in full support of Koizumi’s national security initiative which enabled Japan to take a giant step in normalization not witnessed before the Koizumi administration.

The next chapter will proceed to discuss the national security initiatives of the second Abe administration from the lens of neoclassical realism.

Figure 4-1

![Defense Budget of the Koizumi Administration (FY 2001 to FY 2006) (in billion yen)](http://www.mof.go.jp/english/budget/budget/)
Approval Rate of the Koizumi Administration
(Apr 2001-Aug 2006)
Source: Asahi Poll http://www.tv-asahi.co.jp/hst/poll/graph_naikaku.html

Approval Rate of the Koizumi Administration
(Apr 2001-Aug 2006)
Figure 4-4

Support rate of the various national security initiatives of the Koizumi administration by Nikkei
https://vdata.nikkei.com/newsgraphics/cabinet-approval-rating/

Support rate of the various national security initiatives of the Koizumi administration by Nikkei
https://vdata.nikkei.com/newsgraphics/cabinet-approval-rating/
Chapter 5  National Security Initiatives of the Second Abe Administration

5.1 Introduction

In the face of the severity of the international security environment, the second Abe administration (2012-) has initiated significant national security reforms. These included the establishment of the National Security Council, the promulgation of the first National Security Strategy, continued increase in defence budget since 2014, the Three Principles on Transfer of Defence Equipment and Technology, the signing of the U.S.-Japan Defence Guidelines 2015, and above all, a package of ‘legislation of peace and security’. Japan also enacted the anti-conspiracy law establishing 277 criminal acts deter crimes planning terrorist attacks. The second Abe administration also established an Advisory Committee on Constitutional Reform and advocated constitutional revision by 2020. These series of national security initiatives have enabled Japan to take a giant step towards normalization.

This chapter will consider a package of national security initiatives promulgated by the second Abe administration which led to increasing degree of normalization of Japan. The following discussion will analyse from the neoclassical realist perspective how the primary forces of international structural factors, together with domestic variables have contributed to enactment of the relevant national security initiatives and hence pushing Japan towards normalization. The domestic variables will be analyzed based on the Hilsman’s concentric circle of influence with the Prime Minister and bureaucrats at the innermost layer of influence and the LDP, coalition parties and opposition parties at the outer layers of circle of influence.

5.2 A Package of the National Security Initiatives of the Second Abe Administration

5.2.1 National Security Council and the first National Security Strategy

Following the U.S. model, Japan established the National Security Council in 2013 and the promulgation of the first National Security Strategy. The National Security Council is headed by the Prime Minister and is consisted of a four-minister meeting and a nine-minister meeting,
with the former a meeting between the Prime Minister, Chief Cabinet Secretary, and Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Defence as a top-level discussion of critical national security issues (Cabinet of Japan, 2013). The National Security Council allowed Japan to respond to national security contingencies more speedily by holding regular minister meetings and consolidating the information gathered from different administrative department (House of Representatives of Japan, 2013c, 10). It thus allowed Japan to better coordinate its national security strategies.

Japan published its first National Security Strategy in 2015 which replaced the Basic Policy on National Defence as the basic strategy of Japan in diplomatic and defence affairs. It outlined Japan’s strategic approach to national security, which included, inter alia, reinforcing air, land and maritime defence capabilities, strengthening U.S.-Japan Security Alliance in ballistic missile defence, maritime affairs, outer space, cyber space, and large-scale disaster response operations. The National Security Strategy further outlined enhancing cooperation with Japan’s security partners and U.N. diplomacy as a means for Japan to proactively contribute to international peace and security (Ministry of Defence of Japan, 2015a, 153-155). The National Security Strategy thus codified strengthening defence capabilities of Japan as a national security policy, which made Japan a big step forward towards normalization.

5.2.2 Three Principles of Transfer of Defence Equipment and Technology

In 2014, Japan issued the Three Principles of Transfer of Defence Equipment and Technology which replaced the Three Principles on Arms Exports and Their Related Policy Guidelines. It in effect lifted the ban on arms export imposed since 1976. The first principle stated the cases in which transfer of defence equipment and technology was prohibited, which included cases which violated international agreements and treaties; obligations under UN resolutions or a country in conflict. The second principle states that the transfer of defence equipment and technology will be permitted if it contribute to international peace and security and to Japan’s own national security. The third principle stated that prior consent of Japan is required if the recipient country has extra purpose use or wants to transfer the defence equipment and technology to a third country (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 2014).

It is a significant shift in Japan’s defence equipment policy and can pave way for the joint weapons development and security cooperation with the U.S.-ally and other countries. It is a prominent sign of military normalization of Japan. However, in accordance with a news report
in May 2019, none of the ten potential arms contracts have materialized in the five years since the Three Principles of Transfer of Defence Equipment and Technology was announced in 2014 (Kato, 2019).

5.2.3 U.S.-Japan Defence Guidelines in 2015

The U.S. Japan Defence Guidelines was first issued in 1978. It was first revised in 1997 to better allow for the bilateral operation and coordination of the U.S-Japan Alliance in normal circumstances and in cases of an armed attack on Japan. It further made provision for the two Governments to act and cooperate in response to situations in areas surrounding Japan that will have an important influence on Japan’s peace and security. As the international security environment, in particular in East Asia, has intensified in the last decade, coupled with the legitimatization of the right of collective self-defence by the Legislation for Peace and Security in 2015, the two governments revised the U.S.-Japan Defence Guidelines in 2015.

In the U.S.-Japan Defence Guidelines 2015, the two governments called for “seamless, robust, flexible, and effective” responses and cooperation in the face of contingencies and mutual cooperation in defence cooperation. The 2015 Guidelines for the first time adopted whole-of-government approach through the establishment of a new Alliance Coordination Mechanism which enhanced bilateral coordination and planning (Governments of Japan and the United States of America, 2015, Article I). In response to the intense security environment, the Guidelines was notable for specifically mentioning the strengthening of bilateral deterrence capability against ballistic missile launches and aerial incursions and maritime security (Governments of Japan and the United States of America, 2015, Article IV). The 2015 Guidelines further stipulated for expanded bilateral cooperation, as well as trilateral or multilateral cooperation in peace and security of Asia-Pacific and beyond (Governments of Japan and the United States of America, 2015, Article V). With the legitimization of the right of collective self-defence, the 2015 Guidelines have further expanded the scope of operation of U.S-Japan Security Alliance not only in cases of an armed attack on Japan or situations in areas surrounding Japan, but to international peace and security. The degree of normalization of Japan has been greatly expanded with the promulgation of the 2015 Guidelines.
5.2.4 Legislations for Peace and Security (2015)

Discussions of the right of collective self-defence and other national security issues relating to interpretation of Article 9 can be dated back to the first Abe administration. In May 2007, then Prime Minister Abe commissioned the Advisory Panel on Reconstruction of the Legal Basis for Security which discussed four case scenarios in which Japan’s national security was at stake but she was unable to exercise the right of collective self-defence due to the constitutional constraint of Article 9 and previous Cabinet interpretations of the Constitution. The four cases are “(1) an armed attack against U.S. naval vessels on the high seas, (2) interception of a ballistic missile targeted to the United States, (3) use of weapons in international peace operations and (4) logistic support for the operations of other countries participating in the same U.N. peacekeeping operations.” (The Advisory Panel on Reconstruction of the Legal Basis for Security, 2008, 4). In the first two and the fourth scenarios, the Advisory Panel recommended that Japan could only respond to the three situations by permitting Japan to exercise the right of collective self-defence, a right possessed by Japan due to the UN Charter but was unable to exercise. The third scenario was also referred to as the “kaketsuke keigo” which was described as “the use of weapons for coming to the aid of geographically distant personnel or units of other countries participating in the same U.N. peacekeeping force”. Such force should be distinguished from the use of force for combat purposes. The Advisory Panel recommended changing the constitutional interpretation and allowed the SDF to engage in kaketsuke keigo operations. Constitutional reinterpretation instead of constitutional amendment was recommended (The Advisory Panel on Reconstruction of the Legal Basis for Security, 2008, 31). Owing to the short-lived first Abe administration, the recommendations of the report was not put into practice in the first Abe administration or later until the same Advisory Panel was reconvened during the second Abe administration.

The Advisory Panel on Reconstruction of the Legal Basis for Security was reconvened during the second Abe administration in 2013 and a report was published in 2014. The 2014 report examined another six scenarios of national security which Japan may not be able to adequately respond to due to the constitutional constraint of Article 9. The six case scenarios under examination were:
“(1) contingency in Japan’s neighboring areas, namely ship inspections, and repelling of attacks against U.S. vessels etc.;
(2) Support to the United States when it is under an armed attack;
(3) Minesweeping in maritime areas where navigation of Japanese ships is significantly affected;
(4) Participation in activities based on a U.N. decision;
(5) Measures to be taken when foreign submarines continue sailing submerged in the territorial Sea of Japan and do not follow the request to leave the territorial sea and continue wandering;
(6) Response in the event an armed group conducts an unlawful act against a vessel or civilian in a sea area or remote island” (The Advisory Panel on Reconstruction of the Legal Basis for Security, 2014, 16-21)

The Advisory Panel has made several recommendations in its report in 2014. First, a constitutional reinterpretation of paragraph 1 of Article 9 to the effect that the maintenance of force for the purpose of self-defence and collective self-defence should be made. It concluded that allowing the exercise of the right of collective self-defence would enhance deterrence and diminish the potential of a preemptive attack. Second, paragraph 2 of Article 9 should be interpreted that maintenance of force for the purpose of self-defence or maintenance of international security should be permitted. Third, on the right of self-defence, it should be exercised without constraint provided that the three conditions were satisfied. It also recommended the approval of the right of collective self-defence by a Cabinet decision. Fourth, participation in UN collective security measures should not be regarded as use of force prohibited by Article 9 (The Advisory Panel on Reconstruction of the Legal Basis for Security, 2014, 48-51).

Following the recommendations of the Advisory Panel, LDP and Komeito had discussions which were finally reflected in the “Cabinet Decision on Development of Seamless Security Legislation to Ensure Japan's Survival and Protect its People” on 1 July 2014 (Cabinet of Japan, 2014a). The Cabinet Decision covers three main parts. First, in the case of an infringement which does not amount to an armed attack, the Cabinet Decision provided that Japan should enhance the response capabilities and collaboration among agencies. It also called for seamless cooperation between Japan and the United States by revising the SDF Law such that the SDF could be permitted to use weapons “to the minimum extent necessary” in order to protect American armed forces.
The second part of the Cabinet Decision dealt with further contributions to peace and security in the international community. Previous Government interpretations allowed the SDF to operate only in “rear area” and “non-combat zones” but the Cabinet decided that the SDF should in future be allowed to operate in areas where no actual combat activities are conducted and should withdraw once combat situations emerge. On the use of weapons of SDF for peacekeeping operations, the Cabinet decided that SDF should be allowed to use weapons for the purpose of *kaketsuke-keigo* and “use of weapons for the purpose of execution of missions” such that Japan can make “proactive contribution to peace”.

The third part of the Cabinet Decision dealt with measures for self-defence under Article 9. The existing government interpretation allowed Japan to exercise minimum force necessary for the purpose of self-defence if there is an armed attack on Japan. The Cabinet Decision extended such interpretation to encompass the situations “(1) when an armed attack against a foreign country that is in a close relationship with Japan occurs; (2) as a result threatens Japan's survival and poses a clear danger to fundamentally overturn people's right to life, liberty and pursuit of happiness; and (3) when there is no other appropriate means available to repel the attack and ensure Japan's survival and protect its people” (Cabinet of Japan, 2014a). They were known as the three new conditions.

The Cabinet Decision called for domestic legislations to put its decision into practice. The Legislations for Peace and Security were drafted following the Cabinet Decision. The Legislations for Peace and Security consisted of partial amendments of a bundle of 10 legislations relating to peace and security as well as the enactment of a new legislation, the International Peace Support Act (see Table 5.1 below).

### Table 5.1: A Layout of the Legislations for Peace and Security (Source: Figure II. 3-2-1 of Defense of Japan 2016, p213)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>A</th>
<th>Peace and Security Legislation Development Act (partial amendments to the following existing laws)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Self-Defense Forces Act</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No.</td>
<td>Act Description</td>
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<td>----------------</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| 2   | International Peace Cooperation Act  
Act on Cooperation with United Nations Peacekeeping Operations and Other Operations |
| 3   | Act Concerning Measures to Ensure the Peace and Security of Japan in Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan → Changed to Act Concerning Measures to Ensure Peace and Security of Japan in Situations that will Have an Important Influence on Japan’s Peace and Security  
Act Concerning Measures to Ensure Peace and Security of Japan in Situations that will Have an Important Influence on Japan’s Peace and Security |
| 4   | Ship Inspection Operations Act  
Law Concerning Ship Inspection Operations in Situations that will Have an Important Influence on Japan’s Peace and Security and Other Situations |
| 5   | Armed Attack Situations Response Act  
Law for Ensuring Peace and Independence of Japan and Security of the State and the People in armed attack situations, etc., and Survived-Threatening Situation |
| 6   | U.S. Military Actions Related Measures Act → Changed to the U.S. and Others’ Military Actions Related Measures Act  
Law Concerning the Measures Conducted by the Government in Line with U.S. and Other Countries’ Military Actions in Armed Attack Situations, etc., and Survival-Threatening Situation |
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There were three salient features of the Package of Legislations for Peace and Security which were worthy of attention. It included the situations where SDF can use weapons, the responses of Japan in cases of an armed attack and the enhanced effort of Japan in international peacekeeping operations.

On the use of weapons of SDF, Article 94-5 of the SDF Law was amended to allow the SDF personnel, in addition to transportation, to use weapons to the extent reasonably necessary to implement rescue measures, to protect people’s lives, weapons and equipment (Ministry of Defence of Japan, 2016b, 214). In addition, the International Peace Cooperation Act was also
amended to expand the authority of the SDF personnel to use weapons for self-preservation, for *kaketsuke-keigo* operations and for the protection of lives and properties of themselves, while use of weapons in inflicting injury on a person is permitted for self-defence and a clear and present danger (Ministry of Defence of Japan, 2016b, 218). The scope where SDF can use weapons has thus been greatly expanded.

On the response of an armed attack on Japan, the Legislation for Responses to Armed Attack Situations has been expanded from situations of armed attack on Japan and an anticipated armed attack on Japan, to situations where “an armed attack against a foreign country that is in a close relationship with Japan occurs and as a result threatens Japan’s survival and poses a clear danger to fundamentally overturn people’s right to life, liberty and pursuit of happiness”. It thus expanded the scope of the Legislation for Responses to Armed Attack Situations enacted in the Koizumi administration from cases of self-defence to collective self-defence. The Law Concerning Measures to Ensure the Peace and Security of Japan in Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan was also amended, by revising the term “situations in areas surrounding Japan” to “situations that will have an important influence on Japan”. It thus removed a geographical concept and expanded the scope of the Act to all countries in the world which have an important influence on Japan. On the response action that Japan can take, the existing Act provided Japan can act in concert with U.S. Armed forces. The revised Act added armed forces of other foreign countries in attainment of the objectives of the U.N. Charter or other similar organizations. The scope of SDF was thus expanded to act in concert with other countries in addition to the U.S. ally (Ministry of Defence of Japan, 2016b, 216). These scenarios are instances of collective self-defence. The issue of collective self-defence was perhaps the most controversial part of the Package of Legislation for Peace and Security as it runs counter to previous government interpretation which forbade Japan from exercising the right of collective self-defence under Article 9 of the Constitution.

The third feature worthy of mention in the Package of Legislation for Peace and Security was the enhanced role of the SDF in international peacekeeping operations. The International Peace Support Act was newly enacted to enable Japan to conduct international peacekeeping operations in concert with armed forces of foreign countries with the aim of driving out the threat to international security collectively with other countries in accordance with the UN Charter (Ministry of Defence of Japan, 2016b, 221). The 1992 International Peace Cooperation Act was amended to enable Japan to contribute more proactively to international peace and
security. The existing legislation allowed Japan to participate in UN PKOs, International Humanitarian Relief Operations and International Election Observation Operations. It was amended to further allow Japan to participate in Internationally Coordinated Operations for Peace and Security upon resolutions by the General Assembly, the Security Council or the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations (Ministry of Defence of Japan, 2016b, 217).

5.2.5 Act on Punishment of the Preparation of Acts of Terrorism and Other Organized Crimes

In the wake of terrorist attacks in Britain, the G7 summit in 2017 called for more cooperation to combat against terrorism and extremism, in particular in relation to the UN Convention Against Organized Crime (G7, 2017). Japan enacted the anti-conspiracy law on June 15, 2017 as the “Act on Punishment of the Preparation of Acts of Terrorism and Other Organized Crimes,” establishing 277 criminal acts deter crimes planning terrorist attacks (Cabinet of Japan, 2017). On the date of the enactment of the Legislation, Prime Minister Abe expressed in the press release that the legislation was enacted as an attempt to ratify the UN Convention Against Organized Crime and to prepare for potential terrorist attacks in summer Olympics 2020 (Abe, 2017b). However, this legislation was very controversial and was passed amidst fierce opposition from opposition parties and human rights advocates as infringing the civil liberties of citizens such as privacy and freedom of speech. It has also been argued as Abe’s attempt to broaden state’s power and deter public opposition to government policies. After three futile attempts to pass the law, the government hardhandedly refrained from putting to vote in an upper house committee but instead resorted to a vote directly in the full upper house (Sieg, 2017).

5.2.6 Constitutional Revision of Article 9

Constitutional revision has always been on the agenda of Prime Minister Abe. During his first administration in 2007, the Japanese government has passed the law relating to the procedure for amending the Constitution of Japan (“National Referendum Law”) which became effective in 2010 (Government of Japan, 2010). It provided the first step towards constitutional revision.
During Abe’s second term in office in 2018, the Diet began debating further revisions to the National Referendum Law to address the practical issues in implementing national referendum (Government of Japan, 2010).

Before the start of the second Abe administration, the LDP published a draft Constitution in 2012. On revision of Article 9, the second limb was recommended to revise to allow Japan to engage in a war of self-defence. The draft further recommended an additional subsection 2 of Article 9 under the title of “national army”. The Prime Minister would be the Supreme Commander of the national army. The national army will be responsible for carrying out the defence activities as stipulated in Article 9 including international peace keeping provisions. Further, subsection 2 of Article 9 stipulates that the organization as well as punishment and disciplinary tribunal of the national army will be further provided for in national legislations. The draft recommended the addition of subsection 3 of Article 9 that provided that Japan strove to ensure the sovereignty and territorial integrity of land, sea and air of Japan (Liberal Democratic Party of Japan, 2012).

The 2012 LDP draft Constitution has been subject to much criticism and comment from academics and other political parties. On 13 June 2013, the LDP established the Constitutional Reform Promotion Headquarters to engage in the promotion and study of the constitutional reform initiatives. On 20 December 2017, the LDP Constitutional Reform Promotion Headquarters announced four items for constitutional revision, which covered Article 9, emergency provisions, electoral districts and education reform. On Article 9, it stated that there was a consensus that the Constitution should ensure the civilian control of the SDF but there was divergence of views on whether (1) keeping Article 9 intact while expressly providing for the existence of SDF; or (2) delete paragraph 2 of Article 9 while providing for the objectives and character of the SDF (Liberal Democratic Party of Japan, 2017b).

On 3 May 2017, the 70th anniversary of the 1947 Constitution, Prime Minister Abe said in a video message in a political event, that Japan has a plan to revise the Constitution by 2020. He emphasized in particular that the status of SDF should be expressly recognized in the revised Constitution so that it will silence the long standing debate that the SDF is unconstitutional (Osaki and Kikuchi, 2017). Since the video message, Japan has had a clear timeline to revise the Constitution by 2020.
On 22 March 2018, the Headquarters for the Promotion of Revision to the Constitution of the LDP, by majority votes, approved a proposal to revise Article 9, which would insert a clause to Article 9 that the SDF shall be maintained for Japan to take necessary self-defence measures while keeping second paragraph of Article 9 intact (Mainichi Shimbun, 2018). In December 2018, the LDP has originally plans to present the draft constitutional proposal to the Diet but such plan was later abandoned due to the opposition from Komeito and the opposition parties of constitutional amendment. Prime Minister Abe nevertheless maintained his determination to pursue constitutional revision by 2020 (Tomoko, 2018).

Since late 2019, the world including Japan has been plagued by COVID-19 pandemic, thus the government has been preoccupied with dealing with the pandemic but it does not mean that the Abe government has abandoned its plan for constitutional amendment. On 3 May 2020, the 73rd anniversary of the enactment of the Constitution, Prime Minister Abe while lamenting the inability to amend the Constitution by 2020, did not have any wavering of his resolve to amend the Constitution during his tenure which will expire in September 2021 (The Japan Times, 2020a).

Abe’s dream of constitutional revision received renewed attention with the surprised announcement by Defense Minister Taro Kono on 15 June 2020 that Japan decided to suspend the deployment of U.S.-made Aegis Ashore missile defense systems. Such decision for deployment was made in 2017 as part of the overall national’s defense shield against the growing threat from the nuclear-armed North Korea (The Japan Times, 2020b). In view of the decision to abandon the deployment of Aegis Ashore missile defense systems, the government began to review its national security policy to counteract the threat from North Korea, among which Abe hinted at the possibility of allowing Japan to ability to conduct preemptive strike which would require revising Article 9 of the Constitution.

At the time of writing, the agenda for constitutional revision was overshadowed by the COVID-19 pandemic. It is still premature to conjecture whether constitutional revision could become a reality during the second Abe administration, suffice to say that it is still on the top of the mind of Prime Minister Abe and the ruling LDP.
5.3 Application of Neoclassical Realism and the Hilsman’s Model

According to the neoclassical realist perspective, acts of a nation were driven by the international structural factors to begin with, although domestic factors intervene in the policy-making decision process. For the sake of survival, each state strives to enhance its own security in the face of external threats. A state will enhance military buildup or form alliances with other countries to counterbalance the external threats. The precarious international environment surrounding Japan during the second Abe administration has set the scene for Abe to initiate a series of national security initiatives which culminated in the enactment of Legislations for Peace and Security, which in effect allowed Japan to exercise the right of collective self-defence. Hence, Japan can enhance her role by shouldering corresponding responsibility as a partner of the U.S.-Japan Security Alliance, which in turn will increase the deterrence capability against the external threats. Japan is marching a giant step to be a normal country.

5.3.1 International Structural Factors

In the Diet debates of the establishment of the National Security Council and the Legislation for Peace and Security, the Japanese government has cited the intense international security environment as the motivating factor and background for the enactment of the respective legislations (House of Representatives of Japan, 2013c, 5; 2015a, 3). The international security threat surrounding Japan has intensified during the second Abe Administration. The first and foremost issue was the China’s military and territorial assertion in the South and East China Sea as well as the military and naval advancement of China, which pose increasing threats to the status quo and balance of power in East Asia. The second related issue was the shifting balance of power in East Asia with the rise of China and other regional powers in the place of U.S. hegemony. The third issue was the North Korea’s repeated testing of missiles and nuclear tests during the Kim Jong-un leadership. The fourth factor was the increasing incidences of terrorism which threatened Japan’s national security. The last issue worth mentioning was the changing role of the UN peacekeeping forces which in turn demanded an enhanced role of the SDF.

The threat from China could be vividly seen in the territorial dispute between China and Japan in the Senkaku islands. Just before Abe became Prime Minister for the second time in 2012,
Japanese government nationalized the Senkaku islands which in turn stirred the Chinese government to send government vessels to seas around Japanese territorial waters. It amounted to 20 in 2012 but rose to 52 times in 2013 (Japan Times, 2017). The frequent intrusion of Chinese ships to Japanese territorial waters has intensified the alarm and threat to Japanese national security. Moreover, in 2013, China unilaterally established an air defence identification zone over the East China Sea covering the air over the disputed Senkaku islands (BBC, 2013). In 2015 and 2016, the Chinese navy repeatedly navigated the waters around the Senkaku islands (Ministry of Defence of Japan, 2017, 99). These Chinese actions intensified the sense of insecurity of Japan.

In fact, China’s territorial ambition could also be seen in her claim over the islands in the South China Sea. In the Arbitral Award of the Claim by the Philippines over the disputed territorial dispute with China, it referred to submissions by the Philippines that China has established a presence in Subi Reef in the Spratly Islands in the South China Sea since 1989. China’s dredging work of the Reef intensified in 2014 and by the end of 2015, China has built an artificial island over most of the Reef (Permanent Court of Arbitration, 2016, 350). In 2018, there was a news report that China has completed the establishment of military and naval facilities in seven disputed islands in the South China Sea (Straits Times, 2018). China’s ambition in the disputed islands in the South China Sea has increased the threat perception of Japan against further moves by China in the bilateral territorial dispute in the Senkaku islands.

Apart from territorial claims, the technological and military advancement of China has been viewed with suspicion from neighbouring countries which may affect the balance of power in East Asia and U.S. supremacy in the region. On the 70th anniversary of the end of WWII in 2015, China exhibited her military might by organizing a military parade of more than 12,000 troops with tanks and missile launchers, though with a promise by President Xi Jinping that China planned to cut 13% of armed forces (approximately 300,000) from a military of more than two million members as a gesture that China aimed at peaceful development (New York Times, 2015). In the 2017 military parade which marked the 90th anniversary of the People’s Liberation Army, China showed to the world its latest weapons such as its own nuclear warhead-capable intercontinental ballistic missiles and newest generation stealth fighter (Jiang, 2017). Action speaks louder than words. The “action” of China in its military development and territorial claims ring much louder in the minds of the Japanese than the “words” of Xi Jinping of “peaceful development” of China.
As commented by Paul Kennedy in his book “The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers”, the rise of great powers was heralded by economic shifts, which will gradually translate itself into a military power (Kennedy, 1988, 20). In 2017, China is the world second largest economy with a projected average economic growth of 6.4% from 2016 to 2017 (IMF, 2017). The economic rise of China can also be evidenced by the China-led AIIB which, as commented by Katsuya Okada, a former head of the DPJ, showed that China has risen not only as a great and influential economic power but also entered on the international stage (The Foreign Correspondents’ Club of Japan, 2015). The economic and military power of China did threaten the U.S. hegemony, despite the comment by the then President of the United States, Barack Obama that, “America must always lead on the world stage. If we don’t, no one else will.” (The White House, 2014) With the rise of China, the balance of power in East Asia is gradually shifting towards China. The threat perception of the Japanese against China meant that Japan’s dependence only on the United States may not be sufficient to secure her own national security, hence strengthening Japan’s own national security measures were the means to safeguard her national interests.

In the case of China, the power and grip of the President Xi Jinping has been greatly consolidated and strengthened with the constitutional amendment on 11 March 2018. The National People’s Congress of China passed a historical constitutional amendment by removing the two-term limit on the presidency introduced by the late Deng Xiaoping in 1982 (South China Morning Post, 2018). The leadership of Xi was further exhibited by the inclusion in the preamble of the Constitution “Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era” as one of the guiding ideologies behind following “Marxism-Leninism, Mao Zedong Thought, and Deng Xiaoping Theory” (Li, 2018). The constitutional amendment also added to the preamble the goal of “peaceful development path” and “mutually beneficial strategy of opening-up”. On foreign policy, the Constitution continued to provide, un-amended, that China adhered to the principles of mutual respect for sovereignty, territorial integrity and non-aggression. China opposed any kind of imperialism or hegemony (Xinhua, 2018a). The leadership of China after the 2018 Constitutional amendment has been much strengthened such that President Xi can continue to carry out a persistent foreign policy without the worry of change of leaders. It is without doubt that only stable leadership can lead to coherent and forward-looking policies.
In 2020, in view of the looming China threat and North Korea provocativeness, Japan welcomed the opportunity to join the Five Eyes alliance to gather more intelligence information to counteract China and North Korea. The Five Eyes was formed in 1941 immediately after WWII to provide a platform for intelligence sharing which included Australia, Britain, Canada, New Zealand and the U.S. It was expanded as “Five Eyes plus” upon the inclusion of Japan, South Korea and France to gather more intelligence information on China’s growing military assertiveness and North Korea nuclear preparedness (Ryall, 2020).

The power balance in East Asia is thus much more tilted towards China. Hence, the threat from a strong China persisted and may exceed the perception during the enactment of the Legislation for Peace and Security. It provided justification of the second Abe administration for constitutional revision to enhance deterrence capability of Japan against increasingly severe external security environment.

Ranking next to, if not before, the threat from China was the threat from North Korea. Since Kim Jong-Un became the leader in 2011, North Korea has been more provocative than his father’s regime. In the official publication “Defence of Japan” by Ministry of Defence of Japan in 2017, North Korea ranked just behind the United States as the second most important international factor affecting Japanese national security (Ministry of Defence of Japan, 2017). Since Kim Jong-un came into power in 2011, North Korea had fired a total of 89 missiles testing before November 2017, which far exceeded the total of 16 missiles fired during the 18-year rule under the leadership of former leader Kim Jong-il (Berlinger, 2017). The range of ballistic missiles has been increased over the years, with the one in 2017 claiming to reach as far as the whole of the mainland of the United States (USA Today, 2017). In 2017, North Korea fired two intermediate range ballistic missiles over Japan (BBC, 2017a). As of March 2018, the Kim Jong-un regime also conducted a total of four nuclear tests. (BBC, 2017b).

In the face of the North Korea nuclear and missile threats, Prime Minister Abe has characterized it as the greatest danger facing Japan since WWII (Independent, 2018). It thus provided a justification for Prime Minister Abe to introduce measures to allow Japan to exercise the right of collective self-defence and to revise the Constitution. However, it is worthy to note the comment from Prof Atsuhito Isozaki, an associate professor of North Korean studies at Keio University. He pointed out at a seminar of the Foreign Correspondents’ Club of Japan that the North Korean threat may have been exaggerated by the media and Prime
Minister Abe himself (The Foreign Correspondents’ Club of Japan, 2017). He in particular noted the fact that it was Prime Minister Abe instead of Minister of Defence or Foreign Affairs who was the one to voice out the gravity of the threat in response of the North Korea nuclear testing. In the view of Prof Isozaki, the North Korean threat was more a heightened sense of threat than the reality. It was at the opportune moment when Abe pushed forward his Legislation for Peace and Security that the North Korean threat was intense which thus provided the justification or an “excuse” for Abe to put forward the Legislation for Peace and Security.

2018 also witnessed an unexpected turn of events in the North Korea diplomacy. There were new developments in the relationship of North Korea with South Korea and the world. Kim Jong-un sent his sister, Kim Yo-jong and a cheerleading team to the winter Olympics in 2018 (The Guardian, 2018). Prior to that, there were also brief meetings and exchanges between the two Koreas. This tiny diplomatic gesture on the part of North Korea has ended the years of its isolation from the world scene except for repeated news of firing missiles and nuclear tests, though such effort was not viewed with optimism as Guardian newspaper labelled it as ‘charm offensive’, characterizing it as more ‘offensive’ than charm (The Guardian, 2018).

Another new development in the North Korea nuclear threat was the first ‘unofficial’ overseas visit of Kim Jong-un to China in March 2018 (Xinhua, 2018b). This showed the resumption of close relationship between China and North Korea and the unwavering influence of China in the issue of denuclearization of North Korea. At the meeting with President Xi Jinping, Kim said North Korea aimed at denuclearization of the Peninsula in accordance with the will of the late President Kim Il-sung. Kim also said there were plans for peace talks and development of a relationship of cooperation and reconciliation between North and South Koreas. There were also plans for a summit between Kim Jong-un and President Donald Trump of the United States and President Moon Jae-in of South Korea (Xinhua, 2018b). Japan also suggested a meeting with North Korea in June 2018 (Kikuchi, 2018). On 21 April 2018, North Korea issued a statement that it would no longer conduct missile or nuclear tests but instead pursue economic growth as it had already achieved its goal of developing the weapons (Soyoung Kim, 2018). These were signs for a favourable turn of the North Korea denuclearization issue and easing the tensions in East Asia. A Japanese news commentary remarked the China-North Korea bilateral meeting as a means for China to assume a larger role in world diplomacy in competition with the United States (Yomiuri Shimbun, 2018). The threat perception of North
Korea on Japan has been aggravated by this visit of Kim as North Korea seemed to be receiving support and backup from China, a more tangible threat to Japan.

However, the second summit between Trump and Kim in February 2019 ended without any agreement on denuclearization or the sanctions on North Korea. The North Korea issue was further aggravated in 2020 as the relationship between North and South Korea turned sour again owing to the news that activists sent leaflets with anti-North Korean messages over the border of the two Koreas, spurring anger of the North Korea leader to blow up the inter-Korean liaison office in June 2020 (BBC, 2020). Though North Korea announced suspension of any military action against South Korea on the eve of the 70th anniversary of the outbreak of the Korean War in June 2020 in an attempt to de-escalate North-South tensions, the issue of the North Korean threat has been a persistent headache pointing at the heart of the national security of Japan during the second Abe administration (Kim, 2020).

Another threat to Japan’s national security during the second Abe administration was the increasing incidences of terrorism. For example, Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) continued to remain active in 2017 (Sanchez, 2017). Though terrorism happened mostly in the Middle East countries, in recent years, there were cases of terrorism in European countries, such as the terrorist attacks in Paris in 2015 and 2017, as well as those in London Bridge and Manchester in 2017 (Foster, 2017). Acts of terrorists have spread from Middle East countries to European countries, so protection against terrorism is an international concern for all countries around the world, including Japan.

Finally, the enactment of the package of national security initiatives can also be attributed to the demand of the international community for Japan to contribute more proactively to the international security and UN peacekeeping activities. The UN peacekeeping operations were traditionally about observing ceasefires. After the Cold War, the concept of ‘peace building” was developed which aimed at the preservation of peace and the prevention of future conflicts. In the early 1990s, UN actively sought peace in areas which have not cease-fired. This phrase is known as “peace enforcement”. The current phrase of UN peacekeeping activities developed from the late 1990s was known as “integrated peacekeeping” in which the UN peacekeeping forces played the role of transitional governments in post-conflict areas (Tochibayashi, 2012). The changing role of the UN peacekeeping activities hence demanded different roles of
Japanese SDF, which in turn justified the exercise of collective self-defence and enhanced SDF’s role in peacekeeping operations.

The above international structural factors have been cited by Prime Minister Abe and his Cabinet as the international imperatives motiving the enactment of the package of national security initiatives culminating in the promulgation of the Legislation for Peace and Security legitimizing the right of collective self-defence. According to the theory of neoclassical realism, the international structural factors provided the underlying motivating driving force while the domestic variables have contributed to the enactment of the relevant policy goal. The following section will examine the domestic variables driving the package of national security initiatives of the second Abe administration.

5.3.2 Domestic Variables

In addition to the primary force of the international structural factors, the package of national security initiatives under the second Abe administration were also driven by domestic variables. Prime Minister Shinzō Abe himself was the main architect of the package of national security initiatives. According to the Hilsman’s circle of influence, Prime Minister is at the innermost centre wielding the greatest influence. Hence, in the analysis of the domestic variable, it will start with an analysis of Prime Minister Abe who has inherited the legacy of constitutional revision from his grandfather Nobusuke Kishi and was strongly influenced by the right-wing organization Nippon Kaigi. After analyzing the influence of Prime Minister, it will then understand the views of the political elite which are at the second to fourth layers of the concentric circle of influence under the Hilsman’s model.

5.3.2.1 Prime Minister

(1) Ideology of Prime Minister Abe

Shinzō Abe entered the field of politics first as a secretary of his father, Shintaro Abe, who served as Minister of Foreign Affairs from 1982 to 1986. As a secretary, he travelled to various countries with his father and gained real life experiences as a politician in handling foreign affairs. In 1993, he was elected as a member of the House of Representatives and gradually
climbed the political ladder before he became Prime Minister for the first time in 2006 and the second time in 2012.

Prime Minister Shinzō Abe, before becoming Prime Minister for the first term, said that Japan should exercise the right of collective self-defence. In his co-authored book with Hisahiko Okazaki, “The Will to Protect this Country” published in 2004, he spent a whole chapter discussing the U.S.-Japan Security Alliance and the right of collective self-defence. He stressed that the U.S.-Japan Alliance was of utmost importance to Japan’s security (Abe, 2004b, 57). He labelled it not as a military alliance but ‘an alliance of blood’ (‘chi no domei’). In the case of an attack of Japan, American soldiers may shed their blood to protect Japan but Japan did not have a corresponding obligation to protect the United States (Abe, 2004b, 63). Abe reiterated that Article 51 of the UN Charter provides that UN members enjoyed the right of self-defence and collective self-defence (Abe, 2004b, 75). However, Japan was constitutionally constrained from exercising the right of collective self-defence, thus the Alliance is not an equal partnership. Hence, Abe said in his book that for the U.S-Japan Security Alliance to persist, it was important to increase the bilateral obligations, in particular the right of collective self-defence (Abe, 2004b, 63). Abe further mentioned that one important theme of Japan’s security was the missile defence system. He took the metaphor of Japan’s SDF as a ‘shield’ and the United States as the ‘spear’. In the case of an attack on Japan, it was mainly the SDF which strove to dispel the attack while the United States could use its military bases in Japan to help Japan to drive out the attack (Abe, 2004b, 92).

In 2013, Abe published a revised version of the book “Towards a Beautiful Country (utsukushii kuni e), known as “Towards a New Country” (atarashii kuni e). On the right of collective self-defence, Abe disagreed that it would make Japan subordinated to the United States. Instead, he maintained that it would make Japan an equal partner of the United States and hence strengthened the deterrence capability of the U.S.-Japan Security Alliance (Abe, 2013a). Abe stressed the importance of the United States to the national security of Japan because Japan was unable to protect herself with her own hands. When considering the nuclear deterrence and the stability of the Far East, the United States partner became indispensable, not only in terms of her international influence and economic power, but also in terms of her military power most importantly (Abe, 2013a).
It can be seen that back to the time before Abe became Prime Minister for the first time, he believed in the indispensable importance of the United States to Japan’s national security. In order to enhance the functionality and mutual obligations of the U.S.-Japan Security Alliance, Japan must exercise the right of collective self-defence. Such target was rooted in his mind but it took years until his second term as the Prime Minister that this objective was achieved by the enactment of the Legislation for Peace and Security.

In the beginning of the second Abe administration on 22 February 2013, he delivered a speech with the title “Japan is back”, in which he elaborated his vision for Japan during his second administration (Abe, 2013b). He first emphasized that Japan is not a second-tier country. Abe envisioned three major tasks for Japan. First, Japan would be a more proactive rules promotor in the realms such as trade, investment and environment in the Asia-Pacific region. Second, Japan would continue to safeguard and contribute to the pursuit of the global commons for the benefit of the world. Thirdly, Japan would work closely with the democracies around the world, including but not limited to the United States, South Korea and Australia (Abe, 2013b). Abe has a vision to bring Japan back to the international stage with pride and prestige.

On the day of the delivery of the Report of the Advisory Panel on Reconstruction of the Legal Basis for Security on 15 May 2014, Abe held a press conference in which he reiterated that the intense international security environment in the South China Sea, East China Sea and the North Korea missile threat necessitated Japan to take more measures for its own security. He stated that it is no longer possible for any country to secure its own safety by itself. Thus, Abe said that the security agenda of Japan should be “proactive contribution to peace” by which he meant that Japan should work more closely and seamlessly with her United States ally and other democracies in contributing to the promotion of peace and stability in the world (Abe, 2014). To Abe, ‘deterrence’ is the main theme for the Legislation for Peace and Security. Instead of labelling the Legislation for Peace and Security by some as a ‘war legislation’, Abe defended the legislation as having deterrence capability and hence would prevent war conflict and Japan’s risk of embroilment into war will be eliminated (Abe, 2014).

As agreed by all my interviewees, the Legislation for Peace and Security would not have been passed but for Abe being the Prime Minister at the opportune moment when LDP-coalition government controlled majority in both Houses of the Diet. The public poll of Abe remained relatively high during the early periods of his administration. It was peaked at 76% in Nikkei
poll (Figure 5-2) and 68% in Asahi national poll (Figure 5-1) during the early months of the administration in April 2013. The high support rate provided a favourable climate for the government to put forward the Legislation for Peace and Security. In the period between the announcement of the 2014 Cabinet Decision in July 2014 and the enactment of the Legislation for Peace and Security in September 2015, the average support rate of Abe was maintained at 48% in Nikkei poll (Figure 5-2) and 44% in Asahi Poll (Figure 5-1). The support rating of Abe was able to be kept at slightly below 50% even when there was a record high crowd of protests in Tokyo in 2015 after the passing of the Legislation for Peace and Security by the Lower House. This showed that there was in fact not a small number of the public showing support for the general administration and policies of the Abe administration (Takenaka, 2015).

No government can put forward important policies without a stable leadership. In the six years before the second Abe administrations, there have been six Japanese Prime Ministers. The frequent changes in the top leadership and hence the reshuffling of the Cabinet has made it practically impossible for Japan to deliver important policy change such as constitutional revision. Shinzō Abe is the longest postwar serving Prime Minister which provides a favourable domestic climate for Abe to pursue his vision for constitutional revision (Murakami, 2019).

In relation to the proposed constitutional revision of 2020, the role of Shinzō Abe himself in pushing for constitutional revision is widely known. Practically all respondents in my interview agreed with the indispensable role of Abe in contributing to the initiative to push forward constitutional revision, without whom constitutional revision would not be on the top agenda since Abe came into office for the second time as the Prime Minister.

Abe seized every opportunity to voice out his views on constitutional revision even before he became the Prime Minister. When Abe was serving as the Secretary General of the LDP during the Koizumi administration in 2004, he made a speech in American Enterprise Institute about the U.S.-Japan relationship, in which he elaborated three reasons for the need for constitutional revision. First, the Constitution was drafted by the Allied Powers in a few days, thus it was without ‘historical justification’. Second, he thought that the Constitution, in particular Article 9, did not keep pace with the contemporary security development, with the result that Japan was handicapped from securing its own safety. Thirdly, Abe claimed that Japan must enact a new Constitution with her own hands after the dawn of a new century (Abe, 2004a).
According to Article 96 of the Constitution, amendment of the Constitution needs to be initiated by two-thirds majority votes of both Houses of the Diet and be ratified by a majority votes of the public referendum. The first hurdle of two-thirds majority in both Houses of the Diet has never been achieved until the upper House election in 2016 when the LDP ruling coalition was able to achieve two-thirds majority in both Houses of the Diet (Osaki, 2016b). It was against this political environment that the initiative of constitutional revision could move closer to success.

The task of constitutional revision was daunting not only because of the procedural hurdle stipulated by Article 96 of the Constitution, but also because it required stamina and will of the Prime Minister. The promulgation of the National Security Council in 2013 has led to better coordination and planning of national security strategy of Japan. As the Prime Minister was the head of the Council and there were four-minister meetings among the Prime Minister, Chief Cabinet Secretary and the Ministers of Defence and Foreign Affairs, the influence of Prime Minister on national security policy has been greatly enhanced (Cabinet of Japan, 2013).

Cabinet Human Resources Bureau established within the Cabinet in 2014 was another means to consolidate and strengthen the power of the Prime Minister. The Law to Partially Revise the Law of Public Servants provided that the Ministers and high ranking officials have to undertake ‘eligibility screening’ by the Prime Minister who has the power to determine the appointment and dismissal of top ranking officials (Cabinet of Japan, 2014b). This legislation thus further strengthened the cohesion of the top ranking officials, and Abe as the Prime Minister can better exercise his own preferred policies because he retained the power of appointment and dismissal.

The domestic policy making environment during the second Abe administration empowered the Prime Minister and his Cabinet to pursue policies desired by the Prime Minister with ease. The high popularity of Prime Minister Abe during the early Abe administration has ensured his stable and long leadership which provided another fertile ground for him to pursue the dream of constitutional revision.

(2) Influence of Nobusuke Kishi on Prime Minister Abe
A discussion of the role and ideology of Abe cannot be fully comprehended without an understanding of the political history and vision of Nobusuke Kishi, the grandfather of Abe who has enduring influence on the political thought and ideology on Abe. In a meeting between Eiji Ooshita, a book author, and Abe’s mother, she commented that Abe resembled very much Kishi in his policy and has the character of his father, Shintaro Abe (Ooshita, 2013, 5). Both in the political circle and the minds of the Japanese general public, it is a well-known fact that Prime Minister Abe is the grandson of Kishi Nobusuke, a former Prime Minister (1957-1960) and a Class A war criminal of WWII. In all the interviews that I conducted, all the interviewees agreed that Abe was heavily influenced by Kishi in his move to initiate constitutional revision.

Kishi was a graduate of the Law School of Tokyo Imperial University (currently University of Tokyo). He was influenced by then university constitutional scholar Shinkichi Uesugi who believed in imperial sovereignty theory and joined the Thursday Club (Mokuyobi Kai), which was the origin of a right-wing student movement (Ooshita, 2013, 58). Upon graduation, he entered the Ministry of Agriculture and Commerce. In 1936, he was dispatched to Manchu and was one of the highest ranking officials during the Manchukuo government (Asahi Shimbun, 2016, 13). In the International Military Tribunal for the Far East in 1946, it held that the Manchu incident was an act of aggression of Japan so Kishi was kept in custody as a Class A criminal in Sugamo for three years but was finally released without being charged. In the minds of Kishi, it was a prejudicial view of the victorious countries in WWII that the Manchu incident was an act of aggression (Asahi Shimbun, 2016, 20, 28). In this respect, Abe held different views from Kishi. In response to a question of the Kono statement which maintained that Japan committed acts of aggression in WWII, Abe said that it did not maintain that Japan has not committed aggression and that Japan deeply feels the pain of the suffering of the comfort women but he said he did not want the issue to be politicized (Abe, 2013c).

After Kishi was released from the prison in Sugamo, he gradually climbed the political ladder and ultimately became the Prime Minister in 1957. Kishi has a notorious nickname of “Monster of the Era of Showa” (Showa no Yokai) (Kiyohara, 2015, 3). His most controversial move was the 1960 revision of the Security Treaty between the United States and Japan “Anpo Treaty”, first signed in 1951, which triggered a mass protest (Sasaki-Uemura, 2001, 16). The opposition party, Socialist Party, opposed the revision as it would put Japan in a position of subservience to the United States (Sasaki-Uemura, 2001, 18). The original Anpo Treaty was signed in September 1951 when the San Francisco Peace Treaty was signed. It aimed at disarming Japan
and provided for the stationing of U.S. military in Japanese soil while Japan did not have a reciprocal obligation to the U.S. According to the former Anpo, it had no fixed duration and the U.S. also had the power to quell domestic unrests in Japan. It was this provision, in particular, which incurred criticism from Japan that it was an intrusion of sovereignty or an unequal treaty (Nakajima, 2017). In the 1960 revision of the Anpo, the controversial provision of U.S. power to quell domestic unrest was removed. The most important revision was Article 6, which provided that the U.S. was not only responsible for the defense of Japan but was also for the international peace and security in the Far East (Governments of Japan and the United States of America, 1960b). It thus raised the concern of the risk of Japan being embroiled in a U.S.-led war. However, for Kishi, it was more the fear of the former Soviet Union than the United States. The former Soviet Union proposed to divide Japan into U.S. and Soviet zones in post-WWII but such suggestion was opposed by the United States, so it was necessary for Japan to have the military backup from the United States in order to withstand the power of the former Soviet Union (Ooshita, 2013, 63-64).

Constitutional revision was the ultimate, but regrettably unfinished, lifetime political goal of Kishi. In an article titled “For the realization of a really independent Japan” (Shin no dokuritsu no nihon no tame ni), Kishi expressed his own views on constitutional revision in an article. To Kishi, the Constitution was imposed by the Supreme Commander of the Occupied Forces. The text of the Constitution was an English translation. Hence, Japan must grab the Constitution with her own hands so as to regain her self-esteem and independence as a nation (Asahi Shimbun, 2016, 32). Kishi was apparently aiming at Article 9 of the Constitution. In his article, Kishi also said that it was a natural obligation of an independent nation to exercise the right of defence with her own hands. The stationing of a foreign army in Japan and the reliance of another country for national defence was incompatible with the image of an independent country (Asahi Shimbun, 2016, 33) To Kishi, it was only through a constitutional revision which legitimized the possession of a defence army that can bring back an independent Japan.

In an interview between Kishi and Etsuko Kaji in the 1980s which was transcribed in a book by Hideaki Kase, Kishi in his own words commented on the 1960 revision of Anpo Treaty and constitutional revision (Kase, 2016) On the 1960 revision of the Anpo Treaty, he said it was one of his ‘decisive moves’ (“ketsudan”) as a Prime Minister. To Kishi, the Anpo is not only a military cooperation between Japan and the United States, but also a cooperation in other areas

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like political, economic and cultural areas. He said that for the protection of a nation, it was necessary to have a prosperous country with strong economic power such that Japan could develop its power of national defense (Kase, 2016, 153-154). On constitutional revision, Kishi said it demands strong resolve of the government and it was a task that needs to be done sometime later. Kishi opined that the current Constitution was imposed by the United States. In particular, Article 9 of the Constitution which made it unconstitutional for Japan to have a SDF. It was only through a constitutional interpretation that the SDF could be interpreted as constitutional but it has the adverse effect of impinging the supremacy of the Constitution, thus he thought it was necessary to amend the Constitution instead (Kase, 2016, 156).

Kishi was so adamant about constitutional revision that he was the chairperson of two organizations pushing for constitutional revision: “An Alliance of Diet Members for the Achievement of an Independent Constitution” (Jishu Kenpo Kisei Giin Domei) and “National Conference of the Enactment of an Independent Constitution” (Jishu Kenpo Seitei Kokumin Kaigi) (Kiyohara, 2015, 4). An Alliance of Diet Members for the Achievement of an Independent Constitution was formed by members of the Liberal Party and Democratic Party in 1955 which aspired for constitutional revision, just prior to the formation of the LDP in the same year. Hence, “an independent Constitution” was the spirit of the LDP. Inspired by An Alliance of Diet Members for the Achievement of an Independent Constitution, National Conference of the Enactment of an Independent Constitution was formed in 1969 (Kiyohara, 2015, 42). In 2007 during the first Abe administration, the word “Independent Constitution” in the name of these two organizations were replaced as “New Constitution” It has annual meeting on 3 May which was the day when the Constitution was promulgated in 1947. It also has monthly seminars on various topics of constitutional revision attended by Diet members and constitutional scholars known as “Seminar for the Enactment of a New Constitution” (Atarashi Kenpo wo Tsukuru Kenkyukai) (National Conference for the Enactment of a New Constitution, 2018).

The book of Kiyohara has a collection of the reports of the National Conference dated back to the time when Kishi was the chairperson. In the opening speech, Kishi, the chairperson at 13th annual National Conference, said that the Constitution should be based on the history, tradition and culture of a nation. He said that Japan needed an independent Constitution with four main spirits, pacifism, liberalism, democracy and the respect of basic human rights. A revised
Constitution should be drafted with these four fundamental spirits, together with the Japanese spirit (Kiyohara, 2015, 58).

Though constitutional revision remained an unfinished business during the lifetime of Kishi and even now, Kishi’s initiative of constitutional revision was kept alive by generations of LDP politicians, the aforesaid two constitutional revision organizations, and more importantly by his grandson, Shinzō Abe, who worked very hard at achieving constitutional revision during his term as Prime Minister.

Abe was the first Japanese Prime Minister who was born after WWII but the goal of constitutional revision has deep roots in his mind. Abe was only six years old when his grandfather Kishi negotiated the revision of the Anpo in 1960 against the backdrop of a crowd of demonstration of around three hundred and thirty thousand people. When Abe asked his grandfather of the reason of so many people voicing out “Against Anpo”, Kishi replied that the Anpo is a Treaty that the United States protected Japan and he did not understand the reason why people are against it. Kishi aimed at negotiating a more equal treaty which is the prerequisite of an independent country (Abe, 2013a). Hence, long before Abe began his political career, the importance of the U.S.-Japan Security Alliance and constitutional revision formed one of the core agendas of Abe.

(3) Influence of Nippon Kaigi on Prime Minister Abe

In addition to the influence of Kishi, “Nippon Kaigi” (Japan Conference), the largest right-wing organization in Japan was also highly influential in Abe’s political thought. Prime Minister Shinzō Abe was closely affiliated with Nippon Kaigi as a special adviser (Yamazaki, 2016, 27). In the interviews that I conducted, most of the interviewees said that they do not have sufficient information to comment on the Nippon Kaigi and how it influenced Abe or vice versa. There is an interviewee who is both a member of Nippon Kaigi as well as another right-wing organization known as Sousei Nippon but the precondition of the interview was that he would not answer any questions related to Nippon Kaigi. Hence, I was unable to collect any direct views from members of the Nippon Kaigi or other relevant people on what the organization is like. Hence, I can only rely on secondary sources such as the official website and the monthly publication of Nippon Kaigi known as “Nippon no Ibuki” (Nippon Kaigi, 2018b).
There are also newspapers, magazines and books which discussed the Nippon Kaigi organization during the second Abe administration in Japanese and in English (The Economist, 2013). The western perception of Nippon Kaigi was that it was an extreme right-wing revisionist organization. In 2013, the United States Congress Research Service mentioned for the first time Nippon Kaigi in its publication on “Japan-U.S. Relations: Issues for Congress”. It said that

“Among the positions advocated by these groups, such as Nippon Kaigi Kyokai, are that Japan should be applauded for liberating much of East Asia from Western colonial powers, that the 1946-1948 Tokyo War Crimes tribunals were illegitimate, and that the killings by Imperial Japanese troops during the 1937 “Nanjing massacre” were exaggerated or fabricated.” (Congress Research Service, 2013, 8)

Nippon Kaigi was established in 1997. Its ideological roots can be traced back to two religious groups known as Seicho no Ie and Jinja Honcho. The organization Nippon Kaigi was established in 1997 through the merger of two groups known as Nihon o Mamoru Kai and Nihon o Mamoru Kokumin Kaigi (Mizohata, 2016, 1). Just before the official establishment of the Nippon Kaigi in 1997, there was the inauguration of the “Nippon Kaigi Diet Members Group” (Nippon Kaigi Kokumin Kaigi Kondan Kai). In the same year, “Nippon Kaigi Local Councillors Alliance” (Nippon Kaigi Chiho Giin Renmei) was established. As of 2016, Nippon Kaigi has nation-wide members of around 38,000 while the Nippon Kaigi Diet Members Group has 300 Diet Members, which accounted for around 42 percent of all Diet Members (Yamazaki, 2016, 27-28). As of 2015, Nippon Kaigi Local Councillors Alliance has 1692 Councillor members. As of 2016, sixteen out of the twenty Cabinet members of the Abe administration belonged to Nippon Kaigi Diet Members Group, which was around 80% (Tawara, 2016, 4); (Yamazaki, 2016, 27-28). There were three scholars who, during a Diet session, agreed that the Legislation for Peace and Security which allowed Japan to exercise the right of collective self-defence was constitutional. They were all members of the Nippon Kaigi (Tashiro, 2016, 24). The influence of Nippon Kaigi on the Abe initiative to promulgate the Legislation for Peace and Security and constitutional revision was apparent.

According to the website of Nippon Kaigi, it has the following six objectives:
1. A beautiful tradition of the national character for Japan’s future
2. A new constitution suitable for the new era
3. Politics that protect the country’s reputation and the people’s lives
4. Creating education that fosters Japanese sensibility
5. Contributing to world peace by enhancing national security
6. Friendship with the world tied up with a spirit of co-existence and co-prosperity

(English Translation adapted from Mizohata’s article (Mizohata, 2016, 3-4))

On the first objective of Nippon Kaigi, its website elaborated that it respected the long and beautiful tradition of Japan under the reign of the Emperor who is the 125th Emperor as of 2018. Nippon Kaigi aimed at preserving the beautiful tradition and culture of Japan with the Emperor at the centre (Nippon Kaigi, 2018a).

The second objective of Nippon Kaigi deserved attention. According to the official elaboration of the second objective in the website of Nippon Kaigi, the 1947 Constitution was drafted by the Occupied Forces in a week. It pointed out several deficiencies of the Constitution such as the dependence of a foreign power for national defence hence losing independence; the imbalance of rights and obligations, disrespect of the family system, and the separation of the country and religion. In more than sixty years after the promulgation of the Constitution, Nippon Kaigi viewed that new issues such as the need for international cooperation and environmental protection made it necessary to amend the Constitution to be fully reflected in the revised text (Nippon Kaigi, 2018a).

The fifth objective of the Nippon Kaigi was also relevant for the current discussion as it related to national security. The official website elaborated this objective as the need for Japan to wake up from the dream of “one country pacifism” to taking national security in her own hands. Nippon Kaigi recognized the threat from the military modernization of China and the missile threats from North Korea on the peace and security in Asia Pacific. It also applauded the overseas dispatch of Japan’s SDF in peacekeeping operations (Nippon Kaigi, 2018a).

Nippon Kaigi has been gaining wider attention during the second Abe administration in its effort to achieve its second objective: the creation of a new Constitution. Nippon Kaigi advocated constitutional revision based on the severity of the China’s threat. In the October
2012 publication of Nippon Kaigi’s own monthly publication “Nihon no Ibuki”, it said that in the face of the military threat and expansion of China, it was necessary for Japan to revise the Constitution, abolish Article 9 and establish a national army (Yamazaki, 2016, 47-48). In order to promote its idea of constitutional revision, Nippon Kaigi has organized a meeting known as “A National Congress for the Creation of the Constitution of a Beautiful Japan” (utsukushii nihon no kenpo wo tsukuru kokumin no kai). It aimed at collecting the signature of 10 million supporters pushing for constitutional revision and such objective has already been achieved (Ten million network for the realization of constitutional revision, 2018). On 10 November 2015, The National Congress organized “a ten thousand people meeting for constitutional revision” in Nippon Budokan which has in fact gathered around eleven thousand people (Ten million network for the realization of constitutional revision, 2018). Prime Minister Abe has appeared on a video message broadcasted at the opening of the Ten thousand people meeting (Uesugi, 2016, 15). It showed the close ties between Nippon Kaigi and Abe himself. On 3 May 2017, the 70th Anniversary of the Constitution, Abe announced his plan to revise the Constitution in 2020, including legitimizing the status of the SDF in the Constitution, as an opening video message in the 19th Open Forum on Constitution. Abe’s strategical choice of the Nippon Kaigi’s meeting to publicize his plan for constitutional revision in 2020 showed the extremely close connection between Nippon Kaigi and Prime Minister Abe (Abe, 2017a).

This section focused on the analysis of Prime Minister Abe. He has deep rooted conviction to revise Article 9 of the Constitution which was imposed by the Allied Forces. He wants to draft a Constitution with the hands of Japanese and to pursue the goal of an independent country free from heavy reliance on the United States, though he still recognized the indispensable role of the United States ally in securing the national security of Japan. Abe is highly influenced by his late-grandfather Kishi. With the growing prominence of the right-wing organization Nippon Kaigi, Prime Minister Abe popularized his idea for constitutional revision through its propaganda. It is unclear whether it was Prime Minister Abe which influenced Nippon Kaigi or vice versa but they both strove at the same goal of constitutional revision. Prime Minister Abe being at the innermost centre of Hilsman’s concentric circle of influence wielded the greatest influence in bringing Japan towards the goal of revision of Article 9 of the Constitution and hence a step towards normalization of Japan. The following section will study the views of other political elite and the outer layers of Hilsman’s concentric circle of influence.
5.3.2.2. LDP

The views of the LDP Diet members, the ruling party are at the second layer of influence in Hilsman’s concentric circle of influence. I personally conducted two interviews with current LDP members of the House of Representatives on the Legislation for Peace and Security. In the interview with an LDP member of the House of Representatives who belonged to the Constitution Review Board of the House of Representatives, he commented that the Legislation for Peace and Security was ‘not’ an exercise of collective self-defence. His argument was that Japan would only defend itself against an armed attack on Japan or an attack on a foreign country which is closely related to Japan, so it is still within the meaning of self-defence. He further elaborated that Japan would not provide military assistance to the United States if the country was attacked. A different scenario he gave was a war between the United States and North Korea. In such a case, it certainly concerned Japan’s national security and hence Japan’s dispatch of SDF in such a case would still be an exercise of self-defence. By not giving U.S. military support when U.S. is attacked or at war with a country not closely connected to Japan, he concluded that Japan was not exercising the right of collective self-defence under the Legislation for Peace and Security (Interview, LDP member 6, 2017). He thus held an ‘expansive’ interpretation of the right of self-defence. His view did not represent the mainstream view of the LDP coalition which concurred that the Legislation for Peace and Security has allowed Japan to exercise the right of collective self-defence.

In another interview with an LDP member who belonged to the Committee of National Security of the House of Representatives, he supported the enactment of the Legislation for Peace and Security as did all LDP members, because he believed that there was a need to abide by the principle of one country pacifism and defence-oriented foreign policy, and moving towards the principle of proactive pacifism which means that not only did it stress pacifism, but also friendly cooperation with her ally with the aim of regional peace and stability. On the question of whether the Legislation for Peace and Security may drag Japan into war conflicts which the U.S. was involved, he replied that Japan would not provide military assistance to the United States if it contravenes the Constitution and such position of Japan would have received full understanding on the part of the United States (Interview, LDP member 5, 2017).

The two LDP interviewees has affirmed the official position of the LDP-coalition government that the Legislation for Peace and Security was constitutional and that Japan would abide by
the principle of pacifism enshrined in Article 9 of the Constitution. Such a view was not shared by the opposition parties and the academics at large, who vehemently opposed the Legislation for Peace and Security as unconstitutional. However, the LDP-Komeito coalition passed the Legislation despite voices of opposition, which is still heard years after the Legislation was passed.

In relation to the proposed constitutional revision, LDP has a very clear stance that there is a need for the revision of Article 9. The Commission for Constitution Review of House of Representatives held a series of meetings to discuss each chapter of the Constitution in 2013. On 14 March 2013, the meeting focused on Article 9 of the Constitution in which different political parties expressed their views on the need, if any, of revision of Article 9, including, inter alia, the LDP, DPJ, Nippon Ishin no Kai, Komeito, and JCP. All political parties, except the JCP, made recommendations on revision of Article 9. During the Diet session, JCP recommended the review of the issue of U.S. military bases in Japan, as well as the military budget of the SDF while keeping the existing provisions of Article 9 intact (House of Representatives of Japan, 2013a, 14).

A representative of LDP justified his support for the revision of Article 9 by saying that, though Japan is a sovereign country, its Constitution did not stipulate the right of self-defence and the status of SDF. Hence, the LDP recommended firstly that the principle of pacifism must be kept intact. The second paragraph of Article 9, which states that ‘land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained’ should be revised so as to recognize Japan’s right to exercise the right of self-defence and collective self-defence and that the status, power and structure of SDF be expressly stipulated in the Constitution (House of Representatives of Japan, 2013a, 11).

The two interviewees who were LDP members also agreed on the need to revise Article 9 of the Constitution. Both LDP interviewees said that the Constitution was written by the Occupied Forces decades ago, so there was a need to revise it to keep pace with the changing circumstances of the time. One LDP interviewee said one of the amendments of Article 9 was to make the SDF constitutional. He claimed that the constitutional scholars who thought that the SDF was unconstitutional was unrealistic (Interview 6, 2017). Another LDP interviewee concurred in the express provision for SDF in the Constitution, claiming that the exercise of the right of self-defence is a national right of a nation while the SDF is an organization which
exercises this right. Thus, the status of SDF as an organization responsible for the defence of Japan should be expressly stipulated in the Constitution (Interview 5, 2017). Besides, on national security, an LDP interviewee said that it was unreasonable to rely completely on the United States for national defence while taking no responsibility on her own. Instead, Article 9 should be amended to make Japan shoulder more responsibility for her own national defence (Interview 6, 2017).

The LDP interviewees who agreed on the need to amend Article 9 of the Constitution took the view that Japan should take practical response to deal with challenges in the precarious international security environment and dismissed the opponents as unrealistic and impractical. They all agreed that Japan should shoulder more responsibility in the US-Japan Security Alliance as it was impractical to continue to rely solely on the U.S. security protection while sitting back and not bearing its own responsibility for national security.

Article 96 of the Constitution stipulated the procedure for amending the Constitution. On 9 May 2013, the Commission for Constitution Review of the House of Representatives focused their discussion on Article 96 of the Constitution. Hajime Hunada, an LDP member gave examples of the constitution of U.S., Germany, France, Italy, South Korea and Spain which required approval of either two thirds or three fifths of members of the Diet for constitutional amendment, while only South Korea and Spain required a national referendum. Hence, he argued that the hurdle for a constitutional amendment was too high in Japan, so he suggested that Article 96 should be amended to allow a vote of simple majority instead of a vote of two-thirds of both Houses of the Diet for constitutional amendment. As for the provision for a national referendum, Hunada agreed for its preservation because a constitution should not be changed easily and any changes to the Constitution should be monitored by the public. On the power to initiate a constitutional amendment, the current Constitution vested such power on the Diet but Hunada suggested it be revised to allow individual member of the House of Councillors and House of Representatives to initiate a constitutional amendment (House of Representatives of Japan, 2013b, 3). Other LDP members also supported the lowering of the hurdle for initiating constitutional amendment as they argued that the reason for the Constitution not to be amended since its enactment was because of the high hurdle for initiating an amendment (House of Representatives of Japan, 2013b, 8-9).
The above analysis of the interviews with LDP Diet members and the Diet debates showed the unwavering support of the LDP Diet members on the various national security initiatives of the Second Abe administration including constitutional revision. It was with their decisive votes at the Diet that Prime Minister Abe could pursue his agenda for various moves leading to greater normalization of Japan.

5.3.2.3. Komeito

Komeito has formed a coalition government with the LDP since 1999, except for the period between 2009 to 2011 when the DPJ government was formed. Komeito has been a supporter of the SDF peacekeeping activities and was a key political party leading to the successful passage of the PKO legislation in 1992 (Fisker-Nielsen, 2016, 5). With the end of the rule by the DPJ in 2012, the DPJ has dwindling influence in Japanese politics and no opposition parties could effectively exert any influence on the decision making of the LDP. It was only Komeito, the junior partner of the LDP coalition government, that has been able to act as a check on the LDP ruling. Komeito truly understands that ‘politics is the art of the possible, the attainable, the next best’, a famous saying of the former German Chancellor Otto von Bismack. It is an art not a science; it involves negotiation and above all, “compromise”. The enactment of the Legislation for Peace and Security was the result of a compromise between the LDP and the Komeito. The support of the Komeito was indispensable to the success of the enactment of the Legislation for Peace and Security while the party was acting as a brake and a moderating factor of the final version of the Cabinet decision in 1 July 2014 and the Legislation for Peace and Security.

The Komeito made several significant inputs to the 2014 Cabinet decision and the Legislation for Peace and Security. The position of the Komeito was that it opposed to the engagement of SDF in overseas war conflicts while the party supported the expansion of the scope of SDF activities. During the negotiation of the Legislation for Peace and Security, Komeito has proposed three basic principles for the dispatch of SDF overseas: first, the legitimacy of the SDF dispatch under international support; the public understanding, Diet debates and approval prior to SDF dispatch, and finally the safety of the SDF personnel (Fisker-Nielsen, 2016, 5).

In the 2014 Cabinet decision, the Komeito insisted on inserting an opening paragraph in the original draft proposed by the LDP. The opening paragraph stressed that Japan was pursuing peace diplomacy and that it would maintain a defence-oriented foreign policy (Fisker-Nielsen,
It was also the effort of the Komeito that the sentence “this basic logic must be maintained under Article 9” was inserted in the Cabinet decision (Fisker-Nielsen, 2016, 15). These basic principles inserted by Komeito in the 2014 Cabinet Decision has put a rein on the scope of applicability of the Cabinet decision and the SDF activities within the general spirit of pacifism enshrined in Article 9 of the Constitution. Most importantly, Komeito has initiated the insertion of the clause “in a close relationship with Japan” after “an armed attack against a foreign country” as the first of the three new conditions for the exercise of collective self-defence in the 2014 Cabinet decision (Fisker-Nielsen, 2016, 13). It confined the scope of Japan’s response only when Japan itself or a foreign country closely connected with Japan was attacked instead of all other foreign countries in the world as in the LDP original draft. By incorporating the proposal of the Komeito, the scope of the Cabinet Decision and hence the Legislation for Peace and Security confined the exercise of collective self-defence within strict limits.

On the issue of revision of the Constitution, Diet members of Komeito have expressed their views in 2013 when the Commission for Constitution Review of House of Representatives was held which focused on the discussion of Article 9 of the Constitution. Komeito also gave six areas to concentrate with respect to the revision of Article 9. Article 9 should expressly stipulate the right of self-defence, including the right of collective self-defence, the existence of SDF, the collective security protection framework and Japan’s participation in international cooperation for pursuit of peace. Komeito further suggested the enactment of a provision to deal with emergency situations such as missile attack and international terrorism. Lastly, Komeito suggested that Japan as the only country which has suffered from the attack from atomic bombs should stipulate in the Constitution the principle of elimination of nuclear weapons (House of Representatives of Japan, 2013a, 13).

On the issue of amendment of Article 96 of the Constitution, Yoshinori Ooguchi, a representative of Komeito, said that constitutional amendment was an important question for a nation, so it was of utmost importance to have a broad consensus at the Diet before putting the amendment for voting at national referendum. It was doubtful if lowering the threshold for initiating a constitutional amendment to a simple majority vote of two Houses of the Diet was the result of sufficient debate and discussion in the Diet. The amendment of Article 96 of the Constitution should not only be the result of a broad consensus of Diet members but should also be clearly understood by the general public which understand the reason for and the
necessity of the proposed amendment. He noted that the national poll showed that most respondents were opposed to the amendment of Article 96 of the Constitution, with more than 47% who neither supported nor opposed to the amendment. He concluded that it was because there was insufficient debate and discussion at the Diet so the public failed to understand the reason and necessity of the amendment. Hence, the time was not yet ripe for a constitutional amendment of Article 96 (House of Representatives of Japan, 2013b, 10).

The above analysis showed that the Komeito has constrained the Abe administration in its effort in legitimizing the right of collective self-defence and the journey of normalization. However, as the junior partner of the LDP ruling coalition, Komeito has also conceded to the call of Prime Minister Abe and the LDP for greater degree of normalization for the sake of staying in power.

5.3.2.4 Opposition Parties

The opposition parties have voiced fierce opposition to the various national security initiatives of the second Abe administration including the Legislation for Peace and Security and the constitutional revision initiative of the second Abe administration. The section will analyze the views of the opposition parties including DPJ, JCP and Nippon Ishin no Kai on the package of national security initiatives of the second Abe administration

**DPJ**

In the Diet debates of the Legislation for Peace and Security, a member of the DPJ posed the question that if Japan could exercise the right of collective self-defence under the Law in the case of a preemptive attack from the United States, it would lead to a state of war. Foreign Minister Fumio Kishida responded that a preemptive attack would contravene international law so Japan would not exercise the right of collective self-defence in contravention of the international law (House of Representatives of Japan, 2015a, 12). A follow-up question by another DPJ member was about the Iraq War, which was started by the United States to search for weapons of mass destruction but failed to find any in the end. Prime Minister Abe responded that the Iraq War, which involved large scale air raids and mass fighting on the land, did not comply with the third requirement of “minimum extent necessary” for the exercise of collective self-defence and that there was a general prohibition against dispatching SDF abroad. Hence,
even under the current Legislation, Japan would not send SDF to the battlefield in the Iraq war. (House of Representatives of Japan, 2015a, 21). The government explanation thus clarified the limits of the exercise of the right of collective self-defence envisaged by the Legislation.

As the Japanese government reiterated the deterrence capability of the Legislation of Peace and Security, a DPJ member said that it was a basic principle of a security dilemma that, while the deterrence capability of Japan would be enhanced, it would also trigger other countries to enhance their deterrence capability, which would in turn create security risks for Japan. In response, Prime Minister Abe said that the new U.S.-Japan Security Guidelines 2015 and the Legislation for Peace and Security enhanced the reciprocal obligation of the U.S. and Japan and deterrence capability of Japan. As Japan had a transparent military budget, Abe believed that it would not trigger the security dilemma or arms race as worried by the DPJ (House of Representatives of Japan, 2015a, 27). The government response did not, however, address the issue of the security dilemma or threat perception of neighbouring countries which may escalate tension in the international security environment.

Yuichi Gotou, another DPJ member suspected if the exercise of collective self-defence can be triggered because of economic grounds such as shortage of energy and electricity supply (House of Representatives of Japan, 2015b, 13). Fumitake Kishida, Foreign Minister, replied after repeated pressing from Gotou that Japan would not exercise the right of collective self-defence when there were only economic grounds but no military impact, even though the three new conditions for the exercise of the right of collective self-defence are satisfied (House of Representatives of Japan, 2015b, 17). Kiyomi Tsujimoto, another DPJ member further questioned the scope of the exercise of the collective self-defence. She asked if Japan would exercise force in foreign territories when the three conditions for the exercise of right of collective self-defence are satisfied. Prime Minister Shinzō Abe replied that there is a general principle that Japan would not dispatch troops overseas. It would only be in the cases where the three new conditions are satisfied that Japan would exercise the minimum level of force necessary (House of Representatives of Japan, 2015b, 20).

In relation to the proposed constitutional revision, the DPJ member, as an opposition party, stated in the Diet session of the Commission for Constitution Review of the House of Representatives in 2013 four principles and two conditions with regard to Article 9 of the Constitution. The first principle is the maintenance of the principle of pacifism. The second
principle is to expressly provide for the right of self-defence as stated in the UN Charter. The third principle is to expressly stipulate for the right of collective self-defence as provided for in the UN Charter. The fourth principle is to expressly stipulate the principle of civilian control. The two conditions are first to exercise the maximum restraint in the use of force, while the second condition is to set the basic law for security protection as a subsidiary legislation under the Constitution (House of Representatives of Japan, 2013a, 12).

Representative from the DPJ cautioned against a prior amendment of Article 96 of the Constitution ahead of all the other provisions of the Constitution. Koichi Takemasa of the DPJ said that before lowering the hurdle for initiating an amendment of Article 96, it was important to have a thorough discussion of which part and how the provisions of the Constitution were to be amended (House of Representatives of Japan, 2013b, 4). Another DPJ member also expressed the view that if one-third of the Diet members are opposed to the initiation of a constitutional amendment, the basis and support for a constitutional amendment would be too weak to sustain (House of Representatives of Japan, 2013b, 10).

**JCP**

JCP was the most vocal opposition to the Legislation for Peace and Security. JCP was formed in 1922 as an underground organization. It advocated extremist ideologies such as strict pacifism, the termination of the U.S.-Japan Security Alliance and the disbanding of the SDF. In recent years, JCP is softening its stance and is more willing to meet the expectation of the public. Its party prominence has increased in the second Abe administration in 2014 with supporters who were disillusioned with the ruling LDP as reflected in the 21 seats it secured in the Lower House election (Osaki, 2016a).

In 20 June 2014 issue of Akahata Shimbun, a daily newspaper published by the JCP, the party criticized the 2014 Cabinet decision as contradictory and ambiguous. In respect of the clause that a country in close relationship to Japan was under armed attack, the JCP argued that it was purely the subjective judgment of the government as to which country was in close relationship with Japan and that it would be prone to arbitrary interpretation by the government. On the condition that Japan was able to exercise the right of collective of self-defence if such armed attack “threatens Japan’s survival and poses a clear danger to fundamentally overturn people’s right to life, liberty and pursuit of happiness”, JCP argued that since the provision stated that it
was a ‘threat’ which could trigger the exercise of collective self-defence, the government could on its own arbitrary decision exercise the use of force overseas (Japanese Communist Party, 2014). In September 2015, the JCP advocated the formation of a coalition government to oust the LDP-Komeito coalition government and to repeal the Legislation for Peace and Security, and to restore constitutionalism (Shii, 2015). However, it failed to gather momentum. On 10 June 2016, the JCP announced its election platform for the House of Councillors as the repeal of the Legislation for Peace and Security which it labelled as ‘unconstitutional war laws’ (Japanese Communist Party, 2016).

I interviewed a member of JCP who belonged to the Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defence of the House of Councillors. He echoed the JCP party position that the Legislation for Peace and Security was unconstitutional. While the security environment in East Asia was getting intense, the Legislation had the adverse effect of triggering the vicious circle of military confrontation. He restated the principle of Article 9 of peace diplomacy and that Japan would never repeat the war of aggression in WWII. Besides, he also expressed his disappointment at the undemocratic behavior of the LDP coalition government in pushing forward the Legislation in disregard of previous government constitutional interpretation and the overwhelming opposition from public citizens (Interview, JCP member 9, 2018). In spite of the opposition voiced by the JCP against the Legislation for Peace and Security, the political reality was that its seats in both Houses of the Diet was so insignificant that it failed to produce any meaningful change in the Diet decision to pass the Legislation.

The JCP member interviewee also opposed to the constitutional amendment of Article 9. He believed that the very existence of Article 9 could restrain the government from embarking on military actions overseas. On the recognition of the status of SDF in the Constitution, he believed that it should not change the nature and power of SDF as an organization not exercising the use of force in settling international disputes. Thus, he did not see any reason or justification for changing Article 9 of the Constitution which may be voted against by a national referendum (Interview 9, 2018).

JCP also staunchly opposed to a prior amendment of Article 96 of the Constitution ahead of all other provisions of the Constitution. By lowering the hurdle for initiating a constitutional amendment to a simple majority of the Diet, it would be the same procedural threshold as other ordinary legislations, thus JCP believed that it was a denial of the basic spirit of the Constitution.
being the supreme law of a country. Akira Kasai, a member of JCP, did not agree that the hurdle for amending the Constitution was too severe as it was important that it was more difficult to amend the Constitution than an ordinary legislation. He claimed that the LDP ruling coalition aimed at putting the amendment of Article 96 for national referendum while the real intention was for amending Article 9 of the Constitution with greater ease, so it was an act of deceiving the public. (House of Representatives of Japan, 2013b, 7). Among the political parties which opposed to a prior amendment of Article 96 of the Constitution were the Your Party (Mina no Tou), People’s Life Party (Seikatsu no Tou) and the JCP. Representative from Your Party opposed a prior amendment of Article 96 because they argued that it was initiated with the real motive of easing the hurdle for amending Article 9 of the Constitution while Your Party was a party which strove hard to preserve the Constitution, inter alia, Article 9 of the Constitution (House of Representatives of Japan, 2013b, 6). People’s Life Party maintained similar argument that there should be a thorough discussion of the provisions to be amended instead of merely focusing on the amendment procedure stipulated in Article 96 of the Constitution (House of Representatives of Japan, 2013b, 7).

**Nippon Ishin no Kai**

Nippon Ishin no Kai, another opposition party, also expressed their views at the Diet session of the Legislation for Peace and Security. Member of the opposition party Nippon Ishin no Kai asked why the Government resorted to the enactment of the Legislation for Peace and Security instead of a constitutional amendment in an attempt to allow Japan to exercise the right of collective self-defence, when back in the Committee on Constitution of the House of Representatives in 2001, the government representative said that Japan could only exercise the right of collective self-defence after a constitutional amendment. In response, Gen Nakatani, then State Minister of Foreign Defence, said that thirteen years had passed since the Government made that comment. In 2014, the international environment became more severe and there was not sufficient laws and regulations for the SDF to respond. Nakatani added that though it was good if a constitutional amendment was made, it would require the approval of two-thirds majority of both Houses and that it would take time (House of Representatives of Japan, 2015a, 31). It showed that though the Government recognized the necessity of amending the Constitution, it chose the easy route of enacting a national legislation. Such act deprived the Japanese public of an opportunity to cast their votes in the national referendum and decide whether they supported Japan’s exercise of the right of collective self-defence.
Another question posed by the opposition party Nippon Ishin no Kai was the issue of risk. First was the enhanced risk to the lives and safety of the SDF members in their missions abroad. Besides, in the case of dispatching SDF overseas not in the exercise of the right of self-defence but to protect other countries, the responding countries would view Japan as an enemy so the risk to Japan would also be increased. In response, Prime Minister Abe said that the severe international security environment surrounding Japan such as the North Korea nuclear threat, rise of China, the disputes in East and South China sea increased the risk to Japan so the responsibility of the Japanese government was to reduce such risks. In strengthening the U.S.-Japan Security Alliance, there was greater deterrence and hence the risk of an attack on Japan would be reduced. Certainly, the Japanese government would try its utmost effort in minimizing the risk to the SDF but the SDF was a professional team who could manage to reduce the risk with daily training (House of Representatives of Japan, 2015a, 34).

On constitutional revision, the Nippon Ishin no Kai recommended four principles with regard to the revision of Article 9. First, it should deny Japan the right to engage in a war of aggression while expressly stating that Japan should bear its responsibility to the international community for peace. The second principle is that Article 9 should expressly state that Japan can possess arm potential for self-defence. The third principle is the recognition of the right of self-defence, including the right of collective-self-defence. The fourth principle is to enact a new provision on the response action in the face of an emergency situation to deal with cases of armed attack on Japan, terrorism and major disasters (House of Representatives of Japan, 2013a, 13).

Notwithstanding the overwhelming opposition of the opposition parties to the enactment of Legislation for Peace and Security and constitutional amendment, there was general support even from the opposition parties of the establishment of the National Security Council. In the Diet debates in 2013, DPJ and Nihon Ishin No Kai have expressed full support to the establishment of the National Security Council. Akihisa Nagashima of the DPJ claimed that it was a significant milestone of Japan’s national security policy (House of representatives of Japan, 2013d, 1, 20). Nevertheless, Seiken Akamine of the JCP, holding firmly its antimilitaristic ideals, opposed the bill to establish National Security Council modelling on the U.S. and British model on the ground that it may run the risk of embroiling Japan into military conflict like the U.S. and Britain (House of Representatives of Japan, 2013e, 17).
5.4 Conclusion

According to neoclassical realism, it was the primary forces of international structural factors and influence of domestic variables which led to the course of foreign policy of a country. In the above discussion, I have analyzed the international structural factors leading to the enactment of the package of national security initiatives of the second Abe administration. The first one was the military and economic rise of China and her growing territorial ambitions in the East and South China Sea. The second international structural factor leading to a more insecure Japan was the nuclear and missile threat from North Korea. These two factors together with the persistent call from the U.S. ally on Japan to shoulder more responsibility for her own national defence and international peace keeping operations all contributed to the enactment of the package of national security initiatives during the second Abe administration.

In the domestic arena, the analysis was conducted through the domestic variables identified in the Hilsman’s concentric circle of influence. First at the innermost centre of influence is the indispensable role of Prime Minister Abe with his long cherished aim to revise the Constitution, the preliminary step being to allow Japan to exercise the right of collective self-defence through the enactment of the Legislation for Peace and Security. Abe was strongly influenced by his grandfather Kishi and the Nippon Kaigi in his move to initiate the series of national security initiatives. Abe was able to push forward his agenda as result of the top-down government administrative structure which enabled him to embark on his view on constitutional reinterpretation. After analysis of the role of Prime Minister, outer layers of influence including the LDP, Komeito and the opposition parties are analyzed. It showed that the LDP was in full support of the various national security initiatives of Prime Minister Abe while Komeito was also supportive notwithstanding its effort to serve as a brake on the government from unduly expanding the interpretation of Article 9 of the Constitution. The opposition parties are opposed to the Legislation for Peace and Security and the constitutional revision initiative of the Second Abe administration but as they are situated at the outer layer of influence in the Hilsman’s concentric circle of influence, they thus have little if any real impact on the final foreign policy outcome of the second Abe administration.

The 2014 Cabinet decision and the Legislation for Peace and Security 2015 passed under the second Abe administration was pushed forward hardhandedly by the government in the face of
intense opposition from the DPJ, JCP, the academics, former bureaucrats and the public arguing that the Legislation was unnecessary and unconstitutional. In total disregard of the voices of dissent, the second Abe administration, in particular Prime Minister Abe himself, has skillfully manipulated the international security threats as justification for his goal of reinterpretation the Constitution to allow Japan to exercise the right of collective self-defence and hence answer to the pressure from the US ally.

Having analyzed the national security initiatives from the Koizumi administration in the previous chapter and the second Abe administration in this chapter, the next chapter will be a comparative chapter of how and why the two administrations differed in their extent of normalization.
Figure 5-1

Approval Rate of the Second Abe Administration (Dec 2012–July 2018)

Source: Asahi Poll http://www.tv-asahi.co.jp/hst/poll/graph_naikaku.html

Figure 5-2

Approval Rate of the Second Abe Administration (Dec 2012–July 2018)

Chapter 6  A Comparative Study of the National Security Initiatives of the Koizumi and the Second Abe Administrations

6.1 Introduction

The second Abe administration achieved far greater extent of normalization than the Koizumi administration. A comparative study of a package of national security initiatives of the two administration is conducted with the aim to understand how and why the second Abe administration is different from the Koizumi administration and hence achieved greater extent of normalization in enacting a package of national security initiatives and legitimizing the right of collective self-defence.

A comparative study of the package of national security initiatives of the Koizumi and the second Abe administrations was adopted because the two administrations displayed striking similarities. They faced similar (but different degrees of) external security threats such as the North Korea nuclear threats, rise of China and the threat of terrorism. There was also similar pressure from the United States ally in pushing Japan to shoulder more responsibility in her own national security and international security operations. In the domestic arena, the two administrations enjoyed the fruits of the administrative reform which provided a favourable environment for Prime Minister and its Cabinet to exercise assertive leadership. Koizumi and Abe themselves also shared many similar personal traits as Prime Ministers because they have their own personal goal and vision for Japan, partly attributed to their being political blue blood. Lastly, they are similar in that they pushed Japan towards a ‘normal country’.

Notwithstanding the similarities between the two administrations, the focus of this chapter is to understand the differences in the international structural factors and domestic variables of the two administrations and see how they can help account for the varying degree of normalization of the two administrations.

6.2 The Normalization Journey

Since the initialization of the debate of normalization by Ozawa in 1994, Japan was gradually becoming a ‘normal country’, which has shown significant progress in the Koizumi and second
Abe administrations. By a ‘normal country’, it means Japan could exercise the rights and power of a normal nation, including the exercise of the right of self-defence and collective self-defence, and the right to participate in international humanitarian relief operations. Japan was constitutionally barred by Article 9 of the Constitution from exercising these inherent rights of a ‘normal’ country. In the Koizumi and second Abe administrations, Japan was moving a step closer to become a ‘normal country’ with the second Abe administration achieving greater degree of normalization.

During the Koizumi administration, Japan was moving a step forward towards becoming a normal country as shown by the package of national security initiatives analyzed in this research. Japan enacted an ad hoc Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law to assist the U.S. Ally in the aftermath of the terrorist attack of the twin towers in U.S. soil. The Legislation empowered SDF to transport arms and weapons to U.S. ally in the U.S.-Britain joint air raids which was without UN mandate. Though the SDF was not acting in combat zones, it was still exercising ‘force’ and arguably has overstepped the boundaries of Article 9 of the Constitution which prohibited the use of force in the settlement of international disputes.

In similar vein, in the Koizumi administration, the Iraq Humanitarian and Reconstruction Law in 2003 was enacted in which the provision against the use of force in Article 9 of the Constitution was further relaxed. The Law allowed the SDF to operate only in combat zones but there were concerns that it contravened the Constitution which prohibited against the use of force as it was practically impossible to distinguish between combat and non-combat zones. Furthermore, the Law recognized the right to transport weapons which was arguably a use of force. Though the response of the Government was that the right to transport weapons was confined within strict limits, it greatly expanded the interpretation of Article 9 which prohibited the resort to force in settling international disputes. In the last case study of constitutional revision, it did not come to reality during the Koizumi administration but it involved heated debates among scholars, media and the Diet about revision of the Constitution to legitimize the right of collective self-defence. During the Koizumi administration, Japan has taken a giant step towards becoming a ‘normal country’ through a loosened interpretation of Article 9 of the Constitution.

As compared to the Koizumi administration, the second Abe administration has taken the greatest step ever in postwar Japan to allow Japan to become a ‘normal country’ through the
enactment of a package of national security initiatives such as the establishment of the National Security Council, National Security Strategy, the three Three Principles on Transfer of Defence Equipment and Technology, the signing of the U.S.-Japan Defence Guidelines 2015, and above all, a package of ‘legislation of peace and security’. Expanding upon the use of weapons provisions in the case studies of the Koizumi administration, the Legislation for Peace and Security allowed the SDF to use weapons reasonably necessary to perform rescue missions, for self-preservation, for kaketsuke-keigo and protection of lives and properties of themselves. The Legislation for Peace and Security further legitimized the right of Japan to exercise the right of collective self-defence by allowing Japan to respond in the cases not only against an armed attack on Japan but also when there is ‘an armed attack against a foreign country in a close relationship with Japan”. During the second Abe administration, though there was only a timeline to revise the Constitution by 2020, Japan has in fact reinterpreted Article 9 of the Constitution by allowing itself to exercise the right to use weapons and the right to exercise the right of self-defence and collective self-defence. Japan has thus become a ‘normal country’ according to the meaning defined by Ozawa. The last remaining thing to achieve is to incorporate it in the Constitution with an amendment.

The following sections will consider from the angle of international structural imperatives and the domestic variables to see how and why the second Abe administration could achieve far greater extent of normalization than the Koizumi administration.

6.2 International Security Environment

According to the theory of neoclassical realism, the international structural environment is the primary motivating force for the governments to adopt foreign policy in the face of external threats. As rightly pointed out by Anderson (2017), Japan’s security production is shaped by two major variables: the regional threat environments and the strength of security commitment from the United States (Anderson, 2017, 101). It is submitted that the stronger degree of external threats and lesser security guarantees from the United States will push Japan to adopt greater extent of normalization to beef up its security measures. This section is going to compare the degree of external threats and the strength of commitments from the United States ally faced by the two administrations.
The international security environment surrounding Japan during both administrations were centered on three key factors: threat of terrorism, the North Korea nuclear threat, and above all, the China threat. Terrorism was the immediate catalyst of the enactment of the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law and the three Emergency Related Legislations of the Koizumi administration. Terrorism may be a remote concern for Japan before 9-11 but the 2001 terrorist attack on the United States have shocked the world including Japan which has then devoted a whole section on terrorism in its Defense White Paper in 2002 (Ministry of Defence of Japan, 2002, Chapter 1.1). Since 2001, terrorism has taken a more prominent role not only in international security but also in Japan’s national security. In the second Abe administration, though threat of terrorism may not be in the vicinity of Japan’s national security, it has become more a global concern and remained one of the top security issues faced by all countries around the world, not only to Japan. In the attempt to combat global terrorism and to prepare against terrorist acts in summer Olympics 2020 after the G7 in 2017, Japan enacted the anti-conspiracy bill on June 15, 2017 as the “Act on Punishment of the Preparation of Acts of Terrorism and Other Organized Crimes,” establishing 277 criminal acts deter crimes planning terrorist attacks. While Prime Minister expressed in the press release on the date of the enactment of the Legislation that the legislation aimed at combating terrorism, it has been fiercely criticized by opposition parties and human rights activists as broadening the power of the state while curtailing the civil liberties of citizens. While refraining from commenting on the views of the opposition parties, suffice for it to say that terrorism has become a more prominent concern of the second Abe administration as compared to the Koizumi administration. While terrorism began to catch the attention of the Koizumi administration with the dawn of 9-11 attack, it has become one of the top priority security concerns in Japan’s national security policy in the second Abe administration which is the underlying drivers for various national security initiatives of the second Abe administration.

The North Korea threat has been ranked just behind the rise of China as the source of external threat to Japan during the two administrations. A comparative study of the North Korean threat of the two administrations showed that the sense of threat has been aggravating in the second Abe administration. In the Koizumi administration, there were entry of unidentified North Korean vessels into Japan’s exclusive economic zones as well as the firing of missiles into the Sea of Japan from North Korea. With the withdrawal of North Korea from the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty in 2003, the sense of threat from North Korea on Japan’s national security was apparent. In comparison, there was a more provocative North Korea during the second
Abe administration with the Kim Jong-un coming into power in 2011. During early years of securing in power, Kim Jong-un attempted to consolidate his position as a new leader. He fired a total of 89 missiles testing before November 2017 which far exceeded the total of 16 missiles fired during the rule of his late father (Berlinger, 2017). The range of ballistic missiles has claimed to have reached as far as the whole of the mainland of the United States (USA Today, 2017). In fact, Prime Minister Abe has once characterized the North Korean threat as the greatest danger facing Japan since 2011 (Independent, 2018). Though the North Korea has softened its provocative stance since 2018 with lesser missile testing and bilateral meeting with the United States and China respectively for peace talks and denuclearization, Japan was the only East Asian country which was completely left out from the bilateral meetings or discussion. Hence, the North Korea threat to Japan’s security remained real and persistent. Suffice to say that in a comparative perspective, the threat from North Korea has aggravated in the second Abe administration as compared to the Koizumi administration, more prominently because of the assumption of the Kim Jong-un as the leader.

Ranking at the top security concern of Japan was the rise of China. Rise of China was a concern of Japan during the Koizumi administration but it has emerged prominently and with greater magnitude in the second Abe administration. Back in 2002 during the Koizumi administration, China ranked behind North Korea in the Defence White paper of Japan but China has gained much more coverage and attention in the Defence White Paper of the second Abe administrations. There were greater degree and maturity of military modernization of China in land, sea and air forces in the second Abe administration than the Koizumi administration. Economically, China has also overtaken Japan as the second largest economy in the world in 2010. Being a military and economic giant, the threat from China was apparent. On top of that, there was lingering historical animosity between the countries which further aggravated the sense of threat to Japan. Similar to North Korea, leaders matter. Xi Jinping as the President of China also matters. He has taken a hardline and assertive security policy which has the effect of intensifying the threat perception to Japan. It can thus be concluded that the threat of China was more intense in the second Abe administration than the Koizumi administration. The rise of China thus drove Japan to take greater steps in normalization in the second Abe administration than the Koizumi administration as a balancing act against external threats.

While the international security environment was more intense in the second Abe administration as compared to the Koizumi administration, the twin fear of entrapment and
abandonment of the United States ally was also deepening in the second Abe administration as compared to the Koizumi administration which led the second Abe administration to take greater extent of normalization to secure its own security for fear of entrapment or abandonment by the United States. During the Koizumi administration, the United States hegemony in the world and in East Asia was more secured than in the second Abe administration when it was under serious challenge by China. During the Koizumi administration, Japan could safely count on the United States ally for security protection, so Koizumi gave unwavering support to the United States in times of 9-11 terrorist attack and in the Iraq reconstruction and humanitarian effort. Hence, the foreign policy of the Koizumi administration displayed a strong leaning on the United States which she believed would offer security guarantees in times of crisis. The three Emergency related legislations were seen as a little step towards Japan establishing its own security system in cases of contingency. It still work hand in hand with the United States ally. In comparison, in the second Abe administration, the hegemony of the United States in East Asia were greatly challenged by the military rise of China, thus Japan recognized a greater need to bear responsibility for her own national security. It was also during the second Abe administration that Japan responded to the call from the United States ally for exercising the collective self-defence as the fear of abandonment was more imminent in the second Abe administration. The package of national security initiatives of the second Abe administration thus enabled Japan to strengthen its national security measures as the regional security environments became more intense and Japan believed that the United States ally may not offer sufficient security guarantees to Japan. Japan for example has begun to embrace more security ties with other countries around the world as an attempt to secure its security without giving undue and sole reliance on the United States.

The above discussion showed that the regional security environment in the second Abe administration was more intense as compared with the Koizumi administration. It was coupled with the lesser security guarantees from the United States which drove Japan to take greater strides in normalization such that it can have more control of its own security matters and in international security at large. According to the theory of neoclassical realism, while international structural factors remained the primary driving force of the foreign policy of a nation, the domestic variables do play an important role in making the foreign policy a reality.
6.3 Domestic Environment

Both the national security initiatives of Koizumi and Abe have resulted in a great degree of normalization unseen in historical administrations. This section will analyze from the angle of the domestic environment of Japan why the second Abe administration has achieved greater degree and extent of normalization. The domestic policymaking institutions of Japan were centralized with the Hashimoto administrative reform in the 1990s which enabled the top-down Cabinet-led government. It strengthened the position of the Prime Minister who is at the core of the decision making. According to the Hilsman’s concentric circle of influence, Prime Minister is at the core of the concentric circle of influence and hence wielded the greatest influence. This section thus concentrates on understanding how the differences between the leadership style of the two Prime Ministers enabled the second Abe administration to achieve greater extent of normalization than the Koizumi administration.

In doing a comparative study of Prime Ministers Koizumi and Abe in their foreign policy making, this dissertation will adopt the Prime Minister Leadership Style Variables and dependent variables developed by Kaarbo (1997) as the yardstick for comparison. Table 2.1 is now copied here again from Chapter 2 of this dissertation for easy reference.

Table 2.1

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Prime Minister Leadership Style Variables</th>
<th>Dependent Variables</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>i. Decision Process</td>
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<tr>
<td>1. Interested and experienced in foreign policy</td>
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<tr>
<td>2. Policy goal task orientation</td>
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<td>3. Consensual strategy for managing conflict</td>
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<td>4. Involved in managing information with independent sources</td>
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<tr>
<td>5. Competitive strategy for managing party relations</td>
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Both Prime Ministers Koizumi and Abe stood out from previous Japanese Prime Ministers who were characterized as ‘reactive’ and ‘passive’ because of Japanese culture of valuing consensus and groupism instead of individuality (Hayao, 1993a, 6). Both Prime Ministers have been long serving Prime Ministers, which was a prerequisite for the government to pursue long term policy goals and to maintain leadership. Like many previous Prime Ministers and politicians in Japan, both Koizumi and Abe are political blue blood. They bear the legacy from their ancestors with influence in their family education and personal upbringing. Notwithstanding their common traits, an analysis of the variables of leadership style can highlight the differences between the two Prime Ministers who can account for the reason why the second Abe administration has achieved much greater degree of normalization than the Koizumi administration by legitimizing the right of collective self-defence.

**Prime Minister Koizumi**

In relation to the first variable of leadership style developed by Kaarbo, Koizumi was not very interested or experienced in foreign policy. He did not have a strong foreign policy agenda nor diplomatic experience before becoming the Prime Minister as he was a graduate in Economics at Keio University. However, he did have an international perspective due in part to his love for western culture and his postgraduate education in London. He was known to be a person of strong will and character and his wills cannot be changed easily (Iwasaki, 2006, 13). These character traits and upbringing of Koizumi may have heavily influenced the foreign policy direction of Japan which leaned heavily to the United States. The Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Legislation and the Iraq Reconstruction and Rehabilitation Legislations were both measures to aid the U.S. as an ally without the core national security interests of Japan being at stake. Koizumi’s policy in enacting the Anti-Terrorism Law and the Iraq Reconstruction Law was thus more shaped by his close relationship with the then U.S. President George W. Bush rather than a puzzle in the grand foreign policy developed by Koizumi himself.
In respect of the second variable of leadership style, the policy goal and task orientation of Koizumi was not focused on the normalization of Japan. In relation to constitutional revision of Article 9, though Koizumi has initiated the Diet debates of constitutional revision, he did not have an active agenda or passion to pursue it. In the Diet sessions of the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law, he repeatedly confirmed that Japan was not exercising the right of collective self-defence but was simply an effort at international cooperation. Legitimizing the right of collective self-defence or amending Article 9 was not a policy goal of Koizumi. The enactment of the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law and the Iraq Reconstruction Law was a gesture of support to the United States ally. Koizumi just responded to the call of the United States ally rather than having a clear policy goal in mind. The enactment of the Three Emergency Related Legislations was perhaps the single personal goal of Koizumi which he wanted to achieve in his tenure because it was a historical legacy and unfinished business which was originally debated when Koizumi’s late father, who was a Director General of the Japan Defense Agency. However, even in respect of the Three Emergency Related legislations, it concentrated on an armed attack on Japan which was primarily on the self-defence of Japan.

The last three variables of leadership style were all related to how Prime Minister managed party relations and conflict. The process of the enactment of the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law, Three Emergency Related Legislations and Legislation for Reconstruction of Iraq Law were prominent cases in point of how Koizumi managed party conflict. For all the three legislations, Koizumi first sought agreement from the coalition parties before putting forward to the bill to the LDP’s policy committee such as exerting pressure on the LDP’s policy committee to approve the bill as Koizumi did not have a strong support base from the LDP itself. For the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law, he first sought agreement with the coalition parties before consulting the LDP’s policy committees. Komeito raised initial objections to the transportation of arms and ammunition to the U.S. military with the final concession by the government that the transportation of arms and ammunition will only be allowed in international space and waters but not on foreign soil. Such comment was incorporated by the final bill. After seeking agreement from the coalition parties, the bill was put forward before LDP’s policy committees which was under great pressure to agree with the bill. Upon approval by the LDP’s policy committees, the bill was put before the Diet. At the Diet, the Bill was opposed by the opposition despite effort by the Koizumi administration to seek the support from the DPJ. Even so, with the high popular support of the Koizumi
administration and the support of the LDP, the bill was able to be passed by the two houses swiftly in the span of twenty-four days (Shinoda, 2003, 28-32). In similar vein, the Law for the Reconstruction and Rehabilitation of Iraq was passed by first consulting coalition parties before seeking approval from the LDP’s policy committees but it was passed when the popular support of Koizumi was not as high as that of the enactment of the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law and that it was met with fierce opposition from the opposition parties (Shinoda, 2006, 81-83). Nevertheless, the enactment process of the two legislations showed that Koizumi has strived hard to win the support of coalition parties and even opposition parties of his proposed bill before pushing forward his desired objectives. He was skillful in managing conflict with other political parties despite the majority votes secured by the ruling LDP in passing his desired policy goal. He tried hard to gain support from other political parties instead of pushing forward his policies hard-handedly.

For the Three Emergency Related Legislations, around one year before the draft legislation was put to the Diet for debate, Koizumi listened to the voices of the opposition parties. It was with the skillful diplomacy of Koizumi in securing the support of the greatest opposition Party, DPJ, that the Three Emergency Related Legislations were passed. Koizumi was successful in persuading not only ruling political parties but also opposition parties to support his long cherished initiative to enact the three Emergency Related Legislations. It showed that he did not push forward his policies aggressively which may also account for his high popularity rate. Having recognized that the climate is not yet ripe for revision of Article 9 or legitimizing the right of collective self-defence, Koizumi did not push forward any concrete proposal for constitution revision. He also repeatedly denied that Japan can exercise the right of collective self-defence in the Diet sessions because he was fully aware of the fierce opposition to such initiative.

While linking the five Prime Minister Leadership Style variable with the three dependent variables of decision making, decision outcome and foreign policy output, I found that Prime Minister Koizumi was not making decision alone but aimed to achieve consensus from within the Cabinet and the LDP and even the opposition parties. He was more prone to achieve political harmony or more a group-oriented leader than Abe. Hence, the national security initiatives of the Koizumi administration, being the decision outcome and foreign policy output, was the best that he could achieve through compromise and discussion. The extent of normalization achieved during Koizumi administration was thus limited compared to Abe
given the prevailing opposition of Diet members of further loosening the interpretation of Article 9 of the Constitution.

**Prime Minister Abe**

In analyzing the leadership style of Abe, it will start with the first variable of whether Abe was interested and experienced in foreign policy. Compared to Koizumi, he has more interests and experience in foreign policy than Koizumi. Abe entered politics as an assistant of his father, Shintaro Abe, who served as the Minister of Foreign Affairs. He was highly involved in the North Korea abductees issue when working with his father, which also led him to maintain an eye on this historical issue even when serving his term as Prime Minister for the second time. He has time and again raised this North Korea abductees issue with the U.S. President Donald Trump in view of the lack of direct official communication with the leader of North Korea (Asahi Shimbun, 2018).

In relation to the second variable of whether Abe has the policy goal or orientation towards normalization or constitutional revision of Article 9, Abe apparently displayed a more clear policy goal or orientation than Koizumi. For Abe, constitutional revision was a personal ambition. Abe was the grandson of Kishi Nobusuke who was both a Class-A war criminal and a previous Prime Minister notorious for the controversial revision of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty in 1960. Constitutional revision was such a deep-rooted conviction of Abe who attempted it ever since his first administration in 2006-7. Constitutional revision was, to Abe, an unfinished business inherited from his grandfather Kishi that Abe was desperate to achieve during his term as the Prime Minister.

For the last three variables of managing party conflict, Prime Minister Abe was more prone to act on his own plan and his circle of advisers. He pushed forward the package of national security initiatives including the Legislation for Peace and Security despite fierce opposition from opposition parties and the general public at large. Compared to Koizumi who always tried to seek agreement from coalition parties and opposition parties to smooth the legislation process, Prime Minister Abe was more a leader who follows his own agenda while ignoring the wave of opposition to his initiative. It was with the hard-handed approach that he was able to push the normalization journey of Japan one giant step forward by legitimizing the right of collective self-defence. With the overwhelming majority of votes of the ruling LDP-coalition,
Abe succeeded in pushing forward all his desired goals, though his cherished dream of revising the Constitution by 2020 may be shattered by the onslaught of COVID-19 pandemic.

Having considered the five Prime Minister Leadership variable, I found that it is directly reflected in the differences in the dependent variables of decision process, decision outcome and foreign policy output. The decision process of Prime Minister Abe being a person of deep-rooted conviction to revise the Constitution was acting on his own initiative and plan without listening to the voices of opposition notwithstanding there is mounting opposition in the opposition parties and the public to the Legislation for Peace and Security and his initiative of Constitution Revision. Being indifferent to the voices of opposition, the Legislation for Peace and Security and the packages of national security initiatives leading to a giant step towards normalization were passed during the second Abe administration. The decision outcome and foreign policy outcome, including the agenda to revise the Constitution by 2020 was all the personal ambition and agenda of Prime Minister Abe himself, it did not even receive the full backing from the junior coalition partner, Komeito, itself. It was precisely because of Prime Minister Abe who is a leader focusing on his sole goal of constitutional revision that the decision outcome and foreign policy output tiled in the favour of Prime Minister Abe himself. It explained why he successfully enabled Japan to exercise the right of collective self-defence which was a long-cherished goal of his grandfather Kishi but a daunting task unthinkable to be achieved by other Prime Ministers.

6.4 Conclusion

Against the background of the prevailing intense security environment together with the top-down leadership and the will of the two assertive Prime Ministers, the voices of protests from the public, constitutional scholars and opposition political parties failed to rein the LDP-Komeito coalition government from pursuing a more proactive national security policy. It is submitted that the approach of neoclassical realism which interprets Japan’s national security policy from the primary influence of international structural factors coupled with a consideration of domestic politics can fully account for the fact that the two administrations pursued a gradually relaxed interpretation of Article 9 of the Constitution, which pushed Japan a step closer to the realization of revision of the 1947 Constitution, and hence become a ‘normal country’.
As rightly pointed out by neoclassical realists, the national security strategy of Japan cannot be analyzed independent of the international structural factors. The neorealist argument that a country in the face of security threats must engage in internal and external balancing cannot have more relevance than in the contemporary international security environment. The international security environment surrounding Japan has been changed drastically since the Constitution was drafted in 1947. The international security environment surrounding the Koizumi and the second Abe administration has been characterized as the threat of terrorism, North Korea nuclear missile threat and the military rise of China. The hegemony of the U.S. was also challenged by the rise of China. Hence, the national security strategy of Japan, which has historically relied heavily on the nuclear umbrella and military protection of the United States, was under heavy pressure from the international structural factors to adapt to the changing security environment. As compared to the Koizumi administration, the intensity of the threats from the international community was much higher in the second Abe administration than the Koizumi administration, as seen in a far more assertive China in the political and military respects, as well as a more provocative North Korea under the leadership of Kim Jong-un. The United States ally was also making more demands for Japan to shoulder more responsibility for Japan’s own national security and international security in the second Abe administration as compared to the Koizumi administration. Hence, the severity of the international security environment in the second Abe administration as compared to the Koizumi administration had led Japan to take greater steps towards normalization to beef up its national security defense capability to counteract external security threats.

While the international structural factors provided the background for the national security initiatives of the two administrations, the unique domestic situations in the two administrations made the more proactive national security strategies of the two administrations a reality. The analysis using the five Prime Minister leadership variables and three dependent variables have highlighted the differences in leadership style between Koizumi and Abe. Koizumi was more a leader of achieving consensus and avoiding conflict with not only the LDP coalition parties but also the opposition parties, he also listened to the voices of the public which is shown by his high popularity rating. It is precisely because of this leadership style that he did not push forward hardhandedly the plan for greater loosening of the interpretation of Article 9 of the Constitution as Abe. He took heed of the cloud of opposition to such initiative. However, compared to Koizumi, Abe is a leader has a deep-rooted conviction to pursue his grandfather
Kishi’s dream of constitutional revision by first legitimizing the right of collective self-defence. He had a dream of making Japan great again and shoulder more responsibility in Japan’s national security and international security affairs at large. He is a leader with his own policy goal which he pursued in spite of fierce opposition from the opposition parties and the public. It is precisely because of the conviction and ideology of these two different Prime Ministers that Abe was able to achieve greater extent of normalization during his tenure than that of Koizumi. Nevertheless, the onslaught of COVID-19 in late 2019 around the globe has dampened any effort of constitutional revision of the second Abe administration originally aimed for 2020.
Chapter 7  Conclusion

This conclusion chapter begins with a summary of major findings of this research. Then, it will discuss the contributions of this research, including the contribution to a comparative study approach, study of ideologies and visions of Prime Ministers, neoclassical realism as a tool for research as well as the practical contribution of the study to the constitutional revision of Japan. The third part identifies the shortcomings of this research which relates primarily to limitation of research data. The fourth part gives an account of the practical implications of the research findings of this dissertation on the domestic and international arena as well as the theoretical implications. The chapter concludes with suggestions for future research.

7.1 Summary of Major Findings

This dissertation has argued, using the approach of neoclassical realism, that it was with the primary forces of international structural factors, together with the influence of domestic variables, that contributed to the enactment of the national security initiatives of Japan in different extent during the Koizumi and the second Abe administrations. Findings from the comparative study of the two administrations showed that the international environment surrounding Japan in the second Abe administration was more precarious with a heightened sense of threat perception than that of the Koizumi administration. The China threat and the North Korea threat was much more intense in the second Abe administration as compared to the Koizumi administration. The pressure from the United States on Japan to shoulder greater responsibility for self-defence and international security also weighed more heavily on Japan in the second Abe administration as compared to the Koizumi administration. These differences provided the international background which contributed to enactment of the package of national security initiatives resulting in greater degree of normalization in the second Abe administration than the Koizumi administration.

In the domestic arena, analysis of the domestic variables under the Hilsman’s concentric circle of influence include consideration of the role and ideology of Prime Minister and Cabinet and the bureaucrats, the views of the ruling elite and opposition parties through Diet deliberations and elite interviews. The first major and striking difference between the two administrations is
the personal ideologies of the Prime Ministers. Compared to Koizumi, Abe was more a nationalist with the conviction to revise the Constitution, in particular Article 9. Koizumi’s national security initiatives were however more the result of the reliance and support of the U.S. ally than an independent motive to pursue constitutional revision. The views of the LDP ruling elite in the second layer of the concentric circle of influence has been giving persistent support to the national security initiative of the Prime Minister with the Komeito displaying limited reservation on the policy initiated by the government in the two administrations. The opposition parties in the two administrations have also been persistent in opposing the government initiative. Thus, analysis of the domestic variables under the Hilsman’s concentric circle of influence showed that the single most important difference in the domestic variables is the different Prime Minister in the two administrations who directed different course of national security initiatives which in turn led to greater extent of normalization in the second Abe administration as compared to the Koizumi administration.

The argument of this dissertation is that it is the primary force of the international environment together with the domestic variable with the role of Prime Minister at the concentric circle of influence that led to greater extent of normalization in the second Abe administration than the Koizumi administration. Koizumi has taken advantage of the 9-11 terrorist attack to push forward the three Emergency related legislations which has been shelved for decades but was an unfinished business carried out by his late father, a Director General of the Japan Defense Agency, when the “Three Arrows Study” (Mitsuya Kenkyu), the predecessor of the three Emergency related legislations, were first discussed in February 1965. It was also during the opportune moment of the terrorist attack that Koizumi was able to enact the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law and the law on Special Measures on Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance in Iraq such that Koizumi could showcase Japan’s support for the United States. In similar vein, the precarious international environment such as the rise of China and North Korea nuclear missile threat provided an important justification and ‘excuse’ for Prime Minister Abe to enact the Legislation for Peace and Security and to push for his constitutional revision initiative which was the historical mission he bears from his late grandfather Nobusuke Kishi. The argument of this is that both Prime Ministers has taken advantage of the turn of international events to provide the justification for national security initiatives which have been in their own agenda.
7.2 The Contributions of Study

The most important contribution of this research is that it shows the importance of Prime Ministers in dictating the course of foreign policy of Japan. By conducting a systematic comparison of the national security initiatives of the Koizumi and second Abe administration, it highlighted the differences in the personal ideologies and visions of these two Prime Ministers who have enjoyed the fruits of the administrative reforms in the 1990s and 2000s which empowered the Prime Minister and its Cabinet to exercise leadership. Previous studies have rarely studied the role of Prime Ministers of Japan from a comparative perspective because they were mostly ‘reactive leadership’ with policy making and direction stemming from the bottom-up consensus building. Both Prime Ministers Koizumi and Abe stood out from historical ‘reactive’ Japanese Prime Ministers who reacted and responded to the call of the circumstances. Both these two Prime Ministers are distinguished from previous Prime Ministers and have visions of their own and have taken the lead in initiating various national security initiatives through the top-down policy making process. They have also skillfully manipulated the turn of international environment in their favour and push for their desired domestic national security initiatives. A comparative analysis has highlighted their differences which contributed to their different national security strategies for Japan. They both contributed to making Japan a step closer to become a ‘normal country’ when Japan was not ‘normal’ in the sense that it was constrained by Article 9 of the post WWII Constitution from exercising the right of collective self-defence. A comparative study showed that Abe has deeper conviction and will than Koizumi in his pursuit of the right of collective self-defence and the dream of constitutional revision, and hence a giant step towards normalization.

Another contribution of this dissertation is that it is one of the first adoption of the theory of neoclassical realism to the comparative study of the national security initiatives of the two administrations which analyzed the primary influence of international structural factors as well as the domestic variables of influence of Prime Minister and political elite. While recognizing the pivotal role played by Prime Ministers, this dissertation acknowledged the primary and indispensable role of international structural drivers in directing the course of foreign policy of Japan. Prime Ministers did not act in the vacuum. Without the intense security environment that Japan was facing, both Prime Ministers could not pursue their desired foreign policy of
their liking. This dissertation gives credit to the value of the approach of neo-classical realism in understanding the foreign policy of contemporary Japan.

7.3 The Limitations of Study

During the duration of this research, I have encountered difficulty in getting sufficient respondents for my interviews, as constitutional revision is a controversial and heated debated topic which is politically very sensitive. However, among the limited number of interviewees, the quality of interviews has shown its diversification and representation, with interviews ranging from members of Committee of National Security and Constitution Review Board of House of Representatives, members of Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defence of the House of Councillors, former bureaucrats from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, as well as constitutional scholars from Japan and Western countries. Also, even at the interviews that I managed to get, the respondents who are current Diet members showed reservations and restraint at answering the interview questions as a result of the political sensitivity of the issue of constitutional revision.

A further limitation of research data relates to Nippon Kaigi. As Nippon Kaigi rose to the public eye during the second Abe administration and that Prime Minister Abe himself and many LDP members of the Diet are closely affiliated with Nippon Kaigi, this research intended to delve into this organization to see how it has affected the national security policy making of the second Abe administration. However, only one interviewee belongs to Nippon Kaigi and he refused to make any comment on Nippon Kaigi itself. Other interviewees who are not member of Nippon Kaigi have little other than superficial comment on the organization. Thus, the research on the Nippon Kaigi itself was focused on its official website, newspaper reporting and the spokesman of the Nippon Kaigi on youtube.

To address the shortcomings of limited interview data, I have supplemented my data through research on the archival seminars and interviews of Japanese politicians on youtube. Notwithstanding the fact that they are not personally interviewed by me, they have provided their personal views on various topics on the Legislation for Peace and Security and the constitutional revision initiatives of the second Abe administration as well as their views on Japan’s relations with China, North Korea and the United States. One limitation of the use of
youtube data as a research data is that it will be removed by the author upon expiration of certain period so I can only access the archival seminars and interviews for the second Abe administration but not for the Koizumi administration. Further, there will be a practical difficulty to locate the youtube data for future researchers, unlike other research data such as books and journal publications which are available for future reference for practically unlimited time.

7.4 Implications of the Research Findings

The first and foremost implication of this research is the impact of the ideology of Prime Ministers or Presidents on foreign policy making. Prime Minister Koizumi and Abe were chosen as case studies in this research because they are proactive leaders who have their own perception and ideology with a vision of what the future Japan should become. This research carries implication for the study of Prime Ministers and Presidents in contemporary world in general. The world has witnessed very assertive leaders like Donald Trump of the United States, Xi Jinping of China and Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin of Russia whose ideology and vision could carry important weight on the direction of foreign policy of a country. The leaders, democratic country or not, has seen wielding enormous influence in putting forward their desired course of action for the country. The implication of this research is that it is not limited to Japan but is applicable to worldwide leaders that they have been exerting great influence on foreign policymaking of a country.

This research also carries implication in the domestic and international angle. From a domestic angle, it carries implication to the changing national security strategy of Japan. The Koizumi administration has paved the way for Japan to become a ‘normal’ country and the second Abe administration has taken advantage of the precarious international security environment as an excuse to reinterpret Article 9 of the Constitution. Now that Japan can exercise the right of collective self-defence, there were views that Japan can exercise a more independent national security strategy as it has regained the power to safeguard its own national security in its own hands. In reality, Japan has now become a relatively more equal partner of the U.S.-Japan Security Alliance capable of shouldering more responsibility not only for her own national security but also for international security. Japan thus has higher risks of being dragged in the international security operation led by the United States provided that the three requirements
for the exercise of the collective self-defence are met. It is only time can tell whether Japan can be more independent or even more dependent on the United States in its national security policy.

From an international perspective, Japan’s gaining the right of collective self-defence and the pending constitutional revision, in particular Article 9 of the Constitution can have great international implications, in particular to the balance of power and regional security in East Asia. Time and again, Asian countries, in particular China and Korea, expressed criticism at Japan’s act of reinterpretation of the Constitution and the constitution revision proposals. WWII memories is still in the minds of the Asian countries and they have expressed their fear of revival of militarism of Japan. Should the pending constitutional revision of Article 9 become a reality, it will stir antagonism and suspicion from Asian countries on the belief that Japan did not genuinely repent its wartime atrocities. The international security environment in East Asia will be more intense. The turn of events in 2018 on the North Korea denuclearization issue has shown that Japan was the only East Asian country to be completely left out from the negotiation table. China, on the other hand, was seen as the big brother of North Korea. The exercise of the collective self-defence and hence the revision of Article 9 of the Constitution will further isolate Japan, with the last resort of leaning more closely to the United States. Hence, the Constitution revision initiative will intensify the regional security environment in East Asia with Japan surrounded by suspicious East Asian neighbours.

In addition to the practical implications of this study, the findings of this research also carry theoretical implications on the value of the approach of neoclassical realism in the study of international relations. Historically, the theory of neorealism is the dominant theoretical approach of the international relations. This research has adopted the approach of neoclassical realism which builds on the wisdom of the neorealism and also considered the influence of domestic variables. In the case studies of this research, it analyzed the domestic variables of the institutional framework of strengthened power of the Cabinet, ideological and nationalist Prime Ministers, the climate of antimilitarism prevalent in post WWII Japan. These domestic variables have a bearing on the final foreign policy direction of Japan in the face of external threats from China and North Korea. It is with the insight from the approach of neoclassical realism that national security initiatives of Japan during the two administrations can be adequately comprehended. It is anticipated that the approach of neoclassical realism can be further developed and refined, particularly in the study of States which have powerful
institutional framework, influential ideological or nationalistic sentiment which may determine the course of foreign policy in the face of external structural imperatives.

7.5 Suggestions for Future Research

The contemporary study of foreign relations needs to take into consideration both the influences of international structural factors and domestic variables, the neglect of either of which would make an analysis incomplete. The international security environment in East Asia was dominated by the North Korea threat, rise of China and the enduring influence of the United States which were contemporary recurring themes in the international security environment. While the domestic environment in East Asia differed, this research has implications for future research on Prime Ministers in East Asia in general. This research takes the case of Japan’s domestic environment and the growing power and personal influence of two of Japan’s Prime Ministers as subjects of research. However, this phenomenon of growing personal influence of country leaders is not limited to Japan but can be seen in leaders of other countries such as President Xi Jinping of China and Donald Trump of the United States. While international structural factors remain to be of pivotal importance for foreign policy analysis, the personal ideologies and convictions of Prime Ministers has a growing bearing on foreign policy of a country and is a fruitful area for future research.

Neoclassical realism builds upon the theory of neorealism which emphasized the primacy of structural imperatives, and considers also domestic variables. There is no exhaustive list of domestic variables. The domestic variables in the case studies in this research were subjectively chosen by the author in view of the two proactive, nationalistic and ideological Prime Ministers, ideology of pacifism and antimilitarism in Japan as the historical legacy of the end of WWII and the surge of right-wing activism, especially in the second Abe administration. These domestic variables were chosen having considered the unique situation of Japan taking into account her political, historical and cultural background. Future research taking the approach of neoclassical realism can consider how these domestic variables have persistent or dwindling influence on foreign policy making of Japan in different historical point of time.

Further, the theoretical approach of neoclassical realism has proved to be useful to the study of the enactment of the national security initiatives of Japan. There can be future research to
further test the applicability of the theory of neoclassical realism in the study of other foreign policy initiatives of Japan. Alternatively, it may be worthwhile to apply the theory of neoclassical realism to study the foreign policy initiatives of other East Asian countries so as to understand `how far the intertwining forces of international structural factors and domestic variables would contribute to the individual foreign policy objectives.
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### Appendix  List of Interviews from March 2017 to February 2018

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Interview Number</th>
<th>Position of Interviewee</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Former bureaucrat in Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan and current professor in Japanese Studies in Chinese University of Hong Kong</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Professor in international relations of International Christian University</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Former bureaucrat in Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan and current senior staff at Institute for International Strategy of The Japan Research Institute, Limited</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Former member of the House of Representatives of Japan (2010-2016), previous member of LDP but political affiliation changed to People’s New Party, The Party for Japanese Kokoro and Japan Innovation Party in later years of his political career. He got a Ph.D in politics in an American university</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>LDP member of the House of Representatives of Japan since 2003 and belongs to the Committee of National Security of the House of Representatives of Japan. He is a member of Nippon Kaigi.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>LDP member of the House of Representatives of Japan since 1996 and belongs to the Constitution Review Board of the House of Representatives of Japan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Professor of Japanese Politics in Sophia University</td>
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<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Professor in constitutional law in Kanagawa University</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>A Japanese Communist Party Member and a Member of House of Councillors of Japan since 2001. He belongs to the Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defence of the House of Councillors of Japan</td>
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