A Temporal Metaphysics for Affective Attitudes

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The candidate confirms that the work submitted is his own and that appropriate credit has been given when reference has been made to the work of others.

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Abstract

This thesis endeavours to achieve two things: first, it exposits a version of presentism, the doctrine that only present concrete entities exist, that is enriched with haecceities, the non-qualitative, essential properties of entities that characterise their essences. I argue that haecceity presentism provides strong responses to problematics traditionally faced by presentism (providing ontology for singular propositions, truthmaking, and cross-temporal relations and causation) without violating any of presentism's strictures. I also distinguish my version of haecceity presentism from other versions, and argue my version is the strongest.

Second, I deploy haecceities to mount novel lines of attack on critical elements of the B-theory: eternalism, perdurance, and stage theory. These attacks say that each of these tenseless theories of time and persistence cannot adequately rationalise and vindicate the importance of emotions in our lives, and how they contribute to crucially important projects such as rehabilitation. Further, these tenseless theories generate critical problems with some of our moral practices, such as blame, as well as generating radically alienating consequences for it. Consequently, tenseless theorists should either acknowledge the importance of emotions and reject their theories, or be honest and transparent in accepting that they cannot rationalise or vindicate emotions.
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INTRODUCTION

My thesis consists of two thematic halves. The first half is devoted to the exposition, defence and demonstration of the philosophical utility of a particular version of presentism. Presentism is the thesis that only present concrete entities exist. Unless we qualify or modify this basic thesis, however, familiar problems creep in: for example, how can singular reference to past concrete entities occur if there are no such entities? I argue that by enriching the classic presentist ontology of present concrete objects with haecceities, such problems can be answered. This is because haecceities can function as surrogates for past entities without violating presentism’s strict ontological constraints.

A haecceity, within the context of this version of presentism, is a non-qualitative, uniquely instantiated property of an entity that characterises its essence: the being Bertrand Russell unique to Bertrand Russell. My haecceity presentism shares its foundation and motivation with the thisness presentism of David Ingram, though it differs in certain fundamental respects.

Why defend haecceity presentism? In short, and recalling the title of this thesis, I think it provides a compelling temporal metaphysics of affective attitudes: in other words, I think haecceity presentism allows us to justify and vindicate, in a very deep sense, various critical strands of our emotional experiences – such as grief, regret, and hope – by connecting them to something metaphysically robust rather than ‘merely’ psychological.

The first half begins with a chapter concerning technical matters about the nature of a haecceity, and includes arguments for two aspects of a haecceity’s nature that may seem controversial: that there are haecceities of past and present but not future entities, and that they can exist uninstantiated.

I go on to deploy haecceity presentism to see how it fares against traditional presentist problematics: singular reference, truthmaking, and cross-temporal relations. I also argue that haecceity presentists should understand causation as counterfactual dependence, as this understanding sits very well with their ontology.

Throughout, I consider and argue against objections about the suitability of haecceities for such work, and offer significant differences between my haecceity presentism and David Ingram’s in the section on truthmaking. I also argue that my version of haecceity presentism avoids some problems that Ingram’s faces, so it is stronger.

The second half is concerned with our emotions, our relationship to ourselves and our prior immoral or imprudent actions, and some ethical dilemmas generated by believing in past concrete entities, or those parts of ourselves which have temporal extent in the past.

I argue that for our emotions to enjoy the deep vindication we take them to have, for them to be rational and intelligible, we must deny the existence of the past and invoke haecceities which survive the demise of the past entities that they characterise. The emotional attitudes I am mainly concerned with are: grief, repentance and rehabilitation, horror, and hope.

First, I argue against the intelligibility of grieving a deceased entity when the entity itself is still real with respect to all times. I consider, next, what a metaphysic of temporal parts or person stages might mean for our conception of action and responsibility, certain elements of our moral practice and attributions (such as blame), and how repentance and rehabilitation could occur when our prior immoral or imprudent actions are also real with
respect to all times. Again, I argue that haecceity presentism permits space for genuine overcoming of past immoral or imprudent actions.

Next, I discuss the implications of events being real with respect to all times and what this means for greatly disvalued events that are part of our own history and history more generally. The eternality of these events generates what I call *chronal horrors*. I argue that the existence of chronal horrors gives eternalism a radically alienating character.

Finally, I consider hope in relation to the open future, epistemology, and the experience of change. I argue that for hopes to be genuinely satisfied, reality must be confined to the present.

The thesis offers two major conclusions. The first, noted above, is that my version of haecceity presentism offers good responses to problems traditionally faced by presentism, and that it is also the strongest version of haecceity presentism. Secondly, that haecceity presentism permits a novel line of attack against tenseless theories of time and persistence that generates potent problems for them that have not been answered. Either the tenseless theorists relent and accept the truth of presentism, or accept that their theories have no place for the rationalisation of the emotional lives (and, to a degree, moral lives) of persons, and that as a result, they are profoundly alienating.

Ultimately, though, I endeavour to give a clear, positive reason for one to be a haecceity presentist: it does something (rationalise and vindicate our emotions, personally and ethically) that a tenseless theory cannot. Thus, the presentist, often stuck in the rut of defending her theory, can launch an attack: she need only embrace haecceity presentism.
PART I – THE PROSPECTS FOR HAECCEITY PRESENTISM

SUMMARY

This is the first thematic half of my thesis. In this, I exposit a particular version of presentism – haecceity presentism – which, perhaps obviously, is a version of presentism with the addition of haecceities. I understand haecceities to be non-qualitative, uniquely instantiated properties that serve to characterise the essence of their unique object. In other words, my haecceity characterises my essence as being Kyle Buckle-Hodgson.

Chapter 1 is concerned with articulating what a haecceity is and defending two of its characteristics: first, that there are only haecceities of past and present entities, and second, that haecceities continue to exist uninstantiated when the objects of which they are haecceities cease to exist (e.g. my haecceity continues after my death). The argument for the former concerns the contingency of future objects, whilst the argument for the latter concerns a non-standard, temporal notion of ontological dependence.

With haecceity presentism defined, I turn to the task of using it to provide responses to well established problems for presentism. This is to vindicate haecceities as posits by demonstrating their ability to undertake philosophical labour.

The first problem, dealt with in chapter 2, is the problem of singular propositions. The problem of singular propositions for presentists, simply put, is that propositions depend for their existence on the existence of the proposition’s constituents. So, the proposition "Bertrand Russell was wise" depends for its existence on Russell himself. But Russell doesn’t exist for presentists. Of course, the haecceity presentist says the proposition depends, rather, on Russell’s haecceity (and, for me, it always depended on his haecceity, even when Russell was alive – here Ingram and I diverge). For this chapter, I am largely concerned with a battery of arguments from Ned Markosian (2004) and the objection that singular propositions are really about their concrete constituents – about Russell, in this case – and not about haecceities.

The second problem, truthmaking, is the subject matter of chapter 3. The problem for presentists is this: truth seems to depend substantively on ontology. That is, the truth of a proposition like "Caesar crossed the Rubicon" depends, partly, on Caesar. But this is a proposition about the past, so a presentist does not have Caesar around for that dependence. How does the presentist account for this proposition’s truth, then? I argue that haecceities, as bearers of tensed properties, indirectly characterise the properties of their objects such that true propositions about the past are made true by haecceities. I defend this particular relationship between haecceities and their objects, as well as the philosophical value of tensed properties. Here, I also express disagreement with Ingram about the role haecceities play in truthmaking, and with how he handles the objection that, as with singular propositions, truths are about what makes them true, and thus not about haecceities. I also argue that haecceity presentism respects the intuition that the past has explanatory priority over the present with respect to truths about the past.

Chapter 4 concerns the third problem of cross-temporal relations. Presentists believe in only one time, the present. But causal relations occur across more than one time. Thus, presentists cannot account for cross-temporal relations. As with truthmaking, I argue that haecceities are the bearers of tensed properties, though in this instance they characterise an object’s former causal powers such that they can offer an account of cross-temporal relations. I go on in Chapter 5, following some remarks by Craig Bourne (2006), to
say haecceity presentists should adopt a counterfactual account of causation, as it sits particularly well with their commitments.

Finally, there is a short appendix in which I attempt to address some concerns that haecceities are suspicious or an instance of cheating.
Chapter 1 – The Theory of Haecceity Presentism

1.1 - Sketching Haecceity Presentism

Haecceity presentism is committed to haecceities; it is haecceities that distinguish it from other formulations of presentism and it is haecceities that take on a good deal of the metaphysical labour. A haecceity is a property of an entity and it is the property of being that particular entity – it characterises its primitive identity. So, for any particular entity, that entity’s haecceity is the property of being identical with itself. So, for example, my haecceity, of Kyle Buckle-Hodgson, is the property being Kyle Buckle-Hodgson. It is primitive, insofar as it is not reducible to any more fundamental properties, and it is uniquely mine, as in constituting my primitive identity it cannot be instantiated by anyone else. I do not discriminate on whether only certain kinds of entities have haecceities. Indeed, I am very permissive with haecceities, as I believe they can do, and shall argue they can do, lots of significant work. I also do not think there are different kinds of haecceity that correspond to different kinds of entities. For example, there is no difference in what a haecceity is between the natural and artefactual, as haecceities are merely the properties of being this particular table, or being this particular woman (e.g. being Keshet Buckle-Hodgson). If one believes in haecceities, there are certainly a good deal of them, but there are not different kinds of haecceities.

Haecceity presentism has been alluded to here and there in the philosophy of time literature. Simon Keller calls it ‘Haecceitist Presentism’ (2004). Markosian attacks an analogue of it (2004). The view is sometimes attributed to Timothy Williamson (1998), though his articulation of it is formulated outside the typical contours of the debate in the philosophy of time, and thus such a classification feels procrustean (and, for my money, Williamson’s remarks fit better with the moving spotlight theory). Recently, David Ingram (2016, 2018) has made a sustained effort to rehabilitate it as a respectable position by demonstrating the work haecceities can do for any presentist. Ingram has put his version of haecceity presentism (which he calls ‘Thisness Presentism’) to task on the problems of singular reference for presentists, truthmaking, temporal passage, and the open future. Mine and Ingram’s haecceity presentism share a common core, as all versions of a haecceity enriched presentism should, but there are also significant differences in our analyses of singular reference (and, thus, truthmaking) and how we express the properties of haecceities. But my ultimate contribution to the debate, really, is to demonstrate that haecceity presentism is essential if one wants to find certain kinds of emotional attitudes rational or capable of rationalising actions: that is, if one desires the depth and substantivity of our emotions to be thoroughly vindicated. And by essential, I really do mean that certain kinds of emotions – grief, remorse – cannot be rationalised at all on not only a non-presentist, non-endurantist metaphysic, but a non-haecceity presentist one too. Furthermore, I shall argue that belief in the past and future and belief in persons being some kind of temporally extended entity – that is, having ‘bits’ in the past or future – generates very problematic results ethically also.

1.2 - Getting Clearer on Haecceities

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1 I phrase views of persistence that involve some portion of the temporal extent of a person being ‘located’ in the past or future neutrally, though inelegantly, to insulate my criticisms against the charge that I am only attacking perdurantism. I am arguing that any view of persistence that involves the existence of the past and future generates very serious problems.
Let us be as precise about what a haecceity is as one can. As mentioned, a haecceity is a property. It is a property that is particular to an entity, primitive and non-qualitative. My haecceity, then, being Kyle Buckle-Hodgson, can only be instantiated by me, and the same is true for your haecceity and you, and for the particular haecceity of any particular entity. Following this, it is an essential property, as my haecceity is only ever instantiated by me and, as such, is my individual essence. Further, though my haecceity involves me, I do not constitute it, for, as mentioned, it is primitive.

What is important for haecceities is that they can exist uninstantiated. Imagine Robert. Robert is born on 1st January 1931 and dies on the 1st January 2001. Robert’s haecceity comes into existence when he comes into existence on 1st January 1931. But his haecceity does not cease to exist on the 1st January 2001. Rather, it continues to exist uninstantiated. Thus, for haecceity presentism, there are haecceities for past and present objects in existence but not future entities, for those entities do not exist such that their haecceity does too (they have not yet begun to exist). There is no tension between the existence of the haecceities of past entities for presentists, for the haecceities do not require the existence of past entities to exist presently and it is the haecceities of past entities that function as the present surrogates for past entities in matters of singular reference, truth making, cross-temporal relations etc.

So far, then, we have two important aspects of haecceities that seem advantageous to presentists. The first important aspect is that the haecceities of past and present entities exist, but not future ones. The second important aspect is that haecceities can exist uninstantiated. It is time to examine these aspects closer.

1.3 - Haecceities: Past, Present, but Not Future.

This particular argument is built from an argument by Robert Adams (1981) about the haecceities of non-actual entities. Adams’ argument can be summarised as follows: actualism is the thesis that only actual entities exist. Adams contends that since: a) actualism is inconsistent with the existence of the haecceities of non-actual entities and b) actualism is true, we should reject the haecceities of non-actual entities. Why is actualism inconsistent with the existence of non-actual entities? It is because a property of the form being (that is to say, identical with) x cannot exist if there is no x that has never existed, for something is required to exist such that it can instantiate being (that is to say, identical with) x. And if x is not actual, then x has never existed. Or, as Adams puts the point:

To be the property of being identical with a particular individual is to stand, primitively, in a unique relation with that individual. This relation between an individual and its thisness is the crux of the argument. It would be absurd to suppose that being the property of being identical with me could be a purely internal feature of my thisness, not implying any relation to me. The relation between an individual and its thisness is essential to both of them. My thisness is a property that I would have in every possible world in which I would exist — but equally, my thisness could not exist without being mine. It could not exist without being the thisness of Robert Merrihew Adams. So if there were a thisness of a non-actual individual, it would stand, primitively, in a relation to that individual. But according to actualism non-actual individuals cannot enter primitively into any relation. It seems to follow that according to actualism there cannot be a thisness of a non-actual individual. (1981: 11)

Adams, then, is asserting that the existence of a haecceity for a particular concrete entity, x, suggests a relation with x that could not obtain if x was non-actual and, thus, did not exist. In
effect, Adams is saying that: 1), x's haecceity could not exist without being x's haecceity and 2), x's haecceity could not exist without the actual existence of x. In short: it is impossible for x's haecceity to exist without the initial existence of x.

That is the purely modal dimension of the argument. What of the argument when made with an additional temporal dimension, pertaining to the non-existence of haecceities of future entities? Again, Adams confronts this:

I was born in 1937. Among the many metaphysically possible continuations of the actual history of the world up until, say, 1935, there are surely some in which I would never have existed. It is plausible to conclude that I could have failed to exist even given everything that existed in 1935, or that had existed before then, or that exists timelessly—and, conversely, that all of those things could have existed even if I had never existed. But, as I have argued, neither my thisness nor any singular propositions about me exists in any metaphysically possible world in which I never exist; they are not among the things that could have existed even if I had never existed. It follows that they are not among the things that existed in 1935, or before, or that exist timelessly. My thisness, and singular propositions about me, cannot have pre-existed me because if they had, it would have been possible for them to have existed even if I had never existed, and that is not possible. (1986: 316-7)

Ingram (2016: 2871) glosses the argument thus: suppose that x is a contingent existent. Prior to x's existence, it is metaphysically possible that x fails to exist. So, accordingly, we can suppose there is some world, w, according to which it is possible, at time t0, that x will exist at time t1, and it is also possible that x, at t0, will not exist at t1. According to Adams, then, the existence of x's haecceity implies a relation with x that could not obtain if x were non-actual (so: x's haecceity could not exist without the existence of x). Given, however, that at w at t0 it is indeterminate whether x will actually exist, x's haecceity cannot exist at w prior to x's existence at t1. Furthermore, given the character of haecceities, x cannot exist and fail to instantiate its haecceity. Thus, x's haecceity comes into existence with x.

Adam's argument, however, does rest on a thesis about the contingent existence of future entities:

For any two entities, x and y, and for any time t, if x existed before t (or if x exists timelessly), and y exists contingently and comes into existence at t, then it would be metaphysically possible for x to have existed even if y had never existed (1986: 317)

And such a principle should sit very well indeed with presentists, for it respects the intuition that the existence of future entities is a contingent matter. Were it not a contingent matter, were the existence of future entities somehow fixed, then the future would fail to be open; there would be a fact of the matter about what would be, for what would be already is. But such a thought is unacceptable for presentists, for they do not believe in the existence of the future. Adams’ argument comports well with one motivation for presentism.

So here are the central claims about haecceities endorsed by haecceity presentism (and, more generally, by most ontologies that endorse haecceities in some fashion: Ingram (2016, 2018) shares them, for example): one, x's haecceity comes into existence with x (thus, no future haecceities). Two, x's haecceity is uniquely instantiated by x throughout x's existence.

A further important claim, noted earlier, is that x's haecceity continues to exist, without being instantiated after x ceases to exist. The defence of this is the next task.

1.4 - Existing Without Instantiation
Ingram (2016: 2872) identifies a concern with the argument for the nonexistence of haecceities of future entities: can it be utilised in some fashion to undermine the relationship between haecceities and the past entities of which they were haecceities? In other words, the argument against the haecceities of future entities is based on the fact that it is in the very nature of haecceities that they bear a relation between the haecceity and the entity that exemplifies it. Such a relation cannot obtain if that entity is future for, as a presentist position, haecceity presentism denies the existence of future entities. Is this relationship, however, problematic for the haecceities of past entities? For they do not exist either for the presentist. Or, in short: if haecceities require a relationship between themselves and their object, and past objects do not exist as future ones do not, then what permits the existence of past haecceities beyond the ceasing of their object? That is, how can they exist uninstantiated?

The obvious retort is that past and future entities are distinguished by the former having existed, whereas the latter have not. But that still leaves the relationship between a haecceity and its object obscure, since one of the relata does not exist by the presentist’s lights and for a relation to be genuine, or real, both of the relata need to exist. Something needs to be said of this relation between a haecceity and the (past) entity that exemplified it.

Ingram attempts to distinguish between two kinds of ontological dependence and which one is at work in the relation between a haecceity and its entity. I will articulate his view of dependence before sharing some concerns. A claim common to any version of haecceity presentism, then, is that an entity’s haecceity depends on that entity having existed. For example, the existence of Robert’s haecceity implies a relation with Robert that could not obtain if Robert had never existed. Of course, this is not to say that Robert’s haecceity cannot exist without Robert; it is important for haecceity presentism that this is not so, for it would deprive haecceities of their ability to function as present surrogates for past entities. So, the kind of dependence at work between Robert and his haecceity is going to be an atypical one. One might say that Robert’s haecceity depends on Robert inasmuch as Robert’s haecceity could not exist without the initial existence of Robert. Such a formulation of the dependence at issue, however, does not imply that Robert’s haecceity ceases to exist when Robert ceases to exist, as Ingram notes (2016: 2873). The initial existence of any concrete entity is sufficient for the existence of its haecceity, but the ceasing to exist of that entity does not take its haecceity with it.

This is all well and good but anyone sceptical of such an explanation will likely levy the following (particularly well-worn against presentism) objection: relations, genuine ones, only obtain between relata that exist. One of the relatum in your putative relation does not exist. So it is not a genuine relation and thus there is no genuine relation between a haecceity and an entity that has ceased to exist; haecceities cannot exist uninstantiated.

Ingram’s solution to this worry is to distinguish between two kinds of ontological dependence: rigid and non-rigid. Rigid, Ingram contends, is the typical construal of ontological dependence in metaphysics. He offers the following characterisation of rigid ontological dependence from Lowe:

\[ x \text{ rigidly ontologically depends on } y \iff (i) \text{ necessarily, } x \text{ exists only if } y \text{ exists; and, (ii) it’s not the case that, necessarily, } y \text{ exists only if } x \text{ exists.} \quad (2010: 1) \]

Ingram presents an example to illustrate this (2016: 2873): consider an individual, Colbert, and the set whose only member is Colbert, \{Colbert\} (Colbert’s singleton). \{Colbert\} rigidly ontologically depends on Colbert, as \{Colbert\} exists only if Colbert exists, and it is certainly not the case that Colbert exists only if \{Colbert\} exists; of course, if \{Colbert\} exists, then
Colbert must exist, but this does little to impeach the ontological asymmetry between sets and their members, for sets exist in virtue of their members but not vice versa. All this is to the effect that if one object rigidly ontologically depends on another for its existence, then the former object cannot exist without the latter object: for example, if \( x \) rigidly ontologically depends on \( y \) for its existence, then \( x \) cannot exist without \( y \) (Ingram, 2016: 2873).

Ingram then attempts to articulate the notion of non-rigid ontological dependence. For this, he borrows from Diekemper (2015). The basic idea is that \( x \)'s haecceity non-rigidly ontologically depends on \( x \). Non-rigidity is to be understood as a temporal, rather than modal, notion. The existence of \( x \)'s haecceity ontologically depends on \( x \)'s initial existence, but \( x \)'s haecceity does not continue to depend on \( x \); rather, \( x \)'s haecceity has depended on \( x \) (2015: 65-66). In short, \( x \)'s haecceity depended on the initial existence of \( x \). \( x \)'s haecceity does not always non-rigidly ontologically depend on the existence of \( x \), however; the relationship does not hold, for example, when \( x \) does not exist. But, Ingram says, this is no problem when one buys into Diekemper’s notion of non-rigid ontological dependence: there was some time at which a haecceity ontologically depends on an entity and that is the initial existence of that entity. With that in view, Ingram offers his definition of asymmetric temporal non-rigid ontological dependence:

\[
\text{x non-rigidly ontologically depends on y =df (i) necessarily, x exists only if y has existed; and, (ii) it's not the case that, necessarily, y exists only if x has existed. (2016: 2874)}
\]

This is supposed to capture the thought that if \( x \) non-rigidly ontologically depends on \( y \) for its existence, then \( x \) cannot exist without the initial existence of \( y \). And that is supposed to be the way in which a haecceity non-rigidly ontologically depends on its entity for its existence.

I think the notion of non-rigid ontological dependence is likely to be met with some measure of scepticism, largely because it seems, at first blush, conveniently contrived to produce a form of ontological dependence suited to presentists. If non-rigid ontological dependence is innocent, then what is to stop a presentist trying out analogous moves, such as tensing the truthmaking or grounding relation, such that historical truths, for example, supervene on what was the case, where what was the case carries no commitment to past entities. That way, the truth of propositions about the past depend for their truth on the initial existence of past entities, but do not require the continued existence of such entities. That seems to be one way to have a kind of grounding for truths about the past for presentists without contravening any ontological strictures. It also has an air of cheating to it, as though someone who subscribed to such a move is invoking ontological resources to which they are not properly entitled.

The situation with non-rigid ontological dependence is, I think, not the same. There are some disanalogies between the tensed truthmaking and haecceity presentist approach. First, it is very difficult to understand what role, exactly, the past plays in the tensed truthmaking approach. There is both an affirmation and disavowal of past entities: truth supervenes on what existed, but what existed does not exist now – but, nevertheless, truth still does supervene on it. But! Past entities do not exist (and so on). So, the past lies, presumably, in the same shadowy regions of the ontological atlas as Meinong’s jungle, troubled by existing but not existing, playing a role in a truthmaking relation but not playing a role in any such relation. But a haecceity presentist invokes no past entities at all. There is just the presently existing haecceity – and that is not a past concrete entity.

Secondly, on reflection, I think non-rigid ontological dependence captures something of a fairly intuitive understanding of one kind of dependence. All the instances of a species,
for example, may die out, but the species itself does not perish with its instances – the kind ‘dodo’ has persisted without any of its members, and so on. But the initial existence of that kind, plausibly, depended upon their being some first member of that kind. Analogously, one might say that the relationship between artworks and their instances is another example of non-rigid ontological dependence – ‘Hamlet’, for example, did not exist prior to Shakespeare writing it but it does not depend for its existence thereafter on any particular instance of the play. The situation is complicated if every instance of Hamlet is destroyed simultaneously. But I do not think it is obviously wrong to suggest that, if the world suffered some great literary catastrophe where all of Shakespeare’s plays were eradicated in print and memory, any subsequent writing of an exact duplicate of ‘Hamlet’, unbeknownst to the author, is a rediscovery rather than a new play.

This section has covered two potential lines of attack for any version of presentism with an ontology enriched by haecceities. The first was the defence of the claim that there are no haecceities of future entities. It was argued that a haecceity only comes into existence concomitantly with the entity whose haecceity it is. Given that there are no future entities that are in existence, there are no future haecceities. The second was concerned with the relationship between a haecceity and the entity whose haecceity it is. It was argued, following Ingram and Diekemper, that there are two kinds of ontological dependence, and that haecceities and their objects exhibit non-rigid ontological dependence, which is acceptable to a presentist. Further, I argued that non-rigid ontological dependence is far from a metaphysician’s ad hoc contrivance and reflects an intuitive understanding of dependence in our everyday understanding, as well as cohering with one view of the relationship between kinds and their members.
Chapter Two – Singular Propositions

The following chapters are concerned with the application of haecceity presentism to some problems that have, traditionally, been considered difficult for presentists. The solutions to such problems turn on the haecceities invoked by haecceity presentism. Thus, in providing solutions to these problems, I hope to vindicate the inclusion of haecceities in the haecceity presentist ontology.

In what follows, I shall cover the problem of singular reference, the problem of truthmaking, and the problem of cross-temporal relations. This can be considered the defensive portion of my thesis, intended to demonstrate the usefulness of haecceities in dissolving some typical presentist problematics.

2.1 - Singular Propositions and the Haecceity Presentist Solution

Take any past concrete entity. I shall use Bertrand Russell. I shall assume, not unfairly, that Bertrand Russell was clever. So, the following sentence, ‘Bertrand Russell was clever’, is true and expresses a true proposition, <Bertrand Russell was clever>. This is a singular proposition. The expression of the proposition by a sentence uses a name, ‘Bertrand Russell’, and is about the direct referent of the very name used in that sentence, Bertrand Russell, the man. So, if you think that singular propositions are structured by their constituents, and their constituents determine what the proposition is about, then you would need the relevant ontology to function as constituents – in this example, you would need Bertrand Russell. Presentists, of course, do not believe in any past entities. This presents a difficulty: if singular propositions are dependent on their constituents, and the constituents themselves constitute what the proposition is about, then what possible constituents can a presentist provide for singular propositions about past entities? Not Bertrand Russell, as he no longer exists.

But the situation is not so bad for haecceity presentism. This is because it is not immediately obvious that a singular proposition cannot be about haecceities. And this is what Adams is getting at here:

…a singular proposition about an individual x is a proposition that involves or refers to x directly, perhaps by having x or the thinness of x as a constituent, and not merely by way of x’s qualitative properties or relations to other individuals (1986: 315)

The crux, then, is that singular propositions can have an entity’s haecceity as a constituent rather than the entity itself; so singular propositions about the past are constituted by the relevant entity’s haecceity, and so does not invoke any past entities, and is thus consistent with presentism. To return to the previous example, <Bertrand Russell was clever>, the proposition is constituted by Russell’s haecceity, being Bertrand Russell, and not Russell himself. The proposition, then, is about Bertrand Russell in virtue of Russell’s haecceity being a constituent in the proposition. This solution is intended to generalise to all singular propositions concerning past entities: such propositions are constituted by the presently existing haecceities of past entities.

Such a solution is not novel: it has been toyed with by Adams, as seen above, and William Lane Craig (2002). It has, in outline, been argued strongly against by Markosian (2004). But it has not been thoroughly explored until late, with only David Ingram (2016, 2018), again, interested in resuscitating it. I follow, in part, Ingram’s articulation of the fundamentals of the view, but introduce very significant points of disagreement in how we individually understand haecceity presentism in the next chapter on truthmaking.
In summary, though, I think that a haecceity presentist response to the problem of singular propositions is plausible. In order to support that claim, I will now examine some criticisms levied against the use of haecceities in singular propositions.

2.2 - Asymmetry

This problem of asymmetry is from Markosian (2004). The gist of it is that the haecceity presentist solution fails to account for singular propositions about the future (there are no haecceities of future entities to function in such an account, for a haecceity comes into being concomitantly with the entity whose haecceity it is). Markosian thinks this is unacceptable as it produces an asymmetry between the past and the future – there are singular propositions about the former, but not the latter. This is unacceptable, Markosian thinks, as any presentist solution to the problem of singular propositions should treat the past and future as perfectly analogous (2004: 55).

Like Ingram, however, (2016: 2876), I am not entirely sure why any presentist would seek to keep the past and future perfectly analogous. There is no inconsistency in believing in the present haecceities of past entities and being a presentist. Granted, a presentist should indeed endorse a symmetry of ontology – there are no past and future entities. And that is true for the haecceity presentist as well as any other. But endorsing an ontological symmetry does not entail other kinds of symmetry, principally temporal symmetry. Indeed, I think that temporal asymmetry is an important part of being a presentist in the first place and figures importantly in our explanation of our emotional attitudes to the past and future: for example, the past is that which has ceased to exist and the object of certain kinds of attitudes (remorse, grief). Regardless of whether one buys into that kind of support for temporal asymmetry, other intuitions about temporal asymmetry are common: for example, the past is fixed, the future is open and the metaphors dealing with the past and future (the past ‘recedes’, the future ‘approaches’). I see no good reasons for a presentist to reject this disanalogy between past and future. In fact, it seems important.

As for Markosian’s claim that symmetry in ontology mandates symmetry in true singular propositions, so I must believe in true past and future singular propositions, I simply deny, again, that ontological symmetry places any demand on what true singular propositions there are, for the same reasons. That which is past was once present – thus, we have the haecceities of those once present entities, and that is one reason why haecceity presentists can say there are true singular propositions about the past. But that is not the case for future entities, so that is one reason why haecceity presentists can say there are no true singular propositions about the future.

Markosian could go on to simply insist that there are true singular propositions about future entities. This would spell trouble if it worked out, for haecceity presentism does not have the resources for the constituents of such propositions. What might be an example of such a proposition? Ingram introduces a familiar one (2016: 2877): suppose I have a lump of clay that I am going to carve into a statue, Goliath. I can, it would seem, entertain various beliefs about Goliath in which he figures as a constituent, e.g. ‘Goliath will be 80 pounds’, ‘Goliath will stand in the town square’ etc. So, there are singular propositions about future entities, like <Goliath will be 80 pounds>, that are true, which is a problem for haecceity presentism as it denies there are such propositions.

What is best, I think, is for the haecceity presentist to dig in her heels. Haecceity presentists are committed to understanding singular reference in terms of haecceities. But there are no haecceities about future entities and there are no future entities. So though one
seems to be able to think and believe and assert things about Goliath, there are no true, future singular propositions about Goliath prior to Goliath’s existence. This is all down to the fact that there can be no singular propositions about entities that do not exist, and so there cannot be such propositions about entities that have never existed. This is Adams’ own solution:

Goliath’s thisness, and singular propositions about Goliath, cannot have pre-existed Goliath because if they had it would have been possible for them to have existed even if Goliath had never existed, and that is not possible (1986: 317)

So even though it may seem there can be true singular propositions about future entities, it is a mistake to think there are: there are ways in which Goliath’s creation can fail to be prior to his actual carving, so there cannot be singular propositions about Goliath until he actually exists.

Still, this does not seem to be right. There is a powerful intuition that one can, reasonably, hold attitudes towards future entities in which they figure as constituents in singular propositions. Surely it is fair that I can believe that Goliath will be 80 pounds? Does this view of singular propositions dealing with future entities or future states of affairs render such beliefs unintelligible?

Not as such. I follow Ingram and Adams in believing that such propositions do not have singular content. I also deny that, on inspection, it is really such a curious thought to hold. Here are two reasons: firstly, there is a complete lack of causal contact between myself and Goliath, such that they could not have had any impact on my thinking about them (there is no causal chain leading from Goliath to myself such that Goliath itself could have force on my thinking, for Goliath does not exist yet). So, it does not seem entirely unreasonable that there could not be any singular propositions about them. Secondly, to bring a previous point to bear on the argument, it is possible, up to the very moment Goliath emerges into existence that Goliath fails to exist. Perhaps my clay is stolen moments before I begin, perhaps my hands fail me such that sculpture becomes impossible. If Goliath may never exist, then there is, I think, no fact of the matter over whether Goliath will come to exist. There is, as Ingram says, ‘no settled fact of the matter as to what that singular thing is’ (2016: 2878). It seems fair to me to say that there are no singular propositions about Goliath.

Haecceity presentists, then, should reject singular propositions about future entities.

2.3 - Is Haecceity Presentism Actually Presentism?

Here is a quick detour to touch upon a problem Markosian brings up for friends of haecceities. This problem is related, in part, to the problem of singular propositions, but is more general in shape. The problem has been raised by Ned Markosian against any form of haecceity presentism and is as follows: presentism is the thesis that only present concrete entities exist. A haecceity of a past entity cannot exist without a past entity: the existence of haecceities of past entities requires commitment to past entities. This is because a haecceity is the property of being (identical with) x e.g. being identical with Bertrand Russell is Russell’s haecceity. But Bertrand Russell must exist in order to constitute that property. Thus, we are committed to past entities if we want to have the haecceities of past entities.

There is one obvious response, and that is to deny that ‘Bertrand Russell (i.e., past entities) must exist in order to constitute that property (their haecceity)’: a past entities
haecceity does not suggest the existence of the entity whose haecceity it is. Markosian replies to such a response thus:

I have a hard time understanding how Socrates could fail to be a constituent of Socraticity [i.e. Socrates's thisness], although, admittedly, what we say about this matter depends partly on what we say about the tricky subject of the nature of constituency. In any case … it seems clear to me that this principle will be true: The property of being identical with x exists only if x itself exists. For it seems to me that, for any relation and for any object, the property of standing in that relation to that object will exist only if the object exists. (2004: 56, fn. 15)

In short, a relation must hold between Socrates and his haecceity. The property being Socrates only exists if Socrates exists. This is because ‘for any relation and for any object, the property of standing in that relation to that object will exist only if the object exists’.

We have, however, already gone over a version this problem in sketching the fundamental account of haecceities that should be shared by any form of haecceity presentism: these were the key claims of Adams, Diekemper and Ingram. I shall reiterate. Haecceities can exist, uninstantiated, without the existence of the entities whose haecceities they were. The present existence of a haecceity of a past entity, further, does not suggest, or entail, the existence of a past entity: a haecceity is dependent on the entity of whose haecceity it is to come into existence (it comes into existence concomitantly with that entity) but does not depend on it thereafter. This is the relation of non-rigid ontological dependence articulated and defended earlier. Though it is true to say that Socrates’ haecceity initially depended on Socrates for its existence (its coming to be), it does not do so after it has come to be. So haecceity presentism does not depend on the existence of past entities in the robust fashion Markosian imagines. Rather, it is the weaker relation of non-rigid ontological dependence, which does not violate any presentist scruples.

2.4 - Back to Singular Propositions: Do Haecceities Really Do the Job?

This is Markosian’s final objection against haecceity presentism’s approach to singular propositions. The objection is that haecceities are insufficient for genuinely singular reference: they cannot provide genuine singular propositions about the past and past entities in virtue of the fact they do not invoke past entities but, rather, their haecceities. Or, as Markosian puts it, ‘it is not at all clear that the proposition that there was a unique x that exemplified Socraticity and that was a philosopher is really a singular proposition about Socrates’ (2004: 56).

Now, I stand, again, with Ingram in thinking that there is a sense in which Markosian is correct: <There was a unique x that exemplified Socraticity and that was a philosopher> is not a proposition about Socrates. It is a proposition about Socrates' haecceity. (2016: 2880). But that in itself is no objection to the haecceity presentist solution, for the haecceity presentist understanding of singular propositions takes a singular proposition, such as <Socrates was a philosopher>, to be constituted by Socrates' haecceity and is about Socrates, and thus singular, in virtue of having his haecceity as a constituent. Haecceity presentism, then, does not replace the proposition <Socrates was a philosopher> with <There was a unique x that exemplified Socraticity and that was a philosopher>; rather, it understands singular propositions as constituted by the relevant haecceity and thus singular in virtue of that constitution.

That may fend off one reading of Markosian’s objection. There is another reading, however. This reading is not that haecceity presentism replaces one proposition with another, unrelated one. Rather, haecceity presentism fails because a singular proposition is
about the very entity that constitutes it. It is about Socrates, the man, not his haecceity. It is not singular as singular propositions about Socrates are constituted by Socrates and not constituted by Socrates' haecceity.

As interesting as this, Markosian falls afoul of inconsistency on this point, as his own proffered definition of a singular proposition permits a haecceity as a constituent in a singular proposition: a singular proposition is ‘a proposition that involves or refers to x directly, perhaps by having x or the thisness of x as a constituent’ (2004: 49, fn. 4). And that is no trouble at all for a haecceity presentist, for singular propositions refer directly to x precisely in virtue of having x’s haecceity as a constituent! Indeed, that is its entire advantage over its presentist peers – it permits an understanding of singular reference to past entities in virtue of their presently existing haecceities. Such an understanding is, admittedly, unorthodox; that a singular proposition about x is to be understood in terms of x’s haecceity is non-standard, but that is no genuine criticism.

Ingram provides a more charitable interpretation of Markosian’s criticism (2016: 2880), which Markosian himself develops in turn: if <Socrates was a philosopher> is constituted by Socrates’ haecceity, then it is not really about Socrates. Markosian presses this point further (2004: 56). Take two propositions: <Socrates was a philosopher> and <Plato’s best teacher was a philosopher>. Though both are about Socrates, it is only the former that is directly about Socrates, the latter being indirectly about Socrates, and thus not a singular proposition. The reason why it is not a singular proposition about Socrates is that, rather than being constituted by Socrates himself, it is constituted by a property of Socrates – being Plato’s best teacher. If that is the case, the objection runs, then, analogously, we should not accept Socrates’ haecceity as constituting a singular proposition about Socrates, for it is in exactly the same situation as the property being Plato’s best teacher. Or, as Markosian himself puts it:

…what is the difference between Socraticity and the property of being Plato’s best teacher in virtue of which a proposition containing the former property is a singular proposition about Socrates while a proposition containing the latter is not? (2004: 56)

But there is one very obvious respect in which the properties are disanalogous, and so one very obvious way in which the properties may be individuated such that the former constitutes an instance of singular reference but the latter does not: Socrates’ haecceity, being (identical with) Socrates, is essential to Socrates. Indeed, it exhibits his very essence, that which characterises Socrates’ primitive identity and individuates him from all other entities. The other property, being Plato’s best teacher, is not essential to Socrates. Socrates haecceity is essential to him, it is a necessary property of Socrates, whereas being Plato’s best teacher is contingent: <Plato’s best teacher was a philosopher> is constituted only by a contingent property of Socrates and it is this, as Ingram also notes (2016: 2881), that allows us to say that such a proposition is only indirectly about Socrates and thus not a genuine instance of a singular proposition. Conversely, the very fact that <Socrates was a philosopher> is constituted by Socrates’ haecceity, something absolutely essential to Socrates, permits us to say that the proposition is directly about Socrates, and so a singular proposition.

There is one related, and increasingly prevalent, objection that can be teased out of this one. This objection concerns the nature of ‘aboutness’. The objection asserts that propositions, intuitively, are ‘about’ the very entities to which they refer. So, any instance of the name ‘Socrates’ is about the man, any instance of the name ‘Caesar’ about Caesar, ‘dinosaurs’ refer to dinosaurs and so on. They are not ‘about’ haecceities, or any other kind
of surrogates postulated by presentists. Another, different, presentation of this objection is that propositions cannot be ‘about’ things that do not exist. Given that Socrates does not exist in a presentist ontology, no proposition can be ‘about’ him. Though such an objection is indeed very common, I find it increasingly difficult to deduce its purported force. Indeed, for all its appeal to ‘intuitiveness’, I believe it faintly obscure and close to question begging.

Firstly, it seems unfair to press presentists to construe any putative relation of ‘aboutness’ in such a fashion that they are expected to, in some sense, invoke past entities, with a failure to do so being considered objectionable. No presentist who takes their metaphysic seriously will make such a concession, for it requires surrendering the very foundation on which their metaphysic stands. Indeed, in assuming that any such relation of ‘aboutness’ must pertain to past entities, I worry that the question is being begged against the presentist, for the very nature of the ‘aboutness’ relation is up for dispute; naturally, the haecceity presentist is going to say that ‘aboutness’, in her sense, is adequately captured by a haecceity.

Alternatively, presentists may just reject the demand for ‘aboutness’. Consider the following proposition: <There used to be dinosaurs>. Markosian proposes that one can analyse the proposition thus: ‘It has been the case that there is an x such that x is a dinosaur’ (Markosian, 2012: 137). Markosian suggests that in his paraphrase, the referent of ‘it’ need not be any collection of past dinosaurs. He does not suggest what the referent of ‘it’, in this instance, might be, and I confess it is obscure whether ‘it’ ever really refers to anything. Perhaps he is getting at something like Prior’s suggestion of what facts concerning past entities are about:

On this view, the fact that Queen Anne has been dead for some years is not, in the strict sense of “about,” a fact about Queen Anne; it is not a fact about anyone or anything—it is a general fact. Or if it is about anything, what it is about is not Queen Anne—It is about the earth, maybe, which has rolled around the sun so many times since there was a person who was called “Anne”, reigned over England, etc. (1968: 13)

Maybe, then, the ‘it’ is general or refers to the world, and we could understand Markosian’s paraphrase as something like ‘It [the world] has been the case [such] that there is an x such that x is a dinosaur’. But this reading, though clearing up what Marokosian might mean, is not rejecting the aboutness requirement – rather, it is asserting that past facts are about whatever ‘it’ refers to.

Markosian goes on, though, to draw an analogy that is more explicit in rejecting the aboutness requirement. It is an analogy that is quite typical amongst presentists: the analogy between presentism and modal actualism. Take the following proposition: ‘It’s possible there is a purple cow’. This seems true. If one is a modal actualist then, very roughly, one believes that only actual objects exist, and talk of possibilia is to be understood in terms of abstract objects like possible worlds, which are understood as maximal, consistent propositions, or suchlike. If one is an actualist, the subject of propositions like the purple cow one are the actual world and its contents and the truthmakers for such propositions are various actual objects, but no non-actual objects.

Now, one could be a modal realist, and believe that non-actual objects are just as real as actual objects. If one is a modal realist, the subject of the purple cow proposition is the domain of all possible worlds, and the truthmakers for the proposition are all the real, but non-actual, purple cows.
The modal actualist would seem to violate the thought that the truthmakers for propositions should be ‘about’ what the proposition is about, for her truthmakers do not contain any purple cows. Does it seem like she is any worse off for this? I do not think so. Unless modal realism is correct, it seems fine to say that the ‘It’ in <It is possible there are purple cows> refers to the (actual) world, and it is the actual world and its contents that make that proposition true. Further, presentism and actualism are analogous, so it seems quite natural for a presentist to say that truths about the past are made true by the present state of the world and its contents.

Finally, one may object, specifically to the haecceity presentist, that it is obscure how something can be ‘about’ something that does not exist. How can <Caesar crossed the Rubicon> be about Caesar, whether by means of himself or his haecceity, when Caesar does not exist? This, I think, is to take the notion of ‘aboutness’ as much too metaphysically heavyweight, as it assumes there must be a very robust relation between propositions, say, and individuals; between <Caesar crossed the Rubicon> and the individual Caesar. But there is a familiar and benign way to construe ‘aboutness’ that is to the presentist’s advantage. Certainly, there is indeed a sense in which <Caesar crossed the Rubicon> is about Caesar. But this no more forces my commitment to the existence of Caesar than reading a bedtime story about a hematophagous, phengophobic, caped individual commits myself and my child to vampires – certainly, I do not query her ontology after any such story. I think this is the reading of ‘aboutness’ a haecceity presentist should urge.
Chapter 3 – Truthmaking

3.1 – Truthmaking and the Haecceity Presentist Solution

Presentism’s difficulty with truthmaking is well documented. The difficulty is this: there is a strong intuition that truth substantively depends on ontology. That is, truth depends on being. There are truths that concern the past e.g. <Caesar crossed the Rubicon>. If truth depends on ontology, then the truth of this proposition depends on Caesar, the Rubicon and a relation between them. But Caesar is past; there is no Caesar temporally located in the present\(^3\). So, if you are a presentist, you have no ontology to support the truth of <Caesar crossed the Rubicon>, and that is a very bad result.

The haecceity presentist does have ontology to support the truth of such propositions, however. Haecceity presentist metaphysics (Keller, 2004. Ingram, 2018) offer, broadly, the same resources to address truthmaking concerns. These resources are haecceities and second order tensed properties instantiated by haecceities. That is to say, presently existing haecceities, functioning as surrogates for the past entities which once instantiated them as haecceities, presently instantiate second order, tensed properties, which characterise, indirectly, the object of the haecceity (Keller, 2004: 5. Ingram, 2018: 453.).

Take the proposition in the previous paragraph: <Caesar crossed the Rubicon>. The haecceity presentist understanding for the truthmakers of this proposition are, partly, Caesar’s haecceity instantiating being the haecceity of a man that crossed the Rubicon. What is utterly crucial for haecceity presentism, and in need of sustained defence, is that objects and haecceities instantiate past tensed properties like having crossed the Rubicon for the former, and being the haecceity of a man that crossed the Rubicon for the latter.

Tensed properties are by no means unusual in presentist responses to the truthmaking problem. They are, however, treated with caution. The reasons propounded focus on them being, in some sense, metaphysically suspect, or, in pointing beyond their instances, being objectionably hypothetical, or derivative, pale shadows or echoes of more ‘real’ or fundamental properties, suffering explanatory inadequacy. Haecceity presentists should not be dissuaded by such suspicions and vindicating tensed properties is part of the project of this section, though the vindication of such properties is restricted to their utility for haecceity based presentist ontologies. Indeed, I shall argue that such suspicions at tensed properties are not entirely unwarranted for non-haecceity presentist solutions, bolstering the case that if one is a presentist invoking tensed properties, one ought to be of the haecceity presentist camp. That aside, Ingram, quoting Karen Bennett on the issue of tensed properties, introduces a parallel project to vindicate tensed properties:

It is not the job of a truthmaking principle to, say, deem irreducible Lucretian properties suspicious … The only real question is whether there are any (2011: 190-91).

And one important way to lend credence to the thought that there are such properties is to demonstrate the work they can do for the theory in which they are deployed. There are, I think, three such ways one can demonstrate that tensed properties do substantive work: truthmaking, cross-temporal relations, and, most importantly, their role in rationalising certain of our emotional attitudes. Indeed, in the last case, I shall argue that the work tensed properties do cannot be adequately captured by any tenseless property or tenseless

\(^3\) Interestingly, there is some dispute over whether the Rubicon Caesar crossed is the same Rubicon that lies near Ravenna today, so I have avoided commenting on whether the Rubicon is present today or not.
analysis of tensed properties. If I am right, tensed properties are not only vindicated, but indispensable. For now, however, attention will be restricted to the role past-tensed properties play in truthmaking for the haecceity presentist.

The haecceity presentist solution to the truthmaker problem is both articulated by Keller (2004) and Ingram (2018). Ingram has the most worked out version of the solution, though it requires further elaboration on both the relation of haecceities and their properties to their bearers and their properties, and also on the nature of past-tensed properties. It is here, also, that some of the most substantial differences between myself and Keller and Ingram’s versions of haecceity enriched presentisms come to the fore.

The solution, then, is as follows: haecceities instantiate higher-order properties, tensed properties, that serve to characterise, indirectly, the object of the haecceity and, further, such higher-order properties correspond to, and depend upon, the lower-order properties of the object (Ingram, 2018: 453-454). What is crucial to this as a solution to the truthmaker problem, as mentioned earlier, is that entities and haecceities can instantiate past-tensed properties. So, an entity instantiates first-order tensed properties and its haecceity instantiates second-order tensed properties (this is because a haecceity is itself a property). The second-order properties correspond to, and depend for their initial instantiation upon, the first-order properties. For example, the first-order past-tensed property of Obama, *having been president*, has a corresponding second-order property instantiated by his haecceity, *being the haecceity of man who was president*.

The tensed properties acquired by a haecceity serve to indirectly characterise the entity of which it is a haecceity. These properties are acquired by a haecceity as a consequence of the nature of the relation between a haecceity and its entity. Ingram makes a distinction with properties here that I think may seem obscure, if not outright otiose, so I think it deserves much closer examination. Ingram says that on the death of Obama, his haecceity ceases to instantiate *being the haecceity of a man who was president* but, rather, comes to instantiate *having been the haecceity of a man who was president*. This is because, Ingram says, that upon Obama’s death, he loses the property of *having been president*, for he no longer exists, and thus the corresponding second-order property, *being the haecceity of a man who was president*, is gone, too, for the first-order property has vanished.

The rationale of Ingram’s amendment is, I believe, as follows; it stems from the desire to prevent past objects presently instantiating properties, and that is why he is insistent that the haecceity switches from *being the haecceity* to *having been the haecceity*. Ingram wants to prevent this as past objects do not exist, so are incapable of instantiating properties.

His amendment, however, is confusing, and can generate unpleasant consequences for haecceity presentism. It is to this I now turn.

3.2 Haecceities and Tensed Properties: Diverging from Ingram

First, the haecceity has not ceased being Obama’s haecceity, which makes the phrasing of *having been the haecceity of a man who was president* puzzling, for it still, of course, is the haecceity of a man who was president. Perhaps what Ingram is gesturing at is that the haecceity is of a former man, given that he has ceased, who was once president. And the *who was once president* is not a property of the erstwhile Obama but the haecceity. But all that seems to me to be consistent with the haecceity simply *being the haecceity of a man*
who was president. I see no reason why it must lose this second-order property simply because the entity of which it is a haecceity loses a first-order tensed property in virtue of the entity itself ceasing. Indeed, I would expect the relationship between first and second order properties to mimic the relationship between haecceities and their objects; that is, the second-order properties non-rigidly ontologically depend on the instantiation of corresponding first-order properties to begin being instantiated but do not depend on the continued instantiation of a corresponding first-order property to continue being instantiated as second-order properties.

In fact, should they require a corresponding first-order property, there would be no second-order tensed properties of haecceities, because objects, bearing the first-order properties, obviously eventually cease to exist on a presentist metaphysic. So haecceities would eventually have no properties if this dependence were a feature of the relationship between properties of objects and properties of haecceities. So, I think we should reject Ingram’s insistence on Obama’s haecceity switching from being the haecceity... to having been the haecceity... as it carries bad results for haecceity presentism and the simple being the haecceity version of second-order properties seems to me perfectly consistent with the corresponding first-order properties, and the object of those properties, ceasing to exist.

Perhaps what Ingram means is that a haecceity does not ‘lose’ its being the haecceity of property but that the property itself becomes past tensed on the ceasing of the object. But I struggle with this, too, as properties do not change in their tense along a single timeline, as it were – there is not a temporally distributed compound property, like being the haecceity of a man who was president then having been the haecceity of a man who was president, with the temporal timeline of the haecceity corresponding to the temporal timeline of Obama (that is, it is not as if the previous property is a single property along which a haecceity ‘moves’ in response to the corresponding property of Obama, moving from the being portion to having been portion upon his death). Properties do not change tense – rather, they are lost and a new property comes to be instantiated. So this will not do either.

To dig deeper, I think what Ingram is ultimately maintaining is that haecceities cannot lose past-tensed properties but are capable of losing present-tensed properties without inconsistency. In the context of truthmaking, this is important as the inability to lose certain kinds of tensed properties makes haecceities good candidates to avoid the following problem as described by Ross Cameron:

One constraint on any acceptable theory … is that if it is now true that it was the case that p at some past time t then, for every time t* later than t but before the present, it is now true that it was the case at t* that it was the case at t that p. Whilst not logically inconsistent, it would be bad if it could now be true that ten years ago there was a sea battle, but that five years ago it wasn’t true that five years before that there was a sea battle (2011: 76)

Avoiding the problem Cameron discusses is obviously crucial but I think Ingram’s solution muddies the waters. Presumably, at the very moment of the object ceasing to exist, all the being the properties of the haecceity stop being instantiated and are replaced with having been the properties. But then Ingram’s solution becomes guilty of a version of the problem in which, though the truth values of a proposition do not change, what does the truthmaking work changes, for when Obama is alive, his haecceity only has its present-tensed second-order properties. Or, if you want Obama himself to do the truthmaking work for <Obama was president>, then the truthmakers will switch from the man to the haecceity. What makes this especially pressing is that Ingram is at pains to avoid this problem, as I shall discuss later, so having it trouble his account at this point is not to his advantage,
particularly as permitting property switching or replacement with haecceities will infect haecceities in every role they play – for example, there will be a version of this problem for singular reference, cross-temporal relations, emotions and so on. So, though I understand what motivates Ingram in making this distinction, I think we should reject it, and not be troubled by the simpler being the haecceity property type. Besides, the being the haecceity still achieves the desired effect of characterising the object of the haecceity indirectly while making it obvious the haecceity still is, presently, the haecceity of its object.

One may think, however, that the inability of haecceities to lose the past-tensed properties they acquire is problematic, as it can generate conflicts. Take certain tensed, metrical properties: being the haecceity of an event that finished 26,917 days ago. This is a property of the haecceity of the Battle of the Bulge, and it is true as of 06/10/2018. As of 07/10/2018, however, it will be 26,918 days, and the tensed, metrical property of the haecceity will be being the haecceity of an event that finished 26,918 days ago and it will be true as of 07/10/2018. If haecceities do not lose their past-tensed properties, however, the haecceity will instantiate both second-order tensed properties. Given they are inconsistent, that is bad news.

These properties, however, indicate the relationship of the haecceity of an event, presently, to the date of the occurrence of that event, and thus are incomplete in omitting one element of that relation, the date. In omitting the date, the properties appear inconsistent, but are consistent if the date is appended. For example, it is consistent that a haecceity can instantiate being the haecceity of an event that finished 26,917 days ago as of 07/10/2018 and being the haecceity of an event that finished 26,918 days ago as of 08/10/2018.

Of course, haecceities being unable to lose tensed properties is a welcome result for the haecceity presentist, for it avoids Cameron’s problem of truth-values about the past changing.

To recap, the haecceity presentist solution to the truthmaking problem is thus: truthmakers about the past are states of affairs consisting of tensed properties instantiated by haecceities of past entities. <Caesar crossed the Rubicon>, then, is the state of affairs involving Caesar’s haecceity instantiating being the haecceity of a man who crossed the Rubicon. Ingram is silent on what else the state of affairs consists in, for it seems obvious that it cannot consist in that haecceity and that property alone. Perhaps one reason why Ingram does not discuss such haecceities (those of rivers and so on) and their past-tensed properties is that the properties seem, in some sense, more bizarre, or that it also seems bizarre to say that a river has a haecceity. I see no reason to think either. A haecceity is merely a primitive, non-qualitative property that yields the individual essence of a particular, making it this entity. And entities outside of human beings are just as entitled to such an essence and means of individuation as anything else.

Further, the properties, though superficially more complicated, are no different in kind; a haecceity presentist should not endorse tensed properties for the haecceities of former humans but not other former objects. And this is precisely because tensed properties should be vindicated on the work they do for a theory, as it is this that gives us reason to believe they exist. So, the more work they do for a theory, the more respectable they are. Permitting such haecceities and properties is in the haecceity presentist’s best interests, then, as they are invaluable in their truthmaking solution. It is difficult to say whether this constitutes a revision to the different formulations of haecceity presentism, as the issue of
what entities have haecceities is ignored, but, nonetheless, I think it should be a standard commitment of the theory, and one mine is explicit about.

I now turn to ‘aboutness’. I have previously offered one response to concerns of ‘aboutness’ for presentists keen to try and dissolve the force of the objection, or construe the relation as metaphysically thinner than proponents of ‘aboutness’ understand their purported relation. I shall now attempt a different response, taking the notion of ‘aboutness’ at face value. The reason for this is simple: criticisms of presentist metaphysics failing the ‘aboutness’ condition of truthmakers and their truths are ubiquitous in the literature, to the point where the dialectic would have it that a satisfactory response is a deciding factor. So I want to demonstrate that haecceity presentism does have a satisfactory response to the ‘aboutness’ condition, even though I reserve some scepticism for the condition in anything but a fairly thin understanding of it. Regardless, satisfying the condition leaves haecceity presentism in an even stronger position amongst its peers and critics.

3.3 - ‘Aboutness’: Diverging from Ingram

Recall the haecceity presentist’s understanding of singular propositions about past entities: <Bertrand Russell was clever> is constituted by the presently existing haecceity of a past object, Bertrand Russell. So, a singular proposition is about a past entity in virtue of being constituted by the haecceity of that past entity. Ingram also adds the following addition: the singular proposition is also about Bertrand Russell’s haecceity in virtue of having that haecceity as a constituent (2018: 454).

This relates to the following general analysis of singular propositions and the aboutness relation: a singular proposition, P, is about x, if i) it has x as a constituent, or ii) it has x’s haecceity as a constituent. Importantly, these two conditions are not exclusive, or so Ingram says: <Bertrand Russell was clever> is both about Bertrand Russell and his haecceity, he says, as it is ‘partly constituted by [Russell’s] thisness’ (2018: 450).

I am slightly puzzled by the disjunctive analysis of the aboutness relation and singular propositions, just as I was puzzled by Ingram’s discussion about past-tensed properties when discussing a haecceity presentist solution to truthmaking. There is a way in which it seems inconsistent. Firstly, it takes the ‘aboutness’ relation at face value by granting it substantive force as a criticism and by placing it as a constraint on any adequate response to the truthmaker problem. But it undermines this seriousness by offering a deflationist response to the following question, noted earlier: how can a singular proposition be about something that does not exist? The answer to this was to distinguish between a thick and thin sense of about. A proposition about vampires, say, may be intuitively about Dracula, but that does not commit us to the existence of Dracula, and that is all aboutness amounts to. But Ingram seems to be pursuing both the thick and thin senses, however: there is an aboutness constraint on propositions, certainly, and it is an important constraint on a theory to satisfy (otherwise, truthmaking for presentists would be quite simple, as any surrogate would do the job – the cosmos instantiating tensed properties, for example). On the other hand, the constraint is interpreted as quite thin, with commitment to entities being construed quite loosely. Further, the believer in thick aboutness will say that there seems to be a real disanalogy between Caesar and Dracula. The latter is an intentional object, the former is not! To suppose that the thin aboutness relation is equally in good standing across entities fictitious and (formerly) real is perhaps hasty.

The worry, really, is as such: is the aboutness constraint thick or thin? If construed as thin, it is easy to satisfy, which makes the truthmaking problem not much of a problem at all.
But that fails to make haecceity presentism an interesting improvement over other presentist solutions to the truthmaking problem that purportedly fail by failing to satisfy the aboutness constraint. If it is construed as thick, the haecceity presentist response to worries about propositions about entities that do not exist does not seem to work, for the aboutness constraint is then taken as easy to satisfy in virtue of the relation being ontologically noncommitting, and thus shirking the challenge of a properly thick understanding of the relation in the first place (propositions are about past entities but do not command commitment to them, like propositions about e.g. ghosts are about ghosts but do not command commitment to them).

There is one obvious response: drop the disjunctive analysis and say that singular propositions get to be singular in virtue of having a haecceity as a constituent – and that is what gives them genuinely singular content. In short, only haecceities ever constitute singular propositions. The disjunctive approach, in being permissive, is weak, which I think diminishes the merit of it as an approach.

One problem that may emerge from this was alluded to in the previous paragraph. If a haecceity presentist is entitled to understand the aboutness relation as properly being directed towards haecceities, as they are all that constitute singular propositions, what is to stop someone in a rival presentist position, say Lucretianism, understanding the aboutness relation as properly directed towards Lucretian properties? In short, what precludes their entitlement to such a construal of the relation? If they are permitted such a construal, then haecceity presentism, and any other presentist position that understands truthmaking, singular propositions etc. in terms of presently existing surrogates for past entities, simply collapse into one another, each being mere notational variants of entities bearing tensed properties, with the aboutness relation construed as pertaining to the entities that bear those tensed properties (haecceities for the haecceity presentist, the cosmos for the Lucretian, and so on).

A haecceity presentist need not be phased by such an objection, however, as there are very obvious disanalogies between it and Lucretianism. For example, haecceity presentism has haecceities instantiate second-order tensed properties that correspond to, and are initially dependent upon, first-order tensed properties instantiated by its entity. These second-order properties serve to characterise its entity indirectly. The acquisition of these properties is intimately tied to the relationship between a haecceity and its entity; a haecceity is an essential property of an entity, it discloses its individual essence. The properties of a haecceity are importantly about its former entity. There are no such ties between an entity and the cosmos. That the properties of my haecceity characterise me is no mystery, as my haecceity is mine essentially, but the cosmos is not mine essentially; indeed, I can find no intelligible understanding of this. Neither does the cosmos instantiating tensed properties serve to characterise me, indirectly or otherwise, in any meaningful sense, for the cosmos has no unique relation to me. The cosmos may have such tensed properties as being such that it contains Kyle Buckle-Hodgson, being such that Caesar crossed the Rubicon, and so on, but that relation to me (or to Caesar) is entirely contrived. This is not true of a haecceity and its properties – a haecceity has the properties it does as a consequence of its relation to its entity, a relation that is essential. But there is no such relation between the cosmos and me. So, an understanding of aboutness in terms of haecceities does not permit any construal of the aboutness relation – there are understandings of the relation that are on much better ground than others. Haecceity presentism’s understanding is on, I think, very good ground, for the reasons I have just articulated.
3.4 – Explanatory Priority

This also provides the resources to respond to a particular worry concerning explanatory priority. Sanson and Caplan have frequently made objections in this mould (2010, 2011) in a bid to undermine presentist solutions to truthmaking. I shall argue that haecceity presentism not only answers their challenge but sits well with it.

Sanson and Caplan are keen to demonstrate the explanatory asymmetry between past-tensed properties presently instantiated and the having of a property in the past. Here is an example: John is pale and, suffering from a niggling vanity, heads to the beach in order to achieve a tan. So, he was pale, but is no longer. Now, consider the proposition <John was pale>. This seems true. Plausibly, this is true in virtue of a certain fact concerning John and the relations and properties he instantiates. However, if you are a presentist, the only properties John instantiates are those he presently instantiates. So, we need to identify a property such that presently having it suffices to make <John was pale> true. The natural candidate is the property having been pale.

So that is the presentist friendly truthmaker. The other truthmaker is John, in the past, instantiating being pale. The two solutions, then, are as so:

PAST- The proposition that <John was pale> is true because John once had the property being pale.

PRESENT - The proposition that <John was pale> is true because John now has the property having been pale.

Sanson and Caplan contend that PAST is the correct truthmaker, insofar as it provides the correct kind of explanation for <John was pale>. Furthermore, they think that PRESENT crucially depend on PAST. This is also, I believe, the source of the intuitions behind the dubiousness of tensed properties: it is not merely that they point beyond their instances in looking towards the past, it is that they violate the direction of dependence, for the fact that an entity instantiates a property now depends on how an entity was.

None of this, however, is in conflict with haecceity presentism. Recall that haecceities instantiate tensed second-order properties that indirectly characterise their entity. Further, the acquisition of these properties corresponds to, and is dependent upon, the first-order properties of its entity. So the way an entity was does depend on the way an entity was – indeed, a haecceity has the very character it has in virtue of the way its entity was, for it cannot instantiate such second-order properties without its entity, at some point, instantiating the relevant first-order properties. There is no violation of the direction of dependence here and intuitions are maintained: the properties a haecceity has now do depend on how its entity was. Indeed, it must depend on how its entity was.

Perhaps that answers a certain kind of ontological worry, it might be responded, but it does not answer the principle worry in Sanson and Caplan’s example, that it is PAST that gives a superior kind of explanation of <John was pale>, and that PRESENT is merely derivative. I do not see this as a worry, however, for Sanson and Caplan seek to explain the explanatory superiority of PAST in terms of the ontological asymmetry between PAST and PRESENT, with the latter depending on the former. But there is no difficulty for haecceity
presentism, as it acknowledges and respects this dependence. The truthmaker is a state of affairs with a haecceity instantiating second-order tensed properties as a constituent, certainly, but all this is perfectly in line with Sanson and Caplan's desideratum for any adequate presentist response to the truthmaker problem. The haecceity presentist has a good response to worries of this ilk.

3.5 – Rejecting the Disjunctive Approach

Back to the worry at hand: the disjunctive analysis versus my strictly haecceity analysis of singular proposition. Here is one count on which the strictly haecceity analysis is superior. It is the same type of argument I used against Ingram's having been the haecceity property type: the problem of shifts, though here it is first reference, and thus constitution of singular propositions, that shifts, which also precipitates a shift in truthmakers too, as the haecceity presentist response to the truthmaking problem relies on its analysis of singular propositions.

Suppose I am some kind of hermit that receives global news once a year. I believe <Obama was President> and Obama is alive and well. At that point, I believe a singular proposition in which, presumably, Obama is a constituent, and he has the property having been President, which serves as the truthmaker. Suppose Obama then dies, and I am yet to receive that particular piece of news for another 350 days. In those 350 days, the object of my belief is no longer Obama instantiating having been President, but the haecceity of Obama instantiating the second-order property being the haecceity of a man who was president. But absolutely nothing has happened in my environment such that my belief could change its content in such a radical fashion, which is a bad result. The trouble does not stop with this epistemic problem either, of course – it has a metaphysical counterpart, as noted earlier, which goes hand in hand with it as the manner in which haecceities function is tightly linked between singular reference and truthmaking. Not only does what I believe change, the truthmaker for the proposition <Obama was President> changes too, for it changes from a first-order property instantiated by Obama himself to a second-order property instantiated by a haecceity. Changes in truthmakers are a bad result too. Both problems are avoided if one takes the strict haecceity approach.

Another problem: the disjunctive approach seems committed to a peculiar truthmaking asymmetry that undermines haecceities. What explains that singular propositions about present objects are constituted by present entities instantiating tensed properties, but singular propositions about past objects are constituted by presently existing haecceities of past objects instantiating second-order tensed properties? Whence the asymmetry? Of course, there is an obvious way to explain the asymmetry, and that is to admit that we should privilege concrete truthmakers when we have them because they are explanatorily superior. But that would not be a good admission for a haecceity presentist. Of course, Ingram never considers an emotion based defence of haecceity presentism, where I argue that haecceities are not only explanatorily superior but essential to understanding the content of certain emotions, but giving haecceities a silver medal in matters of explanation is not a move that encourages faith in haecceities anyway.

Indeed, at times it seems like Ingram actually endorses the strict haecceity approach, but his final analysis of singular propositions is professedly disjunctive in its sufficient conditions. Why is this? It seems, at least, that Ingram is bothered by the following point:
Here is an objection. There is no intuitive sense of ‘about’ according to which singular propositions about past objects are about thisnesses of past objects. For instance, one might challenge that is about Caesar and nothing else. As such, the apparently plausible sufficient condition for aboutness, stipulated above, fails. To reply, I concede that is intuitively about Caesar. But, on my picture, the proposition is also about Caesar’s thisness in virtue of being constituted by it. This follows from the solution to the constituent problem and the (rough) analysis of aboutness, proposed above, i.e. a proposition P is about x if: (i) P is partly constituted by x, or (ii) P is partly constituted by x’s thisness. <Caesar crossed the Rubicon> is about Caesar’s thisness in virtue of being partly constituted by Caesar’s thisness (2018: 456)

The issue, then, seems to be that singular propositions about past objects ‘are intuitively about [past objects]’, so Ingram seems to permit some sense in which past objects partly constitute singular propositions. This sense is presented earlier: it is about past objects in the way that stories are about, e.g., ghosts – there is no ontological commitment there. And it is this understanding of aboutness I have been arguing against, for it simultaneously respects a serious stricture placed on ontology – that singular propositions about the past must, in some way, have a past object to constitute that singular content – but answers it in what is, to me, a thoroughly deflationary fashion – that past objects do partly constitute the singular content of a proposition, but not in a way that is ontologically committing and, further, that such singular content is about a past object in virtue of its haecceity partly constituting the singular content. In short: Ingram seems to believe that because singular propositions are intuitively about past objects, they have to figure in an analysis of them somehow. But I have already presented several difficulties that such a condition brings, urging that we adhere to the strict haecceity approach.

Further, I do not think that Ingram’s extra condition on aboutness meshing well with intuitions is a good reason to maintain it, for Ingram is already committed to an unorthodox and non-standard notion of aboutness that involves past objects and haecceities. Fully respecting the intuition that singular propositions are constituted by past objects would, I think, involve actually having the past objects as constituents – that is the source of the intuition. And if one is already committed to a non-standard understanding of the aboutness relation, I think one should opt for the one that is unproblematic – and that is the one found in my strict haecceity approach. It accomplishes all of the desiderata of truthmaking without troubles such as shifting truthmakers, shifting contents of belief, ontological asymmetry etc.

Finally, it might be said that all that Ingram is really saying in his analysis is that propositions are about entities in virtue of their haecceities partly constituting the content of those propositions: <Obama was President> is about Obama in virtue of Obama’s haecceity constituting it, and that is all there is to the notion of aboutness. If that is Ingram’s analysis, then I agree with it. To reiterate, what I demure from is the inconsistency of his treatment of ‘aboutness’ and the haphazard introduction of a non-ontologically committing ‘aboutness’ relation. I have argued against such a construal of the relation and presented reasons as to why one should adhere to a strict haecceity approach (if you want to take aboutness seriously). So it is, I think, difficult to discern exactly what formulation of the relation Ingram is endorsing, as his endorsement changes. Regardless, anyone who does endorse the relation of ‘aboutness’ I attribute to him, and the disjunctive analysis, should reject it and opt for the strict haecceity approach. This is no loss for a presentist; rather, it is a substantial gain, and offers a novel account of truthmaking that satisfies the desiderata placed upon presentist theories by their critics. I conclude, then, that haecceity presentism adequately solves the truthmaking problem for presentists, and, further, if one is a haecceity presentist, then one should be a strict haecceity presentist.
4.1 - Cross-Temporal Relations and the Haecceity Presentist Solution

Here is a problem: I strike a match, light a candle, and extinguish the match. The lit match caused the candle to light. But if you are a presentist, the present properties of an object are its properties simpliciter – the match was lit but it is no longer. So there is a genuine causal relation here, between a lit match and a candle, that a presentist cannot account for, as the match no longer instantiates the property of being lit. This is one example of a difficulty for any stripe of presentist, as it invokes relations that occur at different times, and the presentist will always struggle with such relations as she believes in only one time, the present.

The haecceity presentist response, I submit, should be exactly that of its response to the truthmaking dilemma; that is, one should posit a tensed property of a haecceity to account for cross-temporal relations. Recall that the haecceity presentist response to the truthmaking dilemma made use of second-order tensed properties instantiated by haecceities. These properties served to characterise, indirectly, the way an entity was, that entity being the one uniquely related to its haecceity. Furthermore, these second-order properties correspond to, and depend for their initial instantiation on, the first-order properties of the entity. Finally, though entities may cease to instantiate tensed properties by ceasing themselves, haecceities do not cease to instantiate tensed properties, for haecceities never cease to exist. Truths concerning the past, then, were made true by the haecceities of the relevant past entities presently instantiating second-order tensed properties; for example, what makes <Caesar crossed the Rubicon> true is the haecceity of Caesar instantiating the property being the haecceity of a man who crossed the Rubicon.

The haecceity presentist response to the problem of cross-temporal relations, then, should be modelled along the same lines. What makes it true that <The match lit the candle>? At the object level: it is the haecceity of the match instantiating the property being the haecceity of a match that was lit, and the haecceity of the candle instantiating the property being the haecceity of a candle that was lit (by the match).

These properties serve to characterize the way their entity was with respect to their entering into some kind of cross-temporal relation. And so it is with other such relations, like that of the billiard ball sending the black ball into the pocket, or the firing of the bullet causing the Emperor’s death, and so on. As with the truthmaking solution, no presentist scruple is being flouted; the ontological resources the presentist helps herself to are present entities and the present instantiation of properties. And as with the truthmaking solution again, it is haecceities and tensed properties that do the metaphysical labour.

I expect there will be many that find such a solution difficult to swallow, and I imagine some will say it is unintuitive. But I do not think it is entirely unintuitive or altogether strange; I think it is quite commonsensical. This is because it is natural to assume that causes come into and out of existence frequently: the match is struck, applied to the wick of a candle, and then blown out. The candle remains lit, but the match is not. That the match was lit (but is no longer) and applied to the candle (but is not now being so applied) seems a reasonable explanation of the presently lit status of the candle, as does the event of the candle being lit seem reasonably explained by the event of the match touching it, despite that event having
ceased. If anything, I think it is an eternalist analysis of the relata of cross-temporal relations that is unintuitive: that my striking a billiard ball, for example, is real with respect to all times and is such that the eight ball entered the pocket (and this too is real with respect to all times) seems more unintuitive, more still when the balls are all packed away and I am putting another pound coin to play again (that some temporal part of me is still tenselessly enjoying billiards would not dissuade me from putting the coin in, I wager).

An eternalist is likely to respond with the usual: that my ball example suggests nothing other than the irreducibly perspectival nature of human psychology, or that my notion of causes ‘going into’ and ‘coming out of’ existence begs the question against an eternalist metaphysic, or my understanding of the coming to exist and ceasing to exist of causes is mere conceptual analysis, yielding nothing of the actual metaphysics of cross-temporal relations. But that would miss the mark of my response, for my response is directed towards a criticism of the haecceity presentist analysis of cross-temporal relations being, in some sense, ‘unintuitive’. But I have tried to demonstrate that, on one understanding of what a cause is, the haecceity presentist is consonant with pre-philosophical intuition, and does justice to the thought that a cause can, and indeed does, cease to be, while still providing the relata in a cross-temporal relation. And if accord with intuition is taken to be a theoretical virtue, then I argue that the haecceity presentist view actually fares better with intuition. So, the criticism is misguided. Of course, an objector can say that concordance with intuition is not a theoretical virtue, but if they opt for this route, I say that their contention that my analysis is unintuitive has no sway as a point, for they have admitted that being intuitive or unintuitive counts for nothing (unless, perhaps, they say that while being intuitive does not count as a pro for a theory, being unintuitive does count as a con. I would respond that such an asymmetry seems arbitrary).

Perhaps a more subtle version of this criticism can be teased out. The lack of intuitiveness, the objector may press, is better expressed by the thought that the haecceity presentist analyses cross-temporal relations not in terms of objects and their powers but in terms of the second-order tensed properties of an abstract property of an object — or, in other words, the tensed properties of non-qualitative, abstract properties of objects. And that is every bit as unintuitive as an eternalist analysis of cross-temporal relations. They may even go further, admitting that although the tenseless occurrence of events is indeed no part of intuitions about causes, objects being part of cross-temporal relations certainly is; indeed, reducing cross-temporal relations to the properties of non-qualitative properties of objects is so radically removed from any conception of cause and effect that it is absurd to present it as any analysis of cross-temporal relations.

This objection, ultimately, is a variant of the ‘aboutness’ objection the haecceity presentist faced earlier, where the accusation was that singular propositions must be appropriately about their content by the denotations of singular terms being concrete objects. To this I respond that what the relata ought to be is an open question. A mereological nihilist, for example, would flout such a prohibition, for they do not think there are any (composite) objects. They would analyse the relata, I imagine, in terms of mereological simples instantiating properties. I do not think this is any less coherent than the responses of a haecceity presentist, or an idealist, or a holist, and so on. What the relata must be cannot be stipulated, for it rules out a number of theories by fiat, none of which are obviously incoherent or false.
And for the truthmaking variant of the aboutness objection, which is that a proposition must be about the entities to which its truth pertains, we can also duplicate the earlier response: propositions are about the entities to which their truth pertains in virtue of partly constitutively depending on the haecceities of those entities, which are the objects of singular reference and truthmaking in propositions. For example, <Caesar crossed the Rubicon> has singular content in virtue of the haecceity of Caesar, and the same proposition is true in virtue of the haecceity of Caesar instantiating a tensed property, being the haecceity of a man who crossed the Rubicon.

4.2 - Rival Presentist Accounts of Cross-Temporal Relations: Lucretianism

Similarly, one may worry how haecceity presentism distinguishes itself in its analysis of cross-temporal relations from other presentist positions. As before, I shall pick Lucretianism, as it is another presentist position that is explicit in its reliance on tensed properties. How may a Lucretian answer the problem of cross-temporal relations? It would, rather naturally, offer tensed properties of the cosmos. So, when the match is struck, lights the candle, and is blown out, it is the cosmos being such that the match lit the candle and was extinguished that characterises that causal chain. So, the Lucretian may object that they have an analysis of cross-temporal relations too. Furthermore, they may add that it is a simpler, more parsimonious account, for they have no need to posit any haecceities to be bearers of tensed properties, for the cosmos is perfectly capable of doing so. The worry could be extended such that all presentist theories utilising tensed properties are theoretically on a par, each notational variants of one another, varying simply in what serves as bearers of tensed properties.

As before, a haecceity presentist should press any rival on what is instantiating tensed properties. Haecceities do not cease to exist, but it does not seem obvious to me that the cosmos is such that it does not cease to exist. Perhaps a Lucretian might suggest that the cosmos persists through a big crunch, or some such analogue, but this renders the link between the cosmos and tensed properties even more tenuous, for some subsequent iteration of the cosmos that develops with different laws, histories, entities etc. has nothing at all to do with Caesar having crossed the Rubicon, or whatever past state of affairs that concerns the current iteration of the cosmos. A better strategy for the Lucretian might be to take Lucretius very seriously, and suggest ‘tracts of earth’, as Lucretius puts it, or regions of spacetime as eternally persisting entities. One positive aspect of this is that the connection between a past state of affairs and a region of spacetime is not tenuous – this region of spacetime is being such that Caesar crossed the Rubicon. This jettisons the advantage of parsimony, however, for it seems that any such robust understanding of spacetime would require a commitment to substantivalism. Perhaps such a commitment is independently warranted, but that is an independent issue.

Regardless, there is an issue I wish to press against the Lucretian which the haecceity presentist avoids. It is based on a criticism from Mozersky (2015: 40), and runs as follows: it is metaphysically possible that the current state of the world is compatible with Caesar crossing the Rubicon and Caesar not crossing the Rubicon. That is, the entire physical state of the universe right now could be exactly as it is even if Caesar never existed. It is metaphysically possible there is a world, then, exactly like ours in which Caesar never existed, in which its history is different. So, if some portion of land, or the world, or the cosmos, instantiates the property being such that Caesar crossed the Rubicon, the instantiation of this property cannot supervene on, or have its grounding in,
the physical structure of the world today, as that structure is compatible with it not having that property. But these kinds of tensed properties must supervene on, or be grounded in, the present for presentists, for that is their sole ontological resource. A Lucretian is free to insist, of course, that what distinguishes the two is one instantiating being such that Caesar crossed the Rubicon, whereas the other does not. But, again, this is simply reaffirming that such tensed properties are sui generis, completely free from any grounding in the way the world is. Imagine some future state of the world, with all traces of Roman history entirely obliterated. On the Lucretian account, complete, exhaustive, perfect knowledge of the present physical state of the universe would be insufficient to tell you whether it is the world in which Caesar did or did not cross the Rubicon.

The situation is different for the haecceity presentist, for two such worlds will differ in that one contains the haecceity of Caesar, and the other does not. Haecceities come into existence with their entities; they non-rigidly ontologically depend on them for their initial existence. So, the present existence of Caesar’s haecceity entails that it was once in a relation of non-rigid ontological dependence with Caesar himself. Now, one could simply ask on what grounds this is really different to Lucretianism: the haecceity presentist says the worlds differ in regards to one containing Caesar’s haecceity, and one not containing any such haecceity (as Caesar never existed). But that is merely an analogue of what the Lucretian says. And the haecceity presentist saying that they have provided grounding for Caesar’s haecceity in Caesar himself, as haecceities non-rigidly ontologically depend on their entity for their initial existence, is not a helpful response, for the point is that there could be worlds in which there is no physical difference in the present physical state of two worlds, one in which Caesar existed, and one in which he did not. A haecceity is an abstract property – it cannot be physically detected such that the two worlds are discriminable. So, the present physical state of the world is consistent with both Caesar existing and not existing, and thus his haecceity existing and not existing. We cannot know if we have any such haecceities to do work in truthmaking, singular propositions, cross-temporal relations etc.

A haecceity presentist should resist this argument. Perhaps it is consistent for the present physical state of the world to be compatible with the existence and non-existence of Caesar. But that is beside the point, for on the haecceity presentist metaphysic, it is not consistent metaphysically, for two worlds will differ, of necessity, in their ontology. To restrict difference to concreta is thoroughly arbitrary for a haecceity presentist: analogously, the present physical state of the universe is consistent with numbers being grounded in universals, or numbers not being grounded in universals. The two worlds are, plausibly, physically the same, as universals cannot be physically detected such that the two worlds are discriminable. But that the present physical state of the universe is consistent with numbers being grounded in universals and numbers not being grounded in universals does nothing to militate for, or against, the metaphysical thesis that numbers are grounded in universals and numbers not being grounded in universals. And, if they are (or are not), I take it to be necessary that they are (or are not). Similarly, that the present physical state of the universe is consistent with haecceities existing and not existing does not militate for, or against, the metaphysical thesis that haecceities do, or do not, exist. Furthermore, as mentioned, it is metaphysically impossible for two worlds to be identical in their ontology but for Caesar to have existed in one but not the other. This is because, necessarily, the presently existing haecceity non-rigidly ontologically depended on Caesar having existed. So, necessarily, for any haecceity, its entity either exists now, or existed.

Perhaps the Lucretian may argue that they are entitled to the same response: the two worlds are physically identical but differ in ontology, as one instantiates a Lucretian property, but one does not. But I do not think it works as well for a Lucretian. Haecceities enjoy an essential, that is to say necessary, relation to their entity, and it is
haecceities that are the property bearers for a haecceity presentist. But it is regions of space, or the world, or the cosmos for the Lucretian. The relation between the Lucretian bearers and the properties they instantiate, however, is not necessary. It is contingent. Further, such property bearers are physical entities, which explains the initial attraction of Mozersky’s criticism. So the Lucretian could help themselves to my response to Mozersky, but his ultimate point still stands – Lucretian properties are ungrounded properties, floating free of any robust ontology. For any region of space/world/cosmos and so on, it has this property, and that is a brute, ungrounded fact. That is not so for haecceity presentism. The tensed properties of a haecceity depended upon, and corresponded to, that of its entity, and a haecceity non-rigidly ontologically depended upon its entity for its initial existence. Thus, I conclude that the haecceity presentist response to Mozersky’s objection is superior to the Lucretian’s.

4.3 – Explanatory Priority Once More

The haecceity presentist solution to cross-temporal relations is also vulnerable to another criticism used against it on the matter of truthmaking. This is Sanson and Caplan’s (2010) charge that the past has explanatory priority over the present. A revised version of this criticism would run as follows: a match was used to light a candle. The match is not lit now. What kind of explanations do we have for the match lighting the candle? Here are two:

Eternalist solution –the match, in the past, being lit and the candle, in the past, being lit.

Haecceity presentist solution – the haecceity of the match presently instantiates the property being the haecceity of a match that was lit and the haecceity of the candle presently instantiates the property the haecceity of a candle that was lit.

Sanson and Caplan want to say something like: that the haecceity of the match instantiates such a property is importantly dependent upon the way the match was. Furthermore, it is the way the match was that explains what it did, namely, light a candle. The way the match is now is a mere symptom, or trace, of this fact. That the match was lit in the past grounds and necessitates that it is now such that it was lit. It is explanatorily more fundamental, and thus explanatorily superior. This reflects a certain ontological priority, hinted earlier: the tensed properties of the match’s haecceity, those it has now, are grounded in those that it had.

The haecceity presentist response should, as in previous cases, be modelled on the response given to the analogous worry for truthmaking. The tensed properties of the haecceity do indeed importantly depend on the properties of the match, for it is the properties of the match that the properties of the haecceity depended upon, and corresponded to. It is exactly this that allows a haecceity to characterise its entity presently, even if that entity no longer exists, albeit in a manner which is indirect. So haecceity presentism does indeed respect the ontological priority of the way the match was in determining the way the haecceity of the match is.

I concede that, even though I have provided an answer to Sason and Caplan’s worry of presentism not honouring the ontological priority of the past in determining the present, there is some residual force to their objection. For even though I think the ontological priority is, in some sense, respected, there is still some weight to the intuition that it is the eternalist solution that best answers how the match lit the candle – it was the match, in the past, being lit, not the haecceity of a match, presently, indirectly characterizing how the match was in the past, being lit. It is the former that explains the causal relation between the match and the candle, the latter being parasitic on this explanation.
In response: haecceity presentists should be mindful of the fact that this challenge is not uniquely theirs to wrestle with; it is a burden common to all strict presentist metaphysics that take their ontological restriction (that is, to exclusively present entities) seriously. And I think presentists of all stripes should dig in their heels here: there is a distinction between i) giving an explanation and ii) giving an explanation to everyone’s tastes. The haecceity presentist response may flout ii), on grounds that it seems to violate a plausible intuition about explanation. But that is not to say that it does not offer an explanation full stop. It does offer an explanation for cross-temporal relations utilising only present ontology.

In conclusion, I have argued that haecceity presentism has a coherent and, for those inclined towards presentism, attractive basis for an analysis of cross-temporal relations. Furthermore, its solution utilises only haecceities and tensed properties, a fact which I think lends credence in admitting both to any A-theoretic ontology.
Chapter 5 - Causation

It might be reasonably asked what, exactly, is the relationship that obtains between haecceities such that one may consider that relation and its relata a credible analysis of cross-temporal relations? It does not appear to be a causal one, strictly speaking, for the relation is between second-order properties instantiating tensed properties: being the haecceity of a match that was lit, for example, is a second-order property, a haecceity, itself instantiating a tensed property and so it is for its corresponding effect, being the haecceity of a candle that was lit. Though the relation itself is not strictly causal, I wish to suggest that it is importantly analogous to a causal relation, and that the haecceity presentist analysis of cross-temporal relations and causation exhibits important features of more standard analyses of cross-temporal relations and causation: for example, it is capable of sustaining counterfactuals, is a transitive relation, is asymmetric, and so on.

I shall also, taking my cue from Craig Bourne (2006), present a case for presentists to accept causation as counterfactual dependence and show that this sits well with them not being able to provide a genuinely causal relationship.

5.1 - Counterfactuals

Here is one theoretical advantage of the haecceity presentist approach to causation: it supports counterfactual conditionals (Lewis, 1973a and 1973b. Mellor, 1995. McDonnell, 2016. Kaiserman, 2017). Support for counterfactuals is difficult for presentist positions, for familiar reasons: belief in only concrete present entities severely limits ones ontology and what can enter into counterfactual relations. If one wants to assert the counterfactual dependence of the breaking of the glass bottle on it having been struck by the rock, but both the glass bottle and the rock no longer exist, the presentist has no entities to support the counterfactual dependence of the former on the latter, which is troublesome given that such a conditional is easily supported by any ontology that has both the rock and the bottle as existents. But the haecceity presentist analyses the singular content and truthmaking relation in terms of haecceities anyway, which naturally segues into a way of underwriting counterfactual dependence. To briefly repeat the details, the singular content of singular propositions is granted by such propositions constitutively depending on the haecceities of the entities in the proposition; or, in other words, singular propositions constitutively depend on haecceities for singular content – propositions are genuinely singular, and about the entities to which the proposition pertains, in virtue of the haecceities of the entities, here the haecceities of the rock and the bottle. And so it is for truthmaking, where it is the tensed properties of haecceities of entities which do the truthmaking work - "Caesar crossed the Rubicon" is true in virtue of Caesar’s haecceity instantiating the tensed property being the haecceity of a man who crossed the Rubicon.

All this naturally suggests an analysis of counterfactual dependence: if one wants to assert the counterfactual dependence of 'If the rock had not hit the bottle, it would not have shattered' or 'If the match had not the lit the candle, something else would have' and so on, using something like the standard Lewis-Stalnaker semantics (Stalnaker, 1968. Lewis, 1973b) for counterfactuals, one would go to the nearest possible world in which a counterpart of the rock did not collide with a counterpart of the bottle – the nearest possible world in which a counterpart rock’s haecceity did not instantiate the tensed property of being the haecceity of a rock that was thrown at a bottle – and see if it were a world in which the bottle counterpart was broken or not – a world in which the bottle counterpart’s haecceity did not instantiate the tensed property being the haecceity of a bottle which was struck. And, it
seems to me, that any world in which the rock counterpart's haecceity does not instantiate such a tensed property and the bottle counterpart's haecceity does not instantiate such a tensed property is a slighter departure from actuality in which the rock counterpart's haecceity does not instantiate the tensed property but the bottle counterpart's haecceity does – in other words, the haecceity presentist analysis seems to give the right results, that a world in which the rock did not strike the bottle is a world in which the bottle did not shatter.

Now, one is likely to bring all a manner of cases designed to test counterfactual dependence: early pre-emption, late pre-emption (Lewis, 1986. Hitchcock, 2001. Hall, 2004. Paul and Hall, 2013), trumping (Schaffer, 2000) and so on. I admit that such problems will occur for the haecceity presentist account. Take late pre-emption: Susy throws a rock at the bottle, with Billy throwing a rock of equal dimensions a fraction of a second later. Though it is Susy's throw which causes the bottle to break, one cannot say it counterfactually depends on the throw, for if Susy's rock were not to hit the bottle, Billy's would have. But, again, my point here is merely to establish that the haecceity presentist approach to counterfactual dependence is not as radical as it appears. If haecceities are suitable to support counterfactual dependence then one should expect haecceities to inherit the difficulties that occur for counterfactual dependence generally. Again, what is important, in the first stage, at least, for the haecceity presentist account of counterfactuals is that it is sufficiently robust to ameliorate initial concerns about the suitability of haecceities in any account of counterfactuals, cross-temporal relations, causation and so on. And that haecceities can underwrite counterfactual dependence is one way in which the haecceity presentist account is analogous to more traditional accounts of causation.

Furthermore, one can import solutions to the difficulties of late pre-emption and such into the haecceity presentist metaphysic; one could, for example, make the tensed properties of haecceities more fine-grained, such that they are more modally fragile (Lewis, 2000) e.g. the property of being the haecceity of a rock thrown thus, such that the bottle's breaking counterfactually depends on the exact physical magnitudes of Susy's throw. Naturally, this also imports the difficulties with modal fragility (such as the generation of spurious events, like my wedding being five minutes late being a different event of a wedding, requiring a fresh set of invites), but also demonstrates that haecceities are capable of preserving the features of counterfactual dependence, positive and negative. And it is this, I argue for now, that demonstrates the work they do is importantly analogous to the work done by, say, events in a straightforward causal relation.

To be clear, I am not arguing that one should endorse a counterfactual view of causation, or that it is the best account of causation, or anything like that (though I will go onto argue that taking a view of causation as counterfactual dependence is particularly attractive to presentists). What I am arguing is the following: 1) that a haecceity presentist can account for cross-temporal relations, causation, and counterfactual dependence in a coherent fashion. This in itself puts it far beyond other presentist positions and attests to the usefulness of haecceities; and 2) that if one believes that the ability to support counterfactuals, explain cross-temporal relations and causation and so on is advantageous for a metaphysical position, then haecceity presentism shares in that advantage too. That, also, puts haecceity presentism beyond other presentist positions and attests to the usefulness of haecceities.

5.2 - Asymmetry and Transitivity
The haecceity presentist account of cross-temporal relations and causation is also asymmetric. Plausibly, if \( c \) causes \( e \), then \( e \) does not cause \( c \); if the white ball strikes the black ball, then the black ball did not strike the white ball. It preserves the asymmetry of causation as the tensed properties of the haecceities of objects serve to characterise the former causal relations of the objects themselves – it is this feature of haecceities that makes them suitable to characterise causal relations without the relation between two haecceities being causal itself. Rather, what is true of the haecceities was true of its objects, and thus the truth of any such state of affairs in which the objects were present is maintained in the properties of the haecceities. So, the haecceity of the white ball instantiating the tensed property \textit{being the haecceity of a ball that was struck} and the haecceity of the black ball instantiating the tensed property \textit{being the haecceity of a ball that was hit} characterises, or ‘mirrors’, the asymmetry of the causal relation of the haecceities’ objects, as, again, what is true of a haecceity was true of its object. So, the asymmetry of causation is supported by haecceities; the black ball’s haecceity instantiates \textit{being the haecceity of a ball that was hit}, not \textit{being the haecceity of a ball that was struck} in relation to the haecceity of the white ball.

It is this important feature of haecceities that makes them capable of exhibiting relevant similarities to more orthodox accounts of causation. Take, further, the transitivity of causation; if \( c \) causes \( e \) and \( e \) causes \( d \), then (by and large, at least) \( d \) exhibits some degree of causal dependency on \( c \). So if, for example, the white ball struck the yellow ball which then entered the pocket, the white ball, ultimately, caused the yellow ball to be potted. This transitivity will be manifest in the chain of tensed properties instantiated by the haecceities of the objects that feature in the causal chain: for the white, \textit{being the haecceity of a ball that was struck}, for the black \textit{being the haecceity of a ball that was hit}, and for the yellow \textit{being the haecceity of a ball that was potted}. The chain is exhibited in the stepwise dependence of each effect being dependent on its prior cause, the chain terminating in the striking of the white ball which is characterised by the haecceity of the white ball instantiating the corresponding second order tensed property to the ball’s striking. So just as causation (by and large) exhibits transitivity, the characterisation of the causal powers and causal relations of objects in terms of their haecceities exhibits transitivity. And this, again, is a consequence of the relation of haecceities to their objects.

### 5.3 - Construing Causation as Counterfactual Dependence

There is a further question of how presentists should understand causation. Craig Bourne (2006: 110-115) notes two understandings of causation; in terms of the regularity theory, or in terms of counterfactual dependence. Additionally, Bourne notes an interesting consequence of adopting a theory of causation as counterfactual dependence, and it is one eminently amenable to presentists of all stripes: namely, that it cannot be a genuine relation between times (2006: 114). I turn now to the development of this point before looking at it a little closer.

Bourne analyses dependence between an event \( c \) and an event \( e \) in terms similar to the following two counterfactuals (2006: 113):

a) If \( c \) were the case, then \( e \) would be the case  

b) If \( c \) were not the case, then \( e \) would not be the case

If \( c \) and \( e \) do not actually occur, then b) is automatically true – thus, \( e \) causally depends on \( c \) if and only if a) holds. Conversely, if \( c \) and \( e \) do actually occur, then a) is automatically true –
thus e causally depends on c if and only if b) holds. Bourne remarks that since causal
dependence implies causation, it cannot be the case that causation is a ‘genuine’ relation
between c and e. This is because ‘c causes e’ is analysed as ‘if c were not the case, then e
would not be the case’ – that is to say, in terms of the actual non-occurrence of c and e. But
relations, if they are to be genuine, must have existing relata. Since there are not existent
relata, it follows that causation, on the counterfactual dependence view, cannot be a
‘genuine’ relation. He goes on to note that a presentist need only add tense operators to
present tensed c and e and then evaluate the counterfactual in whatever way they deem
best.

That counterfactual dependence is not a genuine causal relation, or at least not an
‘intrinsic’ causal relation, is fabulous news for a presentist of any stripe, for a presentist will
always lack the resources to provide any genuine causal relations owing to the absence of
non-present times. Better yet, this is not just the presentist’s burden to bear: The problem of
non-existent relata entails that causation is not a genuine relation, but it is a problem for all
who endorse a view of causation as counterfactual dependence (even modal realists will be
forced to admit that the relation is transworld). For the haecceity presentist, it is transworld
as counterfactual dependence is assessed in terms of the counterparts of haecceities and
the tensed properties they do or do not instantiate.

There is, then, a certain, welcome freedom in choosing to understand causation as
counterfactual dependence; this freedom, I suggest, is an artefact of understanding the
relation of causation as not a genuine one. This is good for presentists, as it ameliorates
some suspicions about using present surrogates to ‘stand in for’ their objects, as if causation
is not a relation intrinsic to objects anyway, then there is no disadvantage in having causal
relations characterised by surrogates (here, haecceities), rather than the objects
themselves. This is one attractive reason for presentists to understand causation as the
relation of counterfactual dependence.

However, a haecceity presentist does not require tense operators appended to
present tensed propositions about events: the haecceities are capable of characterising the
counterfactual dependence in the fashion described in section 5.1.

In conclusion, haecceities exhibit important analogies to the relata used in more
orthodox analyses of cross-temporal relations and causation, and provide a credible way of
analysing cross-temporal relations and causation in themselves. Further, the haecceity
presentist is not hindered by having her analysis of cross-temporal relations and causation
be a strictly causal one if she opts for a view of causation as counterfactual dependence.
Thus, she should.
I have, over the course of the first half of this thesis, presented the core commitments of haecceity presentism, distinguished my version from those that also use haecceities, and put it to work demonstrating its usefulness on several problems. In particular, I have taken the foundations of the haecceity presentism endorsed by David Ingram and argued against his disjunctive conception of aboutness and his belief that haecceities come to instantiate past-tensed properties when their object ceases to exist.

I have demonstrated, also, the metaphysical labour a haecceity enriched ontology can do for presentists in terms of singular reference, singular propositions and truthmaking, also trying to show that my own version of haecceity presentism is the best, and, independently of any other haecceity theorist, I have provided a haecceity based account of cross-temporal relations, counterfactual dependence and a reason, following Craig Bourne, for why a counterfactual theory of causation is a good fit for a haecceity presentist.

In all these problematics, I have presented a solution that I maintain: 1) does not flout any of the ontological scruples of presentism; 2) presents a plausible, coherent solution to each problematic for a presentist and; 3) each solution is superior to that of its presentist peers which do not make use of haecceities. Thus, I have presented the case for haecceity presentism and why any presentist should be a haecceity presentist, as it is the most capable version of presentism available. The solutions to each problematic so far, however, acknowledge that theories in opposition to presentism also have coherent theories of singular reference, truthmaking and cross-temporal relations. This is, in effect, the first half of the thesis – the defensive portion.

The second half of the thesis constitutes, in effect, my wholly novel defence of haecceities. It turns haecceities to emotions, and argues that without haecceities, we cannot make sense of several of our emotions and their roles in our lives. In other words, haecceities are indispensable to the character of certain emotions, and any theory that does not make use of them in combination with presentism spells disaster for our emotional lives. This is in combination, further, with problems I argue are generated, but not often acknowledged, by belief in the past and by belief in objects that have temporal extent in the past. Thus, I also argue against theories that assent to the existence of the past and have entities or portions of entities ‘inhabit’ the past.

That is the positive part of the project of vindicating haecceities and tensed properties. With all that said and done, however, I still imagine there are those not fully persuaded that haecceities are indeed legitimate posits. I subscribe to the metametaphysical principle, nicely articulated by Karen Bennett earlier in this thesis, that there is nothing to the matter on whether a posit exists or not other than the work it does. If it does plenty of work, that is good reason to believe it exists – and I think haecceities do indeed do plenty of work.

But there are doubtless those not convinced of this principle and still beset by suspicions. The remainder of this half of the thesis is for them. Prior to continuing the positive project of rehabilitating the reputation of haecceities and tensed properties in terms of their usefulness (or, in emotions, their indispensability) to the presentist, I think it would be useful to question, and hopefully dissolve, some of the suspicions and confusions around haecceities and tensed properties; or, more generally, around brute, unanalysable
properties. For if such suspicions and confusions are dissolved or allayed, the positive part of the project will unfold much more smoothly.

The intuition behind suspicions about haecceities and tensed properties generally seems to trade on the thought that I am, in one way or another, ‘having my cake and eating it’. Or, in other words, that ontologically I am confined to some thin slice of reality, the present, while helping myself to a kind of ‘God’s eye view’ of the totality of reality, such that problems of truthmaking and singular reference for non-present entities is rather helpfully settled by present entities. It is difficult, I think, to get to the very bottom of this intuition. For one, I have argued that haecceity presentism satisfies the desiderata of any adequate theory of reference, truth, cross-temporal relations and causation, and that entails answering questions to which the intuition could pertain: for example, I have argued that haecceity presentism answers the ‘aboutness’ constraint on a metaphysic, so I do not think the intuition is relevant to ‘aboutness’. Secondly, the intuition is quite coarse-grained, for I have argued there is no cheating in haecceity presentism; I do not, for example, say there are ungrounded true propositions, or singular reference that does not answer to ontology, or brute causal facts and the like. But still, there are those who still feel the pull of the cheating objection, even if the nature of the cheating is not entirely clear.

I have discussed and responded to accusations of tensed properties and haecceities being suspicious or suchlike throughout the first half of the thesis but I shall now consider explicit charges of cheating. There are two respects in which I think the charge of cheating can be clearly articulated: 1) that haecceities are cheating insofar as they are contrivances, their characteristics stipulated so that they solve the problems they are introduced for. 2), that haecceities are cheating insofar as they are hypothetical, that is, they point beyond reality (the present) to ontology the presentist is not entitled to.

A. Haecceities Are Contrived

The nature of this objection, in short, is that the characteristics of a haecceity are stipulated by fiat in such a fashion that they are, in some relevant sense, contrived in order to solve the problems for which they are introduced.

It is difficult to get clear about what this objection amounts to. Of course, haecceities are indeed contrived if by ‘contrived’ one merely means ‘a posit of a theory’. But that is an entirely innocuous sense of contrived in which any ontology introduced by a theory is a contrivance. Neither is there something especially problematic with the notion of a posit doing the very work for which it was posited; a posit that did no philosophical labour would be an idle posit, and that is of no use to any theory. So, again, there must be some especially problematic sense of a posit doing the very work for which it is introduced that is a problem for haecceities and tensed properties.

Perhaps it pertains to the characteristics of a haecceity? For example, that it persists beyond the non-existence of its object, is capable of instantiating properties beyond the non-existence of its object, cannot cease itself and so on? An objector, then, may press that it these characteristics that are stipulated in such a fashion so as to be problematic – by giving haecceities these characteristics, the presentist cheats by building a solution to her problems into her posit.
I cannot make much sense of this version of the criticism either. Firstly, a haecceity presentist is entitled to stipulate the characteristics of her posits. They are, after all, the posits of her theory. And a haecceity theorist does not stipulate such characteristics arbitrarily – the sections expositing the nature of haecceities earlier, for example, motivate certain characteristics of a haecceity (such as that there are none of future entities) by argument. Certain other characteristics of a haecceity are not argued for, that is true, but I do not think it is in a sense that is objectionable. A quiddity is a non-qualitative property, and I see no trouble in taking that as an essential feature of a quiddity without argument, just as a haecceity is a non-qualitative property. One ought to be free to define the essential features of one’s posits. There are ways in which one can, unreasonably, stipulate the essential features of one’s posits, such as when one’s stipulation might beg the question, such as if I were to say that haecceities, essentially, were the objects of singular reference, truthmaking and so on. That is stipulation as cheating. But I make no such claims, and argue for such conclusions.

Secondly, I worry that a criticism such as this could easily be brought to bear against any ontology invoked by any theory. Take the eternalist and her belief in past objects. That is ontology that she invokes but I do not. The characteristics of that ontology, that it is tenseless, eternal, instantiates properties and so on all leave that ontology well-disposed to function as the objects of singular reference, truthmaking, cross-temporal relations and the like. But it would be silly of me to accuse her of contriving such ontology. There is nothing about her ontology that is obviously cheating. And I say the same is true of the ontology I invoke. If there is something suspiciously contrived about haecceities, this is not it.

I do not think there is a particularly obvious way in which haecceities are contrived, then. But the core of the criticism is perhaps suggestive of other ways to express the intuition that something is amiss with haecceities. One such way is that they are objectionably hypothetical.

B. Haecceities are Hypothetical

Something is hypothetical insofar as it ‘points beyond its instances’ (Sider, 2001. Crisp, 2007. Cameron, 2011). One such example might be an actualist who maintains that the property, say, of possibly being 6’7 is a genuine property of mine, but it is so brutally and without further explanation. This property points beyond its instances in that it does not characterise how things are with me, but rather how things could be with me, despite the actualist’s insistence that how things are with me is all there is. The parallel to haecceities and tensed properties would be thus: haecceities are present uninstantiated properties that characterise what things there were, despite my insistence that past things no longer exist, and tensed properties are present properties of haecceities that characterise the way that things were, despite that, as entailed by the first point, there are presently no past things such that they could be any way at all.

I think what any presentist ought to do is question the metaphilosophical assumptions behind the objection itself, for the objection rests on a particular view of ontological economy wherein the hypothetical nature of certain properties is deemed suspicious from the start. I have already given an example of irreducibly modal, tensed and

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4 Cameron argues against tensed properties on the grounds that they make no intrinsic difference to a bearer at the time, which is plausibly a way of understanding them as hypothetical.
haecceistic properties as hypothetical, but others can be produced: for example, the dispositional properties of an object may be taken not to supervene on or be grounded in any of its non-dispositional properties. That is, perhaps one may take the dispositional property of *being soluble*, instantiated by salt, to not be reducible to any non-dispositional/categorical properties of salt.

But I do not see why a haecceity presentist should not just challenge the thought that hypothetical properties are suspicious. In fact, if hypothetical properties constitute a class of properties, her haecceities and tensed properties among them, and further to the class of properties are modal and dispositional ones understood as irreducible properties, then I think the haecceity presentist should instead say her posited properties are in good company. This is because I endorse a different view of properties to the objector; for myself, there is not a question of whether properties are or are not ‘suspicious’, but whether there are any such properties. And I further endorse the thought that one way of knowing if there are any such properties is the work they do for a theory, which is what I have attempted to do with haecceities and tensed properties.

I shall press this point with irreducible modal properties. The modal case is a particularly apt one, for the parallels between presentism and actualism are quite strong. The actualist denies possibilia, but acknowledges that there are, for example, possible ways for things to be or possible states of affairs, just as the presentist denies the past and future but acknowledges that there are ways the world was and ways the world will be. The actualist must provide some kind of ontology to underwrite these possible ways for things to be or possible states of affairs; whether it is the property itself that is primitive, as in possibly *being 6’7*, or a modal operator itself that is taken as primitive with a property in its scope, such as having the property *being 6’7* under the scope of the diamond. The property itself, or the operator, or whatever is taken to be irreducible is not what is important, but rather that there is an irreducibly modal residue. Given actualism’s stringent ontology, the work such irreducibly modal properties do is significant, which is, I believe, good reason to believe they exist. In short, actualism is an attractive position, but the actualist will only ever have the actual world and its contents to underwrite any propositions concerning possibility or possible states of affairs. There will always be *something* hypothetical about the ontology it deploys to underwrite such propositions about possibility or states of affairs, for such things are, strictly speaking, ‘outside’ or ‘beyond’ the ontology actualism has. Should this count strongly against actualism? I believe not, no. The very same point applies to haecceity presentism. There will always be *something* hypothetical about the ontology it deploys to underwrite propositions about the past, say. But, again, that is because such propositions are ‘outside’ or ‘beyond’ the ontology it has. Rather than find haecceities and tensed properties suspect, then, I find them in good company with analogous modal properties.

Indeed, the untested presumption behind the inadmissibility of primitive or irreducible properties relates to what Sam Baron describes as:

…rely[ing] on unexplained metaphysical convictions to press the point: Sider presumes, but does not argue for, the claim that hypothetical properties should not be part of one’s ontology. Similarly, Cameron presumes, but does not argue for, that only difference-making properties are kosher. If the presentist digs in her heels in this way, these cheating objections lose their dialectical force. (2012: 265)

I do not think a presentist should be too afraid of using so-called ‘hypothetical’ properties, then. The hypothetical nature of a property is not in itself a bad thing; that is an
artefact of a certain kind of view about ontology and philosophy more generally. Further, hypothetical properties offer an advantage in themselves in that they permit a more parsimonious theory.

In conclusion, I have confronted two explicit charges of cheating haecceity presentism faces and argued that they are not successful. Thus, one should not be dissuaded from utilising haecceities in one’s ontology.
PART II – AFFECTIVE ATTITUDES, MORALITY, AND TENSELESSNESS

SUMMARY

This is the second thematic half of my thesis. Throughout I argue, through a variety of scenarios, that each of eternalism, perdurance, and stage theory possess certain theoretical commitments that make it impossible to rationalise or vindicate the importance of certain emotions or moral concerns in our daily lives. Haecceity presentism does allow this, and it is haecceity presentism that supports these novel lines of attack. Consequently, tenseless theorists must accept the truth of haecceity presentism if they wish to vindicate emotions, or accept that their theories simply cannot provide a rationalisation of our emotional (and, in some respects, moral) lives for persons, which is a very alienating result.

Chapter 6 is concerned with grief. It argues that grief cannot be rationalised or vindicated in a way that respects its role in our emotional lives if, on the first prong of attack, eternalism is true and, on the second prong of attack, perdurance or the stage theory are true. For grief to be rational, I argue, it requires the non-existence of the object of grief – that it has objectively ceased to exist – and its haecceity remain to characterise its former qualities and confer singular content on propositions concerning that object of grief.

Chapter 7 moves more strictly into the ethical dimensions of tenselessness, focusing on perdurance and stage theory. Here I wonder whether temporal parts or stages really are the sort of object that, amongst other things, can be responsible for actions. I argue no and, as temporal parts and stages cannot act, they cannot be responsible for any actions, and this produces disastrous consequences for emotions such as regret and moral projects associated with it, such as rehabilitation. Haecceity presentism faces no difficulty here and, further, allows us to make sense of regret whilst also making acts of self-improvement rational.

Chapter 8 remains within the ethical dimensions of tenselessness but moves back to eternalism. Here, reprising and expanding upon an argument I briefly mention at the end of the previous chapter, I introduce something called chronic horrors. Chronic horrors are disvalued experiences that, under eternalism, are real with respect to all times: they are eternal. I argue that the existence of chronic horrors for eternalism has radically alienating consequences for it as a theory and for our moral practice: for example, an individual having suffered a grossly unpleasant action, such as torture, must endure the eternality of that act of torture.

Chapter 9 is about hope. It considers a cluster of issues around hope, such as its relationship to the open future, epistemology, and the perception of change. The majority of the chapter, however, is concerned with what, metaphysically speaking, satisfies a hope. I argue that there exist hopes whose satisfaction not only require the reality of tense, but the truth of haecceity presentism. The conclusion then follows.
Chapter 6 – Grief: Eternalism, Perdurance, and Stage Theory

6.1 - Motivating the Haecceity Presentist Account of Grief

The haecceity presentist account of grief rests upon the robust ontological change unique to presentism: what licenses and illuminates grief as intelligible, what vindicates its importance in our actions and feelings, is that an element of our ontology has ceased, exiting our inventory of what is, its haecceity persisting to characterise how it was. The desideratum of wanting a theory to vindicate, in a deep sense, our emotions is informed by, and shares something in spirit, with the project David Cockburn (1997) embarks on in Other Times: Philosophical Perspectives on Past, Present and Future. Cockburn characterises what he considers ultimately at issue in the debate between tensed and tenseless theories of time thus:

It is a central contention of this book that ethics...needs to be given a very much more central place in the discussion: the fundamental issues in the philosophy of time – for example, those concerning ‘the reality of tense’ – can only be properly grasped within a framework in which the significance of time in our ethical thinking has a central place. To state the contention boldly one might say: the dispute between the tensed and tenseless theories simply is, unbeknownst to its central contemporary participants, a dispute about the place which tense should occupy in our justifications of action and feeling (1997: 8)

Despite the occasional derisory remark (including Mellor’s excoriating characterisation of Cockburn’s work as, ultimately, ‘conceptual botanizing’ (1999: 429), interest in the role tense plays in action and feeling is still a live issue. Thus, Bradford Skow, at the end of his Objective Becoming, a defence of a tenseless view of time, is forced to admit the following:

I do not think that the fact that we are biased towards the future provides much of an argument for objective becoming. But I do think an interesting question emerges from reflecting on the argument. One of the argument’s premises was: the bias towards the future is rational. Is it?...I am asking whether our time-biased pattern of caring and valuing can find a home in the block universe, or if, having been convinced that the block universe is true, we should abandon it and adopt a different pattern. I hoped when I started this book to make progress on this difficult question. But I have not. (2015: 236)

Exploring Skow’s ‘difficult question’, then, is also an important part of the following chapters.

However, the challenge of providing a metaphysics or ontology that rationalises grief without recourse to robust ontological change of the sort unique to presentism is not wholly the burden of tenseless theorists. Any theory of time that lacks such change will, I argue, be vulnerable to the charge that they cannot, philosophically speaking, give the right sort of account of grief, in that they cannot provide the resources to have it sufficiently vindicated, the result being a significant and unwelcome disturbance to our emotional lives.

When I say ‘robust ontological change’, which I think is crucial in offering the vindication of emotions just mentioned, I mean change which exhibits negative temporal ontological symmetry – both the past and present do not exist. I stipulate this to preclude the growing block theory. The growing block theory assents to the existence of the past, but denies existence to the future (Lucas, 1989. Tooley, 1997. Forrest, 2004. Correia & Rosenkranz, 2015). The tide of becoming rolls ever forward as things – entities, events, properties of entities and events, and so on – come into existence or come to be instantiated. Given that the growing block combines an eternal past with a privileged present, defenders of the theory may well argue that it combines the advantages of a tensed theory (the open future, robust ontological change, the privileged present) with the advantages of a tenseless theory (the existence of the past and all entities that inhabit it,
thus inheriting the familiar tenseless solutions to the truthmaking problem, singular reference, cross-temporal relations and an account of causation).

Much has been said in arguing against the growing block (most famously, that if it were true, you could never know that 'now' actually is 'now': Bourne, 2002. Braddon-Mitchell, 2004, 2013. Merricks, 2006: 104-106) but I wish to attack it anew, and all such theories which do not endorse negative temporal ontological symmetry, from the position I attack eternalism and tenseless theories of persistence: that it struggles to provide a metaphysical backdrop against which some of our emotions are rational and, additionally, that it generates certain kinds of ethical problems. And that is why I stipulate robust ontological change to demand exact temporal ontological symmetry. For while on the growing block things do come into existence, they never cease to exist, and something exiting existence is key to providing rationality for certain of our emotions and dissolving these ethical problems, or so I shall argue. This chapter will focus on the emotion of grief, and how the object of grief exiting existence rationalises grief.

To further elaborate, take the moving spotlight theory (Broad, 1923: 59. 1933: 277. Horwich, 1987. Skow, 2009: 666. Cameron, 2015.). Both the past and future exist on the moving spotlight theory, but the present is privileged insofar as it roams along the temporal mosaic, its illumination endowing what is illuminated with the property of 'being present'. A moving spotlighter could, perhaps, argue that although what constitutes my grief does exist, it no longer has the property of being present, and that is why I grieve. Or, to stray into wilder metaphysical thickets, take Quentin Smith’s degree presentism (2002: 119). According to degree presentism, as entities recede into the past, the magnitude of their existence recedes with it. So a recently past event, say, suffers a slightly diminished degree of existence, whereas a long distant past event has a vastly diminished degree of existence. So what explains my grief, then, is that the object which constitutes my grief no longer wholly exists. Rather, its existence has suffered a privation in that it has begun its indelible decline in its degrees of its existence, never to wholly exist again. What constitutes my grief, then, will never be ‘fully’ real once more.

A defender of this doctrine could, perhaps, cash out how grief loses its hold with how far diminished the existence of something is, for we typically grieve less as time wears on. A defender of this doctrine could, too, construe ontological change as things increasing in degrees of existence, before achieving full existence in being present, before diminishing in existence as they become past. Thus, change consists in the gradual accrual of existence, achieving full existence, and then dissipating in degrees of existence.

This stands in contrast to the haecceity presentist analysis, where grief is a propositional attitude that has a propositional object: should I be grieving my mother, my grief is an attitude towards the proposition <My mother, a very important and cherished figure in my life, is gone>. If the proposition is singular, then, following the haecceity presentist analysis of singular propositions, the proposition is about my mother in virtue of the proposition constitutively depending on her haecceity. That is, her haecceity confers upon the proposition genuinely singular content. This allows the haecceity presentist to avoid the apparent incoherence in maintaining that grief is an attitude towards an object that has ceased to exist. The haecceity conferring singular content allows the haecceity to characterise its object without demanding that one assent to the existence of that object. Thus, the haecceity characterises its object in such a fashion that points to its former existence, its pastness. This is why haecceity presentism entails endurantism: entities are wholly and entirely present at all times they exist. Only the present exists. Thus, objects not
located in the present have no existence at all. The emotion of grief, its hold, sway and importance to our actions and thoughts, is vindicated and rationalised by the ‘deep’ and important fact that the person we grieve has indelibly ceased.

Contrast my solution to something like an existentially pluralist presentist one (McDaniel, 2017: 78-80). Past, present and future all exist, but the past and future exist differently to the present, with each falling into different domains of quantification being governed by distinct quantifiers, none being subsets of the general existential quantifier. Grief, then, might consist in the object that constitutes my grief coming to have a different mode of existence in coming to be past.

Or, perhaps, the unconventional moving spotlight view of Ross Cameron (2015), where past entities exist but fail to instantiate certain important properties, or ‘Williamsonian’ presentism (Williamson, 1998: 257-273. 2013), where objects exist eternally but bereft of all their interesting properties after they have ‘ceased’ to exist (such a view is sometimes, and in my opinion mistakenly, taken to be a version of haecceity presentism).

Given that all the theories just adumbrated lack robust ontological change, any specific argument that a theory lacking such change cannot accommodate grief will apply to all. Eternalism, however, is my principal foil when considering a theory of time, as it is (for me, if not many) its strongest rival and the best defended of any B-theoretic theory of time.

This is the first prong of attack against the B-theory (and non-presentist A-theories\(^5\)). It is an attack that concerns the image of time that the B-theory, I shall argue, entails: eternalism. The argument can be summarised as followed:

1. The B-theory entails eternalism.
2. Eternalism does not allow for robust ontological change.
3. Grief, to be intelligible and rational, requires appeal to robust ontological change.

Therefore:
4. Grief is neither intelligible nor rational on B-theory.

One may quibble with the first premise: is not the growing block theory, for example, a B-theoretic presentism, in that it combines B-theoretic belief in past existents with an A-theoretic present and open future? Also, is not the moving spotlight theory, for example, a B-theoretic presentism, in that it combines B-theoretic belief in past and future existents with an A-theoretic privileged present? Thus, the B-theory does not entail eternalism.

I disagree, and do not think that either the moving spotlight or growing block are genuine instances of the B-theory, as they make use of indispensable, unanalysable and objective tense. Thus, they are versions of the A-theory.

There is also another prong of attack, the second prong, which I wish to bring against the B-theory. This prong of attack does not depend upon the image of time entailed by the B-theory. Instead, the attack depends upon two images of persistence I shall argue are entailed by the B-theory: perdurantism or stage theory. The argument can be summarised as follows:

1. The B-theory entails perdurantism or stage theory.

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\(^5\) My arguments against non-presentist A-theories are, essentially, simply modified versions of my arguments against eternalism. That is because the major non-presentist A-theories all assent to the existence of the past.
(2) Grief, to be intelligible and rational, requires appeal to enduring entities\(^6\).

Therefore:

(3) Grief is neither intelligible nor rational on B-theory.

The classic rationale behind the first premise, with respect to perdurantism, is found in Lewis (1986: 202-204): Lewis argues from temporary intrinsic properties to perdurantism by asking how we can account for me, now, being straight-shaped, but not being straight-shaped in the future. It cannot be that I instantiate both, as that would entail a contradiction. Lewis offers three solutions: 1), that straightness is actually a relation, and that I am only straight with respect to, or straight at, one time, but not straight with respect to, or straight at, some other time. But this conflicts with straightness seeming to be an intrinsic property, and straightness-with-respect-to-t is no more an intrinsic property than being heavier than my nephew is an intrinsic property\(^7\), so we should reject this solution. Solution 2) is simply to accept presentism, as it removes any contradiction in denying that my present straightness and future non-straightness have equal reality. All my present properties are my properties simpliciter. Solution 3), the perdurantist solution, is to say that each property is held by distinct temporal parts, or person stages. What sort of thing is a temporal part, or person stage? Lewis says the following:

A person stage is a physical object, just as a person is...It does many of the same things a person does: it talks and walks and thinks, it has beliefs and desires, it has a size and a shape and a location. It even has a temporal duration. But only a brief one, for it does not last long. It begins to exist abruptly and ceases to exist soon after. Hence a stage cannot do everything that a person can do, for it cannot do those things that a person does over a longish interval (1983: 76)

For the first premise in respect of stage theory, see Sider (2000, 2001: 188-209) and Hawley (2004). In essence, Sider takes umbrage with the fact that a candle, for example, on the perdurantist view, never has a shape simpliciter, and thus never, strictly speaking, changes shape itself; rather, it is the temporal parts of the candle that have shapes, and variation between those shapes occur as the candle, for example, melts. Sider’s view, stage theory (or the stage view), asserts that we are instantaneous person stages, each stage related to others by a temporal counterpart relation. Thus, person stages have their properties simpliciter and, as each stage is distinct, there is no contradiction in a future stage futurely being bent, whereas the present stage is straight.

Quibbles with the first premise to the effect that the B-theory does not entail perdurance and stage theory are dealt with in the corresponding section later, where I side with Ross Cameron in thinking that non-presentist endurantists cannot explain changes in the appearances of objects.

Thus, the plan for this chapter is to pursue the two prongs of argument: 1), to argue that grief requires robust ontological change for its rationality, and eternalism cannot provide for that (so we should reject it) and 2), to argue that grief cannot be rationalised on a perdurantist or stage theorist metaphysic (so we should reject them). Given that both are entailed by the B-theory, we should, further, reject the B-theory.

6.2 - First Prong: That Eternalism Cannot Vindicate and Rationalise Grief

\(^6\) Strictly speaking, this should read ‘presentist enduring entities’, but I go on to argue that a non-presentist endurantism is incoherent.

\(^7\) For further arguments against temporary intrinsics being properties with respect to times, including the troubles of such a solution at timeless worlds, see Sider (2001: 98-110)

\(^8\) Lewis’ use of ‘person stage’ muddies the waters, as person stage, as used by a stage theorist, is explicitly a person, whereas Lewis simply notes a temporal part/his understanding of a person stage is just person-like.
Arthur Prior’s famous ‘Thanks goodness that’s over!’ argument aims to demonstrate that for certain utterances it would be very implausible to suppose we were thankful for some tenseless fact or relation: rather, we are obviously thankful for some kind of tensed fact, such as the fact that my headache has ceased to exist. He says:

One says e.g. ‘Thank goodness that’s over!’, and not only is this, when said, quite clear without any date appended, but it says something which it is impossible that any use of the tenseless copula with a date should convey. It certainly doesn’t mean the same thing as, e.g. ‘Thank goodness the date of the conclusion of that thing is Friday, June 15, 1954’, even if it be said then. (Nor, for that matter, does it mean ‘Thank goodness the conclusion of that thing is contemporaneous with this utterance. Why would anyone thank goodness for that?’) (1959: 17)

Mellor tackles Prior’s challenge of the purported indispensability of tensed facts thus: the utterance ‘Thank goodness that’s over!’ is to be treated as a conjunction of two utterances: ‘Thank goodness!’ and ‘That’s over’. The second of these two conjuncts, Mellor says, can be given tenseless, token-reflexive truth conditions (it could also be given tenseless, dated truth conditions, should one prefer). ‘That’s over’ is true, of an event, if that event is earlier than the utterance of that token of ‘That’s over’. So, to use MacBeath’s example, if Mellor is suffering a headache over being tormented by Prior’s challenge prior to 12 but, having a solution occur at 12, the headache ceases, then any utterance of ‘That’s over’, in reference to the event of the headache, is true after 12, but not before 12 (1994: 301). So far, so good. The first conjunct, however, is where perplexities arise – though we may have token-reflexive truth conditions for token utterances of ‘That’s over’ (which, in itself, is not very surprising), the first conjunct is thanking goodness for something – and Prior says it is precisely that something that is an irreducibly tensed fact.

Mellor denies that one is thanking goodness for a fact. Rather, he says that what one is really doing when one thanks goodness is expressing relief, here relief that a painful experience has stopped. That is, one feels relief when the painful event is earlier than the token utterance of ‘That’s over’. As Mellor says:

…the relief which ‘Thank goodness’ expresses is usually felt only when ‘That’s over’, said of a pain, is true, namely, just after a pain has stopped. However, there is a little more to it than that. The coincidence of these tenseless conditions is not merely that. The ending of the pain is also, we believe, the cause of our relief; and our saying ‘Thank goodness’ in conjunction with ‘That’s over’ expresses, among other things, our recognition of this further, tenseless fact’ (1994: 298)

Now, one’s attention may drift to the use of ‘usually’. Mellor introduces this qualification as he is concerned about those who, rather than finding relief from the absence of pain, find such an absence to occasion unease. Mellor’s own example is a masochist. Nevertheless, such a figure, masochist or otherwise, is quite easily dispensed with when one shifts Mellor’s analysis to a higher degree of generality. Rather than it being the absence of pain that occasions relief, one may need only say that it is the absence of a disvalued experience, or the absence of a disvalued event, that occasions relief. This is MacBeath’s amendment to Mellor’s account, and it seems to solve the problem of masochism (1994: 306).

Now, the trouble with this is that it was advantageous for Mellor to have the masochist as an example. This is because Mellor is keen to deny that there is any necessary connection between relief and the stopping of painful experiences, as he is concerned that one may explain why such a necessary connection exists via tense – the reason it is natural to experience relief after a painful experience is because the experience is past, a tensed fact. The threat is compounded by Mellor’s curiously weak response to the question of why relief is natural after a painful experience rather than before: for him, there is no answer as to why it is particularly natural. He continues, however, that there is also no answer to the question of why relief should be felt when a painful experience is past, rather
than present or future. Indeed, he says that one cannot answer the latter question by
supplying ‘an a priori truth that relief is never felt, in relation to a pain, while the pain is
present’. (1994: 297) And it is the masochist, Mellor contends, that precludes any such a
priori truth.

Bringing masochists within the fold of a generalised principle, MacBeath contends,
restores the link between pain and relief as an ‘exceptionless necessary truth’ (1994: 308).
The trade-off, though, is that, apparently, if it is a necessary truth that relief is only
experienced after a disvalued state of affairs then, a priori, relief can never be felt while a
pain is present. Thus, according to MacBeath, the best explanation of why relief comes after
a pain is that the pain is past.

I do not think any opponent of tense should be swayed by this at all and, really,
neither does MacBeath. But before progressing towards his solution, I think more careful
attention should be directed towards how relief is dealt with in Mellor. The thanking
goodness, for Mellor, is not the thanking goodness for any kind of tensed fact. It is, rather,
the expression of relief, and that expression is caused by the pain being earlier than the
tokening of the ‘thank goodness’. In effect, it is the pain being earlier than ‘now’. But the
example is specious, as can be seen if one considers how this fares as an analysis of
emotions across the board (the problem with Prior’s argument is not the argument itself, as
such, but with the use of a headache as an example). Consider grief. One does not ‘thank
goodness’ when experiencing grief at the loss of a loved one, certainly, but there are
appropriate analogues. Let us amend Mellor’s analysis of emotions for grief – ‘Grief! My
mother has died’ is the conjunction of two conjuncts ‘Grief!’ and ‘My mother has died’. The
latter can be given tenseless truth conditions. Any reference to ‘My mother has died’ is true
at any point after which my mother has died, but not before, just as in the case of the
headache. ‘Grief’, then, is an expression of a particular kind of sadness that is caused by my
mother having ceased to exist. So, the emotion that ‘Grief!’ expresses is felt only when ‘My x
has died’, when said of a person x, is true, namely, just after that person has died, has
ceased. And that, the Mellorian can say, is entirely consistent with a tenseless metaphysic
and, more importantly, the analysis adequately vindicates the rationality of any episode of
grief: I grieve because my mother has ceased to exist.

First, it is less plausible to consider the relationship between grief and a person
passing as merely causal. It is not the case that one moment prior to their passing, all is
well, and one moment after their passing, I am subject to grief. Rather, prior to their passing,
as the moment of their death grows closer, one experiences a swelling of something akin to
proto-grief, the growing acknowledgement that their time diminishes. Proto-grief may indeed
be logically distinct from grief but it is, I think, continuous with it. But the Mellorian analysis
has grief merely be an expression of an emotion that is felt when it is true to say of a person
that they have passed. But the first twinges of grief are felt long before it is true to say that.
The notion of smuggling in truth conditions to emotions occludes their qualities. It is not
outrageous, further, to suppose there is something like proto-relief, or at least something
continuous with relief. If anyone dwells on our experiences with pains and the like, one is not
entirely free of relief one moment, entirely full of relief the next. Rather, as pain calms and
appears to recede, we experience an onset of cautious relief in response to its fading,
towards the prospect of being free of pain. In other words, the connection between an
emotion and the event that occasions it is more fine-grained than the Mellorian analysis
permits.
Second, I say that the plausibility of the Mellorian analysis of grief above is deceptive. Certainly, it seems to make very good sense, for both the haecceity presentist and the Mellorian agree that grief is rationalised by the object of grief having ceased to exist. But my contention is that the plausibility of the Mellorian analysis rests on reading critical verbs - 'died' and 'ceased' - as tensed. In other words, I say the Mellorian is equivocating. Reading the verbs as tensed does indeed adequately vindicate grief, for the object of my grief has irrevocably vanished from reality, has truly ceased to be. But a tenseless understanding of those verbs cannot sanction that understanding: the object of grief is still entirely real, though admittedly not presently existing. So the grief, really, is not occasioned by the object of grief ceasing to be simplicitier, but rather by the object of grief having the entirety of their temporal extent earlier than the expression of ‘Grief!’.

However, the Mellorian can produce an obvious retort to what the haecceity presentist has said: certainly, the object of grief is real with respect to all times, but the haecceity presentist charge of equivocation is baseless, for grief can be vindicated by noting that I grieve because the object of grief does not exist now, at the time of the tokening of ‘Grief!’.

The haecceity presentist can, I think, fairly ask ‘Simultaneity of what?’. Responding ‘Myself and my mother’ does not answer the question properly, for what persons are according to tenseless theories of persistence may very well threaten the vindication of episodes of grief. And, indeed, this is what I argue in section 6.4. Thus, in stressing simultaneity, I say the Mellorian has strayed into an argument rooted in tenseless theories of persistence rather than the B-theory more generally, and politely request that the reader wait until section 6.4, where this concern is addressed.

I still do not think the Mellorian will be swayed by this: in fact, I know she will not, as Mellor himself (1981, 1994: 23-38) is well aware of the need for tensed beliefs:

...tensed beliefs are indispensable, not only for timely action in general and timely conversation in particular, but also for the conscious communication, sincere and insincere, of anything at all, tensed or tenseless. And the reason in both cases is that no agent, and above all no user of language, can do without token-reflexive beliefs. So, far from the tenseless view of time, with its token-reflexive analysis of tensed belief, implying that tensed beliefs are dispensable, it alone explains exactly why they are not (1994: 36)

And this is certainly true for a number of tensed beliefs. My belief that ‘The meeting starts now’, a tensed, indexical belief, is made true by a tenseless fact, ‘The meeting starts at 1PM, 09/11/37’. But I do not go to the meeting because it starts at 1PM, 09/11/37, and I could have believed all along it starts at 1PM, 09/11/37 without that making me go the meeting at all (Perry, 1979), but clearly the indexical belief itself is not some extra, special fact. And that, the Mellorian will say, is the same thing with grief. My belief that ‘I grieve my mother’s passing’ is made true by ‘My mother dies on 10/10/40’. But I do not grieve for that tenseless fact, and I could know it the entire time without me grieving if I do not know that 10/10/40 is ‘now’. But that is not some extra, special fact.

But grief escapes the categories of ‘timely action in general and timely conversation’, nor is it an element, essentially, of conscious communication (thought it can be consciously
communicated). Grief’s relation to action, too, is not as simple, and takes various, sometimes unpredictable, forms: I may refuse to eat or wash, withdraw, abuse alcohol or drugs and so on. But what is really crucial is that the purported tenseless truth conditions of the tensed belief do not adequately vindicate the importance of the emotion and its connection to our actions. The problem, as I see it, is that the Mellorian analysis forces us into something like what Gale (2002: 84) remarks on as follows: ‘If the past-present-future perspective were to be non-objective, an agent’s axiological biases in favour of the future would be merely subjective. There would be a serious and depressing bifurcation between agents and nature’. On a similar note, if we turn to Cockburn (1998: 84): ‘The problem for the four-dimensionalist is to show how anything like our current emotional life might be consistent with the claim that ‘past’, ‘present’ and ‘future’ events all have the same kind of reality and so, in themselves, are all of the same significance’

Just as we demonstrably have certain axiological biases towards the future, I believe we too have certain axiological biases towards the past. Grief is one such example, nostalgia another. And if the distinction between past, present and future is non-objective, as Gale remarks above, then the importance of that bias, the way in which it shapes our conduct and self-conception, our relationship to others and the world, is diminished, if not lost. Violence is done to the equilibrium and legitimacy of our emotional lives and the emotions themselves. The submission of emotions as reasons for actions that are not squarely perfunctory, like attending a meeting, may possibly become problematic too, as the ‘bifurcation of man and nature’ takes hold, and moral reasoning that involves emotional reactions, and the kinds of biases such reactions latch on to, become artefacts of subjective preferences, almost arbitrary. This, ultimately, is why I demur from the Mellorian analysis.

MacBeath himself goes on to pursue an analogous strategy when arguing against the Mellorian analysis, though his tactics are different. MacBeath’s example is actually one of Prior’s: it is that of relief at not having to sit an examination again. This is MacBeath’s gloss:

Consider, for example, a father who, looking at his daughter on 1 June 1982 as she studies for her finals, says, ‘Thank goodness I’m never going to sit another examination’. Maybe the idiom of thanking goodness for facts is indeed tendentious, but what alternative account would Mellor offer of what the remark amounts to, or of what it expresses relief, surely, is not being expressed…Gladness looks like the best candidate; but we cannot say of gladness what Mellor says of relief in relation to his headache when he claims that the relief expressed by ‘Thank goodness that’s over’ is ‘not necessarily relief from or about anything, just relief’ (1994: 309)

MacBeath goes on ‘...even if the truth conditions of the sentence ‘I’m never going to sit another examination’ can be stated tenselessly, it is not the fact that consists in the obtaining of those truth conditions that the father is glad about’. And that, I think is correct, as is the thought that Mellor’s denial of the intentionality of emotional expressions, like ‘Thank goodness’, does not work in more complicated circumstances than pains and their corresponding reliefs once those pains have ceased.

That, however, is as far as I agree with MacBeath. His favoured solution to the problem of tensed facts for opponents of tense is that what one thanks goodness for is an ‘intentional fact’. An ‘intentional fact’, curiously, need not be a fact. In the case of the father thanking goodness for not sitting another exam, MacBeath says we are not implying that, indeed, he will not sit another exam after his utterance. But, should the father’s belief prove true, then it is indeed a fact that the father thanks goodness for – but not a tensed fact! Rather, should the father’s belief be true, it is true because of a tenseless fact, ‘the fact that
he never sits another examination after the time at which he holds the belief’ (note that MacBeath moves between ‘facts’ and beliefs himself). Finally, MacBeath acknowledges that it is not this tenseless fact that the father thanks goodness for. Rather, what the father thanks goodness for is indeed the ‘intentional fact’. His thanking goodness connects not with ‘what is the case’ but ‘what is believed to be the case’ (1994: 310). But what is believed to be the case is made true (if it is true) by a tenseless fact. Thus, we need not admit tensed facts, but we do have irreducibly tensed beliefs, in the same fashion that indexicals may be irreducible.

It seems quite simple to reraise Prior’s question against MacBeath’s analysis – when the father thanks goodness for never having to sit another examination, he is not thanking goodness for his belief he is never going to sit another examination. One can thank goodness for beliefs – say I go home, worried that I left the oven on, only to find that is not on, though I did leave the iron on. ‘Thank goodness I believed I left the oven on!’, I might say. But that is it not what is happening with the father. So the father does not thank goodness for a tenseless fact, and does not thank goodness for a tensed belief that is made true, if it even is true, by a tenseless fact.

MacBeath does anticipate this objection but his response is woolly, and depends upon whether one is willing to buy into his ‘intentional facts’. MacBeath reiterates that he is not thanking goodness for his belief. Rather, he is thanking goodness that he is never going to sit another examination, which is what he believes to be the case. And if the belief is true, then it is made by a tenseless fact.

I still do not understand, precisely, what it is the father is thanking goodness for on MacBeath’s view, other than the ‘intentional fact’, which may very well not be a fact, that he is not going to sit another exam (which is something he believes to be the case). But none of this is any clearer. My concern with ‘intentional facts’ is that something being a fact suggests the existence of what the fact pertains to (indeed, that seems constitutive of a fact). And the fact the father and examination example suggests is a tensed fact, not a tensed belief, and, indeed, MacBeath is explicit in suggesting the father is not thanking goodness for a tensed belief, but rather the state of his affairs itself, which he believes to be true. MacBeath again anticipates something like this but merely reiterates his position once more. His get out revolves around the father thanking goodness for something he believes to be a fact, but not thanking goodness for his belief, which, rather happily, seems to exonerate him of the problem of facts suggesting the existence of what they are about while not having his relief be directed towards a belief that he will never sit another examination. I think MacBeath’s solution has an air of cheating to it.

Regardless of these worries concerning intentional facts, MacBeath’s solution, in seeking to deny tensed facts and the objectivity of tense, is vulnerable to the same worry as the Mellorian analysis: our emotions and emotional lives lose their vindication and rationalisation, and the substantivity of emotions in reasoning (morally, aesthetically, in empathetic dialogue and so on) diminishes owing to their distance from reality, from what, at the fundamental level, is. MacBeath fares better on preserving the equilibrium of our emotional lives, for he is willing to countenance some sort of factuality for tense, albeit in a way that is not straightforward. But my original complaint remains: once again, Gale’s ‘bifurcation of man and nature’ has occurred.

One response to this I have encountered, and one that manifests at various points of what I argue throughout the thesis, is a good friend of the incongruous stare: the indifferent shrug, the ‘so what?’. I sympathise with Lewis here, in that it feels like something I cannot
really defeat, as it is not an explicitly philosophical point. Unlike Lewis, however, I feel it is overwhelmingly obvious why someone ought to care, for surrendering emotions to the entirely subjective destroys, or at least strongly diminishes, their capacity to be rationalised and offer rationalisation for our actions, thinking and ethical projects. That is a very alienating thing, and something to be considered in the process of our evaluation of the positive and negatives of a theory. One is obviously free to opt for the path of declaring emotions to be incapable of rationalisation, or to not hold the value and weight we typically ascribe to them, but with this also comes the responsibility of making sense of their role with any such revisionary metaphysic: a mereological nihilist who simply said 'There are no composite objects, that’s it, deal with it!' would not persuade us of very much, and I say the same is true with the denier of rational emotions.

In conclusion, then, I think both Mellor’s and MacBeath’s B-theoretic solutions to the purported need for tensed facts fail, and the rationalisation and vindication of grief is not possible under eternalism, and thus the B-theory.

6.3 - Second Prong: That Perdurance and Stage Theory Cannot Vindicate and Rationalise Grief – Rejecting Non-Presentist Endurance

Here is the argument I presented earlier concerning the relationship between the B-theory and perdurantism and stage theory:

(1) The B-theory entails perdurantism and stage theory.
(2) Grief, to be intelligible and rational, requires appeal to presentist enduring entities. Therefore:
(3) Grief is neither intelligible nor rational on B-theory.

One may deny premise (1) or premise (2). I think both are true, so I will argue against the denial of both: premise (1) in a moment, and (2) when discussing grief for tenseless theories of persistence. Additionally, as my argument also establishes that endurantism requires presentism to be effective as a theory of persistence, any A-theories that believe in non-present times also cannot rationalise grief.

Earlier in this chapter, I discussed Lewis’ rationale for believing in perdurantism. The rationale, in essence, concerned the problem of temporary intrinsics, and how one thing (like a person) can be F (straight, say) at t1 and also fail to be F (bent, say) at t2. Lewis’ solution is that the entity itself is never straight or bent, but rather some of its temporal parts are. Stage theorists, like Sider (2001) and Hawley (2004), say that person stages are F or fail to be F. So entities themselves are indeed F or fail to be F, in contrast to perdurantism, but persons, strictly, span a very short duration, the greater continuity of stages related to one another via a temporal counterpart relation. Both of these solutions, which are B-theoretic, solve the problem.

However, though it is common for B-theorists to be perdurantists or stage theorists, is there an entailment from B-theory to perdurance or stage theory? Some philosophers think no, and that one can coherently combine some form of endurantism with non-presentist theories.

What makes this difficult is the following: the B-theory says there are many times that exist. An enduring object exists at all those times simpliciter. There are times when one and the same enduring entity is F, and times when one and the same enduring entity is not F. But this is contradictory. Thus, the B-theory and endurantism are not compatible.

Peter van Inwagen (1990) argues that properties like temporary intrinsics (intrinsic monadic properties) are actually relations to times. Thus, when we say A is F at t1, and not F at t2, what we are really saying is that A has the being F relation to t1, but fails to have the
being F relation to t2. Sally Haslanger (1989) argues that intrinsic monadic properties are as they appear, and not actually relations to times, but that the instantiation of these properties is not simpliciter i.e. intrinsic monadic properties are only ever instantiated in a certain way. So, a is F at t1-ly, but not F at t2-ly. Mark Johnston (1987: 129) too suggests ‘relativizing the instantiation relation’ in a fashion similar to Haslanger.

Though each theory is consistent in offering a version of non-presentist endurance, Ross Cameron (2015: 153) is unconvinced that any theory of non-presentist endurance can satisfactorily account for changes in appearance. Cameron says that:

A theory of how I persist through time must account for not just how it can consistently be the case that I am now 6ft tall but was 5ft tall, but must account for why, when you look at me now, I appear to be 6ft tall but do not appear to be 5ft tall, and why, when you looked at me when I was ten years old, I appeared to be 5ft tall but did not appear to be 6ft tall (2015: 153)

As Cameron notes, the solution is simple for presentist endurantists, for I simply am 6ft tall now, as given that only the present exists, how I am presently is how I am simpliciter (and when I was presently 5ft, I was 5ft simpliciter then). And the perdurantist can say that the reason I look 6ft now (i.e. on this date and time, or at the moment of this thought or utterance) is that the temporal part you perceive now is 6ft, and the temporal part you would have perceived when Cameron was 10 was 5ft. The stage theorist can say something very similar, just involving person stages and noting that the instantiation of those properties was also simpliciter.

But non-presentist endurantists are not able to offer this solution. This is because, as endurantist views, whenever you encounter an entity, you are encountering it wholly i.e. in its entirety. But if I am encountering an entity in its entirety, why is it the case that I perceive the entity as 6ft now and not 5ft?

Someone who holds van Inwagen’s view would say the following: I bear the is 6ft relation to the present time, t1, and the is 5ft at relation to some past time, t2. But, as Cameron notes:

...my standing in those relations to those times is not itself subject to change...I always (at least, at every moment at which I exist) bear the is 6ft relation to t1 and the is 5ft relation to t2. A fortiori I bear the is 6ft relation to t1 and is 5ft relation to t2 now. Why, then, do I now look 6ft tall and not 5ft tall? (2015: 154)

The van Inwagen style theorist cannot say I look 6ft tall now because I: 1) bear the is 6ft relation to t1 and 2) t1 is now, as this is an examination of a kind of endurance theory within the context of the B-theory, so the van Inwagen style theorist cannot help themselves to an objective now. As a non-presentist endurantist, the van Inwagen theorist holds that both t1 and t2 are equally real. So, the obtaining of the relations between the is 5ft at relation and t2 and the is 6ft relation at t1 are both equally real. But, when you look at Ross (and for the non-presentist endurantist, you look at all of Ross, for he exists wholly and entirely at any point in time), he is 6ft, not 5ft. The van Inwagen style theorist, Cameron contends, has no resources to explain why he appears thus, given that there is no metaphysical reason to privilege one relational fact over the other.

And so it goes for anyone who opts for the Haslanger/Johnston style theory of B-theoretic endurance, where the instantiation relation is relativised. Ross has the property of being 6ft tall t1-ly and being 5ft tall t2-ly. However, as a theory of non-presentist endurance, he has those two properties in those two ways now. But, when you look at Ross, you only see him as being 6ft tall. Likewise, when t2 was present, you would see Ross as being 5ft tall. In other words, why is there a change in appearance – a change in Ross’s height – without a corresponding change in properties?

The temptation is to respond in the same fashion as the van Inwagen style theorist: Ross appears 6ft tall now as he has the property t1-ly and t1 is now. But the same response to the van Inwagen theorist applies. There is nothing to privilege t1 over any other time, and I am wholly and entirely present at any time I exist. Given that t1 and t2 are equally real also,
Thus, I follow Cameron in thinking that their failure to explain changes in the appearance of objects is sufficient to reject them. A B-theorist should opt for perdurantism or stage theory, as the metaphysics of the B-theory entails perdurance or stage theory.

6.4 - Second Prong: That Perdurance and Stage Theory Cannot Vindicate and Rationalise Grief – Rationalising Grief for Perdurantists and Stage Theorists

Having argued that the B-theory entails perdurance and stage theory, I now wish to construct a theory for the rationalisation of grief for perdurantists and stage theorists that, ultimately, I shall urge we reject. This is in response to the second premise of the second prong of my attack: grief, to be intelligible and rational, requires appeal to presentist enduring entities. Should a theory that uses perduring or stage theoretic entities be able to rationalise or render grief intelligible for those entities, then the second premise of my argument is false and the argument fails.

First, however, I wish to briefly reconstruct the haecceity presentist analysis of grief, and how it rationalises and vindicates grief. This will be useful not only as a refresher, but also to have the salient features of the theory ready to contrast with the perdurantist and stage theorist analyses of grief I shall soon introduce.

As I said earlier: on the haecceity presentist analysis, grief is a propositional attitude that has a propositional object: should I be grieving my mother, my grief is an attitude towards the proposition <My mother, a very important and cherished figure in my life, is gone>. If the proposition is singular, then, following the haecceity presentist analysis of singular propositions, the proposition is about my mother in virtue of the proposition constitutively depending on her haecceity. That is, her haecceity confers upon the proposition genuinely singular content. This allows the haecceity presentist to avoid the apparent incoherence in maintaining that grief is an attitude towards an object that has ceased to exist, which asserts that grief is about something that is not. The haecceity conferring singular content allows the haecceity to characterise its object without demanding that one assent to the existence of that object. Thus, the haecceity characterises its object in such a fashion that points to its former existence, its pastness. This is why haecceity presentism entails endurantism: entities are wholly and entirely present at all times they exist. Only the present exists. Thus, objects not located in the present have no existence at all. The emotion of grief, its hold, sway and importance to our actions and thoughts, is vindicated and rationalised by the ‘deep’ and important fact that the person we grieve has indelibly ceased.

So that is the haecceity presentist analysis of grief. As I have said, it entails endurantism, and enduring entities are important for its rationalisation of grief. What about a B-theorist? I have argued, previously, that one should not opt for non-presentist theories of endurantism as a B-theorist, for they cannot make sense of the changes in appearances of objects. So, a B-theorist should be a perdurantist or a stage theorist. One will recall, too, that the second prong of my attack had the premise that grief requires enduring entities for its intelligibility and rationalisation. Of course, those who are perdurantists and stage theorists will look to deny this. So now is the time, as promised earlier, to develop a theory of the rationalisation of grief for perdurantists and stage theorists.

Let us begin with perdurance: for perdurantists, objects are something like spacetime worms, spread out in time as in space, the wormlike temporal object being the mereological
sum of its temporal parts; that is, the temporally extended object that is you is the sum of all its temporal parts. On this view of persistence, there are, for example, times when me and my grandfather have contemporaneous temporal parts, times when I have temporal parts that are later than his last temporal part, and times when my grandfather has temporal parts that are earlier than my first temporal part. For the stage theorists, each person stage is an entity *simpliciter*, and not an aspect of a greater aggregate. Nevertheless, there is a temporal counterpart relation that obtains between, for example, grandfather-person-stage-1, grandfather-person-stage-2, grandfather-person-stage-3 (and Kyle-person-stage-1,...) and so on, such that there are times when there are contemporaneous Kyle- and grandfather-person-stages, times when there are Kyle-person-stages later than the last grandfather-person-stage, and times when there are grandfather-person-stages earlier than the first Kyle-person-stage.

With this in mind, perdurantists and stage theorists may seek to rationalise grief as follows: imagine the dreadful anguish of having one's child taken away and permanently exiled to an island, never to leave its borders. The anguish would not decrease in its intensity if one is reminded they continue to exist there. Or imagine the longing and sadness of a husband whose wife is jailed. She exists, but that is of no comfort, for she does not exist here with him, like the child on the island. And, the perdurantist or stage theorist says, though my grandfather still exists tenselessly, there are no temporal parts of him/grandfather-person-stages that exist now, where now is taken to be a temporal indexical picking out the temporal part/Kyle-person-stage simultaneous with my utterance (or date and time, if you prefer). I grieve, then, that one of his temporal parts/a grandfather-person-stage is not contemporaneous with my present temporal part/Kyle-person-stage, where present is again understood indexically.

Or, perhaps, it is not merely that a temporal part/person-stage of the entity that constitutes my grief is not contemporaneous with my present temporal part/Kyle-person-stage (and cannot be, as all temporal parts/person-stages are earlier), but that one of the temporal parts/person-stages of a perduring or stage theoretic entity will no longer have experiences that are contemporaneous with my experiences; that is, they will not come to enjoy new experiences, instantiate new properties, and so on. Thus, when one says 'I wish they were here, now' about a departed loved one, what one wishes is that a temporal part of them (or a person-stage) were present such that they could experience what I am experiencing. And this might explain the force behind such wistful remarks as 'I wish my grandfather were here to see my graduation/his great-grandson/my wedding', and so on. Here, it is not just grief that there are no contemporaneous temporal parts or stages, but also the wish that there be contemporaneous temporal parts or stages that stand in a relation of contemporaneous experiences.

So, explaining grief seems to be within the perdurantist's and stage theorist's grasp. Ultimately, such emotions are to be explained in terms of two (or more) perduring or stage theoretic entities and the temporal relations that hold between certain temporal parts or person stages. Such an explanation, then, is perspectival, and the attitude may be described as a *perspectival attitude*: grief is intelligible only with respect to the perspective of a temporal part or person stage, and that part or person stage's relation to another temporal part or person stage of the object that constitutes that grief.

For example, my grieving at t2 is a perspectival attitude, as it involves my temporal part or person stage at t2 grieving that one of the temporal parts or person stages of my grandfather, say, is at t1. And the same is true of wishing: my wish at t4 that my grandfather
could witness my graduation is the wish that my grandfather, who has a temporal part or person stage at t1, could have a temporal part or person stage at t4 such that it could enjoy contemporaneous experiences with the temporal part that is wishing. Such an explanation demonstrates that grieving and wishing are consistent with perdu rantism or stage theory, as long as one is willing to understand grieving and the like as perspectival attitudes in which grief is only intelligible in relation to a temporal part or person stage.

Furthermore, the explanation complements the prevalent eternalist attitude that tense may play many important roles psychologically, in terms of action and belief, for example (‘I know the meeting is soon, so I shall run to its location), that may not be given tenseless translations but nevertheless make no serious demands on ontology.

The difficulty with this explanation of grief, as I see it, is one of arbitrariness. Let us articulate an example: say that it is now t2. My grandfather died at t1, and his last happy, conscious temporal part is located at t0. A later temporal part of mine is located at t3. Let us say I am done with my grieving then, reconciled to the loss of my grandfather (well, that his latest happy temporal part is located at t0, its lack of contemporaneity with t3 bothering me less than it did at t2).

But here is an issue: why do I grieve at t2, but not t3? Indeed, it is reasonable that people eventually stop grieving, so it is not surprising that one of my later temporal parts should not experience grief. But why do I experience grief at t2 at all? Purportedly, because, at t2, I have no temporal parts contemporaneous with my grandfather’s last happy one. But then there are manifold temporal parts later than t2 where I have no contemporaneous parts with my grandfather, and I do not grieve at most of them. There seems to be something about t2 in addition to having no contemporaneous parts with my grandfather’s last happy one that provokes the grief. But what could it be?

Perhaps at t2, but not at t3, there is some property that distinguishes my t2 temporal part from my t3 temporal part, its instantiation explaining my grief at t2, it not being instantiated at t3 explaining the absence of my grief. It cannot be that my temporal part at t2, but not t3, has the property experiencing grief, for why my temporal part at t2 is experiencing grief is what is at issue. Perhaps it is some property of ‘temporal distance’? Grief is at its most fulminant after a death, and tends to dissipate with time. So, at t2, I am 1 day later than the last temporal part of my grandfather and at t3, 301 days later than the last temporal part of my grandfather.

But this is peculiar. Firstly, to make a Priorian argument again, why on Earth would anyone’s grief dissipate with the realisation that my present temporal part is now 301 days later than my grandfather’s last temporal part? It is not as if one is grieving, suddenly becomes conscious of the temporal distance between parts, and then becomes persuaded to stop grieving. Further, why should distance be of any substantial importance? The B-series stands in tenseless relations of earlier than, later than and simultaneous with. Introducing finer temporal metrics, such as n days later than, is just to provide a more fine grained tenseless relation - the tenseless manifold stands exactly as it was, and being told that the t2 temporal part is 1 day later than the last happy temporal part of my grandfather and that the t3 part is 301 days later is still, ultimately, simply to say that both are later than the last temporal part. If we take the B-theory seriously, then those relations have held, do hold, and always will hold. The relation between the temporal parts specified is eternal, and introducing the days between such relations merely provides a more specific description of
what was, ontologically speaking, already the case. I have not been told why I grieve at t2 but not t3, or what makes my lack of grief at t3 rational or appropriate over my grief at t2 (and vice versa).

Perhaps it will be replied that the perdurantist and stage theorist analyses of grief does not, explicitly, capture what it is to grieve. But what it does do is provide something like the correctness or appropriate conditions for grief. It cannot provide the truth conditions of grief, because I cannot think of what it would be to grieve truly. But grief can be correct, perhaps, if it is appropriate for its object. And the serious metaphysics behind grief being correct, or appropriate, is that one’s temporal part under consideration is later than the last temporal part of the entity that constitutes one’s grief. That is all it takes for grief to be appropriate, as it entails there are no contemporaneous temporal parts. Certain further psychological attitudes, like the phenomenological component of the grief, why one grieves at t2 rather than t3 and so on, are to be understood as egocentric, and an artefact of how, psychologically, we situate ourselves temporally.

This sits well with what the hardline defender of tenseless grief might suggest are the metaphysical facts about grief: no, things do not cease to exist. What, strictly speaking, grief amounts to is no contemporaneous temporal parts or stages, in the fashion of the latest temporal part or stage of the object of grief being earlier than a certain temporal part or stage of the griever. And though the object of grief has not exited existence, this provides the ground for the psychological explanation of grief. In a B-theoretic, strict sense, the griever and the grieved are still isolated such that they have no contemporaneous temporal parts, and this forms the basis of an A-theoretic, entirely egocentric and psychological representation of the grieved as gone, ceased. So grief, as it is felt, is a product of the human psychological tendency to represent things A-theoretically, but what grounds that representation is no tensed fact, but rather the B-theoretic picture of a temporal part of the griever standing in a B-relation to a temporal part of the grieved, the B-theoretic fact represented A-theoretically by the griever. Maybe this can be joined with some kind of evolutionary story about how human psychology has evolved to make use of A-theoretic representations, though it would need to be one which explained the evolutionary role of grief.

But I do not find this is an explanation of grief. Here is why: imagine we live in a fully deterministic universe, but we humans psychologise any choice we make as free. There is an evolutionary story for this, perhaps that decisions made that we think are free are quicker, which confers a survival advantage. So while, strictly speaking, no choice is ever free, we humans egocentrically and psychologically represent such decisions as free. But this does not explain freedom to choose. It eliminates it, while trying to preserve an anaemic nod to it that is so wildly different from our standard concept of freedom to choose so as to be entirely alien. Note, I am not saying that our concepts dictate our metaphysics. But if one chooses a metaphysics that makes no real room for the freedom to choose, one should be honest about it. Rather, what has been explained here is the basis of our illusion of the freedom to choose. And, analogously, I say that the eternalist explanation of grief should be honest and say that they have an explanation of the illusion of grief.

That itself sounds strange. One can have the illusion of the freedom of choice, for there is no phenomenal component that corresponds to such a freedom in making a decision (one does not, I think, feel a free choice). But there is no illusion of grief, for part of grieving is its phenomenal character (recall the earlier difficulty in the eternalist analysis of
grief sundering grief from its felt qualities). But, in an important sense, we are the victim of a deceit; imagine the mother grieving her dead son on some misinformation. She might be experiencing grief but she is deceived about the grounds for it, for she believes her son is dead. When he pops through the door, she ceases to grieve because she understands she was the victim of misinformation, and that her grieving was without cause. So while we may not be experiencing illusory grief, what occasions the grief is itself something like an illusion. And if that is the case on the tenseless analysis, it is difficult to see what is left of grief as we typically understand it.

Indeed, I think nothing is left, for the tenseless analysis of grief seems to tell me that my grief is a mistake, and grieving involves a lack of fit between metaphysics and psychology. All the psychological explanation does is demonstrate that the ‘proper’ eternalist explanation involving temporal parts and stages is inadequate, and the ‘grief’ is shifted to a relationship between tensless facts and A-theoretic representation. So here is my contention: the eternalist must either maintain a tenseless analysis of grief that is inadequate, or urge us to give up on grief entirely.
This chapter is concerned with the ethical dimension of perdurance and stage theory. In the previous chapter concerning grief, I spoke quite loosely of temporal parts and person stages having certain episodes of experience, like grieving and wishing, and left that unchallenged. I still argued that perdurance and stage theory could not offer a sufficiently robust account of grief to preserve its importance in our emotional lives. However, what if we were to challenge the assumption that such objects — temporal parts and person stages — could experience such things? Here, I wish to argue that they cannot experience things like grief and wishes, and explore the kind of consequences this has for our notion of responsibility, understanding of ourselves morally, and the sort of moral projects we typically undertake, such as rehabilitation.

The argument against perdurance and stage theory has the following structure:

1) Regret for, and rehabilitation in respect of, a past misdeed requires an intelligible relation of responsibility to be rational.
2) Perdurance and stage theory do not permit an intelligible relation of responsibility.

Therefore

3) One cannot rationally regret, or a rationally experience rehabilitation in respect of, a past misdeed under perdurantism and stage theory.

I also argue, in addition to 2), that stage theory makes certain obviously true attributions of moral blameworthiness and responsibility false.

By rationally, as previously, I mean that the emotion and state in question — regret and rehabilitation — lack the deep vindication I believe they require in order to justify their role in our emotional lives. And the role of regret and rehabilitation in our emotional, ethical and, should one be a theist, religious lives is very important. Regret shapes and informs our subsequent conduct, prudentially and morally, and the manner in which our conduct is subsequently informed can be salutary. Sometimes, we regret very great errors, and may strive to be rehabilitated, importantly free of our previous disgrace, but nevertheless the bearer of its trace. Both regret and rehabilitation are important to the development of people, crucial to explanations of certain actions, and central to some of our ethical projects. They are pivotal to our emotional equilibrium, and any theory that cannot justify that importance is, I argue, weaker compared to one that can. My contention is that perdurance and stage theory cannot accommodate that importance as these theories of persistence cannot provide an intelligible relation of responsibility.

This has consequences, too, for emotions and states within the vicinity of regret. Forgiveness, for example, has an intimate connection with regret and rehabilitation, as does guilt, for what is crucial about our experience of regret or our feeling that we are successfully rehabilitated is that there is some event for which we are responsible that is causing those experiences.

7.1 – Perdurance and Stage Theory: No Candidates for Responsibility

Here, I shall argue that we ought to reject perdurantism and stage theory as theories of persistence. This is because, under perdurance and stage theory, people do not act; only their temporal parts or person stages do. So, human persons do not act, and thus cannot be
responsible for actions. Consequently, there is no rational way of regretting or experiencing guilt, or undertaking a project of rehabilitation (and many more things, but I am focusing on the ethical and moral dimensions of tenseless theories of persistence). For my arguments here, I shall be looking closely at: 1) what sort of thing is a person, according to perdurance and stage theory; and 2) what does persistence consist in, according to perdurance and stage theory i.e., what does it mean to say that the person p is the same person at t1 and at t2. I first argue strictly against perdurance to establish my line of attack and then apply that line of attack to stage theory: this is because the arguments are almost identical, their tenor simply transposed to dealing with person stages rather than temporal parts (though person stages do introduce an additional complication to the dialectic, as they are explicitly persons, though of a very small duration).

The answer to 1) for the perdurantist is that a person is, to quote Lewis (1986c: 306) ‘a temporally extended composite object whose parts tenselessly and changelessly occupy certain temporal locations’.

The perdurantist answer to 1) leads to trouble for the answer to 2). This is because, in a strict sense, it is misguided to ask what it means to say that Kyle-at-t1 is the same person as Kyle-at-t2, for neither Kyle-at-t1 nor Kyle-at-t2 are persons at all; rather, they are temporal parts of Kyle, the person. And, further, they are not identical at all, for they are simply different temporal parts of me, just as my different spatial parts of me, equally real as they are, are not identical. In summary:

...on the relational view, where our identity is based upon a relation between different stages, it is alleged that we do not have one person who performed the crime and is later on trial for it. Rather, there is one stage where an evil deed is taking a place, but there is no self-same substance that exists at both times (Oaklander, 2003: 161)

Such a suggestion is not a new one. It was made in outline, ante litteram, by Thomas Reid:

Our consciousness, our memory, and every operation of the mind, are still flowing like the water of a river, or like time itself. The consciousness I have this moment can no more be the same consciousness I had last moment, than this moment can be the last moment. Identity can only be affirmed of things which have a continued existence. Consciousness, and every kind of thought, are transient and momentary, and have no continued existence; and, therefore, if personal identity consisted in consciousness, it would certainly follow, that no man is the same person any two moments of his life; and as the right and justice of reward and punishment are founded on personal identity, no man could be responsible for his actions (1969: 360)

And in a more technical tenor:

...a tenseless view of time goes hand-in-hand with a view of persons according to which a person-at-a-moment is only loosely identical (genidentical) with the ‘same person’ at other times in its career (Hoy, 1978:275)

Thus, perdurance is incompatible with the thought that Kyle-at-t1 is strictly identical with Kyle-at-t2, given that both exist tenselessly. And if that is the case, to whom do we attribute moral responsibility for past actions? That is, to which individual is responsibility to be assigned?

The first option is to say that I am responsible. But I, on the perdurance view, do not do anything at all, for what ‘I’ am amounts to, in Lewis’ terms, is ‘a very complex temporal solid embedded in a tenseless spatiotemporal matrix with other objects and events and standing in changeless causal relations to other existents’ (1986c: 307). Attributions of responsibility to such an entity are scarcely intelligible, for this aggregate is not conscious, and it does not act.
The second option is to say that my temporal part at t2 – the part in the dock, say, in Oaklander’s earlier remark - is responsible for what my temporal part at t1 – the part that committed the crime – did. Lewis notes two difficulties with such a suggestion: 1) why should my temporal part at t2 be held responsible for what my temporal part at t1 has done?; and 2) what does it mean to attribute responsibility to a temporal part? For temporal parts ‘…don’t kill anyone, or rob banks, or tell lies.’ (Lewis, 1986c: 308). He notes, further, that the performance of such actions would rather require a contiguous series of temporal parts, but those seem no better suited as bearers of responsibility than a single temporal part.

Crucial to this strategy is the denial that temporal parts can kill, rob banks or tell lies, and it would seem entirely sensible for a defender of perdurance to apply pressure here. Peter Geach frames a version of Lewis’ line of thinking as follows:

McTaggart in 1901 was a philosopher holding Hegel’s dialectic to be valid, and McTaggart in 1921 was a philosopher not holding Hegel’s dialectic to be valid’. If we regarded ‘McTaggart in 1901’ and ‘McTaggart in 1921’ as designating two individuals, then we must also say they designate two philosophers: one philosopher believing Hegel’s dialectic to be valid, and another philosopher believing Hegel’s dialectic not to be valid. To be sure, on the view I am criticizing, the phrases ‘McTaggart in 1901’ and ‘McTaggart in 1921’ would not designate two philosophers, but two temporal slices of one philosopher. But just that is the trouble: for a predicate like ‘philosopher believing so-and-so’ can of course be true only of a philosopher, not of a temporal slice of a philosopher. So if our example, which is a plain and true empirical pro- position, were construed as a conjunction of two predications about time slices of McTaggart, then it would turn out necessarily false; which is an absurd result. (1972: 310)

Reference to Geach is particularly handy as Sider tackles him head on in order to dismiss such concerns:

P.T. Geach, for example, objects to four-dimensionalism by complaining about four-dimensionalists like Quine who analyses sentences of the form \[x \text{ is } F \text{ at } t\] as involving a subject term for a stage, \[x \text{ at } t\], and a predicate F. Whatever the merits of the objection, it does not apply to four-dimensionalism as such, for one’s metaphysical account of the nature of persistence is separable from one’s analysis of temporal language. A four-dimensionalist could follow Geach in construing \[x \text{ is } F \text{ at } t\] as a predication of \[x \text{ at } t\] to subject \[x\], but then go on to give a metaphysical account of the truth of such a predication in terms of stages (2001: 210)

Whilst Sider is correct in that one’s analysis of temporal language is separable from one’s theory of persistence, I do not think that Geach’s argument just relates to language: it is, rather, a point concerning the nature of temporal parts that make them unsuitable for predications of certain sorts, like robtings, killings, or beliefs. And the nature of temporal parts is not a linguistic issue, but a metaphysical one, and when there is at least a prima facie tension between a metaphysics of persistence and personhood and the sorts of things we typically predicate or attribute to persons, then it is fair game to query that metaphysics. So, in this instance, I do not think that language and persistence is so easily disentangled. Of course, Sider is correct that one could give an account of the truth conditions of such predications in terms of parts or stages, but he does not, and that is important to rebutting the arguments of Geach and Lewis. It is a hard headed prejudice against such arguments that seems to guide Sider here.

Indeed, Sider’s engagement with these sorts of objections places them as squarely – and, perhaps, merely – linguistic or epistemic; they do not determine, and are not determined by, the metaphysics. Take the following:

One also hears the complaint that predicates of stages cannot be defined without reference to continuants. This, too, need not embarrass the four-dimensionalist, who claims merely that temporal parts exist, not that one vocabulary is analytically prior to another. A worm theorist is under no obligation
to translate person-predicates, for example ‘believes that snow is white’, into predicates of stages.
Persons are composed of subatomic particles, but few think that language about persons can or should be translated into the language of physics. (2001: 210)

And:

It is sometimes urged against four-dimensionalism that we cannot ‘individuate’ stages without making reference to continuants, by which it is meant, I suppose, that we could not pick out particular stages unless we had the ability to pick out particular continuants. But this argument is a non-sequitur; its epistemic premise concerning our ability to pick out particular temporal parts lends no support whatsoever to its metaphysical conclusion that temporal parts do not exist (2001: 211)

But, again, I think this is too swift, and, again, Sider does not seriously think about how if certain predications or attributions of properties become incoherent in the face of revisionary metaphysics, then this might mean there is something wrong with the metaphysics. To be clear, this is the not the point that language should inform our metaphysics, but that tensions of this sort are deserving of serious reflection.

Here is the sort of thing I mean: Sider says, in the second quotation, that our ability to discriminate parts being dependent on our ability to discriminate continuants says nothing about the non-existence of temporal parts. But what about the normative practice of blame? To blame is to hold a person responsible for an action, to recognise them as having done something one considers wrong. The exercise of this ability is common and demands no great sophistication, and we are capable of assessing the appropriateness and warrant of blame; whilst it may not be truth apt, as such, we can and do discuss whether we are blaming correctly. I have argued, however, that the perdurantist does not have persons to blame, for temporal parts are not people (they could not be, for then persons would be strange ‘mega persons’, aggregates of the many, many people that are their temporal parts), and persons themselves do not do anything at all anyway. So, our ability to discriminate and normatively engage with continuants here is not only prior to parts, but it does seem to militate against perdurance, for this practice would be an utter mystery if perdurance were true. Rendering critical elements of moral practice mysterious is a significant drawback of any theory, and good reason to suspect that theory is false.

What if we turn to Sider’s paragraph above that one concerning abilities, where he says that the perdurantist does not owe us translations of person-predicates into stage-predicates? Well, the perduranist does not owe us translations. But she certainly does owe us some kind of account of how practices that seem entirely dependent upon the existence of enduring continuants can be parsed without enduring continuants, much in the same fashion that B-theorists owe us (and do, indeed, try to provide) the truth conditions of tensed discourse in entirely tenseless terms. And, to repeat my diagnosis a few paragraphs above, Sider does not do this, and this enterprise is what is crucial to rebutting the arguments he deems linguistic or epistemic.

So Lewis’ argument, I believe, stands: and what we are interested in, really, in understanding the relation of responsibility is that which obtains between persons and their actions, and if that relationship is threatened or incoherent, then so also is morality, rehabilitation, regret, remorse, and so on. Mellor takes a similar path, close to Lewis’ point above:

If a thing is [a causal sequence of events] it has temporal parts (‘phases’) namely the events in the sequence; the ontological distinction between things (substances) and events is destroyed, since it is just lack of temporal parts that distinguishes a thing from temporally extended events. Well, why not destroy the distinction—perhaps there are no things without temporal parts? But if so, no temporally extended object is wholly present at a time; conversely, what is present at a time is not wholly identical (and so, perhaps, pace Parfit, not identical at all) with anything at any other time. And where then, for
example, in the case of people, do our notions of moral and of legal responsibility for what we have ourselves done, and intended ourselves to do, go? (1975: 251)

What is important, then, for the point concerning responsibility is that perdurance threatens responsibility by not permitting continuants, in the strictest sense.

Against perdurance, then, the crux of Lewis’ argument is that the only things to which responsibility can be assigned on its metaphysic are not the sort of things to which responsibility is assignable. Thus, there is no intelligible relation of responsibility for perdurantists. Consequently, there is no rational sense of experiencing regret, or undergoing rehabilitation, or other like emotions in the vicinity – guilt, shame, and so on. Further, if you think it is necessary that moral agents are the sort of entity to which responsibility is assignable, perdurantism has with it, in addition, that there are no moral agents.

That morality presupposes a conception of persons as both: 1) capable of attributions of responsibility; and 2) persisting entities is not too contentious a thought. Mellor stresses the same point differently:

...the first prerequisite for moral and legal responsibility is identity through time. Nothing and no one can be held responsible for an earlier action unless he, she, or it is identical with whoever or whatever did that earlier action...Now whatever identity through time may call for elsewhere, here it evidently requires the self-same entity to be wholly present both when the deed was done and later when being held accountable for it (1981: 106)

And Samuel Scheffler:

Morality as we normally think of it is intimately bound up with a conception of ourselves as existing agents over time with ongoing values, plans, personalities, loyalties, and commitments. That conception of ourselves enters into morality in two different ways. It enters both as a characterization of the nature of beings who can be the objects of beneficial and harmful conduct, and as a characterization of the nature of beings who are capable of helping and harming others. (1982: 237)

So it should not be surprising that a theory of persistence that fails to fulfil either or both of these fails to have moral agents. Failure to permit moral agents is, I think, a very significant problem for a theory.

Let us now put stage theory to the test and have it answer the two questions posed earlier. These questions were: 1) what sort of thing is a person, according to perdurance and stage theory; and 2) what does persistence consist in, according to perdurance and stage theory i.e., what does it mean to say that the person p is the same person at t1 and at t2.

For stage theory, there are not, in a very strict sense, continuants, as the person stage I am now is an instantaneous person stage that bears relations to other instantaneous person stages via a temporal counterpart relation. So, compared to perdurantism, the answer to 1) is that a person is the sort of thing we typically think a person to be but extremely brief. The answer to 2) is that persistence does not really occur, but we can attribute temporal properties to instantaneous person stages and give them a counterpart theoretic analysis. To use Sider’s own example:

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9 Lewis formulates his argument confusingly, as he argues against the ‘tenseless theory’, but the ‘tenseless theory’ is not a theory of persistence. Further, he states that ‘The first stage is the recognition of the fact that morality presupposes a conception of persons as perduring agents...if persons do not perdure, but are simply tenseless matrices of causally related-events...’. But his argument is that perduring entities are not moral agents. Presumably, he means ‘persist’ rather than ‘perdure’.
...the truth condition of an utterance of ‘Ted was once a boy’ is this: there exists some person stage $x$ prior to the time of utterance, such that $x$ is a boy, and $x$ bears the temporal property counterpart relation to Ted. Since there is such a stage, the claim is true. Despite being a stage, Ted was a boy; he has the historical property of once being a boy (2001: 193)

Sider acknowledges that this invites a pretty obvious objection: that stage theory makes statements about me really statements about someone else. But that is clearly absurd, so we should reject it. And, indeed, Perry makes this sort of objection thus:

(on a view like) the stage view the little boy stealing apples is strictly speaking not identical with the general before me…[The stage view] denies what is clearly true: that when I say of someone that he will do such and such, I mean that he will do it. The events in my future are events that will happen to me, and not merely events that will happen to someone else with the same name (1972: 479-80)

Such an objection has its modal analogue, too, most famously expressed by Kripke:

[According to modal counterpart theory,]…if we say ‘Humphrey might have won the election (if only he had done such-and-such)’, we are not talking about something that might have happened to Humphrey but to someone else, a ‘counterpart’. Probably, however, Humphrey could not care less whether someone else, not matter how much resembling him, would have been victorious in another possible world (1980: 45)

And this analogy is not very surprising given that both theories analyse certain kinds of properties – modal and temporal – counterpart theoretically.

I am troubled by Sider’s temporal counterpart relation in a similar fashion. If we look at Sider’s example – ‘Ted was once a boy’ – then it does not, in the strict sense, have anything to do with adult stage Ted, and has everything to do with a counterpart of Ted that is a boy. In other words, it is not the property of ‘once being a boy’ we are ascribing to adult stage Ted, but something closer to ‘there being a counterpart of Ted that is a boy’. But these two properties are evidently not equivalent: the property ‘once being a boy’, when ascribed to Ted, solely concerns Ted. But the property ‘there being a counterpart of Ted that is boy’, when ascribed to Ted, concerns Ted and a temporal counterpart of his. As Benovsky notes:

Sider’s response can only appear to be satisfactory if one takes the expression “once being a boy” to be a suitable paraphrase of the expression “once there being a counterpart of x that is a boy”, but such a strategy, objectors like Sally Haslanger will claim, “strains the limit of credibility” (Haslanger (2003, p. 337) (2016: 44) Elsewhere, Benovsky makes an interesting point that decouples the analogy of counterparts in modal cases to temporal cases (2015: 18). He notes that he can boast he the he can climb Everest, even if he did not (his doppelganger did). But that is different to boasting that he did climb Everest. That his doppelganger achieved the feat certainly represents the possibility of Benovsky being able to do it, but not his really climbing it. And that is okay for the modal case. But clearly not for the temporal case: in the temporal case, I want to say that I did something – not that some temporal counterpart of me did something such that it represents me as doing it. In other words: even if a temporal counterpart of me did do something (offer a caustic remark at a party, say), the temporal counterpart relation is quite explicit in saying that I did not: rather, a wholly distinct person stage $x$ offers a caustic remark\textsuperscript{10} and bears the temporal counterpart relation to me. But this is distinct from saying I offered the caustic remark: this solely concerns me, whereas the invocation of a counterpart does not.

And in cases of responsibility where we wish to engage in moral evaluation or certain moral practices, it is utterly critical that we can say some individual did indeed do something

\textsuperscript{10} Try and ignore that a caustic remark requires time to utter: the particular problem of duration for stage theory is treated a little later.
such that they are responsible for doing it. But that is just not the case for the stage theory, and I do not see how it can be if temporal properties are analysed counterpart theoretically.

Of course, Sider attempts to resist the force of any Humphrey-esque objection:

…Perry is wrong to say the stage view denies that ‘You will do it’ means that you will do it. ‘Ted was once a boy’ attributes a certain temporal property, the property of once being a boy, to me, not to anyone else. Of course, the stage view does analyse my having this property as involving the boyhood of another object, but I am the one with the temporal property, which is the important thing (2001: 195)

But I very much disagree that, when it comes to actions to which we want to attribute responsibility, that my simply having the temporal property is the important thing: it is that I did it. Analysing my having performed an action in terms of the actions of another, distinct object simply does not offer enough to sustain an intelligible relation of responsibility, moral or otherwise. Thus, I conclude that we should reject stage theory 11.

7.2 – Perdurance and Stage Theory: Actions Take Time

Lewis has a second argument to make against perdurance. It is that human actions take time to perform. He quotes Phillip Quinn on this point:

Human actions in the full-blooded sense, because they involve bodily motion, take time to perform. A body can be in motion at an instant of time and have instantaneous velocity and acceleration, but it takes a finite interval of time for a body to move or to make a motion . . . . Perhaps disembodied spirits of humans could act at an instant too. However, embodied humans can only perform actions in the spatiotemporal world by making motions which span finite temporal intervals. Maybe too there are mental acts that contribute causally to the genesis of human actions but occur at a single instant. Mental willings or decidings, if there are any such things, might be examples of such instantaneous mental acts. Nevertheless, the human actions to which they contribute, such as arm raisings, are not instantaneous. Of course, it makes sense to ask what action, if any, a human agent is performing at an instant to time. But I do not perform the action of raising my arm, or any other, instantaneously. (1983: 64-65)

Quinn is discussing bodily actions, but his point applies quite generally to many mental actions insofar that a good deal of them take time to perform.

Lewis takes this as his starting point, noting that ‘No human agent performs any action unless there is some action such that the agent persists while performing it’ (1986c: 309). Take, for example, the raising of an arm, which begins at t1 and ends at t5 with my hand raised. The question for the perdurantist is: who raises their arm? Not the temporally extended and tenseless ‘I’, says Lewis, for this ‘I’ is not the sort of thing that has hands or feet, and it is also not the sort of thing that can intend, think or act, for it is the temporal parts for the perdurantist that are supposed to do the intending, thinking and acting. But, Lewis says further, it cannot be a temporal part of me that performs the action anyway, for ‘…no temporal part lasts long enough to perform this or any other action’ (1986c: 309). Therefore, there are no agents that persist while performing an action. It follows, then, that there are no human actions if persons are the way perdurantism says they are. And if there are no human actions, there is no responsibility for actions.

Sider, of course, has something to say about this for opponents of stage theory. One could easily substitute temporal parts for person stages in this response to defend perdurantism too (and Lewis anticipated this line of defence, 1986c: 310):

11 Hawley’s stage theory differs in allowing stages to have temporal extent, but is equally vulnerable to the line of attack pursued here.
The sentence 'Ted believes that four-dimensionalism is true' attributes, according to the stage theorist, a belief to my current stage. But how can an instantaneous stage believe anything? Beliefs take time. Having a belief does indeed require having had certain features in the past. This is not inconsistent with the stage view, which interprets the past having of the relevant features as amounting to having temporal counterparts that have those features. In order to have a belief, a stage must stand in an appropriate network of counterpart relations to other stages with appropriate features. Thus, the property having a belief is a highly relational property (2001: 198).

I do not find this example convincing for beliefs for the same reasons I gave against stage theory earlier: the property 'having a belief', when ascribed to Ted, solely concerns Ted, whereas the property 'there being n counterparts to Ted that stand in an appropriate network of counterpart relations with appropriate features such that they hold a belief' concerns Ted and a very large number of other objects. They are distinct properties, and for any past action, it is not I that performed it.

Shifting from belief to an action makes the case worse. Take an episode of temporally extended violence: an assault, and the utterance 'Ted once assaulted Tom'. Not only is Ted, the person stage now, having responsibility for the assault he once performed analysed in terms of the actions of prior, distinct person stages, the temporally extended nature of the assault means there are very many person stages — the only things that are people for the stage theorist — responsible for the assault (or, more strictly, for a very great number of assaults against a very great number of Tom person stages). Consequently, if a trial were to occur, and Tom’s lawyer declared 'One man, Ted, is responsible for the assault of Tom and one man, Ted, deserves to be punished for it!' he would be speaking falsely. But this is absurd. So, again, we should reject stage theory as, in addition to denying us an intelligible relation of responsibility, it also makes obviously true attributions of moral blameworthiness and responsibility false.

7.3 - What If Temporal Parts and Person Stages Could Perform and Be Responsible for Actions?

Additionally, there is a further twist to Lewis’ strand of argument that he does not pick up on. He does not do so, I assume, because he thinks that: 1) temporal parts or instantaneous stages cannot perform actions; and 2) temporal parts and instantaneous stages cannot be responsible for actions. Regardless, it is a useful line to pursue, for even if 1 and 2 were false (which, I have argued, they are not!), and temporal parts and instantaneous stages could do those things, it introduces a big difficulty anyway.

It is suggested in this line: ‘Why should my present temporal part be held responsible for what an earlier temporal part of me is tenselessly doing?’ (1986c: 307). The ‘doing’, in this line, should of course not be read tensed, and there is no suggestion that the ‘doing’ is occurrent, just at an earlier time. But the point remains, however, that it is, in an entirely tenseless fashion, entirely real. And that is a troubling thought for moral psychology: can we be rehabilitated, for example, if the actions that we seek rehabilitation in respect of are, tenselessly speaking, still out there, real with respect to all times? Forgiveness is difficult at the best of times, but we can we forgive at all if the action we are considering forgiving indelibly has its occurrence as part of reality? How is absolution, in the theistic sense, possible when the totality of one’s sin is still real?

Haecceity presentism has the resources to deal with this, and in a fashion very much like it treats grief. As with grief, the haecceity of an event morally relevant to a person12 (say, 12 To be clear, I am not saying that only morally relevant events have haecceities. This is just how a haecceity presentist should deploy their ontology to rationalise and vindicate episodes of emotions like regret.)
in that it is a regretted event, or an event in which a morally bad action took place) persists to characterise the very features that prompt regret or shame in that person. But, importantly, those very features no longer exist (for, as noted above, their continued existence would threaten the rationality and intelligibility of any project of overcoming that regret or shame). It is this that sanctions the crucial liberty persons require from their previous immoral or imprudent behaviour without totally erasing that behaviour. As T.S. Eliot wrote in Burnt Norton (1943): ‘Go, go, go, said the bird: human kind/Cannot bear very much reality’.

The next section is dedicated to this thought, and the relationship between the permanence of a misdeed and its implications for our moral self-conception.
In this chapter, I argue that belief in eternalism entails a radically alienating consequence – the existence of chronal horrors. A chronal horror is any disvalued event understood as eternally real, as all events are in eternalism. The argument, in outline, is that if a theory entails such a consequence – one that is alienating with respect to our moral thinking and psychology - then that is a major deficiency for that theory when compared to a theory that does not suffer that consequence. Eternalism is a theory that does suffer this deficiency, whereas haecceity presentism does not. Thus, in assessing the adequacy of a theory, the radically alienating consequence of chronal horrors for eternalism should count against it.

I begin by quickly looking at arguments that dispute the immoral consequences of belief in modal realism, and conclude there is a parallel with eternalism that generates an analogous, alienating consequence. I then look at numerous arguments that say, in one way or another, that we should not be bothered by chronal horrors, and argue that they are not persuasive.

8.1 – From Modal Realism to Chronal Horrors

Concerns about the immoral or alienating consequences of belief in eternalism are infrequent, though its modal analogue – modal realism – has those who, in one way or another, share worries about its moral import (Adams, 1979. Tännsjö, 1987. Heller, 2003. Le Poidevin, 2016). It may be profitable, then, to briefly explore what is morally troubling in respect of modal realism in order to prompt reflection on what may be analogously troubling about eternalism. And there is, I shall argue, something in spirit that unites the two strands of troubles, though in different ways: the arguments for the immorality of modal realism are that it sanctions moral reasoning that is inconsistent with moral truths. I want to argue that eternalism is an alienating theory because it has unacceptable moral consequences: namely, that all disvalued events (which includes grossly immoral events), and those that have suffered from any disvalued event, must contend with the eternal reality of that event and its consequences. A metaphysic that licenses so profoundly alienating a view of moral action should be rejected.

Adams objects to modal realism on grounds of immorality thus:

Our normal belief in the absoluteness of actuality is reflected in our value judgments too. We may be moved by the joys and sorrows of a character known to be fictitious; but we do not really believe it is bad that evils occur in a non-actual possible world, or good that joys occur in a non-actual possible world, though of course it would be bad and good, respectively, for them to be actual. I think that our very strong disapproval of the deliberate actualizing of evils similarly reflect a belief in the absolutely, and not just relatively, special status of the actual as such. Indeed, if we ask, "What is wrong with actualizing evils, since they will occur in some other possible world anyway if they don't occur in this one?", I doubt that the indexical theory can provide an answer which will be completely satisfying ethically. (1979: 195)

David Lewis, naturally, has a response about why the modal realist does not need to deny that it is wrong to actualise evils:

What is wrong with actualising evils, since they will occur in some other possible world anyway if they don't occur in this one? – if you actualise evils, you will be an evil-doer, a causal source of evil. That is something which, if you are virtuous, you do not want to be. Otherworldly evils are neither here nor there. They aren’t your evils. Your virtuous desire to do good and not evil has nothing to do with the sum

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13 I base the term ‘chronal horrors’ on what Le Poidevin calls their modal counterpart, ‘modal horrors’.
total of good and evil throughout reality. It has to do with what befalls you and your worldmates, and in particular it has to do with the way in which what befalls yourself and others depends causally on what you do.

For those of us who think of morality in terms of virtue and honour, desert and respect and esteem, loyalties and affections and solidarity, the other-worldly evils should not seem even momentarily relevant to morality. Of course our moral aims are egocentric. And likewise all the more for those who think of morality in terms of rules, rights, and duties; or as obedience to the will of God.

If modal realism makes a problem for anyone, it is for utilitarians. But not even for commonplace utilitarians, who might go in for a certain amount of generalised benevolence under the heading of solidarity with humanity, or out of kindness to those whom they are in a position to help. The problem belongs only to utilitarians of an especially pure sort. Only if morality consists of maximising the total of good, absolutely, regardless of where and to whom the good may accrue, can it lose its point because the sum total of good throughout the plurality of worlds is non-contingently fixed and depends not at all on what we do. (1986a: 127)

Mark Heller (correctly, I think) points out that while Lewis successfully responds to the letter of Adams’ objection, he does not quite address the spirit (2003: 2). And the spirit, for Heller, is that ‘the modal realist has to consider more people in moral decision making than we ordinarily do consider’ (2003: 3) and what this entails. Heller is keen to note, further, that the spirit of Adams’ objection need not be attached to pressing such a particularly severe consequence – that is, that there would never be any reason to avoid doing evil. Rather, in decoupling the spirit of the objection from Adams’ particular presentation of its consequences, one is free to explore the point more generally. Heller’s entire project is to demonstrate that there is at least one moral consequence of modal realism that conflicts with one obvious moral truth. Given, by Heller’s lights, that the moral truth is obviously true, we have reason to believe the falsity of any theory that conflicts with it. So, if modal realism conflicts with the moral truth, it is not just immoral but false. Heller argues that if modal realism is true, then there are cases in which it is permissible to let children drown when it would be very easy to save them.

The spirit of Adams objection, as distilled by Heller, is not directly applicable to eternalism: the eternalist has more people be real than a presentist, but that is not quite enough to build an objection. But if we abstract from this, we set upon something that is applicable to eternalism, and does generate a quandary: the eternalist, in moral theorising, has to consider more real times than we ordinarily do consider. That is, in thinking morally, the eternalist must consider that the results of that moral decision are eternally real.

Now, the temporally charged version of Heller’s attack is, as I see it, the following: if there is at least one moral consequence of eternalism that is repugnant, then it is profoundly alienating in respect of our ordinary moral thinking and psychology. Any theory in conflict with our ordinary moral thinking and psychology fails to fulfil a basic desideratum, and is thus inadequate. Thus, we ought to reject any such theory.

This is a weaker argument than Heller’s, for I am not saying that eternalism is false as a result of its morally repugnant consequence. Rather, I am arguing that in assessing eternalism – in undergoing the weights and balances approach of theory choice – it is a heavy strike against it, and that no such strike exists against haecceity presentism.

8.2 – Chronal Horrors, Mere Counterparts, and Occurrence

Chronal horrors – eternally real disvalued events – are not something we are familiar with ordinarily, as it requires a particular way of treating the temporal structure of the world, and it is that way of treating the temporal structure of the world that gives them their character. Compare this to a quotidian case of guilt: that is an emotion that concerns having committed
an action one would rather not have done. There is nothing that pertains to the temporal structure of reality. Chronal horror at one’s misdeeds, however, is a response to not only having done something one would rather not have done, but that what one has done is eternally real, eternally part of reality. And this generalises, not only to the permanence of actions, but to the corresponding consequences of those actions. It is not that one lied to a loved one, but that the action of that lie is forever part of reality. The fact of one’s lying to a loved one is indelible, as is the fact that a loved one is, eternally, a victim of that lie. And nothing can get rid of that. In other words, chronic future is something felt in addition to ordinary guilt and other emotions.

That a chronic horror is earlier than whatever happens to be ‘now’ is irrelevant to it being a chronic horror (and I shall defend this later), for that does nothing to diminish its reality, nor does the copula in any such facts not being tensed; the copula in, say, ‘Sally is murdering Samantha’ and ‘Samantha is being murdered by Sally’, when the murder occurred 50 years ago, may not be like the tensed copula we are acquainted with in manifold ordinary locutions, but the action the copula relates to a subject is not any less real for it. The copula in ‘2 plus 2 is 4’ is certainly not tensed, but that makes no difference to it being real.

Chronic future and guilt (and other emotions to which chronic future can attach) are distinct in other ways too. One feels guilty for one’s own actions. Vicarious guilt is difficult to understand, as there is a close conceptual link between guilt and responsibility; I feel guilty because I am responsible for something I wish I were not (and endangering responsibility is exactly why tenseless theories were argued against in the previous chapter). But chronic future need not be restricted to things for which one is responsible. I can experience chronic future when I consider any greatly immoral or disvalued event. This too distinguishes it from mere future, on the same grounds which it can be distinguished from guilt. Mere future may be experienced in relation to, say, the extermination of a population, and what rationalises the future is the relation of the extermination to some set of normative principles I endorse. Mere is perhaps something of a misnomer, for I do not suggest that the felt quality or importance is somehow meagre, defective or diminished. It is every bit as fulminant and raw as it should be upon learning of the extermination of a populace. Rather, it is mere as opposed to chronic because, I contend, the quality and content of the experience is changed upon being told that this extermination of a populace is forever real.

One response is that an event never ceasing to be is not as terribly shocking as I am suggesting. ‘Go into any history class during a lesson on World War 2 and its manifold atrocities and you’ll find many students learning about the facts of the war, facts that have not ceased to be, and you’ll doubtless find some distress, but nothing like this chronic future you describe, with people tormenting themselves over permanent agonies and suchlike!’. But this equivocates two senses of ‘ceases to be’ for facts. There is a sense in which facts do not ‘cease to be’ that is acceptable to the haecceity presentist, for the haecceity presentist will supply entirely present ontology to ground the fact. For them, facts about the past are grounded in the haecceities of entities and tensed properties. So to say that some person suffered a great mistreatment does not require the continued existence of the person or the mistreatment, for the original event is characterised by haecceities and tensed properties, so the entities involved in such events do indeed exit reality and, with it, the properties they had. So though the entities cease, their haecceities do not, and as the facts are constituted by the haecceities, the facts themselves do not cease to be. Further, there is
no worry about haecceities experiencing a mistreatment forever, for haecceities are properties, and thus cannot experience mistreatments. That is the sense that facts not ceasing to be is acceptable to presentists and, I would wager, the lay sense of facts not ceasing to be, for most people do not trouble themselves with the ontology of facts.

But the sense of not ceasing to be utilised by the eternalist is importantly different here, for on the eternalist picture the constituents of such facts are the entities themselves; there are no surrogates to be substituted for the entities and neither should there ever be, for it is precisely that past entities themselves figure as constituents in singular propositions, facts, counterfactuals, truthmaking and so on that is supposed to grant eternalism dialectical superiority in the debate on the nature of time. Any attempt to amend analyses of singular propositions, facts etc. that are chronal horrors in terms of surrogates is certain to be arbitrary and unwarranted. And, given that the entities themselves are the constituents, the entities themselves are ineradicably part of that event's reality, with all that demands. A member of a populace being exterminated has, is and will always suffer the reality of being exterminated at 12:07 AM, 09/11/2031. And this tenseless fact does not correspond to its tensed, mere counterpart – that I will be exterminated shortly is terrifying, but that the extermination is forever real is a greater horror to bear.

Oaklander anticipates something like this in seeking to establish what he, attributing to Hestevold (1990), is the wrong way to treat tenseless facts:

To say that an extraction is tenselessly occurring on Tuesday (t2) is to say, assuming that time is relational, that the extraction is simultaneous with each member of the set of simultaneous events that constitutes t2. This fact, however, does not exist on Tuesday or on Wednesday or on any other day; it is eternal. But to say that an event's occurring at a certain time is an eternal fact does not imply that the event in some sense is always occurring, although looked at from an external God-like perspective, it may appear as if this is so. But from the inside, and in reality, my painful experiences are (hopefully) short-lived, and as they are succeeded by more pleasant experiences, my awareness of the painful ones become a mere memory (1993: 164)

For Oaklander, ‘experiences and events are not eternal or sempiternal, and they do not exist all at once, totum simul’. I’m not entirely convinced Oaklander is being honest here, however: he concedes that, if we imagine a God’s eye view of all time, events do look like they all eternally exist and are occurrent, albeit tenselessly. But we do not experience as them as such (‘from the inside, and in reality’), so eternal existence is not a big deal. But the latter looks merely like a perspectival, epistemological point: that I do not experience the eternality of an event and what it prompts in me (for example, pain) does not answer the question of whether the pain causing event and pain are indeed eternal.

Regardless, even if Oaklander is right, his response does not relate to chronal horrors as I have described them, for I do not say they exist all at once, and I also do not assert that the chronal horror itself is eternally occurrent. What I do say is that they are real with respect to all times, which makes no mention of occurrence and does not depend on it either way. And that they are real with respect to all times is what decouples chronal horror from its mere counterpart, as the recession of the awareness of any awful experience (being tortured, say) and any loss of the intensity of its unpleasantness does not correspond to a diminishing intensity of the reality of that awful experience – and that is troubling and makes a difference to me. The eternal reality of my torture, for example, may do violence to my ability to self-conceive and self-determine: I may feel burdened by the reality of victimhood, be troubled by the indelibility of the violation to my personhood and the power of my captors
over me, feel anger or despair that I cannot be free of its influence – not just through memory, but through reality itself. None of this is morally irrelevant: the everlasting reality of the torture, in this instance, is radically alienating, and excludes the salutary avenues of rehabilitation and repair. The haecceity presentist is free of such a radical consequence, and she possesses the important advantage of having the means to characterise the former reality and nature of the injustice without having the injustice remain. And it is this that plays a role in the positive recovery from such injustices: its echo remains such that we can learn from it, consider it, reclaim it or reconfigure and integrate it within our life’s narrative, but the eternal reality of the harm is not there to haunt us.

Furthermore, eternalists tend to be fond of arguing for the analogous nature of time and space: Dresden is remote, but no less real than London, just as times are remote, but no less real that what happens to be ‘now’. A chronal horror, then, would have it that the bombing of Dresden and the death of manifold inhabitants is remote, but no less real than the Dresden that happens to be ‘now’. Eternalists should not be too surprised at the reality of chronal horrors.

8.3 – Should We Care Less?

Let us return to the analogy with modal realism: if modal realism is true, there are concrete, non-actual entities right now dying in a horrendous war. Their death is no less real or painful than ours. But, a modal realist might argue, not caring, or being bothered less, is justified by their being non-actual, and neither is that diminished degree of concern impugned by actuality being an indexical; the borders of our concern, it might be argued, latch onto the borders of what is actual in matters modal. Given certain analogies between modal realism and chronal realism (eternalism) and time and space, then, we should apply the same thought to chronal horrors; we need not be terribly bothered by chronal horrors because the diminished lack of concern is warranted by the non-present, where ‘present’ is understood indexically, nature of the suffering, and neither should the indexical nature of ‘present’ be problematic, for the borders of our concern latch onto what is ‘present’ in matters temporal.

This view that ‘distance makes a difference’ in terms of concern is endorsed, though in a weaker form than the above, by Oaklander, and bears similarities to Lewis’ response to Adams earlier. Oaklander says:

More recently [Schlesinger] claimed that “our attitude toward the present may be described as regarding it as distinct from every other temporal position, for while the future is yet to be born and the past is rapidly fading, the present is palpably real”. I suggest that we can make sense of Schlesinger’s phenomenological claims without countenancing transitory temporal properties. Again, a spatial analogy makes the point. I am here and so experience space differently from the way I would if I were outside space. I can know what goes in distant space but, given causal laws, I can affect what goes on elsewhere less surely and can reasonably regard what takes place there as less important, because it affects my life less. Similarly, I am now (at this time), so those events that are at temporally distant times are less affected by me and have less effect upon me than those in the present. (1993: 162-163)

The weaker ‘distance makes a difference’ view differs from the strong version in the following, crucial respect: though Oaklander acknowledges ‘those events that are at temporally distant times are less affected by me and have less effect upon me than those in the present.’, he does permit those temporally distant events to affect me. In other words, he preserves and explains the intuition that temporally distant events often bother me less whilst allowing them to still affect me.
The problem with the weak ‘distance makes a difference view’, however, is that it is not strong enough to stave off chronal horrors, for it does not mandate that I ought not to be bothered by chronal horrors. Rather, it fully permits me to be bothered by such things as it does not circumscribe the borders of my moral concern to what is happening now. Thus, the problem continues.

It could be responded that in allowing the past to affect me, though, the weak ‘distance makes a difference view’ may actually be able to accommodate the reality of chronal horrors whilst affording them a salutary role in our moral thinking and practices: the defender of the weak view might stress, not unfairly, that it is not incoherent for the perpetrator of a very immoral action to insist that it is the reality of the chronal horror itself that has guided her rehabilitation and attempt at reparation. Thus, a tenseless theorist might add, chronal horrors, though unpleasant, can play an important role within eternalism.

I must concede that it is not incoherent for an individual to affirm the role a chronal horror can play in rationalising and prompting positive moral projects. However, the issue I have with this purported accommodation of chronal horrors is that it is egocentric, which makes it difficult to see the extent to which the accommodation of chronal horrors truly is salutary: for a good deal of very immoral actions, more than one person is involved in the occurrence of that action. If I gravely assault someone, the eternality of that assault does not just relate to me, but the victim also. The victim might challenge any propriety I have over the chronal horror, or any of the aims or goals it might prompt for me, the perpetrator, whether positive or negative: they may find it appalling that their injury is used in ways they do not agree with, sanction or consent to. True, there are possible salutary instances of chronal horrors - if the perpetrator and victim are both comfortable with the role that the chronal horror is playing in each other’s thinking or moral projects, for example. But those circumstances are very much exceptional, and establish that the salutary role of chronal horrors is quite limited. Thus, I do not think the attempt to accommodate them is very successful.

I must admit a difficulty, however: my argument in the paragraph above seems to rest on the unargued assumption that the suffering of the victim counts for more than the redemption of the perpetrator, and that is why they do not offer anything greatly salutary in being embraced by eternalism. Why is this? I admit, I do not have a perfectly clear answer. I do think it is intuitive that the suffering counts for more. Take the following question posed to Alyosha by his brother Ivan in Dostoevsky’s *The Brothers Karamazov*:

> Imagine that you are creating a fabric of human destiny with the object of making men happy in the end, giving them peace and rest at last, but that it was essential and inevitable to torture to death only one tiny creature - that baby beating its breast with its fist, for instance - and to found that edifice on its unavenged tears: would you consent to be the architect on those conditions? Tell me, and tell me the truth!” (2009: 269)

Alyosha responds ‘No’. Admittedly, the question posed to Alyosha is not perfectly analogous to the one I am facing, but the shape of the intuition I have deployed and is found in Ivan’s question - that suffering counts for more, and might even null anything salutary that emerges from it - is a plausible one. And, if we are like Alyosha, we might think that in the example of the grave assault, what does emerge as salutary from the assault - the perpetrator’s affirmation of the reality of the assault, as a chronal horror, to rationalise his project of giving reparations - is nullified by the victim’s refusal to have his suffering utilised in any such fashion. So, I think chronic horrors remain a problem for the weak ‘distance makes a difference view’.

What if we were to strengthen Oaklander’s point in the following way: those events that are at temporally distant times are less affected by me and have less effect upon me
than those in the present because of a lack of causal influence. Thus, we ought not to be concerned with events that are at temporally distant times. This view, the strong ‘distance makes a difference’ one, does explicitly offer a reason not to be bothered by any temporally distant events, including chronal horrors.

However, I’m not sure the strong view is very persuasive. The fact that no temporal influence may occur between past and present does not offer good reason to exercise a diminished degree of concern with the past or with chronal horrors. If diminished concern with the past were as easily mustered as being reminded that one cannot causally influence it, emotions like regret, shame and embarrassment would be easily soothed. In fact, it is not implausible that regret, shame and embarrassment have something of their character because the event or action to which they are directed are beyond causal influence; it is not because I cannot influence the past that I should not be concerned with it, but rather I am concerned with the past because I cannot influence it – ‘If I only could go back in time and do it differently, I would not be in this sorry mess!’. Regardless, lack of causal influence does not solve the issue.

Perhaps one should exercise a diminished degree of concern with future chronal horrors because the future is, to those without a God’s eye view of the great temporal tapestry, epistemically inaccessible? That our concern latches onto our epistemological borders is more plausible than the sphere of our causal influence, for one cannot be troubled by something that one does not know of, but it is very easy to be troubled by something outside of our causal influence. But even though one does not know the precise details of any specific future chronal horrors, I do not think the epistemological inaccessibility of the future does much to assuage the uneasiness of knowing that, in a very general sense, there are likely many future chronal horrors, even if one is not apprised of their specific details. I do not need to know when I will die to be troubled by the fact that I will die, and the permanence of the event of my death, even if it should be a painless one, may still be sufficient to trouble me greatly.

Relatedly, and as discussed by Ross Cameron (2015: 175), an eternalist might motivate a lack of concern about future chronal horrors by introducing branching futures to the eternalist metaphysic: we do not know what future branch is ours. But this is merely a restatement of epistemic inaccessibility point dressed up with branching futures. Furthermore, the uncertainty of what future branch is ‘ours’ is merely an epistemic, not a metaphysical, uncertainty: all the branches are real regardless, and thus so are the chronal horrors, so this does not defuse the worry.

I think, ultimately, what a defender of the restricted concern solution really wishes to endorse is that one should not be concerned with chronal horrors because they are not happening to you, now. In the great temporal tapestry, the region of spacetime you occupy has no chronal horrors that pertain to you there, and that is alright. But chronal horrors need not be enormous calamities, great wars, famines, plagues and so on, though these types of events do indeed make the nature of a chronal horror more vivid. Rather, a chronal horror is any kind of disvalued event in conjunction with its permanence. I would be surprised to find any person who has not participated in some event they have come to disvalue and experience shame, guilt, embarrassment etc. over. On the eternalist metaphysic, such events are forever part of reality— and that in itself can inspire chronal horror. Regardless, assume we are dealing with an individual who has, throughout the entirety of their life, undergone no experience they have come to disvalue. Their life is a very splendid one of
chronal joys, replete with events of permanent loveliness. That their life contains no chronal horrors hardly gives good reason for not being bothered by chronal horrors. It may give good reason to not feel a certain kind of first-person relationship to the chronal horror, as one is not casually responsible for it in any fashion, but I have already argued that chronal horror need not involve any attitude of guilt, or causal responsibility, in the first place.

Rather, what the modal realist solution needs is its quite strict temporal egocentrism and a moral injunction: you ought to only be concerned with your own temporal duration and the events that occupy it, not the temporal duration of any others and the events that occupy those, and you ought not to be concerned with chronal horrors. But the moral injunction is entirely unexplained and the candidates proposed so far – lack of temporal influence and epistemological inaccessibility – do not work. Further pressure can be put upon the temporal egocentrism too. Imagine its spatial analogue, spatial egocentrism: all spatial regions are equally real and ontologically on a par but the immediate spatial region you occupy is ‘self-occupied’. So, all other spatial regions are equally real but not-self-occupied, where ‘self-occupied’ is to be understood indexically as referring to the self that makes the utterance (or mentally tokens it or whatever). And, as in the other solutions, our concern latches onto the borders of the region that is ‘self-occupied’. But this seems even more objectionably arbitrary, for why should our concern only extend to the immediate spatial regions we occupy? That another region of space is equally real but not-self-occupied gives no reason to be less concerned with what occurs at other spatial regions. One needs strict spatial egocentrism in combination with the moral injunction that one should not care about what occupies and occurs in other spatial regions, but it is difficult to see why one should not care. Given that the eternalist treatment of time is analogous to that of space, any eternalist that endorses this style of explanation owes us a response to these difficulties. In the absence of any such explanation, I think it is reasonable to believe that eternalism has a morally repugnant consequence – chronal horrors – and the alienating quality of chronal horrors produces some serious dissonance with our everyday moral reasoning and psychology. This which is a severe mark against its adequacy which does not affect haecceity presentism. Further, haecceity presentism’s ability to support and rationalise the role of disvalued episodes of experience in positive ethical or personal projects counts to its advantage.
Chapter 9 – Hope

This chapter considers hope in light of three tranches of questions that relate to it as a non-doctrastic attitude. The first tranche asks whether hoping for an event to be a certain way requires the future to be open: that is, does hope require that the future be unsettled, in that the thing I am hoping for is not yet determined in a particular fashion? More precisely, can one consider hope appropriate if the future is not open, in that the object of my hope is already fixed in its properties or nature? If the appropriateness of hope and how it satisfied is contingent upon the future being open, then on a tenseless metaphysic, hope cannot be justified. I articulate an epistemic conception of hope that relates it to our ignorance of the future rather than it being metaphysically open, concluding that hope does not require an open future for its justification.

The second tranche of questions relates to becoming. I ask whether one can indeed know or experience things coming to be or coming to exist without there being a corresponding change in ontology – that is, the question of whether we can experience change without tense, whether one can have veridical experiences of things coming to exist or ceasing to exist without tense. The phenomenology of a party ceasing to be exciting, or the anticipation of a party that one hopes to be exciting, and is, thus fulfilling the hope, encourages the thought that one does have veridical experiences of events losing, and gaining, properties. But on the epistemic conception of hope, one never comes to know, or experience, things ceasing to be or coming to exist, as entities do not vary in their properties. Rather, one comes to know or experience the tenseless properties of an entity. There are no veridical experiences of thing ceasing or becoming in the tensed sense – in other words, the epistemic conception of hope suggests that these experiences are a deception. I present a version of the knowledge argument – the temporal knowledge argument – to test how the epistemic conception handles this challenge. Ultimately, however, I say that the temporal knowledge argument faces the same issues as its progenitor: there are some rather compelling responses to the knowledge argument, the ability response and phenomenal concepts response, which can be given a temporal twist.

Finally, having gone through other arguments against the epistemic conception of hope, I move to the one I endorse, which concerns whether hopes require objective becoming and objective ceasing to exist to be satisfied. I say they do, and that there is no plausible account of the tenseless satisfaction of a hope. So, as with the other emotions and attitudes discussed throughout this thesis, the tenseless theorist must acknowledge there is no important, vindicable role for hope in our emotional lives. I go on to spell out that, even if the tenseless theorist bites the bullet and endorse revisionary conclusions about how we feel and the importance of those feelings to us, tenseless theories are nevertheless not explanatorily adequate in light of this, for they presently do not say why we should not be upset by the sudden irrelevance or unjustifiability of our emotions and attitudes. Thus, we need a new B-theory, prompted, ultimately once more, by my Priorian, ‘Thank goodness that’s over!’ style arguments.

9.1 - Hope: Does It Require an Open Future?

This section considers whether hopes can be appropriate if the future is already settled: that is, if things in the future, like events and persons, are already a certain way, is there any sense in hoping for them to be a certain way given that they already are a certain way? The way I choose to examine this is by launching straight into an account of hope that would be
amenable for someone who believes that the future is fixed. I call this the epistemic conception of hope.

The epistemic conception of hope says hope is appropriate as even though the future is decisively settled, we do not know in which way it is settled. So my hoping that the party is exciting, or what have you, is the hope that the party is settled in one way, a way in which it is exciting, rather than another, and it is indeed already settled one way, rather than another, but I do not know which. This view of hope fits naturally with opponents of presentism, A- and B-theorists alike, so its success at integrating a settled future with hope would demonstrate that hope does not require an open future to be appropriate. I shall argue that the epistemic conception of hope ultimately is compatible with a settled future, so presentism’s open future is of no advantage with regards to hope. I shall go on to urge, however, that hope being compatible with a settled future is not the be all and end all of the dialectic, and thus the advantage the epistemic conception of hope confers on theories that assent to the existence of the future is not very significant. One theory that assents to the existence of the future is eternalism, and I treat it as my foil here as it is through much of the previous chapters. A-theories that assent to the existence of future concrete entities are dealt with in the final section of this chapter, though the arguments are not substantially different.

The proposition that the future is epistemically inaccessible and how that fits with a tenseless view of hope requires a little expansion, as the future is epistemically inaccessible for a presentist too, for it does not exist; so not knowing that things are settled one way or another is an explanation equally available to a presentist. Rather, it is not knowing in combination with one’s metaphysics of the future. For the presentist, one cannot know the future for there is no future to know. For the eternalist, though the future exists and is settled, the fact that causation is temporally asymmetric and later temporal occurrences are not going to be accessible by earlier ones means I simply cannot know the future despite its existence.

At first blush, the epistemic conception seems to fare well. It captures the anticipatory element of hope by shifting it into a change in what one knows, or experiences, rather than a change in what events exist and how those events are: the fulfilment of a hope comes to be in what is hoped for not only being congruent with how I desire it to be, but also with my knowing that it is how I desire it to be (and, conversely, my hope being frustrated consists in what is hoped for not being congruent with how I desire it to be, and my coming to know that it is not how I desire it to be). So whatever I am hoping for is indeed settled in a determinate fashion already, so that element of a hope is, admittedly, fixed. But the completion of the hope, so to speak, comes in my knowing that whatever is hoped for is how I desire it, or in knowing that it is not how I desire it. And that happens when the object of my hope is no longer epistemically inaccessible i.e. the hoped for event is no longer later than now.

The epistemic conception seems to threaten the appeal to presentism as a vindication of hope, as it points towards the justification of hope being consistent with a settled future. For the epistemic conception, the appropriateness of hope does not consist in the object of the hope being unsettled (e.g. the appropriateness of hoping for a good marathon time does not consist in the properties of myself and the marathon being unsettled), but in our lack of epistemic contact with how it is. If that explanation goes through unhindered, then it is a big positive for the eternalist, for no recourse to tense, or tensed ontology, is needed for the phenomenon, and we have tenseless hope as appropriate. The
epistemic conception makes no use of anything outside of what the presentist already does, in that it too subscribes to an analysis of hope as a kind of imaginative projection.

What might a presentist do to undermine the epistemic conception of hope? Perhaps one might try the following: the eternalist treatment of time is symmetrical. There is no metaphysical or ontological distinction between past, present and future. If that is the case, and if the future is epistemically inaccessible from the present as the events of later parts of the same entity are later than the present then, by parity, so should those that are earlier than the present part of the same entity. Thus, we cannot know the past. This is absurd, so we should reject the epistemic conception (taking temporal symmetry very seriously in this way has been discussed by Adams (1986: 319-320) and Markosian (2004)).

The error in this argument is easy to diagnose, however. It is true that the eternalist treatment of time is symmetrical, and there is no ontological or metaphysical distinction between past, present and future. But the lack of a distinction in the ontology or metaphysics of the past, present and future does not permit the inference that there is no epistemological distinction between the past, present and future. It is consistent to assent to no distinction in one, and to a distinction in the other. The eternalist is in no hot water here.

Furthermore, the same argument could be posed against presentism: presentism treats the past and future symmetrically. The future is epistemically inaccessible as it does not exist. By parity, so should the past be epistemically inaccessible, as it does not exist also. Thus, either we do not know the past (which is absurd), or by modus tollens we do know the future (but we do not, thus a reductio). Again, the symmetry in ontology and metaphysics does not mandate one in epistemology: the past has existed but the future has not. The past is epistemically accessible via memory, records, testimony and the like – and these resources are just as available to the eternalist. This argument fails.

Here is another attempt that treads on similar lines: eternalism treats the past and future symmetrically. Part of this is that an entity instantiates the properties it does regardless of its position in the temporal order: if July 21st, 1973, 14:07PM is sunny in Philadelphia, then July 21st, 1973, 14:07PM is sunny in Philadelphia earlier than that, and it is sunny later than that. It is fixed before that date and time, and it is fixed after that date and time. In other words, entities do not change in their properties – or, more kindly, entities do not change robustly in their properties. This does not mean that they cannot experience, as Skow puts it, ‘anaemic’ change (2015: 27), which he describes thus: ‘Something is [anaemically] changing if and only if i) it is currently one way, and ii) it was (not long ago) some other, incompatible way’ (2015: 22). Now, we know that the epistemic conception of hope will have it that my hope for a party to be exciting is fulfilled when I come to know, or experience, the party as exciting. Plausibly, something being exciting is a property of an event. But as the party comes and goes, so does my hope and so does the excitement of the party. We might remark that the party was exciting, but surely is no longer, and one does not continue to hope that the party remain exciting as it occupies a portion of time earlier than now. Eternalism, however, would at the very least mandate the fact that the party remain exciting. If that party remains exciting, why can we not have backwards hopes? What justifies hope exclusively for the future? Why should we not hope for the party to remain exciting, or continue to hope that the earlier temporal part enjoy it as exciting?

The epistemic conception of hope can, I think, not only avoid the problem of backwards hopes but also demonstrate their coherence: imagine I am in a competition to decide the best artist in Rotherham. The best portrait will be selected on the first of the
month, but the results will be released on the seventh of the month. The winner, then, has already been decided by the fifth, but the results not known to the competitors. It seems quite fair to say that I hope I was selected by the panel, that I was chosen as the winner. But that does not concern the future, as the winner is already settled. I hope for something to have obtained in the past. And one does not need to remain hopeful that the party is exciting, as simply just is – that is a commitment of eternalism.

The issue of the open future, then, does not overly trouble the defender of the epistemic conception. They have an approach that it is consistent with the future being determinate. Still, the question of whether hopes require tense to be intelligible is still unanswered, both in connection to hope’s ties to the experience of change and in terms of how one might consider something like its truth conditions.

9.2 - Becoming: The Relationship Between Hope, Change, and Tense

If the eternalist is using an epistemological argument, it may be best to avoid meeting it with a squarely metaphysical one. Recall that the epistemic conception of hope purports to shift the coming to be of an event from ontology – in which an event would objectively come to exist before ceasing to exist – to epistemology – the event is already determinately one way or another, but my hope is fulfilled (or frustrated) by coming to know or experience what is hoped for. And if I know or experience it in a way that coheres with my hope, then the hope is fulfilled (and if it does not cohere with my hope, it is frustrated). So the epistemic conception of hope does, in some way, argue that coming to be, that is, coming to exist, is something experiential or epistemic. We know or experience things coming to be, and that is how we can get a tenseless analysis of hope without recourse to them coming to be or existing in an ontological sense.

A better place to put the pressure on, I think, is whether one can indeed know or experience things coming to be or coming to exist without their being a corresponding change in ontology – that is, the question of whether we can experience change without tense, whether one can have veridical experiences of things coming to exist or ceasing to exist without tense. We are familiar with the phenomenology of anticipating an event that one hopes will be exciting and coming to confront it, when it occurs, as exciting, meaning the hope is positively fulfilled. This encourages the thought that one does have true experiences of events gaining and losing properties. But events do not gain or lose properties according to the epistemic conception of hope, so those experiences are illusory.

Kiernan-Lewis takes an epistemic approach in arguing against eternalists. He argues that “The fact Prior considers so decisive against a tenseless reality is an epistemic fact, an item of knowledge. It is the sort of knowledge we have when we are pleased something has ceased. “Thank goodness that’s over” means “Thank goodness that has ceased!” (Kiernan-Lewis, 1994: 323). Kiernan-Lewis opts to construe this “epistemic fact” as analogous to the one employed in the knowledge argument. The knowledge argument, offered by Frank Jackson (1982) as an argument against physicalism, runs as follows:

Mary is confined to a black and white room. There she has access to all the information necessary to obtain complete and exhaustive knowledge of all the physical facts of the world. But, when Mary exits her black and white room and sees a rose, she learns something she did not know before: what it is like to see red. Seeing as she knew all the physical facts, she has learnt a non-physical fact. Physicalism claims that all the facts are reducible to, or supervene on, the physical facts. So, physicalism is false.

Prior’s argument can be given a parallel gloss:
B-theorists hold that the world is tenseless, so complete and exhaustive knowledge of the facts of the world is complete knowledge of the world simpliciter. Yet, I know what it is like to have a headache cease to exist, for a headache of mine to cease to be. This is something I could not know if the tenseless account of the world were true. So, the tenseless account of the world is false. (Kiernan-Lewis, 1994: 323)

The upshot of this formulation is that the tenseless theory of time maintains that all events are equally real at all times: they are, ontologically speaking, “on a par”. If all events are equally real, then there is no intelligible sense in which an event can “cease to exist”. Perhaps it can ‘cease’ to be simultaneous with my current awareness of the experience but that is not the experience ceasing, strictly speaking, but rather my awareness of the experience. But we do know what it is like for something to cease to exist, so the tenseless theory is false. What Kiernan-Smith finds so objectionable about the thought that reality is tenseless, then, is best summarised as follows:

If reality is tenseless, then reality cannot begin to have or cease to have any feature that it does not tenselessly possess. Hence, on this view, the only available sense of “exist,” and the only sense needed to provide a complete description of reality, is the tenseless sense. It is simply false, according to the tenseless view that anything, in a strict, non-Pickwickian sense “begins to exist” or “ceases to exist” (Kiernan-Lewis, 1994: 322)

One may import this argument into the case of hope as follows: as an event comes to be, my hope for the party will be fulfilled or frustrated. If it is exciting, the hope is fulfilled, if it is unexciting, the hope is frustrated. With the fulfilment or frustration of the hope comes the ceasing of the hope. As the party finishes, I do not maintain any hope about the party – I have experienced it ceasing and, with that, the excitement ceasing or diminishing. A tenseless description of the party, then, misses something, for if the tenseless description exhaustively captured all properties of the party, there would be nothing intelligible about my hope ceasing to be. But my hope does cease to be, so the tenseless theory is false.

Earlier, I noted than an eternalist may simply respond that this is an artefact of hardwired axiological biases. But that misses the point, for that explanation does not address the crucial questions of our believed veridicality of the change. One who favours that explanation must concede that such experiences are not veridical, or at least not as we take them to be, which threatens hope’s role in our emotional lives and preferences, which I take to be a negative. I take it to be a negative because I think we can be subject to genuine and deep instances of hope, just as we can be subject to genuine and deep instances of grief and remorse, instances of such depth that the experience of a hope’s culmination and withdrawal demand their vindication through being veridical, comporting with something in reality’s structure: my hope that my child survives dangerous surgery, for example, and how the emotional force of that hope impresses so greatly on my thoughts and conduct leading to the operation and subsequently, when monumental relief swells in me as I hear the hope has been satisfied through successful surgical intervention. To be told the experience of those changes is non-veridical robs them of their importance, and there is lack of fit between what matters to me and the way the world is.

Of course, an eternalist need not be swayed by any of this. They can say it’s not veridical, sure, but that’s no big deal, as we have lots of non-veridical experiences, and as long as we can say what is really going on, it is not a problem. But my point is that, in the current strands of eternalism, there is not an entirely plausible story of what is actually going on in episodes such as these and without a plausible account of what is going on, the challenge sticks for eternalism – in other words, we need a new new B-theory.

Regardless, Oaklander (1992) responds that Kiernan-Lewis’ argument is question begging, for on a B-theory of time I do not know my headache has ceased in the A-theoretic sense of going out of existence, for the A-theoretic sense of ceasing to exist is something an
eternalist would deny. But as Craig points out (Craig, 2000: 160), Oaklander has not noticed that Kiernan-Lewis's argument is not framed in terms of propositional knowledge (that my headache has ceased to exist) but in terms of non-propositional knowledge (what it is like to be aware that my headache has ceased). Now, even if the B-theorist denies us the propositional knowledge that our headache has ceased, he cannot deny the phenomenological fact that we know what it is like to be aware that our headache has ceased. So on the B-theory I have an awareness of things really ceasing to exist, even though they do not: so I am frequently deceived by non-veridical experiences, as our awareness of things ceasing to exist is pervasive. Craig remarks (Craig, 2000: 160) that on the B-theory of time I could not know what it is like to be aware that my headache has ceased, so Kiernan-Lewis is implying that such knowledge is inherently - and indispensably - tensed. Indeed, Kiernan-Lewis argues elsewhere:

Someone - say, a timeless God - who knew all but only the tenseless facts, and so knew my headache 'ceases' in the sense of there being times after which it tenselessly occurs, would still not know what it is like for a headache to cease. Since no analysis of my experience of the ceasing-to-exist of a headache in tenseless terms is possible, no tenseless reduction of my experience can succeed (Kiernan-Lewis, 1994: 232)

Craig remarks on the twofold challenge Kiernan-Lewis has presented to B-theorists:

“(1), The B-theorist must explain how I can be deceived by the awareness that things cease to exist in cases where it is my inner experiences themselves of which I am aware they cease to exist; and (2) The B-theorist must explain how an awareness of becoming [and ceasing] can exist if reality is tenseless” (Craig, 2000: 160).

The eternalist could, perhaps, argue that non-propositional knowledge that something has ceased to exist, that is phenomenal awareness that something has ceased, is merely the awareness that some event has come to stand in a B-relation to one’s present thoughts. The ceasing of my hope insofar as it is fulfilled or frustrated is simply explained by the object of that hope standing in an earlier than relation to my experiences now. And so it is for hope for future events: that, and them 'coming to exist', is simply explained by the event standing in the later than relation to my experiences now. Ceasing to exist and coming to exist can be tenselessly redescribed as certain epistemic relations to events that correspond to B-relations. This in itself is also a kind of epistemic fact, insofar as my coming to stand in a simultaneous with B-relation with the entity hoped for brings with it knowledge of the properties of that entity, and with that the fulfilment or frustration of my hope. I hope the future party (later than) is exciting, and when the party is now (simultaneous with my experiences), I know whether it is exciting or not. It has come to be one or the other, in terms of my experience of it, and shall cease to be one or other, in terms of my experience of it, and that is a sufficiently robust sense of coming and ceasing to exist, phenomenally speaking, to undermine the argument. The party maintains these features tenselessly, of course, but this is neither here nor there, for the phenomenology of hope can be explained tenselessly.

Here is one problem with this explanation that a presentist might offer: it simply demands too much of phenomenology. The explanation depends on a kind of double awareness: first, there is the immediate, unreflective awareness of an experience. This kind of awareness is capable of occurring prior to any kind of sophisticated, propositional cognitions, and often does. Think of the ‘sinking heart’ feeling upon hearing bad news, or the strongly somatic element of seeing something frightening, like a lion. Or, more benignly, think of idle thoughts, of watching rolling clouds, undulating waves or an insect crawl across a table, or the ticking of a clock. Such awareness, in the former cases, plausibly occurs prior to a judgement about the awareness. In the latter case, such awareness of passage, of coming to and ceasing to exist, perhaps needs no judgement at all. One simply apprehends the flux of passage. The eternalist explanation requires a second, reflective judgement on
the experience of the first, unreflectively aware experience, for it requires that awareness of, say, becoming excited, be judged as standing in a B-relation as being simultaneous with one's awareness that one is phenomenally aware of being excited. In other words, the presentist response seeks to disentangle one's experiences, at the unreflective level, with one's judgement of those experiences, at the reflective level — that is to say, the presentist seeks to separate unreflective and reflective awareness, whilst the presentist seeks to combine them. If they can be disentangled, then awareness of a B-relation between one's judgement of an experience and an experience itself is not sufficient to explain Kiernan-Lewis' tensed fact of experience in tenseless terms, for there will be instances of this fact without an attendant judgement that this fact is simultaneous with my judgement that it is occurring now. Instances of this may be like the first and second types of example earlier, of phenomenal awareness being prior to a judgement, or of phenomenal awareness having no judgement.

Though I am not convinced of the eternalist strategy here, trouble lurks not too far in the form of a very large elephant in the room: the temporal knowledge argument is, of course, a version of the knowledge argument, and the knowledge argument is subject to two pretty compelling responses: the ability hypothesis and the phenomenal concepts strategy. And there is simply nothing to stop the temporal counterparts of these responses to the temporal knowledge argument cropping up. Experiencing something as ceasing is really just the exercise of an ability to recognise changes in B-relations. Tie this up with some kind of evolutionary explanation and empirical studies on the acquisition of this capacity and there we go. Or, alternatively, experiencing something as ceasing is not a fact in addition to the tenseless way things are, but a different way of it being presented.

It would be noble (or foolish, depending on your perspective) to stand one's ground and carry on fighting against these responses — and in fact, I feel quite some sympathy for those that do and a compulsion to join in — but, sadly, the writing is on the wall, and it states that the knowledge argument has not exactly fared very well. This is not to say that it cannot be resuscitated, of course, but I am keen to move on to what I think is the real challenge to the epistemic conception, and that involves a hope's conditions for satisfaction.

9.3 - Satisfaction Conditions

I now press the attack in the fashion I have done with grief, guilt, regret and so on — that the eternalist view renders such emotions unintelligible in an unrestricted sense and that it is the satisfaction, in the case of hope, of such emotions that requires tense. That is, the eternalist conception of hope forbids its actual, robust satisfaction.

Hoping, really, is something like the following, on the eternalist view: 'my hope that the party is exciting is the hope that myself, later than now, is temporally coincident with a party that is indeed exciting, regardless of the fact that the properties of the party are already determined and my later self already has its hope fulfilled or frustrated'. But (and, again, to alter Prior's famous words) why would anyone hope for that?

Now, any defender of the epistemic account can respond that this is to misread their analysis of hope. To read it in this way is to understand a defender of the epistemic account as claiming that they offer a tenseless translation of the propositional object of hope — what hope really is, in tenseless terms. But this would be to make the same mistake as the old B-theory of time. Prior's argument, in its original guise, was precisely aimed at this error of the old B-theory, the error of thinking that one can give tenseless translations of tensed discourse. Such a project fails but, as history has taught us, this is no strike against the new B-theory of time, which sought to offer the truth conditions of tensed discourse whilst recognising that there may indeed be no straightforward tenseless translation of such discourse. It is not inconsistent for a tenseless theory to admit the indispensability of tensed
discourse whilst denying any reality to tense, metaphysically speaking, just as it is not inconsistent for any theory of indexicals to admit their indispensability whilst denying any reality to I-facts, or suchlike.

The defender of the epistemic conception is quite right to point out that they need not be offering tenseless translations of the propositional content of hopes. However, the situation is not quite so straightforward as offering the truth conditions of hope. We can and do say that we truly hope for things to be a certain way but that is merely in the sense of authentically or emphatically hoping for things to be a certain way. The idea of the truth conditions of emotions like hope is quite obscure.

This is not to say that our emotions float free of any constraints, of course, in terms of their objects. I think the rationalisation, or intelligibility, of hope consists in its satisfaction conditions. The positive satisfaction conditions of a hope (its fulfilment, as I have been calling it) are for what is hoped for to come to be as it is hoped for. So, if one hopes for a party to be exciting, that hope is fulfilled when the party comes to be, and it is exciting. For those instances of hope that have a past temporal direction, such as the hope that I have won the best artist in Rotherham competition, the winner already being determined but the announcement yet to made, share the same form of satisfaction conditions. Here, the hope that I have won the competition is fulfilled by the competition coming to be finished by myself being elected as the winner. That it has already been determined that I am the winner, unbeknownst to me, does not alter the fulfilment of that hope.

The defender of the epistemic conception is free to adopt satisfaction conditions rather than truth conditions for her theory. Those satisfaction conditions, of course, will be tenseless ones, and perhaps the simplest satisfaction condition concerning a hope for a party to be exciting is the following:

my hope that the party is exciting is satisfied if the party, later than ‘now’, is exciting

Or, the dated version, which does indeed seem even more promising

my hope that the party is exciting is satisfied if the party, on 25th July, is exciting

The latter does indeed seem quite a reasonable satisfaction condition of a hope. But that, I think, is inherited from reading the copula as tensed, rather than tenseless. Reading the satisfaction condition as a tensed one would very naturally offer a plausible satisfaction condition, for it concerns the coming to be of a party, on 25th July, and the hope that in coming to be, that party is exciting. A tenseless reading of the satisfaction condition, however, is a different story, for then the hope that the party is exciting would be satisfied by the party, tenselessly on the 25th July, being exciting. If that is the satisfaction condition of my hope, then my hope, should the tenselessly occurring party be exciting, is always satisfied, at any time prior to the party and at any time after the party. But I take it that hearing that there is a certain tenseless fact in which a party on the 25th July bears a tenseless relation to the property of being exciting does not satisfy my hope. It is the smuggling in of the tensed copula, with all the whoosh and jerk of becoming that it conjures up, that lends the tenseless satisfaction condition its plausibility. The problem, I think, is that my hope just is not about the tenseless occurrence of a party that stands in a B-relation to a position I currently occupy in the B-series.

Still, I do not expect a defender of the epistemic conception, now embellished with tenseless satisfaction conditions, to be swayed. It is fair of them to query why, exactly, the tenseless satisfaction condition of the party does not work. And I imagine they may try and rally even more plausible examples of tenseless satisfaction conditions that do seem to
satisfy hopes. For example, imagine that I hope my operation, to occur 17th October, goes well. The tenseless satisfaction condition, at its simplest, would be:

my hope that my operation goes well is satisfied if my operation, on 17th October, goes well

And that seems to make a good deal of sense – I certainly do hope my operation goes well, and goes well on that day! But, again, I ask the defender of tenseless satisfaction conditions to draw their attention to how one is to read the verb ‘goes’. Read tensed, the satisfaction condition would indeed be plausible, for it concerns the coming to be of what is hoped for, how it was hoped for. It is the hope that an event which has yet to occur, occur in a particular way. Read tenselessly, there is no ‘going’, so to speak, merely a relation between the tenseless occurrence of an operation and how it tenselessly occurs. Note, too, that this hard to parse, for ‘occurrence’ itself is naturally understood as tensed. The tenseless copula is a difficult thing to understand. It is at its most intelligible in statements of fact that are not temporal at all, such as mathematics – ‘2 and 2 is 4’, or ‘A right angle is 90 degrees’. But when we hope, we are not concerned with how things stand, tenselessly speaking, and I think our hopes are not satisfied by tenseless states of affairs.

But, a friend of tenseless satisfaction conditions may say, imagine a spin on the previous scenario: I hope that my operation goes well on 17th October, without any complications or hitches. Luckily enough for me, I own a crystal ball that deals with tenseless satisfaction conditions. I shake the ball, and it yields its knowledge. Written upon its display is the following indubitable prognostication: ‘the operation on 17th October goes well. And ‘goes’ is entirely tenseless’. Who could fail to have their hope satisfied by that?

Well, indeed, who could not be satisfied by that? But that is not because the satisfaction condition is tenseless. It satisfies the hope because it specifies, without ambiguity, what happens in the future. Whether this is tenseless or not is beside the point, for A-theoretic eternalists, like a moving spotlighter, could do the same with their own crystal ball. Of course a hope is satisfied if one knows, without incertitude, that it will be satisfied. But this is all inconsistent with the defender of the epistemic conception of hope, for it is central to their analysis of hope that the future is not epistemically accessible.

Further, consider the following: ‘I hope I am never the victim of a chronal horror!’. Given that chronal horrors are entailed by eternalism, there is no tenseless satisfaction condition for this hope. And, as I have argued in the chapter on chronal horrors, this is a very bad result, for it is precisely the sort of hope we do want satisfied. And so it is for legion other hopes that are complicated by tenselessness, either in terms of time or persistence: ‘I hope I will be free of the spectre of that assault’, ‘I hope the man responsible for that murder is blamed’, and so on. And, throughout, I have argued that it is only haecceity presentism that can explain and support the importance of having these sorts of emotional reactions. For the hope that relates to being free of the spectre of an assault: the hope is satisfied, for the assault is no more. Its haecceity persists, of course, but a haecceity of an assault is not an assault, and its haecceity does valuable work. For the hope that relates to the murderer being blamed: the hope is satisfied, for haecceity presentism does indeed have an intelligible relation of responsibility and permits attributions of blame. The victim of the murder, too, is not subject to a chronal horror, for his murder is no more. Its haecceity persists, certainly, but as before, a haecceity of a murder is not a murder, and it too does valuable work, for it characterises the murderer as a murderer whilst also opening up the possibility of rehabilitation and forgiveness.

This also precludes any non-presentist A-theories that believe in the past form giving tenseless or tensed satisfaction conditions for hope, as things like chronal horrors will exist
on those theories, either because they have always existed, but are simply now non-present (moving spotlight), or because they have come to exist and shall now remain existing (growing block).

9.4 – Satisfaction Conditions: Non-Transparent?

The following objection has been presented to me: the issue with satisfaction conditions, really, is one of transparency, in that I am arguing that the satisfaction conditions of a hope are transparent, insofar as they obviously involve tense. But beliefs that relate to tense are actually non-transparent, in that they are made true by the tenseless nature of reality.

Here, the objector continues, is an example of a hope whose satisfaction conditions are not transparent: Jonny is the unfortunate subject of a Matrix scenario. That is, he is plugged into a machine and experiences a virtual world in which everything is the result of the fluctuations of a computer programme. Johnny wants to jump from the roof of one building to another. Jonny does not know he is in a Matrix scenario — he’s quite convinced that everything is on the level. The satisfaction conditions of Johnny’s hope, then, are not transparent, in that they consist in the fluctuations of a computer program being such that he, within the Matrix, leaps from one rooftop to the next — not in the actual act of leaping. Jonny successfully performs the ‘leap’ and, his hope satisfied, is immensely pleased at his extraordinary athletic aptitude. And there we have it, the objection runs — a hope that is satisfied, but the satisfaction conditions are non-transparent. Given that tenseless satisfaction conditions would be non-transparent, then, the eternalist is off the hook.

I deny that Jonny’s hope has been satisfied at all. Jonny hoped that he would leap from one building to another. But he did no such thing — he was the victim of a computer-generated deception that he leapt from one building to another. Just as my hope to swim the Atlantic is not fulfilled if it occurred in a dream, my hope to leap from one building to another is not fulfilled if it is merely the illusion, borne from a program, that I have done so. Of course, if Jonny hopes to jump from one building to another within the context of a computer program, then his hope is fulfilled — but it is no longer non-transparent, as Jonny is aware that such a hope is fulfilled relative to the operation of the Matrix. The same point applies to any hope that is relative to a context — for example, a child may have their hope to slay a dragon fulfilled within a game they play but, much like Jonny’s hope to leap a building, there are no satisfaction conditions for the child’s hope outside of the context of play, for there are no dragons to slay, just as there are no buildings to jump.

However, it can be argued against this point that if semantic externalism is true, then the content of Johnny’s hopes will be determined causally by his being embedded in the Matrix simulation: that is, the meaning of ‘jump’, ‘building’ and so on are determined by the digital illusions in which he is immersed, so the satisfaction of that hope is non-transparent, for programmes and code within the Matrix scenario are to what the various words of his hope refer.

The most straightforward way out of this quagmire is to turn the tables and utilise semantic externalism to undermine such sceptical scenarios and show that they cannot apply to Johnny in the way the sceptic desires, ala Hilary Putnam (1981). Anthony Brueckner (2003) offers the following argument, which I have tweaked for Johnny:

1) If Johnny is in a Matrix scenario, then it is not the case that if Johnny’s word ‘building’ refers, then it refers to buildings.

2) If Johnny’s word ‘building’ refers, then it refers to buildings. So,
3) Johnny is not in a Matrix scenario.

Premise 1 just is semantic externalism, the thesis that meanings and truth-conditions of sentences depend upon the way one's external, causal environment is. If Johnny had been immersed in a Matrix scenario from birth, then all there would be externally to him is a pod, the liquid he is submerged in and a supercomputer. Thus, there would be no causal connection between Johnny's digitally produced representation of a building and buildings themselves – there just is not the kind of causal connection between images or representations of buildings and buildings for that reference to occur.

Premise 2 is where trouble sets in: in order to know its truth, is it not the case Johnny needs to know he is not in a Matrix scenario in order to use disquotation in stating the referents of his words?

Brueckner (1992, 2011) offers the following response: in moving through the argument, Johnny does not know whether he is: 1) not in a Matrix scenario and thus speaking English, where ‘building’ refers to buildings or 2) in a Matrix scenario and thus speaking Matrixese, where ‘building’ refers to digital representations. However, Brueckner contends, Johnny does know certain things about the semantic features of his own language: He knows the meaning of ‘refers’, and he knows what quotation marks are. And if he knows these, then he knows disquotation can be applied to any referring terms in the language he speaks, securing the truth of premise 2. As for premise 1, Johnny can assert that he also knows this to be true owing to his a priori knowledge of the theory of semantic externalism and how it applies to sceptical scenarios like the Matrix one. Further, anyone presenting the semantic externalism argument against me is obviously going to accept premise 1, for their argument depends on the truth of semantic externalism in the first place.

Alternatively, one can make a point similar to Brueckner’s in the fashion of Crispin Wright (1995) and Harold Noonan (1998: 59):

1) ‘Snow is white’ in my language has disquotational truth conditions.

2) If I am a BIV then ‘Snow is white’ in my language does not have disquotational truth conditions.

3) I am not a BIV [from 1) and 2)] [or, for us, in a Matrix scenario]

There we have it: we can resist the force of the sceptical scenario by taking ourselves through the argument and coming to know that we are not in a Matrix simulation, so the idea that the satisfaction conditions for Johnny’s hope might be non-transparent loses traction, as its force rests upon on us being potentially subject to such deceptions.

However, it might be responded that Brueckner’s and Noonan’s arguments are something of a red herring in the dialectic and my response has deliberately misunderstood the original Johnny example. This is because the original Johnny example involves someone who actually is in a Matrix scenario, and someone who actually is will have their hope satisfied non-transparently. Very well: I shall introduce Johnny* who, by fiat, just is in a Matrix scenario, and has never been outside of it, and is none the wiser about his circumstances. Could we say that Johnny’s hopes are satisfied non-transparently? Yes, I suppose we could – just as the truth, satisfaction or appropriateness conditions of everything Johnny is immersed in is similarly non-transparent. But Johnny* is in a Matrix scenario (simply by stipulation, I might add), and his language is Matrixese and the referents of his words executed computer programmes. But I am not in a Matrix scenario, as per the
arguments above, and my language is English, not Matrixese, and the referents of my words are things out there in the world, like concrete buildings. In fact, I find the stipulation that someone truly is in a Matrix scenario – and that is the end of that – to be somewhat question begging, for whether someone can be subject to such a delusion is the question at hand. Regardless, I say we should not be too troubled by Johnny*, for we have the means to know that we just are not in the same situation as Johnny*.

A proponent of the sceptical argument might rephrase it, however, to something more challenging. Let us return to Johnny, who knows the arguments to resist sceptical scenarios, and knows he is not in a Matrix scenario. However, a scientist, keen to prove that hopes have non-transparent satisfaction conditions, sedates and kidnaps Johnny, seamlessly introducing him into a Matrix scenario. Now, he smiles to himself, Johnny will have his hopes be satisfied non-transparently.

This is doubtless a tricky amendment to defuse. Here is my attempt: Johnny, when first thrust into the Matrix, still plausibly has none of his hopes satisfied. This is because the reference of his words is still causally connected to those things that were around him outside of the Matrix scenario, so his hopes about jumping from building to building still relate to buildings. However, as time passes and he spends longer and longer in the Matrix, reference might indeed begin to shift from English to Matrixese, and his hopes now are satisfied non-transparently. But there are still facts about Johnny that limit the bite of the sceptical scenario, for he has lived outside it: it is true, for example, that his hopes used to have transparent satisfaction conditions, and conditions for other facts about him were similarly transparent too. It is also true that all these are now non-transparent after reference has shifted, but I think this relates to the fact that Matrixese is a language without disquotational truth conditions, which makes it non-transparent by default. And that is the best I can say. This is not a terrible thing, as sceptical scenarios are notoriously difficult to topple. But I feel confident in asserting that hopes do have transparent satisfaction conditions even in light of these scenarios, for I am confident I am not in one, and that I speak a language with disquotational truth, and satisfaction, conditions.

Regardless of one’s thoughts about Johnny, the point originally put to me was that these kinds of scenarios demonstrate the intelligibility of non-transparent satisfaction conditions for a hope and, their intelligibility grasped, we can see then how non-transparent satisfaction conditions are legitimate and model tenseless non-transparent satisfaction conditions for superficially tensed hopes in the same fashion. Even if you do not agree with my arguments, though, that hopes do indeed have transparent satisfaction conditions, I have argued that the candidate tenseless satisfaction conditions explored above – B-relations and dates – do not do the necessary work and, in some cases, simply cannot do the necessary work. So even if non-transparency were an element of a hope’s satisfaction, the most plausible tenseless satisfaction conditions that would function non-transparently do not, or cannot, do what they were deployed for. I think, then, that the path of non-transparency is a dead end.

I think, then, that hopes cannot be satisfied by their tenseless satisfaction conditions, unless the hope itself is peculiarly tenseless (such as, perhaps, odd hopes about mathematics or suchlike). Further, I have argued that there are hopes that simply have no tenseless satisfaction conditions, and these sorts of hopes are very much ones we want satisfied.
CONCLUSION

In writing this thesis, I had two goals in mind. The first goal was to articulate my haecceity presentism and argue that it is the best version of haecceity presentism. The second goal was to mount a novel deployment of haecceity presentism against tenseless theories of time and persistence in order to demonstrate that they cannot rationalise or vindicate crucial elements of our emotional and moral lives.

The second goal, in effect, is an attempt at resuscitating the spirit of Arthur Prior’s argument in ‘Thank Goodness That’s Over!’, and issuing its challenge anew: tenseless theorists of time and persons seem to think Prior’s original argument has been neatly laid to rest, but I have endeavoured to redeploy the thought that inspired it. The intended consequence of this redeployment is an ultimatum for those who believe in the truth of eternalism, perdurance and stage theory: for those who feel the importance of honouring the substantivity of emotions in our thinking, action, and practices, moral and otherwise, I say: accept haecceity presentism. To those who resist or deny the substantivity I attribute to emotions for persons, I say: you must transparently and honestly accept that you do not have a place for emotions in your theories that treat them with the appropriate level of seriousness – they are incapable of being rational or deeply vindicated. This should be considered a deeply alienating result.

Haecceity presentism is, I think, a plausible form of presentism, and I do think that my version of haecceity presentism is also the strongest version. It does not diverge from the core of presentism, for it is still an ontology composed of only concrete present objects, and the addition of haecceities simply gives what presentists serious about singular reference, truthmaking, cross-temporal relations etc. must already provide – surrogates for non-present entities. The usual murmurs of cheating abound, of course. They tend to in most instances of surrogates. But this is a charge the haecceity presentist should completely resist. The charge of cheating, in my view, relies on some unexpressed, metametaphysical norm that there is an appropriate way to conduct metaphysical inquiry and that those that posit surrogates are flouting it. But why? This conviction is rarely articulated in depth: certain properties are ‘suspicious’, and that is that. Without any substantial reasons to believe that surrogate properties are somehow ontologically inadmissible, I say we reject the charge of cheating as a bit of dogma. Of course, this does not mean that surrogate properties are all on a par: there are better surrogates than others.

Indeed, there are a few metametaphysical commitments of my own throughout this thesis that are not very popular now. For example, in the chapter on tenseless theories of persistence and how this relates to responsibility and blameworthiness, I express sympathy towards arguments that Sider deems merely linguistic or conceptual. I have always been a bit puzzled by the hostility towards linguistically or conceptually inclined arguments. The metaphysicians that oppose them are insistent that they are solely concerned with what is, not how we talk about things. But a number of very important practices are intimately tied to the way we talk about things, and the way we identify continuants, engage with them, treat them as capable of actions and hold them responsible for those actions is one of them. And if a metaphysics threatens a practice like this, then I think it is fine to challenge it on partly linguistic or conceptual grounds: if your metaphysic makes obviously true statements about

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14 Why do I say metametaphysical and not metaphilosophical? Because I am only commenting on the value of these sorts of arguments within metaphysics. Their value within ethics, say, or philosophy of science is not something I can comment on.
moral responsibility false, then that is a mark against your theory, and this is one of the things I argue against stage theory.

Another metametaphysical commitment that is very important to the thesis is that persons – in their broadest sense – need to be robustly accommodated in metaphysical theories, and a failure to do so renders a theory alienating. The aspect of persons I press for accommodation is their emotional lives. It is very difficult to convince a metaphysician who does not share this commitment that they ought to share it. You open yourself up to an incredulous stare (and you would already have had a couple for expressing belief in presentism and haecceities). But for me, it is very difficult to understand why a metaphysician would not share it. Indeed, to me it just seems obvious that a theory being alienating is a bad thing. There are some suggestions that a theory having an alienating quality is something that has to be addressed, even if it is not explicitly articulated as a disadvantage to a theory (mereological nihilism’s denial of composites like us, for example), but I have been quite explicit in arguing that a theory having alienating consequences is a bad thing. If this thesis has the result of at least drawing people into responding to such concerns (and I think the arguments based on emotion compel a response, as an explanation of where our emotions stand in a tenseless reality is one that must be given), then I think that is also a good result.

Do I think the tenseless theorists I attack in the second half of the thesis will abandon their camps and assent to the truth of haecceity presentism? Maybe. But to reconfigure the debate over the reality of tense is also an important contribution. In shifting the grounds of the dialectic to emotion, I hope I might have achieved something towards this.

Of course, there is always the chance that the purported tenseless bases of emotions that I have given and argued against throughout this thesis might be of the wrong sort, and a tenseless theorist might well come along and give better ones that fend my arguments off. That is fine, though, as much like Prior’s arguments helped precipitate important changes to the old B-theory, if the arguments contained within the second half might contribute or help to inform changes to the new B-theory on grounds of emotions, then that has served to demonstrate that the new B-theory is still inadequate and a new B-theory might be needed.

Ultimately, perhaps the biggest victory to be had in reconfiguring the dialectic on the reality of tense is to give a positive reason for believing in a sort of presentism. Why someone should be a presentist is not always very obvious: there are certain intuitions about how the past was but no longer is, and that we seem to be subject to experiences of passage, and so on. But I have tried to give a clear, definite reason why someone should embrace a particular form of presentism, haecceity presentism: because it honours the importance and value of our emotions, personally and ethically. Thus, after sometime on the dialectical back foot, the haecceity presentist can finally go on the attack.
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