THE ARMY OF ALEXANDER THE GREAT

by

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Submitted to satisfy the requirements for
the degree of Ph.D.
in the School of History in the University of Leeds.

Supervisor: Professor E. Badian
Date of Submission: Thursday 14 March 1974
The army with which Alexander the Great conquered the Persian empire was built around the Macedonian Companion cavalry and the Macedonian heavy infantry. The Macedonian nobility were traditionally fine horsemen, but the infantry was poorly armed and badly organised until the reign of Alexander II in 369/8 B.C. This king formed a small royal standing army; it consisted of a cavalry force of Macedonian nobles, which he named the *hetairoi* (or Companion) cavalry, and an infantry body drawn from the commoners and trained to fight in phalangite formation: these he called the *pezetairoi* (or foot-companions). Philip II (359-336 B.C.) expanded the kingdom and greatly increased the manpower resources for war. Towards the end of his reign he started preparations for the invasion of the Persian empire and levied many more Macedonians than had hitherto been involved in the king's wars. In order to attach these men more closely to himself he extended the meaning of the terms *hetairoi* and *pezetairoi* to refer to the whole bodies of Macedonian cavalry and heavy infantry which served under him on his campaigning. In addition to these bodies, he formed an elite infantry force of Macedonians, distinct from the regular levy, and named them *hypaspists*. Philip was killed as he was about to begin the invasion of Asia and his son inherited the army and the expedition.

During the early years of the Asian campaign, which was begun in 334 B.C., Alexander made few changes in the structure of the army: the Companion cavalry was organised into seven territorial squadrons and a royal guard, all
under a single commander; the foot-Companions consisted of six territorial battalions, organised together with the Greek hoplites under an overall commander; the hypaspists also were grouped together into one command. One battalion was added to the foot-Companions in 331 B.C. but there was no major reorganisation until the hard fighting against the scattered tribes of Iran was encountered. Then, faced by a different style of opposition, Alexander adopted a more flexible structure. In 330 B.C. the overall commander of the pezetairoi was removed and the battalions became fully independent command units: later in the same year the commander of the hypaspists died and was not replaced; the Companion cavalry also lost its commander in this year and was divided into two independent parts. In the winter of 328/7 B.C., in preparation for the Indian campaign, the Companion cavalry was further divided to form six independent commands in addition to the royal guard. No Macedonian reinforcements were received by Alexander after the end of 331 B.C., until his return from India in 324 B.C. During this time the strength of the pezetairoi was maintained by reinforcements of Greek mercenaries, and from 328/7 B.C. Iranian cavalry was introduced to the Companion cavalry to reinforce the strength of that body.

In the final year of his life, after his return from India, Alexander set about establishing the structure of the imperial armies. He discharged many veterans and received fresh troops from Macedonia and his subjects in the Persian empire. Many of these forces he dispatched for service
under satraps and garrison commanders, but he maintained a large main army directly under his command and prepared for a major expedition into Arabia. At the core of the cavalry was the Companion cavalry consisting of Macedonian and Iranian nobility: the nucleus of the infantry was the Macedonian hypaspists and *pezetairoi* and beside them were ranged Iranian guards, called *melophoroi*, and Iranian archers.

The political relationship between Alexander and his Macedonian soldiers was of the most primitive nature. The Macedonian commoners had no background of political involvement and had no consciousness of defined roles for themselves or their king. On the Asian campaign they were intimately involved in the king's policies and their opinions influenced the conduct of affairs, but they showed no sign of being aware of their role and their powers as a political body.
## CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Introduction</th>
<th>1</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Chapter I</strong></td>
<td><strong>Chapter II</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Macedonian army until the accession of Philip II</td>
<td>The army of Philip II</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-28</td>
<td>29-56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Part I Increase of manpower</td>
<td>Part I Increase of manpower</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Part II Organisation of the Macedonian troops</td>
<td>Part II Organisation of the Macedonian troops</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(a) The cavalry</td>
<td>(b) The cavalry</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(b) The infantry</td>
<td>(b) The infantry</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>36-47</td>
<td>47-56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Part II</strong></td>
<td><strong>Part III</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>57-93</td>
<td>94-157</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Part I The Reform of 331 B.C.</td>
<td>Part II The hipparchs and hipparchies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Part II The hipparchs and hipparchies</td>
<td>Part III Reinforcements and losses</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>57-67</td>
<td>68-83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Part II The hipparchs and hipparchies</td>
<td>Part III Reinforcements and losses</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>68-83</td>
<td>84-90</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Chapter V  The army 324/3 B.C.

Part I  Discharge and reinforcement of troops  157-161

Part II  Troops for service in the satrapies  162-164

Part III  The main army  165-193

Part IV  The position of Hephaestion in 324 B.C.  193-199

Chapter VI  The Macedonian army and politics  200-238

Part I  The theory of the Macedonian state  201-215

Part II  The men-in-arms and politics in Alexander's reign  216-238

Bibliography  239-247

Notes to Chapters I - VI  248-327

Appendices

Appendix I  Theopompus and the hetairoi of Philip  329-342

Appendix II  Alexander's army at the beginning of the campaign  343-370
(a) The transmitted totals  343-357
(b) Diodorus 17,17,3ff.  358-370

Appendix III  Arrian's terminology  371-396
(a) Military terminology  371-390
(b) Hetairos  391-396

Appendix IV  Iranians in the Companion cavalry  397-420

Appendix V  Losses in Gedrosia  421-431
INTRODUCTION

There has been no full study of Alexander’s expeditionary army since the monumental work of Berve was published in 1926. Much of his work has found general acceptance and can hardly be improved upon, but his conclusions concerning the Macedonian element in the army have been challenged, notably by Tarn. The question of the organisation and attitudes of these Macedonians is far from settled, but no accurate assessment of Alexander as general and statesman is possible until the nature of his army is understood; and at the heart of the army were the Macedonians. In this thesis I intend to review the evidence on the Macedonian units, taking advantage of recent research on the sources to offer fresh interpretations of much discussed passages, in the hope of making some contribution to the better understanding of Alexander and his achievement.
CHAPTER I

THE MACEDONIAN ARMY UNTIL THE ACCESSION OF PHILIP II

It is generally recognised that the army which Alexander took with him to Asia in 334 B.C. was essentially the creation of his father, Philip. Little attention, however, has been given to the development of the armed forces of the Argead kings prior to Philip: yet this is a necessary background to an understanding of Philip's army, and, therefore, of that of Alexander. It is desirable to begin this study with a discussion of the little evidence that exists concerning the army prior to Philip's accession.
The first reference to Macedonian troops occurs in the context of the Persian invasion of 480/79 B.C., where Herodotus (8,35) says that Macedonian troops garrisoned Boeotian cities when Xerxes moved through to Athens. No details, however, are recorded and the first evidence of any importance refers to the year 429 B.C., when Sitalces, king of the Thracians, invaded Macedonia. Thucydides (2,98-101) describes how Sitalces, with 150,000 men, a third of them cavalry (98,4), swept over Crestonia, Mygdonia and Anthemous, meeting with little resistance (100). Some of the Thracian troops were good (98,4) and the Macedonians could not stand against them. The Macedonian infantry did not even join battle but, Thucydides tells us, the cavalry, which was of good quality and wore breastplates, put up a good fight, although greatly outnumbered. They soon gave up, however, and Sitalces and the Macedonian king, Perdiccas, came to an agreement. Six years later a Macedonian force, with Spartan and Chalcidian support, invaded Lyncestis. Thucydides (4,124,1) records the content of the army. Under Perdiccas were his subject Macedonians and the hoplite force of Greeks resident in his kingdom: under Brasidas were Peloponnesians, Acanthians and other Chalcidians. In all there were about 3,000 hoplites, a little less than 1,000 cavalry, consisting of Macedonians and Chalcidians, and a great mass of barbarians in addition to these. After one small battle between the cavalry and hoplites of each side (4,124,3), the Macedonians heard that the Illyrians had joined Arrhabaeus and they withdrew, leaving
Brasidas and his forces in the lurch.

Taking these two passages together, it is possible to arrive at some idea of the composition of the Macedonian army. The most important part was the cavalry, which was heavily armed, with breastplates, and was of a high standard: it was, undoubtedly, made up of the Macedonian nobility, which had a tradition of horsemanship. Perdiccas was able to call upon his allies of Upper Macedonia, where there was a similar tradition of good cavalry, but the force was, nevertheless, small, at any rate in comparison with the Thracians. No mention is made by Thucydides of allied cavalry on the Lyncestian expedition, and perhaps the allies could not be relied upon to support an attack upon their northern neighbour. The strength of the cavalry can only be guessed at from indications in the second passage of Thucydides: together with the Chalcidians they numbered just under 1,000. The Chalcidian cavalry cannot have numbered many hundreds, as, despite the fact that the cities of Chalcidice were strong in cavalry, no city of any size, other than Acanthus, took part in the expedition. In addition, forces were needed at home and they would not have denuded themselves of troops for the benefit of Perdiccas. Rather more than half of the cavalry, therefore, is likely to have come from Perdiccas himself, perhaps as many as 700: this, I have suggested, did not include the allies of Upper Macedonia.

The Greeks living in the kingdom of Perdiccas were called upon to serve as hoplites in the Lyncestian campaign, though their contribution can have been only small, as, together with the Peloponnesians of Brasidas and his Chalidian allies, they
numbered only 3,000. Brasidas had brought 1,700 infantry from the Peloponnese (Thuc. 4,78,1), of which 500 were left in Mende and Scione (Thuc. 4,123,4) and others elsewhere, so perhaps there were a little fewer than 1,000 of these. There is no check upon the Chalcidic contribution but it was probably no greater than the Peloponnesian, which gives a total for the Greek hoplites of Perdiccas of something over 1,000. This is the only occasion upon which we hear of a hoplite force of the Greeks in Macedonia serving an Argead king, and it is not possible to be sure how regular a force it was. Kahrstedt argued that it was a unit that was formed between 429 and 423 B.C., inspired by the return of Therme and Strepsa to Macedonian control. It seems more likely, however, that Perdiccas merely took advantage of the Spartan support, which made his position strong, to make the Greeks in Macedonia serve him. As we hear of no other occasion on which the Greeks served, we might justifiably doubt that there was a regular arrangement by which the Greeks were expected to fight for the Macedonian king. Perhaps, rather, when the king was strong enough to coerce them they served, otherwise they did not.

The mass of barbarians was, presumably, made up totally of Perdiccas' subjects and was the national levy: if no allied cavalry was called on, it is likely that no allied infantry was used. The nature and strength of the levy is not recorded and in both passages Thucydides implies that they made no substantial contribution. They were almost certainly only lightly armed and in a most irregular way,
being little more than retainers of the cavalrymen. It might be expected that Perdiccas himself had a royal footguard which was well armed, but it would have been small and, apparently, not worth mentioning. Thucydides says that Arrhabaeus put hoplites into the field (4,124,3), and Hammond suggests that this is evidence that Lyncestis was more advanced than Perdiccas' kingdom, which produced no native hoplites. This seems unlikely, however, and Best's suggestion (p.141) that the Lyncestian hoplites were not natives but Greeks in the service of Arrhabaeus is more attractive. The mass of the barbarians receive no mention during the narrative of the campaign, the major battles being primarily the concern of the hoplites and cavalry (4,124,3).

This is all the information we have on the military forces at the disposal of Perdiccas. There was a good but small cavalry force, and he could draw on more cavalry from Upper Macedonia: a small force of Greek hoplites could sometimes be called on from the Greeks on the borders and coast of the kingdom; finally, there was a mass of poor, lightly armed infantry. The forces were clearly inadequate for the defence of the country but there was some progress in the reign of Archelaus according to Thucydides (2,100,2). While describing the Thracian invasion of 429 B.C. he contrasts the situation under Perdiccas with that under Archelaus: 'there were not many (sc. strong places and fortifications), but afterwards when Archelaus, the son of Perdiccas, became king, he built the fortified places which now exist in the country and generally organised other resources for war, with horses, arms
and other materials, making them better than all the eight preceding kings had done.  

Some scholars, notably Geyer, have argued on the strength of this evidence that Archelaus introduced the phalangite system of fighting to the Macedonians. Thucydides, however, makes specific reference to only two areas of improvement, namely the fortification of strongpoints and the cutting of straight roads. The rest of the sentence is vague in its significance: the words 'horses, arms and other materials' form a stock expression used by Thucydides to cover military equipment and resources in general. In the Macedonian context it could be interpreted in many ways, but it seems most unlikely that it describes the arming and organisation of Macedonians as phalangite soldiers. It is improbable that Macedonía was sufficiently developed socially and economically to support such an advance in military power, even under a strong king such as Archelaus. Clearly there was some improvement in military resources during his reign, but Thucydides' evidence is not explicit enough for us to be able to determine any details. Nor do the events of Archelaus' reign or of the years immediately following his death give a hint of any increase in the strength of the armed forces. Argaeus is said by Polyaeus (2,1,17; 4,1,1) to have been weak in infantry, and his military capability generally shows no improvement over that of Perdiccas II. Archelaus exerted strong central control over his kingdom, as is shown by his measures against the city of Pydna: this in itself would have made greater military resources available to him, but
there is no evidence of any far reaching reforms being successfully carried through.

The first king after Archelaus who established himself for any length of time was Amyntas. He was quite weak for many years, under pressure from the Illyrians and Olynthians, and although he seems to have had some garrison troops at strategic points in Macedonia, these may have been mercenary and were quite inadequate against the enemies he had to face. Towards the end of the 380's he took part in a war against the Olynthians to recover some of his land, which he had lost to them, and to resist further encroachment. Our source for this war is Xenophon (Hell. 5,2,37-3,26). Xenophon's evidence supports the view that the Macedonian infantry continued to make no contribution to the military strength of the Argead king. The cavalry of Derdas of Elimeia, an ally of Amyntas, was four hundred strong and of good quality, and Amyntas' own cavalry was probably not inferior. But there is no mention of any Macedonian infantry under Amyntas or Derdas. Xenophon records Teleutias' advice to Amyntas to raise mercenaries, and it would appear that he was dependent upon these and any Greeks resident in his kingdom whom he could levy.

Following the defeat of the Olynthians, Amyntas became much more securely established and, with Athenian backing, could concentrate upon consolidation. It is evident that the general condition of the kingdom grew much stronger, and it was a period of growing trade and prosperity. He played an active role in Greek politics, interfered in Thessaly, and
established himself securely in the cities on the coast and borders of the kingdom. Geyer has argued convincingly that Amyntas began to use the developing urban centres for administrative headquarters. This would have made possible a much better organisation and utilisation of resources.

The effect of this general improvement in the king's position should have had some influence upon the military power of the kingdom, but the paucity of source material makes it impossible for us to uncover any details. Amyntas continued to have close associations with mercenary forces; in particular, he had extensive contact with the great Athenian mercenary commander, Iphicrates, whom he adopted as his son. As well as being a mercenary commander, Iphicrates was a great military tactician, but the association does not appear to have had much influence upon the organisation of the Macedonian army until the time of Amyntas' son, Alexander II.

Amyntas had established his position sufficiently securely for the succession of Alexander II to be unusually smooth. It is at this stage that I wish to discuss the most important piece of evidence we have concerning the Macedonian army prior to the time of Philip II. Harpocration, the grammarian, records a comment of a scholiast upon Demosthenes Olynthiac II 17. In this passage there appears the unusual word 'pezetairoi' and in order to explain the usage the scholiast made a note. 'Anaximenes in Book 1 of the Philippics, speaking of Alexander, said: 'then he made the most eminent men used to serving as cavalry and called them
'hetairoi', and the common people, the infantry, he divided into lochoi and decades and the other archai and called them 'pezetairoi', in order that both elements, through sharing in the king's hetaireia, might remain loyal and enthusiastic for the king's cause. The two main Macedonian units of Alexander the Great's campaign force in Asia were the hetairoi cavalry and the pezetairoi infantry, and Anaximenes is clearly referring to the foundation of these units. It is, therefore, a very important text, but the interpretation of it by modern scholars has been a point of dispute. A brief review of some of the different views will be a useful starting point.

Plaumann accepted the evidence of Anaximenes but suggested that Philip II was the subject and not Alexander: Philip extended the name 'hetairoi', which already applied to the councillors, to apply to the cavalry force and at the same time or not much later, formed and named the pezetairoi infantry. Geyer argued that Alexander I formed and named the hetairoi cavalry: but Archelaus organised the infantry into a heavy-armed articulate body and named it the 'pezetairoi', thus giving its members a position similar to the nobles, and creating for his own support a counterweight against the nobles. Berve interpreted Anaximenes' passage to mean that some king, probably Alexander II, extended the name 'hetairoi' to apply to the whole noble cavalry of the land, overriding regional divisions and attaching them directly to the king. The formation and naming of the heavy-armed pezetairoi infantry, he suggested, took place sometime after the naming of the cavalry (369/8 B.C.), and before 350 B.C. Momigliano
suggested that the first part be ignored altogether because the *hetairoi* cavalry had existed from earliest times and was not the result of an act of institution by some king: the *pezetairoi* infantry was formed and named by Alexander I, who thus increased his own power at the expense of the nobles by using the infantry against them. Iammert, who discussed only the part on the *pezetairoi*, accepted Anaximenes' evidence and interpreted it to mean that Alexander II formed an infantry body guard and named it *pezetairoi*. The name was later extended to embrace the greater part of the heavy infantry. Tarn rejected Anaximenes' evidence on the *hetairoi* for the same reasons as Momigliano (they were coeval with the monarchy), and suggested that the second part referred to the naming of the national levy of infantry. This, he suggested, was done by Philip to keep them loyal and counteract any hostility caused by the privileged position of the hypaspists. Kahrstedt also discussed only the second part and saw the passage of Anaximenes as evidence for the organisation of the infantry force: although there was already a large force of infantry, its parts were distinct in their separate district divisions under local leaders, irregularly organised and armed. Anaximenes, he argued, was referring to an act which gave the force cohesion and uniformity and the name *pezetairoi*; this was done during the early years of his reign by Philip, who benefitted the peasants by bringing them into urban settlements and generally organised them in his support. Finally, Griffith, in discussing the *pezetairoi*, said that Alexander II must have
been the one to organise the infantry and name it "\(\text{πεζεταιρωί}^{\text{a}}\)\), thus creating the beginnings of the Macedonian phalanx.\(^{26}\)

There is,\(\text{then}\), no agreement among modern scholars and the lack of evidence against which to check Anaximenes' passage has led to widely divergent views of its meaning. Certainty is not possible, but a re-examination of the passage might throw some more light on the difficulties. The passage is drawn from the first book of Anaximenes' history of Philip, which he wrote probably in the 330's.\(^{27}\) Though the work is devoted to Philip, this passage could come from an introductory part of the work, which traced Macedonian history at least from the reign of Perdiccas II (ca. 450-413 B.C.).\(^{28}\) Before discussing the content of the passage it is convenient to look at the text.

The word \(\text{ἐφάχας}\) is difficult in this context: the meaning required here is 'divisions' or 'sections' of infantry, a meaning which it has only in the Septuagint.\(^{29}\) This is not good enough authority for us to accept it in this meaning from Anaximenes, and I take it as certain that this is not what Anaximenes wrote. It may be that the text should be emended to read some more acceptable word, such as \(\text{τάσεις}\), but the text appears to be sound\(^{30}\) and it is difficult to explain how the substitution could have taken place. It should be remembered that the words of Anaximenes come to us at third hand, through a scholiast of Demosthenes and through the grammarian of the first or second century A.D., Harpocration. It seems possible, perhaps even probable, that what we have is a summary of Anaximenes' passage, which contained originally a
much fuller description of the organisation of the infantry. The scholiast was not primarily interested in the details of the sections of the infantry, but rather in explaining the word 'pezetairoi', and he may well have used a word of general meaning to cover several specific words in Anaximenes. In this way, the late word έρξα is could have been used by him for several words describing infantry sections of specific strength. The possibility that what we have is, in fact, a summary of Anaximenes' evidence must be borne in mind throughout our discussion of this passage.

Before the contents of the passage are analysed, it is necessary to consider the identity of the king who is its subject. According to the text his name was Alexander, but this has been questioned by many scholars. Many have thought it more likely that Philip II is the subject, relying upon the passage of Diodorus (16,3,1) which states that Philip, 'having improved the organisation of his forces and equipped the men suitably with weapons of war, held constant manoeuvres of the men under arms and competitive drills. Indeed he devised the compact order and the equipment of the phalanx, imitating the close order fighting with overlapping shields of the warriors at Troy, and he was the first to organise the Macedonian phalanx.'31 I shall have cause to discuss the passage again later, but for the moment it is sufficient to point out that the similarity between this passage and that of Anaximenes is not marked enough to allow us to assume that the same actions are referred to in each case. Diodorus makes no mention of the forming and naming of the king's
forces, 'the hetairoi' and 'the pezetairoi', and the whole passage is so vague that it could refer to almost any military reform. The same criticism can be made of Geyer's view that Archelaus is the subject of the second part of the passage, which deals with the infantry. He thought that the passage of Thucydides 2,100 (quoted above p. 6) and the second part of Anaximenes' fragment described the same action, but the only similarity between the passages is that they both refer to some organisation of military resources.

The theory that Anaximenes has conflated the actions of two kings in this passage, that one king was responsible for the hetairoi and another for the pezetairoi, has been proposed by some scholars, e.g. Berve and Geyer. No evidence or satisfactory argument support such a theory and it should be rejected. It must be recognised that our knowledge of Macedonian army development is so scanty that we are not in a position to go against the ancient evidence unless there are cogent reasons for doing so. No convincing reason for doubting the information concerning the subject of the passage has ever been presented, and it must be accepted that a Macedonian king called Alexander was responsible for the reforms. This leaves two possibilities, Alexander I (ca.485-450 B.C.) and Alexander II (369-38 B.C.): the more attractive of these alternatives is Alexander II. Anaximenes is more likely to have dealt in detail with events which occurred ten years before the subject of his work, that is, the reign of Philip II, than with those which occurred one hundred years before. Also, any organisation of Macedonian infantry into
lochoi and decades surely belongs to the fourth century B.C. rather than the fifth, when Thucydides tells us (2,100), there was no good, well organised Macedonian infantry. The arguments against Alexander II being the subject of the passage are based on the brevity of his reign and the established existence of good cavalry in the fifth century B.C. The argument that Alexander II was not in power long enough to carry out the reforms described cannot be conclusive: I shall suggest below that the extent of the reform may have been exaggerated by many scholars. The argument that the hetairoi cavalry must have been formed and named in the fifth century B.C. because Thucydides stated that there was good Macedonian cavalry at the time of the Peloponnesian war, also carries no weight. Good cavalry existed from the earliest times of the Argead kingdom and was not dependent upon any act of institution by a king, either of the fifth century or of the fourth century B.C. The hetairoi cavalry, however, is not known to have existed until the reign of Philip, and it is to this specific institution that Anaximenes refers. That there was good cavalry in the fifth century B.C. is no indication that the hetairoi cavalry was formed and named before the reign of Alexander II. Alexander I did much to unify the Argead kingdom and, undoubtedly, improved the Macedonian military resources, but the indications are that he was not the king to whom Anaximenes was referring, but rather Alexander II, the eldest brother of Philip II.

I shall now look at the contents of the fragment of Anaximenes. There are four separate actions detailed:
Alexander made the most eminent used to serving as cavalry; named them 'hetairoi'; divided the commoners (i.e. the infantry) into lochoi and decades and the other sections; named the commoners 'pezetairoi'. The purpose of these names was to give them a share in the hetaireia of the king and so keep them enthusiastic and loyal.

I have translated τους ἐνδοφόρους as 'the most eminent': the word is sometimes associated with πλούσιος to describe men within a state, and Aristotle uses it with ἥλιος. In the Macedonian context, such a term could only be applied to members of the hereditary class of the large landholding nobility, whose traditions went far into the past. This class, it is generally agreed, was traditionally proud of its horses and horsemanship and, as Berve says, it was the oldest element of the army muster. This being so, the words about a king getting members of this class accustomed to serving as cavalry cannot be accurate: it was a cavalry class, and service in the army as horsemen was of the essence of their class.

The second part of the text refers to the naming of the cavalry force 'hetairoi': that is the force made famous by their exploits on Alexander's Asian campaign. There is general agreement among scholars about this and there can be little doubt that this interpretation is correct. As Plaumann suggested, the term 'hetairoi', which previously had honoured the councillors, was extended to refer also to the force of cavalry. Some scholars, notably Tarn, have assumed that the name 'hetairoi' had always been held by the cavalry, but
in view of the evidence of this passage and the fact that the word is not known to have been used of cavalry until the middle of the fourth century B.C., this theory can be rejected.

The content of this cavalry force has also been the subject of some discussion. It has been held by some that the whole cavalry class, that is the whole nobility, was honoured with the name *hetairoi*. This view, held, for instance, by Berve, seems to be based upon a misunderstanding of the first part of this passage, where Anaximenes says that Alexander accustomed *the most eminent* to serve as cavalry. This could be taken to mean that the whole nobility was called into service, but this is by no means a necessary interpretation, and, in view of other evidence, it seems likely that the rather vague expression *the most eminent* means simply 'some of the nobility'. The word εὐσοφότατος, as I have indicated from parallels from Plato and Aristotle, is an adjective with no such precise meaning, but simply describes rich and privileged members of a state. There is no instance of the term *hetairoi* being used to apply to any group except the councillors or the Macedonian cavalry serving with the king. There is no evidence to support the commonly held view that the Macedonian cavalry left with Antipater in 334 B.C. was also called *hetairoi*, and indeed there is positive evidence that all the cavalry class was not called by this name. Theopompos, in reference to the 340's, wrote that there were not more than 800 *hetairoi* (see Appendix I). Since in 382 B.C. Dendar of Elimeia alone could raise 400 cavalry for a war outside of his
territory, it is impossible that in the 340's the whole of Philip's kingdom contained only 800 of the cavalry class.

Not all the nobles of Macedonia received the title 'hetairoi', and it is clear that Anaximenes is describing the selection and naming of some of the cavalry class, who were formed into a cavalry force and attached closely to the person of the king. This seems a justifiable conclusion in the light of Anaximenes' comments about the purpose of the name, and the subsequent development of the force. The error involved in the statement that it was Alexander who first accustomed them to serve as cavalry is a strange one, for it is difficult to believe that Anaximenes thought that the nobility did not serve as cavalry until about ten years before Philip II came to power. It may well be that Anaximenes did little research upon the history of Macedonia before Philip, and I shall argue below that all the Macedonian cavalry serving under Alexander in Asia were hetairoi, which might have misled him. However, it seems more likely that the meaning of Anaximenes' passage has suffered by being summarised, as I have suggested might be the situation. A reference to some nobles being organised into a cavalry force could have easily been summarised in such a way as to give the impression that they were serving as cavalry for the first time.

The third and fourth parts of Anaximenes' passage concern 'the common people'. It is impossible that all the common people were organised into lochoi and decades and there is, in fact, specific evidence that the pezetairoi was a select body. Demosthenes makes a clear distinction between the
Macedonians in general, who derived no benefit from Philip's policy, and the pezetairoi, who, along with the mercenaries, were the king's special force and shared the benefits of the campaigning. This evidence is confirmed by Theopompus, who says that the tallest and strongest of all the Macedonians acted as the king's guards and were called 'pezetairoi'.

These important pieces of evidence show that these reported words of Anaximenes also are imprecise, and in this case the imprecision is so outrageous that it is difficult to believe that it has not been caused by inaccurate summarising by the scholiast or by Harpocration. It is impossible that Anaximenes could have thought that all the infantry were organised into locoii, decades and 'the other sections' and called 'pezetairoi', for it must have been plain for him to see that they were not. It must be accepted that these words cannot be accurate, yet many scholars have accepted that the term 'pezetairoi' was applied to the whole infantry levy, and have suggested that the king was trying to win the allegiance of the infantry and use it as a political force against the nobility. This goes right against the evidence of Demosthenes and Theopompus. It is clear, as Lammert stated, that the pezetairoi was a select body formed to be a household guard, alongside the hetairoi cavalry, and it is to the creation of this unit that Anaximenes is referring.

The text is precise about the division of the infantry into sections, which is perhaps odd in view of the obvious brevity of the summary. The formation of any infantry force required divisions and such organisation seems hardly worth mentioning.
The fact that Anaximenes seems to have been so precise implies that the divisions have a special significance, that they marked an important advance in the Macedonian army. This advance was surely the beginnings of the Macedonian phalanx system. The pezetairoi infantry of Alexander the Great was divided into lochoi and decades, and it seems logical to assume that this organisation stemmed from the division described by Anaximenes, and that the organisation of the pezetairoi and the phalanx originated in the time of Alexander II. The other archai referred to in the text can hardly be used in this discussion because we cannot know what was in the original. There were, of course, other sections in a phalanx besides the lochos and the decas: the file was divided into half files and quarter files to make for smooth manoeuvrability, and there were, no doubt, larger divisions as well. But whatever the precise wording of Anaximenes, there can be little doubt that he gave much detail about the division of the infantry, which strongly indicates that he was describing the formation of the Macedonian phalanx.

Against the view that Anaximenes is here describing the beginnings of the Macedonian phalanx, the passage of Diodorus (16,3,1) can be quoted: he says specifically that Philip was the first to introduce the Macedonian phalanx. Diodorus, however, shows himself unreliable in this passage, because as well as attributing to Philip the introduction of the Macedonian phalanx, he credits him with the invention of the close order fighting system, which is certainly false. Griffith has already argued that Diodorus is mistaken.
concerning the introduction of the Macedonian phalanx.\textsuperscript{49} Philip made improvements and developed phalangite tactics to a degree that some Greeks, who had little contact with the Macedonian phalanx before Philip, could easily have been misled into thinking that Philip was its originator. It seems best to interpret Anaximenes' evidence to mean that Alexander II was the king who introduced the phalanx system to Macedonia, and he did this by organising a select body of infantry and training them in phalangite tactics. This unit was the king's own household troops.

I have now completed the discussion of the text and I can summarise the results. Anaximenes is referring to the formation of a small personal army, similar to those collected by Dionysius of Syracuse and Jason of Pherae,\textsuperscript{50} which could act as bodyguard to the king and form a well-trained core for the forces of the state. The cavalry was, no doubt, drawn from loyal elements of the nobility, which already had a tradition of cavalry service. Nothing is recorded of any changes in armament and tactics for the cavalry, and probably there was little need for any, as the Macedonian cavalry had always been strong. One can only guess at the size of the cavalry unit. Philip had a force of no more than 800 according to Theopompus, probably referring to a time in the 340's B.C.,\textsuperscript{51} so perhaps anything much over 400 may be thought too high for Alexander II's time. That it was a standing force is indicated by its name and by its smallness; and it seems certain that its infantry counterpart was a standing force, so, surely also was the cavalry.
The infantrymen selected were organised to fight in a phalanx and became the king's household guard. Theopompus tells us (quoted n.42, above) that they were chosen on the basis of their physique, from all the Macedonians. There is no reason to doubt this evidence, there were obvious advantages in having tall strong men: but it might be expected that Alexander also had in view the loyalty of the men, when making his selection, and that the large majority came from the heartland of the Argead territory, in Lower Macedonia. The same fragment indicates that it was a standing force, for Theopompus uses the word ἐπορφόρον in describing their function, and Photius records that they were οἱ περὶ τὸ ἐπορφόρον. The size of the force cannot be known. In 334 B.C. they numbered 12,000, but it is certain that their strength had been greatly increased by Philip: rather less than half of this number may be thought too many for the reign of Alexander II.

It is unlikely that the equipment of the phalanxite of Alexander II was precisely the same as that of the phalanxite of Philip II, but there is no reason to think that it was fundamentally different. The armament of the Macedonian phalanxite under Philip II, as described by Polyaenus (4,2,10), was a sarissa, or long thrusting spear, a pelte, or small shield, a light helmet and greaves. This equipment was more typical of peltasts than of heavy-armed hoplites, the force which usually was organised to form a phalanx. The background of the development of this type of phalanx, which the Macedonians made peculiarly their own, calls for some
discussión.

The Macedonian peoples were in large part similar to the Thracians in lifestyle and culture, and it is reasonable to assume that their military traditions and style of fighting also were similar. The Thracians were famous for their courage and skill as light-armed infantry: Euripides (Rhesus 305) records that the Thracian infantry fell into three divisions, peltasts, archers and javelin-men. The peltasts were distinguished from the psiloi, that is the archers and javelin-men, by having a little defensive armour, namely, a small shield and a pointed cap. Also they were able to operate independently, without the support of more heavily armed troops. There were basically two types of peltasts among the Thracians, one which fought with a sarissa, a long thrusting spear, and one which fought with akontia, or javelins.55

Despite the existence of the same sort of infantry among the Macedonians, the Argead kings did not make effective use of it because of the lack of organisation. All the infantry fought in a mass, not differentiated according to armament: swordsmen fought beside javelin-men, archers beside spearmen.56 Effective use of manpower resources was impossible under these conditions. There is no evidence of a good Macedonian infantry force until the middle of the fourth century B.C.: the kings did not exert sufficient control, nor was the kingdom sufficiently developed, to produce one.

I have argued, however, that Alexander II's father,
Amyntas III, was able to consolidate his hold over the kingdom and establish, at least in some areas, a more efficient system of administration. There is no evidence of any substantial improvement of the military forces under Amyntas, but it seems likely that he laid the basis for the advance under Alexander II. The materials, in the form of manpower and equipment, already existed in the kingdom, all that was required in order to produce a good infantry force was some organisation. The weapons and armament used in the phalanx which Alexander II formed were already traditional for many of his subjects, to judge from Thracian parallels. Alexander simply separated them, or some of them, from the other types of light infantry and organised them into a phalanx formation.

The form which the new unit took was, no doubt, greatly influenced by the connection between the Argead royal family and the great Athenian commander, Iphicrates. Iphicrates, the adopted son of Amyntas, was a great peltast tactician: Diodorus, in a confused passage (15,44,3), tells how Iphicrates changed his hoplites into peltasts. This is obviously wrong and Parke (pp.79ff.) and Anderson (pp.129ff.) interpret it to mean that the peltasts were re-equipped with a smaller shield and a longer spear, to enable them to face the hoplite phalanx. Best (pp.102ff.) has shown that there was, in fact, nothing revolutionary about Iphicrates' peltasts, or his use of them, and that the small shield and long spear had been the traditional equipment of one type of peltast. There can be no doubt, however, that Iphicrates played an
important part in demonstrating that peltasts were able to face the hoplite phalanx, and, in favourable conditions, defeat it. Parke has already noticed the similarity between Iphicrates' use of the peltasts, and the style of armament and fighting of the Macedonian phalanx, and he suggested a possible connection between the two: there can be little doubt that Alexander II was inspired in part by Iphicrates' ideas.59

Alexander II, therefore, drawing upon the sarissa-bearing light infantrymen already existing in his kingdom, and inspired by contacts with Iphicrates, organised a small phalangite force. It was more lightly armed than the usual phalanx and required no great expenditure of resources. The increased prosperity of the Macedonian kingdom in the fourth century B.C. may well have inspired some of the lightly-armed infantrymen to equip themselves with a little more defensive armour, such as greaves and a helmet,60 which would have meant that little new equipment was necessary to implement the reform.

It is likely that the phalanx formed by Alexander II was based upon a file depth of ten men. This is indicated by Anaximenes' reference to the decas as a division of the infantry. Decas survives as the term for the section of the phalanx, even when the number of men in the section exceeded ten. Hence the section of sixteen men organised by Alexander at the end of his life was called a decas (Arr. 7,23,3; see also below Ch. V p.178). Both Domaszewski and Hammond have been led to conclude that this indicates that the original file depth was ten men.61 The lochos in the phalanx of
Alexander seems to have been the largest division of the phalanx battalion, comparable to the *ile* of cavalry. Arrian mentions the *lochagoi* alongside the *ilarchs* as being called upon by name to do their best at the battles at Issus and at Gaugamela (2,10,2; 3,9,6). Curtius tells us that the basic division of the infantry was 500 strong during the first years of the Asian campaign, so we may perhaps conclude that under Alexander III the *lochos* was a division of about 500 men. There is, however, no certainty that it had this strength from its first entry into the Macedonian system, for the size of a *lochos* varied greatly from army to army. Much is known about the divisions and organisation of the later Macedonian phalanx, as it operated under Philip V and as described in the later writers on tactics, but it is clear that this cannot be confidently applied to the fourth century organisation.

It will be clear that I consider that the extent of the reform described by Anaximenes has often in the past been exaggerated. The numbers involved in the *hetairoi* cavalry and the *pezetairoi* infantry appear to have been quite small and, though the formation of the units marked an important advance in the military development, the mass of the Macedonian subjects was not affected. Many scholars have seen in Anaximenes' text evidence that the king, in struggling to assert his supremacy over the local princes and leading nobles, made a bid to bring the commoners into his faction and thereby gain an important political ally. It is misleading, I suggest, to see the creation of the *pezetairoi*
in such a light. The political situation of Macedonia should not be compared with that of the Greek city states, for these pezetairoi were not 'the hoplite class' conscious of their political rights and jealous of the nobles' powers; they were simply the military force of the king. They were, of course, important to the king's position, as they formed a useful defence against rivals and added to the king's prestige, but speculation upon the growth of the 'power of the people' should not be based upon this passage of Anaximenes.

The effects of the reform are not apparent in the events of the immediately succeeding years, though our sources are so poor that this is not necessarily significant. It is expensive to keep an army together and, as I have suggested, the permanent royal force was probably quite small in its initial stages: the bulk of the infantry still fought as light-armed skirmishers. Nevertheless Alexander had the confidence to invade Thessaly, had some success against Alexander of Pherae and garrisoned some cities of Thessaly (Diod. 15,61,4.5): though the garrisons were soon dislodged by the Thebans and Alexander assassinated in a court intrigue. This tells us nothing about the armed forces, nor does the reign of Ptolemy the Alorite. He was mostly concerned with fighting rivals for the Macedonian throne, and had to call in mercenaries to help him with this (Aeschin. 2,27f) but nothing is recorded of his own forces. If, as Aeschines tells us, he lost the support of a large part of the Macedonians, it is not surprising that he had to supplement his own forces by mercenaries.
When lie was removed "by an opposing faction and Perdiccas III, brother of Alexander II, took over, the Argeadæ once more embarked on an ambitious foreign policy, Perdiccas being on active campaigning most of his reign. He made great efforts to secure the north-west frontier, brought Lyncestis under Argead control and conducted more than one campaign against the Illyrians (Polyaen. 4,10,1; Diod. 16,2). He was also active in Chalcidice and the coastal areas of his kingdom, and established a garrison at Amphipolis, and probably at other strategic points in his kingdom. Presumably the hetairoi cavalry and the pezetairoi infantry formed the core of his forces, but he must also on occasions have employed other Macedonian troops, heavy cavalry and infantry, as well as light-armed troops, and he certainly used mercenaries to supplement his strength (Polyaen. 3,10,14; 4,10,2). In Perdiccas' final campaign against the Illyrians Diodorus (16, 2,5) records that 4,000 men were killed, and implies that they were all Macedonians, which indicates that a substantial force of Argead subjects took part.

The military record of Perdiccas is quite impressive and indicates that the forces were reasonably strong. The regular campaigning will have accustomed the troops to military service and trained them into a force to be respected. Although details are lacking, it is clear that the Macedonians were militarily strong enough to take an active part in the affairs of the Greek world. Nothing is heard of service by Greeks living in Macedonia, but they must have continued to give service, although the Argead kings were no longer so dependent upon them for phalangite troops.
CHAPTER II

THE ARMY OF PHILIP II

PART I Increase of Manpower

There is universal agreement that Philip was responsible for the form of the Macedonian army as it is revealed by the Alexander historians in their accounts of the early years of the Persian expedition. There can be no doubt that this army was a much larger and more efficient force than the one Philip inherited from his brother Perdiccas, but details of Philip's achievements do not survive and in any attempt to trace the development of the army during Philip's reign, much must be conjectural.

Although the army of Perdiccas had been greatly shaken by their defeat at the hands of the Illyrians, the nucleus of the campaign force which the king had built up and kept together through his six years of rule must have remained. On taking control of the situation, Philip rallied the troops and soon recommitted them to active campaigning. Diodorus describes Philip's actions upon taking control, but it is most unlikely that the passage is reliable. I have already argued against Diodorus' statement that Philip was responsible for the institution of the Macedonian phalanx, and, although it is undoubtedly accurate that he greatly expanded and improved the phalangite formation, it can hardly be that he achieved it in his first few months, as Diodorus states. Diodorus tells us little more than that Philip improved the army. Demosthenes, speaking in 341 B.C. (9,49), pays tribute
to the efficiency of Philip's army, the coordination of the hoplites, light-armed infantry, cavalry, archers and mercenaries, but this again is far too general to be usable.²

Evidence that the campaign forces of the Argead kingdom increased during Philip's reign is straightforward enough. In 358 B.C., against the Illyrian Bardylis, Philip led 10,000 infantry and 600 cavalry (Diod. 16,4,3). In 352 B.C., his army comprised 20,000 infantry and 3,000 cavalry in the campaign against Onomarchus (Diod. 16,35,4). In 340 B.C. he had 30,000 troops at the siege of Perinthus (Diod. 16,74,5) and in 338 B.C., at Chaeronea, 30,000 foot and 2,000 horse fought on the Macedonian side (Diod. 16,85,5). In 334 B.C. Alexander led perhaps more than 40,000 troops against the Persians, while leaving 13,500 in Macedonia under Antipater (Diod. 17,17).³ These figures show a general trend towards larger armies in the field, and this is hardly surprising in view of the great expansion of territory and the widening interest of Philip. From the middle of the 350's he probably had enough money to employ as many mercenaries as he wished and, as his strength grew, he was able to draw upon more allies and semi-independent tributaries for military support. In Alexander's expeditionary force to Asia, Thracians, Illyrians, Paeonians, Greeks and others contributed to the strength.⁴ This is a good indication of the diversity of troops called upon by Philip.

Although extensive use was made of non-Macedonians, the Macedonian content of these forces must have increased proportionately. An accurate measurement of this increase is
not possible, but some discussion of the problem may be worthwhile. The Macedonian content of a campaign force is given only once: for the Asian expedition in 334 B.C. Diodorus (17,17,3f.) states that there were 12,000 infantry and 1,800 cavalry. This is explicit enough, but Alexander did not take all his troops to Asia: 12,000 infantry and 1,500 cavalry he left in Macedonia with Antipater (Diod. 17,17,5). These soldiers have been seen by scholars as approximately half the Macedonian levy, although Diodorus does not say that they were Macedonian: this would seem to be right. As important as the successful invasion of Asia, was the holding of Greece and Thrace and it seems a reasonable division of strength. The force with Antipater was not a homeguard, as Griffith points out, and reservists were not included. It was a campaign force as was that of Alexander, prepared for an expedition to trouble spots in Thrace or Greece: its role is made clear from the uprisings in 331 B.C. in Thrace and Greece, which threatened the security of Macedonia. Since it was not intended to be on continuous active service, it is not likely that allies and mercenaries were included. The garrisons placed around Thrace and Greece, which undoubtedly were part mercenary, are not included in Diodorus' total.

Despite the absence of some Macedonians on garrison duty and, therefore, not in Diodorus' total, the figures of Diodorus probably give some idea of the strength of the Macedonian levy in 334 B.C.: 24,000 infantry and 3,300 cavalry. A basis of comparison is the number of troops on the Illyrian campaign in 358 B.C. (Diod. 16,4,3): 10,000 foot and 600 horse.
Although Diodorus does not say explicitly that these troops were exclusively Macedonian, scholars have assumed that they were. This is probably right, for the Argeadae were in such a feeble condition, that they would not have been able to draw upon significant numbers of allies or mercenaries. It is likely, therefore, that the force which Philip led against Bardylis was mostly, if not totally, Macedonian. It is also likely that the heavy infantry represented the full strength of the infantry combat-levy, for the Illyrian threat was urgent and Philip could have done nothing other than devote all his first-line infantry resources to this vital expedition. The cavalry cannot have represented the whole combat-levy, however, for there were certainly many more than 600 cavalry available to Philip: but there was little advantage in having a large force of cavalry in the broken hilly terrain of Upper Macedonia.

A comparison between the figure for the infantry available in 358 B.C. and that available in 334 B.C. can give us some indication of the enormous increase in effective military strength during the reign of Philip; Alexander could not have greatly increased the force in the short period between his accession and the start of the Asian campaign. No such comparison between the number of cavalry available at the beginning and that available at the end of Philip's reign is possible, but it may be sound to assume that some substantial increase was achieved. It will be useful to look at those parts of Philip's policy and achievement that contributed to the build up of military resources.
Direct expansion of the kingdom added manpower. Elimiotis, Lyncestis, Pelagonia, Orestis, Tymphaea and Parauaea came within Philip's control. Although Elimiotis, Lyncestis, Pelagonia and, perhaps, Orestis had supplied manpower before, control of these areas had not been secure and the full potential probably never realised before the reign of Philip. In Lower Macedonia, Philip took direct control of Chalcidice, Pydna, Amphipolis and many other areas on the coast and, probably, inland, which could supply or support additional military manpower.13

Apart from increasing manpower by conquest, Philip made much more efficient use of his manpower resources for military ends. Many of the men of Upper Macedonia and the northern and eastern border areas of Lower Macedonia had led a semi-nomadic existence, on the fringes of the mountain ranges. These could not be organised for useful military service until they were established in settled communities on the plains. Thucydides (2,100) pours scorn upon the infantry strength of Macedonia in the fifth century B.C., and in all but the coastal regions of Lower Macedonia the situation probably did not improve until the reign of Philip. By defining and strengthening the boundaries and bringing men down into settled communities on the plains, Philip made available a new source of good military manpower.14

In addition to the organisation of hill tribes and fringe communities, Philip reorganised the administration of the coastal areas of his kingdom in order to involve the Greeks of the kingdom in the military resources. Thucydides tells
us that Greeks contributed a few hoplites in the fifth century B.C., brigaded separately from the Macedonians.15 The numbers of Greeks in the kingdom were much increased during the seventy years since the reign of Perdiccas,16 and some Greeks were probably contributing to the strength of the Argead army before the reign of Philip, but the control of the kingdom through most of the fourth century B.C. prior to Philip's accession was too weak to allow an efficient levy of the Greek communities. With the upsurge of power and the inclusion of more Greek communities under Philip, more Greeks were available for levy, and Philip arranged the recruitment districts, as he arranged the other administrative districts, to involve the Greeks and Macedonians equally and without distinction. This is the obvious conclusion to be drawn from the known centres of the cavalry recruitment districts in the coastal regions. The Greek cities of Amphipolis and Apollonia17 were made centres of recruiting districts, which is strange if the Greeks were not included in the military census. In this way the Greeks were fully integrated into the military system, which would inevitably have resulted in an increased contribution from them. This was, undoubtedly, an important source of heavy infantry.

Another way in which Philip increased his manpower resources was by land settlement. The transplantation of population was accompanied by land settlement, making sections of the population wealthier and, therefore, better able to give military service.18 Areas where the land was not supporting a full complement of military manpower were parcelled out:
for instance, the area of Methone, which had been inhabited by hostile Greeks who were no asset, was distributed to Macedonians,\textsuperscript{19} whose wealth would make a contribution to the strength of the kingdom.

Momigliano pointed out that the cavalry force could not be increased in the same way by grants of land to Macedonians to bring them up into the cavalry census; for, he argued, cavalry service was the distinction of a class rather than of a wealth group.\textsuperscript{20} This is a valid point, in that upper class Macedonians would not have welcomed wholesale promotion of lower class men into their ranks, though we should not completely rule out some promotion.\textsuperscript{21} Momigliano concludes that Philip attracted large numbers of Greeks into the kingdom by grants of land, e.g. at Olynthus,\textsuperscript{22} and it was from these that the cavalry numbers were made up. This, however, does not seem to be a necessary conclusion: although some Greeks may have entered Macedonia to serve as cavalry, there was no shortage of Greeks already established there who might do so.
PART II The Organisation of the Macedonian Troops

Almost nothing is known of the organisation before the very end of Philip's reign, when, it can be assumed, it closely resembled that of the early years of Alexander's campaign in Asia. It is, therefore, necessary to work backwards from the situation at the end of Philip's reign in order to reconstruct the developments during his reign. In 334 B.C., at the time of the crossing to Asia, the Macedonian army was divided into two parts, one part with Alexander, the other with Antipater in Macedonia: 24,000 heavy infantry divided equally, 3,300 cavalry divided in the ratio of 1,800 to 1,500. To uncover details we must look more closely at the army which went with Alexander: nothing is known about Antipater's force and the organisation of his force can only be reconstructed on the basis of Alexander's force.

a) THE CAVALRY

The cavalry with Alexander was divided into eight squadrons, one of which was frequently called the royal squadron and was the king's personal mounted guard. Of the other seven, two receive no description in our sources and the other five are named as follows: from Apollonia; the Anthemousian; the one called Leugaean; from Bottiaea; from Amphipolis. There can be no doubt that the names are derived from the areas from which the men were recruited, and it seems safe to assume that the other two had similar names: it follows, as Curtius (5,2,6) indicates, that the cavalry was recruited and organised by district. It is generally held that the royal squadron was an exception to this rule.
and that it was recruited from the whole kingdom, with no regard for district divisions.\textsuperscript{26} It is, however, equally possible that it was drawn from men who had a particularly close connection with the king: for instance, the men living around the traditional home of the Argeadae (Aegae), or from a particular tribal group; Strabo knows of a tribe of Argeadae (7 fr. 10).\textsuperscript{27}

The location of the districts, as far as we can trace it, will help to reconstruct the organisation. Amphipolis, the Greek city on the east bank of the Strymon, near the coast, gave its name to one squadron. Anthemus, a city and district of north-west Chaldicidice, is, clearly, the origin of another. The location of the other districts has been a matter of dispute. Many scholars have considered that the recruiting district of Apollonia was in southern Chaldicidice, named after the city of Apollonia there, which Philip destroyed in 348 B.C.\textsuperscript{28} There is, however, another city of Apollonia in the Argead kingdom, south of Lake Bolbe, which is known to have been a thriving city through the fourth and later centuries B.C., on the main route east to Amphipolis and beyond. It is unlikely that Philip would have perpetuated the name of a destroyed city in a cavalry recruiting district, and there can be no doubt that the centre of the recruiting district was, indeed, the city south of Lake Bolbe.\textsuperscript{29}

There is also disagreement about the location of the district Bottiaeae. Some scholars have thought that the territory of the Bottiaeans in central Chaldicidice was referred to,\textsuperscript{30} but for Thucydides the area of Bottiaea is
central Macedonia, the area from which the Bottiaeans were expelled by the Macedonians. It is known that the district of central Macedonia retained its name, at least until the time of Philip V, whereas the territory of the Bottiaeans in Chalcidice was scarcely ever called Bottiaea, but more usually Bottike: and neither of these names is applied to it after the middle of the fourth century B.C., when Philip took it over. The Bottiaea of the recruiting district can only be the area in central Macedonia, the heartland of the Argead kingdom.

Another of the cavalry squadrons was described as 'the one called Leugaean', but all attempts at locating its recruiting area have failed. Beloch suggested that it may be a mistake for Augaea (north of Sinthonia, in Chalcidice) or, more likely, for Letaea, the district centred on LeTe, near the mouth of the Axios. Oberhummer suggested that the district was that of Aegae. Kahrstedt took a different line, suggesting that 'leugaean' did not refer to a proper place name at all. For him the form of the expression, 'the one called Leugaean', suggests that 'Leugaean' is a nickname to describe an area; for example, 'woody', 'watery', 'north'. This argument can carry no weight, however, because the infantry battalions from the areas of Elimeia and Tymphaea also are described as 'the battalion called Elimiot', and 'the battalion called Tymphaean'. There seems to be no way of locating the 'Leugaean' recruiting district.

On the basis of what the ancient evidence does tell us, it is possible to suggest how Philip organised his Macedonian
cavalry. It is established that the cavalry on the Asian expedition was recruited and organised by district, with the possible exception of the royal squadron. It is clear from a glance at the districts known that this cavalry was not drawn from the whole kingdom, for it is impossible that Amphipolis, for instance, accounted for a seventh (or eighth) part of the whole. It is reasonable to suppose, therefore, that the cavalry left with Antipater, the other part of the cavalry levy, came from those districts not drawn upon for the Asian expedition. It also seems reasonable to suppose that Antipater's cavalry force was recruited and organised similarly, being drawn from seven districts not represented in Alexander's force. Antipater would have had no equivalent of the royal squadron. The royal squadron may be thought to number 300, and to account for the discrepancy in numbers between the two parts of the Macedonian army. This reconstruction seems most likely, and fits so well with the ancient evidence that it surely must be accepted. The cavalry of the Macedonians numbered 3,000 in 334 B.C., excluding the royal squadron, and was divided into 14 squadrons, each squadron being drawn from one recruiting district. It must, further be assumed that, with some possible exceptions mentioned below, the districts covered the whole of the kingdom.

It is not known how the cavalry was organised prior to the end of Philip's reign, but it is clear that this arrangement was mostly, if not entirely, the work of Philip. Amphipolis was not even a part of Macedonia before Philip's
reign; and Anthemus was not fully integrated, as is attested by Philip's ceding it to the Chalcidians at the beginning of his reign.\textsuperscript{41} It is likely that Macedonians proper, as opposed to native tribes and immigrant Greeks, contributed the bulk of the cavalry strength prior to Philip's reign.\textsuperscript{42} Therefore, in order to integrate the new territory and manpower into a unified military system a comprehensive reform of the recruiting procedure was needed. Where Greek city states had an established hold in the coastal regions, Philip organised the system around them. The mass of Greeks, undoubtedly, was clustered around the cities, and many Macedonians and natives had become assimilated with the Greeks:\textsuperscript{43} it was, therefore, a logical development. Amphipolis, Apollonia and Anthemus were made centres of recruiting districts, in which Greeks, Macedonians and natives were subject to the same system. In most parts of the kingdom, however, the Greek city state had not become established and the system was probably based on the traditional Macedonian tribal groups, in which prominent families were given responsibility for particular areas.\textsuperscript{44} There is some evidence that established administrative boundaries may have been left unchanged in some cases. In Upper Macedonia the areas of Lyncestis, Crestis, Tymphaea and Elimiotis were retained for the infantry recruitment (see below), so it might reasonably be argued that they were for the Cavalry. However, even where an old name is used for a district, it does not necessarily follow that the boundaries were left unchanged. In Upper Macedonia, where Argead control had only a short
tradition and was, therefore, more dependent upon the established organisation of the former petty kingdom, Philip probably did not make many changes, but in Lower Macedonia he may well have rearranged the boundaries quite freely. Therefore, it cannot be assumed that the area of Bottiaea was the same as the Bottiaea which Thucydides mentioned, though some rough approximation must be expected.

It should be clear that there is little likelihood of our successfully dividing the Argead kingdom into its recruitment areas, and there is an added complication, in that many tribal groups remained semi-autonomous, dwelling in enclaves within the boundaries of the kingdom. The Bisaltians and Crestonians are probably examples of such tribal groups, but doubtless many others existed but are never heard of: these did not become integrated into the military system. The Thracians east of the Strymon, except perhaps a few hellenised ones in the area of Amphipolis, also did not become fully integrated, although some of the tribes served in separate units.

The date of the organisation of the military system must remain equally uncertain. In general terms, however, it might be expected that Philip would not have carried through the reform until the boundaries and population of the kingdom had reached some degree of stability. The boundaries were probably not much changed after the early 340's, but consolidation and movement of population no doubt continued for a few years. The date of 340 B.C. may be a reasonable conjecture for the approximate date of the reform which
established the cavalry recruiting system substantially in the form we know from the Alexander historians.

It has been fashionable to believe that all the cavalry which went to Asia with Alexander came from the territory newly acquired by Philip: this has been encouraged by the belief that all the four identified squadrons came from this area. The fashion has led some scholars to the view that the cavalry with Alexander were distinguished in class, or relationship with the king, from those with Antipater. Berve believed that they were all 'new nobility' who had been rewarded with land settlements by Philip and who, therefore, could be relied upon to support the Asian campaign. Momigliano believed that they were a class of men, mostly Greeks, who were enabled by land grants from Philip to serve on long and distant campaigns in their role as subjects of the Argead king. The men of 'Old Macedonia' had to stay in the kingdom, or not go far away, because they were needed for home defence. Hampf produced the most interesting theory: they were a totally new class of men within the Argead kingdom, who had bonded themselves to the king, as to a personal lord, by accepting land settlements from Philip in the newly won territory. Only these had the obligation to serve the Argead king in foreign wars because he was king only within the boundaries of the kingdom, and the ordinary subjects, therefore, had no obligation to follow him outside of the frontiers of the kingdom.

Despite objections from Geyer and Zancan and cautionary remarks from Griffith, these theories have continued to
exert much influence. They, in fact, all seem implausible, for, as Griffith points out, it must be thought unlikely that the old nobility ceased to serve their king in the traditional way. Once it is accepted that two of the squadrons from Apollonia and Bottiaea, certainly did not come from territory newly won by Philip, and Anthemus can hardly be said to have been newly won, in that it was Philip who ceded it at the beginning of his reign, there is nothing at all to be said in favour of these theories. There is no reason to assume there was a class distinction between the cavalry which went with Alexander and that which stayed with Antipater. If it is held that there was such a distinction, it has to be shown that there was some common distinguishing factor among the men of cavalry class of Amphipolis, Anthemus, Apollonia and Bottiaea, and some three or four other districts of the kingdom. This, I believe, is not possible.

There is no way of deciding which other districts contributed to Alexander's cavalry force; those who worked from the assumption that all the squadrons came from the 'new territory' did not make any contribution to a solution to the problem. Beloch suggested that one or two squadrons may have been drawn from Upper Macedonia. This he based on the presence of cavalry of Upper Macedonia on Alexander's campaign against the Triballi in 335 B.C. (Arr. 1,2,5). It has often been assumed that this campaign was used by Alexander to train troops for the Asian campaign, and it might, indeed, give as good an indication as is available of the source of some of the unidentified cavalry. It is, however, far from certain that
Alexander did use the Triballian campaign as a training exercise for his Asian troops. It seems best simply to admit that the criterion used by Alexander in the selection of his cavalry force is unknown, and the squadrons cannot be identified beyond the four identifiable ones recorded in the sources.

Closely related to the question of which cavalry squadrons accompanied Alexander to Asia is the interpretation of the term 'hetairoi'. The whole body of Macedonian cavalry in Asia was called 'the hetairoi cavalry of the king' by the ancient sources. Berve suggested that the cavalry left with Antipater also were known by this name, but there is no evidence to support such a view. It is unlikely that the term 'hetairoi', which is often translated 'Companions', would have applied to cavalry left behind by the king, as they could hardly be seen, in any meaningful way, as his companions: they were not to see him for many years. If any honour was attached to the title, as seems to be the case, the term must have been restricted to those cavalry serving with the king.

If, as I have argued, no particular class distinction marked out the cavalrymen who went to Asia from those who did not, the only qualification for the title 'hetairoi' was their accompaniment of the king. It should follow that the men lost their title when they stopped serving with their king on active campaign, and this does indeed seem to be the case. The status of an hetairos had a very different tradition in the Argead circles from that of cavalry service (see Ch.II:n.19a).

Perhaps we are now in a position to suggest a line of
development for the term during the course of Philip's reign. The hetairoi cavalry at the beginning of his reign was a household cavalry guard which was drawn from the nobility of the Macedonians proper, mainly from the heartland of Lower Macedonia. Little is heard of the unit, but it may have been the 600 cavalry which went with him against Bardylis in 358 B.C. and, presumably, it accompanied the king on all his campaigning. Theopompus tells us that it numbered 800 and the members were incredibly wealthy by Greek standards. He was referring to some unspecified time in Philip's reign when the body called the 'hetairoi' was still something more exclusive than it was in 334 B.C.

A change in the nature of the hetairoi cavalry was a necessary part of Philip's plan to integrate the different elements of the kingdom into a uniform military system, in which the origins of the subjects made no difference to their military standing. An elite cavalry unit of Macedonian nobility, in the main from heartland Macedonia, could not be allowed to survive. Therefore, Philip disbanded it and its members were put on an equal status with the other men of the cavalry class of the district in which they happened to be resident. This left the honoured title free for a more general application to cavalry serving with the king, which would override any divisive distinctions. Philip formed a small personal cavalry guard of about 300, which was the royal squadron, but with this exception, all the Macedonian cavalry which accompanied the king on campaign was of equal
status, all drawn from the regular territorial levies. It was upon these cavalry squadrons, including the royal squadron, that Philip bestowed the privilege of the title 'hetairoi' as a collective name for those on active campaign with the king. In this way, membership of the hetairoi cavalry was made open to all of the cavalry class: it depended only upon their recruitment area being called upon to provide a squadron for a campaign with the king.

Accurate dating of the change is not possible, any more than the dating of the reform of the recruiting system. It must have occurred after the time to which Theopompus was referring, but since this time cannot be established (see Appendix I pp.33ff) this is not of much help. It may be thought likely, however, that the change of meaning of the term 'hetairoi' was closely tied in with the reorganisation of the recruiting system; this I have tentatively dated to around 340 B.C. It might be that the reform of the hetairoi body was in large part inspired by the preparations for the Asian campaign. This great 'crusade' presented a much greater challenge to Philip than any previous campaign, and particularly the strength of the Persian cavalry demanded a much greater effort in that arm. Prior to this campaign, Thessalians, allies and mercenaries could largely answer any cavalry requirement, and the likelihood is that Philip did not draw heavily upon Macedonian cavalry: only the elite hetairoi cavalry was regularly called upon for service. For the Asian expedition, however, Philip had to commit many more of his Macedonian cavalry and this may have moved him to make the change. It would obviously make for a much more loyal
and unified force if all the Macedonian cavalry levy was given the same status, and on a long campaign far from home, it was important to attach so vital a force as closely as possible to the royal person.62

Whether this dating is accepted or not, there can be little doubt that in 334 B.C. the hetairoi cavalry was simply a part of the national levy of cavalry, that part which accompanied the king on the Asian expedition. The change in nature of the hetairoi must be seen in the context of Philip's other reforms, which were aimed at achieving integration and uniformity in the kingdom and the more efficient use of resources.

b) THE INFANTRY

Of the 12,000 heavy infantry which went to Asia, some were called 'hypaspists', others were called 'pezetairoi'.63 The relative strength of these parts is nowhere specifically stated, but scholars have reached some agreement that the ratio of pezetairoi to hypaspists was 9,000 to 3,000.64

The Pezetairoi

Scholars are agreed that those called 'the pezetairoi' were the national levy of the Macedonian heavy infantry.65 Details of these can be taken from Diodorus. In his description of Alexander's battle-line at Gaugamela, Diodorus (17,57,2) records that there were six battalions: this must represent the full strength on the Asian expedition; there were also six at the battle of the Granicus.66 Three of the battalions are named only after their commanders, but three have territorial descriptions: 'the battalion called Elimiot'; 'the battalion of the Orestians and Lyncestians';
the battalion of those called Stymphaeans'. It is clear that, like the cavalry, they were organised and recruited territorially: one battalion from Elimeia, one from Orestis and Lyncestis combined, and one from Tymphaea. There is no difficulty about the identification of any of these places, all of which were in Upper Macedonia and were petty kingdoms before Philip's reign.67

It seems reasonable to assume that the other three battalions in Asia were also recruited and organised territorially, as uniformity is to be expected. By the same argument the Macedonian infantry left with Antipater, which was the other part of the national levy, can also be assumed to have been organised by territories.68 Berve (p.113) suggested that Antipater was left with 3,000 hypaspists, but this suggestion has generally not been favourably received by scholars, who mostly see the 12,000 infantry left with Antipater as being wholly a territorially recruited levy.69 Berve's views on the hypaspists have been shown to be untenable and on this point also his view should be rejected.70 On the assumption, therefore, that Antipater's force was divided into eight territorially organised battalions of 1,500 each, the whole heavy infantry levy of the Argead kingdom was organised in fourteen territorial battalions.71 It is known that at least one battalion was drawn from the two districts, i.e. from Orestis and Lyncestis; these were tribal non-urbanised districts and, therefore, probably relatively weak in heavy infantry.

Only three of these recruiting areas are known and, as
it happens, all these are in Upper Macedonia. It must be assumed, however, that the areas were not confined to one part of the kingdom. Except for the three mentioned, evidence is lacking, but by drawing upon evidence on the cavalry, it is possible to make some suggestions about Philip's infantry organisation. The 10,000 infantry which Philip led against Bardylis in 358 B.C. were probably almost all drawn from the heartland of Macedonia, for control of the rest of the kingdom was quite weak: there would have been little difficulty in raising such a number. It is probable that Philip initially made few demands upon the manpower of the new territories: there is evidence enough that allies and mercenaries bore much of the burden of military service.

Gradually, however, as the kingdom was stabilised and organised, a more comprehensive military levy was desirable, to involve the whole kingdom in military service.

The Upper Macedonian principalities taken into the kingdom retained their identities for the levying of soldiers, as is clear from the names of the battalions which went to Asia. Tribal groupings and loyalties had not been eroded by outside influences and it was natural simply to take over the established system of administration. This was done also in the more backward parts of Lower Macedonia, away from the coast and the trade routes. It is evident that Philip brought into closer control many areas and tribal groups, some of which, perhaps, became involved in the Macedonian military levy, while retaining their traditional regional or tribal identity.
Elsewhere, however, particularly on the coast, many Greek communities had been taken in by Philip and their infantry strength had to be integrated, no less than their cavalry strength. It is difficult to believe that Philip did not adopt the same methods of integration with the infantry as the cavalry, and it would be rather surprising if he did not use the same city centres for infantry recruitment districts; Amphipolis, Apollonia, Anthemus, to name only those known. Also there seems no reason why other cavalry recruiting areas, for instance Bottiaeae, were not used for infantry recruiting. This does not necessarily mean that each recruiting area was assessed at 200-250 cavalry and 1,500 infantrymen, though this may have been the case in some areas. Taking a hypothetical example, Orestis may have been expected to contribute 200-250 cavalry, but to share with Lyncestis the contribution of 1,500 infantry.

It is not possible to view the infantry reorganisation in isolation from the cavalry reforms, and there is no reason to think that they were not related actions: therefore, in dating the infantry reorganisation, the same considerations must be applied to arrive at a date of around 340 B.C. (see above p.41). Prior to this date, additional infantry manpower in the newly controlled areas may have been utilised in a piecemeal fashion as it became available, but there can be little doubt that the form of the infantry force as known from the early years of the Asian campaign was the result of a comprehensive reform of recruitment and
organisation carried through at one time, probably around 340 B.C. 76

The question of which districts contributed troops to the Asian expeditionary heavy infantry levy has not received much attention. Berve suggested that none were drawn from the new territory won by Philip, but three were from Upper Macedonia, as the ancient evidence attests, and the other three from 'Old Macedonia', or the heartland. 77 This latter identification is sheer guesswork, inspired mainly by the mistaken belief that all the cavalry came from the new territory (see above, pp. 424). In fact, there seems no way of determining the origins of the other three battalions.

The term 'pezetairoi' is used by Arrian to describe the Macedonian heavy infantry, and the hypaspists are explicitly not included. 78 From his evidence, it can be concluded that the territorial heavy infantry levy which accompanied Alexander in Asia was called 'pezetairoi'. Berve thought that the name applied also to 9,000 of the 12,000 infantry left with Antipater, 79 just as he thought that the term 'hetairoi' was applied to the cavalry left with Antipater. It is clear that the two terms are parallel and, as I have argued that the term 'hetairoi' referred only to those with Alexander, so I suggest that the term 'pezetairoi' also was applied only to that part of the infantry levy on the Asian campaign.

This was not the original meaning of the term, which appears to have followed the same line of development as
the term "hetairoi". At the time of Alexander II it referred to the royal household footguard, and the reference of Demosthenes in 349 B.C. to the pezetairoi shows that they were still a special infantry force with a particularly close relationship with the king, and distinct from the ordinary levy. There is no further reference to the pezetairoi in the time of Philip, and when the word appears in the context of Alexander's reign it has the much broader application explained above. It is clear that the purpose of the extension of this term was the same as the purpose of the extension of the term "hetairoi", namely to give a much larger body of infantry a privileged name, in order to attach them all equally to the person of the king. The pezetairoi prior to this change were an elite drawn in the main probably from the Macedonians proper of heartland Macedonia. Such a body was not in line with the general policy of Philip. The pezetairoi guardsmen, therefore, were made equal with their fellows on the military census of their districts, losing their elite status which had, in part, been dependent upon their origins. The pezetairoi unit was thus broken up and the name "pezetairoi" was applied to the regular infantrymen recruited from the districts to accompany the king on campaign. In this way anyone, whatever his origin, had an equal opportunity of being honoured by being chosen to be a member of the pezetairoi units: the qualification was simply military service with the king.

As I have suggested in dealing with the cavalry, so I repeat in reference to the infantry; it seems quite likely
that the extension of the name was precipitated by the preparation for the long and distant campaign against the Persians. A great strain would be put upon the Macedonian infantry force far from home for some years, on an arduous campaign. To foster loyalty the levy chosen for the campaign was to be honoured with the name 'pezetairoi', foot-companions of the king.

The Hypaspists

I turn finally to the term 'hypaspists'. There have been many theories put forward to explain the nature and origin of those called 'hypaspists' by our Alexander historians. Hans Droysen identified them with the royal pages, and Bauer thought that they were the porters of the Macedonian heavy infantry, who had been freed from their carrying function at the beginning of Philip's reign, when the infantry were made to carry their own baggage. These views have been decisively refuted by Berve and many others and need not be seriously considered here. It can be assumed with some confidence that they were drawn from the same social class and background as the phalangites. Their armour also has been a subject of discussion. Berve (I p.113) suggested that they were more lightly armed than the pezetairoi, and he has not been without supporters, but the recent consensus of opinion has inclined to the view that they had the same armour and weapons as the pezetairoi. In so far as the hypaspists fulfilled the same function as pezetairoi it would seem to be right that they were armed in
If they were armed in the same way and came from the same class as the phalangites, their distinction, as Tarn observes (II p.140), must have lain in the method of their recruitment. There is, in fact, no evidence upon the methods of recruitment, but it is clear that they were an elite royal force: part of the unit was the royal *agema*, the personal bodyguard of the king, and the rest, as Tarn points out, was a royal footguard. The date at which the hypaspists were instituted also is unknown. Bauer suggested the very beginning of Philip's reign and Milns suggested a date in the late 350's, but neither of these carries conviction. The word 'hypaspist' does not occur at all in a Macedonian context until the accounts of the campaign of Alexander. This is perhaps odd, as Milns points out, if from early in Philip's reign this body was as important as it was in the Asian campaign. However, although it can be assumed that they were Philip's creation, there is no reason to suppose that he instituted the unit until near the end of his reign. This would explain the absence of reference to them in the Greek sources better than Milns' suggestion that the Greek authors were guilty of confusing the names 'pezetairoi' and 'hypaspist'.

If the hypaspists were formed by Philip, as they surely must have been, their creation must be viewed in the context of the other military reforms of Philip. It seems likely that when Philip disbanded his footguard and changed the meaning of the term 'pezetairoi', he formed another elite
infantry force to be his guard and to be a tactical shock unit; this force he called the 'hypaspists'. The value of having a small select force for making the first strike, and for special missions, is well demonstrated during the course of Alexander's campaigning in Asia.

It can be suggested, then, that Philip formed the hypaspists shortly before the end of his reign. The old footguard had been drawn from Macedonians proper, in the main from heartland Macedonia, but the members of this unit were put on an equal footing with the rest of the heavy infantry levy, including immigrant Greeks and natives, and a new footguard formed from the whole heavy infantry census. The method of selection was probably the same as that attested by Theopompus for the old pezetairoi, that is, on the basis of physique and we may add, loyalty. Many who had been in the old pezetairoi were no doubt selected for the hypaspists, but the important difference was that the hypaspist membership was open to the whole heavy infantry census on merit. The royal agema was a distinct honoured band within the hypaspists, the king's personal bodyguard. It may be that this also was chosen on merit from the whole levy, but it is also possible, as with the royal squadron of hetairoi, that they were all drawn from an area or tribe with particularly close associations with the Argead royal family.

Philip had inherited from his brother a small but well trained Macedonian force of cavalry and heavy infantry, which was a standing force attached to the king's person. This
royal guard, as it may be described, consisted of the hetairoi cavalry and the pezetairoi infantry. Philip retained the organisation unchanged until about 340 B.C., when the recruiting districts were reviewed and the populations of the new territories won by Philip were fully integrated. This greatly increased the military potential. Under the challenge of the Asian expedition, the size of the hetairoi cavalry was enormously increased in order that all the Macedonian cavalry needed for that campaign might be of equal status and be closely attached to the king's person. A corresponding reform of the pezetairoi infantry also was carried through, in order that the heavy infantry on the Asian campaign also might be closely attached to the king. Because it was useful to have a small elite shock force of infantry, in addition to the main mass of heavy infantry, Philip created the hypasists, which became the royal guard.
CHAPTER III

THE COMPANION CAVALRY\(^1\) OF ALEXANDER 334-324 B.C.

PART I The Reform of 331 B.C.

I have already discussed the organisation and recruit­ment of the Companion cavalry in the light of evidence drawn from the early years of the Asian campaign (Ch. II pp.36£ ). At the battle of Gaugamela, and presumably throughout the campaign until this time, it was divided into eight squadrons, one of which was the royal squadron. Overall commander of the force was Philotas, son of Parmenio.\(^2\)

a) The Date of the Reform

The first reform of the Companion cavalry attested in the sources occurred a short time after the battle of Gaugamela. According to Arrian it took place at Susa, but Curtius and Diodorus place it in Sittacene, an area west of Susa, on the route from Babylon. Diodorus is the most precise: at 17,65,1 he says that after Alexander had left Babylon, there came to him reinforcements from Macedonia; on the sixth day after their arrival Alexander entered Sittacene and there stopped to rest his troops and reorganise the army. Curtius (5,2,1) also places the reform in Sittacene, but makes the reinforcements arrive at Babylon itself. Arrian (3,16,10) closely connects the reform with the arrival of the reinforcements from Macedonia, but places both at Susa.

It is clear that Diodorus and Curtius are drawing upon a
common ultimate source, for, although Diodorus does not give the detail which Curtius does, his general comments are quite compatible with Curtius' detail and both place the reforms in Sittacene. That Curtius chose to connect the arrival of the reinforcements with the rest the soldiers had at Babylon is quite explicable. He had to reconcile the supposed debilitating corruption of the soldiery, which was the result of the extravagant living at Babylon as described by him, with the continued success of Alexander. The injection of uncorrupted reinforcements was an obvious way of doing this and therefore Curtius moved the arrival of the reinforcements to Babylon to enable him to juxtapose it beside his description of the corruption.

Basically two separate traditions emerge: Arrian represents one tradition, that the reinforcements arrived at Susa and led to the reforms there; the other is represented best by Diodorus, that the reinforcements arrived on the route from Babylon to Susa and on the sixth day after their arrival Alexander reached Sittacene, where the reforms took place. In so far as the latter version is the more precise, it appears to be the more reliable. In addition, as Berve points out (I p.106 n.1), it is much more likely that a well known place be substituted for a less known than vice versa. Wirth has argued that it is not likely that in the depth of winter the army would stop en route for a rest. But Diodorus and Curtius state specifically that it was an unusually rich area particularly suitable for such a halt, and the weather in December is quite mild in that area.
There seems to be little doubt, therefore, that Diodorus' evidence should be accepted, and that the reform took place in Sittacene. On this assumption we may attempt to date the reform. The end of September or beginning of October is a fixed point for the battle of Gaugamela. The most recent discussion of the timing of Alexander's movements is that of Wirth, who suggests that Alexander may have taken a little less than three weeks for the march to Babylon after the battle: this seems likely to be right. Alexander was quite keen to reach and occupy Babylon and such indication as there is suggests that he was moving at a steady pace: for Curtius (5,1,16) says that he reached Mennis from Arbela, a distance of just over 100 km., in over three days. The route all the way from Gaugamela to Babylon is quite even with no serious obstacles, and we might, therefore, expect Alexander to cover the distance of approximately 460 km. at a daily average of about 25 km., i.e. 19 days. The army was rested in Babylon for 34 days (Curt. 5,1,39) and, therefore, Alexander set out from there about 53 days after the beginning of October. Arrian tells us that Alexander reached Susa in 20 days from Babylon (3,16,7), a distance by direct route of over 450 km. Allowing for perhaps three or four days rest in Sittacene (Diod. 17,65,2; Curt. 5,2,2) we may estimate a daily rate of 25-28 km., by no means excessive along the easy road from Babylon to Susa. Sittacene is the narrow fertile strip east of the Tigris between the river and Susiana, under 250 km. from Babylon, and our calculations, therefore, lead us to date the reform about 65 days after the battle of Gaugamela.
that is during the first week of December (331).

b) The Nature of the Reform

Diodorus gives no details, only a very general statement about the improvement of officer strength, the promotion of men on merit, the bettering of conditions of service, and a resulting increase in devotion and effectiveness (17,65,2ff.). Curtius has a fuller version: after a longer account of the changes in the infantry (see below, Ch.IV pp. 122f.), he writes of the cavalry (5,2,6): 'For whereas before the cavalrymen were allocated each into his own tribe, separated from the men of the rest of the tribes, now the distinction by tribe was done away with and he assigned the men not necessarily to commanders of their own people but to those selected by himself.' On the face of it, this seems a very far reaching reform. The cavalry are given no qualifying description, so what Curtius is saying literally is that all the cavalry were put into units, not according to origin but according to whatever Alexander saw as convenient. However, it is clear that this cannot mean that the Macedonians, Thessalians, Greek allies, Thracians etc. were all mixed up into new tactical units. As the infantry reforms concerned only the Macedonians (see below, Ch.IV pp. 122f.), the cavalry reforms described here concerned only the Companion cavalry. It is known that these were organised by recruiting district up until the time of the battle of Gaugamela and the passage seems to mean that henceforth the Companion cavalry was no longer organised in territorial squadrons. As it reads in the text, this involved the redeployment of the men in the
existing squadrons, and the reassigning of them to squadrons as Alexander saw fit. This seems a rather senseless reorganisation in that no advantages are immediately apparent: in fact, what Alexander would have been doing was to break up squadrons of cavalry with at least four years of cooperative combat experience behind them.

In the other two accounts the reorganisation is closely connected with the arrival of reinforcements, which Curtius has displaced, and this naturally raises the question of whether Curtius has misled his readers concerning the scope of the reform, through detaching it from the arrival of the reinforcements. If the text is made to apply only to the reinforcements of Company cavalry, it means that the new troopers were allocated to the squadrons where they were needed, rather than strictly according to territorial distinction. Such a procedure is quite understandable. All the cavalry squadrons would not have suffered equally through casualties, and the reinforcements would not have been drawn in the right numbers from the right district: it would, therefore, have been impossible for Alexander to observe the territorial distinctions when integrating the reinforcements.

This is surely the meaning of Curtius' account. The number of reinforcements represents a substantial proportion of the whole Companion cavalry force, about a quarter, so in integrating them, Alexander went a long way towards destroying the territorial nature of the squadrons. We cannot know whether he still observed the territorial distinctions where
it was convenient, but there would seem to be little advantage in doing so once the principle had been abandoned.

Arrian gives more detail about the reform: 'Amyntas arrived with reinforcements from Macedonia: of these Alexander integrated the cavalry into the Companion cavalry, and the infantry he added to the individual battalions, allocating each man according to tribe. He also established two lochoi in each ile, previously there had not been cavalry lochoi, and appointed as lochagoi men chosen on merit from the hetairoi.' By this evidence, the main feature was the integration of reinforcements, which perhaps supports the interpretation I have suggested of Curtius' evidence. Tarn (II p.160) thought that Arrian's text meant that the cavalry as well as the infantry were allocated 'by tribe'. Though this is a possible interpretation of the Greek, it is by no means a necessary one and the evidence of Curtius that the territorial distinctions were not observed makes such an interpretation unlikely. Arrian is the only author to mention the division of each ile of Companion cavalry into two lochoi; and although these lochoi do not receive any clear mention in the sources during the course of the campaigning, there is no real reason to doubt that such a division was made. The reinforcements may have increased the size of the ilae to an extent that made it convenient to divide them into subsections (see below, p.84): smaller tactical units would make for more flexibility and manoeuvrability. Arrian's statement that the commanders of the lochoi were appointed on merit from the hetairoi could
mean either that they were chosen from the ranks of the
 cavalry, or that they came from the hetairoi councillors.
 There can be no doubt that the former alternative is right.
 The post of lochagos was not exalted enough for a councillor
to hold, and it would be surprising to find the expression
'chosen on merit' in connection with the appointment of a
councillor to a post. There is, also, some indication in
the texts of Diodorus and Curtius that men were promoted from
the ranks on their past record. Diodorus (17,65,3) says that
Alexander considered reports of good conduct in making the
promotions, and Curtius (5,2,3) has some confused remarks
about contests being held and the winners being appointed as
chiliarchs. The chiliarchs were infantry officers, but it
seems possible that Curtius has confused something he found
in his source about the officers being chosen from the ranks
on merit. If infantry positions were filled by open
competition, though not, of course, in the form Curtius
describes (see next chapter pp. 122 f.), it seems likely
that Alexander filled the new cavalry positions in the same
way.

The royal squadron was probably not affected by the
change in recruiting policy. If it was already chosen from
the whole cavalry levy irrespective of recruitment area (see
above Ch.II p. 36), no change was required to bring it into
line with the new methods of ile division. It may, however,
have been drawn from a special class of district, but even so,
it seems unlikely that its tradition would have been tampered
with: for such an elite band, special recruitment arrangements
could easily have been made. With regard to the division of
the ilae into two lochoi, there seems no reason why the
royal ile should not have been so divided. It was no doubt
greater than the other ilae (see above Ch.II p.39), and,
therefore, its size is no argument for its being treated
differently, and there would have been considerable
advantages in some degree of uniformity in the structure of
the ilae of the Companion cavalry.

Arrian (3,18,5) records that early in 330 B.C. Alexander
took with him on the assault of the Persian Gates, as well as
some heavy and some light infantry, 'the royal squadron of
the Companion cavalry and, in addition to this, one tetrarchy
of cavalry'. This is the only reference to a tetrarchy of
cavalry in the Alexander historians, or indeed in any ancient
author, and since it occurs immediately after the cavalry
reform is described, we must consider whether this usage is
connected with the reform, and whether Alexander formed
tetrarchies of cavalry at this time.

The precise meaning of Arrian's usage has been a matter
of dispute. Plaumann suggests that a tetrarchy was a fourth
part of the Companion cavalry, i.e. two ilae. Although he
does not explain how he reached this conclusion, he is
presumably drawing on the analogy of the Thessalian political
unit (Demosth. 9,26). Berve (I p.107 n.2) argues that in a
military context a tetrarchy is a grouping of four units, not
a fourth part, and that therefore four ilae is meant. He
supports his view by citing the Suda's definition of an
infantry tetrarchy as four lochoi.
Plaumann would seem to have the better view. It is more likely that Alexander took only two ilae in addition to the royal ile on this particular expedition. Although no certainty is possible, the difficulty of the terrain made a large force of cavalry of doubtful value.\(^\text{13}\) Ariobarzanes had only 700 cavalry (Arr. 3,18,2); and the demands of the other two missions, under Craterus and under Amyntas, Philotas and Coenus, must be taken into account. Arrian implies that Alexander took only a small strike force against Ariobarzanes, and the bulk of the army went by a different route. These considerations made it more likely that Alexander took three eighths of the Companion cavalry (about 860 men) than five eighths (about 1,400 men).

But on the essential point Plaumann and Berve are in agreement: a tetrarchy was a grouping together of standard tactical units to form a larger command. They both feel uneasy about the total absence of any other reference to such a grouping in Alexander's army and, therefore, conclude that it was not a permanent arrangement but was formed only for the duration of a particular mission, presumably with a tetrarch appointed to lead it. There seems to be no doubt that the term, as used by Arrian, refers to a grouping of ilae, but the view that it was an official term applied to a fixed number of ilae of Companion cavalry seems much less certain. It was, of course, frequently found convenient by Alexander to detach some part of the Companion cavalry to go on a special mission, and presumably the ilae involved were grouped together on
occasion into larger units for tactical purposes. Plaumann and Berve suggest that the term 'tetrarchy' was the term applicable to two or four units grouped in this way: if it was used in this way, it is most odd that the term does not appear elsewhere.

However, Arrian states that the cavalry ilae of Companions were each divided into two lochoi (3,16,11) and it could be that Alexander, as well as dividing the ilae into two parts, also made provision for the grouping of ilae to form tetrarchies. It would have been quite compatible with his general aim of greater flexibility. Arrian implies that the ile remained the basic tactical unit and it would, therefore, have to be accepted that the tetrarchy was formed, as Plaumann and Berve suggested, only when tactical considerations required it. This is not necessarily an objection and would explain the failure of the sources to mention such a provision. On the other hand, it does not seem sound to postulate a totally unattested reform merely to justify the single use of a term by an author who is proven to be less than reliable in such matters.

It seems a sounder method of approach to explain Arrian's use of the term by other means. In Tactica 10,1, Arrian defines a tetrarchy as four lochoi. This refers to infantry but, in the absence of any definition of a cavalry tetrarchy, it seems to be the best guide to Arrian's use of the term. Since Arrian has stated at 3,16,11 that cavalry lochoi were introduced into Alexander's army, is it not possible that Arrian is here substituting the term 'tetrarchy'
for two ilae, reasoning that four lochoi were equivalent to a tetrarchy, and thereby avoiding repetition of the word ilae? That Arrian is capable of this does not seem at all unlikely; he frequently misuses such terms, see Appendix IIIa. It is certainly a difficulty that cavalry tetrarchies are totally unknown outside this one reference, but this will always be a difficulty whatever the interpretation.
PART II The Hipparchs and Hipparchies

a) The Appointment of Two Hipparchs

After the reform at the end of 331 B.C., there were eight ilae (no longer organised strictly according to recruitment area) and sixteen lochoi. All these were under the command of Philotas. This organisation remained until the death of Philotas in the autumn of 330 B.C. The passage of Arrian describing the change at this time is explicit and has never been questioned: at 3,27,4 he writes that 'Alexander appointed two hipparchs, Hephaestion, son of Amyntor, and Cleitus, son of Dropides, and divided the body of the hetairoi into two parts, because he did not want one man, not even one of his friends, in command of so many cavalry, especially as it was the best and most distinguished of all the cavalry'. In place of Philotas, then, Alexander appointed two men. The reason for the change given in Arrian may well come from Ptolemy and there is no justification for doubting that this was the main motivating factor behind Alexander's action: but he may also have wanted to make it easier to divide the Companions for greater flexibility. There is no other evidence upon the change. Tarn (II p.161) suggested that Cleitus remained leader of the royal ile and doubled up as hipparch, the royal ile forming one of the four ilae under him. This is possible, but there seems no reason to suppose that another man did not take over command of the royal ile. Alexander seems to have been wanting more officers in his army and this would certainly not have been achieved by
keeping Cleitus in command of the royal ile.

b) The Division into Hipparchies

(i) The Purpose

Although there are no specific references to any change in structure between 330 and 326 B.C., it is certain that prior to the battle of the Hydaspes the Companion cavalry was reorganised. At this battle the basic tactical unit was the hipparchy and the ile had become a subdivision of this basic unit. The dating and nature of this change have been the subjects of much discussion and a full treatment of the evidence is necessary. I discuss the term 'hipparchy' elsewhere (Appendix IIIa) and it will be enough here to give the definition. The hipparchy was an independent tactical unit, the commander of which was a top-ranking officer subordinate to nobody except Alexander or a strategic commander. Originally there had been only one independent tactical unit of Companions, under Philotas; from 330 B.C. there were two, and before 326 B.C. there were several more.

The purpose which would best be served by this rearrangement is flexibility. The ilarchs were not top-ranking officers and were not suited for independent command: therefore, the ile, although it could be detached from the main body of Companion cavalry, had to be put directly under the command of the leader of the mission of which it was a part. It became clear to Alexander during the campaigning of 329 B.C. that frequent and substantial detachments of Companion cavalry were necessary to cope with the new style of warfare
with which he was confronted. He could no longer expect
set battles in which the enemy would come against him in a
united body: the opposition was dispersed and had to be
chased. His army structure had, therefore, to be more
flexible. These considerations led to the permanent arrange­
ment of the crack cavalry force into several independent
command units, well suited for easy detachment from the main
body.

A brief analysis of the campaigning of the years 329-
327 B.C. will demonstrate the nature of the warfare and
Alexander's reaction to the changed circumstances. In 329
B.C. he sent a detachment against Spitamenes who was being
troublesome in Sogdiana. The detachment consisted of 800
mercenary cavalry, 1,500 mercenary infantry and 60 Companion
cavalry: the commanders were not top quality officers and
the mission ended in disaster, with the force being almost
annihilated. 21 The reaction of Alexander was strong. It was
near the end of the campaigning season of 329 B.C., but when
he heard the news of it he took half the Companion cavalry,
the archers, the Agrianes and the fittest of the phalanx and
chased Spitamenes into the desert in an effort to avenge the
defeat. Craterus was left with the rest of the campaign
force to advance to Zariaspa. 22

The whole campaign force reunited for the winter at
Zariaspa in Bactria, but it was surrounded by hostile pockets
of resistance. Sogdiana had not been subdued by Alexander's
thrusts into it and Bactria was unsettled. When a clear
narrative resumes and the main campaigning season begins in
the spring of 328 B.C., a change of strategy is immediately apparent. Alexander himself moved out of Bactria across the Oxus into Sogdiana: Arrian (4,15,7; 16,1f.) says that he left Polyperchon, Attalus, Gorgias and Meleager, all commanders of Macedonian *pezetairoi* units, to keep order in Bactria. It is clear that Craterus also was left in Bactria because after a raid by Spitamenes on Zariaspa, it was Craterus with some cavalry who came to the rescue: Craterus and his troops did not rejoin the king until the following winter, at Nautaca (Arr. 4,17,1; 18,1; Curt. 8,1,6). In Sogdiana, Alexander himself advanced to Maracanda, not in one body but in five divisions commanded by Hephaestion, Ptolemy, Perdiccas, Coenus and Artabazus, and himself (Arr. 4,16,2). They reunited at Maracanda but he immediately divided the force again, this time into three parts, the commanders being Hephaestion, Coenus and Artabazus, and himself. Hephaestion went to consolidate Alexander's hold on the conquered parts of Sogdiana, Coenus and Artabazus went towards the Scythians, where Spitamenes was reported, and he himself went off to the unconquered parts of Sogdiana. After each division had completed its mission, they reassembled again at Maracanda (Arr. 4,16,3).

Alexander moved away from Maracanda towards the end of the campaigning season of 328 B.C., but left Coenus with the newly appointed satrap of Bactria, Amyntas, to winter in Sogdiana, with orders to maintain control and watch for Spitamenes. Under Coenus, in addition to the satrapal force of Bactrians and Sogdians under Amyntas, were left two
battalions of Macedonian *pezetairoi* infantry, Coenus' own and that of Meleager, all the mounted javelin-men and about 400 Companion cavalry (Arr. 4,17,3). Alexander clearly intended to take no chances. Hephaestion, with a part of the army, was sent to Bactria to make preparations for supplies during the winter (Curt. 8,2,13), and Alexander made his way to Nautaca to spend the winter. The rest of the expeditionary force joined him at some stage during the winter apparently, but the sources are obscure and contradictory. Campaigning seems to have gone on during the winter. In the early months of 327 B.C. Craterus, who had rejoined the main force (Arr. 4,18,1), was sent against Catanes and Austanes, who were keeping up the resistance among the Pareitacenae. Craterus led his own infantry unit and those of Polyperchon, of Attalus and of Alcetas, and in addition 600 Companion cavalry. Alexander with the rest of the expeditionary force went into Bactria and was later joined there by Craterus, when preparations were made for the Indian campaign (Arr. 4,22,1f.; Curt. 8,5,1ff.).

Flexibility and speed were the essential requirements for this type of warfare, and Alexander had learnt in 329 B.C. that a top quality commander and top quality troops must form the nucleus of any detachment. The typical detachment during 328 B.C. consisted of a force of Companion cavalry, some light cavalry or infantry, or both, and a substantial force of good quality Macedonian *pezetairoi* infantry. Although the troops in many of the detachments are not detailed in the sources, there can be little doubt that some Companion
cavalry were always included on missions away from the main body.

The structure described by Arrian in 330 B.C. (3,27,10) clearly was not sufficiently flexible: with only two independent commands, Alexander, who clearly had to keep some Companion cavalry with himself, had only one regular independent command for detachment. In fact, after 329 B.C. Alexander found this organisation unworkable. The Companion cavalry, almost continuously through 328 B.C., was divided into more than two divisions, and one of the hipparchs, namely Hephaestion, was almost continuously on independent missions on which much less than half of the Companion cavalry was present. In practice, therefore, his command of the Companion cavalry, if he still held it, can have been little more than a source of honour and prestige. The other hipparch, Cleitus, is not mentioned in the course of the campaigning of 329 and 328 B.C. and probably stayed with Alexander, in command of the Companion cavalry with the king, but on many occasions less than half the Companion cavalry was with the king and, therefore, the command structure of the body, if it persisted unchanged, was really an empty formality.

There can be little doubt that the changed strategy of the war encouraged Alexander to organise the Companion cavalry into a greater number of independent combat units, which could easily be detached for missions away from the main body. This is confirmed by our knowledge of the role of the
hipparchies. Organisational command of four of the hipparchies was given to those officers frequently sent on separate missions: i.e. Hephaestion, Craterus, Coenus and Perdiccas. When these men went on a mission away from the main body, they usually took their own hipparchies as a nucleus of the detachment; this was the purpose for which hipparchies had been formed.

(ii) The Date

This new arrangement was operative at the battle at the Hydaspes, but the precise dating of the reorganisation has been disputed. The matter is complicated by Arrian's inaccurate use of the term 'hipparchy' in reference to the Companion cavalry. In fact, he uses it of any cavalry unit of substantial size and so, although 'hipparchies of Companions' feature in Arrian prior to his narrative of the year 326 B.C., he may not be using the term accurately (see Appendix III pp. 382 ff.). Only two chapters after he describes the appointment of two hipparchs over the Companion cavalry (3, 27, 4), he writes of three hipparchies as being only a part of the Companion cavalry (3, 29, 7). It has been regarded by most scholars as impossible that each hipparch could have command of more than one hipparchy, and it has been held that Arrian is here inaccurate. At Arrian 4, 4, 7 three hipparchies are again only a part of the force. This refers to the summer/autumn of 329 B.C., less than a year after the appointment of the two hipparchs. Since it seems unlikely that the cavalry was reorganised again so quickly, this usage also probably is inaccurate.
The next usage of the expression 'hipparchies of Companions' does not occur until Arrian 4,24,1 which refers to the beginning of the Indian expedition in the late spring of 327 B.C.²⁹ I have shown that by this time Alexander had adopted a new strategy which demanded more flexibility and made the organisation under two hipparchs unsuitable. This predisposes us to look more favourably upon the usage of Arrian here, but his inaccuracy is such that other evidence is needed.

As well as the reference to hipparchies, the passage also contains a reference to the agema of cavalry; this is the first mention of such a unit in Arrian's narrative. From this time the agema of cavalry appears frequently in the role which had been played by the royal ile: the royal ile is mentioned for the last time at Arrian 3,18,5 and there can be no doubt that the agema replaced it. It seems most likely, as Brunt points out (p.29), that the appearance of the agema is connected with the change to hipparchies. When the hipparchies replaced the ilae as the basic tactical units, the royal ile, which previously had been under the command of one of the hipparchs of the Companions, was not included in any of the new hipparchies. It was Alexander's horseguard and, as such, could perhaps be seen as Alexander's hipparchy, though it is never called that. Anyway, 'ile' was no longer an appropriate name for it because it no longer formed part of a larger cavalry unit. Its name was changed, therefore, and it received the same title as the infantry guard.

There is corroboration that a reform had taken place
before the campaigning season of 327 B.C. At 4,27,5, in
his description of an independent mission to Ora, Arrian
refers to Demetrius the hipparch among its commanders, the
others being Attalus and Alcetas. Demetrius is one of the
men to whom a hipparchy is known to have been assigned when
the Companion cavalry was reorganised, and he is called
hipparch again by Arrian (6,8,2). This indicates that the
structure in operation at the battle of the Hydaspes and
later was already in existence in 327 B.C. 30

These passages together seem to be good enough
indication that the reorganisation of the Companion cavalry
had taken place before the start of the Indian campaign, in
late spring 327 B.C. It remains to be decided how long
before this time the change was made. I have already
suggested that it is not likely that Alexander changed the
command structure during the campaigning season of 329 B.C.
because he had appointed the hipparchs only at the end of
the campaigning season of 330 B.C. The change in strategy,
however, is datable to early 328 B.C., which might suggest
that it was at Zariaspa in the winter of 329/8 B.C., where
the whole army assembled, that the reform took place.
However, there are some reasons to suppose that the winter
of 328/7 B.C. was the date of the reform. Alexander could
have kept the old structure through 328 B.C. in theory, while
in practice adopting a more flexible approach in detaching
parts of the Companion cavalry without regard to the
hipparchs' official commands. This seems to be indicated
from Arrian's account of the campaigning through 328 B.C.,
in which there is no mention of hipparchies of Companions. Instead, we read of a detachment of 400 Companion cavalry with Coenus (Arr. 4,17,3) and a force of 600 Companion cavalry with Craterus (Arr. 4,22,1). If the Companion cavalry had already been organised into hipparchies, we would expect to find 'the hipparchy of Coenus' and 'the hipparchy of Craterus' or 'his own hipparchy and that of Demetrius (or some other officer)'.

In addition to this, Alexander planned to remove Cleitus from the expeditionary force in the winter of 328/7 B.C., and this may be seen to be connected with a plan to change the structure of the Companion cavalry, for in the new-style body, Cleitus and Hephaestion were to lose their positions. For some reason, Cleitus had never been used by Alexander to command an independent mission, unlike the other hipparch, Hephaestion, and it may be that Alexander did not think that there was a place for Cleitus in the new order. He, therefore, planned to remove him from his post before, or at the same time as, carrying through the reform. This reform was intended to be part of the preparations for the Indian campaign, but Cleitus' death probably forced Alexander to carry it through earlier than he had expected. Alexander would not have wanted so prestigious a position to remain unfilled for many months and there was no reason why he should not bring forward the reorganisation to a time shortly after Cleitus' death. I would agree with Brunt's dating (p.29), though not with his view that Cleitus' death was a major reason for the change.
(iii) The Number of Hipparchies

Tarn (II p.164 ff.) was of the opinion that the reform produced five hipparchies, with the agema separate. This is the number of hipparchies named as participating in the battle of the Hydaspes (Arr. 5,11,3; 12,2; 16,3), where, Tarn argues, Alexander must have fielded all his cavalry. He was confirmed in his belief by Arrian's reference in 324 B.C. to the addition of a fifth hipparchy (7,6,3). Brunt (p.29ff.) points out, however, that Arrian's evidence on the line-up at the Hydaspes may not be complete, and he believes that the appearance of the hipparchy of Cleitus immediately after the battle (Arr. 5,22,6) confirms this. Tarn supposed that Cleitus had taken over Coenus' hipparchy when Coenus was left at the River Acesines (Arr. 5,21,1) but, as Brunt points out, this is most unlikely. Even if his hipparchy did not remain with him, and Brunt argues that it did, there is no reason to suppose that he would have been stripped of this most honorific command simply because he was temporarily absent from his men.

There is further indication that Arrian may not have given a comprehensive account of all the troops at the Hydaspes. Coenus' hipparchy is not mentioned in the narrative of the crossing of the river and suddenly appears from nowhere in the attack on the right (Arr. 5,16,3). Had it not been involved in this attack, we would be quite unaware of its existence. The likelihood that Arrian does not tell us the names of all the hipparchies of Companions at the battle seems high, and in view of the appearance of the
hippocracy of Cleitus immediately after the battle, the indications are that there were at least six hipparchies of Companions in addition to the agema.

Brunt maintains that there were in fact seven (p. 29f.). The evidence he puts forward in support of this view is drawn from details from Arrian's account of Alexander's approach to India. At 4.24,1, Arrian states that Alexander took 'almost four hipparchies of Companions', in addition to the agema, in an advance against the Aspasians. Since Arrian has already stated that Alexander had sent out half the Companion cavalry with Perdiccas and Hephaestion towards the Indus (4.22,7) and had kept only half the Companions himself (4.23,1), Brunt concludes that 'almost four hipparchies' and the agema accounted for half the Companion cavalry. He goes on to state that this shows that the whole Companion force comprised seven hipparchies and the agema.

As confirmation of this, he points to Arrian's account of the expedition against the Malli (326 BC). At 6.5,5-7 Arrian says that Alexander divided his expeditionary army into four parts, Craterus, Hephaestion, Ptolemy and himself, each leading a part. Alexander took half of the Companions (6.6,1), the rest of the Companions presumably being divided among the others. Arrian goes on to mention, in the course of the action against the Malli, the hipparchies of Perdiccas, Cleitus and Demetrius (6.6,4; 8.2). As Alexander must have had the agema, Brunt concludes that this confirms the equivalence of half the cavalry of Companions to three hipparchies and the agema. However, since he has argued
above that half the Companion cavalry was almost four
hipparchies plus the agema, Brunt is clearly not on firm
ground. What he seems to have proved from his use of this
evidence is not that the Companion cavalry was divided into
seven hipparchies and the agema, but that Arrian is
imprecise in his use of the term 'half'.

Nothing precise, then, can be proved about the number
of hipparchies from these passages of Arrian and we are left
with the names of six commanders of hipparchies which appear
in his narrative: this is the only indication of the number
of hipparchies. Although Arrian's record of the troops
involved in the campaign is far from complete, there is
nothing in any of our narratives which requires us to assume
that there were more than six. It is, therefore, perhaps
reasonable to accept that the names of all the commanders of
the hipparchies are known from Arrian. In support of this,
it should be noted that the commanders of the hipparchies
were prominent officers and we might, therefore, justifiably
expect their names, or the units under their command, to
appear, however unsystematic Arrian's evidence might be.

(iv) Conclusion

The evidence indicates that in 327 B.C. Alexander
established six hipparchies in addition to the agema, and
the commanders were Hephaestion, Perdiccas, Craterus, Coenus,
Cleitus and Demetrius. The first four of these were
strategic commanders whose command over their hipparchies
was organisational rather than tactical: they are never
called 'hipparch' as Demetrius is (Arr. 4, 27, 5; 6, 8, 2).
These hipparchies normally formed part of their strategic command when they were detached for an independent mission. Under the Ptolemies the armed forces were organised into strategic commands consisting of all types of troops, each strategic unit being capable of independent action. In 327 B.C. this type of organisation was in its formative stages, and the division of the Companion cavalry into hipparchies was a part of the development.

The men after whom hipparchies are named, but who are never mentioned in command of independent missions, are Demetrius and Cleitus; we must, therefore, conclude that they were of lesser standing than the other four. These hipparchies were sent with whichever army commander needed them: for instance, when Perdiccas went on an independent mission along the Malli (Arr. 6,6,4), he took in addition to his own hipparchy that of Cleitus: also among the Malli, when Peithon led a separate mission, the hipparchy of Demetrius accompanied him (Arr. 6,8,2). There are obvious advantages, in terms of flexibility, in not having all the hipparchies attached to the top army commanders. Demetrius was the only commander of a hipparchy who had led an ile of Companion cavalry during the early years of the campaign (Arr. 3,11,8) and he was only a commander of cavalry and is not known in any other role: it is significant that he is the only one to whom a hipparchy was attached who is described as 'hipparch' in the sources.

Cleitus also is not known to have led an independent mission but he seems to have been of higher rank than
Demetrius. He appears as commander of an infantry battalion at the beginning of the Indian expedition in 327 B.C. (Arr. 4, 22,7), and again in this role at the Hydaspes (Arr. 5,12,2). If it is accepted that the reorganisation of the Companion cavalry was carried out on the eve of the Indian expedition, it follows that Cleitus was also a commander of a hipparchy at the Hydaspes. If he did not hold the two commands together, we have to assume that between the reorganisation of 328/7 B.C. and early summer 326 B.C., when his name is attached to a hipparchy (Arr. 5,22,6), some unknown man held this command: this seems less likely. Although not a strategic commander, Cleitus was clearly an experienced officer and he may well have been given this dual command because Alexander was short of good officers whom he could trust. 37

The effect of the reorganisation upon the royal ilae has already been touched upon. From being a part of a larger command comprising several ilae, it became an independent command and its name was changed accordingly, to ‘agema’. There is no evidence that there was any other change. Its number probably remained at 300. The system of recruitment also, whatever it was, was probably unaffected (see above p. 36).

The six hipparchies were divided into ilae. This is established by Arrian 6,21,3, which refers to Alexander as selecting one ile from each hipparchy. Tarn considered that the ilae were divided into hecatostyes, presenting a passage of Arrian in support of his view. The army sustained heavy
losses of their baggage animals during the march through the Gedrosian desert and in order to make good the losses Alexander "distributed all the animals, ...... to the commanders by individuals, to some of the men by ilae and hecatostyes, to others by lochoi, ......". Tarn takes it that the 'hecatostyes' as well as the 'ilae' refers to the Macedonian cavalry, contrasted with the 'lochoi' of the infantry, and believes that there are two hecatostyes in each ile. This view, however, is based upon his belief that Alexander had no Iranian cavalry on the march through Gedrosia, whereas it is certain that he had at least some (Arr. 6,22,1). It seems most likely that the 'hecatostyes' refers to Iranian cavalry. It would appear, then, that the lochos continued to be the subdivision of the ile. The number of ilae in each hipparchy is nowhere indicated, but since the Companion cavalry probably numbered less than 2,500 at the time of its division into six hipparchies, it is likely that there were only two: for each ile is not likely to have numbered less than 150 men.
PART III Reinforcements and Losses

At the time of the crossing to Asia in 334 B.C. the Companion cavalry numbered 1,800 according to Diodorus 17.17.4. A reinforcement arrived in the early spring of 333 B.C., which numbered 300 (Arrian 1.29.4), and since losses up to this time can only have been light, this must have brought the total to something over 2,000. During the years 333 to 331 B.C. there were no more reinforcements of Macedonian cavalry and wastage through sickness and enemy action must have reduced the total. At the battle of Gaugamela the force seems to have suffered quite badly, though no firm estimate of casualties is possible. It is perhaps reasonable to assume that not more than 300 were lost to active service during the years 334 to 331 B.C., and that when the 500 reinforcements arrived at the end of 331 B.C. the total was brought to something in the region of 2,300. If this is accepted, it follows that at the time of the reform of 331 B.C. each ile numbered about 280, with the lochoi at 140, with the royal ile standing at 300.

No Macedonian reinforcements are reported to have reached Alexander after the end of 331 B.C. Losses between the years 331 and 327 B.C. may have run into the hundreds. We hear of 60 Companion cavalry being killed on one mission, admittedly a particularly disastrous one, against Spitamenes (Arr. 4.3.7), and the determined resistance of the Eastern Iranians generally must have taken its toll. Apart from this, sickness, aggravated by the rigours of the climate and by fatigue, must have accounted for not a few. We hear of one
group of Companion cavalry, not numbered, which was left in Zariaspa because they were sick (Arr. 4,16,6). Any number suggested for losses of Companion cavalry can only be very approximate, but perhaps the toll through the hard campaigning of 330, 329 and 328 B.C. may have been as high as 400. Whatever the losses, the ilae were no doubt much weakened, though they could not have fallen much below the strength they had been at the beginning of the Asian campaign during this time.

It, in fact, seems unlikely that the Companion cavalry received any reinforcement during the campaigning in Eastern Iran. Berve believed that Iranians entered its ranks in substantial numbers from as early as 329 B.C., but I have argued against this view in Appendix IV. He also suggested that the prodromoi entered the body of the Companions at the time they cease to be mentioned in the sources, i.e., 329 B.C., and Brunt has supported this suggestion, arguing that it is unlikely that such an important force would have been sent home. However, it must be remembered that the Iranians could, and did, provide Alexander with excellent light cavalry, (the Dahae mounted archers are the best known: Arrian 5,12,2 et. al.) The prodromoi may, indeed, have been sent home, as Tarn suggested (II p.164). There is, in any case, no reason to believe that they were included in the Companion cavalry, even if they did stay. If they did lose their identity through being reorganised, it is more likely that they would have been made part of a light, rather than a heavy, cavalry body: it was in this
style of fighting that their experience lay. They may well, therefore, have formed part of the mounted javelin-men, or of some unknown mercenary body of light horse.

On the eve of the formation of the hipparchies the Companion cavalry probably numbered something under 2,000. In the course of the reorganisation, however, some Iranians were brought into the ranks. The evidence for this is drawn from a retrospective reference in Arrian (7,6,3; 8,2). I discuss these passages at length in Appendix IV and I conclude that men of several tribes of the Eastern Iranian plateau, as well as some few Persians (the Evacae), entered the Companion cavalry during the winter of 328/7 B.C. Faced with the prospect of strong opposition from the fine cavalry of the Indian tribes, Alexander recruited substantial numbers of cavalry from Eastern Iranians. Most of these were organised tribally - we hear, for instance, of the Bactrian and the Sogdian cavalry (Arr. 5,12,2) - but some were armed with Macedonian equipment and introduced into the ranks of the Companions. We may assume that this reinforcement was closely connected with the reorganisation of the cavalry into hipparchies, but it may not have taken place at the same time: for, as I have suggested above, the death of Cleitus may have forced Alexander to reorganise the Companions earlier than he had planned.

The numbers involved were no doubt quite small; this is the natural interpretation of Arrian's comment that they were outstanding specimens of their peoples (7,6,3). Any attempt to estimate numbers, however, is beset with insoluble
difficulty. I have estimated that on the eve of the reform of the Companion cavalry the strength of the force may have numbered a little under 2,000. There are only two indications of the size of the Companion cavalry during the Indian campaign. Arrian (Indica 19, 2) records that on the voyage down the Hydaspes in 326 B.C. Alexander took on to the fleet all the hypaspists, all the archers, and of the cavalry those called Companions: the total is given at 8,000. We may presume that the number came from Nearchus, and we have no reason to doubt it. I shall argue below (Ch. IV pp. 150 ff.) that the hypaspists numbered 3,500 at this time but the archers present a much more difficult problem.

Berve (I p. 133) argued that there were at least three chiliarchies of archers in 327 B.C. and presented Arrian 4, 24, 10 in evidence. In an engagement with the Indians in that year Alexander divided the forces with him into three parts. One part he placed under the command of Leonnatus, another part he led himself. The other part he entrusted to Ptolemy and it consisted of τῶν τῶν ἰππαρχῶν τῶν βασιλικῶν τὸ τρίτον μέρος καὶ τὴν Φιλίππου καὶ Φελώτα τέκου καὶ δύο Χελιαρχίας τῶν τοσιότων καὶ τοὺς Ἀγριανὰς καὶ τῶν ἰππέων τοὺς ἰππίστως of the royal hypaspists the third part and the τάξεις of Philip and Philotas and two chiliarchies of the archers and the Agrianes and half of the cavalry. The genitive 'of the archers' seems to be partitive and Berve appears to be right that this text implies that there were some archers in
addition to the two chiliarchies under Ptolemy. Caution, however, must be exercised in the interpretation of this evidence, for this passage presents many difficulties and it seems likely that Ptolemy, plainly the source of the passage, exaggerated his own importance in the engagement. In particular it must be doubted whether the part of the army with Ptolemy was greater than that with Leonnatus by as much as Ptolemy says it was. If it is accepted that there were at least three chiliarchies of archers, the question must be raised of whether each chiliarchy numbered 1,000 men. There seem to be too many unknowns for this passage to be used confidently to set the total strength of the archers, and we must be content with a less precise estimate.

In 334 B.C. Alexander had only a few hundred archers (Diod. 17,17,4, with my Appendix II), but he certainly did increase his strength in this arm: the Iranians were particularly strong in this arm. Curtius (6,4,2) states that Craterus was detached with his own and with Amyntas' troops, and with 600 additional cavalry and as many archers (cf. Arr. 3,23,2): the date is 330 B.C. It is most unlikely that Alexander sent even the majority of his archers with Craterus (Arrian says 'some of the archers') and, perhaps, we are justified in assuming from this passage that the archers numbered at least 1,500. This was, however, five years before the voyage down the Hydaspes. We must conclude, I think, that we can only guess at the number of archers in Alexander's army in 326 B.C., though some may
have more confidence in the evidence of Arrian 4,24,10 that there were at least three chiliarchies of them. I would suggest that it is unlikely that there were many less than two thousand in India with Alexander, in view of the strength of the Iranian archers and the overall size of the Indian campaign force. On this view Arrian (Ind. 19,2) fixes a maximum for the Companion cavalry of about 2,500.

A passage used to fix the minimum size of the force is Arrian 6,14,4. After the campaign against the Malli, Alexander, on his way down the Hydraotes, 'put on the ships 1,700 cavalry of the Companions, of the psiloi the same number he had had before, and about 10,000 pezoi'. Tarn (II p.162) supposed that this was the full strength of the Companion cavalry, but it was not convenient for him that the body should have been so small as this at the time of the voyage down the river, and he, therefore, suggested that it was the strength of the body as it had stood at Bactra in spring 327 B.C. There is, however, no necessity to interpret the passage to mean that 1,700 was the full total of the force; the genitive 'of the Companions' could be partitive. This has been proposed by Brunt (p.38 n.34) and should be accepted because 1,700 certainly seems too small a number for the whole force, especially if it is accepted that Alexander dismissed 1,500 veteran Macedonian cavalry in 324 B.C. If 1,700 is only part of the Companion cavalry, it seems likely that the full body numbered something over 2,000. I would, therefore, propose 2,000 as a minimum.
for the whole Companion cavalry force.

The result of the discussion of numbers is rather inconclusive, but it is at least clear that not many hundreds of Iranians were introduced to the Companion cavalry in 328/7 B.C. If my estimate of the strength of the body on the eve of the reorganisation is right, no more than about 500 Iranians were involved. There must, of course, have been losses during the fighting in India between 328 and 326 B.C., but Alexander probably made good the losses by promoting men from the units of Eastern Iranian cavalry serving in the army. If we assume, therefore, that the full strength of the force at the start of the Indian campaign was about 2,250 and that the agema continued to be 300 strong, we have a strength for each hipparchy of just under 330. The ilae in each hipparchy cannot have numbered more than two, about 165 each, with the lochoi being about 80. I do not make any claims concerning the accuracy of these estimates, but the figures may not be totally unhelpful.
PART IV Changes During the Indian Campaign

At the battle of the Hydaspes the commanders of the hippocarhies were Hephaestion, Perdiccas, Craterus, Coenus, Demetrius and Cleitus (see above p. 80), but in the summer of 326 B.C. Coenus died (Arr. 6,2,1; Curt. 9,3,20). We hear of no replacement for Coenus and no new name appears as commander of a hippocarchy, but there is no reason to suppose that Coenus was not replaced, and in so far as Peithon seems to have taken over Coenus' infantry battalion (Arr. 6,6,1; Berve II no.623; and see further, Ch.IV p. 112), we may be justified in suggesting that Peithon succeeded also to Coenus' hippocary.

Before Alexander's return to Susa in 324 B.C. the number of hippocarhies was reduced to four. This is made clear by Arrian's reference to the addition of a fifth hippocary, which should be dated to 324 B.C. (Appendix IV pp.4/7e). Berve (I p.111) and Brunt (p.43) argue that the number of hippocarhies was reduced to four after the march through Gedrosia, i.e., at the end of 325 B.C. This is possible in that Alexander probably lost some Companion cavalry on that march, but I would offer an alternative dating. Arrian (6,17,3) records that in the summer of 325 B.C. Alexander segregated those Macedonians whom he was intending to send home, and he sent them, with many other troops, under Craterus' command through Arachosia and Dranghana to Carmania. He himself led another part of the army by a more difficult route, and the parts were to meet again in Carmania. Among those designated for discharge were some
Companion cavalry, and it seems reasonable to assume that this was the occasion of the reduction in the number of hipparchies from six to four. Alexander could have expected little resistance after this time and, therefore, had no cause to bring the force back up to strength.

The number of Companion cavalry sent with Craterus in 325 B.C. cannot be known. The total of Macedonian cavalry discharged by Alexander in the years 325 and 324 B.C., which actually left for home from Opis in the summer of 324 B.C., was 1,500 men (see n.60). Many of these, however, will have remained with Alexander through Gedrosia, and some few others were probably drawn from garrisons which had been established in the centre of the Persian empire (Ch.V p.158). It is difficult to believe that in 325 B.C. Alexander removed from the Companion cavalry the majority of the Macedonians, and since I have suggested that the Macedonian content was a little under 2,000 in 328 B.C., and we can confidently estimate that losses sustained down to mid 325 B.C. amounted to at least 100 to 150, I would suggest that 600 is the very maximum that was sent with Craterus in 325 B.C. This would have reduced the Macedonian content of the body to around 1,200. It might be noted that the reduction in the number of hipparchies from six to four may indicate that one third of the force went with Craterus.

The places of these Macedonians were not filled and Alexander regrouped the body into only four hipparchies in addition to the agema. We may assume, perhaps, that Craterus and Cleitus were the commanders who lost their hipparchies,
because Craterus led those selected for discharge and Cleitus probably went with him.  There was probably no further change in the organisation of the body, as Alexander made his way to Susa to celebrate the end of the Indian campaign. Fresh cavalry reached him in Carmania, but they were not integrated into the campaign army, merely accompanying it on its march through the centre of the Persian empire to Susa.
CHAPTER IV

MACEDONIAN HEAVY INFANTRY 334-324 B.C.

I have already discussed the organisation of the heavy infantry as it stood at the end of the reign of Philip (Ch.II pp.47 f.), using for evidence the sources for Alexander's campaign in Asia. I shall now look at the evidence concerning Alexander's Macedonian heavy infantry in a little more detail and consider changes in organisation during the course of the campaign, to 324 B.C.

Diodorus, 17,17,5, tells us that 12,000 Macedonian infantry went with Alexander to Asia. These, together with 7,000 allies and 5,000 mercenaries, came under Parmenio's command. There seems to be no reason for doubting Diodorus' evidence, although Parmenio was clearly not in command of the whole infantry body in the same sense that Philotas commanded the Companion cavalry, for the infantry was made up of many independent strategic units: e.g., allied infantry under Antigonus (Arr. 1,29,3), mercenary unit under Menander (Arr. 3,6,8). Parmenio, however, as Alexander's second-in-command, can be expected to have held an unusual position, an overall command over several independent strategic units, which would have given him prestige and authority. There was also, perhaps, a good practical reason for such a position, for an overall commander could ensure understanding and cooperation among the diverse units which made up the phalanx.
PART I The Pezetairoi

a) The Number and Commanders of Battalions

(1) 334-331 B.C.

The pezetairoi were organised in independent strategic units, each under a taxiarch or strategos. Evidence on these battalions during the first four years of the campaign is relatively full: details of Alexander's phalanx at all the three major battles fought during this period are recorded and there is substantial agreement among the sources.

Arrian alone has a full list of the battalions in the battle-line at the Granicus (I 14,2ff.): the hypaspists were on the right flank and beside them from right to left were the phalanxes of Perdiccas, son of Orontes (Berve II no.627); of Coenus, son of Polemocrates (Berve II no.439); of Craterus, son of Alexander (Berve II no.446); of Amyntas, son of Andromenes (Berve II nos.57 and 64); of Philip, son of Amyntas (Berve II no.775). Arrian then describes the line from left to right, up to the centre: the phalanx of Craterus on the left flank, then that of Meleager (Berve II no.494), and that of Philip. There is some confusion clearly in that the battalions of Craterus and Philip are mentioned twice. Craterus' battalion invariably held the opposite flank to the hypaspists so it seems likely that it did so here, the battalion of Philip held the middle of the line. There is little doubt that at the battle of the Granicus there were six battalions under the following commanders: in order of position in the line from left to right, Craterus,
Meleager, Philip, Amyntas, Coenus, Perdiccas.

In the battle-line at Issus Arrian (2,8,3f.) gives a list of the battalions which differs from the line-up at the battle of the Granicus only in that Coenus is on the outside of Perdiccas, and in place of Philip, son of Amyntas, is Ptolemy, son of Seleucus (Berve II no.670). Curtius (3,9,7) agrees with Arrian except for minor differences of order; Arrian's version should be preferred. In the battle-line at Gaugamela, Arrian (3,11,9) records that there were the following battalions: those of Coenus, of Perdiccas, of Meleager, of Polyperchon, son of Simmias, of Amyntas (Amyntas was away and his battalion was commanded by Simmias) and of Craterus. Diodorus (17,57,2) has much the same detail as Arrian, even to the order of the line, except that the battalion of Amyntas is not mentioned at all and in its place is the battalion of Philip, son of Balacrus. Curtius (4,13,27) has a very confused account, though there is some agreement with the other versions. His account can be ignored except for the remark that Amyntas was away (which agrees with Arrian's detail) and Philip, son of Balacrus, was commanding his battalion in his absence (which agrees with Diodorus' version).

The usual interpretation of all this evidence is that there were six battalions of pezetairoi from 334 to 331 B.C., as set out by Berve (I p.114) and Tarn (II p.142). Philip, son of Amyntas, lost his command between the battles of the Granicus and Issus, for some unknown reason, and was replaced by Ptolemy, son of Seleucus. Ptolemy was killed at
Issus (Arr. 2, 10, 7) and Polyperchon succeeded him. As for
the disagreement over Amyntas’ deputy at Gaugamela, Arrian’s
version that Simmias stepped in is generally preferred. The
only part of this interpretation which seems at all doubtful
is whether Simmias really did command the battalion of
Amyntas at the battle of Gaugamela. Philip, son of Balacrus
(Berve II no. 778), is otherwise unknown while Simmias,
Amyntas’ brother (Berve II no. 704), is well attested, and,
of course, being brother to Amyntas, may be expected to have
deputised for him. On the other hand, it is very difficult
to explain how Philip should have slipped into the tradition,
whereas there are two reasons why Simmias should have
intruded. The name Simmias appears just a few words before,
as father of Polyperchon, and since Simmias would naturally
be connected with Amyntas, it would not be difficult to account
for the mistake. I do not think the evidence allows a
decision to be made on this point.

(ii) 331-324 B.C.

The number of battalions of pezetairoi in the years
following the battle of Gaugamela is not so clear. Hans
Droysen considered that the number of battalions increased,
but he did not suggest by how many, or when. Beloch thought
that the number rose to at least ten, one under Philotas and
another under Gorgias being added when reinforcements arrived
at the end of 331 B.C. and another, under Cleitus, arriving
with reinforcements in 329/8 B.C.: Peithon may have led yet
another battalion, or he may have taken over that of Coenus
in 326 B.C. Berve thought that a battalion under Philotas
(II no.803) was added when reinforcements arrived at the end of 331 B.C., and another three or four before 326 B.C., proposed additional commanders being Gorgias, Philip, Cleitus and Balacrus. Tarn would allow for the addition of only one battalion, that of Cleitus at Bactra in 327 B.C. Milns accepted that there were no more than seven battalions in India, and argued this number was reached by the addition of the battalion of Philotas, which was formed in 331 B.C., to the six recorded at the battle of Gaugamela. We must look at the evidence used in support of these theories. The fullest case in favour of an increase to ten or more battalions is presented by Berve, who considered that those men who have their names attached to *taxeis* by Arrian, with the single exception of Antigones (II no.83), were *pezetairoi* battalion leaders. According to Berve, Philotas, Philip, Balacrus, Gorgias and Cleitus all commanded battalions because they are said by Arrian to command *taxeis*, and all these battalions were additional to the six which fought at the battle of Gaugamela. Only two of the six at Gaugamela changed their commanders, that of Perdiccas went to Alcetas (II no.45); and that of Amyntas to Attalus (II no.181). Berve considered that on the Indian campaign eleven battalions in all were in existence. In India in 326 B.C. Coenus died and Peithon (II no.623) took over his battalion. Tarn has argued the fullest case in favour of the number seven (II pp.142ff.), taking as the basis of his theory the evidence of Arrian, which indicates that at the battle of the Hydaspes there were seven battalions. In order to
account for the other men who, Arrian said, had commanded
taxeis, Tarn argued that some of the taxeis were not
pezetairoi battalions at all, and that some of the battalion
commanders had succeeded to the battalions of others. He
dismissed Philip and Balacrus, as commanders of light-armed
troops, and argued that Philotas succeeded to Perdiccas'
battalion after the battle of Gaugamela and that he in turn
was succeeded by Alcetas in 327 B.C. Craterus was succeeded
by Gorgias in 328 B.C. and Coenus was succeeded by his son
Antigenes in 327 B.C. Only the battalion of Cleitus was a
new one, he concludes, added in 327 B.C.: Peithon succeeded
to Cleitus' battalion in 326 B.C.

There are difficulties in both these views. If it is
accepted with Berve that there were in fact eleven battalions
of pezetairoi in India, it is very odd that only seven can
be detected in the battle accounts: though our sources are
far from complete, the omission of four battalions would be
very surprising. On the other hand, Tarn's complex succession
of commands passing rapidly from one man to another is also
unsatisfactory. In addition he has to force the evidence
to suit his theory: because he believes that Philotas was
succeeded by Alcetas, he has to dismiss as inaccurate Arrian's
reference to the taxis of Alcetas at 4,22,1, stating that it
is a mistake for Meleager; and because he believes Gorgias
succeeded Craterus in 328 B.C. and Antigenes succeeded Coenus
in 327 B.C., Tarn has to produce the theory that the
pezetairoi battalions in some cases, though not in others,
retained the names of their former commanders. It is clear
that Tarn has quite arbitrarily selected those parts of
the evidence which suit his case and rejected those parts
that do not.

One of the keys to the problem of the number of
pezetairoi battalions is Arrian's use of the term 'taxis'.
It is the term regularly used by him of the pezetairoi
battalions and probably was the official term: but as well
as having this technical meaning, it is also applied by Arrian
to any body of troops. This has been at the root of the
confusion concerning the number of pezetairoi battalions: the
crucial factor in establishing the number is deciding which
usages in Arrian refer to pezetairoi battalions and which to
other troops. Berve acknowledges that 'taxis' does not always
mean a battalion of pezetairoi and argues that one instance,
at 6.17.3, refers to a unit of hypaspists. Yet elsewhere
he is content to accept that taxis does mean a pezetairoi
battalion without even discussing the possibility that it may
refer to some other unit. Tarn rightly criticises him for
this, but even he follows no consistent criterion in deciding
where Arrian is using 'taxis' of a pezetairoi battalion and
where not.

It is clearly sound to begin from the secure evidence
of the pezetairoi battalion commanders at the battle of
Gaugamela. Where the name of one of these men is attached
to a taxis it is safe to assume that it is a pezetairoi
battalion to which reference is being made. There are,
however, many instances of a taxis attached to the names of
other men, and in such cases consideration should be given
to the nature of the pezetairoi battalion command. The pezetairoi battalions contained the mass of the Macedonians in the army, and the spirit and morale of the men in these battalions was undoubtedly an important factor in that of the whole army. Also, in purely tactical importance, they ranked beside the Companion cavalry. It is not surprising, therefore, that command of one of these battalions was one of the highest-ranking posts in the army, carrying with it great influence, and held by men of great distinction. All those who held these posts down to the battle of Gaugamela were very prominent in the army, and it may be assumed that Alexander was careful to choose men of strong leadership qualities, who had the loyalty and confidence of the men. Following the battle of Gaugamela there is no noticeable change in the nature of the battalions and it seems safe to assume that the nature of the commands also remained unchanged. It follows that only prominent men are likely to have held command of the battalions, and that it is likely that Alexander avoided, as far as possible, the risk of undermining morale and efficiency by frequent changes of commander. There was very little change in commanders during the first four years; and, in particular, the fact that Amyntas retained his command despite his absence for eighteen months underlines the importance of the relationship between the battalion and its commander.

Keeping in mind the nature of the pezetairoi battalion command, we may now consider those taxeis in Arrian which appear for the first time after the battle of Gaugamela, and
which have been thought to be pezetairoi battalions. They are the taxeis of Alcetas, Attalus, Gorgias, Cleitus, Peithon, Balacrus, Philip, Philotas and Antigenes.

Alcetas' taxis appears at Arr. 4,22,1; 4,27,1; 5,11,3. Both the commander and the unit play a sufficiently prominent role to support the view that this was a pezetairoi battalion. Alcetas was of high birth, being the brother of Perdiccas, and is among those Alexander entrusts with command of independent missions (Arr. 4,27,1; 1,27,5): he had a position as prominent as that of Amyntas, Meleager and Polyperchon.  

Attalus' taxis appears at Arr. 4,22,1; 24,1; 24,10; 6, 17,3, and in this case, also, both the commander and the unit figure sufficiently prominently to indicate that it was a pezetairoi battalion. Attalus was the son of Andromenes and brother of Amyntas, and is mentioned along with Polyperchon, Gorgias and Meleager on an independent mission in Bactria in 328 B.C. (Arr. 4,16,1), and with Gorgias and Meleager when these are left on an island in the Hydaspes before the battle (Arr. 5,12,1). Further, he was in joint command of an independent mission against Ora in 327 B.C. (Arr. 4,27,5). It may confidently be accepted that the taxis of Attalus was one of pezetairoi.  

Gorgias' taxis appears only once, at Arr. 4,22,7, where it is mentioned as part of the advance expedition sent to bridge the Indus: the taxeis of Cleitus and Meleager appear alongside it. Although his taxis is mentioned only here, Gorgias, presumably with his taxis, figures on two other occasions in the company of pezetairoi battalion commanders:
at Arr. 4,16,1, he is mentioned in joint command with Polyperchon, Attalus and Meleager in Bactria in 328 B.C., and, at Arr. 5,12,1, he is left with Meleager and Attalus on an island in the middle of the Hydaspes. Finally, he is mentioned by Justin as one of the prominent Macedonians who accompanied Craterus and the veterans discharged from Opis in 324 B.C. (12,12,8). These indications of Gorgia's prominence seem sufficient to support the view that the taxis of Gorgia was one of pezetairoi.20

Cleitus' taxis appears at Arr. 4,22,7 and 5,12,2: on one occasion with the taxeis of Gorgias and Meleager on the expedition to bridge the Indus, and on the other occasion in the preliminaries to the battle of the Hydaspes, with the hypaspists and the taxis of Coenus. The contexts of these two usages imply strongly that Cleitus was in command of a pezetairoi battalion, and he is otherwise a very prominent man, being mentioned in command of a hipparchy at Arr. 5,22,6 and 6,6,4. Finally, he appears in Justin's list of the prominent Macedonians discharged from Opis (12,12,8). There seems good reason to think that Cleitus' taxis was one of pezetairoi.21

Peithon's taxis is stated explicitly to have been one of pezetairoi (Arr. 6,6,1) and so there need be no discussion of this one. Although this unit is not specified elsewhere, Peithon figures as commander of an independent mission both at Arr. 6,7,2 and 6,17,4, presumably having his taxis with him both times.22

The taxeis of Balacrus, Philip, Philotas and Antigones
come under suspicion because of the lack of prominence of the units and their commanders. The other pezetairoi commanders make their mark in the sources and clearly played a significant role in the campaigning over several years, but these men have no stature by comparison. I consider each man's career individually.

Balacrus' taxis appears at Arr. 4,24,10, where it is in company with Attalus' taxis under the command of Leonnatus during one of Alexander's engagements with the Indians.23 This taxis does not appear elsewhere. The only two men of any prominence bearing the name Balacrus, who appear in the sources, are the son of Nicanor (Berve II no.200) and the commander of the javelin-men (Berve II no.202). The former was left in Cilicia as satrap after the battle of Issus24 and did not rejoin the main army. The commander of the javelin-men, however, was a prominent officer with the main army, being mentioned at Gaugamela (Arr. 3,12,3), and in the raid against the Scythians (Arr. 4,4,6), and, probably, in a reconnaissance mission in India (Curt. 8,11,22). If it is not this Balacrus whose taxis is mentioned here, then another prominent officer of this name, unknown outside this passage, must be postulated. In fact there can be little doubt that it is the unit of javelin-men to which Arrian refers here as a taxis.25

In the same passage (Arr. 4,24,10), the taxis of Philip appears in the company of the hypaspists and the taxis of Philotas under the command of Ptolemy in the same engagement with Indians. There was, of course, a Philip, son of Amyntas,
who commanded a **pezetairoi taxis** at the battle of the Granicus, but he lost his command to Ptolemy, son of Seleucus, before the battle of Issus and that battalion was now under Polyperchon, son of Simmias (see above pp.96f.). According to Curtius (4,13,27), a Philip, son of Balacrus, had deputised for Amyntas at the battle of Gaugamela, but Amyntas had resumed his command after his return from Macedonia and, as I shall argue below, this battalion was under Attalus in 327 B.C. There is no case for identifying this Philip with either of these former **pezetairoi** commanders; it was a common name in Macedonia and Greece, and there is no commander of prominence with whom this Philip could be identified. Berve accepted that *this taxis* was another **pezetairoi** battalion, but Tarn argued that it was probably a light-armed unit, which balanced the javelin-men of Balacrus under Leonnatus. Whether Tarn is right about its being a light-armed troop or not (it may just as easily have consisted of mercenary hoplites), it seems hardly possible that it was a **pezetairoi** unit, for neither the unit nor the commander is known elsewhere.

In the same passage again another *taxis* appears, that of Philotas (Arr. 4,24,10). This unit was with the *taxis* of Philip and the hypaspists, all under Ptolemy. There has been substantial agreement that this *taxis* was one of **pezetairoi**, and this view finds support in the appearance of this *taxis* also at 3,29,7, where it is part of the force which Ptolemy led in pursuit of Bessus in 329 B.C. The version, however, which Ptolemy gives of his part in the
capture of the rival king has been called into question by Welles, who argues convincingly that the less dramatic account of Aristobulus is to be preferred: in his account, Bessus was surrendered by the followers of Spitamenes and Dataphernes (Arr. 4, 30, 5). If Aristobulus does have the more accurate version, no force was sent out after Bessus and the taxis of Philotas did not take part. Welles suggests that Ptolemy may have drawn details from some later mission he led, perhaps this one, or some minor engagement not worthy of being reported. In any case, the important point for us is that if the taxis of Philotas did not play a prominent role in the pursuit of Bessus, the only action it performed which was thought worthy of mention by the ancient sources is in this minor engagement with some Indians. Not only does the unit not appear elsewhere but neither does Philotas himself. Berve (II no. 803) sees a reference to this Philotas in Arr. 3, 18, 6: at the assault on the Persian Gates early in 330 B.C., Alexander sent Amyntas, Philotas and Coenus with the larger part of the army towards the River Araxes, while he led the assault force against the stronghold of the Gates. Berve argues that this Philotas commanded a pezetairoi battalion, pointing out that he is listed between two pezetairoi commanders. However, by far the most likely man of this name to hold a command in the company of Amyntas, son of Andromenes, and Coenus, son of Polemocrates, is Philotas, son of Parmenio. Tarn says that Philotas, son of Parmenio, could not have been casually mentioned between two 'phalanx leaders', as if of equal rank, but Tarn, I believe, greatly underestimates the
importance of Amyntas and Coenus. It must also be noticed that Alexander took less than half the Companion cavalry on the assault, and it therefore seems likely that the commander of the Companion cavalry went with the larger part of his cavalry. Someone must have been in command of the large part of the cavalry not with Alexander. If some concern is felt about the order in which the names are listed in Arrian, it should be noted that in Curtius' account of the episode (5,4,20-30), Philotas is explicitly made the most distinguished officer in command. It seems wrong to suppose that this prominent officer at the Persian Gates was any other than Philotas, son of Parmenio.

I would conclude, therefore, that the taxis of Philotas has no more claim to being accepted as pezetairoi than the taxeis of Balacrus and Philip, which also make their sole appearance in this passage. That three instances of the use of 'taxis' in reference to troops other than pezetairoi should occur in one passage is remarkable. It is also remarkable that a minor engagement should be covered in such detail, and this fact accounts for the specific mention of less important units which would not normally figure at all. The reason for the detail is doubtless that Ptolemy, as a leading actor, made the most of the episode, even to the extent of saying that the opponents were much the most warlike of those in the area. (Arr. 4,25,3). It may be, even, that Ptolemy made a deliberate attempt to mislead his readers into thinking that they were pezetairoi battalions.

The taxis of Antigones appears at Arrian 6,17,3, as one
of the units sent with Craterus through Arachosia and Drangiana in 325 B.C. (on the date see above Ch. III n. 63). It appears beside the tāxeis of Attalus and Meleager and at first sight may seem to consist of pezetairoi. It does not, however, appear at any other place, and there are no indications elsewhere that Antigenes held a rank equal to that of the commanders of pezetairoi battalions: he is never mentioned in command, or joint command, of an independent mission. At the battle of the Hydaspes he does appear between Seleucus and Tauron as joint commander of the infantry phalanx (Arr. 5, 16, 3), but the accounts of the battle are so confused that the significance of this evidence is not clear. According to Arrian 5, 13, 4, the only infantry which crossed the river with Alexander was the hypaspists, the archers, the Agrianes and the javelin-men: and he states that Seleucus had command of the 'royal hypaspists' (13, 4) and Tauron of the archers (14, 1). If this evidence is taken with that of 5, 16, 3, it follows that Antigenes is left with command of the Agrianes and javelin-men, as the 'royal hypaspists' are simply the hypaspists (see below p. 140f). However, it is clear that the details of the commanders of the phalanx at 5, 16, 3 come from a different source from those about Seleucus' command of the hypaspists and Tauron’s command of the archers at 5, 13, 4 and 14, 1. We are, therefore, not justified in using the passages closely together, and even if we do use them in this way, nothing about Antigenes' permanent command emerges, for if he did lead the Agrianes and javelin-men, it was only for the duration of the battle: for
the Agrianes and javelin-men did not form a permanent unit.

Tarn uses the evidence of Arrian's account of the battle to show that Antigenes did command a *pezetairoi* battalion, but his case is based upon a wrong interpretation. He assumes that the phalanx under Seleucus, Antigenes and Tauron at Arrian 5,16,3 actually contained five battalions of *pezetairoi*, and that it was these that Antigenes commanded. But there is no evidence that there were any *pezetairoi* in this phalanx, and it is fantastic that an otherwise insignificant officer should have had so high a command. Tarn feels obliged to apologise for this view, and suggests that Antigenes was the son of Coenus and that Alexander, seeing the father's qualities in the son, not only made him commander of his father's battalion but also, for the purpose of the battle, made him commander of all the *pezetairoi* in the line. His case is made even more outrageous by his having to assume that although Antigenes had taken over Coenus' battalion, it actually had retained Coenus' name.

There is, in fact, nothing to connect Antigenes with the *pezetairoi*, and the lack of prominence of the man and his unit make it most unlikely that he commanded a battalion of *pezetairoi*. It does seem likely, however, that Antigenes commanded Macedonians: this is indicated by the context of Arrian 6,17,3. All the troops which Arrian lists, with the exception of the archers, who were Iranian, were Macedonian and the unit of Antigenes was one of the Macedonian units which Alexander wished to spare the march through the desert of Gedrosia.
If Antigones' taxis did consist of Macedonians, it must have been hypaspist, and since the hypaspists were organised into chiliarchies at this stage,\(^{39}\) we must assume that the taxis of Antigones mentioned at Arr. 6,17,3 was a chiliarchy of hypaspists.\(^{40}\) That Arrian should use 'taxis' where he might more accurately have used 'chiliarchy' is no surprise\(^{41}\) and I find no difficulty in accepting that Alexander detached a part of the hypaspists to go with Craterus. I shall argue below that the command structure of the hypaspists was flexible enough at this time to allow for easy detachment of a part of the hypaspists, and Alexander no doubt judged that Craterus needed a force of hypaspists to make his force properly balanced (see also Appendix V p.428). The tactical importance of the role of the hypaspists in conjunction with archers, which also formed a part of Craterus' force, needs no emphasising (Arr. 5,23,7; 6,21,3 et passim.).

I suggest, therefore, that the taxeis of Balacrus, Philip, Philotas and Antigones were not pezetairoi units and I now leave them out of account. The men who commanded pezetairoi units in the years following the battle of Gaugamela are as follows: Amyntas, Perdiccas, Coenus, Polyperchon, Meleager, Craterus, Alcetas, Attalus, Gorgias, Cleitus and Peithon. In order to understand the way in which the pezetairoi units developed it is necessary to look more closely at the careers of these men in order, if possible, to fix the dates between which they held their commands. This will enable us to decide which battalions were new and which simply changed their commander. I begin with the commanders at the battle of
Polyperchon retained his command of his pezetairoi battalion until he was dismissed with Craterus and the veterans from Opis in 324 B.C. (Arr. 7,12,4; Just. 12,12,8). His taxis appears frequently in the sources (Arr. 4,22,1; Curt. 8,5,2; Arr. 4,25,6; 6,5,5) and his name, without his unit, appears at Curt. 5,4,20; Arr. 4,16,1; 5,11,3. There can be no doubt that he retained his command throughout the years 331 to 324 B.C. Meleager also retained his command through these years, and is still a prominent Macedonian infantry commander with the expeditionary force after Alexander's death (Curt. 10,6,20ff.). His taxis appears at Arr. 3,18,4; 4,17,3; 6,17,3, and his name without his unit at Curt. 7,6,19; Arr. 4,16,1; 5,12,1).

Polyperchon and Meleager certainly retained their commands throughout, two others, Amyntas and Coenus, certainly gave up their commands for they died during the course of the campaign. Amyntas resumed his command on his return from Macedonia (Arr. 3,23,2; 3,24,1; 3,25,6), but he died in the winter of 330/29 B.C. (Arr. 3,27,3). Coenus continued in his command up until his death in summer 326 B.C. (Arr. 6,2,1) and his taxis is very prominent throughout this period (Arr. 3,24,1; 3,25,6; 4,24,1; 4,25,6; 4,28,8; 5,12,2; 5,21,1).

It can hardly be coincidental that Attalus, the younger brother of Amyntas, appears as a battalion commander after Amyntas' death. The ties between battalion commander after the pezetairoi and it was no doubt good for morale if the brother of the former commander took over the
post. It has, therefore, been generally assumed that Attalus succeeded to Amyntas' command, for although his taxia is not mentioned until Arr. 4,22,1 (327 B.C.), he appears with other pezetairoi battalion commanders at 4,16,1 (328 B.C.), and there can be no doubt that he took over his brother's battalion on Amyntas' death in the winter of 330/29 B.C.

The other command which certainly fell vacant was that of Coenus. It is clearly preferable to assume that he was succeeded by one of those known to have commanded a pezetairoi battalion. Of these, only Peithon could have succeeded him because all the others are known to have held their posts before Coenus' death in the summer of 326 B.C., whereas Peithon appears in this role only at Arr. 6,6,1, shortly after Coenus' death. The identity of this Peithon is not settled. Berve gave him a separate entry (II no.623) from the 'body-guard', son of Crateuas (no.621), allowing for the possibility of identity, but pointing out that Arrian should have made the identification clear if they had been the same man. Tarn (II p.147), however, asserts quite definitely that they are the same man and, although Peithon is quite a common name, I think it likely that it was the son of Crateuas that took over Coenus' battalion. It seems unnecessary to assume that there were two prominent officers of this name in the campaign force in the last three years of Alexander's life.

Perdiccas and Craterus remained prominent throughout the campaigning, but their taxeis disappear from the sources during the later years of the Asian expedition. Perdiccas' taxis
is not mentioned again after Arr. 3,18,5 (early 330 B.C.) and Craterus' taxis, prominent down to 327 B.C. (Arr. 3,18,4; 3,23,2; 4,22,1), does not appear after early spring of that year. Scholars have found it impossible to believe that Perdiccas' battalion, if it continued under this name, could have escaped mention through the remaining seven years of the campaign. As Alcetas, the brother of Perdiccas, appears as a pezetairoi battalion commander after 327 B.C. (Arr. 4,22,1), there has been general agreement among scholars that Perdiccas gave up his command to his brother. This is surely right, but the precise date at which Alcetas took over cannot be fixed definitely, except within the limits of 330 and 327 B.C. Berve (II nos.627 and 45) suggested that Alcetas may have taken over when Perdiccas was promoted to the post of 'bodyguard' in 330 B.C. However, even if Perdiccas was given this honour in 330 B.C., and there is no good evidence that he held this post until the end of 328 B.C. (Arr. 4,21,4), he may well have continued to hold his command of the pezetairoi battalion. It seems not unlikely, in fact, that the change was part of the reorganisation which took place after the death of Cleitus in the autumn of 328 B.C.

The other commander at the battle of Gaugamela was Craterus. He certainly retained his command until 327 B.C.: the last mention of his taxis is at Arr. 4,22,1. Berve (II no.446) believed that there was evidence that Craterus continued to hold this post: at 4,23,5 Arrian records that Alexander left Craterus on a separate mission ἐὰν τοῖς ἄλλοις ἀγέρμοσε τῶν πέζων ....... This cannot, however, be used
with any confidence to support the view that Craterus continued to be a pezetairoi battalion commander. The word ἀλλος here may simply mean 'also': or Arrian may be using the word merely to differentiate between those infantry units Alexander was taking with him against the Aspasians - that is, the hypaspists, the archers, the Agrianes and the taxeis of Coenus and Attalus (4,24,1) - and those he was leaving behind with Craterus. Berve is not certain whether he retained his battalion command after this time (early summer 327 B.C.) or not, but Schachermeyr asserts that Craterus did retain his infantry command until 324 B.C. (Al.d.Gr ♦ 358). He explains that the taxis of Craterus does not appear in Arrian after early 327 B.C. because Arrian knew he was in command of a hipparchy and could not accept that the same commander could also hold an infantry command. This argument depends upon crediting Arrian with much greater sensitivity than he actually possessed. There is, in fact, no indication that Craterus was a pezetairoi commander after early 327 B.C.

While the fact that his taxis is not mentioned is not conclusive proof that he lost his command (Gorgias' taxis appears only once (Arr. 4,22,7) ), one would expect Craterus' battalion to be more prominent than Gorgias' because Craterus was a much more important officer. The omission of any mention of the battalion is particularly striking in two passages of Arrian (5,11,3 and 6,17,3), where other taxeis put under Craterus' command are specified, but there is no reference to his own. It would certainly be expected that in these contexts it would have received mention if it had
existed. It is also worth noting that if Perdiccas gave up his command (and there is general agreement on this), there is some reason to suppose that Craterus, who held a similar rank in the army and the Macedonian aristocracy, also gave up his, and at about the same time. The indications are that Craterus gave up his infantry command sometime after the campaign he led in the early months of 327 B.C., but before the summer of the following year, when the absence of his battalion from accounts of the battle on the Hydaspes is significant.

Tarn (II p.145) believed that Gorgias succeeded to Craterus' command, but there are insuperable obstacles to this belief. Gorgias appears in the role of pezetairoi commander in 328 B.C. (Arr. 4,16,1) while Craterus' taxis is mentioned by Arrian in early 327 B.C. (4,22,1). Tarn explained that the taxis continued to be known by the name of Craterus 'for a time', even after he had ceased to be its commander. Obviously this explanation is not satisfactory, and if we do accept, as seems most reasonable, that one of the battalion commanders known to us succeeded to Craterus' position, it follows that the only possible successor is Cleitus. His taxis appears for the first time at Arr. 4,22,7, at the very start of the Indian campaign, in the early summer of 327 B.C.: thus the change would have been made on the eve of the Indian campaign after Craterus had returned from the campaign against Austanes and Catanes (Arr. 4,22,1), in the spring of 327 B.C. Nothing is known of Cleitus' background
or qualifications, but from this time he appears frequently and prominently both during and after Alexander's lifetime (Berve II no. 428 and see above, Ch. III pp. 81 ff.).

It thus appears likely that all the new commanders except Gorgias succeeded to the commands of battalions already in existence at the battle of Gaugamela. Alcetas succeeded to the command of his brother Perdikkas, probably in the winter of 328/7 B.C., and Attalus to the command of his brother Amyntas in the winter of 330/29 B.C. Cleitus succeeded to the battalion of Craterus in the spring of 327 B.C. and, finally, Peithon took over from Coenus on the latter's death in summer 326 B.C. Of the other battalions at the battle of Gaugamela, both remained under their commanders, Polyperchon and Meleager.

Only one battalion was added by Alexander, therefore, during the course of the campaigning, namely that of Gorgias. He appears in his role as pezetairoi commander in 328 B.C., when he is left in Bactria with other pezetairoi commanders to keep order (Arr. 4, 16, 1). However, because he does not appear until 328 B.C., it does not necessarily follow that the battalion was not added until this time. Our sources for the years 331 to 328 B.C. give a far from full coverage and it would not be at all surprising if this battalion was with the main army during all or part of this time and by some chance escaped notice.

Despite Berve's argument (see below) that new battalions were formed by taking parts of existing battalions and joining them to mercenary and Iranian troops, I believe that
it is most probable that the new battalion was recruited on the same basis as the others had been, i.e. that it was drawn from a recruiting district of Macedonia. I shall argue this point more fully below p.119, but, anticipating the conclusion, I would suggest that there is a strong probability that the new battalion was created when the only Macedonian reinforcements attested after the battle of Gaugamela arrived, that is, at the end of 331 B.C. There is perhaps some support for this view in Curtius. Immediately after the death of Philotas in autumn 330 B.C. Amyntas is brought before the army to answer charges against him: in his defence, Amyntas claims that he has been undeservedly maligned by Olympias, because he took some of her favourites during his recruiting mission of 332/1 B.C. He points to men serving Alexander well thanks to his efforts, Gorgias, Hecataeus and Gorgatas (7,1,33). Beloch (p.329) sees this Gorgias as the pezetairoi commander and cites Curtius' passage as evidence that Gorgias and his battalion arrived in 331 B.C. with the reinforcements that came with Amyntas. Berve (II nos.233 and 234) argued that this identification is not acceptable because Gorgias, the battalion commander, was a mature man, while Curtius implies that the Gorgias in his passage is a young shirker. Berve's argument, however, is not conclusive. Curtius would not have hesitated to use the name of any prominent person among the reinforcements of 331 B.C. in order to build up Amyntas' argument. I believe that some credence should be given to Beloch's identification.

For Tarn (II p.144) there was conclusive proof that no
new battalions were added when the reinforcements arrived in 331 B.C. This proof lay in Arrian's failure to mention it at 3.16.10, which records only that Alexander integrated the cavalry reinforcements into the Companions and added the infantry \textit{tau\i\s \tau\'\acute{e}se\i\tau\i\s \\'\alpha\llas}, arranging them according to tribes (for the full text, see above Ch.III n.13). Tarn interpreted this to mean that Alexander distributed all the infantry reinforcements among 'the existing battalions', and that Arrian's wording rules out the possibility that any new battalion was formed. Milns, however, has the opposite opinion (\textit{GRBS} 7 p.160). He points out that Arrian says nothing of the 'existing battalions' and translates 'he added the infantry to the other battalions, each man according to nationality'. He concludes that 'the emphatic position of the words \textit{tau\i\s \\'\alpha\llas} strongly implies that there was a battalion, or battalions, over and above the ones to which additions were made'. Milns is certainly right that Arrian's text contains no implicit or explicit reference to existing battalions only being involved in the reinforcement. He himself, however, reads far too much into the text in seeing a strong implication that a new battalion, or battalions, was added. The word order is hardly enough to support the interpretation of Arrian's text to the effect that some of the reinforcements formed a new battalion, or battalions, and the rest were distributed among the other battalions. The words \textit{tau\i\s \\'\alpha\llas} surely do no more than look forward to the next phrase concerning the system of distribution: it has the meaning of 'individual' (see above, Ch.III n.13).
There is nothing in the text to indicate that new battalions were added, but this has no more significance than that Arrian did not record that the number of battalions was increased. It is quite wrong to do as Tarn did and count the omission in Arrian as proof that no additional battalion was formed at the end of 331 B.C. Arrian's failure to mention such an addition carries no weight in the face of the very strong probability that the seventh battalion was added when reinforcements from Macedonia arrived. The only Macedonian reinforcement which is recorded in the sources is that of December 331 B.C. Many scholars have admitted that the seventh battalion could have been added only when fresh Macedonian troops arrived, but they have preferred to assume that reinforcements arrived at a later time and have escaped mention in the sources. This procedure is not sound, as I shall try to show below (pp. 131 ff.). I would conclude, therefore, that among the reinforcements which Amyntas brought out from Macedonia at the end of 331 B.C. was a newly formed territorial battalion of *pezetairoi*, of which the commander was Gorgias. The background of Gorgias and the recruiting district of the battalion are unknown.

There is no indication that the size and number of the *pezetairoi* battalions changed before the return from India, but it may be that when Alexander selected Macedonians whom he considered past service and sent them with Craterus through Arachosia and Drangiana in 325 B.C. (Arr. 6.17.3), some reduction took place. I have suggested above (Ch. III pp. 91 ff.) that the number of hipparchies of Companion cavalry may have
been reduced from six to four at this time. Although Arrian does not specify that Macedonian infantry as well as cavalry past service were selected, it seems reasonable to assume that there were infantry among 'the other Macedonians' whom Alexander designated for discharge.\textsuperscript{54} There is, however, no indication of the number of \textit{pezetairoi} battalions in the last years of Alexander's reign and it is impossible to know whether the number was reduced at this time. Perhaps Alexander did not interfere with the traditional territorial divisions and left the number at seven. It is certain, at least, that the battalions of Meleager and Attalus continued (Arr. 6,17,3).

In the early summer of 330 B.C. Alexander left Parmenio in the centre of the Persian Empire while he continued eastwards (Arr. 3,19,7). Parmenio had held overall command of the heavy infantry and his removal from the main army meant increased responsibility for the battalion commanders.\textsuperscript{55} The nature of the warfare in the years following Gaugamela made it essential that the \textit{pezetairoi} battalion commanders should take on more responsibility. Apart from the 6,000 detached to guard the treasury in 330 B.C., who were under Parmenio's command (Arr. 3,19,7), Craterus and Amyntas were detached to guard Parthiene (Curt. 6,4,2; Arr. 3,23,2), and Craterus again, to reduce a pocket of resistance among the Arii (Curt. 6,6,25) and later to take Cyropolis (Arr. 4,2,1; Curt. 7,6,17). Perdiccas and Meleager went against the Memaceni (Curt. 7,6,19) and Craterus was left with most of the phalanx while Alexander pursued Spitamenes (Arr. 4,6; 3; Curt. 7,9,20). In 328 B.C. Polyperchon, Attalus, Gorgias and Meleager were left in Bactria
to keep order (Arr. 4,16,1) and Coenus was sent off towards the Scythians (Arr. 4,16,3). Then Craterus went on a separate mission against the Massagetae (Arr. 4,17,1) and Coenus and Meleager were left in Sogdiana (Arr. 4,17,3). Although it is not always specified that these commanders took their taxeis with them, there seems no doubt that they did. It is clear that in the years following 331 B.C. the pezetairoi battalions were truly independent strategic units and there was no place for an overall commander.

Schachermeyr expressed the opinion that there was a far reaching reform in early 327 B.C. in which Alexander reorganised the army into small task forces comprised of a hipparchy of Companion cavalry and a pezetairoi battalion or hypaspist unit and containing the different types of troop necessary for totally independent action. There is, however, no evidence to support this view and although in practice the same units tended to join together for independent missions, I doubt whether it was a formal arrangement. In any case, there is no marked difference in the operations before and after spring of 327 B.C. which could suggest a far reaching reform such as Schachermeyr proposed. The fact that Coenus and Cleitus commanded both hipparchies of Companion cavalry and battalions of pezetairoi infantry does not seem to support Schachermeyr's case: neither Coenus nor Cleitus are particularly prominent as leaders of independent missions. The double offices of these two men may indicate no more than that Alexander was short of good officers whom he could trust (see also Ch.III p.82 ).
Internal Organisation

At the same time as the reinforcements were integrated and the seventh battalion added, there was a general reorganisation of the army. The reform of the Companion cavalry has already been dealt with (Ch.III pp.60f.), but the infantry also was reformed in a parallel reorganisation. Diodorus (17,65,2f.) makes a general statement about the commanders of the army being strengthened in number and quality, but makes no specific statement about the infantry units (Ch.III p.60).

Curtius (5,2,3ff.) has a more detailed description of a specific reform of the infantry. He records that while resting the army in Sittacene, to prevent the soldiers from becoming slack because of the leisure, Alexander appointed judges and put up prizes for those competing in a contest of military valour: 'those who should have been judged the bravest were each to command a body of 1,000 men - they called them chillarchies - this being the first time that the forces were divided into that number; for previously there had been lochoi consisting of 500 men, and the prizes of command had not gone to bravery. A great throng of soldiers had assembled to take part in this illustrious contest, both to act as witnesses of the deeds of each entrant, and to give their opinion as to the judges; for they could not fail to know whether honour was paid to each man justly or falsely. First of all the prize for valour was awarded to old Atarrhias, who before Halicarnassus, when the battle was abandoned by the younger men, had been chiefly instrumental in arousing them
to action, Antigenes was judged to be next to him, Philotas of Augaea gained third place, the fourth was assigned to Amyntas, and after these came Antigonus and next Lyncestes Amyntas, Theodotus gained seventh place, and Hellanicus the last.58

Diodorus' evidence on its own tells us very little. It is clear that Alexander increased the number of officers in the army and appointed more high-ranking commanders: also, some emphasis was placed upon promotion on merit. But specific details are lacking. Curtius' evidence can perhaps tell us more, but there are difficulties in his account. It is an odd procedure for Alexander to have held a competition in military valour in order to keep the soldiers on their mettle and to have awarded as prizes chiliarchies, which were high-ranking officer positions. Both Berve and Milns have been unable to accept that this is what Alexander actually did.59 He would surely have wanted personal control over the promotion of officers and would not have handed the task over to a board of judges, under the supervision of the common soldiers. Berve thinks that Curtius really means pentacosiarcs, not chiliarchies, and accepts that Alexander appointed pentacosiarcs in this way, but, as Milns points out, there is no justification for this interpretation.60

It seems so out of character for Alexander to have allowed others to appoint his officers, that I cannot accept Curtius' evidence as it stands. Diodorus' evidence, for what it is worth, indicates that Alexander made his own study of the records, and there is an added difficulty. The number of
victors rewarded with the office of chiliarch is given at eight. I shall argue below that the whole Macedonian heavy infantry was involved in the reform, not just the hypaspists, as Berve and Milns believe, and there were many more than eight chiliarchies of these. If it is accepted that only the hypaspists were involved the number is too great.

Milns seems to have the correct explanation of the difficulty of Curtius' passage. He suggests that Curtius, or his source, has conflated two separate incidents which occurred in Sittacene, and that the awarding of prizes to men of outstanding service should be seen as being quite distinct from the reorganisation of the infantry. There is no reason to reject that a competition was held, in which brave conduct was measured by a board of judges under the eye of the men: as Milns points out, it would have been good for morale. The competition was not, of course, an open one, but seems to have been restricted to officers below the top rank. The winner Atarrhias (Berve II no.178) seems to have been an officer of the hypaspists: in the following year (330 B.C.) he led 300 armed men, certainly hypaspists, to make the arrest of Philotas (Curt. 6,8,19.22). The runner up, Antigenes, may also have been an hypaspist officer, if he is to be identified with the officer of that name discussed above (pp.107 ff ). Berve, however, suggests that the Antigenes of this passage is of lower rank, but he presents no compelling reason for this. Philotas Augaeus (who came third) and Hellanicus (eighth) have been plausibly identified by Berve (II nos.807; 298) with the officers who led the defence of some siege
machinery at Halicarnassus (Arr. 1,21,5). It should be noted in this connection that Atarrhias received his prize for bravery at the siege of Halicarnassus. Theodotus (Berve no.361) and Antigonus (the latter cannot be the 'One eyed' (Berve II no.87) ) do not appear elsewhere in the sources, and the two men bearing the name of Amyntas cannot certainly be identified with any of the others of that name, all of whom seem too high ranking in the Macedonian aristocracy.

Although all the winners cannot be certainly identified, it seems likely that this contest was held among the lower ranking officers of the infantry, with rewards for those judged to have given proof of outstanding bravery during the early years of the campaigning. The prize-giving may be compared with part of the celebrations held by Alexander at the end of the Indian campaign, when prizes were given to more prominent officers for outstanding conduct (Arr. 7,5,4).

Just as there is every likelihood that there was a prize-giving in Sittacene, more or less of the character described by Curtius, so there is every probability that there was an infantry reorganisation along the lines described. Diodorus states that Alexander appointed more high ranking officers, which is also the implication of Curtius' evidence, and it is known that chiliarchies became a division of at least the hypaspists.

Berve, and he is followed by Milns, was of the opinion that the reorganisation described by Curtius affected only the hypaspists. Berve gave no arguments in favour of this view but was, no doubt, led to this belief by the appearance
of chiliarchies of hypaspists in the later years of the campaign (Arr. 3,29,7; 4,30,5; 5,23,7). Milns argues that it cannot refer to the \textit{pezetairoi} because no change in the size of the \textit{pezetairoi} battalions is attested.\textsuperscript{64} The hypaspists, however, formed only a small part of the whole Macedonian infantry body and the natural interpretation of Curtius' evidence is that all the infantry was involved. In addition, the evidence of Diodorus indicates that some quite far reaching reorganisation of the command system was carried through, not that only a small part of the infantry was reorganised. I can see no reason to modify the meaning of Curtius' passage in the way Berve and Milns suggest. The fact that there were chiliarchies of hypaspists is no indication that there were not also chiliarchies of \textit{pezetairoi}.\textsuperscript{65} An argument from silence can carry no weight as we know hardly anything of the size and subdivisions of the \textit{pezetairoi} battalions. Curtius does not say that the chiliarchies replaced the territorial battalions as the basic strategic unit.

I would, therefore, interpret Curtius' evidence to mean that the reorganisation involved the \textit{pezetairoi} battalions, as well as the hypaspists (on the hypaspists, see below pp. \textit{146f.}). Until this time (late 331 B.C.) each battalion (1,500 strong, see Ch.II p.\textit{48}) had consisted of divisions of 500 men, as Curtius states (see also above, p.\textit{122}), but after this time it contained two chiliarchies, each chiliarchy being divided into two subdivisions (see further below p.\textit{130f.}). The effect of this change would have been to make the battalions more flexible and the officer strength
better. It would also have made the battalions more flexible, allowing for the easier subdivision of them. The new positions of chiliarch were probably filled by Alexander in the way indicated by Diodorus, on the basis of the past record of the men (see also on the cavalry reform, Ch.III pp.62f).

We must here notice Milns' 'tentative' reconstruction of the divisions of the pezetairoi battalions. Basing his ideas upon what is known of the organisation of the phalanx of Philip V, Milns suggests that in 331 B.C. the taxis, which, he believes, had a paper strength of 1,500, was divided into three pentacosarchies of 500: each pentacosarchy was divided into two lochoi of 250 men; each lochos contained two tetrarchies of 125 men; each tetrarchy consisted of eight decades of 16 men. There is, however, little supporting evidence for this reconstruction. Curtius' evidence, as I have argued, may be taken as indicating that the taxis was divided into chiliarchies and each of these was divided into two sections of about 500. There is, however, nothing to indicate that these sections were called 'pentacosarchies': Curtius says nothing about such a term being introduced, and I would think it unlikely that Alexander had pentacosarchies from the beginning of the Asian campaign. Terms drawn from numerical strength were not usual for the larger infantry divisions among the Greeks. 'Lochos' was the usual word for the largest subdivision of a battalion, and since it is established that there were lochoi of infantry in Alexander's army, it seems likely that these divisions of 500 were, in
fact, called 'lochoi'. Rolfe assumes this in his translation given above (p. 122). 'Lochos' continued to be a term applied to a subdivision of infantry at least until the reforms of 324 B.C., when the terms 'pentacosistry' and 'hecatostys' were introduced.

As for the smaller sections, it is not sound to work from parallels from the army of Philip V. His phalanx was certainly based upon a file depth of sixteen men, each file being called a 'lochos'. It is by no means certain that Alexander's phalanx was similarly structured. It is agreed that the original Macedonian file depth was ten, but Domaszewski suggested that in Alexander the Great's time it was sixteen men. He argued this on the basis of Arrian's description of the decas of four Macedonian heavy infantry and twelve Persian archers and javelin-men, formed by Alexander at the end of his life. However, the mixed decas of Macedonian heavy infantry and Iranian light infantry can hardly be seen as a typical phalangite file, and there can be no certainty that a file depth of sixteen men was basic for the regular phalanx. Callisthenes (Polyb. 12,19,6) says that Alexander marched to Issus in a column with files eight men deep, and Arrian (1,6,1), in describing a formation which Alexander adopted in the Danube campaign, says that the depth was one hundred and twenty men. It could be, therefore, that the sections were based on the number eight. It does not, however, seem safe to make any confident judgment: it may be that the phalanx under Alexander the Great was not so rigid as it later became.
If the file depth under Alexander the Great was not sixteen (certainly it was not called a 'lochos'), then it is not justifiable to use the structure of the phalanx under Philip V to help reconstruct the groupings of files. Under Philip V eight decades formed a tetrarchy, but there is only one very doubtful piece of evidence that tetrarchies existed in the Macedonian army of the fourth century B.C. A monument found at Thermopylae bears the inscription 'the work of the tetrarchy of Philip': it has been dated to the middle of the fourth century B.C. As Dittberner points out, Philip II was active in this area at this time, and this tetrarchy could have consisted of Macedonians. On the other hand, there is nothing to connect the inscription with the Macedonians and it cannot be used to prove that 'tetrarchy' was a term in use in the Macedonian army of Philip II. The question of the existence of infantry tetrarchies under Alexander the Great must be left open.

Finally, the term 'speira' under Philip V referred to a company of 256 men, that is sixteen files. It is generally agreed that the word was not in use under Alexander the Great, but Milns suggests that it took over the meaning of 'lochos' after Alexander's death, when 'lochos' came to be referred to the single file of the phalanx. There is, however, no evidence that what was a 'speira' under Philip V was a 'lochos' under Alexander the Great, and it seems best simply to admit that we do not know the organisation and terminology of the smaller divisions of the phalanx.
(c) Reinforcements and Losses

The strength of the pezetairoi at the time of the crossing to Asia in 334 B.C. was 9,000 (see Ch.II p.47). A reinforcement of 3,000 Macedonian infantry reached Alexander in the following year at Gordium (Arr. 1,29,4), the majority of which must have gone into the pezetairoi. Losses through garrisoning and casualties must be taken into account but these were probably not very high. Milns has reckoned that losses down to the battle of Gaugamela may have reduced the main force by 3,000, but this figure seems disproportionally high. Tarn and Marsden are inclined to think that losses were not great, and Marsden points out that Alexander seems to have regrouped his garrison troops for the battle of Gaugamela.

On the whole, I think it unlikely that many more than 1,500 Macedonian heavy infantry were lost to Alexander in the four years to the battle of Gaugamela, so perhaps about 10,500 heavy infantry of the pezetairoi lined up at Gaugamela.

In the battle the pezetairoi do not seem to have suffered greatly although a gap was opened in the line (Arr. 3,14,4): perhaps something under 200 would be a reasonable estimate of losses. A garrison of 700 Macedonians was left in the citadel at Babylon (Curt. 5,1,43): although 2,000 other forces were also left there, it is unlikely that they were Macedonian. Therefore, not more than about 1,000 pezetairoi were lost between the battle of Gaugamela and the arrival of the reinforcements in December 331 B.C., so when the 6,000 reinforcements arrived (Diod. 17,65,1; Arr. 3,16,10; Curt. 5,1,40; see above p.117f.), even allowing for substantial
reinforcement of the hypaspists (see below pp.150f.), rather more than 14,000 pezetairoi were with the main army. Each battalion would, therefore, have numbered over 2,000. This increase in size from about 1,500 to 2,000 would seem to support my view that the battalions were reorganised into chiliarchies.

Milns argued that the paper strength of the battalions remained at 1,500 and that all the battalions were overstrength in anticipation of losses to garrison duty. Alexander did leave a strong garrison of Macedonians in Susa to guard the treasure, 1,000 men (Curt. 5,2,17), but this would not have reduced the size of the seven battalions by more than 150 apiece. He points also to the garrison of 3,000 left at Persepolis (Curt. 5,6,11), but in this Milns is mistaken. As Alexander had left Persepolis in ruins he would hardly have spared 3,000 crack troops on these: these 3,000 men were only a temporary garrison, until the treasure could be moved to Susa. There is no evidence that Alexander left large garrisons of Macedonians anywhere except in Babylon and Susa. The 6,000 left at Ecbatana (Arr. 3,19,7) later rejoined Alexander (Curt. 7,3,4).

No Macedonian heavy infantry reinforcements are recorded in the years following 331 B.C. until the return from India. Even if the heavy infantry had a light combat role in these years, losses through age and sickness over seven years of continuous campaigning in rough country must have been heavy: the few details which we have indicate this. Alexander sent home Macedonian veterans (Arr. 3,29,5; Curt. 7,5,27), or put them into settlements (Arr. 4,4,1; 4,22,5;
It is impossible to estimate accurately the numbers lost, but any proportion under one quarter of the total may be too low. The pezetairoi must, therefore, have been reinforced during this time. Berve (I p.118) suggested that the pezetairoi battalions were reinforced from Greek mercenaries and conquered subjects of the Persian Empire, these reinforcements being brigaded with the lochoi of pezetairoi, though not actually taken into those lochoi. Tarn suggested that Macedonian reinforcements reached Alexander in Bactra in 327 B.C. and he has been followed by Brunt. Schachermeyr argues for a view that Greek mercenaries were the source of reinforcement for the pezetairoi.

Tarn's case has been attacked by Milns, who has shown that it rests on no sound base. The relevant evidence is contained in Arrian (4,18,3), where it is stated that Alexander sent Sopolis, Epocillus and Menidas 'to Macedonia' to bring to him the forces 'from Macedonia'. Tarn argues that they actually met the army 'at no great distance' from Alexander's camp and that the reinforcements reached Alexander in the spring of 327 B.C. Tarn explains that the reference to the three leaders going 'to Macedonia' is due to an error caused by the appearance of 'from Macedonia' a few words later. His case is plainly unsatisfactory and we may conclude that there is no evidence that any Macedonian reinforcements arrived with Alexander until after Alexander's return from India.

It appears unlikely, however, that natives of the
Persian Empire were drafted into the pezetairoi. I argue elsewhere (Appendix IV pp. 400f.) against Berve's view that the hipparchies of Companion cavalry were units containing diverse types of cavalry and the same arguments apply in the case of the pezetairoi battalions. There is no hint in the sources that these units were not homogeneous and there are sufficient indications that they consisted entirely of pezetairoi (Arr. 4,23,1; 5,23,6; 6,6,1; 6,21,3). The Iranians were accepted into the Companion cavalry from 328/7 B.C. (Ch.III p.86 and Appendix IV pp.403f.), but the pezetairoi were a much more conservative body than the cavalry and seem to have led the complaints at the inclusion of the Iranians in the cavalry (Arr. 7,8,2) (Appendix IV pp.397f.). (The pezetairoi kept their territorial distinctions and their local nationalism, while the Companion cavalry lost both of these.) This apart, and perhaps more important for Alexander, the heavy infantry of the Persian Empire was generally of poor quality: none is known to have served under Alexander until the very end of the reign (Ch.V pp.188f.). It is, therefore, most unlikely that any were made part of the pezetairoi battalions.

The only source of reinforcement remaining is that of the Greek mercenaries. Tarn argued that no Greek mercenaries can have served within the pezetairoi battalions because Alexander had used so many for garrisons and settlements, and the few left to him served separately in India. This line of argument, however, can hardly present any obstacle to the belief that some Greek mercenaries were brought into the
pezetairoi battalions. Only a few, hardly more than 3,000 to 4,000, need have been involved, and the fact that some mercenaries served outside the pezetairoi battalions is no indication that some were not taken for service within the battalions. Tarn uses the same argument to prove that Orientals did not serve within the Companion cavalry. Certainly Tarn underestimates the numbers of Greek mercenaries available to the master of the Mediterranean world, and there is some evidence that Alexander drew heavily on mercenaries both for service with the satraps (for instance, Curt. 5,1,43; Diod. 17,106,3) and with the main campaign force. Mercenary forces are known to have joined the campaign army regularly: in 331 B.C. (Arr. 3,16,10; Diod. 17,65,1; Curt. 5,1,40), in 330 B.C. (Curt. 5,7,12) and again (Arr. 3,23,8f.; Diod. 17,76,2; Curt. 6,5,10) and in Areia (Curt. 6,6,35). In 329/8 B.C. a large reinforcement came to Bactria (Curt. 7,10,11f.) and in 326 B.C. more arrived (Curt. 9,3,21; Diod. 17,95,4). Although many of these, doubtless, did not serve with the main force, it is difficult to believe that Alexander did not keep with him a substantial force of Greek mercenaries. 94

Milns would reject the view that Greek mercenaries were added to the pezetairoi because 'The phalanx retained its purely national character till the end of Alexander's reign'. 95 It is certainly true that the battalions of the pezetairoi retained their national character in that they opposed any coalition with the people they had conquered and were hostile to Alexander's medising. There is no evidence, however, that they felt similar hostility to the Greek mercenaries: for
Greek mercenaries had served alongside Macedonians for a quarter of a century, ever since Philip had begun to make extensive use of them. Griffith has pointed out that the Macedonians and the Greek mercenaries were usually on good terms during the campaign of Alexander.96

It is also important to note that the distinctions between Macedonians and Greeks was being broken down by the policy of the Argead kings. The conscious hellenising and encouragement of Greek immigration was taken a step further by Philip when he reorganised the kingdom to effect the full integration of the resident Greeks (Ch.II pp. 40f.). If Alexander did recruit pezetairoi from the Greek mercenaries, he merely continued the policy of his father, who brought many Greeks into the service of his army when he established the new recruiting areas. Any argument based upon the national character of the Macedonians can carry little weight, for the character of the pezetairoi was already a mixed one, of Greeks and Macedonians.

There seems to be good reason for thinking, therefore, that it was from the mercenary Greeks that Alexander drew reinforcements for the pezetairoi. This was in line with the established policy of the Argead kings and the absence of any reference to reinforcements of Macedonians seems to make it certain that the pezetairoi battalions were kept up to strength in this way. The procedure involved in the change of status of the mercenary cannot be known, but it was regarded as an upgrading of status. He may have been given a grant of land or simply of money, and the conditions of
service in terms of monetary reward and retirement benefit were, no doubt, better for the pezetairoi than for the mercenaries.

The date at which Alexander began to draw reinforcements for the pezetairoi from Greek mercenaries cannot be fixed, but he may have decided upon this policy as early as 330 B.C. Schachermeyr suggests that Alexander may have been following a deliberate policy of building up an 'Imperial Army' of Macedonians and Greeks, but perhaps it is enough to explain Alexander's decision by reference to the practical convenience. It is possible, as Berve suggested, that he was hoping to weaken opposition to his policies by not increasing the number of Macedonians from home. The mercenaries would feel fewer ties with home and would be more amenable to Alexander's will than those fresh from Macedonia. At the same time, it was clearly important for Alexander not to destroy the Macedonian nature of the expedition and of his kingship.

There is no evidence concerning the strength of the pezetairoi in the years following 331 B.C. I have suggested that at the time of the reinforcement in December 331 B.C. the total was rather more than 14,000. A garrison of 1,000 was left at Susa (Curt. 5,2,17) and losses of 3,000 to 4,000 must be allowed for through the years of campaigning on the Iranian plateau and in India. The numbers were, however, probably made up from the Greek mercenaries. In mid 325 B.C. Alexander selected some as veterans for discharge, and sent them with Craterus through Arachosia and Drangiana (Arr. 6,17,3). I have suggested above (p.92) that the places of the
cavalry veterans whom Alexander selected at this time were not filled, and it is probable that the same is true of the infantry.

The number of _pezetairoi_ who were designated for discharge at this time cannot be known. Arrian does not even specify that any _pezetairoi_ infantry were marked out, he refers only to Companion cavalry 'and those of the other Macedonians whom he had already decided to send to Macedonia as being past service'. There can, however, be little doubt that _pezetairoi_ infantry formed the majority of these 'other Macedonians'. 10,000 Macedonian infantry were discharged from Opis in 324 B.C. (Diod. 18,16,4) but some of these will have been taken from the hypaspists, others from garrisons left in the centre of the empire, and many will have stayed with Alexander during the march through Gedrosia. Any estimate of the number designated for discharge and sent with Craterus in 325 B.C. can only be conjectural, but surely the large majority of the _pezetairoi_ remained with Alexander at this time and I think it unlikely that more than 2,000, in addition to the battalions of Attalus and Meleager, went with Craterus (see also Appendix V p.426). This would have reduced the size of the battalions with Alexander to a little over 1,500 apiece.99

In Carmania at the end of 325 B.C. infantry reinforcements of Macedonians reached him, brought by the generals from Media (Arr. 6,27,6 and see below Ch.V pp.154f.). As with the cavalry reinforcements which came to him at this time, these troops were not integrated with the Indian campaign
army, because much of this army was soon to be demobilised (see Ch. III n. 65).

(d) Conclusion

The character and organisation of the *pezetairoi* remained remarkably unchanged during the whole of the Asian expedition to 324 B.C. The battalions were increased in size in 331 B.C. and a battalion added to the existing six, but the territorial divisions continued to be fundamental. In the years following 330 B.C. they were reinforced by men selected from the Greek mercenary bodies, but these were absorbed by the Macedonians and there is no noticeable change in attitudes among the body of the *pezetairoi*. The conservative nature of the *pezetairoi* can also be seen in the length of time the commanders of the battalions held their posts.

There was a general trend towards the lessening in importance of their position in the army from 330 B.C. During the first four years of the campaigning, when Alexander was faced by strong forces of Greek mercenary heavy infantry and the general pattern of fighting called for a major contribution from the Macedonian phalangite forces, the *pezetairoi* played a most important role: the highest post in the army was the command of the phalangite troops, held by Alexander's second-in-command, Parmenio. During the fighting in Iran and India, however, the nature of the fighting changed: the enemy was more elusive and there was less scope for close order fighting. The *pezetairoi* were used more for policing and never lined up together for a major battle. Even at the
Hydaspes the battalions were dispersed (despite Tarn's disbelief of the sources, II pp.190f.), and did not play their traditional role. Light infantry and cavalry were the more important arms, for they were more mobile and, therefore, more suited to the new style of warfare.

One of the results of this was a decline in status for the *pezetairoi* commanders, to the advantage of the commanders of the Companion cavalry. The top officers in the early years of the expedition had been the infantry commanders and these positions had been held by the leading nobles in the army; e.g., Craterus, Perdiccas, Coenus, Amyntas, Polyperchon. In 328/7 B.C., on the eve of the Indian campaign, Craterus, Perdiccas and Coenus were made commanders of hipparchies of Companion cavalry, and along with Hephaestion, also a commander of a hipparchy of Companions, they became the chief strategic commanders of the army, the chief officers of Alexander (Ch.III pp. 80f.). There was also a political aspect to this development. The *pezetairoi* retained their narrowly Macedonian attitudes and were less sympathetic to Alexander's favouring of Iranians than the Companion cavalry, who had shown themselves willing to receive Iranians into their ranks. Apart from this, cavalry officers formed the leading group of officers and administrators in the system of the Achaemenid empire, which Alexander was in part adopting (see Ch.V pp. 193f.).
a) To the Reform of 331 B.C.

There is as great a controversy over the organisation of the hypaspists as over that of the pezetairoi. The three main theories which need attention are those of Berve, Tarn and Milns.

Berve's theory proposes that the hypaspists consisted of two distinguishable parts, the 'royal hypaspists' or 'life-guard', and the hypaspist combat force, within which was an elite, the agema. The strength of the 'royal hypaspists' is unknown, but the hypaspist combat-force numbered 3,000 plus 500 in the agema. Tarn asserted that there was only one body of hypaspists, 3,000 strong, of which 1,000 were the agema; there were no hypaspist lifeguards. Milns, most recently, has suggested that the hypaspists consisted of 3,000 hypaspists only, as Tarn, but that only 500 of these were in the agema.

Berve based his case for the existence of a 'royal hypaspist lifeguard' upon a few references in Arrian to the royal hypaspists as opposed to the more frequently occurring hypaspists. Tarn, however, has shown conclusively that the 'royal hypaspists' are identical with the hypaspists. It was the agema which acted as Alexander's bodyguard and any theory which makes out of the royal hypaspists a special corps of bodyguards, distinct from the agema, does not take enough account of the imprecise terminology of the Alexander historians, Arrian included. The only passage which can be taken to indicate that there were distinct bodies of
hypaspists is in Arrian's description of the battle-line at the Hydaspes (5,13,4): τῶν δὲ πεζῶν πρῶτοις μὲν τοὺς ὑπασπιστὰς τοὺς βασιλικοὺς, ἦν ἡγεῖτο Σέλευκος, ἐπέταξε τῇ ὑπώρει ἐπὶ δὲ τούτων τὸ ἀρχηγὸν τὸ βασιλικὸν. ἔχονέν τις δὲ τούτων τοὺς ἄλλους ὑπασπιστὰς, ὡς ἐκάστως καὶ ἡμενοῦν ἐν τῷ τότε δυνάμειν.

Here three distinct bodies of troops appear, 'the royal hypaspists', the agema and 'the other hypaspists'. Tarn explained that what has happened is that the taxeis of the pezetairoi have dropped out and the hypaspists have slipped in to make up for them. But Tarn's reconstruction of the battle, which is quite unconvincing, is dependent upon this interpretation and there seems to be no good reason for supposing that this is what has happened (see also p. 107).

In view of the fact that in Arrian's description of the battle-line at the Granicus the taxeis of Philip and of Craterus appear twice (Arr. 1,14,2, see p. 95), there is really no difficulty in accepting that Arrian has here simply put the hypaspists in twice. It is certain that this single mention is not enough to support the existence of the 'royal hypaspist lifeguard', when it can be shown that all the other examples of 'royal hypaspists' are alternatives to the simple 'hypaspists'.

Leaving aside Berve's 'royal hypaspist lifeguard', we may now turn to the organisation of the hypaspists at the time of the crossing to Asia, in 334 B.C. There is no direct evidence upon the size of the body, but there has been a measure of agreement among scholars that it numbered 3,000. This is based upon the evidence of Arrian's description of
the battle-line at Issus (2,8,3f.). On the right wing against the mountains was drawn up the agema and the hypaspists, then came the battalions of Coenus and Perdiccas, up to the centre of the heavy infantry. On the left wing were the battalions of Amyntas, Ptolemy, Meleager and Craterus. It has been assumed by scholars that the line of the heavy infantry was balanced, that there were equal numbers on either side of the centre point described by Arrian. It follows from this that the hypaspists and two battalions of pezetairoi were equal to four battalions of pezetairoi, in other words that the hypaspists were numerically equal to two battalions. Since it is known that there were six battalions and that these together with the hypaspists numbered 12,000 at the time of the crossing to Asia (Diod. 17,17,4), the hypaspists must have been 3,000 strong. Berve was of the opinion that the agema did not form a part of the 3,000 but was additional to this number (I p.127). However, if the evidence of Arrian's description of the line-up at Issus is taken as an indication, it must be accepted that the agema and the other hypaspists numbered only 3,000, for Arrian states specifically that it was the agema and the hypaspists that were in the battle-line together.

The only other evidence we have upon the organisation of the hypaspists body is in the passage of Curtius already discussed (above pp.122f. ) in reference to the pezetairoi (5,2,3). Curtius states that prior to 331 B.C. the Macedonian infantry was organised in units of 500 only, but that in the reform of that year Alexander introduced chiliarchies.
J. G. Droysen, Berve and Milns take this to be adequate support for the view that the hypaspists were organised in units of 500 down to 331 B.C.\textsuperscript{106} I have already argued for this interpretation in reference to the pezetairoi and there seems no reason for doubting that the passage can also be applied to the hypaspists. Tarn assumed that the chiliarchy structure, which certainly existed in the period after 331 B.C., also existed prior to this date,\textsuperscript{107} but the evidence of Curtius contradicts this view. The only evidence that there were chiliarchies of hypaspists in the first four years of the campaign comes from Arrian 1,22,7. Arrian records that Adaeus the chiliarch died at the siege of Halicarnassus and although Milns has recently argued that Adaeus was not a hypaspist officer at all, the likelihood is that he did command hypaspists in this action.\textsuperscript{108} The role of the \textit{taxis} under Adaeus and Timander (1,22,4) is characteristic of the hypaspists; they often were used in conjunction with light-armed troops for a rapid attack.\textsuperscript{109} Also, Arrian uses \textit{taxis} of units of hypaspists elsewhere, e.g., the hypaspists troops under Ptolemy son of Philip at the battle of the Granicus (Arr. 1,14,6; Berve II no.671). There is, therefore, no difficulty in accepting that he refers \textit{taxis} to hypaspists here.\textsuperscript{110} The context strongly indicates that these troops were Macedonian and it seems most probable that they were hypaspist. Although most scholars have accepted that Adaeus did command hypaspists at Halicarnassus, only Tarn believed that he was a chiliarch of hypaspists. J. G. Droysen believed that Arrian was using the term anachronistically
and Berve followed him. There seems no difficulty in accepting that Arrian was using the term anachronistically, as it is not uncharacteristic of him to do this (see Appendix IIIa), and in the face of Curtius' explicit evidence, Arrian's solitary usage cannot stand.

The size of the agema is nowhere given. Tarn, following his belief that the hypaspists were in units of 1,000, suggests that the agema also was 1,000. Berve and Milns, following their belief that the hypaspist units were 500 strong, suggest that the agema was 500. No certainty can be reached concerning the strength of the agema, but there is, perhaps, some indication that Berve and Milns are most likely to be right. If the major divisions of the hypaspist force were units of 500 men in the early years of the campaign, clearly there was some advantage in having the agema the same size because it always operated in close cooperation with other units of the hypaspists. It could be argued that it consisted of two units of 500 men, but this seems less likely. In 329 B.C. in the assault on the rock Aornos, Arrian records that Alexander led a detachment of somatophylakes and hypaspists to the number of 700 (4,30,3): these somatophylakes were the agema of the hypaspists (Appendix IIIa). If the agema numbered 1,000 men, it would surely be expected that these 700, chosen for a particularly hazardous venture with the king, would have been wholly somatophylakes, or agema, rather than partly hypaspists. The conclusion which, I would suggest, is indicated by this evidence is that the agema numbered only 500 in 329 B.C. It is most improbable that
the agema was reduced in number between 334 B.C. and 329 B.C. (I shall argue below that the overall size of the hypaspist body was increased), and I therefore incline to the view that the agema numbered 500 men in 334 B.C. and, indeed, throughout the campaign in Asia.

There is little evidence about the officers of the hypaspists. Commander of the whole force was Nicanor, the second son of Parmenio. Of the commanders under him, we may know the names of three. At Halicarnassus, it is generally held, the taxeis of Adaeus and Timander consisted of hypaspists, and it seems likely that these men commanded two of the units of 500 men. At Tyre, when Alexander and the hypaspists were assaulting the wall, Admetus, whom Diodorus calls 'one of the commanders' (17,45,6), was killed in the first assault along with twenty of the hypaspists (Arr. 2,24,4). It would appear from this that Admetus also was an officer of the hypaspists at the siege of Tyre.

Berve suggested that Hephaestion commanded the 'royal hypaspist lifeguard' at the battle of Gaugamela, and although 'royal hypaspists' as a separate body did not exist, we should look at his evidence: Diodorus 17,61,4 records that some prominent officers were wounded in the battle, among them Hephaestion, τῶν σωματοφυλάκων ἱγρούμενος...

Welles cannot decide what somatophylakes are referred to, pointing out that Nicanor, not Hephaestion, was commander of the hypaspists, and doubting that the Greek can mean 'fighting first among the 'bodyguards' in the sense of 'the small group of bodyguards proper'. Certainly 'somatophylakes' cannot here refer to the hypaspists, because
Nicanor is commander of them and Hephaestion could hardly be under Nicanor. It is not so certain that Hephaestion is not yet a 'bodyguard proper', for he could hold both this post and a command of the Companion cavalry (contra Welles), but it seems likely that Hephaestion did not hold this post until rather later, when he achieved more prominence. Nothing is known of Hephaestion's role in the early years, but he is likely to have gone into battle by Alexander's side, that is on horseback, and there is nothing to connect Hephaestion with any infantry guards. He was not, however, commander of the ile Basilike, for Cleitus was its leader. The phrase is clearly a problem, but Diodorus' terminology is sometimes quite imprecise and the term 'somatophylax' in particular is frequently used incorrectly. It is quite possible that all that should be understood from Diodorus' evidence is that Hephaestion was prominent among the circle of friends fighting around Alexander (cf. Curt. 4,16,32; Arr. 3,15,2).

b) From the Reform of 331 B.C. to 324 B.C.

At the time when the reinforcements were integrated in early December 331 B.C. the internal structure of the hypaspists was reformed. I have already presented the evidence and arguments concerning this reorganisation above, in my discussion of the pezetairoi, and the case does not need to be presented again here. Alexander wanted to increase the number of high ranking officers and, therefore, he introduced into the hypaspists, as well as the pezetairoi, the new divisions of chiliarchies, where previously there had been only divisions of 500. The existence of chiliarchies
of hypaspists in the years following 331 B.C. is well attested (Arr. 4,24,10; 4,30,6; 5,23,7), and reference is made to chiliarchs of hypaspists at Arrian 4,30,5. As with the pezetairoi, it seems probable that the sections of 500 continued to exist, as subdivisions of the chiliarchies, for this would give added flexibility. By this reorganisation, additional high ranking officers were introduced to the hypaspist body, making it easier to detach independent commands of hypaspists for missions away from the main body. This was in line with the general needs of Alexander, faced with the more scattered enemy of the Iranian plateau.

The number of chiliarchies and the size of the hypaspist body after 331 B.C. has been a matter of dispute among scholars. J. G. Droysen thought that there were at least four chiliarchies, the agema being one of them. Berve believed that the hypaspist force had been increased by 1,000 when the reinforcements arrived at the end of 331 B.C., and that in all there were four chiliarchies and an agema of 500, making a total of 4,500. Tarn, of course, believed that there was no change, and that the hypaspists remained at 3,000. Most recently, Milns has suggested that the hypaspists remained at 3,000, organised in three chiliarchies. He does not discuss the position of the agema, but the implication would seem to be that the agema remained at 500 and formed one half of one chiliarchy.

Despite the frequent appearance in our sources of the hypaspists, details of organisation are quite elusive. The major piece of evidence used to fix the number of chiliarchies
is contained in Arrian 4,30,6: Alexander sent on a mission in the territory of the Assaceni, and J. G. Droysen concludes that four chiliarchies are referred to here. He considers that the description of Nearchus as a chiliarch of the hypaspists means that Nearchus led his own chiliarchy on the mission, even though Arrian does not specifically mention it. This would mean that four chiliarchies are detailed here, that of Nearchus, which stayed under his command, and that of Antiochus and two other chiliarchies attached to Antiochus. Tarn, however, disagrees, pointing out that Arrian does not say that Nearchus had his own chiliarchy under his command, and concludes that Nearchus' chiliarchy was one of those under Antiochus' command; therefore only three chiliarchies are mentioned here. He explains that the implication of the Greek word παρά τοῦ τάφυς ἡλλάς is perhaps that there were in all more than two chiliarchies of hypaspists in addition to Antiochus' own, but that Arrian is here guilty of bad writing, in saying 'two others' where he should more correctly have said 'the two others'. There seems to be little doubt that Tarn is right, that the passage cannot be used to prove that there were more than three chiliarchies of hypaspists. Arrian specifies only three, and no reliance can be placed upon the precise implications of Arrian's language.

The passage cannot, however, be used to show that there
were not more than three chiliarchies of hypaspists. In fact, it seems likely from this evidence that the *agema* was additional to the three chiliarchies mentioned here. For the expedition led by Antiochus and Nearchus was not an important one, hardly the sort for which Alexander would have detached his personal guard, especially as Arrian implies that Alexander continued on his way (4,30,7). Tarn argues that there were only three chiliarchies of hypaspists, on the strength of Arrian 4,24,10, where it is recorded that Alexander gave to Ptolemy 'the third part' of the hypaspists. Tarn concludes that this must mean one chiliarchy out of three and that the hypaspists numbered three chiliarchies in all. This is not, however, a reliable argument, for Alexander clearly divided the troops into whatever numbers he thought fit: at 4,30,3 Arrian records that he detached 700 hypaspists, but nobody would argue from this that the hypaspists were organised in units of 700.

This passage of Arrian (4,30,6), then, seems to indicate that there were at least three chiliarchies of hypaspists and the *agema*, and in so far as there is no evidence to show that there were any more than this, we should perhaps conclude that this was the full strength. Three chiliarchies of hypaspists are detailed again by Arrian, when Ptolemy leads them, in company with the archers and Agrianes, at the siege of an Indian township (5,23,7). On this occasion Alexander himself led the siege engines against the walls, and he must have kept his *agema* with himself for this. This passage seems, therefore, to confirm the indications drawn from the earlier one (4,30,6).
The total numerical strength of the hypaspists was thought by Tarn and Milns to have remained at 3,000 and not to have been increased by the reinforcement of 331 B.C.\textsuperscript{128} Berve, however, thought that there were 4,500 in the hypaspists after 331 B.C. Berve reached his decision on the strength of his belief that there were four chiliarchies in addition to an \textit{agema}, which he considered remained at 500.\textsuperscript{129} Tarn's arguments are based upon the belief that there were three chiliarchies including the \textit{agema}.\textsuperscript{130} Milns, however, presents two further arguments in favour of the figure remaining at 3,000.\textsuperscript{131} He points to the size of the hypaspist body of Eumenes in 318 B.C., which according to Diodorus 19,28,1, was not more than 3,000. Milns argues that since Eumenes was consciously imitating Alexander, this proves that the hypaspists numbered 3,000 throughout Alexander's lifetime. This argument is hardly conclusive, nor is his argument from Arrian, 3,16,10, which he interprets to imply strongly that no reinforcements went into the hypaspist body because Arrian says that the reinforcements were distributed by tribe: for the text see Ch.III n.13. Since hypaspists were not arranged by tribe, Milns argues, it follows that no reinforcements went to the hypaspist body. Arrian can, however, be over and over again convicted of imprecise and incomplete coverage of detail, and the omission of details of additions to the hypaspist body when a general infantry reinforcement was taking place would rate as one of Arrian's more forgivable inaccuracies. In any case, it is obvious that the hypaspists must have been reinforced
somehow to compensate for the losses they sustained. It may be that losses were made up from the ranks of the pezetairoi rather than from new recruits from Macedonia, in which case the reinforcements would not have gone into the hypaspists. Therefore, even if it is accepted that Arrian is accurate on this point and the reinforcements were all distributed by tribe, i.e. among the pezetairoi, it is still possible that the hypaspist body was increased.

It is clear that nothing in Arrian's text can be used to indicate that the hypaspist force was not increased, and if the pezetairoi were increased in number, there is perhaps some reason for also thinking that the hypaspists were. I have argued from Arrian 4,30,6 that there were three chiliarchies in addition to the agema in 327 B.C. This prima facie would indicate that the hypaspists numbered 3,000 in addition to the agema. Droysen, reasonably enough, has warned against accepting that there were necessarily 1,000 men in a chiliarchy, but in the case of the royal elite guard it is perhaps likely that the units would have been kept up to strength. The agema, I have argued (p.144), numbered 500 men prior to the reform of 331 B.C. In fixing this number I used evidence drawn from the year 329 B.C., and it therefore follows that the agema numbered 500 men also after the reform. It might be thought that if chiliarchies were introduced in 331 B.C., the agema also would have been increased to 1,000 men. However, this is not a necessary conclusion: the agema was the king's personal guard and it therefore did not have to be of exactly the same organisation as the rest of the hypaspists. It seems quite likely that
a greater conservatism was observed in dealing with this unit than with the rest of the units of the hypaspists.

I conclude that after 331 B.C. the hypaspist force numbered 3,500, including the royal agema of 500 men. This means that the number of the hypaspist body was increased by 500 men from its pre-331 B.C. strength of 3,000; and the obvious time for such an increase is December 331 B.C. when the Macedonian reinforcements arrived and the general reorganisation took place.

The reform of the hypaspist body in 331 B.C. did not formally affect Nicanor's position as commander of the whole force, except that he had more officers below him. In the early summer of 330 B.C. Parmenio was removed from the main army (Arr. 3,19,7) and the post he had held as overall commander of the heavy infantry was disestablished. As a result Nicanor was no longer responsible to any higher authority, except, of course, Alexander himself. Nicanor continued to hold his post until his death in Hyrcania in the late summer of 330 B.C. Most scholars agree that following Nicanor's death a successor to the command of the hypaspists was appointed, but Schachermeyr has suggested that the hypaspists were broken up into separate chiliarchies with the agema also separate, with no overall commander. No hypaspist officer is mentioned after Nicanor's death until 327 B.C., when Antiochus and Nearchus are said to be chiliarchs of the hypaspists (Arr. 4,30,5). Arrian's text makes it unlikely that either of these men held the post which had been Nicanor's: Arrian makes no distinction between
the two, they were simply chiliarchs of hypaspists. It is odd, however, if there was an overall commander, that he did not lead the hypaspists on this occasion because it appears likely that all except the *agema* were involved. This passage, therefore, tends to support Schachermeyer's view that there was no successor to Nicanor.

At the battle of the Hydaspes Arrian refers to 'the royal hypaspists which Seleucus led' (5,13,4; cf. 5,16,3): royal hypaspists are simply the hypaspists (see above p.140). There is no reason to doubt that Seleucus led the hypaspists in this battle, and Tarn and Milns have taken the evidence as clear indication that by 326 B.C. Seleucus had taken over command of the whole hypaspist troop.136 This is not a necessary conclusion. The hypaspists had, of course, to have an overall commander at the battle, but this does not mean that Seleucus held the post of permanent commander of all the hypaspists. There is nothing except this passage to connect Seleucus with the hypaspists. Berve saw Seleucus as commander of the royal hypaspist lifeguard, succeeding Hephaestion in this position, and he suggested that Neoptolemus succeeded Nicanor.137 This rests upon the reference of Plutarch, *Eumenes* 1,13, which gives Neoptolemus the title *archihypaspistes*. This would seem to mean that Neoptolemus was overall commander of the hypaspists at the time of Alexander's death (see Ch.V pp.175f.), but in view of the far reaching reforms towards the end of Alexander's life, it is scarcely good evidence that he held the post from 330 B.C. or, indeed, at any time before 324 B.C.138
There is no indication that there was a successor to Nicanor, and the fact that there was no commander of the hypaspists to lead them on their mission against the Assacenians seems to indicate that there was no permanent commander. There can be no doubt that the rank of chiliarchy of the hypaspists was quite a distinguished one: it is difficult to believe that Nearchus (Berve II no.544), for instance, was given the post of a mere subordinate officer, one of four under the commander of the hypaspists. Schachermeyr's view should, therefore, be preferred: i.e., that there was no overall commander, but each commander of a chiliarch and the commander of the agema were top-ranking officers on a par with the commanders of the pezetairoi taxeis.

The names of three chiliarchs of hypaspists are known. Antiochus (Berve II no.90) and Nearchus are stated explicitly by Arrian to have been chiliarchs of the hypaspists (Arr. 4, 30,6) in 327 B.C. In 325 B.C., as I have already argued (pp.109 f.), Antigenes was also probably a chiliarch of the hypaspists. It is not possible to know whether Seleucus held a hypaspist command, a chiliarchy or command of the agema: perhaps his connection with the hypaspists at the Hydaspes does indicate that he did hold such a command. The dates at which these men took up and laid down their commands cannot be fixed with any certainty. Nothing is known of Antiochus who is mentioned only on this occasion. Nearchus joined the expeditionary force at Zariaspa in the winter of 329/8 B.C. (Arr. 4,7,2) and he could have become a chiliarch any time between then and the summer of 327 B.C.
He must have given up his command at the latest when he was appointed admiral in autumn 326 B.C. (Arr. 6,2,3). Antigones was an experienced officer and had, perhaps, been with the army from the very beginning, but the date at which he became a chiliarch cannot be known. He was certainly chiliarch by the summer of 325 (Arr. 6,17,3). Seleucus, if he did hold a permanent hypaspist command, also presents an insoluble problem because the reference to him at the battle at the Hydaspes is the first mention he receives from the Alexander historians. He is not mentioned again until the weddings at Susa, when he figures most prominently among the hetairoi: his career under Alexander is totally unknown apart from this.

I have argued that the battalions of the pezetairoi did not receive reinforcement from the subjects of the Persian Empire, but it may be thought more likely that the hypaspists, who were closer to the king, did receive into their ranks some Iranians. Berve (I p.128) argued that their numbers must have been kept up in this way: certainly Iranian guards were present at Alexander's court from as early as 330 B.C., when, it is attested, Alexander introduced Persian court ceremony and appointed the most distinguished Iranians, among them the brother of Darius, Oxyathres, as doryphoroi (Diod. 17, 77,4). There are, however, no indications that any Iranians actually entered the hypaspists, and even at the end of Alexander's life it would appear that the 'Persian' guards were separate from the 'Macedonian'. This is shown by, for instance, the description of the chariot made to transport Alexander's body, which appears in Diodorus 18,27: the Macedonian guards were depicted separately from the Persian (Ch.V pp.173f).
Yet no Macedonian reinforcements reached Alexander after 331 B.C. and, therefore, no fresh recruits from Macedonia could have entered the hypaspists to make up for losses. There are two sources from which the reinforcements could have been drawn: from the ranks of the pezetairoi, or from the Greek mercenary units. Although there is no evidence, it is perhaps more likely that promotion to hypaspist rank was held out as a reward to deserving pezetairoi, rather than that mercenaries could enter straight into the hypaspists without first serving in the pezetairoi.

This completes my discussion of the hypaspists prior to the reform of 324 B.C. I have suggested that this body consisted of 3,000 men at the time of the crossing to Asia, this number being inclusive of the agema of 500 and five other units of 500. In 331 B.C. the size of the whole body was increased by 500 and chiliarchies were introduced as the main tactical subdivision, their number being three, and the agema being in addition to the three chiliarchies. This number remained constant from 331 to 324 B.C., the strength being kept up from the ranks of the pezetairoi. Until the time of his death in 330 B.C. Nicanor was overall commander of the hypaspists, including the agema, but no successor was appointed and each chiliarchy and the agema became an independent strategic unit parallel to the taxeis of the pezetairoi.
CHAPTER V

THE ARMY 324/3 B.C.

PART I The Discharge and Reinforcement of Troops

The Indian campaign officially ended at Susa in the spring of 324 B.C.\(^1\) and Alexander set about establishing the form of the army. The ancient evidence is rather confused on the order of events during the last year of Alexander's life, and it is not possible to fix precisely the time at which Alexander instituted the various reforms.\(^2\) It is, however, clear that the main framework of the military organisation was established at Susa in the spring to early summer of 324 B.C. At that time the cavalry reinforcement was carried through, the Companion cavalry given its form, and the Iranians introduced into the cavalry agema;\(^3\) and at Susa the Epigoni arrived and were drilled in their phalangite formations.\(^4\) Therefore, even though the Macedonian veterans did not leave the main body until Opis was reached in the late summer of 324 B.C.,\(^5\) there seems to be little doubt that the major reorganisation had taken place some months before, at Susa.

Already in mid 325 B.C. Alexander had selected some Macedonians who were not 'fully fit' and put them under the command of Craterus whom he was sending through Arachosia and Drangiana to Carmania (Arr. 6,17,3; see above, Ch.III pp.91f; Ch.IV pp.136f and Appendix V p.426 for a discussion of numbers). Alexander clearly intended to send them home, and many more were designated for discharge at Susa. The total number of Macedonians who set out under Craterus' leadership from Opis
for Macedonia in the late summer of 324 B.C. was 11,500 (Arr. 7,12,1; Diod. 17,109,1; Justin 12,12,7). The precise number is taken from the number of veterans under Craterus in 322 B.C. (Diod. 18,16,4), which is given as 6,000 who had crossed to Asia with Alexander, 4,000 who had joined en route, and 1,500 cavalry. Also with Craterus were 1,000 Persian bowmen and slingers, but on these, see below, p. 164. The infantry is said specifically to have been veterans of Alexander's campaign and it is, therefore, most probable that these were the men sent from Opis. It is reasonable to assume that the cavalry also were, although Diodorus does not say so. It is difficult to believe that Alexander would have sent any cavalry but veteran Macedonian with Craterus, for while he might want bowmen and slingers in Macedonia to replace mercenary forces, he would hardly want Iranian cavalry there. This passage in Diodorus is in any case the best indication we have of the number of Macedonians discharged by Alexander in 324 B.C.

Some of these, as Beloch pointed out (p.346-7), were taken from garrison duty and not from the combat army, and he cites those left to garrison Babylon and Susa (Curt. 5, 1,43; 2,16) as an example of such troops. There must have been others, and some cavalry as well as infantry may have been involved. Some of the Iranians and other troops which had fought in the Indian campaign probably were also sent home, the Bactrians, Arachosians and others, and mercenaries, but there is no firm evidence. At least some were retained, however, for Hystaspes, the Bactrian, and Itanes, the
Sogdian, entered the cavalry agema; other Iranians were no doubt also kept for service. Alexander had also ordered a general demobilisation of mercenary armies in the pay of the satraps and generals he had left behind to keep order when he was in India (Diod. 17.106.3; and see below p.163). Beloch makes some attempt to calculate what proportion of the army returning from India was discharged, but no reliance can be placed on his figures. No more can be said with any confidence except that large numbers of troops must have been demobilised upon Alexander's return, not only from the Indian campaign force, but also from the troops which he had left behind or which had been recruited in his absence.

The sources do not give details of troops joining Alexander on his return from India, though many certainly did come to him. In Carmania the commanders who had been left with Parmenio in Media arrived with the troops under them, and Stasanor, satrap of the Areians, the satrap of the Zarangians, and the son of the satrap of the Parthyaeans and Hyrcanians came to him, presumably also bringing troops from their satrapies. There can be little doubt that other reinforcements from other places also arrived: many troops from the Median and Persian tribes would be expected to have been called upon, once Alexander was back from the Indian campaign. At Susa 30,000 Iranian youths, trained in Macedonian infantry tactics, arrived from many different regions, and a general cavalry reinforcement, which I have argued took place at Susa, certainly included substantial numbers of Iranians (see Appendix IV pp.412f. for discussion
of evidence, namely Arr. 7,6,3-5). In 323 B.C. 20,000 Persians, who were, at least partially, light-armed bowmen and javelin-men, came to Alexander, and especial mention is made of Cossaeans and Tapurian troops (Arr. 7,23,1). At the same time, at Babylon, Philoxenus arrived from Caria with a force and Menander from Lydia with another force: mention is also made of Menidas arriving with cavalry, but it is not clear whether these were new troops or simply old ones returning (Arr. 7,23,1: see below p.171).

It is odd that no Macedonian reinforcements are detailed. Berve, Tarn, Schachermeyr and others have accepted this omission as an indication that no troops reached Alexander from Macedonia before his death. This is impossible to believe. I have argued that it is conceivable that Alexander did not receive Macedonian reinforcements after he left Western Iran in 330 B.C. (Ch. III pp.84 f., IV pp.131 f.), but I am unable to accept that none arrived in 324-3 B.C. Alexander had sent off Menidas, Epocillus and Sopilis in 328 B.C. for the very purpose of recruiting reinforcements from Macedonia. The latter two are not heard of again, but Menidas is with the main army in command of cavalry in 323 B.C. This cavalry force, mentioned by Arrian (7,23,1), can hardly be these reinforcements - it could not have taken 5 years to bring them - they must have been waiting for Alexander on his return from India. Perhaps they arrived with the generals from Media in 324 B.C., with whom they had been awaiting Alexander's return. Some Macedonians were undoubtedly included in the general cavalry reinforcement at Susa (Arr. 7,6,3-5; and see Appendix IV
In general terms this is all that can be said. There undoubtedly were substantial reinforcements of Macedonians, Iranians and others, which more than made up for those discharged, but our sources tell us little about them.15a
PART II Troops for Service in the Satrapies

During the course of his campaigning Alexander had appointed satraps, strategoi and garrison commanders to administer and control the conquered territory. The details have been fully discussed by Berve (I pp. 253-83) and need no elaboration here, but some notice must be given to the recruitment and deployment of troops through the empire. Originally the Achaemenid system seems to have been based on the concept of the satraps having full powers in their districts, just as the king did in the empire, but owing allegiance to the king and being responsible to him. It became necessary for the Achaemenids to detach command of large forces from the post of satrap in order to keep them from breaking away from the central administration; the empire was divided into seven military toparchies, as the Greeks called them, probably by Darius I, and commanders directly responsible to the king were installed in these, with a substantial military following of royal troops. In addition to these there were royal garrisons on the main routes and at strategic points, also directly responsible to the King. 16

Alexander's system seems to have been based upon the same principles. The empire continued to be organised on the satrapal basis, with the satrap having responsibility for defending and policing his area. For this the satrap raised mainly locally recruited forces, supplemented by mercenaries, and the King did not have direct command over these troops. 17 But Alexander did have royal troops in garrisons in important
cities and at strategic points, e.g. at Babylon, Susa, Memphis. In addition, over areas in which Iranians were appointed as satraps, Alexander stationed Macedonian strategoi, or episkopoi, who commanded royal troops posted in the area as a security measure: e.g. in Babylonia in 331 B.C. Apollodorus was appointed strategos over the troops left in that satrapy; Mazaeus, the Iranian, was satrap.

Alexander, therefore, had to provide troops for service in garrisons and in the detachments stationed around the empire, as well as reinforcing the main army. For many of those he had left on such duties on his way through the Persian empire to India had been veterans and will have been ready for discharge in 324 B.C. Also, he had ordered many mercenaries to be put out of service on his return from India. In the fifth century B.C., the Achaemenids had in large part used subject peoples - Iranians, Carians, and other peoples of Asia Minor - who were attracted into the service by grants of land or other rewards of service.

In the garrison at Elephantine in the fifth century B.C., there were Persians, Medes, Chorasmians, Carians and many other subject peoples, as well as Greek mercenaries: the officers were for the most part Persian and Median. In the fourth century B.C., the Achaemenids had inclined more to the use of mercenary troops in the garrisons and detachments; but there is some evidence that towards the end of his life Alexander hoped to use more subjects, in preference to mercenaries. It is, therefore, likely that in 324 B.C. many Iranian troops and troops from other subject peoples,
were recruited for service in garrisons and detachments posted around the empire.

The sources give us few details of such troops. By chance, we are told that 1,000 Persian archers and slingers were sent with Craterus and the veterans discharged from Opis and they may have been intended for service in Macedonia.\(^2^6\) We may assume that many thousands of other subjects were recruited for similar service; missile-throwers and other light infantry, and also cavalry, were doubtless recruited and sent for service in various parts of the empire. The Epigoni also may in part have been intended for service in garrisons and detachments in the satrapies: they would have been suitable replacements for mercenaries.\(^2^7\) In the absence of evidence, however, this can only be speculative.
PART III The Main Army

As well as sending forces for service in various parts of the empire, Alexander also kept a large army together under his direct command. Although the Indian campaign was finished, he undertook a campaign against the Cossaeans late in 324 B.C. and planned to start a major expedition against the Arabians in 323 B.C. Evidence concerning much of the army under Alexander during the last year of his life is poor, but it is possible to reconstruct the form of the central core.

a) The Companion Cavalry

The organisation of the Companion cavalry is better known than that of any other body, mainly because of the evidence of Arrian (7,6,3-5). This passage is treated at length in Appendix IV, and here I am concerned only with the information it gives about the form of the Companion cavalry in 324 B.C. One part of this passage refers to a reform which took place at Susa in 324 B.C. The massive demobilisation of Macedonians and Iranians no doubt greatly reduced the size of the Companion cavalry, and Macedonian and Iranian reinforcements were drawn upon in a general reinforcement of the whole cavalry force, and the Companion cavalry built up in strength. We are given no information about the numbers of Iranians involved, nor precisely which tribes were represented. Only a handful of Iranians entered the agema, but this is no indication that a similarly small number entered the rest of the force. The entry of the
Iranians into the agema was clearly considered the last straw, and may well indicate rather that quite substantial numbers joined the ranks of the ordinary Companions. Those who entered the agema were homotimoi or other nobles of the highest rank at the court, and their names are recorded for us: Kophen, son of Artabazus, Hydarnes and Artiboles, sons of Mazaeus, Sisines and Phradasmenes, sons of Phrataphernes. All these were of Persian descent, in the strict sense of the word. Of the other four who were so honoured, the race of Aigobares and Mithrobaeus is unknown, Itanes was a Sogdian and Hystaspes a Bactrian. The origins of these men may indicate that those who entered the other ranks of the Companion cavalry came mainly from the Persians, no doubt also from the Medes, but that a few also came from Eastern Iranian peoples.

Those Iranians who entered the ranks of the Companion cavalry during the Indian campaign were equipped like the Macedonians (see Appendix IV pp.417f.). The only direct evidence upon the arms of the Iranians in the Companion cavalry is in Arrian 7,6,5 and it is ambiguous. Arrian states that 'they' exchanged their javelins for thrusting spears, but it is not clear whether 'they' refers to those who entered the agema or to all the Iranians in the Companion cavalry. It is generally assumed that only these in the agema are referred to, but this is not a necessary interpretation and I suggest that Alexander did not introduce cavalry units with mixed arms.

The whole force was organised into five hipparchies
plus the *agema*. This is stated plainly by Arrian and there is no reason to reject his evidence. Brunt considered that the fifth hipparchy was the *agema*, but this view is not tenable (see Appendix IV p.413). Tarn, who believed that the cavalry had been organised into five hipparchies in 326 B.C., suggested that in 324 B.C. the Macedonian content of the hipparchies was drawn together to form one chiliarchy of Companions, 1,000 being all that was left. This chiliarchy he argued was put under the command of Hephaestion.

Tarn based his case upon the passage of Arrian (7,14,10), which states that Alexander appointed nobody as chiliarch of the Companion cavalry to replace Hephaestion, but the chiliarchy retained Hephaestion's name and carried as its standard an image of Hephaestion. Tarn believed that Hephaestion was appointed to the position of *hazarapati*, and that this meant that he must have commanded a body of 1,000 horse and that this body was a chiliarchy. I shall discuss Hephaestion's position at the time of his death more fully below (pp.193f.), but for the moment it is sufficient to say that Hephaestion's position was not a straight copy of the Achaemenid office of *hazarapati*. Hephaestion's title of 'chiliarch', although it was the Greek equivalent of the Persian word *hazarapati*, is not sufficient evidence for the view that a chiliarchy of Companion cavalry numbering 1,000 was under Hephaestion's command. Diodorus says that the unit which Hephaestion commanded was 'the most distinguished hipparchy' of Companion cavalry (18,3,4), thus corroborating the evidence of Arrian 7,6,4. There is no
other indication that there was a chiliarchy of Companion cavalry in Alexander's army, and there is strong evidence to show that Alexander retained the term 'hipparchy' for his basic cavalry unit. Under the Ptolemies 'hipparchy' continued as the term for the basic cavalry unit, which is highly significant, and no chiliarchies of cavalry are attested in the 'Successor' armies. There can be little doubt that the title given in Arrian should not be preferred to the firm indications that the unit which Hephaestion commanded was a hipparchy. It is easy to explain how Arrian was misled into thinking that Hephaestion's unit was actually a chiliarchy. For Arrian, naturally, a chiliarch was a commander of 1,000 men and a chiliarchy was a technical military term for the unit he commanded. He, therefore, wrote 'chiliarchy' for the more correct 'hipparchy', perhaps to show off his knowledge of military terminology: compare, for instance, his usage of 'tetrarchy' at 3,18,5 (see above, Ch.III pp.64 ff).

Tarn also believed that the Companion cavalry was subdivided into sections of 100 and supported this view with a reference in Arrian (7,24,4) to Alexander distributing sacrificial victims and wine to the army by lochoi and hecatostyes. He compares this with Arrian 6,27,6, where Alexander is said to have distributed baggage animals to some by ilae and hecatostyes, to others by lochoi (see Ch.III pp.82ff), and concludes that the hecatostyes had become the standard subdivision of cavalry. However, the cavalry could be covered under 'lochoi', as a lochos was a subdivision of an ile, and the evidence is not strong enough to indicate
that the *ile* did not remain the basic subdivision of cavalry. In the Ptolemaic army '*ile* was the term for the subdivisions of cavalry, and I suggest that in the army of Alexander also this was so. 42

Evidence on the commanders of the Companion cavalry can be drawn from Diodorus 18,3,4. Diodorus states that after Alexander's death Seleucus succeeded to the command of the hipparchy of the Companion cavalry which was the most distinguished. He explains that Hephaestion had been the first to hold this position and after him Perdiccas had taken it. This evidence is confirmed by Plutarch (Eum. 1,3), 43 who says that Eumenes succeeded to Perdiccas' command of a hipparchy when Perdiccas was moved to the command of Hephaestion's hipparchy on the latter's death. The natural interpretation of this evidence is that Hephaestion was appointed commander of the most distinguished hipparchy of the Companion cavalry when that unit was formed at Susa in 324 B.C., and Perdiccas was put in charge of another of the five hipparchies. When Hephaestion died later the same year, Perdiccas succeeded to his post and Eumenes was appointed to the post left vacant by Perdiccas.

The matter is complicated, however, by Arrian's evidence (7,14,10), which states that Alexander did not appoint anyone to replace Hephaestion as chiliarch of the Companion cavalry, but the unit continued to bear Hephaestion's name. There is no doubt that the chiliarchy referred to by Arrian is the hipparchy referred to by Diodorus and Plutarch. The sources are, therefore, at variance.
Tarn accepts Arrian's evidence, and argues that Seleucus was the first man to hold command of the military unit after Hephaestion, and that was after Alexander's death. He does, however, allow that Perdiccas may have succeeded to the 'vizierdom' de facto, without the military command. Tarn's case is poor; it is clear that the evidence of Diodorus and Plutarch indicates that Perdiccas succeeded to the military command, and in so far as the 'vizierdom' carried no formal duties (see below) it is unlikely that Perdiccas would have been appointed to the office de facto.

Brunt offers the solution that Perdiccas succeeded to Hephaestion's command of cavalry de facto and this seems to be the likely answer. Command of this most distinguished hipparchy was linked with the position Hephaestion had held as Alexander's second-in-command (see below pp. 193f.): to give Perdiccas the command which had been Hephaestion's would have been to mark him out as second-in-command, as taking over Hephaestion's role in all its aspects. This Alexander did not wish to do. However, the unit of the Companion cavalry needed a commander and, therefore, Perdiccas was given this command de facto. But it was made clear that Perdiccas was not in fact succeeding to the office of chiliarchy which Hephaestion had held, by the unit's bearing the image of Hephaestion as its standard, proclaiming the continued connection with its dead leader.

There seems to be little doubt that Perdiccas did take command of the most distinguished hipparchy on Hephaestion's death, and Plutarch (Eum. 1, 2) says that when Perdiccas moved into Hephaestion's post, Eumenes took over Perdiccas.
hipparchies. We have, then, the names of two men who held commands of hipparchies simultaneously. The leaders of the cavalry faction after Alexander's death are given in Arrian (Diad. 2): Perdiccas, Leonnatus, Ptolemy, and after these Lysimachus, Peithon, Seleucus and Eumenes. Three of these, apart from Perdiccas and Eumenes, may have been in command of hipparchies of Companion cavalry at Alexander's death, but the evidence is not good enough for us to be sure.

There is no firm evidence concerning the strength of the Companion cavalry. Perhaps the hipparchies remained at around 350-400 men strong and the agema at about 300. The total would thus have been about 2,000. But no certainty can be achieved.

There is no evidence concerning other cavalry units in Alexander's army in 324/3 B.C. Menidas arrived with cavalry under his command by 323 B.C., in time for the Arabian expedition, but nothing more is known of them (see above, p.60). The general reinforcement of 324 B.C. presumably involved many Iranian cavalry, both missile-bearers and lancers, and the troops which arrived from Caria and Lydia (Arr. 7,23,1) presumably contained some cavalry. But there is little to be gained from pursuing a discussion of these troops when nothing is known about them.

b) The Infantry

During the discussion of the infantry I shall frequently refer to the description of the Persian court of Alexander which is preserved in Aelian (V.H. 9,3), Athenaeus (12,539e) and Polyaeus (4,3,24). Polyaeus has the fullest version.
He says that among the Macedonians and Greeks Alexander kept a modest court, but among the barbarians he had a very elaborate one. He describes the royal pavilion with 100 couches and 50 gold pillars, draped with gorgeous materials, and then details the troops and attendants gathered around Alexander. First came 500 Persian melophoroi standing inside the tent dressed in purple and quince yellow. After the melophoroi came an equal number of archers, distinguished from them in colour: for some wore flame-red, some blue and some scarlet (Aelian and Athenaeus say that there were 1,000 of these). In front of these stood 500 Macedonian argyraspids of outstandingly tall stature. In the middle of the pavilion stood a gold throne on which Alexander sat conducting the proceedings, and the bodyguards stood around on all sides of the king as he gave judgment. In a circle around the tent the agema of elephants was arrayed and 1,000 Macedonians dressed in Macedonian uniform. Next to these were 500 Susian 'purple-bearers' and then in a circle 10,000 Persians, the tallest and most handsome of all the Persians, decked out in full Persian dress, all carrying short swords (akinakes).

Polyaenus states that this was the style of Alexander's court among the Bactrians, Hyrcanians and Indians, but this is impossible. For Alexander could not have had had 10,000 Persian, or even Iranian, guards, and a unit of elephants at any time before his return from India, and therefore Polyaenus is wrong in stating that Alexander held such a court among the Bactrians, Hyrcanians and Indians (see Appendix VI p.436). However, there is good reason to think
that the description is a fairly accurate description of Alexander's Persian court, as it was instituted in 324-3 B.C. Jacoby suggested, and scholars generally have agreed, that the passage is derived ultimately from Chares. Chares was usher at the Persian court of Alexander and may, therefore, be thought reliable on such matters. A certain amount of exaggeration may have been introduced, and some details changed during the transmission (see, for instance, Appendix VI pp.437f., concerning the argyraspids), but in general the description is quite credible. The colour and splendour of the Persian court is well established and the details fit well with what is known of the traditions of the Achaemenid institution: for instance, the coloured apparel of the melophoroi and the archers, and the grant of purple from the king are well attested. With the reliability of the passage established (I hope) we may move on to consider the individual units of infantry.

(i) The Hypaspists

The discharge of Macedonian veterans in 324 B.C. will have reduced the number of hypaspists, and after the demobilisation, Diodorus states, Alexander appointed 1,000 Persians 'to the hypaspists around the court' (17,110,1). Justin clearly refers to the same action when he says that Alexander 'chose 1,000 of these young Persians for the body of the guard (satellitum)' (12,12,4). These passages seem to imply that Alexander actually introduced Persians into the body of the hypaspists and Berve accepted this interpretation. He pointed to Arrian's reference to Alexander's 'mixing in
with the *taxeis of Macedonians Persian melophoroi* (7,29,4). The Persian guards referred to by Diodorus and Justin were the *melophoroi*, for they must be identified with those described as guarding Alexander in the passage of Polyænus quoted above. But there is no compelling evidence to indicate that any Persians actually became hypaspists in the strict sense of the word in the Macedonian context. For Diodorus' use of the term 'hypaspist' could very well carry the general meaning of 'bodyguard', and too much significance should not be read into Diodorus' implication that the Macedonians were replaced by Persians. That Alexander used Persians in his army in 324 B.C. is certain, but it does not follow that the place of each Macedonian discharged was filled by a Persian. If this is what Diodorus meant then he is surely wrong and has been misled by the juxtaposition of the discharge of veterans and the introduction of Persians. However, it seems more likely that Diodorus did not think deeply about the meaning of the words, rather he was merely following a conventional formula to describe the act of reinforcements. It might be thought that Arrian's reference to the intermixture of Persian *melophoroi* into the *taxeis* certainly indicates that the *melophoroi* actually became members of the hypaspist body, but Arrian's terminology is vague and it could equally well mean that units of *melophoroi* were introduced alongside Macedonian units and not actually into them.

In fact, it seems most unlikely that any Persians actually entered the hypaspist body in Alexander's lifetime.
The evidence of Polyaenus quoted above shows that the Persians assigned to guard duty at the court kept their Persian identity and their Persian equipment. The hypaspists were not simply guards at the court but a most important combat unit, and it seems unlikely that Alexander would have disturbed the effectiveness of the body by making it a mixed force containing Macedonians in Macedonian equipment and Persians in Persian equipment. Under the Successors the hypaspists continued to be used in the role they had played under Alexander and particular stress was placed upon the Macedonian origins of the hypaspists. Both these considerations support my view that no Persian melophoroi entered the hypaspists.

I would suggest that the hypaspist body was reinforced only by Macedonians and that it kept its traditional character. The divisions of the body were probably also unchanged. In India they were arranged in chiliarchies (Ch.IV pp.146f.), and this remained the standard infantry division under the Successors. Polyaenus' evidence shows that the chiliarchies continued to be subdivided into units of 500, for this was the number of hypaspists in attendance upon Alexander at the court. The strength of the body had been around 3,000 (excluding the agema of 500) in India and there is no reason to think that that number changed: if this is right, then the number of chiliarchies will have remained at three.

In India there was no overall commander of the hypaspists, each chiliarchy being an independent command (Ch.IV pp.152f.). However, Plutarch (Eum. 1,3) refers to Neoptolemus as archihypaspistes, which should mean 'commander
of the hypaspists. It may well be that in the more settled conditions of 324 B.C. Neoptolemus was appointed to the position which Nicanor had held, but which had not been filled during the campaigning in Eastern Iran and India because of the necessity for maximum flexibility. There were no doubt advantages in having the hypaspists drawn together under one commander: it would establish a unity among the royal guard and thereby esprit de corps.

I have not discussed the infantry agema in the context of the rest of the hypaspists because it was probably kept separate. In India it had naturally been separate from the chiliarchies of hypaspists and, although there is no direct evidence, it seems most likely that it remained separate. The cavalry agema was separate from the hipparichies of Companion cavalry and the infantry agema was a parallel unit, and, therefore, probably not under Neoptolemus' command. Arrian (7,29,4) states that Alexander mixed some pre-eminent Persians (homotimoi) into the agemata. We are given details of nine men who entered the cavalry agema (Arr. 7,6,4.5, see above p.166) and Arrian's use of the plural (agema) should mean that Iranians of similarly high rank were introduced into the infantry agema. However, it is strange that none are named and this passage of Arrian is not good evidence, because he is not following a source but making his own general summary (see above n.55). If no Iranians entered the hypaspists, it seems probable that none entered the infantry agema. We should, therefore, explain Arrian's plural as rhetorical. We may assume that prominent Persians entered the melophoroi, as was traditional, and that the Macedonian
guard units remained separate.

(ii) The Pezetairoi

The seven battalions of pezetairoi which fought in India lost a great many men in the demobilisation which followed that campaign. The majority of the Macedonians sent home undoubtedly came from these battalions. This led Beloch, Berve and Schachermeyr to conclude that very few Macedonians remained in the regular heavy infantry forces after 324 B.C., but I have already argued that Macedonian reinforcements certainly arrived and we may assume that these were phalangites. Even if the reinforcements were not equal to the number of men discharged, Antipater was soon to arrive with a new force of Macedonians (Arr. 7,12,4).

Schachermeyr argued that Persians were integrated into the Macedonian heavy infantry battalions and pointed to the passage of Arrian 7,29,4, which refers to Alexander mixing melophoroi into the taxeis of the Macedonians. I have already suggested that that passage refers to the use of Persian guards alongside Macedonian guards at the court (above pp.173f). The melophoroi in Achaemenid times consisted of 1,000 nobles selected from the Persians to be royal guards; as such they would hardly fit into the phalanx. Their name obviously implies that they kept their Persian equipment, which also seems to rule out any such integration. It might finally be noted that Arrian is quite erratic in his use of 'taxis' and, while it often means 'battalions of the pezetairoi', often it means 'unit' in the general sense (see Appendix IIIa). Arrian's passage cannot, then, be used
to support Schachermeyr's case.

But Diodorus and Justin refer to the introduction of Persians into the army after the discharge of the Macedonian veterans at Opis. Diodorus (17.110.1) says that Alexander introduced Persians to the number of those discharged, while Justin (12.12.4), seemingly drawing upon the same source, states that Alexander mixed in with his army Persians armed as Macedonians, that is the Epigoni, see below pp.188f. As I have already suggested above p.173, although the natural interpretation of Diodorus' evidence would be that the place of each Macedonian discharged was taken by a Persian, this is not acceptable. Justin's version need mean no more than that units of the Epigoni were introduced beside the Macedonian units, and this is how Berve interpreted the evidence. It would not have made sense, from the viewpoint of military efficiency, to mix Persians into the Macedonian battalions, for it could have done nothing but arouse ill feeling in the phalanx.

Berve (I pp.12lf.) argued that the pezetairoi ceased to exist, at least by the time the mixed force of Macedonian phalangites and the Persian bowmen and javelin-men was formed at Babylon (Arr. 7,23,3.4). He means by this that the Macedonian phalanx was disestablished. Arrian says that Alexander formed sections containing four Macedonian heavy phalangite infantry men and twelve Persian light-armed infantry men. These sections never went into action, and many scholars have been doubtful of their practical value, but Arrian's evidence is confirmed by Diodorus (17,110,2)
and we have no reason to doubt that Alexander did form such sections. Alexander regularly used light-armed troops in conjunction with heavy-armed and he probably wanted to experiment with the new formations during the Arabian expedition, but it is impossible to believe that Alexander used all the Macedonian heavy infantry in the experiment. Arrian's evidence certainly implies that some Macedonian heavy infantry were withdrawn from the traditional phalanx, but not that the Macedonian phalanx ceased to exist altogether.

Berve argued further that the role of the pezetairoi was completely taken over by the Epigoni at this time. Schachermeyer seems to agree. In support of this view Berve points to the name which Alexander gave to these Iranians, i.e. 'the Successors'. But it may well be that he coined the term for the very purpose of demonstrating to the Macedonians that they were not indispensable, and that they must not be arrogant and insubordinate (for this idea, see Arr. 7,29,4). Berve also cites Arrian 7,11,3, which states that after the mutiny at Opis Alexander formed Persian pezetairoi to replace the Macedonians. But it is generally accepted that none of these Persian replacement forces was of permanent standing. There are no sure indications that Alexander intended to replace the Macedonian pezetairoi with Epigoni, and, as I have argued (p.160), it is most likely that Alexander had a large force of Macedonian phalangites in his army at the time of his death. It is possible that Alexander had a long-term plan to relieve the Macedonian infantry of much of the burden of service in Asia, but it is certain that little progress
towards such a goal had been made by the time of his death.

I would conclude that Alexander did not run down the Macedonian pezetairoi force, nor did he introduce Persians into it. The question of the organisation of the force cannot be satisfactorily treated because of lack of evidence. Some of the phalangites were put into the mixed sections discussed above, at least for the duration of the Arabian expedition. The majority, however, remained in pezetairoi formations of traditional type, but it seems unlikely that Alexander retained the old territorial divisions. There were obvious advantages, both administrative and political, in destroying the territorial distinctions. For the distinctions would have been a restriction upon freedom in the recruiting and promotion of men, and they would have helped maintain the local allegiance of the men and the power of the nobles. It seems likely, therefore, that in the course of the massive reinforcement and reorganisation Alexander removed the traditional territorial divisions and adopted a more flexible principle of dividing the men into tactical groupings. I have already argued in Ch.IV pp. 122f: that the battalions were subdivided into chiliarchies and I would suggest that these became the basis of the new organisation. In the Ptolemaic army, groupings of chiliarchies were probably called 'hegemoniae'; these were under the command of strategoi: the term 'taxis' was not in official use.71 There is no evidence that Alexander used the term 'hegemoniae', but there is some indication that groups of pezetairoi chiliarchies were under the command of a strategos: the strategoi were admitted to court when Alexander was dying, while the chiliarchs and
pentacosiarchs had to remain outside (Arr. 7,25,6).

It might seem likely that of the old commanders of the
taxeis who remained, each took command of a strategic
division. Certainly Meleager continued to be a prominent
infantry leader after Alexander's death: and there is no
doubt that Alcetas and Attalus remained with the army, and
their background indicates that they also will have been
prominent infantry leaders. We cannot know how many
strategoi of pezetarioi there were.

It is also unknown how many chiliarchies were grouped
under a strategos, perhaps no more than two; but it is clear
that the chiliarchy was divided into two pentacosiarchies.
Prior to 324 B.C. the chiliarchy contained two lochoi, which
had a paper strength of 500 (see above Ch.IV p.127f), but
the term pentacosioarchy was introduced in 324 B.C.
Pentacosiarchs appear in Arrain 7,25,6, alongside chiliarchs,
as subordinate officers after the strategoi. It should be
noted that the term was also used in the Ptolemaic army.
The pentacosioarchy itself may have been subdivided into
sections of 100. In the Ptolemaic army the hecatontarchy
was a basic subsection of the pentacosioarchy and there is
perhaps an indication in Arrian 7,24,4, that the pentacosioarchy
of Alexander was similarly divided. For there it is recorded
that Alexander distributed sacrificial victims and wine by
lochoi and hecatostyes: I have already argued that the 'lochoi'
refers to the cavalry, we might therefore conclude that the
'hecatostyes' refers to the infantry. Some doubt must be
cast upon this interpretation because the term might refer to
the Iranians, who were certainly divided into units of 100. It is, however, more likely that Alexander is being described in this passage fulfilling his role as king of the Macedonians, in preparation for the Arabian expedition. The variation between the term which appears in Arrian and that of the Ptolemaic army does not seem particularly significant.

The question of the survival of the term 'pezetairoi' should perhaps be raised. Berve (I p.121), in the belief that the Macedonian phalanx was disestablished, naturally concluded that the term died out (see above p.178). The term originally was applied to a small royal guard, but Philip, in his preparations for the Persian campaign, extended the term to embrace all the heavy phalangite Macedonians who served in the royal army, with the exception of the hypaspists (Ch.II pp. 57f.). The other terms, 'hetairoi' and 'hypaspist', survive and so it seems likely that the term 'pezetairoi' also survived the reforms. The army was given its form at Susa in the late spring to early summer of 324 B.C., and I would suppose that no major reorganisation took place after this time (see above p.157). It is, therefore, significant that during the course of the mutiny at Opis some months after this Alexander formed, or threatened to form, a new body of 'pezetairoi' out of Persians (Arr. 7,11, 3). This indicates that a body of Macedonian pezetairoi was in existence at the time of the mutiny. Whether all the ordinary Macedonian phalangite soldiers in the service of Alexander were called 'pezetairoi' is more doubtful. Those in service in garrisons, and perhaps those introduced into the new-style sections alongside the Persian light
infantry, were not part of the traditional Macedonian phalanx and therefore probably did not bear this name.

The total strength of the pezetairoi at the death of Alexander cannot be calculated with any accuracy: there is simply no information. Brunt points out that Perdiccas had available to him a considerable force of Macedonian infantry after Alexander's death and it is difficult to believe that Alexander had not prepared a good force of Macedonian phalangites before mounting the Arabian expedition. I would suggest that the hypaspists and pezetairoi together could not have numbered less than 7,000 - 8,000 on the eve of the Arabian expedition.

Before leaving our discussion of the pezetairoi some reference must be made to the 1,000 Macedonians in Macedonian uniform at the court of Alexander mentioned among the other forces in attendance (see Polyaenus' passage). One might naturally suppose that they were hypaspists, additional to the 500 within the pavilion of the king, but if this were so one would expect them to be called hypaspists, or at least argyraspids (see Appendix VI). If they were not hypaspists they must surely have been pezetairoi, for no other category of Macedonian infantry is ever mentioned, and 'Macedonian uniform' would naturally be interpreted to refer to the Macedonian phalangite armour and weapons in this context. The full splendour and variety of the infantry seems to have been on display, and the absence of pezetairoi would be surprising. I would suggest, therefore, that chiliarchies of pezetairoi attended upon the king's court, the duty being rotated.
(iii) The Melophoroi

Herodotus, in his description of the marching order of the army of Xerxes which invaded Greece, says that the 1,000 Persian infantry which followed directly behind the king were distinguished by means of their spears, which were decorated by the shape of an apple being worked on the butt (7,41,2). Heracleides of Cumae tells us that the melophoroi were 1,000 Persians selected for their high rank from the ranks of the Immortals. They had golden apples on the butts of their spears and held a court in the royal complex, through which the king would walk in order to go out of the palace.78

There can be no doubt that Alexander continued to maintain this unit in the Achaemenid tradition: the evidence of Polyaenus quoted above makes this certain, as does the passage of Arrian 7,29,4. It is also certain, as I have indicated above (p.174), that these melophoroi are referred to by Diodorus (17,110,1) and Justin (12,12,4); they are the Persians who joined the 'guards around the court'. Berve suggested that Alexander reduced the number of melophoroi to 500, on the strength of the evidence of the description of Polyaenus, but this is most unlikely in view of the traditional strength of the body and the agreement in Diodorus and Justin that the Persian royal guards numbered 1,000.79 As the royal guards probably kept a continuous watch at the court, some must have been off duty when others were on, and I do not think it is necessary to see the evidence of Polyaenus as contradicting that of Diodorus and Justin. I conclude, therefore, that Alexander organised a body of high ranking Persian nobles to the number of 1,000
to form a royal guard and thereby keep up the tradition of the Persian court. Their commander was presumably a Persian of very high rank, and it would seem likely that they were divided into sub-units of 500.

There is no mention of the troops called the 'Immortals' in our sources for the last year of Alexander's life and yet the melophoroi, Heracleides tells us, were a part of the 10,000 Immortals in the Achaemenid days. They had been drawn from Persians, Medes and other Iranian peoples, and from Elamites, and had gained their name from being always maintained at the strength of 10,000. They were stationed at the centre of the Persian Empire, but in times of emergency they were sometimes sent on a special mission and when the king went on campaign in person they accompanied him as an elite combat force of heavy infantry. Originally they were all spearmen it seems, or at least this was their characteristic weapon. The force seems to have survived to the day of Darius III, despite the fact that the Persian infantry in general were greatly overshadowed by the Greek phalangites.

That Alexander continued this force is unlikely. If it had been continued we would almost certainly have heard of it because it had made such an impression upon the Greeks. The Persian heavy infantry had been proven badly inferior to the Greek, and particularly the Macedonian, counterpart, and Alexander would hardly want as many as 10,000 inferior troops in the army. There was some point in continuing the tradition of the Achaemenid court with 1,000 melophoroi, their absence
from the Persian court would have made an impression upon the Iranians and subject peoples. But the Immortals were too numerous to keep for the sake of form and not so important. Their name, in the Greek language, is not likely to have appealed to Alexander either, and I suspect he would have received some satisfaction from demonstrating that the 'Immortals' were, in fact, quite mortal.

(iv) The Royal Archers

At the court of the Achaemenids, as well as the brightly coloured melophoroi, archers were in attendance, as the evidence of the reliefs and tiles shows. The description in Polyaenus shows that Alexander also continued this part of the spectacle, for archers are placed with the melophoroi within the royal pavilion. The number is given as equal to the number of melophoroi in Polyaenus, that is 500, but in the versions of Aelian and Athenaeus they are said to number 1,000. There is no way of proving which is right, but we should perhaps accept the majority view. Even if Polyaenus is accepted and only 500 were at the court, we would have to suppose that the force numbered 1,000, as was traditional among the Persians, and that 500 were off duty, as were 500 melophoroi. The bow was an honoured weapon among the Persian nobility and the Persian archers were highly effective and famed soldiers; there is, therefore, nothing surprising in their being present at the royal court. I would suggest that they were Iranian, and perhaps Elamite, nobility honoured with a place at court and privileged to wear bright colours by the king. Whether this was the full force of
royal archers or only part cannot be known in the absence of evidence. The Iranians were very skilled archers and could make an important contribution to the fighting strength of the army, but there is no reason to suppose that more than 1,000 high-ranking men were honoured by being called to serve in the royal guard. There can be no doubt that the commander of the royal archers was a Persian of high rank.

(v) 10,000 Persians Armed with Short Swords

In Polyaenus' description of the court scene, there appear outside of the royal pavilion, and beyond the elephants, 10,000 Persians in Persian equipment, armed with the characteristic Iranian short sword (akinakes). Polyaenus is the only one to mention that they were armed with the Iranian short sword, but we have no reason to doubt him on this point. He is also the only one to say that these Persians were 'the most handsome and tallest': if reliable, this might mean that they were an elite force of some kind, but the reference to their good looks and stature may be simply aimed at heightening the effect of the passage, without any particular significance. The akinakes seems to have been regularly carried by Iranians at court, to judge from the reliefs at Persepolis, and it may be that these 10,000 were in ceremonial dress, rather than in their fighting equipment. If this is so, it is impossible to know what sort of troops they were. They may have been light infantry, the Iranian and Elamite peoples were strong in this department: but they may have been cavalrymen, without their
horses, in the dress conventional for nobles at court.

Not enough is known of the circumstances of this court described by Polyaenus, and although it is likely that they were a military force, details of their organisation cannot be discussed for lack of evidence. The 500 Susians, to whom Alexander had granted the privilege of wearing the purple, and who stood next to the 10,000, are clearly not a military force. Polyaenus is the only author to describe them as Susians, and if he is right, we should perhaps conclude that this court was held in Susiana, for there can be no other reason for the Susians in particular being in attendance at court.93

(vi) The Epigoni

These were 30,000 Iranians whom, Arrian tells us, the satraps from the newly founded cities and the rest of the conquered territory brought to Alexander at Susa in 324 B.C.94 The clear implication of this evidence is that they were drawn mainly from the Iranians whom Alexander had brought into his new settlements:95 these naturally will have been more readily available for training. But others were selected from the rest of the population of the Iranian plateau, if Arrian's evidence can be trusted. The reference to 'the satraps from the newly founded cities' is clearly inaccurate for the governors of these settlements were not satraps. Arrian is using the term as if it were a synonym for 'archon'.96 The order for their training had been given in 328/7 B.C., before the start of the Indian expedition.97 Tarn was of the opinion that these young Iranians were mere boys when
they arrived at Susa, and dismissed them as of no significance. (II p.169). Yet he can hardly be right, since they had been under training for four years.

I have already argued against the interpretation of the ancient evidence to mean that the Epigoni were put into the same units as Macedonian heavy infantry.\(^98\) I have also tried to refute the arguments used by Berve to show that they replaced the Macedonian phalanx. I interpret the evidence to mean that the Epigoni were organised into separate units alongside the Macedonians. Details of their organisation are not recorded, but they must have been arranged in formations similar to the Macedonian phalanx, as is implied by Diodorus' reference to their being formed into an antitagma to counterbalance the Macedonian tagma, because the Macedonians were becoming insubordinate.\(^99\) And in so far as they were recruited and trained in various centres in the eastern empire, it is perhaps likely that they were organised according to district.

Thirty thousand Iranian heavy-armed infantry is a very large number and it seems doubtful whether Alexander would have wanted so many on the Arabian expedition. Some, no doubt, were intended for this expedition, but many may have been sent for service in garrisons or in detachments of royal troops around the empire (see also above p.164).

**(vii) Other Troops**

In 323 B.C., presumably in preparation for the Arabian expedition, Peucetias, satrap of Persis, arrived with 20,000 men, at least some being archers and javelin-men.\(^100\) Many of
the archers and javelin-men were attached to Macedonian heavy infantry in the new-style mixed sections, as described by Arrian (7,23,3.4) and Diodorus (17,110,2).\textsuperscript{101} but surely not all were so attached. But the organisation of those not in the mixed sections cannot be known, nor can that of the Cossaeans and Tapurians who also arrived with Peucetias (Arr. 7,23,3). The Cossaeans and Tapurians also were probably light-armed infantry, for they were mountain-peoples.

We can do no more than simply record the arrival of troops from Caria under Philoxenus and from Lydia under Menander (Arr. 7,23,1; see above, p.\textsuperscript{160}). These were, presumably, satrapal levies called for the Arabian expedition, just like the troops from Persia. There was a tradition of heavy infantry in these places, not unlike the Greek hoplite tradition.\textsuperscript{102} The cavalry under the command of Menidas, which arrived at the same time as the troops from Caria and Lydia, may have been a force of mercenaries, but I suggest this only because of Menidas' background as a commander of mercenary cavalry and because Arrian fails to give an indication of their nationality (7,23,1).\textsuperscript{103} There were almost certainly other mercenary units with the army at Alexander's death. In the disturbance following that death, Philip Arrhidaeus sent on a deputation representing the infantry faction Pasas the Thessalian (Berve II no.608), Amissus the Megalopolitan (Berve II no.53), and Perilaus. Berve suggests that Pasas was an officer of Greek mercenaries, and I would suppose that Amissus held a similar position. Perilaus (Berve II no.630) was perhaps a Macedonian, for his
nationality is not given, but we cannot know what troops he commanded.

c) The Size of the Main Army

The only relevant figures contained in the ancient sources are those in Curtius 10, 2, 8, where it is recorded that before the discharge of the veterans from Opis, Alexander ordered 13,000 infantry and 2,000 cavalry to be retained in Asia; 'thinking that Asia could be held in check with a small force, because he had placed garrisons in many places and had recently founded towns and filled them with settlers who would be anxious to keep their property'. Beloch and Berve considered that these figures referred to the number of European veterans of the Indian campaign whom Alexander did not discharge. Brunt, however, rightly points out that the number is far too low to cover Greeks, Balkan troops and Macedonians. He suggests that the numbers refer to the reinforcements called for by Alexander during the year 324-3 B.C. But Curtius says nothing about Alexander calling for reinforcements, and it seems unlikely that Curtius could have come across a record of the number of troops which Alexander summoned from Macedonia in the last year of his life. It seems most likely, however, that the numbers do refer to Macedonians; it was the Macedonian veterans who were to be discharged. If it is accepted, as I have argued above p.160, that considerable Macedonian reinforcements had already reached Alexander before the Macedonian veterans were discharged, there is no difficulty in taking the words of Curtius to mean what they say; i.e. that Alexander kept
13,000 infantry and 2,000 cavalry and sent the rest of the Macedonians home. No importance need be attached to Curtius' explanation of the reasoning behind Alexander's action.  

But even if Curtius' evidence is accepted, and Alexander did have 13,000 Macedonian infantry and 2,000 Macedonian cavalry with him in summer 324 B.C. (after the veterans had been discharged), we have no clear indication of the overall size of the army. It seems likely enough that Alexander's army was in excess of 50,000 on the eve of the Arabian expedition, but it is impossible to know the actual strength.
I have already discussed Hephaestion's command of 'the most distinguished hipparchy' of Companion cavalry (pp.167f.), but he is said also to have held the chiliarchy. In Photius' epitome of Arrian Diadochi 3, it is stated that in the settlement at Babylon, after Alexander's death, it was agreed that Perdiccas hold the chiliarchy which had been held by Hephaestion, and in a note Photius explains ῆπτροπῇ ῦῆς ἰμπατέως βασιλείας. Diodorus explains that 'the position and rank of chiliarch had first been brought to fame and honour by the Persian kings, and afterwards under Alexander it gained great power and glory ......' (18,48,5).109 This explanation is made in the context of Antipater's appointment of his son Cassander as chiliarch to Polyperchon, who was 'the guardian of the kings and supreme commander', to be 'second in authority'.

The Achaemenid Kings had had an officer called hazarapati: originally this post was closely linked with command of the royal guard, the melophoroi; these numbered 1,000 (see above, p.184) and it was this command which gave the officer his name, 'commander of 1,000'. (The Greeks called him chiliarch).110 But the office was much more than simply a command of 1,000, it carried great prestige and brought a rank second only to the King.111 Under Darius III the hazarapati was Nabarzanes, whom Arrian calls chiliarch on two occasions,112 but by this time the office was linked with a command of 1,000 elite cavalry, not the melophoroi.113
The office which Hephaestion held under Alexander clearly continued the Achaemenid tradition: he commanded an elite body of cavalry and was an officer of great importance. But the precise nature of Hephaestion's position needs a fuller discussion.

It has been widely held that the post at it existed under the Achaemenids gave its holder overall responsibility for the armed forces, and therefore for the whole administration of the empire: he was 'prime minister' or 'grand vizier'. The case for this interpretation of the office has been stated most fully by Junge. Many scholars have drawn the conclusion that the office under Alexander was of a similar nature and brought Hephaestion general power over the armed forces and the administration of the whole empire. They have been confirmed in this belief by the description of the office (when taken by Perdiccas) as επιτροπή τῆς συμβουλῆς βασιλέως. The evidence upon which this view of Hephaestion's position is based, is not sound. Despite the elaborate arguments of Junge in defining the powers of the Achaemenid hazarapati, he has no firm evidence to support him. Recently Frye has warned against using post-Achaemenid conditions as evidence for the Achaemenid chiliarchy, and seems to come out against the existence of any formal prime minister. He tentatively offers the description of the official as a 'representative or assistant of the king when the latter was indisposed, or unable to carry out his functions'. It seems clear that far less is known about the nature of the office under the Achaemenids than about its nature under Alexander, and that Achaemenid parallels cannot be used in a discussion.
of Hephaestion's position.

The other evidence, drawn from Photius' epitome of Arrian (Diad. 3), is no more reliable, as has been demonstrated by Schachermeyr. After taking the chiliarchy Perdiccas took, or claimed, the powers of ἐπιτροπὴ τῆς συμμάχης βασιλείας, this included command of the royal army and overall control of the empire. But, as Schachermeyr has argued, this was not by virtue of his office of chiliarch. The king was weak, there was a power vacuum; Perdiccas took advantage of his prestige to seize control and he should not be seen as fulfilling his role as chiliarch. That his position was not based on the office of chiliarch is shown, as Schachermeyr notes, by the appointment of Seleucus as commander of the most distinguished hipparchy of Companion cavalry. Under Alexander this command had been closely linked with the office of chiliarch, and it was not within the power of the chiliarch to appoint anyone to this command in the army. We may conclude that the description of the chiliarchy in Photius' epitome reflects the reality of Perdiccas' position, not the theory behind the post of chiliarch.

By his appointment Seleucus took the most distinguished command in the army and became pre-eminent among the officers: in effect he became Perdiccas' second-in-command, though this should not be seen as bringing any formal duties. It was this position as second-in-command to the commander of the royal army, which Diodorus describes as the chiliarchy in the years following Alexander's death. Hence Cassander is chiliarch, second-in-command to Polyperchon in 319 B.C.
a position very different from that of Hephaestion, who had been chiliarch to the King.

In summary then, the evidence from the period following Alexander's death is not applicable to Hephaestion's position and in discussing the chiliarchy under Alexander attention must be confined to the last year of Alexander's reign. Schachermeyr argues convincingly that, in fact, the chiliarchy carried no formal defined duties. Alexander was a strong self-ruler and would not have handed over to any subordinate the responsibility for any aspect of imperial administration, certainly not command of the army. Furthermore, the tradition of the Macedonian kingship was one of a strong direct rule by a patriarchal king, without any bureaucratic system of ministers with defined areas of responsibility. The kings naturally had to have agents to whom they could entrust specific tasks, but these agents had defined powers and duties only as long as it took them to carry out their allotted task. Every delegation of authority was an ad hoc arrangement. The Macedonian kingdom was run by the Argead king and the 

hetairoi councillors, who were advisers to the king and upon whom he could draw for agents when necessary. It is most likely that this tradition continued among Alexander's close associates in the administration of the Persian empire.

Alexander, however, had to have a man of outstanding prestige, someone recognised as Alexander's right-hand man, who could take the king's place when necessary and whom men would respect and obey. The existence of such a man was both natural and necessary. In the early years of the campaigning
Parmenio had fulfilled this role and, although the relationship between him and Alexander was of a very different character from that between Hephaestion and Alexander, their places in the army and at court are comparable. Parmenio had been the natural representative of the king; for instance, when Alexander took a detachment of troops around the coast of Asia Minor, Parmenio led the larger part of the army to Sardis (Arr. 1.24.3). Similarly, when Alexander decided to go from Susa to Opis by ship, he put Hephaestion in command of the army to lead them by road to Opis (Arr. 7.7.1). Parmenio had held the prestigious command of all the heavy infantry, a post which supported his position and authority as the king's stand-in. Hephaestion held the most prestigious command of the elite of the Companion cavalry (Diod. 18.3.4).

For the Macedonians Hephaestion's position was clear and needed no further bolstering, but Hephaestion had to have authority with the Persians, as well as with the Macedonians, if he was to be able to be Alexander's stand-in. The Persians were very conscious of status and protocol and could not be expected to share the unsophisticated attitudes of the Macedonians to rank and authority. Alexander, therefore, sought to build up Hephaestion's status among the Persians. He married him to a daughter of Darius, the sister of his own wife, at the marriage ceremonies at Susa (Arr. 7.4.4) and no doubt sought in other ways to give Hephaestion a royal image. But he also made use of the traditional office of the hazarapati, the holder of which was looked upon as the king's
agent par excellence. This brought no formal powers or duties to Hephaestion, merely prestige among the Persians. He remained one of the pool of inner circle hetairoi upon which Alexander could draw for advice and help. He was not overall commander of the armed forces, nor did he have any permanently delegated authority over the administration of the empire. He held no formal powers outside his command of the most distinguished hipparchy of Companion cavalry.

The other officers of the army similarly will have had no formal political duties, but will have been members of the council of the king's advisers. There was of course some informal differentiation in rank, determined by the prestige attached to the office and person of the members: Hephaestion and his office stood out at the top. The prestige attached to the commands of the other hipparchies and the infantry commands cannot be known in detail, but it may be supposed that the cavalry commands were in general more prestigious than the infantry commands, and that perhaps the commander of the hypaspists stood superior to the other infantry commanders.

**Conclusion**

In the last year of his life Alexander sought to win the acceptance of his position as their King from the Persians and Medes. He also hoped to establish a spirit of cooperation between the Macedonian nobles and the Persian and Median nobility. To further these ends he introduced substantial numbers of cavalry of these peoples into the
hipparchies of Companion cavalry, alongside the Macedonians, and continued the Achaemenid units of the melophoroi and royal archers, giving them a privileged position at court alongside the Macedonian hypaspists. He did not, however, set up any mixed units of Macedonian and Iranian infantry, except for the experimental sections of phalangites and light infantry. Such units would not have been militarily effective, for in general the Iranian heavy infantry were inferior in quality, and the Macedonian infantry had shown themselves hostile to cooperation with the Iranians. Also, it was less important for Alexander to achieve harmony between the infantry classes than between the cavalry classes, upon whom he was dependent for administrators of his empire.
To conclude this study, it is appropriate to discuss the political role of the Macedonians with Alexander. There has been a tendency to see the heavy infantry as a politically and nationally conscious body with defined rights and a defined role in its relationships with the king. But a study of the ancient evidence reveals a high degree of flexibility in the attitudes of Alexander and the men towards each other, which would scarcely be possible in a rigidly defined political system. I wish to argue in this chapter that no theory, nor anything which can properly be termed ideological, influenced the relationship between the king and his men: it was essentially a simple relationship governed solely by the personalities involved in, and the circumstances surrounding, any particular issue.
PART I The Theory of the Macedonian State

So much has been written upon this subject that any full survey of the literature is not practicable. The many arguments and interpretations of the evidence revolve around the fundamental work of F. Granier, *Die makedonische Heeresversammlung. Ein Beitrag zum antiken Staatsrecht*, and, although the evidence used by scholars varies, most follow his conclusions concerning the Macedonian assembly quite closely.¹ Granier's case in the briefest terms is this. The Macedonian kingship developed from the patriarchal style kingship, known from Homer and parallel to the old Germanic heroic kingship. In these systems the king was chosen by the warriors to be their leader, but they were in a sense his equals and he lived among them as one of them, *primus inter pares*. When the state became more defined, a formal assembly of the men-in-arms existed beside the king, holding sovereign power. Then, as the people settled down and became more scattered, the assembly lost its powers and the nobility around the king usurped their position, in practice but not in theory. In the 4th century B.C., however, with the rise in importance of a regular force of Macedonian infantry, the assembly of the men-in-arms revived and the kings, in particular Philip II, fostered its political role as a counterbalance against the nobility; and it became an important support of the monarchy. The exercise of its sovereign power is seen in many events of the 4th century B.C., in the designation of the king or regent and in acting as jury in cases involving Macedonians on charges of high
treason. In practice, Granier explained the men-in-arms did not exercise a free choice in designating the king because the right of primogeniture dominated: and their powers had little effect because in large part the king did not allow them to exercise them or ignored their decisions. But nevertheless, he argues, the king and his subjects were conscious of their constitutional status and this influenced their relationships.

Granier's case has been found acceptable by most scholars, and though many of his arguments have been shown to be unsound, other arguments have been supplied in support of his conclusion. A different interpretation has been presented by P. de Francisci, Arcana Imperii, vol.II, pp.345-435. In a study of the institutions of power in the ancient world he allocates a hundred pages to a study of the Macedonian kingship. He finds little trouble in dismissing Granier's arguments in support of the constitutional rights of the assembly of the men-in-arms, explaining the activities of the assembly as the result of an act of will on the part of the king rather than the exercise of their constitutionally defined sovereign power. It was at the king's bidding that the men met at the accession and acclaimed their king. There was no question of their choosing their king and the acclamation was a mere survival of the decision taken by the original followers to give their allegiance to the king. The custom that the subjects meet for certain judicial decisions was established by the kings themselves and was not, therefore, a constitutional right of the subjects. The kingship was,
in short, a personal one, and the state was founded upon
the recognition by the king's followers of his innate
superiority. The followers, in theory, had no rights except
that of the refusal to follow the king, and once they had
accepted the king they had no rights of limiting his power.

In summary, the arguments concern the theory of the
Macedonian state. Is the kingship an organ of the state
with its powers dependent upon and restricted by the men-in-
arms? Or does the kingship exist in the king quite
independently of his subjects, unaffected by any decision of
the men-in-arms and quite unlimited? Aymard, in two articles
published in 1950, settles the question of the nature of
the kingship in favour of Granier. He argues that Granier's
case is supported by the freedom in the relations between the
king and his subjects, which is apparent, particularly, in
two passages from the ancient sources.3

His first text comes from a speech Arrian puts into the
mouth of Callisthenes on the occasion of the attempted
institution of the custom of 'proskynesis'. In arguing
against the custom, Callisthenes makes a comparison between
the Macedonian and Persian kingships, alluding to Alexander's
descent from Heracles and Aeacus and stating that the
Argeadai oOde biX allx nOcMw MakedonIw
APXOvres DeetodcOw (4,11,6). This indicates, Aymard states,
the existence of a defined and respected political nomos
which was not dependent on the king and which limited his
actions. This means that, contrary to de Francisci's belief,
the kingship was not a personal one, but was an organ of the
state as is indicated by the title used by the king ἐν Μακεδονίαν, and by the presence of 'the Macedonians' beside the king in treaties of the 3rd century B.C.

With the nomos established, Aymard finds evidence of the assembly of the men-in-arms within this nomos. Polybius (5.27.5-7) describes how Philip V wanted to dispose of the commander of the peltasts, Leontius, and after sending the troops under his command far away to Triphylia, arrested him. Leontius' troops hearing of his arrest, sent a deputation to the king calling on him not to take any further action against him and not to bring him to trial in their absence, saying that if he did, they would consider they were held in low esteem and despised by him. Polybius makes the comment that the Macedonians had always enjoyed this kind of freedom of speech (isegoria) in their relations with their kings. Although Philip was annoyed and put Leontius to death without delay, the members of the deputation seem not to have been punished for insolence or mutiny, and it is clear that they were confident that they were within their rights to let the king know what they felt and ask to be consulted on the fate of their leader. Aymard argues that Polybius' note about isegoria supports the view that they were acting according to an established tradition of behaviour, which both the king and the men-in-arms recognised. He finds corroboration of this interpretation in a passage of Curtius. In his treatment of the trials which Alexander conducted before the Macedonian men-in-arms in 330 B.C., Curtius remarked de capitalibus rebus vestusto Macedonum modo inquirebat exercitus -- in pace erat vulgi --, et nihil potestas regum valebat.
nisi prius valuisset auctoritas (6,8,25). Aymard concedes that this evidence on its own could carry no weight, because Curtius is notoriously unreliable in such matters. However, when taken with the text of Polybius, he considers that it shows that it was part of the Macedonian tradition that they had this right.

Aymard continues that, once this is accepted, there can be little doubt that the political tradition also laid down the competence of the men-in-arms in the designation of their king. For, as he rightly points out, this right is much more basic than the judicial rights, and must have existed if the judicial rights did.

In explanation of the insignificant influence which the men-in-arms in general had upon the conduct of affairs, even though they had these important rights, Aymard states that the assembly consciously refrained from using its powers:

"Elle demeura un organe constitutionnel infiniment discret en général, et si docile à l'impulsion du souverain que celui-ci put l'utiliser à son profit sans risque de la voir entreprendre contre son autorité ou contre sa politique. Peut-être n'est-il pas excessif de voir dans cette discrétion, à peu près sans exemple ailleurs, un paradoxe; elle constitue, en tout cas, l'une des plus puissantes originalités de la Macédoine antique."

These, in essence, are the three central discussions of the theory of the Macedonian state and I shall look briefly at each in turn. Granier's case is dependent upon his theory of the origin of the Macedonian kingship and upon his
interpretation of certain events of fourth century Macedonian history. Now, as Aymard points out, nothing can be known of the origin of the kingship; any theory about it could be constructed only from the known workings of the kingship. This argument, therefore, is worthless. As for Granier's arguments from certain historical events, Aymard concedes that nothing can be shown from these either, because the examples of the exercise of political power by the people need not be the result of the working of the constitution but may in each instance be explained simply as the result of the circumstances prevailing at the time. De Francisci's case suffers from the same weakness as Granier's, in that it is dependent upon a theory concerning the origins of the kingship which is unsubstantiated. Nor is his idea of the theory behind the state borne out by what is known of the practice. If there was a defined constitution, under which the subjects recognised the absoluteness of the monarch and their total dependence upon him, it is difficult to see how it became customary for the Argead kings to consult them on judicial matters. Such a custom surely has no place in a constitutionally absolute monarchy.

Aymard's case is built upon the text drawn from the speech of Callisthenes, as it appears in Arrian (4,6,11). For Aymard this text proves that there was a political nomos among the Macedonians, which laid down a certain code covering the king's actions in particular situations. But the text is far from good evidence. It is drawn from a speech composed centuries after the event and there is no good reason to think that it is an accurate reflection of anything said at the time.
The comparison between the Persian 'tyranny' and the Greek 'rule of law', or nomos, was commonplace, and just the sort of detail which might be worked into a speech in this context, whether it formed part of the actual speech delivered at the time or not. And even if it is accepted that Callisthenes did actually use the words attributed to him by Arrian, he may not have been referring to a defined set of constitutional laws protecting the subjects from arbitrary decisions of the king. 'Nomos' came to have the quite vague meaning of 'the characteristic of a free society', and it need have no more significance than this here. There is no doubt that the Macedonians looked upon themselves as free men and expected to be treated as such, but this does not mean that their freedom was safeguarded by specific statutes or recognised constitutional rights.

Once this basic text of Aymard is taken away, his other evidence, drawn from Polybius and Curtius, carries little weight. The text of Polybius (5,27,5-7) refers only to the freedom of speech enjoyed by the Macedonians in their relationships with their king. There is no reference to any specific right, and the only significance the passage has is that, when the Macedonians felt strongly enough about something, they told the king what they thought. Aymard's argument that Polybius took for granted the right of the people to participate in trials, and, therefore, emphasised Macedonian freedom of speech, is not convincing. If a specific right justified the peltasts' deputation to the king, then the
comment about their freedom of speech is out of place: they were merely acting in accordance with the constitutional safeguards. Surely more significant for any discussion of the theory of state is Philip's reaction to the peltasts' message, and the fate of Leontius. The obvious conclusion to be drawn from the incident is that Leontius had no right of trial, and it seems perverse to try to use the evidence to prove that he did.

If Polybius' evidence does not support Aymard's case, then Curtius' comment about the army's, or people's, traditional role in capital cases (6,8,25) stands alone. Aymard admits that Curtius' evidence on its own is not good enough to support his argument, but we should look at the passage of Curtius more closely. Curtius says that it was a *vetustus modus* that the army take a leading part in the trials or, if it was peacetime, the *vulgus* took the role. The mention of the *vulgus* in itself immediately raises doubts about the reliability of the passage. Few scholars can accept the existence of any representative assembly of Macedonians outside of the army, and it would appear that Curtius, or his source, was trying to reconstruct constitutional procedure on the basis of a few examples of the army acting as jury. If there was no representative assembly in peacetime, then this particular detail has been invented. If this was invented, then perhaps the *vetustus modus* concerning the army's part also has been invented. It is not difficult to see how someone interested in barbarian institutions would be tempted to generalise about the army's role in the light of the succession of trials
said to have been held before the Macedonian troops in 330 and 327 B.C.\textsuperscript{10}

But, to leave this difficulty aside, Aymard's interpretation presupposes a degree of precision in the use of terminology which is highly improbable for Curtius. Nomos, in its narrow constitutional sense, as Aymard uses it, has the meaning 'that which is recognised and acknowledged as the valid norm within a given milieu'.\textsuperscript{11} The word presupposes that the institution or procedure has been agreed upon formally by the parties concerned. There can be no certainty that this is what Curtius meant here. It seems quite likely that all he means is that it was customary for the king to summon the army to take part in such trials: or, following the lines of de Francisci's argument, the army's participation was an act of will on the part of the king; it was a custom he was free to follow or not, as he wished. That Curtius was not sensitive enough to distinguish between the narrow meaning of nomos and the vaguer meanings of words for tradition or custom can easily be demonstrated. Just three chapters after his reference to the vetustus modus of the army, Curtius (6,11,20) attributes to the Macedonians a lex providing for the execution of all relatives of those found guilty of plotting to kill the king. This Curtius repeats in connection with the 'Pages' Conspiracy', calling it a mos on this occasion (6,6,28), but he makes Alexander say in a speech that he had long ago abandoned the usage. Curtius here reveals a total disregard of the subtleties of the words referring to constitutional practice. Lex is perhaps an
acceptable Latin equivalent of *nomos* in its narrow constitutional meaning, in that it implies that the parties concerned have agreed to its provisions. But *mos* clearly falls short of this meaning, though there is some implication of general acceptance of its recommendations. But if it was a *lex* or a *mos*, Alexander should not have been able to arbitrarily discontinue it. If he was able to do so, then it was not a *lex* or a *mos*, but simply a general practice followed by the Argead kings, established by an act of will on the part of the king. It is generally agreed that Alexander was not bound by any *lex* or *mos* to execute the relatives of convicted traitors,¹² and if Curtius' evidence has any validity at all, it can mean only that the Argead kings had been in the habit of following such a course of action. But the major point to be noted is that Curtius is quite unreliable in his use of terminology.

To return to our text about the army's role, Curtius uses the vague term *vetustus modus* in referring to the practice of the army's participation. It may be thought, though we have only this instance and one other poorly attested one,¹³ to indicate that the Argead kings were in the habit of using the army as jury. But it is surely unsound to use the passage of Curtius, as Aymard does, to indicate that a political *nomos* existed among the Macedonians, of which the right of the army to participate in trials was an important part. Aymard is thus left with no supporting texts able to carry the weight of his argument.

Neither attempt to reconstruct a political *nomos* for the
Argead kingdom is successful. Both the theories seem artificial; the arguments revolve around intangible concepts and unprovable hypotheses which bear little relationship to the practice as revealed in the ancient sources. Granier asks us to accept that in theory the people had defined rights, but in practice they played no effective role. De Francisci states that the king in theory had unrestricted power over his subjects, but in practice chose to allow them some power. The difficulties inherent in Aymard's case are best summed up by Aymard himself. In conclusion of a long argument to prove the existence and powers of the assembly, he suggests that the assembly's discretion in not using the powers it possessed is perhaps not paralleled elsewhere and is a paradox: 'l'une des plus puissantes originalités de la Macédoine antique'.

It is indeed exceptional that a people who were conscious of their powers and rights should consciously deny themselves these rights, even when the king went completely against their wishes and against the whole spirit of the constitution. It is one solution to say that the Macedonians were an exceptional people in this respect, but another explanation of their 'discretion' may be thought more likely; namely that the people were not conscious that they had powers defined by constitutional statutes.

I would suggest, in view of these difficulties, that modern scholars have attempted to force the practice of Macedonian politics to fit preconceived theories which are out of place in the context of the unsophisticated Macedonian state. Aristotle, in classifying monarchies (Pol 3,9,1285) recognised that many monarchies could be described neither as
absolute nor as constitutional. At one end of the scale he placed the Spartan monarchy as a constitutional monarchy in which the king's power is limited, and at the other end of the scale came the absolute monarchies. Between these extremes, he says, lie most monarchies. Later (Pol. 5, 9, 1313a, 18-33) he specifies that the reason for the long survival of the Spartan and Molossian monarchies is that they are limited and their subjects share power. He does not mention the Argead kingship, although it was long lasting and although he was very familiar with it. This might be thought to imply that the Argead king's power was not limited in any defined way, as the Spartan and Molossian king's power was limited, and the subjects did not share power. For if it had presented an example of the constitutional monarchy Aristotle was discussing, it would surely have appeared.

Aristotle, then, seems to support the view that the Macedonian kingship lay between the two extremes, not absolute but not limited by any defined constitution. Aristotle's testimony (albeit negative), together with the difficulties involved in any classification of the monarchy as absolute or constitutionally limited, points strongly to the conclusion that there was no constitution which specified that the king was absolute and none which limited his power. All was determined by circumstances: e.g. by the personality of the king, the atmosphere of the times, the mood of the people. Some kings would be better able to ride roughshod over the wishes of the nobles and people than others, and the relations of a particular king with his subjects would change from year to year. The conduct of affairs was governed by no particular
expectation on the part of the people.

If we look at the background of the Macedonian state, it becomes even less likely that any constitutional theory existed. In general in the ancient world, political practice led only slowly to the formulation of a political theory. It seems impossible that there had been sufficient practice involving the Macedonian men-in-arms by the time of Alexander's death to lead to the formulation of any theory. It is widely accepted that no political consciousness and no active involvement in politics developed among the common people of Greece until after some of them began to serve regularly as heavy infantry. The Macedonian commoners made no substantial contribution to the armed forces until near the end of Philip's reign. Prior to this date any active participation in political decisions by Macedonian commoners is out of the question, for even if they had political opinions they had no means of expressing them.

Granier offers three pieces of evidence relating to the period prior to the end of Philip's reign to indicate that the men-in-arms did actively participate in politics, and I shall consider these here. The chronographer Porphyry records that Amyntas III was expelled by the Macedonians (FHG III, p.691). Granier interprets this to mean that the men-in-arms were the agents of the expulsion and that this is the first example of their exercising of their right to choose their king. This is quite unconvincing. A chronographer would not be careful about his terminology and his expression 'expelled by the Macedonians' may be nothing more than a transition
clause marking the end of one reign. In any case, 'Macedonians' is a vague term which we would naturally assume referred to some combination of nobles.  

The next example is drawn from Justin and concerns the accession of Philip II. Justin (7,5,9) records that Philip, after being guardian of Amyntas, son of Perdiccas III, for a long time compulsion a populo regnum suscepit. Here, says Granier (pp.26-27), the men-in-arms are again exercising their king-making rights. But this interpretation reads too much into evidence which is patently unreliable. The idea of a man like Philip being 'forced by the people' to take the throne is not acceptable. As guardian to his young nephew he was in an ideal position to take over the throne, just as Archelaus and Argaeus had done when they had been guardians.  

Politics were traditionally the concern of factions of nobles and the kings were made or broken through alliances among the factions. Justin's text is not enough upon which to build a theory that the Macedonian people, or men-in-arms, suddenly decided to take matters into their own hands. Diodorus (16,3,3) records that Philip won over τὰ πληθυνθείοι but this has no significance: the phrase is a mere τόπος. In any case, Philip naturally tried to win over every element in the kingdom.

The other passage proposed by Granier (pp.27-28) as indicating the king-making rights of the Macedonian men-in-arms is Diodorus 16,3,5. Here, Diodorus describes how the pretender Argaeus appealed to 'those in Aegae to welcome his return and become the founders of his kingship'. He argues
that this indicates that the inhabitants of Aegae had
originally had especial importance in designating the king
and that if Argaeus had obtained their support he would have
received some sort of constitutional backing for his position.
This is ridiculous. As home of the Argead kings, Aegae was
of course a prestigious town, but hardly had a 'constitutional'
importance. Hammond has argued, plausibly, that Aegae was
near Vergina, which would mean that it was the closest
place of any size to Argaeus' landing place at Methone.

There are, then, no examples of any participation by
commoners in politics, and I would suggest that there was no
chance of any because the commoners never met regularly in
any significant numbers and were not involved in the king's
affairs until the very end of Philip's reign. There is,
therefore, no likelihood of any political theory being
formulated before the end of Alexander's life. Practice
leads only very slowly to a theory being worked out and a
period of twenty years is not enough for such a development.
Granier (pp.18f.) suggested that the theory was lying dormant
in the men's consciousness, to be awakened at the touch of
the phalanx, but such an idea is fantastic.
I have argued against the existence of any theoretical basis for the practice of politics in the Macedonian state and have suggested that the Macedonian commoners played no active political role prior to the reign of Alexander. The belief that there was a theory of state, and that the Macedonian commoner was conscious of it and of his rights within it, has greatly influenced the interpretation of some scholars of events during Alexander's campaign in Asia. It is misleading to consider the relationship between Alexander and his men as one between a king and politically conscious subjects, with each party governed in its attitudes to the other by preconceptions and traditions developed and defined into codes of behaviour. This view has led to the belief that during the campaigning the men-in-arms developed a community of attitudes among themselves and came to represent the 'nation of the Macedonians', consciously seeking to exert influence upon state policy both through constitutional and unconstitutional methods, as democratic ideas began to stir in their minds. The background of the men involved makes such a blossoming of political sophistication unlikely, as I have already argued, and I wish to discuss the incidents cited to show the men's consciousness of their political power and their progress towards active political involvement, and to suggest sounder interpretations and a more reasonable approach to the question. We may begin with the evidence upon Alexander's succession.
Pausanias chose to kill Philip on an occasion when very large numbers of people were present at Aegae, gathered from all over Macedonia and the Greek world to celebrate a festival and the marriage of his daughter. It was an exhibition for the Greek world of Philip's greatness and, no doubt, many of the Macedonian infantry were present. Justin opens book 11 by describing the feelings of Philip's army at his death. As there were a number of different nationalities, so there were different reactions, hope of freedom, rejoicing at the break from campaigning and fear of attack from neighbours. Into this situation came Alexander who spoke to them, taking away their worries and encouraging them. He gave them promises and they looked forward to better things to come. To the Macedonians he gave immunity of all things except military service and won everyone's goodwill: corpus hominis, non virtutem regis mutasse se dicerent. Then Alexander saw to the death of the guilty (i.e., the accomplices in Philip's assassination) at the funeral pyre of his father, put down the rebellions of peoples and dealt with several plots against himself.

Diodorus' testimony is shorter and less specific. At 17,2,1-2, clearly drawing upon the same tradition as Justin, he says that Alexander succeeded Philip, punished his father's assassins and held his father's funeral. Though he was not universally popular he established his authority, winning over the Macedonians with 'tactful statements', declaring that the king was changed in name only. He then addressed the embassies and kept drilling the soldiers. Diodorus then
moves on to internal opposition (Attalus) and the rebellion in Greece.

The Pseudo-Callisthenes version of the accession (1,26) gives one important additional detail, that it was Antipater who presented Alexander to the troops and commended him to them. Though the version is confused and cannot be used indiscriminately for historical reconstruction, this particular detail seems likely to be right. There can be little doubt that the factions of Antipater and Olympias were either behind the assassination or moved quickly to take advantage of it and set Alexander on the throne. 23

Granier (pp.29f.) used this evidence in support of his view that the Macedonian men-in-arms were conscious of their right to designate the king, and suggested that Alexander was presented to them because this is what the law required, and what the men expected. But this is by no means a necessary interpretation, nor, as I have argued, is it a likely one. There is no reason to doubt that Alexander did come before the assembled troops and did seek to win their allegiance, but this was dictated by plain common sense not by any constitutional theory. The troops were there and if Alexander did not win their allegiance someone else might have done so. It would have been lunacy for Alexander to have ignored them.

Not only is there no indication that the army's involvement was the result of constitutional requirements, but there is not even a hint that the army looked for any part in settling the crisis caused by Philip's death. It played a totally passive role, expressing no opinion but accepting
what was placed before it: the troops allowed themselves to be carried along with the current. Because their role was so passive it is not possible to determine their attitudes with any assurance and the details which appear in Justin's account cannot be trusted. However, the broad outline of events as given in the ancient evidence may be accurate, and from this it is possible to obtain some idea of how the men felt.

Philip had, in large part, been responsible for the formation of the army of the Macedonians. He had greatly improved the circumstances of a large number of his subjects and, in particular, he had been generous to those who served in the army. The value of the support of the troops for his faction was appreciated by him and he worked to attach the men to himself. His record of military success ensured that he made much progress to this end. At the time of his death the troops were undoubtedly attached to their king, who had done so much for them and who could be expected to bring even greater benefits in the future. Those troops at Aegae at the time of his death would have felt their fortunes particularly closely linked with their king. They no doubt felt dismay at the passing of Philip and great concern for their own future. These feelings were personal ones, not linked with any ambition for the people of Macedonia or any approval of Philip's state policies, and they are quite enough to explain the course of events as set out in the ancient evidence. There is no indication that any more sophisticated thinking played a part in the approval of the succession of
Alexander. Alexander and the supporting factions did everything to try to reassure the troops that nothing had changed: Antipater, the trusted general of Philip, was Alexander's chief supporter; the similarity between Alexander and his father is emphasised; in particular the generosity of Philip was continued through Alexander's announcement of freedom from taxation for the troops. Political consciousness seems far removed from their thinking: in a situation in which their very livelihoods were affected they show no awareness of their power and no interest in interfering in the course of events for their own benefit.

Granier (p. 41) uses another episode connected with Philip's death to support his belief that the Macedonian men-in-arms did have a defined role in the conduct of state affairs. This concerns the death of the assassin Pausanias. The fate of Pausanias is the subject of varying reports. Diodorus has the clearest account of his death (16, 94, 4): he fled towards his horse, pursued by the bodyguard, and would have got away had he not caught his foot in a vine; he fell and Perdiccas and others caught him and killed him with javelins. Justin (9, 7, 10) indicates that a horse was ready for his escape but he did not get away and he was later hung on a cross. Diodorus is contradicted by the Oxyrhynchus Papyrus 1798, which, as restored by Wilcken, reads (sc. Ἀλέξανδρος)

.....κρίσιν τοῖς Μακεδόνσκοι παρεβεβίκασιν. ἐπεί δὲ ἁπτομεθάνεισκαν

It is this text which Granier accepts as the accurate account of what happened, using it to support his submission that it was laid down in Macedonian law that the army be the judges
in cases involving Macedonians on charges of high treason. Against this there are two objections. Firstly, it does not seem sound to accept so lacunose a text in contradiction of other sources, and there is absolutely no evidence that \[ \text{[..\text{missing..}]} \] should be supplied. Even if the text is accepted, however, there can be no question of a trial with the Macedonians as judges. Pausanias had assassinated a popular king in the public eye at a great festival, his fate could not be in question. The strength of feeling among the crowd would have been such as to make anything like a trial impossible. If there is some truth in the text, Alexander may well have found it to be in his interest to allow the crowd to vent its feelings against the assassin, but there is no indication of any trial.\(^{28}\) And there is no evidence that others implicated in the assassination received any trial (Justin 11,2; Diod. 17,2,1): they are simply said to have been killed at the funeral of Philip by Alexander. But the ancient accounts are clearly not reliable and it is not sound to use the details in them in any argument about procedures followed in cases of the assassination of the king. Granier's argument can thus be set aside, being without any reliable evidence to support it, and we may move on to the years of the Asian campaign.

Alexander took with him 12,000 Macedonian heavy infantry. These men became intimately involved in the affairs of the king and the king was heavily dependent upon their continued support for himself and his policies. In such a situation it might be expected perhaps that the troops would develop a greater political consciousness and seek to influence the
policy of the state, but this does not seem to have been the result. The experience of the Macedonian commoner in political affairs was practically non-existent and even the direct involvement in the affairs of state could not compensate for this lack of experience. Granier (pp.31-2) draws upon a piece of evidence relating to the year 331 B.C. to prove that both Alexander and the men were in fact conscious of the right of the men-in-arms to designate the king. Again his case must be noticed. Plutarch (Alex. 34) records that after the victory at Gaugamela Alexander was proclaimed 'King of Asia':

\[\text{βασιλεύς δὲ τῆς Ἀσίας Ἀλέξανδρος ἀνηγερέσθης.}\]

This, Granier argues, can only refer to an official designation by the men-in-arms, by which Alexander was made 'King of Asia'. He supports this by reference to an inscription (Blinkenberg 32 XXXVIII 104) in which Alexander is said to have become 'Lord of Asia' after the battle. As Alexander had been using the title since the battle of Issus (Arr. 2,14, 9) this could only have the significance, Granier suggests, of an official designation by the assembly, giving constitutional backing to his use of the title.

While it seems reasonable to assume that Plutarch means that Alexander was acclaimed 'King of Asia' by the troops after the battle at Gaugamela, there is no reason to believe that it was anything other than an outburst of enthusiasm (an organised one!) with no constitutional significance. Nor is the passage of Arrian reliable. It is part of a letter supposed to have been written by Alexander, in which Alexander...
provocatively calls upon Darius to call him 'King of Asia'. There is no reason to think that the letter is genuine, or contemporary, and certainly the passage cannot be used to show that Alexander regularly used the title of himself. The other text quoted by Granier does not support his case, merely reflecting the reality that Alexander was lord of Asia. It cannot be shown that Alexander could not officially use the title 'King of Asia' until it had been bestowed upon him by the troops. As conqueror of Darius he naturally took on Darius' titles, claiming sovereignty over those who had formerly been Darius' subjects. This cannot, therefore, be seen as indicating either that Alexander could not properly take on the title of 'King of Asia' without the title being officially bestowed by the men-in-arms, or that the men-in-arms were becoming conscious that they were the men who made kings.

The most famous instance of the interference of the Macedonian men-in-arms in politics is at the trial of Philotas, Alexander of Lyncestis and Amyntas and his brothers. The evidence does not need setting out in detail as the events are well known and the details reasonably clear. Philotas did not take seriously an urgent request of an interview with Alexander by two young Macedonians who subsequently revealed to Alexander that they wanted to report an attempt on his life by Dimnus. Suspicion was roused against Philotas because he had prevented the interview and Alexander got a case together against Philotas, implicating him in the plot. Firstly, Alexander brought the case before some of the hetairoi councillors and then before the general
assembly of the army. Curtius (6,8,23) says 6,000 troops turned up. Alexander made his case against Philotas and Philotas defended himself, but not successfully, and he was killed by the troops. After Philotas and his associates had been slain, one of Alexander's agents had Alexander of Lyncestis brought before the troops. He was given a chance to defend himself but was also killed. Then Alexander brought Amyntas and his brothers, close associates of Philotas, before the army but they were not killed but freed from guilt.

Granier (pp.42ff.) argues that these men were brought before the army in accordance with the Macedonian law laying down a procedure for the trials of Macedonians on charges of high treason. I have already argued that there need have been no such law and, indeed, only on one other occasion (in 327 B.C.) is there any indication of such a procedure in the ancient sources. There are many other examples of Macedonians being killed by the king without any consultation with the men-in-arms, and without the king being thought the worse of. For instance, Menander, a prominent Macedonian (Berve II no.502), was executed for refusing to command a garrison (Plut. Alex. 57). Other reasons can be found to explain Alexander's decision to involve the men-in-arms.

It is generally accepted now that Philotas was innocent of any plot or act which could be seen as treason. Alexander wanted him removed, however, probably because he was the leading member of a noble faction which opposed the continued eastward progress of the campaign. Now Alexander, if he ever wanted to, no doubt could inconspicuously remove less
prominent members of the expeditionary force, but the removal of Philotas, the son of Parmenio, commander of the Companion cavalry, who had the support of leading nobles of Upper Macedonia, was more difficult. Parmenio was an old and eminent general, a veteran of Philip's campaigns, who had held command over many of the Macedonians in the army before Alexander had come to power. And he had held the post of commander of the heavy infantry in the Asian campaign, until he had been left behind in Media earlier the same year. Parmenio's prestige was certainly high. Alexander knew that he could not remove Philotas without also removing Parmenio, and this he could not hope to achieve without arousing considerable disapproval. Alexander was influenced to take the case before the troops because the life of a popular man was involved then, not because the men-in-arms expected to be involved in trials of this nature.

In other circumstances the disapproval of the men may not have mattered. Philip V, for instance, did not care about the disapproval of the peltasts when he killed Leontius (Pol.5,27, 5-7). But Alexander's men were in a most favourable position for expressing their disapproval. Alexander knew that he could not rely on them to docilely accept such offensive behaviour as the removal of Philotas and Parmenio, and for this reason called the men together, in order to involve them in the offence and thereby to some extent escape the disapproval.

For these reasons, therefore, Alexander brought the Macedonian men-in-arms together. Philotas was the main
threat in Alexander's eyes and his removal was the most
dangerous in that it involved the removal of Parmenio. It
is clear that Alexander had no real case against him and made
Philotas' fate a personal issue, in which the men-in-arms had
to choose between the accused and their king: their decision,
if such it can be called, was in fact little more than the
submission to Alexander's will. The removal of Alexander of
Lyncestis was much less dangerous, he had been under arrest
for five years. It may be, as Hamilton suggests, that
Alexander saw his namesake as a potential rival to the throne,
but the men-in-arms did not see him as such. Their feelings
for their king were roused, the Lyncestian's death could have
meant little to them, they merely did what they thought the
king expected of them. Amyntas and his brothers, however,
came into a different category. Amyntas, a member of a
leading family of Tymphaea, had been a most prominent infantry
commander from the beginning of the campaign. The
association of his family with Philotas was no doubt
disturbing to Alexander, but there is no evidence that the
king tried to implicate them in any plot to assassinate him.
Perhaps Alexander pressed the case against them less
vigorously, he may have been aiming only to discourage
opposition among the nobles by demonstrating his support
amongst the troops and his willingness to use this support in
factional fighting against even prominent infantry officers.
In any event, Amyntas and his brothers were allowed to
maintain their positions.
The attitudes of the men-in-arms in these trials were evidently formed solely on the basis of the immediate circumstances, that is the personalities involved. In over five years of campaigning Alexander had led them to wealth and glory beyond their expectations, his prestige had perhaps reached its highest point. His deeds had eclipsed those of his father and in any trial of strength between Parmenio, who represented the old order, and himself, the majority of the men were naturally drawn to his own faction. The men would perhaps have been more reluctant to condemn the more popular Amyntas and his brothers, but if Alexander had pressed the case to involve them in the assassination attempt, we have no reason to suppose that they would not have sent them to the same fate as Philotatas. In any case, there is no sign of the troops being conscious of the political power inherent in their involvement in the trials, no urge to take an active role: they were totally dependent upon the will of the most dominant personality, the will of Alexander.

Granier (p.46f.) also uses the evidence on the trial of the 'royal pages' as further evidence of the right of the men-in-arms to act as jury in trials involving Macedonians on capital charges. Hermolaus led some of the royal pages in a plot to assassinate the king, the plot was uncovered and according to some versions Alexander brought them before the army, where, amid threats to their lives, they confessed and were stoned to death by the troops, or by the 'royal pages'. Callisthenes, whom Alexander implicated in the plot, was not allowed to appear before the assembly, but was merely imprisoned.
The evidence which states that Alexander brought the royal pages before the assembly of the men-in-arms is suspect: Ptolemy and Aristobulus do not seem to mention it, and Arrian implies that his source is not good (4.14.2). We must, therefore, be cautious in using the details contained in the sources, and Granier is far too confident in his assertion that the pages were tried before the army.

However, some notice must be taken of a comment put into Alexander's mouth by Curtius (8.8.19), that Callisthenes was not brought before the assembly because, as an Olynthian, he did not have the same right as a Macedonian. This could be taken to imply that the Macedonians did have a right to be brought before the assembly, but few would place much reliance upon this clause. I have already touched upon Curtius' inaccuracy in dealing with such matters, and it seems most unlikely that Alexander said any such thing. It is not clear why an Olynthian should not have been considered to be Macedonian; he was the subject of the Argead king, no less than the citizen of any other Greek place taken over by Philip and incorporated into the kingdom, e.g. Amphipolis. Certainly we need to assume no such constitutional rights to explain why Callisthenes did not appear before the assembly while the royal pages did (if they did). The Macedonian troops are hardly likely to have been much concerned about the fate of Callisthenes, Alexander need expect no disapproval from them if he simply removed him. The pages, however, were a different matter. They were of the most prominent families of the Macedonian nobility and support for them may have been considerable. Alexander may well have felt that he could
not simply execute them without the men's asking questions and disapproving of his action. The easiest way to avoid such disapproval was to involve the men in the execution. The episode of the trial of the pages, therefore, cannot be used in any discussion of the rights of the men-in-arms. The details are poorly attested, and even if the pages were tried before the assembled troops, this does not prove that there was a constitutional statute laying down the right of Macedonians to be so tried.

We may now move on to consider the mutinies of the Macedonians at the Hyphasis and at Opis. These are the only occasions during Alexander's lifetime when the Macedonian men-in-arms can clearly be seen asserting their collective will on their own initiative. There has been some discussion among scholars concerning the precise nature of the gatherings at which the troops made their feelings known. For Granier it was unthinkable that the soldiers could have had the constitutional right to disobey orders, and he therefore suggested that the gatherings were not formal 'assemblies of the men-in-arms' but spontaneous informal gatherings. Most recently, Schachermeyr has suggested that the gathering at the Hyphasis was not a formal meeting but the one at Opis was. Such discussions are meaningless and reveal the weakness of any attempt to impose a definite form upon Macedonian political practice. The men made no distinction between their relationship to Alexander as subject to king and their relationship to him as soldier to general, they were aware of no distinction between formal and informal meetings.
As Granier saw, it is, of course, out of the question to reconstruct a Macedonian constitution which laid down the right of the men-in-arms to refuse to continue a campaign. But recently Schachermeyr has used the mutinies as evidence that the Macedonian commoners in the army were becoming a united and politically conscious body, ready to consult their own interests before those of the nobles and to act to interfere in state policies. In the mutiny at the Hyphasis he sees the stirrings of democracy, and he suggests that the actions of the men at Opis show that they were nationally conscious, representing the nation of the Macedonians, and in that role rejecting Alexander's policy of fusion with the Iranians. We must consider this interpretation of the mutinies.

At the Hyphasis in 326 B.C. the Macedonian troops refused to continue the march eastwards and, despite Alexander's efforts to persuade them to continue, the invasion had to be abandoned. There is, of course, no doubt that the men showed a united front and that they spontaneously opposed Alexander's wishes: they successfully influenced the king's policy in their own interest. But it does not follow from this that they were politically motivated, that they were even aware of the implications of their refusal to go on; all they felt was that they wanted to escape the discomforts and uncertainty from which they were suffering. I have argued consistently that the Macedonians had no awareness of political issues, but were influenced only by personalities and immediate circumstances. There is no reason to suppose that the mutiny at the Hyphasis
involved any factors more complicated than these. It was a simple mutiny brought about by the extreme demands made upon them by Alexander, as he led them endlessly further into the unknown, away from their homeland. It is possible that by this stage their bond with Alexander was weakening, and Alexander no longer could command the respect and affection he had previously inspired in the men. His spell was insufficient to give the soldiers the strength to endure the toils and fatigue of campaigning in the difficult conditions of India. It seems unnecessary, and misleading, to see in this response to deep-rooted instincts the stirrings of democracy. The men were not seeking a role in the decision-making procedures of the Macedonian state, they merely did not want to suffer what they were suffering in India. We might note, finally, that Alexander did not abandon the invasion of India because he recognised the right of the men-in-arms to interfere in state policy, but merely because he could not go on without the troops. It was sheer practical necessity.

At Opis in 324 BC Alexander discharged veterans of the Indian campaign and at this the Macedonian men-in-arms spontaneously mutinied, refusing to follow Alexander any more unless he led them home. Again the Macedonians showed their independence, their unanimity, their ability to combine to act in their own interests. But it does not follow that we should see in the mutiny a growing awareness of their political power on the part of the men, and a consciousness of their position as representatives of the Macedonian nation. Certainly we should not see them consciously following a nationalist policy, in opposition to Alexander's policy of
fusion with the Iranians. It seems much more likely that the action of the Macedonians was again a simple mutiny with no political considerations involved. The men had lost their relationship with their king, there was no longer any contact between them. Alexander had begun to favour the Iranians, to bring them into an equal position beside the Macedonians. The Macedonians felt excluded and bewildered. It was the estrangement between themselves and Alexander that impelled them to mutiny, not a rational disapproval of his policies. The discharge of veterans in itself was not a reason for their mutiny, it was merely the occasion upon which they mutinied: they had been close to mutiny when Alexander had offered to clear their debts, which proves that they were not acting rationally at this time. They resented Alexander's favouring of Iranians, but to see in this resentment a policy of nationalism, and the growth of a popular pressure group in opposition to Alexander's policies is surely wrong. The mutiny was inspired by a simple breakdown in the relationship between Alexander and his men. We may explain this breakdown in terms of certain actions of Alexander and certain attitudes held by the Macedonian commoners, but it is misleading to foist our reasoning upon the Macedonian commoners, and from this invent a political motivation for their action. The men who mutinied at Opis did not reason, and did not know what motivated them, they were confused and distressed that they had lost their relationship with Alexander.

We must look finally at the part played by the men-in-arms in the upheaval which followed Alexander's death, for evidence
on this is often used to show that the Macedonian soldiers with Alexander in Asia were politically conscious. The majority of prominent officers who had served under Alexander supported the suggestion of Perdiccas that a decision upon the succession should be postponed until Alexander's child by Roxane was born. But Meleager, with the backing of the mass of the infantry, pressed the claim of Alexander's half-brother, Philip Arrhidaeus. A compromise was reached and details settled before a gathering of the Macedonian troops. Philip Arrhidaeus was to be king, and, if a son was produced by Roxane, he should share the kingship. Other arrangements were agreed before the troops, to provide for the command of the army and the administration of the empire, but these were in large part overridden when Perdiccas took over the direction of affairs.

Granier (pp.58ff.) sees this as another proof that it was recognised among the Macedonian people that the army had the right to choose and designate the king. Schachermeyr sees the role of the troops in the settlement at Babylon as marking a most important stage in the political development of the men-in-arms. During the course of the campaigning the men gradually became more conscious of their own political interests and power to implement these interests, as is shown by the mutinies in India and at Opis. But, Schachermeyr continues, at Babylon came the culmination of this development, when the proper function of the assembly of the men-in-arms was realised, as the men achieved full consciousness of their position and powers as the royal army of the Macedonians.
They saw themselves as representing the national interest of the Macedonians, in opposition to the ideas of fusion with the Iranians advocated by Alexander. For, in supporting the claims of Philip Arrhidaeus, Schachermeyr argues, they were rejecting the broad imperialist policies of cooperation with the Iranians and supporting a return to the more narrowly nationalistic aims, which they identified with Alexander's father, Philip. As important, for Schachermeyr, as the troops' consciousness of their own role is the recognition by the nobles of the troops' right to participate in the choice and designation of the king. The result was a true consensus of the Macedonians achieved through the constitutional process of a formal assembly.

There is no doubt that the army played an active role in the struggle for power, supporting Meleager's proposal that Philip Arrhidaeus be king. There is also no doubt that the nobles took notice of the opinions of the troops and modified their plans accordingly. But there is no support in the ancient sources for the view that the roles taken by the men-in-arms and the nobles were laid down by political tradition. The support of the army was of course most important: anyone bidding for power was obliged to seek the favour of the army, for this was the only basis of power for the officers at Babylon. But the practical necessity is quite sufficient to explain the attitude of the nobility and the participation of the troops.

A passage of Curtius, part of a speech by Perdiccas before the army, should perhaps be noticed, as it may be...
thought to support the view that the right of the troops to designate the king was recognised. Perdiccas says that it lies in the power of the army to name its head (capite opus est; hoc nominare in vestra potestate est (10,6,8) ). But this need not refer to any constitutional right, but only to the practical reality of the situation: in these circumstances the army did have the power to make, or break, anyone bidding for the kingship. Curtius need mean no more than this. But even if he did have some notion of an established political tradition in his mind, I have already shown, I hope, that Curtius' grasp of constitutional theory and practice was very loose, and his evidence on such matters should not be relied upon.

Schachermeyr's view that the Macedonian heavy infantry had developed a spirit of independence and become a politically conscious force with its own opinions needs some discussion. I have already suggested that opposition to Alexander at the Hyphasis and at Opis should not be seen as a political initiative taken by men conscious of their ability to influence state policies. The dispute over the succession was a more clearly political issue and the participation of the heavy infantry was decisive, but Schachermeyr surely exaggerates the degree of their political awareness and their consciousness of any political power to influence decisions of state. I have tried to show that they had no consciousness of any political tradition and that they had no expectation of, or interest in, participation in policy making. When asked for support they would give it in accordance with their
feelings towards the personalities involved. At the accession of Alexander in 336 B.C., for instance, they supported Alexander and to that extent made a political decision, but it hardly follows from this that the troops involved were politically conscious! And the situation at Babylon in 323 B.C. scarcely seems different, the troops were asked for their support and they gave it in accordance with their feelings. At Babylon unanimity was not achieved among the officers, Meleager sought the support of the troops for his faction, in opposition to Perdiccas at the head of other factions. The troops were thus presented with a choice, but it does not follow from this that they were more politically conscious in 323 B.C. than they had been in 336 B.C. They played an active role in so far as they chose whom to support, but they showed no initiative towards involvement in the political decision.

Nor is it necessary to explain their bias towards Meleager's faction in terms of a greater awareness of political and national issues. I have suggested that in 336 B.C., at the accession of Alexander, the men's mood was influenced by their affection for Philip and their expectation that Alexander would follow along the path marked out by his father, which promised to bring them a prosperous livelihood. Such simple attitudes can scarcely be called political at all. In 323 B.C. their mood was influenced by no more sophisticated considerations. They had been led by Alexander through a decade of hard fighting, only to be asked at the end to share the fruits of victory with the conquered, and to be asked also to share their king with them. They had become alienated
from Alexander, therefore, in the last years of his reign. The proposal presented to them by Perdiccas was that the decision concerning the succession be postponed until Alexander's child by Roxane was born in several months' time. The alternative suggested by Meleager was that the adult son of Philip, half-brother of Alexander, be made king immediately. Schachermeyr reasons that the men decided between the two proposals on the basis of their awareness of the national interest, but their response was surely not so intellectual. The child of Alexander was not yet born, it might be female. It would certainly be semi-Iranian. This was hardly likely to appeal to the troops, in view of their feelings on this subject. On the other side, the nearest male relative of Alexander was available, the son of Philip who had done so much for the Macedonians. The troops reacted as they did because of their experience, but their response was instinctive, not reasoned as Schachermeyr argues. They did not support Meleager's proposal because they considered that Alexander's policy of fusion with the Iranians was against the national interest, or even against their own interest; in supporting Philip Arrhidæus they were not supporting a return to a more narrowly nationalistic policy. Their decision was made on the basis of simple considerations of the personalities involved: Philip Arrhidæus was more acceptable, but they were not conscious of any reasons for their choice.

This concludes my survey of the relations between Alexander and the Macedonian heavy infantry. I have tried
to show that these relations were unaffected by any consciousness, on either side, of any constitutional theory, nor by anything except immediate circumstances and the feelings of the men. The intimate involvement of the men in affairs of state and the king's dependence upon the support of the troops during the Asian campaign made it necessary for those in power to take some account of the mood and opinion of the troops, but the troops showed no sign of any political consciousness and no progress towards active participation in the formation of state policy.
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NOTES TO CHAPTERS I TO VI
NOTES TO CHAPTER I

THE MACEDONIAN ARMY UNTIL THE ACCESSION OF PHILIP II

1) This is the usual interpretation of Thucydides' words ἐς ἔδει 
Μακεδόνες...ἐπούς ἐς προσμεταπερθοφευνοίκοι τῶν ἄνω ἐμμάχων
(100,5). Gomme (II p.248) suggests that these 'allies' may 
not be the peoples (Lycestians, Elimiots and others) 
whom Thucydides describes as ἡ ἕθη ἐπάνωθεν,
ἐς ἐμμαχάκη μὲν ἐστὶ τούτοις
(sc. the people of Lower Macedonia under Perdiccas' 
kingship) καὶ ἐπήκοα (99,2). Gomme points out 
that they were already 'subject' to Perdiccas and 
suggests that the 'allies' were independent people to 
the north. But his suggestion is not convincing. There 
were, of course, Paeonian tribes to the north which may 
have had alliances with Perdiccas, but there is no 
evidence. (See I.L. Merker, 'The Ancient Kingdom of 
Paeonia', Balkan Studies 6 (1965) pp.35-54, for a general 
discussion of these peoples.) The natural interpretation 
of Thucydides' reference at 100,5, however, surely is 
that the men of Upper Macedonia are the ones summoned. 
They are called 'allies' at 99,2 (as Gomme himself notes) 
and are explicitly distinguished from the subjects of 
Perdiccas in Lower Macedonia, 'having their own kings'. 
Further, 'these Macedonians' (100,1) which were 
threatened by the Thracians, and are the subject of the 
narrative of ch.100, would seem to be only the 
Macedonians of Lower Macedonia, cf. Gomme loc.cit. The 
'Upper Macedonians' are, therefore, not included among
the Macedonians who face the Thracians. If they were not there, then surely 'the allies' summoned by Perdiccas were the subject allies of Upper Macedonia, for if he called for any support it would surely be from them.

2) Torone, Lecythus, Scione, and Mende are known to have been in Brasidas' hands (Thuc. 4, 110ff.; 121).

3) For Greek cities in Macedonia, see now, Hammond *Macedonia* pp.123-191.

4) The Chalcidians generally were weak in hoplites. See, for instance, Best p.20.

5) *Hermes* 81 pp.88ff. Kahrstedt assumes that all the 3,000 hoplites were made up from Greeks living in Macedonia (p.96), but this is not what Thucydides says.


9) καὶ τὰλλα διεκόμησε τὰ τε κατὰ τὸν πόλεμον ἑπότας καὶ ὑπότας καὶ τῇ ἄλλῃ περισκεψῃ κρείσσονε.....

For the formula elsewhere, cf. 1,80,3; 6,41,3.


11) Pydna was besieged in 411 B.C., and, when reduced, moved inland (Diod. 13,49,1).
12) When ambassadors came to Sparta from Acanthus and Apollonia to complain of the ambitions of Olynthus in 383 B.C., according to Xenophon's account (Hell. 5,2, 12ff.), they warned the Spartans that the Olynthians had undertaken to free the cities of Macedonia from Amyntas, and had even occupied Pella. They continued that Amyntas was withdrawing from his cities and had been just about driven out of the whole of Macedonia. Caution must be exercised in using such evidence, but the implications are that Amyntas was in some way in possession of these cities which Olynthus was setting out to free, and that in so far as he could withdraw from the cities he would seem to have had troops in occupation: further, it seems that withdrawal from the cities meant that he lost control of the country. We cannot know the content or strength of these garrisons, but it seems likely that they were in the main mercenary.

13) Geyer Maked. b.z. Phil. p.79, argues that Xenophon deliberately understated the contribution of Amyntas to the victory over the Olynthians, because he did not want to give the impression that a semi-barbarian king could inflict a defeat upon Greeks. In view of the established weakness of the Macedonian troops, however, it hardly seems necessary to convict Xenophon of such bias in his reporting.

14) Kahrstedt pp.96ff.; Griffith G&R 12 p.128. It led to
the growth of urban centres.

15) Maked. B.Z. Phil. p.101. The argument runs as follows. Amyntas' son-in-law is called Ptolemy, the Alorite, by Diodorus (15,71,1), presumably to distinguish him from other men of the same name. Ptolemy must have been a high-ranking Macedonian noble and high-ranking nobles were not city dwellers; Ptolemy, therefore, was not a citizen of the city of Alorus. It follows that he must have had landholdings in an area which was named after and administered from the city of Alorus. cf. Pantauchus, the son of Nicolaus (Berve II no.604). There is no reason to suppose that this is the only instance of such an arrangement; in the time of Alexander III the practice seems to have been widespread throughout Lower Macedonia. cf. Mieza, Verria, etc. in the trierarch list Arr. Ind. 18,3f. We may assume that Amyntas put royal agents into these cities, and perhaps a small garrison.

16) Aeschin. 2,27.

17) The succession was usually a time of turmoil: from the time of Alexander I to that of Alexander II it had always been accompanied by violence.

18) The text is that of Jacoby, FGrH II A no.72 F.4 (pp.116-7).
NOTES TO CHAPTER I

πεζέταιροι. Ἀγγειόθεν ἡμιπολεικαῖς. Ἀναξιμένης ἐν αἱ ἡμιπολεικῶν περὶ Ἀλέξανδρος λέγων φησίν. ἐπειτα τούς μὲν ἐνδομοτάτους ἴσπευειν συνεθέσις ἐταῖρως προσεχόρευε, τοὺς δὲ πλέιστους καὶ τοὺς πεζούς εἰς λόχους καὶ θεκάδας καὶ τὰς κάλλις ἀρχαῖς δεσλῶν πεζεταῖροι ὑπόμοιαν, ὡς ἐκάτεροι μετέχουσι τῆς βασιλικῆς ἐταιρίας προσομότατα διατελῶσιν ὄντες.

Momigliano (p.8) suggests that καὶ τοὺς πεζούς after τοὺς δὲ πλέιστους should be omitted because it is tautologous: the infantry can be none other but the commoners and he concludes that the words are a gloss. However, this does not seem sound. Anaximenes is interested in showing that both cavalry and infantry were involved in the organisation, and some explicit reference to the infantry is required. Geyer suggests that καὶ is explicative and this is right (Maked. b.z. Phil. p.88).

19) 1376-8.

19a) The hetairoi proper were men called into a specially close personal relationship with the Argead king. Many were influential nobles in dependent parts of the kingdom, whom the king wished to bind to himself for political reasons, others were rather personal friends of the king. The relationship does not appear to have carried any formal duties, but those hetairoi at court generally
shared in the king's life, eating, drinking and hunting with him, and often were called into council by the king for discussions of state policy. They also formed a pool upon which the king would draw for officers and agents to carry out particular assignments. Some method is needed of distinguishing between these *hetairoi* and the cavalry force called *hetairoi*, and I have adopted the terms *hetairoi councillors* and *hetairoi cavalry* in order to avoid confusion. Literature on the *hetairoi councillors* is extensive. See, for example, Plaumann 1374ff. s.v. *έταιροι*; Berve I pp.30ff.; Carrata Thomes; Franke review of Carrata Thomes) Gnomon 30 (1958) pp.206-210.

20) Maked. b.z. Phil. p.88.


22) pp.8ff.

23) RE 19 (1938) 1413 s.v. *pezetairoi*.

24) II pp.137, 140f.

25) p.104.

26) G&R 12 p.128.

27) Jacoby FGrH II c p.105.


29) Liddell and Scott Lexicon s.v. *2ρχύ* Sophocles Lexicon says that this meaning is a Hebraism.
NOTES TO CHAPTER I

30) Prof. Keaney, who is working on the manuscripts of Harpocration, reported to me that there was no reason to doubt the text.


34) I p.104.

35) 1376-8.


37) I p.104.

38) FGrH IIb 115 F.224.

39) Xen. Hell. 5,2,40.

40) Philip had under his sovereignty, in addition to Elimeia, Lower Macedonia, Orestis, Lyncestis and other territory of Upper Macedonia.

41) Demosth. 01. II, 16f. τοῖς δὲ τῆς φιλοτεμίας τῆς ἀπὸ τούτων οὐ μέτεστε...... οὐ μὲν οὖν πολλοὶ Μακεδόνων πῶς ἔχουσιν Φιλίππῷ, ἐκ τούτων ἄν τες χαλεπῶς· οὐ δὲ δὴ περὶ αὐτῶν ὄντως ξένος καὶ πεζέτωρος δόξαν μὲν ἔχουσιν ὡς εἰσὶ Θησαυροῦ καὶ συγγκεκριμένοι τα ὁπὸν πολέμου, οὐδένων εἰσὶ βελτίως.
NOTES TO CHAPTER I

42) FGrH IIb 115 f.348: Θεόπομπος φησίν ὀτι ἐκ πάντων τῶν Μακεδόνων ἐξελέκτων ὁ μέγεστος καὶ ἐσχυράτατος ἑθομορόου τῶν βασιλέω καὶ ἐκαλοῦντο πεζέταιροι. His words are echoed by Photius and the Etymologicum Magnum; cf. Jacoby IIc p.107.

43) I cannot accept that Theopompus was really referring to the hypaspists and made a mistake when he used the term 'pezetairoi' in this fragment. This is the argument presented by Milns Historia 16 p.511.

44) RE 19 (1938) 1413.

45) It is generally assumed that the text of Anaximenes does refer to the beginnings of the phalanx system, e.g. Berve I p.113; Kahrstedt p.104; Griffith G&R 12 p.128.

46) Arr. 4,2,1; 7,23,3.

47) See the description in Xenophon (Cyrop. 2,3,22) and the discussion of Anderson p.100. The names of other divisions are known from later times, e.g. the reign of Philip V (F.W. Walbank, Philip V (Cambridge, 1940) pp.293f.) and from the writers on Tactics (e.g. Arrian Tactica), but there can be no certainty that the phalanx of the Macedonians always was so organised. See also below, Ch.IV pp.127f.

48) See above p.13. Plaumann 1378 uses this passage.

49) PCPhS 4 p.7.
NOTES TO CHAPTER I

50) Parke pp.69; 101ff.

51) Jacoby PGrH I1b 115, F.224: for a discussion of dating and content, Appendix I. Between the time of Alexander II and 340 B.C. the extent of the kingdom had been doubled. The personal army of Jason of Pherae numbered 500 cavalry and 1,500 infantry (cf. Parke pp.69,101ff.).

52) See above, n.42.

53) For a discussion of the armour, see Griffith PCPhS 4 pp.3ff.

54) The lack of a breastplate and the smaller shield in particular distinguished them from the hoplite. See the discussion of Griffith (loc.cit.).

55) For a discussion of the Thracian peltast, see Best pp.3-11 and plates on p.46.


57) That is the sarissa and the pelte.

58) Aeschin. 2,27.

59) Parke actually believed that Philip II was responsible for the Macedonian phalanx and suggested that Philip may have been influenced by Iphicrates' use of the peltast (pp.155-6). Cf. Anderson pp.129ff. The connection between Alexander and Iphicrates is even more likely.
60) The appearance of more defensive armour is noticeable among the Thracians during the fifth century B.C., when increased contact with the Greeks brought more trade and prosperity (Best pp.13f.). The same development may have taken place in the Argead kingdom during the first half of the fourth century B.C.

61) The section of sixteen men was not a true phalangite file, in that twelve of the men were archers and javelin-men. It is nevertheless significant that the file was called a decas. Cf. Domaszewski p.26; N. Hammond Studies in Greek History (Oxford, 1973) p.548.

62) 5,2,3. See below, Ch.IV pp.122f.

63) Xenophon (An. 3,4,21) gives a lochos as 100 men. In the Spartan army it was part of a mora, but its size was not consistent (Xen. Hell. 2,4,31). Cf. RE 13 (19,26) 933f.

64) Cf. F.W. Walbank Philip V (Cambridge, 1940) pp.293ff. and Arrian Tactica. By the time of Philip V the lochos was the basic phalangite file, and comprised 16 men. All the divisions were thus in multiples of 16, at least in theory. It would seem that many changes had taken place in the organisation and terminology since the middle of the fourth century B.C. (see further, Ch.IV pp.127f.).

65) For instance, Momigliano p.9; Geyer Maked. b.z. Phil. pp.88f.
NOTES TO CHAPTER I

66) If Alexander II separated some 'peltasts' from the mass of infantry to form a phalangite force, he may also have separated other units, for instance, archers and javelin-men. There is, however, no evidence of any such units in the sources until the campaign of Alexander III in Asia, when archers appear (Arr. 1,6,6 et passim). It should be noted that Philip and Alexander III made use of Cretan mercenary archers (Berve I pp.149ff.).


68) On all this, see Geyer op.cit. pp.135ff.

69) Polyaen. 4,10,2.

70) Philip withdrew this garrison at the beginning of his reign. RR 1 (1894) 1951 s.v. Amphipolis. Cf. Demosth. 23, 116

71) Philip could raise 10,000 infantry in 358 B.C. and he could by then have had little time to build up the military resources he had inherited (Diod. 16,4,3).
NOTES TO CHAPTER II

THE ARMY OF PHILIP II

1) 16,3.

2) Other references to the quality of Philip's army appear in Frontinus 4,2,4., Polyaenus 4,2,10.

3) See Brunt pp.27ff. and Appendix II pp.358f.

4) Diod. 17,17,3ff.

5) It has been generally assumed that all the figures for Macedonians refer to heavy-armed troops, infantry and cavalry. This is almost certainly accurate. Only hetairoi type heavy-armed cavalry are known and 'pezoi' usually refers to heavy-armed infantry. However, it must be remembered that there were a few hundred light-armed Macedonians in Alexander's infantry force and, presumably, there were also a few in Antipater's, but it seems likely that these were not included in the totals given by Diodorus. See further discussion Appendix II pp.358f.

6) For instance, Beloch p.326; Berve I pp.105 and 113.

7) G&R 12 p.132.

8) Diod. 17,63,1. Antipater collected together an army of 40,000 for this expedition and, although many of these were Greeks (allies and perhaps some mercenaries), it is difficult to believe that less than a third of them were Macedonian.
9) The Macedonian treasury was very low (Arr. 7,9,6) in 334 B.C., and mercenaries would not have been employed unless really needed.

10) Although this is not explicitly stated anywhere, it was a general policy to use mercenaries for garrison duty. The force with Corragus (Aeschin. 3,165), though in part Macedonian no doubt, was surely made up in large part from mercenaries.

11) It is not clear whether Griffith considers that all the Macedonians in garrisons were included in Diodorus' total or not; perhaps the implication is that if the mercenaries of the garrisons were not included, neither were the Macedonians (G&R 12 p.129). If the Macedonians are not included, perhaps the total for 334 B.C. can be brought up a little closer to that for 323 B.C., which Griffith is at pains to do (p.131).


13) On the manpower resources of Macedonia, see now Hammond Macedonia pp.15ff.

14) Philip's reputation as a founder of settlements was well established in the ancient world. Most often quoted is the reference put into Alexander's mouth by Arrian (7,9,2), that Philip found most of the Macedonians nomadic and poor and brought them down from the mountains on to the
plains and made them live in cities. Whatever the authenticity of this speech in Arrian (see Wüst Historia 2 pp.177-188), there is plenty of evidence that Philip did found many settlements. See A. Keramopoullos, εἰ "πόλεις" τοῦ Φιλίππου β' ἐν Μακεδονίκα, Classical Studies presented to E. Capps (Princeton, 1936) pp.191-203. H. Dell, 'The Western Frontier of the Macedonian Monarchy' Ancient Macedonia pp.115-126. For Philip's settlements in Thrace, see Diod. 16,71,2.

15) 4,124,1.

16) On Greek immigration see most recently C. Edson 'Early Macedonia' pp.38ff.

17) See below. Scylax 66 knows Apollonia to be a Greek city.

18) Griffith PCPhS 4 p.9, suggests that Philip's soldiers provided their own armour and this is probable: but even if Philip did help them with their armour, an increase in wealth meant an increase in their ability to serve in the army.

19) Diod. 16,34,5. On the territory of Olynthus, see Demosth. 19,194.

20) Momigliano p.16.

21) Grants of land to prominent Macedonians are well attested, but there is nothing to show that these grants raised a man from 'infantry class' to 'cavalry class' and, indeed,
there is nothing to show that the aim of the grants of land was to increase the cavalry potential. It is just possible that some of the cadet families of the Old Macedonian nobility, which Griffith plausibly suggests benefitted from the grants more than any other class (G&R 12 p.135), had fallen into such poverty that they could not afford to equip themselves as cavalry, but this seems unlikely. As Tarn says, II p.155, those who benefitted from the grants may well have held land in other parts of Macedonia already. It remains true, however, that an increase in their wealth would have made them better able to serve their king, even on a long campaign (so Griffith).

22) He actually suggests (p.14) that the comparison of Theopompus (Jacoby EGrH 115 F.225b) between the land of the 800 hetairoi and the land of 10,000 rich Greeks referred to the distribution of the land of Olynthus to hetairoi, quoting the size of the citizen body (10,000 (Demosth. 19,266) ), to support him. This is evidently wrong. Theopompus is using 10,000 in the most general sense of 'a very large number' and was not thinking of any specific body of Greeks. In any case it is impossible that all 800 hetairoi had the land of the Olynthians (Appendix I p.338).

23) Arr. 1,18,3; et passim.
NOTES TO CHAPTER II

24) Arr. 1,12,7; 2,9,3; In general, see Berve I p.105.

25) See, for example, Berve loc.cit.

25a) See Ch.III pp.60f.

26) See Berve loc.cit.

27) On the tribe of the Argeadae, see now Hammond Macedonia pp.431ff.

28) For instance, Berve loc.cit.; Momigliano p.11; Tarn p.154.


30) See n.28.

31) 2.99.3. See also Hammond Macedonia pp.150ff.

32) Polybius 5.97.4.

33) RE 3 (1897) 795.

34) So Geyer and Zancan, see n.29.

35) Beloch p.326.

36) RE 2 (1896) 2299.

37) p.107.

38) Dioi. 17,57,2. And see below, Ch.IV pp.95f.
NOTES TO CHAPTER II

39) Cf. for instance, Berve I p.105; Momigliano p.11. Tarn's assertion (II p.155) that an equal force of cavalry was not left with Antipater has not been accepted by recent scholars: cf. Griffith G&R 12 p.129.

40) The 3,300 cavalry would seem to represent the full first-line strength of the Argead kingdom.


42) See above, pp.4 ff.

43) On this process, see, in general, Kahrstedt's article.

44) In Bottiaea, for instance, although many urban settlements had developed (see Hammond Macedonia pp.150ff.), they were not used as military recruitment areas because the old divisions had not been eclipsed by them.

45) Edson, 'Early Macedonia' (p.28 n.61) makes the point that the Bisaltians are not recorded as serving the Argeadae in war.

46) See Berve I pp.134ff.


48) Berve I p.105; Momigliano p.11; Tarn II p.154.
NOTES TO CHAPTER II

49) pp.66ff.

50) see n.29.

51) G&R 12 p.135.

52) Zancan (cited n.29) p.138, thought that it had been a Macedonian city from its foundation, but it seems unlikely that Amyntas II would have ceded it to Hippias (Herod.5,94) and Philip II to the Chalcidians (Demosth. 6,20) if this had been so.

53) p.326.

54) I p.104.

55) Momigliano (pp.7ff.) stated that all the cavalry class were called 'hetairoi', but there is no evidence that the word ever carried this meaning. Hampl's view that the term referred to the personal followers of the Argead king (see above and n.49) cannot be defended. See, for instance, Geyer's review PhW 5 pp.118-123; and my discussion of Anaximenes' fragment, Ch.I pp.16 f.

56) Although immigrant Greeks were brought into the ranks of the hetairoi cavalry, it certainly remained, essentially, an elite of Macedonian nobility.

57) Diod. 16,4,3.

58) FGrH 115 F.225b. The phrase 'at that time' (see Appendix I p.332e) seems to imply that he was referring to a
NOTES TO CHAPTER II

time before some change took place.

59) Fredricksmeyer ('Ancestral Rites of Alexander the Great', CPh 61 (1966) pp.179-82 esp. p.181 n.13) suggests that Philip and Alexander tried to break down the religious barriers between Macedonian, Greek and native within the kingdom. The same may well be true of military divisions.

60) See above p. 39

61) I shall argue below that there were no Macedonian cavalry but the hetairoi with Alexander on the Asian campaign (Appendix II pp.365f).

62) I suggested in my discussion of Anaximenes' fragment (FGrH 72 P.4) that Anaximenes' explanation of why Alexander applied the term 'hetairoi' to the cavalry did not carry conviction in view of the nature of the body; for it is not necessary to seek a personal bodyguard's loyalty with a name: they would be loyal in any case. His comment fits much better the situation of 334 B.C., a situation with which Anaximenes was much better acquainted, and which could have led him into confusion. It can perhaps be used to support my view here.

63) For instance, Arrian 1,8,3; 2,27,1; 2,23,2; 4,23,1.

64) See, for instance, Beloch, p.330. For a full discussion, see Ch.IV pp.141 ff.

65) For instance, Berve I p.113; Tarn II p.141.
NOTES TO CHAPTER II

66) Arr. 1.14.2. Beloch believed that there were seven battalions at Gaugamela (p.328), but he was misled by confusion in the sources (see Ch.IV pp. 95 ff. for my discussion of the passage of Arrian).

67) See, for instance, Hammond Macedonia pp.102ff.


69) See, for instance, Beloch pp.326ff.


71) Tarn II p.142, assumes that Antipater was left with six battalions only, which would mean that some of the battalions of the infantry levy numbered 1,500, others 2,000. Unless there is specific evidence to the contrary, it is sound to assume a uniformity in the organisation.

72) Diod. 16.4.3.

73) Parke pp.155ff. Momigliano p.13 n.1 calculated that the Macedonian infantry on the campaign against Onomarchus in 352 B.C. numbered 14,000. Even if his method of arriving at this number is sound, and this is doubtful, it cannot be shown that all these were Macedonians (See Diod. 16.35.4: to arrive at his figure Momigliano subtracts the number of Thessalian infantry in the field in the previous year (6,000, Diod. 16.30.4) from the total Diodorus gives for 352 B.C., 20,000).
NOTES TO CHAPTER II

74) Some tribal groups remained aloof, see n.45 above.

75) See above, pp. 46 ff.

76) Kahrstedt p.104, suggests that Philip's achievement lay in the uniform organisation and arming of the infantry, which before had been very ragged and uneven. It seems likely that he has exaggerated the poor condition of the infantry prior to Philip's reform, and that the heartland of Macedonia did produce some good infantry, but he probably accurately describes the situation in the more remote parts of the kingdom.

77) I p.115.

78) 1,28,3; 2,23,2; 4,23,1; 5,22,6; 6,6,1; 6,21,3; 7,2,1. See further, my discussion of the term 'phalanx.' Appendix III p.375 ff.

79) I 113. He thought that Antipater had 3,000 hypaspists, corresponding to Alexander's. Tarn agreed that all the infantry levy was called 'pezetairoi' (II, 140).

80) Demosth. 01. 2,17. Despite Milns' arguments, Historia 16 p.511, there seems no doubt that Demosthenes used the term 'pezetairoi' of an elite guard and that the scholiast was right. See discussion above, Ch.I n.43.

81) p.12.

82) p.432.
NOTES TO CHAPTER II


84) Milns Historia 16 p.511.

85) Tarn II p.153; Griffith PCPhS 4 pp.3f. Milns Historia 16 p.510. They fought at the major battles within the phalanx (Arr. 2, 8, 3; 3, 11, 9).

86) Berve's case to show that there were two distinct bodies of hypaspists, the agema being part of the ordinary hypaspists, a separate body from the 'royal hypaspists', is untenable, as Tarn has shown (II p.149).

87) p.432. Bauer's case is based on the view that they were converted porters.

88) Milns Historia 16 p.511.

89) See also my discussion, Ch.I pp. 19ff.

90) FGrH 115 F.348. See above, Ch.I n.42.

91) See above, pp. 36 ff.

92) I have not touched upon tactical developments during Philip's reign, though some are attributed to him (e.g. Arrian Tactica 16, 6).
NOTES TO CHAPTER III

THE COMPANION CAVALRY OF ALEXANDER

1) The term is in wide use to refer to the hetairoi cavalry of Alexander the Great and I have therefore adopted it in my discussions here.


3) Historia 20 p.620.

4) See most recently, Hamilton, Comm. p.81 on the date of the battle.

5) (Historia 20 pp.620f. Beloch p.318 also reached this conclusion though by different means. Badian, 'Agis III' Hermes 95 (1967) pp.170-192, esp. p.185 n.3 suggested that Alexander reached Babylon in about a fortnight, but he has informed me that he has revised his estimate and would agree with Wirth.

6) See Badian, Hermes 95 p.185. The site of Mennis was near modern Kirkuk. The whole question of marching rates is a difficult one. It might be expected that there was a comfortable day's march to which the army in favourable circumstances would conform. R. Milns, 'Alexander's Pursuit of Darius through Iran', Historia 15 (1966), p.256, calculated that Cyrus' army averaged 18 km. per day when moving at full speed over 700 km. (Xen. Anab. 1,4,19 - 1,8,1). More recently, C. Neumann, 'A Note on Alexander's Marching Rates' Historia 20 (1971), pp.196-8
suggests that a normal day's march may have been in the region of 19-24 km. Conditions along the roads of the plain of Mesopotamia could hardly have been better for marching, providing the weather was favourable. See *Iraq and the Persian Gulf*, Naval Intelligence Division (1944), esp. pp.91ff. with figure 24 for a description of the route south from Gaugamela.

7) Wirth *Historia* 20 p.620 thought that Alexander would have had to dash ahead of the main army in order to reach Susa in 20 days, but I disagree with his estimate of the speed of Alexander's army on this route.

8) The district of Sittacene is named after the city of Sittace, it seems, but its location is the subject of disagreement among the ancient authors. Stephen of Byzantium placed it on the Tigris, Xenophon (*Anab.* 2,4,13) put it 15 stades west of the Tigris. The weight of opinion, however, makes the city lie to the east of that river. Ptolemy (6,1,6) says the city is two degrees longitude east of the river, close to Susiana: Strabo (11,13,6; 15,3,12) and Pliny (*n.h.* 6,1,14) also indicate that Sittacene lay to the east of the river. Diodorus' evidence is too confused to be usable (17,110,4). See Welles' discussion, *Diod. Sic.* pp.442-3. It would appear that it was a narrow fertile strip bordered by the river in the west and by Susiana in the east, and on the direct route from Babylon to Susa. For further
NOTES TO CHAPTER III

discussion see RE 3 A, 1 (1927) 399f.

9) Diodorus (17,65,2) says that Alexander rested in Sittacene because he was anxious to rest the army after the fatigue of long marches, but I do not think this is good evidence for supposing that Alexander marched from Babylon to Sittacene in forced marches. He may have been using a standard formula to explain why Alexander rested his troops. Weissbach, RE 3 A, 1 (1927) 400, interprets Diodorus' evidence (17,65,1) as meaning that Alexander entered Sittacene on the sixth day after leaving Babylon. However, Diodorus states only that it was after Alexander had left Babylon and was on the road that the reinforcements met him and that it was on the sixth day after the arrival of the reinforcements that Alexander entered Sittacene. Diodorus gives no indication how long Alexander had been on the road when the reinforcements arrived. Alexander could only have reached the Tigris from Babylon in five days if he had headed north-east to ford the river, instead of going on the direct route to Susa.

10) Nam cum ante equites in suam quisque gentem discriberentur seorsus a ceteris, exempto nationum discrimine, praefectis non utique suarum gentium, sed delectis attribuit.

11) Curtius actually refers to the cavalry being divided
NOTES TO CHAPTER III

according to \textit{gens} prior to the reform, and the distinction of \textit{natio} being removed by the reform. But there can be no doubt that he is actually referring to the recruitment districts. See above, Ch.II pp.36 ff.

12) Cf. Berve I p.106. It is possible that in 331 B.C. recruits for the Asian force were drawn from districts which had not been drawn on in 334 B.C.

13) \textit{ενταύθα καὶ Αμίωτις ὁ Ἀνδρομένους ἔτι δυνάμει ἄφεψατο ἐν ἔκ Μακεδονίας ἡ ἡμ. καὶ τούτων τοὺς μὲν ἐπίσης ἐς τὴν ἕπα τὴν ἐταύτην κατέτασαν Αλέξανδρος, τοὺς πεζοὺς δὲ προσέθηκε. ταῖς τάξεοι ταῖς ἀλλαῖς, κατὰ ἐθνη ἐκαστότων ἔνταξας, κατέστησε δὲ καὶ λόχους δύο ἐν ἐκάστη ἱλην, ὡς πρόσθεν ὄντας λόχους ἐπίστικους καὶ λοχαγοὺς ἐπέστησε τοὺς κατ’ ἀρετὴν προκριθέντας ἐκ τῶν ἐταύτων.

The translation of \textit{ταῖς τάξεσι ταῖς ἀλλαίς} is disputed. It could mean 'the other battalions', but since none have been mentioned previously it is more likely that the words \textit{ταῖς ἀλλαίς} look forward to the phrase which follows \textit{κατὰ ἐθνη ἐκαστότων ἔνταξας} (see Ch.IV pp.117 ff.). Robson in his translation of this passage (Arrian, Loeb edition, 1949) I p.277 offers the translation 'various', but perhaps 'individual' gets the sense better.

NOTES TO CHAPTER III

15) Although the interpretation is disputed, I shall argue below (pp. 168 ff.) that the lochoi of Arrian 7,24,5, are Macedonian cavalry sections.


17) 1379.

18) For a description of the campaign, with particular reference to the terrain, see A. Stein, Old Routes of Western Iran (London, 1940) pp.18-27.

19) Accepted without question, by, for instance, Brunt, p.31.

20) Arr. 5,11,3; 12,2; 16,3. For a date of April/May 326 B.C. for the battle, see Beloch, p.320.


22) Arr. 4,6,3ff.; Curt. 7,7,30ff.

23) The sources seem to imply that Hephaestion wintered in Bactria (Curt. 8,2,13), Coenus in Sogdiana (separate from Alexander, Arr. 4,17,3), Craterus somewhere in Bactria (Arr. 4,18,1) and Alexander at Nautaca in Sogdiana (Arr. 4,18,1). Cf. Tarn I p.72 n.1.

24) Coenus was active in Sogdiana (Arr. 4,17,4), Alexander made raids against strongpoints in Sogdiana (Arr. 4,18,4) and in the territory of the Pareitaceneae (Arr. 4,21,1). Cf. Tarn, I p.72 n.4.
NOTES TO CHAPTER III

25) Berve (I p.108), Tarn (II p.164-5) and Griffith (JHS 83 pp.68-74) argue that Alexander introduced hipparchies as a means of using Iranian horse in conjunction with the Companion cavalry. I deal with this point in Appendix IV pp. 400ff., but I hope I have shown that there was adequate reason for a reorganisation in the very nature of the warfare. Brunt (pp.30-32) suggested that the reason for the reorganisation was Alexander's distrust of his officers. But Alexander surely trusted Hephaestion and could have made him commander of the Companions. The organisational necessity was the paramount consideration.

26) Berve (I p.108) suggested a date of 329 B.C., but his arguments were decisively refuted by Tarn (II p.163 n.4). Tarn (II pp.163ff.) put the date of the reorganisation at mid-326 B.C., but for reasons which have been shown to be inadequate by Brunt (p.29). Griffith (JHS 83 pp.68f.) argues for a date of 329 B.C. on the basis of the belief that Arrian did not confuse the meanings of the words 'ile' and 'hipparchy'. This belief, I have tried to demonstrate, is untenable (Appendix III pp.383f.). Brunt (pp.28-30) argues for a date of 328 B.C.

27) For instance, Tarn (II p.136 n.4) and Brunt (p.29).

28) See n.27.

29) For the date of the start of the Indian campaign,
NOTES TO CHAPTER III

Cf. Arr. 4,22,3.

30) Tarn (II p.165 n.3) argues that Demetrius is mistakenly called hipparch by Arrian here, and that he was in fact an ilarch. He asserts that Demetrius was an ilarch at the battle of Gaugamela in the autumn of 331 B.C. and invites us to believe that he was still ilarch in 327 B.C. despite the fact that he admits that he was hipparch one year later in 326 B.C.


32) In any case, the satrapy of Bactria was vital to the security of the empire and Alexander must have a reliable man in the post (Badian, G&R vol.12 p.177). It was also a good opportunity to remove from his presence one of the 'old guard' Macedonians (cf. Parmenio's post in Media).

33) Curt. 8,5,4; Arr. 4,22,3. On the date of Cleitus' death, see Hamilton, Comm. p.139.

34) Arrian's expression 'almost four hipparchies' (καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἑταίρων ἐς τέσσαρας μάλεστα ἑπιφυκίας) is odd. Tarn (II p.164 n.1) criticised Berve (I p.108 n.5) for his translation 'nicht ganz vier Hipparchien', suggesting that it was 'a clumsy phrase which might suggest that the agema was not included in the four
NOTES TO CHAPTER III

squadrons* (Tarn believed that Arrian used 'hipparchy' for 'ile' here). I presume the translation Tarn would offer is 'about four hipparchies', but I do not understand his reasoning. Arrian is explicit that the arcema was not included in the four hipparchies and μάλιστα is, therefore, quite redundant on Tarn's interpretation. I would tentatively accept Berve's interpretation and assume that Craterus was left with just a part of a hipparchy (Alexander had detached as few as sixty men once, Arr. 4,3,7), and this would have left Alexander with rather less than four hipparchies. It is, nevertheless, an odd expression for Arrian to have used, and the difficulty cannot be regarded as settled.

35) J.C. Droysen thought the passage meant that there were eight hipparchies, but presented no further arguments in support of the view (Alex. p.339). Griffith (JHS 83 p.73) also believes that there were eight hipparchies, but see below, Appendix IV pp.401f.

36) On the organisation of the Ptolemaic army in general, see Lesquier. Schachermeyr (Al.d.Gr. pp.358f.) believed that the hipparchy comprised light horse and mercenary horse as well as Companion cavalry. When needed, he suggested, a force of infantry combined with a hipparchy could be formed which would be a totally independent army equipped in every arm. There is, however, no evidence that Alexander did include different types of
cavalry in the hipparchies and no evidence that he yet thought in terms of making permanent arrangements for small independent armies. Of the strategic commanders, only Coenus, it appears, held a command of a hipparchy and an infantry force (see further, Ch.IV pp. 121 ff.). Tarn represents the opposite view to Schachermeyer's: he does not allow for strategic commanders holding more than one military post (II pp.142f.), and he has been followed by Brunt (p.30 n.12). The evidence clearly points to the fact that men did hold more than one post at one time, and even Tarn admits that Hephaestion and Perdiccas were somatophylakes at the same time as they commanded hipparchies.

37) Berve I p.109; II no.328. It is perhaps surprising that Cleitus held command of two units of such important troops, but we do not know enough about Cleitus' background and his position on the staff of Alexander to be confident enough to doubt the evidence of Arrian.

38) 6,27,6; δένειμε γὰρ ἡμῖν πάντα (οὐ. ὑπόβυγκα)..... τοῖς μὲν ἠγερότοι κατ᾽ άνδρα, τοῖς δὲ κατ᾽ ἔλας τε καὶ ἑκατοστύας, τοῖς δὲ κατὰ λόχους.....

39) Griffith has supported Tarn's view (JHS 83, p.73 n.16)

40) In the Ptolemaic army the lochos continued to be the
subdivision of the *ile* (Lesquier, p. 91).

41) For a discussion of the strength of the Companion cavalry after the reorganisation into hipparchies, see below. Brunt (p. 29) also suggests that there were two *iiae* in each hipparchy.

42) For a discussion of this passage, see Appendix II pp. 358f.

43) The most recent full treatment of Macedonian cavalry reinforcements is that of Brunt pp. 36-9. But his calculations are wrong, because he misinterprets the evidence of Polybius 12, 19, 2 (from Callisthenes). Polybius records that 800 cavalry reinforcements reached Alexander before he reached Cilicia, and Brunt added these to the 300 recorded by Arrian, to produce a total of 1,100 Macedonian cavalry reinforcements. However, Polybius does not say that these 800 were Macedonian, and further it seems most likely that the 800 of Polybius includes the 300 of Arrian. It also seems likely that the total given by Polybius includes 200 Thessalians and 150 Eleans who, Arrian says (loc. cit.), arrived with the 300 Macedonians. The discrepancy of 150 men may be accounted for by assuming that Arrian's account is incomplete, or by supposing that Polybius' total includes the *neogamoi* who were returning to the main army after spending the winter with their wives (Arr. 1, 29, 4): cf. Walbank *Commentary* II pp. 371f. Walbank considers the latter explanation unlikely, but the evidence of
NOTES TO CHAPTER III

Polybius is not very reliable and it must be remembered that he was trying to emphasise the size of Alexander's army as reported by Callisthenes (see further, Appendix II pp.348f.). We are, in any case, clearly not justified in supposing that more than 300 Macedonian cavalry reinforcements arrived, and Arrian's evidence is to be followed.

44) Marsden (pp.68ff.) estimates that the strength of the Companions at Gaugamela was 2,071, but the figure seems too high and such precision is not justified. He makes his calculation on the basis of the descriptions of the wedge-formation in which the Macedonian cavalry fought, as contained in Asclepiodotus (Tact. 7,9) and Arrian (Tact. 16,6). It is, however, in general not sound to apply the descriptions of drill formations on the parade ground to the battle formations of Alexander the Great. Cf., for instance, Hammond's review of Marsden JHS 86 (1966) pp.252f.


46) Arr. 3,16,10; Diod. 17,65,1; Curt. 5,40,1. See my discussion above pp.57f.

47) On the strength of the royal ile, see Ch.II: p.39.

48) Brunt has no evidence for a reinforcement of 500 in 328/7 B.C. (p.37). See also Ch.IV pp.131f.
NOTES TO CHAPTER III

49) I p.111.

50) Berve I p.108; Brunt p.28. Berve thought that the prodromoi were Macedonian, and this no doubt influenced his view. I would maintain, with Tarn (II p.164), that they were Thracian (see further, Appendix II pp.365f.).

51) Schachermeyr (cited n.38) believed that light horse served within the hipparchies, but there is no evidence to support this view.

52) It is generally assumed that the body of mounted javelin-men, which is mentioned first in 330 B.C. (Arr. 3,24,1), was wholly Iranian (as Brunt p.28), but no evidence supports this view.

53) Professor J. Hamilton drew my attention to this passage, as having some possible relevance to a discussion of the strength of the Companion cavalry.

54) These difficulties particularly concern the many taxeis which are mentioned here and nowhere else (see Ch.IV pp.104f.).

55) See in particular the aristeia of Ptolemy described earlier in the chapter (sec. 3ff.) Cf. Errington pp.233-42 on the bias of Ptolemy's reporting; and Welles Misc. Aless. pp.101ff.

56) Leonnatus is said to have had only the taxeis of Attalus and Balacrus (Arr. 4,24,10).
57) As Droysen (Hermes 12 p.248) pointed out, there can be no certainty that a chiliarchy always had 1,000 men. Cf. the decas of 16 men formed by Alexander in 323 B.C. (Arr. 7,23,3.4).

58) Berve I p.133 seems to read 1500 (MD) for the manuscript tradition of 600 (DC), but offers no explanation of this reading. For the manuscript tradition, see Hedicke's Teubner edition of Curtius (editio maior, Leipzig, 1927).

59) Arrian (Ind. 19,5) gives a total of 120,000 at the time Alexander was setting off down river to the sea. This, undoubtedly, included many Indians, not properly a part of the expeditionary army (see Appendix V p.423), but even if the army was only half this size, it was still a very large force.

60) Diod. 18,16,4. We have no reason to doubt the evidence (cf. Brunt p.38 and Ch.V pp.157f.).

61) There is no positive evidence on this, but I can see no reason why Alexander should not have wanted to keep his best cavalry force up to strength. Once the principle of Iranian cavalry serving within the Companion cavalry was established, there was no cause to let the number of Companion cavalry fall while the army was involved in heavy fighting in India.

62) Losses sustained by Alexander's army in the Gedrosian desert were probably lighter than many scholars have
believed (see further, Appendix V pp. 421f.).

63) Alexander had sent Craterus and his force away before he arrived at Pattala in July of 325 B.C.: for the date of Alexander's arrival at Pattala, see Strabo 15,1,17, with Hamilton's discussion Comm. pp.181f. Tarn (I p.104 and map) shows that Craterus went through the Mullah pass, which means that he left Alexander about 250 km. up river from Pattala. We may conclude, therefore, that he left sometime in June 325 B.C.

64) Cleitus was one of the commanders sent home in 324 B.C. according to Justin (12,12,8).

65) Iranian satraps and the generals from Media came to Alexander in Carmania at the end of 325 B.C., and they almost certainly brought troops to him (Arr. 6,27,3). But faced with the prospect of demobilisation after the Indian campaign in just a few months time, Alexander could not have considered reorganising his army to include them. See my discussion in Ch.V p.159 and Appendix IV p.416.
NOTES TO CHAPTER IV

THE HEAVY INFANTRY OF ALEXANDER

1) For a full discussion of this passage and of Parmenio's position, see Appendix II, esp. pp. 361 ff.

2) Their official rank was that of 'strategos', cf. Berve I p. 202.

3) For the identification of Berve II nos. 57 and 64, cf. Badian TAPhA 91 p. 334.

4) Arr. 2,8,4; 3,11,10. Craterus had overall tactical command of the left wing of the infantry phalanx at the battles of Issus and Gaugamela. He probably held the same position at the Granicus and this dual position held by Craterus, i.e., the command of his battalion and the command of the left wing of the phalanx, may have misled Arrian into mentioning a battalion under Craterus twice. The battalion of Philip held the middle of the line and it seems likely that it appears twice because of the order in which Arrian describes the line: he first presents the line from right to left, up to the centre, and then from left to right, up to the centre; in each case the centre battalion is included.

5) Only Domaszewski (pp. 43ff.) has used Curtius' evidence, and the results are not satisfactory (see below, n. 7).

6) Beloch (pp. 326ff.) suggests that Philip did not in fact lose his battalion command but retained it until at
NOTES TO CHAPTER IV

least 327 B.C., when he appears again at Arr. 4,24,10: Ptolemy's battalion arrived with the reinforcements (Arr. 1,29,4). However, there is no assurance that it is the same Philip at Arr. 4,24,10, and he has to assume that Philip's battalion was absent from the battle of Issus and that both Arrian and Diodorus omitted a battalion (different ones) in their accounts of the battle of Gaugamela. In addition, his interpretation of the confused account of Curtius is not satisfactory.

7) Domaszewski (pp.43ff.), following the interpretation of E. von Roeder (unpublished Heidelberg dissertation, 1920), thought that each taxis was made up of two chiliarchies of different arms and that each chiliarchy had its own commander. For this reason he suggested, there is frequently confusion over which commander should lend his name to the taxis. So Simmias was commander of one chiliarchy, Philip of the other. This view is not acceptable as it raises far more problems than it solves.

8) pp.12ff.

9) pp.327ff.

10) I pp.115f.; II nos. 784; 201; 203; 428.

11) II pp.142ff.

12) GRBS 7, pp.159-166. He accepts Tarn's conclusions about the number and identity of the battalions at the battle
NOTES TO CHAPTER IV
of the Hydaspes.

13) See also Appendix IIIa.

14) II no.83.

15) Even Berve (I pp.118f.) agrees on this.

16) Only Philip, the son of Amyntas (Berve II no.775), seems to have been removed from his post. Ptolemy, the son of Seleucus (II no.670), was killed at Issus.

17) For Amyntas' absence, see Diod. 17,49,1; Curt. 7,1,38. Cf. Berve II no.57 and 64 (see n.5 above).

18) In general, see Berve II no.45; Tarn II p.144.


20) Cf. Berve II no.233; Tarn II p.145.

21) Cf. Berve II no.428; Tarn II p.147.

22) Cf. Berve II no.623; Tarn II p.147. On the identity of this Peithon, see below p.112.

23) I have already discussed this difficult passage in connection with the Companion cavalry (Ch.III pp.87ff.) and see further below, pp.107.

24) Arr. 2,12,2.

25) Tarn II p.144 already reached this conclusion.

26) See Berve's listing under this name (II nos.774-789).

NOTES TO CHAPTER IV


29) Followed by Tarn II p.144; Milns GRBS 7 p.160.

30) For a discussion of the number of cavalry involved, see above, Ch.III p.64f.


32) As Tarn (II p.146) thought.

33) Berve II nos.700; 741.

34) Cf. Arr. 5,14,3; 14,4. Arrian clearly found several conflicting accounts of the battle and pieced them together as best he could. The result is far from satisfactory.

35) II pp.190-198. Tarn's reconstruction of the battle is dependent upon the view that where Arrian refers to hypaspists (5,13,4), he really means pezetairoi. The interpretation is not acceptable (see pp.140f.). Contrast Beloch pp.341ff.

36) Tarn's arguments appear at II pp.313f. His case is based upon Justin 13,4,14: Susiana gens Coeno, Phrygia maior Antigono, Philippi filio, adsignatur. The text cannot be accepted as it stands, as Tarn shows, but his emendation is far from certain; he reads: Susa (or
Susiana) Antigeni Coeni (sc. filio), Phrygia maior Antigono Philippi filio. This is quite arbitrary and cannot be used to support Tarn's case. All the probabilities point to Antigenes being a mature man: he was among those selected for discharge as veterans and was duly sent home in 324 B.C. (Arr. 6,17,3; Justin 12, 12,8). Later he commanded a body of veterans, i.e., the argyraspids (see below, Appendix VI). If Antigenes were the son of Coenus, he could not have been so old.

37) See also my discussion, Appendix V p.428.

38) The majority of the Macedonians were, by the time they returned from India, veterans of almost ten years of campaigning. Alexander sent some complete units with Craterus through Arachosia and Drangiana (avoiding the Gedrosian desert), and also in addition selected the weakest men from the other Macedonian units.

39) See my discussion below, pp.146f.

40) Beloch (pp.329f.) and Berve II no.83 also think that Antigenes commanded a unit of hypaspists, but rather because of his supposed association with the argyraspids (see below, Appendix VI pp.434f.).

41) See Appendix IIIa.

NOTES TO CHAPTER IV


44) This rests on the very doubtful evidence of Curtius 6, 8,17, where Perdiccas and Leonnatus are described as armigeri.

45) That a bodyguard could temporarily hold another post is also established (Berve II nos. 357; 627): Cf. Milns GRBS 7 p. 160 n. 10.

46) See Ch. III pp. 74 ff.

47) Cf. Liddell and Scott, Lexicon, s.v. ἀϱμήγερα II, 8.

48) It did not stop him in the cases of Coenus and Cleitus (5,12,2; 5,16,3; 5,22,6).

49) For Domaszewski (p. 31), this indicates that the names are interchangeable in the description of the taxis and shows that the taxis was divided into two chiliarchies, but see n. 7 above.

50) Cf. Tarn II p. 143 n. 1; Milns GRBS 7, p. 161.

51) Arr. 3,16,10; Curt. 5,1,40; Diod. 17,65,1. See my discussion above, Ch. III pp. 57 ff. This is argued fully and convincingly by Milns, GRBS 7, pp. 160ff.

52) He cannot show that Hecataeus and Gorgatas were young (II nos. 293, 232).

53) This was seen most clearly by Milns (GRBS 7, pp. 160ff.),
NOTES TO CHAPTER IV

but he thought that its commander was Philotas.

54) See n.38 above.

55) Cf. Schachermeyr Al.d.Gr. p.358 and see my discussion Ch.III pp.69f.

56) Al.d.Gr. p.358. See also Ch.III n.36.

57) He thought that Craterus also commanded both a taxis and a hipparchy, but I have argued above that Craterus gave up command of his taxis in 327 B.C.

58) The translation is that of J.C. Rolfe, Quintus Curtius (Loeb, 1946) pp.343f. I quote the Latin for the first part down to '... had not gone to bravery'.

iudices dedit praemiaque proposuit de virtute militari certantibus nova; qui fortissimi iudicati essent singulis militum milibus praefuturi erant — chiliarchas vocabant — tunc primum in hunc numerum copis distributis; namque antea quingenariae cohortes fuerant nec fortitudini praemia cesserant.

For a discussion of the translation of 'cohortes' as 'lochoi', see below.

59) Berve I p.127; Milns Historia 20 pp.190ff.

60) It is really no more likely that Alexander would have appointed pentacosiarchs in this way than chiliarchs.

61) Cited n.59.
NOTES TO CHAPTER IV

62) II nos. 83 and 84. Berve identifies this with Antigenes of Pellene (II no. 84), who lost an eye at Perinthus and was disgraced over the fraud of which he was found guilty at Opis (Plut. Alex. 70,4). The reason Berve cannot identify this Antigenes with the man who is a commander at the Hydaspes (Arr. 5,16,1), whose unit is mentioned at Arrian 6,17,3, and who later commanded the argyraspids (see below, Appendix VI pp. 432f.) is that he considers that this man is a common soldier, whereas the other Antigenes (II no. 83) is clearly an officer of quite high rank. However, it is unlikely that the Antigenes who came second in this contest was a common soldier and there seems to be no particular reason for thinking he could not be identical with no. 83. I can, in fact, find no obstacle to accepting that Berve II nos. 83 and 84 are identical.

63) Berve I p.127; Milns Historia 20 pp.190ff.

64) It is hardly significant that there is no evidence that the size of the pezetairoi battalions changed, when we are never told what the size was. For a discussion of the subdivisions, see below.

65) Lesquier, pp.93-4, remarks that the chiliarchy was the sub-unit of the taxia until the reform of 324 B.C. Domaszewski, pp.30ff., was of the opinion that the taxeis were divided into two chiliarchies from the start of the Asian campaign, but see above, n.7.
NOTES TO CHAPTER IV


67) Berve I p.127 and Milns Historia 20 p.193 assume without argument that the subdivision of the chiliarchy was the pentacosiarchy.

68) E.g. at Sparta, Xen. Hell. 2,4,31. Cf. the discussion, RE 13 (1926), 933-5 s.v. lochagos.

69) Arr. 3,16,10. See also above, Ch.I pp.25f.

70) Arr. 7,24,4; 25,6. See further, Ch.V pp.181f.


72) Cf. Domaszewski p.26; Hammond, Studies in Greek History, p.548; see further Ch.I pp.25f.


74) Arr. 7,23,34. See further Ch.V p.178.


76) IG IX 1, 316.

77) The inscription might just as well be the work of Thessalians for instance. Dittberner suggests that the tetrarchy was a cavalry section, on the strength of
NOTES TO CHAPTER IV

Arrian 3,18,5, but see my discussion of this usage Ch.III pp.64f. Everything points to the tetrarchy being an infantry section, Asclep. Tact. 3,4; Suda

78) Polybius records (from Callisthenes) that 5,000 infantry reinforcements arrived between the crossing to Asia in 334 B.C. and the battle of Issus (12,19,2), but he does not specify their nationality. We may, however, assume that 3,000 of them were these Macedonians, we have no details of the other 2,000. Beloch (p.330) suggested that 300 of the 3,000 reinforcements of Macedonians were hypaspists, but our source material is not precise enough to justify any discussion of such small numbers.

79) GRBS 7 pp.162f.

80) Marsden pp.27f.; Tarn II pp.182f.

81) Any precise figure can only be conjectural.

82) Cf. Domaszewski (p.29), but for different reasons.

83) I do not maintain that the chiliarchies of the pezetairoi must have been exactly 1,000 strong, but an increase in size of the battalions would have encouraged such a reorganisation.

84) GRBS 7, pp.162ff.
NOTES TO CHAPTER IV


87) Milns GRBS 7 p.161, would seem to allow for no reinforcement of the pezetairoi after 331 B.C.


90) GRBS 7, pp.160f.


92) Cf. Tarn II p.143.

93) loc.cit.


95) GRBS 7 p.161.


98) I p.117.

99) This calculation is based on the assumption that the battalions of Attalus and Meleager remained at full
strength, i.e. 2,000 each. Of the other five battalions, which stayed with Alexander, would have amounted to 10,000 at full strength, but if about 2,000 of the weaker members were taken out, this left Alexander with about 8,000.

100) I pp.122ff.

101) II pp.148ff.

102) Historia 20 pp.190ff.

103) See further, Appendix III pp.37ff.

104) II pp.191ff.


106) J.G. Droysen, Hermes 12 p.248; Berve I p.127; Milns Historia 20 p.193. Berve and Milns assume that these units of 500 men were called 'pentacosiarchies', but I have argued above that they are more likely to have been called 'lochoi' (pp.127ff.).

107) II p.150.

108) Historia 20, pp.189f.

109) e.g. at the battle of the Hydaspes, Arr. 5,13,4; 14,1.

110) See Appendix III pp.378.

111) J.G. Droysen Hermes 12 p.248; Berve II no.22.
NOTES TO CHAPTER IV


113) Diod. 17,17,4; Berve II no.554.

114) Berve II nos.22;746. Milns Historia 20 p.191 denied that these were hypaspist units, but see my discussion above, p. 143.


116) Berve II no.357. On 'the royal hypaspists' as a simple alternative name for the hypaspists, see above, p.140f.


118) There is no evidence that he held this post until 326 B.C. (Arr. 6,28,4).

119) See Appendix III pp.371f.

120) I have not referred to the evidence of Arr. 3,29,7, where chiliarchies of hypaspists also appear, because of the suspect nature of this passage (see Welles, Misc. Aless. pp.101ff. and my discussion Ch.III p. 74).

121) Milns Historia 20 p.193 thinks that the reform would not have increased 'fire-power and mobility' because the tactical unit was now double its former size. However, he admits that the small divisions of 500 continued to exist, and the addition of three high-ranking officers surely would have made for more flexibility.
NOTES TO CHAPTER IV

122) Hermes 12, p.248.

123) I p.127; Domaszewski (p.37) also thought that there were four chiliarchies by 329 B.C.

124) II p.150.

125) Historia 20, pp.190f.

126) Hermes 12, p.248.

127) II p.150; he is followed by Milns Historia 20 p.191.


129) I p.127.

130) I have already argued against this interpretation above, pp.147f.

131) GReS 7 pp.159ff.


133) Berve I p.127 and Milns Historia 12 p.193 agree that the strength of the agema was not changed from 500 men by the reform of 331 B.C.


136) Tarn II p.153; Milns, Historia 20, p.190.
NOTES TO CHAPTER IV

137) II no. 548.

138) Neoptolemus' only appearance during the whole of the Asian campaign is at the storming of Gaza, where Arrian refers to him as 'one of the hetairoi' (2, 27, 6).

139) Arr. 6, 17, 3. On this Antigenes, see n. 62 above.

140) If it was standard practice for one of the hypaspist officers to take full command of the hypaspists when they were combined, as when Antiochus took command (Arr. 4, 30, 6), Seleucus may have been chiliarch or commander of the agema.
1) Arr. 7,5. Beloch, p.321, calculates that Alexander arrived at Susa in March 324 B.C. This cannot be far wrong.

2) The most outstanding confusion is over the timing of the mutiny, with Arrian placing it firmly at Opis (7,8,1) and the other sources, with the exception of Justin, who places it at Babylon (12,10,7; 11,1), placing it at Susa apparently (Diod. 17,109,1; Curt. 10,2,12; Plut. Alex. 71,2). The military reforms connected with the mutiny in the sources cannot, therefore, be precisely dated, even though for the broad outline of the order of events Arrian's evidence is clearly the most reliable (see, for instance, Badian, JHS 85 p.160).

3) See discussion in Ch.III pp. 93 and Appendix IV pp.412f.

4) Arr. 7,6,1; Diod. 17,108,1; Plut. Alex. 71,1 (See below pp.188f.).


7) Philip had employed Cretan archers and these also served under Alexander, see Berve I p.149.

8) Alexander would naturally have left as garrison troops
the less fit soldiers: 1,000 are specifically stated by Curtius (5,2,16) to be old, and we may assume that others, though perhaps only a few, were left in Media on garrison duty in 330 B.C., for Media was an important centre for Alexander (Arr. 3,19,7; 26,3).

9) Tarn (II pp.166-7) asserts that all had left before Alexander entered the Gedrosian desert, but on this he must be wrong. Alexander would not have discharged many Iranians before the Indian campaign was officially ended. Of the mercenaries, many had been left behind en route in settlements and as guards, see, for instance, Arr. 4,5,2; 4,16,4; 5,8,3; Curt. 7,10,10. And see, in general, Griffith, Mercenaries pp.22ff.

10) Beloch, p.345ff. His figures are based on no sound evidence and need no detailed refutation; see further, the discussion in Appendix V p.424.


12) Arr. 7,6,1; Diod. 17,108,1f.; Plut. Alex. 71,1.


14) Arr. 4,18,3. Berve II nos.508, 301, 736. See also discussion above, Ch.IV pp.131f.
15) Arr. 6,27,3. Media was a military headquarters. Berve does assume that the cavalry under Menidas was the reinforcement called for in 328 B.C. (II no.508)

15a) Brunt (p.38) suggests that the figures of Curtius (10,2,8) of 13,000 infantry and 2,000 cavalry refer to the number of Macedonian reinforcements called upon by Alexander in 324/3 B.C. This is not, however, the natural interpretation of the evidence and Brunt's case is not acceptable (see below, pp.171f.).

16) On the organisation of the Achaemenid empire, see, particularly, Xenophon Cyrop. Book 8. For modern works, see P. Junge Klio 34 pp.1-55; P. Éhtecham L'Iran sous les Achéménides; Dandamayev pp.15-58. There is little evidence after Xenophon's time, but we may perhaps assume that the principles of the organisation remained the same. Cf. Berve I pp.274f.

17) The satrapal force of Amyntas, made satrap of Bactria in 328/7 B.C., consisted of Bactrians and Sogdians, and these seem to have been directly under his command (Arr. 4,22,3; Berve II no.60). Berve (I p.276) shows that there can be no doubt that the Macedonian satraps at least, had full responsibility for military matters within their satrapies. The Iranian satraps also must have had powers to levy troops and maintain a satrapal force, even though the king kept royal troops in their
NOTES TO CHAPTER V

satrapies (see below). This was a traditional role of the satraps and in seeking continuity in the administration of the empire, Alexander is not likely to have made such a radical change as to prevent the satraps such as Mazaeus in Babylonia (Berve II no.484) and Atropates in Media (Berve II no.180) from raising their forces. (Cf. the discussion of O. Leuze, Die Satrapieneinteilung in Syrien und im Zweistromlande von 520-320 (Halle, 1935) pp.274-302). The existence of mercenaries in the satrapal forces is shown by Alexander's order to the satraps on his return from India to disband the mercenary armies they had raised (Diod. 17,106,3).

18) Curt. 5,1,43; Diod. 17,64,5; Curt. 5,2,16; Arr. 3,5,1.
19) Arr. 3,16,4. Berve II no.101; no.484. In general on these troops, see Berve I pp.276ff.
20) Cf., for instance, Curt. 5,1,43; 2,16.
22) The warrior class of the Iranians would naturally expect such service (Yasna 32,1; 33,4). On grants of land in return for military service, cf. Xen. Cyrop. 8,4,28; 8,6,10.
23) For these details cf. E.G. Kraeling The Brooklyn Museum Aramaic Papyri pp.32ff.
24) For the decline in the importance of the Iranian warrior class in the fourth century B.C., see, for instance, Ehtecham pp.62ff.

25) This is indicated by the order to the satraps and strategoi to disband their mercenary armies (Diod. 17,106,3). Also, by ordering the return of exiles to the Greek cities, Alexander reduced the number of men available for recruitment as mercenaries (Diod. loc.cit.). This is not to say that Alexander wanted no mercenaries in his service; there seem to have been mercenary troops in Babylon after his death (see below p.190).

26) Diod. 18,16,4. It seems more likely that they were intended to serve in Macedonia, rather than that they were simply sent as an escort force. Alexander had relied upon Cretan mercenary archers earlier in his reign (cf. Berve I pp.149f.).

27) It is difficult to believe that Alexander would have wanted 30,000 such phalanx in the main army; see further, below, p.189.

28) Arr. 7,15,1; 19,6.

29) If 1,500 Companion cavalry were dismissed in 324 B.C., then, as Brunt points out (p.38), very few of the survivors of the Indian campaign could have remained, no more than a few hundred I would think. However, the number lost in the Gedrosian desert may have been
NOTES TO CHAPTER V

exaggerated by Brunt (see Appendix V).

30) Arr. 7,29,4. In the Achaemenid empire, the homotimoi were a special group called to court into the service of the king: it was clearly an outstanding honour (Xen. Cyrop. 2,1,9; 7,5,85).

31) Berve Nos.459, 759, 154, 709, 812. The term 'Persian' is often used loosely also, in the meaning 'Iranian' or simply 'Easterner'.

32) Berve II nos.32, 526, 392, 763 (see also Appendix IV p.419). Itanes was honoured in this way because he was the brother of Alexander's wife Roxane. Hystaspes was a prominent member of the Achaemenid royal family (Curt. 6,2,7), being an uncle of Artaxerxes Ochus. By continuing this institution of the Achaemenids, he obtained hostages of the families' loyalty. There were, presumably, other homotimoi who came to court but did not enter the agema of cavalry.

33) It was traditional for the Persian and Median nobility to serve their king on horseback, and I would suppose that they formed the bulk of the cavalry in the king's royal force (see R. Frye, p.91; M.A. Dandamayev pp.54f.).

34) The Ptolemaic army did not contain units of men of mixed arms. Several units of mixed arms were grouped under a strategos, but this is quite different from one
NOTES TO CHAPTER V

hipparchy containing lancers and missile-throwers. See Lesquier pp.69ff. See further, Appendix IV pp.400ff.

35) Arr. 7,6,4; Brunt p.44.

36) Tarn II, p.166/7. Tarn seems to allow for no demobilisation of Companion cavalry in 324 B.C.

37) 'Alexander's ὑπομνήματα and the World Kingdom' JHS 41 (1921), pp.1-17, esp. pp.6-7. Berve (I p.112) also thought that Hephaestion's unit was a chiliarchy.

38) For this judgment, cf. Schachermeyr, All. in Bab. pp.31ff.

39) The term 'hazarapati' had come to mean more than simply 'a commander of 1,000'. Cf. Frye p.88 and my discussion below, pp.193ff.

40) Arr. Diad. 38 refers to Cassander as 'chiliarch of the horse', but this does not mean that his unit was a chiliarchy (see below, p.195). On the Ptolemaic army, see Lesquier pp.87ff.

41) II pp.160-1.

42) See my discussion of the term 'hecatostyes' above (Ch.III pp.82ff; Ch.IV pp.127ff). On the Ptolemaic ilae, cf. Lesquier pp.90ff. Lochos also continued as a subdivision of ilae.

43) It is repeated by Appian Syr. 57.

44) JHS 41 p.7.
45) Brunt p.44.

46) See, most recently, Errington CQ 19 pp.233-42, and Seibert Ptol. pp.1-26, for the possibility that Ptolemy (Arrian's source) may have chosen to conceal the importance of Perdiccas in the last years of Alexander's life.

47) I have suggested above (Ch.III p.91) that Peithon commanded a hipparchy in India.

48) Since the cavalry fought in the wedge or rhomboid formation, there were some drawbacks to adding or subtracting substantial numbers to the units because these formations were based on lines and files of a particular strength (cf. Arr. Tact. 16,6; Asclepiodotus Tact. 7,9).

49) The descriptions do not vary appreciably from version to version, and where the differences are important, I shall note them in the discussion below.

50) Jacoby FGrH II C p.138. Schachermeyr Al. in Bab. p.28.


52) Schachermeyr says by 3,000 (Al. d. Gr. p.489), but there seems no way of checking. I have suggested that the hypaspists were in fact recruited from the ranks of the pezetairoi, in which case it may be thought that there
NOTES TO CHAPTER V

were few veterans in the body, and that it was kept full of men in their prime. But if Antigones, the commander of the argyraspids, was a commander of hypaspists (Arr. 6,17,3; Berve II no.83) then clearly veterans did serve in the hypaspists (see above Ch.IV pp.108f. and n.62).

53) I.p.123f. Berve had odd views about the hypaspists and believed that they entered the 'royal hypaspists' only. On Berve's view of hypaspists, see Tarn II pp.148ff., and above, Ch.IV pp.140f.

54) This is the natural interpretation of Diodorus' words 'secured replacements from the Persians equal to the number of those soldiers he released' (Welles' translation Diod. Sic. p.441). On the term 'hypaspist' see Appendix IIIa.

55) Arrian is looking back upon Alexander's actions and summarising some of the things for which he had been criticised. This included the intermixing of the homotimoi into the agemata as well as this intermixture of melophoroi. Arrian (I suggest) is using ἐγκατεμίσθαι in a vague sense which can cover the close integration of Iranians into the agemata and the looser intermixture of melophoroi with the Macedonian units. I do not find Arrian incapable of such a vague usage. Cf., for instance, Arr. 7,24,1, where καταλοξιζεῖν is used to describe the close integration of Persians and
Macedonians to form mixed files, as well as the addition of bodies of troops alongside existing units (see below n.102).

56) See Appendix VI pp.436f., on the use of 'argyraspid' for 'hypaspist' in this passage.

57) On the chariot built to transport Alexander's body, the Persian guards were depicted separately from the Macedonians (Diod. 18,27; and see above, Ch.IV p.155).

58) Cf. Perdiccas' hypaspists on the campaign against Ptolemy (Diod. 18,33,6), and those of Seleucus in opposition to the elephants of Demetrius (Polyaen. Strateg. 4,9,3). On the Macedonian origins of the hypaspists of the Successors, see Appendix VI, p.441.


60) The only parallel words of similar type known from the reign of Alexander are archikybernetes (chief helmsman), referred to Onesicritus (Plut. Alex. 66,3), and archigrammateus, used of Eumenes (Arr. 5,24,6). Even if the word was not in use in Alexander's time, it is perhaps not sufficient reason for thinking Neoptolemus was not actually commander of the hypaspists. Cf. archisomatophylax (P.Teb. 79,52).

61) In Polyaeus' description, the agema, or some of it, is
NOTES TO CHAPTER V

probably the somatophylakes surrounding the king. The size of the agema may well have remained unchanged at 500 men, and I have nothing to add to my discussion in the preceding chapter (pp. 144 ff.).


64) Herodotus 7, 41, 2; Heracleides FGrH III c no. 689 F 1 (= Athenaeus 12, 514G).

65) I p. 121.

66) Persian heavy infantry were inferior to the Macedonians, and, even when equipped like Macedonians, Persians would surely not have been equal to the Macedonians. See also Ch. IV pp. 132 ff.

67) Fuller The Generalship of Alexander the Great p. 142-3, refers to a passage of Asclepiodotus (Tact. 2, 1), which describes the use of light-armed troops in battle to shoot over the heads of the phalanx and argues that this passage may indicate that the sections of Alexander were not fully integrated. But this argument is far from conclusive, especially in the face of the explicit description of Arrian. R. Milns Alexander the Great p. 254, is sceptical of the value of the units.

68) I pp. 120, 152.
NOTES TO CHAPTER V


70) Cf. Berve I pp.11f., where he states that the Persian force of *hetairoi* did not survive the reconciliation between Alexander and the men.

71) Lesquier p.92.

72) Berve II nos.494,45,181. Alcetas and Attalus, being of Perdiccas' faction, would not have associated with Meleager and the infantry section in the struggles after Alexander's death. W. Schwahn, 'Die Nachfolge Alexanders des Grossen' Klio 24 (1931) pp.306-332, esp. p.310, suggests that Meleager was commander of the whole phalanx after Alexander's death. But it is likely that this post was disestablished when Parmenio was removed from it in 330 B.C. (see above Ch.IV pp.120f.).

73) Schachermeyr suggests that Holkias (Berve II no.580) may have been commander of an infantry unit (he believes in regiments of mixed arms) and Perilaus may have been an hypaspist officer (Al. in Bab. p.14; Al.d.Gr. p.490). Berve II no.630 lists Perilaos as Perillus, saying Perillus is a shortened form of Perilaos, but it is more likely to be caused by a manuscript error. Perilaos is doubtless the correct form.) The evidence used by Schachermeyr to support these suggestions is flimsy and does not bear inspection.
NOTES TO CHAPTER V

74) Lesquier p.94.

75) Lesquier p.96.

76) Tarn II p.160-1 takes the opposite view, that the locchoi refer to the infantry and the hecatostyes to the cavalry, but see above, Ch.III pp. 82f. and this chapter p.168.

77) p.39. Cf. Schachermeyr Al. in Bab. p.15

78) FGrH III c no.689 F 1 (= Athenaeus 12, 514c).

79) Berve was influenced by his view that there was a force of royal hypaspists, in addition to the ordinary hypaspists, and that these numbered 1,000 in 324 B.C., 500 being Macedonian and 500 Persian (I pp.122-5). On Berve’s views, see Tarn II pp. 148ff. and above, Ch.IV pp.140f.

80) FGrH IIIc no.689 F 1 (= Athen. 12,514c).

81) Herodotus 7,83,1. See also, Dandamayev, p.55.


83) Xen. Cyrop. 7,5,68. Olmstead ‘(238) says that some were archers also, and the reliefs seem to support the view that some carried a bow in addition to the spear: cf. Ghirshman Persia p.171, pl.217.

84) Curtius 3,3,13. But only the melophoroi are mentioned
NOTES TO CHAPTER V

in the battle accounts, Arr. 3, 11, 5; Diod. 17, 59, 3.

85) Ghirshman *Persia* p.141, pl.190.

86) Schachermeyr *Al. in Bab.* p.28.

87) Cf., for instance, Herodotus 3, 35, 1; 1, 136.

88) Bright dress was a mark of high honour. The Elamites had a privileged position among the subjects of the empire (Olmstead pp.68ff.; 163ff.).

89) The passage came from Chares, via Duris and Phylarchus (Jacoby *FGrH* IIA no.81 F41; IIC pp.138ff.). Duris and Phylarchus were not above using such techniques (see Appendix VI pp.436f.).


91) This is perhaps implied by Polyaeus' words παντεί

κόσμος Περσίκω

92) Heracleides refers to peltasts in attendance at the Achaemenid court (*FGrH* IIIC no.689 F2 = Athenaeus 4, 145e).

93) We may suspect that the description of them as Susians may be merely for added colour. The splendour and variety of the men and animals at court is a central theme of this passage and the mention of another race, apart from Persians, may have been thought a suitable addition (see above, n.89).
NOTES TO CHAPTER V

94) Arr. 7,6,1. The name was coined by Alexander (see above p. 179).


96) Cf. the imprecise usage of στρατάρχης of Scythian leaders (Arr. 4,15,3); and of στρατηγός, referred to a non-satrap, i.e. Ada of Caria (1,23,7): cf. Berve II no.20.

97) For the date of the order, Curt. 8,5,1; Diod. 17,108,2; Plut. Alex. 45,1: with the discussion of Hamilton Comm. pp. 128f.

98) See above, in the discussion of the pezetairoi in this chapter, pp. 179f.

99) Though Diodorus' evidence at this point is unsatisfactory, and we need not suppose that Alexander organised the Epigoni because he was dissatisfied with the Macedonians (17,108,3). Diodorus has confused the relationship between the arrival of the Epigoni at Susa and the outbreak of the mutiny at Opis (cf. Welles Diod. Sic. p. 434).

100) Arr. 7,23,3. I would suppose that this was the satrapal levy called for by Alexander for the Arabian expedition. Berve (I p. 152) says that they were mostly bowmen and javelin-men and this may be so because Alexander clearly made more use of Iranian light-infantry than heavy-infantry. But I do not think Arrian's reference
NOTES TO CHAPTER V

(7,23,3.4) to the mixture of twelve Persian bowmen and javelin-men with four Macedonians to form one section necessarily means that most of the Persians were so armed. Arrian may merely have been picking out the most interesting innovation for special comment, and omitted details of other Persian infantry reinforcements.

101) See above, discussion of the pezetairoi, pp. 178f.

102) Herod. 7,74; 7,93. Arrian 7,24,1 puts their integration (καταλοχέζευ) along with the integration of the Persians (including the Tapurians and Cossaeans?): they all went ἐς τὰς Μακεδονίας τέσσερις
I would emphasise that this is a vague expression which need mean no more than that they were brigaded alongside, not inside, the Macedonian units (see above, n.55).

103) Berve II no.508. But it must be recognised that when the nationality is not specified, it often means that the troops are Macedonian. I have, however, no confidence in pronouncing Menidas' cavalry as Macedonian. Berve, of course, does think they are Macedonian, because he considers they are reinforcements which Menidas was sent to Macedonia to fetch in 328 B.C. But see above, p.160.

104) On Perilaus, see n.73 above.


106) p.39.
NOTES TO CHAPTER V

107) The reasoning may well be Curtius' own. It implies that Alexander had no other troops but these.

108) If it is accepted, on Curtius' authority, that there were at least 15,000 Macedonians, then to 15,000 we may add the 20,000 Persian light infantry, some part of the 30,000 'Epigoni' (others being sent for duties in the satrapies, see above, p.164), the forces under Menander and Philoxenus (see above, p.160), as well as Iranian light cavalry, which must have been present in substantial numbers. Schachermeyr, Al.d.Gr. p.491, estimates 70,000 in all, which may not be far wrong, but I do not accept the details of how this figure was made up.


111) Nepos Conon 3,2: chiliarchum qui secundum gradum imperii tenebat.

112) 3,21,1; 3,23,4.

113) At 3,21,1 Arrian calls him 'chiliarch' of the cavalry with Darius, but that he was more than simply a commander of 1,000 cavalry is shown by the precedence he is given in Arrian 3,23,4 over Phrataphephernes, satrap of Hyrcania, and over the satrap of Parthyaea, as well as the other most distinguished Persians of Darius' circle. His
NOTES TO CHAPTER V

regular cavalry command may have been the 1,000 elite mentioned by Diodorus (17,57,2) in the Persian line at Gaugamela (cf. Welles, *Diod.Sic.* p.286). On the position of Natarzanes, cf. Berve II no.543. The change in the nature of the command of the chiliarch is not surprising in view of the inferior nature of the infantry in the fourth century B.C. and the increased dependence upon Greek mercenaries. It may be that the accession of Darius III marked a reaction of the Persian cavalry class against the prominence of eunuchs and mercenary leaders under Artaxerxes III.

114) Schachermeyr (*Al.* in *Bab.* pp.31f.) summarises the literature on the nature of the office under the Achaemenids and comes to this conclusion.

115) *Klio* 33 pp.29-38.


117) *Al.* in *Bab.* pp.34ff. and 171ff.

118) Schachermeyr (*Al.* in *Bab.* pp.171ff.) seems over-concerned with the constitutional position of Perdiccas (see below, Ch. VI pp.232f.), though I accept his conclusions. For other discussions of Perdiccas' position after Alexander's
NOTES TO CHAPTER V


119) Diod. 18,3,4; Justin 13,4,17.

120) Diod. 18,48,4. In 321 B.C. Antipater had appointed Cassander to be chiliarch to Antigonus, commander of the royal army (Diod. 18,39,7), a similar post to the one he held under Polycperchon in 319 B.C. Of his position under Antigonus, Arrian (Diad. 38) records that Cassander was 'chiliarch of the horse'. We are not in a position to know what troops Cassander commanded. On these usages of 'chiliarch' cf. Schachermeyr *Al. in Bab.* pp.171ff.

121) *Al. in Bab.* pp.35ff.


124) This much about the Achaemenid hazarapati seems clear: cf. Frye's comment (cited p.194).

125) Schachermeyr (*Al. in Bab.* p.36) sees the very special relationship between Hephaestion and Alexander as an important aspect of the office. However, while Alexander obviously wanted someone he trusted, there is no evidence
to suggest that Alexander intended the office to mark out the 'other Alexander'. Schachermeyr also thinks that Alexander made Hephaestion hazarapati in order that he might effectively run the empire while Alexander was away in Arabia (loc. cit.), but it must be thought likely that Alexander would not have wanted to leave Hephaestion behind.

126) Perdiccas and Eumenes were especially prominent at the end of Alexander's reign, and there was a general rise in the prestige of cavalry at the expense of the infantry during the latter half of the Asian campaign (see above, Ch.IV p.139).

127) In general on these efforts, cf. Schachermeyr Al. in Bab. pp.1-71.
NOTES TO CHAPTER VI

THE MACEDONIAN ARMY AND POLITICS


3) REA 52, pp. 127ff.

4) RIDA 4, pp. 76ff.

5) Hedicke (Teubner edition, Leipzig, 1927) inserted rex, iudicabat, but on no manuscript authority. It is not necessary to accept this addition to make sense of the text, and for our purposes here I have ignored his suggestion.

6) REA 52, p. 127. Herodotus is our only evidence on the origins of the Macedonian monarchy (8, 137) and his version was undoubtedly inspired by Argead propaganda. E. Ivanka, 'Berghirtenium und Staatenbildung in Antike und Mittelalter', Saeculum 1 (1950) pp. 349ff. suggests that it may have some historical value. But in any case it does not support Granier's case. See also Hammond, Anc. Mac. pp. 433ff. and the interesting discussion of H. Kleinknecht, 'Herodot und die makedonische Urgeschichte', Hermes 94 (1966) pp. 134-146. The story
NOTES TO CHAPTER VI

clearly must reflect what the Macedonians of the fifth century B.C. believed about the Argead monarchy, but no reliable account of the origin can be reconstructed.

7) Ostwald, p.32.

8) It should be pointed out that Aymard seems to assume that there was no political development in Macedonia between the reign of Alexander III and that of Philip V. But the influences upon the Macedonians in the Hellenistic world were great and the people, especially those in the army, must have become more conscious of their power.

9) So Granier p.49. Aymard, REA 52, pp.131f., casts doubts upon the 'communis opinio' that there was no civilian assembly, but he presents no supporting argument.

10) Tarn (II pp.106,163) argues that Curtius was reliable on Macedonian mores, for he used a work composed before the end of the 3rd century B.C. Whatever the judgment on Tarn's case, we are not obliged to accept that all Curtius' comments about mores are reliable.

11) For the definition, see Ostwald, pp.20f.

NOTES TO CHAPTER VI

13) Arrian (4,14,2) says that the detail about the pages' appearance before the army is drawn from a source other than Ptolemy and Aristobulus; and Curtius' account (8,6ff.) does not inspire confidence in its reliability.

14) REA 52, p.137.


16) See my discussion in Ch.II p.52. On any interpretation of the evidence, the commoners contributed little prior to the mid fourth century B.C. (Griffith, G&R 12 p.128.).

17) For the general lack of involvement of the mass of Macedonians in the affairs of Philip, see Demosthenes OL 2, 16-17. The lustration in the month of Xanthos was for the army, but the infantry could rarely have been involved, if at all. Polybius (23,10,17) implies that only cavalry was involved, but Curtius (10,9,12) and Livy (40,6) suggest that the infantry did take part. For a discussion
NOTES TO CHAPTER VI

see RE 9, 2 (1967), 1334.

18) In fact the Olynthians seem to have been behind this expulsion of Amyntas, and they certainly could have worked only through noble factions. Most recently on the expulsion, see J. Ellis, 'Amyntas III, Illyria and Olynthos' Makedonika, 9 (1969), pp.1-8.

19) There is much literature on the 'regency' of Philip. Diodorus (16,2,5) knows nothing of a period of regency for Philip and this has led J. Ellis, in 'The security of the Macedonian throne under Philip II', Ancient Macedonia pp.68-75, to suggest that Philip assumed the kingship immediately upon the death of his brother. This is not convincing, for while it is conceivable that a period of regency dropped out of the tradition, it is difficult to believe that it could have slipped in.

20) See Hammond Macedonia pp.156ff., calling the place Aegeae. He would seem to be right against earlier identifications of it near Edessa: contra Schachermeyr Al.d.Gr. p.30.

21) As, most notably, Granier.

22) As, most recently, F. Schachermeyr Al. in Bab. pp.150-3 and 158-62.


24) The description of the varied reactions to Philip's
NOTES TO CHAPTER VI

death in 11,1 is patently unreliable, being heavy with exaggeration and stylistic tricks.


26) There can be little doubt that this was made known, whether he actually led Alexander before the troops or not (Ps.Call. 1,26). See discussions of Badian and Bosworth, as cited n.23.

27) Justin's version is not necessarily a contradiction of Diodorus'. Pausanias may have been hung on the cross after he had been killed by the guards. No doubt everything was done to direct the anger of the men against Pausanias. See, on the sources for Pausanias' fate, Bosworth CQ 21, pp.95-6.

28) Other restorations seem equally likely. See Bosworth loc.cit. and Jacoby's commentary (FGrH II B p.534) for further discussion.

29) As Schachermeyr, Al. in Bab. pp.152f. He believes in the men's consciousness of the political tradition and the place of the assembly of the men-in-arms within it.

NOTES TO CHAPTER VI


32) The sources for the conspiracy are Arr. 3,26,1-3; Curt. 6,7,7ff.; Diod. 17,79,1ff.; Just. 12,5,3; Str. 15,2,10; Plut. *Alex.* 49. For discussions see the summary in Seibert *Alex.* pp.140f.

33) The evidence is poor on this latter occasion (see Arr. 4,14,2 and below).


35) Amyntas and his family will not have been the only nobles closely associated with Philotas' faction.

36) Berve II no.606.


38) *Alex.* p.95.

39) Berve II no.57.


41) Arr. 4,14,2; Curt. 8,6,30.
NOTES TO CHAPTER VI

42) Curt. 8,8,20, says only the royal pages were involved, but this could be invented for dramatic effect.


44) Schachermeyr, Al.d.Gr. p.389, accepts that the pages were brought before the army and that Hermolaus addressed them, but he offers no convincing reason for the credibility of the inferior source in the face of the contradictory evidence of Ptolemy and Aristobulus. It should be noted that an author who wanted to compose a speech for one of the pages to deliver would have naturally put the speech in the context of a full army assembly, as this would give full scope for his inventiveness and the display of his rhetorical skills.

45) Granier, however, seems to place some reliance upon it (pp.46f.).

46) For the sources see Arr. 5,25-8; Curt. 9,2; Diod.17,93-5, on the mutiny at the Hyphasis. On the mutiny at Opis, see Arr. 7,6,1ff.; Curt. 10,2,9ff.; Justin 12,11,1f.; Plut. 70,3f.

47) pp.34ff.

NOTES TO CHAPTER VI

49) See the comments of Badian _HSPh_ 72 p.194.

50) _Al._ in _Bab._ pp.152-3.

51) Whatever the precise course of events (for discussion see Schachermeyr _Al.d.Gr._ pp.492ff.), there can be no doubt that the initiative came from the ordinary soldier, and that Alexander unwillingly consented to return: Kraft's discussion (pp.103ff.) is not sound.

52) _Arr._ 7,5,1; _Curt._ 10,2,9f.


54) _Al._ in _Bab._ pp.150-3 and 168-72,

55) See the sensible discussion of Wirth, _Helikon_ 7, pp.284f.

56) For a good account of relations between Alexander and the Macedonian troops in the last years of the campaign, see Hamilton, _Alex._ ch.12 and 14.
APPENDICES I TO VI
APPENDIX I

THEOPOMPUS AND THE HETAIROI OF PHILIP II

Jacoby, FGrH II B, 2, 115, F.224. I retain Jacoby's page and line references: B. 582 l. 12(ATHENIENNER 62,166) peri de tis aistros kai tou bion philippou kai twn etairophn auton e[ gei tai xeurhun xerionov to teo[ropov tase geirei. Philippou epile eukrathe pollon

15 egeveto xhprmatwn, ouk analeiphten auta tacheis, all' asebeia, kai erreihe, pantwn en orthwn kakestos wv oikonomov ou monon autous, all' kai o per auton.

20 etplwv gar oudeis autwn epistato zevn ortheis oude sofronws oikein oikiain. To 6 autos aitsos zevn aplh-

25 stos kai polutes oun, prokeirws otopaia poiwn kai ktwmenon kai dedous. ostratwnws gar oun logizesthe

ta prosoonta kai tanaidekomene de' asekolikwn ouk

30 deukto. Epektata de' o etairoi autous ek pollon topwn

35 xetan suverypikates. Oi xevn gar zev autheis tis xurias, oui

30 de ek thespalas, ou de ek tis 6llh 6llados, ouk ari-

35 stin oun xeleghmenoi, all' el' tas zev en tois 6llhous 6

tois xerpras laostauros 6 bdeluros 6 orous ton

tropon, outoi upovtai otopetes eis Makedonian 6thra-

35 othentes etairoi philippou prosoprapontov. Ei de kai

30 mou toioatos tis oun elplthei, upo tov bion kai tis

dieuthe tis Makedonikhs tacheis ekeinou ouirou ege-

35 veta. Tais xevn gar es polerous kai ei otratenei, (ta de)

kai ei poluteles exei orous autous einai prosprepoyno

35 kai zevn mou koumimi all' aitswv kai tois upestrwv.
Concerning the extravagance and mode of life of Philip and his companions Theopompus writes the following in the forty-ninth book of the Histories:

"After Philip had become the possessor of a large fortune he did not spend it fast. No! he threw it outdoors and cast it away, being the worst manager in the world. This was true of his companions as well as himself. For to put it unqualifiedly, not one of them knew how to live uprightly or to manage an estate discreetly. He himself was to blame for this; being insatiable and extravagant, he did everything in a reckless manner, whether he was acquiring or giving. For as a soldier he had no time to count up revenues and expenditures. Add to this also that his companions were men who had rushed to his side from many quarters; some were from the land to which he himself belonged, others were from Thessaly, still others were from all the rest of Greece, selected not for their supreme merit; on the contrary, nearly every man in the Greek or barbarian world of a lecherous, loathsome, or ruffianly character flocked to Macedonia and won the title of 'companions of Philip'. And even supposing that one of them was not of this sort when he came, he soon became like all the rest, under the influence of the Macedonian life and habits. It was partly the wars and campaigns, partly also the extravagances of living that incited them to be ruffians, and live, not in a law-abiding spirit, but prodigally and like highwaymen."
Jacob Fry II B 2 115 P. 225b. I retain Jacoby's page and line references.

P. 583 Polyb. VIII 11. 5-13 (F 27)

εἰ δὲ τεῖς ἀναγγέλλων

βουλήθησα τὴν ἀρχὴν τῆς ἐνάτης καὶ τεσσαρακοστῆς αὐτῶν βούλου,

5 πανταπώστεν ἂν θαυμάσαι τὴν ἀτοπίνην τοῦ συμμαθείας, ὡς ἐκ ξυροῖς τῶν Ἀλλών τετόμημε καὶ ταῦτα λέγειν — αὐτοῖς γὰρ λέγειν αἷς ἐκείνος κέρδηται κατατετάχθειν

10 καὶ γὰρ τε ἢν ἐν τοῖς Ἑλλησπόντι τοῖς βασιλέωις φράσις ἣ ἄλογα ὁρμένοι τοὺς τρόπους, οὕτω πάντες εἰς Μακεδόνιαν ἀφροδίμονοι.

15 πρὸς Φιλίππον ἑταίροι τοῦ

βασιλέως προσηγορεῖσθαι

(= F 224), καθόλου γὰρ δὲ

Φιλίππος τοῖς μὲν κοσμίοις
toῖς ἢθείς καὶ τοῖς

20 ἢθικαῖς ἡμέραν ἐπεμελομένους

ἀπεδεικνύει, τοὺς δὲ πολυτελεῖς καὶ ἡμέρας ἐν μέθοις
cαὶ κύριοις ἡμέραν καὶ προ-

ηγέντο, τοιῷροις δὲ μόνον

25 τῶν ἑκέν τοιοῦτοι παρέ-

σκεύαζον, ἄλλα καὶ τῆς ἐλλη

νικίας καὶ βεβελυρίας ἀθλη-

tίσ ἐποίησαν. τὸ γὰρ τῶν

ἀθόρυβων ἢ δεινῶν κατοῖσ

30 οὗ προφητεύν, ἢ τῶν καλῶν

καὶ σπουδαίων οὐκ ἢπην.;

ἄν δὲ μὲν ὕψομενοι καὶ

λειτυόμενοι διεσέλον ἄν

δρες ὄντες, οἷς δὲ ἀλλήλοιο
έτολμων ἐπανίστασθαι πώς γι' αὐτός ἔχουσι; καὶ περιγράφοντο μὲν δύο καὶ τρεῖς τοὺς ἐταίρους αὐτοῖς, οὐδὲ τὰς αὐτὰς ἐκείνοις ἱραίσεις ἐτέρας παρείχοντο. ἔθεν καὶ δικαίως ἃν τις αὐτῶν οὐχ ἐταίρος ἔταν ἐκείνοις ἱραίσεις ἐτέρας παρείχον. ἔθεν δικαίως ἃν τις αὐτῶν οὐχ ἐταίρος ἔταν ἐκείνοις ἱραίσεις ἐτέρας παρείχον. ἔθεν πρὸς τὸ προσερμόσθην ἀνδρόφοις τὰς ἑνότατος ἐταίρων τοὺς πρόπολος ἐπιστρέφοντο πρὸς τὴν φύσιν εὐνοεῖν καὶ φονεῦειν ἑξῆς. καὶ τὰς ἑνότατος ἐταίρων τοὺς πρὸς τὴν φύσιν εὐνοεῖν καὶ φονεῖν ἑξῆς. καὶ τὰς ἑνότατος ἐταίρων τοὺς πρὸς τὴν φύσιν εὐνοεῖν καὶ φονεῖν ἑξῆς. καὶ τὰς ἑνότατος ἐταίρων τοὺς πρὸς τὴν φύσιν εὐνοεῖν καὶ φονεῖν ἑξῆς.

π.584Κ.585

15 ἐνα παύσεως ἐφεξής μικρολογῶν, ἀλλὰ τε καὶ τοσούτων μεῖον προομωτών ἐπικεχυμένων, ἥγουσα τοι- αύτα θηρίων εὐνοείναι καὶ τὰς ἑνότατος ἐταίρων τοὺς πρὸς τὴν φύσιν εὐνοεῖν καὶ φονεῖν ἑξῆς. καὶ τὰς ἑνότατος ἐταίρων τοὺς πρὸς τὴν φύσιν εὐνοεῖν καὶ φονεῖν ἑξῆς. καὶ τὰς ἑνότατος ἐταίρων τοὺς πρὸς τὴν φύσιν εὐνοεῖν καὶ φονεῖν ἑξῆς.

π.586

20 τοσούτων τοὺς πρόπολος τὸς πλήθους καὶ τῶν ἐταίρων Φίλοποι προσαυξομένων ταῖς οἷς οὕτως τοὺς κενταῦ- ρους τοὺς τὸ πλήθος κατα- 25 σχόντας αὖτε ταῖς λαοτρο- γόνας τοὺς τὸ λεοντίνων πεδίων οἰκοτάσσαται ὡντ' ἀλ- λοὺς οὐδ' ἐστέοις.»
Concerning each (sc. Dionysius and Philip) Theopompus writes in the forty-ninth book as follows:

'Philip spurned those who were of decent character and who were careful of their property, but he honoured with praise the extravagant and those who spent their lives in dicing and drinking. Therefore he took pains that they should have these amusements, and even made them competitors in every king of wickedness and disgusting conduct. For what scandalous or appalling act was not in their programme? Or what honourable and upright act was not missing? Did they not in some cases, grown men though they were, go shaved and depilated, in other cases even go so far as to consort infamously with each other, though they were bearded? In fact each had in his train two or three prostitute companions, and they themselves granted to others the same favours. Hence one may rightly assume that they were not companions, but 'mistresses', and might rightly call them not soldiers, but harlots; for they were man-killers by nature, man-harlots by habit. In addition, they loved drunkenness instead of soberness, they were eager to plunder and murder instead of living decent lives. Truth-telling and keeping promises they regarded as no part of their duty, whereas they readily assumed the odium of perjury and cheating in the most august sanctuary. Careless of what they had, they itched for what they had not, though they owned a whole section of Europe. For I believe that though these companions numbered at that
time not more than eight hundred, yet they enjoyed the profits of as much land as any ten thousand Greeks possessing the richest and most extensive territory.¹

These fragments of Theopompus' Philippica are the main evidence for the number and nature of the ἡταῖροι of Philip II. I have not presented a translation of Polybius' passage because it does not differ significantly from that of Athenaeus' passage. It is clear that Athenaeus' first quotation came in Theopompus' text just before his second quotation and in fact 224 seems to end almost precisely where 225b starts, as Polybius' quotation contains the end of one and the beginning of the other. Polybius was clearly much more selective than Athenaeus, quoting those parts which would best illustrate the defamatory nature of Theopompus' work, while Athenaeus probably presents the fuller version of Theopompus' passage.¹ The last part of 225a, in which οἱ φίλοι καὶ οἱ ἡταῖροι of Philip are compared to beasts, came in Theopompus presumably somewhere after 225b had finished. The general agreement in the texts of Polybius and Athenaeus, where they run parallel, indicates that what is preserved is reasonably close to the text of Thempompus.² Some differences can be accounted for, as Milns suggests,³ by assuming differences in the manuscript tradition at the time of Athenaeus compared with the time of Polybius.

The date at which Theopompus' words were written cannot be established. As Connor points out, Book 57 was certainly written after 337 B.C., but how long after is unknown: perhaps the work was not finished until as late as 320 B.C.⁴
Although it cannot be established when Theopompus wrote the passage, it is generally accepted that it appeared in the context of the narrative of the year 340/39 B.C. This was first argued by Stähelin, who related it to Theopompus' fragment F.292 (FGrH), which records that Philip acquired 700 talents from privateering with Hiero of Soloi, and Stähelin suggested that this gave Theopompus his introduction to his criticism of Philip's extravagance, and immediately preceded F.224: as the privateering occurred in 340/39 B.C., F.224 appeared in the context of that year. However, Philip undoubtedly came into large sums of money through questionable means at other times in his reign, and there can be no certainty that F.292 directly preceded F.224, or bore any relation to it at all. Jacoby assigns F.292 to Book 48 (the very end) or 49 (the very beginning) on the strength of Stähelin's argument, but Polybius says that the passage occurred at the beginning of Book 49, which would seem to mean that F.292 could not have come at the beginning of Book 49. If it occurred at the end of Book 48 then it can hardly be said to be closely linked to this fragment, because it was separated by a book division.

Whatever the chronological context in which the passage occurred, it takes the form of a digression and does not properly belong to the narrative of any year, being rather a general description of the conduct of Philip and his circle. Whether the passage was inspired by the privateering of 340/39 B.C. or not, Theopompus did not intend his readers to take the impression that the conduct described was confined to
this particular time.

The trend of the Theopompus passage is not difficult to follow, and the theme is a familiar one to anyone acquainted with the fragments of Theopompus.\(^7\) The invective and moral condemnation of Philip and his associates is reminiscent of the expressed contempt of the author for other great leaders of his day, e.g. Dionysius of Syracuse.\(^8\) The familiarity of the theme predisposes scholars to suspect Theopompus of prejudice in his judgments of the men of his time and few would accept Theopompus' evidence without qualification. However, it must be remembered that the life style of the 'barbarian' kings and chiefs must have seemed generally extravagant and undisciplined to the Greek from a city state background, and Theopompus' evidence should not be rejected as readily as Tarn rejects it (II p.154 n.5). Indeed it should be recognised that as Theopompus spent time at the court,\(^9\) the background to his invective may have some historical value.

Theopompus was essentially an orator before he turned historian\(^10\) and this passage is clearly much affected by his rhetorical training. It is concerned with the overall effect rather than detail, less with accuracy than with the persuasion of his readers. Yet an orator, if he could, based his invective upon facts and sought to obtain his end by selection of fact, rather than outright falsification. The charges levelled at Philip and his circle seem to be based on a foundation of fact, flimsy though it may be. It is beyond dispute that Philip used his revenue to the full: despite
the enormous income, at the end of his reign the Macedonian treasury was nearly empty;\textsuperscript{11} he was known for his lavish gifts to favourites, for gambling and drinking.\textsuperscript{12} To a Greek, unused to the flamboyance of a royal court, the extravagance would make a very deep impression: adventurers, attracted to the court in search of a fortune, no doubt did not improve the general atmosphere of the place. Homosexuality was probably no more common than in many other military situations, but this was something Theopompus could not omit because it gave him the opportunity to play with words, and make use of the pun on \textit{hetairoi}. It may have been a common joke about the Macedonian court among the Greeks, and his readers may have been disappointed if it had been missing from Theopompus' account. It gave him a chance to show his rhetorical paces in true Gorgian fashion. For the other charges, the Macedonians almost certainly had more in common with the 'barbaric' Thracians than with the Greeks and did not share the Greek moral and religious standards: Philip, for one, was particularly noted for his single-minded and ruthless ambition, which respected laws of neither men nor gods.\textsuperscript{13}

While we must beware of accepting all that the Greeks said about Philip, there seems no good reason for doubting that the court of Philip was no place for those with weak stomachs, and that most of the charges Theopompus lays against the men with Philip had a foundation of fact. However, the overall effect is not so acceptable. By selecting the more extravagant and outrageous elements, Theopompus has made the Macedonian court out to be a den of perverts without any
standards of decency. By listing examples of the degeneracy, without any compensating good points, Theopompus has produced a very distorted and inaccurate picture, without being patently guilty of falsehood. Historians are, therefore, right to pay little attention to the overall picture portrayed by Theopompus: but it should be noted that the details find much support in other evidence upon the life style of Philip and his circle.

Though rejecting the rest of the passage, scholars generally have extracted three points of information as being worthy of serious attention: 1) Philip collected men to himself from all over Macedonia and the Greek world and called them his 'hetairoi'; 2) there were about 800 hetairoi at the time of which Theopompus was writing; 3) these 800 enjoyed the fruits of an enormous area of land. I have argued that the individual charges on which Theopompus builds his invective have some foundation in fact, however misleading the whole is. Therefore, it is very difficult to believe that Theopompus is inaccurate on these three points which in themselves do nothing to blacken the image of the court. It cannot be doubted that Philip made Greeks, as well as Macedonians, hetairoi; there is, in fact, independent evidence that there were Greek hetairoi. It might be doubted that there were as many men involved as Theopompus implies, and the criterion used in their selection may not have been that stated by him - though the qualities looked for by Philip would not necessarily have met with Theopompus' approval.

Concerning the second point, Theopompus could have no reason
for falsifying the number and it does not look like a wild guess: in the absence of contradictory evidence it should be accepted. The third point, namely that these 800 owned a large area of land need not be doubted.

Though scholars are agreed that these points have value for the historian, they differ in their interpretation. Plaumann considered that the first point referred to the *hetairoi councillors*, and points (2) and (3) to the *hetairoi cavalry*, but most scholars since Plaumann have thought that all three refer to the *hetairoi cavalry*. The interpretations have considerable influence upon their theories about the Macedonian army and court, and the matter is of some importance.

All who distinguish between the two uses of the word are agreed that (2) and (3) must refer to the *hetairoi cavalry*, and this would seem to be right. The number of *hetairoi councillors* at any given time is not known, but few scholars would reckon them at many more than 100, even at the end of Alexander the Great's reign, when it is generally assumed the *councillors* were at their highest number. The names of rather less than 100 are known to us from Alexander's reign and it seems impossible, therefore, that Theopompus could have meant that there were 800 *hetairoi councillors* in Philip's reign. As (2) is inseparable from (3), there can be no doubt that Theopompus is saying that these 800 *hetairoi cavalry* were excessively rich landholders.

There is no such agreement upon (1). Plaumann argued that it must refer to the *hetairoi councillors* because the
hetairoi cavalry contained no Greeks, as the territorial divisions show, while it is known that there were some Greeks among the 'hetairoi councillors'. His arguments are clearly inadequate, for although the hetairoi cavalry was recruited from areas within Macedonia, there is no evidence to show that some of them were not Greek immigrants who had acquired, or were granted, enough land to qualify themselves for cavalry service under Philip (see above Ch. II pp. 33f.). As we know the names of only a handful of hetairoi cavalry, and all these are squadron leaders, there can be no certainty about the place of origin of the troopers.

On the other hand, those scholars who consider that (1) refers to the hetairoi cavalry scarcely have a better case to support their contention. It, in fact, relies on the assumption that Theopompus is a careful enough writer in this passage not to confuse the two different types of hetairoi in Philip's circle, and because (2) and (3) refer to the hetairoi cavalry (1) also must. This hardly seems justified in view of the generally held opinion concerning the passage as a whole. Another look at the whole passage will illustrate what I mean. Theopompus is trying to paint the most shocking picture he can of Philip and his circle. To achieve this he selects what appear to him to be the most outrageous features and conflates them into a continuous descriptive passage: Philip named the scum of the earth his 'hetairoi'; drinking and gambling were their main occupations; they were male prostitute homosexuals; they indulged in drunkenness (again), lawlessness, robbery and murder, falsehood, treachery, perjury
and sacrilege; finally, despite their enormous wealth they
lusted after more. It seems wrong to assume that in all these
charges Theopompus is necessarily thinking consistently of
either the 'hetairoi councillors' or the hetairoi cavalry:
clearly he was not interested in describing the life style of
any particular group within Philip's circle so much as merely
listing vices. We only have Athenaeus' word for it that the
passage as a whole is devoted to the body described by the
author as the 'hetairoi'. It is not a necessary conclusion
from Theopompus' words and at the end of Polybius' quotation
(p.584 1.21) the comparison made is between 'the friends and
hetairoi of Philip' and wild beasts. This implies that
Theopompus did not actually have the hetairoi specifically
in mind in the rest of the passage, but that he was merely
talking in general terms about the circle of Philip. Both
the 'hetairoi councillors' and the hetairoi cavalry may have
been seen as a part of this circle by Theopompus. I would
suggest that the hetairoi receive specific mention only
because they illustrate so well some of the conduct Theopompus
is criticising. Philip's desire to have around him debauched
degenerates is best illustrated by reference to the hetairoi:
the charge of homosexuality is inspired by the word hetairoi
and they are a natural object of Theopompus' indignation.
Finally, the wealth of these men who senselessly lusted after
more is best illustrated by a reference to a body of rich men
whose number can be defined, i.e., hetairoi cavalry, and
whose landholdings can, therefore, be described with a
meaningful, though not necessarily precise, comparison.
These, I suggest, are the reasons for the introduction of the hetairoi and Theopompus would have had no hesitation in moving indiscriminately from one type of hetairoi to the other in his search for charges against Philip and his circle. If he had referred to the 'hetairoi councillors' to show how Philip honoured the lowest elements, but then found that he wanted to use the other hetairoi for his punning reference to homosexuality, and for his illustration of the wealth of these men who lusted after more, he would not have paused to consider whether he should do so, or to think that he was giving misleading information. There can, therefore, be no certainty about whether (1) refers to the 'hetairoi councillors', hetairoi cavalry or both, and it cannot be used to show that Philip brought Greeks to serve in the hetairoi cavalry.

The passage as a whole deserves more attention than it has generally received in the past, because the details do indicate that Theopompus was acquainted with the set-up at the Macedonian court, although he was obviously very prejudiced in this passage, both in his viewpoint and in his selection of material. At the same time, however, it must be recognised that the passage is heavily rhetorical, and great caution must be exercised by the historian in the interpretation of the details.
### APPENDIX II

**ALEXANDER'S ARMY AT THE BEGINNING OF THE CAMPAIGN**

#### a) The Transmitted Totals

The following table gives the more important variations in the ancient writers concerning the total strength:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Infantry</th>
<th>Cavalry</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Anaximenes</td>
<td>43,000</td>
<td>5,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Callisthenes</td>
<td>40,000</td>
<td>4,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ptolemy</td>
<td>30,000</td>
<td>5,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arrian</td>
<td>'not many more than 30,000'</td>
<td>'over 5,000'</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aristobulus</td>
<td>30,000</td>
<td>4,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Livy</td>
<td>30,000</td>
<td>4,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diodorus</td>
<td>Sum of items 32,000</td>
<td>5,100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total given 30,000</td>
<td>4,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Justin</td>
<td>32,000</td>
<td>4,500</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Some of the differences in this list are minor and can be explained simply in terms of the ancients' carelessness in dealing with figures. But differences in the region of 13,000 infantry (contrast Anaximenes and Aristobulus) and 1,500 cavalry (contrast Anaximenes and Aristobulus again) cannot lightly be set aside. Scholars have, therefore, found that other causes lie at the root of the disagreements.

Many years ago J.G. Droysen suggested that the confusion among the ancient sources was caused by an advance force joining Alexander when he landed in Asia. Some of the figures, he suggested, referred to the strength of the army prior to this juncture, others to the strength after it. It is
known that a force of Macedonians and mercenaries was sent to Asia by Philip in 336 B.C. (Diod. 17, 7, 10), in preparation for the main invasion, and Polyaeus tells us that this force numbered 10,000 in 336 B.C. (5, 44, 4). Droysen saw that the difference between the highest and the lowest figures could be greatly reduced, in fact almost eliminated, if his theory was accepted.

This theory is attractive because it does allow us to explain the great divergences in terms which in part save the credit of sources we would expect to be well informed. There is, however, a major problem in his approach, for while the explanation works all right for the infantry, it cannot satisfactorily explain the differences in the cavalry totals. Brunt has tried to solve this difficulty by supposing that cavalry joined Alexander on two separate occasions after Pella. Setting aside the lowest cavalry figure, that of Aristobulus and Livy, he explains that Alexander actually left Pella with 4,500 cavalry, but that 600 Thracians joined on the road between Pella and the Hellespont, and another 1,000 cavalry after the main force had crossed the Hellespont, these latter being part of the advance force. In this way, he explains, the totals of 4,500, 5,100 and 5,500 emerged in the following way: one source (i.e. Callisthenes) forgot to add in any cavalry which joined late, while two others (Ptolemy and Anaximenes) remembered to add one reinforcement but not the other. He concludes that the full cavalry strength was 6,100.

This explanation is plainly unsatisfactory. Brunt has
to assume an unlikely degree of inconsistency on the part of the sources: Callisthenes remembered to add in the infantry reinforcement but not the cavalry; Ptolemy remembered to add in one part of the cavalry but none of the infantry; and even Anaximenes forgot one force of cavalry. It is certainly not sound to reject all our cavalry totals. Further, it is in the highest degree unlikely that there were 1,000 cavalry in the force which Alexander had in Asia in 334 B.C. We are not told how many cavalry Philip sent over in 336 B.C., but it is improbable that there were more than a couple of hundred in 334 B.C. For, while Alexander's main force apparently experienced no difficulty in landing in Asia, there is no evidence that anything more than a bridgehead at Abydos was held, and cavalry could have no major role in such a garrison. Alexander would not have needlessly kept cavalry in service, because he was short of funds and it was expensive to maintain a cavalry force in the field. It would also have been difficult to feed as many as 1,000 horses in a garrison at Abydos.

Therefore, whatever the merits of Droysen's theory in explaining the divergence in the infantry totals, it cannot satisfactorily be applied to the cavalry. Yet it is difficult to explain how something as straightforward as the number of cavalry in Alexander's army could have become so confused. There must have been official records and talk must have circulated among the people of the time. It is most surprising that so many different versions exist, even among authors who would be expected to be reliable. However, some general considerations about numbers in the ancient sources should be
noted. Few ancient writers had any great concern about accuracy in dealing with figures: in particular, it was common for them to give rounded figures rather than the often long, stylistically awkward, precise numbers. In reports of the size of armies exaggeration was not uncommon: the drama of a 'David' defeating a 'Goliath' was attractive, and we should be aware of the possibility that Alexander's forces were understated by some writers. Another consideration is the vulnerability of numbers to corruption during the transmission of the text: a scribe's eye easily slipped from one word, or line, to another when copying figures or read them incorrectly. In general it seems much more likely that the differences are caused by the carelessness of the sources or the scribes than that there were many different versions current at the time of the crossing to Asia.

It seems appropriate, therefore, to look closely at the transmitted totals in an effort to establish an order of credibility, on the basis of the reliability of the manuscript tradition and the degree of accuracy to be expected from the source.

The figures of Anaximenes are given only by Plutarch, in a passage (Mor. 327 D-E) which summarises some of the totals given for Alexander's army: Aristobulus recorded 30,000 infantry, 4,000 cavalry; Ptolemy 30,000 infantry, 5,000 cavalry; Anaximenes 43,000 infantry, 5,500 cavalry. There is no particular reason to suspect the manuscript tradition here. Ptolemy's figures can be reliably checked against Arrian's totals, which are evidently from Ptolemy: and as Plutarch seems to be giving the totals in ascending order of size,
this also gives some kind of check. Some reference, however, must be made to the other passage in which Plutarch gives a summary of what his sources said about the size of the army. In his Life of Alexander (ch.15,1), which is an almost parallel passage, he gives the least and the greatest figures he has found. But here the text is far from good: the manuscripts give the lowest figures as 30,000 infantry and 5,000 cavalry; the highest are given by the majority of the manuscripts as 43,000 infantry and 4,000 cavalry, though one has 34,000 infantry and 4,000 cavalry. In general, editors have felt justified in emending the text here to bring it more into line with the Moralia passage: Reiske suggested that the lowest cavalry total and the highest should be interchanged, and there can be no doubt that 43,000 should be read for the highest infantry total. If Reiske's suggestion is adopted, the lowest figures in the Life are those given as Aristobulus' in Moralia, but the highest figures remain lower than those he gives for Anaximenes in Moralia. It is possible that Plutarch made a mistake, or the text has been corrupted, in the Moralia passage, but it is far more likely that the evidence of the patently corrupt passage of the Life is at fault. It does not seem sound, at any rate, to emend the Moralia passage on the strength of the evidence in the Life, or to doubt Plutarch's report of Anaximenes' total as 43,000 infantry and 5,500 cavalry.

The infantry figure of 43,000 is remarkably precise and it is difficult to believe that this is not what Anaximenes actually wrote, though perhaps with a qualifying 'about'.
The cavalry figure is given plainly as 5,500, which might represent a round number, and it may be considered likely that Anaximenes actually had a qualifying 'almost' or 'over' which Plutarch has omitted. As for the reliability of Anaximenes himself, it must be rated very highly. He was with the expedition in 334 B.C. and was at the time engaged in writing an account of the campaign, thus he was in an excellent position to know the size of the army and to report it correctly.

The figures of Callisthenes are drawn from Polybius 12,19,1. The text of this passage is bad and great caution must be exercised in dealing with the numbers. The whole argument of the passage revolves around the number of men Callisthenes said were in Alexander's army and the size of the battlefield at Issus; and Polybius' reasoning is so absurd, as it appears in this chapter, that we are led to suspect that several numbers have become corrupted. It is established beyond doubt that some mistakes have been made.12 As it happens, the infantry total can be checked internally and stands above suspicion: to the original 40,000 given for the start of the campaign Polybius adds 5,000 reinforcements and then allows 3,000 for wastage during the year and a half between the start of the campaign and the battle at Issus; the result is 42,000 (12,19,3). No such check, however, is possible for the cavalry total and when it is compared with Anaximenes' figure, we must surely be led to question its correctness.

Callisthenes, like Anaximenes, was with the army in
334 B.C. and was there specifically to write up the campaign. His opportunities were identical to those of Anaximenes and it would be expected that his figures were approximately the same. This expectation is fulfilled with respect to the infantry: Callisthenes' 40,000 (Polybius may have omitted some qualifying word like 'about') is close enough to Anaximenes' 43,000. But the cavalry figure is 1,000 lower than Anaximenes' figure. It is inconceivable that Polybius gave a much lower figure than Callisthenes actually had, because it was in the interest of his argument to make Callisthenes' figures high. Nor are we justified in thinking either that Callisthenes arbitrarily knocked 1,000 off the cavalry total or that Anaximenes added 1,000. It might also be pointed out that a high infantry figure would be expected to be accompanied by a high cavalry figure. Therefore, apart from the general untrustworthiness of the passage, the cavalry total itself presents some cause to doubt its accuracy. I would suggest, accordingly, that the text of Polybius is corrupt at this point and that it should be emended to bring the total closer to that of Anaximenes. It does not follow that Callisthenes was in exact agreement with Anaximenes on the number of cavalry: in so far as he gave a round figure for the infantry, compared with Anaximenes, he may be thought to have given a round figure of say 'about 5,000', for the cavalry. I would conclude that Callisthenes' cavalry total, as recorded in Polybius, is less reliable than that of Anaximenes. His infantry total must rank equal beside that of Anaximenes.
Ptolemy's figures are given in the passage of Plutarch's *Moria* (327 D) already discussed above with reference to Anaximenes. It is generally agreed among scholars that Arrian's totals also are drawn from Ptolemy (1,11,3) and there can be no doubt that this is correct. These authors, therefore, agree about the figures of Ptolemy and we may be confident that 30,000 and 5,000 are, at least approximately, what Ptolemy gave. Arrian, however, gives the more accurate version for he qualifies the numbers, recording 'not many more than 30,000' and 'over 5,000'. It is possible that Ptolemy gave more precise figures and that Arrian, in preference to recording what he found, rounded the numbers down. However, Plutarch in his passage in the *Moria* perhaps indicates that Ptolemy did not give more precise numbers. He shows that he is not averse to giving precise figures, where he finds them, for he records 43,000 and 5,500 for Anaximenes. It might be expected, therefore, that if Ptolemy did give more precise figures, Plutarch would have copied them. Admittedly he did omit the qualifying words 'not many more than' and 'over!', but this, I suggest, is different from actually changing a precise number to a round one.

The transmitted totals for Ptolemy seem sound, and I would suggest that they were very much in the form in which they appear in Arrian. The reliability of Ptolemy himself may perhaps be rated quite highly. His evidence on the size of the army should not be regarded as that of a primary source, for he did not write until perhaps more than fifteen years after the start of the Asian campaign, and can
hardly be expected to have remembered the details of the army in 334 B.C. However, he is generally regarded as being the best available source for military detail and he must be ranked inferior only to Anaximenes and Callisthenes on the matter of the size of the army. Although his infantry total is at variance with those of Anaximenes and Callisthenes, it is supported by all the other versions handed down to us and must therefore, be lightly set aside. His cavalry total does not differ significantly from that of Anaximenes: 'over 5,000' is close to 5,500, and it should be remembered that Anaximenes may have written 'almost' or 'about' 5,500.

Aristobulus' figures come to us only from the passage of Plutarch's Moralia (327 D), but I have already argued that the text of this is sound. It seems that Aristobulus gave the lowest figures which Plutarch came across, and if this is right, the evidence of Plutarch's Life of Alexander (ch.15,1) seems to contradict his report in the Moralia: for in the Life Plutarch's text gives the lowest figures at 30,000 and 5,000, whereas the Moralia has Aristobulus' totals at 30,000 and 4,000. However, editors have in general not found the text in the Life acceptable and the Moralia passage makes it certain that Aristobulus' totals were less than Ptolemy's of 30,000 infantry and 5,000 cavalry (see also above pp.346f.).

Plutarch had no reason to falsify Aristobulus' figures, but I have already suggested that Plutarch probably omitted qualifying words like 'not many more than' and 'over' in reporting Ptolemy's totals; it is not unlikely that he did the same with Aristobulus' figures. The reliability of
Aristobulus himself was not highly regarded among the ancients: he had a reputation for excessive flattery of Alexander. He did not write until at least the beginning of the third century B.C., in his old age, and by this time great debate concerning the qualities of Alexander had arisen: in this debate Aristobulus took the part of Alexander. The fact that Plutarch found that his figures were the lowest he came across for the army indicates that Aristobulus may have understated the size of the army, in the belief that in so doing he was magnifying Alexander's greatness. His infantry total can scarcely be called into question because it is supported by Ptolemy and all the other sources except Anaximenes and Callisthenes. His cavalry total, however, is extraordinarily low and is corroborated only by Livy: it must rank far below those of Anaximenes and Ptolemy.

The figures of Livy need not detain us long. He gives the same totals of 30,000 infantry and 4,000 cavalry (9,19,5) as Plutarch records for Aristobulus, which seem to be the lowest Plutarch found. In this passage Livy was concerned to argue that Alexander could not have defeated the Romans, and it might be expected that he would give the lowest figures he came across. His reliability must be rated very low and his totals cannot be used to support those of Aristobulus.

Justin's totals (32,000 infantry and 4,500 cavalry) are different from those of any other source: I shall argue below that Diodorus' text should be emended to make the totals
equal the sum of the items listed, i.e. 32,000 and 5,100. Other sources give Justin's infantry total and, according to the text of Polybius (12, 19, 1) Callisthenes gave a cavalry total of 4,500, but no source gives both. I do not think it is sound to reason that Justin's figures are a collation from two different sources, for there is no evidence of such careful working in his book. In fact, Justin lived over 500 years after Alexander and wrote a mere summary of a general history; and it is established that he was not a careful worker. In particular some of his figures can readily be shown to be unreliable. For instance, in his treatment of the invasion of Greece by Xerxes, where he is evidently following Herodotus, he gives a total for the Asiatic contingent of Xerxes' army of 700,000 (2, 10, 18). Herodotus' figure was 1,700,000 (7, 184) and, outrageous as Herodotus' number may be, there can be no justification for Justin's figure, which may be due to arbitrary change by Justin, or his source, or to corruption of the text. Again, Justin records that Antiochus III led 100,000 infantry and 20,000 cavalry against Arsaces III (41, 5, 7). The source of these figures is unknown but they have been universally found unacceptable by scholars. Finally, an example from his account of Alexander also will demonstrate his unreliability. He records that at the battle of the Granicus, of Alexander's men 9 infantry and 120 cavalry died and that Alexander set up statues of these men (11, 6, 13). This evidence is contradicted by both Arrian and Plutarch. Arrian records that
25 cavalry died in the first attack and their statues set up, and that 60 other cavalry were killed (1,16,4). Plutarch says that Aristobulus recorded that 34 men were killed, of whom 9 were infantry (Alex. 16,7f.): these were honoured with statues. Hamilton argues that Arrian gives the correct version and that only 25 statues were set up: he suggests that Justin's text should be emended to read 25 cavalry. Whether this emendation is accepted or not, it is clear that Justin's figures are wrong and cannot be preferred to those of Arrian and Plutarch. Other examples could be cited but it should, at least, be clear that Justin's figures cannot be relied upon, especially when he contradicts better authorities, as he does on the subject of the size of Alexander's army.

This completes my review of the transmitted totals, with the exception of Diodorus' version. I have postponed consideration of this to a separate section (below) because his evidence is not straightforward. I shall, however, argue that his totals should be emended to read 32,000 and 5,100, and as such they are in line with Ptolemy's figures of 'not many more than 30,000' and 'over 5,000'.

I may now summarise the result of my discussion. Two most reliable sources agree upon the total of about 40,000 for the infantry: they are Anaximenes, who is reported as giving 43,000, and Callisthenes, whose total is given at 40,000. It may be supposed that Anaximenes is the more precise, and the total of over 40,000, it cannot be doubted, accurately reflects the infantry strength of the army in 334 B.C. The source which rates as the next most reliable, after Anaximenes and Callisthenes, namely Ptolemy, gives a total
of 'not many more than 30,000', and this figure is supported by all the other versions, which, although less reliable than Anaximenes and Callisthenes, can scarcely all be wrong. We are, therefore, left with two totals for the infantry, of over 40,000 and over 30,000. For the cavalry total, two reliable sources, namely Anaximenes and Ptolemy, seem to agree on a total of over 5,000, Anaximenes giving 5,500, or thereabouts, and Ptolemy 'over 5,000'. Among the rest of the sources there is little agreement, with Aristobulus and Livy offering 4,000 and Justin 4,500. Callisthenes' figure is probably incorrectly transmitted. The other versions are clearly less reliable than those of Anaximenes and Ptolemy.

We may now return to Droysen's theory which was outlined at the beginning of the appendix; namely that confusion has arisen in the sources because an advance force already in Asia in 334 B.C. joined the main force when it landed there. I have argued above that there are two reliable traditions concerning the infantry total, one of over 40,000, the other of over 30,000. Since Polyaenus gives a strength of about 10,000 for the advance force sent over in 336 B.C. (5,44,4), it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that the tradition which supports a total of over 40,000 refers to the infantry strength after the advance force had joined, and the tradition which supports a total of over 30,000 refers to the infantry strength before that force had joined.

It might be objected that there is no record of such a force joining Alexander on his arrival in Asia, but there are many surprising omissions in the sources, and this cannot be
seen as a conclusive argument against this approach. The
sources are mainly concerned with Alexander's dramatic
landing at Troy, his sacrifices to the gods and the Homeric
heroes. They had, in fact, a reason to omit details of the
advance force because Alexander was portrayed in the Homeric
image, dramatically throwing a spear into Asian soil. The
impact of this portrayal would have been greatly weakened by
a description of the joining of the main force with the
substantial body of men which had secured a bridgehead.
Further, it seems unlikely that such an advance force would
have been withdrawn on the eve of the invasion: it would have
been lunacy to withdraw and risk opposition to the landing
troops. Nothing more than a bridgehead seems to have been in
Macedonian hands in 334 B.C. and whether the force still
numbered about 10,000 men cannot be known, but there is no
reason to think that the garrison was not substantial enough
to account for the discrepancy in the traditions concerning
the infantry strength.

There is less difficulty over the cavalry figures, in
that the most reliable ones are in substantial agreement. I
have already argued against there being any significant
number of cavalry already in Asia in 334 B.C., and therefore
there is no difficulty about accepting that, even though
Ptolemy's figure refers to the cavalry strength prior to the
advance force joining and Anaximenes' figure to the strength
after the juncture, they are in substantial agreement. It is,
on the other hand, difficult to see how other totals for the
cavalry could have arisen, and the other versions should, it
seems, be explained in terms of textual corruption or by reference to the possibility of understatement in the reports of the strength of the army.

I conclude, therefore, that the most reliable figures which we have for Alexander's army indicate that the strength on its departure from Pella was over 30,000 infantry and over 5,000 cavalry. On its arrival in Asia it was joined by an advance force, consisting almost entirely of infantry, and numbering something in the region of 10,000 men.
b) Diodorus 17,17,3 f.

This passage gives the only detailed list of the troops that accompanied Alexander at the beginning of his Asian campaign. In setting out the details in tabular form I follow the best manuscript tradition:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Infantry</th>
<th>Cavalry</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>12,000 Macedonians</td>
<td>1,800 Macedonians</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7,000 allies</td>
<td>1,800 Thessalians</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5,000 mercenaries</td>
<td>600 Greeks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7,000 Odrysians, Triballians, 900 Thracian prodromoi Illyrians and Paeonians</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1,000 archers and Agrianians</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32,000 correct total</td>
<td>5,100 correct total</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30,000 Diodorus' total</td>
<td>4,500 Diodorus' total</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The discrepancy which calls for immediate discussion is the difference between the sums of items and the totals as given in the text. Three approaches to this problem may be taken. It can be assumed that Diodorus, or his source, could not add: or it can be assumed, as Brunt and Marsden have done, that Diodorus used one account for the details and another for the totals, and omitted to check the sum: or the text can be emended to make the sum of the details and the totals tally, as Droysen, Beloch and many editors have done.

The first explanation will hardly do. Diodorus, or his source, might have made a slip in one of the additions but it is not likely that he made a mistake in both. In any case it is most probable that Diodorus, or his source, did not
reach the totals by adding up the details but rather that both the totals and the details were established prior to being put together as they appear in this list.\textsuperscript{35} The second explanation also strains belief. Diodorus hardly ever, it seems, used two sources simultaneously in the way in which we would have to assume he did if this explanation were accepted.\textsuperscript{36} Besides this it seems incredible that if Diodorus was careful enough to look to another source for the totals, he was not careful enough to check that the totals tallied with the details as he gave them. In addition it should be noted that no other source actually gives the two totals which Diodorus offers: Justin gives 32,000 infantry and 4,500 cavalry, but I cannot believe that Diodorus would round down a correct 32,000 to a mistaken 30,000 when he was trying to give the sum of a detailed list of units. If the second explanation is to be accepted then, we must attribute to Diodorus a curious mixture of unusual carefulness combined with amazing carelessness, and assume that he had access to a source which gave totals nowhere else recorded. This I cannot accept.

We are left with the third approach, emendation. Emendation is clearly to some extent an open choice, but certain principles should be followed. The emendation should be as slight as possible: only one number should need emending in each list, either the strength of one of the items or the total. Also, the totals should be the same as more securely established totals from another source, for this provides a sounder basis for the emendations. Of the other totals recorded, the two which could be used as guides are those of
Arrian and Justin. Justin's totals are 32,000 for the infantry, which is the sum of the items in Diodorus' list, and 4,500 for the cavalry, which is the total given by Diodorus. Arrian records 'not many more than 30,000' for the infantry, which again supports emendation of the total to 32,000, and 'over 5,000' for the cavalry, which indicates that the details of the units are correct and it is Diodorus' total which should be emended. These are the only possibilities, for while other sources give a total of 30,000 for the infantry, they do not couple it with a cavalry total approximating to 4,500 or 5,100.

In choosing whether Arrian or Justin should be used as a guide, we are naturally drawn to the better source, and I refer to the discussion presented above. Arrian's totals are drawn from Ptolemy and should be regarded as among the most reliable which we have: certainly they are drawn from a good early tradition. On the other hand, it seems unlikely that Justin's totals represent a good early tradition and it is, therefore, much less likely that Diodorus would have the same totals as he has. Beloch and Berve assumed that Justin and Diodorus drew upon a common ultimate source here, as it can be shown they sometimes did. But it is not difficult to show that frequently Justin and Diodorus did not draw upon a common source. For instance, Justin gives the figure of 600,000 for the Persian strength at the battle of the Granicus (11,6,11), while Diodorus has the more conservative 100,000 infantry and 10,000 cavalry (17,19,4.5). For the casualties at the battle of Issus, Justin has
Persian losses at 61,000 infantry and 10,000 cavalry and Macedonian losses at 130 infantry and 150 cavalry (11,9,10). Diodorus, however, has 100,000 Persian infantry and 10,000 cavalry, and for the Macedonians 300 infantry and 150 cavalry. Examples could be multiplied and it is clear that frequently Diodorus and Justin did not draw upon a common ultimate source.

It is preferable, therefore, to use the figures given by Arrian as a guide. I conclude that the totals should be emended to read 32,000 and 5,100, thereby equalling the sums of the items and bringing them into line with the good early tradition attested as Ptolemy’s. With this settled, I move on to discussion of the details of the list.

The lists of Diodorus are quite remarkable and this fact led Droysen to dismiss them as a worthless fabrication. He has not, however, been followed by any scholar, and his arguments against their authenticity are quite flimsy. He opens his attack by pointing out that the information concerning Parmenio’s overall command of the Macedonian and Greek heavy infantry is patently incorrect. Nowhere, he argued, is Parmenio described as commander of these 24,000 heavy infantry. This point has already been answered by Badian, who comments that official commands do not always coincide with the actual duties and responsibilities while on campaign. Parmenio did not actually have a command of a tactical unit (24,000 infantry does not amount to a tactical unit), but held the position of second-in-command
to Alexander (Berve II no. 606). This position of the king's second-in-command was bestowed upon Parmenio by making him officially commander in charge of all the heavy infantry. Also on the subject of commanders, Droysen objects that Diodorus is wrong in saying that Erigyius (Berve II no. 302) was commander of the Greek allied horse at the beginning of the campaign, for Arrian says that Philip, son of Menelaus (Berve II no. 779), led these cavalry into the battle of the Granicus (Arr. 1, 14, 3). Yet Erigyius is attested as their commander in 331 B.C. (Arr. 3, 11, 10) and Berve, who also finds fault with Diodorus' evidence on this point, has to assume that Erigyius was their commander from the winter of 334/3 B.C. It does not seem sound, in view of the explicit statement of Diodorus in reference to 334 B.C. and the evidence of Arrian in reference to 331 B.C., to think that Philip held the post of commander of the Greek allied horse simply because he led them into battle at the Granicus. We cannot know what Erigyius was doing when the battle was being fought, he may have been fighting in the band of hetairoi around the king (Arr. 1, 15, 6), or he may not have been present at the battle at all. At the battle of Gaugamela Amyntas (Berve II no. 57) did not lead his battalion into battle because he was away at the time, and his place was taken by Philip (Diod. 17, 57, 3; Curt. 4, 13, 28) or by Simmias (Arr. 3, 11, 9).

Droysen points out also that Diodorus' statement that Casander was commander of the Thracian prodromoi and Paeonians is inaccurate. Certainly no Casander is known to have taken
part in the campaign, but Beloch suggested that the name should be emended to read Asander, who was the nephew of Parmenio (p.325; Berve II no.165), and this has found support recently from Badian and Brunt (p.28). Such was the power of the family of Parmenio at the beginning of the campaign that there is no difficulty in accepting that another member of it held a prestigious command, that over the light horse. He is not attested as actually leading them in battle but this should not be seen as a problem: see above in respect of Parmenio's command.

Droysen also objects that no reliance should be put upon Diodorus' list because it is arranged by nationality rather than by armament: it must therefore be drawn from a non-military source. He criticises the list because it does not give him the information which he would like, and concludes that it was therefore drawn from an unreliable source. He even suggests that Alexander would not have made an accurate count, because he would have known how many troops he had asked for. These arguments are worthless. The list is clearly not the work of a staff officer but the arrangement of the items is borne out by the units' roles, as described in the accounts of the campaigning. The pezetairoi and the hypaspists would naturally be grouped together, being Macedonians and having similar arms and armour, even though they had separate organisations. And the allied infantry of Greek hoplites and the mercenaries, hoplites or peltasts, naturally formed other separate items. The Odrysians, Triballians and Illyrians were probably similarly armed, as
peltasts, and must have appeared to have been closely related units: they may have been organised into one fully integrated unit later. The Agrianians naturally are attracted to the archers, both being psiloi, and being very frequently used in conjunction (Arr. 1,1,6; 4,26,4; et passim). The Macedonian Companion cavalry present no problems, they were a clearly defined body (Berve has no evidence to support his contention that some were light horse) and there are absolutely no grounds for suspecting the list as regards the cavalry items of the Thessalians and Greek allies. The Thracian prodromoi and the Paeonians naturally belong together because they fulfil a similar function: compare the Thracian infantry and the psiloi. Droysen's case clearly fails, therefore, and in fact it appears that the arrangement of the items, though perhaps not that of an official army list, lends credibility to the lists rather than the reverse.

Some scholars have found that the details of the individual units, their content and their strength, do not in some cases conform to their views upon these troops. Droysen, for instance, wanted to alter the strength of the Greek allied infantry contingent and of the Greek mercenary infantry, Kromayer and Veith (p.100) found that 1,800 was too small a number for so important a body as the Macedonian cavalry, Berve (I p.142) found 600 too small a number for the Greek allied cavalry, Beloch (p.324) found 1,800 too large a number for the Thessalians. But all these doubts have received little acceptance recently among scholars, and we may dismiss them as having no firm basis in the ancient
evidence and standing in need of no refutation here. The only item which continues to raise doubts is the final item of the cavalry, the Thracian prodromoi and Paeonians totalling 900. This calls for a fuller treatment.

Droysen was the first to consider that this number was far too low and that there were in any case Macedonian prodromoi in Alexander's army. Plutarch (Alex. 16) records that at the Granicus Alexander with thirteen ilae of cavalry led the attack over the river. This, Droysen suggested, was a force comprising six ilae of Macedonian sarissophoroi, six of Paeonian and Odrysian prodromoi, and only one ile of Companion cavalry. His case has been refuted, and it is now generally held that the thirteen ilae were made up of eight of Companion cavalry and only five prodromoi. But the view that the prodromoi numbered more than 900 in 334 B.C. and that some were Macedonian has persisted and has been reargued by Brunt.

Brunt argued that Arrian never specifies the nationality of the prodromoi, just as he does not specify the nationality of the pezetairoi and the hypaspists: we may therefore assume that the prodromoi also are Macedonian. His second argument is that they were frequently used in conjunction with the Companion cavalry, which also indicates that they were Macedonian. These arguments can carry no weight. The archers in Alexander's army only rarely receive a description according to nationality, and the same applies also to the hippakontistae and hippocoxotae: and on each occasion Arrian uses the description only to distinguish them
from another unit of the same type.\textsuperscript{53} As for the argument from the frequent mention of \textit{prodromoi} being used in connection with the Companion cavalry, surely function, not nationality, was the overriding consideration in Alexander's deployment of troops. If it were known that there were both Macedonian and non-Macedonian \textit{prodromoi} in the army, then it might perhaps be expected that Alexander would have used Macedonians in conjunction with Macedonians, but such an argument cannot prove that there were any Macedonian \textit{prodromoi}.

Because it was thought that there were Macedonian \textit{prodromoi}, some scholars have adjusted Diodorus' list accordingly. Beloch (p.325) thought that the reference to the Macedonian \textit{prodromoi} had dropped out; Berve (I p.129/30) thought that there were only Macedonian \textit{prodromoi} and Paeonian \textit{prodromoi} and therefore suggested that the Macedonians were included in the 1,800 Macedonians listed and that \textit{kai} should be transposed after Θρακες δὲ . Brunt adopted Berve's emendation but did not accept the other part of Berve's suggestion, but rather suggested that the \textit{prodromoi} of the Macedonians were already in Asia in 334 B.C.\textsuperscript{54} Milns thought that the list did contain Macedonian \textit{prodromoi}, and therefore suggested the most improbable emendation of inserting a \textit{kai} to read Θρακες δὲ καὶ πρόδρομοι καὶ Πατιόνες .\textsuperscript{55} Such emendations are quite unnecessary, once it is accepted that Diodorus' evidence, the only evidence which we possess on the \textit{prodromoi}'s nationality, is accurate.

Arrian mentions a unit of Thracian cavalry under Agathon at the Granicus: it was stationed on the left wing between the Greek allied cavalry and the Macedonian phalanx (1.14.3).
At Gaugamela it was on the extreme left wing, beside the Greek allied cavalry. Those scholars who consider that there were no Thracian prodromoi in the army have argued that these are the Thracians whom Diodorus refers to in his list and that there is evidence in Arrian that they were not prodromoi. It is indeed clear that for Arrian the cavalry under Agathon is not part of the force which he calls 'prodromoi', or 'sarissophoroi', for at the Granicus and at Gaugamela he names the prodromoi as quite distinct from the cavalry of Agathon, and they are not stationed side by side as are the Paeonians and the prodromoi. It would perhaps seem to follow that either Berve's emendation is to be accepted, and the Thracians of Diodorus are Agathon's unit, or the unit of Agathon is omitted altogether.

This is not, however, a necessary conclusion. For it is not established that Arrian used the term 'prodromoi' in the same way as Diodorus. It may be that Diodorus used it to describe the unit of Agathon, while Arrian gave the term a more restricted meaning. Arrian seems to use the term in two senses; to designate a unit also called sarissophoroi, which received its name from its function, that is scouting or skirmishing: this is similar to his use of the term 'archers', which names the unit from its function. But in addition to this use of the term Arrian uses it as an adjective to describe the function of another unit, the Paeonians, because they also scouted and skirmished. There were many other units whose main function was skirmishing and in fact it could be argued that it could refer to any missile-bearing cavalry, e.g. hippakontistae or hippotoxotae.
It seems quite feasible that the word in Diodorus' list may have been used in this broader meaning rather than in the one which Arrian generally gives to the term. Berve (I p.134) suggested that Agathon's unit was heavy cavalry, in which case it could not be described as *prodromoi*. He argues that Arrian, in his description of the battle of Gaugamela, places the cavalry under Agathon with the Thracians under Sitalces and the Greek allied cavalry, expressly separate from the *prodromoi* and Paeonians (3,12,3.4). He concludes that they must be heavy cavalry, because they are drawn up with heavy cavalry. However, nothing certain can be determined about the nature of a unit merely from its position in a battle-line. Alexander often mixed light-armed and heavy-armed troops. Milns has pointed out that, in fact, the unit of Agathon fulfilled the same function on the left wing as the sarissophoroi, or *prodromoi*, fulfilled on the right, namely the protection of the exposed flank of the heavy cavalry. This seems to be by far the more likely interpretation of the evidence, especially as the Thracians were traditionally light skirmishing cavalry. The Triballians were, at least in part, sarissophoroi (Didymus Comm. 13,3) and the Thracian cavalry which invaded Macedonia in 429 B.C. were hippotoxotae (Thuc. 2,96,1). There is, therefore, a strong likelihood that the cavalry under Agathon was of *prodromoi* type.

It might also be argued that if three separate units are included in the total of 900, the size of each is not credible. However, this is a purely subjective judgment and one which I do not share: there seems to me to be no difficulty in assuming that the *prodromoi* (in the narrow sense of the word),
the Paeonians and the cavalry under Agathon should have averaged only 300 each. My argument is of course not conclusive, but there is a strong possibility that Agathon's horse was of prodromoi type. In view of the general reliability of the lists of Diodorus it seems probable that Agathon's cavalry is included within one of the items rather than that it was by accident omitted, and if it was included it would naturally belong with the other Thracian light cavalry.

I have argued that the details of the lists cannot be shown to be in error in any particular. In addition, they agree with totals which I have argued are likely to be the most accurate transmitted for the strength of the army at the time of its departure from Pella. The only sound procedure, therefore, is to accept the details and apply them to our discussion of the army.

The source of these lists had an intimate knowledge of the organisation of the army in 334 B.C. and would seem to have had access to official sources of information. The actual strength of the army leaving Pella, however, may not have been exactly 32,000 infantry and 5,100 cavalry, for it seems clear that the infantry figures are given in round thousands and the cavalry in round hundreds. There can be no certainty that Ptolemy really meant 32,000 and 5,100 by his reported figures of 'not many more than 30,000' and 'over 5,000'.

The other most reliable figures are those of Anaximenes, 43,000 infantry and 5,500 cavalry, which, I have argued above,
refer to the strength of the army after the joining of the advance force. I have proposed above that this advance force consisted of about 10,000 men and contained no significant number of cavalry. It might be argued that there is some indication that about 400 cavalry were part of this force, on the grounds that Diodorus' cavalry total differs from that of Anaximenes by this number. There can, however, be no certainty that this discrepancy was caused in this way. It is likely that the cavalry did not number precisely 5,100 at the departure from Pella, and it is also likely that 5,500 was not a precise figure for the strength after the joining of the advance force: indeed, Anaximenes may well have written 'almost 5,500' (see above). In any case, when dealing with numbers in the ancient sources, we are not justified in making fine distinctions of a hundred or two.

No attempt to determine the content of the advance force can be successful. As I have argued above, the details of Diodorus' lists cannot be shown to be lacking in any particular. It is not sound to use details drawn from the battle of Gaugamela for a discussion of the content of the army in 334 B.C. because so little is known of reinforcements and troop movements during the years 334 and 331 B.C. In 336 B.C., the advance force consisted of Macedonians and mercenaries, and perhaps we may assume a similar content in 334 B.C., but it is impossible to be more specific than this.
APPENDIX III

ARRIANS TERMINOLOGY

a) Military Terminology

The question of the accuracy of Arrian's military terminology is of some importance in any discussion of the organisation of Alexander's army. It has been touched upon by many scholars in the course of their discussions of specific problems, and Tarn devoted a couple of pages to the subject (II pp.135ff.), but a further treatment will be useful.

Arrian was a man of military experience and has shown his interest in military terminology by writing the Tactica, which he intended as a handbook of military terms for people reading history. The definitions of military terms given there are not, however, intended to be applicable to his history of Alexander, and according to a recent study it was written many years after the Anabasis. Nevertheless, it might be expected that Arrian would show some interest in military terminology in his accounts of Alexander's campaigning. However, although he is better than other Alexander historians, there is a degree of inconsistency and carelessness in his usage of terms which has not been fully recognised by many scholars. Analysis of his employment of six important terms will illustrate this.

Somatophylax

Tarn (II p.139ff.) held the view that the term 'somatophylax' in the Macedonian state had two meanings. It
could refer to the agema of the hypaspists, and it described
Alexander's personal staff.'

At the time of Alexander it seems to have had a technical
meaning, describing those holding a post of great honour in
the Argead court (as Tarn). There were never more than eight
men holding this title and it denoted a position of especial
closeness to the king. The duties of these men are not
to entirely clear, but they remained always close to the king,
even sleeping outside his bedroom (Curt. 9,6,4), unless, as
they often did, they held some command which necessitated their
presence elsewhere. There is no reason for doubting that
'somatophylax' was the correct term for these men and that
this was their official name. In this meaning Arrian uses the
word thirty times, out of a total of thirty six occurrences in
the Anabasis and Indica. Of the other six usages, one refers
to the bodyguards of a satrap, three refer to the agema of
the hypaspists (3,17,2; 4,3,2; 4,30,3), and two are of
uncertain meaning (1,6,5; 4,8,8). Tarn's view is that the
usage in reference to the agema of the hypaspists is a survival
of an ancient meaning, used sometimes by Ptolemy. However,
Ptolemy was himself a somatophylax and he is not likely to have
used the term in any meaning other than the narrow one for his
office: he was always keen to play up his rank and honours. Nor
is it justifiable to argue that Arrian used the term in
a technical meaning in applying it to the agema, when he uses
it also to describe the bodyguards of a satrap. The word is
common in Greek authors of the second century B.C. and later
in the meaning of 'bodyguard', and has a very general
significance: this usage would certainly be applicable to the agema of Alexander. I suggest, therefore, that Arrian occasionally uses a word with a precise technical meaning in the context of Alexander's army, in a general sense, thereby creating confusion in the minds of his readers. That either through an oversight or because he did not care, he sometimes used the term in its wider functional meaning, is made clear by his application of it to a satrap's bodyguards.

Some mention of the two usages of uncertain meaning must be made. At 4,8,8, during the quarrel leading to the death of Cleitus, Alexander, some said, snatched a lonche from one of the somatophylakes and killed Cleitus. But others say, Arrian reports, that he took a sarissa from one of the phylakes. Because of the distinction made between a somatophylax and an ordinary phylax, it seems probable that here Arrian is using the word in its technical sense. It would be expected that the somatophylakes proper carried their weapons at all times. At 1,6,5, on the expedition against the Taulantians, Alexander gave the order to the somatophylakes and the hetairoi around him to take up their shields, mount their horses and ride against the enemy. There were enough of these two groups of men to divide into two parts and for one part to dismount and fight on foot. In such circumstances it seems odd to mention a mere handful of men, which the somatophylakes were; it is just conceivable that the royal ile of Companion cavalry is referred to, but that would be a solitary usage. The meaning must remain in doubt, but I incline to think that Arrian is
here using the word in a loose meaning, to apply generally to men around Alexander at this time (cf. Diodorus' usage at 17, 61,4, and Ch.IV. pp.145f. ).

The usages of the term *somatophylax* show Arrian to be lax in his use of the word, in that he occasionally uses it in a loose general meaning of 'bodyguard', while using it mostly in its narrow technical meaning.

Hypaspist

Tarn did not discuss Arrian's usage of this term. Like 'somatophylax', 'hypaspist' has a loose general meaning as well as the technical one applicable only to the Macedonian army. It means 'armour bearer' and then comes to mean 'guard' in general usage: but in the Macedonian army, and then in Seleucus' army, the plural takes on the technical meaning of a 'body of royal guardsmen'. Of sixty seven occasions on which it occurs (in Arrian), sixty four times it has the technical meaning of members of the royal guardsmen of Alexander. Of the other three usages there is no doubt that all have the more general meaning. At 1,5,2 Langarus, king of the Agrianes, is said to have had 'hypaspists'; clearly the term here means 'bodyguards', whose functions may have made them approximately equivalent to the Macedonian hypaspists, and may for this reason have attracted the name to themselves. At 4,24,3, the term is used of the men around an Indian chief in battle: here also, it seems, it must mean 'a group of personal bodyguards', who, on account of their function, attracted the word to themselves. Finally, in the same passage, the term occurs with reference to some men around the officer
Ptolemy. Arrian relates that Ptolemy pursued the Indian chief on horseback until he came to a hill which the horse could not climb, and he then handed the horse to one of the 'hypaspists'. The troops Ptolemy had with him on this occasion are not detailed, but it is unlikely that the hypaspists referred to here are the royal guardsmen, because they were infantry troops, whereas Ptolemy's 'hypaspists' must have been cavalry to keep up with him in the pursuit. It follows that here Arrian is using the term to mean 'the personal bodyguard' of Ptolemy, which was on this occasion mounted.

Again it is clear that, while Arrian mostly uses the term in its strictly technical sense, on rare occasions he uses it in a looser general meaning of 'bodyguard'.

**Phalanx**

Tarn states (II p.142) that there was no such formation in Alexander's army as 'the phalanx', but that it was a convenient expression for the sum total of the battalions of the pezetairoi. It was also, however, he said, referred to a single battalion of the phalanx, or the hypaspists, or was used in the meaning of 'battle-line'.

This word is more common in Greek than either of those preceding, and shows clearly Arrian's lack of precision in his use of technical terms. I agree with Tarn that there was no such formation as 'the phalanx', but the word describes a formation of troops, and then comes to mean the troops in that formation. Arrian sticks to these very wide general meanings of the word in his work, but such are his standards of precision that phalanx can become almost a description of any troops in
any circumstances. The word appears ninety-seven times in all in the *Anabasis* and the *Indica*. In its most general use it describes a kind of formation, be it composed of Greeks or non-Greeks, infantry or cavalry, heavy or light-armed. The formation it describes seems to have been without strict definition, so that the word can be used for a column on the march or for a battle-line; indeed, for any mass of troops drawn up in order.

It is in the meaning of the troops in the formation that the confusion arises. I shall demonstrate this with a few examples. As Tarn points out, it is a convenient term for the sum total of the *pezetairoi*, that force which formed the basis of the Macedonian battle-line and always fought in a tight-order formation, with the *sarissae* of the first few ranks projecting in front of the front rank of the phalanx (e.g. 3.14.3). This is true, and clearly in places Arrian uses it in this way: at 3.23.3, for instance, he refers to the *pezetairoi* with this term; and in this passage the hypaspists are clearly separate from those described as the 'phalanx'. It is equally clear, however, that elsewhere the hypaspists are included in 'the phalanx'; for instance at 3.11.9. So when Arrian uses 'the phalanx' we cannot be sure whether he intends to include the hypaspists or not. It is interesting to notice the different meanings assigned to 'phalanx' in Arrian's description of the battle of Gaugamela. In the description of the prelude to the battle (3.9.6) Alexander is said to have told the *hegemones* of the infantry each to urge on the phalanx assigned to him. It is clear
from this and other passages that 'phalanx' in this context means the individual battalions of the pezetairoi.\textsuperscript{12} Presumably, this is because when they are marching, or being arranged for battle, they are sometimes organised as individual units. So at times Arrian calls the pezetairoi one phalanx, and at other times many phalanxes (six or seven).\textsuperscript{13}

At 3.11.4, Arrian describes the battle-line of Darius: he details cavalry and infantry (mostly cavalry) and then writes \textit{κύριον ἐν τῷ ἑδώνυμῳ κέρως έστε ἐπὶ τὸ μέσον τῆς πάσης φάλαγγος τάξις ἵν.} This implies that the whole of the Persian line was a phalanx, infantry and cavalry, chariots and elephants, archers and heavy-armed. Yet later in the same chapter (Sec.7) Arrian states that Darius stationed the Greek mercenaries and the Persians opposite the Macedonian phalanx because they were the only troops capable of withstanding the phalanx: so here he is using 'phalanx' in the narrower sense of the heavy infantry. In section 9 of the same chapter he again uses the word to refer to the heavy infantry of the Macedonians, including the hypaspists, drawn up in battle formation.\textsuperscript{14} and it appears again in this meaning in section 10. Arrian uses the word mostly in the meaning of the heavy-armed infantry in formation, but it is clear from this passage that he is not careful to confine the usage to this meaning and has little regard for consistency and accuracy in his terminology, even when his meaning is seriously obscured by this laxness.
Taxis

Tarn states (II p.136) that Arrian uses 'taxis' as 'maid of all work'. It mostly meant a battalion of the phalanx, but also could apply to archers, javelin-men and units of cavalry. It also has its general meaning of 'formation'.

This word appears one hundred and seven times in the Indica and Anabasis, and in seven different meanings, but it is not always possible to distinguish the meaning. Its most common meaning is that of a battalion of the pezetairoi, a unit which on four occasions he calls 'phalanx'. This is a specific unit and probably 'taxis' was the official term for it in Alexander's day, for it appears over forty times in this meaning: but Arrian also uses the word in its most general meaning of any 'military unit', infantry or cavalry: it occurs in this meaning over twenty times. Arrian also uses it frequently (over twenty times) in the meaning 'battle-line' and on eight occasions it seems to mean simply 'formation', without any hint of the type. On two occasions it means a 'part' rather than a 'formation' (5,29,1; 4,16,2): finally, twice (both times at 3,4,2) it means 'order' or 'sequence'. Some may object that it is unreasonable to expect consistency in the usage of a word like 'taxis', but given that it has this technical meaning of a battalion, or unit, of the pezetairoi, of standard size and composition, it is to be expected that a careful writer would not use it for other units of very different size and composition, without some qualification.
This term is not discussed by Tarn. It occurs, in all, thirty one times in the *Anabasis* and *Indica*. Of these usages, twenty five probably refer to divisions of the Companion cavalry, theoretically of standard size;\(^{17}\) on two occasions to squadrons of light-armed cavalry (*prodromoi*)\(^ {18}\) and once to squadrons of Thessalian cavalry.\(^ {19}\) Twice it refers to squadrons of Darius' cavalry:\(^ {20}\) once it refers to unspecified squadrons of Alexander's cavalry.\(^ {21}\) Clearly Arrian uses the term to apply to a squadron of any cavalry, Macedonian, Greek, or Persian, heavy-armed or light, the size of which undoubtedly varied considerably; but Arrian also uses it to describe a formation. At 5,17,4: \(\pi\alpha\sigmaa\ 5\iota\gamma\iota\sigma\iota\varsigma\ 5\iota\iota\iota\varsigma\iota\varsigma\nu\iota\nu\iota\iota\varsigma\) here 'iλe' certainly means a massed body, formed into one block, and has no close connection with the meaning of 'squadron'.\(^ {22}\) There are other similar usages, which may or may not be of the same type: at 3,15,4, the emphasis is upon the formation used in the attack; \(\delta\iota\varsigma\ 5\text{Μακεδόνες}\) it seems likely that Arrian did not have the meaning of squadron in mind when he wrote this, but rather used it as part of an idiomatic expression, which in his day had come to mean a special type of cavalry formation (see below, p.388). In support of this, I cite 3,15,2, where \(\iota\nu\iota\varsigma\nu\iota\iota\iota\varsigma\) is used to describe the formation of the Persian cavalry arranged.
in column, rather than on a broad front. Certainly at 5,17,4, and perhaps at the three other places mentioned Arrian uses *ile* not in the meaning of a 'squadron' but as part of an idiomatic expression for a tactical formation. Again then, Arrian is convicted of using a term which in his works mostly has one meaning (perhaps the technical one), also in another meaning.

**Hipparch/Hipparchy**

Tarn (II pp.136f.) saw this term as properly referring to the divisions of cavalry into which the Companion cavalry was divided in India. But he thought that it was also a 'popular variant' for *ile*.

The term 'hipparch' in fifth century B.C. Greece was applied to the commander of the state levy of cavalry. At Athens, for instance, a hipparch was elected annually: when the state levy became so large that it was decided to divide it into two parts, each part was placed under a hipparch, and hence in the fourth century there were two hipparchs. In the federal armies of Greece in the third century B.C., e.g. the Aetolian and Achaean, the contribution of each state was under the elected hipparch of that state. And the overall commander of the cavalry of the league was a hipparch (Plut. Philop. 7,3). One of the essential features of the post of hipparch was that it was an independent cavalry command, the hipparch was subordinate to no officer but the commander of the state, or federal army. In the Ptolemaic army, which, though not federal, was of considerable size and divided into many independent commands, the hipparchs were the officers.
in command of the independent bodies of cavalry.\textsuperscript{25}

The term 'hipparchy' originally referred to the office of hipparch, just as the term 'strategia' was applied to the office of strategos. It does not appear in any meaning but this prior to the time of Alexander; but after this it broadened to refer also to the body of troops under the command of the hipparch.\textsuperscript{26} This was a natural development, as the armies became larger and it was necessary to divide the cavalry into several large independent bodies of horse: a term was needed for these and 'hipparchy' was an almost inevitable choice. Thus in the Ptolemaic army the hipparchy became the basic cavalry division and the cavalry forces of the kingdom were often referred to as 'hipparchy no.1', etc., or as hipparchy of 'so and so (the officer in command)'.\textsuperscript{27}

The terms 'hipparch' and 'hipparchy' were, at least at some time, part of the official usage of the army of Alexander, and one would expect them to fit into the general development just outlined. Arrian uses the term 'hipparch' seven times. Calas, the commander of the levy of the Thessalian horse is called 'hipparch' (1,25,2); and so is Erigyius, commander of the Greek allies (3,6,3); also the commander of each part of the Companion cavalry, when that body was divided into two independent parts (3,27,4); when it was divided further, into seven parts,\textsuperscript{28} the commander of one of the parts is called 'hipparch' on two occasions (4,27,5; 6,8,2). All these usages seem to conform with what would be expected to be the meaning of the term in the light of the development outlined above. A comparison between the use of
the term 'hipparch' at Athens, for instance, and that at 3,27,4 reveals a close parallel, and the Thessalian and Greek allied cavalry can be compared with state levies in federal armies. We may conclude, therefore, that on these five occasions Arrian uses the term in a precise official meaning current in Alexander's army.

There are two instances, however, of a less precise usage in Arrian. At 5,18,2 he uses it of Indian cavalry commanders of high rank, a usage clearly not conforming to the official technical meaning. More important than this usage is the occurrence of the word at 4,5,7, applied to Caranus, one of the commanders of a detachment from the main army. It is not clear precisely what cavalry he had under his command, but it would appear that directly under him was a mixed force of sixty Companions and some few hundred mercenaries.29 Such a body of cavalry is plainly not a regular unit and Caranus could not have held the rank of 'hipparch' in the same way as, for instance, Calas held it by virtue of his command of the Thessalian cavalry.30 In the light of the proven tendency of Arrian to use official technical terminology in a loose general way, I would conclude that he applied the term to Caranus, simply because he held command of some cavalry, without regard to the precise meaning in the context of Alexander's army.

Closely related to the term 'hipparch' is 'hipparchy'. Arrian uses this word on sixteen occasions, and on eleven of these it appears in a precise official meaning current in Alexander's army; that is in reference to the independent
bodies into which the Companion cavalry was divided at the end of 328 B.C. These independent bodies, of which there were seven, bore the title of 'hipparchy', except for the royal guard, which took the title 'agema'. This is the first attested usage of the term 'hipparchy' in the meaning of a body of troops, rather than the office of a hipparch. The commander of only one of the hipparchies is actually called a 'hipparch' by Arrian, namely Demetrius (see above); the other five known commanders were of higher rank than Demetrius, often commanding detachments of independent strategic armies (i.e. Hephaestion, Perdiccas and Craterus) or in command of an infantry force as well as a cavalry one (i.e. Coenus and Cleitus). But whether these men were called 'hipparchs' or not, the important feature of the hipparchies was that they were independent bodies of cavalry.

Arrian uses the term also in a loose general meaning, not in line with official usage. In Arrian's day 'hipparchy' was a word applied by authors to any large body of cavalry, and he states explicitly in Tactica 18,3 that what the Romans call a 'hipparchy', the Greeks call an 'ile'. It is clear that much confusion had developed: Diodorus, for instance, uses 'hipparchy' for 'ile' at 17,57,3, and we have already seen that Arrian uses 'hipparch' of a commander of any body of cavalry. Griffith has tried to save Arrian's credit as an accurate user of terminology by suggesting a more loose meaning for the official usage: he argues that a 'hipparchy' was a convenient term for a body of cavalry made up of ilae of different types of cavalry, e.g. ilae of light-armed cavalry.
joined with ilae of heavy-armed, or ilae of Macedonian with ilae of Iranian. The general level of accuracy of Arrian is not high enough to require us to accept Griffith's case, which is, in any case, in itself implausible. The meaning which Griffith wishes to assign to the term is not known from elsewhere, and it is inherently unlikely because it has a subtlety out of keeping with the usual unsophisticated terminology used by the ancients.

Let us look at the usages of Arrian which clearly do not conform to the official technical meaning which I have suggested for the term, in an effort to see how Arrian uses the term in its loose general sense. At 1,24,3, Arrian says that Alexander sent Parmenio towards Sardis, giving him a hipparchy of Companions and other troops, while he himself proceeded around the coast of Asia Minor. This was in late 334 B.C. We cannot know precisely what proportion of Companion cavalry was sent with Parmenio but it cannot have been all of them. Alexander certainly kept some cavalry with him (Arr. 1,28,4) and these must have been Companions. The Companion cavalry were under one commander (Philotas) at this time, and the division into hipparchies had not taken place.

What then did Arrian mean by the term here? Tarn (II p.136 n.4) suggested that Arrian was referring to an ilae. Griffith (JHS 83 p.70) argued against Tarn that an ilae is far too small a detachment for Alexander to send and that Arrian actually referred to a grouping of ilae. Both are the victims of too rigid a view of Arrian's usage. Tarn is convinced that wherever Arrian uses the term in a meaning other than the
official one it is in the meaning of 'ile'. Griffith believes that Arrian always uses the term in the same meaning and, therefore, has to ascribe to the word meaning which is acceptable for all its usages. It would certainly seem to be right that Parmenio was given more than just an ile of Companions, for Alexander was campaigning in rough country and a large body of cavalry would have been an embarrassment: one would expect rather that Alexander kept only a couple of ilae with himself. On the other hand, Griffith's view that Arrian wanted to emphasise that Parmenio took a group of ilae seems most unlikely. It is probable enough that the Companions with Parmenio did consist of several ilae, but surely he is not justified in concluding that Arrian used 'hipparchy' in some precise meaning of 'a grouping of ilae'. It seems that it is most in keeping with Arrian's general approach to terminology to accept that he is here using 'hipparchy' in its most general meaning of 'a body of cavalry' or simply 'some cavalry'. This makes the most satisfactory sense and the simplicity of this interpretation is a strong recommendation.

The next usage, at 3,29,7, also does not conform to the official meaning of the term as set out above. Alexander is said to have sent Ptolemy after Bessus in March/April of 329 B.C. placing under his command, among other troops, three hipparchies of Companion cavalry. The Companion cavalry, however, was divided into only two bodies, the further division into hipparchies had not yet taken place: there were not three hipparchies in existence. Griffith suggests that Arrian is using the term in his correct meaning, to describe three
groups of ilae, containing mostly Companions, but also some non-Companion cavalry. There is an obvious problem in this interpretation, in that Arrian says that the hipparchies were Companions, not partly Companions and partly some other cavalry. Griffith is, therefore, convicting Arrian of one imprecision in order to acquit him of another. Tarn, on the other hand, thinks once more that Arrian is using 'hipparchy' for 'ile'. In this case Arrian cannot be using the term 'hipparchy' in a vague meaning of 'some cavalry' because he is precise about the number of hipparchies involved. It may appear, therefore, that Arrian is using the term for 'ile'.

However, the veracity of the passage must be doubted. Welles has pointed out that it is in the highest degree unlikely that Alexander actually sent Ptolemy after Bessus in the manner described in Arrian, with the huge detachment detailed (for if three ilae of Companions were involved, they alone numbered about 800). For, as Welles points out, Ptolemy has scarcely had a mention through the whole campaign up until this time: he was an inexperienced officer who owed his position to his friendship with Alexander rather than to any competence he had shown. To send him as sole commander of such an important mission would have been a risk to no purpose. Since Aristobulus directly contradicts Ptolemy in the most important part of the story, serious doubts must be cast upon the historicity of the mission of Ptolemy. It is unlikely, then, that Alexander actually sent Ptolemy and the troops detailed on this mission, and we may see the episode as an invention of Ptolemy with no basis of fact. If it is assumed that there
was no basis of fact to the episode, we might explain that Ptolemy said 'hipparchies of Companion cavalry' because he thought in terms of the hipparcy being the basic division of cavalry, as it had been in Alexander's army from 328 B.C., and was in his own army. It may, of course, still be true, even if Ptolemy did invent the episode, that Arrian found 'ilae' in the source and decided to change it to 'hipparchies', but I think this is a highly unlikely explanation, especially since there was really no reason for him to do so.

The next instance of the term 'hipparcy' is at 4.4.6, where Arrian refers to one hipparchy of mercenaries and four ilae of sarissophoroi leading an attack against the Scythians (329 B.C.). There is no mention elsewhere of any 'hipparchies' of mercenaries in Alexander's army, and even in the Ptolemaic army the term does not seem to have been applied to mercenary cavalry. There were, of course, independent bodies of mercenary cavalry in Alexander's army but we cannot assume, merely on this evidence, that Alexander applied the term to any but the units of Companion cavalry organised in 328 B.C. The usage here, therefore, would appear to be not the official one. Tarn (II p.136) thought that Arrian was again using 'hipparcy' for 'ile'. Griffith (JHS 83 pp.71f.) argues that Arrian was using the term correctly because the body of mercenaries contained ilae of different types of cavalry. Griffith would certainly seem to be right in his criticism of Tarn's suggestion, for it is unlikely that Alexander sent only one ile of mercenaries on this attack. It does not, however, follow that Arrian was using the term to describe a group of ilae of different types. As we have seen above,
Arrian uses the term simply in the meaning of 'some cavalry'. It is impossible to know what Arrian found in his source here, it could have been simply 'some mercenary cavalry' or 'the mercenaries under Menidas (or some other commander)'.

In 4.4.7 three hipparchies of Companion cavalry appear, in the context of the same engagement between Alexander's troops and some Scythians in 329 B.C. Again, the Companion cavalry was still divided into only two independent commands, and there were not yet three hipparchies of Companions in Alexander's army. Griffith and Tarn advance their respective explanations: namely, that Arrian is referring to three groups of ἱλαε, some Companions, some non-Companions; that Arrian is simply using 'hipparchy' for 'ἱλα'. The same criticisms apply to Griffith's case in this instance as applied to his interpretation of the other usages: it is most unlikely that such a subtle and refined use of the term would be understood, and he has to convict Arrian of error in referring to 'hipparchies of Companions'. Tarn's case here has more weight, however, because Arrian uses 'ἱλα' in the next line, and Tarn argues that Arrian was unwilling to use 'ἱλα' twice in the space of a couple of lines and therefore substituted hipparchy in one of the instances. This is particularly attractive in this case because Arrian's usage ὑποθεύσει τοῖς ἱλαῖς is an idiomatic expression used by writers on tactics to describe a particular formation, that is, 'in column' (see above p.379). If Arrian had used 'ἱλα' in the preceding line, as well as in this idiomatic expression, to indicate the number of units of cavalry involved, the meaning of his
description of the formation might have been obscured. For in that idiomatic expression the meaning of 'ile' is rather different from the meaning of the word when it simply describes a squadron of cavalry of fixed size. This is best indicated by reference to Arrian's description of the cavalry at the battle of the Hydaspes forming into one ile, with 'ile' clearly being used here to describe the formation and containing no reference to the size of the body of cavalry concerned. In these circumstances, Arrian had good reason to substitute 'hipparchy' for 'ile', using the 'Roman' terminology for the 'Greek' (see Tactica 18.3). I therefore follow Tarn's interpretation of this passage.

Before concluding this discussion we should notice the odd usage of the term at Arrian 7.11.6:

καὶ τις αὐτῶν καθ' ἕλικίαν τε καὶ ἑπαρκής τῆς ἑπταχάρας οὐκ ἡρανής . . . τοιαύτα ἔιπεν.

Callines is said to have been distinguished by reason of his age and his hipparchy of Companion cavalry. It is certain that Callines was not commander of a hipparchy, for he is completely unknown, apart from this one reference. Berve (II no.405) suggests that he held a minor command position in the Companion cavalry, or that Arrian's text should be taken to mean that Callines was distinguished because he belonged to the most distinguished hipparchy of Hephaestion (see above, Ch.VI pp.167f.). Tarn (II p.136) suggests that here again Arrian is using 'hipparchy' for 'ile', and that Callines was a commander of an ile of Companions. It seems impossible to decide how Arrian uses the term here. In so far as Arrian uses
the term 'hipparchy' to apply to almost any body of cavalry, it may be that he used it here of the command of an ile or lochos. But it seems equally possible that Berve's second explanation is correct, that Callines was distinguished simply because he was an ordinary trooper in Hephaestion's hipparchy.

Conclusion

There are many other examples of similar lack of precision in the Anabasis and Indica, some of which have led to serious confusion over the organisation of the army of Alexander. These are better dealt with when the unit involved in the confusion is being discussed. I merely briefly mention one more example, which makes it obvious that Arrian either has no interest in making the military organisation of Alexander clear, or has not the necessary knowledge to do so. In the course of the battle of the Granicus, Arrian (1, 12, 7) says, Amyntas led forward four ilai of those called 'prodromoi'. In 1, 14, 1, however, Amyntas is said to have with him the sarissophoroi. This has been explained by supposing that the prodromoi and sarissophoroi were the same troops, but called by different names:43 this is certainly right, but were Arrian's readers (second century A.D. Greeks and educated Romans) in a position to know this? I very much doubt that they were. If they were not, Arrian, who uses 'prodromoi' ten times and 'sarissophoroi' three times, is guilty, either through ignorance or through lack of interest, of seriously misleading his readers.
b) **Hetairos**

It has long been noticed that this term has two distinct meanings with reference to institutions of the Macedonian state. It describes a member of a body of men chosen individually by the king to be his personal followers, for whom I have used the term 'councillors'. Its other meaning in the time of Alexander, is that of the body of Macedonian heavy-armed cavalry who served under the king. There can be no doubt that this double meaning of the term existed in Alexander's day in the usage of the Macedonian court and that the historians are not responsible for the confusion. Therefore, bearing in mind the double meaning of the term, let us consider the accuracy with which Arrian applies the word.

It appears one hundred and sixteen times in the *Anabasis* and *Indica*, and on fifty five occasions it can with confidence be said to apply to the 'councillors': e.g. 1,25,4; 2,6,1; 3,5,3. On fifty-four occasions it seems to refer to the cavalry: e.g. 1,14,1; 1,18,1. This leaves us with seven usages which are either doubtful in meaning, or certainly not of these two meanings. In general, 'hetairos' means simply 'friend', 'companion' or 'lover', and Arrian may use the word in this way. It is not possible to be categorical in asserting that the word is used in this meaning by Arrian because it can always be argued that it really means 'hetairos councillor'. However, in one place in particular, the context makes it highly likely that it is being used in its more general meaning. At 7,14,3, at the death of Hephaestion, Alexander is said to have lamented, throwing himself on to
the body of his *hetairos*:\(^{50}\) the word occurs in similar circumstances at 7,14,6. It would be most out of place to use it here in the formal way, and it can only mean 'very dear friend'.

It certainly is used in other than the formal meaning at 4,21,8. Here Chorienes, a tribal chief of the Pareitacae, is said to have submitted to Alexander, coming to Alexander, along with some of his kinsmen (*oikeioi*) and some of his *hetairoi*. It is possible that here *hetairos* is being used to describe the equivalent of the 'councillors' in a non-Macedonian environment. Arrian seems to do this elsewhere.\(^{51}\) It could, on the other hand, be a use of the word in a general way. I incline to the former.

At *Indica* 8,1 the term refers to the select body of the devotees of the god *Dionysus*. Clearly this is a conscious transference of the term for 'councillors' to the company of 'Dionysus', part of the attempt to place Alexander on a level with the god.\(^{52}\)

There are, in addition to these irregular usages, some occurrences which cannot easily be explained. In the Granicus battle-line, Arrian (1,14,2) details a body he calls 'the hypaspists of the *hetairoi*': this is a solitary usage, the hypaspists being nowhere else described as *hetairoi*. They were, in a way, in a position similar to the cavalry of the *hetairoi* and perhaps the term was attracted to them for this reason, but whatever the explanation, it is a very loose use of the term *hetairos*.\(^{53}\)

Other difficulties occur at 2,23,4 and 1,6,5. At 2,23,4 Arrian is describing the storming of Tyre and tells how the
hypaspists climbed the wall, led by Alexander: the part of the wall where Alexander was fighting was captured first and Alexander is said to have climbed it with his *hetairoi*. It is self-evident that the cavalry had no part to play in the ascent of a wall: that this refers again to the hypaspists is possible, in view of the description of this body at 1,14,2 as 'the hypaspists of the *hetairoi*'. It is, however, a big step from calling them 'hypaspists of the *hetairoi*' to calling them simply 'hetairoi'. I therefore reject the explanation that the *hetairoi* here are the hypaspists. Another explanation is that Arrian here uses the word in a loose meaning of 'those who were with him at the time', but Arrian does not seem to use the word in this meaning and it would be better to establish a meaning for it which is in keeping with one of Arrian's normal usages. The meaning which has not so far been considered is that of 'councillors'. Tarn writes 'he is only once recorded to have called on them (or those who were with him) to fight as a body, and that was before he crossed to Asia and in very special circumstances'. This refers to the 'councillors', and the occasion when they were called on to fight as a body was against the Taulantians during the campaigns in the north in 335 (1,6,5). Tarn does not explain why the circumstances were special and it is not obvious to me that they were: and it is difficult to see what he had in mind when he wrote 'in a body': presumably it means only that several (those with Alexander) fought side by side rather than independently in different parts of the battle areas. Certainly there cannot have been any military unit of the 'councillors' because individual 'councillors' were often
put in charge of units, or sent on independent assignments: therefore their number and composition always varied. The fact that they were not a military unit, however, does not mean that they did not fight in the battles unless assigned especially to a command. It cannot be believed that they did not fight in every battle in which the king fought, and not fight beside him, along with the somatophylakes, together in a body. That they are not often mentioned in our source is not a valid argument against this, and can be explained by the relative smallness of their numbers.\textsuperscript{55} I consider it as certain that they accompanied the king in battle just as they accompanied him on hunting expeditions or at banquets, provided that they were not occupied elsewhere on the king's business. It seems possible therefore that the \textit{hetairoi} at 2,23,4 were the 'councillors' and that Arrian is using the word in an official technical sense.\textsuperscript{56}

We might, therefore, consider whether the usage at 1,6,5 also refers to the 'councillors' or to cavalry. Tarn presents no arguments to show that they were 'councillors', and no significance can be attached to the description of them as \textit{τοῖς ἀμφ' αὐτῶν ἑταῖροι}. This need mean no more than that they were with him and not somewhere else. Plaumann and Berve consider that the expression was an official one to distinguish 'councillors' from cavalry,\textsuperscript{57} but \textit{ὁι ἀμφί} is often used by Arrian simply to mean 'those around'.\textsuperscript{58} In this engagement Arrian (1,6,1) implies that Alexander had only four hundred of his cavalry and it is, therefore, a natural expression, if they are Companion cavalry.
There is, in fact, reason to suppose that these hetairoi are cavalry. In the description of the ensuing fight between Alexander with his somatophylakes and hetairoi and the enemy on the hill, Arrian says that Alexander gave orders to his men to mount their horses and for half to dismount when they reached the enemy position and fight on foot. This implies to me that there were a fairly large number involved (see above, p.373). It is not of course known how many 'councillors' Alexander had with him at the time, but it would only be a matter of tens, not enough to make them, together with the somatophylakes, worth dividing into two parts. On the approach of Alexander, the enemy (there were not many of them Arrian tells us, 1,6,5) fled and Alexander captured the hill 'with the hetairoi': then he called up the rest of his troops. There is no mention of any cavalry among the rest of the troops, which leaves the four hundred cavalry totally unaccounted for if they are not 'the hetairoi with Alexander' of 1,6,5 and 'the hetairoi' of 1,6,6. This argument is certainly not conclusive, but it does seem that it is more likely that the hetairoi here are the cavalry rather than the 'councillors'. Little can be said concerning the other doubtful usages: they certainly refer either to 'councillors' or to cavalry. An instance of such a doubtful usage occurs at 1,15,6; when Alexander breaks his spear during the battle of the Granicus, Demaratos of Corinth, one of the 'hetairoi around him', gave to Alexander his own spear as a replacement. Droysen considered him to be a member of the agema of the hetairoi, and it is conceivable that he was. However, in consideration of his
age and position at the Macedonian court, it seems to me much more likely that he was a 'councillor'.

This brief consideration of Arrian's use of 'hetairos' reveals that on rare occasions only does he use the word in other than one of the two technical Macedonian court meanings. 'Hetairos' clearly was not a word which Arrian regularly used outside of the subject of the Macedonian army and court, and therefore it did not often creep into his history. That it was not care on his part which accounted for this is clear, not only from his careless use of other terms, but also from the few non-technical uses in the Anabasis and the Indica, which, had he really wished to, he could easily have excluded from his work, even if he found them in his source.62
APPENDIX IV

IRANIANS IN THE COMPANION CAVALRY

The only evidence which refers directly to reforms of the Companion cavalry in the period following 331 B.C. is contained in Arrian, where two passages (7,6,3; 8,2) refer retrospectively to some unpopular developments concerning the Companion cavalry. I have decided to devote an appendix to discussion of these passages because of the complexity of the subject and the importance of the evidence.

The first passage is introduced by the arrival of the Epigoni at Susa in 324 B.C. The arrival of these Iranians, armed in Macedonian fashion, annoyed the Macedonians, making them think that Alexander was planning to dispense with their services in future. This leads on to a summary of their other grievances:

After the arrival of the Epigoni at Susa in 324 B.C., the Iranians, armed in Macedonian fashion, made the Macedonians think that Alexander was planning to dispense with their services in future. This led to a summary of their other grievances, which included complaints about the treatment of the Companion cavalry by the Macedonians. The problems faced by the Iranians were complex, and the evidence is important for understanding the dynamics of the period following 331 B.C.
'For the sight of Alexander in Median clothes was no small sorrow to the Macedonians; the marriages conducted in Persian fashion had not been to the liking of most, not even for some of those married, although they had been greatly honoured by being put on the same level as the king. They were aggrieved by Peucetias, satrap of the Persians, who was adopting Persian dress and language, because Alexander delighted in his Orientalism: also by the Bactrian, Sogdian and Arachosian cavalry, and the horsemen of the Zarangians, Areians, Parthyaeans, and among the Persians the so-called Euacae, who had been brigaded in the Companion cavalry, in so far as any of them seemed to be distinguished by rank, physical beauty or any other merit, and by a fifth hipparchy which had been added to these ---- it was not wholly barbarian, but when the whole cavalry force had been augmented, some barbarians had been enrolled into that force, and by these men who had been added to the role of the agema: Cophen, the son of Artabazus, Hydarnes and Artiboles, the sons of Mazaeus, Sisines and Phradasmenes, the sons of Phrataphernes, the satrap of Parthyaea and Hyrcania; Histanes, the son of Oxyartes and brother of Roxane, the wife of Alexander; Autobares and his brother Mithrobaeus; Hystaspes the Bactrian, who had been appointed as their leader; and by the Macedonian spears which had been given to them in place of Oriental javelins, by all these things the Macedonians were aggrieved. ¹

Two chapters later (7,8,2), in the context of the mutiny at Opis, Macedonian grievances are again listed. The introductory issue in this instance is the discharge of Macedonian veterans and, once more, the Macedonians' feeling
of being excluded is mentioned. They were annoyed at Alexander's words, καὶ τὴν στρατιὰν ταύτην πᾶσαν πολλοῖς καὶ ἄλλοις ἀγοραστέντες, ὅτι πολλάκις εἰς ἑλπὶς αὐτῶν ἦ τε ἐσθήση ἦ Περσικὴ ἐς τοῦτο φέρουσα καὶ τῶν Ἑπιγόνων τῶν βαρβάρων ἦ ἐς τὰ Μακηδονικὰ ήθη κόσμησις καὶ ἀνέμεσις τῶν ἀλλοφύλων ἐπέστρεψεν ἐς τὰς τῶν έτοίμων τάξεις

'having been aggrieved throughout the whole of this campaign for many other reasons, for frequently before this his (Alexander's) Persian dress, which pointed the same way, was a source of grievance to them, and the Macedonian equipment of the barbarian Epigoni, and the introduction of cavalry of other nations into the units of the Companions.'

Badian has shown conclusively that these two passages cover the same ground, refer to the same set of grievances, and that Arrian has been led into repeating himself by insufficient care in following two different traditions. The first passage is drawn from a source other than Ptolemy and Aristobulus, which places the mutiny of the Macedonians at Susa and, therefore, recounts the reasons for the mutiny in the context of events at Susa. Ptolemy places the mutiny at Opis and, therefore, lists the grievances of the Macedonians in the context of events at Opis. The two passages must, therefore, be taken together, and the one may be used to complement the other. Since the second passage is a summary of the first in many respects, it will be convenient to base our discussion on the text of the first passage, using the second to elucidate the first where necessary.
The parts of the passages which directly concern us are those dealing with the grievances connected with the service of the Iranians within the Companion cavalry. In the second passage this is covered by the simple statement ἀνάφεσις τῶν Ἑλλοφόλων ἐπιπέων ἐς τὰς τῶν Ἐταίρων τάξεις, but in the first passage it is covered in much more detail and the subject may be divided into three parts. The first part concerns the Bactrians and other Iranians who had been brigaded with the Companion cavalry (καταλοχίσες θεντισ ἐς τὴν ἐπιπον τὴν Ἐταίρικην). The natural interpretation of this is that Iranian cavalry of the tribes listed was integrated into the Companion cavalry body. Some modern scholars, however, have been reluctant to accept this interpretation, but have taken it to mean that the Iranians were brigaded with the Companion cavalry but remained in separate troops, not becoming Companions. It will be useful to look into the history of this view.

The idea that the Iranians were grouped with Companion cavalry into tactical units, i.e. hipparchies, while remaining distinct from the Companions, was proposed by Berve (I pp.107f.). He was led to this view by his interpretation of Arrian 3,30,6 Ἁλέξανδρος δὲ ἀναπληρώσας τὸ ἐπιπεδὸν ἐκ τῶν αὐτοθεῖν ἐπιπέων He believed that this was evidence that Alexander introduced Iranian cavalry into the Companion cavalry in 329 B.C.: but in the passage of Arrian we are discussing, there is also evidence that Alexander introduced Iranians into the Companion body. Berve believed that this evidence referred not to an action of 329 B.C., but rather to 324 B.C., and he
was led to the conclusion that the introduction of the Iranian cavalry to the Companions was done in two stages: in 329 B.C. Iranian cavalry was grouped loosely with Companion cavalry within the hipparchies; and in 324 B.C. they were fully integrated into the ranks of Companion cavalry and took the name of 'Companions'. Berve's interpretation of Arrian 3,30,6 was recognised as being wrong: what Arrian is saying is that horse losses, not cavalry losses, were made up, but his idea that Iranians and Companions were grouped into heterogeneous tactical units was more attractive. Tarn (II p.164-5), although he believed there was only one reorganisation of the Companions after 330 B.C., adopted this idea of Berve in his interpretation of Arrian 7,6,3, and he has recently been followed by Brunt (pp.43f.). Griffith concurred with Berve in the belief that there were two stages in the 'Iranisation' of the Companion body, though he presents different arguments in support (JHS 83 p.68 n.2).

The view that there were ever heterogeneous tactical units of Macedonian Companion cavalry and Iranian cavalry is immediately suspect because of the fundamental flaw in Berve's interpretation of Arrian 3,30,6. However, Griffith (art.cit. pp.68ff.) found another argument in favour of such units, in a comparison between Arrian 7,8,3 and 7,6,3. He suggested that these two passages referred to two separate sets of grievances, and that those described in chapter eight were of longer standing than those of chapter six. He argued from this belief that ἀναπαρατείσις in chapter eight described the brigading of Iranians with Companions in tactical units, while καταλοχισθέντες (chapter six) described the full
integration, which was the later development. But his arguments fail. Badian (JHS 85 p.160) has shown that the two passages refer to the same set of grievances, which makes it most unlikely that ξυνοικεσεσ describes an earlier development than καταλοχισθενεσ and one different from it. In addition, Griffith has not shown that it is justified to find such subtle shades of meaning in Arrian's usage of the two words. Tarn is much more likely to be right (II p.165) in thinking that the two words mean precisely the same and that Arrian is not using them to describe two different procedures. The other arguments that Arrian's use of the term 'hipparchy' shows that the unit so called was heterogeneous are quite inadequate.5

Brunt does not argue specifically against the natural interpretation of Arrian's evidence, i.e. that there was full integration, but he implies that Arrian's, makes the interpretation impossible (p.44 n.55).6 In this passage Arrian describes how a Companion troop of Iranians was formed to replace the mutinous one. Brunt seems to assume that the strong reaction of the Macedonians to this move makes it impossible that any Iranians, except for the few in the agema, could have been full Companions before this date. This assumption is not justifiable, however, as there is a great difference between selected Iranians being enrolled into an essentially Macedonian body, and a new and totally Iranian body being formed.

In short, there is no evidence that there were ever Iranians loosely brigaded with Companion cavalry while not being Companions themselves. There is no contemporary
analogy for such units of a heterogeneous nature⁷ and there can be no doubt that the natural interpretation of the passages of Arrian is that Iranians became full members of the Companion cavalry body (cf. Badian, *art.cit.* p.161). It is not helpful to search out differences in shades of meaning between the wording of 7.6.3 and 7.8.2.

The date to which this part of Arrian's text refers has also been the subject of disagreement: the different datings suggested are 326 B.C., 324 B.C., and a period running from 328 B.C. to 324 B.C. The case for dating it to 326 B.C. was presented by Tarn (II p.163ff.). He was convinced that the Iranians did not become full Companions, but were brigaded within the hipparchies with the Companions. He based his argument for the dating, therefore, on his dating of the organisation of the Companions into hipparchies:⁸ this he dated to 326 B.C. His reasons for this have been adequately refuted by Brunt (p.29).

Brunt presents the fullest case in favour of the dating 324 B.C.⁹ He finds that all the causes of grievance listed in chapter six, except for the Median dress of Alexander, were new: the Epigoni had just arrived, the marriages were recent, the satrap of Persis had been only recently appointed, and the Zarangians, Areians and Parthyaeans had joined the 'Grand Army' only at the end of 325 B.C., the Evacae even later. The reduction in the number of hipparchies to four, he suggested, was done after the march through the Gedrosian desert, and, therefore, the addition of the fifth hipparchy was also recent. This, he argues, points to the conclusion that the addition of the Iranians to the
Companion cavalry was done recently, i.e. in 324 B.C.

Badian (art. cit. p. 160) has argued against the view of Brunt. He points out that the parallel passage in chapter eight states that the grievances had been in the air 'throughout the whole of this campaign': further, this is borne out by what is known of the details of the complaints. Median dress had been adopted by Alexander in the winter of 328/7 B.C. and the order to train the Epigoni in Macedonian fighting methods had been issued at about the same time. He argues also that the campaign to which reference is made can only be the whole Asian campaign, not, as Griffith supposed, the Indian campaign, which was formally ended in 324 B.C. at Susa (Arr. 7, 5) and, therefore, could not be referred to as if it were continuing. There seems to be no doubt that Badian is right in thinking that there is no indication in the text of Arrian that the causes of the grievances were recent. Brunt's case is undermined by his own concession that Alexander's Median dress was not new. If one of the grievances was not new, why not another also? The passage in chapter eight implies that the grievances listed there are of long standing and if it proves nothing positive about the dating of the introduction of Iranians to the Companion cavalry, at least it shows that the evidence of chapter six cannot be used to indicate that it was a recent development.

Badian suggests a different approach to dating the start of Alexander's use of Iranians within the Companion cavalry. He argues that Arrian lists the peoples in chapter six in the order in which they joined Alexander's main army and that this indicates that selected men from the peoples
mentioned were introduced into the Companion cavalry as whole units of those peoples joined the main army. He points out that the first two peoples mentioned by Arrian, namely Bactrians and Sogdians, are the first to appear in the service of Alexander, that is in 328 B.C. (Arr. 4,17,3); and in India a cavalry unit of Arachosians appears beside them (Arr. 5,11,3). The Zarangians, Areians and Parthyaeans are not, however, mentioned as serving in India, and Badian suggests that they did not join the main army until Alexander had returned from India, when Arrian records that the satraps of Areia and of Zarangia, and the son of the satrap of Parthyaea and Hyrcania came to him in Carmania in 325 B.C. (Arr. 6,27,3). Finally, those Persians called the Evacae joined in 324 B.C. while Alexander was marching through Persis (this follows Brunt p.43). Arrian is, therefore, referring to a development which started in 328 B.C. and was continuing through the years right down to 324 B.C.

His case clearly rests upon the belief that Arrian actually listed the peoples in the order in which they joined the army. It was Brunt (p.43) who first suggested that the Zarangians, Areians and Parthyaeans did not join until 325 B.C., pointing to Arrian's reference to the arrival of the satraps or their representatives (6,27,3). However, there is no more indication that the satraps brought troops to join the army in 325 B.C. than there is that they did in 328/7 B.C. at Nautaca in Sogdiana, for Arrian records that the satrap of the Parthyaeans and the satrap of the Areians also came to Alexander there (4,18,1). I am inclined to think that the satraps brought troops to Alexander in Carmania in
325 B.C., even though the Indian campaign was drawing to a close, but I am convinced that the satraps brought Parthyaeans and Areians for service in the army in 328/7 B.C., when Alexander was preparing his forces for the Indian campaign. Granted there is no mention of any Parthyaean or Areian cavalry during the course of the Indian campaign, but this is scarcely a difficulty. The sources were not much interested in Iranian units and nobody would claim that we hear of all the cavalry units which Alexander took to India. I am disposed to believe that the Parthyaeans and Areians, and, indeed, the Zarangians also, though their satrap is not specified as coming to Alexander just before the Indian campaign, entered service in Alexander's army before the start of the Indian campaign, probably at the same time as the Arachosians.

The Bactrians and Sogdians, Badian argues, served in Alexander's army by the time of Cleitus' death, i.e. autumn 328 B.C. The text which is used in support of this is Arrian 4,17,3, which says that Amyntas was appointed satrap of Bactria in place of Artabazus and that Alexander left Coenus in Sogdiana with his own battalion, Meleager's, about 400 Companion cavalry, all the mounted archers and of the Bactrians and Sogdians such as had been placed under Amyntas'. This indicates not that the Bactrians and Sogdians were serving in Alexander's main army but that they were a part of Amyntas' satrapal army, which was put temporarily under Coenus' overall command. This distinction must be made: there can be no doubt that the satraps made extensive use of
native tribes for their forces from as early as 330 B.C.\textsuperscript{15} The first appearance of the Bactrians and Sogdians in the main army is therefore at the battle of the Hydaspes (Arr. 5,12,2). It seems likely that they too, along with the Areians, Parthyaeans and Zarangians, were levied for the main army for the first time in 328/7 B.C. for the Indian campaign.\textsuperscript{16}

I turn finally to the Evacae, who appear last in Arrian's list. These men were Persian, Arrian tells us, and Brunt, followed by Badian, concludes that they could have joined only when Alexander was returning through Persis in 324 B.C. It is by no means clear who these Evacae were.\textsuperscript{17} It seems unlikely that they could have been a tribal group for, whenever they were recruited, Alexander surely can have had no reason to draw only upon one tribe of the Persians and none of the others. Nor does it seem probable that it refers to a particular age group, like the Ephebes at Athens, for, though Alexander clearly wanted men in their prime, their precise age can hardly have been a consideration worth mentioning. I shall refer to the problem again below, but on any view it seems that the Persians called Evacae must have been something of a special group, not drawn from the cavalry class as a whole. I do not believe that Alexander drew upon a select section of the Persians in 324 B.C. for service as a cavalry force. He was returning after leading a campaign into India as the king of the Persians: in a couple of months he was to be at Susa demobilising troops of the campaign army and proclaiming a policy of harmony and co-operation between the Macedonians and Greeks, and the Persian and Median nobility.
A part of this policy consisted of bringing substantial numbers of Persian and Median nobility into the cavalry, as I have argued. It would surely have made no sense to select a few Persians of some special group when a much more substantial levy of Persians was being called at the same time. The Evacae, I am sure, were called upon no later than the beginning of the Indian expedition.

I cannot follow Badian's interpretation, therefore, that Arrian lists the peoples in the order in which they joined the main army and must look for another method of dating the introduction of Iranian peoples into the Companion cavalry. Griffith (JHS 83 pp.68ff.) argues that Arrian's reference to the intermixture of Barbarians and Companion cavalry in chapter eight looked back as far as 329 B.C. He was particularly concerned about the lack of any mention of Western and Central Iranian people serving as cavalry in Alexander's main army and, accordingly, suggests that they served within the hipparchies, thereby achieving anonymity. I have already argued against his view of hipparchies of mixed cavalry, and I would maintain that Alexander did not recruit substantial numbers of Western and Central Iranian peoples for service against their eastern neighbours because he did not trust their loyalty. However, I join him in his concern about the total absence of any Persian cavalry in the main army.

Alexander used several top-ranking Persian nobles in administrative posts; Diodorus (17,77,4) tells us that he appointed Persians as doryphoroi at his court, and he made efforts generally to be accepted as the successor of Darius III.
As Griffith points out, one of the mainstays of the relationship between the Persian king and his nobles was cavalry service, and it is difficult to believe that Alexander called upon no Persian nobility to serve in his main army. In substantial numbers, perhaps, Alexander could not trust them, but a small select group of sons of prominent nobles, sons of men whom Alexander had drawn into posts of responsibility, would be no threat but rather a surety of good conduct on the part of their families, and their service might even bind them to the king. I would suggest, therefore, that Alexander did draw upon a few Persians for cavalry service, perhaps in 330 B.C., at the same time as he appointed doryphoroi. It would have been most suitable for Persian nobles to serve in the Companion cavalry and I suggest that it was these who bore the name, perhaps applied to them by Alexander himself, of Evacae. They may have served as a separate body at first, though we hear nothing of them, but I am sure that they became a part of the body of Companion cavalry no later than the representatives of the tribes of Eastern Iran.

The peoples of Eastern Iran are first known to have served in the main army in the Indian campaign. It is, therefore, likely that they were called upon first in the winter of 328/7 B.C., when Alexander was preparing the force for the invasion. Now, I have suggested that the Persians were probably called upon to serve as cavalry for political reasons and that their number was small, but there were urgent military reasons for Alexander to build up his cavalry forces for the invasion of India, because the enemy were famous for their cavalry. I have suggested (Ch.III pp.84-87)
that no reinforcements reached Alexander from Macedonia after 331 B.C. and, therefore, the Companion cavalry must have fallen below strength. The Bactrians, Sogdians, and other Eastern Iranian peoples were fine horsemen and Alexander trusted them sufficiently to use whole units of them in his army. I have little doubt, therefore, that selected representatives of these Eastern Iranian peoples entered the Companion cavalry on the eve of the Indian expedition.\(^{22}\) The political advantages of involving Eastern Iranian peoples in the military undertakings were much less than in the case of the Persians. It was, of course, important for Alexander to win the allegiance of the chiefs of the tribal groups, but there is no indication that Alexander needed to make extensive use of the nobility of Eastern Iran for running the empire, nor was it so important to win from them acceptance of his claim to be successor to Darius.\(^{23}\)

If I am right that Alexander was looking primarily to military objectives in enrolling the Eastern Iranians, the obvious time for their enlistment is the eve of the Indian campaign. Alexander would scarcely have been in a position to use them earlier than this, for he was involved in putting down rebellions and may not have employed Eastern Iranian horse for the same reason he had not used Western Iranian horse for his campaigning during the years 330-328 B.C. After the Indian campaign was over there was little need for substantial reinforcement of the campaign army and I find it difficult to believe that the entry of any of the peoples into the Companion cavalry mentioned could have occurred
after Alexander's return from India. Certainly troops came to Alexander in Carmania and later, but if Arrian was referring to Iranian peoples who had entered the Companion cavalry at the end of 325 or the beginning of 324 B.C., the omission of any reference to Persians (except the special group of Evacae) and to Medes needs some good explanation. If Alexander was collecting together Eastern Iranian nobles in Carmania and introducing them to the Companion cavalry body at this time, it is scarcely credible that Persians and Medes would not also have been involved. Leaders came to him from Media as well as from Parthyaea, Areia and Zarangia. If the latter brought men for inclusion in the Companion cavalry, surely the former did also. It seems probable that Alexander did not introduce any men into the Companion cavalry after his return from India until after he had closed the expedition and demobilised the campaign army at Susa.

I would conclude that the Eastern Iranian peoples mentioned by Arrian in chapter six as entering the Companion cavalry had been introduced to that body on the eve of the Indian campaign, when Alexander was preparing his campaign army (see Ch.III pp. 86 ff.). The entry of the Evacae cannot be firmly dated, but it should be put no later than this and, of course, no earlier than 330 B.C. They may have served as a small separate force, more as a mounted escort, as the doryphoroi served as an infantry escort, until the preparations for the Indian campaign were made. They were then, along with the Eastern Iranians, integrated into the Companion cavalry. The precise form of the integration cannot be known, but I have argued against any suggestion of
heterogeneous units being grouped together to form hipparchies. It follows, therefore, that they were armed and fought as Macedonian heavy cavalry: they probably served within the iēa, but in purely Iranian files and under Iranian leaders.

We may now move on to the next clause of Arrian's text:

Tarn believed that this referred to the same reorganisation as the preceding clause; at the same time as selected barbarians were enlisted into the Companion cavalry, i.e. at Taxilia in 326 B.C., a fifth hipparchy was added. This fifth hipparchy, Tarn added, contained a higher proportion of barbarians than the other four. He wrote (II p.165):

'The fifth hipparchy, Arrian says, differed somewhat from the others, but still was not 'wholly barbarian'; this must mean that it had a much smaller Macedonian squadron.' Brunt (pp.43ff.) argues that Arrian's text must be emended in order to have the sense that the fifth hipparchy was the agēma, and in order to make this clause run into the next one, in which details concerning the inclusion of barbarians into the agēma are given: he proposes to read:

This involves changing 'autò' to 'autèν' to make it refer to the 'fifth hipparchy' and the omission of 'tò τε ἀγήματε προσκαταλεγέντες.'
The text referred, he suggests, to a development which took place shortly after the introduction of selected Iranians which is described in the preceding clause, that is in 324 B.C. Badian (JHS 85 p.161) agrees with Brunt that the text must be emended, because it makes no sense for Arrian to say that the fifth hipparchy was not wholly barbarian without his specifying exactly how it differed from the other four hipparchies. He proposes that μόνον should be added before οὐ βαρβαρικὴ ἡ πᾶσα and that ἄλλα ἐπαυσὲνθέντος ἡ ἀρ τοῦ παντὸς ἐπιτικοῦ κατελέγησαν ἐσ αὐτῷ τῶν βαρβάρων be considered a parenthesis. On this reading the text would translate 'and in addition a fifth hipparchy added, almost wholly barbarian (but in fact barbarians had been selectively added to the whole cavalry when it was increased in numbers). The words in the bracket refer back to the inclusion of Iranians in the other four hipparchies as well as in the fifth. On the date of the addition of the 'almost wholly barbarian' fifth hipparchy Badian follows Brunt.

Considering the emendations first, I find Brunt's proposal a too violent approach, he has to suppose an unusual degree of inaccuracy in the manuscript tradition of Arrian. In addition, he has to assume that the agema could be referred to as a hipparchy (which is nowhere attested) and that it was possible to think in terms of the agema being added to the Companion cavalry, whereas it was in fact the very nucleus of that body. Badian's emendation is much less violent, but difficulties remain in his interpretation. The
fifth hipparchcy clearly could not have been added before Alexander's return from India because in India, as I hope I have shown, there were six hipparchies. Now if, as I have argued, the Iranians were first introduced into the Companion cavalry in the winter of 328/7 B.C. and this is referred to in the preceding clause, the content of the parenthesis, on Badian's interpretation, refers to developments which covered about three years. The meaning of the bracket on Badian's interpretation would have to be 'during the reinforcement of the Companion cavalry over two or three years, barbarians had been selectively brought into it (sc. the Companion cavalry)'. The aorist participle \( \varepsilon \pi \alpha \upsilon \varsigma \eta \theta \varepsilon \nu \rho \sigma \) makes it difficult to interpret the Greek in this meaning: for, strictly, the action of the verb in the participle is past in relation to the action of the main verb. A present participle would be needed rather to accommodate Badian's emendation. The natural interpretation of the text, as it appears in Arrian, is that the reinforcement happened at one point in time and that as a result a fifth hipparchy was added to the Companion cavalry and some barbarians introduced.

The difficulty of emendation, therefore, is great and, as Brunt recognises, the whole thing really needs rewriting to obtain satisfactory sense. The major difficulty is to find a reason for the singling out for special mention of the addition of the fifth hipparchy, and the apparently redundant repetition of the information that barbarians were introduced into the Companion cavalry. Tarn suggested that what Arrian was saying was that the Macedonians were particularly annoyed about the fifth hipparchy because it contained more Iranians.
than the other four hipparchies. Certainly this would explain why it deserved special mention, but it does not explain why Arrian repeated the information about barbarians being brought into the Companion cavalry. I might also point out that Arrian does not say that the Macedonians were annoyed about the higher proportion of Iranians in the fifth hipparchy than in the other four. It must, of course, be admitted that there is nothing in Arrian's detail about the addition of the fifth hipparchy which indicates why it should have been an aggravating factor in the Macedonians' breaking out into open mutiny at Opis in 324 B.C., and this is the reason for the emendations being suggested. It seems, however, that the reason for the Macedonians' annoyance cannot be supplied by an acceptable emendation and I would prefer to suppose that either Arrian did not understand what he found in his source, or he did not express clearly what he found. I would, therefore, offer another interpretation of the text involving no emendation, but rather relying on the assumption that Arrian did not express himself clearly.

I suggest that mention of the addition of the fifth hipparchy, and the repetition of the information that barbarians were introduced to the Companion cavalry, were caused by these changes in the Companion cavalry being carried through quite separately from the introduction of selected Iranians into the Companion cavalry. The context of the explanation of the Macedonian discontent is Opis in the summer of 324 B.C.: Beloch (p.321) suggested June at the earliest. Now, it is generally assumed that when Alexander
returned from India and ended the campaign at Susa in the spring of 324 B.C., he made great efforts to win the cooperation of the Persian and Median nobility, most spectacularly by means of the wedding celebrations, but also by putting them on an equal level as soldiers, that is, as cavalry. Many scholars are of the opinion that Alexander introduced many Persians and Medes into the Companion cavalry when he was at Susa. The case is presented more fully in Ch. V pp. 157ff., but here I would say simply that after the close of the Indian campaign at Susa in spring 324 B.C. Alexander disbanded much of the army which had fought in India, including most of the Companion cavalry. He then reorganised the army, the Companion cavalry being built up out of fresh recruits from Macedonia and out of Iranians, in particular the Persian and Median nobility. If the Macedonians were concerned about the use of selected Iranians within the Companion cavalry during the Indian campaign, they surely were more concerned about the new-style Companion cavalry which was present before their eyes at Opis. It would be surprising, considering that the list is so full on the subject of the Companion cavalry, if no reference were made to the outrageous new Companion cavalry. Yet the only mention of Persians and Medes in the Companion cavalry in the list is the reference to the Persians called Evacae, who, I have argued, could only have been a small group.

I would suggest, therefore, that mention of the addition of the fifth hipparchy, when the whole cavalry force was reinforced and when some barbarians were brought into the Companion cavalry, is a reference to the formation of this
new-style Companion cavalry which was carried out at Susa a few months before. Surely one would expect some mention of such a reform in the list. It is difficult to see how the addition of the fifth hipparchy and the general reinforcement of the cavalry could have taken place at any other time than at Susa in spring 324 B.C. I have argued that in India there were six hipparchies (Ch.III pp.78f) and, therefore, a fifth hipparchy could not have been added in India, or at any time before the number of hipparchies had been reduced to four. The precise date of the reduction of the number of hipparchies is not important for our present purpose. Some scholars put it at the very end of 325 B.C., I would make it a few months earlier, but the point is that no reinforcements could have reached Alexander before the very end of 325 B.C. By this time, Alexander certainly knew that he would have no more fighting to do during the remainder of the Indian campaign and that he would end the campaign and disband much of the army at Susa three or four months later. It is recorded that troops came to him in Carmania at the end of 325 B.C., but I find it incredible that Alexander could have integrated these forces into the army of the Indian campaign at this time, knowing that a thorough reorganisation was going to be needed in a very short time. I would suppose that the troops which came to him in Carmania simply made their way to Susa organised separately from the army of the Indian campaign, and when they reached Susa some of them were sent home, some put on duty in the satrapies, and some integrated into the new central army. I find it impossible to believe that any additions to the Companion cavalry were
made during the last three or four months of the Indian campaign.

It seems most likely, therefore, that the addition of the fifth hipparchy and the introduction of barbarians into the Companion cavalry, which is mentioned in this part of Arrian's text, were important facets of the reform of the Companion cavalry which Alexander undertook at Susa in the spring of 324 B.C. We cannot know what was in the original version of the explanation of the men's complaints, but an adequate description of their reaction looking back to the sort of reform I have outlined might have been: 'then again there are those barbarians brought in when the fifth hipparchy was added'. If someone was writing out the sort of list which appears in Arrian, and was not really sensitive to the fact that there were two quite separate enrolments of barbarians into the Companion cavalry, he might easily be led into emphasising the addition of the fifth hipparchy, instead of the important part about the introduction of the barbarians, which he thought had already been covered in detail.

If this interpretation is accepted, the words whatever interpretation is adopted. I would suggest that they were introduced by Arrian, or his source, as a gloss. The passage has the theme of the Macedonians' outrage at barbarians being enrolled into the Companion cavalry: the preceding detail was that various Iranian tribes had been introduced to the Companion cavalry; this detail, as it appears in this version, is that a fifth hipparchy had been
added, the next item was that Iranians had been introduced into the *agema*. I would suggest that Arrian, or his source, aware that the theme of the passage might suggest to the reader that the addition of the fifth hipparchy meant the addition of a whole hipparchy of Iranians, and knowing that this was not what he had read in his source, decided to explain that the hipparchy was 'not wholly barbarian'.

I deal with the details of the reform described in this part of the text in Chapter V pp.165 ff. and now move on to the next part, which gives a list of the prominent Iranians added to the *agema* of the Companions. This is relatively straightforward. The Macedonians would naturally single out the *agema* of the Companion cavalry for special mention, because it held a particularly honoured position in the army and it was particularly outrageous that Alexander should have brought Iranians even into that unit. It is generally assumed that this took place at Susa, at the same time as Alexander's other measures aimed at securing the cooperation of the Persian and Median nobility. It, undoubtedly, was part of the reorganisation described, partially, in the preceding clause about the addition of the fifth hipparchy.

The last section of this passage concerns the arming of Iranians in Macedonian fashion. Brunt (p.44) referred this to the Iranians who were enrolled in the *agema*, and not to any other Iranians in the Companion cavalry. This is a possible interpretation but by no means the necessary one; *tous* could easily be taken to refer to all the Iranians mentioned as being introduced to the Companion cavalry. The whole passage is so loosely constructed that such an
interpretation is quite likely. In fact, since I have argued that all the Iranians in the Companion cavalry were armed in Macedonian manner and fully integrated into that body, this interpretation becomes obligatory; for there is no reason for the Macedonians to be particularly upset about the Macedonian arms of a handful of Iranians within the agema, when the rest of the Companion cavalry contained many more, similarly armed.
APPENDIX V

LOSSES IN GEDROSIA

Estimates of these losses have varied enormously, from 60,000, as proposed recently by Green, to almost nothing, as Tarn believed. It is, therefore, necessary to discuss the march in order to determine the effects upon army strength.

The fullest case in favour of the view that casualties were in the region of 50,000 is presented by Strasburger, who contended that less than 15,000 survived out of 60,000 to 70,000 who started the march. He argues (pp.456-486) that the details of the suffering of the army contained in the accounts of Arrian 6, 23-26 and Strabo 15,2,5f. (C.722) are taken from Nearchus. They are, therefore, likely to be reliable and are in any case corroborated by modern accounts of the difficulties involved in crossing that desert. Strasburger concludes that Alexander's army suffered enormous losses. He reaches his absolute figures on the following basis (pp.486ff.).

Plutarch (Alex.66,4) states that Alexander lost so many men in the march through the land of the Oreitae that he brought back less than one quarter of his fighting force from India, yet this force had numbered 120,000 infantry and 15,000 cavalry. Plutarch then describes in general terms the suffering encountered by the army in Gedrosia. The plain implication of Plutarch's evidence is that almost the whole of the enormous loss sustained by the Indian campaign army was due to the hardships of the march through the desert. That such losses were sustained is strongly suggested, in Strasburger's view, by the other evidence concerning the
severity of the conditions. He also cites the estimates of Beloch and Berve independent of these figures, that put Alexander's force on his return to Susa at around 30,000. Since casualties on the return journey from India can have been only light, except in the march through the desert, Strasburger (pp. 486 ff.) concludes that 45,000 men died in Gedrosia.

Strasburger's demonstration that the evidence concerning the details of the march is reliable and that the men went through immense hardship is quite convincing and needs no discussion, but his attempts to calculate the numbers involved will not stand up to scrutiny. Plutarch's evidence is not from Nearchus, as Strasburger admits (p. 487), and the figures given by him are not applicable to those entering the desert nor to the proportion which survived the ordeal. 135,000 men did not enter the Gedrosian desert. Strasburger in fact suggests, rather arbitrarily, that only one half this total was actually involved. It seems inconsistent then to use Plutarch's evidence in settling that over three-quarters of the men were lost. Plutarch's evidence is of unknown origin and seems unlikely to be reliable. No scholar can accept that 135,000 men actually left India, nor that 100,000 died on the way. The details seem to have been inserted merely to emphasise the horrors of the march, with little regard for any factual basis. It should not be used, therefore, to indicate the toll taken by the Gedrosian desert.

The other argument of Strasburger is based on the belief that Alexander returned to Susa with only about 30,000 men out of the force of 120,000, or 135,000, which left India.
The figure for the strength of the force which left India is based on the evidence of Arrian (Ind. 19,5), Curtius (8,5,4) and Plutarch (Alex. 66,5). The evidence of these sources, however, does not establish the strength of the force which left India for Susa. Arrian says that at the time of the beginning of his voyage down the Hydaspes, Alexander had 120,000 troops around him, those he had brought from Macedonia and many others of different races who had joined him. This is almost certainly from Nearchus and it is the most reliable figure. Plutarch's figure has already been discussed. It is probable that it is meant to give the highest total which Alexander's force ever reached, but it cannot be preferred to Nearchus' evidence and should be set aside. Curtius repeats the total of 120,000 but refers it to the force which left Bactria in 327 B.C. It is unlikely that the total of 120,000 accurately reflects the strength of the army at the start of the campaign. This total is given by Nearchus for late autumn of 326 B.C., when many more troops, of Indian princes and chiefs, had collected around Alexander. It is likely that the army led into India by Alexander was very much smaller and that Curtius has applied Nearchus' total anachronistically. Schachermeyr has suggested that an army of only 45,000 - 50,000 entered India and this may not be much too low. At any rate it is likely that many less than 120,000 men set out from India to Susa, if Indians are included in Nearchus' total; for although there are no specific references to their detachment from the main army, it is almost certain that Alexander left the Indian troops with their leaders or as mercenaries on duty in India.
As for the number which arrived at Susa, the estimate of about 30,000 is equally ill-founded. This figure is based upon Beloch's interpretation of the evidence of Curtius. Curtius (10,2,8) states that in 324 B.C. Alexander wanted to keep 13,000 infantry and 2,000 cavalry for the occupation of Asia. Beloch considered that this represented the number of European veterans of the Indian campaign whom Alexander did not discharge. By adding to this figure the number who were discharged, that is 11,500, he reached a figure of 26,500. I have argued in Ch.V p. 97 that Beloch's is not the most likely interpretation of Curtius' evidence: there are great difficulties involved in his case. Further, Beloch maintained that only European troops can be included in this figure; it is, therefore, not sound to compare it with a total for the whole Indian campaign force, which includes a great many non-Europeans.

Strasburger's arguments to show by calculations that tens of thousands of men died in the Gedrosian desert fail. The fullest case against Strasburger is presented by Kraft. He agrees with Strasburger's assessment of the evidence of Arrian and Strabo, and accepts that conditions on the march were very hard. But he argues that, far from supporting a figure of 45,000 for the losses, the accounts make it most unlikely that anything like that number died. The references to the 'many' dying in every case concern only a part of a small part of the army and do not imply that the majority of those with Alexander did die. He argues that the general tenor of the accounts makes it unlikely that more troops
died than survived, as the emphasis in the descriptions is upon the sufferings of the living rather than the agony of the dying. They were so thirsty that some died of over-drinking; they were so hungry that some died of eating bad food; they were so tired that some fell asleep and could not catch up with the main group. The detail about the sick being left behind and about the illicit slaughter of the baggage animals would have been ludicrous bathos if the disaster and suffering reached the proportions suggested by Strasburger. In general, then, the sources show an awareness of great suffering but not of near annihilation. Arrian can say that the army suffered more in this desert than through the whole of the rest of the expedition (6,24,1; Ind. 26,2), but this is different from saying that three-quarters of the army died. He can even make Alexander boast of his leadership in bringing the men through the desert (7,10,7). Kraft also makes the point that if anything like 45,000 men had died, some officers prominent enough to be named in the sources would surely have been included and their deaths duly recorded. We have no such record.

There can be no doubt that Kraft is right. If there was a catastrophe of the proportions suggested by Strasburger, there would be clearer evidence of it in the sources. If the number of dead troops had been even near the 45,000 mark — not to mention the camp followers — surely some explicit reference to the enormous death toll would have appeared. The apparent survival of all top-ranking officers is also a strong indication that the death toll was not so high.

Another indication that over three-quarters of the men
did not die can be found in the relatively low overall death
toll among the Macedonians who served in Asia between 334 and
324 B.C. It is generally accepted that the veterans sent
home from Opis under Craterus' leadership were all
Macedonian and that they numbered 10,000 infantry and 1,500
cavalry. It is certain that at least 3,000 veteran heavy
infantry were retained (they later became the argyraspids),
and we may perhaps assume that a few others also were
retained, though perhaps not very many. In any case, I would
suggest, we are left with a total of not less than 15,000
for the Macedonians who survived the campaigning down to the
middle of 324 B.C. The total number of Macedonians who
participated in the Asian campaigning was about 21,000
infantry and 2,600 cavalry. It follows that no less than
15,000 out of fewer than 24,000 men survived the
campaigning, and that the death rate was little more than
one third. It is difficult to reconcile this conclusion with
the hypothesis that three-quarters of the Macedonians who
went into the Gedrosian desert never came out. It can be
explained that some of the Macedonians discharged by Alexander
in 324 B.C. were drawn from garrison duty and did not,
therefore, see Gedrosia; others went on an alternative route
with Craterus and avoided the desert. But almost 12,000
did go through the desert with Alexander, and these were
the large majority of the Macedonians in Alexander's service
at the time. We must conclude that three-quarters of these
did not die in Gedrosia. Although there may be some
justification for the view that the non-Macedonian troops in
the column suffered more heavily than the Macedonians,
overall losses in Gedrosia surely must have been less than half of the total force.

It seems most likely that, although the troops suffered greatly, the majority survived. The extent of the disaster has been exaggerated in modern accounts because the size of the force attested as following Alexander in India is so much greater than that with which he is thought to have arrived at Susa. But, as I have argued, there is no evidence that 120,000 troops under Alexander's command left India, nor is there any evidence that he arrived at Susa with only 30,000.

Any discussion of the precise extent of the losses can only be in the most general terms. Strasburger has shown that if Alexander had taken the huge number of 60,000 into the desert the percentage lost would have been in the range of seventy-five. It follows that if the majority actually survived, and the evidence strongly indicates that they did, a much smaller number followed Alexander into the desert. The smaller the division, the less would be the strain on the limited resources of the land and the less the proportion which succumbed to the hardships. Precise figures are impossible to determine, but perhaps it is reasonable to assume that if the army was half the size of the one Strasburger based his calculations on, then the proportion of that army lost would have been reduced by more than a half. I would estimate that an army of 30,000 would have lost about one quarter of its number.

It may be thought by some scholars that Alexander must have had many more than 30,000 men. For Alexander can scarcely have set out from India with many less than half of
the number with him on the Hydaspes,\textsuperscript{20} and the force sent with Craterus on the easier inland route consisted of only a few thousand Macedonians according to Arrian (6,17,3). He records that Alexander sent Craterus through Arachosia and Drangiana to Carmania with two pezetairoi battalions, one chiliarchy of hypaspists, some archers and those of the Companion cavalry and other Macedonians (presumably infantry) which he had already decided to discharge. These could scarcely have numbered more than 10,000.\textsuperscript{21} Thus Alexander seems to be left with 40,000 - 50,000 men. But there is some reason to think that Arrian does not give a complete list of the troops with Craterus. Alexander could have expected little resistance along his route to Carmania when he detached Craterus' force in the summer of 325 B.C. And he must have known that his route around the coast was difficult and that the physical conditions might make a very large army an embarrassment.\textsuperscript{22} It would be not at all surprising if Alexander sent roughly as many men inland by the easier route as he planned to take around the coast. It is noticeable that, with the exception of the archers,\textsuperscript{23} the only troops specified by Arrian are Macedonian. It might be expected that some mercenaries and Iranians also went with Craterus.\textsuperscript{24} In particular Craterus' force, as detailed by Arrian, is ill equipped with light cavalry; it included only a few veteran Companions. Light cavalry was very important in the sort of fighting practised on the Iranian plateau: it is most odd that Craterus should have had none. For the route of Craterus did not take him through territory fully subdued and Alexander must have sent him with a balanced effective
force. As it turned out, Craterus met with and suppressed a revolt in Drangiana.25

It seems probable, therefore, that Arrian's list is not complete and that Craterus had a stronger detachment, perhaps as large as Alexander's own. In this case there is no difficulty in accepting that Alexander had little more than 30,000 troops when he left Pattala. If we assume that a little under 60,000 troops in all set out west from India, which is a reasonable assumption, we may suggest that about 25,000 went with Craterus while slightly more remained with Alexander.

Kraft argued that fewer than 15,000 men went into the desert (p.117). He considered that Arrian could be relied upon to give a full account of the troops with Alexander. From the chapters of Arrian describing troop movements immediately preceding the march (6,21,22), he reconstructed the total force with Alexander. The result is a force of the Companion cavalry, the pezetairoi, the hypaspists, mounted archers, Agrianes, archers, Greek mercenary cavalry and infantry. Of these the Agrianes, archers and Greek mercenaries were left behind with Leonnatus in the territory of the Oreitae (Arr. 6,22,3). However, Arrian cannot be relied upon to give full details of troop movements. Hamilton has recently pointed out that on his sortie along the coast from the River Arabius Alexander had almost all the Macedonians, as well as the Agrianes and mounted archers (Arr. 6,21,3), a total of about 11,000.26 While Alexander was away with this force, Hephaestion was left at a base camp, and it must be thought likely that he had at least as
many troops left with him as Alexander had taken. Hamilton concludes that the full force with which Alexander left Pattala in the late summer of 325 B.C. could not have been less than 25,000. This seems likely to be right. It is hardly possible that Alexander did not have several thousand Iranian cavalry with him, as well as mercenaries, in addition to those troops mentioned by Arrian.

And the majority of troops which left Pattala with Alexander went through the desert. Arrian (6,22,3) says that Leonnatus was left in the territory of the Oreitae with Agrianes, archers, cavalry and Greek mercenary cavalry and infantry. But it is clear that the mass of the army did go into the desert with Alexander. Arrian (6,22,3) states explicitly that he took most of the army with him, for Hephaestion had come up with him. The force which stayed with Leonnatus could have numbered no more than a few thousand.27 Kraft (p.117) argues that the nature of the mission through the desert called for no more men than the similar mission which Alexander had undertaken around the coast from the River Arabius (Arr. 6,21,3); that is the Macedonians, the Agrianes and the mounted archers. But Alexander certainly took most of the troops with him, whatever the numbers necessary for the fulfilment of the practical purposes of the mission. Nearchus states specifically that Alexander wanted to outdo Semiramis and Cyrus in leading a large army successfully through the desert (Arr. 6,24,2; Str. 15,2,5). Kraft (pp.106ff.) argued that this sense of rivalry in fact had no influence over Alexander's conduct,
but he fails to carry his point in the face of the emphatic statement of Nearchus. 28

Kraft's estimate of the number of men which Alexander led into the desert is too low and it is likely that that total was nearer to the maximum which, I have argued, is consistent with the general indications in the sources, that is 30,000. It, in fact, seems certain that over 20,000 men entered the desert. Precision is impossible. The indications in the sources are only of the most general nature and it is possible to fix the size of the losses only within quite wide limits. These limits should perhaps be fixed at about 5,000 at the lower end and about 10,000 at the upper end.
There is a widely held belief that the argyraspids were formed in 327 B.C., as part of the hypaspist force. This was the view of Droysen and was developed by Berve, who argued that Alexander created the force of argyraspids on the eve of the Indian campaign out of veteran hypaspists, to be a unit parallel to a chiliarchy of hypaspists. Tarn dismissed Berve's arguments and explained that there was no such unit as the argyraspids during Alexander's lifetime but that the term was simply confused with 'hypaspists'. Scholars generally have agreed with one or other of these views.

The argyraspids appear first in the accounts of Diodorus (17,57,2) and Curtius (4,13,27) of the battle of Gaugamela, where under Nicanor's command they held the right flanking position of the Macedonian phalanx. In Arrian's account (3,11,9) these argyraspids are hypaspists under Nicanor's command, and there has been no hesitation among scholars in dismissing this appearance of the term as a mistake, or as an alternative to the more correct hypaspists. This establishes the important point that the terms argyraspid and hypaspist were sometimes confused. The evidence which led Berve to believe that the corps was formed in 327 B.C. is contained in Justin 12,7,5: on the eve of the Indian campaign, in order to make the equipment of the army equal to the occasion, Alexander decorated it with silver and named the army 'argyraspids', from their silver shields. The term appears again in the description in Arrian of the mutiny at
Opis (7,11,3): after Alexander had dismissed the Macedonians he formed Persian units to take their place; a Persian agema, Persian pezetairoi, a Persian body of argyraspids, and even hetairoi cavalry and a royal agema of these. The term appears also in the descriptions of the splendour of Alexander's court, given with reasonable correspondence by three different authors, Athenaeus (12,539 e), Aelian (VH 9,3) and Polyaeusus (Strateg. 4,3,24). First, standing inside around the tent came 500 Persian melophoroi, then an equal number of archers (as Polyaeusus, according to Athenaeus and Aelian there were 1,000 archers), and standing in front of these were 500 argyraspids of outstanding physical stature.

There is no further reference to the corps during Alexander's lifetime and the first mention of it, or rather of its commander, after Alexander's death is in Photius' epitome of Arrian's Diadochii (35). Here it is recorded that Antigens, who had led the assassins in their attack on Perdicas, and who commanded the Macedonian argyraspids, was rewarded by Antipater with command over all Susiana. This can be dated to 321 B.C. Antipater, however, then ordered him to transport the treasury at Susa to the west, and gave him about 3,000 of the Macedonians who had stirred up trouble (38). Antigens turns up next in Cilicia, in 317 B.C., sharing the command over the 3,000 argyraspids with Teutamus, and joining the army of Eumenes, who is preparing to fight Antigonus. Antigens and Teutamus had received letters from the kings instructing them to do this (Diod. 18,59,3; Plut. Eum. 13,2-3; Justin 14,2,6f.). These troops are pre-eminent among Eumenes' army and their commanders lead not only the
argyraspids but also over 3,000 hypaspists, who are stationed next to them (Diod. 19,28,1). The nature of the argyraspids is made clearer in Diodorus (19,41,1f.), Plutarch (Eum. 16,4) and Justin (14,2,6ff.): they are said to have been all over 60 years old and to have served gloriously under Philip and Alexander. Eumenes was defeated in the second battle against Antigonus and the argyraspids went over to Antigonus, who sent them off to waste themselves in the service of the satrap of Arachosia to prevent their seeing their home ever again (Plut. Eum. 19,2; Diod. 19,48,4).

This force clearly ceased to exist at this time, but later, by the battle of Magnesia in 189 B.C. at the latest, the equivalent of Alexander's force of hypaspists was called argyraspids, according to Livy (37,40,7), who states that the 'royal cohort' were called the argyraspids from the type of arms they carried. It also became a description of a particular category of soldier appearing beside the chalcaspids in the procession at Daphne in 167 B.C. (Polyb. 30,25,5).

This is the full evidence relating to the argyraspids during and after Alexander's lifetime. Berve was led by Justin's evidence (12,7,5) to the view that Alexander formed the argyraspids early in 327 B.C. and on the strength of character of Antigenes' and Teutamus' force, suggested that they were veteran hypaspists whom Alexander formed into a chiliarchy under Antigenes and attached to the hypaspist force. I shall discuss Berve's case at some length in my treatment of the source material (below). Tarn's beliefs about the argyraspids were influenced by his view of the
relationships between the sources, in particular his contempt for Justin and much of Diodorus (see especially II pp.123-125). He argues that Hieronymus called Alexander's hypaspists 'argyraspids' when they entered Eumenes' service, and the familiarity of the sources with this usage led them to introduce the identification too early, all usages prior to 317 B.C. being anachronistic (II pp.151f.). His argument is poor, as is shown conclusively by Strasburger in his review of Tarn (BO 9 p.210). Berve's case is based more closely on the individual instances of the term and we must now look at these.

The evidence of Justin is not good. It is certainly wrong that Alexander called his whole army argyraspids, and the context of the evidence which Berve would use to establish the date of the formation of the argyraspids is hardly such as to inspire confidence. The wealth of India was legendary and there was a tradition, clearly reflected in Curtius (8,5, 4) and Justin (12,7,5), that Alexander's army matched the fabulous splendour of the Indians. It is not difficult to see how this tradition could become related to the famed argyraspids of Alexander. That this connection was not made by the ultimate source of Justin and Curtius (there is no doubt that a common source lies at the root of their accounts) is indicated by Curtius' omission of any reference to the formation of that body. There can be no doubt that Justin's evidence should not be used to support a date of 327 B.C. for the institution of the argyraspids (cf. Tarn II pp.123f.).

That Berve's interpretation of the Justin passage is unacceptable, is also indicated by the absence of any reference
to the corps during the course of the campaigning of 327-323 B.C. This seems to me quite decisive support for the view that the argyraspids did not exist at this time, especially when the prominence of the unit after Alexander's death is considered. The other reference Berve uses to indicate the existence of the argyraspids from 327 B.C. is Arrian 7,11,3, in which the formation of a replacement unit of Persian argyraspids is described. Tarn has criticised Berve's interpretation, arguing that this is a clear case of confusion between the terms 'argyraspid' and 'hypaspist', and points out that the absence of any reference to the most important hypaspist body makes it certain that Arrian has here used 'argyraspid' where he should have used 'hypaspist'. Tarn seems to have a very good case in that there should have been a unit of Persian hypaspists beside the pezetairoi and the Companion cavalry, whereas the argyraspids, who receive no mention up to this time, apart from the highly suspect reference in Justin, seem to have no claim to inclusion here. I find little difficulty in accepting that 'argyraspid' in this passage is a mistake for 'hypaspist', and the evidence is certainly not sufficient to support a case for the existence of a unit of argyraspids from 327 B.C.

The other evidence used by Berve is the description of Alexander's court. Although Polyaenus says that he is describing the court which Alexander held among the Bactrians, Hyrcanians and Indians, it cannot be believed that Alexander had a force of 10,000 Persian guards at any time before the return to the heartland of Persia in 324 B.C., for it was only then that Alexander made extensive use of Persian
soldiers and fully adopted the court ceremony (see Ch. V pp. 172f.). The details of the description make it clear that the scene is taken from the last year of Alexander's life. This passage cannot, therefore, be used to indicate that the argyraspids were formed before 324 B.C.

However, it may be thought that the evidence of the description clearly indicates that Alexander formed the argyraspids when he returned from India in 324 B.C. That he established an elaborate and colourful court at this time nobody would deny, but this is the only evidence that the formation of the argyraspids is attributable to Alexander himself and, in view of the established tendency to confuse the terms 'argyraspid' and 'hypaspist', we must discuss its reliability.

The survival of the hypaspists after Alexander's death is well attested. Eumenes copied Alexander's unit in his elite guard of 3,000 in the struggles with Antigonus and called them hypaspists; Perdiccas in his invasion of Egypt used hypaspists in precisely the same way as Alexander had done, as did Seleucus in his fight against Demetrius. There is no doubt, therefore, that the hypaspist body survived and kept its traditional role up until Alexander's death and beyond. The hypaspists were Alexander's guards and as such one might expect them to appear in the description of the court scene, especially since the melophoroi, who are Alexander's Persian guards and who (we are told) had an equal share with the Macedonians in the guarding of the king, do appear in the description. We may be justifiably suspicious
of the term 'argyraspids' here, for much the same reason that we were suspicious of it in its appearance in Arrian 7.11.3.

There is further reason for suspicion. The known nature of the corps of argyraspids which fought under Eumenes is not such as to make it credible that it was this force, or part of it, which formed a dazzling spectacle at the court of Alexander in 324 B.C.: for despite Tarn's rejection of the evidence about the age of the argyraspids, there seems little doubt that one of the most characteristic features of the unit was its veteran quality. Now, even if we were to assume for the purposes of argument that the average age of the argyraspids was in the 40's and not the 60's, as Diodorus and Plutarch say, it is impossible to believe that Alexander would have ranged them beside the young and handsome Persians in his court in 324 B.C., when at least some would have been in their forties. To claim that there were two separate units of argyraspids, that which appears in the description of the court and another which served Eumenes, would require special pleading. It seems impossible to relate the argyraspids of Eumenes to the argyraspids of Alexander as they appear in the description of the court. Therefore, since it is established that 'argyraspids' is often mistakenly used for 'hypaspist', and 'hypaspist' would fit the context, there can be little doubt that in the descriptions of Polyaenus, Aelian and Athenaeus the use of 'argyraspids' should be viewed as an anachronistic one for 'hypaspist'.

It appears likely that the passages derived ultimately from Chares, who should have known his terminology well enough not to have made such a mistake, but Athenaeus tells
us that he took his quotation from Phylarchus, and Phylarchus certainly took it from Duris. Polyaeus and Aelian do not quote their source but their versions are so similar that they certainly came from Duris, if not from Phylarchus. Neither Duris nor Phylarchus is notable for his accuracy, writing rather with an eye to sensationalism. It is by no means unlikely that one of them decided to use the more interesting word 'argyraspis' for the 'hypaspis' which he found in the source. The emphasis in the descriptions is upon the colour and splendour of the scene, and it would have been particularly tempting to an author of the stamp of Duris or Phylarchus to introduce another colour by substituting a synonym for the word 'hypaspis'. We do not, of course, know when it was that the term 'argyraspis' began to be used by the Seleucids to describe their 'hypaspists', but since it was certainly before 189 B.C. there is no real difficulty in supposing that this meaning of the term was current in Phylarchus' time, i.e. the last quarter of the 3rd century B.C., or even in Duris' day, the mid-3rd century.

I conclude that there is no evidence that the argyraspids were formed during Alexander's lifetime. The evidence indicates rather that they were a product of the years of conflict following Alexander's death. Photius' epitome of Arrian's Diadochoi (38) would seem to give a clear indication of the origin of the unit. Antipater sent Antigenes from Susa, giving him 3,000 troublesome Macedonians to escort the treasure. That these troops were veterans of Alexander's campaigning needs no demonstration (id. 34); that Antipater was actually sending them home at this time is also most
likely;¹⁶ and the troops which turn up under Antigenes' and Teutamus' command in Cilicia, 3,000 in number, can be none other than those troublemakers which Antipater had sent away. It seems to me most probable that in between the time of their departure from Susa in 321 B.C. and their appearance in Cilicia in 317 B.C. they had been formed by Antigenes and Teutamus into a freelance semi-mercenary unit, proclaiming their close connection with Alexander by decorating their shields with silver. This interpretation requires that the description of Antigenes in Photius (id. 35) is anachronistic; Antigenes was not yet leader of the argyraspids when he led the attack upon Perdiccas. There is no real difficulty in this, however, because Antigenes was clearly best known for his connection with the argyraspids and anyone wanting to distinguish this Antigenes from others would be tempted naturally to use this connection, even if he were not yet commander of them.¹⁷

This explanation of the background of the argyraspid force seems to fit their character as revealed in the battles between Eumenes and Antigonus. The mercenary nature of the men and the very extreme reaction of Antigonus to their betrayal of Eumenes¹⁸ can best be explained if they had a background of stirring up trouble to obtain money from Antipater in 321 B.C. and of four years of adventuring and unruly plundering.¹⁹ It is not, of course, likely that precisely the same 3,000 men who left Susa served in the army of Eumenes, some of these would have left or died and others joined the force, but I have no doubt that these formed the majority of those in the unit.
The argyraspids have been connected with Alexander's hypaspists by scholars because of the confusion between the two terms. I have argued, however, that the confusion was caused not by a connection between the argyraspids and Alexander's hypaspists, but by a connection between the argyraspids and the Seleucid hypaspists. That such a connection existed is clear enough: Livy states explicitly that the royal elite infantry were called 'argyraspids'. It is also evident that the royal elite infantry were called hypaspists (Polybius 7,16,2; Zeno 16,18,7; FGrH 257 F 36). Some explanation of the connection should be offered. The original argyraspids boasted of their association with Alexander and used the distinctive shield to mark their heritage, and the unit clearly caught the imagination of the people, as a force carrying on the tradition of Alexander's invincible Macedonian army. This idea of continuity was of paramount importance to the leaders in the years following Alexander's death and it is quite understandable that someone adopted the distinctive marking to proclaim the connection with Alexander's army and the invincibility of his royal infantry force. This force would, of course, necessarily be Macedonian, in theory at least, and it gave rise to another development: an argyraspid's armour was a claim to be of Macedonian descent. One can only guess at the date of the adoption of this term for the royal force of elite infantry, but it would have more point if it were taken to be before the memory of what the argyraspids had stood for faded. Therefore, I would suggest that already by the beginning of
the 3rd century B.C. 'argyraspids' began to be used of what was the equivalent of Alexander's hypaspists.
NOTES TO APPENDICES I TO VI
NOTES TO APPENDIX I

THEOPOMPUS AND THE HETAIRAI

Notes on the text

I do not wish to discuss all the textual variants recorded by Jacoby, but two are more important than the others.

π.584 l.8 ολίγ'εταιπρωτο contained in Va should be read as Jacoby, although it is lacking in both Polybius and Athenaeus, for clearly it is needed for the pun which is obviously intended.

π.584 l.9 οπατιώτασ is clearly wrong because it does not present a jingle as the other two pairs do, and it is such a colourless word that it is difficult to believe that Theopompus could have used it: also it is more likely to be a gloss. Meineke's suggestion Χαρακκοίτας is likely and should be accepted; 'those who sleep on the ground' could have been a popular description of soldiers on campaign.

1) Even so, Athenaeus may have omitted parts without telling us. The fragments have been discussed by R.D. Milns, 'Theopompus Fragments 225A and B Jacoby', i.e. La Parola del Passato 23 (1968) pp.361-4. His conclusions seem beyond dispute.

2) For the accuracy of the quotations of Athenaeus, see W.R. Connor, Theopompus and fifth-century Athens, p.9 and n.27.

3) loc.cit.

4) p.5.
NOTES TO APPENDIX I

5) "Die griechischen Historiker-Fragmente bei Didymus'
Klio 5 (1905) pp.141-154, esp. p.149. He has been
followed by, for instance, Jacoby 2 B D Kommentar p.387,

6) Little progress has been made in deciding which book
covered which years and so there can be no confidence in
the assignment of the events of Book 49 to the year
340/39 B.C.


8) e.g., F.134, 186, 187.

9) Connor, p.3.

10) Ibid. p.2f.

11) According to Arrian (7,9,6) less than sixty talents
remained. The exact figure is variously given.

12) Plut. Alex. 9,3ff.; Athen. Deipn. 6,260. Although the
evidence may be influenced somewhat by the prejudice of
the Greek sources, there can be little doubt that Philip
was not moderate in his habits.

13) See, for instance, Demosth. Philipp. I and III.

14) FGrH IIB 2, p.582,11.23ff.; p.583,11.10ff.

15) Ibid. p.584 F.225 b.1.28.

16) Ibid. p.584 F.225 b.1.32. The figure of 10,000 has no
particular significance (see Ch.II n.22).

17) See Berve II no.253; 302; 464. These were Alexander's
hetairoi of course, but this nevertheless supports
NOTES TO APPENDIX I

Theopompus' evidence that Philip made Greeks his hetairoi though it does not prove it.

18) Whether the hetairoi referred to are hetairoi councillors (for a definition see Ch.I n.19a), hetairoi cavalry, or both (see below), there were hetairoi already existing before Philip's expansion, and the numbers collected from all over the Greek world cannot have been large. At the very most only the names of about a dozen Greek hetairoi councillors are known. See Berve I p.31, and Carrata Thomes p.44.

19) 1375f.


21) Edson states that the 'hetairoi' councillors' numbered 800 under Philip ('Early Macedonia' p.30 n.78), but he seems to be the only exception to my generalisation.

22) P.R. Franke, Gnomen 30 (1958), p.207 estimates 'well over 100'.


NOTES TO APPENDIX II
ALEXANDER'S ARMY AT THE BEGINNING OF THE CAMPAIGN


2) In Hellenismus I (1836) p.165 n.2. He recanted this view in Hermes 12, p.229, but the idea has found wide acceptance: e.g. by Judeich, 'Die Schlacht am Granikos', Klio 8 (1908), pp.372-397, esp. p.376, n.2; Griffith Mercenaries, pp.13ff.

3) JHS 83 pp.32ff.

4) He explains that it was rounded down from Callisthenes' 4,500 (p.33).

5) He is led to the view that Arrian's 'over 5,000' is 5,100 by the assumption that Arrian's cavalry figure referred to the same number as that of Diodorus: but on this, see below, p.65.

6) The figures of Arrian he rightly sees as being drawn from Ptolemy.

7) On this, see below, p.355.

8) Arrian preferred to follow Ptolemy for such details and scholars generally have assumed that his figures are taken from him (cf. for instance, Berve I p.177; Brunt p.33).

9) In both passages he discussed Alexander's financial resources and then his manpower.

10) Cf. the text and apparatus criticus of Ziegler in Plutarchus Vitae Parallelae II 2 (Teubner 1968).
NOTES TO APPENDIX II


12) In section 3 of the chapter, the figures of the cavalry are omitted altogether. See, in general, Walbank's discussion, Commentary II pp.371ff.


14) He is arguing that Callisthenes' account of the battle of Issus is impossible, for the area of the battlefield was too small for the number of troops he says were involved.

15) Callisthenes was the 'official historian', and although he clearly magnified Alexander's achievements, such an alteration is not likely. Anaximenes could have had no cause to add 1,000.

16) Callisthenes' cavalry figure appears also in Justin (I shall argue below that Diodorus' total was 5,100), but there is much less reason to think that Callisthenes had the same cavalry total as Justin than that he had the same as Anaximenes. Justin, it should be noted, does not share Callisthenes' infantry total (see also below).

17) Cf. n.8 above.

18) Brunt (p.33) seems to assume that Ptolemy actually had the same totals as Diodorus, but see below p.369c.

NOTES TO APPENDIX II

20) Differences of a thousand or two can be ignored.


22) (Lucian) Macrob 22 = FGrH II B no.139, T 3.

23) If he could make Alexander meet Porus in single combat, he must be thought capable of understating the size of Alexander's army (Lucian Quomodo hist. conscrib.12).

24) See above, for an argument against the accuracy of the report of Callisthenes' cavalry figure.

25) In general, it should not be assumed that writers of general histories used several sources together for any particular passage. For a discussion of Pompeius Trogus' sources, see RE 21 (1952) 2300-2313 esp. 2305ff.

26) Cf., for instance, N.C. Debevoise A political history of Parthia (Chicago, 1938) p.17 n.69; Walbank, Commentary II p.236.


28) Justin frequently has numbers not contained in any other source, and it seems possible that they are simply invented. For instance, Epaminondas in a raid on Sparta before the battle at Mantinea in 362 B.C. is said to have had 15,000 men with him and to have been opposed by 100 (6,7,4). Neither Xenophon nor Diodorus has such figures, and it is difficult to believe they are trustworthy. On Justin's reliability see in general RE 21 (1952) 2300-13, esp. 2304f.
NOTES TO APPENDIX II

29) Arr. l,11,6ff.; Diod. 17,17,6f.

30) Given the tendency of ancient writers to use round numbers, 7,000 to 8,000 would be sufficient to produce the difference between 'over 30,000' and 'over 40,000'.


32) Welles (Diod. Sic. p.164) oddly prints 32,000 as the infantry total without question, thereby changing Diodorus' text, but for the cavalry he retains the numbers in the items and the total of Diodorus without comment. One can only assume that Welles did think that Diodorus could not add.

33) Brunt, pp.28 n.9 and 33; Marsden, pp.24ff. They are followed by Milns 'Alexander's Macedonian Cavalry and Diodorus XVII 174' in JHS 86 (1966) pp.167-8.

34) J. Droysen Hermes 12 pp.230ff.; Beloch pp.323ff. Cf. Fischer, cited n.31. This can itself be done in different ways, see below, pp.364f.

35) The details appear to have come from some official source (see below) and it is difficult to believe he had to rely upon his own powers of addition.


37) I shall argue below that the details of Diodorus' list show an accuracy which could only be achieved by someone writing near the event, with access to official sources of information.
NOTES TO APPENDIX II

38) Beloch, pp.323f.; Berve I p.177.

39) Cf. Fischer's text for the emendation of the infantry total (cited n.31).


41) TAPhA 41, p.328.

42) Schachermeyr (Al.d.Gr. p.139) thinks that Diodorus' list is mistaken on this point.

43) Badian and Brunt have already suggested that Philip may have led them in this battle only (Brunt p.28 n.9).

44) He was soon removed from service with the main army to be satrap of Lydia (Berve II no.164).

45) Parke Mercenaries p.188 thought that they were hoplites, but Griffith Mercenaries p.17, is more cautious, suggesting that they may have been peltasts. I do not see how the matter can be settled.

46) They were probably all akontistae, see Best pp.3ff. For the later organisation, see Berve I p.139.

47) Hermes 12 p.251.

48) See, for instance, Brunt pp.28f. and Marsden pp.24ff.

49) Hermes 12, pp.238-40.

50) See, for instance, Berve I p.130; Brunt p.27.

51) Brunt pp.27f.

52) A common additional argument is that the sarissa was a peculiarly Macedonian weapon (cf., for instance, Berve I p.129); but see Tarn's refutation (II p.157), based on Didymus Commentary on Demosthenes 13,3, and above Ch.1.
NOTES TO APPENDIX II

53) For the rare occasions, see Arr. 2,9,3; 3,12,2; 5,12,2. The hippakontistae's nationality is never given.

54) Brunt p.27f.

55) The prodromoi, if they were Macedonian, would not have been listed between the Thracians and Paeonians with no indication of their nationality.

56) Arr. 3,12,4. The Thracian cavalry under Agathon at the Granicus, must be the same unit as the Odrysian cavalry under Agathon at Gaugamela. Cf. Berve I p.134 and II no.8.

57) Berve I p.134; Brunt pp.27f.

58) Arr. 1,14,1; 14,3; 3,12,3; 12,4. Arrian uses prodromoi and sarissophoroi as interchangeable terms: see Appendix III p.390

59) On prodromoi in general, see RE 23 (1957) 102-4, article by Pauli. Originally 'prodromoi' was an adjective to describe a group of men, or in the singular a man, who went ahead of the main body: it could be a herald (Herod. 1,60), or it could apply to an advance force (Herod. 9,14). At Athens in the fourth century B.C. it applied to a special type of cavalry, citizens who were used to escort a hipparch, to forage, to scout or to skirmish: they were armed with javelins (Xen.Ep.Mag. 1,25; Arist. Ath.Pol. 49,5).

60) JHS 86, p.168.

61) On this view, the command of Asander was rather the over-command of three independent tactical units; the Thracian
NOTES TO APPENDIX II

skirmishing cavalry under Agathon; the prodromoi unit, which was under Hegelochus at the Granicus (Arr. 1,13,1), under Protomachus at Issus (Arr. 2,9,2), and under Arates at Gaugamela (Arr. 3,12,3); and the Paeonians who were under Ariston (Arr. 1,14,1; Berve II no.138). We never hear of all these units operating in concert and it would appear, therefore, that Asander's command was an organisational rather than a tactical command.

62) There has been a tendency to assume that units were omitted from Diodorus' list because they were already in Asia when the main force left Pella, e.g. Brunt p.34; Milns, JHS 86 p.168. But there can be no certainty about what troops were in the advance force (see below) and I have shown (I hope) that it cannot be shown conclusively that any particular unit which fought under Alexander in 334 B.C. was omitted by Diodorus' list.

63) That is Ptolemy's figures of 'not many more than 30,000' and 'over 5,000'. See above.

64) A few hundreds over in each infantry item and a few tens in each cavalry item would affect the total.

65) Marsden (p.24) assumes that Diodorus used Ptolemy for his detailed list and on p.27 he says 'Diodorus certainly did not use Ptolemy as a general rule, but the Army List is more probably one of the very few exceptions.' There seems to be no case for thinking that Diodorus used Ptolemy, and in view of the probability that Ptolemy used an existing account for his totals, if there is a
direct link between Diodorus and Ptolemy, it is more likely that Ptolemy used Diodorus' source. This is made more probable because Ptolemy appears to have given round numbers, Diodorus' source precise ones. Brunt thought that Ptolemy's total for the cavalry was exactly 5,100 (p.33). However, there is no particular reason to see a direct link between Ptolemy and Diodorus' source.

66) As Brunt pp.33f.

67) Diod. 17,7,10.
NOTES TO APPENDIX III
ARRIAN'S TERMINOLOGY

1) For instance, Tactica 18,2 ἑλε = 64 cavalrymen, clearly too small to correspond to Alexander's ἑλε.

2) A.B. Bosworth 'Arrian's Literary Development', CQ N.S. 22 (1972), pp.163ff. argues that Arrian wrote the Anabasis not late in his life, as is usually held, but early, in his youth, before he had had any military experience. If correct, and the case is not proven, this would make Arrian's carelessness more understandable.

3) Arrian 6,9,3. Leonnatos (Berve II no.466) was beside Alexander during the storming of the town held by the Malli, but Ptolemy (Curtius 9,5,21) was not there, although he was a somatophylax (Arrian 3,27,5, Berve II no.668).

4) The ἱσοματοσφυλάκες of Philip (Berve II no.780), satrap of the Indians, killed his assassins (6,27,2).

5) Berve I p.26 anticipated Tarn in this opinion.


7) The word appears first in extant literature in Polybius. It always applies to a man, or men, closely attached to the person of one of the Diadochi kings, and it seems likely that it describes holders of a position similar to that of Alexander's 'personal staff', or somatophylakes in the strict sense. Walbank Commentary II p.95 describes them as 'a group of high ranking officers who remain close to the king day and night,'
and he uses them for special confidential missions. It is clear that the somatophylakes do survive into the Diadochi kingdoms and retain their name. Compare Hegesander (PHG IV, 416 F.13) on somatophylakes under Antiochus I (Müller considers he was writing about the time of Perseus, king of Macedon). While it cannot definitely be shown that all the usages of Polybius are in this strict meaning, it cannot be shown that they are not, and the likelihood is that they are. The usages of the word are at 8,20,8; 15,27,6; 30,7; 31,4; 31 6; 32 6; 32 8; 28,8,9. Diodorus uses the word with reference to the time of Philip II, when the institution was certainly in existence (cf. Berve I p.26). At 16,93,3 Pausanias, the assassin of Philip, is called a 'somatophylax', and at 93,9 is said to be a member of the 'somatophylakia'. This may be the strictly technical usage, but in 16,94,4 he uses it in a looser meaning of 'bodyguards', being a synonym for 'dorymphoroi' (sec. 3). As Welles (Diod. Sic. p.101 n.2) points out, it cannot here be used in its narrow meaning, but I cannot agree that probably it refers to the guard of Alexander: it must surely refer to the royal guard of Philip. If this is correct, this is the first usage extant of 'somatophylax' being used definitely in the loose meaning of 'bodyguard'. At 14,43,3, however, Diodorus uses the verb 'somatophylakein' of a mercenary bodyguard of Dionysius of Syracuse. Later Josephus uses 'somatophylax' in this meaning (Life 17. 18), referring to his own guards. This shows that by the time of
Arrian the word had become just another word for 'guard', and it seems likely that on occasion he uses it in this way. Diodorus' use of it in 16,94,4 may well refer to the 'royal agema' (Berve I p.26), but this is not proof that the Macedonians of Alexander's day also referred to it so. The usages in Alanika of Arrian (sec.22) can only support this view.

8) Cf. the distinction between somatophylakes and hypaspistae in Plutarch Alex. 51.

9) For instance, Herodotus 5,111, Euripides Phoenissae 1213, Xenophon Anab. 4,2,20.

10) For its use in Seleucid army, see Walbank Commentary II p. 482.

11) For instance, 3,20,1 on the march; 5,16,4 of the cavalry of an Indian king in battle; of heavy infantry in battle formation 2,9,3; 3,23,3. I have tried to sort out the number of times Arrian uses the word in the meaning of the formation, as opposed to the troops themselves, but in so many cases it is impossible to decide with any certainty.

12) 1,14,2.3; 3,14,4; 5,20,3; 21,5. In Tactica 10 Arrian explains the infantry division; though he describes many intermediate divisions, the main ones are lochos, taxis and phalanx. The use of 'phalanx' for a battalion of pezetairoi may well be Arrian's own idea. 'Phalanx' does not appear in the papyri records of Ptolemaic armies. In the Alanika it is used of the main tactical formations of heavy cavalry (sec.5, 6, 7,
NOTES TO APPENDIX III

15, 24.), as well as for the whole body of infantry (sec. 5, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 26.). It is worth noting that 'taxis' is not used as meaning a 'battalion' or 'unit' in the Alanika, perhaps indicating that Arrian found 'taxis' in this meaning in his sources (see below n.16).

13) For the number of units, see Ch.IV pp. 95f

14) At 5, 25, 5 and many other places the hypaspists are clearly not included in 'the phalanx'.

15) e.g. 1, 6, 6; 1, 6, 9; et passim. See above Ch.IV pp. 100f. While in the Tactica (10, 2) 'taxis' is given a fixed strength (128 men), in the Alanika, although it occurs fifteen times, it means always either the 'ranks' of the battle-line (sec. 16, 17, 18, 26, 27), or the 'formation' or the 'troops in the formation' (in this meaning it is sometimes a synonym for 'phalanx', e.g. sec. 4: τὰς ἀλεπίδας τῆς ταξίων); and it is often difficult to distinguish between the latter two meanings (e.g. sec. 4; 10; 12).

16) taxis is used of hetairoi at 3, 27, 4 and 7, 8, 2; of light infantry at 6, 8, 7.

17) 1, 18, 3; 2, 9, 3, et passim. See Ch.III pp. 84f.

18) 1, 12, 7; 4, 4, 6.

19) 2, 12, 2.

20) 1, 14, 4; 3, 11, 6.

21) 3, 9, 6.

22) Cf. the usage in Xenophon Anab. 1, 2, 16, where κατ' ἐλάχιστο

"..."
NOTES TO APPENDIX III

is equivalent to \( \text{kata toseis} \).


26) RE 8 (1913) 1662. Liddell and Scott, Lexicon s.v. \( \text{epiparXía} \).

27) Lesquier, pp.77f.

28) See Ch.III pp.78f.

29) The accounts are confused and the positions of the commanders, Menedemus, Andromachus, Caranus and Pharnuches, are not clear. Cf. Berve II no.412.

30) Commanders of mercenary cavalry are not known to have held the title of 'hipparch'.

31) 4,24,1; 5,11,3; 5,12,2; 5,13,4; 5,16,3; 5,21,5; 5,22,6; 6,6,4; 6,7,2; 6,21,3; 7,6,4. Cf. Tarn. See my discussion above, Ch.III pp.69ff.

32) RE 8 (1913) 1662 suggests that Alexander was the first to put such a meaning on the term.

33) I have suggested above (Ch.III pp.80f.) that these top army commanders had organisational rather than tactical command over their hipparchies.

34) JHS 83, pp.69ff.

35) Diod. 17,17,4.
NOTES TO APPENDIX III


38) Arr. 3,30,5.

39) Lesquier pp.88f.


41) Ελάσων ἐκέλευσεν ἐς αὐτοὺς τῶν τε ἐνεύρην τρεῖς ἑπτακόκτονοις καὶ τοὺς ἑπτακόκτονοις συμμαχεύσας καὶ αὐτός ἐπὶ τὴν λοιπὴν ἐπιθευ τὸν ὁ ποιδήν ἐνέβαλεν ὁμοίως τοῖς ἑλάσις.

42) Arr. 5,17,4; cf. κατ' ἑλας 3,13,4; 5,15,2 and Xen. Anab. 1,2,16.

43) Cf. Berve I p.129; Brunt p.27.


45) See Ch.I n.19a for a definition.

46) See above, Ch.II pp.44f.

47) Theopompus (FGrH 115 F.224) and Anaximenes (FGrH 72 F.4), both contemporaries of Philip, use the term of the cavalry, and Theopompus may use it in its other meaning (see Appendix I pp.338f.).

48) For the general meaning, Xen. Cyrop. 2,2,5 'companions'; Aristoph. Ecc. 912 'lover'; Plato Gorg. 482a 'friend' as a term of address.

49) An instance of this comes at 7,29,4. Arrian reports that
Aristobulus explained that Alexander sat long over his banquets not to drink a lot of wine, but out of affectionate feeling towards the *hetairoi*. 'hetairos' is often used of companions at a feast (e.g. Xen. Cyrop. 2,2,5, Theognis 115), but because Alexander usually ate and drank with the 'councillors' quite possibly the word is here being used with a technical meaning.

50) Hephaestion (Berve no.357) was certainly a 'councillor'.

51) For instance, hypaspists of Langarus at 1,5,2, royal *ile* of Darius at 3,11,6: Appendix I pp.338f.


53) See above, p.374

54) II p.138. In this he contradicts Berve I p.31, who considers Demaratos of Corinth, who is fighting beside the king at the Granicus (1,15,6), to be a 'councillor' (II no.253). Plaumann (1375) is in no doubt that they fought beside the king in all the battles.

55) There were more than 80 in 324 B.C. (Susa marriages, Arr. 7,4,7). See also Ch.I n. 19a.

56) Plaumann (1377) assumed that they were the 'councillors'.

57) Plaumann 1377; Berve I p.30.

58) Cf. 1,6,7; 4,24,3. *εἰ ἰμαθ' αὐτὸν ἔτηφροι* appears only at 1,6,5; 1,15,6; 7,11,2; 7,24,2: these four usages cannot prove that *it* has some special significance. Cf. the expression at 3,21,2 *τοὺς*
NOTES TO APPENDIX III

εταίροις μόνοις ἐκὼν ἀρχ' αὐτῶν,

where the hetairoi cavalry are certainly referred to.

59) At 5,2,6, for instance, Alexander is said to have gone to Mt. Merus with the hetairoi cavalry and the infantry agema, and there he sacrificed to Dionysius and 'conducted a festivity with the hetairoi'. I would suspect that these were 'councillors' rather than cavalry, but it cannot be easily decided.

60) Hermes 12 p.236 n.2. By 'agema' Droysen means the 'royal ile'.

61) Cf. Berve II no.253; Plaumann 1376.

62) I have not considered Arrian's use of 'philoi' as a synonym for 'hetairoi' ('councillors'). This usage is regular in Diodorus (17,72,1; 100,1) and also occurs in Plutarch (Hamilton Comm. p.37). It occurs only rarely in Arrian, 1,25,5; 6,13,4; 7,24,4 (perhaps). 'Philoi' also occurs in connection with the circle of Philip in the fragments of Theopompus as quoted by Polybius and Demetrius Rhet. (FGrH 115, F.225a and c respectively) (See Appendix I, above).
NOTES TO APPENDIX IV

IRANIANS IN THE COMPANION CAVALRY - ARRIAN 7,6,8

1) I have followed the translation of Brunt (p.43) except for the first sentence, which Brunt did not include.

2) JHS 85 pp.160-1.

3) It is generally accepted that the mutiny did, in fact, take place at Opis in the summer of 324 B.C. The complaints, therefore, properly have the context of Opis. Cf., for instance, Tarn I p.115 and Hamilton Comm. p.197.

4) Cf., for instance, Tarn II p.163 n.4.

5) Tarn II p.164 sees proof that the Iranians were brigaded separately from the Companions within the hipparchies in the fact that Arrian lists Iranian casualties separately (5,18,3). This argument is based on the mistaken belief that no Iranians other than those within the hipparchies served in the army. Berve's arguments that the hipparchies comprised ilae of Macedonians and hecatostyes of Iranians has already been touched upon. He argued from Arrian 6,27,6, where Alexander is said to have distributed baggage animals by ilae and hecatostyes, that each hipparchy of Companions contained an ile of Macedonians and hecatostyes of Iranians. However, as I have argued elsewhere (Ch.III p.83), Iranian cavalry served outside the hipparchies of Companion cavalry at this time and it seems most probable that it is to these cavalry that the 'hecatostyes' refer. Griffith (JHS 83 pp.71f.)
argues from certain passages in Arrian (5,13,4; 7,8,2) that there is an implication that the Iranians did serve within the hipparchies in separate squadrons, but his arguments are weak and the plain inference of Arrian's use of the term 'hipparchy' is that all the men in these units were Companions (for instance 5,16,4, which even Tarn admitted has this implication, II p.185). Cf. the arguments of Brunt (pp.44ff.) on Arrian's use of 'hipparchy' and also Badian, JHS 85 p.161. See further, Appendix III pp.382f.

6) This point is developed with more clarity by Griffith, art.cit. p.71.

7) The view of Schachermeyr (Al.d.Gr. p.358) is that the hipparchies contained squadrons of light horse and mercenary horse as well as Companion cavalry. He presents neither evidence nor argument, and has never developed his ideas on the army organisation (see further, Ch.III p.n.36).

8) Tarn, of course, believed that the Iranians could not have served with the Companion cavalry until the hipparchies were formed. Since I have already argued against Tarn's views on the form of the hipparchy and these views are basic to his dating, his case needs little attention here (see Ch.III pp.69f.).

9) Brunt, p.43. Berve I p.111 and Griffith, art.cit. p.68 also refer it to 324 B.C.

10) Griffith loc.cit. As Badian pointed out, exaggeration
NOTES TO APPENDIX IV

in such a passage is nothing remarkable.

11) The adoption of Persian dress by Alexander as early as 329 B.C. is attested in the sources (Arr. 4,7,4; Curt. 6,6,4; Plut. Alex. 45,1). For a discussion see Hamilton, Comm. p.120. The training of the Epigoni started in 328/7 B.C. (Curt. 8,5,1; Diod. 17,108,2; Plut. 47,6): see Hamilton Comm. pp.128f. The results of the training however, were not fully clear to the men until 324 B.C., when the 30,000 Iranians arrived at Susa (Arr. 7,6,1).

12) But they were not integrated into the Indian campaign army (see below and Ch.III p.93).

13) Cf. Brunt, pp.42f., who also assumes that many Oriental cavalry served in India.

14) Zarangia bordered Areia and Arachosia on the south west.

15) The satrap of Susiana was a Persian (Abulites, Arr. 3,16,9; Berve II no.5) and presumably had a force of Iranians or Elamites under him. The satrap of the Medes also was Iranian (Atropates, Arr. 4,18,3; Berve no.180) and therefore probably had some Iranians as a satrapal force.

16) The Parapamisadae also served in India (Arr. 5,11,3) and one would expect them to be treated in the same way as the other Eastern Iranian horse. Arrian may have omitted them from his list in Ch. 6 out of carelessness, or they may have been classed with the Bactrians. They were situated between Arachosia and Bactria and were a small group, but they had their own satrap (Arr. 4,22,5;
NOTES TO APPENDIX IV

Berve I p.266).

17) Berve (I p.111) and Tarn (II p.164) are both at a loss to suggest who or what they were.

18) See Ch.V pp.159f. Whatever the precise significance of the actions at Susa, there can be no doubt that Alexander intended to take the Persian and Median nobility into his administrative and military machine.

19) Mazaeus (Berve no.484) and Phrataphernes (no. 814) immediately come to mind; there were many more. I would point to the appointment of Oxyathres (no.586) as a doryphoros to support my contention that Alexander may have formed such a cavalry force. The parallel of the Macedonian 'royal pages' suggests itself.

20) Cf. Alexander's name for the 30,000 Iranians in Macedonian dress (Arr. 7,6,1). I can find only ἐΰχησ meaning 'well-pointed', used by Homer II. 22.319, of a spear as a possible source for such a coinage. It is most odd that the name is totally unknown from elsewhere, if it was an established traditional term for some special group of Persians.

21) Tarn II p.163 thought that these Eastern Iranians did not join Alexander's army until Taxila in 326 B.C., but it is hardly likely that Alexander would have waited until he had crossed the Indus before levying them.

22) I would agree with Badian on this point, that
NOTES TO APPENDIX IV

representatives of the people entered the Companion cavalry when whole units of the same people were levied.

23) Alexander's marriage to Roxane may have been directed towards attaching Oxyartes to Alexander's cause, but Alexander claimed to be king of the Persians, not of the Bactrians etc., and it was the Persian empire, administered traditionally by the Persian and Median nobility, that he had taken over. Of the Iranians who entered the cavalry agema in 324 B.C., only Hystaspes (Berve II no.763), who was related to the Achaemenid family (Curt. 6,2,7) and Itanes (no.392), who was Roxane's brother, are known to have been other than Persian (Arr. 7,6,5). See further, Ch.V pp.165 f.

24) Arr. 6,27,3 and Ch. V pp.159 f.

25) Arr. 7,5; see below and Ch.V pp.157 f.

26) Some Iranians traditionally served as lancers, and not as missile bearers, and there is no need to assume that a difficult retraining programme had to be conducted (see Dandamayev p.55); though Arrian in Ch. 6 refers to the Iranians exchanging their ἱπποκάλοι for Macedonian ἴθαρτα.

27) This is how the Iranians within the agema were arranged (Arr. 7,6,5). See Ch.V pp.165 f.

28) Although I have suggested that the aorist participle implies that the action of the verb in the participle is past in relation to that of the main verb, the
NOTES TO APPENDIX IV

introduction of barbarians to the Companion cavalry may properly be viewed as a result of the general reinforcement of the whole cavalry.

29) It seems most unlikely that the Macedonians would have been particularly concerned about the precise details of the deployment of the Iranians within the Companion cavalry, whether there were more in one hipparchy than in another. It also seems unlikely that Alexander would have ever wanted to make one of the hipparchies of the Companion cavalry different from the others, inferior in fact, in the eyes of the Macedonians.

30) Arrian was not drawing upon Ptolemy or Aristobulus, see Badian, JHS 85 p.160.


32) Berve I p.111; Brunt p.43. See further, Ch.III p.91f.

33) Alexander seems to have had very little contact with the west until he reached Carmania.

34) Arr. 6.27.3. The Median commanders certainly brought troops and probably the satraps of Drangiana and Areia also did, as well as the son of the satrap of Parthyaea and Hyrcania.

35) See my discussion, Ch.V p.162f.


37) See above.
NOTES TO APPENDIX V

LOSSES IN GEDROSIA

   Tarn I p.107. For a fuller summary of the literature,
   see Kraft p.109 and J. Seibert Alex. pp.162f.

2) Hermes 80, pp.456-93. Green offers no supporting
   arguments and his precise figures do not differ
   significantly from those of Strasburger.

3) For details of modern accounts, see Strasburger Hermes 80
   pp.481f.

4) Beloch p.344; Berve I pp.183f.

5) Cf. Tarn I p.84; Schachermeyr Al.d.Gr. p.466; Hamilton

6) Beloch p.344, and Tarn I p.84, suggested that the figure
   includes camp followers, but this cannot be right (so
   Berve I, p.180). No account of such people would have
   existed and the sources specify armed men.


8) pp.345f.

9) Diod. 18,16,4. This number is generally accepted,

10) pp.108ff. Tarn I pp.106f. does not present arguments
    but simply states that casualties were negligible.

11) pp.111f. For the details in the ancient sources, see
    Arrian 6,24-5 and Strabo 15,2,5 (c.722).

12) So Brunt p.38, and see above, Ch.V pp.157f.
NOTES TO APPENDIX V

13) Arr. Diad. 38 (see also Appendix VI).

14) These figures are reached by adding the reinforcements of 9,000 infantry and 800 cavalry to the force which crossed with Alexander (Diod. 17,17,3f.; Arr. 1,29,4; Curt. 5,1,39; Diod. 17,65,1). See in general, Milns GRBS 7 pp.162f. on reinforcements down to the end of 331 B.C., and my discussions above, Ch.III pp.84f.

15) Beloch p.346 and see above Ch.V p.158.

16) Arr. 6,17,3f. and see above, Ch.III p.91f.

17) Alexander had all the Companion cavalry, except for those ready for discharge, who had been sent with Craterus. The number cannot be precisely determined, but if the force was reduced by two hipparchies (see Appendix IV p.417f. above), we may not be too far wrong in estimating that Alexander had little under 1,500 Companion cavalry with him, of whom the vast majority were Macedonians. One chiliarchy of hypaspists went with Craterus, leaving Alexander with 2,500, all Macedonian. Two pezetairoi battalions (about 4,000 men) went with Craterus, and a few other Macedonians designated for discharge: but surely no fewer than 8,000 Macedonian pezetairoi were with Alexander. For further discussion of numbers, see above, Ch.III p.91f. and IV pp.136f.


NOTES TO APPENDIX V

20) If Schachermeyr's estimate that Alexander took only 45,000 to 50,000 men into India (Al.d.Gr. p.404) is accepted, then it seems likely that no more than this number were brought out. But we should perhaps assume that Schachermeyr's estimate is somewhat low.

21) The pezetairoi and hypaspists numbered about 5,000 (n.17) and it is hardly possible that the other troops mentioned by Arrian amounted to many thousand more.

22) The presence of the less fit Macedonians and the elephants in Craterus' force (Arr. 6,17,3) indicates that Alexander knew his route was the more difficult.

23) These archers may have been Iranian: cf. the force of Iranian archers and slingers which Craterus took on his march to Macedonia in 324 B.C. (Diod. 18,16,4).

24) Tarn I p.106 asserted that all the Iranians, except for the mounted archers, were discharged before Alexander left India. He has no evidence for this and it is unlikely that any large number of Iranians were discharged before the Indian campaign officially ended, at Susa in 324 B.C. See Ch. V p.157f.

25) Arr. 6,27,3; Curt. 9,10,19.

26) Alex. p.126.

27) In any case it was not a major detachment. This much is clear, though there is no chance of determining its size.

28) See, for instance, Hamilton's judgment (Alex. p.126).
NOTES TO APPENDIX VI

THE ARGYRASPIDS

1) Droysen RE 2 (1895) 800f.; Berve I p.128.

2) II p.151.

Beloch (p.347) believed they were formed in 327 B.C.

4) Cf., for instance, Berve I p.128 n.3; Droysen RE 2,800.

5) Cui gloriae ut etiam exercitus ornamenta convenirent, phaleras equorum et arma militum argento inducit exercitumque suum ab argenteis clipeis Argyraspidae appellavit.

6) For a fuller discussion of these passages, Ch.V pp./71 f.

7) The trouble had been over some pay which Alexander had promised them but which they had not received (id. 32-3).

8) See also, Walbank Commentary I, p.608; II p.64; and Weissenborn and Müller's edition of Livy (Berlin, 1910).

9) Launey (p.319) follows Berve on this.

10) Diod. 19,28,1; 18,33,6; Polyaenus Strateg. 4,9,3.

11) II, p.151 n.4: followed by Brunt n.39.

12) There can be little doubt that Alexander was conscious of the appearance of his court and would not have wanted there as guards men past their prime.

13) Jacoby FGrH II c p.138.

14) See, for instance, Walbank, 'History and Tragedy', Historia 9 pp.216ff.
NOTES TO APPENDIX VI

15) The very poor evidence for the history of the 3rd century makes it not at all difficult to accept that the term 'argyraspid' was used extensively earlier than 189 B.C. without our reading about it.

16) The veterans were difficult to control and were scarcely an asset to the force (id. 32-3).

17) We might compare Arrian’s description of Ptolemy as 'King' in his Preface of the Anabasis, even though Ptolemy wrote the work Arrian was drawing upon many years before he became king (Cf. Errington pp.24lf.).

18) Diod. 19,48,3; Plut. Eum. 19,2. This would be surprising, I think, if they had been Alexander’s hypaspists (contra Tarn II pp.15lf.).

19) Schachermeyr Al. in Bab. p.14 has the argyraspids follow some very elaborate patterns of movement between 324 B.C., when he believes they were discharged by Alexander, and 317 B.C. Antigenes does seem to have been discharged at Opis (Just. 12,12,8), but there is no evidence that those who later became the argyraspids were.

20) Livy 37,40,7; cf. Walbank Commentary II p.64.

21) Cf. the speech and description, Diod. 19,41.

22) The term later meant simply that the troops wore a certain style of armour (Launey pp.319f.).