Stereotyping and translation in Arabic and English news texts with reference to Islamophobia and the Arab-Israeli conflict

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Dedication

To my beloved parents who I love beyond words.

To my brother Ayman whose infinite support and guidance helped me see the light at end of the tunnel.

To my sister Maha, the bright dentist. You left early, but your soul never departed. We love you now and forever.
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Abstract

Stereotyping, as defined in this thesis, is the use of generalization or shorthand for describing groups of people, cultures, religions or ethnicities. Stereotypes are to be distinguished from ideologies, which, as defined in this thesis, are sets of attitudes that manage social and political interests including the media. Ideologies work to serve particular interests by setting agendas and managing people’s opinions to serve the ultimate goal of the ruling class. Stereotypical images can be used to serve certain ideologies especially when this is done systematically and in an organised manner.

Technological advances, and especially the internet, have increased the volume of language and media exchange, hence increasing the translation of news texts. This research is concerned with tracking the role of translation in rendering stereotypical and ideological expressions between English and Arabic in relation to news texts extracted from two news services: BBC and Reuters. The general theory adopted is critical discourse analysis.

The news texts are pertinent to two topics: the Israel/Palestine question and Islamophobia. The data is collected over one month: May 2016. The methodology followed for the purpose of analysis is the Discourse Historical Approach developed by Ruth Wodak et al. The methodology identifies a number of strategies which can be used to identify evaluative/stereotypical presentations in news texts: nomination, predication, perspectivation, mitigation and argumentation. It tries to incorporate as much relevant available knowledge as possible about the historical sources and the background of the social and political context in which discursive practices are embedded.

The selected texts are analysed using the above methodology. Background information is gathered as part of the methodological approach. The analysis is followed by a comparative qualitative analysis of both the English and Arabic texts. A quantitative analysis is also conducted, by assigning numerical categories to the stereotypes/ideologies defined within the texts. Here, two types of stereotypes/ideologies are identified: those of the news service, and those of the likely
reader. News service stereotypes/ideologies are identified through analysis of the relevant aspects of the text. Likely reader stereotypes/ideologies are identified where possible by determining the ‘typical’ or ‘average’ reader through extrapolation from statistically reliable quantitative publicly available sources, such as public opinion surveys conducted in America, Britain and the Arab world. The quantitative results are analysed, and then those for news service stereotypes/ideologies are compared to the qualitative analysis to provide a composite qualitative-quantitative analysis of each text.

The results endorse the view that images of Islam in Islamophobia-related texts are generally negative for both English and Arabic texts, but more negative for English ones. For Sunni Islam, the stereotypes are consistently very negative. For Shia Islam the stereotypes vary between fairly and very negative for both English and Arabic texts. For the Israel/Palestine texts, the ideological and stereotypical expressions in the English texts are more pro-Israel than those in the Arabic ones.

This research demonstrates that stereotypes are used in media to enhance the ideological agenda of the news service. It also shows that media contributes to developing new stereotypes.
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Introduction

0.1 Background to the study
The question of stereotyping has not been researched on many levels. As will be discussed later in the thesis, stereotyping has been confined to psychology and to images of religious or ethnic groups. The era of globalization which we have been experiencing for around two decades has pushed the issue of stereotyping to the fore. The revolution in technology, the internet and its applications have increased the interaction between various communities and groups. The likelihood of stereotyping would automatically increase with higher volumes of communication and language use.

Since news constitutes a substantial part of language communication, there is ample room for using pejorative expressions or discriminatory language. The Arab Spring has provided a platform for extensive news reporting and of course translation. The Arab Spring has also coincided with the rise of Islamophobia which intensified the likelihood of racist discourse, and of constructing and deconstructing new and old stereotypes. Ideological discourse has long been associated with political issues and news reporting: “Although by no means limited to the field of politics, ideology is nevertheless of particular relevance for politics. Translation plays a role in political communication as well [...]” (Schaffner, 2010, pp. 107-108). However, this has not been the case for stereotyping. Reading news reports during the Arab Spring alerted the researcher to the use of stereotypes in promoting certain ideologies by news outlets. This triggered the need to explore the relationship between stereotyping and ideology, and how stereotypes are employed or incorporated in the ideological agendas of news outlets.

The process of translation in news outlets is not purely linguistic, and that is why it is more correctly called trans-editing. Trans-editing involves strategies for adaptation or translation of the same piece of news in order to address specific audiences (in this case speakers of specific languages).

The need to deal with linguistic diversity in news production and the simultaneous circulation of news in different languages make translation an important part of news agency work. But news agencies
do not tend to employ translators as such. This is because translation is not conceived as separate from other journalistic tasks of writing up and editing, and is mainly assumed by the news editor, who usually works as part of a desk, where news reports are edited and translated and sent to a specific newswire (Bielsa and Bassnett, 2008, p. 57).

There are a number of considerations which determine the choice and later the translation and editing of news texts, which can be political, cultural or ideological. Andre Lefevere says that journalistic translation like other genres entails processes of adaptation and manipulation of the original text (1992, p. 8). This research study will examine the ideological aspect in relation to political and cultural factors.

The thesis will investigate the translation of news texts in relation to two themes: Israel/Palestine conflict and Islamophobia. It will attempt to unveil the techniques used in the trans-editing process in order to promote a certain ideology and present it as the de facto situation or to persuade the reader of some political visions. The study will evaluate the role of the stereotypes in stimulating ideological discourse, and it will also demonstrate that stereotypes are not static, but are subject to evolution and can be part and parcel of constructing an identity.

0.2 Research Scope and Statement of the Problem

This research aims at featuring the utilisation of stereotypes in constructing racist and discriminatory representations. It also works on exposing the overlap between ideology and stereotype when used to promote ideological discourses. The research will rely on news texts collected in May 2016. Choosing a time-limited sample allowed for sufficient data, but not an excessive amount which it would have been impossible to analyse in the body of the thesis within the time available. The analysed sample is essentially random and has not been manipulated. However, in order to consider texts which contain rich data, I eliminated texts where Islamophobia or the Arab-Israeli conflict were minor elements. As mentioned above, the two main topics of the news texts will be Israel/Palestine conflict and Islamophobia. Since in 2016 the events and complications of the Arab Spring were still operative, the study researches the translations of ideological texts at time of conflict. The Israel/Palestine conflict texts are collected from
the BBC news service and the Islamophobia texts are collected from Reuters news agency.

Political news texts can scarcely be neutral. News agencies/services usually have some agenda, and therefore can sometimes lack objectivity in disseminating the news. This problem has increased with the technology revolution and the mass media. Translation is an essential part of this news communication and through translation, prejudices, stereotypes and ideologies can be mediated, mitigated or intensified. This research will trace and compare the ideological representations and stereotyping between English and Arabic news texts using the Discourse-Historical Approach, which stems from Critical Discourse Analysis. The approach specifications help to position the stereotypes and ideologies in their political, cultural and historical perspectives as they require analysis on a number of levels, one of which is resorting to the social, cultural and historical background of the discriminatory expression at hand. The study will also demonstrate that due to certain ideological agendas, some stereotypes may dwindle, and others rise and flourish or even be newly formed.

The analysis is of two types: qualitative and quantitative. The qualitative analysis is represented in a detailed discussion which follows the data analysis of both the English and Arabic texts. Then, a quantitative analysis is carried out by assigning numerical categories to the stereotypes/ideologies defined within the texts. The stereotypes and ideologies will be sub-categorized into those of the text itself (news service) and those of the reader when possible. Since those of the reader are not absolute, then they are referred to as ‘likely’ reader stereotypes and ideologies. They are extrapolated by resorting to reliable sources such as public opinion polls and surveys as well as newspaper articles. Excel sheets were used for each of the data analysis texts in order to calculate the numerical results of the quantitative analysis. Finally, both the qualitative and quantitative analyses were discussed and compared to provide a composite qualitative-quantitative analysis of each text.

0.3 Research questions
This research study will attempt to address the following questions:
1. Do translations retain stereotypes, stereotypical imagery/discourse between Arabic and British-based media?
2. Do translations increase, decrease or otherwise alter stereotypes/stereotypical imagery/discourse; in other words do they construct new stereotypes between Arabic and British-based media?
3. If translations increase, decrease or otherwise alter stereotypes/stereotypical imagery/discourse between Arabic and British-based media, how do they do so?
4. How do stereotypes and ideologies overlap, and how can they be combined or incorporated to serve some ideological discourses?

0.4 Significance of the research
While research studies which examined ideological discourses are plentiful, there are only a few which looked into the issue of stereotyping. This is a novel piece of research which looks coherently into stereotyping in both English and Arabic texts and focuses on stereotypes rather than ideologies, yet it establishes a link between ideology and stereotyping and evidences that stereotypes work as part of ideologies to serve ideological discourses. Moreover, this thesis demonstrates the evolvement and change of stereotypes not only within the texts but also chronically over a period of time. It also digs into the historical, cultural and socio-political foundation of the stereotype itself. It is also the first language-based research work that differentiates between reader stereotypes and writer stereotypes while taking steps to reduce the subjective element as much as possible. The quantitative analysis undertaken is original and done independently of the qualitative analysis, meaning that any conformity between the two analyses has an independent significance which would be lacking were one of the two analyses simply dependent on the other.

0.5 Methodology and Data
The methodology adopted in this research study is the Discourse-Historical Approach (DHA), which is discussed extensively in chapter 3. DHA is an approach developed within the perspective of Critical Discourse Analysis, which is in itself an analytical tool designed for social research and for spotting the inequalities and prejudices embedded in texts
and their relation to social and political processes. DHA stresses the importance of context, and so in addition to the discursive strategies it postulates (chapter 3), it relies heavily on contextual information – broader socio-political and historical contexts which the discriminatory discourse relates to.

The data is news texts collected over a period of one month and relating to two main topics: Israel/Palestine conflict and Islamophobia. The texts which fall under the umbrella of Islamophobia have been in turn grouped under the name of the country which the news text is relevant to. Hence we have a number of texts under each of the following: Iraq, Saudi, Syria and Yemen, plus one general text.

As noted, the analysis is carried out following the DHA approach. There is an analysis of the English text, then a translation of the Arabic text followed by an analysis of the Arabic text. A discussion of both English and Arabic texts is given (qualitative analysis) followed by the results of the quantitative analysis. Finally, a comparison of both qualitative and quantitative analyses is provided, allowing for consideration of the extent to which the two analysis corroborate and enhance one another. A final quantitative result of all the data for the Israel/Palestine conflict and Islamophobia is presented through illustrative graphs.

0.6 Structure of the thesis

This thesis consists of five chapters in addition to an introduction and a conclusion. Chapter 1 explores the relationship between language and culture, and the effect of the technology revolution on language exchange starting with traditional media tools (radio and television), but elaborating on the impact of the internet on the intensity of language utilization. Then, the chapter discusses the role of media in shaping public opinion: examples from modern history with focus on the internet applications in media are given. The notion of stereotyping is then introduced with illustrative examples from both academic writings and media. The media examples are followed by discussion and comparison between the texts and their corresponding translated texts.

Chapter 2 presents overviews of key concepts: stereotyping and ideology, discourse and Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA). Stereotyping and ideology are looked at from various
perspectives with special focus on the position of ideology in CDA. The chapter then establishes the link between the two notions explaining how stereotyping can be used to endorse a particular ideology. Then it introduces the conception of discourse from different perspectives, giving, however, special attention to discourse from the viewpoint of social scientists and critical theorists. How discourse accommodates certain ideologies and how these ideologies incorporate some stereotypes are discussed. Then the chapter moves on to explore the relationship between translation and ideology. Finally, the concept of CDA is introduced integrating the notions of ideology, stereotyping and discourse and highlighting its suitability as the background theory for this study.

The third chapter provides a comprehensive account of the Discourse-Historical Approach (DHA), which will be used as the research tool of this research study. First a review of four discourse analysis approaches which contributed to the formation of DHA is presented. Then, the strategies of analysis are fully explained and illustrated with examples where necessary. The concepts of text and genre are presented since they are instrumental to the multi-level analytical dimensions of the Discourse-Historical Approach. The chapter wraps up with an account of the structure of the strategies of analysis which will be applied in chapter five.

Chapter 4 falls into two main parts. The first covers the theoretical framework of this research study from a translation studies, and also philosophical, perspective. Then, the analytical framework of the study presented in chapter three is further developed by presenting specific aspects of the corpus-based translation analytical methods which fit the data selected for this research. The second part of the chapter addresses issues pertinent to the choice of particular news agencies as well as particular topics. The impartiality of news agencies is briefly discussed. To set the scene for the following chapter, the two chosen topics of analysis, the Israel/Palestine conflict and Islamophobia, are presented from historical and socio-political viewpoints.

Chapter 5 is dedicated to the data analysis. This is divided into two major sections that correspond to the themes of the news texts: Israel/Palestine conflict and Islamophobia. In turn, the Islamophobia-related texts are subdivided into country-related subgroups
(Iraq, Saudi, Syria, Yemen), as the chosen news texts cover events occurring in those countries or relevant to them. However, before embarking on the data analysis, guidelines for the analysis process and subdivisions are presented and clarified. A sizeable volume of background information, as well as cultural, historical and socio-political term-specific overviews, is provided to support the analysis. Background information for each of the country subgroups is also provided.

The conclusion of the thesis gives a general summary of this study explaining its significance. It then presents a summary of the results and findings. It finally considers the limitations of the study and puts forward recommendations for further research in this area.
Chapter 1

1.1 Introduction
This chapter seeks to provide a background to the subject at hand, which is to study the translation of stereotypical and ideological expressions in media texts especially in a period when the internet and the technological revolution have changed the means and amounts of language exchange.

The chapter comprises 4 main sections (1.2-1.5), plus a Conclusion (Section 1.6). Since stereotypes in particular have a cultural element it is essential to look into the fundamental relationship between languages and culture in a number of aspects. This is done in Section 1.2. In the same section, the theory of linguistic relativity and the influence of linguistics on cognitive reality are also touched on. Section 1.3 explores the remarkable increase in language utilisation due to the technological revolution starting with radio and television, but elaborating on the advent of the internet and its applications in the past two decades. Section 1.4 sheds light on the effect of media on shaping people’s opinions with focus on political scenarios from modern history. Contemporary internet applications in media tools and how they affected people’s lives and opinions are also investigated. Sections 1.5-1.5.5 introduce the notion of stereotyping, illustrated with examples of stereotyping selected from academic writings (Bernard Lewis and Daniel Pipes) and from media. Media texts from various news agencies in Arabic and in English are presented to illustrate instances of stereotyping and sometimes ideological intervention in media and translated media with discussion and comparison between the texts in Arabic and in English.

1.2 The relationship between Language and Culture
The relationship between language and culture has been examined from the viewpoints of different disciplines. Linguists, sociologists and anthropologists have written many books and articles on this subject. Below, I will highlight the importance of this relationship from a linguistic and translational perspective.
Kramsch (2010 p. 3) describes culture as: “the membership in a discourse community that shares a common social space and history, and a common system of standards for perceiving, believing, evaluating, and acting.” Language and culture interlock at various points. In fact language is the principal medium and reflection of culture. Literature in its diverse genres, history, customs and traditions is entirely expressed through language.

It is language and the first alphabets that enabled us to discover ancient civilisations and find out about their contributions to the making of the world we now know. “The world without language becomes unimaginable since language makes the articulation of our thoughts and the human experience possible” Corsen (2009 p. 63) states. These old signs and symbols have made it possible in the 21st century to communicate with and build on the achievements of our very ancient ancestors. Juri Lotman, the Soviet semiotician who described language as a modelling system, declares: “No language can exist unless it is steeped in the context of culture; and no culture can exist which does not have at its centre, the structure of natural language. Language then is the heart within the body of culture, and it is the interaction between the two that results in the continuation of life energy” (Lotman 1978, cited in Bassnett 1991 p.14).

Language is also a medium that reflects the changes which occur in a given society: economic, political, social and cultural. New expressions, novel uses of certain words, and borrowed words from other languages are examples of the dynamic nature of language which mirror cultural transformations. Throughout history, language has also been the means to document these changes. Edward Sapir (Sapir 1956, cited in Bassnett 1991 p.13) claims, “language is a guide to social reality”. He further argues that human beings are at the mercy of the language that has become the medium of expression for their society (cf. Sapir’s Linguistic Relativity Hypothesis, which is discussed below).

A contemporary example of the bond between language and culture is the new methodologies in teaching languages. Cultural aspects of the country whose language is being taught are embedded in teaching books, and educational trips are regularly organised to the country to further enhance the information in the text books and provide the student with a lasting flavour of the culture of the country and naturally the
language. Eli Hinkel explains that cultural aspects of both the native culture and the second language culture have recently been examined to serve teaching and learning purposes (Hinkel, 1999).

Language is also a medium used for retaining culture and we can observe this in immigrants’ environments because language helps to maintain customs and other aspects of the cultural heritage of the immigrants while in their new host country.

According to Nunan and Choi (2010), “there are aspects of language that are culturally specific”. In many languages prose and poetry are highly reflective of the culture of a given place. They are in some instances the register of a nation’s history and cultural evolution. That is why literary translators should be well aware of the cultures of both languages. Bush (2001, p. 127) states: “A literary translator is bilingual and bicultural and thus inhabits a landscape which is not mapped by conventional geographies; s/he is at home with the flux that is the reality of contemporary culture.”

Earlier in the last century, some linguists investigated the relationship between language and human behaviour/thought. The hypothesis of ‘linguistic relativity’ laid out by Edward Sapir and further enhanced by Benjamin Lee Whorf holds that language influences thought and that linguistic categories influence or even determine cognitive categories. Sapir 1956 (cited in Bassnett 1991 p.13) stipulates that “No two languages are ever sufficiently similar to be considered as representing the same social reality.” The worlds in which different societies live are distinct worlds, not merely the same world with different labels attached”. “Sapir also argued that cultures sharing a language share a way of thinking, and that these ways of thinking constituted the psychology of the culture” (Nunan, 2007). The Sapir-Whorf Hypothesis has however been disputed by a number of subsequent linguists such as Eric Lenneberg, Noam Chomsky and Steven Pinker. In his book The Language Instinct (Pinker, 2003), Pinker discredits examples introduced by Whorf to illustrate how language influences habitual behaviour. “Pinker’s The Language Instinct (2003) is a well-argued and influential case for believing that the appearances are misleading. English and other languages might look like purely cultural creations, but they really are not”, Geoffery Sampson (2005) elucidates. In this thesis we will be open to the idea of linguistic relativity without specifically arguing for it.
Human beings have a natural need to express themselves and interact with each other. When this interaction takes place through the medium of language, cultural aspects are part of it and will outline the way people perceive themselves and other communities as well. In support of this, Corsen (2009) argues in line with the linguistic relativity hypothesis: “through the interrelated nature of language and its cultural components, the way we learn and recognise the world becomes predetermined and dependent on our specific system of symbols and sounds used within our communities, developing our sense of reality and cultural identity.” This stipulation of course leads us to better recognise the impact of the relationship between language and culture in a world of mass communication. Language is a major tool of communication if not the most important at all and is strongly linked to culture: “Language is an index of culture”, Fishman says. Kramsch (1998) describes the communicative role of language as follows: “The words people utter refer to common experience. They express facts, ideas or events that are communicable because they refer to a stock of knowledge about the world that other people share”.

In the following sections, the increasing importance of language utilisation in the light of mass communication and modern technologies will be investigated.

1.3 Language Utilisation in the Light of Mass Communication and New Technologies

Language is verbal and written messages that we send and receive. In addition to the language bond with culture and identity, which was discussed in the previous sections, language is the main tool people use to communicate and share information. Edward Sapir (1963 p. 7) describes language as a communication tool: “The truth of the matter is that language is an essentially perfect means of expression and communication among every known people”. Through history, language has enabled people to communicate their needs, thoughts and feelings. Sapir (1963 p.7) continues: “In the first place, language is primarily a system of phonetic symbols for the expression of communicable thought and feeling.”

Radio, telephone and television spread rapidly in the 20th century, giving rise to the revolution in telecommunications, and virtually changing the face of the world. “The
dominance of the rise of the printed book as the medium of communication has become challenged by the rise of the new electronic media” (Benczik, 2003, p.11).

In the 21st century, the introduction of the computer has changed the way people work. Gradually both private and government organisations have become computerised. The evolution of ICT as a discipline and its numerous applications have been quick and overwhelming.

There is no doubt that the major invention that has affected our lives in the past decade or so is the internet. Although other means of communication are definitely important, the internet has added a volume of speed, mobility and comprehensiveness that none of the previous communication tools was able to provide. The applications of the internet are embedded in people’s daily lives allowing an intense long distance exchange between human beings across the globe. According to albawaba Business, (2010): “A new Arabic financial website (www.nuqudy.com) reported on Tuesday that the total number of Web users in the Arab world is estimated at about 75 million users by the end of July 2010”. [...]The report claimed that in some countries internet penetration rate is low but cellular penetration rate is close to 100%. For example, the internet penetration rate in Algeria is put at about 15%, while the penetration rate of mobile phones in this country is over 100% (meaning that on average Algerians own slightly more than one mobile phone each). The United Arab Emirates boasts the highest penetration of the internet in the Arab world at 76%. However, most of the users in this country are expatriates. Bahrain and Qatar are ranked second and third respectively with penetration rates of 56% and 53%. Egypt is leading the Arab world in terms of internet users with 17.5 million. There are 11 million users in Morocco and 8.5 million in Saudi Arabia.

A natural consequence of this extensive communication is the extensive use of language. We are aware that accessing information about various subjects has become a simple task through using search engines. The internet “has now become the vital source of information that is highly helpful in education. A person can find any information such as essays, blogs, books, articles, pictures, news, or any other topic. If the person is still struggling for their information, then they can email someone or set up their own web
page with their findings to help others” (Internet Democracy, Freedom of Speech Runs Deep 2011).

ICT technologies and the internet have been of added value to the teaching and learning processes. Students are able to use computer software programmes and the internet to present research projects. Hence they can be more active in the learning process and better equipped to abandon a solely recipient role in the classroom. Since language is our core issue here, an English language teacher in Spain explains how ICT has provided a useful tool and a safe environment for teaching (Lopez-Brea Fernandez, 2005): “In this sense I consider that ICT provides for the language teacher a relatively safe environment (provided the teacher “feels” confident with the media), but also a strongly realistic use of language, thus providing a reason to learn. There is little doubt that we, language teachers, need to focus on the use of language, and ICT makes it easy for us to do so.”

We can keep ourselves updated with current events through reading news and analysis of news on the internet, and by watching the numerous satellite channels which are another product of mass communication technology. Paterson (1998) states: “The rapid spread of cable and satellite technologies has given rise to many fledgling news operations, most multi-national in character”. Through the many satellite channels people are now more exposed to different languages and cultures more than any other time in the past. “The new technologies are breaking down borders and barriers at a faster rate than is possible in physical terms. Sudden, unexpected encounters with other languages and cultures confront European citizens with new choices, opportunities and challenges”, as stated in a report on Education and Culture (International Certificate Conference, no date). What the report considers applies not only to European citizens, but also to all the citizens of the world. The growth of satellite channels in the Middle East has not only opened doors to programmes from diverse cultural, intellectual and perhaps doctrinal backgrounds, but it has also opened our eyes to the many ethnicities and their languages which have existed in the region whether for thousands of years or just a few generations, but were not widely spoken in the Arab world, such as Kurdish, Assyrian, Armenian and Circassian. It has certainly contributed to a cultural revolution that has swept the Arab world. “The arrival of satellite television in the Arabic language took the region by storm, boosting access to information, breaking taboos, bringing the
Arab world closer together [...], satellite television was part of a cultural revolution that had taken place across the Arabic speaking world in the decade leading up to 2011” (Noueiheid and Warren, 2012, p. 46).

Audiences may however tend to be selective in what they watch or in what type of information they would like to access according to the theory of ‘Selective Exposure’. “People tend to see and hear communications that are favorable or congenial to their predispositions; they are more likely to see and hear congenial communications than neutral or hostile ones” (Sears and Freedman, 1967 p.211). Yet, this abundance of communication through different channels and applications exposes people to a range of information and cultures even if they did not really intend to be acquainted with them. In this context language plays a vital role in determining how the novel information they have encountered is relayed to the various audiences. “The reports exist only in and through language; my attempts to read them depend entirely on language”, Kress (1983 p.121) stresses. This notion of how language shapes people opinions will be further discussed in section 1.4.

### 1.4 The growing effect of modern media tools on shaping people’s opinions

Media is an important tool of communication. After the invention of numerous means of media, the world has experienced dramatic changes in many aspects. Media has been used to serve certain objectives or even create the right atmosphere for major events which left a print on modern history. Hitler had a Ministry of Propaganda, which controlled radio and press campaigns to promote his war plans and later his actual invasions of neighbouring European countries. “Before the Führer rose to speak, the German radio announcer named literally dozens of countries, from Lithuania to Uruguay, where the speech was being broadcast live” (Vaughan, 2008). This diplomatic crisis was a turning point in radio history. Marshall McLuhan states: “That Hitler came into political existence at all is directly owing to radio and public address systems. [...] Radio provided the first massive experience of electronic implosion, that reversal of the entire direction and meaning of literate Western civilization” (McLuhan, 1971, p.57). By 1938, radio had reached almost every household in Europe and North America, and its alchemy, at the time, was unmatched.
The engagement of television in election campaigns has also been very effective. Television appearances, advertisements and debates have been used to disseminate political information and to allow political figures specially the runner ups to the American presidency to influence the voters' opinions. Probably the most remembered debates are the Nixon-Kennedy presidential debates of 1960. Television, in contrast with radio and newspapers, gave the opportunity to viewers to observe and visually appreciate the traits of the competitors and vice versa: “In substance, the candidates were much more evenly matched. Indeed, those who heard the first debate on the radio pronounced Nixon the winner. But the 70 million who watched television saw a candidate still sickly and obviously discomforted by Kennedy’s smooth delivery and charisma. Those television viewers focused on what they saw, not what they heard. Studies of the audience indicated that, among television viewers, Kennedy was perceived the winner of the first debate by a very large margin” (Tyner Allen, no date). Televised debates have opened the door to a number of questions regarding the role of television in determining election results, but most importantly to the role of television and other media in the whole democratic scene in a given country.

Perhaps most important, the Great Debates forced citizens to rethink how democracy would work in a television era. To what extent does television change debate, indeed, change campaigning altogether? What is the difference between a debate that "just happens" to be broadcast and one specifically crafted for television? What is lost in the latter? Do televised debates really help us to evaluate the relative competencies of the candidates, to evaluate policy options, to increase voter participation and intellectual engagement, to strengthen national unity? (Tyner Allen, ND).

If radio plays the role of quick news feeder, the device that puts us on track regarding weather, transport and other local issues then, it can also be used to serve certain objectives. McLuhan (1964) describes radio’s effect on people: “Radio affects most people intimately, person-to-person, offering a world of unspoken communication between writer-speaker and the listener” (Berry, 1971, pg. 57). Although some may claim that the press has lost a lot of its impact vis a vis radio and television, it also retains its own characteristics and strengths: detailed written analysis, emphasised headlines,
cartoons and advertisements. Berry (1971) refers to the role of the newspaper in the era of radio and television, saying: “It cannot achieve the instant coverage of contemporary events that broadcasting can, but its strength – extensive verbal amplification of the news – is unchallengeable”.

Taking the above into account, then perhaps we understand how media could be involved in the democratic process and in influencing the public or in other words ‘controlling the public mind’. Noam Chomsky (2002, p.14-15) explains that liberal democratic theorists and leading media figures in America like for example Walter Lippmann, argued that “a ‘revolution in the art of democracy’, could be used to ‘manufacture consent’, that is, to bring about agreement on the part of the public for things they didn’t want by the new techniques of propaganda”. Lippmann’s democratic theory is based on a group of ‘responsible men’ who are also smart enough to realise ‘the common interests’ of the community and take the lead. According to Lippmann, the other group of people, which is the majority ‘the bewildered herd’, is not equipped with the skills that qualify them to manage crucial issues. Yet, since it is a democracy, they are allowed to participate in the democratic process by giving their consent. Chomsky (2002, p.18) goes on to explain how to deal with this situation according to Lippmann’s theory of progressive democracy: “So we need something to tame the bewildered herd, and that something is this new revolution in the art of democracy: the manufacture of consent. The media, the schools, and popular culture have to be divided”. Media again is classified amongst the major tools used to manage public opinion.

As noted in section 1.2, the last twenty years have witnessed a massive increase in the amount and means of communication due to the technological revolution and the wide reception of these modern communication tools by various audiences across the globe. Undoubtedly, these portable, easy-to-access small devices have been very rapidly taken up amongst different segments of world societies. Internet and mobile phones have been skilfully applied to serve numerous purposes including news and media. “These new technologies have indeed modified relationships between the public and private spheres, radically changing the organization of work, and transforming the functioning of democracy” (Flichy, 1995 p.1).
Social websites have provided a particularly interesting platform for people to communicate and express themselves: their likes and inclinations, and political, social and religious views. The constant communication and exchange of ideas which these websites permit have allowed a free zone, and an appropriate environment for consolidating certain views in various Arab societies. Online communities have emerged to call for action regarding different causes, the Arab Spring being a vivid example of the impact of internet communication on speeding up social change and converting timid voices into loud cries for freedom. Noueihed and Warren (2012) speak about the role of the internet in the Arab revolutions: “Whatever its role in the mechanics of the revolts, the rapid rise in internet use, blogs and social media over the preceding five years had already had a democratizing effect on Arab society that authoritarian governments could not roll back” (Noueihed and Warren, 2012, p. 55).

The internet and its ‘social networking service’ applications have empowered their users with the ability to discuss their concerns with intensity and speed with large numbers of internet visitors. They have been able to address challenges and difficulties, propose ideas and solutions and take initiatives. In addition to this facility, blogs have also become available. Statistics produced by the Population Reference Bureau in 2010 (Zuehlke, 2012) about the percentage of internet penetrations in different Arab countries show that for each 100 persons in Egypt 6.4 log into the internet from a mobile and 1.8 from a fixed computer. Corresponding figures in Jordan are 2.4%, 3.2% and in Libya 42.7%, and 1.2%. A case study conducted at Harvard University in 2009 “identified a base network of approximately 35,000 active Arabic language blogs”. The study aimed at assessing the “networked public sphere” in the Arab World, “and its relationship to a range of emergent issues, including politics, media, religion, culture, and international affairs”. The study team organised the Arab blogosphere over countries or number of countries. The study reached the following conclusions in relation to what Arab bloggers think about personal life and local issues (Etling, Kelly, Faris and Palfrey, 2009): “Overall, the writing of most bloggers is centred on personal, diary-style observations. Those that write about politics tend to focus on issues within their own country and are more often than not critical of domestic political leaders. Foreign political leaders are discussed less often and most commonly in terms more negative than positive. Domestic news is more
popular than international news among general politics and public life topics, especially within large national clusters writing entirely in Arabic. The one political issue that commands attention of bloggers across the Arab world is Palestine, and in particular the situation in Gaza (Israel’s December 2008/January 2009 military action occurred during the study)”. My own observation of the above findings is that online forums have contributed to the current upheaval in the region and that the internet has definitely influenced public opinion at least in a large region like the Arab World.

The internet also offers online ‘community’ e-magazines, which contain articles, analysis, reviews and interviews. The Arabist and Jadaliyya are examples of serious blogs looking into Arab affairs and culture which help to increase the knowledge of the more cultivated internet users.

As the study of Etling, Kelly, Faris and Palfrey (2009) indicates, the predominant group of Arab bloggers are young people. However, the vast number of satellite channels, another production of mass communication and modern media, attract young and old alike. The audiences are exposed to varied sources of information and culture. People tend to choose what they prefer from what is offered. Sears and Freedman (1971 p.209) state in their review of Selective Exposure theory: “We know that in general we try to select from the media what we think will be useful to us or what we expect to enjoy”. Yet, due to the extensive flow of programmes shown on the very many channels, it is quite likely that audiences may become more familiar with new cultures or exposed to an alternative point of view. Moreover, satellite channels cater for computer-illiterate populations, and for individuals who are not qualified in English. The percentage of these individuals in Arab societies is quite substantial. A paper presented during the 9th Annual Conference on Al Jazeera and the New Arab Media (Conte, 2007) elucidates: “Instead, satellite televisions have many advantages: they are much more difficult to control as journalistic content, they can easily be broadcast from other countries to avoid censorship, and they can exceed the limit of illiteracy”.

Within this setting of new players in the global scene, communications and media seem irrepresible, and managing public opinion is a far more challenging task than it has ever been.
1.5 The notion of Stereotyping

“The great majority of mankind is influenced by things that seem, rather than by things that are” (Niccolo Machiavelli).

‘Generalisation’ or ‘assumption’, frequently not based on factual information, could be the key words to describe stereotyping. Stereotypes concern groups of people who may belong to a certain culture, ethnicity, religion, sect, gender or even different social class. Stereotype is commonly associated with prejudice, although some stereotypes could be positive.

Stereotypes are those common shared attitudes that serve as a shorthand for assessing groups of people based on fixed images or ideas. They can be prevalent in a certain culture, society or a social class. However, they become far more serious when they infiltrate the media, cinema and televised programmes including commercials. With the revolution in technology and mass communication, stereotypes have found in internet and social media platforms a hotbed in which to proliferate.

1.5.1 The use of stereotypical language in media and in translated media

Stereotyping can exist between any two or more cultures or between smaller groups of people. As an Arab who has witnessed the increase of stereotyping over her own culture within the past decade, I will concentrate in this research on perceptions affecting Arabs and Muslims. There are generalisations frequently used about Arabs and Muslims, and unfortunately some academics make this link between infamous extremists and all Muslims. My first example will be from a book by Bernard Lewis, with a short overview of his life and work first.

1.5.2 Bernard Lewis: an overview

Bernard Lewis was a British American historian and a specialist in oriental studies. He graduated from the University of London (History with Special Reference to the Near and Middle East) and earned his doctorate from the same university (SOAS) specialising in the origins of Ismailism. In 1974, Lewis was appointed as a lecturer at Princeton
University in the United States, which marked the most productive period of his academic life.

Lewis took an active interest in the social and economic history of the Middle East, and he is especially famous in academic circles for his works on the Ottoman Empire. Martin Kramer (1999) says: “Lewis’ early work centred on medieval Arab-Islamic history, especially in what is now Syria. However, after the creation of Israel, it became difficult for scholars of Jewish origin to conduct archival and field research in most Arab countries. Lewis turned his efforts to the study of Arab lands through Ottoman archives available in Istanbul, and to the study of the Ottoman Empire itself. The Emergence of Modern Turkey (1961) examined the history of modernizing reform not through the European lens of the “Eastern Question,” but through the eyes of the Ottoman reformers themselves” (Kramer, 1999, p. 719-20).

Lewis argues that the Middle East is currently backward and its decline is a largely self-inflicted condition resulting from both culture and religion, as opposed to the post-colonialist view, which mainly relates the under development of the region to 19th century European colonization. Kramer (1999) states: “Lewis, however, insisted that Ottoman decline was both real and self-inflicted. It resulted not only from the West’s material superiority, but from a Muslim attitude of cultural superiority, which impeded borrowing. The importance of creative borrowing, and the costs of Muslim insularity, was major themes in his Muslim Discovery of Europe (1982)”.

Lewis is known for his public debates with the Palestinian intellectual Edward Said, which concerned Said’s book ‘Orientalism’ (Said 1978). Bernard Lewis was among the scholars whose work was questioned in Edward Said’s ‘Orientalism’. Said thought that Lewis did not possess an academic background that qualified him to write about Arabs and Muslims; Lewis had not lived in or even visited an Arab country for a long time, most of his Muslim experience being Turkish-based. Yet he labelled the whole culture as violent, angry and anti-modern. Said added that Lewis’s work on the Muslims and Arabs lacked the necessary authenticity. “What he writes about Islam is all so self-evident that it allows him to bypass normal conventions of intellectual discourse, including proof” (Said, 2002). Said added that Lewis had traded on the ignorance of the American people
and fed it with a biased and distorted interpretation of the September 11 bombings (Adoing, 2008).

For his part Lewis thought that Said in his book *Orientalism* had ignored a number of scholars whose work was not merely based on a legend of the orient (Adoing, 2008, p.18). “What is the background of Oriental legend that inspired Burton or Lane? Was Flaubert’s vivid imagination stimulated by Oriental legend, and was this the same legendary material that inspired Burton, Lane and Lamartine?” (Lewis, 2002). Lewis also accused Said of being anti-western, which Said has denied, explaining that “there is no enduring oriental reality and even less an enduring Western essence, that he has no interest in, much less capacity for, showing what the true Orient and Islam really are” (Adoing, 2008). Lewis has also accused Said of using pretentious and incomprehensible language which conceals banal observations (Adoing 2008).

In his book, *The crisis of Islam, Holy War and Unholy Terror*, (Lewis 2003 p.xviii) Bernard Lewis mentions how “historical allusions [...] which may seem abstruse to many Americans are common among Muslims”. Bernard Lewis arrived at this conclusion after quoting one of Ben Ladin’s pronouncements on the “humiliation and disgrace” that Islam has suffered for “more than eighty years” (Lewis, 2003 p. xv). He continues (Lewis 2003 p. xv): “Most American-and, no doubt, European observers of the Middle Eastern scene began an anxious search for something that had happened ‘more than eighty years’ ago and came up with various answers. We can be fairly sure that Bin Ladin’s Muslim listeners – the people he was addressing –picked up the allusion immediately and appreciated its significance”. In this example Bernard Lewis is proposing that all Muslims are listening attentively to Bin Laden and thereby assuming that he is an important Muslim figure whose speeches and references are highly appreciated by his Muslim audience. This assumption by an academic and historian such as Bernard Lewis is liable to tarnish the image of Islam and Muslims within an important segment of educated people and young people in particular.

### 1.5.3 Daniel Pipes: an overview

My second example is from a book by Daniel Pipes. Again before providing and analysing the example, I will give an overview of the author himself.
Daniel Pipes is an American historian, writer and political commentator. He is the founder and director of the Middle East Forum and the editor of the Middle East Quarterly Journal (Middle East Forum n.d.). Pipes studied history at Harvard University, majoring in Middle East History in 1971. After his graduation, he spent two years in Cairo where he learnt Arabic and studied the Quran. He returned to Harvard in 1973 to embark on PhD research in medieval Islamic history. His PhD thesis entitled, ‘Slave Soldiers and Islam’ became his first book.

Pipes taught at a number of universities and then served as director of the Foreign Policy Research Institute, before founding the Middle East Forum. His 2003 nomination by U.S. President Bush to the board of directors of the U.S. Institute of Peace was protested by Democratic leaders, Arab-American groups, and civil rights activists, who cited his allegedly rightist views and belief that force was the most effective remedy for conflict. An online article on the Middle East Forum website says (Middle East Forum, no date): “The Wall Street Journal calls Mr. Pipes "an authoritative commentator on the Middle East". CBS Sunday Morning says he was "years ahead of the curve in identifying the threat of radical Islam". "Unnoticed by most Westerners," he wrote for example in 1995, "war has been unilaterally declared on Europe and the United States". It is evident that such statements could be inflammatory and extremely destabilizing of European communities, and mainstream European politicians in countries with large Muslim populations would be very unlikely to welcome them.

Pipes has written or co-written more than a dozen books, and has written columns or opinion pieces for many newspapers. He frequently participates in discussion panels on television, and has lectured profusely in the U.S. and abroad. He is currently the Taube Distinguished Visiting Fellow at Stanford University’s Hoover Institution.

In a book entitled Greater Syria, The History of an Ambition, Daniel Pipes (1990) describes the scenarios of the making of Lebanon a Maronite/Christian state. He says that there were two proposals: keeping Lebanon small but with Christian demographic predominance, or having a bigger geographical territory but then encompassing more non-Maronites or non-Christians (Pipes, 1990, p.33-35). Pipes goes on to say that the Maronites then opted for geographical expansion outside Mount Lebanon, and that “the
price of expansion was that many unwilling Muslims became Lebanese, sowing the seeds of the civil war that began in 1975” (Pipes, 1990 p.34). Pipes is presuming that the prime reason for the 15-year civil war in Lebanon was Muslim unwillingness to co-exist in a diverse environment, while the majority of contemporary observers perceive a number of critical issues behind the eruption of the Lebanese civil war (regional factors, as well as local dissatisfaction among some Lebanese communities).

1.5.4 Translating examples involving stereotypes
As discussed in previous sections, translation can stress prejudices and enlarge existing gaps between cultures. The following translation from one of the speeches of former Iraqi president Saddam Hussein is an example. The speech was delivered on 17 January 2003 on the eve of the American invasion:

ولد العراق الجديد، همة ورؤية، وقليبا زاده التصميم على الارتفاع، وقهر الصعاب، ثباتا في محبته لأمته، وصلاحية في مواجهة أعدانها، وعمق فيه أيمانه، الذي أثابه الله عليه، بعد أن عطر الموقف والراية بدماء سخية من أبنائه، قربانا تقبله الله عن الغفلة التي أصابت ولاة الأمور في بغداد، فوجد الأجنبي، بسنابك خيله، طريقه إليها (شبكة المنصور, 2009)

The official TT produced by the Iraqi state reads:

A new Iraq was born with firm resolution, great power of vision and a heart, which has been increased in the strength by a determination for ascent and for overcoming difficulties. It was firm in its love for its nation. Its faith, which God has given it and which the situation and banner was perfumed by the generous blood from its sons, has been deepened by a sacrifice which God accepted in compensation for the negligence which took over those who ruled Baghdad, and therefore the foreigners with horny feet of their horses, found their way towards it. (Iraq News Agency: English version; cited in Moreton, 2010 p.252).

The Arabic original text can be classified as flowery and redundant. It features an over-use of poetic and dramatic expressions which aim at striking the eye and the ear of the listener/reader. The almost literal English translation, by contrast, sounds to the English reader bizarre, incomprehensible and probably funny. Hence this translation helps in
enhancing the negative image of an Arab country/political leadership regardless of where we stand on the actions of Saddam Hussein.

Another example, this time from Farsi, is when Ayatollah Khamenei in 2012 described the acquisition of nuclear weapons as a sinful act that cannot be forgiven. The original text in Farsi reads:

The TT reads:

The Islamic Republic of Iran considers the use of nuclear, chemical and similar weapons as a great and unforgivable sin. We proposed the idea of Middle East free of nuclear weapons and we are committed to it. This does not mean forgoing our right to peaceful use of nuclear power and production of nuclear fuel. On the basis of international laws, peaceful use of nuclear energy is a right of every country. All should be able to employ this wholesome source of energy for various vital uses of their country and people, without having to depend on others for exercising this right. Some Western countries, themselves possessing nuclear weapons and guilty of this illegal action, want to monopolize the production of nuclear fuel. Surreptitious moves are under way to consolidate a permanent monopoly over production and sale of nuclear fuel in centres carrying an international label but in fact within the control of a few Western countries.
Although the overall translation is of good quality, the literal rendering of the sentence “The Islamic Republic of Iran considers the use of nuclear, chemical and similar weapons as a great and unforgivable sin” gives an immediate impression of a non-objective approach to the issue of the Iranian nuclear programme and might increase fears on the opposing side.

1.5.5 News Agency Translations

It can be argued that news agencies are not in practice translating news reports from one language to another. They are more producing independent reports for different audiences and the differences traced fall more in the area of marketing and social science rather than translation. Christina Schaffner (2010, p. 107), however, provides a counter-argument when she says: “However, research, as conducted in particular within the framework of descriptive translation studies and post-modern theories, has revealed that translation is also used to promote dominant ideologies [...] (e.g. Venuti 1998, Baker 2006). Translation methods are applied strategically to make target texts conform to or to challenge dominant world views”. Many of the prominent news agencies have sections for reporting news in other languages: the BBC, CNN and Al Jazeera are well-known examples in the Arab world. “For mediating politics to the general public, mass media play a significant role, including the reporting of politics in other countries” (Schaffner, 2010, p. 107). In order for the news agency to produce politically convincing reports, it depends on translators, and not only on professional translators: “As research into global news and translation has shown, it is a widespread phenomenon that journalists in fact do translations, but do not refer to this work as translation” (Schaffner, 2010, p. 109).

It might be obvious to some people, specially those who work in the media field, or are extensively exposed to media and news, that different media agencies deliver the same piece of news differently. This can be attributed to the policy, ideology and strategy of the news agency. News agencies are not simply relaying news, as their primary task seems to be. They are actually persistently influencing their audiences by implanting or instilling an idea or an attitude. (Bazzi 2009, p. 47-48) says:
An apparatus like media by which individuals are daily subjected to massive inculcation and “cramming” of concepts (e.g. moralism, terrorism, martyrdom or suicide bombing), can forge one’s beliefs about the way specific subjects should be interpellated in a particular conflict, thus, imposing what Althusser calls imaginary relations between the ruling ideology and the ruled individuals.

An example of this can be seen in the news regarding the current conflict in Syria. When the official Syrian Television reports a bombing in Damascus, the incident is described as follows (SANA 2012):

سانا: انفجرت في حي المزة جبل 86 تفجير إرهابي أسفر عن استشهاد 11 من المدنيين وجرح 30 آخرين بينهم أطفال ونساء، وتسبب في تدمير عدد كبير من السيارات والمحلات التجارية وتضرر البنية والمرافق الخدمية في المنطقة.

TT (SANA 2012):

Terrorists on Monday detonated an explosive device planted under a car in Mazzeh Jabal 86 area in Damascus, killing 11 citizens and injuring tens, including women and children.

SANA’s correspondent who visited the bombing site said the explosion caused significant damage to the area which is heavily populated, and that a large number of cars and shops were destroyed and infrastructure and utilities were also damaged.

By contrast the same incident is reported by the Al Jazeera Satellite Channel (JSC 2012), as follows:

وفي دمشق أيضا، انفجرت عبوة ناسفة في حي المزة غربي المدينة مما تسبب في مقتل 11 شخصا، وجرح 30 آخرين بينهم أطفال ونساء طبقاً للتلفزيون السوري.

TT (AJE 2012):
There were also reports of a car bombing in Mezzeh, an upscale neighbourhood in the Syrian capital, in which four people were killed and dozens wounded on Monday.

The same principle of ‘imaginary relations between the ruling ideology and the ruled individuals’ can be applied to individual translators. We come across texts influenced or even target texts manoeuvred by the translator according to his/her own positioning and ‘Ideological State Apparatuses’ as termed by Althusser. Hatim and Munday (2004, p.200) confirm this notion: “equivalence no longer governs the production and reception of translation. Translation is not merely an innocent transfer of ideas from one language into another. The process of translation can be ideologically manipulated to influence perceptions and to undermine the target culture”.

The Syrian Prime Minister Riad Hijab, who defected from the Syrian regime in 2012, made the following announcement in Amman after he arrived there (JSC 2012):

أؤكد لكم بحكم خبرتي وموقعي الذي كنت اشغله بأن النظام بات منهاراً معنويًا ومادياً واقتصادياً ومنتصداً عسكرياً حيث لم يعد مستمراً بالفعل على أكثر من 30% من أرض سوريا. فتقدم الثورة في نهجها الحضاري المتميز لتنكمل صورتها المنشرفة عبر الحفاظ على وحدة البلاد ونسيجها الوطني المتماسك وعبر الحفاظ على مؤسسات الدولة ومنشآتها الحيوية وبنيتها التحتية التي بتناها جميعاً بجهدنا وعرفنا ودماء أبنائنا، أما عن فصائل المعارضة الخارجة فهي مدعوة أكثر من أي يوم مضى لتوحيد جهودها وسد نزاعات من يتمها بالنشتة والتشرد فاختلاف المشارب لا يلغى وحدة الهدف.

أؤكد في هذه المناسبة عدم رغبتي في تقلد أي موقع أو منصب سواء كان في الوقت الراهن أو في المستقبل بسورية المحررة والذي أراه قريباً بآذان الله إنما نذرت نفسي جندياً في مسيرة الحق لا أبغي من وراء ذلك إلا وجه ربي ثم إرضاء ضميري والوفاء لوطني أعطانا الكثير وينتظر منا ان نحقق مما نعتمله ما يسمح من خلال البذل والضحية وعمل الحمة للوصول إلى دولة مدنية ديمقراطية تصل الحق والعدل والكرامة لجميع السوريين.

Translation:

From my experience and because of the position I held I assure you that the regime is decaying morally, financially and economically. It is broken militarily as it practically controls no more than 30% of the Syrian territory. Let our revolution continue in this civilised manner to complete its bright picture and maintain the unity of the people and the integrity of their national fabric, and to preserve the
state’s institutions and establishments, the infrastructure which we all built with our sweat and blood. As for the opposition factions, they are demanded more than ever to unite their efforts and refute others’ accusations of disintegration and fragmentation. The diversity of the opposition should not revoke their sole objective.

On this occasion, I confirm that I do not wish to take up any senior position whether currently or in the future free Syria, which I see it near, God willing. More, I have dedicated myself as a soldier in the march for the righteous cause. In doing this, I am only asking for God’s blessings, a contented conscience and faithfulness to a country which has given us a lot and is waiting that we give it what it deserves through providing, sacrifice and firm resolution to reach a civil state, a democracy that guarantees people’s rights, equality and dignity for all Syrians.

The English translation as quoted from AJE news reads (AJE 2012):

I confirm that the regime is decaying: morally, financially and economically. It is militarily losing ground, let the revolution continue in this civilised manner to maintain the integrity of the people and the state institutions which we built with our sweat and effort. Now, the opposition abroad is invited to unite and unify the ranks. Here I confirm that I don’t intend to take any office now or in the future.

The translator omitted the parts which could have made the announcement redundant and not quite meaningful. The translator’s intention is to secure the readers’ support for the Syrian revolution. Since using a flowery and rather too eloquent expressions is more a feature of Arabic, and Western readers won’t favour this type of language, so the translator resorted to omitting parts of the TT. The translator maintained a pro-revolution stance through the translation. For a clearer idea, please see translation below.

In the process of preparing pieces of news for different audiences, omissions could also be made in order for the text to be better received by a particular mind-set or ‘Ideological State Apparatus’. As previously discussed, another reason is where the news agency stands in a particular relationship to the events or to some political leadership.
The following is the news report about the Palestinian Authority (PA) bid for non-member state recognition at the UN (Reuters Arabic 2012):

 وقال عباس للصحفيين في القاهرة عقب اجتماع لوزراء الخارجية العرب في مقر جامعة الدول العربية بشأن التصويت المزمع للأمم المتحدة انه تم الاتفاق على إجراء التصويت في 29 نوفمبر تشرين الثاني الجاري مشيرا إلى ان الاغلبية اللازمة للفوز في الاقتراع ستكون في مصلحة الجانب الفلسطيني. وأضاف "ذاهبون لنحصل على دولة غير عضو دولة مراقب .. اذا ارادوا حوارا في اليوم التالي فنحن مستعدون".

وزعت السلطة الفلسطينية مشروع قرار على الدول الأعضاء في الأمم المتحدة يوم الأربعاء يطالب بترقية وضعها إلى دولة مراقب على الرغم من اعتراضات الولايات المتحدة وإسرائيل.

واقتراح عباس الذي سيجري التصويت عليه في الجمعية العامة للأمم المتحدة في وقت لاحق من الشهر الجاري سيكون اعترافا ضمنيا بدولة فلسطينية وربما يؤدي أيضا إلى انضمام فلسطين إلى هيئات دولية مثل المحكمة الجنائية الدولية في لاهاي.

 وقال عباس "نحن لا نريد ان نتصادم مع أحد لا مع أمريكا ولا مع إسرائيل".

وبات في حكم المؤكد أن يحصل الرئيس الفلسطيني على تأييد اغلبية الأصوات في الجمعية العامة التي تضم 193 دولة لرفع التمثيل الفلسطيني.

Translation:

Following a meeting of Arab foreign ministers in the headquarters of the Arab League in Cairo, Abbas told journalists about the intended vote of the United Nations which was agreed to take place on 29 November (this month). Abbas noted that the majority will vote in the Palestinian favour.

“We are going to obtain the United Nation’s recognition for a non-member state. If they want to talk the day after, we are ready”, he added.

The Palestinian Authority on Wednesday circulated a draft resolution to U.N. member states that calls for upgrading its U.N. status to that of observer state, despite objections by the United States and Israel.

Abbas’s proposal which will be voted on in the United Nation’s General Assembly later this current month will be an implicit recognition of a Palestinian
state, and it may also result in Palestine joining international organisations such as International Criminal Court in The Hague.

“We do not seek confrontations with anyone neither America nor Israel”, Abbas said.

It is almost certain that President Abbas will obtain the majority of votes in the U.N. General assembly which comprises 193 stats to upgrade the Palestinian representation.

As the English version of this piece of news is quite lengthy, I have chosen a few paragraphs to comment on. The English starts as follows (Reuters 2012):

(Reuters) - Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas told President Barack Obama on Sunday he was intent on pressing ahead with a Palestinian bid for United Nations recognition as a non-member state, despite the U.S. leader's objections.

As we read through the passage, we realise that some paragraphs which highlight the link between the Palestinian Authority and the west have been omitted as well as those which reveal the dependent relationship between The PA and Israel: Israel controls the economy and is able to monopolise all the resources leaving no room for the proposed ‘viable Palestinian state’:

[...] The Western-backed Palestinian Authority on Wednesday circulated a draft resolution to U.N. member states that calls for upgrading its U.N. status to that of observer state, despite objections by the United States and Israel.

President Abbas cited the reasons and motives for the Palestinian decision to seek non-member statehood as continued Israeli settlement activity and the continued attacks on Palestinians and their property," Abu Rdaineh said.

The White House said Obama, responding to a message from Abbas congratulating him on his re-election, used the call to reiterate "opposition to unilateral efforts at the United Nations."
The upgrade seems certain to win approval in any vote in the 193-nation General Assembly, which is composed mostly of post-colonial states historically sympathetic to the Palestinians.

Palestinian diplomats also are courting European countries to further burnish their case.

Israel and the United States say Palestinian statehood must be achieved by negotiation and have called on Abbas to return to peace talks that collapsed in 2010 over Israeli settlement construction in the occupied West Bank.

"In his discussion with President Abbas, President Obama reaffirmed his commitment to Middle East peace and his strong support for direct negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians with the objective of two states living side by side in peace and security," the White House said.

Obama pledged to make Middle East peacemaking a top priority when he took office in 2008 but on-again-off-again U.S. diplomacy yielded no tangible progress.

With Washington focused on the West's nuclear standoff with Iran and seeking to avert any unilateral Israeli attack on its nuclear sites, the White House has shown no real appetite for any immediate new Israeli-Palestinian peace initiative.

The Palestinians seek to establish a state in the Israeli-occupied West Bank and the Gaza Strip - which is controlled by the Islamist Hamas group who are bitter rivals of the Palestinian Authority - and want East Jerusalem as its capital.

Abbas has billed the U.N. move as a last-ditch attempt to advance long-stalled talks to achieve statehood by first having the world recognize Palestine as a state under Israeli occupation and its borders.

But U.S. officials have warned that the U.N. bid is counterproductive and will make it harder for the two sides to agree to renewed negotiations.

On Saturday, Israeli Finance Minister Yuval Steinitz threatened to stop collecting tax revenues for the Palestinian Authority and not hand over any money if Abbas continued to seek U.N. observer state membership.
The aid-dependent Palestinian economy in the West Bank faces financial crisis due to a drop in aid from Western backers and wealthy Gulf states, as well as Israeli restrictions on trade.

When a news agency works to promote a political figure, they may need to elaborate in order to enhance their positive traits. Bearing in mind Qatar’s stance towards the Syrian Revolution and the relevant events, AJE introduced the new Syrian Coalition leader, Ahmad Moaz Al Khatib, by describing at length his firm stand against the Syrian regime, especially after the start of the uprising in March 2011, while JSC kept this concise (JSC 2012):

The name of Muath Al Khatib has been associated with the Syrian opposition since the break out of protests against Bashar al-Assad rule, he was arrested by the Syrian authorities several times because of his participation in anti-regime demonstrations.
His speeches which were delivered from the pulpit of the Omayyad mosque in Damascus, and in the funeral ceremonies were messages of criticism of the regime’s policies’ and have put him into trouble with the security services which frequently summoned him for interrogation in 2011 and 2012.

As much as preacher Muath Al Khatib is known for his fiery speeches, he is as well known for his moderate positions. He preached religious and ideological pluralism in Syria, as he gave his pro protests speeches with a number of Alawi and Christian figures standing next to him.

Once he was elected president for the Syrian Coalition, Al Khatib said the task of the Coalition would end as soon as the regime falls. He indicated that the coalition did not and would not make any promises to any party in a way that would “betray the blood of the revolutionary people”.

Al Khatib always demanded public freedoms in all Muslim countries, he also called for releasing political prisoners, removing emergency and martial laws, and abrupt detention, ending the one party rule, combating bribery and political, social and economic corruption, halting public wealth looting, and making people alert to their rights including social care. He finds all this intrinsic part of Islam, and superseding it means we are despising religion and undermining people’s minds and manipulating them.

Although the Arabic version is rather rhetorical, it is shorter and much less detailed than the English one:

Just 20 days into the eruption of anti-regime protests across the country on March 15, 2011, Khatib was seen in the Damascus suburb of Douma at the funeral of an anti-government protester killed by security forces.

“We speak up for the freedom of every human in this country; for every Sunni, Alawite, Ismaili, Christian, for every Arab and every Kurd,” he said that day as he stood on a high platform.

Protesters at the funeral responded by cheering: “The Syrian people are one.”
Two days later, Khatib was at another funeral for a slain protester in the Damascus suburb of Madimiyyah.

“The free person feels for other people’s pain, lives their feelings, cries with them and calls for their rights,” he told mourners in Madimiyyah.

Khatib was arrested several times for his involvement in the movement, including his most recent incarceration in April 2012.

Al Khatib is from a religious Muslim family; he has been Imam to several mosques in Damascus including the “prestigious Omayyad Mosque”, according to Al Jazeera. What is interesting here is that Al Jazeera is promoting an Islamic figure by implicitly defying the stereotype about Muslims being exclusive and rigid:

His struggle for freedom along with what many consider his moderate Islamic discourse made him a popular figure among many Syrians. He has written dozens of books and articles on religion and society, advocating for equality between men and women, for minority rights and political plurality.

The English version of this article is longer and much more detailed than the Arabic one. It contains examples of Al Khatib’s rebellious attitudes towards the regime, and his open-mindedness (AJE 2012):

“I knew him personally for twenty years...I used to attend his Friday speeches at the mosque with my friends at Damascus University, we all were liberal but proud Muslims, and we found in him the right figure. He was always very open-minded and ready to talk to us about anything,” Rim Turkmani, a Syrian-born astrophysicist at Imperial College London, said.

"His attitude towards women is very admirable as well.”

[...] Fadi Salem, a Syrian researcher based in Dubai, sees Khatib as a "moderate Islamist" who has a lot of support among conservative urban Sunnis. He could be the right man to tackle the rise of extremism, the researcher said.

Religious issues are on numerous occasions the focus of cultural stereotyping especially in a region like the Arab World. The reason is that historically Islam and norms of
leadership were interwoven. In modern times leadership in different Arab states has become more secular. However, people have suffered from dictatorship, poverty and political repression, which have given rise to political Islam, which came to be at the forefront of the Arab spring that changed the face of the Arab region. The Muslim Brotherhood, which won the 2011 elections in Egypt, subsequently faced accusations of cementing authoritarianism. Reuters Arabic published the following article about the crisis in Egypt caused by a presidential decree seen by opponents as an attempt to monopolise political decision making (Reuters 2012):

The Cairo (Reuters) - A prime ministerial decree issued on Sunday has caused a political crisis in Egypt, with opposition leaders calling for the resignation of President Mohamed Morsi. The decree, which gives the president the power to dissolve the lower house of parliament, has been met with widespread protests across the country.

Morsi's decision has been described as a coup by some, with opponents accusing him of increasing his own power at the expense of the democratic process. The move has also been met with criticism from the country's military, which has been a key supporter of Morsi's government.

The crisis has raised questions about the future of Egypt's transition to democracy, with many wondering whether Morsi's government can weather the storm. Some are calling for a new election to be held soon, while others are calling for a more inclusive government to be formed.

Morsi's opponents have also been quick to point out that the decree was issued without consultation with the country's top leaders, including the prime minister and the head of the armed forces. This has added to the sense of unease among Egyptians, who are already divided over the country's future direction.

The crisis has also sparked protests across the country, with large crowds gathering in cities and towns across the country to demand the president's resignation. The government has responded with a show of force, with police and military personnel deployed to keep the peace.

Despite the challenges, Morsi has shown a willingness to engage with opposition leaders to try and resolve the crisis. He has met with the country's top politicians in recent days, and has called for a national dialogue to be held to discuss the future of the country.

The crisis has also sparked international concern, with leaders from around the world calling for a peaceful resolution to the crisis. The United States has expressed concern over the situation, and has called for a return to democracy and the rule of law in Egypt.
Translation:

A presidential source told Reuters on Wednesday that President Mursi will address the nation on Thursday eve. He will give a speech that will address a number of issues including the constitutional declaration which was issued last week, the reason behind issuing it, and the protests prompted by it.

Protesters say that Mursi has granted himself sweeping powers by issuing the constitutional declaration, however the source said that Mursi seeks to clarify that it is not as it seems.

“The president will address the nation on the state television on Thursday eve, which will discuss the constitutional declaration, why it was issued and the events that followed, the presidential source said.

The president of the presidential court Muhammad Rafaal Al Tahtawi confirmed in a phone call with Al Hayat television that Mursi will give a speech on Thursday.

A member of the Muslim brotherhood who is well informed of how the declaration was issued said to Reuters that Mursi and his deputy Mahmoud Makki and two other independent legal experts have started working on the constitutional declaration in October, in the aftermath of the president’s failure to discharge the General Prosecutor Abdul Majid Mahmoud

Mursi’s measure exasperated the judges who said he has exceeded his capacities, and caused widespread protests among Egyptians who accused him of attempting to grant himself dictatorial authorities.

“The president and his deputy started working secretly in October during the eves with two legal experts to structure the declaration which allowed him to discharge the General Prosecutor and other things, “The group member who asked to remain anonymous said.

He said, Mursi chose not to inform his counsellors to avoid any leak of the declaration to media or to Judiciary. Muslim Brothers group were not aware of the declaration, he added.
The Arabic version does state that Mursi, the Egyptian president, has issued a decree to grant himself extra powers, and that, along with dismissing the General Prosecutor, this has caused resentment and persistent protests in the country. Yet, it does not elaborate on or include the statements made by major and well-liked figures who had a significant impact on the Egyptian revolution. Reuters English published the following version of the same article (Reuters 2012):

(Reuters) - Egyptian President Mohamed Mursi will address the nation on Thursday, calling for unity as he pushes through a new constitution he hopes will defuse a crisis prompted by his decision to grant himself sweeping powers.

The assembly tasked with writing the constitution said it was hoping to wrap up a final draft with a view to voting on the document later on Thursday.

But as Mursi’s opponents pressed on with their week-old protests in Cairo's Tahrir Square, critics said the Islamist-dominated assembly's bid to finish the constitution quickly could make matters worse.

Two people have been killed and hundreds injured in countrywide protest set off by Mursi's decree since it was issued last week.

The Muslim Brotherhood, the Islamist group which was behind Mursi's election June, hopes to end the crisis by replacing the decree with an entirely new constitution to be approved in a popular referendum, a Brotherhood official told Reuters.

It is a gamble based on the Islamists' belief that they can mobilise enough voters to win the referendum: they have won all elections held since Hosni Mubarak was toppled from power.

But the move seemed likely to deepen divisions that are being exposed in the street.

In his speech, Mursi was expected to explain why he had issued his decree and to outline what he saw as conspiracies being planned by his non-Islamist political opponents, officials said. He would also call for national unity.
The Muslim Brotherhood and its Islamist allies have called for protests on Saturday in Tahrir Square, setting the stage for more confrontation with their opponents, who staged a mass rally there on Tuesday.

The constitution is one of the main reasons Mursi is at loggerheads with non-Islamist opponents. They are boycotting the 100-member constitutional assembly, saying the Islamists have tried to impose their vision for Egypt's future.

The assembly's legitimacy has been called into question by a series of court cases demanding its dissolution. Its standing has also been hit by the withdrawal of members including church representatives and liberals.

RIOT POLICE
Just down the road from the constitutional assembly meeting, protesters were clashing with riot police in Tahrir Square. Members of the assembly watched on television as they waited to go into session on Wednesday.

"The constitution is in its last phases and will be put to a referendum soon and God willing it will solve a lot of the problems in the street," said Talaat Marzouk, an assembly member from the Salafi Nour Party, as he watched the images.

But Wael Ghonim, a prominent activist whose online blogging helped ignite the anti-Mubarak uprising, said a constitution passed in such circumstances would "entrench authoritarianism".

The constitution is supposed to be the cornerstone of a new, democratic Egypt following Mubarak's three decades of autocratic rule. The assembly has been at work for six months. Mursi had extended its December 12 deadline by two months - extra time that the assembly speaker said was not needed.

The constitution will determine the powers of the president and parliament and define the roles of the judiciary and a military establishment that had been at the heart of power for decades until Mubarak was toppled. It will also set out the role of Islamic law, or sharia.
The effort to conclude the text quickly could mean trouble, said Nathan Brown, a professor of political science at George Washington University in the United States.

"It may be regarded with hostility by a lot of state actors too, including the judiciary," he said.

Leading opposition and former Arab League chief figure Amr Moussa slammed the move. He walked out of the assembly earlier this month. "This is nonsensical and one of the steps that shouldn't be taken, given the background of anger and resentment to the current constitutional assembly," he told Reuters.

Once drafted, the constitution will go to Mursi for approval, and he must then put it to a referendum within 15 days, which could mean the vote would be held by mid-December.

The assembly said that legislative powers assumed by Mursi in August would be handed to the Shura Council, or upper house of parliament, once the constitution is ratified at the weekend.

A constitution must be in place before a new parliament can be elected, and until that time Mursi holds both executive and legislative powers. An election could take place in early 2013.

The English version mentions ‘Al Tahrir Square’ and ‘Wael Ghunaim’, both strongly associated with the Egyptian revolution with all the enthusiasm, sympathy and admiration the revolution received internationally. Even Amr Mousa (a secular politician who had held a high position over a long period of time) is introduced in a positive way. On more than one occasion, however, it is hinted that the 'constitutional assembly' is dominated by Islamists, and therefore, it is very possible that the constitution will be tailored to the agenda of the Muslim Brotherhood and their Islamist allies.

1.6 Conclusion
This chapter has provided the necessary background for embarking on this research. It has explained the important role of language in peoples’ minds and ways of life. It has
drawn on the bond between language and culture, and clarified the notion of language as a medium of communication, and the mutual effect between communities and cultures inflected by language. It has demonstrated that the media is a vital means of communication especially with recent inventions that have led to a revolution in communication, and has shed light on the role of media in shaping people’s opinions.

The chapter has clearly made the link between mass media and news dissemination.

In section 1.5, it has introduced the notion of stereotyping, illustrating this with examples. Finally the chapter has presented a number of illustrative media texts in English and Arabic from news agencies and provided comparisons and discussions highlighting stereotypes and ideological interferences.
Chapter 2

2.1 Introduction
The first chapter looked into the relationship between language and culture and introduced the notion of stereotyping illustrated with cases involving the use of media examples that have a blend of stereotypical as well as ideological elements. It is now essential to further explain the concepts of stereotyping and ideology and their position in discourse. This chapter will also examine the relationship between ideology and translation and finally set out the theoretical background for the research tool used in this study by giving an overview of Critical Discourse Analysis.

The chapter consists of nine sections (2.2-2.9) and a conclusion (2.10). Section 2.2 is a brief review of the definition of ideology from different perspectives, while special focus is placed on the perspective of ideology within critical discourse analysis. Section 2.3 looks into the concept of stereotyping and its position in psychology and social science. Section 2.4 then establishes the relationship between ideology and stereotyping and explains how the latter is used in practice in ideological discourses. Section 2.5 introduces the conception of discourse from various perspectives, highlighting the position of discourse in social science, and from the viewpoint of proponents of critical theorists: a text in context. Section 2.6 builds more on the conception of discourse as a means which incorporates certain ideologies and how stereotypes can be used to consolidate the ideologies of the elite. Section 2.7 is dedicated to exploring the connection between translation and ideology where the views of a number of translation scholars are presented. Section 2.8 presents the conception of Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) as complementary to previous conceptions of ideology, stereotyping and discourse. It is also shown how CDA is a suitable research theory for this study. In Section 2.8, the sub-categories of CDA, ‘Semiotics’ and ‘Rhetorics’, are introduced.

2.2 Ideology
Many of the definitions of ideology share the notion that it is a set of attitudes, or a body of concepts or a system of beliefs (McClosky, 1964; Lane, 1962). However, the notion of
‘ideology’ has been subject to two major turning points: one at a period of time following the French revolution (Napoleon 1803-1815), while the second is associated with Karl Marx (1818-1883).

Antoine Destutt De Tracy, one of the Enlightenment era philosophers wrote *Elements d’Idéologie* in which he proposed a ‘new science of ideas’. De Tracy rejected ideas which derive from established authorities (religion, state) or biology and advocated that the behaviour and ideas of a human being are the product of his upbringing and the environmental conditions he is subject to. De Tracy also advocated democracy as a feasible and rational way to govern on the basis of humane and positive ideas. Napoleon severely criticised the enlightenment philosophers and their ‘social policy’, as he found them contradictory to his dictatorial inclinations (Gee, 1996, p. 1-3).

The second turning point was Karl Marx and his economic-based social theory. Marx introduced a crucial point when he made the association between people’s beliefs, behaviour and knowledge and their economic status. Marx argued that the economic position of people shaped their beliefs and views. In consequence, the more powerful and wealthier social classes had social and political views and beliefs that reflected their interests (Gee, 1996, p. 4-5). Marxism adopts a very specific approach to ideology. Karl Marx put forward his fundamental ideas on ideology in his book *The German Ideology* two years before he published his famous *Communist Manifesto*, and already here he presents a well formulated, and revolutionary, understanding of ideology.

Many of the definitions of ideology share the notion that it is a set of attitudes, or a body of concepts or a system of beliefs (Mclosky, 1964; Lane, 1962). Yet, there is some variety in the body of the definitions, between those which adopt a more structured definition of ideology and those which adopt a more flexible one. An example of the more structured approach is Sartori (1969), who defines ideology as: “A typically dogmatic, i.e., rigid and impermeable, approach to politics”. Campbell et al. (1960) agree with Sartori that ideology is “A particularly elaborate, close woven, and far-ranging structure of attitudes. By origin and usage its connotations are primarily political”. The more flexible definition of ideology is illustrated by Sleiger (1976), who describes ideologies as: “Sets of ideas by which men posit, explain and justify end and means of organised
social action, and specifically political action, irrespective of whether such action aims to preserve, amend, uproot or rebuild a given social order”.

In the modern era, the concept of ideology has been used specially in relation to politics. Leach (2009) explains that political ideas have been powerful and some revolutionary slogans have transformed the world. As is clear from Leach’s discussion, the word ‘ideology’ is often closely associated with Marxist thought and the policies of the working classes. Leach concludes that different ideologies expressed at any time reflect conflicting class interests.

‘Ideology’ has been described as a “central term of Social Science discourse” (Gerring, 1997). Thus, it has been classified within the realm of social science. It also has a strong link to political thought and sometimes to economic or more accurately economic reform.

According to one fairly standard definition of ideology, it is a set of beliefs that affects our outlook on the world. It acts as a filter through which we see events and also people. Ideology is a comprehensive vision, or a set of ideas typically proposed by the dominant class of the society. Fairclough states: “Practices which appear to be universal and common sensical can often be shown to originate in the dominant class or the dominant bloc and to have become naturalized” (Fairclough, 2001, p. 27). In this sense, ideology is not merely feelings or a psychological state, but it is the perspective of the dominant class being cascaded to the rest of the society.

As noted, ideology is frequently described as the mindset of the more powerful class or group of the society imposed on others. The imposture is however, is of the powerful class and not randomly done, and there is an organised lobbying of power and exercise of control over important sectors in public life. Ideology in the following pages will be used in this sense.

Within this research, the term ‘ideology’ will be used as the political set of attitudes that manage social and political interests including the media. It works to serve particular interests by setting agendas and managing people’s opinions to serve the ultimate goal of the ruling class.
2.3 Stereotyping

A considerable amount of research and analysis has been dedicated to the notion of ideology and its relevance and applications in politics, economics and social science. Fewer studies have been conducted on stereotyping and its relevance to other domains. Some studies have, however, touched on the relationship between stereotyping and social science and psychology/social psychology. Gordon Willard Allport (1897-1967), who was an American psychologist, put forward the early theories of stereotype content.

Katz and Braly conducted a piece of research about the attitudes of 100 students at Princeton University in 1933 (Katz and Braly 1933, p. 28; pp. 280-290). The study was based on asking the students to list traits of 10 prominent social groups at the time. The study came to the conclusion that stereotypes were “[...] not based upon animosity toward a member of a prescribed group” because of individual characteristics, but rather because of attitudes (or ‘stereotypes’) against ‘race names’ (p. 280). Although the study deals with attitudes towards people grouped according to their nationality or religion, it is classified under the area of psychology and no obvious link to social or political issues is made.

Stereotyping was described by Lippmann (1922) as “knowledge structures that serve as mental pictures of the groups in question” (Stagnor, 2010). Allport (1954) said that stereotypes have characteristics such as inaccuracy, negativity and overgeneralisation. More recently, a tendency to simplify the concept of stereotyping has led to overlooking these concepts and concentrating more on the particular traits of individual groups: “I’d say that we generally agree that stereotypes represent the traits that we view as characteristics of social groups, or of individual members of those groups, and particularly those that differentiate groups from each other. In short, they are the traits that come to mind quickly when we think about the groups” (Stangor, 2010, p. 2). “Edmund Ghareeb, a Middle East specialist, notes that stereotypes provide a method of ‘shorthand’ for identifying groups” (Saloom, 2006, p. 24). Although stereotypes can be positive, as explained above they tend to be negative and related to prejudice: “The basic argument of the inevitability of prejudice perspective is that as long as stereotypes
exist, prejudice will follow. This approach suggests that stereotypes are automatically (or heuristically) applied to members of the stereotyped group” (Divine, 1989, p. 5).

However, the first decade of the 21 century witnessed a rapid development of research on the notion of imagology and its relationship to translation studies. By ‘imagology’ is meant representations of cultural, historical and political dispositions including other representations (Flynn, Leersen and Van Doorslaer, 2015). The three researchers introduce the term ‘ethnotype’, which means assigning specific characteristics to some nations, linking the formulation of ethnotypes to literary-narrative genres. They argue that ethnotypes are “[...] invoked without conscious awareness of their source and provenance [...]” (Flynn, Leersen and Van Doorslaer, 2015, p. 3).

While the authors explain that the roots of imagology lie in literary studies which have had a lasting influence on constructing ethnotypes, van Doorslaer (2010) stresses that it has been proven that media discourse can also have a considerable impact on the spread of images through translation selection.

The authors explore the impact of globalization on national and cultural images in relation to translation, concluding that “Much work still needs to be done on the impact of globalization on translation, and more particularly on the translation of various types of image. In a more general or global sense, has the instantaneous availability of information brought about selection processes that reinforce cultural stereotyping (in translation) rather than dispelling it?” (Flynn, Leersen, Doorslaer, 2015, p. 7). The authors emphasise that the main focus of imagology has been on tracing ethnotypes and tropes particularly in ‘literary representations’. However, “how such manifestations are mediated by translation and its agents in various linguistic and cultural spaces – not only in literary discourses – has yet remained largely unexplored” (Flynn, Leersen and Doorslaer, 2015, p. 8).

According to Valdeon (2015), translation scholars have recently begun investigating the connections between “language, translation and the construction of national image”. For the purpose of exploring language as a base of social interaction, the concept of framing has been used. ‘Framing’ has multidisciplinary utilities; in linguistics, sociology and translation studies. A number of communication studies scholars stipulate that “a
frame is a central organising idea for news content that supplies a context and suggests what the issue is through the use of selection, emphasis, exclusion, and elaboration” (Tankard, Hendrickson, Silberman, Bliss, and Ghanem, 2010; cited in Valdeon, 2015, p. 221). Other communication studies scholars have stressed that pre-existing knowledge of current events affects the way news is re-produced. Valdeon discusses the shared roles of writers and readers in interpreting or reacting to the news, which leads to another conclusion that frames are not necessarily static: “[...] the promotion of national images in news texts depends on the frames that writers and readers might share (or not), on the ideological position of the medium and the writer, and on the multimodal text understood as a combination of verbal and non-verbal signs. These factors allow for certain elements to be activated and foregrounded given the appropriate circumstances (Leerssen, 2000) but they also account for the flexibility characteristic of change (Valdeon, 2015, p. 221).

If stereotyping is mainly about prejudiced groups’ characteristics and the immediate mental picture that comes to our mind when dealing with or discussing ethnic or religious groups, then it will affect the relationships between social groups, classes, and also civilizations: “Stereotypes homogenize people which results in biased depictions” (Saloom, 2006, p. 24).

But how is stereotyping different from ideology and is there any overlap between the two?

2.4 Stereotyping and Ideology

Stereotypes among different social groups unconsciously produce more fortunate segments of a given society or a more fortunate society/culture in relation to two or more distinct societies. Stereotypes can also consciously be used to promote certain ideologies. Stereotypical images and approaches are hence frequently encountered in social media but in a more organised way in international media. “[...] [I]deologies are typically, though not exclusively, expressed and reproduced in discourse and communication, including non-verbal semiotic messages, such as pictures, photographs and movies. Obviously, ideologies are enacted in other forms of action and interaction, and their reproduction is often embedded in organizational and institutional contexts”
(Van Dijk, 1995, p. 17). When the stereotypical perspective is professionally employed to serve specific interests on a large scale, those stereotypes have practically entered a new phase which is more like ideology.

Ideological influence is harmonised and complemented between politics, economy, media and even art. “Power relations are not reducible to class relations” (Fairclough, 2001, p. 28). He also confirms: “[...] the power to project one’s practices as universal and ‘common sense’ is a significant complement to economic and political power, and of particular significance here because it is exercised in discourse” (Fairclough, 2001, p. 27).

Stereotyping is more relevant to describing groups of people and on many occasions ascribing negative connotations to these groups. Such connotations can be used to serve the interests of the dominant class of the society and hence stereotyping links to ideology. One of the phenomena which demonstrates this proposition is the state of public alarm caused by ‘Moral Panic’, “defined as a condition or situation in which public fears and state interventions greatly exceed the objective threat posed to society by a particular group that is claimed to be responsible for the condition” (Cohen, 1972; McCorkle & Miethe, 1998, cited in Bonn, 2010. p. 5). The concept of moral panic confirms that stereotypes of some group are being used/engineered by the social elite through mass media and law enforcers in order to turn this group into ‘folk devils’. “It has been argued that moral panics arise when distorted mass media campaigns are used to create fear, reinforce stereotypes, and exacerbate pre-existing divisions in the world, often based on race, ethnicity and class (Goode & Ben-Yehuda, 1994, cited in Bonn, 2010. p. 6). Another example is the pervasive negative stereotypes of Arabs in Hollywood films. Jack Shaheen (2001) explains that “Obviously, filmmakers did not create the stereotype but inherited and embellished Europe’s pre-existing Arab caricatures” (Shaheen, 2001, p. 7).

2.5 Discourse

The term ‘discourse’ has been defined in many different ways. While some writers define it as more abstract and general (the linguistic approach), others include social and psychological aspects in their definition.
A basic definition of ‘discourse’ from a linguistic perspective can be found in *A Dictionary of Linguistics and Phonetics* (Crystal, 2008), where it is defined as: “[...] a continuous stretch of (especially spoken) language larger than a sentence – but, within this broad notion, several different applications may be found. [...] Several linguists have attempted to discover linguistic regularities in discourses (discourse analysis or DA), using grammatical, phonological and semantic criteria (e.g. cohesion, anaphora, inter-sentence connectivity)”. Discourse has also been examined in relation to applied linguistics where the lexico-grammatical forms claim their meanings from particular contexts, thus seeking to match form and function.

There is another trend which categorises discourse within the perspective of social sciences and sees discourse as a form of social practice. This highlights the use of meaning and making new meanings in particular historical, social, and political conditions. “At this level, the term ‘discourse’ is employed to explain the conditions of language use within the social relations that structure them” (Koteyko, 2006, pp.132 - 157).

In relation to the definition of discourse as a form of social practice, Foucault’s study on discourse is one of the elemental studies that should be taken into consideration. Foucault thinks that the main unit of discourse is the statement and not the text and when a number of statements are formed together, they make discourse. “Whenever one can describe, between a number of statements, such a system of dispersion, whenever, between objects, types of statements, concepts, or thematic choices, one can define a regularity, we will say for the sake of convenience, that we are dealing with discursive formation” (Foucault, 1989, p.38).

Another influential figure in the development of notions of discourse analysis is the German philosopher and sociologist Jürgen Habermas. Habermas thinks that the primary threat to human beings is the encroachment of the market system bureaucratic authorities into human day-to-day social relationships – what he calls the ‘lifeworld’ – resulting in the erosion of their characteristic human qualities. This unfavourable impact is also manifested in the destruction of specifically human communication structures as the workings of the market and bureaucracy expand. If this takes place, the system
rationalization results in a society that has greater control of the environment and where citizens enjoy material abundance. On the other hand, the lifeworld rationalization brings forth the enrichment of life as truth, goodness and beauty flourish. Unfortunately, the lifeworld’s rationalization does not currently flourish because of the system’s domination. As a result, people are able to enjoy the fruits of the system rationalization as in the rise of their standard of living, but their lives are not enriched (given the persistent threat of war, nuclear annihilation, urban blight, pollution, alienation and the like).

It is in this context that Habermas proposes his theory of communicative action. This theory urges both critical thought and practical action. Habermas seeks to rediscover ways in which individuals can live together in harmony and mutual dependence, but providing adequate space for individual autonomy and taking advantage of technological advancement. He insists on the active involvement of the actors in the interaction which is governed by binding consensual norms, which in turn, are defined by their mutual expectations. One assumption is that people should be able to express their intentions to one another in the most truthful and sincere manner. Such communication demands open and uninterrupted argumentation.

Habermas’s view of discourse states that discourse should accommodate for the marginalised sections of the society to express themselves; in this respect he is in line with proponents of diversity. Baumeister (2003) deals with Habermas’ concept of ‘Discourse and Cultural Diversity: “[…] his vision of discourse ethics can be reconciled with the struggle for recognition on the part of many groups historically marginalised in liberal democracies and that, properly understood, a liberal theory of rights is not blind to cultural difference. […] his approach is sensitive to many of the concerns expressed by those proponents of diversity whose demands for recognition are rooted in liberal values and a desire to enable citizens to participate in the public realm on equal terms” (Baumeister, 2003, p. 740). This sense of discourse is rooted in Critical Theory (The Frankfurt School), which was influenced by Marxian theory. However the Frankfurt School theorists “sought to extend and update the Marxian tradition by examining the domination and oppression of the masses by societal elites in advanced capitalist
societies” (Bonn, 2010, p. 19). Frankfurt School theorists including Habermas and Horkheimer saw that media can be used as a tool to oppress the masses.

Within the flow of this research, I will be using the term ‘discourse’ in the CDA sense and the media texts I use will be analysed in their relation to the implicit meaning of the author or the news agency that produced them.

2.6 Discourse and ideology/stereotyping

As explained above, discourse can be used to project certain ideologies and manage public opinion (Chomsky, 2002). In this context, stereotyping can be embedded in discourse as stereotyping in many cases is part of ideology given that “[...] ideologies consist of social representations that define the social identity of a group, that is, its shared beliefs about its fundamental conditions and ways of existence and reproduction” (Van Dijk, 2006, p. 116)

Media tools can be used to promote specific political, economic and social views. In order for the media to embody these views or ideologies, it should have some sort of power. This could be political power as is common in less democratic states. On the other hand, media in the more democratic states still embodies ideologies and stereotypes of the more dominant class of the society, where this projection of specific beliefs becomes common sense and the right vision. “There are key discourse types which embody ideologies which legitimize more or less directly existing societal relations, and are so salient in modern society that they have colonized many institutional orders of discourse” (Fairclough, 2001, p. 30).

According to a number of scholars, discourse is fundamentally linked to the power relations in the society. Knowing that there is a constant struggle over power between the various classes/segments of the society, discourse is a very important tool that has been effectively used on many occasions particularly in the modern era to exercise control and win over the perspectives of other societal groups. The news, advertisements, cartoons and talk shows are examples of vehicles to convey and persuade people of the views of the dominant class. “Discourse assumes such importance in terms of power struggle: control over orders of discourse by institutional
and societal power-holders is one factor in the maintenance of their power” (Fairclough, 2001, p.31).

Stereotypes, as mentioned above, are used in the process of consolidating certain views which could be spread at random among members of some social groups. Since ideologies are by definition more organised and mobilised than stereotypes, stereotypes are employed to serve some ideologies and to even make them more popular. This demonstrates the correlation between ideology and stereotyping, Van Dijk defines the role of ideologies as follows: “First of all, as explained above, they organise and ground the social representations shared by the members of (ideological) groups. Secondly, they are the ultimate basis of the discourses and other social practices of the members of social groups [...] Thirdly, they allow members to organise and coordinate their (joint) actions and interactions in view of the goals and interests of the group as a whole. Finally, they function as the part of the sociocognitive interface between social structures (conditions, etc.) of groups on the one hand, and their discourses and other social practices on the other hand” (Van Dijk, 2006, p. 117).

2.7 Translation and ideology

The section concentrates on translation and ideology. The general objective of most forms of translation is to preserve the message and particularly the main idea of the source text when received by an audience from a different linguistic background and often a different culture. When texts have the ideological element as defined in the previous sections (2.4, 2.5 and 2.7), translation becomes a more sensitive process, “Ideology shapes discourse and is shaped by it” (Fowler, 1986).

The role of the translator is recognised in all translational work. The element of mediation can vary according to the type of text being handled. If the text is ideological, then the translator should be well informed about the ideology of the ST and maybe expected to reproduce this in the TT or even requested to translate according to a counter/different ideology. Alternatively, the translators may themselves have a counter/different ideology and hence the mediation could lead to an inaccurate target text. Basil Hatim has distinguished two perspectives in researching ideology and translation: “1-The translation of ideology, with focus on how ideology is handled in the
text to be translated and how best to convey this in translation; [...] 2- The ideology of translation with ideology becoming a cover for what is essentially in and of translation” (Hatim, 2001, p. 126 -127). Hatim recognises two challenges in each perspective. In the first one he believes there are societal constraints stemming from the social conventions of a given social group. The other challenge relating to the second perspective is translational constraints; for example how fluent the translation is (Hatim, 2001). Hatim also highlights the importance of the notion of mediation stating: “Mediation is a facet of the translator’s work which straddles the two perspectives [...]. Translator mediation can be ideological in itself,” (Hatim, 2001, p.127)

According to Hatim, the translation of Ideology is associated with the cultural studies perspective. Cultural Studies according to Cary Nelson, Paula A. Treichler, and Lawrence Grossberg (1992) include: “the history of cultural studies, gender and sexuality, nationhood and national identity, popular culture and its audiences, science and technology, identity politics, pedagogy, the politics of aesthetics, cultural institutions, the politics of the disciplinarility, discourse and textuality, history, and global culture in a postmodern age”.

Hatim states that “A number of factors surround the act of translation and influence the conditions under which translations are made” (Hatim, 2001, p. 129). The factors that Hatim lists can be summarised in the role of the critical establishment, the kind of interventions made by translators, the economics of the exercise and the influences which translations exert on or receive from the dominant ideology (Hatim, 2001).

Hatim mentions “Expropriation”, introduced by Vladimir Maccura who “felt that to translate is to prove one’s national identity (expropriation), and that a language is capable of rendering the treasures which other languages [...] possess” (Hatim, 2001, p. 128). Then he moves on to “Mimicking target discourse” (Hatim, 2001, P. 129). To explain what he means by this, Hatim gave the example of a study on the Bengali poet Tagore’s auto- translation: “The study outlines the pitfalls of a translation in which faithfulness is exclusively shown towards the target language and culture”. The poet has apparently changed his own work through translation to match the target audience style, imagery and tone of lyric (Hatim, 2001).
Hatim brings to the surface reasons why some literary works get translated more than others. Considering the research conducted by the cultural theorist and translation scholar Donald Bruce. Bruce (1994) sought “to enquire into a familiar question of cultural politics which returns repeatedly to haunt translators and cultural historians: what factors determine whether a text will be translated or not?” (Hatim, 2002, p. 129). Bruce’s case study was Jules Valles’ (1871) literary works. He concluded that issues such as ideological marginalisation, and delegitimization of these novels could be the factors behind their exclusion. Bruce also suggested that a taste for this kind of writing was yet cultivated (Hatim, 2001).

Based on the above, Bruce “develops a working model for the analysis of the discourse of the Commune” (Hatim, 2001, p. 130). The model according to Hatim (2001) is applicable to many texts, and stresses the interactive relationship between text and context in order to produce meaning. Bruce believes that “[...] translators must first thoroughly acquaint themselves with the cultural politics surrounding an issue. Literary and cultural theory are particularly beneficial in laying the foundations for conceptually more valid translation methodologies, a trend which, according to Bruce (1994, p. 47) can be enhanced by enlisting discourse analysis (Hatim, 2001, p. 131).

In another context investigated by Maysaa Tanjour (2011), there are a number of reasons that decide on the amount and type of translated texts. She says, “There is a network of interconnected linguistic and socio-cultural norms that govern translation activity at all levels: economic, political, cultural and ideological norms”. Tanjour gives an outline of these norms but applies them to the Syrian context in relation to literary translation. So in addition to the commercial and financial factors in the sense how well the translated text is going to sell, she also adds: “Censorship is one of the cultural and ideological factors that govern literary works of Syrian authors as well as translated ones. Institutional censorship in Syria plays an important role in regarding all kinds of expression...” (2011, p. 93).

In relation to the ideology of translation, Hatim considers the feminist perspective, feminism being a kind of ideology. Feminist translators have endeavoured to make the woman visible in the literary and cultural arena. A model of feminist translation has been
introduced. Flotow (1991), a feminist translator, used a number of interventionist strategies:

1- Supplementing the source text

2- Prefacing and footnoting

3- Appropriation

The above strategies are already existing ones, but originally they were used to serve ideologies which are not necessarily feminist (Hatim, 2001). “Massadier-Kenny (1995: 57) puts forward a comprehensive scheme setting out major strategies which have been or can be adapted to advance a feminist agenda. Such a framework is useful not only for researching feminist translation issues, but also for describing the process of the translation in general” (Hatim, 2001, p. 135). This framework covers ‘author-centred’ and ‘translator-centred’ strategies and involve translation methods such as: Commentary, Recovery, Resistancy, Framing, Annotation, Parallel texts, and Collaboration.

Subsequently however, Francoise Massadier-Kenny (1997) who seems to have an alternative view and challenges the traditional distinctions within feminist thinking on translation has argued, “The use of ‘feminist’ or ‘woman’ provides an unstable point of departure for translation practice. Active translation does not depart from predetermined gender definitions but must lead to an interrogation of such gender definitions and roles” (Hatim, 2001, p.134).

Other Scholars have made the link between ideology, translation and the socio-cultural environment. Jeremy Munday (2009) states that literary translation is not only related to style: “[...] the functional conception of style developed in this book is also linked to the socio-cultural environment and ideology of which translation is a part” (Munday, 2009, p. 43). (Bassnett, 1998: 123) supports this view when she says that: “Translation never takes place in a void but always in a context”. Tanjour (2011) deduces from this viewpoint that ideology is part and parcel of the translation process right from the very beginning: “In such an environment, cultural and ideological norms seem to regulate the translation process and product starting from the very choice of which texts to translate and accommodate within the target culture system” (Tanjour, 2011, p.106). Schaffner
(2010) explains that translation is relevant to the prevailing ideologies “Translation methods are applied strategically to make target texts conform to or to challenge dominant world views. The very choice of texts to be translated or not to be translated, as the case may be, is often an ideologically motivated decision” (Schaffner, 2010, p. 107).

Mona Baker (2010) emphasises the clear link between translation, power and conflict. She notes that her research “[...] draws extensively—though not exclusively – on examples of political, armed conflict [...] . It also assumes that translation and interpreting are part of the institution of war and hence play a major role in the management of conflict—by all parties, from warmongers to peace activists” (Baker, 2010, p.1-2). Baker then goes on to explain how translation is used in the first declarations of war, and in the accompanying/relevant propaganda. She adds that modern warfare consists of more than one army and communication/coordination between these armies makes the need for translation/interpreting inevitable: “The very process of mobilizing military power then is heavily dependent on continuous acts of translation and interpreting; including – crucially - acts of translation and interpreting that allow military personnel to communicate with civilians living in the region. Propaganda leaflets dropped by US forces over Iraq in March 2003 communicated a variety of messages to Iraqi civilians and soldiers” (Baker, 2010, p. 2).

Of course, propaganda as we must have all noticed at least in the past two decades, is not exclusive to war time, but a large part of it is previous to the start of military operations themselves. People both locally and internationally need to be prepared to accept such costly action that involves pain and brutality on all sides. “Contemporary wars have to be sold to an international and not just domestic audiences, and translation is a major variable influencing the circulation and legitimation of the narratives that sustain these activities” (Baker, 2010, p.2). When the parties engaged in the conflict have decided to find channels of communication to manage the conflict or agree on a solution that will put an end to the war, translation again plays a vital role. “[...] once war is underway, attempts to broker and manage an end to the conflict typically take the form of meetings, conferences and public seminars, in addition to secret
When discussing the mediating role of translation and interpreting, Mona Baker proposes the relationship between this role and the concept of narrative. She recognizes a similarity between this concept and that of ‘discourse’ previously introduced by Foucault. She starts by explaining: “The notion of narrative used in this book overlaps to some extent with Foucault’s and Barthes ‘myths’, especially in its emphasis on the normalizing effect of publicly disseminated representations” (Baker, 2010, p. 3).

Narratives are generally defined as any account of connected events, presented to a reader or listener in a sequence of written or spoken words, or in a sequence of (moving) pictures. Narrative is defined by Mona Baker in a different context as:

- “A story that unfolds in time with a (perceived) beginning and a (projected) end;
- Populated by participants, real or imaginary, in a configured relationship to each other and to the unfolding story;
- Realised through a variety of media;
- And across texts and media: local narratives are episodes of larger narratives” (Baker, ND. p.1).

Narratives have been approached and defined in a number of ways. Fisher (1987) states: “Narration is the context for interpreting and assessing all communication-not a mode of discourse laid on by a creator’s deliberate choice but the shape of knowledge as we first apprehend it” (Fisher, 1987, p.193).

Baker however, approaches the concept of narrative from a social and communication theory perspective rather than a linguistic or a literary one. She also does not categorize the ‘narrative’ as a genre (Baker, 2010). Baker then sheds light on scientific narratives demonstrating that “scientific stories and reports are narratives in the sense that they are ultimately ‘stories’ that have a beginning, middle and end. [...] It is narrativity that turns the continuous flow of experience into a set of delineated categories that can be processed in different ways [...]” (Baker, 2010, p. 10). To reiterate this point of view,
Baker refers to Zureik (2001) who discussed the use of census counting in colonial and post-colonial societies. She explains: “Needless to say, every set of statistical figures participates in elaborating different and often competing narratives. In the context of the Middle East, for example, both Palestinians and Israelis appeal to a different set of statistical/census data ‘to garner legitimacy for their respective claims’ (2001:215)” (Baker, 2010, p.10).

Baker concludes that narrative in general including scientific narratives: “[...] systemizes experience by ordering events in relation to each other” (Baker , 2010, p.2010). Narratives even allow us “not only to relate events, but also stances and dispositions towards those events” (Baquedano-Lopez, 2001, cited in Baker, 2010 p. 10). Finally, she stresses the sensitivity of scientific narratives as they can be employed in a direct political sense due to the fact that: “[...] scientific narratives – like all narratives – are ultimately concerned with legitimizing and justifying actions and positions in the real world [...]” (Baker,2010, p.11).

Baker then discusses the ‘normalizing function of narratives’. She explains that narratives have an effect on the audience making people receive stories/messages as the realities and unquestionable facts of the world. This normalising effect brings to the mind the relationship between power and discourse previously discussed in this chapter, and how discourse is used to manage public opinion and disseminate certain opinions/stereotypes to make some ideologies prevail. Baker states: “One of the effects of narrativity is that it normalizes the accounts it projects over a period of time, so that they come to be perceived as self-evident, benign, uncontestable and non-controversial” (Baker, 2010, p.11). Baker goes on to illustrate the relation between narratives and some clichés about “‘security and terrorism’, Islamic fundamentalism’, and the so called ‘clash of civilisations’” (Baker, 2010, p.11-12).

There are thus substantive similarities between the notion of narrative and that of discourse, especially when Baker states that narratives “embody the truths of social elites and their publics” (Baker, 2010, p. 13). As mentioned in section 2.5 discourse is defined and used in this thesis from the perspective of social relations of power, and the ideology of the dominant class of the society.
2.8 Critical discourse analysis

Foucault’s view (section 2.5) to some extent contrasts to the views of the proponents of Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA), who associate the text with the underlying intentions of the author. They further make the link between discourse and ideology, and relate discourse analysis to social situations and relations within society itself. According to a number of scholars (Fairclough, Van Dijk, Wodak), discourse is fundamentally linked to the power relations in the society. It is a very important tool that has been effectively used on many occasions particularly in the modern era to exercise control and win over the perspectives of other societal groups. News, advertisements, films, cartoons and talk shows are examples of vehicles to convey and persuade people of the views of the dominant class.

Van Dijk (2003) defines CDA as follows: “Critical discourse analysis (CDA) is a type of discourse analytical research that primarily studies the way social power abuse, dominance, and inequality are enacted, reproduced, and resisted by text and talk in the social and political context. With such dissident research, critical discourse analysts take explicit position, and thus want to understand, expose, and ultimately resist social inequality” (Van Dijk, 2003, p.352).

Issues of stereotyping and the translation of stereotypes can also be fruitfully investigated using Critical Language and CDA, which of both consider the context of the language used to be crucial (Wodak, 2000; Benke 2000) and are concerned with analysing “[...] structural relationships of dominance, discrimination, power and control as manifested in language” (Wodak and Meyer, 2001, p. 2). CDA hence gives importance to the social structures and to some extent the political setting within which a text is produced. Therefore the concepts of power, history and ideology are intrinsic in the process of CDA studies.

Because CDA is mainly concerned with the underlying intentions of texts and seeks to unveil the hidden power relationships, it is very well suited to media and political texts where the relations of power “connections between language use in a society and ideological, societal or cognitive structures” (Bazzi, 2009, p.71) are frequently utilized
and even “legitimated by ideologies of powerful groups” (Wodak and Meyer, 2001, p. 3). Examining the context of the discourse in question means that we are looking at social, psychological, historical and ideological factors. As has been discussed before, stereotyping has social and psychological relevance and can also be employed to reinforce some ideological thoughts when required.

However CDA opponents have reservations which concern the probability of subjectivity of CDA as an analytical approach. Their reservations mainly involve the positioning of CDA analysts when referring to words, phrases or collocations as ideological. Widdowson (1998) has reviewed three CDA works which lay the corner-stones of critical discourse analysis: *Texts and Practices Reasings in Critical Discourse Analysis* by C.R. Caldas-Coulthard and M. Coulthard (eds), *Critical Discourse Analysis* by N. Fairclough and *Language as Ideology* by R. Hodge and G. Kress. Widdowson explains that Kress presents two concepts: presentation and transformation. While presentation is a Hallidayan term that refers to ‘semiotic abstraction’, Kress argues that different communities have different ‘representational resources’. Transformation is on the other hand “[…] the process whereby one representation impinges on another and modifies it” (Widdowson, 1998, p. 138). Although this postulated theory of language is one of semiotic change as Widdowson concludes, it does not provide an explanation to how this change is brought about: “Thus we are shown different configurations of verbal and visual features in certain newspapers and told that these necessarily represent particular subjectivities, particular ways of conceiving the world, and that these necessarily bring about a transformation of how the world is conceived by the reader” (Widdowson, 1998, p. 138).

Widdowson then adds that the proposed representational subjectivity is not that frequently immediately recognisable. Many times this subjectivity requires ‘careful structural analysis’, which is in Widdowson’s view a type of transformation that works to unveil intentions and meanings subtly embedded in the text. In Hodge and Kress’ conception, some sentences will carry representational subjectivity but others will not, and so some sentences will be transformed but others will not. Widdowson finds this problematic as it is not feasible to identify neutral sentences, and should neutral sentences be identified, it means that it is possible to have language free of representational subjectivity, which contradicts Kress’s premiss that there is no neutral
language: “There are two difficulties here. [...] In the absence of any theoretical substantiation of this new concept of transformation as converting one kind of sentence into another, there is no way of identifying a neutral sentence as distinct from a transformed one. [...] It seems a matter of descriptive convenience. Secondly, even if we were able to identify the neutral sentences, their very existence means that it is in principle, by a judicious avoidance of transformation, to produce language which is entirely free of representational subjectivity. But this contradicts the critical linguistic tenet that there is no neutral language: all of it is loaded, ‘ideologically saturated as Kress puts it (Kress, 1992 174)” (Widdowson, 1998, p. 140). Widdowson even concludes that transformations exercise power themselves, and so they may suppress or distort information particularly when they rely on a realist approach.

Widdowson also criticises what he sees as contradictions among critical analysts themselves about relating practices of production and consumption to texts. While Kress and his colleagues emphasise this point, Fairclough admits that it has not been adequately operationalized (Ibid, p. 143). Then he explains that this inadequacy is very serious because it detaches the textual from the contextual analyses and consequently ‘invalidates the critical operation’. Ultimately, Widdowson blames critical analysts for the fact that, although they mean to disclose and expose how language can be exploited, they do this from their own ideological positioning, which means they are being selective: “Fairclough, in common with his critical colleagues, sets out to expose how language is exploited in the covert insinuation of ideological influence. But they do this in careful selection and partial interpretation of whatever linguistic features suit their own ideological position and disregarding the rest” (Widdowson, 1998, p. 146).

I have addressed the above concerns by using a well-framed methodology which has built on a number of theories and approaches including the pragmatic approach, which involves contextual setting and information in the overall analysis. I have also allowed room for variation in ideologies and stereotypes, minimising the possibility of bias in terms of ideology or positioning. It should be noted as well that Widdowson’s criticism was written in 1998. Since then critical analysts have further developed the theory of CDA addressing initial deficiencies. However, a minimal degree of subjectivity is unavoidable.
The CDA approach employs concepts such as intertextuality and interdiscursivity; CDA makes use of the textual aspect of the text to derive results. Many CDA scholars have contributed to the linguistic analysis of discourse. A prominent name is M.A.K. Halliday who developed Systemic Functional Linguistics based on social semiotics, hence promoting the social-cultural meaning of the sign and building on Saussure’s structuralist approach.

The various methods of CDA aim at rendering their theoretical claims into analytical tools. Figures like Siegfried Jager, Norman Fairclough and Ruth Wodak have viewed CDA from the perspective of Society and Power. Basing himself on socio-cognitive theory, Van Dijk defines discourse as a “communicative event”. He understands linguistics in a broad structural-functional sense and argues that “CDA should be based on a sound theory of context” (Wodak and Meyer, 2001, p. 21).

2.9 CDA approaches

In the previous sections, an account of the notion of discourse was given, explaining in what sense it is related to CDA, and hence accommodating the ideological dimension in examining discourse.

Many scholars have approached CDA from various angles. Two major but also general categories can be identified: contextual and textual analysis of the text. Contextual analysis refers to the analysis of the relationship between the text and its surrounding circumstances, while textual analysis is concerned with the formal linguistics of the text.

Some linguistic theories have made the link between the text itself and other influential factors be they cultural, ideological or personal. A major theory that researchers have frequently built on when looking at discoursal issues is Michael Halliday’s Systemic Functional Linguistics. Halliday considers language as a communication system and focuses on what language is used for. He identifies three major metafunctions of language/grammar (Halliday 1994; Halliday & Matthiessen 2004) namely, the ideational, interpersonal, and textual metafunctions. The ideational metafunction is concerned with describing or presenting realities, including how society functions, and how people work together. It could also describe how we feel or what we regard as true or false. In short it is concerned with all aspects of human experience. The interpersonal
metafunction is concerned with relationships and types of affiliation in those relationships (authority, friendliness, hostility etc.). The textual metafunction describes the relations between linguistic units: how linguistic elements fit together to form an integrated text. All the three metafunctions are reflected in a system network, which specifies all the meaning potentials; or the centrality of “[...] the ideas of system and choice” (Hoigilt, 2011, p.14). Systemicists in general view language as a tool for making meaning. Halliday believes that the choices that we make affect the meaning of our message. “A system network is a theory of language as a choice. It represents a language or any part of a language, as a resource for making meaning by choosing. Each choice point in the network specifies (1) an environment, consisting of choices already made, and (2) a set of possibilities of which one is (to be) chosen; (1) and (2) taken together constitute a ‘system’ in this technical sense” (Halliday, 1985, p. Xxvii).

Systemic Functional Linguistics has many applications, but no matter what application is at hand, the common focus of all of them when dealing with texts is “their relation to the cultural and social context in which they are negotiated” (Eggins, 1994, p. 1). This focus has made Systemic Functional Linguistics a point of departure for many linguists investigating discourse analysis.

Systemic Functional Linguists pose questions such as: how do people use language? and how is language structured for use? Then another set of questions is proposed like: how do people make the distinction between types of meaning? and how are texts structured and organised to make meaning? Thus the perspective from which systemic linguistics sees language is a semantic one. (Eggins, 1994). Since Systemic Functional Linguistics views language as a system of choices where a chosen word acquires its meaning from being in contrast with another possible choice of a word, this allows a semiotic interpretation of this system of choices. “This semiotic interpretation of the system of language allows us to consider the appropriacy or inappropriacy of different linguistic choices in relation to their contexts of use, and to view language as a resource which we use by choosing to make meanings in contexts” (Eggins, 1994, p. 3).
2.9.1 The Semiotic Approach

The main relationship between semiotics and language is that language is considered a semiotic system, i.e. language is considered as a system of signs. A simple simile is that of traffic lights where each of the signs has a meaning and entails a specific action. In linguistic terms meaning = content encoded as expression = realisation.

The father of semiotics is the Swiss linguist Ferdinand de Saussure who envisaged a model of the sign that formed the base for further studies in this domain. He used the terms *signifié* (signified) = content and *signifiant* (signifier) = expression (Saussure, 1959 – 1966). The signifier and the signified are linked through encoding or realisation.

According to (Eggins, 1994) the traffic lights example illustrates that “semiotic systems are established by social convention” (Eggins, 1994, p. 15), and she builds this assumption on Saussure’s argument that the fusion between the two sides of the sign is arbitrary. In other words, another colour could have been chosen other than red to mean ‘stop’, but it is social consensus that granted this expression its meaning or content.

This notion can then be applied in a more detailed way when we make choices of words that reflect the ideational/experiential function or the interpersonal function and lastly the textual one:

> The intensity of the civil war in Syria, combined with the continued upheavals in Iraq and the endemic instability of Lebanese politics, has naturally led to speculation that the famously “artificial” borders in the eastern Arab world, drawn by Britain and France in the aftermath of the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, are on their last legs.

In the above example, the word ‘artificial’ was chosen to describe the type of borders separating Arab countries when we had other choices (‘unnatural’, ‘contrived’). ‘Artificial’ is representing and describing facts. In another example the choice of the word could indicate a relationship of power as the example below shows:
Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu blasted Palestinian President Mahmoud’s Abbas on Sunday after Abbas released a special message condemning the Holocaust as one of the most "heinous" crimes against humanity in modern history.

The word ‘blasted’ here indicated the upper hand and an attitude of superiority on the Israeli side towards the Palestinian Authority. Another word which does not convey this attitude could have been chosen, e.g. ‘criticised’.

The two examples above draw attention to the lexical choices we make in language and how they are part of a semiotic system where “[...] words encode meaningful oppositions, and that the process of choosing a lexical item is a semiotic process” (Eggins, 1994, p. 18).

2.9.2 Rhetorics

Jacob Hoigilt (2011) has used Systemic Functional Linguistics, and particularly the interpersonal and ideational metafunctions, to explain what he calls ‘Islamic Rhetoric’. He found that “Functional Grammar [i.e. Systemic Functional Linguistics] offers a way of conceptualizing the relations between the lexico-grammatical choices we make and the meanings we thus produce” (Hoigilt, 2011, p.15). He explains that how each author construes himself under the interpersonal domain and draws on the Aristotalian categories of ethos, pathos and logos in realising the rhetorical potential of texts.

First Hoigilt builds on Ken Hyland’s notion of ‘metadiscourse’, which is, as he further explains: “[...] a cover term for all the linguistic choices that serve some purpose in the relation between writer and reader in texts” (Hyland, 2005; cited in Hoigilt, 2011, p.19).

Hoigilt works on the interpersonal aspect, identifying two main categories: personal reference or pronoun, and mood choice. Pronoun use helps in working out relations of respect and distance and also the how a writer can emphasise his own person in the text, and finally as a means to make the text interactional. Mood (part of Halliday’s schema of speech functions: offer, command, statement and question) helps in working out the reader’s/writer’s different roles according to which choices are made within the system.
of mood, and more specifically those of giving and demanding, stating and asking. These choices according to Hoigilt are a “natural part of any text; they often contribute to placing it in a certain genre, such as political speech or scientific text book” (Hoigilt, 2011, p.22). Hoigilt further explains that expository texts tend to feature more declarative clauses while “Horatory discourse” is likely to feature more imperative language. Then, Hoigilt looks at modality in interpersonal analysis, illustrating this in the degrees of commitment to “the truth value of commitment or to the imperative force of command” (Hoigilt, 2011, p.22). He also underlines the choices of where the important information is placed in the clause and the “rhetorical implication” this placement has.

The ideational aspect which “[...] represents experience through the system of transitivity” (Hoigilt, 2011, p. 23) includes a number of processes: material process, relational process and attributive process. Halliday states: “The clause is also a mode of reflection, of imposing order on the endless variation and flow of events [...] The transitivity system construes the world of experience into manageable sets of process types” (Halliday, 2004, p.170). Hoigilt uses this framework to clarify the ideological relation of Islamic discourse to the choices of actors and participants.

From a different theoretical approach, Hoigilt’s account can be looked at in terms of the contextual dimension of texts analysis. This contextual dimension is related, as Van Dijk (1998) describes it, to the socio-cognitive component and concerned with the subjectivity of experiences, evaluative beliefs, knowledge, attitudes, truth criteria, common sense, the cognitive construction of groups, the group’s identity and the legitimation of power by social and ideological institutions.

The textual dimension is more concerned with the linguistic aspect of the text. As Samia Bazzi (2009, p. 75) states, “[...] the analyst employs pragmatic, stylistic and rhetorical studies. Hence, textual descriptions should focus upon lexical selection, in what way style can be derogatory, syntactic structures (e.g. agency and passivization), conditional relations between clauses relecting cause and effect, presuppositions, selective or emotive quoting, thematic structuring, metaphors, and speech acts.”
2.10 Conclusion

The chapter has provided the theoretical framework for the analytical tool to be used in this research study. It has given an overview of key concepts: ideology, stereotyping and discourse, and established the relationship between these concepts to legitimise the use of media examples that have a blend of stereotypical as well as ideological elements. Moreover, it has demonstrated the connection between translation and ideology/stereotyping and justified the rationale for choosing Critical Discourse Analysis as the theoretical background for this research.
Chapter 3

3.1 Introduction:
The previous chapter has discussed the conceptions of ideology, stereotyping and discourse. It has also elucidated the link between these various conceptions and then the relationship between ideology and translation was discussed. The chapter finally gave an overview of Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA). It is now appropriate to embark on explaining the particular approach to be used in this research as the tool for data analysis.
The chapter consists of four sections (3.2-3.4) and a conclusion (3.5). Section 3.2 provides an overview of the Discourse-Historical Approach (DHA) in addition to a review of four critical discourse analytical approaches which influenced the formation of DHA. The section later investigates the postulated strategy of analysis and provides a thorough explanation of the five strategies of analysis in three sub-sections. Section 3.3 then presents the notions of text and genre in order to explicate how these notions are utilized in DHA and how they support the analytical levels of the Discourse-Historical Approach. Section 3.4 wraps up the categories of analysis which will be applied in chapter 5 in a structured manner.

3.2 Discourse-Historical Approach, an overview:
This research looks into current socio-political issues; hence it is appropriate to use Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) because CDA is an analytical tool designed for social research and relates text and discourse to social processes, conventions and social change to provide a deeper and more comprehensive analysis of texts. Within the general perspective of CDA, a number of more specific approaches have been developed. In the following, I will introduce the Discourse-Historical Approach (DHA) which will later be used as the analysis tool for the thesis data.

Ruth Wodak and other CDA scholars, such as Martin Reisigl and Michael Meyer, have proposed the Discourse-Historical Approach, implementing it in a number of studies. They used this approach particularly to trace anti-Semitic words, phrases, sentences or even texts in what they call ‘racist discourse’ (1987-1993).
The Discourse Historical Approach is committed to critical discourse analysis and adheres to critical theory. However, it “[...] considers discourse analysis not just to be a method of language analysis, but a multidimensional project incorporating theory, methods, methodology and empirically based research practices that yield concrete social applications” (Reisigl, 2018, p. 48).

The approach also adopts the principle of ‘triangulation’, which as explained by Wodak (2001) means: “[...] to work with different approaches, multimethodically and on the basis of a variety of empirical data as well as background information” (Wodak, 2001, p. 65). Hence, the discourse-historical approach relies heavily on integrating a significant amount of knowledge about the historical, political and social background of the discursive practice (utterance) in question.

Before they started introducing the approach itself, they reviewed four discourse analytical approaches to racism. They began with Uta Quasthoff, who made an analysis of social prejudices though her analysis did not exceed the sentence level. In her work, Quasthoff defines the term ‘stereotype’ (cf. also the discussion in section 2.3) as “the verbal expression of a certain conviction or belief directed towards a social group or an individual as a member of the social group”. Quasthoff elaborates on the meaning of stereotype: “The stereotype is typically an element of common knowledge, shared to a high degree in a particular culture” (Quasthoff, 1987, p. 786). She had previously explained that the stereotype “[...] takes the logical form of a judgement that attributes or denies in an oversimplified and generalising manner, and with an emotionally slanted tendency, particular qualities or behavioural patterns to a certain class of persons” (Quasthoff, 1973, cited in Reisigl and Wodak, 2001, p. 19).

Quasthoff groups stereotypical expressions in four categories according to directness.

1- Analytical expressions: These are the basic form of all stereotypes and claim to tell the truth.

2- Modified statements: This is where the stereotypical expression uses certain signals like the subjunctive or interrogative.
3- Directly expressed stereotypes: These are utterances where the speaker refers to himself/herself by means of personal reference ('I') and a verb of believing or thinking.

4- Text linguistics: Here the stereotype is expressed implicitly and the interpretation of the stereotype “[…] relies on knowledge of context and transcends the sentence level” (Reisigl and Wodak, 2001, p. 21).

The second analytical approach is the socio-cognitive discourse analytical approach developed by Van Dijk. According to Van Dijk,

prejudice is not merely a characteristic of individual beliefs or emotions about social groups, but a shared form of social representation in group members, acquired during processes of socialisation transformed and enacted in social communication and interaction. Such ethnic attitudes have social functions, e.g. to protect the interests of the ingroup. Their cognitive structures and the strategies of their use reflect these social functions (Van Dijk, 1984, p. 13).

Van Dijk’s model links the generation of prejudice to discursive units larger than the sentence. He focuses on the rationalisation of discriminatory attitudes towards minorities. Van Dijk uses a multidisciplinary approach which values the study of cognition in the critical analysis of discourse, interaction and communication. He differentiates between three types of memories:

1- Semantic memory. Here the collective shared beliefs of a society are stored and are consequently organised as attitudes (group schemata).

2- Episodic memory. This retains personal or narrated experiences and events as well as patterns abstracted from these experiences.

3- The control system. “In 1998 Van Dijk conceptualises the third structure of long-term memory, the control system. This memory is responsible for linking “communicative aims and interests (e.g. persuasion) with the situational and individual social conditions” (Reisigl and Wodak, 2001, p. 23).
A third approach is that of Discourse Strands and collective symbols. The main figures in this approach are Siegfried and Margret Jager and the Duisburg group. The Duisburg group follows and extends the research of Van Dijk. Their research technique includes interviewing different groups of people to elicit their attitudes towards ‘foreigners’ and ‘Jews’. Their methods lead people to tell their stories in depth. The group studied everyday racism and conducted media analysis of a number of German newspapers.

Margret and Siegfred Jager adopt the same theoretical and methodological framework. However, a major interest of Margret Jager, which is not found in the other writers, is the relationship between culturalist racism or ethnicism and the discourse about gender inequality. She conducted interviews about sexism and the attitudes of male/female foreigners towards the host society and towards each other.

The major part of the studies conducted by the Duisburg group was about ‘Collective Symbols’, which are “designated as ‘cultural stereotypes in the form of metaphorical and cultural synecdochic symbols that are immediately understood by the members of the same speech community’” (Link 1982, 1988, 1990 and 1992 cited in Reisigl and Wodak, 2001, p. 26). For example in Germany, images of natural disasters like ships sinking or avalanches represent immigration as a cause of social and national problems. Moreover, the headscarf also serves a collective symbol that is interpreted in a number of ways; “[...] the reading as a symbol of sexist suppression of Islamic women, as a symbol of the acceptance of this male suppression by the suppressed, and, in general, as a symbol of the cultural and religious difference of Moslems” (Reisigl and Wodak, 2001, p. 26).

The Duisburg researchers rely on Michael Foucault’s theory of power and discourse. They also use elements from Van Dijk’s sociocognitive model. They integrate the social, political and historical contexts in their analysis in a similar fashion to the Discourse-Historical Approach. The Duisburg group reiterate the concept of power and discourse when they argue that the group in power employs collective symbols to “stigmatise, marginalise, and exclude minority groups” (Reisigl and Wodak, 2001, p. 27). In other words, racism is tied to power and hegemony. The methodology adopted by the group is qualitative as they say it gives more accurate results, and a sample of discourse studied
in a precise and differentiated manner would shed light into the interdiscourse (i.e. the implicit or explicit relations that a discourse has to other discourses). On the other hand, quantitative analysis, they say, is only necessary in particular cases.

The Loughborough group, namely the sociopsychologists, Margret Wetherell and Jonathan Potter (1992), oppose sociocognitive approaches that give priority to the cognitive dimension in the analysis of racism and tend to “universalise the conditions for racism” (Reisigl & Wodak, 2001, p. 28). They argue from a constructivist point of view that attitudes and stereotypes are not simply mediated via cognition and reject social identity theory (the perceived membership of a relevant social group), and the social cognition approach. They stress that racist discourse is not static and homogeneous but dynamic and contradictory and it is also context-dependent, in a similar manner to the Duisburg group and the discourse-historical approach. Their methodology relied on interviewing people from New Zealand and they used social-psychological, ethnographic and post-structuralist perspectives for the analysis of these interviews. Accordingly, Wetherell and Potter integrate contextual information in their analysis of racist practices and representations. In their book Mapping the Language of Racism, they state: “We are not wanting to argue that racism is a simple matter of linguistic practice. Investigations of racism must also focus on institutional practices, on discriminatory actions and on social structures and social divisions. But the study of these things is intertwined with the study of discourse. Our emphasis will be on the ways in which a society gives voice to racism and how forms of discourse institute, solidify, change, create and reproduce social formations” (Wetherell and Potter, 1992, p. 3).

The authors developed the notion of ‘interpretative repertoire’, which is mostly the counterpart of the interdiscourse of the Duisburg school except that the Duisburg school focuses on metaphors and symbols while the Loughborough school instead focuses on narratives and argumentation.

In addition to the above-mentioned four approaches the Discourse Historical Approach in recent years has been influenced by the tradition of Hallidayan systemic functional linguistics (by Fairclough, Fowler, Hodge and Kress) as well as by classical and new rhetoric and argumentation theory (Toulmin, Perelman, Kopperschmidt, and others).
As mentioned above, the research will rely more specifically on the Discourse Historical Approach postulated by Wodak et al. This approach tries to incorporate as much available knowledge as possible about the historical sources and the background of the social and political context in which discursive practices are embedded. “One of the most salient distinguishing features of the discourse-historical approach is its endeavour to work with different approaches, multimethodically and on the basis of variety of empirical data as well as background information (Wodak and Meyer, 2001, p. 65). It is also highlighted that a mutual influence exists between, situational, institutional and social settings and discourses: “[…] discourse influences social and political processes and actions” (Wodak and Meyer, 2001, p. 66). On the other hand, institutional, political and social settings contribute to shaping discourse. The approach integrates theory and methodology in a selective manner to help investigate the discourse in question.

Wodak and Reisigl (2009) develop a five-question strategy of analysis:

1- How are persons, objects, phenomena/events, process and actions named? (nomination)
2- What characteristics, qualities and features are attributed to social actors, objects, phenomena/events and processes? (predication)
3- What arguments are employed in the discourse in question? (argumentation)
4- From what perspective are these nominations, attributions and arguments expressed? (perspectivation)
5- Are the respective utterances articulated overtly; are they mitigated or intensified? (mitigation and intensification)

Since all of these strategies refer to positive self-representation and negative other-representation, then naturally they involve stereotyping or evaluative statements. For a better understanding of the above strategies, they will be further described here below, where they will be grouped into three subgroups: 1. Reference and Predication, 2, Argumentation, and 3. Perspectivation and Framing, Mitigation and Intensification:
3.2.1 Reference and Predication

Both are concerned with constructing and representing social actors, which is the simplest form of linguistic and rhetorical discrimination:

**Reference**

This involves how persons are named and referred to linguistically. This can be done:

1- By membership categories devices, including reference by tropes, biological, naturalising and depersonalising metaphors and metonymies and synecdoches.
2- By naming social actors derogatorily.
3- By metaphorical (figurative or the use of metaphor/metaphorical in the broad sense) references. These are very common: they are based on a referential identification procedure which is tropologically described as ‘synecdochisation’. A specific feature, trait or characteristic is selectively pushed to the fore as a ‘part for the whole’, as a representative depicter. Because of the descriptive quality of such referential categorisation, linguistic identification is already related to strategic predication and thus very often involves evaluation.

The main referential strategies are categorised by Van Leeuwen (1993 and 1996) as: exclusion, inclusion, specification, genericisation, assimilation, collectivisation, aggregation, impersonalisation, abstraction and objectivation.

**Predication**

1- What traits, characteristics, qualities and features are attributed to particular people or groups. Once the social actors as groups or individuals are constructed or identified, they are provided with predications.
2- Predicational strategies may be realised as stereotypical, evaluative attributions of negative and positive traits in the linguistic form of implicit or explicit predicates. Predication strategies cannot be neatly separated from nomination strategies. Moreover, in a certain sense, some of the referential strategies can be considered to be specific forms of predicational strategies, because the pure
referential identification very often already involves a denotatively as well as connotatively more or less deprecatory or appreciative labelling of social actors.

3- Predication is a very basic process and result of linguistically assigning qualities to persons, animals, objects, events and social phenomena. Through predication, persons and things are specified and characterised with respect to quality, quantity, space, time, etc.

4- Predicational strategies are mainly realised by specific forms of reference (based on explicit denotation as well as on implicit connotation). They can also be realised through the following:

   a) attributes in the form of adjectives,
   b) appositions,
   c) prepositional phrases,
   d) relative clauses,
   e) conjunctional clauses,
   f) infinitive clauses,
   g) participial clauses or groups
   h) predicates or predicative nouns/adjectives/pronouns
   i) collocations
   j) explicit comparisons, involving similes, metaphors and other rhetorical figures, such as metonymies, hyperbole, litotes, euphemism, allusion, evocations, presuppositions/implications, flag words (e.g. ‘multiculturalism’), stigma words (racism).

Tropes and Reference and Predication (the tropological Construction and Discrimination of Ingroups and Outgroups)

Tropes like metonymies, synecdoches and metaphors are related both to reference and predication, as they help in creating homogeneity and generalisation. These tropes can be defined as follows.
**Synechdoche**: a substitution of part for whole,

**Metonymy**: There are four types corresponding to the four causes: substitution of cause for effect or effect for cause, proper name for one of its qualities or vice versa..

**Metaphor**: changing a word from its literal meaning to one not properly applicable but analogous to it; assertion of identity rather than, as with simile, likeness.

**Personification**: An animal or an inanimate object is represented as having human attributes and addressed or made to speak as if it were human” (Lanham, 1991, pp. 100-148).

The term “foreigner” is very often used as a synecdoche (part for a whole), where the seemingly all-inclusive nomination actually refers only selectively to a very specific groups of persons.

Metonymies and synecdoches can achieve the following discursive effects: de-individualisation, referential absorption, generalising and selective foregrounding of common particularities. The previous effects can also be common particularities of metaphors.

Synecdoches are substitutions within one and the same field of reference: a term is replaced by another term, the extension of which is either semantically wider or semantically narrower than the non-synecdoche to which it corresponds.

a. Particularising synecdoche (part standing for a whole) or collective singular (singular stands for the plural), e.g. ‘foreigner’, ‘Jew’, ‘Muslim’;

b. Generalising synecdoche (whole for part);

Metonymies are substitutions involving two semantically (and materially or cognitively) adjacent fields of reference. The name of the referent is replaced by the name of another referent which semantically (abstractly or concretely) adjoins the referent of the replaced name. This may be any one of the following:
a. The cause by the product
b. The user of an object by an object
c. The person by the place
d. The person by the building in which the person is
e. The action or event by the place
f. The country or state by the persons living in this country
g. The persons by the time
h. The representatives of an institution by the institution
i. The action or events by the institution connected with these actions or events.

According to Reisigl and Wodak, “metonymies enable the speaker to conjure away responsible, involved or affected actors (whether victims or perpetrators), or keep them in the semantic background” (Reisigl and Wodak, 2001, p. 58).

Metaphors can be used largely as ‘collective symbols. See section 3.1.

Personifications vitalise abstract entities, phenomena, ideas and imaginations. Their apparent concreteness and vividness often invite hearers or readers to identify or feel solidarity with the personified entity. They play a decisive role in animating imagined ‘collective subjects’ as for example races, nations, ethnicities.

Fallacious generalisations can be suggestively implied by the frequent referential foregrounding of specific features or traits. (Reisigl and Wodak, 2001, pp. 56-59).

3.2.2 Argumentation
How do racist, ethnicist and nationalist prejudices come into one’s mind? From a linguistic and rhetorical point of view, the answer to this is, by persuasion. According to Reisigl and Wodak (2001, p.70-71), there are rules for rational disputes and constructive arguing that allow for characterising and discerning reasonableness in critical discussions. These rules are:

1- Freedom to argue
2- Obligation to give reasons
3- Correct reference to previous discourse by the antagonist
4- Obligation to matter-of-factness
5- Correct reference to implicit premises
6- Respect for shared starting points
7- Use of plausible arguments and schemes of argumentation
8- Logical validity (the arguments used must be validated by the explicitisation of one or more unexpressed premises)
9- Acceptance of the result of the discussion
10- Clarity of expression and correct interpretation

There are a number of pragmatic fallacies serving the justification of discrimination:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Fallacy</th>
<th>The rule(s) it violates</th>
<th>Example</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Threatening to use force against the antagonist</td>
<td>Rule 1 and rule 4</td>
<td>Al Zawahri threatened to use force against The Russians and Western crusaders and also against the Shi’a troops in Syria. The US threatened to apply sanctions against Iran</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Verbal attack on the antagonist’s personality and character</td>
<td>Rule 4</td>
<td>Erdogan slams Assad for killing dozens everyday (Reuters, 10 April, 2012)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unjustifiably appealing for compassion</td>
<td>Rule 4</td>
<td>‘The voters perfectly know that we, the Austrian Freedom Party, are the real victims of the policy of exclusion’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pathetic fallacy</td>
<td>Rule 4</td>
<td>In a meeting with Norwegian PM, Netanayhu says radical Islam is “a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a specific social group instead of relevant arguments.</td>
<td>threat to our common civilization” (Jerusalem Post)</td>
<td></td>
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<td>---</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| **Appeal to ignorance**  
This means that a standpoint, argument or thesis is to be regarded as true if it has not been refuted. Conversely, if the argument has been defended weakly one concludes that the contrary standpoint is true. | Rule 9  
Israel, the only democracy and tolerant society in the Middle East, is surrounded by Muslim states that have sworn to destroy it and have conducted a genocidal propaganda campaign against the Jews, promising to "finish the job that Hitler started." A global wave of Jew-hatred, fomented by Muslim propaganda and left-wing anti-Semitism, has spread through Europe and the United Nations and made Israel a pariah nation. (Horowitz, 2009). |
| **Misplaced appeal to deep respect and reverence for authorities or in falsely parading once own qualities** | Rule 4 and rule 7  
“Our great people... The valiant men of our Armed forces. On previous occasions, we have said that our view of our history in Iraq, which is also our view of our history as a nation, is that it is tantamount to faith. This is because history, to our nation and people, is not merely a register of contextual activities. |
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Fallacy</strong></th>
<th><strong>Rule</strong></th>
<th><strong>Example</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Straw-man fallacy</strong>&lt;br&gt;This amounts to twisting somebody’s words, to presenting a distorted picture of the antagonist’s standpoint in order to be able to refute it.</td>
<td>Rule 3 and Rule 5</td>
<td>&quot;The comparison drawn in the words of the deputy chief of staff regarding events which characterised Nazi Germany 80 years ago is outrageous,&quot; he said. &lt;br&gt;&quot;They do injustice to Israeli society and cause a belittling of the Holocaust&quot; (BBC, 8/05/2016).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Confusingly considering events occurring earlier in time as the causes of events happening later</strong></td>
<td>Rule 7</td>
<td>Increase in unemployment rates in the UK is the consequence of the growing number of immigrants.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Begging the question</strong>&lt;br&gt;This means that what is controversial and in question is presupposed as the starting point</td>
<td>Rule 6</td>
<td>• Palestinians are attacking settlers in the West Bank.&lt;br&gt;• Immigrants are a burden on the economy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Rigged question</strong>&lt;br&gt;This is committed when one manipulatively asks</td>
<td>Rule 6</td>
<td>“When will the Ministry of Interior finally stop favouring</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fallacies</td>
<td>Rules</td>
<td>Examples</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
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<td>--------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Questions containing one or more presuppositions that are open to discussion</td>
<td>Rule 3 and Rule 4</td>
<td>the foreigners over the nationals”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ignoring counter-proof or counter-argument</td>
<td>Rule 10</td>
<td>Israel has the right to protect itself</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ambiguity, equivocation, amphibole or lack of clarity</td>
<td>Rule 4</td>
<td>The interpretation of some clauses of the UN resolutions concerning The Israel/Palestine question.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The fallacy of hasty generalisation</td>
<td>Rule 2</td>
<td>The majority of Austrians are against immigration.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unfavourable light is cast on a thesis by pointing out its possible consequences, without rightness of the thesis itself being disputed</td>
<td>Rule 7</td>
<td>Removing Assad means the danger of Islamist extremists ruling Syria.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The non sequitur. It consists of argumentatively tying arguments to a conclusion that would be correct but where the connection is false, for the conclusion does not follow from arguments.</td>
<td></td>
<td>The Arab Spring is a plot to cause chaos and spread extremism.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The different forms of social exclusion and discrimination can also be discussed by means of *topoi*. These “[...] are the content-related warrants or ‘conclusion rules’ that connect the argument or arguments with the conclusion, the claim. As such, they justify the transition from the argument or arguments to the conclusion” (Kienpointner, 1992, p. 194). Reisigl and Wodak warn that “[...] discourse analysts should always keep in mind that the lines between more-or-less plausible argumentation and fallacies cannot be drawn clearly in any case, especially where prejudiced predications are part of argumentation schemes” (Reisgil and Wodak, 2001, p. 75).

The analysis of typical content related argument schemes used in argumentation for and against discrimination can be done against the background of the following list of topoi.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Topos</th>
<th>Example</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Topos of advantage and usefulness</td>
<td>Usefulness of guest workers for a national economy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>If an action under a specific relevant point of view will be useful, then one should perform it. Sub-types: to the advantage of all, to the advantage of us, to the advantage of them.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**Topos of uselessness/disadvantage**
This is a specific causal argumentation scheme which relies on the conditional

| If we allow immigration, our jobs will be at risk. |

---

**Topos of definition or topos of name interpretation**

The euphemistic term ‘guest worker’ implies that these workers will or have to return back. It could otherwise imply that they will be treated with hospitality.

| If too many immigrants or refugees enter the country, the native population will not be able to cope with the situation and will become hostile to foreigners. |

---

**Topos of danger and topos of threat**
If a political action or decision bears specific dangerous, threatening consequences, one should not do it.
Subtype: topos of threat and racism
This argumentation scheme could lead to a victim-victimiser reversal

| Arbitrary detention does not conform with human rights. |

---

**Topos of humanitarianism**
If a political action or decision does or does not conform with human rights and humanitarian values, one should or should not do it.

| As far as social security is concerned, workers should be treated equally since they are making the same social security payment. |

---

**Topos of justice**
This is based on the principle and claim of equal rights for all.
### Topos of responsibility
This occurs when a state or group of persons is responsible for the emergence of specific problems, it or they should act to find solutions to these problems.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The government is held responsible for unemployment and required to reduce the quota of immigrants.</th>
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</table>

### Topos of burdening or weighing down
This is a specific causal topos (a topos of sequence) which means if a person, an institution or a country is burdened by a problem, one should act to diminish these burdens.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The boat is full/overcrowded.</th>
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### Topos of finances
If a specific situation or action costs a lot of money or causes a loss of revenue, one should perform actions that diminish the costs or help to avoid the loss (close to topos of burdening).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Implicitly used by the head of Upper Austria (Jozef Ratzenbock), when he argued against the accommodation of Romanian refugees.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

### Topos of reality
This can be paraphrased as follows: because reality is as it is, a specific action/decision should be performed or made.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>A general example would be: social, economic and political realities have changed and the Asylum Act does not fit anymore. Therefore, the law must also be changed.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

### Topos of numbers
If the numbers prove a specific topos, a specific action should be performed/not performed. This topos can

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>In a letter addressed to a student who asked Michael Häupl (the Mayor of Vienna) who enquired about his right to vote: ‘The reason for</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
become fallacious if it is related to incorrectly presumed majorities that are not verified empirically. It can be combined with the pathetic fallacy.

the fact that there is no general right to vote for foreigners in these parts is that an extraordinarily large majority of the Austrians are against it'.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Topos of law or topos of right.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>If a law or an otherwise codified norm prescribes or forbids a specific politico-administrative action, the action has to be performed or omitted. It can be considered a specific form of the topos of authority.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The use of this topos is exemplified in rejections of applications for residence permits.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>During the Austrian Asylum debate in April 1991, the FPÖ representative, Alois Huber argued against ‘the mixture of races’ by appealing to religious authorities. Which he used as an argument against immigration.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Topos of authority</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>X is right then X has to be done or X has to be omitted because A = an authority. Of course this topos is not easily distinguishable from the fallacy called argumentum ad verecundiam (misplaced appeal to reverence and respect.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>To compare the leader of the Austrian FPÖ, Jörg Haidar, with Hitler, is often an undifferentiated and counter-productive hyperbole.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>History teaches that specific actions have specific consequences, one should perform or omit a specific action in a specific situation (allegedly) comparable with the historical</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
example referred to. This means that we have learned from the past and so we will not repeat the same mistakes. This could lead to trivialising and playing down horrendous crimes committed in the past. This specific topos backgrounds the victims afflicted by this wrongful act. Topoi of history are also used to warn of a repetition of the past.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Topos of culture</th>
<th>This topos is employed by Haider in combination with the <em>topos of danger</em> on 16 December 1992: ‘The greatest damage that one can do to a people is to put its identity, its cultural heritage, and the opportunities of it youth’. There is a lot of discourse about the threat of Islamic culture to Europe specially after the Syrian crisis and the fleeing of millions of Syrians to neighbouring countries and Europe.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Topos of abuse</strong></td>
<td>If a right or an offer for help is abused, the right should be changed or the offer for help should be withdrawn or measures against the abuse should be taken.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Topos of culture</strong></td>
<td>Frequently used by right wing politicians to restrict immigration or asylum policy.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The example of ‘guest worker as well as the naturalising metaphor ‘flood of immigrants’ which implicitly carries two conclusion rules (if something is a flood, then it is dangerous and threatening, and if it is dangerous and threatening, then something must be done about it) bring to our minds the relationship between argumentation and referential strategies.

3.2.3 Perspectivation and framing, mitigation and intensification

Perspectivation, framing and discourse representation relate to the fact that “[…] speakers express their involvement in discourse and position their point of view in the discursive flux: for example, in the reporting, description, narration and quotation of discriminatory events or utterances […]” (Wodak and Reisigl, 2001, p. 81).

‘Intensifying’ and ‘mitigation’ (Wodak and Reisigl 2001; Wodak and Meyer 2002) mean “qualifying and modifying the epistemic status of the proposition”. They also affect the degree of certainty in addition to “the persuasive impact on the hearers and readers. They either intensify or mitigate the illocutionary force of racist, antisemitic, nationalist or ethnicist utterances” (Wodak and Reisigl, 2001, p. 81).

Wodak and Reisigl have built their involvement and detachment model on Erving Goffman’s concepts of ‘participation framework’, ‘frame’ and ‘footing’ (1974). Goffman (1974) uses the term ‘keying’: “I refer here to the set of conventions by which a given activity, one already meaningful in terms of some primary framework, is transformed into something patterned on this activity but seen by the participants to be something quite else. The process of transcription can be called keying” (Goffman, 1974, p. 43-44).

A participation framework as Goffman describes it, involves the fact that “When a word is spoken, all those who happen to be in perceptual range of the event will have some sort of participation status relative to it. The codification of these various positions and the normative specification of appropriate conduct within each provide an essential background for interaction analysis – whether (I presume) in our own society or any other” (Goffman, 1981, p. 3). A participation framework involves the following (cf. Wodak and Reisigl, 2001, p. 81):
1- Animator: the person who produces an utterance (tells the story)
2- Author: the person who creates an utterance
3- Figure: the person portrayed through the utterance (protagonist)
4- Principal: the person responsible for the utterance and committed to what is said

These four statuses can fall on one person, in which situation they produce a case of narrative.

Frames are conceptualised as organisational and interactional principles by which situations are defined and sustained as experiences (Goffman, 1974). Wine (2008, p.1) describes frames as follows: “Frames are mental structures that shape the way we see the world”. One can distinguish different frames:

a) Frames of deception
b) Frames of playing
c) Frames of joking
d) Frames of dreaming
e) Frames of contest and fight
f) Frames of celebration
g) Frames of testing and rehearsal
h) Frames of demonstration or performance
i) Frames of participatory observation

“Framing capabilities: cues distinguishing special readings to apply across strips of bracketed communication, recasting otherwise conventional sense, as in making ironic aside, quoting another, joking, and so forth [...]” Goffman, 1981, pp.14-15).

Footing is the way in which writers or speakers arrange themselves and their relationship to others. “Footing relates to the alignments we take up to ourselves and the others present as expressed in the way we manage the production or reception of an utterance” (Goffman, 1981, p. 128).

Footing changes are also called conversational shifts. Examples of these shifts:
1- Direct speech
2- Selection of the recipient
3- Interjections
4- Repetitions
5- Personal directness or involvement
6- Emphasis
7- Separation of topic
8- Discourse type (lecture, discussion)

Footing and framing are closely connected with the speaker’s or writer’s involvement or distance. Strategies of involvement aim at two things: expressing the speakers’ inner states, attitudes and feelings or degrees of emotional interest and engagement; and emotionally and cognitively engaging the hearers in the discourse. These strategies are opposed to strategies of detachment, which are realised by discursive means for encoding distance. Levinson (1992) explains that “some shifts in footing have more enduring implications, transforming social relations, and sometimes whole activities, into something else” (Wine, 2008, p. 2).

**Detachment** can be expressed by means of complex hypotactic syntax, where hypotactic is “A term used in traditional grammatical analysis, and often found in descriptive linguistic studies, to refer to dependent constructions, especially those where constituents have been linked through the use of subordinating conjunctions. ‘Hypotactic constructions’ are opposed to paratactic ones, where the linkage is conveyed solely by juxtaposition and punctuation/intonation” (Crystal, 2008, p.233). Hypotactic constructions include relative and complement clauses, sequences of prepositional phrases, or the abstractive passive voice, nominalisations and metonymisations or distancing personal, local and temporal deictics (‘deixis’ – involving a word or expression whose meaning is dependent on the context in which it is used – such as ‘here’, ‘you’, ‘that one’, ‘there’, or ‘next Tuesday’), and forms of address and salutation, or of indirect speech.

**Involvement** often, but not always, goes hand in hand with intensification. Intensification becomes manifest in the discoursal organisation in:
1- Turn-taking: in interruptions and overlapping talks
2- Repetition at all levels (textual and discursive)
3- Intensity markers: emphasising particles (‘really’, ‘very’, ‘absolutely’, ‘only’) or amplifying particles (‘very’, ‘too’, ‘absolutely’), and amplifying morphemes (‘super’, ‘mega’)
4- Exaggerating quantifiers and intensifying verbs
5- Verb phrases, adjectives and adverbs that encode the speaker’s emotions, feelings, moods and general dispositions
6- Superlative and primary as well as secondary interjections (which work also as intensifiers)
7- Ellipsis
8- Rhetorical figures (metaphor, irony and hyperbole)
9- Meta-communicative parts of utterances and factious scenarios

A way of expressing either involvement or detachment is ‘discourse representation’. One can represent, for example, racist, nationalistic or ethnicist discourse by means of direct quotation, indirect quotation or free indirect speech. Usually indirect speech is an indicator of distance, but in comparison direct speech and free direct speech express the speaker’s and evoke the hearer’s involvement.

Involvement and detachment are highly connected to the discourse genre and the field of social action with which the genre is associated. For example, narratives and conversations have a high degree of involvement. Detachment is not necessarily associated with mitigation, especially if mitigation is an expression of prudence and deliberation.

The following table from Reisigl and Wodak (1997, p. 84) shows categories of mitigation:
### Macro-mitigation

**Categories**

- **Forms indicating degrees of reservation:**
  - Addresser-oriented
  - Speaker-oriented. Related to the importance/relevance of the following/previous part of discourse/text or related to the conversational organisation

- **Modal verbs + verbs of saying**

- **Verbs of feeling (verba sentiendi) and verbs of thinking (verba cogitandi)**

- **Anonymisation by means of impersonalising constructions**

- **Stereotypical conjunctive**

**Forms/Examples of realisation**

- If you don’t mind.../unless I have misunderstood you.../unless I heard incorrectly
- I’m not an expert, but...
- I have just some additional remarks...

**Indirect micro-mitigation**

**Categories**

- **Question instead of assertion**
  - Basic: question/realised: directive
    - (Especially together with negations)

- **Assertion with ‘we’/‘one’/‘it’**

**Forms/Examples of realisation**

- Shouldn’t we go further?
- Can you shut the windows, Robert?
- We have to consider recent developments in...
- It will be necessary to consider...
Instead of directive with ‘you’  

- Assertion with ‘we’/‘one’/‘it’ instead of assertion with ‘I’
- Particles and adverbs in questions and directives

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Categories</th>
<th>Forms/Examples of realisation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Vague expressions</td>
<td>There may be some point you didn’t mention before.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tag questions</td>
<td>It was because of the tension, wasn’t it?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Particles and adverbs</td>
<td>Fairly, pretty, quite, rather, somewhat, supposedly, perhaps, theoretically, technically, strictly speaking, just, possibly, probably, likely,...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subjunctive</td>
<td>Such a move might anger much of black Africa/it would be endangering relations to black Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negation/litote</td>
<td>Not unlikely, not unhappy, not unreasonable ...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hesitations, false starts, self-corrections, repetitions</td>
<td>The relationship here is not unproblematic.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Direct micro-mitigation</td>
<td>- (micro-strategies)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 3-3
It is important for the sake of the analysis to determine the genres that the texts in question belong to. In the section that follows an overview of genre and text is given.

### 3.3 Genre and text

A ‘text’ could be defined as the main body of a manuscript, book, newspaper etc. Some linguists use the word ‘text’ to refer to written material only while others use it to refer to both written and spoken material. Another definition of a ‘text’ given by Dickins, Hervey and Higgins (2002, p. 242) is: “any stretch of speech or writing produced in a given language (or mixture of languages [...] and assumed to make a coherent whole on the discourse level”.

Genre is a specific type of production, whether music, film, or writing, etc. Thus literary genres include science fiction, and a film genres include horror, comedy or romance. In linguistics and literature the term can get more complicated. Genre is a traditional term in literary criticism (the word ‘genre’ itself means ‘type’, ‘kind’ or ‘sort’ in French). We are used to classifications in literature such are ‘prose fiction’, ‘thriller’, ‘detective story’ [...]. As with the subject field and institutional context, the list of such genres (also sub-genres, etc.) seems potentially endless.

Many approaches to genre, such as those above, rely on subject matter for their classification. Dickins, Hervey and Higgins have introduced a different approach to the categorisation of genres where the subject matter is not the main criterion according to which genres are specified. Hervey and Higgins argue that the fundamental issue in question is the “author’s attitude, implicit or explicit, to treatment of the subject matter. This attitude also includes the intention that the text should have a particular sort of effect on the reader or listener, and acceptance of the probability or improbability of this intention being completely achieved” (Dickins, Hervey and Higgins 2002: p.178).

The five genres which are traditional, at least in pre-modern Western culture, according to Dickins, Hervey and Higgins are: Literary, which has many sub-genres; Religious (of spiritual content); Philosophical, concerning the ‘world of ideas’; Empirical, which is relevant to science and technology and other informative texts; and Persuasive, which as the name suggests, aims to get the reader or listener to behave in a prescribed
manner. Manuals, rules and regulations, and some media texts, especially advertisements or editorials, fall under this category. The sub-genres in this category are endless, but they have a common goal which is to persuade readers or listeners of certain action or way of thinking.

Following Lemke’s approach (Lemke, 1995), Wodak (2001) makes a distinction between text and discourse: “‘Discourse’ can thus be understood as a complex bundle of simultaneous and sequential interrelated linguistic acts, which manifest themselves within and across the social fields of action as thematically interrelated semiotic, oral or written tokens, very often as ‘texts’, that belong to specific semiotic types, that is genres […]”, (Wodak, 2001, p. 66). In establishing their theory of discourse Wodak et al. use the word ‘genre’ in the ‘subject matter’ sense, as explained above, especially when they talk about media genre. Genres, according to Wodak, can be considered as semiotic types and texts (written or oral) as tokens. The texts belong to various genres within the social fields of action. A sequence of thematically interrelated texts that belong to specific genres will formulate a discourse. She understands the notion ‘field of action’ to mean “institutionalised aims of discursive practices”. She gives some examples of fields of action in the political arena: manufacturing public opinion, functions of legislations, developing party-internal consent, advertising and vote-getting, etc. For ‘genres’, she gives examples such as: laws, bills, press releases, interviews, election programme, speeches in elections, decisions (approval/rejection) inaugural speeches, etc., which develop the discourse topic.

3.4 Categories of analysis:

The Discourse Historical Approach developed for a number of discrimination-relevant case studies is three-dimensional. First, the contents or topics of a particular discourse (usually racist or discriminatory) are established. Second, the discursive strategies are investigated, and thirdly the linguistic means (as types) and the linguistic realizations (as tokens) are examined. Accordingly, in respect of these dimensions, I have established the contents of my topics: Israel/Palestine conflict and Islamophobia; for more comprehensive discussion refer to chapter 4. I have investigated the discursive strategies which will be used in conducting the analysis. See table 3.5 below; a full
overview is given above. Thirdly, I have examined the ideological and stereotypical images in the chosen texts (corpus) which belong to the media genre. Further discussion of the topics used is presented in chapter 4.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strategy</th>
<th>Objective</th>
<th>Devices</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Referential/nomination</td>
<td>Construction of in-groups and out-groups</td>
<td>Membership categorization. Biological, naturalizing and depersonalizing metaphors and metonymies, synecdoches</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Predication</td>
<td>Labelling social actors more or less positively or negatively, deprecatorily or appreciatively</td>
<td>Stereotypical, evaluative attributions of negative or positive traits. Implicit and explicit predicates</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Argumentation</td>
<td>Justification of positive or negative attributions</td>
<td>Topoi used to justify political inclusion or exclusion, discrimination or preferential treatment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perspectivation, framing or discourse representation</td>
<td>Expressing involvement. Positioning speaker’s point of view</td>
<td>Reporting, description, narration or quotation of (discriminatory) events and utterances</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intensification, mitigation</td>
<td>Modifying the epistemic status of a proposition</td>
<td>Intensifying or mitigating the illocutionary force of utterances</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 3-4

The discourse-historical approach as shown in the above is eclectic and interdisciplinary. It is also problem oriented, integrating the theories and methods which work best at unveiling racist utterances and relations of power as well as the constructing and deconstructing of identities.
3.5 Conclusion
The chapter has provided a comprehensive overview of the Discourse-Historical Approach, its theoretical background, motivation, formation and categories of analysis. The interdisciplinary and problem-oriented nature of this approach in addition to the multi-level exploration of contextual information justifies its suitability to be the analytical tool of the media texts which constitute the corpus of this research.
Chapter 4

4.1 Introduction:
This chapter is divided into two main parts covering six sections (4.2-4.7) and a conclusion (4.8). In the first part, section 4.2 introduces the theoretical framework of the study from a translation studies perspective, providing the title of the thesis, research questions, resources and topics. It also covers the research position from ontological and epistemological viewpoints. Section 4.3 presents focused aspects of the research methodology developing the discussion of the general approach which has been laid out in chapter 3. In section 4.4 reasons behind choosing specific news services and topics are given. Since the data collected for this research is ‘news texts’, the second part will address the issue of news agencies’ impartiality in section 4.5. Then sections 4.6 The Israel Palestine Conflict and 4.7 Islamophobia will set the background for the two central themes of the news texts selected to be analysed in chapter 5. Section 4.7 will in turn involve two sub-categories which will further enhance the reader’s knowledge of the complexities concerning the relationship between Muslim communities and the West.

4.2 Introduction to Research Methodology:
Translation studies is interdisciplinary. It borrows research methods and approaches from a number of other disciplines, but at the same time, it covers various fields because it is relevant to linguistics, literature and to social science, cultural studies, philosophy, gender studies and others. Recently many developments in computational linguistics have become associated with translation studies, such as machine translation, CAT tools, and corpus analysis of parallel – i.e. translated – texts).

The general topic and title of the thesis is ‘Translation and stereotyping in Arabic and English news texts with reference to Islamophobia and the Arab-Israeli conflict’.
My initial research questions are:

1. Do translations retain stereotypes, stereotypical imagery/discourse between Arabic and British-based media?
2. Do translations increase, decrease or otherwise alter stereotypes/stereotypical imagery/discourse; in other words do they construct new stereotypes between Arabic and Western media (British)?
3. If translations increase, decrease or otherwise alter stereotypes/stereotypical imagery/discourse between Arabic and British-based media, how do they do so?
4. How do stereotypes and ideologies overlap, and how can they be combined or incorporated to serve some ideological discourses?

These research questions are fundamentally descriptive – conceived in Descriptive Translation Studies (DTS) – a descriptive research question being one that seeks to elicit data through which a phenomenon can be described in detail. The research goes beyond this, however, in seeking to assess the degree of stereotyping, define its nature, and illustrate in which way it has been used: this is when the research moves on to CDA.

These two questions can be converted into two hypotheses, the first being a null hypothesis, as follows:

1. Translations do not increase, decrease or otherwise alter stereotypes, stereotypical imagery/discourse between Arabic and British-based media.
2. (Assuming hypothesis 1 is refuted) there are identifiable ways in which translations increase, decrease or otherwise alter or construct stereotypes, stereotypical imagery/discourse between Arabic and British-based media.

4.2.1 Ontology and Epistemology:

According to O’Brien and Saldanha (2013), ‘ontology’ is a key term that should be understood before embarking on research. Matthews and Ross (2010, p.23) define ontology as “the way the social world is seen to be and what can be assumed about the nature and reality of the social phenomena that make up the social world”. ‘Epistemology’ is another key term which is related to ‘ontology’ and is defined as: “the
theory of knowledge and how we know things” (ibid.). Matthews and Ross identify three basic categorisations for seeing the social world: objectivism, constructivism and realism. Linked to these, there are three epistemological positions: positivism, interpretivism and realism, each of which “entails some beliefs as to what counts as knowledge and how knowledge can be obtained” (O’Brien and Saldanha, 2011, p. 11). In fact, there are many more ontological and epistemological positions, but these are the essential ones.

Ontological Categories:

1. **OBJECTIVISM**: “asserts that the social phenomena that make up our social world have an existence of their own [...] , apart from and independent of the social actors (humans) who are involved”.

2. **CONSTRUCTIVISM**: asserts that social phenomena “are only real in the sense that they are constructed ideas which are continually being reviewed by those involved in them [the social actors]” (ibid, p. 25).

3. **REALISM**: adopts an intermediate position between objectivism and constructivism. It accepts that social phenomena can have a reality that is separate from the social actors involved in it but also recognizes that there is another dimension that relates to what we know about the social world as social beings. This dimension includes “structures and mechanisms that trigger or affect the social reality that can be observed” (ibid, p. 26).

Each of the ontological positions above is linked to an epistemological position: that is, it entails some beliefs as to what counts as knowledge and how knowledge can be obtained.

Epistemological Positions:

1. **POSITIVISM**: The ontological belief of Objectivism assumes a positivist epistemology, which asserts that the social phenomena can be objectively researched, data about the social world can be collected and measured, and the resulting observations must remain independent of the researcher’s subjective understanding: that is to say, the researcher remains independent and has no impact on data. Positivism is often linked with quantitative approaches to
research and to empiricism, which means the collection of observable evidence. However in postpositivist research, empiricism and objectivism are treated as distinct positions: “just because research is empirical does not mean that it is ‘objective’” (Tymoczko, 2007; cited in Saldanha and O’Brien, 2013, p.147). Crisafulli (2003, p. 82) states: “empirical facts do not exist independently of the scholar’s viewpoint; indeed, it is the scholar who creates the empirical fact of the analysis by making observable (raw) data relevant to his/her perspective”.

2- INTERPRETIVISM: This is linked to the ontological position of constructivism; it prioritizes people’s subjective understandings and interpretations of social phenomena and is often linked with qualitative approaches to research, where the researchers attempt to explore the social world from the point of view of the actors and reflect on their own subjective interpretations.

3- REALISM: Realism is both an ontological and epistemological position. As an epistemological position, it claims that certain social phenomena exist outside the human mind and can be objectively investigated using approaches similar to those in the natural sciences. In this respect, realism agrees with positivism. However, it also recognizes the existence of invisible but powerful structures and mechanisms that cannot be directly observable but whose effects are apparent, and these effects can provide evidence of the underlying structures and mechanisms (Matthews and Ross 2010, p. 29). Realist approaches to research might typically adopt both quantitative and qualitative tools and methods.

Since the research at hand relies largely on collecting observable “textual data containing many instances of whatever is being analysed” (Williams and Chesterman, 2002, p. 66) – in other words it uses a corpus-based driven methodology – it falls under the category of empirical research. However, some conceptual research has been also conducted when the concept of CDA is introduced and clarified and when the theoretical framework adopted (DHA) is defined and reinterpreted in relation to my research topic.
Having stated this, the research is mainly empirical and seeks new data and new information. Since the corpus-based methodology used encompasses both quantitative and qualitative analysis, the ontological stance of this research project can be regarded as realist, assuming, as mentioned, above a realist epistemological position. However, the research might also be argued to adopt a postpositivist position in that data are collected to identify and highlight a specific social phenomenon.

4.2.2 Resources:
As noted in the Introduction chapter, my primary resources are media texts from news outlets and news agencies:

1- Reuters
2- BBC

The topics are:

1- Islamophobia
2- Israel/Palestine conflict

I have chosen the examples for Islamophobia from Reuters news agency and the examples related to the Israel/Palestine conflict from the BBC.

4.3 What type of research is being engaged in:
As previously mentioned, this will be a corpus-based translation studies project. According to Laviosa (1998, p.1), corpus-based methodology “[...] hopes to show that the corpus-based approach is evolving, through theoretical elaboration and empirical realisation, into a coherent, composite and rich paradigm that addresses a variety of issues pertaining to theory, description, and practice of translation”. The scope of this project will be to cover the news related to two topics, discussed below, over a period of one month.

“The adoption of corpus linguistics as a methodology for the study of language is based on the idea that language is a social phenomenon and as such it must be investigated
starting from actual data” (Zanettin, 2012, p. 11). It can even be argued that corpus linguistics has established itself as a theoretical approach in its own right.

Corpus studies use a wide range of textual data. A corpus does not have to be computer based: “A corpus can mean a heap of books or a pile of photocopies and cut-outs” (Zanettin, 2011, p. 103). There should be one or more criteria for compiling a corpus, while the investigation method could differ from one corpus to another (e.g. computer-based or not).

This study is also relevant to ‘comparative models’, which is one of the earliest translation approaches, revolving around the notion of equivalence (Williams and Chesterman, 2002). Comparative translation models work to align Source Text (ST) and Target Text (TT) by selecting the closest elements of the target language with given elements from the source language. This approach has close links with contrastive linguistics. Relevance is optimized in the successive comparisons between two corresponding/respective texts. By ‘corresponding’, I mean two texts that cover the same piece of news in a clearly similar manner.

A comparative corpus–based study would normally have two main sets of data which are called “corpora components or subcorpora” (Zanettin, 2012, p. 10). These sets of data could belong to the same language (monolingual) or to two or more different languages. Corpora used in descriptive and applied translation studies usually involve the comparison of at least two main sets of data. These can be translations with their respective original texts, or can all be translations of different texts from one language to the other. The corpus which I intend to use is classified as a bilingual corpus (i.e. a corpus involving two languages).

A distinction is also frequently made between comparable and parallel corpora. Comparable corpora consist of texts in two or more languages which are markedly similar to one another in terms of subject matter (etc.), and can be compared with one another in various ways. “Sampling techniques, balance and representativeness” (McEcnery et al., 2006. P. 49) are three important factors needed to ensure the “comparability between two subcorpora in different languages” (Zanettin, 2012, p. 150).
In contrast with comparable corpora, parallel corpora typically consist of source texts in one language and their translations in another language. The source language and the target language do not have to be constant, so the target language could become a source language and then the source language a target language (bidirectional). Although Zanettin argues that “A parallel corpus may contain, for instance, text pairs which are not or are only partially translations of each other, that is texts which were created or developed independently in each language but which have a common ideational source” (Zanettin, 2012, p. 153). Such corpora are at the margin of the parallel corpus category, sharing some features with comparable corpora. Most parallel corpora are bilingual but we come across multilingual parallel corpora which could be made up of several translations of one source text (O’Brien and Saldanha, 2011, p. 68). Parallel corpora are, on the whole, designed to include only one translation for each source text (Laviosa, 1998, p.3).

The material in this study belongs primarily to the parallel corpus category since it involves sets of two texts one of which (or, in some cases, either of which) could be regarded as an original text and the other as derived from this (by translation and/or transediting). It also, however, has some features of the comparable corpus category because it involves an element of comparison between two texts whose relationship is not clearly one of straightforward translation.

The analysis will comprise both qualitative discussion and quantitative analysis which will then be compared to check the extent to which they conform to one another.

4.4 Choice of Examples:

As noted above, I have selected 2 main news outlets to be the sources of my examples:

1- Reuters
2- BBC

This choice is made for several reasons. These two news outlets are prominent ones on a global level, and both have sections that report in several languages, though naturally
I am concerned with the Arabic and English versions. The most critical reason, however, is that the both news outlets have a reputation for being objective, and yet not very neutral reporting of the news can be spotted specially in the English version.

Topics which I thought might be controversial and could generate considerable instances of stereotyping are:

1- Islamophobia
2- The Palestine Israel conflict

In this research, I will attempt to make a connection between the deeply rooted misconceptions (stereotypes) in the western mentality, taking British-based media outlets as an example, of Arab/Muslim culture and how these can be used to disseminate some pieces of news in a biased/non-neutral manner.

4.5 Impartiality of news agencies
The domestication of news to make it more familiar to a local audience is a widespread phenomenon. “'[F]oreign' news events are told in ways that render them more familiar, more comprehensible and more compatible for consumption by different national audiences” (Gurevitch et al, 1991; cited in Alasuutari, Qadir and Creutz, 2013, p. 693). However, in some instances, this phenomenon may go beyond the stage of domestication of to become a kind of biased reporting of news. For example in the American context, we encounter this issue on a relatively large scale: “In his study of American television news, Herbert Gans (1979) already pointed out that foreign news deals either with ‘stories thought relevant to Americans or American interests’ or ‘interpretations that apply American values’” (Alasuutari, Qadir, and Creutz, 2013, p. 695).

According to leaked reports, the BBC and Sky News change their narrative specially when news are related to the Middle East. According to some reports, this is due to interference from the pro-Israel lobby, which is very influential in both the UK and the USA. The Israel lobby organisation, BICOM (Britain Israel Communication and Research Centre), is said to have meetings with a number of editors, directors and news reporters
of the BBC. “In the email [...]”, Fitzsimmons reveals how BICOM officials regularly met with editors and journalists from the BBC, Sky News and the Financial Times to 'brief' them on how to frame issues relating to Israel in order to ensure that, “the most objectively favourable line was taken” (Watson, 2011). Lorna Fitzsimmons is a former MP and the CEO of BICOM between 29/09/2006 and 22/03/2012.

The Electronic Intifada has also listed a number of incidents which jeopardise the integrity and impartiality of the BBC when it comes to commenting on the Palestinian Israeli conflict. For example, the BBC received an imbalanced number of Israeli and Palestinian commentators on the Israeli assault on Gaza in 2012. The BBC also interviewed pro-Israel analysts and pundits and introduced them as independent while they were not. Three people were given the chance to justify the Israeli actions in Gaza through television, radio and even online.

“On 22 July, BBC Online uploaded a long feature headlined “Gaza: How Hamas tunnel network grew. [...]” Reams of paragraphs are devoted to tunnels “booby-trapped with explosives” — and the effort needed by Israel to detect them [...]” The article is written, not by a BBC journalist, but by Dr. Eado Hecht, who is described by the BBC as an “independent defence analyst and lecturer in military doctrine at the Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies at Bar Ilan University.” [...] But Hecht is not “independent,” as the BBC claims. He is in the pay of the Israeli army. Unknown to readers of the BBC Online article, Hecht also teaches at the Israeli military’s Command and General Staff College” (Saleem, 2014).

In March 2006 John Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt published an essay entitled "The Israel Lobby" in The London Review of Books (Vol. 28, No. 6, March 23, 2006). The essay was later turned into a book in 2007. This courageous attempt by the two writers entailed a public debate in the United States and elsewhere. Noam Chomsky commented saying “M-W deserve credit for taking a position that is sure to elicit tantrums and fanatical lies and denunciations, but it’s worth noting that there is nothing unusual about that” (Chomsky, 2006). A sample of the debate aroused by this paper/book is found here https://mearsheimer.uchicago.edu/pdfs/A0042.pdf. The
more general influence of the Israel lobby in America and Britain is discussed in the following section.

4.6 Historical background (Israel/Palestine conflict)

I heard you in the other room asking your mother, 'Mama, am I a Palestinian?'. When she answered 'Yes' a heavy silence fell on the whole house. It was as if something hanging over our heads had fallen, its noise exploding, then - silence. Afterwards...I heard you crying. I could not move. [...] Do you believe that man grows? No, he is born suddenly - a word, a moment, penetrates his heart to a new throb. One scene can hurl him down from the ceiling of childhood onto the ruggedness of the road (Ghassan Kanafani, 1999, p.10).

4.6.1 The Israel lobby in Britain

The influence of the Jewish lobby in Britain dates back more than 100 years ago. The pioneering Zionists, Theodor Herzl and Chaim Weizmann, made connections with British politicians and policy makers. Herzl, who is regarded as the father of political Zionism, was a Jewish Austro-Hungarian journalist and playwright. He was deeply affected by the anti-Semitic feelings that swept Europe in the second half of the 19th century. As a journalist, he covered the Dreyfus affair, in which a French Jewish officer was falsely accused of passing secrets to the Germans. In 1881, following the assassination of Tsar Alexander II, large numbers of Jews were killed in a series of Russian pogroms. By 1914 up to 2 million Jews had fled Russia to escape persecution. Most of those went to the United States, but 25,000 arrived in Palestine in two waves of immigration in 1882-84 and 1890-91. Herzl first thought that Jews could assimilate into European societies, but he later reached the conclusion that the only solution for Jewish dispersal and living as minorities was to create a Jewish state in which Jews would be the majority and able to exercise ‘national self-determination’ (Philo and Berry, 2004 pp. 2-3).

In order to achieve his goal, Herzl started canvassing the current powers for an ‘imperial sponsor prepared to grant a settlement charter’. Herzl thought of Argentina and Palestine as potential locations for the prospective Jewish state. He canvassed Germany’s Kaiser, the Ottoman Sultan and Britain’s Joseph Chamberlain explaining the
advantages and benefits this Jewish state would bring them. His attempts were not successful with the Ottoman Sultan although he offered Jewish capital to cover the Ottoman public debt. Herzl then switched his attention to Britain trying to link Jewish and British imperial interests. Herzl lobbied Lord Rothschild\(^1\) to achieve the Zionist aspirations (Philo and Berry, 2004, p. 3-4).

During the 1\(^{st}\) World War the imperial powers were negotiating the future of the Ottoman territories as it was becoming evident that the Ottoman Empire was about to be dissolved. Jewish leaders had extensive communication with British politicians: Arthur Balfour, Herbert Samuel and Mark Sykes. In 1915, Samuel (a Liberal party politician and banker) presented a memorandum under the name ‘The Future of Palestine’ in which he proposed “British annexation of Palestine [where] we might plant three or four million European Jews” (Weisgal, 1944, p.131; cited in United Nations, 1990). The Zionists efforts culminated in the Balfour Declaration addressed to Lord Rothschild (2 November 1917) in which British support for a Jewish homeland in Palestine was explicit:

> I have much pleasure in conveying to you, on behalf of His Majesty’s Government, the following declaration of sympathy with Jewish Zionist aspirations which has been submitted to, and approved by, the Cabinet. His Majesty’s Government view with favour the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people, and will use its best endeavours to facilitate the achievement of this object, it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine or the rights and political status enjoyed by the Jews in any other country (William, and Staff, 2017).

One of the ways used to convince the British government was that having a home for the Jews in Palestine would lessen the flood of Jews into Britain. The Zionists were also

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able to make connections with the League of Nations, since the League had accredited the mandate of Britain and France over countries in the region in the aftermath of World War 1 (which had new borderlines according to the Sykes-Picot treaty). The way was paved for more Jewish immigration to Palestine. Britain facilitated Jewish Immigration and the Jewish Agency worked on buying land and establishing plantations and small factories to provide for the new settlers (Hourani, 1991). Hourani explains: “In 1922 Jews had formed about 11% of a total population of three quarters of a million, the rest being mainly Arabic speaking Muslims and Christians; by 1949 they formed more than 30% of a population which had doubled. [...] there had been considerable investment both by individual Jews and by institutions formed to help in the creation of the national home [...] some to industrial projects: electrification (for which a Jewish company was given an exclusive concession), building materials, food processing. Much also went into the buying of land and agricultural projects” (Hourani, 1991, p. 323). For information about proportion of land ownership in Palestine by Jews and by Palestinians in 1947, please see figure and table below.

The support that London extended for the making of a national home for Jews in Palestine in the first half of the 20th century was, as mentioned above, lobbied for by Chaim Weizmann, the Zionist leader and Manchester University academic, who later became the first president of Israel. According to an article entitled ‘The UK’s Pro-Israel Lobby in Context’, “Weizmann worked with a close-knit trio of supporters; the Guardian journalist Harry Sacher and the businessmen Simon Marks and Israel Sieff, who together ran the quintessential British clothing retailer Marks & Spencer” (Mills, Aked, Griffin and Miller, 2013). In cooperation with other leading Zionists, this trio established a number of organisations which later became Israeli national organisations: the World Zionist Organisation, the Jewish Agency and the Foundation Fund. Other institutions, the English Zionist Federation, the Joint Palestine Appeal and the Jewish National Fund, remained UK institutions, “Whilst affiliated to the ‘parent national institutions’ in Israel” (Mills, Aked, Griffin and Miller, 2013). These organisations, located in London’s Great Russel Street later formed the core of the UK Israel lobby.

The Zionist Federation, which was not completely favoured by a considerable number of British Jews, became more popular, and after the establishment of Israel it found a
new role “in public relations, political lobbying, cultural diplomacy and the promotion of aliya (Jewish immigration to Israel)” (Mills, Aked, Griffin and Miller, 2013). The Zionists came to dominate the Board of Deputies of British Jews and one of their constitutional purposes is now “to advance Israel’s security, welfare and standing”.

In the 1970’s the British Israel Communications and research Council (BICOM) was established. Although BICOM did not act as hard-line pro-Israel institution, it is still embedded within the British Zionist movement. “It has adopted a strategic approach to communications, employing public relations and lobbying professionals. It seeks to insulate policy-makers from the negative opinions about Israel encountered in the public” (Mills, Aked, Griffin and Miller, 2013).

The Labour Friends of Israel was established in 1957. Israel was first ruled by the left-wing party Mapai, which later merged with the Israel Labour Party (1968), and hence it enjoyed good relations with the British Labour Party. During the 1950’s the British Labour Party was supportive of Israel, but this support faded and the Conservatives subsequently identified themselves more with Israel. The Conservative Friends of Israel was established by Michael Fidler and in 1974 80 MP’s joined the group including Margret Thatcher. Funding for the Conservative Friends of Israel was mainly raised by Michael Sacher and other donors (businessmen and financiers). However, under Tony Blair there was another shift towards Labour by ‘The Funding Fathers’ (a group of very powerful donors). Michael Levy, one of the Funding Fathers, was introduced to Blair by an official at the Israeli Embassy and was later appointed as a fundraiser for Blair. “He became a key figure in a network of New Labour donors that allowed Blair to achieve financial independence from the trade unions and to build up a coterie of advisors – including Alastair Campbell and Jonathan Powell – who would follow him to 10 Downing Street” (Mills, Aked, Griffin and Miller, 2013). This new circle of donors is seen as part of a shift in the politics of the Labour Party to the right.

4.6.2 The Israel lobby in the United States:

Any average observer of America’s foreign policy will inevitably notice unlimited favouring of Israel at the expense of other countries/parties in the Middle East. Moreover, all presidential candidates over the years have spoken with one voice
towards this theoretically foreign country and even competed in expressing their commitment and support for it, although they could have lively disagreements over many other issues such as combating terrorism, standing up to Iran’s nuclear ambitions, responding to China’s rising economic power and so on and so forth. By contrast, unanimous agreement is expressed for Israel.

In March 2006 an essay entitled "The Israel Lobby" was published in The London Review of Books. A documented version of this article was also posted on the Working Papers website of the John F. Kennedy School of Government at the University of Harvard. This article was turned into a book (Mearsheimer and Walt 2007). This was the first time the issue of the influence of the Israel lobby on US foreign policy was openly discussed.

The electoral campaign for the presidential election of 2008 is given as an example in ‘The Israel Lobby and U.S Foreign Policy’: “In 2008, as in previous election years, serious candidates for the highest office in the land will go to considerable lengths to express their deep personal commitment to one foreign country – Israel – as well as their determination to maintain unyielding U.S. support for the Jewish state” (Mearsheimer and Walt, 2007, p.3). This repeated favouring of Israel by America’s politicians, whether Democrats or Republicans, has not been frequently questioned. On some occasions, it has been justified by the moral case that Israel is the only country in the region that “shares our values”. Senator Hillary Clinton spoke before the powerful American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC): “in this moment of great difficulty for Israel and great peril for Israel ... what is vital is that we stand by our friend and our ally and we stand by our values. Israel is a beacon of what’s right in a neighbourhood overshadowed by the wrongs of radicalism, extremism, despotism, and terrorism” (Mearsheimer and Walt, 2007, p. 4). The other justification that some would argue for is that Israel is a vital strategic asset for the United States. But this latter rationale has recently been seen to be on shaky grounds as some Americans have started to realise that Israel is now more of a liability for America’s politics in the Middle East than an asset. The first justification, Israel being the only democratic haven in the region opposing terror and extremism, is also no longer convincing as the brutal treatment of Israel towards the Palestinians has been widely covered in Gaza’s wars and disputes over settlements in the West Bank.
Given the above reasons, it would be in the United States interests to pursue a more balanced policy towards Israel and the Palestinians. Then, what is the real reason behind this consistent deference from leading American politicians towards Israel?

A programme produced and presented by Stephen Sackur ‘gives an insight in to an alliance that has formed in America between the traditional Zionists and the ultra-right Christians who call themselves Christian Zionists.’ Mearsheimer and Walt also confirm the power of the Israel lobby: “The real reason why American politicians are so deferential is that the political power of the Israel lobby. The lobby is a loose coalition of individuals and organisations that actively works to move U.S. foreign policy in a pro-Israel direction” (Mearsheimer and Walt, 2007, p. 5). The pro-Israel lobby emerging from this alliance is far stronger than the so-called "Jewish lobby".

Americans who challenge Israel are frequently subject to attacks from the lobby. Jon Stewart, the famous Jewish American political satirist and television host came under fire for “being both too lenient and too harsh when it comes to the topic of Israel” (Dekel, 2014). On more than one occasion Stewart drew attention to the “asymmetrical nature of the conflict” during the 2014 Israeli offensive on Gaza. Although Stewart declared that criticising Israel does not make him anti-Israel, it did not stop some voices in the US from describing him as a self-hating Jew.
Jewish Owned Land in Palestine as of 1947

As of 1947, Jews in Palestine owned under 7% of the Palestine's lands, and after the 1948 war 80% of the Palestinian people were dispossessed of their homes, farms, and businesses.

Figure 4-1
Share of Palestinian vs. Jewish land ownership as of April 1st, 1943

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category of land (Fiscal categories)</th>
<th>Palestinians &amp; others</th>
<th>Jews</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dunums (1000 sq. meters)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban</td>
<td>76,662</td>
<td>70,111</td>
<td>146,773</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Citrus</td>
<td>145,572</td>
<td>141,188</td>
<td>286,760</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bananas</td>
<td>2,300</td>
<td>1,430</td>
<td>3,730</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural built-on area</td>
<td>36,851</td>
<td>42,330</td>
<td>79,181</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plantation</td>
<td>1,079,788</td>
<td>95,514</td>
<td>1,175,302</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cereal land (taxable)</td>
<td>5,503,183</td>
<td>814,102</td>
<td>6,317,285</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cereal land (not taxable)</td>
<td>900,294</td>
<td>51,049</td>
<td>951,343</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uncultivable</td>
<td>16,925,805</td>
<td>298,523</td>
<td>17,224,328</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total area:</td>
<td>24,670,455</td>
<td>1,514,247</td>
<td>26,184,702</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage</td>
<td>94.22%</td>
<td>5.8%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roads, railways, rivers, and lakes</td>
<td></td>
<td>135,803</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Area including roads, railways, etc.</td>
<td></td>
<td>26,320,505</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 4-2

4.7 Islamophobia:

Islam releases us from the blind zeal and the ardour of ignorance. Allah, the Almighty and Splendid, says: “Oh, Humankind! We have created you from male and a female, and made you into nations and tribes, that you may know one another. Verily, the most honourable before Allah, is the most pious of you” (Ar- Risālah, 1976).

Islamophobia can be defined as an anti-Islamic sentiment or prejudice against Muslims or social groups identified as Muslims. In recent years, Muslims have become highly stereotyped in western media. Undoubtedly acts like the London bombings and the 9/11 have contributed to this violent image of Muslim groups, but as is always the problem with stereotyping, there is a generalisation attributing a number of traits, most likely negative, to a whole social group. There is no simple answer to this multifactorial problem as it has roots in race and in history. There is also the ongoing issues of economics: the difficult economic situation in the Middle East, and social inequality, with a rich minority and other extremely poor segments of society. This necessarily leads in some cases to revolt and to radicalism. In a number of cases, even the people in the
Middle East, have no clear idea where the extremist groups are coming from and how they come to operate. The irony which some may not be aware of is that the vast majority of victims of extremism are Muslims.

It is somewhat unclear when the term ‘Islamophobia’ was first used. In the 1980’s Khaleda Khan identified the problem, putting down her observations of the situation of ordinary Muslims in the London Borough of Brent where anti-Muslim prejudice was beginning to emerge. Significantly, the first generations of Muslims in Britain identified themselves in terms of their country of origin, but later generations have “attributed less emotional and cultural meaning to their country of ancestral heritage” (Allen, 2010, p. 7) and a shift from Asian identity to a more prominent Muslim identity has been recognised. Anti-Muslim feeling in Britain could be seen in terms of the general issue of racism. Yet, for a number of reasons, this phenomenon had many special features that make it stand as an independent issue on its own. In 1989, the Satanic Verses affair generated an air of discomfort towards the Muslim reaction. The establishment of the Islamic Republic of Iran and its role in inflaming the Satanic Verses affair by sentencing Rushdie to death in absentia was yet another development in the recent history of anti-Islamic sentiment. Rana Kabbani (1989) wrote her ‘Letter to Christendom’ following the Salman Rushdie affair: “This book is the modest contribution by a woman who had been a sort of underground Muslin before she was forced into the open by the Salman Rushdie affair” (Kabbani, 1989, p.ix).

In 1990 Kalim Siddiqi published what is known as the Muslim Manifesto, in which he accused the political parties and mass media of adopting a negative discourse about Muslims in an attempt to turn Muslims into an oppressed minority. The Manifesto was followed by the establishment of the Muslim Parliament, and both attracted extensive media coverage, which was generally negative; “[…] the mediatised form of Muslim identity was one that from the outset was overtly represented in negative frames and one that was highly politicised […]” (Allen, 2010, p. 12).

The United Nations acknowledged Islamophobia as a global phenomenon alongside racism and anti-Semitism without giving a definition. At this point, Islamophobia changed from a socio-economic problem to a phenomenon which has global and
historical dimensions and one that is recognised on many levels including academia, media, and policy making. In her book ‘The Enemy Within’, Baroness Warsi discusses the fact that some people in Britain believe that Islam is a violent religion. She lists a number of statistical sources which support her view: “COMERS in 2016 found that 43 per cent of people polled felt that Islam is a negative force in the UK, and 72 per cent agreed that most people in the UK have a negative view of Islam. [...] A YouGov poll conducted in 2015 found that 55 per cent of people agreed with the statement “There is a fundamental clash between Islam and the values of British Society” (Warsi, 2016, p. 141).

Many of the theories of Islamophobia have highlighted the historical factor in the issue. Weller (2001; cited in Bakali, 2016, p.11), affirms that “Islamophobia is undeniably rooted in the historical inheritance of a conflictual relationship that has developed over many centuries involving the overlap of religion, politics and warfare”.

In the few decades following the death of the Prophet Mohammad, Muslims were able to conquer vast areas which were largely ruled and populated by Christians. Damascus, Baghdad and of course Jerusalem came under Muslim rule. In Europe (Roman Christendom) there was a feeling of threat from the unknown other, while the absence of direct contact augmented a discourse of antipathy towards a danger in the East.

The most confrontational direct contact with Muslims was with the Crusades (1095 - 1291), refer to Crusades 5.6.8, which started following a call from Pope Urban II to liberate the Holy Land (Jerusalem) from the infidels, or Saracens. Although this militaristic pilgrimage had underlying internal political and economic reasons, it seemed to have the necessary religious element to convince many. After this direct contact with the Muslim World, the Crusaders did not go back with a deep understanding of the Muslims or the Islamic World but rather with more fantastical and romanticised picture of the East. The violent and long period of conflict helped in enhancing an image of Muslims as barbaric enemies of Christianity.

In the centuries that followed, the influence of the church weakened in Europe. There was less concentration on the interpretation of Islam or representation of Muslims from a theological point of view. Instead there was the cultural aspect, so now “Muslim
culture and civilisation was inherently different and obtuse to its European/Western counterpart” (Allen. 2010, p. 28). The image of Muslims and the Prophet remained though much the same as in the Crusaders’ myths. “These stories, and others like them have been used over the centuries to justify a depiction of the Prophet as plagiarist, libertine and opportunist, a picture which is with us still” (Kabbani, 1989, p. 8).

In the 1700s, there was a strong interest in Islamic civilisation from a cultural angle, maintaining a superior stand towards the East especially from an intellectual perspective. This is evident in the travelogues which some members of the western elite wrote after travelling to the Middle East to experience Muslim culture. In 1979, Edward Said analysed and presented these writings as a romanticised depiction of the Orient which continued to be portrayed as backward, dreamy, and posing itself as the contradiction of the occident, which was more objective, practical and advanced. The Orient remained in the eyes of these Orientalists a place which can be feared or controlled. “The general basis of Orientalist thought is an imaginative and yet drastically polarized geography dividing the world into two unequal parts, the larger, “different” one called the Orient, the other, also known as “our” world, called the Occident or the west. [...] Insofar as Islam has always been seen as belonging to the Orient, its particular fate within the general structure of Orientalism has been to be looked at first of all as one monolithic thing, and then with a very special hostility and fear” (Said, 1997, p. 4).

Many Muslim countries in the Middle East moved away from Islamic rule after gaining independence from European mandates between the 1940’s and the 1960’s. Although the type of rule in many of these countries of Muslim majority was not democratic, it was secular. During the 1960’s and 1970’s, the relationship between the Middle East and the West (principally Western Europe and the United States) was not overshadowed by an Islamic-Christian conflict as in previous periods. Saudi Arabia as an Islamic state did not represent a Muslim civilisation in the same sense as the Arab Caliphate or the Ottoman Empire. Rather it re-presented a number of the backward images of Islam found in some history books and travelogues as well as in many westerners’ mentality: polygamy, sex separation, and restricted women’s rights as well application of Islamic worshipping practices by force. Hence, the inherited images of Muslims in the previous centuries were not totally wiped out from the Western mentality. They were easily
stimulated when there was a rise in Islamic fundamentalist groups or at the time of the Satanic Verses affair. It is very likely that the media have built upon these images/stereotypes and enhanced the notion of the backward, barbaric ‘other’.

Stereotypes of Muslims not only affect the Middle East and Islamic world more generally. They are also influenced by, and influence, the perceptions of Muslims living in the West. This is the topic of the next section.

4.7.1 Reasons for Emigration:
The waves of Muslim emigration to the UK overlapped with the two world wars as there was a need for labourers to work in the factories. “As demand for labourers increased whilst our boys were away fighting in the First World War, Britain saw dramatic and visible increases in Muslim populations in small towns and cities near the shipping industry and the dock” (Warsi, 2017, p. 17). However, many Muslim emigrants in the UK arrived here in the 1950’s and 1960’s especially from India, Pakistan and Bangladesh.

There was a culture of migration in these countries that is related to economic factors and social status. Emigration intensified due to family links and more education opportunities in these countries. For example, in India education became more available for the middle and lower classes. The feudal system also collapsed and allowed better opportunities for a wider sector of people. Educated young men found it easier to migrate and gain higher incomes and social statuses. The main reasons for migration were study, work and the fact of easier travel opportunities abroad (Ali, 2007, pp. 37-58). Another category of emigrants were the poorly skilled workers who arrived in the UK to work in British factories during the 1960’s. With the industrial recession of the 1970’s these workers became redundant, and over time they came to constitute a relatively impoverished community both economically and socially.

4.7.2 Muslims in France
France is the home of the biggest Muslim minority in Europe with around 4-5million Muslims, and as such provides a good case study of the relationships between Muslims and non-Muslims in Europe more generally. The majority of the Muslim population in France are of North-African origin: Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia. These three countries
were former French colonies. Most of the Muslim emigrants arrived in France in the aftermath of the 2nd World War to cover for the shortage of labour caused by the war.

The relationship between these immigrants and the existing French population has been affected by the problematic colonial decades, and at the same time the indigenous French were not welcoming to new comers. There has been some circulation between Algeria and France since the early 20th century. Hundreds of thousands of Algerians died for France in the First World War. Acknowledging the ‘blood debt,’ France built the Mosque of Paris in 1926 in the heart of Paris. Yet, the highest numbers of Muslim emigrants arriving from Algeria was in the post-World War Two-era to meet “Labour needs of France” (Maillard, 2005, p.64). Those were allocated housing in the outskirts of the big cities, which were later called banlieues. Many of these banlieues, or suburbs, have become Muslim ghettos. In 1953 the Algerian War of Independence broke out and the French authorities thought that the living conditions of Algerian workers in France needed immediate improvement and constructed “residences for bachelors”. However, “Algerian workers who could not find access to bachelors’ residences or families without housing have settled in makeshift shantytowns stigmatized by the propaganda of the NLF” (Maillard, 2005, p.65). By the year 1957, the French authorities changed their stance towards the Muslim/Algerian population in France and attempts at assimilation were replaced my monitoring and control of emigration. The economic slump of the 1970’s turned many of the French Muslims who were initially received in France to work in factories into unemployed and impoverished communities. The strong sense of cultural and national identity among the French has also contributed to them not accepting Muslims though many of these Muslims were born in France.

The social and economic situation of the French Muslim community has not improved much and is currently rather difficult, with unemployment at 20% and a high level of crime that is not even accurately reported as police frequently ignore Muslim areas. Serious riots took place in 2005, which drew the attention of the French government to the fact that it needs to improve their living conditions. The general feeling of the majority of French Muslims is that they are crammed and isolated in deprived areas.
The French introduced the concept of *laïcité* ‘secularism’ in the late 19th century, which surprisingly has no agreed definition. Regardless of the number of ways in which French politicians/thinkers expressed their views of *laïcité*, it is still fundamentally a secular concept that stresses freeing society from religious dogmas. A law separating the state and church was passed in 1905. The concept developed with the establishment of the French republics (there have been 5 republics already, the 5th one established in 1959). It seems that French secularism has not worked very well with the Muslim community as they feel it has been used to restrict their freedom of religious practice. Thus, in 2004 the veil was banned in French schools (banning of ‘ostentatious’ religious symbols). On the other hand many French feel that Muslims have a problem of integration in French society and culture. However, Wolfreys provides this understanding of *laïcité*:

> At the core of the French Republican notion of citizenship is the belief that shared values, rather than ties of blood or race, are fundamental to the relationship between individuals and the state. Identification with the Republic’s ‘universal’ values takes precedence over particular, individual interests or affiliations based on gender, sexuality, ethnicity or religion. State institutions play a central role in disseminating these values, acting as ‘pathways to integration’ (Wolfreys, 2018, p. 89).

The veil issue in France started in 1989 when a number of schoolgirls wore headscarves at school in a small town north of Paris. The girls were excluded from school “[... on the grounds that their veils were not compatible with the *laïque* [*laïcité*] principles of the French state schooling system” (Gemie, 2010, p. 19). The issue surfaced again in 2003 when two Jewish girl converts attended school with headscarves on and again were excluded from school. There were three dimensions to the issue of the girls wearing veils at school, which can be summarised as follows:

1. Public concern with the condition of schooling
2. Political machinations
3. *Laïcité* and the revival of the republic

President Chirac himself described wearing the veil as an aggressive act, though some Muslim observers would wonder why the Jewish skullcap (yarmulke) or the headscarf of
Catholic nuns were not seen as such. Muslim communities in France started to believe that *laïque* principles are applied selectively and this widened the gap between them and the host community and establishment. From a secular French point of view, Milton Virost says “Schools have a mission to neutralize religious differences between students while imbuing them with French civilisation” (Viorst, 1996). The Muslim counterargument is that “wearing Hijab at school is not a religious symbol but a cultural artefact” (Viorst, 1996). In 2010, France became the first European country to ban women from wearing the Niqab or burqa (the face cover).

As mentioned above the sensitive relationship between France and its Muslim population dates back to 1830, the year of the French invasion of Algeria. Taking into consideration that Algeria and other North African French colonies were also part of the Orient, and that we can thus apply the orientalist perspectives to them, we can presume that the sensitive relationship dates even long before 1830. This is illustrated by statements by a number of French officials. Jacqueline Costa-Lascoux, who was a member of the Stasi Commission on the Veil issue stated: “Islam opposes its concepts to ours, the first of which are *Laïcité* and Tolerance”. For writers such as Regis Debray and Michèle Vianès, Islam is at best a problem to be solved and at worst a threat to be defeated. Yet, the long years of antagonistic confrontations with the French colonisers must have shaped a more difficult relationship between the North Africans particularly Algerians, who make up about 1.5 million of the Muslim community in France. Despite the many years of relentless efforts by the French to impose assimilation into French culture (by introducing technical advances and enforcing French education in schools) on the Algerians and other North African peoples, the French had limited success, particularly given the consistent inequality between the colonised and the coloniser. It is also interesting to note the claim by the French colonisers was that they were in Algeria to free women from the oppression of Islam and apparently the veil was a symbol of that oppression in their eyes. The implementation of *laïcité* seemed very much concerned with the appearance of Muslim women in particular “Since 1989, when the issue of *laïcité* came to the fore, measures aimed at upholding or preserving France’s secular traditions at both national and local level have primarily been concerned with policing what Muslim women wear” (Wolfreys, 2018, p. 93).
During the relatively long period of colonisation, the French established settlements in Algeria in which about one million Europeans lived. Those Europeans were referred to as the *pieds noirs* (‘black feet’) named after the colour of their leather boots. The French had in mind their welfare in Algeria when they were taking measures concerning the Muslim and particularly the European community in Algeria. Thus, some of the improvements and integration strategies aimed at the Muslim population in France were a trade-off for securing privileges for the European settlers in Algeria. “The French authorities in their negotiations with the NLF [National Liberation Front] had in mind to trade improved status of the Algerian immigrants for the future status of the Europeans living in Algeria” (Maillard, 2005, p.66).

Another episode in this problematic relationship was the Islamic Salvation Front which won the Algerian elections in 1990, but was later associated with horrific acts of terror. The French people’s image of Islam as a violent religion was intensified.

The hard economic and social conditions suffered by the Muslim community have contributed to making these Muslim ghettos or *banlieues* a hotbed for Muslim radicalism. “More than 1,200 French Muslims have joined ISIS in Syria – more Jihadist than any other European country” (The Week, 2015). Most Muslims were opposed to the Charlie Hebdo attack in 2015, in which Islamist militants attacked the offices of the French satirical magazine Charlie Hebdo, which had a record of anti-Islamist (and even anti-Muslim) coverage. However, these Muslims also criticised the mockery of the Prophet, seeing it as symbolic of the humiliation they themselves experience.

There have been Muslim public figures who adopted a contrary attitude towards the veil issue and the general Islamic viewpoint in regard with the position of French Muslims. For example Chahdortt Djavann (Iranian in origin) was a frequent public speaker on French television during the years of the war of the veil. Her first famous publication was “Down with the Veil” in 2003. The 47-page pamphlet provided a media context in which Djavann’s work flourished and received very good reviews from French magazines and newspapers (Gemie, 2010). Djavann introduced herself as a ferocious defender of the principle of *laïcité* and launched a harsh attack on the veil pronouncing it as “a way of marking out a young girl’s body, similar to genital mutilation” (Gemie, 2010, p. 55). One
of the most conspicuous features of Djavann’s views is that she does not acknowledge more than one version of Islam (e.g. extremist vs. moderate). She declares that the origin of Islamism is Islam.

There is, however another point of view towards these emigrants which considered accepting them an expression of the founding values of the French Republic “by giving it a universal dimension: human rights, liberty, equality and fraternity” (Maillard, 2005, p. 63).

4.8 Conclusion
The chapter has presented the theoretical and philosophical framework of this research study. It has also defined the resources, topics of the data, and introduced the dimensions and levels of the research methodology of the data analysis. Finally, it provided a socio-political and cultural introduction to the two main topic of the selected news texts which will be analysed in the following chapter.
Chapter 5

5.1 Introduction
This chapter deals with the data analysis. It provides the directly relevant explanations and guidelines that inform the data analysis and clarifies any possible ambiguities in addition to examples of analysed texts. The chapter comprises twelve sections and a conclusion (5.2-5.13). Section 5.2 provides a detailed description of how the analysis will be conducted, which sub-categories have been devised and how the reader stereotypes have been elicited. It also presents the classifications of the stereotypes/ideologies and their numerical grades for the purpose of processing the results (quantitative analysis). Section 5.3 gives background information about issues, locations, bodies and figures which have been mentioned in the Israel/Palestine conflict texts, and it is a pre requisite to introduce the reader to the contextual setting of the utterance. In section 5.4 an example of Israel/Palestine conflict data analysis is presented followed by a graph showing the overall final results of the analysis of Israel/Palestine texts, that is section 5.4.1. Section 5.5 takes us to the second theme of the texts analysed, which is ‘Islamophobia’. Another fact sheet that includes background information on issues, locations, bodies and figures mentioned in the Islamophobia-related texts is provided. Section 5.6 covers a discussion of a number of terms that can be controversial from socio-political, or even cultural and historical as well as translational perspectives between English and Arabic. The section has eight sub-sections. Section 5.7 justifies giving similar weight to the pro-Shia and pro-Sunni reader stereotypes/ideologies, which have been essentially extrapolated. Since the Islamophobia-related texts have been sub-grouped according to country except for one general text, section 5.8 introduces the reader to the background of the Syrian conflict, and then presents an example of the Syria-related data analysis in 5.8.1 followed by graphs that show the final results of the quantitative analysis of the Syria-related texts in section 5.8.2. Section 5.9 informs the reader about the Iraq conflict, and a graph showing final quantitative results for the Iraq-related texts is presented in section 5.9.1. Section 5.10 sets the background to the Yemeni conflict, and in section 5.10.1 a graph that illustrates the quantitative results of the Yemen-related texts is also provided. Section 5.11 provides an example of the Saudi
Arabia-related texts, and a graph that represents the average results of the Saudi-related texts is shown in section 5.11. There is no section devoted to the Saudi status quo since there is not a raging conflict in Saudi Arabia, and a considerable volume of information associated with Saudi Arabia has been given in the fact sheets and in the various data analysis texts. Section 5.12 displays a graph that represents the overall results of the quantitative analysis of all the Islamophobia-related texts.

5.2 Guidelines to data analysis

As has been mentioned in previous chapters, the data is collected from Reuters and the BBC news services during May 2016. The texts are aligned to two major themes: the Israel/Palestine question and Islamophobia. The Islamophobia texts are grouped according to the topic of the text, so we have a number of texts under Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Syria and Yemen, and one general text. The analysis is carried out using the Discourse Historical Approach (chapter 3).

For each data analysis, I have devised in addition to the categories put forward by Wodak (2001), another category: ‘justification for using a particular strategy’. The strategies used as mentioned in previous chapters are:

1- Referential/nomination
2- Predication
3- Argumentation
4- Perspectivation
5- Intensification, mitigation

I have also distinguished between two types of perspectivation: direct and indirect. Direct perspectivation is when the news service is adopting a certain perspective. Indirect perspectivation is when the news service is reporting someone’s or some party’s perspective.

For some of the examples, I elaborated on the category ‘justification for using a particular strategy’ by adding four sub-categories: Basic analysis, Background facts, Likely reader stereotypes/ideologies and News service stereotypes/ideologies. These
sub-categories have been used in most of the analyses, particularly in nomination and perspectivation, but not so much in predication. ‘Predication’ is a stereotype, a label or an evaluative description in its own right used by the news service itself, so it does not require an addition of a likely stereotype. The sub-categories of Basic analysis, Background facts, Likely reader stereotypes/ideologies and News service stereotypes/ideologies have not been used in mitigation, intensification or argumentation. Also, these sub-categories are overlooked when the reference or the quotation is not essential to the overall analysis. However, a concise justification without sub-categories is given in all cases except in argumentation where a definition of the fallacy is provided. Each reference (nomination) is analysed once, and the same goes for predication, although predications are not frequently repeated while nominations are. For the Arabic texts analysis, another category is added, which is the translation of the example into English.

The format of the analytical tables is as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strategy</th>
<th>Objective</th>
<th>Devices</th>
<th>Justification for using a particular strategy</th>
<th>Example</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Basic analysis</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Basic analysis</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Background facts</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Likely reader stereotypes/ideologies</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>News service stereotype ideologies:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 5-1

The basic analysis (justification) is provided for each of the examples even if the heading ‘basic analysis’ is not given.

Some of the background facts/information are provided in an introductory section to the data analysis. Others are provided in two fact sheets, one for each theme (Israel-Palestine question and Islamophobia). The reader will be referred to the specific section. For the Islamophobia-related texts, some key terms such as ‘Islamist’, ‘jihadist’, ‘mujahid’, ‘Crusader’, ‘Shia’ and ‘Nusayri’ were explained with some historical
background where necessary in separate sections. A background to each of the devastating conflicts in Iraq, Syria and Yemen is also provided to help the reader understand the ideology and stereotypes of the news service and that of both the British and Arab readers. Finally some background facts are mentioned in the flow of the analysis under ‘background facts’.

Likely reader stereotypes are presented whenever available. By ‘available’, I mean whenever a realistic stereotype has been discerned from opinion polls, reviews and newspaper articles. In the case of the British reader opinion regarding the Israel-Palestine question, the YouGov poll shows that the British opinion is divided between those who are pro-Israel, pro-Palestinian, those who have no specific allegiance towards either side, and finally those who are simply not informed about the issue. For British public opinion, I have used the links below in addition to a significant number of newspaper articles and reviews:

https://yougov.co.uk/topics/politics/articles-reports/2014/03/11/israel-and-palestine-whose-side-britain

https://yougov.co.uk/topics/politics/articles-reports/2014/08/05/sympathy-palestinians-more-common-britain-france-a


For a complete list of the sources consulted in this regard, see Appendix 1. The Israel-Palestine conflict has been going on for a long time (over 70 years). During this time, the conflict has gone through many phases and British public opinion has fluctuated according to various developments and of course media influence. The wars on Gaza have certainly shifted British public opinion more to the Palestinian side. However, the rise of Islamist fundamentalism can reflect negatively on the Palestinian cause, taking into consideration that Hamas is an Islamist paramilitary movement. The likely reader stereotypes for the Israel-Palestine question are structured along those lines. Most of the examples of the Israel-Palestine related texts entail one or two reader stereotypes, and in very few cases three or four.

Arabic public opinion, which has generally been supportive of the Palestinians or what are commonly termed Palestinian rights (end of occupation and right of return), has also
been affected by a number of setbacks, change of priorities and the emergence of Iran as a regional super-power, which some Arab countries feel is threatening. Discerning Arabic public opinion towards the Palestinian issue is no longer a straightforward matter, especially given that opinion polls are not frequently conducted in the Arab world. However, I have been able to refer to the following in addition of course to newspaper articles and the views of the main Arab TV channels like Al Jazeera and Al Arabia, which currently represent two polarised opinions on a number of issues including the Israel-Palestine question. Again there are one or two and in a few cases three or four Arab reader stereotypes.

https://www.mei.edu/events/public-opinion-conflicted-middle-east
https://www.raialyoum.com/index.php/%D9%81%D9%88%D8%B1%D9%8A%D9%86-%D8%A8%D9%88%D9%84%D9%8A%D8%B3%D9%8A-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A8-%D8%AA%D9%86%D8%A7%D8%B3%D9%88%D8%A7-%D9%82%D8%B6%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D9%81%D9%84%D8%B3%D8%B7%D9%8A%D9%86/

For a complete list of the sources consulted in this regard, see Appendix 1.

The news service stereotypes/ideologies are cited in the text.

The stereotypes/ideologies of the BBC texts (Israel-Palestine question) whether reader or news-service stereotypes/ideologies are classified as follows:

1- Pro-Palestinian
2- Fairly pro-Palestinian
3- Neutral
4- Fairly pro-Israel
5- Pro-Israel
6- The stereotype is not classified (not relevant to the topic to be measured).

For working out results, a numeric categorisation is devised as follows:

1- Pro-Palestinian  2
2- Fairly pro-Palestinian  1
3- Neutral  0
4- Fairly pro-Israel  -1
5- Pro-Israel  -2
6- The stereotype is not classified (not relevant to the topic to be measured).

Thus, the results for any individual element range between 2 and -2. Taking averages of results for individual elements, the following classification has been used.

- 2 is classified as ‘very strongly pro-Palestinian’
- 1.5 to 1.85 is classified as ‘strongly pro-Palestinian’
- 1.1 to 1.49 is classified as ‘clearly pro-Palestinian’
- 0.6 to 1 is classified as ‘fairly pro-Palestinian’
- 0.2 to 0.59 is classified as ‘slightly pro-Palestinian’
- Anything below 0.2 but above 0 is classified as ‘very slightly pro-Palestinian’
- 0 is classified as ‘neutral’
- Anything above -0.2 but below 0 is classified as ‘very slightly pro-Israel’
- -0.2 to -0.59 is classified as ‘slightly pro-Israel’
- -0.6 to -1 is classified as ‘fairly pro-Israel’
- -1.1 to -1.49 is classified as ‘clearly pro-Israel’
- -1.5 to -1.85 is classified as ‘strongly pro-Israel’
- -2 is classified as ‘very strongly pro-Israel’

As for the Islamophobia-related texts, again for the stereotype of the British reader, I referred to surveys and opinion polls in addition to a significant number of newspaper articles not all of which I can list here.


http://www.pewglobal.org/2013/09/10/muslim-publics-share-concerns-about-extremist-groups/
A lot of the literature in the Islamophobia-related texts revolves around the Sunni-Shia divide. However the British reader does not particularly differentiate between Sunnis and Shia. The concept of the two types of Muslims, Sunni and Shia is relatively new to the British reader. As explained in ‘Islamophobia’ 4.7, there is a generally negative perception of Islam which has been increased by the recent terror attacks and the rise of Islamic fundamentalism. Refer to Islamism and Jihadism 5.6.1 and 5.6.2. On the other hand, a conspicuous polarisation between Sunni and Shia has emerged in the Arab/Islamic worlds. Hence, the reader stereotype on controversial issues, because they are relevant to the Sunni Shia divide which has regional and sometimes international dimensions, will be reflected in two reader stereotypes. For further information on this, refer to reader stereotypes case 5.7. I have also referred to numerous newspaper articles and surveys and opinion polls whenever possible to provide as representative as possible stereotypes/ideologies of the Arab reader towards groups or parties of the conflict as well as associated events.

For a complete list of the sources consulted in this regard, see Appendix 1.
For a complete list of the sources consulted in this regard, see Appendix 1. However, it should be highlighted that sometimes the likely reader stereotypes for both themes (Israel/Palestine question and Islamophobia are not always materialised in two or three stereotypes which reflect the varied attitudes of the reader. This is because the context of the media text may suppress or surface some of the readers’ opinions.

The stereotypes/ideologies of the Reuters texts on Islamophobia, whether reader or news service stereotype/ideology are classified as follows:

A. Islam and Sectarian Division
   B. Sunni Islam
   C. Shia Islam

For working out results, the tables were transferred to Excel sheets. A numeric categorisation was devised as follows:

A. *Islam and Sectarian Division*
   - Very positive image of Islam and sectarian division 2
   - Fairly positive image of Islam and sectarian division 1
   - Neutral 0
   - Fairly negative image Islam and sectarian division -1
   - Very negative image of Islam and sectarian division -2
   - The stereotype is not classified (not relevant to the topic to be measured).

B. *Sunni Islam*
   - Very positive image of Sunni Islam 2
   - Fairly positive image of Sunni Islam 1
   - Neutral 0
   - Fairly negative image Sunni Islam -1
   - Very negative image of Sunni Islam -2
   - The stereotype is not classified (not relevant to the topic to be measured).

C. *Shia Islam*
   - Very positive image of Shia Islam 2
   - Fairly positive image of Shia Islam 1
   - Neutral 0
   - Fairly negative image Shia Islam -1
- Very negative image of Shia Islam - 2
- The stereotype is not classified (not relevant to the topic to be measured).

Thus, the results for any individual element range between 2 and -2. Taking averages of results for individual elements, the following classification has been used.

- 2 is classified as ‘extremely positive’
- 1.5 to 1.85 is classified as ‘strongly positive’
- 1.1 to 1.49 is classified as ‘clearly positive’
- 0.6 to 1 is classified as ‘fairly positive’
- 0.2 to 0.59 is classified as ‘slightly positive’
- Anything below 0.2 but above 0 is classified as ‘very slightly positive’
- 0 is classified as ‘neutral’
- Anything above -0.2 but below 0 is classified as ‘very slightly negative’
- -0.2 to -0.59 is classified as ‘slightly negative’
- -0.6 to -1 is classified as ‘fairly negative’
- -1.1 to -1.49 is classified as ‘clearly negative’
- -1.5 to -1.85 is classified as ‘strongly negative’
- -2 is classified as ‘extremely negative’

5.3 Fact sheet (Israel/Palestine Conflict)

(1) Avigdor Liberman:
Avigdor Liberman was born in Moldova 1958, and emigrated to Israel in 1978. He served in the IDF and obtained a bachelor degree in International Relations and Political Science from the Hebrew University in Jerusalem. He has served as member of the Knesset since 1998. He was the Director General of the Likud Movement, and later a director General of the Prime Minister’s office. In 1999 he founded and headed the Yisrael Beiteinu party. “Yisrael Beitenu claims to be "a national movement with the clear vision to follow in the brave path of [Zionist leader] Zev Jabotinsky [which] fulfils the three cardinal principles of Zionism: Aliyah (Jewish immigration to Israel), settlement and security movements" (BBC, 2016). Yisrael Beitenu is formed of mainly Russian speaking members. It very much encourages Jewish immigration, and takes a hard line towards the peace talks with Palestinians and the integration of Israeli Arabs. Liberman lives in a Jewish settlement in the occupied west Bank. In May 2016, he was named Israel’s defence minister. He

(2) Benjamin Netanyahu:
The longest-serving Israeli Prime Minister, and the first to be born in Israel in 1949 – one year after the establishment of Israel. He has held many senior positions starting with Deputy Chief of the Israeli ambassador in the US in 1982. Netanyahu also served as an Israeli ambassador to the United Nations from 1984 to 1988. In 1988 he won a seat in the Knesset for the Likud, and became Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs. In 1993 he was elected chairman for the Likud party and in 1996 he became the youngest Israeli prime minister ever. He assumed the finance portfolio in 2003 in a cabinet led by Ariel Sharon. He took office again in 2009 and was re-elected in 2013.

Netanyahu has been a fierce critic of Oslo Accords between Israel and the Palestinians. He is known for his three no’s “no withdrawal from the Golan Heights, no discussion regarding Jerusalem and no preconditioned negotiations” (Haaretz, 2017b). He has also encouraged building Jewish settlements in the occupied West Bank. Due to this policy along with continuous construction in East Jerusalem, peace talks with Palestinians collapsed in late 2010 (BBC, 2015). Although he expressed initial acceptance for a two state solution, he put rigorous conditions for its establishment: “During his current term, Netanyahu has expressed acceptance of a Palestinian state alongside Israel, in principal. However, he has also stipulated that any future Palestinian state should be fully demilitarized, with no control of its airspace, and said that Jerusalem would be undivided Israeli territory. He also stated that the Palestinians must recognize Israel as the Jewish national state with an undivided Jerusalem, and he has rejected a right of return for Palestinian refugees” (Haaretz, 2017a).

(3) B’Tselem:
The Israeli Information Center for Human Rights in the Occupied Territories. It was founded in 1989 during the first intifada by Israeli academics and activists of left-wing political parties (Kessler, 2015). It documents many of the human rights violations
committed by the Israeli forces or settlers against the Palestinians (killings, injuries, house demolitions, collective punishments and detentions. It publishes reports, photos and other evidence that supports its documentations (Firbanks, 2015).

(4) Gaza Strip:

“The world’s largest open-air prison”, as it is frequently called in the media. The Strip is about 360 sq km and is inhabited by 2 million Palestinians who have been besieged by Israel since June 2007 when Hamas formed its own government after failing to form a unity government with the Palestinian Authority (The Guardian, 2007) and after a battle over control of security forces. Almost half the population are Palestinian Arab refugees who were deported from areas where the state of Israel was established. Most of those refugees live in impoverished, squalid refugee camps and are mainly sustained by the aid provided by UNRWA (United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East) (Encyclopaedia Britannica, ND).

Gaza was part of historical Palestine. After the establishment of the state of Israel in 1948, it fell under Egyptian military administration until 1967 when it was captured by Israel along with the West Bank and East Jerusalem. In 2005, Israel withdrew from Gaza in what is termed the Israel disengagement “Israeli army and settlers pulled out of Gaza, but it retains control of borders, airspace and ports” (Al Jazeera, 2017a). In 2007, Hamas, a branch of the Muslim Brotherhood, took over the Strip after a short war with Fatah (Palestinian National Liberation Movement), a main faction of the Palestine Liberation Organisation.

In December/January 2008/2009 Israel launched an assault on Gaza (Operation Cast Lead) which lasted for three weeks, and aimed according to Israel to halt Hamas activities and blast the “infrastructure of terror”, which apparently included police stations, homes, and mosques (The Guardian, 2009). The assault caused the death of 1,440 Palestinians, and 13 Israelis (Zanotti, 2010). According to Al Jazeera, 920 of the Palestinian deaths were civilians while the Congressional Research Service based in Washington said “[...] approximately 1,440 Palestinians have died (with some organizations estimating that at least half of the dead are civilians), compared with 13
dead (including four civilians) on the Israeli side” (Zanotti, 2010). The Goldstone report for the United Nations Fact Finding Mission on the Gaza Conflict headed by Richard Goldstone “concluded that both Israeli forces and Palestinian armed groups committed grave violations of international law, including war crimes and possibly crimes against humanity” (Amnesty, 2009a). Both Israel and Hamas found the report biased. Judge Goldstone was accused by Israel supporters of being “a "blood libel", a false accusation that had been used to demonise Jews in the past” (Urquhart, 2011) and personally “[..] regretted aspects of the report that bears his name, [..]” (The Irish Times, 2011) 2. However, the report remained and all other report authors maintained their original position.

On 14 November 2012, Israel mounted another operation “Operation Pillar of Defence” an 8-day campaign in Gaza by launching airstrikes and killing a Hamas military leader. The Israeli forces killed 167 Palestinians, including 87 civilians (Al Jazeera, 2017a). “Human Rights Watch field investigations found 14 strikes by aerial drones or other aircraft for which there was no indication of a legitimate military target at the site at the time of the attack. In four other cases, attacks may have targeted Palestinian fighters, but appeared to use indiscriminate means or caused disproportionate harm to civilians (Human Rights Watch, 2013).

In July 2014 Israel launched its operation “Protective Edge” which lasted for 50 days. Israel said its offensive came as a response to Palestinian rocket fire (NBC News, 2014a). However, the Israeli attempt to stop rocket fire killed 2,139 Palestinians amongst whom were 490 children. 11,000 Palestinians were wounded, up to 500,000 Palestinians were displaced and 20,000 homes were destroyed (Dearden, 2014).

Life in Gaza for the majority of Gazans is exemplified by hardship, poverty and immense difficulties. All basic everyday activities are a challenge.

(5) Hamas:

A Palestinian Islamist organisation founded by Sheikh Ahmad Yasin in 1987. The acronym ‘Hamas’ stands for Islamic Resistance Movement in Arabic. Hamas is a branch of the Muslim Brotherhood, which believes in liberating historic Palestine (including land from 1948 when the state of Israel was first established) from Israeli control, as stated in its charter. Its armed wing is called Izz al-Din al-Qassam brigades. However, Hamas and Islamic Jihad were designated as terror groups by some international powers: “Hamas as a whole, or in some cases its military wing, is designated a terrorist group by Israel, the US, EU, and UK, as well as other powers” (BBC, 2017a).

Hamas established civil service institutions (clinics, schools and charities) in Gaza and the West Bank, which gained popularity for it. It also worked on building its own rocket arsenal. Hamas manufactured Al Qassam rockets locally, while other rockets were smuggled in from Iran. However, all its rocket arsenal was of limited range and quality (Business Insider, 2014).

Hamas, along with some other Islamic factions, denounced the Oslo accords concluded with Israel in 1993 and, as a result, it engaged in inconsistent clashes with Israeli forces (Encyclopaedia Britannica, 2017). The confrontations intensified with the collapse of the Israeli/Palestinian peace talks and the start of the Second Intifada in September 2000.

In 2006 Hamas won a sweeping victory over Fatah (Palestine National Liberation Movement) in elections for the Palestinian Legislative Council. The two major factions had differences which culminated in a short war that ended in Hamas taking over the Gaza Strip and Fatah taking control of the West Bank. In the same year, Israel imposed a blockade on Hamas-ruled Gaza which involved power cuts, border closures by both Israel and Egypt, and heavy restrictions on imports. In order to obtain basic goods, as well as smuggle rockets, Hamas built long tunnels that stretched under the border into Egypt, while others, intended for military purposes, went into Israel. Israel targeted these tunnels, which it considered a means for Hamas to carry out attacks on Israel and achieve its terrorist objectives (Business Insider, 2014).

Israel has carried out numerous assassinations of Hamas leaders and key figures since the 1990’s (Younes, 2018). Israel launched three major military campaigns against Gaza Strip in order to halt Hamas’ activities as it claims (firing rockets, smuggling rockets

Hamas, which was supported by Iran and had offices in Syria, changed loyalty in 2012 in the aftermath of the Syrian revolution: “Hamas relations with the governments of Syria and Iran, two of its primary sources of support, were strained in 2011 when Hamas leaders in Damascus conspicuously avoided expressing support for a crackdown by Syrian armed forces against anti-government protestors inside the country” (Encyclopaedia Britannica, 2017). By 2012, Hamas had formed a new alliance with Egypt, which at that time had an elected Muslim Brotherhood (Freedom and Justice Party) government, and Qatar. However, this alliance did not last long, as the Muslim Brotherhood government in Egypt was toppled by a military coup. As a result, Hamas became unwelcome and was designated a terrorist group in Egypt. Hamas, which found itself in a desperate situation, had to re-open channels of communication with Iran.

Some efforts at reconciliation with the Palestinian Authority have been made under the patronage of the Egyptian government during the past decade, the most recent one being signed in 2017: “Hamas and Fatah have signed a landmark reconciliation deal in Cairo in a key step towards ending a decade-long rift between the two Palestinian factions” (BBC, 2017b).

(6) Hebron:

Hebron is a Palestinian city in the West Bank which was occupied by Israel in 1967. According to Ramsay and Dwaik:

Hebron, the largest city in the West Bank, is unique among other West Bank cities in that illegal Israeli settlements are distributed not only at its periphery, but also in the heart of the city, including in Tel Rumeida. These are accompanied by military checkpoints spread out over the city centre preventing the free movement of its inhabitants, and dividing the city into isolated sections which have become a sort of exhibition of contemporary apartheid, or - from the point of view of the terrorised inhabitants who remain - a ghost town (Ramsay and Dwaik, 2017).
The city has a fairly conservative social background and it has an important Muslim site – the Ibrahimi Mosque or the Sanctuary of Abraham. In the Hebrew tradition, the mosque is called Cave of Machpelah or Cave of Patriarchs where the tombs of Abraham, Isaac, Jacob, Sarah and Lea are found. In February 1994, an American Israeli Baruch Goldstein opened fire on Palestinians who had gathered to pray during Ramadan. He killed 29 Palestinians and injured 125. The incident triggered protests throughout the West Bank and another 20-26 Palestinians were killed and 120 injured during clashes with the IDF. Some zealous settlers in Hebron praised Stein for his deed. "Ephraim Rosenstein, a Jewish settler from Kiryat Arba, praised the man who committed last February's massacre. Baruch Goldstein, the American-born physician who brought his assault rifle to the tomb and fired into the mass of kneeling Muslim worshipers, was actually preventing a "massacre of the Jews," Rosenstein said" (Gellman, 1994).

The situation in Hebron has always been very tense and difficult. It has been characterised by violent settler’ abuse of Palestinians, protected by the Israeli army. The number of killings and violent actions have always been high. The Israeli authorities implement restrictions and discriminatory actions against Palestinians in Hebron. Over 20 years ago, the Israeli authorities closed the commercial centre of the city to Palestinians: “For more than two decades, the Israeli authorities have imposed severe and deeply discriminatory restrictions on Palestinian residents of Hebron’s Old City. New restrictions have compounded these violations and intensified the collective punishment of tens of thousands of Palestinians, in violation of international law” (Amnesty International, 2016).

(7) Holocaust:
The Holocaust, or the “final Solution” as termed by the Nazis, was the systematic killing and persecution of European Jews and other persecuted communities (Gypsies and homosexuals) in Germany and other occupied parts of Europe. Over the course of the Second World War, millions of people were imprisoned in concentration camps and death camps which were specifically constructed for the mass killing of European Jews. By 1945, the end of the Second World War, 6 million Jews had died in those camps, either in the gas chambers or from illnesses, malnutrition, and maltreatment.
The Holocaust has frequently been evoked in the context of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, in culture, history, and political discourse. For some, the Holocaust gave Europe an ethical justification for the establishment of Israel in 1948. “The internment of Jewish refugees – many of them Holocaust survivors-turned world opinion against British policy in Palestine. The report of the Anglo-American Commission of Inquiry in January 1946 led US president Harry Truman to pressure Britain into admitting 100,000 Jewish refugees into Palestine” (Holocaust Encyclopaedia, ND). Others argue that the horrors of the Holocaust did not constitute a valid ethical reason for the occupation, that one cannot correct one injustice by imposing another (Said, 2014).

Gerstenfeld, a scholar of anti-Semitism, argued that European culture is complicit in anti-Semitism and that it would not act in case of future genocide. He argues that if another Holocaust could happen, it would be in the Arab world. In this scenario, the actual murderers would be Muslims/Arabs but Europe will be indirectly contributing as it was bystander in the face of motions and movements aiming at demonization of Israel (Gerstenfeld, 2012, p. 389-397). By examining numbers of casualties on both sides of the two Palestinian uprisings and the three wars on Gaza in addition to daily casualties of Israeli occupation, we can discern that Gerstenfeld’s statement is far from reality.

(8) Israel:
A Jewish state which was established in 1948 after forcing the indigenous Palestinians out of their homeland (historic Palestine) and replacing them by mainly immigrant European Jews. Israel denies the ‘ethnic cleansing of Palestinians. The establishment of Israel has caused an ongoing Arab/Israeli conflict. For further information about the Palestine-Israel conflict, see Historical Background, (Chapter 4, section xx).

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(9) Israelis (Israeli society):

The Jewish population of Israel is made up of Jews who immigrated to historic Palestine predominantly from Europe. In Europe, Jews suffered persecution for centuries which increased in the 20th century, culminating in the Holocaust. Jewish communities, mainly from Europe, have replaced indigenous Palestinians who were subsequently subjected to deportation by force (ethnic cleansing). To this day, immigration to Israel is open for Jews in the diaspora. The Israeli population resides both within the state of Israel, as well as in settlements in the West Bank, East Jerusalem and the Golan Heights. Israeli society is highly militarised and military service is compulsory for both men and women from the ages of 18. For further information, see (10).

(10) Israeli Defence Forces (IDF)

The IDF is the strongest army in the Middle East possessing advanced weapons and the only nuclear arsenal in the Middle East, although Israel keeps information about its nuclear arsenal ambiguous. In its own words: “What has typified the Israeli army throughout its diverse history is its commitment to innovation and its continuous maximization of the resources at its disposal, both human and technological” (IDF Mahal, ND).

Since its inception in 1948, The Israeli Defence Forces have invested in much more than defence. It has been able to annex large swathes of Arab land in 1967, including Sinai in Egypt and the Golan Heights in Syria. Its air force carried out numerous raids in Lebanon during the 1970s up till the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982. Since then, Israel has waged two large offensive wars on Lebanon (Grapes of Wrath 1996 and the July 2006 war) and three wars on Gaza. Israel maintains that the offensives were meant to be self defence against both Hezbollah in South Lebanon and Hamas in Gaza. For further

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information, see (5) above. In both cases, Lebanese and the Palestinian sides have suffered many more casualties than the Israelis due to a significant imbalance in modern weapons and technology. The Israeli airforce is a very important part of the Israeli army as it is highly developed and capable of causing large-scale damage.

In Israel, conscription applies to all citizens (men and women) above the age of 18, including the Druze and Circassians, but not Israeli Arabs (Druze are not considered Arabs by the Israeli state). “The Israeli army is comprised of conscription, reserve and career service. All eligible men and women are drafted at age 18, three years for men and two years for women. Men are liable for reserve duty until age 51 and women until age 24” (ADL, ND).

(11) Mahmoud Abbas:
Mahmoud Abbas was born in Safed (Northern city of Historic or British Mandate Palestine) in 1935. His family was forced to leave Palestine in 1948. The family resided in Syria where Abbas earned a degree in law from Damascus University. He is a founding member of Fatah. Abbas is known for his moderate policies. He was a signatory of the Oslo Accords, and he signed an interim peace agreement with Israel in 1995. In 2004, he became the chairman of the PLO after the death of Yasser Arafat, and in 2005 he won the Palestinian presidential elections becoming the president of the Palestinian authority, a position which he still retains till now (Al Jazeera, 2017).

(12) Nazi Germany:
In the 1930s, Germany was still paying reparations put in place after the Treaty of Versailles following the First World War, and the buying power of the German currency disintegrated (History on the Net, 2013). The National Socialist German Worker’s Party was founded in 1919. Hitler became its leader in 1921. The party promoted German nationalism, anti-Semitism and resentment against the Post-War reparations and economic despair. Hitler became German Chancellor following elections in 1933 and assumed dictatorial powers. A charismatic public speaker, Hitler promised the German people prosperity, jobs for the unemployed and a market for farmers’ goods. At the
same time, he blamed Germany’s problems on the communists, Jews and corrupt politicians. Hitler began to eradicate his opponents through the “suppression of all political parties except the Nazis” (History on the Net, 2013).

Hitler espoused an ideology of extreme nationalism and the concept of the ‘Aryans’ as a master race. The Nazis created a system of exclusion and eradication of races, cultures, and people who they thought did not fit in their homogeneous national Aryan society (BBC History, 2011). Jews, Gypsies (Roma and Sinti), some East European communities, homosexuals, and disabled people were among the victims of Nazi policies.

The Nazis quickly issued a number of laws and legislations which limited the rights of Jewish citizens and curtailed their participation in public life. The first major law was “Law for the Restoration of the Professional Civil Service” (Holocaust Encyclopedia, ND). This law prevented Jews from joining the public sector. Other laws which restricted the number of Jewish students at schools and universities were to follow. In due course, laws were passed that prevented Jews from the practice of medicine, and law, and excluded Jewish civilian workers from the army (Holocaust Encyclopedia, ND). The persecution against non-‘Aryans’, particularly Jews, culminated in the Holocaust.

(15) Occupied West Bank:
Israel has occupied the West Bank, including Jerusalem and the Gaza Strip, since 1967 (West Jerusalem was occupied in 1948 and claimed as part of Israel, East Jerusalem was occupied in 1967 and it is a legally disputed area). Ever since, Palestinians have been subjected to oppression and numerous violations of human rights. Israel has adopted a settlement building policy in the West Bank and used Palestinian resources to support these settlements, establishing 237 settlements by 2017 (Human Rights Watch, 2017). Moreover, the settlers in these settlements are allowed to use weapons by Israeli law, while neighbouring Palestinians are not. The West Bank is divided by settlements and also features the apartheid wall and a special status for Jerusalem (accorded by the United Nations). However, East Jerusalem can only be reached by residents of the West Bank with immense difficulty. The West Bank itself is full of checkpoints and movement can be tremendously slow or impossible. Amnesty International summarises the
situation with the following: “Since the occupation first began in June 1967, Israel’s ruthless policies of land confiscation, illegal settlement and dispossession, coupled with rampant discrimination, have inflicted immense suffering on Palestinians, depriving them of their basic rights” (Amnesty International, ND).

Daily life is made very difficult for Palestinian in the occupied West Bank since Israel systematically demolishes houses and annexes land in addition to putting restrictions on Palestinian access to safe and clean water. This is exacerbated by military control of these territories, including 3 large offensives on Gaza Strip between 2008 and 2014: “In the West Bank, Israeli security forces have routinely used excessive force in policing situations, killing or grievously wounding thousands of demonstrators, rock-throwers, suspected assailants, and others with live ammunition when lesser means could have averted a threat or maintained order” (Human Rights Watch, 2017).

(13) Palestinians:
The Palestinian people in the analysed texts are those who were forced out from their homeland in 1948. Consequently, they became refugees in neighbouring countries or elsewhere in the diaspora. The ones who managed to avoid deportation live as an ethnic minority inside Israel. Others suffer from the Israeli occupation in Gaza, East Jerusalem, and the West Bank.

(14) Palestinian National Authority (PA):
The Palestinian National Authority was established in 1994 following the signing of Oslo Accords to govern the West Bank and Gaza Strip. According to the signed agreements, the PA (Palestinian Authority) does not have full control over rural areas, while Israel retained control over bypass roads between Palestinian cities, the Jordan valley and Israeli settlements. In the Gaza Strip, the Israelis retained control over the airspace, crossing points and coastal waters (Office of the Historian, ND).
**Peace Talks:**

The peace process with the aim of solving the Arab/Israeli conflict started in Madrid 1991 sponsored by the United States and the Soviet Union. It resulted in a peace agreement between Jordan and Israel in 1993. In 1994 the PLO and Israel signed the Oslo Accords where mutual recognition was achieved. “The Oslo Agreement stipulated that Israeli troops would withdraw in stages from the West Bank and Gaza and that a "Palestinian Interim Self-Governing Authority" would be set up for a five-year transitional period, leading to a permanent settlement based on resolutions 242 and 338” (BBC, 2013). There are also final status issues which have not been resolved to date (refugees’ right of return, Jerusalem, borders, territory, security, the Jewish state). In order to finalise the final status issues, there have been numerous phases of negotiations which have mostly reached a stalemate. The peace talks have all been mediated and sponsored by the United States. For further information see 6

**Saeb Erekat:**

The Palestinian Chief negotiator. He is also a member of the PLO and has held several senior positions in the Palestinian Authority, but his diplomatic career has overshadowed his other positions. Erekat was named Chief Palestinian negotiator in 1995, a post he continued to hold till 2011, when he officially resigned. His current status is unclear. He holds a PhD in peace and conflict studies from Bradford University in the UK.

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(18) Settlements:

Settlements are one of the intractable issues between Israel and the Palestinians. Israel has been building settlements in the West Bank and East Jerusalem since after 1967. These settlements are illegal under international law, and they are built on occupied land where Palestinians hope to establish their sovereign state. “Today, between 600,000 and 750,000 Israelis live in these sizeable settlements, equivalent to roughly 11 percent of the total Jewish Israeli population” (Al Jazeera, 2017). In 2017 Netanyahu vowed that he would not evacuate any settlement in the West Bank, calling it the ‘land of Israel’ (Haaretz, 2017).

(19) Yair Golan

Yair Golan has filled many senior positions in the Israeli Defence Forces IDF during his 37 years career “[...] including head of the Nahal Brigade, head of the West Bank Division during the tail end of the Second Intifada [...]” (The times of Israel, 2017). He also participated in engagements with Hezbollah in South Lebanon. He was ousted from his position as deputy chief of staff few weeks after making these controversial remarks about the holocaust.

(20) Zionist/Zionism:

Although the term ‘Zionism’ generally relates to the Jewish religion and history, it was first coined in 1890 by Nathan Birnbaum, an Austrian writer and journalist who embraced Jewish nationalist ideas and wrote a number of books which reflect his passion for Jewish emancipation and “[...] resettlement in Palestine” (The Jewish Virtual Library, ND). Those ideas were later promoted by Herzl who called for the first Zionist Congress in 1897 in Basel, Switzerland. A number of Jewish thinkers including Leon Pinsker had contemplated ways of solving the Jewish question in other ways in response to the persecution of Jews in Europe.

The Zionist efforts paid off with the signing of the Balfour Declaration (1917) and the creation of a Jewish state in Palestine in 1948, which resulted in the deportation of 700 000 Palestinians from their homeland, causing another question (the Palestinian
question) which is ongoing to date with many serious repercussions (see chapter 3). The establishment of Israel caused a number of regional wars and continuous aggression against Palestinians and bordering Arab countries. Zionism is considered by the majority of Arabs including Hezbollah as an antagonist ideology and practice.

5.4 Data Analysis
The following is an example of the data analysis for Israel/Palestine conflict.

BBC 09/05/2016

Israeli soldier goes on trial for killing wounded Palestinian attacker

The trial of an Israeli soldier charged with manslaughter after killing a wounded Palestinian attacker has opened at a military court in Jaffa

Sgt Elor Azaria, 19, shot Abdul Fatah al-Sharif in the head while the 21-year-old was apparently incapacitated in Hebron, in the West Bank, in March.

The soldier denies violating the Israeli military's rules of engagement without operational justification.

The incident, which was caught on video, has divided opinion in Israel.

Human rights groups say Sgt Azaria carried out an extra-judicial killing, while thousands of people who believe he did nothing wrong attended rallies in support of him last month.

Truth will out'

Sgt Azaria sat on a bench inside the courtroom as his trial began on Monday morning with the head of the three-judge panel reading out the indictment.

"The truth will come out. The path will be long. We will endure," said Binyamin Malka, a member of the soldier's defence team.

In their indictment, prosecutors said Sgt Azaria "violated the rules of engagement without operational justification as the terrorist was lying on the ground wounded and represented no immediate threat for the accused or others who were present". 
Sharif and another Palestinian, Ramzi Aziz al-Qasrawi, stabbed and wounded an Israeli soldier in Hebron, in the occupied West Bank, on 24 March before troops opened fire on them, wounding Sharif and killing Qasrawi.

Footage of the scene several minutes later, filmed by a Palestinian nearby and released by an Israeli human rights group, shows Sharif alive.

A soldier, identified as Sgt Azaria, is then seen cocking his rifle and fatally shooting Sharif from several metres away.

Afterwards, Sgt Azaria told Israeli military police: "When I looked at him I saw that he was moving his head, and his hand was within reach of the knife he used in the stabbing - the black knife. He moved his hand towards the knife."

He also said that he had feared that Sharif was wearing an explosive vest.

However, army investigators said that before he opened fire, Sgt Azaria had told a comrade that the wounded man "deserved to die" for stabbing his friend.

And on Sunday night, Israeli Channel 2 television broadcast a new video of the incident that appeared to show the knife mentioned by Sgt Azaria in his police statement was at least 1m (3ft) away from Sharif.

Since October, 29 Israelis have been killed in stabbings, shootings or car-rammings by Palestinians or Israeli Arabs.

About 200 Palestinians - mostly attackers, Israel says - have also been killed in that time.

The assailants who have been killed have either been shot dead by their victims or security forces as they carried out attacks. Some attackers have been arrested. Other Palestinians have been killed in clashes with Israeli troop
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strategies</th>
<th>Objectives</th>
<th>Devices</th>
<th>Justification of using a particular strategy</th>
<th>Examples</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nomination</td>
<td>Construction of social actors/in-groups and out-groups</td>
<td>Membership categorization Use of rhetorical figures</td>
<td><strong>Basic Analysis</strong>&lt;br&gt;The social actor is constructed as a soldier in the Israeli army.&lt;br&gt;<strong>Background facts:</strong> Refer to fact sheet <em>Israeli Defence Forces (IDF)</em>&lt;br&gt;<strong>Likely reader stereotype/ideology:</strong>&lt;br&gt;a. Neutral&lt;br&gt;b. Someone who represents the oppression of the Israeli occupation (pro-Palestinian).&lt;br&gt;c. A member of the army trying to carry out his duties in maintaining peace and protect himself and others from Palestinian terrorists (pro-Israel).&lt;br&gt;<strong>News agency stereotypes/ideologies:</strong> Neutral</td>
<td>Israeli soldier</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nomination</td>
<td>Construction of social actors/in-groups and out-groups</td>
<td>Membership categorization Use of rhetorical figures</td>
<td><strong>Basic Analysis</strong></td>
<td>wounded Palestinian attacker</td>
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<td>The social actor is constructed as a Palestinian aggressor albeit he is wounded</td>
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<td><strong>Likely reader stereotype(s):</strong></td>
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<td></td>
<td>a. Ongoing clashes between the Israelis and the Palestinians (neutral)</td>
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<td>b. Palestinians suffer from oppressive occupation and rebellious spikes are bound to occur (Pro-Palestinian).</td>
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<td>c. Palestinians initiate violence and therefore should pay the price (pro-Israel).</td>
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<td><strong>News agency stereotypes/ideologies:</strong></td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>When the BBC labels the wounded Palestinian as ‘attacker’, it is immediately stereotyping Palestinians as violent people without setting the scene for the reader about the reason of this violence (pro-Israel).</td>
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<tr>
<td>Perspectivation (Direct)</td>
<td>Expressing involvement, positioning speaker’s point of view</td>
<td>Reporting, description, narration or quotation of events and utterances</td>
<td>Basic Analysis: The news agency is using a headline written in bold to say that the Israeli soldier is being tried for killing a Palestinian attacker (i.e. the Palestinian is already deemed guilty).</td>
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<td>Background facts: Elor Azaria is a soldier in the IDF (Israeli Defence Army). He killed a wounded Palestinian after the Palestinian had stabbed another Israeli soldier. Elor Azaria was arrested and was tried in the military court. His case became controversial in Israel and many Israelis supported him but he was eventually convicted of manslaughter. For further information, refer to fact sheet Israeli Defence Forces (IDF), and to <a href="http://www.jpost.com/Israel-News/Rule-of-Law-Verdict-time-for-Azaria-476933">http://www.jpost.com/Israel-News/Rule-of-Law-Verdict-time-for-Azaria-476933</a>.</td>
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<td>Likely reader stereotype/ideology: a. Oppressed people would find a way to rebel against oppression (pro-Palestinian). b. Palestinians are terrorists, and are responsible for initiating violence, and so they would pay the price (pro-Israel).</td>
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<td>News agency stereotypes/ideologies: Israel is a state of institutions and maintains law and proper procedures despite conflict with Palestinians (pro-Israel).</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>Israeli soldier goes on trial for killing wounded Palestinian attacker</td>
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</table>
The trial of an Israeli soldier charged with manslaughter after killing a wounded Palestinian attacker has opened at a military court in Jaffa.

### Basic Analysis:
The news agency is presenting more information about the case in this sub-headline.

### Background facts:
Please see discussion above.

### Likely reader stereotype/ideology:
- a. Many of the verdicts of Israeli soldiers end in whitewash mechanisms (pro-Palestinian).
- b. Despite conflict with Palestinians, Israel is a state of institutions and the soldier will be subject to trial (pro-Israel).

### News agency stereotype(s)/Ideologies:
This sub headline confirms an image of the Israeli military establishment as fair and transparent (pro-Israel).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Perspectivation</th>
<th>Expressing involvement, positioning speaker’s point of view</th>
<th>Reporting, description, narration or quotation of events and utterances</th>
<th>Basic Analysis:</th>
<th>The trial of an Israeli soldier charged with manslaughter after killing a wounded Palestinian attacker has opened at a military court in Jaffa</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nomination</td>
<td>Construction of social actors/in-groups and out-groups</td>
<td>Membership categorization Use of rhetorical figures</td>
<td>Basic Analysis:</td>
<td>The social actor is constructed as a named Israeli soldier whose military rank and age are also given.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>Background facts:</td>
<td>Sargent in the Kfir Brigade (IDF). Conscription exists in Israel to all citizens above 18 including Druze and Circassians but not Israeli Arabs. For further information, please refer to fact sheet Israeli Defence Forces (IDF)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>Likely reader stereotype(s)/ideology:</td>
<td>‘Sgt’ provides an official rank, giving the individual a status in an official organisations, which is likely to be read positively. The age ‘19’ might suggest that the person is not to be considered as fully culpable for their actions as someone who is older (neutral).</td>
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<td></td>
<td>News agency stereotype(s)/Ideologies:</td>
<td>Neutral</td>
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<td>Sgt Elor Azaria, 19</td>
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Sgt Elor Azaria, 19
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nomination</th>
<th>Construction of social actors/in-groups and out-groups</th>
<th>Membership categorization</th>
<th>Use of rhetorical figures</th>
<th>Basic Analysis</th>
<th>Background facts</th>
<th>Likely reader stereotype(s)/Ideology:</th>
<th>News agency stereotype(s)/Ideologies:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>The social actor is constructed as a named individual (The wounded Palestinian)</td>
<td>A Palestinian youth from the city of Hebron who was shot dead by an IDF soldier while immobile and wounded (see discussion, below).</td>
<td>Abdul Fatah al-Sharif is not given professional status (unlike Elor Azaria, above), which may make him less important. The name may sound Arabic/Muslim to a few people but for the majority it is a foreign name (neutral).</td>
<td>Neutral</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>mitigation</td>
<td>Modifying the epistemic status of the proposition</td>
<td>Intensifying or mitigating the illocutionary force of discriminatory utterances</td>
<td>The use of the ‘apparently’ seems to mitigate the act of killing or to shed doubt on the fact that the victim was already incapacitated.</td>
<td>apparently</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Perspectivation (Direct) | Expressing involvement, positioning speaker’s point of view | Reporting, description, narration or quotation of events and utterances | **Basic analysis:** The news agency is providing details of the incident: names, ages, date, location and also the state of the victim being incapacitated. **Background:** Refer to fact sheet 5.3 Hebron. **Likely reader stereotypes/Ideologies:**
  a. Israeli soldiers use excessive force against Palestinians (pro-Palestinian).
  b. Israeli soldiers are only responding to violence on the part of the Palestinians (pro-Israel).  
**News agency Stereotype(s)/Ideology:** The word ‘incapacitated’ means a temporary immobility which may give an indirect reason for Azaria to shoot al-Sharif. There is inherent doubt in the ‘incapacitated’ which gives a rather pro-Israel stance in what is otherwise a fairly neutral piece (fairly pro-Israel). | Sgt Elor Azaria, 19, shot Abdul Fatah al-Sharif in the head while the 21-year-old was apparently incapacitated in Hebron, in the West Bank, in March. |
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Perspectivation (Indirect)</td>
<td>Expressing involvement, positioning speaker’s point of view</td>
<td>Reporting, description, narration or quotation of events and utterances</td>
<td><strong>Basic Analysis:</strong> The news agency is reporting the standpoint of the defendant. <strong>Likely reader stereotypes/Ideologies:</strong> Neutral. <strong>News agency Ideology(s):</strong> The use of official jargon ‘military rules of engagement’ ‘operational justification’ suggest that the Israeli army has high professional standards and therefore gives a positive image of it (fairly pro-Israel).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perspectivation (Direct)</td>
<td>Expressing involvement, positioning speaker’s point of view</td>
<td>Reporting, description, narration or quotation of events and utterances</td>
<td><strong>Basic Analysis:</strong> The news agency is introducing Israeli views on the subject. <strong>Background facts:</strong> Thousands of Israelis rallied in support of the Israeli soldier. He also received support from Benyamin Netanyahu. Relatively few Israelis</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
thought he should be charged. For further information, please see: [https://www.timesofisrael.com/netanyahu-backs-pardon-for-soldier-convicted-of-killing-wounded-stabber/](https://www.timesofisrael.com/netanyahu-backs-pardon-for-soldier-convicted-of-killing-wounded-stabber/)

**News agency stereotypes/ideologies:**
The news agency is seemingly objective, introducing different views of the incident, though the fact that these are all Israeli views gives the text a somewhat pro-Israeli ideology (pro-Israel).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Argumentation</th>
<th>Justification of positive or negative attributes</th>
<th>Topoi used to justify political inclusion or exclusion, discrimination or preferential treatment</th>
<th>The topoi of Humanitarianism is used here to explain that some action does not conform to human rights.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

| Perspectivation (Indirect) | Expressing involvement, positioning speaker’s point of view | Reporting, description, narration or quotation of events and utterances | **Basic Analysis:**
The news agency is presenting a perspective which incriminates Sgt Azaria.  

**Background facts:**
There are active human rights groups in Israel. A well-known one is B’Tselem. Refer to fact sheet 5.3 B’Tselem  

**Likely reader stereotypes/ideologies:**
Human rights groups are objective and deal with occupation crimes against humanity (pro-Palestinian).  

**News agency stereotypes/ideologies:**
Neutral |
|-----------------|-----------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

Human rights groups say Sgt Azaria carried out an extra-judicial killing,
while thousands of people who believe he did nothing wrong attended rallies in support of him last month.

| Perspectivation (Indirect) | Expressing involvement, positioning speaker’s point of view | Reporting, description, narration or quotation of events and utterances | **Basic Analysis:**
The news agency is presenting the perspective which supports Sgt Azaria.  
**Background facts:**
**Likely reader stereotypes/Ideologies:**
The Israeli society seems to be in support of aggression, and unwilling to accept the right of others to live freely without occupation (pro-Palestinian).  
**News agency likely Stereotype(S)/Ideology:**
This could give an image of public support for a rightful cause (fairly pro-Israel). |

| Perspectivation (Direct) | Expressing involvement, positioning speaker’s point of view | Reporting, description, narration or quotation of events and utterances | **Basic Analysis:**
A headline which espouses the position which supports the Israeli soldier and objects to his trial.  
**News agency stereotypes/ideologies:**
By using this headline, the news agency is adopting an ideology which is supportive to the Israeli stance in this issue (pro-Israel). | The Truth will out while thousands of people who believe he did nothing wrong attended rallies in support of him last month. |
| Perspectivation (Indirect) | Expressing involvement, positioning speaker’s point of view | Reporting, description, narration or quotation of events and utterances | Basic Analysis: The news agency is introducing the position of the supporters of Sgt Azaria. **Background facts:** The Defence team is planning an appeal and request for pardon. Eventually, Elor Azaria, was released after serving 9 months in prison. For further information, see: https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/elor-azaria-released-israel-defence-forces-soldier-convicted-manslaughter-palestinian-a8341581.html **Likely reader stereotypes/Ideologies:** a. Many of the verdicts of Israeli soldiers end in whitewash mechanisms (pro-Palestinian). b. It is right to follow the legal channels in well-established legal system (neutral). **News agency stereotypes/ideologies:** Truth and justice lay on the side of Sergeant Azaria and his supporters (pro-Israel) |

"The truth will come out. The path will be long. We will endure," said Binyamin Malka, a member of the soldier's defence team.
## Argumentation

| Justification of positive or negative attributes | Topoi used to justify political inclusion or exclusion, discrimination or preferential treatment, or the use of a fallacious discursive practices which violate the o more of the rules for rational disputes and constructive arguing. | The fallacy of ‘Appeal to Ignorance’ is used here, which serves to make the standpoint of the protagonist is “regarded as true if it has not been refuted”. However, the already available facts make it fairly clear that Azaria is guilty | "The truth will come out. The path will be long. We will endure," said Binyamin Malka, a member of the soldier's defence team. |

## Nomination

| Constructing social actors in in-groups and out-groups | Membership categorization Use of rhetorical figures | **Basic Analysis**
The social actor is constructed as the team of prosecutors who found the soldier guilty of ‘manslaughter’. | prosecutors |
| Nomination | Constructing social actors in in-groups and out-groups | Membership categorization | Use of rhetorical figures | **Basic Analysis:** The social actor is constructed as terrorist, which is very prejudiced and bigoted towards Arab Palestinians. It immediately provides a mitigating reason for the killing of a person who was incapacitated. | **Background facts:** Over many years of occupation, and to justify the oppression of Palestinians, the Israeli media has labelled Palestinian protestors or freedom fighters as terrorists. As an occupied people, the Palestinians have a legal right to resist occupation, including by military means: https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/american-journal-of-international-law/article/resistance-to-military-occupation-an-enduring-problem-in-international-law/AF4ADS1CF59A2DA9A3E63CE075AFA330/core-reader#
| Likely reader stereotypes/Ideologies: | a. Palestinians are resisting against occupation (pro-Palestinian). b. Palestinians are terrorists (pro-Israel). | News agency stereotypes/ideologies: The term ‘terrorist’ is a very negative stereotype in itself. It gained prominence in the 70’s as an ideological term used by Western political elite and Israeli politicians to describe PLO operations. Its extensive use could have made a stereotypical image of Palestinians. However, this image is slightly decreasing with repeated Palestinian attempts to present their side of the story (pro-Israel). | **Terrorist** |
| Perspectivation (Indirect) | Expressing involvement, positioning speaker’s point of view | Reporting, description, narration or quotation of events and utterances | **Basic Analysis:** The news agency is reporting the exact wording of the indictment pronounced by the prosecutors in which he was found guilty. **Likely stereotypes/ideologies:**

a. Although Israel has a seemingly well-established legal system, it resorts to whitewash mechanisms at some point when it comes to convicted Israeli soldiers (pro-Palestinian).

b. Israel has a well-established and fair legal military courts unlike most of its Arab neighbours (pro-Israel).

**News agency stereotypes/ideologies:** The report may enhance a positive stereotype of a fair Israel’s judicial system. At the same time, this seemingly reliable judicial system maintains the status of the Palestinian as a terrorist (pro-Israel). |

| In their indictment, prosecutors said Sgt Azaria "violated the rules of engagement without operational justification as the terrorist was lying on the ground wounded and represented no immediate threat for the accused or others who were present". |


Sharif and another Palestinian, Ramzi Aziz al-Qasrawi, stabbed and wounded an Israeli soldier in Hebron, in the occupied West Bank, on 24 March before troops opened fire on them, wounding Sharif and killing Qasrawi.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Perspectivation (Direct)</th>
<th>Reporting, description, narration or quotation of events and utterances</th>
<th>Basic Analysis: A description of the situation which shows involvement (mentioning of names and date). It also gives a comprehensive picture and more credibility to a certain situation but from a specific perspective to justify the act of killing.</th>
<th>Background facts: Though the news agency mentions that the stabbing happened in the occupied West Bank, but it is ignoring the history of the conflict and overlooking the occupation as the main reason for violence. For further information please see 4.6 Historical background</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Likely reader stereotypes/ideologies: Palestinians are responsible for violence in this ongoing conflict (pro-Israel).</td>
<td>News agency stereotypes/ideologies: The sequence in which the events are presented endorses the stereotype of violent/terrorist Palestinians (pro-Israel).</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nomination</th>
<th>Reporting, description, narration or quotation of events and utterances</th>
<th>Basic Analysis: The social actor is constructed as an Israeli human rights group</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Background facts: There are a number of human rights groups in Israel. The most well-known one is B’Tselem. Refer to fact sheet 5.3 B’Tselem</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Likely reader stereotypes/ideologies:</td>
<td>News agency stereotypes/ideologies:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Sharif and another Palestinian, Ramzi Aziz al-Qasrawi, stabbed and wounded an Israeli soldier in Hebron, in the occupied West Bank, on 24 March before troops opened fire on them, wounding Sharif and killing Qasrawi. |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Israeli human rights group | --- | --- | --- |
Footage of the scene several minutes later, filmed by a Palestinian nearby and released by an Israeli human rights group, shows Sharif alive.

A soldier, identified as Sgt Azaria, is then seen cocking his rifle and fatally shooting Sharif from several metres away.

| Perspectivation (Direct) | Expressing involvement, positioning speaker’s point of view | Reporting, description, narration or quotation of events and utterances | Basic Analysis: Another detailed description of the incident which supports the Palestinians perspective. **Likely stereotypes/ideologies:** This could be one of many stories of Israelis using excessive force against Palestinians (pro-Palestinian). **News agency stereotypes/ideologies:** Reporting that would give more credibility to the news outlet being seemingly balanced in its reporting as the description now leans towards the Palestinians perspective. However, the name of the Palestinian who filmed the incident is not mentioned and there is no quotation either (fairly pro-Palestinian). | Footage of the scene several minutes later, filmed by a Palestinian nearby and released by an Israeli human rights group, shows Sharif alive. A soldier, identified as Sgt Azaria, is then seen cocking his rifle and fatally shooting Sharif from several metres away. |
Afterwards, Sgt Azaria told Israeli military police: "When I looked at him I saw that he was moving his head, and his hand was within reach of the knife he used in the stabbing - the black knife. He moved his hand towards the knife."

He also said that he had feared that Sharif was wearing an explosive vest.

**Perspectivation** (Indirect)

| Reporting, description, narration or quotation of events and utterances | **Basic Analysis:** A direct quotation by the defendant himself in which he provides a more detailed description from an Israeli perspective. Azaria is trying to justify the killing by claiming that the victim was about to use a knife in an attempt to stab him. He even claims the incapacitated victim could have had an explosive vest. **Background facts:** The last decade has witnessed a rise in Islamic militancy, and the advent of Jihadist groups. Israel finds it useful to make a link between Palestinian resistance against occupation and the actions of these groups. **Likely reader stereotypes/ideologies:** a. This detailed quotation can reinforce a violent image of the Palestinians especially the use of lethal weapons (pro-Israel). b. Palestinians are Muslims and so they are liable to carry out suicide bombings (pro-Israel). **News agency stereotypes/ideologies:** Introduction of the violent images of the Palestinians. The lethal weapons, and the explosive vest which immediately evokes the stereotype of the Jihadist suicide bombers. For a Western reader, it is very easy to link between any Arab/Muslim and Islamist militancy especially in the last decade up till now (pro-Israel). |

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**Expressing involvement, positioning speaker's point of view**
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Predication</th>
<th>Labelling social actors negatively</th>
<th>Stereotypical evaluative attributes/traits</th>
<th>A strong stereotypical image also connection to Islamist militancy. It is used here to label the victim by giving a strong impression that he is a potential suicide bomber.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>News agency stereotypes/ideologies: (pro-Israel)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nomination</td>
<td>Constructing social actors in in-groups and out-groups</td>
<td>Membership categorization Use of rhetorical figures</td>
<td>Basic Analysis: The social actors are constructed as investigators in the Israeli army. Likely reader stereotypes/ideologies: Well organised military judicial system (pro-Israel). News agency stereotypes/ideologies: This nomination enhances an image of an organised Israeli judicial system (pro-Israel).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nomination</td>
<td>Constructing social actors in in-groups and out-groups</td>
<td>Membership categorization Use of rhetorical figures</td>
<td>The social actor is constructed as an Israeli commercial television which was established in 1990 to enhance competition and pluralism.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Israeli Channel 2 television</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
However, army investigators said that before he opened fire, Sgt Azaria had told a comrade that the wounded man “deserved to die” for stabbing his friend.

And on Sunday night, Israeli Channel 2 television broadcast a new video of the incident that appeared to show the knife mentioned by Sgt Azaria in his police statement was at least 1m (3ft) away from Sharif.

| Perspectivation (Indirect) | Expression involvement, positioning speaker’s point of view | Reporting, description, narration or quotation of events and utterances | **Basic Analysis:** Reporting and adding more details which are this time supportive of the Palestinian stand, and present evidence which refutes the claims of Sgt Azaria. | Likely reader stereotypes/ideologies: Aggressive Israeli army (pro-Palestinian).  
News agency stereotypes/ideologies: There is strong evidence which incriminates Sergeant Azaria. However the sources for this evidence are also Israeli (fairly pro-Palestinian). |
<table>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nomination</td>
<td>Constructing social actors in in-groups and out-groups</td>
<td>Membership categorization Use of rhetorical figures</td>
<td>The social actor is constructed as Israeli victims of Palestinian violence.</td>
<td>However, army investigators said that before he opened fire, Sgt Azaria had told a comrade that the wounded man &quot;deserved to die&quot; for stabbing his friend. And on Sunday night, Israeli Channel 2 television broadcast a new video of the incident that appeared to show the knife mentioned by Sgt Azaria in his police statement was at least 1m (3ft) away from Sharif.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nomination</td>
<td>Constructing social actors in in-groups and out-groups</td>
<td>Membership categorization Use of rhetorical figures</td>
<td>The social actors are constructed as the Palestinian victims of the Israeli response.</td>
<td>29 Israelis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nomination</td>
<td>Constructing social actors in in-groups and out-groups</td>
<td>Membership categorization Use of rhetorical figures</td>
<td>The social actors are constructed as the Palestinian victims of the Israeli response.</td>
<td>About 200 Palestinians</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Predication</td>
<td>Labelling social actors negatively</td>
<td>Stereotypical evaluative attributes/traits</td>
<td>Labelling the Palestinians negatively and stereotyping them as violent. <strong>News agency stereotypes/ideologies:</strong> (pro-Israel)</td>
<td>mostly attackers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------</td>
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<td>-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perspectivation (Direct)</td>
<td>Expressing involvement, positioning speaker’s point of view</td>
<td>Reporting, description, narration or quotation of events and utterances</td>
<td><strong>Basic Analysis:</strong> The news agency is foregrounding the violent incidents which Israel accuses Palestinians of having committed. The violence committed by Israel is mentioned later and also justified. Although the number of Palestinians killed is far higher than the number of Israelis, the Palestinians are described as attackers, thereby mitigating the act of killing on the Israeli side. <strong>Background facts:</strong> Refer to fact sheet 5.3 Hebron &amp; The Occupied West Bank <strong>Likely reader stereotypes/ideologies:</strong> a. Palestinians started the violence, and so they would pay the price (pro-Israel) b. Palestinians suffer from oppressive occupation and rebellious spikes are bound to occur. They are also paying heavy price for the excessive use of force by the Israelis (pro-Palestinian). <strong>News agency stereotypes/ideologies:</strong> Again the news agency is using techniques such as foregrounding violence committed by Palestinians to that of the Israelis, and justifying Israeli violence (pro-Israel).</td>
<td>Since October, 29 Israelis have been killed in stabbings, shootings or car-rammings by Palestinians or Israeli Arabs. About 200 Palestinians - mostly attackers, Israel says - have also been killed in that time.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Argumentation</td>
<td>Justification of positive or negative attributions</td>
<td>Topoi used to justify political inclusion or exclusion, discrimination or preferential</td>
<td><strong>The trajectio in alium</strong> Strategically employed in rationalisation, in the discursive construction of scapegoats, in victim-victimiser reversals consisting of putting the responsibility, guilt or blame on somebody else</td>
<td>A wave of stabbing, shooting and car-ramming attacks by Palestinians and Israeli Arabs over the past eight</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Nomination | Construction of social actors/in-groups and out-groups | Membership categorization | Use of rhetorical figures | The social actors are constructed as the Palestinians who are engaged in confrontations with the Israelis. They are constructed and labelled as the aggressors (pro-Israel news agency stereotype) | months have left 29 Israelis dead.
More than 200 Palestinians - mostly attackers, Israel says - have also been killed in that period.

*Basic Analysis:*
Constructing the social actors as the Israelis who shot Palestinians dead. However, the news agency still calls them victims and stipulates that the Palestinians were the aggressors.

**News agency stereotypes/ideologies:**
Reinforcing a stereotype that Israelis are usually the victims of Palestinian violence. The Palestinians were killed because they initiated violence on the part of either their pre-empted victims or by the legally forces responsible for keeping order (pro-Israel).

| Nomination | Construction of social actors/in-groups and out-groups | Membership categorization | Use of rhetorical figures | The social actors are constructed as Palestinians who engaged in confrontations with Israeli soldiers. | Other Palestinians

<p>| Nomination | Construction of social actors/in-groups and out-groups | Membership categorization | Use of rhetorical figures | The assailants |
| Perspectivation (Direct) | Expressing involvement, positioning speaker’s point of view | Reporting, description, narration or quotation of events and utterances | <strong>Basic Analysis:</strong> The news agency narrates the events and concludes the media text in a way that justifies the Israeli actions and underestimates the Palestinian suffering whether it was the number of victims or the background of the conflict (occupation and its consequences). It is adopting the Israeli narrative, and justifying the massive killing of Palestinians by holding them responsible. <strong>Likely reader stereotypes/ideologies:</strong> Palestinians are aggressors and so they would be dealt with accordingly (pro-Israeli). <strong>News agency stereotypes/ideologies:</strong> The ideology of the news agency continues to justify Israeli actions, and indirectly blames the Palestinians (pro-Israeli). | The assailants who have been killed have either been shot dead by their victims or security forces as they carried out attacks. Some attackers have been arrested. Other Palestinians have been killed in clashes with Israeli troops. |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Argumentation</th>
<th>Justification of positive or negative attributions</th>
<th>Begging the question</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Topoi used to justify political inclusion or exclusion, discrimination or preferential treatment. Fallacies that undermine or aims at discrediting the argument.</td>
<td>This means that what is controversial and in question is presupposed as the starting point. The text is presupposing that Palestinians are aggressors without any reference to the main reason for violence, which is occupation and its practices.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The assailants who have been killed have either been shot dead by their victims or security forces as they carried out attacks. Some attackers have been arrested. Other Palestinians have been killed in clashes with Israeli troops.
محاكمة جندي إسرائيلي متهم بقتل مهاجم فلسطيني جريح وقته

بدأت محكمة عسكرية في مدينة حيفا محاكمة جندي إسرائيلي اتهم بإطلاق النار على فلسطيني جريح وقته في الضفة الغربية المحتملة.

ويواجه الجندي، إلور أزاريا، تهمة القتل غير العمد في قضية أثارت جدلًا كبيرًا، وفي حالة نادرة لجندي في الخدمة.

و Возникло подозрение в убийстве Аزارией в результате открытия огня в ограниченной ситуации.

و كانت الحادثة، التي وقعت قبل شهرين، قد بدأت ببعض الهجمات، مثل الهجمات التي وقع فيها، وأصيب عدد من قوات الأمن والعمال الفلسطينيين.

وليتهم فلسطينيون إسرائيل باستخدام القوة المفرطة ضد المهاجمين في تلك الهجمات، الذين اتهموا بالفعل بعد محاكمة قوات الأمن أو بعض الأفراد لهم، إما أصيبوا، ويتهمونها أيضا بقتل مدنيين أبرياء في بعض الحالات.

و نشر شهادات عدد من مقاطع الفيديو التقطها هواة تدعم ما يقوله الفلسطينيون، أن حالة الخليل ربما كانت أقواها من حيث الدليل على ما يرتكبه الإسرائيليون.

و قد أفاد قادة في الجيش الإسرائيلي بما فعله الجندي. ولكن أزاريا نفسه يقول إنه كان يخشى أن يكون هذا الفلسطيني الجريح يخفي قنبلة.

وانتربع عناصر من اليمين الإسرائيلي للفعل على الجندي، متهمة الجيش بمعاملته غير عادلة.

وقال بنيامين نتنياهو، رئيس الوزراء، إن فريقهم مستعد لمتابعة التهم الموجهة إلى موقفه.

وأضاف: "هذه هي بداية المحاكمة الرسمية، ونحن مستعدين، وسنواصل خطنا في الدفاع. وسوف تظهر العدالة. الطريق سيكون طويلا، وسوف نتعامل معه".

Translation:

The trial of an Israeli soldier accused of killing a Palestinian attacker

Military court in Haifa started the trial of an Israeli soldier charged with shooting a wounded Palestinian and killing him in the occupied West Bank

The soldier, Elor Azaria faces the charge of manslaughter in a highly controversial and rare case of a soldier in military service facing charges of the like.
The incident which took place two months ago had earlier started with some stabbing incidents against Israeli army soldiers in Hebron.

The Israeli army said then that two Palestinians were killed after being shot while they were – according to the Israeli army – launching an attack with knives which caused the injury of an Israeli soldier.

Video clips which were later released by the human rights group B’ Tselem however, showed one of the attackers lying on his back wounded and incapacitated after being shot. It also showed how Azaria shot him at close range aiming at his head.

The incident took place amid a months’ long wave of attacks by Palestinians during which a number of security men, civilians and Palestinians were killed.

The Palestinians accuse Israel of using excessive force against the attackers who were either arrested after challenging the security forces or were injured. In some cases, they accuse Israel of killing innocent civilians.

Activists disseminated video clips taken by amateurs which confirm what the Palestinians say. The Hebron incident however, provided the strongest evidence of what the Israelis committed.

High-ranking officers in the Israeli army denounced what the soldier did, but Azaria himself says he feared the wounded Palestinian was hiding a bomb. Members of the Israeli right wing leapt to defend the soldier, accusing the army of treating him unfairly.

Binyamin Malka, Azaria’s lawyer said his team is ready to refute the charges against his client. He added: “This is the beginning of the official trial, we are prepared and will continue our defence, justice will come out, it will be a long road but we will deal with it”.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strategies</th>
<th>Objectives</th>
<th>Devices</th>
<th>Justification of Using a Particular Strategy</th>
<th>Translation of the Arabic text</th>
<th>Examples</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nomination</td>
<td>Construction of social actors/in-groups and out-groups</td>
<td>Membership categorization Use of rhetorical figures</td>
<td><strong>Basic Analysis</strong>&lt;br&gt;The social actor is constructed as a soldier in the Israeli army&lt;br&gt;&lt;br&gt;<strong>Background facts:</strong>&lt;br&gt;Refer to fact sheet 5.3 <em>Israeli Defence Forces (IDF)</em>&lt;br&gt;&lt;br&gt;<strong>Likely reader stereotype(s):</strong>&lt;br&gt;Someone who represents the oppression of the Israeli occupation (pro-Palestinian).&lt;br&gt;A member of the Israeli army who might be aggressive towards Palestinians. (Fairly pro-Palestinian).&lt;br&gt;&lt;br&gt;<strong>News agency stereotypes/ideologies:</strong>&lt;br&gt;Neutral</td>
<td>Israeli soldier</td>
<td>جندي إسرائيلي</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Perspectivation   | Expressing involvement, positioning speaker’s point of view | Reporting, description, narration or quotation of events and utterances | **Basic Analysis:**
The news agency gives this headline to the text, which describes the situation as a legal process taking place to hold accountable an Israeli soldier who had an exaggerated response to an act of violence by an outlaw or even a thug. **Background facts:**
Elor Azaria is a soldier in the IDF (Israeli Defence Army). He killed a wounded Palestinian after the Palestinian had stabbed another Israeli soldier. Elor Azaria was arrested and was tried in the military court. His case became controversial in Israel and many Israelis supported him but he was eventually convicted of manslaughter. For further information, refer to fact sheet 5.3 *Israeli Defence Forces (IDF)*, and to [http://www.jpost.com/Israel-News/Rule-of-Law-Verdict-time-for-Azaria-476933](http://www.jpost.com/Israel-News/Rule-of-Law-Verdict-time-for-Azaria-476933)

**Likely reader stereotype/ideologies:**
a. The Israeli military courts act as fair and transparent, but in fact they have clever ways to pardon their soldiers (pro-Palestinian).
b. Israel is the only democracy in the Middle East with a well-established judicial system which it applies equally to all including the Palestinians who Israel is in conflict with (pro-Israel).

**News agency stereotypes/ideologies:**
An image of Israel as a civilized state which maintains law and proper procedures despite conflict with the Palestinians (pro-Israel). Many, Arab readers may not however, be profoundly influenced by this image. For further information, please see: [http://www.pewglobal.org/2007/06/27/chapter-5-views-of-the-middle-east-conflict/](http://www.pewglobal.org/2007/06/27/chapter-5-views-of-the-middle-east-conflict/) | The trial of an Israeli soldier accused of killing a Palestinian attacker |

محاكمة جندي إسرائيلي متهم بقتل مهاجم فلسطيني جريح وقته
| Nomination | Construction of social actors/in-groups and out-groups | Membership categorization Use of rhetorical figures | The social actor is constructed as an Israeli military court responsible for trying military personnel. | Military court in Haifa |

| Perspectivation (Direct) | Expressing involvement, positioning speaker’s point of view | Reporting, description, narration or quotation of events and utterances | **Basic analysis:**  
The news agency is providing more information in this sub-headline like the location of the killing ‘the occupied West Bank’ and that of the trial, which was not mentioned in the English text. We also note the word ‘مهاجم’ ‘attacker’ is dropped from the Arabic text in the sub-headline.  

**Likely reader stereotype/ideologies:**  
a. The Israeli military courts act as fair and transparent, but in fact they have clever ways to pardon their soldiers (pro-Palestinian).  
b. Israel is the only democracy in the Middle East with a well-established judicial system which it applies equally to all including the Palestinians who Israel is in conflict with (pro-Israel).  

**News agency stereotypes/ideologies:**  
The news agency is providing a better image of Israel by presenting this news with a good amount of neutrality (fairly pro-Israeli). | Military court in Haifa |

|开始了军事法庭在海法市开庭审判一名被控向巴勒斯坦人开枪并致其重伤并致其死亡的以军士兵。  

**Likely reader stereotype/ideologies:**  
a. The Israeli military courts act as fair and transparent, but in fact they have clever ways to pardon their soldiers (pro-Palestinian).  
b. Israel is the only democracy in the Middle East with a well-established judicial system which it applies equally to all including the Palestinians who Israel is in conflict with (pro-Israel).  

**News agency stereotypes/ideologies:**  
The news agency is providing a better image of Israel by presenting this news with a good amount of neutrality (fairly pro-Israeli). | Military court in Haifa |
### Basic Analysis
The social actor is constructed as a soldier in the Israeli army charged with manslaughter. The age and military rank are dropped from the Arabic text which make him less personalised.

### Background facts
Please see the discussion above

### Reader likely stereotypes/ideologies:
- A member of the Israeli aggressor army who is likely to be a culprit in this case (pro-Palestinian).
- Neutral

### News agency stereotypes/ideologies:
Neutral

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nomination</th>
<th>Construction of social actors/in-groups and out-groups</th>
<th>Membership categorization Use of rhetorical figures</th>
<th>The soldier, Elor Azaria</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

الجند،
الورازاريا
| Perspectivation (Direct) | Expressing involvement, positioning speaker’s point of view | Reporting, description, narration or quotation of events and utterances | Basic Analysis: The news agency is neutrally introducing the general atmosphere in Israel regarding this case describing it as controversial and uncommon. Yet, it is adding that this is a ‘rare case’ of an Israeli soldier being tried suggests some sympathy for the Palestinians.  
Background facts: Please see the discussion above  
Reader likely stereotypes/ideologies: a. How many Israeli soldiers should face the same charge! (pro-Palestinian). b. Civilised and well-established judicial system which Israel applies to the Palestinians who it is in conflict with (pro-Israel).  
News agency Stereotypes/ideologies: The text shows an ideological bias to the Israeli side. This is shown through the neutral reporting of the events without reference to many injustices imposed on the Palestinians (pro-Israel). | The soldier, Elor Azaria faces the charge of manslaughter in a highly controversial and rare case of a soldier in military service facing charges of the like  
Israeli army soldiers |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Nomination | Construction of social actors/in-groups and out-groups | Membership categorization Use of rhetorical figures | Basic Analysis: Constructing the social actors as soldiers in the Israeli army.  
Background facts: Refer to factsheet 5.3 Israeli Defence Forces (IDF)  
Likely reader stereotypes/ideologies: Individuals who belong to a very strong military forces that tend to use excessive force against unarmed Palestinians (pro-Palestinian).  
News agency Stereotypes/ideologies: Neutral |ـبوواجه الجندي، إلور أزاريا، تهمة القتل غير العمد في قضية أثارت جدلا كبيرا، وفي حالة نادرة لجندي في الخدمة يواجه مثل تلك التهم.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Perspectivation (Indirect)</th>
<th>Expressing involvement, positioning speaker’s point of view</th>
<th>Reporting, description, narration or quotation of events and utterances</th>
<th>Basic Analysis: A mild description/reporting of the situation which is less supportive of the Israeli perspective from the English text, but does not convey a comprehensive picture of the nature of the conflict.</th>
<th>The incident which took place 2 months ago had earlier started with some stabbing incidents to the Israeli soldiers in Hebron</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Background facts:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>Refer to fact sheet 5.3 Hebron</td>
<td><strong>Likely reader stereotypes/ideologies:</strong> a. Palestinians have the right to resist occupation (pro-Palestinian). b. Palestinians suffer from oppressive occupation and rebellious spikes are bound to occur (pro-Palestinian).</td>
<td><strong>News agency Stereotypes/ideologies:</strong> Seemingly neutral reporting of the incident, however, it ignores the roots of the conflict (fairly pro-Israel).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mitigation</td>
<td>Modifying the epistemic status of the proposition</td>
<td>Intensifying or mitigating the illocutionary force of discriminatory utterances</td>
<td>The stabbing incidents are mitigated by using ‘some’</td>
<td>some</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

وكانت الحادثة، التي وقعت قبل شهرين، قد بدأت ببعض الهجمات طعنا تعرض لها جنود في القوات الإسرائيليّة في الخليل. |
### Nomination of social actors/in-groups and out-groups

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nomination</th>
<th>Construction of social actors/in-groups and out-groups</th>
<th>Membership categorization Use of rhetorical figures</th>
<th>Basic Analysis: The social actor is constructed as the Israeli army.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>The Israeli army</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Background facts:
Refer to Fact sheet 5.3 Israeli Defence Forces (IDF)

### Likely reader Stereotypes/ideologies:
Strong army that tends to wage wars and use excessive force against disarmed Palestinians (pro-Palestinian).

### News agency Stereotypes/ideologies:
Neutral

### Basic Analysis:
The news agency is quoting directly and indirectly the Israeli army, which is presenting a scenario that incriminates the two Palestinians and justifies the killing at the hands of the Israeli soldier. The news agency is however stressing that it is quoting the Israeli army and adopting its scenario, which is different from the English text.

### Likely reader Stereotypes/ideologies:
- a. Palestinians have the right to resist occupation (pro-Palestinian).
- b. Israelis try to justify killing Palestinians by claiming that Palestinians are initiating violence (pro-Palestinian).

### News agency Stereotypes/ideologies:
Quoting the Israeli army gives indirect credibility to its scenario which incriminates Palestinians (fairly pro-Israel).

---

**Perspicuation (Indirect)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Perspicuation</th>
<th>Expressing involvement, positioning speaker’s point of view</th>
<th>Reporting, description, narration or quotation of events and utterances</th>
<th>Basic Analysis: The news agency is quoting directly and indirectly the Israeli army, which is presenting a scenario that incriminates the two Palestinians and justifies the killing at the hands of the Israeli soldier. The news agency is however stressing that it is quoting the Israeli army and adopting its scenario, which is different from the English text.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>The Israeli army said then that two Palestinians were killed after being shot while they were – according to the Israeli army – launching an attack with knives which caused the injury of an Israeli soldier.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

**News agency Stereotypes/ideologies:**
Quoting the Israeli army gives indirect credibility to its scenario which incriminates Palestinians (fairly pro-Israel).
| Nomination | Construction of social actors/in-groups and out-groups | Membership categorization Use of rhetorical figures | **Basic Analysis:** Constructing the social actor as an Israeli human rights group  
Background facts: Please see fact sheet 5.3 B’Tselem  
Likely reader Stereotypes/ideologies: A glance of hope for justice for Palestinians (pro-Palestinian).  
News agency Stereotypes/ideologies: Neutral | the human rights group B’Tselem |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Nomination | Construction of social actors/in-groups and out-groups | Membership categorization Use of rhetorical figures | **Basic Analysis:** Constructing the social actor as one of the Palestinian attackers who was lying on the floor and was incapacitated  
Background facts: Please see the discussion above  
Likely reader Stereotypes/ideologies: An image of a Palestinian victim would be dominant even though the text mentions مهاجم ‘attacker’ (pro-Palestinian).  
News agency Stereotypes/ideologies: The news agency continues with its seemingly neutral reporting which ignores the roots of the conflict (fairly pro-Israel). | one of the attackers lying on his back wounded and incapacitated after being shot |

أحد المهاجِمين وهو ملقٍ على ظهره جريحاً على الأرض
جماعة بيت سيلم لحقوق الإنسان

187
Basic Analysis: The news agency is indirectly reporting the view point of a human rights groups which provides details that support the Palestinian position.

Likely reader Stereotypes/ideologies: Palestinians are often targeted by the Israeli army, and this anecdote confirms that (pro-Palestinian)

News agency Stereotypes/ideologies: Neutral

Video clips which were later released by the human rights group B’Tselem however, showed one of the attackers lying on his back wounded and incapacitated after being shot. It also showed how Azaria shot him at close range aiming at his head.
| Nomination | Construction of social actors/in-groups and out-groups | Membership categorization | Use of rhetorical figures | **Basic Analysis:** | **Background facts:** | Likely Reader Stereotypes/ideologies: | News agency Stereotypes/ideologies: | Membership categorization | Use of rhetorical figures | **Basic Analysis:** | **Background facts:** | Reader likely Stereotypes/ideologies: | News agency Stereotypes/ideologies: | Nomination |
|-------------|------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------|---------------------------|-------------------|-----------------|--------------------------|--------------------------|---------------------------|---------------------------|-------------------|--------------------------|--------------------------|-------------------|
| Palestinian | Refer to fact sheet 5.3 *The Palestinians*          | a. Oppressed people under Israeli occupation (pro-Palestinian). | Neutral                  |                    |                 |                          |                          | security men, civilians |                         | security men, civilians |                          |                          |                         | 189 |
| Israeli security forces and civilians | The news agency missed out the fact that some of the civilians are Israeli settlers. | a. The Israeli security forces oppress the Palestinians, and the civilians could well be Israeli settlers who are allowed by Israeli law to carry weapons and use them (pro-Palestinian). | Neutral                  |                    |                 |                          |                          | security men, civilians |                         | security men, civilians |                          |                          |                         | 189 |
| Perspectivation (Direct) | Expressing involvement, positioning speaker’s point of view | Reporting, description, narration or quotation of events and utterances | Basic Analysis: The news agency is describing the situation from a seemingly neutral perspective. However, it is again foregrounding the Israeli casualties and stressing that the attacks are ‘launched by Palestinians’. It is also ignoring the number of casualties on both sides which shows the huge number of Palestinian casualties in comparison with the Israelis.  
**Background facts:** Please see the discussion above  
**Reader stereotypes/Ideologies:** Palestinians who are under occupation have the right to resist (pro-Palestinian).  
**News agency stereotypes/Ideologies:** Again the news agency is endorsing a pro-Israel ideology in presenting the news. Please see ‘basic analysis’ above (pro-Israel). | The incident took place amid months’ long wave of attacks by Palestinians during which a number of security men, civilians and Palestinians were killed.  
وقد وقعت الحادثة وسط موجة من الهجمات شنها فلسطينيون واستمرت شهرًا وقُتل فيها وأصيب عدد من قوات الأمن والمدنيين والفلسطينيين. |

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<p>| 190 |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nomination</th>
<th>Construction of social actors/in-groups and out-groups</th>
<th>Membership categorization</th>
<th>Use of rhetorical figures</th>
<th>Basic Analysis: The social actor is constructed as the state of Israel</th>
<th>Background facts: Refer to fact sheet 5.3 Israel</th>
<th>Likely reader stereotypes/ideologies:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>a. An enemy by default responsible for many crimes towards Arabs over many years (pro-Palestinian).</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>b. Rogue state which was established on stolen land, and which keeps a policy of land and culture annexation (pro-Palestinian).</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>c. A de facto state which has the full support of the US (international super power) and we need to deal with this reality (neutral).</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>d. A potential ally against more dangerous enemies (Iran) (pro-Israel).</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>News agency stereotypes/ideologies: Neutral</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Israel**
| Nomination | Construction of social actors/in-groups and out-groups | Membership categorization | Use of rhetorical figures | **Basic Analysis:** The social actors are constructed as the Palestinian attackers.  
**Likely reader Stereotypes/ideologies:** For the majority of the Arabic readers, Palestinian attacks are justified and viewed as a type of resistance (pro-Palestinian).  
**News agency stereotypes/ideologies:** The news agency maintains qualifying the Palestinians involved in the incident as attackers regardless of surrounding circumstances created by the Israeli occupation (pro-Israel). | attackers | المهاجمين |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Nomination | Construction of social actors/in-groups and out-groups | Membership categorization | Use of rhetorical figures | **Basic Analysis:** The social actors are constructed as innocent Palestinian civilians.  
**Likely reader Stereotypes/ideologies:** Many innocent Palestinians are victims of Israeli aggression (pro-Palestinian).  
**News agency stereotypes/ideologies:** Neutral | Innocent civilians | مدنيين أبرياء |
| Perspectivation (Indirect) | Expressing involvement, positioning speaker’s point of view | Reporting, description, narration or quotation of events and utterances | **Basic Analysis:**
The news agency is reporting the Palestinian perspective and describing the indiscriminate excessive force Israel is using against Palestinians.  
**Background facts:**
Refer to fact sheet 5.3 Hebron, Israeli Defence Forces & The occupied West Bank  
**Reader Stereotypes/Ideologies:**
The Arab audience is more aware of the meagre means of resistance which Palestinians possess, and are likely to believe and agree with this perspective. The image of Israel as a strong aggressive power in the region though weakened but still exists in the Arab mind (pro-Palestinian).  
**News agency stereotypes/Ideologies:**
Neutral | The Palestinians accuse Israel of using excessive force against the attackers who were either arrested after challenging the security forces or were injured. In some cases, they accuse Israel of killing innocent civilians. | ويتهم فلسطينيون إسرائيل باستخدام القوة المفرطة ضد المهاجمين في تلك الهجمات، الذين أوقفوا بالفعل بعد مجابهةقوات الأمن أو بعض الأفراد منهم، وإما أصيبوا، ويتهمونها أيضا بقتل مدنيين أبرياء في بعض الحالات. |
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nomination</th>
<th>Construction of social actors/in-groups and out-groups</th>
<th>Membership categorization Use of rhetorical figures</th>
<th><strong>Basic Analysis:</strong> The social actors are constructed as supporters of human rights and Palestinians’ rights. <strong>Likely reader Stereotypes/ideologies:</strong> Relatively new concept to the Arab mentality for two reasons: first, the general idea that Israelis are aggressors, second, the non-democratic Arab states which suppress all anti-establishment voices (neutral). <strong>News agency stereotypes/ideologies:</strong> Neutral</th>
<th>activists</th>
<th>نشطاء</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nomination</th>
<th>Construction of social actors/in-groups and out-groups</th>
<th>Membership categorization</th>
<th>Use of rhetorical figures</th>
<th>Basic Analysis: The social actors are constructed as the Israeli army, security forces, Israeli civilians and illegal settlers in the West Bank.</th>
<th>Background facts: Refer to fact sheet 5.3 The Israelis (Israeli society)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

| Israelis | الإسرائيليون |
| Perspectivation (Direct) | Expressing involvement, positioning speaker’s point of view | Reporting, description, narration or quotation of events and utterance | **Basic Analysis:**
The news agency is providing details of evidence of the Israeli use of excessive force. **Background facts:**
Refer to fact sheet 5.3 Hebron
**Likely reader Stereotypes/ideologies:**
There are many Palestinian victims of the Israeli occupation/oppression (pro-Palestinian).
**News agency stereotypes/Ideologies:**
The Palestinian point of view is taken into consideration (pro-Palestinian).
**Activists disseminated video clips taken by amateurs which confirm what the Palestinians say. The Hebron incident however, provided the strongest evidence of what the Israelis committed.**

ونشر نشطاء عدد من مقاطع الفيديو التقطها هواة تؤيد ما يقوله الفلسطينيون. غير أن حادثة الخليل ربما كانت أقوىها من حيث الدليل على ما يرتكبه الإسرائيليون.
### Nomination

**Construction of social actors/in-groups and out-groups**

**Membership categorization**

**Use of rhetorical figures**

**Basic analysis:**
The social actors are constructed as high-ranking officers in the Israeli army.

**Background facts:**
Refer to fact sheet 5.3 *The Israeli Defence Forces (IDF)*

**Likely reader Stereotypes/Ideologies:**
Leaders in an army with history of aggression towards Palestinians and some Arab neighbouring countries (pro-Palestinian).

**News agency stereotypes/Ideologies:**
Neutral

### Perspectivation (Indirect)

**Expressing involvement, positioning speaker’s point of view**

**Reporting, description, narration or quotation of events and utterance**

**Basic Analysis:**
High ranking officers in the Israeli army have expressed their dissatisfaction with the soldier’s action.

**Likely reader Stereotypes/Ideologies:**
Military leaders whose non-biased opinion can be very surprising (fairly pro-Israel).

**News agency stereotypes/Ideologies:**
Pluralistic and democratic military establishment (pro-Israel).

High-ranking officers in the Israeli army denounced what the soldier did.

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قد ندد قادة في الجيش الإسرائيلي بما فعله الجندي.
| Perspectivation (Indirect) | Expressing involvement, positioning speaker’s point of view | Reporting, description, narration or quotation of events and utterance | Basic Analysis: Azaria claimed that the wounded Palestinian could have hidden a bomb which is an implausible excuse. The news agency reports this in both texts but it is reduced from an ‘explosive vest’ in the English text to the less specific ‘bomb’ in the Arabic text.  
Likely reader Stereotypes/Ideologies: Israelis may make up lies to incriminate Arabs (pro-Palestinian).  
News agency stereotypes/Ideologies: The Israeli soldier’s story is taken into consideration, however, it is downplayed in the Arabic text (fairly pro-Israel). | but Azaria himself says he feared the wounded Palestinian was hiding a bomb. |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Predication | Labelling social actors negatively | Stereotypical evaluative attributes/traits | Although this is a verbal phrase, it refers to a stereotypical trait and an evaluative attribute which is that of a violent attacker or a suicide bomber.  
News agency stereotypes/Ideologies: (Pro-Israel) | Hiding a bomb |
| Perspectivation (Indirect) | Expressing involvement, positioning speaker’s point of view | Reporting, description, narration or quotation of events and utterance | Basic Analysis: The news agency is reporting the controversy prompted by the incident. Some commanders in the Israeli army have been critical of the soldier’s behaviour, while right-wing members of the government defended Azaria and criticised the military establishment.  
Likely reader Stereotypes/Ideologies: It is expected that Netanyahu’s government would not side by the Palestinian victims (pro-Palestinian).  
News agency stereotypes/Ideologies: Neutral | Members of the Israeli right wing leapt to defend the soldier, accusing the army of treating him unfairly. |
Binyamin Malka, Azaria's lawyer said his team is ready to refute the charges against his client. He added: “This is the beginning of the official trial. We are prepared and will continue our defence. Justice will come out. It will be a long road but we will deal with it”.

**Basic Analysis:**
The news agency is presenting the viewpoint of the defendant's lawyer, which is of course very biased. He is ready to refute the charges against Azaria and sees justice only in his acquittal of all charges against him. The Arabic text uses the term ‘العدالة’ ‘justice’ instead of ‘truth’ in the English one, which is rather milder.

**Likely reader Stereotypes/Ideologies:**
The concept of justice in the Israeli mind is very twisted! (pro-Palestinian).

**News agency stereotypes/Ideologies:**
Quoting the Azaria’s lawyer who is presuming that justice can only be realised when he is acquitted of all charges is an indirect endorsement of this point of view (pro-Israel).
| Argumentation | Justification of positive or negative attributions | Topoi used to justify political inclusion or exclusion, discrimination or preferential treatment. Fallacies that undermine or aims at discrediting the argument | The *trajectio in alium* | Strategically employed in rationalisation, in the discursive construction of scapegoats, in victim-victimiser reversals consisting of putting the responsibility, guilt or blame on somebody else. It also uses the begging the question fallacy which presupposes what is in question and controversial as a starting point. | He added: “This is the beginning of the official trial, we are prepared and will continue our defence, justice will come out, it will be a long way but we will deal with it”. |

وأضاف “هذه هي بداية المحاكمة الرسمية، ونحن مستعدون، وسنواصل خطنا في الدفاع. وسوف تظهر العدالة. الطريق سيكون طويلا، وسوف نتعامل معه”. |
Discussion

Qualitative analysis

The English text may seem balanced to a reader who has minimal background on the Israel/Palestine question. It has almost evenly distributed the paragraphs to cover both the Israeli and the Palestinian sides of the story. Yet, starting with the headline, which is usually the most prominent feature, Palestinians are labelled as attackers and the Israeli soldier who might have not abided by the laws of engagement will be on trial. This gives the impression that Israel is a state of institutions and fairness facing savage Palestinians who use barbaric tools to attack civil Israelis. There is also this image of a democratic Israel which has human rights groups, free demonstrations and freedom of expression. The text however, foregrounds the Israeli point of view and sometimes marginalises the Palestinian one. The text uses a sub-headline ‘The truth will out’ which suggests that truth is on the Israeli side. There is also this strong association between Palestinian attackers and suicide bombers in ‘explosive vest’, which is very suggestive of an Islamist militant dimension of the Palestinian resistance.

Instead of ‘explosive vest, Arabic text uses ‘hiding a bomb’ (يخفي قنبلة), which is indicative of violence, but not of Islamic militancy. Moreover, the English text refers to Palestinians as ‘terrorists’, ‘assailants’ and ‘attackers’, which are very negative terms, and enhance a violent stereotype of the Palestinians. The text informs the reader about the demonstrations and rallies in support of Azaria which were attended by thousands. This confirms what was mentioned in a previous text about the discriminatory trends in Israeli society.

The Arabic text takes into consideration the Arabic audience who largely sympathises with the long Palestinian suffering under Israeli occupation. In comparison with the English text, it mentions in the headline ‘wounded Palestinian’ (فلسطيني جريح), ‘the occupied West Bank’ (الضفة الغربية المحتلة) – two nominal phrases which preserve the Arab perspective (Palestine is an occupied territory and the Palestinians are oppressed people). However, the text maintains the use of ‘attacker’ (مهاجم) to describe the Palestinians involved in stabbings. The text also avoids mentioning details such as the names of the attackers and details regarding the divide in Israeli public opinion. While
the English text says that the video was broadcast on Israeli television (Channel 2), the Arabic one says that the video was released by a Human Right’s group, B’Tselem, and later by anonymous activists. The English foregrounds the Israeli deaths and elaborates on the many methods the Palestinian and Israeli Arabs use to attack Israelis. Despite the details of the Hebron incident and the alternative views mentioned in the English text, it describes the Israeli casualties as victims and the Palestinians as attackers. The Arabic text however, does not totally adopt the Palestinian side as it mentions the wave of stabbings attributed to Palestinians, and the casualties among all parties. However, the Arabic text sometimes uses a phrase like بحسب ما قاله الجيش ‘according to Israeli army sources’, which implies that the news agency is distancing itself from the information given.

Elor Azaria, has been released from prison after serving 9 months out of his 14 months sentence. For further information, please see https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/elor-azaria-released-israel-defence-forces-soldier-convicted-manslaughter-palestinian-a8341581.html.

**Quantitative analysis**

The quantitative analysis of the English and Arabic texts give total scores as follows:

**English text: news service stereotypes/ideologies**

The quantitative analysis of the English text gives a total score of -34 for news service stereotypes/ideologies, with 26 relevant records. The average score per record (-34 ÷ 26) is thus -1.3. This indicates that the news service stereotypes/ideologies are clearly anti-Palestinian/pro-Israel.

**English text: reader stereotypes/ideologies**

The quantitative analysis of the English text gives a total score of 1 for reader stereotypes/ideologies, with 21 relevant records. The average score per record (1 ÷ 21) is thus 0.047. This indicates that the reader stereotypes/ideologies are very slightly pro-Palestinian.
**Arabic text: news service stereotypes/ideologies**

The quantitative analysis of the Arabic text gives a total score of -18 for news service stereotypes/ideologies, with 26 relevant records. The average score per record (-18 ÷ 26) is thus -0.692. This indicates that the news service stereotypes/ideologies are fairly anti-Palestinian/Pro Israel.

**Arabic text: reader stereotypes/ideologies**

The quantitative analysis of the Arabic text gives a total score of 38.66 for reader stereotypes/ideologies, with 27 relevant records. The average score per record (38.66 ÷ 25) is thus 1.43. This indicates that the reader stereotypes/ideologies are clearly pro-Palestinian.

**Comparison of qualitative and quantitative analyses in relation to news service stereotypes/ideologies**

The qualitative analysis of the English text shows that it highlights the incident and the trial without providing the necessary background of the violence, and uses negative stereotypical terms to refer to Palestinians and also hints to Islamic militancy at the Palestinian side. The text also refrains from using the term occupation as in the Arabic text. It then exhibits substantial anti-Palestinian ideology which is reflected in the quantitative analysis result/score.

The qualitative analysis of the Arabic text shows that the Palestinian side is under occupation when it mentions the occupied West bank, and preserves the Arabic perspective of the conflict which is an occupied territory by Israeli forces. However, in the quantitative analysis, the text remains slightly pro-Israel.
5.4.1 The overall averages of the Israel/Palestine conflict

Figure 5-2

Figure 5-3
5.5 Fact sheet (Islamophobia)

(1) Ahrar al-Sham
Ahrar al-Sham is a Sunni Salafist militant group. It was formed in November 2011, and operated all over Syria but was first based in Idlib region (Stanford University, 2017). Some leading members of the group were imprisoned by the Syrian government for their Islamist leaning, but were released in 2011. The movement of Ahrar al-Sham aimed at toppling al-Assad’s rule and establishing a government guided the Islam teachings (al Jazeera, ND).

(2) al-Qaeda
According to the BBC, “Al-Qaeda is an organisation of Islamic militants that has declared "holy war" on Americans, Jews and their allies. It is blamed for thousands of deaths in the 11 September attacks on the US and other attacks around the world. [...] Experts say it is a loose-knit global network, with links to radical groups in Algeria, Central Asia, Kashmir, the Philippines and across the Middle East” (BBC, 2006).

(3) al-Qaeda in Yemen:
Islamic militancy represented by al-Qaeda has struck Yemen in the past decades. Al-Qaeda in Yemen was formed in the year 2000. In 2009, it merged with the Saudi branch to form al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). IS presence in Yemen was formally acknowledged in 2014, and it had a growing presence in southern areas where

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8 Al Jazeera, ND. [Online]. [Accessed 4 November 2018]. Available from: http://www.aljazeera.net/encyclopedia/movementsandparties/2014/9/11/%D8%AD%D8%B1%D9%83%D8%A9-%D8%A3%D8%AD%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%B1-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B4%D8%A7%D9%85
significant Sunni population exists. For more information about the rise of the Islamic State in Yemen, see:\(^{10}\):

\((4)\) **Association of Muslim Scholars of Iraq**

A religious and political organisation which emerged in the post-Saddam era to advocate for Sunni Arab interests, and resist the ‘American occupation’. It springs from the Muslim Brotherhood. For further information, see section 5.6.1 on Islamism.

\((5)\) **Ayman al-Zawahiri**

An Egyptian doctor who comes from a distinguished Egyptian family. He had links to the Egyptian Islamic Jihad before joining the Mujahedeen in Afghanistan. He succeeded Osama Ben Laden in leading Al Qaeda (CNN, 2018).

\((6)\) **Badr Organisation**

The organisation was founded in 1983 by Hadi al-Amiri as a Shia Iranian-backed proxy. During 1983-2003 it operated from Iran against the regime of Saddam Hussein and fought against Iraq during the Iran-Iraq war (1980-1988). After the fall of Saddam Hussein in 2003, the organisation returned to Iraq, and renamed itself as the ‘Badr Organisation for Reconstruction and Development’. During 2004-2006 it was accused of committing atrocities against the Arab Sunni population in Iraq. The Badr organisation split from the Supreme Council of Iraq in 2012 and maintained in addition to its links to Iran both military and political roles. The Badr Organisation took part in fighting Islamic State alongside the Iraqi army and other Shia militias. For further information, see: *Iraq Conflict* \(^{11}\)


(7) Free Syrian Army
It was formed in the first year of the revolution (2011) mainly from defecting secular Syrian army members. However, it didn’t receive enough backing or support till Turkey recognised it in 2017 to create a ‘safe zone’ in northern Syria.

(8) Haider al-Abadi
Haider al-Abadi was Iraqi Prime Minister from 2014 to 2018. He is the chairman of the Islamic Dawa Party which was persecuted during the rule of Saddam Hussein. The Dawa party calls for the creation of an Islamic state in Iraq based on the values of Shia Islam. The al-Abadi government was supported by Iran.

(9) Hezbollah
Hezbollah (literally ‘Party of God’) is a Shia Islamist, social, political and paramilitary movement (Worrall, Mabon and Clubb, 2016 pp. 7-10). It was founded during the period following the Israeli invasion of South Lebanon in 1982, and is backed by Iran. Hezbollah was formally established in 1985. It gradually gained power in the Lebanese political system, being officially represented in the Parliament in 1992 (Worrall, Mabon and Clubb, 2016 p. 92). In the year 2000 Hezbollah was given credit for driving Israeli forces out of South Lebanon. After the liberation of the Lebanese territories, the issue of the party’s arms was debated extensively. However, Hezbollah refused to renounce its arms, which increased tension between Hezbollah and other Lebanese political parties particularly the Future Movement, which is aligned with Saudi Arabia. In 2006, Israel fought a devastating war against Hezbollah, which lasted for 34 days. In recent years, Hezbollah intervened in Syria siding with the al-Assad government against opposition factions supported by Saudi, Qatar and Turkey. This military intervention has deepened the rivalry between Iran and Saudi Arabia and also the Sunni/Shia sectarian division. Hezbollah is designated as a terrorist organisation by the governments of the United
States, Israel, Canada, the Arab league\textsuperscript{12}, the Gulf Cooperation Council\textsuperscript{13}, the United Kingdom, Australia and the European Union. Hezbollah fought a bitter war against the Israeli occupation of South Lebanon which started in the late 1970’s but more land was encroached upon after the 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon. Hezbollah was the major Lebanese power which undertook the responsibility of liberating South Lebanon from the Israeli occupation which spanned over two decades but was finally achieved in the year 2000. “Hizbu’llah defines itself first and foremost as a ‘jihadist movement’ or a ‘party of the resistance’ whose paramount function is the liberation of Lebanese territory from Israeli occupation by means of armed resistance” (Saad-Ghorayeb, 2002, p.112).

\textbf{(10) Houthis}

The Houthis are a group of mainly Zaidi Yemenis (an offshoot of Shia Islam) who hail from Sa’ada governorate in the northern Yemen. The Houthi group was founded in the 1990’s by Hussein Badreddin al-Houthi. Their official name is Ansarullah. They attempted a revolt against President Ali Abdallah Salih in 2004. During the political anarchy that followed the Yemeni revolution, the Houthis executed a coup against President Abd Rabbuh Mansour Hadi and forced him to flee the country, seizing the capital Sana’a. Iran is considered an ally of this movement and thought to have been providing it with arms\textsuperscript{14} (The Sydney Morning Herald, 2017).

\textbf{(11) Iran}

Iran is a state in West Asia on the Persian Gulf with a population of around 81 million. The Pahlavi dynasty ruled Iran from 1926 to 1979. From the 1920’s through to the 1940’s the British owned the oil company which had the rights of drilling, refining and of selling Iranian oil. By the end the WW2 Iran like other Middle Eastern countries experienced a wave of nationalism. In 1951, Prime Minister Mohammad Mossadeq nationalised the oil company and promised that Iranian oil profits would be used to develop Iran. This was followed by Western interference to restore British and American interests in Iran. Premier Mossadaq was imprisoned and the Shah went on to rule Iran with an iron fist, torturing and killing all his dissidents (Abrahamian, 2008, pp. 113-122). In 1979 a religious dissident Ayatollah Khomeini returned from exile in France to culminate a popular revolution against Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi. Iran is still under the rule of Ayatollahs (velayat-e faqeh) following the Shia Islam faith despite sporadic popular unrest in recent years. American hostage crisis in 1979 was followed by sanctions imposed by the United States which saw in Iran a major threat to both America and Israel. Regionally, Iran fought a devastating war with Iraq (1980-1988). It has intervened in a number of Middle Eastern countries (Iraq, Syria, Yemen) causing a lot of tension with the conservative Sunni Gulf countries, particularly Saudi Arabia. However and as Ervand Abrahamian (2008) puts it “Iran entered the twenty-first century as a major regional power – certainly in the Persian Gulf, if not in the entire Middle East. With some 70 million people, it is the largest country in the region. It plays a key role in the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries, is the world’s third largest producer of oil” (Abrahamian, 2008, p. 194).

12 Islamic state

Islamic State; also known as Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), and Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) and Islamic State (IS). It is self-governed according to Salafi laws inspired by the Wahhabist doctrine.

In the wake of the American invasion of Iraq, ISIS originated as a group which paid allegiance to al-Qaeda in 2004. The aim of the group was to expel the American troops

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and establish a Sunni Islamist state in Iraq. When the Syrian civil war broke out, the group expanded into Syria and gained ground in both Syria and Iraq. The major achievement of ISIS was to capture of Mosul the second biggest Iraqi city in North Iraq in 2014.

“ISIS aims to create an Islamic state called a caliphate across Iraq, Syria and beyond” (CNN, 2017). The group implements an austere version of Sharia Law inspired by the teachings of Muhammed ibn Abd al-Wahhab (an 18th century Muslim scholar, who resided in the Arab Peninsula and the spiritual forebear of the Saudi state). Islamic State is involved in mass killings, abductions and beheadings (BBC, 2015). Many suicide bombings in Iraq were claimed by Islamic State.

The group has also been involved in fighting the Syrian and Iraqi authorities but it also engaged in fights with Jabhat al-Nusra and other Islamist groups in Syria. Islamic State is responsible for the killing of many people in Syria and Iraq who belong to different sects and religions and political affiliations including Sunnis. It has also claimed responsibility for terror attacks and suicide bombings in the Middle East, Europe and the US: Charlie Hebdo, January 2015; Paris attacks November, 2015; Brussels Bombings, March 2016; Nice terror attack, July, 2016; Normandy church attack, July 2016; Berlin Christmas market attack, December 2016; Westminster attack, March 2017; Stockholm attack, April 2017; Paris shooting, April 2017; Manchester terror attack, May 2017; London Bridge terror attack, June, 2017; Spanish terror attacks, August 2017. In the US it carried out terror attacks in San Bernardino, California, December, 2015; and Orlando, Florida, June, 2016. The victims of the Islamic State however are mainly Muslims.

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(13) Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC)
A significant military militia, which was created after the Islamic Revolution in Iran in 1979. Its prime purpose is to maintain the national security and safeguard the Islamic revolution. The IRGC has become a strong player inside Iran and across the region especially through the Quds force, which has worked closely with Hezbollah and Hamas. IRGC has conducted operations in Iraq, Bosnia and recently in Syria, where it has offered advice and military support to President Bashar al-Assad’s government since 2012. The commander of the Quds force is Maj. Gen. Qasem Soleimani.

(14) Jabhat al-Nusra (Jabhat Fateh al-Sham)
An offshoot of Al-Qaeda, Jabhat al-Nusra (Jabhat Fateh al-Sham) was founded by Abu Muhammad al-Jawlani in 2012 in Syria taking advantage of the opportunity afforded by the chaos that followed the uprising against al-Assad’s rule. The group has a Salafist jihadist ideology which eventually aims at establishing an Islamic caliphate. “Jabhat al-Nusra has been explicitly clear about its religio-political objectives since 2012, when it identified itself as a movement devoted to *nusrat ahl al-sham* (support for the people of the Levant). While its earliest statements also made clear reference to its intention to impose ‘God’s law on Earth’” (Lister, 2016, p. 23). In 2015, the group merged with other rebel groups in Syria to form ‘The Army of Conquest’ or ‘Jaish al-Fath’. In 2016, the group announced its split from al-Qaeda although it had initially sprung from it. 18

(15) Jaish al-Fateh
A loose alliance of rebel groups formed in March 2015 to fight against the forces of president Bashar al-Assad. The members of this alliance are mostly Islamists, but includes some other moderate factions (The New York Times, 2015). A major member

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group is al-Nusra Front which is the al-Qaeda affiliate in Syria. The alliance is in conflict with the Islamic State as well as the Syrian government.

(16) Muqtada al-Sadr
An Iraqi Shia cleric, political leader and founder of the Sadrists movement. The revered Al-Sadr family hails from Jabal Amel in South Lebanon. Muqtada’s father was the Grand Ayotallah Mohammad Sadiq al-Sadr, and his cousin is Ayotallah Mohammad Baqir. al-Sadr was brutally executed by Saddam Hussein together with his sister Amina. After the fall of Saddam Hussein, and the American occupation of Iraq, al-Sadr formed the al-Mahdi Army (more a militia than an organised army) to push the coalition forces which toppled Saddam Hussein authoritarian regime out of Iraq, and voiced his outright defiance of the American occupation. After the American withdrawal from Iraq in 2011, al-Sadr leaned towards moderation and renunciation of arms. In 2014, he called for the forming of ‘Peace Companies’ to protect Shia shrines from the Islamic State. The al-Mahdi Army also participated in some battles against the Islamic State. In 2016 al-Sadr led a huge protest against corruption and the government’s failure to fulfil promises of reform. Al-Sadr remains an influential political figure in Iraqi modern politics. Al-Sadr coalition ‘Saairun’ won the highest number of seats in the 2018 parliamentary elections.

(17) Mustafa Badreddine
A top military commander in the Lebanese Shia military group Hezbollah. He is believed to have run the group’s operations in Syria since 2011. The Special Tribunal for Lebanon which investigated the killing of the Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri

by a car bomb indicted Badreddine of organising the bombing. On 13 May 2016 Badreddine was killed in an explosion near Damascus International Airport.  

(18) Osama Ben Laden
The son of a wealthy Saudi businessman, Bin Laden was influenced by religion and believed in pan-Islamic holy war. He joined the Mujahedeen 1979 to fight the Soviet forces in Afghanistan. He became a target for the US after the September 11 attacks which Al Qaeda claimed responsibility for. Bin Laden was shot by US forces on 2 May 2011 in Pakistan.

(19) Popular Mobilisation Forces
After the fall of Mosul \t the hands of the Islamic State in 2014, and out of fear for the capital Baghdad being over taken by the insurgents of the Islamic State, the grand Ayatollah Sistani issued a Jihad fatwa to recruit Shia fighters against the advance of the Islamic State. Many Shia men volunteered and different Shia militias merged to form the Popular Mobilisation Forces (PMF) operating under the umbrella of the Iraqi government.

(20) Russian military bases
There is a tradition of special relations between Syria and Russia that goes back to the time after Syria gained its independence from the French mandate (1946). However, these relations intensified after the Baath party rose to power in 1963. In the 60s and early 70s the Soviets contributed to the creation of national industry in Syria. USSR was


given a port in the city of Tartus, which permitted the Soviet navy to have presence in
the Mediterranean.
In September 2015 the Russians started airstrikes against opposition enclaves and also
against jihadist groups (IS and Qaeda) in support of the Al-Assad government, which had
been facing an internal uprising since 2011. For further information, refer to section 5.8
The Syrian conflict.

(21) Saddam Hussein
Saddam Hussein was an authoritarian ruler of Iraq during the period 1979-2003. He was
a member, then the leader, of the Baath Arab Socialist Party. His era was characterised
by brutality and ruthless crackdowns on his adversaries. Hussein launched a war against
Iran which lasted 8 years (1980-1988). In 1990 Hussein invaded Kuwait, which led to the
formation of a United Nations-authorised coalition of forces against Iraq led by the
United States. Kuwait was liberated by February 1991. The Gulf War was followed by a
Shia uprising in the south and a Kurdish one in the north. Both were crushed by Saddam
Hussein’s forces. Saddam was finally toppled by the American invasion of Iraq in 2003,
and hanged on 30 December 2006 at an Iraqi army base.

(22) Saudi Arabia
A country in the Arabian Peninsula which was founded in 1932 under the rule of the
House of Saud who are a tribe which had contested the reign of the area with several
other tribes, but finally were able to defeat their contesters (Al Rashid) and unify the
kingdom under their rule. The House of Saud have historical links with Muhammad ibn
Abd al-Wahhab the founder of Wahhabism. The government of Saudi Arabia has
espoused the Wahhabi doctrine in running the civil and religious affairs of the country.
Saudi Arabia has the privilege of being the custodian of the birthplace of Prophet
Muhammad, and the host of the Muslim pilgrimage in Makkah. Owning quarter of the
oil reserves in the world, Saudi is a massive oil exporter. Saudi Arabia is an affluent Gulf
state and a major player in the Arab region. The Saudi royal family have entrenched the
Wahhabi doctrine in Saudi Arabia and elsewhere where possible. Since the rise of the
Islamic revolution in Iran, Saudi Arabia has considered Iran an ominous threat and it has joined alliances and financed proxy wars to avert what it sees as the danger of Iran.

(23) 11 September Attacks

On September 11, 2001, 4 passenger jets were hijacked when flying out of airports in the American east coast. The planes targeted the twin towers of the World Trade Centre, and the Pentagon. Over 3,000 lives were lost including the 19 hijackers. Al-Qaeda was implicated in the attacks. The lawyers of families of the victims have found evidence that members of the Saudi royal family sponsored terrorist organisations related to the attacks24

(24) United States

A country that covers a vast swathe of land in North America, the US emerged as a superpower, and in the eyes of many a colonial power, after the end of WW2. Currently, it has significant military bases around the world, notably in the Middle East. The highest number of American troops in the Middle East is based in Kuwait (16,592 soldiers). In 1995, the United States established the 5th fleet, which is focused on the waterways of the region (Persian Gulf, North Arabian Sea, Gulf of Aden, Red Sea and Gulf of Oman) (Zenko, 2018).25 The United States launched a ‘war on terror’ and most specifically against the Jihadist organisation al-Qaeda in the aftermath of 9 September attacks. It also led a coalition, which comprised a number of western and Middle Eastern countries, to fight Islamic State in Syria and Iraq in 2014.

(25) US-led coalition in Syria and Iraq

The coalition was formed in 2014 when the Islamic State was able to capture large swathes of land in Iraq and Syria including the Iraq’s second largest city Mosul. The


coalition is led by the United States of America and comprises many Middle Eastern and Western countries including: Australia, Canada, Belgium, Denmark, Sweden, France, Germany, Italy, Norway, Turkey, Netherlands, Jordan, Morocco and Spain. In addition to these countries, there are a few countries who are intervening in Syria only: Saudi Arabia, Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates in support of rebel groups, and Russia in support of the Syrian regime. The US-led coalition provided air power to support the Iraqi government forces fighting the Islamic State.

(26) Wahhabism
A puritanical version of Sunni Islam founded in Najd (contemporary Saudi Arabia) in the 18th century by Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab. The movement preaches austere implementation of Muslim teachings inspired by the Medieval Sunni theologian Ibn Taymiyya.

5.6 Discussion of some controversial terms
5.6.1 Islamism
Some Muslims believe that Islam is the final perfect version of the three monotheistic religions. Yet, many more Muslims look at their past with admiration and nostalgia. For within a short period after the beginning of Dawa (the preaching of Islam as a new religion by the Prophet Mohammad), the followers of Mohammad, who were the dwellers of the Arab Peninsula, were able to conquer the empires of the time, the Byzantines and Sassanians. Within 100 years the Islamic Empire extended from Spain to India. The Arab/Islamic supremacy was not only military; culture, including translation, architecture and sciences, also flourished. Many contemporary Muslims yearn for their glorious past and make this subconscious association between Islam and a new renaissance (Pipes, 2000, pp.87-88).

There have been periods where many Muslim countries opted for secular governments especially after the decolonisation of Arab states. Arab nationalist ideas were also dominant during the 1950’s and the 1960’s. Yet, the association between Islam and the regaining of an advanced and successful position in modern times is recurrent and can be regarded as one major factor in the formation of a number of Islamic movements in
the last 100 years. The most well-known of these is the Muslim Brotherhood, which was founded in Egypt in 1928, and later spread to Syria in the mid-thirties. Hasan al-Banna, founder of the Muslim Brotherhood wrote: “Rebuilding the international prominence of the Islamic Umma by liberating its lands, reviving its glorious past, bringing closer the cultures of its regions and rallying under one word. Until once again the long awaited united and lost Khalifa is returned”. Although al-Banna and other Islamists who laid down the scholarly foundations of Islamist thought were not combative, non-violent Islamists are accused by a significant segment of Western scholars and academics of inspiring jihadist beliefs: “The competition between secular politics and political Islam after the collapse of Ottoman authority and the ensuing processes of colonization and decolonization have contributed in part to regional instability, and it is during this period that elements of Islamism which fuse the notions of jihad and Salafism began to emerge” (Turner, 2012, p. 173).

Islamism tends to draw a line between Islam and Islamism, as Islamism makes a close link between faith and ideology where Sharia (Islamic law) is sacred and an appropriation of western influences is conducted. Gita Sahgal and Nira Yuval-Davis believe that Islamic fundamentalism has three main features: “it is a project to control women’s bodies; it is a political practice which rejects pluralism; and it is a movement that purposefully conflates religion and politics as a means of furthering its aims” (Sahgal and Yuval-Davis, 1992, cited in Sayyid, 2015, p. 8).

Glenn E. Robinson (1997) believes that there is a consensus in the West that Islamist groups are clinging onto outdated beliefs: “[...] movements bent on turning back the historical clock hundreds of years, of returning to traditional ways. Alternatively, Islamism [...] has been viewed as a movement of rage, of marginal groups that have been excluded from the social and global orders lashing out at persons who are seen to oppress them [...]” (Robinson, 1997, p. 132).

In the aftermath of recent attacks in Europe (e.g. in Belgium and France) which were blamed on jihadis, and for some of which the Islamic State has claimed direct responsibility, conservative voices expressed fear that Europe is being terrorized and warned of the threat of Islamism to European civilization: “Islamism is a most clear and
determined attack on our civilization, so this must be recognised, not evaded. Its adherents declaredly hate freedom, democracy, women’s rights, Judaism and Christianity. They entirely deny the rights of anyone [...] who does not share their views. They recognise no law except Sharia” (Moore, 2016). Unfortunately some of these voices have overlooked the fact that the majority of the ISIS victims are Muslims who may not agree with their views or happen to exist in their areas of dominance.

Islamism denotes an ideology which may or may not involve militancy. Therefore, Islamist groups encompass the revolution in Iran and the Shi’a political group, Hizbollah, in South Lebanon, the Jama’at groups in Egypt as well as the various branches of the Muslim Brotherhood in a number of Arab countries.

It is worthwhile explicating the denotation and connotations of the term ‘Islamist’. In 1998, Daniel Pipes wrote an article entitled ‘Distinguishing between Islam and Islamism’. He makes the distinction between Islam as a faith and Islamism as an ideology. He goes on to explain that there is no incompatibility between Islam and the west but there is one between Islamism and the west. He defines Islamism as “[…] in other words, yet another twentieth-century radical utopian scheme. Like Marxism-Leninism or fascism, it offers a way to control the state, run society, and remake the human being. It is an Islamic-flavoured version of totalitarianism. As can be discerned from this definition in addition to the discussion above, Islamism/Islamist has a very negative connotation in the Western mind. It is associated with a radical and dogmatic ideology. (Abaza (2010) argues that some people in the West confuse Islam the faith with Islamism the ideology, hence wrongly attacking Islam and ordinary Muslims.

Interestingly, ‘Islamist’ has no standard equivalent in Arabic which would convey the same meaning and have the same connotations/impact on the reader (although various terms, such as الإسلاموي, have occasionally been used to translate ‘Islamist’). It is therefore standardly translated as الإسلامي, which is in English ‘Islamic’. ‘Islamic’ has no particular negative connotations except for what can be imparted from the context that surrounds it.
5.6.2 Jihadism

The word ‘jihadist’ has a negative stereotypical connotation in Western political discourse and in the West in general. It derives from the Arabic word جهاد jihād, which means a holy war or as the online Merriam Webster Dictionary puts it: “a holy war waged on behalf of Islam as a religious duty” or “a crusade for a principle of belief”. The dictionary also adds: “a personal struggle in devotion to Islam especially involving spiritual struggle”. According to English Oxford Living Dictionary: a ‘jihadist’ is “A person involved in a jihad; an Islamic militant”. The first use of the term ‘Jihadist’ was in 1967 when the American historian John Ralph Willis coined the term to describe the Sokoto Caliphate established in West Africa in the 18th and 19th centuries (Sedgwick, 2015, p. 15). The BBC (2014) mentions that “The term "jihadist" has been used by Western academics since the 1990s, and more widely since the 11 September 2001 attacks, as a way to distinguish between violent and non-violent Sunni Islamists”. Earlier in 1986, Haggai Erlich used the term ‘Jihadism’ to refer to Mahdists in Sudan as did Nikki Keddie in 1994.

In 2015 Mark Sedgwick discussed the fact that Jihadism has been defined between two extremes: “At one extreme it has been argued that the term denotes religiously obligatory campaigns of conquest directed against non-Muslims, who, qua non-Muslims, should in principle be conquered. At another extreme it has been argued that it denotes any commendable effort made in a good cause, such as stopping smoking or planting trees to prevent environmental degradation. There are a variety of positions between these two extremes” (Sedgwick, 2015, p. 34). Omar Ashour (2011) defined Jihadism as “armed confrontations with political rivals [which] is a theologically legitimate and instrumentally efficient method for socio-political change” (Ashour, 2011, 379).

Some Western experts try to find the roots of jihadist violence in Islamic theology or in the Quran, but Olivier Roy (2004) stresses that these acts of violence perpetrated by the jihadists are coming from people not from an Islamic tradition “We speak about people, acts and motivations, not theology. Interestingly, however, the terrorists in their endeavour to root their wrath in the Koran are introducing some obvious religious
innovations. The most important is the status of jihad.” (Roy, 2004, p. 41). One of the interesting findings that Olivier Roy confirms is that the concept of suicide attacks is not found in Islam (2004, p. 42).

In 2006, Thomas Hegghammer distinguished between three varieties of what he called ‘Islamist violence’:

The first modern violent Islamist groups appeared in the Middle East in the 1960s and 1970s as radical expressions of broader socio-revolutionary movements. These groups struggled for state power and their main enemies were the local political regimes. In the 1980s and 1990s, Islamism as an ideological framework was adopted by nationalist and separatist movements in many different parts of the world. This type of militant Islamist group, present in places such as Palestine and Chechnya, did not fight primarily for state power, but for a specific territory. Their principal enemies were non-Muslim states or communities that contested the same piece of land. In the mid-1990s, a third type of militant Islamism appeared, namely global jihadism. It emerged as a result of Usama bin Ladin’s adoption of a doctrine in 1996 which emphasized the fight against the US over the fight against local regimes (Hegghammer, 2006, pp. 12-13).

In the past decade, and largely because of the various armed conflicts that swept the region, the Middle East has witnessed the emergence of more jihadist organisations, the most infamous of which is the Islamic State. The Islamic State claimed a number of attacks and suicide bombings in the Middle East and Europe.

5.6.3 Mujahideen

The term Mujahideen (مُجاهِدین) in Arabic, plural of mujāhid (مُجاهِد) is derived from ‘Jihād’ جهاد in Arabic meaning a holy war (see section 5.6.4). According to Merriam Webster Dictionary, Mujahideen means “Islamic guerrilla fighters especially in the Middle East”.

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It seems the term was first used extensively in English to refer to the fighters in Afghanistan during the 1980’s. The word was, however, originally applied to Afghan fighters who opposed the British Raj’s push into Afghanistan in the 19th Century.

The fighters in the 20th century were Islamic groups defending Afghanistan from the Soviet invasion. In 1979, Soviet forces invaded Afghanistan, and the invasion was swiftly confronted with a wide-scale rebellion by Islamic groups who called themselves ‘Mujahideen’ (Taylor, 2014). They were made of different ethnic groups (Chechnyans, Uzbeks, Tajiks and a few Arabs). It is worth mentioning that one of the Arabs was Osama Bin Laden. Foreign support poured in to aid the diverse groups of rebels: “The mujahidin would not have been competitive without having access to large sums of money and arms, which were supplied by the United States and Saudi Arabia” (Barfield, 2004, pp. 282-283).

The use of the word ‘Mujahideen’ brings to recent memory an image of Muslim fighters from various Islamic countries fighting an atheist and anti-Islamic enemy (the Soviet Union). At the same time it conjures up older memories and images among Muslims in particular of wide-ranging Islamic unity winning battles against infidels and spreading the word of truth.

5.6.4 Mujahid

As noted in section 5.6.3, the root of the Arabic word ‘mujāhid’ which means a holy war in Arabic. The plural is ‘Mujahideen’, which has also been used specifically to refer to the Mujahideen in Afghanistan since 1979 (see section 5.6.3). The term ‘Jihad’ as a general term means an internal effort to observe Islamic virtues. The Dictionary of Spiritual Terms defines Mujahid as follows: “Literally ‘one who exerts himself,’ refers to those who participate in Jihād, as both an inward and outward exertion for the realization of religious objectives.” ‘Jihād’ has a general positive connotation in Arabic relating to sacrifice for good causes, and so does ‘mujāhid’, which has been occasionally used in the Arabic texts (e.g. Reuters 20 May). For example, the war between Hezbollah and Israel as well as Hezbollah’s intervention in Syria as
referred to by the party’s general secretary and the personnel involved in them (fighters or commanders) falls under this positive meaning of the word.

5.6.5 Rawāfiḍ

As their forebears did throughout their extended and interlocked histories, today’s Shi’i’s and Sunnis weave narratives of remote ages and events into a rich tableau of contemporary politics. In effect they consciously combine the past and present in dealing with events of the moment and anticipating developments of the future (Lassner, 2011, p.17).

Rawāfiḍ (روافض) means ‘rejecters’ or ‘those who reject’. The common use of the term rawāfiḍ among the majority of Sunni Muslim followers is in reference to Shi’a Muslims. The term has a negative, derogatory implication.

The beginning of the Sunni/Shia divide was a political clash between a group of supporters of Imam Ali, primarily his clan (Banu Hashim) who thought he had more legitimacy to Muslim rule, the caliphate (خلافة), after the death of the Prophet Muhammad (AD 632) since he was first cousin and son-in-law of the Prophet than the first three caliphs (أبو بكر (Abu Bakr) عمر بن الخطاب (Omar Ben Al Khattab) and عثمان (Othman). At that time, in the 7th century, the division was political and tribal rather than sectarian or theological. The appointment of these three companions of the Prophet to rule the Muslim community was disputed. As mentioned in al-sīra al-nabawiyya (the Biography of the Prophet), Abu Bakr and Omar rushed to a meeting place to be involved in the process of electing a successor to the Prophet, while Ali was with a few other companions (in other references members of the Banu Hashim clan) preparing for the funeral of the Prophet. According to Caetani (1905) in (Madelung, 1997) “The Banu Hashim refused to recognise Abu Bakr and buried their illustrious kinsman privately, depriving the new caliph and A‘isha of the honour of attendance” (Madelung, 1997, p. 4). A‘isha, the Prophet’s favourite wife and daughter of Abu Bakr, had feelings of antipathy towards Ali and strongly sided against his appointment as caliph on several occasions.
The division intensified when Othman عثمان was appointed caliph, because he belonged to the Umayyads, a different clan of Quraysh to Banu Hashim. However, after 25 years Imam Ali was eventually appointed caliph, though he faced a number of rebellions. The most serious one came from the Umayyad ruler of Damascus (wālī) Mo’awiya Ben Abi Sufian. Between 656 and 659 Ali and his partisans fought a number of battles with dissidents. All the battles took place in present-day Iraq. However, “Taking advantage of the problems that Ali was having with dissidents, Mo’awiya consolidated his position in Syria and occupied Egypt” (Richard, 1991, p. 18). Eventually Ali was assassinated by a Kharijite (another dissident group) in 661 AD. Hasan, the elder son of Ali, chose to conclude a pact with the Umayyads according to which he withdrew to Medina. Yet, and according to Shia sources, the Umayyads schemed to kill him by getting one of his wives to poison him in 670 AD. When Mo’awiya died in 680, Hussein the son of Ali, refused to pledge allegiance to Mo’awiya’s son Yazid. Hussein headed to Kufa to lead a rebellion against Yazid, but the Umayyad troops hindered his advancement, so he had to stop in a spot called Karbala in the month of Muharram 61 AH. When Hussein and his companions camped in Karbala, Yazid cut the route off from food and water supplies. On the morning of 10 Muharram, Yazid’s troops attacked the camp and the majority of Hussein partisans were slaughtered. Hussein was decapitated, and his head was taken to Yazid’s palace in Damascus (Richard, 1991, p. 16-29). The Shia’s profound disappointment at the defeat of Hussein turned into polemics repeatedly heard at important Shia occasions particularly Ashura (10 Muharram).

Towards the end of the Umayyad caliphate (740 AD/122 AH), another uprising by Zaid Ben Ali زيد بن علي (son of the fourth Imam) took place, but the followers of Zaid deserted and rejected him as they did not believe in the efficacy of resorting to arms. Another alleged reason for the use of the term rawāfīḍ (روافض) is that the followers of Zaid, requested that he publicly detach himself from Abu Bakr and Omar and call them ‘usurpers’. Hence the term could refer to the rejection of the Twelver Shias of the first two caliphs in Islamic history (Kohlberg, 1979 p. 677-679). This incident also marks a division within the Shia into Zaidis (those who only believe in the first five imams and the Twelver Shias (those who believe in twelve imams descending from Ali and Fatima). The Twelver Shias constitute the majority, or mainstream, Shiism. Other sub-divisions of
Shia include the Ismailis, who are followers of Ismail, the elder son of the sixth Imam Ja’far al-Sadeq (d.765) (see Figure 5.4). On the other hand Alawites/Nusayris, who are classified in some resources as a Shia group are according to various sources influenced by the Shia doctrine, but they have influences from other faiths and philosophies. However, in the 1970’s the Alawites were included under the umbrella of Shiism by the Shia religious leader Sayyid Musa al-Sadr upon the request of President Hafez al-Assad who was an Alawi himself. See section Nusayris.

The Safavid Empire (1501–1722) in Iran made Twelver Shia Islam the official religion of the state, and converted the Iranian population to it. The Safavids had several confrontations with the Ottomans, who were predominantly Sunnis and whose official religion was Sunni Islam. The 1979 Islamic revolution in Iran is a landmark as it has triggered the revival of Shia Islam particularly in the Middle East. For further information, see section 5.6.6 below The Savafids.

After the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire, the Shia were mostly categorised among the oppressed and the deprived specially in the Gulf, Iraq and in Lebanon. This situation made them turn to communism: “In Iraq and Lebanon after World War I, numerous Shi’ites turned to communism to resolve problems of poverty, rural disintegration, colonial rule, and political marginalization” (Jurdi Abisaab and Abisaab, 2014, p. xxvii). A Shia cleric founded in 1970 the mahrumin (deprived) movement in Lebanon as a voice for the deprived (Jurdi Abisaab and Abisaab, 2014, p. 113 -117).

In 1979, a remarkable event took place that would change the scene in the Middle East and drive towards a revival of Shia in the region: the Islamic Revolution in Iran. In 1985, Hezbollah (The Party of God), an Islamist Shia para military group, was formed in South Lebanon as one of the major consequences of this revolution. Hezbollah engaged in fighting the Israeli occupation of South Lebanon, and later became an influential political party in Lebanon and in the region. Iran has also supported the Iraqi Shia-led government in the following the end the Saddam era which was characterised by Shia repression. For further information, see section 5.9 Iraq Conflict.
Shias and Sunnis share and agree on the main tenants of Islam. However, towards the end of the eighth century both groups started to establish their own jurisprudence. “The period that followed this first crisis and tension between the ideal and the real gradually marked the growth of discontent among the people, which led to revolutions and rebellions as to discussions and deliberations. This is reflected in the early Islamic fiqh (theology cum jurisprudence) literature that emerged toward the end of the second/eighth century” (Sachedina, 1988, p. 4). There are some differences in inheritance and marriage rules, but the most prominent characteristic of Twelver Shia Islam, which is not approved by Sunni scholars, is the sacred position of the imams. “The Ithna Asharis are the largest group and believe that Muhammad’s religious leadership, spiritual authority and divine guidance were passed on to 12 of his descendants [...]” (BBC, 2016).

According to the Pew Research Centre, “Sunni Muslims and Shia Muslims (also known as Shiites) comprise the two main sects within Islam. Sunni and Shia identities first formed around a dispute over leadership succession soon after the death of the Prophet Muhammad in 632 AD. Over time, however, the political divide between the two groups broadened to include theological distinctions and differences in religious practices as well. While the two sects are similar in many ways, they differ over conceptions of religious authority and interpretation as well as the role of the Prophet Muhammad’s descendants [...]” (Pew Research Centre, 2009 p. 1).
Figure 1  Genealogy of the Twelve Imams

Mohammad (d. 632)

Fatima (d. 632) — (1)  'Ali (d. 661)

(2) Hasan (d. 670) — (3) Hoseyn (d. 680) — Mohammad b. al-Hanafiya

(4)  'Ali Zeyn al-Abedin al-Sajjadi (d. 713)

Zeyd (d. 740) (Zeydites) — (5) Mohammad al-Baqer (d. 732)

(6) Ja'far al-Sadiq (d. 765)

Esmail (d. 755) (Ismailis) — (7) Musa al-Kazem (d. 799)

(8)  'Ali al-Reza (d. 818)

(9) Mohammad al-Jawad, al-Taqi (d. 835)

(10)  'Ali al-Hadi, al-Naqi (d. 868)

(11) Hasan al-Zaki, al-Askari (d. 874)

(12) Mohammad al-Mahdi (disappeared in 874)
5.6.6 The Safavids

The Safavids were a dynasty which ruled in Persia (Iran of today, parts of Turkey and Georgia) between 1501 and 1722. Safavidism started as a Sufi order in the region of Azerbaijan. The founding figure was Safi al-Din Alardabili (1252-1334), who converted to Shia Islam. The group grew stronger with time and became a military and religious group by the 15th century when they launched a war (Jihad) against Ottoman Turkey and Georgia. By that time, Turkey had outlawed Shia Islam and persecuted its followers.

Shah Ismail was the first Safavid ruler. He carried out a military conquest and took power over all of Iran by 1510 establishing what is historically known as the Safavid Empire. The Safavid Empire instituted Shia Islam and declared it as the formal religion of the state although it was not practiced by the bulk of the population of that time. “The first Ismail had decreed that the Ithna-ashari Shi’i form of Islam and the Ja’fari system of law be formally established in the country” (Gholsorkhi, 1994, p. 477). As a result the Safavids converted the predominantly Sunni population, and spent generously on religious institutions and Shia scholars to create a religious class that was closely associated with the state. In this sense the Safavid Empire was a theocracy. Sunni Muslims were persecuted in this empire as were all forms of Islam other than the Twelver Shiism adopted by the heads of the state. One may ascribe “two important historical accomplishments to the house of Safavids: one, predictably enough, was maintaining and sheltering Twelver Shi’ite faith in an entirely Sunni world; the other was the unification of western Iran with the formerly Timurid country of Khorasan, […]” (Fragner, 2012, p. 24).

The Safavid Empire benefited from being on the cross-roads of trade between Europe and Central Asia, and although religious, it built its own secular administrative and government institutions. The capital was Isfahan which till now represents the renowned Safavid art and culture.

The Safavid Empire worked on its empowerment to face the threat of the neighbouring Ottoman Empire, but by the 17th century the threat from the Ottomans declined and hence less attention was given to military affairs and Safavid rulers became complacent.
and even corrupt. A Shia religious council was able to seize power and eventually deposed the Shahs. As a result, the world’s first Islamic Republic was proclaimed in the eighteenth century. In 1726, an Afghan group destroyed the ruling dynasty but they retained the Shia religious institutions and Ulama (men of religion) which led to a separation of powers (BBC, 2009).

Due to the sectarian polarization in the Arab world and the Middle East, the term ‘Safavids’ has been used specially by hard-line Sunni groups to refer to Iran in order to highlight its Shia affiliation specially given that Iran is led by an Islamic government that follows the Shia Muslim faith.

5.6.7 The Nusayris (Alawites)

For their part the ‘Alawis suffered from an acute sense of grievance, nourished over centuries, which explained the formidable energy, even the frenzy, with which this unfavoured community snatched at education, wealth and power once the wheel of fortune turned. With their history of oppression and exploitation, it was to be expected that ‘Alawis should seek redress for the injustices of the past and should be utterly determined never to be subdued again (Seale, 1995, p.23).

The ruling family in Syria belongs to a sect named Alawis, Alawites or Nusayris. The name ‘Alawite’ (العلويون in Arabic) is the most common form and widely used in Syria. It is taken for granted that this name is after ‘Ali Bin Abi Taleb’ the cousin of Prophet Mohammad and his son-in-law. After 2011, the term ‘Nusayris’ became more used than before especially in media dominated by some factions opposing the Syrian regime.

From a social point of view, Syrian Alawites lived in rural coastal areas and worked in farming till the 1960’s when the Baath Party rose to power (08/03/1963). Before this date Alawites were a more-or-less persecuted segment of Syrian society; they were largely poor and illiterate and identified as peasants. Yet, many of them joined the military during the French mandate as the French authorities facilitated this for them, “Under the French Mandate (1923 -46) a kind of divide-and-rule policy was followed by favouring the military recruitment of special detachments among Alawis, Druzes, Kurds,
Circassians and other minorities, who then formed part of the Troupes Spéciales du Levant, which were used to maintain order and suppress local rebellion.” (Van Dam, 2017, pp.16-17). After Syria gained its independence in 1946, some Alawites opted for more nationalist and leftist ideologies, so good numbers of them joined the Baath Arab Socialist Party probably as a reaction to the feudal system which prevailed under the Ottomans and through the French mandate till the late 1950’s. President Jamal Abdul Naser, President of the United Arab Republic (Egypt and Syria: 1958–1961) carried out a reform policy of land and major enterprises ownership which was endorsed by the ruling Arab Socialist Baath Party during the years following the break-up of the UAR.

Interestingly, it has always been controversial whether Alawites are Muslims or whether they have distinct beliefs from mainstream Islam. The name ‘Nusayri’ comes from Mohammad Bin Nusayr (A.D. 859) a close companion of the 11th Imam of the Twelvers Shia community (Imam Hasan al-Askari) who was named as his own intimate messenger (as Mohammad Bin Nusayr claimed). The movement started in Iraq and then the Nusayris moved to Aleppo under Sayf Al Dawla Al Hamdani (a Nusayri himself). At the turn of the 12th century, the crusaders conquered ‘the western part of the Alawi territory’ (Farouk Alli, 2015, p. 32); many Nusayris were then concentrated in the coastal mountains of Syria.

Alawism spread out over Mesopotamia and into northern Syria, Aleppo, Hama, and finally the coastal highlands from Acre to Latakia (in that order). This was not the result of some imagined flight from oppression, but rather of a sustained missionary effort (da’wah). Its later concentration in the Syrian coastal mountains was above all the product of the Crusades, which spelled the effective end of the da’wah and increasingly forced the Alawis to organise themselves along tribal lines. The Alawis emerged from the twelfth century as something they had not been before, but which would define them for the rest of history: as a ‘minority’ (Van Dam, 2017, p. 22).

During the Mamluk period the Alawites were persecuted and many of them were killed. Then after the Ottoman invasion of the area, the Nusayris lived in their mountains without much contact with the prevalent social and administrative fabric. However, the
Ottomans supported the Nusayris against the Egyptian conscription policy in 1834 following the invasion of Greater Syria by Muhammad Ali Pasha the Viceroy of Egypt (Talhami, 2012).

Another question which has been frequently asked is whether Nusayris are an offshoot of Shi’a Islam, taking into the consideration that both denominations consider Imam Ali to be of uniquely high eminence. There is a consensus among a number of sources that the Alawi (Nusayri) faith is secretive. It has syncretic and mystic rites which only a few of the elite (Khassa) of the sect itself know or are allowed to know. The rest of the community (Amma) is kept ignorant of their own beliefs. According to the Islamic Monthly (Nguyen, 2016) “The core of the Nusayrism is the concept of triad (Ali, Mohammad and Salman Al Farisi (Salman the Persian) who is a Persian companion)”. This trinity concept made a number of scholars believe that Nusayrism “derives from Christianity”. The Nusayris also endorse the concept of reincarnation (the transmigration of the soul and reincarnation after death), which is most likely borrowed from Hinduism. Nusayrism is believed to have some Greek influences as well. Faruk Alli (2015) says: “Mahmud Faksh points out that the Alawi religion crystallised in the tenth and eleventh centuries as a mixture of various Islamic and non-Islamic beliefs and practices [...]” (Alli, 2015, p. 29). He explains that there are pagan, Shia and Ismaili characteristics in the Alawi beliefs26. The Nusayris resort to Taqqiya ‘dissimulation’ to protect themselves. There had been a number of fatwas both against and for the Nusayris, the most known of which is that of Ibn Taymiyya’s (14th century), who declared that Nusayris are infidels and issued fatwas which threatened their lives (Talhami, 2010).

Under al-Assad the father, efforts were made to bring the Alawites closer to mainstream Islam. A number of mosques were built in major Alawite towns in the 1970’s and President Hafiz al-Assad was able to “obtain a legal decision about their status as an Muslims (offshoot of Shia Islam) from the Lebanese religious leader Imam Musa al-Sadr in 1973” (Harvard Divinity School, N.D.).

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5.6.8 The Crusaders

“A crusade was a holy war fought against those perceived to be the external or internal foes of Christendom for the recovery of Christian property or in defence of the church or Christian people” (Riley-Smith, 1987, xxviii). Although there were other crusades, e.g. in the Baltic, the best-known crusades were the medieval military campaigns intended to reconquer the Holy Land (Jerusalem) from the ‘infidels’ (the Muslims). These crusades are often termed ‘the Crusades’.

The Crusades were carried out in a number of campaigns over a period of 200 years. In 1095 Pope Urban II called for “a war of liberation”, under the banner of the Catholic Church after an appeal from the Byzantine emperor Alexius, who had been alarmed by the Turks’ advances in Asia Minor. His call also echoed the desire for reform expressed by progressive churchmen to free the church from corruption (Riley-Smith, 1987, pp. 1-4). The fact that the Crusades were meant to defend and free people from Muslim rule and to free the holy city of Jerusalem where Christ was crucified gave them an aura of pilgrimage. Moreover, Pope Urban II preached the idea that it is not a sin to kill non-Christians, and all those who fight in the Holy Land will have their past sins forgiven (Crusades, 2010).

The Crusader armies were mainly recruited from Western Europe. The first campaign achieved its goal with the capture of Jerusalem, which was under the Egyptian Fatimids, in 1099. Jerusalem became the first Latin state in the East Mediterranean. Earlier in 1098 and during their march to Jerusalem, the Crusader armies along with their Byzantine allies were able to capture the important Syrian City of Antioch. Upon conquering Jerusalem, the Crusaders committed massacres of civilians and unarmed people of all faiths including Christians. The following is an account by al-Qalanisi: “The Franks stormed the town and gained possession of it. A number of the townfolk fled to the sanctuary and a great host were killed. The Jews assembled in the synagogue, and the Franks burned it over their heads. The sanctuary was surrendered to them on guarantee of safety on 22 Sha’ban [14 July] of this year, and they destroyed the shrines and the tomb of Abraham” (Hillenbrand, 1999, p. 64-65).
Louis VII of France and Conrad III of Germany headed the Second Crusade, 1147-1149, which scholars are agreed was not successful. Overall, the period between 1110-1187 was not as active in crusading terms, and popes found it difficult to convince people to take up the cross and join new expeditions since the Holy Land was already in the hands of the Latins. However, two major losses were inflicted on the Crusaders: the loss of Edessa in 1144 and the Horns of Hattin in 1187. By 1189, all that was left of Palestine (Kingdom of Jerusalem) was the port of Tyre (Riley-Smith & Riley-Smith, 1981, pp. 15-19).

For almost the entire following century, the Crusaders actively attempted to regain control over lost territory. The Third Crusade, 1189-1192, was led by a number of kings, the most well-known of whom was Richard I of England, known as Richard the Lionheart, who captured Acre, then defeated Saladin in the battle of Arsuf in 1191. In 1192 Richard I and Saladin signed a peace treaty which preserved the kingdom of Jerusalem though without the city of Jerusalem itself (Crusades, 2010). “The third crusade had recaptured much of the coastline, but Jerusalem was still in Muslim hands” (Riley-Smith & Riley-Smith, 1981, p. 21).

The Fourth Crusade 1202-1204 was called for by Pope Innocent III with the aim of recapturing Jerusalem. However, a diversion of mission happened en route to Jerusalem. The crusading armies struck a deal with the Byzantine prince Alexius Angelos to attack Constantinople, and restore his deposed father to power in return for financial and military assistance to be provided later to the Crusaders to help them achieve their ultimate goal, Jerusalem (Riley-Smith & Riley-Smith, 1981, p. 23-24). In 1204, Alexius was killed in a popular uprising against him and his father. In response, the Crusaders, decided on a conquest of the Byzantine capital, which they sacked. The Fourth Crusade ended with the storming and looting of Constantinople and the establishing of a Latin state instead.

There were various subsequent crusades which aimed at “[...] combating any and all of those seen as enemies of the Christian faith” (Crusades, 2010). The Fifth Crusade, 1213-1221, called for by Pope Innocent III before his death targeted Egypt ruled then by the Ayyubid dynasty, as it was believed to be the key to restore control over Jerusalem and
the Holy Land. The campaign made some advances into Egypt, but was finally defeated at the city of Al Mansurah.

The Sixth Crusade started in 1228 with another attempt to capture Jerusalem. Though King Frederick II had “[...] envisaged an attack upon Egypt, but now a direct assault on Jerusalem became his goal” (Riley-Smith & Riley-Smith, 1981, p. 26). In fact, Frederick II was able to reach an agreement with the Sultan of Egypt Al Kamel on a peaceful transfer of control of Jerusalem and other parts of Palestine, including Bethlehem, Nazareth, Jaffa and Sidon to the Crusaders. King Frederick had a crown-wearing ceremony in the Church of the Holy Sepulchre. The agreement lasted for 10 years, after which the Muslims regained control of Jerusalem.

The Seventh Crusade, begun in 1239, briefly regained control over Jerusalem and a large part of Palestine, but this land was lost again in 1244 to forces loyal to the Sultan of Egypt. In reaction, King Louis IX of France embarked on the Eighth Crusade in 1249. He headed to Egypt where he was defeated and forced to go back to Acre in Palestine. During the following years, the Mamluk dynasty rose to power in Egypt. The Mamluks, who were former extraordinary slaves of the Sultan with particular martial skills, were able to crush the Mongols, who emerged as a potential ally of the crusaders, at Ain Jalut in 1260. Baibars, who was a commander of the Mamluk army, became Sultan of Egypt after the assassination of the previous Sultan Qutz. He initiated a crackdown on the remaining Crusader strongholds in Palestine. In 1268 Baibars demolished Antioch, prompting another campaign led by King Louis IX. However, the campaign was diverted to Tunis where the Crusader army was subject to an epidemic and King Louis IX himself died.

The last Crusade took place in 1289 when the Mamluk Sultan Qalawan captured Tripoli. Warships arrived to defend the remaining Crusader fortresses. In the following year, Qalawan’s son marched with a huge army to besiege Acre, the effective capital of the Crusaders (Crusades, 2010). The coastal city of Acre fell after seven weeks, marking an end to two hundred years of crusading activity in the East Mediterranean and Asia Minor.
The medieval Crusades are indicative of the political authority of the Pope, and the extensive influence of the Catholic Church in life in medieval Europe. In a video entitled ‘Crusades’, Professor Henry Louis Gates JR says the Crusades were also characterized by “[...] tremendous barbarity [...]” (Gates, 2010). The Crusaders built formidable castles in what is now Israel/Palestine, Lebanon, Syria and Jordan, many of which still remain.

In the minds of contemporary Arabs and Muslims, the Crusades are typically remembered as just one of the many assaults by various invaders on the region. As a child at school in Syria, I was taught that the Crusades were started mainly to seize control of the resources of the area, and to divert the attention of people in Europe from internal political and economic difficulties. However, a connection is sometimes made between current Western intervention in the Arab world and the Crusades, particularly by Islamist organisations.

Over the past 200 years, in particular, the Arab/Islamic world has undergone setbacks and lengthy periods of decline, which appear all the more prominent when compared with the advanced West. In 1798 Napoleon Bonaparte occupied Egypt without great difficulty. Further colonial domination was experienced in Algeria in 1830 when French military fleet landed on the Algerian shores. During the 1900’s the term ‘crusade’ and its legacy were used by European elite as was done by the Archbishop of Aix-en-Provence in a prayer to French soldiers in Algeria. The archbishop associated ‘crusading’ and ‘just war’ and used terms like ‘the sword of God’ and ‘Christians under Muslim slavery’, which “[...] call to mind the blessed instruments of war Crusaders used to wage war in the Holy Land. In addition, his reference to Christians under Muslim slavery also calls to mind Pope Urban II’s calling of the First Crusade [...]” (Dartmouth, 2016, p. 4).

In the early 20th century, a substantial area of the Arab region was divided between Britain and France (Sykes–Picot agreement), which were the great colonial empires of the time. Some researchers noted two trends in the way Arabs/Muslims reacted to these setbacks: secular and Islamist. The secular trend viewed these interventions as a secular colonial conflict “based on greed and political control” (Dartmouth, 2016, p. 3). A number of Arab leaders and political movements preached this view especially around the 1960’s and 1970’s. The Islamist perspective, by contrast, considers the recurring
Western interventions in Muslim countries as a continuation of the Crusades. They perceive the relationship between the East and the West as one of rivalry and distrust mainly because of the legacy of the Crusades. Subsequent engagements between Muslims and European Christians for Islamists are but subsequent episodes of the Crusades. “Some contemporary Arab and Muslim scholars evaluate and reinterpret the crusading phenomenon in the light of recent experiences such as colonialism, Arab nationalism, the establishment of the state of Israel, the liberation of Palestine and the rise of ‘Islamic fundamentalism’ (Hillenbrand, 1999, p. 4).

Some groups of Islamic fundamentalists believe in a united Islamic community, under one Muslim caliphate; even those who don’t, still believe that faith should govern all aspects of life including the state and political life. Muslim fundamentalist scholars consider that the above interventions have laid the groundwork for developing militant Islam. Sayyid Qutb, one of the leading figures of the Muslim Brothers movement, is regarded as one of the most important scholars involved in developing the ideology of militant Islam, and making the link between the Crusades and contemporary conflicts: “[...] Qutb paints the crusades as deep, festering wounds in the hearts and minds of Islamic society” (Dartmouth, 2016, p. 7). Moreover, the Crusades have affected Jihadist (5.6.2) rhetoric, calling for a holy war against offences against Muslim lands and peoples. “Al-Qaeda and the Islamic State, for example, often employ the rhetoric of the crusades, framing modern westerners as ‘crusaders’ in their efforts to rally support for their causes” (Holt, N.D. p.7).

According to the American critic, Paul Berman (New York Times, 2003), Al Qaeda, which incorporated some Egyptian Islamist factions, was influenced by the conceptions of Sayyid Qutb. As Lawrence puts, it “While Bin Laden and his suicide warriors came from Saudi Arabia, their broader roots came from Egypt via Afghanistan. [...] The Egyptian factions emerged from a school of thought within Egypt’s fundamentalist movement, the Muslim Brotherhood, in the 1950s and 60s. At the heart of that single school of thought stood, until his execution in 1966, a philosopher named Sayyid Qutb [...]” (Lawrence, 2006). Al Qaeda has frequently used the Crusades in its discourse to refer to the long-standing animosity between the Muslim East and Christian Europe, of which the United States is an extension.
It is noteworthy too that US President George Bush Junior described the 2003 invasion of Iraq as a ‘new crusade’. Although he was using ‘crusade’ in the sense ‘An aggressive movement or enterprise against some public evil, or some institution or class of persons considered as evil’ (Oxford English Dictionary Online), this carried a clear echo, i.e. what Dickins, Hervey and Higgins (2016, p.103) call a ‘reflected meaning’, of ‘crusade’ in the more basic sense discussed in this section. Bush’s statement caused significant resentment across the Middle East. It is noteworthy that the concepts of Jihad in Islam (particularly militant Islam) and Crusade in Christianity) share a common ground, which is engaging in holy war in the name of religion.

5.7 Case for the likely reader stereotypes inclinations (Islamophobia related texts)

I collected the Islamophobia-related texts from Reuters news agency over the month of May 2016. These texts were varied in their content, relaying news from Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Yemen, Saudi Arabia and Iran. People who are following the news from the Middle East and North Africa know that the issue of Islamophobia has become exacerbated in that region and beyond, with the rise of Islamist organisations, including jihadist ones, and the polarisation of Muslim, but more notably Arab, public opinion along sectarian lines: Shia and Sunni. Shia and Sunni are the two mainstream Muslim denominations.

From a statistical point of view, Sunni Muslims make up 90% of the world’s Muslims (1.4 billion in 2010), and the Shia make up 10 percent of the world’s Muslims (162 million in 2010) (Pew Research Centre, 2011)\(^\text{27}\). The largest three Sunni Muslim countries are not Arab, while the second and fourth largest Shia Muslim countries are Arab. Iran, the largest country with a majority Shia population\(^\text{28}\), though not Arab, has influence in the


Arab region and is a major regional player. It has been noted both in the media, and by researchers that there are high levels of sectarian tension in some of the countries where Sunnis and Shias live side by side. There is also rising concern about radical religious groups. Shia and Sunni Muslims have the same beliefs with respect to the principal tenets of Islam (see Section 5.6.5).

The news texts collected, as mentioned above, are related to countries where sectarian tensions have in one way or another contributed to the problems discussed. Shia and pro-Shia voices are clearly heard, especially given the effective media outlets that serve their causes, such as Al Manar (Hezbollah TV), Al Alam (an Iranian TV station which broadcasts in Arabic), and Al Mayadeen and Al Jadid, two Lebanese TV channels which endorse the pro-resistance (anti-Saudi) stance. On the other side are channels such as Al Arabia TV, which represents the Saudi point of view, and also Al Jazeera, which although in dispute with Saudi Arabia (as a Qatar-based channel), has been anti-Shia, as well as the Lebanese Future Television owned by Saad Al Hariri, the current Lebanese prime minister, who is also a Saudi national. There are no precise figures for the Shia/Sunni distribution in areas of conflict but approximate percentages are available from (Dickins, J. and Watson, J., 1999: 30-32):

Iraq: Shia Muslims: 50%, Sunni Muslims: 45%
Syria: Shia Muslims (Alawi): 12%, Sunni Muslims: 70%
Yemen: Shia Muslims (Zaydi): 43%, Shia Muslims (Ismaili): 7%, Sunni Muslims: 50%
Lebanon: Shia Muslims: 35%, Sunni Muslims: 23%
Saudi Arabia: Shia Muslims: 4%, Sunni Muslims: 96%

Demographic information for the Arab world can also be found on this link: https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-25434060

I have tried to devise the likely reader stereotype relying on opinion polls, surveys whenever available and also news articles/videos from both Arab and British media sources. This technique is known as extrapolation. For the reasons given above, and because of the sensitivity, complexity and significance of the Sunni/Shia sectarian divide
and also because it has impacted on the major Arab political and military conflicts during the past few years, and particularly following the ‘Arab Spring’, I have given generally equal weight to the likely reader stereotypes of both categories of readers: those who are pro-Sunni (and especially pro-Islamist) and those who are pro-Shia. The pro Shia readers for example in Syria and Lebanon are more likely to be pro the so called resistance axis. It is worth noting that this category pro-Shia or pro-‘resistance’, is not confined to Shia populations only, as some Sunnis and some Christians, and probably other minorities have joined this group for various reasons, e.g. nationalistic stance or for concern over Islamist encroachment in the region. In Iraq, the Shia population which was suppressed under Saddam Hussein’s rule thought they had rightfully earned power in the post-American invasion era since they are the majority. Consequently, Sunnis felt they were marginalised “The fear of marginalisation and impotence in the face of both a rising Shi’a militancy and a powerful occupying force kept most Sunni Arabs in a state of active or passive hostility to the new order” (Allawi, 2007, p.136). The devastating Yemen war can also be viewed from the perspective of a proxy war between Sunni Saudi Arabia and Shia Iran.

5.8 The Syrian Conflict

Syria has been ruled autocratically by members of the al-Assad family for the past 45 years. Hafez al-Assad was the General Secretary of Arab Socialist Baath Party and rose to power in 1970 following a coup d’état. He was in office from 12 March 1971 to 10 June 2000. He was also the commander in chief of the Syrian armed forces. During the 1960’s, the Alawites/Nusayris were establishing themselves in the army. Al-Assad, an Alawite/Nusayri himself, consolidated Alawite/Nusayri control over sensitive positions in the army and intelligence. He declared emergency rule in Syria in the aftermath of an uprising led by the Muslim Brotherhood from the mid 1970’s to the early 1980’s. This is still in effect. Throughout the duration of al-Assad’s rule, the iron grip of the regime stifled all freedoms and restricted power to a small circle. “During the three decades that Hafiz al-Asad had the monopoly of power in Syria (1970-200), very little changed in the power structure of the Syrian regime. Most of the prominent Alawi officers who commanded key positions in the armed forces and security and intelligence services in
the early and mid-1970s were after 25 years still in the same, or similar, positions” (Van Dam, 2017, p.54). This practice has created some barriers between the Alawites and the other Syrian communities. At some instances, the Sunni majority felt marginalised.

Hafez al-Assad died in the year 2000, and his son Bashar was unanimously nominated president in a Parliamentary session. The session was followed by general election in which al-Assad (the son) was the only candidate. He was elected president, and assumed office on 17 July 2000.

When Mohamed Bouazizi set himself on fire in December 2010, this incident marked the beginning of what was later called the Arab spring. A democratic wave swept through the region and proved contagious. Tunisia, Egypt, Yemen and Libya experienced uprisings against authoritarian governments and Syria was to follow.

In March 2011, some Syrians started to form a small-scale popular movement. Syrians took to the streets peacefully asking for major reforms. The regime reacted brutally, and used violence (live ammunition, random detentions, indiscriminate shooting of protestors) against the peaceful protests. Consequently, the demonstrators demanded the toppling of the regime and establishing a secular democratic state. The regime employed increasing levels of violence which initially triggered the idea of local self-protection militias. However, regional and international factors pushed to militarise the peaceful revolution. The Syrian uprising dramatically changed into a bitter internal fight between various opposition factions and the official Syrian army.

The Syrian conflict has regional and international dimensions. Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Qatar have backed the opposition, while Iran and Russia have backed the regime. Currently, there are is a Saudi-based opposition and a Turkish-based opposition. There are also specific members of the opposition who are affiliated with certain regional or international states such as Qatar, the USA and even Israel “As a result of this foreign support, the war in Syria developed into a war by proxy, as well as being an internal intra-Syrian war” (Van Dam, 2017, p.64).

Moreover, Jihadist groups (IS and Jabhat al-Nusra, which is affiliated with al-Qaeda) found their way to Syria and increased the complexity of the situation. However, some
observers of the Syrian scene noted that the Syrian regime found in the Jihadists an opportunity to improve their own image, and to claim that the alternative to it is even worse. In fact, some of those Islamist insurgents had been previously released from the regime’s prisons at the early stages of the crisis, “Indeed, some of the released Islamist leaders later played a prominent role in the Syrian War, like Hasan ‘Abbud of Ahrar al-Sham and Zahran Alloush of Liwa’ al-Sham (Later Jaysh al-Islam)” (Van Dam, 2017, p.80). Charles Lister states, “Weakening the moderate insurgency and therefore facilitating the rise to prominence of Islamists had been a consistent and key element of the regime’s strategy” (Lister, 2015, p.289).

The Kurdish issue has cast its complications on the Syrian issue. There are several Kurdish forces which are pursuing a separatist agenda in the war-torn country. The (YPG or People’s Protection Units), who are a militia and main component of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) which was founded in October 2015 as a multi-ethnic and multi-religious group (Middle East Observer, 2015). The United States is backing the YPG and providing them with arms. The role of the YPG in what they call ‘Rojava’ or ‘Syrian Kurdistan’ worries the Syrian opposition, Turkey and probably the Syrian government.

Despite its legitimate demands – freedom of expression, democracy and curbing corruption – the Syrian revolution was not supported by the international community. A number of international initiatives were attempted under the auspices of the United Nation: Geneva I in June 2012, Geneva II in 2014, and Geneva III in February 2016. The first communique issued by the action group conference on 30 June 2012 stressed the need for a "transitional government body with full executive powers", which could include members of the present Syrian government and of the opposition (BBC, 2012).

In the summer of 2011, defecting members of the official Syrian army formed the Free Syrian Army (FSA). The FSA was a national secular power. However, it was not supported sufficiently and the FSA dwindled in numbers and effectiveness. A number of other armed factions were then established in different Syrian regions. Liwa al-Islam was established by Zahran Alloush in the Damascus suburbs (Eastern Ghouta). Zahran Alloush is the son of a religious scholar based in Saudi Arabia. He was imprisoned in Syria for his “Salafist Activism”. On 29 Sept. 2013, 50 rebel factions merged under what is now
called Jaysh-al Islam led by Zahran Alloush. “Saudi Arabia appears to be central to the merger of rebel groups around Damascus. Liwa al-Islam chief Zahran Alloush is backed by Riyadh, while both Ahrar al-Sham, which is supported by Qatar, and Jabhat al-Nusra have been excluded from the new grouping” (Hassan, 2013).

The Syrian conflict has also witnessed the unceasing backing of Iran and Hezbollah for the Syrian regime. Military, economic and intelligence support have been huge. Russia has shown unwavering support to the official Syrian authorities, voted against a of UN resolutions aimed at delegitimising the Syrian regime or imposing sanctions against it (2011), condemning Syria over its crackdown on anti-government protesters (2011), demanding that all parties in Syria — both Government forces and armed opposition groups — stop all violence and reprisals (2012), referring Syria to an international criminal course (2014) and also condemnation of the Syrian regime for carrying out chemical attacks (2017). Since September 2015, Russia has intervened militarily on the ground. In cooperation with Iran and the official Syrian army, the Russians were able to conquer the last stronghold of the rebels in Aleppo, the largest Syrian city in the north of the country. Most of the rebels are now concentrated in the northern city of Idlib, and negotiations are taking place in the Kazakh capital Astana. However, these are now more about understandings between Russia, Turkey and Iran than about the will and demands of the Syrian people.

5.8.1 Data analysis example (Syria)

There are six texts related the Syrian conflict. Here below is the first one, and the rest are to be found on Appendix 2.

Reuters English: 08/05/2016

**Al Qaeda chief tells jihadist fighters in Syria: Unite or die**

Al Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri urged rival jihadist fighters in Syria to unite or risk death but again decried fellow Sunni Muslim militants Islamic State as "extremists" in an audio recording posted online on Sunday.
As successor to Osama bin Laden, Zawahiri has the allegiance of al Qaeda branches in the Middle East, North Africa and South Asia. But the group’s dominance is being challenged by Islamic State, which controls territory in Syria and Iraq and followings in Libya and Yemen.

In Syria, al Qaeda offshoot Nusra Front and Islamic State are the two most powerful groups fighting government forces. Once a single group, they split in 2013, largely due to a power struggle among leaders.

"We have to want the unity of the Mujahideen in Sham (Syria) so it will be liberated from the Russians and Western crusaders. My brothers ... the matter of unity is a matter of life or death for you," Zawahiri said.

The authenticity of the recording, the first since January, could not be immediately verified, but it had the hallmarks of previous Zawahiri tapes. In January, the Egyptian former doctor called for revenge after Saudi Arabia executed dozens of militants.

He is believed to be hiding in a border area between Afghanistan and Pakistan.

On the recording, Zawahiri lambasted a U.N.-backed political process to find a solution in Syria, and praised Nusra Front, which controls most of Idlib province.

Nusra is also part of an alliance of Islamist brigades known as Jaish al Fateh, which is leading battles against Syrian government forces and its Russian- and Iranian-backed allies in the southern Aleppo countryside.

In January, Nusra Front tried unsuccessfully to convince rival Islamist factions to merge into one unit, including the powerful Ahrar al-Sham.

Zawahiri also emphasized once again the ideological divide between al Qaeda and Islamic State, which is fighting a Western-led coalition and Russian forces while also clashing with Western-backed rebels and the Syrian army.
He described them as "extremists and renegades" whose followers would eventually disavow their beliefs and methods.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strategies</th>
<th>Objectives</th>
<th>Devices</th>
<th>Justification for Using a Particular Strategy</th>
<th>Examples</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Nomination | Construction of social actors/in-groups and out-groups | Membership, Categorization, Naming social actors, Use of rhetorical figures | **Basic analysis:** The social actors are constructed as Jihadists.  
**Background facts:** Members of jihadist organisations or Islamist rebel factions fighting in Syria. For further information, refer to 5.6.1 & 5.6.2 *Islamism & jihadism.*  
**Likely Reader stereotypes/ideologies:** The term conjures up images of the violent and ruthless Muslim fighters who are guided by irrational exclusive views and could be involved in globalised terror (very negative image of Islam).  
**News service stereotypes/ideologies:** Violent members of militant Muslim organisations (very negative image of Islam). | Jihadist fighters |
| Perspectivation (Direct) | Expressing involvement, positioning speaker’s point of view | Reporting, description, narration or quotation of events and utterances | **Basic analysis:**
A title where the news service is introducing the piece of news which is the focal point of this media text.  

**Likely reader stereotypes/ideologies:**
Al-Qaeda is a terrorist Muslim organisation which is involved in global terror attacks and killing innocent people (very negative image of Islam).

**News service stereotypes/ideologies:**
Islamic fundamentalist rhetoric, which conforms with the concept of sacrificing one’s life for a certain cause (very negative image of Islam). |
---|---|---|---|
| **Nomination** | Construction of social actors/in-groups and out-groups | Membership Categorization, Naming social actors Use of rhetorical figures | **Basic analysis:**
The social actor is constructed as the leader of Al-Qaeda who succeeded Osama Ben Laden.

**Background facts:**
Refer to fact sheet 5.5 *Ayman al-Zawahiri*

**Likely reader stereotypes/ideologies:**
A leader of a Jihadi group involved in global terror (very negative image of Islam).

**News service stereotypes/ideologies:**
The leader of a Muslim jihadist organisation which is responsible for global terror attack and which is still planning to commit more terror attack around the world, particularly in the ‘West’ (very negative image of Islam). |
---|---|---|---|
|  |  |  | Al Qaeda chief tells jihadist fighters in Syria: Unite or die |
| Nomination | Construction of social actors/in-groups and out-groups | Membership Categorization, Naming social actors Use of rhetorical figures | **Construction:**
The social actors are constructed as the fighters of the Islamic State who are defined as Sunni Muslim militants. |
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Background facts:</strong></td>
<td>Please refer to fact sheet 5.5 <em>Islamic State</em></td>
<td><strong>Likely reader stereotypes/ideologies:</strong> Apparently, Sunni Islam is more militant and extremist than other versions of Islam (very negative image of Sunni Islam).</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>News service stereotypes/ideologies:</strong></td>
<td>The jihadist organisations, and other militant groups follow Sunni Islam (very negative image of Sunni Islam).</td>
<td>The Islamic State militants are labelled as “extremists” by the Al Qaeda leader. The news service is distancing itself from this attribute by using inverted commas.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Predication</th>
<th>Labelling social actors negatively</th>
<th>Stereotypical evaluative attributes/traits</th>
<th>Sunni Muslim militants Islamic State</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>News service stereotypes/ideologies:</strong></td>
<td>The Islamic State militants are labelled as “extremists” by the Al Qaeda leader. The news service is distancing itself from this attribute by using inverted commas.</td>
<td>&quot;extremists&quot;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Basic analysis:
The news service is reporting a statement by Al Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri who is calling on all jihadist fighters in Syria including his rivals to unite. Yet, he criticized IS and described the Islamic State as extremists.

### Likely reader stereotypes/ideologies:
The Muslim Jihadi fighters are in pursuit of death in order to reach the bliss of heaven including the many virgins (very negative image of Islam).

### News service stereotypes/ideologies:
The leader of the jihadist group al Qaeda is urging the militant groups in Syria to unite, however, he has criticized the Islamic State and described it as extremist (very negative image of Islam & very negative image of Sunni Islam).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Perspectivation (Indirect)</th>
<th>Expressing involvement, positioning speaker’s point of view</th>
<th>Reporting, description, narration or quotation of events and utterances</th>
<th>Al Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri urged rival jihadist fighters in Syria to unite or risk death but again decried fellow Sunni Muslim militants Islamic State as “extremists” in an audio recording posted online on Sunday.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nomination</td>
<td>Construction of social actors/in-groups and out-groups</td>
<td>Membership Categorization, Use of rhetorical figures</td>
<td>Basic analysis: The social actor is constructed as the former Al Qaeda leader.</td>
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<td></td>
<td><strong>Background facts:</strong> Please refer to fact sheet 5.5 <em>Osama Ben Laden</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td><strong>Likely reader stereotypes/Ideologies:</strong> Former leader of the jihadist group al-Qaeda which is responsible for the 9/11 attacks (very negative image of Islam).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>News service stereotypes/ideologies:</strong> A jihadist leader of al Qaeda who has been accused for being primarily responsible for ‘international terrorism’ (very negative image of Islam).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nomination</td>
<td>Construction of social actors/in-groups and out-groups</td>
<td>Membership Categorization, Use of rhetorical figures</td>
<td><strong>Basic analysis:</strong> The social actor is constructed as a Sunni Salafist jihadist organisation which declared the establishment of a &quot;caliphate&quot;.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Background facts:</strong> Refer to fact sheet 5.5 <em>Islamic State</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Likely reader stereotypes/ideologies:</strong> A Jihadist organisation which carries out violent and unjustified actions in the name of Islam (very negative image of Islam).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>News service stereotypes/ideologies:</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Sunni Salafist jihadist organisation which aims at establishing a Muslim caliphate in the region (very negative image of Islam).

| Perspectivation (direct) | Expressing involvement, positioning speaker’s point of view | Reporting, description, narration or quotation of events and utterances | **Basic analysis:**
The news service is introducing al-Zawahiri and the groups he is leading by providing information about al Qaeda, its areas of influence and its former leader Osama Bin Laden.

**Likely reader stereotypes/ideologies:**
Unfortunately, the jihadist organisations are proliferating! (very negative in Islam).

**News service stereotypes/ideologies:**
Al-Qaeda is led by al-Zawahiri who succeeded Osama Bin Laden. It has a number of branches in the Middle East and North Africa. However, it is challenged by the Islamic State which is another jihadist Sunni organisation that is gaining territories and support in various areas in the Middle East (very negative image of Islam).

As successor to Osama bin Laden, Zawahiri has the allegiance of al Qaeda branches in the Middle East, North Africa and South Asia. But the group’s dominance is being challenged by Islamic State, which controls territory in Syria and Iraq and followings in Libya and Yemen.
<p>| Nomination | Construction of social actors/in-groups and out-groups | Membership Categorization, Use of rhetorical figures | Basic analysis: The social actor is constructed as a jihadist group based in Syria. It has pledged allegiance to Al Qaeda. | al Qaeda offshoot Nusra Front |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Basic analysis: The social actor is constructed as the official Syrian government forces. | Background facts: Refer to 5.8 Syrian Conflict | Likely reader Stereotypes/Ideologies: Although the Syrian government is autocratic, at least it is secular, and it is fighting fundamentalist groups (very negative image of Islam). | |
| Nomination | Construction of social actors/in-groups and out-groups | Membership Categorization, Use of rhetorical figures | Likely reader Stereotypes/Ideologies: Jihadi Islamist Sunni group based in Syria with an allegiance to al-Qaeda (very negative image of Islam). | News service stereotypes/ideologies: Since it is an offshoot of al-Qaeda, then it is a Sunni jihadist organisation (very negative image of Sunni Islam). |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Perspectivation (Direct)</th>
<th>Expressing involvement, positioning speaker’s point of view</th>
<th>Reporting, description, narration or quotation of events and utterances</th>
<th>News service stereotypes/ideologies: The official Syrian government which is secular and in conflict with Sunni, Jihadist groups (very negative image of Sunni Islam).</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Basic analysis: The news service is providing information on the inception of Nusra Front and its affiliations.</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Background facts: Refer to 5.5 Islamic State &amp; Jabhat al-Nusra (Jabhat Fateh al-Sham)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Likely reader Stereotypes/ideologies: Syria has become a hotbed for fundamentalist groups and organisations (very negative image of Islam).</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>News service stereotypes/ideologies: The Sunni jihadist organisations, the al Qaeda offshoot Nusra Front and the Islamic State, are powerful groups fighting the Syrian government. However, they had an internal leadership conflict which eventually led to their split (very negative image of Sunni Islam).</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>In Syria, al Qaeda offshoot Nusra Front and Islamic State are the two most powerful groups fighting government forces. Once a single group, they split in 2013, largely due to a power struggle among leaders.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Nomination | Construction of social actors/in-groups and out-groups | Membership Categorization, Use of rhetorical figures | **Basic analysis:**
The social actors are constructed as Mujahideen with a reference to the ‘Mujahideen’ in Afghanistan. |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| | | | **Background facts:**
Refer to 5.6.3 *Mujahideen* |
| | | | **Likely reader stereotypes/ideologies:**
Salafist believers in Jihad or Muslim holy war who were mainly in Afghanistan in the 1980’s fighting the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan (neutral). |
| | | | **News service stereotypes/ideologies:**
Al-Zawahiri is calling the fighters of the Islamist groups ‘Mujahideen’ which means the Muslim fighters who are ready to sacrifice their lives for ‘Jihad’ which is a holy war (very negative image of Islam). |
| Russians and Western Crusaders | Construction of social actors/in-groups and out-groups | Membership Categorization, Use of rhetorical figures | **Basic analysis:**
The social actors are constructed as the Russian forces which intervened in Syria on the side of the Syrian regime. al-Zawahiri is making an association (allusion) between the Russian intervention and other Western interventions in the region and the crusades. |
| | | | **Background facts:** |
Refer to 5.6.8 Crusaders

**Likely reader stereotypes/ideologies:**
An emerging stereotype of Western invasion of the Muslim world. The image of crusaders in the western mind used to be positive, but westerners are gradually developing a less positive view towards them (neutral).

**News service stereotypes/ideologies:**
Al-Qaeda jihadists and their followers have retained the image of the West as the ‘Crusaders’ of the Middle Ages (very negative image of Islam).

| Perspectivation (Indirect) | Expressing involvement, positioning speaker’s point of view | Reporting, description, narration or quotation of events and utterances | Basic analysis: The news service is reporting a direct quotation by al-Zawahiri. Al-Zawahiri is likening the conflict in Syria to that in Afghanistan by using the term ‘mujahideen’

**Likely reader stereotypes/ideologies:**
Urging people to die is a kind of jihadist discourse (very negative image of Islam).

**News service stereotypes/ideologies:**
Al-Zawahiri is urging the jihadist fighters in Syria to unite in face of the Russians and the Western crusaders or face death. He is retrieving a mediaeval image of clash between the Muslims in the East and crusaders from the West (very negative image of Islam).

“We have to want the unity of the Mujahideen in Sham (Syria) so it will be liberated from the Russians and Western crusaders. My brothers ... the matter of unity is a matter of life or death for you,” Zawahiri said.
### Basic analysis:
The social actor is constructed as an international organisation whose role is to attempt to solve international conflicts and monitor processes of implementation.

### Nomination
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Construction of social actors/in-groups and out-groups</th>
<th>Membership</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Use of rhetorical figures</td>
<td>Categorization</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Basic analysis:
The news service is reporting the dissatisfaction of Al-Zawahiri with U.N involvement in Syria, probably relaying a general feeling of distrust in the performance of international organisations.

### Background facts:
Refer to 5.8 Syrian Conflict.

### Likely reader stereotypes/ideologies:
Jihadist groups wouldn’t comply with international law (very negative image of Islam).

### News service stereotypes/ideologies:
Al-Zahrawi is angry at the UN peace negotiations related to Syria, while he is pleased with the advances of al-Qaeda offshoot al-Nusra front (very negative image of Islam).

### Perspectivation (Indirect)
| Expressing involvement, positioning speaker’s point of view | Reporting, description, narration or quotation of events and utterances |

On the recording, Zawahiri lambasted a U.N.-backed political process to find a solution in Syria, and praised Nusra Front, which controls most of Idlib province.
| Nomination | Construction of social actors/in-groups and out-groups | Membership Categorization, Use of rhetorical figures | **Basic analysis:**
The social actor is constructed as a rebel coalition which consists mainly of Islamist factions including al-Nusra Front.

**Background facts:**
Refer to 5.5 *Jaish al-Fateh*

**Likely reader stereotypes/ideologies:**
Some Islamist group fighting in Syria (very negative image of Islam).

**News service stereotypes/ideologies:**
Al Nusra Front, which is an al Qaeda affiliate, is in alliance with other Islamist factions fighting in Syria (very negative image of Islam).

| Nomination | Construction of social actors/in-groups and out-groups | Membership Categorization, Use of rhetorical figures | **Basic analysis:**
The social actor is constructed as the official Syrian government forces. We note a change in the naming of the Syrian leadership from ‘regime’ to ‘government’. This changes the construction of the social actor.

**Likely reader stereotypes/ideologies:**
Syrian government forces |
Though it is an authoritarian rule, it is the lesser evil than the (Jihadist groups) (very negative image of Islam).

**News service stereotypes/ideologies:**
The forces which belong to the official Syrian government (the stereotype is not classified).

| Nomination | Construction of social actors/in-groups and out-groups | Membership Categorization, Use of rhetorical figures | **Basic analysis:**
The social actors are constructed as forces which intervened in the Syrian conflict in favour of the Syrian regime - Russia and Iran-affiliated forces (mainly Hezbollah). |
|---|---|---|---|
| **Background facts:**
Refer to 5.8 *Syrian Conflict*. |
| **Likely reader stereotypes/ideologies:**
Some regional and international powers have intervened in the Syrian conflict (neutral). |
| **News service stereotypes/ideologies:**
The Syrian government is backed by Iran and Russia (neutral). |

| Perspectivation (Direct) | Expressing involvement, positioning speaker’s point of view | Reporting, description, narration or quotation of events and utterances | **Basic analysis:**
The news service is presenting the situation in some conflict areas in Syria and introduces the opposing alliances. |
|---|---|---|---|
| **Likely reader stereotypes/ideologies:**
The Syrian conflict is no longer confined to Syrians but has regional and international dimensions (the stereotype is not classified). |
| Nusra is also part of an alliance of Islamist brigades known as Jaish al Fateh, which is leading battles against Syrian government forces | Russian- and Iranian-backed allies |

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The Syrian government is backed by Iran and Russia against Islamist and jihadist groups including al-Nusra front which is an al-Qaeda affiliate (very negative image of Islam).

| Nomination | Construction of social actors/in-groups and out-groups | Membership Categorization, Use of rhetorical figures | **Basic analysis:**
The social actor is constructed as an Islamist rebel faction. |

**Background facts:**
Refer to fact sheet 5.5 Ahrar al-Sham

**Likely stereotypes/ideologies**
Islamist rebel group operating in Syria (very negative image of Islam).

**News service stereotypes/ideologies:**
A Sunni Islamist and Salafist group and a rival of Nusra Front (very negative image of Sunni Islam).

In January, Nusra Front tried unsuccessfully to convince rival Islamist factions to merge into one unit, including the powerful Ahrar al-Sham.
| Nomination | Construction of social actors/in-groups and out-groups | Membership Categorization, Use of rhetorical figures | **Basic analysis:**
The social actor is constructed as an international coalition led by the US to fight the Islamic State.

**Background facts:**
Refer to fact sheet 5.5 *US-led coalition in Syria and Iraq*

**Likely reader stereotypes/ideologies:**
The whole world should cooperate against this terrorist jihadist group and eliminate it (very negative image of Islam).

**News service stereotypes/ideologies:**
The jihadist organisation Islamic State has gained ground in Iraq and Syria, and thus an international coalition led by the US has intervened in both Iraq and Syria to fight IS (very negative image of Islam). | a Western-led coalition |
### Nomination

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Construction of social actors/in-groups and out-groups</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Membership Categorization, Use of rhetorical figures</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Basic analysis:
The social actor is constructed as the Western-backed Kurdish groups who are armed and trained by the US to take part in fighting the Islamic State in Northern Syria.

#### Background facts:
The US-supported Kurdish militias and Arab tribes opposing Jihadi organisations in north-east Syria particularly the Islamic State.

#### Likely reader stereotypes/ideologies:
Positive view of Kurds, since they are secular and Western-backed (very negative image of Islam).

#### News service stereotypes/ideologies:
The United States has armed and trained some Kurdish groups to take part in fighting the jihadist group the Islamic State (very negative image of Islam).
| Nomination                      | Construction of social actors/in-groups and out-groups | Membership Categorization, Use of rhetorical figures | **Basic analysis:** The social actor is constructed as the official Syrian army fighting opposing rebel groups and defending the Syrian government.  
**Likely reader stereotypes/ideologies:** The official Syrian army fighting a cohort of Islamist factions (very negative image of Islam).  
**News service stereotypes/ideologies:** The Syrian army which is fighting the Islamic State alongside a number of regional and international forces including Russia and the United States (very negative image of Islam). | The Syrian army |
|--------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------|
| Perspectivation (Indirect)     | Expressing involvement, positioning speaker’s point of view | Reporting, description, narration or quotation of events and utterances | **Basic analysis:** The news service is reporting the attitudes of al-Qaeda towards the Islamic State.  
**Likely reader stereotypes/ideologies:** Both al-Qaeda and the Islamic State are jihadist groups and pose the threat of global terror (very negative image of Islam).  
**News service stereotypes/ideologies:** | Zawahiri also emphasized once again the ideological divide between al Qaeda and Islamic State, which is fighting a Western-led coalition and Russian forces |
While also clashing with Western-backed rebels and the Syrian army, Al-Qaeda and the Islamic State are rivals although both are jihadist Islamist groups. The Islamic State is battling with a number of regional and international forces (very negative image of Islam).

**Predication**

| Labelling social actors negatively | Stereotypical evaluative attributes/traits | The Islamic State is labeled by the al-Qaeda leader using stereotypically Islamic negative terms ‘extremists’ and ‘renegades’. The news service is distancing itself from this description by using inverted commas. | “extremists and renegades” |

**Perspectivation (Indirect)**

| Expressing involvement, positioning speaker’s point of view | Reporting, description, narration or quotation of events and utterances | **Basic analysis:**
The news service continues to report al-Zawahiri’s viewpoint on IS, but distances itself from it by using inverted commas.  

**Likely reader stereotypes/ideologies:**
Both are jihadist groups who are responsible for global terror attacks (very negative image of Islam).

**News service stereotypes/ideologies:**
Al-Zawahiri is using Islamic rhetoric to blemish the Islamic State accusing it of not following the right path of Islam, but of being extreme (very negative image of Islam). | He described them as "extremists and renegades" whose followers would eventually disavow their beliefs and methods. |
الظواهري يقول للمتشددين في سوريا: اتحدوا أو موتوا

دعا أيمن الظواهري زعيم تنظيم القاعدة السابق للمتشددين في سوريا للأتحاد أو مواجهة خطر الموت ولكنه وصف
من جديد متشددي تنظيم الدولة الإسلامية بأنهم "غلاة" في تسجيل صوتي جديد بث على الإنترنت يوم الأحد.

ويعرف الظواهري الذي خلف أسامة بن لادن مؤسس تنظيم القاعدة بفروع التنظيم في الشرق الأوسط وفي شمال
أفريقيا وجنوب آسيا. لكن هيئة الجماعة تعرضت لتحذيرات مثيل بقيام تنظيم الدولة الإسلامية الذي يسيطر على أجزاء
من سوريا والعراق وله أتباع في اليمن وليبيا.

وفي سوريا فإن تنظيم الدولة الإسلامية وجبهة النصرة هما أكبر تنظيمين يقاتلان القوات الحكومية السعودية. وكان
التنظيمان يعملان تحت مظلة تنظيم واحد إلى أن انفصلا في 2013 لأسباب أهمها الخلافات على السلطة بين قادتها.

وقال الظواهري "من واجبنا اليوم أن ننفر لنصرته خفافا وثقالا وأن نحرض على وحدة المجاهدين في الشام حتى
يتحرر من النظام التصريحي العلماني وأعوانه الروافض الصفويين وحلفائه الروس والغربيين الصليبيين.

"إخواني المجاهدين من كل الدنيا. إن مسألة الوحدة هي قضية الحياة أو الموت لكم.

ولم يتبنى الظواهري التحليق في صحة التسجيل وهو الأول منذ يناير كانون الثاني لكنه يحمل سمات تسجيلات
الظواهري السابقة. وفي يناير دعا الظواهري وهو طبيب سابق مصري إلى الثأر بعدما أعدمت السعودية العشرات
المتشددين.

واعتق الظواهري في تسجيل يوم العملية السياسية التي تدعمها الأمم المتحدة سعيا للوصول إلى حل في سوريا وأعاد
جبهة النصرة التي تسيطر على معظم أجزاء محافظة إدلب.

وجهة النصرة جزء من تحالف من قوافل إسلامية يدعمي جيش النصر الذي يقود معارك ضد القوات الحكومية
السورية وحلفائها الروس والمدعومين من إيران في ريف جنوب حلب.

وفي يناير كانون الثاني حاولت جبهة النصرة ولم تفلح في إقناع الفصائل الإسلامية المنافسة للتوحد في كيان واحد
بمن فيهم تنظيم أحرار الشام.

وشدد الظواهري من جديد على الانقسام الأيديولوجي بين القاعدة والدولة الإسلامية التي تقاتل القوات الروسية
والتحالف الذي يقوده الغرب. وتفاقم في نفس الوقت المعارضين المدعومين من الغرب والجيش السوري.

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Translation:

The leader of Al-Qaeda Ayman Al-Zawahiri called upon hardline (radical) fighters in Syria to unite or risk death. However, he again described the IS extremists as “Exaggerators” in an audio recording posted online on Sunday.

Al-Zawahiri, who succeeded Osama Bin Laden founder of Al-Qaeda organisation, recognises its branches in the Middle East, North Africa and South Asia. However, the hegemony of the group was challenged by IS which controls swathes of land in Syria and Iraq and has followers in Yemen and Libya.

In Syria, IS and Al Nusra Front are the two largest groups fighting the Syrian government forces. Both groups worked under the umbrella of one organisation until they split in 2013, mainly because of conflict over power among the leaders.

Al Zawahiri said “It is our duty today to go forth for Islam’s victory light and heavy (with all that we can afford), and to urge the unity of the Mujahideen in Sham, until it is liberated from the secular Nusayri regime, its Rafidites (apostate, renegades, defectors, rejectors) Safavids collaborators, and its Russian and Western Crusader allies.

“My Mujahideen brothers all over the world.. the issue of unity is a matter of life or death for you”.

The recording which was the first since January was not immediately verified. Yet, it has the same features as all previous recordings of al-Zawahiri. In January, al-Zahrawi, a former Egyptian doctor called for revenge after Saudi had executed tens of extremists.

In today’s recording, al-Zawahiri criticised the political process backed by the UN in order to reach a solution in Syria. He praised Al Nusra Front which controls most parts of Idlib governorate.

Al-Nusra Front is part of an alliance of Islamist factions called Jaysh al-Fateh (Army of Conquest), which is leading the fight against the Syrian Government forces and its Russian allies backed by Iran in the countryside of South Aleppo.
In January, al-Nusra Front unsuccessfully tried to convince rival Islamic factions to merge in one unit including Ahrar Al Sham.

Al Zawahiri stressed the ideological divide between Al-Qaeda and Islamic State which is fighting the Russian forces and the Western-led coalition, and at the same time battles with the Western backed insurgents and the Syrian army.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strategies</th>
<th>Objectives</th>
<th>Devices</th>
<th>Justification of Using a Particular Strategy</th>
<th>English Translation</th>
<th>Examples</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nomination</td>
<td>Construction of social actors/in-groups and out-groups</td>
<td>Membership Categorization, Use of rhetorical figures</td>
<td><strong>Basic analysis:</strong> The social actor is constructed as the leader of Al-Qaeda who succeeded Osama Ben Laden.</td>
<td>Ayman al-Zawahiri, the leader of Al-Qaeda</td>
<td>أيمن الظواهري زعيم تنظيم القاعدة</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nomination</td>
<td>Construction of social actors/in-groups and out-groups</td>
<td>Membership Categorization, Use of rhetorical figures</td>
<td><strong>Basic analysis:</strong> The social actors are constructed as extremist fighters who have joined the various Islamist factions in Syria.</td>
<td>Hardline fighters</td>
<td>المقاتلين المتشددين</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nomination</td>
<td>Construction of social actors/in-groups and out-groups</td>
<td>Membership Categorization, Naming social actors Use of rhetorical figures</td>
<td>Basic analysis: The social actors are constructed as members of the ‘Islamic State’.</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Likely reader stereotypes/ideologies:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Extremist fighters who are members of the extremist organisation the Islamic State (very negative image of Islam).</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>News service stereotypes/ideologies:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Extremist fighters of the jihadist organisation Islamic State (very negative image of Islam).</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Predication</th>
<th>Labelling social actors negatively</th>
<th>Stereotypical evaluative attributes/traits</th>
<th>Basic analysis: A qualifying adjective used to label the social actors ‘The extremists of the Islamic state’.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Likely reader stereotypes/ideologies:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Extremists of the Islamic State</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Basic analysis:** The social actors are constructed as members of the ‘Islamic State’.

**Likely reader stereotypes/ideologies:** Extremist fighters who are members of the extremist organisation the Islamic State (very negative image of Islam).

**News service stereotypes/ideologies:** Extremist fighters of the jihadist organisation Islamic State (very negative image of Islam).
Islamic sects deviating from mainstream Sunni Islam (neutral).

**News service stereotypes/ideologies:**
The al-Qaeda leader is accusing the Islamic State of deviating from mainstream Sunni Islam (neutral).

| Perspectivation (Indirect) | Expressing involvement, positioning speaker’s point of view | Reporting, description, narration or quotation of events and utterances | **Basic analysis:**
The news service is introducing the viewpoint of an Islamist figure, and the leader of a globally known fundamentalist organisation. Al-Zawahiri is emphasising the notion of unity and Jihad. However, he is excluding and labelling IS fighters.

**Likely reader stereotypes/ideologies:**
The Syrian arena is overrun with radical Islamic factions (very negative image of Islam).

**Newsagency stereotypes/ideologies:**
The leader of the jihadist organization al-Qaeda is calling upon the hardline fighters in Syria to unite or risk death. However, he again described the IS extremists as “Exaggerators” in an audio recording posted online on Sunday.

| Nomination | Construction of social actors/ingroups and out-groups | Membership Categorization, Naming social actors | **Basic analysis:**
The social actor is constructed as the founder of the al-Qaeda organisation.

**Background facts:**
Refer to fact sheet 5.5 *Osama Ben Laden*

|  |  |  | The leader of Al-Qaeda Ayman al-Zawahiri called upon hardline fighters in Syria to unite or risk death. However, he again described the IS extremists as “Exaggerators” in an audio recording posted online on Sunday. |  |

|  |  |  | دعا أيمن الظواهري زعيم تنظيم القاعدة المقاتلين المتشددين في سوريا للاتحاد أو مواجهة خطر الموت ولكنه وصف من جديد متشددي تنظيم الدولة الإسلامية بأنهم “غلاة” في تسجيل صوتي جديد بث على الإنترنت يوم الأحد. |  |

<p>|  |  |  | اسامة بن لادن مؤسس تنظيم القاعدة |  |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nomination</th>
<th>Construction of social actors/in-groups and out-groups</th>
<th>Membership Categorization, Naming social actors</th>
<th>Use of rhetorical figures</th>
<th>Likely reader stereotypes/ideologies: The most wanted person by the United States after 9/11 serial attacks and former leader of al-Qaeda organisation (fairly negative image of Islam).</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Basic analysis:</td>
<td>The social actor is constructed as a Sunni Salafist jihadist organisation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Background facts:</td>
<td>Refer to fact sheet 5.5 Islamic State</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Likely reader stereotypes/ideologies:</td>
<td>An extremist organisation which carries out violent and unjustified actions in the name of Islam (fairly negative image of Islam).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>News service stereotypes/ideologies:</td>
<td>Salafist jihadist organisation which aims at establishing a Muslim caliphate in the region (very negative image of Islam).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Islamic State</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perspectivation</td>
<td>Expressing involvement, positioning speaker's point of view</td>
<td>Reporting, description, narration or quotation of events and utterances</td>
<td><strong>Basic analysis:</strong> The news service is describing al-Qaeda’s expanding authority, which is at the same time faced by the expansion of the Islamic State on the ground.</td>
<td><strong>Likely reader stereotypes/ideologies:</strong> It is unfortunate that Muslims should be represented by extremist organisation such as al-Qaeda and the Islamic State who carry out morally unjustified action in the name of Islam (fairly positive image of Islam).</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Basic analysis</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Likely reader stereotypes/ideologies:</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>News service stereotypes/ideologies:</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>News service stereotypes/ideologies:</strong></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

**Perspectivation (Indirect)**

**Expressing involvement, positioning speaker's point of view**

**Reporting, description, narration or quotation of events and utterances**

**Basic analysis:**

The news service is describing al-Qaeda’s expanding authority, which is at the same time faced by the expansion of the Islamic State on the ground.

**Likely reader stereotypes/ideologies:**

It is unfortunate that Muslims should be represented by extremist organisation such as al-Qaeda and the Islamic State who carry out morally unjustified action in the name of Islam (fairly positive image of Islam).

**News service stereotypes/ideologies:**

Al-Zawahiri, a successor to Osama Bin Laden, acknowledges the branches of al-Qaeda in the Middle East and North Africa. However, it is challenged by the Islamic State which is another jihadist Sunni organisation that is gaining territories and support in various areas in the Middle East (very negative image of Islam).

**Al-Zawahiri, who succeeded Osama Bin Laden founder of Al-Qaeda organisation, recognises its branches in the Middle East, North Africa and South Asia. However, the hegemony of the group was challenged by IS which controls swathes of land in Syria and Iraq and has followers in Yemen and Libya.**

**Likely reader stereotypes/ideologies:**

It is unfortunate that Muslims should be represented by extremist organisation such as al-Qaeda and the Islamic State who carry out morally unjustified action in the name of Islam (fairly positive image of Islam).

**News service stereotypes/ideologies:**

Al-Zawahiri, a successor to Osama Bin Laden, acknowledges the branches of al-Qaeda in the Middle East and North Africa. However, it is challenged by the Islamic State which is another jihadist Sunni organisation that is gaining territories and support in various areas in the Middle East (very negative image of Islam).

**Perspectivation (Indirect)**

**Expressing involvement, positioning speaker's point of view**

**Reporting, description, narration or quotation of events and utterances**

**Basic analysis:**

The social actor is constructed as the al-Qaeda branch in Syria (the Levant).

**Background facts:**

Refer to fact sheet 5.5 Jabhat al-Nusra (Jabhat Fateh al-Sham)

**Likely reader stereotypes/ideologies:**

Where are the regions of Syria and Iraq attended by al-Qaeda in the Levant (the Levant).
Being affiliated to al-Qaeda would make the general public concerned about its ideology and its violent means (very negative image of Islam).
For further information, see: [http://www.pewglobal.org/2013/09/10/muslim-publics-share-concerns-about-extremist-groups/](http://www.pewglobal.org/2013/09/10/muslim-publics-share-concerns-about-extremist-groups/)

**News service stereotypes/ideologies:**
Sunni Salafist jihadist organisation (very negative image of Sunni Islam).

| Nomination | Construction of social actors/in-groups and out-groups | Membership Categorization, Naming social actors Use of rhetorical figures | **Basic analysis:**
The social actor is constructed as the official Syrian government forces.  
**Background facts:**
Refer to 5.8 *Syrian Conflict*  
**Likely reader stereotypes/ideologies:**


b. Civil government with strong links to the resistance axis, which includes Iran. Hence, it is viciously attacked by Sunni fundamentalist groups which have
been mobilised by Saudi Arabia (very negative image of Sunni Islam).

*News service stereotypes/ideologies:*
A secular government facing a Sunni Islamist fundamentalism. However, it is supported by some regional and international powers (very negative image of Sunni Islam).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Perspectivation (Direct)</th>
<th>Expressing involvement, positioning speaker's point of view</th>
<th>Reporting, description, narration or quotation of events and utterances</th>
<th>The news service is reporting the recent history of the two Islamist organisations, which were fighting the Syrian government but later became two distinct organisations.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>In Syria, IS and Al Nusra Front are the two largest groups fighting the Syrian government forces. Both groups worked under the umbrella of one organisation until they split in 2013, mainly because of conflict over power among the leaders.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Nomination               | Construction of social actors/in-groups and out-groups | Membership Categorization, Naming social actors Use of rhetorical figures | **Basic analysis:**
The social actor is constructed as Muslims who are fighting in support of Islam. ‘Mujahideen’ is an Islamic term which means a group of Muslims fighting in order to spread the word of God or to defeat those who defy

|                          |                                                       |                                                                            | Mujahideen |

|                          |                                                       |                                                                            | مقاتليَّة |

في سوريا فإن تنظيم الدولة الإسلامية وجبهة النصرة هما أكبر تنظيمين يقاتلان القوات الحكومية السورية. وكان التنظيمان يعملان تحت مظلة تنظيم واحد إلى أن انفصلا في 2013، مع اختلاف الفصائل في أسباب أسماءها وصراع على السلطة بين قادتها.

المجاهدين
it. A more contemporary sense of ‘Mujahideen’ is associated with the Taliban.

**Background facts:**
Refer to 5.6.3 Mujahideen.

**Likely reader stereotypes/ideologies:**
Holy warriors who could be very good believers. However, this stereotype/ideology is subject to some confusion because people repeatedly hear and read in media sources that individuals named as such are committing atrocities (fairly negative image of Islam).

**News service stereotypes/ideologies:**
The Islamist rebels who belong to a number of rebel factions fighting in Syria (very negative image of Islam).

| Nomination | Construction of social actors/in-groups and out-groups | Membership Categorization, Naming social actors Use of rhetorical figures | **Basic analysis:** The social actor is constructed as the Syrian regime (being non-religious or secular). There is also a strong reference to the Assad family and senior officials as being Alawites (Nusayris). **Background facts:** Refer to 5.6.7 Nusayris. **Likely reader stereotypes/ideologies:** | The Nusayri secular regime | النظام النصيري العلماني |
A secular regime, which is actually relying on a minority that monopolises political and military power and undermines the Sunni Muslims who make up the majority of the population (very negative image of sectarian division).

**News service stereotypes/ideologies:**
Al-Zawahiri is describing the Syrian government of being both sectarian and secular but in a negative sense (as in non-believer), and also of belonging to the Nusayri sect. which could be classified as heretic by Sunni Salafists (very negative image of sectarian division and very negative image of Sunni Islam).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nomination</th>
<th>Construction of social actors/in-groups and out-groups</th>
<th>Membership Categorization, Naming social actors Use of rhetorical figures</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Basic analysis:</td>
<td>The social actor is constructed as the Iranian allies. They are referred to as the Rafidites (derogatory reference). The Safavids were a dynasty (1501-1722) which ruled Iran and imposed Shia beliefs of the Twelver sect on its people.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Background facts:</td>
<td>Refer to 5.6.5 &amp; 5.6.6 Rawafid &amp; Safavids</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Likely reader stereotypes/ideologies:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**واعوان الروافض الصفويين**
| Nomination | Construction of social actors/in-groups and out-groups | Membership Categorization, Naming social actors Use of rhetorical figures | **Basic analysis:** The social actor is constructed as the Russian Federation which intervened militarily in Syria in September 2015. Refer to *Syrian Conflict* 5.8 for further information. | **Background facts:** The Russians intervened militarily in Syria in September 2015. Refer to *Syrian Conflict* 5.8 for further information. | **Likely reader stereotypes/ideologies:** a. The Russians have intervened in Syria to support the regime against the Syrian people who are seeking democratic rule (the stereotype is not classified). |

A group of Muslims who deviated from mainstream Islam, they are mainly from Iran (very negative image of sectarian division).

**News service stereotypes/ideologies:** Sunni Islamist organisations like al-Qaeda and the Islamic State label Shia Muslims as deviants from mainstream, or proper, Islam (very negative image of sectarian division & very negative image of Sunni Islam).
b. The Russians have intervened in Syria to support the Syrian government against Sunni jihadist groups (very negative image of Sunni Islam).

**News service stereotypes/ideologies:**
Al-Zahrawi, leader of al-Qaeda, is attacking the Syrian government allies Iran and Russia (neutral).

<p>| Nomination | Construction of social actors/in-groups and out-groups | Membership Categorization, Naming social actors Use of rhetorical figures | Basic analysis: The social actor is constructed as the Western powers and associating them with the crusaders of the middle ages. | Background facts: Refer to 5.6.8 Crusaders. | Likely reader stereotypes/ideologies: The crusades are medieval military campaigns similar to other campaigns by different groups over history (neutral). | News service stereotypes/ideologies: The leader of the jihadist organisation al-Qaeda is making a direct association between the contemporary Western powers and the Crusades of the Middle Ages (very negative image of Islam). | Western Crusaders والغربيين الصليبيين |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Perspectivation (Direct)</th>
<th>Expressing involvement, positioning speaker’s point of view</th>
<th>Reporting, description, narration or quotation of events and utterances</th>
<th>Basic analysis:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Al-Zawahiri said “It is our duty today to go forth for Islam’s victory light and heavy (with all that we can afford), and to urge the unity of the Mujahideen in Sham, until it is liberated from the secular Nusayri regime, its Rafidites (apostate, renegades, defectors, rejectors) Safavids collaborators, and its Russian and Western Crusader allies.”</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Likely reader stereotypes/ideologies:  
Although al-Zawahiri is using eloquent language and addressing religious emotions, he is still a leader of an extremist organisation which has conducted unjustified actions (fairly negative image of Islam).  

News service stereotypes/ideologies: 
Al-Qaeda leader al-Zawahiri is urging the Islamist rebel groups in Syria to unite in face of Shia Iran, Russia and the Western powers, who he considers the crusaders of today (very negative image of Sunni Islam).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nomination</th>
<th>Construction of social actors/in-groups and out-groups</th>
<th>Membership Categorization, Naming social actors</th>
<th>Use of rhetorical figures</th>
<th>The social actors are constructed as fighters of a holy war, Muslims who are ready to sacrifice their lives for a good cause.</th>
<th>Mujahedeen</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Perspectivation (Direct)</td>
<td>Expressing involvement, positioning speaker’s point of view</td>
<td>Reporting, description, narration or quotation of events and utterances</td>
<td><strong>Basic analysis:</strong> Al-Zawahiri continues to urge the Islamist rebel factions and followers to unite in face of the various above groups or risk death.</td>
<td><strong>Likely reader stereotypes/ideologies:</strong> Unfortunately, those Mujahedeen do not represent the real Muslim mujahideen who followed the tolerant teachings of Islam (fairly negative image of Islam).</td>
<td>“My Mujahideen brothers all over the world .. the issue of unity is a matter of life or death for you”.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nomination</td>
<td>Construction of social actors/in-groups</td>
<td>Membership Categorization,</td>
<td><strong>Basic analysis:</strong></td>
<td>United Nations</td>
<td>الأمم المتحدة</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

currentIndex: 277
The social actor is constructed as an international organisation which has a role in mediating international conflicts and monitoring the solution processes.

**Likely reader stereotypes/ideologies:**
According to PEW research centre 2013, most of the Arab countries have unfavourable view of the UN (less than 50%) except for Lebanon
http://www.pewglobal.org/2013/09/17/united-nations-retains-strong-global-image/
(The stereotype is not classified).

**News service stereotypes/ideologies:**
An international organisation which mediates in international conflicts and monitors solution processes (the stereotype is not classified).

---

| Perspectivation (Indirect) | Expressing involvement, positioning speaker’s point of view | Membership Categorization, Naming social actors Use of rhetorical figures | **Basic analysis:**
The news service continues to report the content of al-Zawahiri’s audio recording in its own words. |

**Likely reader stereotypes/ideologies:**
Sadly, extremist organisations are controlling large swathes of land in Syria (fairly negative image of Islam).

**News service stereotypes/ideologies:**
In today’s recording, al-Zawahiri criticised the political process backed by the UN in order to reach a solution in Syria. He praised Al Nusra Front which controls most parts of Idlib governorate.

£لانتقد الظواهري في تسجيل يوم العملية السياسية التي تدعمها الأمم المتحدة سعيًا للوصول إلى حل في سوريا وأشاد بجبهة النصرة التي تسيطر على معظم
| Nomination | Construction of social actors/in-groups and out-groups | Membership Categorization, Naming social actors Use of rhetorical figures | **Basic Analysis:**
The social actor is constructed as the Jihadist group ‘Nusra Front’.

**Background facts:**
Refer to fact sheet 5.5 *Jabhat al-Nusra (Jabhat Fateh al-Sham)*

**Likely reader stereotypes/ideologies:**
Al-Qaeda affiliate in Syria that once tried to stand up to America, but uses the wrong means, as it has killed many civilians (fairly negative image of Islam).

**News service stereotypes/ideologies:**
Sunni Salafist jihadist organisation (very negative image of Sunni Islam). |

| Al-Nusra Front | الجبهة النصرة |جزاء محافظة إدلب |
| Nomination | Construction of social actors/in-groups and out-groups | Membership Categorization, Naming social actors Use of rhetorical figures | **Basic analysis:** The social actor is constructed as a rebel coalition which consists mainly of Islamist factions Including al-Nusra Front. | **Likely reader stereotypes/ideologies:**
- Al-Nusra Front, which is an al-Qaeda affiliate in Syria, is part of this group which means it is an extremist group (fairly negative image of Islam).
- There may be some extremist elements in this alliance, but they are patriotic fighters fighting an oppressive regime (fairly positive image of Islam).

**Background facts:**
Refer to fact sheet 5.5 *Jaish al-Fateh*

**News service stereotypes/ideologies:**
Al Nusra Front, which is an al-Qaeda affiliate, is in alliance with other Islamist factions fighting in Syria (very negative image of Islam). |

| Nomination | Construction of social actors/in-groups and out-groups | Membership Categorization, Naming social actors Use of rhetorical figures | **Basic analysis:** The social actor is constructed as the Syrian government forces. | **Likely reader stereotypes/ideologies:**
- Authoritarian regime, where an Alawite minority is oppressing the Sunni majority (very negative image of sectarian division). For further information please |

|  | Syrian government forces | جيش الفتح |  |  |

|  |  | القوات الحكومية السورية |  |  |

b. Civil government with strong links to the resistance axis, which includes Iran. Hence, it is viciously attacked by Sunni fundamentalist groups which have been mobilised by Saudi Arabia (very negative image of Sunni Islam).

**News service stereotypes/ideologies:**
The official Syrian government forces (neutral).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nomination</th>
<th>Construction of social actors/in-groups and out-groups</th>
<th>Membership Categorization, Naming social actors Use of rhetorical figures</th>
<th>Basic analysis:</th>
<th>Likely reader stereotypes/ideologies:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>The social actor is constructed as a Shia Muslim state and regional power with specific alliances.</td>
<td>a. A Shia state which intervenes in neighbouring Arab countries with ill intentions of undermining Sunni Islam (very negative image of sectarian division &amp; very negative image of Shia Islam).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>b. A strong regional power which stands up to the colonial schemes of the US and Israel (the stereotype is not classified).</td>
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</table>

Iran
### News service stereotypes/ideologies:
A powerful state on the Persian Gulf which has tense relations with its Arab neighbours particularly Saudi Arabia, but is an ally of the Syrian government (neutral).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Perspectivation (Direct)</th>
<th>Expressing involvement, positioning speaker’s point of view</th>
<th>Reporting, description, narration or quotation of events and utterances</th>
<th>Basic analysis:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td>The news service is presenting some opposing alliances in the Syrian civil war, with government forces and their allies facing an alliance of Islamist rebel groups.</td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>Likely reader stereotypes/ideologies:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>a. The Syrian government and its allies are fighting an alliance of extremist groups including al-Nusra Front, which is the al-Qaeda affiliate in Syria (very negative image of Islam).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>b. The Russians and the Iranians are backing the al-Assad regime against its own people (the stereotype is not classified).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td></td>
<td>News service stereotypes/ideologies:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td></td>
<td>The official Syrian government backed by Iran and Russia is battling with an alliance of Islamist factions headed by al-Nusra Front (very negative image of Islam).</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nomination</th>
<th>Construction of social actors/in-groups and out-groups</th>
<th>Membership Categorization, Naming social actors</th>
<th>Basic analysis:</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>The social actor is constructed as an Islamist rebel faction.</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Background facts:</strong></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Refer to fact sheet 5.5 Ahrar al-Sham</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

|                         |                                                             |                                                                     | Background facts: |
|                         |                                                             |                                                                     | Ahrar al-Sham |

### Basic analysis:

**Al-Nusra Front is part of an alliance of Islamist factions called Jaysh al-Fateh (Army of Conquest), which is leading the fight against the Syrian Government forces and its Russian allies backed by Iran in the countryside of South Aleppo.**

**Likely reader stereotypes/ideologies:**

a. The Syrian government and its allies are fighting an alliance of extremist groups including al-Nusra Front, which is the al-Qaeda affiliate in Syria (very negative image of Islam).

b. The Russians and the Iranians are backing the al-Assad regime against its own people (the stereotype is not classified).
**Likely reader stereotypes/ideologies**

- a. Islamist rebel group operating in Syria against the Syrian government (very negative image of Islam).

- b. God-fearing and patriotic group seeking to topple the al-Assad regime (very positive image of Islam).

**News service stereotypes/ideologies:**
A Sunni Islamist and Salafist group operating in Syria, and a rival of Nusra Front (very negative image of Sunni Islam).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Perspectivation (Direct)</th>
<th>Expressing involvement, positioning speaker’s point of view</th>
<th>Reporting, description, narration or quotation of events and utterances</th>
<th>The news service is shedding light on the efforts of al-Nusra Front to unite the efforts of the Islamist groups and form alliances.</th>
<th>In January, al-Nusra Front tried unsuccessfully to convince rival Islamic factions to merge into one unit, including Ahrar al-Sham.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Nomination              | Construction of social actors/in-groups and out-groups      | Membership Categorization, Naming social actors Use of rhetorical figures | **Basic analysis:**
The social actor is constructed as the extremist organization al-Qaeda.  
**Background facts:**
Refer to fact sheet 5.5 *al-Qaeda* | Al-Qaeda |

في يناير كانون الثانى حاولت جبهة النصرة ولم تفلح في إقناع الفصائل الإسلامية المنافسة للتوحد في كيان واحد من فيهم تنظيم أحرار الشام.

القاعدة
**Likely stereotypes/ideologies:**
An extremist organisation responsible for global terror attacks. The actions of al-Qaeda are not morally justified and do not represent Islam (fairly negative image of Islam).

**News service stereotypes/ideologies:**
A Sunni jihadist organisation which is responsible for global terror attack specially 9/11 (very negative image of Sunni Islam).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nomination</th>
<th>Construction of social actors/in-groups and out-groups</th>
<th>Membership Categorization, Naming social actors Use of rhetorical figures</th>
<th>Basic analysis: The social actor is constructed as an international coalition led by the US to fight the Islamic State.</th>
<th>Background facts: Refer to fact sheet 5.5 US-led coalition in Syria and Iraq</th>
<th>Likely reader stereotypes/ideologies:</th>
<th>Western-led coalition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
It is a necessity to fight IS, but the coalition strikes are not making progress so far (neutral).

**News service stereotypes/ideologies:**
The jihadist organisation Islamic State has gained ground in Iraq and Syria, and thus an international coalition led by the US has intervened in both Iraq and Syria to fight IS (very negative image of Islam).

| Nomination | Construction of social actors/in-groups and out-groups | Membership Categorization, Naming social actors Use of rhetorical figures | **Basic analysis:**
The social actor is constructed as the Western-backed Kurdish groups who are armed and trained by the US to take part in fighting the Islamic State in Northern Syria. **Background facts:**
The US supported Kurdish militias and Arab tribes against Jihadi organisations in north-east Syria particularly the Islamic State. | Western- backed insurgents | المعارضين من الغرب |
**Likely stereotypes/ideologies:**
Unfortunately, some Kurdish groups have a separatist agenda (the stereotype is not classified).

**News service stereotypes/ideologies:**
The United States has armed and trained some Kurdish groups to take part in fighting the jihadist group the Islamic State (very negative image of Islam).

| Nomination | Basic analysis:  
The official Syrian army which is affiliated to the Syrian government. | Likely stereotypes/ideologies:  
a. The Syrian army is participating in suppressing the revolution of the Syrian people (the stereotype is not classified).  
b. The national Syrian army is facing a cohort of extremist Sunni factions (very negative image of Sunni Islam). | News service stereotypes/ideologies:  
The official Syrian army is in conflict with Islamist rebels and jihadist organisations (very negative image of Sunni Islam). | The Syrian army | الجيش السوري |

| Perspectivation (Indirect) | Expressing involvement, positioning speaker’s point of view | Reporting, description, narration or quotation of | Basic analysis:  
The news service continues to report al-Zawahiri’s viewpoint on IS, which stresses the ideological difference between al-Qaeda and the Islamic State. | Al-Zawahiri stressed the ideological divide between Al-Qaeda and Islamic State, which is fighting the | Al-ظواهري من جديد على الانقسام الأيديولوجي بين القاعدة والدولة |
| events and utterances | Likely reader stereotypes/ideologies: Syria has become a battlefield for armies and factions from all over the world (the stereotype is not classified) **News service stereotypes/ideologies:** According to al-Zawahiri, leader of al-Qaeda, there is an ideological divide between al-Qaeda and the Islamic State (neutral). | Russian forces and the Western-led coalition, and at the same time battles with the Western-backed insurgents and the Syrian army. | بالإسلامية التي تقاتل القوات الروسية والتحالف الذي يقوده الغرب وتقاتل في نفس الوقت المعارضين المدعومين من الغرب والجيش السوري.
Discussion

**Qualitative analysis:**

The English text uses the word ‘jihadist’, which has a negative stereotypical connotation in the Western mind. For further information see *Jihadism*. The use of ‘Sunni Muslim militants’ in the English text draws attention to a possible new trend in western media, which may be to associate Sunni Islam with militancy versus a more moderate Shia Islam. This is contrary to the general situation since the 1979 Islamic revolution in Iran, in which the Islamic Republic of Iran has generally been very negatively viewed in the West.

The news service is reporting the call of al-Zawahiri for Jihad, which is as mentioned above a negative term in the western mind. The text goes on to describe the expanded authority of al-Qaeda over regions and groups in the area, and how this authority is now challenged by another even more violent Jihadist group, IS. The English text underlines the differences between al-Qaeda and IS when it reports al-Zawahiri’s statements criticising IS and stressing the different ideologies of the two Jihadist groups. The text also defines the warring groups and on which side of the conflict they stand.

The word ‘Mujahideen’ again derives from Arabic *(jihād)*. The definition given in Oxford English Dictionary is: ‘A person (esp. a guerrilla) who strives or fights in support of Islam; spec. an Islamic fundamentalist guerrilla’. See section *Mujahideen* for further details.

The English text also preserves the controversial usage ‘Western Crusaders’ which conjures up images of the West as invaders and as antagonists of the Muslim East. The mention of the Crusades, which took place between 1095 and 1291, might exacerbate an image of the conflicts in the Middle East as religious wars between the Christians and Muslims. For more about the use of ‘Crusades/Crusaders’ by Islamists, refer to *Crusaders*.

In the following paragraph the word ‘Islamist’ is used, which again has a negative connotation in the Western reader’s mind, because it has developed a stereotypical image of an exclusive Muslim fundamentalist who has dogmatic concepts about religion.
(Islam) and maintains a strong association between the teachings of Islam and every walk of life within the Muslim community including politics, as well as relations with other non-Muslim communities. For more comprehensive discussion of the term, see *Islamism*.

Finally the use of ‘Syrian Government’ indicates a change in the stance towards the Syrian government/regime as the word ‘regime’ is no longer dominant as it was in the first 2 years of the Syrian revolution.

The Arabic text uses words such as متشدد (*mutašaddid*) instead of ‘jihadist’ or ‘Muslim militant’. The word متشدد (*mutašaddid*) can often be translated as ‘hardliner’. It does not have a full range of negative associations for an Arabic reader as terms such ‘jihadist’ or ‘Muslim militant’ do. The text also uses words such as غلاة (*gulāt*) (‘exaggerators’), which refers to sectarian differentiation as some Sunni scholars consider Shia theology to deviate from a number of important Islamic principles and propound some exaggerations specially in regard to the character of Imam Ali and other members of Al Al-Bayt (the Prophet’s family). Interestingly, as per Babylon Online Dictionary, the term was initially used by Shia theologians to refer to some Shia groups who added “divine characteristics to figures of the Islamic history (usually a member of Prophet Muhammad’s family (Al al-Bayt)) or hold beliefs deemed deviant by mainstream Shi’i theology”.

The Arabic text also reports the words of al-Zawahiri خفاذا وثقا، which are quoted from the Quran: انفرزوا خفاذا وثقا وجاجدوا بأموالكم وأنفسكم في سبيل الله ذلكم خير لكم ان كنتم تعلمون (At-Tawba chapter, verse 41), which is translated as follows: “Go forth, light armed and heavy armed, and strive with your wealth and your lives in the way of Allah! That is best for you if ye but knew” (Picktall, 2017). The use of Quranic vocabulary in al-Zawahiri’s recording echoes his wish to frame himself as an Islamic leader who derives his influence from the holy books. A strong reference to the Shia is made through the use of the terms رواضي (rāwāfi) صفويين (ṣafawiyīn) and the نصيري (Nusayrī).

The ruling family in Syria belongs to a sect named Alawites or Nusayris. The name ‘Alawite’ is much more common and widely used in Syria. It is taken for granted that the sect is named after ‘Ali Bin Abi Taleb’ the cousin of Prophet Mohammad and his son-in-
law. After 2011, the term ‘Nusayri’ became more commonly used than before especially by the factions opposing the Syrian government. For a comprehensive account of the Nusayris, see *Nusayris*.

The text later mentions the term ‘Safavids’, making a clear association between this term and the Shia of today particularly the Iranians. Al-Zawahiri used the term رواضيد (*rawāfīḍ*) to refer to the Shia, which is considered a derogatory description. For more detailed account of who the ‘Safavids’ and ‘Rawafid’ were see *Rawafid* and *Safavids*.

Again the Russians and Western Crusaders are stressed, and ‘Syrian government’ is mentioned in the Arabic text, as it is in the English text.

**Quantitative analysis**

The quantitative analysis of the English text gives total scores as follows:

**English text: news service stereotypes/ideologies**

I. The quantitative analysis of the English text gives a total score of -36 for news service stereotypes/ideologies for Islam and sectarian division, with 19 relevant records. The average score per record (-36÷19) is thus -1.894. This indicates that the news service stereotypes/ideologies present a strongly negative view of Islam and sectarian division.

II. The quantitative analysis of the English text gives a total score of -12 for news service stereotypes/ideologies for Sunni Islam, with 6 relevant records. The average score per record (-12÷6) is thus -2. This indicates that the news service stereotypes/ideologies present an extremely negative view of Sunni Islam.

III. The quantitative analysis of the English text yields no stereotypes/ideologies records for Shia Islam.
**English text: reader stereotypes/ideologies**

I. The quantitative analysis of the English text gives a total score of -40 for reader stereotypes/ideologies for Islam and sectarian division, with 23 relevant records. The average score per record (-40÷23) is thus -1.74. This indicates that the reader stereotypes/ideologies present a strongly negative view of Islam and sectarian division.

II. The quantitative analysis of the English text gives a total score of -2 for reader stereotypes/ideologies for Sunni Islam, with 2 relevant records. The average score per record (-4÷2) is thus -2. This indicates that the reader stereotypes/ideologies present an extremely negative view of Sunni Islam.

III. The quantitative analysis of the English text yields no stereotypes/ideologies records for Shia Islam.

The quantitative analysis of the Arabic text gives total scores as follows:

**Arabic text: news service stereotypes/ideologies**

I. The quantitative analysis of the Arabic text gives a total score of -34 for news service stereotypes/ideologies for Islam and sectarian division, with 22 relevant records. The average score per record (-34÷22) is thus -1.545. This indicates that the news service stereotypes/ideologies present a strongly negative view of Islam and sectarian division.

II. The quantitative analysis of the Arabic text gives a total score of -6 for news service stereotypes/ideologies for Sunni Islam, with 3 relevant records. The average score per record (-6÷3) is thus -2. This indicates that the news service stereotypes/ideologies present an extremely negative view of Sunni Islam.
III. The quantitative analysis of the Arabic text yields no records for news service stereotypes/ideologies for Shia Islam.

*Arabic text: reader stereotypes/ideologies*

I. The quantitative analysis of the Arabic text gives a total score of -24 for reader stereotypes/ideologies for Islam and sectarian division, with 24 relevant record. The average score per record (-24÷24) is thus -1. This indicates that the reader stereotypes/ideologies present a fairly negative view of Islam and sectarian division.

II. The quantitative analysis of the Arabic text gives a total score of -8 for reader stereotypes/ideologies for Sunni Islam, with 4 relevant record. The average score per record (-8÷4) is thus -2. This indicates that the reader stereotypes/ideologies present an extremely negative view of Sunni Islam.

III. The quantitative analysis of the Arabic text gives a total score of -2 for reader stereotypes/ideologies for Shia Islam, with 1 relevant record. The average score per record (-2÷1) is thus -2. This indicates that the reader stereotypes/ideologies present an extremely negative view of Shia Islam.

*Comparison of qualitative and quantitative analyses in relation to news agency stereotypes/ideologies*

The qualitative analysis of the English text refers to the use of stereotypical and evaluative terms which have very negative connotations in the Western mind (jihadist, Islamist, militant). It also explains that the text revolves around the call by the al-Qaeda chief to launch attacks against ‘Western crusaders and Russians’ in Syria and the difference between the two infamous jihadist groups: al-Qaeda and the Islamic State. Therefore the qualitative analysis conforms to the quantitative analysis, which presents strongly negative views of Islam and sectarian division. The qualitative analysis also illustrates how the text refers to the fact that the two jihadist groups are Sunnis, and
this also justifies the extremely negative view of Sunni Islam shown in the quantitative results.

The qualitative analysis of the Arabic text shows that the negative evaluative terms used in the English text are replaced by Arabic terms which do not have the full range of the negative associations connotated by the English terms. On another note, the Arabic text stresses more the sectarian division in Syria, and introduces the conflict in Syria to a large extent as a sectarian war between Sunnis and Shias. Hence the quantitative results, though still strongly negative for Islam and sectarian division, are not as strong as those for the English text. Since Sunni Islam is associated with violent hardline groups, the quantitative results relevant to it remain extremely negative. Neither the English nor the Arabic text make direct reference to Shia Islam. The only reference to Shia Islam is ascribed to the al-Qaeda chief, not to the news agency.
5.8.2 The overall averages for Syria texts:

![News Service Stereotypes/Ideologies](image1)

![Reader Stereotypes/Ideologies](image2)
5.9 The Iraq Conflict

In 2003 America led by George W. Bush lobbied to invade Iraq under the pretext of weapons of mass destruction which the American leadership claimed that Iraq possessed. The American President also made an association between the 9/11 attacks on the Twin Towers and the government of President Saddam Hussein, claiming that Saddam had links to the 9/11 attacks (Bonn, 2010, pp. 1-2). Saddam ruled Iraq between 1979 and 2003. He was previously a leading member of the Arab Socialist Ba’ath party, which rose to power in Iraq in 1968. Saddam was an authoritarian leader, whose rule was characterized by ruthlessness and suppression of all segments of the Iraqi people; however reports of his brutal crackdown on the Shia and Kurdish uprisings in 1991, following the expulsion of Iraqi troops from Kuwait, particularly shocked many people.

“Post–uprising repression has been particularly harsh in the two holy Shi’a holy cities of al-Najaf and Karbala. Since the uprising, religious institutions and prominent clerical families have been targeted in a campaign to subdue Shi’a opposition, which Saddam is thought to view as the greatest potential popular threat to his rule. Unlike the Kurds, whose political aspirations mainly concern the region in which they are in the majority [...]” (Goldstein, 1992, p. 26).

The power vacuum which followed the coalition invasion of 2003 was very soon filled by Shia Islamist forces especially in the south and in the poor suburbs of Baghdad where the Shia are predominant. In the largely Sunni Arab provinces of central Iraq, however the sentiment was that of resistance to the occupier and “a serious fear of disempowerment” (Allawi, 2007, pp. 90-95). In the aftermath of the occupation, ministerial buildings including the National Museum of Iraq were looted and burnt, and criminal acts like theft and kidnapping took place on a large scale. The indiscriminate use of force by American troops and the failure to impose order and security created a general feeling of rejection for the occupiers (Cockburn, 2007, pp. 74-107).

2004 witnessed the beginning of wide-scale suicide bombings which were claimed by the jihadi organisation al-Qaeda. “Wahhabi teachings infiltrated the Sunni Arab community in Iraq, and a number of Wahhabi preachers and even academics issued a fatwa authorising a jihad against the Shi’a” (Allawi, 2007, pp.233-236). In addition, “The concept of takfir, or levelling the charge of infidelity to Islam to the Shi’a as a group was
introduced” (Allawi, 2007, p. 235). Resistance or insurgency against American occupation mainly involved the Sunni Arabs or ‘Ba’athist elements’ and fundamentalist groups, most notably al-Qaeda. However, the Sadrist movement led by Muqtada al-Sadr son of the Shia cleric Muhammad Sadiq al-Sadr who was assassinated by Saddam was also gaining ground in Sadr City, a poor densely populated Shiite suburb of Iraq, and people there mobilised against American troops. “The main Iraqi opposition came from the Arab Sunnis — the ousted Ba’thists, Sunni religious elements, and al-Qa’ida, which now gained a foothold in Iraq. In addition, a group of poor and disaffected Shi’a, also excluded from power, was mobilized against the occupation by Muqtada al-Sadr, son of the former assassinated cleric Muhammad Sadiq al-Sadr, and the supporters he had left behind” (Marr, 2011, p. x).

On a governance level, the Americans kept control of security, but instituted an interim Iraqi government. “Sovereignty was handed to an interim Iraqi government in June 2004; control of security, however, stayed in US hands. The parliamentary elections in January and December 2005 and the referendum in October were significant” (Cockburn, 2007, p. 110). Although the elections were run on a party/coalition or individual level, they produced an ethnic-sectarian quota system (the Iraqi governing system) (Marr, 2011, pp. 287-290).

The American troops withdrew from Iraq in December 2011 after 8 years, again leaving a power vacuum, which ISIS seized (Brown, 2018). The Islamic State follows a Wahhabi doctrine which also excludes Shia and other minorities. In 2013 the United States came back to the country to fight ISIS through the US-led coalition. The American troops were deployed mainly to support the Iraqi forces fighting ISIS and to train the Kurdish militias for the same purpose. In 2014, the Islamic State gained large swathes of land including Mosul, the second most important city in Iraq, and declared their caliphate in Iraq and Syria. Huge numbers of civilians fled their homes to other Iraqi regions particularly the relatively safe Kurdish region. However, some Arab Sunnis collaborated with the Islamic State because of their grievances and marginalisation under a Shia-led government supported by Iran. In October 2016 the battle for Mosul began. “By mid-2016, ISIS was pushed out of the areas it had captured in 2014, and preparations were made for the expected reconquest of Mosul. But numerous problems remained, including ISIS’s
lingering presence in Iraq and neighbouring Syria, its transformation into a formidable sponsor of regional and international terrorism, as well as contributor to the collapse of neighbouring Syria” (Marr and Al-Marashi, 2017, pp. 287-288). Mosul fell in July 2017 after a long siege. For further details, please check (Marr and Al-Marashi, 2017, p. 287-305). The post Saddam era and the emergence of jihadi groups was characterised by a sectarian rift between the Sunni and Shia populations.

The Islamic State committed many atrocities including many suicide bombings. “ISIS’s struggle for power since 2011 has been marked by hundreds of suicide and car bombing attacks, killing thousands of civilians, including through the use of child soldiers. In territory under its control in 2017, fighters continued to resort to ill-treatment, including sexual violence, as well as public beheadings and other grotesque killings and acts of torture as a method of governing through fear” (Human Rights Watch, 2018).

5.9.1 Data analysis example (Iraq)
There are four texts related to the Iraqi conflict. Here below is the first one, and the rest are to be found on Appendix 2.

Reuters 09/05/2016

**Islamic State car bomb in eastern Iraq kills 16, sources say**

A car bomb claimed by Islamic State in the eastern Iraqi city of Baquba killed at least 16 people on Monday and wounded 54 others near a bakery close to the city center, police and hospital sources said.

The Amaq news service, which supports Islamic State, said a suicide bomber had targeted Shi’ite Muslim militia fighters in the provincial capital of Diyala, a mixed Shi’ite and Sunni Muslim area bordering Iran.

The sources said many of the fatalities were children eating at a nearby restaurant.

Iraqi officials declared victory over Islamic State in Diyala more than a year ago, after security forces and Shi’ite militias drove them out of towns and villages there. But the
insurgents have remained active and militia elements have been accused of abuses against Sunni residents.

The fight against Islamic State has exacerbated a long-running sectarian conflict in Iraq, mostly between the Shi'ite majority and the Sunni minority. Bombings in Baquba and a nearby town in January set off a string of apparently retaliatory attacks against Sunnis.

Sectarian violence also threatens to undermine efforts by Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi, a moderate Shi'ite Islamist, to dislodge the militant group from areas in the north and west that they seized in 2014.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strategies</th>
<th>Objectives</th>
<th>Devices</th>
<th>Justification of using a particular strategy</th>
<th>Examples</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nomination</td>
<td>Constructing social actors in in-groups and out-groups</td>
<td>Membership categorization Use of rhetorical figures</td>
<td><strong>Basic Analysis:</strong> A jihadist Salafist organisation that has carried out many violent actions, and deadly attacks in various countries, but mainly in the Middle East. <strong>Background facts:</strong> Refer to fact sheet 5.5 <em>Islamic State</em> <strong>Likely reader stereotypes/ideologies:</strong> A Jihadist organisation which carries out violent and unjustified actions in the name of Islam (very negative image of Islam). <strong>News service stereotypes/ideologies:</strong> A Sunni Salafi-jihadist organisation (very negative image of Sunni Islam).</td>
<td>Islamic State</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nomination</td>
<td>Constructing social actors in in-groups and out-groups</td>
<td>Membership categorization Use of rhetorical figures</td>
<td><strong>Basic Analysis:</strong> The social actor is constructed as an Islamic State suicide bomber. <strong>Likely reader stereotypes/ideologies:</strong> Horrific suicide bombings are perpetrated by Muslim Jihadists who bring their criminal acts to the west as well (very negative image of Islam). <strong>News service stereotypes/ideologies:</strong> A type of act of mass murder, usually committed by individuals who belong to Jihadi Sunni Islamist organisations (very negative image of Sunni Islam).</td>
<td>a suicide bomber</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
A car bomb claimed by Islamic State in the eastern Iraqi city of Baquba killed at least 16 people on Monday and wounded 54 others near a bakery close to the city center, police and hospital sources said.

**Basic Analysis:**
The Islamic State claims responsibility for many suicide bombing attacks in Iraq. Many Iraqis have lost their lives due to violence from different parties including this jihadist organisation.

**Likely reader stereotypes/ideologies:**
The cycle of violence in Iraq is exacerbated by the jihadist Islamist organisations who kill innocent people in Iraq and elsewhere (very negative image of Islam).

**News service stereotypes/ideologies:**
The Sunni jihadist organisation Islamic State is carrying out suicide bombings in public places in Iraq and killing many innocent people (very negative image of Sunni Islam).

**Nomination**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Constructing social actors in in-groups and out-groups</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Membership categorization Use of rhetorical figures</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Basic Analysis:**
The social actors are constructed as paramilitary Shia troops which support the Iraqi government.

**Background facts:**
Refer to fact sheet Badr Organisation & Iraq conflict

**Likely reader stereotypes/ideologies:**
a. The war in the Middle East is between different Muslim sects (very negative image of sectarian division).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Predication</th>
<th>Labelling social actors negatively/positively</th>
<th>Stereotypical evaluative attributes/traits</th>
<th>Describing the geographical/residential area according to the sects of its residents.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>News service stereotypes/ideologies:</td>
<td>The Shi’ite militias are siding with the official Iraqi government to fight the Jihadist Sunni organisation IS (fairly positive image of Shia Islam, very negative image of Sunni Islam &amp; very negative image of sectarian division).</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>News service stereotypes/ideologies:</td>
<td>a mixed Shi’ite and Sunni Muslim area</td>
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<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Perspectivation (Indirect)</th>
<th>Expressing involvement, positioning speaker’s point of view</th>
<th>Reporting, description, narration or quotation of events and utterances</th>
<th>Basic Analysis: Narrating events from the viewpoint of the source (Islamic State); also elaborating on the sectarian division/conflict.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Background facts:</td>
<td>Refer to 5.9 Iraq conflict</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Likely reader stereotypes/ideologies:</td>
<td>a. Sectarian war is sweeping the Middle East, but it is particularly devastating in Iraq (very negative image of sectarian division).</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Likely reader stereotypes/ideologies:</td>
<td>b. The vacuum of leadership post the American invasion of Iraq was sadly filled by sectarianism (neutral).</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Likely reader stereotypes/ideologies:</td>
<td>The Amaq news service, which supports Islamic State, said a suicide bomber had targeted Shi’ite Muslim militia fighters in the provincial capital of Diyala, a mixed Shi’ite and Sunni Muslim area bordering Iran.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Islam, particularly Sunni Islam, is a religion which promotes violence (very negative image of Sunni Islam).

**News service stereotypes/ideologies:**
A devastating sectarian war between Sunni and Shia Muslims in which Shia Muslims are being more moderate (fairly positive image of Shia Islam & very negative image of sectarian division).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nomination</th>
<th>Constructing social actors in in-groups and out-groups</th>
<th>Membership categorization Use of rhetorical figures</th>
<th>The social actors are constructed as officials representing the Iraqi government.</th>
<th>Iraqi officials</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Nomination | Constructing social actors in in-groups and out-groups | Membership categorization Use of rhetorical figures | **Basic Analysis:**
The social actor is constructed as the official Iraqi forces which belong to the Iraqi official government, and the Shi’ite armed militias affiliated with it.  
**Likely reader stereotypes/ideologies:**
The sectarian split in Iraq has got worse. Shia militias openly support the Shia-led government and many Sunnis support the fundamentalist organisations (very negative image of sectarian division).  
**News service stereotypes/ideologies:**
The Shi’ite militias are siding with the official Iraqi government to fight the Jihadist Sunni organisation IS (fairly positive image of Shia Islam, very negative image of Sunni Islam & very negative image of sectarian division). | security forces and Shi’ite militias |
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nomination</th>
<th>Constructing social actors in in-groups and out-groups</th>
<th>Membership categorization</th>
<th>Use of rhetorical figures</th>
<th><strong>Basic Analysis:</strong> The social actors are constructed according to religious/sectarian affiliation, hence concentrating on the sectarian nature of the conflict. <strong>News service stereotypes/ideologies:</strong> Very negative image of sectarian division</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Background facts:</strong> Refer to 5.9 Iraq conflict</td>
<td><strong>Likely reader stereotypes/ideologies:</strong> The Sunni Jihadists are carrying out an insurgency against the official Iraqi government which is affiliated to Shia Iran (very negative image of Sunni Islam &amp; very negative image of sectarian division). <strong>News service stereotypes/ideologies:</strong> The Shia-led Iraqi government is fighting a violent Sunni insurgency (very negative image of Sunni Islam, neutral image of Shia Islam &amp; very negative image of sectarian division).</td>
<td>the insurgents</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nomination</td>
<td>Constructing social actors in in-groups and out-groups</td>
<td>Membership categorization</td>
<td>Use of rhetorical figures</td>
<td><strong>Basic Analysis:</strong> The social actors are constructed as outlaws who are carrying out an insurgency against the official Iraqi government. <strong>Background facts:</strong> Refer to 5.9 Iraq conflict</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Iraqi officials declared victory over Islamic State in Diyala more than a year ago, after security forces and Shi'ite militias drove them out of towns and villages there. But the insurgents have remained active and militia elements have been accused of abuses against Sunni residents.

**Basic Analysis:**
Again narration of events, stressing and elaborating on the sectarian nature of the conflict.

**Background facts:**
Refer to 5.9 Iraq conflict

**Likely reader stereotypes/ideologies:**
- Iraq is drowning in a devastating sectarian war (very negative image of Islam).
- Apparently, Shia Muslims are more reasonable than the Sunnis and are fighting them because Sunnis have formed violent Jihadist groups (fairly positive image of Shia Islam & very negative image of Sunni Islam).

**News service stereotypes/ideologies:**
The Shia-led official Iraqi government is fighting a violent Sunni insurgency led by the Islamic State (very negative image of Sunni Islam, fairly positive image of Shia Islam & very negative image of sectarian division).

**Predication**
Labelling social actors negatively/positively

**Stereotypical evaluative attributes/traits**
A nominal phrase which describes and evaluates the type of conflict in Iraq.

**News service stereotypes/ideologies:**
Very negative image of sectarian division.

Iraqi officials declared victory over Islamic State in Diyala more than a year ago, after security forces and Shi'ite militias drove them out of towns and villages there. But the insurgents have remained active and militia elements have been accused of abuses against Sunni residents.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nomination</th>
<th>Constructing social actors in in-groups and out-groups</th>
<th>Membership categorization Use of rhetorical figures</th>
<th><strong>Basic analysis:</strong> The social actors are constructed according to sectarian affiliation. <strong>News service stereotypes/ideologies:</strong> Very negative image of sectarian division</th>
<th>the Shi’ite majority</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nomination</td>
<td>Constructing social actors in in-groups and out-groups</td>
<td>Membership categorization Use of rhetorical figures</td>
<td><strong>Basic analysis:</strong> The social actors are constructed according to sectarian affiliation. <strong>News service stereotypes/ideologies:</strong> Very negative image of sectarian division</td>
<td>the Sunni minority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mitigation</td>
<td>Modifying the epistemic status of the proposition</td>
<td>Intensifying or mitigating the illocutionary force of discriminatory utterances</td>
<td>The word ‘apparently’ is used here to mitigate the act of retaliation.</td>
<td>apparently</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perspectivation (Direct)</td>
<td>Expressing involvement, positioning speaker’s point of view</td>
<td>Reporting, description, narration or quotation of events and utterances</td>
<td><strong>Basic analysis:</strong> The news service elaborates on the reason for the intensified sectarian conflict in Iraq. <strong>Background facts:</strong> Refer to 5.9 Iraq conflict <strong>Likely reader stereotypes/ideologies:</strong> Iraq has been a victim of a series of wars and invasions which culminated in this sectarian conflict (fairly negative image of sectarian division). <strong>News service stereotypes/ideologies:</strong> A country wrecked by longstanding sectarian division regardless of any other factors or The fight against Islamic State has exacerbated a long-running sectarian conflict in Iraq, mostly between the Shi’ite majority and the Sunni minority. Bombings in Baquba and a nearby town in January set o ff a string of apparently retaliatory attacks against Sunnis.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nomination</td>
<td>Constructing social actors in in-groups and out-groups</td>
<td>Membership categorization</td>
<td>Use of rhetorical figures</td>
<td>Basic Analysis: The social actor is constructed in terms of a sectarian civil war (personification). Likely reader stereotypes/ideologies: Fundamentalist organisations have driven Iraq into this bitter sectarian conflict (very negative image of sectarian division). Background facts: Refer to 5.9 Iraq Conflict News service stereotypes/ideologies: Sectarian violence is the main and maybe the only reason for the bloodshed in Iraq (very negative image of sectarian division).</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nomination</td>
<td>Constructing social actors in in-groups and out-groups</td>
<td>Membership categorization</td>
<td>Use of rhetorical figures</td>
<td>Basic Analysis: The social actor is constructed as the Iraqi prime minister. Background facts: Refer to fact sheet 5.5 Haider al-Abadi Likely reader stereotypes/ideologies: Official Iraqi prime minister in a country which is torn by numerous wars and conflicts (neutral). News service stereotypes/ideologies: A moderate Shi’ite Islamist prime minister who is working to drive Sunni militancy out</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>Sectarian violence</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
of Iraq (fairly positive image of Shia Islam &
very negative image of Sunni Islam).

| Predication | Constructing social actors in in-groups and out-groups | Membership categorization
Use of rhetorical figures | Qualifying the social actors with a certain degree of Islamic extremism. Associating the trait of moderation with Shia Islam rather than Sunni Islam. **News service stereotypes/ideologies:**
Fairly positive image of Shia Islam. | moderate Shi'ite Islamist |

| Predication  | Constructing social actors in in-groups and out-groups | Membership categorization
Use of rhetorical figures | Qualifying the social actors with a certain degree of Islamic extremism. Associating the trait of moderation with Shia Islam rather than Sunni Islam. **News service stereotypes/ideologies:**
Fairly positive image of Shia Islam. | moderate Shi'ite Islamist |
| Perspectivation  
(Direct) | Expressing involvement, positioning speaker’s point of view | Reporting, description, narration or quotation of events and utterances | **Basic Analysis:**  
The news service is making a direct statement illustrating that the prime minister, who belongs to specific denomination (Shia) is moderate though Islamist, and he is fighting a Sunni Jihadist group widely known for its violent actions and extremism.  
Background facts:  
Refer to fact sheet 5.5 *Haider al-Abadi* & 5.9 *Iraq conflict*  
**Likely reader stereotypes/ideologies:**  
- The Iraqi prime minister is a moderate Muslim (fairly positive image of Shia Islam).  
- Sunni Islam is a militant form of Islam (very negative image of Sunni Islam).  
**News service stereotypes/ideologies:**  
- Iraq is devastated by sectarian violence (very negative image of sectarian division).  
- Islamic State is a Sunni Muslim militant group (very negative image of Sunni Islam).  
Sectarian violence also threatens to undermine efforts by Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi, a moderate Shi’ite Islamist, to dislodge the militant group from areas in the north and west that they seized in 2014. |
|   |   | c. Iraqi prime minister. Though a Shia Islamist, he is relatively moderate (fairly positive image of Shia Islam). |   |
مصادر: مقتل 16 شخصا في انفجار تبنته الدولة الإسلامية بالعراق

بغداد (رويترز) - قالت مصادر طبية ومصادر من الشرطة إن سيارة ملغومة أعلن تنظيم الدولة الإسلامية مسؤوليته عن تفجيرها في مدينة بعقوبة بشرق العراق يوم الاثنين قتلت 16 شخصا على الأقل وأصابت 54 آخرين بالقرب من مخبز قرب من وسط المدينة.

وأوردت وكالة (أعماق) للأنباء المؤيدة للتنظيم المتطرف أن "عملية استشهادية استهدفت تجمعا للحشد (الشعبي) بمنطقة شفتة في بعقوبة مركز (محافظة) ديالى المتاخمة لإيران والتي يسكنها مزيج من السنة والشيعة.

وقالت المصادر إن كثيرا من القتلى أطفال كانوا يأكلون في مطعم قريب.

وأعلن المسؤولون العراقيون النصر على تنظيم الدولة الإسلامية في ديالى قبل أكثر من عام بعد أن طردته قوات الأمن العراقية والحشد الشعبي من قرى وبلدات هناك غير أن المقاتلين المتضامنين استمرروا في نشاطهم في حين وجهت اتهامات إلى عناصر في الجماعات المسلحة الشيعية بارتكاب انتهاكات ضد السكان السنة.

وتفاقم القتال ضد تنظيم الدولة الإسلامية في العراق بين الأغلبية الشيعية والإقليلية السنية.

وتسبب تفجيرات في بعقوبة وبلدة قريبة منها في يناير كانون الثاني في سلسلة من الهجمات الانتقامية على ما يبدو ضد السنة.

كما يهدد العنف الطائفي تقويض مساعي رئيس الوزراء العراقي حيدر العبادي لطرد التنظيم المتطرف من مناطق سيطر عليها عام 2014 في شمال غرب البلاد.

Translation:

Car bomb in eastern Iraq claimed by Islamic State kills 16, sources say

Hospital and police sources said that a car bomb took the lives of 16 people and wounded 54 others on Monday in Bakouba, Eastern Iraq. The Islamic State claimed responsibility for the explosion which took place near a bakery close to the city centre.

Amak News service which supports the hard-line group said “a martyrdom operation targeted a group of the ‘Popular Mobilisation Forces’ in Bakouba (the Centre of Diyala governorate)” bordering Iran, Shafta area that is inhabited by a mixed Shi’i and Sunni
population. The sources said that many of the casualties were children eating in a nearby restaurant.

Iraqi officials declared victory over Islamic State in Diyala over a year ago after Iraqi security forces and Popular Mobilisation Forces drove them out of towns and villages there. But extremist fighters remained active. At the same time, elements in the Shi’ite militias were accused of committing atrocities against the Sunni residents.

The fight against Islamic State has exacerbated a long-running sectarian conflict in Iraq, mostly between the Shi’ite majority and the Sunni minority. Bombings in Baquba and a nearby town in January set off a string of apparently retaliatory attacks against Sunnis.

Sectarian violence also threatens to undermine efforts by Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi, to dislodge the militant group from areas that they seized in 2014.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strategies</th>
<th>Objectives</th>
<th>Devices</th>
<th>Justification of Using a Particular Strategy</th>
<th>Translation of the Arabic text</th>
<th>Examples</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Nomination | Constructing social actors in in-groups and out-groups | Membership categorization Use of rhetorical figures | **Basic Analysis:** The social actor is constructed as the Jihadist Sunni organisation IS.  
**Background facts:** Refer to 5.5 Islamic State  
**Likely reader stereotypes/ideologies:**  
a. IS does not represent real Islam. It is harming Islam with its violent actions (fairly positive image of Islam).  
b. A Sunni Islamist exclusive organisation which is waging a war against minorities, Shia in particular. (very negative image of sectarian division & very negative image of Sunni Islam).  
**News service stereotypes/ideologies:** A Sunni Jihadist/Islamist organisation which carries violent actions and maintains an exclusive ideology especially towards minorities particularly Shia Muslims (very negative image of Sunni Islam). | The Islamic State | الدولة الإسلامية |


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Perspectivation (Indirect)</th>
<th>Expressing involvement, positioning speaker’s point of view</th>
<th>Reporting, description, narration or quotation of events and utterances</th>
<th>Basic Analysis: A title which informs the reader about the violence caused by the Islamic State in Iraq.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>likely reader stereotypes/ideologies:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>IS continues its violent actions in the name of Islam (very negative image of Islam).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>This Sunni Islamist exclusive organisation is waging a war against minorities, Shia in particular (very negative image of sectarian division &amp; very negative image of Sunni Islam).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>News service stereotypes/ideologies:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Violent actions by a Sunni Islamist/Jihadist organisation which maintains an exclusive and violent ideology (very negative image of Sunni Islam).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Car bomb in eastern Iraq claimed by Islamic State kills 16, sources say**

ศาสตราและแหล่งข่าวการแพทย์และแหล่งข่าวจากตำรวจได้ยืนยันว่ารถระเบิดที่เชื่อมโยงกับอิสลามจะมีหน้าที่ระเบิดในเมืองบัฟฟาบูในイラคตะวันออกปีมาสแล้ว 16 ผู้เสียชีวิตและสาหัส 54 รายในวันอังคารที่ผ่านมา.
The Islamic State claimed responsibility for the explosion which took place near a bakery close to the city centre.

**Predication**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Labelling social actors negatively</th>
<th>Stereotypical evaluative attributes/traits</th>
<th>Evaluative description of the Islamic State which categorises the group as hard-line or extremist. <strong>News service stereotypes/ideologies:</strong> Very negative image of Islam.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Hard-line group</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Basic Analysis:</strong> The social actor is constructed as a ‘martyrdom operation’ carried out by what is termed a ‘suicide bomber’. The Arabic text uses this term which is much more positive that ‘suicide bombing’. However the news service is distancing itself from the term by using inverted commas. <strong>Likely reader stereotypes/ideologies:</strong> a. It is incomprehensible how someone can end his own life to</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Nomination**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Constructing social actors in in-groups and out-groups</th>
<th>Membership categorization Use of rhetorical figures</th>
<th><strong>A martyrdom operation</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Operational analysis</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>عملية استشهادية</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Nomination | Constructing social actors in in-groups and out-groups | Membership categorization Use of rhetorical figures | **Basic Analysis:**
The social actor is constructed as the Shia militias aligned with the official Iraqi military forces.  
**Background facts:**
Refer to 5.5 *Popular Mobilization Forces*
**Likely reader stereotypes/ideologies:**
a. Popular militias formed to retake land lost to the extremist group IS (fairly positive image of Shia Islam).  

| Popular Mobilisation Forces | للحشد (الشعبي) |
| Perspectivation (Indirect) | Expressing involvement, positioning speaker's point of view | Reporting, description, narration or quotation of events and utterances | **Basic Analysis:**
Narration of events from the viewpoint of the source (Islamic State).

**Background facts:**
Refer to fact sheet 5.5 *Popular Mobilization Forces*

**Likely reader stereotypes/ideologies:**
- a. It is very sad to witness this bloody sectarian war in Iraq (neutral)
- b. The Sunni Jihadist organisations are killing Shia and other minorities (very negative image of Sunni Islam).

|  |  | **Amak News service which supports the hard-line group said a martyr executed a suicide bombing in a crowd of the “Popular Mobilisation Forces in Shafta area in Bakouba the centre of Diyala governorate” which borders Iran and is inhabited by a mixed Sunni Shi’ite population**

<p>| | | |</p>
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</tbody>
</table>
c. The Iraqi government along with Iran are persecuting Sunnis who no longer have a representation in the government (very negative image of sectarian division & very negative image of Shia Islam).

*News service stereotypes/ideologies:*
A sectarian war in which the Sunnis are represented by the Jihadist militant group IS and the Shia are represented by the official Islamist moderate Iraqi government and the popular mobilisation forces aligned with it (very negative image of a sectarian division).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nomination</th>
<th>Constructing social actors in in-groups and out-groups</th>
<th>Membership categorization Use of rhetorical figures</th>
<th>Highlighting the central issue of sectarianism by naming social actors according to their sects. <em>News service stereotypes/ideologies:</em> Very negative image of a sectarian division.</th>
<th>a mixed Sunni Shi’ite population</th>
<th>مزيج من السنة والشيعة</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nomination</td>
<td>Constructing social actors in in-groups and out-groups</td>
<td>Membership categorization Use of rhetorical figures</td>
<td>The social actor is constructed as officials in the Iraqi government. Iraqi officials</td>
<td></td>
<td>المتعاونون العراقيون</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nomination</td>
<td>Constructing social actors in in-groups and out-groups</td>
<td>Membership categorization and Use of rhetorical figures</td>
<td>Basic Analysis: The social actors are constructed as Shia individuals in the armed militias. <strong>Background facts:</strong> Refer to fact sheet 5.5 <em>Badr Organisation &amp; Popular Mobilization Forces</em></td>
<td>elements in the Shi’ite militias</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td><strong>Likely reader stereotypes/ideologies:</strong> After the American invasion, Iraq descended into anarchy and</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

**Likely reader stereotypes/ideologies:**

a. Extremist fighters who belong to an extremist organisation (neutral).

b. Sunni extremist fighters (very negative image of Sunni Islam).

**News service stereotypes/ideologies:** Extremist fighters who belong to the Islamic State (very negative image of Sunni Islam).
sectarian rule as the Shia-led government recruited individuals on a sectarian basis to support it (very negative image of sectarian division & very negative image of Shia Islam).

**News service stereotypes/ideologies:**
There is a sectarian war in Iraq where each sect has its own armed groups (very negative image of sectarian division).

| Nomination | Constructing social actors in in-groups and out-groups | Membership categorization Use of rhetorical figures | **Basic Analysis:**
The social actors are constructed according to their religious/sectarian affiliation.

**Background facts:**
It is widely assumed that Iraq has a Shia majority but there is little reliable data on the breakdown of the population. For more information, see:

Sunni residents
Likely reader stereotypes/ideologies:

a. The Shia majority are persecuting the Sunni minority (very negative image of sectarian division & very negative image of Shia Islam).

b. Sunnis and Shias have lived peacefully together for hundreds of years, it is foreign powers that are manipulating the co-existence in Iraq (fairly positive image of Islam).

News service stereotypes/ideologies:
There is an armed conflict in Iraq which revolves around sectarian divisions (very negative image of sectarian division).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Perspectivation (Indirect)</th>
<th>Expressing involvement, positioning</th>
<th>Reporting, description, narration or quotation of events and utterances</th>
<th>Basic Analysis: A narration/reporting of the events which builds on the Shia/Sunni issue.</th>
<th>Background facts: Iraqi Officials declared victory over Islamic State in Diyala over a year</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

وأعلن المسؤولون العراقيون النصر على تنظيم الدولة الإسلامية في ديالى قبل أكثر من عام بعد أن طردته قوات

| Speaker's point of view | Refer to 5.9 *Iraq conflict*<br><br>**Likely reader stereotypes/ideologies:**<br>a. The moderate Shia Iraqi government is facing extreme Sunni terror (very negative image of Sunni Islam and fairly positive image of Shia Islam).<br>b. The Shia Islamist Iraqi government is persecuting Sunnis (very negative image of sectarian division and very negative image of Shia Islam). | ago after Iraqi security forces and ‘People’s Mass’ forces drove them out of towns and villages there. But extremist fighters remained active. At the same time, the Shi’ite militias were accused of committing atrocities against the Sunni residents.<br><br>**News service stereotypes/ideologies:**<br>The Iraqi government is in a long conflict with IS, but the conflict is taking on a more and more sectarian nature (very negative image of sectarian division). |

| Nomination | Constructing social actors in in-groups and out-groups | Membership categorization<br>Use of rhetorical figures | **Basic analysis:**<br>The social actor is constructed as the Iraqi Shia population who make up the majority.<br><br>**News service stereotype/ideologies:**<br>Shi’ite majority |

| Arabic language note | الأغلبية الشيعية من قرى وبلدات هناك غير أن المقاتلين المتشددين استمرا في نشاطهم في حين وجهت اتهامات إلى عناصر في الجماعات المسلحة الشيعية بارتكاب انتهاكات ضد السكان السنة |

321
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nomination</th>
<th>Constructing social actors in in-groups and out-groups</th>
<th>Membership categorization</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Basic analysis:</td>
<td>The social actor is constructed as the Iraqi Sunni population who make up the minority.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>News service stereotype/ideologies:</td>
<td>Very negative image of sectarian division.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sunni minority</td>
<td>Very negative image of sectarian division.</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Perspectivation (Direct)</th>
<th>Expressing involvement, or distance. positioning</th>
<th>Reporting, description, narration or quotation of events and utterances</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Basic Analysis:</td>
<td>The news service identifies a long-standing sectarian conflict in Iraq and relates it to current events.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The fight against Islamic State has exacerbated a long-running sectarian conflict.</td>
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</table>

وفاقم القتال ضد تنظيم الدولة الإسلامية الصراع الطائفي المستمر منذ فترة طويلة في
### Background facts:
Refer to 5.9 *Iraq conflict*

**Likely reader stereotypes/ideologies:**
The Islamic State and the formations of Shia militias triggered the sectarian conflict in Iraq where different denominations lived peacefully for hundreds of years (fairly positive image of Islam).

**News service stereotypes/ideologies:**
There is a sectarian conflict in Iraq that goes back to thousand years. The advent of IS has only exacerbated the situation (very negative image of Islam & very negative image of sectarian division).

### Mitigation

**Modifying the epistemic status of the proposition**
The fact of launching retaliation attacks against Sunnis is mitigated by using *أعلى ما يبدو* (‘apparently’).

**Intensifying or mitigating the illocutionary force of discriminatory utterances**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>speaker’s point of view</th>
<th>conflict in Iraq, mostly between the Shi’ite majority and the Sunni minority. Bombings in Baquba and a nearby town in January set off a string of apparently retaliatory attacks against Sunnis.</th>
<th>العرق بين الأغلبية الشيعية والأقلية السنة وتسببت تفجيرات في بعقوبة ولمدة قريبة منها في يناير كانون الثاني في سلسلة من الهجمات الانتقامية على ما يبدو ضد السنة</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
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<td></td>
<td>وتسببت تفجيرات في بعقوبة ولمدة قريبة منها في يناير كانون الثاني في سلسلة من الهجمات الانتقامية على ما يبدو ضد السنة</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>On what appears to be retaliation attacks against Sunnis is mitigated by using <em>أعلى ما يبدو</em> (‘apparently’).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Intensifying or mitigating the illocutionary force of discriminatory utterances</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nomination</td>
<td>Constructing social actors in in-groups and out-groups</td>
<td>Membership categorization</td>
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<tr>
<td>Nomination</td>
<td>Constructing social actors in in-groups and out-groups</td>
<td>Membership categorization</td>
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العنف الطائفي

رئيس الوزراء العراقي حيدر العبادي

العنف الطائفي

Iraqi prime minister Haider al-Abadi

Likely reader stereotypes/ideologies:

a. Iraqi prime minister of a Shia-led government which is backed by Iran, and persecuting the Sunnis in Iraq (very negative image of sectarian division).

b. The official Iraqi prime minister who is trying to lead the country amidst chaos and penetration of jihadi organisations in Iraq (fairly positive image of Shia Islam).
The official Iraqi prime minister who is trying to drive the extremist organisation out of Iraq and restore peace in Iraq (neutral).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Perspectivation (Direct)</th>
<th>Expressing involvement, or distance. positioning speaker’s point of view</th>
<th>Reporting, description, narration or quotation of events and utterances</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

**Basic Analysis:**
The news service is assuming that the nature of the conflict is sectarian and the escalating violence is hindering the state’s efforts to get rid of extremism.

**Background facts:**
Refer to 5.9 *Iraq conflict*

**Likely reader stereotypes/ideologies:**
a. A long sectarian war is turning Iraq into ruins (very negative image of sectarian division).
b. Regional and international interventions have contributed to the current situation, and it is not only the sectarian war (fairly positive image of Islam).

**News service stereotypes/ideologies:**
Sectarian violence in Iraq is entrenched as some Sunnis may be supportive of the Sunni extremist organisation against the Shia-led

**Sectarian violence also threatens to undermine efforts by Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi, to dislodge the militant group from areas that they seized in 2014.**

كما يهدد العنف الطائفي بتقويض مساعي رئيس الوزراء العراقي حيدر العبادي لطرد التنظيم المتشدد من مناطق سيطر عليها عام 2014 في شمال وغرب البلاد.
government (very negative image of sectarian division)
Discussion:

*Qualitative analysis:*

The English passage focuses on sectarian division as the main reason for violence in Iraq. It mentions the religious/sectarian affiliations of the factions involved, for example: ‘Shi’ite Muslim militia fighters’. It introduces the war in Iraq mainly as a civil war based on sectarian conflict that has deep roots in history, overlooking other major factors such as the American intervention in Iraq, the corrupt Iraqi government and other regional factors. Moreover, it hints at the recent trend in Western media, which is to designate Shia Islam as the more moderate denomination of Islam in comparison with Sunni Islam, especially when Western media makes the direct association between the violent Islamic State and Sunni Islam.

The body of the Arabic text is similar to the English one except that it does not mention the sectarian affiliation of the militias fighting the Islamic State; it only says: الحشد الشعبي. On another occasion, the Arabic text mitigates the sectarian conflict by the use of على ما يبدو (‘as it appears’), avoiding mentioning the reason for the ‘string of retaliatory attacks’ against Sunnis (سلسلة من الهجمات الانتقامية ضد السنة).

The Arabic text avoids implying the moderation of Shia Islam in comparison to its counterpart Sunni Islam, omitting any equivalent of “a moderate Shi’ite Islamist” to qualify the Iraqi Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi.

*Quantitative analysis*

The quantitative analysis of the English text gives total scores as follows:

**English text: news service stereotypes/ideologies**

1. The quantitative analysis of the English text gives a total score of -26 for news service stereotypes/ideologies for Islam and sectarian division, with 13 relevant records. The average score per record (-26÷13) is thus -2. This indicates that the news service stereotypes/ideologies present an extremely negative view of Islam and sectarian division.
II. The quantitative analysis of the English text gives a total score of -18 for newspaper stereotypes/ideologies for Sunni Islam, with 9 relevant records. The average score per record (-18÷9) is thus -2. This indicates that the news service stereotypes/ideologies present an extremely negative view of Sunni Islam.

III. The quantitative analysis of the English text gives a total score of 7 for newspaper stereotypes/ideologies for Shia Islam, with 8 relevant records. The average score per record (7÷8) is thus 0.875. This indicates that the news service stereotypes/ideologies present a fairly positive view of Shia Islam.

**English text: reader stereotypes/ideologies**

I. The quantitative analysis of the English text gives a total score of -18 for reader stereotypes/ideologies for Islam and sectarian division, with 11 relevant records. The average score per record (-18÷11) is thus -1.73. This indicates that the reader stereotypes/ideologies present a strongly negative view of Islam and sectarian division.

II. The quantitative analysis of the English text gives a total score of -8 for reader stereotypes/ideologies for Sunni Islam, with 4 relevant records. The average score per record (-8÷4) is thus -2. This indicates that the reader stereotypes/ideologies present an extremely negative view of Sunni Islam.

III. The quantitative analysis of the Arabic text gives a total score of 2 for reader stereotypes/ideologies for Shia Islam, with 2 relevant records. The average score per record (2÷2) is thus 1. This indicates that the reader stereotypes/ideologies present a fairly positive view of Shia Islam.

The quantitative analysis of the Arabic text gives total scores as follows:

**Arabic text: news service stereotypes/ideologies**

I. The quantitative analysis of the Arabic text gives a total score of -22 for news service stereotypes/ideologies for Islam and sectarian division, with 11 relevant
records. The average score per record (-22÷11) is thus -2. This indicates that the news service stereotypes/ideologies present an extremely negative view of Islam and sectarian division.

II. The quantitative analysis of the Arabic text gives a total score of -6 for news service stereotypes/ideologies for Sunni Islam, with 3 relevant records. The average score per record (-6÷3) is thus -2. This indicates that the news service stereotypes/ideologies present an extremely negative view of Sunni Islam.

III. The quantitative analysis of the Arabic text gives a total score of 1 for newspaper stereotypes/ideologies for Shia Islam, with 2 relevant records. The average score per record (1÷2) is thus 0.5. This indicates that the newspaper stereotypes/ideologies present a slightly positive view of Shia Islam.

Arabic text: reader stereotypes/ideologies

I. The quantitative analysis of the Arabic text gives a total score of -11 for reader stereotypes/ideologies for Islam and sectarian division, with 13 relevant record. The average score per record (-11÷13) is thus -0.846. This indicates that the reader stereotypes/ideologies present a fairly negative view of Islam and sectarian division.

II. The quantitative analysis of the Arabic text gives a total score of -8 for reader stereotypes/ideologies for Sunni Islam, with 4 relevant record. The average score per record (-8÷4) is thus -2. This indicates that the reader stereotypes/ideologies present an extremely negative view of Sunni Islam.

III. The quantitative analysis of the Arabic text gives a total score of -6 for reader stereotypes/ideologies for Shia Islam, with 6 relevant records. The average score per record (-6÷6) is thus -1. This indicates that the reader stereotypes/ideologies present a fairly negative view of Shia Islam.
Comparison of qualitative and quantitative analyses in relation to news service stereotypes/ideologies

The qualitative analyses of both English and Arabic texts are explicit about the sectarian division and the violence it is causing in Iraq. The suicide bombing is claimed by the Islamic State, which the news service presumes is a hard-line Sunni organisation since it is targeting Shia militias and civilians. While the English text remains slightly more explicit in this regard, the quantitative analyses of both the English and Arabic texts for Islam and sectarian division presents extremely negative views. Of course since Sunni Islam is associated with jihadist and extremist organisations responsible for suicide bombing attacks and killing innocent people, as shown in the above text, the quantitative analysis for Sunni Islam in English and Arabic is extremely negative.

The qualitative analysis of the Arabic text demonstrates that the sectarian affiliation of the militias and the prime minister are dropped. The efforts of the Iraqi government, which is trying to drive extremist organisations out of Iraq and restore peace, are stressed, so the quantitative analysis of Shia Islam is slightly positive. The English text on the other hand gives more credit to Shia Islam, when it mentions the efforts of the government and the militias alongside their sectarian affiliation. Hence Shia Islam in the quantitative analysis is relatively positive.
5.9.2 The overall averages for the Iraq texts:

Figure 5- 7

Figure 5- 8
5.10 The Yemen Conflict

Yemen is a country with a long history before Islam. It is mentioned in both pre-Islamic and Islamic literature. When examining socio-political aspects of Yemen, it is appropriate to see it as two entities: north and south Yemen.

In 1538 Aden in south Yemen fell under the Ottomans who subsequently extended their rule, but did not exercise much authority over the northern highlands except for a short period 1552-1560 when the whole of Yemen was officially under Ottoman rule. The northern highlands were ruled by Imam al- Mutwakkil Yahya Sharf ad-Din (1506–1555), and subsequent Zaidi imams (Nahrawali, 2002). Zaidi Imams ruled northern Yemen for 1,000 years till 1962 when military tribesmen tried to seize power from the Imams with support from Nasser’s Egypt (Dresch, 2000, p. 89). In 1839 South Yemen was seized by the British Empire to secure the shipping route to India, but the Ottomans returned in 1849. After the 1\textsuperscript{st} World War Ottoman troops were finally withdrawn from South Yemen to be replaced by a British mandate till 1967.

Yemen has a tribal social structure which is more conspicuous in the north where the land is more mountainous and rugged. The south is richer with its pastures and land that is good for farming. Over the years until the 1920’s and 1930’s, the northerners or highlanders repeatedly attacked the richer south and practiced a sort of looting of commodities (Dresch, 1984). Especially in the north, the tribes were able to devise their own system based on customary law (ʕurf) and to settle their own differences and disputes according to this system. The main tribes of the north are Hashid and Bakil, who in addition to their large numbers are politically influential. The Zaidi Imams for example “depended on the tribes for support” (Dresch. P. 1984, p.161), though they didn’t consider them as reliable allies. Hashid and Bakil gradually started to gain a greater political role in Yemen particularly after the end of Ottoman rule.

The tribes embraced more liberal attitudes than the Zaidi state. In 1959, a revolution with a liberal, republican orientation took place. Tribalism in itself had some liberal basics in its system so the tribes were included in the government. In 1962 civil war erupted in Northern Yemen as military groups supported by Egypt tried to seize power from the royalists who were supported by the Saudis, the British and to a lesser degree
by Jordan (Phillips, 2008, pp. 43-44). The republicans won the war in 1968 and declared the Yemen Arab Republic. The intervention of Saudi Arabia in Yemeni politics thus started as early as the 1960s.

A number of coups took place in North Yemen during the 1970s, which was at the time officially entitled the Yemen Arab Republic (YAR). In 1977 Ibrahim al-Hamdi, who took several measures to exclude the tribes from ruling the state and curb their influence, was assassinated. In 1978, Ali Abdallah Salih seized power. As someone who already knew the rules of the political game, he made sure to maintain the privileges of the tribes and the military, fearful that he would otherwise end up like Al Hamdi. The current regime in Yemen before the revolution of 2011 had a tribal military base (Phillips, 2008).

South Yemen on the other hand after independence in 1967, adopted a more far-left socialist ideology. It was officially called the People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY) and was supported by the former Soviet Union. Soon, there was an “ideological clash” between the two Yemeni states and the relationship was constantly fraught with tension. The PDRY, however, also suffered from internal conflicts over power that climaxed in 1986 with a two-week civil war that resulted in the ruling party allowing more freedoms.

In the year 1990, following the collapse of the Soviet Union, the two states unified but fairly quickly the Southerners came to resent the fact that the North was dominating resources and opportunities. This situation caused a civil war in Yemen in 1994, which was quickly won by the North.

In addition to tribalism, Yemen has diverse religious communities. Zaidis, who are Fiver Shia (see Rawafid) make up 45% of the population. Sunnis (of the Shafi’i School of Law) make up 53% of the population, while the remaining minorities are Jews and other Shia sects (refworld, 2008). It is worth mentioning that the Zaidi teachings are closer to the Sunnis’ than to the Twelver Shia (the majority of Shia; see Rawafid). Zaidis and Sunnis have lived in harmony for hundreds of years. Reading the history of Yemen, there is no mention of any sectarian conflict between Sunnis and Zaidis.
During the 1990’s, a movement named Ansarullah was founded by Hussein Al Houthi, a Zaidi leader from the North. He was supported by Iran, and the movement gradually came to follow in the footsteps of Hezbollah: “Houthis and Hezbollah follow the same doctrine” (The National Opinion, 2014). The Houthis revolted against the Yemeni establishment in 2004 (Sa’da war) (BBC, 2016). The Houthi insurgency continued till 2011. The Houthis on their part present a different point of view of the issue, “[…] Huthi-friendly sources assert that their movement originated merely in a cultural effort to rejuvenate Zaydism. Huthis thus fight today as true Yemenis, in defense of Zaydism against Wahhabi infiltration, military encroachment, and a Goy campaign against the community of Zaydis,” (Salmoni, B., Loidolt, B. Wells, M., 2010).

The advent of Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) in Yemen, 2009, meant another complication in the Yemeni political scene. The group has claimed responsibility for a number of terrorist attacks in Yemen and abroad during 2009–2015. In 2016, AQAP was able to capture the Abyan Governorate and the town of Jaar in South Yemen (Mukhashaf, 2015).

The contagious Arab Spring caught on in Yemen at roughly the same time as the Egyptian revolution of January 2011. The demands of the Yemeni uprising, as it was initially called, were also similar to those of other Arab revolutions in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya and later in Syria. Protestors called for political reforms, freedom of expression, democratic succession of power, combatting of corruption and fairer distribution of national wealth. Ali Abdullah Salih, who had been in power since 1978, was accused of corruption and of depending on an inner circle of military men who mostly came from a tribal background. Yemenis also had worries that Salih was in the process of preparing his son to succeed him.

Mass demonstrations took place in Sana’a, the capital, and in a number of major cities on Fridays for a number of successive weeks. For the first few weeks the demonstration went on without casualties. However, when the demonstrators started calling for Salih’s ousting, a number of protestors were shot and on Friday 18 March 52 protestors were killed. At this point, defections in the Yemeni army were increasing.
In May 2011, Sheikh Sadik Al Ahmar, leader of the Hashid tribal federation declared his support for the opposition and fought with loyalist security forces in the streets of the capital Sana’a shortly after the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) suspended its mediation in the Yemeni crisis. The fighting escalated and the presidential compound was bombed. Salih was injured, and he flew to Saudi Arabia for treatment. Abd Rabbuh Mansour Hadi, his deputy took over as acting president. Yet, Salih insisted he was coming back after recovery to resume his position in office. The government showed reluctance in responding to the opposition’s demands, but in November 2011 under the patronage of the GCC, Salih signed a power-transfer agreement. On 25 February, 2012 Abd Rabbuh Mansour Hadi took the oath of office as interim President in Yemen’s Parliament.

The security situation remained unsettled during 2012 with random killing and bombing incidents. Neighbouring Gulf States who were concerned about the situation in Yemen initiated a national dialogue conference. “The national dialogue conference – a cornerstone of the Gulf initiative – started in June 2013 and concluded on January 2014. Its purpose has been to address and resolve in an inclusive manner core Yemeni conflicts [..]” (Manea, 2015, p. 169).

The founder of the Houthi movement, Hussein Badreddin al-Houthi, was killed and replaced by his brother Abdul-Malik al-Houthi in 2004 who instigated a rebellion against the government of Ali Abdullah Salih. In 2014, the Houthi movement managed to turn the tide against the Yemeni government with the support of Iran. The movement took over wide areas including the capital Sana’ (BBC, 2016), with the help of then former president Salih who made a u-turn in his political allegiances. President Abd Rabbuh Mansour Hadi fled first to Aden then to Saudi Arabia. Iranian support for the Houthis was viewed as a direct threat by Saudi Arabia. Eventually Saudi Arabia, with the help of the US, formed an alliance of Gulf States which started targeting Houthi-held areas.

The war in Yemen to date has proven very costly, and ‘Happy Yemen’ (Al Yemen Al Saeed or Arabia Felix) has drowned in misery. Around 10,000 people have been killed, mainly because of the Saudi-led coalition airstrikes, and millions have no access to clean water, food or medical aid. Yemen is “one step away from famine”; “[..] over 14 million are food insecure, 7 million are severely food insecure - they do not know where their next
meal is coming from. Over two million people are malnourished nationwide, including 370,000 children who are severely malnourished” (O’Brien, 2016).

5.10.1 Data analyses for Yemen
There are two data analyses for Yemen which are found in Appendix 2. I have not presented them here for space restrictions.

5.10.2 The overall averages for the Yemen texts

![Diagram showing news service stereotypes and ideologies in Yemen with bar graph comparing English and Arabic texts.](Figure 5-9)
5.11 Data analysis example (Saudi Arabia)

There is no raging conflict in Saudi Arabia, but the country is focal to Sunni-Shia tension, and to other terror group issues.

There are two texts related the Saudi affairs. Here below is the first one, and the other is to be found on Appendix 2.

Reuters 17 May 2016

Senate passes bill allowing 9/11 victims to sue Saudi Arabia

The Saudis, who deny responsibility for the 2001 attacks, strongly object to the bill. They had said they might sell up to $750 billion in U.S. securities and other American assets in retaliation if it became law. The U.S. Senate passed legislation on Tuesday that would allow families of Sept. 11 victims to sue Saudi Arabia’s government for damages, setting up a potential showdown with the White House, which has threatened a veto.

The "Justice Against Sponsors of Terrorism Act," or JASTA, passed the Senate by unanimous voice vote. It must next be taken up by the U.S. House of Representatives,
where the Judiciary Committee intends to hold a hearing on the measure in the near future, a committee aide said.

If it became law, JASTA would remove the sovereign immunity, preventing lawsuits against governments, for countries found to be involved in terrorist attacks on U.S. soil. It would allow survivors of the attacks, and relatives of those killed in the attacks, to seek damages from other countries.

In this case, it would allow lawsuits to proceed in federal court in New York as lawyers try to prove that the Saudis were involved in the attacks on the World Trade Center and Pentagon.

Saudi Foreign Minister Adel bin Ahmed al-Jubeir has said his country’s objection to the bill is based on principles of international relations. "What (Congress is) doing is stripping the principle of sovereign immunities which would turn the world for international law into the law of the jungle," he said in a statement on Tuesday.

James Kreindler, a prominent trial lawyer who represents 9/11 families and won large payouts for the victims of the 1988 bombing of Pan American Airways Flight 103 over Scotland, said he expected the bill to pass the House and become law.

"It would be crazy for (President Barack) Obama to veto bipartisan legislation (which would) open (U.S.) courts to victims of the worst terrorist attack in U.S. history," Kreindler said.

Senator Charles Schumer, a New York Democrat and a JASTA co-sponsor, said the bill is overdue.

"Today the Senate has spoken loudly and unanimously that the families of victims of terrorist attacks should be able to hold the perpetrators, even if it’s a country, a nation, accountable," Schumer told a news conference.
CLASSIFIED PAGES OF 9/11 REPORT

Republican Senator John Cornyn, also a sponsor of the bill, said JASTA does not target the Saudis, although he alluded to a still-classified section of a report on the Sept. 11 attacks that Saudi critics say might implicate Riyadh.

"We have yet to see the 28 pages that have not been yet released about the 9/11 report, and that may well be instructive," Cornyn said at the news conference.

Other lawmakers who have seen the 28 pages have said releasing them would quiet such rumors.

Cornyn said it was up to the court to decide whether the Saudis were liable. "I don't believe that this will be destructive of the relationship that we have with the kingdom of Saudi Arabia," he said.

The White House said Obama still plans to veto JASTA.

"This legislation would change long-standing, international law regarding sovereign immunity," White House spokesman Josh Earnest told a daily press briefing.

"And the president of the United States continues to harbor serious concerns that this legislation would make the United States vulnerable in other court systems around the world."

Asked if Senate Democrats would back a veto, Schumer said he would vote against Obama.

Republican Senator Lindsey Graham, who had opposed the bill, said the version passed on Tuesday eased his worries that it might leave U.S. allies more vulnerable to lawsuits, for example if groups based within their borders but not supported by their governments were behind a terrorist attack.
"We don't want to alienate allies, but we do want to create redress if a nation-state was involved in helping a terrorist organization attack American interests, and I think they should be held liable," Graham said in a brief interview.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strategies</th>
<th>Objectives</th>
<th>Devices</th>
<th>Justification of using a particular strategy</th>
<th>Examples</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nomination</td>
<td>Constructing social actors in in-groups and out-groups</td>
<td>Membership categorization Use of rhetorical figures</td>
<td>The social actor is constructed as the Senate, which is the upper chamber of the American congress.</td>
<td>The U.S. Senate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nomination</td>
<td>Constructing social actors in in-groups and out-groups</td>
<td>Membership categorization Use of rhetorical figures</td>
<td><strong>Basic analysis:</strong> The social actor is constructed as the government of Saudi Arabia.</td>
<td>Saudi Arabia’s government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Background facts:</strong> Refer to fact sheet 5.5 <em>Saudi Arabia</em></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Likely reader stereotypes/ideologies:</strong> An affluent Arab/Muslim state that harbours extremist Islamist teachings, and could be involved in supporting some terrorist actions (very negative image of Islam).</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>News service stereotypes/ideologies:</strong> A Muslim Arab state that might well be involved in sponsoring global terror attacks (very negative image of Islam).</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perspectivation (Direct)</td>
<td>Expressing involvement, positioning speaker’s point of view</td>
<td>Reporting, description, narration or quotation of events and utterances</td>
<td><strong>Basic Analysis:</strong> The news service is describing the Saudi point of view and possible reaction.</td>
<td>The Saudis, who deny responsibility for the 2001 attacks, strongly object to the bill. They had said they might sell up to $750 billion in U.S.</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td><strong>Background facts:</strong> Refer to fact sheet 5.5 <em>11 September Attacks</em></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Likely reader stereotypes/ideologies:</td>
<td>News service stereotypes/ideologies:</td>
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<tr>
<td>Saudis should be sued for their involvement in global terror (very negative image of Islam).</td>
<td>Members of the Saudi royal family are implicated in sponsoring global terror organisations. They are threatening to retaliate by selling high value assets (very negative image of Islam).</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Basic Analysis:
The news service goes on narrating the developments in the issue, highlighting the fact that it caused disagreement between the Senate and the White House.

Likely reader stereotypes/ideologies:
There should be no compromise on individuals, organisations or governments sponsoring jihadist terror (very negative image of Islam).

News service stereotypes/ideologies:
The American Senate wants to sue the Saudi government, while the White House is protective of American interests with Saudi Arabia (neutral).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Predication</th>
<th>Labelling social actors negatively</th>
<th>Stereotypical evaluative attributes/traits</th>
<th>Qualifying and describing the social actors as terrorists (a stereotypical trait which is usually attributed to Muslim terror). The protagonist is qualified as the one on the side of justice.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>News service stereotypes/ideologies</strong></td>
<td>Very negative image of Islam.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Perspectivation</strong> (Direct)</td>
<td>Expressing involvement, positioning speaker’s point of view</td>
<td>Reporting, description, narration or quotation of events and utterances</td>
<td>If it became law, JASTA would remove the sovereign immunity, preventing lawsuits against governments, for countries found to be involved in terrorist attacks on U.S. soil. It would allow survivors of the attacks, and relatives of those killed in the attacks, to seek damages from other countries.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Basic Analysis:</strong></td>
<td>The news service is explaining the consequences of passing the bill.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>** Likely reader stereotypes/ideologies:**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a. All means should be attempted to prevent terrorist attacks anywhere in the world (very negative image of Islam).</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>b. The Islamist Saudi government could be complicit in the 2001 attacks, and should not be protected by sovereign immunity (very negative image of Islam).</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>News service stereotypes/ideologies:</strong></td>
<td>JASTA can remove sovereign immunity from governments thought to be involved in terror attacks, and would legally allow those harmed to sue complicit governments such as the Saudi government (very negative image of Islam).</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nomination</td>
<td>Constructing social actors in in-groups and out-groups</td>
<td>Membership categorization Use of rhetorical figures</td>
<td>The social actors are constructed as members of the Saudi government (synecdoche).</td>
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<td>-----------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nomination</td>
<td>Constructing social actors in in-groups and out-groups</td>
<td>Membership categorization Use of rhetorical figures</td>
<td>The social actor is constructed as the Saudi Foreign Minister.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Perspectivation (Indirect) | Expressing involvement, positioning speaker’s point of view | Reporting, description, narration or quotation of events and utterances | **Basic Analysis:** The news service is presenting the Saudi perspective by reporting statements made by the Saudi Foreign Minister.  

*Likely reader stereotypes/ideologies:* Facing Islamist global terror justifies ignoring bureaucratic rules like “sovereign immunity” (very negative image of Islam).  

*News service stereotypes/ideologies:* Neutral. | Saudi Foreign Minister Adel bin Ahmed al-Jubeir has said his country's objection to the bill is based on principles of international relations. "What (Congress is) doing is stripping the principle of sovereign immunities which would turn the world for international law into the law of the jungle," he said in a statement on Tuesday. |
Saudi Foreign Minister Adel bin Ahmed al-Jubeir has said his country's objection to the bill is based on principles of international relations. "What (Congress is) doing is stripping the principle of sovereign immunities which would turn the world for international law into the law of the jungle," he said in a statement on Tuesday.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Argumentation</th>
<th>Justification of positive or negative attributes</th>
<th>Topoi used to justify political inclusion or exclusion, discrimination or preferential treatment</th>
<th>Misplaced appeal to deep respect and reverence for authorities or in falsely parading once own qualities</th>
<th>Saudi Foreign Minister Adel bin Ahmed al-Jubeir has said his country's objection to the bill is based on principles of international relations. &quot;What (Congress is) doing is stripping the principle of sovereign immunities which would turn the world for international law into the law of the jungle,&quot; he said in a statement on Tuesday.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Perspectivation (Direct) | Expressing involvement, positioning speaker’s point of view | Reporting, description, narration or quotation of events and utterances | Basic Analysis: Narration of prospective events in case the bill was passed. 

Likely reader stereotypes/ideologies: The Saudis practise an extreme faith which encourages killing civilians (very negative image of Islam).

News service stereotypes/ideologies: JASTA will work in favour of the victims of terror attacks on U.S. soil, allowing them to sue implicated governments and request compensation (the stereotype is not not classified) | In this case, it would allow lawsuits to proceed in federal court in New York as lawyers try to prove that the Saudis were involved in the attacks on the World Trade Center and Pentagon. |
Today the Senate has spoken loudly and unanimously that the families of victims of terrorist attacks should be able to hold the perpetrators, even if it's a country, a nation, accountable," Schumer told a news conference.

Pathetic fallacy (it consists of the appeal to prejudiced emotions, opinions and convictions of a specific social group)

And the president of the United States continues to harbor serious concerns that this legislation would make the United States vulnerable in other court systems around the world."

| Argumentation | Justification of positive or negative attributes | Topoi used to justify political inclusion or exclusion, discrimination or preferential treatment | Pathetic fallacy (it consists of the appeal to prejudiced emotions, opinions and convictions of a specific social group) | "Today the Senate has spoken loudly and unanimously that the families of victims of terrorist attacks should be able to hold the perpetrators, even if it's a country, a nation, accountable," Schumer told a news conference. |
| Perspectivation (Indirect) | Expressing involvement, positioning speaker’s point of view | Reporting, description, narration or quotation of events and utterances | Basic Analysis: The news service is presenting the view point of the White House. Likely reader stereotypes/ideologies: The US has intervened in other countries (Iraq) and committed crimes against humanity which amount to acts of terror (neutral). News service stereotypes/ideologies: There is a rift between the views of the White House and the Senate (neutral) | "And the president of the United States continues to harbor serious concerns that this legislation would make the United States vulnerable in other court systems around the world." |
| Perspectivation (Indirect) | Expressing involvement, positioning speaker’s point of view | Reporting, description, narration or quotation of events and utterances | **Basic Analysis:** The news service is quoting another public figure who is trying to create a balance between the two perspectives within the American government regarding the issue in question.  
**Likely reader stereotypes/ideologies:** All parties proven to have taken part in or supporting terrorist organisations anywhere in the world should be held liable (not classified).  
**News service stereotypes/ideologies:** Means should be found to hold countries or states which have contributed to supporting Islamist terrorist organisations accountable (very negative image of Islam). | "We don't want to alienate allies, but we do want to create redress if a nation-state was involved in helping a terrorist organization attack American interests, and I think they should be held liable," Graham said in a brief interview. |

 مجلس الشيوخ الأمريكي يقر تشريعا يتيح لضحايا 11 سبتمبر مقاضاة السعودية

واشنطن (رويترز) - وافق مجلس الشيوخ الأمريكي يوم الثلاثاء على تشريع يسمح للناجين من هجمات 11 سبتمبر أيلول وذوي الضحايا بإقامة دعاوى قضائية ضد حكومة السعودية للمطالبة بتعويضات.

وجرت الموافقة على التشريع الذي يعرف باسم قانون العدالة ضد رعاة الإرهاب بموافقة جماعية من أعضاء المجلس.

وإذا وافق مجلس النواب على التشريع ووقعه الرئيس باراك أوباما فسوف يتيح المضي قدما في دعاوى بالمحكمة الاتحادية في نيويورك تسعى لإثبات أن السعوديين كانوا ضالعين في تلك الهجمات على مركز التجارة العالمي ومبنى وزارة الدفاع الأمريكية (البنتاجون) في 2001.

وتنفي السعودية أي دور لها في الهجمات.

Translation:

Senate passes bill allowing 9/11 victims to sue Saudi Arabia

The American Senate passed a bill on Tuesday which allows survivors of the 9/11 attacks and relatives of the victims to proceed with lawsuits against the Saudi government and seek compensation.

The bill, which is known as "Justice Against Sponsors of Terrorism Act", was passed unanimously in the Senate.

If the House of Representatives passed the bill and it was signed by President Obama, it would allow lawsuits to proceed in federal court in New York to prove that Saudis were involved in the attacks on the World Trade Centre and the Pentagon in 2001.

Saudi Arabia denies any involvement in the attacks.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strategies</th>
<th>Objectives</th>
<th>Devices</th>
<th>Justification of Using a Particular Strategy</th>
<th>Translation of the Arabic text</th>
<th>Examples</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nomination</td>
<td>Construction of social actors/in-groups and out-groups</td>
<td>Categorization Use rhetorical figures</td>
<td>The social actor is constructed as the American Senate.</td>
<td>The American Senate</td>
<td>مجلس الشيوخ الأمريكي</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Nomination | Construction of social actors/in-groups and out-groups | Categorization Use rhetorical figures | **Basic Analysis:** The social actor is constructed as the Saudi government.  
**Background facts:** Refer to fact sheet 5.5 *Saudi Arabia*  
**Likely reader stereotypes/ideologies:**  
   a. The custodian of the Muslim holy places and an affluent Arab country which preserves conservative Sunni Muslim practices (very positive image of Islam & fairly positive image of Sunni Islam).  
   b. A controversial government which meddles suspiciously in Yemen, Syria and elsewhere in addition to playing a suspicious role in sponsoring some | The Saudi government | الحكومة السعودية                 |
fundamentalist organisations (very negative image of Islam & very negative image of Sunni Islam).

**News service stereotypes/ideologies:**
A conservative Muslim government of an affluent Arab country and a major player in the region. This government is accused by the United States that it has a role in sponsoring 9/11 attacks (fairly negative image of Islam).

**Basic Analysis:**
The news service is introducing the issue taken up by the American Senate which is approving a legislation allowing families of victims of 9/11 to sue the Saudi government.

**Background facts:**
Refer to fact sheet 5.5 11 September Attacks

**Likely reader stereotypes/ideologies:**
11 September attacks are not morally justified. However,

---

**Perspectivation (Direct)**
Expressing involvement, positioning speaker’s point of view

**Reporting, description, narration or quotation of events and utterances**

**The American Senate passed a bill on Tuesday which allows survivors of the 9/11 attacks and relatives of the victims to proceed with lawsuits against the Saudi government and seek compensations.**

---

وافق مجلس الشيوخ الأمريكي يوم الثلاثاء على تشريع يسمح للناجين من هجمات 11 سبتمبر أيلول والذوي الضحايا بإقامة دعوى قضائية ضد حكومة السعودية للمطالبة بتعويضات.
according to this new legislation, Arab governments should have the right to sue the American government for committing war crimes in Iraq and other Muslim countries (fairly positive image of Islam).

**News service stereotypes/ideologies:**
The American government is trying to find legal means to sue the Saudi government for September 11 attacks (very negative image of Islam).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mitigation</th>
<th>Modifying the epistemic status of the proposition</th>
<th>Intensifying or mitigating the illocutionary force of discriminatory utterances</th>
<th>Decreasing the impact of the law's name.</th>
<th>Which is known as</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Perspectivation (Direct)</strong></td>
<td>Expressing involvement, positioning speaker's point of view</td>
<td>Reporting, description, narration or quotation of events and utterances</td>
<td><strong>Basic Analysis:</strong> The news service is informing the reader of the name of the legislation and that it was approved unanimously.</td>
<td>The bill, which is known as &quot;Justice Against Sponsors of Terrorism Act&quot;, was passed unanimously in the Senate.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

وجرت الموافقة على التشريع الذي يعرف باسم قانون العدالة ضد رعاة الإرهاب بموافقة جماعية من أعضاء المجلس.
The United States should take into account its actions against Arabs and Muslims and apply this legislation on all parties (fairly positive image of Islam).

**News service stereotypes/ideologies:**
The American Senate has unanimously approved legislation which considers Saudi Arabia a sponsor for Muslim terrorism, and seeks justice in its application (very negative image of Islam).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nomination</th>
<th>Construction of social actors/in-groups and out-groups</th>
<th>Categorization Use rhetorical figures</th>
<th>The social actor is constructed as the House of Representatives. The US Senate and the House of Representatives together constitute the American Congress, which is the legislative institution of the US.</th>
<th>the U.S. House of Representatives</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nomination</td>
<td>Construction of social actors/in-groups and out-groups</td>
<td>Categorization Use rhetorical figures</td>
<td>The former president of the United States of America.</td>
<td>President Barak Obama</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

المجلس النواب

الرئيس باراك أوباما
| Perspectivation (Direct) | Expressing involvement, positioning speaker’s point of view | Reporting, description, narration or quotation of events and utterances | **Basic Analysis:** The news service is presenting a concise description of prospective events.  
**Likely reader stereotypes/ideologies:** The United States wants to frame Muslims as terrorists and blackmail them (fairly positive image of Islam).  
**News service stereotypes/ideologies:** The Americans are pursuing legal channels and proper investigations to demonstrate that the Saudis are complicit in the 9/11 attacks and consequently sue them (very negative image of Islam).  
If the House of Representatives passed the bill and was signed by President Obama, it would allow lawsuits to proceed in federal court in New York to prove that Saudis were involved in the attacks on the World Trade Centre and the Pentagon in 2001. | وإذا وافق مجلس النواب على التشريع ووقعه الرئيس باراك أوباما فسوف يتيح المضي قدما في دعاوى بالمحكمة الاتحادية في نيويورك تسعى لإثبات أن السعوديين كانوا ضالعين في تلك الهجمات على مركز التجارة العالمي ومبنى وزارة الدفاع الأمريكية (البنتاجون) في 2001. |
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Perspectivation (Direct)</th>
<th>Expressing involvement, positioning speaker's point of view</th>
<th>Reporting, description, narration or quotation of events and utterances</th>
<th><strong>Basic Analysis:</strong> The news service is introducing a strong Saudi stand which denies any involvement in the attacks. <strong>Background facts:</strong> Refer to fact sheet 5.5 11 September Attacks <strong>Likely reader stereotypes/ideologies:</strong> Saudi Arabia is an ally of the United States, so how come it had a role in the attacks! (fairly positive image of Islam). Saudi Arabia's government endorses the Wahhabi doctrine and supports Muslim fundamentalist organisations (very negative image of Sunni Islam). <strong>News service stereotypes/ideologies:</strong> The response of Saudi Arabia to this debatable legislation is an absolute denial of sponsoring the 9/11 terror attacks (fairly positive image of Islam).</th>
<th>Saudi denies taking any part in the attacks.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>وتنفي السعودية أي دور لها في الهجمات</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Discussion:

**Qualitative analysis**

The English passage is quite long and elaborate in comparison with the Arabic one. It presents a number of perspectives towards the issue in question, and also the complexity of the relations between the US and Saudi Arabia. Even at a time when the values of the United States contradict with those of Saudi Arabia, Saudi Arabia is still considered an ally. At the same time as the American Senate is attempting to hold the Saudi government responsible for the 9/11 attacks, other parties are trying to prioritize the interests of the United States. The viewpoint of the Saudi government is given little space in this long and extensive discussion about an issue that involves the Saudi government and its support for radical Islamism. There is only an understated Saudi argument regarding undermining international law.

The Arabic text is very brief and detached from this controversial issue. It distances itself from the different point of views and the discussions which are found in the English text. At the end of this brief text, it allows room for the Saudi denial of any possible role in the 9/11 attacks, which is not mentioned in the English text.

**Quantitative analysis**

The quantitative analysis of the English text gives total scores as follows:

*English text: news service stereotypes/ideologies*

I. The quantitative analysis of the English text gives a total score -10 for news service stereotypes/ideologies for Islam and sectarian division, with 8 relevant records. The average score per record (-10÷8) is thus -1.25. This indicates that the new agency stereotypes/ideologies present a clearly negative view of Islam and sectarian division.

II. There are no news service stereotypes/ideologies records for Sunni Islam in the English text.
III. There are no news service stereotypes/ideologies records for Shia Islam in the English text.

*English text: reader stereotypes/ideologies*

I. The quantitative analysis of the English text gives a total score of -12 for reader stereotypes/ideologies for Islam and sectarian division, with 7 relevant records. The average score per record (-12÷7) is thus -1.714. This indicates that the reader stereotypes/ideologies present a strongly negative view of Islam and sectarian division.

II. There are no reader stereotypes/ideologies records for Sunni Islam in the English text.

III. There are no reader stereotypes/ideologies records for Shia Islam in the English text.

The quantitative analysis of the Arabic text gives total scores as follows:

*Arabic text: news service stereotypes/ideologies*

I. The quantitative analysis of the Arabic text gives a total score of -6 for news service stereotypes/ideologies for Islam and sectarian division, with 5 relevant records. The average score per record (-6÷5) is thus -1.2. This indicates that the news service stereotypes/ideologies present a clearly negative view of Islam and sectarian division.

II. There are no news service stereotypes/ideologies records for Sunni Islam in the Arabic text.

III. There are no news service stereotypes/ideologies records for Shia Islam in the Arabic text.


**Arabic text: reader stereotypes/ideologies**

I. The quantitative analysis of the Arabic text gives a total score of 4 for reader stereotypes/ideologies for Islam and sectarian division, with 5 relevant records. The average score per record \((4\div5)\) is thus 0.8. This indicates that the reader stereotypes/ideologies present a fairly positive view of Islam and sectarian division.

II. The quantitative analysis of the Arabic text gives a total score of -2.5 for reader stereotypes/ideologies for Sunni Islam, with 2 relevant records. The average score per record \((-2.5\div2\) is thus \(-1.25\). This indicates that the reader stereotypes/ideologies present a clearly negative view of Sunni Islam.

III. There are no reader stereotypes/ideologies records for Shia Islam in the Arabic text.

**Comparison of qualitative and quantitative analyses in relation to news service stereotypes/ideologies**

Although the English text is much longer and more elaborate than the Arabic text, it does not yield far more records which involve stereotypes around Islam and sectarian division than the Arabic text. In fact, since the text revolves around the September 11 attacks, it does not touch on the issue of sectarian division and it does not involve the current propagation of terror attacks whether in the Middle East or beyond. The same applies to the Arabic text though brief and much shorter than the one text. The qualitative analysis rather discusses the families of victims having the right to sue the government of Saudi Arabia for sponsoring ‘international terror’. Hence the quantitative analysis for Islam and sectarian division for both English and Arabic texts is negative, but not as strongly negative as in most other analysed texts. As previously mentioned neither text discusses the Sunni Shia conflict, nor so there are no records for either Sunni or Shia Islam in either text.
5.11.1 The overall averages for the Saudi related texts:

Figure 5-11

Figure 5-12
5.12 The overall averages for the Islamophobia-related texts:

![Graph showing data for Islamophobia-related texts in May 2016](image)

**Figure 5-13**

![Graph showing data for ISLAMOPHOBIA in May 2016](image)

**Figure 5-14**
5.13 Conclusion
The chapter has covered all the evidence, justifications, classifications and explanations that enable the reader to fully comprehend the process of analysis undertaken in the exemplary analyses provided. It has complemented the contextual and circumstantial information given in chapter 4 which is an inherent constituent of the implemented analytical approach. This chapter mirrors the previous theoretical knowledge, and the cultural historical and political material provided in previous chapters and in this chapter, to provide an exhaustive analysis of the news texts at hand.
Chapter 6
Conclusion

6.1 Introduction:
This chapter concludes this thesis, which has provided in-depth research study into the manifestations of prejudiced discourse using both stereotypical and ideological representations that aims at shaping the public opinion and creating the appropriate atmosphere for effecting particular agendas. The chapter gives a summary of the motivations and objectives of the research study. It also reminds the reader of the methodology adopted and the reason behind the choice of this particular methodological approach. The chapter then recapitulates the data analysis results and findings. The research questions are revisited and answered, these answers exhibiting a striking compatibility with the data analysis results. Finally, the chapter lists the contribution and implications of this research study referring also to its limitations, and puts forward recommendations for further research.

6.2 Summary of the key objectives and methodology:
This research study was instigated by the consistent misrepresentation of Arabs and Muslims in the British-based media. During the past few years when armed conflicts have raged in a number of Middle Eastern countries, it has been observed that some British media outlets have highlighted sectarian divisions and presented them as the main reason behind the various confrontations in the Arab world. Moreover, Islamophobic discourse has intensified because of the wave of terror attacks in Europe and elsewhere and also because of news of proliferating fundamentalist organisations in the Middle East. Other major news services like the BBC have been producing a biased discourse towards the Israeli/Palestinian issue for many years. Although the separation wall and the wars on Gaza have influenced British public opinion, as has been noted in the reader stereotypes elicited, they have not been able to persuade the BBC to present objective reports either on the Palestinian issue as a whole or on the recurring events relating to the Israel/Palestine conflict.

Since the theory of Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) was developed to unveil social inequalities discursively realised in explicit or vague attributions, and because CDA also
makes a connection between the relations of power in a given society (section 2.8) and the type of prevalent discourse, it is therefore an appropriate theory to scrutinise texts and investigate their underlying intentions. From within the theory of CDA, the Discourse-Historical Approach (DHA) emerged as an adaptable approach which has been particularly designed to trace anti-Semitic representations in media and political discourse. DHA (Chapter 3) has been implemented in analysing a number of cases which involved racist discourses. Its main advantage is its ability to incorporate various approaches, methods, theories and empirical data as well as background information. It postulates that to study historical and situational context requires other approaches in addition to textual analysis, including different theoretical concepts, such as ‘national identity’ and ‘gender’. Analysing context often also requires different methods and collecting different types of data other than language, such as participant observation, ethnographic data, demographic data, etc. This can also be termed, in non-academic language, ‘collecting background information’. The approach develops a number of discursive strategies (see section 3.4) which were implemented in this thesis (data analysis) to identify manifestations of prejudiced, racist and ideological discourse (for an overview of discourse and ideology, see section 2.6). Each of the discursive strategies is associated with a certain objective and a device. For the sake of this research study (data analysis), I have devised another category, justification for using a particular strategy, which in turn is sub-categorized into four sub-categories (for details of the data analysis process, refer to section 5.2). These categories include ‘reader stereotypes/ideologies’, which aims at assessing the inclinations of both the British and Arab reader towards the classifications of the stereotypes laid down (again for a full account see 5.2). In order to minimize the subjective element, I have had recourse to a significant number of opinion polls and surveys in addition to newspaper articles and reports. This method is called extrapolation. As mentioned in the course of the thesis, the two main themes of the data analysis are ‘Israel/Palestine conflict’ and ‘Islamophobia’. Background information and historical accounts have been collected to support the analysis as indicated in the approach adopted for this research study (chapters 4 & 5). The classification of the stereotypes along with their numerical categorization is also detailed in section 5.2, and the Excel sheets are found in Appendix 2. Each of the data analysis tables (four examples of which are to be found in chapter 5 (sections 5.4 & 5.8.1, 5.9.1, 5.11 and the rest in
Appendix 2) are followed by a discussion (qualitative analysis) and a quantitative analysis which was processed through Excel sheets. The results of both are subsequently discussed and compared. Graphs which demonstrate the overall analysis results for both news service stereotypes/ideologies and reader stereotypes/ideologies are presented (figures 5.2., 5.3, 5.5, 5.6, 5.7, 5.8, 5.9, 5.10, 5.11, 5.12, 5.13 and 5.14).

6.3 Summary of results of data analysis
6.3.1 Israel/Palestine Conflict (new service stereotypes/ideologies)

The overall analysis of the Israel/Palestine conflict texts informs the reader that the English texts are fairly pro-Israel, while the overall average of the Arabic texts shows that they are very slightly pro-Israel. I will now consider how these conclusions were arrived at.

The English texts generally put more weight on Israeli sources. So, the news service typically reports the news according to an Israeli source a greater number of times than it relies on a Palestinian source. The news service also often gives more room to the Israeli point of view than the Palestinian one. Consequently, the number of direct and indirect quotations ascribed to Israeli sources or officials outnumbers those ascribed to Palestinian ones. On a number of occasions, the news service foregrounds the Israeli perspective over the Palestinian one. When the news service reports the rounds of violence between the Palestinians and the Israelis, it on several occasions constructs the image of the Palestinians as ‘attackers, or ‘militants’. ‘Militants’ in particular is recurrent because it comes up almost every time there is tension between Hamas and Israel. Members of Hamas are constructed as ‘Islamist militants’, while on another occasion it is mentioned that an ‘Eritrean immigrant was confused for an Arab militant’, and similarly a Palestinian who was shot while incapacitated is an ‘attacker’. This construction of various Palestinian elements as violent fundamentalists explains the analysis results which indicate that the texts are fairly pro-Israel.

Another reason for this result is the news service obscuring of the roots of the Israel/Palestine conflict. All the texts report the news of the episodes of violence between the two sides while ignoring the occupation, the predicament of the refugees,
the siege of Gaza and proliferating settlements. The BBC news service repeatedly foregrounds the number of Israeli victims, though this is far fewer than the Palestinian ones and uses headlines that refer to Palestinians as ‘insurgents’ and to the Israel as a ‘sovereign state’ which is trying to deal with these insurgents, who could be fundamentalists, in order to sustain its security and stability. Argumentation strategies of persuasion like topoi and fallacies have also been used to impose an Israeli perspective and switch the positions of the victim and the victimizer.

The Arabic texts on the other hand report the news on the Israel/Palestine conflict with more sympathy for the Palestinian side, taking into consideration the longstanding Arab unease with Israel as a force occupying Arab land, and as an antagonistic entity which has engaged in several confrontations with a number of Arab states/factions over the years. The Arabic texts refer to Hamas members as armed fighters (مسلحون تابعون لحماس). The term ‘Islamist’, which translates in Arabic as (إسلامي), does not have the negative connotations it has in English; hence the Arabic texts would hardly read as negatively as the English ones. The term ‘militant’ used to describe Hamas members and the Hamas movement in the English texts has no equivalent in the Arabic texts. The Arabic texts use designations such as ‘the occupied West Bank’ (الضفة الغربية المحتلة), which reminds the reader of the reality on the ground. However, like the English texts, they do not discuss the roots of the issues, although they may depend more on Arab background knowledge of the Palestinian situation. The Arabic texts refer to the Palestinian Authority as a sovereign entity, mentioning, for example, مؤسسات السلطة الفلسطينية (‘PA institutions’) and الرئيس الفلسطيني (‘the Palestinian President’), while the English texts decline this construction and to refer to Mahmoud Abbas as the Palestinian Authority President. The Arabic texts usually give more space to the Palestinian perspective and foreground the Palestinian victims when rounds of violence are reported.

6.3.2 Israel/Palestine Conflict (reader stereotypes/ideologies)

According to the opinion polls and newspaper articles consulted (see Appendix 1), the views of the British public towards the Israel/Palestine conflict have shifted to be more sympathetic towards the Palestinians. The wars on Gaza, and Israeli practices and intransigent attitudes have been reflected in this change, though it is not a very
substantial one. As the opinion polls also show, a significant segment of the British public is not concerned with the Israel/Palestine issue and so it does not follow or ponder upon it in order to have an informed opinion.

Arab views, which present a clearly pro-Palestinian stance, are influenced by spontaneous Arab national feelings and a view of Israel as a de facto suspicious entity that could be aggressive. Of course the current dynamics of the Arab-Israeli conflict have significantly changed since the wave of Nasserism and Arab nationalism. However, a high percentage of the Arab population does not see Israel as a normal extension of the Middle Eastern formation. The Arab reader stereotype is informed also by a number of opinion polls and news articles (see Appendix 1).

6.3.3 Islamophobia (new service stereotypes/ideologies)
The overall outcome of the analysis of the Islamophobia texts informs the reader that the English texts reflect a clearly negative image of Islam and sectarian division, an extremely negative image of Sunni Islam and a slightly positive image of Shia Islam, while the overall average of the Arabic texts shows that they reflect a clearly negative image of Islam and sectarian division, a strongly negative image of Sunni Islam and a fairly negative image of Shia Islam.

The texts deal with the problem of Islamophobia whether through direct reports of events relevant to fundamentalist organisations such as ‘al-Qaeda’ and ‘Islamic State’, or through current issues like the conflicts in Iraq, Syrian and Yemen. Nevertheless, the raging conflicts in Iraq, Syrian and Yemen have been strongly affected by the religious factor, and by dogmatic organisations and regional powers which have sectarian tensions that have probably inflamed sectarian confrontations elsewhere. In recent years, Islamophobia has become more complicated as the image of Islam has not only worsened, but has become blurred and confused with sectarian issues between Sunni and Shia. These issues might seem rather trivial and at times confusing to the English reader, but they may be frustrating to the Arab reader or they could rekindle sectarian feelings and attitudes.

The texts, whether English or Arabic, show that there is an emerging image of a fundamentalist Sunni Islam. The strong justification for this growing image is the
activities of fundamentalist organisations such as al-Qaeda and Islamic State, and their branches or similar organisations (but on a smaller scale) which follow a very strict version of Sunni Islam. The English texts however, are more explicit in constructing the image of two types of Islam – ‘Sunni’ and ‘Shia’; they have also worked on associating particular traits with each type, specially the Sunni one. So, references such as ‘jihadist’, ‘militant’ and ‘Islamist’ are only used with Sunni Islam. These references have stereotypical and ideological connotations. This explains the consistently extremely negative image of Sunni Islam throughout the texts, as it is constantly associated with jihadist and Islamist organisations which are involved in acts of terror in the Middle East and beyond. The texts frame Shia Islam as the counterpart of Sunni Islam, and hence it quickly gains a slightly more favourable status in an indirect comparison with the more extremist and violent Sunni Islam. For example, Hezbollah, which is technically a Shia Islamist political and paramilitary party, is not described as such in the texts, and neither are the numerous Iraqi military factions. The Arabic texts display the same association between extremism and Sunni Islam and so they also reflect a strongly negative image of Sunni Islam. However, as has been mentioned before, technical terms like ‘jihadist’, ‘militant’ and ‘Islamist’ do not have Arabic equivalents which carry the same associations as in English (they are translated as جهادي, متشدد and إسلامي respectively). These Arabic terms do not have a similar negative impact on the Arab reader as their English counterparts do.

As has been frequently mentioned in the text analysis, the tense relationship between Iran and Saudi Arabia has affected the whole region, and manifested in political and military groups taking sides specially in countries like neighbouring Iraq, Syria and Yemen. The analysed texts however, show that the Arabic texts on a number of occasions put more weight on the Saudi viewpoint, and show more involvement in the Saudi side of the story. The Arabic texts as well sometimes refer to Iran as a Shia state backing a number of factions in the devastating wars in the region. This predication has contributed to the fairly negative image of Shia Islam in the Arabic texts.

Both English and Arabic texts, through a number of strategies used in discriminatory discourse, relay the picture of sectarian conflict and communities divided along sectarian lines, without mentioning the other contributing factors to the conflict as the
case is in Iraq for example. The discourse of these texts has developed an image of a divided Muslim community and ignored the many factors which have contributed to the current situation. Hence, a rather new stereotype of a sectarian Muslim community has been developed, while another new stereotype of extremist and fundamentalist Sunni Muslims has been created though it builds on lingering stereotypes of a violent and dogmatic faith which intimidates other communities. As the Shia Muslims were at this period of time facing the threat of Sunni extremists, the image of a violent and dogmatic Shia Muslim or even Shia Iran has been mitigated. This result confirms the point of Reisigl & Wodak (2001, p. 2): “[...] racist discourse is not static and homogeneous but dynamic and contradictory and it is also context-dependent”. Similarly stereotypes are not static entities; they develop, change and can be created. The context can also supress certain stereotypes and disclose others. As Wetherell and Potter (1992, p. 3) put it, “[...] discourses institute, solidify, change, create and reproduce social formations”.

6.3.4 Islamophobia (reader stereotypes/ideologies)

The English reader may have a generally negative view of Islam due to cultural and historical reasons. However, recent developments in the Middle East, and more significantly the rise of jihadist organisations who have committed several terror attacks in Europe must undoubtedly also have had a serious impact on the views of the British readers towards Islam. The sectarian division is yet another factor that reflected very negatively on the image of Islam. Although British and Western readers would not know much about Muslim denominations, and probably would not be that interested to know, the media coverage of recent conflicts has increasingly stressed the image of groups of Muslims embattled over sectarian grudges. The other factors which led to this situation whether in Syria, Iraq or Yemen were substantially ignored. Hence, the reader is rather influenced by this presentation, and the image of Islam and sectarian division is strongly negative, while Sunni Islam, which has been consistently more strongly associated with fundamentalist and jihadist organisations than Shia Islam, is viewed extremely negatively. On the other hand Shia Islam has gained a somewhat better reputation, or at least has been neutralised in this division.
The Arab public is more concerned with and has more solid attitudes towards this division, which has been exacerbated by recent developments, and also by the media. I have tried to show the possibilities of both the pro-Shia and the pro-Sunni stereotypes for reasons explained in section 5.7. However, there is a generally strong negative view of Shia Islam, which may be due to the growing role of Iran and the empowering of Shia factions by the Iranian state. The views of Sunni Islam are even worse (extremely negative), as opinion polls show the majority of Arabs/Muslims are strongly against extremist jihadist organisations. As mentioned before, Sunni Islam has been consistently associated with jihadist and fundamentalist organisations.

6.4 Revisiting research questions

The Discourse-Historical Approach (DHA) was particularly designed to trace discriminatory discourse and reveal social injustices embedded in seemingly neutral discourse. One of the interesting points is that it was first used to expose stereotypical anti-Semitic utterances and discourses. This constituted a motivation to applying it in tracing stereotypical utterances in what could be Islamophobic discourse or discursive practices. Of course this could not make it any less suited to work out the stereotypical and ideological discourse encountered in the news texts covering the thorny relationship between Israel and the Palestinians. This research study is concerned with all of the above, in addition to the translational aspect.

The following research questions were put forward in the introduction and in chapter 4:

1. Do translations retain stereotypes, stereotypical imagery/discourse between Arabic and British-based media?
2. Do translations increase, decrease or otherwise alter stereotypes/stereotypical imagery/discourse; in other words do they construct new stereotypes between Arabic and British-based media?
3. If translations increase, decrease or otherwise alter stereotypes/stereotypical imagery/discourse between Arabic and British-based media, how do they do so?
4. How do stereotypes and ideologies overlap, and how can they be combined or incorporated to serve some ideological discourses?
During the 1970’s a stereotype of the Palestinians was constructed in the West as a ‘terrorist’ while this pejorative reference was countered by ‘freedom fighter’ in the Arab media. Despite some positive change in the views of the British public towards the Palestinians as has been noted in previous chapters, the British media – the BBC at this instance – has maintained a violent image of the Palestinian, which means that to a certain extent, it has retained this stereotype in the English texts. A blend of referential and predicational strategies, in addition to argumentative and perspectivation strategies, was used to maintain the image of the Palestinians as the instigators of violence, to overlook the basic rights of the Palestinian people and to equate the two sides of the conflict. The English texts have also noticeably made allusions to a possible association between ordinary Palestinians and Islamist extremism. In this way the news agency is taking advantage of a current stereotype of Muslims and trying to extend it to Palestinians, further consolidating the Israeli position. The Arabic texts, however, have fewer references and predications which would frame Palestinians as violent. Rather they use more perspectivation strategies in favour of the Palestinians, and generally foregrounded the Palestinian perspective. The Arabic texts, like the English ones do not present a historical synopsis of the Palestinian issue, but depend more on Arab recollections of the long-standing conflict. They also regard Israel as a legal yet hostile entity, and present an image of a legal Palestinian state and officials, while the English texts present a vague picture of the Palestinian entity. In the English texts, the negative stereotype of the Palestinians as terrorists is used to serve the ideology of the news service which is a pro-Israeli one and is reluctant to present facts that may incriminate Israel. The news agency is also making use of the negative stereotypes of Muslims as violent and extremist by attributing it to some Palestinians in order to further justify the Israeli actions.

Western culture and naturally media as a constituent of this culture have a stable reservoir of pre-existing prejudices, explicit and implicit stereotypes towards Arabs and Muslims. These stereotypes, as has previously been explicated in this thesis, are the product of confrontation and rivalry at several stages in history. It has also been noted in the course of the thesis that the rise of Islamophobia in recent decades has given a boost to these Islamophobic stereotypes which could be manifest or latent depending
on the context. The prejudicial discourse could then be latent in the text and rely more on the already negative views of the readers. But when the British news agency (Reuters), in the case of this study, uses an explicit stereotypical reference, the equivalent in Arabic is not as negative and does not carry the same connotations. Examples of such stereotypical references have been mentioned in the Summary of Results and many times in the qualitative discussion following each of the data analysis (militant, Islamist, jihadist). In this case the translation does not retain the stereotypical utterance. The context, however, in addition to other strategies such as perspectivation may bring about part of the intended stereotypical frame but it is not fully equivalent to the meaning produced in the English text.

In the process of trans-editing and due to factors such as the agenda and ideology of the news service, some stereotypes are constructed. This has been strongly manifested in the formation of the new stereotypes of Sunnis and Shias as my data analysis has revealed. The stereotype of Sunni Muslims as violent and extremist has built on a general and profound stereotype of Islam as a violent and backward religion (refer to Islamophobia, section 4.7 and Crusades, section 5.6.8). Yet, the newly emerging image of Shia Islam as the more moderate group and a better version of Islam is novel specially if we look few years back and remember things such as the initial image of the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Salman Rushdie Fatwa. Moreover, there is an emphasis on the Sunni-Shia division in the British-based media, which mostly disregards any other imperative factors for the various conflicts (Iraq, Yemen and Syria). The Arabic texts generally retain a similar emphasis on the sectarian division as the English texts, but the deprecatory framing of Sunni Islam, though evident, is not as strong as in the English texts, while the image of Shia Islam in the Arabic texts does not present Shiism as the moderate branch of Islam, but as intimidating and aggressive towards the Sunni bloc and the region.

This leads us to the conclusion that the news agencies are creating new stereotypes/images and that certain prejudices are recycled and functionalised and are later employed within a specific context in order to promote the ideology of the news service. Here, the overlap between stereotypes as traits of certain groups and ideologies as the beliefs of dominant groups becomes very obvious.
6.5 The main contributions and Implications of the research

This is one of the few research studies which have been dedicated to stereotyping. Some other research studies have recognised the use of stereotypes in racist and prejudiced discourses which were utilized by the more dominant social class for the sake of creating favourable social relations and orders which would ultimately serve their interests. However, this is the first research work which has established the theoretical link between stereotyping and ideology and demonstrated the overlap between the two notions. The link between stereotyping and ideology has been illustrated by examples such as ‘moral panic’ and the stereotypes of Arabs in Hollywood films (section 2.4.) However, the data analysis conducted in this research study provides consistent and extensive examples from British-based media in English and Arabic exposing stereotypical utterances and discursive practices which have stereotypical and ideological content.

The study has also shown how stereotypes are not static but can change or develop or even be suppressed. It has been demonstrated in the data analysis and the discussions that followed that new stereotypes can build on older conventions and historical experiences and cultural impressions can be stirred to generate new stereotypes that suit the agenda of the news service or the ideology of the elite. The data analysis has also shown that some stereotypes can be mitigated or retained in translation. In other cases they lack the ability to relay the same connotations, and hence they are distinct in their function in the English and Arabic texts.

Another original aspect of this research study is the combination of both qualitative and quantitative analysis. The qualitative data analyses were thoroughly discussed with my supervisor and amendments were undertaken as agreed. Quantitative analysis was carried out for the first time in this type of research. The qualitative and quantitative analyses were done independently and there was no requirement for them to confirm one another in the final comparison and discussion after processing the results of the quantitative analysis.

This research adds to the scope of studies concerning stereotyping in general, as stereotyping is for the first time linked theoretically with social science and socio-
political research. Previously, stereotyping had always been confined to psychology and social psychology (section 2.3). The study has also investigated the capacity for stereotypical utterances/phrases and discourses to be translated into another language (Arabic), and has measured their adaptability and flexibility between languages. It has also placed the context as a determining factor for firstly understanding the stereotype and later for its ability to be constructed, mitigated and deconstructed.

The assessment of likely reader stereotypes is also a novel addition to this type of research. Research studies which rely on CDA approaches as their tool of analysis understandably concentrate on textual analysis. However, this research study also investigated the possible reader stereotypes by referring to numerous reliable sources. This addition has enriched the analytical process and provided an interesting aspect for comparison and deliberation.

6.6 Limitations of the Study

This study has used media texts from two news services (BBC and Reuters) for a limited period of one month in 2016. Only two main themes have been investigated: the Israel/Palestine conflict and Islamophobia. These limitations were largely imposed by restrictions of time. For a more comprehensive view, a corresponding analysis could be conducted over a longer period of time.

Another limitation is that it was impossible for me to personally conduct surveys in the Arab world to evaluate Arab public opinion, because of obstacles such as financial capacity to travel to a number of Arab countries and because of safety issues and armed conflicts raging in a number of Arab countries.

Finally, I had originally intended to cover a third topic that of Women’s Issues. However, lack of time and thesis space made this impossible to do. This can, accordingly, also be regarded as a limitation on the thesis.

6.7 Recommendations for future research

This research opens the door for further research in this domain. As has been previously discussed, this research study examined the role of stereotypes from cultural, historical and socio-political perspectives. It also demonstrated the potential for stereotypes to
change, develop and dwindle. Issues like the Israel/Palestine conflict and Islamophobia are a hotbed for stereotyping and ideological discourse, and could be investigated in much greater depth. The processes of development that such discourses may experience would in my opinion be a very rich and interesting field to observe and analyse. Islamophobia is a rich area, and data analysis could be done according country (Syria, Iraq, Yemen, Saudi Arabia). More focused research projects could also be carried out, on a particular country or state in order to provide deeper specific analyses. Political discourse in Egypt and the rise and decline of Islamist organisations and nationalist parties as well as the situation of the Egyptian Copts is a fruitful topic that may make a very important contribution to the research on both Islamophobia and stereotyping and ideology. In fact, several Muslim and Arab countries could provide case studies for conducting similar research. This research study has great potential for being re-devised to suit varied settings of racist or discriminatory discourse that aim at shaping public opinion and pushing events in a certain direction.

Another possibility would be to apply this analytical tool to Women’s Issues in the Arab world in order to shed light on how women are portrayed in Western and Arab media, the relationship between women and Islam, and women and nationalist movements. As noted above, this topic was intended to be included in this thesis but because of time and space limitations it was not.


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Appendix 1

Sources consulted for the extrapolation of reader stereotypes:

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Appendix 2

Appendix 2, which provides the full data analysis is on an attached DVD.