The Politics of Development and Stagnation of Civil Society:
Experiences of Zambia and Botswana
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ABSTRACT

This study examines what factors affect the development of civil society, using the experiences of Zambia and Botswana. My main concern is political factors promoting and limiting activities of actors in civil society, namely, associational organisations (AOs) in this study's terminology.

After reviewing some theories and arguments concerning such issues as democratisation, state, and civil society not only in Africa but also in other parts of the world, several hypotheses will be developed and tested so as to identify reasons of the state's responses to AOs. A kind of "map" of AOs in Zambia and Botswana is described in accordance with the classification developed in the first chapter.

Thereafter, case studies are used to test the hypotheses developed in the theoretical part of the study: rural sectors, Christian Churches, and national service development associational organisations (NSDAOs) in this order, paying attention to their interaction with the state in a comparative way.

In conclusion, Botswana is a case which fits one of the hypotheses that "a regime is established in favour of the state in terms of power distribution" and that "the state dominates material and ideological bases." As a result, the development of civil society has been politically controlled. On the other hand, Zambia is a case where the state has failed to dominate both material and ideological bases, and allowed AOs to act in areas where the state failed to maintain its presence. Therefore, AOs have developed further in Zambia. These insights prompt us to reconsider the characteristics of political regimes, the prospects for democratisation, and the usefulness of applying the concept of civil society in Africa.

Figures

Tables

List of Abbriviations

ABWO	Association of Botswana Women's Organisations
AD	agricultural demonstrator
AGC	Annual General Conference
AMAs	agricultural management associations
AME	African Methodist Episcopal Church
AOs	Associational Organisations
ARDP	Accelerated Rural Development Programme
BCB	Botswana Cooperative Bank
BCC	Botswana Christian Council
BCU	Botswana Cooperative Union
BCW	Botswana Council of Women
BDP	Botswana Democratic Party
BFTU	Botswana Federation of Trade Unions
BFHSII	Botswana Family Health Survey II
BNA	Botswana National Archives
BNF	Botswana National Front
BOCCIM	Botswana Confederation of Commerce, Industry and Manpower
BOFWA	Botswana Family Welfare Association
BOJA	Botswana Journalists Association
BRIDEC	Brigade Development Centre
CARYM	Catholic Agricultural and Rural Youth Movement
CCMG	Christian Churches' Monitoring Group
CCNR	Christian Council of Northern Rhodesia
CCZ	Christian Council of Zambia
CDAOs	Community Development Associational Organisations
CDC	. Commonwealth Development Corporation
CFDA	Communal First Development Areas Programme
CUSA	Credit Union and Savings Association of Zambia
CODEC	Department of Cooperatives (Botswana)
CORDE	Cooperation for Research, Development and Education
COZ	Credit Organisation of Zambia
CSD	Christian Service Department
CSDAOs	Community Service Development Associational Organisations
DAOs	developmental associational organisations
DCUs	District Co-operative Unions
DEG	development education group
DEN	Development Education Namushakande Programme
FEP	Foundation for Education with Production
EFZ	Evangelical Fellowship of Zambia
FAB	Forestry Association of Botswana
FAP	Financial Assistance Policy
FLMZ	Family Life Movement of Zambia
FNDP	Fourth Natioanl development Plan
FODEP	Foundation for the Democratic Process

FONSAG	Forum on Sustainable Agriculture
FWEs	family welfare educators
GDOs	Group Development Officers
GM	General Manager
GMC	General Missionary Conference
GONGOs	Governmental Non-governmental Organisations
GRZ	Government pf Republic of Zambia
GSOs	Grassroots Support Organisations
HUZA	Human Settlements of Zambia
IAOs	interest associational organisations
IDAs	Interest Development Associations
IPPF	International Planned Parenthood Federation
JTCP	Inter-agency Technical Committee on Population
KCS	Kalahari Conservation Society
KRDA	Kweneng Rural Development Association
LAZ	Law Association of Zambia
LDAs	local development associations
LOs	Local Organisations
MAOs	membership associational organisations
MCC	Mennonite Central Committee
MCH/FP	Maternal and Child Health/ Family Planning
MDF	Malambo Development Foundation
MEC	Makeni Ecumenical Centre
MEF	Mindolo Ecumenical Foundation
MLGLH	Ministry of Local Government, Lands and Housing
MMD	Movement for Multi-party Democracy
MSOs	Membership Support Organisations
NAMBOARD	. National Agricultural Marketing Board
NBCC	National Brigades Coordinating Committee
NCCW	National Council of Catholic Women
NCDP	National Commission for Development and Planning
NCU	Northern Co-operative Union
NCZ	Nitrogen Chemicals of Zambia
NDP	National Development Plan
NEC	National Executive Committee
NEMIC	National Employment and Income Council
NERP	New Economic Recovery Programme
NGOs	Non-governmental organisations
NGOCC	Non-Governmental Organisations Coordinating Committee
NSDAOs	National Service Development Associational Organisations
NWLG	National Women's Lobby Group
PAZA	Press Association of Zambia
PCUs	Province Cooperative Unions
PDL	Poverty Datum Line
PDSF	Public Debt Service Fund
PHC	primary health care

POs	People's Organisations
PPAZ	Planned Parenthood Association of Zambia
PRICE	Pioneer Rural Industries Centre
PSCs	Public Service Contractors
PUSH	project for urban self-help
RADP	Remote Area Dwellers Programme
RADS	Remote Area Dwellers
RCZ	Reformed Church of Zambia
RIIC	Rural Industry Innovation Centre
ROB	Republic of Botswana
SAOs	service associational organisations
SAP	Social Action Programme
SDA	Seventh Day Advantist Church
SEGA	South East Growers Association
SHD	Self Help Development
SIDO	Small Industry Development Organisation
SNDP	Second National Development Plan
SRDA	Southern Rural Development Association
TGLP	Tribal Grazing Land Policy
TL	Thusano Lefatsheng
TNDP	Third National Development Plan
UCCSA	United Congregational Church of Southern Africa
UCZ	United Church of Zambia
UIM	Urban Industrial Mission
UNFPA	United Nations Fund for Population Activities
UNIP	United Independent Party
UNZASU	University of Zambia Student Union
UPP	. United Progressive Party
UTH	University Teaching Hospital
VDC	Village Development Committee
VDF	Village Development Foundation
VDN	Village Development Network
VIS	Village Industry Service
VOs	Voluntary Organisations
VPCs	Village Productivity Committees
WCC	World Council of Churches
WDCs	Ward Development Committees
WDP	World Day of Prayer
ZAMPOPCOMU	Zambia Population Communication Unit
ZARD	Zambia Association for Research and Development
ZAW	Zambia Alliance of Women
ZAUW	Zambia Association of University Women
ZCF	Zambia Co-operative Federation
ZCSD	Zambia Council for Social Development
ZCROF	Zambia Community Research and Occupational Foundation
ZCTU	Zambia Congress of Trade Unions

ZEC	Zambia Episcopal Conference
ZEMCC	Zambia Elections Monitoring Coordinating Committee
ZFE	Zambian Federation of Employers
ZIMT	Zambia Independent Monitoring Team
ZIT	Zambia Institute of Technology
ZNA	Zambia National Archives
ZNADWO	Zambia National Association of Disabled Women

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INTRODUCTION

This thesis is a comparative study of the development and stagnation of civil society in southern Africa, using the cases of Zambia and Botswana. This study focuses mainly on the political logic of the development of civil society, analysing the relationship between the state, which is considered to be a regulator of civil society, and societal actors, which are termed associational organisations (AOs) in this study's terminology, to determine why the state pursues certain tactics toward specific (in some cases, potential and embryonic) AOs. In addition, the roles of specific AOs in the process of democratisation will be also considered.

This study's background is the rapidly emerging academic interest in the concept of "civil society." Since the late 1980s, the process of democratisation has been one of the most interesting phenomena in Africa as well as in other parts of the world, to which academics have paid much attention. In the discussions over democratisation, "civil society" has offered quite a unique point of view to consider the process, and the concept became one of the most used in analysing issues related to democratisation (in the African context, see, e.g., Bayart, 1986; Chabal, 1992; Fatton, Jr., 1992; Bayart, 1993; Harbeson, ed., 1994).

Tracing the history of the recent usage of this concept, it was "brought back in" in the 1980s' political discourse, to explain such phenomenon as "Solidarity" in Poland (e.g., Pelczynski, 1988). Gradually, the application of the concept has been expanded to studies of other parts of the world like southern Europe like Greece, Portugal, and Spain, and Latin America such as Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Mexico (one of the relatively early examples was, e.g., O'Donnell and Schmitter, 1986).

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In African studies, this concept was probably first used in the title of a translated paper written by the French Africanist, Bayart (Bayart, 1986)[1]. After that, the concept started to be used in papers focusing on democratisation and the failure of the African state (e.g., Bratton, 1989a). In the 1990s, there have appeared numerous works and articles on civil society in the context of African democratisation both from the theoretical and analytical points of view (e.g., Lewis, 1992; Woods, 1992; Lemachand, 1992; Harbeson, ed., 1994; Fatton, Jr., 1995; Hutchful, 1995).

The concept has also recently been adopted in development studies, which focus on "NGOs," voluntary sectors, and empowerment (Korten, 1990; Carroll, 1992; Friedmann, 1992; Ndegwa, 1993; Sandberg ed., 1994; Fowler, 1994). In addition, this concept has been adopted in the literature of international relations, refering to transnational actors' roles in international politics (e.g. de Oliveira, M.D. and R. Tandon, 1994; Walzer, ed, 1995) in the form of "global civil society." To respond to the readoption of the concept, more philosophical and historical studies of the concept have also appeared in recent years (e.g., Keane, ed., 1988; Selingman, 1992; Cohen and Arato, 1992; Hall, eds., 1995).

However, there are also criticisms of the overuse and abuse of the concept in recent political discourses, especially from Marxian points of view (Wood, 1990 in general; Nzimande and Sikhosana, 1995 in South Africa). In addition, problems of using the concept in the African context have been raised among Africanists (e.g., Callaghy, 1994; Hartmann, 1994).

Against this background on the concept of civil society, this study will analyse several AOs to determine the political factors and logic which impact on the development of civil society in the African context, and AOs' role in the process of democratisation. In methodological terms, the case studies of this study are based on materials collected during my field

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[1]The original title of this paper in French was "La ravanche des sociétés africanes."

research conducted between November 1991 and May 1992 in both Zambia and Botswana. The main materials obtained during the field research include (1) interviews with people in government and such AOs as the Christian churches, so called non-governmental organisations (NGOs), and other professional associations, (2) evaluation reports of AOs, which are usually quite limited in number, and (3) some archival resources.

The first task is to operationalise the concept for analytical purposes after reviewing the concept both in Western philosophical history and in the contemporary usage (in chapter 1). After the operationalisation of the concept, some of the logic of the interaction between the state and societal actors will be theoretically considered. In addition, such issues as: the validity of the concept for the African context; civil society and democratisation; and civil society in the context of alternative development or development "from below"; will be argued at length. Thereafter, (potential) actors in civil society, namely AOs, will be categorised for convenience for practical analysis. After arguing the concept of civil society and related issues, the hypotheses of the study to be tested will be developed at the end of the chapter. The content of the following chapters is as follows.

In chapter 2, the political and economic trajectories and characteristics of Zambia and Botswana will be described. After that, the organisational dimension of civil society, or in other words, "potential" AOs in both countries will be "mapped" comparatively based on the data obtained in the field research. After that, the characteristics of AOs in both countries will be compared in order to identify similarities and differences, and the reasons for that, which will be a springboard for proceeding to the following case studies.

The following chapters are case studies of specific (potential) associational organisations. Chapter 3 focuses on "weak and weakened

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rural civil society," where interests are less organised and the state has used relatively tight methods to control people. Issues raised in this chapter include the impact of labour migration on rural communities, political parties' role in rural areas and clientelism. My argument in this chapter will be that "weak rural civil societies" in the post-colonial period have been derived partly from their weak "organisational principle," but mainly from the state's tactics (i.e., "preemptive tactics," political clientelism) to weaken any autonomous organisational action by regulating the political space. As a result, rural areas have became the places where democratisation has been delayed in comparison with urban areas where imperatives for the process in contemporary Africa mainly come.

Christian churches, which have been one of the most active and institutionalised actors in civil society in African history, will be analysed in Chapter 4. They have been among the most important actors in the process of democratisation (see, e.g., Gifford, 1994; Gifford, ed., 1995; Haynes, 1996). In addition, Christian churches, which have emphasised social justice and human rights in more recent days, have been active in the area of education and health since the colonial period. They have been involved in political affairs both in order to defend their own interests, and to avert political instability, when they faced national political "crises." These issues will be considered in comparative terms.

Chapter 5 deals with several cases of national service development associational organisations (NSDAOs) (in this study's terminology) in both countries. In addition, experiences of one type of NSDAOs, which have been involved in population and family planning issues, will be also analysed from an issue-oriented perspective. My arguments in this chapter will be (1) that NSDAOs tend to appear and work well in those areas where the state failed to deliver the expected social services and where

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there is not any ideological difference between the state and a specific NSDAO, (2) that NSDAOs can promote democratisation by "participating" in policy-making processes, which means that the state allowed societal actors to have a say in national policy, and (3) that NSDAOs may have ambivalent effect on target groups when they do not genuinely represent them, which means that they may negatively affect the process of empowerment.

In conclusion, the theoretical views and case studies will be integrated in order to get theoretical insights on the issues like evaluation of the nature of political regimes and relations between civil society and the process of democratisation, raised in the first chapter.

Because of the elusiveness of the concept of civil society, I judged that it is better to develop more refined hypotheses *after* not *before* the concept of civil society is treated at a length in chapter 1. Therefore, I state only one of the main contentions of this study in this introduction. It is that multi-partyism does not necessarily guarantee the development of civil society more than a single-party system, and that, paradoxically enough, civil society may develop well under, so-called, authoritarian regimes. The development of civil society is rather determined by the power balance between the state and societal actors, and the process of democratisation does not proceed without any change of the power balance between them. Therefore, the development of civil society is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for democratisation, and democratic consolidation.

It is now necessary to frankly confess the problems which I have faced in recent years. As already stated above, academic interest in the concept of civil society has rapidly been increasing. As a result, there has appeared a mushrooming of the literature related to the concept, including both theoretical and analytical aspects. In fact, when I started this

project in 1990, stimulated especially by papers by Bayart (1986) and Bratton (1989a, 1989b), I could not predict the current result. Although I have tried to keep up with the times and refer to as many works as I could, as you will find in chapter 1, I may fail to refer to certain important recent works on this issue. However, I hope that you will understand that this study was mainly written between 1990 and 1993, at which time I was obliged to go back to Japan to work, although I have continued as well as I was able under the new circumstances to revise it by refering to newly appeared books and articles related to the concept of civil society and the issue of democratisation.

CHAPTER 1

THE POLITICS OF DEVELOPMENT AND STAGNATION OF CIVIL

SOCIETY: A THEORETICAL REVIEW AND AN ANALYTICAL

FRAMEWORK

The concept of "civil society" has been recently much used and one of the key issues in literature of political science (e.g., O'Donnell and Schmitter, 1986; Keane ed., 1988; Hall ed., 1995)[1] and even in several studies of international politics (Rosenburg, 1994; Waltzer, ed, 1995).

This is also the case in African studies since this concept was introduced by Bayart (1986). In the context of democratisation or political reordering process in Africa, "civil society" has recently been one of the main academic concerns, although the meaning and the validity of the concept in African context have been recently much argued in academic circles (e.g., Chabal, 1992; Hyden and Bratton eds., 1992; Fatton, Jr., 1992; Harbeson et al., eds., 1994; Sachikonye, ed., 1995; Hutchful, 1995). Not only has this concept been adopted in these studies, but also there have been a variety of arguments about the validity of the concept as an analytical tool in the context of Africa. Some scholars, especially from the left, caution against the "abuse" of the idea civil society[2]. In fact, "civil society" is currently one of the ambiguous and elusive concepts, as other important concepts in political science such as the state, power and democracy.

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[1] In O'Donnell and Schmitter, they refereed to "resurrecting civil society" (1986: 48). In the volume edited by Keane, Pelczynski titled "rebirth of civil society" for his essay (1988: 361), refering to Solidarity in Poland.

[2] One of the cautions against "abusing" the idea of civil society from the left was made by Ellen Meikins Wood, who cautioned in her article, "(a)after a long and some what tortuous history, after a series of milestones in the works of Hegel, Marx and Gramsci, this versatile idea [of civil society] has become an all-purpose catchword for the left, embracing a wide range of emancipatory aspirations, as well-it must be said- as a whole set of excuses for political retreat. However constructive its uses in defending human liberties against state oppression, or in marking out a terrain of social practices, institutions and relations neglected by the 'old' Marxist left, 'civi' society' is now in danger of becoming an alibi for capitalism" (1990: 60). A similar criticism against the usage of "civil society" in the South African context can be found in Nzimande and Sikhosana (1995).

Although stances taken by scholars towards the concept have differed, more constructive rather than destructive efforts have been made to operationalise the concept in order to use it for political analysis.

Civil society in the context of Africa is selected as the main topic of the current study. The following are the main questions of this study. Under what conditions will civil society develop? And under what conditions will the development of civil society be impeded?

In order to construct hypotheses to be evaluated in this study, this chapter aims (1) to clarify and operationalise the concept "civil society" for political analysis in the African context by referring to the concept in the history of Western political history and to the recent debates concerning the concept among Africanists, (2) to develop analytical tools and framework to interpret complex reciprocity between the state and actors in civil society, and (3) to identify "potential" actors in civil society, by refering to historical studies of social groups in Africa and recent studies of so-called Non-governmental organisations (NGOs).

1.1 The Concept of Civil Society

1.1.1 "Civil Society" in Western Political Philosophy

In this section, conceptual issues concerning civil society will be raised to identify elements and features of civil society.

For contemporary political scientists, it seems to be surprising that, in European tradition including such philosophers as Hume, Rousseau and Kant, until the middle of eighteenth century, "civil society was conterminous with the state," and "civil society... and the state... were interchangeable terms" (Keane, 1988: 35-36)[3]. It was not until around 1800

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[3]Harbeson noted that there emerged "a vague but discernible distinction between civil society and the state in the works of both Hobbes and Locke" (Harbeson ed., 1994: 286).

that civil society and the state were seen as different entities, which is currently familiar to us. From then on, however, civil society has never been considered to be synonymous with the state, and it has been usually a completely separate entity from the state. In other words, civil society is defined to be what is *not* of the state and outside the state. Therefore, it is possible for us to find the first element of civil society: "externality," in the sense that, in theory, civil society is external to the state.

In historical terms, the meaning of the concept civil society in political philosophy has often reflected changing political realities. In other words, it is influenced by its power relations with the state. When the state's power appeared as that of suffocating civil society, on the one hand, the importance of protecting and renewing a pluralistic, self-organising civil society independent of the state tended to be emphasised. On the other hand, if state's power declines and the freedom of civil society is considered just as self-paralysing and conflict-producing, "the anti-statist impulse of the distinction between the state and civil society was weakened" (Keane, 1988: 38-39). In this case, even though the distinction is preserved, "its predecessor's trust in a free, independent civil society is reversed in favour of" strict state regulation and control (Keane, 1988).

One of the most important theorists of the notion of civil society is Hegel. Before his period, the meaning of civil society had already changed from the original one which was interpreted as "an unqualified good" while the state was seen as "a necessary evil." Hegel's stance can be understood as a reaction against this over-evaluation of civil society. He, therefore, located civil society between the family and the state and saw it in *Philosophy of Right* (1821) as:

> "the battle field where everyone's individual private interest
> meets everyone else's, so here we have the struggle (a) of private

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interests against particular matters of common concern and (b) of both of these together against the organizations of the state and its higher outlook"(Hegel, 1967: 189).

For Hegel, civil society itself is "a self-crippling entity in constant need of state supervision and control" (Keane, 1988: 50) in order to be "civil" and, on the other hand, the state is "a new moment which contains, preserves and synthesizes the conflicting elements of civil society into a higher ethical entity" (Keane, 1988: 52-53). Therefore the state has the right to intervene in civil society in order to restore the normative unity of society when inequalities are too acute.

Therefore, according to Keane, a novel contribution of Hegel to the "modernisation" of the idea of civil society can be summarised in two points. First, it is conceived "as a *historically produced* sphere of ethical life... 'positioned' between the simple world of the patriarchal household and the universal state" (Keane, 1988: 50-51, original emphasis). In this position, civil society is "a mosaic of private individuals, classes, groups and institutions whose transactions are regulated by civil law and, as such, are not directly dependent upon the political state itself." Second, he argued that "there is no necessary identity or harmony among the various elements of civil society" (Keane, 1988). In this context, we can identify a second characteristic of civil society: "plurality." By this term, I intend to mean that civil society, which is the arena where various interests can be expressed, is composed of quite a few mutually conflicting as well as cooperative groups.

What we have to put in mind concerning Hegel's usage of the idea of civil society is that it includes not only the sphere of economic relations and the class formation but also *the political arena and spontaneous and voluntary forms of organisations.* This is, as pointed out by Bobbio `1988: 81), wider than that taken up in the terminology of Marx and Engels who

used it as mainly the realm of economic relations. For Marx, therefore, civil society is the sphere of "structure," or the level of material relations. This interpretation is shared by contemporary radical scholars like Amin, when he writes:

> "Comparative analysis of the state/economic life (civil society) relationship in the central ('developed') forms of capitalism and in its peripheral ('underdeveloped') ones throws a most instructive light on the nature of this relationship" (1987: 3).

and

> "...in the societies of peripheral capitalism, precisely because that capitalism is not completed capitalism, civil society is feeble or even non-existent" (Amin, 1987: 3).

At any rate, after Marx and Engels "had developed the theory of historical materialism and the concepts of forces and relations of production, they abandoned the term 'civil society' in their later works" (Simon, 1982: 71).

In stark contrast to the view of recognising civil society as the sphere of "structure," it is an Italian Marxist, Antonio Gramsci, who brought civil society back in as an idea belonging to "super-structural" sphere and refined this concept in the context of modern society[4]. According to Bobbio, there are two important points in Gramsci's theory of civil society. First, Gramsci's concept of civil society is not derived from Marx's but from Hegel's, who recognised the concept of civil society as that including the political arena and spontaneous and voluntary forms of organisations. Second, the concept, as understood by Gramsci, is superstructural (1988: 84). However Gramsci was different from Hegel in that "the civil society which Gramsci has in mind when he refers to Hegel is not that of the *initial* stage, of the explosion of contradictions which the state will have to

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[4]Interestingly enough, recent important works in African politics by Chabal (1992) and Bayart (1993) were theoretically based on the work of Gramsci.

overcome, but that of the *final* stage, when the organization and regulation of the various interests (the corporations) provide the basis for the transition towards the state" (Bobbio, 1988: 85, emphasis added).

In fact, Gramsci's definition of civil society is not so clear. He did not define the term in his *Prison Notebooks*. The nearest to a definition is a passage, as correctly quoted by Simon (1983: 69) as well as Bobbio (1988: 82):

> What we can do, for the moment, is to fix two major superstructural 'levels': the one can be called 'civil society," that is, the ensemble of organisms commonly called 'private,' and that of 'political society' or 'the state.' These two levels correspond on the one hand to the functions of 'hegemony' which the dominant group exercises throughout society and on the other hand to that of 'direct domination' or command exercised through the state and 'juridical' government (Gramsci, 1971: 12)

According to Simon, who constructed a definition from the *Prison Notebooks*, "civil society is the sphere where capitalists, workers and others engage in political and ideological struggles and where political parties, trade unions, religious bodies and a great variety of other organisations come into existence" (Simon, 1982: 70). It is not only the sphere of class-struggles, but also the sphere of all the popular-democratic struggles which arise out of the different ways in which people are grouped together by forming 'private' organisations such as churches, trade unions, political parties and cultural associations, which are distinct from the process of production and from the apparatuses of the state (Simon, 1982: 70). "All the organisations which make up civil society are the result of *complex network* of social practices and social relations" (Simon, 1982: 70, emphasis added). This understanding of civil society is quite important in offering us the significance of associational activity

(Woods, 1992: 83), whose complex network can be a counterweight against the state.

For Gramsci, civil society is also the sphere where the struggle for hegemony takes place between labour and capital and where the hegemony of the dominant class has been built up by means of political and *ideological* struggles (Simon, 1982: 70). The concept of hegemony is one of the most important concepts in Gramsci's political thought, which means "the 'spontaneous' consent given by the great masses of the population to the general direction imposed on social life by the dominant fundamental group; this consent is 'historically' caused by the prestige (and consequent confidence) which the dominant group enjoys because of its position and function in the world of production" (Gramsci, 1971: 12). If hegemony fails, compliance is acquired by "(t)he apparatus of state coercive power which 'legally' enforces discipline on those groups who do not 'consent' either actively or passively" (Gramsci, 1971: 12). What is important is that, for Gramsci, the state in the ordinary sense, which he calls "the state-as government" or "political society," is "the negative aspect of the superstructure." Distinguished from the state as "political society" is "the integral state," which is "political society plus civil society." In this sense, the civil society of Gramsci, according to Bobbio, is the autonomous space where hegemony welds together determinate objective conditions and actual domination of the ruling group. In other words, it is civil society which determines if the state is legitimate. Civil society as a hegemonic project is, therefore, supposed to play a major role for the end of "the state as government" by enlarging its sphere until all the space previously occupied by the state, or political society has been eliminated (1988: 93-94). This is "the dialectical process which leads to the withering away of the state"(Bobbio, 1988: 95)[5].

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[5] According to Bobbio, this process is written as follows:

Alexis de Tocqueville, the author of *Democracy in America*, is the only thinker who made an important contribution to the elaboration of the state-civil society relations as well as the concept of civil society outside the Hegelian and Marxian tradition. In his theory, what are not considered as separated factors in the argument of Gramsci, namely civil society in the Hegelian sense and political society which is synonymous with "the state as government," is distinctly treated with. Pelczynski summarised this point well:

> "Throughout *Democracy in America* Tocqueville uses a *triad* of concepts: the state, political society and civil society. 'State' in his terminology is the centralized, bureaucratic apparatus which nineteenth century France inherited from absolute monarchy... 'Political society' is the realm of citizens' involvement in politics or public affairs -- the realm of local self-government, parties, newspapers, public opinion, etc., undeveloped in continental Europe but flourishing in the United States... 'Civil society'... is the realm of the citizens' private mostly economic activities based on self-interest" (1988: 379n, original emphasis).

In his thesis, voluntary associations are considered as important contributors to both political and civil societies, when he writes that "an association simply consists in the public and informal support of specific doctrines by a certain number of individuals who have undertaken to cooperate in a stated way in order to make these doctrines prevail," and that an "association unites the energies of divergent minds and vigorously

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"In most of the rare passages which mentioned the end of the state it is conceived as a 'reabsorption of political society in civil society.' The society without a state, which Gramsci call a 'regulated society,' results from the enlarging of civil society, and therefore of the hegemonies forces, until all the space occupied by political society has been eliminated. the states which have existed until now are a dialectical unity of civil society and political society, of hegemony and domination. The social class, which will succeed in making its own hegemony so universal that the factor of coercion will become superfluous, will have achieved the conditions for the transition to a regulated society. In one passage 'regulated society' is even used as synonymous with civil society (and also with ethical state), that is, as civil society freed from political society" (Bobbio, 1988: 94).

by their "check and balance" mechanism, even though "they have not directed them toward a clearly indicated goals" (de Tocqueville, 1968, vol.1: 233). Especially right to make law," "they do have the power to attack existing laws and to formulate... laws which should take the place of the present ones" (de Tocqueville, 1968, vol.1: 234), thus they can make certain linkage with political society. In addition, civil associations are arenas where citizen can negotiate wider undertakings of concern to the whole society and individuals can direct their attention beyond their own interests which are often selfish, narrow and conflictive. Therefore, in de Tocqueville's theory, plural and autonomous civil society not unified with the state but well linked with political society is an indispensable condition of democracy.

What have we learned so far by reviewing the historical evolution of the concept civil society? One of the lessons is civil society has several dimensions. It is useful to refer to three dimensions of civil society : (1) a material base, following Hegel and Marx and Engels; (2) a organisational base, following dé Tocqueville; (3) a ideological base following Gramsci (Bratton, 1994a: 52-53). It is because these dimensions will be important explanatory variables to analyse civil society in its relation to the state.

In addition, we have so far identified three basic characteristics. First, it is "externality," which means that civil society exists in the non-state sphere. Second, it is "autonomy," which means that societal actors' activities are not tightly limited nor oppressed by the state, and in some cases they can be completely beyond the state's control. Third, it is "plurality," which means that civil society is never a monolithic entity (though I do not exclude the possibility where civil society can be monolithic against the state under such situations as political and economic crises, especially in recent "democratic" transitions), but is composed of various types of social groups which are conflicting in some

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conditions and cooperative in others. In this sense, civil society is not the self-regulated sphere but can be turned into the "battlefield" among conflicting interests, as Hegel pointed out, unless "hegemonic control" is established or unless "civility"[6] is attained (Shils, 1991: 13).

In the Western philosophy, it seems that civil society has been recognised as the realm of "private" rather than "public." Individual private interests were emphasised in Hegel's argument, and "private" dimension of civil society was refered to in Gramsci and Hegel. In my view, however, there is a problem of definition of "private" and "public", which will be treated in a length in the next part.

1.1.2 Civil Society as a Sphere Between "Public" and "Private"

In this section, I will raise and consider some m re related issues for the purpose of clarifying and operationalising the concept civil society. First, civil society is considered in comparison with the concept "political society." Second, civil society is taken in its relation to the state.

As augured above, de Tocqueville adopted the concept political society apart from civil society. In the contemporary political analysis, this concept is well defined by Alfred Stepan for analytical purposes as follows:

> "By 'political society' in a democratizing setting I mean that arena in which the polity specifically arranges itself for political contestation to gain control over public power and the state apparatus. At best, civil society can destroy an authoritarian regime. However, a full democratic transition must involve political society, and the composition and consolidation of a democratic polity must entail serious thought and action about *those core institutions of a democratic political society -- political parties,*

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[6]According to Shils, "civility" is "a mode of conduct which protects liberal democratic society from the danger of extremes of the partisanship which, it itself, generates; civility limits the potential sources or compensates some of the real losses which are bound to be inflicted on a society in which conflicts are both inherenting..." (Shils, 1991: 14-15)

elections, and legislatures -- through which civil society can constitute itself politically to select and monitor democratic government" (Stepan, 1988: 4, emphasis added)

This point is useful to distinguish civil society from political society. In an authoritarian regime, in Stepan's view, it is "political society [not civil society] which was "frequently absorbed by the dominant groups into the state"(Stepan, 1988: 4). In other words, political society has been concealed behind the state. Therefore, even in an authoritarian regime, civil society has not been completely deprived of autonomy, there are opportunities for actors in civil society to become an important component of political change.

In my view, these tripartite concepts, namely the state, political society and civil society, of state-society relations will give us a possibility of more elaborated analysis of contemporary political dynamics and evaluating the prospect of democratisation in Africa. However what is more important in this study is the separation of political society both from the state and civil society, and thus to clarify the concept of civil society.

Stephan's following definition of "civil society," distinguished from "political society," is useful for further consideration of the concept:

"Very schematically, by 'civil society' I mean that arena where manifold social movements (such as neigbourhood associations, women's groups, religious groupings, and intellectual currents) and from all classes (such as lawyers, journalists , trade unions, and entrepreneurs) attempt to constitute themselves in an ensemble of arrangements so that they can express themselves and advance their interests" (Stepan, 1988: 4).

What is clarified so far in theoretical argument is that civil society is neither "the state" nor "political society". It is also the realm or sphere of

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autonomous activities of a variety of social movements even under some authoritarian rules.

We are now returning to the problem: namely is civil society only the realm of "private"? To some extent, in my view, civil society is the sphere of "private," where a variety of groups are formed to improve members' interests. Therefore, if "public" refers to just the realm of the state action, civil society can be the realm of "private" in the sense that it is *not* the realm of the state. If "private" means just the realm of individual or family interests and other specific interests, civil society is not the realm of "private." It is because civil society is the space where some "common" purposes are to be pursued. This is the point which has been recently made by Bratton (1994a) as follows:

> "Civil society consists of *public* activity that occurs in the realm between the state and the family. Although such political activity may be motivated by the quest for private advantage, it is not 'private' in the sense of being confined to the domestic or household arena. Instead, it is decidedly 'public' in two sense: It entails *collective action* in which individuals join to pursue shared goals, and it takes place in the institutional 'commons' that lie beyond the boundaries of the household" (Bratton, 1994: 56, emphasis added)

On this issue, Azarya also clearly stated that:

> "Public... denotes what is of common concern. The essence of civil society is a sense of reciprocal obligations and expectations that prevail among groups in society, a commitment to take part in the establishment of a common order and a voluntary compliance to abide by its rules... This public domain is different from the private sphere but also from the state... The recognition of such a nonstate public realm is manifested in civil society" (1994: 91).

In fact, considering the organisational aspect of civil society, a variety of groups and associations are usually formed to attain "common" purposes which can be effectively pursued by collective actions, as we will see later. Therefore, the sphere of civil society is an elusive realm which is existing between "private" (refering to family life and narrow benefit-seeking activities) and "public" (refering to state action). Therefore, in practice, there are realms where both the state and associations in civil society are involved. Civil society, thus, inevitably interacts with the state. In other wards, the relationship between civil society and the state is reciprocal.

The point of reciprocity between the state and civil society needs further consideration, because it contains one of the essential issues around the concept civil society: is "opposition"[7] to the state an essential feature of civil society? Is civil society just a phenomenon of a society which appears during the period of political change when civil society has a mission to destroy an autocratic regime or a sphere which can exist after a political change? In the recent literature, the concept of civil society contains both factors without distinguishing one from the other, which causes the result of just confusing the argument on civil society. I am on the side that "opposition" is not an indispensable nature of civil society. In my view civil society is not a temporary phenomenon of a society but an existing arena where societal actors interact complexly.

Let me be clear. In the recent literature, arguments on civil society seem to have the nature of anti-statism. As a historical phenomenon, it looks similar to the discussion by Thomas Paine which appeared against

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[7]Hutchful named the concept of civil society including the element of "opposition" "political definition" of civil society (1995: 58). In a recent article by Foley and Edwards (1996), they made a distinction between two broad versions of "civil society argument." The first one, which was named "Civil Society I," is the approach which puts special emphasis on the ability of associational life to foster patterns of civility in the actions of citizens. This version does not necessarily include the element of "opposition." The second one, which is called "Civil Society II," emphasises more on the element of "opposition" in the concept of civil society and emphasises the importance of civil association as a counterweight to the state.

the despotic state in order to protect civil society. Concerning Africa, this tendency is probably most apparent in the volume edited by Chabal(1986). In this, Chabal himself defines civil society as follows:

> "Civil society is a vast ensemble of constantly changing groups and individuals whose only common ground is their being outside the state and who have... acquired some consciousness of their externality and *opposition* to the state"(Chabal, 1986: 15, emphasis added).

In the same volume, Bayart, an outstanding French Africanist, clearly argues the nature of civil society and that in the African context. According to his basic, but provisional definition of civil society which is based on that of Fossaert, civil society is

> society in its *relation* with the state... in so far as it is in *confrontation* with the state (1986:111, emphasis added).

He also writes that "civil society exists only in so far as there is a self-consciousness of its existence and of its opposition to the state" with reference to Michel Foucault's "collective will of the people" in Iran and to Alain Touraine's "movement for the liberation of society" in Poland (Bayart, 1986: 117). Both phenomena in Iran and Poland happened in historically critical situations, even though problems, which awoke the "opposition" of the civil society against the state, had been created in the structure of destroyed political regimes. Also in Africa, it seems to be a common recognition that political as well as economic crisis which "African autocracy" caused should be overcome by organised challenge of civil society against the state.

Civil society is considered as an actor, or a movement as a whole in opposition to the state rather than an arena, when "opposition" is

recognised as an indispensable condition of civil society. This is, to some extent, apparent when Bayart writes as follows:

> "...no such social group has hitherto managed to lead and channel society's revenge into an effective organisational principle; atomisation and disunity have prevented it" (1986: 119)

and

> "Civil society can only transform its relation to the state through the organisation of new and autonomous structures, the creation of a new cultural fabric and the elaboration of a conceptual challenge to power monopolies"(Bayart, 1986: 120).

Therefore, in Bayart's thesis, unless various interests in a society are well organised into a homogeneous totality against the state, civil society is interpreted as absent.

Taking these situations where civil society is at odds with the state into consideration, we can conclude that the concept of civil society which contains the nature of "opposition" is a more limited usage which can be only valid for the critical situations where the countervailing power of society against that of the state is necessary for a more democratic political regime[8]. In this sense, "opposition" can be a potential nature of civil society as a continuing existing sphere, but not an essential one. It follows that civil society is an arena rather than an actor as a whole against the state.

The *potentiality* of civil society against the state has been integrated in the more recent argument of civil society in Africa. Following definitions apparently took the stance that recognises "oppositeness" as potential rather than essential characteristics of civil society. Chabal defined civil society in his more recent study as follows:

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[8]See, fn. 7 on this issue.

> "Civil society is .... a vast ensemble of constantly changing groups
> and individuals whose only common ground is their exclusion from
> the state, their externality and their *potential* opposition to the
> state" (Chabal, 1992: 84, emphasis added),

which was changed from his original definition (1986), which was quoted above. The word "potential" was added. This shows a slight but important change of recognition of civil society by Chabal. Fatton, Jr. also refereed to this issue, when he wrote:

> "Civil society is.... *potentially* a highly subversive space, a space
> where new structures and *norms* may take hold to challenge the
> existing state order" (1992: 6, emphasis added).

One of the assertions in this thesis is that more neutral characterisation of civil society can be possible by introducing the "check and balance" mechanism or "reciprocity" between the state and civil society. "The symbiotic relationship between state and civil society is a recognition of the fluidity of power and of its aggregation in integrative or dispersion in diffuse social spaces. The power, autonomy, and capacity of states is therefore a function of the relative autonomy of civil society" (Chazan, 1994: 258). This point is one of the most important aspect of the current interest of "democratisation."[9]

1.1.3 Validity of the Concept Civil Society for the African Context

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[9]For example, Sangmpam stated that "the debate about democratization is about the theory of the state in the third world. It is, in final analysis, a debate about the similarities shared by third world countries regarding the state-society relationship" (1992: 416).

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This recent "discovery" of civil society in the African studies is a result of the different historical experience from Europe, where modern civil society emerged within the context of absolute monarchy in political terms and capitalist development in economic terms. Especially economic development has been delayed in Africa so as to impede the development of private interests and bourgeois, which has been considered the essential component of civil society and democracy in the liberal democratic theory[10] and which strengthen civil society by offering "material" base (Bratton, 1994a: 53) of the civil society. Furthermore economic development has been curtailed by the arbitrary and parasitic behavior of African state leaders, which has resulted in weak civil society. Bratton also recognised the weakness of civil society in African context in his stimulating review article:

"At first glance, African societies seem to possess few intermediate organizations to occupy the political space (broadly defined by affective ties of blood, marriage, residence, clan, and ethnicity) and the state. Those civic structures that do exist are usually small in scale and local in orientation"(1989b: 411).

Therefore, it has been difficult for scholars to research "civic structures" so far in Africa, although the realm of civil society was captured in other ways.

For example, when Holmquist analysed cooperatives in Kenya and Tanzania, he wrote:

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[10] On this issue, for example, Ri eschemeyer et al. (1993) argued that capitalist development furthers the growth of civil society. In African context, however, there has recently been an argument that the absence of a true bourgeoisie per se does not block the emergence of democracy. For example, Mamdani argued that "the possibility exists that a democratic movement may not be bourgeois, and/or that constitutionalism may not necessarily be liberal" (1990: 373-374).

> Like trade unions, cooperatives are double-edged swords. They are
> occasionally used by elements opposed to peasant majority interests,
> and they are used by this majority to defend those interests if there
> are no organizational alternatives. Gradual politicization of this
> *political space* along with majority involvement will help defend
> immediate interests and hold out the possibility of calculated and
> political accidents that may give rise to broad-based movements
> (1980: 167, emphasis added).

Here, on the one hand, Holmquist uses "political" as almost synonymous with "autonomous" and "external." In this sense, the "political space" can be interpreted as the space where peasant can take action autonomously, which can be civil society in the current terminology[11].

Apart from this instance, there is a variety of historical works on voluntary organisations in colonial urban centres (e.g., Wallerstein, 1964; Little, 1967), which "became explicitly political by giving voice, first to protest at the indignities of colonial rule, and later to call for independence" (Bratton, 1989b: 411) and on religious associations and movements (e.g., Ranger, 1978). Therefore, historically speaking, it is not true that "civil society" has been absent. In fact, as in the recent literature captured, "civil society grew in size and in strength, eventually becoming a self-conscious opposition to the colonial state" (Chabal, 1992: 88) in the late colonial era. In addition, Chazan also depicted activities of a variety of social groups in the colonial phase from the perspective of civil society (Chazan, 1994: 258-263).

It was in the post-colonial, authoritarian rule in which associational activities have been restricted. In this situation, more research of the state was carried out, but more limited research of civil society has been carried out in Africa except for a few works (e.g., Bates, 1981; Chabal, ed., 1986; Chazan and Rothchild, eds., 1988), because political influence of civil

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[11]A recent work, which analysed opposition history in South Africa, by not using the term civil society, was done by Marx (1992).

society has been less visible and more informal[12]. This also means that, owing to the failure of the developmental state in post-colonial era, there has been relatively prevalent informal, underground sectors[13] in Africa as summarised by Bratton as follows:

> "Because of the shallow penetration of society by weak state institutions, there is a relatively larger realm of *unoccupied political space* [by the state] in Africa than anywhere else in the world"(1989b: 425, emphasis added).

Therefore, we have to recognise the existence of "a larger realm of unoccupied political space," where there are opportunities for newly formed associations to be nurtured (e.g., Chazan, 1982). The concept civil society will offer the possibilities for political analysts to re-capture "hidden" historical and contemporary political dynamism in the context of Africa in other ways.

Before ascertaining the validity of the concept for Africa, we have to refer to the recent arguments on this issue. As Harbeson raised (1994: 26), one of main objections to the proposition that the idea of civil society is singularly valuable both theoretically and practically with respect to Africa is "the ethnocentrism of the concept" derived from Western political philosophy. On this issue, Hartmann (1994: 221-222) argued the problematic of the concept civil society in Africa by refering to the peculiarity of African society: lack of a common identity and an awareness of itself, and a strong ethnic consciousness. However, she did not completely reject the usefulness of the concept in Africa. She proposed the following modifications in order not to abandon the concept civil society in Africa: (1) the problem of ethnicity should be postulated as an

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[12]One of the exceptional works in this area is concerning credit associations and cooperatives (e.g., Hamer, 1976, 1980, 1981).
[13]There are arguments on the issue of the political implications of the process of informalisation and disengagement (See, Lemachand, 1992: Hutchful, 1995).

independent variable rather than be incorporated into the concept of civil society; (2) the development of the civil society in Africa should be seen in relation to state-making (Hartmann, 1994: 222). Harbeson also argued in his essay (Harbeson, 1994: 26) that civil society by definition roots political values in culturally specific value system and it thus singularly valuable in overcoming and counteracting ethnocentrism, and, therefore, this concept allows the possibility of further innovation in other context (Harbeson, 1994: 26-27).

Therefore the concept civil society can be useful as far as it is not abused and it is well operationalised for political analysis. "The test of the necessity of civil society analysis turns on whether it can be shown that the idea of civil society fills a gap in our understanding of African political and socioeconomic structures and processes that can be close in no way"(Harbeson, ed., 1994: 289-90).

1.1.4 The Meaning of "Development" of Civil Society: The Role of Civil Society in the Process of Democratisation

What is meant by "development" of civil society? How much does civil society matter in the process of democratisation? One of the early answers in Africa was offered by Diamond, when he wrote:

> "a rich and vibrant associational life has developed in many
> African countries independent of the state, and this pluralism in
> civil society has been one of the most significant forces for
> democracy" (1988: 23).

However, this is no more than a part of the answer to these questions, because the importance of pluralising civil society on which Diamond emphasised refers to only one of the dimensions of civil society. Even so

it is to some extent true because a "dense" civil society establishes a *counterweight* or a *countervailing power* against the state that has a natural tendency to expand its sphere of influence and control (Rueschemeyer et al., 1992; Fowler, 1993).

On the issue of democratisation, it is now necessary to distinguish "transition to democracy" from "democratic consolidation," both of which are different phases of the long process of democratisation (see, on this issue, Gunther, et al., 1995). According to Gunther et al. (1995: 3), transition "begins with the breakdown of the former authoritarian regime and ends with the establishment of a relatively stable configuration of political institutions within a democratic regime." On the other hand, consolidation "refers to the achievement of substantial attitudinal support for and behavioral compliance with the new democratic institutions and the rules of the games which they establish" (Gunther, et al., 1995: 3). Therefore, in most cases, the consolidation phase takes more time than the phase of transition.

It is in this context, the roles of civil society must be considered. As Chazan argued in her recent paper, however, "there is no axiomatic connection between the expansion of the voluntary sector [or the pluralisation of associational life] and the consolidation of civil society" (1992: 282). It is because the development of civil society is a process including other dimensions. On this issue, Chazan stated that:

> 'The task of strengthening civil society... involves not only providing backing for groups concerned with public affairs, but also devising ways to facilitate intergroup communication, buttress state capacities, and promote economic opportunities autonomous of the state" (Chazan, 1992: 284)

Although political parties, free competitive elections, and enforcement of the rule of law, which are essential to democratic transitions, are introduced, it is not possible for these institutions in "political society" to be institutionalised without the emergence of a dense *network* of autonomous associations (Sandbrook, 1992). The dimension of the expansion of networks is also essential in the development of civil society[14]. In this political process, therefore, civil society is considered to be developed when vibrant linkages between groups at the local and national level and between different groups throughout the country emerge, occasionally *in opposition to* the state. In other words, both horizontal and vertical linkages are vital for civil society to be developed (Chazan, 1992: 290-1). This development of civil society composes of one of the most important elements to promote and support substantial democratisation.

Furthermore, civil society itself has to be democratised in order for a new political regime to continue to work as a democracy. In recent argument, one of the important claims related to this issue is that civil society has to be a sphere where *norms* are formed to check the state. Wood, for example, argued that:

> "civil society is an arena in which the emergence of *normative claims* from society regarding its own identity and the role of public institutions in shaping that identity are formulated" (Woods, 1992: 96, emphasis added).

Furthermore he argued that:

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[14]By refering to experiences of Eastern and Central Europe, Michael Waltzer, who is taking communitarian stance, emphasised the importance of networks in civil society as follows:
> "The words 'civil society' name the space of uncoerced human association and also the set of relational network -- formed for the sake of family, faith, interest and ideology -- that fill this space" (1992: 89)

Waltzer actually recognised civil society as the network of associational lives (1992:99).

"The pertinent question for these [African] societies is not whether
there is a nascent civil society emerging but under what conditions it
will evolve. ... a European civil society developed with individuals
and associational groups articulating a set of normative limitations
to state action and, then, ultimately grounding state action within a
public sphere and a set of institutions operating on the principle of
accountability. At this point, there are faint, bur real, echoes of
such a development occurring in Africa" (Woods, 1992: 97).

The importance of the point of norm or rule setting function in civil
society has been shared among Africanists (e.g., Harbeson et al. eds., 1994).
Arguments of this normative or rule-setting roles of civil society, which
can "become the basis of counterhegemonic movements to reform or
supplant the economic and political depredations of weak states in times
of crisis" (Harbeson, 1994: 288), will become more important in African
context, because this argument includes democratisation of civil society
and c..utions us not to be too optimistic about the prospect of democratic
consolidation[15] of newly introduced "democracy" in Africa unless civil
society becomes more democratic or gains "civility."

In relation to the argument of norm-setting function of civil society,
the issue of citizenship is also recently developed. This is not the issue
argued not only in Africa but also in the other parts of the world such as
Latin America (e.g., Fox, 1990, 1994; Cammack, 1994) where the process of
democratisation is also underway. Citizenship is "a set of *non-contingent,*
generalised political rights" (Fox, 1990: 8, emphasis added). Also as Fowler
pointed out, for this social contract of citizenship to work, but it is required
that

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[15]On a recent review of "consolidation" of democracy in Africa, see, Sandbrook, 1996.

"people identify with the state as a legitimate entity, because from
this recognition stem both the justification for demanding rights and
the grounds for a willingness to fulfill obligations" (1993: 335),

which has been quite weak in Africa.

One of the main impediments which block citizenship is political
clientelism, which "refers to the inherently selective and contingent
distribution of resources and power based on ties of personal and political
loyalty"(Fox, 1990: 8)[16]. These personal and political ties have been more
commonly observed in Africa, where relationship between the state and
society at large has been structured in a clientelist manner especially in
rural areas. In other words, clientelism has been one of the main features
in "neopatrimonial regimes" (Bratton & van de Walle, 1994). One of the
reasons to explain how clientelism interferes with the consolidation of
democracy is considered to be as follows: if competitive elections are
introduced, especially the poor has to sacrifice their political rights in order
to access to distributive programs in the political context where the
relations of domination based on political subordination in exchange for
material rewards are still dominant (Fox, 1994: 152-3). This relationship,
which prevents people from acquiring citizenship to fulfill their political
rights and thus precludes them from organising themselves to improve
their interests, is supposed to clearly undermine the development of civil
society and the process of democratisaion. Therefore, the dimension of
both clientelism and citizenship will have to be included in the argument
of civil society and prospect of democracy in Africa.

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[16]From the stance of class analysis, Charney also characterised clientelism as follows:
"Clientelism is a personalised relationship between two individuals or groups belonging to
different classes or class fractions, based upon reciprocal exchange of goods and services"
(1987: 52).

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More concrete issues related to specific actors' role in civil society in the process of democratisation will be raised later in this chapter and chapters of case studies.

1.1.5 Civil Society in the Context of Socio-economic Development

The concept civil society has been also occasionally refered to in the literature of "alternative development", "democratic development" and roles of Non-governmental Organisations (NGOs) (e.g., Bratton, 1989a; Clark, 1991; Korten, 1991; Friedmann, 1992; Farrington and Bebbington, 1993). The issue of "alternative" or "democratic" development is closely related to political and economic reforms in these days, but we should consider the issue separately, because the related arguments to this issue contain a variety of important points to be treated better of their own.

The apparent context in which these arguments have been flourished is that "there is no doubt that at this [macro] level the quality of life for the majority of Africa's inhabitants has been declining in both absolute and relative terms. For many parts of Africa there is no compelling evidence that 'development,' however defined, is taking place" (Taylor, 1992: 215). It is partly as a result of the centralised "failed state" regarded as inefficient, overstuffed and corrupt (Bert, 1988: 4) at the macro level, and partly as a result of the state's tactics to structure society in a clientelist manner, both of which factors are intertwined closely in reality. Especially the first is the point on which the World Bank criticised in its report, *Sub-Saharan Africa: From Crisis to Sustainable Growth* (1989). Therefore, an alternative development is usually conceived as one that would be "centered on *people* and their environment rather than production and profits" and "based as it must be on the life spaces of civil society" (Friedmann, 1992: 31, emphasis added).

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The concepts such as "participation" and "empowerment," which inevitably contain political dimensions of development, consist of the important components of "alternative development." Participation is, as Taylor stated, a key concept of "development from within" or "from below" (Taylor, 1992: 236). Participation, in the development model[17], is defined as "the organised effort to increase control over resources and groups and movements hitherto excluded from such control" (Wolf quoted by Goulet, 1989: 165). Taylor fully took the classification of Goulet of participation composed of: (a) participation as a goal or as a means; (b) the scope of the arena in which participation operates; (c) the originating agent of the participation; (d) the moment at which participation is introduced. Based on this perspective, Taylor states:

> "Participation is seen as both a goal and a means; it operates primarily at the local community level in the first instance. It is *not induced from above but is generated from below by the populace itself;* it can also be generated by the catalytic action of *some external third agent*" (Taylor, 1992: 236-237, emphasis added)

The post-colonial state occasionally used the rhetoric of "participation" to mobilise popular support from above in a clientelist manner. However, participation is considered not the rhetoric belonging to the state but the method to achieve the goals of the populace.

"Empowerment" is another important idea in developmental efforts from below. In his comprehensive work on "empowerment" in the context of an alternative development, Friedmann, recognising poverty as

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[17]The concept "participation" is used in a slightly different way, which is one of the criteria to determine the characteristics of a political regime later in this chapter.

a form of social, political and psychological disempowerment[18], stated as follows:

> "Most important, an alternative development involves a process of *social and political empowerment* whose long-term objective is *to rebalance the structure of power in society by making state action more accountable, strengthening the powers of civil society in the management of its own affairs,* and making corporate business more socially responsible. An alternative development insists on *the primacy of politics* in the protection of people's interests, especially of the disempowered sectors, of women, and of future generations that are grounded in the life space of locality, region, and nation (Friedmann, 1992: 31, emphasis added).

and

> "Political power is thus *not only the power to vote;* it is as well *the power of voice and of collective action...* their voice raises not only in local assembly but also, and at times more effectively, when it merges with the many voices of larger political associations -- a party, a social movement, or an interest group such as a labor or peasant syndicate" (Friedmann, 1992: 33, emphasis added)

Thus, in theory, "participation" and "empowerment" are important not only to overcome economic difficulties of people but also to get out of clientelism, which is supposed to lead to the development of civil society, especially in rural areas, as discussed in chapter 3 in this study. To the extent that associational activities "can mobilize communities at the grassroots level and activate the political participation of marginalised sectors of the population, they help to pluralize the institutional

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[18]There is an argument that even "democratisation is becoming a legitimation of their [African people'] disempowerment", because democratisation is too market-oriented (Ake, 1993: 70).

environment ... and promote a democratic culture" (Fatton, Jr., 1992: 113) at the local level.

In reality, however, we should not neglect an important issue, which was raised by Bratton and which makes up of main parts of the state-civil society relations. Bratton wrote as follows:

> "If 'empowerment' is taken to mean the capacity to get what you want, it is certainly an achievable goal *in a local context* where community-based organizations can sometimes effectively challenge a traditional power structure. The rural poor in Africa generally do not face local elites that are as economically entrenched or as class-conscious as those in Asia or Latin-America. But the concept of 'empowerment' exaggerates and raises unfulfillable expectations in the context of *national politics* in Africa. To try openly to rearrange the allocation of resources on which power structure of the state rests is to run the risk of *political oppression*" (1990: 95, emphasis added).

There are a variety of areas where concerns of both the state and actors in civil society overlap each other. In this sphere, it is likely that there are conflictive relationship between the state and these actors. In terms of foreign financial resources, for example, "African states may in fact see [indigenous] NGOs as dangerous competitors in quest for foreign assistance, because international donors searching for alternatives to inefficient and corrupt officials are beginning to redirect their resources to NGOs" (Fatton, Jr., 1992: 113).

In the context of socio-economic development, especially from below, it is true that so called NGOs are important to promote "participation" and "empowerment" of members of targeting people, which contribute to the development of civil society[19]. However, this

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[19]In his doctoral thesis on NGOs in Kenya, Ndegwa argued that NGOs do not necessarily play a role in democratisation in the manner of opposing the state, but they can contribute to democratisation by grassroots empowerment (1993: 152-165).

process is never autonomous because there is always some logic of the state's response, because this process inevitably "creates power centres outside the state" (Sørensen, 1992: 58), to which the state is apt to respond.

1.2 The Logic of the Interaction between the State and Civil Society

In this part of the chapter, first, a variety of issues around the state in Africa are to be considered by using the four dimensions of the state, and the basic stance to the state in this study will be clarified. Second, the distinction will be made between the state and political regimes for analytical purposes. Third, reasons and tactics of the state responses to civic actors will be argued. Fourth, political implications of state strategy towards actors in civil society will be considered.

1.2.1 The State in Africa: A Theoretical Review

The state in' Africa has been one of the most popular topics among Africanists since the 1970s, and it has been analysed and characterised in a variety of ways. Moreover, one of the main problems that has caused the current political transition is the African state, which has been called a "failed" or "collapsed" state (Zartman, 1995).

In order to consider characteristics of the state in Africa, it is useful to borrow the formulation developed by Lonsdale who raised four dimensions of the state: (1)its material base, (2)its apparatus, (3) its cultural code (ideology) and (4)its power (Lonsdale, 1981: 156-170).

1.2.1.1 The Dimension of a Material Base

The state as a material base has been researched and analysed in its relation to the issue of class formation in Africa, where indigenous capitalism has been incipient. This characteristic of the state as a material base is derived originally from "the organisational capacity of the state to extract resources" (Kasfir, 1984: 16) and to redistribute them, in other words, the channeling apparatus in a territory. The state's projects "become the object of intense pressure to convert them into means of individual and group accumulation" (Joseph, 1984: 24). There have been so far debates on the issue of the relationship between the state and class formation (see, e.g., Forrest, 1988).

In dependency theory, the state was considered to be not only an imported product but also an agent of external capitals, which was characterised as "overdeveloped," focusing on the organisational aspect of the state which has too much material resource as well as too much coercive and administrative power. It was supposed that "the inherited state apparatus [from colonialism] is larger, its coercive or administrative powers weightier or more ramified, than they would be if the colonial state had not had to subordinate all the domestic classes including those which were themselves dominant classes in the pre-colonial social formation" (Leys, 1976: 41).

On the issue of class formation in Africa, for example, as Sklar put it by proposing the concept of "managerial bourgeoisie," class formation has considered to be less based on production than on the state bureaucracy (1979). There is also the literature characterising politicians and administrators as "organisational" (Markovitz, 1987), "bureaucratic" (Shivji, 1976) bourgeoisie. Concerning the relationship between the state and class formation, Diamond pointed out four ways in which the state may serve as the basis of dominant-class formation (1987: 569). First, it is through its legitimate employment and expenditures. Second, it is

through development plans and strategy. Third, it is through the manipulation of patronage and ethnic ties to inhibit the development of lower-class consciousness and organisation. Finally, it is through the illegitimate accumulation of public wealth, i.e., political corruption. Such a view that "(t)he perpetual changes of state formation are... not to be separated from the social processes of class-formation" (Lonsdale, 1981: 162) has been basically shared among Africanists, although there are various arguments and possibilities of combination of four ways in realities.

It seems that there is not a consensus how to relate the state and class formation in Africa (cf., Forrest, 1988)[20]. However, it is still to some extent true that the one-party state was interpreted in a way as "the vehicle through which material resources are organized and distributed" not for people in the territory but for "the interest of the dominant faction of ruling class" (Fatton Jr., 1988: 255).

The recent work by Bayart (1993) also focused on and analysed this dimension of the state. On the basis of the Braudelian *longue durée* (long term), Bayart emphasised "the historicity of the African state" (Bayart, 1993), "by which he means that modern African politics can only be understood in relation to long-established traditions of government on the continent" (Clapham, 1994: 433). He rejected the "paradigm of yoke" by which he refered to dependency, modernisation theory and world system analysis, which see African states essentially artificial and external creations, imported from European colonialism. In other words, he shifted the focus of academic attention to endogenous factors. Therefore, the state was conceived to be deeply rooted in African historical experience[21]. In the

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[20]Recently, there have been several case studies to show the class formation outside the state, especially in the informal sector (e.g., MacGaffey, 1988).
[21]This view is also shared by the recent work by Chabal (1992).

Bayart's thesis, the dimension of the state as a material base was clarified in the following quotation:

> "The apparatus of the State is in itself a slice of the 'national cake'... so that any actor worthy of the name tries to get a good mouthful" (Bayart, 1993: 90).

For Bayart, the phenomenon of corruption is partly due to the traditional or cultural behavior of the patrimonial act of gifting, by which the "legitimacy" of the state is supported and wealth distributed. What Bayart argued is not behaviors *of* the modern African state, but behaviors of ruling elites *in* the state. In other words, as Clapham pointed out, Bayart has remarkably little to say about the state (1994: 437), which is composed of other dimensions of the state.

1.2.1.2 The Dimensions of Apparatus and Cultural Code

What was relatively lacked in Bayart's study is the second dimension of the state, namely the state as apparatus of domination or institutional orders (Lonsdale, 1981: 157). When the argument to protect single-party state as the vehicle of political, economic development was popular just after the newly independent states emerged, its focus was mainly on the dimensions of apparatus, especially of development. Also, in this insistence, the state's newly introduced development philosophy was emphasised. In other words, the state was supposed to be the central apparatus of resource (re)distribution on the one hand, and cultural code or ideology for national unity on the other. The latter dimension may be also paraphrased as the symbol of a nation which is expected to contribute nation-building in African countries such as Humanism raised by Kaunda in Zambia. At the theoretical level, if the single-party state had worked

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well as formulated by theorists in those days, the expected goals should have been attained.

These dimensions are important to consider and evaluate the state's policy towards actors in civil society. As will be stated below, the state is apparently the apparatus to control these actors and the state's ideology always influence the design to control society at large.

1.2.1.3 The Dimension of Power

The last dimension, namely a, not the, power centre that is closely related to the others, especially that of the apparatus for domination and control. Although it is a power, it is, in principle, asymmetrically stronger than any other societal actors. Therefore, the state can use a range of tactics to compete for power to its advantage.

This dimension seems to have been more emphasised since the state was "brought back in" as the most attractive analytical target among students of third world politics. As Krasner pointed out in his review article, recent "statist approaches see politics more as a problem of *rule* and control than as one of allocation..." (1984: 224, emphasis added). This tendency can be found in the literature on state-society relations in the third world (e.g., Migdal, 1988). In these works, the state is recognised as "a ruling organization that competes for power with other political, economic, and social organizations and groups" (Callaghy, 1984: 90)

However, to use the state's power in order to dominate its society in authoritarian ways has not led to establish hegemony in the Gramscian sense in Africa. In other words, the state in Africa has failed to achieve legitimate rules.

1.2.1.4 Poor Performances of the African States: Debates of Characterisation

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It became clear that the African state was incapable of fulfilling the expectations of economic development and political integration. In this context, especially in the 1980s, the state was regarded as "weak," "soft," and "underdeveloped," focusing on the reasons for the poor performance of the state which "is weak by any conventional measure of institutional capacity" (Bratton, 1989b: 410) in comparison with the "strong" state in other parts of the world, especially those in Asian NIES. There was an agreement that the African state is ineffective, ill-institutionalised and, therefore, precluded the development of the rational-bureaucratic apparatus necessary for political integration and economic development. In the arguments which regard the state as "weak" or "soft," the dimension of apparatus or institution, which has been decayed, was focused. However, the state "remains the most prominent landmark on the African institutional landscape" (Bratton, 1989b: 410). Callaghy, for example, captured this situation of the African state as "a lame Leviathan," which is omnipresent but hardly omnipotent and is excessively authoritarian to disguise the fact that it is inadequately authoritative (Callaghy, 1987).

Fatton Jr. has recently attacked the thesis of "soft or weak state," arguing that the African state constitutes a "hard" structure of repressive dominance because the state often monopolised brutal force, bureaucratic bumbling, and political corruption, while it may not be "integral" or "hegemonic" (1989: 172) in the sense that the state does not reconcile fundamental interests of the ruling class to certain aspirations of the subaltern groups (Fatton Jr., 1989: 173). His argument is that the thesis of the "soft state" errs in its capacity to distinguish between statelessness and hegemony, and between powerlessness and withdrawal (Fatton Jr., 1989: 172). His emphasis in the argument of "hardness" of the African state is

mainly on the dimensions of ruling apparatus and of power in its relation to society.[22] The same dimension of the state as apparatus is focused, but from different perspectives: the thesis of the" soft state" from institutional disorder and weakness, and Fatton Jr. regareded the state as "hard repressive instrument" (1992). These different perspectives seem to show ambivalent nature of the state as an apparatus in Africa.

Because of poor performance of the post-colonial African state in terms of socio-economic development, which caused the current economic and political crisis, there seems to be a minimum consensus that the state in Africa has not well functioned as it is supposed to do, and has not been accountable to the people. In practice, this fact became one of the main factors to promote the economic and political reforms, or liberalisation and democratisation respectively. Among the arguments for reform, the World Bank, which emphasised the reduce role of the state, criticised the state-centred approach in the postcolonial Africa in its report *Sub-Saharan Africa: From Crisis to Sustainable Growth*:

> The post-independence development strategy accorded the state a lead role in producing many goods and services. This approach foundered on the weak capacity of public institutions. At the same time, far from promoting the private sector, the state often actively curbed private initiative, including cooperatives and grass-roots organizations (1989: 54).

This criticism on the centralised African states is necessary to be taken into consideration. However the point is not to support the "minimalist state thesis" but to find the state's appropriate role in development and political stability in the African context. Therefore we should also take Sandbrook's scepticism of the alternative model proposed by the Bank

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[22]Fatton Jr. argued that hegemony is at best embryonic in Africa (1992: 26).

seriously. He wrote that because of historical, cultural, socio-economic conditions that prevail in Sub-Saharan Africa,

> the liberal democratic model the Bank proposes is flawed in so far as it is unlikely to be widely realized in Africa, and even where it does materialize it is unlikely to yield the equitable growth that the Bank identifies as its goal (1990: 674).

There is not a clear consensus on the issue how much the state in Africa should play in the emerging new politico-economic circumstances. In my view, however, the institutionally-weak state is necessary to be reformed to be more accountable to the populace, which is also one of the indispensable components to promote democratisation apart from the development of civil society, although, in practice, this reform is neither automatically proceeding nor easily achieved.

1.2.1.5 The Stance of this Study

There are a variety of arguments or "paradigms" appeared in the recent literature on African states (e.g. Chabal eds., 1986; Ergas ed., 1988; Chazan and Rothchild eds., 1988; Wunch and Olowu eds., 1990; Chabal, 1992; Fatton, 1992; Bratton and Hyden eds., 1992; Sandbrook, 1993; Bayart, 1993), which analysed the state in Africa in its relation with society and raises reasons of the failure of the state.

In this study, the state is basically defined as a ruling organisation which competes for power with other political, economic, and social organisations and groups, and which attempts to structure relations between itself and civil society (cf. Stepan, 1988: 4) in order to attain legitimacy and hegemony of the ruling class. Therefore, the dimension of

the state as material base will not be treated in detail. Rather, the power relations between the state and civic actors will be mainly focused.

Furthermore, the state is supposed to be the actor by adopting strategies to have marshaled to control and contain actors in civil society, and thus mould the characteristics of civil society. Therefore, the range of manoeuvrability of actors in civil society is severely determined (Chazan, 1992: 292).

1.2.2 The State and Political Regimes: Necessity of Conceptual Separation in Political Analysis

In order to analyse the relationship between the state and civil society, it is necessary make difference between the state and political regimes in theory. On this issue, Fishman gave us a useful distinction between the two concepts, which is basically adopted in this study, as follows:

> A regime may be thought of as the formal and informal organization of the center of political power, and of its relations with the broader society. A regime determines who has access to political power, and how those who are in power deal with those who are not. The distinction between democracy, totalitarianism, and authoritarianism thus deals with the question of *regime type*. .... Regimes are more permanent forms of political organization than specific governments, but they are typically less permanent than the state. The state, by contrast, is a normally more permanent structure of domination and coordination including coercive apparatus and the means to administer a society and extract resources from it (1987: 428, original emphasis).

Therefore, the issue of changes of a political regime clearly includes changes of reciprocal patterns of power between state and civil society. It is, thus, possible to state that researching and analysing actors in civil society

in their relation to the state inevitably contain the features of political regimes.

Before arguing the logic of reciprocal interaction between the state and civil society, it is also useful to introduce Dahl's formulation (Dahl, 1971) to classify political regimes in Africa according to two dimensions: competition (contestation) and participation (inclusion), which has been developed in the African context by Bratton and van de Walle (1994: 468-84). One of the advantages of this formulation is that it offers the possibility of a variety of political regimes, which can be determined by not one but two dimensions, and thus makes it possible to clarify the nature of a regime in a more sophisticated way. Competition is the extent to which "members of the political system are allowed to compete over elected positions or public policy" (Bratton and van de Walle, 1994: 469-70). In the case competition is high, the regime is democratic; in the case competition is low, it is authoritarian. Participation is the extent to which people are allowed to be consulted in policy-making, which ranges from exclusiveness to inclusiveness (see figure 1-1). As Bratton and van de Walle stated, there are four ideal regime categories at the corners of the figure 1-1: exclusive authoritarianism, inclusionary authoritarianism, exclusionary democracy, and inclusionary democracy (Bratton and van de Walle, 1994: 470).

Considering the recent process of "democratisation" in the sense of reintroducing multi-party politics, this process is "essentially a process of securing of increased opportunities for political competition" (Bratton and van de Walle, 1994: 470), which is essentially a matter for "political society" rather than civil society. Therefore it is possible that "democracy has functioned despite relatively *low levels of participation and associational activity*" (Cammack, 1994: 186, emphasis added).

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
Figure 1-1 Regime Variants: Ideal Types

Source: Bratton & van de Walle, 1994: 471.

In this formulation, what matters to civil society is rather the dimension of participation. It is necessary to note that "democratisation" does not equal with a constitutional change from a one-party polity to a multi-party one, but this process is "a double-sided phenomenon: concerned, on the one hand, with the re-form of state power and, on the other hand, with the restructuring of civil society" and it is the "interdependent transformation of both state and civil society" (Held,

1987: 283, original emphasis). The "restructuring of civil society," which is supposed to support democratisation from below, has to include "respect for associational autonomy, which allow citizens to organize in defense of their own interests and identities without fear of external intervention or punishment" (Fox, 1994: 151-2) and increased opportunities for actors in civil society to participate in the public-decision making (participation) as well as in the management of people's own affairs (empowerment). The transition toward more substantial democracy, thus, "are accompanied by decisive upsurges in popular mobilization and organisation. A strengthening of civil society is taking place, which improves the conditions for democracy and simultaneously makes the reversal to authoritarian rule more difficult" (Sørensen, 1992: 60).

1.2.3 Reasons of the State Responses to Actors in Civil Society

The state in Africa is generally recognised as "failed," but the state has been repressive or "hard." In authoritarian political regimes, where at a glance few intermediate organisations to occupy the political space between the family and the state, "even a weak state can seem to be strong" (Bratton, 1989b: 411) and the state can be the basic "body which defines the rules of the game" (Doornbos, 1970: 1133). Especially the state in Africa, which is "neopatrimonial" in nature, tends to protect the status quo. Therefore there are strong imperatives to pursue power as well as to defend interests derived from the status quo, by adopting even coercive means.

As Young stated, the major imperatives that shape the behavior of the state is composed of following five factors: hegemony, security, autonomy, legitimation, and revenue (Young, 1988: 31), which were also adopted by Fowler to explain reasons of states' responses (1994: 46-51).

Therefore, the state quickly responses to actors in civil society when they are recognised to undermine these elements.

States seek hegemony[23] over the ruling territory. States do not tolerate resistance to the supremacy of their laws nor accept challenge to their ultimate authority over territory (Young, 1988: 31). Therefore, when there are any actors that undermine or are supposed to undermine the state's efforts to pursue hegemony, the state tends to restrict their autonomous activities. The case that states are not comfortable with different development approaches (ideological stances), if they are prevalent in the territory.

Security is also the big concern for the state. There are various causes of "threat" from civil society, ranging from organised strikes or protests against the state to the press's anti-state campaign. When the state "perceived" threats, the state will eventually take some means to neutralise them.

Autonomy in action, which is derived from their sovereign status, is also pursued by the state. This autonomy has both external and internal dimensions. Especially in domestic terms, states "represent themselves as pursuing a 'national' or 'public' interest distinct from those of any segment of civil society or even the sum of its parts" (Young, 1988: 32). However, in Africa, where states have "failed" or "collapsed," there are a variety of actors in civil society to be involved in activities pursuing shared goals among people and providing services. Therefore, the state responds to these civic actors when there are areas where both the state and civic actors keep interest. In theory, "the boundaries between state and civil society are not immutable; they shift over time" (Bratton, 1994a: 59). It is supposed that there is a tendency that there is more conflicting

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[23] More sophisticated and expanded analysis of hegemony in Africa, see Chabal (1992); Fatton, Jr. (1992).

interaction between state and civic actors when the spaces previously occupied by the one shift to the other.

It is also necessary for states to obtain "legitimation for the effective exercise of authority and economic accumulation of power" (Young, 1988: 32). Considering the past performance of African states, they normally took repressive or authoritarian ways to rule their territory, which is considered to be abuse of state's power rather than legitimate way of dominance. In theory (in the Gramscian sense), to get legitimation, it is necessary to acquire "engagement of civil society in consent-gathering processes of consultation and participation and participation..., constitutionalizing authority in the form of a solemn compact between sate and civil society" (Young, 1988: 32). It has been a shared concern among theorists from diverse intellectual traditions that restoring civic action or civil society and state legitimacy to the centre of accounts of politics (Bratton, 1994:a 55).

The African state's revenue base is, in principle, the most fundamental imperative. Especially in terms of foreign aid, what is called non-governmental organisations (NGOs) are competitor to the state. As Fowler correctly pointed out, reallocating foreign bi-lateral aid towards NGOs "can provoke difficulties between NGOs and African governments as the latter lose Treasury income and direct control" (1994: 50). This reallocation also means that the state as a big material resource is to be eroded in the African neopartrimonial state.

1.2.4 State-society Relations: Whole v.s. Parts

The type of argument in which the state and society are recognised as integralities is common and can be valid at the theoretical and the cognitive levels. When Callaghy, for example, classified essential views of

the state-society relationship into three (1984: 89), for example, state and society are clearly considered as a totality. First, "the state controls society," and "society is the object of the state or, more precisely, the object of statecraft." The second one is "that the state, and politics in general, are the product of society." The third view is that state and society are partly dependent and partly autonomous arenas of socio-political life," and "(t)he state and society are intertwined, and the struggle for dominance and autonomy is an ongoing process never to be completely decided one way or the other."

In practice, however, it is not possible to analyse a relationship between the state as a totality and the whole of society. It is partly because both are too huge and ambiguous entity to be easily seized even by eminent scholars, and partly because in reality relationships are formed between parts of both spheres, in other words, actors of society and those of the state. Therefore even when state-society relations are analysed and interpreted, the main focus has been cast in the state's policies on particular societal actors. On the basis of on these case studies, some intellectual insight has been gained.

If a whole is never aggregation of its parts, this methodology may be problematic. From purely a philosophical standpoint, this approach is incomplete. If we take practical problems into consideration and use it with recognition of its limits, it will be still valid, if not complete. This point was raised by Lonsdale, when he wrote:

> the division between state and society is to be found *not between institutional complexes, one set being of the state, the other self-regulating within society, but rather within all such institutions.* No matter whether they be trade unions or tribes, they are torn between obligation to the state and responsibility to their members (1981: 162-3, emphasis added).

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The similar point is pointed out by Mitchell, when he argued the boundary problem between the state and society:

> (t)he line between state and society is not the perimeter of an intrinsic entity, which can be thought of as a free-standing object or actor. It is a line drawn internally, *within* the network of institutional mechanisms through which a certain social political order is maintained (1991: 90, emphasis original).

> it could be shown that the state-society divide is not a simple border between two free-standing objects or domains, but a complex distinction *internal* to these realms of practice (Mitchell, 1991: 90, emphasis orig nal).

Therefore the political dynamism of state-society relation can be found in a particular policy area, or societal actors themselves, although it is problematic to generalise findings in particular actors in civil society. However, to observe state policies toward these actors will help to build an analytical framework of this thesis.

1.2.5 State Responses: Tactics

The state takes various types of tactics to control society. These can be basically classified into two categories. First, it can be called "preemptive tactics" to create state-chartered groups to regulate the political spaces before people have organised themselves into some form of collectivity. Second, they include several types of tactics that are taken toward existing organisations and groups in civil society.

"Preemptive tactics" that try to promote the formation of such groups as agricultural cooperatives have been taken in African countries. These have been not only projects of state-initiated development, but also a way of control of society. This tactic was theoretically regarded by Stepan

as a means of the "organic-statist" strategy to "control the society and to forge non-pluralist modes of interest representation that are intended by tne state elite to lessen society's vulnerability to organized class conflict" (1978: 158). In reality, this tactic has been used to structure the state and society relations in a clientelist manner in rural Africa.

Second category can be again classified into several sub-types, which range from coordinating to repressive. Some of them have been so far well formulated in Bratton's essay on government-NGO relations in Africa (1989a: 576-580) and in Fowler's essay on the role of NGOs in changing state-society relations (1991: 64-69). In addition, there have been reported some cases concerning this topic in other parts of the third world (e.g., Tandon, 1989; Clark, 1991). Following Bratton's formulation, where "regulatory instruments that African governments use on an ascending scale of government intervention" (Bratton, 1989a: 576-7), registration, monitoring, coordination, co-optation, reorganisation and dissolution are main state tactics to regulate activities of NGOs. Fowler used three basic tactics, namely legislation, administrative co-optation, and political appropriation, and he stated that a "mix of three basic strategies is being adopted in order to capitalize on NGO growth while maintaining the political status quo" (Fowler, 1991: 64).

Monitoring, or regular reporting requirements as well as registration are a mean for the state to gather information on NGOs. In addition, by using this, the state can regulate the activities of NGOs by rejecting their requirement of a legal status, thus discouraging formation of NGOs. In India, for example, this tactic was sometimes used to harass even voluntary agencies by the cancella'ion of their registration numbers often without any proper hearing and/or substantial basis (Tandon, 1989: 23).

Coordination is the synchronisation of (especially development) activities between the state and actors in civil society. A basic difference between the state and NGOs in their activities is that the state conceives of development national terms, while NGOs consider them in more restricted and often localised terms. Even so, as has recently been argued, there are much "comparative advantage" to NGOs (Fowler, 1988). So if coordination works well, it will be possible that "both local participation and the efficiency of resource allocation" (Bratton, 1989a: 578) are enhanced. Here the possibility of a positive-sum game betwe· n the state and society is potentially high.

Co-optation is "a firmer form of control in which autonomous organizations are captured and guided by a superordinate agency" (Bratton, 1989a.: 579). As a result of being incorporated into the national administrative system, NGOs reduce their autonomy and effectiveness as well as their local sensitivity (Fowler, 1991: 67). Reorganisation is also a way of tight control where previously autonomous organisations are reorganised into other entities that are completely under the state.

A case in India, which is applicable to cases of co-optation and reorganisation, is reported by Tandon (1989: 21-22). It is a case of co-operatives. According to him, co-operatives in India have been historically one of the clearest expressions of the people's own initiatives and organisations for economic improvement. However, the state took an increasing interest in co-operatives, initially under the guise of supporting and funding them, and gradually state intervention and control become all-pervasive. After all, the state has the right to appoint officers, supersede duly elected governing bodies, institute enquiries into its affairs, and merge, bifurcate or in any other way intervene in a co-operative.

These tactics are also recognised by Stepan as an important part of "organic-statist" strategy that restructures "civil society into functional

units which would contribute to the formation of 'solidaristic, participatory, communitarian' harmony and would lessen class conflict and individual egoism"(1978: 192).

The last and the most repressive one, dissolution, is "a convenient shorthand for a range of government interventions to impede the functions of autonomous organizations"(Bratton, 1989a: 579). In the most severe case, NGOs may be forcefully deprived of freedom of action. Tandon also wrote that there is a form of response from the state that of intimidating, harassing or physically attacking NGOs (1989: 22-24).

1.2.6 Political Implications of State Strategy towards Actors in Civil Society

The tactics stated above are no more than a shopping list. What is necessary to consider further is political implications contained in tactics adopted by the state in a broader political context.

Such tactics as preemptiveness of the unorganised and weakly organised, co-optation, reorganisation and dissolution of the organised can be interpreted as those which are intended by policy-makers to contain the range of social conflict among social actors and social resistance against the state within the limit of certainty by emasculating power of societal actors. At the same time, these are tactics of stifling the autonomous, external space of civil society to maintain the political and social status quo of the ruling class. Especially a result of preemptiveness is often the formation of clientelism which precludes democratisation. By these tactics, political development, in the sense of the growth of plurality and autonomy of civil society, is prevented and, thus, the prospect for democratisation is narrowed as pointed by Diamond, Linz and Lipset (1990: 21-23). This is almost a similar argument of what was called the political framework, by Esman and Uphoff (1984: 56), where autonomous civic actors are allowed

to function. The narrower is the space as a result of these state tactics, and thus the less is the possibility of autonomous activities of societal actors, the less the opportunities for the state to be checked by actors in civil society.

This is an issue of political regimes especially in terms of participation, not of competition. Therefore, the more repressive tactics the state tends to adopt, the more exclusive the political regimes are. The dimension of participation of a political regime differs both in their distribution of power and in their accumulation of power between the state and civil society as well as among actors in civil society. If power is tended to be strategically accumulated and concentrated by the state by repressing tactics as described just above, the degree of participation is considered to be low and the process of promoting inclusiveness of a political regime is to be obstructed. It is because this tendency is at odds with "democracy" in its literal sense that the power belongs to the people and, as Sartori put it in a negative way, that democracy "is a system in which no one can choose himself, no one can invest himself with the power to rule and, therefore, no one can arrogate to himself unconditional and unlimited power" (1987: 206). In other words, as Przeworski formulated (1991: 12-13), democracy basically introduces a degree of uncertainty in the political process. In a democracy no single group can sure that its interest will ultimately prevail. Democratisation is, therefore, inevitably not only the process of the reintroduction of multi-party system (democratic transition in recent days), but also the process where distribution of power and between the state and civil society is restructured.

1.3 Actors in Civil Society: Associational Organisations (AOs)

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Who are actors or agents in civil society? In order to answer this question, this section's main purposes are (1) to typify, what are called in this study, associational organisations (AOs), which are considered to be actors in civil society, and (2) to describe main and "ideal" activities and functions of AOs from a historical and comparative perspective, referring to socio-economic reasons for their emergence and development, in order to raise some criteria to interpret the following case studies.

1.3.1 The Increasing Interests in Organisations in Civil Society

There have been various types of, so called, voluntary associations in Africa. In the history of African studies especially since the 1950s[24], many Africanists, mainly anthropologists, have focused on the activities and roles of these associations in the new context of political and social transformation. In this case, the main analytical interests were partly in their political functions for independence but mainly in their social functions in the process of urbanisation in Africa. At this stage, therefore, their relations with the new state were almost neglected among academic interests, because it was just a period of hope and expectations for the new governments as the main developmental agent in Africa and there were relatively few, if any, relations between the new state and these associations which should have attracted the attention of scholars.

After more than a decade of independence, in most countries, these expectations turned out to be disappointed. More recently it has been popular to appreciate what are now commonly called non-governmental organisations (NGOs) as development alternatives to governmental institutions. However, it has become clear that NGOs have been allowed to work only in a given political framework. In this situation, new

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[24] See e.g., Hodgikin (1956), Little (1967), Epstein (1961).

academic interests have arisen in NGOs' relations with the state among scholars of Africa. Behind this change, there was a gradual, even though less effective, penetration of the state's institutions into society, and more pluralised trends in society in Africa owing to urbanisation, industrialisation and other socio-economic transformations.

In this new political as well as socio-economic context, investigations of these organisations have become tasks not only of anthropologists but also of political scientists and developmental economists (e.g., Fowler, 1988, 1991, 1993, 1994; Bratton, 1989a; Korten, 1990; Clark, 1991; Farrington and Bebbington, 1993). It is because these organisations have chances to turn social space into more regulated "political space" and differentiate "political space," which lead to a dense civil society as a countervailing power against the state. It follows that they cannot avoid gaining power to some extent as a competitor to the state. Borrowing a sentence in a recent work by Clark on the role of voluntary organisations, NGOs:

> "need no longer remain the 'carers' of societies, they can become 'changers'. Their legitimacy depends on their popular base, and on their potential-- through influence with governments or sheer might-
> - to become agents of social change" (1991: 87).

In addition, as Frantz wrote in his essay, some NGOs play the role of "strengthening civil society" (Frantz 1987: 121-127). On this point, Clark also writes:

> "As conduits for local democracy they [NGOs] have *the potential to strengthen civil society*, and to force institutions to be more accountable and more responsive to the needs of ordinary people"(1991:87, emphasis added).

As a result, they are often regarded by officials of government to be "anti-governmental forces," although these organisations are not concerned with capturing state power itself. Therefore, "(t)he issue of government-NGO relations" "raises fundamental questions about the balance between the state and civil society" (Bratton 1989a: 527) in Africa. Moreover the view that these organisations will be "seedbeds of democracy" in Africa has been shared by eminent Africanists (Bayart, 1986; Sklar, 1987; Sandbrook, 1988). However, Fowler, for example, has resisted this argument, insisting that NGOs are unlikely to have a significant impact on political reform partly because of the political regime's containment approach to NGOs (1993). This does not mean that he is pessimistic of the role of NGOs in the process of democratisation. Instead, he proposed the "onion skin strategy," by which he means complex development strategies pursuing not only socio-economic development but also citizenship in a sophisticated way (Fowler, 1993, 1994). As already stated, the relation between the development of civil society and democratisation is not determined in a simple manner.

1.3.2 The Concept of Associational Organisations (AOs)

When we try to discuss actors in civil society, one of the problems is the term NGOs that is commonly used not only in practical reports but also in the academic literature. Even in this study, the term has been so far used. However, NGO is so comprehensive a concept that various types of organisations and groups are included. These are actors which are just distinguished from the state.

However, as Chazan repeatedly argued that "(n)ot all social associations are part of civil society; some organizations contribute to its growth and others do not"(1994: 256), and those parochial associations, say

some fundamentalist groups, ethno-national movements, and ideological associations, are outside the bounds of civil society (1992: 283). Actors in civil society is supposed to have common purposes beyond just parochial interests. Although the point of parochialism is important, in theory, to differentiate actors in civil society from those with narrow interests, it is, in practice, not easy to determine to which category one specific association belong. If it is possible to define one a_sociation to be parochial, it is only *after* researchers conducted a deliberate research about it. Therefore, we have to be careful to handle the issue of parochialism in the context of civil society arguments.

Furthermore, there are organisations that are just organisationally separate from the state. In other words, they are agents of the state that lose autonomy from the state, which were called GONGOs (Korten, 1990). For the purpose of considering this issue, it is useful to refer to four distinct categories of voluntary sector in Africa on the basis of the degree of autonomy from and connection to official institutions (Chazan, 1992: 288). The first group are associations that stand apart from the state and shun all contact with it. The second kind is considered not only an integral part of the state, but also opposed to it at times, consisting of civil servant associations, military unions, teachers' organisations, government-backed trade unions and cooperative societies, some women's and youth movements, development-support organisations, and a number of state-inspired groups. These groups are normally used as a funnel for distributing state funds and thereby procuring support of ruling coalitions. The third groups are separate from the state and act either as an alternative to it or attempts to take it over, including subnational ethnic and regional movements and religious organisations. The fourth type of associations is those possess the characteristics necessary for inclusion in civil society, which are organisationally autonomous from, but interact

with the state (Chazan, 1992: 288). By classifying actors in voluntary sector, Chazan found that only a part of all associations are included in the sphere of civil society, which is the fourth group in her categorisation.

This classification clearly shows us that too much a comprehensive concept NGOs includes those organisations that are not included in civil society, and that it is even misleading to use this term too much for analytical purposes. In this thesis, against this background, the concept associational organisations (AOs) is used instead of more popularly used NGOs and Local Organisations (LOs) (Esman and Uphoff, 1984) in order to refer to organisations and groups in civil society, especially in terms of autonomy from the state. There are several reasons for this usage. First, NGOs and especially LOs are used to refer to groups whose characteristics are mainly related to developmental activities. In addition, according to Esman and Uphoff, LOs are institutions which contribute to rural development "in a more limited and focused manner" (1984: 18-19). In this study, however, the analytical focus will be brought to bear on the political dimensions of these organisations. Therefore, the term of LOs is especially unsuitable.

Second, analytical targets are not "international NGOs," which have been widely active, but so called "indigenous NGOs" whose activities are limited within the boundary of a country. The reason adjectives such as "indigenous" and "international" is added is that the concept of NGOs is used to refer to actors that can just be differentiated from governments without reference to their activities' scope and range. Here AOs are used only in order to refer to "indigenous" organisations. Although such organisations as churches are not "indigenous" in origin except for independent or separatist churches, these organisations can be classified into AOs as far as they have their own national organisations working

independent of international counterparts and their activities are historically institutionalised in a society.

Third, as mentioned above, by using the term of AOs, it is possible to distinguish them from groups and organisations which are agents of the state or which are created and completely taken over by the state that can be classified into NGOs (GONGOs) only because they are not governmental institutions. In this sense, the term NGOs is politically more static than dynamic. For the purpose of analysing political dynamism, therefore, the concept of AOs is more suitable for the purpose of this study.

1.3.3 Classification

In theory, it is quite important to refer to Chazan's classification *after* investigating organisation and activities of a specific association in detail. In practice, it is difficult to exactly classify one association into one of the categories·*before* such investigation. In this sense, Chazan's categorisation is useful *a posteriori* rather than *a priori*. In this section, a method will be developed to identify "potential candidates" of actors in civil society in Chazan's fourth category.

In recent years, several methods for classification of NGOs have been suggested apart from Chazan's. In his article, Bratton (1989a: 571) proposed three principal categories, which are community-based, national, and international level organisations, that cut across "the conventional distinction between membership organizations, that help themselves, and service organizations, that help others" originally raised by Leonard and Marshal (1982).

Korten also proposed the following four categories of NGOs (1990: 2); (1) Voluntary Organisations (VOs), which pursue a social mission

driven by a commitment to shared value; (2) Public Service Contractors (PSCs), which function as market-oriented non-profit business serving public purposes; (3) People's Organisations (POs), which represent their members' interests, have member accountable leadership, and are substantially self-reliant; (4) Governmental Non-governmental Organisations (GONGOs), which are creations of government and serve as instruments of governmei t policy. In this categorisation, VOs and PCSs and GONGOs are, what Korten called, *third*-party organisations with different aims (Korten, 1990: 95). These groups can be classified as service associational organisations (SAOs), which are working for others. POs, which are the fourth sector and *first*-party organisations (Korten, 1990: 100-101), can also be classified as membership associational organisations (MAOs).

Furthermore, Carroll proposed the three types of NGOs: (1) Grassroots Support Organisations (GSOs), which are civic developmental entity, providing services allied support to local groups of disadvantaged rural or urban households and individuals; (2) Membership Support Organisations (MSOs), which provide services and linkages, at least in principle, to its base membership; (3) Primary grassroots organisations, which arc the smallest aggregation of individuals or households that regularly engage in some joint development activity as an expression of collective action(1992: 10-11). In this classification, GSOs are SAOs, and both MSOs and primary grassroots organisations are considered to be MAOs. Both Korten's and Carroll's classifications of NGOs are arranged comparatively in a diagram (see, figure 1-2).

Considering these examples of classification, there are several criteria to classify a variety of actors in civil society. First, it is the target for which an AO is working; for members or for others? Second, it is at which AOs are organis' d, from community to national level. Third, it is the

nature of interests of AOs; professional, regional, and so on. Fourth, it is

the issue area where specific AOs are working such as education, health,

population, and even lobbying. Therefore, it is possible to classify AOs on a

membership-service axis and a national-grassroots axis. In the diagram,

GONGOs appeared in figure 1-2 is excluded, because it is not considered to

be a part of civil society.

Service

Voluntary Organisations (Korten)

Government
Nongovernmental
Organisations
(Korten)

Grassroots Support
Organisations (Carroll)

Public
Service
Contractors
(Korten)

Public   Civil   Private

People's Organisations (Korten)
Membership Support Organisations (Carroll)

Primary Grassroots
Organisations (Carroll)

Membership

Figure 1-2 Classification of NGOs by Korten and Carroll

Then how can we classify actors in civil society by taking these

insights into consideration? They can be categorised into three basic types,

(1) interest associational organisations (IAOs), (2)churches, (3) developmental associational organisations (DAOs), whose configuration is showed in figure 1-3. IAOs and DAOs have more diversified sub-types, which will be considered in detail later.

Service

Community
Service
Development AOs
(CSDAOs)

National Service
Development
AOs (NSDAOs)

Churches

Grassroots

National

Cooperatives

Interest
Development
AOs (IDAOs)

Community
Development
AOs (CDAOs)

Interest Associational
Organisations (IAOs)

Membership

Figure 1-3 Actors in Civil Society: A Variety of AOs

1.3.3.1 Interest Associational Organisations (IAOs)

As has been established by scholars of the modernisation school, socio-economic development leads to a multiplication of organisations and associations as well as the involvement of larger number of people into such groups. This is because in this socio-economic process, people can pursue and attain a similar aim effectively by acting collectively rather than individually. Generally this aim is called interest. The first type of AO whose main characteristic feature is collective pursuit of common interest, in this thesis, is named interest associational organisation (IAO).

According to Deutsch, an interest "means both a distribution of attention and an expectation of reward" (1968:51). He raises eight kinds of basic value usually desired by people, which consist of reward, namely wealth, power, respect(or status), rectitude(or righteousness), well-being(or sense of gratification), enlightenment (or knowledge), skill, and affection(including friendship as well as love). These are not mutually always exclusive but overlapped each other.

Following these value types, such economic organisations as business associations, labour unions and farmers' associations pursue the improvement of their wealth as well as of social status. Even so, in this pursuing process their power will be improved, in some cases, to be at odds with the state. Community organisations as well as recreational and religious associations are established for, say, well-being, enlightenment and affection.

(a) Process and Formation of IAOs in the Colonial Period

Even in "traditional societies" in Africa, there were groups and organisations which were almost synonymous with lineage. These are often called "primary groups" or "primary associations." Through the process of penetration of the money economy into rural areas and urbanisation, however, there have appeared different types of

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organisations especially in urban areas during the "transitional period." As has been depicted so far (e.g., Wallerstein 1964, Epstein, 1961, 1967), one of the reasons these associational organisations were voluntarily set up in urban areas is to provide new urban dwellers with social and psychological security, which had been relatively secured but was threatened in new circumstances. This phenomenon is often recognised as the voluntary associations' function of "adaptation" to urban conditions (e.g., Parkin, 1966). In other words,

> "These new associations provided their members with mutual aid
> and protection as well as companionship and assisted them in the
> adaptation to urban life by imbuing them with new standards in dress
> and personal hygiene and by teaching them basis of thrift and how to
> use their money to the best advantage" (Kerri, 1976:26)

Moreover, throughout the colonial era in Africa, the growing network of these associations played quite a few roles in the broader socio-economic and political context (Wallerstein, 1964). First, they were more important, and at least as important as the colonial government in providing social service and instructing their members in new urban norms. Second, they contributed to combining various groups and creating the nationalist's movements. Third, they became training grounds for leaders, both in the technical skills of running organisations and in the substantive appreciation of political ideas. Fourth, they served as communication networks through which new ideas could be circulated. In this process, the political organisations that drew on the wide base of these IAOs came into being. At this stage, the problem was how to form a mass movement, or nationalist movement with the support of sufficient geographical scope to force the colonial state to yield to their demand. With political leaders in these movements having this intention, a whole network of these IAOs had a tendency to be more politicised. In other

words, these networks organised themselves into, in the Gramscian or Bayart's sense, "civil society" against the colonial state.

(b) Subtypes of IAOs

After political independence, there have been several kinds of IAOs in African countries, even though the degree of proliferation differed from one country to another. Here we should introduce subtypes of IAOs based on diversified interests and motivations for collective actions.

The first subtype contains groups based on historical and cultural commonness like clans, lineage, and cultural identity. These are often called "primary associations", or "primary groups." Broadly speaking, these associations include traditional forms of organisations. Even though these groups cannot be easily excluded, the main ones are "language groups" and "cultural associations" which have been "created as a response to growing contacts between different groups in the colonial period" (Chazan et al., 1988: 78). These primary associations have been a centre for urban migrants and "mainly important for providing mutual benefits and small-scale political power to a wide range of middle and lower socioeconomic groups of urbanities"(Barnes & Peil, 1977: 93). And in the postcolonial period "there developed political forms of ethnic action and agitation" (Chazan et al., 1988: 78) based on these primary associations. This cultural identity has become a strong base for political mobilisation which has been made use of by ethnic elites in the competition for political power. In addition, cultural identity is often closely related to internal regional differentiation, which often caused ethnic conflicts and even civil wars. Where these ethnic diversities have connection with partisan politics or political society, internal conflict may be augmented and the prospects for democratisation are blocked. In this sense, there is a

high possibility that these associations are parochial and are not included in civil society.

The second subtype consists of "occupational associations," or "professional associations," which have been established to improve sectoral interests, such as lawyers', teachers', physicians', journalists', engineers', farmers' associations and trade unions. In other words, these associations are almost synonymous with, what is called, "interest groups." The appearance of these associations has been mainly detei mined since the colonial period by the nature of the industries which have developed in a territory and by the degree of availability of education, especially tertiary education which makes specialisation and professionalisation possible.

These organisations are usually recognised as main components in civil society to spearhead the process of democratisation (transition to democracy) in Africa (see, e.g., Bratton and van de Walle, 1991). Therefore, these IAOs are occasionally oppressed in authoritarian regimes and are "resurrected" in the process. Apart from churches, these associations are "voices" to express themselves for political reforms, educational modernisation and defense of press freedom. In addition, by aligning with political parties in the context of politicisation of economic issues, they can become significant powers for social and political reform, thus they check and balance state power. In this sense, in countries where these associations have developed, they can play roles buttressing and fostering democratic regimes (Diamond et al., 1990: 22-23).

As has been pointed out, in Africa, the emergence and diversification of "occupational associations" has been delayed, especially at national level, in comparison with other parts of the world. At the macro-le el, this phenomenon can only partly be explained by the relative lack of capitalism and the so far limited opportunities of higher education,

even though these are different from one place to another. In Africa, the existence of smaller scale associations like craft guilds, which are less likely to become "voices," has been investigated in, for example, the West African town (Lloyd, 1953: 30-44) both in the colonial period and after independence. As in the case of rotating savings and credit associations, these small associations have been more informal than formal (e.g., Miracle et al., 1980). This has been one of their characteristic features in Africa.

Students' and women's associations compose the third category of IAOs, and there are several varieties just inside the category. These associations are slightly different from other social and economic associations which pursue the improvement of collective economic interest. However, they are important actors in civil society in that they show us that group formation has evolved even in the sphere where there is just the universal socio-biological distinction of age and sex, even though they are not completely independent of socio-economic circumstances.

Students' associations in such countries as Nigeria can be traced back to the colonial period when they formed big protest movements. Just after independence, in some countries, these youth organisations "were incorporated into the ruling parties, and official youth organisations were established. At the same time the creation of national universities witnessed the establishment of student unions at all major universities" (Chazan et al., 1988: 90). These newly established students' organisations have been relatively committed in visible political activities by aligning with other actors both in civil and political society. Students are therefore "a vital barometer of the status of particular regimes, being among the first groups to voice discontent and to indicate levels of dissatisfaction with

government policies," and they "have played an important role in moulding popular attitudes" towards the state (Chazan et al., 1988: 90).

Women's associations have been also important actors in civil society. As has been pointed out, women in Africa have had a wide sphere of their own in which they have dominated the activity because of the gender-based division of labour that is traced back to the pre-colonial period and was more differentiated in the colonial period when migrant and wage labour was introduced. In producing food, marketing and trading locally, women have played substantially important roles. Even so, the degree of group formation among women has been seriously influenced by cultural norms and "traditional" practices in a region.

What should be mentioned here will be two types of women's associations that can be classified into IAOs. The first one is those based on employment, which can be interpreted as a women's version of "occupational associations." The other one is relatively radical feminist groups based in large cities. These associations are the main "voices" which influence the government to promote women's rights and status in a society.

Apart from the IAOs mentioned so far, there have been a variety of associations that provide opportunities for leisure and other service activities like recreational association, sports clubs, literacy societies. Though it can be supposed that these associations' roles in civil society are not politically so important as others owing to the nature of common interests, what w had better keep in mind is that they can fill the institutional gaps which are not occupied by others and create social networks.

1.3.3.2 Churches

Religious associations can be classified into IAOs. In this study, however, especially Christian, churches, are treated separately from IAOs, because they are historically and politically unique actors in Africa and "the single largest organized movement in Africa" (Jenkins, 1994: 92). Therefore, they should be analysed of their own.

Churches, which are not only those of Christianity but also those of Islam, are considered one of the largest and most rapidly growing elements of civil society. In the *Prison Notebooks*, Gramsci writes that "the Church is taken as representing the totality of civil society" (1971: 245), even though, the usage of the concept of "civil society" in this thesis is not the same as that of Gramsci. In contemporary Africa, it can be observable that churches' ministries increasingly address not only spiritual but also secular concerns. Christian churches:

> "have a much longer history in Africa, with a mass appeal that
> cross class lines, ethnic and tribal differences, associational
> groupings, and national boundaries... the message of the gospels and
> the spiritual influence of the church put the church in a position to
> speak out on social injustices, economic failure, and political
> repression in Africa" (Jenkins, 1994: 85)

In this context, churches were the most active AOs in the colonial period especially in the fields of health service and education.[25] In fact, their influence was far beyond these areas. They were also active politically, and have been interpreted as playing indispensable roles in the rise of nationalist movements and of the modern African state.

In his classic work, *Nationalism in Colonial Africa*, Hodgkin writes:

> 'The contribution of these [religious] movements to the development
> of African nationalism has been much more important in Bantu
> Africa than in West Africa; and within Bantu Africa it has varied

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[25] There are arguments on their cooperative relationship with the colonial state.

from region to region. Their main achievement, in their areas and periods of greatest strength, has undoubtedly been diffuse certain new and fruitful ideas, in however confused a form, among the African mass, the peasants in the countryside and the semi-proletariarised peasants in the towns, for the most part: the idea of the historical importance of Africans; of an alternative to total submission to European power; of social ties that are based upon common beliefs and purposes rather than upon kinship: of a community in which women enjoy equal rights and duties with men" (1956: 113-114).

In the colonial period, especially in education and health care at a local and grass-roots level, churches appeared as an alternative to the colonial state. Most Christian missions made a big investment in education, thus a Christian was almost equal with school attendance and, for many Christian communities, the school-church complex was the only communal building they possessed. Also in health care, missionary churches were the main bodies to establish and run hospitals in rural areas.

At the same time, generally, consciousness of freedom and equality among Africans grew through education at mission-run schools. In addition, Christian congregations often provided a network of individuals, associations and communications of considerable significance to the emergence of political movements for independence. In fact, churches had great influence in establishing such proto-nationalist organisations as welfare associations in such parts of Africa as northern Rhodesia. Therefore, in the colonial period, churches were deeply involved in the emergence and development of nationalist movements for political independence.

In the post-colonial Africa, churches' roles and their relations to the state and other organisations have been greatly transformed, even though the degree of change can never be simply determined. One of the common

features after political independence is that, by making use of their extensive internal networks which have formed since the colonial period, they have been deeply committed to developmental activities in rural regions in terms of financial support and so on. It is because, with decreasing responsibility for education, which was mainly provided by them but is administrated by newly establishe ! governments, they have diversified their secular interests into other issue areas, especially those related to human rights and needs. This is a phenomenon what is called "NGO-isation" of the mainline churches (Gifford, 1994: 521).

In a political sense, churches have been relatively influential bodies in the post-colonial period. Because of churches' involvement in African nationalist movements as a prelude to African political independence, in some cases, there has been an alliance between leaders in the new state and churches. However, this does not always mean that churches are "coopted" by the state. In the African context, they have opportunities to cooperate in some situations, while churches can be the largest and most influential bodies of criticism of governmental policies in others and at odds with the state. This is because, even though churches have been secularised by committing themselves to social and political activities, they can never stop being intermediaries between people and God.

In addition, churches in Africa have the advantage of having relatively tight international connections in terms of financial and personnel support even in the contemporary context. These connections have facilitated their contribution not only to social and economic development but also the improvement of human rights.

In the sense that churches have been working for social, economic and political development, churches have been one of the most important components of civil society in Africa, where well-organised groups have been few so far. As Jenkins states, the churches

"are important participants in African affairs contributing to socialization of African citizens and thus affecting the prospects for democratic participation by those involved in church programs" (1994: 84).

As a whole, they have been not only actors themselves but also coordinators of various other societal actors. Also as recent argument has revealed, churches are actors in civil society taking *normative position* against the postcolonial state (Woods, 1992: 88) and are granted a privileged place providing a haven where subaltern classes find refuge from the harsh realities of poverty and powerlessness (Fatton, Jr., 1992: 77). Therefore their stance in one country's politics, which varies by time and place, is supposed to influence patterns of forming the ruling coalition, and thus the nature of a political regime. As detailed in chapter 4, Christian churches in Zambia, for example, were one of the most active actors in the transition phase mainly as mediator to avert political deadlocks and to contribute to peaceful transition. They are also active in the consolidation phase by involving themselves in "civic education" to spread democratic values.

1.3.3.3 Developmental Associational Organisations (DAOs)

Up to now, in developing countries, the developmental roles played by what are usually known as NGOs or Local Organisations have been substantially important. I adopt here the term developmental associational organisations (DAOs), which are involved in a variety of developmental activities. DAOs are supposed to be almost the same as, what Esman and Uphoff called, LOs and People's Organisations (POs) in Korten's terminology. In their terminology, LOs are local institutions

which can contribute rural development, and which are distinguished from "organs of the state and also from more purely social or cultural associations" (1984: 18) which are mentioned above. Important differences are that, in the concept of DAOs, associations which contribute to *urban* development, like self-help housing projects in squatter settlement, are *not* excluded and that official agents like village developmental committees which are included in LOs *are excluded* in terms of the definition of AOs in this study.

Therefore DAOs are a type of associational organisations which take part in rural and urban development activities that are distinguished from IAOs in that they are involved more in self-help actions out of (immediate) necessity in the sphere where the state often fails to supply people with necessary service as a result of the "decay of state capacity and structures" than activities of reform requirement and other interest expression.

There have been arguments as to their advantages in comparison with organs of the state in developmental activities. Fowler (1988) and Clark (1991) pointed out almost similar features of DAOs' comparative advantage in "micro-development." Following Fowler, there are essentially two major comparative advantages which DAOs have. The first advantage is "the relationship with the intended beneficiaries" (Fowler, 1988: 9-10). In comparison with the state that is often "ambivalent" in the sense that the national plan itself is not necessarily made to promote people's interest but to control people, DAOs "have no formal authority over the populace and can only invite voluntary involvement in their activities" (Fowler, 1988: 10) to improve living standards of people committed in these activities. Therefore, DAOs can

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have more direct, unambivalent, and voluntarist relations with, "the intended beneficiaries," or people.[26]

The second feature is that DAOs have the organisation that is more appropriate to "micro-development." It is because there is "no particular need to organise along bureaucratic lines" (Fowler, 1988: 11), thus, DAOs are relatively flexible in their activities and responsible to members in terms of organisation.

These characteristics are derived from DAOs' closeness to the poor and their advantage in obtaining accurate information on their practical needs of them in comparison with governmental agents who conceive of development more in national terms than in local ones in spite of their broader reach and capacity. This means that governmental organs often find it difficult to respond swiftly to localised needs of just a part of society. This is usually considered to be a gap which has to be filled by the development activities of societal groups.

(a) Subtypes of DAOs

Five subtypes are introduced: (1) National Service Development Associational Organisations (NSDAOs); (2) Community Service Development Associational Organisations (CSDAOs); (3) Community Development Associational Organisations (CDAOs); (4) cooperatives; (5) Interest Development Associational Organisations (IDAOs).

The first and second type, NSDAOs and CSDAOs are in the category of service associations which are working for others. NSDAOs are more commonly observed in urban centres where their headquarters are situated. They are, in some cases, carrying out many projects and have

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[26]However, as discussed in chapter 5, there is also cases that a specific DAOs, especially cases of NSDAOs, has ambivalent impacts on target groups.

branches in various parts of the country. On the other hand, CSDAOs are service-oriented, but limited within small areas.

The third type, CDAOs, which are called local development associations (LDAs) by Esman and Uphoff, as "area-based, bringing together all or most of the people with in a community or region to promote its development by direct self-help or other means, such as lobbying for needed services or raising funds to pay for new construction"(1984: 61-63). They "are generally *multifunctional* in that they can undertake a wide variety of tasks" (Esman and Uphoff, 1984: 61-63 original emphasis). In this category, such small collectives as burial societies which can be observed in rural regions are also included.

The fourth type, cooperatives, is, as they mentioned, "extremely varied and has many subtypes"(Esman and Uphoff, 1984: 62) and, in many cases in Africa, they are established by the state's policy or co-opted by government. They regard the pooling of resources such as capital, labour, land, purchasing power, or products as the most distinguishing characteristic of cooperatives.

The fifth type, IDAOs, which they called interest associations (IAs), is most characteristically defined by certain common features of their membership. In other words, they are "places" where people work together in the basic area of life like water management, public health or primary education to get maximum results.

(b) Problems around DAOs

Despite much of the enthusiasm for DAOs as agents of "alternative development", DAOs cannot avoid being vulnerable because of their smallness of scale, limited resources, fragmentation of focus, lack of collective efforts. Especially in the case of NSDAOs, the middle class nature of their staff is also pointed out as a paradox (Fowler, 1993: 333).

Moreover their formation, development and decline are severely influenced by both internal and external factors as have been so far investigated (e.g., Esman & Uphoff, 1984: 181-202; Hamer, 1976, 1981; Farrington and Bebbington, 1992). Parts of factors are also shared by other types of AOs.

Farrington and Bebbington well summarised "limitations of NGOs," which showed that DAOs are never panacea in development. These limitations consist of small size, restricted impact, distance from policy decisions, professional and technical limitations, poor coordinations, problems of representativeness and accountability (1992: 22-26).

In addition, according to Esman and Uphoff, DAOs can face various types of "resistance" (1984: 182-187). Local and regional elites, governments and administrators, the rural poor and other AOs themselves are included in these opponents. In addition, as Hamer writes, kinship homogeneity or neighbourhood is often an impediment for successful association, so kinship heterogeneity is important in establishing viable associations (1981: 116). Therefore harmonious relations among similar or different types of AOs are not necessarily the case and they are sometimes even conflictive with one another.

This is closely related to the second vulnerability of "subordination" of DAOs to more powerful organisations, mainly governmental agencies, and even co-opted by the state.

There are other vulnerabilities of internal origin. Esman and Uphoff classified them into three, namely internal division, ineffectiveness, and malpractices (1984: 193-202). There are various reasons which explain internal cleavages. They can be ethnic, political, economic. Shortage of skills in business management as well as relative lack of authority to make binding decisions and to ensure compliance on the part

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of all members contributes to an association's ineffectiveness. This tendency is more salient as an organisations becomes larger. Malpractices are caused by using "organizations to pursue personal goals, which violate the goals of the organization and the collective interests of its members" in the form of corruption (Esman and Uphoff, 1984: 199-201).

(c) DAOs as Agents of "Democratic Development"?

Though DAOs' roles in civil society are not supposed to be so important as other AOs in the sense that they have not been so active in the phase of transition to democracy as other AOs, they can be turned into bodies criticising governmental developmental policies through their experiences and can be regarded as more legitimate than governmental organs in development by people. In addition, they are the most effective associations in creating networks among people who have not so far been involved in collective activities. In other words, DAO-type AOs are potentially more important in the phase of democratic consolidation that in transition.

Therefore, DAOs, especially community-level and membership associations, can be, as is sometimes pointed out, "places" where people can be more conscious of the importance of collective activities to improve their own living standard and learn "democratic" attitudes in the process of decision-making. Also it will be *basically* true that NGOs [NSDAOs in this study's terminology] can contribute to democratisation by grassroots empowerment, as argued by Ndegwa (1993: 152-165). This is a main reason why Africanists expect that these associations which are omnipresent in Africa will be the seedbeds of democracy in Africa in the future.

However, as Fowler recently pointed out (1993: 334-335), "civic awareness" and "citizenship" issues have to be taken by DAOs not as "expected natural results" but as "strategies" which must be positively pursued in the process of democratisation (in the phase of democratic consolidation). In addition, activities of NSDAOs may even harm the process of democratisation (empowerment) by changing political configuration of rural communities (as discussed in chapter 5), unless they are fully conscious of their political effects caused by their involvement.

1.3.4 Validity of Categorisation

In this chapter, AOs have been categorised into some categories, and their "expected" functions and "practical" constraints have been also argued. How useful is this categorisation?

A categorisation which has been developed in this chapter will be useful to make "a map" of "potential" AOs working in a particular country. Although there is a problem of data collection in practice, the insight contained in this chapter will be a guide to researching a variety of organisations. Which AOs are really actively working? Why? These questions will direct us to investigate the reasons for the development or stagnation of specific AOs, which will give us some answers to the more questions raised by this study.

1.4 The Logic of the Emergence and Development of Civil Society: Hypothesis

In this chapter so far, it was clarified that the development of civil society will positively affect the consolidation of democracy. However, as stated in the early part of this chapter, the main task of this study is to

identify reasons and conditions of the development of civil society, especially focusing on its relation to the state.

In her recent paper, Chazan raised the two positive and negative conditions for the growth of civil society as follows:

> "(T)hose groups that contribute to the elaboration of civil society have thrived at two important conjunctures: in oppositional context that developed when state control was challenged..., and when efforts to maintain state exclusiveness,..., have declined. There seems, however, to be a correlation between the emergence of civil society and the simultaneous relaxation of monopolistic tendencies on the one hand, and the closure of exit options on the other hand. Both statism (which invites populism) and state decay (which evokes localism) stymie the growth of civil society" (1994: 278).

Furthermore, she insisted that the emergence of civil society

> "depends heavily on the expansion of channels of communication and the accumulation of shared experience" (Chazan, 1994: 279),

which includes commercialisation.

This argument offers us a very useful insight to construct hypotheses of this study to be tested as below. Before constructing them, it is useful to note that, for civil society to be developed, factors as follows are necessary to be taken into consideration: (1) contextual conditions such as socio-economic situations and natures of a political regime and (2) conditions like the existence of a variety of AOs and networks among them. The first is related rather to the material and ideological dimensions of civil society and the second rather to the organisational dimension.

In this study, first, the conventional and intuitive assumption that a constitutional democracy provides favourable conditions for the development of civil society, is to be disproved. It is because democracy, in

a narrow sense of political democracy refering to multi-partyism as defined in this study, does not guarantee the inclusiveness of AOs in political arena and the space where AOs act autonomously from the state to potentially oppose the state. Even in a democratic regime, there is a possibility that AOs are deliberately repressed by the state.

In addition, for the purpose of more refined analysis, the following hypotheses constructed on the framework developed in this chapter will be evaluated:

1. There are more limited opportunities of the development of civil society in a country where a regime is established in favour of the state in terms of power distribution, or in other words, the state dominates material and ideological bases in the territory. Therefore, there are more opportunities for civil society to develop in the country where monopolistic tendencies of the state are relaxed.

2. There are more opportunities of the growth of civil society in a country where material and ideological bases of the state are eroded and socio-economic conditions are declined, or in other words, the state is losing its legitimacy and resources. Therefore, in this situation, IAOs and churches will become candidates to challenge the state to reform it, and DAOs agents of "alternative development."

3. There are more opportunities of the emergence of vibrant civil society in a country where material conditions have been prepared for civil society as a result of industrialisation and commercialisation, ideological conditions have been offered by education, and organisational bases have been acquired both through historical experiences like a struggle for independence and by strong leadership in a society at large.

Furthermore, it is possible to hypothesise that there is limited possibility of the development of civil society in the following context:

4. The state with ample resources tends to use the "preemptive" tactic to control, especially, rural areas, which are major political bases of ruling elite, for the purpose of depoliticising people in a clientelist manner.

5. As far as the state is strong in terms of power distribution, the state tends to take more repressive tactics toward AOs especially with different ideological inclinations from the state, for the purpose of securing hegemony by restricting activities of the AOs.

These hypotheses are evaluated by a comparative study of Zambia and Botswana in the following chapters.

CHAPTER 2

THE CASES OF ZAMBIA AND BOTSWANA: POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC BACKGROUNDS AND A "MAP" OF ASSOCIATIONAL ORGANISATIONS

The purpose of this chapter is (1) to offer basic information of the two countries, namely Zambia and Botswana, which are selected to evaluate the hypotheses constructed in the previous chapter, and (2) to clarify the significance and the validity of this comparative study. Thereafter, the organisational dimension of civil society, namely a variety of potential AOs will be depicted from a comparative perspective.

2.1 Zambia and Botswana: Basic Background

The two countries neighbour each other in the region of southern Africa, but their political and economic trajectories have been different (see, table 2-1, table 2-2 for selected economic indicators for their comparison).

As table 2-1 shows, Zambia's economic situation has been generally declined. On the other hand, Botswana has experienced very rapid economic growth, although the growth rate has been a little bit down in more recent days.

This contrast is also the case in terms of social indicators in table 2-2. Botswana has experienced rapid improvement in the areas of health and education since independence against the sound economic performances, although it has also experienced the fastest urbanisation in sub-Saharan Africa. Zambia's experience is not impressive in comparison with Botswana, although it has achieved some improvement in the African standard.

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Table 2-1 Zambia and Botswana in Comparative Terms: Economic Indicators

	1965-1973	1973-1980	1980-1993
Growth Rate, GNP per capita			
Zambia	-0.5	-2.2	-3.1
Botswana	9.3	7.3	6.2
SSA	2.9	0.1	-0.8
Growth Rate, GDP			
Zambia	2.4	0.3	0.9
Botswana	14.7	10.5	9.6
SSA	5.9	2.5	1.6
Growth Rate, General Government Consumption			
Zambia	10.4	-0.6	-0.1
Botswana	5.5	14.3	13.8*
SSA	9.0	7.0	5.8
Average Inflation Rate			
Zambia	5.8	8.9	58.9
Botswana	4.4	11.6	12.3
SSA	7.5	6.8	16.1
Growth Rate of Exports (Nominal $)			
Zambia	5.5	-0.3	-2.6
Botswana	20.4	18.7	6.7
SSA	15.1	0.2	2.5

Sources: World Bank, *World Development Report 1995*, Washington, D.C., 1995; World Bank, *Sub-Saharan Africa: From Crisis to Sustainable Development*, Washington, D.C., 1989.

Note: *Date of 1980-87.

Table 2-2 Zambia and Botswana in Comparative Terms: Social Indicators

	1965	1970	1984	1993
Population per Physician				
Zambia	11,380	13,640	7,100	11,430
Botswana	27,450	15,540	6,900	n.a.
SSA	33,200	38,180	23,850	n.a.
Population per Nursing Person				
Zambia	5,820	1,730	740	610
Botswana	17,710	1,920	700	n.a.
SSA	5,420	3,210	2,400	n.a.

	1965	1970	1987	1993
Infant Mortality Rate				
Zambia	121	106	114	103
Botswana	112	95	69	42
SSA	160	132	n.a.	93

	1965	1970	1980	1992
Percent Age Group in Primary Schools				
Zambia	53	90	98	97
Botswana	65	65	91	116
SSA	41	50	79	67
Percent Age Group in Secondary Schools				
Zambia	7	13	17	31
Botswana	3	7	19	54
SSA	4	7	16	18

	1965	1970	1980	1993
Urban Population as a Percentage of Total Population				
Zambia	23	30	43	42
Botswana	4	8	19	26
SSA	14	19	22	30

	1965-73	1973-80	1980-93
Growth Rate of Urban Population			
Zambia	7.6	6.6	3.8
Botswana	18.4	10.3	7.6
SSA	5.5	5.7	4.8

2.1.1 The Colonial Period: Economy and Political Process towards Political Independence

2.1.1.1 The Case of Zambia: Development of Colonial Civil Society in Urban Areas

Northern Rhodesia (currently Zambia) was administered by the British Government from 1924 to 1952, following the rule of the British South Africa Company. During this period, the colonial government aided the establishment of a large-scale copper industry, which eventually not only became the main component of economic structure of the territory, but also caused social transformation of the African people.

It was by the 1930s that large-scale mining and land alienation from African people, caused by white immigration and settlement, had affected the social life of the African people. Able-bodied men were attracted or even forced to the Copperbelt, where they worked on contracts. The working conditions were brutal and unstable. Furthermore, very few services were introduced in rapidly growing urban areas under colonial rule. In addition, women's access to town living was legally restricted until the late 1950s.

In rural areas, agricultural production declined[1], because of the shortage of manpower as a result of male migration to the Copperbelt[2] as well as the lack of fixed or working capital for agriculture. Rural people suffered periods of malnutrition and starvation directly linked to the loss of labour (Burdette, 1988: 21). The "colonial policy created conditions of severe resource restraints for hundreds of thousands of Zambia's peasant

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[1]In such traditional agriculture as *chitemene*, agrarian techniques required a kind of heavy physical work done by men (Burdette, 1988: 21).
[2]There were nearly 22,000 Africans at work on the copper mines in 1930, which was more than one-third of the total number of Africans employed in Northern Rhodesia. By 1937, there were almost 18,000, and by 1943, nearly 33,000 (Roberts, 1976: 186).

households reducing their viability as subsistence units with little or no potential of producing a surplus for the market" (Klepper, 1979: 139)[3].

There have been collective or associational activities since the 1920s especially in urban areas[4]. Welfare societies were formed to cope with the unexpected death of a member. In 1922, schools' inspector Donald Siwale set up the first welfare association in Northern Rhodesia with the aid of missionary teacher David Kaunda, father of the first Zambian president (Burdette, 1988: 29). In the following years, the number of associations rapidly increased in towns along the railway. There was even an attempt to federate these societies into a nation-wide organisation o !y to fail.

It was in the 1940s that a nation-wide organisation, namely the Federation of African Societies, was successfully formed by Dauti Yamba and George Kaluwa, who were a schoolmaster and a trade unionist and farmer respectively (Burdette, 1988: 29). Against the formation of "new men," who were the nucleus of an African petite bourgeoisie, in urban areas, the Federation was turned into a political party, the Northern African Congress by this stratum, in 1948.

Parallel to the development of an urban petite bourgeoisie, the African mine workers had organised a series of strikes in order to seek better wages and living conditions as well as to end the colour bar since 1935. In 1949, a national union for all mine workers, the Northern Rhodesian African Mineworkers Union, was created. In addition, in 1950 an African Trades Congress was created with the miners and railwaymen. Both African unions played major role in nationalist politics.

During the period of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland (1953-1963), known as the Central African Federation, African opposition against colonial rule continued to grow. In reality, this federation was " a

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[3]Labour migration also affected differentiation of peasants, see Cliffe, 1978.
[4]See Epstein(1992) for more detail of urban life in the Copperbelt of Northern Rhodesia.

political scheme that favored the whites most and provided the capital for the development of the industrial and service sectors of the Southern Rhodesian economy" (Burdette, 1988: 25). This period, especially the early years, was also characterised by rapid growth of the copper industry. By 1960, the Copperbelt accounted for almost 16 percent of the free world's supply of copper. However, growth occurred only in the sectors directly linked to Western capital after the 1940s (Burdette, 1988: 26). In the process of rapid growth, 400,000 Africans were in the Copperbelt by 1956, and the organisations of African resistance developed with the leadership of the newly educated and urbanised Africans. They felt the growing burden of both direct and indirect taxes as well as large gaps between the income of the whites and that of Africans, which contributed the main reasons for African opposition.

It was from such organisations as trade unions that the nationalist parties such as the African National Congress (ANC) and the United National Independent Party (UNIP) were formed to struggle for political independence in the following period prior to self-government. They not only absorbed the complaints of urban Africans but also mobilised rural people to successfully oppose the colonial state[5].

It can be concluded that, in Zambia, during the colonial period, the organisational bases, which were favourable for the development of civil society, were relatively established.

2.1.1.2 The Case of Botswana: Underdevelopment as Constraint on Organisational and Material Development of Associational Life

During the colonial period, Bechuanaland was never viewed as being of importance from the British point of view because most of the

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[5]On the issue of peasant mobilisation, see Bratton, 1980, chapter 7.

country was semi-arid or desert in geographical terms and therefore limited agricultural potential in the future. In addition, the Protectorate had almost nothing to export. It was rather viewed as an integral part of South Africa in economic terms. In fact, the British colonial authorities expected that the Bechuanaland Protectorate would be incorporated into South Africa. There was a strong demand for foreign and relatively unskilled workers who were destined to work in South African mines. In addition, a hut tax and a "native" tax, imposed by the colonial government, had to be paid by the people, which forced them to find jobs to get regular sums of money every year. Therefore, Bechuanaland became a labour "reserve" mainly to South African mines. Both "push" and "pull" factors existed for labour migration from the protectorate.

As a result of the socio-political process of colonisation caused by migration[6], previously independent and dynamic societies were transformed into dependent entities (Parson, 1984a). In rural areas, the exodus of active male labours severely undermined the agricultural and manufacturing sectors. In contrast with Zambia where migration and industrialisation were an integrated social process happening in the same territory, Bechuanaland was only subsidising the cost of labour in South Africa. In other words, industrialisation which caused migration did not occur in the same territory. Therefore, the economy in the protectorate was crippled and underdeveloped[7].

The absence of industry of any significance in the protectorate also stunted political life in Bechuanaland. There were limited organisational

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[6]In 1930, 4,012 Batswana were employed in South Africa, and the number increased to 10,314 in 1935 and to 18,411 in 1940. In 1943, nearly half of all males aged fifteen to forty-four were away from the protectorate (Parson, 1984a: 25).

[7]Parson characterised the situation as follows by coining the concept "peasantariat":
"Tswana society was thus changed at its economic and social base. Formerly self-sufficient peasants in a tribunary society were now partly proletarialized, and they became a 'peasantariat,' adapting peasant production and wage work into a new form of working-class existence" (1984a: 26).

actions and activities in Bechuanaland against the colonial government. There was no harsh anti-colonial struggle for political independence. The process of preparing independence could be characterised not by confusion but by negotiation.

It was only in the 1960s[8] when the process of constitutional and political change began that the political parties were formed. The Bechuanaland Peoples' Party (BPP) was formed in 1960, a splinter group from the BPP formed the Bechuanaland Independent Party (BIP) in 1962, and the moderate Bechuanaland Democratic Party (BDP), which led the country to independence and later became the ruling party in independent Botswana, was also established in 1962. However as Nengwekhulu pointed out, these parties were not so radically militant, nor so different in ideological terms (1979). In addition, the level of popular mobilisation was far lower than that in Zambia. Especially in the case of BDP, the party was a rather loosely organised coalition of notables (Parson, 1984: 32).

In addition, the late colonial period between the late 1950s and independence in 1966 was the important period in terms of state formation. It was during this period that the following characteristics were formed in the process of negotiations between the local elites and the Commonwealth Development Corporation (CDC) about the future management of the cattle industry which was the main industry in the protectorate at that time: (1) a distinct ethos of state action: the primacy of commercial criteria, a high value placed upon compromise, stability, security, and the systematic accommodation of competing interests; and (2) durable patterns of elite interaction linking producers, state authorities, and external interests (Morrison, 1993: 27). By this negotiation process, "a

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[8] In terms of nationalist movement in the territory, there was the activities of Simon Ratshosa during the 1920s and 1930s, demanding for the transfer of power from the colonial administration to the indigenous people of the territory (Parsons, 1974). There was the first political party, the Bechuanaland Protectorate Federal Party, which was formed in 1959 (see, Nengwekhulu, 1979: 60-62).

stable biracial elite" was installed, which eventually led to a peaceful transition to political independence (Morrison, 1993: 45).

Against these political and socio-econimic backgrounds, as Nengwekhulu pointed out, "there is no evidence of cultural, religious or social pressure groups preceding the formation of nationalist movements [in Bechuanaland] as was the case in other countries in Africa" (1979: 52). Concerning the issue of the relatively slow process of the formation and development of political parties and other associations, Nengwekhulu argued that it was a result of colonialism being 'less' vicious than in other parts of Southern Africa (Nengwekhulu, 1979: 53).

In terms of the development of colonial civil society, however, economic underdevelopment and the relative lack of political struggle for independence eventually caused a condition of weak civil society in the post-colonial polity in Botswana.

2.1.2 Economy in the Post-colonial Phase

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Zambia, which was considered to be one of the richest countries in Africa at independence because of its copper, is now categorised among "low-income economies." On the other hand, Botswana was one of the poorest countries at independence, but she has achieved the highest rate of economic growth of any country in the world over the past twenty years. These different economic experiences are useful to contrast. However, in terms of economic structure, mining sector is the major component in both economies. The difference is that for Zambia it is copper, and for Botswana diamonds. Therefore, the price of these commodities in the international market have heavily affected politics as well as economies.

2.1.2.1 The Case of Zambia: Decline of Economy

Zambia's economy is almost defined by its production of copper. As stated above, copper production began in the 1920s when Zambia was under British control, and Zambian economy has depended heavily on copper exports since that period. As long as the copper prices was favourable, its economy could depend on its export to gain almost all the foreign exchange, which provided the bulk of revenue for the state. Therefore there was a sort of euphoria and prospects for development in the Zambian state just after independence. It also means that Zambia has ample material base on which the state could depend.

However, in the 1970s, there began the long-term decline of copper price in the international market. As a result, the contribution of the mining sector to government revenue fell from 71 percent in 1965 to only 7 per cent in 1987. As table 2-1 shows, the rate of economic growth worsened in and after the mid-1970s. In fact, since then the Zambian economy has entered a long period of stagnation and then rapid decline. From independence up to 1974, the real GDP grew at an annual rate of 2.3 per cent. However since 1974 there has been no growth of GDP in real terms and the GDP per capita has declined steadily; by 1983 it had fallen to 42 per cent of its 1965 level because of rapid population growth (Freund, 1986: 877)[9]. Zambia was in chronic economic malaise in this period and suffered one of the greatest economic declines among all the nations of Sub-Saharan countries. In fact, by 1984 Zambia became the most indebted country in the world relative to its GDP (Bates and Collier, 1993: 388-9).

In the 1980s, the Zambian government entered the period of economic reordering to stabilise economy. According to Saasa (1995: 3), it is possible to characterise the period 1983-1991 as follows:

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[9] As stated in the next chapter, Zambia's population has been increasing at more than a 3.0 per cent per annum rate, because of consistently high fertility levels coupled with declining mortality rate.

December 1982-October 1985:	Decontrols and deregulation
October 1985-April 1987:	Highly liberalised regime
May 1987-November 1988:	Return to controlled regime
November 1988-June 1989:	Relaxation of some controls
July 1989-April 1991:	Return to highly flexible regime with full-scale liberalisation
May 1991-October 1991:	Political transition with both government and the opposition expressing support for economic liberalisation

This was the period when the IMF/World Bank structural adjustment programme (SAP) design was applied in Zambia, which eventually deepened the economic crisis. It was in the first period of 1983-85 when a more comprehensive SAP was undertaken. The October 1985 reform programme aimed at allowing market forces to play a vital role in influencing economic decisions. However, the economy was not recovering and the auction system was severely criticised because it was seen as causing inflation, which recorded the rate of 93 percent during the first months of its operation.

In the following period, the Zambian government unilaterally abandoned the SAP on May 1, 1987 and introduced "New Economic Recovery programme" to control the economy. The result was ambivalent. On the one hand, this period recorded a 6.3 percent GDP growth largely due to the favourable increase in the price of copper, and the manufacturing sector recorded some growth. On the other hand, the inflation rate remained high, the black market reappeared, and consumer prices for the low income group continued to rise.

Zambia progressively moved towards the re-establishment of its relationship with the IMF and the World Bank in the latter half of 1988. The kwacha was devalued in November 1988, and a newly prepared SAP

was set in August 1989. Furthermore, an economic and financial Policy
Framework Paper (PFP) covering the period 1989-93 was prepared by the
government in collaboration with the IMF and the World Bank. This
period was when the government was committed to the policy of
liberalisation and also when there emerged a strong opposition
movement against the UNIP government, seeking the reintroduction of
multi-party politics.

In the changing process of Zambian economic policy, as table 2-3
shows, government revenue, generally decreased in real terms in the
1980s. The influence of this economic crisis was most severely felt by the
urban poor, especially women and children. In addition, there was also
damage substantially to the one-party rule under UNIP.

Table 2-3 Changes in Government Expenditure and Revenue, Average Annual Change, in
Percentages

	Nominal Increases					
	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986
Expenditure						
Recurrent	12.8	6.9	-3.7	6.9	46.9	124.6
Capital	10.2	38.3	-9.5	7.8	236.7	--
Total[a]	-5.7	20.0	-9.3	9.5	72.1	--
Revenue[b]	5.1	4.6	22.8	4.3	41.6	102.9
	Real Increases (Corrected for changes in domestic prices)[c]					
Expenditure						
Recurrent	5.3	0.9	-18.9	-9.8	4.2	22.7
Capital	2.8	30.5	-23.8	-9.1	110.8	--
Total[a]	-12.0	13.3	-23.6	-7.6	23.7	--
Revenue[b]	-1.9	-1.3	3.4	-12.0	0.5	10.8

Source: Hilderbrand, 1992: 187, Table 1

aTotal Expenditure minus Lending and Repayments
bRevenue plus Grants
cDeflator: GDP deflator, national currency series

2.1.2.2 The Case of Botswana: The Fastest Growing Economy in the World

Botswana had the fastest growing economy in the world; it recorded an average annual growth rate of GDP, 14.5 percent between 1970 and 1980, and 9.6 percent between 1980 and 1993 (*World Development Report*, 1995). By 1993, per capita GNP was nearly U.S. $2,800, which is almost seven times as much as that of Zambia, which was only U.S. $380 in the same year. In terms of external debt, which has been one of the serious economic problems in Africa, its debt went from $ 14 million in 1970, through $ 143 million in 1980, to $ 666 million in 1993, while the ratio of debt services to exports has been between 2 percent and 4 percent. This is quite an unusual situation in Africa. The currency, Pula, is also unusually firm and stable. Under what conditions was this economic stability and development achieved?

Harvey and Lewis, Jr. pointed out three elements in explaining Botswana's economic record: (1) luck, (2) economic management, (3) skill in negotiating with outsiders (1990: 6-9).

As stated above, at independence, there were limited resources for development in Botswana. However, De Beers discovered two fields of kimberlite pipes and developed two of the world's largest diamond mines, namely Orapa and Jweneng. In addition, a large copper-nickel deposit was discovered and exploited in Selebi-Phikwe. The mining sector has thus been the major sector to contribute to growth of the economy. What is important in the issue of the discovery of mineral resources is *historical timing*. The point is that these discoveries did not occur *before* independence, and that they did *after* independence. Therefore, Botswana as a sovereign state had more room for manouvre to negotiate with giant multinational companies to its advantage.

The second element is good management. The government had a sense of priorities, and of limits, and did not reach too far, too fast. Also, the government made an effort to anticipate problems and opportunities.

In addition, the government explicitly pursued a counter-cyclical policy in the management of foreign exchange reserves and government cash balances, basing year-to-year spending decisions on the intermediate term forecasts of export earnings and government revenue and on a realistic view of spending capacity (Harvey and Lewis, Jr., 1990: 7).

Third, it is skill in negotiating with more powerful outsiders. Botswana has managed to have fairly advantageous commercial relations in the Southern African Customs Union centred around South Africa[10], and with the three largest companies, namely Exxon, the Royal Dutch/Shell group, and the Anglo American/De Beers group. Also, Botswana has successfully accessed the pricing benefits of the EEC's Common Agricultural Policy (Harvey and Lewis, Jr., 1990: 8-9) made available through a beef quota under the Lomé Convention.

According to Harvey and Lewis, Jr., these good management and performance can be partly explained by the high quality leadership of the President and the civil service. This is a point which is related to the formation of the "bureaucratic state" in Botswana.

2.1.3 Politics after Political Independence

2.1.3.1 Zambia: The Fall and Rise of Multi-Party Politics

Zambia is one of the countries which have traced a common path in African politics. At independence, the new government was constitutionally "a hybrid of a Westminster system with a prime minister and responsible cabinet and an executive system with strong powers located in a president" (the First Republic) (Burdette, 1988: 65). Three

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[10]At the same time, Botswana has been a member of Southern African Development Coordinating Conference (SADCC), whose major aim used to be to lessen dependence on South Africa.

major parties contested the 1964 election to take office, and the United National Independence Party (UNIP) gained 55 out of 65 seats. Therefore, Zambia was a one-party dominant system rather than a multiparty system. As Baylies and Szeftel pointed out, post-colonial politics were shaped by conflict and competition *within* UNIP rather than between parties (1992: 78). In this political system, clientelism became one of the main characteristics of politics. Baylies and Szeftel depicted the process of clientelist politics in the early post-colonial period as follows:

"UNIP membership offered instrumental rewards-- access to the State and state apparatus in a society where there were few other avenues of social mobility. UNIP's recruitment of support gave prominence and strategic significance to political leaders who were, in essence, regional and sectional power brokers, all inevitably competing with each other for influence and power at the centre... Party and government positions had constantly to be distributed among different groupings so as to produce the least possible dissatisfaction. Politicians constantly weighed and measured this distribution... the system made the executive an arbiter of influence and access and ensured that development policy became a hostage to the distribution of spoils" (1992: 78).

This multi-party politics, however, continued only until December 1972, when legislation was passed and Zambia became a "one-party participatory democracy" (the Second Republic) de jure in response to the threat from the United Progressive Party (UPP), which had broken from UNIP with wide support from the Northern and Copperbelt Provinces. The introduction of the one-party system meant the absorption of political society by the state, but it is necessary to understand that it *did not mean the complete oppression of civil society.*

In this one-party system, one of the characteristics in politics was the growing power of the executive president, Kenneth Kaunda. Clientelism

was not substantially changed in the one-party era. One of the main differences was that political power was more centralised in the presidency not in UNIP, and this power was used to marginalise political activity (Baylies and Szeftel, 1992: 79). UNIP gradually lost its political function as a political party.

This process of functional decline of UNIP was related to the declining Zambian economy as stated above. The slumped economy reduced the capacity and legitimacy of the Zambian state. This meant that the state resource was shrinking, which inevitably reduced the resources for clientelism and increased competition. In fact, as Baylies and Szeftel pointed out, local government reform in 1980 effectively disenfranchised the bulk of the electorate in local elections, and the list of notables thus sacked grew (Baylies and Szeftel, 1992: 79).

The economic crisis caused a political protest for political reform, demanding the return to multi-partyism in the world wide tide of democratisation. In October 1991, Kenneth Kaunda and the ruling UNIP lost in presidential and parliamentary elections that were restored after 18-years' one-party rule (the Third Republic). In this political process, what is important from the viewpoint of this study is that a variety of associations, including trade unions, Christian churches, and professional associations have been relatively active even in the period of the one-party rule. These associations were critics in this period and they were the core forces which organised the opposition into the Movement for Multi-party Democracy (MMD) against the one-party rule.

2.1.3.2 Botswana: A Stable "Multi-Party System"

Botswana, on the other hand, has always been refered to as one of the unusual cases in Africa, because the formal multi-party system has

been sustained since independence in 1968. However, the Botswana Democratic Party (BDP) has been the dominant party, which have created "a system of elite democracy, successfully blending 'traditional' and 'modern' elements" (Good, 1992: 69). In fact, the BDP leadership is composed predominantly of large cattle herd. Almost all cabinet members own over two hundred head and assured of deriving sufficient income from these enterprise (Holm, 1988: 203). In addition, the party organisation of BDP was once characterised as "a machine whose major function at the local level is the distribution of patronage" (Vengroff, 1977: 173) to control rural areas. Opposition parties have competed at regularly held national elections only to fail to challenge the predominance of the BDP, except in urban areas in more recent elections. Therefore the multi-party system in Botswana has been no more than a one-party dominant system. This political system has achieved unusual political stability with the support of a rapidly growing economy.

In the multi-party politics, the state has established methods of social control, which in the post-colonial state has been made possible by increasing recurrent revenue, whose average annual real growth rates between 1975/76-85/86 was 18.5 percent (Hill and Mokgethi, 1989: 185 Table 7.5). As Harvey and Lewis, Jr. noted:

> "In the early years, the government's main concerns were to manage
> scarce financial resources, and to seek new resources of revenue. In the
> later years, the government had to manage financial surpluses"
> (1990: 187).

The Botswana government has two primary sources of revenue: customs revenues and mineral revenue mainly from diamonds. First, Botswana receives customs revenues from the Southern African Customs Union, whose share in total revenue was almost 50 percent in 1974/75, and 13.7

percent in 1985/86 (Hill and Mokgethi, 1989: 183). This was related to the new formula negotiated in 1969, which had considerable advantages for Botswana. The second source of revenues is from diamonds. Revenues are determined by a long-term agreement with De Beers, whereby profits are split between De Beers and the government. Revenues from the mining sector contributed to 53.5 percent of total revenue in 1985/86 (Hill and Mokgethi, 1989: 183-4). This ample revenue has basically guaranteed the stable resources of the state in Botswana.

In addition to the resources of the state, one of the most important characteristics of Botswana, which has made it possible to control society, is the formation of the relatively strong bureaucracy[11] or administrative state (e.g. Gunderson, 1971). This institutional development of the Botswana state is one of the essential components to explain one of the main characteristics of "democracy" in Botswana: weak civil society (Molutsi and Holm, 1989). As Holm stated,

> "Rather than articulating their own interests, communities are mobilized to serve the objectives of particular government ministries" (Holm, 1988: 210).

Taking this dimension into consideration, Botswana has been considered not only to be "paternalistic democracy" in its nature of the political regime (Holm, 1988), but also the state in Botswana has resources to be effectively paternalistic.

2.1.4 Significance and Validity of Comparative Study: The Issue of Case Study Selection

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[11]Holm and Molutsi have stressed this point (see, Holm, 1995), although Charlton (1991) and Mayande (1994) attacked this stance, by arguing that they underestimated the role of politicians.

At a first glance, it can be considered that there have been relatively similar regional and historical backgrounds in the cases of Zambia and Botswana. It may be possible to assume that there have been similar regional constraints and influences derived from South Africa's apartheid, especially in the post-colonial period.

However, as stated above, the implications of the existence of the economic giant in this region have been quite different. The historical timings of involvement of actors based in the South African mining sectors and the Republic itself in the renegotiation of the Southern African Customs Union, namely in 1920s in Zambia and especially after independence in Botswana, have had quite different impacts on each country, especially in economic terms.

This difference also affected the historical experiences of both countries. As a result of the development of copper-mining sector in the Northern Rhodesia, there emerged a relatively strong organised labour which became one of the cores of liberation struggle. In Botswana, it was only after independence that MNCs based in South Africa were actively committed to diamond mining, which eventually contributed to the state formation in Botswana and their employment was small.

In addition, the political and economic trajectories of both countries are quite different as stated above. Ideologically, Zambia adopted African socialism, named Zambian Humanism, and Botswana has been more capitalist-oriented. These two countries in the same region have thus had very different experiences.

From the perspective of civil society considered in chapter 1, the experiences of Zambia and Botswana can be contrastingly understood. Furthermore, these experiences can be one of the important cases to test hypotheses developed in chapter 1.

2.2 A "Map" of Associational Organisations: Objects and Limits

The objects of this part of the chapter are, firstly, to describe the diversity of associational organisations (AOs) both in Zambia and Botswana, and secondly to point to similarities and differences which are observable from a map of AOs in both countries. In this sense, this part of the chapter offers a kind of list or "map" of the diversity of AOs in both Zambia and Botswana. Therefore it refers to only one of the dimensions of the multi-dimensional entity of civil society, which will be basically static. In this chapter, it is not intended to attempt to capture the dynamism of civil society in its relation with the state.

It is impossible, however, to describe AOs in an exhaustive way. It is only possible to take a *snapshot* of activities of AOs in practical terms. In addition, the character of one specific association is never static, because it is quite likely that it changes its objectives according to its circumstances. It is also difficult and almost impossible to get data concerning *all* existing and acting associations in a country because of various restrictions as well as time. As a result, the description will be inevitably based on the limited data and knowledge which could be obtained during the period of my field research and other works which referred to some types of associations.

An effort will be made in this part to clarify the characteristics of potential actors in civil society which the two selected countries have. In addition, a tentative evaluation will be made to identify significant actors in civil society especially in the process of democratisation. Apart from the evaluation, the academic significance of relatively weak actors in civil society will be argued. These efforts will be steps to further arguments in later parts of this study.

2.3 The Case of Zambia

According to the list of registered societies under the Societies Act (CAP.105) which was obtained at the office of Registrar of Societies, there are more than 3000 registered societies in Zambia. This is a list classifying associations by districts. In fact, it is a by-product of one of the tactics of the state, namely registration. Such small members' associations as women's clubs, sports clubs, on the one hand, and nation-wide service associations like the Planned Parenthood Association of Zambia (PPAZ), on the other hand, are included in this list. Apparently there are quite a lot of AOs in Zambia, but it is not only another story but also difficult to determine how well these associations are actually functioning. But it is also true that there are a lot of informal groups which are not included in this list[12].

Even so we can find some characteristics of the formation of associations in Zambia. First, there is a concentration of associations in urban areas. This is true in terms of variety as well as number. In Lusaka urban district, for example, there are more than 600, one-fifth of all registered associations in Zambia. Around towns in the Copperbelt, there are about 650 associations altogether. These Zambian urban centres account for more than two-fifths.

Just in terms of number, one small rural district, Petauke, has nearly 100 associations. But in this case nearly 60 per cent of them are composed of Women's clubs. It is a general tendency that in rural areas most of the registered associations are composed of Women's Clubs according to the list. This is the second characteristic. In contrast, in urban centres, there are other types of associations to which I will return later.

Third, there are special issue-oriented associations in the districts which grapple with common problems. In Senanga and Mongu, for

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[12]It will be enough to use one example to illustrate this incompleteness. According to an official of the Village Industry Service (VIS), some women's clubs with which it is working have not registered (personal interview).

example, which are situated just by the Zambezi River in the Western Province, there are several associations which are involved in the activity of water management and cattle rearing and marketing, which can be classified into interest development associational organisations (IDAOs). This phenomenon is considered to be related to their geographical, socio-economic and industrial structure in specific areas.

Following are Christian churches and para-church organisations, such interest associational organisations (IAOs) as trade unions and professional associations, and development associational organisations (DAOs).

2.3.1 Churches and Para-Church Organisations (see Chapter 4 for detail)

According to the data obtained at the Registrar of Societies concerning registered religious associations, there were quite a lot of congregations of various churches registered in Zambia in January 1992 as is shown in the table 2-4.

According to Barrett's counts quoted in Henkel (1989: 46), by 1980, the percentage of Christian population in Zambia, which was 72 per cent, was higher than the average in sub-Saharan Africa, 52 per cent[13]. Although it is really difficult to get the correct data on the extent of Christianisation, it is more or less true that the majority of Zambians are Christian, considering the estimated number of adherents and congregations in Zambia[14].

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[13] Concerning on this data, Barrett counted as Christians all those who identify themselves thus in answer to the question "What is your religion?" (Henkel, 1989:46).

[14] The growth of adherence to Christian churches and groups is rapid and exceeds the natural population growth of the country. The annual growth rate of Christians was 4.2 per cent between 1970 and 1980 compared to a growth rate in the population as a whole of 3.1 per cent between 1969 and 1980. It is considered that the majority of non-Christian in Zambia are adherents of traditional religions. In detail, see Henkel, 1989, p.47.

Table 2-4 Registered Churches in Zambia

Church, Mission	No. of Church	Adherents (estimate 1982/3)
United Church of Zambia	288	200,000
Watch Tower Churches	1585	740,000
Apostolic Churches	452	42.000
Lutheran Churches of Central Africa	52	10,000
Baptist Convention of Zambia	290	20,000
Evangelical Churches	307	40,000
Churches of God	135	21,000
Apostolic Faith Mission	70	14,000
Christian Mission in Many Lands	621	75,000
Seventh Day Adventist	895	93,000
Roman Catholic Churches	959	1,627,000
New Apostolic Churches	197	20,000
Reformed Church in Zambia	76	110,000
Salvation Army	92	15,000
United Pentecostal Churches of Zambia	29	12,000
Anglican Churches	54	45,000
Church of Christ	62	17,000
Christian Fellowship of Zambia	294	n.a.
Churches Exempted from Registration	549	n.a.
Minor Churches	542	n.a.
Muslim Association	113	n.a.

Source: Registrar of Societies, Ministry of Home Affairs; Henkel, 1989: 50.

2.3.1.1 Three Coordinating Bodies

Organisationally, most of these various churches belong to three main church associations, namely the Christian Council of Zambia (CCZ), the Zambian Episcopal Conference (ZEC), and the Evangelical Fellowship of Zambia (EFZ). The CCZ, which is associated with the World Council of Churches, is the mother organisation of ecumenically-oriented Protestant churches whose membership in January 1992 is shown in table 2-5. The ZEC is the national coordinating body of the Catholic Church, which consists of seven dioceses and two archdioceses. The EFZ, which was officially formed on 8th April 1964, is the mother body of evangelically-oriented Protestant churches (see membership table 2-6). So far these three church organisations have collaborated quite closely with each other in

order to solve nationally critical issues like that of the transition to the multi-party system as discussed in chapter 4.

Table 2-5 Member Churches and Christian Organisations of the CCZ (1992)	TaTable 2-6 Member Churches and Christian Organisations of the EFZ (1992)
African Methodist Episcopal Church	Brethren in Christ
Anglican Church	Church of the Nazare
Baptist Convention of Zambia	Baptist Union of Central Africa
Brethren in Christ	Evangelical Church in Zambia
Church of Christ	Pilgrim Wesleyan Church
Church of God	Northern Baptist Association
Kimbauguist Church	Africa Evangelical Fellowship
Northern Baptist Association	Scandinavian Independent
Presbyterian Church	Baptist Union
Reformed Church in Zambia	Apostolic Faith Mission
Salvation Army HQ.	Baptist Mission of Zambia
Society of Friends	Dorothea Mission Baptist
United Church of Zambia	Convention of Zambia
United Pentecostal Church	Emmasdale Church
Apostolic Faith Church	Full Gospel Church of God
	Garneton Church of Christ
Mennonite Central Centre Zambia	Life Ministry
Multimedia	Mulongoti Christian Assembly
Churches Medical Association of Zambia	Mpongwe Baptist Association
LWF/Zambia Christian Refugee Service	Pentecostal Assemblies of God
YMCA	Pentecostal Assemblies of Canada Youth for Christ
YWCA	Zambia Nurses Christian Fellowship
Reformed Church of Zambia	Girls Brigade of Zambia
Mindolo Ecumenical Centre	Pentecostal Holiness Church
Every Home Crusade	Zambia Christian Mission
Girl Guides	Christian Fellowship in Zambia
World Literature Crusade	Fire Baptized Church
Bible Society of Zambia	Church of Christ
Westside Zambia Student Christian Movement	Church of God South
Makeni Ecumenical Centre	International Needs of Zambia
Zambia Ecumenical Church	Loan Fund Jimmy Swaggart Ministries
	Matero Church of Christ
	Pentecostal Believers' Church of God
	Prison Fellowship
	Wesleyan Mission of Zambia
	Zambia Baptist Association
	Velberter Mission
	Christ Liveth Mission
	Haggai Institute
	Berean Church of Christ
	Scripture Union of Zambia
	Every Home Crusade

Source: List of Membership of CCZ, Source: EFZ Brochure, CCZ Secretariat, Lusaka.

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2.3.1.2 Para-church Organisations

Apart from the three coordinating bodies, there are various "para-church" organisations, which have been active in development as well as religious activities. In this sense, they have characteristics of service and development AOs.

The Mennonite Central Committee (MCC) is working in the area of placement of volunteers in order to stimulate long term change, to promote a better life for local families, communities and churches through the placement of volunteers. The MCC has especially seconded volunteers to the Brethren in Christ Church, the Africa Methodist Episcopal Church, the YMCA, and the Salvation Army.

The Mindolo Ecumenical Foundation (MEF), which was established in 1957 and is situated in Kitwe, is a big church-run educational institution with the objective of serving the African continent as an agent of change and reconciliation through leadership training of men, women and youth. It has offered various training course such as conference and research programmes, youth leadership programmes, industry and commerce programmes and women's training programmes. Today it is an international, inter-denominational, ecumenical training institution, coordinating, arranging, and facilitating various training programmes not only for churches and para-churches, but also NGOs. Makeni Ecumenical Centre (MEC) is another institution related to churches, which has been involved in the activities of settlement of landless families and the aged and promotion of self-reliance through agriculture, handicraft, and other trade skills training since 1971.

The World Day of Prayer (WDP) has been working in the area of creating social programmes for the poor. Its activities include support for the handicapped child care and adoption society, and for hospitals for the

mentally handicapped and leprosy victims. The World Vision International has been involved in child sponsorship, water supply, agricultural assistance, school classroom extension in the area of welfare and community development. The Church Medical Association of Zambia, which is composed of 32 hospitals and 56 Rural Health Centres, is the inter-denominational association which is represented by 15 different Church denominations and which is divided equally in terms of work load between Protestants and Catholics. Members institutions of this association provide about half of the health services in rural areas, and 35 per cent of the total health care of Zambia (*Zambia Catholic Directory 1991*: 26).

The Young Children's Christian Programme, which is another church-based organisation, has been involved in youth development for the purpose of meeting the needs of young people through spiritual and social concern and care and the community at large. The Young Men's Christian Association (YMCA) and the Young Women's Christian Association (YWCA) are Christian associations which are quite active in quite a wide range of issues. It includes the promotion of income generating activities in such areas as handicrafts and agricultural activities, and technical and entrepreneurial training. Recently especially the YWCA has started its programr·e of conscientisation of women in rural areas.

The National Council of Catholic Women (NCCW) is basically the coordinating body of Catholic Women's Organisations and Associations in terms of their initiatives and activities. But its objectives are not only to support women in their endeavour for human and spiritual development and to promote contribution of Catholic women to the community but also to represent and to be a link between Catholic Women Organisations and other women organisations of similar aim, whether they are Catholic

or not. Its projects include a tailoring course, school assistant teachers course, a soap making project, a wine making project.

The Catholic Agricultural and Rural Youth Movement (CARYM) has adopted the "See, Judge, Act" method applied to rural situations in order to mobilise the rural youth for the improvement of their own lives and the integral development of their communities.

There are some other organisations like the Bible Society of Zambia involved in distribution and promotion of Holy Scripture and St. Vincent de Paul Society which intends to show Christ like interest in, and take personal care of the poor by visiting them and providing for their needs.

2.3.1.3 Media of the Churches

Multimedia Zambia, which was founded jointly by the CCZ and the ZEC, is the institution whose objectives are to spread the "Word of God" effectively by mass communication media and to create and encourage inter-church cooperation in this field. Its main activity has been production of radio and TV programmes, and publication of a weekly newspaper the *National Mirror*.

2.3.2 Interest Associational Organisations (IAOs)

In this section, trade unions, professional associations, women's associations and other associations organised for representing economic or social interests will be treated.

2.3.2.1 Trade Unions

In Zambia, as is well-known, there has been one of the best organised trade union centres in Africa, namely the Zambia Congress of

Trade Unions (ZCTU). Historically, the ZCTU was born in 1965 following the dissolution of its forerunner, the Northern Rhodesia United Trade Union Congress and the repealing of the Trade Unions and Trade Dispute Ordinance. Therefore This new organisation was registered in 1966 under the "new" Trade Unions and Trade Disputes Act which provided for obligatory affiliation to the ZCTU of any trade unions formed according to the provisions of the law (ZCTU, undated: 1). In 1990, there were 19 affiliations with a total membership of 352,900 as is shown in table 2-7. The ZCTU retained some autonomy and role as critic and opposition of the UNIP government in the one-party era. In the recent political and constitutional transformation from a one-party system to a multi-party system, the ZCTU was one of the core forces in forming the Movement for Multi-Party Democracy (MMD) and mobilising people for the change. In this sense, the organised trade union movement in Zambia has composed a core power of civil society in Zambia.

On the other side of industrial relations, there are organisations of large capital, namely Zambian Industrial and Commercial Association and the Zambian Federation of Employers (ZFE). These organisations have kept informal contacts with ministerial representatives, and the ZFE "participated regularly in a Labour Consultative Council and in this capacity was relatively effective as a pressure group" (Baylies, 1982: 198).

Table 2-7 Affiliated Trade Unions and Membership

Name	May 1986	May 1990	Difference
Mineworkers Union of Zambia	45,867	58,808	+ 12,941
National Union of Commercial and Industrial Workers	28,000	27,000	- 1,000
National Union of Building, Engineering and General Workers	35,000	25,084	-9,912
Guards Union of Zambia	8,000	13,128	+ 5,128
National Union of Communication Workers	5,000	6,319	+ 1,319*
Zambia United Local Authorities Workers Union	24,000	25,000	+ 1,319*
Zambia Electricity Workers Union	4,200	6,600	+ 2,400
Rail Workers Union of Zambia	10,243	8,858	- 1,385
National Union of Plantation and Agricultural Workers	1,143	16,674	+ 6,531
Hotel and Catering Workers Union of Zambia	8,000	7,000	- 1,000
Zambia National Union of Teachers	25,000	36,230	+ 11,230
Civil Servant Union of Zambia	33,000	28,000	- 5,000
National Union of Public Service Workers	82,025	65,610	-16,515
National Union of Transport and Allied Workers	9,000	7,592	- 1,408
Zambia Union of Financial Institutions and Allied Workers	7,100	11,754	+ 4,654
Airways and Allied Workers Union of Zambia	10,243	8,858	+ 1,385*
Typographical Workers Union of Zambia	1,400	1,509	+ 109
University of Zambia and Allied Workers Union	2,748	2,794	+ 46
Zambia National Union of Health and Allied Workers	NIL	1,219	NIL*
Total	340,818	352,900	+ 12,082

Source: ZCTU 1990: 36-38, * There are obvious errors contained in this original table.

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2.3.2.2 Other Professional AOs

Apart from trade unions, commercial farmers have formed a relatively strong organisation, the Commercial Farmers Bureau, representing their interests and influencing agricultural policies.

Moreover there are several professional associations. The Press Association of Zambia (PAZA) composed of about 500 journalists in Zambia, had been dormant since 1983 because of the tight control of the media by the United National Independence Party (UNIP). It was not until in 1991, when the importance of an independent press was recognised again in the irresistible tide toward the multi-party elections, that the PAZA started to work its objective of "freedom of the press." The Law Association of Zambia (LAZ) is another professional association which is composed of about 450 lawyers. The objectives of the LAZ are to look after lawyers' interests and to advise legal affairs.

The list of the Registrar of Societies contains quite a few other "professional associations" mainly based in Lusaka and cities in the Copperbelt. A variety of professions includes charcoal burners and wood cutters, liquor traders, taxi drivers, social workers, butcheries, dairy farmers, nurses, pharmaceutists, university lecturers, hardware and electrical marketeers, commercial farmers, traditional health practitioners, building contractors, accountants, secondary school teachers, religious education teachers, truckers, airline pilots, dentists, dental therapists, workers of hotels and tourism, tobacco growers, small-scale entrepreneurs and agrochemists.

2.3.2.3 Women's AOs

There are several women's associations, namely the Zambia Alliance of Women (ZAW), the Zambia Association of University Women (ZAUW), the Zambia National Association of Disabled Women (ZNADWO), the National Association of Business and Professional Women of Zambia, the Women in Media, and the National Women's Lobby Group (NWLG). The Zambia Alliance of Women formed in 1978 has been involved in activities to assist women gain some self-reliance, and to participate in inheritance, education and other women's rights issues for the purpose of the betterment of women and children economically, socially, politically and so on. In order to enhance the standard of women through education, ZAUW's main activities are (1)the establishment of an Educational Trust Fund which will assist the unprivileged or disadvantaged young women who can qualify to university in the field of sciences, (2) an educational campaign on combating diarrhea and other related ailments through the use of soya to mothers at community level. The ZNADWO was founded in March 1990 at the vocational Rehabilitation Centre in Ndola for the main purposes of (1) enhancing the situation of the women with disabilities in the community, (2) encouraging and promoting education, training and employment possibilities for women with disabilities in the community, (3) informing, educating, and creating awareness in the general public, through various means about the plight of the disabled women and their families. The National Association of Business and Professional Women of Zambia, which was formed in 1964, has been involved in the area of career guidance in order (1) to evaluate the standards for women in business and the professions, (2) to promote the interests of business and professional women, (3) to bring about a spirit of cooperation among business among the business and professional women of Zambia, (4) to extend the opportunities of business and professional women through

education along lines of industrial scientific and vocational activities. The NWLG, which was formed in July 1991 when over 50 women from all walks of life met at the YWCA in Lusaka, has had purposes of (1) uplifting of the status of not only women but also children, (2) making the attitude of decision-makers more gender sensitive, (3) supporting and financing any women with political ambitions to contest parliamentary seats, and so on. In addition, because this is supposed to be the first "lobbying-oriented" group in women issues, people have seen its establishment as the wind of change really sweeping across the country (*Daily Mail*, 22 August 1991).

2.3.2.4 Students

Students' organisations are also active in Zambia. The University of Zambia Student Union (UNZASU), basically seeking the improvement of conditions of learning, was one of the important components of a big riot which followed Kaunda's announcement of the removal of the subsidy on mealie meal and drove the one-party state to its constitutional change into a multi-party system. In August 1991, also students at the Copperbelt University formed a pressure group to ensure their lecturers demands were met (*Times of Zambia*, 17 August 1991).

2.3.2.5 Cooperation among IAOs in the Process of Democratisation

Some of the associations classified into Interest Associational Organisations (IAOs) established the Zambia Elections Monitoring Coordinating Committee (ZEMCC) on 27 September in 1991 with the initiative of the Christian Churches' Monitoring Group (CCMG) composed of the CCZ, the EFZ, the ZEC with its basic objective to be to ensure that the elections of 31 October 1991 and any other elections would

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be free and fair. This was joined by five other groups, namely the PAZA, the University of Zambia Student Union, the NWLG, the Non-governmental Organisations Coordinating Committee and the LAZ. This association played quite important roles in the process of election. This association has been transformed into the Foundation for Democratic Process (FODEP) which will work not only for election monitoring, but also for civic education of the general public.

2.3.3 Development Associational Organisations (DAOs)

2.3.3.1 National Service Development AOs

In this section, what will be treated are basically National Service Development Associational Organisations (NSDAOs), whose headquarters are in cities and that are working for others in such issue areas as health, education and rural development.

Most of Service AOs (SAOs) working in Zambia are membership based. Exceptions are such government-initiated bodies as the Village Industry Service (VIS) and the Small Industry Development Organisation (SIDO), and church-initiated ones like Makeni Ecumenical Centre. But in the latter case, individuals can be accepted as "friends" by paying an annual subscription. In terms of the fields of work, these AOs have covered a wide range.

(a) Education

In education, there are several AOs. The Adult Education Association of Zambia has been involved in technical training, income-

generating activities, entrepreneur training, home economics and health care targeting women, girls and school leavers.

The Zambia Pre-School Association has been working in the area of pre-school education by training pre-school teachers, arranging workshops and seminars, producing play materials and providing pre-school services to the marketeers children.

(b) Health

In general health and population issues, the Planned Parenthood Association of Zambia (PPAZ) has been widely working for dissemination of information on family planning and population issues to the general public. In addition, it has provided a family planning service, promoted education for responsible family life for youths, collaborated with other agencies on projects and programmes relating to child spacing and population and so on.

The Family Life Movement of Zambia (FLMZ) is another AO with a background in the Catholic Church which has been involved in population issues by adopting the approach of "scientific natural fertility management"

Additionally, there is an association, the Breastfeeding Association of Zambia, which is working in order to promote optimum nutritional status for mothers and children and to raise the general public awareness of the need to raise the nutritional status of mothers and children.

Concerning the similar issue of nutrition, the National Food and Nutrition Commission composed of trained nutritionists was working to fight against malnutrition among children and pregnant mothers[15].

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[15]It is not clear that this association is still active.

One of the church-related associations, the Christian Children's Fund's objectives are also to assist children and their families in the areas of health, education, nutrition, shelter and clothing. The Zambia Red Cross Society is another organisation working for social welfare through the activities of primary health care, first aid, welfare service, blood donor recruitment and disaster preparedness and relief.

There have also appeared such associations as the Society for Women and AIDS in Zambia whose activities are concentrated in the issue area which is in urgent need of action for education for prevention of infection of HIV.

(c) Children and Youth

On issue of children and youth including school leavers, there are several associations. The Child Care and Adoption Society of Zambia have been trying to support those who cannot afford to support their families due to low income or ignorance through the activities of adoption, fostering, transient home, nutrition rehabilitation centre for malnourished children and so on.

The Boy Scouts Association founded in 1932 has been involved in the area of youth welfare by providing opportunities for youth to acquire skills at various projects. The Home Economics Association of Zambia has also offered school leavers training programme to help school leavers gain knowledge and skills of tailoring and general house keeping.

Associations having long histories such as the Girl Guides Association have been active in the area of youth welfare in Zambia. For the purpose of promotion of the welfare of youth and improvement of the education for the youth, the Girl Guides Association, targeting girls attending school and women school leavers, has offered training

programmes for leaders of small groups, literacy programmes and skill improvement programmes.

(d) Self-Help

There are also some organisations in the area of self-help development. The Human Settlements of Zambia (HUZA) have been engaged in the production of building materials, the promotion of small scale industries such as soap-making and so on and conservation projects like tree planting and improved charcoal stoves in order to assist low income groups and rural dwellers technically, socially and financially, and to facilitate self realisation of one's potential to be transformed through self-help.

The Self Help Development (SHD) has also been committed in this area. Basically its purposes are promoting community up-lift through expansion of localised industrial production, organised work opportunities, involving local communities in reflection, education and action for community and group problem solving and so on. Through such projects as "grassroots food security project," currently, it is making "efforts to counteract the negative effects of structural adjustment of economy and the desperate situation of many vulnerable groups in Zambia."

(e) Environment

On the environmental issues, there are such organisations as the Forestry Association of Zambia, and the Wild Life Conservation Society of Zambia. Apart from them, the Human Settlement of Zambia (HUZA), which has been also involved in the area of self-help development, has

had tree planting projects mainly around Lusaka by encouraging the wider community to participate in tree planting activities.

(f) Women in Development

There are various associations working in the area of "women in development" (WID). Among them, the Non-governmental Organisation Coordinating Committee (NGOCC) is an umbrella body of organisations involved in WID, which totaled more than 30 in October 1991. Its objectives are as follows:

1. To coordinate and strengthen links between member(NGOs) organisation throughout Zambia.

2. To stimulate, assist, train, collect and disseminate information which will encourage the effort of the member NGOs in their aims and objectives of peace, equity and development.

3. To establish training programmes for NGOs i.e. seminars to teach the writing up of fund raising proposals etc.

4. To establish and maintain a system of information, documentation and communication so as to be enabled to respond to the need for disseminating information on women's issues and the work of NGOs in Zambia.

5. To encourage and develop arrangements for active and close co-operation with UNIP Women's League, and with other associate or bodies throughout the world having similar aims or objectives[16].

6. To be the voice and pressure group for member NGOs.

Such associations as the PPAZ and the FLMZ which are mentioned above and more or less related to WID are members of the NGOCC. Also under this umbrella, there are such financial organisations as the Women's Development Limited and the Women's Finance Trust Zambia Limited whose objective is to develop entrepreneurship of grassroots women in

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[16]In the Third Republic, NGOCC has been completely delinked from the UNIP and has taken a non-partisan stance.

general by providing direct credit or through credit guarantee scheme through the bank.

The Zambia Association for Research and Development (ZARD), whose main objective is to encourage research on the position of women in Zambia, is, in this context, a kind of think-tank on women's issue. It has offered not only channels of communication between researchers and people concerned with the place of women in the development process of Zambia but also arenas in which participants consider problems to be solved concerning women in Zambia. In a similar field of research, the Institute of Cultural Affairs has worked in the area concerned with human factor in development.

(g) Coordination of NSDAOs

The Zambia Council for Social Development (ZCSD), which is under reconstruction in order to adapt itself to the "newly established" situation in the Third Republic and to become a "voice" of local NGOs at the time of December 1991, used to be another umbrella body of various organisations including both NGOs and local governments like district councils. Its objectives were (1) to promote and support policies and programmes which are beneficial to and serve the development of the people of Zambia and their social environment, especially those programmes which are referred to as social development and which include the eradication of disease, hunger, ignorance, poverty and unemployment, (2) to promote, coordinate, extend and organise cooperation in the achievement of the above purpose and to that end bring together in the council national local representatives of voluntary agencies, statutory authorities, Government departments and others,

including individuals engaged or interested in the furtherance of the above purposes or any of them.

(h) Government Non-government Organisations (GONGOs)

The objectives of the Small Industry Development Organisation (SIDO) and the Village Industry Service (VIS), which were originally created by government initiative, have been to promote small scale, informal industries and cottage, village industries respectively by providing extension services.

2.3.3.2 Community Service Development Associational Organisations (CSDAOs)

Even though it is sometimes difficult to identify this type of association because of their "low profile" (Bratton, 1989a: 581) in rural areas, and thus shortage of reliable data and difficult accessibility to them, there are a few identifiable CSDAOs in Zambia, which have been involved in community development activities as coordinating bodies of several rural communities. Common characteristics shared by CSDAOs in Zambia include emphasis on the importance of conscientisation and awareness of people, because it is considered to be important for people in rural areas themselves to identify problems confronting them and to organise themselves in order to solve these problems. Also gradually local people's initiative has been emerging, though original initiative came from such leaders as retired civil servants and former parliamentarians.

One of them is the Zambia Community Research and Occupational Foundation (ZCROF) founded in 1984 by a retired civil servant, and situated at Namushakande near Mongu in Western Province, where a

pilot project of the ZCROF has been carried out. Its objectives are to create a physical, economic and social environment conductive to the growth and happiness of the majority of the people especially the poorest of the poor and to enhance the harmony of the community as a whole. The ZCROF defines itself as a kind of "an operating Foundation seeking to work together in solidarity with underdeveloped communities in the rural and urban areas for social change and development" (ZCROF, 1984:2). The ZCROF has emphasised the importance of education and training, and has carried out the Development Education Namushakende Program (DEN).

At Kabompo, in North-Western Province, there is the Village Development Network (VDN) which coordinates an Animation Programme in three rural communities in the Province. By animation, it tends to mean "motivation, stimulation and encouragement among local community members to critically question their conditions of living and resolve, collectively, to take action to redress the situation" (VDN brochure). Its basic principles of approach are (1) that people can and should determine their own development, and (2) that they themselves know what their problems are and are capable of implementing action to overcome problems and/or meet the needs identified (VDN brochure). Therefore any development work undertaken is considered to be sustained by the people themselves not reliant on continuous outside support. For that purpose, there have been such projects as carpentry training for youth, water scheme and inter-project study visits.

The Village Development Foundation (VDF), which was started as the Mungwi Village Industry Service in 1981, in the district of Kasama in Northern Province is another CDA which has initiated its programme to bring about social transformation in rural areas for people to be self-reliable. It has so far organised people in 15 villages in the province, 10 of

them concentrated in Kasama District (*Sandon News*, 1991: 3). Its programme objectives have been (1) promoting income-generating small-scale cottage industries in rural villages and so create employment, (2) dissuading the youth from migrating to urban areas, (3) bringing basic services to the rural areas which will facilitate the necessary economic development, (4) encouraging a spirit of self-reliance as the psychological springboard to development, (5) providing adult education sufficient to create awareness among the participating villagers of some of the causes of their plight and suffering, and to instill the will to overcome the difficulties in co-operation with their neighbours, (6) training the locals in more efficient food production technique and organise them to start producer co-operatives in rural areas (Mukela, 1989: 154-155). For these purposes, it has carried out several projects like women's projects for income-generation, male youth projects for skill-training, food security projects and adult literacy projects.

In Mambwe Sub-district of Chipata district in the Eastern Province, in 1989, one project was started by the Malambo Development Foundation (MDF). It aims at supporting and strengthening community-based development initiatives emanating from local villages. This foundation was established by the local Member of Parliament and local leaders, as the Malambo Development Committee (MDC) to fill the vacuum left behind following the closure of Save the Children Federation (SCF) development programme, which used to be actively working in the sub-district. To achieve its purposes, it has adopted (1) social mobilisation and organisation: setting up viable and self-reliant local groups, committees and associations, (2) self-help: encouraging use of local labour input and resources, (3) training: upgrading skills of the community in leadership and self-management, (4) establishing linkages: helping the people to have access to various development agencies and services in the country. It has

been becoming a national foundation beyond its original scope and has sponsored community development projects like training of community leaders and members, small scale agricultural production and processing, improving primary and second school education, supporting functional literacy programme, immunisation of children, construction of water wells and health centres, and stimulating small scale economic enterprises.

The Chikuse Rural Community Development and Motivation Centre which the people of Chikuse area in the Petauke District in the Eastern Province is a trial of the Chikuse local community to build self-help projects in their area (*Daily Mail*, September 24, 1991). This used to be a place where, during the rainy season, access to essential facilities like hospitals, schools, dip tanks and retail shops was difficult and people sometimes tried to cross the river at the expense of their lives, because there was no bridge. This association was initiated in 1986 by a leadership of a former Luanshya Member of Parliament. But these projects were all village oriented, initiated and managed by the local people themselves through community participation under strong grassroots leadership.

Apart from these associations, there are community development projects in rural areas, according to the list of the Registrar of Societies.

2.3.3.3 Community Development AOs (CDAOs)

There are few efforts "from below" or "from within," which cope with difficulties communities are facing. In Zambia, development of this type of organisations has been quite limited. Organisations based on communities have been established rather from above.

In the post-independent history, Village Productivity Committees (VPCs) and Ward Development Committees (WDCs), which were set up

in early 1970s on a nation-wide basis with the initiative of the state in the programme of decentralisation of decision-making and development effort, were a quasi-type of CDAOs, even though VPCs have been collapsed because "the expectations of peasants at village level that their effort would be assisted with government aid for local development projects have not been met" (Klepper, 1979: 138` They were, in principle, supposed to "mobilise individual initiative and self-help in the provision of local infrastructure and the generation of output" (Klepper, 1979: 138) and members of VPCs were elected and those of WDCs were appointed, but their original purposes had not been materialised.

2.3.3.4 Interest Development Associational Organisations (IDAOs)

IDAs are other type of AOs which are sometimes difficult to be identified because of their smallness and dispersion all over the country. Apart from detailed research in specific communities, the possible way to access the information is the list of registered society of the Registrar of Societies.

As stated earlier, similar kind of IDAs have a tendency to be concentrated in districts where there are similar geographical and industrial structures like in a district of Western Province. In Senanga District, there are nine cattle, water-oriented associations out of twenty-four registered associations. According to the file of one of such associations at the Registrar, for example, namely the Mulele Water Association, it is "willing to maintain any damage to the pond and any difficulties that will be found to be done to the pond." It is composed of 36 members.

In rural areas, women's clubs are most common associations which account for nearly one-third of all registered associations.

There are also burial societies, or funeral committees in Zambia, but these associations[17] seem to be quite an urban phenomenon according to the list. Among about 50 registered societies, nearly 30 of them are in Lusaka and Copperbelt. In districts situated in rural areas, there are no more than ten registered burial societies altogether.

2.3.3.5 Cooperatives

In this section of the chapter 2, I only refer to the organisational structure of Zambian cooperatives, and further treatment will be done in chapter 3 in the present study.

In 1989 (Annual Report for 1989, Department of Marketing and Cooperatives, Draft), the cooperative movement had one apex organisation, Zambia Cooperative Federation (ZCF), nine provincial cooperative unions (PCUs), newly established 23 district cooperative unions (DCUs), and 1571 registered primary cooperative societies with a membership of 686,943. Even though this structure looks very smooth and well-organised, this four tier system has not been so viable.

Primary cooperative societies, formed by a minimum of 10 people with a minimum share capital of K20.00, form the basis for the cooperative movement in Zambia, even though the majority are in a very weak financial position. These have been very diversified into a wide range of areas, 23 types. A majority of primary societies fall in the category of ward-multipurpose societies, which account for 843 primary societies. A multipurpose cooperative is a special form of cooperative organisation characterised by a broad range of inter-related functions which it performs to satisfy the economic needs of its members and their dependents as

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[17]On the issue of the historical dimension of the formation of urban-based association, see Epstein, 1992, chap 4-5.

farmers and/or residents of a rural areas. It is supposed to provide multipurpose service such as marketing, input supply, implement supply, credit facilities, consumer goods and so on. This type of cooperative is considered in principle to provide better service in form of package instead of sporadic service offered by various organisations. Other types of primary societies include farming/producer cooperatives, consumer cooperatives, marketeers cooperatives, saving and credit cooperatives, PTA and school cooperatives, artisans cooperatives and so on.

District Cooperative Unions (DCUs) have been recently established, and in 1989 there are 23 DCUs out of the potential 54. Their formation resulted from a commitment to ensuring decentralisation of agricultural marketing in terms of economic power and decision making. Their main functions are supposed to be as follows:

(1) Supervisions of marketing (stock inspections);
(2) Preparation and distribution of payments to farmers;
(3) Summarising marketing information;
(4) Transport allocation and logistics;
(5) Management of district sheds;
(6) Stock control;
(7) Training of society managers and marketing personnel;
(8) Sales to Millers and inter-district/provincial transfers;
(9) Sales and distribution of inputs to primary societies;
(10) Weekly district report to ZCF;
(11) Sale of equipment and farm requisites;
(12) Promote cooperative development.

There are Provincial Cooperative Unions (PCUs) in each province. They used to provide such services as development of infrastructure and transportation of products of which DCUs have taken the place. Under the present marketing system, the PCUs' main concerns are Agro-processing and coordinating roles at provincial level like preparation of provincial marketing plans, promotion of cooperative development activities, operation of Agro-Processing plants, and provision of any services as may be required by affiliates.

Apart from DCUs and PCUs, there are three other secondary societies, namely the Credit Union and Savings Association of Zambia (CUSA), the Marketeers Union, and the Zambia Army Consumer Societies Union. Among them, CUSA is the apex organisation of saving and credit unions, which mobilises savings and creates a source of credit for their members especially people in rural areas who have had limited chance of banking facilities.

The apex organisation of the cooperative movement, Zambia Cooperative Federation (ZCF), was established in 1973, and it represents all primary societies affiliated to it through the DCUs and PCUs. Its major objective is to advance and coordinate cooperative development in order to improve the economic position and the standard of living for cooperative members. ZCF's specific functions include:

(1) Monitoring of agricultural policy, pricing and statistics;
(2) Importation and consignment of farm inputs;
(3) Management of strategic stocks;
(4) Coordinate logistical requirements for agricultural marketing;
(5) Maintenance of soils and grain sheds;
(6) Promotion of cooperative development;
(7) Representation of the cooperative movement at national and international level.

ZCF basically provides supportive and supervisory service to member societies and also carries out business operations for the cooperative movement in Zambia generally.

2.3.4 "Significant" Actors in Civil Society in Zambia

In this part of the chapter so far, a variety of associations has been described almost without refering to their significance and performance in civil society. However, it will be useful to evaluate which actors are really significant, although it is also important to ask why other actors are *not*

significant. This question will be answer in the later part of this study more in detail as well as this chapter in general.

Considering the period of the one-party era and the democratic transition, the trade union has been one of the most important components of civil society in Zambia (cf. Liatto, 1989). They have a long historical background as well as relatively well working organisation. Trade unions, represented by ZCTU, have been autonomous bodies from the state, and have checked the state's policies by opposing through organised strikes in urban areas. Members from the trade union were core members of the Movement for Multi-part Democracy (MMD), which eventually defeated UNIP in 1991.

In addition, churches and church-related associations have played important roles in civil society. As analysed in detail in chapter 4, one of the main performances of the churches was the prevention of the ideological domination of the state, which was illuminated in the early 1980s when the state tried to introduce scientific socialism into school education. In the process of transition, the churches were more mediators between MMD and UNIP rather than radical opponents of MMD. What was also important in this process was that the churches functioned as a core of the formation of networks among a variety of IAOs including women's association, journalists' associations and lawyers' associations, in order to achieve free and fair multi-party elections.

However, other development-oriented AOs should not be overlooked. It is true that these AOs were not so much active in the phase of transition, there AOs have potential importance in the phase of democratic consolidation, which was considered in theory in the previous chapter, and which will be also discussed in this study later, namely chapter 3 and chapter 5.

2.4 The Case of Botswana

According to the list of registered societies obtained at the Registrar of Societies of the Ministry of Labour and Home Affairs, there are nearly seven hundred societies including sports and recreational clubs, burial societies, professional associations and women's organisations apart from religious societies.

There is a tendency for concentration and diversification of associations in urban areas. Among associations classified into "professional associations," 41 out of 52 associations are located in the capital, Gaborone, and in the case of "miscellaneous" associations such as the Botswana Red Cross Society and the Botswana Bus-Taxi Association, 50 out of 64 are situated in Gaborone.

As in the case of Zambia, following are Christian churches and para-church organisations, IAO, and DAOs in this order.

2.4.1 Churches and Para-church Organisations

In March 1992, there were 211 registered religious societies in Botswana. Some of them have only one branch in the country, and others have about 70 branches like the United Congregational Church of Southern Africa (UCCSA). This means that there are quite a lot of "independent churches"[18] in Botswana. Table 2-8 may give an idea of the extent of Christianisation in Botswana, even though the data is rather old[19].

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[18]Here, the term of "independent churches" is used to refer to churches independent of "global" churches.

[19]Relatively new data, which was collected a Motswana scholar has been recently appeared (see, Amanze, 1994a).

Table 2-8 Christian Churches in Botswana

Church or Mission	No. of Branches (1983)	Communicants, Full Members (1967 estimate)	Total Christian Community (1967 estimate)
Church of the Province of Central Africa	-	1,400	-
Dutch Reformed Church	11	3,860*	21,600*
Apostolic Faith Mission	-	-	-
Assemblies of God	16	-	-
Evangelical Lutheran Church	16	30,000	50,000
United Congregational Church of Southern Africa	70	7,481	12,128
Methodist Church of South Africa	-	4,437	6,508
Seventh-Day Adventist Church	10	2,311	-
Society of Friends	-	-	-
United Freedom Church of Scotland	-	2,000	5,000
Roman Catholics	14	-	8,000
Others	526	-	-

Source: Wakelin Coxill et al., 1968: 60-61, 220-221; Fako, 1983. * data of 1962.

2.4.1.1 Botswana Christian Council

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In comparison with Zambia which has three main mother bodies of Christian churches, there is the one coordinating body of relatively large churches and para-church organisations, the Botswana Christian Council (BCC) in Botswana. Current membership of BCC is shown in the table 2-9.

The BCC was founded in May 1966 by four churches, namely the Anglican, the London Missionary Society (UCCSA), the Methodist and the United Free Church of Scotland who met in the capital, Gaborone, to discuss the take over of the operations of a small inter-church relief programme known as the Northern Bechuanaland Christian Council (BCC Brochure). What is different in comparison with Zambia is that the BCC has been joined not only by Protestant churches but also by the Roman Catholic Church which is not so large an organisation in Zambia.

So far the BCC has a total membership of 34 churches (out of 211 registered religious societies) and other Christian organisations.

The BCC is basically existing "to serve the churches, to enable them to serve God and His people in need" (BCC Brochure). It is also a national body which associate with the All Africa Conference of Churches and the World Council of Churches at the international level. Internally, it "serves to bring the churches togethe₁ and engages them actively in development projects, welfare work, mission, evangelism, indirect youth service through Brigades, women's work and other emergencies that may arise from time to time" (BCC Brochure).

Table 2-9 Membership of the Botswana Christian Council

1. African Methodist Episcopal
2. African Mission Church
3. Anglican Church
4. Association of Medical Missions for Botswana
5. Kgolagano College of Theological Education by Extenuation in Botswana
6. Bible Society in Botswana
7. Christian Women's Fellowship
8. Church of God in Christ
9. Church of Jesus Christ
10. Dutch Reformed Church in Botswana
11. Evangelical Lutheran Church in Botswana
12. Evangelical Lutheran Church in Southern Africa
13. Love of God Church
14. Mennonite Ministries in Botswana
15. Methodist Church of Southern Africa
16. New Convert Church in Christ Mission
17. Revelation Blessed Peace Church
18. Roman Catholic Church
19. The Saint Apostolic Church
20. St. John's Apostolic Faith Mission
21. St. Luke's Gospel Church
22. St. Patmos Apostolic Faith Mission
23. St. Paul's Apostolic Faith Mission
24. United Congregational Church of Southern Africa
25. Young Women's Christian Association
26. The Herman Church
27. St. Isaac Church in Salvation
28. Hallelujah Apostolic Church
29. Emau Christian Church
30. Jacob's Ladder Church
31. Orthodox Church in Botswana
32. Church World Service
33. Church Radio Council
34. Jesus Generation Movement

2.4.1.2 Para-Church Organisations

The Botswana Young Women's Christian Association (YWCA) is one of the largest Christian associations in Botswana, which was initially formed in Kanye in 1962. The national organisation started its activities in 1971. Its objectives are (1) to develop and coordinate the work of the YWCA throughout Botswana, (2) to build a fellowship of women and girls devoted to practicing the principles of Christian living in all aspects of individual and community life and to accept the basis and purpose of the World YWCA, (3) to serve the community without distinction of race, nationality or religion, (4) to work in common fellowship with members of the Association in all parts of the World (*Botswana YWCA, Five Years Plan 1988-1992*: 14). At the local level, the YWCA clubs have teaching and income-generating programmes of self improvement for members like those of handicraft, home management, hygiene, and vegetable production. At the national level, the YWCA operates a variety of projects like a Day Care Centre, a Commercial School, a Hostel for Women. It also offers Home Economics classes mainly to young women and tutoring classes for junior certificate and 'O' Level for those who wish to reset examinations.

The Christian Women's Fellowship, which was started in 1975, is another Christian organisation involved in women in development issues. Its objectives are (1) to promote the high recognition of the World Day of Player in Botswana on an ecumenical basis, (2) to promote Christian home and family life, (3) to stimulate creative thinking in leaders who are committed to Christian renewal, (4) to promote leadership development and the sharing of experiences with other women in

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Botswana, (5) to promote Christian women's awareness of youth problems and projects in Botswana. Its activities have covered sponsoring annual seminars on topics related to national development, leadership training courses, community needs assessments, feasibility studies and market research.

In the field of health, the Association of Medical Missions in Botswana (AMMB) is the coordinating body of missions' medical activities, which runs three mission hospitals and other mission clinics. Apart from medical involvements, it has organised engineering workshops to provide repairs and maintenance of the various equipment in hospitals and other mission members. In addition, it has also involved in AIDS education.

There are some other Christian organisations like the Bible Society and the Council for Refugees. Also, the Christian Radio Council, which is consisted of 22 churches, has been producing radio programmes.

4.2. Interest Associational Organisations (IAOs)

2.4.2.1 Trade Union and Employment Organisation

The Botswana Federation of Trade Unions (BFTU), which was formed in 1977, is the mother body of existing trade unions in Botswana. This formation was initially called by the President as early as 1971. But because the trade union movement in Botswana "really got under way in the early 1970s," and "the individual unions were concentrating on building up their membership and organisation rather than on forming a federation," the formation of the federation was delayed (*South African Labour Bulletin*, 1980: 59). At the time of March 1992, there are fifteen trade unions in Botswana as shown in table 2-10. Even though there are

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no reliable data on the present membership of each union, out of 220,000 workers about between 35,000 and 40,000 have been organised into trade unions (interview with the Executive Secretary of BFTU, 19 March 1992)[20].

Table 2-10 Membership of Trade Unions in Botswana

Name	Actual Membership (estimate 1979)	Approx. No. of Membership (estimate 1979)
Air Botswana Employees Union	not existent	not existent
Botswana Housing Cooperation Staff Union	not existent	not existent
Central Bank Union	?	?
Botswana Diamond Sorters Valuators Union	45	45
Botswana Railway Workers Union	600	600
National Development Bank Staff Union	not existent	not existent
Botswana Bank Employees Union	550	550
Botswana Meat Workers Union	650	650
Botswana Railway Senior Staff Union	100	100
Botswana Mining Workers Union	2,000	4,000
National Amalgamated Local and Central Government and Parastatal Manual Workers Union	4,600	8,850
Botswana Postal Service Workers Union	not existent	not existent
Botswana Vaccine Institute Staff Union	not existent	not existent
Botswana Telecommunications Employees Union	not existent	not existent
Botswana Commercial and General Workers Union	655	10,000

Source: Compiled from data of the Registrar of Societies, Gaborone.
   South African Labour Bulletin, 1980:56.
   * This name list comes from the Registrar of Societies in March 1992.
   ** "not existent" means that it did not exist in 1979.

The Botswana Confederation of Commerce, Industry and Manpower (BOCCIM), which used to be the Botswana Employers' Federation BEF), is on the other side of the industrial relations in Botswana. With its membership of more than one thousand of large and small enterprises (List of membership, BOCCIM Secretariat) which employed more than 60,000 persons, it quite strongly represents the interests of the private sectors. It has also influence on government policies affecting the private sector through its representation on various

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[20]According to a more recent interview with the Executive Secretary of the BFTU, only 6 percent of all workers were organised (10 August 1996).

advisory bodies such as the National Employment and Income Council (NEMIC) and its sub-committees, the Labour Advisory Board, Minimum Wage Board, Land Allocation Committee, and Regulations Review Committee. It is actively working through such programs as the Botswana Management Assistance Programme (B-MAP), which was designed to assist the solution of problems facing small business and new start-up business.

2.4.2.2 Other Professional AOs

According to the list of registered societies under the Societies Act (Cap. 18: 01), there are 52 associations classified into professional associations. These professions include accountants, traders, engineers, dental therapists, physio-therapists, primary and secondary school teachers, architects, taxi and bus drivers, environmentalists, nurses, workers of hotels and tourism and scientists. What should be pointed out is that most of these association's headquarters' offices are concentrated in the capital, Gaborone.

(a) Journalists

The Botswana Journalists Association (BOJA), which was registered with the Registrar of Societies in 1974, is the organisation of journalists in Botswana. In spite of its nearly 20 years existence, it had been dormant until 1990 because of delayed growth of private press. But since then it has actively worked for the purpose of "freedom of press" and recently it has been resolved to reorganise it into a trade union (BOJA Conference in March 1992).

(b) Cultural Associations

There are several associations which are classified into "cultural associations" in the list of the Registrar of Societies. Among these associations, some are a kind of groups involved in cultural activities like drama, arts, but others are "primary associations" like the Hosanna Traditional Association in Ramokgwebana and the Kwame Traditional Associations in Nata.

(c) Farmers

According to the same list, there are six associations categorised into farmers' associations[21], which are supposed to be non-profit oriented. But concerning farmers' associations, there is the other system of registration as agricultural management associations (AMAs) under the Ministry of Agriculture. AMAs are registered groups of farmers working in profit-oriented agricultural production. In 1989, there are four dairy AMAs, one fisheries, thirteen horticulture AMAs, and twenty cattle ranching AMAs (NORAD, 1989: 143-144).

(d) Women

As in Zambia, there are women's organisations active in Women in Development, and sixteen registered women's organisations including such Christian associations already mentioned above as the YWCA and the Christian Women's Fellowship. Among them, the Botswana Council

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[21]Six associations which are categorised into farmers associations and registered at the Registrar are Tati Farmers Association, Botswana Mill Owner Association, Botswana Molopo Farmers Association, Botswana Society for Agricultural Development, Ghanzi Farmers Association, and Tuli Block Farmers Association.

of Women (BCW) is the largest one in Botswana. The BCW was formed in 1965 and had 302 branches with over 6,000 members in seven districts. BCW's objectives are (1) to develop good citizenship among the women in Botswana, (2) to encourage higher standards of living in Botswana and in particular all aspects of women's work, (3) to promote mutual understanding between women of different countries and cultures, and (4) to undertake and finance such practical projects as the development of schools, clinics, creches, home craft centres and all aspects of adult education.

There is one women's organisation of a more progressive nature. It is the Emang Basadi Women's Association started in 1986 by a group of urban-based, progressive women like women in the university and in business. Its basic purpose is to enhance the position of women socially, economically and politically. For this purpose, the Emang Basadi's focus has been "Women and the Law," with the aim of mobilising for removal of discriminatory laws which undermine the social, political and economic development of women. It has had established a permanent secretariat for daily work.

The Business and Professional Women's Clubs of Botswana is composed of three separate clubs in Gaborone, Mochudi and Maun. Among them, the Gaborone club was established as early as in 1972. Its objective areas include the promotion of the interests of business and professional women by combined actions, the continuing occupational and professional training, the awareness of business and professional women on their responsibilities in a broader social and economic context. For this purpose they have been involved in community development activities.

(e) Students

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The University-based students' union is one of the politically quite sensitive organisations in Botswana. One event, which happened during my research trip in March 1992, well illustrates this sensitivity. It is the fact that students took to the streets in protest against the first "scandal" of senior ministers in the history of Botswana. (*Botswana Guardian*, 13 March 1992)[22].

2.4.3 Development Associational Organisations

2.4.3.1 National Service DAOs

In Botswana, there are various kinds of service-type associations composed of membership of individuals and groups. One of the association which I came across that does not have membership and managed by just a limited number of people is Thusanao Lefatsheng (Terre Aide Botswana).

(a) Education

The Foundation For Education with Production (FEP)[23], which was established in 1981 by Patrick van Rensburg, has emphasised the development of an appropriate educational system geared to meet the needs of the whole population. The Mmegi Publishing Trust, which was formally inaugurated in 1988, has its principal objective of building

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[22]After the issue of the report of the Presidential Commission led by Kgabo, "Kgabo Report", which revealed that two Minister, namely the Vice-President, Peter Mmusi and the Minister of Agriculture and BDP Secretary General, Daniel Kwelagobe, together with MP for Kgatleng/Tlokweng, Washington Meswele were involved in the illicit land dealings in Mogaditshane, these two cabinet ministers resigned immediately.

[23]The FEP was originally based in Botswana, but it is now operating internationally, especially in southern Africa.

Mmegi wa Digang/The Reporter[24] into a viable national newspaper that can sustain itself in the interim[25] and laying the basis for the development of journalism in Botswana in the long term.

(b) Health

In the issue of health, the Botswana Red Cross Society is the largest body in Botswana. Its objectives, which is based on the Geneva Convention, include a variety of areas including the improvement of health, emergency relief services, training of youth and children. For these purposes, it has carried out such projects as Primary Health Care (PHC) and Community-Based Rehabilitation (CBR) of the World Health Organisation, disaster preparedness and relief programme, and health education.

In the narrower area of family planning, the Botswana Family Welfare Association (BOFWA) started its activities in 1988. Its objectives are mainly on educational aspects of family planning. They are (1) to collect information on, and advance education in family planning and responsible parenthood in the interest of family welfare and community well-being, (2) to increase understanding by people of Botswana of the demographic problems of their own country and of the world, (3) to advocate for and promote the provision of information and education, particularly human psychology, sexual developments and human reproduction, and so on.

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[24]This newspaper was originally a newsletter of the Serowe Brigade. Currently this weekly, whose mission is recognised as a campaign newspaper to advocate equity and accountability, is the most popular one in Botswana.
[25]According to the editor, the number of circulation of this newspaper has been gradually increasing, which seems to be entrenched in the society (Personal Interview with the editor, Mr.Mubya 20 March, 1992).

(c) Children and Youth

In the issue area of children and youth, the Child to Child Foundation of Botswana has been involved in activities of pre-school education in cooperation with schools.

The Bona Ba Rona Trust was established and registered in 1988 to organise and coordinate the initiatives of individuals and organisations who try to alleviate the plight of street children, whose numbers were swelling quite rapidly.

The Botswana Girl Guides Association, which provides opportunities for 5600 girls and women to develop character and commitment to serve others, has been involved in a number of special projects like children's literacy school and youth truing centre for the purpose of providing girls and women with opportunities for self training in the development of character, responsible citizenship and service to the community.

The Botswana Workcamp Association, which began in 1980 and has nearly 800 members of secondary school ages, has undertaken tasks of manual labour to assist development in rural areas especially during school breaks.

(d) Rural Development

Two other associations are active in rural development individually. The Cooperation for Research, Development and Education (CORDE) is a rather unusual in its structure. It is an organisation promoting activities of self-managed producer groups. Organisationally it is composed of 21 member producer groups and staff of CORDE who are

employed makes the Technical Support Team (TST) in order to provide various support of member producer groups to promote their viability.

The Thusano Lefatsheng (TL) is another organisation engaged in rural development through agricultural research, extension and marketing. TL aims to meet the needs of rural people for alternative sources of income by developing cash crops and collecting products from the wild like the Kalahari Devil's Claw[26] and techniques and extending these to farmers in rural areas, especially women.

(e) Environment

On the environmental issues, there is the Environmental Liaison Group, which is an affiliation of six AOs concerned with environment of Botswana. Among individual organisations, two of them have been directly involved in this issue areas.

The Kalahari Conservation Society (KCS), which was inaugurated in 1982 in recognition of the pressures on Botswana's environment, is one of the most active AOs in this area. Its objectives are (1) to promote knowledge of Botswana's rich wild life and its environment through education and publicity, (2) to encourage, and in some cases finance, research into issues affecting these resources and their conservation, (3) to promote and support policies of conservation towards wildlife and its habitat. So it has carried out research and management projects. Also it assists government anti-poaching, project implementation, and lobbies government where necessary and education in primary and secondary schools as well as for decision makers and the general public.

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[26]Devil's Claw (Grapple/Harpagophytum procumbens) is a plant which grows in the Kalahari Desert of Botswana and Namibia. This is a well known traditional medicine which has been also recommended by healers in Europe for a variety of illness. Thusano Lefatsheng employs rural women to do the crushing of the dried material and the packaging to support their activities of income generation.

The Forestry Association of Botswana (FAB) formed in 1983 is another environmental issue-oriented association which is working to find practical ways to prevent the disappearance of timber and to encourage forestry in Botswana.

Two others are the Botswana Society and one of its branches, the Botswana Bird Club. The Botswana Society, which was established in 1969, has existed for the purpose of encouraging an interest in research in the natural and social sciences, the humanities and the arts, particularly where such subjects are related to Botswana. For that purpose it has organised a big conference with overseas participation. The Bird Clubs, encouraging and promoting an interest in and knowledge of birds, is also active in scientific research.

(f) Coordinating Bodies[27]

There have been two coordinating or collaborating bodies in the issue area of rural development. On the one hand, it is the Forum on Sustainable Agriculture (FONSAG), which was established in 1990. It has two main objectives, (1) to develop and facilitate collaboration between non-governmental organisations like the CORDE, the FAB, and the TL, which have technical know-how, rural poor farmers, who have formed small groups, and the government in terms of information exchange and joint planning in agricultural development, (2) to develop understanding of sustainable agriculture and natural resource management. It has two main programmes. Firstly, it is information dissemination programme which includes both collection and distribution. Secondly, it is outreach programme like seminars and workshops.

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[27]In 1995, the NGO coordinating body, namely the Botswana Council for NGOs (BOCONGO), was finally established.

Non-governmental Organisation Consortium composed of five local NGOs, on the other hand, was the special case which worked in the narrow area of the development of three farms which had been embarked for the Remote Area Dwellers (RADs) in the Ghanzi District. Since its formation about August 1989, it has experienced various problems including not only operational but also political problems, which will be analysed in chapter 5 (NGO Consortium, 1991: 4), and dissolved in 1991.

(g) Government Non-governmental Organisations (GONGO)

The Rural Industry Promotion (RIP), which was initiated by the Ministry of Commerce and Industry and the Friederich Ebert Foundation in 1972 and was registered as a company limited by guarantee (non-profit) in 1974, has been involved in the area of the creation of rural employment by developing job creating industries. It is a mother body of two main projects, namely the Rural Industries Innovation Centre (RIIC) in Kanye and the Pioneer Rural Industries Centre (PRICE) in Palapye. The RIIC has been involved in a number of programmes of practical research and development, the manufacture of products involving appropriate technologies and training.

PRICE's main project is a One-Stop Service Centre for Agriculture, which provides a variety of services to farmers. Even though their importance in rural development has been recognised, they cannot be autonomous organisations in civil society, because members of the main policy making body of the RIP, the Board of Directors, are appointed by the Minister of Commerce and Industry, and main source of income is still from the government.

The Botswana Technology Centre (BTC), which was originally set up as a parastatal organisation in 1979 with a Board of Directors composed

of senior civil servants representing appropriate Ministries, plus representatives of the Botswana Development Corporation and the RIP, has been involved in serving and coordinating all technology endeavours within Botswana as a private company limited by guarantee so far. As in the case of the RIP, the BTC is also heavily dependent for its fund on the government.

4.3.2 Community Service Development Associational Organisations (CSDAOs)

The Southern Rural Development Association (SRDA)[28] with its headquarters at Kanye, was founded in 1978 to assist rural development in the Southern District. Its main objectives include creating employment, training of residents, self-sufficiency, carrying out innovative programmes, conserving natural resources, publicising the work of SRDA through reports and other media and so on. For these purpose it used to carry out various projects like sorghum mills and blockyards throughout the District, but SRDA has faced difficulties and reduced its projects because of financial problem and mis-management.

The Pitsane Villages Production Project Trust, which was formally established in 1983 to promote and support small scale entrepreneurial activities, is a joint project of six villages: Pitsane, Dinatshana, Bethel, Tlhareseleele, Phitshane, Potlokwe and Rakhuna. It provide technical support to textile producers, the majority of whom are individual dressmakers or knitters, horticultural projects and other projects as they develop.

The Pelegano Village Industries, which was initiated in 1974 in Serowe and moved to Gabane near Gaborone in 1975 where it was

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[28]Political characteristics of the SRDA will be raised later in this chapter.

formally registered in 1976, has been involved in a variety of village industries like sorghum milling, pottery and coffin making for employment creation. It has several objectives such as initiating and integrating a community uplift programme, research, development and promotion of village industries, providing facilities for village industries, providing management, production and marketing assistance, but its main trust is to help the poorest families in rural areas.

Even though the South East Growers Association (SEGA), which began to trade in vegetables in 1982, used to provide a market for six horticultural cooperatives and individual producers in South Eastern Botswana, and sell the produce to consumers retailers and wholesalers, it has stopped its function.

2.4.3.3 Community Development Associational Organisations (CDAOs)

Among types of Community Development Associational Organisations (CDAOs), the Brigades movement is the most distinctive one in Botswana. Brigades are officially defined as "autonomous, community based, predominantly rural organisations" (*BRIDEC, Annual Report 1990-1991*: 6). "Each brigades centre has its own specific set of objectives, but these broadly include the provision of production and commerce, vocational training and development activities. These activities are generally aimed at providing for those who are not normally included in other development programmes, such as providing training for standard seven school-leavers, jobless residents of rural areas where there are few other employers, and goods and services to those would otherwise have import them from distant towns or even from outside the country"(*BRIDEC, Annual Report 1990-1991*: 6). In 1990/91, there are 27 registered brigades throughout the county, and they employed

approximately 1,300 people and trained 1482 trainees in accordance with the Brigades Development Centre (BRIDEC), through which government support to the brigades has been directed since 1976.

Historically, the first brigade was, as is well known, founded in 1965 in Serowe, the largest village at that time, by Patrick van Rensburg, a South African exile, as a response to the "school leaver problems." His personal view of the history of the brigade movement can be found in his own works (van Rensburg, 1974; 1978; 1984), and one observer has shown us the process of transformation of the movement (Parsons, 1983 ;1989). A phrase of Parsons concisely summarises the history of the brigades.

> "...One brigade proliferated into many, and spread to other centres, becoming a movement. But while the ideology of the movement developed through cooperative ideas into ideas of total communal transformation, the actual institutions of the movement were coopted by government and gradually formalised into the lowest level of national post-primary vocational education." (1989: 29).

The Village Development Committees (VDCs), which are coordinating bodies of various AOs, especially interest development associations (IDAs) at the village level, are other CDAOs. In theory, they are "village parliaments" elected every two years at the kgotla. They are usually supposed to be involved in "the provision of basic social infrastructure - clinics, classrooms, teachers' quarters, public latrines, dikgotla" (Brown, 1983: 41). But it has been reported that the most effective VDCs are those that work hand-in-hand with traditional institutions like kgotla. The VDCs, by itself, is incapable of mobilising broad-based community action (Brown, 1983: 42).

2.4.3.4 Interest Development Associational Organisations (IDAOs)

As Willet's comprehensive research shows (Willet, 1981), there were and are a variety of IDA-type groups, which were founded with the initiative or assistance of an extension worker from the government in any particular area. They include farmers' committees, farmers' associations[29], dam groups, drift fence groups, TGLP commercial Areas ranching groups, tractor syndicates, small stock husbandry groups, horticultural groups, women's groups, fisheries groups, parents and teachers associations (PTAs) and other projects like those of poultry, bundling.

Just in terms of numbers, there are quite a few IDAO-type groups all over the country. But the interesting phenomenon of all IDAO-type groups being quite similar has been pointed out by one researcher (Brown, 1983: 43). This is because of the fact that extension workers can only help form and support those type of groups with which their training and supervision makes them familiar with and it is difficult for them to help to establish a new type of organisation, responding to specific local needs.

In addition; this "top-down" approach of relying heavily on an extension worker has caused another kind of problem of viability of IDAO-type groups, because establishment of new types of organisation may occur and this might lead to the duplication of roles and the demise of previous organisation, when new extension workers arrive in the places where there have been some organisations.

Burial societies are commonly observable IDAOs in Botswana. In spite of their importance at the level of villages studied by Brown (1982), they seem to be also important in urban and peri-urban lives according to the list of the Registrar, which shows their location. Out of 204 registered

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[29]"Farmers Associations" are different from FCs in that their membership is restricted to those who join, that members are required payment of joining fee or subscription, and that their activities are for members themselves. Therefore in my categorisation, FAs are classified into interest development associations (IDAs).

societies, 107 societies are situated in Gaborone, 31 in Ramotswa, 13 in Mochudi, 7 in Lobatse, 6 in Mahalapye, 5 in Orapa, and Selebi-Phikwe respectively, 3 in Molepolole and Serowe and so on. One of the reasons of importance of societies in cities and towns is that resident in urban areas want to be buried in their villages so that they have to prepare for their sudden death which will be expensive because a casket has to be bought, the body must be kept for a few days and be transported to the village (Feddema, 1990:31).

2.4.3.5 Cooperatives

In Botswana, the history of cooperative movement is relatively new. Even though there was a movement towards the formation of a cooperative societies in 1949 in the Bamangwato Reserve by Tshekedi Khama in the Bechuanaland Protectorate, this scheme was not materialised because of the political troubles in this reserve (BNA, S215/6/2). Another movement to organise a cooperative society came from 16 people of the Bakalanga in 1953 (BNA, S215/6/2), this movement was not welcomed nor permitted by the Colonial Government because of the lack of qualified personnel to control and supervise societies. It was in 1959 that the impetus for the launching of cooperative movement in the Bechuanaland Protectorate has come from Oxfam. This initiative lead to a proposal for Cooperative Departments staffed by a Registrar and an assistant in both Bechuanaland and Basutholand in 1959 by Jimmy Betts, who worked in collaboration with Bert Youngjohns, the Registrar of Cooperatives in Basutholand at that time. This proposal was discussed with the Commissioner in Mafeking, Peter Fawcus, who was sympathetic to the proposal and become a main advocate in favour of the formation of cooperatives in the colonial government. Another initiative came from the Tribal Authorities, who regarded the economic potential of

cooperatives (Morgan, 1982: 5-6). It is in 1962 that a Cooperative Society Law was introduced for cooperatives to be registered. Under this law, the Swaneng Consumer Cooperative Society which registered in 1964 was the first one in the registrar of the Cooperative Movement in the country (Dept. of Cooperative Development, 1986: 4).

In 1988 (Department of Cooperative Development, 1989: 70), there are 132 primary cooperative societies, within the total membership of 69,884 and two secondary cooperative societies, namely, the Botswana Cooperative Union (BCU) as the apex and wholesale organisation of the entire cooperative movement, and the Botswana Cooperative Bank as an independent financial institution for the entire cooperative development.

There are basically four types of primary societies. Firstly, it is marketing, supply and multi-purpose cooperative societies. In 1988, though there are 19 marketing and supply cooperative societies and 58 multi-purpose societies, in fact, most of the present multi-purpose cooperative societies used to be marketing and supply societies. This conversion has happened to further societies' service. This type of cooperatives' purposes are:

(1) marketing the small scale reducers' cattle and small-stock and ensuring that they receive prices which are fair;
(2) passing on the precise Botswana Meat Commission (BMC) bonus to each individual members;
(3) distributing basic food items ensuring an even supply at fair prices;
(4) ensuring supply of necessity agricultural requirements to improve production;
(5) providing the supply of livestock inputs for the sake of an improvement in livestock production;
(6) encouraging savings by acceptance of deposits aiming at financial self-reliance of the Movement. The funds are channeled through the Botswana Cooperative Bank, to be utilised in the Cooperative   Sectors in need of capital for development projects;
(7) advancing credit, enabling the farmers to buy agricultural tools, implements, seeds etc. for the sake of modernising farming and improvement of production;
(8) marketing the farmers produce, thus having access to an efficient market system which will further encourage the farmers to increase production;
(9) supplying its members with building material for the sake of improving housing;
(10) operating sorghum service mills, dairies, petrol stations, etc.

Secondly, it is the consumer cooperative societies which are mainly located in the rural areas. In 1988, there are 14 societies, but the "number of

consumer societies might in future not anymore increase, as more and more Marketing Societies are being converted into multipurpose Societies, thus operating a shop for the supply of consumer goods and other goods" (ROB, 1986: 8). The consumer societies provide services of food items, dairy products, fruits and vegetables, groceries, butcheries, bakery products, clothes, shoes, petrol, paraffin and so on.

The third type is the thrift and loan/savings and Credit societies which were 36 in 1988. Their objectives are:

(1) to promote the economic interests of members by encouraging thrift and savings;
(2) to provide facilities to members for depositing and withdrawing savings;
(3) to grant loans to members for provident and production purposes;
(4) to encourage in members the spirit of self-help and mutual help.

The last type is producers' societies. From 1988, when there were 5 societies, to 1989, when there were 11 societies, there was a sharp increase in terms of number. They are registered profit-oriented different types of group enterprises in the field of dairy, bakery, weavers, textiles, fisheries, horticulture and so on.

The apex body of the cooperative movement in Botswana, the Botswana Cooperative Union (BCU), offers the following services:

(1) distribution of various goods including consumer goods, building materials;
(2) cattle marketing on behalf of its member societies;
(3) small stock marketing;
(4) maintaining of an insurance agency;
(5) retail advisory service;
(6) members education and publicity;
(7) fruits and vegetable shop;
(8) cash and carry.

The other secondary society, the Botswana Cooperative Bank, has its main objective to promote the economic development of the cooperative sector by rendering a full range of banking services to cooperative societies. As its function it is (1) receiving deposits/sav ngs from societies and the general public, (2) lending funds to cooperati e societies, (3) acting as an apex organisation for savings and credit societies.

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2.4.4 Active Actors in Civil Society in Botswana

According to Holm and Molutsi (1990), the number of active actors in civil society is quite limited, apart from an environmental IAO, KCS and the employers' organisation BOCCIM. Therefore, one of their conclusions was "weak civil society" in Botswana, although this country has been famous for its continuous multi-party democracy.

Therefore, it is not so meaningful to identify "significant actors" in civil society. What is more meaningful in the case of Botswana is to ask why there are few active actors in the civic realm and what role AOs will play in the democratic consolidation in Botswana. These will be among the main concerns in the later chapters.

2.5 Characterisation of Civil Society: Similarities and Differences of Diversity of AOs in Zambia and Botswana

As has been described so far, there have been various types of organisations in Zambia and Botswana. In this part of the chapter, characteristics of the diversity of AOs in both countries will be argued based on the description so far and some additional data.

It will be useful to summarise the description in this chapter into a table for visual comparison (see table 2-11 at the end of the chapter).

2.5.1 Similar Type of AOs: From a Comparative Perspective

2.5.1.1 Churches and Para-church Organisations

Concerning churches and para-church organisations, there are several differences between Zambia and Botswana. First, in Zambia, there

have been three main associations of churches and para-church organisations into which various churches have been well organised. In Botswana, there is only one coordinating body, namely the Botswana Christian Council (BCC), but there are quite a few independent churches[30] which have not belonged to the BCC.

Second, there is a variety of para-church organisations like the Mindolo Ecumenical Foundation and Makeni Ecumenical Centre in Zambia, which have been deeply involved in developmental activities, whose counterparts do not exist in Botswana.

Thirdly, in Zambia three mother bodies have been more involved cooperatively mainly in political issues, in some cases as big voices against the state, and, in others, as a mediator by establishing such organisations as the Zambia Election Monitoring Coordinating Committee (ZEMCC) and its successor, the Foundation for Democratic Process (FODEP)[31] than the BCC. It can be pointed out as a similarity that, in both countries, churches have been multi-dimensional actors which have been working in various areas as will be argued later in chapter 4.

In this study (chapter 3), Christian churches mainly refered to will be mainline churches, which have been actively involved in the process of democratisation. Therefore, fundamentalist churches known as "the New Right" will not be refered to so much, although these churches have been active in the region of southern Africa as detailed by Gifford (1988), which have their origin in the United States and have different political

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[30]On the issue of independent churches in Botswana, see a recent article by Van Binsbergen (1993).

[31]The FODEP, whose core is the churches, intends "to work to strengthen the institutions and operations of democracy in the Third Republic of Zambia" (Constitution of FODEP). According to the constitution, its objectives includes to promote a new political culture of civic responsibility through education about the rights and responsibilities of both leaders and citizens, to speak out on issues that may threaten the democratic process, and even to promote a recognition of necessary role in a democracy of a strong opposition and of various civic organisations (ibid.).

agenda, including opposition to social care service and support to free enterprise and military expenditure (Gifford, 1988: vii).

2.5.1.2 IAOs

In both countries, there are currently various IAOs including trade unions, professional associations and women's organisations. Considering the diversity stated above, it can be observed that there are more types of professional associations in Zambia, which may support the hypothesis proposed by Bratton (1989b: 427) that "associational life is likely to be most developed in economies that have undergone the greatest degree of indigenous capitalist industrialization." These situations, which will lead to the diversification of economic activities, are favourable for social classes "to have constructed an economic base independent of the state and a set of shared interests that are best defended by autonomous political action" (Bratton, 1989b: 427).

These "favourable socio-economic conditions" for IAOs to be formed have been created in the historical process of economic development, and the process of "institutionalisation" of specific associations and improvement of their organisational strength happened in the same process as well as in the state's strategic position toward IAOs. Considering the background of economic development and the process of industrialisation, there are striking differences between Zambia and Botswana as overviewed earlier part of this chapter.

In Zambia, where the beginning of mining industry can be traced back to the late 1920s, it is as early as the same period when the first "modern associations" by like-minded men and women who tried to help each other in the copperbelt towns. During the British colonial period, there were a series of militant strikes organised by the African mine

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workers demanding for better wages and living conditions, and to end to the color bar. In addition, trade unions became one of major actors in nationalist politics towards independence. Politicised nature of trade union has been kept, and the ZCTU was a big oppositional force in the Second Republic. Its organisational strength has been shown in the formation process of the Movement for Multiparty Democracy (MMD). It has large organisational network all over the country through voluntary-basis district committees which mobilised people's support to that new movement (interview with ZCTU officers, 20 February 1992), which is present ruling party.

In Botswana, where industrialisation was delayed, the formation of various associations was relatively a new phenomenon as are the cases of trade unions which were only formed in early 1970s. In addition, they are deliberately controlled by the state (Good, 1992: 85-86), and, among about 234,000 labours, 50 percent of which are in the export-oriented sectors, only 6 percent are members of the Botswana Federation of Trade Unions in 1994 (interview with Deputy Executive Secretary of the BFTU, 6 August 1996).

Therefore, it can be concluded that, in Zambia, material bases of civil society have relatively developed as a result of early industrialisation and even organisational bases has established through a historical and political experiences. In Botswana, however, this is not the case. Actors' organisational base is by far weaker than that in Zambia.

2.5.1.3 Other IAOs

In the case of women's associations, variety itself is not so much different. Some are involved mainly in development projects, and others in improvement of legal status of women. But one of differences is that in

Zambia, there is a coordinating, and umbrella body of associations involved in women in development, the NGO Coordinating Committee (NGOCC), which was initiated by local progressive women after the United Nations decade for Women Conference in 1985, but there is no counterpart in Botswana, though there used to be a coordinating body, the Association of Botswana Women's Organisations (ABWO) which was established by the government initiative in early 1980s, but was dissolved. This means that network of society has been developing in Zambia among women's IAOs. In addition, the formation of the National Women's Lobby Group (NWLG) in Zambia, which is an active pressure group on women's issue, is another difference which shows development of civil society in Zambia.

Among IAOs in Botswana, the most organised and advocative organisation is the Botswana Confederation of Commerce, Industry and Manpower, which was formerly the Botswana Employers' Federation. As stated above, it has taken part in various government committees and has kept ties with government officers to influence government policies. In the context of relatively weak organisational formation in Botswana, this association can be considered of "bourgeois class action as a social movement" captured by M.J.Sklar (1988), even though much more research will be necessary on this issue. In Zambia as well, apart from the observation that the Employer's Federation has kept its informal ties with ministries, "bourgeois elements" have played a part of the transition to multi-party system, through taking part in the MMD and establishing the independent newspaper, the *Weekly Post* in the transition period. These actions will be considered in the context of the transformation of the relation between the state and civil society.

2.5.1.4 DAOs

(a) NSDAOs

Among the third category of AOs, namely development associational organisations (DAOs), various national service development associational organisations (NSDAOs) have been active in both countries. They have been involved in various issue areas such as education, health, population, self-help development, rural development, youth and children, women in development, and environment, with their target groups being women, youth, child, and others who face problems in some way. Therefore the diversity of issue areas of involvement itself is seemingly not so much different, even though there is a variety of approaches, management styles and degree of success of individual NSDAOs.

One of differences in organisational terms is that so far there has not been formed a formal network of NSDAOs in Botswana, while in Zambia there has been the Zambia Council for Social Development (ZCSD) as an umbrella body[32]. Even so, during my stay in Botswana, there appeared a move to form such a formal network among "NGOs."

Considering issue areas deliberately, however, we can find several differences. First, on environmental issues, there established a liaison group collaboratingly working on that issue, while there is not a counterpart in Zambia. Second, in Botswana, there have been concerted efforts of several NSDAOs on a specific issue area by forming an *ad hoc* coordinating body like NGO consortium, which has not been the case in Zambia even though there are collaboration among individual NSDAOs. Thirdly, it is the difference of formation period of NSDAOs in the similar issue areas, although formation period of NSDAOs is concentrated in the

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[32]This AO was under reconstruction and did not function during my research period.

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1980s in both countries apart from several exceptions. For example, in the issue area of family planning, there has been the Planned Parenthood Association of Zambia (PPAZ) since 1972, while in Botswana the counterpart, the Botswana Family Welfare Association (BOFWA) was only established in 1988. I will return to the difference in chapter 5 for further consideration.

One of similarities of NSDAOs in both countries is that most NSDAOs are based in urban areas, especially capitals, and they are run by small groups composed of people with progressive ideas. In addition, it often happens in both countries that the executive secretary of one organisation is not only a member of other NSDAOs but also, in some cases, the chairperson or the vice chairperson of another NSDAO. In this context, especially in Botswana, after the co-optation of the brigades in the governmental structure, there have established several associations like FEP, CORDE, and Mmegi Publishing Trust following the ideal of Patrick van Rensburg.

(b) Other DAOs

As described above, Community Service Development AOs (CSDAOs) has developed particular areas in both countries, although there may be much more these activities in other parts of the countries[33]. One of the characteristics of CSDAOs is that those AOs were usually formed by retired civil servants and other community leaders. Main purposes include job creation, training for employment and so on. Therefore, there are similarities between CSDAOs in both Zambia and Botswana. However, as happened in the case of the ZCROF, there has been "interference with

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[33]It is because we do not have any feasible means to conduct comprehensive researches to identify "all" existing associations.

internal affairs" of local politicians of the United National Independent Party (UNIP) in the Second Republic (interview with a research officer of the ZCROF). In Botswana, the Southern Rural Development Association (SRDA) is the case. SRDA was started by the members of the BDP[34] with financial assistance of the Friedrich-Ebert Foundation[35], this was used by the ruling party as a counterweight to the brigade in Kanye which was in initiated by the pro-BNF notables. This tendency is also the case of the other community-oriented AOs, namely Community Development Associational Organisations (CDAOs).

In the case of CDAOs which are mainly located in rural areas, some have been established by the initiative of the government, especially extension workers, like village productivity committees (VPCs) and Ward Development Committees (WDCs) in Zambia and village development committees (VDCs) in Botswana, and others have been originally formed by the initiative of leaders of communities like the brigades in Botswana. There is a tendency that it is difficult for this type of associations to avoid being involved in political patronage and local political struggles, because they have some power of political mobilisation. In the case of VPCs and WDCs in Zambia, as Bratton researched, because financial support from the government primarily channeled to politically powerful farmers and traders who are members of WDCs, VPCs, which could not receive enough financial supports and are composed of smaller, poorer and technologically less advanced peasant farmers usually ceased to function (1980).

In Botswana, this type of associations has been easily influenced by party politics and some associations were initiated by a political party. The

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[34]At the early stage, Masire was one of the directors who were involved in management (SRDA, undated).

[35] This Foundation related to German Social Democrats, whose headquarters is in Germany, is supposed to be the politically-oriented one which has been financially supporting the BDP.

Serowe brigade, which was the first brigade initiated by Patrick van Rensburg, was interfered with by the government and the ruling Botswana Democratic Party (BDP) in 1978 as treated in detail in chapter 4.

Even though in organisational terms CDAO-type of associations have seemingly been more developed in Botswana, they have lost or have not got autonomy as organisations in civil society. In the case of the brigades, though they have been established all over the country and they have contributed a lot to community development, in fact, they were coopted in the government's vocational education structure and became "an effective lever for achieving state control" (van Rensburg, 1984: 48). In Zambia, where organisational form of community development have been dominated by cooperatives, the emergence of this type of organisations apart from VPCs and WDCs started only in early 1980s with the initiative of ex-civil servants or ex-parliamentarians. They have not been free from the influence of the political party, namely UNIP, but they have not been coopted into the party structure. It remains to be seen what kind of actors they will be in civil society.

In the case of IDAO-type groups, there are quite a few of them are existing especially in rural areas. Owing to the support of extension workers or "top-down" approach, there have been more various groups in Botswana. Therefore, basically these groups are no more than developmental instruments of the government in rural areas. In comparison, there are limited types of groups like women's clubs, and water-oriented groups in the Western Province in Zambia. But as mentioned above, their viability is quite doubtful, even though it is not always the case as have been observed in the case of the dip tank project of Mmankgodi Farmers Association in Botswana under several favourable factors[36] (Kloppenburg, Jr, 1983). Apart from these groups, the burial

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[36]He pointed out ten factors as follows:

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societies are uniquely locally-initiated associations, which are active in both countries and are mainly based in urban areas.

In both countries, seemingly the cooperative "movement" has been organised quite well because Zambia has a four-tier organisational form with more than 1,500 primary societies and Botswana a two-tier one with 132 primary societies. In addition, in Zambia there are nearly 700,000 members which accounts for about 10 per cent of the total population and in Botswana nearly 70,000 which accounts for 5 per cent of the total population. Just in terms of number, therefore, this movement can be considered to be the largest actor in civil society in both countries which surpasses the trade union movement.

In fact, cooperatives have been so far more instruments of government in the state's "socialistic" development policy than organisations of members in Zambia because they have been set up by "top-down" approach and the secondary societies have been just put above unviable primary societies, which have failed to constitute a "movement" in civil society. In Botswana, in comparison, the cooperative has been considered to attain a fair amount of success. Among several advantages enjoyed by cooperatives in Botswana raised by Morgan (1982: 60-61), there is "the generally non-ideological and non-interventionist policies adopted by the Botswana government in the rural production and private sectors" which not only favoured the growth of cooperatives but also made a

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(1) Initiative for the formation must come from the people themselves.
(2) Responsibility for decisions and action must remain with the group.
(3) Groups must not be excessively subsidised.
(4) Technical information must be sound.
(5) Group projects must be well planned.
(6) Groups must establish an organisational structure.
(7) Groups must develop competent leadership.
(8) Financial arrangements must be equitable, well managed, and accurately documented.
(9) Consultation must be through and continuous.
(10) Comprehensive extension support must be available to groups.

difference from those in Zambia. Even though they are not instruments of government policy, as I will return in chapter 3, it is not clear how "autonomous" cooperatives in Botswana are as actors in civil society.

2.5.2 General Similarities and Differences

Based on the observation above, we can identify several similarities and differences which characterise civil society in Zambia and Botswana.

One of the similarities is urban-rural unbalance, or unevenness of development of civil society. In other words, it is that various AOs like IAOs and NSDAOs are mainly based in urban centres, which have relatively strengthened "urban civil society," while groups and organisations in rural areas have failed to become strong components of civil society because they have often been mere instruments of governments like IDAO-type groups in Botswana and cooperatives in Zambia or they have often been coopted into government structure like the Brigades in Botswana. This phenomenon means that the stagnation of "rural civil society" as we consider in detail in chapter 3.

Although it is a common characteristics that civil societies are relatively developed in the urban areas, AOs have been more diversified in Zambia than in Botswana. In addition, their organisational strength has been more developed in Zambia as can be observed in the cases of churches and trade unions, which played a major role in the impressive but peaceful transition from one-party to multi-party system in 1991. On this point following comment appeared in *Africa Demos*:

> "A Vigorous Civil Society: One of the reasons why a plural democracy
> was peacefully restored to Zambia on Oct. 31 is because it never died in
> that country. The trade union movement remained strong and enjoyed
> considerable autonomy. University students and teachers has a
> reputation for confronting the government on major issues and had
> forced the resignation of a vice chancellor in the midst of political

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battles of 1991. The churches have also successfully fought the government on several instances and enjoyed considerable moral strength as well as their own institutional resources. Together with several other professional and nongovernmental associations, such as those of lawyers, journalists, women and voluntary agencies, these civic associations played a major role in election monitoring" (vol.11: 3).

In addition, there is ideological base on the side of civil society, as will be considered in the case of churches in chapter 4.

On the other hand, AOs in Botswana have not attained their organisational strength to act against the state. As Molutsi and Holm characterised civil society in Botswana as "weak" (1990), there are two tendencies, namely (1) the characteristics of corporatism of the Botswana government and (2) the lack of capacity of organising itself on the side of society.

Another difference between Zambia and Botswana is the difference in the state capacity in terms of revenue and economic performance. Zambia, on the one hand, has been characterise as shrinking economic resources and poor economic performance. Botswana, on the other hand, can be characterised as stably expanding resources and good economic performance. This dimension of the difference of the state is one of the crucial causes of the development of civil society. It is because this means that the state in Botswana has ample material bases at its disposal to control social actors without being opposed seriously by civil society. This is not the case in Zambia.

Taking these differences into consideration, generally speaking, we can tentatively characterise civil society in Zambia as being more developed than that in Botswana, in spite of the seemingly more favourable political condition for AOs to develop more autonomously, which is provide by the multi-party system in Botswana. This is the main point of departure to attempt to determine the political causes which

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determine the development and stagnation of civil society in later parts of this study.

Table 2-11 Comparison: AOs in Zambia and Botswana (1992)

Zambia	Botswana
<Churches and Para-Church Organisations>	<Churches and Para-Church Organisations>
Christian Council of Zambia	Botswana Christian Council
Zambia Episcopal Conference	
Evangelical Fellowship of Zambia	
Mennonite Central Committee	Mennonite Ministries in Botswana
Mindolo Ecumenical Foundation	
Makeni Ecumenical Centre	
Multimedia	Church Radio Council
World Day of Prayers	
Church Medical Association Zambia	Missionary Medical Association of Botswana
Girl Guides Association	Girl Guides Association
Young Children Christian Programme	
YMCA, YWCA	YWCA
National Council of Catholic Women	Christian Women's Fellowship
Catholic Agricultural and Rural Youth Movement	
Bible Society	Bible Society
<IAOs>	<IAOs>
(Trade Union)	(Trade Union)
Zambia Congress of Trade Unions (organised about 350,000 workers)	Botswana Federation of Trade Unions (organised less than 40,000 workers)
(Employers' Association)	(Employers' Association)
Zambia Employer's Federation	Botswana Confederation of Commerce, Industry and Manpower
(Journalists)	(Journalists)
Press Association of Zambia	Botswana Journalists Association
(Lawyers)	(Lawyers)
Law Association of Zambia	Botswana Law Society
(Farmers)	(Farmers)

Commercial Farmers Bureau	Farmers Associations, Botswana Agricultural Union
(Professional Associations) no less than 150	(Professional Associations) about 50
(Women) Zambia Alliance of Women Zambia Association of University Women Zambia National Association of Disabled Women National Association of Business and Professional Women of Zambia Women in Media National Women's Lobby Group NGO Coordinating Committee Zambia Association for Research and Development	(Women) Botswana Council of Women Women in Development Business and Professional Women's Clubs of Botswana Emang Basadi
(Students) University of Zambia Students' Union	University of Botswana Students' Union
(Others) Zambia Independent Monitoring Team Foundation for Democratic Process (former Zambia Elections Monitoring Coordinating Committee)	
<National Service DAOs>	<National Service DAOs>
(Education) Adult Education Association of Zambia Pre-school Association of Zambia	Child to Child Foundation of Botswana
(Health) Red Cross Planned Parenthood Association of Zambia Family Life Movement of Zambia National Food and Nutrition Commission	(Health) Red Cross Botswana Family Welfare Association
(Children and Youth) Child Care and Adoption Society	Bana Ba Rona Trust

of Zambia Boy Scouts	Botswana Workcamps Asso.
(Self-help, Rural Development) Zambia Council For Social Development (Coordinating Body) Human Settlements of Zambia Self-help Development	(Self-help, Rural Development) CORDE Thusano Lefatsheng (NGO Consortium) Forum on Sustainable Agriculture

Foundation for Education with
    Production
	Foundation for Education with
	    Production

(Environment) Wildlife Conservation Society of Zambia	Environmental Liaison Group Kalahari Conservation Society Forestry Association of Botswana
(Government-initiated) Village Industry Service Small Industry Development Organisation	(Government-initiated) Rural Industries Promotions '.ıﬞﬞal Industries Innovation C ·nﬞre Botswana Technology Centre
<CDAOs>	<CDAOs>

Zambia Community Research and
    Occupational Foundation
Village Development Network
Village Development Foundation
Malambo Development Foundation
Chikuse Rural Community
    Development and Motivation
    Centre
Village Productivity Committees
Ward Development Committees
	Brigades
	Southern Rural Development
	Association
	Pelegano Village Industries
	Pitsane Village Production
	Project Trust
	(South-east Growers Association)
	VDCs
	Farmers Committees

<IDAOs>	<IDAOs>

Water Management Associations
    (e.g. Western Province)
 	
Burial/Funeral Associations
    (no less than 50 registered
    associations)
	Agricultural Management
	Associations
	Other Farmers Groups
	(more than 1,200 in 1980)
	Burial/Funeral Associations
	(204 registered associations in
	1990)

<Cooperatives>(1989)	<Cooperatives>(1990)

1,571 registered primary
    societies
23   district unions
9   provincial unions
1   Zambia cooperative
    Federation
membership: 686,943

129 registered primary
societies

1 Botswana Cooperative Union

membership; 79,645

CHAPTER 3

THE RURAL SECTOR: WEAK AND "WEAKENED" RURAL CIVIL SOCIETY

"The strength of the political voice of peasant farmers in
Africa is a function of their social-economic position and of the
way government and politics are structured" (Barker, 1989: 162).

How strong is "the political voice of peasant farmers"? It differs between one place and another, and also between one period and another. This strength has been determined, as Barker argued in the quotation above, by both socio-economic and political factors. These are also internal and external. Therefore, the strength of rural civil society must be considered from these perspectives.

In his relatively recent article on the issue of rural democratisation, Fox argued that "nominally pluralist electoral systems do not necessarily guarantee effective rural access to political rights" (1990: 8). In rural areas, "[political] parties have usually become shadowy symbols of support for government rather than viable structures for doing political work with peasant-farming communities" (Barker, 1989: 179). In fact, political parties have not been representatives of rural communities. Rather they are occasionally organs of control. In fact, one of the important issues related to tactics of the state to control rural areas is the role of political parties. Later in this chapter the issues of political parties in both Zambia and Botswana will be considered to answer the main question on this issue how the party activities has or has not left "space" for activities of other AOs. These issues are also closely related to the issues of "party-state" especially in Zambia and of clienteli m in both countries.

Taking the stance of Fox, who regards "the process of rural democratisation in the most general sense as an institutionalised shift in the balance of power" (1990: 11-12), it would be necessary for rural societies to have democ. itic projects to empower peasant-farmers or autonomous AOs different from political parties to represent the interests of rural people if the purpose of materialising "rural democracy" is to be achieved.

Both in theory and practice, roles of AOs in rural areas in the process of democratisation are supposed to be not so much salient in the transition phase as in the consolidation phase. As discussed in chapter 1, AOs based in rural areas are, in theory, considered to mobilise rural communities, to activate political participation and to promote democratic culture and citizenship, so as to get out of clientelism, which has prevented democratisation in rural areas. This is one of the most important dimensions for democracy to be consolidated "from below." One of the arguments following in this chapter will be that leadership is quite important for AOs which have these agenda for their purpose of activities in rural areas.

In Africa, there are a variety of rural organisations with differing organisational forms and capabilities. These differences are attributable to such factors as the historical process and degree of commercialisation of agricultural products[1], political experience in the process of liberation and the strategy of the colonial and post-colonial state towards rural areas.

Generally speaking, both in Zambia and in Botswana, rural civil societies have been underdeveloped in terms of the relative lack of autonomous and organised AOs in rural areas. My argument is that weakness of rural civil societies in the post-colonial period is derived partly from a weak "organisational principle" (cf. Bayart, 1986) in rural

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[1]One of the example is the case of Ghana, where farmers producing cocoa have been organised (Beckman, 1976).

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areas, which is a result of socio-economic transformation of rural areas in the historical process as we see below, but mainly from the state's tactics to control and weaken any autonomous organisational actions in rural areas by regulating autonomous political space to some extent, or "to fragment the rural opposition" (Bates, 1981: 108) and to dominate rural areas both in ideological and financial terms. We, therefore, will consider similarities and differences of the attitudes of the states in Zambia and Botswana towards rural areas, which were affected by the material bases of the state, as we see below.

It is not only paradoxical but also true that such collective organisation as cooperatives "does not stand alone" (Bratton, 1986: 383) in Africa. From various field experiences in Africa, a collective organisation in rural Africa seems to have been "unlikely to arise and flourish in the absence of well-developed states and markets" (Bratton, 1986: 383). It is because of the relative lack of the organisational principle in rural Africa, that farmer organisation or collective action can only happen in part as a result of stimulation not from "within" but from "outside" or "above."

In southern Africa, as discussed later in this chapter, one additional historical factor to have weakened rural civil societies is supposed to be migration from rural areas to urban centres, especially to mines in South Africa and Zambia. In this migration process, rural people have not had enough opportunities and motivations to organise themselves to defend and express their interests at any cost because they could find an "exit" by choosing the option of migration. It seems that this migration phenomenon, resulting in the absence of adults, has been historically weakening organisational efforts in rural areas.

Such underlying socio-economic features are not the whole story of rur 1 civil society. The post-colonial state has used deliberate tactics to "demobilise" rural communities against it. As we consider below, the use

of subsidy programmes and financial assistance programmes through various channels and the preemption of group formation to build political support in the countryside *for* governments in power are common tactics adopted by the states in the post-colonial era, although there are difference between Zambia and Botswana. The state tends to regulate "autonomous space," which is crucial for a variety of AOs to be formed and for civil society to develop independently, of rural areas to prevent the formation of political opposite from below, because rural constituencies have been politically quite important to retain power for, especially, the incumbent of the power. This tactics has prevented AOs to be established in rural areas.

One prominent example of this control, which can be found in the continent, is co-operatives. In particular, in countries following socialist development path, the state has taken co-operatives as instruments to organise rural people to attain rural development. But co-operatives have not functioned well, because they have been used more as political control than as tools of development for rural people. This tendency has been criticised as follows:

> "Today many observers and analysts of development are skeptical both about the real and manifest intentions of the state and its control of co-operative institutions. The over-increasing state bureaucracy, and its circumscriptions imposed on co-operative institution is an important manifestation of this eagerness for control. The negative correlation between an increasingly powerful state bureaucracy and its control of co-operative institutions, and its effect on local production and efficiency in unions and primary co-operative societies, have not discouraged the increasing control and bureaucratic involvement of the state" (Hedlund, 1988: 9).

There have been a variety of arguments on co-operative development in Africa. These include such questions and issues as whether co-operative

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development and structures in Africa should be regarded as an institution alien from traditional society and the relationship between the state and co-operative structures. It is because co-operative development has faced problems in Africa. Generally speaking, in Africa, it can be said that co-operatives have been both strongly initiated and strictly controlled from above, which have prevented them to stand up as autonomous actors in rural civil society. In fact, the state's control of co-operatives has "weakened" their viability as autonomous development agencies and their potential function as "political" movements. In this context, it is not possible that "the shift of balance of power in rural area," which is crucial to rural democracy, has occurred. This is also the case of the state's involvement in the process of the formation of groups in rural area in Botswana as we see below.

According to recent literature, however, it is also true that rural people in some areas have started to organise themselves to cope with crises on the continent (e.g., Pradervand, 1989; Taylor and Mackenzie eds, 1992). What is one of the most important factors of self-organised type associations is that they have emerged in the space which the state has not tightly regulated and where there were initiatives from members (leaders). This slight change in rural people's attitude may be considered to be a potentially good sign of change towards rural democratisation. However, it remains to be seen *how* these actors will contribute to the big project of democratisation in rural Africa (see chapter 5, on related issues).

3.1 The Case of Zambia

In the post-colonial period, co-operatives have been the dominant form of rural collectivity in Zambia. President Kaunda launched the "revitalised" post-independence co-operative movement personally on 17

January 1965, at the first national rally since Independence at Chibufu. At the rally, the President called on all the unemployed in Zambia to form themselves into co-operative societies and to put their various skills to work on the agricultural and construction projects planned (Lombard, 1971: 18). There was quick response[2] to the President's speech, and eventually the number of registered societies increased five fold between 1964 and 1969. However, as has been shown (e.g.. Lombard, 1971; Quick, 1975, 1977, 1979, 1983; Bates, 1976; Scott, 1980b; Chilivumbo, 1986; Hyden, 1991), the history of co-operative movement since independence has been that of failure. Many societies became moribund very quickly and the rate of repayment on government loans was low. The explanations for this failure have been in two ways; on the one hand, the explanation emphasises the shortage, or misapplication, of technical, management and planning skills necessary to maintain activities of co-operatives (Lombard, 1971); on the other hand, others emphasise political factors of co-operative policy, attitudes of politicians and senior servants, and political patronage systems (Quick, 1975, 1977, 1979, 1980; Bates, 1976; Scott, 1980). In Zambia, therefore, co-operatives have not been viable actors of civil society. The cases of Village Productivity Committees (VPCs) and Ward Development Committees (WDCs) were similar.

Apart from co-operatives and VPCs and WDCs formed "from above," since around the early 1980s, community based group projects in rural areas have been started with the initiative of quasi-National Service Development Associational Organisations (NSDAOs) like the Village Industry Service (VIS), and Community Development Associational Organisations (CDAOs), which were established by leaders experienced in urban areas, like the Village Development Foundation (VDF) situated in

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[2]One of the reasons of this quick response is considered to be the government allocation of financial resources in the form of subsidies, loans and grants (Lombard, 1971: 18).

the Northern Province and the Zambia Community Research and Occupational Foundation (ZCROF) in the Western Province. These efforts are relatively new in Zambia to "empower" peasant farmers. Although there was control from UNIP in the form of "interference" of local politicians in the era of one-party politics, they have potentiality to become viable actors in rural civil society.

3.1.1 Weak Rural Associations in the Labour Reserve: Impacts of Labour Migration on Rural Communities

One of the important characteristics of rural communities in southern Africa, including Zambia, has been that they have been the labour reserve to capitalist farms, mines and industries set up by settlers, especially the British South African Company. After the opening of the Zambian copper mines in the late 1920s, Zambia became an importer of labour not only from within but also from without. The Copperbelt tended to "specialise in its recruitment and the two north-eastern provinces (mainly Bemba-speaking) have tended to supply almost half the miners, with up to a quarter coming from outside the country (mainly from Malawi and Tanzania)" (Cliffe, 1978: 152).

As has been pointed out, one of the impacts of labour migration on rural communities in Zambia is the change of the make-up of population derived from absence of males of working age (see Table 3-1). It is clear that in rural areas there are more older people and fewer males of working age than the national average, which explains the fact that the most common form of groups is women's club in rural Zambia as noted in Chapter 2[3].

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[3]Apart from this result, rural areas have been affected in other ways in terms of gender. Female labour was "indirectly" exploited in the colonial economy, and agricultural productivity and living standards declined (Geisler, et al., 1985: 4-6). Also as raised later in this chapter, women's clubs were formed from above by the Women's League if UNIP and others (Geisler, et al., 1985: 36-37).

Table 3-1 Distribution of the Population by Age and Area in Zambia

Area/Age	Women		Men	
Rural	Number	% of Total Population	Number	% of Total Population
0-14	820,100	14.4	828,900	14.6
15-64	873,700	15.6	707,400	12.5
65+	62,900	1.1	73,100	1.3
not stated	20,600	0.4	16,500	0.3
sub-total	1,777,300	31.4	1,625,900	28.7
Urban				
0-14	569,900	10.1	554,200	9.8
15-64	519,900	9.2	557,200	9.8
65+	9,300	0.2	11,900	0.2
not stated	15,900	0.3	20,700	0.4
sub-total	1,114,500	19.7	1,144,000	20.2
Total	2,891,800	51.1	2,769,900	48.9

Source: calculated from Central Statistical Office(1991) *Women and Men in Zambia* p.17.

This means that agriculture suffered because of a lack of male labours and women bore the brunt of agricultural production and family management. According to the Labour Force Survey in 1986, averagely 56 percent of peasant-farmers was conducted by women as the table 3-2 shows. Furthermore, for example, in the case of the Chipata District in the Eastern Province, "there is a tendency for those households who lose more members, and more productive members, to be affected more severely" because "the flow of remittances from urban areas is small" after people have moved to urban areas (Hedlund & Lundahl, 1983: 53)[4].

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[4]According to the survey conducted by Mater and Honeybone in the mid-1970s, on the general pattern in Zambia, including Eastern Province, they concluded as follows:
"that only a few households receive contributions from relatives in urban areas and that the amount of money involved is small. In fact, remittances are often notable by their absence as in the situation, often encountered, where married women are left unsupported by husbands who moved to urban areas. Such contributions therefore have no appreciable influence on the income distribution between households."(Marter and Honeybone, 1976: 40-41, quoted in Hedlund & Lundahl, 1983: 53).

Therefore, rural society has lost most active members, who should have become leaders.

Table 3-2 Subsistence Farming by Province 1986, Zambia

| | Women | | Men | | % within Areas | |
Province	Number	%	Number	%	Women	Men
Northern	168,800	23	116,100	20	59	41
Eastern	145,200	20	126,200	22	54	46
Western	105,500	15	64,900	11	62	38
Southern	74,600	10	65,700	12	53	47
Central	54,800	8	65,200	11	46	54
Luapula	60,600	8	42,100	7	59	41
North-Western	54,800	8	42,000	7	57	43
Copper-belt	47,200	6	42,300	7	53	47
Lusaka	17,300	2	16,000	3	52	48
Total	728,700	100	580,400	100	56	44

Source: Labour Force Survey, 1986 quoted in Central Statistical Office (1991) *Women and Men in Zambia*: 38.

In this historical process, "traditional" form of co-operation has been gradually lost. According to Hedlund and Lundahl, who researched impacts of migration on a community in Chipata District, called Ngoni, due to the penetration of cash transaction in rural areas in combination with rural urban migration over the past 70-80 years, "a new work pattern was gradually substituted for traditional one, where cooperative element in the labour teams was lost"(Hedlund & Lundahl, 1983: 73). Originally in this community, there was the cooperation between men and women of different households in agricultural work, which was "rewarded by free beer from the organising household"[5]. However, this kind of cooperation was lost in the process of the disintegration of old norms and values, particularly emphasised and diffused in the local communities by

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[5]Beer has been important in keeping reciprocal relationship in the community. "The organizers of beer parties were able to draw on a variety of cultural rationalizations for communal drinking"(Hedlund & Lundahl, 1983: 73).

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returning migrants, who had acquired different sorts of values in urban areas.

This historical factor of migrant labour system, or rural communities as the labour reserve has been one of the important factors to determine relatively weak organised and collective actions in rural Zambia. It is because this flow of population has made it possible for rural dwellers to escape from poverty by emigrating in order to "extract wealth from the towns and transfer it to the village communities" (Bates, 1976: 253). Therefore migration has made the regional pattern of inequality less pronounced than it might otherwise be, instead of organising themselves to defend their survival in rural areas. Therefore it can be said that peasant-farmers choose "exit" option instead of "voice" option, using Albert Hirshman's terms (1970). If there had been no opportunities for them to leave rural areas and the process of commercialisation of agricultural products had been developed, it would have been more likely that they take political option of lobbying to upgrade the living standard of life and to defend their interests. Migration, therefore, has been the favoured weapon of peasant-farmers, and has prevented them take "voice" option, which is to strengthen rural civil society.

Against this background, there have been limited associational organisational activities in rural areas. These are almost always created "from above," as exemplified by various types of co-operatives, and village productivity committees (VPCs) at the village level and Ward Development Committees (WDCs) at the ward level. Only in recent years, some farmers' groups were farmed with efforts of development associational organisations headquatered mainly in capitals of provinces like the Village Development Foundation in the Northern Province.

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In the following sections, we will consider characteristics and reasons of weak organisational formation of interest expression in rural areas.

3.1.2 UNIP Control in Rural Areas

In this part of this chapter, the main question how far UNIP controlled the space in rural areas will be considered by reviewing the literature related to this issue.

In terms of political party system in rural area, the post-colonial Zambia can be characterised as follows:

(1) UNIP's transformation of a party of participation to a party of control by mid-1975 (Bratton, 1980a, 1980b);

(2) however, generally speaking, political control of UNIP became more strict only above the Regional level[6] and its control below the Regional level was sparse and sporadic (Bratton, 1980a: 227);

(3) in addition, as the importance of civil service which came to exercise power in the one-party system, the role of UNIP in the process of decision-making declined and the party's functions at local level were weakened (Scott, 1980: 158-159; Tordoff, 1988: 26)[7];

(4) the decline of functions of UNIP, especially at grassroots level, can be explained by UNIP's dwindling resources of patronage in the 1970s (Tordoff, 1988: 20);

(5) as a result of the introduction of the Local Administration Act, 1980, however, party organisations at the grassroots level revived to some extent (Tordoff, 1988: 22).

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[6]Regional level organisation of UNIP corresponds to that of District level in the administrative organisation.

[7] After the Local Administration Act was established in 1980, the activities of party organisation at the grass-roots level were to some extent revived. It is partly because a new, even limited, avenue for extending patronage to local party official was created by the introduction of the Act (Tordoff, 1988: 23-25).

In his research in the Kasama district in the Eastern Province, Bratton found that party organisation at the district level was controlled by the centre in a way of appointments of the top two party officials, namely the District Governor and the Regional Secretary (1980a: 237-239)[8], which composed of one of the main day-to-day political control of rural localities. In addition, the local-level party was also required to perform as a control appendage of the central state and to defend policy made at the top level of the party (Bratton, 1980a: 237). Therefore, the UNIP Region was transformed from a predominantly local to central political institution in Kasama.

Furthermore, it was reported that "recruitment to party office leaned away from peasant agitators toward educated administrators" by 1975 (Bratton, 1980a: 240). This can be considered a transformation of UNIP towards an elitist style of control organ by distancing peasants from the party organisation in this period.

However, there was limitation of "penetration" of UNIP in rural areas. Against the background of the transformation of UNIP away from peasants, the number of party branches in Kasama District reduced from 110 in 1964 to 87 in 1974, and estimated membership was also reduced from 11,000 in 1964 to 5,000 in 1974 (Bratton, 1980a: 229). Symptom of the atrophy of UNIP below the Regional level was not limited to the reduction. Branch political activity in Kasama was found to be low and party branch in the most peripheral rural areas were generally defunct in the district around the mid-1970s (Bratton, 1980a: 230). At the subbranch or village level, the Village Political Committee, which was different from the administrative Village Productivity Committee, was supposed to

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[8]This point is not similar to the argument of Tordoff and Scott, who argued that the UNIP RS had a strong local base which gives him a greater degree of in dependence of the centre (Tordoff, 1974: 128).

function, but they were generally nonexistent (Bratton, 1980a: 233-234). Therefore, by the mid-1970s, lower level UNIP organisations were generally defunct in terms of political control.

This decline of UNIP in the lower level can be partly explained by its dwindling resources. It was only before the price of copper on the international market was decline that UNIP's resources of patronage was sufficient to reward local level party officials, because the party was regarded as an important source of patronage. This point will be argued later in some detail. Bratton explained that:

> "(w)here development resources were available for local party
> patrons and their followers, the center had a presence in the locality
> and a modicum of political control. Where resources were lacking, so
> was central control" (1980a: 227).

Therefore, by the mid-1970s, UNIP control was generally strengthened above the level of Region, but weakened below.

It was the Local Administration Act, 1980 which revived the activities of lower level party organisation to some extent[9]. Intended in this legislation was the merger between the district administration, the local councils and the party organisations. One of the main result of the introduction of this Act was that those elected chairman of the new wards could automatically become councillors[10] entitled to receive sitting

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[9]"This Act provided for the merger of party and governmental organs at district level in order to create an integrated administrative structure, called a district council" in each district (Tordoff, 1988: 21). Each council was comprised of former central government field officers, local government officers and party officials. It was to be chaired by the district governor, and most of its members were to be party officials, prominent among whom were the UNIP regional secretary and UNIP chairmen of ward committees in the district. These committees were the result of a merger between the existing low-level party organs (like village political committees) and ward development committees and village productivity committees (Tordoff, 1988: 21)

[10]They got "a new avenue for expanding patronage to local party officials," but the local party organisation did not receive enough financial support which the central party leadership intended (Tordoff, 1988: 25).

allowances. This means that local UNIP officials got an opportunity to be rewarded as a result of this legislation. In fact, there is a report that party membership increased by 31 per cent between 1981 and 1984 (Chikulo, 1986, quoted in Tordoff, 1988: 22).

Based on the limited information available above, it is possible to assume that UNIP control in rural area had been restricted by its dwindled resources since the mid-1970s. The one-party political system, therefore, does not guarantee effective control by the party in rural area. In the context of patronage politics, tight control of rural civil society can become relatively difficult without sufficient resources to do so. This means that it can be assumed that there are relatively "autonomous" space below the level of region, but this does not mean that organised rural civil society could automatically emerge from this space.

3.1.3 Co-operatives

At the 17th annual general meeting of the Zambia Co-operative Federation (ZCF), the apex body of the co-operative movement in Zambia, held on 6th December 1991,

> "It was decided to *de-affiliate ZCF from UNIP with immediate effect* and it was further resolved that the co-operative movement should *remain politically neutral* although individual members are free to join a political party of their choice" (ZCF, 1991: 1, emphasis added).

and

> "It was decided that ZCF should strengthen its role as *the sole national spokesman* for the co-operative movement in Zambia [in the Third Republic]" (ZCF, 1991: 1, emphasis added).

As is clear from quotations above, the apex organisation of the co-operative movement had been coopted into the party structure during the one-party era. In fact, the posts of top management were occupied by the members of Central Committee of UNIP. In the Third Republic, the co-operative movement in Zambia has made an effort to become a viable "voice" from below. At the same meeting in December, 1991,

"It was recommended that the present Co-operative Society
Act be amended to remove provisions that give authority to
the government to interfere in the operations of co-operative
organizations" (ZCF, 1991: 2, emphasis added).

It remains to be seen how viable and important the co-operative movement will become in developing civil society, but we have to turn to the process in which the "weak" co-operative movement has been structured until the end of the one-party era.

3.1.3.1 The Co-operative Movement before Independence: A Brief Background

Lombard (1971) argued that the co-operative movement was initiated "from above" in the colonial period.

Even though the first co-operative society was registered in 1914 under the rule of the British South African Company, the co-operative societies remained exclusively a concern of the whites from 1914 to 1947. These cooperatives were formed for the purpose of using it as the means for marketing their agricultural products to the newly developing copper mines in Katanga region in Zaire and copperbelt in Zambia. The dispersion of the earliest cooperatives was mainly restricted to Eastern

and Southern Provinces. It is not until 1930s that collective actions among small-scale African farmers to form their own cooperatives against the colonial policy of trying to protect the interests of settler community.

It was in 1948 when the Department of Marketing and Co-operatives was formed and the Co-operative Societies Ordinance was passed in spite of the opposition of the white settler farmers' co-operative movement (Chilivumbo, 1986: 24) that the co-operative movement in Zambia got under way (see table 3-3), although there were a few unsuccessful efforts by missions before that time (Lombard, 1971: 7-8). According to Lombard, this failure was derived from the lack of trained experienced and trustworthy business administrators, which was a major problem in the post-independence movement too (Lombard, 1971: 8).

Table 3-3 The Growth of Co-operative Societies, 1947-1964, by Race and Selected Year, Zambia

	Europeans		Europeans		Totals	
Year	Societies	Members	Societies	Members	Societies	Members
1947	10	1344	0	0	10	1344
1948	21	3740	16	447	37	7147
1958	14	3600	213	26003	227	30003
1964	20	4020	1049	30677	1069	43699

Source: Chilivumbo, 1986: 25.

The basic co-operative policy in the pre-independence period was more rigid than in the post-independence era, in the sense that "no society was registered until share capital and membership was such that a reasonable success, in the Department view, existed" and "credit was granted reluctantly, and then only after evidence was brought forward showing that the society could make proper use of it and was able to repay" (Lombard, 1971: 9) and the government expenditure on the co-operative movement before independence was small as table 3-4 shows.

Table 3-4 Direct government expenditure on the co-operative movement in Zambia, comparing the period 1 January 1949-30 June 1964 with the period 1 July 1964-31 December 1969

	K'000
1 January 1949-20 June 1964	1,702
1 July 1964-31 December 19(9a	14,120

Note: a Because of difficulties in estimating recurrent costs, this figure might be slightly over-estimated.
Sources: Annual Financial Reports of the Government of Northern Rhodesia, 1949-69; Financial Reports of the Government of Zambia, 1964-69; Estimates of Revenue and Expenditure of the Government of Northern Rhodesi 'Zambia, 1949-68, quoted in Lombard (1971), p. 10.

In addition, during the pre-independence period, it was producer marketing co-operatives among Africans that were encouraged by the colonial government as table 3-5 shows. The development of the marketing co-operatives happened especially in the Eastern Province, the Southern Province, and the Northern Province, where agricultural activities were advanced and loose marketing associations at the level of the Provinces were formed (Lombard, 1971: 12-15), although the African societies did not give a feeling of belonging and togetherness and it often happened that there were no meetings of members as members of the co-operative society (Chilivumbo, 1986: 27). Apart from producer marketing societies, other types of co-operatives did not thrive. In the case of consumer and supply societies, because of the requirement of large financial resources and trained, competent managers, which were not available at that period, they were not viable (Lombard, 1971: 15-17). Also competition from established traders and rising costs made consumer and supply societies less viable.

Table 3-5 African co-operatives, comparing 1950 with 1960, by type, showing the importance of agricultural marketing co-operative societies, Zambia

TYPE	No. of Societies		Membership		Share Capital (£'000[a])		Turnover (£'000)	
year	1950	1960	1950	1960	1950	1960	1950	1960
Thrift & Loan	10	44	310	4,341	1	130	-	-
Consumer & Supply	20	16	3,716	5,683	6	4	36+	78
Prducer's Marketing	34	152	6,309	18,209	11	38	105+	1,702
Other	1	2	29	765	-	2	-	5
Total African	65	214	10,364	28,998	18	174	141	1,785

Note: a Paid-up share capital expressed in pounds.
Sources: Annual Report of the Department of Co-operative Societies (1950) and the Annual Report of the Department of Agriculture, Co-operatives and African Marketing (1960), quoted in Lombard (1971), p.11.

3.1.3.2 The Co-operative Movement in the Post Independence Period. A Brief History of Institution-Building

The period between 1964-1970 can be characterised as that of "communal co-operatives as a tool for implementing rural or micro-socialism" (Quick, 1977; Chilivumbo, 1986). With the ideological background of Humanism, the formation of communal farm co-operatives was encouraged. But as table 3-6 shows, these co-operatives were not viable at all. Most societies were formed before 1968, and in the 1970s rather than registration of new societies, the main characteristics was liquidations of societies.

Faced with the problems of co-operatives in the 1960s, the Department of Marketing and Co-operatives convened the First National Co-operative Conference in January 1970. Delegates were mainly from various departments of the government and the provincial marketing co-operative unions but not from the communal farms. The conference came

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up with two basic recommendations; firstly the conference did not favour the continuation of the communal form of co-operatives but recommended the promotion of the marketing societies based on individual household farms within existing village set-up; secondly the conference recommended the formation of the Zambia Co-operative Federation, to be the apex body of all unions in the country (Chilivumbo, 1986: 34). In the same year, 1970, a Co-operative Societies Act was passed. And in 1972 the Zambia Co-operative Federation (ZCF) was formed as an apex organisation of the co-operative movement in Zambia[11], although the role of the ZCF was not clearly defined. Anyway, it has not been a "representative" body of primary societies and neither was it formed "from below."

Table 3-6 Communal Co-operative Societies in Zambia, 1965-1975

Year	No. of Societies	Members	Average Membership	New Societies	Liqiudation
1965	126	2,500	19.00	126	0
1966	240	5,157	21.48	114	0
1967	466	7,630	16.37	277	1
1968	609	11,50	18.88	143	0
1970	805	12,175	26.00	0	0
1972	535	6,686	12.49	4	89
1973	509	4,890	9.61	0	0
1974	351	5,148	14.67	12	128
1975	339	5,147	15.18	0	46

Source: Chilivumbo, 1986: 31.

In 1973, the Second National Conference was held with delegation drawn from the Department of Marketing and Co-operatives, the marketing unions, the ZCF, and other departments of the government. It

[11]Apart from the UNIP government, the Swedish Cooperative Centre (SCC) was involved in the creation of the ZCF (interview with Mr. Chabala, the General Manager of the ZCF, 24/12/91).

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was in this conference that the specific recommendation for the type of co-operative, namely "multi-purpose co-operative societies" in contrast with single purpose ones, was made. For the purpose of encouraging the formation of multi-purpose societies, the number of communal co-operatives was reduced administratively through the liquidation of the existing communal co-operatives and by not registering any new collective farms. Following the conference, the existing unions were renamed and the term "marketing" was dropped. In other words, The three existing unions became the Eastern Co-operative Union, the Northern Co-operative Union, and Southern Co-operative Union, which have the role of promoting new forms of societies of multi-purpose co-operatives and which are managed in an authoritarian fashion by *appointees of the government* (Quick, 1977: 390, emphasis added)[12].

The Third National Conference, held in 1980 under the auspices of the ZCF, also recommended the multi-purpose co-operative societies as the only feasible pattern of rural agricultural development.

A multi-purpose co-operative society is a special form of co-operative organisation characterised by a broad range of interrelated functions which it performs to satisfy the economic needs of its members and their dependents of farmers and/or residents of a rural area. Multi-purpose societies in Zambia are engaged in a variety of activities including marketing of produce generally as agents at the unions and distribution of farm inputs as well as farm implements. To a limited extent, they are also providing seasonal credit and consumer goods. Some of the large ones are providing tractor hire services and carrying out simple processing such as grinding of maize using hammer mills (ZCF, 1982: 2).

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[12]This can be considered to be "the transformation of micro-socialism into macro-socialism in the co-operative sector," according to Quick (1977: 390).

The 1980s can be characterised as reorganisation of both local and national level co-operative structure. In 1983, the co-operatives were declared a mass movement by UNIP and in the same year the Ministry of Co-operatives was formed as a base for co-operative policy formulation. The newly formed Ministry took over the Department of Marketing and Co-operatives and the Co-operative College from the Ministry of Agriculture and Water Development.

In addition, the structure of the co-operative movement has also tended to respond to changes in the overall agricultural marketing arrangements, because, in the 1980s, the main source of finances in co-operative movement was from agricultural marketing. In the marketing structure of Zambia, it was the government controlled National Agricultural Marketing Board (NAMBOARD) that had been the monopoly buyer of maize at prices set by the government since 1964. In this structure, provincial Co-operative Unions, which are quasi-parastatal marketing organisations, were merely agents of NAMBOARD. But there were difficulties especially in maize marketing in this institutional setting as follows:

(a) Inability to collect maize from rural areas to storage depots.

(b) Untimely payments to farmers.

(c) Requirement of high subsidies to operate the system and run both the organisations.

(d) Double crop handling resulting from unclear division of responsibilities (ZCF, 1991: 12).

In 1986, as a part of the general macro-economic policies, in order to overcome these shortcomings, NAMBORAD's monopoly was removed to enable Provincial Co-operative Unions, Millers, and other traders to participate in maize marketing. But this liberalisation of the agricultural marketing coupled with the "foreign exchange auctioning" led to a high rate of inflation. Therefore in the New Economic Recovery Programme (NERP) price control for some items and the restriction of the agricultural

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marketing of maize and fertiliser to the Provincial Co-operative Unions and NAMBOARD were reintroduced. And in mid 1988, primary marketing of maize was further restricted to the PCUs.

In this institutional arrangement, there were still problems. The major one was that the production figures in maize surplus provinces was too high to be efficiently handled by a provincial centralised marketing organisation without facing problems such as delayed payment, uncollected maize and late delivery of agricultural inputs. In was in this context that the government decided in 1989 that District Co-operative Unions (DCUs) are necessary to be created to ensure decentralisation of economic power and decision making. This was intended to create vertical integration, whereby Provincial Co-operative Unions would concentrate on agro-processing and relinquish grain marketing to lower level organisations. In this way, the current four-tier co-operative structure, as stated in chapter 4, was formed.

On 30th June in 1989 NAMBOARD was dissolved by the government and its function was transferred to the ZCF and the Nitrogen Chemicals of Zambia (NCZ) through the amendment of the Agricultural Marketing Act. This abolition means that the provincial co-operative unions were for the first time expected to compete in a free market economy (Geisler, 1992: 117). Functions transferred to the ZCF included:

(a) Importation and distribution of Empty Grains Bags,
(b) Fumigation services,
(c) Maintenance of strategic reserves.

In addition, in February 1990, the importation and distribution of fertiliser, which was transferred to the NCZ in June 1989, was also transferred to the ZCF.

It is quite obvious that the formation process of the co-operative structure has been always initiated "from above" and that it has been formed not upward but downward without any initiative of primary societies from below. ZCF as well as provincial co-operative unions have never been "representative" organisation of primary co-operatives with the purpose of public lobbying, but rather a sort of parastatals. This point is very clear from the fact that district co-operative unions were created long *after* provincial unions were formed for the purpose of *decentralisation*. In response to my question about the prospects of co-operative movement in the Third Republic, the General Manager of the ZCF Development Service Division, Mr. Chabala answered that unviable primary societies must once be dissolved because they had been very weak in the cooperative structure in Zambia and that they would have to develop only "from below" to become viable societies (interview, 24/12/91). Therefore, in Zambia, the co-operative movement up to now has never been an organised social movement but has been no more than an agent of the state or a part of system of political control providing jobs and other patronage, as happened in other parts of Africa (e.g., Hyden, 1976).

3.1.3.3 The Failure of the Co-operative Movement after Independence: Factors

As detailed by Bates (1976), the UNIP government of newly independent Zambia increased radically the level of public investment in the rural areas, because of its abundance of revenues derived from copper, its ideology of Humanism, and the nature of the constituency within which it competed for power with ANC in the First Republic. This resource allocation pattern is partly explained by the rural peoples intense demands for benefits from the state, by demanding that their political

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sacrifices during the liberation period pay off, and that their incomes and economic opportunities be enhanced by increased expenditure by the public sector, which their own "representatives" now controlled (Bates, 1976; 99-100). It was in this "political" context that the UNIP government attempted to establish profitable communal farming through the creation of the co-operative movement and the provision of services to rural cultivators. Therefore President Kaunda declared at the first national rally at Chifubu that:

> "The money is there and the know-how is there. You can form
> these co-operative societies anywhere and we shall assist you
> in getting on" (Northern News, 18 January 1965 quoted in
> Lombard, 1971: 18).

As pointed out, in order to distribute credit as patronage to UNIP followers in the rural areas, mainly by way of small loans to individual farmers, the Credit Organisation of Zambia (COZ) was created after independence, while the Department of Co-operatives was not given sufficient funds itself to take care of the needs of local societies (Quick, 1977: 383). For example, this was actually the case in Kasama as Bratton observed (1980b: 259). "Co-operative societies, eligible for loans under the COZ programme, were ... made up of primarily of branch and constituency leaders [of UNIP]. COZ failed to implement rigorous precautions in dispensing funds" (Bratton, 1980b: 259).

In this quite "lavish" scheme, "this stumping subsidy provided a powerful incentive for exploitative and unproductive behavior by co-operative members"(Quick, 1977: 384), because this subsidy was regarded by members not as capital to establish a successful commercial farm, but as "income" to be consumed or to be wasted (Quick, 1975: 381). It also happened that the co-operatives were often simply "paper societies set up

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by influential party officials to exploit government's generosity (Scott, 1980: 234). This loan policy toward co-operatives led to the reinforcement of members' dependence on financial supports (Scott, 1980: 387). Also as Quick pointed out, this policy created a conflict between rank-and file members and elites of the societies (Scott, 1980: 387), which was ironically the opposite result of the Kaunda's ideological intention of co-operatives as the solution to the problem of class conflict (Scott, 1980: 230). Therefore, this loan policy through the COZ strengthened the tendency of primary co-operative societies' dependence on the state, discouraged members' initiatives, caused internal conflicts (Scott, 1980: 391), and thus weakened "the organisational principle" among members of co-operative to create viable societies. In other words, the UNIP government policy toward co-operative societies in early years destroyed rural people's consciousness of self-reliance because of the intrusion of political patronage in the form of "money," which led to mutual suspicion among members.

In fact, as a result of farming co-operatives, in *Humanism Part2* published in 1974, Kaunda referred only a bit to co-operative societies, in contrast with *Humanism Part1*. This supposedly reflects a change of Kaunda's vision of, or disillusion of communal co-operative as the tool to attain rural development. Therefore there was a change of policy towards co-operatives as stated above.

While rural development through communal co-operatives failed *as a policy*, however, the failure of communal co-operatives was more seriously impacted on rural communities. One of them is the lack of participation among members of co-operatives. It is supposed that rural people were obsessed with the idea that "co-operatives" as only channels of government money and as government institutions, sometimes, for employment. This means that co-operatives have not been "democratic organisations" where members actively participate in decision-making,

control and co-operative activities. As illustrated by a survey of various types of co-operatives in Lusaka and Eastern Provinces by Chilivumbo (1986: 113-114), there was a lack of participation by co-operative members in initiating, implementing, and interpreting all the regulations and activities of co-operatives, which led to misunderstanding among members. As table 3-7 shows, the sample of Chilivumbo indicates that in more than 60 per cent of co-operatives, decision seemed to be decided by election or unanimity, while decision-making is monopolised in some 10 per cent of the respondents in the sample. However, Chilivumbo himself was sceptical, when he wrote:

> "... one tends to doubt even the unanimity of decisions in such an environment where the few ruling elite of management executive seem to capitalize on members' ignorance and lack of technical capabilities and their lack of background in co-operative economic activities. So the few enlightened executives tend to become too smart and swindle the society of its money and bring about calamity. In some cases, the management committee was not even elected, but committee members merely brought themselves into office and were accepted"(Chilivumbo, 1986: 114-115)

Members' participation in decision-making process, in principle, has the advantages of making a co-operative responsive to the members and gives them more motivation to be involved in activities of the co-operative. Although, at the initial stage, the role of leaders is important to manage its own affairs, leadership occasionally leads to internal conflicts because of political background of the formation of co-operatives. Therefore, members' participation was interrupted and as a result co-operatives failed.

Table 3-7 Methods of Decision-Making in Co-operatives, Zambia

Method	Percentage
Elections (Secret Ballot)	30.9
Unanimous Decisions	27.6
Leaders	10.7
Elections and Unanimous Decisions	4.4
Unanimous Decisions and Leader	1.1
Members and Leaders*	18.4
Don't Know	7.9**

*It is not clear what the author means by "members and leaders."

* *This figure did not appear on the original table. Derived from auther's calculation.

Source: Chilivumbo, 1986: 114.

As recent surveys illustrated (e.g.. Chilivumbo, 1986; Hyden, 1991), the level of viability of primary societies is still low. Based on a research in Eastern and Southern Provinces in 1991[13], Hyden assessed the co-operative movement as follows:

"Poor understanding of roles, division of responsibilities, and low level of skills still plague. Training, therefore, is important, but with the exception of the secondary or tertiary level organizations there is no systematic thinking going into training... Member involvement is generally low. There is only one or two cases [out of 23 cases] in my sample where there is evidence that members participate in any way other than the AGM. While they often do speak out at these meetings, it is more out of disillusions than commitment... Member interest in their co-operative has been further reduced by the relative absence of direct member benefits... Against the background of all these shortcomings, it is not surprising that the co-operative identity is weak. To be sure, co-operatives keep

[13]Hyden used twelve indicators to evaluate the development stage of co-operatives and put them in "the co-operative development ladder. These indicators are as follows: Capital (Assets/Liabilities), Prices (Unregulated/Regulated), Investments (Profitable/Unprofitable), Cost Consciousness (High/Low), Accounts (Maintained/Not Maintained), Audit(Acceptable/Unacceptable) Staff Retention (High/Low), Terms of Service (Satisfactory/Unsatisfactory) Training(Adequate/Inadequate), Member Involvement (Extensive/ Inextensive) Member Benefits (Effective/Ineffective), Representation (Active/ Inactive). Based on these indicators he evaluated 23 co-operatives, and classified, almost all of them in the lowest ladder.

complaining to government and party authorities about specific problems they encounter, notably delays in payment, but the notion that co-operatives stand for ideals that have a value in their own right is never fought for in the open. There is no public lobbying and to the extent that co-operative ideals are being represented, it is taking place in discussions behind closed doors at the highest policy level. While these representations should not be underestimated they do not have the effect of enhancing co-operative identity and pride" (Hyden, 1991: 15-16).

Co-operative movement in Zambia has been a movement with very weak grassroots, which were spoiled and lost viability in the post-colonial politics. As Mr. Chabala mentioned, it remains to be seen if this movement will appear as an important actor in civil society in the "Third Republic."

The co-operative movement in Zambia after independence, therefore, has attributed its failure as the viable movement in civil society to a combination and interaction of factors as follows composed of both internal and external ones:

(1) the high expectation of people for the improvement of living standard just after independence;

(2) the formation of political patronage system as means of political mobilisation, in which co-operatives have been a part;

(3) the lack of idea of co-operatives as self-managed association in rural communities;

(4) the lack of technical, management and planning skills of members.

3.1.4 Other Rural Organisations

3.1.4.1 Village Productivity Committees (VPCs) and Ward Development Committees (WDCs)

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As Bratton (1980, 1982) detailed in his study in Kasama District, local level "participatory institutions," namely Village Productivity Committee (VPCs) and Ward Development Committee (WDCs), have never changed the uneven distribution of development benefits and the dependent character of rural economies inherited from colonial rule. "VPCs have in some cases performed to bolster the powers of traditional leaders, but have not universally filled the 'institutional vacuum' in the village. WDCs, wherever active, have embarked on local development projects; the decentralised AFC credit procedures have been particularly valuable in giving WDCs something to do. In general, however, WDCs have failed to secure more than a selective or truncated diffusion of benefits with regard to local social structure" (1980: 237). Especially WDCs, which gained more central resources, became integrated into the patronage machine. Therefore they could not become "participatory institutions" and they were only parts of patronage machine of the one-party state.

In addition, as Bratton pointed out from the case of Kasama, "the impact of development committees on policy-making in Zambia is negligible" (Bratton, 1980: 237). One of the important implications of this impact was that "the State has not placed resources behind self-help as the strategy for rural development in Zambia." He stated that:

"Repeated observations in Kasama indicated that peasants were willing to organise themselves into local-level committees and to provide labour on community projects if the State met their efforts with capital resources. The absence of funds for self-help, however, has often resulted in a demobilisation of popular energies and a withdrawal of support for the centre. National ideological commitment to devolution and participation through WDCs has not been matched with a commitment of material resources. There is

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little 'trust in the mass' in the Zambian strategy for rural
development"(Bratton, 1980; 238)

It is, therefore, not possible to regard VDCs and WDCs as "the local
institutions for "participation." Rather, these institutions, as a result,
reduced the aspiration for public participation, which created
"demobilised mass" in rural areas. This is also a case that the state
involvement precluded the development of rural civil society in Africa.

3.1.4.2 Women Clubs

As pointed out in the previous chapter and as a result of migration
of male labour in rural Zambia, most village communities in Zambia
have few forms of organisation within them, apart from cooperatives and
women's clubs. "Women's clubs have been the main vehicle for
addressing women's perceived needs for many years. During the latter
part of the colonial period when clubs became common until recently,
these perceived needs were for improved domestic skills..." (Geisler et al.,
1985: 35-36). In the post-colonial era, clubs have been organised and
assisted by the Women's League of the ruling UNIP and by churches and
other non-governmental bodies in recent years. "The majority of clubs,
however, are run by the Department of Social Development and depend
on Government personnel and services" (Geisler et al., 1985: 36).

These clubs' activities are generally stereo-typed, like home-craft,
cooking and baking, sewing and knitting. In these days, the acquirement of
these skills are still main activities of these clubs, even though, in the
recent economic crisis, women are less motivated to be involved in such
activities and more interested in getting cash by selling vegetables and
other goods.

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In the case of Northern Province, in 1985, though there were 227 registered women clubs, it is not likely that they were all well functioning. Most of them were considered not to be functioning (Geisler et al., 1985: 37). Reasons of the ineffectiveness of women's clubs were pointed out from researches as follows:

1. acceptance of an Eurocentric view of women's role, reflected in the predominant home-economics orientation of clubs;

2. inadequate supervision by staff and need for constant supervision;

3. dependence on staff for ideas, skills training, inputs, managements etc.;

4. lack of local leadership;

5. lack of local management, budgeting, planning etc. skills;

6. predominant membership of married women;

7. disproportionate number of "better-off women";

8. lack of time for poor women to participate in club activities;

9. illiteracy;

10. lack of self-confidence;

11. past use of club funds;

12. negative attitude of husbands;

13. competition and envy among club members;

14. lack of continuity in club activities (Geisler et al., 1985: 37)

In addition, there is another problem of the "legitimacy" of women's club in rural communities. It is because there is a recognition gap between development agencies and women involved in the activities themselves. The former, on the one hand, regards women's clubs as a vehicle for introducing income-generating projects[14], but on the other hands, the latter views them as only a social activity. This gap has prevented the community to perceive women's club as making a significant contribution

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[14]According to Geisler et al., members of women's clubs cultivated "small field of one cash crop in order to raise money for flour to bake and sell scones, or to buy materials so that each member can sew one piece of clothing" (1985: 36-38). Therefore, women's clubs' activities include both agricultural and craft-making.

to rural development. At the most, achievements of women's clubs have been evaluated as "moderately successful."

Even so, in the situation where small-scale farmers have lacked any organisational forms to lobby for their interests, women's club considered to be potentially important in strengthening rural civil society because "clubs provide one of the few opportunities for rural women to meet and make decisions" (Geisler et al., 1985: 38). In addition, such AOs as YWCA are involved in "conscientisation" activities in rural areas, so that this is also positive implication for women's clubs to become places to empower women.

3.1.4.3 Other Rural Development Efforts of Rural Communities

Since the early 1980s, there have been small scale rural development projects in rural Zambia, which were mainly organised by "intermediary organisations" like community development associational organisations, and churches lead by prominent local leaders with, in some cases, experiences overseas. In contrast with a disappointing history of co-operative development in the country, these efforts have possibilities to become a seed of contributing to strengthening rural civil society. At the same time, there are other options for small-scale farmers to cope with astute economic and political realities, using such tactics as smuggling and violent actions.

One of the important development efforts of this kind can be found in the Northern Province. The Village Development Foundation (VDF), which was established in 1981 at Mungui about 20 kilometres from Kasama, the provincial capital of the Northern Province, with an effort of Thomas Chishimba who resigned as Senior Administrative Officer in Zambia's Ministry of Labour and Social Services. This organisation has

seeked to transform the social life of Zambia's rural areas by setting the following programme objectives:

1. Promotion of income-generating small-scale cottage industries in rural villages and so create employment;

2. Dissuasion of the youth from migrating to urban areas;

3. Bringing basic services to the rural areas which will facilitate the necessary economic development;

4. Encouraging a spirit of self-reliance as the psychological springboard to development;

5. Providing adult education sufficient to create awareness among the participating villagers of some of causes of their plight and suffering, and to instill the will to overcome the difficulties in co-operation with their neighbours;

6. Training the locals in more efficient food production techniques ands organise them to start producer co-operatives in rural areas (Mukela, 1989: 154-155).

In fact, the purposes of the organisation themselves are not directly to create a "voice" organisation in rural areas, but to change social life in rural areas so as to strengthen rural civil society, because the programme objectives have connotation of establishing local organisations "from below" or "from within" by creating opportunities of employment in rural areas and by conscientising people to organise for themselves.

As can be expected, most of the participants of the projects have been women and the youth. Therefore, VDF's projects include growing cash-crops like soya-beans and wheat, processing soya-milk and wheat-flour for bakery, and tailoring. In addition, VDF teaches people to read in conjunction with their farming chores, text being about work, use of inputs, and so on (Mukela, 1989: 156). This is an important component of the organisation's programme, which has been lacking and is necessary for rural small-scale farmers to organise themselves. For this purpose, VDF uses the method to stimulate community interest in cooperation and self-reliance, but not to impose programmes form above.

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Alongside the projects of VDF, there has been another small-scale development project, the *Cinci wa Babilli* ("Two heads are better than one") situated about 90 kilometres from Kasama at a place called Matale Wa Kabwe in the Chonya District, which was initiated in 1979 by, John Beaudry, a Catholic priest working in this area for a long time. This project is more directly involved in the formation of organisational structure in rural areas by forming village-based groups, with a co-operative-like structure. It started with a membership of 50 and had risen to 700 after 5 years in 17 villages in the Northern Province (Geisler et al, 1985: 39), which became one of the most impressive small-scale agricultural development in this country. The work of this project has included "organising farmers to be shown new agricultural practices in the field, encouraging the adoption of the practices and training particular individuals to set up co-operatives so that they may eventually assume leadership roles. The project also arranges the supply of inputs from outside and the marketing of surplus grain" (Mukela, 1989: 158). What is unique about this project is that *Cinci* relies not on resources from outside but entirely on its own resources. "All the work - agricultural extension, marketing, supply of inputs and payment of farmers is done by the staff of *Cinci* (with transport costs reimbursed by NCU [Northern Co-operative Union]) and thus *Cinci* acts as an intermediary between the farmers and NCU" (Geisler et al., 1985: 39-40). This effort is quite different from those of other co-operatives in the same province which were organised under the Northern Co-operative Union, a quasi-parastatal sponsored by the UNIP government. As stated in the previous sections, these co-operatives "from above" returned to fail. This project of giving peasant farmers to purchase farm implements and inputs, in contrast, "is remarkable for the way in which it has transformed Choyna into a self-sustaining collection of villages where farmers are so well-off that they now pay market prices for

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their transport and run their own credit union to meet their financial requirement" (Mukela, 1989: 158). In addition, the production of maize was beginning to have successfully grew up (Mweembwa, 1992: 26). However, the UNIP government has so far interfered in the activities because *Cinci Wa Babilli* 's success began to attract public attention (Copestake, 1993: 166).

One of the important characteristics contained in these efforts is that education and self-reliance are important parts. In 1983, the VDF made people aware that bread-making could help control and reverse the high rate of malnutrition among children in Masela village (Copestake, 1993: 163-165). At the same time the association provided the village community with an ongoing source of income. After the fourth community meeting, the villagers agreed to initiate this project by themselves. In order to manage this project and to mediate between participants and resolve any misunderstandings, a committee was elected. Skilled manpower with experience in urban areas were recruited in the village. And they constructed a pole and grass-roofed shelter. After this was done, the project participants decided to build a permanent building to house the bakery. 10 men and 26 women were involved in this work. They made bricks and pans for baking the bread from empty cooking-oil tins. A management was set up and a bank account opened. From this experience, participants intended to register as a primary producer co-operative, which is completely different from the formation process of co-operatives in the post-colonial era in Zambia. Most important was that at each step project participants meet to discuss and plan their working programmes, which eventually more and more motivates villagers to work on their own and makes them feel that they can stand on their own foot and that they are able to carry on the schemes the VDF helped to get started.

These kinds of development efforts can be found in other parts of Zambia like in Western, Eastern, and North-Western Provinces, which was briefly mentioned in the previous chapter.

The Zambia Community Research and Occupational Foundation (ZCROF) is another effort to foster "the ability of peasants to generate ideas and make decisions on issues that affect their day-to-day activities as Development Education Namushakande Programme (DEN) members" (Banda, 1989: 3)(See, figure 3-1 for operational structure of the DEN project). Three issues of concern and purposes for ZCROF are as follows:

1. Effective utilisation of research findings and community participation in research process;

2. Maximum utilisation of local productive forces, skills and knowledge for self-reliance;

3. Community education for participation (ZCROF, 1989: 2-3).

The idea of establishing ZCROF began in 1983. In this year, there was a workshop of Theatre for Development organised by the University of Zambia in conjunction with the International Theatre Institute from the 19th September to 1st October at Namushakande, Mongu in the Western Province. A participant, Alan Kalimkwa, who was former Research Officer and Community worker for self-help development, got inspiration and courage to organise his thought into organisational form. This organisation was born as ZCROF in April 1984 at a meeting between the Chairman of Social and Cultural Committee of UNIP, Bob Litana and Kalimkwa himself. This means that just from its inception, there was a control from UNIP and that an "autonomous" or "independent" association was difficult to exist beyond the knowledge of UNIP during the period of one-party politics in rural areas. However, it does not mean that ZCROF was completely co-opted, but rather it was under supervision of UNIP. Concerning to this issue, in fact, the involvement of local UNIP leaders was high. The director at the early stage used to be invited by the

Namushakanda Ward Chairman of UNIP to share the platform with him so that he could address the people and to educate them on ZCROF. Furthermore, some UNIP leaders are often prominent DEG members (Banda, 1989: 14).

ZCROF SRAFF — Administration, and Policy Review Body of elected members

Development Education Assembly (DEA)

DEA — A representative and policy review body of elected members

Development Education Centres

Noalina DEC — Nambaota DEC — Lionga DEC — Imwiko DEC — Lubosi DEC

Co-ordinating body of Development Educational Activities

DEGs — DEGs — DEGs — DEGs — DEGs

Basic Productive Units

Development Education Groups

Peasants

Figure 3-1 Operational Structure of the DEN Project (ZCROF, in Zambia)
Source: Banda, 1989: 11

Namushakanda Social Development Centre, the place of the Theatre for Development workshop was chosen as the first project area for ZCROF. Several villages outlying in Namushakanda were identified as being more needy just after the ZCROF office was opened in 1984 with the

Director operating there on full-time basis. The first work for the director was to spread the idea of ZCROF to peasant-farmers in those villages.

As a means to put this idea into action, what is important is people's initiative to start working together. When these groups meets the ZCROF requirements, then it is registered as a development education group (DEG)[15]. Each DEG has an organising committee which elects or nominates a chairman and his vice; secretary, treasurer and two trustees whose tenure of office is two years. DEGs are main productive units of the ZCROF structure working in close relation with ZCROF field staff. In 1989, there were 18 DEGs, with the membership of 258[16]. These DEGs are involved in various income-generating activities, mainly rice growing[17]. For activities of DEGs, ZCROF assists them by procuring or purchasing tools, equipment and other agricultural inputs. In addition, training among the farmers is encouraged and conducted with the assistance of other institutions including the nearby Namushakanda Farm Institute, so as to improve the living standards and working conditions of subsistence farmers. One of the achievements which ZCROF made was that it mobilised target people to drain canals on self-help basis.

As in the case of the VDF, ZCROF is also emphasising on the importance of education and training. For the purpose that DEGs can understand the concept and importance of development education, ZCROF itself has organised courses and workshops for ZCROF field staff and members of DEGs.

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[15]This group can be formed with a minimum of five people in a village to pursue the same purposes. The maximum number is 30.

[16]The breakdown of gender of membership is as follows: male members is 126, and female members is 132.

[17]15 out of 18 groups are involved in rice growing. However this does not mean that these groups are not involved in other activities. Other activities include handicrafts-making like pottery, basketry, mat and so on. Of course, they are also growing maize and vegetables. Because of soil condition, the area is good for rice growing. ZCROF, however, is looking at the prospects of diversification of production.

In spite of these efforts, ZCROF has never been free from problems. As always, there is a problem of funding. In the case of ZCROF, it is almost dependent on the grants from NOVIB. This is quite unhealthy condition for ZCROF to continue its work stably. In addition, ZCROF is still a "top-heavy" organisation, managing "from above" by managing committee of the organisation in the capital, Lusaka. Although there are some improvement of DEGs' participation in the process of formulation of decision and "empowerment" of DEG members and ZCROF is becoming a peasant-farmers' organisation (interview with Research Secretary of ZCROF, 4/2/1992), they have not had much influence in the running of ZCROF.

As described above, leadership of these AOs, namely a resigned senior administrative officer of the Ministry of Labour and Social Services in the case of the VDF, a Catholic priest in the case of *Cinci wa Babilli*, and a former research officer and community worker for self-help development in the case of the ZCROF, seems to be among the most important reason to explain the establishment and activities of these relatively unusual associations, and their moderate successes. Therefore, it is possible to insist that the factor of leadership is an important cause to spearhead democratisation in rural areas.

3.1.4.4 Other Options of Rural Communities: "Disengagement"[18]?

As Geisler (1992) showed, in the Northern Province, there is "private" cross-border trade in recent years as follows:

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[18]This concept was defined as "the tendency to withdraw from the state and keep at a distance from its channels as a hedge against its instability and dwindling resource base" (Azarya, 1987: 7). See Azarya, 1987 and Chazan, 1987.

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> "Zambian farmers in the border area have opted to sell their maize at a higher price to Malawi's Agricultural Development and Marketing Corporation (Admarc), known to pay cash on delivery. Malawian farmers, on the other hand, are said to have responded to the high producer price of groundnuts in Zambia selling these to E.C.U. [Eastern Co-operative Union]" (Geisler, 1992: 119).

This is a sort of international cooperation of small scale farmers to cope with acute economic realities, created by structural adjustment programme, by forming special economic exchange relations. According to Geisler, by this transaction, "Zambians gain higher prices and the much desired Malawian currency for their maize, while Malawians avoided having to pay so much for fertilisers in their own country for the production of maize, and get better price for their groundnuts in Zambia (Geisler, 1992: 119). This kind of "smuggling" or "exit" option is utilised by small-scale farmers at the expense of more involvement of their interest expression.

In addition, there is a tendency of small-scale farmers to reduce and abandon the production of maize in favour of more profitable crops like soya-beans and groundnuts, all of which require little or no commercial fertilisers, and offer more secure marketing channel (Geisler, 1992: 119). This change of cropping patterns as well as losses due to "smuggling" is considered to be major factors to explain the "plummeting" figures of marketed maize.

These options *per se* taken by small-scale farmers are in fact very effective not only for them to survive but also as tactics to temporarily "revenge" on the unable state. These are among passive tactics of rural communities to survive by disengaging themselves from the state. These tactics will weaken rural civil society in the long run. In addition, the short-fall of maize, the Zambia's staple food, has severely affected not only

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Zambia's urban centres but also rural areas. Therefore, from a long and broad perspective, or "sustainability" these option will not be the best way of coping with harsh realities.

3.3.2 The Case of Botswana

In Botswana, in contrast with Zambia, there have been a variety of, what are called, "local institutions" (Esman and Uphoff, 1984). An image of the variety of local or village institutions can be available from table 3-8.

As can be seen, co-operatives are not the dominant form of rural collectivity, which is different from the case of Zambia. Rather, as table 3-8 shows, *kgotla* is the most well-known and important institution where people gather and make decisions. Thus, in the case of Botswana, it is necessary that co-operatives should be evaluated and considered in a broader context because there are alternative organisational forms, including agricultural management associations (AMAs)[19], syndicates, farmers' associations, brigades and trusts of which are promoted to some extent by the Government under varying degrees of legal protection and access to financial and advisory support in rural areas. However, there has been a variety of the state's control on rural sectors to "demobilise" rural people.

Before turning to analysis of a variety of "local institutions," it may be benefitable to overview their context by looking at rural areas from a historical point of view.

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[19]AMAs are controled under Agricultural Management Associations Act (Chapter 35: 08).

Table 3-8 Village Institutions in Botswana

Institutions	Known to be Present[2]	Actually Present (villages)	People Attended Meetings	People Attended Frequently	Active or Effective	Overall Score[3]
Kgotla	100%	100%	91%	68%	75%	33
	300	(6 Villages)	272	203	224	
Village development committee	85%	100%	43%	31%	41%	20
	254	(6 Villages)	128	92	124	
Parent Teacher Association	73%	100%	37%	22%	29%	16
	219	(6 Villages)	112	67	87	
Farmers' Committee	48%	67%	12%	5%	6%	7
	95	(4 Villages)	24	10	11	
Botswana Council of Women	73%	67%	19%	11%	27%	13%
	145	(4 Villages)	37	22	53	13
YWCA	76%	17%	6%	4%	42%	13
	38	(1 Villages)	3	2	21	
Co-op	95%	33%	28%	19%	57%	20
	95	(2 Villages)	28	19	57	
Burial Society	45%	33%	30%	13%	30%	12
	45	(2 Villages)	30	13	30	
Land Board[1]	91%		4%		68%	17
	272	0	12	0	169	
District Council[1]	77%		5%		27%	10
	230	0	16	53		

Total Respondents: 300   Maximum Possible Score: 40

Source: Rural Sociology Unit (1981), Traditional and Modern Local Institutions and Their Role in Development, Gaborone: Government Printer, quoted in Odell, Jr., 1985: 67.

1. Land Board and Council were not actually present in the six villages studied, but data are provided for comparative purposes.

2. Percentages are calculated only on village where the institutions actually exist. Burial Societies, for example, are found only in two villages (100 respondents), so th · proportion knowing of the burial societies is 45 % (45 out of 100 respondents).

3. Sum of positive responses in columns 1, 3, 4, and 5 (%), divided by 10.

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3.2.1 Labour Reserve for South African Mines: Implications

3.2.1.1 Process of Labour Reserve for South African Mines: Rural Class Formation

Botswana, or then Bechuanaland, had been integrated into South Africa as a labour reserve for the diamond and gold fields of South Africa since around the turn of this century, when new taxation was imposed (Parson, 1984: 22-23).

> "The taxation 'forced upon the people the necessity of finding a
> regular sum of money each year'"(Parson, 1984: 22-23).

In this context, labour migration in the form of short-term contracts to South African mines has been the major means to earn "a regular sum of money." "The demand for labour in South Africa and the need to earn cash in Bechuanaland quickly created a pattern of oscillating migratory labour that touched almost all people in the Protectorate"(Parson, 1984: 25). Thus this migration pattern, which made villages increasingly integrated into the market economy, was developed into a rigid system which determines people's pattern of moving in the Protectorate. According to Parson, in 1930, 4,012 Batswana were employed in South Africa, and the number increased to 10,314 in 1935, to 18,411 in 1940 and nearly half of all males aged fifteen to forty four were away from the protectorate in 1943. In 1980s, however, the number of employment -- more correctly the number of recruitment -- in South African mines has been gradually decreased as Table 3-9 shows, because of the change of policies in South Africa.

Table 3-9 Employment in South Africa Mines, Botswana

	Number		Earning	
	Employees*	Recruits	Deferred Pay (R'000)	Remittances (R'000)
1982	18,437	21,456	14,434	5,996
1983	18,691	18,462	16,355	7,660
1984	18,916	19,075	16,776	6,863
1985	20,128	19,648	15,350	6,515
1986	20,994	19,223	15,335	6,108
1987	20,112	17,848	14,784	5,572
1988	19,320	16,470	13,913	4,875
1989	17,874	16,464	11,870	2,984
1990	13,516	14,627	8,085	1,711

* Quarterly figures reflect numbers employed at the end of each period. The annual figures
are the averages of the quarterly figures.
Source: Central Statistics Office, *Statistical Bulletin* June 1991, p.37.

Results of this process can be explained in some ways, and purposes
of migration have been changed from original ones as well.

"Migrant labour has not only taught the value of money and
introduced many new material goods, but it has also introduced
the concept of wage-employment" (Kooijman, 1980: 25).

The process of colonisation "transformed the previously independent and
dynamic societies into dependent entities, and their dependence was
brought about because their ability to support themselves were
progressively undermined" (Person, 1984: 25), which is characterised as a
labour reservoir where "(t)he peasantry exports adult labour-power to
capitalist wage-employment, but at rates of pay or under social conditions
which preclude any substantial material returns to subsistence
agriculture" (Cliffe and Moorsom, 1979: 43). Therefore, one of the
important consequences is the growing reliance on migrant labour for
survival and deterioration of agricultural production derived from
absentee male labour in rural communities. This led to rural class
formation and poverty of peasants (Cliffe and Moorsom, 1979: 43), which
has reinforced the migrant labour system where peasants have to choose

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migration as a option to avoid their impoverishment rather as a result of being forced to pay taxes in the colonial period. In other words, this process created people, oscillating between rural and urban areas, especially South African mines[20], and being partly proletarialised[21]. This is because:

> "the jobs in which migrants work are at the low and/or bottom
> end of income distribution, so much so that wages for this group
> in Botswana cannot sustain a household in the urban areas.
> Hence the wage component of the equation causes in turn the
> retention of rural base where a portion of total household
> income can be independently generated and where the cost of
> living... is much less than in urban areas... The cycle is thus
> complete and the intertwining of wage labour and agriculture
> shows a structure and stability that almost alone accounts for
> its persistence" (Person, 1984b: 14).

Figure 3-2 shows that only one-fourth (24 percent) of rural dwelling units, which is considered to be richer households, relied their income just on agriculture. Majority (62 percent) of them depend on various combination of income, including wages. "A total of 68% of rural dwellings have at least one absent wage earner at some point during the year" (*National Migration Survey, vol.1,* 1982: 39). This can be considered, as in the case of Zambia, that small-scale farmers have been offered and can choose "exit" option instead of "voice" one as their tactics to cope with issues related to their survival.

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[20]Patterns of migration has been changing. There was an increase within the country, especially from rural areas to urban centres (see, e.g. , NMS, vol.2, 1982).
[21]Parson coined the term "peasantariat" to refer to those who adapt peasant production and wage work into new form of working class existence (1984: 26).

Wages= A member of the unit wage employment during one or more Rounds in the year

Lands= The dwelling unit has its own land used for arable farming

Cattle= The dwelling unit owns cattle

36% Wages, Lands & Agriculture

20% Wages, Lands, No Cattle

11% Cattle & Lands, No Wages

11% Lands, No Cattle, No Wages

10% Wage, No Cattle, No Lands

6% Wage, Cattle, No Lands

2% Cattle, No Lands, No Wages

3% No Cattle, No Lands, No Wage

Wages and Agriculture 62%

Agriculture Only 24%

Non-Agriculture 13%

Figure 3-2 Rural Dwelling Units: Agriculture and Wage Employment in Botswana (1978/79)

Source: Migration in Botswana, p.563, figure10.5

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The consequence of the formation of migrant labour system have most severely hit the subsistence peasants, promoted polarisation in rural Botswana and "deepened exploitation of women" as explained by Cliffe and Moorsom (1979). According to *Houshold Income and Expend'ture Survey in 1985/6,* more than 45 percent of rural households were headed by women, being increased by 15 percent from the end of 1970s. Disadvantages of female-head households are quite clear in the following table 3-10. There is a similarity with the case of Zambia where rural poor escape from the impoverish by migrating to the urban areas rather to organise themselves to take collective action.

Table 3-10 Difference of Property in Different Types of Household, Botswana

House-hold: Heads	Holding No Cattle (%)	Holders Average Cattle Held (No.)	Holding no Small Stock (%)	Holders Average Stock Held (No.)	Area Planted 0 ha (%)	Area Planted 0-4ha (%)	Average (ha)
male	33	23.5	23	20.3	22	62	3.9
female	72	5.6	47	8.4	36	84	2.3
female, no men*	76	3.8	66	5.1	49	89	1.6

Source: Constraints, table B1.3.1-8-1, quoted in Cliffe and Moorsom, 1979: 45.
* i.e. households without any resident adult males.

3.2.1.2 Impact at the Level of Community: From Communalism to Individualism

In Tswana communities, there was a variety of communal "cooperation", even patron-client, arrangement, for example, "mafisa," "letsema," and "motsheko." "Mafisa" is not only "one of the long term arrangements for ploughing[22] as one of its objectives is to provide the holder with draft power, " which even pass on from one generation to the next (Willet, 1981: 31), but also cattle which are given by the chief in a kind

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[22]See Curtis, 1972 for more details of the social organisation of ploughing.

of loan or agistment (Peters, 1994: 29). "Many of these *mafisa* cattle were given in small numbers to a wider range of men, partly to fulfill the chief's role as savior of the needy" (Peters, 1994: 29). The holders of *mafisa* cattle were not necessarily the chief, and they "were drawn from a range of ranks, some of them among the more prominent followers of the chief's subordinates" (Peters, 1994: 29). And these cattle are given out to their followers and clients, though the number of cattle is small.

Apart from "mafisa," other forms of arrangement involve larger groups of up to ten or fifteen members. "Letsema" is one of this type cooperation. In "letsema," the only contribution other than labour is food and/or drink, provided by the member whose field the group is working on. This arrangement includes ploughing, weeding, harvesting, bush clearing, destumping and fencing.

However, as anthropological and sociological works in some villages in Botswana showed (e.g., Curtis, 1972; Kooijman, 1978, 1980, Willet, vol.1, 1981), in the early 1970s, the kinship co-operation was almost lost in the Tswana villages, because of socio-economic changes, caused mainly by the establishment of a labour reserve. One of the most salient changes in this process is the penetration of the money economy into the rural areas, which changed people's attitudes to co-operative works. As a result, people tend to work together if they will be paid for it. For example, there are cases that the traditional workparties take the form of a few people working together for a wage of one small basin of salt or one larger basin of sugar (Kooijman, 1978: 235-236).

This change is considered to be a shift from communalism to individualism in rural Botswana. But this change means not only the breakdown of cooperation but also the formation of new type cooperation. Burial societies indicate this tendency. This is a form of association which is widespread and which meets a strongly felt need of "money." Therefore,

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the formation of burial societies is highly motivated by the people being involved, and they became the most popular and active association in rural Botswana as Brown observed (1982).

Apart from the burial societies, most of other forms of association in rural Botswana was organised not by "genuine" people's initiative but "from above" as we see below.

3.2.2. Political Parties in Rural Area

In this part of the chapter, roles of political parties in rural areas will be considered to consider the same question as in Zambia how the political parties regulate the "space" of rural areas.

3.2.2.1 Functions of the Ruling BDP at the Local level

Though there are limited systematic researches and analyses of the local level party systems except for a study by Richard Vengroff (1977) in the Kweneng District by the early 1970s, we can get fragmented information on this issue in academic literature and government reports on local institutions in the 1980. Therefore, these empirical evidences will be integrated into a picture which depicts functions of parties in rural areas[23].

According to Vengroff (1977: 104), the formal structure of the ruling party exists at two levels in the district: (1) MP constituency, and (2) the ward committee. Vengroff concluded that "(t)he constituency-level

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[23]Parson stated in his 1984 election surveys concerning patron-client relationship in rural Botswana as follows:
"A significant proportion of households [in rural areas] engaged in tribunary, patron-client, relations with larger cattle owners in order to plough at all or had to pay cash for the ploughing of lands....Large cattle owners, many of whom had traditional status and position, were also the main pool from which candidates for the BDP were drawn" (1986: 85).

organization, aside from the annual meeting held (in some constituencies) prior to the national convention, generally is active only during elections" (Vengroff, 1977: 113) in the Kweneng district, where the ruling BDP was dominant. In the early 1970s, constituency committees coordinated activities of the party at this level.

It is the latter that was "important in terms of the day-to day operation of the party and its relations with the people" (Vengroff, 1977: 104). This organisation is composed of committees of eighteen members, and normally led by the councillor or the party candidate for councillor. The main task of the ward committees was the recruitment of party members through the sale of party cards. However, the degree of success of committees in this regard was different. The most successful case was the one led by a headman-councillor, and "his committee members were given the role of advisors to the headman and are organized to *completely control all other organizations in the ward*, including the village development committee and the PTA" (Vengroff, 1977: 104, emphasis added). On the other hand, the least successful committees were strictly oriented to elections.

One of the most prominent roles of the party committee at this level was that it functioned as a local-party caucus, as Vengroff documented (Vengroff, 1977: 107). In this organisation, "an effort is made to insure that at least a majority of each [village development] committee is composed of party activists" (Vengroff, 1977: 107). In occasions of selection of VDC members, "(a)s many party supporters as possible are brought to the meeting to insure selection of the [dominant] party's choice of candidates and to act as a potential veto over the nomination of more than a few opposition party members" (Vengroff, 1977: 107). Vengroff also reported a case where the opposition organised effectively to gain control over the VDC. What eventually happened in this case was that "the MP

was called upon to have the selection voided and the members dismissed. The BDP was able to organize and regain control at the next opportunity" (Vengroff, 1977: 107).

Therefore, there was a tendency that the control of the BDP is more strict in the area where the opposition organised well against the ruling BDP. The similar phenomenon can be observed in the area where the opposition is relatively strong in the election of councillors. As observed in a study of local organisations in the North-East District by Fortmann et al. (1983), an BDP councillor was usually nominated where the opposition Botswana People's Party (BPP) was elected (Fortmann et al., 1983: 81, 117). It is possible to see an intention of the ruling BDP not to leave political "space" favourable to the opposition at the level of ward. Furthermore, it was reported that the escalation of partisan politics which was a result of the idea of having two councillors, in wards (e.g. Themashenga and Tshesebe villages) had a considerable, mainly negative, impact on village development (Vengroff, 1977: 81, 118).

It was also reported that the councillor's working relations with major local institutions such as the VDC, PTA and the *kgotla* were generally quite poor in the ward (e.g. Matsiloje village in the North-East District) where the councillor was of the BDP (Vengroff, 1977: 40). His major roles included the preparation for the Ministers' visit or the MP's tours.

Considering these cases, Vengroff's observation that the influence exercised by the ruling party committee over local "nonpolitical" organisations varied from total control in some areas to very little in areas lacking an opposition, or where only weak or rudimentary committees exist (1977: 107) is considered to be still valid.

3.2.2.2 Demarcation between Political Parties and Local Administration?

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In his detailed survey in the 1970s (1977, 1985), Louis Picard revealed that the then European-dominated district administration was used as a mechanism to control the opposition before 1974, especially the Botswana National Front (BNF) which gained advantage of traditional leadership, and which became strong in the Southern District[24]. However, the BDP and the government changed its tactics for the 1974 elections by adopting the tactic to use district development policy as a tool of electoral mobilisation (1985: 194). It was the Accelerated Rural Development Scheme (ARDP). As a result, he explained, "(p)olitical and administrative elites increasingly seem to be seeing the need to use the district administration as a force to mobilize political support in the district" (Picard, 1985.: 197). In development policies, such common goods as roads, schools, watering facilities and clinics were offered. In addition, in the case of drought, food was also provided.

Therefore, it is possible to assume that administration was used to implement development policies favourable to mobilise political support for the ruling BDP at the district level. However, this does not mean that political parties, especially the ruling BDP, and local administration has been functionally merged. They are both organisationally and functionally separated. It is rather assumed that local administration and its policy implementation mechanism became a means of the ruling elite to control rural civil society in the process of building a institutionalised way of patronage distribution ("pork-barrel", such as roads and schools as raised above) in contrast with a highly personalised way of patronage in many other African states. In other words, rural policy implementation has became an indirect and non-violent way of controlling rural political space

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[24]In the 1969 election, as is well-known, Bathoen II who joined the BNF defeated the then Vice-President Masire, and the BNF captured all three Ngwaketse seats.

by the state by distributing resources in a way of development programme as detailed later in this chapter.

It is necessary to point out that the degree of control of rural civil society is different from one ward from another. It depends not only on the function of party committee and councillors as noted above but also on the effectiveness of administrative staff, although the political system in Botswana is relatively hierarchically self-regulated[25].

3.2.2.3 Autonomous Space in Rural Area?

As noted above based, it is not possible that political control has been evenly strict all over the country. However, it can be assumed that the ruling BDP has adopted a combination of tactics in order to effectively control rural areas.

In the area where the opposition is relatively strong, on one hand, the BDP's control is rather explicit, by intervening election process of the Village Development Committee and by appointing a BDP councillor to counterweight an elected opposition one.

On the other hand, in the area where the ruling BDP is relatively strong, there seem to be no explicit interventions by the BDP in local affairs. However, this does not mean that there is no control at all. Councillors are usually "supervised" by MP, fearing the electoral consequences of dissatisfaction with the performance of councillors of the party (Charlton, 1993: 343). As Vengroff analysed in the 1970s, "the MPs

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[25]In a relatively recent survey as a part of the Democratic Research Project (DRP), Molutsi found that:

> "The MPs look on themselves a s supervisors of the councillors as
> well. It is not unusual for constituents to report to the MP when they
> feel their councillor is not doing his job, such as not holding meetings
> or not taking the community's concerns to council" (1989: 127).

exercise some influence over the activities of councillors and party leaders at the local level" (1977: 117)[26]. In addition, local patronage resources are supposed to be used effectively to neutralise oppositions by seducing support away from the opposition by reminding voters that they will receive more benefit from BDP rule (Charlton: 1993: 344). As a result, the patronage in the form of a variety of support schemes of development projects eventually suffocated the will of self-help in rural areas.

Therefore, generally speaking, it can be assumed that political parties have narrowed autonomous space of rural civil society in Botswana.

3.2.3 Co-operatives

3.2.3.1 A Brief Historical Background: Before Independence

It was around 1945-1946 that the idea of encouragement of "co-operatives" in dairy industry was introduced in the Bechuanaland Protectorate by Mr. Thornton, the then Agricultural Advisor to the High Commissioner (BNA, S.215/6/1). This idea was accepted by the Resident Commissioner in Mafeking when he wrote:

> "...the encouragement and extension of co-operative dairying
> will be good for the cattle industry as it will certainly be
> financially beneficial to the people, and for this reason I am
> now prepared to support the suggestion" (BNA, S.215/6/1).

But it was also clear that these co-operatives were allowed as far as they are under complete control of the colonial administration,

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[26]At the same time, MPs also "act as a watchdog on the central administration to see that their areas receive some benefits from the central government", which has kept its sufficient resources to be allocated (Vengroff, 1977: 117).

"But it is clear that we should not develop co-operative dairying to such an extent that it cannot be adequately supervised by officers of the department, and that is why I agreed to support the establishment of only 5 dairies in the Bamangwato Reserve and one on Crown Land in the first instance"(BNA, S.215/6/1).

In 1958, there were 6 "co-operative" dairies in the North of the Protectorate and 3 in the South. They sent in cream to the creamery in Francistown which was operated by a firm (BNA, S.215/6/3). However, because of the lack of co-operative law for native Africans, at this time, there was no "registered" co-operative societies in Bechuanaland under the 1910 Co-operative Agricultural Societies Proclamation. Apart from co-operative form of organisations, there were other types of organisations as we will see in the next section.

It was at the end of the 1950s, when Oxfam had interest in possible development projects in the Protectorate, that impetus for the launching of co-operative movement as one of the components of development for native Africans was given. In 1959, Jimmy Betts, who was the then field director of Oxfam and worked collaboratively with Bert Youngjohns, the then Registrar in Basutholand for Co-operative Departments, made a proposal on co-operative development (Morgan, 1981: 5). This was discussed with the Commissioner in Mafeking, Peter Fawcus, who was the main advocate within the colonial government. It was at this time that a Co-operative Act was drafted.

There were also consultations with the Tribal Authorities during the early 1960s, which forged consensus between the colonial government and the Tswana chiefs that co-operative organisations have economic potentiality, and which led to a Co-operative Societies Law introduced in 1962. In the 1963/66 Development Plan, the provision for a Department of

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Co-operative Societies was made, and a Registrar and staff of 6 Co-operative Officers were recruited (Morgan, 1981: 6).

In the initial policy of the Department of Co-operative Development stated in the first *Annual Report* (1964), priority was given to the organisation of a group of crop marketing and agricultural supply societies in the southern part of the territory where agricultural extension was concentrated for the purpose of fostering national sufficiency in food grain production (Morgan, 1981: 6). In the same document, co-operative societies in the territory were considered to be potentially contributing to economic and social development as autonomous associations under the Department's supervision and guidance as follows:

> "... Co-operatives can serve the people only to the extent that they are efficient, and responsive to the disciplines of sound Co-operative and commercial practice. This means that *development has to be contained within the Department's ability to give adequate supervision and guidance* ... Co-operatives can only be established when people know and understand what they are doing. They can grow and develop only within the capacity of their members to finance and manage... The aim is the creation of a vigorous, independent Co-operative movement based on the principles of self-help, mutual and voluntary association" (BNA, S215/6/5, emphasis added).

At the outset, co-operatives were therefore "quasi-autonomous" organisations in the sense that they are principally independent but they could work only within the policy framework of the Department.

However, a factor of drought in the year 1964 changed the original emphasis on grain or crop marketing as a function of co-operatives, which was designed by the Department of Co-operative. Several marketing co-operatives "turned their emphasis from grain to cattle when it was

discovered that marketing directly to the abattoir fetched a better price than traders or dealers could pay" (Campbell, 1978: 104). This change resulted in the change of the Department of Co-operatives's emphasis from agricultural and grain marketing co-operatives to those of cattle marketing. As a result, as stated below, members of cooperative at the first stage in Botswana were relatively wealthy cattle owners.

3.2.3.2 Co-operatives after Independence: General Trend and Characteristics

It can be concluded that the cooperative movement has been relatively successful in terms of performance. This relative success of co-operative movement[27] can be found in concrete data of registrations and liquidations of marketing societies in early days after independence, as is shown in table 3-11, which is clearly contrasting with the case of Zambia. Table 3-12 also shows recent development of co-operative movement in terms of number of primary societies and membership. What is also a characteristics is that co-operatives, especially marketing, are relatively large, averagely nearly 550 members in 1988, although the spread of membership among societies is not even.

Table 3-11 Registrations and Liquidation of Marketing Societies
in 1960s and 1970s, Botswana

Years	No. Registered	No. Liquidated	No. Societies
1964-1967	18		18
1968-1971	17	3	32
1972-1975	23	1	54
1976-1979	9+		63

Source: Morgan, 1980. Table 2.

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[27]One of the most successful co-operatives is the Odi Weavers' Co-operative, which is famous for the production of beautiful tapestries. This co-operative's approach combines social and political consciousness with technical and skills, which has successfully educated members in the process of production of various tapestries drawing various stories in southern Africa (see e.g. Byram, undated).

Table 3-12 Number of Types of Primary Societies 1986-1988, Botswana

Types	1986	1987	1988
Marketing & Supply	20	20	19
Producer	4	4	5
Multipurpose	55	56	58
Consumer	15	14	15
Savings & Credit	32	33	32
Total	108	127	128
Total Membership	63,103	64,567	69,884

Source: Department of Cooperative Development, Annual Report 1989, p.70.

Considering marketing, including multipurpose, societies, in recent years, they contribute more than 20 percent of cattle marketed to the Botswana Meat Commission as is shown in table 3-13. Therefore, it is true that Morgan wrote that "a fair amount of success is usually claimed for the Co-operative Movement in Botswana" (1) because co-operatives, especially agricultural, have made an important contribution to localisation in the private small business sector, (2) because they have helped to spread the benefits of growth in cattle export trade to smaller herd owners through diversification of available marketing channels and through their offer of non-speculative prices, and (3) because co-operatives have provided trading practices and jobs (1982: 43-44).

Table 3-13 Co-operative -- Supply of Cattle & Small Stock, Botswana

Year	No. of Coop. Cattle Slaughtered	% of Coop. Cattle/BMC	No. of Coop. Small Stock Slaughtered
1972	11,587	7.4	n.a.
1973	20,728	9.9	n.a.
1974	24,080	12.9	n.a.
1975	27,802	14.8	4563
1976	35,415	16.7	2722
1977	35,079	17.8	1709
1978	23,991	16.1	80
1979	36,261	15.8	79
1980	22,255	15.8	66
1981	42,354	21.0	-
1982	47,586	20.0	72
1983	50,955	21.8	1342
1984	46,549	19.5	3095
1986	38,538	20.2	
1987	29,259	21.0	
1988	27,195	21.8	

Source: Department of Cooperative Development, Annual Report 1989, 70.
BCU, A Brief Outline of the Activities of the BCU, 1985: 10.

However, the story of the cooperative movement after independence is not so simple a success story if we consider the changing characteristics of cooperative more in detail in its relation with the state.

One of the main characteristics of the co-operative movement in Botswana since independence is that "co-operative organisational forms have been little used in Botswana as instruments for government aims and initiatives, in contrast to many other African countries" (Morgan, 1982: 9). From the outset, co-operatives were understood as a local private sector institution to maximise their gains. Therefore, there was relatively limited intervention in the movement, which could be called "minimalist orientation" of the state (Morrison, 1987: 415). At the time of immediately after independence, the role of the state did not go beyond "nurturing."

According to a government document concerning policies on co-operative development in the 1980s, it is "(t)he policy of creating a strong, viable and self-reliant co-operative movement" and "Government assistance to co-operatives has been described as 'help to self-help', taking the form mostly of training, advice and long term loans" (ROB, 1983b: 5). Therefore, at the level of primary societies, "(a)ll staff, including the managerial level, of cooperative in Botswana is employed directly by the management committees and Government is not involved at all" (ROB, 1983b: 5). In addition, the attitude of the Ministry of Agriculture towards the Department of Co-operatives was characterised as "enlightened disinterest" or "sympathetic non-intervention," which means "providing basic services to movement, allowing the Department of Co-operative Development to decide its own priorities, but not otherwise interfering or imposing over-ambitious objectives and this has been considered to contribute to "the nature of the movement in a context in which it has received no substantial commercial favours from the Government"

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(Morgan, 1982: 9). At the same time, however, this "disinterest" is a reflection of the relative lack of government interest in the co-operative movement in the national economy, which is clearly exemplified by a short reference to co-operatives in National Development Plan after independence.

However, even in this general context of the movement, the relation between the state and the movement has been changing. In other words, the state has gradually penetrated into and regulated the movement, as th stat· became financially self-sufficient in the 1970s, results of which will be raised just below. Also this change reflected the changing nature of the cooperatives. At independence, as Morrison showed, "the cooperative became dominated by the traditional and newly emergent political elite, the social category in possess of the nations cattle and the means for private consumption" (1987: 439). Therefore, there was no immediate necessity for the BDP nationalists to manipulate the institution, because both were composed of those who had relatively similar social background.

> "BDP loyalists of the local level had migrated into positions
> of authority in the cooperatives, creating such a degree of
> overlap that the cooperatives became a de facto element of
> the BDP legacy" (Morrison, 1987: 442).

Furthermore, immediately after independence, the arm of the state responsible for the cooperatives, the Department of Cooperatives was still weak both in financial and in functional terms.

In the 1970s, as a result of financial independence of the 3otswana state owing to "luck," cooperatives were interpenetrated by state agencies and programmes (Morrison, 1987: 448-449). As Morrison stated,

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"Cooperatives were a convenient instrument of public administration and a vehicle for the distribution of state patronage to rural and urban elite" (Morrison, 1987: 448)

during this period. In this process, capacities of the Department of Cooperatives (CODEC) were expanded. Funding levels grew from R46,000 in 1969/70 to R139,000 in 1974/75 in recurrent expenditure. Professional staffing levels also grew from 23 in 1969/70 to 42 in 1974/75 (Morrison, 1987: 455-456). In functional terms, outreach and annual audits became regular elements of CODEC. In addition, the superstructure of the movement, the Botswana Cooperative Bank (BCB) and the Botswana Cooperative Union (BCU) were elaborated by the state initiative[28]. This strengthened structure of the cooperative movement eventually supported the growth and expansion. "The State assumed a more aggressive stance vis-a-vis the movement" (Morrison, 1987: 456).

Table 3-14 Livestock Ownership of Sample Members, Kgatleng Marketing Society, 1974
(Botswana)

No. of Livestock	No. of Members Owning Cattle in This Range	No. of Members Owning Smallstock in this Range
0	10	8
1-10	12	12
11-20	7	6
21-30	8	5
31-50	4	4
51-100	1	4
100+	4	2

Source: Morgan, 1982: Table 14.

Table 3-15 Cattle Ownership, Cattle Sales ad Reported Annual Gross Income by Branch, Sample at Kgatleng Marketing Society, 1974 (Botswana)

Branch	Average Cattle Owned	Average Head Sold (1973)	Income (1973)	No. of Members Sampled
Mochudi	80.53	5.6	R 1584	15
Sikwane	10.37	1.5	R 341	8
Bokka	4.77	0.44	R 566	9
Artesia/ Letshibitse	9.21	0.78	R 560	14

Source: Morgan, 1982: Table 15.

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[28] At this period, "the Development Trust was transformed into the Botswana Cooperative Bank (BCB) in 1974, and the BCU acquired in 1973 an apex marketing wing located near the abattoir in Lobatse, its function to coordinate quotas and communication between societies and the BMC (Morrison, 1987: 460).

It is also necessary to consider the nature of co-operatives in terms of membership, which will show a changing nature of co-operatives during this period more clearly. However, there is only limited data concerning co-operative membership. Table 3-14 and 3-15 shows the pattern of differentiation of cattle ownership and sales between members both overall and by branches based on a small-scale survey, carried out in 1974 at the Kgatleng Marketing Society, which was the only "district-wide" society. According to these data, membership was quite diversified in terms of the numbers owning livestock. In addition, difference among branches is very wide. Roughly speaking, members of this marketing co-operative are middle- and small-scale farmers or middle or poor peasants (see e.g. table 3-16). Even so, according to one of reports of a series of "local institutions" survey, there is a tendency that initiative comes from "a group of farmers" with advantages of education, wealth and influence, and the overall operations of co-operative falls into the hands of those people (Fortmann et al.: 47-49). In addition, there is quite limited opportunities for women to join the co-operative and the few women who have joined are of two categories:

(a) those who are heads of households (unmarried); and
(b) those widows who have replaced the deceased husbands.

Therefore, co-operatives in Botswana, which is more capitalist-oriented and private economic organisations, became organisations more profitable for middle-scale farmers rather than for peasant farmers (see e.g., table 3-16), although cooperatives changed from its original elitist organisations.

Table 3-16 Various Categories of Agricultural Producers used by Individual Researchers in Botswana

Cliffe/Moorsom	Comaroff	Cooper	Opschoor
Cattle Ranchers: 100+ cattle	Large Farmers: Own a Tractor 100+ bags of crops harvested in normal years: Hire labour always Rent out implements regularly	Very rich peasantry (Emergent capitalist farmers): 100+ cattle 100+ bags of crops harvested Hire labour always	Upper stratum: 40+ cattle and/or 2+ bags of crops harvested per household number and/or worker earning P50+
		Lower level rich peasantry: 41-100 cattle 15+ bags of crops harvested Hire labour regularly	
Middle peasants: Ready Access to a plough and to draught-oxen Crops for sale - "fair proportion of output"	Middle-range farmers: Own a small tractor or hire Crops for sale	Middle peasantry: 21-40 cattle 11-15 bags of crops harvested Household and relatives as labour Enough crops for consumption (A small minority)	Middle stratum: 1-40 cattle cannot survive on cultivation alone
Poor peasants: 0-19 cattle 1-19 bags of crops harvested Crops cultivated for consumption	Small farmers: Have few implements Only small amounts of crops for sale	Poor peasantry: 0-20 cattle 1-10 bags of crops harvested Household and relatives as labour Not Enough crops for consumption(An overwhelmingly majority)	Lower stratum: No Cattle Cannot survive on agriculture alone

Source: Hesselberg ,1985: 131 Table 5

It is also necessary to point out another one of the characteristics of the cooperative movement in Botswana, which is that the movement became gradually urban-biased. This is a result of strengthening of the BCU and the BCB by the state, especially by the Ministry of Finance (not by the CODEC). The BCU acts as an apex organisation acting as a wholesale supplier of consumer goods, agricultural inputs to primary societies, and cattle agent for the livestock marketing societies with the Botswana Meat Commission, through its offices and holding ground adjacent to the Lobatse abattoir. "This agency arrangement involves the obtaining of

quotas at the abattoir, reception of co-operatively marketed cattle, calculation of annual bonuses for society members" (Morgan, 1981: 86). It is, therefore, possible to consider that co-operatives involving trading activities have achieved moderate success at an aggregated level. However, the operation of BCU was monopolised by "the urban bloc," which was formed in the process of expansion of consumer societies in the 1970s (Morrison, 1987: 462-464). As a result, the cooperative movement itself became consumer societies-dominated by 1976, which was a completely different reality pursued in the original state policy emphasising rural societies (Morrison, 1987: 465). The majority of marketing societies in the countryside was institutionally left behind in this mainstream.

The argument above contains two important issues to be considered. The one is that the cooperative movement was developed by the state resources. The other is that the rural sector was relatively neglected.

The former means that the movement became more dependent on the financial resources of the state. This also means that the apex organisations of the cooperative movement is under financial control of the state. For instance, in 1978, the Ministry of Finance started to provided the BCU, via the BCB with public debt service moneys called Public Debt Service Fund (PDSF)[29]. These grew steadily, and by the early 1980s funds were totaled 5 million pula (Morrison, 1987: 486). Therefore, it can be conclude that the state penetration into the movement deepened by this period, and the cooperatives were gradually incorporated into the state institution. On this point, Morrison stated that

[29]According to Colclough and McCarthy, PDSF is one of "two funds for appropriation of domestic revenues in years of surplus..., which would be used to cover future deficits and to finance the small but growing public debt" (1981: 94)

"its [Ministry of Finance's] authority and integrity established
prior to the full bloom of cooperative power, functioned as an able
referee, rescuing the cooperatives from PDSF and commercial debt
obligations totaling P3.5m while insisting upon a reordering of the
cooperatives' national affairs"(Morrison, 1987: 488).

There is another important evidence of the state control of the BCU.
By the mid-1984, "the Government agreed to loaning BCU about P3.0
million in order for BCU to exist as a true going concern. The loan has to
be repaid to Government at an interest rate of 10.5% for a period of 25
years" (BCU, 1985: 4). In order to ensure that the amount so loaned is put
into effective use by making the entire movement financially sound, the
Government required that the management of the BCU should be
strengthened, and proposed that the Government must have a temporary
majority of Government appointees in the BCU Board of Directors, which
is a main policy-making body of the BCU (BCU, 1985: 4). Eventually at the
BCU annual General Meeting of the 6th October 1984, it was resolved that
the Government appointees should be in the majority in the BCU Board
of Directors, and the Board was composed of 4 appointees and 3 members
elected at the Annual General Meeting by the members (BCU, 1985: 4).
Therefore, the BCU is almost incorporated into the state structure.

The latter is necessary to be considered in the broader context of
rural areas, as Morgan pointed out. In rural area, cooperatives are not the
dominant form of collective activity in Botswana or the institution for
rural development, which was clearly revealed in a series of reports of
local institutions in the 1980s (e.g. Brown, 1983; Fortmann et al, 1983).
Cases of cooperatives researched in these report are only a few in
comparison with other institutions treated in the next section. It is quite
difficult to generalise experiences, but Zufferey reported a case of neglect by
CODEC in the Mopipi Village in the Central District. According to a report

(Zufferey, 1983b: 76-78), the Mopipi Cooperative which was established in 1976 by the initiative of an agricultural demonstrator (AD) in the area failed mainly as a result of mismanagement (under the notorious Serowe Cooperative) of cooperative fund. In order to revitalise the cooperative, two officers were invited to explain the basic purpose, and function of a cooperative in 1982. However, continuous support from CODEC was not materialised (Zufferey, 1983b: 77).

Generally speaking, there are problem of little understanding of objectives of cooperatives and lack of management skill among members of cooperatives in rural areas. Therefore, it is usually difficult for newly established cooperatives to operate smoothly without support from CODEC or other facilities of training, and trained personnel suitable to lead a cooperative. In a form of cooperative, there is limited opportunities for peasant farmers to organise themselves without the state, which is paradoxical. Co-operative form of organisation in Botswana, thus, has had relatively limited scope of organising rural dwellers.

3.2.4 "Democratic" Structure Imposed "from Above": Controlled and Weakened Rural Civil Society

3.2.4.1 Group Formation From Above

As Vengroff stated, government leaders felt that democracy, development, and self-reliance must be fully implemented in rural areas in order to succeed in creating an infrastructure to serve the mining sector of the economy (1977: 18). For this purpose, the basic aim of the government, represented by the Community Development Department of the Ministry of Local Government and Lands, was to establish such local institutions as village development committees (VDCs), being capable of

encouraging mass participation and popular control. Therefore the government has made an effort to promote formation of various groups in rural areas.

One of these cases is agricultural groups. In Botswana the implementation of the (agricultural) group development programme has been a major aspect of the work of the Department of Agricultural Field Services since 1977, when Group Development Officers were appointed to the regions. However, before this programme was adopted, there were other forms of "agricultural extension" policy.

Since 1947, when Botswana was still under the colonial rule, there had been the Agricultural Demonstrators' Pupil Farmers Scheme (*Report of an Economic Survey Mission*, 1960: 184-187) to produce master farmers, in which farmers' associations were often formed in such areas as Ngwaketse and Kgatleng (Willet, 1981, vol.1: 36). In this scheme, these associations were used as a forum for disseminating information, co-ordinating arrangements for field and farmers' days and selecting topics and candidates for farmer training courses. Most of the planning was for the benefits of its membership. In addition, beneficiaries of this scheme were limited more or less to those who were better-off farmers, which was identified in three major consultancies over the period of 1970 and 1973 (Lever, 1971; Lynn, 1971; Chambers and Feldman, 1973, quoted in Willet, 1981: 54).

The specific origins of groups development are traced back to two separate strands of policy around the end of 1960s and the early 1970s. On the one hand, it is "the desire, first defined around 1970, to replace the Pupil Farmers Scheme as the then Department of Agricultural extension's system of farmer contact with a broader extension approach/outreach" (Willet, 1981, vol.1: 53-54). On the other hand, it is "the need, first noted at

least as far back as 1968/69, to discover and develop systems for the management of communal grazing land"(Willet, 1981, vol.1: 53-54).

Among three consultancy reports mentioned above, the most influential one on general rural development policy was that done by two planners with African experiences, Chambers and Feldman, to which the government responded by a white paper presenting official thinking on development in the early 1970s. These documents established the guidelines and official thinking for rural development towards the end of the decade, in which it was recognised that rather than being based on the mobilisation of the rural population, rural development policy was designed primarily to ensure political sequence of support by offering district physical infrastructure and services (Picard, 1987: 239-240).

Concerning the group approach, the three reports and another one by Fosbrooke (1971) agreed that group methods, especially targeting at small farmers who had not get benefits in the former Pupil Farmers Scheme, should be set in a wider extension strategy. It was in the early 1970s that the group approach was recognised as one method of reaching the rural poor (Willet, 1981, vol.1 : 61).

Following these recommendations, there were several changes in the Ministry of Agriculture in terms of its organisation and extension policy. In 1974-75, the Ministry reorganised itself in order to revitalise its impact on the farming community. The key level for change was recognised on the point of farmer contact. In this reorganisation, one of the most crucial changes was the creation of a regional structure for greater decentralisation of planning and management, particularly of support to the District and Extension Area level programmes (Willet, 1981, vol.1: 58), including measures to improve agricultural demonstrators' (ADs) performance. For this purpose, at the national level, the new Department

of Agriculture Field Services, which incorporated technical support divisions and sections, was created at the headquarters.

In practice, however, it can be said that there was no technical strategy to revitalise agricultural extension. Neither was there model for a broader extension outreach to approach the farming communities at this stage.

It was not until in 1976 that a "gradualist extension approach" to TGLP (Tribal Grazing Land Policy) implementation in the communal areas was formulated and the Pupil Farmers Scheme was officially disbanded (Willet, 1981, vol.1: 36, 93). In this implementation strategy,

> "Group activities in themselves were not new, but the concept of seeing them *as part of a wider strategic process* was new. The effect was to dramatically increase the attention given to *group development as an extension approach* and to encourage more forms of group activity than in the past" (Willet, 181, vol.1: 93, emphasis added).

In order to guide the work and liaise between the various specialist committees in the government and to design an effective approach to encouraging collective action in relation to the goals of the TGLP, an inter ministerial committee, known as the "Groups Group," was formed. Following the acceptance of the strategy as Ministry of Agriculture policy, the Groups Group worked on three areas:

> (1) preparation foi training of the Department of Agricultural Field Services;
> (2) necessary arrangements for the registration of groups;
> (3) provision of appropriate funding sources for small projects (Willet, 1981, vol.1, 98, emphasis added).

As a theoretical framework designed to structure government support for building groups, the Groups Group proposed:

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> "a gradual, extension approach to group formation, based on
> the immediate needs of local communities and assisting them
> at whatever level of enterprise they are ready and willing to
> undertake."

This principle was accepted and the Gradualist Extension Approach became official policy of the Ministry of Agriculture.

One of the important points in this approach was the recruitment of five Group Development Officers (GDOs). Posted in early 1978, the GDOs work as members of regional specialist staff teams, which provide support to an average of about 40 Agricultural Demonstrators (ADs). GDOs are responsible for establishing an effective approach to overcoming whatever constraints impede the formation, operation, or smooth functioning of groups (Kloppenburg, 1983: 318).

Concerning financial assistance, the first funding in the Ministry of Agriculture was AE10, which was intended to finance the Small Projects Programme, targeting at lower income groups such as female headed households and people with no or few cattle. The second similar source of finance was AG15 to Services to Livestock Owners in Communal Areas. This was intended to focus on the low income farmers of the communal areas within the framework of the implementation of the TGLP. AG15 is linked to the Agricultural Management Associations, which acquired a formal legal identity for the purposes of obtaining loans or establishing rights to land within a legal structure provided by the Agricultural Management Associations Act accepted in Parliament in April 1978. Apart from these two funds, there are various fund support programmes, including AE11 to assist small scale farmers who work in groups in the area of horticultural production, and LG17 for Village Development Programme (*Information on Funding for Small Projects*).

In addition, in 1982, the government adopted the Financial Assistance Policy, known as the "FAP," with immediate effect. This is a programme run by Government to provide incentives in the form of grants for productive enterprises that create employment in the context of the possibility of the creation of additional unemployment due to the cutback on labour migration to South Africa. There are three categories of FAP, namely small scale, medium scale and large scale. Among them, the small scale grants, administered by rural industrial officers and district and town Councils, would provide additional support for small scale agriculture and rural industrialisation.

These financial assistance programmes have a nature, on the one hand, to absorb excess domestic capital derived from mining industry and donor funds and, on the other hand, to disperse them and "feed" groups and rural entrepreneurs in order to control rural areas where the ruling BDP can keep its popularity.

However, there have been a variety of factors, including the government attitude, which discouraged initiatives of people in rural areas, and there was relatively high failure rate of financial assistance in rural areas.

3.2.4.2 Signs of Control by the State and Factors of Lack of Cohesion in Rural Communities

In this section, first, characteristics of the state involvement in the process of formation and financial assistance to rural organisations, and secondly, *internal* factors causing difficulties of organisational activities in rural areas is to be considered.

According to Roe and Fortmann (1982: 95-96), who conducted research on dam groups, it often happened that the government

sometimes acted alone, leaving the farmers behind and that in some localities lack of trust and cooperation were increasing owing to the existence of people who use a dam without contributing to the management of it. This suggested that the problems are two-fold; first, it is on the side of the government in that the way and the intent of the government's involvement has negative impacts on the group development and secondly it is on the side of rural communities in that they lack "organisational principle."

According to a recent evaluation report of AE10, namely the Agricultural Extension Small Projects Programme, which was intended to facilitate improved agricultural production through the creation of farmers' groups, it had relatively high failure rate (Selake quoted in SIAPAC-Africa, 1991: 29). The requirement for successful application is that the group must contain at least five members, have a constitution, contribute 10 percent of total project costs, and that the project itself should meet certain standards of viability; of special interest is the participation of low income households and female-headed households. Each project is reviewed by kgotla, the District Development Committee, the Regional Agricultural Officer and finally the Ministry of Agriculture. Therefore it often takes a long time before a grant is released, which eventually undermines the original enthusiasm. From 1978 to 1990, the Ministry assisted 372 projects, with grants ranging up to 15,000 pula. These have included drift fences, storage facilities, construction of small dams, horticulture, woodlots, poultry, fishing, and related areas. During this period, income-generating projects comprised 43.8 percent of all AE10 projects, was estimated to have a failure rate of 50 percent. Of the 56.2 percent of those projects that were non-income-generating 12.9 percent was estimated to have failed.

Furthermore, concerning FAP for small scale enterprise (SSE) projects, it was reported that FAP records do not exist in the relevant offices charged with SSE project administration. This lack of proper official record made it difficult to ascertain whether those entrepreneurs who were not located were still operating their enterprises (Morapedi and Jones-Dube, 1988: 7). Therefore financial assistance was not sufficiently managed by the government institutions.

At the field level, there are several critical reports even among government circles about the attitude of extension workers. For example, it is often reported that they and their supervisors maintain a "superior" attitude and they do not listen nor do they respect opinions of the rural people (Pearce, 1991: 20). In addition, some ministries, district and village staff do not regard participation and coordination as a high priority, which was exemplified by Roe and Fortmann, when they wrote:

> "During the course of the survey, the North-East District Council fenced five dams as the first step in turning them over to the village. The entire fencing effort took place on council's initiative *without informing the people...* the Council viewed the villagers as irresponsible and destructive..." (1982: 95, emphasis added).

In practice, grassroots "participation" is difficult due to the "top-down" flow of decisions, which results in the failure of participants' involvement in decision making even at lower levels. In addition to the example above, the communal grazing project suffered due to the lack of consultation with local people (Pearce, 1991: 21).

There was comprehensive research of local institutions in various districts in Botswana, which was organised by the Applied Research Unit of the Ministry of Local Government and Lands in the early 1980s. Among

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the reports derived from this research, Brown, who conducted a research in the communal areas in the Kweneng District, found that:

> "the remarkable extent to which *district and national government authorities condition the behavior of local institutions*. This influence is most noticeable in the voluntary organisations though it is also apparent in the traditional institutions. Often, as with major funding programmes such as LG17, *this influence is intended*" (Brown, 1983: 67, emphasis added).

Furthermore,

> "One interesting consequence of the fact that *local institutional activity is so heavily influenced by government is that local people start anticipating government and asking for the things they have come to expect government to provide* (Brown, 1983: 68, emphasis added).

One of the crucial problems derived from the government involvement in rural areas in terms of "top-down" approach, and financial assistance, was that the principle of "self-help" or 'ipelegeng' in Setswana, has "dwindled" as a result of the government extension and assistance policies, which are considered to weaken the organisational principle of rural dwellers. Considering one of the findings in rural development in developing countries that "groups must not be excessively subsidised" (Kloppenburg, 1983: 328), too much government financial assistance, exemplified by AE10 which had high failure rate, have had negative impact on rural self-reliance. Apart from financial assistance, the government's provision of social service facilities and the government's drought relief efforts have also robbed voluntary organisations of much of what used to be a major activity for them on a *voluntary* basis (Brown,

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1983: 71-72)[30]. The problem with drought relief in which people are paid for their work was that the projects chosen are exactly the same type of projects as the Village Developing Committee undertakes in a non-drought year. Therefore people become used to receiving food or money for community work and they refuse to do it on a voluntary basis. Furthermore, there is also a report that most of the people selected to benefit from the drought relief had, in fact, rarely or never participated in village projects, because the spirit of self-help in community development was killed (Fortmann et al., 1983: 58). Brown also pointed out that:

"The finding of this research... is that self-help is gradually being killed in Botswana. This is an unfortunate, and largely unintended (sic) side-effect of government's ... rural development programmes over the 1st decade or so" (Brown, 1983: 71).

One of the phenomena about the formation of associations in rural Botswana is that those formed are the same. This is attributed to the fact that extension workers can only help form and support those types of groups with which their training and supervision makes them familiar. It is very rare that extension worker who is capable of independently devising a new organisational form to respond to a local felt need (Brown, 1983: 44). In addition, since an extension worker is considered to be a representative of the government, people often take his suggestion as a command, and they have a sense of obligation to form commanded groups (Brown, 1983: 45), which result in forming a particular group without full understanding of its purpose. Zufferey, who was also a

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[30] One of the examples which Brown gave us is that of the namolo leuba projects. These projects left incomplete when the programme was abruptly ended in September 1982. A very few enterprising VDCs managed to complete these on a self-help basis. It was impossible for the VDCs to organise voluntary labour when people had recently been paid for the same work (Brown, 1983: 71-72).

member having been involved in the project of local institutions and conducted a research in Eastern Central District, wrote as follows:

"A number of voluntary institutions emerge [like PTA, branches of the Botswana Councils of Women] under the influence of dedicated members from neighboring village institutions, a good number of others are introduced as part of government policy and development strategy [like Village Development Committees, Village Health Committees, Agricultural Groups] by various government officers each of whom present the advantages and benefits of his organisation/project to the community. Besides the fact that each preaches for his/her own programme in isolation from his colleagues, the typical extension talk approach of government officers conveys *some sense of obligation on the part of the villagers to initiate committees because of the official character of their message.* As a result, a flurry of groups, committees and institutions emerges in rural communities. *Only a few of them are actually established out of genuine assessment of community needs performed with and by communities*" (1983b: 64, emphasis added).

Since they are the product of some extension workers who know that it is a good thing to form groups but do not know what else to do, many organisations exist in name only. The effect of such "artificial" groups is often negative because they tend to create cynicism about organisations in general. In this sense, there are limited opportunities for people in rural areas to create their initiative in order to form associations by themselves. In other words, rural civil society has been "suffocated" by the state.

In this way, a variety of the government rural involvement has resulted in weakening organisational principle in rural areas.

There are also factors on the side of rural communities which have stagnated rural civil society. These factors can be summarised as the lack of education and organisational skills to support, especially modern,

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organisational activities. This is "the sad fact" (Brown, 1983: 44). According to Zufferey:

> "The majority of modern institutions, including coordinating committee, lack the basic skills to operate and function as a group:
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> - a number of them were formed *on the spot* without adequate information on objectives and purpose of their institution.
>
> - As a result many of them duplicate roles and compete with each other for projects and fund raising.
>
> - Most executive committees show little ability to work as a group and lack basic administrative skills i.e. records/bookkeeping; lack of understanding of specific roles and duties of respective officers; *information, consultation, planning, decision-making and evaluation processes; group management and supervision* (1983: 61, original emphasis)

In addition, the constant stream of people in and out has reduced both the amount of available talent, concentrated attention and length of common experience which sustain organisations in some places (Fortmann et al., 1983: 250). These *internal* factors also have impeded the formation of cohesive rural associational organisations.

3.2.4.3 The Problem of Marketing

Another important problem in rural societies intertwined with problems raised above is that of marketing of products for domestic use like vegetables. This is also a problem of urban informal sector business[31].

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[31] "The poorly developed home also thwarts the growth of these [clothes, bakery and so on] informal business. The market is to a very large extent conditioned by the formal sector." "There is a competition posed by the formal sector... and this reduces the market available

This problem impeded sustainable organisational activities of small-scale business like commercial vegetable growers and bakeries.

One of the victims in this context is the South East Growers Association (SEGA). SEGA was formed in 1982 to trade vegetables and to provide a market for six horticultural co-operatives and individual producers in South Eastern Botswana. SEGA purchased vegetables from the growers and sold them to cover its cost. For this purpose, SEGA had a retail shop in central Gaborone.

During my research trip in 1992, I found the shop was used by other people and they said that SEGA no longer exist.

It is because of following reasons: SEGA had suffered from a lack of suitable management expertise after the departure of former expatriate volunteer advisors. In addition, there was financial difficulties. These difficulties were exacerbated by the competition with vegetables from South Africa, and the Ministry of Agriculture's decision to undertake parallel programmes in horticultural marketing rather than to strengthen SEGA. These factors only led to the member's loss of confidence in the organisation and failure of SEGA.

As this case indicates, not only financial as well as staff problems, but also marketing problem have been a major predicament for sustainable organisational activities in rural areas.

3.2.5 The Case of the Brigades Movement

Botswana's Brigades are post-primary training and educational institutions originally initiated by Patrick van Rensburg, a South African exile. By considering the case of the brigade movement since its inception,

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to informal businesses"(Alexander et al., 1983: 174, 177). In Botswana, it is also the case that there is a competition with the products from South Africa.

we can get a picture of transformation of an AO in its relation with the state. In this case, the movement was gradually "reorganised" and "coopted" by the state into a lower level institution of the government, as we shall see.

3.2.5.1 A Brief Early History

In 1965, the first Brigade, namely the Serowe builders brigade, was founded in Serowe, which was then the biggest population centre and the most important political centre before independence. It was the time when the country was one of the poorest countries in the world. Therefore the Brigade movement was a non-governmental response to the "school-leaver problem," which was a critical issue but could not be managed by the state.

In 1962-63, van Rensburg had founded a secondary school in Serowe, namely, Swaneng Hill School, as the sixth secondary school in the country. The Serowe builders brigade was founded as an outgrowth of this school. This brigade took over the work of building at Swaneng Hill School and employed primary school leavers who could not be admitted to the academic secondary classes. The brigade consisted of apprentices being trained on-the-job for three years by a qualified builder, and converted its costs by spending 80 percent of its time on production against 20 per cent on academic and trade theory teaching (ROB, 1981: 7). The name "brigade" was borrowed from Ghana in order to emphasise its being a production unit rather than a school, and it was governed by local community leaders through the Serowe Youth Development Association. The success of the model led to textile manufacture and the founding of carpenters, mechanics and farmers brigades in 1967. In 1969, Shashe River School, modeled on Swaneng, was founded at Tonota with its own

brigades, and a third school and brigade complex was founded at Mahalapye in 1971.

Outside Serowe, there was another expansion of this movement in the late 1960s and early 1970s. It was when the Community Development Department helped to found brigades centres at Kanye, Lobatse and Francistown that brigades were expanded in other parts of the country. In addition, the Kgatleng Youth Development Association was formed in Mochudi with brigades based on its existing community centre, and Maun's Ngamiland Youth Training Centre and the Tutume-McConnel Community College with brigades attached were founded. Outside Serowe, the Kweneng Rural Development Association in Molepolole was the largest centre, which was started in 1969 as a voluntary organisation of people interested in the development of the district under the leadership of David Inger (Egner et al, 1980: 1).

3.2.5.2 Idea of the Brigades

According to van Rensburg, the Brigade was considered to be a comprehensive tool for development "by offering training and education a' well as employment" (van Rensburg, 1978: 38). His basic idea of the brigade was based on the combination of education and production in order to support "deprived and oppressed working people, excluded from further education and employment" (van Rensburg, 1984: 26). Basically van Rensburg's emphasis in Serowe was on training rather than job-creation. This is because van Rensburg thought that conventional enclave development actually promoted rural stagnation and increased under development and unemployment and that it is necessary to formulate strategies to harmonise rural development with overall development, aiming at the mass of people (van Rensburg, 1984: 19). In other words, the

ideology of the brigade, which he had in mind, was one of transformation of community by linking learning with productive work and by community control and participation. But, as wee see below, this idea was gradually separated from the actual institutions of the brigade, which were reorganised into "the lowest level of national post-primary vocational education" (Parsons, 1989: 29).

This movement expanded in order to respond to two basic needs in a pragmatic way. First was the "school leavers problem." There were increasing numbers of primary school leavers who did not have any employment prospects and were denied access to secondary education. Therefore, as an institution which offered both education and training whose costs will be covered by production, the brigades were considered to be a model to meet this demand. Secondly, the brigades were suitable institution to meet growing demands for semi-skilled labour in the changing political economy. When there was a building boom between 1969 and 1971, which demanded semi-skilled labour in formal employment, this type of labour was provided through the builders brigade, known as "Con-Coop."

What we have to be careful to realise is that all brigades have not followed the ideal of the Serowe Brigade which was coined by van Rensburg. The Kweneng Rural Development Association(KRDA), which developed into the second largest Brigade centre during the 1970s, became the model of the brigade movement in the government policy, especially in the 1980s, as we can see from the fact that the brigade's Policies and Procedures Manual 1981 was written by David Inger, the then executive trustee of the KRDA. This manual, which has been used as the manual to form a new brigade, is based on the KRDA model.

Originally, the KRDA began as an informal discussion group in 1969 with a "Community Development ethos," aiming "to discuss and create

new lines of development in the area, especially those providing employment or practical training to young people" (Egner et al., 1981: 1). At the early stage, the KRDA faced a problem concerning the issue whether it would be a government-run or an autonomous body in the future, and it was determined among the parties involved, namely the District Council, the Community Development Department, KRDA and the Botswana Christian Council, that the KRDA would remain an autonomous organisation.

In terms of administration, the KRDA is a community-owned organisation which is administered by a Board of Trustees, which is made up of nine ex-officio trustees and thirteen trustees elected by secret ballot at a bi-annual general meeting at which all resident of the Kweneng District may vote. The Board may coopt up to eight more members of which no more than four may be given voting rights. The full board meets five or six times every year, and its Executive Committee more frequently. The KRDA is represented on the District Development Committee and also a member of the National Brigade Coordinating Committee (NBCC). The Executive Secretary of the KRDA, David Inger, is in his own right a member of the National Rural Development Council and a director of the Botswana Corporation.

There is a striking contrast between the KRDA and the Serowe Brigade. It is that the KRDA began life as a job-creating commercial organisation, which emphasises commercial projects rather than training efforts, which was emphasised in Serowe. This was Inger's attitude. Therefore, in Molepolole, "Inger set out to show that KRDA was *sui generis*, an end in itself, not an offshoot of van Rensburg's tortuous and often faltering socialist experiment at Serowe" (Egner et al., 1981: 11). For this purpose, strong and effective scientific management was guided by rational and positive business principles.

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3.2.5.3 Attitude of the State: From Non-intervention to Conflicts and Co-optation

The state changed its relation with the brigades mid-1970s from non-intervention to direct control of the movement as we will consider just below.

One of the first actions taken by the Botswana government toward the Brigades movement was the formation of the national coordinating body of the movement in 1969, the National Brigades Coordinating Committee (NBCC) which is under the wing of the Ministry of Education. The NBCC has a role to advise the Ministry of Education on Brigade policy and problems. The functions of the NBCC include fund-raising, vetting of plans for new Brigades and expansion of existing Brigades, exchange of information and ideas among centres, including technical information and advice, assistance with planning and staff recruitment, auditing and finding markets and contracts (van Rensburg, 1974: 107). Initially, the NBCC was led by van Rensburg and it started by calling the tune for the formulation of future rural development policies based on government mineral re ·enues. One of the fruits of the establishment of the NBCC is a white paper, *Rural Development of Botswana*. However, this initiative was shortly taken over by advisors and planning officers funded through western donors (Parsons, 1989: 34).

By the early 1970s, the government was still several years away from deciding to support brigades with subsidies. At this time, the government did not have sufficient financial resources to support the Brigade movement. For example, in *National Development Plan 1970-1975,*

"...given the limited resources of finance and personnel at
Government's disposal private initiatives will continue to
play vital role in this [Brigade Development] field" (p.111).

Furthermore, in *National Development Plan 1973-78*, it is stated as
follows:

"... it is an integral part of Brigades' activities and, by
financing the training, enable them to be run with little or no
reliance on funds from the Government" (p.126).

It is clear from these quotations that by the early 1970s the government did
not intend to financially support Brigades centre. In addition, around
1973, the government non-intervention was observed by Flood, who was
the then researcher of the Serowe Brigade who was employed by the
Botswana Christian Council, when he wrote that the Botswana
government's non-intervention "becomes something less than the
neutral" (Flood, 1974: 141). In terms of financial assistance, it was only in
the mid-1970s that the government formally determined its policy of
supporting the Brigades movement.

Hence, "(A) milestone ... was the 1975 government decision, taken
after a long process of evaluation, to support and strengthen their
educational and production-oriented training function's with substantial
subsidies. After a hand-to-mouth existence in their early days, the brigades
finally obtained the official seal of approval on their educational and
training work"(Egner et al., 1981: 7). As will be stated below, however, this
financial assistance from the government was used as a lever to achieve
state control. Following the decision, the Brigade Development Centre
(BRIDEC) was established in 1976 as a institution through which all
government and donor support to the Brigades would be channeled.

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This government's decision at that time to involve itself into the Brigades was partly derived from the objective background of (1) its increased revenue from Botswana's mining industry and (2) the regional instability in southern Africa. Following financial independence at this time (Hermans, 1974), the government could have enough resources to intervene in the Brigades movement and co-opt the movement into formal educational system through financial assistance. In the region of southern Africa, it was the time when the Rhodesian Liberation war was in the final stage and there were persistent Rhodesian military incursions into Botswana. Therefore, a very unstable atmosphere was created and the government took an oppressive means to stamp down university student and the opposition, the Botswana National Front (BNF) .

Against the regional instability mentioned above, the government attitude was determined by the late 1970s (1) to take the Brigade movement firmly under the wing of the Ministry of Education (Parsons, 1982: 42) and (2) to adopt the Molepolole model, namely the KRDA model, which emphasises on commercial viability, as the standard model brigade centre in the country, rather than Serowe, emphasising building an alternative socialist society (Parsons, 1989: 34). This change of the state stance was derived from the conflict (1) at the level of ideology, and (2) at the level of power struggle between the ruling party and the opposition. On the first point, Serowe Brigades' philosophy of rural development developed by van Rensburg was at odds with the state's developmental path. On the latter point, it was around this time when Serowe Brigades "aligned themselves with the socialist wing of the opposition Botswana National Front against the 'bourgeois' ruling Botswana Democratic Party" (Parsons, 1982: 43). As we see just below, this determination was derived from the fact that the state had, on the one hand, quite conflictive

relations with the Serowe Brigade, and, on he other hand, harmonious relations with the KRDA.

On this government attitude, van Rensburg wrote his view as follows:

"We were critical of conventional education and would expect some hostile reaction" (1974: 31).

Therefore,

"There was some opposition from within Government and from educationalists and much scepticism" (1974: 31)

In spite of initial non-interventionist stance, the government gradually became interventionist towards Serowe Brigades, "willing to permit wide-ranging experimentation, and to endure the sniping and sometimes carping of mavericks like myself" (van Rensburg, 1974: 107). The ideological orientation of van Rensburg and leading elements of the Serowe Brigades caused the interventionist stance of the state. One of the targets of government's attack, which was led by a senior Ministry of Education official, within the Secondary Curriculum Task Force preparing for the report entitled *Kagisano ka Thuto/ Education for Kagisano*, on the Serowe Brigades was its curriculum including Development Studies, "emphasising those aspects which can produce a disgruntled and discontented citizen rather than one who is patriotic and dedicated" (Husen, 1977, vol.2: 5-80). As stated above, in Serowe, the Brigades were intended to expand to produce an integrated form of alternative community education and development to the conventional "formal" model. In addition, since the 1960s van Rensburg has had some relationship with Kenneth Koma, who is the leader of the BNF (File 1/2,

Mitchison Collection, Southern African Archives, University of York)[32].
One of the examples, which showed relatively cordial relationship
between the two men, was van Rensburg's address in July 1977 at Kanye,
one of the power-base of the BNF, when he was invited to the 42nd
Agricultural Show and performed the official opening. At this time, he
urged Botswana to start making full use of people's energy by mobilising
the young and the able-bodied old to develop their own country, by
quoting cases of China and Cuba as examples of the countries where
people make use of energy and capacity to build their mother lands (*Daily
News*, 12 July 1977). He also criticised the government attitude to rely on
foreign manpower and what he termed indiscriminate borrowing money,
which would oblige Botswana to serve foreign interests at the University
College of Botswana in November 1977. Therefore, van Rensburg
inevitably confronted with the ruling BDP during this period. These
criticisms were counter-criticised in the Parliament by the BDP including
the then Minister of Commerce and Industry, Nwako and the vice-
President, Masire (*Daily News*, 25, 30 1977 November). Nwako described
van Rensburg as "perverter of our youth."

It was just around this time when the government intervention in
the Serowe Brigades was escalated. The Minister of Education came to see
the Serowe Brigades as a hotbed of opposition dissidence. According to
van Rensburg,

> 'The Government and the ruling party had... become aware of
> the study groups [which was formed to increase staff
> understanding of the Brigade's policies and to organise adult
> education around consciousness-raising for workers and the
> poorest peasants in the brigades and those in rural
> development activities], and also of the way in which some
> members of the opposition were using their positions in the

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[32]They occasionally exchanged letters each other during this period.

Serowe Brigades to further their own party's interests, and it had identified them as one and the same thing. This prompted the setting up in the Serowe Brigades of the ruling party's Youth League"(van Rensburg, 1984: 44).

In addition,

"... we were under heavy attack from Government, accused of promoting 'communism', and of dismissing staff and blocking recruitment of staff and trainees on the grounds that they were members of the ruling Botswana Democratic Party ..." (van Rensburg, 1984: 44).

In fact, at that time, all Board members were BNP members or supporters (interview with the Coordinator of the Serowe Brigade Trust, 4/5/92). It is clear that the factors of conflict between the ruling party and the opposition, and ideological difference were major reasons of the government intervention in Serowe. And its support to the opposition was discouraged. Furthermore, the government attacks took other forms, like financial pressure of withdrawal of subsidies and threat to change internal organisation, including the change of the Deed of Trust providing means of protection of "community" interest. Van Rensburg wrote that:

'The optimism over a possible compromise [over the change of the Deed of Trust] was short-lived because the Minister [of Education] himself came to a Board Meeting for which he had prepared by seeing *ex-officio* members in advance, most of whom were civil servants. The Minister threatened the total withdrawal of subsidies if the Deed was not amended to exclude staff and trainee representation. He insisted that the Board should be the 'employers, the bosses, the controllers ... and masters', directing the employees and making directions which the employees should implement... The financial dependence of the Brigades thus became an effective lever for

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achieving state control"(van Rensburg, 1984; 47-48, original emphasis).

The intention of the government was the standardisation of the Brigades movement, inducing all brigades centres to conform to the model deed of trust drawn up by the KRDA, the BRIDEC model. Furthermore, the government had a growing belief that Botswana could solve its social problems within the formal framework without depending on "alternative" or "non-formal" one, given the growing and sufficient revenue from the mining sector. This meant that all centres would be under the control of the Ministry of Education. This BRIDEC model trust proved to be "a handy weapon" for the Minister of Education at the time of intervention (Parsons, 1982:43). In practice, the strategy of establishing purely commercial operation in which labour was not to be trained, which followed the KRDA model, was proposed by the new Secretary of the Serowe Brigade Trust in 1979 after van Rensburg's resignation and withdrawal from Serowe, whose appointment was accepted by the Ministry in spite of van Rensburg's lack of experience in administration (van Rensburg, 1984: 53). However it was almost the time when the Serowe Brigades were being collapsed because the Brigades had problems obtaining the government and local government contracts, and because most donor agencies and volunteer agencies withheld financial and technical assistance. As van Rensburg expected, the government, which permitted the collapse of Brigades because it had intention to reorganise the Brigades into formal educational system, used the collapse to undermine the Secretary and his party (van Rensburg, 1984: 53-54). As a result of the government intervention, the original idea of the Brigades emphasising on combining education with production to "meet the needs of the large but hardly shrinking rural population"(Parsons, 1982: 45) were

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lost, and the Brigades were reorganised into "specialised trade training for the small but growing urban-industrial population"(Parsons, 1982: 45).[33]

Apart from the state involvement, there are *internal* reasons for the collapse of the original attempts of the Brigades, especially Serowe, and their co-optation and reorganisation into the government structure. These are (1) financial vulnerability in changing socio-economic conditions, and (2) internal struggle in the process of bureaucratisation. The rapid economic development of Botswana during the 1970s increased the national educational need for brigades, which provided the largest trainees in the country as exemplified by the builders' brigades in Serowe. However economic development also changed the markets for brigades production, which in turn threatened the cost-covering basis for brigades training. Problems were first identified in farmers' brigades because they rarely succeeded in covering production costs, let alone training costs. Meanwhile in such towns as Lobatse and Francistown, builders' brigades filed on cost-covering basis because of local competition for contracts and high salary expectations from staff. It was not until in the later 1970s that this kind of problem appeared in the major villages, where builders brigades had been successfully working since the 1960s. This was one of the main reasons of financial crisis. Apart from this, there are a few more causes. First, the Brigade centres had continued to be dependent on generous donor aid, including salaries for volunteers working for the Brigades, which had sometimes prolonged financial crises by allowing capital fund to be used to cover recurrent financial deficits. In addition, once donors determined to withdraw from financial support, it was inevitable for centres to face serious financial crisis. Serowe was not the

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[33]Van Rensburg's activities based on his original idea is still alive in other forms. See Chapter 4 in some detail.

only Brigades suffering crisis. However, the problem which other smaller brigades, including the KRDA, faced was mainly financial one.

3.2.5.4 Current Brigades Movement

Current structure of the Brigades and related institutions are shown in figure 3-3. Officially, Brigades are defined as "autonomous, community based, predominantly rural organisations" (BRIDEC, *Annual Report*, 1990-1991: 6). It is true that, in principle, the initiative "from below" has been emphasised, but, in fact, "the performance has very much depended upon the support from BRIDEC" (BRIDEC, *Annual Report 1987-88*:: 1). Government support/control through BRIDEC takes the form of:

(1) capital investment in the brigades,

(2) provision of training subsidy and monitoring of its use,

(3) Board, management, staff and instructor training programme,

(4) ongoing development of appropriate training syllabi in consultation
with Madirelo Training and Testing Centre to meet national trade testing
standards and industrial needs,

(5) provision of advice on administrative, financial and managerial
situations at the brigades,

(6) auditing of brigades centres,

(7) advising on and facilitating the establishment of new brigades centre
(BRIDEC, *Annual Report*, 1989-1990: 13).

Brigades are under various forms of control of the government listed above, so that they are no more than a wing or an instrument of vocational training at the bottom of national educational policy. In addition, as stated below, the trustees who run brigades are often politicians belonging to the ruling BDP and the BNF. In the sense that political parties are more control rather than representative organs as discussed in earlier part of the chapter, the brigades are politically

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controlled. Therefore, the Brigades are considered to be by no means autonomous institutions as they used to be at the early stage.

BRIGADES   Ministry of Education

Figure 3-3 Organisational Chart: Brigades, BRIDEC and NBCC (Botswana)

Source: BRIDEC Annual Report, 1990-1991. p42.

As the institution offering opportunities of training and employment through production, on the one hand, the Brigades became

those of post-primary vocational education within the "formal" educational system. On the other hand, as Parsons pointed out (1989: 29), the original idea of van Rensburg behind the Brigade has been succeeded by a few development associational organisations (DAOs) formed in the 1980s, including the Foundation for Education with Production (FEP) and the Cooperation for Research Development and Education (CORDE).

However, the Brigades still have problems. First, their community relations have been one of the most serious ones. Since the Molepolole model became the standard deed of trust, the brigades centre has been governed by trustees elected by secret ballot at a general meeting at which all residents of the Kweneg District may vote. Therefore, staff, workers and trainees do not have any influence on the policy of the centre, which is different from the Serowe Brigades in the early stage, where they could participate in the process of running of the centre Secondly, normally, people who are elected as trustees are local politicians belonging to either the ruling BDP or the opposition BNF. Therefore, at the times of election of trustees, it is almost an atmosphere of the general election, and the Brigades become an arena of competition of political parties. This makes the Brigades quite difficult in meeting the objectives and vulnerable to political parties' control. In other words, the Brigades are in danger be coming objects of control by political parties.

Concerning internal struggle, which weakened the activities of the Brigades, as there appeared problems of expensive and inefficient bureaucratisation of management and labour relations, while the major centres grew in scale and complexity. This was one of the most serious internal causes of the decline of the Serowe Brigades centre, as van Rensburg described (van Rensburg, 1984: 48-52).

3.3 Implications from a Comparative Perspective

As we have seen in this chapter, it can be concluded that rural civil societies in both countries have been weak and "weakened" in terms of interest expression and autonomous actions due to the lack of autonomous organisational forms to do so. It is not only because of the socio-economic conditions, but also because of the tight state's control of rural areas in clientelist manners. In the last part of the chapter, factors extracted from argument above will be summarised and logic of weak and "weakened" rural society will be considered.

3.3.1 Socio-economic factors

From a socio-economic point of view, weakness of rural civil societies has been both *internally* and *externally* determined. Firstly, or externally, it is the process of formation of migrant labour system under the colonial rule, which has had great impacts on rural communities. The establishment of the system underdeveloped rural areas and created rural poverty. Results derived from this process include:

(1) shortage of manpower in agricultural activities, resulting in the creation of female-headed household as the lowest strata in the rural class structure;

(2) the loss of opportunities to commercialise agricultural products, in this context (in Botswana, this factor is aggravated by its semi-arid environment, which precludes crop and vegetable production);

(3) the erosion of "traditional" or "old" prin iple of co-operation (in Botswana, it was also exploitative in nature) in rural communities due to the penetration of money economy and formation of more individualistic attitudes in communities.

These changes in rural society as a result of its integration into broader economic entity, therefore, are considered to have rather negatively affected the development of rural civil society, because it offered "exit"

options to rural people. It was, however, partly positive in the sense that the integration brought "modern" or "individualistic" attitudes which are a basic component for people to organise themselves into a "modern" AO.

In addition, there are *internal* factors. These are general and common problems of rural areas like difficulties of communication between different areas owing to disperse settlement patterns, limited access to (1) especially educational, facilities necessary to acquire basic skills to organise and manage organisational forms of collectivity even at the local level, resulting in the lack of organisational and managerial skill to run organisational activities, and (2) information due to the limited circulation of information like in the form of newspaper in comparison with urban areas. As Marx noted, therefore, it is difficult for peasantry to act as *a class*.[34] In this context, "private solution" of "exit" option has been preferred to "collective solution" of "voice" option as the tactic to cope with "crises" in rural areas, because it is a solution more easily available in a given circumstances. Therefore, as Chazan pointed out (1994: 278), "the closure of exit options" is necessary for civil society to develop in rural areas.

3.3.2 Political Factors: Citizenship versus Clientelism and Implication for Development of Civil Society

As stated in the first chapter, in theory, political clientelism blocks the formation of citizenship, which is one of the important components of democracy, as a result of the state tactic of "preemptiveness." Citizenship

> "entails a set of non-contingent, generalised political rights, while clientelism refers to the inherently selective and contingent

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[34]The term coined by Parson (1984), "peasantariat," illustrated a complex nature of peasants in rural Botswana.

distribution of resources and power based on ties of personal and political loyalty" (Fox, 1990: 8).

As Bates revealed in the case of rural areas in Zambia, there was the case that villagers protested and pressured local political officials in search of higher level of government services and their more efficient supply *in exchange for* votes after independence (Bates, 1976: 202-225). This is considered to be quite a contingent way of resource distribution based on the patron-client exchange. As far as this way of resource distribution is dominantly institutionalised, the prospect for further democratisation will be thin, because rural society will be stifled so as not to organise itself for the purpose of expressing its interests and reforming its power relation with the state.

In this context, especially in Zambia, where co-operatives were used as an instrument of political patronage, rural areas were "preempted" by the state and structured in a clientelist manner, although, as discussed above, the content of patronage in not the same. in theoretical terms, cooperatives were organisational tools for UNIP to dominate rural areas both in ideological and financial terms. Therefore, there have been limited room left in rural areas where participation was initiated, autonomous AOs were created and the process of democratisation could occur "from within," as far as UNIP could control cooperatives' activities. Also it is necessary to point out that "preemption" by the state depends on amount of patronage or material base available. Against this background, the result of this pattern of political control was "political regionalism" struggling for limited government resources (Bates, 1976: 225). This political factor has weakened rural civil society in Zambia, despite the UNIP's rhetoric of "one-party *participatory democracy.*"

In Botswana, in contrast with Zambia, co-operatives *per se* have not been used as a tool of political patronage by the state, but rather remained

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relatively autonomous, although an "urban-bloc" dominated structure of the cooperative movement was created and controlled by the state. Nevertheless, it is also the case in Botswana that the "autonomous space" of rural areas has been tightly controlled by the state. Against the sound financial condition, the state has used the tactic of "preemption," as we can find in the case of agricultural groups by using extension services and financial assistance. In addition, such common goods as roads, schools and clinics have been provides before national elections, and food in the cases of drought. Therefore, the Botswana state has successfully dominated rural areas by distributing its sufficient material bases at its disposal. However, excess involvement of the state, especially during the period of drought, "suffocated" the "voluntary basis" of self-help activities. From theoretical point of view, these state's practices are strategy to emasculate, if any, political power of rural areas and to keep the area politically silent.

In addition, the state has used more rigid tactics of "co-optation" and "reorganisation" towards the Brigades, especially the Serowe Brigades, which was recognised as a challenger to the state, by threatening ideological dominance of the state. These state's tactics, which have "demobilised" rural people, have effectively precluded the emergence of autonomous AOs in rural areas, which are politically-oriented and against the dominant BDP in some respect. In other words, they have "weakened" rural civil society even under multi-party system where, supposingly, there is enough "unregulated" space by the state. In fact, as observed in earlier part of the chapter, the ruling BDP, which is more control-oriented in the areas where the oppositions are more influential, has narrowed autonomous spaces for the purpose of blocking the formation of strong base of opposition parties. Therefore, in the case of Botswana, weak civil society has been further weakened by the state and the ruling BDP which

seem to be stronger by controlling "a measure of pluralism in associational life" (Bratton, 1989b: 429).

There is a contrast between Zambia and Botswana in terms of the way the state have structured the rural areas. In other words, the state in each country structured rural area but in different manners. On the one hand, in Zambia, the one-party state had structured rural areas in a clientelist manner, adopting a tactic of "pre-emption" and using communal co-operatives as channels of political patronage to "mobilise" popular support. However, as the state resources dwindled, the resources available to UNIP for political patronage also became scarce. Therefore, the functions of UNIP as a political party inevitably declined and its legitimacy was eroded and its dominance was loosened, which left some space where autonomous activities became possible.

On the other hand, in Botswana, the state has controlled rural areas for the purpose of "demobilising" people by using a variety of tactics of "preemption," "cooptation" and "reorganisation." The ruling BDP functions as a regulator of autonomous spaces in rural areas in its favour. As a result, autonomous associations lost their autonomy and a variety of quasi-AOs were created "from above," which prevented the co-operation based on voluntarism. In both cases, in different manners, rural civil societies have been further "weakened."

As we saw in the early part of the chapter, however, it is also true that there are newly formed organisational development efforts in some provinces of Zambia. This kind of effort will be important in the sense that these activities will possibly become places or spaces where people can really understand the meaning of participation and citizenship, which are essential components of democracy. This will be "democratisation from below," which is potentially important factor in the consolidation phase. Even though "new" organisational activities are formed in the places