

Active Berkeleyanism

*Containing an exposition of an improved methodology
for Berkeleyan scholarship via a new unified
interpretation of Berkeleyanism, with objections and
replies*

John E. Blechl

PhD

University of York

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Abstract

This dissertation demonstrates an improved methodology for Berkeleyan scholarship. This improved methodology, which I call Active Berkeleyanism, seeks to incorporate Berkeley's corpus, his biography, and Berkeleyan scholarship in order to open new possibilities of understanding and interpretation of Berkeleyanism. To express and exhibit this improved methodology, this dissertation offers a new unified interpretation of Berkeleyanism which highlights the content, purpose, scope, method, and importance of the 1710 Design for Berkeleyanism. This new unified interpretation is a product of Active Berkeleyanism and must not be confused with Active Berkeleyanism as a methodology. This new unified interpretation argues for a commonality of aims under the 1710 Design: the general aim of bringing Berkeley's audience to a proper understanding and activity in their relationships with each other, the world, and God; and the final aim of preparing his audience for Anglican salvation. Having completed the exposition of Active Berkeleyanism and the new unified interpretation, this dissertation turns to possible objections against Active Berkeleyanism, the final aim of the 1710 Design, and the non-abandonment of the 1710 Design. This dissertation concludes with a summary of the important points contained herein and suggestions of further research using the methodology of Active Berkeleyanism.

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Preface

When dealing with George Berkeley, there are two broadly different types of text with which one must contend: primary sources and secondary sources. *Prima facie*, this is a simple truism of any philosopher, although the case can be made more difficult if that philosopher had a number of subsequent thinkers identifying themselves in their footsteps: e.g. a student studying Plato must deal with the dialogues and secondary literature, but she might also deal with the long history of Platonist writings and their subsequent secondary literature. The same is true of Confucius, Aristotle, Aquinas, Descartes, Kant, Wittgenstein, etc. On the other hand, some students deal with particular schools of thought instead of particular philosophers, and those students can only focus, if there is sufficient surviving material, on a smattering of broken texts for their primary sources. To this group go the Hellenistic Schools, among others. Thankfully, a student of George Berkeley need not concern herself with either of these two further complexities: most (but not all) of what we know Berkeley wrote survives in fairly readable and accessible manuscripts and publications, and he failed to establish a philosophical grouping which took his name. A Berkeleyan scholar has only to deal with the writings of George Berkeley and the writings of Berkeleyan scholarship.

The majority of the focus historically and correctly has been upon Berkeley's primary texts, which fill only a relatively small handful of volumes. The latest and most complete collected edition, edited by Luce and Jessop, consists of nine volumes, although the final two volumes are an assortment of letters and addenda.¹ While the eighty years between Fraser's first edition of Berkeley's collected works and that of Luce and Jessop saw a deluge of primary material (mostly in the form of correspondence and sermons) come to public light for the first time, the seventy-five years since Luce and Jessop's edition have seen that fountain of new Berkeleiana slow to a trickle. New limited collections of selections of Berkeley's corpus have found the press, and while Berman boasted twenty-five years ago to have given the academic world "the most up-to-date book on Berkeley" (Berman, 1994, pp. v-vi), one can only look to Hight's collection of Berkeley's correspondence as the latest edition of new primary textual information. But even Hight is mostly collecting correspondence found and published elsewhere, although he does publish some new letters for the first time. Therefore regarding

¹ I am aware Bertil Belfrage is currently compiling a new complete edition of Berkeley's corpus; however, at the time of this dissertation, that new edition has not yet been completed.

the primary texts of George Berkeley, the completed corpus has now been published, and seemingly only minor biographical information or the stray letter to, from, or about Berkeley remains to be unearthed and added to his corpus.

The situation is vastly different concerning Berkeleyan scholarship. While one can lose oneself in the subtlety and brilliance of Berkeley's thought and doctrines, one can equally lose oneself in Berkeleyan scholarship, although that sense of being lost can be of an entirely different order. True, there is a wealth of subtlety and brilliance in Berkeleyan scholarship. But often, to lose oneself in Berkeleyan scholarship is to lose oneself in an exponentially-increasing quantity of secondary sources. Berkeleyan scholarship dates back to Berkeley's first published work, and while Berkeleyan scholarship was historically slow to keep pace with the man in his lifetime, since his death and Fraser's efforts to reintroduce Berkeley's thought to the universities Berkeleyan scholarship has quickly outpaced the corpus from which it takes its origin.

On the one hand, it is a simple numbers game: the amount of instances of Berkeleyan scholarship in the remaining decades of the nineteenth century following Fraser's landmark first edition of Berkeley's corpus saw an increase in production three times over per decade what it had been in the preceding decades of the nineteenth century. In the twentieth century, the rate of growth continued to increase, barring the obvious droughts during the World Wars. By the end of the twentieth century and well into these opening decades of the twenty-first century, the number of instances of Berkeleyan scholarship increased again at alarming rates. Also, the number of different languages Berkeleyan scholarship works in has exhibited a steady increase. Beyond the European languages, Berkeleyan scholarship has branched into Eurasian and Asian languages, the most recent notable instance being Japanese. While these numbers suggest Berkeleyan scholarship is both alive and well, and seriously *thriving* in all parts of the world, it is also daunting to anyone who begins to wade into the beautiful waters of Berkeley's thought and the secondary literature on it.

On the other hand and as might be expected, the spectrum of interpretation has widened significantly as both the number of instances of Berkeleyan scholarship and the number of Berkeleyan scholars have increased. Certain sections of this spectrum of interpretation have all but faded in the last century or even recent decades, but the intensity of other sections of this spectrum of interpretations have been illuminated to almost blinding proportions. So too have areas of debate come in and out of fashion, either regarding certain texts or portions of texts on

current issues or questions regarding Berkeley's influence on, or him being influenced by, other philosophical systems. Berkeleyan scholarship has further divided itself along philosophical fault lines to the point that even relatively small issues of debate have individuated long and varied scholarly histories within Berkeleyan studies. This seems to lead one to the following conclusion: gone are the days when a Berkeleyan scholar could offer a comprehensive account of Berkeleyanism, and now the tomes of Berkeleyan scholarship focus on a given particular theme within the field of Berkeley studies. One need only look to recent monographs of the last two decades for evidence. Any attempt at offering a comprehensive study and evaluation of Berkeley's thought with its adjoining scholarship is limited to collections of single chapters in collected works, wherein each chapter (written by a different scholar) is given as a stand-alone piece.

It is truly impossible to give proper justice to the wealth, beauty, and sometimes ugliness of Berkeleyan scholarship. The only way to give some kind of justice to it is to confess one struggles to give proper justice to it all. Even if Berkeleyan scholarship were to suddenly cease at this exact moment, it would take someone several professional careers to explore its depths, to say nothing of linking all the secondary literature together in historical or philosophical narratives. Even a generation of Berkeleyan scholars, who between them could account for all the different languages Berkeleyan scholarship has expressed itself up to this point, would find the task quite daunting. One would need first to create a complete bibliography of Berkeleyan scholarship, a feat I have attempted to do for a number of years without the success and confidence of perfect completion.² Once this comprehensive bibliography was completed, the next task would be locating all of these secondary sources, which even in this digital age of information is a herculean endeavour, and then dividing the labour of reading, annotating, indexing, and gathering data for specific analysis. Even barring all of these difficulties, one would still have to agree on the data collected and find an acceptable way to present that information, either in raw or compressed forms, for future Berkeleyan scholars in a multitude of different languages. This acceptable way both would

² As it currently stands, my effort to compile a complete bibliography of Berkeleyan scholarship is still in progress. I have created what is commonly called a 'living document' whereby I can easily update the bibliography whenever there are new instances of Berkeleyan scholarship. This bibliography is in digital form and is sharable with other Berkeleyan scholars. The benefits of using a 'living document' are (a) the bibliography does not immediately become outdated whenever new Berkeleyan scholarship is published, and (b) the bibliography is easily accessible anywhere the scholar has access to the internet. All updates to the bibliography instantaneously update for all scholars accessing the bibliography, thereby bypassing the need for a new published version each time the bibliography is updated. Therefore, each scholar who has access to this 'living document' always has the latest version of the document.

have to give scholarly justice to the history and complexity of Berkeleyan scholarship and (if desired) be flexible enough to allow for the evitable changes within Berkeleyan scholarship; otherwise, the process would have to begin again with a different way of presenting information.

All of this is beyond the work of a single person, and even if a single person *could* accomplish this work on Berkeleyan scholarship, she would not be exempt from points of interpretation, selection bias, and common efficiency, even with the goal of realistic objectivity. Completing such a task would require a very long, and perhaps equally unhappy, scholarly life.

To attempt anything of the kind, especially within the limited time and resources available to a struggling student, would be tragically hilarious. I make no claims to such an attempt. Such an endeavour would inevitably fail far more than it could succeed. However, the foregoing description is incomplete in some crucial ways. First, while it is practically impossible for a single person to complete such an exhaustive objective investigation of Berkeley and Berkeleyan scholarship, this does not mean some small effort in its direction should be discarded out-of-hand. Some ancient philosophers believed in an ideal to which no person could reasonably attain, but the fact that it is practically impossible did not stop them from pursuing it nonetheless. Furthermore, such a striving was considered noble, not foolish, because the end to which the effort was directed was simply valued to be the greatest end that could be achieved. I do not mean here to draw too close a parallel between an objective investigation of Berkeley and Berkeleyan scholarship to The Good (no matter how much Berkeley himself and perhaps some Berkeleyan scholars would welcome it); rather, I merely wish to point out such an objective investigation of Berkeley and Berkeleyan scholarship must be a great end indeed, and perhaps the greatest end for it to achieve. Second, the method by which to attain that end should be precisely stated and understood. Returning to the example of the ancients, they debated on *what* exactly The Good was, *if* there was such a thing, and *how* one might go about achieving it.

It appears to me Berkeleyan scholarship does not have its own discussion concerning how scholars should go about achieving the best version of Berkeleyan scholarship. This is strange, especially when it is remembered Berkeleyan scholarship has philosophical threads in a number of issues already. While these other philosophical threads are important in their own right, I cannot but say the discussion on what exactly Berkeleyan scholarship is, how it should

be used, and what is the best way to do Berkeleyan scholarship is superior in importance to all else Berkeleyan scholarship might attempt to achieve. True, contemporary Berkeleyan scholarship is guided by modern academic principles (e.g. charity), but these remain ill-defined in general and vaguely applicable to Berkeleyan scholarship as a whole. My concern, to borrow a phrase from Berkeley, is “that we have first raised a dust, and then complain, we cannot see” (PHKI 3).

Therefore, while completing this given task of a proper and comprehensive investigation of Berkeley and Berkeleyan scholarship is admittedly one beyond my own abilities and resources, the objective of starting this important discussion on what Berkeleyan scholarship is, how it should be utilised, and what is the best way to do Berkeleyan scholarship *is* entirely possible. It is to this aim I have directed my efforts. Without question, I do not expect my opening statements which compose this dissertation to be the final word on the matter. I am a person who recognises his considerable limitations, and I also freely admit there are at least just as many shortcomings of which I am unaware. Philosophical discussion and debate are the life-blood of philosophy, and I no more believe I have solved these issues than any other real student and practitioner of philosophy believes she has solved philosophy. My goal, instead, is to *begin* the discussion and *persuade* other Berkeleyan scholars of the importance of that discussion. I trust wiser and more experienced scholars will correct my errors, and I also trust those errors will not detract from the ethos of the present investigation: whatever failures and shortcomings this present dissertation has, these weaknesses should be rightly placed upon me and not the important discussion I am trying to initiate.

It remains to acknowledge my debts to others. When one is undertaking such important work, the list of debts runs long. I cannot give proper acknowledgement to everyone on that list, but a few entries noticeably stand out. First and foremost, my supervisor, Prof Tom Stoneham, must be acknowledged and recognised. Without his tireless efforts, patience, and advice, I would have failed in my task long ago. I owe him for so much care and concern professionally, philosophically, and pastorally that to go into great detail would be inappropriate here. All I can do is acknowledge him first and pray he already knows everything I would say. Second, I wish to acknowledge the Philosophy Department at the University of York, including the faculty, administration, and students. They have been especially kind and encouraging in my studies, and they have ensured, along with Prof Stoneham, I have never strayed too far off into the deep end. I especially wish to thank the Rev Dr David Eford, who has always been a source of support and inspiration, and Dr Janet Eldred, who has looked after

me administratively through the long process. Third, I wish to acknowledge the International Berkeley Society, its members, and the organisers and presenters at the conferences I have attended all around the world in the years producing this dissertation. These presentations, discussions, and conversations about Berkeley have been of great value to my own growth as a Berkeleyan scholar. To this group I wish to include the examiners of the present dissertation, Prof Adam Grzeliński (Nicolaus Copernicus University) and Dr Keith Allen (University of York). I also, perhaps morbidly, wish to thank all the Berkeleyan scholars no longer living but who have been of immense guidance and assistance. My bibliography, use, and interpretation of their published scholarly works are all I can do to honour them. Finally, I wish to thank my family, who have supported me without exemption my entire life. Without their love and often very verbal encouragement, I would have never dreamed such a task as a dissertation was possible for me.

Author's Declaration

I declare that this thesis is a presentation of original work and I am the sole author. This work has not previously been presented for an award at this, or any other, University. All sources are acknowledged as References.

Introduction

Section 1: Thesis Statement

1. My purpose is to demonstrate an improved method via a new and unique interpretation whereby Berkeleyan scholars can unify the works and life of George Berkeley, Bishop of Cloyne. This unity involves his academic publications, remedial publications, religious writings, and biography.¹ These elements compose a unity because of a commonality of aims: these elements are immediately related to his general aim of bringing his audience to a proper understanding and activity in their relationships with each other, the world, and God; and these elements are generally related to his final aim of Anglican salvation.

Section 2: The Disparity of the Current State of Berkeleyan Scholarship

2. There is evidently little agreement between Berkeleyan scholars. This spectrum of understanding and interpretation is primarily due to a shift in emphasis of Berkeley's publications.

3. Berkeley struggled to gain sustained interest in his writings, especially early in his publication career. His first publication, *New Theory of Vision*, received limited notice.² His next three publications, *Principles Part 1*, *Passive Obedience*, and *Three Dialogues*, suffered mostly under neglect, but when they were noticed, they suffered under wrongful abuse.³ His next publications, *De Motu* and *Prevention*, failed to win him any academic or public interest.⁴ It was not until Berkeley attained some public attention in his Bermuda project that earnest general interest in his publications began. This interest was wisely fuelled by Berkeley himself, who published in quick succession *Alciphron*, which had a new edition of *New Theory of Vision* attached, *Vindication*, new editions of *Principles Part 1* and *Three Dialogues*, *Analyst*, *A Defence of Free-Thinking in Mathematics*, *Reasons for not replying to Mr Walton*, *Querist*,

¹ This labelling and division of Berkeley's publications and writings might initially cause the reader some hesitation. The 'academic' publications are discussed in Ch. 1 and 2 below. I label these publications 'academic' because they directly deal with subjects discussed in the universities at the time. I have purposely not used the label 'philosophical' in discussing these publications, not because these publications are not philosophical, but because I argue Berkeley held philosophy to include a much larger scope of topics than most Berkeleyan scholars believe. Cf. Intro. 21 and Ch. 5.41. An explanation of 'remedial' is given in Ch. 3.11-12.

² *Works*, vol. I, pp. 146, 153; cp. Jessop (1973), pp. 8, 77

³ Bracken (1965), esp. Ch. 1 and 2

⁴ Luce has mixed praise for *De Motu*. Cf. *Works*, vol. IV, p. 3. *Works* has little to say concerning *Prevention*; cf. *Works* VI, pp. v-vi; Luce (1949), p. 82 gives little more than a summary; cp. Fraser (1871), vol. IV, pp. 88-89 for a different interpretation.

and *Discourse to Magistrates and Men of Authority*. The earliest instances of this outbreak of publications immediately aided Berkeley in obtaining the bishopric at Cloyne, but more importantly, this outbreak of publications established interest in Berkeley that continues to present times. Berkeley's subsequent work as a bishop, especially his tar-water writings, increased public interest in him.

4. General scholarly interest in Berkeley dates to Baxter's metaphysical criticism,⁵ but Baxter's view does not begin *ex nihilo*. Bracken (1965, p. 5) convincingly argues Baxter was "the inheritor of a two-decade tradition of vilification, ridicule, and at best distortion" of Berkeley's thought. From their earliest reception, Berkeley's publications were poorly understood and represented. They were accused of upholding the appearance/reality distinction; failing to fulfil the claim to rescue man to common sense; used in the Jesuit war to attack Malebranche; and variously accused of egoism/solipsism, scepticism, and atheism. From these early scant interpretations of Berkeley's publications, the later and more famous criticisms of Baxter, Beattie,⁶ Reid,⁷ and Kant⁸ found their origin. In the wake of religious and mathematical controversies, attacks from Browne,⁹ Jurin,¹⁰ and Walton¹¹ further contributed to a poor understanding of Berkeley's views. Finally, the tar-water controversy brought Berkeley back into the public eye.¹² Thus, responses to Berkeley through the end of the eighteenth century include philosophers, theologians, mathematicians, and physicians, most of whom were more interested in discrediting Berkeley's claims than in attempting to understand them.¹³

5. The efforts of Fraser in the latter half of the nineteenth century returned Berkeley to the foreground of philosophical interest, especially with the discovery of Berkeley's Notebooks and a focus on *Siris* as a metaphysical work.¹⁴ Fraser reset much of the landscape in Berkeleyan scholarship.¹⁵ Since Fraser, there continues steady interest in Berkeley's academic

⁵ Baxter (1733), vol. II, pp. 258-260, 267, 270-272, 279-280, 284, 310

⁶ Beattie (1770), Part II, Ch. 2, Sec. 2, pp. 158-170

⁷ Hamilton (1967), vol. I, pp. 101-102, 283-285, 299, 423, etc.

⁸ Kant (1996) pp. 102, 288-289, 506 fn. 123

⁹ Browne (1733)

¹⁰ Jurin (1734); Jurin (1735)

¹¹ Walton (1735)

¹² Cf. Jessop (1973), pp. 69-73 for a listing of published writings in the controversy.

¹³ Cf. Berman (1989)

¹⁴ There is a noticeable increase in Berkeleyan scholarship after Fraser (1871). In the previous decades of the nineteenth century leading up to Fraser's publications, each decade averaged just over 12 publications. Starting in the 1870s and in the remaining decades of the nineteenth century, each decade averaged over 46 publications. Fraser notes this increase of attention and interest in Fraser (1901), vol. I, pp. vi-viii.

¹⁵ Fraser had to handle widely varying views on Berkeley, ranging from the view that Berkeley introduces a 'New Materialism' that is inherent in all subsequent metaphysical systems (Simon (1869) and Simon (1881), pp.

publications, but interestingly, Berkeleyan scholarship still retains many of the old accusations of the 1710s and 1720s. In the twentieth century, Berkeleyan scholarship focused heavily on Berkeley's immaterialism: what it means and implies; how successful or logically coherent it is; and to whom, how much, and in what way it is indebted to previous thinkers.

6. A cursory survey of the products of Berkeleyan scholarship from the last century displays a chaotic scene. There are very broad 'schools' of interpretation, but these 'schools' are drawn according to the specific doctrine or view in question. With regard to the question of influence, we find Berkeleyan scholarship attributing influence to many thinkers leading up to and including Berkeley's student years: Plato, Montaigne, Descartes, Spinoza, Malebranche, Locke, Bayle, King, Browne, etc. At every point it is possible to find disagreement in Berkeleyan scholarship. For example, Luce argues for the strong influence of Malebranche on Berkeley's anti-abstractionism,¹⁶ but Wild believes the influence comes from Spinoza.¹⁷

7. The disagreement in Berkeleyan scholarship is not isolated to influence; there is disagreement regarding the nature of Berkeley's philosophy. Here the old accusations abide. Some Berkeleyan scholars hold Berkeley to be either a covert sceptic because he uses sceptical arguments,¹⁸ or they hold Berkeley to be someone who went through the sceptical dilemma to re-emerge tainted with scepticism.¹⁹ But other Berkeleyan scholars either flatly deny any scepticism in Berkeley's writings,²⁰ or they hold Berkeley's foray into scepticism produced conviction in his own positive immaterialism.²¹ Another related example is the question of idealism. While many Berkeleyan scholars believe Berkeley is an idealist, there are some Berkeleyan scholars who understand him in realist terms.²² Coupled with this idealist/realist discussion is the old accusation of solipsism that finds intermittent expression.²³

8. However, I think the most important discourse in Berkeleyan scholarship concerns unity. Berkeley never publically disowned any of his publications, and he continued to reprint

81-82) to the view that Berkeley's relevance was waning both historically and philosophically, e.g. Stirling (1873), pp. 3-4.

¹⁶ Luce (1934a), pp. 143-147

¹⁷ Wild (1936), p. 62

¹⁸ E.g. Imlay (1992), pp. 502-504

¹⁹ E.g. Berman (2010), pp. 153-156; cf. Wild (1936)

²⁰ E.g. Warnock (1953), p. 91

²¹ E.g. Popkin (1951), pp. 223, 236-239

²² E.g. Woodbridge (1918); cp. Luce (1945), p. 28; Popkin (1957). For an early investigation and attack on the interpretation of Berkeley as a realist, cf. Laird (1916). The opposition between idealism and realism is questioned by both Laird and Luce in relatively the same way, but with very different conclusions.

²³ E.g. Grey (1952); Fogelin (2001), pp. 138-141, 149-150

many of his publications up until his death.²⁴ Luce suggests Fraser's work spawned the discussion concerning the unity of Berkeley's philosophy.²⁵ This discussion stems from bookend texts of Berkeley: his Notebooks and *Siris*. The discovery of Berkeley's Notebooks is perhaps the single-most important event in Berkeleyan scholarship since Berkeley's death. Once the Notebooks were discovered, it was left to Berkeleyan scholars to understand and interpret that text.²⁶ But Berkeleyan scholars soon realised the text needed to be properly ordered, and the first few decades of the twentieth century saw many Berkeleyan scholars dealing with the ordering of the Notebooks.²⁷ This problem directly affected interpretations of Berkeley. There were also discussions on the Notebooks' date of composition,²⁸ and there is continuing discourse on the marginal signs.²⁹ It is historical fact the Notebooks immediately divided, and continues to divide, Berkeleyan scholarship.

9. With the discovery of the Notebooks and the growing interest in Berkeley's metaphysical publications, the discourse in Berkeleyan scholarship over the unity of his thought and philosophy erupted. Many Berkeleyan scholars believe the development of Berkeley's views did not terminate in the Notebooks, but he continued to alter his philosophy as needed. Those Berkeleyan scholars support their claims from apparently discarded entries in the Notebooks, apparently accepted entries in the Notebooks but not published elsewhere in Berkeley's corpus, a possible evolution of key doctrines away from earlier expressions, and a possible new metaphysics in *Siris*. Many Berkeleyan scholars (but not all)³⁰ arguing for unity throughout Berkeley's works follow Luce, who admitted development within the Notebooks as indicated by marginal notations but argued there was no substantial change in doctrine throughout Berkeley's publications.³¹

²⁴ Thirteen of Berkeley's writings found the press in 1752, the year before he died.

²⁵ *Works*, vol. V, p. 12

²⁶ The initial interpretation is in Fraser (1871), vol. IV, pp. 27-36.

²⁷ Lorenz (1905); Johnston (1923), pp. 20-24, fn. 2; Johnston (1930), pp. xii-xvii, xix-xxi; Hicks (1932), pp. 26-28; Wild (1936), p. 22; Ayers (1975b), pp. xxxv-xxxvii; Thomas (1976), pp. v-ix; etc.

²⁸ Johnston (1923), pp. 20-24, fn. 2; cp. Luce (1942), pp. 280-285; Luce (1970), pp. 14-22; Thomas (1976), pp. ix-xv; etc.

²⁹ Luce (1944); Luce (1963), pp. 24, 56-57, 106; Luce (1970), pp. 6-11; cp. Ayers (1975b); Belfrage (1987b); Daniel (2013); etc.

³⁰ E.g. Daniel (2013), pp. 32-40 is a notable exception.

³¹ This is the view given throughout the prefaces and introductions in *Works* and was being prepared in many of Luce's publications of the 1930s. Cf. Ch. 6.9-12 for further discussion. Luce ironically further fuelled the problem he intended to solve by arguing the "+" sign in the Notebooks meant discarded entries. This move begs for interpretations not for the unity of Berkeley's thought, but for the continual development thereof, as the history of Berkeleyan scholarship bears witness. The influence of Luce's interpretation on *Three Dialogues* has been recently noted in Storrie (2018b), pp. 1-4 and Downing (2018), p. 7.

10. Therefore, the current disparity in Berkeleyan scholarship is due to a change in emphasis in Berkeley's publications. This change in emphasis in Berkeley's publications suggests certain methodological practices in Berkeleyan scholarship are in some ways defective. There is need for an improved methodology that unifies the elements of Berkeley to produce new and more comprehensive interpretations. Recent products of Berkeleyan scholarship either focus narrowly on certain aspects of Berkeley's philosophy,³² or introduce new biographical facts,³³ or look to combine a general commentary on Berkeley's works with a new biographical narrative.³⁴ No scholarly effort exists which attempts to unify³⁵ Berkeley's publications and incorporate his biography as further evidence to his philosophy. This dissertation offers a remedy.

Section 3: On the Various Methodologies in Berkeleyan Scholarship: Mere Immaterialism, Academic Berkeleyanism, and Active Berkeleyanism

Mere Immaterialism

11. With the traditional focus on what is now understood as his philosophy and especially his metaphysics, Berkeleyan scholars habituate themselves to primarily investigating Berkeley's immaterialism. The discovery of the Notebooks and other Berkeleiana concentrate the discussion on the development and content of Berkeley's early publications, almost to the extent of ignoring publications after 1713 or 1721.³⁶ This fixation on Berkeley's earliest publications naturally leads to the view that Berkeleyanism simply is immaterialism because immaterialism appears to be our fullest statement of certain philosophical themes and topics, the publications are produced within a few years of each other, and we have access to an account of the development or setting down in private form of some of his thoughts.

³² E.g. Grayling (1986); cp. Dancy (1987); Flage (1987); Moked (1988); Winkler (1989); Atherton (1990); Pappas (2000); Stoneham (2002); Roberts (2007); Dicker (2011); Rickless (2013); Storrie (2018a)

³³ E.g. Luce (1949); Berman (1994)

³⁴ E.g. Hone and Rossi (1931); Hicks (1932); Wild (1936); Berman (1994)

³⁵ Pearce (2017a) is the latest in a line of Berkeleyan scholars who offer an interpretation of unity within many of Berkeley's publications. However, even this effort falls short for two main reasons: first, it is subject to the Minor Publications Hypothesis, explained in Ch. 3.3-7, and second, it does not incorporate Berkeley's biography.

³⁶ Fraser, I believe, intensifies this fixation by the way he organises his 1871 edition of Berkeley's corpus. Therein, Fraser separates the three volumes of Berkeley's texts into the 'pure philosophical works', the 'applied philosophical works', and the 'miscellaneous works'. This tripartite division is based solely on Berkeley as a metaphysician. Cf. Fraser (1871), vol. I, pp. ix-xiii. Cp. Ch.3.5

12. The outcome of this fixation is disappointing.³⁷ There is little agreement among Berkeleyan scholars concerning what immaterialism is and implies, how logically coherent it is, and who influenced the formulation of it in Berkeley. Further, there is little agreement on the results and importance of the publications of vision, the coherence and use of anti-abstractionism, the scope and use of the New Principle, the existence and importance of an emotive theory of language, the nature of causality, the content of a theory of mind, etc. Many Berkeleyan scholars find Berkeley's immaterialism problematic and incomplete, and with good reason.

13. Perhaps it has heretofore passed unnoticed the link between defining the limits of research and its outcomes; i.e. the disagreement among Berkeleyan scholars is a product of the methodology used. Many Berkeleyan scholars find it necessary to limit the bounds of their investigations, so as to deal with the fewest number of passages, influences, and objections and in many cases to conform to external publishing limitations. They assume this act of limiting aids in establishing certainty and validation on some single point, and thereby from a slow accumulation discover every possible truth in Berkeley's writings. While there is use in such a methodology, it is insufficient for the desired aim of a comprehensive understanding of Berkeleyanism. I say, by the very act of limiting the scope of the investigation as much as possible, the possibility of acquiring any comprehensive conclusion is lost: to set sights so narrowly and then complain of incompleteness or pretend to comprehensive truth is absurd. Narrow focuses make for narrow investigations and lead to narrow results.

Academic Berkeleyanism

14. The failure to gain comprehensive truth or agreement has led some Berkeleyan scholars to broaden their scope of research (and thereby alter their methodology) in approaching Berkeley's corpus. I do not claim Berkeleyan scholars do not critically read all the publications of Berkeley; rather in the majority of their own publications, these scholars limit themselves to narrow themes. There are investigations on Berkeley's publications after his return from America, but these publications are often separated from the other works, e.g. mainly investigating only *Alciphron*, or only the 1734 editions of *Principles* Part 1 and *Three Dialogues* as related back to their earlier editions. These investigations still suffer in the same way as those investigations that understand Berkeleyanism merely as immaterialism.

³⁷ An excellent example of this fixation, along with a discussion of its problems, is Stirling (1873).

15. There are some Berkeleyan scholars who attempt to combine new and interesting biographical information with general commentary on Berkeley's philosophy. As these new pieces of Berkeleiana are usually few in quantity, the time between these kinds of investigations is often great.³⁸ Where these efforts are more advantageous than the efforts of the limited investigations is exactly in their attempt at comprehensiveness: these hybrid investigations attempt to complete narratives of Berkeley's biography and general commentaries on his philosophy at the same time. When there is crossover between the biographical narrative and the commentary, it is usually dealing with the question of influence.³⁹

16. The upshot to these hybrid investigations, or the methodology I call Academic Berkeleyanism, is the implicit assumption Berkeleyanism is not simply immaterialism. The scope of investigation widens, thereby both allowing Berkeley's publications on religion, ethics, natural philosophy, economics, and mathematics a fairer consideration, and at least tacitly suggesting some kind of unity between these areas and immaterialism. This upshot makes better strides towards comprehensiveness than the investigations of Berkeleyan scholars who consider Berkeleyanism as merely immaterialism, discusses unity in a more balanced way, and is closer in spirit to Berkeley's 1710 Design. All of these benefits are accomplished without generally degrading those Berkeleyan scholars working on narrower themes within Berkeleyan scholarship. As such, the methodology of Academic Berkeleyanism is superior to the previous methodology because it widens the scope of investigation and does not generally degrade other work in Berkeleyan scholarship.

17. However, Academic Berkeleyanism is still an intermediate position. When the biographical narrative is linked with general commentary, the relation is always in the same direction: *the biography dictates the publications. The reverse is never considered.*⁴⁰ Also, there is a lack in consistently incorporating the entirety of Berkeley's corpus. This is surprising, especially since, for example, the common complaint of inadequacy in Berkeley's theory of

³⁸ E.g. Fraser (1871), vol. IV; Balfour (1897); Fraser (1901), vol. I; Hone and Rossi (1931); Hicks (1932); Wild (1936); Berman (1994). Luce explicitly decides to keep biography and commentary separate. Cf. Luce (1949), p. v. Because of the expanded nature and complete restructuring of Fraser (1901) from Fraser (1871), in which many new Berkeleiana were further discovered, I list these publications as separate entries even though Fraser (1901) is technically a new edition of Fraser (1871). Fraser remarks on these vast changes in Fraser (1901), vol. I, pp. viii-xi, and concludes "The present (1901) edition is thus really a new work, which possesses, I hope, a certain philosophical unity, as well as pervading biographical interest" Fraser (1901), vol. I, p. xi. Therefore, my listing these editions separately aligns with Fraser's appraisal of his own publications.

³⁹ E.g. Berman (1994), pp. 7-17, 85-93, 148-150; Young (1985); etc.

⁴⁰ This dissertation offers a new unified interpretation of Berkeley which is founded in part on the reciprocity between Berkeley's philosophy and his life. Cf. Ch. 5.39-46

mind is found in Berkeleyan scholars working in both immaterialism and Academic Berkeleyanism. If spirit is activity for Berkeley and if Berkeley adhered to his own philosophy, investigating how the biography of Berkeley unfolded should be convincing evidence of his theory of mind because a person's biography is an account of their activity in life. I say, the relationship between biography and philosophy should be reciprocal in Berkeleyanism, which suggests a superior methodology to Academic Berkeleyanism. Additionally, Academic Berkeleyanism does not offer a unifying aim to Berkeley's corpus; it at best links together some of Berkeley's publications in a variety of ways.⁴¹ This inability to offer such a unifying aim is also a result of the general method employed by Academic Berkeleyanism. Therefore, there is further indication of a possible superior methodology to that of Academic Berkeleyanism which would be able to subsume the benefits of both methodologies and surpass the specific limitations of each methodology.

Active Berkeleyanism

18. What is here proposed in this dissertation is entirely new. Active Berkeleyanism is at once an improved methodology for investigating Berkeley, a methodological critique on previous methodologies used in Berkeleyan scholarship, and at times a meta-interpretation of previous interpretations of Berkeley. Active Berkeleyanism produces new unified interpretations of Berkeleyanism. Active Berkeleyanism appears inevitable, especially in light of the previous discussion on the different methodologies used in Berkeleyan scholarship. In a way, Active Berkeleyanism is partially unphilosophical; in another way, it is a full expression of the meaning of philosophy.

19. Active Berkeleyanism has never been proposed as a methodology for interpreting Berkeley and Berkeleyan scholarship.⁴² One need not be a Berkeleyan to have access to this methodology, although there is a diminished return. It is diminished in the same way as a non-Stoic studies Stoicism: there is an indescribable element of unity and persuasion lacking precisely because Stoicism is studied, but not lived as it was intended.⁴³

⁴¹ There are a number of ways Academic Berkeleyanism offers partial unifying aims. For example, Berkeley's social and economic writings, texts involving morality, texts involving mathematics, etc. are instances where Academic Berkeleyanism displays how certain texts or parts of certain texts can fit together under the general headings of morality, mathematics, social and economic philosophy, etc., but these instances fail to unite Berkeley's corpus.

⁴² Some interpretations using Academic Berkeleyanism come close to Active Berkeleyanism, e.g. Wild (1936) and Berman (1994), but each of these examples is still deficient in some important way.

⁴³ That is, a philosophical '-ism' is understood in its contemporary sense as a philosophical position, and not as a set of attitudes toward the world. It is anachronistic to understand these non-contemporary philosophical '-isms'

20. Active Berkeleyanism appears to be the inevitable methodological outcome of the progression previously discussed. It neglects nothing in its considerations. It accepts as relevant everything that can plausibly and charitably be taken to conform to its methodology. Few views are rejected outright, but those that are rejected are done so because they impede the investigation of unity.⁴⁴ Active Berkeleyanism incorporates and uses Berkeley's publications and his biography as evidence, and each element fulfils a need. It views and uses the remedial publications⁴⁵ and religious writings in the same manner as his academic publications. Finally, it weaves his biography as both cause and evidence for his philosophy. By the method of Active Berkeleyanism, one achieves comprehensiveness and establishes a firm stance on the unity of Berkeley's effort.

21. Active Berkeleyanism subsumes the investigations completed by Berkeleyan scholars who utilise the methodologies of mere immaterialism and Academic Berkeleyanism. No degradation is implicit in the method of Active Berkeleyanism, although by this method some views might be demonstrated as untenable. Because Active Berkeleyanism assimilates a lifestyle as both cause and evidence for the philosophy, this element of the method is unphilosophical when philosophy is taken in its purely academic meaning. However, Active Berkeleyanism acknowledges the more ancient meaning and the vulgar meaning of philosophy: philosophy is an active way of life. As such, Active Berkeleyanism in part relies on two key presuppositions. First, Berkeley's theory of mind is understood to mean spirit is volitionally active by nature and essence. Second, Berkeley adhered to his own philosophy, taken in the ancient and vulgar meanings. Berkeleyanism for Berkeley was inescapable, and thus demanded belief, obedience, and loyalty. Berkeleyanism had to be lived to exhibit its truth and explain its full meaning. It is this supposition that allows Active Berkeleyanism to transcend Academic Berkeleyanism and evince real originality. But by the first presupposition, Active Berkeleyanism could be rejected, and it would be rejected if it was misunderstood and misrepresented. Misunderstanding and misrepresentation define the tradition of criticism, but

in Berkeley's time as philosophical positions; i.e. we must not confuse philosophical '-isms' in Berkeley's time with the philosophical '-isms' in contemporary times.

⁴⁴ One view rejected outright by Active Berkeleyanism is the view that Berkeley withheld his 'real' philosophy from publication. Cf. Turbayne (1959); Berman (1994), pp. 22-29ff.; Berman (2005), pp. 22-31. Active Berkeleyanism rejects this view because it leads to scepticism concerning the ability to interpret Berkeleyanism in any beneficial way.

⁴⁵ Cf. Ch. 3.11-12 for discussion of the term 'remedial'.

also define Berkeleyan scholarship. Therefore, it is evident why Berkeleyanism receives neither proselytes nor fair trial whenever Berkeley is not directly involved.⁴⁶

22. Active Berkeleyanism is a methodological critique of previous methodologies used in Berkeleyan scholarship. This critique originates from the desire for unity and comprehensive understanding of Berkeley's corpus. In one way, Active Berkeleyanism as a methodological critique is a negative endeavour because it rejects previous methodologies in Berkeleyan scholarship due to their inability to properly provide both unity and a comprehensive understanding to Berkeley's corpus. Yet, this methodological critique is far more positive and constructive: it offers an improved way of approaching Berkeley that is comprehensive, demanding, and enriching. Just as Fraser reset the landscape of Berkeleyan scholarship in the nineteenth century, so too does Active Berkeleyanism offer a new landscape in which Berkeleyan scholars can ply their trade in the twenty-first century. To incorporate the method of Active Berkeleyanism is to become very familiar with, if not an expert in, the history and content of Berkeleyan scholarship, Berkeley's corpus, and Berkeley's biography. This method neglects nothing in consideration, even if it is unable to incorporate every previous interpretation of Berkeley's views. As a methodological critique, Active Berkeleyanism does not claim there is only one, true, and correct interpretation of Berkeleyanism; rather, it does claim any interpretation that does not attempt to give a comprehensive and unified account of the entirety of Berkeley's corpus and his biography is in some way defective. Just as Active Berkeleyanism does not neglect in consideration anything in Berkeleyan scholarship, so too does it not neglect in consideration anything in Berkeley's corpus. The ink and parchment of Berkeley's academic publications are of the same kind as those of his remedial and religious writings: when it comes to unity and comprehensiveness in Berkeley's corpus, to value one kind of writing or set of texts over another is to negotiate for failure. Furthermore, to ignore Berkeley's biography, even partially, is to lose valuable information in understanding Berkeleyanism.

23. Active Berkeleyanism is also a meta-interpretation of previous interpretations in Berkeleyan scholarship. There are at least two instances of this meta-interpretation in this

⁴⁶ Samuel Johnson was a convert. Arbuthnot appeared convinced to a point (Letter 52). Simon (1847) was a proud immaterialist, using, defending, and expanding on Berkeley's arguments. Luce, arguably the greatest authority on Berkeley of the last century, professed to be a follower. Those who knew Berkeley speak in very high praise of him, even if they reject his philosophical view. Still, they admire his doctrines, but more importantly, his lifestyle and life choices.

dissertation: first, the discussion and rejection of the Minor Publications Hypothesis,⁴⁷ and second, the discussion and rejection of the epoch-view of Berkeley's biography.⁴⁸ Both instances are in line with the presuppositions of Active Berkeleyanism. The Minor Publications Hypothesis is rejected because it hinders a unified and comprehensive understanding of Berkeley's corpus, while the epoch-view of Berkeley's biography is rejected because it supports disunity both in Berkeley's lifegoals and in the way we can interpret his biography. The list of instances contained in this dissertation is by no means exhaustive of the possible opportunities of meta-interpretation within Active Berkeleyanism.

24. Finally, this dissertation is more than an explanation of Active Berkeleyanism as an improved methodology and a methodological critique in Berkeleyan scholarship. It is also an interpretation, but an interpretation as the product of Active Berkeleyanism. This dissertation offers a possible way to unify Berkeley's corpus and gain a comprehensive understanding of Berkeleyanism. As an interpretation, this dissertation argues the 1710 Design was never abandoned by Berkeley, although the expression, order of publication, etc. of the Design did undergo change from its original conception. The interpretation in this dissertation allows for modification and improvement of the way in which the 1710 Design was communicated to Berkeley's audience, but it denies Berkeley abandoned the 1710 Design in content, methodology, scope, and aim. Therefore, this new unified interpretation is a sample product of the methodology of Active Berkeleyanism, but it must not be confused with the methodology itself.

Section 4: The Road Ahead

25. One way of understanding a thing is by the use of examples. When the thing in question is a method, we learn and comprehend the activity by doing it. Therefore, this dissertation constructs and defends a new unified interpretation of Berkeleyanism from the position of Active Berkeleyanism. This dissertation includes six main chapters, this introduction, and a conclusion.

26. Chapter One discusses the 1710 Design, the contents of the academic publications composing the initial steps of the Design, and the interconnectivity of these publications. The chapter begins by introducing and evaluating the traditional interpretation of the 1710 Design, concludes this interpretation is 'static', and highlights certain problems with this traditional

⁴⁷ Ch. 3.3-7

⁴⁸ Ch. 5.35-38

‘static’ interpretation. The investigation shifts to exploring the evidence for the 1710 Design in various locations within Berkeley’s corpus and argues there is evidence for Berkeley’s intended approach to his publications. With this understanding of the 1710 Design and its intended approach established, the chapter continues to the three academic publications traditionally considered to be subsumed under the 1710 Design: *New Theory of Vision*, *Principles Part 1*, and *Three Dialogues*. Regarding *New Theory of Vision*, the chapter investigates two traditional interpretations: as an optical publication, and as a metaphysical publication. I offer an attempt at harmonising these two traditional interpretations under the methodology of Active Berkeleyanism. Next, I examine *Principles Part 1*, and I focus particularly on the scope of its frontispiece and the importance of approach and methodology contained in the final sections of *Introduction*. I apply that approach and methodology to the main body of text in *Principles Part 1*. Then, I consider *Three Dialogues*, and I distinguish two main traditional interpretations: as a restatement of *Principles Part 1*, and as a surpassing publication. I again offer a way of harmonising these two traditional interpretations under Active Berkeleyanism. Having dealt with each of these three publications in turn, I argue each of these publications both is independent and also contains content of the 1710 Design. I consider the similarity of approach and method in all three publications. Finally, I return to my discussion of the 1710 Design, explaining its scope, content, activity, and practicality. All of these components unite in understanding the general aim of the 1710 Design, as set forth in my thesis statement, and fulfil Part I of the 1710 Design.

27. Chapter Two investigates the remaining academic publications after 1713 with the intention of drawing them together with the previous publications of the 1710 Design. The opening sections of this chapter argue against the view that no account of Berkeleyan spirits or Berkeley’s view on morality can be given. Using Active Berkeleyanism, I offer a brief sketch of Berkeleyan spirits, their agency, and how we know them. Then, I turn to Berkeley’s scattered remarks on morality, collect them together, and offer what I call the Berkeleyan basics of morality. I argue this morality is inherently active. This investigation completes the intended content of Part II of the 1710 Design. Moving on, I focus on Part III of the 1710 Design, which concerns natural philosophy. Using the Berkeleyan basics of natural philosophy found in *Principles Part 1*, I argue *De Motu* and certain sections of *Siris* are further elaborations of these Berkeleyan basics of natural philosophy, and I consider how such a natural philosophy is active. Next, I investigate Berkeley’s views on mathematics, which compose the possible Part IV of the 1710 Design. I discuss Berkeley’s views on the three main branches of mathematics

(geometry, arithmetic, and algebra), and I explore Berkeley's criticisms of the calculus in the *Analyst* controversy. I conclude from this discussion on mathematics that there are two different interpretations of Berkeley's view of mathematics, and I discuss these views in light of the importance of practical applicability. Having completed the general discussion of these academic publications within the methodology of Active Berkeleyanism, I argue these remaining academic publications are interconnected with each other in their content and their approach. I conclude the chapter by arguing these remaining academic publications are interconnected with the other academic publications discussed in Chapter One.

28. Chapter Three links the remedial publications to the cohesive whole established in Chapters One and Two. I begin by arguing for the need to investigate the entirety of Berkeley's corpus, and highlight a major obstacle in doing so: the Minor Publications Hypothesis. I explain what this hypothesis is, its disadvantages, and its history. I dismiss the Minor Publications Hypothesis, and I briefly explore an alternative account used by Theodore Young. Moving onto the textual analysis, I begin by defining the term 'remedial' as it is used in this dissertation. Next, I elucidate Berkeley's continued interest in public spiritedness by investigating Berkeley's writings on public spirit in the 1720s, which include *Prevention* and *Proposal*. Regarding *Prevention*, I agree with Fraser's assessment that it is an important text in understanding this key thread of Berkeley's thinking. I highlight how Berkeley relates religion, industry, and frugality of manners to public spiritedness, explain the use of practical examples from theoretical outcomes, and relate the text back to *New Theory of Vision* in a novel way. To conclude my discussion of Berkeley's emphasis on public spiritedness, I explore *Proposal* as the practical outcome of *Prevention*, argue it is a continuation of his efforts in *Principles* Part 1 and *Three Dialogues*, offer what I believe to be the main goal of the text, and explain how the practical results of *Proposal* answer the needs from *Prevention*. This firmly links these two publications together, and I argue public spirit is an aspect of the 1710 Design. Then, I link Berkeley's political writings together by focusing on the theme of political loyalty found in *Passive Obedience*, *Advice to Tories*, and the 1745 Letters, and the theme of improvement of the State found in *Discourse* and *Word to the Wise*. Afterwards, I turn to Berkeley's economic writings, focusing mainly on *Querist*. Using Active Berkeleyanism, I offer the Berkeleyan basics of economics and explore how economics in Berkeley's view is active. Berkeley's medicinal writings are the final set of remedial texts I investigate in this chapter. I explore the tar-water writings, their scholarship, and how these remedial texts can be considered active. Having completed the textual analysis, I argue for the remedial texts' interconnectivity and for

the rejection of the Minor Publications Hypothesis. I also argue for the applicability of the remedial texts, emphasising their scope and their connectivity with the 1710 Design. I conclude these remedial texts should be included under the 1710 Design.

29. Chapter Four argues for the fundamental importance of Berkeley's religious writings and their relation to the 1710 Design and the publications already discussed in this dissertation. I begin the chapter by highlighting the importance of apologetics and eschatology in Berkeley's corpus, and I briefly discuss previous Berkeleyan scholarship on the religious writings. The textual analysis begins by arguing eschatology unites the sermons together, and the sermons connect with the general aim of the 1710 Design. Next, I use Active Berkeleyanism to investigate *Alciphron* in the light of the general aim of the 1710 Design. I argue *Alciphron* shares important similarities with the other publications of the 1710 Design, including common targets, general points on living with each other, how to understand the world, God and the power of Christianity, and its methodology. Then, I turn to Berkeley's episcopal writings, and I argue for their harmonisation. These texts include *Primary Visitation Charge*, Letter to Sir John James, and *Address at Confirmation*. To complete the textual analysis of Berkeley's corpus, I explore the remaining sections of *Siris*. In my discussion of that portion of *Siris*, I establish the importance of the non-atheistic recommendation and the compatibility of the view expressed in *Siris* with the ancients. I conclude that remaining portion of the *Siris* should be subsumed under the 1710 Design.

30. Chapter Five fuses biographical evidence into the interpretation of Berkeley, and argues Anglican salvation answers the final aim of the 1710 Design. I begin the chapter by examining the Anglican doctrine of salvation, focusing on the relevant homilies in *The Two Books of Homilies*, many of which were written by Thomas Cranmer. I delve into the important aspects of the Anglican doctrine of salvation by Cranmer, which was the orthodox view during Berkeley's time. I highlight the difference between dead faith and a true and lively faith, explain the Anglican tenet of justification by faith alone, and emphasise the place of good works. This discussion of Anglican doctrine naturally leads into an investigation of Berkeley's views on education. I discuss a variety of views and topics found in Berkeleyan scholarship, and use Active Berkeleyanism to unify these views and offer a brief account of Berkeley's educational views. This account is related back to the 1710 Design. Next, I focus on previous discussions of Berkeley's biography, noting differences in length and presentation. I expound the epoch-view of Berkeley's biography, its history, and its problems. I reject the epoch-view of Berkeley's biography, and I argue for a reciprocity between Berkeley's life and his works. I

conclude the chapter by arguing Anglican salvation answers the final aim of the 1710 Design, that the general aim of the 1710 Design is for the sake of Anglican salvation, that there is a vocational aspect to the 1710 Design, and that my interpretation interprets all aspects of the 1710 Design as marks of true and lively faith as offered by Cranmer.

31. Chapter Six introduces objections to my thesis statement and contains my replies. This chapter is divided into three main sections: objections against Active Berkeleyanism, an objection against the final aim of Berkeleyanism, and objections concerning the non-abandonment of the 1710 Design. In the first section, I investigate two objections against Active Berkeleyanism: an objection from the variety of Berkeley's interests, and an objection from the traditional debate on Berkeley's 'development'. In the second section, I focus on the general objection that salvation is not the unifying element of Berkeleyanism. In the third section, I offer two arguments for the abandonment of the 1710 Design and refute each in turn. First, I review some of the obstacles Active Berkeleyanism as encountered in the previous chapters. After this review, I begin a discussion of each of the two arguments for the abandonment of the 1710 Design. The first argument is the Historical argument, wherein it is argued that there is historical evidence for Berkeley abandoning the 1710 Design. The equivocality of an important premise is demonstrated, and the Historical argument is rejected in both equivocal senses. I also offer an alternative account for Letter 194. The second argument is the Philosophical argument, wherein it is argued that there are philosophical reasons for Berkeley abandoning the 1710 Design. Because of the wide spectrum of variations to this argument, I formalise the Philosophical argument in general terms. I locate the problematic premise, argue why its demand is incorrect, and offer the further evidence Berkeley continually asked for criticism and was not embarrassed by his philosophy. Because of these points, I reject the Philosophical argument in its general form, which is sufficient for the purposes of this dissertation.

32. In the Conclusion, I summarise the main points of the dissertation and offer opportunities for further research regarding both Active Berkeleyanism and the new unified interpretation.

Chapter 1: The Traditional Publications of the 1710 Design

Introduction

1. The purpose of this chapter is to discuss the traditional publications of Berkeley's proposed 1710 Design using the method of Active Berkeleynism. These publications are *New Theory of Vision*, *Principles Part 1*, and *Three Dialogues*. In this introduction, I claim the 1710 Design is more than a planned set of publications with distinct objectives, and the remainder of the chapter is evidence for this claim. Section 1 provides textual evidence for the 1710 Design. I argue the traditional interpretation of the 1710 Design is too limited and fails to answer the more important questions of the 1710 Design's general aim. Section 2 argues the fundamental importance of *New Theory of Vision* based on both the internal conclusions reached within that text and the external fact of its constant reference and republications. I argue the two main contrasting interpretations can be harmonised. Section 3 discusses the general conclusions of *Principles Part 1* and how they fulfil its frontispiece. Attention is drawn to the methodological approach of the text, focusing on the final sections of *Introduction* and the use of objections throughout the main text. Section 4 focuses on two contrasting interpretations of *Three Dialogues*. I argue these interpretations also can be harmonised. Section 5 summarises the interconnectivity of these three academic publications in both content and approach. Section 6 argues the 1710 Design has the general aim of helping its audience to a proper understanding of finite spirits, the world, and God.

The Traditional 'Static' Interpretation of the 1710 Design

2. Traditionally, Berkeley's 1710 Design is interpreted by Berkeleyn scholars as a planned set of publications with distinct objectives. These objectives are broadly recognised to be categorised by Berkeley into distinct Parts, with each Part as a separate publication.¹ It is agreed by these Berkeleyn scholars this Design was originally formulated and expressed in the Notebooks, so the Design predates 1710 in this sense. *New Theory of Vision* and *Principles Part 1* were drafted concurrently to some extent,² and the former text was published at least with the intention of replying to the particular objection raised in PHK 42-44.³ The 1710 edition of *Principles Part 1* expresses Part I of the 1710 Design. Part II concerns a theory of spirit,

¹ NB 508, 583, 736, 792, 807, 878; cp. title of *Principles Part 1*; Letter 194

² Manuscript Introduction dates from 15 Nov. 1708 – 18 Dec. 1708

³ Specifically, "the consideration of this difficulty it was, that gave birth to my *Essay towards a new Theory of Vision*, which was published not long since" (PHK 43).

morality, and freedom. Part III, and possibly a Part IV, concerns natural philosophy and mathematics.⁴

3. It is also agreed by Berkeleyn scholars who hold the traditional interpretation of the 1710 Design that Berkeley deviated from his original conception of the planned publications sometime shortly after the publication of *Principles* Part 1. The poor reception of *New Theory of Vision* and *Principles* Part 1 occasioned the unplanned publication of *Three Dialogues*,⁵ which attempts to broaden Berkeley's audience by presenting some of the main points of *Principles* Part 1 in a different style, offering new arguments for these points, and articulating at least one additional objection.⁶ *Three Dialogues* received a second edition with only an altered title page in 1725.

4. *Principles* Part 2 was apparently lost in Europe sometime during the process of drafting and never found publication.⁷ Berkeley elaborated some further account of natural philosophy in *De Motu* and *Siris*, and the *Analyst* controversy provided some further account of mathematics.⁸ New editions of *Principles* Part 1 and *Three Dialogues* were published together in 1734 and are noteworthy because of the introduction or systematic use of 'notions'⁹ and a few other additions, alterations, and deletions in the texts. *New Theory of Vision* received a second edition with an appendix shortly after the publication of the first edition, and a third edition in 1732 when it was attached to *Alciphron. Vindication* was a defence against an anonymous attack of *New Theory of Vision* occurring a few months earlier.¹⁰ Both *New Theory of Vision* and *Alciphron* received new editions in 1752, shortly before Berkeley's death.

5. Finally, it is agreed by these Berkeleyn scholars that Berkeley abandoned his 1710 Design. They generally believe the abandonment happened before 1734, but they disagree as to the reasons for abandonment and the exact date.¹¹ Some scholars cite the introduction of 'notions' in the 1734 edition of *Principles* Part 1 along with the additions in *Three Dialogues* as evidence Berkeley abandoned his Design, but that he continued to flesh out needed theory,

⁴ *Works*, vol. II, pp. 5-6 suggest there was to be a Part III on natural philosophy and possibly a Part IV on mathematics, although evidence cited there are from what I shall call indirect evidence. Cf. Ch. 1.11. There is no direct evidence in the Notebooks for a Part IV, but the alterations to the text at PHK 22 (MS. only) and PHK 125 (1710 only) can be taken as supporting evidence.

⁵ *Works*, vol. II, pp. 149-150

⁶ Preface ¶¶4-5

⁷ Letter 194; cp. Ch. 6.29-38 for further discussion

⁸ *Works*, vol. II, p. 6

⁹ PHK 89, 140, 142; cp. DHP3 231-234

¹⁰ Anonymous (1732)

¹¹ Cf. Ch. 6.29-48 for two arguments for abandoning the 1710 Design and my discussion of them.

especially pertaining to spirit.¹² Other scholars cite correspondence with Samuel Johnson as a confession for the abandonment.¹³ Still other scholars believe Berkeley's philosophical evolution caused him to abandon the Design.¹⁴ Even some of the scholars who maintain a unified interpretation of Berkeley's major works admit he abandoned the 1710 Design, but they reject the implication of disunity that often accompanies the claim of abandonment.¹⁵

6. The traditional interpretation of the 1710 Design is 'static', viz. the 1710 Design is taken only as a compilation of works published or merely planned. There is not generally supposed any unifying aim to the 1710 Design, but only the unifying element of Berkeley's philosophical views.¹⁶ These philosophical views being fragmentary (insofar as the 1710 Design is assumed to be abandoned), the understanding of the 1710 Design must be limited to this compilation of publications.

Initial Problems with the Traditional 'Static' Interpretation of the 1710 Design

7. The traditional 'static' interpretation labours under serious difficulties. First, it fails to give a final aim to the 1710 Design; i.e. a unifying theme between what was published, what was intended to be published, and why the 1710 Design was important to Berkeley. This final aim is not directly specified by Berkeley in his publications, although he is remarkably consistent in expressing the aim of the Part I publications in other places. While Berkeley states a broad unifying element of Part I of the Design,¹⁷ the traditional interpretation fails to give a reason *why* such a unifying element is important. However, it is unnecessary to assume such a unifying aim is non-existent and undiscoverable, even in the surviving publications of the 1710 Design. The limiting factor for the traditional interpretation is precisely the view that the 1710 Design is only a set of planned publications.

8. Second, Berkeleyan scholars are hesitant in how they ascribe and describe *De Motu* and the *Analyst* controversy with regard to the Design. These scholars are affected by their view of abandonment, their view of the Notebooks, and by the fact none of these works appear

¹² E.g. Davis (1959); Turbayne (1959); Grave (1964); Tipton (1966); Frankel (1977); etc.

¹³ E.g. Grayling (1986), p. 13; Winkler (2005), p. 7

¹⁴ E.g. Hicks (1932), p. 19; cf. Ch. 6.39-48 for further discussion

¹⁵ *Works*, vol. II, pp. 7, 13; cp. Luce (1941); Ramsey (1966)

¹⁶ *Works*, vol. II, p. 6: 'It is evident, then, that Berkeley, while still in his early twenties, conceived a plan covering no less than the whole field of philosophy and science as known in his day. When he lighted on what he regarded as his two discoveries, first immaterialism as founded on the axiom '*esse is percipi*,' and secondly, soon afterwards, the non-existence of abstract ideas, he believed that he had found the keys to all sound knowledge.'

¹⁷ Frontispiece of *Principles* Part 1

under the banner of the Design; viz. *De Motu* and *Analyst* are not titled *Principles* Part X. Also, these scholars worry about the order of publication, as there is apparent evidence Berkeley did not publish Part II of the 1710 Design. Yet, there is strong evidence and considerations Berkeley did not abandon the 1710 Design. These considerations and evidence are discussed below.¹⁸

Section 1: Evidence for the 1710 Design

9. Active Berkeleyanism can interpret the 1710 Design in a different, more beneficial, and comprehensive way. In order to attain a proper understanding of the 1710 Design, it must be viewed in its entirety. Heretofore, 1710 Design has been understood solely as an exercise of composition of the projected publications and their internal conclusions. This is the traditional ‘static’ interpretation. However, other crucial aspects of the 1710 Design have been neglected by Berkeleyan scholarship. Therefore according to Active Berkeleyanism, the 1710 Design can be more than this catalogue of publications; the Design also suggests how to actively and critically investigate these publications.

Evidence for the Composition of the 1710 Design

10. Evidence of the 1710 Design fills Berkeley’s early writings. The evidence comes from his Notebooks, *Principles* Part 1, *Three Dialogues*, his correspondence, and *Vindication*.

11. There are three categories of evidence for the 1710 Design in the Notebooks: direct, indirect, and marginal. Direct evidence, which is scattered and sparse, is those entries directly mentioning the various Parts of the 1710 Design.¹⁹ Indirect evidence is those entries concerning the various Parts but fail to make a direct reference.²⁰ These entries are important because they define the different Parts of the 1710 Design. Marginal evidence is those entries linked to their respective Parts by their marginal notation. The marginal evidence is more numerous, but also more controversial. Each entry in the Notebooks has a marginal notation, but Berkeleyan scholars disagree on exactly what this notational system means.²¹ Regardless of the outcome of this discussion concerning the meaning of the marginal notations, the marginal notations denote themes or categories. These categories help to group entries, which in turn link a particular entry with a particular Part of the 1710 Design.

¹⁸ Ch. 1.69-80

¹⁹ E.g. NB 508, 583, 736, 807, 878

²⁰ E.g. NB 676, 853

²¹ Luce (1970), pp. 6-14; Belfrage (1987b); Daniel (2013)

12. The evidence for the 1710 Design contained in *Principles* Part 1 falls into two distinct categories: direct evidence for the purpose of Part I, and indirect evidence for subsequent Parts. The two pieces of direct evidence link together. These pieces of evidence are found in the frontispiece and in the Preface to the 1710 edition. Of particular note are three key themes laid out in the Preface: the principles generally aid in the attack on scepticism, and they specifically aid by giving “a demonstration of the existence and immateriality of GOD” and “the natural immortality of the soul.” The indirect evidence is found in later altered or deleted passages of the 1734 edition, wherein references to a publication under the banner of *Principles* Part 2 are removed.²²

13. The evidence for the 1710 Design in *Three Dialogues* occurs in the frontispiece and Preface. The purpose of this evidence is both to link *Three Dialogues* to *Principles* Part 1 (and thereby link with the 1710 Design) and to distinguish the specific objectives of *Three Dialogues* from *Principles* Part 1 with respect to presentation and argumentation. The link back to *Principles* Part 1 is clear in the language of the frontispiece and Preface ¶¶3-6. Further, the connection between *New Theory of Vision*, *Principles* Part 1, and *Three Dialogues* is stated in Preface ¶10.

14. There is further evidence in Berkeley’s correspondence. Berkeley explains to Percival the aim of *Principles* Part 1 in amazingly consistent fashion with the prior evidence: “to demonstrate the existence and attributes of God,²³ the immortality of the soul,²⁴ the reconciliation of God’s foreknowledge with the freedom of men,²⁵ show the emptiness and falseness of several parts of the speculative sciences,²⁶ and to reduce men to the study of religion and things useful²⁷” (Letter 12). Berkeley echoes many of these points in Letter 18.

15. Finally, there occurs evidence in a few sections of *Vindication*. Here, Berkeley focuses on the “proof of the existence and immediate operation of God, and the constant condescending care of his providence” (TVVE 1; cp. TVVE 8).

²² PHK 85, 125, 131-132, 144

²³ PHK Preface

²⁴ PHK Preface; cp. DHP frontispiece and Preface ¶3

²⁵ DHP frontispiece and Preface ¶3

²⁶ Cf. *New Theory of Vision* for the effect on optics; PHK 101-134 for the effects on natural philosophy and mathematics

²⁷ PHK 156; cf. DHP Preface ¶¶1, 6

Evidence for the Proper Approach and Investigation of the 1710 Design

16. However, there is evidence to an intimately related topic: how the reader should approach and investigate these publications.²⁸ Here again, Berkeley is extremely consistent: Berkeley's public proclamations exactly match his private advice to Samuel Johnson.

17. The first point is the insistence on the reader to follow along with Berkeley in her own mind without being deceived by language. This point finds early and unpublished expression in the Notebooks.²⁹ The truth to be found is not contained in the books Berkeley publishes, but only in the mind of the reader. The publications provide hints or a documentation of Berkeley's own thoughts designed to be followed at every point by the reader. If Berkeley has truly erred and the discrepancy is not merely shock from the "purely verbal", the reader should be able to find the error and correct it to her own ability because she has followed the hints and has not been deceived by language. This exact sentiment is expressed in *Introduction*³⁰ and in letters to Johnson.³¹ In addition, Berkeley is desirous for others to indicate possible errors in his thinking so he can learn from them. We find this willingness in his correspondence.³² His letters to Johnson again express the same tone.³³

18. The second point is that Berkeley insists his publications must be read over more than once. In this way, he has made his publications relatively short.³⁴ Besides this kind of ease, Berkeley believes his publications are clear, especially to an active reader who has properly followed the first point of insistence. He allows the shock of his language and the effect prejudice has upon any reader. He believes the repetition of active reading will "render the whole familiar and easy to the mind, and take off that shocking appearance which hath often been observed to attend speculative truths" (Letter 194). This view is expressed earlier in the

²⁸ As the traditional publications of the 1710 Design are the focus of this chapter, I limit the foregoing discussion to only those publications. However, I argue in subsequent chapters this approach is properly applicable to the entirety of publications subsumed under the 1710 Design.

²⁹ NB 521, 532, 693, 696, 719, 883

³⁰ PHKI 21-25

³¹ Letter 194, 199. Berkeley is consistent about this sentiment over the expanse of several decades, and this fact forms an important element in my rejection of the Philosophical Argument. Cf. Ch. 6.39-48

³² Letter 16, 18-19, 21-22, 24-25, 27-29, 32-33, etc.

³³ Additionally, Berkeley shows the same willingness and tone in his defence of his suspicion of tar-water as a possible panacea. Cf. Ch. 3. fn. 62

³⁴ Letter 194

Prefaces to *Principles* Part 1³⁵ and *Three Dialogues*,³⁶ so it cannot be thought a later addition or addendum to his method. Rather, there is consistency in his view of how one should read each publication and how many times.

19. The third point of insistence is that Berkeley requests his publications be read together and in order.³⁷ The Preface of *Three Dialogues* specifically refers the reader back to *New Theory of Vision* and *Principles* Part 1 in order to aid a second reading to “make the entire scheme very plain” (DHP Preface ¶10). This indicates interconnectivity between these three publications: *New Theory of Vision* and *Principles* Part 1 advance principles for the proper attainment of truth, and *Three Dialogues* allows for further pursuit, re-expression, and the introduction of new points “which naturally tend to confirm and illustrate them” (ibid.).

20. Berkeley expresses in reverse order all of these points to Johnson in his typical compact style: “I could wish that all the things I have published on these philosophical subjects were read in the order wherein I published them; once, to take in the design and connexion of them, and a second time with a critical eye, adding your own thought and observation upon every part as you went along” (Letter 199).

Failure of the Traditionally ‘Static’ Interpretation of the 1710 Design

21. It is evident from the foregoing discussion that the traditional interpretation of the 1710 Design as merely a set of publications is incomplete. This ‘static’ interpretation does accurately identify the publications concerning Part I, but it fails by taking a ‘static’ view of the 1710 Design in general. The 1710 Design is more than a catalogue of publications. It is also an active methodology for discovering truth and principles within an individual’s own mind. Berkeley published typically short texts acting as guidebooks for discovering these goals. He charges the reader to actively read and think, viz. to actively follow the train of ideas, arguments, reasons, and their implications to gain truth for oneself. A passive acceptance of his doctrines is rejected in the same way Berkeley rejects passively accepting others’ doctrines. Therefore whereas his publications are focused on specific objectives or conclusions, the 1710 Design is equally concerned with aiding readers in attaining these conclusions on their own. This methodology creates a sense of authority of one’s own conclusions because one has

³⁵ “...I make it my request that the reader suspend his judgment, till he has once, *at least*, read the whole through with that degree of attention and thought which the subject matter shall seem to deserve... so likewise, though the whole should be read over, yet, if this be done transiently, ‘tis very probable my sense may be mistaken; but to a thinking reader, I flatter my self, it will be throughout clear and obvious” (emphasis original).

³⁶ DHP Preface ¶10

³⁷ This point affects the Minor Publications Hypothesis (cf. Ch. 3.3-7) and the epoch-view (cf. Ch. 5.35-38).

actively gained them and not passively accepted them. Berkeleyan scholarship has heretofore overlooked this essential element of the 1710 Design, and the traditional interpretation suffers accordingly. I say, the traditional interpretation of the 1710 Design fails to satisfyingly account for the essential link between *New Theory of Vision* and *Principles*, for the final sections of *Introduction*, and for the change in presentational style of *Three Dialogues*. Active Berkeleyanism encourages an interpretation of the 1710 Design that accords with Berkeley's own statements and allows for a more inclusive and comprehensive understanding of the 1710 Design. In so doing, I offer in the remaining portions of this chapter a different textual analysis and interpretation of the traditional publications of the 1710 Design, and I discuss how these traditional publications of the 1710 Design are more firmly linked together via Active Berkeleyanism.

Section 2: Towards a New Theory of Vision

22. *New Theory of Vision* is a crucial publication for Berkeleyanism. It performs a variety of functions. It immediately is a publication on optics, establishing a positive psychological account of vision dealing with distance,³⁸ magnitude,³⁹ situation,⁴⁰ and famous problematic cases in optics.⁴¹ It also introduces metaphysical points: the heterogeneity of the proper objects of sight and touch,⁴² the rejection of the abstract general idea of extension,⁴³ the proper objects of geometry,⁴⁴ the problem of language,⁴⁵ and visual sensible ideas as the language of the Author of Nature.⁴⁶ Finally, it proposes a new method of approaching the world, wherein the observer is an active being who must understand her true relation to the things seen and touched.

23. Interpretation of *New Theory of Vision* is remarkable because of the diversity of views. Berkeleyan scholarship is divided on what the publication is and how successful it is. This disparity results from a supposed conflict of purpose taken from two distinct passages. On the one hand, *New Theory of Vision* is read as a publication in optics, and the evidence for this

³⁸ NTV 2-51

³⁹ NTV 52-87

⁴⁰ NTV 88-120

⁴¹ NTV 29-40, 67-78, 115-120

⁴² NTV 121-136

⁴³ NTV 122-126

⁴⁴ NTV 149-159

⁴⁵ NTV 48-51, 66, 120-121, 128, 134-135, 139-140, 143, 152, 158-159

⁴⁶ NTV 147-149, 152

interpretation lies in NTV 1, wherein Berkeley states the publication's purpose.⁴⁷ As such, the publication must not be reflexively read in light of the other metaphysical publications. On the other hand, *New Theory of Vision* is read as a publication intimately pertaining to an objection stated in PHK 42, and so must be read in light of the metaphysical views contained therein.⁴⁸ However, there is no reason why these two schools of interpretation cannot be harmonised, and I offer below an interpretation which harmonises these two schools of interpretation.

As an Optical Publication

24. *New Theory of Vision* explains how we see distance, magnitude, and situation.⁴⁹ It combines elements of other optical theories to argue for a positive theory of vision. It is not a publication on the physics of vision; rather, it looks to separate that kind of investigation from its purpose. Berkeley's positive theory of vision involves a positive change in approach, viz. it aims to move towards an approach that aptly handles problematic cases in the field of optics.

25. The change in approach towards a new theory of vision includes a critique of the prevailing approach of theoretical opticians. The publication is critical of a geometrical approach insofar as that approach attempts to offer psychological consequences.⁵⁰ The geometrical approach is neither banished out-of-hand nor banished completely;⁵¹ rather, it is argued to be unable to give proper psychological consequences of how an observer sees. In this way, the geometrical approach has no place within the purpose of *New Theory of Vision*.

26. An intensive analysis of the content of *New Theory of Vision* in the context as an optical publication has already been performed by other Berkeleyan scholars.⁵² It is sufficient to summarise the results of such an analysis. Distance, magnitude, and situation are involved in vision, but they are not immediately perceived. Lights and colours are immediately perceived and compose visual sensible ideas. These visual sensible ideas suggest tangible sensible ideas, and the mind arbitrarily connects what is seen with what is touched via experience. The suggestion of other sensible ideas is inherent in visual sensible ideas, but the observer

⁴⁷ E.g. Atherton (1990); cp. Belfrage (2003), Belfrage (2017)

⁴⁸ E.g. Rogers bluntly states one of the reasons Collingridge is mistaken is due to "assuming that the theory of vision stands alone and can be studied without reference to the immaterialist arguments in Berkeley's *Principles of Human Knowledge*." (1980, p. 552); cp. Collingridge (1978)

⁴⁹ In this subsection, I mainly follow Atherton's (1990) account and argument for interpreting *New Theory of Vision* as a positive contribution to the history of the theory of vision. A recent alternative interpretation is Belfrage (2003) and (2017).

⁵⁰ Cf. TVVE 37, 43

⁵¹ NTV 38-39, 78, 145

⁵² E.g. Atherton (1990), Part 2

accomplishes the act of realising the suggestion and connecting a given visual sensible idea to some tangible sensible ideas. The observer is active in dealing with the presentation of sensible ideas by forming the connections between the sensible ideas actually perceived and those ideas that are suggested. These connections result in the formation of distance, magnitude, and situation. This theory of vision, Berkeley claims, solves problematic cases like the Barrovian case, the moon illusion, and Molyneux's Man. The lasting effect of *New Theory of Vision* evidences the eventual success of this positive theory of vision.⁵³

As a Metaphysical Publication

27. The dominant interpretation of *New Theory of Vision* in Berkeleyan scholarship focuses on the metaphysical passages and their implications.⁵⁴ This interpretation claims *New Theory of Vision* must be interpreted within the metaphysical system later expressed in *Principles Part 1* and *Three Dialogues*. With the discoveries of the Notebooks and Manuscript drafts of *Principles*, Berkeleyan scholarship now correctly rejects the view Berkeley's metaphysics was incompletely formed at the time of publication of *New Theory of Vision*.⁵⁵ However, the issue remains why Berkeley presents a limited statement of his metaphysics in *New Theory of Vision*, especially if there are possible conflicts with *Principles Part 1* and *Three Dialogues*.

28. First, there is the concern of the metaphysical status of tangible sensible ideas. In *New Theory of Vision*, tangible sensible ideas appear to have a different metaphysical status than in *Principles Part 1*. In the former text, they are taken or implied to be without the mind;⁵⁶ in the latter text, they are explicitly stated as not being without the mind.⁵⁷ Tangible sensible ideas play a role in Berkeley's theory of vision because they are part of the sign-signified relationship visual sensible ideas are argued to have, viz. visual sensible ideas are signs of tangible sensible ideas. The concern is not the consistency of the relationship between visual sensible ideas and tangible sensible ideas; rather, the concern is the metaphysical status these sensible ideas have. The subsequent discussions of retinal imagery,⁵⁸ space perception,⁵⁹ etc. stem from the question of the metaphysical status of tangible sensible ideas.

⁵³ E.g. Bailey (1842); Mill (1842); Rock (1975).

⁵⁴ E.g. Armstrong (1961); Pitcher (1977), Ch. 2-4

⁵⁵ E.g. Hicks (1932), pp. 39-66; cp. Luce (1949), pp. 161-162

⁵⁶ E.g. NTV 45

⁵⁷ PHK 44

⁵⁸ E.g. Turbayne (1955); Armstrong (1956); Davis (1960)

⁵⁹ E.g. Turbayne (1954a); Collingridge (1978); Thrane (1982)

29. Second, Berkeley's discussion of the abstract idea of extension only focuses on extension and not on other abstract ideas.⁶⁰ The abstract idea of extension is rejected in *New Theory of Vision* because it both is incomprehensible and acts as support for common sensibles, which are later refuted.⁶¹ However, there are other abstract ideas besides extension recognised by Berkeley elsewhere in his publications.⁶² The criticism is that the discussion of abstract ideas is heavily focused on the ability to frame a single example of an abstract idea, and not this ability in general.

30. Third, *New Theory of Vision* offers a limited glimpse into Berkeley's view of geometry.⁶³ In this publication, geometry is argued to concern tangible objects, not visual objects. *Principles* Part 1 handles the subject more thoroughly. Therein, Berkeley discusses divisibility⁶⁴ and the relation geometry has with abstract ideas and universal ideas.⁶⁵ The conclusion that geometry deals with tangible sensible ideas and not visual sensible ideas is assumed, but this assumption adopts a different meaning because of the metaphysical status of tangible sensible ideas. Even more is argued in the *Analyst* controversy, and that discussion relates more to *Principles* Part 1 than *New Theory of Vision* because the controversy focuses on divisibility rather than the visibility/tangibility of geometrical objects.⁶⁶

31. Fourth, Berkeley merely begins a brief discussion on the problems of language, and this is only for the sake of introducing his language analogy.⁶⁷ Berkeley's view of language is complex, and like the issue of abstraction, it variously appears throughout his publications.⁶⁸ However, the subject is approached only with regard to possible objections in *New Theory of Vision*. As such, the doctrine is incompletely expressed.

32. Finally, Berkeley's ultimate conclusion of the theory of vision is "the proper objects of vision constitute a universal language of the Author of nature" (NTV 147). This visual language aptly summarises the preceding metaphysical arguments. The broader view is

⁶⁰ NTV 122-126

⁶¹ NTV 127-136

⁶² E.g. absolute time, absolute space, absolute motion; etc.

⁶³ NTV 149-159

⁶⁴ PHK 123-132

⁶⁵ PHKI 15-16; cp. PHK 126-128

⁶⁶ E.g. *Analyst* Query 5, 17-21, 52; cp. *Analyst* 5ff; Ch. 2.44

⁶⁷ NTV 139-148

⁶⁸ E.g. PHKI 6ff; PHK 38, 52; DHP1 181, DHP3 245-246; GE 8; DM 8; A.I.14, IV.11; S 155, 298; Letter 36; etc.

provided in *Principles* Part 1, wherein the metaphysical status of tangible sensible ideas and the other ideas of sense are discussed.

As an Active Work

33. The optical interpretation and the metaphysical interpretation harmonize in the new unified interpretation because they are considered to be merely two sides of the same coin. It is not necessary to read *New Theory of Vision* solely as an optical publication or solely as a metaphysical publication, and some of the continuing difficulties in Berkeleyan scholarship occur because of the choice to categorically read it in only one way.

34. *New Theory of Vision* has separate but related aims, and these aims are not given all at once or in the same place. The optical interpretation does much to consider the work both as the first publication by Berkeley and as a concentrated effort in the history of the theory of vision. The aims explicitly stated in NTV 1 are accomplished, and these aims form the main focus of the discussions on distance, magnitude, situation, and heterogeneity of sight and touch. The optical interpretation argues the publication can, and in many ways should, stand alone based on its aims and internal conclusions.⁶⁹

35. However, *New Theory of Vision* is not intended to only stand alone. External references to *New Theory of Vision* both emphasise these internal conclusions and add other aims not expressed in NTV 1. The references from PHK 42-44, DHP Preface ¶10, *Vindication*, and A.IV demonstrate there are important metaphysical implications contained in *New Theory of Vision* used elsewhere for different purposes. *Vindication* exhibits the importance of these metaphysical conclusions and consequences, and these publications are agreed by Berkeleyan scholars to be intimately related. Further, the fact *New Theory of Vision* is attached to the editions of *Alciphron* evidences *New Theory of Vision* is not meant to stand alone in all instances. Finally, *New Theory of Vision* was drafted partially concurrently with *Principles* Part 1, which implies their important relationship with one another.

36. Which interpretation to use or emphasise depends on the focus of investigation. It is not by happenstance the more metaphysical aspects of *New Theory of Vision* appear towards the end of specific discussions. The heterogeneity of the proper objects of sight and touch is the second aim given in NTV 1, and the periodic handling of the theme while discussing distance, magnitude, and situation, which compose the first aim given in NTV 1, appear at the

⁶⁹ This is a main conclusion of Atherton (1990).

end of those discussions.⁷⁰ The entire portion of sections devoted specifically to the heterogeneity of the proper objects of sight and touch happens only after the matters of distance, magnitude, and situation are completed. The more metaphysical discussions all arise in the argumentation for the second aim given in NTV 1. Therefore, the internal evidence within *New Theory of Vision* suggests the focus is non-singular in nature. The external references and republications target the arguments and themes applicable beyond an effort in the history of the theory of vision. But *New Theory of Vision* has been historically accepted as a work on its own. It has succeeded on its own. It was published on its own and as an attachment piece, and even as an attachment piece, it still was intended as a work on its own with implications applicable to other philosophical discussions. It received its own vindication and explanation. It has other primary aims which it fulfils. Therefore, neither interpretation should be put forward categorically as being the only correct interpretation of the work.

37. The importance of *New Theory of Vision* must not end with a solution to the competing interpretations; this would confine the work within the ‘static’ interpretation of the 1710 Design. As the 1710 Design also aims to offer a new approach towards investigation, *New Theory of Vision* begins the process of training the audience. It is not simply called “An Essay on a New Theory of Vision”; rather, it is titled “An Essay *towards* a New Theory of Vision” (my emphasis). The addition is subtle, but significant. Berkeley’s theory of vision is essentially an active theory because the observer must establish connections between visual sensible ideas and tangible sensible ideas. These connections are established by experience and are based on a sign-signified relationship discoverable only by an active and attentive mind. Berkeley’s theory of vision intends to correct the static approach of how distance, magnitude, and situation are seen, but perhaps more importantly, it intends to activate the reader into a better understanding of what vision is and how it is used. These two goals are intimately related. Interpreting *New Theory of Vision* merely as a *theory* of vision limits the work to a ‘static’ interpretation, one easily contextualised and filed. Berkeley has an additional aim: he wants to change the way people understand the way they *see* the world. This additional aim is the root of the shock of his later conclusions of the heterogeneity of the proper objects of sight and touch: the visual object is not the tangible object,⁷¹ the tangible object is invisible and the visual

⁷⁰ NTV 41, 45-49 while discussing distance; NTV 79-80, 85 while discussing magnitude; NTV 105, 108, 111, 114, 119 while discussing situation. Berkeley admits this in NTV 121: “We come now to inquire *more particularly* concerning the difference between the ideas of sight and touch... From what we have at large set forth and demonstrated in the foregoing parts of this treatise...” (my emphasis); cp. Atherton (1990), Ch. 10

⁷¹ NTV 49

object untouchable,⁷² visual sensible ideas are signs of tangible sensible ideas,⁷³ and most importantly, all visual sensible ideas form a language from the Author of nature wherein that Spirit speaks to us.⁷⁴ Many of these shocking conclusions are expanded into greater applicability after *New Theory of Vision*: as applicable to the purposes stated in NTV 1, they are essentially given; as applicable to greater Berkeleyan purposes and unity, they act as introductory conclusions to be expanded and later applied.

Section 3: Principles of Human Knowledge Part 1

38. *Principles* Part 1 both stands on its own and is meant to be taken in relation to other publications. On the one hand, the text has its own aims and objectives, which Berkeley believes are accomplished. *Principles* Part 1 is a comprehensive statement of his theory of ideas of sense and how this theory affects the fields of study dependent upon them. On the other hand, *Principles* Part 1 is meant as one of a specific series of publications. Many of Berkeley's later works draw upon *Principles* Part 1. The aims of *Principles* Part 1 have been argued to be consistently stated, and its place within the 1710 Design has been established. It remains to explain why Berkeley believes these aims are important, and how the theme of an active approach is handled.

Fulfilling the Frontispiece

39. Scepticism, atheism, and irreligion are the targets of *Principles* Part 1 because of their consequences. They damage human knowledge and place human beings in a harmful position.⁷⁵ Berkeley takes scepticism as the root of atheism and irreligion in this text, so scepticism receives the bulk of attention.⁷⁶ Scepticism limits the scope of human knowledge concerning ideas of sense because it draws a distinction between appearance and reality.⁷⁷ Scepticism's main pillar of support is materialism,⁷⁸ which posits the distinction between

⁷² Corollary of the heterogeneity of ideas of sense

⁷³ NTV 9ff

⁷⁴ NTV 147

⁷⁵ PHK 3

⁷⁶ The opening two sentences of PHK 3 limits the investigation to ideas of sense because they appear to be what is 'up for grabs'. The discussions of spirits, ideas of imagination, etc. are in relation to ideas of sense. It is not that spirits or ideas of imagination are not important, but they are not the focus of the investigation. This parallels the reason for the different metaphysical status of tangible ideas between *New Theory of Vision* and *Principles* Part 1; cf. PHK 44, "Though throughout the same, the contrary be supposed true of tangible objects: not that to suppose that vulgar error, was necessary for establishing the notion therein laid down; but because it was beside my purpose to examine and refute it in a discourse concerning *vision*" (emphasis original).

⁷⁷ PHK 4-5

⁷⁸ PHK 86, 92

appearance and reality and a dichotomy of sense qualities. Berkeley purposively withholds mention of the attack on materialism in the title and frontispiece to deflect immediate dismissal from his audience.⁷⁹ But the attack on materialism is thorough and comprehensive, and Berkeley completes the attack with the aim of destroying scepticism with regard to human knowledge. The collapse of the sensible quality distinction and the assertion of the New Principle affectively remove the central claims of materialism in its various forms. Without materialism's distinctions between appearance and reality and between kinds of sensible qualities, what is sensed or perceived is also what is real and known. This point is Berkeley's own foundational support upon which he builds his claims that the scope of human knowledge is far wider and more certain than the materialists claim.

40. According to Berkeley, scepticism involves a lengthening of investigation, a cluttering of data.⁸⁰ Scepticism claims what is perceived is not what is real, so immediately an additional realm is created and a link between appearance and reality must be given. Whenever there is investigation, there remains the suspicion that reality is eluding the investigator. Since investigation depends upon appearance, what is real becomes more unlike what is perceived.

41. The main focus of explanation in *Principles* Part 1 is upon the fields of study based on ideas of sense. Natural philosophy and mathematics, taken as fundamentally important fields of study involving ideas of sense, are handled in order.⁸¹ Berkeley shows them to be unnecessarily plagued with abstraction and scepticism. Materialism, failing to add anything positive to those fields of study, only lengthens and damages the investigation needlessly by introducing or leading to scepticism.⁸² Therefore, the removal of materialism does not negatively affect these fields of study; rather, it positively affects them by removing error and difficulty.

42. Atheism, irreligion, and their respective fields of study, which do not appear to be of the same kind as natural philosophy and mathematics, are handled more briefly and always after scepticism and the ideas of sense.⁸³ This is by design: *Principles* Part 1 is primarily an investigation into ideas of sense, not spirits. Spirits are introduced and discussed in relation to

⁷⁹ Letter 18

⁸⁰ PHKI 1; cf. PHKI 25 for the relation of words to scepticism

⁸¹ PHK 101-134

⁸² E.g. PHK 117

⁸³ The same methodology is used in *New Theory of Vision* when dealing with metaphysical themes. Cf. Ch. 1.36

the ideas of sense; so too atheism, irreligion, and their respective fields of study are introduced and briefly discussed in relation to scepticism.

43. However, because ideas and spirits are intimately related in Berkeleyan metaphysics,⁸⁴ their respective problems and fields of study are also intimately related. The difference is one of focus, of explicit argument and implicit argument. In *Principles* Part 1, ideas, scepticism, and their related fields of study are handled in more explicit detail than spirits, atheism, irreligion, and their respective fields of study. The conclusions Berkeley claims to reach regarding atheism, irreligion, and their respective fields of study are more implicit than the conclusions Berkeley claims to reach regarding scepticism, natural philosophy, and mathematics. For example, Berkeley claims he has discussed “the reconciliation of God’s foreknowledge with the freedom of men” (Letter 12). But no explicit treatment of either God’s foreknowledge or man’s freedom appears in *Principles* Part 1. One can give an argument based on inference for Berkeley’s claim, but she would be unable to directly point to the appropriate section or passage.⁸⁵

44. Finally, if we assume the frontispiece of *Principles* Part 1 intends to be reused in some fashion for later publications, the explicit/implicit discussions of these different fields of study become easily understandable. Many of the 1734 deletions and alterations involve removing these hints to upcoming parts. It traditionally has been interpreted that these deletions and alterations are evidence for abandonment, but they need not be so taken, especially if these investigations were already handled by 1734 or were planned by Berkeley to be handled in a different publication.⁸⁶

Altering the Approach of Investigation

45. *Principles* Part 1, like the 1710 Design and *New Theory of Vision*, contains more than advertised. As with the 1710 Design and *New Theory of Vision*, *Principles* Part 1 contains many passages concerning approach and methodology.

⁸⁴ PHK 1-2

⁸⁵ Therefore, I am in partial agreement with Stoneham’s brief treatment of this situation; i.e. I agree there is no direct and explicit “discussion of divine foreknowledge and freedom in [*Principles*]”, but I disagree the reader has no information available to form general conclusions on these matters. I do not believe Berkeley mistakes the conclusions drafted in *Principles* Part 1 “only two months” before the publication of *Principles* Part 1, and thus adds a conclusion or description from *Principles* Part 2 in his letter to Percival. Stoneham’s view agrees with NB 508, but mine does too. The important difference is what is explicitly discussed, wherein Stoneham and I agree, and what can be implicitly inferred based on the conclusions of *Principles* Part 1. Cf. Stoneham (2002) p. x; Letter 12

⁸⁶ Cf. Ch. 6.29-48

46. The most obvious example is the closing sections of *Introduction*. Many Berkeleyan scholars⁸⁷ focus on the anti-abstractionism of *Introduction*. The rejection of abstract general ideas plays important roles in Berkeley's arguments throughout *Principles* Part 1.⁸⁸ Berkeleyan scholars also investigate the differences between *Introduction* and Manuscript Introduction; notably, an emotive theory of language is given greater attention in the manuscript version.⁸⁹ These two components, viz. the rejection of abstract general ideas and an emotive theory of language, are worthy of investigation, but *Introduction* also contains a crucial discussion about approaching and investigating the main text (PHKI 21-25). The purpose of these sections is clear: Berkeley considers ideas and not names, and requests his reader to do the same. Berkeley believes this methodology offers advantages: no "controversies purely verbal"; extrication from abstract ideas; and he cannot be deceived about the ideas he has, so he can properly discern whatever agreement or disagreement exists between them (PHKI 22). These three advantages appear in the Manuscript Introduction with other advantages not stated in the published version.⁹⁰ This difference between *Introduction* and the Manuscript Introduction suggests the importance of the published advantages. The published advantages are important because words hinder our knowledge by making us look for abstract ideas pertaining to certain names "where there are none to be had", needlessly and harmfully elongate reasoning, and become "entangled in difficulties and mistakes" (PHKI 24-25).⁹¹ They also form an important part in understanding the proper approach to the 1710 Design.

47. A corollary to this approach is creating authority in the reader. Berkeley is critical of views offered by other authors exactly where he fails to be able to follow their ideas or

⁸⁷ E.g. Craig (1968); Winkler (1983); Pappas (1985); Robinson (1986); Atherton (1987); Bolton (1987); Rickless (2012); etc. For a different interpretation, cp. Pearce (2017a), Ch. 1.

⁸⁸ Anti-abstractionism is a crucial unifying theme for Luce (1934a, Ch. 7-8), but others have questioned its importance. Cf. Stoneham (2002), pp. viii-ix. I find Stoneham unpersuasive on this point. The placement of Berkeley's arguments for anti-abstractionism in *Introduction* and not in the main text is over-emphasised. If readers fail to read *Introduction*, that failure is not the fault of the author. The Manuscript Introduction shows Berkeley seriously concerned with the content of *Introduction*. The separate numbering of sections, Stoneham believes, indicates *Introduction* is not part of the main argument. However true this might be, it is important in Berkeley's methodology and approach. An introduction prepares the way for what is to come, and I understand *Introduction* to be doing that both in the sense that it removes a major support for materialism and in the sense of training the reader. In the sense of being a discussion on methodological approach to his main argument, it is understandable *Introduction* is numbered separately and comes before the main argument. In my estimation, Pearce (2017a, Ch. 1) handles the textual and dialectical structures of *Introduction* expertly, and while my interpretation differs from Pearce insofar as he highlights the language aspect and I highlight the methodological aspect, I see no reason for our two views not to work together.

⁸⁹ E.g. Belfrage (1987a), pp. 46-50

⁹⁰ *Works*, vol. II, pp. 142-143

⁹¹ The expressed method of PHKI 21-25 can only be arrived at after the discussions of abstraction and of the relation of words and names are completed.

connections. For Berkeley, these authors are deceived by their words and claim ideas or connections between ideas where neither exists. Berkeley admits his approach does not originate with him: other philosophers also claim and request “the laying aside all use of words in their meditations, and contemplating their bare ideas,” but they have “failed to perform it themselves” (PHKI 23). According to Berkeley, this fact is evidenced by their use of abstract ideas. Therefore, Berkeley accepts their methodology but rejects their conclusions, not because of the failure of the methodology but because they themselves have failed to adhere to it.

48. This approach expresses itself in various ways throughout the main text. The most common expressions are Berkeley’s use of his ability or inability to evidence a claim⁹² and Berkeley’s repeated requests for the reader to search her own thoughts for evidence.⁹³ Berkeley is standing trial for his views in front of the reader, and he asks the reader to judge the quality of his views. This is consistent with Berkeley’s requests for reactions and opinions of his work.

49. Another example of Berkeley’s approach is his use of objections. A careful reading of the text exhibits that Berkeley uses objections at particular moments. His general *modus operandi* in *Principles* Part 1 is to immediately follow a portion of sections with particular objections. Berkeley does this to solidify his argument. The use of objections comes in two different types, and they signal a conclusion of a particular theme. The first type are specific to a conclusion reached immediately beforehand. The second type are objections more general to his system, which he handles *en masse*.

50. Briefly, PHK 1-3, which lays the general groundwork of Berkeley’s New Principle, are followed by the general objection involving the distinction between reality and appearance. Berkeley explicitly signals a break in the main argument at the beginning of PHK 4, saying “It is indeed an opinion strangely prevailing amongst men...” He resumes his argument in PHK 6-7, and he ends that discussion with the collapse of the primary/secondary quality distinction. Again, he signals a pause of the main argument explicitly in the opening words of PHK 8, “But say you...” The main argument is resumed in PHK 11 and immediately is followed by another objection signalled exactly like the previous objection. Berkeley returns to the main argument in PHK 12-15 to finish his initial discussion. Once completed, Berkeley turns to his first *en masse* set of objections, discussing the faults of materialism, which appear to contradict Berkeley’s main argument to that point. Berkeley signals this discussion of materialism at the

⁹² E.g. PHKI 10

⁹³ E.g. PHKI 13

beginning of PHK 16, “But let us examine a little the received opinion.” He pauses in PHK 22, believing the reader should already understand the inherent problem of materialism, and he appeals to his methodology as evidence. However, because materialism is the main support of scepticism, which is his primary target, Berkeley returns to another objection in PHK 23, again with “But say you...” Finally, in PHK 25 Berkeley resumes his main argument, stopping briefly in PHK 27 to discuss an objection concerning his description of spirit. His main argument ends at the close of PHK 33.

51. Following his main argument for his metaphysical system in which ideas and spirits are defined, the New Principle is set forth, spirit is maintained as the only substance, the sensible quality distinction is collapsed, discussions on relative terms, numbers, and unity, matter rejected, reality and causation defined, and the origin of ideas of sense given; I say, following this main argument, Berkeley follows it with the *en masse* set of objections of PHK 34-84. These objections pertain to the argument as a whole, and Berkeley treats each objection individually. Once these objections are removed, Berkeley begins to discuss the consequences of his main argument, specifically in relation to his stated task of removing scepticism, atheism, and irreligion, and aiding the fields of study they have damaged.⁹⁴ Returning to his earlier methodology, he follows up each consequence with an objection.⁹⁵ He continues this approach in dealing with spirits at the end of the text.⁹⁶

52. The purpose of this explanation of the use of objection is to highlight Berkeley’s consistent use of it within the main text. Combine the use of objection with the example of the approach of investigating bare ideas and the reader will come to see why *Principles* Part 1 is often considered to be a masterpiece of philosophical literature. Admittedly, when it is compared to Berkeley’s next publication, which is in dialogue form, many prefer that text over *Principles* Part 1. However, the structure of *Principles* Part 1 is entirely clear, and it is suggested here that the ‘static’ interpretation of dividing the publication into three portions⁹⁷ should be further fleshed out: I say, when the methodological approach is added into the traditional tripartite structure, the work becomes clearer, more dynamic, and more active.

⁹⁴ PHK 87-156

⁹⁵ Viz. PHK 91 after discussing scepticism; PHK 96 after discussing atheism; PHK 117 after discussing natural philosophy; PHK 122 after discussing arithmetic; PHK 133 after discussing geometry

⁹⁶ PHK 137, 139, 144, 148, 150-151, which all follow main points in the argument for spirit

⁹⁷ *Works*, vol. II, pp. 14-17

Section 4: Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous

53. The immediate interpretational problem of *Three Dialogues* resembles *New Theory of Vision*: should we consider the text on its own or in relation to *Principles Part 1*?⁹⁸ However, the problem is not identical. First, *Three Dialogues* is posterior in the order of publication to *Principles Part 1*, and its Preface makes explicit reference back to *Principles Part 1*.⁹⁹ Second, *Three Dialogues* does not completely contain identical material used in *Principles Part 1*, viz. there are new arguments, focus, and at least a new objection in addition to similar arguments from *Principles Part 1*. This suggests at least a change in some way for Berkeley and displays the effects of a few years of maturation.¹⁰⁰ Third, there is a definite change in presentation and literacy style.

As a Restatement of Principles Part 1

54. Berkeley believes *Three Dialogues* is a restatement of some of the points in his main argument from *Principles Part 1*, and the traditionally dominant interpretation follows suit. Even those Berkeleyan scholars who argue the publication is of a surpassing nature agree there is great similarity between the two texts.¹⁰¹ Therefore, one can rightly assume which “certain principles” Berkeley has in mind in Preface ¶4. He discusses perception,¹⁰² the sensible quality distinction,¹⁰³ the New Principle,¹⁰⁴ the rejection of materialism in various formulations,¹⁰⁵ the so-called Master Argument,¹⁰⁶ causation,¹⁰⁷ substance,¹⁰⁸ and a number of objections.¹⁰⁹

55. The overlap is not confined to content; consequences between the two texts also run parallel. Berkeley believes the results from these principles in *Three Dialogues* lead to the same outcomes targeted in *Principles Part 1*.¹¹⁰ The same points are being brought together in a different way, but it does not change the conclusions or the implications.

⁹⁸ Cf. Storrie (2018b), pp. 1-4 for an explanation of the two views of *Three Dialogues*

⁹⁹ Preface ¶¶4-8

¹⁰⁰ Stoneham (2002), p. viii

¹⁰¹ Stoneham (2002), pp. viii-xi

¹⁰² DHP1 174-175

¹⁰³ DHP1 175-194

¹⁰⁴ DHP2 212

¹⁰⁵ DHP2 215-226; cf. DHP1 197-198, 205-206

¹⁰⁶ DHP1 200

¹⁰⁷ DHP2 208-213, 216-221

¹⁰⁸ DHP3 231-234

¹⁰⁹ DHP1 195, 197, 199, 201, 203; cf. DHP3; Stoneham (2002), pp. 42-45

¹¹⁰ Preface ¶6; cf. frontispiece of *Principles Part 1*

56. Therefore, the restatement interpretation carries great weight with many Berkeleyan scholars. Those who adhere to this interpretation admit the literary brilliance of the work, but they fall back upon the commonalities of content and consequences to give philosophical preference to *Principles* Part 1.¹¹¹ Also, Berkeley himself states *Three Dialogues* was not originally planned in the 1710 Design.¹¹² The scholars who hold the restatement interpretation understand *Three Dialogues* as a quick, although beautifully written, diversion to emphasise main points or principles of Berkeley's argument from *Principles* Part 1. They evidence the poor reception of *Principles* Part 1 as the leading cause for drafting *Three Dialogues*, and they press the issue by maintaining Berkeley left Dublin, at least in part, to publish a text on his philosophy in London.¹¹³

As a Surpassing Publication

57. The restatement interpretation has its opposition.¹¹⁴ No doubt the facts are facts: Berkeley in some ways restates points of his main argument from *Principles* Part 1, and he confesses to the same; the targets of scepticism, atheism, irreligion, materialism, etc. are the same; and *Three Dialogues* was not originally intended in the 1710 Design. However, to simply think the work is a restatement is an error. There is a difference between a reworking and a restatement, and this difference coupled with further reflection produced a more mature work.

58. The First Dialogue should be taken seriously, and its purpose is insightful. Whereas in *Principles* Part 1 a certain theory of perception is assumed and quickly established,¹¹⁵ the First Dialogue takes great care to argue there are problems with the materialistic view of perception. Berkeley discusses each of the five senses and the primary qualities to demonstrate sensible qualities are mind-dependent. The surpassing interpretation emphasises this fact and concludes Berkeley recognised a need to handle the subject in the way it is done in the First Dialogue.¹¹⁶

59. The Second Dialogue is a comprehensive attack on materialism. It brings together conceptions of matter handled in *Principles* Part 1, but the advantage here is that the attack is

¹¹¹ E.g. *Works*, vol. II, p. 150

¹¹² Preface ¶4

¹¹³ *Works*, vol. II, pp. 149-154; cp. Letter 43

¹¹⁴ E.g. Stoneham (2002). There are a number of recent chapters in Storrie (2018a) that also seem to take the surpassing interpretation. However, as Stoneham is considered the leading exemplar of this interpretation, I use his interpretation in what follows.

¹¹⁵ PHK 3, 6-7

¹¹⁶ Stoneham (2002), pp. 24-26, Ch. 3; cp. Downing (2018); Stoneham (2018); Marusic (2018); etc.

sustained and contained in an entire dialogue instead of being broken up and scattered throughout various objections in *Principles* Part 1.¹¹⁷ While the attack may not be different in content, the effect of the rejection of matter is more heavily highlighted in the Second Dialogue.

60. The Third Dialogue handles *en masse* objections to immaterialism as a whole. However, a key set of objections are the theological objections.¹¹⁸ These objections are important because they begin to form a direct link between Berkeley's philosophical position and his theological position.¹¹⁹ The claim that Berkeley's immaterialism does not need God,¹²⁰ or more importantly does not really argue for the Christian God,¹²¹ begins to suffer under difficulty with Lady Percival's objection concerning Creation. I say, in a similar way as Berkeley places a link to another publication at the end of discussions, e.g. metaphysical points in *New Theory of Vision* and the implications of immaterialism on natural philosophy and mathematics in *Principles* Part 1, it is plausible to believe the placement of Lady Percival's objection at the end of the Third Dialogue is significant because Berkeley believes it will function in part as a link to the next publication (*Principles* Part 2 as planned at that time).

As a Methodological Work

61. As with *New Theory of Vision*, the two interpretations of *Three Dialogues* can be harmonised, which exhibits the publication's ability to have various functions. The possibility of harmonisation again concerns the question of investigation. If one is looking towards the interconnectivity of the text with other publications via similarities, the restatement interpretation is more helpful. However, if one is looking beyond the similarities between *Principles* Part 1 and *Three Dialogues*, the latter becomes a very different work because of its

¹¹⁷ PHK 9-11, 16-21, 35-36, 50, 67-81, 92-95

¹¹⁸ Stoneham (2002), p. 44

¹¹⁹ The interpretation given in this dissertation explores this link in two stages. First, I argue Berkeley's religious writings must be subsumed under the 1710 Design. Since the 1710 Design also subsumes the academic publications, the religious writings and the academic publications become linked and intertwined because of they are both subsumable under the 1710 Design. Cf. Ch.4 for my discussion of Berkeley's religious writings. Second, I argue Berkeley's philosophical positions are ultimately for the sake of Anglican salvation, which is the final aim of the 1710 Design. Cf. Ch. 5.47-53

¹²⁰ Stoneham (2002), p. vi

¹²¹ *Ibid*; however, e.g. Letter 12 seems to contradict this point directly. Stoneham's claims result from attempting to distinguish Berkeley-*qua*-philosopher and Berkeley-*qua*-theologian or -*qua*-religious-believer. It is of no harm to highlight Letter 12 as a small piece of evidence against this common line of thinking. Letter 12 speaks of politics, his own publications of *New Theory of Vision* and *Principles* Part 1 (wherein he claims it will be "subservient to the ends of morality and religion"), and ends the letter discussing a sermon by Archbishop King ("whereupon I consulted the sermon..."). Many of his letters have this kind of mixture, showing he is very much keeping up with, considering, etc. a variety of fields at once. I contend his publications to some extent mirror his pursuits evidenced in his correspondence.

focus, use of argumentation, style, and objections. In this way, the surpassing interpretation is more attractive.

62. Regardless of which interpretation best suits the investigation, the real novel value of the work lies in its presentation. This value can be understood in light of previous discussions on methodology and approach throughout the 1710 Design. It is the dialogue form that the methodological approach inherent in the 1710 Design becomes most prominent and elegant.

63. The fact Berkeley believes his texts cannot directly teach truth is fundamental to his methodology in the 1710 Design. Berkeley insists the reader follow along with him by allowing the ideas to enter into the reader's mind without the prejudice of words. This is dramatized in *Three Dialogues*: Hylas suffers from prejudices, shocks, and confusion in understanding Philonous in a similar way as Berkeley supposed (or knew) his readers suffered.¹²² The issue of whether Philonous should be interpreted as always speaking for Berkeley has come under debate,¹²³ but even the most adamant Berkeleyan scholars who wish to maintain some distinction must allow Philonous to speak for Berkeley at particular points in the dialogues. So, whereas Berkeley guides the reader through his theory of vision and his metaphysical views in a one-directional approach in *New Theory of Vision* and *Principles* Part 1, he decides in *Three Dialogues* to emphasise his methodological approach by placing his metaphysical views in dialogue form. The fiction allows the reader to watch an example of Berkeleyan methodology in action.¹²⁴ The content, aim, and targets are similar to his previous texts, and the additions to the arguments and objections and the focusing of establishing his theory of perception and sustained attack on materialism suggest Berkeley is doing even more than previously done; i.e. he is offering fictitious dialogues designed to exemplify the proper methodological approach and obstacles pertaining to his metaphysical views. This is the “new light” of *Three Dialogues* (Preface ¶4). Yet even with this example, Berkeley requires the reader to be active in her investigation, viz. the reader must still follow the discussion, turn in discussion, and objections with the same diligent care as requested in *Introduction*.

64. There exists a different interpretation of the methodology in *Three Dialogues* deserving evaluation.¹²⁵ This interpretation asks who the sceptic under investigation in the text is, and this interpretation concludes Berkeley himself is the “unhappy sceptic”. *Three*

¹²² Letter 18, 21, 24, 25, etc.; PHKI 21-25; DHP Preface ¶¶2, 5-6

¹²³ Stoneham (2002), pp. 16-22

¹²⁴ NB 163, 185; cp. Luce (1949), Ch. 4; Berman (1994), p. 78

¹²⁵ Berman (2010); cp. Wild (1936) which uses a similar interpretation

Dialogues in this interpretation becomes an autobiographical confession of Berkeley's own struggle with scepticism. Whatever the merit of this interpretation, it can be subsumed under the current interpretation as a methodological work. If Berkeley is the unhappy sceptic before the discovery of the New Principle, then the dialogue becomes an example of Berkeley's personal struggle with scepticism and the relief, insight, and clarity he believes to accompany the New Principle and its metaphysical stance. It would also shed some clarifying light upon the Notebooks. Regardless, Berkeley would be even more invested in the dialogues, their turns of thoughts, and objections not originating from an external source because they are intimately personal. Thus, the methodological approach inherent in the 1710 Design would be on full display in *Three Dialogues* exactly because it is a fictional account of Berkeley's own path towards accepting his metaphysical views. As Berkeley's path might parallel his reader's path in understanding his philosophy, the link between this autobiographical interpretation and other interpretations of *Three Dialogues* is established.

Section 5: The Interconnectivity of the Publications of the 1710 Design

65. In view of the foregoing textual analysis incorporating the methodology of Active Berkeleyanism, the interconnectivity between the 1710 Design texts becomes evident, strong, and multifaceted.

Interconnectivity of Content

66. Each publication is independent. *New Theory of Vision* stands as a publication in optics that discusses distance, magnitude, situation, and a few famous problems that were pressing at the time. These discussions fulfil the primary aim of NTV 1. *Principles* Part 1 stands as a publication in metaphysics that asserts a new definition of existence, a positive theory of perception, an attack on materialism, scepticism, atheism, and irreligion, and how Berkeley's metaphysical view affects natural philosophy and mathematics. Also contained therein are implicit arguments for theology and ethics, although these were planned to be explicitly discussed in Part II. *Three Dialogues* assumes nothing from either *New Theory of Vision* or *Principles* Part 1, giving new arguments for Berkeley's theory of sensible qualities, a sustained attack on materialism, and at least one new objection concerning Creation.

67. Each publication shares connections with the other publications of the 1710 Design. *New Theory of Vision* has secondary aims of discussing the heterogeneity of the proper objects of sight and touch, the rejection of common sensibles, and the conclusion that there is an Author

of nature who uses visual sensible ideas as a language to link tangible sensible ideas. These themes reoccur in *Principles Part 1* and *Three Dialogues*. *Principles Part 1* connects back to *New Theory of Vision* by establishing the proper metaphysical status of tangible sensible ideas, explaining what the perceiver of ideas is, and expands the discussion of the Infinite Mind or God¹²⁶ as the Author of nature. *Principles Part 1* indirectly expands the explanation of optics because the text argues the fields of study involving ideas of sense can be simplified and made clearer as a result of the metaphysical position taken.¹²⁷ Because of the link between the Author of nature in *New Theory of Vision* and the Infinite Mind or God of *Principles Part 1*, the importance and function of vision and touch, along with the other senses indirectly, are given a divine aspect. Ideas of sense, which compose nature, are given by the Author of nature or Infinite Mind in such a way that finite minds benefit from their order and coherence, viz. ideas of sense are given in such a way that finite minds can live their lives well if they understand what they are perceiving and that they are perceiving gifts from God.¹²⁸ Also ideas of sense, which originate in spirits, have religious, moral, and ethical implications.¹²⁹ All of these themes are further discussed in *Three Dialogues*, which Berkeley says should be read along with *New Theory of Vision* and *Principles Part 1*.

Interconnectivity of Approach

68. Running throughout all three traditional texts of the 1710 Design is Berkeley's insistence on how the reader must approach and investigate his works. *New Theory of Vision* acts as a case study of actively collecting, interpreting, and understanding visual sensible ideas as signs of tangible sensible ideas. This shifts the perceiver from passively accepting ideas of sense to actively engaging with them in order to form an understanding of the world. This method is expanded in *Introduction*, wherein the reader is required by Berkeley to actively follow, collect, interpret, and understand the philosophy Berkeley is setting forth. This

¹²⁶ PHK 62 describes God as "the intelligence which sustains and rules the ordinary course of things". Therefore, the Author of nature is the Infinite Mind, and the Infinite Mind is God. Thus the Author of nature is God.

¹²⁷ The metaphysical status of tangible ideas, Berkeley claims, does not affect *New Theory of Vision* as a case study (PHK 44). However, this case study is both a new theory of vision without the need of his metaphysical views of ideas of sense fully given (i.e. it is an optical publication), and an example of how his full metaphysical views of ideas of sense fulfil the frontispiece of *Principles Part 1* by clearing that field of study of difficulty and error (i.e. it is a surpassing publication). For a different interpretation, cf. Belfrage (2003). Many of the points raised in that article are similar to mine, although we differ in our conclusions. Belfrage wishes to argue for an optical interpretation, and adheres to what he calls the Principle of Autonomous Fields of Discourse to argue it is "a dubious method to interpret *one* book [*New Theory of Vision*] by reading a *different* book [*Principles Part 1*] on a very *different* subject" (2003, p. 186, emphasis original).

¹²⁸ PHK 149

¹²⁹ PHK 149-156; cp. PO 5-7; A. IV; Letter 12, 18; Roberts (2007), Ch. 3-4.

approach both establishes truth in the reader and forces the reader to correct whatever errors Berkeley might have made, thereby endowing the reader with authority originating from within instead of from without. This authority is not to be undermined by prejudice and the misgivings of words. Finally, *Three Dialogues* offers an example of this approach. Hylas and Philonous act as their own authorities: Hylas' struggles and the victory over the prejudices and misgivings of words attest to Hylas becoming his own authority, while Philonous exemplifies the authority and advantages of Berkeley's metaphysical system and methodological approach. I say, *Three Dialogues* is an example of the proper interplay that *Introduction* requested.

Section 6: The General Aim of the 1710 Design

69. In this final section, I argue the 1710 Design has the general aim of helping its audience to a proper understanding of the world, finite spirits, and God. This is shown to be the case based on the content and the approach of the 1710 Design.

The Importance of the Scope, Content, and Activity of the 1710 Design

70. It is agreed the 1710 Design is at least a planned series of publications. These planned publications concern the metaphysics of sense perception, the metaphysics of spirit, ethics, morality, God, natural philosophy, and mathematics. Ideas of imagination, being a category of ideas, should also have found some treatment.

71. The 1710 Design is expressed formally in *Principles* Part 1, although *New Theory of Vision* and *Three Dialogues* both claim acceptance to the 1710 Design: the former publication because it both aids in the metaphysical status of visual sensible ideas and establishes important tenets from which *Principles* Part 1 expands; the latter publication because of its similar topics and themes as a restatement and reworking of *Principles* Part 1. These publications are further interconnected because they involve ideas of sense, either as a case study into a specific kind of idea of sense (visual sensible ideas) or as a metaphysical account wherein they are the primary and explicit focus.

72. But it must be asked why Berkeley thought all of this important. These ideas of sense are important because so much of human knowledge is reliant upon them. They are the data wherein spirits have connections beyond themselves, viz. ideas of sense compose the world and give evidence for other spirits. All science (if I can be permitted to use an

anachronism) deals with ideas, regardless if they are ideas of sense or imagination.¹³⁰ As such, ideas are extremely important because they offer content and evidence for our perception, understanding, reasoning, and willing. Thus, attaining a clear understanding of ideas of sense aids in attaining a clear understanding of the world and our evidence of other spirits.

73. Since ideas can only be like ideas¹³¹ and since ideas and spirits are wholly different,¹³² we must infer the existence of other spirits and their activity from the ideas we perceive.¹³³ Ideas of sense become the means by which spirits communicate. For example, the Author of nature communicates what is for the sake of wellbeing for finite spirits by a visual language that suggests tangible sensible ideas, which further suggest ideas of pain and pleasure. We come to know this language through experience with the ideas of sense and through our capacities as spirits. As such, we react to the ideas of sense given in a certain way, and this produces other ideas of sense.¹³⁴ This is mortal life: the communication of spirits, either finite or Infinite, with a particular spirit via ideas of sense and that particular spirit's activity as a result. That activity is both reactive to the ideas of sense which have come before in the succession of ideas, and it is proactive because it causes further ideas of sense that are received by other spirits.¹³⁵

74. This activity manifests itself in two ways. There are situations where the succession of ideas of sense only affect the individual perceiver. But there are other situations where two or more finite spirits are affected. The communication between spirits must be shared and understandable; otherwise, communication fails and the desired goal of the activity remains unfulfilled.

75. Therefore, having a clear understanding of ideas of sense is necessary for proper activity in the world, with the world, and with other spirits.¹³⁶ Ideas of sense are not solely for the sake of understanding the world and other spirits simply because the perceiver is a spirit, which is active by nature and definition. Ideas of sense are also used by the perceiver to interact with the world of sense and with other spirits. This interaction of spirits using ideas of sense is

¹³⁰ Berkeley was correct in his own day and remains correct today, even though there are numerous sciences not formally recognised when Berkeley wrote.

¹³¹ PHK 8

¹³² PHK 2

¹³³ PHK 27, 139-140

¹³⁴ PHK 29-33

¹³⁵ Cf. Ch. 2.9-10 for my discussion of finite agency.

¹³⁶ PHK 31

at the foundation of the world, our understanding of the world and other spirits, and our engagement with them.

76. Scepticism undermines our understanding of the world and throws into confusion ideas of sense necessarily needed for knowledge and activity. The fields of study dependent upon ideas of sense are unnecessarily confused and compounded as a result.¹³⁷ As ideas of sense are our evidence for other spirits, scepticism concerning ideas of sense confuses our knowledge of spirits, which leads to solipsism, atheism and irreligion involving God, and unethical and immoral acts involving other finite spirits. As far as religion, theology, politics, economics, medical knowledge, etc. are fields of study relying on ideas of sense, scepticism harms them, too. The divine aspect of ideas of sense further requires proper understanding for the fields of study dependent upon spirit.¹³⁸ Therefore, Berkeley claims scepticism is the root of many problems.¹³⁹

77. Finally, as much as ideas of imagination and notions rely on ideas of sense, they are affected by poor understanding. Ideas of imagination originate in the perceiver, but they are the framing of ideas of sense from another mind within the mind of the perceiver.¹⁴⁰ The relations formed in the mind between ideas of sense necessarily rely upon ideas of sense perceived.¹⁴¹ Finally, the notions one forms of oneself and another spirit rely upon ideas of sense because ideas of sense are the evidence from which we reason to spirits.¹⁴²

Practicality of the 1710 Design

78. All of Berkeley's efforts have a genuinely practical intention and appeal.¹⁴³ Proper understanding of the world and spirits better situates the perceiver to act accordingly. One must act in accordance with nature, insofar as being in accordance with the succession of ideas of sense are ordered, coherent, etc. and are designed for the wellbeing of the perceiver. One must understand the laws of nature to better their own wellbeing. But this understanding is not merely a passive acceptance; rather, because spirits are essentially active, they must act in the world. By acting in the world, they produce further wellbeing, provided their actions are also

¹³⁷ PHKI 1, 25; cp. PHK 119-120

¹³⁸ PHK 32

¹³⁹ PHK 86, 92

¹⁴⁰ PHK 1, 30, 33-36

¹⁴¹ PHK 11

¹⁴² PHK 145

¹⁴³ PHKI 3; cp. DHP Preface ¶1

in accordance with nature. Any interpretation that fails to properly account for this active element in Berkeleyanism is incomplete.

79. In order to provide a better understanding of the world and spirits so individual spirits can act properly, Berkeley planned his philosophy for this sake. It is not sufficient merely to have a theory; rather, it must accord with experience and be implemented to better the wellbeing of spirits. In this sense, the 1710 Design is inherently practical.

80. This combination of better understanding to produce proper action is the general aim of the 1710 Design. It explains the scope, content, and approach of these texts. One needs to understand the interconnectivity of ideas and spirits to improve the fields of study. The proposed content of the 1710 Design seeks to establish how this interconnectivity functions in the various sciences. A proper approach is needed, without which the meaning and functionality is missed. The individual must find the truth for herself, and she is equipped with the faculties to do so.¹⁴⁴ Having attained the principles for these truths, proper action with regard either to ideas of sense or to spirits follows.

¹⁴⁴ PHKI 2-3

Chapter 2: The Academic Publications after 1713

Introduction

1. Many investigations in Berkeleyan scholarship confine themselves solely or mainly to the traditional publications of the 1710 Design because these scholars believe those publications are essential and comprehensive in understanding Berkeleyanism. However, the method of Active Berkeleyanism holds Berkeleyanism is greater than immaterialism, so scholars must look beyond those texts. Active Berkeleyanism holds the traditional publications of the 1710 Design are essential, but not comprehensive. In the previous chapter, I argue for an interpretation of the 1710 Design which is a combination of a planned series of publications and a methodological approach, both of which are connected in scope, content, activity, and practicality. But that discussion involves only those traditional publications of the 1710 Design, and Active Berkeleyanism demands an investigation of more than those traditional publications. Thankfully, Berkeleyan scholarship contains investigations of other publications which Active Berkeleyanism can utilise, and my interpretation given as a result of the method of Active Berkeleyanism can proceed with these additional investigations. The purpose of the current chapter is to use Active Berkeleyanism to connect these other Berkeleyan academic publications with those texts of the 1710 Design, and thereby continue my interpretation which subsumes all of these publications under the 1710 Design.

2. Because the 1710 Design is now better understood via Active Berkeleyanism, a more appropriate investigation of the missing Parts of the 1710 Design is possible. In order to accomplish this goal, I argue certain Berkeleyan texts contain discussions of the apparently missing Parts of the 1710 Design. I approach my purpose thematically. This approach is permissible because the apparently missing Parts of the 1710 Design are thematic in nature. Sections 1 and 2 investigate the themes of Part II of the 1710 Design; i.e. spirits and morality. I argue there is sufficient information found in Berkeleyan texts to form an understanding of Berkeleyan spirits and morality. Section 3 focuses on the themes of natural philosophy and philosophy of science of Part III of the 1710 Design. Section 4 investigates the themes of mathematics and philosophy of mathematics, which was either to be included in Part III or as an additional Part IV of the 1710 Design. Section 5 argues for interconnectivity between the themes of spirits, morality, natural philosophy, and mathematics. Section 6 links the texts of

this chapter with the texts from the previous chapter, thereby subsuming all discussed academic texts under the 1710 Design.

Section 1: Spirits

3. A familiar difficulty in approaching the components of Part II of the 1710 Design stems from the apparent lack of definitive textual evidence. Spirits are mentioned in several Berkeleyan texts, but there is no text mainly focused on them. Morality is also a theme in different texts, but no text focuses exclusively or mainly on that subject. It is traditionally assumed, based on textual hints in *Principles* Part 1, the Notebooks, and correspondence, that Part II of the 1710 Design would have given accounts of both spirits and morality, but as a text specifically concerning these accounts does not survive, Berkeleyan scholarship is left with scant remains. However, coherent accounts have been given of Berkeleyan spirits and morality by previous Berkeleyan scholars.¹ The purpose of this section and the next section is to show there is sufficient evidence for both spirits and morality in Berkeleyan texts, and to stimulate further investigation.

Finite Spirits

4. The apparent lack of published textual evidence concerning finite spirits has led many Berkeleyan scholars of the last century to turn to Berkeley's Notebooks because it is within those pages Berkeley appears to give the greatest treatment to spirit. However, the use of the Notebooks comes with an expensive cost.² Incorporating the Notebooks into the discussion of spirit is not the only method available. Instead, one can reasonably assume Berkeley's publications and their editions are the finalised statements of doctrine. Whether or not the Notebooks are themselves a developmental work or a comprehensive piece can remain

¹ For discussions on Berkeleyan spirits, cp. Tipton (1966); Adams (1973); Doney (1982); Atherton (1983); McCracken (1988); Beardsley (2001); Daniel (2008); etc. For discussion on Berkeleyan morality, cp. Orange (1890); Johnston (1915); Johnston (1923), Ch. 4; Conroy (1961); Warnock (1990); Darwall (2005); Flage (2008); Hayry (2012); Airaksinen (2015); etc.

² Ch. 1. fn. 21

a separate issue.³ Hereafter, the Notebooks are used sparingly in the account offered.⁴ In discussing spirits, I follow *Principles* Part 1.⁵

5. Spirit is the metaphysical counterpart to idea. Spirit is not an idea, but “a thing entirely distinct from them, wherein they exist...” (PHK 2). Spirits perceive ideas, and ideas are perceived by spirits. Sensible and imaginative things being composed of ideas, they exist insofar as they are perceived and as long as some spirit perceives them.⁶ The relation between spirit and idea is not confined to perception. Spirits do more than perceive: “there is likewise something which knows or perceives [ideas], and exercises divers operations, as willing, imagining, remembering about them” (PHK 2). This makes spirit an “active being” in as many senses as there are activities spirits perform, viz. at least in perceiving ideas, exercising various operations on those ideas, willing the production of certain ideas, producing ideas of imagination, and remembering ideas previously perceived and acted upon.

6. Berkeley calls spirit by several names. Taken as what acts, it is called “*mind, spirit, soul or my self*” (PHK 2, emphasis original). In addition to these names, “spirit... as it perceives ideas, it is called the *understanding*, and as it produces or otherwise operates about them, it is called the *will*” (PHK 27, emphasis original). Spirit is also called an incorporeal/immaterial,⁷

³ Cf. Daniel (2013)

⁴ The Notebooks are used to aid the establishment of the content and scope of the 1710 Design. Cf. Ch. 1.11. However, the entries in that discussion are uncontroversial, or at least the use of them in Chapter 1 was intended to be only in uncontroversial ways. The entries regarding spirit in the Notebooks are a source of great controversy in Berkeleyan scholarship. These entries are not used in this dissertation since they are inconclusive as evidence for a final view of spirits. Samuel Rickless recently has expressed a similar view when approaching the Notebooks, and the formulation of his view was completely independent of my formulation. We agree Berkeleyan scholars must be especially mindful when utilising the Notebooks in order to establish doctrine, especially when there are published passages which either contradict the Notebooks or when little is said on a given topic in Berkeley’s publications. Cf. Rickless (2019)

⁵ Elsewhere, I argue *Principles* Part 1 mainly focuses on ideas of sense, and the other topics in that publication are considered in relation to ideas of sense. Cf. Ch. 1. fn. 76. It might be thought contradictory to use the same text to argue for an account of Berkeleyan spirits. However as will hopefully become clear below, it is inappropriate to attempt to investigate Berkeleyan spirits in the same way as ideas of sense. Therefore, the use of introspection and the relational content concerning Berkeleyan spirits is enough to lay the foundation for discussions of Berkeleyan spirits without inappropriately attempting to investigate them in the same way as ideas of sense. Cf. Ch. 2.8

⁶ PHK 3, 6, 7, etc.

⁷ PHK 26, 141

unextended,⁸ indivisible,⁹ unperceivable,¹⁰ knowable,¹¹ active,¹² thinking,¹³ immortal¹⁴ substance.¹⁵ There is no parity of argument between material substance and spiritual substance.¹⁶

7. Spirits are the only true causes of ideas.¹⁷ This fundamental tenet of Berkeley's philosophy appears in various situations, e.g. in metaphysical causation, morality, natural philosophy, and mathematics. Ideas are passive, inert, and unable to cause themselves or each other.

8. Many Berkeleyan scholars find this characterisation of spirit to be insufficient and use the Notebooks as a supplement. But Berkeley did not believe he needed to publish his Notebooks: what additions he thought necessary and sufficient were made in the later editions of his published texts. Wherein does the problem lie for Berkeleyan scholars? It is in the failure to heed Berkeley's repeated warnings about taking spirits as ideas. I say, the problem arises because these scholars want to investigate and study spirits in a similar way as investigating sensible and imaginative things; i.e. they expect *Principles* Part 2 to be of a similar kind of investigation as *Principles* Part 1. But according to Berkeley, our knowledge of sensible and imaginative things is different than our knowledge of spiritual things. A study of spirit done in a similar way as a study of ideas confuses the issue because such an investigation relates ideas and spirits in a way denied by Berkeley.¹⁸

⁸ PHK 49, 91, 141

⁹ PHK 27, 89, 91, 141

¹⁰ PHK 27, 139

¹¹ PHK 2, 27, 89, 139

¹² PHK 2, 26-28, 66, 89, 136, 139, 141-142

¹³ PHK 3, 7, 33, 39, 91, 98, 136, 138

¹⁴ PHK 141

¹⁵ PHK 7, 34, 89, etc.

¹⁶ The traditional view, which is now undermined, is that Hume raised the parity objection against Berkeley's argument of substance. However, Bracken shows the objection predates Hume by several decades, and finds its origin in 1713. Cf. Bracken (1965), p. 43. This is significant because Berkeley's 1734 editions of *Principles* Part 1 and *Three Dialogues* take into account the parity objection. Berkeley was aware of the objection, and certain additions in 1734 are his attempt to meet this objection directly. This is very different from the belief Berkeley merely added the specific sections in 1734 and these additions *later caused* the parity objection.

¹⁷ PHK 26-33

¹⁸ The work of Turbayne is helpful here. Turbayne cautions against taking spirit as idea, and this leads to an understanding of Berkeley using metaphor to speak of spirit. Cf. Turbayne (1959), (1962a), and (1962b). In some sense this is perhaps true, but I hold Turbayne extends this situation too far because he lacks a proper methodological approach. We must extend the methodology of investigating ideas without names to include investigating notions without names. Berkeley must be able to talk about spirits (otherwise they would either go unstated or be murkier than many hold), but he understands the dangers of thinking they are like ideas. However, we can still hold spirit and idea distinct while using our language to speak about them. In this way metaphor may be used, but it is not necessary. Therefore, Turbayne is right to call important attention to the

Finite Agency

9. Spirits are maintained throughout Berkeley's publications as things wholly distinct from ideas. One way they are distinct is in their agency: ideas have no agency and spirits have agency. One issue in Berkeleyan scholarship is the limit of causal agency of finite spirits. There are two main lines of interpretation: the inconsistent/inadequate line and the consistent line. Scholars who hold Berkeley's theory of finite causal agency is ultimately inconsistent/inadequate with the remainder of his philosophical tenets either aim to manifest these inconsistencies/inadequacies or attempt to alter the theory with additional points to obtain consistency/adequacy.¹⁹ Scholars who maintain Berkeley's theory of finite causal agency is consistent within Berkeley's general philosophy fall along a spectrum of different views. At one end is the Occasionalist interpretation:²⁰ finite spirits are limited in their causal agency by the division of kinds of ideas, viz. ideas of imagination are the only ideas finite spirits can cause, and ideas of sense are the production of God alone. At the other end of this spectrum is the causal realist interpretation:²¹ finite spirits actually cause certain sensible ideas. Falling in between these two poles is an assortment of views which incorporate some kind of cooperation between the finite spirit and God to cause ideas of sense.²²

10. The interpretation offered in this dissertation maintains Berkeley's theory of finite causal agency is consistent with his overall philosophy.²³ Because causal realism allows the greatest freedom to finite spirits, viz. because spirits actually affect the sensible world around them by creating certain sensible ideas, this view is accepted in my interpretation as the most probable and reasonable. Causal realism recognizes the distinction between ideas of sense caused by God and ideas of sense caused by finite spirits.²⁴ This does not derogate God's power or ability in the slightest; rather, it allows for freedom in finite action, which is fundamentally important to Berkeley's philosophy.²⁵ Yet, the ability of a given finite spirit is limited, being

issue, but one need not accept his conclusions. Additionally, Fasko (manuscript) recently takes up this issue of likeness.

¹⁹ E.g. McKim (1984); Woozley (1985); Jolly (1990); Muehlman (1995); Dancy (1998), pp. 55-56; etc.

²⁰ E.g. Pitcher (1981); Bennett (2001) pp. 165-167; Downing (2005a); Hight (2017b); etc.

²¹ E.g. Stoneham (2010)

²² E.g. Fleming (2006); McDonough (2008); Lee (2012); Kendrick (2014); Lee (2018); Brook (manuscript); etc.

²³ This does not mean his theory is liberated from issues concerning action, but as Berkeley repeatedly argues, objections that weigh equally on either side have no bearing. Nor should one confuse the interpretation given in this dissertation with the methodological approach of Active Berkeleyanism. There are a number of different interpretations one can offer using Active Berkeleyanism which could lend support to a different interpretation of finite agency.

²⁴ Cf. PHK 145 for strong textual evidence

²⁵ Such a restriction is a perfection, not an imperfection. God's will is free, and while He exercises things to His will all of the time (evidenced by the sustainment of the world), He doesn't use the full extent of His power.

able to affect only certain parts of its present surroundings of the sensible world.²⁶ I can raise my arm and pick up a book, but I cannot cause rain on the other side of the country or around me. I say, all of my actions are limited and contained to my immediate surrounding, but I do not completely control all of my immediate surroundings; rather, I only affect certain parts of my immediate surroundings while the vast remainder is caused and maintained by God (and other finite spirits if applicable).

Notions

11. For Berkeley, spirits have notions of spirits, operations of the mind, and relations between things. Debate continues on exactly what a notion is.²⁷ Berkeley sometimes speaks as if they are things, and this has led some Berkeleian scholars to argue notions are a third metaphysical thing besides ideas and spirits,²⁸ or notions are like ideas in certain respects.²⁹ However, this problem stems from the failure to heed Berkeley's warning concerning the distinction between spirits and ideas. Notions are not ideas in a similar way spirits are not ideas. If a spirit has an idea, that spirit perceives that idea.³⁰ Notions cannot be perceived; rather, they are what is known beyond an idea. A notion, then, is simply knowing a non-idea 'thing'. This accords with Berkeley's use: spirits, operations of the mind, and relations are not ideas, so notions are known in a different way than ideas. Spirit is not confined to merely perceptual knowledge. Beyond the limit of perception are notions of non-idea 'things'. I say, we have a

God has the power to produce miracles at any moment anywhere, but He does not. This is not an imperfection, but a demonstration of His freedom, wisdom, etc. This assists in understanding how the relations between things in the world are arbitrary to God's will, freedom, wisdom, etc.

²⁶ Generally, these are sensible ideas of motion (cf. PHK 147). In each instance where Berkeley discusses our ability to act, he is discussing motion. I do not maintain or sustain my arm in its colour, shape, figure, etc., although I can enact movements with it. I can cause (in some sense) it to change colour and add pain if I stay in the sun too long, but I do not sustain that colour and pain. In a larger sense, anything produced from our motions are sustained by God. That the real action of finite spirits is not a derogation of God's activity and power is essential in cases of morality and natural philosophy. While Berkeley does admit guilt and sin are located in the will alone, this does not necessarily imply a finite spirit has no causal agency. Instead, one can hold the ideas produced from my will do not play a part in guilt and shame. This is why Berkeley claims in his sermons to love the sinner but hate the sin: for Berkeley, Christian charity involves forgiveness of both the effect and the will affecting that thing. Cf. *Works*, vol. VII, pp. 17, 28, 59. I can, for instance, intend to be good, but I actually bring out evil, and *vice versa*. That I bring about the opposite of my will is due to my finite nature, wherein I do not have complete control of the world nor complete understanding of the laws of nature. Similarly, in natural philosophy I can actually use the laws of nature to construct new and artificial things. These things can be used for the benefit or harm of mankind, but I still must have the power to produce (in some sense) those things. Finally, merely closing my eyes does not destroy God's power or agency. If I were to spend the remainder of my life with my eyes closed, that does not take away God's power to produce visible ideas in me; rather, I must open my eyes to receive those ideas.

²⁷ E.g. Furlong (1968); Beal (1971); Flage (1985); Flage (1987); Daniel (2008); Frankel (2009); etc.

²⁸ E.g. Davis (1959)

²⁹ E.g. Rome (1946); Adams (1973)

³⁰ But spirits do more than perceive. Cf. Ch. 2.5

notion of a spirit in the same way³¹ we say we have a notion of its operations, e.g. understanding or will, but these are not ideas, so they are not ‘things’ in the same way as ideas are ‘things’.³² To require more from notions is an instance in failing to heed Berkeley’s warning about the investigation of spirit and how that investigation differs from investigating ideas.

God

12. Central to Berkeleyanism is the Infinite Mind or Spirit, also called the Author of nature and God. It is impossible to properly account for Berkeleyanism without giving central importance to the Infinite Mind. Under the causal realism interpretation of Berkeley’s view of finite agency, the Infinite Mind produces the vast majority of ideas of sense (viz. all sensible ideas except for some highly-localised ideas of motion caused by finite spirits), and thereby gives finite minds the items for their ideas of imagination and operations; He establishes the laws of nature, and thus allows investigation to proceed; He perceives ideas when no other finite spirit is perceiving them and maintains the sensible world; and He produces, sustains, and can destroy each finite spirit and its faculties of perception, imagination, thought, belief, etc. Truly, Berkeley does not err when he repeatedly returns to his favourite passage in Scripture, “in whom we live, move, and have our being.”³³

Conclusion

13. Herein is an account of spirits, their agency, their operations, and God. Admittedly, this account is brief, but it is plausible that Berkeley’s own account would have been similarly brief. A lack of brevity does not imply an uncomprehensive view, especially with a suggestive author and subtle thinker as Berkeley. Even in instances where he returns to the same topic in multiple ways and in multiple publications, philosophical questions remain. The suggestive and concise nature of Berkeley’s writing is intentional because of his methodology: he requires his readers to read and re-read his texts and think for themselves. It is only when his publications are taken together and the use of his method is applied that truth is revealed, and in its revelation the source is not the texts but the mind.³⁴

³¹ I do not mean to suggest the formation of notions of spirit and notions of operations are the same. Obviously, introspection is the means by which we know or have a notion of ourselves and our operations, but analogy is the means by which we know or have a notion of other spirits and their operations.

³² PHK 33, 89

³³ PHK 66, 149; DHP3 236; Letter 199; etc.

³⁴ Cf. Ch. 1.17-20. Yet, there is at least one similarity with the investigation of ideas: Berkeley handles the topic very concisely but comprehensively. The argument for ideas in *Principles* Part 1 is actually quite short. Cf. Ch. 1.49-52

Section 2: Morality

14. Berkeley does not give his views on morality their own text, but his views can easily be located in several texts and combined to form a general stance.³⁵ Scholarship on Berkeley's morality is relatively small in comparison to other issues: there currently exists only a few sustained studies of Berkeleian morality,³⁶ although there has been an increase in articles and chapters in recent decades.³⁷ Some Berkeleian scholars hold Berkeley to be a rule-utilitarian.³⁸ Regardless of the merits and attraction of this claim, the more important issue here concerns his two "great Principles of Morality: the Being of a God & the Freedom of Man" (NB 508).

15. Berkeley's moral views are intimately connected with the views expressed in *Principles* Part 1. This is evidenced by the planned content of Part II of the 1710 Design, which reasonably would have been based on the conclusions of *Principles* Part 1 and in the texts wherein discussion of morality appears. Therefore, investigating the appropriate conclusions from *Principles* Part 1 and the conclusions reached in other texts where morality is discussed yields the basics of Berkeleian morality.

Berkeleian Basics of Morality

16. There are a number of interweaving elements spanning through all of Berkeley's moral discussions. They are (1) the existence of God and His use of the Visual Language, (2) the nature of pleasure, (3) the laws of nature, (4) the existence of a future state and the immortality of the soul, (5) our happiness and the nature of sin and guilt, (6) the responsibility of the schools, and (7) the problems that needlessly complicate morality. I briefly outline these elements.

17. (1) Berkeley believed he had given a new proof for the existence of God. The existence of God is fundamental to his view of morality. Berkeley suffers great pains throughout his publications to establish the existence of God and thereby refute atheism. Berkeley describes God in many different ways: as the immediately present Creator and Author of nature who uses a Visual Language;³⁹ as the sustainer of the universe;⁴⁰ as the legislator who

³⁵ Cp. Orange (1890); Johnston (1923), Ch. 7; Hicks (1932), pp. 181-204; Hedenius (1936), Ch. 4; Olscamp (1970); Darwall (2005), p. 311. For an alternative account, cp. Bender (1946), pp. 85-86

³⁶ E.g. Olscamp (1970)

³⁷ E.g. Urmson (1982), Ch. 7; Young (1985), Ch. 3 and 8; Darwall (2006); Jaffro (2007)

³⁸ Cp. Olscamp (1970); Urmson (1982); Darwall (2006). For alternative accounts, cp. Johnston (1916), pp. 187-192; Young (1985), Ch. 3 & 8.

³⁹ NTV 147; PHK 28-32, 145-148, 150, 155; GE 88, 126; A.I.16, IV. 3-15; TVVE 38-40; S 258, 274

⁴⁰ PHK 6

establishes the laws of nature;⁴¹ and as a teacher.⁴² The use of God's Visual Language is especially significant because it appears frequently in the texts either as a conclusion⁴³ or as a premise to argue for the existence of God. Pleasures, the happiness of man, and the future state are intricately involved with the Visual Language: pleasures are what the principle of self-love seek whereby we regulate our actions;⁴⁴ happiness consists in moving past sensual pleasures to notional natural pleasures, which conforms to God's will;⁴⁵ and man infers the future state in part from the Visual Language.⁴⁶

18. (2) There are two general sorts of pleasure: natural and fantastic.⁴⁷ Berkeley goes on to distinguish three kinds of natural pleasures: sensual, imaginative, and rational. These kinds of pleasures are part of human nature, albeit sensual pleasures are natural insofar as they are contained within the rules of reason. Notional and rational pleasures are esteemed more than sensual pleasures because they stem from the rational faculty, which is the highest faculty of humans and what distinguishes us from brutes.⁴⁸ Sensual pleasures serve a function, especially early in life, but there is progression away from sensual pleasures and toward rational pleasures.⁴⁹ Sensual pleasures grow less pleasurable over time, so Providence has prepared different pleasures for different stages of life.⁵⁰ These rational pleasures are desirable in a "compounded reason" of their goodness and their obtainability.⁵¹ God created and knows humankind, so He knows which pleasures are best.⁵² As such, natural pleasures are the easiest and cheapest to obtain because they are just as (or more) pleasurable than fantastic pleasures and suited to both sense and reason.⁵³

19. (3) The laws of nature are crucial for establishing the existence of God, the pursuit of pleasure, the judgment in the future state, and the obtainment of happiness. Because ideas of sense are ordered, coherent, real, and steady, their signification of other ideas forms a fundamental piece of our well-being. As we gain experience with these ideas of sense, we

⁴¹ PHK 28-32, 150, 155; PO 7-8, 11, 13-14, 26-28; GE 126; A.I.16, IV. 3; S 274

⁴² Sermon I: Immortality, p. 9; Sermon IV: Mission of Christ, p. 45; GE 88

⁴³ TVVE 38-40

⁴⁴ NTV 147; PHK 30-31, 151, 155; PO 7-8, 11; GE 62

⁴⁵ PO 5; GE 49, 62

⁴⁶ Sermon I: Immortality, pp. 14-15; NTV 148; PHK 141; GE 27

⁴⁷ GE 49

⁴⁸ A. II. 10-16

⁴⁹ PO 5

⁵⁰ GE 49, 62

⁵¹ Sermon I: Immortality, p. 11

⁵² GE 49

⁵³ GE 49

discover certain laws by which to understand the signification we perceive. This allows “foresight” for the regulation of action, particularly for the benefit of life. These laws of nature are of two different kinds: physical and moral. Physical laws involve the sensual faculty of humankind, viz. they are the laws by which we come to connect certain signs with other signs. Moral laws are designed to fulfil the rational faculty of spirits. Moral laws point to what God wills for us to do; i.e. when given a choice, what we ought to do. We ought to do what God wills us to do because He created us and knows what is best for us, and it is by His will we are happy or miserable.⁵⁴ These moral rules require a voluntary obedience, whereas the physical laws require an involuntary obedience. Discovering and obeying the will of God leads to our happiness in our present state and in the future state.

20. (4) The existence of a future state and the immortality of soul are important elements in Berkeley’s morality. In many instances, Berkeley relies on the revelation of the immortality of soul as evidence for the soul’s existence and the existence of a future state. However, he also argues for them without the support of religion. First, he links the Visual Language to the suggestion of a future state in his discussion of vision.⁵⁵ Second, his arguments for soul imply its natural immortality, taken to mean that “it is not liable to be broken or dissolved by the ordinary laws of nature or motion” (PHK 141). Third, he argues for a future state on natural grounds: our appetite for immortality and the rational arguments for it would be the only discordant things in a harmonious and ordered world.⁵⁶ Fourth, a future state is needed to correctly understand virtue.⁵⁷ Finally, he summarizes his view by saying instinct, reason, and faith all attest to the immortality of soul, the knowledge of which forms the greatest joy.⁵⁸

21. (5) Our happiness and interests are the goal of morality. Christ’s promises aside,⁵⁹ Berkeley believes he has arguments for what makes us happy, and how we should handle the

⁵⁴ This point is of great importance for Berkeley. God is the Creator of spirits and the sensible world. The sensible world is governed by the physical laws, so discovering the order of the succession of ideas of sense aids in discovering the physical laws. All of this is firmly within God’s immediate and perpetual control: it is only in the rare cases of miracles, which are a different kind of example of God’s power, that the physical laws are broken. God also creates spirits, but He does not control them like He does the sensible world. Created spirits are free; they can will and cause limited agency in the sensible world. Moral laws speak to the freedom of created spirits, and the laws allow for true morality to take place. Without the freedom and power inherent in finite spirits, morality would be impossible because we would have to follow the moral laws in the same fashion as we follow the physical laws.

⁵⁵ NTV 148

⁵⁶ GE 27; Sermon VII: Eternal Life, pp. 108-109; cp. Sermon V: Notes for Sermons at Newport (Sermon 9), pp. 73-74

⁵⁷ GE 55; A.III. 9-11, 16

⁵⁸ GE 89

⁵⁹ Sermon I: Immortality, pp. 11-13

moral laws. Since self-love is the principle guiding moral action, we seek what we think is good and reject what we think is evil. We learn to forego immediate goods for distant greater goods, and this reflects the progression away from sensual pleasures toward rational pleasures. Since there is a God who created us and knows what is best, there are moral laws. The ends of these moral laws are good because God is good. Therefore, our happiness or misery is dependent upon God and our following the moral laws. When the immortality of soul and the future state are factored in, our interests must ultimately lie in our eternal interests, i.e. the rewards or punishments in the future state. So, we must regulate our actions in the present state by following the moral laws established by God to gain the benefits of eternal rewards in the future state. This includes foregoing the more immediate pleasures of our present state for the eternal pleasures of the future state. Not following these moral laws results in sin and guilt. It is not the physical action or motion that has sin; rather, it is “in the internal deviation of the will from the laws of reason and religion” (DHP3 236-237).⁶⁰ This claim rejects the view that God is the author of sin because God is not the only agent who produces the motions in bodies; because finite agents also have limited power to produce motions in bodies, “this is sufficient to entitle them to all the guilt of their actions” (ibid.).⁶¹

22. (6) The dissemination of the knowledge of these laws of nature is important. Berkeley briefly discusses the universities and their role in bringing about knowledge and morality. Schools must prepare people to enter the world to bring about knowledge and goodness. Because Providence has prepared different pleasures for different stages of life, we must prepare for each of these stages, and this is accomplished via the schools.⁶² They are not perfect, but they do an adequate job. The need to improve schools has a religious, moral, and social function.⁶³

23. (7) Finally, Berkeley discusses various problems that needlessly complicate morality. He does so in order to resolve them. The use of abstract ideas in morality goes back

⁶⁰ Cp. Letter 194

⁶¹ This supports the view of causal realism regarding finite agency. Sin and guilt, and by implication virtue and reward, are confined to the will. If I will something to happen, it does not matter if I affect the motions to produce my desired result. Therefore, I can sin in thought, word, and deed exactly because of my will. Instances of willing something from a great distance, e.g. via communication and manipulation of others, still counts as sin even if I am not present to affect those motions and changes or if those events do not occur. Obviously, the finite spirit who carries out my will must have their will judged too, but using another as an instrument still makes me guilty. Cp. Ch. 2. fn. 26.

⁶² GE 69; *Prevention*; A.V. 21-24

⁶³ Cf. Ch. 5.22-27

at least to Plato,⁶⁴ but they only render the spiritual sciences “intricate and obscure” (PHK 143). Speaking of spirit as an idea is another source of problem.⁶⁵ The problems of gradual production in nature and of evil are also discussed by Berkeley. The slow production of nature demonstrates the wisdom and goodness of God because He conceals Himself from the lazy and sensual, but is plainly legible to the attentive and unbiased.⁶⁶ Evil, on the other hand, is a problem of scope. Because of self-love, we take pain as an evil, even though our present state necessitates pain for proper moral choice. When we enlarge our view to comprehend the various factors involved (viz. the end, connections, and dependencies, occasions and proportions of pleasure and pain, the nature of freedom, and the design with which we are put into the world), the things we account as evil appear good.⁶⁷

Active Morality

24. Berkeleyan morality is essentially active because it inherently involves freedom of choice and action. The laws of nature are discovered by the mind by operating upon the ideas of sense. By perceiving and experiencing their order, coherence, and stability, we are able to predict future sensations and experiences. As we are guided by the principle of self-love, we seek pleasure and avoid pain. By learning the laws of nature, we can successfully navigate through the world to obtain pleasures and avoid pain.

25. This navigation is possible only because of our faculties. But our rational faculties are not limited to merely discovering certain laws of nature that involve the physical world. We also have the ability to learn other laws of nature that are entirely moral; i.e. we can discover God’s will.⁶⁸ God’s will is important to us because it dictates the laws of nature, both physical and moral. Specifically regarding morality, we come to know what God wills and what He presents as choices. What we ought to do becomes a subset of what we can do. We must act in order to survive, and proper action leads to our well-being. Without the immortality of soul and the existence of a future state, we could remain limited to the physical laws, seeking only what

⁶⁴ PHK 100: while Plato is not directly mentioned, it is plausible that Berkeley has Plato in mind.

⁶⁵ Cf. PHK 144; DHP1 174; Ch. 2.8

⁶⁶ PHK 151; cf. DHP3 259 on Hylas’ laziness. This description also highlights some differences between the minute philosophers in *Alciphron* from their Christian interlocutors. Cf. A.I.1 for a brief contrast, but this distinction is demonstrated throughout the work. Cf. Ch. 4.30-32

⁶⁷ PHK 153; A.IV.23-24

⁶⁸ Religion aids in this pursuit, as it offers answers and acknowledgements from God. But because Berkeley believes he can give an ethical system apart from revelation, the path must be open for man to discover these moral laws without revelation. This is a theme of *Alciphron*, and the text ends on a method for dealing with minute philosophers which does not depend upon revelation. Cf. A.VII.30.

serves us best in our present state.⁶⁹ In this, little use of the rational faculty is needed. However, our rational faculty allows⁷⁰ us to discover the immortality of soul, and consequently a future state. Therefore, we are faced with a set of choices: serve the more immediate ends of the present state or serve the distant ends of the future state. Berkeley's morality can be understood as an argument against categorically serving the immediate ends of the present state, and in favour of foregoing certain immediate pleasures for eternal ones.⁷¹

26. Morality is not located in ideas, although ideas play roles in morality. It is via ideas we come to discover the moral laws, our moral opportunities are presented, and the intentional or unintentional consequences of our decision are displayed. This is evident because our present state is in the world, and our relation and interaction in the world forms the boundaries of morality in our present state. These moral opportunities are not the true moments of morality; rather, the true moments of morality happen in the soul as it meditates and operates on the world. This is our activity and agency, and because we can decide, will, and act, we are free. But these powers present a moral choice because in each instance we can decide, will, and act either in accordance with the moral laws we have discovered or not in accordance with them. What we actually produce, viz. the production of ideas of sense our limited agency allows, is not what our eternal rewards or punishments will be based upon; rather, it is in what we will and how what we will is in accordance to the moral laws that are the means to God's ends.⁷²

⁶⁹ Berkeley's relation to classical philosophy is a point sorely underdeveloped in Berkeleian scholarship. However, Young (1985) attempts to remedy this issue by highlighting Berkeley's relation to Plato, among others. We know Berkeley taught ancient Greek and Hebrew at Trinity College Dublin, and we know Plato was among his favourite authors. It is not a stretch to suggest Berkeley has Plato's *Gorgias* in mind on this point concerning the nature of the tyrant.

⁷⁰ If *Introduction* is meant to canvass the entire 1710 Design, then PHKI 1-3 takes on slightly different meanings depending on what topic the reader supposes Berkeley to be discussing. Traditionally, these three opening sections are read strictly within the confines of *Principles* Part 1, or more specifically, within the confines of immaterialism. No doubt this is a natural interpretation. But if one approaches these opening sections with Berkeley's view of morality (or natural philosophy or mathematics) in mind, they appear to be just as relevant. If this approach is permissible, this permissibility lends support to my interpretation because the focus is on the *use* of our faculties, and not the problems or dust encountered.

⁷¹ Berkeley was not an ascetic, although he did practice a fair deal of moderation with regard to the fashionable vices (e.g. drinking). His system is built upon the pursuit, obtainment, and restraint of immediate pleasures. As we grow in experience and use of our rational faculties, we can and should choose to forego any immediate pleasure distracting or harming our eternal interests in the future state.

⁷² Implicit in this account is the recognition of our finitude. We do not have perfect knowledge of the laws of nature, physical or moral. Revelation aids in deciding certain matters of morality, but at least some of these moral laws are discoverable without revelation. Once moral laws are discovered, religion is of great use in placing oneself in the proper position to be a moral agent, and it is only when Alciphron is convinced not by religion but by reason of the existence of God that Berkeley's religious apology begins (A.V-VII). Therefore, religion can be useful to the Christian who does not doubt God's existence, but it can also be useful to the converted theist in determining which religion and revelation are accurate. Cf. Ch. 4.33-41.

Section 3: Natural Philosophy

27. *Principles* Part 3 was to discuss Berkeley's views on natural philosophy. The use of *Principles* Part 1 aids in understanding the foundational position or initial conclusions from which a further treatment would occur. There are publications which are more focused on natural philosophy, being *De Motu* and *Siris*. Much of what is contained in these texts are further elaborations of what is contained in *Principles* Part 1.

Berkeleyan Basics of Natural Philosophy in Principles Part 1

28. Ideas and spirits in Berkeley's philosophy play roles in his view of natural philosophy. In the texts where Berkeley discusses his views of natural philosophy, his metaphysics are present and relied upon. In *Principles* Part 1, the laws of nature are introduced at the end of his positive doctrinal argument (PHK 29-32). Ideas of sense are passive and have no agency, which is proved from observation and from the meaning of 'idea'.⁷³ Because the mind perceives a continual succession of ideas, there is some cause to those ideas which cannot be the ideas themselves, and this cause is spirit.⁷⁴ Spirit is known by the effects produced.⁷⁵ Since many ideas of sense are not dependent upon the finite observer's will, these ideas must be produced by some other spirit.⁷⁶ These ideas of sense are strong, lively, steady, ordered, and coherent, which distinguish them from the observer's ideas of imagination, and the nature of these ideas of sense "testify" attributes of God.⁷⁷ The laws of nature are "set rules or established methods" wherein the mind of God "excites in us the ideas of sense," and these laws are learned from experience (PHK 30). Further experience and knowledge of the laws of nature give the observer "a kind of foresight that enables [us] to regulate [our] actions for the benefit of life" without which we would be "at a loss" (PHK 31). These laws of nature are not "absolutely necessary" (PHK 62), but they are necessary to "pass right judgment of what would have appeared to us, in case we were placed in circumstances very different from those we are in at

In addition, Active Berkeleyanism does not disallow a project of an ethical dictionary or an 'Algebra of Ethics.' But what these projects mean takes on a different meaning than Johnston apparently understood. We can use algebraic reasoning to discover further moral laws, and it might be that some moral laws are only obtainable by the use of this ability. Regardless, as algebraic reasoning is allowable and at times extremely useful, it would be rash to exclude its possible use in morality. An ethical dictionary and algebraic reasoning might be employed to convert specific people, as Alciphron is handled with a particular process Berkeley says is not the only means, but it does not need to be the only or the best means.

⁷³ PHK 25

⁷⁴ PHK 26

⁷⁵ PHK 27

⁷⁶ PHK 29. Cp. Ch. 2.10 and fn. 26

⁷⁷ PHK 30

present” (PHK 59).⁷⁸ These laws of nature “run through the whole chain of natural effects... and are by men applied as well to the framing artificial things for the use and ornament of life, as to the explaining the various *phenomena*” (PHK 62). The negative effect of such a “consistent uniform working of ideas of sense” is that it might not lead to God as the cause, but “instead sends the mind looking for secondary causes” and “attributes power and agency to those ideas” (PHK 32; cf. PHK 102-103).

29. Natural philosophy does not deal with philosophical matter, but with real things.⁷⁹ Natural philosophy attempts to give an explanation of the phenomena. This explanation “is all as to shew, why upon such and such occasions we are affected with such and such ideas... they who attempt to account for things, do it not by corporeal substance, but by figure, motion, and other qualities, which are in truth no more than mere ideas, and therefore cannot be the cause of any thing” (PHK 50). The natural philosopher differs from other people in having “a greater largeness of comprehension, whereby analogies, harmonies, and agreements are discovered in the works of Nature, and the particular effects explained, that is, reduced⁸⁰ to general rules... which rules grounded on the analogy, and uniformness observed in the production of natural effects, are most agreeable, and sought after by the mind” (PHK 105).⁸¹ The framing of general rules and the derivation of phenomena from them deals with ideas as signs, not causes.⁸² The language used in these explanations is important, and natural philosophers must be able to appropriately distinguish and use two sets of languages when discussing matters of natural philosophy. On the one hand, “in the ordinary affairs of life, any phrases may be retained, so long as they excite in us proper sentiments, or dispositions to act in such a manner as is necessary for our well-being, how false soever they may be, if taken in a strict and speculative sense” (PHK 52). On the other hand, there are terms used for the sake of philosophical

⁷⁸ The laws of nature and the connections between ideas of sense are arbitrary from God’s perspective. From our point of view, they are still arbitrary because of miracles. In the normal dealings of everyday life, we take them to be necessary based on our experience of the order, coherence, and steadiness which we experience in them.

⁷⁹ PHK 50; cf. PHK 33-34

⁸⁰ A popular thread in Berkeleyan scholarship is the discussion of possible reductionism and instrumentalism in Berkeley’s view of natural philosophy. Reductionism in this context means all talk of sense objects can be translated into talk of having ideas of sense. Instrumentalism claims the aim of science is merely the production of theories that are empirically adequate. What is at stake in this discussion is how to understand Berkeley’s view of scientific explanation. As this discussion in the secondary literature affects more than natural philosophy, it will be discussed in more detail in Ch. 2.62-65. Cp. Myhill (1957); Buchdahl (1969), Ch. 5; Moked (1971); Brook (1973); Urmson (1982), pp. 50-54; Newton-Smith (1985); Dancy (1987), pp. 104-109; Moked (1988), pp. 157-166 ; Downing (2005b); etc. for discussions specifically relating to natural philosophy.

⁸¹ Our natural ability to learn these laws of nature and regulate our actions accordingly is a specific ability. Natural philosophers differ from other people only in so far as they focus more intently on this ability, develop it through use of reason, refine it through use of experimentation, and express it in their theories.

⁸² PHK 108

explanation, viz. the “strict and speculative sense,” which cannot be thought to actually exist but are beneficial for practical reasons like mathematical calculations and theories in natural philosophy. ‘Force’, ‘attraction’, ‘gravity’, etc. are such terms.⁸³ Care must be taken not to confuse and abuse the two languages, otherwise one might wrongly inquire in natural philosophy for some natural efficient cause distinct from spirit.⁸⁴

30. Finally, the criticism Berkeley makes of natural philosophy should not be understood as a wholesale attack; rather, Berkeley has specific points of disagreement. First, the belief in the real existence of such terms is problematic because it leads to scepticism,⁸⁵ error, and confusion in explanation.⁸⁶ This is a result of improper abstraction, and like all improper abstractions, the supposed abstraction does nothing but harm in its context. Berkeley’s discussion of Newtonian absolute space and absolute motion is an example of the error and confusion in explanation. Second, such explanation is limited insofar as natural philosophy is limited. It cannot give proper accounts of causation because causation is properly a topic in metaphysics and theology. Rather, natural philosophy is used to predict future sensations and explain past sensations in terms of the physical laws and a set of hypotheses, and to produce “artificial things for the use and ornament of life” (PHK 62). As such, theories in natural philosophy are consistent insofar as they perform these functions, even if the different theories are logically incompatible and use different terminology.

De Motu as an Elaboration

31. *De Motu* is essential to the understanding of Berkeley’s natural philosophy. It is an important elaboration of various sections in *Principles* Part 1 that deal with motion, language, and explanation in the sense of natural philosophy. *De Motu* is traditionally⁸⁷ understood as Berkeley’s account of motion. In one sense, this is unquestionably true because the primary topic of discussion is the principle,⁸⁸ nature,⁸⁹ and communication of motion.⁹⁰ Thus, it is an elaboration of the view held in *Principles* Part 1. But in another sense, *De Motu* offers much

⁸³ E.g. PHK 103 deals with ‘attraction’

⁸⁴ PHK 107

⁸⁵ PHK 86-91

⁸⁶ PHK 110-117

⁸⁷ *Works*, vol. IV, p 3; cp. Hinrichs (1950) pp. 491-494

⁸⁸ DM 3-42

⁸⁹ DM 43-66

⁹⁰ DM 67-72

more than the traditional understanding. It returns to other themes in *Principles* Part 1 and relies heavily upon them.

32. *De Motu* begins as *Principles* Part 1 begins: with a call for clear language, and the methodological claim that no one's authority ought to rank so high as to set value to words and terms.⁹¹ The early suggestion that abuse of language is to be found in natural philosophy, and specifically in discussions of motion, is teased out through the text. Certain terms in natural philosophy are inappropriately applied to spirit,⁹² while other terms have practical use for calculations but do not denote real things.⁹³ Those terms which are thought to denote real things are abstractions, which are abusive to language precisely because we tend to think there must be some idea annexed to each name.⁹⁴ The actual and real cause of motion is not some occult or sensible quality (the former being nothing and the latter being passive), but spirit or mind.⁹⁵ Therefore, the real principle of motion is metaphysical, not mechanical, and has a place in natural philosophy only insofar as it is assumed or borrowed from metaphysics.⁹⁶

33. The nature of motion also is entangled with abstraction,⁹⁷ hyper-defining,⁹⁸ error, and confusion.⁹⁹ Confusion between motion and efficient causation of motion exists in the study of natural philosophy. When it is realised that motion is a sensible quality and therefore passive, these confusions are resolved.¹⁰⁰ Other errors like the conservation of motion,¹⁰¹ the doctrine of absolute space¹⁰² and absolute motion,¹⁰³ and experiments claiming to demonstrate them¹⁰⁴ are properly understood as being errors. Berkeley recommends distinguishing mathematical hypotheses from the nature of things, avoiding abstractions, and considering motion as something perceptible and measureable in relative terms only. His recommendations

⁹¹ DM 1-2

⁹² DM 3

⁹³ DM 17, 39

⁹⁴ DM 7-9; cp. PHKI 18, 23-24

⁹⁵ DM 4-5, 23-28

⁹⁶ DM 34

⁹⁷ DM 43-44

⁹⁸ DM 45

⁹⁹ DM 47-50

¹⁰⁰ DM 49

¹⁰¹ DM 48

¹⁰² DM 52-57

¹⁰³ DM 58-65

¹⁰⁴ DM 55, 59, 60, 62

leave the content of natural philosophy untouched and the examination of motion liberated from many trivial issues.¹⁰⁵

34. The communication of motion is Berkeley's opportunity to more fully explain his view concerning possible theories of natural philosophy. According to Berkeley, natural philosophy must seek the cause and solutions of phenomena among mechanical principles,¹⁰⁶ not metaphysical principles.¹⁰⁷ A phenomenon is explained physically by showing its connection with those mechanical principles.¹⁰⁸ A phenomenon can be explained in different ways.¹⁰⁹ This does not point to the inadequacy of natural philosophy, but rather its proper limitations. Natural philosophy is not metaphysics; their purposes and functions are different. Within the confines of natural philosophy, any one theory is as good as another if it conforms to given ideas of sense and laws of nature, and if it accurately predicts future phenomena.

35. In dealing solely with motion, Berkeley has given a specific example of his overall views on natural philosophy. The main points in his argument are found in *Principles* Part 1, and these points involve both motion and other philosophical premises like the abuse of language, the proper methodological approach, and the complex nature of explanation. This is consistent with the general progression of *Principles* Part 1, wherein abstraction and methodology are first discussed, then metaphysical points, and finally consequences of the view. In *De Motu*, language and methodology begin the text, followed by a discussion that ends with a distinction between metaphysical causation and the sensible nature of motion. However, the focus between the two texts is slightly different: *De Motu* concerns a 'lower science' than that of first philosophy, so it depends upon first philosophy in key ways. However, those Berkeleyan scholars who hold Berkeley as trying to draw a sharp distinction between natural philosophy and first philosophy err to the extent that a sharp distinction is impossible: it is true the contents of first philosophy and natural philosophy differ to some degree, but the latter is a consequent of the former, being a 'lower science' dependent upon a 'higher one'.

¹⁰⁵ DM 66

¹⁰⁶ DM 67, 69, 71

¹⁰⁷ DM 72

¹⁰⁸ DM 68

¹⁰⁹ DM 68

Siris as an Elaboration

36. *Siris* is a complex and complicated text.¹¹⁰¹¹¹ An appropriate and lengthy discussion of its contents is here unnecessary. However, within the confines of natural philosophy, especially in relation to *Principles* Part 1 and *De Motu*, a few key points can be concisely expressed.

37. A key feature of *Siris* is its overall textual progression from tar-water, to discussions of topics in natural philosophy, and end in topics of first philosophy. These elements also appear in *Principles* Part 1 and *De Motu*, albeit in a different order. In those texts, the progression is from language and methodology, through metaphysical and theological issues, to the consequences of those views in other branches of knowledge. *Siris* moves in the opposite direction: it goes from discussions of a particular thing (tar-water), to speculations of the physical causes of its properties, and eventually to discussions of first philosophy. These present a chain in reasoning because there exists a chain in natural effects (PHK 62). Finally, many discussions within scholarship about *Siris* concern language and methodology.

38. *Siris* also contains what Berkeley believes is a prime example of how the laws of nature can lead to the discovery of some sensible thing (tar-water) having a real benefit to our well-being. In the sections concerning tar-water, Berkeley is at pains to display the various ways natural philosophy functions, and how they combine to give evidence for a possible panacea. A quick survey of the division of sections concerning tar-water acknowledges this point: weaved throughout the general discussion of tar-water are practical sections on how to prepare it, how to best apply it in treatment, the kinds of illnesses it can alleviate, and the various experiments and experiences Berkeley has had with it. There are also more scientific sections discussing the anatomy and physiology of plants, the qualities of plants' juices, theories of acids, salts, and alkalis, and aether.

39. When these two points are combined, the situation in *Siris* is in some sense similar to the situation of *De Motu*: Berkeley has offered an elaboration of his view, rooted originally in *Principles* Part 1, by discussing a particular example.

¹¹⁰ *Siris* traditionally is divided into three main portions, which I call 'beginning', 'middle', and 'late'. The beginning portion is §1-119, wherein Berkeley discusses his recipe for tar-water and all of its various functions as a cure. The middle portion is §120-250, wherein Berkeley is mainly discussing natural philosophy. The late portion is §251-368, and involves the philosophical climb to the Christian Trinity. I employ this traditional division only for the sake of my arguments here and at Ch. 3.54-62 and Ch. 4.55-68.

¹¹¹ I acknowledge the discussion of particles in secondary literature, but leave aside that discussion for the purpose of this dissertation. Cf. Moked (1971); Moked (1988); Garber (1982); Wilson (1985); etc.

Active Natural Philosophy

40. Physical laws are discoverable, meaning they require spiritual activity. They are the rules and established methods of God whereby He evidences His attributes to us. This is done in a similar way as finite spirits: the spirit is itself unperceivable, yet we by analogy and experience come to have notions of another's spiritual existence. Visual ideas form a language whereby God speaks to His creatures, and the remaining ideas of sense (while heterogeneous) form various sensible sign systems to the same end. These laws of nature exist in the same way as the order, coherence, steadiness, etc. of sensible ideas exist, and these laws are discoverable only through the use of our sense and reason, which combine to form experience. Therefore, discovering the laws of nature and the evidence for other spirits requires activity, some of which is shared with other creatures (i.e. sense), and some of which is unique to at least¹¹² humankind (i.e. reason).

41. Physical laws help finite minds to understand, interpret, predict, and practically use the world. Without them, we would be "at a loss." Each of these activities essentially involves the spirit's activity. We come to understand the physical laws through experience. As we discover them, we interpret their possible meanings. We form experiments to test our hypotheses and see if our predictions are accurate. Finally, we practically use the physical laws of nature as they are intended: for our benefit and well-being. All of the "ornaments of life" are evidence of the active use of natural philosophy.

42. The discovery and use of the laws of nature are according to God's will. They are of such a nature as to be discoverable and applicable to the most common affairs of life, to experimentation, and to the production of the "ornaments of life." Ultimately, they evidence the attributes of God, who should be a target in investigation because of His fundamental importance in our lives. It is in Him that "we live, move, and have our being."

Section 4: Mathematics

43. Serious and sustained scholarship in Berkeley's views on mathematics dates back over a century.¹¹³ The emergent threads in this area of Berkeleyan scholarship deal with

¹¹² I acknowledge, as Berkeley does, there may be other finite spirits of a higher order than humankind. Angels are a prime example. Berkeley seems almost entirely concerned with humankind, so I limit it here.

¹¹³ E.g. Johnston (1916); Johnston (1918); Johnston (1923); Wisdom (1939); Wisdom (1941); Wisdom (1942); Wisdom (1953b); Baum (1972); Urmson (1982) Ch. 6; Pycior (1987); Sherry (1987); Jesseph (1993); Sherry (1993); Fogelin (2001) pp. 126-136; Jesseph (2005); etc. Additionally, this dissertation does not explicitly incorporate Berkeley's earliest mathematical texts. This lack of incorporation does not suggest ignoring these

Berkeley's views of the three main branches of mathematics (geometry, arithmetic, and algebra), Berkeley's criticism of the calculus in *Analyst*, and the relation of his mathematical views to his general philosophy.

Mathematical Branches

44. Berkeley holds distinctive views on geometry, arithmetic, and algebra. I expound them in turn. Concerning geometry, one must begin with Berkeley's view on abstract general ideas. His rejection of abstract general ideas clarifies key points in his view of geometry. First, it stipulates the content of geometry is perceivable extension, a view originally expressed in *New Theory of Vision*.¹¹⁴ This has led some Berkeleian scholars to conclude Berkeley holds geometry as a higher branch than arithmetic and algebra,¹¹⁵ although recent scholarship has sought to dissolve the issue of priority by stating each branch is separate.¹¹⁶ Regardless, geometry has particular ideas as its content.¹¹⁷ Second, the rejection of abstract general ideas leads to a new theory of generality. Berkeley holds particular ideas can stand for other particular ideas of a certain sort, and a particular idea becomes a general idea not by a change of content but by a change in use. General ideas are particular ideas used in a particular way, viz. the particular idea stands for other particular ideas. This allows Berkeley to retain geometrical demonstration as applicable to more instances than any particular diagram or idea. Third, Berkeley denies the infinite divisibility of finite extension. His previous view in the Notebooks, which called for a far more radical overhaul of geometry, is replaced by his view of generality, although the error of infinite divisibility arose from a failure to distinguish the line actually employed in demonstration from the line it can be taken to represent.¹¹⁸

45. For arithmetic, numerals are “creatures of the mind” (PHK 12) and are wholly nominalistic. As such, the arithmetical notations are the objects of thought in arithmetic. These notations or symbols can be employed without considering their referents because numbers are

texts or that these texts lack value (as this would be contrary to Active Berkeleianism); rather, for the sake of brevity, this dissertation focuses on the mathematical texts published after the 1710 Design. It is possible to subsume these early mathematical texts under the 1710 Design, but that subsumation would be purely conjectural and perhaps throw confusion upon the 1710 Design (e.g. it would not be labelled the ‘1710 Design’ because those mathematical texts predate the 1710 Design as discussed in Chapter 1). One of the focuses of this chapter is to subsume the mathematical texts after 1710 under the 1710 Design to demonstrate a new unified interpretation.

¹¹⁴ NTV 149-160

¹¹⁵ E.g. Pycior (1987), p. 278

¹¹⁶ Jesseph (2005), p. 277

¹¹⁷ Sherry holds Berkeley to be realist in his view of geometry, but a formalist in his views of arithmetic and algebra. The tension between these two views is the subject of Sherry (1993).

¹¹⁸ Jesseph (2005), pp. 282-284

merely names and do not denote any particular idea. Arithmetic's importance lies in its usefulness and applicability to other systems. In itself, arithmetic as a purely formal mathematical branch lacks real value because it is merely an exercise in the manipulation of symbols based on computational rules. The truth of arithmetical statements consists in their derivability within the arithmetical system.

46. Of far more interest to Berkeleyn scholars is Berkeley's view of algebra. Algebra also concerns symbols, but whereas arithmetic is nominalistic, algebra is purely symbolic. The content of algebra is merely the algebraic symbols of a given system, which are more general than numbers. Algebra, being concerned only with symbols and their manipulation given a set of rules, further allows Berkeley to claim reasoning need not be about particular ideas or things, but can also function purely on symbols without referents. Consequently, meaning is not necessary when reasoning.

Calculus in the Analyst

47. Generally, Berkeley's work in mathematics is confined to *Analyst*, which contains his criticism of the calculus. His criticism takes two different forms: metaphysical criticism and logical criticism.

48. Berkeley views the calculus as part of geometry. Therefore, the content of the calculus must be in perceivable extension, and the objects must be clearly conceived. However, the fluxions and infinitesimals of the calculus are incomprehensible because they are of no determinate or conceivable magnitude, yet they are posited as existing and used in the calculus. The higher-order fluxions and infinitesimals are even more incomprehensible. This forms the crux of Berkeley's metaphysical criticism: the calculus' subject matter is inconceivable and violates the definition of geometry.

49. The logical criticism links with the metaphysical criticism. Because fluxions and infinitesimals are inconceivable, their use in mathematical proof and demonstration is inconsistent. Berkeley focuses on two proofs from Newton: one from *Principia* involving computation of the fluxion of a product of two flowing quantities, and one from *On the Quadrature of Curves* involving computing the fluxion of any power of a flowing quantity. In the first proof, Newton appears to ignore or avoid a term in his result so as not to deal with the infinitesimal. In the second proof, Newton introduces a positive increment into his calculation

only to later dismiss the same increment; however, he retains the result as if that increment was still present, thus suffering from *fallacia suppositionis*.¹¹⁹

50. In 1821, Cauchy resolved both of these criticisms by conceiving of the calculus in terms of limits.

Active Mathematics

51. Berkeley's mathematical endeavours have only recently come to be properly appreciated. The traditional view holds Berkeley was not much of a mathematician, although he possessed a fine enthusiasm and ability to be critical of mathematics.¹²⁰ The traditional view also holds Berkeley's major contributions to mathematics are his metaphysical and logical criticism of the calculus, but his more radical views are more the unfortunate by-products of his overall philosophy. Berkeley's rejection of the infinite divisibility of lines is the oft-cited example, and his workings in the Notebooks for a complete (and usually believed unrealistic) overhaul of mathematics are looked upon by scholars with uneasiness.¹²¹ Criticism of Berkeley's mathematical views persist, although the method has soften from harsh judgment to exploring ways to correcting Berkeley's views.¹²²

52. Against this traditional view is the view that mathematics played an important, if not essential, role in the formation of Berkeley's philosophy. Johnston presents this alternative view by arguing the influence of mathematical conceptions is shown throughout Berkeley's texts by Berkeley's constant interest in mathematics.¹²³ This influence plays important roles in Berkeley's philosophy, with many of his examples employing key points coming in mathematical form. A more recent adherent to the fundamental importance of mathematics in Berkeley's philosophical development and expression is found in Pycior. She seeks to place Berkeley in an English tradition where mathematics and philosophy are intimately linked. She argues many of Berkeley's most notable philosophical characteristics, e.g. his nominalism and

¹¹⁹ Sherry (1987), p. 457; cp. Jesseph (2005), pp. 303-304

¹²⁰ Wisdom quips, "In this field [Berkeley] was in the best sense an amateur, but not amateurish" (Wisdom, 1953b, p. 24)

¹²¹ This is further evidence for being very cautious of using the Notebooks as Berkeley's stated views. Some Berkeleyan scholars note Berkeley's view of geometry underwent significant revision in the little time between the Notebooks and *Principles* Part 1 (e.g. Jesseph, 2005, p. 278). While I agree the germs of his views on arithmetic, algebra, and the calculus are contained in the Notebooks, the entries require at least further explanation. That explanation comes only in his publications.

¹²² E.g. Sherry's 'neo-Berkelian' account in Sherry (1987); Sherry (1993)

¹²³ Johnston (1916); Johnston (1918); and Johnston (1923), esp. Ch. V

theories of signs and language, manifest themselves from reading Wallis, Hobbes, and Barrow.¹²⁴ Finally, Jesseph more recently echoes this sentiment.¹²⁵

53. While much of the focus of Berkeleyan scholarship is on the use of algebraic reasoning and how the acceptance of such reasoning affects Berkeley's theories of language, meaning, and use of signs, what is of more interest to Active Berkeleyanism is the general attitude towards mathematics found throughout Berkeley's texts. Johnston first introduced the view that this apparently unrelated influence on Berkeley's immaterialism actually has a wealth of evidence that permeates throughout Berkeley's philosophy as a whole. In this, Johnston is correct, though limited. It is true the mathematical discoveries and debates of his time concern and influence Berkeley. This undermines the traditional interpretation that the metaphysical advances of his time are the only or major influence on his philosophy, and his views on ethics, natural philosophy, and mathematics must be understood through an immaterialistic lens. Johnston's major achievement is to offer another plausible way to understand Berkeley's philosophy, wherein such metaphysics is not the dominating factor. However, Johnston and other Berkeleyan scholars are still too limited in their conception of influence. Publications on morality, natural philosophy, and mathematics influenced Berkeley. Focus on a possible hierarchy only confuses the issue because we find these influences throughout all of Berkeley's texts.

54. Berkeley places high value on the ability to reason using symbols without concern for referents. On the one hand, the ability to reason in such a way is a major advancement in extending the use of our faculties. On the other hand, Berkeley refuses to allow use without applicability to the world of sense; i.e. mathematics requires utility or practicality. Therefore while we can reason purely on symbols and stay within a "pure system" without translating the results to the world of sense, Berkeley finds this ability to be an incorrect use of the faculties. This is perhaps why he abandons an Algebra of Nature and an Algebra of Ethics. Algebraic signs remain important, but the sensible signs that suggest other signs or laws of nature are more important.

Section 5: The Interconnectivity of these Additional Publications

55. Traditionally, Berkeleyan scholars maintain Berkeley separates morality, natural philosophy, and mathematics. Their evidence is as follows: Berkeley sought to publish these

¹²⁴ Pryciór (1987)

¹²⁵ Jesseph (2005), pp. 266-276

different fields of study in their own separate parts of the 1710 Design; he published at least portions of these remaining parts in separate publications (e.g. *Passive Obedience*, *De Motu*, and *Analyst*); and Berkeley makes various comments in his publications which seemingly call for their separation (e.g. DM 71-72).

Interconnectivity of Content

56. However, this traditional view seriously mistakes the issue. First, Berkeley seeks to subsume these fields of study under one great banner, wherein each contributes to the general aim of the *Principles*. True, they are treated somewhat separately, as evidenced by the planned series of publications, but this is only for convenience and clarity. In the same passages where the traditional view draws its evidence, a key combining phrase is overlooked: they can be separated for convenience and clarity.¹²⁶ Second, Berkeley does not treat these fields of study separately in the texts. Morality, natural philosophy, and mathematics are all handled in *Principles* Part 1, and Berkeley believes his arguments in the opening sections of the main text also apply and have consequences to these fields of study. When these apparently separated fields of study receive more elaboration in later publications, the other fields of study are never far removed. For example, Berkeley elaborates the role of the natural philosopher in *De Motu* by contrasting it with the work done in metaphysics, theology, and morality. The natural philosopher is doing something very specific, and it is often confused with a different job description, viz. the natural philosopher is thought to be dealing with the causes of motions when in fact she is dealing with laws and order of sensible ideas. Berkeley explicitly mentions one can expand the scope of natural philosophy to include incorporeal spirits, but it is not done for convenience and accepted usage.¹²⁷ In another example, the backdrop of *Analyst* is not mathematics, but morality. It is to an “infidel mathematician” that the text is directed. The aim is not to separate mathematics from morality, but to argue mathematicians require the same kind of faith as theologians. This brings morality and mathematics closer together, but in this move, Berkeley is only following the example set by the circumstance that prompted *Analyst*: a mathematician had made judgments on theological and moral matters, and Berkeley follows by making different judgments about the relationship between them.

57. *Siris* is helpful to further illustrate this point. *Siris* deals with the mundane topic of tar-water, scientific explanations, uses of mathematical reasoning, and topics of first

¹²⁶ DM 42, 72

¹²⁷ DM 42

philosophy, morality, and theology. In the later sections of this text, Berkeley performs the task mentioned in *De Motu* of expanding natural philosophy to include incorporeal spirits. There is the old talk in *Siris* of mechanical laws, mathematical hypotheses, and what actually exists in nature (e.g. S 234-250), but this discussion leads into topics of first philosophy. Indeed, if *Siris* is meant to show a chain of reasoning, one would expect these topics to be connected and for *Siris* to demonstrate ways they are connected. While *Siris* points to a hinted promise in *De Motu*, Berkeley has already begun this work in *Principles* Part 1 by showing the consequences of his philosophy in these fields of study.

Interconnectivity of Approach

58. That the content of morality, natural philosophy, and mathematics is interconnected in their appearances in the texts is easily evidenced and argued. How these fields of study are interconnected is another issue entirely. I argue they form different levels in the process whereby we come to understand ourselves, the world, and God.

59. Mathematics is the beginning level. In mathematics, one comes to be able to manipulate signs in a given system. Since mathematics is separated into three distinct fields, each field has its own subject. Algebra deals solely with signs and symbols that have no immediate referent, and algebra trains our faculties to be capable of sign manipulation and computation. However, algebra must have the goal of being useful, viz. applicable to the sensible world. Algebra dealing only with pure system manipulation, viz. algebra divorced from any application to the sensible world, is a “waste of time” (PHK 121).¹²⁸

60. Arithmetic deals with “creatures of the mind” and must be applicable to the sensible world. Arithmetic can have referents in the sensible world, insofar as we apply our numbers to sensible objects. How we apply numbers is arbitrary, but once we supply a connection between sensible objects and numbers, we can manipulate our numerals to assist in discovering facts about the sensible world. We form mathematical hypotheses, and these hypotheses aid our understanding of the sensible world. Arithmetic simply and solely for the sake of itself, viz. without application to the sensible world and thus confined to a pure system, is a “waste of time”.

¹²⁸ Johnston deserves much credit for first uncovering the use of algebraic reasoning with regard to natural philosophy and morality in Berkeleyanism. While it is true we hone and perfect our reasoning by use of algebraic functions, Johnston extends the tool too far by thinking Berkeley is seeking an “Algebra of Nature” and an “Algebra of Ethics.” Rather, Berkeley comes to see how algebraic reasoning is helpful in application to sensible perceptions, and forms a basis from which other fields of study can be investigated. Cf. Johnston (1916)

61. Geometry is a bridge between mathematics and the sensible world because geometry has sensible extension as its referent. The training in arithmetic and algebra aids our reasoning upon sensible extension. That geometry for Berkeley is from sense perception is evident from the final sections of *New Theory of Vision*, which links a field in natural philosophy to a field in mathematics.¹²⁹ Since geometry is used by natural philosophers to assist in descriptions of the sensible world and its laws by means of mathematical hypotheses, geometry forms a convenient and important bridge between mathematics and natural philosophy.

62. With the mathematical training in place, which all must tend toward the sensible world, the next level in the process is natural philosophy. Herein, the goal is to understand the sensible world, viz. to discover the physical laws and subsume the orderly and coherent system of sensible ideas as signs into a system. Natural philosophers use mathematical hypotheses for this task and create explanatory systems based in part on these mathematical hypotheses. The key point which Berkeley repeatedly emphasises is for natural philosophers not to mistake the words and symbols they use for real objects in the sensible world. Terms like ‘force’, ‘attraction’, etc. have use in a given explanation of the sensible world. These terms are used as mathematical terms and descriptors, and they are used like variables in algebra. They have no referent to any real sensible qualities.

63. This clarifies the scholarly debate concerning Berkeley’s use of instrumentalism and reductionism. Insofar as Berkeley is discussing explanations of sensible signs in terms of mathematical hypotheses and descriptors, he is using instrumentalism. But, these explanations must also be reduced to physical laws, which is the highest aim of natural philosophy. In this way when applying the explanations of sensible perceptions to the orderly and coherent system of nature, these perceptions must follow the physical laws. Thus, they must be reduced to instances of these physical laws. Experimentation and observation are the tools by which natural philosophers form their mathematical hypotheses and descriptions for their explanations of the natural system. In this way instrumentalism is key. However when natural philosophers subsume the same observations under the physical laws, these observations must be reduced to those physical laws. Otherwise, the explanation is incorrect.

¹²⁹ Viz. geometry is useful to vision if properly applied. Berkeley argues mathematical hypotheses are applied incorrectly in *New Theory of Vision*, but he states there and in *Vindication* that he does not reject their general use.

64. The goal of natural philosophy is explanation of the sensible world and discovering the physical laws. But natural philosophy is (commonly) limited to the sensible world, and as such cannot partake of the higher fields of study except insofar as it must “borrow” metaphysical background tenets. But as *Principles* Part 1, *De Motu*, and *Siris* demonstrate, the natural philosopher is ultimately led to investigate the content of metaphysics, theology, and morality. But as the natural philosopher is performing a different task than the mathematician, so too does the metaphysician, theologian, and moral thinker perform a different task than the natural philosopher. As geometry is a bridge between mathematics and natural philosophy, so causation and the laws of nature are bridges between natural philosophy and first philosophy.

65. The physical laws are necessary for the survival and well-being of our present state, but reflection upon our interests, self-love, relation to pleasure, etc. raise our view from the sensible world to higher-order subjects. The sensible sign systems, which is the subject and goal of natural philosophy, become the basis from which our mind is raised to God, first by coming to realise the order, coherence, and stability of the sensible world with the laws of nature. These laws allow for in-depth investigation into God’s will as expressed in physical laws. But we also have the ability and privilege of acting morally, wherein we must use our rational faculties to the fullest extent to discover the moral laws, and of asking further questions as to the nature of things.

66. Morality requires some use of mathematical and ‘scientific’ operations. Understanding and obeying the physical laws give lower level pleasures and are key for survival, but they fall short of our true potential as rational creatures. Since we have introspection and learn we are each a spirit that wills, perceives, etc.; since we come to understand sense perception is the succession of sensible ideas, most of which are caused by an agent of greater capacity than ourselves and other finite spirits like us; and since we discover sensations are parts of a complex system of signs, one of which forms a Visual Language from the Author of nature; for all of these reasons, we come to first philosophy and its unique questions. In this, our minds are raised to higher fields of study, and we focus on true causes and moral laws.

Section 6: The Interconnectivity with the 1710 Design

67. In the previous chapter, I argue the 1710 Design has the general aim of helping its audience to a proper understanding of the world, finite spirits, and God.¹³⁰ In that discussion, only the traditional publications of the 1710 Design were considered. In light of the discussions of the current chapter, we are in a position to discuss these additional texts in relation to the 1710 Design.

Importance of Scope, Content, and Activity

68. First, Berkeley planned to write on morality, natural philosophy, and mathematics in subsequent parts of his 1710 Design. There are texts devoted in varying degrees to each of these fields of study. In those texts, these fields of study are not completely handled by themselves, but references and relations to the other fields of study litter his discussions.

69. Second, each text concerns the metaphysical entities of Berkeley's system in different ways. The branches of algebra and arithmetic mainly concern the faculties of the mind and sign manipulation, but they are important only insofar as they are useful and applicable to the sensible world. Geometry has extension as its subject, and the mind operates on a given sensible idea to discover mediate qualities or attributes of extension. Natural philosophy deals most properly with ideas of sense, which form the basis of observation and experimentation for investigation and explanation by the mind. Morality uses ideas of sense to discover the moral laws. These ideas of sense are the circumstances and opportunities for real moral production, although true moral action occurs only within the will. Sin and guilt are attached properly to the spirit, not to the ideas of sense it perceives or produces.

70. Third, each field of study deals with the discovery of rules which, when applied to the appropriate content, benefit the spirit's well-being. Mathematical rules and systems function as training of the mind with regard to sign systems: first to the mathematical system itself and then in relation to the sign systems of the sensible world. Natural philosophy deals with the physical laws, wherein God gives ideas of sense in an orderly, coherent, and steady way for the benefit of our wellbeing. It is upon these ideas of sense that we use the faculties of the mind to discover pleasure, laws of nature, and ultimately our freedom and immortality. Morality raises our inquiries to spirits, true causation, proper behaviour, and to our eternal

¹³⁰ Cf. Ch. 1.69-80

interests. All of this is accomplished via the rules of reasoning learned from experience and training.¹³¹

71. Fourth, morality, natural philosophy, and mathematics aid in having a clear understanding of ideas of sense, which is necessary for proper activity in the world, with the world, and with other spirits.

72. Fifth, the issues of abstraction, scepticism, and atheism remain targets of morality, natural philosophy, and mathematics. Each is prone to abstraction and the dangers of believing abstract ideas are real objects, and each is prone to scepticism and misunderstanding. If the natural philosopher fails to truly perform her task, she is not led to true causation and metaphysical inquiries into spirit, and she both mistakes “secondary causation” with true efficient causation and comes to have incorrect views on God. The mathematician might place too much faith in her mathematical reasoning and hypotheses, making claims on metaphysical issues that her mathematical sign systems have no real authority to make. Finally, the ethical thinker might forego the beauty and utter brilliance of the sensible world and our rational faculties to perform mathematics, observation, and experimentation in the world, and forget that while our eternal interests are our ultimate interests, we must still be a part of the sensible world, which is a constant divine gift from God whereby He perpetually reveals Himself.

Practicality in these Additional Texts

73. Berkeley repeatedly claims mathematics is useful only as it is applicable to the sensible world with its natural laws and sign system. Pure mathematics is a result of improper use of our rational faculties and needless entertainment resulting in fantastic pleasures. Mathematics must be applicable to experience, mainly in order to assist in the investigation, understanding, and explanation of the sensible world. However, mathematics is also helpful in understanding and further developing our faculties. Therefore, mathematics is practical.

74. Natural philosophy discovers the physical laws whereby we can survive and gain benefit from life. In discovering the physical laws, society improves. This improvement occurs by discovering deeper aspects of the order of the world, e.g. in the medicinal advantages of some sensible object or in the proper creation of a calendar based on astronomical motions. By natural philosophy, we come to better interact in the sensible world. We find ourselves in our

¹³¹ Revelation is another way to accomplish these aims. Here, Berkeley focuses on our rational faculties. Revelation falls in some way outside of our rational faculties because it involves faith.

present state. We find ourselves bound by the physical laws, and we must learn and regulate our actions to survive, to progress properly through the sensible world, and to discover the higher fields of study. So, natural philosophy is practical.

75. Morality involves the highest content: spirits, true causation, and eternal interests. Spirit is something immortal and has interests lying beyond the present state. It is to these topics and interests mathematics and natural philosophy must ultimately aim because our eternal interests are obtained only through experience of the sensible world by discovering moral laws. Being in line with God's will and acting morally is what makes us good, so morality is practical.

Conclusion

76. Berkeley believes each individual spirit has the ability to traverse this "gold chain." His principles of human knowledge are nested within perception, epistemology, metaphysics, theology, morality, and natural philosophy that includes vision and medicine, and the three branches of mathematics. They are interconnected because they are all part of an overall process that each individual spirit is capable of attempting. True, any particular individual spirit might focus more on one or more aspects, and she can become a natural philosopher, a mathematician, or a metaphysician, but they are all directed towards the same end. In this, Berkeley's discussion for allowance of teleological causes makes sense. Berkeley himself was ambitious in his 1710 Design because he sought to offer an account of all of these fields of study and how they relate to each other. His 1710 Design was not abandoned, although the planned series of publications did undergo some alteration. Motion was planned to be in *Principles* Part 3, but instead finds itself the central theme in *De Motu*; the calculus and its criticism was meant to be in Berkeley's discussion of mathematics, but it found publication in *Analyst*; and Berkeley's ethical theory was meant for *Principles* Part 2, but it was forced into publication in part because of a misunderstanding of his sermons preached at Trinity College Dublin and in part by the opportunity of writing in the *Guardian*. These alterations do not equate to abandonment of the 1710 Design or a change of approach, only a change in planned publications.

Chapter 3: The Remedial Publications

Introduction

1. In the previous chapters, I argue (1) the 1710 Design was a planned series of publications linked by method, content, scope, and purpose; (2) the academic publications before and of 1713 belong to the 1710 Design; and (3) the academic publications after 1713 also belong to the 1710 Design. The vast majority of Berkeleyan scholars hold the first two points to be obvious: the 1710 Design is a planned series of publications linked by at least content, and the academic publications before and of 1713 belong to that Design. My intention in arguing for them is not to restate the obvious; rather, my goals are (a) to introduce complexity into the 1710 Design by arguing for a consistent methodology and purpose along with proposed content, and (b) in spite of this introduced complexity, to show the agreed academic publications of the 1710 Design remain and are further entrenched in that Design. Berkeleyan scholars who maintain unity of Berkeley's publications accept the third point, although for only partial reasons than argued in Chapter 2: they unify these academic texts after 1713 under the 1710 Design based solely on promised content found in Berkeley's Notebooks and correspondence. Active Berkeleyanism strengthens the claim of the third point by offering further reasons for its acceptance, viz. these publications should be subsumed under the 1710 Design based on method, scope, purpose, and promised content.

2. Merely adding reasons to accept the third point is a consequence of Active Berkeleyanism; however, this methodology's final goal aims to account for all the aspects of Berkeleyanism. So, Active Berkeleyanism holds that scholarship must investigate Berkeley's other writings and his biographical facts for a fuller comprehension of his philosophy. It is true any doctrine or tenet can be abstracted from the philosophy as a whole, and even the philosophy can be abstracted from the philosopher; however, the greater the separation, the greater the limiting of a proper and full understanding. Active Berkeleyanism takes the spirit of anti-abstractionism of *Introduction* and applies it to the entire life of George Berkeley, including all his writings, his beliefs, and events of his life. Therefore, it is not sufficient to investigate only certain texts and apply the results of that analysis over an entire corpus; this would be tantamount to claiming an individual or her philosophical outlook is known by analysis of only part of the available evidence, which is absurd.

Dispelling the Minor Publications Hypothesis

3. The immediate obstacle facing Active Berkeleyanism is the hypothesis that Berkeley's writings can be separated into two general categories: major publications and minor publications. Such division is typical among scholars of philosophy, so this error by no means lies solely with Berkeleyan scholars.¹ The basic problem is this: traditional scholarship divides Berkeley's writings into those which apparently have more philosophical interest and those which apparently have far less philosophical interest. This division is problematic because it assumes the division is correct by some appropriate standard, and it influences Berkeleyan scholarship by explicitly suggesting certain texts simply have more value than others.

4. Sustaining the division of Berkeley's corpus into 'major' and 'minor' publications places scholarship at distinct disadvantages. First, the terms 'major' and 'minor' are misleading because they can cause the scholar to believe Berkeley did not take 'minor' publications as seriously, or did not place as much value in them, as 'major' publications. Second, this division is anachronistic, completed by scholars and not by Berkeley, and used as descriptors to what *they* thought were of philosophical value. But it is obvious scholarship's focus shifts over time. Yet, the shifting of focus has been confined mostly within the category of 'major' publications, thereby unnecessarily limiting scholastic growth. Third, there is not agreement between scholars on which publications are 'major'.² Finally, it is not a viable or fully productive method of analysis to investigate only certain texts and ignore others when the goal of investigation and analysis is to form a comprehensive understanding of a philosopher's general outlook.

5. The acceptance of the Minor Publications Hypothesis in Berkeleyan scholarship dates back at least to Fraser, although Fraser states in his 1871 Preface all previous editions of Berkeley's collected works "omit important works which should have found a place, and the same works are omitted in all, as if by common consent" (Fraser 1871, vol. I, p. viii). He proceeds to explain "it was not easy to apply any satisfactory principle for the arrangement of the Works", and he opts to divide the first three volumes "into three groups:— The Pure

¹ E.g. Turbayne (1965), p. vii; Tipton (1969), p. 203; Benjamin (1990), p. 165; etc.

² For example, Armstrong (1965) includes Notebooks, *New Theory of Vision*, *Principles Part 1*, *Three Dialogues*, *De Motu*, and Letters 190, 194, 197, and 199, although these texts are not given in chronological order in that collection. Ayers (1975a) adds *Vindication* and reorders the works. Clarke (2008) drops the Notebooks, *Vindication*, and the letters, but adds excerpts from *Alciphron* and *Siris*. In the latest example, Brook and Belfrage (2017) incorporate the typical division into the structuring of the parts of their Companion. Part 2 is titled "Berkeley's Major Works" and includes chapters on *New Theory of Vision*, *Principles Part 1*, *Three Dialogues*, *Passive Obedience*, *De Motu*, *Alciphron*, *Querist*, and *Siris*.

Philosophical; the Applied Philosophical; and the Miscellaneous, some even of the last containing a pretty distinct metaphysical ingredient” (ibid, p. ix). It is obvious when investigating Fraser’s editions and other writings on Berkeley that he holds Berkeley to be primarily a metaphysician, and he orders Berkeley’s publications accordingly, even though he admits some of the ‘miscellaneous works’ have metaphysical value. Noteworthy in Fraser’s first edition is the non-chronological ordering of the volumes: Fraser opts for a thematic approach. Therefore, Fraser corrects the issue of non-comprehensibility of previous editions but introduces or reaffirms the Minor Publications Hypothesis. Fraser’s 1901 edition of *The Works of George Berkeley* also admits this error.³ While Fraser does list some of Berkeley’s publications (viz. those texts Fraser believes to be philosophical) in chronological order in the 1901 edition, the remaining non-philosophical texts (according to Fraser) are unceremoniously lumped chronologically together in volume four. Indeed, the titles of the first three volumes are “Philosophical Works” of a given period, while volume four is titled “Miscellaneous Works”. What this effectively accomplishes is that it emphasises the texts contained in volumes one through three, and de-emphasises those texts contained in volume four.⁴ It is peculiar Fraser takes Berkeley’s advice to Johnson concerning reading his (Berkeley’s) own texts in the order of publication to only apply to what Fraser holds are philosophical texts and not to the entire corpus of Berkeley.⁵

6. Luce and Jessop’s *Works* remedies many errors in Fraser’s edition, but it fails to correct this error of division.⁶ *Works* adheres even less to chronology, although it seeks to offer texts more thematically. However, the possible theme of *Works*, vol. VII is far from clear, and it might be supposed the texts contained therein are simply the remaining texts not neatly fitted into more philosophical themes. Indeed, even a charitable stance takes *Works*, vol. VII as a collection of Berkeley’s ‘minor’ texts. Luce admits, “These writings [contained in volume seven] are miscellaneous, reflecting the many-sided interests and activities of the man” (*Works*, vol. VII, p. v). This categorising is strange when Luce’s discussion of the history of focus on

³ Frazer (1901), vol. I, pp. viii-ix

⁴ The method is strikingly different in Sampson (1897), who, in three volumes, does not divide the texts into ‘major’ and ‘minor’, and he lists them chronologically. In addition, Sampson lists the texts in the 1752 *Miscellany* and notes in which of his three volumes those texts are found.

⁵ Letter 199. The correspondence between Berkeley and Johnson at this stage concerns immaterialism, so Fraser’s reading is natural. But one need not limit Berkeley’s advice to Johnson to solely the ‘major’ publications.

⁶ “Berkeley’s *An Essay towards a New Theory of Vision* was the first of his major publications” (*Works*, vol. I, p. 143). The admittance of the error occurs in the very first sentence of the Editor’s Introduction. Turbayne, too, commits the error in his opening sentence of Editor’s Introduction. Cf. Ch. 3. fn. 1

New Theory of Vision and *Principles* is taken into account: Luce appears to miss the very lesson he is trying to convey concerning those publications with his categorisation in *Works*, vol. VII.⁷

7. Other collected editions of Berkeley's publications since *Works* reproduce and republish this error. While no newer edition currently exists of Berkeley's complete texts, those editions which seek to offer reprints of certain publications stay firmly within the category of 'major' texts.⁸ Indeed, the 'minor' publications are usually discussed only in the biographies of George Berkeley (and then, only short overviews and brief historical context are given before quickly moving on to the next 'major' publication)⁹ or the rare academic journal article or chapter.¹⁰ No sustained scholarly attention is given to many of these efforts of Berkeley, and no real effort is made to subsume and unify all of these texts into the corpus.¹¹ Perhaps it is because of the Minor Publications Hypothesis that these texts have been relegated, not handled academically with the attention and respect implied therein, or simply ignored.

Theodore Young: An Exception to the Minor Publications Hypothesis

8. Luckily, this division is not absolute in Berkeleyan scholarship. Young's *Completing Berkeley's Project: Classical vs. Modern Philosophy* (1985) stands in opposition to much of the traditional trends in Berkeleyan scholarship. Of its many merits, there are three of particular importance. First, it does not follow the Minor Publications Hypothesis. While superficially Young divides his discussion in such a way as to seemingly support the division at the core of the Minor Publications Hypothesis, he does not err in holding what he calls "occasional works"¹² to be of limited value. On the contrary, these "occasional works" help to establish the backdrop of Berkeley's more famous publications and doctrines because they demonstrate Berkeley as a classical philosopher. Second, it addresses most of the so-called 'minor' publications and argues for a unity between them. Young is keen to demonstrate how the *Guardian* essays, *Passive Obedience*, *An Essay towards preventing the Ruin of Great Britain*, *Advice to the Tories*, *Discourse to the Magistrates and Men in Power*, the 1745 Letters on the Jacobite Rebellion, and *A Word to the Wise* all deal with common themes. Beginning with

⁷ *Works*, vol. I, p. 156

⁸ Cf. Ch. 3. fn. 2

⁹ E.g. Hone and Rossi (1931); Hicks (1932); Berman (1994); etc.

¹⁰ E.g. Tipton (1969); Kelly (2005); Breidert (2007); etc.

¹¹ This does not mean some scholars do not attempt a partial unification. E.g. Leyburn (1937), pp. 94-98 attempts to link many of Berkeley's Cloyne writings around *Querist*; Holtzman (2011), pp. 485-491 argues for a pedagogical theme strung from *Principles* to *Siris*; etc. Luce (1934a), Ch. 8 attempts to link the major texts via anti-abstraction, but he does not treat many of the 'minor' texts in his attempt.

¹² Cp. Ritchie (1967), p. 134 for another use of "occasional" with regard to some of Berkeley's publications.

Berkeley's target, the free-thinkers, Young argues these texts are unified because they all exhibit Berkeley's views on the relation between religion and politics (the name of Young's Chapter 2) and because they all attack free-thinking in some form (cf. Young's Ch. 1-3). Third and most outstandingly, Young discusses these so-called 'minor' texts *before* discussing Berkeley's more famous publications and doctrines. This discussion is done against the backdrop of viewing Berkeley as a classical philosopher (Part 1) and as a modern philosopher (Part 2).

9. One need not ascribe to Young's theses of Berkeley to enjoy the advantages of his efforts. What is of importance is the shift away from the Minor Publications Hypothesis and toward an interpretation that emphasises and values texts like *Alciphron*, the *Guardian* essays, and *Passive Obedience* equally as much as *Principles* and *Three Dialogues*.

10. The present chapter, along with the subsequent chapters of this dissertation, are in the spirit of Young's rebalancing. By doing so, Active Berkeleyanism repairs the damage done by the Minor Publications Hypothesis. In accordance with this aim, the present chapter comprises sections again divided by theme. Section 1 focuses on public spirit, especially contained in Berkeley's texts of the 1720s. Section 2 deals with political writings, specifically dealing with the questions of loyalty and improving the State. Section 3 covers Berkeley's economic writings. Section 4 discusses Berkeley's medicinal publications. From these discussions, Section 5 argues for the interconnectivity of the remedial texts. Section 6 argues for the applicability of the remedial texts, and argues they too should be subsumed under the general aim of the 1710 Design.

'Remedial'

11. In line with Active Berkeleyanism, the publications discussed in this chapter are referred to as 'remedial'. Unfortunately, there is ambiguity in the term 'remedial'. One popular use involves education, specifically the description of courses involving learning difficulties. Another use of the term is to correct or improve a wrong or bad situation, and this use is more closely aligned with the use of a remedy. Neither of these uses are satisfactory on their own for the present purpose: the first includes too much, while the second includes too little. For the present purpose, 'remedial' is meant to describe publications of Berkeley where he is trying to educate the populace by offering a solution or remedy to some issue or situation.

12. Most, if not all, of Berkeley's texts could be interpreted as remedial. Indeed, the interpretation of this dissertation understands Berkeley as a remedial thinker, and when viewed

in this way, a particular unity emerges throughout his corpus. I say, the thesis statement of this dissertation is set in remedial terms. However, here the term is limited to secular texts not traditionally included as ‘major’ publications. It is true I commit in some small degree the error I wish to correct, but I have done so not out of negligent inconsistency but out of intentional courtesy to the reader, who has, no doubt, become accustomed to such a popular, if erroneous, categorisation from the Minor Publications Hypothesis. Also, the term offers an easy grouping of Berkeley’s writings not normally reproduced. The sectional groupings of this chapter are products of dividing the remedial publications by primary content. This sectional grouping is merely for the sake of ease; I argue at the end of this chapter these remedial publications have numerous links between each other.

Section 1: Writings on Public Spirit

A Lifelong Commitment

13. The old erroneous view of Berkeley as a man with his face buried in a book and oblivious to the world around him is mostly gone. This view of Berkeley is a product of a gross misinterpretation and overemphasis of his immaterialism, and many Berkeleyan scholars in the course of the last century have endeavoured to permanently remove this view from him by annihilating that misinterpretation.¹³ In its place has arisen a more realistic view of Berkeley.¹⁴ My interpretation aims to push further this more realistic view of Berkeley and harmonise what can be considered his more idealised endeavours.¹⁵

14. The division of Berkeley’s life into epochs is an attractive method.¹⁶ No doubt, this division has its basis in biographical fact and philosophical exertion. But it is possible to interpret these divisional lines as rigid, resulting in two or three different Berkeleys. To offset this possibility, some Berkeleyan scholars attempt to demonstrate unity in his texts, while other scholars accept some form of variation of different Berkeleys.¹⁷ My interpretation maintains there is only one Berkeley and a single overarching enterprise to his life. This enterprise takes

¹³ However, little has been done to rectify the overemphasis of immaterialism. Active Berkeleyanism is such an attempt.

¹⁴ Woodbridge, Luce, and Stoneham have each called for Berkeley’s philosophy to be seen in more realistic terms. Of the scholars who still hold onto the claim of idealism with Berkeley, even they mostly reject the view of Berkeley as oblivious.

¹⁵ Berman attempts such a mixture. While the intention and purpose of synthesising these two views of Berkeley is admirable, I do not subscribe to Berman’s peculiar results. Cf. Berman (1994) Ch. 8

¹⁶ Cp. Sampson (1897), pp. ix-lxi; Hone and Rossi (1931); Hicks (1932), Ch. 2; Luce (1949); Berman (1994); etc. Cp. 5.35-38

¹⁷ Cf. Intro. 6-10

different forms and focuses its energy in different ways as Berkeley experienced the world of his time, and this variation is the origin of the epoch-view expressed in the biographies of Berkeley of the last century and a half.

15. A major element of this literal life-goal of Berkeley concerns public spirit. My interpretation maintains this element of public spirit does not arise from the South Sea disaster, and thereby drive Berkeley's life only in the 1720s; rather, the force of public spirit is always working on Berkeley, and promoting public spirit is a compositional element of his entire life after becoming a fellow at Trinity College. There is evidence of this public spiritedness in his correspondence from the outset, in the purpose and execution of the 1710 Design, in his efforts of the 1720s leading up to and including his Bermuda scheme, and during his time as Bishop of Cloyne. This public spiritedness takes the form of metaphysician in the 1710s; propagator in the 1720s; and as a bundle of other titles like religious apologist, bishop, and Irish patriot from the 1730s onwards.

16. To demonstrate all the various manifestations of Berkeley's public spiritedness would be beside the current purpose of the chapter. However, it is possible to briefly discuss this public spiritedness in the remedial publications of the 1720s and offer hints how this discussion can apply to Berkeley as a whole. Indeed, these remedial publications demonstrate Berkeley's public spiritedness in blunt and full display, and linking these texts to previous and succeeding publications dispels any notion of his public spiritedness as being merely a passing phase in his life.

An Essay towards preventing the Ruin of Great Britain

17. *Prevention* is an important text that has been relatively neglected by Berkeleian scholarship.¹⁸ This neglect is confusing because the text contains key information concerning Berkeley's understanding of, and relation between, religion and politics, industry, frugality of manners, and public spirit, all of which find repeated expression beyond *Prevention*.¹⁹ Herein,

¹⁸ When this text is discussed, it is usually in relation to the economics of *Querist*. E.g. Kelly (2005), p. 342; etc. However, Fraser (1871) vol. IV, pp. 88-89 notes its importance "in the study of his character and social conception."

¹⁹ Cf. *Advice to the Tories*, wherein Berkeley argues for political loyalty based on religion; *1745 Letter to the Clergy* and *1745 Letter to the Roman Catholics*, wherein Berkeley contrasts religious and civil liberties within the current government and that of the opposition; *Discourse to Magistrates*, wherein Berkeley claims religion is fundamental to politics because of the notions men learn and act upon; and *A Word to the Wise*, wherein Berkeley links religious and civic duty of Catholic clergy to increase the industry of the poor Irish Catholics.

it is intended to indicate its importance as a remedial publication and as a key piece to understanding the interpretation of this dissertation.

18. *Prevention* is only partially concerned with the South Sea disaster.²⁰ This situation, Berkeley contends, is an effect of a deeper problem, viz. people have lost sight of their true interest, which involves public interest, and are now focused on their own private interests (PRGB 1, p. 69). The purpose of *Prevention* is remedial: Berkeley wants to re-establish our true interest. By demonstrating the links between religion and politics, industry, and frugality of manners with public spirit, Berkeley offers a remedy in both theoretical and practical terms. In typical remedial fashion, Berkeley admits some of his points are difficult to accept only because the State is in need of such a remedy.

19. Religion links to public spirit via patriotism, politics, and liberty, all of which end in the flourishing of the State when done appropriately. Religion links to these topics because it gives virtue, conscience, duty, and direction to the public. As the public loses religion, the State loses proper direction of interest; i.e. as religion (and thereby virtue, conscience, and duty) in a given State decreases, the interests of its people shift from public interest to private interest. The atheist and infidel are enemies of the State because they draw the public away from public interest to private interests by subverting religion (PRGB 2-7, pp. 69-71). The atheist and infidel are the old targets from the 1710 Design, both in the publications of the 1710s and in the publications upon Berkeley's return from America. Therefore, there is unity in the general target of Berkeley's works, and in *Prevention* Berkeley emphasizes their destructive tendencies in relation to public spirit.

20. Industry links to public spirit via the wealth and comforts it produces (PRGB 8-18, pp. 71-74). Industry is the natural means²¹ of obtaining the remedy to the central problem of *Prevention*. Industry is guided by religion and virtue, and industry's employment affects the wellbeing of the State. Under the best circumstances, the industry of the people is directed

²⁰ For the alternative view *Prevention* is very concerned with the South Sea disaster, cf. *Works*, vol. VI, p. 63; Kelly (1992b); etc.

²¹ As Berkeley has just discussed religion and virtue, a link between industry as a natural means of obtainment and the natural pleasures discussed in the *Guardian* essays is appropriate. Natural pleasures are the easiest and best to obtain, and Berkeley now places focus on industry as the natural and best way of obtaining these pleasures. If industry should be directed towards public interests and if industry is the natural way of obtaining natural pleasures, it appears natural pleasures benefit the State. Indeed, this is aligned with Berkeley's general view in *Prevention* that public interest, which should be pleasurable if in the proper circumstances, is a natural pleasure or amalgamation of natural pleasures. Conversely, fantastic pleasures are or can be harmful, and their obtainment is via a non-natural way; i.e. those pleasures based on the poor choices of fashion and caprice are obtained through non-industrial means like gaming. Cp. PRGB 8-11, p. 71; GE 49.

toward public interests, and these public interests positively affect and increase private affairs. When industry loses the direction from religion, the people turn inward to private interests and the public suffers accordingly. Even worse, when wealth and comforts can be quickly gained or lost by activities like gaming, the effect on the public state is disastrous.²²

21. Frugality of manners links to public spirit by sustaining the strength and wealth acquired through industry (PRGB 19-29, pp. 74-79). Berkeley calls frugality of manners “the nourishment and strength of political bodies” (PRGB 19, p. 74). Luxury is problematic and harmful, as examples of the masquerade and luxurious dress demonstrate. The problem of luxury is a problem of use:²³ when riches promote honest commerce and motivates industry and virtue, they are advantageous, but when riches are made an instrument to luxury, they enervate and dispirit people (PRGB 20, pp. 74-75). Frugality of manners combats the ill-effects of luxury, which dispirts the people. This dispiriting of the people causes them to turn their interests from public to private.

22. So far, the discussion of *Prevention* has been limited to its theoretical aspects. However, Berkeley is also very concerned with offering practical examples as support of his theoretical outcomes. Because *Prevention* is remedial in nature, merely having a theoretical discussion on public spirit would be to only partially administer the remedy. If focus is also on use, it is plausible to expect Berkeley to give specific examples, and he does so throughout the text. Berkeley attacks the free-thinkers who subvert the place of religion in the State and confuse the correct use of liberty (PRGB 4-5, p. 70). He suggests a poor-tax and discusses how to implement and use it to alleviate the poor and motivate the workforce (PRGB 12-15, 72-73). He discusses the importation and exportation of various items and promotes rewards to inventors and artisans who can match or surpass the quality being imported (PRGB 16-17, pp. 73-74). He recommends different treatment of sailors (PRGB 18, p. 74). He decries luxurious dress and supports the implementation of sumptuary laws (PRGB 21-26, pp. 75-77). He warns

²² Industry remains a key theme to Berkeley as Bishop of Cloyne. His view on the Irish peasants and their decision to remain poor and have poor manners directly links back to the views expressed in *Prevention*. Cf. Kelly (2005)

²³ The issue of use finds its explicit origin in PHKI 3, although *New Theory of Vision* also argues for the inappropriate use of geometry in optics. In each text, it is claimed the error lies not in things, but in our use of things. Looking forward, the issue of use is of prime concern in *Querist*. The luxurious items of inappropriate fashion show their improper use in the Irish gentry by the economic state of Ireland during the time of *Querist*. Many of the imports should be produced in Ireland instead, and therefore the economy of Ireland would benefit from a better circulating monetary medium and employment of the Irish workforce. Finally, tar-water must be prepared and administered properly to avoid physical sickness. While Berkeley recommends using tar-water on a routine basis, he is at pains to discuss how to individualise its preparation and administration to meet the needs of the individual patient.

against the masquerade (PRGB 27-28, pp. 77-78). He calls for reform of public diversions like dramas (PRGB 29, pp. 78-79). He calls for public service works and monuments of both praise and shame (PRGB 32-33, pp. 79-80) and supports the arts to adorn them (PRGB 34, p. 80). He promotes an academy directed at public spirit (PRGB 36-37, p. 81). He suggests how to resolve political party turmoil (PRGB 38, pp. 81-82). He calls for the proper gifting of money to the State and the removal of perjury and bribery (PRGB 40-43, pp. 82-83).

23. Finally, there is a similarity between *Prevention* and *New Theory of Vision*. Each essay is an essay *towards* something. With regard to *New Theory of Vision*, I argue the use of ‘towards’ denotes an active theory.²⁴ Similarly, *Prevention* also denotes an active theory: Berkeley asks the reader to connect the decline of religion and morality with the abysmal state of Great Britain. *Prevention* intends to correct the harmful methodologies of luxury and a lack of industry, an irreverence towards religion, and the promotion of private interest over public interest. Just as *New Theory of Vision* intends to activate the reader to a better understanding of what vision is and how it is used, so too does *Prevention* intend to activate the reader to a better understanding of the connections between religion, morality, frugality, virtue, public spirit, public interest, and the improvement of the State.

Proposal and the Bermuda Scheme

24. Berkeley’s Bermuda scheme is not a ‘sudden’ interest, if by that it is meant he suddenly became enthused with propagating religion to aid the promotion of the State. Rather, even a non-charitable reading of Berkeley at the time he first mentions his plan must accept the link between *Prevention* and the Bermuda scheme. The beginning of *Prevention* discusses religion’s role with politics, and suggests an academy to help promote public spirit and public interest. The Bermuda scheme, considered with *Prevention*, indicates a harmony in his thinking and action. *Proposal* is a practical outcome of *Prevention*,²⁵ and *Proposal* demonstrates Berkeley’s commitment to his theoretical aspects of *Prevention*. The specific manifestation of a seminary, which is nowhere explicitly mentioned in *Prevention*, is a natural outgrowth of the views expressed.

25. If a central problem of public spiritedness is the focusing of interests to the public domain and if that focusing requires direction from religion, it is reasonable to ensure religion is properly propagated in a State. If a part or the entirety of a State lacks religious foundation

²⁴ Cf. Ch. 1.37

²⁵ Fraser (1871), vol. IV, p. 103 states Swift claims the Bermuda scheme was in Berkeley’s mind since 1721.

and such a foundation is of great importance, then some practical measure is needed to correct the problem. Berkeley already offered attempts at this correction: *Principles* Part 1 and *Three Dialogues* both focus on the practicality of the views contained therein and the benefits thereof. However, since these publications were considered theoretical by his readers and failed to gain public approval, Berkeley shifts his tactic to a more practically-minded national enterprise. This shifting of tactic is not a new interest, but rather a variation of his interest in his previous writings. If the sceptic, atheist, and infidel are harmful in a myriad of ways (in philosophy, religion, morality, natural philosophy, mathematics, and public spirit), then they must be combated on each front. Berkeley's attacks on the more theoretical aspects of the negative influence of the sceptics, atheists, and infidels were not immediately successful; therefore, Berkeley decides to take a practical, and perhaps extreme but consistent, new approach with his Bermuda scheme.

26. This logical consistency is supported by textual evidence. The opening paragraph of *Proposal* re-introduces the main theme of *Prevention*: there is little regard of religion and poor manners. The remedy²⁶ is consistent with *Prevention*: industry is a means to obtain the desired wealth. The difference is the industry proposed in *Proposal* concerns religious and moral goods, whereas the industry of *Prevention* concerns economic commodities. However, because natural pleasures are defined in such a way as to not limit these pleasures to more earthly goods, the benefits of religion and morals can also be subsumed under natural pleasures.²⁷

27. While *Proposal* concerns the problem of public spirit expressed in *Prevention*, Berkeley also turns to a more practical problem of establishing a better foundation of religion

²⁶ Berkeley used this term in PCFP 2 (p. 345), and this example acts as direct justification for the use of 'remedial'.

²⁷ Berkeley hints at this inclusion of religious and moral goods at PCFP 55 (pp. 358-359), and he also links it with *Revelation of Immortality*. In that sermon, Berkeley says, "Rational desires are vigorous in proportion to the goodness &, if I may so speak attainableness of their objects. for wtever provokes desire does it more or less according as it is more less desirable & wt makes a thing desirable is it's goodness or agreeableness to our nature, & also ye probability there is our being able to obtain it... But I speak not of ye ordinary brutish appetites of men, but of well grounded rational desires; wch from wt has been said, 'tis plain are in a direct compounded reason of the excellency & certainty of their objects. Thus an object with half the goodness & double the certainty, & another with half ye certainty & double ye goodness are equally desired. & universally those lots are alike esteem'd wherein the prizes are reciprocally as the chances" (*Works*, vol. VII, p. 11). In *Proposal*, he states, "The Greatness of a Benefaction is rather in Proportion to the Number and Want of the Receivers, than to the Liberality of the Giver. A wise and good Man would therefore be frugal in the Management of his Charity; that is, contrive it so as that it might extend to the greatest Wants of the greatest Number of his Fellow-creatures. Now the greatest Wants are spiritual Wants..." (PCFP 55, pp. 358-359). Since these rational desires are natural pleasures and spiritual wants are included in benefaction, proper natural industry and method are needed to obtain spiritual wants.

in the State: viz. educating seminarians and missionaries, and supplying them with the religious, moral, and earthly goods needed to succeed in their industry. This is the main goal of *Proposal*. This supplying of religious, moral, and earthly goods is handled practically: Berkeley is concerned with a proper location for the seminary in order to obtain the best religious, moral, and earthly results (PCFP 19-34, pp. 348-353), the necessary costs (PCFP 18, 58, pp. 348, 359), etc.

28. This practical issue of how to supply the churches in America is woven into the more central theme of public spiritedness. Berkeley highlights the need of having missionaries with good character and skill, who have the spirit of industry and the frugality of manners to be more self-sufficient in obtaining the necessary goods (PCFP 3-10, pp. 345-347). Berkeley's culmination on his method harmonises the two specific problems faced in *Prevention* and *Proposal*: the whole education of the seminarians must be directed to their religious mission that results in a proper zeal for religion and love of country, and are well-versed in the topics of religion, nature, public spirit, and virtue (PCFP 16, 36-37, pp. 348, 353-354). The benefit of his proposal is one of religious and national pride (PCFP 43, p. 355).

29. Yet the success of Berkeley's proposal depends on the method of application of zeal, industry, wealth, and learning (PCFP 52, pp. 357-358). Proper method is central to the goals of the 1710 Design. So, if the enemies of public spirit are the enemies of the 1710 Design; if proper learning, morality, and religion are essential to Berkeley's views on public spiritedness, his Bermuda scheme, and the 1710 Design; and if the dangers caused by the enemies and the impropriety of method all amount to the same issue; it can be supposed public spiritedness is consistent with the 1710 Design. And if the texts discussed here are consistent with that 1710 Design in the ways just mentioned, then they have some relation to the other texts of the 1710 Design and the 1710 Design has a public spiritedness aspect to it. Since these publications are remedial in nature, are consistent, and form a part of the 1710 Design, the 1710 Design is at least in part remedial.

Section 2: Political Writings

30. In canvassing Berkeley's remedial texts, a conclusion arises: Berkeley does not separate questions of loyalty, civic improvement, economics, party politics, etc. from general discussions of politics; rather, they are tied together.²⁸ However, this does not disallow fruitful

²⁸ Kelly has specifically noted this difficulty with regard to economics, and his point is taken here to apply to other aspects associated with politics. Cf. Kelly (2005), pp. 339-340; cp. Ritchie (1967), pp. 134-159

discussion of specific and reoccurring themes and problems in Berkeley's remedial texts. In this section, two main issues are discussed: political loyalty and the means to improve the State. Berkeley's efforts in the political field link directly to his efforts of public spiritedness.

Political Loyalty

31. Political loyalty interests and concerns Berkeley throughout his life. Many of his remedial texts focus on loyalty to the State, and Berkeley remains consistent in his views. Because of their remedial nature, the texts concerning political loyalty vary precisely because they involve different audiences and different problems; however, they intricately link together because the same points are raised and defended. Berkeley also handles the issue of political loyalty in another way: while many of his remedial texts are practical in nature, he does offer theoretical discussion on the nature of political loyalty. The order of publication is important. *Passive Obedience*, which contains Berkeley's theory of political loyalty, comes first, implying Berkeley has his theory before he begins to publish on practical issues of political loyalty. This means Berkeley works from a coherent theory to practical instances; he does not give advice piecemeal from which a theory can be surmised.²⁹ Therefore, Berkeley's view concerning political loyalty is not an incomplete doctrine given in passing, but a coherent view given in a variety of ways in different remedial texts.

32. The theoretical work of Berkeley's view on political loyalty is the main content of *Passive Obedience*. Berkeley's first thesis, that there is an absolute unlimited non-resistance due to the supreme civil power wherever placed in any nation, is of particular interest (PO 3-28). Loyalty is the fulfilment of the laws of the supreme power, whether divine or human (PO 3). Loyalty is a natural moral duty because absolute obedience is required on general and specific grounds. The laws of nature must always be esteemed and used as the standard to judge the disputes among people (PO 13). The laws of nature, being a system of rules, are for the benefit of humankind, and those benefits are obtained only by obeying the rules of the system (PO 15). Political states must form in accordance with the laws of nature, and the formation and sustainability of these states requires loyalty (PO 16). Submission to the government is a point important enough to be established by a moral rule, and obedience to any government is universal enough to fall under the direction of a law of nature (PO 17). This links God, the laws of nature, and the formation of political states. Religion and morality give direction to the

²⁹ Hutchinson (1953) pp. 52-53 defends this piecemeal approach concerning economic problems in *Querist*.

industry of the State,³⁰ and loyalty ties the people to the State. Vice must be avoided in the State (PO 26-32), which harmonises with his views on public spirit. Loyalty is a natural moral duty: it is natural because it involves the laws of nature and our place within that system; it is moral because religion and morality tie the State and its people.

33. Turning to the practical application of political loyalty, Berkeley furnishes us with a spectrum of different texts. *Advice to the Tories* centres on the issue of a political party possibly not upholding their oaths to the civic power. Berkeley rests his argument for their loyalty to their oaths based not on a political theory, but on the importance of religious matters; i.e. Berkeley appeals to the Tories' zeal for the Church of England to resolve the suspicion of their disloyalty and oath-breaking (AT 1, p. 53). Berkeley identifies two things that influence us with regard to religion, viz. a sense of its truth and a sense of its usefulness. Being guilty of sedition to a sworn sovereign weakens both things (AT 2, pp. 53-54). Perjury is an injury to religion because of its destructive nature, viz. mutual faith is the greatest support of society and an oath is the highest obligation to keep that faith (AT 5, p. 54). The visible interest of the Church depends on the credit and reputation it has, which is measured by the acts of the practitioners (AT 7, p. 55). Perjury both damages the Church's creditability and reputation, and renders the Church unguarded against the destructive efforts of those who wish to dissolve it (AT 8, pp. 55-56). If the Tories, who support the Church of England and wish it well, want to be zealous for the Church, they must uphold their oaths of loyalty to the supreme civic power.

34. Berkeley again faces the Jacobite issue in 1745, thirty years after *Advice to the Tories*. In response to this new manifestation of the Jacobite threat, Berkeley produces two letters, one addressed to his own clergy and one addressed to the Catholics of Ireland. His audience affects his approach, but these two letters are not in tension with each other or with *Advice to the Tories*. In his letter to his clergy, Berkeley's aims are to dispel any notion that a Jacobite rule would allow for greater religious and civil liberties (LC 1, p. 227), and to bring his clergy, and thereby their parishioners, to action against allowing Ireland to be attractive to the Jacobite cause (LC 4, 6, pp. 227-228). The loyalties of his clergy to both the supreme civic power and to the Church of England are pillars upon which Berkeley completes his aims. These pillars are also the same pillars for his *Advice to the Tories*. In his letter to the Catholics, Berkeley focuses on the interests of Catholics, which he believes will fare far better under the rule of the supreme civic power. Berkeley's letter is an appeal to past experience where

³⁰ Cf. Ch. 3.20

Catholic uprisings have produced worse conditions for Irish Catholics, and the recommendation to remain silent on the possible Jacobite invasion because their prospects are not as beneficial as Jacobites suppose. Herein is an example of the theoretical framework of passive obedience in practical application. In arguing for this action, Berkeley discusses their treatment under the present rule (LRC 1, 4, pp. 229-230), and the practical situations if the Jacobite invasion succeeds (LRC 3-4, pp. 229-230).

35. Berkeley presents the practicality of loyalty in positive terms. In neither *Advice to the Tories* nor the 1745 letters does Berkeley accuse his audience of disloyalty, and he explicitly states in all three texts he does not believe those addressed are disloyal. Rather, his intention is to highlight the fact they display their loyalty by their actions. For Tories, they should reaffirm their oaths for the sake of the Church, the State, and themselves. For Protestant clergy in Ireland, they should display their loyalty by not being complacent to the Jacobite threat. For Irish Catholics, they should carefully consider their interests and remain silent on the Jacobite cause. This careful distinction by Berkeley highlights the importance of loyalty to the State, expressed in theory in *Passive Obedience* and practically applied in the mentioned instances. The positive expression of loyalty remedies the problem of suspected disloyalty in each practical instance. The net gain is a better State because its people actively demonstrate their loyalty to the State.³¹

Improving the State

36. The discussion of Berkeley's interest in public spirit, particularly in *Prevention*, indicates one avenue Berkeley takes to improve the State. However, this is not his only attempt. Berkeley makes different attempts in *Discourse* and in *Word to the Wise*. Both of these texts centre on interest, and both have obvious links to *Prevention* and Berkeley's commitment to public spiritedness. Improving the State is an act of public spirit, and arousing public spirit improves the State. They are related. But these attempts take the notion of improving the State onto new paths.

37. *Discourse* is addressed to magistrates. The main aim is to persuade the magistrates of the importance and power of religious and moral notions in a people, and thereby the State.³² Berkeley's argument is as follows. Notions must be placed into the minds of children. Early

³¹ Berkeley exhibits his loyalty to the State by clarifying the loyalties of the various groups within it.

³² This is by no means the only topic discussed. Berkeley's valuable discussions of prejudice and opinion, use of testimonies, and attack on free-thinkers are also opportunities of philosophical research.

education has the general goal of placing morally good and religious notions into the minds of children because these notions are the most influential to support virtue and curb vice. These early notions are the deepest notions a person has, and they are the principles by which she acts throughout her life. Since the duty of the magistrate is to govern the people and guide their acts to beneficial situations for the State, which are virtuous acts done by the people, the magistrate has a vested interest in the religious and moral notions of the people. Consequently, the magistrate must understand her duty as encompassing the function of ensuring that good religious and moral notions are instilled and nourished in those under her governance (D 1-37, pp. 201-212).

38. What is at issue in *Discourse* is the need to improve the State by improving the actions of its people. This is accomplished by improving the notions a person has. Berkeley focuses on the fact that religion and morality have a foundational role in the actions of a given person, and so have influence over a given people and State. By calling attention to their role, virtuous actions should be encouraged at the most fundamental level of a person, viz. in her notions and principles.³³ In this way, *Discourse* is remedial.

39. As the call to bring about better religious and moral foundations in *Prevention* and the general intention of propagating religious and moral values of the Bermuda scheme had been less successful than Berkeley hoped, he now turns his sights on the magistrates to aid in the same goal of increasing reverence for religion and morality. Berkeley believes it is the duty of magistrates to care for the religious and moral notions of people, and the practical way of nourishing those notions is through education. The magistrate must feel the point of contact between the State and the religion and morality of its people, and as he argues in *Prevention*, the State is reliant upon the religion and morality of its people for its flourishing or demise. Those who attempt to undermine religion and morality are enemies of the State, and these enemies appear as the free-thinkers, who Berkeley believes to be sceptics, atheists, and practitioners of irreligion. Therefore, the State and the 1710 Design share the same enemies.

³³ The link to *Principles* Part 1 and *Three Dialogues* becomes clear. As the intention of these two publications is the removal of false and harmful notions that are sceptical, atheistic, and irreligious, and the implementation of true notions that destroy scepticism, atheism, and irreligion, they form Berkeley's positive answer to what the magistrate might ask of Berkeley: what notions, exactly, should be taught? The republication of these texts in 1734, only four years before *Discourse*, keep Berkeley's answers fresh in the public's view. While their impact was minimal at the time of original publication, Berkeley gives the magistrates reasons to seek out his answers. This is not to say *Discourse* is designed to sell copies of Berkeley's previous publications; rather, *Discourse* is designed to show non-philosophers why Berkeley's earlier publications are important; i.e. they answer the next logical question the magistrate will have.

40. Berkeley does not stop with *Discourse* in his efforts to improve the State. While in the effort to bring about better reverence for religion and morality Berkeley makes a public appeal in *Prevention*, attempts to found a seminary in *Proposal* for the betterment of missionaries overseas, and attempts to employ the magistrates in *Discourse*, there is a final group to which Berkeley applies for aid: the Catholics of Ireland.³⁴

41. *Word to the Wise* discusses the relation between religion, industry, and interest, as introduced in *Prevention*. At issue is the overwhelmingly pitiful state of poverty found in Ireland at the time. *Word to the Wise* is an appeal to the Catholic clergy to encourage industry in the Irish Catholics who are poor. In encouraging industry, Berkeley argues many benefits will result: those who are poor are lifted from their poverty not by means of a gift easily spent, but by a principle that perpetually aids in their lives; the clergy themselves better perform their religious duties of helping those in need, and their superiors look favourably upon them; and Ireland as a State improves because its workforce increases, becomes more efficient, and has more opportunities for employment.³⁵ While greater attention is given to how industry improves the poor and the clergy, Berkeley still discusses the benefits to the State. As religious matters are bound up with civil matters, they affect each other. Berkeley has already propounded the advantages of industry in *Prevention* and in *Querist*, and now he focuses on the advantages for the individual and clergy. Therefore, while Jessop recommends reading *Word to the Wise* in close conjunction with *Querist*, it must be added the text should also be read in close conjunction with *Prevention*.³⁶

Section 3: Economic Writings

42. The economic writings of Berkeley enjoy comparatively more scholarly attention than many of the other remedial texts and themes discussed in this chapter. While *Querist* generally remains in the ‘minor publications’ category, there is at least a full book devoted to Berkeley’s economics,³⁷ various chapters in collected essay editions,³⁸ and even a suggestion of understanding the text as the major record of Berkeley’s efforts during his time at Cloyne.³⁹

³⁴ Leyburn, while discussing *Querist* and its importance to Berkeley between 1734 and 1750, highlights Berkeley’s attitudinal change towards Catholics during this period. The change is from being “venomous” to one of more respect. Cf. Leyburn (1937), pp. 93-94

³⁵ These last benefits of industry are echoes from *Prevention*.

³⁶ Cf. *Works*, vol. VI, p. 233

³⁷ Johnston (1970)

³⁸ Kelly (1992a); Kelly (2005)

³⁹ Leyburn (1937), pp. 76-77

As the focus of scholarship increases on Berkeley's economic writings, so too the divergent views. Perhaps this is a natural consequence of the query style, whatever its advantages.⁴⁰ Regardless, many Berkeleyan scholars take *Querist* to contain positive views and claims, aided by *Prevention* and other remedial texts.⁴¹ By interpreting the economic writings as making positive claims, their function as remedial texts becomes clear.

Berkeleyan Basics of Economics

43. Many Berkeleyan scholars working on Berkeley's economic writings give some view of what is at the core of Berkeley's economics. Leyburn claims the "idea that a busy people is a happy one lies at the heart of his whole [economic] plan for the salvation of Ireland" (Leyburn, 1937, p. 80). Hutchison holds Berkeley's economic programme was "built upwards out of particular practical proposals suggested by the closely-observed problems around him, [rather] than deduced downwards from a set of formulae or generalisations," wherein Berkeley "[introduces] almost as a by-product the minimum of theory and analysis necessary for supporting and explaining his programme" (Hutchison, 1953, p. 53). Johnston believes "it is impossible to give a coherent account of [Berkeley's] monetary philosophy without bringing in the essential principles of his social philosophy" (Johnston, 1970, p. 72). Kelly finds the core of Berkeley's argument contained in the first forty queries, and summarises fourteen propositions needed in understanding Berkeley's economics (Kelly, 1986, pp. 15-16; restated 1992a, pp. 109-112). Additionally, Kelly holds that "the main premiss on which *The Querist* rests is that of a profound difference between the Irish economy and those more prosperous countries" (Kelly, 1986, p. 14).

Be all of this at it may, there are elements in which the scholars agree.

44. First, Berkeley's economic writings are for the sake of promoting action in the Irish people. In line with Berkeley's political and moral efforts, industry plays a key role in economics as the means of improvement for the Irish economy. Berkeley mentions industry in the "Advertisement by the Author" as a reason for "meddling out of my profession". Indeed, there are almost one hundred mentions of industry between the economic writings: in 76

⁴⁰ Cp. Leyburn (1937), pp. 77-78; Hutchison (1953), p. 53; Kelly (2005), pp. 341-342

⁴¹ For alternative views, cf. Leyburn (1937), pp. 79-80; Hutchison (1953), p. 53

queries, in 12 of the omitted queries, in *Letter on the Project of a National Bank* as an advantage, and in query 10 of *The Irish Patriot*.⁴²

45. Second, at least *Querist*, *Letter on the Project of a National Bank*, *The Irish Patriot*, and *Prevention* contain Berkeley's economics. The incorporation of these four texts achieves the work of presenting a unified economic view. Many Berkeleyan scholars present a different narrative based on their own interpretation, but they agree these texts contain important pieces of evidence for Berkeley's economics.

46. Third, the economic, social, and political conditions leading up to the publication of *Querist* are crucial to understanding much of the content of that text, and the omissions and alterations to the subsequent editions of *Querist* evidence changes in the Irish socio-political-economic climate between editions. Leyburn introduced and inspired other Berkeleyan scholars to research the exact conditions of Ireland leading up to the publication of *Querist*.⁴³ The greatest example of this is Johnston, who claims a proper understanding of Berkeley's economic view is impossible without an understanding of the conditions of Ireland leading up to and during the time of the publication of *Querist*.⁴⁴ Kelly agrees, and many of his publications incorporate these conditions.⁴⁵

47. Fourth, Berkeley takes a vastly different turn in his conclusions for Ireland than Swift: Berkeley holds a more positive view of Ireland's prospects and the cooperation to be had from England. Swift seeks the promotion of Ireland at the cost of England, viz. Ireland's gain is England's loss. It is generally agreed Berkeley does not hold such hostility towards England. Indeed, many of the queries suggest a mutually beneficial cooperation between England and Ireland. Also, England saw editions of *Querist* in 1737, 1750, 1751, and 1752, most of them concurrent with new editions in Ireland. This suggests Berkeley wants English

⁴² Queries: 3, 5, 6, 8, 11, 20, 21, 26, 30, 31, 35, 36, 38, 40, 43, 44, 46, 47, 57, 63, 70, 107, 110, 119, 128, 201, 217, 218, 228-230, 236, 238, 241, 250, 253, 254, 272, 281, 290, 295, 305, 311, 312, 314, 338, 354-356, 360, 369, 375, 378, 395, 403, 415, 416, 424, 437, 448, 460, 480, 487, 494, 511, 521, 528, 547, 553, 554, 560, and 563-567. Omitted queries from part one: 241, 256, and 267. Omitted queries from part two: 111, 128, 129, and 198. Omitted queries from part three: 68, 106, 235, 270, and 299.

⁴³ Leyburn (1937)

⁴⁴ Johnston (1970), p. 8: "The fact is that the full significance of the social philosophy contained in *The Querist* can only be grasped by one who is familiar with the national and social environment in which it was written... in order to bring out the full significance of *The Querist* the present writer [Johnston] has found it necessary to undertake considerable investigations into eighteenth-century Irish economic history, and especially the history of Irish currency conditions."

⁴⁵ Kelly (1986); Kelly (1992a); Kelly (1992b); Kelly (2005).

eyes and Irish eyes to read the same content at the same time, and both to see how England and Ireland could cooperate to be mutually beneficial to both nations.

48. Fifth, Berkeley advocates a paper currency and a national bank for the sake of stimulating the Irish economy. The move away from precious metals (however far Berkeley does move away from them) is rooted in Berkeley's conceptions of wealth, money, industry, and the relation between them.⁴⁶ Berkeley had experience of paper currency from his time in America, but his general economic view suggests he would have advocated a paper currency regardless of this experience. This is difficult to prove because it is hypothetical. What is not hypothetical is Berkeley's commitment to, and arguments for, Ireland's adoption of a paper currency. In order to issue this paper currency, Berkeley supports a national bank owned entirely by the State. Berkeley is wary of vice and private interest. He expresses concerns in his theoretical framework in *Passive Obedience*, and the South Sea Bubble only confirms what he already thinks to be the case. A national bank only functions properly if it is owned and operated by the State.

49. Sixth, Berkeley in *Querist* wants to severely limit foreign trade because of the effects of luxury on the morals and industry of the Irish gentry, and because the exportation-importation trends are such that the basic necessities of life for the general Irish population are not being met. The exportation-importation trend in Ireland is one such that frivolous luxuries are imported into Ireland while resources for the necessities of life are exported. With the high poverty rate and unemployment of the Irish peasants, the trend needs to be inverted so as to secure the basic necessities of the Irish people. To this end, Berkeley is sceptical of the trend he finds in Ireland, and advocates a more closed economy. The necessities of life need attention first, without which any exportation cannot reasonably be maintained. How much foreign trade Berkeley allows once Ireland has inverted its exportation-importation trend is debated among scholars, but they agree that Berkeley seeks to aid the conditions of the peasants, viz. improving their living conditions and employment rates, and of the gentry, viz. revising their appetites toward non-luxurious items producible in Ireland.

50. Finally, Berkeley believes it is the State's responsibility to promote proper industry by stimulating proper appetite, supplying an appropriate quantity of circulating currency, and legislating to these ends. As the gentry composes the Irish legislature, Berkeley thinks it necessary to modify their appetites away from luxurious goods requiring import to native goods

⁴⁶ There is debate on the possible mercantilism of Berkeley. Cp. Johnston (1970), p. 84; Kelly (1986), p. 14; etc.

produced domestically. As the Irish peasants depend on the gentry's appetites both for employment and for inspiration of their own appetites, educating the gentry to the real nature of wealth, power, and money, along with reinstating a proper reverence for religion, morality, frugality, public spirit, and industry, is crucial.

Active Economics

51. The various suggestions by Berkeleyan scholars on what is at the core of Berkeley's economics are held to be harmonious in my interpretation. Berkeley's economics are tied and presented with his views on morality and politics. *Querist* concerns the nature of wealth and money, but also industry, political aim and policy, and social improvement. Economics is just one more avenue in which the power of industry manifests itself and offers its benefits. When industry is appropriately directed, improvement naturally occurs in whatever area that industry focuses. This thought is expressed throughout the remedial texts, and that expression links the economic writings to the other remedial texts.

52. Industry in itself is necessary but not sufficient for prosperity. Industry must be directed toward proper ends, which morality and religion accomplish. Berkeley is aware people can be very industrious and not work, and his view on gambling is an example. Therefore, Leyburn's comment above⁴⁷ must be taken in the appropriate way. It is not simply that a busy people is a happy people because this is ambiguous. What Leyburn meant, and surely what Berkeley means, is a busy people working towards appropriate goals in the appropriate ways is a prosperous and happy people. A proper understanding of the nature of wealth and money contribute to formulating appropriate goals on both the individual and national levels. So too, morality and religion help formulate the appropriate means of industry. Finally, a people can appear happy, regardless of prosperity. The Irish peasants of Berkeley's time appear happy in their dirt and idleness. Those who gamble and spend fortunes on luxurious exports also appear happy. However, they are not prosperous, so their happiness is doomed to end in a ruinous way. Prosperity, properly attained, offers lasting and increasing happiness because the wants and needs of a person are finite. Once the basic needs and necessities of life are met and luxurious appetites dispelled, further natural pleasures become available. With the correct foundation of a proper understanding of wealth, money, fashion, and industry, and with the State promoting positive policies that guard against luxury and vice, even more economic prosperity is attainable. This increase is still fixed by the proper circulation of the monetary

⁴⁷ Cf. Ch. 3.43

medium and the bounds of morality, religion, and industry, but the glory of past civilisations are attainable to every State, even one in such a low situation as Ireland in the 1730s. Such an accomplishment, however, is a slow process, checked at each moment by virtue and proper understanding.

53. Having an economic theory without showing its applicability is repulsive to Berkeley. One way to generate a theory is to have a need for a theory, and one way to have a need for a theory is to have specific problems that need to be solved. Whether or not Berkeley used a ‘bottom-up’ approach to economics need not concern us, and indeed it may ultimately be a matter of taste which interpretation a scholar prefers. What is more important is Berkeley has both the theoretical framework and the ability to suggest its application to real concerns and problems. Ireland definitely did have peculiar conditions that separated its economic history and immediate economic prospects from other countries, and the work of Berkeleyan scholars to enumerate these conditions should not go unnoticed.⁴⁸ Therefore, the specific solutions to Irish problems were of immediate concern. However, Berkeley also has a distinct method of applying a theory to specific problems. His consistency within the remedial texts indicates Berkeley to be working from the same theory, and applying that theory to matters of public spirit, politics, education, and economics; so too for his thoughts on vision, metaphysics, epistemology, language, natural philosophy, morality, and mathematics.

Section 4: Medicinal Writings

54. Perhaps the use of the term ‘remedial’ is most easily understood with Berkeley’s medicinal writings. Berkeley’s tar-water writings were his most popular in his lifetime, and it is interesting how history unfolds. The writings which gained Berkeley great notoriety are often the ones Berkeleyan scholars (with the progression of medicine and the medicinal profession) now ignore, separate, or relegate. In some sense, this is inevitable due to the nature of these writings: tar-water has lost its edge as a remedy of any real importance with the progression of medicine and the medical profession. However, this would not have bothered Berkeley: in much the same way as Berkeley accepts the calculus but rejects its method due to logical inconsistencies, so too Berkeley would accept tar-water’s eventual defeat in the wake of better alternatives. Berkeley offers the best remedy he has access to at the time, but Berkeley is never as inconsistent as to reject a better alternative if presented with viable evidence and

⁴⁸ E.g. Hutchison (1953), pp. 55-58; Johnston (1970), esp. Ch. 2, 4, 6, 10, and 11; Kelly (1986), pp. 8-14; Kelly (1992a); Kelly (2005), pp. 344-346

experimentation. In this way, his calls for error from Clarke and others with his immaterialism⁴⁹ are consistent with his offering tar-water as a possible panacea.

Tar-Water Writings

55. Berkeley's writings on tar-water are contained in the beginning portion of *Siris*,⁵⁰ *Three Letters to Thomas Prior, A Letter to Dr Hales*, and *Farther Thoughts on Tar-Water*.⁵¹

56. The beginning portion of *Siris* discusses how to make and administer tar-water (S 1, 3); the various ailments tar-water cures (S 2, 4-6, 58-119); the production of tar (S 10-17), resin (S 18-19), turpentine (S 20), and the best trees to obtain them (S 24-26); builds an analogy between plants and animals (S 29-39); and offers a theory of plant juices and how tar-water operates (S 7-9, 40-57). These sections account for the popularity of *Siris* in Berkeley's lifetime, although they now are mainly ignored by Berkeley scholars.

57. The various letters to Prior and Hales and *Farther Thoughts on Tar-Water* have reoccurring themes. One theme deals with Berkeley's defence of using tar-water.⁵² Another theme is clarifying the method of preparation and administration.⁵³ A third theme is tar-water's use against the plague and with livestock.⁵⁴ Another theme is Berkeley's call for further experimentation with tar-water.⁵⁵ A final theme is offering various case studies.⁵⁶ Each of these texts and themes are supplemental to the beginning portion of *Siris*.

Tar-Water Scholarship

58. For the Berkeleyan scholar who either holds Berkeleyanism is merely immaterialism or holds Academic Berkeleyanism, Berkeley's involvement with tar-water is either ignored⁵⁷ or uneasily discussed.⁵⁸ Those scholars who have a purely academic intention

⁴⁹ Cf. Letter 19, 21, 22, 24, 27, 28, 32, etc.

⁵⁰ Cf. Ch.2 fn. 110

⁵¹ These are contained in *Works*, vol. V.

⁵² 1LP ¶¶7, 14, 15, 21; 2LP ¶¶12, 13, 17, 18; 3LP ¶¶5-7, 15, 35 (pp. 191, 193, 198); FTTW ¶53 (p. 217)

⁵³ 1LP ¶¶2-6, 8, 9, 18, 19; 2LP ¶¶2-5, 8, 12, 14, 15; 3LP ¶¶8-12, 18-34 (pp. 191-192, 194-198); LH ¶¶1-2 (p. 203); FTTW ¶¶3-9, 13-19, 22-24, 26-30, 32-35, 39-44, 47-52, 56-59, 61-63, 65 (pp. 207-208, 208-210, 211, 211-212, 212-213, 214-215, 215-217, 218, 219).

⁵⁴ 3LP ¶1ff; LH ¶1ff

⁵⁵ 1LP ¶¶10, 13; LH ¶6 (p. 204); FTTW ¶¶20, 21, 43 (pp. 210, 215)

⁵⁶ 1LP ¶¶13, 19, 20, 23; 2LP ¶¶12, 14-16, 18; 3LP ¶¶7, 10-12, 19 (pp. 192, 194); FTTW ¶¶7-9, 17, 31, 42, 54, 55, 60 (pp. 207-208, 209, 212, 214-215, 217-219)

⁵⁷ Tipton, in the midst of giving a rousing example of the Minor Publications Hypothesis, says, "It is not surprising, then, that Berkeley's last major work, published in 1744 when he was just fifty-nine, is almost completely ignored. The title alone is enough to put any philosopher off..." Tipton (1969), p. 203.

⁵⁸ This uneasiness is perhaps best articulated by Holtzman, who begins an article on *Siris* with "Berkeley's *Siris* is a strange little book" (Holtzman, 2011, p. 473). Cp. Bell (1933), p. 630; Luce (1936a), p. 197; etc.

in investigating Berkeley ignore the most famous part of his corpus in Berkeley's own lifetime.⁵⁹ The beginning portion of *Siris* seems simply beside the point of academic investigation.⁶⁰ Other scholars focus on the middle portion of *Siris*, and use it for their debates on Berkeley's view on natural philosophy. Still other scholars focus on the middle and late portions of *Siris* in their discussions on the issue of the unity of Berkeley's philosophy. Some scholars make a salutatory nod to the opening portion of *Siris*, and to Berkeley's letters to Prior and Hales, as being in some way relevant to Berkeley's view in *Siris*.

59. It is the biographers, or those Berkeleyan scholars doing biography at a particular moment, who are mainly attracted to the beginning portion of *Siris* and Berkeley's letters to Prior and Hales.⁶¹ This is for one of two reasons. First, they are recounting the bare biographical facts of Berkeley's life. Herein, the scholar is simply 'going through the motions' to give a recounting of Berkeley's life.⁶² Second, they are building an argument dealing with chronology and influence. The main discussion here traditionally has been the origin of influence of tar-water on Berkeley, and thereby the order of events dealing with experimentation. The traditional view, now out of fashion among Berkeleyan scholars, is Berkeley learned of tar-water and its effects while in Rhode Island.⁶³ However, Tipton has called this view into question, offering at least two alternatives for the source of Berkeley's information of tar-water: from an article in *Gentleman's Magazine* in 1739 or indirectly from William Byrd.⁶⁴ The *Gentleman's Magazine* alternative has appealed to most scholars.

60. The popularisation of tar-water and the ensuing controversy tie to the discussion of the beginning portion of *Siris*. As to the impact *Siris* had on the general public, it was the beginning portion of *Siris* that was reprinted and widely distributed; i.e. the sections dealing with tar-water as a remedy to physical ailments that received the most immediate public attention. The reprinting, paraphrasing, or discussions on these sections form the evidence for tar-water's popularity immediately following the publication of *Siris*. The tar-water

⁵⁹ Cf. Breuninger (2009), ¶2: "For philosophers concerned with Berkeley's legacy *Siris* is rarely mentioned as anything other than a curiosity: yet during his own life, his call for the use of tar-water was extraordinarily popular and helped cement his reputation as 'the good bishop'."

⁶⁰ This has led Nicolson and Rousseau (1970), p. 110 to remark: "Among those who seemed to forget that *Siris* was a philosophical rather than a medical work was its author".

⁶¹ However, cp. Holtzman (2011), p. 481, who gives a view of the importance of the beginning portion *for* Berkeley: "The chief contribution of the first third of *Siris*, as Berkeley sees it, is the discovery of the proper 'menstruum' for tar."

⁶² Cp. Sampson (1897); Hone and Rossi (1931); Luce (1949); Turbayne (1965); etc.

⁶³ E.g. Bell (1933), p. 629; *Works*, vol. V, p. v; Brayton (1954), p. 4; etc.

⁶⁴ Tipton (1969), pp. 210-211

warehouses, the call for case studies of its use, and the reprinting of the content of *Siris* all fuelled discussion on the beginning portion of *Siris*.⁶⁵ Berkeleyan scholars now tend to focus on the ensuing controversy because that controversy is in more scholastic terms and offers a wealth of information for their own interpretations.⁶⁶

Active Medicine

61. The situation described by Tipton is now no longer applicable.⁶⁷ Interest in *Siris* has increased steadily over the decades since Tipton's article, but this interest has remained either in the middle or late portions.⁶⁸ Active Berkeleyanism ignores nothing from Berkeley. Indeed, Berkeley's tar-water writings form a crucial part of the remedial texts under discussion here.

62. The remedial nature of the tar-water writings is obvious because the tar-water writings are remedies in a natural sense of the term. They are an effort to help cure the sicknesses of the body, and so are medicinal in nature. The immediate context for Berkeley's tar-water writings are the horrible conditions in Ireland in the late 1730s and early 1740s. In this way, Berkeley is responding to immediate conditions by experimentation with, reflection on, and administration of tar-water. He collects his findings and publishes the beginning portion of *Siris* as a result. He defends his *suspicion* that tar-water is a panacea,⁶⁹ as carefully defined

⁶⁵ Cf. Nicolson and Rousseau (1970), pp. 107-116, 128-137

⁶⁶ Cp. Bell (1933), pp. 630-632; Tipton (1969), pp. 204, 218, 220-221; Nicolson and Rousseau (1970), pp. 116-128; Benjamin (1990), pp. 176-184; Breuninger (2009), ¶10-13; etc.

⁶⁷ Cf. Ch. 3. fn. 57

⁶⁸ The middle portion on natural philosophy is discussed in Ch. 2.36-39. The late portion is discussed in Ch. 4.55-68. Examples are plentiful. E.g. Benjamin (1970); Breuninger (2009); Holtzman (2011); etc.

⁶⁹ Berkeleyan scholars are apt to note Berkeley's careful definition of a panacea, but they fail to realise the care of his claim about tar-water as a panacea. I quote the appropriate paragraphs of the *First Letter to Thomas Prior* (11-13, 20, 22): "Now, to speak out, and give this objection [that tar-water promises too much, and that it is a panacea] or question a direct answer, I freely own that I *suspect* tar-water is a panacea. *I may be mistaken, but it is worth trial*: for the chance of so great and general a benefit, I am willing to stand the ridicule of proposing it... Having thus frankly owned the charge, I must explain to you that by a panacea is not meant a medicine which cures all individuals (this consists not with morality), but a medicine that cures or relieves all different species of distempers...neither will I undertake to demonstrate a priori that tar-water is a panacea. But yet methinks I am not quite destitute of *probable* reasons, which, joined to what facts I have observed, induced me to entertain such a *suspicion*...Howbeit, those theories, as I said, enlarged my views of this medicine, led me to a greater variety of trials, and thereby engendered and nourished my *suspicion* that it is a panacea. I have been the more prolix in these particulars, hoping that, to as many as shall candidly weigh and consider them, the high *opinion* I conceive of this medicine will not seem altogether an effect of vain prepossession, or blind empiric rashness, but rather the result of free thought and inquiry, and grounded on my best reason, judgment, and experience... *as for tar-water in particular, I do not say it is a panacea, I only suspect it to be so*" (my emphasis throughout). Berkeley is *not* claiming tar-water is a panacea. Berkeley is claiming he is suspicious that tar-water *could be* a panacea. He forms his suspicion based on theory, reason, experience, experimentation, and judgment. What Berkeley calls for is further experimentation and honest, open discussion as to the possibility. If it turns out tar-water is a panacea, then its availability and inexpensiveness should help to alleviate many illnesses in many cases, as long as proper preparation and administration occur. If it turns out tar-water is not a panacea, this

by him in his *First Letter to Prior*, and he draws further possible applications of tar-water to sicknesses in people and animals.

Section 5: Interconnectivity of the Remedial Texts

63. The remedial texts herein discussed are linked by more than their remedial nature. They span over Berkeley's entire career, through the so-called Heroic Period, Middle Years, and his life at Cloyne. While such a division of Berkeley's life is helpful in some instances, the remedial texts do much to show such a division should not be taken rigidly.⁷⁰

64. Public spirit remains a constant interest throughout Berkeley's life. These texts on public spirit are meant to improve the common benefit of humankind. Each text rests upon the belief that our true private interests are bound with common interest, which is properly set by religion and morality. By the use of religion and morality, the State is directed toward proper ends. Sometimes these ends are primarily religious and moral; other times they are primarily political and practical. Regardless, the energies of people must be set toward the improvement of each other for the sake of the natural pleasures of this life and for the sake of the rewards in the afterlife. This is the public spiritedness Berkeley addresses specifically in *Prevention*, and it is a strong undercurrent for the other remedial texts.

65. The political spectrum of the State is also a constant motivation for Berkeley. *Prevention* concerns saving the State and warns against political parties.⁷¹ *Proposal* looks to

discovery furthers the general progression of medical knowledge. (In this way, a link is formed with Berkeley's requests to Clarke for errors in his immaterialism.) When understood, Berkeley's work in the letters to Prior and Hales, and his *Farther Thoughts on Tar-Water*, make sense. The question under this particular investigation for Berkeley is tar-water's practical use and applications, regardless of what else *Siris* contains. He does not forget *Siris* is a philosophical work, but he is focused on the practical application and real possibility tar-water might be a panacea. He believes it is his moral and Christian duty to offer it and face possible ridicule because the possibility of a true panacea is worth such ridicule. Therefore, the view expressed by Nicolson and Rousseau (Ch. 3. fn. 60) is rejected. What Berkeley does not want is to be ridiculed away by those who lack the proper theoretical basis, who have poor reasoning and judgment, who have not experimented with tar-water, or who simply dismiss out-of-hand anything that is proposed as a panacea. The letters and *Farther Thoughts on Tar-Water* are written in response to this ridicule.

⁷⁰ Cf. Ch. 5.35-38

⁷¹ The stance taken by Benjamin, while interesting and of some merit, is too extreme. She claims, "As a High Churchman and Tory, Berkeley was deeply opposed to what he saw as the natural-theological consequences of a Newtonian materialism, which had become allied to the Whiggery and, in his opinion infidelity, of the Latitudinarian Low Church" (Benjamin, 1990, pp. 166-167). While the High Church and Tories probably did oppose the natural-theological consequences of Newtonian materialism (which might have been a plank in the Whig platform, many of whom could have been Latitudinarians), and also while Berkeley did oppose those same consequences (as Benjamin argues persuasively), it does not follow Berkeley is a Tory. Indeed, his biographers often stress how he is friends with, and accepted by, Whigs and Tories alike. Hutchinson claims Berkeley is "essentially a middle-of-the-road moderate" (Hutchinson, 1953, p. 76). Berkeley's stance on

aid the State by administering education to certain colonies and fend off war with the natives. *Querist* involves suggestions for improving the administration of the monetary and commercial aspects of the State, although the moral aspects are discussed constantly in the form of rejecting luxury and providing the necessaries of life. *Siris* has also been taken as a political text.⁷²

66. Through all of these remedial texts, Berkeley believes the improvement of the people of a State will improve the State itself. This must be done on the fundamental levels of (i) instilling proper religion and morals, (ii) giving them the appropriate education, (iii) being loyal to the State over and above being loyal to a particular political party, (iv) providing the infrastructure of a State with the tools to succeed in the proper knowledge of money, wealth, and trade, and (v) providing the State's citizens, which are also its workforce, with good conditions of life. Industry is crucial for all of these levels, and Berkeley pushes industry in all of these remedial texts. Medicine is seen as keeping the citizens, and thereby the workforce, healthy and productive, and tar-water also is applied to live-stock to fight off famine and disease. Berkeley believes the issues of religion, morality, pedagogy, politics, economics, and medicine are interrelated: focusing only on a part of the overall issue does not fully help to perfect the State, which is appointed by God and wherein man must live before the future state.

67. The Minor Publications Hypothesis stands as the final bulwark against uniting these remedial texts with each other and with Berkeley's other texts. Regarding the remedial texts themselves, the Minor Publications Hypothesis claims these texts are separated by style, aim, content, audience, and scope. *Querist*, for example, stands apart from the other remedial texts because of its query style, wherein Berkeley must be doing something different from his other texts; and *Advice to the Tories* and the *1745 Letter to the Roman Catholics* have different scopes and audiences, and so we must not link them together; *Passive Obedience* is for a congregation and the *Guardian* essays for the general public; etc.

68. There is sufficient reason to severely doubt this hypothesis. It does more harm than good. It limits Berkeleyan scholars and fragments Berkeley. It makes different Berkeleys, disjointed in fundamental ways. The Berkeley of 1709, labouring over his earliest texts, is not the same Berkeley some decade later but labouring in the same buildings in Trinity College, who is gathering support for a proposal on Bermuda. The books on Berkeley's bookshelves

political parties, their aims, and their consequences, is stated in *Prevention* (PRGB 38, pp. 81-82). It does not appear to me Berkeley ever deviates from this view in theory or practice.

⁷² Cf. Anonymous (1744); Benjamin (1990)

stay, but their owner undergoes vast alterations to the point of non-recognition. All of this is absurd, and Active Berkeleyanism attempts to expose it as such.

Section 6: Applicability of the Remedial Publications

Scope of the Remedial Texts

69. If Active Berkeleyanism is an accepted method, an immediate consequence is that the remedial texts have a greater scope of application than previously supposed. Under a narrower view, one might claim *Prevention* aims solely at the English, *Passive Obedience* solely at Anglicans, *Advice to Tories* solely at Tories, *Querist* solely at the Irish gentry, and *Siris* solely at natural philosophers and physicians. This is incorrect. Active Berkeleyanism holds Berkeley always aims at the widest possible audience, and there are reasons and evidence for this claim.

70. First, Berkeley does not believe only England (or Great Britain) is founded on religious and moral elements. Rather, these elements form the basis of every State. This explains his final comments on the possible lifecycle of the State.⁷³ In a similar way, converting the Native Americans to the Church of England is his method of aiding their inclusion under Great Britain, but this process of missionary work was happening for Catholics, too. Provided Berkeley knows some European history,⁷⁴ he would also know of Muslims from previous centuries, and he would also have the Bible as proof of the importance of religious conversion in a given State. The nature of religion and morality form the foundations and directions of every State, not only Britain and Ireland.

71. Second, as Berkeley believes Christianity is the true religion, all Christians are bound to loyalty. His view of passive obedience is not directed solely at Irishmen, but it holds in every Christian State because passive obedience is a law of God. The advice to the Tories is applicable to everyone within a Christian State. Education is a religious enterprise, so education necessarily requires religion and morality. Loyalty must be part of education, and education should teach proper loyalty.

72. Third, Berkeley's economics are not limited to Ireland. It would be absurd for someone to think Berkeley holds there is an Irish nature of wealth and money, and this Irish nature of wealth and money is different from any other country's nature of wealth and money.

⁷³ PRGB 49, p. 85

⁷⁴ Cf. Aaron (1932b) for a discussion of Berkeley's library; cf. Berman (1989) vol. 2, pp. 469-516

His views are meant to be applicable to all nations. Yes, Berkeley handles specific Irish problems because they are of immediate concern, but the theoretical underpinnings or outcomes are widely applicable. *Querist* offers, or at least hints at, a procedure for improving the economy of any State. His views on bullion and the belief in the proper understanding of money, wealth, and industry, are not limited to Ireland. Berkeley publishes *Querist* in England at the same time as in Ireland, and while these two nations are the ones primarily under investigation, it is unnecessary to think Berkeley restricts the text to these two nations alone.

73. Fourth, tar-water is not meant to be a possible panacea for only the Irish. The success of *Siris* proves Berkeley meant tar-water to be a cure for all humankind. This possible cure is also not kept secret solely for the Anglicans for fear of curing Catholics. Not long after the publication of *Siris*, Berkeley works with the Roman Catholics of Cloyne on improving Ireland. This toleration and cooperation of the 1740s demonstrates a general attitude of Berkeley. While Berkeley suggests kidnapping natives in *Proposal*, his interest in the Native Americans of Rhode Island indicates the suggestion in *Proposal* is exaggerated by scholarship. If the exaggerated view were true, one would expect Berkeley to fortify himself and his property against those who either threaten him or who would be victims of kidnapping; yet, Berkeley does none of these things. One receives the impression Berkeley, if he had made a second journey to America after the publication of *Siris*, would have educated the Native Americans on how to better prepare and administer tar-water, while at the same time attempting missionary work to convert them to Christianity.

74. Finally, Berkeley has his publications distributed to a wider audience and not simply to those citizens of a particular nation. True, Berkeley's immediate concern is to whatever audience he is addressing, but when the more general nature of the remedial publications are taken into account, Berkeley remains relevant today. He has a theory of morality, and views on natural philosophy, mathematics, economics, politics, and medicinal matters that stretch beyond the immediate scope of a given text. Tar-water is still used. Most nations have a national bank, etc.

Connectivity with the 1710 Design

75. Many of the publications discussed in Chapters 1 and 2 of this dissertation are assumed by Berkeleyan scholars to be more theoretical in nature, although Berkeley is at pains to stress their practicality. Some of the remedial texts of this chapter are more obviously practical, but Berkeley is at pains to demonstrate their theoretical basis. While the emphasis

between the remedial texts and the philosophical publications may differ, this does not mean they are unrelated. Looking at the corpus of texts discussed in these first three chapters of this dissertation indicates the genius of Berkeley: he diversifies his industry in a variety of different ways. His audience changes, his topic of discussion changes, and his style of delivery changes; however, his goal is always the same. That goal is the general aim of the 1710 Design: to give his audience a proper understanding of themselves, and their relations to each other, the world, and God.

76. The true interest of people is that of the public interest. Berkeley believes free-thinkers, atheists, deists, etc. damage public interest. He directs his industry to correct the wrongs done. It is the free-thinkers, the atheists, the deists, and the sceptics who look to attack the State, religion, and morality. They strike their blows at the very foundation of reality that God gives. Distrust of the senses, belief in philosophical matter, the attacks on morality, clergy, and religion, and the general belief that private interests outweigh public interests are all products of these dangerous people.

77. The efforts of scholars to unify parts of Berkeley has taken Berkeleyan scholarship a portion of the way. Luce never tired of defending Berkeley's unity. Luce's argument, based on the anti-abstractionism from what he took to be Berkeley's 'major' publications, is just one thread of a chord yet to be fully realised.⁷⁵ Leyburn attempts to centre *Querist* as the pivotal work of the Cloyne period.⁷⁶ Holtzman attempts to show *Siris* is the eventuality of the work done in the early stages of Berkeley's philosophical career.⁷⁷ Young points to all of the occurrences of Berkeley's attack on free-thinkers.⁷⁸ The list goes on and on. Each attempt, each thread, paves the way toward a unified Berkeley beyond the narrow limitations accidentally imposed by scholars of yesteryear. Active Berkeleyanism shows scholars the work done by its various participants, and unites together these seemingly unrelated efforts.

78. We have a duty to public interest. That duty stems from our duty to the State, which is ordained by God. We have a duty to the State because we have a duty to religion and morality. Ultimately, our duty to each other in the State, and as one State to another State, comes from our duty to the world. The world, created by God, is ordered such that the laws of nature are discoverable. These laws of nature instruct us on what can be done and what ought to be done.

⁷⁵ Luce (1934a), Ch. 8

⁷⁶ Leyburn (1937)

⁷⁷ Holtzman (2009)

⁷⁸ Young (1985)

But we discover the laws of nature from experience, which comes from our proper use of the senses and rational faculties. Our sensations come from God, and our rational faculties link us to ourselves and other spirits. To hold private interest above public interest is to begin a chain reaction down to the most fundamental level of humanity and reality. Our ills are the products of our making. God offers clues to correct ourselves. Berkeley believes he has discovered some of these clues. As such, Berkeley's works are remedial.

Chapter 4: The Religious Writings

Introduction

1. In the previous chapters, I argue for a new interpretation of Berkeley's 1710 Design, understanding that Design both as a series of planned publications and as a methodology. The planned publications encompass a variety of fields of study ranging from metaphysics, religion, morality, natural philosophy, and mathematics. In addition to the publications typically handled by Berkeleyan scholars, I argue against the Minor Publications Hypothesis and for the inclusion of the remedial publications under the 1710 Design. There remains a final category of Berkeley's corpus: his religious writings. These writings include his sermons ([Section 1](#)), *Alciphron* ([Section 2](#)), his episcopal writings ([Section 3](#)), and the later portion of *Siris* ([Section 4](#)). This chapter aims to subsume Berkeley's religious writings under the 1710 Design. This aim completes the task of subsuming Berkeley's corpus under the 1710 Design, thereby uniting each text under the general aim of assisting his audience to a proper understanding of themselves, each other, the world, and God.

2. To accomplish this task, I investigate Berkeley's religious writings by highlighting two important themes that link the writings together with each other and with the 1710 Design: the apologetic nature of many of Berkeley's religious writings, and an eschatological element.¹ Berkeley defends Christianity, and usually the Church of England, from various opponents. This apologetic nature connects the religious writings together and with the 1710 Design. His religious writings, especially his sermons, also involve Christian salvation.

Some Previous Scholarship on the Religious Writings

3. Berkeleyan scholarship has made excellent advances regarding the religious writings of Berkeley. One can easily trace lines of interest in scholarship regarding Berkeley and religion. One such line of interest in Berkeleyan scholarship is evident in the monographic publications that combine Berkeley's biography with interpretations of his philosophy.² This

¹ Cp. Jessop (1966); Brykman (1982) for discussions on the importance of apologetics in understanding Berkeleyanism.

² This is not the only place to find discussions on Berkeley and religion. There are a number of books, articles, and chapters throughout the secondary literature. For Berkeley's arguments for God and His attributes, cp. Mabbott (1931); Hurlbutt (1957); Sillem (1957); Myerscough (1961); Bennett (1965); Levine (1987); Ayers (1987); Atherton (1995); Daniel (2001a); Stoneham (2002), pp. 153-62; Botterill (2007); Ksenjek and Flage (2012); Frankel (2012); Hunter (2015); etc. For discussion on Berkeley's Divine Visual Language Argument, cp. Creery (1972); Hooker (1982); Kline (1987); Danaher (2002); etc. For discussion on the use of analogy, cp.

line of interest has notable characteristics: first, each scholar understands Berkeley's religious writings as crucially important in interpreting Berkeley's philosophy; second, each scholar seeks to identify the influential thinkers on Berkeley's religious views. This line of interest originates in Johnston's monograph, and manifests itself in a continual line in the monographs of Hone and Rossi, Hicks, Luce, and Berman.

4. Johnston argues Berkeley must be considered as a philosopher of religion. Johnston devotes an entire chapter at the end of his monograph to this task.³ He begins by rightly claiming that in Berkeley's eyes "all speculation of an interpretative and critical kind is alike philosophy, irrespective of the particular subject-matter" (Johnston, 1923, p. 319). Johnston argues Berkeley has many of the marks of a philosopher of religion,⁴ and he believes Berkeley's religious views are a product of the times.⁵ This naturally leads into a discussion about analogical knowledge and a comparison to Browne.⁶ Johnston ends his chapter by discussing Berkeley's arguments for the existence of God, the immortality of the soul, and the meaning of faith.⁷ Regarding religious influence, Johnston claims the "new experimental philosophy of mind and nature of Newton and Locke, and [the] great religious controversy between orthodoxy and deism" influence Berkeley (ibid, p. 14). Johnston concludes by discussing Toland's and Browne's responses in highlighting the fact that when Berkeley entered Trinity College free-thinking was still a subject of debate and controversy.⁸

5. Hone and Rossi locate Berkeley's doctrines of Divine Visual Language and his general language theory as support for Berkeley's religious views. These scholars also devote an entire chapter to the task.⁹ They understand Berkeley to find the grounds of rational belief in his early philosophy, viz. the Divine Visual Language is the basis for a demonstration of

O'Higgins (1976); Daniel (2011); etc. For the debate concerning mysteries and Berkeley's theory of meaning and language, cp. Kohlenberg (1973); Belfrage (1985); McKim (1985); Belfrage (1986a); Belfrage (1986b); Berman (1986); Belfrage (1987a), Editor's Commentary; Stewart (1989/90); Duddy (1999); Jakapi (2002); Jakapi (2007); Williford and Jakapi (2009); etc. For discussion on archetypes and divine ideas, cp. Brykman (1987); Ayers (1987); Daniel (2001b); etc. For discussion on how religion affects Berkeley's moral theory, cf. Hayry and Hayry (1994). For the application of immaterialism, especially Berkeley's version, on various aspects of Christianity, cp. Byrne (1984); Eaton (1987); Spiegel (1996); Cates (1997); Hight (2007); Hight (2010); Hight and Bohannon (2010); Spiegel (2017); etc.

³ Johnston (1923), Ch. 7

⁴ Ibid, pp. 321-325

⁵ Ibid, pp. 321-322, 325-342

⁶ Ibid, pp. 342-345

⁷ Ibid, pp. 349-359

⁸ Ibid, p. 15

⁹ Hone and Rossi (1931), Ch. 10

God's existence.¹⁰ However, even when Berkeley demonstrates God against atheism and the theories of Browne and King, this is only the deistical position. Hone and Rossi believe Berkeley must demonstrate revelation and the rights of the Church, and they understand Berkeley's views on language are of the utmost importance in this regard. They highlight the fact that words must always be used in a significant sense for Berkeley, so a person may believe any doctrine of religion if she finds it revealed, provided the doctrine makes a proper impression on her mind.¹¹ For Hone and Rossi, they focus on King and Browne as probable influences on Berkeley's religious writings.¹²

6. Hicks also devotes an entire chapter to Berkeley's moral and religious views.¹³ For Hicks, Berkeley desires to distinguish faith from knowledge; however, Hicks understands Berkeley to nowhere state in what precisely Berkeley takes the distinction to consist.¹⁴ Hicks claims "faith is the acceptance of something as true which cannot be logically proved to be true, the mental attitude of being, a state of assured conviction, far stronger than that of mere opinion" (Hicks, 1932, p. 194). He interprets Berkeley as holding that if we seek to logically justify such a conviction, we are thrown back upon probable reasoning. Faith is not a mere passive acceptance of certain doctrines, but rather it is essentially a phase of our active nature.¹⁵ So, he concludes Berkeley is unable to draw a rigid distinction between faith and knowledge: faith is essentially involved in all the fields of study of natural philosophy because it deals with probabilities. Hicks understands the aim of knowledge for Berkeley as practical, wherein the true end of natural philosophy, reason, and faith is an active operative nature tending to a conceived good.¹⁶ Finally, he interprets Berkeley as recognising the incompleteness of human knowledge concerning God, but maintaining the trustworthiness of that knowledge.¹⁷ Regarding possible influences on Berkeley, Hicks sees Berkeley reacting to the negative theology of King and Browne.¹⁸

7. Luce furthers the connection between Berkeley's philosophy and religion, claiming "for Berkeley's theism is inseparable from his ideism, as concave from convex" (Luce, 1934a,

¹⁰ Ibid, pp. 168, 170

¹¹ Ibid, pp. 170-173

¹² Ibid, pp. 18-20

¹³ Hicks (1932), P. II, Ch. 6

¹⁴ Ibid, p. 194; cp. Hurlbutt (1957)

¹⁵ Hicks (1932), p.195; cp. Griffiths (1859), pp. 26, 34, 37-39

¹⁶ Hicks (1932), pp. 196-197

¹⁷ Ibid, p. 200

¹⁸ Ibid, p. 201

p. 119). For him, Berkeley expounds his religious views along with his doctrine of ideas in *Principles* Part 1, which teaches what God is rather than what ideas are.¹⁹ For Luce, “Berkeleyianism is a philosophy of God, not of mind alone... it is a religious philosophy, as Berkeley’s was a philosopher’s religion... his published writings, his correspondence, his private notebooks, his public and private life all prove his absolute genuineness and unswerving conviction” (ibid, p. 120). Luce is primarily concerned with Berkeley’s view on the knowledge of God, which Luce understands to partake of three elements: the intelligent study of “idea-things” with the unavoidable inference to some other spirit; the attentive consideration of certain qualities of value in things; and the attention to the meaning and import of the attributes as they appear in rational theology. He concludes “Berkeley’s ideism is theological realism,” (ibid, p. 125) with its basis not as mind but deity. For Luce, Berkeley can be understood in relation to Malebranche, among others.

8. Finally, Berman focuses heavily on the religious aspects of Berkeley’s thought. He discusses natural or rational theology and the passivity and continuity arguments,²⁰ the immortality of the soul,²¹ various sermons and preaching style,²² and the theme of St. Paul’s. After these preliminary discussions, he also devotes an entire chapter to Berkeley and religion.²³ Herein, he discusses the proof of God’s existence in *Alciphron*, Divine Visual Language, and Berkeley’s emotive theory. He links much of Berkeley’s religious writings via the water image.²⁴ Berman is also interested in providing examples of religious influence on Berkeley. For Berman, the Irish influences of Toland, King, Browne, and Molyneux are especially important.²⁵

Section 1: Sermons

9. Berkeley’s sermons span across his entire adult life. They are perhaps one way of pinpointing the subtle maturation in Berkeley’s motivations, and are a great support for interpretations of unity within Berkeley. Yet, Berkeley’s sermons are often overlooked or

¹⁹ Luce (1934a), p. 119

²⁰ Berman (1994), pp. 45-52

²¹ Ibid, pp. 58-70

²² Ibid, pp. 80-81, 103

²³ Ibid, Ch. 6

²⁴ Ibid, pp. 171-173

²⁵ Ibid, pp. 9-17

handled in a haphazard way.²⁶ The sermons require further study in their own right. However, here the purpose is to show the interconnectivity between the sermons and link these sermons to the 1710 Design. That interconnectivity lies in the Christian notion of salvation. Salvation is at the heart of every sermon of Berkeley. It pervades and guides each sermon. For Berkeley, salvation has a number of features, each crucial to the proper understanding and obtainment of salvation. In his sermons, there are a number of interrelated features of salvation discussed throughout all of the sermons.

Eschatological Interconnectivity between the Sermons

10. The first feature of salvation addressed in Berkeley's sermons is the need for salvation. Christians are in a special place with regard to salvation, one which the Gentiles and Jews do not share. The Gentiles and Jews are generally unable to attain salvation, although their knowledge and method aids them. Both the Gentiles and Jews are able to gain some idea of Providence, God, resurrection, the future state, and the method by which to attain salvation, but they lack the key component: Christ.²⁷ The Gentiles, guided by the 'light of nature', know of a deity and that this deity should be worshipped by virtuous acts.²⁸ They have a metaphysical knowledge of God, considering Him in His absolute essence or nature, but they lack the saving knowledge of God, which salvation requires.²⁹ This saving knowledge comes from Christ. The Gentiles are further aware of the depraved condition of human nature, but they lack the knowledge both of how man has come into this condition and how to be delivered from it.³⁰ The 'light of nature' also partially informs Gentiles of resurrection and a future state, albeit that notion is imperfect.³¹ As such, the Gentiles do not know what the eternal life is or how to come to it.³² They have some conception of virtue and its importance, but they are unable to direct those virtuous acts to their proper end, thereby wasting their efforts.³³ While the Gentiles use the 'light of nature' as their guide, the Jews have their Law to guide them. The Jewish Law, like the 'light of nature', ultimately fails to complete the knowledge necessary for salvation. This is because they lack Christ. The Jewish Law is not designed to be perfect, nor applicable

²⁶ Clark (2005) is an example of the latter. He selects from the sermons certain passages out of context and runs the risk of misunderstanding or misrepresenting Berkeley. Bracken (1965) warns against this methodology. I take Bracken's warning to apply to all of Berkeley's texts, not simply to his earlier publications.

²⁷ Sermon VIII: Eternal Life, pp. 109-113; cp. Griffiths (1859), pp. 24-27

²⁸ Sermon I: Immortality p. 10; Sermon V: Notes for Sermons at Newport (Sermon 1), p. 54

²⁹ Sermon IX: Propagation of the Gospel, p. 116; cp. Griffiths (1859), pp. 24-27, 33-34, 36-39

³⁰ Sermon VI: Mystery of Godliness, p. 86

³¹ Sermon VIII: Eternal Life, pp. 106-109

³² Sermon IX: Propagation of the Gospel, p. 115

³³ Sermon V: Notes for Sermons at Newport (Sermon 1), p. 55

to the whole world, nor to last forever.³⁴ The Jewish religion is a religion of legal justice, not saving grace.³⁵ Like the Gentiles, their notion of a future state and resurrection is imperfect, and they fail to grasp the true method and proper end of virtuous acts.

11. However, simply because Christians have the saving grace of Christianity through Christ, it does not follow that every Christian is saved. There are important features the Christian must partake in to be in a worthy position of salvation. One difficulty for Christians, along with Gentiles and Jews, is the distraction of the present state and a lack of thought or concern for the future state. This is the conclusion reached in Berkeley's first sermon, and he touches upon its theme in subsequent sermons.³⁶ People believe their lives to be long, but in actuality life is very brief.³⁷ The distractions of the mortal state delays regard and concern for the future state.³⁸ The pursuit of self-interest hampers the pursuit and concern of virtue, which assist in securing the future state.³⁹ The effects of fashion influence people into desiring things in the mortal state, and these pursuits negatively influence the propagation of a future state.⁴⁰

12. Berkeley understands salvation as involving a kind of perfection of human nature.⁴¹ This perfecting of human nature includes a turning away from self-interest and a turning towards public interest. God has not created the souls of people merely for the mortal life, but also for the eternal life.⁴² It is only when the soul is turned to the future state that she begins to place herself in a position to receive the saving grace.⁴³ This turning is complex, as it involves first an inward transformation of the soul and then an outward production of that transformation. While Berkeley holds the orthodox Anglican view that justification for salvation is by faith alone, he understands salvation to require virtuous activity and proper knowledge because the mark of the saving faith is good works.⁴⁴ With regard to virtuous activity, Berkeley places heavy emphasis on charity and the other virtues.⁴⁵ With regard to

³⁴ Ibid, p. 54

³⁵ Sermon V: Notes for Sermons at Newport (Sermon 5), p. 64

³⁶ Sermon I: Immortality, pp. 13-14; Sermon VIII: Eternal Life, p. 109; cp. Ch. 5.5-7

³⁷ Sermon I: Immortality, pp. 13-14; Sermon V: Notes for Sermons at Newport (Sermon 9), p. 73

³⁸ Sermon I: Immortality, pp. 13-14

³⁹ Sermon V: Notes for Sermon at Newport (Sermon 13), pp. 81-82

⁴⁰ Sermon IX: Propagation of the Gospel, p. 123. Interestingly, Mandeville makes similar claims in his response to *Alciphron*. Cf. Mandeville (1732)

⁴¹ Sermon I: Immortality, p. 12

⁴² Sermon IX: Propagation of the Gospel, p. 114

⁴³ Griffiths (1859), pp. 38, 48

⁴⁴ Cf. Ch. 5.11-13

⁴⁵ Sermon III: Charity

knowledge, Berkeley sees zeal as a key component. Each of these elements follow the teachings of Christianity.

13. Salvation requires following Christ. Following Christ means following His preaching and His example.⁴⁶ All of Christ's preaching and examples give the necessary knowledge of God and our relation to Him, and they give the appropriate way of living to attain salvation.⁴⁷ The uncharitable acts stemming from improper self-love and private interest characterise the world before Christ.⁴⁸ Yet the Gospel and Epistles have the constant themes of love and charity, which procure our true happiness.⁴⁹ It is only in following Christ's example and preaching that Christians can become worthy of receiving salvation.

14. Living a virtuous life (and specifically a charitable life) follows Christ's example. Virtue depends on free agency, so there must be an active acceptance of virtue and aversion to vice.⁵⁰ Directing our free agency towards virtue is the inward change necessary for salvation. When we inwardly change our pursuits from self-interest to public interest, we become proper Christians. Interest and duty go together, and Berkeley believes it is personal interest that breaks apart the world.⁵¹ Charity and virtue are their own rewards, and they are rewarded by God in the future state and in the present state.⁵² Living virtuously also is in accordance with Christ's teaching⁵³ and the ancients' teachings.⁵⁴ It accords with God's will.⁵⁵ As God is the common Father to everyone, it cannot be His intention that each of us promote our own private interest to the wrong or damage of others; rather such conduct and behaviour that tends to promote the general well-being of humankind is the most acceptable to God.⁵⁶

15. It is insufficient merely to lead a virtuous life.⁵⁷ We must also have proper zeal to accompany our actions. Zeal, for Berkeley, is as important as charity. They are two sides of the same eschatological coin. The saving knowledge of God is inseparable from the knowledge

⁴⁶ Sermon IV: Mission of Christ, pp. 45-46

⁴⁷ Ibid, p. 45; cf. Ch. 5.5-13

⁴⁸ Ibid, pp. 40-44

⁴⁹ Sermon III: Charity, p. 27

⁵⁰ Sermon I: Immortality, pp. 10-11, 14; Sermon II: Religious Zeal, p. 17

⁵¹ Sermon III: Charity, pp. 33-34

⁵² Sermon III: Charity, pp. 29, 32, 34, 37

⁵³ Sermon V: Notes For Sermons at Newport (Sermon 13), pp. 81-82

⁵⁴ Sermon VIII: Eternal Life, pp. 109-113

⁵⁵ Sermon X: Will of God, pp. 132, 136-137

⁵⁶ Sermon X: Will of God, pp. 132, 135, 137

⁵⁷ This is true in two senses. First, a virtuous life without lively faith are dead good works. Cf. Ch. 5.6-7. The second sense is the discussion in this paragraph.

and practice of His will.⁵⁸ Zeal has three parts: the object, the principle, and the degree. The objects of zeal must not be directed against persons but things, but those things must be rated by Christianity according to their tendency to promote salvation. Therefore, the true objects of zeal are virtue, praise of good works, faith, and the church's institutions and traditions.⁵⁹ Bad principles of prejudice and self-interest found spurious zeal, while the true principles of knowledge, love of God, and benevolence towards men (public interest) found proper religious zeal.⁶⁰ The degree of zeal is also important. We must be most zealous towards virtuous works, then towards our faith, and finally to the church's institutions and traditions.⁶¹ Having this proper knowledge and outlook aids in performing truly virtuous acts, as the knowledge helps turn the soul away from private interest and towards public interest.

16. There are noticeable effects of this inward change of soul. Real charity, and not simply the outward appearance of charity, occurs.⁶² Faith and repentance are inward turns, and so real faith and real repentance occur only when the soul is properly turned to God and the future state.⁶³ Worship, too, is inward.⁶⁴ Berkeley goes as far as to say the true members of the Christian Church are those Christians that have this inward change.⁶⁵ This is because piety has an inward purity of heart.⁶⁶ Salvation requires all of these aspects of religious life.

17. Finally, in living a truly Christian life, we imitate and perform the will of God. Christ omitted no instance of love and goodness for humankind.⁶⁷ Christ formed the Christian Church for the orderly submission to God's will.⁶⁸ So, the Christian Church endeavours to conform their lives and actions to God's will.⁶⁹ If we consider the weakness of people, we are too imperfect to be governed by our own wills.⁷⁰ As it is necessary that civil actions and natural motions are governed by an over-ruling principle or law that directs them to their proper ends, it is no less necessary to the wellbeing of the whole world that the moral actions of humankind

⁵⁸ Sermon IX: Propagation of the Gospel, p. 116

⁵⁹ Sermon II: Religious Zeal, pp. 17-20

⁶⁰ Sermon II: Religious Zeal, pp. 20-22

⁶¹ Sermon II: Religious Zeal, pp. 22-23

⁶² Sermon III: Charity, pp. 28, 30; cf. Ch. 5.6-7

⁶³ Sermon V: Notes for Sermons at Newport (Sermon 5), p. 64; cp. Ch. 5.5-7

⁶⁴ Sermon V: Notes for Sermons at Newport (Sermon 1), pp. 54-55; (Sermon 3), p. 58

⁶⁵ Sermon VI: Mystery of Godliness, pp. 89-90

⁶⁶ Sermon VI: Mystery of Godliness, p. 90

⁶⁷ Sermon IV: Mission of Christ, p. 46; cp. Griffiths (1859), pp. 64-65

⁶⁸ Sermon V: Notes for Sermons at Newport (Sermon 5), p. 64; (Sermon 8), pp. 71-72

⁶⁹ Sermon VI: Mystery of Godliness, p. 87

⁷⁰ Sermon X: Will of God, pp. 130-131, 134

be conformed to God's will.⁷¹ Finally, as we are His creatures and He as Creator has infinite power, wisdom, and goodness, it is right to conform to His will.⁷²

18. Therefore, if the Christian realises her special place among the people of the world; if she focuses on the future state and does not become distracted with the present state; if she accepts virtue and lives an appropriately virtuous life; if she is charitable and properly zealous; if she truly changes her soul towards public interest and God and away from vice and self-interest; if she follows the preaching and example of Christ; if she imitates and performs God's will – if she does all these things, she places herself in the best possible position for salvation. As salvation includes the perfecting of her nature, she is ready for the future state.

Interconnectivity with the 1710 Design

19. One could establish the sermons' interconnectivity with the 1710 Design by noting every instance of direct or indirect reference to the texts already subsumed under the 1710 Design. However, such a process would be tedious and, perhaps in many instances of indirect reference, controversial. Instead, if one holds firmly in view the general aim of the 1710 Design (viz. the proper knowledge of self, each other, the world, and God), then demonstrating the interconnectivity of the sermons with the 1710 Design becomes an easy task.

20. Much of the content of the sermons focuses on improving the individual spirit. Berkeley mainly discusses this improvement in terms of inward change in the soul. Perhaps paradoxically, the inward change of soul occurs when self-interest is no longer pursued and public interest is the goal. In a similar way in the remedial texts, the pursuit of public interest aids proper private interest. Vice is the result of extreme self-love originating in a purely self-interested way, while virtue is the result of self-love originating in a publicly interested way. The advantage of the religious backdrop in the sermons is the constant reference to Christ as an example of how to live our lives. Christ's example is one directed towards public interest, and Christ demonstrates His inward purity, piety, and virtuousness by His pursuit of public interest. Our ultimate end is salvation, which involves the perfecting of our soul. This perfection enables the rewards of the future state, which is where we should ultimately direct all of our free agency. Therefore when we focus our interest towards the public and live

⁷¹ Sermon X: Will of God, pp. 130-132

⁷² Sermon X; Will of God, p. 132

virtuously and charitably with the proper zeal, we are in a position to gain the rewards of that lifestyle.

21. Intricately related to the improvement of the individual spirit, Berkeley also says much about how to treat others. The public interest aspect of his sermons, Berkeley believes, naturally flows into virtuous acts towards others. Among Christians, we should seek to imitate Christ for our own benefit, but such an imitation has a positive effect on others, whether by easing any suffering they might experience or in bringing them closer to what Christianity means. Berkeley states this in strong terms: vice and uncharitable acts characterised the world before Christ, and it is vice that breaks apart the world. His sermons can be understood as furthering the attempt to heal the effects of vice, self-interest, etc. Propagation and conversion are also key elements in many of Berkeley's sermons. The Christian must demonstrate the superiority of Christianity for her own sake and for the sake of others: by demonstrating the superiority of Christianity for her own sake, she exemplifies Christ's teaching and prepares herself for the future state; by demonstrating the superiority of Christianity for another's sake, she persuades them of the true religion and assists the other person in beginning the process of their own salvation.

22. Berkeley does not disparage the present state when he argues our attention should be focused on the future state. This is inconsistent with what he claims elsewhere. The present state and the world in which we live are our opportunities to overcome the depraved condition of our human nature and prepare ourselves for the future state.⁷³ The world is our opportunity to demonstrate the power of virtue, charity, zeal, and our inward acceptance of conforming our lives and agency to God's will. We must use the world and not abuse it. We can properly use the world by understanding its laws, and directing our actions and those of others to living in accordance with these laws.

23. Finally, the proper knowledge of God is essential in the sermons' messages. Many of the Gentiles and the Jews are unable to attain salvation precisely because they lack the proper knowledge of God. Berkeley freely admits they have some knowledge of God, but they lack the key component: the saving knowledge of God from Christ. This saving knowledge allows

⁷³ An aspect of this overcoming and our ability to overcome is a theme in the later portion of *Siris*. There, the focus is primarily on knowledge and truth, and secondarily on virtue and practice. In the sermons, the focus is from the other direction, viz. primarily on virtue and practice, and secondarily on knowledge and truth. As with many such occurrences in Berkeley, he is not inconsistent, but merely showing the relationship from the point of view of each relata. Cp. Griffiths (1859), pp. 57-65

us to understand God not as some distant deity, but as always close at hand.⁷⁴ His will is in the world, and it moves the world. Our habitation in our present state prepares us for our habitation in the future state, wherein we are rewarded or punished. Understanding God's love, wisdom, and goodness are crucial in living properly in the present state. That we have a 'light of nature' demonstrates we are prepared to accept the saving knowledge; that we have the example of the Jewish Law also shows us our propensity for salvation and God's concern for us. We must come to understand God through the world and most importantly through Christ.⁷⁵ Believing in Christianity, therefore, is essential to salvation, and believing in Christianity in part means having the proper knowledge of God.

Section 2: Alciphron

24. Subsuming *Alciphron* under the 1710 Design is accomplished most easily by understanding the general themes of the publication. *Alciphron* enjoys a more privileged place in scholarship than Berkeley's sermons and his episcopal writings. When investigating *Alciphron*, Berkeleyan scholars generally focus on some single aspect or feature from the text. These investigations include Berkeley's attack on Mandeville and Shaftesbury,⁷⁶ his use of Divine Language to establish a proof for the existence of God,⁷⁷ his use of divine analogy,⁷⁸ and his comparison of scientific terms and religiously mysterious terms.⁷⁹ While all these investigations and other investigations attempting to illuminate Berkeley's philosophy of religion are productive and beneficial, the purpose of this section is different. My interpretation argues the general aim of the 1710 Design is to promote proper knowledge of finite spirits, the world, and God. This is done with a certain methodology distinct to Berkeley. The content and the methodology combine to give Berkeley's apology against atheists. In what follows in this section, various links to these kinds of proper knowledge and methodology are advanced with the purpose of subsuming the text under the 1710 Design.

⁷⁴ Berkeley addresses the possibilities for God's relation to the world in the later portion of *Siris*. He investigates the view that God is considered as a part of the universe, and the view that God is distinct from the universe. In both views, Berkeley finds no grounds for atheism, although his orthodoxy tends to the later view.

⁷⁵ This is where, I believe, the discussion and use of the ancient philosophers in *Siris* is limited. It completes the former, but fails in the later. Both must work in conjunction, and both are necessary, but not sufficient, for salvation.

⁷⁶ E.g. Jaffro (2007)

⁷⁷ Cf. Ch. 4. fn. 2

⁷⁸ Cf. Ch. 4. fn. 2

⁷⁹ Cf. Ch. 4. fn. 2

Common Targets

25. *Alciphron* shares its targets with other publications of the 1710 Design. Those targets are sceptics and atheists. Here, atheists take centre stage in Berkeley's attack. The atheist under investigation is the modern free-thinker, eventually dubbed 'minute philosopher'.⁸⁰ The Christian clergy oppose the minute philosophers because minute philosophers both progress towards atheism and attempt to convert others to atheism.⁸¹ The Christian dialectical opponents to the minute-thinking characters in *Alciphron* seek first to understand what makes a minute philosopher and what their grounds for morality are.⁸² Once the moral grounds of the minute philosophers are found to be untenable, the opponents offer and defend Christianity as the proper grounding for morality.⁸³ Finally, the opponents to minute philosophy argue minute philosophers are sceptics.⁸⁴ In *Alciphron*, Berkeley reverses his usual order of approach with regard to sceptics and atheists: previously, Berkeley focuses on scepticism and infers atheism, whereas now he focuses on atheism and infers scepticism. Berkeley's general aim is to demonstrate the relation between scepticism and atheism from both directions, and *Alciphron* links the relation between atheists and sceptics in the opposite direction than that argued in *Principles* Part 1 and *Three Dialogues*.

Living with Each Other

26. A cornerstone of the proper knowledge of finite spirits is the issue of how finite spirits should live together. This is the foundation of the State. Berkeley makes numerous claims both before and after *Alciphron* that religion and morality are the foundations for every State.⁸⁵ While in these other publications Berkeley merely asserts this claim, in *Alciphron* he defends and argues at length for it. The minute philosophers are shown to have everything wrong, and their erroneous outlook is dangerous to the State. While they mostly agree in their atheism, they do not agree on the grounds for morality.⁸⁶ Berkeley investigates two very

⁸⁰ A.I.10

⁸¹ A.I.3, 6, 8

⁸² A.I-III

⁸³ A.IV-VI

⁸⁴ A.VII.22-26

⁸⁵ Ch. 3.17-20, 23, 25-27, 32, 37-41, 64, 66, 70-71, 76, 78

⁸⁶ The first half of the Fourth Dialogue (A.IV.1-15) deals with *Alciphron* and the specific charge of atheism.

Lysicles is noticeably absent from the proceedings. He makes his introduction to begin a different discussion on the sense of the term 'God' (A.IV.16-25). Lysicles is hesitant in allowing the term, but believes allowing the use of the term is of small consequence (*Works*, vol. III, p. 163). While Berkeley believes this is still a form of atheism, one might think the allowance of the term, even in an insignificant sense, enough to avoid the charge of atheism.

different options offered by the minute philosophers: morality based on vice, and morality based on beauty.⁸⁷ Each is rejected in turn, and Berkeley argues the true grounds of morality must come from religion. The minute philosophers' atheism bars them from establishing a proper moral grounding. As minute philosophers lack religion and a proper grounding of morality, their outlook cannot be a proper foundation of the State and becomes detrimental to the State.

27. Berkeley also discusses other aspects of the 1710 Design. For example, Lysicles' argument for the economic advantages of vice as the proper moral grounds is contrary to Berkeley's views on economics and public spiritedness. Lysicles' view emphasises private interest, and de-emphasises industry and frugality of manners.⁸⁸ The focus on gaming, drunkenness, etc. is antipodal to *Prevention* and the other remedial publications. The economic view offered by Lysicles cannot be a productive or sustainable economics for a State.

28. The minute philosophers also ridicule loyalty.⁸⁹ In their hands, loyalty becomes something to ridicule, not cherish. But loyalty binds the people to their State, and Berkeley offers subtle hints that the minute philosophers seek not only to dissolve religion, but also civil government. As Berkeley believes religion and morality are the foundation of a State and loyalty to that State binds its people together, the minute philosophers utterly fail in offering a viable option. Instead, Berkeley portrays them as enemies to religion, morality, and the State.

29. The failings of the minute philosophers stem from a core misunderstanding: they are essentially creatures of private interest. Vice and a love for beauty are unacceptable grounds to found morality in part because they are inherently interested in self-love. It does not matter if the private interest comes out in a more debased or elevated manner.⁹⁰ Because there is a foundational misunderstanding in minute philosophers, even their most attractive claims fail. Berkeley is quick to dismiss one of the most attractive ones: liberty. Liberty, it is concluded, is a fine thing, and under the banner of 'free-thinking' the minute philosophers gain converts. But liberty cuts both ways.⁹¹ However, Berkeley moves away from such a term as 'free-thinking'

⁸⁷ A.II-III. Berkeley received responses immediately following the publication of *Alciphron*. Cf. Anonymous (1732); Hervey (1732); Hoadley (1732); Mandeville (1732).

⁸⁸ A.II.2, 13

⁸⁹ A.I.7, 12, II.21, VI.4

⁹⁰ *Works* gives a brief description of the Second and Third Dialogues. The Second Dialogue states "examination of the utility of free-thinking, as represented at its lowest, namely as egoistic freedom from rational and moral restraints." The Third Dialogue states "examination of the utility of free-thinking, as represented at its highest, namely, as the disinterested love of virtue, as altruism without religion." *Works*, vol. III, p. 16

⁹¹ A.II.26; A.III.12; A.V.34; A.VII.30; etc.

because it does not accurately denote the views of his opponents. Berkeley also stresses the fact the free-thinkers are no more liberated from prejudice than anyone else; in fact, Berkeley argues how deeply rooted and harmful their contradictory view of prejudice runs within them.⁹² Whatever might be gained by the use of free-thinking is lost when it is argued such people actually lack any real freedom and their outcomes are unsustainable. This issue for the minute philosophers originates at the deepest level of their private interest.

Understanding the World

30. The characters of *Alciphron* share some common ground about the world. All believe the sensible world to exist, and all place high value on experience. What the reader does not encounter in *Alciphron* is the pyrrhic exasperation of Hylas at the beginning of the Third Dialogue of *Three Dialogues*.⁹³ While it is true *Alciphron* does claim sceptical notions as “the sum and substance, the grand Arcanum and ultimate conclusion of our sect” (*Works*, vol. III, p. 321), the discussion is focused on the existence of God and the certainty and utility of Christianity.

31. Where the minute philosophers differ from the Christians is in their general approach to the world. Berkeley establishes the difference in the opening section of the First Dialogue of *Alciphron*. The Christians are industrious farmers who balance cultivating the soil with cultivating their minds and souls. Berkeley quickly links the farmer with the philosopher, “two characters not so inconsistent in nature as by custom they seem to be” (*Works*, vol. III, p. 31). Throughout the description of Euphranor, Berkeley plays on the similarity. Euphranor has a good Christian education, he has found a way to make just as much use of his “good collection, chiefly of old books” as his “hundred acres of land”, and his industry as a farmer aids his industry as a philosopher and as a Christian.⁹⁴ Crito also shares these characteristics, although he is less naïve in matters of “that great whirlpool of business, faction, and pleasure, which is called *the world*” (*Works*, vol. III, p. 31). Like Berkeley, the Christians are earlier risers,⁹⁵ avid readers, industrious, and devout. They exemplify a virtuous life, whereby they

⁹² A.IV.13, V. 26; cp. Ch. 5.7-10

⁹³ DHP3 227. Although *Alciphron* does admit to scepticism in A.VII.24-25, there is no exasperation as with Hylas.

⁹⁴ *Works*, vol. III, p. 32

⁹⁵ There is a parallel between *Three Dialogues* and *Alciphron* on this point that has gone unnoticed. Philonous, Euphranor, Dion, and Crito, all good Christians who espouse Berkeley’s views in some form, are early risers, just as Berkeley himself. Cp. DHP1 171; *Works*, vol. III, pp. 33, 141, 286; Letter 4; Stock (1776), p. 13. However, Hylas, Lysicles, and *Alciphron* are typically late risers, and usually found awake early because of some unsettling of mind. Cp. DHP1 171, DHP2 208; *Works*, vol. III, pp. 141, 162, 219, 286.

use the world, not abuse it.⁹⁶ In the Fourth Dialogue, this takes on a religious dimension as the result of Euphranor's view on the Divine Visual Language. However, extending the similarity between the farmer and philosopher, use and not abuse takes on an additional aspect: the Christians do not abuse reason, knowledge, and authority.

32. The minute philosophers, on the other hand, are diametrically opposed to the Christians. Both Alciphron and Lysicles began a good Christian education, but both became enamoured with amusements, pleasure, fashion, and the "polite parts" of the world. Neither character is particularly industrious with either their education or their estate. They abuse the world instead of using it properly. Their claims to the grounding of morality demonstrate their lack of virtue: Lysicles advances vice as the grounds for morality, while Alciphron advances beauty as the grounds for morality as a product of his "splenetic indolence".⁹⁷ Applying the same kind of extension from the similarity between the farmer and the philosopher, the idle minute philosophers use sophistry and ridicule to support their atheism,⁹⁸ and they are unable to withstand the conclusions of their concessions or uphold the conclusions of their assertions. They assert passionately and quickly, but easily tire of investigation.

God and the Power of Christianity

33. The entirety of *Alciphron* is set within the general context of Christian apologetics, so it is no surprise the existence of God, the knowledge of His attributes, the utility of Christianity, and the use of religious terms are the touchstones of scholarly attention. Most Berkeleyan scholars agree *Alciphron* primarily concerns revealed religion, while Berkeley's work in *Principles* Part 1, *Three Dialogues*, and *New Theory of Vision* deal with natural religion.⁹⁹ Yet, the Divine Visual Language is most comprehensibly laid out in the Fourth Dialogue.¹⁰⁰ So, too, is the discussion on the attributes of God.¹⁰¹ It would seem Berkeley believes he must argue in favour of natural religion before he can argue in favour of revealed religion.

34. Much has been made in Berkeleyan scholarship of the Divine Visual Language and its relation to other arguments for God's existence in previous publications.¹⁰² My intention is

⁹⁶ *Works*, vol. III, p. 178; *Works*, vol. VI, p. 74; *Works*, vol. VII, p. 47; etc.; cp. Ch. 5.28-35

⁹⁷ A.II-III

⁹⁸ A.III.15, A.VII.22-24

⁹⁹ E.g. Pearce (2017b)

¹⁰⁰ A.IV.7-13

¹⁰¹ A.IV.16-25

¹⁰² Cf. Ch. 4. fn. 2; Bradatan (2006), Ch. 5; Pearce (2014)

not to recount those discussions. Instead, it is important to recall what happens immediately prior to those sections in the Fourth Dialogue establishing the Divine Visual Language. First, there is disagreement on who bears the onus of argument: Alciphron has taken his parting remark at the end of the Third Dialogue to mean the Christians bear the responsibility, but the Christians understand Alciphron to have that obligation.¹⁰³ This hints at a difference of approach between the two groups of characters: Alciphron demands a certain kind of proof but will not allow others, while the Christians expect to learn some positive doctrine about atheism, as Alciphron himself claims atheism “is the very top and perfection of free-thinking... the grand *arcanum* to which true genius naturally riseth, by a certain climax or gradation of thought, and without which he can never possess his soul in absolute liberty and repose” (*Works*, vol. III, p. 44). It seems Alciphron views atheism as a kind of negative space left when the prejudice of God is removed, but this naturally leaves an emptiness which needs filling. A positive argument for atheism would fulfil such a need, but Alciphron’s earlier attempts have left him unable to produce any argument to support his claims.¹⁰⁴

35. Second, Euphranor advances the Divine Visual Language not as the first, and thereby not as the most important, argument; rather, it is used only when all else fails to convince Alciphron. Note the limitations Alciphron first imposes: he rejects metaphysical arguments “drawn from the idea of an all-perfect being, or the absurdity of an infinite progression of causes” (*Works*, vol. III, p. 142). He also rejects arguments based on authority and arguments “from utility or convenience”. He accepts “anything that may seem irregular or unaccountable in the works of nature, against a cause of infinite power and wisdom... [and] the justice and providence of a supreme Being from the evil that befalls good men, and the prosperity which is often the portion of wicked men in this life” (*ibid.*). Crito and Euphranor take issue with Alciphron’s limitations because they undercut many of the arguments they could have (and probably would have) used. Euphranor highlights the tension between Alciphron’s negative and critical position against the positive arguments requested by saying “to content you *we* must prove, it seems, and we must prove upon your own terms” (*Works*, vol. III, p. 144, emphasis original). Finally, Alciphron gives a positive assertion from which Euphranor can begin: Alciphron requires a proof “as every man of sense requires of a matter

¹⁰³ A.IV.1-3

¹⁰⁴ A.I.9. It is tempting to draw a parallel between the portrayal of negative space and ability of Alciphron and Berkeley’s view on absolute space. Both Alciphron’s view and the doctrine of absolute space are intended to supply some great piece of knowledge, but Berkeley finds both to be non-existent and therefore unable to provide what is required. A further parallel is also suggested between Alciphron’s view that atheism is the point to which the mind rises, whereas in *Principles* Part 1, *Three Dialogues*, and *Siris*, it is God.

of fact, or the existence of any other particular thing” (ibid.). Euphranor then runs an argument involving inferences from sensations to rational causes, first in our own introspective case and then in the case of other finite spirits, and then from other finite spirits to God based on similar sensations and rational causes.¹⁰⁵ It is only when Alciphron is unable to accept this initial proof that the language criterion is introduced, and from it the Divine Visual Language argument.¹⁰⁶

36. Kline takes the Divine Visual Language argument to be Berkeley’s central point of the Fourth Dialogue. I understand Kline to be making a value judgment along with a descriptive acknowledgment that the Divine Visual Language argument is under discussion through the second quarter of the Fourth Dialogue. While Kline appears correct that the Divine Visual Language is Berkeley’s invention¹⁰⁷ and rests on *New Theory of Vision*, it is questionable whether Berkeley himself placed his argument above other possible arguments for God’s existence. My claim here, contrary to Kline, is that the Divine Visual Language argument (while necessary to the Fourth Dialogue) is not the first argument Berkeley would have advanced in other circumstances. Hooker (1982) and Atherton (1995) both suggest the Divine Visual Language argument proceeds without immaterialism. If what is at stake at this point in *Alciphron* is the crucial establishment of the existence of God, then it is reasonable Berkeley would not want to base such a proof solely on his earlier metaphysical claims; rather, Berkeley both demonstrates he has such a new proof to meet these restrictions, while at the same time deferring to other kinds of arguments as perhaps preferable in other circumstances.¹⁰⁸ Berkeley’s Divine Visual Language argument is advanced out of dramatic necessity based on the restrictions of free-thinkers, and not out of Berkeley’s hubris.¹⁰⁹

37. Moving to the discussion with Lysicles on the attributes of God, little needs to be added to the scholarship on this topic.¹¹⁰ Berkeley disagrees with the views of King and

¹⁰⁵ A.IV.4-6.

¹⁰⁶ Cf. Myerscough (1961) for a detailed account of this dialectical progression and its consequences.

¹⁰⁷ Hone and Rossi question this claim. For them, the claim of a visual language as direct revelation of the existence of God is “directly related to the systematic meditations which gave rise to the new science of the seventeenth century” (Hone and Rossi, 1931, p. 180, fn. 1).

¹⁰⁸ Herein is a possible answer to the issue of the relationship between the arguments given in *Principles* Part 1, *Three Dialogues*, and *Alciphron*. Cf. Ch. 4. fn. 2 for a listing of scholars who have written on this topic.

¹⁰⁹ This claim appears to be in tension with Berkeley’s earlier claims, and indeed boasting, of having a new proof for the existence of God. To whatever extent that proof is based on *New Theory of Vision*, he has reason to boast. But when dealing with a specific opponent (e.g. minute philosophers), who is portrayed as constantly shifting in philosophical positions, such a single proof is likely insufficient. If the Passivity argument, the Continuity (Independence) argument, and the Divine Visual Language argument all establish the existence of God, these can be *added to* the already existing arguments from philosophers and theologians. In this respect, I agree with Hunter (2015) and his flotilla model.

¹¹⁰ Cf. Ch. 4. fn. 2

Browne, who have made God's attributes either inconsistent or meaningless. Such a procedure of analogy is unacceptable to Berkeley, and he is at pains in the second half of the Fourth Dialogue to render his account of analogy whereby to free God of the problems levelled by Collins at King and Browne. Berkeley asserts analogy is a mathematical proportion, and as a proportion, the terms must be known. The attributes of God are not different in kind, only in degree. Therefore, we can speak intelligibly about God and His nature, and in so doing avoid Lysicles' view that the term 'God' is allowable but has no real meaning.

38. The transition from natural religion to revealed religion happens at the turn towards the Fifth Dialogue. At the end of the Fourth Dialogue, the conversation turns to the subject of divine worship, which opens the way for a discussion on Christianity.¹¹¹ Many Berkeleyan scholars pass over the Fifth and Sixth Dialogues apparently because they see little philosophical value in them. However, if *Alciphron* is a work in Christian apologetics, then it would seem when Christianity is actually being discussed and defended, it is here that the heart of the publication rests.¹¹² The first four dialogues, I argue, have a key goal of bringing the reader to the important point: "If it be good for us to worship God, it should seem that the Christian Religion, which pretends to teach men the knowledge and worship of God, was of some use and benefit to mankind" (*Works*, vol. III, p. 173).

39. The Fifth Dialogue has key points to this question of worship, utility, and benefit. Among the many topics discussed, Berkeley argues for (i) Christian worship being suitable to God and man;¹¹³ (ii) the excellency and usefulness of Christianity;¹¹⁴ (iii) its ennobling nature;¹¹⁵ (iv) its good effects, like education and the establishment of natural religion;¹¹⁶ (v) factions and war are not effects of Christianity;¹¹⁷ and (vi) the character of the clergy.¹¹⁸ It is

¹¹¹ A.IV.25

¹¹² If length and number of sections of dialogues bear any indication of importance, then the Fifth and Sixth Dialogues are the most important dialogues in *Alciphron*. True, the Second and Seventh Dialogues are close in length to the Fifth Dialogue, but the fewer sections in the former, and the summary nature of the second half of the latter, seem to place them behind the Fifth Dialogue with regard to apologetics. It would be expected, however, that an attack on vice as the grounds for morality would be handled in a more complete fashion because religion, for Berkeley, has as much to do with moral practice as it does with religious doctrine. In this regard, the content of the Second Dialogue must be cleared away before the proper grounds of morality occurs. Cp. Pearce (2018). Also, the first half of the Seventh Dialogue deals directly with Christian mysteries, and is a continuation of the Fifth and Sixth Dialogues.

¹¹³ A.V.2

¹¹⁴ A.V.4

¹¹⁵ A.V.5

¹¹⁶ A.V.11, 23, 25, 29

¹¹⁷ A.V.16

¹¹⁸ A.V.8

beyond my purpose to give exposition of the issues and arguments of these subjects. However, the purpose of the Fifth Dialogue is to argue Christianity offers exactly what is reasonable when it comes to worshipping the God established in the Fourth Dialogue. While Berkeley has shifted from natural religion to revealed religion, he continues to use reason and argument to establish the probability of the Christian religion being the best religion to adhere. In the Fifth Dialogue, the focus is firmly on the moral practice Christianity teaches. This discussion would be further hindered if the characters had reservations as to the grounds of morality; it is the purpose of the Second and Third Dialogues to remove exactly this reservation.

40. Yet for all of this, the minute philosophers have their doubts about Christian doctrine. These doubts and the Christians' replies form the Sixth Dialogue, wherein the subjects of faith, the authority and tradition of the Church, the Bible, divine revelation, and Articles of Christian faith are considered. Whereas the Fifth Dialogue concerns moral practice, the Sixth Dialogue concerns faith and doctrine. Berkeley's apologetics attempt to rationally ground Christianity in both doctrine and practice, which is consistent with his sermons. Exactly what Berkeley means in his discussion of faith and how that might point to Lockean influences remain matters of debate.¹¹⁹ Regardless of that debate, faith remains extremely important when discussing revealed religion, and Berkeley's purpose is to defend Christian doctrine.

41. The Seventh Dialogue, much like the first four dialogues, has received a wealth of scholarly attention primarily because of the nature of Christian mysteries and their relation to terms in natural philosophy. Various views have been offered. Notably, there are Berkeleyan scholars who understand the discussion of Christian mysteries as an expression of Berkeley's earlier emotive theory of language.¹²⁰ Other scholars have challenged this view, opting for a more cognitive interpretation.¹²¹ While this discussion is important, simply acknowledging the fact Berkeley attempts to give some rationalisation to the Christian mysteries is all that is required for the work of apologetics. Berkeley is offering some attempt at comprehending the Christian mysteries, and thereby comprehending what the minute philosophers find to be one of the largest stumbling blocks in accepting Christianity. With the final obstacles discussed, the minute philosophers end their discussions and make their exit.

¹¹⁹ Johnston (1923); cp. Berman (2005); Pearce (2014); cp. Ch. 5.38-40

¹²⁰ Cf. Ch. 4. fn. 2

¹²¹ Cf. Ch. 4. fn. 2. Conversely, Hervey (1732) attacks Berkeley because of Berkeley's supposed rationalisation of religion.

Methodology

42. Berkeleyan scholarship has not failed to see the genius of *Alciphron* in terms of its methodology: Berkeley uses free-thinking strategies in order to secure his premises in his arguments, but he is also able to avoid certain conclusions that would offend Christianity, especially Anglicanism. At the premise level, Berkeley is careful to use propositions his opponents would be willing to accept. For example, some Berkeleyan scholars see Berkeley's initial proof for the existence of God to be founded on Cartesian arguments for the existence of other spirits.¹²² Other scholars point to the use of Collins' critique of King and Browne to make way for Berkeley's own view of divine attributes.¹²³ Pearce notes Berkeley's reliance on Lockean religious epistemology, which the deists and free-thinkers found amenable.¹²⁴ The use of free-thinking and deist arguments in order to gain part of the necessary conclusion is nothing new to Berkeley; his use of Collins and deists' arguments in the Parity argument in *Three Dialogues* is well-known.¹²⁵ Also, Berkeley is apt to use certain sceptical premises to explode scepticism from within.¹²⁶ But taken more generally, Berkeley uses the arguments of his opponents in a religious context in order to defend Christianity. Finally, one Berkeleyan scholar notes the use of free-thinking rhetorical tools against the free-thinkers themselves in order to deliberately influence the reader to choose Christianity.¹²⁷

Section 3: Episcopal Writings

43. Berkeley does not confine his apologetic writings to atheists: he also combats intra-Christian disputes between the Church of England and other denominations, specifically Roman Catholics. There is a noticeable harmony in Berkeley's apologetic approach to Roman Catholics in *Primary Visitation Charge* and the Letter to Sir John James that binds together his writings as bishop of Cloyne. This harmony involves both content and methodology. There is also the eschatological aspect in certain episcopal writings, e.g. *Address at Confirmation*, which binds these episcopal writings to his sermons.

¹²² Hooker (1982); Kline (1987)

¹²³ Daniel (2011); Pearce (2017b)

¹²⁴ Pearce (2014); cp. Pearce (2017b); Johnston (1923), Ch. 1

¹²⁵ DHP3 232-233; cp. Cummins (1982); Pearce (2018); etc.

¹²⁶ Popkin (1951)

¹²⁷ Bradatan (2006), p. 131

Primary Visitation Charge

44. Berkeley establishes his methodology early in his bishopric with *Primary Visitation Charge*. While recognising the population of Roman Catholics outnumbers that of the Protestant Church in Ireland, Berkeley advises a way both to live in harmony with the Roman Catholics and continue the Protestant mission of conversion. Effectively, Berkeley emphasises the common ground between Protestants and Catholics as an opportunity for establishing harmony and conversion. This common ground, viz. “professing faith in the same Saviour”, allows the Protestant clergy to begin rational conversation in order to pry Catholics away from their passions and prejudice of following the Pope.¹²⁸ Berkeley believes Catholics to be mainly passionate believers,¹²⁹ and rational conversation on the general doctrines of morality and religion wherein all Christians agree begins the process of conversion to Protestantism. In order to win upon the Catholics’ affections, Berkeley advises his clergy to be charitable, gentle, obliging, and show a true concern for their interests.¹³⁰

45. This attitude of charity, gentleness, obligation, and showing a true concern for another’s interests is trademark Berkeleian methodology. It is Berkeley’s approach in dealing with matters of loyalty with the Tories, and it is the same methodology in his approach to the 1745 Jacobite Rebellion during his time as bishop of Cloyne.¹³¹ It is also the attitude the protagonists assume in Berkeley’s dialogues, on display in *Three Dialogues* and *Alciphron*.¹³² Berkeley discusses the benefits of such an attitude in his sermons.¹³³ Berkeley is aware early on of the benefits of this approach, as he mentions in his Notebooks.¹³⁴ He does not deviate from this general attitude in his writings, and he is consistent with that attitude in his episcopal writings. It is the same attitude Berkeley adopts in his Letter to Sir John James and in *Word to the Wise*.

¹²⁸ *Works*, vol. VII, p. 161. Berkeley’s view on the need and reasons to convert Catholics unfolds in his episcopal writings. In *Primary Visitation Charge*, the message is to live in harmony with them while slowly unpacking their prejudice and beliefs. It is not until Letter to Sir John James that Berkeley more directly expresses why Catholics might be in error.

¹²⁹ *Works*, vol. VII, p. 162

¹³⁰ *Ibid*, p. 162

¹³¹ Ch. 3.31-35

¹³² This is Euphranor’s general attitude throughout the text. It must be admitted Crito generally is more combative than Euphranor.

¹³³ Cp. esp. Sermon II: Religious Zeal; Sermon III: Charity

¹³⁴ NB 185, 209, 441, 498, 633, 634, 715, etc.

Letter to Sir John James

46. *Alciphron* is a publication on Christian apologetics, designed and intended to combat those who claim support for atheism. Letter to Sir John James is also an apologetic text, but the context is very different from *Alciphron*: in the letter, Berkeley is defending the Church of England against the claims and arguments of Catholics. Some Berkeleian scholars have taken the letter to align with other possibly disparaging remarks Berkeley offers regarding the Catholics around the same time.¹³⁵ However true the view that Berkeley came to hold a different position with regard to the Catholics during his bishopric might be, the content of the letter, especially with regards to apologetics, is of greater concern.¹³⁶

47. Berkeley's main contention is that the individual Christian is in a natural position to judge for herself religious doctrines and practices without the aid of the Pope. For Berkeley, the debate between Sir John and himself is on the question of the Pope's infallibility, and consequently his authority: "It is not simply believing even a Popish tenet or tenets that makes a Papist but believing on the Pope's authority" (*Works*, vol. VII, p. 144). He offers a variety of arguments to undercut the Pope's infallibility, and thereby restrict the Pope's authority.

48. First, Berkeley argues there is no textual evidence in either Scripture or in the early Church Fathers to support the infallibility of the Pope. It is obvious Berkeley finds Scripture and the early Church Fathers as the main source of Christian doctrine,¹³⁷ and he often disparages "the cold and dry writings of our modern Divines" (*Works*, vol. VII, p. 143), which Berkeley blames Rome for their origination. Berkeley mentions Augustine and Basil as evidence. Additionally, there is historical evidence suggesting the infallibility of the Pope is a later invention.¹³⁸ Berkeley mentions the heresies in the early centuries of the Church as evidence that the Pope's expediency was neither known nor considered.¹³⁹

49. Second, Berkeley defends the view that the spirit of God guides all Christians to truth and offsets natural human defects in this pursuit without the assistance of the Pope. The

¹³⁵ Leyburn (1937)

¹³⁶ It is unfortunate the initial letter from Sir John to Berkeley does not survive because it is apparent that letter initiated Berkeley's response. The missing letter would clarify how much Berkeley is responding to arguments given by Sir John, and how much Berkeley is providing additional matters to discuss. Pearce (2014) interprets the letter within a greater religious debate because of possible Lockean religious epistemological claims. This is a plausible interpretation and may help to explain the letter in its current form. But simply taking the letter as responding point by point to thoughts and concerns of Sir John is also plausible. Indeed, Berkeley requests Sir John to number his paragraphs (*Works*, vol. VII, p. 154), which supports the latter interpretation.

¹³⁷ *Works*, vol. VII, p. 144

¹³⁸ *Ibid*, p. 145

¹³⁹ *Ibid*, pp. 145, 148, 152

spirit of God is “an indwelling... an inward light” wherein if the Christian soul is humble, obedient, and has faith then she cannot “fail to see the right way to salvation by that light” (*Works*, vol. VII, p. 145). One knows this inward light by “an inward feeling jointly with the interior as well as exterior λόγος” (ibid.). This inward light governs and leads the Christian by “God’s grace, by the outward light of his written word, by the ancient and Catholic traditions of Christ’s church, by the ordinances of our National Church which we take to consist all and hang together” (*Works*, vol. VII, p. 146). Therefore, the “Christian may know and ought to know the written law of God” (ibid.). Berkeley grants the need for magistrates “to explain and apply” God’s laws, but like civil laws, the private citizen must both avoid transgressing the law and ensure the magistrates themselves do not deviate from the law.

50. This second argument has telling consequences that are on display throughout the letter. Perhaps the most important consequence is the doctrine of the invisible church, which some scholars attribute its origination to Augustine. Such attribution aligns with Berkeley’s use of Augustine in the letter. What is specifically important is the effect such a doctrine has for Berkeley. The focus of the letter and in many of his sermons revolve around the notion that the individual has the ability and responsibility to prepare herself for the future state. The invisible church comprises Christians from various visible churches, even ones who have “fallen into error”. The congregation of the invisible church are those Christians who have “the invisible grace, as well as the outward sign; the spiritual life and holy unction” (*Works*, vol. VII, pp. 147-148). Anyone who has these two components, regardless of when, where, and to what visible church she belongs, is a member of the invisible church.

51. It might be supposed the doctrine of the invisible church nullifies the debate Berkeley and Sir John James are having because Berkeley grants any member from any visible church can be a member of the invisible church, but Berkeley repeatedly emphasises Catholics fall into error precisely because they take the Pope as an infallible guide and authority to the future state. According to Berkeley, this establishes Catholics as idolatrous worshippers of the Pope, Mary, and other images of the saints, and not true worshippers of Christ.¹⁴⁰ Therefore, the debate between Berkeley and Sir John has immediate importance: if Sir John converts to Catholicism, he risks becoming an idolater and losing the hope of salvation by not being a member of the invisible church. This is the core of Berkeley’s apologetics in the letter.

¹⁴⁰ *Works*, vol. VII, pp. 145, 152

52. Finally, it should be noted the care and concern Berkeley has in the letter. The letter can be interpreted as another example of the Berkeleian method of being charitable, gentle, obliging, and having a true concern for the interests of others. Berkeley lays out his arguments clearly, making concessions when appropriate, but all for the sake of engaging Sir John in conversation. He praises Sir John at both the beginning and end of the letter. More importantly, Berkeley follows his own charge in *Primary Visitation Charge*: he has gained a favourable hearing, so he wishes to put the “errors and wrong principles”, and thereby the erroneous practices, “in the strongest light, and paint them in their true colours” (*Works*, vol. VII, p. 165).

Address at Confirmation

53. *Address at Confirmation* neatly displays many elements at work in Berkeley’s religious writings. First, there is the twofold division of Christ’s kingdom. Christ is the king “of all things”. In this way, Christ is identified with the philosophical infinite mind of God as Governor of the sensible world.¹⁴¹ Also, Christ is the King of the Christian Church. This is the visible church of the various Christian denominations, and more importantly, the invisible church of which Christ is the head.¹⁴² Christians are members of this kingdom in this twofold sense: they are members of the sensible world, which comprises their present state, and they are members of Christianity, governed by revealed religious doctrine and law. Therefore, Christians have a double duty in Christ’s kingdom, or what Berkeley elsewhere calls a “double diligence”.¹⁴³

54. Second, Berkeley emphasises the covenant Christians have with Christ. The goal is salvation in the future state, and the Christian’s part to obtain grace involves faith, repentance, and baptism. Therefore, the Christian is in part responsible for earning the promises of the future state.¹⁴⁴ This aligns with many of Berkeley’s claims throughout his entire corpus. Specifically in *Address at Confirmation*, Berkeley is reminding his congregation they must be active in fulfilling their part of the covenant with God. They fulfil their part by “conforming themselves to [God’s] will, living according to his precepts, and thereby entitled to the promises of his gospel” (*Works*, vol. VII, p. 169). These are “the conditions of your admission into this state” and are shown by “faith and repentance, and the outward Sign and Seal thereof

¹⁴¹ PHKI 1; PHK 32, 44, 106; PO 6, 26; GE 49; A.III.11; A.IV.1, 14, 25; A.VI.17; S 152, 154, 160, 266, 268, 291, 326; *Works*, vol. VII, pp. 90, 97, 137, 146; Letter 194, etc.

¹⁴² This establishes the common ground given in *Primary Visitation Charge*, the belief in Christ as Saviour. Cf. Ch.4.44

¹⁴³ *Works*, vol. VII, pp. 154, 161

¹⁴⁴ Cf. Ch. 5.42

is baptism” (ibid.). Therefore, this covenant with God “requires something to be done on both sides” (ibid.). That is, Berkeley is charging his audience to be active in the Christian faith, both in the outward marks of the Church of England and in the inward marks of the soul.

Section 4: *Siris*

55. The final piece of Berkeley’s writing left to subsume under the 1710 Design is perhaps the most difficult and controversial; i.e. the later portion of *Siris*. Without question, *Siris* plagues many Berkeleyan scholars at least in part because they are unsure how to properly interpret the final one hundred or so sections.¹⁴⁵ Many decide to ignore the work entirely in their investigations. However, provided *Siris* as a whole is constructive as certain scholars argue,¹⁴⁶ it requires positive interpretation. There is a spectrum of possible views. At one end is the view that the later portion of *Siris* is not associated with Berkeleyan philosophy: it merely expounds a possible system for consideration, viz. it is, as the title says, merely “A Chain of Philosophical Reflexions and Inquiries concerning the Virtues of Tar-Water, and divers other Subjects connected together and arising One from Another”.¹⁴⁷ At the other end is the view that Berkeley embraces Neoplatonism.¹⁴⁸ At this end, there are at least two different possible interpretations of when Berkeley embraced Neoplatonism: on the one hand, one can suppose Berkeley always has been Neoplatonic in his philosophy and *Siris* is the final unveiling of his complete metaphysical system;¹⁴⁹ on the other hand, one can suppose the Neoplatonism in *Siris* is the logical consequence of Berkeley’s earlier philosophical efforts and Berkeley embraces Neoplatonism sometime in preparing *Siris*.¹⁵⁰ However, there are a number of positions one can embrace on the later part of *Siris* in between the two extremes: indeed, *Works* offers such a moderate interpretation.¹⁵¹

56. Active Berkeleyanism always seeks to harmonise the views of scholarship. While there is much value in the Editor’s Introduction of *Works*, for present purposes I expound a specific element of that interpretation, viz. “that the great ancients cannot be charged with

¹⁴⁵ “Ever since Fraser recalled attention to *Siris*, it has been assumed that this work presents a contradiction, if not a recantation, of Berkeley’s earlier philosophical position.” *Works*, vol. V, p. 12.

¹⁴⁶ E.g. *Works*, vol. V, pp. 5-19; Airaksinen (2010); etc.

¹⁴⁷ E.g. Hone and Rossi (1931), pp. 216-217; Ritchie (1954)

¹⁴⁸ Jacob (1991), p. 115 claims *Siris* is more Neo-Stoic than Neoplatonic.

¹⁴⁹ Wenz (1976); Daniel (2001b). For a response to Wenz, cf. McKim (1982). Wenz replies in Wenz (1982).

¹⁵⁰ For a weaker version of this claim, cf. Johnston (1923), pp. 246-247, and Hicks (1932), pp. 208-209, where the claim is Berkeley reinterpreted his main earlier conceptions into a Neoplatonic system. For the stronger claim Berkeley logically comes to Neoplatonism, cf. Bradatan (2006), Ch. 1

¹⁵¹ *Works*, vol. V, pp. 12-19

atheism is the organizing refrain of the last seventy or eighty sections” (*Works*, vol. V, p. 16). The denial of atheism in most of the ancient philosophers (or at least in many of their shared doctrines) is key to understanding how *Siris* might affect Berkeley’s philosophy regarding his religious views. The Editor’s Introduction argues persuasively there is no change in general (and in many cases particular) doctrine in the later portion of *Siris*. While it is beyond the purpose here to comment on whether or not Berkeleianism is or is not Neoplatonic, it is sufficient to merely emphasise that Berkeley believes many ancient doctrines are compatible with his stated metaphysical views in his texts. Therefore, we can agree with those Berkeleian scholars who deny Berkeley is Neoplatonic while granting there is at least compatibility with his own philosophy.

57. A consequence of this compatibilist reading with regard to Berkeley’s religious writings is a possible explanation of the ‘no atheism’ mantra in the later portion of *Siris*.¹⁵² In the remainder of this section, that consequence is explored in more detail. I argue the ‘no atheism’ mantra is important for two reasons: first, as Berkeley recommends the study of the ancient philosophers in *Siris* and in other texts, it is important to show this recommendation is not harmful, but indeed advantageous; second, as Berkeley’s stated metaphysical views in previous publications and in *Siris* is compatible with these ancient doctrines, it is important to show the ancient doctrines are not atheistic, thereby implying Berkeley’s views also do not lead to atheism.

Non-Atheistic Recommendation

58. One key image in *Siris* is the Chain of Being.¹⁵³ In previous publications and again in *Siris*, Berkeley describes the journey from the senses to the faculties of reasoning a person makes.¹⁵⁴ Sensible impressions or appearances first occupy the mind: they amuse and entertain our senses, are used for “vulgar uses and the mechanic arts of life”, and thereby “easily obtain a preference, in the opinion of most men, to those superior principles, which are the later growth of the human mind arrived to maturity and perfection” (S 264). Because of their amusement, use, and early preference, many people understand sensible appearances to be real things, “sensible and real, to common apprehensions, being the same thing” (*ibid.*). This understanding leads to believing “the sensible appearances are all in all: our reasonings are employed about them; our desires terminate in them; we look no farther for realities or causes” (S 294). This

¹⁵² The claim that various ancient doctrines are not atheistic appears at S 276, 279, 287-288, 326-327, 353-354

¹⁵³ For discussion of other images, cp. Berman (1994), pp. 171-179; Airaksinen (2006); Bradatan (2006), Ch. 3

¹⁵⁴ E.g. PO 5-7; cp. S 264, 294

belief results in one of the sorts of philosophers described by Proclus: these people place “Body first in the order of beings, and [make] the faculty of thinking depend thereupon, suppose that the principles of all things are corporeal; that Body most really or principally exists, and all other things in a secondary sense, and by virtue of that” (S 263). These philosophers discover the general rules of nature from the uniformity of phenomena, but because they understand body to be the first order of being, they misapprehend mechanical principles for explanations of causality.

59. The religious effects of such thinking disturb Berkeley deeply. If bodies are thought to have causation and the sensible world operates from mechanical principles, the place of God, especially with regard to efficacy, becomes remote. In effect, one is led to deism. Erroneous doctrines like absolute space (and thereby absolute motion) become necessary to explain the phenomena of the world. Corporeal bodies become causes and effects of other corporeal bodies, and the need for a guiding agent weakens. Providence, goodness, and God’s relation to the sensible world are overshadowed by mechanical principles. Blind fate, unthinking causes, and matter dominate the sensible world, and the need of God in such systems decreases until there is no need whatsoever.¹⁵⁵ This domination, stemming from the amusement, use, and preference of the senses, ultimately ends in atheism. Such philosophies have noticeable effects on the State, affecting its religion and morality and thereby affecting its political activities.¹⁵⁶

60. Thankfully, this atheistic domination of the senses is not the only possible outcome. We also have the faculties of thought, reason, and intellect that mature in our lives. “There is an instinct or tendency of the mind upwards” (S 302). “From the outward form of gross masses which occupy the vulgar, a curious inquirer proceeds to examine the inward structure and minute parts, and, from observing the motions in nature, to discover the laws of those motions... but if, proceeding still in his analysis and inquiry, he ascends from the sensible into the intellectual world, and beholds things in a new light and a new order, he will then change his system, and perceive that what he took for substances and causes are but fleeting shadows; that the mind contains all, and acts all, and is to all created beings the source of unity and identity, harmony and order, existence and stability” (S 295). “The mind, her acts and faculties, furnish a new and distinct class of objects, from the contemplation whereof arise certain other notions, principles, and verities, so remote from, and even so repugnant to, the first prejudices which surprise the sense of mankind” (S 297). This ascent of the mind leads to the second sort

¹⁵⁵ S 255, 272-273

¹⁵⁶ S 331-332

of philosopher given by Proclus: “others, making all corporeal things to be dependent upon Soul or Mind, think this to exist in the first place and primary sense, and the being of bodies to be altogether derived from and presuppose that of the Mind” (S 263).

61. This elevating of the mind from the sensible world to the intellectual world is a process. One should not disparage the senses, although they strictly know nothing.¹⁵⁷ They are necessary in climbing the Chain of Being, as “sense and experience acquaint us with the course and analogy of appearances or natural effects” (S 264). We must ascend the Chain one link at a time, and each link is important in aiding the mind to the next link because “by a certain analysis, a regular connexion and climax, we ascend through all those mediums to a glimpse of the First Mover, invisible, incorporeal, unextended, intellectual source of life and being... the veils of prejudice and error are slowly and singly taken off one by one” (S 296). At each link we “change our system” until we understand the new order and new objects of a new world, viz. the order of mind, its activities and faculties of the intellectual world. Herein, true causation and existence are found, and “we then perceive the true principle of unity, identity, and existence” (S 294).

62. The consequence of this ascension up the Chain of Being on religious issues is striking. Bodies are denied efficacy, and Mind becomes the true cause of the phenomena we perceive. God becomes nearer, to the point He is immediately causing and ordering the phenomena we experience. Absolute space and absolute motion have no place in such a system. Bodies are fleeting and do not strictly exist; rather, mind is the only real existence because mind is what is permanent. As God is the Mind that orders and creates all things, God is said to truly exist, and indeed, be the only thing to really and truly exist. Everything else becomes a creation, and as God is the rational Agent of creation, all things tend to some end. God being both infinitely wise and supremely good, all creation is created for the supreme good, which, because God is perfect, is the supreme good of the creation and not the Creator.¹⁵⁸ Providence becomes the guiding principle of the world, directed by Mind and not blind fate, unthinking causes, or matter.¹⁵⁹ Atheism is destroyed because any view that adheres to the notion of a Mind guiding the world is not atheistic, although it can fall short of truth.

¹⁵⁷ S 253, 305

¹⁵⁸ S 258, 260, 279

¹⁵⁹ S 272-273

63. These views, Berkeley believes, are found in some of the ancients.¹⁶⁰ Berkeley invokes the ‘no atheism’ mantra several times throughout the later portion of *Siris*. The various views considered are of note: nature as the life of the world, animated by one Soul and compacted into one frame; all things are One, meaning God is a part of that one general notion and part of the universe; Intellect, considered either as a part of creation or distinct from it, as God; God does not know anything without Himself; and the universe is made and governed by an eternal mind. All of these views orbit the same key claim: the universe is one whole being, either including or distinct from God. What makes this doctrine and its various discussion throughout *Siris* non-atheistic is the claim that the universe is governed or directed by, presided over, and does not exist without Mind or Intellect, either as a part thereof or as a distinct entity who immediately affects it. Some of the ancients understood (quite remarkably for Berkeley) that Mind or Intellect governs, directs, and presides over the universe, and Mind or Intellect is the true cause of the sensible world. Those ancients who have this doctrine within their systems, i.e. those who do not take body to be the first order of being, Berkeley recommends for study and reflection. That recommendation is not harmful because studying those ancients aid in elevating our minds beyond the sensible world, and their systems act as guides to understanding the importance of Mind or Intellect, along with Soul/Spirit and the supreme Being/One. Studying these ancients leads to a truer understanding of the universe, and as such positively affects the religion, morality, and civic government of the State.¹⁶¹

Compatibility with the Ancients

64. At the closing of the middle portion of *Siris*, Berkeley concludes mechanical principles do not give a clear solution to phenomena because phenomena are only appearances in the mind perceiving them. Mechanical principles fail to explain how perceived bodies and motions produce these appearances in the mind; rather, mechanical principles “only reduce them to general rules” (S 251). If mechanical principles (and thereby the mechanical philosophy of Berkeley’s time) fail in this way, then explanation must be sought elsewhere. While Berkeley is sensitive to and explicitly acknowledges “the advancements of these later ages”, he believes “the ancients too were not ignorant of many things, as well in physics as metaphysics, which perhaps are more generally, though not first, known in these modern times” (S 265). This suggestion of studying the ancients is not new in Berkeley’s publications, as the

¹⁶⁰ For a discussion of Berkeley’s library and possible texts from which to draw many of his claims throughout *Siris*, cf. Parigi (2010).

¹⁶¹ S 331

Editor's Introduction to *Siris* in *Works* points out: “[the study of the ancients] was not altogether new, but the culmination of a tendency: in *De motu* he had quoted modern authorities, and in *Alciphron* ancient ones, and had closed this latter work, written in the leisure of Rhode Island, with a plea for the study of ‘the wise men of antiquity’” (*Works*, vol. V, p. 18). The use of ancient and modern writers by Berkeley is also the central theme in Young (1985).

65. The sorts of philosophers given by Proclus reflect the sorts of philosophers given by Socrates: one is focused on body and the perpetual flux of the sensible world, while the other is focused on Mind and the fixed and immoveable nature of the intellectual world.¹⁶² It is evident Berkeley would consider his philosophy to fall in with the second sort of philosopher: sensible ideas are fleeting, have no causal power, and are created by the mind, either finite or infinite, which give existence and reality to those sensible ideas. Knowledge of a thing comes from understanding that thing, and understanding that thing is “when we can interpret or tell what it signifies” (S 253). What it signifies is based on the order and uniformity of the phenomena, so given by God, and allows us to regulate our actions for the benefit of mankind. Discovering laws with which to form a prediction or “vaticination” is the mark of wisdom. This comes from the faculties of the mind and its ability to think upon sensible ideas.

66. Any Berkeleian scholar who misunderstands Berkeley's philosophy as centrally involving sensible ideas as its key tenet (and thereby understanding Berkeleianism as merely immaterialism) fails to understand the purpose of the distinction between the sorts of philosophers given in *Siris*. Berkeley's philosophy is one centred on the mind, its activities, and the journey up the Chain of Being via the investigation of the Animal by reading the *liber mundi*¹⁶³ towards the One or God. In this, Berkeley is in the company of Plato and many other ancients. While it is true these ancients fell short of the divine truth of things because they lacked the knowledge and guidance of Christ and Christianity,¹⁶⁴ they were nevertheless closer to the creation and unburdened with the long tradition of misunderstanding, prejudice, and reliance on the senses.¹⁶⁵ As philosophy appears to have a divine origin,¹⁶⁶ their claims are closer to the truth than those of mechanists and ancient philosophers labouring under the

¹⁶² S 263, 348

¹⁶³ Bradatan (2006), Ch. 3

¹⁶⁴ S 301

¹⁶⁵ S 298

¹⁶⁶ S 301

opinion body is the first order of existence precisely because of “the advantage of patriarchal lights handed down through a few hands” (S 298).

67. The ancients saw a variety of trinities in the universe, and they held “a Trinity in the Godhead” (S 364). Their views were both pious and philosophical.¹⁶⁷ They understood this Trinity to be composed of goodness, intellect, and animating life or spirit, denoted by the One, Mind or Intellect, and Soul respectively. Christianity also acknowledges a Holy Trinity in the Godhead, and the early Church Fathers often used the ancient systems to explain the Holy Trinity. The difference, of course, is the saving mission of Christ and His teachings, which did not so much introduce complete novelty into the world but perfect the knowledge already present in the ancients. This difference, however, does not negate the opportunity of studying the ancients along with the teachings of the Church. As Berkeley is compatible with these ancient systems and with the orthodox teachings of the Church¹⁶⁸ and as the ancients (while obviously lacking in some key areas because they did not receive Christ and His mission) are compatible with and support an acceptable link in the chain towards the ultimate truth, the compatibility of Berkeley’s philosophy with those ancients discussed in *Siris* further supports Berkeley’s philosophical views. As those views are religiously orthodox and as the ancients discussed in *Siris* cannot justly be accused of atheism, so too can Berkeley’s views not be justly accused of atheism.

Conclusion

68. The later portion of *Siris* is subsumed under the 1710 Design because it expounds Berkeley’s views on religion, metaphysics, and methodology. As the general aim of the Design is proper knowledge of the self, other finite spirits, the world, and God, *Siris* offers explanations on all of these elements. The world comprises both the sensible world and the intellectual world, and most importantly an account of how and why the individual journeys through the sensible world to the intellectual world. Berkeley and the ancients recognise the lapsed state of humankind¹⁶⁹ and the instinct or tendency of the mind upwards. Berkeley uses the Chain of Being as a model for this journey, and the Chain is compatible with Berkeleyanism. As number is a creature of the mind, the same thing can be viewed as one or many. The world is no different: it can be viewed as one Animal, connected by the One, Mind, and Soul, or it can be

¹⁶⁷ S 291

¹⁶⁸ Cf. Spiegel (1996); Bradatan (2006), Ch. 1; Hight (2007); Hight (2010); Hight and Bohannon (2010); Spiegel (2017)

¹⁶⁹ S 302

viewed as separated into the sensible world and the intellectual world. God can be understood as being a part of the world or as distinct from the world, and neither view is atheistic. What is fundamental for Berkeleynism is that the individual must navigate through the world and its various realms (sensible, intellectual, religious, moral, etc.) to approach the ultimate truth, which is God and His nature, and the relations of the world and finite spirits to God. The journey is long and difficult, and ultimately the end is not found in the mortal state. However, this does not exclude the honest activity of the mind upwards towards God and proper knowledge. Instead, it prepares the mind for the future state. Christianity as revealed religion aids in the preparation for the future state by combining with philosophy, natural reason, and natural religion. As such, Berkeley's efforts in the 1710 Design, insofar as they concern religion, are apologetic and eschatological.

Chapter 5: Practicing What He Preached: Active Berkeleyanism and the Goal of Salvation

Introduction

1. In the previous chapters, I argue for the unification of Berkeley's corpus as the fulfilment of the proposed 1710 Design. This unification involves both the content and the methodology of Berkeley's corpus. I divide that corpus into various kinds of writings: academic, remedial, and religious. However, such a division should not be understood as rigid. Berkeley's academic writings have a strong religious background, and Berkeley's religious writings have an academic style to them. Yet each of these kinds of writings is remedial in nature. The result is that Berkeley's corpus is academic, remedial, and religious.

2. I also argue that the general aim of the 1710 Design is the proper knowledge of spirits and ideas. This general aim assists in unifying the content and methodology of Berkeley's corpus under the banner of the 1710 Design. However, one still requires a final aim to the Design, viz. why Berkeley devoted so much time, effort, and energy to the Design. Active Berkeleyanism can provide for the need for such a final aim, and that answer in the interpretation of this dissertation is Anglican salvation. The present chapter aims to place salvation as the final aim of the 1710 Design. Section 1 explores the Anglican doctrine of salvation with its components of faith, justification, and the place of good works in order to understand what salvation would mean to Berkeley. I use Cranmer's sermons on these specific topics from *The Two Books of Homilies* as a guide. Section 2 answers the question of how proper knowledge brings about salvation. In answering this question, I investigate Berkeley's views on prejudice and education. Section 3 considers how the 1710 Design plays out in Berkeley's life. I argue against the epoch-view of Berkeley's biography, and I argue for a reciprocity between Berkeley's life and his work. Section 4 argues the notion of Anglican salvation fulfils the final aim of the 1710 Design.

Section 1: Cranmer on Anglican Salvation

3. Anglican beliefs aid in the investigation of what salvation meant to Berkeley. My interpretation finds no points of disagreement between Berkeley's corpus and the general practices and beliefs of Anglicanism at the time Berkeley lived. In fact, keeping these beliefs and practices in mind can often clear up possible confusion in various places of Berkeley's

corpus and point to possible motivations within his corpus.¹ However, my purpose is not to identify and resolve each point of possible confusion or give every possible motivation; rather, the purpose of this section is to explain the Anglican notion of salvation in preparation to answer the question of why the 1710 Design was so important and influential for Berkeley.

4. A key Anglican text for understanding the Anglican doctrine of salvation is *The Two Books of Homilies*. It is unfortunate this text is overlooked in conversations concerning Berkeley because he was an Anglican clergyman and much of what he argues in his writings conform to Anglican teaching at the time. When Berkeley says he is defending religion against the attacks of scepticism, atheism, and irreligion, Berkeleyan scholars correctly understand this statement to mean Berkeley is defending Anglicanism against the attacks of scepticism, atheism, and irreligion (Christian or otherwise). However, Berkeleyan scholars may not take seriously or properly incorporate the tenets of Anglicanism into Berkeleyanism. This neglect by Berkeleyan scholars is perhaps due to believing Berkeleyanism is either simply immaterialism or staying within the confines of Academic Berkeleyanism.²

A True and Lively Faith

5. In Anglicanism, salvation begins with faith. Cranmer, in *The Two Books of Homilies*, stresses the importance of having a correct faith in order to obtain salvation. Anglicans are justified by faith alone for salvation (Article XI). As such, understanding what that kind of justifying faith is, in opposition to other kinds of faith, is paramount.

6. Cranmer devotes an entire sermon (Book 1, Sermon 4) on proper faith, which he calls the true, lively, and Christian faith.³ He begins by defining what lively faith is by contrasting it with what he calls dead faith.⁴ Both dead faith and lively faith believe in the articles of

¹ One need only survey the contents page of *The Two Books of Homilies* to see ample opportunity of linking Berkeley's corpus with Anglican belief and doctrine. Within *The Two Books of Homilies*, there are sermons on love and charity, good order and obedience to rulers and magistrates, disobedience and wilful rebellion, swearing and perjury, contention and brawling, fasting, gluttony and drunkenness, excess of apparel, almsdeeds and mercifulness toward the poor and needy, idleness, and resurrection. Berkeley wrote on all of these topics.

² E.g. Fraser (1871), vol. IV, pp. 362, 415

³ Griffiths (1859), pp. 36-47. Cranmer's discussion of faith actually spans from the third sermon in Book One through at least the fifth sermon of Book One. As the sixth sermon, which discusses charity, takes its cues from the fifth sermon, one could argue the third through the sixth sermons deal at length on faith, its characteristics, products, and benefits; however, Griffiths believes the sixth sermon might not have been written by Cranmer (p. xxvii). Regardless of authorship, the themes of faith, with its features and its by-products of good works characterised by charity, run throughout these sermons.

⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 36-38

religion, meaning they both believe in the Word of God as given in Scripture.⁵ But dead faith is at best idle and does not lead to good works that are pleasing to God,⁶ but at worst dead faith brings about evil works. Lively faith brings about good works that are pleasing to God. Additionally, lively faith has trust in God’s mercy that through the sacrifice of Christ and living a godly life full of good works that are pleasing to God true Christians will obtain God’s promises of salvation.⁷ The remainder of the fourth sermon and the following sermon on good works⁸ concern the three marks of lively faith: it is not dead in the heart of the Christian; without lively faith, no good works can be done that are acceptable to God; and in what manner are these good works done from a lively faith.⁹

7. It is not the belief in the articles of religion that distinguishes lively faith from dead faith; rather, the real focus of distinction is the trust and confidence in God’s mercy. God’s mercy on Christians of lively faith is not for anything the believer does, but instead for the sake of Christ, who sacrificed Himself so believers can obtain salvation through that sacrifice.¹⁰ For the Anglican doctrine of salvation, Christ becomes central because Christ both acts as a person’s “perpetual Advocate and Priest” and provides a real example of how one should live her life by avoiding sin and truly repenting to return to Christ.¹¹ It is this trust and confidence in God’s mercy that turns Christians away from sin and towards good works that are pleasing to God.¹² The activity of lively faith is the production of these kinds of good works that are pleasing to God, in both word and deed. These good works done because of faith become the marks whereby lively faith is known. Therefore, lively faith displays itself in good works, and a person of lively faith does good works often. Interestingly, Cranmer claims people living before Christ could also have had this lively faith, and he cites numerous examples of people

⁵ In the previous sermon on salvation (Book 1, Sermon 3), Cranmer introduces the key characteristics of these two kinds of faith. Dead faith is actually the faith of devils and is a “feigned faith”. Cranmer says even devils believe the basic tenets or articles of Christianity, both from the Old and New Testaments. The difference between the faith of these devils and of true Christians comes not from believing the articles of religion, for in that they both agree, but in having trust and confidence in God’s merciful promises. Cf. *Ibid.*, p. 34.

⁶ Cf. Ch. 5.11 on the distinction between *lively* good works and *dead* good works.

⁷ Griffiths (1859), pp. 37-38

⁸ Cf. Ch. 5.11-13

⁹ The first mark occupies Cranmer for the remainder of the fourth sermon (given in three parts; Griffiths (1859) pp. 38-47), while the second and third marks are given as the first and second parts of the fifth sermon respectively (pp. 48-52; 52-57). The final part of the fifth sermon (pp. 57-65) contains a sustained attack on other Christian sects, notably Roman Catholics, who have failed in the chief vows of religion (obedience, chastity, and wilful poverty), a listing of improper Christian devices and superstitions, and a final exhortation to keep God’s commandments.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 25

¹¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 38-39

¹² *Ibid.*, p. 39

living before the coming of Christ as having this lively faith.¹³ These claims amount to the conclusion that good works are the testimonial of faith.¹⁴ Therefore, each person must examine herself to know if she has lively faith, which she shall know by her good works. If upon such self-examination she believes herself to truly possess this lively faith, then she can trust in Christ and God's mercy to obtain salvation.

Justification by Faith Alone

8. In Christianity, justification is the removal of sin and guilt from an individual soul by God. This removal of sin and guilt is what allows salvation. To be justified is to fulfil God's law as given to humankind in Scripture. But according to Cranmer, no one can justify herself by her own acts because all people sin and therefore break God's law.¹⁵ Thus for Cranmer and Anglicanism, every person must seek another form of justification, which is only found in Christ because Christ was sent to fulfil God's law for humankind.¹⁶

9. There are three parts of Anglican justification according to Cranmer: God's part, Christ's part, and the believer's part. Concerning God's part, He contributes His mercy and grace, granting mercy as forgiveness for transgressing His laws and commandments and granting grace by bestowing salvation. Christ's part concerns the satisfaction of God's justice. Christ sacrificed Himself for the sake of humankind, fulfilling the Law in humankind's place and paying atonement through that sacrifice. The consequence for Cranmer of Christ's part in justification is it removes the possibility of the believer's justification by her own works.¹⁷ The believer's part in justification concerns the true and lively faith in Christ. But this true and lively faith is not solely the work of the Christian because this true and lively faith is given as a gift from God.¹⁸ Otherwise, it might be thought an individual Christian, solely by her own means, can justify herself by bringing forth this true and lively faith, which could be considered as an instance of good work. But Cranmer and Anglicanism hold justification is through faith alone, and even this faith is given as a gift from God to the individual. This faith does not

¹³ Ibid., pp. 41-42. This claim is of interest to Berkeleyan scholarship because of Berkeley's view of the invisible church. Cf. Ch. 4.50-51

¹⁴ Griffiths (1859), pp. 45-46

¹⁵ Ibid., p. 24

¹⁶ Ibid., p. 24

¹⁷ Ibid., p. 26

¹⁸ Ibid., p. 26

exclude proper religious actions like repentance and love, but only the possibility of being justified by the believer's works.¹⁹

10. Cranmer spends the second part of his Sermon on Salvation supporting the claim that justification is by faith alone with passages from Scripture and other ancient writers. He concludes the doctrine of justification by faith alone is meant to remove a believer's works from her justification. Cranmer states this act of justification is only within God's power.²⁰ Because of humankind's sinful nature, an individual cannot make herself righteous by her own works. Cranmer ends the second part of this sermon with a summary statement of the doctrine of justification by faith alone.

The Place of Good Works

11. Cranmer focuses on the place of good works in the fifth sermon. In part, this is a continuation of the three marks of lively faith.²¹ Yet, this sermon also resolves possible tension between faith and good works. Cranmer has two different kinds of good works in mind throughout the third, fourth, and fifth sermons. The first kind of good work is work done without the true and lively faith. Because the individual lacks this lively faith, these good works do not justify the individual, so that individual cannot claim (based on the merit or virtue of her good work) she will earn salvation. Cranmer claims a lively faith gives life to the soul, and so good works done without this lively faith are dead.²² Because these good works lack the appropriate faith, they are displeasing to God. For simplicity and clarity, I call such works *dead* good works, in order to distinguish them from the second kind of good works discussed by Cranmer. This second kind of good works are those that are the product of a true and lively faith.²³ In contrast to *dead* good works, this kind of good work is pleasing to God because the good work originates from lively faith. Again for simplicity and clarity, I call such works *lively* good works. Cranmer proceeds to further explain how one can understand this difference. *Lively* good works are not measured by the facts themselves, but by the ends and intentions for which they are done. Where faith in Christ is not the foundation for good works (meaning where there are *dead* good works), "there is no good work, what building soever we make" (Griffiths, 1859, p. 49). So only *lively* good works are acceptable to God, and they are lively

¹⁹ Ibid., p. 26

²⁰ Ibid., pp. 30-31

²¹ Cf. Ch. 5.6

²² Griffiths (1859), p. 48

²³ Cf. Ch. 5.6-7; Griffiths (1859), p. 48

not in the facts of the matter, but in the intention and end of these works, viz. they come from a lively faith and bear testament to that faith.

12. In the fifth sermon, Cranmer addresses the final mark of lively faith, viz. the manner of *lively* good works.²⁴ Cranmer spends most of his effort arguing for the claim that the laws of God are the way to salvation, not the traditions and laws of humankind. He claims that ever since the Fall of Adam humankind has always been ready to follow their own laws and not God's law. He proceeds through the Fall of Adam to the traditions, laws, and superstitions of the Gentiles, Israelites, Jews, and even Christians, arguing each have at times placed their own traditions and laws above the laws of God.²⁵ Cranmer does not mean to say human laws should not be observed and kept; rather, these laws and traditions cannot take the place of God's law and commandments. Cranmer goes so far as to claim that God is offended by the supposed holiness of humankind's devices.²⁶ Therefore, the believer must keep and observe God's law and commandments first, and observe and keep human laws second. God's law and commandments supersede the laws and traditions of humankind, and it is only by observing God's law and commandments that *lively* good works are accomplished.

13. This claim is consistent with Cranmer's distinctions regarding faith and good works: dead faith and *dead* good works are only the outward appearances of faith and good works and are thought "gay and glorious" by humankind. But lively faith and the *lively* good works that follow from that faith are focused solely on God, and these works show observation and obedience of God's law and commandments. But even *lively* good works do not justify an individual; it is by faith alone that a Christian is justified. It is from this lively faith that *lively* good works flow, and so it is from this lively faith that the observance and obedience to God's law and commandments flow. Those who think an individual can be justified (at least in part) by their good works have misunderstood the order and the office of justification. An individual gains the benefits of a lively faith and the *lively* good works that follow not from anything they have originally done, but from the original gift of God in instilling that individual with a lively faith. Through this lively faith that individual is justified, and through that lively faith *lively* good works follow, which are pleasing to God not in themselves but in the facts that they take their origin from the lively faith which He bestowed and they are directed toward God. Through

²⁴ Ibid., p. 52

²⁵ Ibid., pp. 53-59, 61-64

²⁶ Ibid., pp. 56-57

lively faith, which produces *lively* good works in observance and obedience to God's law and commandments, an individual is in the position to receive salvation.

Section 2: Berkeley and Education

14. The interpretation of this dissertation argues the general aim of the 1710 Design is proper knowledge of spirits and ideas: ourselves, each other, God, and the world. This general aim aids in establishing unity in Berkeley's publications. This general aim includes an inherently active aspect. As my interpretation holds the 1710 Design subsumes Berkeley's corpus and the general aim of the Design is the proper knowledge of a variety of topics, so my interpretation also holds the 1710 Design to be educational and Berkeley's dissemination and methodology to be pedagogical. It is reasonable to expect Berkeley has an obvious and evident educational theory and pedagogy from which he works. It is also reasonable to believe Berkeley's educational theory (if not his pedagogy) remains consistent throughout his life because the Design unifies his publications.

15. One would expect Berkeleian scholarship to have a wealth of literature on Berkeley's view of education and pedagogy. Unfortunately, this is not the case. There are comparatively very few scholarly publications on Berkeley's view of education and pedagogy, although one can cite numerous instances of the methodology Berkeley uses to refute his opponents.²⁷ I take this to be another consequence of the Minor Publications Hypothesis.²⁸ Understanding Berkeley solely within the confines of his 'major' publications disadvantages the scholar because she is unable or unwilling to recognise the unity of Berkeley's philosophy and its appropriate aims. This explains the traditional (albeit now out of fashion) interpretation of Berkeley as a negative philosopher. Regardless of the reason, there is currently little research to assist the Berkeleian scholar in the endeavour of understanding Berkeley's theory of education and pedagogical method.

Berkeley's Own Education and the Bermuda Scheme

16. Most Berkeleian scholars who discuss Berkeley and education do one of two things: either they discuss Berkeley's education at Kilkenny College and at Trinity College Dublin, or they limit their discussion to some aspect of the Bermuda Scheme. Those scholars who discuss Berkeley's education generally keep to the biographical aspect of the question.

²⁷ Cp. Popkin (1951), pp. 226, 232, 234-236, 238-239, 241; Popkin (1953), p. 506; Popkin (1957) pp. 9, 12; Berman (2010), p. 153-155; Pearce (2018); etc.

²⁸ I also take this to be the consequence of the epoch-view of Berkeley's biography. Cf. 5.35-38

The reason for this biographical emphasis seems to be because there is little available information concerning exactly what Berkeley was taught at Kilkenny College and Trinity College Dublin.²⁹ Therefore, little information and evidence can be presently found for understanding Berkeley's view of education in this area of scholarship.

17. Those Berkeleyan scholars who discuss Berkeley's Bermuda scheme do so in narrow ways. They limit their investigations to some one aspect of the project, perhaps as a consequence of the limiting nature of Academic Berkeleyanism.³⁰ For example, Cochrane (1954) focuses on *Verses* and its relation to the Bermuda scheme, and he argues *Verses* is a turning point in the development of the idea of the westward progress of civilisation and the arts and sciences. Conroy (1960) investigates Berkeley's personal influence on early American educators and colleges. Perhaps the most attention has been on the recent interest of the millenarianism and messianism in the Bermuda scheme. Bracken (1988), Bradatan (2003; cp. 2006, Ch. 6), and Kendrick (2017) discuss millenarianism, messianism, and missionary work within the Bermuda scheme.³¹ However, while these scholarly efforts aid in understanding the influence of Berkeley on others and place Berkeley in a general context, they do little in the search for Berkeley's view of education and pedagogy.

Prejudice, Plato, and Reconstructing Berkeley's View of Education

18. The few Berkeleyan scholars who do attempt to discuss Berkeley's theory of education usually focus their attention on Berkeley's view of prejudice. Breidert (2006) gives a short and general account of various discussions of prejudice in Berkeley's publications. Breidert's main thesis is the distinction between prejudices: there are "inevitable prejudices" and "necessary prejudices" in visual perception and in the foundations of elementary arithmetic, and there are other prejudices in moral education that Berkeley does not speak of "with disdain" (Breidert, 2006, p. 20). Breidert makes the correct claim, originally recognised

²⁹ However, Young (1985) pp. 63-74 does incorporate Berkeley's previous education as evidence of what one could expect his school in Bermuda to cover. Young sets this discussion within a larger context of arguing that Berkeley is a classical philosopher. Cf. 5.21. It would be an excellent opportunity to compare Berkeley's education to his view on education and pedagogy in his *Design*, but this avenue has been historically slow to develop because of a lack of sufficient evidence.

³⁰ Cf. Intro. 14-17

³¹ While it is beyond the purpose to investigate these publications more specifically, it should be noted Bracken, Bradatan, and Kendrick seem to overemphasise the conversion of the Native Americans in *Proposal*. I am not denying this is an important aspect of the scheme, and Bracken rightly highlights *Proposal* has the dual aim of "preparing the sons of colonists for the Church, and would also educate Indian boys so as to convert the Indian populations." (Bracken, 1988, p. 67). My point is these scholars focus heavily on the second aim, and so they seem to ignore or de-emphasise the other aim of preparing the colonists for a pious life, hopefully as a member of the clergy.

by Clark and later by Stoneham, that there is a distinction between prejudices that are false opinions and prejudices that are accepted without reasoning that may be true. Breidert further properly claims Berkeley holds the latter form of prejudice to be axiomatic “for the establishment of state for every social or scientific community” (ibid., p. 21).

19. Clark (2005) also discusses Berkeley’s view of prejudice, but he sets his discussion within a religious context. For Clark, understanding Berkeley’s view of prejudice acts as an introduction to Berkeley’s philosophical understanding of religion. Clark emphasises the fact that Berkeley lives and works in a time when the identification and removal of prejudice is an important task for the philosopher. Clark understands Berkeley to be clarifying this need of the philosopher, and Berkeley’s polemics against free-thinkers are Berkeley’s way of demonstrating the complete removal of prejudice is both impossible and harmful to the individual and society. Clark lays added importance on Berkeley’s use of natural light as a way to discover truth for oneself and to be able to believe in the truths others have discovered. This paves the way for Clark’s discussion of Berkeley’s philosophy of religion, which is the intention of Clark’s publication.

20. The most sustained and beneficial investigation into prejudice and Berkeley’s view of education comes from Stoneham (manuscript). Stoneham’s primary interest is Berkeley’s apparent modification in methodology in refuting the philosophers who “justified an irreligious and immoral ‘libertine’ lifestyle”, which would have the consequence of attracting others to that lifestyle and “think, because of the apparent philosophical support, that it was a reasonable option for them” (Stoneham, manuscript, p. 1). Stoneham claims Berkeley abandons the publication of *Principles* Part 2 because Berkeley no longer finds his original strategy the best course of action. Stoneham then begins the task of reconstructing Berkeley’s new strategy. There are some key pieces of information that are valuable in this discussion. First, Stoneham widens his search over “a wide variety of different publications, each for a particular purpose, and some surviving correspondence” (ibid., p. 1). Because Stoneham is able to successfully reconstruct a coherent strategy, his investigation is an instance of the success of rejecting the Minor Publications Hypothesis. Second, Stoneham argues that Berkeley has a tripartite view of prejudice, and this view is the foundation from which Berkeley discusses moral, social, religious, and educational matters. Third and most importantly, Stoneham concludes “the question of education [is] a two stage one for the philosopher: first he must determine which principles are correct; then he must ask whether teaching those principles as prejudices to those who will never be in a position to enquire as to their correctness is in the best interests of society

at large” (ibid., p. 6). For Stoneham, this explains the change in strategy. It also suggests a continuity between Berkeley’s earlier and later publications by means of an educational theory and a “two stage” pedagogical practice. Berkeley did not actually abandon his view; rather, he merely switched from the first stage of the question of education to the second stage of the question. For Berkeley, these two stages are what are needed in order to properly address the question of education comprehensively.

21. Finally, Young (1985) also discusses Berkeley’s views on education. Young’s discussion of Berkeley’s view on education is within his general argument that Berkeley should be considered as both a classical and modern philosopher. Young correctly highlights education is religious, moral, and political for Berkeley. Young’s interpretation sees Berkeley defending Christianity not against reason and science, but against the “pretence of reason” of the minute philosophers (Young, 1985, p. 63). As such, classical education is the cure for such an attack: the aim of education is to bring moral and political virtue to the citizens of a State. Young looks to Berkeley’s own education as evidence for this classical education: mathematics, languages, logic, and philosophy (both ancient and modern) compose both Berkeley’s education and Berkeley’s educational aims. If an education is not supported by classical thinkers, then that education will be “free and easy” but not thoughtful (ibid., p. 69). This (according to Young) tends to encourage iconoclasm and cynicism. But philosophy as the pursuit of wisdom aims to lead a student between the extremes of cynicism and fanaticism.³² Young holds Berkeley to believe very few people have the capacity to philosophise, here meaning the pursuit of a long and arduous course of disciplined study. But there is no inconsistency between Berkeley’s reliance on classical education and his criticism of modern education because of the distinction between those who pursue education to become moral, political, and religious leaders and the remainder of the citizens. In understanding Berkeley’s view, Young believes one must look to Plato’s view on education. Young interprets Berkeley to be following Plato’s educational plan as set out in the *Republic*, but with greater emphasis on the role of religious education by arguing religion is the foundation of the State. For Berkeley, the education of moral, religious, and political leaders requires arduous moral, political, and religious training, and the religious training is crucial because it provides the morale and ethos for the State.

³² This point agrees with my interpretation of the meaning of philosophy for Berkeley. Cf. Intro. 21 and Ch. 5.41

Active Education

22. I argue in the previous chapters that the 1710 Design involves proper knowledge of spirits and the world. The Design also is a methodology. Berkeley's corpus displays this content and methodology, and the Design subsumes the corpus. Therefore, the 1710 Design is an educational project, and because Berkeley never abandons the 1710 Design, that project remains at the core of his publications. Because of the central importance of the 1710 Design for Berkeley's corpus, my interpretation places emphasis on Berkeley's view of education. Additionally, my interpretation looks to harmonise and incorporate other scholarly views whenever and wherever possible.

23. The effects of poor education are apparent to Berkeley by the state of the world in which he lives. A libertine lifestyle, as mentioned by Stoneham,³³ is a consequence of poor decision-making, which ultimately stems from false principles. Therefore, correcting false principles and defending true or necessary principles become the primary educative tasks for Berkeley.³⁴ A principle is necessary if it benefits the society in which people live.³⁵ That a true or necessary principle can also be a prejudice makes no difference for Berkeley, and he defends these principles against the attacks of those who believe all prejudice should be dismissed out-of-hand.³⁶ Once these principles are correctly identified as being true or necessary, they are worthy of incorporation into the educational system.

24. These principles include a wide range of tenets dealing with the more academic features of society like mathematics, logic, and natural philosophy, as well as with the more practical, moral, and religious features.³⁷ The principle dictates the scope of its effect: some principles should be more contained within a field of study, while other principles have more wide-ranging influence.³⁸ What the principle is, how it should be used, and in what part of society it should be used is all in the task of identifying the principle as a true or necessary

³³ Stoneham (manuscript), p. 1; cp. D 1, 5, 6 (pp. 201, 202); this is also a general theme of *Alciphron*

³⁴ Many of the titles and subtitles in Berkeley's corpus imply this conclusion. Cp. *Principles* Part 1, *Passive Obedience*, *Three Dialogues*, *De Motu*, *Alciphron*, *Vindication*, *Analyst* controversy, *Discourse*, and *Siris*.

³⁵ D 7-8 (pp. 202-203)

³⁶ Cf. Stoneham (manuscript), pp. 3-4; cp. D 8, 10, 12, 14, 15, 17, 18-21, 25, 34, 35, 52, 54 (pp. 203, 203-204, 205, 205-207, 208, 211-212, 215, 216)

³⁷ D 9, 11, 12, 14, 17, 23, 34, 35, 58 (pp. 203, 204, 205-206, 207, 211-212, 218)

³⁸ Perhaps the most famous example of this kind of limiting of scope of a given principle is found in DM 71. Belfrage (2003) and Belfrage (2017) makes much of this section of *De Motu*, but it appears Belfrage is not the originator of this thesis in its general formulation in Berkeleyan scholarship. Fraser (1871), vol. IV, p. 376 makes a somewhat similar observation regarding faith and science. This tenet of Berkeley again appears as the conclusion of S 231-253.

one.³⁹ Education becomes the act of disseminating the knowledge of these principles and their use, truth, and scope to the State, sometimes as prejudices that can possibly be further investigated later on and other times simply as axioms.⁴⁰

25. This makes education active for Berkeley. The spirit is activity, and that activity involves the educative process.⁴¹ Sometimes the soul learns or disseminates the principle, and other times the soul uses that principle for a benefit. That benefit should be primarily of public interest, which will in turn benefit private interest.⁴² Hence, the principles of human knowledge, religion, and morality are all closely tied together for Berkeley. They are all principles, regardless of their domain, scope, and use. Some principles affect others within a given domain, while other principles are more contained. These principles are ultimately given by God, discoverable by the use of our reason and experience.⁴³ We must continue to reason, experience, and live properly to investigate these principles. Education becomes a lifelong process for Berkeley, and it must be both investigated as an object and lived as a way of life.⁴⁴ This is true regardless of the particular occupation a spirit has in the mortal state: a philosopher must actively be a philosopher just as much as a musician must actively be a musician. There is no end for any one spirit in this process: she is either learning or disseminating principles to others, or using them in some form or fashion.

26. Berkeley also understands the way one disseminates these principles is important. He believes the one disseminating must be charitable, gentle, obliging, and show a true concern for the interests of the person who is receiving the education.⁴⁵ This involves finding common ground or premises from which to begin, and then showing how the principle being disseminated furthers knowledge and proper behaviour. Situations of ignorance are different from situations of error.⁴⁶ In ignorance, one needs to show what the principle is, its proper use, and its proper scope. Situations of ignorance are what one typically thinks of when envisioning the education of a child. But education is not simply for children, as it is a lifelong process. Situations of error require more effort and skill, as one must first dissuade the other of their

³⁹ D 4 (p. 202)

⁴⁰ D 4, 8, 12-14, 58, 59 (pp. 202, 203, 204-205, 218)

⁴¹ D 4-6, 58 (pp. 202, 218); cp. Ch. 1.37, 73-75, 78-80; Ch. 2.24-26, 54, Ch. 3.23

⁴² D 4, 6, 56 (pp. 202, 217); cp. Ch. 3.15, 18-23, 25, 26

⁴³ D 36 (p. 212); cp. Ch. 2.40-42

⁴⁴ This is a general theme of *Alciphron*. Cp. D 58 (p. 218); Intro. 21; Ch. 1.37; Ch. 2.58-66, 70, 71; Ch. 3.23; Ch. 5.41

⁴⁵ Again, a reoccurring theme in *Alciphron*. Cp. WW 1, 4, 5, 7, 9, 10 (pp. 235-238); Ch. 1.18-20, 49-52, 68; Ch. 3.33-35; Ch. 4.21, 42, 44, 45, 52

⁴⁶ DHP2 208; A.IV.15, A.VI.2, 14

improper view before implanting the true or necessary principle.⁴⁷ In this approach, we find Berkeley's trademark methodology of beginning or using premises his opponent would accept, but arguing to a different conclusion than his opponent holds.

27. Finally, Berkeley's Design is ambitious, but not perhaps how one might immediately think it is ambitious. The Design incorporates an educational strategy that is complex, viz. there is both a critical aspect and a positive aspect to the educational strategy. On the one hand, the Design intends to attack certain philosophical arguments, which include false principles and errors, of the learned; but on the other hand, the Design intends to attack certain prejudices of the unlearned.⁴⁸ These intentions form the critical aspect of the 1710 Design because the purpose of this part of the educational strategy is to remove the obstacles of ignorance, false principles, error, and certain prejudices from the thinking and activity of people in society. Berkeley's refutation of materialism and his attack on minute philosophers are examples that have obtained the majority of scholarly attention, but these two examples are by no means the only examples one finds in Berkeley's corpus. The geometric view of vision,⁴⁹ the mechanistic philosophy's attempt to go beyond natural philosophy and into metaphysics,⁵⁰ the supposed nature and use of fluxions and infinitesimals in the calculus,⁵¹ the praise of vice and private interest and its effects,⁵² the misunderstanding of economics and trade,⁵³ etc. all contribute to a growing number of sceptics, atheists, and irreligious believers in society because of false principles and errors in the learned. These false principles and errors become harmful prejudices in the unlearned, who more significantly compose the public spirit, industry, morality, loyalty, and religious zeal of society.⁵⁴ Yet, there is a positive aspect to the Design. Once one removes the false principles and harmful prejudices from society, that negative space must be filled.⁵⁵ Berkeley's immaterialism,⁵⁶ his own view on vision,⁵⁷ his suggestion of

⁴⁷ Cf. esp. *Works*, vol. VII, p. 356; cp. An. 19-30; S 296

⁴⁸ These prejudices include accepting, where possible, those philosophical arguments that contain false principles and errors, and ones leading to particular ways of living, e.g. a libertine lifestyle or a slothful, idle, and unindustrious lifestyle.

⁴⁹ Cf. Ch. 1.25

⁵⁰ Cf. Ch. 2.32-35, 41-42

⁵¹ Cf. Ch. 2.47-49

⁵² Cf. Ch. 3.18-22, 25, 76, 78; Ch. 4.12-14, 26-29

⁵³ Cf. Ch. 3.43-50

⁵⁴ Berkeley believes the unlearned greatly outnumber the learned in total population, although the learned have great influence over the unlearned. Cf. Ch. 5.21

⁵⁵ D 10 (pp. 203-204). I take Berkeley's point to be generalised beyond the specific situation of a child. This is a general theme in *Alciphron*.

⁵⁶ Cf. Ch. 1.39-44, 50-51, 61-64

⁵⁷ Cf. Ch. 1.34-37

ancient philosophies that take Mind to be the fundamental element of the universe,⁵⁸ the importance of being industrious, frugal, and practicing virtue and public spiritedness,⁵⁹ his Divine Visual Language argument,⁶⁰ and focusing on charity, zeal, and salvation,⁶¹ etc. are all positive recommendations to society to recover its way. These positive recommendations are academic, remedial, religious, and philosophical. The dissemination of these recommendations involves a kind of hierarchy: first, one must teach the learned portion of society and teachers of priests; next, these teachers educate the priests; and finally, the priests educate the general population of unlearned individuals.⁶² But it should not be thought Berkeley is looking to completely tear down the entirety of the current way of thinking and acting; rather, he is, like the Christian farmers in *Alciphron*, looking to weed out the bad effects of harmful prejudices, false principles, and errors; heal the damage of these harmful prejudices, false principles, and errors; and nurture the good effects of a society founded on religion and morality.

Section 3: The Reciprocity of Life and Work

28. Berkeleyan scholarship has long taken Berkeley's biography and philosophy as linked together. Indeed, the one often influences the other. Because there is a spectrum of interpretations existent in scholarship on Berkeley's philosophy, there is a corresponding spectrum of interpretations regarding his biography. The purpose of this section is not to restate the well-known biographical facts of Berkeley's life; one can easily obtain the information, varying in length and detail, from any one of the numerous monographs on Berkeley. Instead, my purpose is to discuss the spectrum of interpretations and emphasise the reciprocity of Berkeley's life and works in a new way. This section addresses the issue of how the 1710 Design played out in Berkeley's own life.

Timelines, Short Narratives, and Particular Focuses

29. Many monographs on Berkeley of the last century briefly discuss Berkeley's life. The introductions or opening chapters in these monographs usually contain these discussions

⁵⁸ Cf. Ch. 4.56-57, 60-68

⁵⁹ Cf. Ch. 3.18-22, 25, 43-53, 76, 78; Ch. 4.20-21

⁶⁰ Cf. Ch. 2.17; Ch. 4.33-36

⁶¹ Cf. Ch. 3.54, 57, 60, 62, fn. 66; Ch. 4.12-18

⁶² Berkeley consistently adheres to this model in all of the so-called romantic or idealistic causes in the epoch-view of Berkeley's life. The consistent adherence to this educational model is one way to argue for the unity of Berkeley's life despite the epoch view of Berkeley's biography. This model is used for the 'static' interpretation of the 1710 Design, is directly referenced by Berkeley in *Proposal* and the Bermuda scheme, and is obvious in his episcopal efforts at Cloyne. But, there is a better way of arguing against the epoch-view. Cf. Ch. 5.35-46

of Berkeley's biography.⁶³ In the shortest form, only a timeline of major events in Berkeley's life is given.⁶⁴ However, many Berkeleyan monographs offer a short narrative on Berkeley's life. Generally, these narratives are objective, weaving together what is considered the most important biographical facts. These instances of the biographical narrative are extremely similar to one another, sometimes following the epoch-view (discussed below) and occasionally sprinkling certain quotations from Berkeley or his contemporaries.⁶⁵

30. But not all examples of the biographical narrative of Berkeley are objective. In the more detailed instances of these short narratives, discussions of Berkeley's interests and interpretations of his character round out the account.⁶⁶ Discussing Berkeley's interests and his character dovetails into the scholar's interpretation of Berkeley's philosophy. These accounts vary as their interpretations of Berkeley's philosophy vary. For example, there is the debate between Yeats's interpretation and Luce's interpretation of Berkeley's character. In this debate, Yeats' interpretation focuses heavily upon certain entries of the Notebooks, and results in what Luce believes to be two different Berkeleys: that of the fiery young man in the Notebooks, and that of the more subdued, mask-wearing older gentleman. Luce adamantly rejects this interpretation, this 'Berkeley of the limerick' who 'wears a mask', and opts for an interpretation where there is only one Berkeley who is "honest and single-minded", who is "a normal man of flesh and blood in constant and fruitful touch with the real world" (Luce, 1945, pp. ix, 1). Berman, coming from the vantage point of being both the heir to these interpretations and the heir to further progress in Berkeleyan scholarship regarding biographical discoveries, looks to harmonise these two ends of the spectrum, but appears to again conclude a duality in Berkeley.⁶⁷

⁶³ For instances where the biography comes at the beginning of a monograph, cp. Fraser (1874), pp. x-xiii; Hone and Rossi (1931), pp. xv-xxix; Hicks (1932), pp. 3-24; Luce (1945), pp. ix-x, 1-19; Olscamp (1970); pp. 1-3; Johnston (1970), Ch. 1; Park (1972), pp. 1-7; Bracken (1974), pp. 13-15; Tipton (1974), pp. 1-10; Pitcher (1977), Ch. 1; Foster and Robinson (1985), pp. 1-3; Berman (1985), pp. 11-14; Young (1985), p. 5; Walmsley (1990), pp. 2-3; Dancy (1998), pp. 6-11; Fogelin (2001), pp. 3-4; Stoneham (2002), pp. 5-11; Berman (2005); Clarke (2008), pp. x-xii; Jones (2009), pp. 3-6; Kail (2014), pp. 1-2; Flage (2014), pp. 3-17; etc. For instances where the majority of the biography appears later in the monograph, cp. Wisdom (1953a); Ch. 9-10; Urmson (1982), Ch. 8; etc.

⁶⁴ Most, if not all, of the monographs not listed in Ch. 5. fn. 63 contain a timeline of major events in Berkeley's life.

⁶⁵ Cp. Davis (1966), p. 417; Williams (1958), pp. 304-305; *Works*, vol. VII, pp. 176-177; and, if we conclude Steele was speaking of Berkeley, GE 90; etc.

⁶⁶ Cp. Fraser (1874), p. xi; Luce (1945), pp. ix, 1; Wisdom (1953a), Ch. 10; Johnston (1970), Ch. 1; Park (1972), p. 7; Tipton (1974), pp. 4-10; Urmson (1982), pp. 78-79; Berman (1985), pp. 19-21; Dancy (1998), pp. 10-11; etc.

⁶⁷ Berman seems generally to agree with Luce's interpretation, but says "There is a deeper, wilder and more uncanny Berkeley which neither Latham nor Luce has captured, but of whom Goldsmith and Yeats have caught

31. Additionally, some Berkeleyan scholars sculpt and offer the biographical narrative of Berkeley for the sake of the particular focus of the monograph. A few examples demonstrate this point. First, Fraser focuses heavily on Berkeley as an academic recluse, always preferring a quiet life of study and meditation (Fraser, 1874, pp. x-xiii). This portrait of Berkeley as an academic recluse guides or supports Fraser's interpretation of Berkeley's philosophy. Second, Foster and Robinson focus on Berkeley's defence of orthodox Christianity as the "principle objective" of Berkeley's life, and therefore focus their discussion on how Berkeley's philosophy supports common sense against the modern corpuscularian philosophy (Foster and Robinson, 1985, pp. 1-3). In a similar vein, Young emphasises the political and religious climate of Berkeley's time, which constructs the backdrop for Young's interpretation of Berkeley's philosophy and purpose. Dancy, in his Editor's Introduction to the *Principles*, begins by stating Berkeley was "a young man in a hurry", and this sets the tone for his interpretation of that work (Dancy, 1998, p. 5). Finally, Walmsley introduces his theme of Berkeley as a writer by highlighting the biography of Berkeley of 1712-1713, stating "the distinction we readily make between the philosopher and the man of letters is misleading" (Walmsley, 1990, p. 3). In each of these cases, the scholar uses both the biographical facts and their interpretation of those facts as support for their own interpretation of Berkeley's philosophy.

Longer Narratives and Complete Monographs

32. At the beginning of the first serious publication on the life of Berkeley, Stock laments the "odd fatality attending upon some of the first characters in the republic of letters", wherein their "celebrity" prevents "an accurate knowledge of their lives from descending to posterity" (Stock, 1776, p. 1). Berkeleyan scholarship continues to suffer under this "odd fatality", although through no fault of its own. The facts of Berkeley's life have been historically slow to come to light.⁶⁸ The discovery of new biographical facts about Berkeley was often the directed effort of some Berkeleyan scholars, notably Stock, Fraser, Balfour, Luce, Aaron, Berman, etc. Fraser, in his efforts to offer a better collection of Berkeley's corpus,

a distant glimpse" (Berman, 1985, p. 21). While this duality does not necessarily lead to two Berkeleys, it is tempting to make the logical inference. Indeed, Berman appears to open the way for such a dilemma: "For Berkeley – the man and thinker – was deeper and more hidden, I argue, than has been generally recognized" (Berman, 1994, p. vi). This lends itself to a kind of Yeats/Turbayne interpretation of both Berkeley and his philosophy. Turbayne holds Berkeley had a 'secret' conception of mind and relied heavily on metaphor. The result of Turbayne's view is different Berkeleys: the real and secret Berkeley, and the Berkeley of the metaphor. Cf. Turbayne (1959); Turbayne (1962a); Turbayne (1962b).

⁶⁸ It appears the process is still incomplete. New information frequently appears in scholarly publications.

heavily focused on the life and letters of Berkeley. The great biographical interest of Berkeleyan scholars since the 1930s also testifies to the importance of Berkeley's biography. While often these discussions focus on the dating, order, purpose, and unity of the Notebooks,⁶⁹ there also are equally important discoveries of Berkeley's correspondence, sermons, and other Berkeleiana.⁷⁰

33. A general maxim among Berkeleyan scholars is that a better comprehension of the life of Berkeley and a better comprehension of the philosophy of Berkeley aid in forming a better complete account of Berkeley.⁷¹ The great authoritative scholarly publications on Berkeley's life, viz. Stock (1776), Fraser (1871) vol. IV, Balfour (1896), Luce (1949), and Berman (1994), all follow this general maxim even if they differ widely in their approach. For example, Stock and Luce both maintain their publications are separate from an account of Berkeley's philosophy.⁷² Other scholars decide to blend biography with their interpretations of Berkeley's philosophy, either by accounting for Berkeley's life first or by blending discussions of Berkeley's life together with interpretations of his philosophy.⁷³

34. Instances of the short narrative, either objectively given or offered with particular interest emphasised, and instances of the long narrative, either as separate publications or as a combination with an interpretation of Berkeley's philosophy, indicate a relation between biography and philosophy. When Berkeleyan scholars investigate this relationship between Berkeley's biography and philosophy, they conclude the relationship is always in the same

⁶⁹ Cp. Aaron (1931); Aaron (1932b); Luce (1932a); etc.

⁷⁰ Cp. Aaron (1932a); Luce (1932b); Rand (1932); Keogh (1933); Luce (1933a); Luce (1933b); Luce (1934b); Luce (1936b); etc.

⁷¹ Perhaps Tipton best expresses this point: "In restricting our attention largely to Berkeley's case for immaterialism we run the risk of underestimating our man" (Tipton, 1974, p. 1). Notably, Luce appears at one point to disagree: "[Recent books on Berkeley's philosophy and life] blend the story of the life with a study of the thought, and I am not sure that those two things mix well. It is an arguable point. I, at any rate, have had to keep them separate" (Luce, 1949, p. v). However, it appears Luce was limiting this comment only to that scholarly publication, as many of his other publications freely blend and mix biographical fact with interpretation. Indeed, many of his articles concerning the Notebooks rely heavily on biographical fact as evidence for his interpretation of the dating, purpose, etc. of the Notebooks. Luce's comment appears both in his Preface to the 1949 edition and is retained in the 1968 edition of *The Life of George Berkeley*. This is important because *Works*, mostly published in between these two editions, often carries with it in the Editor's Introductions and footnotes throughout the text biographical facts in support of Luce and Jessop's interpretation contained therein. I know not what to make of Luce's comment, except he must mean he intends to give an account of Berkeley's life in *The Life of George Berkeley* completely separate from any discussion of Berkeley's philosophy. This would make the comment plausible and reasonable, given Luce mentions publications by Hone and Rossi and by Wild as examples of what he [Luce] is *not* doing in *The Life of George Berkeley*.

⁷² Stock (1776), p. 1; Luce (1949), p. v.

⁷³ For the former instance, cp. Hone and Rossi (1931); Hicks (1932); etc. For the later instance, cp. Wild (1936); Wisdom (1953a); Berman (1994); etc.

direction: the biography dictates the publications.⁷⁴ This has led to the epoch-view of Berkeley's life and has contributed to the Minor Publications Hypothesis.⁷⁵

The Epoch-View of Berkeley's Biography

35. Generally stated, the epoch-view of Berkeley's biography divides his life into certain time periods or epochs, with each epoch defined by some overarching theme, goal, attribute, or purpose. However, Berkeleyan scholars do not agree on the length, number, or theme of those epochs, so there is variation of the epoch-view among Berkeleyan scholars. The number and length of epochs depend on how the scholar comprehends general, overarching phases of Berkeley's interest and activity. Obviously, the epoch-view must account for the entirety of Berkeley's life, so the epoch-view has a definite beginning and end, being Berkeley's birth and death respectively. Some scholars offer three epochs, others four, and still others five.⁷⁶ Some scholars explicitly endorse the epoch-view, while other scholars appear to tacitly endorse the view.⁷⁷ However, it is not completely clear in the cases of tacit endorsement whether or not that scholar does in fact endorse the epoch-view.⁷⁸ Other scholars appear not to endorse the epoch-view at all.⁷⁹

⁷⁴ Cf. Intro. 17

⁷⁵ In his 1901 Preface, Fraser seems to introduce the Minor Publications Hypothesis and the epoch-view together: "The first three volumes in this edition contain the Philosophical Works exclusively; arranged in chronological order, under the three periods of Berkeley's life. The First Volume includes those of his early life; the Second those produced in middle life; and the Third those of his later years. The Miscellaneous Works are presented in like manner in the Fourth Volume." (Fraser, 1901, vol. 1, p. ix)

⁷⁶ For instances of three epochs, cp. Fraser (1901); Tipton (1974), pp. 2-4; Berman (1994); Berman (2005); Flage (2014); etc. For an instance of four epochs, cf. Luce (1945), p. 12. For an instance of five epochs, cf. Young (1985), Ch. 1.

⁷⁷ For instances where scholars explicitly endorse the epoch-view, cf. previous fn. Other scholars who appear to tacitly endorse the epoch-view are Olscamp (1970), pp. 1-3; Clarke (2008), pp. 5-11; Kail (2014), pp. 1-2; etc.

⁷⁸ Support for the suspicion that some Berkeleyan scholars tacitly endorse the epoch-view lies in the way in which the scholar uses paragraph-breaks in their accounts of Berkeley's life. For example, Olscamp and Kail each use a three paragraph account, and the paragraph-breaks fit neatly within instances of three epochs. Clarke uses a four paragraph account. Because these scholars are not explicit in their endorsement, it could be argued these scholars are only following convention and tradition within Berkeleyan scholarship and not endorsing the epoch-view.

⁷⁹ Other Berkeleyan scholars who account for Berkeley's life do not appear to endorse, even tacitly, the epoch-view. While these scholars have interesting paragraph-breaks in their accounts, it does not appear they are following the epoch-view. Indeed, at least in the case of Luce, he does not endorse the epoch-view in *The Life of George Berkeley*, while he does endorse the view in *Berkeley's Immaterialism*. Other scholars offer a unifying element to Berkeley's life without appearing to endorse the epoch-view. For example, Park (1972), p. 7 offers Berkeley's "crusading spirit" as the unifying element. Foster and Robinson (1985) and Young (1985) have already been discussed. Other possible instances of scholars not endorsing, but also not rejecting, the epoch-view are Fraser (1871) vol. IV; Fraser (1874); Johnston (1970); Bracken (1974); Pitcher (1977); Urmson (1982); Dancy (1998); Fogelin (2001); Stoneham (2002); Jones (2009); etc. Fraser's entries might understandably be removed from this list if the epoch-view originated with Luce, or at least in Fraser (1901). Stoneham may elsewhere adhere to the epoch-view as two epochs, as in Stoneham (manuscript).

36. The epoch-view dates back at least to Luce (1945, p. 12).⁸⁰ There, Luce briefly states the epoch-view is for convenience. The epoch-view is a convenient way to divide Berkeley's life into easily comprehensible periods. For Luce, those four periods of Berkeley's life are "early authorship, his travels in England and on the Continent, his American mission, and the Cloyne episcopate" (Luce, 1945, p. 12). However, Luce and subsequent Berkeleyan scholars who endorse the epoch-view fail to explain exactly why such a view is convenient and helpful. True, the lines one draws in such an exercise are arbitrary, as the examples of the scholars who endorse the epoch-view illustrate. But Luce fails to give any real justification for drawing those dividing lines in the first place, and I argue such an arbitrary convention has had negative effects on Berkeleyan scholarship.⁸¹

37. First, the epoch-view is another instance where Berkeleyan scholars are unable to agree. The point may appear small, but it is important. The epochs are defined by how the scholar understands what Berkeley is doing during that period of time, and often evidence for what Berkeley is doing is taken from his publications. Some scholars, for instance, interpret *De Motu* as part of the earlier period; others place it within a larger category of travelling years that includes *Alciphron*; and still others understand the work as separate from both the earlier period publications and from *Alciphron*.⁸² What this disagreement displays is disparity with regard to understanding how Berkeley's publications are unified.

38. Second (and perhaps ironically), the epoch-view can easily be understood as involving rigid dividing lines and, as a result, different Berkeleys. This is apparent from reading Yeats and Berman.⁸³ But Berkeleyan scholars can possibly go farther. Each epoch is defined

⁸⁰ Obviously, the epoch-view can be interpreted as being in Fraser a half century prior to Luce. The point is that Luce is following Fraser in both endorsing the epoch-view and defending its use because of its supposed convenience, implied by Fraser.

⁸¹ There is an odd similarity between the epoch-view and the Minor Publications Hypothesis. In both cases, arbitrary lines of division are drawn by an eminent Berkeleyan scholar, assuming convenience and ease of comprehension, but those divisions are neither supported by argument nor limited in bounds of application. Indeed, such use of division sets a dangerous precedence within Berkeleyan scholarship, and both the epoch-view and the Minor Publications Hypothesis have had adverse influence on the growth of Berkeleyan scholarship.

⁸² This is within the Minor Publications Hypothesis. The epoch-view and the Minor Publications Hypothesis are both rejected by Active Berkeleyanism because each promotes disunity.

⁸³ In fairness to Berman, he is careful not to take these different Berkeleys as being completely separate. His goal is to offer a unified account between Yeats and Luce. His attempt to unify the two views is found in Berman (1985) and in Berman (1994), Ch. 8. To Berman's credit, there is the beginnings of Active Berkeleyanism and my interpretation in *George Berkeley: Idealism and the Man* in the opening paragraph of the Preface: "Whereas most books dwell almost exclusively on Berkeley's philosophical writings of 1709-1713, with little or no attention to either his later work or his life, this book looks at the full range of his work and links it with his life. Advancing chronologically, I have focused on Berkeley as *homo religiosus* – a focus that is

by some important characteristic, usually displayed in the publications and biographical facts of the period. The Berkeley in Ireland before 1713 can be considered as a different Berkeley than the one in London and the one who travels throughout the Continent; and these Berkeleys can be distinguished from the Berkeley who campaigns for the Bermuda scheme, the Berkeley who returns from America, and the Berkeley of Cloyne. From these different possible Berkeleys come different possible Berkeleyan philosophies.⁸⁴ In essence when Berkeley's biography is fractured (even for convenience), disunity in Berkeleyanism becomes a more probable option. The irony in this situation is that Luce always adamantly opposed disunity in Berkeley, yet Luce, at least in one publication, introduces a definite way to spread disunity in Berkeley.⁸⁵

Active Berkeleyanism and the Reciprocity of Berkeley's Life and Works

39. Active Berkeleyanism always seeks to harmonise views whenever possible, and this activity of harmonisation extends to Berkeley's biography. Indeed, Active Berkeleyanism takes a somewhat untraditional view in rejecting the epoch-view of Berkeley's biography because it can lead to disunity concerning both Berkeley's philosophy and comprehension of Berkeley's life. Berman's three idealistic projects or bold crusades⁸⁶ and other manifestations of the epoch-view, while possibly convenient as learning devices, do more long-term harm than good. The epoch-view can take Berkeley in Ireland in his earlier years and Berkeley in Ireland in his later years to be two different people with two very different aims; and the travelling Berkeley in between to be a different Berkeley altogether from the two Irish Berkeleys. The publications of Berkeleyan scholars demonstrate the fracturing effects of the epoch-view, and as such Active Berkeleyanism rejects the epoch-view of Berkeley's life on the basis of its leading to disparity.

by no means either forced or artificial, since it is generally agreed that religion was the main driving force in his life and thought. As my teacher, A.A. Luce, once expressed it: 'You think he is building a house, you find he has built a church' – an epigram which could well have been the motto for this book" (Berman, 1994, p. v). This is an example of how Active Berkeleyanism and my interpretation are the products of development within Berkeleyan scholarship.

⁸⁴ Those Berkeleyan scholars who interpret publications after 1713 as composing a (or even multiply) different philosophies or philosophical outlooks often take as supporting evidence the apparently different biographical activities of Berkeley. Therefore, Berkeley's Bermuda scheme and his apparent abandonment of Europe as a corrupted State, supposedly found as a result of *Prevention*, act as support for why Berkeley's immaterialism makes so little of an appearance in *Alciphron*. Additionally, Berkeley's focus in Cloyne, a supposedly ailing mind, etc. also are given as support for why Berkeley seems to abandon his earlier immaterialism in *Siris*.

⁸⁵ For Luce's articles, of which there are many, that argue for unity in Berkeley's philosophy, cp. Luce (1936a); Luce (1937); Luce (1940); Luce (1942); Luce (1943a); Luce (1943b); etc. It appears obvious Luce did not intend his convenient tool of the epoch-view to lead to disunity; however, subsequent use of the epoch-view demonstrates the hidden danger to a unified Berkeley. Again, there is a parallel with Fraser and the Minor Publications Hypothesis.

⁸⁶ Berman (1985), pp. 19, 21; cp. Berman (2005), p. 13

It is far better to understand Berkeley as a single man and “single-minded”, although this term needs qualification. The efforts of the previous chapters argue Berkeley never abandons the 1710 Design throughout the remainder of his life, viz. in his corpus and in his crusading activities. The case for the publications has already been given, so it remains to argue for unity or “single-minded[ness]” in Berkeley’s biography.

40. The relation between Berkeley’s biography and his philosophy is unclear in many Berkeleyan scholars’ publications. It is probable the scholar first comes to some understanding of Berkeley’s philosophy because most students of Berkeley begin their journey with his publications.⁸⁷ Because the content, method, and purpose of the 1710 Design are not properly understood, it is easy and understandable for a scholar to fall victim to the notion of disunity among Berkeley’s publications, especially under the influence of the Minor Publications Hypothesis.⁸⁸ However, when a comprehensive view of Berkeley’s corpus and his life, along with a proper understanding of the 1710 Design, are taken into account, the scholar discovers magnificent unity between Berkeley’s corpus and life.

41. To best understand this unity, it is important to comprehend how Berkeley understands philosophy. According to my interpretation, Berkeley understands philosophy in the ancient sense of the term, viz. as a way of life. Berkeley did not understand philosophy in the contemporary and academic sense of the term, viz. as a purely intellectual pursuit or discipline; rather, philosophy for Berkeley is an intellectual pursuit for the sake of practical outcomes. For Berkeley, philosophical investigation is not, and cannot be, a purely intellectual exercise, and a philosophy is as much discredited by the practical outcomes it endorses as from any logical inconsistencies contained therein.⁸⁹ This is easy to understand if we take a few common examples. First, Berkeley rejects much of Locke’s philosophy both because Berkeley finds logical contradictions within it and because Locke’s philosophy leads to the Deist position. This Deist position is both a logical outcome and has practical implications. For Berkeley, Lockean philosophy and Deism lead to scepticism, atheism, and irreligion, and Berkeley considers those outcomes as dangerous to religion, morality, the State, etc. Second, Berkeley also rejects free-thinkers because of contradictions in thought and in practice, notably

⁸⁷ Typically, it is the ‘major’ publications of 1709-1713, the Berkeley of the ‘early’ or ‘heroic’ period.

⁸⁸ This usually occurs when the scholar moves from the ‘heroic’ period to later publications like *Alciphron* and *Siris* (again, keeping within the Minor Publications Hypothesis). However, it is possible to claim disunity even within the ‘heroic’ publications; e.g. the metaphysical status of tangible ideas in *New Theory of Vision* and *Principles*. Cf. Ch. 1.28, 32, 67, 71, and in fn. 72 and fn. 128.

⁸⁹ Cf. Intro. 21

the dilemma of their rejection of prejudice while maintaining their own prejudices. This tension is apparent in the free-thinkers' practical outcomes: not only are they hypocritical in rejecting all prejudice while upholding their own, but they also have no clear collective philosophical outlook of their own.⁹⁰ Therefore, we must approach Berkeley as we would an ancient Stoic or Epicurean, viz. we must see life and philosophical outlook as essentially intertwined.⁹¹ A Stoic or Epicurean is stoic or epicurean both because she believes the general doctrines of those philosophies and because she adheres to those doctrines in her daily life. A Stoic who reads the philosophical doctrine but did not live as those doctrines dictate is simply no Stoic at all. Conversely, someone who lives by the philosophical tenets of Epicureanism but has never read Epicurus or Lucretius is still considered an Epicurean.

42. Academic Berkeleyanism is an intermediate position between viewing Berkeleyanism merely as immaterialism and Active Berkeleyanism in part precisely because the relation between biographical narrative and interpretation of philosophy is in one direction: the biography dictates the publications, and the reverse is never considered.⁹² This is why Academic Berkeleyanism fails to satisfy: it is a positive step away from understanding Berkeleyanism as merely immaterialism, but it is incomplete in part because it fails to account for the reciprocity between Berkeley's life and philosophy.

⁹⁰ This is a lesson of from *Alciphron*. The two free-thinkers are hardly consistent throughout the dialogues, often claiming one thing and then later claiming another. *Works*, vol. III makes several of these instances clear in its footnotes. However, immediately following the publication of *Alciphron*, there were numerous attempts to combat this issue. Cf. Mandeville (1732), Hervey (1732), Hoadley (1732), etc. Browne also felt this criticism, and responded in Browne (1733).

⁹¹ The work of Young (1985) is helpful on this point. Young attempts to show how Berkeley is responding to both modern and ancient philosophy, and in a sense Berkeley is both a modern and ancient philosopher. Daniel, too, seems to be on this track when he argues for Stoic influence on Berkeley. Cf. Daniel (2008). Stoneham (manuscript) also begins his discussion with a comparison to Diogenes the Cynic.

⁹² Cf. Intro. 17. For a recent expression of this view, cf. Stoneham (manuscript) and my discussion at Ch. 5.20 regarding the theme of prejudice and education. Stoneham also makes a few important observations with regard to biography and publication. First, he begins by acknowledging the fact philosophy has acted as a justification for lifestyle, and uses Diogenes the Cynic as an example. Second, Berkeley believed in such a link between philosophy and lifestyle. Third, it is possible, and an actual fact, philosophical error led to erroneous or harmful lifestyles. Fourth, the 1710 Design was an "orchestrated plan to produce an over-arching and powerful philosophy system" intended to promote a better lifestyle. Fifth, Berkeley modified the plan after the poor reception of *Principles* Part 1. Finally, Berkeley abandoned the 1710 Design of "addressing the pernicious consequences of materialism before they trickled down into the wider population by attacking its philosophical foundations" because it "no longer seemed the best strategy to him". While I do not agree with Stoneham in his account that Berkeley abandoned the 1710 Design, I do agree with Stoneham on the other points. Indeed, the only thing lacking in Stoneham is to understand the general aim of the 1710 Design, and thereby realise Berkeley did change in one way, but in the essential essence of the 1710 Design he never faltered. I believe Stoneham is extremely close to admitting a more final aim that unified Berkeley's two educational strategies.

43. Active Berkeleyanism claims there is reciprocity between Berkeley's life and publications, and one cannot be properly understood without the other. Of course one can, for the purposes of an investigation, limit the scope to exclude one or the other, or even all of one and parts of the other, but this course of action, as mentioned earlier,⁹³ entails its own set of problems. Berkeley's philosophy, in the wider sense, must be intimately connected with his life and vice versa. Active Berkeleyanism agrees with Academic Berkeleyanism that Berkeley's biography influences his philosophy and his methodology. This is simply historical fact. Berkeley, as much as he is reacting to previous philosophers, can only form his philosophy around these philosophers if he has read those thinkers. We know Berkeley studied Locke, Descartes, Malebranche, many of the mathematicians, scientists, free-thinkers, and theologians of his own time and of history, and the historical fact that Berkeley studied these thinkers produces his comments on them in his philosophy. *But what has not been considered, and this is in part what makes Active Berkeleyanism novel, is how Berkeley's philosophy dictates his life.*

44. The Notebooks offer the reader a rare glimpse into both the developing philosophy of Berkeley and Berkeley the young man.⁹⁴ The Notebooks are in part a working out of his

⁹³ Cf. Intro. 13

⁹⁴ Almost every Berkeleyan scholar who comments on the Notebooks take the Notebooks as the beginning of Berkeley's philosophy. However, there is a notable and curious exception. Luce (1942) and Luce (1963) argues Berkeley already had some draft of an earlier version of his philosophy before he began to write the Notebooks. The Notebooks are then not only a record of Berkeley developing his philosophy, but they are also a commentary on this previous posited draft of his philosophy. There is no external evidence for this draft, but only internal evidence based on a number of entries. This is an intriguing possibility. In a similar vein, doubt can be thrown on the claim that Berkeley's draft taken with him to London was *Three Dialogues*. It could have possibly been *Principles* Part 2 or Berkeley could have had both *Three Dialogues* and *Principles* Part 2 mostly written upon his journey to London. The publishing of *Three Dialogues* could still have been in reaction to the poor reception of *Principles* Part 1, and actually having the opportunity to discuss his views with critics might have caused revision to a pre-existing draft of *Principles* Part 2. Such a possible pre-existing draft of *Principles* Part 2 could account for what Berkeley was working on between 1710 and 1713. Many scholars agree Berkeley had most, if not all, of his views for *New Theory of Vision* and *Principles* Part 1 established in advance, and the quick succession of publication of both those works demonstrate the speed at which Berkeley could write. His Draft Introduction also demonstrates this point. This possibility of having both *Three Dialogues* and *Principles* Part 2 somewhat drafted before he arrived in London should not throw doubt on Berkeley's confidence in his doctrine of mind/spirit, as is sometimes asserted by scholars. The criticism received in London would not have changed Berkeley's view, as his view of spirit/mind did not change throughout his publications; rather, as usual, Berkeley would have sought a better way of expressing and delivering his philosophy for the benefit of his audience. This goes against the views of Yeats, Turbayne, etc. who believe in an exoteric Berkeley and esoteric Berkeley, a kind of mask or strategy whereby the real Berkeley is hidden. Instead, Berkeley would be on full display insofar as he has a desire to present his philosophy, of which he is convinced, to the public for their own good. This accords well with Active Berkeleyanism because Berkeley is modifying the presentation, but not the content, of his philosophical outlook for practical outcomes. Cp. NB 209. Berkeley is convinced both logically and by the practical outcomes that his philosophy is beneficial; the task of the 1710 Design is to demonstrate the logic and practical benefits of his philosophy to others. In this, his corpus and his biography become intertwined.

published view, but they are also in part a demonstration of that philosophy sculpting and moulding Berkeley himself. There are numerous notes to himself wherein he is reminding himself to take or reject some action or attitude.⁹⁵ This acceptance or rejection is based on his blossoming philosophy. Berkeley's philosophy makes God immediately and intimately present in the world and to each individual spirit. God's presence and activity guides the activity of each individual spirit, and the more an individual spirit realises the immediacy and intimacy of God, the greater effect it has on the activity of the individual spirit. God's presence essentially identifies and directs our actions by the physical and moral laws. Virtuous action, along with a pious attitude to the sensible world, are direct results of Berkeley's philosophy. Christianity also supports his philosophy, and in turn guides Berkeley's life. The publications, the crusading spirit, the "idealistic causes", etc. make intuitive sense when we realise Berkeley's philosophy is affecting his life just as much as his life is affecting his philosophy. The well-known praise of Berkeley's character becomes the recognition in others of Berkeley's devotion to his philosophical outlook, not only logically but more importantly in his daily activity and attempts to bring about virtue, morality, and religion in the world. Berkeley's philosophy might be peculiar, but it leads to practical outcomes that individuals both recognise and value.⁹⁶

45. The effect of Berkeley's philosophy on his life choices is not limited to moral and religious matters. Berkeley's remedial works, focusing on public spirit, economics, charity work, etc. also stem from his philosophy. Indeed, it is easy to suppose Berkeley had a working theory before he began to publish and act on these topics. This claim is circumstantial and controversial, but in itself there is nothing implausible to it. Many of Berkeley's remedial publications and "idealistic causes" make better sense if we suppose Berkeley was working from a pre-existing theory.⁹⁷ Also, I argue the 1710 Design subsumes the publications after 1713 in part because they fulfil the promised content and adhere to the methodology of the Design. But many of the publications are directly linked to Berkeley's activity: *Prevention* and *Proposal* anticipate and announce the Bermuda Scheme; *Alciphron*, the Johnson correspondence, Propagation Sermon, and Berkeley's gifts of books account for Berkeley's time in America; the *Analyst* controversy springs Berkeley into his episcopate; and *Querist*,

⁹⁵ Cp. NB 79, 185, 209, 252, 320, 323, 441, 489, 491, 498, 550, 560, 620, 633, 713, 751, 794; etc.

⁹⁶ That is, virtuousness. As such, Berkeley's attack on Mandeville is comprehensible because Mandeville promotes vice as publically beneficial, whereas Berkeley believes virtuous action is publically beneficial. Additionally, one of the purposes of *Siris* is to offer a possible panacea to the public, which is solely for the benefit of the public. This can be considered, and those who sided with Berkeley in the tar-water controversy seem to consider it, as a virtuous action by an individual for the benefit of the State and for humanity.

⁹⁷ Cf. 3.18-21, 31-34, 37-38, 41, 51-53, 63-66

Discourse, Siris and the tar-water writings, Letter to John James, *Primary Visitation Charge, Address at Confirmation*, 1745 letters on the Jacobites, etc. all cast light on and help to explain Berkeley's activities as bishop of Cloyne.

46. The stress in the foregoing paragraphs is on how Berkeley's philosophy affects his life choices. It should not be thought the denial of the traditional view, viz. Berkeley's biography dictates his philosophy, is implied. Rather, there is a genuine reciprocity between Berkeley's biography and philosophy, and the emphasis placed here on how Berkeley's philosophy dictates his biography is meant solely to balance out the account of that reciprocity. That Berkeley was working from a pre-existing theory and system, at least insofar as his academic publications are concerned, is evidenced by Berkeley's many references in those later academic publications to his early works. Berkeley's remedial and religious writings also share this reciprocity. The occasion for publication and the practical applicability of the content of those publications may in some cases be dictated by Berkeley's life choices, but the theoretical content of those publications stem from his philosophical system, which Berkeley believes to be harmonious and whole. As a result of that theoretical system, Berkeley lives his life in accordance to it, thereby directing his life choices and activities, which in turn dictate the occasions and applicability of his publications. This conclusion explains how the 1710 Design played out in Berkeley's life.

Section 4: Salvation as the Final Aim of the 1710 Design

47. It might be thought sufficient that what has been shown and argued is all that should be required from the interpretation of this dissertation: i.e. the unification of content and methodology of Berkeley's corpus under the general banner and aims of the 1710 Design, the educational theory and practice needed to disseminate that content to correct the errors in human understanding, and Berkeley's life as a living example of the embodiment and benefits of the 1710 Design could be sufficient to properly understand Berkeleyanism in its fullest sense. Such thinking would fulfil questions of *what* the 1710 Design concerns and *how* such a Design can be actually implemented in everyday, practical life. However, such thinking would fail to account for the final important aspect of the 1710 Design, an aspect which Active Berkeleyanism holds to be vital in truly understanding Berkeleyanism. This aspect is the final aim of the 1710 Design, which answers the question of *why* the 1710 Design was so important to Berkeley that he devoted so much time, effort, and energy to it. My interpretation

understands the answer to why Berkeley devoted his life to the 1710 Design to lie in the desire for salvation.

48. It is impossible to claim with complete confidence Berkeley had this lively faith because this lively faith is something inherently internal. Cranmer nowhere speaks of any other person but the individual in question, God, and Christ knowing for certain if she has lively faith or not. Lively faith is a gift of God and a turning of the soul towards God in more than a profession of belief in the articles of a religion. Lively faith involves a trust and confidence in God's mercy and grace, and a real belief in Christ as a priest, advocate, and redeemer.⁹⁸ We cannot even in complete confidence look at Berkeley's life and actions as verification because we cannot properly identify his good works as lively or dead.⁹⁹ However, there are marks or signs to which we can point to say Berkeley might have believed himself to have this lively faith, and if so, that his final aim in his life and 1710 Design was salvation.

49. The interpretation of this dissertation understands the 1710 Design as something that unifies Berkeley's corpus, methodology, and life choices together. This Design involves a proper knowledge of spirit and ideas. Berkeley believes he is defending his religion, and so it is reasonable to conclude this proper knowledge of spirit and ideas conforms to his religion. As the end of Anglicanism is salvation, it is reasonable to conclude the end of this proper knowledge of spirits and ideas is also for salvation. In the quest for identifying proper knowledge, Berkeley takes issue with philosophies that are against his religious beliefs. Because these philosophies end in scepticism, atheism, and irreligion, they cannot possibly be the proper knowledge needed to gain salvation. This sums up Berkeley's efforts in each and every written work. His new theory towards vision ends in understanding that the visual ideas we receive at every moment come directly from God and form a Divine Visual Language.¹⁰⁰ His immaterialism ends in understanding that philosophical matter is problematic, leading to scepticism, atheism, and irreligion, and the removal of this philosophical matter returns confidence and proper knowledge of the world of ideas, the existence and attributes of God, and the proper way to live one's life.¹⁰¹ His remedial works end with the understanding that society, with its ethics, politics, economics, education, etc. have religion as its cornerstone, and so they must advance and adhere to religion. His religious writings defend Christianity, and

⁹⁸ Cf. Ch. 5.7-10

⁹⁹ Cf. Ch. 5.11-13

¹⁰⁰ NTV 147; A.IV; *Vindication*

¹⁰¹ PHK 156; DHP3 262-263; A.IV; A.VII.31; etc.

especially Anglicanism, as that proper foundation of society, with the end of all worship, morality, politics, etc. being the end of religion. But the end of religion is salvation, so that society, with its different aspects, is all for the sake of salvation. Because salvation is in some sense the unification with God, the end of religion, and thereby society, is the unification with God and therefore salvation. So that all of our interests in this present life should be understood in terms of our eternal interests of salvation.¹⁰²

50. Berkeley understands his own philosophical system to be one within the group of philosophies that takes Mind as the fundamental element.¹⁰³ As Berkeley understands God to be Mind, *Siris* becomes a possible guidebook for reaching God. Yet, *Siris* also displays how God is present in the world, all the way down to such a mundane thing as tar. *Siris* is not alone in Berkeley's corpus in this regard.¹⁰⁴ His works on vision end with arguments that God is directly giving our minds the visual ideas we perceive, and these visual ideas form a language with which God speaks to us.¹⁰⁵ God's ordering of the world allows advances and knowledge in the scientific fields of study.¹⁰⁶ Our mind's faculties, which are created by God, allow advancement in mathematics, and our belief in mathematics is no different than our religious beliefs.¹⁰⁷ God's law and commandments guide us through our societal concerns, be they matters of ethics and morality, religion, politics and loyalty, education, medicine, or any other.¹⁰⁸ If we understand Berkeleianism in this way, then God becomes the centre of Berkeleianism, from which all other things find their origin.¹⁰⁹ Indeed, my interpretation reads each and every work of Berkeley's corpus to show or rely upon this tenet. And if God is the central component in Berkeleianism, then it accords with Berkeley's Anglican beliefs and need to have a lively faith. God is at the centre of Berkeleianism much like God is at the centre of lively faith: God gives us the world and our faculties like He gives us this lively faith, and we must accept, understand, and act in the world like we must accept, understand, and act in lively faith.

51. Yet Berkeley is keen to uphold the Anglican doctrine of justification by faith alone. Berkeley does not believe himself correct and justified in his philosophy because of any real

¹⁰² Cf. Ch. 2.17, 19-21, 25, Ch. 3.66; Ch. 4.10-18, 20-23, 50-51, 54, 68

¹⁰³ Cf. Ch. 4.64-68

¹⁰⁴ Cf. Ch. 1.16-20

¹⁰⁵ NTV 147; A.IV; *Vindication*

¹⁰⁶ Cf. Ch. 2.40-42

¹⁰⁷ Cf. Ch. 2.51-54

¹⁰⁸ Cf. Ch. 5.12-13

¹⁰⁹ Cf. Ch. 2.12

power he has, but because his system conforms to and defends Anglicanism. One should not misunderstand Berkeleyanism to the point that one could believe that by believing in Berkeley's philosophy she could be justified for salvation. That would place Berkeley's Design, along with the reciprocity between life and works, as a kind of justification by works, which Berkeley would roundly reject.¹¹⁰ Berkeley is not telling his reader to believe in him, but to follow along to find their own answer.¹¹¹ This means Berkeley's methodology, as interpreted throughout this thesis, is one that places the onus back upon the reader. When one truly understands Berkeleyanism, one is in a better position to receive lively faith, investigate it, understand it, and guide her actions accordingly; i.e. the reader has an inward turn toward God in preparation to receive a lively faith.

52. Additionally, Berkeley was ordained in the Anglican Church. This means he had further responsibilities to others above and beyond those typically assigned to members of the Anglican congregation. These duties include upholding allegiance to the monarch; to "instruct the people committed to [his] charge: to teach nothing (as required of necessity to eternal salvation) but that which [he] shall be persuaded may be concluded and proved by scripture... to banish and drive away all erroneous, and strange doctrines, contrary to Gods word[,] and to use both publick and private monitions, and exhortations as well to the sick as to the whole within [his] Cures, as need shall require, and occasion shall be given"; to "be diligent to frame and fashion [his] own [self], and [his] families, according to the doctrine of Christ; and to make both his [self], and them, as much as [he lieth], wholesome examples and Patters to the flock of Christ"; and to make himself "gentle, and be merciful for Christs sake to poor and needy people, and to all strangers destitute of help" (Book of Common Prayer). My interpretation holds Berkeley took these responsibilities in ordination very seriously, shaping both his own life and his purpose with others. Because Berkeley had already received Holy Orders by the time the 1710 Design began to be implemented,¹¹² these responsibilities in ordination help guide the Design. This fact means the Design has a vocational aspect, and thus Berkeley's corpus and methodology have a vocational aspect.

53. For all of Berkeley's works, published or otherwise, my interpretation does not claim this would justify Berkeley to God. But it does point to the marks and signs of a possible

¹¹⁰ Cf. Ch. 5.8-10; cp. Wild (1936), p. 75

¹¹¹ Cf. Ch. 1.16-20

¹¹² Holy Orders was statutory when becoming a fellow at Trinity College, Dublin. Berkeley began his fellowship in 1707. Cf. Luce (1949), pp. 41-44

lively faith and argues Berkeley's entire life, viz. his corpus, his methodology, his practice of dissemination, and his everyday activity can be understood as instances of the true and lively faith that is crucial to Anglicanism and its beliefs about salvation.¹¹³ As Berkeley was an Anglican clergyman, he preached the beliefs of Anglicanism and strove to follow Christ's example in living his life. As a philosopher, Berkeley always kept the focus of God's centrality in mind by making God the creator and sustainer of the world, by keeping his interests in line with those taught by Christ and in line with his eternal or future interest. So, distinguishing Berkeley as a clergyman and Berkeley as a philosopher, or as a mathematician or natural philosopher or physician or educator, etc. is to miss the deeply inherent unity of the man and his efforts.

Conclusion

54. The interpretation of this dissertation takes Berkeley to be Berkeley: one, whole, unified man who had one, whole, unified project. For Anglicans and for Christians in general, there is no greater goal than that of their own salvation. Berkeley is no different in this regard. Where he is different is in his devotion to these Anglican beliefs, in striving to see if he had a lively faith, and if so, to not be idle in his faith. My interpretation interprets Berkeley to succeed in not being idle, suggests Berkeley did have such a lively faith, and so he strove to do what was necessary to keep his faith alive as instructed by his religious beliefs. "To *Berkley*, ev'ry Virtue under Heav'n" (Davis, 1966, p. 417). As *lively* good works are the product of lively faith, we can interpret the reciprocity between Berkeley's 1710 Design with all of its aspects, components, and characteristics, and his life choices as such *lively* good works. And as lively faith and *lively* good works are marks of Anglican salvation, so too does my interpretation take Berkeley's final aim to be salvation.

¹¹³ Cf. Ch. 5.5-13

Chapter 6: Objections and Replies

Introduction

1. In the previous chapters of this dissertation, I argue for a new unified interpretation of Berkeleyanism. My interpretation is a product of an improved methodological approach, called Active Berkeleyanism, to Berkeley's corpus and Berkeleyan scholarship, and this interpretation holds Berkeley did not abandon the Design of his youth either in content or methodology. Berkeley's Notebooks, correspondence, corpus, and biography all aid in understanding the Design's purpose, which is the proper knowledge of spirits and ideas for the sake of Anglican salvation. The intention and effort of this dissertation is to demonstrate both the benefits of Active Berkeleyanism, and how and why this new interpretation of Berkeleyanism can be the case for Berkeleyanism. Previous chapters of this dissertation also contain various obstacles for Active Berkeleyanism and this new interpretation in Berkeleyan scholarship, including the 'static' interpretation of the 1710 Design, an apparent lack of definitive textual evidence for the remaining components of the 1710 Design, the Minor Publications Hypothesis, and the epoch-view of Berkeley's biography.

2. However, there are objections one can raise against both Active Berkeleyanism and the interpretation offered in this dissertation. These objections can be separated into two general categories: objections pertaining to Active Berkeleyanism itself, and objections pertaining to the specific interpretation advanced in this dissertation. In this chapter, I discuss and reply to various objections to both Active Berkeleyanism and the new unified interpretation of Berkeleyanism. Section 1 offers two different objections against Active Berkeleyanism: an objection from the variety of Berkeley's interests, and an objection from the traditional debate on Berkeley's 'development'. Section 2 provides an objection against the final aim of my interpretation, viz. Anglican salvation is the unifying principle of Berkeleyanism. Section 3 furnishes two arguments against the interpretation's claim that Berkeley did not abandon the 1710 Design. I identify these separate arguments as the Historical argument and the Philosophical argument respectively, formalise these arguments, and refute them.

Section 1: Two Objections against Active Berkeleyanism

3. Active Berkeleyanism serves the following functions: it is an improved methodology for investigating Berkeley; it is a methodological critique on previous methodologies used in

Berkeleyan scholarship; and it is a meta-interpretation of previous interpretations of Berkeley.¹ As a new methodology, Active Berkeleyanism produces new interpretations of Berkeleyanism. Active Berkeleyanism is the methodological outcome of the progression of Berkeleyan scholarship, neglecting nothing and attempting whenever possible to incorporate and harmonise primary Berkeleyan texts and secondary scholarship.² Active Berkeleyanism subsumes without intending any degradation the investigations completed by Berkeleyan scholars who utilise the methodologies of mere immaterialism and Academic Berkeleyanism, and it assimilates Berkeley's lifestyle as both cause and evidence for the philosophy.³ As a methodological critique, Active Berkeleyanism both rejects previous methodologies in Berkeleyan scholarship due to their inability to properly provide unity and a comprehensive understanding to Berkeley's corpus, and offers an improved way of approaching Berkeley that is comprehensive, demanding, and enriching. It does not limit the possible outcomes of interpretations of Berkeleyanism to a single instance, but it does hold that any interpretation which does not attempt to give a comprehensive and unified account of Berkeley's corpus and his biography is defective.⁴ Finally, Active Berkeleyanism is a meta-interpretation of previous interpretations in Berkeleyan scholarship, as evidenced in this dissertation by the rejection of the Minor Publications Hypothesis and the epoch-view of Berkeley's biography.⁵

4. These features of Active Berkeleyanism could raise certain concerns. In this section, I investigate two possible objections to Active Berkeleyanism as distinguished from the interpretation offered in this dissertation. The first objection focuses on the variety of Berkeley's accomplishments, and it worries unity is not possible with such a résumé. The second objection finds its origin in the traditional debate on the unity of Berkeleyanism. Both of these objections centre on the importance of unity inherent within Active Berkeleyanism.

The Objection from the Variety of Berkeley's Interests

5. A possible objection to Active Berkeleyanism stems from concern over the variety of accomplishments and interests of Berkeley's career. Berkeley was a teacher, a metaphysician, a physicist, an epistemologist, a mathematician, a moralist, a clergyman, a traveller, a polemicist, a public debater, an entrepreneur, a fundraiser, and an economist. He

¹ Intro. 18

² Intro. 20

³ Intro. 21

⁴ Intro. 22

⁵ Intro. 23

was interested in ancient philosophy, the new philosophy, architecture, art, music, chemistry, and medicine. He has been called an idealist, a phenomenalist, a sceptic, a realist, a mystic, and a solipsist or egoist. He has been accused of being a contrarian, a fool, a dreamer, an establisher of paradoxes, a Jacobite, and an overly practical man. He knew many of the great thinkers and activists of his generation in England, and he suggested tar-water was a possible panacea for the masses. He was a brother, a husband, a father, and a bishop. He was loved and respected by Tories and Whigs. He gained inspiration from Plato, Aristotle, Stoics, and Neoplatonists, as well as from Descartes, Malebranche, Bayle, and Locke. He influenced Hume, Reid, and Kant. He wrote technical treatises and brilliant dialogues, a work entirely composed of questions, another work of seemingly unrelated and obscure reflections, along with public essays and congregational sermons. He penned poetry, mathematical criticisms, geological descriptions, and a set of notebooks with aphorisms and private thoughts. In conclusion, it seems a serious question whether unity can be established over such a wide range of interests and accomplishments.

6. I reply, first, none of the things Berkeley actually was or did are in any way necessarily such that unity is impossible. There is no inherent contradiction between any of his accomplishments, interests, and styles of writing. A person can live her life and be all these things, do all these things, and be interested in all these things without fear of being fundamentally inconsistent and disjointed, and all of these things can be subsumed under a consistent purpose or aim which makes them all relevant and important aspects of an individual life.

7. Second, this objection rests on presuppositions or views argued against in this dissertation, e.g. the Minor Publications Hypothesis and the epoch-view. If a Berkeleyan scholar only narrowly focuses on a handful of publications in Berkeley's corpus and is unable to see a consistent unifying purpose, then that is hardly the fault of Berkeley. If one attempts to understand (e.g. *Principles* Part 1) without studying Berkeley's correspondence around the time of its publication and the various other remarks Berkeley makes concerning that work, then it should come as no surprise that the scholar's account is insufficient. If a scholar is concerned only with a single aspect of Berkeleyanism and detaches that element from his overall system, then it is reasonable to expect complaints of incompleteness and confusion. If a scholar separates Berkeley's life into any number of arbitrary phases and then investigates each phase on its own without connection to the rest of Berkeley's life, it is plain she will eventually conclude there are as many Berkeleys as arbitrary divisions. If Berkeleyan scholars allow a

limitless cleaving upon Berkeley in his interests, accomplishments, modes of expression, possible attitudes, and endeavours, like some Lockean grain of wheat, then truly we fall victim to Berkeley's accusation that we have "raised a dust, and then complain, we cannot see" (PHKI 3).

8. Finally, this dissertation covers Berkeley's corpus and his life systematically. It gives an interpretation based on an improved methodology, and that interpretation is both comprehensive and unified. Using Active Berkeleyanism, I have neglected nothing, although I admit not every piece of Berkeleiana has been ushered into my interpretation. We can disagree on minor or small points, and such disagreement is expected and encouraged. But those small points do not impact Active Berkeleyanism as a method, a methodological critique, or a meta-interpretation. I have marshalled into this dissertation a variety of differing interpretations in Berkeleyan scholarship throughout its history to exhibit their strengths and weaknesses. Further examples can be included, but such use might be prolix.⁶

The Objection from the Traditional Debate on Berkeley's 'Development'

9. Another possible objection to Active Berkeleyanism is more specific in nature, and it claims Berkeleyanism developed over Berkeley's career to the point that his writings at Trinity College are fundamentally at odds with his writings at Cloyne. This objection finds actual debate in Berkeleyan scholarship. This debate concerns the question of Berkeleyanism's 'development'. What 'development' means in this context is itself debateable; indeed, the debate, in my opinion, is in some way centred on clarifying this term. The debate of Berkeleyanism's 'development' (or lack thereof) has a history in Berkeleyan scholarship which dates back well over a century, and it continues to the present day. It would be inappropriate to discuss every possible standpoint in this debate, but there is a certain period of a few years in Berkeleyan scholarship where this debate took centre-stage, and I focus on this period to give some reality to the claims of the objection. This period is 1934-1937, and it consists of notable Berkeleyan scholars, viz. primarily Luce and Wild.⁷ This debate, like many others in

⁶ I have incorporated throughout this dissertation many scholarly publications with which the reader may be unfamiliar, due to the age of these publications and perhaps their relative obscurity. This was done intentionally in order to exhibit the wealth of available scholarly work now generally ignored by contemporary Berkeleyan scholars. Obviously, many of my arguments could have also received support from more recent and familiar scholarly publications, but it would have been a shame to miss an opportunity to display Active Berkeleyanism in such a way as to incorporate these neglected parts of Berkeleyan scholarship.

⁷ I begin in 1934 because of Luce (1934a), which argues for the unity of Berkeleyanism in its most substantial form by Luce before *Works*. The other pieces of scholarship I include during that period as relevant are Wild (1936); Luce (1936b); Luce (1937); Jessop (1937); and Wild (1937). While the monographs of Luce and Wild set their respective positions, the debate really intensifies in Luce (1936b), wherein Luce takes issue with Wild's

Berkeleyan scholarship, displays misunderstanding between prominent Berkeleyan scholars. I argue Luce misunderstands Wild, Wild misunderstands Luce, and both Luce and Wild misunderstand Fraser, to whom they both agree is incorrect or insufficient. It is necessary, in order to both understand the objection and properly respond to it, to discuss the history and misunderstandings of this exchange between Luce and Wild.

10. Before investigating Luce and Wild's positions of apparent disagreement, it would be wise to begin with the view they both reject, viz. Fraser's view on Berkeley's 'development'. Luce, in introducing the "broader issue behind and around [the textual question of if Berkeley 'corrected' some of his sermons]", believes the issue of 'development' was a product of Fraser's editions.⁸ Luce's concern is that Fraser's view of Berkeley's development "has been carried to absurd lengths". Wild, too, sees Fraser as the origin of the debate.⁹ Yet we must handle both of these scholars' claims with care.¹⁰ It appears to me Fraser does allow some kind of development within Berkeleyanism, but such a development is not of such a nature as the objection claims. Fraser does not anywhere claim, so far as I have found, *Siris* is at odds with *Principles* Part 1; in actuality, Fraser argues the exact opposite multiple times in different publications.¹¹ The earliest Berkeleyan scholars that I have found to make this objection concerning unity are Stirling,¹² who responds and rejects Fraser's claims of unity, and Balfour, who follows Stirling a few decades later.¹³ It appears to me Luce, Wild, and others confuse the position of Fraser with the positions of Stirling and Balfour. This might explain why Luce

view that certain sermons were 'corrected' by Berkeley. This in itself is interesting as the initial textual point of disagreement is not *Principles* Part 1, *Siris*, or any other of the so-called 'major' works; instead, it is on Berkeley's sermons, which, while perhaps circumstantial, offer some support to the importance of Berkeley's religious writings. Luce uses (1936b) as an initial salvo against the interpretation of Wild (1936). The debate between Luce and Wild quickly moves away from the sermons and onto Berkeley's corpus as a whole in Luce (1937), but it is important at least to pause and remember why the debate originally started. Soon after Luce (1936b), Luce (1937) appears in two parts, and Jessop (1937) follows. Wild's response happens in Wild (1937). Wild (1937) appears to be the final word for Wild, but Luce and Jessop continue on with other publications defending their view, eventually leading up to *Works* a decade after the debate with Wild. Recently, Storrie (2018b), p. 3, fn. 4 has also called attention to Luce's series of publications on this issue.

⁸ Luce (1936b), p. 282

⁹ Wild (1937), pp. 463-464; cp. Wild (1936), p. v. Woodbridge (1918), pp. 214-215 makes a similar claim.

¹⁰ The reasons why Luce and Wild reject Fraser's interpretation are different. Luce believes there is no developmental process in Berkeleyanism as described by Fraser. Wild agrees there is a developmental process in Berkeleyanism as described by Fraser, but Wild believes Fraser's interpretation is inadequate.

¹¹ E.g. Fraser (1871), vol. IV, pp. 262, 294-295, 362, 375, 413, 415; Fraser (1881) pp. 30-31, 178-179, 203-204, and in the Preface of this work wherein Fraser blatantly begins by saying, "This volume is an attempt to present, for the first time, Berkeley's philosophic thought in its organic unity."

¹² Stirling (1873), p. 16

¹³ Balfour (1897), pp. li, lviii

believes Fraser's view of development "has been carried to absurd lengths".¹⁴ It is Stirling who holds "the *Siris* of 1744 has hardly any bearing on [*Principles*] – rather, indeed, it is separated by a gulf from it, and stands confronting it, even frowning opposition... What the *Siris* shows mostly is that Berkeley has somewhat forgotten his first love, his 'Principles,' and that meanwhile he has been reading the Greeks".¹⁵ It is Balfour who claims "As in 'Siris', of which I shall presently speak, there are hints and adumbrations of a new philosophy strangely tacked on to reflections upon a new medicine".¹⁶

11. Luce's position in the debate can be summarised quite easily in his own words, "in youth [Berkeley] climbed so high and saw so far that his 'development' could consist only in seeing wider applications of that early philosophy, which he never abandoned, never out-grew, and never changed".¹⁷ Jessop shares this position with Luce.¹⁸ Interestingly, Luce and Jessop also partially share the position of Stirling, although there are extremely important differences. Stirling believes Berkeley's philosophy and philosophical thinking was completed before he left Trinity College in 1713, and in this, Luce and Jessop agree. Where Luce very much disagrees with Stirling is in the value of the remainder of Berkeley's corpus: Stirling sees no philosophical value in *Siris*, and it is apparent in Stirling this lack of value extends to the remainder of Berkeley's corpus after *Principles*. Luce holds no such claim, but instead thinks the remainder of Berkeley's corpus, at least with the 'major' works, are "wider applications of that early philosophy". Jessop takes a kind of middle ground between Luce and Stirling: he holds most of Berkeley's 'major' works are wider applications, but seems to agree with Stirling concerning the *Siris*.¹⁹

12. The position of Luce and Jessop, i.e. Berkeley's philosophising was mainly completed at Trinity College in 1713, has seen its share of opposition throughout the history of the debate. Most recently, this position has been labelled "militantly static".²⁰ Be that as it may, Luce and Jessop's overall position claims unity within Berkeley's corpus. Yet when Luce describes Wild's position, he believes they are in different "schools of thought about

¹⁴ Although, it does appear to me Luce has Wild directly in his sights. Luce fails to mention any scholars directly. Wild explains specifically his stance on Fraser as a platform for his own interpretation in Wild (1936), p. v. If Luce is targeting Stirling, his claim that Fraser's view has been carried to absurd lengths is incorrect since Stirling very much disagrees with Fraser's interpretation.

¹⁵ Stirling (1873), p. 16

¹⁶ Balfour (1897), p. li

¹⁷ Luce (1937), p. 44

¹⁸ Jessop (1937), pp. 286-287

¹⁹ Jessop (1937), p. 228. Interestingly, Jessop goes so far as to call his view of *Siris* "heretical".

²⁰ Storrie (2018b), p. 3

Berkeley's development".²¹ Luce labels Wild's position "the conversionist view", while Luce believes himself to hold a "growth" view. He explains the difference between the two by implication,²² and supports his view with textual evidence separated into "topics".²³ Yet it is exactly this difference that Wild highlights as the instance of him being misrepresented by Luce.

13. Wild correctly understands there is a difference between his view and Luce's position. But Wild errs in believing his view is so different from Fraser's. In both Fraser and Wild, Berkeley is seen as slowly developing his philosophy towards some greater end, which Fraser variously calls Eternal Mind/Spirit/Reason/Intellect. In both Fraser and Wild, Berkeley's early philosophising develops in the later works, being, to use Wild's expression, "in a sense" both consistent and surpassing. Wild rightly notices a comparison between his view and Fraser, but perhaps that comparison is deeper and greater than Wild admits.²⁴ Wild can disagree with Fraser on where Berkeleyanism begins and ends, but the process of development is the same between these two scholars' interpretations. Fraser and Wild can also agree with Luce and Jessop, and therefore disagree with Stirling and Balfour, that there is a unity in Berkeleyanism. What Fraser, Wild, Luce, and Jessop disagree on is what exactly that unity is and what 'development' means in this context.

14. It is not my purpose to demonstrate those differences between these great Berkeleyan scholars. My purpose, rather, is to emphasise that while Fraser, Luce, Jessop, and Wild disagree amongst themselves on particular points and definitions, they are united against the view expressed most properly by Stirling and Balfour that *Siris* is fundamentally at odds with Berkeley's earlier writings. Luce, I argue, has properly understood the debate, but placed it in incorrect terms and targeted the wrong opponents. True, there are important disagreements between Luce and Wild, and neither scholar is particularly shy about expressing those differences. But Luce incorrectly understands Fraser and Wild as holding a view of disunity in Berkeleyanism, and Luce's understanding of Fraser and Wild simply is not the case. It might be true, as Luce claims, that the kind of development argued by Fraser and Wild could result in "absurd lengths", but Luce's real targets are also Fraser's and Wild's targets.

²¹ Luce (1936b), p. 281

²² Ibid., p. 282

²³ Luce (1937); cp. Wild (1937) for his response to a few of these "topics"

²⁴ Wild (1937), pp. 463-464; cp. Wild (1936), p. v

15. Therefore, we must remove Fraser, Luce, Jessop, and Wild from the discussion as opponents to unity in Berkeley's corpus, and instead place them as supporters of unity within Berkeleianism. By doing so, Active Berkeleianism gains powerful allies against the view, expressed differently but similar in intention, of Stirling and Balfour. These two Berkeleian scholars are, so far as I have discovered, the originators of the objection in question, and it is to their claims I turn my attention.

16. The positions of Stirling and Balfour are by no means similar. Yet both Stirling's and Balfour's understandings of Berkeleianism can be called into serious question. Stirling holds Berkeleianism to consist of a single proposition, viz. that no matter is known but that which is known with consciousness.²⁵ Therefore according to Stirling, once Berkeley dismisses abstract matter, the entire issue is settled for Berkeley. Stirling also believes in a very Hegelian understanding of philosophy, and by those Hegelian standards dismisses Berkeleianism (as he understands it) as not even philosophy.²⁶ Under this misunderstanding of Berkeleianism, we can perhaps agree with Stirling, but no contemporary Berkeleian scholar, or one of recent memory, has subscribed to Stirling's understanding of Berkeleianism. Even Berkeleian scholars who hold Berkeleianism as mere immaterialism do not, as far as I have discovered, hold such an extreme view as Stirling. If Stirling's understanding of Berkeleianism is fundamentally flawed, which Active Berkeleianism and Berkeleian scholarship both hold it to be, then Stirling's logical conclusion of disunity between Berkeley's early writings and that of the later writings can be dismissed.²⁷

17. Balfour's view is far more subtle. He holds Berkeley's "scheme of life" underwent a complete change once Berkeley began to travel.²⁸ Balfour's interest is in Berkeley's biography, and not his philosophy *per se*.²⁹ While his general claim is that Berkeley the man changed significantly but his philosophy only changed in the attitude of expression and way of treatment, Balfour still makes some slight missteps away from this view and towards disunity.³⁰ He holds Berkeley's chief title to fame rests in his philosophy,³¹ but the philosophy of his later

²⁵ Stirling (1873), p. 8

²⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 8-10

²⁷ It would take more effort than that given here to actually dismiss Stirling's interpretation. However, this could be easily done because Stirling's entire interpretation hinges on the claim that Berkeleianism amounts to only a single claim. One would simply need to show Berkeleianism is more than this one claim, and many, if not all, of Stirling's other claims could be dismissed.

²⁸ Balfour (1897), pp. xxviii-xxix

²⁹ *Ibid.*, p. ix

³⁰ *Ibid.*, p. lviii

³¹ *Ibid.*, p. ix

years is inferior to that of his earlier years.³² He claims both the philosophy of *Siris* is the same as *Principles* Part 1, although the quality of their treatment is different, and yet he believes the treatment of the subjects in the later period of Berkeley's life surpasses that of his earlier period. Indeed, it appears to me Balfour, while focusing on the biography of Berkeley, has a confused and inconsistent interpretation of Berkeleyanism.

18. Therefore, the originators of the objection have unsatisfactory understandings of Berkeleyanism. This, in itself, does not undermine the objection, but it does weaken it from a historical and philosophical perspective. But let us remove Stirling and Balfour from the objection, and focus instead on the intention and meaning of it. The objection relies upon isolating Berkeley's earlier works and *Siris*. Therefore, the objection neglects a rather significant portion of Berkeley's corpus in its claim. It highlights changes of tone, style, treatment, and apparent differences in doctrine between these isolated works. But to do so is like watching the first and final acts of a play, but removing oneself during the middle acts. The objection complains the characters onstage are either not the ones introduced at the beginning, or the characters have significantly changed to the point of unrecognizability. To this method of inquiry, Active Berkeleyanism stands firmly in opposition. To isolate and compare works from Berkeley's earliest days to those of his latest days without acknowledging everything else in between simply is poor investigative practice. Active Berkeleyanism holds there is an inherent unity in Berkeley's corpus and in his biography, and this dissertation is a systematic attempt to show a version of that unity. In doing so, *Siris* is linked to other parts of Berkeley's corpus in at least three different ways: via Berkeley's views on natural philosophy, his medicinal interests, and his religious writings. Concerning natural philosophy, *Siris* is taken as an elaboration of doctrine in both *Principles* Part 1 and *De Motu*.³³ Concerning Berkeley's interest in tar-water, *Siris* is linked to other remedial interests.³⁴ Concerning the religious writings, this dissertation offers a compatibilist interpretation of *Siris* with Berkeley's other religious writings.³⁵ As such, *Siris* is subsumed under the 1710 Design, and is done so systematically.³⁶ No Berkeleyan scholar objects to *Principles* Part 1 or the earlier works being subsumed under the 1710 Design. Therefore, this dissertation provides an adequate response to this objection.

³² Ibid., p. lix

³³ Ch. 2.36-39

³⁴ Ch. 3.56, 58-60

³⁵ Ch. 4.64-67

³⁶ Ch. 4.55-68

19. If the objector is still unsatisfied, it would be left to her to offer a comprehensive interpretation of Berkeley's corpus demonstrating the disunity of *Siris* and the earlier works, but this attempt must be done by incorporating the remainder of Berkeley's corpus.³⁷ Otherwise, one can rightly fall back on any number of interpretations that allow for development but not a complete philosophical overhaul between the two publications of Berkeley. The objection, at its core, says there is a difference somewhere in Berkeleynism, but, I argue, that difference has yet to be properly identified and properly tracked. There may indeed be a "conversion", as Luce called it, but how, when, why, and to what extent such a conversion took place in Berkeley is insufficiently proposed. The monographs of Berkeleynian scholars focusing on a comprehensive view of Berkeley's corpus and life agree there is unity in Berkeleynism, although they disagree exactly how it is unified and what exactly it means to be unified. But these disagreements do not detract from the fact they agree on the question of unity. With these monographs, the present dissertation begs inclusion among their ranks.

Section 2: An Objection against the Final Aim

20. Having dealt with two objections to Active Berkeleynism, it is proper to turn to specific objections to the interpretation offered as a product of that methodology. While this dissertation is more concerned with introducing and defending Active Berkeleynism, a way to exhibit that methodology's strength is in replying to these possible objections concerning its product. I investigate three different objections. The first objection concerns the general unifying aim of the interpretation, i.e. Anglican salvation. This objection and its reply are handled in this section. The second and third objections concern the possible abandonment of the 1710 Design, where the rejection of such an abandonment is at the core of the new unified interpretation. These two remaining objections are called the Historical argument and the Philosophical argument, and each is handled separately in [Section 3](#).

³⁷ An additional debate partially relevant to this objection is between Wenz and McKim. Wenz (1976) argues *Principles* Part 1 and *Siris* are consistent, and *Siris* is the logical completion of *Principles* Part 1 in at least one important way. But Wenz does not prove this consistency via the intervening publications between *Principles* Part 1 and *Siris*; instead, he argues for their consistency based almost solely on *Principles* Part 1 and *Siris* in isolation, and takes a main theme of consistency to lie in abstract ideas and archetypal ideas. Unfortunately, McKim (1982) does not pick up on the general claim of unity between *Principles* Part 1 and *Siris*, but instead focuses on the specific details of Wenz's interpretation of abstract ideas and archetypal ideas. Wenz (1982) responds to McKim's criticisms. This exchange appears to be a missed opportunity to discuss the claims made in Wenz's opening paragraph in 1976. But perhaps McKim agrees with Wenz there is unity between *Principles* and *Siris*, but disagrees only with how Wenz has interpreted the matter.

21. The objection to the claim that Anglican salvation is the unifying aim of Berkeleyanism can be stated easily: Berkeley's corpus is obviously other-focused, viz. it is written for the benefit of an audience, while Anglican salvation is obviously self-focused, viz. it is believed and pursued for the benefit of that specific believer. My interpretation either conflates or confuses these two aspects, and the interpretation relies heavily on being able to have both aspects play crucial roles in arguing for Anglican salvation as the final aim of the 1710 Design. Therefore, there is an inherent tension and disunity in my interpretation which can be used to argue for the disunity of Berkeleyanism. Additionally since my interpretation is a product of Active Berkeleyanism, this objection casts doubt on the effectiveness of that methodology.

22. I reply, first, my interpretation neither conflates nor confuses the other-focused aspect with the self-focused aspect. Berkeley was both a philosopher and a devout member of the Church of England, among many other things.³⁸ His philosophical system is always in the context of his religious beliefs, even when that context is not immediately or explicitly recognized in a particular text. As such, Berkeleyanism is always applicable to the doctrinal beliefs of the Church of England.³⁹ To divorce Berkeleyanism from this context and applicability, even hypothetically, is to lose sight of crucial motivations, intentions, and purposes of Berkeleyanism. While the established link between Berkeleyanism and the Church of England has at times become obscured or ignored, it is relevant to emphasize that Berkeleyan scholarship has kept the link established at least marginally throughout its long history and that there is an increase in focus on this link especially in the last decade.⁴⁰ Active Berkeleyanism honours this established connection between Berkeleyanism and the Church of England, and it looks to further establish it via the interpretation in this dissertation.

23. Second, I acknowledge there are other-focused and self-focused aspects to my interpretation, but these aspects do not necessarily exclude each other. I argue a true and lively faith, as believed by the Church of England, is the core of this self-focused aspect of the final aim of the 1710 Design. This faith cannot be proven or disproven by any Berkeleyan scholar regarding Berkeley for the simple reason that the marks of a true and lively faith are internal.⁴¹ Yet as Cranmer says repeatedly, the products of this true and lively faith are (*lively*) good

³⁸ Ch. 5.52

³⁹ Ch. 5.50-53

⁴⁰ Ch. 4. fn. 2

⁴¹ Ch. 5.7

works.⁴² These works are good not because of the effects they cause, but because they are done by the true and lively faith, which is pleasing to God.⁴³ Therefore in the Church of England and under the doctrinal beliefs Berkeley held, good works unavoidably spring forth from faith; if this were not the case, then according to the doctrine the faith one would have would not be the true and lively faith. So what is thought by the objector to be a source of tension in Berkeleyanism in actuality becomes a confirmation of Anglican doctrine in Berkeleyanism, viz. a true and lively faith (self-focused aspect) leads to good works that are pleasing to God (other-focused aspect). This is the vocational aspect of my interpretation of the 1710 Design.⁴⁴ This is also what actually happens with religious clergy: they first find faith within themselves; this faith leads to a vocation; and this vocation leads to a focus of helping others gain the same faith not for the clergy's benefit, but for the benefit of the new believer.

24. Finally, the objector might emphasize points of disagreement with my interpretation. But as each one of the points offered in this interpretation have been argued to establish, support, and defend the claim that Anglican salvation is the final aim of Berkeleyanism, it remains left to the objector to supply reasons and arguments why any point of disagreement would affect the claim that Anglican salvation is the final aim of Berkeleyanism. It is insufficient to merely identify a point of disagreement; the objector must also argue how and why that point of disagreement undermines the claim of salvation. More to the point, the objector would have to discover some point about Anglican salvation that is fundamentally at odds with Berkeleyanism, and then demonstrate how this point disallows Berkeleyanism to have the final aim of salvation.

Section 3: Two Arguments about the Abandonment of the 1710 Design

Brief Summary of Previously Discussed Obstacles, and some Corollaries thereunto

25. Before investigating and replying to the arguments pertaining to the abandonment of the 1710 Design, it is helpful to summarise relevant information from this dissertation and to add some corollaries where appropriate. This summary and further discussion is for the sake of the reader: collecting the relevant information from earlier chapters of this dissertation assists the reader in understanding the investigations and replies to the particular objections of this section.

⁴² Ch. 5.6-7, 11-13

⁴³ Ch. 5.6, 13

⁴⁴ Ch. 5.52

26. The traditional ‘static’ interpretation of the 1710 Design is as a planned set of publications with distinct objectives, categorised into parts as separate publications.⁴⁵ The ‘static’ interpretation holds Berkeley deviated from his original conception of the 1710 Design after the initial publication of *Principles* Part 1 and also holds Berkeley eventually completely abandoned the Design.⁴⁶ This ‘static’ interpretation is problematic for a number of reasons. First, it fails to give a final aim to the 1710 Design, although it does give a general aim of abridging studies. The ‘static’ interpretation fails to give a reason why such a general aim is important to Berkeley and to his audience.⁴⁷ Second, the ‘static’ interpretation has caused Berkeleyan scholars to be hesitant in ascribing certain publications to the 1710 Design. This, in part, is due to the supposed order of planned publications.⁴⁸ But additionally, the ‘static’ interpretation conflates the content of the remaining Parts of the 1710 Design with the titles *Principles* Part X. This conflation is of the utmost importance in replying to the objections of this section. The new unified interpretation seeks to locate the content of the remaining Parts of the 1710 Design without limiting that search under the banner of ‘Principles’. I argue the content of the 1710 Design is found throughout Berkeley’s corpus, and so the conflation of the content of the remaining Parts of the 1710 Design and the titles *Principles* Part X is unwarranted. I also argue the 1710 Design is more than a catalogue of publications; it is also an active methodology for discovering truth and principles, which creates a sense of authority in the reader.⁴⁹ This methodology is inherently practical.⁵⁰

27. There is also the supposed problem of a lack of definitive textual evidence for the remaining Parts of the 1710 Design. No main text exists from Berkeley devoted to spirit and morality.⁵¹ But I argue one can reasonable assume Berkeley’s publications are the finalised statements of his doctrine.⁵² These finalised statements need not be paralleled in the Notebooks. My interpretation allows Berkeley to choose what issue or set of issues he believed relevant to his purpose. The supposed problem of insufficient textual evidence regarding spirit and morality arises because scholars want an investigation of spirit and morality in a similar way as the investigation of ideas, viz. scholars want *Principles* Part 2 to be a similar kind of

⁴⁵ Ch. 1.2

⁴⁶ Ch. 1.3-5

⁴⁷ Ch. 1.7

⁴⁸ Ch. 1.8

⁴⁹ Ch. 1.21

⁵⁰ Ch. 1.78-80

⁵¹ Ch. 2.3

⁵² Ch. 2.4

investigation as *Principles* Part 1, *De Motu*, *Analyst*, etc. But this fails to heed Berkeley's warning about understanding spirits as ideas.⁵³ Additionally, I argue Parts III and IV are accomplished in Berkeley's corpus,⁵⁴ and I link these accomplishments to the 1710 Design.⁵⁵

28. Finally, there is the Minor Publications Hypothesis, which supposes Berkeley's writings can be separated into 'major' and 'minor' publications based on a very narrow understanding of philosophy.⁵⁶ But the Minor Publications Hypothesis entails a number of difficulties for Berkeleian scholars. First, the terms 'major' and 'minor' are misleading and anachronistic. Second, there is no agreement between Berkeleian scholars as to which publications are major and minor. Third, this hypothesis is not a viable method to attain a comprehensive understanding of Berkeleianism.⁵⁷ Therefore, Active Berkeleianism rejects the Minor Publications Hypothesis, allowing for a better comprehensive understanding of Berkeleianism and setting each of Berkeley's publications in his corpus on equal standing.

The Historical Argument

29. The Historical argument states Berkeley abandoned the 1710 Design. In truth, the Historical argument is an implicit argument based on narratives of historical evidence. Because of the implicit nature of the Historical argument, the supporters⁵⁸ of the Historical argument do not explicitly state a formalisation of the Historical argument. Therefore, the first task in understanding the Historical argument is to explicitly formalise the argument. While there are possible variations of the Historical argument throughout Berkeleian scholarship with regard to when and why Berkeley abandons the Design based on peculiar narratives of historical evidence, each possible manifestation of the Historical argument agrees Berkeley does abandon the Design and there is historical evidence for this claim.⁵⁹ It is more efficient to focus on the

⁵³ Ch. 2.8

⁵⁴ Ch. 2.27-54

⁵⁵ Ch. 2.55-75

⁵⁶ Ch. 3.3

⁵⁷ Ch. 3.4

⁵⁸ Because of the implicit nature of the Historical argument, it is difficult to determine which Berkeleian scholars subscribe to the Historical argument. In many cases, Berkeleian scholars offer the historical evidence as the simple fact Berkeley abandoned the 1710 Design, and there is no narrative or argument attached to their discussion; rather, the Berkeleian scholar appears to simply assume from the historical evidence that abandonment is the obvious and uncontroversial conclusion. The Historical argument does not necessarily conclude there is disunity in Berkeley's philosophical system; indeed, the only thing actually concluded from the Historical argument is Berkeley abandoned the 1710 Design. Berkeleian scholarship still has open the option of finding unity in Berkeley's philosophical system elsewhere, and this is the option those Berkeleian scholars take when arguing for unity.

⁵⁹ E.g. Fraser (1871), vol. IV, p. 42; Johnston (1923), p. 283; Luce (1949), p. 48; Warnock (1953), pp. 20-21; Turbayne (1954b), p. ix; Luce (1963), p. 106; Winkler (1982), p. xi; Berman (1994), p. 6; etc.

commonality between the various possible manifestations of the Historical argument, and explicit formalisation of the Historical argument aids in understanding why Berkeleyan scholars subscribe to this implicit argument for the abandonment of the 1710 Design.

30. The formalisation of the Historical argument is as follows.

- (HP1). Berkeley originally formulated the 1710 Design in his Notebooks.
- (HP2). The 1710 Design was composed of specific parts.
- (HP3). Each part of the 1710 Design concerned a specific topic.
- (HP4). Part I concerns Berkeley's theory of knowledge from sense-perception and gives "a preliminary outline of the metaphysics of sensory reality and of mind which he intended to develop in an ordered sequence of Parts".⁶⁰
- (HP5). Part II concerns Berkeley's moral philosophy, which includes metaphysics, "the distinction between the corporeal and the mental, the nature of God, the freedom of man, the commonplaces of ethics, and apparently a nominalist logic of demonstration".⁶¹
- (HP6). Part III (and possibly a Part IV) concerns Berkeley's views on natural philosophy and mathematics.
- (HC1). Therefore, the 1710 Design planned to publish a *Principles* Part 1, Part 2, Part 3, and possibly a Part 4.
- (HP7). Berkeley published *Principles* Part 1 in 1710.
- (HC2). Therefore, the first Part of the 1710 Design was completed.
- (HP8). Berkeley makes several references to *Principles* Part 2, Part 3, and a possible Part 4 in the 1710 edition of *Principles* Part 1, in *Three Dialogues*, and in his correspondence with others.
- (HP9). Berkeley does not publish *Principles* Part 2, Part 3, or Part 4 by the time of the Johnson correspondence.
- (HP10). Johnson specifically informs Berkeley of his "impatience till I see the second part of your design accomplished" (Letter 190).
- (HP11). Berkeley admits to Johnson of being in the process of drafting *Principles* Part 2 while touring Italy but that manuscript was lost (Letter 194).
- (HC3). Therefore, Berkeley had not abandoned the 1710 Design between the publication of *Principles* Part 1 and at least some portion of his tour in Italy.

⁶⁰ *Works*, vol. II, p. 6

⁶¹ *Works*, vol. II, p. 5

- (HP12). Berkeley informs Johnson he has not had the leisure to rewrite the lost draft of *Principles* Part 2 (Letter 194).
- (HP13). Berkeley does give a new edition of *Principles* Part 1 in 1734.
- (HP14). Berkeley does not publish *Principles* Part 2, Part 3, or Part 4 at any point during his life.
- (HC4). Therefore, Berkeley abandons the 1710 Design at some point in his life after the loss of the draft of *Principles* Part 2 in Italy, and scholars must assume the reason to be Berkeley's explanation to Johnson or some other reason.
- (HP15). My interpretation holds Berkeley never abandoned the 1710 Design.
- (HC5). Therefore, my interpretation is incorrect in its fundamental position of unity based on its claim that the 1710 Design unifies Berkeley's corpus and methodology.
- (HC6). Therefore, my interpretation is an incorrect interpretation of Berkeleyanism.

31. The Historical argument claims Berkeley abandoned the 1710 Design and supports the claim with a narrative based on historical evidence. The narrative proceeds from two historical facts: first, Berkeley writes to Johnson that his draft of *Principles* Part 2 was lost in Italy and he did not have the leisure to rewrite it (Letter 194); second, Berkeley never published *Principles* Part 2, Part 3, or Part 4. Therefore, the Historical argument claims it has both the fact of abandonment of the missing parts of the 1710 Design and Berkeley's own reasons for that abandonment. The Historical argument takes the issue of abandonment as a fairly straightforward open-and-shut case.

32. The Historical argument and the new unified interpretation diverge from one another relatively late in the formalisation of the Historical argument. It is not until (HP14) and (HC4) that my interpretation must disagree with the Historical argument. This disagreement at (HP14) and (HC4) indicates different understandings of (HP11) and (HP12) between my interpretation and the Historical argument.

33. The new unified interpretation must agree with (HP14) in a certain sense. It is undoubtedly true Berkeley never published any work with the title *Principles* Part X after 1734, and the 1734 publication is the second edition of *Principles* Part 1. So in this sense of (HP14), my interpretation agrees with the Historical argument. But in this sense of (HP14), the conclusion (HC4) is unjustified and the argument is invalid because the conclusion does not follow from the premises. Additionally, (HP14) is not univocal in its meaning. The Historical

argument conflates the content of Part II, Part III, and Part IV with the title *Principles* Part X, viz. the Historical argument assumes the ‘static’ interpretation of the 1710 Design.⁶² The Historical argument assumes the ‘static’ interpretation of the 1710 Design for two possible reasons: first, the Historical argument assumes the familiar difficulty in approaching the components of the remaining Parts of the 1710 Design because of an apparent lack of sufficient definitive textual evidence concerning those remaining Parts,⁶³ and second, the Historical argument assumes the Minor Publications Hypothesis.⁶⁴ But my interpretation rejects the Historical argument’s assumptions concerning the Minor Publications Hypothesis,⁶⁵ the lack of sufficient definitive textual evidence concerning the remaining Parts of the 1710 Design,⁶⁶ and therefore the ‘static’ interpretation of the 1710 Design⁶⁷ and the conflation of the content and title of the remaining Parts of the 1710 Design.⁶⁸ In rejecting these assumptions, the new unified interpretation rejects this sense of (HP14). Therefore, my interpretation holds (HP14) to be equivocal in meaning: my interpretation accepts (HP14) in one sense, but rejects (HP14) in the other sense. Where my interpretation agrees with the Historical argument in the first sense of (HP14), the conclusion (HC4) does not follow and makes the Historical argument invalid; where my interpretation disagrees with the Historical argument in the other sense of (HP14) because of the assumptions underlying the premise, my interpretation rejects that sense of (HP14) and therefore (HC4), which in turn makes the argument invalid. Therefore, the new unified interpretation holds the Historical argument to be invalid at (HP14) because that premise is equivocal, and in one sense the conclusions (HC4), (HC5), and (HC6) do not follow from (HP14), and in the other sense the premise (HP14) is rejected based on underlying assumptions and therefore (HC4), (HC5), and (HC6) do not follow.

34. The Historical argument relies upon these assumptions in order to claim (HP14) and therefore (HC4), (HC5), and (HC6). In fairness, the Historical argument could reject the Minor Publications Hypothesis and still proceed in its claims and conclusions, as the Minor Publications Hypothesis only contributes to, but does not in itself justify, the ‘static’ interpretation of the 1710 Design. The assumption that there is a lack of sufficient definitive textual evidence concerning the content of the remaining Parts of the 1710 Design is what

⁶² Ch. 1.2-6

⁶³ Ch. 2.3-4, 9, 11, 14, 27, 55; cp. *Works*, vol. II, pp. 5-6

⁶⁴ Ch. 3.3

⁶⁵ Ch. 3.4-9

⁶⁶ Intro. 1

⁶⁷ Ch. 1.7-8, 21

⁶⁸ Intro. 1

drives (HP14) and therefore (HC4), (HC5), and (HC6). Without the assumption of a lack of sufficient definitive textual evidence concerning the content of the remaining Parts of the 1710 Design, it does not appear the Historical argument would rely upon the ‘static’ interpretation of the 1710 Design, conflate the content and the titles of the remaining Parts of the Design, and therefore equivocate the meaning of (HP14). But these assumptions are what drives the Historical argument to (HP14) in a certain sense and allows (HC4). Rejecting these assumptions, as this dissertation argues in various places, blocks the remainder of the Historical argument as an objection to the interpretation.

35. Since the new unified interpretation does not fully accept the equivocated (HP14), the resulting conclusion (HC4) is also rejected. Yet, my interpretation must give some account for Berkeley’s apparent explanation to Johnson in Letter 194. It is apparent the Historical argument assumes (HP12) is the exact reason why Berkeley had not published any of the content of the remaining Parts of the 1710 Design before the Johnson correspondence, and why Berkeley never provides this content.⁶⁹ In effect, the Historical argument understands (HP12) as true throughout the remainder of Berkeley’s life after (HP11), viz. when Berkeley says he did not have the leisure to redraft the content of the planned *Principles* Part 2, the Historical argument assumes that statement holds true for the remainder of Berkeley’s life because Berkeley never published a new work titled *Principles* Part X. So, the Historical argument takes (HP12) to be a statement not only of Berkeley’s past, but also Berkeley’s future after the Johnson correspondence. But my interpretation holds this to be untrue in two ways. First, Berkeley did expound his view on natural philosophy in *De Motu*, which Berkeley is anxious to send to Johnson in Letter 194. Second, my interpretation argues the proposed content of the remaining Parts of the 1710 Design are in fact published in Berkeley’s corpus, although not under the expected title of *Principles* Part X; i.e. my interpretation does not conflate content with title. In this aspect, the new unified interpretation is not novel since *Works* makes similar claims.⁷⁰ Therefore, my interpretation rejects the Historical argument’s interpretation of (HP12) both with regard to Berkeley’s past and with regard to Berkeley’s future after the Johnson correspondence.

36. It should also be noted Johnson only asks after *Principles* Part 2, which is understandable since he did not have access to Berkeley’s Notebooks and did not understand

⁶⁹ The possibility of some other reason for abandonment drives the Philosophical argument.

⁷⁰ *Works*, vol. II, p. 6, albeit the editors hold *De Motu* and the *Analyst* controversy to be incomplete accounts of Part 3 and Part 4 respectively.

the full scope and content of the 1710 Design. In Johnson's request at (HP10), we can read Berkeley as being very precise in his answer (HP11 and HP12): Johnson has asked after *Principles* Part 2, and Berkeley responds only about *Principles* Part 2. This interpretation might seem uncharitable, as it would be reasonable to assume Berkeley would at least make Johnson aware of the work he had made in the 1710 Design. But we find this is exactly what Berkeley does, viz. Berkeley sends Johnson *De Motu* in order to assist Johnson with his questions. Berkeley also asks Johnson to "consider well the answers I have already given in my books to several objections" (Letter 194), which is just before Berkeley states his intention to send Johnson *Principles* Part 1 and *De Motu*. So there is no necessity in concluding with the Historical argument that the relation between (HP11) and (HP12) is of the kind held by the Historical argument. The new unified interpretation argues Berkeley may not have had the leisure to redraft *Principles* Part 2 in that guise between Italy and Johnson's correspondence, but Berkeley continued to unfold his views on morality, metaphysics, and "the nature of God, the freedom of man, [and] the commonplaces of ethics" (*Works*, vol. II, p. 5). In fact, these are the main themes of *Alciphron*, written during Berkeley's 'American sojourn' and where Dion admits "for several months past, I have enjoyed such liberty and leisure in this distant retreat" in order to ponder "a life of action, which takes its issue from the counsels, passions, and views of other men, if it doth not draw a man to imitate, will at least teach him to observe. And a mind at liberty to reflect on its own observations, if it produce nothing useful to the world, seldom fails of entertainment to itself" (A.I.1). Berkeley himself⁷¹ admits "it is the author's opinion, that all those who write either explicitly or by insinuation against the dignity, freedom, and immortality of the human soul, may so far forth be justly said to unhinge the principles of morality, and destroy the means of making men reasonably virtuous" (A. Advertisement). So, the new unified interpretation rejects the Historical argument's conclusion (HC4) because, among other evidence, Berkeley does give the promised content of Part II in *Alciphron* only a few years after Letter 194 and he has already addressed at least a portion of Part III in *De Motu*, which Berkeley sends to Johnson.

37. One would think the following reasons sufficient to reject the Historical argument's conclusion (HC4) on the basis of (HP11) and (HP12). But the new unified interpretation can give a further reason to reject (HC4), and this is found in Berkeley's methodology. Johnson

⁷¹ These sentences maintain a distinction between Dion the character and Berkeley the author. Stoneham (2002), pp. 16-22 argues Berkeleyan scholars must be on guard from flatly attributing Berkeley's view to a particular character. I take Stoneham's point to apply to *Alciphron* too, although it is not necessary to argue for this claim for the purposes of this thesis.

quite rightly admits the original objections in Letter 190 “may vanish before me upon a more mature consideration of it”. This point Berkeley addresses towards the end of Letter 194 when he recommends the three points to consider when objecting to his philosophy. Berkeley again addresses the point of methodology in Letter 199. My interpretation holds there is a proper approach and investigation of the 1710 Design,⁷² and Berkeley’s correspondence to Johnson in these two letters touches upon why (HC4) can be further rejected based on methodology. Berkeley’s methodology involves guiding the reader to her own conclusions based on his publications, not merely dogmatising his philosophy for acceptance. The reader must be active in her approach to Berkeley’s corpus. The new unified interpretation argues this methodology remains consistent throughout Berkeley’s corpus, and therefore (HC4) can be rejected on the basis of Berkeley’s methodology.

38. From what has been argued here and elsewhere, the new unified interpretation rejects the Historical argument for the abandonment of the 1710 Design based on the equivocality of (HP14), the falseness of (HC4), and thus the falseness of (HC5) and (HC6), which follow from the false (HC4) and the true (HP15). Therefore, the Historical argument for the abandonment of the 1710 Design fails as an objection to the new unified interpretation, and therefore to Active Berkeleyanism.

The Philosophical Argument

39. The Philosophical argument shares some commonalities with both the Historical argument and the new unified interpretation. The Philosophical argument follows the Historical argument throughout a portion of its premises and conclusions, diverging from the Historical argument at the same points (although for different reasons) as my interpretation. The Philosophical argument agrees with the Historical argument in that both arguments seek to conclude Berkeley abandoned the 1710 Design, but the Philosophical argument disagrees with the Historical argument as to why Berkeley abandoned the 1710 Design. Whereas the Historical argument bases its claim that Berkeley abandoned the 1710 Design on a narrative of historical events, the Philosophical argument bases its claim that Berkeley abandoned the 1710 Design on a narrative of philosophical interpretation. This claim means the Philosophical argument is explicit, whereas the Historical argument is implicit. While there is a wider

⁷² Ch. 1.16-20

spectrum of interpretations and uses of the Philosophical argument, it is still possible to formalise the Philosophical argument in general terms.⁷³

40. The formalisation of the Philosophical argument is as follows.

- (PP1). Berkeley originally formulated the 1710 Design in his Notebooks.
- (PP2). The 1710 Design was composed of specific parts.
- (PP3). Each part of the 1710 Design concerned a specific topic.
- (PP4). Part I concerns Berkeley's theory of knowledge from sense-perception and gives "a preliminary outline of the metaphysics of sensory reality and of mind which he intended to develop in an ordered sequence of Parts".⁷⁴
- (PP5). Part II concerns Berkeley's moral philosophy, which includes metaphysics, "the distinction between the corporeal and the mental, the nature of God, the freedom of man, the commonplaces of ethics, and apparently a nominalist logic of demonstration".⁷⁵
- (PP6). Part III (and possibly a Part IV) concerns Berkeley's views on natural philosophy and mathematics.
- (PC1). Therefore, the 1710 Design planned to publish a *Principles* Part 1, Part 2, Part 3, and possibly a Part 4.
- (PP7). Berkeley published *Principles* Part 1 in 1710.
- (PC2). Therefore, the first Part of the 1710 Design was completed.
- (PP8). Berkeley makes several references to *Principles* Part 2, Part 3, and a possible Part 4 in the 1710 edition of *Principles* Part 1, in *Three Dialogues*, and in his correspondence with others.
- (PP9). Berkeley does not publish *Principles* Part 2, Part 3, or Part 4 by the time of the Johnson correspondence.
- (PP10). Johnson specifically informs Berkeley of his "impatience till I see the second part of your design accomplished" (Letter 190).

⁷³ It would be prolix to deal with every version of the Philosophical argument currently available in Berkeleyan scholarship. In what follows in this section, the general formalisation of the Philosophical argument is given in order to go to the core of the objection against the new unified interpretation, while accepting the fact that dealing specifically with each version of the Philosophical argument is left undone. There would be additional premises in the Philosophical argument, specifically around (PP14), that would differentiate each version of the Philosophical argument from the other versions of it. Specific refutations of specific versions of the Philosophical argument would involve addressing the specific additional premises that would seem to justify (PP13) and (PP14) in each version of the Philosophical argument. Cp. Wisdom (1953a), Ch.6; Dennes (1957); Turbayne (1959); Grave (1964); Pitcher (1977), pp. 189-227; Turbayne (1982); Stoneham (2002), pp. 296-299; etc.

⁷⁴ *Works*, vol. II, p. 6

⁷⁵ *Works*, vol. II, p. 5

- (PP11). Berkeley admits to Johnson of being in the process of drafting *Principles Part 2* while touring Italy but that manuscript was lost (Letter 194).
- (PC3). Therefore, Berkeley had not abandoned the 1710 Design between the publication of *Principles Part 1* and at least some portion of his tour in Italy.
- (PP12). Berkeley informs Johnson he has not had the leisure to rewrite the lost draft of *Principles Part 2* (Letter 194).
- (PP13). Berkeley's reason for abandoning the 1710 Design is not his explanation to Johnson.
- (PP14). In working out his doctrine of spirit and moral philosophy, Berkeley uncovers deep philosophical difficulties with his system.⁷⁶
- (PP15). Berkeley does give a new edition of *Principles Part 1* in 1734.
- (PP16). Berkeley does not publish *Principles Part 2*, Part 3, or Part 4 at any point during his life.
- (PC4). Therefore, Berkeley does not publish *Principles Part 2* or complete *Principles Part 3* and Part 4 because of these philosophical difficulties with his system.
- (PC5). Therefore, Berkeley abandons the 1710 Design at some point in his life after the loss of the draft of *Principles Part 2* in Italy, and scholars must assume the reason to be some other reason than the reason given by Berkeley to Johnson.
- (PP17). My interpretation holds Berkeley never abandoned the 1710 Design.
- (PC6). Therefore, my interpretation is incorrect in its fundamental position of unity based on its claim that the 1710 Design unifies Berkeley's corpus and methodology.
- (PC7). Therefore, my interpretation is an incorrect interpretation of Berkeleyanism.

41. The Philosophical argument claims Berkeley abandoned the 1710 Design and supports the claim with a narrative based on philosophical interpretation. The narrative

⁷⁶ A variant strand of the Philosophical argument stems from understanding the difficulties arising from a problem of methodology. Cp. Johnston (1923), pp. 9-10, 283; Hone and Rossi (1931), pp. 215-34; Hicks (1932), pp. 181-183, 215, 224; and Wild (1936), pp. 225-226, 397-398, 483-485; etc. One might think such a difference in claim would result in a different kind of objection, viz. calling this strand the Methodological argument. But in these cases, with Wild being the possible exception, the general claim and flow of the objection is the same, and one can understand difficulties in methodology as a kind or subset of philosophical difficulty (broadly understood). Wild, to be fair, appears to allow for a development of methodology that may not result in supporting the Philosophical argument. But then the question for Wild would be if this development of methodology meant the abandonment of the aims of the 1710 Design. To me, it is unclear what Wild is specifically claiming. Cf. esp. Wild (1936) pp. 488-491.

proceeds from various interpretations of Berkeley's philosophical system. However, unlike the Historical argument, the Philosophical argument has a wider spectrum of views on exactly why Berkeley abandoned the 1710 Design; viz. there are a number of different interpretations and understandings of Berkeley's philosophy, and each interpretation that claims abandonment has its own particular and peculiar reasons for claiming abandonment of the 1710 Design.

42. Insofar as the Philosophical argument accepts the Historical argument as subsidiary grounds for claiming Berkeley abandoned the 1710 Design, there is nothing more that needs to be added to the discussion. The real focus and drive of the Philosophical argument is in the implications of certain premises and conclusions specific to the Philosophical argument.

43. In one sense, the Philosophical argument gains logical traction at (PC4) and at the close of (PC5), specifically at the phrase "some other reason". The Philosophical argument offers narratives in cashing out this phrase, which aids in understanding the general interpretation and implications of several of its premises. The Philosophical argument explains its understanding of this ending phrase of (PC5) in (PP13) and (PP14). What each version of the Philosophical argument essentially argues is (PP12) is a false premise in some sense, not because Berkeley did not inform Johnson of this reason but because that reason is dishonest. To put the matter flatly, the Philosophical argument holds Berkeley in some way lies to Johnson, insofar as Berkeley claims "he has not had the leisure to rewrite the draft". This claim is expressed in (PP13). The Philosophical argument claims Berkeley did not rewrite the draft of *Principles* Part 2 because of (PP14), not because he was simply too busy to do so as the Historical argument claims. The Philosophical argument agrees with my interpretation in claiming (PP16) is equivocal, but it disagrees with my interpretation as to what each possible meaning of the premise has. Under the Philosophical argument, (PP16) is true because of (PP14), not (PP12). (PP12) is still true in a historical sense, but it is not the actual reason for (PP16), (PC4), and (PC5).

44. If the new unified interpretation is to counter the objection of the Philosophical argument, it must do so at (PP14). Rejecting (PP14) allows my interpretation to block the logical moves of the Philosophical argument to reach (PC4) and (PC5), which in turn invalidates (PP13) and the remainder of the conclusions of the Philosophical argument. The process of rejecting (PP14) is complicated because it is exactly here that the various versions of the Philosophical argument begin to differentiate from each other. However, this

complication is not insurmountable because of the general formalisation of the Philosophical argument.

45. A purpose of this dissertation in introducing the new unified interpretation is to provide reasons for rejecting (PP13) and (PP14). In many ways, the Philosophical argument hangs on the supposed information of *Principles* Part 2, as partially expressed in (PP5). But the demand of the Philosophical argument for a treatment of spirit, moral philosophy, and the other topics is incorrect.⁷⁷ The new unified interpretation argues Berkeley does give the appropriate information concerning spirits, moral philosophy, etc. elsewhere in his corpus, and the reason why my interpretation claims the Philosophical argument holds its demand is left unsatisfied is because the Philosophical argument holds Berkeleyanism to be either merely immaterialism or Academic Berkeleyanism. It is precisely because the Philosophical argument has a narrower understanding of Berkeleyanism that it believes its demand for the supposed content of *Principles* Part 2 remains unsatisfied, and therefore the Philosophical argument holds (PP13) and (PP14), and thereby the remainder of the premises and conclusions.

46. (PP13) and (PP14) stem in part from the apparent lack of definitive textual evidence concerning spirit, moral philosophy, and the remainder of the supposed topics of *Principles* Part 2 as gathered from Berkeley's Notebooks, correspondence, and comments in early editions of *Principles* Part 1 and *Three Dialogues*. The driving belief here is Berkeley has given an incomplete account of spirit, moral philosophy, etc. in his corpus, and (as the narrative goes) when Berkeley came to complete his account on these topics, he discovered certain philosophical difficulties that initially delayed publication of the remaining Parts of the 1710 Design and ultimately led to the abandonment of the Design. In effect, those Berkeleyan scholars who endorse the Philosophical argument believe Berkeley's philosophical system is either irreconcilably incoherent or inconsistent, or his philosophical system demands greater philosophical aptitude than Berkeley himself possessed.

47. Yet both of these kinds of endorsement suffer under critical scrutiny. First, while the new unified interpretation shies away from overemphasising the Notebooks, it is apparent to many Berkeleyan scholars that Berkeley does indeed have a coherent and consistent theory of spirits, and thereby a moral philosophy, contained therein. Second, it seems at least uncharitable, if not absurd, to claim Berkeley initially published *Principles* Part 1 without a complete, coherent, and consistent theory of spirit. This is because much of *Principles* Part 1

⁷⁷ Ch. 2.8

involves spirit specifically, the relation between ideas and spirits, and the relation between spirits. Third, the Philosophical argument must account for (PP15). Fourth, the Philosophical argument makes the same mistake as the Historical argument, insofar as it confuses the content of the remaining Parts of the 1710 Design with the title *Principle* Part X, and thereby adheres to the ‘static’ interpretation of the 1710 Design. Fifth, the Philosophical argument suffers under the disadvantages of Academic Berkeleyanism or supposing Berkeleyanism is merely immaterialism. The Philosophical argument supporters’ narrow investigations into minute details of Berkeley’s arguments lead them to misapprehend the general theory, and they either forget or fail to realise Berkeley’s methodology of the 1710 Design. Berkeley was not embarrassed with his philosophy in the Johnson correspondence, going so far as to invite Johnson, or generally anyone else, to his home to discuss and clarify possible confusion. This display of confidence by Berkeley suggests the Philosophical argument is wrong in its premises and conclusions exactly where the new unified interpretation and the Philosophical argument diverge. Finally, for Berkeley ideas are not like spirits. Berkeley repeatedly emphasises this point, and the discussion of this claim and its effects lead the Berkeleyan scholar to properly comprehend what Berkeley is claiming. It would be incorrect to expect the kind of treatment of ideas to be similar in kind to the treatment of spirits: ideas can be investigated empirically, analytically, and scientifically because ideas have the nature that they have, but spirits cannot be similarly investigated because spirits have an entirely different nature from ideas.

48. Therefore, there are sound reasons to generally reject (PP14), and so (PP13) is also rejected. This generally invalidates (PC4) and (PC5). True, specific versions of the Philosophical argument would offer additional premises to support (PP14) and thereby (PP13), but these additional premises themselves would be rejected by the new unified interpretation. This point need not be overly worrisome, as rejecting the general formulation of a claim, regardless of its support, should also reject specific instantiations of that general claim. Once (PP14) is rejected, the Philosophical argument transforms into the Historical argument, which my interpretation rejects on different grounds. The grounds for rejecting the Philosophical argument are different from the grounds of rejecting the Historical argument, and the two rejections by the new unified interpretation are by no means incompatible with each other; indeed, these grounds harmonise in Active Berkeleyanism and show its strength, value, and advantage over other general interpretations of Berkeleyanism.

Conclusion

Section 1: Summary of the Dissertation

1. This dissertation demonstrates an improved methodology for Berkeleyan scholarship. This improved methodology, which I call Active Berkeleyanism, seeks to incorporate the entirety of Berkeley's corpus, his biography, and the vast wealth of Berkeleyan scholarship in order to open new possibilities of understanding and interpretation of Berkeleyanism. To express and exhibit this improved methodology, this dissertation offers a new unified interpretation of Berkeleyanism which highlights the content, purpose, scope, method, and importance of the 1710 Design for Berkeleyanism. This new unified interpretation is a product of Active Berkeleyanism and must not be confused with Active Berkeleyanism as a methodology. This new unified interpretation argues for a commonality of aims under the 1710 Design: the general aim of bringing Berkeley's audience to a proper understanding and activity in their relationships with each other, the world, and God; and the final aim of preparing his audience for Anglican salvation.

2. The need for Active Berkeleyanism originates from the limited methods deployed by Berkeleyan scholarship. This dissertation investigates two previous methodologies in Berkeleyan scholarship, viz. mere immaterialism and Academic Berkeleyanism, and concludes these methodologies are insufficient for obtaining the fullest understanding of Berkeleyanism. The disparity of interpretations of Berkeleyanism is not the issue this dissertation seeks to resolve, if for no other reasons than this disparity of interpretations is both unavoidable and healthy for the future of Berkeleyan scholarship. Rather, the issue at the core of this dissertation is the methodologies employed by these divergent interpretations. This dissertation offers Active Berkeleyanism as an opportunity to re-evaluate this spectrum of possible interpretations, thereby supplying new means to discover, strengthen, defend, attack, weaken, or discard interpretations of Berkeleyanism. This opportunity indicates the various functions of Active Berkeleyanism: subsumption, critique, and meta-interpretation.

3. The new unified interpretation of Berkeleyanism offered in this dissertation focuses on the importance of the 1710 Design in understanding Berkeleyanism. This new unified interpretation finds unity in Berkeleyanism once the 1710 Design is properly understood, and this new unified interpretation argues against the view Berkeley abandoned the 1710 Design. The traditional interpretation of the 1710 Design understands it to be a planned set of

publications with distinct objectives, from which Berkeley quickly deviated and never returned, and it understands the 1710 Design as lacking a unifying aim. This lack of a unifying aim establishes a ‘static’ nature to the traditional interpretation of the 1710 Design. This ‘static’ interpretation of the 1710 Design fails to provide a final aim for the 1710 Design and creates hesitation on how to attribute later Berkeleyan writings traditionally accepted to relate to the 1710 Design. The new unified interpretation agrees the 1710 Design is partially a planned set of publications with distinct objectives, but it disagrees with the traditional interpretation because the 1710 Design is more than merely this planned set of publications: the 1710 Design is also an active methodology for discovering truth and principles within an individual’s own mind. This leads to the conclusion that the traditional ‘static’ interpretation of the 1710 Design is incomplete in an important way, and this incomplete understanding of the 1710 Design results in suboptimal interpretations of Berkeleyanism.

4. The positive effects of Active Berkeleyanism are immediately shown when investigating the traditional publications of the 1710 Design. Active Berkeleyanism allows for the opportunity to unify different broad interpretations of *New Theory of Vision* and *Three Dialogues* and to interpret *Principles* Part 1 as a publication in methodology, and allows for a more robust understanding of how the traditional publications of the 1710 Design fit together with each other. These traditional publications interconnect as both independent and dependent works, sharing content, scope, aim, practicality, and approach.

5. Because Active Berkeleyanism opens new opportunities of investigation and because the 1710 Design is more properly understood, the remaining academic publications of Berkeley after 1713 can also be subsumed under the 1710 Design. The new unified interpretation subsumes Berkeley’s writings on spirit and morality under the 1710 Design both because these topics were part of the planned set of publications and because of the active methodology established in the 1710 Design. What spirits are and are not, how they are active, and how we know them can be gleaned from Berkeley’s publications without heavy reliance upon his Notebooks. In a similar way, the Berkeleyan basics of morality can be extracted from Berkeley’s published texts to form key points for an ethical system. The new unified interpretation applies similar procedures to Berkeley’s writings on natural philosophy and mathematics. The result of using Active Berkeleyanism in the new unified interpretation is further interconnectivity in Berkeley’s corpus: the remaining academic publications after 1713 are interconnected amongst themselves and with the traditional publications of the 1710 Design via content, scope, aim, practicality, and approach.

6. These new opportunities of investigation into Berkeley's corpus do not end with the academic publications. Because Active Berkeleyanism considers all of Berkeley's corpus as important in understanding Berkeleyanism, Berkeley's publications on other topics also play significant roles in understanding Berkeleyanism. Therefore, the Minor Publications Hypothesis, which claims only certain publications within Berkeley's corpus have crucial value in understanding Berkeleyanism, is rejected. Once this influential hypothesis is removed, Berkeley's writings on public spirit, politics, economics, and medicine become vital for a proper understanding of Berkeleyanism. The new unified interpretation incorporates these remedial publications into the working understanding of Berkeleyanism by again demonstrating interconnectivity amongst these remedial publications and with the publications already subsumed under the 1710 Design.

7. The removal of the Minor Publications Hypothesis also allows for the inclusion of Berkeley's religious writings into the new unified interpretation of Berkeleyanism. Berkeley's sermons, which run throughout his public life, are interconnected with each other and with the 1710 Design. *Alciphron*, Berkeley's longest publication, is also an excellent example of the content, scope, aim, and approach of the 1710 Design. Even Berkeley's episcopal writings and the later portion of *Siris*, which has troubled many Berkeleyan scholars, are subsumable under the 1710 Design. This unification of Berkeley's corpus is an aim of the new unified interpretation of this dissertation, and this unification is made possible by the use of Active Berkeleyanism.

8. The new unified interpretation does not rest upon merely unifying Berkeley's corpus. There is also Berkeley's biography, which forms an essential element in any comprehensive understanding of Berkeleyanism. The insufficient methodologies of mere immaterialism and Academic Berkeleyanism fail to establish an acceptable relationship between Berkeley's corpus and his life. *Berkeley's life is as indispensable as his corpus in gaining a comprehensive understanding of Berkeleyanism.* The new unified interpretation argues for a reciprocity between Berkeley's corpus and his life, and argues against the epoch-view of Berkeley's biography. Active Berkeleyanism also allows the new unified interpretation to construct Berkeley's view on education and to highlight the importance of Anglican doctrine on Berkeleyanism. With all of these pieces properly weighed and understood, the new unified interpretation is in a position to claim Anglican salvation is the final aim of the 1710 Design, viz. that which all of Berkeley's efforts and energy in both his writings and his life choices tend. This final aim unifies every element in Berkeleyanism.

9. Having completed the exposition of Active Berkeleyanism and the new unified interpretation, this dissertation turns to possible objections against Active Berkeleyanism, the final aim of the 1710 Design, and the non-abandonment of the 1710 Design. Two possible objections against Active Berkeleyanism are from the variety of Berkeley's interests and from the traditional debate on Berkeley's so-called 'development'. This dissertation argues neither objection succeeds against Active Berkeleyanism. The objection against Anglican salvation as the final aim of Berkeleyanism, which is the climax of the new unified interpretation, is also considered and given various replies. Finally, two arguments in favour of the abandonment of the 1710 Design are examined. These two arguments, called the Historical argument and the Philosophical argument, attack the core of the new unified interpretation because the exposition of interpretation in this dissertation uses the 1710 Design as the unifying element for Berkeley's corpus. Both of these arguments are formalised and rejected, thus leaving the new unified interpretation as a possible interpretation of Berkeleyanism.

Section 2: Further Research

10. Active Berkeleyanism opens up wide new landscapes for further research. This improved methodology can be applied to Berkeley's corpus, biography, and Berkeleyan scholarship. Regarding the application of Active Berkeleyanism to Berkeley's corpus, this methodology demands the rejection of the Minor Publications Hypothesis, which as this dissertation argues is one of the most crucial decisions in approaching Berkeley's corpus. Maintaining a limited view of the essential publications necessary for a viable interpretation of Berkeleyanism has caused Berkeleyan scholars to neglect vital parts of Berkeley's corpus, and thereby disregard important aspects and connections in Berkeleyanism. This dissertation argues these important aspects and connections are needed in understanding Berkeleyanism and in limited investigations of any of its themes and topics. This claim does not negate limited investigations into Berkeleyanism's themes and topics; rather, this claim argues Berkeleyan scholars must be more aware of the interconnectivity of Berkeley's corpus when investigating Berkeleyanism. Additionally, approaching Berkeley's corpus (either for the first time or for the hundredth time) using Active Berkeleyanism enriches the research process. Each work in Berkeley's corpus becomes integral in establishing an overall interpretation, and in confirming or altering an existing interpretation. As the spectrum of interpretations widens and contains stronger interpretations, the general scholarly interest in Berkeleyanism is increased.

11. Similar benefits from Active Berkeleyanism are available for understanding and incorporating Berkeley's biography. Active Berkeleyanism claims Berkeley's biography is as indispensable to understanding Berkeleyanism as his corpus, and this dissertation argues for a reciprocity between Berkeley's corpus and biography: Berkeley's life decisions and interests affect his publications just as much as his publications affect his life decisions and interests. This reciprocity supports and conforms to Berkeley's understanding of what philosophy is and how philosophy can be practically applied to the activity of life. In doing so, the new unified interpretation rejects the epoch-view of Berkeley's biography, not because it is impossible or unhelpful in certain circumstances but because the unity of Berkeley's corpus demands it. Additionally, by removing the epoch-view when approaching Berkeley's biography, the Minor Publications Hypothesis is less attractive because of the reciprocity between Berkeley's life and his publications.

12. The benefits of Active Berkeleyanism on Berkeleyan scholarship cannot be understated. Regarding existing scholarship, Active Berkeleyanism offers new means of strengthening and defending, or weakening and attacking, pre-existing scholarship. This methodology and its benefits are applicable to all previous Berkeleyan research, and this dissertation has intentionally incorporated scholarly publications throughout the history of Berkeleyan scholarship to exhibit these benefits on Berkeleyan scholarship. Often-cited scholarly publications are intermingled with more obscure or neglected scholarly publications, and scholarly publications currently out-of-favour have also been utilised to show new strengths and weaknesses contained within them. Some scholarly publications might find new interest for current research, and other scholarly publications might find further reasons for rejection. Active Berkeleyanism instils a dynamic approach to previous Berkeleyan scholarship, and this dynamic approach aids in progressing Berkeleyan scholarship forward while better understanding and utilising the history of Berkeleyan scholarship. Obviously, incorporating the entirety of Berkeleyan scholarship is a herculean task, but incorporating more Berkeleyan scholarship into future research strengthens that research. Regarding new Berkeleyan research, Active Berkeleyanism can be utilised in approaching Berkeley's corpus, biography, and pre-existing scholarship in order to discover new interpretations of both Berkeleyanism as a whole and its themes and topics. These new interpretations need not focus on the question of unity within Berkeleyanism as this dissertation has done.

13. Additionally, this dissertation has intentionally ignored the question of philosophical influence regarding Berkeleyanism, both in respect to possible influences on

Berkeley and in respect to Berkeleyanism's effect on subsequent philosophical thinking. This decision is based on the following considerations. First, it is a debateable issue which philosophers influenced Berkeley generally, and which philosophers influenced Berkeley at a particular point in his thinking. Second, investigating these possible philosophical influences on Berkeley would have taken this dissertation to other areas of research not necessarily needed in order to establish the thesis statement. Third, the external limitations in preparing this dissertation demanded this aspect of Berkeleyan scholarship be removed. However, this important aspect of Berkeleyan scholarship deserves mention as a real opportunity for further research while employing Active Berkeleyanism.

14. Thus far, this dissertation has considered Active Berkeleyanism only in relation to Berkeley and Berkeleyan scholarship. However, the ethos of this methodology allows for its application into other research which excludes Berkeley altogether. The methodology introduced in this dissertation is potentially applicable to any study of philosophy or philosopher. Additionally, it can be applicable to any area or topic which has an established canon. This methodology's functions as a methodological critique and as a meta-interpretation are applicable far beyond Berkeley and Berkeleyanism.

15. Shifting specifically to the new unified interpretation of Berkeleyanism contained in this dissertation, there are many things which could still be done. Further research into Berkeleyan scholarship would allow new connections between the new unified interpretation and previous Berkeleyan scholarship. This dissertation has given a general exposition of the new unified interpretation, focusing on a single way to unify Berkeleyanism. There are other possible ways to unify Berkeleyanism which do not focus as heavily on the 1710 Design. Because of the limitations of this dissertation, many points of interest have either been left out of this dissertation or have yet to be discovered. A longer and more thorough exposition of the new unified interpretation is entirely possible with a different set of limitations. Throughout this dissertation, indications of some possible further research specifically involving the new unified interpretation have been offered to the reader. These indications do not exhaust the possibilities.

List of Abbreviations

All references to Berkeley's works in the text, unless otherwise specified, are to *The Works of George Berkeley, Bishop of Cloyne* in nine volumes, edited by A. A. Luce and T. E. Jessop, London: Nelson and Sons Press, 1948-1957 (*Works*, vol. I, II, III, etc.). References to Berkeley's correspondence are to *The Correspondence of George Berkeley*, edited by Marc A. Hight, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013 (Letter x). Internal references within this dissertation are given by chapter and paragraph number (Intro. x and Ch. x.xx). The following abbreviations will be generally employed.

NB, Notebooks	Philosophical Commentaries, <i>Works</i> , vol. I
NTV, <i>New Theory of Vision</i>	An Essay towards a New Theory of Vision, <i>Works</i> , vol. I
PHKI, <i>Introduction</i>	Introduction to the Principles of Human Knowledge, <i>Works</i> , vol. II
PHK, <i>Principles</i>	A Treatise concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge, <i>Works</i> , vol. II
PO	Passive Obedience, <i>Works</i> , vol. VI
DHP, <i>Three Dialogues</i>	Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous, <i>Works</i> , vol. II. Listings give the dialogue number and the relevant page number(s)
GE	Essays in the Guardian, <i>Works</i> , vol. VII. Listings give the essay number
AT, <i>Advice to Tories</i>	Advice to the Tories Who Have Taken the Oaths, <i>Works</i> , vol. VI. Listings give the paragraph number and page number
DM	De Motu, <i>Works</i> , vol. IV
PRGB, <i>Prevention</i>	An Essay towards Preventing the Ruin of Great Britain, <i>Works</i> , vol. VI. Listings give the paragraph and page number
PCFP, <i>Proposal</i>	A Proposal for the Better Supplying of Churches in our Foreign Plantations, <i>Works</i> , vol. VII. Listings give the paragraph and page number
A, <i>Alciphron</i>	Alciphron, or the Minute Philosopher, <i>Works</i> , vol. III. Listings give the dialogue number and the relevant section(s)
TVVE, <i>Vindication</i>	The Theory of Vision Vindicated and Explained, <i>Works</i> , vol. I
An, <i>Analyst</i>	The Analyst, <i>Works</i> , vol. IV
Q, <i>Querist</i>	The Querist, <i>Works</i> , vol. VI
D, <i>Discourse</i>	A Discourse Addressed to Magistrates and Men in Authority, <i>Works</i> , vol. VI, pp. Listings give the paragraph and page number
S, <i>Siris</i>	Siris: A Chain of Philosophical Reflexions and Inquiries, <i>Works</i> , vol. V
LC	A Letter to His Clergy, <i>Works</i> , vol. VI. Listings give the paragraph and page number
LCR	A Letter to the Roman Catholics of the Diocese of Cloyne, <i>Works</i> , vol. VI. Listings give the paragraph and the page number
LP	Letters to Thomas Prior, <i>Works</i> , vol. V. Listings give the number of the letter (e.g. 1LP, 2LP, 3LP) and the paragraph number
LH.....	Letter to Hales, <i>Works</i> , vol. V. Listings give the paragraph number
FTTW.....	Farther Thoughts on Tar-water, <i>Works</i> , vol. V. Listings give the paragraph number and page number
WW, <i>Word to the Wise</i>	A Word to the Wise, <i>Works</i> , vol. VI. Listings give paragraph and page number
Sermon x: name	Sermons are listed according to the naming, numbering, and pagination in <i>Works</i> , vol. VII

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