THE DUCHEY OF BURGUNDY AND THE CRUSADES, 1095–1220

Submitted in accordance with the requirements
for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

by

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UNIVERSITY OF LEEDS
School of History
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NOVEMBER 2018
The candidate confirms that the work submitted is her own and that appropriate credit has been given where reference has been made to the work of others.

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THE DUKES OF BURGUNDY
1032—1220

Robert II Capet (r. 996–1031) — m. Constance of Arles

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Henry I of France (r. 1032-60)</th>
<th>ROBERT I OF BURGUNDY (r. 1032–75)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>m. 1. Helias of Semur</td>
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<td></td>
<td>2. Ermengard of Anjou</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Hildegard—(m. William VIII of Aquitaine)</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Hugh (died childless) | Henry (m. unknown) | Robert | Constance (m. Alfonso VI of Castile-León)

HUGH I OF BURGUNDY (r. 1075–78)  ODO I OF BURGUNDY (r. 1078–1102)
(m. Sibylla of Burgundy) (1)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Helias</th>
<th>HUGH II OF BURGUNDY (r. 1102–43)</th>
<th>Henry</th>
<th>Agnes (2)</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(m. Matilda of Mayenne)</td>
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ODO II OF BURGUNDY (r. 1143–62)
(m. Marie of Champagne) (3)

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Helias</th>
<th>HUGH III OF BURGUNDY (r. 1162–92)</th>
<th>m. 1. Alix of Lorraine (4)</th>
<th>2. Beatrice of Albon</th>
</tr>
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ODO III OF BURGUNDY (r. 1192–1218)

<table>
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<th></th>
<th>Alexander</th>
<th>m. 1. Matilda of Portugal, countess of Flanders</th>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2. Alix of Vergy</td>
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HUGH IV OF BURGUNDY (r. 1218—1272)

KEY TO RELATION WITH OTHER NOBLE HOUSES

(1) Sibylla of Burgundy was the daughter of William I ‘Tête-Hardi’, count of Burgundy (r. 1057–87) and his wife Stephanie. Her siblings included Rainald I of Burgundy, Stephen I of Burgundy, Raymond of Burgundy (husband of Urraca of Castile), Guy of Burgundy (Pope Calixtus II, r. 1119–24), Clementine, countess of Flanders (wife of Robert II), and Gisela of Burgundy (mother of Adelaide of Maurienne, wife of Louis VI of France).

(2) Agnes of Grancey has been tentatively substituted here in place of the almost assuredly fictional Florina.

(3) Marie of Champagne was the daughter of Theobald II of Blois-Champagne (the son of Stephen of Blois and Adela of Normandy) and Matilda of Carinthia. Her siblings included, among others, Henry I ‘the Liberal’, count of Champagne (r. 1152–81), Theobald of Blois, Adela of Champagne (third wife of Louis VII of France and mother of Philip II of France), and Stephen, count of Sancerre.

(4) Alix of Lorraine was the daughter of Duke Matthew of Lorraine and Bertha, the sister of Frederick I Barbarossa, Holy Roman Emperor (r. 1155—90). Her sister was Judith of Lorraine, wife of Stephen II of Burgundy, the cousin of Barbarossa’s wife Beatrice. Beatrice was herself the granddaughter of Stephen I of Burgundy (see above) and became sole heiress to the county of Burgundy when her father, Rainald III of Burgundy, died in 1148.
BURGUNDY IN THE NINTH AND TENTH CENTURIES

Image source: Marco Zanoli, Wikimedia
<https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/4/4a/Karte_Hoch_und_Niederburgund_EN.png>
BURGUNDY IN THE TWELFTH AND THIRTEENTH CENTURIES

Image source: Marco Zanoli, Wikimedia
<https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/e/ec/Map_Kingdom_Arelat_EN.png>
# LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Notes</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ATF</td>
<td>Alberic of Trois-Fontaines (<em>RHGF</em> and <em>MGH</em>)</td>
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<tr>
<td>CAM</td>
<td><em>Cartulaires de l’abbaye de Molesme</em> (ed. Jacques Laurent)</td>
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<tr>
<td>CCB</td>
<td><em>Chartes de communes et d’affranchissements en Bourgogne</em> (ed. Joseph Garnier)</td>
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<tr>
<td>CGY</td>
<td><em>Cartulaire général de l’Yonne</em> (ed. Maximilien Quantin)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cîteaux</td>
<td><em>Chartes et documents concernant l’abbaye de Cîteaux</em> (ed. Jean Marilier)</td>
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<td>CSBD</td>
<td><em>Chartes et documents de Saint-Bénigne de Dijon</em> (ed. Georges Chevrier and Maurice Chaume)</td>
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<tr>
<td>CSED</td>
<td><em>Chartes de l’abbaye de Saint-Étienne de Dijon</em> (ed. Georges Valat)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>DLKJ</td>
<td><em>Die Urkunden der lateinischen Könige von Jerusalem</em> (ed. Hans Eberhard Mayer)</td>
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<tr>
<td>DRI</td>
<td><em>Die Register Innocenz III</em> (ed. various)</td>
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<tr>
<td>GPA</td>
<td>Rigord, <em>Gesta Philippi Augusti</em> (ed. and trans. Elisabeth Carpentier, Georges Pon, and Yves Chauvin)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GV</td>
<td>Geoffrey de Villehardouin (ed. and trans. Caroline Smith)</td>
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<tr>
<td>HA</td>
<td><em>Historia Albigensium</em> (Peter of les Vaux-de-Cernay)</td>
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<tr>
<td>HAC</td>
<td><em>History of the Albigensian Crusade</em> (ed. and trans. W.A. Sibly &amp; M.D. Sibly)</td>
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<tr>
<td>HdB</td>
<td><em>Histoire des ducs de Bourgogne</em> (Ernest Petit)</td>
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<tr>
<td>HGMV</td>
<td><em>Histoire généalogique de la maison de Vergy</em> (André Duchesne)</td>
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<tr>
<td>LCC</td>
<td><em>La conquête de Constantinople</em> (ed. Edmond Faral)</td>
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<tr>
<td>MGH</td>
<td><em>Monumenta Germaniae Historica</em> (ed. various)</td>
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<tr>
<td>PL</td>
<td><em>Patrologia Latina</em> (ed. J.P. Migne)</td>
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<tr>
<td>RCAC</td>
<td><em>Recueil des chartes de l’abbaye de Cluny</em> (ed. Auguste Bernard and Alexandre Bruel)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>RHGF</td>
<td><em>Recueil des historiens des Gaules et de la France</em> (ed. various)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>RPA</td>
<td><em>Recueil des actes de Philippe Auguste</em> (ed. Clovis Brunel, Charles Samaran)</td>
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<tr>
<td>SMC</td>
<td><em>Sword, Miter, and Cloister</em> (Constance Brittain Bouchard)</td>
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<tr>
<td>WT</td>
<td>William of Tyre, <em>Deeds Done Beyond the Sea</em> (trans. Emily Babcock &amp; August C. Krey) and <em>Chronica</em> (ed. R.B.C Huygens)</td>
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INTRODUCTION

In the two centuries between the call for the First Crusade in November 1095 and the fall of the city of Acre to the Mamluk Turks in June 1291, all of Europe underwent dramatic political, physical, social, cultural, and religious change, but possibly nowhere more so than the birthplace of the movement: the medieval kingdom of France. Over the course of the crusades, it transformed from a collection of largely independent fiefs and principalities, ruled by a fairly limited king, to arguably the pre-eminent secular power in the Western world. Its relationship to the crusades has been studied almost exhaustively, but the duchy of Capetian Burgundy (1032–1361) has to date lacked any sustained analytical treatment in this context, such as which nearly all of its regional counterparts have received in detail. There are several reasons for this. One is a mistaken assumption that Burgundy was merely a passive satellite of the French monarchy, and strong impulses to political centralisation in France have led to a historical narrative of conformity. Secondly, Burgundy lacked the readily visible glamour of the Plantagenet territories and the political and personal conflicts of their charismatic rulers. Finally, the well-documented Valois dukes (1363–1482) and their neo-crusading exploits have contributed to the impression that it was only in the late medieval period that the duchy developed a distinct or independent crusading interest. Yet in the first 125 years of the crusades, three dukes of Burgundy and three counts of Burgundy (including Frederick Barbarossa, Holy Roman Emperor) joined up and in multiple cases led crusades, which were comparable to and often greater than other French principalities. But this was not merely a ducal endeavour, and it is possible to identify close to a hundred Burgundian crusaders over the same period, active in Iberia, the Holy Land, Greece, and southern France. This is remarkable given that Burgundy produced no dedicated crusading narratives and barely had a presence in the foundational First Crusade.
In surveying the extant literature, the space for such an undertaking becomes readily apparent. Popular interest in the crusades has revived sharply since the attacks of 11 September 2001, and resulted in a number of new general histories joining older scholarship. But despite the work done on many subsections of crusade studies, Burgundy’s near-total invisibility remains striking, as examination of its involvement is almost completely restricted to the powerful fourteenth and fifteenth-century Valois dukes.\(^1\) The *Annales de Bourgogne*, the pre-eminent journal of Burgundian history, has not printed a single article on Burgundian crusading in the period of 1095–1291.\(^2\) Instead, works have focused on powerful individuals such as Duke Philip the Good (r. 1419–67),\(^3\) the French Valois monarchy as a whole,\(^4\) the relations to royal and regional politics,\(^5\) and the emerging sense of Burgundian statehood and authority.\(^6\) Due to these developments, the effects of the Hundred Years War and persistent Anglo-French conflict, and the eventual influence of the French wars of religion, the appeal of Burgundy in this era is easily visible. But it did not only begin to be relevant in this time period, and nor did its crusade contributions spring from nowhere. Furthermore, while other regions of France were subject to the dual governance of rival English and French kings, Burgundy was uniquely divided as both a French duchy within the remit of the Capetian monarchs, and as a German county nominally subject to the Holy Roman Emperors. The borders between the regions were never entirely clear and often overlapped, supported by marriages, church patronage, and other customary acts of


diplomacy. While this complicates the historian’s task in trying to sort out the political landscape and primary sources, it also speaks to Burgundy’s importance at the heart of two of the most powerful medieval polities, and how its study can offer compelling new insights on both.

To piece together an account of Burgundian involvement in the traditional era of the crusades, and to determine what sort of questions we are able to ask, we must draw on evidence from a range of sources. Among the secondary literature, one of the most important starting places is Ernest Petit’s nine-volume *Histoire des ducs de Bourgogne*, published in the nineteenth century but still of considerable use. Petit’s work is invaluable for its access to local chroniclers and the inclusion of reprinted charters and documents. However, he did make mistakes in his genealogy and chronology, and should be used cautiously at points. More recently, Constance Brittain Bouchard has also identified the nobility of tenth-to-twelfth-century Burgundy and the relationships between its secular and religious leadership, among a generally important body of work on the region, and Gregory Smith has treated the question of violence in Burgundy in this time period through the letters of Peter the Venerable, the influential abbot of Cluny (r. 1122–56). A unique approach to studying Cluniac attitudes toward the First Crusade has emerged in Elizabeth Lapina’s analysis of the murals of the chapel in Berzé-la-Ville in Burgundy, and Dominique Iogna-Prat has explored medieval Cluny’s relations to and rhetorical constructions of heresy, Judaism, and Islam. To consider Burgundy in comparison to its provincial neighbours,

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noble genealogies, and its relation to the emergent Capetian monarchy, we must also draw upon studies of regional and monarchical French history and its associated prosopography, such as those of Jean Dunbabin,\textsuperscript{12} Kimberly LoPrete,\textsuperscript{13} and K.F. Werner.\textsuperscript{14}

Nonetheless, the sheer lack of dedicated modern scholarship on medieval Burgundy as a distinct entity – it is often considered in relation to or in support of other topics, but rarely on its own – means that the thesis has had to provide some of its own body of evidence, demarcation of the relationships and structures of the regional nobility, and analytical interpretations, with the inevitable errors and lacunae which may result when there is not a substantial supporting literature with which to compare treatments. By nature, the thesis touches upon some questions of regional French history, but it remains fundamentally concerned with crusading, and the construction, experience, and memory of this action among a representation of Burgundian individuals and communities, whose connections to each other and documentary records are sometimes more visible in one place or time than in others. To this end, the disadvantage of little specific source material on Burgundy per se can be overcome in favour of more thematically centred approaches. Marcus Bull’s study of crusade response in the Limousin and Gascony has usefully informed the present work in some of its early chronological stages, such as in the Peace of God and the involvement of Frenchmen in pre-First Crusade Iberia.\textsuperscript{15} Nonetheless, it has


\textsuperscript{13} Kimberly A. LoPrete, \textit{Adela of Blois: Countess and Lord (c.1067–1137)} (Dublin: Four Courts Press, 2007). While focusing primarily on the figure of Adela, the work offers extensive investigation and commentary on Blois-Champagne’s relations with its regional neighbours, including Burgundy, and the structure of the aristocracy.


nuanced or challenged Bull’s arguments at points, and Bull also focuses centrally on the theme of piety, which is not ultimately the most useful approach for understanding Burgundian crusading commitments. Piety can never be far from any analysis of crusading activity in the Middle Ages, and genuine religious feeling certainly played a part in all the expeditions under consideration here, but Burgundy’s experience emerges as primarily shaped by two factors: firstly, the political connections of the dukes to the kings of France, and secondly, the existence of familial crusading traditions and the collective memory of extended kinship networks.

Nicholas Paul’s recent monograph, *To Follow in their Footsteps: The Crusades and Family Memory in the High Middle Ages*, thus emerges as a principal model on which this study should be seen to shape itself.16 Paul has remarked that ‘from a practical point of view, crusading would seem to have been almost impossible without the support of kindred’,17 and a selection of multi-generational crusading dynasties did form in Burgundy in this time period, including the lords of Donzy and Toucy, the counts of Nevers, the Champlitte fathers, sons, and brothers, and others. During the Third Crusade, kinship connections and the presence of previous or fellow crusaders became especially prominent in patterns of prosopography, such as in the example of the crusading cousins Clarembaud of Noyers, Stephen of Brive, and Aswalo of Seignelay. The

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17 Paul, *To Follow In Their Footsteps*, p. 1.
late Jonathan Riley-Smith’s long interest in family traditions is also vital, particularly in his treatment of the comital family of Burgundy in the First and Second Crusades. Nonetheless, while every modern crusade scholar owes an intellectual debt of some fashion to Riley-Smith, the present work has deemed it necessary to substantially revisit and revise his conclusions in several places. The question of crusading memory and the *post facto* configuration of crusading experience, as much or even more than the actual events themselves, is also drawing critical attention. When applying these frames of reference to Burgundy, we can ask why it has been so un- or under-memorialised in the years following the crusades, and consider for example its representation in the famous *Chanson d’Antioche*. The *Chanson*, an epic poem of the Old French crusade cycle, quickly became the primary vehicle for crusade memorialisation, to the point that the omission of one Arnold II of Ardres (dep. Pas-de-Calais, arr. Calais) provoked the family scribe to a lengthy and vituperative tirade about the injustice in the early thirteenth century.

As we will see, Burgundy’s vexed and limited participation in the First Crusade proper may have resulted in it ‘missing the boat’ for long-term memorialisation. While two of its First Crusade participants, Achard of Montmerle and Oliver of Jussey, do appear briefly by name in the *Chanson*, neither of these men had descendants to follow their example (Achard, at least, was killed), and both furthermore are likely to have been comital Burgundians, rather than ducal.

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The unflattering and somewhat inexplicable character of a ‘bearded Saracen […] an interpreter originally from Burgundy’ is unlikely to have helped matters. Additionally, the Chanson groups the French and Burgundians together as a general rule. While this certainly reflects the reality of Burgundian crusading in the late twelfth and early thirteenth centuries, where the dukes participated (or did not participate) almost entirely as an indication of the state of political play with France, it is less accurate prior to 1187, including for the First Crusade itself. While the Chanson’s largely fabricated and fantastic nature has long been recognised, the historian must also accept that emotional imagery, selective memory, useful fiction, and other consciously created and curated material is sometimes as important as supposedly straightforward and factual prose sources, if not more so, in shaping the perceptions, preconditions, and expectations of audiences both past and present. To borrow a turn of phrase, sometimes the truth is inconvenient, and must be repaired and reconstructed in more advantageous ways. This was certainly the case in regard to an activity where there was so much at stake – politically, socially, religiously, culturally, and reputationally – as crusading.

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p. 143, n. 68, for Oliver’s blunt response to Stephen of Blois’ cowardice in battle (Stephen serving as a usual point of critique for the Chanson).

22 Chanson d’Antioche, p. 134, sect. 51. Edginton and Sweetenham note that it is unclear why there would be an apostate interpreter, and as he is publicly made an example of for his treachery (catapulted into Nicaea and killed), it is furthermore an uncomfortable anecdote for Burgundy. See also Isabel de Riquer, ‘Los interpretes de la Chanson d’Antioche’, Boletín de la Real Academia de Buenas Letras de Barcelona, 43 (1991–92), pp. 313–19.

23 Chanson d’Antioche, p. 123, sect. 35; p. 125, sect. 38, p. 151, p. 83, p. 159, sect. 102, for the French and Burgundians together (sometimes in company with Flemings or Normans, but often paired on their own).


On that note, it is useful now to pursue the question of primary material in more depth.

We begin with the traditional narrative sources, most of which are well-known to crusade scholars and cover the major expeditions in general detail, but are only of intermittent or occasional relevance to Burgundy. It highlights the fact that while many of the First Crusade personalities and contingents had a dedicated chronicler, the lack of a comparable Burgundian author meant that their participation remained unevenly recorded. (Or, in the case of Florina of Burgundy, they can be proven as unlikely to have existed at all.) We have considered their suspect fortunes in the *Chanson d’Antioche* above, a trait that can tend to hold true more generally. When they are given a prominent presence in the chronicles, the attention is not necessarily positive. Duke Hugh III of Burgundy played a leading role on the Third Crusade as King Philip II of France’s chief lieutenant, opposite King Richard I of England, and Roger of Howden, Ambroise, and the *Itinerarium Peregrinorum*, all generally or overwhelmingly favourable to Richard, commented on Hugh’s actions in increasingly negative terms. When the overall result is one of nonexistence, brief mentions, contrary and sometimes incorrect information, or active hostility, it becomes clear that the bulk of the primary material must be drawn from other places. For this project, the cartularies of Saint-Bénigne, Cluny, Molesme, and other regional religious establishments have been of most use for the First and Second Crusades, while the cartulary of the Yonne region was particularly fruitful for the Third.26 By the time of the Fourth and Albigensian Crusades, Burgundians become slightly more visible in the narrative sources, but still must be supplemented with diplomatic evidence and papal correspondence.


Isabelle Rosé has studied the construction of cartulary records and diplomatic manuscripts in Burgundy from the eleventh to eighteenth centuries, and noted that the ‘caractère prolifique’ of the evidence can be partly explained as a corollary of the presence of the major religious houses of Cluny, Cîteaux, and Clairvaux, all engaged in producing, preserving, and transmitting their own corpus of documents. 27 Many of the cartularies were printed in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries by French presses, and edited by local scholars and historical societies. The dates of their material vary, but usually cover the period from the tenth to the fourteenth centuries; the *Chartes et documents de Saint-Bénigne de Dijon, des origines à 1300*, is fairly representative in scope. 28 In the *Chartes de communes et d’affranchissements en Bourgogne*, we find several instances of the dukes negotiating military service with the citizens of Dijon and granting them rights, as well as Philip II of France guaranteeing these in 1183. 29 The cartulary of Marcigny-sur-Loire includes acta of the Burgundian-connected popes Urban II (prior of Cluny from 1070–80, r. 1088–99) and Calixtus II (born Guy of Burgundy, r. 1119–24). 30 The *Cartulaire des comtes de Bourgogne* records some documentation for comital Burgundy, though it leaves out the first 150 years and begins in 1166. 31 Ernest Petit also reprints numerous charters in *Histoire de la ducs de Bourgogne*.


29 *Chartes de communes et d’affranchissements en Bourgogne*, ed. by Joseph Garnier, 4 vols (Dijon, 1867), t. p. 1.


31 *Cartulaire des comtes de Bourgogne (1166-1321)*, ed. by Jules Gauthier and Roger de Lurion (Besançon: Jacquin, 1908).
In sum, the printed cartularies provide an excellent starting point, but face some limitations. To consider how the work of archiving cartulary records has been brought into the twenty-first century, and the additional sources and methods made possible through it, we turn now to the Chartes de la Bourgogne du Moyen Âge, or CBMA.\(^{32}\) The project is currently supported by the Laboratoire de Médiévistique Occidentale de Paris (LAMOP) at the Université de Paris-Sorbonne, and is the result of a ten-year collaboration by scholars at the Université de Bourgogne, Dijon, to collect over 15,000 charters, documents, scanned books, and other primary sources for Burgundy in the Middle Ages, including high-quality images of original manuscripts. CBMA offers additional scholarly articles, regional French histories, and recent doctoral theses in the medieval studies programme at the Université de Bourgogne. They also link to the archives of the modern French départements of Côte-d’Or, Nièvre, Saône-et-Loire, and the Yonne (the historical territory of Burgundy), and the Bibliothèque nationale de France. The venerable *Recueil des historiens des Gaules et de la France* has provided many regional chronicles, obscure or brief documents, papal letters, and miscellaneous material, and similar older multi-volume archives such as the *Patrologia Latina*, *Monumenta Germaniae Historica*, and *Historiens des croisades* have continued to serve their purpose, though this text has been corroborated and corrected with modern critical editions where they exist.

Altogether, both the traditional and digitised resources provide a great deal of raw material on medieval Burgundy. Nonetheless, clarifying and cataloguing Burgundian crusaders and their involvement, motivations, and consequences remains a work in progress, and we must additionally recognise the exterior social, religious, and archival influences present in the construction of cartulary records. Stephen White has remarked that ‘gifts or confirmations of

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gifts tended to be clustered around critical moments in the main donor’s life-cycle or in the developmental cycle of a kin group to which he belonged’. In the case of crusading, the critical moment is obvious: the departure of a crusader to the Holy Land required certain social, financial, and liturgical obligations, performative penitences, and practical arrangements for transfer of property – often with the awareness of the high mortality rate and unlikelihood of return visibly underlying these pious preparations. This fits with White’s observation that charters were implicitly associated with death – whether that of the giver him-or-herself or of a close relative or friend, and other moments of social and existential transition and reconfiguration. Charters are by no means an impartial or objective source of documentary evidence, having been formulated at deliberate points (sometimes well past the actual temporal occurrence of the event) for a set of specific religious and rhetorical purposes that were obviously concerned with casting the giver in as favourable a light as possible. Sometimes their task was more difficult than others, as we shall see in the discussion of Duke Odo I’s preparation to crusade in 1101. In some sense, we are only able to access of Burgundian crusaders what they explicitly wished us to remember, but the cartularies’ function in providing prosopography, motive, religious and financial economy, and specifics of time and place remains invaluable.

Having discussed some of the secondary and primary material which this project utilises, we now turn to a consideration of some of the contentions that can be drawn from it, and their importance to crusading and medieval French history more generally. In any assessment of Burgundy’s importance, we should begin with the major religious houses of Cluny and Cîteaux. King Alfonso VI of Castile-León’s (r. 1072–1109) extensive Burgundian and Cluniac connections were partially responsible for the ultimate escalation of the so-called Iberian

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34 White, Custom, Kinship, and Gifts to Saints, p. 33.
‘reconquista’ into a fully-fledged holy war, but Cluny’s influence on the crusades proper, at least at first and then again in later years, was ambivalent and limited. Nonetheless, its programme of the Peace of God and other major eleventh-century ecclesiastical reform initiatives has driven much scholarship into its involvement with crusade origins, and Cluny’s function as an international medieval network of exchange and patronage bears attention. Moreover, Cluny was founded in 910 by an Aquitainian duke with a Burgundian wife, in a Burgundian model of monastic patronage, and Cîteaux (also located in Burgundy) and the new Cistercian order were established in response to it in 1098. While the simple fact of geography does not necessarily make a nascent political ‘Burgundy’ responsible for these developments, it does highlight that a certain kind of religious and monastic activity was taking place in the region, and that this had enduring consequences. The Cistercians’ involvement in, preaching for, and financing of the Second, Fourth, and Albigensian Crusades arguably made each of those ventures possible to begin with, and as each altered the parameters of crusading philosophy in oftentimes shocking and drastic ways to their contemporaries, these changes have their ultimate roots in Burgundy.

The case study of Duke Odo I of Burgundy (r. 1078–1102) and Burgundian First Crusade participation in general shows that while French crusade involvement was widespread nearly from the moment of the council of Clermont in autumn 1095, it nonetheless was not universal, and political obligations and tensions interacted with the sense of religious ardour from the start. No matter the rationale for Odo’s rejection of the First Crusade, he did constitute a different kind of crusade response from his peers, who overwhelmingly joined up or at least materially supported it. Despite Odo’s participation in 1101, which was done for decidedly political reasons following his disadvantages with the church, this seems to have laid a family policy of the dukes remaining largely separate from the crusades, at least on their own initiative. When Hugh III (r.
1162–92) and Odo III (r. 1192–1218) did go on crusade in the late twelfth and early thirteenth centuries, this was at the explicit behest of the French kings, borne from political antagonism on Hugh’s part and political alliance on Odo’s. Thus the participation of the dukes themselves tended to reflect the periods of strongest royal control and influence, and makes clear that prior to 1187, Burgundy was not as closely or effectively attached to the French crown as it later became.

In contrast to the First, the Second Crusade was built within a specifically Burgundian sphere of influence, among the ecclesiastical, secular, and familial connections of Bernard of Clairvaux and Godfrey of Langres, and Pope Eugenius III and King Louis VII had been involved in domestic Burgundian politics and disputes beforehand. Once more, as with the Cistercians, the fact of geography alone does not represent a conscious ‘Burgundian’ policy, but does serve to point our attention to this region and its similarities to or differences from its neighbours. The connections mobilised to launch the Second Crusade relied upon local Burgundian networks and kinship groups often located very close to the dukes’ seat of power in Dijon, including Bernard and Godfrey’s immediate families. By this time alone, therefore, Burgundy is marked out by a distinct pattern of Iberian involvement and influence in the eleventh century, a unique and limited response to the otherwise massively popular First Crusade, and then a function as the driving force in the Second Crusade. It thus becomes clear that its study as its own region does have something of considerable value to contribute, and that to overlook it risks simplifying or misreading the overall function of the crusades in French politics and society.

Burgundy’s bicephalous nature, divided between the French-aligned dukedom and the imperially-subject county, necessarily made it hard to define by territorial borders alone and gave it a unique position between Western Europe’s two major powers. In some sense, Burgundy’s
dual political identity is mirrored throughout the time period under consideration, as we can find it playing a variety of contrasting roles, serving as both ally and antagonist to the French crown, implicitly withdrawing from or explicitly partaking in crusading activity, being defined largely in relation to its dukes or largely in relation to its counts, and otherwise embodying a certain sort of fluidity in its existence, and a transgression of the usual geographical and analytical categories. Simply put, perhaps ‘Burgundy’ can be whatever someone needs it to be, and this challenges us to define our terms and pose our questions more carefully. Indeed, this lack of specificity has demonstrably hampered the existing literature. Throughout this thesis, we have identified and discussed errors in the published scholarship, including foundational (and dated) reference works such as those of Ernest Petit. It is now therefore possible to provide a more correct and convenient starting place, factually and linguistically (as many relevant publications remain in French or Latin) for future English-speaking historiography.

Burgundy’s relationship with king and emperor was especially complex in the mid-to-late twelfth century. This period also saw arguably the most open conflict between France and Burgundy since the establishment of the ducal Capetians, as the 1180s were characterised by power struggles and all-out war between King Philip II (r. 1180–1223) and Duke Hugh III. The Burgundian experience of crusading, at least where the dukes themselves were concerned, is quite different pre-and-post 1187, and came about as a consequence of this political defeat and the religious trauma of Jerusalem’s fall in 1187. In both cases, the overall motivation to crusade was linked directly to closer ties, wanted or unwanted, with the French crown, and the expansion of royal Capetian power into the duchy. The results of this were seen on the Third Crusade, where Hugh III served as lieutenant to Philip II and then, after the king’s early departure, as overall commander of the French forces. In this capacity, he clashed repeatedly and ultimately
irreparably with King Richard I of England (r. 1189–99), but this rivalry did not become fatal until after the crusading army had already suffered several major tactical and financial setbacks. In other words, while the dominant narrative of the Third Crusade is often, and in some part understandably, the Anglo-French rivalry that weakened its chances of putting up a united front against Saladin, both Richard and Hugh made an effort, at least at first, to co-operate despite acrimonious circumstances. We can identify almost half (almost 50) of all our named Burgundian crusaders as having taken part in the Third Crusade, and the cartulary of the Yonne highlights especially the depth of the crusading commitment that this particular expedition was able to invoke in the region. This, however, came about as a direct result of the war of 1186 against France, and should be viewed in its broader context.

Lastly, during the height of the crusading era under Pope Innocent III (r. 1198–1216), King Philip II of France and Duke Odo III of Burgundy served as political partners and close allies in multiple ventures, including their response to the threat of heresy in the Languedoc and Toulouse. Odo’s long-term role as Philip’s faithful lieutenant arguably allowed the Capetian monarchy to survive its most serious challenges during the reign of the formidable Richard I of England. This was once more embodied in the duke’s personal crusading activity. After Odo’s refusal of its leadership in 1201, the Fourth Crusade recruited a few notable participants, but this was mostly funneled through the influence and activity of the Cistercian motherhouse of Cîteaux, and represented an arguably ambivalent lay response to crusading in Burgundy that had not been permanently changed by the Third. It is not possible to identify nearly as many named individuals from the Fourth Crusade as from the Third, and the number comes out about equal to the Second. This may represent the ever-present pitfalls of having to rely on charters, gifts, or other explicit documentation, but it at least demonstrates that the activity and preparation for
crusading in Burgundy differed between the Third and the Fourth, and changed again during the
efforts against the Albigensians. Instead of focusing on large-scale, macro-historical changes
such as those that took place in the Plantagenet provinces, we can obtain a more subtle picture of
political development in medieval France by means of Burgundy’s example, and the ways in
which crusading was integrated into the mechanism of royal control. The duchy was never fully
outside Capetian authority after its establishment in 1032, and often adhered to that authority at
least in theory, but as its relationship to the crown grew increasingly refined and controlled, the
dukes’ personal obligation to crusade became the chief indicator of royal policy. While
Burgundy’s human crusade participation was sporadic, its influence in creating many of the
longest-lasting and most central paradigms of crusading ideology cannot be understated.

The thesis has endeavoured to rely on as broad a base of evidence as possible, but due to
the discussed lack of material in certain eras and subjects, there are moments where repeated
consultation of the same source is necessary, though fleshed out and cross-referenced as much as
possible. Some necessary conventions are observed in what follows. For the identification of
places, their historical name is presented first and used if familiar; i.e. Constantinople instead of
Istanbul. For places in France, their modern name (if applicable), département and
arrondissement is presented after first citation; i.e. Achard of Montmerle (Montmerle-sur-Saône,
dep. Ain, arr. Bourg-en-Bresse), with note, if feasible, of whether these are traditionally ducal or
comital lands. The equivalent is also provided for locations and cities in the Holy Land (modern
name and country). Major cities such as Paris, Dijon, Jerusalem, etc., and historical provinces of
France such as Normandy, Flanders, Maine, Anjou, etc., are assumed as general knowledge.
Rulers are given at first citation with their regnal number and dates, with as much effort as
possible to differentiate between the multiple individuals sharing the same name.
The thesis is structured in six chapters. The first, ‘Burgundy at the Dawn of the Crusades,’ investigates the political and geographical paradigms of Burgundy in the early medieval era, and the transformation from Carolingian to Capetian governance, in order to provide a firm grounding for an understanding of Burgundy at the time of the First Crusade. It also investigates the ducal and comital families, the role of Burgundy in Iberia in the eleventh century, and the question of Cluny’s influence on the intellectual prehistory of the crusades. The second chapter, ‘Considering Contrasts,’ studies the First Crusade itself and Burgundy’s ambivalent response to the initial expedition in 1096, compared to its heavy involvement in the follow-up expedition of 1101, as well as highlighting the ‘curious case of Florina of Burgundy’, a popular crusading heroine whose foundations prove to be rather slight. Chapter three, ‘Transforming Traditions,’ finds that the controversial and much-criticised Second Crusade was born from a nexus of Burgundian family, religion, and influence, and was instrumental in laying the groundwork for the tradition of crusader kings. It also examines the roles of two Burgundian churchmen, Pope Calixtus II and Peter the Venerable, in creating long-lasting paradigms of canon law and religious negotiation with Muslims and Jews in the context of the crusades.

Chapter four, ‘Between King and Emperor,’ investigates the polities of Burgundy in the latter half of the twelfth century, and their complex links with the king of France and the Holy Roman Emperor, both of whom participated alongside the duke on the Third Crusade. Chapter five, ‘Intimate Enemies,’ covers that crusade, perhaps one of the most well-known due to the involvement of the rival kings of France and England, and the duke of Burgundy’s role as lieutenant (to the former) and antagonist (to the latter). It nonetheless argues that simplistic reductions of the Third Crusade to a nonstop theatre of Anglo-French conflict are incorrect, and
examines larger questions about the increased response to crusading post-1187 and the reasons for its integration into the structure of medieval political and religious commitment.

Lastly, chapter six, ‘The Early Thirteenth Century,’ considers Burgundy’s ongoing assimilation into the kingdom of France, involvement in the Fourth and Albigensian Crusades, and the apogee of papal power and calls for crusading under Pope Innocent III (1198–1216), as well as the duchy’s increasingly close links with France. It cannot cover the later crusades of Louis IX or the full term until the fall of Acre in 1291, but offers a study in both breadth and depth of the province of Burgundy and the major consequences of its involvement with the ‘high’ crusading era until about c. 1220. Along the way, it will centre Burgundy within the context of its development within France, its role in the regional and territorial conflicts of the French crown, its place in imperial Germany, its relations to other major political actors such as the kings of England and the popes of Rome, and the insights that can be drawn for any and all of these. It will focus largely on the Capetian dukes, though the German counts will be considered in their interactions with the broader picture, and lay crusaders are often traceable to the comital lands. It does not intend to offer a step-by-step recitation of Burgundy’s involvement in subsequent chronological events, but to use its examples and case studies to illuminate the development of crusading history and medieval France and Europe alike. In a world more fascinated by the crusades and Muslim-Christian relations than ever, and one in which medieval histories are written and rewritten for a variety of political projects, the need for careful, critical, and compassionate scholarship is easily apparent. It is in that spirit which we begin.
CHAPTER ONE

Burgundy at the Dawn of the Crusades: Familial, Political, and Religious Histories

To begin, it is necessary to establish the basic parameters of ‘Burgundy,’ the identities of its ducal and comital houses, and some understanding of its regional, national, and international relations, both political and religious. This is a task uniquely difficult in comparison to its neighbours; as Constance Brittain Bouchard remarks, ‘The region known as Burgundy has had some of the most elastic borders of any region of France, and some of the various regions called ‘Burgundy’ at different times barely overlap at all’.\(^1\) While not providing a lengthy recitation of the area’s complex history in the early medieval period, as others have done more comprehensively, this chapter lays out enough socio-political context to provide orientation. It also considers the Burgundian role in the physical, legal, and intellectual prehistory of the crusades, both in its extensive involvement in eleventh-century Iberia and the abbey of Cluny’s keystone project of the Peace and Truce of God. Both of these subjects have been well studied overall, but by placing them in regional context, we emerge with a new understanding of Burgundy’s particular – and arguably, paramount – importance in both of these developments.

I. Geography, Territory, and Polity: From Carolingians to Capetians, 843–1032

Burgundy is generally regarded as a post-Roman kingdom emerging in the fifth century, roughly corresponding to the area between Lyon (to the west), Geneva (to the east), and Arles (to the south).\(^2\) The Frankish people with whom it became associated in the sixth century were aggressive conquerors who quickly identified themselves as Burgundians, but not the same as the

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original Burgundian tribes.\(^3\) After its absorption into the Merovingian polity in the mid-sixth century, its borders grew substantially, encompassing ‘essentially all the Loire and Saône-Rhône river basins, stretching from its capital at Orléans to the Mediterranean’.\(^4\) It was divided in 843 in the Treaty of Verdun, with Charles the Bald, son of Louis the Pious and grandson of Charlemagne, taking the portion which counted Sens and Troyes as its northern border, Autun and Mâcon as its southern, and the Saône-Rhône rivers as its western. The rivers would come to serve as the major boundary between French (ducal) Burgundy to the west and imperial (comital) Burgundy to the east. The latter was assigned to Charles’ half-brother, Holy Roman Emperor Lothar I (r. 817–55), and included the traditional Burgundian heartlands between Besançon and Geneva to the north, and the southern territory in the region of Provence.\(^5\) Charles the Bald’s portion, without Sens and Troyes (which became attached to Champagne) generally corresponds with the eventual duchy of Burgundy. This, however, would not develop for another hundred years, and demonstrates the immediate complication of speaking of a political Burgundy.\(^6\)

Jean Richard’s *Histoire de la Bourgogne* also provides a general overview of the region, roughly applicable to our period of study overall. Burgundy is set out as an area of north-east and central-eastern France, with its northern frontier in Sens, its western at Nevers, its southern at Mâcon, and its eastern extending to Besançon, with the regional capital and primary residence of the dukes, Dijon, lying about 30 miles to the west of the latter.\(^7\) Other cities included Autun,

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Auxerre, Avallon, Beaune, Chalon, Château-Chinon, Châtillon, Donzy, Joigny, Langres, Montbard, Tonnerre, and Toucy. Of these, Autun, Auxerre, Chalon, Langres, Mâcon, and Nevers were episcopal sees, while the influential abbey of Cluny lay a short distance outside Mâcon. The abbey of Vézelay was about 30 miles south of Auxerre and Tonnerre. Paris, seat of the Capetian kings, lay roughly 200 miles northwest of Dijon, and Burgundy’s provincial neighbour to the north was Champagne; to the west, Bourbounais and Berry; to the south, Lyon; and to the east, the territory controlled by the counts of Burgundy. There is some debate as to whether Nevers and the Nivernais region should be treated as an independent entity, but Bouchard reminds us that it is more sensible to define the boundaries of Burgundy in this era by its dioceses and religious centres of influence. In this case, Nevers certainly qualifies, and despite its separation in the later Valois era, it was very much an affiliate of ducal Burgundy and participated fully in the politics of the region. More evidence of medieval Nevers’ links with Burgundy, including its feud with Vézelay, is treated in chapter 3.

Among this group of territories, bishoprics, and regional lordships, various patterns of political fealty and comital-episcopal affiliation emerged. The archbishopric of Sens was largely affiliated with the counts of Champagne, though at times it was drawn into questions of Burgundian remit. The bishop of Langres and the count of Tonnerre shared the overlordship of the Tonnerrois, whereas the bishop and count of Auxerre, with the count of Nevers, formed the Auxerrois. The Burgundian bishops were powerful landholders and feudal overlords in their

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9 SMC, p. 31.
own right, and their secular neighbours were often subject to their jurisdiction.\textsuperscript{12} The bishop of Auxerre was the most senior political figure in the Auxerrois and often received the homage of the powerful counts of Auxerre and Nevers, and the major lordships of the Nivernais – Donzy, Cosne, and Saint-Sauveur – were included in this obligation. This is best demonstrated in the early thirteenth century, where in 1209–10, William, bishop of Auxerre, received ‘faith and homage’ from Hervé IV, count of Donzy and Nevers, and Peter of Courtenay, count of Auxerre and Tonnerre, for castles and territories.\textsuperscript{13} Parts of Auxerre were also claimed by the Thibaudians of Blois-Champagne.\textsuperscript{14} This demonstrates that political and spiritual authority in Burgundy remained permeable and prone to alteration, at least in the eleventh and twelfth centuries. Nor can the precise genealogical, legal, or territorial trajectories always be fully reconstructed.

This is partly due to the fact that the kingdom of Burgundy, relatively centralised under Carolingian royal authority, splintered into various ‘Burgundies’ at the dissolution of the dynasty and divided into competing areas of administration and local influence, constantly contested and with little overarching structure or legal coherence.\textsuperscript{15} René Poupardin remarked on the resulting difficulty for the scholar, as well as the scarcity of surviving documentation.\textsuperscript{16} However, the first emergence of the duchy of Burgundy proper occurred in the late ninth and early tenth centuries, under the authority of Richard the Justiciar (c. 858–921)\textsuperscript{17} who, along with his brother, Boso of

\textsuperscript{12} ‘Constitution de la société civile et féodale’, p. v.
\textsuperscript{14} LoPrete, Adela of Blois, p. 106.
\textsuperscript{17} Dunbabin’s account of Richard the Justiciar’s rise to power offers some challenge to this narrative of a fragmented and fractious Burgundy, noting that he was able to secure election of his own candidates to bishoprics,
Provence, was a powerful and ambitious retainer at the court of Charles the Bald (r. 843–77). Their sister, Richildis, became Charles’ second wife, and Charles was politically and personally generous to his in-laws. The family has been termed the ‘Bosonids’, though relatively little can be discerned of their origins among the Frankish petty nobility. Richard and Boso themselves were the sons of one Bivin of Gorze (dep. Moselle, arr. Metz, north-eastern France). Some of the brothers’ enterprises in provincial politics were more successful than others, as Boso was elected king of Burgundy and Provence in 879 by its bishops, but enjoyed little support from the secular nobility and died eight years later, viewed unkindly by his peers. It should be noted that the ‘Burgundy and Provence’ of Boso’s ambition was not a prefabricated title or coherent bloc of territories, but rather a loosely knit group of lands with some historical association, and his charters may reflect this ambiguity, as he came to style himself ‘Dei gratia id quod sum [by the grace of God that which I am]’ rather than ‘Dei gratia rex’ or more usual titles. It was in response to Boso’s play for the crown that Richard, his brother and rival, created a competing power base in the lands that would become ducal Burgundy, taking the city of Autun as his capital in 880 and achieving fame in fighting the Vikings then attacking France. Unlike his brother, Richard does not seem to have coveted monarchical power for himself, preferring to remain in a supporting role. In this capacity, he became a trusted ally of the future Robert I of

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France (r. 922–23), whose daughter Emma married Richard’s son, Rudolf of Burgundy; Rudolf succeeded his father-in-law as king (r. 923–36).23 Upon assuming the crown, he passed the duchy of Burgundy to his younger brothers, establishing a political precedent followed several times in the decades to come. Richard’s daughter Ermengard, whose husband Giselbert briefly ruled Burgundy *jure uxoris*, was countess of Chalon, Autun, Troyes, Avallon, and Dijon, as well as duchess of Burgundy, indicating that those lands were now considered part of the duchy.24

By 943, Hugh the Great, son of Robert I, had become duke of Burgundy, in which title he was confirmed after assisting Lothar IV (r. 954–86) to be crowned as king of Western Francia; the previous acting duke, Giselbert, did homage to Hugh and renounced his claim.25 Hugh’s three sons were Hugh Capet (founder of the Capetian monarchy), Otto, his first successor in Burgundy and who married Giselbert and Ermengard’s daughter, and Henry the Venerable (r. 965–1002), who became duke following Otto’s death.26 Thus the linkages between the French monarchy and the duchy of Burgundy can be observed to take shape quite early in the post-Carolingian period. The common date for the beginning of this association is 1032, but its previous iterations have been somewhat overlooked. This can be explained by the fact that none were particularly long-lasting or consequential, and that neither succession was firmly established until the mid-eleventh century, but nonetheless, the persistent relationship between the French monarchy and the use of Burgundy as a familial political appanage could go some way to explaining why Burgundy has rarely been considered as an entity in its own right, rather than a mere extension of the crown. Burgundy’s development as a ‘safe option,’ an available

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territory to give a discontented or rebellious second son or brother, may have played a pivotal role in allowing the tenuous French monarchy to take root. It would certainly fulfil that function in 1032, but this partition of power did not come without a price.

At this point, it is pertinent to discuss Georges Duby’s classic thesis of social change and transformation in the Mâconnais region in the tenth and eleventh centuries, which has greatly influenced the study of medieval French political structures. In brief, Duby’s position was that the late tenth century was a period of comparative ‘public’ power, with the institutions of the old Carolingian monarchy still more or less functioning to ensure social cohesion, but that around the year 1000, this dramatically broke down and was replaced by the jurisdiction of ‘private’ counts and petty lords who could operate almost at will. Large pious donations and land divisions among multiple heirs then impoverished and weakened these families, who likewise had to contend with the unclear but allegedly important distinctions between ‘free’ and ‘non-free’ citizens, and the rights and legal obligations of each. This supposed *mutation féodale* was only reversed with the increasing power of the Capetian monarchy in the twelfth century, when French knights and regional lords swore their allegiance to the king in exchange for cash, which they invested in their deprived and divided ancestral holdings. This reparation of political structures, and the emergence of a more dynamic and money-based economy, allowed for the creation of more stable judicial and legal institutions, and the rise of a truly centralised country.27

While Duby’s command of the charter evidence and success in redefining a field of study dominated by nineteenth-century Marxist and sociological perspectives cannot be doubted, many objections have been raised to his overall thesis. Synthesising these in 2002, F.L. Cheyette found substantial grounds to criticise Duby’s conclusions, especially in Duby’s attempt to apply his

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analysis of a relatively small area of the Mâconnais across all of the Frankish/French lands.28 In Cheyette’s reading, the year 1000 was only a very artificial and chronologically obvious divisor, which functioned largely as a consequence of Duby’s desire to build a structure and narrative for the ‘progression’ of history.29 While tenth-century France, in the absence of the Carolingians and before the rise of the Capetians, was by nature a patchwork of local courts and lordships, and violence and disruption was certainly far from uncommon, ‘[it] was more often committed by agents of counts, viscounts, abbots and bishops than by lawless castellans, and in the twelfth century by the armies of counts and kings’.30

In other words, contrary to Duby’s claim that ‘for the upper class, feudalism was a step toward anarchy’,31 where ambitious castellans pursued their interests outside any law or restraint, these castellans still served mostly to keep order and administer local justice, due to the lack of any other political body for doing so, and the effect of violence and insubordination was not beyond the norm or representative of a significant or uncontrollable social decay. Insofar as the effect of a mutation féodale can be discerned, perhaps it is that of regional castellans serving an intermediary or transitory role between Carolingians and Capetians, and a reconsideration of the claim that they had nothing at heart apart from their own economic or political enrichment.32

29 Cheyette, ‘Georges Duby’s Mâconnais’, p. 314: ‘I think we may plausibly conclude that claims for the occurrence of a mutation féodale, a ‘feudal revolution’, when the structure of public power disintegrated around the year 1000 has no basis in the evidence, at least in the original homeland of that construction, Duby’s Mâconnais. […] To be sure, vast amounts of material from a variety of regions have since been added to the meager supply of evidence that Duby first offered, but I am not sure it would have been found convincing support for a ‘feudal revolution’ had the narrative structure he built not already been in place. We would probably be better off without it.’
31 Duby, La société aux XIe et XIIe siècles, p. 195; Cheyette, ‘Georges Duby’s Mâconnais’, p. 300.
32 Duby seemed to retreat from his own analysis in his conclusion, arguing that while tenth-century society had not much changed to outward eyes, ‘this stability is only on the surface [. . .] If the bankruptcy of royal power has not yet weakened the authority that the count exercises over the high aristocracy, it has removed its public character and its legitimacy’. The question, which Cheyette subsequently took up, is whether this concept of ‘private’ power is relevant or useful. Even if the lack of a king made comital power less ‘legitimate,’ is this really a
Duby’s claim of a ‘confused conception of the judicial function entirely at the mercy of personal relations and domestic considerations’ created a portrait of an early medieval Burgundy where political influence was essentially synonymous with personal charisma, which may accord in some degree with the independence of its exercise, but does not necessarily prove that it was done with no idea of larger purpose. The question of just how violent the tenth and eleventh centuries actually were, and who was responsible for restraining and redirecting this violence, is fundamental to our enquiry into the Peace and Truce of God, and its possible influence on crusading theology and development. Nonetheless, this is not meant to claim that power arrangements were particularly deep or stable, and they certainly often did change and shift.

While the lack of a central authority allowed the first Burgundian dukes to operate alongside and often above the limited French crown, they had to contend with the rise of a second tier of lordships intent on challenging them in turn. The counties of Mâcon, Chalon, and Nevers all became established in the tenth century, as well as many local ‘counts’ without specific titles or lands. Bouchard remarks on the rise of castellanies, as treated above, though her analysis does not make clear whether it accepts or rejects Duby’s formulation of their role. The dukes had to engage in regional matrimonial and diplomatic politics as a result. Duke Henry the

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reflection of the breakdown of society, especially when ordinary citizens had few other options than their local lord for dispute resolution? See Duby, La société aux XIe et XIIe siècles, pp. 150–51, and Cheyette, ‘Georges Duby’s Mâconnois’, p. 305.


Venerable married Gerberga, daughter of the count of Chalon, in the 970s. Gerberga’s son with her first husband, Adalbert of Ivrea, king of Italy (r. 950–61) was named Otto-William, and Henry adopted him as his heir. In turn, Otto-William married Ermentrude de Roucy, the widowed countess of Mâcon, and their daughter Matilda married Landric, first count of Nevers, linking these emerging regional powers to the dukes’ seat of authority in Dijon.36

Nonetheless, Burgundy experienced a succession crisis in 1002, when Henry the Venerable died without legitimate sons.37 His brother Hugh Capet’s son, King Robert the Pious (r.996–1031), laid claim to his uncle’s territories, but was challenged by Otto-William, Henry’s adopted heir. The resulting rebellion saw nearly all of Burgundy rise against the king in support of Otto-William (as well as their own interests), but Robert eventually prevailed in 1015, after over a decade of bitter civil war. This illustrates the fact that Burgundy’s position as a convenient bequest for competing male family members also made it a tempting target for a politically limited king in search of a place to expand his authority, and it was as a result of this war that Otto-William had to accept the title of ‘count of Burgundy’ rather than duke. This, however, did not confer much actual power or associated land, and Otto-William’s descendants continued actively staking their claim to the disputed territories centring on Besançon.38

Lastly, any theoretical framework must take into account that there was a separate monarchy in Burgundy at this point. Rudolf I, descendant of the Carolingian Welf family, had claimed the kingdom of Burgundy and Provence after Boso’s death in 887.39 By the early eleventh century, the monarchical title was vested in his great-grandson, Rudolf III (r. 993–

37 Hallam and Everard, Capetian France, p. 37.
1032), who has not been viewed favourably by his contemporaries or modern scholarship. He is characterised as a weak and ineffective ruler far outmatched by his more powerful vassals, unable to defend the rights of the church or stop the local castellanies and independent lordships from spreading into the north of Burgundy. As noted in our discussion of Duby, Rudolf III may have failed to restrain their rise, but there is certainly a point to be made that if they were effectively exercising authority and he was not, despite being present as a king, the idea of ‘legitimacy’ or ‘public’ power does not quite encompass the nature of their function versus his. Likewise without legitimate sons, he agreed to cede his territory to the Holy Roman Empire upon his death, which presaged the end of the Frankish kingdom. Poupardin summed up the prevailing sentiment in his epitaph: ‘Ce n’était donc qu’une ombre de royauté et des domaines bien réduits que le dernier roi de Bourgogne laissait à son successeur éventuel lorsqu’il termina, le 5 ou le 6 septembre 1032, peut-être à Lausanne, sa vie misérable’.

There was a brief extension of the kingly title, as the future emperor Henry III (r. 1038–56) acquired it in 1039. But after that, it ceased to be a particular honour, and was absorbed into the empire’s territory.

1032 thus proved a pivotal date in Burgundian history for multiple reasons. The future King Henry I of France (r. 1032–60), second son of Robert the Pious, was originally intended to inherit Burgundy, but when his elder brother died in 1025 and he became the royal heir, it was promised, but not actually ceded, to his younger brother, the future Duke Robert I (r. 1032–75). After the turbulence surrounding Henry’s accession to the French throne and a civil war between the brothers and their mother, the formidable Constance of Arles, Burgundy was finally conferred on Robert in 1032. While this inheritance, unlike the previous attempts, would last, it did not provide an instant panacea to the disorganised, violent, and fragmented principality.

41 Poupardin, Le royaume de Bourgogne, p. 144.
which Robert himself often made worse with an evidently rough, murderous, and heavy-handed character. The end result of nearly two centuries of succession wars was that ‘by the 1070s, ducal authority was theoretical in most of French Burgundy’. As we investigate in the final section, the continuing unrest would be pivotal to the Cluniac programme of the Peace and Truce of God. However, we next turn to the project of examining the ducal and comital Burgundians in the late eleventh century, and their identities, alliances, and political actions.

II. Politics, Family, and Power in Burgundy, 1032–95

Duke Robert I married twice, first to Helias, sister of Hugh of Semur, abbot of Cluny, and then after repudiating her c. 1050, to Ermengard, sister of Geoffrey Martel and daughter of Fulk ‘Nerra’, both counts of Anjou. His first union resulted in at least four children: three sons, Hugh, Henry, and Robert, and a daughter, Constance. Constance became the second wife of Alfonso VI of Castile-León, and Robert’s daughter by his second wife, Hildegard (sometimes called Aldeardis) married William VIII, duke of Aquitaine. The ducal family, and the succession of Burgundy, descended via Henry, Robert’s second son, after the eldest, Hugh, died childless.

In the late eleventh century, the duke of Burgundy was Robert I’s grandson, Odo I (r. 1078–1102). He succeeded his elder brother Hugh I, who ruled for three years following their grandfather’s death in 1075 (their father Henry having predeceased them) and then retired as a monk to Cluny in 1078. They had three younger brothers, as well as two younger sisters. Henry

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43 See the simplified family tree on p. 7 of this work. Bouchard has a more comprehensive version in *SMC*, p. 256, though it (erroneously, as we will demonstrate) contains Florina as Odo I’s daughter.
44 Richard critiqued the considerable confusion among earlier historians in identifying Henry’s unknown wife, including mistakenly naming her as Sibylla (her daughter-in-law and wife of Odo I). He concluded that Henry’s wife could have been named Clerence, ‘et il possible qu’elle ait été originaire du midi de la France capétienne, peut-être de Poitiers plutôt que de Barcelone’. He also dispelled claims that Hugh I was married either to Sibylla or to a daughter of the count of Nevers; he was unmarried when he retired to Cluny in 1078. See Jean Richard, ‘Sur les alliances familiales des ducs de Bourgogne aux XIIe et XIIIe siècles’, *Annales de Bourgogne*, 30 (1958), 34–46 (p. 41–42).
of Portugal, the third son, earned his appellation through his adventures on the Iberian peninsula, marrying Teresa, an illegitimate daughter of Alfonso VI of Castile-León, and eventually founding the Portuguese royal house as father of its first king. The youngest two sons both became churchmen: Robert, bishop of Langres, and Rainald, abbot of Flavigny. Their long-lived great-uncle, Hugh of Semur, brother of their grandmother, was still in charge of Cluny, and became a particular nemesis of his great-nephew Odo.

Odo himself married Sibylla, daughter of Count William I of Burgundy (often known as William ‘Tête-Hardi’, r. 1057–87). They had two sons, Hugh and Henry, the former of whom succeeded his father as Hugh II (r. 1102–43), and (possibly) two daughters. Their daughter Helias, who married Bertrand of Toulouse, son of Raymond of Saint-Gilles, is well-established, but traditional historiography has assigned them a second daughter, Florina. As will be explored in chapter 2, however, this individual is extremely unlikely to have existed. If Odo and Sibylla did have a second daughter, this is much likelier to have been Agnes of Grancey, wife of Rainald II of Grancey in the early twelfth century. As she is referred to as ‘duchess’, an honorific sometimes granted to daughters of dukes, and had a son named Odo, presumably for her father, linking her to the ducal family makes more sense. But regardless of Agnes’ provenance, Florina can be assumed apocryphal.

On the comital side of the family, Odo’s wife Sibylla was the great-granddaughter of Otto-William, count of Burgundy and adopted son of Henry the Venerable. As noted, Otto-William married the widowed countess of Mâcon, Ermentrude, with whom he had five children. Their eldest son, Guy, inherited Mâcon from his mother, and the independent line continued

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46 SMC, p. 332.
through his descendants for a few generations, before being later reunited with Burgundy. Their second son, Rainald I, became count of Burgundy (r. 1026–57) and married Adelaide, daughter of Duke Richard II of Normandy and aunt of William the Conqueror.\(^48\) The other three of Otto-William and Ermentrude’s children were daughters who made regional alliances with their marriages: Matilda to Landric, count of Nevers; Gerberga to William II, count of Provence; and Agnes to William V, duke of Aquitaine.\(^49\) Thus we can see that the new comital branch, despite coming up short in the civil wars following Henry the Venerable’s death, nonetheless sacrificed no ability to marry its children well: Normandy, Nevers, Provence, and Aquitaine were all solid matches. As Jean Richard pointed out, ‘Le mariage d’Hugues II [son of Odo I] avec Mahaut de Mayenne – bien que Gautier de Mayenne ne put entrer en comparaison avec un duc d’Aquitaine ou en roi d’Espagne – nous montre encore les ducs regardant au loin pour leurs alliances familiales’.\(^50\) Therefore, despite his having the feudally superior title and familial connections to the French crown, Hugh II’s match with a daughter of the local lord of Mayenne was less prestigious than the earlier generation of marriages to Alfonso VI of Castile-León and William VIII of Aquitaine. This may reflect the fact that by the 1070s, Robert I’s misrule had weakened the desirability of an alliance, and the counts of Burgundy, with their connections to the Holy Roman Empire, made more sense as a partner in the region.

Count William I, Sibylla’s father, was the oldest son of Rainald I and Adelaide of Normandy. He succeeded to the county of Burgundy in 1057, and with his wife Stephanie had at least ten children who became influential in France and beyond. Having inherited Mâcon in

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\(^{49}\) *SMC*, pp. 266–70.

\(^{50}\) Richard, ‘Sur les alliances familiales des ducs de Bourgogne’, p. 43.
1078 when his cousin Guy II retired to Cluny without heirs, he passed it to his eldest son, Rainald II, who succeeded him as count of Mâcon and Burgundy and eventually went on crusade, where he died. The second son, Stephen I, was also count of Burgundy and perished on crusade in 1102. The third son, Raymond, followed his ducal brothers-in-law to Castile-León, where he married the only legitimate daughter of Alfonso VI and was at first a friend and ally to his fellow Burgundian, Henry of Portugal. But the Castilian king, fearing this centralisation of Burgundian power and lacking a male heir, began to play the two against each other and turned them into rivals. We return to the question of Burgundians in Iberia in the final section.

William Tête-Hardi and Stephanie’s fourth and fifth sons, Hugh and Guy, both became archbishops, Hugh of the counts’ capital city of Besançon and Guy of the old Burgundian kings’ capital city of Vienne. Hugh died with his brothers Rainald and Stephen on crusade, whereas Guy was elected pope as Calixtus II (r. 1119–24). The family’s sixth son, Otto, died young. The four daughters made solid matches. The eldest, Sibylla, married Odo I of Burgundy, and the second, Clemence, married Robert II of Flanders. The third, Ermentrude, married Theodoric of Montbéliard, and the fourth, Gisela, married Humbert of Maurienne and became the mother of Louis VI of France’s queen consort, Adelaide of Maurienne. But despite this number of children, five of William Tête-Hardi’s six sons – Rainald, Stephen, Raymond, Hugh, and Otto – were dead by 1107, three of them on crusade, leaving only Guy of Vienne (Pope Calixtus). The counties of Burgundy and Mâcon descended first through Rainald’s children and then after 1127,

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51 Bouchard assigns Rainald II’s date of death as 1095, on which she is apparently mistaken; the vexed question of Rainald’s crusade participation is treated in chapter 2. SMC, p. 266.
52 Pierre David, ‘Le pacte successoral entre Raymond de Galice et Henri de Portugal’, Bulletin Hispanique, 50 (1948), 275–90. For more recent work, see Stephen Lay, The Reconquest Kings of Portugal: Political and Cultural Reorientation on the Medieval Frontier (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), and José Augusto de Sottomayor-Pizarro, ‘Political Origins of Portugal: From County to Kingdom (1096-1143/1157)’, in Catalonia and Portugal: The Iberian Peninsula from the Periphery, ed. by Floce Sabaté Curull and Luís Adão de Fonseca (Bern: Peter Lang, 2015), 165–204.
53 SMC, p. 266.
through Stephen’s. Stephen’s granddaughter Beatrice married Frederick Barbarossa in 1156, bringing the old Burgundian kingdom back under the Holy Roman Empire’s direct overlordship. (Her male cousins, however, continued to title themselves counts of Burgundy.)

Overall, we emerge from the eleventh century with a portrait of two ruling families and polities that had somewhat stabilised after the governmental turmoil and territorial disarray that followed the breakup of Carolingian power. However, an assured succession did not necessarily bring more settled circumstances to the dukes. The counts of Burgundy, by comparison, seem to have been able to consolidate power and alliances more effectively, or at least more sedately. We turn now to the corresponding development of religious power in Burgundy during this time period: how much influence, if any, did the abbey of Cluny exert on the development of crusade thought and action? How, if at all, did the Peace of God contribute? These questions have also been well studied, but for the purpose of this work and understanding their role in the scholarship and critical context, it is instructive to briefly revisit them.

III. Cluny and the Prehistory of the Crusades: 910–c.1050

For the purposes of this section and overall, it must be understood that Cluny did not necessarily constitute a specifically Burgundian identity, and that as we have argued in the introduction, the simple fact of geography does not mean that its interest or sphere of influence was constrained to Burgundy alone. Indeed, quite the opposite; Cluny represented an international network of monasteries with a variety of political, ecclesiastical, and social concerns, and when it intersected with the dukes of Burgundy, the relationship was not always co-operative or warm. However, due to the fact of its being centred in Burgundy, and the vast amount of attention paid, particularly in older historiography, to the role of the Peace of God in the formulation of

54 SMC, p. 277.
crusading theology, it is useful to have the material laid out, even if not substantially revised, as part of this work, as our understanding of Burgundian religious history, the prehistory of the crusades, and the state of the scholarly debate on both is less complete without it. Arguments for Cluny’s unqualified support of the crusading movement often rest on the fact that Pope Urban II, instigator of the First Crusade in 1095, served as prior of the abbey from 1070–80, and maintained the relationship after his elevation to cardinal and then pope. Additionally, a letter from Peter, prior of Sens, to Hato, bishop of Troyes, written in c. 1145, claimed that the pope had acquired in Cluny the ‘knowledge and eloquence which were able to enlighten all the faithful and gave to the Christians the courage to crush the infidels’. As Giles Constable pointed out, however, this document postdates Clermont by fifty years and does not prove any Cluny-wide support of the endeavour. As has been generally argued, and as we will demonstrate, Cluny’s relationship to the crusades emerges as ultimately inconclusive, cautious, and carefully negotiated. Nonetheless, its major role in eleventh-century Iberia, treated in the final section of the chapter, cannot be ignored or overlooked, and this context must first be understood.

In brief, Cluny was established in the year 910 by Duke William I of Aquitaine, who granted the abbey a charter ensuring that it would be free from secular authority and answer only to the Pope. It quickly became a centre for pioneering ecclesiastical reforms: outlawing married

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57 Recueil des chartes de l’abbaye de Cluny, ed. by Auguste Bernard and Alexandre Bruel, 6 vols (Paris: Imprimerie nationale, 1876-1903), I, act 112, pp. 124–28; ‘Placuit etiam huic testamento inseri ut ab hac die nec nostro, nec parentum nostrorum, nec fastibus regie magnitudinis, nec cujuslibet terrenæ potestatis jugo, subiciantur idem monachi ibi congregati; neque aliquis principum secularium, non comes quisquam, nec episcopus quilibet, non pontifex supradicte sedis Romanæ, per Deum et in Deum omnibusque sanctis eis, et tremendi judicii diem contestor, deprecor invadat res ipsorum servorum Dei, non distrahat, non minuat, non procamiet, non beneficiet alicui, non aliquem pretium super eos contra eorum voluntatem constitutam’. See Giles Constable, ‘Cluny and Rome’, in The Abbey of Cluny, pp. 19–41; Constable, ‘The Reception-Privilege of Cluny in the Eleventh and Twelfth Centuries’, in Le Gouvernement d’Hugues de Semur à Cluny: Actes du Colloque scientifique international,
clergy, caring for the poor, focusing on the liturgy and hours of prayer, and other efforts to restore ideological purity to a weakened and ‘worldly’ church. However, one should not forget the question of why William I, a southern French nobleman who had no particular influence in the region or inclination toward the church (though he earned the soubriquet ‘the Pious’ for his monastery foundations) would make such an establishment in the first place. The answer seems to lie with his wife. Duchess Angilberga was the daughter of the ill-fated Boso of Burgundy and Provence and the niece of Richard the Justiciar, and had married William shortly after Boso’s death. Furthermore, after William’s death in 918, the dukes of Aquitaine forgot about Cluny for another hundred years, while it continued to be generously patronised by Angilberga’s Burgundian relatives. Cluny was thus established as the sort of monastic house that the Bosonids had invested in for several generations, and not a new order in and of itself.

Similarly, there had been a spate of monastery foundations in Burgundy during the previous several decades: Vézelay, Pouthières, Saint-Bénigne in Dijon, Charlieu, and Saint-Philibert in Tournus all dated their origins between 858 and 875. Cluny’s foundation in 910 fitted within this emerging pattern of monastic patronage by Burgundian elites. Moreover, its origin under the sponsorship of an Aquitainian duke and a Burgundian duchess matches rather

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well, if inadvertently, with the greatest reform for which it would become known: the Peace and Truce of God. This project first appeared in Aquitaine and Burgundy at the end of the tenth century, and developed more extensively in the early eleventh. The eleventh-century Cluniac historian Ralph Glaber constructed it in benevolently providential terms, supposedly arriving in previously war-torn regions almost exactly in the year 1000 to portend a new era of peace and plenty.  

Duby, following Glaber and his own preference for the millennium, concurred, arguing for its appearance in Burgundy around 1023 and reaching full influence in France by 1033. It was the result of a number of church councils attempting to address the problems of social disruption and violence engendered by the lack of a strong central authority.

While the ‘feudal anarchy’ thesis is a long-dated one, resting on the modern tendency to equate the term ‘feudal’ with petty territorial violence or primitive or unstable political arrangements, Gregory Smith argued in 2002 that the ecclesiastical authors who complained about the state of society at the time ‘cannot be relegated dismissively to the barren category of stylized monastic reactions to stylized representations of pillaging and plundering’. The word ‘feudal’ has been stripped of much critical value, and some historians have abandoned it altogether, while others still find some purpose for it, but only if carefully constructed. Either way, the political situation and secular leadership in Burgundy had been precarious for

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generations, and it cannot be assumed that the church was deliberately manipulating or
exaggerating circumstances to consolidate its power. But nonetheless, the responsibility of
peacekeeping in society is a profoundly political one, and was one of the central expectations of
medieval kingship. Indeed, we find Gerald of Florennes, bishop of Cambrai, opposing the
Peace of God upon its appearance in his territories, on grounds that the emperor was able to do
this as usual, and the church was not needed in the role. Furthermore, while Gerald is formally
credited with introducing it to Flanders in 1024, his biographer tells us that Baldwin IV, count of
Flanders, was the actual agent behind the decision, and had to force the bishop into agreeing.
This is the inverse from what one might cynically expect – that the Peace was merely a vessel for
the church to usurp a previously secular political function – and reveals the change in thought
which was still taking place. Nonetheless, the Peace challenged social expectations and redefined
power dynamics; in prescribing certain days of the week, feast days, holidays, and other
religiously significant dates as off-limits for violent actions, and punishing wrongdoers with
ecclesiastical sanctions, it also implicitly and then explicitly assumed the ‘authority to determine
who could employ arms, for what purpose, on whose command, against whom, and when’.

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67 As Gregory Smith remarks, ‘To be sure, we have learned long since not to talk about “feudal anarchy” in twelfth-
century Burgundy or anywhere else, though it has proven harder to find a suitable replacement for the term. But the
just demise of a facile modern phrase need not impugn beyond recall all those medieval sources that once served as
its justification.’ (Smith, pp. 32–33.) Some of the dated sections of Cowdrey should be read in light of this.
68 Tomasz Mastnak, Crusading Peace: Christendom, The Muslim World, and Western Political Order (Berkeley:
University of California Press, 2002), pp. 1–10. See also our discussion of Bisson and White in the first section of
this chapter, notes 30 and 34, and for comparative perspectives on the Peace, Frederick S. Paxton, ‘History,
the Year 1000, ed. by Thomas Head and Richard Landes (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1992), pp. 21–40, and in
the same volume, Elisabeth Magnou-Nortier, ‘The Enemies of the Peace: Reflections on a Vocabulary, 500-1000’,
pp. 58–79.
Reflections/Reflexions Historiques, 14 (1987), 531–49 (p. 531). See also Stephen Vanderputten and Diane J. Reilly,
‘Reconciliation and Record Keeping: Heresy, Secular Dissent and the Exercise of Episcopal Authority in Eleventh-
71 Mastnak, Crusading Peace, p. 10.
The idea that a Christian could attain salvation through military service, and by fighting ‘infidels’, was by no means pre-established or self-evident in the eleventh century. Indeed, it went diametrically against the opinions of earlier theologians and church fathers. The ambitious and reform-minded Pope Gregory VII played a large part in eliding the divide between *militia Christi* and *militia saecularis*. Traditionally, the former fought its battles with prayer, asceticism, piety, and scripture, whereas the latter handled the unholy, demeaning work of physical warfare. However, Gregory conflated *Christus* and *saecularis*, promoting a view of the ideal soldier of Christ as partaking in active and vigorous work against His enemies. But to a monastery as powerful as Cluny, which had established itself as best able to offer salvation through its strict focus on the liturgy and prayerful seclusion, this ideal was not destined for easy acceptance. Bouchard, in her studies of the twelfth-century hierarchy of Burgundy, has identified the fact that while the secular and religious elite often came from the same powerful families and had similar concerns, their goals were not identical. It is pertinent to apply this distinction here as well. While Cluny became a prominent supporter of the crusades under the abbacy of Peter the Venerable in the mid-twelfth century, this previously resulted in some historians positioning Cluny as the birthplace of crusading ideology from the start, which Étienne Delaruelle found very thinly, or not at all, supported in the primary sources. Indeed, the nearly complete lack of reference to the crusades in the late eleventh century cannot be taken to mean that the well-

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72 Carl Erdmann treated some of the misconceptions about the genesis of crusading: that Christianity is inherently inclined to ‘world domination,’ that the church was warlike from its earliest origins, that crusades were merely ‘erroneous pilgrimages’ to Jerusalem that somehow and inexplicably turned violent, that they could not be explained apart from the ‘religious exuberance’ of the age, or that they were mere political and diplomatic gambits for economic resources and secular credentials. As he pointed out, early theologians such as Tertullian (c.160–c. 225) and Origen (c. 184–c. 253) had such a negative view of war that they did not think it possible for a Christian to fight at all, and considered the soldier’s life profoundly irreligious. Carl Erdmann, *The Origins of the Idea of Crusade*, trans. by Marshall W. Baldwin and Walter Goffart, 2nd edn (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1977).


75 SMC, p. 45.

connected abbey was somehow unaware of them, but instead reveals a deeper tension and ambiguity about a competing model of militia Christi.

In any event, the Peace and Truce of God, whether intentionally or not, functioned as a broader political project, with the result of converting now-unlawful civil wars and localised feuds against fellow Christians into a unified effort against the ‘infidels’. Nor were Muslims an initially obvious choice of enemy. For the previous nine hundred years, Christianity had targeted pagans, philosophers, heretics, and Jews, building itself into a movement remarkable in late antiquity for its intolerance of competing theological perspectives.77 Furthermore, its paradigm for a holy death was that of the martyrs, meekly submitting to persecution at the hands of Roman authorities rather than recant their faith. Thus for the Cluniac writers of the late eleventh century, the obvious successors to the martyrs were not crusaders, but priests.78 In this framework, Cluny itself represented an ideological geography of the Holy Land, a place where God’s real work was already being performed to perfection, and which did not need or require rivals.79

This is not to argue that Cluny was uninterested in or actively disapproving of crusading efforts. Indeed, its own encounter with Muslims in the late tenth century had sparked an outraged response across France. After Abbot Maiolus of Cluny, returning from Rome in July 972, was kidnapped by Muslim raiders in the Alps, he sent a hasty ransom note to the monastery in which he described his predicament as ‘the hordes of Belial have surrounded me’.80 Scott G. Bruce has

78 Delaruelle, ‘Crusading Idea in Cluniac Literature’, p. 207.
79 Delaruelle, ‘Crusading Idea in Cluniac Literature’, p. 211.

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traced the historical etymology of ‘Belial’ to argue that Maiolus was making a particular claim about the wicked or heathen religion of his captors, and the response expected as a result.  

Furthermore, while payment was secured and Maiolus was released, the incident conferred a sort of living sainthood on him, was retold extensively by Cluniac authors between 1000 and 1150, and within a year of its occurrence, motivated William I, count of Arles and Provence, to lead an army south to wipe out the Muslim frontier state of Fraxinetum (now La Garde-Freinet, dep. Var, arr. Draguignan, near Saint-Tropez, France).

Hence we do see Cluny playing a particular role in the prehistory of the crusades, from its strategic use of Maiolus’ ordeal in the tenth century to its careful management of papal interference in Iberia in the eleventh (next to be examined). However, the claim that it was involved in the movement from its earliest origins, and that the Peace of God was conceived to give the church the direct legal and political license to prosecute a war against Muslims, is not borne out by the evidence. In fact, the First Crusade represented a serious challenge to Cluny’s claims of having perfected Christian duty and embodying a semi-Holy Land, and had to be dealt with as much as the simultaneous rise of the Cistercians, reacting austerely against perceived Cluniac luxury and worldliness. It is possible to read the interplay between these groups – Cluniacs, Cistercians, and crusaders – as part of the larger renegotiation of Christian ethics, and

82 This incident is also described at more length in the work of Ralph Glaber, which adds (or invents) details regarding Maiolus’s saintly interactions with his captors. See Ralph Glaber, *Historiarum Libri Quinque*, pp. 18–23.
83 Bruce, ‘An Abbot Between Two Cultures’, pp. 427, 432. Mohammad Ballan has questioned the troublesome tendency of Western historians, some language of which is certainly present in Bruce’s article, to treat the Muslims of La Garde-Freinet as a ‘historical anomaly’ or a mere nest of thieves and robbers intent on making life difficult for Christian kings, rather than considering the reasons for their presence and the questions it raises. See Mohammed Ballan, ‘Fraxinetum: An Islamic Frontier State in Tenth-Century Provence’, *Comitatus*, 41 (2010), 23–76.
the ideological space carved out for the crusades, taking place in the late eleventh and early twelfth centuries. In this sense, the crusades were an important part of the political and social landscape of emerging ‘Christendom,’ but by no means the only available mechanism for engaging infidels, and one which Cluny had a vested interest in monitoring and modifying.

The ambiguous and cautiously negotiated nature of this relationship, and Cluny’s next-discussed interest in Iberia, is demonstrated by Elizabeth Lapina’s analysis of the paintings in the chapel of Berzé-la-Ville, a small village a few miles south of Cluny. She sees the unusual choice to depict Eastern Orthodox and Spanish saints in the design, strategically positioned on the periphery of more traditionally western figures, as ‘due to [its] interest in the First Crusade and the Reconquista. The paintings not only represent a synthetic vision of humanity, but they also highlight the conflicts on the fringes of Christianitas’.  

In this artistic ‘mnemonic association,’ the intent was both to ‘remind the viewers of the ongoing war against Muslims [and] to persuade them to adapt [sic] a particular position towards it’. The Eastern and Spanish saints are portrayed within the context of iconography, such as rescuing a pig from the jaws of a wolf, that had traditionally been used to represent the conversion of pagans. Furthermore, the pig is retrieved by discussion and negotiation, not by force. In short, Lapina read the paintings as a particular Cluniac commentary on the changing methodology of Christendom’s approach to religious others, urging them to remember that even as the crusading mentality took hold, the established model for Christian life had been to save the souls of infidels by preaching the Gospel to them, not merely killing them.  

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1049 –1109) as the patron of the design adds weight to this hypothesis.\textsuperscript{88} In his writings, Hugh did not view Muslims as impervious to reasonable debate and the work of missionaries, but as any other pagans who needed the truth (and an example of good behaviour) to enlighten them.\textsuperscript{89} We explore Hugh’s connections with Castile-León in the final section of this chapter, as part of a larger question of Frenchmen, particularly Burgundians, present in Iberia in the late eleventh century, and the potential ramifications for crusading ideologies.

As will be discussed in chapter 2, Pope Urban does not seem to have viewed Cluny as an active or particularly useful asset in his recruitment tour across France after Clermont, and he did not target Burgundy, or otherwise translate Cluniac prestige into his call for crusading. Indeed, the two seem to have coexisted quite uneasily, with Cluny aware of both the advantages and the challenges of the crusades’ threat to its ideal of Christian duty, and the new possibilities for a Christian to achieve salvation through force of arms. Neither was a foregone conclusion, and nor was the Peace of God invented specifically for the church to call for a holy war. Such interpretations take too much advantage of historical hindsight, would not have been obvious to eleventh-century ecclesiastics, and overlook the fact that the hundred-odd years from the Peace of God to the council of Clermont had to be constructed in multiple legal and rhetorical stages. The reformers may have had a genuine interest in solving social disruption and public violence, or advancing the church as a political entity and alternative peacekeeping institution in the low level of secular authority, but to connect it to an imagined need to prosecute a justified war against the Muslims is ultimately unlikely. Nonetheless, the question of Cluny, Islam, and the religious and political contours of this conflict takes its most relevant shape in another form: that of late eleventh-century Iberia, and Burgundy’s leading role therein.

\textsuperscript{88} Constable, ‘Cluny and the First Crusade’ p. 191.
\textsuperscript{89} Lapina, ‘Mural Paintings of Berzé-La-Ville’, p. 320.
IV. Battling the Muslims and Cluniac Reform: Burgundians in Iberia, 1063–87

The presence of Burgundians in Iberia in the late eleventh century, and the French impact in the region more generally, can only be understood within the context of the unique political status of the Iberian peninsula. Islamic rule in Iberia began in 711, when the weak Visigothic regime fell to North African and Arabian Muslim invaders. But soon after the turn of the millennium, in c. 1009–13, the collapse of the Umayyad caliphate, the fractured and infighting Muslim principalities, and the increasing power of Christian rulers laid the groundwork for what is often known as the ‘reconquista’ or ‘reconquest,’ though this term is not without substantial scholarly baggage. Peter Linehan saw its invention as a rhetorical device for Iberian Christian chroniclers as early as the 880s, furnishing their kings with the right to ‘reclaim’ territory supposedly unjustly taken by the Muslims, and subsequent historiographical use has often uncritically replicated it. There has been a vastly long-running debate as to whether it was religious or political in nature, in addition as to whether the Cluniac and French influence in the region was a promotion of much-needed learning and reform (according to some French historians) or an unwanted and meddlesome attempt to force Iberia’s national liturgy and religious practice into the thrall of Roman papal politics and control (according to some Spanish historians).

92 Linehan, History and Historians of Medieval Spain, pp. 172–76; see also 206–7.
The question of whether late eleventh-century Iberia functioned as a training ground or precursor for the First Crusade has been almost as exhaustively covered, and this work has neither the space nor the critical need to replicate or reassess the full sum of their conclusions. Marcus Bull’s *Knightly Piety* devoted a chapter to the military contributions of Frenchmen in Spain as a possible motive for participation in the First Crusade, but ultimately concluded that – prior to 1095, at least – ‘it is clear that in terms of numbers and motivation, the Spanish theatre could not have been anything more than a very minor factor behind the response of Aquitainians, Gascons, and others to the First Crusade’. More recently, William Purkis has explored the development and expansion of crusading ideology and spirituality in Iberia after the First Crusade, though following Bull, he asserted that ‘there is no trace whatsoever of any comparable fusion of acts of pious violence and pilgrimage in Iberia before 1095’. This may state the case somewhat too strongly. Popes Alexander II (r. 1061–73) and Gregory VII (r. 1073–85) had a demonstrable interest in Iberia as a particular frontier of encounters with Muslims, demanding a variety of legal, religious, military, and theological strategies. The co-ordinated Christian effort in 1064–65 to capture the city of Barbastro in northern Spain, at the time part of the Muslim emirate of Zaragoza, has been repeatedly probed for potential ideological or structural connections to crusading genesis, with the question still remaining a point of contention.

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The opinion of the present work, at least in respect to Burgundy, both concurs with and challenges the historical consensus. While we agree that the military and religious experiences in Iberia in the mid-to-late eleventh century and then later on the First Crusade are by no means analogous, there are nonetheless important connective tissues, and the temptation to draw too sharp a line between the two movements should be resisted. Including Iberia in the notions of holy war that were beginning to take shape, and would soon be put into broader practice, was a dynamic that had deep roots in this Burgundian connection. Throughout the late eleventh century, French noblemen, particularly those from Burgundy, grew increasingly interested in travelling to Iberia to assist in the ongoing wars against the Muslims. This was due in perhaps considerable part to the alliance between King Alfonso VI of Castile-León (r. 1072–1109) and the abbey of Cluny. Nor were Cluny’s interests and contacts in Iberia confined to its Christian nobility. Cluny may have spearheaded the ‘earliest extant record of a Christian mission to Muslims in the West’, with Abbot Hugh of Semur posited as the likely author of a letter that arrived in the court of Zaragoza in the 1070s, inviting the emir, al-Muqtadir Ibn Hūd (Ahmad ibn Sulayman al-Muqtadir, r. 1049–82), to convert to Christianity.96

Interest and involvement in Iberia was not specific to Burgundy, and included Gascon and Occitan noblemen from the south of France, situated more closely to Iberia, and others.97 More recently, the participation of Normans and Anglo-Normans in 1018–1248 has been studied

96 Diego Sarrió Cucarella, ‘Corresponding across Religious Borders: Al-Bājī’s Response to a Missionary Letter from France’, *Medieval Encounters*, 18 (2012), 1–35. Cucarella considers the authenticity of the exchange, concluding that it has no rhetorical or stylistic features of a forgery, and fits very well with Hugh of Semur’s long-term Iberian interests, engagements, and contacts, as well as Cluny’s variety of strategies for the contact and (attempted) conversion of Muslims. Hugh cannot be definitively identified as the author, but he is the likeliest candidate. Cucarella also makes note of intriguing suggestions that Cluniac missionary efforts to Iberia could have begun under Hugh’s equally long-tenured predecessor Odilon (r. 994–1048), and that the attested presence of Spanish Mozarabic monks at Cluny could have stimulated some Arabic-language study. A monk, Anastasius of Cluny, was certainly sent to Iberia by Abbot Hugh in 1074, though it is less clear if he was involved with this. (See pp. 14–15.)

by Lucas Villegas-Aristizabal. As he points out, Normans fought in Iberia among their presence in many venues of eleventh-century military expansion, and there were explanations for their motivation quite separate from anything to do with Cluny and Burgundy. Nonetheless, Villegas-Aristizabal thought it possible that Norman pilgrims visiting Santiago de Compostela, located in Castile-León, would have encountered Cluniac monks eager to educate them about the need for Christian involvement. Furthermore, Cluny’s influence over Castile-León remained supreme in his analysis, which concords with what we will demonstrate below. Thus, while we should note the presence of other Frenchmen, Castile-León’s extensive relationship with Cluny connected eleventh-century Iberian Christian political and religious power directly to the Cluniac homeland and centre of influence in Burgundy. In other words, while the ‘reconquista’ attracted men from across France, whether for Christian duty, personal adventure, financial profit, or military opportunity, the overall pre-eminence and position of personal status with the most powerful king of the region (Alfonso VI) remained Burgundy’s.

Charles Julian Bishko phrased this notion quite strongly: ‘Was the Leonese-Castilian kingdom in the 11th and 12th centuries a vassal state of Cluny? Did the heraldic lion sculptured [sic] on the pediment of the first edifice Abbot Hugh the Great built with Spanish gold symbolize a tamed Leonese Empire in the service of the monks? Few phenomena in the history of Leon and Castile between 1050 and 1150 are better attested yet less studied or understood than the intimate

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99 Villegas-Aristizabal, pp. 50–52.

100 King Philip I is reported as sending ‘many knights’ to Alfonso VI’s aid in May 1087; it is unclear if this overlapped or correlated with the Burgundian expedition at this same time, but demonstrates a royal French effort to assist the efforts in Iberia against ‘pagans’. Clarius, *Chronicon Sancti Petri Vivi Senonensis*, ed. and trans. by Robert-Henri Bautier (Paris: Éditions du centre national de la recherche scientifique, 1979), p. 136: ‘Anno M L XXX VII […] Precepto regis Philippi in mense maio multa milia Francorum perrexerunt in Hispaniam in adjutorium Anfuldi regis christiani cujus terram et regnum invadere volebant pagani egressi di finibus suis, jam mare transito’.
friendship existing between the rulers of the Navarro-Basque dynasty – Fernando I, Alfonso VI, Urraca, Alfonso VII, Fernando II, Alfonso VIII—and the Burgundian abbey.\(^{101}\) Bishko laid some useful parameters, but a major point of his case – the belief that Fernando I of León, father of Alfonso VI, paid Cluny an annual tithe of 1000 gold pieces from 1053 – has been challenged by Lucy K. Pick. She pointed out that all the documentation attesting this gift dates from the time of Alfonso and not his father, that a charter for this does not exist in the Cluniac archives despite the great incentive for recording such a generous donation from a foreign power, and that there is very little evidence of Cluniac activity in the region during Fernando’s reign (1037–65).\(^{102}\) In Pick’s analysis, any association between Castile-León and Cluny cannot be definitively established until the reign of Alfonso VI, and his close ties with Hugh of Semur. Furthermore, the invention of a previous friendship with Cluny was politically useful for king and abbot alike. As Pick puts it, ‘A lasting union founded in the religious feeling of Alfonso’s deceased forebear could provide a bulwark against papal ambitions, whereas a new friendship between Hugh and Alfonso could have been more easily trumped by papal claims of ancient suzerainty over Spain [. . .] It will not surprise or shock us that a king and abbot might collaborate to create a more usable past for present purposes through the construction of a legal fiction’.\(^{103}\)

Furthermore, although older historiography treats Cluny and Rome’s motivations in Iberia as one and the same, and Abbot Hugh and Pope Gregory VII as close allies, this does not appear to have been the case, and their relationship was in turns cooperative and combative.\(^{104}\) Vincent Cantarino nuances this claim, as in his view, papal proclamations including Iberia as


\(^{103}\) Pick, Rethinking Cluny in Spain, p. 13.

\(^{104}\) Linehan, History and Historians of Medieval Spain, p. 189.
part of the ‘patrimonium Sancti Petri [. . .] need not be proof of papal political ambitions; rather it provides evidence for the conscious recognition of the Peninsula as an integral part of the Christian body. For Gregory VII, this right of Saint Peter to the Spanish territories allowed the pope the corresponding right to accept tributary dependence from established royal houses and even to recognize new monarchs’.105 This, however, seems rather naïve. While expanding the ‘spiritual sphere of the res publica christiana’106 doubtless did rank on Rome’s priority list, it hardly follows to separate the pursuit and consolidation of political influence from the equation, especially given the ambitions and character of the late eleventh-century popes.

In any event, by the 1060s, Fernando I had succeeded in forcing the surrounding Muslim lands to render annual financial tributes known as parias.107 Fernando’s son Alfonso VI continued this policy, and formed an enduring personal alliance with Cluny. Abbot Hugh of Semur acted to free Alfonso from imprisonment by his brother Sancho II during the succession war of 1072, as well as negotiating his marriage, and the king rewarded him bountifully. Between 1073–77, four Castilian monasteries were granted to Cluny in quick succession: San Isidro de Dueñas, San Salvador de Palaz del Rey, Santiago de Astudillo, and San Juan de Hérmedes.108 While the Castilian king was not alone in patronising Cluny generously, the spiritual connection resulted in unique and tangible political bonds. Alfonso’s first wife, Agnes, was the daughter of William VIII of Aquitaine (who had himself married Hildegard of

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Burgundy, daughter of Robert I, though she was not Agnes’ mother. After separating from Agnes in about 1077, Alfonso swiftly secured a new match with his primary French ally. At the time of Duke Odo I’s accession in 1078, negotiations to marry his aunt Constance to Alfonso were under way. Peter of Tournus, a Burgundian abbot, seems to have been the key figure in this. Alfonso and Constance were married by 1080, as their only surviving daughter, Urraca of Castile, was born in that year, and probably by 1 May 1079, as she appears in a charter given at Burgos. In that same year, a Cluniac monk, Bernard of Sauvetot, became abbot of the royal monastery of Sahagún. Following Alfonso’s capture of Toledo in 1085, Bernard was promoted to its archbishop, serving as a chief minister to Alfonso and his daughter Urraca.

Alfonso likewise used the conquest of Toledo to make improvements to his title, styling himself imperator Hispanie, a status to which his father had also aspired, but he was perhaps the first to have a realistic claim. This proved to be overly optimistic when the defeated Muslim lords appealed to their co-religionists in Morocco, the Almoravids, for assistance. They duly invaded, and Alfonso was defeated on 23 October 1086 at the battle of Sagrajas. In response, he once more looked to his French in-laws for assistance, which they were happy to provide. As news of his victories against the Muslims spread, it, in Petit’s view, ‘colorait d’une apparence de

110 Reilly, _King Alfonso VI_, p. 107.
111 _HdB_, i. p. 216.
112 Reilly, _Queen Urraca_, p. 11.
113 Bernard first appears as abbot in a charter of 24 April 1080. See _Coleccion diplomatica del monasterio de Sahagun_ (857-1230) III: 1074-1109, ed. by Marta Herrero de la Fuente (Leon: Centro de Estudios e Investigacion, 1988), act 779, p. 66. See also act 781, pp. 68–69, where Alfonso and Constance, on 8 May 1080, jointly grant, ‘per quosdam religiosos uiros ad instar Cluniacensis norme monastici ordinis sancti Benedicti docte eruditos instituere curauit et super multis possessioni’ to Sahagun.
114 Reilly, _Queen Urraca_, p. 12.
légalité une guerre dirigée par des chrétiens contre ces barbares’. The *Latin Chronicle of the Kings of Castile* certainly saw it in religious terms, but as it was written in the early thirteenth century, as the crusading era was reaching its zenith, this may have been a natural predisposition to link past and present pious militarism:⑩⑦

After taking the very noble and well-fortified city of Toledo, the king, a wise and powerful man, began to devastate the whole region called Extremadura, and through the power of our Lord Jesus Christ, ripped from the hands of the Saracens many castles and other towns in the Trasierra.⑩⑧

Now these victories were under threat from the Almoravids, to which Burgundy was in a unique position to respond. Petit identified several of the Burgundian nobility who made the trip to Iberia in 1086–87, most notably Duke Odo I, his younger brother Henry of Burgundy, his brother-in-law Raymond of Burgundy, his uncle Robert of Burgundy, and Savaric of Donzy and Humbert of Joinville, as well as the later First Crusade leader Raymond of Saint-Gilles, count of Toulouse.⑩⑨ We know little about Odo’s Iberian experiences, other than that they do not appear to have gone well (and potentially put him off a repeat on the First Crusade), but Dunbabin credited these expeditions with helping to build cohesion and unity of purpose between the duke

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⑩⑥ *HdB*, t. p. 225.


⑩⑨ *HdB*, t. pp. 225–26: ‘Des 1085 et les années suivantes, nombre de seigneurs de France et principalement de Bourgogne partirent en Espagne: Eudes, Duc de Bourgogne (1) ; son beau-frère et cousin Raimond de Bourgogne (2) ; comte d’Amaous ; Raimond de Saint-Gilles, comte de Toulouse ; Savaric de Donzy, plus tard comte de Chalon et sire de Vergy ; Humbert de Joinville; Robert de Bourgogne (1) oncle du Duc Eudes et fils du Duc Robert 1er. Les forces coalisées jointes aux troupes d’Alphonse VI, parmi lesquelles un comptait l’illustre Cid, investirent Tudela après un siège mémorable qui dura cinq ans.’
and his vassals.\textsuperscript{120} Odo was in León on 5 August 1087 after abandoning the ill-fated siege of Tudela, confirming a charter that Queen Constance had issued to the abbey of Tournus.\textsuperscript{121} This moment also saw Raymond of Burgundy betrothed to Alfonso’s daughter Urraca.\textsuperscript{122} The \textit{Latin Chronicle}, writing well past the date of events, is mistaken in assigning Raymond the title of count (which belonged to his older brother Rainald II) and in the description of Henry of Burgundy, Odo I’s younger brother, as ‘also a count \textit{[nomine Henricus, qui et comes erat]}’, but this reflects that they were both of noble birth.\textsuperscript{123} Henry became count of Portugal later, but he was not at the time, and married Teresa, Alfonso’s illegitimate daughter, soon after Raymond’s wedding to Urraca. As Urraca was herself the daughter of Constance, Henry’s aunt, this formed a formidable base of Burgundian power close to the Castilian throne, which later unsettled Alfonso and impelled him to disrupt it, particularly after Constance’s death in 1093.\textsuperscript{124}

Urraca herself was no older than seven or eight at the time of her marriage, given that she was born in 1080, which likely explains the annalist’s comment that Raymond ‘did not live for a long time thereafter with his wife’; the couple’s only son, the future Alfonso VII, was not born until 1105.\textsuperscript{125} As mentioned, Henry of Burgundy was married to one of Urraca’s illegitimate

\textsuperscript{120} Dunbabin, \textit{France in the Making}, p. 183. She mistakenly identified Odo II, rather than Odo I, as the participant in Iberian campaigns; it is possible that Hugh I, Odo’s elder brother, and Robert I, his grandfather, also had Spanish interests. See also Maurice Chaume, ‘Les premières croisades bourguignonnes au-delà des Pyrénées’, \textit{Annales de Bourgogne}, 18 (1946), 161–65.

\textsuperscript{121} Reilly, \textit{King Alfonso VI}, p. 194. He however misidentified Constance as Odo’s cousin (she was his aunt) and followed Petit’s error by calling Henry of Burgundy and Raymond of Burgundy cousins. Unless Odo’s unidentified mother was a member of the comital Burgundian house (and which as such cannot be proved) there is little scope for them to have been blood relations.

\textsuperscript{122} \textit{Chronica Latina}, p. 6: ‘Sic igitur, predictus rex, regno multipliciter ampliato, cum filium non haberet […] cepit tractare et diligenter inquirere cui filiam suam, nomine Vrracam, quam de legítima uxore susceperat, posset, salvo suo honore, matrimonialiter <dare>. Verum cum in Yspaniis non inueniret talem qui uideretur dignus esse gener regis, aduoaut de Burgundie partibus que sunt iuxta Ararim, qui fluxus ulgo dictur Saona, uirum nobilum, in armis strenuum, valse famosum, bonis moribus ornatum, comitem scilicet Remondum, cui predictam filiam suam, Vrracam scilicet, in matrimonio copuluit’.

\textsuperscript{123} The annalist’s difficulty in identifying Burgundians is unfortunately replicated among modern historians, as Ernest Petit, Joseph O’Callaghan, and Bernard Reilly all mix up ducal and comital Burgundians. See O’Callaghan, \textit{Latin Chronicle}, p. 5, n. 14, and Reilly, \textit{Queen Urraca}, p. 13.

\textsuperscript{124} Reilly, \textit{King Alfonso VI}, pp. 247–52.

\textsuperscript{125} \textit{Chronica Latina}, p. 36: ‘Dictus comes non longo tempore uixit postea cum uxore’.
half-sisters, Teresa, and another, Elvira, married Raymond of Saint-Gilles, count of Toulouse, in 1094 and accompanied him on the First Crusade. Since Raymond participated in Alfonso’s wars against the Muslims at the same time, married an illegitimate daughter of the king’s, and moved in the same political circles, this could explain why some of the Burgundians who went on crusade in 1096 are identified as part of Raymond’s contingent. Additionally, Raymond’s son Bertrand married Odo I’s daughter Helias in June 1095, cementing the political bond.\footnote{\textit{Bull, Knightly Piety}, p. 89.} Overall, the presence of these individuals is critical to the development of political and religious ideals in Iberia and the particularly Burgundian involvement in it. This appears to be the corollary of Alfonso’s close ties with Cluny. After 1072, he cemented this alliance by taking a second wife from the Burgundian ducal family, marrying his daughters to Burgundian noblemen, and promoting a Cluniac monk to archbishop of Toledo and one of his chief advisors. The question, therefore, is whether this helped transform the attempts of Iberian Christian kings to conquer territory from their Muslim rivals, from mere land disputes into a recognisable ‘holy war.’

As discussed above, a Christian campaign to capture the Muslim city of Barbastro had been called for in 1063, and ‘if this enterprise, often taken to be the direct prototype of the First Crusade, can be identified as the work of Cluny or Rome, or of both, it should be possible to obtain from it insight into the activities of the two religious centers in the context of the Reconquista and of Iberian inter-state rivalries’.\footnote{Charles Julian Bishko, ‘The Fernandine-Cluniac Alliance and the War of Barbastro,’ in \textit{Studies in Medieval Spanish Frontier History} (London: Variorum, 1980) \texttt{http://libro.uca.edu/frontier/bishko2b.htm}, 53–88 (p. 55).} Bishko himself criticised this formulation of the Barbastro campaign as a forerunner to the First Crusade, as he saw the inchoate ‘reconquista’ in 1063 as quite different from the project formed at the council of Clermont in 1095, and one must tend to agree with him. However, the more pertinent issue is that of Cluny’s involvement – was Abbot Hugh of Semur a sponsor of the efforts in Barbastro, especially if Pope Alexander II...
is less likely to have been its patron? Bishko dismissed the idea that the Aragonese monarchs, the military leaders of the attack, would call for aid from Hugh and Cluny, supposedly well entrenched as supporters of Fernando I in Castile-León, Aragon’s great rival.\(^{128}\) However, if Pick is correct and the Cluniac connection was not established until Alfonso VI’s ascension, Bishko’s position is weakened. The Norman Sicilian chronicler Amatus of Montecassino, writing before 1093, viewed the expedition in providentially religious terms, and made explicit reference to the presence of many French and Burgundian soldiers:

> In order that the religion of the Christian faith might be spread and in order to destroy the detestable folly of the Saracens, kings, counts, and princes, through the inspiration of God, agreed to a plan whereby a great army of the French and Burgundian knights and others should be assembled. They would be accompanied by the most brave Normans and would all go to fight in Spain to subject the Saracen knights who had been brought together. […] Then the city of Barbastro was taken.\(^{129}\)

Since Amatus was a Norman partisan, his note of the presence of Burgundians does not owe to any particular need to promote them and can be treated as reasonably factual, though the quality of his overall information and his predisposition to view the expedition as the triumphalist companion to the Norman conquests of Sicily (1061–90) and England (1066) have been questioned.\(^{130}\) In contrast, one of the few French chroniclers to deal with the matter, Hugh of Fleury, was much more understated (and arguably cynical) about the motives of the Frenchmen who went to Barbastro, referencing King Philip I’s (r. 1060–1108) minority as an implication


that he could not have prevented them from an opportunistic adventure.¹³¹ Among these, the commander of the Burgundian contingent was Theobald of Chalon, count of Semur and uncle of Abbot Hugh.¹³² Even if Burgundy’s connections to Barbastro did not run through Aragon, France, or Rome, they were distinctly and independently present.

To add a further level of intrigue to the question of Burgundian influence, in the year 1073 there was a second organised attempt to send French forces to fight Muslims in Iberia. However, Pope Gregory VII strongly urged any Frenchmen thinking of going to respect Rome’s rights in the region, so ‘that when they have captured the land, they may not do the same wrongs to St Peter as do those who, not knowing God, now occupy it’,¹³³ and offered papal sanction to Ebles II, count of Roucy (arr. Laon, dep. Aisne) and cousin of Sancho Ramirez, king of Aragon, to lead the expedition.¹³⁴ This does not appear to have come to much. According to Pierre David, the papal legate Gerald of Ostia, a Cluniac monk, assisted in thwarting it precisely due to its connection with the kings of Aragon, and thus against Cluny and Castile-León’s interests.¹³⁵ Abbot Hugh may also have been involved in its disruption, Alfonso VI likewise took steps against a united front of Aragonese-Roman interference, and the attempt was thirdly rejected by


¹³⁴ Reilly, King Alfonso VI, p. 80.

¹³⁵ David, Études historiques sur la Galice et le Portugal, pp. 331–39.
Sancho IV of Navarre, who went so far as brokering an alliance with the Muslim ruler of Zaragoza to protect himself.\footnote{Reilly, \textit{King Alfonso VI}, p. 80.}\textsuperscript{136} Cantarino’s aforementioned claim that papal attempts to assert authority in Iberia were merely representative of a desire to include it in ‘Christendom,’ and not necessarily that of mundane political wheeling-and-dealing, thus seems soundly repudiated by the actual reaction to those events. Hugh of Semur, Alfonso VI, Sancho IV, and the Cluniacs – all assuredly Christians – did not view this as a benign action for the good of the faith, but as a threat to their political interests, and prevented it accordingly. Gregory’s letter was plainly at pains to emphasise that simple ignorance or non-Christianity might have explained the failure of Iberia’s current inhabitants to obey the rule of the Roman church and pontiff, but Catholic Frenchmen going there for just such a purpose would have no comparable excuse.

Still more interestingly, in the following year, there was a specific papal appeal for Burgundy to take a leading role in defending the Roman church and the rights of eastern Christians. On 2 February 1074, Gregory VII personally wrote to William Tête-Hardi, count of Burgundy, referring to a recent pilgrimage to Rome and encouraging him to materially and militarily support efforts against Muslim incursions in Constantinople:

\begin{quote}
Gregory, bishop, servant of the servants of God, to William, count of Burgundy, greeting and apostolic blessing. You will prudently remember with how great an abundance of love the Roman church not long ago received your excellency and with how especial a charity she has loved your close friendship. For nor does it become you to be forgetful of the promise by which you bound yourself to God before the body of St Peter […] that at whatever hour it might be necessary, your hand would not be lacking to fight for the things of St Peter if it were ever summoned. […] We also hope that a further advantage may, perhaps, accrue from it: namely, that when the Normans [of southern Italy and Sicily] are brought to peace we may cross to Constantinople to bring aid to Christians who are grievously afflicted by the most frequent ravagings of the Saracens, and who are avidly imploring us to extend them our helping hand.\footnote{\textit{Das Register Gregors VII}, 2 vols, ed. by Erich Caspar (Berlin: Weidmannsche Buchhandlung, 1920-23), I, pp. 69–71; ‘Gregorius episcopus servus servorum Dei Gulielmo Burgundionum comiti […] Meminisse valet prudentia vestra, quam larga affluential dilectionis Romana ecclesia valentiam vestram iam dudum receptit et quam speciali caritate vestram familiaritatem dilexit. Neque enim se condecect oblivisci promissionis, qua Deo se ante corpus'}
\end{quote}
The interest of this letter is obvious, in terms of Gregory envisioning a potential expedition to Constantinople against Muslims, and wanting the count of Burgundy to lead it, 21 years prior to Clermont. He also requested that William pass the message to Raymond of Saint-Gilles, count of Toulouse, once more reinforcing the correlation between Raymond and the Burgundians.  

There is a potential interpretation to be made that Gregory, having seen his efforts of 1073 thwarted due to its cross-purpose with Burgundian political interests, addressed himself directly to Count William (whose son Raymond would marry Urraca of Castile in 1087) in search of launching new efforts in defence of Christianity. In 1073 and 1074, these efforts were sited at locations (Iberia and Constantinople) that became central to the development of the crusades, and in both, Burgundy’s approval or initiative seemed to occupy a leading role in the prospects of their execution (or non-execution). Indeed, Gregory’s letter is striking in its direct exhortation of William to partake in an expedition that does bear some resemblance to Urban II’s call to assist Constantinople and eastern Christians twenty years later. Even if William did not ultimately do as the pope wished, the prototype in this case is certainly visible, and again argues for a Burgundian connection both early and important. This could have also been a contributor to the policy of William’s son, the future Pope Calixtus II, who was exceptionally concerned with crusading law, theology, and political obligation throughout his pontificate (1119–24).

Thus from 1063 to 1087, we see a consistent pattern of Burgundian involvement in Iberia, from the siege of Barbastro, through the frustration of Ebles of Roucy’s intervention, to its extensive ties with Alfonso VI and Castile-León. Indeed, one emerges with the sense of

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138 Et hoc idem rogamus vos monere comitem Sancti Egidii’, Das Register Gregors VII, p. 70.
Burgundy (and more specifically, Cluny) functioning as a sort of gatekeeper, deciding which expeditions were permissible to the Castilian king’s interests (and by extension theirs) and which were not, even if it came at the cost of opposing the pope and his Aragonese alliances. The pope had furthermore addressed himself directly to Burgundy at this time, perhaps in implicit recognition of the support necessary for his projects to be carried out. Thus so far as it goes, the Burgundian involvement in Iberia, at least by itself, is indeed not necessarily a proto-crusade or ‘blueprint’ for later wars. Modern historians can be rather careless in using the word ‘crusade’ for pre-1095 battles against the Muslims, which is reflective of the fact that while we might characterise these expeditions as such, the idea had not developed in any systemic fashion, and was not established as a distinct kind of political or religious action.\(^{139}\)

However, to stop here is to fail to take account of the continuing operation of the ‘reconquista,’ and its transformation from a land dispute between Iberian Christians and Iberian Muslims into a legally structured and recognised holy war, a second – and equally righteous – companion to the expeditions soon commencing to the Holy Land. As it would very much come to be viewed in these terms, and did not develop in isolation from Christendom’s other wars against the Muslims, it should be considered where the tipping point was located, and there is a plausible argument that it was as a direct result of this French alliance, connected to the Cluniac reform and patronage of Castilian monasteries, the establishment of papal policy and diplomatic ties, and the number of French and especially Burgundian nobles heading to Iberia to fight.\(^{140}\)

(Additionally, the Cluniac alumnus Pope Paschal II was the first to formally elevate the conflict


in Spain to the status of a crusade, in c. 1116–18.)¹⁴¹ It certainly drew the Christian peninsular kingdoms into the emerging realm of crusade policy, law, and rhetoric, and since the Islamic kingdom of Granada was conquered only in 1492 – a full two hundred years after the fall of Acre in 1291 – the impact should not be understated or ignored, especially given the ‘reconquista’s’ ongoing and sensitive memory in modern Spain.¹⁴² It is noteworthy that it was specifically Burgundy which helped drive this change, and contributes to our contention that the study of this region, in both its tangible and intangible borders, is deeply consequential for an understanding of the crusading institution in several ways, whether its associations with the transnational religious phenomenon of Cluny or its political involvements in Iberia. In laying the groundwork for an investigation of Burgundy’s role in the crusades on an individual and collective level, we have opened space for the beginning of the movement, and the shape of things to come.

CHAPTER TWO

Considering Contrasts: Burgundian Participation On The First Crusade, 1095–1101

Having established Burgundy’s political and social background, we begin a deeper investigation of its role in the First Crusade. Can we uncover any particularly Burgundian experience of crusading, and does this enable us to consider an overall hermeneutic for First Crusade studies? As we shall see, Duke Odo I of Burgundy was almost completely alone among his peers in neither participating in nor acknowledging the movement in any way, and when he finally did go on crusade in 1101, it was as an expressly political manoeuvre to escape mounting ecclesiastical and domestic difficulties. While a few lay First Crusaders with Burgundian affiliations can be discovered, their linkages are almost exclusively to the comital lands, rather than the ducal demesne, and it is our key contention that this sparse and belated participation laid the groundwork for the further pattern of Burgundian crusade involvement. The dukes themselves only ever went on crusade personally for political reasons, while the response of broader Burgundian society developed in different stages, sometimes in concordance with the general feeling of popular religiosity and sometimes with the example of a higher-ranking lord to propel them. By largely missing out on the foundational narratives, hagiographies, and traditions that came to surround the glorious memory of the First Crusade, Burgundy in some sense ensured that it would face considerable difficulties in being noticed in later years and expeditions. While it did have a very strong response to the crusade of 1101 – indeed, the duke, two counts, the count of Nevers, and several regional lords all took part – the heavy death toll and the ignominious overall failure of the expedition further problematised the terms of Burgundy’s involvement. As we now turn to, this programme of crusading activity is nearly unique among its French regional neighbours, and raises questions about the political function and tension of the crusades even in the very earliest days of their religious ardour.
I. France on the Eve of the First Crusade: Clermont, Recruitment, and Resistance

Any study of Burgundian participation must begin at the official birth of the movement: the council of Clermont in November 1095. The circumstances of this event are well known and nearly exhaustively covered. Nonetheless, Clermont was not the initial choice for Pope Urban II, who had first considered using the abbey of Vézelay in his former homeland of Burgundy.\(^1\) Thus Burgundy narrowly missed out on being the physical birthplace of the First Crusade, though Vézelay became a focal point for both the Second and Third Crusades. At least four accounts of Urban’s speech survive, by the chroniclers Fulcher of Chartres,\(^2\) Robert of Reims (Robert the Monk),\(^3\) Baldric of Bourgueil,\(^4\) and Guibert of Nogent,\(^5\) as part of an extensive First Crusade

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historiography that also includes Ralph of Caen,6 the *Gesta Francorum*,7 Peter Tudebode,8 Raymond of Aguilers,9 and Albert of Aachen.10 Of the Clermont accounts, Fulcher, Robert, and Baldric were present at the council; the last, Guibert, was not, and their interpretations of Urban’s message evinced competing and coordinating rhetorical strategies.11 Most notably for our purposes, both Robert and Guibert envisioned the crusade as specifically for the Franks, to the point that Robert had Urban open his address with an appeal to make the most of this exalted standing.12 The theme of French pre-eminence was also present in Guibert, though his version of

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12 Robert, *Historia*, p. 5: ‘Gens Francorum, gens transmontana, gens, sicuti in pluribus vestris elucet operibus, a Deo electa et dilecta, tam situ terrarum quam fide catholica, quam honore sancte ecclesie ab universis nationibus
Urban’s speech omitted any specific references, and stressed the brotherhood of Eastern and Western Christians. In his *Gesta Dei per Francos*, he commented on the wide European participation, while reserving a special position for the French:

> Although the call from the apostolic see was directed only to the French nation, as though it were special, what nation under Christian law did not send forth throngs to that place [Jerusalem]? In the belief that they owed the same allegiance to God as did the French, they strove strenuously to share the danger with the Franks’.  

Altogether, the point is clear: the French were the enactors of God’s will on earth, the crusade was designed for them, and its leaders had a greater responsibility to carry it out. However, the theme of Christian brotherhood and a defence of threatened Jerusalem, rather than any medieval French ‘nationalism,’ is given the strongest representation in the accounts of Clermont. A similar call for ecumenical unity is found in Baldric and Fulcher, as well as claims of the alleged tyranny and brutality of the Muslim rulers of the Holy Land, an emphasis on the importance of the region in the Christian theological imagination, and the horror and dishonour of fighting other Christians. Baldric had Urban deliver a scathing reprimand to the knightly class for the immorality and bloodthirstiness of its behaviour:

> To speak the truth, you are not following the path that leads you to life. You oppressors of orphans, you robbers of widows, you homicides, you blasphemers, you plunderers of others’ rights; you hope for the rewards of brigands from the shedding of Christian blood [. . .] You must either cast off as quickly as possible the belt of this sort of knighthood or go forward boldly as knights of Christ, hurrying swiftly to defend the eastern Church.  

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13 Guibert, *Gesta Dei*, pp. 88–89: ‘Cum solam quasi specialiter Francorum gentem super hac re commonitorium apostolicae sedis attigerit, quae gens christiano sub iure agens non ilico turmas edidit et, dum pensant se deo eandem fidem debere quam Franci, Francorum quibus possunt viribus nituntur et ambient communicare discrimini?’ Trans. by Levine, p. 29.

14 Baldric of Bourgeuil, *Historia Iherosolimitana*, pp. 8–9: ‘Ut ueritatem fateamur, cuius preones esse debemus, uere non tenetis uiam per quam eatis ad salutam et uitam. Vos pupillorum oppressores, uos uiduarum predones, uos homicide, uos sacrilegi, uos alieni iuris direptores. Vos pro effundendo sanguine Christiano expectatis latrocinantium stipendia; et sicut uultures odorantur caduera, sic longinquarum partium auspiciamini et sectamini bella. Certe uia ista pessima est, quoniam omnino a Deo remota est. Porro si uultis animabus uestris consulis, aut istiusmodi militie cingulum quantocius deponite, aut Christi milites audacter procedite, et ad defendendam
Self-evidently, there is a striking difference between Robert’s high praise of French martial and spiritual merit, and Baldric’s pointed polemic against a fractured, infighting secular aristocracy. This was particularly the case in Burgundy. The political situation during this period was one of ongoing instability and regional rivalries, and while it had somewhat stabilised by 1095, the conflict between Duke Odo I and his great-uncle Hugh of Semur, abbot of Cluny, formed a key part of Odo’s motivation in leaving on crusade in 1101, and may well have discouraged him from wanting to play any role in an enterprise envisioned by a Cluniac pope. But we must first investigate to what extent the vision of the crusade as a French project was justified, Pope Urban’s own ideals of the undertaking, and how the First Crusade can be considered in its political and religious iterations, especially as it concerns Burgundy.

It is generally accepted both that French response was so overwhelming as to ensure that crusaders throughout the next two hundred years were labelled as ‘Franks’ regardless of their country of origin, and that recruitment for the First Crusade was complicated due to King Philip I’s excommunication for his marital misadventures (which led to a delicate situation for the Capetian dynasty). Indeed in his post-Clermont speaking tour across France, Urban avoided regions under direct royal control; Philip’s tarnished status meant that he was barred from consideration, even if the opportunity to redeem themselves was offered to others. However, the king could not remain entirely separate from the movement, and on 11 February 1096, shortly after Clermont, he held a council in Paris with his brother, Hugh of Vermandois, and other


leading magnates of the kingdom to discuss it. Hugh ultimately took the cross on behalf of the royal family and became one of the crusade’s highest-profile leaders, though his early departure brought further shame on the dynasty.\footnote{Riley-Smith, *The First Crusade and the Idea of Crusading*, p. 159. See also Duby, *France in the Middle Ages*, p. 112, and Guibert of Nogent, *Gesta Dei per Francos*, p. 54.} Furthermore, Philip I and Odo I were cousins, as their respective father and grandfather, King Henry I of France and Duke Robert I of Burgundy, were brothers. The status of the Burgundian ducal house as a cadet branch of the Capetian monarchy was unique among its fellows, and familial political interests, especially in light of his conflict with Cluny, could have led Odo to reject participation. He had met with the king shortly before Clermont, while Philip was angling to have his second marriage recognised, also likely indicating that he was on Philip’s side in the negotiations.\footnote{Riley-Smith, *The First Crusade and the Idea of Crusading*, p. 89.} After Philip’s excommunication was confirmed at Clermont, Odo may have viewed the crusade as an enterprise fabricated by his enemies, the Cluniacs, and at the instigation of a pope hostile to the crown of France, to which he was closely related. If he was looking for a reason not to get back into the business of holy war after his bad experiences in Iberia in the 1080s, this may have provided a convenient pretext.

Secondly, we must consider which geographical regions of France were targeted by Urban and his associates, and what this tells us about how the crusade was supposed to be constructed. The pope did not direct his preaching toward Burgundy and his former home base of Cluny, where he had stayed prior to the council of Clermont (and to which Abbot Hugh had accompanied him).\footnote{H.E.J. Cowdrey, ‘Pope Urban II’s Preaching in The Crusades’, in *The Crusades: The Essential Readings*, ed. by Thomas F. Madden (Oxford; Blackwell, 2002), 15–31 (p. 21).} Either Urban did not think he needed to persuade a region one might expect to be on his side already, he viewed Burgundy as hostile territory due to Odo’s affiliation with the king, or despite the idealised and religious character of his call for the liberation of Jerusalem, he knew it was very much a matter of practical political and military support, and thus
not one where Cluny, with its emphasis on prayer, liturgy, and withdrawal from the world, would be of particular use.\textsuperscript{20} He focused his appeal on the west and south of France, where his influence and control was strongest, and this region provided two of the crusade’s most high-profile leaders in Adhémar, bishop of Le Puy, and Raymond of Saint-Gilles, count of Toulouse.\textsuperscript{21} We can also locate Urban in Limoges (Christmas 1095), Anjou and Maine (February 1096), Touraine and Poitou (March 1096), Saintes, and as far south as Nîmes in July 1096.\textsuperscript{22} In this reconstruction, northern France was circumvented due to its association with the excommunicated king, central France and Cluny were regarded as either taken for granted or of too little tactical use, and the focus on western and southern France became a matter of activating existing political support for the papacy and thus the expectation for its secular nobility to fight the pope’s battles.\textsuperscript{23} Indeed, it seems that Urban was not prepared for or planning on the immense response from the north and the Capetian lands.

Nonetheless, Burgundy’s absence becomes quite peculiar when considered against the response of its neighbours, almost all of which contributed at least one high-level leader to the crusade. The dukes of Brittany (Alan IV) and Normandy (Robert II ‘Curthose’), and the counts of Boulogne (Eustace III and his brothers Baldwin of Boulogne and Godfrey of Bouillon), Blois

\textsuperscript{20} This hypothesis is stated in its strongest form by Dominique Iogna-Prat, \textit{Order and Exclusion}, pp. 324–30: ‘Today it seems a mighty exaggeration to ascribe even an indirect role to Cluny in either the ideological prehistory of the Crusades or the practical prosecution of the first two of them. [. . .] Cluny’s contribution to the First Crusade was extremely modest. It is true that Urban II was a professed Cluniac and that his 1095 tour of Gallia included many member houses of the Ecclesia cluniacensis. But, as far as we know, Hugh of Semur and his Cluniac brethren did not work directly to launch the expedition’.

\textsuperscript{21} Duby, \textit{France in the Middle Ages}, pp. 112–13.


\textsuperscript{23} It must be noted, of course, that at this time there was an antipope, Clement III (r.1080/4–1100) who had been elected in opposition to the Gregorian Reforms and Gregory VII’s actions in the Investiture Controversy. However, he does not seem to have involved himself in the politics of the crusade, and his centre of power and influence was in Germany, as the pope supported by Henry IV, Holy Roman Emperor (r. 1056–1105) and his party. See Umberto Longo, ‘A Saint of Damned Memory: Clement III, (Anti)Pope,’ \textit{Reti Medievali Rivista}, 13 (2012), 137–51, and Nicolangelo D’Acunto, ‘Das Wibertinische Schisma in den Quellen des Regnum Italiae’, in \textit{Gegenpäpste: Ein unerwünschtes mittelalterliches Phänomen}, ed. by Harald Müller and Brigitte Hotz (Wien: Böhlau, 2012), 83–96.
(Stephen), and Flanders (Robert II) all took the cross, and chroniclers report on the deeds of men from all these regions.\textsuperscript{24} Regardless of the likelihood of any of the theories we have proposed to explain Odo’s disinterest, the fact remains that he was an aberration among his peers, even though they certainly had other interests, internal conflicts, and competing motivations just as he did. The other first-rank members of French secular nobility who did not participate – Helias I, count of Maine, Fulk IV (le Réchin), count of Anjou, and William IX, duke of Aquitaine – have reasons recorded. Count Helias originally took the cross, but cancelled his plans upon learning of William II Rufus of England’s interest in re-annexing his territory (which had been held by William the Conqueror) and vowed to treat the defence of Christian lands as similar in importance to a crusade. (However, as Riley-Smith points out, this interpretation comes forty years later from Orderic Vitalis, when the crusading ideal was quite differently established and regarded.)\textsuperscript{25} As for Fulk of Anjou, it was his wife, Bertrade of Montfort, whom King Philip had unlawfully married, and this as well as other difficulties of law and order meant that the crusade was a distraction he could not afford; he was also involved in the politics of keeping Maine out of William Rufus’s hands.\textsuperscript{26} Nonetheless, we find him welcoming Urban to his lands and assisting the recruiting effort, albeit in an anecdote constructed by Fulk himself to burnish his controversial reputation and tie Urban’s visit to the event of the translation of the body of Fulk’s uncle, Geoffrey Martel, thus implicitly suggesting papal approval of Angevin comital policy.\textsuperscript{27}

\textsuperscript{24} Duby, \textit{France in the Middle Ages}, p. 113.
\textsuperscript{26} Mark Blincoe, ‘Angevin Society and the Early Crusades, 1095-1145’ (unpublished PhD thesis, University of Minnesota, 2008), and OV, v, pp. 245–47.
Hence while they did not actively participate, the leaders of Maine and Anjou made some contribution to the crusading cause, and Orderic Vitalis noted men from these provinces travelling under the command of Robert of Normandy. William IX, duke of Aquitaine, hosted Urban for Christmas 1095, where the pontiff urged him to take the cross, but he declined; he later participated in the crusade of 1101, apparently for the adventure. Thus, since nearly all his contemporaries are recorded as participating in or at least acknowledging the movement, Odo of Burgundy’s absence (and silence) becomes ever more unusual. Whether conflict with Cluny and thus a Cluniac pope, support of his excommunicated Capetian cousin, political embroilment, or lack of interest in the undertaking (possibly coloured by unsuccessful experiences in Iberia) were enough to keep him behind is not clear. Individual Burgundians could and did go on crusade even in the absence of their local lords, but it is also evident that the non-participation of major noblemen had an impact on recruitment, as we next explore.

II. Doing Christian Duty: Burgundian First Crusaders, 1096–99

Despite the silence from Burgundian leaders, there was certainly interest in the crusade in the wider society and laity of Burgundy. As noted, neither the duke himself nor any immediate members of his family took the cross in 1095–96, nor did any prominent ducal vassals. The crusader known as ‘Robert the Burgundian’ was closely associated with the counts of Anjou and spent most of his life as an Angevin castellan, although by blood he was the brother of William I,
count of Nevers and grandfather of the 1101 crusader William II of Nevers. Thus we are obliged to focus primarily on those hailing from the comital lands. Two examples from the cartulary of Cluny have received attention: first, the 1096 pledge of the brothers Bernard and Odo, probably vassals of Rainald II of Mâcon and Burgundy, that ‘for the remission of our sins, setting out with all the others on the journey to Jerusalem, we have made over for 100 solidi [. . .] a manor known as Busart, which we were holding in the county of Mâcon [. . .] We are making this arrangement on the condition that if, in the course of the pilgrimage we are undertaking, because we are mortal and may be taken by death, the manor, in its entirety, may remain under the control of St Peter and the monastery of Cluny, which is under the reverend father Hugh’.  

The other example is that of Achard, castellan of Montmerle (Montmerle-sur-Saône, dep. Ain, arr. Bourg-en-Bresse), testifying that he is ‘excited by the same intention as this great and enormous upheaval of the Christian people wanting to go to fight for God against the pagans and the Saracens, and, to enable this to take place, and desiring to go there [Jerusalem] armed, I have made an agreement of this kind with lord Hugh, venerable abbot of Cluny, and his monks’. Achard is likely the single most famous of all Burgundian First Crusaders, as he appears in a broad selection of sources and has some attention paid to his exploits (and heroic death). His charter is also dated precisely: 12 April 1096, less than five months after Clermont, which

reflects how swiftly crusading fervour had spread across France. A less-publicised act in the
Cluny cartulary is that of Ebrolda, widow of a crusader, making a donation around 1100: ‘Let
those who read this charter know that I, Ebrolda, who was wife of Berengar who went to
Jerusalem and died there [. . .] after his death gave twelve denarii to St Peter of Cluny’.33 She
then became a nun at the Cluniac convent of Marcigny (dep. Saône-et-Loire, arr. Charolles).34

Participation among the Burgundian nobility is, however, thinly documented for the
period of 1096–99. None of the chroniclers record any Burgundian crusader by name (with the
exception of the anecdote of Achard of Montmerle’s death, mentioned in Robert, Peter,
Raymond, and the Gesta) or even make a note of Burgundians present among the other factions.
During the siege of Antioch, Raymond of Aguilers noted that ‘among the auxiliary group were
the Count of Flanders and some Provençals, a name applied to all those from Burgundy,
Auvergne, Gascony, and Gothia. I call to your attention that all others in our army are called
Franks, but the enemy makes no distinction and uses Franks for all’.35 This is a useful critical
difference. If the Burgundians were not ‘Franks,’ as would surely be the case for crusaders from
northern France or ducal Capetian Burgundy, they were more likely part of a linguistically and
culturally distinct southern French contingent and to hail from the old kingdom of Burgundy,
presently in comital territory. However, ‘Provençal’ as a catch-all term for men from a variety of
regions still does not offer much specificity. It is not until Albert of Aachen that we find a
reference to ‘Burgundienses’ alongside Normans, Bretons, and Germans, dated July 1097.36

33 RCAC, V, act 3804, p. 152: ‘Sciant qui istam cartam legerint, quod ego Ebrolda, que fuit uxor Berengarii qui in
Jerusalem perexit et qui ibi defunctus est [. . .] post obitum dedit Sancto Petro de Cluniaco xii denarius’.
34 Riley-Smith, First Crusade and the Idea of Crusading, p. 123.
35 Raymond of Aguilers, p. 244: ‘Erat autem inter eos qui profecti fuerunt ad propiscum fugae et clamoris causas,
Flandresis comes et cum eo quidam Provinciales: namque omnes de Burgundia et Alvernia, et Gasconia, et Gothi,
Provinciales appellantur, ceteri vero Francigenae; et hoc in exercitu, inter hostes autem omnes Francigenae
dicebantur’. Trans. by Hill and Hill, p. 34.
36 AA, p. 139.

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The question remains as to whether these were ducal or comital Burgundians, an identification difficult within Albert as he persistently confuses the two regions and the ranks of their leaders.37 His Historia is also a unique case, as while most First Crusade chroniclers share information so closely as to essentially replicate each other, Albert seems to have been entirely unaware of them and hence his account can be read in independent corroboration (or conflict) with these sources.38 While Albert was a geographically German chronicler, he was close enough to French centres of influence to be well aware of their doings; Aachen also lies just a hundred miles north of Bouillon, homeland of Godfrey, first Christian ruler of Jerusalem (1099–1100).39 This has led to speculation that the Historia was written as a hagiography for Godfrey and the new dynasty, but Albert’s modern translator, Susan Edgington, believes that a thorough reading of the work does not support that assertion. Albert emerges remarkably even-handedly for all parties, constructing his text more as a straightforwardly secular history than a theological sermon or model of classical allusion.40 He was certainly well-informed and prolific, as the Historia is by far the longest of any crusade source and covers both the 1096–99 and 1101 expeditions in detail, but like any other medieval chronicler, he is not to be trusted uncritically.

Albert provided a roster of participants at the siege of Nicaea (14 May–19 June 1097), under the command of Adhémar of Le Puy. This included Hugh of Vermandois, Achard of Montmerle, Gilbert of Traves (dep. Haute-Saône, arr. Vesoul), ‘one of the princes of Burgundy’, and Oliver of Jussey (dep. Haute-Saône, arr. Vesoul), ‘a bold and aggressive soldier’.41 Gilbert of Traves and Oliver of Jussey were surely part of the same Burgundian contingent, as Traves

37 AA, p. 633.
41 AA, pp. 100–01: ‘Giselbertus de Treua, unus de principus Burgundie, Oliuerus de castro Iussi, miles audax et pugnax, Achar de Montmerla’.
and Jussey are less than twenty miles apart. Men from Montmerle-sur-Saône could also form part of this, especially as Achard had given a charter at Cluny, and we later find him fighting (and dying) with Gilbert of Traves in June 1099. The *Gesta Francorum* places him under the command of Raymond of Toulouse when this occurred:

> At dawn a hundred knights set out from the army of Raymond, count of St Gilles. They included Raymond Pilet, Achard of Montmerle, and William of Sabran, and they rode confidently toward the port. Then thirty of our knights got separated from the others, and fell in with seven hundred Arabs, Turks, and Saracens from the army of the amir. The Christian knights attacked them bravely, but they were such a mighty force that they surrounded our men and killed Achard of Montmerle and some poor foot-soldiers.

However, the *Gesta* earlier referred to Achard departing France with the Flemish and Norman leaders, at which time he was not attached to Raymond: ‘Our second army came through the Dalmatian lands, and it was led by Raymond, count of Saint Gilles, and the bishop of Le Puy. The third came by way of the old Roman road. In this band were Bohemond and Richard of the Principality, Robert count of Flanders, Robert the Norman, Hugh the Great, Everard of Puiset, Achard of Montmerle, and many others’. Achard was evidently important enough to warrant mention with these other leaders, as Raymond of Aguilers eulogised him as ‘a noble young man and a well-known knight’. It may also be the case that Achard’s heroic death in battle gave him a retroactive importance to the chroniclers, and thus they made sure to note his presence. He is

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42 AA, pp. 408–10: ‘Gisilbertus de Treua et Achart de Montmerla, fortes Christianorum duces et uiri nobiles, illic post plurimum certaminis detruncati corruerunt’.

43 We discussed in chapter 1 the relationships between Raymond and the Burgundians, due to shared experiences in Iberia and the marriage of Raymond’s son to Odo’s daughter, which could be some reason for this affiliation.


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also lauded for bravery in the *Chanson d’Antioche*, where as we saw in the introduction, he and
Oliver of Jussey are the only Burgundian crusaders specifically named.

In contrast to Achard and Gilbert’s fate, Oliver seems to have survived longer, as he
appeared alongside Robert of Normandy, Robert of Flanders, Gerard of Quierzy, and Rainald of
Toul as commanders in the battle of Ascalon (12 August 1099) that secured Christian control of
the Holy Land.\textsuperscript{47} Since Haute-Saône is located in the Franche-Comté area of Burgundy, this is a
strong indicator that Gilbert and Oliver (and probably Achard) were in fact comital Burgundians.
They could have been attached first to Adhémar of Le Puy and then, after his death in summer
1098, to Raymond of Toulouse, or they could have, with less likelihood, travelled with their own
lord: Rainald II, count of Mâcon and Burgundy (who is discussed in the following section.) Next,
Albert reported on a man named Welf, ‘an outstanding soldier who came from the realm of
Burgundy’, holding the city of Adana (in Anatolia) and playing a crucial role in its capture:

For this Welf had gone ahead with the others who were separated from the army.
Tancred, finding the gates closed and knowing that a Christian leader occupied the city,
sent messengers under safe conduct and begged to be admitted for the sake of hospitality,
and for food to be shared with him by fair buying and selling. Welf listened to his pleas
and ordered the city to be opened, Tancred to be brought in with his men, and all the
necessities of life to be served to them.\textsuperscript{48}

However, Albert then referred to this Welf as ‘Welf of Boulogne,’ raising the question as to
whether he was once more confusing individuals, conflating titles, or simply mixing up
Burgundy and Boulogne.\textsuperscript{49} Welf is listed as being from the ‘regnum’ of Burgundy; this could
point toward an origin in the historical kingdom of Burgundy, either Upper Burgundy (the

\textsuperscript{47} AA, p. 463. See also Guibert of Nogent, *Gesta Dei per Francos*, p. 139.
\textsuperscript{48} AA, pp. 154–55: ‘Obtinuit enim hanc ciuitatem quidam Welfo, ortus de regno Burgundie, miles egregius, qui
ejectis et attritis Turcis urbem possederat […] Tancradus portas inueniens clausas et principem Christianum urbem
possidere intelligens, missis nuncius sub fide data intromitti hospitandi gratia precatur, et alimenta iusta uenditione et
emptione sibi impertiri’.
\textsuperscript{49} AA, pp. 190–91: ‘… cum sociis Artesia receptis, Tancrado, Welfone Buloniense, a maritisimis cum uniuersis
Gallorum sociis relatiis’. Runciman followed Albert’s initial lead, describing this individual simply as a
‘Burgundian knight called Welf’, and does not mention either Boulogne or the rival commander of Adana, Ursinus.
county/Franche-Comté region) or Lower Burgundy (anywhere in southern France from Lyon to Marseille). William of Tyre later identified this individual as ‘Guelf’ from the ‘Burgundian nation’, and in the *Gesta Tancredi*, Ralph of Caen gave an Armenian named Ursinus as the commander of the city of Adana, rather than any party called Welf. The Germanic name ‘Welf’ was common for comital Burgundy, and was the dynastic name of the kings of Burgundy in the tenth and eleventh centuries. As we have found other comital Burgundians present at the same time, it seems likely on balance that Welf was indeed Burgundian. However, since this anecdote is associated with Tancred of Sicily, and Tancred’s biographer Ralph reported Adana to have been held by a different man entirely, it demonstrates the drawbacks of Albert’s account existing separately from other crusade chronicles. Ralph devoted an entire chapter to Ursinus, which is a more substantial testament than a passing and contradictory mention. A Burgundian named Welf may certainly have been present, but cannot be unquestioningly assigned command.

Other participants for 1096–99 remain elusive. Guy of Thiers (dep. Puy-de-Dôme, arr. Thiers), count of Chalon-sur-Saône, appears in the cartulary of Paray-le-Monial ‘volens Hierosolimam proficisci’ and making arrangements ‘pro remissione peccatorum meorum’, this document does not have a date, though he has been assigned to the First Crusade. It is also

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54 ‘Guy of Thiers’, in *A Database of Crusaders to the Holy Land, 1095-1149* (University of Leeds; University of London Royal Holloway; British Academy, online) <https://www.dhi.ac.uk/crusaders/person/?id=351>.
possible that Walter of Couches, bishop of Chalon, went with him. But overall, the presence of a mere half-dozen identifiable Burgundian crusaders for 1096–99 (Bernard and Odo of Mâcon, Achard of Montmerle, Gilbert of Traves, Oliver of Jussey, Welf of Burgundy, Guy of Thiers), with even fewer locatable in the chronicles (Achard of Montmerle is the only one to warrant broad attention), does not point to a large or memorable number of participants. There is always the possibility that enough were present to warrant Albert’s description of ‘Burgundians’ among the other national factions, but if so, they were largely unrecorded, and possessed no figures of a sufficient profile to attract notice or comment. It also seems to be the case that those who went were essentially freelancers, and thus fairly mobile among the crusading army, as Achard, Gilbert, and Oliver served with Adhémar of Le Puy and then Raymond of Toulouse, as well as other commanders. The fact that Bernard and Odo, Achard, and Guy of Thiers all had to make private arrangements to finance their journeys may support this hypothesis.

In sum, the scant record of Burgundian involvement in the First Crusade proper is a striking counterpoint to any idea that all regions of France joined up at once; while French response was vast, it nonetheless was not universal. The presence of Cluny and its connection to Urban II did not account for any positive effect on recruitment, and due to Odo I’s conflict with it, may have functioned as an active negative. Nor did Urban, despite his broad itinerary across the rest of France, express a particular interest in targeting Burgundy – perhaps taking into account Odo’s alliance with the embattled Capetian monarchy, and thus treating Burgundy the same as the other royal territories he avoided. This could also indicate a strengthening of ducal authority after the turbulence of Capetian Burgundy’s establishment under Duke Robert I in 1032. Considering the fact that all our noted crusaders are from the county, Odo’s vassals seem to have followed his example and stayed home. This changed in 1101, and dramatically.

\[55 SMC, p. 392.\]
III. Making Amends: Burgundy Goes on Crusade, 1101

The expeditions of 1100–02 are much less well-known than the events of 1096–99, and thus warrant somewhat more introduction and discussion. Alec Mulinder characterised it not as an overall movement but rather four separate smaller ones, with diverse leaders, motives, and experiences. Responding to Pope Paschal II’s calls for the conquest of Jerusalem to be reinforced, and involving crusaders with a number of reasons to complete aborted participation, travel to the East after having not done so before, or simply go on pilgrimage to the Holy Places without the effort (or so they hoped) of an actual battle, it took shape in stages. An Italian/Lombard army was the first to depart, leaving Milan on 13 September 1100 and reaching Constantinople in March 1101, but behaved badly in Byzantine lands over the winter. A second army under the command of William II, count of Nevers, had left France a month earlier, in February 1101, and the third wave, departing soon after, included the three brothers Rainald and Stephen of Burgundy and Hugh of Besançon as its leaders, alongside Stephen of Blois, Guy of Rochefort, Miles of Troyes, and others. These armies both arrived in Constantinople between May and June 1101. Lastly a southern French expedition, led by William IX of Aquitaine, joined up with a German contingent led by Welf IV of Bavaria and made it, after considerable battle and turmoil, to the other three in the imperial capital at the start of June 1101, where they were joined by Raymond of Toulouse, experienced veteran of the 1096–99 campaign.

As had been the case during the First Crusade, the rival forces were plagued by power struggles, mistrust of each other, and clashes with the Byzantine emperor, Alexios Komnenos. Opposed by the formidable Kilij Arslan I (r. 1092–1107), Seljuk sultan of Rûm, and ignoring Alexios’ advice to follow the route of the First Crusaders, they decided to attempt to rescue

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Bohemund I of Antioch after his defeat and capture at the battle of Melitene in 1100.\textsuperscript{58} They remained embroiled in a number of protracted and draining skirmishes in the region of Anatolia, culminating in disastrous defeat at Mersivan on 16 August 1101. The contingent commanded by Stephen of Blois and Stephen of Burgundy was forced to retreat all the way to Constantinople, while William of Nevers endured catastrophe after catastrophe. Finally regrouping around February–March 1102 in Antioch, they travelled south, stopping to besiege Tortosa (Tartus, Syria) and meeting King Baldwin I of Jerusalem in Beirut about 8 March. Reaching Jerusalem itself around Easter, they remained there for a few months and then had to fight against an Egyptian invasion in May. The second battle of Ramla (17 May 1102) took a disastrous toll on their leadership, including the Burgundians, and led to the survivors drifting home piecemeal, without much to show for their venture or for the overall stability of the new Christian government in the Holy Land.\textsuperscript{59}

What can be identified about the Burgundians in this expedition, and why did they choose to depart now? Was it merely a chance to make up for their non-participation in the first place? Mulinder observed, ‘The fact that the areas affected by the new wave of crusading fervour were largely those regions previously untouched by the initial crusading drive in 1095–6, further suggests that oath-breakers would have formed only a small element in the crusading expeditions of 1101–2’.\textsuperscript{60} At least one of its leaders, Count Rainald II of Burgundy, may have gone earlier, but his case is an obscure one, and firm documentation is almost non-existent. James Lea Cate


claimed that ‘Reginald’ of Burgundy travelled to Jerusalem soon after Clermont, leaving his
brother Stephen as his regent, but did not provide clear dates or sourcing, 61 and Bouchard
believed that Rainald had died by 1095, which would preclude his participation at all. 62 Riley-
Smith confidently placed Rainald, along with his brothers Stephen and Hugh, on the ‘First
Crusade,’ which conflates the two expeditions, and likewise did not make his source clear. 63 A
passing reference to the ‘duke [count] of Burgundy’ in Guibert of Nogent may be to Rainald:

For who could describe how great a crowd of nobles, burghers, and peasants, from
Frankish lands alone (of the others I say nothing) accompanied Count Stephen [of Blois]
whom we mentioned earlier, and Hugh the Great, brother of King Philip, when, later on,
they again undertook the journey to the tomb of the Lord? Not to speak of the Count of
Burgundy, what shall I say of the Count of Poitou, who brought not only a large group of
knights, but a crowd of young girls as well? 64

This anecdote clearly relates to 1101, as Guibert discussed Stephen of Blois and Hugh of
Vermandois returning after their first failed expedition, and we can at least ascertain that a count
of Burgundy was present at that time. Therefore, it is just as possible that this reference is to
Stephen I, Rainald’s brother, as it is to Rainald himself. Marjorie Chibnall, in her translation of
the Ecclesiastical History, added to the confusion by mistakenly identifying Stephen as
Rainald’s son. 65 In the History itself, Orderic recorded a ‘Reginald’ being elected as leader of the
People’s Crusade in Constantinople in 1096, but with no title or further attestation except for a
shameful desertion to the Turks, as well as his involvement with unorganised commoners rather

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62 SMC, p. 274.
64 Guibert, Gesta Dei, pp. 312–13: ‘Quis enim colligate eo tempore, quo Stephanus comes, de quo supra egimus, et ille Philippi regis frater Hugo Magnus Sepulchri dominici viam iterato ceperunt, summi, mediocris et infimi generis quanta ex solis Franciae partibus – de ceteris enim taceo – frequentia processerit? Tacito Burgundiae duce quid de Pictavensi comite loquar, qui pretor militiae grandis, quem secum proposuit ductare, globum etiam examina contraxerat puellarum?’ Trans. by Levine, p. 147. Even more confusingly, it will be noted that Guibert uses ‘dux [duce]’ instead of ‘comes’ here, despite almost surely meaning Rainald (or Stephen) of Burgundy, rather than Odo I; possibly why Levine has translated it as such.
65 Marjorie Chibnall, Ecclesiastical History, v, p. 325, n. 7.
than fellow noblemen, it is unlikely in the extreme that this was Rainald of Burgundy. Orderic went on to mention a ‘brave Count Rainald with four thousand Germans and Bavarians’ in 1096, but neglected to specify where he is from. It is possible that this is the basis on which Cate and Riley-Smith claimed Rainald’s participation in the actual First Crusade, but it is rather slender proof, especially as Orderic, writing forty years after the events, is the only one to make the statement. As count of Burgundy with its connection to the Holy Roman Empire, it is certainly feasible to find Rainald travelling in company with Germans and Bavarians, but it is far more likely that this reference is to Rainald III, count of Toul (dep. Meurthe-et-Moselle, arr. Toul) whose participation can be firmly verified. Since Toul was part of the Empire at the time, and Rainald was commended for bravery at the siege of Antioch, he fits the criteria just as well (or better) than Rainald of Burgundy. Furthermore, Orderic’s version of the First Crusade is often muddled and inaccurate, as well as non-contemporary, and must be regarded with caution.

Furthermore, since Rainald of Burgundy does not appear in the accounts of Raymond of Aguilers, Peter Tudebode, Robert the Monk, or the Gesta Francorum, all of which share information closely, it is doubtful that he had any significant role with the actual First Crusade, and is much more likely to have travelled after 1100. Identification is also hampered by the fact that he does not seem to have made a donation or charter at a religious house in preparation for his journey. There is of course the possibility that such a document has not survived, but considering Rainald’s rank, the fact that such a testament would be politically valuable to whichever establishment received it, and the good survival of charters associated with even ordinary crusaders, this is unlikely. Riley-Smith believed that Rainald, supposedly already in the

66 OV, v, pp. 32, 38.
68 ‘Rainald III of Toul’, in A Database of Crusaders to the Holy Land
<https://www.dhi.ac.uk/crusaders/person/?id=619> [accessed 04-10-2017].
Holy Land, delayed his departure in 1099, after the capture of Jerusalem, to assist in forming the new Christian government, but the compilers of the Cluny cartulary claimed that he died in 1097. However, Albert’s account of his death placed it after the siege of Tortosa in 1102:

After this, that same Prince Raymond [Raymond of Toulouse] was received, Tancred [Tancred of Sicily, nephew of Bohemund] was cheered by all, and they went back from Antioch to the town called Tortosa. They besieged and conquered and subdued it, and by common agreement Raymond himself remained in the town to defend it […] The rest decided to continue the journey to Jerusalem. Duke Welf [of Bavaria], however, avoided this siege, and went on to Jerusalem to worship, together with Rainald duke [count] of Burgundy, Stephen’s brother who ruled Burgundy in his place; Rainald was making for Jerusalem six months before the Lombard expedition and had wintered at Antioch. But this same Rainald was attacked by illness, died on the journey, and was buried.

As Albert referenced Tancred imprisoning Raymond of Toulouse, which occurred in 1102, in the previous paragraph, as well as the presence of Rainald’s brother Stephen, who did not arrive until 1101, it makes sense to locate Rainald’s death in one of these two years, ruling out the earlier dates of 1095 and 1097. (It, alas, still does not establish when he arrived in the first place, though ‘six months before the Lombard expedition’ could suggest a departure in the early spring of 1100.) James Cate cited (presumably) Pope Calixtus II’s letter of 19 March 1122 to Anseric, archbishop of Besançon, in which Calixtus (born Guy of Burgundy, brother of Rainald, Stephen, and Hugh, and the fifth of William Tête-Hardi’s six sons) mentioned Hugh’s death in Jerusalem, which occurred in 1102. Cate took this as proof of the 1102 date of death for Rainald as well, though it is not clear on what evidential grounds. In any case, 1102 does seem the most likely.

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69 Riley-Smith, First Crusaders 1095-1131, p. 158.
71 AA, pp. 632-33: ‘Post hec receptor eodem principe Reimundo, unanimiter salutato Tancrado ab Antiochia regressi sunt usque ad ciutatem nomine Tortosam […] Welfo autem dux, obсидionem hanc deuitans, Jerusalem adadorandum descendit, una cum Reinoldo duce Burgundie, fratre Stephani, uice ipsius Burgundiam regentis, qui semianno ante expeditionem Longobardum Jerusalem tendens, Antiochie usque nun hiemauerat. Sed infirmitate corruptus, in uia mortuus est idem Reinoldus et sepultus’.
72 Cate, History of the Crusades, 1, p. 364, n. 32. Cate does not specify which letter he used; I have had to infer. See ‘Epistolae Calixti II Papae’, in Rerum Gallicorum et Francicarum Scriptores/RHGF, xv. pp. 242–44, ‘XXIX: Ad Ansericam archiepiscopum et Canonicos Bisuntinae ecclesiae S. Joannis’. The relevant passage appears on p. 244, section C: ‘Porro consuetudines omnes quas ecclesia S. Stephani, a tempore Hugonis Salinenis bonae memoriae...
Stephen of Burgundy is more well-attested than his brother, as he reliably appears in the accounts and is given prominence in each. Fulcher of Chartres named him as a leader of the 1101 army, with Hugh of Vermandois, William of Aquitaine, Stephen of Blois, and Raymond of Toulouse, and called him the ‘noble count of Burgundy’ with a large army of foot and cavalry. Orderic Vitalis commented, ‘So Duke Stephen [a mistaken reference for Odo of Burgundy] and Stephen, count of Burgundy, and another Stephen the son of Richelda gladly joined the crusaders with great troops of warriors from Burgundy’. Albert, while consistently misidentifying Stephen as ‘duke,’ praised his exploits: he called him a ‘very famous knight’ and lauded his role in serving as defender of the Christian army during its difficult procession from Ankara in summer 1101: ‘When the following day dawned and the cruel news of the people’s destruction was announced in the camp, all the army leaders were thrown into confusion and they greatly reproached the Lombards [. . .] But nobody offered to be a guard except Stephen duke of Burgundy, who with five hundred armoured cavalry protected the army in such a way that not a single person died on the day of his watch duty’. His death at Ramla came as a tragedy:

Bisuntini archiepiscopi usque ad tempora fratis nostri Hugonis, qui in Jerosolymitana peregrinacione defunctus est’. Hugh’s death is also referenced in Calixtus’ letter of 30 June 1119 to the canons of Besançon. ‘Calixtii II Papae: Epistolae et Privilegia’, in PL, clxii, p. 1107: ‘[…] usque at tempora fratris Hugonis archiepiscopi, qui in Jerosolymitana peregrinacione ad Dominum migravit, conservata noscuntur’.

Fulcher of Chartres, pp. 428–30: ‘De secunda Francorum miserabili peregrinatione et de morte de Hugonis Magni. Cum Francorum exercitus ingens, ut dictum est, Hierusalem tenderet, aderant in illa multitudine simul Guillelmus, Pictavensium comes, et Stephanus, comes Blesensis, qui ab Antiocha, relicto exercitu, discesserat; sed quod tunc reliquerat, nunc restaurare satagebat, cum his etiam Hugo Magnus erat; qui post Antiochiam captam in Gallias repedaverat. […] Aderat quoque Stephanus, Burgundiae comes nobilis, adiecto populo inunmero, de equitibus et peditibus exercitu bipartito’.

OV, v, p. 325-27: ‘Stephanus autem dux et Stephanus comes super-Saonensis aliusque Stephanus Richeldis filius cum plurimis cetibus bellatorum de Burgundia militae Christi celeres adheserunt.’ As noted, the Latin is ‘super-Saonensis’ or ‘above the Saône [river]’ which indicates the tendency for the counts of Burgundy not to be identified as such specifically, but in relation to an associated group of lands under the control of a ‘comes’. This had certainly been the case earlier, though it is somewhat surprising to see Orderic still using it. See also Kimberly A. LoPrete, Adela of Blois: Countess and Lord (c. 1067–1137) (Dublin: Four Courts Press, 2007), p. 114, n. 69.

AA, p. 604-5: ‘Stephanus dux Burgundiae, miles clarissimus,’.

AA, pp. 598-99: ‘Crastina autem die illucescente et crudeli fama attrite gentis perlata in castris conturbati sunt omnès primores exercitus, multum Longobardis improperantes, eo quod mollicie et pigricia eorum contritus et imminutus fuerit exercitus […] sed nemo se obtulit ab custodiam preter Stephanum ducem Burgundie, qui cum quingenti loricatis equitibus sic tuebatur exercitum, ut nee unus in custodia sue diei de populo periret’.

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The rest – Conrad, Arpin, Stephen of Blois, and the other Stephen, of Burgundy, and all the eminent knights – occupied a certain tower in Ramla for its protection. [. . .] On the second day the Saracens, and also those from Ethiopia, broke down the walls of the town and in great strength began to powerfully strike and attack that same tower [. . .] But on the third day the eminent knights, choosing rather to be destroyed while defending honourably than to choke and die a wretched death, came out, having invoked the name of Jesus and his favour, and they fought fiercely face to face with the Saracens, and avenged their own lives [. . .] But all the rest, including the noble princes Stephen [of Blois] and the other Stephen [of Burgundy] were beheaded in that place. 

The leader of the third prong of the 1101 expedition, William II, count of Nevers, likewise did not fare well in the Holy Land, although he at least survived the adventure. A charter issued at Molesme on 30 January 1101 records William’s intention to depart for the Holy Land, and his penance for starting a fire in the village. It is also the case that William could afford his own expedition and thus the honour of equipping and leading it himself, rather than having to share the glory. The scale of his contributions, however, has been inflated. Petit rather uncritically accepted Albert’s unlikely figure of 15,000 men, which Cate found incredible. Nonetheless, William travelled in style:

Also at that time and in King Baldwin’s first year [1101] the very powerful count and prince of [Nevers], William by name, set out from the land and kingdom of [western; see note] Francia, and travelled through Italy, and he sailed on the high seas to the port which is called Brindisi with fifteen thousand cavalry and infantry, not to mention countless of the female sex, and put in at the town of Avlona [Vlorë, Albania].

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79 HdB, I, p. 263.

80 Cate, History of the Crusades, I, p. 351. To further demonstrate the unreliability of medieval estimates, we find Guibert of Nogent claiming that 100,000 crusaders besieged Nicaea in summer 1097, and defeated an Arab and Persian army of 460,000, thus adding another 100,000 to the Gesta Francorum’s already incredible figure of 360,000. Guibert himself commented on the difficulty; see Gesta Dei per Francos, trans. Levine, pp. 67, 162.

81 Crusade chroniclers had an ulterior motive to record the presence of women, especially in 1101, as the failure of that expedition seemed to demand explanation, and was (at least in some cases) settled on as the poor personal
William proceeded to Thessaloniki, then Constantinople, where he was received by the emperor. In comparison to 1096, where all the leaders decided on or were manipulated into swearing fealty to Alexios, the only ones who may have done so this time were those of the Aquitainian-Bavarian expedition. Mulinder commented, ‘The status of the leaders on the 1101 expeditions was at least equal to that of the leaders of the [1096] expedition, if not superior. Men like Welf IV of Bavaria, William IX of Aquitaine, Stephen of Burgundy, Albert of Biandrate, and William of Nevers were powerful magnates who belonged to well-respected and long-established families. They were not the younger sons and disaffected fortune-seekers who seem to have comprised a significant proportion of the leadership of the First Crusade’.

In Mulinder’s reckoning, although the First Crusade was more celebrated and successful, it was conducted by men of comparatively lower social status, whom Alexios could feel confident treating as inferiors, whereas with the leadership of 1101 he was more able to relate to them as equals. This does not seem likely, as the disparity in their ranks was not nearly enough to explain this shift on its own (in any case, the ‘malcontents of Europe’ thesis has been fairly well discarded) and the capture of Jerusalem had profoundly changed the political landscape of the East, as Alexios was not the only Christian ruler in the area and therefore they were not as dependent on him as their predecessors. It also reflects the fact that Alexios could no longer hope to have former Byzantine lands returned, as he had with the 1096 crusaders, which removed any morals of the crusaders. Albert may be making a veiled critique of William of Nevers here, though his treatment of the count’s time in the Holy Land is otherwise fairly sympathetic. See also Natasha Hodgson, ‘Women’, in The Crusades: An Encyclopedia, ed. by Alan V. Murray, 4 vols (Santa Barbara, CA; Oxford: ABC-CLIO, 2006), iv, pp. 1286–91, and James Brundage, ‘Prostitution, Miscegenation and Sexual Purity in the First Crusade’, in Crusade and Settlement, ed. by Peter Edbury (Cardiff: University College Cardiff Press, 1985), 57–65.

82 AA, pp. 618–19: ‘Eodem quoque tempore anno primo regis Baldwini, comes et princeps potentissimus de ciuitate Niviae, quod ulgo dictur Nauers, Willemus nomine, de terra et regno occidentalis Francia egrediens, et iter per Italiam faciens, ad portum qui Brandiz nauigio alto mari inuectus est cum quindecim milibus equitum et peditum uirorum pugnatorum absque sexu feminine innumerabili, et ad ciuitatem nomine Vallonam secessit’. Edgington has translated ‘occidentalis Francia’ as ‘eastern Francia’, perhaps in recognition of the fact that Nevers is indeed in eastern France and thus correcting Albert’s geography, but it reads as ‘western Francia’ in the text.

83 Mulinder, Crusading Expeditions, p. 120.
political necessity to obtain their fealty. Nonetheless, he did endeavour to maintain good relations, and William reportedly visited Alexios every day during his stay in Constantinople.\(^{84}\)

Despite this, William’s crusade participation remained star-crossed. After a few more stops at Civitot and Ankara, he was ambushed near Iconium (Konya, Turkey), his army annihilated at the battle of Heraclea, and forced to flee all the way back to Germanicople (Ermenek), where he was then robbed by native guides hired to take him to Antioch. He did finally get there, in considerable disarray. ‘The count of Nevers, who had only just escaped the peril of death, and was only just still holding onto some of his riches and revenues in his flight from Turkish hands, and had only just managed to turn aside to the town of Germanicople’ was assisted by Tancred of Sicily, now regent of Antioch in his uncle Bohemund’s stead.\(^{85}\) After resting and re-provisioning, William was present in Antioch in March 1102 with the other crusading magnates, including his countryman Stephen of Burgundy.\(^{86}\) His activities after that are not recorded. He would ultimately survive, as he returned home and lived until 1148, but his brother Robert, who accompanied him, seems to have not.\(^{87}\)

As we move from counts to lords, there is certainly better representation among the second rank of Burgundian nobility for 1101 than for 1096. Geoffrey II, lord of Donzy (dep. Nièvre, arr. Cosne-Cours-sur-Loire), appears to have sold off his claim to Chalon-sur-Saône (the other heir was the First Crusader Guy of Thiers, encountered in the preceding section) in order to raise funds to go in 1100; he survived the journey and became a monk at Donzy before his

\(^{84}\) Mulinder, *Crusading Expeditions*, p. 181.
\(^{85}\) AA, p. 624-25: ‘Comes igitur de Nauers qui uix periculum mortis euaserat, utu ix adhæ aliiquid de opibus et stipendiis suis a manibus Turcorum fugiendo retinuerat, et uix ad ciuitatem Germanicoplam declinuerat…’
\(^{87}\) *SMC*, p. 346.
The noble family of Toucy (dep. l’Yonne, arr. Auxerre), which provided a great number of crusaders for later expeditions, suffered the loss of at least two members in 1101: Itier, lord of Toucy, and his brother Hugh. A third brother, Narjod, also participated, and their charter establishing the monastery of Crisenon (dep. l’Yonne, arr. Auxerre) prior to their departure survives. Stephen of Neublans (dep. Jura, arr. Dole) made journeys in both 1101 and 1123/26.

His first act appears in the Cluny cartulary and provides a glimpse at the appeal of the Holy City: ‘Considering the multitude of my sins and the mercy of our Lord Jesus Christ [. . .] I therefore will visit Jerusalem, where man saw God and where he conversed with men, and to adore the place where his feet stood’. Stephen made his later bequest at the abbey of St Marcel-lès-Chalon, Chalon-sur-Saône, in c.1123–26, in response to the ‘crusade’ of Pope Calixtus II (examined next chapter). In this we can see that just as regional recruitment for 1096 suffered due to the lack of any major Burgundian lord, the participation of Rainald and Stephen of Burgundy and William of Nevers in 1101 encouraged several substantial vassals to make the trip. But the counts were not the only ones to take the cross, as Duke Odo finally did as well.

IV. Cluny and the Crown of France: Odo of Burgundy and the Crusade

Whilst his compatriots were crusading, Odo I was occupied in a feud with Cluny and its abbot, his great-uncle Hugh of Semur, and was excommunicated on 29 September 1100 by a pair of papal legates sent by Paschal II (r. 1099–1118). It is hard to pinpoint exactly how long this had

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88 SMC, p. 327.  
89 Bouchard, ‘The Lords of Toucy’ in SMC, pp. 373-74.  
90 CGY, I, p. 199.  
91 RCAC, V, act 3737, 87–91 (p. 88): ‘Considerens peccatorum meorum multitudinem et Domini nostri Jesus Christ pietatem [. . .] statui ergo Hierosalem adire, ubi Deus homo visus et cum hominibus est conversatus, ac in loco steterunt pedes ejus adorare’.  
93 For the date, see HdB, I, p. 258. Petit identifies ‘les cardinaux Jean et Benoit’ as the legates responsible.
been going on, but it is noteworthy that between 1078–79 and 1100, a span of 278 numbered acta given at Cluny, Odo made no charters or gifts to the abbey at all. He appeared just after his accession in 1078, making a donation with his elder brother Hugh, who had retired as a monk to Cluny and left his position to Odo,\(^94\) and then vanished entirely. In the following twenty-two years, we find acts given by or on behalf of William Tête-Hardi and his son Stephen, counts of Burgundy; William I, William II, and Henry I, kings of England; Philip I, king of France; Alfonso VI, king of Castile-León; Stephen and Adela, count and countess of Blois, and numerous privileges and honours by the Cluniac popes Urban II and Paschal II. Yet not a single act by Odo is recorded, which may be an indicator of strained relations. We do find him at Cluny in 1094 to witness one of his knights, Froger of Meursault, making a donation to the abbey,\(^95\) and in 1095 as witness to his cousin King Philip I’s granting of the abbey of Mozac (dep. Puy-de-Dôme, arr. Riom) to Cluny, among other bishops and nobles.\(^96\) However, this act was given at Mozac, instead of at Cluny, and emerges as a distinctly political move on Philip and Odo’s parts, given that 1095 was the year when Philip was at the height of legal and religious difficulties over his matrimonial misadventures, and when he was excommunicated by Urban II. Odo participating in a charter to help his royal cousin purchase some goodwill with the church lends credence to our hypothesis that he was more interested in his family ties to the Capetian monarchy, rather than a crusade envisioned by a pope associated with an institution with which

\(^{94}\) RCAC, IV, act 3531, p. 653.

\(^{95}\) RCAC, V, act 3678, p. 31: ‘Unde ego Frotgerius miles de castello quod vulgariter appellatur Murassalt, dono omnipotenti Deo et sanctis apostolis ejus Petro et Paulo Cluniacensi ecclesie in ipsorum nomine Apostolis dicate, ecclesiam sancti Nicholai presulis Christi, que sita est in supradicto castro, quam ex beneficio domini Oddonis Ducis Burgundiae dudum possideram, ita scilicet ut eamdem ecclesiam jam dicti coenobii fratres ex integro habeant, teneant atque possideant [...] S. domni Oddonis Ducis’.

\(^{96}\) RCAC, V, act 3698, 46–48 (p. 47): ‘Actum est autem hoc publice Mauziaci, anno Dominicae incarnationis millesimo nonagesimo quinto, regni vero nostri XXX septimo, indictione III, praesente et confirmante sedis apostolicae legato Hungone, archiepiscopo Lugdunensi et subscribente, presentibus etiam episcopis aliquibus et multis nobilibus. [...] † Philippus. S. Hugonis, apostolicae sedis legati et archiepiscopi Lugdunensis. [...] S. Odonis, ducis Burgundiae. [et al]’. 

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he had, at best, lukewarm relations. Urban complained personally in 1097 to Hugh, archbishop of Lyon, about Odo: ‘Make prompt justice for the abbot Hugh [de Semur], when he speaks to you, on the subject of the damages that the Duke of Burgundy [. . .] caused the monastery of Cluny’.97

Nonetheless, the travails of the First Crusaders were becoming common knowledge in Europe at the start of the twelfth century, and there was growing public pressure for a second force to be sent to assist them.98 It seems likely that Odo, in deepening ecclesiastical trouble and an outlier among the French secular nobility for failing to respond to Clermont, finally decided that the cost of non-participation had become too high. The fact that just five years previously in 1095, this had been an entirely unknown action, and now was the chief option for him to regain lost standing, demonstrates the speed with which this ideal had transformed society. It seems indisputable that Odo’s crimes, even in a Burgundy suffering from the secular nobility viewing church property as a source of quick cash to be forcibly acquired,99 were of a serious nature. The charter given at Cluny in early 1101 made the monastery’s embitterment clear, as it opened: ‘In the name of the Lord. Let all sons of the Holy Church, present and future, know how lord Odo, duke of Burgundy, inflicted countless injuries and bad customs on the place of Gibriacum [Gevrey-Chambertin, dep. Côte d’Or, arr. Dijon]100 before detailing Odo’s injustices. The scribe also remarked, one must suspect rather cynically, on Odo’s change of heart: ‘Thus, finally, with the proposed journey to Jerusalem seized within him, he is now promising a true improvement,

97 HdB, 1, pp. 234–37: ‘Faites rendre prompte justice à l’abbé Hugues, dès qu’il s’adressera à vous, au sujet des dommages que le Duc de Bourgogne [. . .] causent au monastère de Cluny’.


99 Smith, ‘Sine Rege, Sine Principe: Peter the Venerable on Violence in Twelfth-Century Burgundy’, 1–33. See also Dunbabin, France in the Making, pp. 183, 241, for her discussion of Odo I’s bandit activities, apparently deliberately targeted at churchmen rather than his own vassals, and the holding of pilgrims and merchants for ransom by the duke and his retinue.

ordered the Cluniac brethren to come, and demanded that they be ready to carry it out’. Odo’s mistreatment of the monastic community of Gevrey seems to have been the particular sticking point: ‘If a messenger of the duke finds the lord abbot of Cluny, complain to him about the monks of Gevrey’. While reparations were arranged, the scribe could not resist a parting shot: ‘And although it is clearly on behalf of himself and it was confirmed by the persons named above, Odo, that is to say the duke, and his sons Hugh and Henry, and Henry, Prior of Cluny, Bernard, the chamberlain, Troy, the dean, and Geoffrey, obedientiary of the town, let it be sufficient that the adherence to authority has been [...] reinforced’.

Odo’s own explanations for his undertaking, not filtered through a hostile Cluniac scribe, attempted to paint a rosier picture. We next find him at Molesme, asking for the prayers of the religious and the success of his enterprise to Jerusalem. In a second charter at Molesme, Odo claimed to be fired with ‘divine zeal and love of Christianity, and [wants] to go to Jerusalem with the rest of the Christians’, and sponsored the entry of a monk named Rainfred into the religious community there, perhaps to perform the prayers for him. Lastly at Saint-Bénigne, he apologised for more infractions, and abolished unfair customs forced on the monks during the days of his grandfather, Robert I. The number of places at which Odo had to make amends, and the number of documents in which his bad behaviour was referred to, may provide all the insight necessary as to why going on crusade in 1101 had become, in a sense, his only option.

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101 RCAC, V, act 3809, p. 156: ‘Unde tandem aliquando, cum Hierosolimitanum iter proposuisset arripiendum, in se reversus veramque jam promittens emendationem, mandavit ad se venire fratres Cluniacenses, quod ipsi dictassent exequi paratus’.
Having been conspicuously absent from Urban’s initial call for recruits, engaged in a long feud with Cluny that resulted in his excommunication, making enemies of the Burgundian clergy, and facing social pressure for the conquests of the First Crusade to be consolidated and reinforced, Odo’s decision to join up appears as a soundly political manoeuvre, attempting to repair his damaged reputation, and one which at least the unfriendly scribe of Cluny commented on.

After the flurry of documentation accompanying Odo’s departure on crusade, the record goes rather more silent on his voyage to the Holy Land itself. It is possible that he travelled in company with Stephen of Blois and Stephen of Burgundy, but as this is assigned on the basis of the garbled reference by Orderic Vitalis to ‘Duke Stephen’, it becomes difficult to reconcile his absence from all other accounts of the crusade, and the well-attested activities of the other Stephens. It is likely that he did not reach Jerusalem, as Albert of Aachen, otherwise well-informed on the events and personalities of the 1101 crusade, does not mention him at all. Riley-Smith claimed that he died in ‘Asia Minor’ in that same year, once more on unclear evidential grounds, which may be as close as we can come to locating the time and place of Odo’s demise. In any event, he did not return from the Holy Land, being killed either in Tarsus at uncertain date or at the battle of Ramla in May 1102; Petit noted it is certain only that his body was brought back to France later that year and entombed at Cîteaux. The Ramla hypothesis seems unlikely, given Albert’s record of the deaths of Stephen of Blois and Stephen of Burgundy, and it seems odd that he would fail to mention the death of another dignitary of comparable stature. Additionally, the persistent misidentification of counts Rainald and Stephen as ‘dux’ may reflect the fact that Albert was unaware of the actual duke of Burgundy deciding to participate, and assumed that Rainald and Stephen were the holders of the title.

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106 LoPrete, Adela of Blois, p. 114.
Altogether, it appears that Odo’s venture to Jerusalem was neither long nor memorable, and that he died before participating in any action to bring him to the attention of chroniclers (as noted, Orderic Vitalis’s mistaken reference to him as ‘Duke Stephen’ is the only possible mention of him outside his own diplomatic evidence, and the problems with Orderic’s First Crusade information are established). Odo’s son and successor Hugh II confirmed his father’s gifts to the Molesme monks, and vowed amends to Saint-Bénigne for ‘les vexations et incursions faïtes sur les terres de l’abbaye du temps son père’. Additionally, Odo’s daughter Helias had married Bertrand of Toulouse, eldest son of Raymond of Saint-Gilles, who established the county of Tripoli in modern-day Lebanon. But the case of Odo’s other supposed daughter, Florina of Burgundy, is harder to sort out. Her tale follows below in full:

While these many disasters were still fresh, a wicked rumour reached the ears of all the sacred army that after the conquest and capture of Nicaea the son of the king of Denmark, called Svend, high born and very handsome, had been detained for some days and graciously received and honoured by the emperor of Constantinople, after which he continued his journey through the middle of Rum confidently, having heard of the Christians’ victory, bringing fifteen hundred warlike comrades to assist at the siege of Antioch. But [...] as the prince was lying down [...] he was killed by a hail of arrows, and all his company was destroyed by wicked killers in that same martyrdom. For their presence was betrayed by certain wicked Christians, that is to say Greeks, and they were surrounded unwares by Suleyman’s band, which had come together from the mountains. Nevertheless, the king’s son Svend resisted with great strength of arms, scattering many of the Turks with his sword, and his men did so too. But in the end they were weary and stripped of their weapons, and [...] all alike were shot with arrows and killed.

In that same place a certain woman called Florina, daughter of the duke of Burgundy, who used to be married to a prince of Philippi but was now unfortunately widowed, was in that same company of Danes, hoping she would be joined in marriage to that same great nobleman after the triumph of the faithful. But the savagery of the Turks cut off this hope. For they shot her with six arrows as she rode on her mule toward the mountains. Although she was hit she did not fall off her mule; she still thought she could escape death until at last she was overtaken in her flight and put to death with the king’s son.

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109 HdB, 1, act 121, p. 431: ‘[…] conventum fratrum suppliciter deprecantes pro se suaque patris anima’.
110 HdB, 1, act 122, p. 431.
111 SMC, p. 259.
112 AA, pp. 222–25: ‘Inter hce plurima aduersa adhuc recentia, impius rumor aures totius sacre legionis perculit, qualiter post deuictam et captam Niceam filius regis Danorum, Sueo nomine, nobilissimus et forma pulcherrimus,
Among medieval contemporaries, only William of Tyre, influenced by Albert, retold the story of Svend, but omitted Florina.\footnote{Babcock and Krey, in their translation of William, comment on the omission of Florina and note that the story ‘has appealed to the literary and artistic fancy of later ages’. See WT, \textit{A History of Deeds Done beyond the Sea}, pp. 217–18, n. 23, and WT, \textit{Chronicon}, i, pp. 261–62.} In modern historiography, this story has been cited in varying ways. Jonathan Riley-Smith presented it as Florina, already married to Svend of Denmark, accompanying him to the East.\footnote{Riley-Smith, \textit{The First Crusade and the Idea of Crusading}, p. 95.} Ernest Petit adhered more closely to the \textit{Historia}’s account, claiming that Florina ‘épousa un seigneur de Macédoine et pérît en Terre-Sainte,’\footnote{\textit{HdB}, vol I, p. 268.} clearly considering Albert’s Philippi to be the historical city of the same name in present-day Macedonia, but then made no mention of any union with Svend of Denmark. If Florina did accompany a husband to the Holy Land, it would be difficult for her to have been married to a man from Philippi, as it is not an ordinary alliance for the daughter of a French duke, and would have depended on coming into contact with Greek Christians in the course of the crusade. (The other option for the identification of Philippi is Caesarea Philippi, between modern Syria and Israel, but that is also a match that would require the motivating event of the crusade). In 1865, Paul Riant extensively critiqued the implausibilities of the story (as we will examine below) and concluded that both Florina and Svend were likely to be fictional, but that there was a hesitance

\[\text{per aliquot dies retardatus et benigne ab imperatore Constantinopolis suscepsus et commendatus, per suscepsus ad commendatus, per mediam Romaniam securus iter agebat, audita Christianorum uictoria, qui socios mille et quingentos uiros belligeros secum in auxilium obsidionis Antiocie abducebat [...] in grandine sagittarum occissus est, totusque comitatus illius eodem martyrio ab iniquis carnificibus consumptus est. Nec miram si uniueri Turcorum uirius oppressii interierunt. Nam quorundam iniquorum Christianorum, Grecorum scilicet, proditione propalati, improsi a Solimanni manu et montanis adunata circumuuenti sunt. Sed tamen filius regis Sueno multa armorum defensione resistens, multos Turcorum gladio strauit, strauerunt et sui. Sed ad ultimum fessi et armis exuti, ineffabilem aduersariorum multitudinem suffere non ualents, pariter sagittis coniux confici decollati sunt.}\\
\text{Ibidem matrona quedam Florina nomine, filia ducis Burgundie, Philippiensium principi copulata, nunc uero miserabiliter uiduata, in eodem comitatu Danorum erat, sperans post triumphum fidelium tanto et tam nobili sociari marito. Sed spem hanc Turcorum abruptit ferocitas. Nam eandem in mulo sedentem sex fixerunt sagittis, uersus montana fugientem. Que licet percussa non tamen a mulo lapsa est, semper euadere mortem credens, dum tandem cursu superata cum filio regis capitali sententia extincta est’}.
to sacrifice two ‘figures les plus poétiques du Moyen Age scandinave’. He proposed a possible conflation of her identity with the heroine ‘Flore’ from the Le Chevalier au cygne et Godefroid de Bouillon, part of the Old French Crusade Cycle; however, this is too late to explain her original appearance in Albert, writing well before the composition of the main cycle in the fourteenth century. Nonetheless, she may indeed have served as the basis for this figure.

The site of Florina and Svend’s death is given by Albert as ‘in the mountains between Philomelium [Akşehir, Turkey] and Ferna, cities of Rūm’ since she and Svend are depicted as proceeding to the relief of the siege of Antioch (21 October 1097–3 June 1098) after the successful siege of Nicaea (14 May–19 June 1097). This would seem to place their deaths, if Albert’s chronology is to be considered reliable, circa late autumn 1097. But as Odo I did not depart on crusade until 1101, his daughter would not have travelled alone unless already married to Svend of Denmark, which leaves no space to be the widow of a prince of Philippi (and if she had married a man from Macedonia or Palestine prior to the First Crusade, she would already be in the East, but as noted, it is extremely unlikely). At the very least, it seems impossible for her to have been married to both of these men, and that Albert, even if he was partially correct in identifying her as the intended or actual wife of Svend of Denmark, was mistaken in assigning

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116 Paul Riant, Expéditions et pèlerinages des Scandinaives en Terre Sainte au temps des croisades (Paris, 1865), p. 151. The present analysis was completed independently of Riant’s, hence lending some legitimacy to the similarity of the conclusions, especially as his critique has not been taken up in English-language scholarship.

117 Riant, Expéditions et pèlerinages des Scandinaives, p. 148. See Le Chevalier au cygne et Godefroid de Bouillon, poème historique, ed. by Frédéric Reiffenberg (Brussels, 1846), the edition cited by Riant, in which Florie is described as ‘fille de la reine Calabrie’ (p. 11) and plays a major role. The cycle is available in modern critical editions, ex. The Old French Crusade Cycle, Vol. II: Le Chevalier au Cygne and La Fin d’Elia, ed. by Jan A. Nelson (Tuscaloosa, AL: University of Alabama Press, 1985), and The Old French Crusade Cycle Vol. X: Godefroi de Buillon, ed. by Jan Boyd Roberts (Tuscaloosa, AL: University of Alabama Press, 1996).

118 AA, p. 222: ‘[…] inter Finiminis et Fernam, urbes Romanie hospitatus’.

119 For comparison, Alberic of Trois-Fontaines, a chronicler located geographically close to Burgundy and who often reported on their activities, discusses the siege of Nicaea in 1097 and comments on the presence of Welf of Burgundy, a figure we have seen in Albert, as commander of the city of Adana. No mention, however, is made of Florina. See Alberic of Trois-Fontaines, ‘Chronica Alberici Monachi Trium Fontium’, in MGH (Hanover: Hahn, 1874), XXIII: ‘Nicaea vero civitas a Constantino senior Augusto emancipata fuit a jurisdictione Nichomedie,’ p. 806, line 27, and ‘Guelpho Burgundio Turcis iectis capit Adamam civitatem,’ p. 807, line 2.
her a prior first marriage in the East, an error which Petit and Bouchard replicated. As we have seen, the alleged Florina’s sister Helias married the son of the count of Toulouse (a much more conventional match for a daughter of Burgundy), who did not pursue his inheritance in the Holy Land until the early twelfth century. Given the difficulties in Albert’s identification of Florina’s husband(s), the lack of any other source to corroborate his account, and the fact that he describes her only as ‘daughter of the duke of Burgundy’, even the least sceptical approach must wonder if Albert is confusing her story with someone else’s, or if she was a daughter of the comital Burgundians – especially as Odo’s wife, Sibylla, was the sister of counts Rainald and Stephen.

Nor can Albert be trusted on who the duke of Burgundy actually is, as he (as seen above) refers to Rainald II and Stephen I, counts of Burgundy and sons of William Tête-Hardi, by that title throughout. Simply adjusting Florina’s provenance from ducal to comital Burgundy may solve the problem at first glance, but still leaves the task of ascertaining her identity. This is the task that four Danish scholars took in their recent treatment of Danish participation in the crusades, referring to Florina as “[Svend’s] betrothed, the beautiful Florina, daughter of a Burgundian count”. Even allowing for the fact that Albert is mistaken on this point, this still does not offer any better evidence, and demonstrates the historiographic tendency to adjust small aspects of the story without going through it on a comprehensive level. While they rebutted claims that Svend himself was fictional, they made no further attempt to determine the historicity of Florina, and otherwise accepted her existence at face value. Furthermore, chronology

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120 SMC, p. 259.
121 Ane L. Bysted, Carsten Selch Jensen, Kurt Villads Jensen, and John H. Lind, Jerusalem in the North: Denmark and the Baltic Crusades, 1100-1522 (Turnhout: Brepols, 2012), p. 17. Making Stephen and his wife, Beatrice of Lorraine, Florina’s parents does not fit either, as their four children are likewise accounted for, and with Stephen’s own well-attested crusade participation, there is once more the question of why Florina would not arise in that context. Stephen was part of a large and influential family with many brothers, but it becomes even more of a stretch to apply ‘duke of Burgundy’ to one of them. See e.g. Mary Stroll, Calixtus the Second (Leiden: Brill, 2004), p. 9.
122 Bysted et al., p. 19. The medieval epic tradition surrounding Svend’s death is examined in Franco Pignatti, ‘La morte di Sveno (Gerusalemme liberata VIII, 5-40) e la tradizione epico-cavalleresca medievale’, Giornale storico
militates against Florina. Odo and Sibylla were married in 1080, the year their first child, Helias, was born, meaning that if we assign Florina a birthdate of c.1082–83 (Odo’s son and successor, Hugh, was born in 1084) she could have been no older than 14 in 1097, making a first marriage and widowhood even more unlikely. Florina’s supposed fiancé, Svend of Denmark, was probably born c. 1050,123 making him at least thirty years her senior, and while many women did accompany their husbands to the East, it is difficult to imagine that a grown man and warrior in his forties would have gone to the trouble of bringing along a barely pubescent bride, let alone exposing her to active combat.124

Lastly, there is the fact that ‘Florina’ is the name of a city in Macedonia, which has existed since at least the early Byzantine period (founded in turn on a much older settlement of the same name)125 and thus well before the crusades. The original Greek name, Χλέρινον (Chlérinon, from chlóros, χλωρός or ‘green’) was Latinised as ‘Florinon’ or ‘Florina’126 and this identification allows some threads to be pulled together. The name of the princess has apparently been borrowed from the city, and ‘a prince of Philippi,’ thus presumably also from Macedonia, is

123 Due to the difficulty of assigning precise dates for the many children of King Svein Estridsen, Svend the Crusader’s father, there is no way to be certain. However, as Niels of Denmark (born c. 1063) is generally regarded as being King Svein’s youngest son, Svend the Crusader was certainly born no later than that, and c. 1050 fits with the births of Svein’s sons in the 1040s-50s. See Lektor Blomme, ‘Svend 2. Estridsen’, GylENDAL ÂbNE encyKlOpEdI <http://denstredanske.dk/Danmarks_geografi_og_historie/Danmarks_historie/Danmark_f%C3%B8r_Reformationen/Svend_2._Estridsen> and Carl Frederik Bricka, “Svend Tveskjæg”, in Dansk Biografisk Lexikon (Project Runeberg [online], 1887) <http://runeberg.org/dlb/17/0005.html>, [accessed 4-11-2017].
used as her first husband. It is possible that the story originated during the crusaders’ stopovers in Byzantium in 1096 or 1101, and Albert’s claim of ‘wicked Christians, that is to say Greeks’ betraying Svend and Florina becomes particularly interesting. It could function as an early piece of anti-Greek propaganda (as the tension would certainly remain explicit throughout the crusades). Who first concocted this story, or transmitted it to Albert, we cannot be sure, though we can presume that he felt it reliable (or instructive) enough to include. Even he himself, however, hedged it by calling it a ‘wicked rumour’, so perhaps he also had some doubts.¹²⁷

Natasha Hodgson mentioned Florina briefly in *Women, Crusading, and the Holy Land in Historical Narrative*, though she did not treat the inconsistencies around her existence, and speculated that Albert intended it as a cautionary tale about the fate of women who embarked on crusade, as the other women in his account often do not end up in happy circumstances.¹²⁸ There is also the perennial stylistic and moralistic appeal of portraying the mistreatment of women and children by the enemy, or in Florina’s case, shaming the men refusing to participate in the crusade by pointing out that even a young noblewoman was supposedly doing so (and dying in battle) while they were not. Thus it is fairly easy to understand Florina’s function in Albert’s work, whilst in our own time, she is perhaps read more affirmatively as an example of an overlooked crusading heroine crowded out of male historical memory. Nonetheless, as can be concluded here, on closest inspection, the entire story falls apart.¹²⁹ Florina is almost certainly a

¹²⁷ Christopher Tyerman comments on Albert’s narrative style in the context of his treatment of Florina: ‘[…] or Albert of Aachen’s penchant for the exotic anecdote, such as Godfrey of Bouillon’s encounter with a bear in Anatolia or the heroic deaths of Sven of Denmark and his intended, Florina of Burgundy’. Christopher Tyerman, *The Debate on the Crusades 1099-2010* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), p. 11.


¹²⁹ For comparison, Albert also reports on the presence (and death in battle) of another crusading noblewoman whose origins and existence can be more easily verified: Ida, widow of Leopold II of Austria, who led her own army to the Holy Land alongside Welf of Bavaria and other German magnates in 1101. Despite similar colourful legends surrounding her fate, Albert says only that she was ‘either captured or taken away, or [torn] limb from limb by the hooves of so many thousand horses’. AA, p. 631; see also *Database of Crusaders to the Holy Land*, ‘Ida of Cham’,
fictional character, but that should not prevent her from serving as a unique and compelling figure in questions surrounding the demographics of crusade participation and gendered appraisals of medieval and modern warfare. Moreover, while she herself may be apocryphal, other women were not, and still have generally not received proper study and historiographical approach. To put it succinctly, in considering Florina’s popularity in historic-fictional retelling, we should make a better effort to examine her real-life counterparts, and to allow for the existence of crusading masculinities (and femininities) beyond the trite and traditional.

Overall in this chapter, we have analysed Burgundian crusading involvement in 1096–1101, and specifically the contrast between participation in the two expeditions. It thus is pertinent to return to the question of whether we can conclude anything about a particularly Burgundian experience of crusading, and its implications for a critical hermeneutic of the First Crusade. We have seen that when they did participate in 1096, the documented crusaders – Bernard and Odo of Mâcon, Achard of Montmerle, Gilbert of Traves, and Oliver of Jussey – did so for fairly orthodox reasons, in response to the upwelling of popular piety and militarism engendered by Pope Urban II’s call at Clermont. They made preparations at religious houses, fought in battle, in some cases were killed, and were memorialised by chroniclers, particularly Achard. But due to the paucity of their numbers, and the lack of any major secular leader, they seem to have been more mobile within the crusading army than men from other regions of France, who were more closely identified with the group led by their own count or duke. They were probably required to self-finance their journeys, and we cannot be sure whether they


130 Some effort is beginning to be made to address this; apart from Hodgson’s book, see *Gendering the Crusades*, ed. by Susan Edgington and Sarah Lambert (Cardiff: University of Wales Press, 2001).
survived; Achard and Gilbert, at least, did not. This was repeated on a much greater scale in 1101, which saw the death of two counts (Rainald and Stephen) their younger brother and archbishop of Besançon (Hugh), the duke (Odo) and considerable misadventure and financial ruin for William of Nevers. Indeed, while others were quicker to respond to the initial summons, it can be argued that no other province of France suffered such a high toll on its secular leadership in the first decade of the crusades, as nearly the entire top tier was wiped out.

This leads into the second question of the importance of Burgundy in an overall approach to the First Crusade. It is our contention that Burgundy’s very low involvement in 1096, despite the Cluniac connections of Pope Urban II, highlights the fact both that Urban expected the expedition to be a professional military (rather than popular religious) one, and that he did not anticipate Cluny, despite its fame and influence, as a natural partner. Next, while we have examined some potential reasons for Odo I to withhold participation, it remains the case that the counts of Maine and Anjou and the duke of Aquitaine, who did not join in 1096 either, have recorded acknowledgement or assistance of the movement, whereas Odo does not. Thus, despite its family connections to the French crown, its status as Urban II’s prior home base, and its later extensive involvement, Burgundy does in fact constitute a unique case in the First Crusade, and serves as an important counterweight to any notion that French participation was universal throughout every region. At the very least, it should induce scholars to look for the underlying political, familial, and contextual clues, such as those we have used to consider Odo I, in assessing the motives and environment in which eleventh and twelfth-century individuals chose to crusade. After 1101, the age of crusading was just beginning, and Burgundy would once more find itself involved in the expeditions of the twelfth century, to which we now turn.
CHAPTER THREE
Transforming Traditions: The Burgundian Second Crusade, 1119–49

Entering the twelfth century, we must take into account both the shifting political landscape of France and the ways in which Western Europe’s interest in crusading, after the capture of Jerusalem and establishment of a Christian kingdom in 1099, developed to the point of Louis VII taking the cross in 1146, the first king of France to do so. The Second Crusade itself was an infamous disaster that would leave its most zealous proponent, Bernard of Clairvaux, shaken and disillusioned, but in investigating it from a specifically Burgundian perspective, we must do more than replay this central theme. The focus is less on providing an overall recounting of events, but rather in investigating the second generation of Burgundian crusaders, if there was a developing tradition of crusading as a repeatable action, and how Burgundy and France’s political relationships evolved as a result. The Second Crusade was built within a distinctly Burgundian religious, social, and physical space, among the kinship networks and monastic connections of Bernard of Clairvaux and his cousin Godfrey, bishop of Langres, and important groundwork was previously laid by Pope Calixtus II and Peter the Venerable. Nonetheless, it is noteworthy in that respect that the duke of Burgundy himself, Odo II, once more did not participate. Some identifiable vassals accompanied Louis VII, but as with his namesake grandfather during the First Crusade, Odo neither took the cross nor recorded any substantial interest in the expedition. Political relations between king and duke were quite cool at the time, but the Second Crusade stands in stark contrast to the Third, forty years later, where Louis’ son Philip II was able to compel Odo’s son Hugh III to accompany him despite similar bad relations. This reinforces our contention that 1187 marked a pivotal moment in the Burgundian crusading experience, and that throughout the first half of the twelfth century, Burgundy, although remaining in the Capetian kings’ general orbit, was by no means a mere extension of their polity.
I. Dukes, Counts, and Kings: Political Change and Context, 1102–45

The duke of Burgundy for the first half of the twelfth century was Hugh II, son of Odo I, who inherited the title after his father’s death on the crusade of 1101. He ruled for over forty years (1102–43) and with his wife, Matilda of Mayenne, had six sons and four daughters. The eldest son succeeded his father as Odo II (r. 1143–62) and two of the younger sons became bishop of Autun; Robert briefly in 1140, and Henry in 1148–70. Another, Walter, served as archbishop of Besançon (1162–63) and bishop of Langres (1163–79); this episcopal demotion is unusual and the reasons for it are not clear.¹ Hugh and Matilda’s daughters became the wives of regional French lords, with the exception of the second-youngest, Sybil, who married Roger II of Sicily in 1149 but died a year later. This match is interesting, given Roger’s kingly rank, involvement with the Second Crusade, and his own intrigues against Manuel I Komnenos, the Byzantine emperor, with the supposed possibility of Roger launching a new crusade against the Greeks.² It is thus worthwhile to speculate on what impelled him to take a second wife from Burgundy.

There was no apparent military alliance between central France and southern Italy, and the marriage took place before Louis VII and Eleanor of Aquitaine arrived in Sicily in 1149 on their return from the Holy Land, arguing a pre-existing interest. The French crown did support the kingdom of Sicily in its conflict against the Byzantine empire, which caused problems for Louis on the way home, and Roger’s first wife, Elvira, was another daughter of Alfonso VI of Castile-León, whose extensive Burgundian connections were documented in chapter 1.³ Thus either Roger was aware of the Burgundian linkage from the family of his first wife, or saw marrying

¹ SMC, p. 260.
³ This Elvira should not be confused with her illegitimate half-sister of the same name, the wife of Raymond of Toulouse. See Hubert Houben, Roger II of Sicily: Ruler Between East and West, trans. by Graham A. Loud and Diane Milburn (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), p. 65.
the sister of the duke of Burgundy (Odo II having succeeded his father after Hugh II’s death in 1143) as a sound move to improve his relationship with France. The marriage did not last long, given Sibyl’s death in 1150, but its existence is noteworthy nonetheless.

During his rule, therefore, Hugh II seems to have followed his father Odo I’s precedent in maintaining ties with the crown of France, but reformed the relationship with his clergy and barons. In Petit’s view, his informal nickname of ‘the Peaceful’ was well merited, as he took the initiative to settle disputes between lay and clerical vassals, and did not overtly interfere in their affairs.⁴ Of course, a feudal lord in the twelfth century could never remain entirely above such territorial and political conflicts, and nor should this be taken to imply that Burgundy had suddenly become a calm and settled place after decades of upheaval. Complaints about bad government and robber barons continue to appear,⁵ and as discussed in chapter 1, Hugh’s marriage to Matilda of Mayenne, the daughter of a nearby French regional lord instead of the dukes and kings that an earlier generation of the family had managed to attract, may be a reflection of the duchy’s disordered and weakened state at the time he took over in 1102.

Nonetheless, there seems to have been a tangible change in the political atmosphere after the turbulent reigns of Robert I and Odo I. There is more sense of a ducal ‘Burgundy’ as an identifiable entity, operating in a broader political context, and one to which Hugh himself contributed. Soon after his accession, we find him re-establishing good relations with the monks of Saint-Bénigne of Dijon, and a passage in the relevant charter directly addressed his father’s violent tenure and the disruption that had attended the beginning of Capetian rule in Burgundy.⁶

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⁴ *HdB*, II, p. 6: ‘Pendant ce temps, Hugues, duc de Bourgogne, continuait à mériter le surnom de Pacifique, et ne parait avec sa cour, dans les affaires de la province, que dans des plaids où s’agitent des discussions entre les barons et les monastères’.


⁶ *CSBD*, II, p. 181: ‘Et quia eodem violentie tempore ducatus patris mei maxime increverant, cum mihi obitum ejus certi nuncii detulissent, tum pro remedio anime ipsius et omnium antecessorum meorum, tum etiam pro me ipso . . .’
One emerges with the impression that Hugh was keen to stress his difference from his father, and signal the possibility of a stronger relationship between duke and church. Nor was this an isolated appearance, as the next several documents in the cartulary refer to Hugh’s acts in the early years of his reign, granting privileges to the inhabitants of Saint-Bénigne, instituting an annual celebration of St John’s feast-day (24 June) in partnership with the abbot Jarenton, and splitting the proceeds, even going so far as to insist that the duke could not alter the arrangements without the consent of the monks – all actions that would have been, to say the least, unlikely in his father’s day.\footnote{CSBD, \textit{il}, acts 403-406, pp. 182–84.} This appears as at least a somewhat sincere effort on Hugh’s part. Not long later, we find him disowning an underling guilty of an offence against Saint-Bénigne, in a document given in the abbot’s own rooms.\footnote{CSBD, \textit{il}, act 418, p. 196.} We also find him solemnly vowing to protect the basilica on the occasion of Pope Paschal II’s visit in 1107,\footnote{CSBD, \textit{il}, act 419, p. 196.} as well as return visits in later years, covering until at least 1120–24. Overall, Hugh’s relationship with Saint-Bénigne makes clear that he was aware of the dubious precedent his forebears had set in their religious governance, and put some effort into correcting it. The charter evidence (albeit from one religious house in the dukes’ capital city) thus offers some basis for a new style of Burgundian governance under Hugh, or at least the duke’s eagerness to construct such an impression through a record of performative patronage. Of course, it is difficult to evaluate how successfully it was put into practice, and it is again worthy of caveat that the cited examples are from Saint-Bénigne alone, but Hugh’s overall reputation does not lend itself to the impression that he was pursuing warfare or private feuds elsewhere. He was also able to purchase lands from his vassals, such as his acquisition of Le Châtelet (dep. Cher, arr. Saint-Amand-Montrond) from Savaric of Donzy in 1113, which allowed for the expansion of the duke’s authority, absent since the end of the tenth
century, into the county of Chalon.\textsuperscript{10} The Burgundian dukes beginning with Hugh II also displayed an unusual degree of control over their major vassals, who generally held large amounts of land in their own right and depended on the dukes only for castles.\textsuperscript{11} K.F. Werner has also argued for an emerging sense of French cohesion in the early twelfth century, even if Louis VI’s practical authority remained limited in scope.\textsuperscript{12}

Additionally, after the events of 1066 and the dukes of Normandy becoming the kings of England, the most ambitious and notorious enemies of French kings and regional lords had permanently changed. The sons of William the Conqueror had to negotiate the difficult position of being a vassal to one king while also holding a crown in their own right, and they tended to follow their father’s solution in such matters. Suger, abbot of Saint-Denis and biographer of Louis VI (the Fat), recorded the duke of Burgundy and the count of Nevers fighting together in Louis’s army, with other leading French magnates,\textsuperscript{13} against an attempted invasion by Holy Roman Emperor Henry V (r. 1111–25) in the summer of 1124.\textsuperscript{14} At the time, Henry V was King Henry I of England’s son-in-law, and this enterprise was probably in support of Henry I’s ongoing battles with Louis to assert more authority in France. More interestingly, however, Suger claimed that ‘when the Germans were cut off and unable to flee, the French could attack,

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\textsuperscript{10} Dunbabin, \textit{France in the Making}, p. 307. \\
\textsuperscript{11} Dunbabin, \textit{France in the Making}, p. 308. \\
\textsuperscript{12} Werner, ‘Kingdom and Principality in France’, pp. 266–68. \\
\textsuperscript{13} Alongside them, Suger cites the presence of Theobald of Blois, Hugh of Troyes, Ralph of Vermandois, men from Ponthieu, Amiens, and Beauvais, and the count of Flanders (Charles the Good). He explains that the dukes of Brittany and Aquitaine and the count of Anjou would have participated as well, but were prevented by constraints of time and distance. While Suger is often hyperbolic about the accomplishments of the French kings, it does seem in this case that he was correct; Louis VI’s ability to gather his vassals from across the country was the first successful muster of this nature in several centuries, and argues for a considerable strengthening in royal authority and respect. Suger, \textit{The Deeds of Louis the Fat}/\textit{Vita Ludovici Grossi Regis}, trans. by Richard Cusimano and John Moorhead (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 1992), pp. 129–30, n. 129d. \\
\textsuperscript{14} Suger, \textit{Louis the Fat}, p. 130. We also find Hugh of Burgundy and William of Nevers appearing in a charter given by Hugh I of Troyes, count of Champagne, upon his return from the Holy Land in 1108, confirming privileges to the abbey of Molesme. \textit{CAM}, II, act 173: ‘ego ipse cum illustribus viris Hugone Borrello duce Burgundie, Willelmo Niverensi comite [. . .] Actum est hoc et confirmatum apud Castellionem super Sequanam anno ab incarnatione Domini M°. C°. VIII°., testibus hiis: Willelmo Niverensi [et al.]’
\end{flushright}
overthrow, and slaughter them without mercy as if they were Saracens [emphasis mine]. The unburied bodies of the barbarians would be abandoned to wolves and ravens [. . .] and such great slaughter and cruelty would be justified because the land was being defended’.\(^\text{15}\)

While it is rather early to think of the crusading sanction being extended to misbehaving or unchristian European princes, it is clear that Suger was drawing an explicit parallel between the Germans (unjustly invading French lands, and being appropriately punished) and the Saracens (unjustly invading Christian lands, and being appropriately punished). In both cases, whatever treatment the French meted out was merited, as the integrity of the kingdom was at stake. Suger himself served as regent of France during Louis VII’s absence on the Second Crusade, and the king often wrote to him to provide updates on the campaign, so he was certainly well-connected to the emerging realm of crusade policy and rhetoric. This equivalence of Germans with Saracens also fits within the transformation and expansion of the identification of Christendom’s enemies that took place between the First and Second Crusades. After an undertaking largely targeted at the Turks in a limited geographical area of the Near East, it had slowly developed into ‘a “global” enterprise with expeditions against the Muslims in Syria, in the Iberian peninsula, and against the pagan Slavs east of the river Elbe’.\(^\text{16}\) For Suger to use this comparison is thus congruent with the changing mind-set: crusade action could possibly be undertaken in other regions than the Holy Land, and against a broader variety of enemies.


Evidence of Burgundy’s evolving relationship with the crown of France, or what Jean Richard termed ‘les débuts de l’infiltration royale en Bourgogne du sud’, marking a period of revived royal authority after its virtual disappearance in the eleventh century, also appeared in the cartulary of Cluny. In an act of 1119, Louis VI placed the monastery under his personal protection, and vowed that this pledge would be upheld by his successors. Furthermore, this royal warrant extended not merely to Cluny, but to all its dependent priories in the kingdom of France, including many in Burgundy, which Richard listed as Saint-Thibault-en-Auxois, Saint-Margarite-lez-Beaune, Fleury-sur-Ouche, Saint-Vivant de Vergy, Trouhaut, Mesvres, Bourbon-Lancy, Paray-le-Monial, and Marcigny-sur-Loire. The charter itself enumerated several more, including two in Nevers and one near Donzy; William II, count of Nevers, was specifically listed as a faithful man whom the king expected to help keep these promises. William himself, undaunted by his terrible experience on the crusade of 1101, would later support the Second Crusade and send two of his sons to fight on it, one of whom died. It is, however, somewhat ironic to discover him positioned as the guarantor of a monastery’s rights. It was the count’s long-running feud with Vézelay that dominated the monastery’s politics in the 1140s–50s, and as a result, the Vézelay chronicle holds a very dim view of him.

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18 *RCAC*, v. act 3943, pp. 295–98 (p. 296); ‘... monasterium Cluniacense, nobilius membrum nostri regni, cum omnibus prioratibus, possessionibus et pertinentiis suis in regno nostro constitutis, in nostra et successorum nostrorum regum Francie defensione, garda et tutela recipimus.’ Dunbabin saw this as demonstrative of Cluny’s initiative in appealing for the king for protection, rather than Louis’ effective power, but the act proved consequential, as Louis VII, bound by the promises of his father, mounted two campaigns in Burgundy in 1166 and 1171 to defend Cluny. See Dunbabin, *France in the Making*, pp. 261, 265.
We shall return to the counts of Nevers later, but for the moment, this sufficiently illustrates the state of local and regional politics. Altogether, we can infer that the political relationship between king and duke continued, for the first decades of the twelfth century, to be fairly good. The long reigns of Louis VI (29 years) and Hugh II (41 years) provided some stability for both polities, and as noted, the chief enemy for royal France in this period was Henry I (r. 1100–35), king of England and duke of Normandy. Yet when the Second Crusade was called in 1145–46, neither Louis nor Hugh were still alive, having been succeeded by their respective sons: Louis VII in 1137 and Odo II in 1143. Odo II followed his grandfather’s example in taking no apparent part in the enterprise, and without an explicitly recorded reason. However, it is useful to consider the state of the French principalities, which had substantially changed from their relatively independent and individuated circumstances fifty years previously. Louis VII was married to Eleanor and thus was duke of Aquitaine. Stephen, king of England (r. 1135–54), was the count of Boulogne by marriage and engaged in the English civil war known as the Anarchy with Empress Matilda, whose second husband Geoffrey Plantagenet, count of Anjou and Maine, had recently (1144) conquered Normandy in her right. Conan III, duke of Brittany, had allied with Stephen against his traditional Norman and Angevin rivals. Thierry, count of Flanders, was a devoted crusader who accompanied Louis, but otherwise there was scant desire among the first-rank nobility of France, deeply involved in the war in England, to

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22 Louis also had to do battle against the powerful castellan families in the Île-de-France, who were resistant to having their wings clipped by a resurgent Capetian monarchy. See Elizabeth M. Hallam and Judith Everard, *Capetian France 987-1328*, 2nd ed. (Harlow: Longman, 2001), p. 150.
leave the country for several years. It is unclear if Odo had some investment in the conflict, or if he, only three years into his rule as duke, had enough to manage at home.

With this examination of ducal Burgundy concluded, it is time to turn briefly to the counts. As noted, comital Burgundy suffered a particularly high toll on its secular leadership during the crusade of 1101, losing the three brothers Rainald II, Stephen I, and Hugh of Besançon, and its succession became unsettled as a result. Guy of Vienne, the future Pope Calixtus II, acted as regent for his underage nephews, Stephen’s sons, who included Rainald III, count of Burgundy (r. 1127–48) and William III, count of Mâcon (r. 1127–56); they inherited the latter title after their cousins, Rainald II’s sons, all died in the mid-1120s.25 William III followed his father’s example by travelling on the Second Crusade, though he, unlike Stephen, made it back – at least the first time. He made a return trip to the Holy Land in 1156, and died there.26 He had been serving as regent for his niece Beatrice, Rainald III’s daughter. She was three when her father died in 1148, and as his only child, became heiress to the county of Burgundy.

After her uncle William’s death in 1156, Beatrice was married, at the age of about eleven, to Frederick Barbarossa, Holy Roman Emperor (r. 1155–90), who claimed the old kingdom of Burgundy. By this alliance, Barbarossa became count of Burgundy in jure uxoris, and remained so until shortly before his death in 1190. Barbarossa’s sons by Beatrice included Frederick VI, duke of Swabia; Henry VI, Holy Roman Emperor; Philip of Swabia, king of Germany; and Otto, count of Burgundy, who took the title on his mother’s death in 1184, but was killed in 1200.27 (Beatrice herself refers to ‘nos et successores nostros comites Burgundie’ in a charter of 1181.)28

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25 SMC, p. 275.
26 SMC, pp. 275–77.
27 See Gilbert of Mons, Chronicle of Hainaut, trans. by Laura Napran (Woodbridge: The Boydell Press, 2005), pp. 54–55, for a brief account of Barbarossa’s early career, Burgundian marriage, and a list of his and Beatrice’s sons.
28 Cartulaire des comtes de Bourgogne (1166-1321), ed. by Jules Gauthier and Roger de Lurion (Besançon: Jacquin, 1908), p. 3.
Otto was also succeeded by an underage daughter, but by the early thirteenth century the line had returned to the descendants of William III, who were allowed to claim the title of ‘count of Burgundy’ throughout the twelfth century. This is chronologically ahead of our present purposes, but it demonstrates that while the succession of ducal Burgundy had become fairly settled by this point, transmitting steadily from father to son, the succession of comital Burgundy fluctuated between cousins, brothers, daughters, and marriages, and this disorder was originally engendered by the death of the entire first rank of its leadership in 1102.

Nonetheless, these daughters hold possibly considerable relevance for the development of crusade traditions in Burgundy. Jonathan Riley-Smith highlighted the comital family of Burgundy as one in which his favoured theme of crusading traditions could be most easily glimpsed, and noted that three daughters (Sibylla, Gisela, and Clemence) of William Tête-Hardi were married to First/1101 Crusaders (Odo I of Burgundy, Humbert II of Savoy, and Robert II of Flanders, respectively), their sons and grandsons numbered eight Second Crusaders, and their daughters and granddaughters were married to four more. Riley-Smith hypothesised that these women played an active part in motivating the male members of their family to respond to crusade appeals, and this might serve to explain the high levels of participation in certain families across generations. Nicholas Paul has more recently studied the transmission of crusading traditions and the various types of material and memorial culture surrounding particular families. We have no evidence of particular physical objects that might have been associated with the counts of Burgundy’s crusading memory, such as relics, texts, or valuable

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items. However, William III of Mâcon’s return to the Holy Land in 1156 took place at a time when twelfth-century writers and familial dynastic scribes were increasingly rediscovering the tradition of pilgrimages to Jerusalem in the early eleventh century, before the crusades.\(^{33}\) It is therefore plausible that even after the failed Second Crusade, the counts of Burgundy retained enough of an ancestral orientation to the Holy Land to compel William to return, perhaps in an attempt to reconfigure family memory more positively for future generations, but like his father Stephen I, he died there. Additionally William’s aunt Clemence, countess of Flanders, had been left in charge of the county while her husband Robert II was on the First Crusade, and ensured that her son, Baldwin VII, was appropriately aware of his father’s example and memory.\(^{34}\) This would seem to concord rather well with Riley-Smith’s contention that the women of comital Burgundy served as guardians of crusading tradition among both their natal and marital families, though we cannot trace the ultimate source, methods, or rhetoric of this tradition, or if it was similar to or different from those of other regional noblewomen.

This challenges the portrait presented by the sources, that women were an obstacle to the crusade movement either by discouraging men from leaving for the Holy Land in the first place, or distracting them with sexual temptations once they were there – especially after the Second Crusade’s failure was blamed on Eleanor of Aquitaine’s behaviour, rather than Louis VII’s military ineptitude and its general disorganisation and internal difficulties.\(^{35}\) Natasha Hodgson has studied this in detail, examining the tension around the presence of women for crusading chroniclers, and the complex role that the wives, daughters, and mothers of crusaders played.

\(^{33}\) Paul, *To Follow in their Footsteps*, p. 172. He considers the rhetorical utility of ancestors on pilgrimage in regard to Anjou, Normandy, and Flanders-Hainaut (‘Pilgrim Forefathers’, pp. 176–87). In some sense, if one had not had an ancestor on the First Crusade, a pilgrim journey to Jerusalem was an acceptable alternative.

\(^{34}\) Paul, *To Follow in their Footsteps*, pp. 40, 44.

both outside and inside an expedition.\textsuperscript{36} This accords interestingly with the work of Anne E. Lester, who investigated crusader families in Champagne in the thirteenth century, and concluded that the women became Cistercian nuns in an attempt to share the same spiritual rigour and experience as their menfolk travelling to the Holy Land.\textsuperscript{37} As a result, and as Riley-Smith suggested, the high numbers of crusaders in some families and not in others may not be simply random, but reflect a dynamic participation and conscious influence by the women, who had to find other ways of involving themselves in a movement that by its nature was designed for knights and soldiers.\textsuperscript{38} Therefore, the well-known example of Adela of Blois might not be unique in terms of how the female family members of crusaders saw it as their responsibility to protect and promote dynastic honour, and to use the example of one generation to inspire the next.\textsuperscript{39}

Overall, we have seen that while the relationship between the dukes of Burgundy and the kings of France remained cordial, and much improved from its previous turbulence in the eleventh century, Odo II followed his predecessors’ lead in refraining from participation on the Second Crusade. The counts of Burgundy, meanwhile, could claim more crusaders among their family networks, but had also seen an oft-changing succession and became once more a direct fief of the Holy Roman Empire, in comparison to the relative political stability finally beginning to prevail in ducal Burgundy. With that, we turn to the growth of the crusading movement between 1099–1146, and Burgundian agency, particularly that of Pope Calixtus II, in doing so. Lastly, a secular king (Louis VII) serving as leader of a religious crusade provided new questions for its development, and one in which Burgundy played a central – indeed, pre-eminent – part.

\textsuperscript{39} See LoPrete, Adela of Blois, p. 114.
II. Canon Law and Crusader-Kings: Creating a New Political Paradigm

The common terminology of ‘First’, ‘Second’, ‘Third’, etc. Crusades can sometimes obscure the informal or private crusading activities that took place between the capture of Jerusalem in 1099 and the call in 1145 to reclaim the county of Edessa from its conquest by Imad ad-Dīn Zengi (r. 1127–46), the motivating event of the Second Crusade.\(^\text{40}\) While it is arguably inaccurate to term these ventures ‘crusades’ in the strictest sense, it likewise cannot be quite accurate to think of them as taking place outside the wider context. We have already seen how the disastrous crusade of 1101 was organised in an attempt to shore up the newfound Christian conquests, and King Sigurd I of Norway led an expedition in 1107–10, where he met Baldwin I of Jerusalem and assisted in capturing the city of Sidon.\(^\text{41}\) The First Crusade leaders who had become rulers of the Holy Land, particularly the ambitious Bohemund I of Antioch, were engaged in political manoeuvring and intrigue, and there was, at least at first, continued interest in supporting the new crusader states. Pope Paschal II presented Bohemund with a papal banner and called for a new ‘via sancti sepulchri’ in 1106, though little came of it.\(^\text{42}\)

More interesting, however, is the development of a long-term response, the idea of how the lessons of the First Crusade could be applied, and the challenges that resulted. Thus it is instructive to consider the efforts of Pope Calixtus II (r. 1119–24), born Guy of Burgundy, to launch a new crusade in the 1120s and establish canon law for the treatment of Jews in Europe. We have encountered Calixtus in terms of his relationship to Counts Rainald II and Stephen I and Archbishop Hugh of Besançon, as he was their younger brother. He was elected pope in

\(^{40}\) See James Doherty, Nicholas Paul, et al., *The Independent Crusaders Mapping Project* (Center for Medieval Studies, Fordham University) [https://independentcrusadersproject.ace.fordham.edu/] [accessed 20-10-2018]


1119, and Suger was full of praise for him, reinforcing his connection to the royal family as
Queen Adelaide’s uncle (her mother was Calixtus’ sister, Gisela of Burgundy): ‘Raised up to so
lofty a dignity, [Calixtus] safeguarded the rights of the church splendidly, humbly, and bravely,
and helped by the love and service of the lord king Louis and his own niece, the noble queen
Adelaide, he was better able to take care of the church’. Likewise, Calixtus took a warm,
avuncular tone in his letters to Louis, closing at least two with greetings sent to Adelaide and the
royal children, underscoring the familial relationship with the French monarchy.

One of Calixtus’ first acts as pope was to respond to a military disaster in the Holy Land:
the Battle of the Field of Blood or ‘Ager Sanguinis’, which, on 28 June 1119, saw a Frankish
army from Antioch decisively defeated by a Muslim army from Aleppo. This prompted the new
king of Jerusalem, Baldwin II (r. 1118–31) to formally request assistance from the papacy and
the doge of Venice, Dominico Michiel, at a council in Nablus on 23 January 1120. The
response in both cases was swift. After the Venetians had been read the letters of appeal from
Rome and Jerusalem, they took the cross, and Calixtus sent a consecrated papal banner as signal
of his approval. Riley-Smith dated these transactions to sometime potentially in the autumn of

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43 Vie de Louis VI le Gros, pp. 203-04: ‘Sublimatus itaque tante celsitudinis dignitate, gloriose, humiditer, sed
strenue ecclesie jura disponens, amore et servitio domini Ludovici regis et nobilis Adelaidis regine neptis, aptius
eclesiasticis providebat negotiis’. Trans. by Cusimano and Moorhead, p. 120.
Reginam, et filium Philippum, quos tamquam visera nostra diligimus, per te salutamus et benedicimus’. See also
et filios tuos carissimos nepotes nostros, Philippum, Ludovicum, Henricum, per te salutamus, et benedictionis B.
Petri et nostrae participes fieri desideramus’.
45 Riley-Smith, The First Crusade and the Idea of Crusading, p. 176. See also Jonathan Phillips, Defenders of the
46 Jonathan Riley-Smith, ‘The Venetian Crusade of 1122–1124’, in I Comuni Italiani nel Regno Crociato di
Gerusalemme / The Italian Communes in the Crusading Kingdom of Jerusalem, ed. by Gabriella Airaldi and
Benjamin Z. Kedar (Genoa, 1986), 339–50 (p. 340). See also Cerbanus Cerbani, ‘Translatio mirifici martyris Isidori
a Chio insula in civitatem Venetam’, in Recueil des historiens des croisades: Historiens occidentaux, 5 vols (repr.
Farnborough: Gregg International, 1967), v, pp. 321–34 (pp. 322–23). This describes the appeal and references
‘legatos suos [Baldwin II, ‘regni Baldunicus de Borc’] ad venerabilem papam dominum Calixtum atque praedictum
Venetiae ducem miserunt, postulantes ut, sicut oportebat, eis providerent, et auxilia necessaria ferrent’.

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1120, with preparations well under way by July 1121, this expedition has become known as the ‘Venetian Crusade’, and succeeded in capturing the city of Tyre for the Latin kingdom on 29 June 1124. It found an exceptionally willing propagator in Calixtus. Riley-Smith believed it possible that a formal encyclical was issued, but acknowledged the lack of a single document which would considerably predate the *Quantum praedecessores* of Pope Eugenius III in 1145. However, we can find numerous examples of Calixtus’ crusading interest in the extant material. Prior to the organisation of formal relief efforts with the Venetians, he had already issued a charter to the Knights Hospitaller on 19 June 1119, confirming their rights and possessions in Jerusalem as granted by Paschal II in 1113. We have discussed in chapter 1 how Pope Gregory VII had appealed to Calixtus’ father, William I of Burgundy, as early as 1074 to sponsor expeditions against the Muslims, and Calixtus could have had this precedent likewise in mind.

Furthermore, according to Riley-Smith, one of Calixtus’ letters in response to the crisis referred to Baldwin II of Jerusalem as his kin. Riley-Smith suggested a rather tenuous connection routed through matrimony and the Capetian monarchy. Baldwin was the son of Melisende of Montlhéry, a member of the influential French Montlhéry clan, and his cousin Elizabeth of Montlhéry was married to Philip I’s younger son, Philip of Mantes; Philip’s elder son, Louis VI,

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51 The Montlhérys were a powerful and troublemaking family who repeatedly interfered with the Capetian kings’ attempts to extend their authority, and the marriage of Elizabeth and Philip of Mantes had been made in response to this. See Alan V. Murray, ‘Dynastic Continuity or Dynastic Change? The Accession of Baldwin II and the Nobility of the Kingdom of Jerusalem’, *Median Prosopography*, 13 (1992), 1–25 (p. 8).
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was married to Calixtus’ niece, Adelaide of Maurienne.\textsuperscript{52} It is thus possible that Calixtus considered both himself and the new king of Jerusalem part of the extended French royal family, especially in terms of an emerging special French connection to the Holy Land and his blood family’s history of crusading. It also appears as a move to shore up Baldwin’s fragile grip on power, as the intended location of the crusade was not at the site of the battle in Syria where the Christians had lost their tactical foothold, but at the centre of political authority in Jerusalem.\textsuperscript{53} This same year, 1119, also saw the foundation of the Knights Templar, intended as an impoverished order to protect Christian pilgrims making the dangerous journey to the Holy Land, but which swiftly grew larger and wealthier due to Bernard of Clairvaux’ zealous sponsorship. Their importance to the history of the crusades, of course, need hardly be stated.

Calixtus was to remain exceptionally concerned with questions of crusaders and crusading through the rest of his relatively brief pontifical tenure. In addition to his 1119 charter the Hospitallers, he gave another, of uncertain date, in which he urged the clergy and laity of Europe to listen favourably to the pleas of Raymond du Puy, master of the order, who had been sent to the West to solicit money and support.\textsuperscript{54} On 6 July 1121, he confirmed the rights of the Church of the Holy Sepulchre, charging them to defend the holy places, protect pilgrims, and fight in defence of the faith, and granting the churches, including those of St Peter and St

\textsuperscript{52} Riley-Smith, \textit{First Crusade and Idea of Crusading}, p. 176. Once more, as with Cate, it has been difficult to determine which letter Riley-Smith is basing this on, despite a detailed scrutiny of Calixtus’ papal epistles in \textit{RHGF} and \textit{PL}. The nearest reference I have been able to find to Calixtus addressing a Baldwin as a kinsman around this time is in his granting of monasterial privileges on 20 November 1119, where he mentioned a ‘nepotis nostri comitis Balduini’. However, this is beyond doubt a reference to his nephew Baldwin VII of Flanders, son of Calixtus’ sister Clemence of Burgundy and Robert II of Flanders. See ‘Calixti II Papae: Epistolae et Privilegia’, \textit{PL}, vol. 163, act L, p. 1139, and act XXXVI, pp. 1127–28, where Calixtus referred to ‘sororis nostrae Clementiae Flandrensis comitissae […] et viro ejus Roberto et filio Balduino comitibus’.

\textsuperscript{53} Riley-Smith, \textit{First Crusade and Idea of Crusading}, p. 177.

\textsuperscript{54} \textit{Cartulaire général des Hospitaliers}, I, p. act 47, pp. 39–40: ‘Domnus papa Calixtus, etc. dilectis fratribus episcopis, abbatibus, plebanis, canoniciis ac capellanis, et ceteris per Europam fidelibus, salutem etc. […] Latorem presentium, ab Jerosolimitani Xenodochii preposito Raimundo missum ad vos, caritati vestre attentius commendamus.’

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Lazarus in Jaffa, first given to them by Arnulf of Chocques, patriarch of Jerusalem (1112–18).  

Then in 1123 at the First Lateran Council, Calixtus authorised broad remittances and legal protections to defenders of the Holy Land, as well as threatening to excommunicate those who took the cross and never fulfilled their vows:

> To those who set out for Jerusalem and offer effective help towards the defence of the Christian people and overcoming the tyranny of the infidels, we grant the remission of their sins, and we place their houses and families and all their goods under the protection of blessed Peter and the Roman church, just as has been decreed by our lord pope Urban. Whoever dares to distrain or carry off their houses, families and goods, while they are on their way, shall be punished with excommunication. Those who have put crosses on their clothes, with a view to journeying to Jerusalem or to Spain, and have later taken them off, we command by our apostolic authority to wear the crosses again and to complete the journey between this Easter and the following Easter. Otherwise, from that moment we cut them off from entry into church and forbid divine services in all their lands.

It is noteworthy that Calixtus included Iberia as a valid (and important) option for fighting infidels, since as discussed, the involvement of Burgundian noblemen in the early Iberian ‘reconquista’ was pivotal, and another of Calixtus’ brothers, Raymond of Burgundy (d. 1107) had married Urraca, the daughter of Alfonso VI of Castile-León. Hence Calixtus was certainly aware of more than just the Holy Land as a frontier for the military defence of the Christian faith, and ordered the crusade shirkers to fulfil their duty. As the council began on 18 March 1123,


57 On 9 April 1123, Calixtus had also, on request of his nephew Alfonso VII of Castile-Léon, restored the rights of the church in Segovia, Spain, which had come back under Christian control at the end of the eleventh century as part of the conquest of Toledo. Alfonso VII was a major figure in the ‘reconquista’ and vigorously pursued its policies. See ‘Catalogue sommaire des actes de Calixte II’, in *Histoire du pape Calixte II*, ed. by Ulysse Robert (Paris:
and Easter that year fell on 15 April, it seems evident that Calixtus was expecting immediate action. Suger attended personally, recording that he was ‘welcomed with great honour by the lord pope Calixtus and the whole curia, and for six months we stayed there with him, attending a great council of 300 or more bishops at the Lateran; it had been called to bring the quarrel of investitures [the Investiture Conflict, settled in 1122] to a peaceful conclusion’.  

At least one Burgundian, a veteran of the crusade of 1101, responded to Calixtus’ call. Stephen of Neublans (seen in chapter 2) made his donation to the monks of St-Marcel-lès-Chalon around 1123–26 in preparation for the journey, in company with his wife Beatrice and his four sons, Hugh, Walter, Simon, and William, exchanging any property he held at Pontoux (dep. Saône-et-Loire, arr. Chalon-sur-Saône) to the monks in return for 400 solidi.

However, Stephen did not ultimately have much company. Riley-Smith suggested that men from France, Germany, and Bohemia, as well as Venice, demonstrated some interest in the expedition of 1122–24, but it struggled to attract any lasting recruitment, was quickly forgotten, and otherwise represented the embryonic and informal status of crusading theology in the early twelfth century. In short, as he put it, ‘the popularity of crusading increased when there were disasters’, and the tepid response to Calixtus’ efforts may point to the fact that while the Field of Blood was undoubtedly an unfortunate setback for the nascent crusader kingdom, it was not

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59 Bouchard, Cartulary of St.-Marcel-lès-Chalon, act. 44, pp. 76–77: ‘[…] quod domnus Stephanus de Neblens Iherosolimam ire desiderans, timens aeternae damnationis interitum incurrere, si aliquam particular terrarum beati martiii Marcelli temperarii ausi filii suis possidendam inconsulte dimitteret, tam por sue anime, quam pro antecessorum suorum animarum remedio ullam quandam quod Pontidotum proprio nomine nuncupatur […] uxori sue carissime Beatrici nomine et quattuor filii sui Hugoni, Walterio, Simoni, atque Willelmo, laudare iterum fecit, accipiens de generalitate fratrum quadringentorum ualens solidorum’, of the sons, William made a trip to Jerusalem in 1174, and a Philip of Neublans on the Third Crusade (seen in chapter 5) was likely a son of one of the brothers, giving the family some crusade tradition.


nearly enough to warrant a major response from Europe. This arguably indicates that at least in the early post-First Crusade era, piety was swiftly tempered with pragmatism, and purely idealistic or religious calls to aid the Holy Land, without a correspondently strong political, military, or diplomatic crisis to provoke concrete action, stood relatively little chance of success.

On that note, Calixtus was certainly aware of the real-world consequences and corollaries of crusading activity, as evidenced in his production of the *Constitutio pro Iudeis*, or *Sicut Judaeis*. While the original text has not survived, its ratification and re-issue by a number of his successors gives us a good idea as to its content and purpose.\(^6^2\) The call to crusade in 1095 resulted in violence directed against Jews at home in Europe as well as Muslims abroad; while the latter was the intended outcome, the former was more complicated.\(^6^3\) *Sicut Judaeis* outlined the Holy See’s position that Jews should not be forced into conversion or baptism, should be protected from vigilante mobs or physical persecution, and that their festivals and cemeteries should remain unmolested. It was confirmed by Calixtus’ successors Eugenius III (1145–53), Alexander III (1159–81), Clement III (1187–91), Celestine III (1191–98) and Innocent III (1199–1216), as well as Honorius III (1216–27) and Gregory IX (1227–41), spanning almost the entire operation of the crusades.\(^6^4\) It is important to recognise that the popes were operating from an Augustinian position of only permitting Jews to exist to demonstrate the truth of Christianity, and Innocent III in particular was stringent about condemning their theological errors and


restricting protection only to those who had not engaged in supposed plots against Christians.⁶⁵ Therefore, the popes were not protecting Jews altruistically or to promote any equality of religion, but rather for a set of targeted and specific political purposes.

Indeed, the existence of the Constitutio and its attempts to outlaw or at least moderate violence against European Jews can be read as a natural corollary of the Peace of God. While Jews were not part of the spiritual fabric of Europe and its emerging sense as ‘Christendom’, they were very much part of its physical, financial, and geographical fabric, and continuing violence against them threatened to render pointless all the ecclesiastical efforts to check public social disruption and assert control over lawlessness. In this sense, while Jews might be as equally undesirable as Muslims from a religious point of view, there were material costs associated with persecuting them at home that did not obtain to wars conducted in the distant Holy Land. If the church was to retain moral or legal authority for the maintenance of social order, and the prescription of holy wars in the future, it could not afford to let unrestrained anti-Semitic violence continue. Calixtus may well have had an eye on this in issuing the Constitutio.

This leads us to the final groundwork to consider in the run-up to the Second Crusade: how the First Crusade transformed from a glorious memory into a practical model for future ventures, or as Marcus Bull put it, ‘Europe’s gradual habituation to the institutional and ideological framework of crusading, which came to be seen as a repeatable and potentially frequent exercise’.⁶⁶ In Bull’s view, Urban II’s avoidance of Philip I’s lands and authority during his preaching of the First Crusade was not merely attributable to Philip’s personal misbehaviour with his irregular marriage and excommunication, a situation he could have rectified by

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repudiating his wife and reconciling with the church, but rather reflected a deeper uncertainty about the right of a secular king to lead an explicitly religious expedition.\(^{67}\) In this model, Urban was not punishing Philip for flouting church morality, though that may have been a factor, but rather evading any confusion about whose rule the crusade was following. The connective tissue in this case is Philip’s brother, Hugh of Vermandois. Despite Hugh’s early desertion causing an embarrassing situation for the royal family, which had to be carefully dealt with,\(^{68}\) the French propagandists managed to construct a sufficiently praiseworthy explanation of his actions for Louis VII to take his great-uncle as a suitable model. This eagerness of the French monarchy to align itself with growing crusading prestige, especially given France’s privileged status as the birth of the movement, happened quite early on. By the time of his death in 1108, Philip I had married four of his five children to crusaders or their offspring.\(^{69}\)

Nonetheless, despite the participation of Sigurd I of Norway in 1107–10, and the interest of Alfonso I of Aragon in creating a crusading legacy for himself, Louis VII’s decision to take the cross personally was unprecedented.\(^{70}\) It was first proposed not by Bernard of Clairvaux, but by his cousin, Godfrey (or Geoffrey) de la Roche, bishop of Langres. At Louis’s Christmas court in Bourges in December 1145, Godfrey ‘spoke in his episcopal capacity concerning the devastation of Rohes, whose ancient name is Edessa, and the oppression of the Christians and the arrogance of the heathen, and by this doleful theme he aroused great lamentation, while at the same time he admonished all that, together with their king, they should fight for the King of all


\(^{69}\) James L. Naus, ‘Negotiating Kingship in France at the Time of the Early Crusades: Suger and the Gesta Ludovici Grossi’, French Historical Studies, 36 (2013), 525–41 (p. 536). This also usefully explores Suger’s ambivalent relationship toward crusading. Despite personally opposing the Second Crusade, he tried to ensure that Louis VII would benefit from it – which did not work out in this case, but provided the precedent for the crusading French kings Philip II (Louis’ son) and Louis IX (Philip’s grandson). Naus, ‘Negotiating Kingship,’ p. 41.

in order to succor the Christians’. Godfrey accompanied Louis on the crusade and was one of its most prominent clergymen, but his origins are worthy of note. He is sometimes identified as being from Rochetaillée (dep. Haute-Marne, arr. Langres) but seems to have hailed from La Roche-Vanneau (dep. Côte d’Or, arr. Montbard). He had served as abbot of Fontenay (1119–30) and prior of Clairvaux (1130–38), and was involved in the Cistercian reforms with Bernard.

Godfrey’s relation to Bernard is not entirely clear, though the local history of La Roche-Vanneau claims that he was the son of Bernard’s mother’s sister, which would make him a member of the powerful (and piously inclined) Montbard family. This version, however, incorrectly attributes him a brother named Robert, and is not clear if it is conflating two separate cousins of Bernard’s from two different mothers. In fact, Godfrey’s brothers were named Walter, Rayner, and Nivard, and they were closely connected to the ducal family of Burgundy. Walter served as the duke’s constable, and Rayner as his seneschal; it is most likely that this duke was Hugh II, although Rayner could have continued into the rule of Odo II, as he was still in his post

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73 Odo de Deuil, *De profectione Ludovici VII*, pp. 6–7, n.4.

74 *Histoire de la commune*: ‘... que Bernard avait réuni, dès le mois d’octobre 1111, ceux qu’il pouvait nommer ses disciples. Il compte bientôt parmi eux, non seulement ses frères, mais encore son oncle Gaudry de Touillon, ses cousins Godefroid de la Roche et Robert, fils de la sœur de sa mère, Aleth de Montbard.’ The archive cites an article by one J.C. Didier as the basis for this claim, but fails to give its title or a source list; thus it is somewhat difficult to establish on what authority it is making the argument.
in the 1140s.\textsuperscript{75} As Bernard of Clairvaux’s father, Tescelin Sorus (‘le Roux’), was the lord of Fontaine-lès-Dijon and an important vassal to the dukes, and had married one Montbard sister, it is at least feasible that another high-ranking ducal servant, the La Roche brothers’ father, could have married a second. La Roche-Vanneau and Montbard are located about fifteen miles apart, so this match would form a sound partnership of neighbouring lordships. Furthermore, Stephen of Montbard, archdeacon of Langres, was the son of Rainard I, lord of Montbard, whose widow remarried to Walter of La Roche.\textsuperscript{76} This provides another connection between the families.

In any event, this genealogy, while unavoidably speculative in places, highlights the fact that Godfrey, Bernard, and their extended family were well-connected to the dukes of Burgundy. Furthermore, Louis did not take the cross at Bourges in 1145, but at Easter 1146 at Vézelay, in the Burgundian heartland.\textsuperscript{77} The chronicle of Richard of Poitiers, a monk at Cluny, also singles out Bernard and Godfrey by name in discussing their influence on Louis’s decision.\textsuperscript{78} We can hence see the Second Crusade itself being conceived and built within a specifically Burgundian space. Bernard and Godfrey were scions of high-ranking Burgundian vassals whose fathers and brothers were servants of the Burgundian dukes. Louis took the cross in Burgundy and asked William of Nevers to be the regent of the kingdom in his absence, but William refused, supposedly on account of a pre-existing monastic vow; the honour went to Abbot Suger.

\textsuperscript{75} SMC, p. 337.
\textsuperscript{76} SMC, p. 337.
\textsuperscript{77} Jonathan Phillips suggests that Louis most likely intended to take the cross at Bourges at Christmas 1145, but delays with the arrival of \textit{Quantum praedecessores}, the encyclical of Eugenius III declaring the Second Crusade, had complicated matters. He also notes that Alberic of Ostia, the present papal legate to France, was the former abbot of Vézelay, indicative of further Burgundian religious ties to the enterprise. See Jonathan Phillips, \textit{The Second Crusade: Extending the Frontiers of Christendom} (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2007), p. 67.
instead. Also, the Second Crusaders’ one success was the recapture of the city of Lisbon, Portugal, from its Muslim overlords, an action undertaken in concert with Afonso I, king of Portugal (r. 1139–85), who had written personally to Bernard for help and had close ties with the papacy and the Templars. Afonso was the son of Henry of Burgundy and the nephew of Odo I, making him the first cousin of Hugh II and the first cousin once removed of Odo II. As the second-in-command of the Templars at the time, and the eventual master of the order, was Andrew of Montbard, Bernard’s maternal uncle, one is left with the impression of a network of Burgundian influence stretching across nearly every aspect of the crusade. Indeed, it can be argued that the Second Crusade was – at least in its structural, ideological, and geographical origins – a majority Burgundian enterprise, and one which successfully convinced Louis VII to join, laying the foundation for the tradition of French crusader-kings.

Lastly, there is the question of Cluniac influence on the movement, and how this had changed from its cautious and carefully negotiated beginnings. During the abbacy of Peter the Venerable (1122–56), support for the crusades, and the view of Islam as a major threat to be dealt with, had become considerable. Writing to Everard des Barres, master of the Templars (1147–51) and a key figure on the Second Crusade, Peter railed against the Saracens for their defiance of Christ, and referred to Humbert III of Beaujeu, a Burgundian nobleman who had travelled to the Holy Land and joined the Templars, returning home. After mentioning how the

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81 *SMC*, p. 336.
83 *Letters of Peter the Venerable*, I, lett. 172, p. 408: ‘Nobilis vir dominus Humbertus de Bello Ioco nuper a partibus transmarinis veniens ad partes nostras rediit, et cum immense exultation [. . .]’. 
prophets spoke of defending against the enemies of the house of Israel, Peter declared, ‘But perhaps you will say [instead]: Against pagans, not against Christians, we took up arms’.

Indeed, Peter’s influence on the relationship between medieval Islam and Christianity can scarcely be rivalled. He had travelled to Iberia in 1142 and commissioned the first translation of the Qur’an into Latin, the *Lex Mahomet pseudoprophetae*, and was pivotal in producing other editions of Arabic texts and disseminating information about Islam to Europe. He had a vested interest in the conversion of the Muslims who had come under Christian lordship as a result of the ‘reconquista,’ and engaged two Latin scholars and Arabic translators, Robert of Ketton and Herman of Carinthia, to assist in producing Islamic texts for a Christian audience. He also employed an actual Muslim, named Muhammad, to vet the translated works for accuracy, resulting in the first substantial and high-quality influx of information about the Islamic world and religion to Western Christianity. But as with the popes and their issuing and reissuing of *Sicut Judaeis*, Peter’s interest was not impartial or altruistic. As we can see in his heated rhetoric above, and in his tracts characterising Islam as a Christian heresy that had to be resisted, he intended to demonstrate that it was, as he wrote to Bernard of Clairvaux, ‘detestandum ac damnabilem’. He had been in company with Pope Eugenius III from November 1145 to February 1146, directly participating in the construction of *Quantum praedecessores*, and

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84 *Letters of Peter the Venerable*, t. I., lett. 172, p. 409: ‘Sed forte dicitis: Contra paganos, non contra Christianos, arma sumpsimus.’


87 *Letters of Peter the Venerable*, t. I., lett. 111, pp. 274–99. In this lengthy letter, Peter also complained that ‘Arabum uel Sarracenorum hac peste infectorum surrexit principatus, atque ui armata maximas Asiae partes cum tota Africa ac parte Hispaniae paulatim occupans, in subjectos sicut imperium sic et errorem transfdit,’ (pp. 297–98) and it is throughout concerned with the relations of Muslims, Jews, and Christians and the mutual obligation of Cluniacs and Cistercians to take part in combating heresies. He also makes explicit reference to his translation efforts in Spain and their intended use on p. 294: ‘Misi et nouam translationem nostram contra pessimam nequam Mahumet heresim disputantem, quae dum nuper in Hispanicis morarer meo studio de lingua Arabicâ uersa est in Latinum’. See also Matthias Tischler, ‘Translation-Based Chronicles, Twelfth to Thirteenth Centuries: New Sources For The Arabo-Latin Translation Movement in the Iberian Peninsula’, *Journal of Transcultural Medieval Studies*, 1 (2014), 175–218.
Cluniac interest in the crusades as a theatre of potential conversion for Muslims, carrying on from its previous missionary activities in Iberia, remained considerable. Peter was also an active partner in correspondence between himself, Suger, Louis VII, and Bernard of Clairvaux during the Second Crusade and afterward, and had written to Roger II of Sicily in 1150 to bewail the treachery of the Greeks in supposedly sabotaging it. Peter was thus deeply connected to the operation of the crusade and the destruction of its enemies, suggesting that by this time, Cluny had become a strong supporter of the Second Crusade, an interest shared with its rivals, the Cistercians. This crusade’s legacy, however, was not one that anyone was in any haste to claim.

III. The Folly of Christendom?: Participation and Penance in the Second Crusade

The Second Crusade has often been judged harshly by historians, both medieval and contemporary. It suffered from the outset from a lack of planning and military discipline, the unexpected involvement of King Conrad III of Germany (r. 1138–52), controversy about which monarch should be held in precedence, and consequent fierce rivalry. Despite Bernard of Clairvaux’s success at raising recruits, he seemed less able to put them efficiently to use. The People’s Crusade in 1096 had already ended in disaster, and there was no improved notion of

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how Bernard expected to use a large number of untrained common people.\(^93\) The crusaders did not attempt to recapture the county of Edessa, which had been taken by Imad ad-Dīn Zengi, atabeg of Mosul, on 24 December 1144, instead persuaded to try an ultimately disastrous attack on Damascus. It exerted a heavy cost upon the reputation and theology of Bernard of Clairvaux,\(^94\) Raymond of Antioch, strongest of the regional Christian princes, was killed in 1149, and Muslim power was centralised in the armies of Zengi’s son Nūr ad-Dīn (r. 1146–74).\(^95\) The situation provoked an attempt to organise a new relief mission in 1150, which went nowhere.\(^96\)

Nonetheless, Graham Loud rejected simplistic characterisations of the crusade as a mere ‘folly’ predestined to failure, and pointed out that while nearly all aspects of the expedition did end up going wrong, this was not somehow intrinsic to it; all medieval military endeavours, especially on this scale, had to run similar risks.\(^97\) It is also the case that condemnations of the attack on Damascus benefit too much from historical hindsight, and an apparent overstatement of the viability of a previous truce between the Muslim city and the Christian crusader states. As Martin Hoch has studied, and as Alan Murray commented in his review of Hoch’s work, ‘Rather

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than assuming an outbreak of collective irrationality among a group of experienced Christian leaders and their advisors, it would be more useful to admit that possibly historians might not have obtained a full picture of events’. 98 In short, the attack on Damascus, which Baldwin II of Jerusalem had twice tried to conquer in 1126 and 1129, might have been not merely a defensible second option, but the best available. Baldwin III, the current king of Jerusalem (r. 1143–63), supported the decision to besiege Damascus, so it cannot be argued that the Frankish crusaders were forcing an unwise course of action in a land they were unfamiliar with. Baldwin’s mother, Queen Melisende, advocated for the opposite, believing that the crusade army should attack Nūr ad-Dīn’s capital of Aleppo. Thus, as also pointed out by Murray, there was an element of dynastic rivalry at play, and a chance for a young king to establish his power outside of his mother’s, by means of an ambitious and crucial military success. 99 The siege itself fell victim to severe strategic and supply shortcomings, but the decision on its own was not necessarily the episode of hubris and self-sabotage in which it has often been framed.

Furthermore, the one thing the Second Crusade did succeed at was the expansion of its operations beyond the Holy Land, as it created new battlegrounds and a broader ideal of what ‘Christendom’ was and who its opponents were. 100 While the First Crusade had drawn from a good selection of French nobility, it had – whether due to Urban II’s reservations about involving royal authority, or Philip I’s personal misbehaviour – failed to enlist an actual king. As we have seen, Philip was keen to marry his children to crusaders, and his brother Hugh of Vermandois


100 This work, however, had arguably begun much earlier, with the Norman conquest of Muslim Sicily in 1061–90 pointed to in both Muslim and Christian sources as the moment at which ‘Christendom’ identified itself as engaging in a particular action against Islamic enemies, and constructed its duty to fight them. See Paul E. Chevedden, ‘The Islamic View and the Christian View of the Crusades: A New Synthesis’, *History*, 93 (2008), 181–200.
had personally taken part, so it is not the case that Louis VII was the first member of the dynasty to evince crusading interest and investment. However, by the time of the Second Crusade, any questions about the rank and character of its participants were decisively overcome; it was a thoroughly prestigious activity that could attract top-tier recruits, including the king of France himself. This also makes clear that while the Second Crusade ultimately ended in failure, it was considered a worthy investment at the start, and said failure cannot be attributed to a lack of skill or commitment. Robert of Monte (Robert of Torigni) commented that the gathered crusaders were ‘multi magnae auctoritatis et dignitatis viri, Franci, Normanni, Angli, et de aliis regionibus innumerabiles, non solum milites et laici, sed etiam Episcopi, Clerici, Monachi, crucem in humeris assumentes ad iter Jerosolymitanum se praeparaverunt’.\(^{101}\)

As noted, the proper start of the crusade was Louis VII taking the cross at Vézelay on Palm Sunday, 24 March 1146. The Vézelay chronicle itself, however, notes this almost in passing: ‘Almost all Gaul had assembled at the abbey in greater numbers than usual, to take part in the frequent opportunities for prayer and at the same time to show their reverence for the most pious and religious king Louis the Younger, who, intending to make a pilgrimage to Jerusalem, accepted there, on his own shoulders, the standard of the cross of the Lord’.\(^{102}\) This is one sentence squeezed into a much longer account of what Hugh of Poitiers evidently considered far more important to record for posterity: a detailed treatment of the ongoing feud between the abbot of Vézelay and William II of Nevers over the abbey’s rights and privileges, which the


count had been, in their view, unjustly usurping. Hugh recorded the names of all the witnesses to the abbot’s complaints, but none of the magnates taking the cross with Louis, except to note that ‘many, aroused by the fame and example of this act, seized upon a transmarine pilgrimage’.103 The two Second Crusaders he mentioned by name, William II’s sons William III and Renaud of Tonnerre, he did for a pointed purpose. Hugh felt that Renaud’s fate in the Holy Land, where he died as a prisoner of the Saracens, was fitting punishment for his father’s sins: ‘thus his father [William II], who had tried to deprive the liberty of the church of Vézelay, tasted the opprobrium of servitude in the person of his son’.104 Moreover, according to Hugh, William III was in danger of shipwreck during his return from the Holy Land, and it was only when he repented his father’s misdeeds against Vézelay, and swore to release the abbey from unfair taxation, that he was blessed with deliverance. If so, it seems to be a promise that William III immediately tried to get round.105 However, even their continuing bad luck did not end the counts of Nevers’ crusading exploits. Until 1270, they participated in every major expedition, including the Albigensian Crusade, and the succession often passed through the female line due to men dying abroad.106

Odo of Deuil provides a slightly longer account of the events of Palm Sunday 1146, but only notes, ‘Then the king, and many nobles with him, received the sign of the cross which had been sent by the pope’.

It is in the Grandes chronique de France that we finally find a detailed listing of these nobles. The Grande chronique was first assembled in about 1270 by the monks of Saint-Denis, as an Old French translation of the abbey’s historical Latin chronicles, and updated fairly consistently afterward. Thus, as it had access to the French royal archives and was

103 Scott and Ward, p. 164; for the Latin, see above.
105 Monumenta Vizeliacensia, p. 424.
produced in a centre of Capetian power, we can assume it to be at least acceptable in its prosopography (and indeed, the names are all verifiable elsewhere): 108

Lors se croisa li Rois Loois toz premiers, et après li la Roine Alienors sa fame; et quant ce virent li Baron qui là estoient asemblé, si se croisierent tuit cil qui ci sont nomé, Alfons le Cuens de S. Gile [Alfonso-Jordan, count of Toulouse, son of Raymond of Saint-Gilles]
Tierris le Cuens de Flanders [Thierry, count of Flanders],
Henris fuze le Conte Thiebault de Blois qui lors vivoit [Henry I of Champagne],
li Cuens Guiz de Nevers [a mistaken name for William III, son of William II],
Renauz sès freres, li Cuens de Tonnerre [his brother, Renaud of Tonnerre],
li Cuens Roberz freres le Roi [Robert of Dreux, Louis’s younger brother],
Yves li Cuens de Soissons [Yves II, count of Soissons],
Archambauz de Borbon [Archimbaud VII of Bourbon],
Engerranz de Couci [Enguerrand II of Coucy],
Gefroiz de Rençom [Geoffrey de Rançon, lord of Taillebourg],
Hues de Lisigniem [Hugh VII of Lusignan],
Renaux de Montargis [Renaud of Montargis],

Among this list, we can identify several names with matrimonial, political, and genealogical connections to the Burgundian ducal and comital families. William III of Ponthieu was the second husband of Helias of Burgundy, daughter of Odo I, whom she had married after the death of her first husband, Bertrand of Toulouse. William de Warenne was his son-in-law via marriage to William III and Helias’ daughter Adela, and was killed at the disastrous battle of Mount Cadmus near Laodicea (Denizli, Turkey), on 6 January 1148. 110 The aforementioned William III

110 Phillips, The Second Crusade, p. 201
of Nevers and Renaud of Tonnerre, counts of Nevers, did not have much more success than their father had on the crusade of 1101. Itier II of Toucy was the heir of the Burgundian noble family that had lost at least two members (Itier and Narjod) on that same crusade. Of the comital Burgundians, Louis VII and Robert of Dreux themselves were the grandsons of Gisela of Burgundy on their mother’s side. Archimbaud of Bourbon was another grandson of Gisela and cousin of Louis. Other sons of Gisela who went on the Second Crusade, from her first and second marriages respectively, were Amadeus III of Savoy, brother of Queen Adelaide and uncle of Louis VII, who died in Cyprus en route, and William V of Montferrat, father of Conrad of Montferrat, defender of Tyre and short-lived king of Jerusalem in the Third Crusade.

Amadeus’ son, Humbert III of Beaujeu, also went on the expedition and briefly joined the Templars, though he returned to Burgundy afterward, and is discussed in a letter of Peter the Venerable, treated in the previous section. Other crusaders with Burgundian affiliations not listed in the *Grandes chronique* included Hugh V of Beaumont (probably the Beaumont of dep. l’Yonne, arr. Auxerre) and Anseric II of Montréal (dep. l’Yonne, arr. Avallon), both ducal Burgundians, and Josbert Rufus of La Ferté (dep. Jura, arr. Lons-le-Saunier) from the county.111 William III of Mâcon, son of Stephen I of Burgundy, is noted as fighting bravely against the Turks at Mount Cadmus in January 1148, in company with the future Henry I of Champagne (the ‘Liberal’) and Thierry of Flanders.112 Bernard Grossus, lord of Brancion (dep. Saône-et-Loire, arr. Mâcon) ‘quando voluit ire Iherosolimam’, gave a charter at Cluny in c. 1147.113

111 *SMC*, pp. 235, 323, 326, 338. Anseric II’s sons, Anseric III and John of Arcis, both went on the Third Crusade and died there, as is examined in chapter 5.

112 *De profectione Ludovici VII*, p. 110–11: ‘Sed egregii comites Henricus, filius comitis Theobaldi, et Flandrensis Theodericus et Guillelmus Matisconensis post illos more turbinis irruerunt ripamque ripamque ardum sagittarum pluviam et Turcorum copiam dicto citius penetrarunt’. Trans. by Berry: ‘But the excellent counts, Henry, son of Count Theobald, and Theoderic of Flanders and William of Mâcon, rushed after them [the Turks] like whirlwinds, scaled the steep bank, and penetrated the rain of arrows and the Turkish throng more swiftly than can be told.’

Overall, the above examples constitute at least 13 named crusaders, not counting Louis VII and Robert of Dreux, with Burgundian links, which doubles the scanty evidence from the First Crusade and identifies participants from the ducal lands aside from the duke himself, which did not happen previously until 1101. Aside from William III of Mâcon, their individual appearance in narrative sources, attesting to specific actions, is once more rather thin. However, upon Louis’s departure on crusade in 1147, he was noted as being accompanied by Frenchmen, Aquitainians, and Burgundians. As Louis was king of France and duke of Aquitaine, it makes sense to find them present with him, but since as seen above, there had been a fairly good recruitment from many regions of France, it is noteworthy that Burgundy is the other one singled out. This fits with our contention that the Second Crusade had its roots in a particularly Burgundian sphere of influence, and Louis was in Dijon shortly before his departure, on 30/31 March 1147, confirming the privileges and possessions of the abbey of Saint-Bénigne of Dijon by request of its abbot Philip. Considering the status of Saint-Bénigne as the dukes’ home abbey and centre of religious influence in their capital city, and Bernard of Clairvaux’s family ties in Dijon, this was a notable gesture for Louis to make, and once more appears as a sign of Burgundian patronage of the enterprise. Lastly, the first charter that Louis issued upon his return to France in 1149 was at Cluny, and he made a stop at Nevers sometime between 1 August 1146 and 19 April 1147, confirming a gift of his father’s. Altogether, the circumstantial evidence indicates that Louis was aware of Burgundian influence in the crusade, and acted to reward it. Given his still-cool personal relationship with Odo II, it is useful to distinguish between secular and religious Burgundians in this instance, and to speculate whether Louis’s generosity to the

116 Études sur les actes de Louis VII, pp. 64, 159.
religious Burgundian establishment that had created and promoted the crusade also involved an implicit positioning of himself as guarantor of their rights, rather than their duke.

Lastly, the Burgundians who went to the Holy Land may have encountered some countrymen who had travelled or settled after the First Crusade. We find a Henry of Burgundy (\textit{Hanricus Burgondio}) witnessing an act given by the Knights Hospitaller in Jerusalem in 1129, and his ancestry and family group is of interest. Hans Eberhard Mayer has identified him as the brother of Robert de Craon, second master of the Knights Templar (1136–47). Robert is generally known as \textit{Robertus Burgundio} in the charters, as he was the grandson of Robert the Burgundian, castellan of Anjou and possible First Crusader.\footnote{Hans E. Mayer, ‘Angevins versus Normans: The New Men of King Fulk of Jerusalem’, in \textit{Kings and Lords in the Latin Kingdom of Jerusalem} (Aldershot: Variorum, 1994), IV; pp. 1-25 (p. 6).} As Robert the Burgundian was the brother of William I of Nevers, grandfather of William II, this gives Robert de Craon and his brother Henry a solidly locatable position within the higher tier of Burgundian nobility, distant cousins of the counts of Nevers. This also relates to the accession of Fulk V, count of Anjou, as Fulk I of Jerusalem (r. 1131–43). The de Craon family had continued their service to the Angevin counts, and as king, Fulk benefited from a Templar master who had been one of his vassals back home in France. Thus, as Mayer suggests, Robert de Craon and Henry were part of the coterie of ‘new men’ who had come with Fulk to the Holy Land, helping him to establish his own centre of power at the outset of his reign.\footnote{Mayer, ‘Angevins versus Normans,’ p. 7.}

Additionally, a Gervase of Burgundy witnessed several charters of the king of Jerusalem: a donation to the Holy Sepulchre made by Fulk I in 1138, another act in Acre in 1138,\footnote{Le cartulaire du chapitre du Saint-Sépulcre de Jérusalem, acts 32–33, pp. 95–98: ‘Fulco, per Dei gratiam rex Latinorum tercius Jherusalem, una cum assensu Milissendis regine uxoris mee et Balduini filii mei […] bona voluntate et gratuita et solo intuit pietatis concede ecclesi Sancti-Sepulchri et Petro priori et universe conventui fratrum […] Et hec concessio firma et inconvulsa in perpetuum consistat […] Gervasius Burgundiensis’. This individual also appears in the preceding charter (given at Acre, 4 December 1138) as ‘Gervase Burguin’.} and a
charter of Melisende and the young Baldwin III to the Hospitallers in 1147.\textsuperscript{120} His provenance and family heritage are less easily traced, but for Gervase to appear in charters given by two different kings of Jerusalem, nine years apart, argues that he was a long-term or permanent resident, and fairly trusted confidant to the monarchy. It is noteworthy that he was able to maintain this position through a turbulent transition period. Fulk had died in 1143 and was succeeded by his thirteen-year-old son, Baldwin III, but real power remained largely with his widow and queen regent of Jerusalem, Melisende, which became a point of contention as Baldwin grew older and sought a more active part in the affairs of the kingdom and a lessening of his mother’s influence. As 1147 was the date of one of the now seventeen-year-old Baldwin’s early military campaigns,\textsuperscript{121} it is possible that Gervase was another of Fulk of Anjou’s ‘new men,’ and inclined to prefer service to Fulk’s son, rather than Fulk’s foreign-born widow.

Altogether, however, the Second Crusade was, as noted above and well studied overall, an abject failure in any of its stated military or strategical objectives. As before, the crusaders had bad relations with the Byzantine Empire, and Odo of Deuil fulminated at length against the Greeks and portrayed them as openly in league with the Turks, spying on and undercutting the crusade contingent at every turn – accusations to which there was at least some truth, given the sharp political tensions between Byzantium and Sicily.\textsuperscript{122} As Manuel I Komnenos, the emperor, was fighting Roger II of Sicily, Louis’s ally, this contributed to the crusaders’ suspicions that the

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\textsuperscript{120} DKLJ, i, act 216, pp. 402–04: ‘…quod ego Balduinus dei gratia in sancta Ierusalem Latinorum rex quartus et et ego Milesendis eius mater […] pro requie animarum antecessorum nostrorum donamus et concedimus Hospitali sancte civitatis Ierusalem Altum Casale in elemosinam et pro concambio casalium […] Huius quidem rei testes sunt: […] Geruasius Burgundio’.


\footnotescript{122} For Berry’s discussion of how Odo’s anti-Greek bias informed (and sometimes deformed) his version of the crusade, see the introduction in De profectione, pp. xxi–xxii. See also Savvas Neocleous, ‘Byzantine-Muslim Conspiracies Against the Crusades: History and Myth’, Journal of Medieval History, 36 (2010) 253–74.
nominally Christian empire was far more of a hindrance than a help.\textsuperscript{123} The failed decision to besiege Damascus contributed to a breakdown in relations between the local nobility of the Holy Land and the European crusaders, which would resurface to detrimental effect in later expeditions. Louis remained in the East for almost a year after the crusade’s failure, finally returning (not without more difficulty) to France in 1149, where preparations for his divorce from Eleanor were soon under way. Odo of Deuil, writing his account to Suger, who had hoped so greatly for Louis to benefit from crusading prestige, had to strain to put a good face on it:

Serious were the losses and hazards he endured, Father Suger, but you ought to be comforted by the fact that he is safe. For it will even be to his advantage to have toiled thus, since he is recognized as one who is prudent in time of danger and serenely happy after suffering losses, and he has borne all kinds of fortune wisely and steadfastly. [...] By his integrity he procured the favour of men, by his piety the favour of God.\textsuperscript{124}

This is likely the best version of events that Louis could have hoped for personally, but his participation had left a lasting impact on conceptions of the crusades, and the many kings – including his son, Philip II, on the Third Crusade – who would follow his example. Altogether, the Second Crusade represented the first conscious attempt to engineer a repeat expedition after the model of the First, a project now opened to the participation of crowned heads of the secular state, and as we have contended throughout this chapter, it came about as the result of a nexus of political, religious, and ideological influence centred in Burgundy. Louis himself was a descendant of the comital family of Burgundy, Bernard of Clairvaux and Godfrey of La Roche were Burgundian-born with family members in high-ranking service to the dukes, Louis took the cross in Burgundy and approached William of Nevers to be regent, many Burgundian crusaders


\textsuperscript{124} \textit{La Croisade de Louis VII}, pp. 79–80: ‘Gravía sunt que pertulit dampna et pericula, pater Sugeri; sed ipso debitis sospite consolari. Illi etiam proderit laborasse qui scitur, in periculis tutus et post damna letus, constanter et prudenter omnia pertulisse [...] Sic liberalis ut rex [...] locis et temporibus et virtutibus singulis se aptabat de probitate fervorem hominum, de religione divinam gratiam conquirebat’. Trans. by Berry, p. 143.
and their families accompanied the king, and the efforts of the Burgundians Pope Calixtus and Peter the Venerable to produce laws and texts concerning Jews and Muslims in crusading context and conflict would serve as precedent for hundreds of years. Despite its lack of success, the Second Crusade did perform a vital role in reconciling the Capetian monarchy and the papacy, bringing it full circle from its tumultuous relationship during the First. As Monique Amouroux puts it, ‘La Seconde croisade contribua à rapprocher le chef du royaume du France et le chef de la chrétienté occidentale’.\textsuperscript{125} In other words, with the king of France and the pope now firmly on the same side, there was more ability to present a united front, and to expand the operations of Christendom against the pagans. In terms of Burgundy, it also had direct ramifications for the relationship of the king and the regional aristocracy. Louis’ personal example and pious behaviour favourably impressed the Burgundians who accompanied him, and these crusaders, along with other lords who had hereto disdained the king’s interference or arbitration, more actively sought out and accepted his pronouncements upon their return to France.\textsuperscript{126}

Nonetheless, the failure of the Second Crusade altered the prestige of participation, and complicated the formulation and expansion of family traditions. It was an honour to have an ancestor on the First Crusade, but it was rather less so to have one on the Second, and it also largely put an end to the private ventures that took place after the successful First.\textsuperscript{127} The Frankish settlers in the East became increasingly isolated, no longer able to count on help or interest from Europe, and the popes seem to have taken no particular interest in renewing appeals

\textsuperscript{125} Monique Amouroux, ‘Louis VII, Innocent II et la seconde croisade’, in La papauté et les croisades / The Papacy and the Crusades, ed. by Michel Balard (Farnham: Ashgate, 2011), p. 64.
\textsuperscript{126} Dunbabin, France in the Making, p. 293.
\textsuperscript{127} Martin Hoch differentiated between the effect on western and eastern Christians, noting that the Latin kingdom of Jerusalem itself continued to pursue ambitious and expansionist policies in the 1160s–70s. He concurred, however, that western crusading interest and commitment dropped sharply, and while further private ventures continued to be sporadically planned, they did not enjoy much recruitment or interest. This would, of course, be reversed by the fall of Jerusalem in 1187. See Martin Hoch, ‘The Price of Failure: The Second Crusade as a Turning Point in the History of the Latin East?’ in The Second Crusade: Scope and Consequences, ed. by Jonathan Phillips and Martin Hoch (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2001), 180–200.
for the Holy Land in the following decades. It is this, and the changes in Burgundy’s political relationships in the latter half of the twelfth century, to which we now turn.
CHAPTER FOUR

Between King and Emperor: The Evolving Burgundies, 1143–87

Before we can move to a consideration of the Third Crusade, the one in which Burgundy enjoyed its highest-profile participation, we must reconstruct the four decades of political intrigue and alteration that led up to it, and how it functioned in the context of a changing relationship with French king and German emperor. This was reflected in the marriage alliances of the dukes: Odo II with Marie of Champagne, daughter of Theobald ‘the Great’ of Blois-Champagne and eventual sister-in-law of Louis VII, and their son, Hugh III, with Alix of Lorraine and Beatrice of Albon, kinswomen of Frederick Barbarossa.¹ Both connections proved consequential to Burgundy’s affairs in the twelfth century, and when Jerusalem fell in 1187, the family was no stranger to the Holy Land, having made at least one expedition and being sounded out for marriage prospects to Frankish Latin princesses. However, the 1180s also witnessed the greatest upheaval of political ties between France and Burgundy since the eleventh century, and the 1185–86 war between King Philip II and Hugh III, where Hugh III was decisively defeated and forced into heavy reparations, represented the critical moment where Burgundy’s crusade policy, at least on the personal part of the dukes, would henceforth operate as nearly a direct corollary of French political obligation. It is thus by tracing the political, familial, religious, and legal genealogy of these developments that we can begin to understand exactly why the dukes’ crusading commitments were so drastically different before and after 1187. Thus, despite not dealing with a major crusading expedition, this chapter is in some sense the most consequential of the overall argument. It aims to demarcate more of the formative influences in the rapidly changing political landscape of late twelfth-century France, outside merely the Capetians and Plantagenets, and how this was manifested in the years and expeditions yet to come.

¹ SMC, p. 256.
I. Power Struggles and Dynastic Development: The Dukes, 1143–65

Odo II, eldest son of Hugh II and Matilda of Mayenne, became duke of Burgundy in 1143 upon the death of his father. Soon thereafter, he married Marie of Champagne, daughter of Theobald II of Blois and Champagne and thus a member of the largest and most powerful noble family in both France and England at the time. Theobald’s mother was the formidable Adela of Normandy, daughter of William the Conqueror, his father was Stephen, count of Blois, and his younger brothers included Stephen, king of England, and Henry, bishop of Winchester. With his wife, Matilda of Carinthia, Theobald had a number of children, including:

- Henry (‘the Liberal’), count of Champagne (1152–81) and husband of Marie of France, the elder daughter of Louis VII and Eleanor of Aquitaine;
- Theobald, count of Blois (1151–91) and husband of Alix of France, Louis and Eleanor’s younger daughter;
- Adela, third wife of Louis VII (m. 1160) and mother of Philip II of France;
- Isabella, wife of Roger of Apulia, the son of Roger II of Sicily;
- Marie, wife of Odo II of Burgundy and mother of Hugh III;
- William, archbishop of Reims (1175–1202);
- Stephen, count of Sancerre, who made at least two trips to the Holy Land;
- Agnes, wife of Rainald II, count of Bar;
- Matilda, wife of Rotrou IV, count of Perche;

It is apparent that Marie of Champagne’s family connections reached nearly every corner of France, as well as outside it. Furthermore, this marriage took place in the context of a particular power struggle with the king. In 1142, Louis VII had allowed Ralph I, count of Vermandois, to repudiate his wife Eleanor of Champagne, Theobald II’s sister, and marry Petronilla, sister of Eleanor of Aquitaine. The numerous scandals that this union caused for Louis included a war with Theobald, resulting in the occupation of Champagne by the French army and the burning of

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the church at Vitry (dep. Marne, arr. Vitry-les-François), causing the deaths of many citizens. This inflicted considerable damage to Capetian-Burgundian ties, as Theobald turned to Odo II as an ally against Louis. Odo and Marie were married soon after the devastation of Vitry, and Theobald did homage to the young duke, despite being an established statesman of over fifty years; Odo at this time cannot have been older than about twenty-five. Evergates suggests that hard feelings over Vitry, and a new alliance with Theobald (and thus the kings of England), may have been what prevented Odo’s personal participation on the Second Crusade.

This could be true, though the debacle certainly did not destroy all relationships between the French crown and the duchy, given that we have found the development of the Second Crusade being focused specifically in Burgundy just a few years later. (We also argue that it would have been unlikely for Odo to go in either case, given the precedents discussed above.) It does seem, however, that Vitry set the tone for a more turbulent relationship between Louis VII and Odo II than that of their fathers. Odo’s chief conflict was with Godfrey of La Roche, bishop of Langres, who had served as a close ally to Louis on the crusade, and in his repeated disregard of the rights of the monastery of Vézelay (or at least permitting William II of Nevers to molest it with impunity). This feud is recorded in a substantial portion of Pope Eugenius III’s correspondence, which spans his entire pontificate (1145–53). By examining the quarrel between king, pope, bishops, and abbot (on one side) and duke, count, and secular lords (on the other), we may identify some of the key political tensions and dynamics in mid-twelfth-century Burgundy.

Eugenius’ first letters to deal with the Vézelay question, in 1145, were addressed to Odo, William II of Nevers, and Louis VII in turn. Eugenius exhorted Odo to recall Vézelay’s special

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3 Evergates, *Henry the Liberal*, p. 10. In a separate work, Evergates describes this as ‘the earliest recorded [homage] for a count of Champagne’, and notes that it involved Theobald acknowledging that he held Troyes (a major centre of Champenois power, upon which Burgundy had old claims) as a fief from the duke. Evergates, *The Aristocracy in the County of Champagne*, p. 11. Dunbabin also discusses this homage in *France in the Making*, p. 308.

status and pay particular attention to it. He instructed William more directly to cease his insults against Vézelay, and appointed two bishops, Samson of Reims and Godfrey of Langres, and an abbot, Bernard of Clairvaux, to keep an eye on things. Thirdly, Eugenius’ letter to Louis made note of the previous two and had an air of the pope ensuring that the king knew what his misbehaving vassals were up to. To finish off this flurry of reproach, Eugenius then wrote to Hugh of Auxerre, Godfrey of Langres, and Bernard of Clairvaux directly.

This does not seem to have had much effect, as Eugenius wrote again to Odo and to William III’s wife Ida (who was administering the county while William himself, inheritor of his father’s quarrel with Vézelay, was on crusade) on 3 April 1148, each letter short in length and irritated in tone. This was followed by a further missive to Odo on 24 October 1150, noting that the insults to Vézelay had not, in fact, ceased; peace-making efforts via Odo’s brother Henry, bishop of Autun, were attempted. By 19 December 1152, in his letter to Odo and the major lords of Burgundy, Eugenius was thoroughly out of patience. Finally in early 1153, Odo was

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officially condemned by the royal court for his continuing attacks on the bishopric of Langres’ lands and estates, as well as his general disregard of the pope’s censure.¹²

This case is noteworthy in several respects. Firstly, Louis VII took the initiative of inviting Odo and Godfrey to a council in Moret (Moret-sur-Loing, dep. Seine-et-Marne, arr. Fontainebleau), where Godfrey accused the duke of a number of offences, including allowing his vassals to plunder church holdings with impunity. Ernest Petit, who provided a detailed if not extensively sourced account of the proceedings, characterised Odo as giving an insufficient response to all the charges against him, and felt that Godfrey was the clearly wronged party.¹³

However, what stands out to this analysis is Godfrey’s admonishment of Odo to make peace not as a matter of friendship, but of law, in respect of Odo’s duty to Louis as his rightful sovereign.¹⁴

In other words, Godfrey was framing his case in what was still a new political paradigm, and one which marked a distinctive shift from late Carolingian arrangements, where alliances among roughly equal lords were transacted on a more informal and individual basis. In this scheme, it did not matter if Odo was on individual good terms with the king or his own subjects, as that did not preclude him from recognising the law’s obligations and the monarch’s authority to compel his compliance. This represents, despite Louis’s difficulties with his more powerful vassals, a considerably more muscular Capetian monarchy, and serves as a leitmotif of Odo II’s relations

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¹² Hallam and Everard, Capetian France, p. 216.
¹⁴ HdB, II, p. 116: ‘Moins par amitié, que pour la déférence due à votre suzerain, et pour l’hommage que vous lui devez.’
with the crown: despite a less than warm personal relationship, the overriding concerns of political stability and French cohesion against the Plantagenets tended to come to the fore.¹⁵

In 1153, however, this argument remained firmly theoretical, and it appears that Odo’s principal response was to ignore it. Louis attempted four times to summon the duke and the bishop back for a second meeting, with Godfrey dutifully turning up each time but Odo supplying a number of excuses and finally sending several underlings in his place.¹⁶ Finally, a council composed of the archbishop of Sens, the bishops of Paris and Auxerre, and several members of the royal household found, predictably, in Godfrey’s favour. Later that year, Pope Anastasius IV (r. 1153–54) again wrote to the lords of Burgundy – including Odo and his brother Raymond, and the counts of Chalon, Joigny, Donzy, Montréal, and Vergy – ordering them to protect Pons of Vézelay and his monastery from further mistreatment.¹⁷ It is surprising that Hugh of Poitiers, always quick to belabour any insult to Vézelay, has comparatively little to say on this point. He does note that a quarrel between Pons and Henry, bishop of Autun (Odo’s younger brother), was settled by the pope around this time (1154),¹⁸ but is more focused on the fact that the ongoing bitter feud between the abbey and the counts of Nevers remained enough of a concern to warrant Louis’s personal involvement.¹⁹ The king’s sympathies fell on the side of the monastery (though not without charging for the service, by forcing a recognition of his ultimate lordship), but this also represented royal patronage and concern in a distinctly regional matter.²⁰

Apart from their interminable feuding with the secular lords of Nevers, Vézelay was also

¹⁵ It is perhaps comparable to Henry II’s refusal to attack the city of Toulouse in 1159 while Louis was inside, rather than directly harm the king to whom he had sworn an oath in his capacity as a vassal of France – even gaining a finite military advantage was not worth undercutting the rule of law, and could potentially free his own barons to break their oaths to him. See Chris Wickham, Medieval Europe, pp. 9–13.

¹⁶ HdB, ii, p. 117.


¹⁸ Vézelay Chronicle, p. 199.

¹⁹ Vézelay Chronicle, p. 200; Monumenta Vizeliacensia, pp. 433–37.

²⁰ Dunbabin, France in the Making, p. 275.
engaged in a dispute with a religious foe, the abbey of Cluny.\textsuperscript{21} To find the king and pope involved on a long-running basis with the affairs of a Burgundian abbey against its Burgundian rivals provides a clear example of Louis’s increasing influence, and the ways in which, despite a cool personal relationship between duke and king, their respective territories and polities remained, and were growing further, enmeshed. Indeed, one nearly emerges with the sense that in the eight years of Eugenius’ pontificate, two of the most pressing political issues in France were the Second Crusade and the feud between Nevers and Vézelay. Both were centred in Burgundy, both recruited the pope and the king in their arbitration and execution, and both represented a considerably more confident exercise of papal and royal power.

This point is echoed by Jean Richard, who noted that during this period, Louis was able to move fairly freely around Burgundy, apparently with no logistical or hostile concerns to impede his travels, had taken the cross in and departed on crusade from Burgundy,\textsuperscript{22} and that ultimately by the end of the century, ‘il semble qu’un hommage en règle (hommage lige à la fin du XIIe siècle) unissait le duc au roi’.\textsuperscript{23} Louis also made two later interventions in Burgundy in 1166 and 1171 to defend the rights of Cluny, spurred by his father’s promise of protection from 1119, and Dunbabin described these as relatively ‘forceful’\textsuperscript{24}. It is also reflected in the fact that Odo could not avoid the king forever, or even for very long. In June 1155, he attended a royal council in Soissons alongside the counts of Flanders, Troyes, Nevers, and others, where Louis ‘came as close to legislating as any twelfth-century French or English king was to do’.\textsuperscript{25} Louis proclaimed the Peace of God to be in force in France for a period of ten years, ordered a halt to

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\item \textsuperscript{21} Vézelay Chronicle, p. 233.
\item \textsuperscript{23} Richard, Les ducs de Bourgogne, p. 115. We will see, however, that this homage did not come without considerable challenge in the time of Hugh III, and had been broadly renegotiated as a result.
\item \textsuperscript{24} Dunbabin, France in the Making, p. 261.
\item \textsuperscript{25} Dunbabin, France in the Making, p. 263.
\end{itemize}
further depredations of church land, and named himself as guarantor, promising penalties for non-compliance.\textsuperscript{26} The dignitaries present accordingly consented to observe the peace, and Dunbabin viewed this as, if not quite to the standard of Charlemagne, nonetheless ‘[reviving] the tradition whereby the crown was seen as the author of society’s moral norms’.\textsuperscript{27}

It is useful now to consider how much these power struggles actually affected daily life in Burgundy, and to compare the duchy’s political situation and developments with those of its neighbours. In Dunbabin’s analysis, the very fact of the dukes’ low-profile crusade involvement (or as she put it, ‘abstention from heroic enterprise’) in the twelfth century permitted them to be generally at home and attending to administration, rather than expensively absent in the Holy Land.\textsuperscript{28} This, along with a rapidly developing wine trade, resulted in a fairly stable and prosperous principality, and was a period of great architectural expansion, with the building of many new churches, city walls, and castles which altered the physical and civic geography of the duchy.\textsuperscript{29} It is a reminder of the fact that what the dukes of Burgundy accomplished while not going on crusade may have been, at points, more consequential than what they did by going. We have observed the pattern of the dukes either participating late and in extenuating circumstances, or simply not at all, without a clear reason for their refusal. Inferences can be made, but it is nonetheless fair to speculate whether they constituted a counterpoint to the noble families in which exceptionally high crusading commitment was visible across generations. If, as Jonathan Riley-Smith, Nicholas Paul, and others have argued, crusading traditions were transmitted through kinship networks, it is entirely possible that the dukes of Burgundy settled on a family

\textsuperscript{26} \textit{HdB}, II, p.119.
\textsuperscript{27} Dunbabin, \textit{France in the Making}, p. 263.
\textsuperscript{28} Dunbabin, \textit{France in the Making}, p. 306.
policy and rule of thumb that favoured remaining at home in France, rather than embarking on costly and dangerous adventures abroad.

This functions as a challenge both to any assumption of universal French participation in the crusades and the simplistic modern myth that medieval people were only concerned with religious zealotry and could not make decisions in any other interests. After all, if Burgundy’s dukes behaved differently from their peers over several generations, and during several periods of conflict in the Holy Land, this is surely as important to our understanding of the effects of crusading ideology as those who did respond to crusade calls, and joined up on formal or informal expeditions. Accordingly, Dunbabin characterised Burgundian government in this era as essentially stable, generic, and conservative, with modest expenditures and no need for drastic change.

If not quite as developed as Flanders or Normandy in its organised social hierarchy, financial apparatus, and control and regulation of its bishops, it was competent in all these areas, and while it was the first region in France to establish an official archive (around 1180), Dunbabin again saw this as conserving, rather than challenging, the status quo. It does reflect the increasingly bureaucratised administration, as it became important to keep track of a complex network of vassals, obligations, honours, duties, and laws.

The rise of the Plantagenets – kings of England, lords of Ireland, Scotland (1174–89), and Wales, dukes of Normandy, Brittany, and Aquitaine, and counts of Anjou, Poitou, and Maine, a vast bloc of territories often termed the ‘Angevin empire’ – provided the greatest challenge to

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30 This popular explanation for the crusades, as well as the contention that they were merely cynical and economic wars as a precursor of modern colonialism, is critiqued (though with some issues of its own) in Tal Dingott Alkopher, ‘The Social (And Religious) Meanings That Constitute War: The Crusades as Realpolitik vs. Socialpolitik’, *International Studies Quarterly*, 49 (2005), 725–37.
the kings of France in the latter twelfth century, a rivalry which also involved the formidable Frederick Barbarossa, Holy Roman Emperor (r. 1155–90). Barbarossa became the count of Burgundy by his marriage to Beatrice, daughter of Count Rainald III, in 1156, after he originally intended to acquire it by means of a military campaign with Berthold IV, duke of Zähringen. He soon made his presence known, holding a major council in Besançon in October 1157 in order to receive homage and symbolically re-establish the kingdom of Burgundy among the territories of the Holy Roman Empire. This achievement did not pass unnoticed, as Barbarossa’s biographers in the *Gesta Frederici Imperatoris* implied that he was Charlemagne’s proper successor, reuniting the lands divided in the ninth century, and commented on his initiative to organise and rule Burgundy directly. Frederick also had to compensate Beatrice’s cousins, the sons of William III of Mâcon, who were allowed to title themselves counts of Burgundy, and whom he was successful at converting into loyal allies and supporters. The elder, Stephen II of Burgundy, attended Frederick and Beatrice’s wedding, and received the county of


36 *Monumenta Germaniae Historica: Diplomata Regum et Imperatorum Germaniae. Friderici I. Diplomata (1152-1158)*, ed. by Heinrich Appelt (Hanover: Hahn, 1975), X-I, p. 23: ‘Dominus rex dabit eidem duci terram Burgundìæ et Prouncië in terris fuerit. In Italiam expeditionem ducet cum domino rege mille loricatos equites, quamdiu dominus rex in eisdem terris fuerit. In Italiam expeditionem ducet cum domino rege quamdiu in ipsa expeditione fuerit, quingentos loricatos equites et L arcobalistarios’. The date of this document is 1 June 1152; Berthold was also optimistically referred to as ‘Berthold duke of Burgundy [Bertoldus dux Burgundie]’ in Frederick’s charter of 28 July, later that summer. See *Friderici I. Diplomata (1152-1158)*, X-I, p. 28.


Auxonne; his younger brother, Gerard, held Mâcon and Vienne. Stephen appeared as a witness in Frederick’s charters of 24 September 1162, in Vesoul, and on 19 September 1165 in Worms.

Among the other regional nobility, Henry the Liberal, count of Champagne, Louis VII and Odo II’s brother-in-law (and Louis’s soon-to-be son-in-law) was also a major force. The chronicles do not comment much on what, if any, direct role Odo II played in this dynamic. His court at Dijon, however, served an important function in the ongoing church schism, engendered by the disputed 1159 papal election between Alexander III and Victor IV. Most of Western Christendom accepted Alexander’s victory, but a minority, including Barbarossa, supported Victor IV as antipope. In summer 1162, Louis VII asked Henry the Liberal to negotiate a meeting with Barbarossa in order to discuss the matter of the rival popes, which Henry did. The date was set for 29 August, at Saint-Jean-de-Losne (dep. Côte d’Or, arr. Beaune) in Burgundy, about 20 miles south of Dijon. Louis used Odo’s court as his base, which demonstrates his confidence in treating ducal Burgundy as a fairly reliable extension of his own demesne. This is additionally noteworthy in that it suggests an ongoing (and rather self-evident) usage of Burgundy as a halfway point for meetings between king and emperor. In highlighting the

39 Freed, Frederick Barbarossa, p. 184.
43 Alexander came out on top, ruling from 1159–81, and Victor died in 1164, ending the dispute.
44 The biographer of Alexander III in the Liber pontificalis presents this all as having been pre-arranged by Henry and Barbarossa to intentionally deceive Louis, ‘a man pious but having the simplicity of a dove’, but this is an obviously partisan account with an interest in vindicating Louis, Alexander’s ally, and critiquing Barbarossa, Alexander’s enemy, and should not be given excess credence. Boso, Life of Alexander III, trans. by G.M. Ellis (Oxford: Blackwell, 1973), p. 55.
45 HdB, II, p. 128.
46 According to Otto of Freising, Louis had in fact first come to Dijon in 1157, five years earlier, for an attempted conference with the emperor, but this had come to nothing. It is possible that Otto’s chronology is muddled and this is a reference to the 1162 meeting, but as it takes place among events solidly locatable in 1157 and 1158, this is likewise not certain. Otto of Freising and Rahewin of Freising, The Deeds of Frederick Barbarossa, trans. by Charles Christopher Mierow, 2nd edn (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1994), p. 187.
region’s unique position between royal and imperial authority, it also reflects the geographical divide of power in France itself: the north and east, including the Île-de-France, Burgundy, and Champagne, were largely loyal to Louis, while the west and south (excluding the Languedoc and parts of Toulouse) were almost entirely under Plantagenet control.47

Louis’s first audience with Barbarossa fell through, but Henry the Liberal managed to arrange another on 22 September 1162. Odo II himself, however, was ill and in considerable ecclesiastical difficulties, which meant he played very little part in the discussions. His brother Henry, bishop of Autun, had excommunicated him around 1160 for his treatment of the commune of Flavigny, and sent word to Pope Alexander III – who, according to Petit, suspected Odo of harbouring sympathies for his rival Victor as a result.48 Alexander was resident in France at the time, having been forced to flee Rome after the disputed election, and was evidently offered lodging at the castle of Vergy, but declined to take it up. On 22 September, as Louis was returning to Saint-Jean-de-Losne, Alexander (then in Dole) wrote to the king instructing him to force Odo to yield his claims to Flavigny, and threatening further penalties if he disobeyed, as well as referencing his legacy of ecclesiastical defiance and general misbehaviour.49 Alexander’s efforts, however, were in vain. Odo died before the month was out; it is unclear if his excommunication was still in force. In line with emerging tradition, he chose Cîteaux as his place of burial, and left his only son, Hugh, as his successor.

48 HdB, ii, p. 132. We can see some proof of this in Alexander’s letter of 6 April 1162 to the abbey of Saint Stephen in Dijon, discreetly authorising them to continue celebrating the holy offices in the event of an interdict being levied on the rest of Burgundy. Chartes de l’abbaye de Saint-Étienne de Dijon, de 1155 à 1200, ed. by Georges Valat (Paris: Librairie Picard, 1907), iii, act. 13, pp. 34–35.
At his father’s death, Hugh III was no more than fourteen years old. Petit assigned him a birthdate around 1148, which would make him nearly old enough to rule in his own right, but it was his mother, Marie of Champagne, who became regent. As Henry the Liberal’s sister and Louis’s sister-in-law (thanks to his marriage to their sister Adela in 1160), Marie was part of the ruling family of northern France, and seems to have been a respected figure during her husband’s tenure. She appeared fairly consistently in his charters, and was described in one as ‘Maria, illustriissima uxore sua’. 50 One of her foremost concerns was to find her son a wife, and she wrote to Louis asking for Eleanor of Vermandois, younger daughter of Ralph of Vermandois and Petronilla of Aquitaine, to be given in marriage to Hugh. 51 As Ralph and Petronilla’s own union had caused the Champenois-French war in 1142 and Marie’s marriage to Odo, this appears as an astute olive branch, and Marie likewise reminded Louis of the advantage (and her preference) of having the new duke of Burgundy marry within the kingdom of France, rather than outside it. 52 Indeed, with the twin threats of the Plantagenets and Barbarossa, and ducal Burgundy’s status as a buffer zone for Louis, this should have been a clear-cut decision, and it is unclear why Louis proceeded to mismanage it thoroughly. He did have help, as a number of Burgundian barons, including the lords of Grancey, Vergy, Faverney, Dijon, and others, drove a wedge between Hugh III and his mother, and forced Marie to flee to her dower lands. 53 There she again implored Louis to assist her, concluding poignantly, ‘After God, I have no more hope than in you’. 54

To Louis’s credit, he did respond. However, his decision, compounding his unexplained decision to reject the match between Hugh and Eleanor of Vermandois, was to prepare for an

52 Historiae Francorum Scriptores, IV, p. 722: ‘Sciatis, cum in alio Regno filius meus uxorem habere posset, ego multo magis volo in vestro Regno uxorem ducere quam in alio.’
53 HdB, II, p. 146.
invasion of Burgundy. Alarmed, the barons counselled Hugh to pursue an alliance with Frederick Barbarossa as a precaution, advice which the young duke promptly took. In response to French threats, Barbarossa wrote to Henry the Liberal warning him that he was prepared to assist Hugh’s interests with the full might of the empire, and urging Henry not to intervene and to change Louis’s mind. Overall, this appears as such a profoundly tone-deaf move on Louis’s part that one cannot help but concur with Petit’s disparaging assessment that he had committed ‘une grande faute politique’. The king had been offered a golden and much-needed opportunity to consolidate his power in northern and north-central France, reinforce ducal Burgundy as a friendly territory against the advances of Barbarossa, repair the old wounds of Vitry, and establish himself as a patron and mentor to the young duke, but he comprehensively botched it. Barbarossa offered his niece Alix, daughter of his sister Bertha and Duke Matthew of Lorraine, as a bride for Hugh instead, and the two were married in 1164 or 1165.

Later, in the late 1170s or early 1180s, Hugh separated from Alix for unknown reasons. Bouchard claimed that it was due to the opportunity for a more ‘eligible’ wife, but it is not quite clear what she meant, given that Alix, as Barbarossa’s niece, was highly placed in the hierarchy of the Holy Roman Empire, and had borne children to Hugh including the future Odo III. Alberic of Trois-Fontaines remarked on this, possibly suggesting that there was some element of land acquisition or expansion of political authority at play, though he did not give a

55 ‘Epistolae Frederici, Romanorum Imperatoris’, in Rerum Gallicorum et Francicarum Scriptores/RHGF, xvi, pp. 691–92: ‘Ad Henricum, Trecarum Comitem […] Audivimus, unde plurimum gravamur et dolemus, quod Rex videlicet Franciae in proximo festo sancti Joannis terram Ducis Divionensis nostri dilecti et nostri obligati hostiliter atque destruer proponit [...] pro nostre amore ipsum Regem ab hoc proposito modis omnibus retrahas et impedias [...] Quod si Rex ipse ab hac intentione desistere vel supersedere noluerit, scias pro certo quod non patiemur nec sustinebimus, immo ei resistendo amicum nostrum Ducem cum toto rebore imperii nostri juvare curabimus et defensare. Verumtamen, si inter Ducem et matrem ejus aliqua quaestio, quae tendat ad discordam…’
56 HdB, ii, pp. 149–50.
57 HdB, ii, p. 151. See also SMC, pp. 256, 261.
58 SMC, p. 261.
precise reason for the dismissal of Alix. Hugh’s new bride was Beatrice of Albon, daughter of Guigues V, count of Albon, and herself descended from Stephen I of Burgundy. She seems to have also been related to Barbarossa, but this kinship is not defined. Hugh and Beatrice were married by 1184, with their first son, Andrew, born soon thereafter. However, this was not Hugh’s only choice for a new bride, as the issue of his potential marriage to Sibylla of Jerusalem, and a broader Burgundian expedition to the Holy Land, arose in the 1170s, and involved questions of wider political significance for both France and the kingdom of Jerusalem.

II. Burgundy and the Holy Land: Marriages and Expeditions, 1162–79

We arrive now at an interesting juncture in the relations of the ruling family of Burgundy, both nuclear and extended, with the Latin Christian kingdom of Jerusalem, in the last full decade before the fall of the city to Saladin in 1187. In the interim, Burgundian noblemen had continued to play an important role in Outremer. The notorious Raynald of Châtillon was a younger son of the lord of Donzy, and was possibly considered as a husband for one of the duke’s daughters (this duke most probably Hugh II) prior to his marriage to Constance, widow of Raymond of Antioch, in 1153. But around 1169, the advisors of King Amalric of Jerusalem (r. 1163–74)

60 For the lineage and background of the counts of Albon, see Aurélien Le Coq, ‘La trajectoire des Guigues d’Albon: Réseaux et lieux de pouvoir, Xe–XIIe siècle’, Florilegium, 29 (2012), 201–27.
61 SMC, p. 261.
63 Jonathan Phillips, Defenders of the Holy Land: Relations Between the Latin East and the West, 1119-1187 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996), pp. 126. See also Jean Richard, ‘La noblesse de Terre-Sainte (1097-1187)’, Arquivos de Centro Cultural Português, 26 (1989), pp. 326–27. Raynald’s background and family connections, as well as the identity of the ducal daughter he may have been considered to marry and his overall disparaging historiographical treatment, is discussed in Paul F. Crawford, ‘An Upstart without Prospects? The
sent an offer to Stephen of Sancerre, uncle of Hugh III and brother of Henry the Liberal, for him to marry Sibylla, at the time Amalric’s only daughter. Sibylla was already recognised as a potential heiress to the throne, and her marriage was thus not merely a matter of general politics, but encompassed the future of the succession and any man who might rule as king with her.

It is unclear if the leprosy of Amalric’s only son, the future Baldwin IV, was known at this point. William of Tyre gave an account of the discovery of Baldwin’s condition while playing with friends as a boy, but there is no mention of when this took place, and in 1169, Baldwin was about eight years old. But the interest in securing Sibylla a husband from the largest and most powerful family in France also reflected an unease about the precarious fortunes of the kingdom of Jerusalem, and an urgent need to recruit Western help. William of Tyre described the appeals sent to the kings Louis VII of France, Henry II of England, and William II of Sicily, and the counts Philip of Flanders, Henry I of Champagne, and Theobald V of Blois, which achieved little except for Theobald’s brother, Stephen of Sancerre’s, agreement to marry Sibylla. Even this, however, backfired, as Stephen quickly reneged on his promise: ‘On the count’s arrival in the kingdom, the king [Amalric] graciously reminded him of the matter, but although the offer had already been made and accepted, Stephen now rejected it and, after living a disgracefully licentious life for several months in the kingdom, decided to return home.

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65 When Baldwin became king at the age of thirteen in 1174, there was no mention of his condition in official documents. This would have been a serious weakness and political disadvantage to disclose, which also makes it difficult to set a precise date of diagnosis. See Piers D. Mitchell, ‘An Evaluation of the Leprosy of King Baldwin IV of Jerusalem in the Context of the Medieval World’, in Bernard Hamilton, The Leper King and His Heirs: Baldwin IV and the Crusader Kingdom of Jerusalem (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), pp. 245–58.


67 Irregular matrimonial behaviour was evidently something of a habit for Stephen, who had previously married the daughter of Geoffrey III of Donzy after her first husband, Anselm II of Traîné, had held off on consummating it due to her young age. Evergates, The Aristocracy in the County of Champagne, p. 102.
overland’.  

William’s overall impression was withering, as he viewed Stephen as ‘a man of noble family but of far from noble life’, and remarked that ‘the hatred of all the people in the East followed him’.  

However, Stephen of Sancerre’s short and star-crossed excursion in 1171–72 was part of a visit to the Holy Land for a number of Burgundian noblemen, both ducal and comital, including Hugh III himself and Stephen II of Burgundy, cousin of Empress Beatrice. Odo of Champlitte, Hugh’s seneschal and another cousin of Beatrice, and other Burgundian lords also accompanied them, representing a powerful nexus of family interest. Robert of Monte recorded Stephen of Sancerre and Hugh III’s departure, and noted that Stephen brought money for the assistance of the church in Jerusalem. Benjamin Z. Kedar believed that this was the proceeds of the tax imposed in 1166 by Louis VII in France and Henry II in England for the defence of the Latin kingdom, and suggested that Stephen may have been the one responsible for discussing the scheme of taxation, which was later replicated in Jerusalem in 1183. Louis and Henry had squabbled over who was to be entrusted with its delivery, culminating in the burning of the city and cathedral of Tours. With a financial trust and an intended marriage as his purpose, one of which at least he seems to have accomplished, Stephen’s reasons for the visit are clear, but those of his companions are less so.

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70 Evergates, Henry the Liberal, p. 151. See also Phillips, Defenders of the Holy Land, p.168.  
We can possibly infer from Hugh’s robust ecclesiastical patronage prior to his departure that similarly to some of his predecessors, he was in difficulties with the church (as he certainly was later). A charter of 1170 to Saint-Bénigne was to ‘réparer les injustices commises à l’égard de l’abbaye’, and Hugh issued at least two to Cîteaux. The first in 1170 is described as being at the ‘intervention’ of the archbishop of Lyon, the archbishop of Tarentaise, and the abbot of Cîteaux, in which Hugh granted broad economic concessions to the Cistercians. While Jerusalem was not specifically mentioned, this was clearly part of his preparations for the journey, given as it was principally witnessed by ‘my uncle, count Stephen of Sancerre’. Another charter of 1170 gave generous financial rewards (1000 livres) to the monastery of Saint-Stephen in Dijon, as well as authorising it to collect a portion of all tolls from entries to the city, and to establish their own postern gate between the house of the Templars and the Ouche river bridge. Hugh also patronised the Hospitalers of Dijon, sponsoring the entrance of two new brothers to the order, Guibert and Martin, with the consent of his wife and young son in 1170.

Hugh then gave two charters at Beaune in 1171. The first claimed that he wished to participate in the prayers and spiritual benefits of the Cistercians, especially as he was making ready to go to Jerusalem, and granted them broad privileges to buy and sell, travel freely, and

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74 *HdB*, ii, act 499, p. 338.
76 *Cîteaux*, act 192, p. 156: ‘…avunculo meo comite Stephano de Sancerre’.
77 *CSED*, act 43, pp. 58-59: ‘Ego Hugo dux Burgundie omnibus fidelibus notifico Erueyo Abbati et ceteris Canonici Ecclesiae Beatiissimi Protonomartiris Stephani, me in vadimoniio concessisse pro mile solidis Divionis monete […] Concessi etiam predictis Canoniciis portam quae dicitur Porta Canoniciorum cum redditu ipsius, quandiu ista gageria steterit […] Hoc denique non est praetermittendum quam praeditis Canoniciis, inter Domum Templariorum et pontum Oshare’.
78 Chartulaire général des Hospitaliers, t, act 413, pp. 287: ‘…ego Hugo, dux Burgundie, notum fieri volo cunctis presentibus et futuris quod, Deo inspirante, Iherosolimam iturus, pro remedio anime mee […] assensu et laude Aalydis, uxoris mee, et Odonis, filii mee, libere dedi et in perpetuum concessi Deo et fratribus Hospitalis Jherusalem S. Johannis Baptiste apud Divionem duos homines fratern, Guibertum scilicet, piperarium, et Martinum, fratrem ejus […] Factum est hoc in manu Guidonis, venerabilis preceptoris fratrum Hospitalis, anno ab incarnatione Domini MCLXX’. Odo of Champlitte, Hugh’s seneschal and fellow crusader, his friend Girard of Réon, and the Second Crusade veteran Anseric II of Montréal were all witnesses for this charter.

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otherwise remain exempt from customary taxes and dues.\textsuperscript{79} The second charter insisted that it was to ‘remove scandal and all scruple of doubt’ that Hugh was travelling to Jerusalem to remedy his soul, that of his father’s, and those of his ancestors.\textsuperscript{80} His wife Alix witnessed both charters, appearing as ‘Aalydis, uxoris mee’\textsuperscript{81} and ‘Aaliz ducissa Burgundie’.\textsuperscript{82} It is possible that the young duke, still only in his early twenties, was attracted by the adventure, but not without ulterior motives and political concessions. Relations with his mother Marie must have been repaired, as she acted as regent of the duchy while Hugh was abroad, in which capacity she settled a dispute between the Cistercians and Odo of Marigny around 1171–72.\textsuperscript{83} (After her son’s return, Marie retired as a nun to Fontevraud Abbey in 1174, where she died about 1190.\textsuperscript{84}) It is also noteworthy that Hugh felt confident enough to go abroad for some time, likely counting on Barbarossa as protector of his lands, though he faced less military threat than others.

Stephen II of Burgundy followed suit in issuing a charter to Cîteaux in 1170, prior to his departure for Jerusalem with the others, exempting the Cistercians from the same taxes and dues on his lands.\textsuperscript{85} It appears as a symbolic gesture of unity to patronise the dukes’ favoured house of Cîteaux, especially with Stephen and Hugh both married to Frederick Barbarossa’s nieces.\textsuperscript{86}

\textsuperscript{81} \textit{HdB}, II, act 518, p. 347.
\textsuperscript{82} \textit{Cîteaux}, act 198, p. 160.
\textsuperscript{83} \textit{Cîteaux}, act 206, p. 165.
\textsuperscript{84} Evergates, \textit{Henry the Liberal}, pp. 141, 208.
\textsuperscript{86} Stephen was married to Judith – daughter of Duke Matthew of Lorraine, niece of Barbarossa, cousin of Beatrice, and sister of Alix, first wife of Hugh III. The Lorraine sisters can be viewed as one piece of the prosopographical ‘glue’ that held together the complex linkages between the various counts, cousins, dukes, and eminences of Burgundy in this time period.
Additionally, Odo I of Champlitte, Hugh’s seneschal and the viscount of Dijon, had been honoured in 1166 by Barbarossa and Beatrice for ‘fidelitatis ac devotionis ardore hactenus nobis servivit’. The witness list of this charter named several prominent members of the Burgundian nobility, both lay and ecclesiastical, including Herbert, archbishop of Besançon, Hugh, abbot of Cluny, and Stephen II of Burgundy and Gerard of Mâcon-Vienne, Beatrice’s cousins. It was then notarised by William, archbishop of Vienne and arch-chancellor of Burgundy. For Odo to serve Hugh, Barbarossa, and Beatrice – in other words, the duke, count, and countess of Burgundy – and for his recognition to be attended by such a distinguished gathering, including the archbishop of Besançon (the highest religious authority in comital Burgundy) and the abbot of Cluny (the highest religious authority in ducal Burgundy) suggests that he may have been the focal point to unite both Burgundies on the expedition. Odo was the grandson of the 1101 crusader Stephen I, count of Burgundy, via his mother Elizabeth. His father was Hugh I, count of Troyes, who had travelled extensively to the Holy Land in the early twelfth century and even joined the Knights Templar, which gave Odo a crusading pedigree on both sides of the family.

Aside from William of Tyre’s dismay at Stephen of Sancerre’s failure to marry Sibylla and personal misbehaviour, relatively little is recorded of the pilgrims’ time in the Holy Land itself. William, however, was favourably impressed by Stephen II of Burgundy:

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90 Odo of Champlitte was the son of Hugh I of Troyes and Elizabeth of Burgundy, but had not been acknowledged by his father, who believed himself impotent and made his nephew Theobald II heir instead. Elizabeth was the elder sister of Rainald III of Burgundy (d. 1148), Beatrice’s father, and William III of Mâcon (d. 1156), Stephen II’s father. See Kimberly A. LoPrete, ‘Adela of Blois: Familial Alliances and Female Lordship’ in Aristocratic Women in Medieval France, ed. by Theodore Evergates (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1999), 7–43 (p. 12), for the family tree of the early twelfth-century Blois-Champenois house, including Hugh’s marriage to Elizabeth. For Hugh’s crusading participation, see James Doherty, ‘Count Hugh of Troyes and the Early Crusading Era’ (unpublished PhD thesis, University of Lancaster, 2014) <https://www.history.ac.uk/history-online/theses/thesis/count-hugh-troyes-and-early-crusading-era>
That same year, another Count Stephen, a son of Count William de Saône, arrived in the kingdom on a pilgrimage of prayer and devotion. Although he bore the same name, he differed greatly from the other Stephen, as he was an unassuming man of honourable life, entirely worthy of great respect. He was accompanied by Henry [Hugh] the Younger, duke of Burgundy, the son of a sister of the Stephen [of Sancerre] spoken of above. After a short stay in the kingdom, they returned to their own land but stopped on the way in Constantinople, where the emperor showed them marked attention and dismissed them with many gifts.\footnote{91}{WT, II, p. 947: ‘Eodem anno comes quoque Stephanus equivocus eius sed morum honestate longe dissimilus, vir modestus et plane commendabilis, filius comitis Willelmi de Sauna, et dux Burgundiae Henricus junior, superioris Stephani ex sorore nepos, in regnum orationis gratia et devotionis intuitus ingressi et moram modicum facientes, per imperatorem Constantinopolitanum ad propria reversi sunt, ab eo suscepti honorifice, et cum multis muneribus dismissi’. Trans. by Babcock and Krey, II, pp. 384-5.}

William’s mistake on Hugh’s name as ‘Henry the Younger’ may reflect confusion with Henry the Young King of England; it is not clear why he consistently errs on this point.\footnote{92}{The seventeenth-century historian André Duchesne noted both William of Tyre and Robert of Monte’s mistakes on Hugh’s name (as noted above, where Robert calls him Odo), but was also unsure from whence they originated. In fact, Hugh III is consistently misnamed in chronicle sources, as William the Breton also calls him ‘Odo’ and he is often referred to or glossed as ‘Henry’. See André Duchesne, Histoire des roys, ducs et comtes de Bourgogne et d’Arles, extraict de diverses chartes et chroniques anciennes (Paris: Cramoisy, 1619), p. 280.}
The reference to a visit to Byzantium and an audience with the emperor (Manuel I Komnenos, r. 1143–80), is of some interest, given that a few years previously, Amalric of Jerusalem had been courting the Byzantines for assistance in a planned invasion of Egypt. William himself had been sent as emissary to Constantinople, and treated the failure of the scheme harshly.\footnote{93}{Alan V. Murray, ‘The Grand Designs of Gilbert of Assailly: The Order of the Hospital in the Projected Conquest of Egypt by King Amalric of Jerusalem (1168–1169)’ in Ordines Militares: Yearbook for the Study of the Military Orders, 20 (2015), 7–24. See also Steven Runciman, ‘The Visit of King Amalric I to Constantinople in 1171’, in Outremer: Studies in the History of the Crusading Kingdom of Jerusalem presented to Joshua Prawer, ed. by B.Z. Kedar, H.E. Mayer and R.C. Smail (Jerusalem: Yad Izhak Ben-Zvi Institute, 1982), 153–58.}

However, it does not seem that the Burgundian visit had any ramifications for this project, which was largely concluded by 1170–71 with the exception of the brief appearance of a Byzantine fleet in 1177;\footnote{94}{Ralph-Johannes Lilie, Byzantium and the Crusader States, 1096-1204, trans. by J.C. Morris and Jean E. Ridings (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993), p. 319.} the Byzantine historian Nicetas Choniates did not make any mention of them.\footnote{95}{For Nicetas’ discussion of the events of this year, see Nicetas Choniates, O City of Byzantium: Annals of Nicetas Choniates, trans. by Harry J. Magoulias (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1984), p. 91.} If anything, it shows that relations between Byzantium and Jerusalem, even after the failed venture, remained cordial enough for Manuel to grant a diplomatic reception to a pair of European noblemen...
returning home after a visit to the Holy Land, but does not appear to be consequential in any larger way. Indeed, the chief events of the return journey took place elsewhere. At some point, Hugh experienced a terrible storm at sea and promised, in exchange for deliverance, to build a church in Dijon dedicated to the Virgin Mary and St John the Baptist. After a visit to Pope Alexander III in Rome, he returned home with ten clerics to serve at the new foundation, and in 1173 actually did this, arranging for the new church to be built near the ducal castle. Stephen of Burgundy also gave a gift to Cîteaux shortly after his return in October 1172, and remarked that he expected to go to Dijon soon, where Hugh would recognise and confirm it. Overall, we are left with a continued impression of intra-Burgundian unity, Hugh’s scuffles with the church aside, and with the visit to the Holy Land showcasing this relative political equilibrium.

This changed somewhat as the decade progressed. With Louis VII in declining health and Henry II’s discontented sons participating in a number of uprisings against their father, the political situation in France – despite the birth of Louis’s much-needed son, the future Philip II, in August 1165 – remained unstable. The kingdom of Jerusalem was also suffering setbacks following the death of King Amalric, the coronation of the thirteen-year-old Baldwin IV in 1174, and the rise of Saladin. After the failed attempt to match her with Stephen of Sancerre, Sibylla, now heiress presumptive to the crown, married William of Montferrat in November 1176, a union that lasted only months until he died, having nonetheless managed to leave her pregnant

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96 CSED, III, act 49, pp. 65–66: ‘Ego Hugo dux Burgundiae notum uolo esse praesentibus et futuris, quoniam Ierosolimam profiscens, pro nimia maris perturbation et imminentis periculi acerbitate, tam ego quam omnes qui mecum in nauigio errant, grauiter perterriti fuimus; ea propter, uotu \[…\] promisi Deo, constructurum, in mea curte, apud Diuionem, ecclesiam in honorem Sanctae Genitricis Mariae et beati Joannis Euangeliste, unde factum est ut, Romam ueniens, per manus bonae memoriae Alexendri Summi Pontificis \[…\] confirmari feci.’

97 Cîteaux, act 208, p. 168: ‘\[…\] quod ego Stephanus comes Burgundie \[…\] promisi Deo, meconstructurum, in mea curte, apud Dijonem, ecclesiam in honorem Sanctae Genitricis Mariæ et beati Joannis Evangelistæ, unde factum est ut, Romam ueniens, quod uouveram per manus bonae memoriae Alexendri Summi Pontificis \[…\] confirmari feci.’
with the future Baldwin V. William, son of William V of Montferrat, was a grandson of Gisela of Burgundy and thus a first cousin of Louis VII (Adelaide of Maurienne, Louis’s mother, was a daughter of Gisela by her first marriage, while William V was a son of her second). However, his premature death left affairs scarcely more settled than before, and set to again overlap with those of ducal Burgundy, as it is possible that one more attempt was made, in 1179, to secure a Burgundian husband for the widowed Sibylla of Jerusalem. William of Tyre and a number of other churchmen left the Holy Land in October 1178 to attend ‘a general synod at Rome which had been proclaimed the previous year throughout the entire Latin world [the Third Lateran Council, March 1179]’. One of these delegates, Joscius, bishop of Acre:

went as envoy to Henry [Hugh], duke of Burgundy, charged with the mission of inviting him to come to the kingdom. For we had unanimously agreed that he should be given the king’s sister [Sibylla] in marriage under the same conditions which had been made at the time of her previous marriage to the marquis [William of Montferrat]. The duke received this offer at the hand of Bishop Joscius graciously and is said to have sworn by his own hand that he would come. However, for reasons still unknown to us, he later disregarded his oath and refused to fulfil the solemn promise by which he had bound himself.

Jean Richard was sceptical of this account on the grounds that Hugh had likely not yet separated from Alix at the time, but this need not be a disqualifier. If relations had soured between the ducal couple and Hugh was already informally in the market for a new wife, Joscius of Acre might have felt it worthwhile to approach him anyway, and William, travelling with Joscius to Rome, would be well positioned to report on his future itinerary. No other source records the

98 Hamilton, The Leper King, pp. 110, 118.
offer, but if it was a matter of internal politics in Jerusalem that failed to achieve any result in Europe, it is unlikely that Western chroniclers would be broadly aware of it.

The question, therefore, is why the nobles of Jerusalem would again select Burgundy as the supplier of a suitable husband. William notes that they tried once more to obtain Hugh via approaching Henry the Liberal: ‘At this time the negotiations which had been made the year before with reference to the duke of Burgundy were renewed through Count Henry, his uncle. It was hoped that he would arrive by the next crossing, but for some unknown reasons he still declined to come’.\footnote{WT, II, p. 1004: ‘Per idem tempus renovatum est verbum, quod anno proxime preterito de duce Burgundie motum fuerat cum domino comite Henrico, eius avunculo: sperabatur in proxime futuro transitu venturus esse; sed, sicut postea evidentur patuit, causis quibusdam occultis adhuc venire recusavit’. Trans. by Babcock and Krey, II, p. 445.} It is possible that Hugh, like Stephen II of Burgundy, had made a favourable impression during his visit, and any match between Sibylla and the sons of Henry II of England would have been prohibited on grounds of consanguinity (she and Henry shared a grandfather, Fulk of Jerusalem, who was Geoffrey Plantagenet’s father by his first marriage). After the embarrassment of Stephen of Sancerre’s rejection of Sibylla, the Haute Cour of Jerusalem may have been wary of once more approaching any member of the Blois-Champenois family, and they could point to Hugh as someone who had actually been to the Holy Land. Marrying a princess of Jerusalem would also require a candidate of high rank, such as a duke.

It is also possible that the Haute Cour felt that Hugh was sympathetically inclined to Jerusalem’s cause, as in 1177 he had issued a charter to the Knights Hospitaller granting many similar economic privileges as he had to the Cistercians: the right to buy and sell without tallage, to travel freely by land and water, to be exempt from the \textit{péage} (road and travel) tolls, and to use the ducal forests. He had invested Roger de Moulins, the new Hospitaller master, specifically
with these gifts, though they applied to all brothers of the Order.\(^\text{103}\) If this was combined with at least theoretical eligibility as a husband and a previous in-person visit to the kingdom, Hugh could have constituted an attractive or even simply one of the few viable candidates available, and at the age of around 31 in 1179, was not too old to lead armies or father more children. But as it would have involved leaving France permanently, and his eldest son Odo was no more than thirteen years old at the time, it is unsurprising that Hugh ultimately refused. Most important, however, is the fact that in 1179–80, France was about to have a new king: the fifteen-year-old Philip II, who succeeded to the throne after Louis VII’s death on 18 September 1180. It is altogether plausible that Hugh, even if he had an earlier agreement with Joscius of Acre, did not want to forsake opportunities made possible by a teenage monarch.\(^\text{104}\) This leads us to the last section of the chapter: an examination of the clashes between Philip II and Hugh in the years 1180–87, which permanently altered the relationship between France and Burgundy.

III. Challenges to the Crown: France and Burgundy, 1180–87

The 1180s were a politically turbulent decade for France. Henry the Young King, eldest son of Henry II of England, died in 1183 after prolonged conflict with his father, and his surviving brothers enlisted the assistance of the young and ambitious Philip II in their succession struggles and personal intrigues. Contests with Flanders and its powerful and influential count, Philip of

\(^{103}\) *Cartulaire général des Hospitaliers*, 1, act 506, pp. 348–49: ‘Igitur ego Hugo, dux Burgundie, quorumdam sacris ammonitionibus instructus, intuens sanctum domum Jerosolimitani Hospitalis tam in elmosinis quam in ceteris […] ut beneficiorum ejusdem loci particeps existerem, fratibus prescripti Hospitalis libere et absolute concessi ut, pro rebus propriis tam vendendis quam emendis, for a terre mee, que mea dominica sunt, absque ullius pedagii requisitione valeant exercere. Et quicquid de rebus suis sicco vestigio seu navigio per terram meam delatum fuerit, ab omni exactione, quantum ad me pertinent, liberum permanebit […] Hoc autem donum pro meis et parentum meorum excessibus institui in manu fratris Oldini, prioris S. Egidii, Rogero de Molinis, Jerosolimitani magistro, qui me in vita et post decessum in percipiendis beneficiis ejusdem domus constituit fratrem’.

\(^{104}\) Phillips also discussed this match, and concluded that the presence of Sibylla’s infant son, the future Baldwin V, may have additionally discouraged Hugh from wanting to serve as regent for a child that was not his. Sibylla ultimately married Guy of Lusignan in 1180. See Phillips, *Defenders of the Holy Land*, p. 240.
Alsace, also came to the fore, especially after Philip II married his niece, Isabelle of Hainaut, in April 1180.\textsuperscript{105} In this context, Hugh III of Burgundy serves as an interesting example of Philip II’s relations with his vassals in the early part of his reign, and Hugh’s eventual participation on the Third Crusade under Philip’s command must be framed not as a natural act of solidarity with a long-standing ally, but as the result of a relationship that had undergone considerable change and challenge in a short time. Despite difficult relations with Louis VII, Hugh had usually supported him against the Plantagenets.\textsuperscript{106} Indeed Jim Bradbury, following Robert Fawtier, has claimed that royal authority over Burgundy was never challenged until the accession of Philip II.\textsuperscript{107} This is an overly simplistic assessment, but it does reflect Burgundy’s position as generally within the orbit of Capetian influence, which now encountered its first major upheaval since the eleventh century. Early in Philip’s reign, in 1180–81, the principalities which formed the core resistance to Plantagenet expansion in France – Flanders, Champagne, and Burgundy – were alarmed by his desire to improve relations with Henry II, which could have seen their own interests disadvantaged. Setting aside old rivalries, and urged on by Barbarossa, their leaders made an expedition against Ralph, count of Clermont, a friend and ally of Philip’s. This flare-up was quickly settled by Henry II himself, but it set the tone for an ongoing tension.\textsuperscript{108}

Similarly to his cousin Hugh, Philip II had had difficulties with his mother, Adela of Champagne. Isabelle of Hainaut had previously been betrothed to the future Henry II of Champagne, Adela’s nephew, and was promised to marry him as recently as 1179; her marriage to Philip II instead in 1180 represented both a rejection of Blois-Champenois influence at court

\textsuperscript{107} Bradbury, \textit{Philip Augustus}, p. 31.
\textsuperscript{108} Bradbury, \textit{Philip Augustus}, p. 56.
and Philip’s determination to separate himself from his mother’s authority. Accordingly, relations with Philip’s powerful uncles (and brothers-in-law) Henry I of Champagne and Theobald V of Blois quickly deteriorated after the marriage took place, culminating in Philip’s seizure of his mother’s lands. Hugh III of Burgundy (who was also a nephew of Henry I and Theobald V via his mother Marie, their sister) was part of the Champenois contingent during this struggle, allying with Philip of Flanders, William, archbishop of Reims, Theobald of Blois, Stephen of Sancerre, and Marie of Champagne, widow of Henry I, against the king. As noted, peace was made with the assistance of Henry II of England in 1182, but in 1183, Hugh was once more in coalition with these partners in opposition to Philip II. The crux of the matter was the claim of Philip of Alsace, count of Flanders, to Vermandois, the inheritance of his late wife Elisabeth, vis-à-vis the royal desire to reclaim the territory that had caused so many Capetian embarrassments in Louis VII’s day. The settlement allowed Philip of Alsace to retain it for life, but it would revert to the crown upon his death.

It is difficult to determine precisely what altered Hugh’s policy from reluctant but general support of Louis VII to persistent struggle with Philip II. It could be that he was well aligned with his Champenois relatives by this point. In 1179, Henry the Liberal had departed on his own expedition to Jerusalem (for which Hugh assisted in the preparations), passed through Burgundy, and made multiple charitable donations to Burgundian religious houses, including to

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111 *HdB*, II, p. 200. Henry I of Champagne died in 1181, and Hugh III’s involvement in Champenois marriage politics in the early 1180s is also discussed in the *Chronicle of Hainaut*. See Gilbert of Mons, *Chronicle of Hainaut*, trans. by Laura Napran, pp. 104–05. Hugh was also apparently involved in Philip II’s efforts to annul his marriage to Isabelle of Hainaut in 1183, which as Napran points out, may have been an act of retaliation by their Champenois uncles for the Flemish match and diminution of their influence at court. *Chronicle of Hainaut*, p. 85.
Châtillon-sur-Seine, Bar-sur-Aube, Jully, Dijon,115 and Beaune.116 Thus, Hugh may have taken a
dim view of any royal attempts to threaten this nexus of established family power, and Philip II
had also been interfering in the affairs of the county of Nevers. Upon his death in 1176, Guy of
Nevers left the wardship of his minor children, William and Agnes, to Louis VII, an avenue of
potential political influence that Louis had not actively pursued, but in which Philip took a much
more vigorous role.117 Guy’s widow, Matilda of Burgundy, was Hugh’s first cousin (her father
was Raymond of Grignon, one of the many younger sons of Hugh II and Matilda of Mayenne,
and brother to Hugh’s father Odo II), and this new arrangement, while leaving her as regent in
formality, considerably reduced her actual influence. Petit described this time as one in which
Nevers and Auxerre were ‘sous la domination directe de l’autorité royale’.118

It is impossible to judge how much Hugh III was personally invested in his cousin’s
fortunes, but as Nevers had been recognised as a fief of Burgundy for quite some time, it is likely
that he felt politically impinged upon by Philip’s determination to rule these territories directly. It
is also the case that the previous hundred years of fairly uneventful relations for France and
Burgundy owed more to a lack of aggressive motivation on the part of the dukes, than to a
monarchy capable of forcefully resisting them if they had chosen otherwise. In other words, the
Capetians had passively benefited from Hugh II and Odo II’s willingness to maintain the status

115 HdB, ii, p. 197.
116 Cîteaux, act 234, p. 185: ‘Actum apud Bernam cum irem Iherosolimam’. Hugh had been the principal witness for
his uncle: ‘Hujus rei testes sunt: Hugo dux Burgundie [et al].’
117 HdB, ii, p. 199. See also SMC, pp. 348-9.
118 HdB, ii, p. 199. We can also see this royal jurisdiction in Philip ordering Peter de Courtenay, count of Nevers, to
assist him in a conflict against Henry II in the late 1180s. Peter was Philip’s cousin once removed, a grandson of
Louis VI, and husband of Agnes of Nevers. Recueil des actes de Philippe Auguste, roi de France: Lettres de
formulaires, ed. by Jean Favier and Michel Nortier (Paris: Diffusion de Boccard, 2005), vi. See act 25, pp. 51-52:
‘Le roi [Philippe Auguste] demande au comte de Nevers [Pierre de Courtenay] (ou à tous ses barons) de venir en
armes au colloque qu’il doit avoir avec le roi d’Angleterre [Henri II] le dimanche de la semaine après Pâques […]
Rex Nivernensi comiti, ut armata manu veniat ad colloquium quod habiturus est cum rege Anglie’.
quo, but when they began to expand their power under Philip II, they found that it was less easily
negotiated or appreciated by the similarly bellicose and ambitious Hugh III.

It is thus debatable how Philip’s charter for the city of Dijon, issued sometime between 1
November 1183 and 31 March 1184, should be interpreted.\footnote{HdB, II, p. 203.} Hugh III and his eldest son, the
future Odo III, had granted the inhabitants rights and privileges after the model of the commune
of Soissons.\footnote{CCB, I, p. 1. For the ‘Constitutions de la Commune de Soissons’, see CCB, I, pp. 15-16.}
Philip accordingly guaranteed those rights, which could be viewed as either a
political nicety to smooth troubled waters, or as a pointed reminder that from now on, the king
had to explicitly confirm whatever acts the duke presumed to make. Indeed, Philip’s role appears
more as that of enforcer, ensuring that Hugh kept his word if he should be tempted to renege on
it,\footnote{CCB, I, p. 1: ‘In nomine sancte et individue Trinatis, Philippus Dei gratia Francorum rex, noverint universi
presentes partier et future, quam fidelis et consanguineous noster Hugo, dux Burgundie, suis hominibus de Divione
communiam dedit ad formam communie Suessionensis, salva libertate quam antea habebant. […] Quod si Dux vel
heredes ejus memoratam communiam vellent infringere, vel ab institutionibus communie resilire, nos ad eos posse
nostrum eam teneri faciemus’}.\footnote{HdB, II, p. 203.} The concessions to the inhabitants of Dijon may then have
resulted from being at a political disadvantage and obliged to buy their goodwill, with Philip
scenting an opportunity both to profit from Hugh’s weakness and position himself as the ultimate
guarantor of legal rights and privileges in Burgundy. It certainly does not seem, with the ongoing
friction since Philip’s coronation, that this represented a friendly rapprochement or personal
favour, especially given what was still to come.

In the autumn of 1185, the fragile relations between crown and duchy broke down
completely. The nominal cause for the conflict was Guy of Vergy, a vassal of the dukes of
Burgundy and a long-standing thorn in their side. The root of Guy’s discontent lay in Hugh’s
determination to annexe strategically important territory near Vergy, as well as the building of
four castles to block him in, and other provocative military actions. Feeling affronted by Hugh, he appealed to Philip to redress the situation. Philip ordered the lord of Broyes to put the castles under siege, and while the attempt was unsuccessful, Broyes was attacked and burned in retaliation. A conference at Sens in December 1185 failed to put an end to things, and Philip himself took a hand at the beginning of 1186, invading Burgundy, destroying the disputed fortifications, and making the point explicit: the young king, not yet twenty-one years old, was of a considerably different make than his father Louis. Hugh’s territorial ambitions and political aggressiveness, unlike his recent predecessors, had made him deeply unpopular in Burgundy, especially among the religious establishment. He was soon summoned back to the royal court, where he faced the accusations of the Burgundian abbots and bishops, was censured for failing to respect the rights of the church and for his own disobedience of the king, and ultimately condemned and fined the enormous amount of 30,000 livres parisis.

Upon his return to Burgundy, Hugh wrote angrily to Barbarossa, trying to enlist his assistance against Philip and reminding him that increasing Capetian power was likewise a threat to imperial interests. Barbarossa, however, could not afford to anger the Burgundian churches and religious houses on which his governing policy relied, and refused a new alliance. Philip, accurately sensing that hostilities had not been concluded, hastily made peace with the count of Flanders, raised an army of Frenchmen and Flemings, and invaded Burgundy again in March 1186. After a short campaign of two or three weeks, he achieved victory, including the capture

Hugh’s eldest son, the future Odo III, at the siege of Châtillon-sur-Seine.\textsuperscript{127} It is noteworthy that Rigord’s \textit{Gesta Philippi Augusti} described Philip in this relatively minor territorial squabble as ‘miles Christi’.\textsuperscript{128} Due to Hugh’s insults and exactions against the church, royal retribution could be classified as a sort of holy purpose, and calls to mind Suger’s description of French warfare against the invading Germans in 1124. There, the Germans could be killed ‘as if they were Saracens’ – here, the Burgundians were the ones placed into opposition to the soldier of Christ.

In any event, Philip’s triumph was substantial. Aside from Odo’s capture and Châtillon’s surrender, Hugh was forced to yield three more castles in punishment. Rigord, while failing to name these castles, indicates that Philip was also censuring Hugh for infractions committed against his father Louis, which seem to have been a general disregard of his promises to the king.\textsuperscript{129} At this, Barbarossa did intervene, writing to Philip to ask for Odo’s release, and Richard suggested that fear of more German involvement made the king decide to be conciliatory; he freed Odo and returned Hugh’s castles.\textsuperscript{130} Philip also ordered Hugh to make reparations to an unnamed monastery that he had insulted.\textsuperscript{131} In short, the defeat was comprehensive and permanent. That summer, the changed terms of Burgundy’s relationship with king and emperor were ratified in the treaty of Orvieto, made on 3 June 1186 between Henry of Hohenstaufen, the future Holy Roman Emperor, on his father Barbarossa’s behalf, and Hugh.\textsuperscript{132} Hugh’s reduced status is at once evident, as Henry was addressed as ‘king of the Romans and always august’ and

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item \textsuperscript{127} Rigord, \textit{Gesta Philippi Augusti}, trans. by Élisabeth Carpentier, Georges Pon, and Yves Chauvin (Paris: CNRS, 2006), p. 189. The editors suggest that Hugh had also infuriated Philip of Alsace by failing to stop bandit attacks on Flemish merchants carrying passports of safe-conduct. See \textit{GPA}, p. 189, n. 139.
\item \textsuperscript{128} \textit{GPA}, p. 188: ‘Philippus semper Augustus Francorum rex contra ipsum movit arma et, collecto exercitu, Burgundiam miles Christi pugnaturus intravit et pro defensione ecclesiarum et cleri libertate.’ See also Jerzy Pysiak, ‘Philippe Auguste: Un roi de la fin des temps?’, \textit{Annales Histoire, Sciences Sociales}, 57 (2002), 1165–90, discussing Rigord’s depiction of ‘sacred kingship’ for Philip.
\item \textsuperscript{129} \textit{GPA}, p. 190: ‘Tria castria optima’.
\item \textsuperscript{130} Richard, \textit{Les ducs de Bourgogne}, p. 165.
\item \textsuperscript{131} \textit{RPA}: \textit{Lettres de formulaires}, act 18, p. 42: ‘18. [1186 ?] Le roi [Philippe Auguste] mande au duc [de Bourgogne] de restituer au moines d’un monastère [non désigné] ce qu’il leur a enlevé [...] De eodem. Rex duci, ut prefatis monachis ablata restitutae et in abbaiciam de cetero non presumat’.
\item \textsuperscript{132} Henry was in Italy after having married Constance of Sicily on 27 January 1186, in Milan.
\end{enumerate}
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Hugh (rather pointedly) as his ‘beloved and faithful vassal, the duke of Dijon’. The county of Albon, which Hugh claimed in his wife Beatrice’s name, was recognised as an imperial possession, but this bound him into a complex and almost untenable network of rights and obligations, divided between Philip and Barbarossa. If Philip attacked Barbarossa, Hugh was legally allowed to assist the emperor in his capacity as a German vassal, but if Barbarossa attacked Philip,Hugh could not call on resources from his imperial lands, and could only muster troops from his French possessions to fight with the king. Lastly, he was explicitly forbidden to make war on Philip in any capacity, issued with a blunt reminder that the same obligations of fealty would be expected from his son, the future duke, and informed that three bishops would keep an eye on him, as well as an additional man or men of Henry’s choosing.

In other words, any imagined autonomy or ‘prétention à l’indépendance’ for Burgundy had been put to a resounding end, and Hugh’s future course of action would rest entirely on the volition of the French crown or the German emperor, rather than his own. The location for the treaty, in central Italy and deep in the Empire’s territory, reflected this arrangement: henceforth, Hugh would have to meet his overlords on their terms and on their ground. He was still liable to pay the full amount of damages to the church, and while Vergy itself, the original cause of the trouble, remained under ducal authority, it is doubtful that Hugh regarded that as much of an


134 Recueil de plusieurs pièces, p. 260: ‘In hoc etiam voluntati tuae consentimus, quod filius tuus, ille qui Dux futurus est Divionensis, salva fidelitate Rex Francorum [...] & simuliter de allodis quae habet, & quae habebet intra Imperium [...] Contra omnem hominem, praeter Regem Franciae, pacem & verram facies ad mandatum nostrum, de universo Comitatu Alboini, salvo iure Ecclesiarum Imperii [...] Compositionem quoque facies cum hominibus fidelibus nostris, Archiepiscopi Viennensi, & cum Episcopo Gratianopolitano, & Episcopo Valentino, supra queriimonis. Sciens, si quas adversum te proponant, vel in præsentia nostra vel fidelis nostri Urrici de Godembert, vel alterius certi nunci nostri ad hoc destinati [...] vel secundam iustitiam, vel secundum amicabilem compositionem satisfaccionem exhibebis. Ad hoc in gratiae nostrae plenitudinem te recipimus. Datum in Campo urbe veteri, anno dominicae Incarnationis millesimo centesimo octuagesimo sexto, indicatione quarta, tertio Nonas lunii’.

135 Richard, Les ducs de Bourgogne, p. 166.
enjoyable victory. He had put himself heavily in debt, been rendered dually subject to Philip and Barbarossa, lost any ability to pursue his own interests, made enemies with the church, and generally failed in his attempt to carve out a broader role for Burgundy. In this context, it is no wonder that Hugh participated in the Third Crusade, as both king and emperor took the cross soon after Jerusalem’s fall in October 1187, and his obligations had been forced into conjunction with their own. As contended at the beginning of the chapter, this was indeed the turning point for Burgundian ducal crusading policy, and the shift would be permanent.
CHAPTER FIVE

Intimate Enemies: Burgundy On The Third Crusade, 1187–92

The approximately five-year period surrounding the Third Crusade, from the battle of Hattin in July 1187 and the fall of Jerusalem that October, to the treaty of Jaffa between Saladin and Richard I ‘the Lionheart’ of England in September 1192, is arguably as close as medieval Christian Europe ever came to replicating the success of the First Crusade in a specifically military context. Despite its failure to recapture Jerusalem itself, it carved out substantial political and diplomatic gains for the dwindling Christian kingdom, allowing a renewed period of peace and prosperity to persist into the thirteenth century.¹ For the first time, it is relatively straightforward to locate Burgundian participation within this framework. Hugh III served as Philip II’s deputy after the king’s early departure, often clashed with Richard in this capacity, was involved in the disputed succession to the throne of Jerusalem, and died in August 1192 before returning to France. The chief question is whether the increased Burgundian crusade response in this expedition – indeed, the most dense and visible of those under consideration here – was a consequence of the new political pressure from France, sincere religious shock at the loss of Jerusalem, or some combination of both. We contend that while both factors played a part, and that the religious sentiment may have equalled or possibly even eclipsed that for the First Crusade, the identifiable Burgundian crusaders often arose either from kin-groups with established crusading traditions, or from individuals who were politically or familially connected to Hugh III. Thus while the Third Crusade did represent a new kind of Burgundian crusading experience, it did not completely overshadow or act out of keeping with pre-existing political realities, and reflected this new dynamic in several ways.

I. The Fall of Jerusalem and Initial Response, 1185–88

The Latin Christian kingdom in the Holy Land had sent repeated calls for assistance to its counterparts in Europe, as its position weakened following the failed Second Crusade. These had been, at best, tepidly received, with limited financial resources dispatched and attempts made to match Sibylla of Jerusalem with a French husband, but no sustained or organised military relief. The precarious state of affairs with first a leper king (Baldwin IV), then a child king (Baldwin V), and lastly a king succeeding by perceived trickery in right of his wife (Guy of Lusignan) functioned, over the period of 1174–87, to divide and undermine Frankish political cohesion.\(^2\)

The Muslim leader known famously as Saladin (Ṣalāḥ ad-Dīn Yūsuf ibn Ayyūb) also came to power about 1174, establishing himself as sultan of Egypt and Syria.\(^3\) He had agreed to a periodic and strategic series of truces with the Latin Christian states in the 1170s–80s, and in 1185, a general truce was arranged between Saladin and the kingdom of Jerusalem.\(^4\)

It is clear, however, that neither side had much expectation of this being honoured. Saladin supposedly pursued an arrangement with Andronikos I Komnenos, the Byzantine emperor (r. 1183–85) and his successor Isaac II Angelos (r. 1185–95 and 1203–04),\(^5\) and the advisors of the ailing Baldwin IV sent yet another urgent appeal to the West in the persons of

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\(^2\) Philip of Alsace, count of Flanders, had also taken the cross at this time and travelled to the Holy Land in 1176, where he exerted considerable political influence, including attempts to oversee the arrangement of a new match for Sibylla of Jerusalem after the death of William of Montferrat. He then departed in 1178. See Phillips, ‘Crisis in the Latin East, 1174–87’, in *Defenders of the Holy Land*, 225–66 (pp. 233–39).


\(^4\) For a discussion of the various politics of the mid-1180s, see Hamilton, *Leper King*, pp. 211–34.

Eraclius, patriarch of Jerusalem, Arnold of Toroja, grandmaster of the Templars, and Roger of Moulins, master of the Hospitallers. Their high rank and urgent itinerary makes clear that their success was a matter of the first importance. After visiting Pope Lucius III in Verona in the autumn of 1184, where Arnold of Toroja died, Eraclius and Roger risked a winter crossing of the Alps to arrive in Paris in mid-January 1185, where Philip II gave them some financial support and authorised the cause to be preached in the dioceses of France. Continuing to England at the end of January, they targeted their pleas at Henry II, grandson of Fulk of Jerusalem and cousin of Sibylla. All that was concretely achieved, however, was for Henry and Philip to agree to confer on the possibility of dispatching more aid to the Holy Land, frustrating Eraclius. While refusing to commit either himself or his sons to the cause, Henry did give permission for his subjects to swear a crusading vow, which resulted in magnates from England and the Plantagenet lands in France pledging to take the cross.

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9 The thirteenth-century chronicler Roger of Wendover claims that the envoys meant to offer Henry the crown of Jerusalem, as Baldwin V was only a child. If so, they were considerably misjudging the situation, as Henry was over fifty years old, had been engaged in long rivalries with his adult sons, and was unlikely to abandon the vast, wealthy, and powerful ‘Angevin empire’ for the crusader kingdom. But as Roger of Wendover is neither contemporary nor closely connected to the events, this must remain speculative. See ‘Quod rex Henricus regnum Hierosolymarum recusavit’ in Roger of Wendover, *Chronica sive Flores Historiarum*, ed. by Henry O. Coxe, 5 vols (London: Sumptibus Societatis, 1841), II, p. 417. See also Phillips, *Defenders of the Holy Land*, pp. 261–62.
12 Henry’s crusade policy had long been a subject of controversy. ‘[His] perpetual avenue of escape was to put up money, more money and still more money instead of going himself [. . .] All the evidence points to Henry accumulating money in the East without permitting anyone to spend it’. Hans Eberhard Mayer, ‘Henry II of England and the Holy Land’, *English Historical Review*, 97 (1982), 721–39.
It is not known precisely when Eraclius and Roger returned to the Holy Land, but they were likely back by the autumn of 1185 and certainly by early 1186. After Baldwin IV’s death in March 1185, Baldwin V died at the age of nine in August 1186, deepening the political crisis. His mother Sibylla, the elder of King Amalric’s two daughters, had the best claim to the throne, but this was complicated by her marriage to the unpopular Guy of Lusignan, of whom Baldwin IV had repeatedly tried to rid himself. The nobles of Jerusalem were willing to crown her, but tried to make their divorce a condition of it.\footnote{There had also been concerns raised about Sibylla’s legitimacy, as part of the political efforts to circumvent her and Guy. See Alan V. Murray, ‘Women in the Royal Succession of the Latin Kingdom of Jerusalem (1099–1291)’, in \textit{Mächtige Frauen? Königinen und Fürstinnen im europäischen Mittelalter}, ed. by Claudia Zey (Ostfildern: Thorbecke, 2015), pp. 131–62.} However, Guy and Sibylla contrived to both remain married and to assume the rule of Jerusalem in September 1186.\footnote{See Jean Richard, \textit{The Latin Kingdom of Jerusalem}, trans. by Janet Shirley (Amsterdam: North Holland Publishing Co., 1979), esp. pp. 167–74.} This dispute formed the foundation for most of the internal Christian politics on the forthcoming crusade.

Saladin’s first major triumph in the decisive campaign came on 1 May 1187, at the battle of the Springs of Cresson, where his forces put to flight Gerard of Ridefort, the new master of the Templars, and killed Roger of Moulins.\footnote{\textit{Chronicle of the Third Crusade: A Translation of the Itinerarium Peregrinorum et Gesta Regis Ricardi}, trans. by Helen Nicholson (Aldershot: Ashgate, 1997), p. 25. See also RH, \textit{Chronica}, II, p. 319.} The struggle famously culminated in the battle of Hattin on 4 July 1187, a crushing victory for Saladin. Most of the Frankish nobility were killed or taken prisoner, including King Guy, and the most important relic of the True Cross, which had been carried in battle for the kingdom since 1099, was captured, exacerbating the religious crisis.\footnote{Alan V. Murray, ‘Mighty Against the Enemies of Christ’: The Relic of the True Cross in the Armies of the Kingdom of Jerusalem’, in \textit{The Crusades and Their Sources}, ed. by John France and William G. Zajac (Farnham: Ashgate, 1998), pp. 217–39.} Saladin consolidated his victory in the following months, taking Acre, Beirut, Sidon, and Ascalon, but was repulsed by Conrad of Montferrat in Tyre.\footnote{Nicholson, \textit{IP}, pp. 35–37.} He began the siege of Jerusalem on 20 September 1187, and the city – critically under-manned, ill-prepared for battle, and largely
without resources – surrendered less than a fortnight later, on 2 October 1187. For the first time since its capture in 1099, Jerusalem had been taken from Christian control, and the psychological effects were profound. The death of Pope Urban III on 20 October 1187 was popularly attributed to his shock at hearing of the disaster at Hattin, and his successor, Gregory VIII, was elected the next day. Just a week later, on 29 October 1187, Gregory published Audita tremendi, ‘not only the most impassioned plea for a crusade ever issued by a pope until then, but the fullest detailed account of crusaders’ spiritual and temporal rewards and privileges to date’. Likewise blamed the sins of ordinary Christians, as religious immorality rather than political inaction was viewed as the cause of Jerusalem’s downfall, and stringent new liturgical practises were developed as a result. The situation now demanded response from all of Europe.

Richard the Lionheart, at the time still duke of Aquitaine and count of Poitou, was among the first to take the cross, sometime in November 1187. This he did without informing his father, Henry II, causing further strain in their fractured relationship. However, Henry II and Philip II themselves followed suit just a few months later. On 21 January 1188, at a meeting in Gisors to discuss Philip’s attempted invasion of Normandy, Joscius, archbishop of Tyre, arrived to urge

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23 RH, Chronica, ii, p. 334.
the kings of England and France to commit to the defence of the Holy Land in person. Joscius’ persuasion (or perhaps the impossibility of a point-blank refusal) induced Henry and Philip to take the cross on the spot. It is there that we locate our first mention of Hugh III of Burgundy in connection with his crusade activities, as William of Newburgh listed him among the French magnates inspired by Philip’s example.

We thus arrive at the question of what Hugh had been doing between his chastisement at Orvieto in summer 1186 and the call to crusade in early 1188. Ernest Petit’s discussion is not reliable on this point, as he placed the siege of Châtillon-sur-Seine (March 1186) in March 1187, and otherwise dated the events of Philip Augustus’ punitive campaign against Burgundy to a year later than when they took place. This casts doubt on his claim that there was a royal army in Burgundy at the end of February 1187. It is certainly possible that Philip had left a garrison to ensure Hugh’s good behaviour, but this seems to stem from Petit’s difficulty with the dates of the Vergy campaign. What can be deduced of Hugh’s activities in 1187 is that he was making reparations to (among others) the city of Dijon, by re-confirming the charter first issued in 1183, granting municipal rights and privileges. The political subtext of this can be read in

24 Stubbs questioned whether this was William of Tyre the historian, or his successor Joscius, since Roger names him only as ‘archiepiscopus Tyri’ (Chronica, II, p. 334, n. 1). But as William died on 29 September 1186, one can safely assume that it was in fact Joscius. The error stems from Roger of Wendover’s later chronicle. See Roger of Wendover, Chronica sive Flores Historiarum, II, p. 426.
25 William of Newburgh, Historia rerum Anglicarum, p. 272: ‘Quorum exemplum dux Burgundiae [Hugh III], comes Flandriae [Philip of Alsace], et comes Campaniae [Henry II, son of Henry the Liberal and nephew of Philip and Richard], cum allis compluribus utriusque regni nobilibus atque ingenti viorum militarium numero, hilari devotione amplexi, ipsi quoque signo Domini proprios insignere humeros, seuque pro Ipso laboribus periculosque exponere gloriosum duxerunt’. A more complete list of French magnates, including Hugh, who followed Henry and Philip’s lead is given in GPA, pp. 244–47.
26 HdB, III, p. 26: ‘En mars 1187, la ville de Chatillon-sur-Seine était investie par les troupes royales et le siège commencé’.
two senses. The first interpretation is that Hugh was genuinely penitent, and after the debacle of 1185–86, for which he had engaged Dijon’s military assistance on several occasions, felt it expedient to patch things up with his capital city. The second interpretation is that Hugh was seeking to regain some political authority and personal respect, since the original charter was issued in Philip’s name, not his, and functioned as an implied reproach of Hugh’s power and trustworthiness. If so, Hugh could have been attempting to reclaim his standing as the originator and guarantor of legal rights in Burgundy, as well as being aware that his misadventures had seriously damaged the duchy’s prestige and autonomy. He would thus be forced to make some amends with his frustrated subjects, while continuing to push against French royal authority.

Indeed, the latter interpretation is supported by the fact that a war of bureaucratic one-upmanship ensued. After Hugh’s eldest son, Odo, confirmed his father’s grant, Philip II retaliated with a charter reminding everyone that he had given the inhabitants of Dijon the rights they enjoyed, and pointedly instructing Hugh and Odo to settle disputes according to royal authority and in the royal court. Odo went to the trouble of issuing an elaborate second confirmation of Hugh’s gift, as if to be sure that father and son had the last word on the king.

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30 Three charters attest to Hugh’s recruitment of the burghers of Dijon for military service at this time. The first (II in CCB) is solidly dated to 1185: ‘Actum est istud anno ab Incarnatione Domine M.C. octogesimo V’. The second two (III and IV) are not, but both refer to Hugh as duke of Burgundy and count of Albon (‘Dei gratia Burgundie dux et Albonii comes’) meaning that they postdate his 1184 remarriage. CCB, i, pp. 2–4.
31 CCB, i, pp. 17-18: ‘Ego Oddo filius Hugonis ducis Burgundie, omnibus notum facio Hugone ducem Burgundie patrem meum concessisse communiam hominibus de Divione in perpetuum habendam ad formam communie Suessionis [...]’,
32 CCB, i, pp. 19-20: ‘Philippus Dei gratia Francorum rex, noverint universi presentes pariter et futuri, quam Hugo, dux Burgundie, hominibus de Divione dedit et concessit communiam imperpetuum habendam, ad formam communie Suessionis. Nos vero ad petitionem ipsius Ducas et Odoni, filii ejus, eam confirmamus, et ita manutendam promittus, quod si vel Dux, vel dictus filius ejus ab institutis hujus communie resilierit, nos infra quadraginta dies ex quo clamor inde ad nos pervenerit, communie emendari faciemus, sicut nostra curia judacabit, reddendo capitale. Quod in perpetuum stabilitatem, presentem paginam sigilli nostri auctoritate [...] Actum Tornodori, anno ab Incarnatione Domini, MCCLXIII°VII°[...].’ It will be noted that this charter was given at Tonnerre, where Philip’s cousin Peter of Courtenay was married to Agnes of Nevers, thus within Burgundian ducal lands and as both a physical and legal placement of the king at the top of the hierarchy.
33 Garnier places Odo’s confirmations back to back (acts VI and VII) and prior to Philip’s, but we can tell that the second confirmation did come after Philip’s. It references Philip’s charter, mentions that the archbishops and bishops of the duchy have promised to follow Hugh and Odo’s lead in solving disputes, and recruits an impressive
Odo was indeed an almost ubiquitous presence in his father’s charters at this time and in Hugh’s gifts to religious houses, including Maizières, Cluny, Chalon-sur-Seine, Bussière, Quincy, Tart, and Beaune, for the rest of 1187.\footnote{34}

This busy schedule of ecclesiastical patronage is hardly out of the ordinary for a twelfth-century nobleman, as extravagant acts of violence or misbehaviour could be followed by just as extravagant acts of penitence or religious piety. Hugh’s prolific tour of Burgundian abbeys in 1187 does, however, lend credence to the idea that he had major political amends to make. Some gifts were also motivated by the death of Girard of Réon, Hugh’s friend and the father-in-law of his son Alexander (Girard’s daughter, Beatrice, was married to Alexander).\footnote{35} At least five charters, such as the two to Maizières (‘pro anniversario domini Gerardi de Reon’/ ‘pro anniversario domini Girardi de Reun’)\footnote{36} the one to Cluny (‘ego Hugo, dux Burgundiae […] et pro anima domini Guirardi de Reon)\footnote{37} the gift to Chalon-sur-Seine,\footnote{38} and the gift to Bussière (‘pro remedio anime domini Gerardi de Reone’)\footnote{39} reference this loss, clearly one Hugh felt deeply.

Overall, we can construct a portrait of crusade motivation for Hugh by the time of his decision to follow Philip’s lead in taking the cross in 1188. A year spent extensively patronising Burgundian religious houses, in penance for the disruption of 1186, could leave him expected to follow it up with the ultimate gesture of committing to the recovery of Jerusalem, and Hugh may

\footnote{34} Odo approved or confirmed Hugh’s gifts to Beaune (6 August 1187), reparations to Cluny (1187), gifts to Tart (1187), gifts to Bussière (1187), and gifts to the bishop of Langres (Christmas 1187), among others. See ‘Pièces justificatives’ in \textit{HdB}, iii, acts 757-73, pp. 270-76.

\footnote{35} \textit{HdB}, iii, p. 71.

\footnote{36} \textit{HdB}, iii, act 760, p. 270.

\footnote{37} \textit{RCAC}, v, act 4313, pp. 672–73.

\footnote{38} \textit{HdB}, iii, act 763, p. 272.

\footnote{39} \textit{HdB}, iii, act 769, p. 273.
have wished to make his crusading vow on his own terms, especially after Henry II and Richard I of England, Philip II of France, Philip of Flanders, and Henry II of Champagne – representing the overlords of nearly all the rest of the country – had sworn theirs. Burgundy’s absence in this context would indeed be glaring, and Hugh can hardly have been eager to run the risk of another embarrassing and public coercion. Genuine personal conviction may also have played a part, given Hugh’s journey to Jerusalem in the 1170s and the death of his friend Girard of Réon. A stable, functional, and politically experienced relationship with his son Odo (not at all a given in twelfth-century France, as Henry II and Richard I could attest) meant that Hugh could be confident of leaving the duchy in capable hands if he went abroad, and as Frederick Barbarossa also took the cross soon after Audita tremendi, Hugh was in the middle of crusading fervour from all sides. He could also hope to benefit from the spiritual privileges accorded to crusaders by Gregory VIII’s unprecedented liturgical expansion of their status. Full remission of sins was doubtless an attractive prospect, and participation would allow some avenue to engage in politics alongside the king and other French nobles. Therefore, it is unlikely that he was personally moved by Philip’s example of piety, but his likely reasons make sense just the same.

II. Burgundy Prepares for the Crusade, 1188–90

Of the crusades under consideration here, the Third features the most consistent participation across all levels of Burgundian society. It is difficult to assess precisely how fast crusading fervour spread across Burgundy, or which of the two rulers who had taken the cross – Hugh III and Frederick Barbarossa – was more influential in shaping public opinion. However, Barbarossa was able to exercise more immediate political clout. At the diet of Mainz on 27 March 1188, he gathered the nobility of the Holy Roman Empire to prepare for a new crusade, and despite being sixty-eight years of age, personally took the cross, along with his son Frederick, duke of
Swabia.\(^{40}\) A Burgundian churchman – Henry of Marcy, cardinal-bishop of Albano and legate of Gregory VIII – also played an important role in German recruitment. Born in Marcy (deip. Rhône, arr. Villefranche-sur-Saône, about forty miles south of Cluny), he had been involved in combating heretics in the Languedoc in the 1170s–80s, and served as abbot of Clairvaux from 1176–82, before being sent personally by the pope to preach the new crusade.\(^{41}\) The *Historia expeditione* praises him as a ‘wise, discreet, and religious man […] even though he was French, and ignorant of the German language, he explained his sweet doctrine through an interpreter, and prepared the minds of many valiant knights in Germany for that journey’.\(^{42}\)

The *Historia* gave a fairly extensive list of German magnates from Swabia, Bavaria, Saxony, and Austria participating alongside Barbarossa, but neglected to mention any French ones. It did note the presence of Haimo of Briancon, archbishop of Tarentaise (near Vienne), an imperial Burgundian,\(^{43}\) and later praised him and the bishop of Toul (Peter de Brizey) for their commitment, one not shared by all of their countrymen:

Moreover, I do not think that I should omit mention of the resolve of the Archbishop of Tarentaise, the Bishop of Toul, and their companions, for as they, accompanied by a large number of knights from Burgundy and Lotharingia, followed somewhat later after the army of Christ, they were upset by various false rumours that our men had been hard hit by attacks from the Hungarians and that they were suffering from hunger […] Then, indeed, almost all the companions of the Archbishop of Tarentaise fled in terror back towards the sea. Nevertheless the archbishop himself carried on undaunted toward the army, as did the Bishop of Toul, and after almost six weeks of rapid and steadfast travelling both saw with their own eyes that what they had been told was false.\(^{44}\)


\(^{43}\) Loud, *Crusade of Frederick Barbarossa*, p. 48, n. 73/*Historia de expeditione*, v. p. 18.

\(^{44}\) *Historia de expeditione*, v. p. 24: ‘Nec pretereundum puto memorabilem constantiam Tarentasiani archeepiscopi et episcopi Leucorum id est Tullensis sociorumque eorundem qui, dum diverso tempore multis sociis militibus comitati
The only further mention of Archbishop Haimo in the Historia occurred in July 1189, by which time he had reconnoitred with Barbarossa’s contingent in Nish (modern Niš, Serbia), but he must have been one of the relatively few leading Germans to both survive the expedition and return home, as he lived until 1211 and in 1198, crowned Barbarossa’s third son, Philip of Swabia, as King of Germany. The German chronicler Burchard of Ursberg, writing a continuation of Ekkehard of Aura’s Chronicon, also noted the presence of the archbishop of Tarentaise among Barbarossa’s contingent, though he somewhat interestingly (if incorrectly) placed Hugh III of Burgundy and Ludwig III, landgrave of Thuringia (d. 16 October 1190) as arriving at the siege of Acre together in 1190. Comital French Burgundian participants were also allegedly present: ‘Dans les prélatats et chevaliers bourguignons qui s’y rendirent en grand nombre, en remarquait notre archevêque [of Besançon] Théodoric de Montfaucon [arr. Besançon, dép. Doubs], Richard de Montfaucon, son frère, Henri, évêque de Bâle [Basel, Switzerland], les abbés des Charité et de Rosières, Gauthier, sire de Salins [arr. Dole, dép. Jura], Gilbert de Faucogney [Faucogney-et-la-Mer, arr. Lure, dép. Haute-Saône], vicomte de Vesoul, Guillaume de Pesmes [arr. Vesoul, dép. Haute-Saône].’ Édouard Clerc credited at least the Montfaucon brothers and Walter of Salins with continuing to the siege of Acre under Frederick

ex Burgundia et Lotharingia exercitum Christi subsecuntur, nonnunqua falsis rumoribus sunt lacesiti, quasi videlicet nostri ab Ungaris seditione mota graviter attriti et fame cruciati in summa coartarentur egestate. Inde denique, dum omnes pene socii Tarentasiani archiepiscopi perterriti versus mare retro tenderent, ipse inperterritus usque at exercitum accessit, sicut nichilominus Tullensis episcopus post sex ferme septimanas constanter advolavit et uterque oculata fide falsa sibi fuisse relata perspexit.’ Trans. by Loud, p. 57.

45 Crusade of Frederick Barbarossa, trans. Loud, p. 65.
49 Édouard Clerc, Essai sur l’histoire de la Franche-Comté, 2 vols (Besançon: Bintot, 1870), i, p. 383.
of Swabia’s command, where they arrived on 3 October 1190 and where Thierry of Montfaucon, archbishop of Besançon, died on 23 November of that year. However, his sources were not made clear, and as a result, it is uncertain where to establish documentary corroboration for the given individuals. Of Clerc’s names, we can find external confirmation at least for the archbishop of Montfaucon in Benedict of Peterborough’s necrology of the dead at Acre (see note 50 below) and the presence of men from Vesoul witnessing one of Hugh III’s charters in the Holy Land in May 1191, discussed in the next section. William de Pesmes’ sons, Guy and Aimar, would also participate on the Fourth Crusade.

Barbarossa’s army departed on 10 May 1189 from Regensburg, in Bavaria. Travelling via Vienna and Hungary, it reached Bulgaria and Greece by summer, encountering (or causing) the perpetual crusader difficulties with the Byzantines, which delayed them in the autumn and winter of 1189. An arrangement was finally reached at the end of February 1190, allowing the crusade to proceed. After skirmishes with the Turks over the spring, they arrived in Seleucia (near Silifke Castle, southern Turkey), where on 10 June 1190, Barbarossa drowned in the Göksu river. According to the *Historia expeditione*, the shock and loss of morale was so great that a number of the soldiers committed suicide, renounced Christianity altogether, or simply fled for home. Barbarossa’s son and successor, Frederick of Swabia, made a considerable financial

50 Clerc, *Essai sur l’histoire de la Franche-Comté*, t. p. 385. Clerc gave the year for Thierry’s death as 1191, but as there was disease in the Christian camp before Acre in the autumn of 1190, with its victims including Queen Sibylla of Jerusalem and her daughters, Patriarch Eraclius of Jerusalem, and Baldwin of Canterbury (on 19/20 November 1190), 1190 seems much more accurate (which he acknowledged as a possibility). Furthermore, by November 1191, the siege of Acre had ended and the city was in Christian hands. Benedict of Peterborough also includes the ‘archiepiscopus de Besenzun’ among the dead during the siege, and in the same list/year as the deaths of Sibylla, Eraclius, Baldwin et al., which can be firmly dated to 1190. William Stubbs has likewise given 1191 as the year of Thierry’s death, but as noted, it is impossible for it to have happened both in November 1191 and at the siege of Acre. See Benedict of Peterborough, *The Chronicle of the Reigns of Henry II and Richard I, A.D. 1169-1192/Gesta Regis Henrici Secundi Benedicti Abbatis*, ed. by William Stubbs, 2 vols (London: Longman & Co, 1867), ii, p. 147, n. 3. For the date of the arrival at Acre, see p. 142.
51 *Historia de expeditione*, v, p. 17.
52 *Historia de expeditione*, v, pp. 40-60.
deposit to the treasury of Antioch upon his arrival in the Holy Land in October 1190, but died himself on 20 January 1191, at Acre. It is difficult to examine the imperial Burgundian or Franche-Comté contingents in any more depth, so we must continue the documentary search for those with ducal Burgundian connections. As a starting point, Ernest Petit gives a long list:

Joubert de Sossay, fils de Renier de Sossay (2); Hugues et Ponce de Gigny (3); Henri, fils de Hugues de Gerland (4); Etienne de Cisse (5); Humbert de Villaines (6); Simon de Bricon (7); Girard de Chaudenay (8); Henri et Guillaume de Salives (9); Othe de Saulx (10); Amon de Rouvres-sur-Aube, chevalier, et les frères Girard, Roger et Joubert de Rouvre (11); Jobert de Nuilly, chevalier (12); Mathieu de Laignes et son frère Arnoul (13); Viard, vicomte de Tonnerre (14); Eudes de Grancey, frère de Jobert, abbé de Fontenay et de Mile, abbé de Saint-Etienne de Dijon (1); Guillaume, sire de Ravières (2); Anseau, sire de Duesme (3); Amon de Quemigney (4); Garnier de Fontaines-les-Dijon et son frère Barthelemy (5); André de la Bretenière (6); Barnuin de Drées, chambellan de duc (7) et Jean de Drées, son fils (8); Simon, sire de Clermont (9); Etienne et Bernard de Grandchamp, frères (10); Philippe de Neublans (11); Gauthier, sire de Sombernon (12); Etienne de Argenteuil (13).

To consider these names in light of potential family histories of crusading, Viard of Tonnerre was related to the counts of Nevers, and Odo of Grancey was possibly a descendant of Duke Odo I (if Agnes of Grancey in the early twelfth century was indeed Odo I’s second daughter instead of Florina). Garnier and Barthélemy of Fontaines-les-Dijon were likely to have ancestral connections to Bernard of Clairvaux (as Bernard’s father was the lord of Fontaines-les-Dijon), and Philip of Neublans was also likely descended from the crusader Stephen of Neublans in 1101 and 1123/26. ‘Simon of Clermont’ may be a mistake for Simon of Clefmont, whose widow’s charter to Molesme is cited in our following discussion, and Walter of Sombernon is verifiable as a witness to Hugh III’s charters in the Holy Land. This list alone is a total of 31 named individuals, which doubles the 15 Burgundian Fourth Crusaders who can be identified just ten years later, and when matched with the 13 persons whose specific charters and financial

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55 HdB, III, pp. 50-51.
arrangements we investigate below, takes the number of identifiable Burgundians for the Third Crusade to nearly 50. As with Clerc, Petit’s sources cannot always be clearly discerned, but this sets the tone for a pattern of extensive crusading across established kinship networks, and a strong recruitment generally, as we now turn to in more detail.

The cartulary of the Yonne is especially fruitful in this regard. The modern department was assembled from portions of the historical provinces of Burgundy, Champagne, the Île-de-France, the Nivernais, and the Gâtinais, meaning that the documents are not specific to one region, religious house, or patron. However, the major urban centres around which they primarily congregate include Sens, Auxerre, Tonnerre, and Avallon with their attendant ecclesiastical dioceses: the archbishopric of Sens, the bishopric of Auxerre, the bishopric of Langres, and the bishopric of Autun.56 Edited in the mid-nineteenth century by Maximilien Quantin, the published cartulary spans two volumes and contains documents from the early sixth century to the mid-thirteenth. The entries have been placed in roughly chronological order and represent, particularly in the twelfth century, a vast expansion of lay diplomatic and patronage interest. In the eleventh century, the cartulary contains 3 acts by kings, 7 by bishops and clergy, and 14 by regional lords, but in the twelfth century, these numbers leap to 15, 87, and 150 respectively, with another 26 by or for popes.57 This is evidence both of an increasing tendency to bureaucracy and formal record-keeping, and of a broader ability by the secular laity to engage in religious patronage and financial and territorial transactions. In the case of the Third Crusade, these charters allow a glimpse into the extensive crusading interest evoked in the region, the variety of individuals and kin-groups who participated, and the format of their preparations.

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In the three-year period of 1188–91, at least 15 acts by crusaders or in reference to crusade preparations are recorded. Some, such as Rainald of Grancey (dep. Côte d’Or, arr. Dijon) had wasted no time in leaving. On 25 October 1189, Rainald gave the Templars everything he owned in the villages of Gessey-le-Franc and Bussières, after provision had been made for his children; the will was made at the siege of Acre. For Rainald to be in the Holy Land well ahead of either king (and Hugh III himself) argues that he had travelled independently, and that his motives were sincerely religious; it is unclear if his kinsman Odo accompanied him. The siege of Acre had begun in August 1189, so it is unlikely that Rainald could have left France with the express intention of joining it. In any event, he died there.

One of the more human moments in the fairly dry records of cartularies can also be glimpsed at this time, and provides a valuable glimpse at crusade participation and recruitment among individuals of more ordinary status. Gui, archbishop of Sens, reported in 1189 that a pair of villagers, Hugh and William from the commune of Mercy (dep. Allier, arr. Moulins, 50 miles south of Nevers) gave alms to the abbey of Dilo – a donation approved by their local lord Odo and his wife Agnes, Hugh and William’s wives, Odearda and Engeburga, and Hugh’s son and daughter, Girard and Hersend. In addition, Girard planned to depart for Jerusalem, and if he died in the undertaking, willed his modest property – half a meadow – to his other sister and her husband. One is left with the impression that the two ordinary families had pooled their

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60 SMC, p. 360.
61 CGY, ii, act 391, pp. 397–98: ‘Guido, Dei gratia Senonensis archiepiscopus, omnibus ad quos littere iste pervenerint, in Domino salutem. Notum sit omnibus, tam futuris quam presentibus, quod Ugo et Guillelmus, homines Messiacci, dederunt Deo et ecclesie Deiloc in eleemosinam quicquid juris habebant [. . .] Laudavit hoc Odo,
financial resources in order to sponsor Girard’s journey to Jerusalem, and perhaps were all proudly present to see him off. It is a reminder of the fact that while Girard of Mercy is unlikely to appear in any other historical document, he and his peers were the largest part of crusading armies, no matter the glamorous reputations of kings and emperors. Unfortunately, we have no way of knowing if Girard returned from his adventure. His presence, however, arguably indicates that crusading interest had penetrated even to the more ordinary ranks of society, and that either the prominence or the efficacy of crusade preaching and propaganda in Burgundy had increased.

Crusading commitment clustered especially closely among a group of cousins: Clarembaud of Noyers (dep. l’Yonne, arr. Avallon), Stephen of Brive, son of the lord of Pierre-Perthuis (dep. l’Yonne, arr. Avallon), and Aswalo II of Seignelay (dep. l’Yonne, arr. Auxerre). In 1188, Clarembaud made a gift to a local church, St Mary’s, of some of the financial proceeds and a bushel of corn from his mill if he should die during his journey to Jerusalem.62 Stephen made gifts to the abbey of Pontigny, and appeared again in his cousin Clarembaud’s second charter of 1190, which gave more money to the Templars for the relief of the Christian cause.63 Stephen was also related to the regional lords of Seignelay; the line descended through his

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63 CGY, II, act 406, p. 412-13: ‘Notum sit universis bone voluntatis hominibus quod nobilis vir, dominus Clerembaldus de Nowers, honestatem et laudatam strenuitatem in Christi servitio domus Templi attendens, ad hec considerans quod in tante liberalitatis expensas ad fratrum usus ibidem Deo et salutifere cruci strenue ac devote famulantium [. . .] sexaginta solidorum inter Avalun et silvam de Arvial, ita quod de consilio meo, Stephani de Pierrepertus [. . .] Hujus rei testes sumus, ego Stephanus de Pierrepertus [. . .] per quos memorati dominus Clerembaldus’.
father’s oldest brother, Daimbert I of Seignelay.\textsuperscript{64} He thus appeared for a third time alongside his other cousin, Daimbert’s son Aswalo II,\textsuperscript{65} in 1190.\textsuperscript{66} This dense network of Burgundian crusading cousins is unprecedented in the documentary evidence thus far, and this group is likely to have travelled together. At least Clarembaud and Stephen went ahead, as Clarembaud died at the siege of Acre in about November 1190. On 30 October, he made his will out to Hugh of Noyers, bishop of Auxerre and another cousin, and wrote lovingly to his mother, wife, son, and daughter.\textsuperscript{67} Stephen was once more witness for his kinsman.\textsuperscript{68}

The charter of William I, count of Joigny (dep. l’Yonne, arr. Sens), issued in preparation for his departure to Jerusalem, is noteworthy in that it was made between himself and a convent: the abbey of Saint Julien in Auxerre, which employed monks in supporting roles but was primarily focused on religious women.\textsuperscript{69} William’s charter, addressed to his ‘dearest friend, Elvida, abbess of St. Julien’, ratified the arrangements of his father and her predecessor on the subject of their rights in the village of Migennes (dep. l’Yonne, arr. Auxerre). He also apologised for violence committed by his men, and made reparations.\textsuperscript{70} While it may be the case that St

\textsuperscript{64} The Lords of Seignelay’ in SMC, pp. 356–57.
\textsuperscript{65} Aswalo II and three of his sons all died in the Holy Land. SMC, p. 357.
\textsuperscript{66} CGY, II, act 410, p. 415-16: ‘Ego Awalo de Sellenniaco tam futuris quam presentibus notum fieri volo quod Stephanus de Briva, cognatus meus, Jherusalem profecturus, ecclesie et fratibus Sancti-Mariani quoddam molendinum, quod apud Basso cum eis partiæbatur, in elemosinam quittavit, et alia quedam de proprio tribuit. […] Actum est hoc, anno ab Incarnatione Domini millesimo centesimo nonagesimo’.
\textsuperscript{67} Additionally, Gui, archbishop of Sens, was Clarembaud’s uncle. Jean Lebeuf, Mémoires concernant l’histoire ecclésiastique et civile d’Auxerre (Paris: Durand, 1743), p. 316.
\textsuperscript{68} HdB, III, act 852, p. 356: ‘Reverendo patri in Christo, ac domino suo quoque dilecti germano H(ugoni), Dei gratia dignissimo Autissiodorensis episcopo, sue quoque karissime matri domine Adeline, et sue fidelissime uxori domine Ade, et suo caro filio Miloni, sua quoque filia dilectissima Adeline [...] Clarembaudus de Noiers qualscumque peccatorum eternam in Christo salute [...] Hujus rei et donationis interfuerunt testes [...] Stephanus li Bories de Petra Pertuis, meus consanguineus [...] Actum est hoc in obidione ante Accon [...] anno Domine incarnationis M°C°XC°, mense octobris, ultima die ejusdem mensis’.
\textsuperscript{70} CGY, II, act 407, pp. 413-14: ‘Ego Willelmus, comes Joviniaci, notum esse volo omnibus Dei fidelibus, tam futuris quam præsentibus, quod, cum Jerosolymam esses iterus, charissima amica mea, Elvidis, abbatissa S. Juliani, conquesta est mihi super quibusdam iniquis et exactionibus quas homines et servientes mei in terra sua de Migannia, in boscis ad eam pertinentibus, tempore meo, fecerant contra jus et æquitatem, et compositionem que inter bonæ memoriae Renardum, patrem meum, et Agnem, quondam abbatissam praefati monasterii S. Juliani, facta fuisse dinoscebatur’.
Julien was simply the religious house with which William most needed to patch up relations, it is interesting to see a nunnery receive a charter from a Third Crusader, as this featured the most visible discourse to date on the gendered politics of participation. Richard I excluded women from his coronation on grounds that they were inappropriate for a crusader’s ceremony (though he took his wife and sister to the Holy Land) and the potential involvement of women in battle on the Muslim or Christian sides was a point of contention for the other. The example of William and Elvida reminds us of the agency that medieval women could and did hold, and that female ecclesiastics could participate in the same legal and ceremonial rituals as their male counterparts. Nor was this exclusive of crusade preparations and investments.

Other Burgundian crusaders included Simon of Clefmont (dep. Haute-Marne, arr. Chaumont) and his son Robert Wichard, who both died on the campaign; his widow and surviving son made gifts at Molesme in their memory sometime between 1191 and 1192. Guy of Vergy (cause of the recent friction between Philip II and Hugh III) and his son Hugh also took the cross, as did Narjod of Toucy, descendant of the Toucy crusaders in 1101. Hervé III, lord of Donzy, was a relation of Raynald of Châtillon (through Raynald’s descent from the Donzy family, discussed in chapter 4) and a cousin once removed of Hugh III; they were both grandsons of Duke Hugh II, as Hervé’s mother was Hugh’s second daughter, Clemence. Hervé was also the great-grandson of 1101 crusader Geoffrey II of Donzy, which places him into an overall

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71 The topic of ‘crusading masculinities’ and other questions of gendered crusading participation are beginning to be examined in more depth. See for example Natasha R. Hodgson, ‘Reputation, Authority and Masculine Identities in the Political Culture of the First Crusaders: The Career of Arnulf of Chocques’, History, 102 (2017), 889–913.
73 See also Lester, ‘A Shared Imitation: Cistercian Convents and Crusader Families in Thirteenth-Century Champagne’, 353–70.
74 CAM, ii, act 685, p. 502.
75 HGMV, p. 148.
76 ‘The Lords of Toucy’ in SMC, p. 375; Bouchard gives Narjod’s date of death as 1192.
77 Richard, ‘Sur les alliances familiales des ducs de Bourgogne aux XIIe et XIIIe siècles’, p. 41, n. 4.
familial nexus with crusading links.\(^{78}\) Anseric III of Montréal was also part of the extended ducal network. His wife Sibyl was another granddaughter of Hugh II through a younger son (Hugh-Rufus, brother of Odo II) and thus he was Hugh III’s cousin-in-law, as well as his seneschal.\(^{79}\) His father Anseric II had gone on the Second Crusade, and his brother was John of Arcis (arr. Troyes, dep. Aube) who in 1189 gave the church all rights to his mill at Frène before his departure to Jerusalem.\(^{80}\) Anseric issued at least two charters before his journey, one at Cîteaux\(^{81}\) and one to a local Cistercian priory in Montréal, to which he also gave a mill; his brother John was a witness to this act, and his reference to his father’s gifts may represent an attempt to consciously echo a crusading legacy.\(^{82}\) Lastly, Simon of Semur was also a member of the ducal circle; he was Hugh III’s son-in-law by his marriage to Hugh’s daughter Maria, who confirmed his charters, at Ferté-sur-Grosne and Autun, before departure.\(^{83}\)

In contrast to the intense flurry of crusade activity contained in the Yonne cartulary, Cluny’s is almost barren. Indeed, the only charter given there in preparation for the journey is that of a father and son of the same name, Hugh of Berzé-la-Ville (dep. Saône-et-Loire, arr. Mâcon) making ready to go to Jerusalem in about 1190.\(^{84}\) We can possibly infer that by this

\(^{78}\) ‘The Lords of Donzy’ in SMC, p. 327.

\(^{79}\) ‘The Lords of Montréal’ in SMC, p. 339.

\(^{80}\) CGY, II, act 393, p. 399: ‘Notum sit universis, presentibus pariter et futuris, quod ego Johannes de Arcies, Jherosolimam petiturus, donavi communiter in perpetuum ecclesie Escarleiensi et ecclesie Fontis-Johannis quicquid habebam in molendino dou Fraine, redditum scilicet, dominium ecclesiarum sibi muneros ad suum placitum mitterent et mutarent; preterea quicquid deinceps in molendino habebam in molendino dou Fraine, reduxit scilicet, dominium et dignitatem, ita ut monachi predictarum ecclesiarum sibi muneros ad suum placitum mitterent et mutarent; preterea quicquid deinceps in molendino acquirere poterunt laudo et concede [. . .] anno ab Incarnatione Domini Mº Cº LXXXº IXº’.

\(^{81}\) HdB, III, act 808, p. 290.


\(^{83}\) HdB, III, act 845, p. 304: ‘Sciant presentes et futuri quod dominus Symon de Sine Muro dedit pro animasua et predecessorum suorum quando profectus est Iherosolimam [. . .] Hoc laudavit uxor ejus et Dalmatus, frater suus, sacramento firmaverunt. Actum in aula de Sinemuro, anno Mº Cº nonagesimo, quo Philippus rex Francorum Iherosolimam profectus est’. Petit misidentifies Simon as Hugh’s brother-in-law (‘beau-frère du duc de Bourgogne’) in the introduction to the charter, but as noted, he was Hugh’s son-in-law.

\(^{84}\) RCAC, V, act 4346, p. 710: ‘Ego Hugo de Berziaco pater, et ego Hugo de Berziaco, filius, notum facimus omnibus presentes litteras inspecturis, quod quum iter Ierosolimitanum arripuimus, in plenario capitulo Cluniacensi.
point in its evolving relationship with the crusades, from the existential unease associated with the First, through Peter the Venerable’s zealous support of the Second, Cluny had once again retreated somewhat by the time of the Third Crusade. This could also be reflective of the fact that the dukes’ support of the Cistercians and choice of Cîteaux as the family necropolis made it less politically useful to patronise Cluny. Nonetheless, it retained enough of a legacy to play a part, albeit a minor one, in Hugh III’s own crusade preparations. In 1190, in the presence of his father, his eldest son Odo relinquished all rights in the villages of Gevrey and Barges to the monks of Cluny.\(^85\) Hugh’s great-grandfather, Odo I, had made reparations over Gevrey and Cluny before departing on the crusade of 1101, and it appears that it was necessary for the issue to be revisited. 

We can see from Hugh’s own record of patronage in 1188–90 that he was engaged in the fairly standard pre-crusade agenda of settling disputes, ceding rights, giving financial grants, and otherwise attempting to correct the damage of the 1180s.\(^86\) His mother Marie, the dowager duchess of Burgundy, died in 1190, soon before his departure, and he made a gift for her soul, to Notre Dame-de-Châtillon.\(^87\) His adult sons by his first marriage were, as noted, nearly omnipresent in his acts; both Odo, the elder and heir apparent, but often Alexander, the younger, as well. By instructing them in the governance of the duchy and involving them in his affairs, Hugh certainly had in mind the possibility that he would not return (as indeed he did not) and thus ensuring that Odo and, in the event of a tragedy, Alexander were capable of taking over as

\(^85\) *RCAC*, v, act 4345, p. 709: ‘Ego Odo, filius ducis Burgundie, omnibus notum facio quod, in presencia patris mei Hugonis venerabilis ducis Burgundie, adestatunm fuit et vere cognitum, quod nichil habebamus in villa Gevreii, preter illos qui vocantur Booler et in hominibus Sancti Petri Cluniacensis morantibus in villa de Barges, […] presentem cartam, precepto patris mei et propria voluntate, sigillo meo munivi’.

\(^86\) See ‘Pièces justificatives’ in *HdB*, iii, pp. 284–300, for Hugh’s charters between 1188–90, esp. acts 793, 797, 798, 800, 823, 824, 829.

\(^87\) *HdB*, iii, act 825, pp. 295–6: ‘Ego Hugo, dux Burgundie […] pro remedio anime mee et predecessorum meorum, canonicis Castellionis XL solidos in pedagio ejusdem castri, post decessum matris mee, in purificationem beate Marie annuatim recipiendos […] Acta sunt hec anno M°C°LXXXX°’. 

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duke. Hugh’s preparations seem to have paid off, as his son Odo uneventfully administered the duchy during the crusade, giving acts at customary places such as Châtillon, Cîteaux, and Autun. One of these, by the abbot of St Martin in Autun in 1191, referred to Hugh’s absence in the Holy Land. Hugh also made arrangements for his wife, Beatrice of Albon, to live in the Viennois while he was gone; Philip II later confirmed these. Beatrice also worked on some occasions with Odo, including a joint charter in Saint-Vallier (dep. Drôme, arr. Valence) in 1191. Considering the intrigue in France and especially England during their kings’ absences, this emerges as a certain indication of Burgundy’s political stability, despite Hugh’s costly recent attempt to challenge French royal power. While the rest of France was fought over by Plantagenets and Capetians, Burgundy’s reliable production of a duke named either Hugh or Odo, eldest son of his predecessor, is worthy of note.

On 7 November 1189, Hugh was in Saint-Vallier, which was part of his territory as count of Albon, to muster troops for the crusade. From there, he continued to Genoa, Italy, where Philip II had given him the authority to arrange passage for the French crusaders. Hugh concluded two treaties with the citizens of Genoa on 15 and 16 February 1190. The first charter

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88 *HdB*, III, acts 868-871, pp. 315-16.
90 *HdB*, III, act 850, p. 306.
91 *HdB*, III, act 870, p. 316.
92 *HdB*, III, act 816, p. 293.
granted broad privileges to Genoese traders and travellers in Burgundy, including the assurance of safe-conduct and discounted peáge tolls in Dijon, Chalon, Châtillon, Chagny, and Beaune.94

The second made arrangements for the transport of Philip’s army to the Holy Land by the Genoese fleet.95 The provision was for the king and his barons, 650 French knights, their squires, servants, horses, arms, armour, food for eight months, and wine for four, at a total of 5,850 marks, or nine marks per package.96

This is a considerably lower figure, both in number of combatants and in overall price, than for Barbarossa’s crusade and for the grandiose arrangements of the Fourth Crusaders with the Venetians twelve years later, which were to get them into such lasting financial straits.97

There is no provision for the French rank-and-file, and Philip’s expenditure of just under 6,000 marks is considerably modest; the expenses of Barbarossa’s knights alone have been estimated to be nearly 72,000 marks, with the overall bill for the expedition close to 100,000.98 Altogether, there is certainly material in this charter for Philip’s enemies to accuse him of expending minimal effort or money on the cause, though this does not take into account any other of his crusade-related expenses. But by any lights, just under 6,000 marks appears considerably thrifty for as costly an activity as crusading, and for the transport of a major contingent. Barbarossa

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95 Liber Iurium, I, p. 355: ‘Hugo Burgundiae dux, Philippi II Francorum regis legatus, pro transfretandis militibus expeditioni Terrae Sanctae addictis, cum ianuensibus consulibus pacta init’.
97 Alan V. Murray, ‘Finance and Costs of Crusading: Some Comparative Figures from the Third and Fourth Crusades’ (presented at the Society for the Study of the Crusades and the Latin East, Istanbul, 2004). Geoffrey de Villehardouin discusses the Fourth Crusaders’ arrangements with the Venetians, which were to cost them 94,000 marks and were a source of extended financial burden. See Chronicles of the Crusades / Joinville & Villehardouin, trans. by Caroline Smith (New York: Penguin, 2008), pp. 8–9.
planned for a campaign of two years, whereas Hugh (on Philip’s behalf) secured provisions merely for eight months. Once more, this does not reflect the fact that the French army would have other ports of supply, but it is arguably accurate in demonstrating Philip II’s frugality and limited and ambivalent relationship with crusading, which was to cause him reputational difficulties after his early departure. For Hugh to be given this degree of authority in crusade preparations indicates that he and Philip were in close communication over the logistics of the expedition, and that Philip had settled on Hugh as an acceptable deputy; indeed, Hugh referred to himself as Philip’s ‘legatus [et] procurator omnimodum’. While this might seem unexpected, given their rancorous relationship for most of the 1180s, medieval political rivalry often had to be forgiven and reconfigured, and extended bad relations did not preclude later reconciliation. It cannot be discerned whether this represented any personal emotion on Hugh’s part, or was merely the necessary formulaic language and legal specifications of a charter, but it does at least mean that king and duke were once more on diplomatic terms and in co-operation.

Having returned to Dijon in spring 1190, Hugh made several gifts to the Cistercians, including one more for Gerard of Réon’s soul. He also witnessed another bequest to the Cistercians by Everard, provost of Dijon, who was going with him to Jerusalem, and donated sixty solidi to the Cistercian abbey of Maizières, in Beaune, shortly before his departure. By 4 July 1190, the French and English contingents, under the command of Philip II and Richard I, had arrived at Vézelay in Burgundy, where they met up with Hugh and several of the Burgundian crusaders named above, including Peter of Courtenay, Aswalo of Seignelay, Stephen

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100 Liber Iurium, I, p. 355.
101 HdB, III, act 842, p. 302: ‘Ego Hugo, Dei gratia dux Burgundie et Albonii comes […] et pro anima domini Gerardi de Reun, dedi Deo et beate Marie Cistercii in perpetuum elemosinam […]’.
102 HdB, III, act 843, p. 303: ‘Ego Hugo [Dei gratia, etc . . .] quod Euvrardus, Divionensis prepositus, Jerosolimam prefecturus, dedit in perpetuum elemosynam Deo et Beate Marie et fratribus Cistercii […]’.
103 HdB, III, act 848, p. 305: ‘Ego Hugo [etc. ..] anno ab incarnatione Domini M°C°LXXXX°, iter Iherusalem aggrediens, dedi et concessi Deo et Sancte Marie de Maceriis […] LX solidos in perpetuum possidendos’.
of Brive, William of Joigny, Narjod of Toucy, and others.\textsuperscript{104} The use of Vézelay as the
rendezvous point reflected its role in the Second Crusade, which had seen Philip’s father Louis
and Richard’s mother Eleanor depart thence for the Holy Land, and carried familial legacies of
holy duty for both. For his part, Hugh returned briefly to Dijon, then travelled south to join the
army in Lyon in August 1190.\textsuperscript{105} At last, the Burgundians were on crusade.

III. The Third Crusade, 1190–92

The Third Crusade has often been viewed as a theatre of Anglo-French rivalry almost more than
the military campaigns against the Muslims, and it certainly did strain the crusade from its
inception. This also inevitably colours the portrait of Hugh which emerges, as he is featured
increasingly in opposition to the heroic figure of Richard I. The two main Western narrative
sources are the \textit{Itinerarium Peregrinorum} or \textit{Itinerary of Richard I to the Holy Land (IP)}\textsuperscript{106} and
the \textit{Chronica} of Roger of Howden, both produced from English perspectives and accordingly
promoting the English monarch. Both have some claim to firsthand experience of the crusade, as
the \textit{Itinerarium} is generally accepted as having been reworked and completed in the 1220s on the
basis of earlier accounts, also sharing material with the \textit{Continuations} of William of Tyre.\textsuperscript{107}
Roger of Howden was personally present on the crusade until August 1191, when he left to
return to England (likely to help keep an eye on the departed Philip II); after this point, the

\textsuperscript{104} HdB, III, pp. 46-7.
\textsuperscript{105} HdB, III, p. 48.
\textsuperscript{106} \textit{Chronicles and Memorials of the Reign of Richard I/Itinerarium Peregrinorum et Gesta Regis Ricardi}, ed. by
William Stubbs, 2 vols (London: Longman, Green, and Co., 1864), and \textit{A Translation of the Itinerarium
Peregrinorum et Gesta Regis Ricardi}, trans. Helen Nicholson. References to the Stubbs edition are to Latin, and to
the Nicholson edition are English.
\textsuperscript{107} John France, ‘Saladin, from Memory towards Myth in the Continuations’, in \textit{Deeds Done Beyond the Sea: Essays
on William of Tyre, Cyprus, and the Military Orders Presented to Peter Edbury}, ed. by Susan B. Edgington and
Helen J. Nicholson (Abingdon: Routledge, 2014), 69–82 (p. 78.) See also Nicholson, ‘Following the Path of The
Lionheart: The De Ortu Walwannii and the Itinerarium Peregrinorum et Gesta Regis Ricardi’, \textit{Medium Ævum}, 69
(2000), 21–33, and H.E. Mayer, \textit{Das Itinerarium: Eine zeitgenössische englische Chronik zum dritten Kreuzzug in
ursprünglicher Gestalt} (Stuttgart, 1962), 1–44.
quality of his information is reduced.\textsuperscript{108} The Old French \textit{Estoire de la guerre sainte} of Ambroise, a Norman companion of Richard I, has not been extensively relied upon, except for comparison or corroboration with the main narratives.\textsuperscript{109} Nonetheless in all three sources, the portrayal of Hugh is more complex than the straightforwardly and unremittingly negative depictions of other French or French-allied figures, such as Philip II and Conrad of Montferrat, and in our reading, argues for a more nuanced interpretation of his relationship with Richard I, and the crusade policies of both leaders individually and in concert, than has been sometimes acknowledged.

The first venue of conflict was in Sicily. King William II (r. 1166–89), Richard’s brother-in-law, had been among the first European monarchs to send military support to the Holy Land, dispatching a fleet of fifty galleys in 1188.\textsuperscript{110} However, his death later that year left Richard’s younger sister, Joanna of Sicily, a widow, detained along with her dowry by the illegitimate claimant to the Sicilian throne, Tancred of Lecce. Upon their arrival in the city of Messina, Philip on 16 September 1190 and Richard on 23 September 1190, the kings were immediately caught up in the project of the Sicilian inheritance. It did not take long for trouble to break out. On 3 October, a quarrel erupted between the citizens of Messina and the English army, which Richard unsuccessfully attempted to pacify, and on 4 October, a council was called among the


\textsuperscript{110} Stubbs, \textit{IP}, i, p. 27.
Sicilian, English, and French nobility in an effort to restore order. Both Roger of Howden and Benedict of Peterborough listed Hugh as present among the French dignitaries.\(^{111}\) Roger blamed the citizens for the failure of these negotiations, which led to the city being attacked and taken by Richard and his forces later that same day.\(^{112}\)

As Philip notoriously refused to assist Richard during this exercise, it is unlikely that Hugh played any significant role either. He appeared once more on 8 October, named among the sureties of the treaty of Messina. Alongside Walter, archbishop of Rouen, Manasses, bishop of Langres, the masters of the Templars and the Hospitalers, and other French and English lords, he was to ensure that dead crusaders’ estates were spent in defence of the Holy Land.\(^{113}\) Hugh himself wintered in Messina with Philip, but at least some Burgundian crusaders travelled ahead. In addition to Rainald of Grancey and Clarembaud of Noyers, who had already died in Acre, Anseric of Montréal and his household did the same and met the same fate, sometime at the end of 1190.\(^{114}\) (William, bishop of Montréal, who had played a role in the Messina negotiations, is also listed among the dead.)\(^{115}\) As Anseric was Hugh’s seneschal and cousin-in-law, it is notable that he had not stayed in Sicily with the duke, but as the delays of the campaign were the cause of some discontent – by now, it was a full three years since Jerusalem had fallen to Saladin – several crusaders chose to continue their journey rather than wait for the dawdling kings.\(^{116}\)

\(^{111}\) RH, *Chronica*, III, p. 57: ‘Quarto die Octobris venerunt ad regem Angliam [...] et adduxerunt secum Philippum regem Franciae [...] et Hugonem ducem Burgundiae’.

\(^{112}\) RH, *Chronica*, III, p. 58.

\(^{113}\) RH, *Chronica*, pp. 58–59, and *Annals*, p. 161. In Roger’s account, Hugh is listed after the archbishop of Rouen and the bishop of Langres, and the masters of the Templars and Hospitalers, but is the first secular nobleman mentioned from either side. Benedict of Peterborough, *Gesta*, p. 130, disregards the others and merely records ‘Hugonis ducis Burgundiae et aliorum plurimorum’.

\(^{114}\) RH (*Annals*, p. 188/*Chronica*, p. 89) gives his name as ‘Anselm’ of Montréal and thus so does Benedict, *Gesta*, p. 149: ‘Isti obierunt eodem anno [1190] in obsidione Acre [...] Anselmus de Monte Regali et tota familia ejus’.

\(^{115}\) RH, *Chronica*, III, p. 87: ‘Archepiscopus de Monte Regali’. This sentence is somewhat confused on Roger’s part, as Montréal was not the seat of an archbishopric, but can be presumed to refer to William.

\(^{116}\) Alberic of Trois-Fontaines comments on this directly, and suggests that some of the crusaders (including Burgundians) travelled ahead. ATF, in *MGH: Scriptores* (Hanover: Hahn, 1874), XXIII, p. 863: ‘Inter hec igitur multi Francorum proceres morarum pertesi, quia iam plus quam per annum baiuli crucis extiterant et propter hoc ab
Hugh himself had an eventful time in Italy. At Christmas 1190, he received a gift of 1,000 marks from Philip, among Philip’s various financial emoluments to French barons,\textsuperscript{117} and was present at Richard’s feast in Messina, with Peter of Nevers, William of Joigny, and others. In early 1191, Hugh may have again become involved in the ongoing rivalry. The settlements of the previous year had included Tancred of Lecce’s recognition as king of Sicily, and during Richard and Tancred’s conference in March, Tancred allegedly gave Richard letters in which Philip called Richard a traitor and promised French support if Tancred committed to destroying the English army. These letters were supposedly delivered via Hugh:

> On the following day, when the king of England was preparing to take his leave, king Tancred gave him a certain document, which the king of France had sent to him by the duke of Burgundy, and had therein stated that the king of England was a traitor, and had not kept the treaty of peace which he had made with him, and that if king Tancred was willing to go to war with the king of England […] he [Philip] and his people would give him aid against the king of England, for the purpose of destroying his army.\textsuperscript{118}

However, this is one of the more questionable documentary episodes of the crusade, and is unlikely to be true as presented. No matter how acrimonious Richard and Philip’s relationship was, it is still considerably doubtful that Philip would have openly recruited Tancred to destroy Richard’s army and by extension, the crusade. Richard was in need of a pretext to formally dissolve his long-standing betrothal to Philip’s half-sister Alys in order to marry Berengaria of Navarre, and Philip accused him of forging the letter for exactly that purpose.\textsuperscript{119} Roger of Howden is more likely to be passing along the justifications created either then, or at a later

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\textsuperscript{117} GPA, p. 286.

\textsuperscript{118} RH, \textit{Chronica}, III, p. 98: ‘Et in crastino cum rex Angliae recedere vellet, rex Tancredus tradidit ei quodam breve, quod rex Francie miserat illi per ducem Burgundiae, et mandaverat per breve illud, quod rex Angliae proditor erat, et pacem, quam cum illo fecerat, non servaret, et si ipse rex Tancredus vellet cum rege Angliae in bello congregdi […] ille et gens sua auxiliarentur ei, ad regem Angliae et exercitum suum destruendum’. Trans. from \textit{Annals}, pp. 194–95.

point, to excuse Richard’s actions, and it becomes difficult to locate any actual historicity for Hugh’s involvement as a result. However, it at least suggests that the formulator of the story saw him as a likely partner for Philip in duplicity, implying that Hugh and Philip remained in co-operation over the winter, and that Hugh had seen the advantages of serving as the second-highest-ranking French official on the crusade. Money, diplomacy, and mutual enmities had bound him more closely to Philip during the winter in Sicily, and would continue to do so.

Hugh embarked for the Holy Land on 25 March 1191 with the French fleet, arriving in Acre on 13 April, Holy Saturday. He participated in the siege with the French army, and sometime in May, confirmed a donation that one of his vassals, Viard of Uchey (dep. Côte d’Or, arr. Dijon) made to the Hospitallers. Near the same time, his 1186 nemesis Guy of Vergy, also present, made a gift to the Templars. Two of the named witnesses appeared in both acts: Stephen of Faverney (arr. Vesoul, dep. Haute-Saône) and Walter of Sombernon (dep. Côte d’Or, arr. Dijon), which arguably suggests that despite old rivalries at home, the Burgundian crusaders were functioning as a more or less connected unit in the Holy Land. Faverney is in comital Burgundy, and Sombernon in ducal Burgundy, perhaps also implying some affiliation with those from Barbarossa’s crusade who had continued under Frederick of Swabia. Once again, this is the first of the crusades from which we have enough evidence of Burgundian participation to speculate on such relationships. It also reinforces our contention that the Third Crusade marked a different sort of Burgundian crusade activity, and that this was sustained through several levels.

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120 HdB, III, p. 59.
121 HdB, III, act. 865, p. 313: ‘Notum sit […] quod Viardus de Vulchee dedit Deo et sancte domni Hospitalis Iherosolimitani, in obsidione Accon […] ego Huge, dux Burgundie, hec dona facto fuisse domni Hospitalis, sicut suprascriptum est […] Actum est hoc anno Dominice incarnationis M°C°LXXXX°I°, mense maio’.
One of Hugh’s other acts at this time is likewise worthy of note. On 9 May 1191, he appeared as a witness in a charter of Conrad of Montferrat, claimant to the throne of Jerusalem after his marriage to Isabella, half-sister of the late Queen Sibylla, in November 1190. Given at the siege of Acre, this charter is interesting in several respects. First, Conrad issued it jointly in his and his wife’s name (as Isabella was the origin of his claim). Next, the function of the charter was to renew the privileges granted to the Venetians during the captivity of King Baldwin II (r. 1118–31), an event requiring some brief contextualisation. In 1123, Baldwin had been imprisoned by the Turkish Artuqid rulers of Mesopotamia and Syria, and the Latin kingdom was subsequently invaded by the Fatimids of Egypt. The timely arrival of a Venetian fleet defeated the Fatimids, and in gratitude, the Venetians received tax remittances, civic privileges, and other gifts for their citizens in the Holy Land. An agreement was then made in Acre for the Venetians and the Franks to besiege Tyre (held by the Fatimids) together.

Thus for Conrad to re-issue this privilege in 1191, with the circumstances reversed (Tyre now held by the Christians, with Muslim-held Acre under siege) was both a deft political manoeuvre and an ambitious positioning of himself within the established legal genealogy of Jerusalem’s kings, as he promised that the Venetians’ historical rights would apply in any of the cities that the crusade succeeded in retrieving. It also featured all the major players of the French/Montferrat contingent: Conrad himself, Philip II of France, Philip of Flanders, Ralph of Clermont, Hugh III of Burgundy, and Leopold of Austria, along with the Templars and

123 Die Urkunden der lateinischen Könige von Jerusalem, ed. by Hans Eberhard Mayer, 4 vols (Hanover: Hahn, 2010), II, act 530, p. 905: ‘[...] quod ego Conradius marchionis Montisferrati filius, per dei gratiam rex Ierosolimorum electus et domina Isabella uxor mea, illustris quondam regis Aimalrici filia [...]’.
125 DLKJ, I, p. 236. An English translation can be found in WT, Babcock and Krey, I, pp. 552–56.
126 As discussed in chapter 3, this became known as the ‘Venetian Crusade’ of 1122–24.
Hospitallers. This took place on 9 May 1191, at which point Richard I and the English army were still on Cyprus after their campaign to conquer it from Isaac Komnenos, cousin of the Byzantines and self-proclaimed emperor of the island. It is thus reflective of the fact that the French political alignment with Conrad was quite established prior to Richard’s arrival, and may explain why Guy of Lusignan felt it prudent to hasten to Cyprus for Richard’s assistance.

This also sheds some light on why Hugh became the leader of the French crusaders. Philip II and his cousin Peter of Nevers would soon depart the Holy Land; Conrad returned to Tyre and refused to cooperate with Richard; Leopold of Austria was not French and also departed in July 1191, and Ralph of Clermont, a count and the constable of France, died at Acre in 1191. Henry II of Champagne was another option, as Philip’s nephew, but it is most likely that Philip felt that Henry was too closely aligned with his other uncle, Richard (as he was for the remainder of the crusade.) In one sense, Hugh was the only viable choice, and had been entrusted with the business of managing the crusade in Philip’s name for some time anyway. Having had personal experience of Hugh’s bellicose nature and ability to hold a grudge, Philip could doubtless be sure that Hugh would do the same to his bête noire, Richard (as eventually proved to be the case). Overall, the next stage of the crusade was characterised by clashes and disputes between the French and English armies and their leaders – though arguably, at least at first, less than has been commonly portrayed. In this, Hugh played a pivotal role.

Richard arrived in the Holy Land on 8 June 1191, having completed his conquest of Cyprus and destroyed a Muslim ship off the coast of Sidon, before it could proceed to the relief

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128 DLKJ, ii, act 530, p. 903–4: ‘domni Phylippi dei gratia serenessimi regis Francorum, et domni Phylippi comitis Flandriae et domni ducis Burgundie et domni ducis de Osterico et omnium comitum et baronum exercitus Christianorum Acconis’. Conrad, Philip II, Philip of Flanders, Ralph of Clermont, Hugh of Burgundy, Leopold of Austria, and members of the Templars and Hospitallers then attest, in that order.

of Acre. He received a hero’s welcome, but he and Philip soon fell seriously ill with a malady known as *arnaldia*, which has resisted precise retrospective diagnosis. The indisposition of the kings influenced the siege operations, but Acre was finally acquired by diplomacy on 12 July, along with five thousand Muslim hostages. Ten days later, on 22 July, Philip had made up his mind to leave, sending a delegation consisting of Hugh, Robert of Beauvais, Drogo of Amiens, and William of Merlou to notify Richard of his intentions. After a heated week of criticism over his decision and negotiations over the settlement of the kingdom of Jerusalem, Philip ceded command of the French army to Hugh, along with its treasury and supplies, on 29 July 1191. Hugh, Henry of Champagne, and others also served as Philip’s pledge not to interfere in Richard’s lands in France. After administrative formalities, Philip departed Acre on 31 July 1191, taking his cousin, Peter of Nevers, with him.

Hugh was now the undisputed leader of the French contingent in the Holy Land, but he was also the inheritor of Philip’s bitter rivalry with Richard, the delicate politics of the succession to Jerusalem, and the shame of his king’s early departure. Like much of the crusading army, he was in financial straits, and obtained a loan of 5,000 marks from Richard, sometime in August 1191, to pay the French troops. This, along with his embassy to retrieve Philip’s half of the Muslim hostages from Conrad of Montferrat (who had taken them to Tyre), perhaps

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indicates that Hugh made an effort to work with Richard at first, and vice versa.\textsuperscript{137} The month of August continued with no attempt by Saladin to fulfil the terms of Acre’s surrender, and on 20 August 1191, Richard ordered the hostages to be killed before the city walls. Hugh supervised the execution of the French half of the prisoners, though he and Richard spared several high-ranking commanders in hopes of forcing a new capitulation from Saladin.\textsuperscript{138} Given that this was a controversial move, and Hugh could have refused to follow Richard’s lead or reserved the French half of the hostages for another purpose or separate arrangement with the Muslims, it is again evidence of some unity. Either Hugh saw no point in resisting once the decision had been taken to kill Richard’s captives and supported the chance to force Saladin’s hand, or he lacked an alternative strategy, but it again reinforces the impression that the ultimate failure of his and Richard’s working relationship did not begin straight away. This unpleasant task complete, the army left Acre on 22 August 1191, intending to make for the city of Jaffa, about 75 miles south.

Hugh was then blamed for a near-miss military disaster during the march down the coast, sometime at the end of August. He and the French troops were stationed in the rearguard, and during a thunderstorm, became separated from the rest of the army, causing the Muslims to launch a successful surprise attack. The situation was only rescued from catastrophe by Richard’s personal intervention.\textsuperscript{139} Still, this did not totally sour relations between Richard and Hugh, as the \textit{Itinerarium} again reports them working in concert prior to the battle of Arsuf (7 September 1191): ‘King Richard and the duke of Burgundy rode this way and that with a chosen company of knights, keeping a constant look out on all sides, to the right and to the left, carefully

\textsuperscript{137} RH, \textit{Annals}, p. 218. The \textit{IP} adds Drogo of Amiens and Robert de Quincy to Hugh’s party in travelling to Tyre on Richard’s behalf in early August 1191, and blames Conrad rather than the French (at least in this instance) for failing to come to an agreement. (Nicholson, \textit{IP}, p. 230.) Ambroise also treated Hugh and the French relatively sympathetically in this episode, crediting them with travelling on Richard’s command and inducing Conrad to give up the hostages. \textit{Estoire}, II, p. 107. (See also \textit{Estoire}, I, p. 88, lines 5440–51)

\textsuperscript{138} RH, \textit{Annals}, p. 220.

\textsuperscript{139} Nicholson, \textit{IP}, p. 238, and \textit{Estoire}, II, pp. 111–12. Roger of Howden conflates this with the battle of Arsuf and is uncomplimentary of Hugh’s actions. RH, \textit{Annals}, p. 220.
weighing up the Turks’ position and behaviour so that they could advise the advancing army as they saw necessary’. Richard’s letter to the abbot of Clairvaux on 1 October 1191, after the army had arrived in Jaffa, also did not refer to Hugh pejoratively: ‘The duke of Burgundy with the Franks placed under his command, count Henry [of Champagne] with his men, and the other earls, barons, and knights, who have expended their means on behalf of God, will return home, unless through the skilful effects produced by your preaching, timely provision shall be made’.

However, Richard and Hugh then quarrelled over the crusade’s next move. After hearing of Saladin’s recent destruction of the strategically important city of Ascalon, Richard wanted to march south again and recapture it; Ascalon’s location, roughly 20 miles north of Egypt, would also be beneficial in disrupting Muslim supply caravans. Hugh and the French, on the other hand, wanted to stay in Jaffa, perceiving the route to Ascalon as diverting too far from Jerusalem, and it was this decision which prevailed. Nonetheless, it is difficult to get much sense of Hugh’s actions for the remainder of 1191, as he makes no further appearance in the chronicles. By early 1192, the crusade army had spent the winter rebuilding a series of destroyed fortifications and negotiating intermittently with Saladin, plagued by bad weather and slow progress. Against the advice of the Templars and Hospitallers, it set out for Jerusalem at the start of January, giving into the fervour to see the Holy City regardless of the realities of the tactical situation or the likelihood of actually capturing and holding it – which the Itinerarium, with the benefit of

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141 Richard’s point was clearly to recruit more men, goods, and money for the crusade, rather than to blame Hugh and the French (yet) for undermining the effort. RH, Annals, pp. 223-24/Chronica, III, p. 132: ‘Dux Burgundiae, cum Francigenis sibi subditis, et comes Henricus cum suis, et caeteri comites et barones et milites, qui in servitio Dei sua jam expenderunt pro Deo, ad propria remeabunt, nisi per vestrae praedictionis solletam eis […]’.

142 Nicholson, IP, p. 264, n. 68. Richard’s reluctance to march directly on Jerusalem has been interpreted either as a wise tactical decision given the limitations of his resources and position, or as a fundamental misunderstanding of the religious aspect of the crusade, along with various other character flaws. E.g. Michael Markowski, ‘Richard Lionheart: Bad King, Bad Crusader?’, Journal of Medieval History, 23 (1997), 351–65.
hindsight, admitted to be quite low. However, this makeshift advance lasted barely a fortnight before it was abandoned (on 13 January 1192) due to continuing bad weather, lack of supplies, and illness among the rank and file, and the army returned ignominiously to Ramla. This was the major event in fatally compromising Richard and Hugh’s relationship, which until now, if antagonistic, was at least functional. The *Itinerarium* recorded:

Most of the French left because they were angry at how things were going, and remained at leisure in Joppa for quite some time. Also, some went back to Acre, where there was no shortage of food. Some went to Tyre to join the marquis, who had been strongly urging them to do this. Also, in anger and contempt for the rest of the army, some went with the duke of Burgundy to the Casal of the Plains, where they stayed for eight days.

Given the long-stewing discontent in the French ranks over Richard’s treatment of Philip, his temperamental nature, and his perceived arrogance in assuming sole command of the crusade and dispossessing other leaders, an open schism was almost inevitable. We can presume that Hugh and the Burgundians had been with the main crusade army until this point (though a consequence of the duke himself being present is that mentions of other Burgundian crusaders vanish, as Hugh and the French become the sources’ only point of reference) and suffering its tribulations, but after the failed January march on Jerusalem, their participation was transformed into a matter of permanent contention. Richard and Henry of Champagne marched with the English crusaders to Ascalon, which had been left almost completely destroyed by Saladin, and arrived on 20 January 1192, but the French remained stubbornly absent. After finally agreeing to obey Richard, but only until Easter and with the promise of being free to leave beforehand, they travelled to Ascalon to join the rest of the army, and assisted in the rebuilding effort.

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144 Stubbs, *IP*, p. 311: ‘Francorum enim pars maxima ob iracundiam recesserat, qui ad Joppen aliquamdiu resederunt in otiis; quidam etiam ad Achon regressi sunt [...]. Nonnulli etiam prefectum sunt Tyrum ad Marchisum qui plurimum eos ad id sollicitaverat, quidam quoque cum duc e Burgundiae ob iram et indignationem diverterunt ad ad casellum de Planis, ubi per octo dies morati sunt’. Trans. by Nicholson, p. 285.
however, did not mend relations between Richard and Hugh, which were soon broken by another dispute over money. Hugh was unable to pay the French troops their maintenance and sought another loan from Richard, similar to the one in August 1191, but Richard, noting that Hugh had not repaid him, turned him down. ‘For this reason […] the duke departed in an agitated state. Despite his failure to pay them, the French set out with him and hurried toward Acre’.

Hugh’s luck did not improve upon his arrival in Acre, which, after its recapture by the Christians, had fallen into civil war between the Pisan and Genoese crusading contingents. The Pisans, allied with Richard and Guy of Lusignan, met the French at their arrival and wounded Hugh: ‘Focusing their attack on the duke of Burgundy, who appeared to be the leader, they made a great charge, encircled him and immediately threw him from his horse to the ground, transfixed with a lance’. After this painful setback, Hugh continued to Tyre to join Conrad of Montferrat, and the Itinerarium portrayed them as scheming together to undermine Richard and withdraw the French from active participation. Hugh remained with Conrad until the latter was elected king of Jerusalem, then assassinated on 28 April 1192. Conrad’s widow Isabella was swiftly remarried to Henry II of Champagne, and the couple were acclaimed as king and queen of Jerusalem. Since this placed the Christian territories of the Holy Land under the control of Henry, Richard’s nephew and ally, the French no longer had a legal refuge to avoid the crusade, and Hugh rejoined the army, arriving at Darum with Henry and the French on 22 May 1192.

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147 Stubbs, IP, p. 322: ‘In ducem Burgundiae, qui major eorum esse videretur, insurgentes, impetu magno ipsum circumdantes, ab equo statim lancea transfixo dejecturunt in terram’. Trans. by Nicholson, p. 292
148 Nicholson, IP, pp. 293-95. According to Roger of Howden, Hugh had sent for Conrad on the advice of the Genoese, their mutual allies, and intended to make him king. However, Roger’s chronology is again rather muddled here, as he places the conflict between the Pisans and Genoese after Easter, rather than before. RH, Annals, p. 266.
149 Richard had already captured it, as the IP pointedly notes, ‘without any help from the French’, after an engagement of three days; Nicholson, IP, pp. 313-14. For the date, see T.A. Archer, The Crusade of Richard I.
At this time, news had begun to reach the Holy Land of political embroilments in England, impelling Richard to consider returning home, but after a flattering speech by an army chaplain, reminding him of his accomplishments, he decided to stay. He informed 'his nephew Count Henry and the duke of Burgundy and the other chiefs that he would not leave the country before Easter [1193]', and agreed in principle to the idea of proceeding toward Jerusalem. However, a month later, with the summer heat intensifying and the army stalled at Betenoble, about 20 miles from Jerusalem, Richard again refused a full march on the city without the consent of the Templars and Hospitallers. He pointed out the dangers awaiting the crusaders if they tried to force an attack in a hot, hostile, unfamiliar land without adequate water, supplies, intelligence, or cohesion in the ranks, and that as soon as the men reached Jerusalem, most would leave, resulting in no way to hold the city even if they took it. The French insisted that they would only proceed to Jerusalem, but Richard eventually persuaded Hugh to come with him to raid Muslim supply caravans, in exchange for a third of any plunder taken. However, this was only a temporary – and it turned out, final – stopgap. After the crusading army advanced as close as four miles from Jerusalem, but was ultimately ordered to retreat in early July 1192, relations broke down altogether. The French camped separately from the English, and Hugh took out his animosity toward Richard in a more personal fashion. The Itinerarium commented:

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151 Stubbs, IP, p. 365: ‘…dixit comiti Henrico nepoti suo, et duci Burgundiae, aliiisque proceribus, quod nec per nunciam quaecumque sollicitantem, sive quoscumque rumores vel queralas ante Pascha recederat in terra’.


154 Rather unfortunately for the historian’s curiosity, the precise content of this song has not survived. However, given other rumours about Richard, and the implication that it was of a particularly shameful (i.e. sexual) nature, it is possible to guess. Hilary Rhodes, ‘Richard the Lionheart, Contested Queerness, and Crusading Memory’ (presented at the International Medieval Congress, University of Leeds, July 2018) explored this topic in more detail.
On top of all this, Henry [Hugh III] duke of Burgundy, prompted by a spirit of worthless arrogance or perhaps led on by the most unbecoming malicious envy, composed the words of a song to be sung in public.\textsuperscript{155} Such shameful words should never have been made public if its composers had retained any sense of propriety [. . .] This invidious composition was sung all through the army. The king was extremely annoyed about it, and thought that he should punish them by paying them back in their own coin. So he also sang something about them, and it was little trouble to compose because there was plenty of material at hand.\textsuperscript{156}

Hugh withdrew to Acre with the rest of the crusade army, where at the end of July 1192, word reached them that Saladin had attacked and captured the city of Jaffa. Richard at once hurried back to fight him in the battle of Jaffa (5 August 1192), where he succeeded almost against all odds, but Hugh by this point was mortally ill. He evidently knew that the end was at hand, since on 18 August 1192 he wrote to his son Odo,\textsuperscript{157} made a donation to the canons of the church of Saint-Stephen in Dijon, and sent a letter to Philip II as well, addressing him in humble terms and naming him as co-guarantor of the gift to Saint-Stephen.\textsuperscript{158} It is possible that this act represented the expected penitence and reconciliation of a Christian facing death, or Hugh’s attempt to give

\textsuperscript{155} No matter whether Hugh was the actual composer or merely the patron of this song, its existence fits quite well into the tradition of crusading songs used as both celebration of crusaders’ efforts and critiques of their shortcomings. Indeed, they seem to have been among the most versatile methods of mass communication in a crusading army. See Linda Paterson, \textit{Singing the Crusades: French and Occitan Lyric Responses to The Crusading Movements, 1137-1336} (Woodbridge: D.S. Brewer, 2018); Carol Sweetenham, ‘Reflecting and Refracting Reality: The Use of Poetic Sources in Latin Accounts of the First Crusade’, in \textit{Literature of the Crusades}, ed. by Simon Thomas Parsons and Linda M. Paterson (Woodbridge: D.S. Brewer, 2018), 25–41 (esp. pp. 37–38) and Luca Barbieri, ‘Crusade Songs and the Old French Literary Canon’, \textit{Literature of the Crusades}, 75–96.


\textsuperscript{157} \textit{CSED}, III, act 102, p. 116: ‘Hugo Dux Burgundie et Albonis comes, Odoni filio suo karissimo. […] Cum graui infirmitate apud Accom detemptus fuissem, diuina miseratio memorie mee reduxit quod ego uoueram et promiseram donare Canonicos Sancti Stephani tantam de terra nostra que eis per singulos annos decem libras reddent’.


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his heir a better relationship with the French crown than the one he himself had had. Hugh III of Burgundy died on 25 August 1192; his body was embalmed and returned to be buried at Cîteaux with his forebears, probably by his chamberlain Matthew d’Étais.\footnote{HdB, III, p. 71. The recent editors of Rigord mistakenly give Hugh’s date and plate of death as 1193 in Tyre. See GPA, p. 300, n. 473.} His demise was not at all lamented by Richard. The king, seriously ill after taking Jaffa, supposedly recovered his health in joy at hearing the news of Hugh’s expiration, and gave him a scathing epitaph.\footnote{Richard of Devizes, \textit{Chronicon Ricardi Divisiensis de rebus gestis Ricardi Primi regis Angliæ}, ed. by Joseph Stevenson (London: Sumptibus Societatis, 1838), p. 74: ‘Dum Ricardus rex aegrotabat apud Jafes, nunciatum est ei quod dux Burgundiae apud Accaronem gravitur aegrotaret. Dies ille fuerat regis criticus, et ex delectatione rumorum febris ejus soluta est. Elevatis autem continuo rex manibus imprecatus est, dicens, ‘Deus destruat eum, quia noluit mecum inimicos fidei nostrae destruere, licet ad meos solidos jam pridem militaverit’. While the speech may not be entirely accurate, Richard’s glee at Hugh’s death is likewise altogether in character.}

Altogether, the death toll was overall very high, though the existence of some crusaders’ wills, such as those of Rainald of Grancey and Clarembaud of Noyers, means that those documents were returned to France by surviving companions. Our question at the beginning – whether this high participation resulted from shock at Jerusalem’s fall, or a result of closer ties with France – can be provided with a preliminary answer. While there were a high number of Burgundian crusaders from across several levels of society, the identifiable ones often arose from either those families with previous crusade participation, or linkages to the ducal circle. I therefore propose that while the Third Crusade provided a considerably larger number of crusaders than its predecessors (indeed, nearly half of all named Burgundian crusaders in the entire period under consideration here) it did not fundamentally change the premise or motivations for crusading. Rather, it activated multiple members of extant crusading and ducal networks to a greater degree than previously, which suggests that while the religious and psychological ramifications of Jerusalem’s fall were profound, there was more of a concrete social and political mechanism in place to elicit response. This can best be understood as the result of Burgundy’s recent enforced closer relationship with the crown of France, and we can
conclude that – again, at least in Burgundy – the act of crusading remained a political choice, and evolved in keeping with political realities. Despite the genuine religious nature of the crisis, this did not overshadow or act out of proportion to established crusading functions and commitments.

This was fed by social groups, religious belief, and increased control by a more centralised French crown. For example, the Second Crusade was centred in Burgundy and cultivated by Bernard of Clairvaux and Godfrey of Langres, both of whom had Burgundian positions and family groups, but Odo II did not participate with Louis VII and it seems altogether unlikely that Louis could have compelled him to do so. But it is difficult to imagine Odo’s son Hugh possessing the same right of refusal in regard to the Third Crusade and Louis’s son Philip, which does suggest that there had been a specifically political shift in the relationship of duchy and kingdom, and the Third Crusade magnified this trend. The First Crusade certainly did not provoke this coordinated interest across several interrelated noble families. The Second Crusade elicited a broader Burgundian response. However, this is the first time that we can see crusading recruitment and participation by multiple individuals in an extended kinship group, and these individuals then appearing in each other’s charters and sharing in each other’s acts.

We have also explored the relationship between the French and English contingents, and demonstrated that despite considerable animosity, Hugh III and Richard I managed to work together until the failed advance on Jerusalem in January 1192, which served as the watershed moment in irretrievably alienating the two. This should be taken into consideration when appraising the internal politics of the Christian army in 1191–92. While Anglo-French relations were strained prior to their arrival in the Holy Land, and would remain so for the rest of Richard’s reign, this rivalry did not become insurmountable until the latter half of the crusade, after numerous logistical and physical difficulties. In other words, both leaders (Richard and
Hugh) did view the crusade as their primary concern, though their conceptions of how to carry it out differed, and they acted accordingly. Since the main Western sources for the crusade are overwhelmingly favourable to Richard, with plenty of motive to malign and denigrate the French, Hugh’s neutral portrayal (rather than the actively negative reports of such figures as Conrad of Montferrat and Philip II) for the period of July 1191–January 1192 means that at worst, he did nothing more to add to his infamy. After relations broke down, however, he came in for the weight of the chroniclers’ scorn, and died before any chance to rehabilitate himself.
CHAPTER SIX

The Early Thirteenth Century: Burgundy, France, and Rome, 1193–1223

Entering the final stage of our enquiry, our attention turns to the relationship between ducal Burgundy, the increasingly powerful French crown, and the papacy of Innocent III (r. 1198–1216), between the end of the Third Crusade in 1192 and Philip II’s death in 1223. This includes the troubled marital politics of Philip II and Odo III, the Fourth Crusade (1201–04), the Albigensian Crusade (1209–29), the battle of Bouvines (1214), and Innocent III’s involvement in French (and English) affairs. While it is impossible to treat each of these subjects in full depth, we nonetheless examine the latter thirty years of Philip II’s long reign, and Burgundy’s crusade involvement and overall development in this context. After the eventful and rebellious tenure of his father, Odo III became perhaps the most consistent ally of the French king among any of the medieval dukes of Burgundy, and his crusade participation directly reflected the wishes and policies of the French crown. While he rejected the leadership of the Fourth Crusade in 1201, he accepted a prominent role against the Albigensians in 1209, and the reasons for each can be traced relatively clearly to Philip II. Lay Burgundians were also present on both expeditions, with some achieving positions of nobility in the new Latin Empire after the conquest of Constantinople in 1204, and it is possible to argue that the Albigensian Crusade was, at least in the early stages, constructed as a regional Burgundian response to a unique political and religious challenge for the king of France. To understand the similarities and differences between these two expeditions, as crusading interest and activity arguably reached its zenith in the early thirteenth century, and their relevance to France and Burgundy, we must first consider Philip II and Odo III’s actions prior to them, and the confirmation of a reconfigured relationship.
I. Marriages, Politics, and Papal Reprisals, 1193–1200

When his father, Hugh III, died at Acre in August 1192, Odo III was about 26 years old, and had served as regent of the duchy for the last two years while Hugh was abroad. He had been included in his father’s acts of patronage and political administration for some time, making him relatively well-prepared to take over as duke. While Hugh’s relationship with the king had been notoriously confrontational, Odo’s was characterised by a close adherence to Philip over the course of multiple major political developments, and he was the only major vassal of France to hold fast to the crown throughout. With Normandy, Brittany, Anjou, Maine, Poitou, and Aquitaine under constant contestation with Richard I and John of England, the succession and loyalty of Flanders changing several times, and the Languedoc and Toulouse becoming notorious as the site of the Albigensian crusade, Burgundy was the only region outside Philip II’s direct royal demesne in which his authority was never seriously questioned during this formative interval of territorial conflict and political challenge. The French crown is generally understood as undergoing a period of ascendancy and centralisation during 1180–1223 under Philip’s strong personal rule. However, this was by no means a foregone conclusion, was not definitive until 1214 at least, and saw the Albigensian crusade continuing for another six years after his death. Burgundy’s function as the only reliably loyal French principality, especially after its clashes with the crown under Hugh III, is thus crucial to any appraisal of Philip’s successes and the broader context of the Capetians’ political rivalries, against both the Plantagenets and the pope.¹ Odo would play direct roles in both struggles.

It is important to remark that Odo was returning to established ducal policy, rather than innovating it. Aside from Hugh III, the dukes had generally aligned with the French kings since

the days of Odo I, with varying degrees of explicit co-operation or acknowledgment of their authority. Nonetheless, it is noteworthy that Odo not only chose to return to the royal fold, but then stoutly maintained this alliance for the next quarter-century of his rule. In other words, his position should not be regarded as a ‘default’ or passive political alignment, since as will be explored, incentive was also offered to Odo to change sides, and he could have done so along with many of his noble peers. In examining the often-parallel trajectories of himself and Philip II, we can certainly see moments of self-interest in Odo’s association with the crown, but rather than rejecting the enforced closer relationship that had resulted from Hugh’s defiance, Odo embraced it, and importantly assisted in the rise of royal power.

The first aspect of consideration is that of Philip and Odo’s marriages in 1193, which both ended in estrangement and caused ongoing political difficulties for them, particularly Philip. After the death of his first wife, Isabelle of Hainaut, in March 1190, Philip married Ingeborg, sister of Canute VI of Denmark,2 on 15 August 1193. However, for unspecified reasons, he publicly repudiated her the next morning and refused to acknowledge her as his wife.3 Philip’s unexplained aversion to Ingeborg, years-long efforts to annul the marriage, and miserly treatment of her formed the cause of much of his political difficulties with Pope Innocent III after the latter’s ascension in 1198, but it also had ramifications in the shorter term. About the same time, in 1193, Odo also contracted a dynastically ambitious marriage with Matilda (born Theresa) of Portugal. She was the widow of Philip of Alsace, count of Flanders, who had died at Acre in June 1191 and was one of the nominal reasons for Philip II’s premature departure from crusade.

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Philip of Alsace’s brother-in-law, Baldwin V of Hainaut, immediately claimed Flanders in his wife’s (Philip’s sister Margaret’s) name, which Philip II was forced to agree to. But as the dowager countess, Matilda retained some territorial rights, including to her dower settlement of Lille, Douai, Guînes, and Calais.4 Odo’s match with her clearly indicates an interest in testing the waters of the contested Flemish inheritance for himself, and in his charter of July 1193, granting benefices to the canons of Saint-Maurice de Semur, Matilda was referred to as ‘ducissa Burgundiae et comitissa Flandriae’.5 However, it is also possible that this represented a larger strategy by Philip to get the county of Flanders into the hands of a loyal subordinate. In early 1194, during the ongoing conflict in Flanders and Hainaut, Odo and Philip are recorded as jointly dispatching troops, suggesting an extant unity in their aims.6 As Philip had originally intended to annexe Flanders to France again directly, it is unclear whether Odo’s marriage represented a distraction from or an attempted part of that plan.

Nonetheless, the union proved short-lived. Odo and Matilda were related within the prohibited degrees (she was the daughter of Afonso I, king of Portugal, and granddaughter of Henry of Burgundy, youngest brother of Odo I),7 she was aged about 44 and unlikely to produce any children, and it quickly became clear that Baldwin V of Hainaut (and his son Baldwin VI/IX, who succeeded in 1194)8 were the victors in Flanders, preventing any political advancement

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5 HdB, iii, act 902, p. 330.
7 Duchesne gives the degree of kinship as the reason for the separation. HGMV, p. 110: ‘Ce qui eut lieu de que leur mariage fut déclaré nul, tant à cause de la proximité de sang, dont elle appartenait au Duc, comme issue du Henry de Bourgogne Comte de Portugal […]’. While it was true in this case that Odo and Matilda were related, the marriage had become inconvenient for both Odo and Philip, and consanguinity was often used as a legal pretext for annulment. See also Léopold Delisle, Catalogue des actes de Philippe-Auguste (Paris: A. Durand, 1906), p. 106.
8 The younger Baldwin was Baldwin VI of Hainaut and IX of Flanders. Nicholas, Medieval Flanders, p. 75.
from the match. In any event, Odo was seeking to separate from Matilda by 1195, a process in which Philip II was actively involved. Possibly for the degree of consanguinity involved, Matilda had been excommunicated by William, archbishop of Reims, in his capacity as a legate of Pope Celestine III (r. 1190–98). As part of the settlement, she agreed not to marry again without Philip’s consent, which clearly represents a concerted effort on the king’s part to prevent any more claimants to Flanders. Odo thus escaped relatively unscathed from his failed marriage, and he had already played a substantial role in efforts to do the same for Philip, becoming one of the most vigorous partisans for the king’s divorce from Ingeborg.

William of Newburgh commented on Philip’s continued efforts to find a replacement bride, including a brief renewal of his suit to Joanna, widow of William II of Sicily and sister of his bitter rival, Richard I of England, which would have had implications for any larger peace deal between the feuding kings. Philip finally married Agnes, daughter of Berthold, duke of Merania, on 1 June 1196. As he was still legally married to Ingeborg, this bigamous third union caused ecclesiastical outrage, as well as censure from Canute of Denmark, brother of the discarded queen. As ever, Odo took Philip’s side. In 1195, he had seized Anders Sunesen, the chancellor of Denmark, and the elderly William, abbot of Saint-Thomas du Paraclet, the messengers carrying papal letters for Philip. He treated them violently and threw them into

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9 Olivier de Wrée, *La Généalogie des comtes de Flandre depuis Baudoin bras de fer jusques à Philippe IV, roi d’Espagne* (Bruges, 1642), p. 167. It is likely that the excommunication being applied only to Matilda, rather than to Matilda and Odo both, was another royal favour from Philip to ensure that Odo had sufficient legal and religious grounds to enforce the separation.

10 It is also possible that this was in Matilda’s own interests. She had continued to issue charters in Flanders after her marriage to Odo, exercised considerable power as guardian of Baldwin IX’s daughters after his death on crusade, and resisted any attempts to have her dower subsumed into Flemish comital control. See Karen S. Nicholas, ‘Countesses as Rulers in Flanders’, in *Aristocratic Women in Medieval France*, ed. by Theodore Evergates (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1999), 111–37 (p. 126).

11 William of Newburgh, *Historia rerum Anglicarum*, p. 459: ‘Haec dicem causam subcitui, qua nimium propensius eo tempore ad inœundum cum rege Anglorum foedus movebatur. Quippe ut dicitur, ad germanae ejus, quae Siculi regis compar exstitet, nuptias aspirabat, quibus tamen potitus non est; plures enim feminae nobiles’, *GPA*, p. 341: ‘Eodem anno et eodem mense [June 1196], Philippus rex duxit uxorem nomine Mariam [Agnes], filiam ducis Meranie et Bohemie marchionisque Hystrie’. Rigord is mistaken on Agnes’ name (Marie was their daughter) and treats this episode with brevity, as opposed to his glowing depiction of Ingeborg (*GPA*, p. 320).
prison in Dijon; Anders wrote to Melior, cardinal and legate of Celestine III, complaining of their circumstances. At the intervention of the abbot of Citeaux, the messengers were released six weeks later, enabling them to complete their journey to Paris. Nonetheless, Odo then imprisoned them again on the return, and it took until 1196 for them to be freed a second time. Odo could not excuse this extreme treatment of an old man and official papal envoy, as well as the king of Denmark’s chancellor, by pleading obedience to his sovereign’s will, and the episode did not engender any good will for him in Rome. Celestine III ordered an interdict to be placed on Burgundy, but was unable to enforce it. We thus find the king of France and the duke of Burgundy banded together in opposition to the pope, making substantial efforts to assist the other in terminating undesired marriages and operating as a unit within a context of shifting political interests and regional alliances. No matter Odo’s original intentions in marrying Matilda of Portugal, it seems inarguable that he had now settled firmly on his allegiance to Philip.

This was demonstrated again in short order. The death of Pope Celestine III on 6 January 1198 resulted in the election of 37-year-old Lothario dei Segni as Innocent III the next day. Richard I and Philip II competed to submit their special interests for the pope’s arbitration, but Innocent sided against Philip in his marital dispute, ordering him on 17 May 1198 to repudiate

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13 PL, CCIX, pp. 716–17: ‘Epistola LXV (92). Magistro Meliori cardinali. Venerabili domino M. sanctae Romanae Ecclesiae tituli Sanctorum-Joannis et Pauli cardinali et apostolico sedis legato, Andreas, domini regis Danorum dictus cancellarius […] Magnum est, ut nostis, remedium tribulationis afflictorum ad expert suffragia […] Roma vel ab urbe digressi Divionem usque pervenimus, sed ibi, postposita reverential sedis apostolicae dictus cancellarius […] Magnum est, ut nostis, remedium tribulationis afflictorum ad expert suffragia […] Roma vel ab urbe digressi Divionem usque pervenimus, sed ibi, postposita reverential sedis apostolicae et invocation nominis vestry, contempto videlicet apostolicae legationis officio, a ministris ducis Burgundiae per septem dies sumus detenti et arcae custodiae mancipati […] quod si domino regi facta disliceat nobis remisso, iterum Divionem vel ad locum aliam debeatam deduci’.


15 HdB, III, p. 97.


Agnes and take back Ingeborg.\textsuperscript{18} The swiftness of Innocent’s bureaucracy, after eight years of the old and indolent Celestine, seems to have caught political Europe off guard. On 15 August 1198, the pope issued \textit{Post miserabile}, which called for a new crusade to Jerusalem via Egypt, criticised the Western rulers’ distraction with fighting each other, and urged them to overcome their own interests in favour of a coordinated Christian effort.\textsuperscript{19} But only six years after the costly stalemate of the Third Crusade, and with Richard and Philip once again at war at home, it is unsurprising that it, at least at first, received a tepid response.

Indeed, Richard and Philip’s activities in 1198 were dedicated to building coalitions against each other, rather than any pretence of setting aside their rivalry for a new crusade. In recent months, Richard had focused on converting Philip’s highest-profile allies to his side, particularly Raymond VI, count of Toulouse, Baldwin IX, count of Flanders, and Renaud de Dammartin, count of Boulogne. Richard married his sister Joanna off to Raymond in October 1196, representing a diplomatic reversal of prior Plantagenet aggression against Toulouse,\textsuperscript{20} and used a combination of economic blackmail and financial incentives to acquire Flanders and Boulogne. Baldwin IX agreed to an Anglo-Flemish treaty with Richard in 1197.\textsuperscript{21} Combined with his resurgent military successes after setbacks, and the construction of his formidable castle,

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Château-Gaillard, at Les Andelys in Normandy, Richard was quickly establishing supremacy in the various theatres of territorial conflict.  

Richard also seems to have sounded out Odo for the possibility of changing allegiances alongside the others. On 1 May 1198, he arrived in Dijon in hopes of meeting Odo, and on 14 May in Lyon, shrewdly made a donation to the dukes’ favoured house and family necropolis of Cîteaux.  

This confirmed the privileges granted by his father Henry II, and included a gift of the royal church in Scarborough, forbidding anyone but the Cistercians from erecting new ecclesiastical buildings in the parish. Odo was thus the only major French vassal to refuse overtures from the English king, even when it could have appeared more profitable to join the victorious Plantagenet delegation. In November 1198 in Vincennes (dep. Val-de-Marne, in the suburbs of Paris), Odo swore that he had never engaged in any secret or unlawful discussions with Richard, and only interacted with the English king as a licit representative of Philip’s. In other words, at a crucial moment when Philip’s remaining allies had largely decided to take up with Richard and had been given significant incentives to do so, Odo remained loyal. He and Richard also had few territorial borders or shared interests, which could have likewise argued against any risky manoeuvre to upset his arrangement with Philip.

The closeness of French and Burgundian political aims is also demonstrated by the fact that Odo reinstated the rights of the Jews in Burgundy in 1196, implying that he had followed

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26 Recueil des actes du prieuré de Saint-Symphorien d’Autun de 696 à 1300, ed. by André Deléage (Autun: Taverne et Chandioux, 1936), act XIX, pp. 27-8. Other documents relating to Odo’s Jewish policy can be found in the cartulary of Champagne. See Littere Baronum: The Earliest Cartulary of the Counts of Champagne, ed. by
Philip’s lead in confirming their expulsion from his territories after the Bray incident in March 1192. Philip was forced to likewise readmit the Jews to his royal demesne during this period of economic stress and political isolation in 1198, which seems to have applied to Burgundy in some part. In that same year, Odo issued an edict against counterfeitors at Saint-Symphorien in Autun, which he had previously authorised to serve as a mint in 1194. It is difficult to assess the duchy’s financial situation from this alone, but the presence of enough counterfeit money to warrant a ducal edict potentially argues some degree of fluctuation and uncertainty in Burgundy’s economic affairs. Richard had already made donations to the Cistercians and was demonstrably interested in acquiring Odo as an ally, so the possibility of financial inducements, similar to his offers to Flanders and Boulogne, could have been on the table if Odo had been receptive. However, Odo rejected these advances, and in gratitude, following Odo’s pledge of fealty in November 1198, Philip granted him the rights to the abbey and commune of Flavigny, addressing him as ‘our dearest and faithful kinsman, Odo, duke of Burgundy’.

Overall, it is easy to see the complicated network of political interests that bound king and duke together. It is thus understandable that Innocent III’s legate, Peter of Capua, chose Burgundy as the place to exact reparations for France’s disobedience of the pope. Richard I’s


unexpected death on 6 April 1199 had drastically changed the Anglo-French conflict, as he was succeeded by his brother and Philip’s former ally John, but Philip himself continued to ignore Innocent’s warnings to separate from Agnes of Merania and reconcile with Ingeborg, even when threatened with interdict. Therefore on 6 December 1199, Peter of Capua convened a council at Saint-Bénigne in Dijon, with the archbishops of Lyons, Reims, Besançon, and Vienne, the abbots of Cluny, Vézelay, Saint-Remy of Reims, and Saint-Denis of Paris, along with eighteen other bishops, to discuss Philip’s insubordination. This event is referred to in both the *Ex brevi chronico Sancti-Benigni Divionensis* and Alberic of Trois-Fontaines.

It is clear that by the use of Odo’s capital city and the assembled clergy of his region and the kingdom to bring charges against Philip, Peter of Capua was treating Burgundy and France as a single unit, especially as hard feelings lingered over Odo’s brutal treatment of the papal messengers in 1195. For the legate to arrive in Dijon, site of the injustice, further exemplifies the fact that Innocent had targeted Philip and Odo together for their defiance, and viewed them as politically dependent partners. It is perhaps unsurprising that the council broke up in reported rancour before anything could be achieved, since Odo would have had an interest in ensuring that it did, but when it reconvened, on 15 January 1200, it was in imperial Burgundy, in the city of Vienne. Odo had had power struggles with Otto I – count palatine of Burgundy, son of Frederick Barbarossa, and brother of Henry VI, Holy Roman Emperor – in the first year of his


reign,\textsuperscript{33} and the use of Vienne as a replacement location emerges as noteworthy in two respects. Peter of Capua still got to hold the council in Burgundy, but the change from ducal to comital territory also emphasised to Odo (and Philip) the fact that close neighbours could turn against them, and that if they persisted in flouting the Holy See, they would pay the same price. This time the council was seen through to completion, and an interdict on France, including Burgundy, was published in February 1200. (It was lifted in 1202, upon Philip finally bowing to papal pressure and setting aside Agnes, though he did not restore Ingeborg until 1213.)\textsuperscript{34}

In 1199, Odo had contracted a second marriage with Alix, daughter of Hugh of Vergy, as part of a peace settlement arranged in 1196 to halt the long-running feud between the dukes of Burgundy and the lords of Vergy. The arrangement granted the castle of Vergy to the dukes, but the lordship of Vergy itself to Alix’s brother William, who was promised, along with his heirs, the position of seneschal of Burgundy.\textsuperscript{35} As Philip had married Agnes of Merania in 1196, we can once more glimpse a close correlation in his and Odo’s actions, reinforced by a pair of trade laws issued in 1204. In one, Philip confirmed a treaty between Parisian and Burgundian merchants, referring to ‘merchants in our land of Burgundy,’\textsuperscript{36} and in the other, ‘France and Burgundy’ are cited in a statute outlawing the importation of wine by ship to newly-acquired Normandy, from the rival Plantagenet territories of Gascony, Poitou, and Anjou.\textsuperscript{37} It seems clear that Philip had provided tangible economic and mercantile privileges to Odo in return for his

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\textsuperscript{33} HdB, III, p. 90.
\textsuperscript{34} For a longer discussion and analysis of the event, including the above dates, see Xavier Girault, ‘Discussion historique sur le concile tenu a Dijon en 1199, et sur les chroniques de Saint-Benigne’, in Mémoires de l’Académie des sciences, arts et belles-lettres de Dijon (Dijon: Chez Fran tin, 1817), pp. 139–56.
\textsuperscript{35} HGMV, pp. 111–12.
\textsuperscript{37} Brunel, RPA, II, act 865, p. 453: ‘Hoc est prohibito quod nulla navis possit afferre vina in Normanniam nec de Pictavia nec de Gasconia nec de Andegavia, et si venerit, ad opus regis retineatur. Sed in quadrigis potest afferri de Oblanc et de Bituresio et Andegavia; et de Francia et de Burgundia possunt afferre per aquam.’
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loyalty, reinforcing them as part of the same polity, and the two rulers had dealt with matrimonial, religious, financial, and military matters in essential synergy. As we turn to a consideration of the intense crusade activity during Innocent III’s pontificate, the foundation of French-Burgundian alliance is well established.

II. The Fourth Crusade: From Cîteaux to Constantinople, 1200–04

The Fourth Crusade, formally organised in 1200 and concluded with the sack of Constantinople in 1204, was characterised by financial troubles with the Venetians, diversion of the army to the cities of Zara (Zadar, Croatia) in November 1202 and Constantinople in August 1203, and the internal politics and struggles of the Byzantine succession, rather than ever setting foot in the Holy Land. The part that Burgundy played in this enterprise represented a hybrid of its previous models of crusade participation, and would prove consequential on several levels. Its initial head and organiser, Theobald III, count of Champagne, died on 24 May 1201, and soon afterward, a delegation consisting of Matthew of Montmorency, Simon of Montfort, and Geoffrey of Joinville approached Odo III to offer him leadership of the crusade. However, he rejected it – a decision that Geoffrey de Villehardouin viewed rather dimly. The precise reasons


why the crusaders opted for Odo as a replacement leader cannot be determined, but some circumstantial consideration offers a likely explanation. On the one hand, Odo was one of the few sufficiently high-ranking and independent secular overlords in the country, as John of England was still duke of Normandy, Brittany, and Aquitaine and count of Anjou, Poitou, and Maine. Raymond VI of Toulouse was an unlikely choice to lead a major crusading army (as indeed he would be the cause of the Albigensian Crusade in eight years’ time) and with Odo’s close family having recently gone on crusade in the person of his father, Hugh III, he was perhaps a natural choice as first alternative. His refusal therefore also tracks with his unwillingness to depart from Philip’s policy, and since the king was not at all interested in personal participation on another crusade, Odo did not take the political initiative to separate himself. As we shall see, his participation in the Albigensian Crusade was a direct result of Philip’s instruction and deputation, and since no such orders existed in this case, he declined.

Indeed, Fourth Crusade recruitment in Burgundy seems to have focused primarily on its religious infrastructure, rather than its secular nobility. Following the stalemate of the Third Crusade, the Cistercians had continued to actively include crusade liturgy in their orders of service and general statutes, issuing appeals for the recovery of Jerusalem each year over the period of 1194–97.\(^{42}\) They also had so many preachers assigned to promote the Fourth Crusade as to sternly reprimand a self-appointed volunteer, Renerio of Aguias, in 1201, and were heavily

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involved in financing it, at cost to their own interests. A setpiece recruitment event was held at the motherhouse of Cîteaux in September 1201, attended by Boniface I, marquess of Montferrat, the crusade’s new leader. Boniface, brother of the late Conrad, had historical family ties to the kingdom of Jerusalem, as the young king Baldwin V had been his nephew, but his selection arguably demonstrates that after Odo’s refusal, eligible French noblemen were thin on the ground, and resort had to be made to an Italian instead. Nonetheless, there were several secular Burgundian participants enlisted at Cîteaux, as Villehardouin records:

The marquis left to attend the chapter of the Cistercians held at Cîteaux on the feast of the Holy Cross in September [1201]. There he found a very large number of the abbots and barons and other people; my lord Fulk went there to preach the cross. Odo the Champenois of Champlitte and his brother William took the cross there, as did Richard of Dampierre and his brother Odo, Guy of Pesmes and his brother Aimon, Guy of Conflans, and many good men from Burgundy whose names are not written down here. Then the bishop of Autun took the cross and so did Count Guy of Forez, Hugh of Berzé (both father and son of that name) and Hugh of Coligny.

Of these, the Champlitte brothers were the sons of Odo I of Champlitte, Hugh III’s seneschal, who had accompanied him to the Holy Land in the early 1170s and on the Third Crusade, and the descendants of Hugh I, count of Troyes, and Stephen I, count of Burgundy, which gave them a distinguished multi-generational crusading pedigree. They were also the only crusaders of Burgundian extraction of high enough profile to be noted by name by the common man-at-arms

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43 Twelfth-Century Statutes, pp. 499–500, sects. 47 and 49.
44 Alberic of Trois-Fontaines also remarks on the national origin of Fourth Crusade recruits. ATF, RHGF, xviii, p. 765: ‘[…] et plures alii de Francia, Flandria, et Burgundia’.
46 The ‘Champenois’ designation for the brothers comes from the fact that Odo I was the son of Hugh I, count of Champagne, who married Elizabeth, daughter of Stephen I, count of Burgundy. However, Hugh believed himself impotent and refused to acknowledge Odo as his son, transferring his titles to his nephew, Theobald II. See Jean Longnon, Les compagnons de Villehardouin: Recherches sur les croisés de la quatrième croisade (Genève: Droz, 1978), p. 209, and the discussion of the Champlitte/Troyes/Burgundy family tree in chapter 4, note 90.
Robert of Clari in his chronicle.\(^\text{47}\) Guy and Aimar of Pesmes (dep. Haute-Saône, arr. Vesoul), also had a family interest, as their father William had accompanied Frederick Barbarossa on the Third Crusade. The father and son Hugh of Berzé had already gone on the Third Crusade, as seen in chapter 5. It is, however, difficult to reconstruct if the Burgundian crusaders made specific religious preparations for their journey. After the embarrassment of riches that constitute Third Crusade-related charters in the cartulary of the Yonne, no items appear for the Fourth Crusade, and it generally features the acts of Peter of Courtenay, count of Auxerre and Tonnerre, and Philip II’s confirmations.\(^\text{48}\) While this is accurate in highlighting Philip’s increasing control over Burgundian politics, via his deputy in the person of his cousin Peter, it also demonstrates that the same region that had produced so many Third Crusaders was not responding as enthusiastically to a repeated call to arms just ten years later.

It is therefore possible to contend firstly that Odo III’s refusal of participation had some impact on noble recruitment, and secondly that the Third Crusade, with its particularly shocking stimulus in the fall of Jerusalem, naturally elicited more religious sentiment and activation of crusading commitments, but that this was not necessarily sustained after its conclusion. Thus after the intense spike in crusading activity from extended kinship networks and ducal associates in the Third Crusade, Burgundian crusading interest and commitment had fallen back to First and Second Crusade levels by the time of the Fourth. The recruitment pattern evinced is indeed most similar to the Second Crusade, where the chroniclers generically mention many Burgundians, but do not always provide specific names, and correlating charter evidence is likewise sometimes


\(^{48}\) See for example acts DI and DII, both from c. September 1200, in *CGY*, II, p. 509.
thin. Indeed for the purposes of this work, we have been able to locate only four acts, given by three named crusaders. Seguin de Voudenay (dep. Côte d’Or, arr. Beaune) made gifts to the monks of Bussière Abbey (La Bussière-sur-Ouche, dep. Côte d’Or, arr. Beaune) in 1200, prior to his departure.49 Odo of Thoires (dep. Côte d’Or, arr. Montbard) took the cross sometime between 1199 and 1207, and gave a gift to Clairvaux in relation to this, pledging his pastures in the villages of Thoires and Belan to the usage of the monastery. The act was witnessed by his wife Ermentrude and sons, Hugh and Odo, but was recorded only briefly (six lines) in the Clairvaux cartulary, without giving specifics as to the date or Odo’s motivations in setting out on crusade.50

The crusader Hugh II of Coligny (dep. Ain, arr. Bourg-en-Bresse) is traditionally described as having married Beatrice of Albon, the widow of Duke Hugh III of Burgundy, after his death in the Holy Land, but this claim originates from Jean du Bouchet’s seventeenth-century genealogy of the Coligny family and cannot be independently corroborated.51 Both Petit and Longnon follow in this assumption.52 Hugh’s wife was in fact named Beatrice, and she witnessed his act of 1202 granting land near Sélignac (dep. Ain, arr. Bourg-en-Bresse) intended for the construction of a Carthusian monastery, as ‘Beatrix Ducissa’.53 Bouchet’s identification of this woman with Beatrice of Albon has been questioned, given that no contemporary references to Beatrice’s remarriage appear and that upon her death in 1228 in Vizille, near Grenoble, she did not make any mention of either Hugh or the two children she would have had from that marriage.

49 HdB, III, act. 1017, p. 375.
50 Abbaye de Clairvaux, Grand cartulaire de l’abbaye (tome 2). Transcription de 966 actes de 1121 à 1260. Les archives de l’Aube, MS 3 H 10, p. 396.
51 See Jean du Bouchet, Preuves de l’histoire de l’illustre Maison de Coligny, tirées des chartres de diverses églises et abbayes et de plusieurs autres titres, mémoires, chroniques et histoires dignes de foy (Paris, 1662), p. 49.
53 Bouchet, Preuves de l’histoire de l’illustre Maison de Coligny, p. 48: ‘Notum sit omnibus quod ego Hugo Coloniaci Hierosolymam tendens quicquid iuris habeo apud Siliniacum […] integre & absque retractatione dono & confirmo Domni Sellionis ad construendam ibi Carthusiensis Ordinis, ita tamen si iuxta considerationem & assensum Ordinis potuerit. Testes sunt Beatrix ducissa uxor mea […] et plures alii’. Hugh’s charter to the church of Saint Mary in Montmerle, also given in 1202, follows on p. 49.
It is, however, not an entirely impossible association, as the lords of Coligny had some previous affiliation with the counts of Albon and dauphins of the Viennois, and as Hugh III’s widow, Beatrice would be entitled to style herself as ‘duchess’. In either case, Hugh of Coligny was killed in June 1205 at the battle of Serres (modern Greece), fighting against Kaloyan, emperor of Bulgaria (r. 1196–1207) and the nascent Latin Empire’s formidable new enemy.

Nonetheless, the relatively low number of charters reinforces our contention that while the Third Crusade did constitute a prolific case across many regions of France, it did not fundamentally or permanently change the activity and orientation of crusading as a political practice, especially in Burgundy. If it had, one would expect to see the Third Crusade levels of recruitment sustained, even in the absence of a major religious affront like the fall of Jerusalem, but the return of Burgundian secular nobility to its usual limited participation does not bear that out. In other words, it was still a political decision whether or not to go on crusade, and with the duke’s return to the general policies of his ancestors (as well as the high death toll on the Third Crusade), it likely did not appear necessary to undertake the journey for any other reasons apart from personal inclination. As noted, the Champlitte and Pesmes brothers both had crusading backgrounds, which could have made their participation a matter of family tradition, but this is a private motive, rather than public or political. This also perhaps demonstrates the more usual Burgundian relationship to crusading, in which we are informed that men from the lower classes of society were present in fairly good numbers, but their higher-ranking or titled counterparts remain elusive. As noted in chapter 5, we can cite close to 50 named Burgundian Third Crusaders, with varying degrees of appearance in separate documents, but the number falls back to about 15 for the Fourth. This matches well with the approximately 13 Burgundian individuals

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55 GV, p. 105.
for the Second Crusade, and as justification for our position that the Second and the Fourth were the most similar in their patterns of Burgundian noble recruitment, in both cases when the duke (Odo II and Odo III, respectively) had refused active participation.

The Champlitte brothers may have been the highest-profile Burgundian crusaders, but Villehardouin reported Odo at least as having less than complete commitment to the cause, making it possible that this visibility was not of the favourable sort. In spring 1203, after the arrival of Prince Alexios of Byzantium (the short-lived Alexios IV Angelos, r. August 1203–January 1204), at the crusaders’ camp on Corfu, appealing for help in retrieving his throne, a number of men planned to leave the army (as occurred at multiple points during the crusade) rather than accept the controversial diversion to Constantinople. Odo seems to have been the instigator of these plans, as Villehardouin gave his name first among the culprits. This list also included Odo’s fellow Burgundians, the brothers Guy and Aimar of Pesmes. Nonetheless, the desertion was not followed through, as we find the Champlitte brothers at Constantinople in August later that year, where Villehardouin changed his tune and called them ‘very good men’.

Odo is also given a favourable epitaph, as he died in May 1204, shortly before the coronation of Baldwin IX of Flanders as the new Latin emperor. His brother William remained in the east after the crusade and became prince of Achaea, north-western Greece, addressed as such by Innocent III in a letter of 19 November 1205, and dying around 1208.

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58 GV, p. 71/ LCC, II, p. 68.
Burgundian crusader, Otto of La Roche, also rose to a prominent position in the nobility of the newly founded Latin Empire, becoming the lord of Athens after the conquest of Constantinople. Alberic of Trois-Fontaines describes him as ‘cuiusdam nobilis Pontii de Rupe in Burgundia filius, quodam miraculo fit dux Atheniensium atque Thebanorum’. However, Alberic was mistaken on this point, as Otto’s actual title in Athens was *Megaskyr* (μεγασκύρο) or ‘Grand Lord’; ‘duke’ was used only once granted to his nephew and successor by King Louis IX in 1260. The exact timing of Otto’s appointment is not noted in Villehardouin, but was most probably in 1205, and he may have eventually abandoned his position in the East to return home to France, sometime after 1224. Despite the similarity of place name, he was not related to Godfrey of La Roche, the bishop of Langres and cousin of Bernard of Clairvaux, who had been influential in the Second Crusade. Instead, the most probable candidate for the family’s origin is La Roche-sur-l’Ognon in the commune of Rigney (dep. Doubs, arr. Besançon). This would make Otto a comital Burgundian, rather than a ducal one, also reflected in his Germanic name.

Other Burgundian Fourth Crusaders included Walon of Dampierre, Dalmase of Sercy (dep. Saône-et-Loire, arr. Chalon-sur-Saône), and Ponce of Bussières (probably dep. Saône-et-Loire, arr. Mâcon). Walon of Dampierre, possibly the son of Richard, was a priest of the diocese of Langres, and became bishop of Domokos (Greece), eventually returning to France in 1209 and bringing holy relics of the third-century Saint Mammes to the bishop of Langres; this resulted in Mammes’ centre of veneration becoming established in Langres. Dalmase of Sercy

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60 ATF, in *MGH*, xxiii, p. 885.
65 Anonymous of Langres [Canonic Anonymi Lingonensis], ‘Historia translationum reliquiarum S. Mamantis’, in *Exuviae Sacrae Constantinopolitanae: Fasciculus Documentorum Minorum, Ad Byzantina Lipsana In Occidentem*
and Ponce of Bussières were also interested in acquiring relics, and had a rather more colourful way of going about it. They were present in Thessaloniki until the autumn of 1205, but elected to set out to the Holy Land to fulfil the full terms of the crusading vow. Forced by bad weather to return to Constantinople, they decided to at least bring back relics as token of their journey, and concocted an elaborate plot to steal the head of Saint Clement (Pope Clement I, r. 88–99) from a local monastery called Triandaphyllon. On the designated day, 26 March 1206 (Palm Sunday) they entered the monastery with an accomplice priest named Marcel, but Marcel, having lost his nerve at the crucial instant, declined to carry out the theft. This required Dalmase to pretend to have forgotten his gloves and thus distract the monks, whilst Ponce seized the head and ran for it. Successful in their reliquary larceny, they made a gift of the head to Cluny upon their return to France, on 27 July 1206, solemnly (if untruthfully) insisting that they had come by it without venality. This lively story was preserved in the chronicle of Rostang of Cluny. Longnon viewed this as an example of the bad behaviour of the crusaders in Byzantine territory, as Dalmase and Ponce evidently saw no difficulty in acquiring souvenirs in such an underhanded fashion.

While not everyone’s crusading career produced such dramatic spoils as this, Burgundian recruits comprised the entire sixth division of the crusade army during its first attack on Constantinople in August 1203, so there were enough of them to be noted as a national contingent. As we have seen, they were also in confederation on at least one occasion to resist the army’s diversion away from the Holy Land. It is difficult to decisively conclude that this represented a formalised Burgundian policy, but it does strengthen the likelihood that the

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Seculo XIII Translata, Spectantium & Historiam Quarti Belli Sacri Imperii, ed. by Paul Riant (Paris: Société de l’Orient latin, 1877), 22–34 (pp. 29–33). Langres Cathedral is also dedicated to St Mamnes as a result.


Burgundian leaders had been travelling together, and were in communication over major decisions. The Champlitte brothers’ dates of death are given, but the Dampierre and Pesmes brothers do not appear again in Villehardouin’s account, and their fate is unknown.\footnote{Longnon, ‘Les croisés du comté et du duché de Bourgogne’, pp. 212–13. Odo of Dampierre and Guy and Aimar of Pesmes were commanders in the army, making their omission somewhat more noticeable.}

We are thus left with some ambivalence in our conclusion about the overall relationship to crusading in Burgundy after the Third, and how this complex and perhaps contradictory experience was exemplified during the Fourth. The Cistercians remained zealously interested in the project of retrieving the Holy Land, had extensively financed and preached the Fourth Crusade, and used their motherhouse of Cîteaux in a major recruitment event. However, the Burgundian nobility that had participated in such identifiable numbers, and such dense prosopographical networks, in the Third Crusade do not appear to have been as receptive to crusading calls ten years later. It would be inaccurate to characterise Burgundian participation as ‘thin’, given that 15 names is a not-insignificant sample, and the repeated appearance of the Champlitte and Pesmes brothers in Villehardouin’s account, as well as their (and Otto of La Roche’s) resultant positions in the nobility of the new Latin Empire, argue for some influence. We should also avoid the elitist trap of concluding that Burgundian involvement was limited simply because the higher-ranking nobility seem to have largely sat out, and it consisted of more ordinary knights instead. Nonetheless, the Fourth Crusade does represent a different experience from the Third, and demonstrates the political functions and commitments that underpinned the choice to crusade. These had not been lastingly altered even by the religious trauma of the loss of Jerusalem, but did signal a continued and sustained interest in crusading throughout the thirteenth century. Since Odo III of Burgundy refused participation, it is now instructive to look at the expedition on which he did choose to crusade, and the circumstances that surrounded it.
III. The Crown of France, the Cistercians, and the Albigensian Crusade, 1203–09

The Fourth Crusade’s abortive conclusion in 1204 was only the beginning of the intense crusading activity of the thirteenth century, which took place on multiple fronts and under the sponsorship of nearly successive popes until the final fall of Acre in 1291. Nonetheless, the Albigensian Crusade (1209–29) represented a new development, and one with lasting consequences for the future of the institution.70 The background to this crusade lies in the development of the Cathar sect, or ‘Albigenses’, in southern France and northern Italy, which had been intermittently present for two centuries and the subject of ongoing efforts to root out, alongside other localised and informal practices of ‘unorthodox’ Christianity.71 Precisely reconstructing the Cathars’ beliefs is a challenge, as they left relatively few written records of their own,72 but it was a form of Christian dualism that rejected the material world as evil, imposed strict dietary and behaviour requirements on its adherents or perfecti, and – perhaps most threateningly for established orthodoxy – advocated for a priesthood of believers, possibly including women, rather than ordained clergy.73 The legacy of the crusade against them has been a challenge for historians to assess. Was this a civil dispute elevated to the status of holy war, a

70 For more on the intellectual links between the Fourth and Albigensian crusades, see Monique Zerner-Chardavoine and Hélène Piéchon-Palloc, ‘La croisade albigeoise, une revanche: Des rapports entre le quatrième croisade et la croisade albigeoise’, Revue historique, 267 (1982), 1–18, and Karl Borchardt, ‘Casting Out Demons by Beelzebul: Did the Papal Preaching against the Albigensians Ruin the Crusades?’, in La Papauté et les croisades/The Papacy and the Crusades, ed. by Michel Balard (Farnham: Ashgate, 2011), 77–89.


72 Malcolm Barber discusses the question of Cathar source material (both French and Italian), demonstrating that their beliefs were fairly consistently preserved in inquisitorial depositions and some of their own literature. Malcolm Barber, The Cathars: Dualist Heretics in Languedoc in the High Middle Ages (Essex: Pearson, 2000), pp. 81–86.

 cynical power grab by the French crown against unruly southern vassals, a misdirected co-optation of the crusade ideal by a worldly and ambitious pope, a genuine concern for the inhabitants of the Languedoc, or the inevitable culmination of the crusade ideal and function? While the Albigensian crusade is often characterised as particularly bloody or savage, especially the sack of the city of Béziers in July 1209, it must be asked if it is treated as more shocking because it took place in Europe, against schismatic Christians (the same problem that had plagued Innocent III as he attempted to forbid the Fourth Crusade from its attacks on Zara and Constantinople) rather than in the distant Holy Land, against Muslims. While its violence was indeed considerable in places, it becomes difficult to argue that this represented a ‘different’ or ‘worse’ crusading violence than that established in prior expeditions. 74

Even while sternly reprimanding Philip II for his obstinacy on the Ingeborg issue, Innocent continued to urge him to once more take up personal leadership on a crusade. 75 Despite the death of Richard I, his great rival, in April 1199, it is doubtful that Philip felt any desire to leave France again for a long time, the Third Crusade had been psychologically and physically scarring for him, and he cannot have been in haste to do favours for the pope who had made himself such a forceful impediment to Philip’s marriages and French policy more generally. Nonetheless, the question of political authority and potential separatism in the south was obviously concerning for him, especially given his wars for control of the Plantagenet territories.

74 This attitude is exemplified in Mark Gregory Pegg, A Most Holy War: The Albigensian Crusade and the Battle for Christendom (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008). For Pegg, the Albigensian Crusade was ‘a holy war unlike any before it, a great medieval drama as spiritually subtle as it was crudely brutal’ (p. 5) and introduced the idea and practice of genocide into European culture (p. 188) in a way that ‘epitomized the sanguine beauty and bloody savagery of thirteenth-century Latin Christendom’ (p. 189). Michael Costen reminds us that the crusade’s contemporaries did not see it as taking place against Christians, but heretics. Costen, The Cathars and the Albigensian Crusade (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1997), p. 117. See also Laurence W. Marvin, ‘The Albigensian Crusade in Anglo-American Historiography, 1888-2013’, History Compass, 11 (2013) 1126–38.
Philip could not afford to defy Innocent again, and needed to make some response to the
situation, but had many reasons not to do so in person. As in the Second Crusade, it would be
Burgundy that provided the religious personnel, public consciousness, and other support, as well
as, such as in the Third Crusade, the duke’s leadership in place of the king’s.

The proposition of the Albigensian Crusade may have been Innocent’s, but his most
important allies in its organisation and execution were the Cistercian monks and their
motherhouse of Citeaux, once more representing the backbone of crusade infrastructure and
finance after their influence in the Fourth. Their role was both administrative and practical. The
crusade’s chief chronicler, Peter of Les-Vaux-de-Cernay, was a monk at the Cistercian abbey of
Vaux-de-Cernay (Cernay-la-Ville, dep. Yvelines, arr. Rambouillet), where his uncle Guy, a
veteran of the Fourth Crusade and later a leader against the Albigensians, was abbot. Arnaud
Amaury, abbot of Citeaux (1200–12), served as initial commander of the crusade forces and was
the reported source, when asked by a French knight how to distinguish between Catholics and
heretics, of the infamous command to simply kill them all; God would know his own.76 In 1203,
Peter of Castelnau, whose murder in 1208 served as the catalyst for official crusade, and Ralph,
another Cistercian monk, were appointed as papal legates to preach in the Languedoc. Even
before Peter’s death, the vexation of the Albigensians had become uppermost in Innocent’s
mind. On 17 November 1207, the pope wrote to Philip and other French nobles, including Odo:

To the illustrious king of the Franks. The age-old seduction of wicked heresy, which is
constantly sprouting in the regions of Toulouse, does not cease to bring forth monstrous
offspring, by which, with corruption derived from its own insanity, it immediately
revives to the detriment of others. [...] And therefore, since wounds which do not

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76 Caesarius of Heisterbach, *Caesarii Heisterbacensis monachi Ordinis Cisterciensis Dialogus miraculorum*, ed. by
Joseph Strange (Cologne: J.M. Heberle, 1851), p. 302: ‘Cognoscentes ex confessionibus illorum catholicos cum
haereticis esse permixtos, dixerunt Abbatii: Quid faciemus, domine? Non possimus discernere inter bonos et malos.
Timens tam Abbas quam reliqui, ne tantum timore mortis se catholicos simularent, et post ipsorum absessum iterum
ad perfidiam redirent, fertur dixisse: Caedite eos. Novit enim Dominus qui sunt eius. Sicque innumerabiles occisi
sunt in civitate illa’.
respond to the medicine of poultices must be cut out with steel […] we have thought it good, O most dear son, to invoke your help in order to vindicate the injury done to Jesus Christ […] A letter was written almost in the same way and with the same date to all the counts, barons and soldiers, and to all the Christian faithful established in France. […] In almost the same way a letter was written with the same date to the duke of Burgundy and to the counts of Nevers and Dreux and to the noble Guy of Dampierre.\footnote{Die Register Innocenz III. 10. Pontifikatsjahre, 1207/1208, Texte und Indices, ed. by Rainer Murauer and Andrea Sommerlechner (Vienna: Verlag der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 2007), x, act 149, pp. 254–57: ‘Illustri regi Francorum: Inveterata pravitatis heretice corruptela, que succre sit assidue in partibus Tolosanis, fetus non desinit parere monstruosos, per quos in alios corruptione proprie vesanie derivata reviviscit instanter et pullulat monstruosos, per quos publica pax offenditur et haeretica nostris Viennensi, Ebredunensi, Arelatensi, Narbonensi, archepiscopus, et eorum suffraganeis, salutum, etc. Cum excessus et enormes abusus nobilis viri R. Comitis Tolosani, per quos publica pax offenditur et haeretica nostris Viennensi, Ebredunensi, Arelatensi, Narbonensi, archepiscopus, et eorum suffraganeis, salutum, etc. Cum excessus et enormes abusus nobilis viri R. Comitis Tolosani, per quos publica pax offenditur et haeretica nostris Viennensi, Ebredunensi, Arelatensi, Narbonensi, archepiscopus, et eorum suffraganeis, salutum, etc. Cum excessus et enormes abusus nobilis viri R. Comitis Tolosani, per quos publica pax offenditur et haeretica nos}
Innocent accused Raymond of being a minister for the devil.80 The pope then wrote to Philip II and the barons of France, condemning Peter’s death and explicitly drawing the parallel between Cathars and Saracens,81 and to Arnauld Amaury, abbot of Cîteaux, seeking his assistance.82

Efforts to organise a crusade began, the Cistercians targeted preaching campaigns in their homeland of Burgundy,83 and recruitment was drawn from northern France, Burgundy, and the Rhineland.84 Philip II kept a characteristic distance, making excuses about conflicts with John of England and Otto of Brunswick85 after Innocent again appealed to him for leadership of the army in February 1209.86 However, Odo III commanded the second-highest number of men in France after the king’s,87 and in May 1208, Philip had written to him and Hervé IV of Donzy, the count of Nevers after marrying Matilda of Courtenay in 1200,88 authorising them to participate in his name. He noted that he had coordinated with the abbot of Cîteaux, that 500 Burgundian knights were licensed to join up, and soldiers from other regions did not have the same permission.89

80 DRI, 10, act 25, pp. 29–35 (p. 31): ‘Sane rem audivimus detestabilem et in commune luctum generalis ecclesie deducendam, quod, cum sancta memorie frater Petrus de Castro-nouo […] adversus eum diabolus ministrum suum comitem Tholosanum’.
81 Die Register Innocenz III. 11: Pontifikatsjahr, 1208/1209, Texte und Indices, ed. by Othmar Hageneder and Andrea Sommerlechner (Vienna: Verlag der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 2010), XI, act 26, pp. 35–37: ‘Eia igitur, miles Christi, eia, christianissime princeps, moveat religiosissimum pectus tuum universalis ecclesiae sancte gemitus, succendat te ad tantam Dei tui vindicandam iniuriam pius zelus […] hereticam tamen studeas perfidiam abolere sectatores ipo ecclesie sanctorum […]’. See also DRI, 11, act. 27, p. 38: ‘Nobilibus viris comitibus, baronibus et universis populis per regnum Franciae constitutis’.
82 DRI, 11: Pontifikatsjahr, 1208/1209, act. 29, p. 40.
84 Sibly and Sibly, HAC, p. xli.
85 HAC, pp. 41–42. As the Sibyls note (p. 41, n. 65), Philip had twice responded to Innocent’s crusade appeals by citing the need to defend against John and Otto. Innocent also wrote to Philip again on 23 April 1209, urging him to join John, count of Brienne, in a renewed defence of Jerusalem and the Holy Land. (Epistolarum Innocenti III, HAC, Act. 27, p. 38: ‘Nobilibus viris comitibus, baronibus et universis populis per regnum Franciae constitutis’.
86 ‘Sane rem audivimus detestabilem et in commune luctum generalis ecclesie deducendam, quod, cum sancta memorie frater Petrus de Castro-nouo […] adversus eum diabolus ministrum suum comitem Tholosanum’.
88 Sumption, The Albigensian Crusade, p. 79.
89 Matilda was the daughter of Peter of Courtenay and Agnes of Nevers. SMC, p. 328. See also Guy Perry, John of Brienne: King of Jerusalem, Emperor of Constantinople, c.1175–1237 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), pp. 30–31.
90 ‘Philippus Dei gratia Francorum rex dilectis et fidelibus suis karissimo consanguineo suo Odoni duci Burgundie et Herneo comiti Nivernensi salutem et dilectionem. Noveritis quod abbas Cisterciensis semel secundo
Unlike Philip’s crusade with Odo’s father Hugh III, which came about as royal authority punitively enforced on Burgundy after extended disruption, his deputising of Odo in this case was the result of 15 years of close alignment. Philip himself could not (and did not want to) lead the crusade, but he had a trusted subordinate in Odo. Indeed, despite the question of the French king’s authority in the Albigensian Crusade, Philip’s response to the Cathars was (at least in the early stages) a regional Burgundian response – its leaders had been granted special permission to prosecute it, and its knights to carry it out. As Philip had recently returned to war with King John of England, he could not spare extra men, and clearly hoped to use Odo as a proxy.

Odo’s actual participation in the crusade was not lengthy, spanning only a few months from May to September 1209 (though he was briefly engaged again in 1213), but he was the ‘most important layman’ that it recruited. Given his refusal to lead the Fourth Crusade or even to participate in it, it is useful to speculate whether he accepted this position as a recognition of its value to French domestic politics and to Philip. Nonetheless, his religious motives were orthodox and devout. In 1208, Odo granted the castle of Ile-d’Ouche and the village of Crimolois (dep. Côte d’Or, arr. Dijon) to the Knights Templar to assist in their defence of the Catholic faith, and made additional gifts to Saint-Symphorien in Autun. Peter of Les-Vaux-de-Cernay also described him as a ‘very keen supporter of the crusade against the heretics’. Indeed, Odo gave anywhere between 10 and 28 acts in the spring and summer of 1209 as he readied for the crusade, but the changing format of thirteenth-century charters, more strictly regularised in

nobis dixit, et tercio nobis per subcellarium Citerciensem nobis mandavit apud Chinonem, quod vos volebatis arripere iter contra Arrianos et ex toto cordis affectu ad hoc aspirabatis. Preterea, idem subcellarius nobis dixit quod quingenti milites in Burgundia ad hoc erant parati. [...] si vos contra Arrianos ad servicium Dei ire velletis, nos bene, salvo servitio nostro, hoc volebamus ex quo hoc volebatis, et illi tantummode de Burgundia, quia aliis de terra nostra nequaquam volebamus licentiam donare, nisi illis de Burgundia.’

90 HAC, p. 47, n. 6.
92 Déléage, Recueil des actes du prieuré de Saint-Symphorien d’Autun, act 36, p. 76.
93 HAC, p. 221.
formula and without narrative explanation for their purpose, makes this hard to correlate, as only six of them cite the upcoming expedition specifically. Nonetheless, given their time period, they certainly related to Odo’s preparations prior to leaving Burgundy, whether or not they were explicitly to support the religious premises of the crusade.\footnote{Daniel Power, ‘Who Went On the Albigensian Crusade?’, \textit{The English Historical Review}, 128 (2013), 1047–85 (p. 1054). Power also discusses the use (and difficulties) of charters for Albigensian Crusade prosopography, given the aforementioned tightening of format with fewer personal statements and witness lists, and the detail of the chronicle sources (Peter of les-Vaux-des-Cernay and William of Tudela).}

Interestingly, given Odo’s predecessors’ – and apparently his own – complicated relationship with the abbey, the most noteworthy of these charters was to Cluny. Issued probably in spring 1209, it addressed Odo as ‘cruce signatus,’ the legal definition of a crusader that had become regularised after 1187. It granted Cluny rights over the village of Fleurey (Fleurey-sur-Ouche, dep. Côte d’Or, arr. Dijon), but included a recommendation for the village of Gevrey-Chambertin to make peace with the abbey of Beaune, so as to honour a charter given by ‘my father of blessed memory, Hugh, duke of Burgundy’.\footnote{RCAC, V, act 4453, pp. 827–28: ‘Noverint omnes presentes et futuri quod ego Odo, dux Burgundie, cruce signatus contra hereticos Albigenses, recordatus me contra Cluniacensem ecclesiam in multis deliquiss, donavi et concessi, pro remedio anime mee, domino Willelmo, venerabili abbati et conventui Cluniacensi, omnes homines quos habebam apud Floriacum […] Preterea commendationem quam ab hominibus Givriaci et domus de Belna acciepiebamus et remisimus penitus et quittavimus, nolentes in aliquo venire contra cartam bone memoriae patris mei Hugonis ducis Burgundiae […] Actum anno Gratiae M°C°CC°VIII°.'} This implied that Hugh’s wishes, as a deceased crusader, should be given preference. The subject of Cluny and Gevrey was thus one addressed periodically by the dukes throughout their crusading careers. First mentioned by Odo I in 1101, then by Hugh III in 1190, it was now documented for a third time in 1209, before Odo III fought against the Albigensians. Altogether, it represented several developments of crusading law and practice in Burgundy, both overall and more specifically to the dukes.

The subject of land rights was also a pressing one for Odo. The assembly at Villeneuve (Villeneuve-sur-Yonne, dep. l’Yonne, arr. Sens) on 1 May 1209, where Philip held a council of his principal barons, was to a large degree concerned with the Albigensian Crusade, and the need
to establish territorial rights and protocols for the French king’s major vassals. With Raymond VI of Toulouse under a sentence of interdict, and an army of French noblemen prepared to depart on a punitive expedition against one of their peers, the issue required explicit resolution. The fact of the council being held in Burgundy also reflects its importance to the upcoming crusade, and Odo and Hervé, granted royal license to participate, were the first addressed in the charter. Moreover, following the council, a large number of participants left to commence the crusade:

In the year 1209 of the Incarnation of our Lord, in the twelfth year of the papacy of Innocent III, in the reign of Philip, King of France, about the time of the feast of St John the Baptist [24 June], all the crusaders who had been making their way from various parts of France converged on Lyon […] Most important of those were the Archbishop of Sens [Peter], the Bishops of Autun [Walter], Clermont [Robert], and Nevers [William], the Duke of Burgundy [Odo], the Count of Nevers [Hervé], the Count of St Pol [Gaucher], the Count of Montfort [Simon] the Count of Bar-sur-Seine, Guichard of Beaujeu, William des Roches the Seneschal of Anjou, and Gaucher de Joigny. The fact that this roster of participants is overwhelmingly Burgundian is apparent; indeed, Sumption argued that they were the core composition of the army. Detailed records of their actions are thin, as the accounts mention only Odo of Burgundy and Hervé of Nevers by name. William of Tudela also commented on the personnel of the army:

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96 Samaran, RPA, iii, pp. 166–67: ‘Philippus Dei gratia Francorum rex, Odo dux Burgundie, Herveus comes Niverensis [. . .] et plures alii magnates de regno Francie […] ita sit de feodalibus tenementis: quicquid tenetur de domino ligie vel ali modis, si contigerit per successionem heredum vel quocumque ali modo divisionem inde fieri, quocumque modo fiat, omnes qui de illo feodo tenebunt, sicut unus antea tenebat priusquam divisio facta esset; et quandocumque contigerit pro illo totali feodo servicium domino fieri, quinlibet eorum seconum quod de feodo illo tenebit servicium tenebitur exibere et illi domino deservire et reddere rachatum et omnen justiciam. […] Actum apud Villam Novam Regis juxta Senones, anno ab incarnatione Domini M°CC° nono, mense maio, primo die ejusdem mensis.’


98 Sumption, The Albigensian Crusade, p. 88. See also Power, ‘Who Went on the Albigensian Crusade?’, p. 1060. Power also points out that the relatively inexpensive nature of a domestic crusade, rather than having to raise substantial funds to travel all the way to Jerusalem, makes it unlikely for individuals to leave charter evidence. Likewise, the term of service was much shorter. Power, ‘Who Went on the Albigensian Crusade?’, p. 1056.
My lords, you have heard how this host was first assembled. The abbot of Cîteaux rode with it [...] Near the clergy rode the brave duke of Burgundy, his banner displayed, bringing his entire host, also the count of Nevers, banner flying, the count of St Pol at the head of a strong force, Count Peter of Auxerre with all his men [...] They came from the whole length and breadth of the Auvergne, from Burgundy, from France, from the Limousin [...] Provence was there in full and so was Vienne.100

However, the army soon ran into difficulty when Raymond VI, whose misbehaviour was the chief motivating factor for the crusade, was reconciled to the church in June 1209, having promised to keep the peace and assist in combating heresy.101 Shortly after, he himself took the cross, which meant his lands were under ecclesiastical protection. Nonetheless, the crusade could not be called off at this late hour, and it was decided to attack the territory of Raymond-Roger Trencavel, Raymond VI’s vassal and the viscount of Albi, Béziers, and Carcassonne.102 After Raymond-Roger’s own attempt at reconciliation was rebuffed, the crusaders arrived at the city of Béziers on 21 July 1209. When their order to surrender the town was rebuffed, it was stormed and sacked the next day, 22 July 1209, with infamous bloodshed. The citizens, even those who had taken refuge in the church, were massacred, at which point William of Tudela came closest to criticising the crusaders and compared their actions to those of the Muslim conquerors of Iberia. He, however, blamed the slaughter on a pack of overzealous kitchen boys, rather than the French knights.103 In this way, the scale of the offence was acknowledged without directly connecting it to a judgment on the crusade itself, of which William remained broadly supportive.

101 Sibly and Sibly, HAC, p. xli.
102 Sibly and Sibly, HAC, p. xli.
103 Chanson de la Croisade Albigeoise, p. 58: ‘Per so son a Bezerz destruit e a mal mis / Que no ls pot gandir crotz, autar ni cruzifis / E los clerz aucizan li fols ribautz mendics / E femnas e efans, c’anc no cug us n’ichis / Dieus
After Béziers had been violently subdued, the crusaders continued to Carcassonne, where they arrived on 1 August 1209. The city was well-fortified, but filled with refugees and ill-prepared for a long siege, and Raymond-Roger Trencavel, while once more attempting to negotiate a settlement, was deposed and taken prisoner. Carcassonne surrendered on 15 August 1209, and its inhabitants, while they avoided a massacre or detailed interrogation on their beliefs, were expelled from the city.\textsuperscript{104} Arnauld Amaury was the head of a council created to determine Trencavel’s successor, although King Peter II of Aragon was the immediate overlord of his lands (a claim contested with Philip II of France).\textsuperscript{105} Hervé of Nevers was their first choice to become viscount of Béziers and Carcassonne and overall military leader of the crusade, but he refused the offer, which was then extended to Odo III. He in turn refused; his reasons are not recorded, but it is unlikely that Odo would have wished to cultivate a power base in the contested south of France, away from his centre of influence with Philip II.\textsuperscript{106} But according to Peter of Les-Vaux-de-Cernay, he cajoled Simon of Montfort, count of Leicester, into accepting it instead:

These seven [Arnauld Amaury and the council] […] chose a man true to the Catholic faith, honourable in his way of life, and strong in battle – Simon, Count of Montfort. At once the Abbot of Citeaux […] with the Duke of Burgundy and the Count of Nevers, went to Simon de Montfort and urged and begged him to accept. However, this most singular man firmly refused, declaring that he was inadequate for the task and unworthy of it. The Abbot and the Duke threw themselves at his feet, redoubling their entreaties, but as the Count continued to resist the Abbot […] instructed him to do as they asked.\textsuperscript{107}


\textsuperscript{105} William of Puylaurens, Chronicle, p. 37, n. 29.

\textsuperscript{106} HAC, p. 55.

\textsuperscript{107} HA, p. 22: ‘Hi septem […], eligunt virum fide catholicum, moribus honestum, armis strenuum, Simonem videlicet Comitem Montisfortis. Statim abbatis Cisterciensis […] et Dux Burgundiae, Comes etiam Nivernensis, ad ipsum veniunt, monent, rogant et consulunt, ut suscipiat onus pariter et honorem: quod cum vir discretissimus instantissime renueret, et se fateretur insufficientem et indignum, mox abbas Cisterciensis et Dux ejus pedibus se provolvant.
While this Burgundian effort succeeded in appointing Simon as leader of the crusade army, it had untenable internal friction of its own. Soon after the capture of Carcassonne, Arnauld Amaury begged Hervé and Odo to stay, pointing out how much remained to be done. Peter characterised Odo as ‘a man of exemplary good will, [who] cheerfully acceded to these requests and undertook to stay with our Count [Simon] for some time.’ But Hervé of Nevers ‘would not listen to any pleas and returned home forthwith. In fact he and the Duke did not get on well together, but also that enemy of peace, the Devil, aroused such hostility between them that every day there was concern that they might kill each other’. However, Odo himself remained with the army for only about three more weeks, until early September 1209, when he too returned to Burgundy. His participation in the crusade was over, albeit not entirely.

Odo’s main political activities in the second decade of the thirteenth century centred on the ongoing war between Philip II and John of England. However, sometime in autumn 1213, he rejoined Simon of Montfort near Largentière (dep. Ardèche, arr. Largentière), where Simon was conducting operations against Pons of Montlaur and Adhémar of Poitiers, allies of Raymond of Toulouse and opponents of the crusading army. Odo brought the archbishops of Lyon and Vienne, and played a role in settling the frustrated negotiations with Adhémar, as he ‘promised firmly that he would join the Count [Simon] in attacking Adhémar unless he showed himself willing to abide by the Church’s instructions. The Duke at once summoned a substantial number


108 HAC, p. 24: ‘Dux autem Burgundiae, upote benignissimus, benigne adquievit, promisitque se per aliquantum tempus cum eis ad haec moraturum. Comes autem Nivernensis nullo modo voluit deprecantibus obaudire, sed statim ad propria remeavit; non enim bene conveniebat Dux et Comes ille; sed hostis pacis diabolus ita inter illos mutuas inimicitias acuebat, quod timebant quotidie nostri ne se mutuo occiderent’. Trans. by HAC, pp. 59–60.

109 HAC, p. 63-64, n. 104.

110 HAC, pp. 90-91: ‘Dum esset Comes noster in partibus illus, venit ad eum Dux Burgundie Odo, vir potens et bonus, qui negotium fidei contra haereticos, insuper et Comitem nostrum multo amplectebatur affectu; venerunt etiam cum Duce Lugdunensis et Vienensis archiepiscopi. Dum ergo esset Dux et Comes noster prope Valentiam, apud Romanas vocaverunt inimicum ecclesiae Ademarum Pictavensem ad colloquium; convocatus venit, sed, super his quae pacis erant, noluit Comiti vel Duci assentire’.
of knights to enable him to carry out this proposal’. This enabled Simon of Montfort to enforce a surrender, and Burgundian knights were sent to garrison Adhémar’s captured castles.

Additionally, Odo had returned to the crusade in the first place on the request of Arnauld Amaury, now archbishop of Narbonne (1212–25), suggesting that he retained both ecclesiastical and secular links to its leadership. Odo next asked Arnauld to arrange a marriage between his niece, his half-brother Andrew’s daughter Beatrice, and Simon of Montfort’s eldest son, Amaury. As Simon had also become duke of Narbonne in his southern territorial conquests, this reflects a continuing communication between the leaders of the Albigensian crusade, and a maintenance of Burgundian influence within it. Earlier that year, in February 1213, the future Louis VIII, eldest son of Philip II, had also taken the cross to fight the Albigensians. A council in Paris followed, where Fulk, bishop of Toulouse, and Guy, bishop of Carcassonne, appealed for new recruits. This resulted in a number of French knights making vows alongside Louis. We can assume with all likelihood that Odo attended this gathering, and that once more his crusading participation reflected the policies of the French crown.

111 HA, p. 91: ‘Videns igitur Dux quod nihil proficere posset, motus ira et indignation contra Ademarum, promisit Comiti nostro quod, nisi supradictus Ademarus staret per omnia mandato ecclesiae et haberet se ad voluntatem Comitis nostri, et super his bonam faceret securitatem, ipse Dux cum Comite nostro eum impugnaret. Statim etiam vocavit plures milites suos’.
112 HAC, p. 222.
113 HA, p. 91: ‘Interea venerabilis pater Narbonensis archiepiscopis, vir consilio providus et omnino virtuosus, ad cujus etiam monitiorem et preces praedictus Dux Burgundiae ad partes venerat Vienenses, coepit tentare cum Duce de negotio pro quo ipsum vocaverat, de contrahendo videlicet matrimonio inter primogenitum Comitis nostri nomine Amalricum et filiam Delphini, qui erat princeps potens, et frater germanus ipsius Ducis’. HAC, p. 222, n. 19.
115 HA, p. 78: ‘Anno ab incarnatione Domini MCXII [1213], mense februario, Ludovicus primogenitus filius Regis Franciae, mitissimus juvenis et bonae indolis adolescens, signo crucis signavit contra haereticos pestilentes: quo auditio, infiniti milites Franciae, ejus amore et aemulatione provocati, signum crucis vivificae assumpserunt [....] Prima vero dominica Quadragesimae, celebravit Rex generale colloquium baronum in civitate Parisiensit, ut ordinaret de motione filii sui, et sciret qui et quanti et quales irent cum eo. Erant ipsa die Parisisi Tolosanu et Carcassonensis episcopi, viri totius sanctatis, qui tunc venerant in Franciam, ut promoterent negotium fidei contra haereticos pestilentes’.
IV. Aftermath: Nation Building and Crusading Memory

By the beginning of 1214, Odo had once more returned to Burgundy, where he became a key member of the royalist coalition in preparation for the campaign that culminated in the battle of Bouvines (27 July 1214). Philip gathered his army from ‘France, Picardy, Champagne, and Burgundy,’ and Odo was the highest-ranking lieutenant within it. These French, Picards, and Burgundians were largely veterans of the Albigensian Crusade, suggesting that their loyalty to Philip was a matter of long-term alliance, and that they moved from one realm of his military interest to another. The French forces also consisted of Robert and Philip of Dreux, Philip’s cousins, and William II, count of Ponthieu, his brother-in-law. The Anglo-German opposing force included John of England’s nephew Otto IV, Holy Roman Emperor; Renaud I, count of Dammartin and Boulogne; Ferdinand, count of Flanders; Theobald I, duke of Lorraine; and Henry I, duke of Brabant. Odo fought bravely at Bouvines, where William the Breton put an inspiring speech into his mouth, and while Philip was nearly killed at one point, the overall result was a crushing victory that ended all further Plantagenet claims to lost lands in France and forced a defeated King John to bow to the demands of his barons in Magna Carta the next year. The ascendency of the French crown was at last nearly complete.

Odo’s connection with crusading remained implicit until the end of his life, and in the aftermath of his death. He and Simon of Montfort died within a fortnight of each other in

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117 ‘Chronico Sythensi Sancti-Bernini’, in RHGF, XVIII, p. 605: ‘Rex Francorum, audito de hac eorum conspirante, filio suo Ludovico, ut praemittitur, in Pictavia contra Regem Angliae viriliter agente, congregato exercitu de Francia, Picardia, Campania atque Burgundiae, quasi extra regni sui terminus, venit ad pontem de Bovinis, fueruntque cum eo Eudo Burgundiae […] et alii plures.’
119 Baldwin, Government of Philip Augustus, p. 381.
summer 1218 – Simon on 25 June 1218 at the siege of Toulouse, and Odo on 6 July 1218 in Lyon – and Alberic of Trois-Fontaines reports their obituaries in the same sentence. Following tradition, Odo was buried at Cîteaux, and his will made provisions for crusaders, ordering that knights and men be armed to succour the Holy Land. But his son and successor, Hugh IV, was only five years old, and his widow, Alix of Vergy, became regent. Philip II moved quickly to ensure that his authority remained unchallenged; in August 1218, Alix promised the king that any future remarriage of hers would not affect his rights in the duchy and the city of Dijon. As it is doubtful that she had any notion of a new match so soon after her husband’s death (and indeed did not contract one), this was clearly Philip’s initiative to have his rights in writing, and ensure that Burgundy would remain as closely attached to the crown as it had been.

Odo’s crusading interests appeared one more time, two years after his death, in 1220. His widow Alix imposed a tax on the city of Dijon in his memory, intended to fund a hundred knights in the Holy Land, and cited his crusading efforts during his lifetime as justification for

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123 ATF, RHGF, xviii, p. 788: ‘Odo quoque Dux inculitus Burgundiae apud Cistercium fuit sepultus, decessit cruce-signatus, et, condito testamento, pecuniam sufficientum et milites et viros armatos misit pro se in obsequium sanctae Crucis ad succurrendum Terrae Sanctae’.
125 CCB, I, act XXIII, p. 30: ‘Ego Aalidis ducissa Burgundie, notum facio presentibus et futuris, quod communia Divionensis ad mandatum meum juravit, quod si alicui nupsero, nisi de voluntate karissimi domini mei Philippi, regis Francorum, vel ei prout debuero non serviero, dicta communia, absque malefactor, ad dominum Regem se tenebit, et contra me ibit, donec inde domino Regi fuerit satisfactum, salvis tamen consuetudinibus et libertate dicte communie. […] Actum anno Domini millesimo CC° octavo decimo, mense augusto’.
126 After Philip’s own death in 1223, the link became explicit, reinforced by the marriages of Burgundian heirs and heiresses into the royal family. Margaret of Burgundy, Hugh IV’s granddaughter, was the queen of Louis X, and also the granddaughter of Louis IX through her mother Agnes, wife of Duke Robert II (r. 1272–1306). Odo IV (r. 1315–49) was the brother-in-law and close advisor of Philip VI, by his marriage to Philip V’s daughter Jeanne. See Anne-Lise Courtel, ‘La chancellerie et les actes d’Eudes IV, duc de Bourgogne (1315-1349)’, Bibliothèque de l’École des chartes, 135 (1977), 23–71, and Michelle Bubenicek, Quand les femmes gouvernent: Droit et politique au XIVe siècle: Yolande de Flandre (Paris: Ecole des chartes, 2002), pp. 54-55.
the subsidy.127 Philip subsequently ratified the arrangement.128 As the Fifth Crusade had been organised in 1217 by Innocent’s successor, Pope Honorius III (r. 1216–27), it is likely that this gift was intended to support its efforts.129 Odo was thus directly or indirectly associated with four crusades – the Third as regent for his father, the Fourth whose leadership he declined, the Albigensian where he actively participated, and the Fifth, which his will and then later gifts in his memory made provisions to finance. This is by far the highest number of any of the dukes of Burgundy, and reflects the thirteenth century’s status as the ‘golden age’ of crusading, but also a tangible shift in the dukes’ political activities and obligations. From the First Crusade, where Odo I was allied with Philip I but pursued an idiosyncratic crusading career without connection to the king’s policy, to the Second Crusade where Odo II was able to sit out entirely, to the Third where Hugh III was allied to Philip II despite previous rebellion, to the Albigensian Crusade where Odo III had become affiliated with Philip on multiple levels, and engaged in crusading activity as a direct result of the crown’s interest, we can use the dukes’ crusading to study the development of Burgundy as a political entity, and its importance to France, more generally.

On that note, we will briefly consider crusading memory in late medieval Burgundy, and how these exploits were remembered – or not – within the Valois dynasty. Philip the Good (r. 1419–67) was one of the chief proponents of crusading activity and propaganda in Europe, even

127 CCB, I, act XXV, p. 32: ‘Ego Aalydis ducissa Burgundie, omnibus notum facio quod Odo bone memorie dux Burgundie dominus et maritus meis laborans in extremis injunxit mihi coram baronibus meis, et quia propter hoc oportuit me gravare communiam Divionensem, qui ad expensas illas persolvendas efficaciter juvit me’.
128 CCB, I, act XXVI, p. 33.
before the fall of Constantinople to the Ottoman Turks in 1453.\footnote{Elizabeth Johnson Moodey, \textit{Illuminated Crusader Histories for Philip the Good of Burgundy} (Turnhout: Brepols, 2012), p. 80. See also Andrew Heron, ‘Il faut fait guerre pour paix avoir’: Crusading Propaganda at the Court of Duke Philippe le Bon of Burgundy (1419-1467)’ (unpublished PhD thesis, University of Cambridge, 1991) <http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.240192> Jacques Paviot, ‘Burgundy and the Crusade’, in \textit{Crusading in the Fifteenth Century: Message and Impact}, ed. by Norman Housley (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), 70–80, and Attila Bárány, ‘Burgundian Crusader Ideology in Bertrandon de la Broquière’s \textit{Le Voyage d’Outremer}’, in \textit{Byzance et l’Occident III: Ecrits et manuscrits}, ed. by Emese Egedi-Kovács (Budapest: Collège Eötvös József ELTE, 2016), 17–40.} He was deeply involved in the organisation of crusading response in 1454–55, and was viewed as the leader of a final grand expedition against the Turks,\footnote{Graeme Small, ‘Of Burgundian Dukes, Counts, Saints, and Kings’, in \textit{The Ideology of Burgundy: The Promotion of National Consciousness, 1364-1565}, ed. by D’Arcy Jonathan Dacre Boulton and Jan R. Veenstra (Leiden: Brill, 2006), 151–94 (p. 159).} even if Europe was now too deeply divided by political, religious, and national rivalries to make the prospect feasible. Philip’s commission of two sumptuously illustrated manuscripts, \textit{Les croniques de Jherusalem abregies} and \textit{Les croniques et conquestes de Charlemaine}, represented his effort to create a crusading legacy for Burgundy. In 1460, Philip appointed a priest named Hugh de Tolins ‘to inquire, by means of the endowment of churches and otherwise, into the names of the kings and dukes who ruled Burgundy in the past, and to find out about their deeds and the foundations they made, in order to write a chronicle’; if no sources were available, de Tolins was merely to find some.\footnote{The full title was \textit{Aulcunes croniques extraittes d’aulcuns anciens registres et aultres enseignemens d’anciens roix, princes et plusieurs saintes personnes issus de la tres noble et anchienne maison de Bourgongne}. Small, ‘Of Burgundian Dukes, Counts, Saints, and Kings,’ p. 153.}

This flexible approach to historiography in the resulting \textit{Chronique des royz} demonstrates Philip’s invention of a past mythology to undergird his present efforts.\footnote{Small, ‘Of Burgundian Dukes, Counts, Saints, and Kings,’ p. 155.} Evidently his annalists found little to admire in the Capetian dukes’ tenure, as the \textit{Chronique} claimed, cheerily ignoring a three-hundred-year difference in the dates, that Frederick Barbarossa (d. 1190) was the nephew of Boso of Vienne (d. 887), the unlucky king of Burgundy and Provence encountered in chapter one.\footnote{Small, ‘Of Burgundian Dukes, Counts, Saints, and Kings,’ p. 155.} It traced the Valois dukes’ origins through the comital and imperial line, implicitly
associating them with the higher rank of emperor rather than as the vassal of another king, and smoothed the complicated political landscape of both Burgundies into one of united royal continuity.\footnote{Small, ‘Of Burgundian Dukes, Counts, Saints, and Kings,’ p. 155.} The only one of the Capetian dukes to make much of an appearance was Hugh III, in \textit{Les chroniques de Jherusalem abregies}. An illustrated panel places his name (yet again incorrectly given as Henry, an error which Moodey repeats) next to a circle containing that of Sibylla, queen of Jerusalem.\footnote{Moodey, \textit{Illuminated Crusader Histories}, p. 195.} The implication, as Moodey points out, is that Hugh and Sibylla were married – whereas as we have seen in chapter four, Hugh repeatedly rejected a match with her and while he did die in the Holy Land, it was much later, on the Third Crusade.\footnote{Moodey, \textit{Illuminated Crusader Histories}, p. 194.}

Nonetheless, Hugh’s prospect of a royal marriage in Jerusalem made him useful for the propagandists of late medieval Burgundy, and their efforts to create a crusading pedigree for Philip the Good. It is thus a pertinent critical metaphor on which to close, as the fictionalised memory of crusading in Burgundy, and in other areas of medieval history more generally, should be returned to and re-examined. Indeed, many of these assumptions, reworkings, and misremembered histories still stand as fact, and many avenues for future study can be opened by examining both the medieval narratives themselves and the modern interest in sustaining them.


CONCLUSION

The ultimate purpose of this work was to pose the question of why Burgundian crusading or proto-crusading should matter in a study of the institution, and to highlight the lack of any sustained analytical treatment, such as that which nearly all other regions of France have received in detail. We have contended that the reason for this is due firstly to a mistaken assumption that Burgundy was merely a passive satellite of the French monarchy; secondly, because it did not possess the ‘glamour’ and conflict of the Plantagenet territories; thirdly, because strong impulses to French political centralisation have urged a narrative of conformity; and lastly, the Valois rulers and their neo-crusading exploits, which have occupied interest in Burgundy in relation to the subject. But as we have demonstrated, the study of Burgundy in 1095–1220 allows for a more subtle narrative of crusading history and ideology, and a deeper appraisal of its impact both in presence and absence. When Burgundy did enter the fray, its contributions were central, critical, and long-lasting. No other region has a comparable history.

Throughout the work and overall, we have argued that the strongest motives for Burgundian crusading commitment centred around family traditions and political connections, and identified those themes in several ranks of the nobility. The dukes themselves participated almost entirely as a corollary of their relationship with the kings of France, with this distinction being most marked pre-and-post 1187 and the Third Crusade. The counts of Burgundy suffered an exceptionally high death toll on the crusade of 1101 and remained involved in the Second and Third Crusades (and on the latter, in the person of Frederick Barbarossa, functioned as one of the highest-profile leaders). This awareness also figured into the kinship networks of their matrimonial alliances and extended relations via daughters and granddaughters, who seem to have played an active part in the transmission of crusading ideals and appeals. William I of
Burgundy was the recipient of arguably one of the earliest formal appeals to assist Constantinople and eastern Christians, from Pope Gregory VII in 1074, and his son, Pope Calixtus II, was central to the development and vigorous promotion of new crusading expeditions and canon law in the early twelfth century. The counts of Nevers formed one of the most committed and long-lasting crusading traditions of all medieval French noble families, with participation attested from 1101 to 1270 in nearly every major expedition, and which had an impact on their succession at home. The Burgundian regional lordships of Donzy, Montréal, and Toucy also produced multi-generational crusading commitments, as did the Champlitte family with its dual Burgundian-Champenois connections, and a group of crusading cousins from Noyers and Seignelay in the Yonne constituted a particularly visible participation in the Third Crusade. Thus in some sense, these two related aspects of Burgundian crusading memory, both familial and political, developed in tandem. By the Fourth and Albigensian Crusades, crusading participation and political loyalty to the king of France had interlocked to such a degree that Odo III of Burgundy was absent from one campaign and present for the other entirely due to the needs and wishes of Philip II, and veterans of one campaign moved easily to service in the next.

We can thus return to our contentions in the introduction about where the areas of Burgundian crusading influence and participation were the strongest, and how this evolved in the first 125 years of the movement. In all cases, its religious institutions, particularly the abbeys of Cluny and Cîteaux, played crucial roles in structuring the theological and ideological response to crusading or proto-crusading, with effects that reached well beyond the physical borders of Burgundy itself and represented an international prominence. King Alfonso VI of Castile-León’s extensive Burgundian and Cluniac connections were partially responsible for the escalation of the so-called Iberian ‘reconquista’ into a fully-fledged holy war, but Cluny’s influence on the
crusades proper, at least at first and then again in later years, was ambivalent and limited. Instead, its most visible and vigorous role came in the Iberian peninsula in the mid-to-late eleventh century, and in its function as a gatekeeper for the expeditions deemed permissible to Alfonso VI’s interests – in other words, fighting Muslims alone was not sufficient justification for these campaigns. Rather than setting aside national and territorial concerns for a pan-Christian enterprise, Castile-León and Cluny kept a sharp eye on the actions of their Aragonese and Roman rivals in Iberia, and the noblemen of the region viewed papal interference in their affairs quite warily, rather than as an altruistic promotion of the Christian faith and polity. We have thus agreed to some extent that eleventh-century experiences in Iberia did not function as a direct precursor to the First Crusade, but we have also argued against too much of a tendency to draw strict boundaries between the two. The crusades’ undergirding conceptual framework, papal interest, justifying ideology, secular participation, and choice of enemy were all present in Iberia in the 1060s–80s, and continued to develop until their formal launch by Urban II in 1095. In both cases, the conflict was formulated not as an offensive and aggressive war of expansion into alien new territories, though that might well have been how it was perceived by its opponents, but as simply ‘reclaiming’ lands traditionally Christian and now unfortunately lost to pagans, and thus within the remit of Augustinian just war theology. Whether or not personal experiences in Iberia motivated specific individuals or their descendants to go on the First Crusade or any other expeditions, this systematic and structural context must be considered.

The case study of Duke Odo I hence demonstrates that while French crusade involvement was widespread nearly from the moment of the council of Clermont, it nonetheless was not entirely universal, and political obligations and tensions interacted with the sense of religious ardour from the start. As we have seen, barely a half-dozen identifiable Burgundians can be
shown to have taken part, not including the almost surely apocryphal Florina of Burgundy. The failure of her supposed father, Odo I, to acknowledge the movement in any recorded way was unique among the first-rank nobility of France, and cannot be explained as a mere corollary of French royal policy, given King Philip I’s careful relationship to the movement and the attendant challenges for the Capetians. No matter the ultimate rationale for Odo’s rejection of the First Crusade, he did constitute a different kind of crusade response from his peers, who overwhelmingly joined up or at least materially supported it. The effect that this had on long-term Burgundian crusade memorialisation was arguably irrecoverable. The only Burgundians that can be firmly assigned to the 1096–99 expedition hailed from the comital lands, were described as distinct from ‘Franks’ by Raymond of Aguilers, and had no figures apart from minor supporting characters to feature in the Chanson d’Antioche (and indeed, an actively unflattering apostate interpreter). As such, since it did not feature in any substantial or memorable way in the foundation of the movement, its contributions were less visibly drawn out both by medieval chroniclers and modern scholars unless when explicit, and indeed could be completely disregarded by Philip the Good’s project of dynastic memory in the fifteenth century.

In contrast to the First, the Second Crusade was built within a specifically Burgundian sphere of influence, among the ecclesiastical, secular, and familial connections of Bernard of Clairvaux and Godfrey of Langres, and Pope Eugenius III and King Louis VII had been involved in domestic Burgundian politics and disputes beforehand. This was reinforced by the roles of Pope Calixtus II and Abbot Peter the Venerable, Burgundian-born churchmen of the early twelfth century, in establishing laws and texts to dictate the approach of medieval Christendom to its Jewish and Muslim counterparts, opponents, and victims. Calixtus’ relatively brief papacy was nonetheless deeply concerned with questions of crusading ideology and practice, including
the launch of the Venetian Crusade and the issuance of *Sicut Judaeis*, and Peter the Venerable was perhaps the leading medieval Christian authority on Islam, including commissioning the first translation of the Qur’an into Latin. Nonetheless, these interests were not altruistic or without agenda, and should be considered in light of the ongoing question of Christian-Muslim relations, the selective remembering (and misremembering) of the crusades, and the other ways in which propagandist historical memory, as it was in the lavish manuscripts of Philip the Good, is used, manipulated, and drawn upon in ways often very remote from its actual reality.

Burgundy’s relationship with king and emperor was especially complex in the mid-to-late twelfth century. This period also saw arguably the most open conflict between France and Burgundy since the establishment of the ducal Capetians, as the 1180s were characterised by power struggles and even all-out war between Philip II and Hugh III. The eventual peace settlement in 1186, imposed jointly by Philip and the future Henry VI, king of Germany and son of Frederick Barbarossa, reinforced Burgundy’s position as subordinate to both monarchs, and served as the moment in which its political philosophy decisively became one of active alignment with the French crown. The Burgundian experience of crusading, at least where the dukes themselves were concerned, is quite different pre-and-post 1187, and came about as a consequence of this political defeat and the religious trauma of Jerusalem’s fall in 1187. In both cases, the overall motivation to crusade was linked to closer ties, wanted or unwanted, with the French crown, and the expansion of Capetian power into the duchy. This played out in direct consequence on the Third Crusade, which featured the most intense and visible Burgundian participation across several levels of society. Recruiting the duke himself, members of his extended family, several regional lords, a nexus of crusading cousins, and even ordinary men, the crusade has often been framed in terms of its Anglo-French rivalry, but a closer examination of
Hugh’s role offers more nuance than has sometimes been allowed. As the Third Crusade is still awaiting its dedicated modern monograph, this analysis can hopefully play some part in any future constructions or considerations of the relationship between Hugh III and Richard I, and how this touches upon this ever-popular crusade’s legacy more generally.

Lastly, during the height of the crusading era under Pope Innocent III, King Philip II of France and Duke Odo III served as political partners and close allies in multiple ventures, including their response to the threat of heresy in the Languedoc and Toulouse. Odo’s long-term role as Philip’s faithful lieutenant arguably allowed the Capetian monarchy to survive its most serious challenges during the reign of the formidable Richard I of England (1189–99). This was once more demonstrated in the duke’s personal crusading activity. After Odo’s refusal of its leadership, the Fourth Crusade recruited a few notable participants, but this was mostly funnelled through the influence and activity of the Cistercian motherhouse of Cîteaux, and represented an arguably ambivalent lay response to crusading in Burgundy that had not been permanently changed by the Third. It is not possible to identify nearly as many named individuals from the Fourth Crusade as from the Third, and the number comes out about equal to the Second. This may represent the ever-present pitfalls of having to rely on charters, gifts, or other explicit documentation, but it at least demonstrates that the activity and preparation for crusading in Burgundy differed between the Third and the Fourth, and changed again during the efforts against the Albigensians. Indeed, the most well-documented participants from the Fourth Crusade, the Champlitte brothers, came from a long and distinguished crusading pedigree stretching all the way back to Stephen I of Burgundy, and their father had served both Hugh III (of ducal Burgundy) and Frederick Barbarossa (of comital Burgundy) and been a part of the overall Burgundian visit to the Holy Land in the 1170s. This expedition had also featured the
repeated attempts to match Sibylla of Jerusalem with a Burgundian husband, and overtures were made specifically to Hugh III on multiple occasions, but did not ultimately come to fruition.

This all touches upon the question of whether crusading was a diversion from or a central obligation of medieval political practice. In our view, it is incorrect to conclude that extended ventures in the Holy Land in the name of a religious cause, impractical as they may appear from a realpolitik perspective, were a simply opportunistic or personally pious decision to avoid or undercut ‘secular’ commitments. Instead, when we posit that crusading in Burgundy was a political action, we do not mean that participants were signing up for unnecessary cost and danger in the expectation of acquiring greater prestige in France when (or if) they returned. Rather, they were partaking in an increasingly established model of behaviour for the European Christian male aristocrat that had its own raison d’être and prestige, and this was an extension of their roles and status at home. This is specifically exemplified by both Hugh III and Odo III and their respective relationships with Philip II, how that changed between the rules of father and son, and how their crusade obligations were carried out as a result.

It is hence instructive to consider why, after having declined involvement in the Fourth Crusade in 1201, Duke Odo took up a position of prominence against the Cathars in 1209. Indeed, the Albigensian Crusade was (at least in its early stages) King Philip deputising the leaders, infrastructure, and regional knighthood of Burgundy to solve a problem that he could not respond to individually for a variety of personal, political, and social reasons, and it once again demonstrates the peculiar role and particular utility of Burgundy as a crusading entity. By this point we have thoroughly deconstructed any idea that its policy was merely a reflection of the king’s throughout, so the fact that it was now functioning in exactly that role should draw our attention. Instead of focusing on large-scale, macro-historical changes of leadership and
allegiance such as those that took place in the Plantagenet provinces, we can obtain a more subtle picture of political development in medieval France by means of Burgundy’s example, and the ways in which crusading was integrated into the mechanism of royal control. The duchy was never fully outside Capetian authority after its establishment in 1032, and often adhered to that authority in theory, but as its relationship to the crown grew increasingly refined, controlled, and specific, the dukes’ personal obligation to crusade became the chief indicator of this deepening relationship with royal policy.

At this final stage, therefore, we hope to offer some general remarks on the influence that Burgundy – whether its region, rulers, conflicts, clergymen, participants, or politics – exerted on the overall framework of the crusades. Perhaps the most obvious comparison can be found in the development and deployment of the Second, Fourth, and Albigensian Crusades, which were centrally focused in the preaching, ideology, and recruitment of the Cistercians. As noted, this means that Burgundy was the birthplace of several of the most central features (and scandals) of the crusading institution. The Second Crusade introduced crusading as a formally repeatable activity and the personal concern and obligation of kings, which led to a host of monarchs taking the cross after Louis VII’s example. Philip II and Louis IX of France, Richard I and Edward I of England, and Frederick Barbarossa and Frederick II of the Holy Roman Empire, among others, all became famous for crusade participation, with long-lasting impacts on their personal legends and political legacies. The number of men (and women) from each of these regions who then travelled with the monarchs, or in imitation of them, must surely constitute a significant part of overall crusade prosopography, and makes it possible to argue that without the (Burgundian) Second Crusade, despite its failure, the institution might not have formally continued at all. The Fourth Crusade never reached the Holy Land, involving itself in secular political disputes and
culminating in the sack of Constantinople, the leitmotif of over a hundred years of bitter relations between Western and Eastern Christians. Lastly, the Albigensian Crusade formally transplanted the operation of the ideal from the Holy Land to Europe, allowing for the development of the Baltic and Northern crusades against Eastern and Northern Europeans. While Burgundy’s human crusade participation was uneven, its influence in creating many of the longest-lasting and most central paradigms of crusading ideology cannot be understated.

Therefore, this project has not sought to offer a mere recital of regional history, a simple list of participants, or a recapitulation of each major crusading expedition, but to urge a more dynamic and critical consideration of the events, and to highlight the places where Burgundy’s example can be used to think about crusading, the medieval world, and questions of religious, political, intellectual, and social history more broadly. In one sense, Burgundy should be studied simply because it has not had the same focus as its neighbours, and deserves at least the same level of investigative historiography, but this history is unique and important enough that not to consider it results in a less complete understanding of the crusading institution. Burgundy also challenges the historian to search for more nuance in her examples, to ask more specific and subtle questions, and to place this project into an overall narrative which it both supports and challenges. As ever, further work remains to be done; we have not had the space to cover the crusades of the later thirteenth century, the expeditions of King Louis IX of France, or the fall of Acre to the Mamluk Turks in 1291, much less the following centuries of neo-crusading ventures. But that should also stand as an invitation for scholars to draw upon a critical and careful hermeneutic in continuing this work, and to be receptive and honest as to where it takes us.
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