Tracing the formation of territorial stigma through the British media: the case of Toxteth, Liverpool

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The candidate confirms that the work submitted is her own and that appropriate credit has been given where reference has been made to the work of others.

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Abstract

Literature on territorial stigma, the persistent stigma attached to place, has traditionally accepted that the phenomenon is temporally linked to the late 20th century and the era of advanced marginality, defined by the post-Fordist economy and post-Keynesian welfare state. This thesis draws on recent literature that questions this assumption and addresses the lack of research on the emergence of place-based stigma, using Toxteth, Liverpool as a paradigmatic case study. An area that saw civil disturbances in the 1980s, Toxteth is popularly and academically stigmatised. Following a combined quantitative-qualitative content analysis that draws on Critical Discourse Analysis, this thesis traces the portrayal of Toxteth in the British press, to show that the emergence of stigma has a longer history. Drawing on notions of core and event stigma, the study reveals the process of stigmatisation with the press first relying on core stigmatising attributes to smear Toxteth, before using the event stigma of the disturbances, and finally returning to core stigma after 1981. The thesis characterises the earlier form of stigma that relies on core attributes as primitive stigma, which is the necessary precursor to territorial stigma and is defined by discursive obliqueness. Through the careful analysis of 1,950 newspaper articles and more than a dozen in-depth interviews with journalists and politicians, this thesis makes three main original contributions. The first is methodological, demonstrating that core and event stigma can help us to understand the process of stigma. Secondly, this thesis develops a new theorisation of primitive stigmatisation, showing that place-based stigma exists on a temporal continuum. Finally, this study demonstrates that the use of territorial stigma serves the media’s profit and power motives, supporting the primacy of dominant groups in society who determine how reality is constructed.
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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BNA</td>
<td>British Newspaper Archives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDA</td>
<td>Critical Discourse Analysis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CLT</td>
<td>Community Land Trust</td>
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<tr>
<td>DLP</td>
<td>District Labour Party</td>
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<tr>
<td>EZ</td>
<td>Enterprise Zone</td>
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<tr>
<td>HMR</td>
<td>Housing Market Renewal</td>
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<td>L8</td>
<td>Liverpool 8</td>
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<tr>
<td>LFC</td>
<td>Liverpool Football Club</td>
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<tr>
<td>LLP</td>
<td>Liverpool Labour Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MDC</td>
<td>Merseyside Development Corporation</td>
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<tr>
<td>PM</td>
<td>Prime Minister</td>
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<td>UDC</td>
<td>Urban Development Corporation</td>
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<td>UP</td>
<td>Urban Programme</td>
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Chapter 1: Introduction

1.1 Background

Why is it dodgy? Plagued by rioting some 20 years ago, you’d think the inner-city area of Toxteth would have recovered by now, but it’s still in the grip of violence and crime. Cranby [sic] Street is particularly bad, with derelict, graffiti-emblazoned buildings making up most of the scenery. Shootings are a regular thing here, and pedestrians can almost certainly expect to run into trouble. Drugs are prevalent, too, with addicts and dealers hanging around on street corners. Grey, bleak and seemingly resistant to regeneration, it’s safe to say that Toxteth was not on the promotional material for last year’s Capital of Culture, Liverpool (Clarke, 2009).

This feature on the popular website askmen.com captures the popular images of Toxteth that spring to mind when its name is mentioned: it is rife with crime and lawlessness, resistant to change and, if you are foolish enough to venture there on foot, trouble is bound to ensue. Similarly, an article on Liverpool on the SmarterTravel website adds a stigmatising overtone to Toxteth. In a subsection on petty crime, the guide states that “the areas around Toxteth, Dingle, and Wavertree have a reputation for rough characters, and can be dangerous at times” (SmarterTravel, 2017). Here, not only is Toxteth as a place constructed as being dangerous but its residents are also to be feared for their pathological ‘roughness’.

Equally, in 2014, buyagift.co.uk, a website that sells ‘experience days’ launched a spoof campaign entitled ‘Hate Breaks’. Included among the “worst places in the world” was Toxteth, described as “the underbelly of Liverpool” with its “rows upon rows of derelict houses” (Liverpool Echo, 2014). Readers were also informed that the area is “long associated with gang and gun crime” (Liverpool Echo, 2014), reinforcing popular and media stereotypes that link the area with delinquency, danger and lawlessness.

A district in the south end of Liverpool, Toxteth is situated in the Liverpool 8 postal district and is an area of great architectural, demographic, and socioeconomic diversity. In 2012, Toxteth East was the country’s most deprived area (BBC News, 2012). The focus of this
thesis is the stigmatisation and press representation of Toxteth throughout the 20\textsuperscript{th} century. The thesis is less concerned with—though is grounded in—the realities of life in Toxteth and instead considers the image of Toxteth that emerges from press coverage that leads to the construction of an imagined—stigmatised—geography of the district.

Toxteth has an ambiguous and poorly-defined geography. It refers primarily to the area built to the south of the city of Liverpool on the ancient Toxteth Park hunting park, stretching from “Queen’s Dock on the Mersey, down Parliament and Upper Parliament Street, across the junction with Smithdown Road and Lodge Lane to Penny Lane, then Queen’s Drive and Aigburth Vale before coming back to the Mersey at Otterspool” (Greaney, 2013). But the name has become, since the disturbances in July 1981, a label that encompasses all of the Liverpool 8 postal district including the north of the Toxteth district, the south of the district still referred to as ‘Dingle’, and the small subarea of Granby, which is where the majority of the disturbances took place, as opposed to being spread through the entirety of Toxteth as the popular imagination and the press suggest. Figure 1.1 shows the geographical location of Toxteth.

This thesis will show that the stigma directed towards Toxteth is not a recent phenomenon that arose out of the disturbances of 1981. Rather, Toxteth has a longer history of being an area with a negative reputation. It represents a paradigmatic case in terms of the intensity of coverage directed towards it in the British press compared to other areas. For example, a brief comparison with coverage of Chapeltown, an area of Leeds in Yorkshire, which also saw disturbances in the 1970s and 1980s and which has a similar history to Toxteth in terms of economic, land use, and demographic change, shows that Chapeltown does not bear such an intense history of stigma when compared to Toxteth. In the Times archive, a search for the term ‘Chapeltown’ with no Boolean restrictions applied other than the date (1\textsuperscript{st} January 1900 to 31\textsuperscript{st} December 1980), yields only 274 results when compared to Toxteth, which, with the same conditions, yields 1,474 results, thereby capturing the intensity of coverage directed towards Toxteth prior to the disturbances.

Liverpool as a city is widely stigmatised in “plays, television drama, autobiographies, disaster texts, articles, features, comment pieces, editorials, chat shows, news items, political interviews and reviews” (Scraton, 2007: 77). This forms part of a larger stigma and negative portrayal of northern cities during the economic decline of the 1970s and 80s (Boland, 2008:
in line with the dominant ideology that Liverpool was a place of trouble that should, in fact, be shut down through managed decline (Howe, 1981). But, despite time passing, Liverpool remains stigmatised as a city with one of the worst images in Britain (Madsen, 1992: 633). While there are positive connotations of sport, music and the Scouse sense of humour, when one mentions the name ‘Liverpool’ (McIntyre-Brown, 2001: 10), the city’s negative image lingers (Boland, 2008) with the historical legacy and image of the place being powerful enough to overshadow contemporary changes (Madsen, 1992: 634).

Thus, the Liverpool of today is stuck with a reputation for low-skilled, work-shy scroungers with deflated economic prospects and a history of protests, riots, precarity, and crumbling

![Map of Toxteth in relation to the city of Liverpool and England.](image-url)
industry (Madsen, 1992; Boland, 2008) all of which are perpetuated by the dominant ideology in the media. Such an ideology propagates the idea that Liverpool is an alien place of ‘others’ who are social pariahs (this can be seen particularly in the damaging and untrue discourse surrounding the Hillsborough football disaster of 1989, which saw Liverpudlians condemned for tampering with corpses and stealing from the dead).

Within the stigmatised city of Liverpool, however, Toxteth stands out as the poster child that defines 20th century stigma (Fig 1.2); it features in the press far more than other—even popularly infamous—districts. A search on the Times archive for ‘Toxteth’ AND ‘Liverpool’ between 1st January 1900 and 31st December 1980 (restricted to capture events prior to the disturbances only) yields 910 results¹. In the late 19th century, the area of Scotland Road was so infamous for its levels of poverty and slum housing that a play was written entitled *Princes Park and Scotland Road or Vice in Liverpool* (Howell Williams, 1971: 169). A search for the area of Scotland Road (search: ‘Scotland Road’ AND ‘Liverpool’ between the same dates) yields

![Figure 1.2: Coverage of Toxteth compared to other areas of Liverpool (1900-1980)](image)

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¹ I include the word ‘Liverpool’ in the search here in order to receive consistent results. It was necessary to use the term when searching for ‘Scotland Road’, ‘Vauxhall’, and ‘Granby’ to narrow results and, thus, for consistency, I used it when searching for ‘Toxteth’, too.
only 55 results. Vauxhall, a district in the north of Liverpool which was also known for its squalid housing and overcrowding as well as a high Irish population (McIntyre Brown, 2001: 152; de Figueiredo, 2003: 241) yields 33 articles (search: ‘Vauxhall’ AND ‘Liverpool’ NOT ‘car’ NOT ‘vehicle’). Even Granby, a small area within the same postcode as Toxteth, which was marked out by Shelter for its poor housing and ‘twilight’ status in the 1960s (Hughes, 2018, interview), yields only 24 results (search: ‘Granby’ AND ‘Liverpool’ between the same dates). This suggests that, despite having worse or equally dire physical conditions compared to Toxteth, and supposed popular infamy, other districts in Liverpool received less media coverage. As such, it is suggestive that Toxteth is an extreme case not just when compared to other areas of the country that had seen disturbances, but among Liverpool districts for its levels of continued stigmatisation.

1.2 Conceptualising the emergence of stigma
To understand this particularly damaging vision of Toxteth, the theoretical foundation provided by the body of work on territorial stigma is illustrative. This literature is divided roughly into two strands—a macro-scale focus that examines the role of dominant actors and powerful voices who promulgate stigma, and that which traces the lived realities of stigma (Butler et al., 2018: 498). Methodologically these strands are different. The macro-scale focus tends to be on agents of power and on structural dynamics that contribute to a top-down imposition of stigma. Comparative ethnographies (see Wacquant, 1996; 1997; 2008), and discourse analyses (Devereux et al., 2011a; 2011b) are also used to examine how powerful structures enact stigma on communities. The micro-scale strand relies more heavily on interviews and ethnographies that follow the lives of individuals living in a stigmatised community (Butler et al., 2018: 498).

Combined, the literature tells us about the residents’ management of living in a stigmatised place, political activation of territorial stigma, and the role of economic investment and disinvestment in territorial stigma (Slater, 2017). What is missing, however, is a detailed understanding of the ‘production’ or emergence of stigma (Slater, 2017); that is, while we know how stigma can be used and the effects it has on individuals, we know far less about where and how this powerful and transformative stigma emerges.

1.3 Research design and questions
With Toxteth declared a “blemished district” by Wacquant (2008: 238), it is clear that both popular and academic sources stigmatise Toxteth. Yet, academic research to date does not
really help us to understand when territorial stigma emerged or how it emerged in relation to Toxteth or to the myriad other places on the planet that are also portrayed in this way. While Wacquant et al. (2014) have traditionally seen territorial stigma in the era of advanced marginality as vastly different to “spatial smear of earlier epochs” (1273), this thesis concurs with Tyler and Slater (2018) and Loyd and Bonds (2018) that there is a need to see stigma as part of a longer story.

This study intervenes in the production or emergence gap by tracing language in an historical context in order to critically and discursively examine how the print media stigmatise place from a temporal perspective. Using a mixed qualitative-quantitative content analysis — that draws on the Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) tradition — of 1,950 newspaper articles and interviews with journalists, the project de-privileges the contemporary moment to trace discourse evolution and to note the wider, changing social and political context in which the discourse occurs.

This thesis attempts to address the emergence gap in two ways. The first addresses language and discourse, through which stigma is enacted (Goffman, 1963: 15). Media represents a form of powerful discourse that affects the way that people perceive the world around them (Chomsky, 1989: 8; van Dijk, 1995: 10; Schemer, 2012), and which is dominated by powerful outsider voices (van Dijk, 1995: 10). The combined quantitative and qualitative content analysis that draws heavily on the Critical Discourse Analysis tradition popularised particularly by Norman Fairclough (1995; 2001; 2003) and Teun van Dijk (1995; 1996; 1998), allows the tracing of how the discourse of stigma surrounding Toxteth has evolved during the course of the 20th century, and how different linguistic features have been used to operationalise stigma.

In addition to a discursive focus, the thesis addresses the emergence gap through an historical approach. Recent literature has acknowledged that there is a significant need to delve more deeply into the history (or story) of territorial stigma (Tyler and Slater, 2018; Loyd and Bonds, 2018). Nir Cohen’s study of the history of stigma formation in Bat Yam, Israel (2013) is a rare example of this task being attempted (2013: 113). Following Cohen, I examine the development of stigma in Toxteth over the 20th century in the British press. This approach, which follows the Foucauldian archaeological tradition, allows me to peel back layers of discourse to understand the wider context in which the language of stigma occurs.
The research question guiding this study is: how and why does the press territorially stigmatise Toxteth, Liverpool in its coverage during the 20th century? The question offers a full picture of the rising, peaking and falling stigma throughout a century of media coverage. To access this question, several subsidiary research questions guide the study:

1. **How is Toxteth portrayed prior to the disturbances of 1981 and can traces of stigma be detected prior to the era of advanced marginality?**

   This study is situated in the body of literature on territorial stigmatisation; however, where the majority of research has examined stigma during the era of advanced marginality, this question examines the traces and emergence of stigma surrounding Toxteth in the press in the years between 1900 and 1981. It is a significant attempt to address the historical emergence research gap by examining what preceded the territorial stigmatisation that is prevalent in the era of advanced marginality. This question is addressed in chapter 5 where, building on Hudson’s concept of core stigma, these early traces of stigma are conceptualised as ‘primitive stigma’, the necessary foundations on which later enduring and transformative forms of territorial stigma are built.

2. **What discursive and linguistic techniques does the press use to stigmatise Toxteth during the disturbances of 1981?**

   In addressing the discourse emergence research gap, this research question seeks to describe and analyse what discursive techniques the press use to stigmatise Toxteth during the peak moment of stigmatisation of the disturbances of 1981 through a close textual reading of newspaper articles from during and immediately following the disturbances to show how language and discourse contribute to the formation of stigma. This question is addressed in chapter 6 where the concepts of ‘naming’, ‘negativity’, ‘oppositionality’
and ‘stranger-making’ are used to highlight the ways territorial stigma is enacted through particular discursive techniques. Emphasising these techniques reaffirms the linguistic and discursive basis of stigma and underscores the necessity to study the emergence gap from a linguistic angle as well as an historical angle.

3. How do moments of stigmatisation extrapolate and connect to a broader social, political and economic context?

A CDA study seeks to connect the words on a page to the broader social, political and economic contexts in which the discourse occurs. This question is developed throughout chapters 5 to 8, but particular attention is given to the broader context of a stigmatised moment in chapter 7, where the idea of ‘inner cityisation’ as a form of territorial stigmatisation is discussed. This discussion emphasises the way in which powerful voices in the media are intertwined with powerful voices in government, with each echoing the discourse of the other. Chapter 7 demonstrates how PM Margaret Thatcher’s government used the notion of the ‘inner city’ to smear Toxteth as a problematised space in need of government intervention and solutions. These interventions involved the attraction of and injection of private capital into Toxteth, which, ultimately, led to state-led gentrification and privatization of Toxteth. The press ‘inner cityisation’ of Toxteth can be seen to echo a larger government discourse in which the idea of Toxteth as the inner city was being operationalised to justify private intervention in Britain’s cities. The press echoing of this discourse serves to normalise in the public imagination the threat posed by the problem inner city of Toxteth and the necessary solutions. This makes Toxteth into a national threat and justifies economic solutions to deeply engrained structural problems.
4. Does the stigmatisation of Toxteth by the press continue after the disturbances of 1981 and, if it does, how does this stigma transform?

This question picks up the temporal continuum of stigma following the disturbances and seeks to gauge what happened to the levels of stigmatisation in the press surrounding Toxteth after the peak levels of coverage fell. It carefully notes how the discourse surrounding Toxteth changes and what linguistic and discursive tropes the press come to rely on in the latter part of the 20th century. This question is the focus of chapter 8 where there is a discussion of the ways in which the media stigmatises Toxteth through drawing on the legacy of the disturbances, through a renewed focus on criminality, and finally through entering Toxteth into the discourse of celebrity heritage. The focus on the legacy of the disturbances sees the stigma being transformed from Hudson’s event stigma back into core stigma, normalising a discourse that sees Toxteth continually and inescapably linked to the events of four nights in 1981. Criminality serves to further pathologise and make deviant the residents of Toxteth, implying a sense of danger and a threat to society. Finally, through entering Toxteth into a discourse of celebrity heritage, Toxteth becomes the symbolic millstone that residents have had to overcome in order to attain celebrity status. In this way, Toxteth becomes further normalised by the press as a challenge and as a hindrance to life chances.

1.4 From primitive stigma to territorial stigma; from core to event stigma

Following the two-strand approach that considers the emergence gap through language and history, Bryant Ashley Hudson’s stigma typology is useful, highlighting a division between core and event-based stigma types (2008). This typology can be successfully incorporated into territorial stigma research to better understand the changing landscapes and temporalities of stigma. Amanda Holt and Chloe Wilkins apply the notion of event and core stigma to place in their study of the impact of the killings by Fred and Rosemary West on the English city of Gloucester. They consider how the occurrence of a ‘discrete’ event
influences the adhesiveness of territorial stigma about that area. This thesis builds on Holt and Wilkins’ work and adds a further temporal and process-oriented angle, to show that during the 20th century, the story of Toxteth’s stigma is based first on core attributes that, combined, form a primitive stigma based on perceived notions of difference, criminality, and substandard housing. I suggest that thinking of stigma on a temporal continuum is helpful, with primitive stigma forming the foundations upon which the stigma activated during the era of advanced marginality can be built. The term ‘primitive’ is used in the same sense that Karl Marx uses the term ‘primitive’ in his conception of ‘the so-called primitive accumulation’ (1867: 874–875). His conception highlights the basis on which the capitalist mode of production is built and his formulation sees that capitalism could not—and did not—emerge from nowhere. ‘Primitive’ in ‘primitive stigmatisation’ is used in the same sense, to capture the stigma that existed and preceded the adhesive and pernicious stigma of the Wacquantian sense.

The events of the disturbances in 1981 served as the catalyst for the change from primitive stigma to territorial stigma through the reliance on stigma surrounding the ‘anomalous’ events of the disturbances. This event-based stigma resulted in a high intensity stigma that defined Toxteth in the early 1980s. The story of Toxteth in the latter part of the 20th century involved the activated territorial stigmatisation transmuting from event stigma back to a background, insidious core stigma that gradually and incessantly smears Toxteth with damaging tropes.

This thesis suggests that we can think of place-based stigma as being situated on a temporal continuum with primitive stigma based on core stigmatising attributes being the necessary foundations upon which the adhesive stigma of the era of advanced marginality builds. The thesis takes a temporal approach, showing how this early form of stigma defined by core attributes then transitions, through the events of the disturbances, into pernicious and adhesive territorial stigma in the Wacquantian sense. The era after the disturbances is defined by the return to stigma based on core attributes but this stigma is deeply ingrained into the larger social, political and economic system of the post-Fordist and post-Keynesian period.

1.5 Thesis outline
This thesis is arranged in nine chapters. For the sake of narrative flow, no single context chapter is offered; instead, context is interwoven into the fabric of the thesis to allow the story of the process and evolution of stigma in relation to Toxteth to evolve naturally. After
this introductory chapter in which foundations are laid for the rest of the thesis, chapter 2 offers a review of literature on territorial stigmatisation, referring to Loïc Wacquant’s development of the term ‘territorial stigma’, Tom Slater’s conceptual breakdown into the four main themes in the literature, and a critique of the current field. The chapter also identifies key subject and methodological gaps in literature.

Chapter 3, lays out the theoretical underpinnings of territorial stigmatisation, referring to the works of Erving Goffman and Pierre Bourdieu whose research on stigma and symbolic violence respectively inform Wacquant’s formulation of territorial stigma. In order to explain the CDA approach used in this study, the chapter turns to an exploration of the theoretical foundations of this methodological approach, discussing discourse and power, power and the media, and media and place.

Drawing on the theoretical foundations of the CDA approach established in chapter 3, chapter 4 offers a thorough explanation of the study’s research design. After explaining the rationale for source, time, and location selection, I give an in-depth account of the coding schedule and coding manual used to analyse texts, as well as the interview procedure employed. The chapter concludes with a consideration of ethical implications and the project’s limitations.

Chapters 5, 6, 7 and 8 are empirical chapters that present the study’s findings. Chapter 5 examines how the press portray Toxteth before the disturbances of 1981. Building up a thesis of primitive stigmatisation, this chapter shows the discursive techniques used by the British press to draw attention to Toxteth in an increasingly negative manner between 1900 and 1981. I engage with Hudson’s typology of stigma in this chapter to categorise the type of stigma that the press enacted regarding Toxteth. To fully access the episteme of which the press coverage of the early- to mid-20th century was a part, other archival sources are used including street directories, local history resources, maps, and photographs of the era.

Chapter 6 is also an empirical chapter and focuses on the century’s peak of press coverage: 1981. Set during the period that Wacquant would term ‘the era of advanced marginality’, this chapter picks up the story of territorial stigma at a stage more familiar to the rest of the literature. Where the previous chapter addressed the historical gap, this chapter focuses on
addressing the discursive gap, examining the linguistic and discursive techniques that the press use to smear Toxteth during this period of high coverage.

Chapter 7 examines the press use of the term ‘inner city’ in relation to Toxteth. After a brief review of the symbolism of the term and the concept of the ‘underclass’, the chapter turns to a discussion of how Toxteth is ‘inner-cityised’ in the British press during and after the disturbances. The chapter continues, connecting the press discourse to the political discourse of the Conservative Party under Prime Minister (PM) Margaret Thatcher (1979-1990), and underscoring the link between the operationalising of the term ‘inner city’ and the Conservative Party’s urban agenda. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the language of territorial stigma and points to how certain phrases have come to gain national or international infamy as they are enacted for political or economic ends.

Chapter 8 completes the analysis of the stigmatisation of Toxteth in the 20th century by examining the press treatment of the area in the latter part of the 20th century after the disturbances to show how stigma is produced and reproduced. This is achieved by unearthing the tropes and discursive features being used by the press in its treatment of Toxteth. Again, Hudson’s typology of stigma is used to show how the press transform the type of stigma being enacted from event stigma back into a core, enduring stigma.

The final chapter of the thesis, chapter 9, offers a summary of the findings of the study, referring to the research questions outlined in this chapter. I connect the study’s findings to a wider social, economic and political context, with particular reference to the state of British journalism. I also offer suggestions for future research, and suggestions for journalistic practice.
Chapter 2: Reviewing the literature

2.1 Introduction

Any comparative sociology of the novel forms of urban poverty crystallizing in advanced societies at century’s turn must begin with the powerful stigma attached to residence in the bounded and segregated spaces, the ‘neighbourhoods of exile’ to which the populations marginalized or condemned to redundancy by the post-Fordist reorganization of the economy and the post-Keynesian reconstruction of the welfare state are increasingly consigned (Wacquant, 2008: 169).

For Loïc Wacquant, territorial stigma is intricately intertwined with the temporality of the close of the 20th century and the emergence of the post-Fordist economy. More recent literature has begun to question this inextricable temporal tie, and suggests that there is a need to look further back into the longer story of place-based stigma in order to fully understand the concept (Tyler and Slater, 2018; Loyd and Bonds, 2018). This shift means accepting that Wacquant’s “novel forms of urban poverty” (2008: 169) may not be so novel after all and may, in fact, have their roots earlier in the 20th century. This chapter will offer a thorough review and discussion of territorial stigmatisation, and will lay the foundations for the rest of the thesis in which this temporal hold suggested by Wacquant is tested and explored.

I begin by explaining Wacquant’s framing of territorial stigmatisation and providing an explanation for the context of post-Fordism in which the concept arose, thereby underscoring the temporal framework in which Wacquant’s territorial stigmatisation is situated. I also introduce the concepts of core and event stigma as introduced by Bryant Ashley Hudson (2008) to explain distinctions between stigma types.

Next, I turn to the work of Tom Slater who has reviewed the literature and noted four distinct themes into which literature often falls: residents’ management of living in a stigmatised place, political activation of territorial stigma, economic investment and

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2 The next chapter includes a consideration of the theoretical underpinnings of territorial stigmatisation as seen in the works of Erving Goffman and Pierre Bourdieu.
disinvestment, and production of stigma. I offer a summary of each of these themes, reviewing the relevant literature, highlighting how this thesis addresses a gap noted by Slater. I then offer a critique of the Wacquantian approach to territorial stigmatisation drawing on an existing body of critique along with my own to highlight three points where Wacquant’s framing is problematic: the notion of advanced marginality, the lack of a cogent definition of territorial stigmatisation, and the way in which Wacquant situates territorial stigmatisation within the temporal frame of advanced marginality, where this project intervenes.

Finally, I offer a review of the gaps in literature. I note that, despite the discursive foundations of Bourdieu’s symbolic power, which forms part of territorial stigma’s heritage, there has been little focus on the language and discourse of territorial stigma. Further, there have been only a select few studies that consider the role of media—an accepted constructor of social knowledge and opinions (Schemer, 2012)—so we know very little about how the press and broadcast media construct places and use a discourse of territorial stigma. Slater advises us that we know little about the production or emergence of stigma in places around the world but we see very few examples of studies that attempt to consider the historical arc of stigmatising discourse. To understand where territorial stigma has come from, we need to engage in historical studies that trace key words over time and see how a discourse of stigma is constructed in an historical sense. Lastly, and again despite territorial stigma’s strong discursive roots, there are few studies that engage with text using a Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) to see language in action and to connect language with context to understand the role of discourse in the production of stigma. By conducting a content analysis—which borrows heavily from the CDA tradition—of British 20th century print media, I am able to address unanswered questions using under-used methods.

2.2 Wacquant and territorial stigma
The concept of territorial stigmatisation was first coined by French-American sociologist Loic Wacquant. His concept was rooted in the works of Damer (1989), Gill (1977) and Tucker (1966), but it was in his 1993 article that Loïc Wacquant first named and introduced the theme of territorial stigmatisation, connecting the work of Erving Goffman on stigma with Pierre Bourdieu’s work on symbolic violence and group-making (Wacquant, 2008: 7), explaining that territorial stigmatisation becomes normalised as a result of the internalization of social and political power dynamics. Situating the study of territorial stigmatisation in the domains of space and place, de- and post-industrialisation, housing, economics, power, and politics, Wacquant describes territorial stigmatisation as:
…the powerful stigma attached to residence in the bounded and segregated spaces, the
‘neighbourhoods of exile’ to which the populations marginalised or
condemned redundant by the post-Fordist reorganisation of the economy
and state are increasingly being relegated (1993: 369).

Central to Wacquant’s understanding of territorial stigmatisation is a sense of temporal fixity
in the post-war era of post-Fordist economies. The above definition notes that territorial
stigmatisation, in Wacquant’s framework, is linked to the post-Fordist era, which he terms
the era of ‘advanced marginality’. The term ‘post-Fordist’ refers to the changed economic
system—and related political and social systems—from roughly 1975 onwards (Wacquant,
production and division of labour—was one of ‘organised capitalism’ (Wacquant, 1996: 123-4)
and was defined as a “regime of accumulation built around the mass-producing welfare
state” (Breathnach, 2010: 1181). We see that Fordism and the Keynesian welfare state and
their macroeconomic policies go hand in hand, supported by nationalization and state
intervention. The Fordist era was one of spatial Keynesianism, meaning that socially
democratic governments (largely in power in Western Europe in the post-war years),
promoted spatial standardization and equalization through, for example, strong local
government, public services, and bringing industry to “lagging” areas (Breathnach, 2010:
1182). Labour was, generally, domestically contained so national governments were able to
regulate inequality through hands-on measures.

Post-Fordism—a changed economic system in response to the financial crashes of the 1970s
and rising globalization processes—is characterised by “a decentralised neoliberal state
wherein regional economies pursued their own economic interests through direct
participation in the global economy” (Breathnach, 2010: 1181). This era is defined by a
hands-off state, and a flexibilization and precariousness in the labour force. No longer was
labour a domestic concern; it was spread globally for the purposes of flexible specialization
and accumulation. A series of more right-leaning governments further withdrew the hands-
on approach to spatial and social equality, resulting in a heavier focus on national rather than
local government. The advent of the post-Fordist regime and concurrent social and political
changes resulted in seismic social changes, and concurrent uneven and unequal development
with factory closures, job losses, increasing social and labour precarity, ethnoracial tensions,
public disorder, and a resurgence of high levels of poverty and social deprivation (Wacquant, 1996: 121).

The transition, in the 1970s and 1980s, from the Fordist regime of accumulation built around the mass-producing welfare state to a post-Fordist regime of flexible neoliberalism is widely associated with a profound restructuring of state spatialities throughout Western Europe. The centralised Fordist welfare state, oriented to the spatial equalization of living standards and employment opportunities within its borders, was replaced by a decentralised neoliberal state wherein regional economies pursued their own economic interests through direct participation in the global economy. For Wacquant, these features which form part of what he terms ‘advanced marginality’, are a defining feature of the post-Fordist era. Wacquant describes advanced marginality as “the novel regime of sociospatial relegation and exclusionary closure…that has crystallised in the post-Fordist city as a result of the uneven development of the capitalist economies and the recoiling of welfare states” (Wacquant, 2008: 2-3). He refers here to, among others, the left behind populations after factory closures, those rendered deprived by welfare state retrenchment, and those impacted by labour precarity because of the new flexible, globalised and fragmented economy. Advanced marginality is a way for Wacquant to explain the “return of the repressed” (1996: 123) that he notes as a feature of the post-Fordist age. For Wacquant, territorial stigmatisation exists as one of six features of this larger, more encompassing era of contemporary advanced marginality (Wacquant et al., 2014: 1272n) and, as such, is distinctly time-bound. I discuss and challenge this notion in section 2.5 and suggest avenues for further research that can enrich the study of territorial stigma.

In later work, Wacquant stresses that territorial stigmatisation has a “distinctive weight and effects…as well as the insuperable political dilemmas posed by the material dispersion and symbolic splintering of the new urban poor” (2008: 7). Stigmatised locations are “widely labelled as ‘no-go areas’, fearsome redoubts rife with crime, lawlessness and moral degeneracy where only the rejects of society could bear to dwell” (2008: 29). From Wacquant’s descriptions, it becomes apparent that territorial stigmatisation has a distinctively discursive aspect: it is the ‘labelling’, the rumour, the reputation surrounding an area that enables and facilitates territorial stigmatisation. Language is being used “as a form of social practice” (Fairclough, 1995: 7) that constructs and attaches reputations, stigmas and stereotypes to certain geographies and those who live there.
This connects with Bourdieu’s argument regarding capital in relation to space. Capital allows spatial domination but a lack thereof “chains one to a place” (Bourdieu, 1999: 127). Those residing in a “fashionable neighborhood” (1999: 129) have access to the collective capital (here Bourdieu refers less to financial capital and more to social, cultural and symbolic capital) that can further enhance and benefit their lot. Conversely, the weight of the symbolic stigma is shared by all of those living in a stigmatised location, grinding down both the physical space and the social space of the agents, further adding to the popular mental construct of stigmatised space. For Wacquant, residence in such an area is highlighted by “personal indignity…that colours interpersonal relations and negatively affects opportunities in social circles, school and the labour market” (Wacquant, 2008: 29). He adds that “a blemish of place is thus super-imposed on the already existing stig mata traditionally associated with poverty and ethnic origin or postcolonial immigrant status” (Wacquant, 2007: 67, emphasis in origina), suggesting that stigma of place latches onto other forms of social disgrace. Thus, Wacquant’s later work substantiates his 1993 explanation of the problems that create territorial stigmatisation; these subsequent discussions add a suggestion of social construction, discourse and symbolism that combine to create problems that are acutely felt by those living in stigmatised locations and who carry additional ‘blemishes’.

2.3 Core and event stigma
This thesis will argue that Bryant Ashley Hudson’s work on organizational stigma (2008) can helpfully be applied to studies of the stigmatisation of place, as shown by the work of Amanda Holt and Chloe Wilkins (2014). Hudson differentiates between two forms of stigma: core and event stigma (2008). She explains that core stigma “is due to the nature of an organization’s core attributes—who it is, what it does, and whom it serves” (2008: 253). She notes examples including tobacco and gambling services, abortion providers, and strip clubs, all of which may attract “stigma because of their very nature” (2008: 253). Core stigma can be seen outside the organizational sphere as background attributes that are seen to define the fundamental principles and characteristics of an entity or place. This reliance on the idea of core attributes feeds back into Erving Goffman’s observation (discussed in chapter 3) that stigma refers to “an attribute that is deeply discrediting” where these attributes are at odds with “what a given type of individual should be” (Goffman, 1963: 13). Considered in Hudson’s example, core attributes can be seen as key features that define an entity and that, upon their being made known, are the cause of stigma and a loss of status in society.
Event stigma, on the contrary, “results from discrete, anomalous, episodic events” (2008: 253). Writing about stigma affecting organizations, she notes that examples of event-related stigma include industrial accidents, mass product defects or bankruptcy (2008: 253). These can be seen as key, damaging moments. It is possible to find parallel moments in the stories of places including mass public disturbances, accidents or major crimes. Holt and Wilkins apply the idea of event stigma to the study of place in their study on the impact on the residents of Gloucester in relation to the killings by Fred and Rosemary West (2014). They note that the legacy of an event can be long-lasting and, in the case of the extreme crimes of the Wests, residents of Gloucester felt that their home was tainted because of its connection with the murders. In this thesis, I draw on the ideas of core and event stigma to make sense of the ways that stigma forms as a result of media reliance on stigmatising attributes and on the legacy of ‘anomalous’ events.

2.4 Slater’s review of literature
Tom Slater, a geographer based at the University of Edinburgh, contributes both to the literature through studies of territorial stigma in action and, crucially, offers a thorough review of literature and the themes into which the topics of the literature can be categorised (2017). He notes that literature can be seen as falling into four distinct themes: work that discusses residents’ strategies for managing territorial stigmatisation; studies that address the political activation of territorial stigma; research that investigates neighbourhood investment and disinvestment; and work that addresses the production of territorial stigma. The first three of Slater’s categories have been explored the most. It is the fourth and final theme – production or formation – in which this study intervenes and on which it builds an alternative debate.

2.4.1 Managing strategies
Goffman’s work on stigma (discussed more in chapter 3) considers the management or coping methods employed by a blemished individual. He suggests that, as stigma arises from the gap between virtual and actual identity, “tension management and information management have been stressed – how the stigmatised individual can present to others a precarious self, subject to abuse and discrediting” (1963: 161). The methods he describes include changing one’s name to conceal an identity (1963: 76), or “covering” a physical impairment (1963: 126).
A sub-section of territorial stigmatisation literature considers the lived experiences of stigmatisation and the possible mechanisms employed by those stigmatised to deal or cope with what Goffman terms ‘spoiled identity’ (Wacquant et al., 2014: 1273). Wacquant (2007) notes that distancing and lateral denigration are frequently used by residents of maligned places in order to separate themselves “from a place and population that they know are universally sullied” (2007: 69). Lateral denigration involves a member of the stigmatised ‘ingroup’ engaging in a process of ‘othering’ (2007: 67); it allows an individual to distance himself from the remainder of the group and to condemn his neighbours thereby elevating himself and removing himself from the stigmatised discourse. These methods show traits of both Miller and Major’s emotional-focused coping strategies and problem-focused strategies as they involve an adopted behaviour, but the ultimate aim is to salvage self-esteem.

Tom Slater and Ntsiki Anderson (2011) find that residents in a stigmatised neighbourhood of Bristol seek to hide their address (2011: 539) and others subvert the negative image of their neighbourhood and derive a level of pride from bearing a stigmatised identity, which suggests, again, a linked problem- and emotion-focused response of safeguarding self-esteem through an adopted behaviour. Relatedly, Jensen and Christensen find that where outsiders may have a negative view of the area, residents tend to view their area more positively than these outsiders (2012: 79). While this does not amount to the ‘pride’ that Slater and Anderson found in their study, it unearths a problematic: either residents experience place differently to outsiders, in which case we see that external reputation is damaging, or residents accept the stigma of their location but choose to ‘make the best of it’ and inverse the stigma to invoke pride or satisfaction with their place of residence. More research is needed to uncouple this quandary.

In opposition to the invoked positivity, residents may engage in a form of spatial abjection, trying to separate themselves from their place of residence through a stated desire to leave, thus creating a discursive boundary between, and attempting to restructure the relationship between, self and place (Butler et al.: 2018). This means that residents in some locations directly state that they wish to sever from their personal identity any sense of place.

In general, then, management of territorial stigmatisation is seen to span both emotion- and problem-focused responses. It can subvert stigma or it can highlight shame and a desire to attain distance from the stigmatised place. Whether territorial stigma can be overcome is
debated. Wacquant maintains that the stigma of residing in a maligned place can be “dissimulated and attenuated – even annulled – through geographic mobility” (2007: 67); however, as Keene and Padilla demonstrate in their study of black Chicagoans who relocate to smaller towns in largely white Iowa, the blemish of place can be carried even after relocation (2010: 1216). This highlights that territorial stigmatisation can be seen to be becoming distinct from other forms of stigma onto which it has previously thought to latch (Slater, 2017: 115).

2.4.2 Political activation of territorial stigma
Existing literature has captured the political and policy activation of territorial stigma, particularly within a British context. Politically, territorial stigma serves as a justification to engage in a discourse that demonises those living in particular—often working class—areas (Kornberg, 2016; Jones, 2012; Gray and Mooney, 2011; Hancock and Mooney, 2011). Acknowledging that territorial stigma is often a byword for stigma directed towards class or ‘problem people’, Imogen Tyler (2013a) argues that territorial stigma has “become a device to procure consent for punitive policies directed at those living at the bottom of the class structure” (Slater, 2017: 117, emphasis in original). This means that territorial stigma, a distinctly place-based phenomenon, can take on a class aspect that seeks to divide space by the ‘type’ of people living there.

This fits closely with the British socialist commentator and author, Owen Jones’ analysis in his account of the “demonization of the working class” (2012). For Jones, “demonization…promotes the idea that inequality is rational: it is simply an expression of differing talent and ability” (2012: xiii), demonstrating the role of policymakers and politicians in using discourse to justify demonization and stigmatisation of the ‘undeserving’ poor and the places they live.

Lynn Hancock and Gerry Mooney (2011) identify a level of political scapegoating that has had the intention of dividing ‘the working class’ into distinct groups, branding some ‘deserving’ and others ‘undeserving’. The ‘political myth’, for Hancock and Mooney, has cultivated the image of the working class and, more specifically, benefit recipients as lazy and ‘feckless’. The image, enhanced by media portrayals (2011: 26), divides the stigmatised group into ‘deserving’ and ‘undeserving’ poor, chastising the latter while supporting the former. Creating an ‘othered’ image of the “problem” poor (2011: 27) divides an already stretched society without, as Hancock and Mooney are quick to acknowledge, considering
that crime is rife at all levels of the social system, not just among one particular class (2011: 27). As Hancock and Mooney demonstrate, a distinct ‘othering’ is at play in society that is linked to, *inter alia*, “justification for spending cuts” following the financial crisis of 2008 (2011: 26). The political discourse surrounding territorial stigmatisation, then, forms part of a larger literature that highlights the scapegoating of the working class.

For Neil Gray and Gerry Mooney, in their study of Glasgow East, the political use of territorial stigmatisation is seen as being “a neo-liberal alibi for accumulation strategies” (2011: 10), connecting territorial stigmatisation with the drivers of the post-Fordist economy. By stigmatising a place, policies and punitive sanctions can be directed at places and the residents of those places, in order to “obfuscate[s] fundamental structural and functional differences underlying the uneven spatial distribution of poverty and disadvantage, and displace[s] questions of culpability away from the state and private sectors” (Hancock and Mooney, 2013: 53). This tells us that territorial stigmatisation of a place may be activated by a political body in order to apply a stigmatising mask to a place, implying that the area’s problems are pathological and due to the behaviour and character of residents, thereby hiding the potential structural causes.

The political activation of territorial stigma – particularly in a UK context – that draws on images of an ‘othered’ poor living in deprived estates for which their lack of aspiration and ambition are responsible—demonstrates the role of discourse in apportioning blame to those residing in certain locations resulting in a pathological stigma.

### 2.4.3 Neighbourhood investment and disinvestment

Similarly, territorial stigma may be invoked, operationalised, or manufactured for economic ends. This process often involves the creation of a stigmatised locale in order to justify either investment to attract more affluent residents, or disinvestment. Relying on our innate tendency to judge and ‘rank’ urban areas in relation to each other (Semyonov and Kraus, 1982), a territorially stigmatised view of a place viewed in binary opposition to surrounding areas may be “invented” to justify investment and/or disinvestment (Gray and Mooney, 2011: 20). Kallin and Slater reflect that territorial stigmatisation and regeneration operate as “two sides of the same coin” with stigmatisation serving as “an engine of regeneration” (2014: 1364). Regeneration is “the reinvestment in a place after a period of disinvestment” (Shaw and Porter, 2009: 2) and often focuses on physical improvements to a neighbourhood (Gourlay, 2007; Hastings and Dean, 2003), implicitly linking back to the ‘broken windows
theory’ formulated by Kelling and Wilson during research on visibility of ‘order’ and the negative consequences of ‘disorder’ in Newark, New Jersey (Kelling and Wilson, 1982).

Gourlay’s examination of neighbourhood regeneration efforts and enduring stigma in two housing estates on the periphery of Dundee highlights an important point on the internal vs. external perceptions of regeneration. While improvements to the physical environment may be perceived positively within the stigmatised area as contributing to residents taking “more pride in their neighbourhood” (2007), residents are acutely aware that the negative reputation of their neighbourhood persists more widely.

An alternative interpretation of literature reveals a focus on manufactured stigma with the state as stigmatiser for economic ends. Hamish Kallin and Tom Slater argue that, in the case of Craigmillar in Edinburgh, the point of a “regeneration’ project was to attract more affluent residents to Craigmillar” and, as such, the state constructs “the very stigma it then insists on scrubbing” such that “the ‘blemish of place’ becomes a target and rationale for ‘fixing’ the area” (2014: 1351). Kallin and Slater describe invoked territorial stigmatisation as the driving force behind regeneration policies (2014: 1364), offering the “ideological justification for a thorough class transformation, usually involving demolition, land clearance, and then the construction of housing and services aimed at a more affluent class of resident” (2014: 1354). Gray and Mooney agree with this interpretation and add that a territorially stigmatised view of a place viewed in binary opposition to surrounding areas may be “invented” to justify investment and/or disinvestment (2011: 20).

Libby Porter, too, argues that there is a distinct policy focus to British regeneration, which operates a “deprivation-focused regeneration” presented as being of benefit to the poor or ‘socially excluded’ through the “demolition and rebuilding of social housing estates” (2009: 248). She adds that the interests of designers, developers, policymakers and others must be considered to better understand whose interests the ‘urban renaissance’ truly serves (2009: 249). This process suggests careful construction of territorial stigmatisation in order to serve an economic agenda, which is a deeply troubling trend as, once adhered to a place, stigma does not readily and easily vanish (Gertner and Kodler, 2004; Gourlay, 2007). Even through investment in an area, the wider reputation and stereotypes about a place remain adhered to the place’s name in the popular imagination (Gourlay, 2007).
Slater notes that, crucially, it is the *perception* of an area that affects disinvestment or investment or political activation. That is, it is how the area exists in the national imagination and popular geography that affects the implementation of stigmatising forces. It is not, as he argues, necessarily “a property of the neighbourhood, but rather a gaze trained on it” that influences the priming of stigmatising forces (Slater, 2017: 121). In other words, it is how the place is socially constructed that affects the decision to invoke a blemish of place for economic or political reasons. This connects with Pierre Bourdieu’s work on symbolic power, which is a way of people getting others to see the world in a particular way. Powerful individuals exert their power through their use of language and symbols because there is a “belief in the legitimacy of the words and of those who utter them” (Bourdieu, 1991: 170). As such, language and discourse become a means of exercising power and of constructing a certain view of reality. It is the construction or production of stigma that is the understudied fourth theme identified by Slater.

### 2.4.4 Production of territorial stigma
The previous three themes consider the effects- or activation-oriented literature of territorial stigmatisation. The final category noted by Slater (2017) is that of the production of territorial stigma, which is, as its name would suggest, a way of understanding the origins or emergence of stigma. Despite Slater’s acknowledgement of the theme, he admits that it is an understudied area and that “very few studies have taken up the challenge of tracing the production of territorial stigmatisation” (2017: 115). It is in the lack of emergence-oriented literature that this project intervenes.

However, looking at elements of existing literature, it is possible to see two ways in which territorial stigmatisation may be formed; racialization and criminalization of place are, I argue, sub-themes of this category and are, in part, responsible for the production and reproduction of territorial stigmatisation.

*Racialization of place*
Connecting territorial stigmatisation to the notion of race is central to Wacquant’s writing (2008). He notes that territorial stigma tends to attach to existing stigmata, including that of race (2007: 67). Tom Slater and Ntsiki Anderson (2011) interact with the ongoing debate about the perceived ‘ghettoization’ of British cities, towns and neighbourhoods, with a particular focus on Ceri Peach’s “reputational ghettos” (1996, in Slater and Anderson, 2011) and Ludi Simpson’s “ghettos of the mind” (2007, in Slater and Anderson, 2011). Using a
case study approach of the St Paul’s neighbourhood of Bristol, the authors argue that public perception of St Paul’s has created an image of a racialised ghetto that is not consistent with the lived reality (2011). They argue that applying a “black ghetto filter” (2011: 543) to the view of St Paul’s results in a racialised and imagined ghetto without the demonstrable collectivity and social ties that exist. Their work highlights the link between territorial stigmatisation and perceptions (based on actual or imagined reality) of heightened racialization, suggesting that the concept of race cannot be ignored when analysing territorial stigmatisation for, in lived realities of the stigmatisation process, the idea of race is drawn on heavily to create a racialised, ‘othered’ space.

Yet Keene and Padilla (2010) suggest that this may not always hold true and that there are circumstances where stigma of place is the primary ‘blemish’. Upon relocation from Chicago to Iowa, the African American respondents in the Keene and Padilla study are more stigmatised than other non-Chicagoan African Americans; they carry with them the stigma of being from Chicago, which overshadows their racial identity. This suggests that while race (or perceived race) may often play a significant role in the stigmatisation of place, considering race as the primary stigma onto which other stigmas may attach may not always hold true and it may in fact be place that is the primary stigmatiser.

James Rhodes (2012) has transitioned the connection of race and stigmatised place into a British context with his work in Burnley that seeks to look beyond Wacquant’s assertion that stigmatised locations are “primarily populated by ‘racial’ or ‘ethnoracial’ others” (2012: 687) and sees that territorial stigmatisation does not necessarily belong solely to areas of minority ethnic or racial populations but that it extends to areas that are instead ‘marked’ by other socioeconomic factors. Certainly, Wacquant acknowledges that territorial stigmatisation can attach to existing factors other than race – he cites poverty as an example (2007: 67) – but Rhodes moves beyond a solely Wacquantian analysis and considers Matt Wray’s ‘stigmatypes’ (2006, in Rhodes 2012). His findings, based on interviews with British National Party (BNP) voters in Burnley, demonstrate that both ‘Asian’ and ‘scruffy white’ areas are vulnerable to stigmatisation (2012: 696). Indeed, Rhodes’ study appears to highlight a stark difference between territorial stigmatisation of racialised spaces, with ‘Asian’ areas deemed places to be feared as threatening locations defined by difference (2012: 695), and the ‘scruffy white’ areas perceived to be areas of social problems often relating to ‘scrounging’ (2012: 696).
Though race clearly plays a part in territorial stigmatisation, the seed planted by Rhodes (2012) that considers the differences between types of racialised space, is important for future analyses. It is important to note that there are two kinds of racialisation apparent in literature: the colouring of space through the suggestion of a ghettoization, and the whiteness of place in what Rhodes (2012) terms a ‘scruffy white’ area, which connects to burgeoning literature on ‘chavs’, “a term of abuse for the white poor” (Tyler, 2008: 1471; see also Hayward and Yar, 2006; Jones, 2012; Bennett, 2013) that sees the chav as a socially and visually constructed binary ‘other’ that is deemed to be “deficient” (Bennett, 2013: 147).

*Criminalization of place*

Lynn Hancock considers the criminalization of places and highlights several contributory factors that can lead to an area being maligned as a dangerous place. She suggests that, while “political-economic forces” are largely responsible for this process (2008: 22), there are additional factors worthy of consideration. She argues that the division between the “respectable” and “least deserving” poor (2008: 22) has created a discourse of “problem estates” (2008: 22). Of particular interest is her observation that the blame attributed to “the poor...for their filthy living conditions” in the 19th century (2008: 22) was carried forward into the 20th century when tenants from cleared slums were moved into new housing estates – often bringing with them the stigma of previously residing in a slum – and were “disinfested” prior to arrival (2008: 22). Her analysis offers many avenues to be explored and the connections that she observes between slum and social housing warrant further consideration.

Hastings and Dean’s study highlights outsiders’ perceptions of stigmatised housing estates, identifying “crime and personal safety” as the primary stereotypes surrounding these estates (2003: 179). In line with Gourlay’s observations on regeneration projects in housing estates in Dundee (2007), Hastings and Dean note that “positive’ news [about the estates] was read negatively” (2003: 180), citing examples of the introduction of healthy eating schemes and placement of CCTV cameras in the areas studied, which implicitly label the estates as in need of both of these schemes because of high crime and “parenting deficiencies” (2003: 180). These interpretations of ‘positive’ news can be read negatively by both residents and non-residents with the latter ‘suspicious’ of positive stories about crime reduction and increased estate safety (2003: 180).
Worth noting because of its different focus and thus different findings, Holt and Wilkins’ study, through research on the impact of the case of Fred and Rosemary West on residents of Gloucester, consider the role of the stigmatisation of place in relation to “extraordinary crime” or event stigma (2014: 84). Their study contrasts with other crime-focused stigmatisation literature as it considers not the ‘rumour’ and stereotypes of a culture of crime, but the impact of an actual crime on the residents in the area. The findings of their study are useful for two reasons. First, they remind us that personal and community identities are closely intertwined (2014: 93), which proves useful when considering the effects of territorial stigma on individual residents of an area of ‘spoiled identity’. Second, it reinforces Gourlay’s claims that a negative label is particularly adherent (2007). Holt and Wilkins write 20 years after the West case and yet residents feel that the reputation of their town remains marred.

Like racialization of an area, criminalization produces a staining or tainting of a place’s identity that continues to be reproduced. Criminalization of a place, or the invoking of a sense of crime in relation to an area, thus contributes to the emergence or origination of territorial stigmatisation. The adherent label of criminality may be based on an actual crime in that area whose infamy taints the town or city for years to come, or it may be based on a fear or perception of crime and deviance. Stanley Cohen’s description of ‘deviance amplification’ (1972, cited in Gourlay, 2007; Cohen, 2002) considers the role of mass media in engaging in “distortion to the extent that this partial and negative information was an important reference point for understanding life in the estates” (Gourlay, 2007: 10). It is important to note that it is not solely the mass media that proffers such damning and distorted accounts of life in stigmatised areas; as Hastings adds, various external agents may play a part in labelling an area (2004) and Gourlay notes that negative representations, rumour, and stereotypes may originate from “residents, non-residents, service providers and mass media” (2007: 11).

2.5 Pushback against the Wacquantian approach
While most of the studies referenced in the previous sections thus far reference Wacquant, there are limits to his approach, several key gaps, and there is room for progress to be made within the field (Jensen and Christensen, 2012). His arguments are valid and offer much to the way that geographers and sociologists think about place and space, but by examining the gaps in his thesis, a stronger understanding of territorial stigma can be sought. To understand these gaps, it is necessary to begin by considering how territorial stigmatisation is defined. This section seeks to (1) summarise the critique of Wacquant’s advanced marginality
framework; (2) demonstrate that there is a lack of coherent definition of territorial stigmatisation; (3) show that territorial stigmatisation can be uncoupled from advanced marginality and, as such, is not a temporally fixed phenomenon; and (4) suggest that supposed differences between historical topographies of disrepute and contemporary territorial stigmatisation can be reformatted to show an historical legacy of the phenomenon of territorial stigmatisation.

2.5.1 Advanced marginality
For Wacquant, territorial stigmatisation is a feature of advanced marginality, which he describes as “the novel regime of sociospatial relegation and exclusionary closure…that has crystallised in the post-Fordist city as a result of the uneven development of the capitalist economies and the recoiling of welfare states” (Wacquant, 2008: 2-3). This description highlights a specific temporality connected to advanced marginality. It suggests that advanced marginality is a feature of the late 20th century and, as such, is distinct from previous forms of marginality in that it is “the result of the uneven, disarticulating development of the most advanced sectors of capitalist societies” (Wacquant, 2008: 25, emphasis in original). It also implies an “unravelling” of a “certain model of labor relations and working-class politics and culture” since the Fordist era (Caldeira, 2009: 849).

Wacquant’s framing of advanced marginality is not without critique (see Tissot, 2007; Small, 2007; Caldeira, 2009; Gilbert, 2010). As a distinctly temporal phenomenon, Wacquant’s advanced marginality theory should logically focus on the present and future, given that he states that the features of advanced marginality lie “ahead of us” (2008: 232, emphasis in original). However, the Parisian and Chicagoan case studies upon which his theorisation is based (Wacquant, 1993; Wacquant, 2007; Wacquant, 2008) date from between 1986 and 1991, and this fixity in the 1980s and 1990s fails to capture the events of the past two to three decades that have resulted in great changes to the spaces and groups he describes (Caldeira, 2009: 850): the move from a “black-white duality” (Small, 2007: 419), and the decline of ghetto discourse in France and, instead, the rise of the discourse of the European ‘Muslim enclave’ (Tissot, 2007: 366). Were Wacquant’s research to be updated, brought forward to the 21st century, his central argument—that there has been no transatlantic convergence of ghettoization (Chatterton, 2007; Tissot, 2007)—could be nuanced in line with the decline of racial difference and separation, and the rise of a fear of cultural, religious and ethnic incompatibility. Yet, by writing in the present tense about research from several decades earlier, Wacquant presents a sense of current reality that does not match the lived
Below I shall demonstrate that territorial stigmatisation need not be attached to a temporally fixed notion of advanced marginality but, for Caldeira, Wacquant’s use of time has an additionally troubling aspect. She argues that in his advanced marginality framework Wacquant presents a forward-focused view that is, paradoxically, weighed down heavily by a sense of nostalgia and loss (Caldeira, 2009: 850). Wacquant’s writing suggests a yearning for times past but fails to see that the past modes of reproduction have been replaced and are, in Caldeira’s example of the Brazilian urban peripheries, often imbued with dignity and strength (2009: 851-852). By ignoring the present and overly focusing on a nostalgic view of the past, Wacquant fails to acknowledge any positive change and the voice that many of the ‘marginal’ populations and spaces now have (Caldeira, 2009: 852). His formulation of marginal populations in stigmatised locations removes all sense of agency and self-determination (Gilbert, 2010: 149; Jensen and Christensen, 2012) that is reminiscent of the neighbourhood effects research that sees the individual’s outcome in life entirely determined by where he or she resides, without any role for agency and self-determination.

Wacquant’s theory of advanced marginality can be seen as a temporal framing of a set of contemporary poverty conditions and properties, but criticism points to Wacquant’s own work on advanced marginality being based on outdated information and imbued with nostalgia and notions of a lack of individual agency. His advanced marginality is not as temporally ‘advanced’ as he claims and is, in fact, stuck in a period of time in the 1980s and 1990s, and actually reflects an historical vision of marginality rather than the contemporary view of poverty.

### 2.5.2 Territorial stigmatisation: lack of definition

The phenomenon of territorial stigmatisation is one of six features of advanced marginality (Wacquant et al., 2014: 1272n). With an understanding of advanced marginality, it is clear that territorial stigmatisation is thus being framed as temporally fixed. Despite a burgeoning literature on territorial stigmatisation, there is a distinct lack of a coherent definition that permits easy recognition of a location that is stigmatised.

The most consistent definition provided by Wacquant of the phenomenon is “the powerful stigma attached to residence in the bounded and segregated spaces, the ‘neighborhoods of exile’ to which the populations marginalised or condemned to redundancy by the post-Fordist
reorganization of the economy and the post-Keynesian reconstruction of the welfare state are increasingly consigned” (2008: 169, emphasis in original). This is based on a similar definition from 1993 (Wacquant, 1993: 369) but neither specifically explains how territorial stigma presents itself and how the phenomenon can be recognised.

Digging deeper it is possible to see that Wacquant associates territorial stigma with places “widely labelled as ‘no-go areas’, fearsome redoubts rife with crime, lawlessness and moral degeneracy where only the rejects of society could bear to dwell” (2008: 29) and “urban hellholes in which violence, vice and dereliction are the order of things” (2008: 238). These definitions suggest that territorial stigma is defined by not only the type of person (“the rejects of society”) who live there but also by crime, perceived immorality, and physical and social dereliction, all of which rely on an outsider’s perception of a location, thus implying that territorial stigmatisation is externally constructed, closely connected to the aesthetics and demographics of the location. While it is possible to use Wacquant’s writing to fit together a piecemeal definition of the concept, it is clear that there is a need to establish a more solid definition to guide future research and to understand how territorial stigma is discursively constructed in order to recognise the language that we use to talk about stigmatised places.

2.5.3 Territorial stigma’s link with advanced marginality

“Even the societies that have best resisted the rise of advanced marginality, like the Scandinavian countries, are affected by this phenomenon of territorial stigmatisation linked to the emergence of zones reserved for the urban outcasts” (Wacquant, 2008: 238).

The above quotation shows that it is possible to disentangle territorial stigmatisation from advanced marginality, for even countries less affected by Wacquant’s advanced marginality thesis and model experience territorial stigmatisation. That is, territorial stigmatisation can exist independently of advanced marginality. By being uncoupled from advanced marginality, territorial stigma is also divorced from its temporal hold, suggesting that it is possible to view the process of territorial stigmatisation as part of a story that extends further back in history than the close of the 20th century, which this thesis investigates.

To be sure, Wacquant coined the term ‘territorial stigmatisation’ but the concept has been in
action far longer. This is evidenced by earlier references to, for example, “a certain social stigma” attached to the popular use of the term ‘slum’ in the early 20th century, which served to give “some people a chance to feel righteous” (Davie, 1932: 100). Firey, too, writing in the mid-20th century about Boston, notes the ascription of sentiments to space and the symbolic use of space to represent “certain cultural values” (1945: 140). Victorian era newspaper representation of slums “sought to extend the principal of municipal slum clearance” (Mayne, 1993: 9), thus drawing attention to early production of territorial stigmatisation for a particular purpose. In the post-war years, Owen Gill’s study of the creation of a pseudonymed delinquent area in Liverpool considers important questions relating to the ‘hierarchy of desirability’ of residential areas, and he makes a crucial point that the creation of a delinquent area occurs “in the minds of those people whose residential location is far removed from such places” (1977: 1), such as journalists, politicians, and the rest of the population.

Given that much of Wacquant’s research has been based on US examples, a brief search of the New York Times archive reveals that stigmatised descriptions of place were apparent in the early 20th century, too, implying that territorial stigmatisation predates the era of advanced marginality. Figures 2.1 and 2.2 show a newspaper article from 1934. It acknowledges the “stigmata” of the slum and, in it, the slum—acknowledged to be “the product of larger social and economic forces” (Thasher, 1934)—is said to be the cause of crime and delinquency in society. Frederic M. Thrasher, author of the article writes that “slum conditions actually breed and create criminals” (1934). In the article, we see that slum dwellers are depicted as morally and ethically inferior to those living in “a relatively desirable residential section” (Thrasher, 1934). Written in language that embraces a pathological vision of stigma, those residing in a slum are described as having “lowered cultural levels” and “an almost complete lack of concern with the necessity for social conformity” (Thrasher, 1934). Here it is apparent that the discursively-created ‘rejects’ of society dwell in an ‘urban hell-hole’ (to borrow Wacquant’s terms) and we see the roots of territorial stigma: the taint of place is seen to transfer onto the character of residents.

In ‘Brooklyn slum aided’ (Fig. 2.3 and 2.4) we are told of a slum district where “many of Brooklyn’s poorest people huddle together” (Gruber, 1934). In this district are sub-areas described as the self-contained and bordered ‘Negro hinterland’ (Gruber, 1934), and an Italian district so poor that “peas are sold in cans with the label ‘Below U.S. standard—low
quality but not illegal.’” (Gruber, 1934). The article finishes with a reflection on the low-
paid work carried out by the various communities living in the shadow of New York’s

Figure 2.1: A New York Times article (1934) which pathologises slum residents as criminals.
Figure 2.2: Four cuttings taken from the article shown in Fig. 2.1.
BROOKLYN
SLUM AIDED

Razing Fulton Street “L”
Will Bring Light to a Needy Colony
By RUTH GRUBER.

INTO an old slum area of Brooklyn the sunlight is at last to filter. For the Fulton Street elevated structure approaching the Brooklyn Bridge is to be torn down and streets that have been growing steadily darker are once more to be bright.

Today, in the shadow of the Elevated, many of Brooklyn’s poorest people huddle together. Embedded in a great banking and shopping world, they are apparently unnoticed. Yet they are a strange conglomeration of peoples and cultures. Alien to an industrialized scheme, they stand out a stranger anomaly now than ever before. Color, charm, exotic quaintness—these things one goes abroad to discover—are here, obscured by their very nearness.

Here live Negroes, Spaniards, Puerto Ricans, Italians and gypsies. Fleeing poverty at home, they have followed the mirage of economic independence, and in Brooklyn are making their last stand. But here is none of the drabness of poverty, none of the apathy of many of America’s unemployed, Indians, standing at their pushcarts, whistle arias from “Aida,” though they have been up since dawn to get a good place at the curb. Negroes laugh richly. Gypsies dance around the grimy pillars of the “L.”

The Negro Hinterland.

The little territory reflects in miniature the great social problems of the world—nationalism, economic rivalry, petty jealousies. The streets are marked by stern frontier boundaries. Walking down Hudson Avenue, one is acutely conscious of a Negro heritage. The Negroes have created no indigenous architecture in the North, but the houses they rent—dark, unpainted dwellings in sad disrepair—become as native to them as the kiosk to a Turk or the tepee to an Indian.

Rents in the Negro hinterland must be paid by the week. Evictions for two weeks’ non-payment are so common that lodgings are in a constant flux of changing residents. In a typical railroad flat facing the condemned “L,” six Negro families are now living together. Recently one of them broke the baby’s bank to pay the landlord a dollar on account.

Figure 2.3: A New York Times article from 1934 highlighting the socio-spatial relegation of the slum districts and their populations.
skyscrapers, “alien to an industrialised scheme” (Gruber, 1934). We see here a socio-economic reflection that Wacquant argues is a feature unique to advanced marginality. Yet, in this article more than half a century earlier than Wacquant’s model, we clearly note that the ‘rejects of society’ have been ‘relegated’ to an area that is dismal, impoverished and removed from the industrial society into which the low-paid workers attempt to filter. Caldeira notes Wacquant’s tendency to differentiate advanced marginality from previous forms of poverty by noting that he states that the new poor are grouped together in ‘no-go areas’ (2009: 849). However, this article shows, particularly in the case of the ‘Negro hinterland’, which “even the gypsies and the ‘poor whites’” avoid (Gruber, 1934), that no-go areas of poverty and race were already forming early in the 20th century. Returning to Wacquant’s definition of advanced marginality—“the novel regime of sociospatial relegation and exclusionary closure” (Wacquant, 2008: 2-3)—we see that sociospatial relegation and exclusionary enclosure were occurring decades before Wacquant’s model.

These early 20th century examples of urban othering and manipulation of spatial symbolism
for purposes of ‘social distinction’ (Davie, 1932: 100) assure us that territorial stigmatisation has been in existence for far longer than the last several decades and is not limited to the period of advanced marginality. Indeed, Wacquant, Slater and Pereira (2014) attempt to illustrate that territorial stigmatisation is a “new and distinctive phenomenon” (2014: 1273), and they compare it to “spatial smear of earlier epochs” (1273). Slater, too, argues that territorial stigma differs from previous forms of spatial taint because (1) it is practiced by citizens at large and (2) it is partially autonomised from other forms of stigma but is linked closely to the racialization of the populations living within the stigmatised districts (2017).

The above examples show that stigmatising images and discourses were being filtered throughout the citizenry at large through the print media and, from what we know about the role of media effects on stereotypes (see section 3.4), these images would influence the general population’s views of the areas discussed in the press. Secondly, we see that the descriptions of the slums given particularly in Figure 2.3 are partially autonomised but closely linked to the racialization of the slum and its inhabitants. Previous forms of spatial smear and territorial stigma sit, perhaps, closer on the spectrum than previously thought.

By relegating the concept of territorial stigmatisation to the era of advanced marginality, much of the history and emergence of territorial stigmatisation as both a theoretical concept and a reality is ignored. Instead of drawing the division between “spatial smear of earlier epochs” and territorial stigmatisation, this thesis joins with more recent literature (Cohen, 2013; Tyler and Slater, 2018; Loyd and Bonds, 2018) to argue that there is a longer history of territorial stigma that can be seen on a temporal continuum rather than divorced from its past. Ignoring the ‘earlier epochs’, as most studies of territorial stigmatisation have, has resulted in little being known about the origination of the concept (Slater, 2017) and the history of the field is sorely lacking. While activation of place-based stigma may differ by era, the “powerful stigma” (Wacquant, 2008: 169) remains constant and this study investigates the historical emergence of territorial stigmatisation, which will allow a deeper understanding of how present usage has occurred.

2.6 Reviewing the gaps in literature

The review so far has highlighted several key gaps in literature that need to be explored further. These are the need to consider the production of stigma through media, to embrace an historical or temporal focus that can capture the longer arc of history, and to conduct a thorough linguistic analysis of texts to understand the language used to create a stigmatised place. In this section I shall address each of those gaps and explain their importance.
2.6.1 Media and stigma

We have seen that territorial stigma can be invoked for political and economic ends. We also know that territorial stigma has its roots in Bourdieu’s symbolic power that places a high premium of the power of discourse (1992: 170). Despite studies referring to media stigma (see for example Krase, 1977; Wacquant, 2007; Boland, 2008; Devereux et al., 2011a; Devereux et al., 2011b; Jensen and Christensen, 2012; Morris, 2013; Arthurson et al., 2014), we know very little about how territorial stigma in the media is actually developed.

Yet, this thesis maintains that the role of media—and language more broadly—in understanding, perceiving, and producing images of the world around us is central to understanding territorial stigmatisation. What we read affects the way that we think about the world. Particularly, there is evidence that stereotypes that appear in the media affect the stereotypes that we hold away from the media in our everyday interactions (Goodall, 2012; Schemer, 2012; Hart, 2014).

We know that negative or biased attitudes in the media correlate to biased or negative attitudes in real life (Schemer, 2012: 739). This is because of something called ‘priming’ which, from a social psychology perspective, means that a racist attitude or a stereotype in the press triggers the mental network of stereotypes on which people rely to make sense of the world around them (Schemer, 2012: 741). Words or phrases such as ‘inner city’ or ‘ghetto’ are enough to trigger ideas and stereotypes of race or poverty, and research suggests that these activated stereotypes then influence people’s understanding and attitudes away from the press in their everyday interactions (Schemer, 2012). Media, then, both produce and reproduce stigma. Media activate already existing stereotypes and mental images but are also influential in creating and adding to new ones. Stereotypes or stigmatised representations of place in the media will function as do other stereotypes and may result in the uptake of prejudiced beliefs away from the press in quotidian life. Sean Damer, in his study of a Glasgow housing estate, notes that “the iconography of problem people congregated in problem places is so strong in British society…that the most subliminal of media cues can trigger off a chain reaction in our minds” (1989), touching the core of the issue: media produce and reproduce stereotypes and stigma about places and, as such, affect the way that people think.

While the role of the media may get a passing mention in the literature, few studies have directly studied the role of media on the stigmatisation process, however, and this is
problematic as we do not know how a powerful constructor of knowledge is working to spatially smear places. Notable exceptions are the works of Eoin Devereux, Amanda Haynes and Martin Power (2011a; 2011b). In their work, they consider the role of local and national Irish media in constructing and reproducing a stigmatised identity of Moyross, a housing estate near Limerick, Ireland. Their approach is “tripartite” (2011a: 126), considering media production, media content and audience reception (2011a: 123), and they formulate a distinction between normalising versus pathologising discourses: the former being “critical…of an estate’s stigmatised image” and which can “explain the estates’ stigmatisation and problems in terms of structural causes” (2011a: 125); whereas the latter considers “behavioural explanations for the estates’ stigmatised images and problems” (2011a: 125). It can be seen, then, that normalising discourse is outward looking, seeing the problems — if they exist — as externally constructed and applied to an area, whereas a pathologising discourse has an inward gaze, blaming those within the area for its problems. Overwhelmingly, media use a pathologising gaze when stigmatising place (Devereux et al., 2011b), meaning that reporters largely turn away from considering structural causes and, instead, blame those within the area for its perceived problems.

It is rare for media to highlight positive stories of a stigmatised place (Tsfati and Cohen, 2003; Devereux et al., 2011a; Devereux et al., 2011b) and, instead, reporters, often due to the profit motives of the media industry, report negative stories that hint at controversy and strife (Devereux et al., 2011a: 129; Devereux et al., 2011b: 509). Crime and deviance are considered good markers of newsworthiness (Devereux et al., 2011b: 504) in the era of the highly commercialised press.

As well as being newsworthy, crime and deviance are particularly stigmatising markers, too, and Nauta et al. (2001, in Devereux et al., 2011a) argue that a stigmatised identity arises from “the balance of stories about crime and safety, policy, housing and the environment, urban renewal and 'social items' regarding such issues as employment and education” (Devereux et al., 2011a: 128). This categorization highlights the interplay in the media between physical, social and crime/deviance-based stigmatisation, which ties with the argument that territorial stigma attaches to existing stigmatising features and that while media may exacerbate it, the stigma, tension, or precipitating attributes already exist (Warr, 2006: 2; Wacquant, 2007: 67). Conversely, Tsfati and Cohen add that “not only do images matter, but also…they do not have to be accurate or grounded in reality to affect people” (2003: 724), implying that the
stigma does not necessarily have to be grounded in any existing conditions or events. These portrayals of place fall under Stanley Cohen’s stigmatisation of media-created moral panics, the public anxiety that swells at the prospect of society’s status quo being challenged by some form of deviance (Cohen, 2002). The stigmatisation of place in the media results in moral panics and fear of deviant places that challenge society and geography. We need to better understand how these moral panics are created by the media and how media contribute to the territorial stigmatisation of place.

2.6.2 Historical gaps
In addition to not knowing how media, one major constructor and conduit of social knowledge, is involved in the production of territorial stigma, we are also lacking knowledge about the historical construction of stigma. The Wacquantian approach is firmly situated in the post-Fordist era and, as has been discussed, territorial stigmatisation is defined in relation to this temporal hold. However, I have shown that stigma surrounding place has been in existence prior to the post-Fordist era and, as such, there is a need to intervene in the debate and to consider the historical emergence of stigma.

Indeed, despite assertions that territorial stigma is a post-Fordist phenomenon, previous research on territorial stigmatisation has acknowledged that negative reputations have existed for centuries (Gourlay, 2007; Boland, 2008; Slater and Anderson, 2011; Slater, 2017). Yet studies have tended to follow Wacquant’s assertion that territorial stigmatisation remains a feature of advanced marginality and, as such, has a temporal origin in the mid- to late- 20th century. There is a need to move beyond this rigid temporal hold (see section 2.5) and to consider the historical emergence of the phenomenon and to examine how territorial stigmatisation developed historically in relation to a place over time. Indeed, some eight years after writing Urban Outcasts and asserting that territorial stigmatisation is inextricably linked to advanced marginality of the post-1980s era, Wacquant, writing in 2016, suggests that there is room for further consideration of advanced marginality “via sociohistorical transposition” (2016: 1085). This suggests that even Wacquant himself sees the need to reconsider the role of the historical emergence of territorial stigma.

Hastings (2004: 236) engages briefly with the historical connection that sees the transformation of spoiled identity from the slum to present-day housing estates, considering similarities in physical and symbolic separation, and external judgements and assumptions about the “behavioural distance from mainstream norms”. This observation captures the
reality of territorial stigmatisation where judgements about moral and behavioural failings are linked to those residing in particular locations. Yet, surprisingly, there is very little literature that considers the history or transformation of territorial stigmatisation discourse and development. Though research in this area is scant, there are two studies worthy of note.

Nir Cohen’s study of Bat Yam, an edge city of Tel Aviv in Israel seeks to show the “interconnectedness between types-of-places and types-of-people explanations” (2013: 124) of the stigmatisation of place. Cohen carefully details the linked triad of physical characteristics, deviance (or perceived deviance), and ethnic composition of Bat Yam as being the contributory factors that have led to the city’s negative image (2013: 116). He agrees with Wacquant’s assertion that it is the perception of deviance, of poorly planned physical surroundings and ethnic composition that leads to territorial stigma; the veracity of the reputation is largely irrelevant as the negative perception of a place can trigger the stigmatising discourse that Bat Yam has suffered (2013: 124). Of note in Cohen’s writing is the interrelatedness of edge or peripheral cities with their core. In the case of Bat Yam and Tel Aviv, the ‘othering’ of Bat Yam only served to strengthen, in “binary opposition”, Tel Aviv (2013: 120-1). Thus, each comes to be defined in contrast to the other and, largely, at Bat Yam’s expense. Indeed, the city stands as a representation of the intersection of poor planning, crime and lower-class ‘others’, which, Cohen argues, is a standard feature of territorial stigma: places become “proxies of…stigmatised social identities” (2013: 121) with the boundary between identity and place becoming blurred (2013: 120).

Ultimately, Cohen provides an excellent historical vision of an edge city that is stigmatised through both place- and people-based factors. His research impressively captures the linked and stratified relationships between cities, and his highlighting of difference between Tel Aviv and Bat Yam is an illuminating observation that adds much to the study of stigmatised peripheries and their core. Though his research is specific to Israel and the relationship between Tel Aviv and its peripheral towns and cities, Cohen’s article can be drawn upon as a guide for considering the origination of territorial stigma elsewhere. Considering the relationship between maligned and non-maligned spaces, racialised or ethnic space, and his analysis of the peripheral location of stigmatised areas may all prove useful when examining the historical movement from city ‘slums’ to peripheralised housing estates in Britain and elsewhere, and the perceived racialization of space.
Although he does not use the term ‘territorial stigma’ as Cohen does, Dominic Severs’ article offers a useful British-based comparison of the 19th century St. Giles rookery and the 20th century Broadwater Farm modernist social housing estate. Both housing types are characterised by their “non-street” format (2010: 449) and Severs posits that both represent the outsider’s fear of “hostile, alien territory” (2010: 482), or locations that have come to represent, in the minds of the outsider, the danger of strong community (2010: 488) based in areas of “intimidating architecture” for outsiders (2010: 486). He notes—of particular interest to a study of territorial stigmatisation—that both the rookery and the modernist housing estate function as “bywords for certain symptoms of society's self-diagnosed problems” (2010: 451). This point demonstrates the tenacity of territorial stigma, which adheres so firmly to a place as to gain widespread social infamy, and Severs acknowledges parallels between contemporary and historical forms of spatial stigma.

Recent literature has started to acknowledge the role of history in the emergence of stigma (Tyler and Slater, 2018; Loyd and Bonds, 2018). In the 2018 monograph on the Sociology of Stigma, Imogen Tyler and Tom Slater argue for research to take into consideration the historical story that accompanies stigma. They argue “that this requires sociologists to move beyond Goffman’s decidedly ahistorical and apolitical formulation of stigma” (2018: 728), adding that “stigma is not a self-evident phenomenon but like all concepts has a history” (2018: 728). This sudden interest in the history of stigma tells us that it has largely been ignored thus far and represents a significant gap in literature in which this thesis intervenes.

In their study of the suitability of the term ‘territorial stigma’ to explain the processes of racialised capitalism in Milwaukee, Wisconsin, Jenna Loyd and Anne Bonds acknowledge that Wacquant has traditionally situated territorial stigma as a feature of advanced marginality and they ask “is territorial stigmatization distinctive to the contemporary ‘post-industrial’ moment?” (Loyd and Bonds, 2018: 902). They conclude that the term presents a dilemma as it suggests both “distinctiveness and continuity”, with territorial stigma representing a distinctive moment in the post-industrial city and, simultaneously “distinctiveness and continuity” (2018: 911). They suggest that the term ‘neutralizes’ the histories and realities inherent in the often-racialised nature of stigma. This thesis takes this point and suggests a concept of ‘primitive stigma’ to explain the longer history of the topic.
Finally, João Queirós and Virgílio Borges Pereira (2018) offer an archival study of Porto, Portugal as a means of understanding territorial stigma in the 1970s. While their study is based in the post-Fordist era and does not capture existing stigma, their work serves to highlight the growing concern for historical study and for looking for the traces of territorial stigma in the past rather than simply charting and describing its effects in the contemporary moment.

With so little research comprising the historical origination and transformation of territorial stigmatisation and its discourse, this is an area that requires additional research. No study to date has attempted to address both literature gaps simultaneously—the study of media, a main production source of stigma, and the historical dimension of territorial stigma—and it is here that this project intervenes by combining the two into a historical study of the British press during the 20th century.

2.6.3 Methodological gaps
As detailed in the Introduction (1.2), generally, territorial stigmatisation literature can be divided into two different methodological strands depending on the focus on the study. There are, first, studies that seek to access how powerful actors use and enact stigma (see for example, Gray and Mooney, 2011; Kallin and Slater, 2014; Kornberg, 2016; Schultz Larsen, 2013; Wacquant, 1993; Wacquant, 1996; Wacquant, 2007; Wacquant, 2008). These tend to use either field analytic approaches as proposed by Schultz Larsen (2013) or a combination of ethnography and analysis as detailed by Wacquant (1996; 2007; 2008). These approaches allow an in-depth study of stigma enacted from above, taking into account the ways in which stigma is applied and the reasons for its application. Second are those studies that examine stigma management strategies and the lived experience of territorial stigma (see for example Gourlay, 2007; Keene and Padilla, 2010; Slater and Anderson, 2011; Morris, 2013; Rhodes, 2012; Holt and Wilkins, 2014; Thomas, 2016). They tend to use ethnographic approaches that can access the minoritarian voices that are generally unheard in studies of the powerful actors.

Macro-level studies consider how stigma is enacted from above, whereas micro-level studies examine the lived realities of stigma. Current research using these methodologies has adequately answered many questions; however, to access unanswered gaps, a new approach is needed and an in-depth consideration of the requisite analytical and theoretical framework is the subject of the following chapter.
Methodologically, there is a distinct gap in the literature that this study seeks to address. We know that territorial stigma is a discursive process because Wacquant tells us that stigmatised areas are “widely labelled as ‘no-go areas’” (2008: 29), thus highlighting the role of language in the emergence of stigma. If we want to trace the emergence of stigma, then it makes sense to complete a thorough linguistic analysis of the terminology, descriptors, and patterns used to stigmatise a place. The way to access this is through a combined qualitative and quantitative content analysis that borrows from the tradition of Critical Discourse Analysis as made famous by Norman Fairclough and Teun van Dijk. Only the studies by Devereux et al. (2011a, 2011b) and Butler et al. (2018) have overtly embraced this approach and their findings from content and discourse analyses of current print and social media tell us that this is a methodology that can be used more frequently to understand how language is used to stigmatise place.

In their study of the discourse of denigration on Twitter, which uses a discourse analytic approach, Butler et al. (2018) trace the term ‘shithole’ to ascertain what kind of places get labelled as such and what kinds of discursive responses are elicited in this discourse of denigration. They show that the discourses invoked vary according to scale and whether the Tweeter is an insider or an outsider, highlighting the nuances in the language of stigmatisation that warrant further study. The study highlights the ability of discourse analysis of large datasets to be applied to territorial stigma research in order to better understand the language and discourse of stigma.

Devereux et al., in their study of Moyross, a housing estate in Limerick, Ireland, employ a thorough content analysis that reveals that places are stigmatised through media by associating them with negative, criminal events, and through the use of descriptors. They also highlight that the media discourse of stigmatising places is situated in a larger political economy of the media that is defined by increased marketization and commodification, noting that it is important to consider the various scales of discourse at play.

These studies demonstrate that to trace the development of territorial stigmatisation it is particularly beneficial to employ content and discourse analyses as they can reveal linguistic changes and variances that indicate how the discourse of stigmatisation is originated and produced. They also show how large datasets of texts can be analysed and interpreted using content and discourse analytic methods. Most studies, however, have approached the study...
of territorial stigmatisation asking different questions and using alternative methods. Most have not asked how stigma is produced but have, instead, fallen into one of the other three of Slater’s thematic categories: political activation, economic investment or disinvestment, or managing strategies.

This PhD study attempts to fill the gap through a critical analysis of media representations of Toxteth in Liverpool in order to consider how territorial stigmatisation has evolved and developed in a British context. The study also addresses an unresolved debate that sees discussion of territorial stigmatisation fixed in a temporal hold. It is necessary to change the direction of this debate, focusing on addressing the dearth of emergence-based literature but doing this by re-orienting the debate so that it moves away from temporal fixity. Despite a growing literature on media’s role in the stigmatisation of an area, there is little research that combines an historical angle that considers media’s role in the longue durée and it is here that this project intervenes.
Chapter 3: Stigma, power, discourse and the media

3.1 Introduction: gaps in literature
Chapter 2 introduced the literature on territorial stigma and some of the pushback against the Wacquantian framing of the concept. It also noted some of the gaps in which this study intervenes. These gaps can be broken down into two strands: a gap in the historical development of stigma, and a gap in the linguistic development of stigma. By not understanding the media’s role in the territorial stigmatisation process, we run the risk of not understanding generally how outsiders enact stigma and, particularly, how the media—a great shaper of opinion and viewpoint—contribute to the process. Failing to examine the longue durée of territorial stigma means that we tend to pick up the discussion in the post-Fordist era and may be missing the prelude to stigmatisation, which I examine in chapter 5 and which I term ‘primitive stigmatisation’, that can tell us how various processes coalesce and result in adherent territorial stigma. Finally, by not addressing thoroughly the role of language and discourse in the formation of stigma, we fail to see how the words that we use can enact stigma.

To approach these gaps, a new approach is needed that critically examines discourse while taking into account layers of time and context. To achieve this, this thesis relies on a Foucauldian archaeological approach to the longue durée of history, paired with a combined qualitative-quantitative content analysis that draws heavily on the CDA tradition in line with Teun van Dijk and Norman Fairclough, particularly. Implicit in these approaches are conceptions of power and dominance by particular elite voices in society. Following Foucault (1984) and van Dijk (1995), I see the media as enmeshed in biopolitical and regulatory power relations. This chapter engages with the foundational concepts of territorial stigma alluded to in the previous chapter, while laying the theoretical underpinnings for the approach used in this study.

First, I turn to the theoretical foundations of territorial stigmatisation, describing its roots in the work of Erving Goffman and Pierre Bourdieu. Wacquant has been able to expand Goffman’s notions of ‘blemishes’ to consider the ‘blemish of place’ in part by combining the work of Goffman with Bourdieu’s symbolic power, which has an “authority capable of making its representations stick and come true to forge the concept of territorial stigmatisation” (Wacquant et al., 2014: 1272). I then examine the roles of discourse and power, drawing on the tradition of CDA to understand how discourse connotes power in
society. Next, I turn to the role of power in the media, discussing ideology and media hegemony, and drawing on the work of Teun van Dijk to explain how the media propagates a worldview or ideology that represents and normalises the aims of elite groups in society and, in so doing, silences the voices of those being dominated by the hegemonic ideology of the media. I then consider the connection between media and place and offer a review of work that has attempted to connect these two concepts, while reflecting on notions of power and discourse. Finally, I turn to the theoretical underpinnings of content analysis and CDA that will be further expanded in the following methods chapter.

3.2 Theoretical underpinnings of territorial stigma
Studies considering the practice of stigmatisation often begin with a reference to the ancient Greek tendency to “slice and burn criminals and traitors to denote their immorality or lack of fitness for regular society” (Neuberg et al., 2000: 31). This historical practice of physical branding sits in contrast to the current practice that sees stigma as a “social construction whereby a distinguishing mark of social disgrace is attached to others in order to identify and devalue them” (Arboleda-Flórez, 2002: 15). Yet, implicit in the connection between the physical and visible Greek stigma and the practice and process of stigmatisation is the suggestion that both seek to mark as outcasts a section of society for being different or for bearing what is deemed to be a socially undesirable or negative characteristic or tendency.

Canadian-American sociologist Erving Goffman’s 1963 work on stigma began a trend of stigma-based research that has spanned academic disciplines and continues to demonstrate the negative effects for those stigmatised (Link and Phelan, 2001: 363). Key to Goffman’s work is the relationship between “attribute” and “stigma” (1963: 13), with stigma constituting the gap that exists between “virtual social identity” – the identity expected based on “first appearances” (1963: 12) – and “actual social identity” – the identity that transpires from learning of the individual’s “attributes” (1963: 12). For Goffman, it is these “attributes” that are crucial, for “stigma…will be used to refer to an attribute that is deeply discrediting” (1963: 13). Such attributes have a “discrediting effect” (1963: 12) that transition the individual from a positive to a negative identity. Seen in Goffman’s definition and conception of stigma is a Hegelian dialectical relationship between initial perceptions of an individual, contradicted by an attribute that negates the earlier perception and, finally, synthesised into a stigma that is pressed onto the identity of the individual by society. For Goffman, stigma can occur at three levels “based on ‘abominations of the body’, ‘blemishes of individual character’, and ‘tribal’ affiliation ‘transmitted through lineages’, (Wacquant et
al., 2014: 1272), suggesting that stigma can be because of one’s heritage, religion or race (tribal affiliation), physical appearance or disability (abominations of the body), and personal ways of being such as addiction, mental disorder, homosexuality, or unemployment (blemishes of individual character).

Four decades later, Bruce Link and Jo Phelan (2001) offer a reconceptualization of stigma. Since Goffman’s 1963 work, they argue, much has been added to the research area but, despite the increase in attention to the topic, much confusion remains. Their article takes Goffman’s vision of stigma and transforms it, adding to it, amending it, and creating a workable definition that can be applied to the process of stigma in most areas that is applied “when elements of labelling, stereotyping, separation, status loss, and discrimination co-occur in a power situation that allows the components of stigma to unfold” (2001: 367). Their definition successfully amalgamates and builds on work by Goffman, also capturing the process of stigma that highlights the interplay between perception, application of labels, and resultant discrimination. Their definition becomes particularly useful when the elements of ‘discrimination’ and ‘power’ are considered. Link and Phelan argue that “when people are labelled, set apart and linked to undesirable characteristics, a rationale is constructed for devaluing, rejecting, and excluding them” (2001: 371). Here, Link and Phelan give a cause, a rationalization for the process of stigmatisation; instead of stigma being solely, as Goffman’s definition implies, a means of understanding and categorising a stigmatised person as “not quite human” (1963: 15), stigma may be operationalised by entities in positions of power for stratifying purposes (2001: 375). In this way, Link and Phelan transform Goffman’s ‘from-below’ view of stigma (Wacquant et al., 2014: 1273-4) into a from-above conception that acknowledges that stigma can be enacted or operationalised by powerful or elite voices in society.

For sociologist Loïc Wacquant, Goffman’s triad of stigma defined by “abominations of the body”, “blemishes of individual character”, and “tribal stigma of race, nation and religion” (1963: 14-15), was missing one crucial element: stigma associated with place. He married this consideration of stigma with French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu’s notion of symbolic power or symbolic violence, which refer to the ways in which agents of power are able to exert their views of the world. This view ties with Link and Phelan’s view of the way that stigma is applied from above by policy elites, politicians and other powerful actors. Bourdieu explains that symbolic power is:
A power constituting the given through utterances, of making people see and believe, of confirming or transforming the vision of the world and, thereby, action on the world and thus the world itself, an almost magical power which enables one to obtain the equivalent of what is obtained through force (whether physical or economic) (1991: 170)

Bourdieu is discussing the subtle forms of power that structure and control society. For him, this power is a tool that separates and stratifies society, making people see the world in a particular way. “In essence it represents the way in which people play a role in reproducing their own subordination through the gradual internalisation and acceptance of those ideas and structures that tend to subordinate them” (Connolly and Healy, 2004: 15). It is a self-fulfilling notion of power that sees “individuals, through their experience of the social world and of the various institutions and structures that compose it, come progressively to develop taken-for-granted ways of thinking and behaving that reflect this lived experience” (Connolly and Healy, 2004: 17). This ‘taken-for-granted’ thinking shows us two things. Firstly, we see that, for Bourdieu, individuals are deeply enmeshed within the social structures of society in order for power systems to become internalised without their direct knowledge; they are complicit in the symbolic violence or power being pressed upon them (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992: 167). Secondly, returning to Bourdieu’s definition, we see that “utterances” create “the given” (1991: 170), which tells us that it is the power of discourse that is internalised by individuals; that is, individuals put faith in and take-for-granted certain orders of discourse which actually serve to oppress them. We see then, that Bourdieusian power is a force that is applied top-down but that it is applied in subtle and often barely perceptible ways that people subject to the power then internalise. By using language to understand and stratify society, Bourdieu’s understanding of power can help us to understand the way that territorial stigmatisation works through discourses of difference and otherness that see groups of people ‘relegated’ to ‘no-go’ areas and other ‘left behind’ geographies. Further, we know that power in a Bourdieusian sense is reinforced and internalised by individuals, so the discourse of stigmatisation is perpetuated often by the very people whose place of residence is being stigmatised. Bourdieu’s work highlights the primacy of discourse in power constructions and underscores the need to study discourse closely to understand how power and stigma are enacted through language.
3.3 Discourse and power
Like Bourdieu, French philosopher, Michel Foucault informs us that discourse carries power. He explains that “discourse transmits and produces power; it reinforces it, but also undermines and exposes it, renders it fragile and makes it possible to thwart it” (1984: 101) and, in so doing, he tells of the inextricable link between discourse and power. Discourse is a carrier for power and exposes where power lies and is a form of power.

The term ‘discourse’ is used in two keys ways. It can be used to refer to a specific body of vocabulary associated with that social practice, for example, political discourse or legal discourse, suggesting that there are certain words, phrases and semantics associated with those particular disciplines. The use that is more pertinent to this study is discourse as the “use of language seen as a form of social practice” (Fairclough, 1995: 7), which means that discourse is seen as “an element of social life which is dialectically related to other elements” (Fairclough, 2003: 214-5). Discourse is inseparable from the social world that it takes place in, represents, and constructs.

As such, discourse analysis is an “analysis of how texts work within sociocultural practice” (Fairclough, 1995: 7) with a text being the “product of the process of text production”—and discourse being the “whole process of social interaction of which a text is just a part” (Fairclough, 2001: 20). This means that discourse analysis is centred on understanding the links between words or images and the social context in which they are situated rather than examining the actual produced object (text analysis). Much of modern discourse analysis is grounded in Foucauldian principles with Fairclough explaining that “the analysis of discourse for Foucault…is more a matter of discerning the rules which ‘govern’ bodies of texts and utterances” (Fairclough, 2003: 123). Here we see that a discourse analytic approach moves beyond the content of the text (as would be explored in a purely quantitative content analysis of a text) and, instead, seeks to connect the intra-textual elements to the wider context (Carvalho, 2008: 163). This ‘wider context’ is particularly oriented towards notions of power and ideology.

To access power and to understand how it has changed over the 20th century, this thesis follows Michael Foucault’s archaeological approach to dig through layers of discourse to unearth the knowledge systems or epistemes that were inherent in various eras (Foucault, 1969). Foucault’s archaeological approach sees that different historical eras bear varying knowledge systems defined by—and accessible through—an examination of discourse. By
studying discourse, it is possible to access an understanding of different knowledge systems and power structures inherent through historical time. The archaeological approach taken in this thesis digs through the discourse of the 20th century press in order to highlight the changing patterns of power and knowledge that led to stigmatisation. By sifting through discourse and connecting it to the wider social, political and economic context, it is possible to understand the power of the media at various points throughout the 20th century.

For Foucault, “power is everywhere” and discourse is one means through which power is rendered tangible (1984: 92, 101). Fairclough, building on the Foucauldian sense of power and discourse, terms it as “power behind discourse” (2001: 46), which is a useful conceptualization as it allows us to understand that discourse is produced by power. It does not, however, adequately reflect the fact that power is reproduced by discourse.

Beginning with Foucault, we can see that there are two ideas of power: one is juridical and the other is the power over life (or normalising power). Juridical power can be seen as the power of “deduction” (Foucault, 1984: 136) and can be thought of as the right to death or of as a repressive power. It is the type of power that is exercised through force by a powerful individual and results in the seizure (the deduction) of life or the means to life (Foucault, 1984: 136). Examples of this can be seen in extreme examples such as the death penalty (the seizure of life) and in less extreme examples such as through driving disqualifications (the seizure of the right to drive). Juridical power has ceased to be the primary means through which power is exerted and, instead, there is recourse to a more “magical power” (Foucault, 1991: 170) that functions more subtly not through means of direct force, subtraction or seizure. Instead, for Foucault, the powers over life seek to control, hierarchise and micromanage the daily life of individuals (disciplinary power) and of society (bio-political power) through the creation of norms; disciplinary and bio-political power become normative power. These subtle, ‘magical powers’ function to maintain the status quo through careful administering of life and, combining this view with that of Bourdieu, we see that the individual is complicit in conforming to these power systems by internalising and acting upon the subtle but top-down power structures that manage every aspect of life. For Foucault, too, power is embedded in discourse as he states that “discourse transmits and produces power” (1984: 101) and, indeed, it is found everywhere (1984: 93).
Biopower or bio-political power is a form of power that we do not even recognise as power because it is so insidious and seems so ‘normal’. Foucault explains that it is a less violent form of power and that the power over life “has to quantify, measure, appraise and hierarchise, rather than display itself in its murderous splendour” (1984: 144), meaning that its mechanisms are creeping and subtle. It can be thought of as a type of micro-management of lives. Where disciplinary power, is aimed at the control of the individual human body (Foucault: 1984: 139), biopower is aimed at the control of the population and maintenance of the status quo (Foucault, 1984: 139). The aim of biopower is to optimise the population and to maintain the status quo: anything outside the status quo is to be relegated. If we recall that the other term for this ‘power over life’ is ‘normalising’ power, we can see that biopower and disciplinary power seek to make certain parts of society and certain populations ‘normal’ and others ‘abnormal’. Foucault explains this through an example of race, and he argues that, for the biological threat of a different race to disappear, another race must be smeared as a threat “to the population and for the population” (1992: 256) and made to disappear from the status quo. In this way, stigmatisation is a biopolitical power that is central to state action.

Foucault argues that anatomo- (disciplinary) and biopower are enacted through “the great institutions of the state” including “the family and the army, schools and the police, individual medicine and the administration of collective bodies” (1984: 141). We can include the mass media in this category as a means of “administering life” (Foucault, 1984: 138) through the dispersal of various discourses of power and through the voices that are heard within the media. This connects to Fairclough’s notion of ‘power behind discourse’: whose voices do we hear in the media? Fairclough argues that powerful groups control discourse through bearing more cultural capital (2001: 46); it is the dominant bloc in society that has the ability to speak and to be heard because they control the media through which voices are broadcast. As such, their views become naturalised or normalised and, when a discourse is viewed as natural or normal, it becomes uncontested (Croteau and Hoynes, 2003: 163; Fairclough, 2001: 75-6), allowing such power structures and ways of viewing the world to remain largely beyond question.

The way that power is disseminated and represents the views of one particular section of society connects to the idea of ideology. Fairclough explains the concept with an example of doctor-patient relationships with an implicit hierarchy where the doctor knows more than
the patient and is in a position to steer the treatment plan whereas the patient’s role is to be
guided (Fairclough, 2001: 2). He explains that this viewpoint is a common-sense assumption
and that such assumptions are ideologies.

Ideology can be thought of as a “system of meaning that helps define and explain the world
and that makes value judgments about that world” (Croteau and Hoynes, 2003: 159-160). It
is the joining point of discourse and power, and it matches closely with the concepts of ‘set
of beliefs’, ‘values’ or ‘worldview’ (Croteau and Hoynes, 2003: 160). Ideology and discourse
are linked because it is through language (the most often-used social context) that power is
enacted. Key to the understanding of ideology is that it seeks to keep a particular group’s
interests dominant and their power foregrounded. An example of this is the need for the
dominant bloc (politicians, the middle class) to keep the ideology of capitalism central in
order that they, as a group, remain dominant. This is enacted through controlling the
discourse of the press, for example.

‘Ideology’ has its roots in the French philosopher Destutt de Tracy’s conception of the term
idéologie to refer to a ‘science of ideas’ (van Dijk, 1998: 2). In early Marxist scholarship, the
term refers to the “powerful mechanism of social control whereby members of the ruling
class imposed their worldview, which represented their interests, on members of subordinate
classes” (Croteau and Hoynes, 2003: 164). Those who accepted this elite worldview (or
ideology), couched in class terms regarding the exploitation of the subordinate classes for
economic gain, despite it being contrary to their own interests, were said to bear ‘false
consciousness’ (Croteau and Hoynes, 2003: 164). While current research and scholarship on
sees ideology as less bound in economic and class terms and more in terms of culture
(Croteau and Hoynes, 2003: 165), the basic tenet remains the same: ideologies are ways of
portraying and viewing the world that “contribute to establishing and maintaining relations
of power” (Fairclough, 2003: 218). So, while ideology may operate in the realms of culture,
through dominating particular angles in the discourse of gender and race, for example, rather
solely through economic paths, it remains understood as a means of constructing the world
that promulgates the views of the powerful and that dominates subordinate groups. Ideology
functions to keep the ‘ruling class’ or the elite members of society in their dominant position
and it is through bodies and agents such as schools and media that the ideology of elite
supremacy is enacted.
One way that the dominant group’s position remains unchallenged is through hegemony, which is the means of maintaining power through consent—that is, the oppressed groups support the promulgation of power systems and ideologies that keep them subordinate. Another way to think of hegemony is as ideological dominance (van Dijk, 1998: 102). It is a concept that originates with Antonio Gramsci, which is a way of “conceptualising power and the struggle for power in capitalist societies, which emphasises how power depends on consent or acquiescence rather than just force” (Fairclough, 2003: 218). Essentially, it is related to the idea of power by consent, which sees a powerful group dominating an oppressed group not through physical force but by the oppressed group’s consent to that structuring (Burgess, 1985: 198). It is the acceptance and reproduction of a subordinate group to a dominant ideology that supports the position of the dominant group in society (Burgess, 1985: 198). ‘Perfect’ hegemony occurs when the oppressed group are not even aware that they are being manipulated by a dominant ideology and, as such, continue to promulgate that ideology themselves (van Dijk, 1998: 102).

Jacquelin Burgess, in her study on the media response and coverage of the disturbances of 1981, argues that “the mass media are profoundly implicated in the maintenance of hegemony” and stresses the bardic function of media noted by Fiske and Hartley (Burgess, 1985: 199). Fiske and Hartley note that, like bards or poets of centuries past who recited and represented dominant cultural concerns to their audiences, television in the contemporary era plays a similar role in defining reality (1978). Through media coverage, a consensus on culture is created where there is seen to be one culture with one dominant system of common-sense and one perspective on events (Hall, 1978 in Burgess, 1985: 198). John Hartley, reflecting on the bardic function of media, explains that media performs an ideological role “rendering the unfamiliar into the already known, or into ‘common sense’”, meaning that the media creates linkages in order that new situations and new conflicts can be understood. Hartley continues that “bardic television is a conservative or socio-central force…It uses binary oppositions to represent oppositional or marginal groups as deviant or ‘foreign’” (Hartley, 2011: 24, emphasis in original), thereby explaining how the media structures society, making oppositions, creating a common-sense view of the world beyond the limits of which is “nonsense” (Hartley, 2011: 24). This vision fits with Gramsci’s vision of hegemony through which “the media create a ‘common-sense’ view of the world that portrays capitalism as being natural and inevitable” (Devereux, 2014: 161). Equally, other ideologies (such as racism and sexism) can be put forth by dominant groups to make them
seem ‘common-sense’ and central to society.

Hegemony connects to Foucault’s power over life, which is a consensual rather than coercive power structure enacted, as it is, through insidious, creeping means rather than through “murderous splendour” (Foucault, 1984: 144). Hegemonic power allows ideologies to become ‘common-sense’ and unquestioned.

We see, then, that discourse, which surrounds us, is a producer and reproducer of power systems. Where power used to be simply coercive and based on the right to seize, contemporary power tends to be more insidious and is directed at the micro-management of everyday life and populations. The control of populations ensures that a status quo is maintained. The status quo is expressed commonly through language and discourse, and is shaped by powerful groups in society, including the media, who maintain their position through the promulgation of particular ideologies or worldviews that reinforce their assumptions and belief systems. The oppressed groups in society for whom these ideologies do not serve any real benefit, may in fact support these dominant ideologies—hegemony.

3.4 Power and media
Media coverage and discursive construction of any place do not reflect accurately the lived-reality of life there, and merely reflect fragments of a larger discourse put forth by elite and dominant groups. Stories are selected for their newsworthiness; ambiguous, complex, minor, positive, and quotidian events are not likely to make it into the newspaper (Galtung and Ruge, 1965). This is because news does not exist independent and separate to the newspaper; it is constructed by reporters who handpick stories for inclusion in the paper. Chibnall explains that “the reporter does not go out gathering news, picking up stories as if they were fallen applies, he [sic] creates news stories by selecting fragments of information from the mass of raw data…and organising them in a conventional journalistic form” Chibnall, 1981: 76 in Burgess, 1985: 195, emphasis in original). These ‘fragments’ that a reporter picks up are carefully selected events and occurrences that are deemed newsworthy. Negative, ‘extreme’, unexpected, or severe stories are generally considered newsworthy and are popular with newspapers who operate in a marketised sphere and who are competing for sales (Galtung and Ruge, 1965: 68; Devereux et al., 2011a: 129; Devereux et al., 2011b: 509). This means that, preferentially, papers will construct stories that reflect these traits. As such, when we ask who the negative and stigmatising coverage serves (Kornberg, 2016: 265), we see that it
serves the economic imperatives of the newspaper industry. Herman and Chomsky explain how power and the media are tightly entwined:

The same underlying power sources that own the media and fund them as advertisers, that serve as primary definers of the news, and that produce flak and proper-thinking experts, also, play a key role in fixing basic principles and the dominant ideologies (Herman and Chomsky, 1988: xi).

In this way, places such as Toxteth are used as pawns in the economic quest to sell copy and to maintain existing power structures in society.

The media, operating for financial incentives, and as an agent of biopolitical and regulatory power “work in concert with the state by communicating and ‘vitalising’ it” (Knudsen and Stage, 2015: 12). This means that the press reflect the hegemonic view of the capitalist state and, rather than represent the lived realities of a place like Toxteth, the press, instead, reflect the lived-realities of a capitalist economy where media success is built on sales rather than on veracious reporting. As such, negative, ‘extreme’, unexpected, or severe stories fall outside the status quo and are more likely to receive media attention for being anomalous.

Understanding what is included in the media is imperative as the media plays a strong role in understanding the world around us and what we read affects the way that we think. Stereotypes in the media affect the way that we view the world in our quotidian life (Goodall, 2012; Schemer, 2012; Hart, 2014). The reason for the ability of the media to make us view the world in particular ways comes down to the media’s representation of and relationship with society’s elite (van Dijk, 1996; Croteau and Hoynes, 2003). Van Dijk stresses that the reporting of a “situation contributes to the manufacturing of public opinion, if not to the opinions of the political elite” (1996: 28). Here he ties together the position of the media with that of the elite, or ruling class of society, a hegemonic relationship which, he maintains, is responsible for the elite dominance of the media. He argues that “the press and most other news media position themselves in all these power conflicts at the side of the dominant group, thereby confirming the status quo, legitimating inequality, and reproducing the (ingroup) consensus on which they rest” (1996: 24), here overtly stating the relationship between society’s elite and the mass media.
Indeed, for van Dijk and other critical discourse analysts and social theorists, the media is not to be seen as a neutral or passive force in society but, instead, as a body that defines reality (Croteau and Hoynes, 2003: 168), and, in so doing, defines it so that the ideology of the elite class stays paramount and uncontested (Croteau and Hoynes, 2003: 167). The power of the media comes, in part, from their ability to inform us of social norms and “what is ‘normal’ and what is ‘deviant’” (Croteau and Hoynes, 2003: 163) through the constant repetition of only a “narrow range of behaviors and lifestyles” (Croteau and Hoynes, 2003: 163). Knowing, as we do, that the media functions as an arm of the elite groups in society, we know that the ideologies put forth within media texts will support their interests and, as such, anything outside these interests will come to be seen as deviant. This power is not necessarily overt: sometimes the absences and omissions can be as telling as that which is included in a media text (Croteau and Hoynes, 2003: 163). By omitting certain voices and ideas from the media, powerful groups control who speaks for society and whose opinions matter. It is in the interests of these powerful voices to maintain the status quo, as it is through this that they maintain their powerful position in society (Altheide, 1984: 476). Ultimately, these voices come to define reality (Croteau and Hoynes, 2003: 168) and to shape the way that readers view the world around them.

In Foucauldian language, the power of the media is not juridical but is bio-political, meaning that it “endeavours to administer, optimise, and multiply [life] to precise controls and comprehensive regulations” (Foucault, 1984: 137) explaining that it is a type of power that seeks to maintain the status quo (Foucault, 1984: 139). Here, then, the media promulgate discourses through which the power to “qualify, measure, appraise, hierarchise” (Foucault, 1984: 144) is practised. Media functions as a means of controlling the population and of shaping behaviour to fit into society’s status quo as established by society’s elite. ‘Media hegemony’ is the idea that the elite control the media and that, as such, the media promote their dominant ideology (Chandler and Munday, 2011).

Van Dijk considers the processes behind the media’s influence on the way that we think. He refers to ‘models’ that readers construct in their mind when they read a news report. “A model is a mental representation of an experience” (1996: 14) or the way that a reader thinks about and interprets the news event, and, as such, is related to the mental networks through which priming work (Schemer, 2012). Van Dijk explains that “it is the aim of a news report and its authors that the readers form a model of the news event in the report” (1996: 14) and
that “one of the many ways to influence the structure of a model (and hence, the understanding of a news event) is to manipulate what information is important” (1996: 14). This means firstly that news reports are based on the piecing together of elements of a text in order to put together a mental picture or model that helps us to understand the story. But, secondly and, crucially, what van Dijk implies is that there is a motive behind the news report and suggests that particular mental models are foregrounded over others. When considering the role of newspapers in promoting white dominance, for example, he contends that “the mainstream news media are inherently part of a power structure of elite groups and institutions, whose models of the ethnic situation provide (sometimes very subtle and indirect) support for the ethnic status quo of white group dominance” (1996: 22).

Media and power are closely tied together. Media discourse is a means by which the powerful in society are able, through the intertwining of news bodies and elite groups, to shape public opinion and determine whose voices are heard, which angles are put forth, which terms and vocabulary are used, and how stories are structured. It is in the interests of the press, as an agent of biopolitical power, to maintain the status quo but it is in the interests of critical discourse scholars to pick away at the dominant ideologies present in the media and to highlight the hegemonic discourses that are shaping society.

3.5 Media and place
Even prior to the term ‘territorial stigmatisation’ being widely used, the suggestion that media could shape public perception of place was emerging (Burgess, 1982; Burgess and Gold, 1985; Avraham, 2000: 363; Tsfati and Cohen, 2003; Moinuddin, 2010: 27). Research directly related to stigmatisation of place has referenced the importance of considering the role of the press in the production and reproduction of stereotypes and stigma and the scope of media to influence the public (Krase, 1977; Wacquant, 2007; Devereux et al., 2011a; Devereux et al., 2011b; Arthursen et al., 2014). Wacquant et al. sum up the general feeling in territorial stigma literature that “blemish of place can be fuelled, harnessed, and manipulated by private concerns (such as the media, employers, and real-estate firms) and public officials (in both the political and the bureaucratic fields) to promote their own agendas” (2014: 1276). Except for Arthursen et al. (2014) who consider the role of televised stigma in the Australian television series Housos, and Devereux et al. (2011a; 2011b) who conduct a tripartite analysis of media content and production, and a reception analysis, other studies merely allude to media’s role in stigmatisation. By connecting research on stigmatisation of place with what we know about dominant ideologies in the media we can
gather that the media promotes one single view of a particular place for reasons that support the elite or ruling class’ needs in society. These are ideas and themes that I explore in later chapters.

Edward Herman and Noam Chomsky, further explain why dominant ideologies persist and why views that fall outside the status quo will not be heard. In their work on the political economy of the mass media, they support a propaganda model that sees the media putting forth the messages of government and big business that the public need to have in order to consent and comply with the status quo and the common-sense vision of society that the government wants to be put forth. Herman and Chomsky see that the media functions as powerful corporations that act with the motive of profit, and that they censor coverage for the benefit of government and big business to ensure that their profit and consistent revenue is guaranteed (Devereux, 2014: 160). They explain that “it is our view that, among their other functions, the media serve, and propagandise on behalf of, the powerful societal interests that control and finance them” (1988: xi). They conclude that “the mass media of the United States are effective and powerful ideological institutions that carry out a system-supportive propaganda function by reliance on market forces, internalised assumptions, and self-censorship, and without significant overt coercion” (1988: 306). Ultimately, this means that quality, critical and investigative journalism that holds power to account cannot—and rarely does—exist because the media system, according to the propaganda model, encourages collusion between the media and other voices of power. They argue that press reliance on advertising revenue, which sees the press selling audiences to advertisers, on the concentrated nature of capital and ownership, on a reliance on dominant voices for sources, on ‘flak’ or the removal of dissenting voices from the media voice, and on notions of fear, filter and distil the media so that powerful media elites maintain their position in society.

The propaganda model connects with the ‘agenda-setting’ model that sees “editors, newsroom staff, and broadcasters play an important part in shaping political reality. Readers learn not only about a given issue, but also how much importance to attach to that issue from the amount of information in a news story and its position (McCombs and Shaw, 1968: 176). Maxwell E. McCombs and Donald L. Shaw who formulated the agenda-setting theory remark—in a way that links to Herman and Chomsky’s propaganda model—that in a political campaign, the press sets the ‘agenda’, setting out what readers should think about, directing attention towards certain issues and away from others. Bernard Cohen sums up
this hypothesis when he states that the press “may not be successful much of the time in telling people what to think, but it is stunningly successful in telling its readers what to think about” (Cohen, 1963, in McCombs and Shaw, 1968: 177, emphasis in original). Herman and Chomsky’s model builds on this by suggesting that, not only does the press set an agenda but that it does it for particular, premeditated purposed.

Another key feature of the propaganda model is the need for a common enemy and it is here that stigmatised places become scapegoats, blamed for all of society’s ills: dumping grounds into which the media can pour negative imagery, construct damaging identities, and smear with harmful tropes. A group, ideology, population or place that serves as a public enemy serves to unite the readership through consensus. As such, it is rare for media to highlight positive stories of a stigmatised place (Tsfati and Cohen, 2003; Devereux et al., 2011a; Devereux et al., 2011b) and, instead, reporters, often due to the economic constraints of their paper that demand sales (van Dijk, 1996: 25), report negative stories that hint at controversy and strife (Devereux et al., 2011a: 129; Devereux et al., 2011b: 509). This supports Herman and Chomsky’s propaganda model that sees a common enemy at the forefront of media production (1988: 29). As such, even positive stories tend to reference negative associations in order to conform with the marketised system of newspaper production (Devereux et al., 2011b: 504): crime and deviance are considered good markers of newsworthiness (Devereux et al., 2011b: 504) in the era of the highly commercialised press. As van Dijk explains, “most mass media, not only in the West, are business corporations deeply integrated in the capitalist mode of production” (1996: 25). This means that sales and the market (part of the dominant ideology of capitalism) guide media and journalists in their decisions about what to write and which angles to take (Papathanassopoulos, 1999: 380).

3.6 Understanding content analysis and CDA
In order to address the gaps in research—the lack of focus on the historical nature of language and discourse related to stigma — this study uses a content analytic approach that relies, in part, on influences from critical discourse analysis (CDA). Content analysis “is a means of analysing written, verbal or visual communication messages” (Elo and Kyngäs, 2007: 107-8) and the methodology dates back to the 18th century (Hsieh and Shannon, 2005: 1278). It is a research method that relies on objectivity and systematization, meaning that the researcher tries to limit personal bias from the coding procedure and consistently applies the coding procedure to each message under examination (Bryman, 2012: 289). As a method, it
can be applied to a variety of texts messages including speeches, cartoons and, commonly, newspaper articles. It can follow a qualitative or quantitative approach depending on the aims and objectives of the research project. This project uses a combination of the two approaches as recommended by Macnamara (2005: 5)

The combined approach mitigates the weaknesses inherent in both methods. A purely quantitative content analysis can be deemed to be too prescriptive, simply counting key terms and noting frequencies, (Macnamara, 2005: 4). Where a discourse analysis looks to the ‘beyond the text’ to understand the context, a quantitative content analysis looks only within the parameters of the text and does not connect to the larger social, political and economic conditions that are part of the discourse. On the other hand, it does provide a wealth of data about the “volume of mentions” (Macnamara, 2005: 4) that is useful for examining and visualising the peaks and troughs of certain terms through time as well as noting silences and absences. Employing a quantitative content analysis is a reliable way to adequately handle a large dataset where a research aim is to monitor usage of particular terms over time. A qualitative content analysis requires more interaction with the text and is interpretative (Krippendorf, 2004: 17). It allows the researcher to take into account the context of the texts under scrutiny, which is something that a purely quantitative study cannot do. Coding for themes in the text or how positive or negative an article is requires such interaction with a text and cannot be achieved through a solely quantitative approach. Staunch adherents to quantitative content analysis argue that this is the downfall of a qualitative content analysis: for them, a content analysis needs to measure data in a manner that is independent from the researcher (Neuendorf, 2017: 9).

The qualitative content analysis used in this project borrows from the CDA tradition, which forms part of a body of analytic methods that developed from the field of linguistics—the study of language—and semiotics—the study of signs. While the quantitative content analysis of the study can achieve a reliable understanding of terminological frequency and usage, CDA is a means of studying language in use, or going beyond the words on the page. It is “the analysis of what people do with talk and text” (Richardson, 2007: 25, emphasis in original), thus hinting at the central tenet of discourse analysis: examining the link between words and society. Discourse analysis is concerned less with the “way in which language or discourse ‘works’”, which is what linguists examine (Bloor and Bloor, 2007: 2), and instead see discourse and language as a “form of social practice” (Fairclough, 1995: 7), transitioning
the study away from language, semantics and syntax, and into a way of seeing how language and discourse are connected to and embedded in “sociocultural practice” (Fairclough, 1995: 7).

CDA is a means of understanding abuses of power in society. It is a way of examining and uncovering the “relations of power, dominance and inequality” and it amounts to the “attempt to uncover, reveal or disclose what is implicit, hidden or otherwise not immediately obvious in relations of discursively enacted dominance or their underlying ideologies” (van Dijk, 1995: 18, emphasis in original). CDA, then, is tightly bound with ideas of manipulated domination by elite voices of marginalised groups in society. It takes discourse as the carrier of this abuse of power and seeks to understand the role that discourse and language play “in producing and reproducing social inequalities” (Richardson, 2007: 26). Studying media is particularly pertinent as the media industry represents a means of discourse control, with elites controlling the press and the voices heard through that medium (van Dijk, 1995: 20). Reporters and editors decide what constitutes news, who speaks, which angle a story takes, and how the story is presented to the public. This is social power in action, whereby one group is dominating another in society and controlling the “actions and minds of the dominated group” (van Dijk, 1995: 20), amounting to a sort of Foucauldian biopolitical control and regulation. In the media, places and populations are written about without their input, they are marginalised and made socially unequal through the media discourse. To follow a CDA approach assumes a stance against these abuses of power and a desire to unearth and expose such abuses (van Dijk, 1995: 18).

The ‘critical’ aspect of CDA is directly related to this concern for and attention given to the roles of power, social problems, social relations, hegemony, ideology in discourse (Richardson, 2007: 26-7). Foucault tells us that “discourse transmits and produces power” (1984: 101), alerting us to the need to examine and critically analyse discourse in order to understand power relations within society: it is this that is the focus for CDA analysts who maintain that discourse “simultaneously reflects reality (‘the way things are’) and constructs (construes) it to be a certain way” (Gee, 1999: 82 in Richardson, 2007: 26, emphasis in original). This means that discourse both reflects and produces power structures. There is a triangular relationship between “text production, distribution and consumption” (Fairclough, 1995: 9), highlighting the importance CDA places on considering extra-textual context. In CDA, reading beyond the text to understand what is and is not included and how things are included,
is paramount, as “the producer shapes the text but the text, and its conventions, shapes its production, too” (Richardson, 2007: 41, emphasis in original), meaning that the social, political and economic contexts in which a text is situated—and in which the elite voices are positioned—shape the text.

In CDA, by examining both the text and the ‘beyond text’, analysis seeks to connect language to the representation, production and reproduction of power and inequality in society. Analysing the press’s representation and construction of a discourse of territorial stigmatisation in Toxteth is seen as being part of a larger sociocultural story with the press playing a key role as a stigmatising force that produces and reproduces existing stigma and stereotypes.

3.7 Conclusion
This chapter has explored in depth some of the theoretical underpinnings to the research design that is explored in the following chapter. It first examined notions of discourse, power, ideology and hegemony, and showed that media and power are closely intertwined with media as a conduit through which elite and powerful groups in society are able to push forward their agendas and visions of the world. Beginning with an explanation of the theoretical underpinnings of territorial stigma, the chapter then gave an account of the Foucauldian archaeological approach and articulated the ways that this historical approach will allow me to peel back layers of discourse. I explored the Foucauldian vision of power and argued that the media represents a form of bio-political power that seeks to control the population through the maintenance and enactment of the status quo. Herman and Chomsky’s propaganda model helped to explain ideological dominance and the closeness between powerful elite voices in society.

In order to understand the relation between media and place, the chapter offered a review of literature, and connected this work to the theoretical discussions explored in this chapter. The chapter highlighted the fact that stigmatisation of place is part of the status quo and has become normalised in societal discourse, meaning that it will continue to be enacted as it is in the interests of the capitalist ideology to stigmatise alien others who are a challenge to the ‘normal’ aspects of society. In explaining the premise behind the use of content analysis and discourse analysis (particularly CDA), I have also shown the level of attention given by discourse analysts to the power dynamics beyond the text. While content analysis can give insight into terminological frequency, it is through borrowing from the CDA tradition that
this study is able to connect the words in a newspaper article about Toxteth to the wider issues of ideology, power, social change, and social struggles.
Chapter 4: Research design

4.1 Introduction
A major gap in literature and where this project intervenes is in tracing the development of territorial stigmatisation in press discourse from an historical perspective, thereby accessing both the linguistic and historical emergence gaps. We know that discourse generally and media discourse in particular, are important in shaping our perceptions of the world around us and in reinforcing the power systems that structure society. This chapter will take the theoretical underpinnings set down in the previous chapter and introduce the methodology used for the project and will explain how the research was designed to best respond to the questions and aims of the study. First, this chapter offers a discussion of the research design including the rationale and context behind the selection of newspapers, location, and historical time period, and location. Second, it examines the methods in action, including considering the content/discourse analysis framework employed, and references the coding schedule and manual. A section on the use of interviews follows, before turning to the ethical considerations and the limitations of the study.

4.2 Research design
The main question guiding this research is *how and why does the press territorially stigmatise Toxteth, Liverpool in its coverage during the 20th century?* This question reflects the gap in literature highlighted in chapter 2: we do not understand well enough the development of territorial stigma from either an historical perspective or a discursive perspective. Research on territorial stigma has, so far, largely overlooked the formation of stigma and has, instead, focused on the effects of living in a territorially stigmatised location or on the activation of stigma for political or economic ends (Slater, 2017). The research question guiding this study seeks to understand how stigma develops and how we recognise its advent.

To fully access this question, the study addresses four subsidiary research questions, which are addressed in the four empirical chapters of this thesis:

1. How is Toxteth portrayed prior to the disturbances of 1981 and can traces of stigma be detected prior to the era of advanced marginality?
2. What discursive and linguistic techniques does the press use to stigmatise Toxteth during the disturbances of 1981?

3. How do moments of stigmatisation extrapolate and connect to a broader social, political and economic context?

4. Does the stigmatisation of Toxteth by the press continue after the disturbances of 1981 and, if it does, how does this stigma transform?

To access the above questions, I conducted a mixed qualitative-quantitative content analysis that draws on Critical Discourse Analysis of five national newspapers—the Times, the Guardian, the Express, the Mirror and the Financial Times—where I traced the use and appearance of the word ‘Toxteth’ from 1st January 1900 to 31st December 1999 in each paper. For additional context, I conducted 12 interviews with journalists and politicians. These interviews were not subject to content/discourse analysis but were used for contextual and explanatory purposes.

The study is set in the stigmatised district of Toxteth within the stigmatised city of Liverpool (Boland, 2008). Toxteth and the larger city of Liverpool serve as paradigmatic cases that typify territorial stigmatisation in action. This section details the rationale for selecting the newspapers used, the time period, and the location of the study.

4.2.1 Newspaper selection

This project notes how media discourse and language in the national British press contribute to the emergence of territorial stigmatisation of Toxteth. This means that the focus of the study is on the external historical formation of territorial stigmatisation in relation to Toxteth. There is a danger when studying the ‘outsider’ perspective to approach the study from several angles and use multiple sources such as public health records, interviews with residents from elsewhere in the city or region, and policy documents to create ‘the view of the outsider’. But, it is a mistake to see the ‘outsider’ as a homogenous category (Permentier et al., 2008: 845). This thesis focuses on the print media, one single ‘outsider’ group that is responsible for transmitting images and stereotypes of places that are particularly adhesive, though I draw on maps, street directories and other archival sources in chapter 5 when interpreting the context in which primitive stigma occurs. Further, I draw on official policy documents in
chapter 7 when considering the wider context of the stigma of the inner city. The contemporary media promulgate a version of “reality” that becomes a “true’ reality” (Avraham, 2000: 364) in the minds of those living a distance from the location being described, and professor of Communication Sciences, Anabela Carvalho maintains that media represent “a discursive re-construction of reality” (Carvalho, 2008: 164); that is, journalism is built on and reflects other social actors who have witnessed or experienced first-hand what journalists, through newspapers, report second-hand. Newspapers, and discourse more generally, exist in a cyclical fashion that both inform and are informed by social practices.

Given this cyclical, dialectical relationship, historical newspapers serve as a means of better understanding the broader context surrounding popular discourse of a given time period. Yet, while reflecting broader social practices and views, they continue to represent an ‘outsider’ perspective written as they are by journalists who remain external to and removed from the event or situation that they report (Johnson, 1926: 63), and, as such, may not only recount events that contribute to the formation of territorial stigmatisation but may directly contribute to its development through 1) their choice of language, 2) the context of the article, 3) their inclusion or exclusion of certain descriptors or clarifiers, and 4) intertextuality—Bakhtin’s concept that explains the formation or creation of one text based on others (Fairclough, 1995: 7; Bloor and Bloor, 2007: 51-2).

This study examined coverage in the Times, the Guardian, the Express, the Mirror, and the Financial Times in order to critically examine newspapers from a spectrum of political leanings and markets (Hartmann and Husband, 1974; Mendes, 2012: 558). I follow the same selection criteria that Hartmann and Husband use in their study of racism and the mass media who state that the papers are “broadly representative of the British national daily press in terms of readership, political orientation, style and format” (1974: 128). I also include the Financial Times to reflect Noam Chomsky’s assertion that it is the paper that “tells the truth” (Kennard, 2013). The Mirror and the Guardian (Smith, 2017) represent the broadly left-leaning press. The Express and the Times represent the broadly right-leaning press (Smith, 2017). The Express and Mirror followed earlier tabloidization—the Mirror went tabloid in 1934 as it sought to appeal to a new market as a “brash tabloid aimed directly at a working-class audience” (Bingham and Conboy, 2015: 14) and the Express embraced tabloidization in 1977 to try and boost sales in a dwindling market (Bingham and Conboy, 2015: 19). The Guardian
and *Times* were traditionally broadsheet in style and format, but have embraced elements of tabloidization since the 1980s as they have reduced the page size, increased the page volume, and included elements of sensational, entertainment, and lifestyle-based (soft) news (Bingham and Conboy, 2015: 230). All of these newspapers are national papers and it was important for the project to focus on national portrayals of Toxteth to gain understanding of how Toxteth as a place was used as a concept and byword in the national discourse of place.

Further, these five newspapers were all accessible through digitised newspaper archives available on the Internet either through Leeds University Library or through a personal subscription. The *Times*, the *Guardian* and the *Financial Times* each have their own digital archive, and the *Express* and the *Mirror* are digitised through the UK Press Online archive. Selecting newspapers that were digitised was an important consideration as, within a 12-month timeframe, it was necessary to be able to complete the research in a timely manner and being able to search online archives using a search engine was more time-efficient than manually searching non-digitised archives and reading every newspaper dated between January 1900 and December 1999 for a mention of ‘Toxteth’, which would not have been feasible in the time available.

### 4.2.2 Location selection

Liverpool has long had a reputation. As the city ‘progressed’ in the 17th and 18th centuries it bore the moniker of “slaving capital of the world” (Belchem, 2006: 13), underscoring the city’s role in the slave trade. Over time its reputation has shifted from the contemporarily repugnant connection with slavery to a city “stung by its poor image” (Boland, 2008: 357) that is “synonymous with vandalism, with high crime, with social deprivation in the form of bad housing, with obsolete schools, polluted air and a polluted river, with chronic unemployment, run-down dock systems and large areas of dereliction” (Marriner, 1982 in Wildman, 2012: 119). But it is also the stereotyped view of Liverpool’s residents, Scousers, that has led to further stigmatisation of the city. Boland catalogues the many popular caricatures of the Scouser in television ranging from the comedic Harry Enfield “calm down” Scouser sketch to the gritty dramas of Alan Bleasdale that highlight the city’s unemployment.

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3 While it would have been illuminating to have included the *Daily Mail* in the analysis, it was not possible to access the archive through a personal subscription, and the cost of a university subscription would have been prohibitive.

4 It is worth noting that while this reputation may latterly be seen as negative, it would, at the time have been seen as worthy of praise as the city thrived on the slave trade.
(2008), both of which paint the city and its residents in a particular, stereotyped light. While the focus and intentions of these televisual representations are very different (Enfield’s based on pure caricature, and Bleasdale’s serving as a social commentary), both serve to underscore certain aspects of Liverpool and its residents.

Officially, too, the reputation of Liverpool and Scousers has been smeared in policy and in press. In his account of the aftermath of the Toxteth disturbances in 1981, Phil Scraton notes that Lord Scarman, famed for his investigation into the civil disturbances in British towns and cities of 1981, drew on notions of Liverpool’s “cultural deficiency” and moral degeneracy” in explaining the city’s disturbances (2007: 28). Following these events, UK PM Thatcher (1979–1990) considered a “managed decline” of the city (Travis, 2011), underscoring the stigmatised and stigmatising political rhetoric surrounding Liverpool. A further example of the city and its residents bearing the brunt of ‘official’ smear comes from the coverage of the Hillsborough football stadium disaster, which saw The Sun newspaper relying on popular stereotypes of Scousers as morally degenerate, with a front page that suggested that Liverpool fans “urinated on the brave cops” (MacKenzie, 1989). Liverpool is a stigmatised space both in popular culture and in official sources. Media are culpable in the negative portrayal and stigmatisation of Liverpool for, while the Capital of Culture title awarded to the city in 2008 increased focus on the city’s culture and heritage, media representation of the city continues to focus on stereotyped images of the city as a harbourer of social problems (Boland, 2008: 357; Garcia et al., 2010: 44).

Though Liverpool is a stereotyped and stigmatised space, it would not have been feasible within a 12-month fieldwork project, to conduct a thorough historical study of the entire city of Liverpool and achieve sufficient depth to trace the origination of territorial stigmatisation. It was necessary to situate the project within a stigmatised district of Liverpool and, as such, the project specifically focuses on Toxteth, a district of Liverpool in the L8 postcode.

In academic literature, Toxteth is recognised as a “blemished” district that suffers from territorial stigmatisation (Hall, 2003: 204; Wacquant, 2008: 238; Pearce, 2013: 2039). It is also popularly stigmatised as an area of criminality, deviance, and lawlessness (Clarke, 2009; Liverpool Echo, 2014; SmarterTravel, 2017). An article in the Liverpool Echo about the ‘no-go’ areas in Liverpool includes Toxteth as a place that taxi drivers do not like to venture (2007). Toxteth also features on iLiveHere, a website where users comment on the worst
places to live in Britain. The author of the post comments that the residents of Toxteth are known for their promiscuity, for their worklessness, that the area is violent, gang-riddled, and plagued with drug issues, concluding that:

Everwhere [sic] you look, dog shite, piss stinking alleyways, grafitti [sic] all over the walls, the pavements are that uneven a spirit level wopuldnt [sic] straighten them out, as for the bars there is more atmosphere on the moon than any of these (iLiveHere, n.d.)

Although an extreme case (Bryman, 2012: 70) because of the intensity of the stigma, Toxteth is also an exemplifying or paradigmatic case (Bryman, 2012: 70) that can help to explain the process of the formation of stigma elsewhere. It allows us to critically examine how stigma appears, adheres and flows over time and this lesson can be applied to countless other districts and cities throughout the United Kingdom and beyond.

4.2.3 Historical approach
The project is situated in the 20th century, examining all press coverage in the Times, the Guardian, the Express, the Mirror and the Financial Times from 1st January 1900 to 31 December 1999. It was necessary to select both a start and an end point, and constraining the project to the 20th century made pragmatic sense, offering a natural beginning and conclusion. Situating the study in the 20th century captures a great period of change for Liverpool and for Toxteth. The dawn of the 20th century captures the tail-end of Liverpool’s boom years when the city was thriving economically as the second port of the British Empire (McIntyre-Brown, 2001: 22). But, as the 20th century progressed, some of the sheen faded and the city was beginning to exhibit poverty, deprivation and inter-community struggles.

The 20th century was a period of great transition for Toxteth as its dawn saw first sectarian violence (Neal, 1988: 226), then race riots (Wildman, 2012: 121; Belchem, 2007: 315; Belchem and MacRaild, 2006: 375). It suffered from extreme levels of poverty like other areas of the city, but Toxteth in particular became a “dumping ground” for black and poor white residents of Liverpool (Gifford et al., 1989: 39-40; Nassy Brown, 2005: 68). Prior to the outbreak of disturbances in 1981, unemployment for the black population of Liverpool 8, including Toxteth, was 32.5% (Nassy Brown, 2005: 104). The disturbances of summer 1981 capture the rising tensions in Toxteth caused by heavy-handed policing, racial disadvantage, and deprivation. The main disturbances lasted for only four nights (though
subsequent violence endured for six weeks and continued to flare for several summers) (Frost and Phillips, 2011: 1-2), but their occurrence was enough to cement Toxteth as a place of inner city strife in the public imagination. Understanding how Toxteth went from a ‘visible’ place in the British press from 1900 to 1981 to a directly stigmatised place during and after the disturbances, will help to further our understanding of how territorial stigma develops and is produced over the long arc of history.

4.3 Methods
This section will provide an overview of the methodological basis for the study before discussing the procedures followed in this study including data collection, analysis, and use of interviews.

4.3.1 Using content analysis
The key component of a content analysis is coding, and the main difference between the approaches of a quantitative and a qualitative study is the way that the coding manual and system is created. In both cases a coding schedule needs to be created, which is a form into which the data being coded is entered. Figure 4.1 shows the coding schedule used in this study, which was built in Microsoft Excel. This study benefitted from a pilot study (discussed in the following section), which helped to generate a preliminary list of codes (a coding manual) for use in the main study, but these were refined and updated as the research progressed, in line with qualitative content analytic procedures (Bryman, 2012: 559). A code is “a word or short phrase that symbolically assigns a summative, salient, essence-capturing, and/or evocative attribute for a portion of language-based or visual data” (Saldaña, 2009: 3). Individual codes can be sorted together after the initial coding process into “families” or categories (Saldaña, 2009: 8) through a process of first cycle and second cycle coding that gradually refines the codes used in the project (Saldaña, 2009:3). A copy of the coding manual is included in Appendix 1.

Combining qualitative and quantitative content analytic approaches means that the data can be studied for frequency and volume (quantitative) while the context and wider meanings can also be examined (qualitative). The quantitative content analysis was employed in this project to ascertain when Toxteth was mentioned, which descriptors or tag-phrases were used to describe it, how often and when certain key terms (such as ‘inner city’) were mentioned, and who was quoted in each article. What the quantitative analysis could not ascertain, however, were some of the more contextual questions. As such, the qualitative
aspect of the study focused on the valence of articles or whether Toxteth was mentioned in a positive or negative way, and it noted the context in which Toxteth was mentioned. The qualitative angle of this study borrows heavily from the tradition of Critical Discourse Analysis (Macnamara, 2005: 3; Neuendorf, 2017: 11-12) to connect language use with a wider political context; for example, I engaged with the CDA tradition to consider why certain individuals may or may not be quoted in the text, and how the term ‘inner city’ matched with the political discourse of the day.

4.3.2 Collection process
A pilot study using the British Newspaper Archive (BNA) revealed two things. Firstly, it revealed that the BNA was not a suitable source to use to collect data for the remainder of the study as newspapers were not consistently digitised thereby leaving gaps in coverage that skewed and biased the dataset. Secondly, it revealed the terms that should be excluded from the search. Omitting the terms ‘election’ or ‘candidate’ meant that parliamentary records and election results did not appear in the search results and this was advantageous as these categories had been inflating the dataset with election results and news of candidates that were not relevant to the study of Toxteth. Thus, the Boolean search used across papers was “Toxteth NOT election NOT candidate” or “Toxteth NOT election OR candidate” depending on the archive search engine.

This initial search criteria resulted in 3,999 newspaper articles across all five newspapers (1,709 from the *Times*, 1,838 from the *Guardian*, 341 from the *Express* and *Mirror* combined, and 14 from the *Financial Times*). Each article was read and reviewed for relevance. Hard news, opinion pieces, editorials, images pieces, and features were included in the search of newspaper articles. The following categories were excluded from the data search: church or ecclesiastical news; births, marriages and deaths; parliamentary updates; shipping news. Obituaries of Toxteth residents were excluded apart from where the obituary gave an account of events in the area. Articles were also excluded where the location of ‘Toxteth’ was mentioned in passing (following the approach used by Conway et al., 2011) or when listed among numerous other locations meaning that Toxteth as a place and concept was not singled out. For example, an article that discussed the riots at Risley prison was included
because the only rioting inmate quoted in the piece was from Toxteth, highlighting an editorial choice made to associate prison uprisings with Toxteth, despite countless other inmates from other locations being involved in the riots. However, a follow-up article that listed the sentences given to all those rioted was not included because this article simply listed all inmates and their hometown: Toxteth was not singled out and used to frame the article in a specific way. After eliminating articles that were not pertinent to the study, a final sample of 1,950 texts remained (172 in the Express, 120 in the Mirror, 13 in the Financial Times, 732 in the Times, and 913 in the Guardian).

4.3.3 Analysis
After reviewing each article, those with relevance were downloaded, given an identifying code and entered into the coding schedule, “a form onto which all the data relating to a code will be entered” (Bryman, 2012: 298).

Coding
The coding schedule (see Figure 4.1) consisted of columns to note the article’s code number, title, page number, author, news type (hard news, feature, opinion etc.), code (how Toxteth was mentioned), sub-code (more detail about how Toxteth was mentioned), tag words, descriptors, valence (whether Toxteth was mentioned in a positive or negative angle), quote source, and comments, which amounted to a summary of the article. The combination of these categories allowed for a quantitative analysis that would count and measure the frequency of certain key terms and appearances, and a qualitative/discourse analysis that would look at the context and the qualities inherent within the text. The pilot study provided the basis of the coding manual—the “complete listings of all categories for each dimension” (Bryman, 2012: 299)—but, as the study had a qualitative element, the construction of the coding manual was reflexive and iterative, with the analysis generating new codes as I worked.

After collecting the relevant data and inputting each newspaper into the coding schedule it was necessary to complete the analysis of each text using the coding manual. Content analyses are often completed by multiple researchers, in which case inter-coder reliability is paramount, meaning that all coders should be interpreting and following the coding manual in the same way. As I carried out all of the coding in this project alone, I was more concerned

\footnote{For a copy of the coding manual, see Appendix 1.}
with *intra*-coder reliability, meaning that the codes had to be applied fairly and consistently (Bryman, 2012: 299).

I assigned myself 30 articles to read each day and began by reading the article to take account of the *intra*-textual qualities such as language use. This reflects Teo’s “general characterization of newspaper discourse” in his discourse analysis of racism in Australian media (2000) and Carvalho’s textual analysis which involves consideration of elements within the text such as grammar, rhetorical devices employed, unearthing of power and ideology, and themes or objects created by the text. This stage noted the general tone of the article, who was quoted, whether the article’s angle was positive or negative (or contained elements of both positivity and negativity), and any descriptors or key terms used in each text. Each column of the schedule was filled accordingly beginning with filling in the name of the newspaper, the date of the article, the year of the article, the page number, title of the article, and author where available.

Next, the ‘type’ column was filled according to the kind of news article. The choices for this column included: advert, editorial, entertainment, feature, finance, image, index, law, letter, listing, news, news in brief, obituary, opinion, parliament, reviews, sport, and stop press. Some of these choices were obvious to spot (for example, advert, image, letter, stop press, sport, finance, and obituary). ‘Index’ refers to the ‘table of contents’ at the start of the paper that give a precis of the story to come. ‘News in brief’ is similar to index but longer, consisting of several sentences. It is an abbreviated article at the beginning of the paper summarising a major news story that may or may not be featured further along in the paper. ‘News’ refers to a hard news story that details something current or new that has happened. A ‘feature’ refers to a longer piece that details something that is either (a) not current enough to be considered ‘news’, (b) an investigative piece, or (c) softer news. ‘Opinion’ and ‘editorial’ have a similar tone in that they are both written allowing bias and, as the terms would suggest, opinion rather than pure fact to come through the text. ‘Editorials’, however, come from the editor or reflect the editor’s and the newspaper’s stance on an issue. ‘Opinions’ may come from any reporter or public figure who offers an opinion on an issue that may or may not be in line with the newspaper and editor’s stance.

‘Law’ and ‘Parliament’ do not feature in every paper and are more prevalent in the broadsheet papers, particularly the *Times*. They are news stories that often quote legal or parliamentary
proceedings verbatim and inclusion of these stories in the *Times* perpetuates its reputation for being a newspaper of record. Finally, ‘entertainment’, ‘listing’, and ‘review’ all refer to something leisure-based. ‘Listing’ refers to television or radio listings for what is to be broadcast. ‘Reviews’ are generally in the newspaper the day after a broadcast and recount a reporter’s opinion of the production. Where ‘news’ stories report current events and current affairs in the world of hard news, ‘entertainment’ stories reflect softer stories of celebrity, fame, music, or arts.

With regards to the ‘code’ and ‘sub-code’ columns of the coding schedule, I here followed Saldaña’s first and second coding cycle methods, which meant that I assigned a broad range of codes at the first stage of analysis (a full list of these codes can be found in the coding manual in Appendix 1). Later, when all codes had been assigned, I returned to the dataset and grouped the codes into umbrella categories thereby making the data more manageable (Saldaña, 2009). I was seeking to find codes that “represent and capture a datum’s primary content and essence… just as a title represents and captures a book or film or poem’s primary content” (Saldaña, 2009: 3). This means that I read the text and coded for the way in which Toxteth was mentioned. For each article, I asked the question: in what capacity is Toxteth mentioned in this text? I assigned a code based on the answer and applied a sub-code to give more detail. For example, an article entitled “Gangster patrol” in the *Times* in May 1995 discussed the rise of gangs and shootings in Toxteth, including the death of drug-lord, David Ungi. In what capacity is Toxteth mentioned in this text? Toxteth is mentioned in a crime capacity, particularly related to drugs. Thus, the article is coded in the ‘crime’ category, with the sub-code, ‘drugs’. In “Inquiry seeks police driver involved in riot fatality”, the death of David Moore is foregrounded (Young, 1981: a). Moore, a disabled man who was visiting his sister in Toxteth at the time of the disturbances, was killed after being crushed by a police van. This article is coded “riot” as that is the main category and frame into which the coverage falls and it is given the sub-code “David Moore” to reflect the particular way in which Toxteth is mentioned: the death of a bystander during the disturbances.

“Mother mourns two sons who died within hours” tells the story of a Toxteth mother who, while sitting with her critically-ill older son in Alder Hey Children’s Hospital following a hit-and-run incident in Toxteth, learned that her baby, at home in Toxteth, had contracted

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6 While I refer to the events of 1981 as ‘disturbances’ or ‘uprisings’ to reflect local terminological choice, I used the code ‘riot’ during the coding process to echo the press framing of the disturbances.
meningitis. Both boys died, and the article discusses the mother’s treatment for shock, the background to the deaths, and includes quotations from an officer with Merseyside Police (Alderson, 1996). This article is categorised as “human interest”—glorified ‘gossip’, it is a story about an individual’s experience meant to elicit feelings of sympathy, and to highlight a story of human tragedy in Toxteth. The particular sub-code allocated to this article was “death”. This article is included in the study because Toxteth is not mentioned in passing. It is central to the story; the mother’s first child died because of a hit-and-run incident in Toxteth, the coverage of which forms part of a larger media narrative about joyriding and vehicular crime in Toxteth (see chapter 8).

Another example from The Express in March 1982 entitled “Where would we be if we had no one else to blame?” discusses blame culture in Britain (Edwards, 1982). It refers to pupils in a school running an extortion racket and the article blames the media for giving the students the idea. In one paragraph, it refers to blaming the media “for over-reacting and for having shown pictures of the carnage at Toxteth for the mini-thugs to copy” (Edwards, 1982). Toxteth here is mentioned in relation to the disturbances but it is not about the disturbances; in fact, it is using Toxteth as an example or reference point in a larger article about something entirely different. This article was coded under the category “riot” because Toxteth is inserted in the article in reference to the ‘riots’, but its sub-code was “reference point” because this reflects how Toxteth is being used in the article.

A further example of more symbolic use of the term ‘Toxteth’ is in the Guardian in 1992 in an article about Russian debt and the difficulties investing in the former Soviet Union (Elliott et al., 1993). The concluding quotation from “an observer” likens the difficulties in investing in the former Soviet Union to “buying a semi [detached house] in Liverpool and being told that the whole of Toxteth comes with the house” (Elliott et al., 1993). Here Toxteth is used in a symbolic capacity. The article is not about Toxteth—far from it as it is an international article about finance and changing economies. There is no need to insert Toxteth into the article other than in a symbolic capacity to represent something else. Toxteth is introduced in a figurative capacity as being emblematic of something negative. This article was coded as “symbolic value” because it represents how Toxteth is entered into an unrelated discourse. It was sub-coded as “emblematic of negative” because this is the particular way that Toxteth is used symbolically.
The ‘tag’ column was filled with any term or theme that was worthy of note. This is the column in which I noted particular phrases such as ‘inner city’ or where a particular discourse such as an anti-Tory narrative was exhibited. This column also housed notes for whether Toxteth was likened to another place, particularly the United States or Northern Ireland. Often it was only after reading many articles that I realised that such terms or comparisons were being used, in which case I revisited all previous articles to ensure that I captured all occurrences of the term or comparison.

The valence column allowed me to capture whether Toxteth was framed in a particular angle: positively, negatively, mixed or neither. To access this, for each article, I asked the question, ‘how is Toxteth portrayed in this piece?’ A detailed discussion of the underpinnings of ‘valence’ is included in chapter 6 where it is examined. I used numbers to code this column: 1 (positive), 2 (negative), 3 (mixed), and 4 (neither). This code involved subjective interpretation of how I believed that Toxteth was being mentioned. An example of a positive valence is a story about a Toxteth man who offers a free bedtime-reading service for children if they telephone him (Mirror, 1988). This story was coded as having a positive valence because it highlights a story about a Toxteth resident who is doing something good; it does not focus on any negative aspect of life in Toxteth. An example of a negative valence story is entitled “Incredible reign of King Con…” and it details the story of a Toxteth resident who is on trial for a series of fraudulent benefits claims (Clare, 1976). The link to Toxteth in this article is entirely negative: a resident is committing a major financial crime. An example of a ‘mixed’ story is entitled “Back to school for success”. This article details an adult education programme in Toxteth (Houghton, 1994). If the article had simply detailed this story and the positive results that the scheme was having, it would have been classed as ‘positive’, however, it also uses a negative description of Toxteth to geographically and socially situate the story, necessitating the story be classified as ‘mixed’: that is, with both elements of positivity and negativity. In the case of some mixed stories, the event being reported is entirely negative, such as an assault (Guardian, 1957a) but it is marked as ‘mixed’ because of the positive involvement from members of the community who exhibited camaraderie and community spirit in aiding the victim. In the case of a ‘mixed’ angle, I noted in the following column whether this reflected a community spirit and community relations angle. A story marked as ‘neither’ was often where Toxteth was used as a reference point or where there is nothing either positive or negative about the inclusion of Toxteth or the resident of Toxteth in the story; an example of this is a story about a man from Toxteth who
was adopted and brought up Jewish and later found out that he was ethnically Arab (Dyer, 1994). This story does not reflect anything especially negative or positive: Toxteth is simply where the man was from and where elements of the story took place but it is not the story, so it was coded as having ‘neither’ a positive nor a negative valence. Such a story is included in the study, however, because Toxteth features prominently in the article and its inclusion implies notions of ethnic and religious ‘otherness’.

The next column is the ‘quote’ column and it is here that I marked where any quotations in the article came from: an official/outsider source, a resident/insider source, both outsider and insider sources, and no quotation given. I coded using letters: a (official/outsider source), b (resident/insider source), c (both insider and outsider sources, and d (no quotation given). ‘Official/outsider sources’ were police, politicians, policymakers or anyone who was not from Toxteth. ‘Residents/insider sources’ were people who lived in Toxteth and who were familiar with life there. Articles coded ‘both’ had quotations from both an insider and an outsider source. Finally, the ‘no quotation’ option captured those articles where there was no quotation provided by any source.

The ‘descriptor’ column housed the tag-phrases that journalists and reporters use either preceding or following mention of Toxteth, such as “riot zone” (Guardian, 1985a: 26) or “commonly considered a no-go area” (Dunn, 1987). I noted the term used in the column and, where no term was used, I left the column blank.

The following column entitled ‘district’ was a place for me to note whether Toxteth was referred to as ‘Toxteth’, ‘West Toxteth’, ‘Toxteth Park’. Toxteth Park is an older term that refers to the district prior to its incorporation within Liverpool in 1895 but usage persisted into the 20th century. West Toxteth was a voting district that was abolished in 1950. I also noted any streets referred to in the article in the ‘street’ column. Finally, the ‘comments’ column allowed for me to give a precis of the article and to note any particularly interesting quotes from the text.

All articles were coded in this way to establish both terminology usage and context, over a two-month period between September and November 2017. The second stage of the analysis took place following the initial analysis and this sought to recontextualise the data (Starks and Brown Trinidad, 2007). This is what Teo terms “deep comparison” (2000) and
Carvalho calls “contextual analysis” (2008). Whereas the first stage considered each article as a textual entity with little outside context taken into consideration (decontextualised), the second stage of analysis reintroduced the context of the articles and considered them as part of a larger narrative (recontextualised). At this later stage of the analysis, I collated the data and plotted it onto graphs and charts to note larger trends that were occurring and to see how key term use coincided with political discourses of the era. This portion of the project involved returning to the literature on the history of Liverpool to better understand the context in which the texts were occurring and to note themes such as power struggles, dominant ideologies, and to ask who was creating the discourse in the texts and for what reason. At this stage, I also referenced official documents (such as those available through the Margaret Thatcher Archives), street directories, maps, and photographs to create a more complete contextual view.

4.3.4 Interviews
Interviews were conducted with ten journalists and two politicians to provide additional contextual understanding to the discourses that were arising from the newspaper analysis, and to triangulate findings that came about through textual content analysis. Interviews with journalists, while not subject to a critical discourse analysis, are an integral part of this study. Incorporating interviews with journalists draws on the approach used by Devereux et al. (2011a; 2011b) in their studies of housing in Limerick; they engaged with journalists as part of a production analysis and also with audiences as part of a reception analysis (2011a; 2011b). While a detailed reception analysis involving focus groups was not feasible in the time available for this project, engaging with journalists was possible within the timeframe.

Opting to use elements of a production analysis also fitted with the research question that sought to understand the why of press stigmatisation. By incorporating interviews with journalists into this project it became possible to move beyond the text and to see how media is produced, how discourses of stigma are produced and reproduced and, crucially, why this certain discourses emerge. The questions put to journalists concerned the production of news, their memories of Toxteth, and their interpretation of events. The interviews allowed me the chance to better understand how the media industry functions—quite necessary given that my analysis was, in part, based on the argument that the power dynamics inherent in the media play a part in the stigmatisation of Toxteth. The interviews also allowed journalists an opportunity to defend certain linguistic and semantic choices such as the use of tag-phrases (see 6.3.2) and to explain how the use of language came to be normalised.
In order to obtain a fair and balanced representation of journalists from across all of the papers under analysis, I began by contacting four journalists from each of the four main newspapers in the study (the Express, the Times, the Guardian, and the Mirror) selected based on how prolific they were or whether they wrote a particularly note-worthy article about Toxteth. I found their email addresses through an online search or found their LinkedIn profile and sent a contact request with a short explanation of why I wished to contact them. As responses were slow to arrive, I gradually emailed more journalists, discounting those whose email addresses were not available online or those who had died. I contacted 5 reporters from the Mirror, 7 from the Express, 12 from the Guardian, and 4 from the Times. I received initial replies from 12 journalists. Most were happy to be interviewed but explained that they did not recall very much from their time covering Toxteth, as many were now retired and their time working on Toxteth was many years ago. Two journalists from the Guardian stopped responding to emails after initial contact. Three journalists from the Express declined to be interviewed, with one accusing me of exhibiting a “Tory-bashing” agenda. Of this initial response group, I conducted six in-depth interviews: three in-person (Nick Timmins and Lucy Hodges formerly of the Times, and Maurice Chesworth formerly of the Mirror) and three by telephone (John Carvel and David Rose from the Guardian, and David Wooding now with the Sun but formerly with the Express). I also had informal conversations with two additional journalists formerly with the Guardian (Martin Wainwright and Malcolm Pithers) during the Northern Journalists’ Christmas Lunch to which I was invited by Malcolm Pithers and Martin Wainwright.

In addition to the journalists who had written for the newspapers under analysis, I also reached out to media commentators and reporters who had knowledge of media and journalistic ethics, and who could speak more freely about press and media practices. Of the six I initially contacted, five were happy to be interviewed. I travelled to London to conduct one in-person interview (Jon Snow, Channel 4 news), met another in Todmorden (Peter Lazenby formerly of the Yorkshire Evening Post and currently with the Morning Star), I conducted one telephone interview (Ian Hislop, Private Eye), and two respondents preferred to have the questions emailed to them (Nick Davies, formerly of the Guardian and Philip Cass, senior lecturer at Unitec, New Zealand). I also met with local Liverpool 8 housing activist, Ronnie Hughes, to ensure that my background and contextual understanding of the

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7 The reporter who wrote most articles for the Financial Times died recently so contacting an FT journalist was more problematic.
events in Liverpool were correct. I emailed Fred Forrest of the Liverpool History Society to clarify several key points; this exchange took place over email.

Finally, I sought the opinions of two key politicians: Lord Michael Heseltine, former Secretary of State for the Environment (1979-1983) and Minister for Merseyside who was directly involved in the regeneration work in Liverpool following the disturbances of 1981, and former Home Secretary Charles Clarke who, as a researcher for the Labour party in 1983, organised the Community Challenge conference about difficulties faced in ‘inner city’ areas. Both were willing to be interviewed and I met Lord Heseltine for an in-person interview and conducted a telephone interview with Mr. Clarke.

All in-person interviews took place in public spaces with the exception of the meeting with Jon Snow, which took place in Channel 4 news headquarters, and the meeting with Lord Heseltine which took place in business offices in London. They were semi-structured with an interview outline of questions to ask all participants but there was room for participants to talk freely and to interject with comments that they deemed relevant. A copy of the questions used to guide the interviews is included in Appendix 2. Transcripts of full interviews or sections to be used in the thesis were typed up and emailed to participants for them to review as agreed. Participants were told that they could redact anything from the interview transcript, and could withdraw from the study at any time.

It is worth reflecting on the final sample of journalists and policymakers interviewed in this study. With one exception, all journalists interviewed for this study were male. All journalists and policymakers were white. While recent research (Thurman et al., 2016) has shown that there is now a higher proportion of women involved in the production and presentation of news (despite a persistent gender pay gap that sees female journalists paid less than their male counterparts), the profession has historically been male-dominated (van Zoonen, 2002; Cvetkovic and Oostman, 2018). In the United States in the 1920s, “women journalists were treated as biologically unfit for newsroom duties” (Cvetkovic and Oostman, 2018: 95). This gender bias has significant ramifications for the type of news and the language and register of reporting used in reporting. For Cvetkovic and Oostman, the male-dominance in newsroom culture in the United States is reflected in a heightened press concern with “politics, crime, and sports” (2018: 95). Moreover, the “values of caring and compassion” that are associated with female discursive register are largely absent from the newsroom
Language use and register vary according to gender (Herring, 1993; Herring et al., 2007; Courtney Walton and Rice, 2013; Butler et al., 2018). Males tend to rely on challenging and assertive language where women tend to perpetuate a more defensive and supportive discourse (Herring, 1993; Herring et al., 2007; Courtney Walton and Rice, 2013; Butler et al., 2018). In Butler et al.’s study of the use of the term ‘shithole’ on the social media platform, Twitter, the authors found that men were overtly denigrating and condemnatory in relation to place (2018). This body of literature on gendered differences in communication suggests that where journalism is male-dominated, more challenging, authoritative and stigmatising language and tropes will be used. As such, while the journalists interviewed in this study largely represent the male-dominated nature of journalism, it is worth reflecting that their responses to interview questions may maintain the same dominant, authoritative, intransigent and stigmatising tones that the literature on gendered communication suggests.

Just as journalism has traditionally been a male-dominated field, the profession has been largely white. This lack of diversity persists in the contemporary era (Thurman et al., 2016). Thurman et al. explain that “UK journalism has a significant diversity problem in terms of ethnicity, with black Britons, for example, under-represented by a factor of more than ten” (2016: 6). This lack of diversity is reflected in the sample obtained in this study but it does raise larger questions about which voices the public hear through the media. Largely the voices being broadcast and printed are those of white males. This is particularly relevant in the case of Toxteth, which has a large black population. Dynamics of race play into the coverage and reportage of Toxteth, then, with black voices not being heard in the media coverage of the area.

Finally, while the questions asked of journalists did not enquire as to their class background, Thurman et al.’s research tells us that today “about half of journalists take a left-of-centre political stance, with the remaining half split between the centre and the right-wing. Right-of-centre political beliefs increase with rank” (2016: 6). However, Thurman et al.’s study also reveals the levels of trust that journalists place in various institutions, stating that “journalists have less trust in religious leaders and trade unions than they do in Parliament, the police, and the military, in part, we argue, because of their reliance on these latter institutions as sources of information” (2016: 7). This suggests that while journalists are almost evenly split between left and right politics, that journalists generally trust and value
voices that represent the status quo and, more particularly, the elite and dominant voices in society; they do not seek out critical voices. This means that while they may align across the political spectrum, they, as agents of power, tend to uphold the status quo.

Understanding the nature of the journalistic profession is necessary to evaluate the biases implicit in the journalists interviewed in this study. While they are able to reflect on journalistic practices and their insights were invaluable in establishing an understanding of the profession and professional practices, it is necessary to be cognisant that their views are entrenched in gendered, racial, and class relationships.

4.4 Ethics
Ethical approval was sought as part of a Light Touch Ethical Review application that covered the PhD project and a linked group project about online participation in the discourse of denigration. Ethical approval was granted as LTGEOG-027.

The overriding ethical consideration in qualitative research is that the researcher must protect the participants from harm (Orb et al., 2000: 94; Bryman, 2012: 135, 146). The first part of the study—archival research—bore little to no potential for human harm, whereas the potential for harm had to be considered more fully during the interview section of the study. Other ethical principles that must guide research include informed consent, privacy, and lack of deception (Diener and Crandall, 1978 in Bryman, 2012: 135).

There is very little research on the ethics of working with newspaper archives. Studies on archival materials tend to focus on personal documents such as letters that have made their way into an archive collection (see McKee and Porter, 2012) and there are clearer ethical implications for using such documents for research; these include personal information being divulged, names being used without consent, and issues of privacy (McKee and Porter, 2012). Such issues are less pertinent when using archived newspapers for research; journalists abide by a code of conduct that dictates that those being interviewed in the article have consented to their inclusion in the text and that intrusions into personal life are minimal (National Union of Journalists, 2011). Both journalists and those interviewed within the text had, as such, already consented to their inclusion within the newspaper text and, by being named, they had forgone their right to privacy. Two questions that McKee and Porter recommend asking for all archival research are: “how did the material get in the archive in the first place?” and “why and how” the researcher is doing the research (2012: 63, 67). The
first question is directed more towards letters and personal documents, with the express concern that they have entered an archive with the owner’s permission. For historical newspapers, it is accepted that they are freely available in the public domain from the time that they are printed. The second question refers to the need to ensure that any “damage done in the past” through archival research (McKee and Porter, 2012: 74) is not repeated. I was clear in my project’s guiding research questions: I was analysing newspapers that mention Toxteth to understand how the media adds to the territorial stigmatisation of place. By keeping this question foregrounded, it ensured that only relevant sources were amassed and that I was using the archival sources in a rigorous and critical manner.

The second aspect of the study involved interviews and so the issues of harm, consent, privacy, and personal information being divulged coalesce differently. Interviews were with non-vulnerable informants (journalists who were already happy for their name to be in the public domain). Each respondent consented to voluntary participation in the project (Bryman, 2012: 146) and each was given the opportunity to read an information sheet, ask questions, and sign a consent form (four participants elected not to sign consent forms but verbal consent was obtained) before commencing the interview. While their names are currently or have previously been used regularly in the public domain, I ensured that each was happy to be named both in the main body of the thesis and in the acknowledgements. Most participants were happy to give their permission for this for both appearance in the thesis and in any published work but two preferred to be emailed before quoting and naming them in the thesis and in any subsequent articles.

No personal information other than the interviewee’s name was garnered during the interviews so there was no sensitive or personal data (such as age, date of birth, religion, sexual orientation) to anonymise or protect. However, one respondent talked about an event at work and named individuals involved. As the interview progressed, the participant asked that that section of the interview be omitted because all parties were still alive and it was potentially inflammatory. Another interviewee contacted me after the interview and asked that a phrase used during the interview be omitted. Several interviewees made small changes to the transcript when it was sent to them for their approval.

The principle of protecting individuals from harm was central in all of the decisions made: from omitting sections of the interviews at a participant’s request to ensuring that there was
time to answer questions about the interview prior to commencing the interview. The ESRC framework for ethical research references that “research which would or might induce psychological stress, anxiety or humiliation, or cause more than minimal pain” would not be deemed ethical (ESRC in Bryman, 2012: 147). Questions referred to the respondents’ memories of covering the disturbances and to their knowledge of how the newspaper industry functions; none of the questions could cause anxiety, humiliation or stress to the participants.

By keeping the focus of harm to the participant central to this project and continually foregrounding the question of why I was doing the research, I ensured that the data gathered was relevant and ethically gathered.

4.5 Limitations
Locating the absolute genesis of territorial stigmatisation with regards to Toxteth or any other location through a strict linear approach is arguably not possible within the confines of a 12-month fieldwork project. As such, the study focuses on one stigmatised district (Toxteth) within a stigmatised city (Liverpool) within a stigmatised region (the North) to use as the project’s focus. By narrowing the geographical focus, it is possible to gain depth of understanding regarding the creation and emergence of stigma in a location and, by electing to use an exemplifying or paradigmatic case, much can be learned from Toxteth and can, as such, inform future studies.

Similarly, it has been necessary to limit the time-frame under study to the 20th century. As such, this thesis seeks less to find the very moment that stigmatisation began in relation to Toxteth but rather aims to tell the story of the media’s role in construction of stigma and to highlight that the longer story of place-based stigma warrants attention and is not separate to the story of territorial stigma but, rather, represents its foundations. These discursive moments of stigmatisation can tell a larger story of the historical legacy and evolution of territorial stigmatisation that is not limited solely to Toxteth or Liverpool but can be extrapolated, learned from, and applied to other settings.

While Devereux et al. (2011a, 2011b) follow a tripartite approach that combines content analysis with reception analysis and production analysis, this project does not use a reception analysis. The temporal focus of Devereux, Haynes and Power’s project was contemporary and so the residents from the area were aware of the issues being discussed and may have
resided in the area at the time of the media coverage. This project, conversely, is historical in nature so the residents with whom a reception analysis could have been conducted are likely no longer alive or active in the community. As such, this project was limited to content analysis, with additional context provided through interviews with journalists, politicians and media commentators. Pragmatically, it would also have been impossible within a 12-month fieldwork project completed by one researcher to have conducted such an in-depth study of newspaper texts and to have carried out both interviews with journalists and with members of the community if they were still alive and willing to talk to me. I decided that it was preferable to conduct a thorough content analysis of newspapers and to interview journalists to better understand the outsider construction of stigma rather than to complete a half-hearted attempt at all three (content analysis, journalist interviews and community interviews).

Finally, the project openly acknowledges that Toxteth is stigmatised. The research process has been oriented towards Toxteth and has sought to find examples of stigma, stigmatising language, and threads of discourse that, woven together, tell a story of an emerging stigmatised location. What this project has not done in great depth is consider whether the stigmatisation applied to Toxteth is unique or whether similar discursive moments can be found in relation to districts of other cities or even to other districts of Liverpool. However, this approach mirrors that employed by similar studies. Devereux et al. (2011a; 2011b) preferentially select Moyross, Limerick as their case study where they consider stigmatising media coverage. They acknowledge that Moyross is a stigmatised housing estate but they do not seek to examine whether the treatment of Moyross is comparable to other housing estates in Limerick, Ireland or to other housing estates in Ireland more generally. Similarly, Slater and Anderson (2011) study St Paul’s, Bristol. They interview and examine the perception and lived reality of territorial stigma in St Paul’s—they do not engage in a comparative study to examine whether the same factors are at play in other localities. Studies of territorial stigmatisation generally select extreme cases of stigma where there is an enduring, palpable and detectable popular stigma and examine the factors at play in that case location. A criticism of this approach is that it fails to capture similar factors at play in locations that do not suffer enduring stigma; however, this underscores the question at the heart of all research on territorial stigma: why does spatial smear stick in some places and not in others? This question requires much consideration and, slowly, as scholars pick away at the question, we will begin to understand why stigma adheres in some places and why the
same factors, the same media treatment, the same smear elsewhere, does not result in an enduring spatial stigma. This study contributes to this debate by stepping back from the contemporary moment and adding to the puzzle a larger story of the historical legacy and evolution of territorial stigmatisation in the extreme case of Toxteth, through a lens of the transition from primitive stigmatisation to territorial stigmatisation.
Chapter 5: Toxteth before the 1981 disturbances: a story of silences and primitive stigma

5.1 Introduction
In February 1902, the Catholic Herald ran a series of special reports on slum areas in Liverpool entitled ‘The Black Spot on the Mersey’ referencing the description used in 1843 by William Henry Duncan, Liverpool’s first Medical Officer of Health to describe Liverpool (Bailey and Millington, 1957: 43). In the sixth report of the series, the reporter visits Toxteth and describes the conditions in the district:

There are a few streets in the locality, the dwellers in which have a notoriety which is not exactly enviable. The distinguishing characteristics of these streets are lodging-houses for negro, lascar, and other foreign seamen, mulatto children, drunken men and women, and street fights. These streets are not considered desirable beats by the police, many of whom have come to grief in the perambulations therein—one of them, not long since had one of his eyes gouged out whilst trying to quell a riot amongst some foreign sailors and their hangers-on. (The Catholic Herald, 1902).

Here, written in the language of fear, we see the image of Toxteth that has been perpetuated by the press for decades: a place of others, of danger, of lawlessness, and as a threat to mainstream society. While the next chapters consider the portrayal and stigmatisation of Toxteth during and after the disturbances and examine the techniques used to stigmatise and the broader socio-political context, in this chapter I address how Toxteth was depicted in the Times, the Guardian, the Mirror, the Express, and the Financial Times in the years prior to the disturbances of 1981.

Figure 5.1 shows that the coverage of Toxteth peaked dramatically in 1981 coinciding with four nights of uprisings in July 1981 (Frost and Phillips, 2011: 1). While the lack of high levels of coverage (Fig. 5.1) indicate lower levels of press stigmatisation of Toxteth prior to 1981, the media exhibited what I term ‘primitive stigmatisation’, meaning that reporters draw attention to Toxteth and make Toxteth a ‘visible’ place in the public imagination, or, in the language of sociologist Erving Goffman—whose work on stigma forms the basis of
Figure 5.1: Coverage of ‘Toxteth’ in the British press during the 20th century.

Figure 5.2: Coverage of ‘Toxteth’ before the disturbances.
Wacquant’s theories of territorial stigma—tainting it, and marking it with discrediting attributes (1963: 12). Figure 5.2 reflects the fact that the coverage of Toxteth between 1900 and 1980 was gradually mounting as newsworthy events and occurrences in Toxteth were increasing in frequency; but, more so, with newsworthy events comes increased coverage (Galtung and Ruge, 1965) and Figure 2 supports this fact. With the exception of the Financial Times, which did not cover Toxteth prior to the disturbances of 1981, all newspapers increased their coverage of Toxteth as the century progressed with peaks in the first decade (1900-1910), in the 1930s, and then between 1960 and 1975.

This chapter does not address the causes of the disturbances; that is a task that has been addressed effectively elsewhere (Gifford, 1989; Frost and Phillips, 2011; Hunt, 2014). This chapter addresses subsidiary research question 1: How is Toxteth portrayed prior to the disturbances of 1981 and can traces of stigma be detected prior to the era of advanced marginality? To achieve this I first offer a historical contextualisation of the era covered in this chapter, highlighting conditions in Liverpool generally and Toxteth more specifically. The chapter then shifts to show that the story of Toxteth prior to 1981 is seemingly a story of silences relating to structural inequalities, of stories not reported, of findings not covered by the press. However, using elements of a Foucauldian archaeological approach, I dig deeper in the data, excavating fragments and strands of discourse to show that the press was actually drawing attention to key aspects of life in Toxteth—sometimes indirectly—by painting the area as a place of inter-community strife that points to ideas of difference, of increased criminality that points to deviance, and as exhibiting a lack of housing safety, that points to notions of danger. The process used to access the analysis in this chapter involves a careful sifting of data, noting discourse fragments, connecting these fragments to other discourses, piecing together an analysis through consulting with a variety of archival sources ranging from maps, photographs, and street directories. This archaeological approach reflects the fact that fragments of discourse in the press connect to, and echo, longer strands of discourse that can explain social and political changes and discourse. In addition to using national coverage on which this thesis is primarily based, in this chapter I also draw on sources gathered from regional newspapers during the pilot study stage of the study to illustrate some of the silences of the national media to help piece together, in a Foucauldian sense, strands of discourse that can explain a larger discourse of primitive stigmatisation.
Then, using coverage from during the disturbances that reflects on structural conditions in Toxteth prior to 1981, I show that the conditions that led to the disturbances were evident but that media and politicians largely remained silent. Toxteth was not treated as either a political or a press priority and, as such, coverage about amalgamating structural forces that were weighing heavy on the district largely went ignored. Next, I discuss the notion and theorization of primitive stigma upon which this chapter is built. I then dig beneath the dominant silence and discuss the discourse threads or epistemes that constitute media-created primitive stigmatisation. I consider first the press stigmatisation of Toxteth as a place of inter-community strife, focusing specifically on the sectarian violence that marred Toxteth (and Liverpool more generally) in the early part of the 20th century. Depicting Toxteth as an area in which rival communities were sparring made Toxteth stand out and reinforced Liverpool's position as a particularly factional city (Neal, 1988; Belchem, 2006; Belchem and MacRaid, 2006; Roberts, 2017). Next, I address the press coverage of Toxteth that focuses on increasing criminality. This press focus renders Toxteth visible as a criminalised and unsafe locale in which random crime is common and, as such, portrays Toxteth as a place that should be feared. I focus on reports of crime and police hunts for criminals, which were particularly common during the mid-20th century. Finally, I show that the press stigmatised Toxteth as a place of public danger through focus on housing failings, with fires, explosions, and gas leaks featuring regularly in the news. The precariousness of safety in Toxteth as reported by the press reflects a reality that the housing in Toxteth that was largely unsuitable for the population residing therein; that the media simply reported the events and not the structural context amounts to a further media silence.

In this chapter I show that the coverage of Toxteth prior to the disturbances of 1981 follows Hudson's core stigma thesis. This core stigma forms a sort of foundational or primitive stigma that precedes territorial stigmatisation at the levels experienced under conditions of advanced marginality. It is the parallel coalescence of real-world events and the stigmatising portrayal of these events through discourse that transforms primitive stigmatisation into stigmatisation. Without the parallel discursive construction and stigmatising of a location, the real-world events go unreported and stigma cannot emerge.

5.2 From world city to pariah city
As the 20th century dawned, Liverpool’s façade, built on centuries of merchant success, was beginning to crumble. It was struggling both socially, infrastructurally, and economically. Socially, the presence of the ethnic ‘others’ in Liverpool rose to the forefront as the 20th
century dawned. Sectarian violence marked the beginning of the 20th century for the city with protests between Catholics and Protestants (Neal, 1988: 226), and the Liverpool Catholic Herald drew attention to ‘no-go’ areas in Toxteth defined by presence of immigrants and street fights (Belchem, 2007: 69). Race riots hit in 1918 at the end of World War I (Belchem, 2007: 315) and a Liverpool Echo report into Liverpool’s “coloured colonies” referred to Toxteth as the “New Harlem of Liverpool” (Belchem, 2005: 151). Housing was some of the poorest in the country (Wildman, 2012: 127) and unemployment in the city between the wars reached 20% for men (Belchem, 2006: 516). By the beginning of the Great Depression, 30% of the city was living under the poverty line (Belchem, 2006: 516) and the wealthiest residents of the city were moving out, helped by the new Mersey Tunnel built in 1934, which connected Liverpool to the leafier Wirral (Vereker et al., 1961: 83, 105).

The Second World War unleashed a cruel attack on the city of Liverpool’s infrastructure and housing and, by its close, 75,000 people were made homeless in the city (McIntyre-Brown, 2001: 127; Bailey and Millington, 1957: 57; Belchem, 2006: 516). The Housing Repairs and Rents Act of 1954 saw 43% of residences in Liverpool condemned unfit for habitation compared with the national average of 6.5% (Vereker and Barron Mays, 1961: 39). As a result of the 1944 Merseyside Plan, slum clearance policies were under way and families were rehoused in new outlying estates such as Kirkby, Cantril Farm and Netherley, built on the outskirts of the city (Belchem, 2006: 516; Frost and North, 2013). The housing development initiatives soon slowed and lost momentum in the 1970s (Frost and North, 2013). Politically the city was changing, too, and in 1955 Labour won control of the council for the first time after Conservative and Liberal holds in the years prior (Belchem, 2006: 516).

The biggest challenges faced by the city were economic and, ultimately, it was these economic changes that led to further social and political changes. Liverpool’s success was built on it being a prolific general port that handled and processed a variety of goods (Milne, 2006: 258). Graeme Milne, in his account of the maritime history of Liverpool, expresses that “Liverpool’s experience was in many ways the embodiment of Victorian free-trade Liberalism” (2006: 259). The city had risen to the status of a prolific port in the 19th century with booming Irish and Atlantic trade (Milne, 2006: 259). The reach of Liverpool’s ships and trading pathways only expanded as the 19th century advanced, and the city embraced the move from sail to steamships (Milne, 2006: 260) and was trading heavily in cotton—the main trade for the city since the abolition of the slave trade (Belchem, 2006: 514). Liverpool was,
during this era, a truly world city at the forefront of “the first era of globalization” (Milne, 2006: 261).

The city’s fortunes were shaken during the two world wars but the interwar years saw the city adapt to changing industries. Rather than a focus on textiles and cotton, inter-war Liverpool began to focus on “metals and machinery” and post-1945 Liverpool shifted to a focus on technology and consumer goods (Milne, 2006: 164). However, the globalization wave of the 1960s and 1970s dealt Liverpool’s port a blow from which it could not recover. The rise in containerization and air travel deprived the city of a purpose and a sustainable economy. Where international travel had once required the journey to begin in a major port city like Liverpool, now travel “became a suburban, rather than an urban, business” (Milne, 2006: 264) with airports and transport hubs located outside the city limits; passenger ferry traffic moved to Southampton further removing Liverpool from the core of international travel itineraries (Frost and North, 2013). Also located outside the city were the factories where containers were packed; no longer were dock labourers needed on the city’s docks to pack cargo (Milne, 2006: 264). For communities like Toxteth, which housed dock labourers, the changes in global trade dealt them a strong blow.

Adding to the declining industrial conditions that saw the docks abandoned and the loss of jobs for thousands, by the 1970s the country, including Liverpool, was gripped by strikes and industrial disputes (McIntyre-Brown, 2001: 94), racial tensions were brewing in Liverpool. Most working poor and the Black population in Liverpool lived in council housing in Liverpool 8 (that includes Toxteth), which had become a “dumping ground” according to Margaret Simey, a local councillor, campaigner and chair of the Merseyside County Police Commission (Gifford et al., 1989: 39-40; Nassy Brown, 2005: 68), and unemployment for black youths in Liverpool 8 was at 32.5% compared to 19.5% for an equivalent white group (Nassy Brown, 2005: 104). By 1980, The Merseyside Area Profile Group published ‘Racial disadvantage in Liverpool’ detailing concerns about unemployment among the black community of Liverpool, poor access to housing, black residents being waitlisted longer than white residents for housing outside Liverpool 8, and the role of prostitution in Granby (also in Liverpool 8) (Nassy Brown, 2005: 104-5). The Gifford Report commissioned after the disturbances of 1981 would later state that the situation for black people in Liverpool at this time was “uniquely horrific” compared to elsewhere in the

In 1978 a recession hit Liverpool. Not a city historically famed for its manufacturing, always preferring the port industry and international trade, the burgeoning manufacturing industry was struck by the recession and 450 factories closed their doors bringing the city’s unemployment to 25% (Belchem, 2006: 517). Some 12,000 people vacated the city and 15% of land in Liverpool was vacant or derelict (Belchem, 2006: 517).

This chapter is temporally situated during this period of immense social, economic and political change and tells the story of how, grounded in the realities of life in Liverpool, stigma around Toxteth came to build in the national press through a form of primitive stigmatisation.

5.3 Media silences
Despite the structural problems apparent in Liverpool generally and Toxteth more specifically, the press were largely silent on these issues. Once the disturbances broke out in July 1981, however, several newspapers referred to the structural problems that had been in existence in the years before 1981. Their retrospective coverage discussed the unemployment, the poor housing, and the pervading sense of hopelessness present in Toxteth. However, that the coverage only emerged retrospectively suggests that, without the catalyst of the disturbances, the stories of structural causes would have gone largely unheard.

The *Mirror* included an article four days after the commencement of the disturbances with photographs and acknowledgement of the structural barriers in place in Toxteth (Fig. 5.3 and Fig. 5.4). These images and analysis had, it appears, been commissioned in March 1981 but were never included in copy until the disturbances occurred. The article, entitled, “A portrait of Liverpool 8 BEFORE the fury spilled over” is illustrated with five images. The first is of a bandaged and injured policeman, referring to the “savage rioting” (*Mirror*, 1981a: 13). Another shows a street sign with the name “Toxteth” on it. The others are of two children playing, referring to “racial harmony”, of “three men…outside a boarded-up slum house” and “a broken-down car…left to rot against a background of rundown houses”, both
Figure 5.3: An article from the Mirror containing findings from March 1981.
of which reflect the dereliction and physical decay experienced—but unreported—in the lead up to the disturbances. The article reads:

This is the grim face of Toxteth, Liverpool 8—the rundown area which became front-page news after a weekend of savage rioting. These pictures, specially taken for the Daily Mirror in March show the squalor and desolation and what was once a middle-class suburb. Unemployment in the area, now virtually a black ghetto, is critically high. Red-light girls thrive in the shambles of tatty terraced streets and modern tenement slums. But it is the despair of unemployment which probably lies at the heart of Toxteth’s festering troubles. A city councils survey last year put the number of jobless in the area at 37 per cent. Other estimates paint an even more dismal picture. A recent Liverpool University report on the Liverpool and district [sic] put white unemployment at 43 per cent and black at 47 per cent. In its 1980 report the Merseyside Community Relations Committee claimed that half the black people in the city were
out of work. Latest unemployment figures for the city show
81,000 people chasing just over 1,000 jobs. At the careers
office, with thousands of school-leavers looking for work,
there are just twelve vacancies. Against this background, the
ugly and unacceptable face of Toxteth has little hope (Mirror,
1981a: 13).

The conditions detailed in this report were all evident prior to the disturbances but, despite
having photographs and data, the Mirror did not publish details of the structural inequalities
that plagued Toxteth until the advent of the disturbances. The Merseyside Community
Relations Committee report and the city council survey cited in the article, which show
staggeringly high unemployment rates, did not receive media attention. With the exception
of the Guardian, unemployment and discrimination in Toxteth generally went unreported
prior to the disturbances. An article in the Guardian in 1972 (Fig. 5.5 A) noted Toxteth as an
area struggling under high unemployment, racial discrimination, gang violence, educational
inequity, and “large movements of population”, seemingly through housing clearance
(Dewhurst, 1972: 4). The article notes that Liverpool’s senior community relations officer
was surveying the area—her findings are not reported in any newspaper other than in the
Guardian. In 1975, writing for the Guardian, Gillian Linscott reports findings of the Inner
Area Study (Fig. 5.5 B) that noted “low income, poor housing, and a ‘sense of alienation [felt]
by many of [Toxteth’s] inhabitants brought about by poverty, insecurity, and a lack of
power’” (Linscott, 1975: 5). Similarly, a Guardian article from 1975 (Fig. 5.5 C) entitled
“Tough times in Toxteth” acknowledges that “Toxteth, the Liverpool 8 area that in general
provides plenty of work for sociologists and very little for anybody else”, has a severe job
shortage and that unemployment in 1975 was at 11% compared to 3% in the rest of the
country, with residents facing “handicaps” in successfully attaining a job (Guardian, 1981f:
6). The Guardian was the only paper in this study that sought to draw attention to the rising
tensions and deprivation within Toxteth and that attempted to bring to the public discourse
a seemingly genuine concern for the plight of the area’s residents.

For other papers, the silence prior to the disturbances was deafening but a month after the
disturbances broke out, the Times (Fig. 5.5 D) relayed the news that a government-sponsored
report approved by the Home Affairs Committee of Racial Disadvantage had been
commissioned prior to the disturbances and found that “Liverpool was pinpointed as the most disturbing area of racial disadvantage in the United Kingdom” (Hodges, 1981: 2). This fact had been largely unacknowledged prior to the disturbances. That the government had commissioned a report says that there were problems of deprivation, unemployment, and racial inequality that needed to be addressed but the findings came too late to prevent the disturbances from occurring. That the press remained silent on these structural issues but chose, instead, to report on the manifestations of these factors (inter-community strife, crime, and the substandard nature and safety of housing), explains the reporting preferences of the press: reporters and editors selected only newsworthy and negative stories at the expense of investigative journalism that would have examined the causes of Toxteth’s strife, and challenged the status quo. This media silence correlates with Noam Chomsky’s
propaganda theory. He explains that “media serve the interests of state and corporate power, which are closely interlinked, framing their reporting and analysis in a manner supportive of established privilege and limiting debate and discussion accordingly (Chomsky, 1989: 21). Drawing attention to structural issues inherent in Toxteth would be to have drawn attention to political deficiencies and weaknesses in the status quo. The press, in support of state actors, is unlikely to draw attention to flaws in the status quo and is more likely, instead, to focus on core stigmatising attributes that mar Toxteth through a ‘pathological gaze’ (Devereux et al., 2011a; 2011b).

5.4 Primitive stigmatisation
While the media remained silent on issues of structural inequality and deprivation in relation to Toxteth, it keenly pointed to stories that painted Toxteth as a place of strife, increasing criminality, and substandard housing. This chapter shows that Toxteth was being stigmatised in the years before the disturbances but not to the levels it would experience in the post-Fordist era. A key feature of this early stigma is its obliqueness and subtlety. Where later stigma of the era of advanced marginality is direct and overt (see chapters 6, 7 and 8) with reliance on stigmatising terminology and with the reader being told directly which negative features to associate with Toxteth, this earlier stigma is constructed through stigmatising attributes, indirect and subtle references, and contextual knowledge, I term this early stigma ‘primitive stigma’.

I use the term ‘primitive’ in the same sense as it is used in Marx’s ‘primitive accumulation’ where it refers to the processes that led to the emergence of capitalism (1867: 874-5). The process of primitive accumulation marked the transition zone between the feudal economic system in which the peasant worker could control the means of production and in which he retained direct contact with the means of production, and the capitalist economic system marked by private ownership of land. For Marx, this transition period was violent and wrenched peasants and workers from land, and “divorces the worker from the ownership of the conditions of his own labour” (Marx, 1867: 874). The resultant capitalist system required the worker to sell his labour and to relinquish any rights to the land as a means of production. Crucial in Marx’s structuring of the process of primitive accumulation as the precursor to capitalism, is the understanding that the capitalist economy could not—and did not—emerge from nowhere; the process of primitive accumulation was foundational. In this way, it serves as the facilitator of capitalism—the necessary basis on which the capitalist economy was built.
In the same vein, rather than seeing territorial stigmatisation as a unique feature of the age of advanced marginality or of the post-Fordist economy (Wacquant, 2008; Wacquant et al., 2014), I hold that ‘primitive’ stigmatisation was the necessary precursor to territorial stigmatisation. In order for the stigma of the era of advanced marginality to attain such an adhesive grip, such that “urban hellholes” gain “national eponym” status (Wacquant, 2008: 238), a form of stigma had to precede it. Wacquant et al. suppose that “the confluence of urbanization, industrialization, and upper-class fears as well as fantasies about the ‘teeming masses’ rallying in the city” (2014: 1273) led to a “spatial smear of earlier epochs” (2014: 1273) but they argue that this differs from territorial stigma in five ways. Territorial stigma is, they argue, “autonomised, nationalised and democratised, equated with social disintegration, racialised through selective accentuation, and it elicits revulsion often leading to punitive corrective measures” (2014: 1270). I argue that this breakdown is misleading and creates an unnecessary division in the story of stigma. This study highlights that the five differences do not always hold true: Toxteth in the early 20th century is shown as a place of strife but it is not depicted as the counterworld Wacquant et al. suggest (2014: 1274); its name is continually degraded and comes to bear only negative associations; it is racialised and exoticised; and the later penal sanctions were, in part, the result of the longue durée of stigma.

This thesis argues that instead of drawing a distinction between ‘spatial smear of earlier epochs’ and territorial stigma, it is more helpful to see this earlier smear as a form of primitive stigma that was necessary for later stigma to endure. This primitive stigma is facilitated by and enacted through core stigma (Hudson, 2008), whereby Toxteth is marred with a low-level, background stigma that gradually degrades and chips away at the image of the area. In the same way that the working class is normalised through capitalist society’s advances (Marx [1867] 1976), this low-grade stigma becomes normalised, taken-for-granted and, ultimately, can transition into operationalised and politically activated territorial stigma.

I concur with Wacquant et al. (2014) that there is a change in the character and operationalization of stigma with the advent of the era of advanced marginality as part of the post-Fordist economy, but separating the two strands deprives territorial stigma of its history. Instead of seeing the advent of territorial stigma with the post-industrialisation of society, I suggest that stigma of place can be seen as a feature that began with the industrial metropolis, as urban land use economies and patterns changed, and areas of the city came to bear particular purposes and demographic characteristics (Kivell, 1993: 4).
5.5 Inter-community strife
One of the ways that the press primatively stigmatised Toxteth in the decades prior to the disturbances was through a focus on inter-community strife, particularly in relation to Catholic-Protestant sectarianism and poor race relations. Coverage of both racial and sectarian disputes subtly highlights that the area is a place of otherness and difference with a diverse population struggling to get along.

Liverpool was known as being a particularly cosmopolitan city (Belchem, 2005: 147) with immigrants arriving from all corners of the world; it had a more varied and diverse population than London in the mid-19th century (Lawton and Pooley, 1974: 276). Professor John Belchem, who has studied the ethnic relations of settlers and communities in Liverpool, argues that Liverpool was unusual among early-modern British cities in its ‘modern’ forms of spatial segregation with different ethnic communities and social classes occupying different areas of the city (Belchem, 2005: 151). Though many of the Irish who arrived in Liverpool following the famine of the 1840s settled in the north end of the city in and around Vauxhall, a significant proportion also settled in the south end of the city near Toxteth (Neal, 1988: 4). Most of those who arrived on the mainland from Ireland following the famine were Catholic, and the terms “Irish and Catholic were readily synonymous” (Belchem and MacRaild, 2006: 326). Toxteth at the dawn of the 20th century was a mixed area of Catholics and Protestants but the Belfast News-letter, in addition to stating that Liverpool remained loyal to Ulster (suggesting it remained a Protestant city), referenced a large presence of Orangemen in the area (1912: 7). The Orange Order, a Unionist Protestant fraternity, has long been connected with working class Loyalist culture (Walker, 1992; Magennis, 2006; McAuley and Tonge, 2006) and reference to a high number of Orangemen in Toxteth would conjure up images of not only Protestantism but of notions of the working class, which stigmatises Toxteth on class and economic grounds. Liverpool’s Protestant presence was further upheld through its Protestant political party—the Protestant Party led by George Wise—and both Wise and members of the party were frequently arrested for obstruction, often in Toxteth (Guardian, 1904a: 12). Wise’s aims were initially to reduce ritualism in the Protestant liturgical tradition but eventually the aims of the party became directly anti-Catholic (Coslett, 2009).

In addition to the Protestant presence, however, an article in the Nottingham Evening Post mentions the existence of the Catholic Democratic League in Toxteth (1904: 3). There is no literature to be found on the Catholic Democratic League in Liverpool but it appears to a
political movement based on Christian democracy and Catholic social values (O’Malley, 1903: 264) that was situated on Jackson Street (Liverpool Daily Post, 1904a). An Edwardian Street directory shows that there was, in fact, a church on Jackson Street in 1908 but does not specify if it was Catholic or Protestant (Bolger, 2002: 8). Also indicative of a strongly religious population in Toxteth is discussion in the Liverpool Daily Post in 1904 of ‘Judas burnings’ on Good Friday (1904b: 2). The same practice is reported again in the Aberdeen Evening Express in 1954 (1954: 12). This practice of burning an effigy of Judas Iscariot is practised by Catholic and Orthodox denominations and suggests that there was a significant Catholic population living in the Liverpool 8 postcode. However, the Hartlepool Northern Daily Mail refers to the Judas burnings as being a custom peculiar to Protestant communities in the South End of Liverpool (1937: 4). This suggests that the tradition may not have indicated a strong religious identity as much as a strong local community identity.

In the press, the Catholic and Protestant populations of Toxteth were not reported to live in harmony, and, in the first decade of the 20th century, sectarian tensions were portrayed as being high. By 1909, Liverpool was referred to as the ‘Belfast of England’ reflecting the sectarianism in the city (Coslett, 2009). Tensions between Catholics and Protestants were reported in the both the Times and the Guardian but not in the Express, Mirror, or Financial Times. In March 1904, the Times reports that (Fig. 5.6 A):

A disturbance occurred in Liverpool yesterday morning between members of the George Wise Protestant Crusade and a strong Catholic opposition…When the procession was marching through Toxteth in the direction of St. George’s Hall it encountered strong opposition. Somebody, it is said, rushed at the drummer and endeavoured to cut the drum. A general fight followed, in which blows were exchanged and missiles were thrown (Times, 1904: 10).

A month later, marches and disturbances were continuing and a report in the Guardian in 1904, explains that (Fig. 5.6 B):

The Liverpool police have in custody nine young men and two women in connection with religious processions. Late on Saturday night a Protestant band was attacked in the
Toxteth district, where Orangemen are numerous... Seven arrests were made. Last night a Roman Catholic band paraded the district, and the disturbance was renewed and four more arrests were made. A large force of police was drafted into the district, the opposing factions maintaining a threatening attitude (Guardian, 1904b: 8).

Although not a key part of this study, a pilot study using newspapers sourced from the BNA revealed that sectarianism in Toxteth was widely discussed in regional daily papers with the *Shepton Mallet Journal* describing the scenes in Toxteth as “notorious” (1904: 7) and the *Daily News* adding that Toxteth is an area where religious disturbances have become prevalent (1904: 9). While street skirmishes between Catholics and Protestants became less frequent in Toxteth (the same could not be said for the northern districts of the city) as the 20th century progressed, in 1920, Sinn Fein planned to bomb the gates at Toxteth docks (Guardian, 1920: 7), implying that politico-religious tensions in the area remained high and had become politicised.

The nature of the sectarian conflict in Liverpool may have been linked to a religious overtone in the search for employment. Frank Neal, economist and historian whose work has centred on the role of the Irish in Britain, explains that “in Liverpool the docks and warehouses became the battleground for jobs between Catholic and Orange equivalents of the Mafia” (2002: 32) implying that religious sectarianism spread as far as the realms of employment. With Catholics and Protestants competing for jobs in a sectarian market, and clashing on the streets, Toxteth was portrayed as an area of inter-community strife.

**Figure 5.6:** Newspaper cuttings regarding the religious disturbances in Liverpool in 1904.
This national press coverage of sectarian strife in Toxteth in the early years of the 20th century signalled that the area was one of disruption and otherness. Sectarian strife hinted at the presence of the Irish, which cast a deeply stigmatising pall over Toxteth with the Irish representing a threat of otherness, poverty and society’s “dregs” (Belchem, 2005; 2007). The area was shown to be one of turmoil, strife, and difference that could not be tamed but this was not limited to Catholic-Protestant disputes. The early 20th century also saw racial conflicts in Toxteth, in Liverpool more widely, and in port cities across the country.

In addition to its diverse religious population, Toxteth had a diverse ethnic composition also. “Negroes, Chinese, Mulattoes, Filipinos, almost every nationality under the sun’ were to be found in the south end, but they seldom ventured into the north end” (O’Mara, 1934: 11 in Belchem, 2005: 151). The Black population of Liverpool was largely confined to Toxteth (Belchem, 2005: 151) because of institutionalised ghettoization (Hughes, 2018, interview). Toxteth’s diverse racial composition stemmed from its position as a port city. Its high black population arose from its roots as the ‘slaving capital of the world’ (Belchem and MacRaild, 2006: 320) and the popularity and fashion among wealthy traders to have one or more black slaves (Belchem and MacRaild, 2006: 320). Combined with a population of African sailors—particularly the Kru from Liberia (Costello, 2001: 17)—who stayed in Liverpool after disembarking from their voyages, the black population of Liverpool largely settled in Toxteth (Nassy Brown, 2005: 87). The First World War had provided a “boom for black labour” in shipping companies and in the military, which soon collapsed when the war ended (Fryer, 1992: 298). By 1919, animosity was growing between the white ex-servicemen returning from the war seeking work, and the black labourers who had filled their jobs during the war. Peter Fryer, a writer and journalist who detailed the history of the black community in Britain in his book, *Staying Power*, explains that the situation in Liverpool following the war was particularly dire:

Demobilization had increased Liverpool’s black population to a figure variously estimated at 2,000 and 5,000, of whom a large proportion was out of work. In one week alone, in the spring of 1919, about 120 black workers employed for years in the big Liverpool sugar refineries and oilcake mills were sacked because white workers now refused to work with them (1992: 299).
Attacks on the black population became commonplace and retaliatory attacks also took place. Fryer explains that the police, in attempt to stop the violence, raided boarding houses that housed black seamen where attacks took place between the police and the black lodgers. During these raids, a man named Charles Wooten, who had served in the navy, fled from a boarding house in Upper Pitt Street “closely pursued by two policemen—and by a crowd of between 200 and 300 hurling missiles” who threw him into the docks and let him perish (Fryer, 1992: 300). Fryer writes that “for the next few days an anti-black reign of terror raged in Liverpool” (1992: 301) with frequent attacks and crowds of white people looting and damaging black boarding houses.

Fryer’s work hints that the media inflamed tensions, primarily placing blame at the hands of the black population, leaving it “to a local magistrate to say that it was the white mob which were ‘making the name of Liverpool an abomination and disgrace to the rest of the country’” (1992: 302-3). However, the coverage of the race riots of 1919 is revealing. Apart from one article in the Times, the national media did not connect the race riots with the district of Toxteth. Instead, the national press focused on either the city more generally or on individual streets (that were within the Toxteth district) such as Mill Street, taking the stigmatisation of Liverpool to a city-level or street level rather than a district level (notions of scale and up-scaling are discussed in chapter 7 in the context of the ‘inner city’). An article in the Guardian entitled ‘The colour trouble in Liverpool’ reads (Fig 5.7 A&B):

The strong feeling against the blacks for the recent rioting in Liverpool resulted in an attack by whites on coloured men in Mill Street, the foreign quarter of the city, during the early hours of yesterday morning. Four negroes and two white men were injured in a fierce fight, in which a big black man was seen striking out with an iron bar and was also shouting, “Down with the white race”. Knowing the intention of the white men to clear out the blacks from their locality, the police counselled the blacks to remain indoors. The negroes, however, are not inclined to follow the advice, and whenever a black man shows himself after nightfall he is chased and beaten…Though warned by the police, the black men walked abroad in the foreign quarter yesterday afternoon, and as they
came out of their lodgings or stepped from tramcars were attacked by whites. Seven black were arrested and a number were wounded in the head (Guardian, 1919: 8).

This article refers to Toxteth indirectly as the ‘foreign quarter’ and the paper’s acknowledgement that Mill Street is the “foreign quarter of the city” reflects Toxteth’s
diverse ethnic composition. This article demonstrates that, in the case of the race riots, the media did not engage widely in district-level stigmatisation but, instead, took a city-level or street-level focus. Quite why the national press referred to religious or sectarian violence at a district-level but racial violence at a city- or street-level is unclear, and this district-level silence requires further future examination. However, this finding shows that stigma can operate at various levels from the street to the city.

The *Times* article, which does report and stigmatise at a district-level (referring to the former name of the area, Toxteth Park) states that (Fig. 5.8):

Last night there was indiscriminate rioting in the Toxteth Park district. House property was damaged, furniture taken from houses, piled in the streets, and set on fire. The fire brigade was called out twice. The streets were filled with thousands of excited people. In one case a taxicab, containing a coloured man, was stopped, the passenger taken out and robbed of about £175 by hooligans, who at once decamped (Times, 1919: 9).

![FRESH DISTURBANCES.](image)

*FRESH DISTURBANCES.*

Telephoning at 1 o'clock this morning, our Liverpool Correspondent reported that the disturbances had assumed an increasingly dangerous aspect. The trouble of the past few days has inflamed the passions of the hooligan classes, and last night there was indiscriminate rioting in the Toxteth Park district. House property was damaged, furniture taken from houses, piled in the streets, and set on fire. The fire brigade was called out twice. The streets were filled with thousands of excited people. In one case a taxicab, containing a coloured man, was stopped, the passenger taken out and robbed of about £175 by hooligans, who at once decamped.

The coloured population are in a state of terror, and at the time of telephoning some hundreds of them were being sheltered at the police headquarters. In numerous cases coloured men were found to have armed themselves for self-defence.

*Figure 5.8: A Times article reporting on racial tensions in Toxteth (1919).*

Apart from this *Times* article, however, the district-level stigmatisation of Toxteth as being a place of lawlessness and difference is largely omitted. The high levels of coverage of Toxteth
with relation to sectarian violence and tension compared to the low—almost non-existent—coverage of the race riots of 1919 raises many questions. The wider coverage of the sectarian violence and omission of district-level racial violence implies a condonation of the behaviour of the white population in Toxteth with relation to their treatment of the black population. A more likely explanation for the press stigmatisation of the race riots occurring at a city-wide and street-level is that the riots were operationalised as a means of stigmatising Liverpool as a city in the national discourse, as a place of danger, deviance, and difference. Always considered a city that is different or ‘exceptional’ in some way (Belchem, 2006), attributing the race riots in Toxteth to a city-level scale may have drawn further attention to the city of Liverpool as an ‘other’ in the national geography of Britain. This echoes Kornberg’s assertion that we must always ask what purpose and which ends stigma serves (2016). In the case of sectarianism, stigma was operationalised at a district-level to single out Toxteth as a troubled sub-section of Liverpool. In the case of the racial violence, stigma was, instead, operationalised to smear the entire city of Liverpool as being racially different and troubled.

The focus on inter-community strife contributes to primitive stigmatisation by painting Toxteth as bearing the attributes of otherness, strife, factionalism, and disorder. Chapter 2 highlighted the role that racialization and othering plays in the creation of stigma, and the coverage of inter-community strife contributes to this development. This is achieved through building a picture of Toxteth’s core attributes of difference that cannot be separated from the identity and character of the area, in line with Hudson’s conception of core stigma (2008).

5.6 Increasing criminality
Chapter 2 highlighted that criminality, too, is an attribute that contributes to the formation of stigma. Like inter-community strife, criminality is built into a background picture of an area creating an inseparable connection between place and criminality, thereby resulting in the emergence of primitive stigma. Where difference was operationalised at a district-level in the case of sectarianism, and at a city-level and street-level in the case of race riots, stigmatisation occurred at a district-level in the national press when referring to increasing criminality. Much of the pre-1981 coverage of Toxteth focuses on diminishing public order and crime-based stories.

8 The argument here is not that these stories of these crimes were fabricated by reporters. Rather, I accept that these crimes likely occurred. The argument is that, combined with other factors, continued reporting of crimes in Toxteth, which always references the district rather than the city as
The century opened with stories of domestic murder and attacks. In 1902, the *Express* reports that a father in “distressed circumstances” (unemployed) shot his daughter (Express, 1902: 5) and two years later, the *Mirror* reports that “mutilated and charred beyond hope of identity, the dead body of a newly-born child has been found near Toxteth Park, Liverpool” (Mirror, 1904: 5). A further story tells of a father killing his six-month-old son by beating him with a belt (Times, 1938: 16). These tales of infanticide hint at criminality and deviance in the area.

By the 1950s, however, the crime coverage relating to Toxteth has changed and no longer considers domestic crime but, rather, violent or random crime. This reflects a wider story of what was happening in terms of crime in Britain. In the House of Commons Library publication, *Olympic Britain*, the authors explain that “during the first two decades of the 20th century the police in England and Wales recorded an average of 90,000 indictable offences each year, a figure which increased to over 500,000 during the 1950s” (Thompson et al., 2012: 153). The same publication suggests that social, technological and legal changes affected the reporting of crime:

An increase in the number of burglaries reported, for example, may partly be due to the relatively recent need to inform the police in order to make an insurance claim, rather than an indication of any real increase in the level of burglary. New inventions, creating new opportunities for misdemeanour, a growth in the value of ordinary people’s personal property, and the criminalisation of drug use have had real effects on crime levels during the 20th century (Thompson et al., 2012: 153).

This suggests that the coverage of crime in Toxteth, shifting from fewer domestic crimes to more violent or random crimes, is in line with the changing crime patterns in Britain more generally. That the press coverage reflects this change implies that the press, with its focus on crime and deviance as markers of newsworthiness—an imperative consideration in an a whole, serves to smear the area as bearing core attributes of criminality and deviance, thereby creating a form of primitive stigmatisation of the area.

In line with this finding, the early 1950s saw attacks on police in Toxteth being reported in the national press. In August 1950, the Guardian reports an attack during which a Toxteth resident hurled “two half-bricks” at a police constable (Guardian, 1950: 8). The article describes Toxteth in the article as “on the fringe of the city’s ‘Chinatown’”, which immediately connotes notions of difference, foreignness and, crucially, trouble. After an earlier fear of ‘yellow peril’ in Liverpool at the dawn of the 20th century (Belchem and MacRaild, 2006: 370), the city’s Chinese population was once again viewed with suspicion during and after the Second World War. Chinese sailors had been caught in disputes during the war as the pay offered to Chinese seamen serving in the British forces was significantly less than the British were being paid. The Chinese unions fought this point and the Chinese population became noted for being “troublemakers” (Foley, n.d.: 10). An article in the South China Morning Post explains that “at the Public Records Office, in London, there was documentary evidence of a meeting, on October 19, 1945, at the Home Office, at which the government decided to remove the Chinese seamen, referring to them as ‘an undesirable element in Liverpool’” (Heaver, 2017). Thus, the syntactic juxtaposition of Toxteth and ‘Chinatown’ serves to mark the residents of Toxteth as being in some way connected to or linked to trouble, foreignness and ‘otherness’. The subtle inclusion of ‘Chinatown’ serves to indirectly smear Toxteth as a place of deviance, trouble, and difference.

In November 1953, the Times reports that a Toxteth resident, John Field, aged 23 had attempted to murder a policeman, Thomas Booth (Times, 1953: 3). In the details of the trial in February the next year, the paper reports that “a man alleged to be Field went up to him with a story of men fighting, and stabbed him in the back as he was leaving a deserted chapel yard, after searching it” (Times, 1954: 3). Such attacks on the police painted Toxteth residents as being hostile to authority figures and opposed to legality, which further smears the area.

Crime was not directed solely against the police. In 1966, the Times reports two major criminal stories. One story relates to a Toxteth children’s home house-father practicing “indecency involving boys” (Times, 1966a: 6). In the same year, a pedestrian was found dead, stabbed in the heart in Geraint Street, Toxteth (Times, 1966b: 10). Murders, shootings, stabbings, aggravated robberies, assaults, and kidnappings continued into the 1970s, with
most coverage found in the *Guardian* and *Times* (Fig. 5.9). In an article exhibiting the tabloid concern for ‘gory details’ the *Mirror* reports the murder of a “rich widow” (Corless, 1970: 28). The article describes how Marjory Ellis, who had rented out rooms in her house on Falkner Street in Toxteth “was found gagged with a piece of lace curtain and battered about the head in the ransacked bedroom of her home” (Corless, 1970: 28). As well as providing a detailed description of the crime, this article and the details supplied within, serve to paint Toxteth in a particular stigmatising light. Readers are informed firstly that this is an area where larger houses are being subdivided and sublet and, with subletting historically being associated with poverty (Burnett, 1978: 67), the article subtly informs readers of the financial struggles of residents.

In addition to violent crime, in 1976, the *Express*, the *Mirror*, and the *Times* all reported a story surrounding the fraudulent benefits claims of a Toxteth resident who was using 40 aliases. The *Mirror* describes Derek Deevy as “King Fiddler” (Mirror, 1976: 3) and the *Express* label him “King Con” (Clare, 1976: 1), accompanying the article with a large photograph of Deevy,

| A | Kidnap baby is found unharmed |
| B | Two sentenced to ‘life’ for murder at club |
| C | Man shot dead in club brawl |
| D | Mother of three killed |
| E | Man attacked and wounded |
| F | Four injured in knife attacks |

*Figure 5.9: Headlines from the Times and the Guardian reporting violent crime between 1957 and 1980.*

a large quote reading “Many people will ask: What’s the good of working?” and a subtitle stating “Greedy”. This story marks an early example of benefits fraud coverage that Lynn Hancock and Gerry Mooney argue has perpetuated a ‘political myth’ of the image of the working class and, more specifically, benefit recipients, as lazy and ‘feckless’ (2011: 26). This article, preceding Wacquant’s conception of advanced marginality, highlights the already-
existing forms of territorial stigma that have their basis in notions of class. While Deevy, by claiming under multiple aliases, was committing fraud, the coverage of the story begins to perpetuate a myth of Toxteth as an area of ‘scroungers’ who seek to claim what is not rightfully theirs.

While the crimes reported in the first part of the 20th century likely occurred, the coverage of them in such intensity is deeply stigmatising. Persistent reference to the crimes occurring in Toxteth are problematic in two key ways. Firstly, coverage refers back to the pathological Victorian belief in the ‘criminal class’ that sees “concentration and recurrence of crime within groups and across generations” (Hagan and Palloni, 1990: 265). Consistent coverage of Toxteth in relation to crime, implies a pathological tendency for Toxteth residents to be engaged in crime and deviance, and paints Toxteth as an area of deviance that threatens national values. It structures Toxteth residents as a subversive deviant class that threaten the fabric of society. Secondly, the focus refers to the media’s tendency to “consistently underplay petty, nonviolent and white-collar offenses while they overplay interpersonal, violent, and sexual crimes” (Barak, 1994: 11). This highlights that while the media widely and freely reports the crimes of ‘the poor’, it veers away from reporting the ever-present structural violence that creates poverty and destitution.

The media’s increasing focus on criminality and deviance, and its increasing desire—particularly in the tabloid press—for the ‘gory details’ amounts to a synoptical view of society. The synopticon is a concept conceived by sociologist Thomas Mathiesen. He takes Foucault’s idea of the panopticon—a type of building used for social control and surveillance—which allows a “few…[to] supervise or survey a large number” (Mathiesen, 1997: 217), and conceives the reciprocal structure: the synopticon. “An enormously extensive system enabling the many to see and contemplate the few”, the synopticon is the system of mass media that allows “surveillance in modern society” (Mathiesen, 1997: 219, emphasis in original). This synoptic system can be seen operating through crime reporting of Toxteth in two ways. In Mathiesen’s language, the “control of the ‘soul’” (1997: 218) functions as a form of biopolitical power to control and regulate life and society (Foucault, 1984: 137) through the mass promulgation of a discourse of wrongdoing and criminality. Synoptical power also relies on the power of the few that are being observed (Mathiesen, 1997: 226). Journalists and reporters serve as “creative mouthpieces” determining what is included (the crimes of the poor) and what is excluded (the structural violence committed by the powerful)
from the discourse; above all, however, the readers of the press (the ‘many’) who contemplate the messages put across by reporters (the ‘few’) place value and sustain and support the power of the few to tell the truth and to paint a valid and reliable vision of society (Mathiesen, 1997: 226). That is, if reporters and the press, as agents of power are seen to decry something as criminal or deviant, the ‘many’ have “confidence” in the authority of the reporters and the media to decry it thus (Mathiesen, 1997: 226). Press reporting on criminality in Toxteth amounts to a means of power and control by the media—a means of surveilling and regulating that which is considered socially deviant and socially normal.

This synoptical construction of crime in Toxteth links notions of elite power and control with primitive stigmatisation. Stigmatisation prior to advanced marginality was occurring through elite voices who controlled the flow of information that reached the general public. The elite voices decide which stories are made into news, and they report on domestic and violent crime, rather than on structural violence that was gradually creating an unequal area defined by institutional racism, went unreported. This follows Herman and Chomsky’s assertions that the closeness between elite powers means that dominant ideologies, which serve the elite, cannot be held to account because the press is entrenched in the same capitalist system that sees dominant ideologies sustained (1988).

5.7 Building safety and stigma
In November 1981, the Guardian explained that one of the first tasks to be tackled by Michael Heseltine as the Minister for Merseyside in the wake of the disturbances was “comprehensive environmental improvements with community involvement” amounting to the refurbishment of housing estates (Sharratt, 1981: 2). Admittedly, the housing estates in question were in the county of Merseyside more generally rather than the local-scale of Toxteth (this regional up-scaling is discussed in chapter 7) but the focus on housing highlights another aspect of Toxteth that was problematic prior to 1981. While the media did not directly and overtly focus on the context of poor housing conditions, the need for area refurbishment, and the substandard building conditions (the exception being several reports in the Guardian discussed below), the media prior to 1981 did report on the effects of these failings with reports of building fires and explosions. These occurrences all hint at the substandard housing in Toxteth in the early 20th century. Moreover, the type of language used and the inclusion of certain details gives clues to readers as to the type of area that Toxteth was, thereby indirectly stigmatising Toxteth with a smear of poverty and deprivation.
Though there are very few articles that directly report on the deprivation in Toxteth, several key documents—including *Guardian* press coverage—provide insight into areas of Toxteth and give context to the majority of articles that focus purely on the incidents that arose in Toxteth prior to the disturbances. The *Guardian*, unlike the other papers in this study, did directly address the infrastructural weaknesses and multiple deprivations in Toxteth. While this coverage, in line with the leftist orientation of the paper, is intended to draw attention to the deprivation in Toxteth and to exhibit concern for the conditions that the residents were enduring, the result is, nevertheless, stigmatising. In 1900, the paper reported on housing demolitions across Liverpool (Fig. 5.10 A). In particular, the article references houses in “the crowded districts of Scotland Road and Toxteth, where recently large demolitions of insanitary and decaying property have taken place” thereby displacing the population (*Guardian*, 1900: 3). In 1926 (Fig. 5.10 B), West Toxteth Labour MP Joseph Gibbins addressed the “large percentage of the people in Liverpool” who were living in homes that “had been condemned for 10, 20, or 30 years” (*Guardian*, 1926: 4). Housing was again foregrounded by the *Guardian* in 1956, when the conditions in Toxteth were singled out among Liverpool housing for being among the worst examples of slum housing in the city (Fig. 5.10 C). The article tells of Duncan Sandys, Conservative Minister of Housing and Local Government’s visit to Liverpool to see “the worst slums that Liverpool has to offer” (*Guardian*, 1956: 12). After deeming the “gloomy tenements round *sic* Scotland Road…not bad enough”, Sandys was advised to visit “some slum dwellings in the Toxteth Park area”. The *Guardian* reports that Sandys “said that they were even worse than those that he had seen in the morning. In one house of three rooms, the windows of which were stuffed with cardboard, eight people were living” (*Guardian*, 1956: 12). This coverage in the *Guardian* provides a glimpse into what Toxteth was like in the early part of the 20th century from a housing perspective: it was overcrowded with substandard housing, and deprivation. While possibly factually correct, the singling out of Toxteth for bearing these attributes smears the area. Other papers remained silent on directly drawing attention to the deprivation apparent in the area and endured by residents.
By the 1960s, a plan for the extension of the M62 motorway (not discussed in the national press) had been scrapped but there remained the possibility of an inner ring road extending through the area of Granby, a small area within the larger district of Toxteth, explains Ronnie Hughes, a Liverpool-based housing activist. The result of this planning decision meant that urban blight set in as residents with the financial ability, left the area, buildings were left empty and rogue landlords moved in, sparking tensions between old and new residents (Hughes, 2018, interview). The area was labelled by government as a ‘twilight area’, reflecting its uncertain future, and this label “battered” the community (Hughes, 2018, interview). Into this area that was amassing a reputation and multiple deprivations, arrived the Shelter Neighbourhood Action Project (SNAP), led by the housing charity Shelter, which sought to examine the conditions in Granby and to work with residents to tackle the area’s deprivation (Hughes, 2018, interview).

The SNAP report provides an account of what Granby was like in the late 1960s:
This account tells of the physical dereliction and signs of deprivation evident in the Granby area of Toxteth that had once endured a different fate. The housing problems are echoed in the Merseyside Structure Plan—a form of strategic development plan used in the mid-20th century—of 1975, which also notes the declining population, and highlights that, while private investment has supported suburban developments and infrastructure, “much less attention has been given to maintaining and upgrading the existing economic and social infrastructure…There has been a consequential process of accelerating decline in older urban areas, particularly evident in the inner parts of Merseyside (Lees, 1975: 29).

These conditions and, indeed, the SNAP report went unreported in the press (except the Guardian—see Hillman, 1972: 12). What was reported in the press did not take this wider context into account and, instead, reported on the horrific manifestations of the deprivation that were occurring in Toxteth with little consideration of the wider and more pressing causes. Instead, the coverage of Toxteth focused on the substandard nature of housing through reference to explosions and fires—both at homes and business premises. Stigmatisation was present through the language used and through the inclusion of certain
details, which serve to indirectly smear Toxteth as an area of multiple deprivation and substandard housing without giving readers the full picture of the structural causes of the deprivation.

In 1908, the *Guardian* reports on an explosion in the Toxteth workhouse. The boiler explosion caused the deaths of three “inmates” and the injury of two others (*Guardian*, 1908: 7). While the primary focus of the article is the coverage of the fire, the reference to the workhouse boiler explosion highlights the precarious conditions in which the poor were forced to work and tacitly implies that Toxteth comprised a population of society’s poorest individuals. Explosions occurred in homes, too, and were reported with equally stigmatising details and language (Fig. 5.11 A&B). In 1962, Toxteth resident Joseph Amao of Verulam Street was killed when an oil stove exploded as the “heater [was being carried] between the rooms of the house, which was let out into flats” (*Guardian*, 1962: 1). The *Times* reports that the “explosion was in a terraced house in one of the most densely populated suburbs in the city” (1962: 10), thereby informing readers of the overcrowded nature of the area. That the building is reported to be subdivided reflects the housing poverty in the area (*Burnett*, 1978: 67). Verulam Street was a narrow street that ran parallel to Granby Street and south from and perpendicular to Upper Parliament Street. It is now called Verulam Close and is a street of neat, newer houses, closed off to Upper Parliament Street, suggesting that the area was, since the days of the explosion in 1962, marked for clearance and redevelopment. The style of property—houses as opposed to high rise blocks—suggest that the Verulam Street area was redeveloped under the Militant council of 1983-1987 who favoured the construction of houses to replace “some of the city’s worst tower blocks and slums”. These new two-storey edifices, funded by an illegal budget, were nicknamed ‘Hatton’s houses’, in reference to the Derek Hatton, the Deputy Leader of the Militant-led Liverpool City Council (*Murden*, 2006: 456).

In 1963, another exploding paraffin heater caused a death in Toxteth (*Guardian*, 1963: 22). These articles about exploding paraffin heaters are particularly revealing. Not only do the reports situate Toxteth as a place of danger that can lead to personal tragedy, but they tacitly give a clue to readers regarding the type of housing that residents were enduring. Oil stoves or paraffin or kerosene stoves/heaters were commonly used prior to electrification but their use subsided in the early part of the 20th century as electrification and gas-based heating systems became more prevalent; kerosene heaters are now seen most commonly “in the
developing countries of Africa, Asia, and Latin America” (Lam et al., 2017). That the houses in Toxteth were still using paraffin in the 1960s highlights the substandard nature of housing.

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**A**

A man died and seven other people were injured as the result of a midnight explosion in a terraced house in Verulam Street, Toxteth, Liverpool. It is understood that an oil stove exploded in the house, which is in a densely populated district, less than two miles from the heart of the city.

Large crowds, attracted by the noise, watched policemen, firemen, and ambulance men bring out the injured. The victims were taken to Sefton General Hospital.

A neighbour who went into the house to help the victims suffered a hand injury. Two of the injured are women.

A police spokesman said: “It was a scene like the blitz. The effects of the explosion seemed to have spread from floor to floor.”

The dead man was Mr Joseph Amao, aged 30. The injured people were later allowed to leave hospital. The men were accommodated in a corporation hostel, the women in a house of help.

The house was burned out. It is believed that the explosion occurred as one of the men was carrying a heater between the rooms of the house, which was let out into flats.

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**B**

**MAN KILLED, 10 HURT IN HOUSE EXPLOSION**

A man was fatally injured and seven other people, two of them women, were seriously hurt in a midnight explosion in a house in Verulam Street, Toxteth, Liverpool. Three others who were hurt refused to go to hospital. The explosion was in a terraced house in one of the most densely populated suburbs in the city.

The dead man was Joseph Amao, aged 30. The injured were allowed to leave hospital after treatment.

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Figure 5.11: News coverage of Joseph Amao’s death (1962).
that residents endured where homes were not heated or lit sufficiently, combined with the
Guardian reference to the house being subdivided into flats serves as an example of the press
indirectly referring to the housing shortcomings in Toxteth, and highlights the stigma of
slum living. Readers would be aware that electricity, having been nationalised in the 1940s,
was fairly widely available in homes and that those homes without were, likely, considered
slums. This is confirmed by the series of pictures produced for Shelter by photographer
Nick Hedges that show the slum conditions in areas of Liverpool, including Toxteth
(Hedges, 1969–72).

In addition to explosions, house fires are also reported. Building fires can be seen as a marker
of rapidly urbanising, industrialising, crowded cities. In his work on Glasgow as a Victorian
“tinder box city”, Shane Ewen explains that commercial and domestic risks were inherent in
the industrialising city. Densely-packed combustible materials in warehouses and equally
densely inhabited tenement housing was a significant fire risk in the industrial city (2006).
Reference to fires, then, hints at the densely-packed, industrialising nature of an area.

In 1931, a major house fire claimed the lives of four Toxteth residents. This story was
reported in the Mirror and the Guardian. The Mirror report covers two pages, with the story
making a front-page splash before being repeated on page 2 (Fig. 5.12). The front page
features a photograph of the destroyed kitchen along with photographs of some of the
victims, reflecting the Mirror’s role as “an illustrated paper” (Bingham and Conboy, 2015: 9)
developed by Alfred Harmsworth who, by the 1930s owned the Times, the Daily Mail, and
the Mirror. The Mirror describes the deaths of a mother, her two children and her friend
during the fire and adds a chilling detail when it states that a neighbour “saw the boy Robert
standing at the window screaming for help. A sheet of flame shot out and he disappeared”
(Mirror, 1931: 2). The article includes descriptions of the rescue attempts made by
neighbours including a man who attempted to shin the drainpipe to reach the bedroom
window (Mirror, 1931: 2) and another who tried to crawl along a window-ledge to reach the
trapped residents (Mirror, 1931: 2). The same story is reported in the Guardian with the
additional comment that “Herman Bootman, a coloured man” also tried to help in the
rescue. “He climbed on to the sloping roof of the house and on to the window ledge at the
back. Just as he got on to the ledge the glass broke with the intense heat, Bootman receiving
severe burns to his hands” (Guardian, 1931: 9). While the focus of these articles is negative
and they centre on the effects of dangers inherent in living in Toxteth, what is apparent is the evident community spirit and camaraderie that is highlighted by neighbours risking their lives to attempt the rescue of trapped residents. While the focus of the articles is the fire, the photograph in the Mirror highlights the poor condition that the residents were enduring and adds an element of visual stigmatisation to coverage of Toxteth. The kitchen depicted with the article shows a kitchen that would have been characteristic of compact working class kitchens of the era with few electrical commodities (Bock, 2012).

Referring back to Ewen’s work, Toxteth’s plight was not unusual in terms of its conflagration affliction—Glasgow, too, was badly affected—but it also reminds us that the coverage of Toxteth in relation to domestic fires in multi-occupancy residences heated by paraffin, would passively inform readers of the character of the area as a densely populated district of an industrial city. This means that while the stories of fires were grounded in reality, the coverage casts a stigmatising pall over the area, reminding readers of the ‘character’ of
Toxteth and its challenges. Of course, the true story here should be the structural changes that lead Toxteth and similar areas to experience such tenacious and damaging blazes. Focus could have been on the lack of structurally sound housing available to the urban poor, on the destitution of residents, on the lack of suitable fireproof building materials used in buildings, on urban crowding, and on the need for government-funded housing for the urban poor.

As with reports of explosions that give clues to readers as to the type of housing stock that comprised Toxteth, some of the reports of fires give away clues as to the type of housing stock available in the area and ultimately serve to mark the area as deprived. An article in the *Guardian* in 1965 refers to a fire in Devonshire Road, Toxteth. Six residents were taken to hospital and the article explains that “altogether 15 people, including six children, living in single-room flats in the five-storey building were able to get to safety” (Guardian, 1965: 18). This implicitly informs the reader that the house is a “subdivided” multi-occupancy residence (a tenement), split into multiple dwellings to house the urban poor, as was common practice in the 19th and 20th centuries (Burnett, 1978: 67).

While Toxteth was home to tenements in the form of older houses split into multiple-occupancy dwellings, there were a series of modern dwellings built in the interwar years under architect Lancelot Keay. Often bearing nature-based names such as Caryl Gardens, St Andrews Gardens or Myrtle Gardens that belied their inner urban position and their excess of concrete, these tenement flats were built in the Modernist style and based on Austrian and German designs (Hatherley, 2010: 334-336). They served the purpose of rehousing the urban population displaced by slum clearance within the city rather than on suburban housing estates, but most were later destroyed by the Militant Labour council—an exception is St Andrews Gardens, which is now student accommodation for Liverpool’s university population. One such residence was South Hill House in Toxteth in which the *Mirror* reports that a young boy “slept three nights beside his mother unaware that she was dead” (Mirror, 1938: 5). Her death, and that of an older child, was caused by a gas leak that the younger boy managed to avoid by spending the day outdoors playing. While not directly smearing Toxteth through linguistic or terminological means as is apparent in later territorial stigma (see Chapter 6), the story indirectly yet again points to the municipal housing that was common in Liverpool and the poor-quality construction that the urban poor were forced to
endure, thereby primitively stigmatising the area through a reliance on Hudson’s core stigma that focuses on core attributes inherent in the area.

A story in the Times in 1977 gives a clue to the changing housing stock of Toxteth and, equally, casts an indirect but stigmatising pall on the district’s housing. The report tells of a fire in Entwistle Tower, a 22-storey block of flats (Times, 1977: 2). Entwistle Tower was completed in 1965, according to ‘Old Liverpool Pics’ group on Facebook, and it seems likely that its development was the result of the Housing Repairs and Rents Act of 1954 that enabled “large-scale clearance schemes to begin” (Murden, 2006: 397). By the time this act was passed, “88,000 dwellings [were] considered ‘unfit’ for habitation. Of this total, 33,000 were slum dwellings concentrated in the Toxteth, Abercromby and Everton areas” (Murden, 2008: 397) condemned because of lack of amenities, structural problems, public health concerns, and precarious structure (Murden, 2006: 397). The Housing Subsidies Act of 1956 encouraged through payment of subsidies, the construction of multi-storey dwellings and, “consequently, by 1965, 79 blocks of multi-storey flats had been completed” in Liverpool (Murden, 2006: 398). As such, the Times reference to Entwistle Tower, a multi-storey block of flats, informs the readers that the area had in part been cleared of slums and that the tower-block is, likely, home to those families moved during the clearance of the area. This conjures up notions of slums, poverty, rehousing schemes, and municipal housing, serving to build up the core attributes of the area on which primitive stigma is built. Such imagery was strong again in another article of February 1981 that tells of a mother and her three young sons who were “found dead yesterday in their smoke-filled council flat” (Times, 1981c: 2). Reference to the property being council-let is irrelevant in the context of the story, and the addition of this fact serves only to stigmatise the area as home to welfare recipients.

Fires and explosions were not limited to domestic dwellings. Toxteth, being adjacent to the River Mersey, has traditionally been home to docks and warehouses and many of the fires reported in the press involved the industrial areas of Toxteth. In 1900, the Times reported a fire at West Toxteth Dock, which began in a shed before a steamer caught alight; “the flames of the burning shed lighted up the sky and attracted thousands of people to the spot” (Times, 1900: 11). Similarly, in 1933, the Guardian reported a fire in a “three-storey warehouse in Sefton Street” opposite the Toxteth Dock (Guardian, 1933: 9). The warehouse was described as being “in the danger zone” (Guardian, 1933: 9), referring to the nature of the items stored in the warehouse, and the overcrowded streets making the spread of fire a risk.
However, the tag “danger zone” as used by the press, with no explanation regarding the infrastructural reasons that have led to the label, imply that Toxteth is an area of danger and lack of safety.

The press coverage of fires and explosions in Toxteth does not merely report on various conflagrations and the often-associated loss of life. Rather, it is apparent that through this coverage the press indirectly stigmatises Toxteth’s housing stock and infrastructure. Choice of language and inclusion of certain details serve to smear Toxteth from a housing perspective. The press includes details such as a dwelling being multi-occupancy, overcrowded, or council-let, signalling to readers the type of property in question, and, indirectly but subtly, stigmatising the area as home to slums, welfare recipients, or deprivation. References to oil heaters may seem minor but they provide clues that the property is being marked out for its lack of amenities and lack of modernity.

But the characteristics of this primitive stigmatisation are largely indirect. It is perpetuated through reference to core attributes and oblique associations with poverty, lack of development, and substandard building stock. The press (with the exception of the *Guardian*) did not take into consideration the wider and more pressing issues of structural deprivation that were made manifest in housing deprivation. This is an example of the press upholding the status quo rather than challenging and drawing attention to the inequitable structures governing society and points to the media’s lack of challenge and refuting of existing power structures.

The continuation of tacit housing stigma—first directed at slum conditions, then at the high rises that replaced slums, then at council-let housing—serves to show that territorial stigmatisation has been in existence since prior to the post-Fordist era, contrary to the assertions of Wacquant et al. (2014). Certainly, they are correct that the stigma attains a new depth and volume at the rise of the post-Fordist era when it becomes territorial stigma in the Wacquantian sense, but the traces of territorial stigma based on existing forms of stigma such as poverty, race, and class, predate the era of advanced marginality and, as such, tell us that the history of territorial stigma is longer than we have previously thought.

### 5.8 Conclusion
This chapter has highlighted the ways in which the press was stigmatising Toxteth prior to 1981. First, the coverage of Toxteth prior to 1981 is notable for its silences and absences of
stories of structural deprivation and inequality that would later be reported retrospectively. This highlights the press’ support for the status quo, and for foregrounding ‘newsworthy’ stories that highlight the pathology of a place and its population in favour of engaging in critical journalism that would hold power to account, making the issues that led to the disturbances accessible to the population at large.

Where the press was silent about the structural deprivation that was coming to define life in Toxteth, it was vocal in narrating stories that highlight core stigmatising attributes that smear the area and its population as, in some way, contrary to the status quo. This stigmatisation was often indirect and subtle, and relied on motifs and themes that were relevant to the historical moment or, in Foucauldian language, the episteme in which the discourse is situated. The press structuring of Toxteth in the era prior to the emergence of advanced marginality amounts to the reliance on a sense of ‘core stigma’. Bryant Ashley Hudson describes as stigma arising from an entity’s “core attributes—who it is, what it does, and whom it serves” (2008: 253). This core stigma constructed by the press is not based on one “discrete, anomalous, episodic” and “negative” event (Hudson, 2008: 253) but, rather it is based on the careful reporting of multiple smaller events that fall into themes for which Toxteth begins to become known. This background—often indirect—stigma is created by the press choice of what to report in relation to Toxteth.

Inter-community strife, particularly related to Catholic-Protestant sectarian violence, marked the district as being factional, troubled, and oppositional—a theme discussed in more depth in chapter 6. Stigma is activated through notions of difference and deviance. The discourse of inter-community strife hints at the core attributes inherent in Toxteth and it is this background character on which elements of primitive stigma are built. Although sectarian violence smeared and stigmatised Toxteth at a district-level, the racial disharmony that characterised the first decades of the 20th century was reported at a city-level and, apart from one article in the *Times*, did not connect Toxteth directly with the race riots of 1919. This underscores the fact that territorial stigma is operationalised for different reasons at different scales. In the case of the race riots of 1919, the stigma was operationalised at a city-wide level as part of a larger discourse of xenophobia and moral panics about the “growth of black…settlements and the wholesale dumping of ‘coloured seamen’ in Liverpool and other British ports” (Belechem and MacRaild, 2006: 378). Connecting Liverpool as a whole rather than at a district-level to the debate about race formed part of an episteme about repatriation,
the labour market, and the purportedly dubious behaviour of black residents in Britain, served to connect the city of Liverpool to the discourse of port cities and race.

The discourse of criminality was seen to change from highlighting domestic crime in the early part of the 20th century, to a focus on random and violent crime away from the home as the decades progressed. These discourse fragments connect to a larger episteme of social and economic change in Britain that saw an increase in reported crime, reflecting an increase in the value of personal property coincident with an increase in disposable income, and with the need to report crime for insurance purposes. I argued that the crime coverage in the press during the 20th century before the disturbances of 1981 amounted to a synoptic vision of crime and society. The synopticon, which is Mathieson’s reciprocal of the panopticon, serves as a means of understanding the mass media in society as a form of “surveillance in modern society” (Mathiesen, 1997: 219). The press, through its coverage of crime—both domestic and violent—is a means of the many surveilling the few in society. The ‘few’ represents Toxteth in society. The press, in this way, serves as a powerful extension of the state, controlling and monitoring society, determining who and where should be cast out as deviant. The coverage of criminality in Toxteth by the press serves to stigmatise and mar Toxteth as a place of deviance and a lack of social control. As with inter-community strife, the press reportage of crimes in Toxteth gradually builds a structure of core stigma, as constructed by elite voices, that allows primitive stigma to emerge.

While the crimes of the working class were readily reported, the structural violence enacted by those in power that saw Toxteth slowly descend into social and economic decline was subject to a media silence. From Herman and Chomsky’s propaganda model, we see that the closeness between various voices of power means that this power cannot be held to account and that the media is complicit in the promulgation of an unequal society that criminalises only a certain section of the population (1988).

The final means through which the press stigmatises Toxteth prior to the post-Fordist era is through housing and infrastructural stigma, which is indirect and subtle. The examples I have highlighted in this chapter to underscore this point cover fires and explosions, which mark the area as being substandard in terms of safety. Press coverage in this theme includes certain key details and language to smear the area. Reference to the area being overcrowded, densely populated, home to slums, home to council tenants, a place of slum clearance, and of
municipal housing, combined with references to buildings being multi-occupancy or heated by outmoded systems all sully Toxteth’s image as a place of substandard housing and building infrastructure.

The key feature in the three themes used to comprise primitive stigma in Toxteth is that the stigma is indirect and subtle but lingering. To unearth it, it is necessary to dig deep into the data and to connect the emerging stigma with other discourse strands that can provide an adequate picture of how Toxteth was being constructed by the press. The indirect stigma alludes to deficiencies, to difference, to vice, to strife, and to an inferior infrastructure and housing stock, thereby building up a gradual stigma surrounding Toxteth based on perceived and constructed core attributes. Whereas the stigma of the era of advanced marginality is direct and, as chapter 6 and chapter 7 show, Toxteth is overtly tainted through descriptors, through linguistic markers, and through a consistently negative image, the primitive stigmatisation that marks the era prior to advanced marginality, is a slower, more gradual process, which amounts to a ‘core stigma’ through which certain attributes are always associated with Toxteth.
Chapter 6: Constructing an image of Toxteth during the 1981 disturbances: naming, negativity, oppositionality, and stranger-making

6.1 Introduction
The disturbances in Toxteth broke out on 3rd July 1981 and persisted for four nights with skirmishes occurring for the remainder of the summer (Frost and Phillips, 2011: 1). The consequences were devastating:

Police were drafted in from around the country and CS gas was used for the first time on the UK mainland to control pitched battles between residents and police... A disabled young man, David Moore, was dead, hundreds of police and civilians had been injured and £11 million of damage had been unleashed upon the neighbourhood’s public buildings, homes and shops (Murden, 2006: 444).

In their coverage, the press would largely ignore the structural causes that led to the outbreak of the disturbances and instead constructed an image of Toxteth and its residents as pathologically to blame for the plight of their area. Electing to quote Merseyside Chief Constable Ken Oxford’s view of the events, the Express cited that “the situation is anti-discipline and anti-authority. It is the action of a band of hooligans who do not want to live in a civilised society” (Hunter, 1981: 3). This quotation sums up the press portrayal of the disturbances, of Toxteth and its residents: the area and its residents were shown to be oppositional to authority and social norms, to be entirely negative, and to be socially and behaviourally distant to the rest of society.

The previous chapter addressed the primitive stigmatisation of Toxteth in the years leading up to the disturbances of 1981 through a Foucauldian archaeological approach that dug deep into the media discourse of Toxteth. It showed that stigmatisation coalesced around three key issues that were structured as core attributes of the area: inter-group strife, criminality, and the condition of housing stock. As its name implies, primitive stigmatisation was the existing stigma that was first present, upon which later territorial stigma could adhere. The principle feature of this primitive stigmatisation is its obliqueness and that can be seen as a type of core stigma, following Hudson’s typology of stigma types (2008); that is, the primitive
stigmatisation of Toxteth exists as a background, constant but low-key denigration because of the “very nature” (Hudson, 2008: 253) of Toxteth that the press chooses to report.

This chapter shifts the focus to the transition from primitive to territorial stigma in the Wacquantian sense, and I argue that, in the case of Toxteth, primitive stigma morphs into territorial stigma through the transition from core to event stigma. This transition is facilitated through the press’ shifting concern from core attributes to a focus on “anamolous” events (Hudson, 2008). The chapter addresses subsidiary research question 2: What discursive and linguistic techniques does the press use to stigmatise Toxteth during the disturbances of 1981? The “discrete, anomalous, episodic events” of the disturbances of 1981 act as the trigger that changes the type of stigma of Toxteth in the press. The resultant stigma is direct and occurs at a high intensity, and is centred around notions of identity, through concurrent processes of identity construction and identity denial. Erving Goffman tells us that it is stigma involves the “contaminated aspects” of identity (1963: 19), and this chapter shows the ways in which the media contaminates Toxteth’s identity through external identity construction, and internal denial of identity formation.

While external identity construction imposes an identity on Toxteth, the internal denial of identity—through silencing insider voices—deprives Toxteth residents of a voice and an ability to self-define themselves and their home. I argue that this dual process operates through four key techniques: through naming, negativity, oppositionality, and stranger-making. I highlight that less than 10% of all articles from the period between July 1981 and the end of December 1981 include a quotation from a resident, raising questions about who gets to talk, who gets to define identity, and how this feeds into a stigmatising process that externally smears a location while internally denying residents a voice.

The process of naming refers to the journalistic ‘creation’ of the idea of Toxteth, using the primitively stigmatised name of ‘Toxteth’ as opposed to ‘Liverpool 8’, as it was locally known (Hughes, 2018, interview). This yields an entity to which primitive stigma was already attached and onto which more stigma could adhere. Negativity is characterised by a lack of positive features, a smearing or tainting of place through the ‘from above’ application of unfavourable imagery, language, or semantic/syntactic choices. The term ‘oppositionality’ is applied as in the field of psychology to explain the way that the press frames Toxteth and Toxteth’s residents as being wilfully hostile, defiant and contrary to the mainstream. The
conception of “stranger-making” draws on Georg Simmel’s work on the figure of the stranger in society, and I use the concept to explain how the press spatially fixes Toxteth while socially distancing the district and its residents. I illustrate the techniques of naming, negativity, oppositionality, and stranger-making that contribute to territorial stigmatisation through a careful consideration of some of the linguistic, discursive, and terminological choices made in press reporting of the disturbances. I first explain the idea of identity and the four techniques that are used by the press to shape notions of identity, and then proceed to show how they are enacted. Where primitive stigmatisation shaped identity through a reliance on core attributes, as the stigma transitions to territorial stigma, the idea of identity expands to encompass the events of the disturbances.

6.2 Defining identity, naming, negativity, oppositionality, and stranger-making

6.2.1 Identity

Identity, according to sociologist Stuart Hall, “is formed in the ‘interaction’ between self and society. The subject still has an inner core or essence that is ‘the real me,’ but this is formed and modified in a continuous dialogue with the cultural worlds ‘outside’ and the identities which they offer” (Hall, 1996: 597). This tells us that, generally, identity is projected outwards and interacts with elements of society to transmit an essence of who we are. Hall continues that “identity stitches…the subject into the structure” (1996: 598), thereby highlighting the way in which the identity of the self is connected to a larger social structure.

Crucial in Hall’s conception of identity formation is the concept of individuation, which is a psychological term referring to the “‘coming to selfhood’ or ‘self-actualization’” process (Jung in Colman, 2015: 372) through which an individual comes to have a sense of self. This further implies the outward motion of identity formation that has the individual or self at the core.

When it comes to issues of place and identity, however, place is generally treated as the object rather than the subject of identity. Place is used to individuate other identities and helps people define themselves rather than vice versa. Also, where identity of the self is outwardly projected, identity of a place is imposed externally. Regarding the formation of the identity of a place, however, there is less current literature with Anssi Paasi arguing that these “traditional exclusive, homogenising regional geography narratives have lost their validity in academic research” (Paasi, 2003: 476). Territorial stigmatisation tells us that individual places have particular, adhesive and rigid identities and reputations that form the way that the world
understands them. Considering place identity or regional identity is necessary to understand
the creation of territorial stigma as we understand how places come to bear particular
identities in the public discourse. Paasi explains that place identity or regional identity is:

In a way, an interpretation of the process through which a
region becomes institutionalised, a process consisting of the
production of territorial boundaries, symbolism and
institutions. This process concomitantly gives rise to, and is
conditioned by, the discourses/practices/rituals that draw on
boundaries, symbols and institutional practices (2003: 478)

This highlights the importance of understanding how places come to gain an identity that is
deeply symbolic and engrained and entrenched in the public imagination. Paasi also
underscores the prominence of discourse in the formation of identity, suggesting that identity
formation occurs through language and linguistic choices. In this chapter, my argument is
that the press use identity (the concurrent application of identity and the denial of identity)
to stigmatise Toxteth.

6.2.2 Naming
The idea of ‘naming’ is twofold. It comes both from a linguistics origin and from the world
of marketing where it is central to the process of ‘branding’. In terms of linguistics, names
are proper nouns, the function of which is “to designate individual entities, whereas common
nouns refer to any one of a class of beings or things” (Brédart, 2017: 146). This means that
the application of a proper noun (or a name) to a person, place, or object designates
individuality and difference. This connects to the marketing view of name as brand. Brand
identity is the external vision of an entity—what it presents to the world—and “the sum total
of all the elements of branding that make the unique identity” (Doyle, 2016). For Robert
Govers, a scholar of place branding and reputation, “the core of branding is to make sure
that consumers attach distinctive associations to this entity” (Govers, 2013: 71).

A body of literature exists on the idea of place branding, through which the reputation of a
town or city is made favourable and memorable and, above all, noticeable (Govers, 2013: 71;
Govers and Go, 2009: 17). But while place branding is generally considered a means through
which positive attributes are foregrounded, in his paper about place branding at a global
scale, Peter van Ham notes that externally imposed negative place branding can damage a
country, city or entity’s reputation (2008). I argue that such negative naming or place branding is used by the press in the case of Toxteth through which reporters and editors apply a name (or brand) to the area. This is an act of biopolitical or normative power, which exhibits the media’s power to name (Melucci, 1996: 182).

Negative branding connects with Erving Goffman’s conception of the origins of stigma. Goffman explains that “the Greeks, who were apparently strong on visual aids, originated the term stigma to refer to bodily signs designed to expose something unusual and bad about the moral status of the signifier. The signs were cut or burnt into the body” (Goffman, 1990: 11, emphasis in original). For Goffman, stigma originates with physical branding and setting apart a person as ‘other’ in some way. This same reading of ‘branding’ can be applied to place branding, where a place is made visible as a social and geographical ‘other’.

6.2.3 Negativity

Negativity is part of the concept of valence, the latter of which is a term borrowed from psychology that “corresponds to intrinsic value and thus to potential outcomes” (Frijda, 1986: 205). Valence helps us to understand the intrinsic negativity or positivity of newspaper articles. According to Dutch psychologist Nico Frijda, “events, objects, and situations may possess positive or negative valence; that is, they may possess intrinsic attractiveness or aversiveness” (1986: 205). In this study, I apply the idea of valence to place representation in the media to see how attractively or aversively Toxteth is presented in the press—crucially, this does not refer to the reality of life in Toxteth but to the press representation of that reality through the choice of angle, tone, and semantic and syntactic choices. We know that negative portrayals in the press affect the way that readers see and interact with the world around them (Schemer, 2012), so coding for valence allows the measurement of how Toxteth is talked about and the ratio of negative to positive articles. Tsfati and Cohen note that perception of a place does not have to be grounded in reality (2003); in measuring the valence of an article, the reality of Toxteth is less important than the way in which it is reported and framed in the press.

Newspapers, operating as they do in a marketised sphere, tend to report largely negative stories that are deemed to be newsworthy and that will lead to increased sales (Galtung and Ruge, 1965: 68; Devereux et al., 2011a: 129; Devereux et al., 2011b: 509); positive stories of a stigmatised place are rare (Tsfati and Cohen, 2003; Devereux et al., 2011a; Devereux et al., 2011b). This means that we see the press both producing and reproducing stigma. If we
take a murder in Toxteth as an example of negativeness (that is, readers will associate a negative connotation or aversion to the event), the homicide is an example of a stigma: it is a mark of shame that ‘taints’ Toxteth (Goffman, 1963:12; Wacquant, 2008: 29). The crime and the stigma of that crime exist whether anyone reports on it. The press reproduces the stigma by talking about it but they create new depth to the stigma through the way that they talk about the event, using certain terms to describe the event or the location it took place, adding to the perception and “public scorn” (Wacquant, 2008: 29) regarding life in that place. This ‘way that they talk about it’ is the valence of an article.

6.2.4 Oppositionality
Oppositional behaviour is described by the American Academy of Child and Adolescent Psychiatry as an “ongoing pattern of uncooperative, defiant, and hostile behavior toward authority figures” (AACAP, 2011: 1). While this description is generally used as part of the diagnostic criteria of Oppositional Defiant Disorder (ODD), a condition that affects young people who show these behaviour patterns, I note that as part of its pathological gaze, the press constructs Toxteth as bearing these same characteristics. Toxteth and its residents are shown as being defiant, unwilling to cooperate, and deliberately antagonistic. Indeed, the press constructs Toxteth as being ‘opposite’ to the rest of society—meaning that it is different and in some way deviant from social norms—but also as ‘oppositional’—meaning that it is inherently maladjusted and wilfully contrary. Rather than using the term ‘deviant’, I have elected to use ‘oppositional’ as this highlights the discursive positionality of otherness in addition to deviant behaviour.

One way in which the press constructs an oppositional Toxteth is through the creation of a ‘mob’ and through describing the disturbances of 1981 as ‘riots’. By describing those on the streets as a rioting ‘mob’, the press devalue the identity and claims of those on the streets and, instead, symbolically form an amorphous group that does not have legitimate claims.

6.2.5 Stranger-making
Writing in his 1908 excursus on the stranger, Georg Simmel explains that the stranger occupies an unusual and unfavourable position within society; “fixed within a particular spatial group…his position in this group is determined, essentially, by the fact that he has not belonged to it from the beginning, that he imports qualities into it, which do not and cannot stem from the group itself” (Simmel, 1908: 1). Simmel likens the position of the stranger to that of “inner enemies” (1908: 1); “he is near and far at the same time” from ‘us’
(Simmel, 1908: 2). The nearness he describes comes from spatial proximity, but the farness arises from social distance. The concept of the ‘stranger’ is echoed by prominent Chicago School sociologist, Robert Park, whose work on the ‘marginal man’ was built from Simmel’s conception of the ‘stranger’. For Park, the ‘marginal man’ is “an individual who lives in two different worlds, in both of which the individual is a stranger” (Rogers, 1999: 64). I argue that the press coverage of Toxteth structures residents as marginal men but, more so, as strangers who lack the social ties to be considered part of society.

Further, creating strangers is a means of territorial stigmatisation as strangers are shown to be in geographical proximity but socially distant from the rest of society. Indeed, Wacquant frequently uses the notion of ‘outcasts’ in his work (2008), which ties in neatly with Simmel’s conception of strangers. Like the outcast, the stranger does not belong in society and is socially distant—but spatially or physically proximal—to the rest of society.

Devereux et al. argue that the media is part of the formation of social distance. They add that the media suppose that “the audience [is] located outside” the place about which they are reporting (2011a: 130), suggesting that the press sees its role as acting as “a window into this place from which the audience themselves are socially distant” (2011a: 130). This creation of a ‘window’ into a socially distant world for readers amounts less to closing the social gap and more to creating a voyeuristic gaze that further objectifies those relegated to social outcast status. In so doing, the media make strangers out of those about whom they write, disassociating them from the mainstream discourse and stigmatising them.

Social distance is “the perceived distance between social strata (different socio-economic, racial, or ethnic groups), usually measured by the amount of social contact between groups” (Mayhew, 2015), and Devereux et al.’s argument implies that the media assist in creating this social distance through a voyeuristic window that they offer by focusing on negative stories that do not represent the lived reality of the place (Devereux et al., 2011a: 131). The concept of social distance originated in Simmel’s work and was built on by his student, Robert Park and, in turn, Park’s student Emory Bogardus, who highlight that perceived differences in social strata lead to social distance and prejudice (Park, 1924: 344). In the next section, I examine two ways that media exacerbate this social distance first by constructing Toxteth as a place of ethnic difference, and secondly, by silencing the voices of Toxteth residents. In so doing, the press acknowledge that the residents are part of the geography and spatial
composition of Toxteth (‘nearness’) but are removed from the social discourse (‘farness’). This combined ‘nearness’ and ‘farness’ amounts to the creation of a stranger who shares spatial ties but remains socially distant.

6.3. Naming, negativity, stranger-making, and oppositionality in action

6.3.1 Naming and labelling Toxteth

One way in which the media stigmatises place is through the application of an identity to an area through the process of (re)branding or labelling. The name of Toxteth was largely reinvented by the media and, through its creation, the press left a primed identity ready to fill with meaning. As chapter 5 shows, the name of Toxteth was primitively stigmatised throughout the 20th century, priming the area for later stigma to adhere. The name of ‘Toxteth’ was already associated with strife, crime, and paucity of housing, but the coverage levels were low compared to the peaks seen in 1981 thus highlighting the rapid launch of a media-rebranded Toxteth.

Journalists interviewed for this study directly acknowledge that the area that came to be known as Toxteth was not known by that name by residents and that the national identity and idea of Toxteth was constructed by the media, suggesting that the media are responsible for the name and image of Toxteth gaining such prevalence. Jon Snow of Channel 4 news who was working as a broadcast journalist for ITN in 1981 and reported on the disturbances, explains that “Toxteth was sort of invented by the media and became a very dark word”. He continues that “it had become toxic Toxteth almost as soon as the news [of the disturbances] broke”. He adds that prior to the disturbances, the area was largely known by residents as Liverpool 8 (Snow, 2017, interview). ‘Toxteth’ was a journalistic imposition.

David Wooding, a Liverpudlian and current political editor of the Sun, formerly of the Express, affirms Snow’s assertion and explains how the press came to invent and name Toxteth:

[Previously] it was called Dingle or Liverpool 8. And the folklore goes that—I can’t remember which paper it was…Daily Mail perhaps...I think the story goes that the photographer arrives from London and drives into the area and sees a sign saying ‘Toxteth’ which was just on the outskirts of that bit of Liverpool, and took a picture of the
sign and it became ‘Liverpool’s Toxteth district’ all of a sudden. They used to call it Dingle or Liverpool 8 but you know, then Toxteth stuck as a label for it. (Wooding, 2017, interview).

Wooding and Snow describe here the blatant fact that journalists arriving in Liverpool during the disturbances took the name of the area from a sign that they saw, rather than talking to residents and finding out how people referred to the area. This is echoed by Ronnie Hughes, a Liverpool-based housing activist who explains that “we called it Liverpool 8 or L8 and that was a badge of considerable pride...L8 was where exciting culture happened in Liverpool” (2018, interview). This tells us that the name and label of Toxteth was largely externally applied by the media and then absorbed into common parlance and the public discourse. Where ‘Liverpool 8’ had positive connotations relating to culture and community, the label or name of ‘Toxteth’ bore a primitively stigmatised identity, ripe for the transference to adhesive and pernicious territorial stigma. This highlights the power of the media in the process of labelling and in entering a name into the public discourse. Sociologist Alberto Melucci, in his work on the ‘power of naming’ (1996: 182), argues that the power to name rests with those in dominant positions in society. He further explains that the media represent such a dominant body and that “there is no doubt about the capacity of the media system of manipulating news or transforming public and political life into a spectacle of worldwide proportions” (1996: 225). Here he explains the role of the media in contributing to the public discourse in which we all participate. If we take Melucci’s thesis and apply it to the naming of Toxteth, we see that the media occupies a position of power in society such that it has an ability to ‘name’ and to change the contours and language of public discourse.

The name of Toxteth that the media created bore significant weight and could command coverage. Wooding tells a story of Toxteth’s identity informing the Express’ choice to cover a story.

I picked up the Liverpool Daily Post, the [Liverpool Echo’s] sister paper, which was still going in those days and one morning, and I think I read on page 48 or far back in the paper, a small story about a kid, a head teacher taking a break at a school because children had—as young as four and five—had
caused him…were running amok. And I thought, “that’s not a bad…” No in fact I think the school had been closed for a week, that’s what it was (Wooding, 2017, interview).

He continues to explain his attempts to contact the school whereupon he spoke to the caretaker, who provided more insight explaining that the head teacher “had a nervous breakdown, he’s gone into hospital and the teachers can’t cope” (Wooding, 2017, interview). He further confirmed the story with the Chair of the Education Committee before writing up the story. Wooding continues:

We splashed it…It probably would have made a page lead but because of the Toxteth angle, you know, it showed another aspect of that area, which had a bad reputation so it was, it was a cause of its own misfortune in a way because suddenly, you know, we even called it “in Liverpool’s riot-scarred Toxteth district” or “Liverpool’s riot-torn Toxteth district (Wooding, 2017, interview).

Here, Wooding explains that the story was made a ‘splash’ or lead story in the Express that day and, in this case, it was the weight of the name of Toxteth that carried the story from a couple of column inches to a lead story. The act of naming Toxteth and the power of its name and reputation affected the editorial positioning of the story in this instance, and Wooding’s story highlights an example of Toxteth being singled out by the press to further add to its negative reputation.

The process of naming is one way that the press contributes to the stigmatisation of Toxteth. By exerting a “power of naming” (Melucci, 1996: 182), the press used the name ‘Toxteth’ that was not used locally but was primed with primitive stigma from decades of negative coverage, and applied a label that was ready to be filled with all of the nuances that form character and identity (Sampson and Goodrich, 2009). Places “are produced and maintained through an array of social and cultural mechanisms that ascribe meanings or values to them” (Sampson and Goodrich, 2009: 902), and, in the following sections I show how the press then proceeded to ‘fill’ Toxteth’s identity with negative connotations, comparisons, and
ready-made shorthand descriptions that directly informed readers of what to think about Toxteth.

6.3.2 Negativity during and after the disturbances of 1981
Into the idea of Toxteth the press poured negative imagery. Of 496 newspaper articles that mention Toxteth between July 3rd 1981 and December 31st 1981, 490 (98.8%) are negative. Only one article in the Express (0.2%) in this period is positive. Two articles are neither positive nor negative (0.4%) and three (0.6%) are mixed. To arrive at this figure, I measured each article for valence or how positive or negative the article is in relation to Toxteth (the approach to measuring valence is discussed in the research design in chapter 4).

Where Toxteth was visible for increasingly negative coverage in the 20th century up to 1981, resulting in negative valence in 68.2% of articles, by the time of the disturbances, the coverage becomes more negative, reflecting Hudson’s event-stigma typology, and this contributes to the shift from the primitive stigmatisation of Toxteth to the territorial stigmatisation of Toxteth in the Wacquantian sense. Reporters not only produce and reproduce stigma through their semantic and syntactic choices, but through their tone and angle.

Figure 6.1: Valence of articles across papers between 1900 and the start of the disturbances.
Where 15.4% of articles between 1900 and 1981 were neither positive or negative (suggesting that primitive stigma was less protrusive), by the time of the disturbances this decreased to only 0.4% of all articles (compare Figs. 6.1 and 6.2). This overwhelmingly negative vision of Toxteth contributes to the area’s identity formation as a place that is unfavourable and aversive. Following the naming and labelling of Toxteth, the press then applies to it only a negative pall, thereby not only naming but shaming Toxteth.

The negative valence is achieved through the tone of articles, the semantic and syntactical choices, and the choice of angle. In a *Guardian* article of July 6th 1981, the reporter assesses fairly the possible conditions that led to the disturbances, listing, “high unemployment and social decay, exacerbated by the virulent infection of racism” (Guardian, 1981a: 10). However, the article (see Fig. 6.3 A) also paints a stark picture of the conditions in Toxteth.

![Figure 6.2: Valence of articles mentioning Toxteth during the disturbances and the six months following.](image-url)
that, with knowledge of the way that media affects the way we view the world, adds a stigmatising overtone to the district:

Smashed windows, looted shops, terrorised local inhabitants, burning cars, buildings on fire, policemen rolling over and over to extinguish the flames on their tunics and hair, petrol bombs, flying bricks, the ranks of incongruous British bobbies trembling behind their riot shields, hopelessly ill-equipped, both mentally and physically, for the hatred that confronts them (Guardian, 1981a).

In this quotation, there are several motifs that contribute to the overall negativity. The first is the visual imagery used in the description, which is reminiscent of the broken windows theory developed by Kelling and Wilson in 1982. This theory holds that broken windows are a visual manifestation of the underlying strife and disorder in the area. Indeed, the description of the physical damage to the area paints a picture of a neighbourhood in turmoil. Further, much of this quotation focuses on the barrage faced by the police, who are referred to in the colloquial as ‘British bobbies’. This colloquialism serves to add familiarity to the police; conversely referring to those taking to the streets only in the abstract as ‘hatred’ serves to distance them. By referring to them as ‘British bobbies’, the reporter also structures the police as representatives of the British state, implicitly suggesting that an attack on them is an attack on British values, law and order, decency, and status quo.

Figure 6.3: News cuttings demonstrating the discursive techniques used to stigmatise Toxteth in 1981
Negativity is also applied through supposedly humorous or ironic articles in the press. In a piece in the *Times* in October 1981, Miles Kingston writes a spoof piece on postage dates implying that he has the last postage dates for the Christmas season (see Fig. 6.3 B). For postage on 23rd October, Kingston lists, among others, “the Iran-Iraq war zone, Christian Beirut, downtown Kabul, Harlem above 125th Street, Toxteth” (Kingston, 1981: 14). Here he juxtaposes Toxteth with warzones (Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, and Afghanistan) and other areas that have experienced civil strife (Harlem). The tacit assumption from this juxtaposition is that Toxteth belongs in a list of areas of war and conflict. The readers of the piece are informed that Toxteth is as dangerous as warzones in the Middle East, or Harlem, implicitly creating a hierarchy and stratification of space. The negative symbolism in this juxtaposition means that Toxteth is yet again portrayed with a negative valence.

Not only are descriptions, juxtapositions, visual imagery, and symbolic language used to cast Toxteth in a negative light, but tag-phrases contribute to the overall ‘negativeness’ of the image presented of the district. Tag-phrases are short descriptors that either precede or succeed mention of Toxteth. They are often employed as a means of conveying information where space is limited. David Rose, a former *Guardian* journalist explains that:

> Newspapers use tag-phrases all the time for all kinds of things and often they very rapidly degenerate into clichés but nevertheless they do serve their purpose which is basically, you know, readers and writers, they…it’s a sort of shared vocabulary where you know what you’re talking about and it’s saving space…Remember space is always at a premium (Rose, 2017, interview).

The space-saving theme is echoed by David Wooding, formerly of the *Express*, who explains that they are particularly prevalent in the tabloids because of limited space. He also adds that these tag-phrases are a way of “just reminding people” of key facts associated with an area” (Wooding, 2017, interview). Jon Snow of Channel 4 news who was a television news reporter during the 1981 disturbances in Liverpool, adds that the use of tag-phrases is a useful tactic of the print media, which builds a story based on shock factors:
I mean, I don’t want to be seen as holier than thou but I think
the print press locate it in the shock dictionary (Snow, 2017,
interview).

Tag-phrases serve to further stigmatise an already-stigmatised area and tell readers directly
which traits to associate with the place. In the articles covering Toxteth during the
disturbances and the six months following, the tag-phrases fall into two categories: those
that reinforce the image of a ‘riot-scarred’ district, and those that make reference to the—
generally ethnic—characteristics of the area. Examples of characteristic-based tag-phrases
include prefacing or suffixing mention of Toxteth with “the multi-racial area’ (Cooke, 1981),
“immigrant area” (Crowther and Chesworth, 1981), “an inter-racial community just south of
the city centre” (Halsall, 1981: 1), and “virtually a black ghetto” (Mirror, 1981a: 13). These
tag-phrases (see Fig. 6.4) give an impression of geographical ‘otherness’ perpetuated by the
presence of social and ethnic ‘others’. Use of the words ‘area’, ‘community’ and ‘ghetto’
spatially situate Toxteth, while ‘immigrant’, ‘black’ and ‘inter-racial’ give a sense of ethnoro-
nacial difference. Schemer’s research on the impact of media on stereotypic attitudes, tells us
that words such as ‘ghetto’ are enough to trigger readers’ mental networks that process

Figure 6.4: News cuttings showing characteristic-based tag-phrases based on immigrant status and race are used to
describe Toxteth.
stereotypes. “Once stereotypes have been activated by news stories these negative beliefs are more accessible for subsequent judgments as activation spreads through the cognitive network of individuals” (2012: 741), meaning that the inclusion of the word ‘ghetto’ is enough to trigger stereotypical attitudes among readers towards Toxteth.

The tag-phrases that relate to Toxteth as an area defined by the disturbances range from the bland to the poetic. Descriptors include “the Toxteth riot area” (Aitken et al., 1981), “riot-torn” (Sharratt, 1981: 18), “strife-torn” (Express, 1981a: 2), and “wilderness of despair” (Young, 1981b: 3) (see Fig. 6.5). These short descriptive phrases provide readers with a
ready-made idea of what Toxteth is like and contribute to the negative valence of the press coverage. Here the difference between the techniques of primitive stigmatisation and territorial stigmatisation are apparent; where primitive stigma exists through indirect references to core attributes that would resonate with readers, press territorial stigma in the age of advanced marginality, which relies on tag phrases, directly tells readers what to associate with a place. The reporters I interviewed agreed that it was troubling that these tag-phrases continued to be used long after the disturbances had ended because they serve to further reinforce the disordered and tumultuous image of the area and such reputations are “very difficult” to escape (David Rose, 2017, interview).

In the identity formation process, these tag-phrases serve as identity markers (Kiely et al., 2001) that serve to construct an imposed identity. Generally, identity formation comes from an understanding of the self in relation to the rest of society (Erez and Earley, 1993: 26) but, in the case of Toxteth, the identity is imposed externally and by depriving Toxteth residents of a voice (see discussion later in this chapter), Toxteth is denied the opportunity to form an identity that it projects outwards to the world. Through its labelling, its identity is externally determined.

The act of labelling and forming an identity around Toxteth also serves to situate it geographically within the public imagination. In particular, tag-phrases often geographically situate Toxteth, tying it to the imagined geography of Britain (see Fig. 6.6). Toxteth is geographically described variously as “an enclave within the general area of Liverpool 8” (Osman, 1981: 2), “one of Liverpool’s immigrant areas” (Osman et al., 1981: 1), “an inter-racial area just south of the city centre” (Halsall, 1981: 1), and “devastated Liverpool district” (Lewis, 1981: 22). These descriptors and the use of the terms ‘enclave’, ‘area’ and ‘district’ all bind the constructed image of Toxteth to the geography of Liverpool and tie Toxteth into the geography of the United Kingdom.

Negativity about Toxteth is characterised by bleak visual imagery of destruction and devastation, juxtaposing Toxteth with areas of strife, contrasting Toxteth with representations of British values, and employing tag-phrases that provide a set idea about what readers should associate with the name ‘Toxteth’. Where, during the primitive stigmatisation period prior to the disturbances, more stories were told in a ‘neutral’ manner
that did not rely on emotionally-charged language and strong images of the physical scars borne by Toxteth, the post-1981 era is characterised by an increase in articles that are characterised by negative valence and that further stigmatise the area. The disturbances represent an event stigma that the press then build on through their use of language, ultimately giving the impression that Toxteth is not compatible with British values, hinting at the oppositionality to be discussed in the next section.

The press employs negativity as part of the pathological discourse that creates stigma surrounding Toxteth. By using negative visual imagery, juxtaposition, and tag-phrases, the press creates a vision of Toxteth that is “problematic” (Devereux et al., 2011b: 506). Following from Devereux et al.’s findings about a stigmatised housing estate in Limerick, Ireland, it is apparent that in the articles about Toxteth, crime, disorder and deprivation are all normalised, meaning that the poor conditions of Toxteth and the character of a small population of the residents are made to seem ‘natural’ and unquestioned. It is shown to be a place of danger, deprivation, damage, and in need of rescuing from itself.

6.3.3 Oppositionality in the press

If the shattered shop windows of Toxteth remind us of humanity’s greed, selfishness and imperfection, this marriage
of two young people reminds us of the best, the freshest, the most idealistic of human impulses (Lacey, 1981: 9).

In this extract from an article (see Fig. 6.7 A) we see, yet again, the broken windows metaphor being invoked. The reporter tells readers directly that the shattered windows of Toxteth symbolise the imperfection of society. However, we also see that the article tells us that everything that the marriage of Charles and Diana—occurring in the aftermath of the disturbances on 29th July 1981—is shown to be, Toxteth is the polar opposite. Where their love is ‘fresh’ and ‘idealistic’, the disturbances are based on greed and imperfection. The two images are juxtaposed by the reporter and, while it reflects well on the royal family (indeed, from the perspective of the royal family, this article has a positive valence), there are negative overtones when describing Toxteth. The entire article runs to two pages and is accompanied by two images (see Fig. 6.8). One is a half-page image of the Queen with Charles and Diana, and the other is of a Union Jack-waving crowd. The Union Jacks serve as a reminder of the association between the British state and the royal family, tacitly suggesting that if those in Toxteth are the antithesis of the royal family, that they also represent a direct attack on British values.

Figure 6.7: Cuttings comparing the disturbances to the royal wedding and to the Troubles in Northern Ireland.
The above quotation is not the sole reference to Toxteth and, in fact, the article sandwiches the royal wedding between two mentions of Toxteth. The citation is from the third to last paragraph of the piece but the article opens with a reference to Toxteth in the fourth paragraph that talks about Toxteth’s “ruined streets” (Lacey, 1981: 9). Again, the careful and deliberate opposition of the royal family and the Toxteth disturbances and those rebelling serves to cast a negative pall over Toxteth. In this way, Toxteth is shown to be oppositional to British values: it is a place of “greed, selfishness and imperfection” (Lacey, 1981: 9), whereas the young royal couple—who symbolise Britain—represent “the best, the freshest, the most idealistic of human impulses” (Lacey, 1981: 9). Toxteth and its residents are shown to bear wilfully deviant behaviour and, as such, the press construct the place in opposition to the rest of Britain and British values and norms.

Juxtaposing Toxteth and its residents with the royal family is just one way that the press constructs Toxteth as oppositional. Additionally, the press foster notions of oppositionality by painting the disturbances in direct comparison to the events in Northern Ireland (see Fig. 6.8: A two-page spread about the royal wedding that compares the nuptials to events in Toxteth.)
An article in the Guardian directly compares Toxteth to Northern Ireland, stating that “the scenes in Toxteth immediately call to mind images of Belfast and Londonderry” (Guardian, 1981g: 10). With the Troubles raging on the island of Ireland, the reference to Northern Ireland and its cities in relation to Toxteth contributes to the formation of Toxteth’s identity as a place of strife and turmoil. In a Mirror article, a reporter cites a report that suggests that Toxteth’s “hooligans learn riot tactics from watching television pictures of violence in Northern Ireland” (Fallows, 1981: 15), suggesting that the scale of devastation in Northern Ireland is replicated and found on the mainland. Toxteth’s identity is thus imbued with notions of violence. The transition from primitive to territorial stigmatisation is marked by the reliance on event-related attributes to mar the identity of Toxteth.

The oppositionality is further reinforced through the way that reporters write about the disturbances and those participating: rather than referring to those on the streets as a ‘crowd’, reporters refer to the events as ‘riots’ and often use the word ‘mob’ to describe those involved, invoking a sense of hooliganism and uncontrollable chaos against which the nation is under threat.9

By describing those on the streets as engaging in a ‘riot’ or behaving as a ‘mob’, the press devalues the identity and claims of those revolting and, instead, symbolically form an amorphous group that does not have legitimate claims. Michael Keith writes that the media construction of the ‘rioter’ serves to fulfil Stanley Cohen’s vision of a folk-devil, “a symbolic threat to society” (1993: 57). The folk-devil implies a figure to be feared, and constant reference to the events as riots and those on the street as a ‘mob’ or as ‘rioters’ reinforces the idea that those in Toxteth are to be feared.

The terminological choices work in tandem with the overriding political ideology of the time. Roger Fowler explains that “the Conservative government in office since 1979 represented public disturbances as straightforward criminality, a view which the media supported by constantly speaking of ‘riots’, ‘mobs’, ‘violence’; the government’s response was to strengthen the powers of the police and of the courts” (1991: 135). The constructing of the disturbances as riots and those involved as a mob fits with a conservative perspective on collective violence that sees disorder as “an aberration perpetrated by irresponsible and  

9 ‘Rioter’ also invokes a sense of disorder but the term denies the possibility that the civil strife is a protest against a legitimate cause such as oppression, poor housing, or taxation.
criminal elements” (Benyon and Solomos, 1988: 406). This view of collective violence sees that “existing social and political structures are adequate, and there can therefore be no justification or need for violent agitation” (Benyon and Solomos, 1988: 406). This conservative perspective, adopted by the media generally, explains why the disturbances and those involved are looked on so unfavourably.

Looking at the dataset from 1981, time and again those on the streets are described as engaging in a riot and as presenting as a ‘mob’ thereby structuring their behaviour as deviant and dangerous. The term ‘mob’ is used frequently to describe those revolting in Toxteth (see Fig. 6.9). An article in the *Express* about a taxi driver injured during the disturbances reads that the driver was injured by “a rioting mob of youths” (Stoakes, 1981: 14) and, in describing the actions of some of those involved, an article in the *Mirror* reads that “a mob of 300 black and white youths” vandalised and stole from a dairy (Mirror, 1981b: 1). The term is not used solely by the tabloids, though. A *Guardian* reporter, whilst also condemning the violence of the police, writes that the “Toxteth mob has been vicious” (Guardian, 1981b: 12) and, in September, reflecting on the disturbances, the paper again makes reference to “stone-throwing mobs of mainly black youths” (Guardian, 1981c: 2).

A mob is defined as “a disorderly crowd; a rabble” or, in British English, “a gang”. It is related to the terms “mob rule” or “mob law” which mean “law or rule imposed and enforced by a mob” (Pearsall and Trumble, 1996: 927). Inherent in this definition is the suggestion that a mob poses a danger to society and to social norms and conventions: the mob is outside, or at odds with what is normal. Mob rule implies a direct threat to the status quo and to law and order.

By framing the disturbances as a riot and those on the streets as a mob or as rioters, the press implicitly informs readers that those revolting are in the wrong and are acting wilfully and unlawfully. Reference to being part of a riot, eliminates from the discourse any possibility that those on the streets had legitimate concerns and grievances. Couching them in terms of deviance suggests that there is an unjustified element to their actions. This eliminates any consideration for the potential structural causes that may have provided the backdrop to the disturbances. Cohen explains that media “is a main source of information about the normative contours of a society” (2002: 8) so, by painting those on the streets as a mob, the press shows that such behaviour is against accepted social norms. The simple act
of labelling those involved as rioters or as a mob discounts their claims as legitimate and socially normal. Jon Snow, while working for ITN, reported on the Toxteth disturbances in 1981, argues that the press construction of those on the streets as a hooligan mob shapes how readers think of them, stating that “if the papers have told them the people are hooligans, they [readers] will see them” (2017, interview), highlighting the power of the press to name (Melucci, 1996: 182) and to shape reality.

The mob is constructed as oppositional to order with the press using the police as representatives of order and discipline. Reporters in the *Times* describe ‘the savagery of the pitched battle’ during which the “mob screamed, the buildings roared in flames and a hail of missiles beat a non-stop drum roll on the police shield wall” (Osman and Timmins, 1981: 4) (see Fig. 6.10 A-C), describing the ‘rioters’ as launching a constant assault on the police. The reporters continue to explain that:

We saw looters of all ages and both sexes, black and white, some wearing Balaclava masks and others handkerchiefs or black plastic bags across their faces rushing up within yards of the police line to hurl petrol bombs, bricks, bottles and
lengths of uprooted iron railings (Osman and Timmins, 1981: 4).

Here, again, the reporters use emotive visual imagery to conjure up a picture of what the scene at Toxteth is like. To readers at the time, the mention of balaclavas would have evoked images of the balaclava-clad Provisional IRA in Northern Ireland who wrought terror on Northern Ireland from 1969 until 1997. The balaclava marks those protesting on the streets and connotes ideas of criminality and concealment, and of opposing British law and order. Again, those participating in the disturbances are shown as being in opposition to the police and are shown to be literally and metaphorically attacking the symbols of British law and order. Further, the reporters write that the scene is “an awful picture of anarchy” (Osman and Timmins, 1981: 4), informing readers again that those ‘rioting’ present a threat to the status quo. The term ‘anarchy’ implies that that those on the streets present a direct challenge to the state and to the system of British government.

Those participating in the disturbances are symbolically criminalised through their opposition to the police, to the state, and to law and order. They are also directly criminalised in some articles, however (see Fig. 6.10 D). In a piece in the Times, Chief Constable Ken Oxford (1976-1989) is quoted heavily commenting on the behaviour of those revolting. He does not use the term ‘mob’ but instead refers to them as “thieves and vagabonds” (Kershaw, 1981: 2). The choice of the word “vagabond” is interesting as it implies someone without a fixed abode (Pearsall and Trumble, 1996: 1593), which is not what those taking to the streets were. Oxford suggests that the solution to the violence is a return to “basic civilised discipline” (Kershaw, 1981: 2), tacitly implying that that those on the streets are uncivilised, in need of taming and order and the term ‘uncivilised’ places the ‘rioters’ as oppositional to civilization and civility. This idea of taming and blaming is another common trope used to oppositionalise Toxteth and its residents.

The same article refers to “the savagery of the pitched battle” invoking two ideas simultaneously. First, the disturbances and those participating are linked to savagery, connoting ideas of barbarism and cruelty, consistent with the image of the dangerous mob created in the rest of the article. Secondly, the reporters use language of war, implying that the mob are at war with—in battle with—the rest of Britain. The images of war are constant across the papers with reporters in the Guardian describing the mob engaging in violence
Figure 6.10: News cuttings showing Toxteth as oppositional to law and order.

reminiscent of ‘a medieval affray’ (Morris et al., 1981: 1), during which ‘the mob had won the battle of Upper Parliament Street’ (Morris et al., 1981: 1). Reference to the “elderly refugees” fleeing their homes as the flames took hold on the streets of Toxteth invokes images of warzones and battlegrounds that innocent bystanders are forced to flee (Osman et al., 1981: 1).

Photographs, too, add to the war and battle imagery with stark images depicting battle scenes (see Figs. 6.11 and 6.12). Pictures show the police pitted against those on the street (Chartres, 1981: 2; Storrock, 1981: 10; Morris et al., 1981: 1), and the ‘ruins’ of Toxteth following the disturbances (Gale, 1981: 1; Morris et al., 1981: 1; Thorpe, 1981: 3).

The depiction through photographs of those on the street as against or in opposition to the police (see Fig. 6.11), serves to further reinforce the idea that the people of Toxteth are, in some way, against or in opposition to the police as representatives of and guardians of British norms and social values. The photographs are taken from the vantage point of the police,
looking back at the defiant ‘mob’, placing the readers on the same side as the police and, tacitly, implying that the audience and the police represent an ‘us’ against which the residents of Toxteth are positioned as a ‘them’. The foregrounding of the police as victims to an oppositional group is presented through the frequent use of one image that shows a headshot of a policeman whose visor is battered and bloodied (see Fig. 6.13). This image is used in the Mirror, the Times, and the Guardian coverage of the disturbances and serves to further reinforce the disturbances as an attack on law and order (Morris et al., 1981: 1; Osman et al., 1981: 1; Crowther and Chesworth, 1981: 5; Mirror, 1981a: 13; Mirror, 1981b: 1; Mirror, 1981c: 6; Mirror, 1981d: 7).

Figure 6.11: Images in the press show those on the street as in opposition to the police.
Figure 6.12: Images showing the destruction of Toxteth as a result of the disturbances.

In addition to building a picture of the ‘mob’ through opposition to the police, who represent symbols of the British state, and through the language of war, the ‘mob’ is further constructed through language of mania, implying that those on the streets act through lunacy rather than rationality. The Times describes those revolting as a “screaming, almost berserk mob” (Osman et al., 1981: 1), implying that they are acting in a “frenzied” manner (Pearsall and Trumble, 1996: 136). Similarly, an article in the Times is entitled “Greed and ferocious violence mark a collective madness” (Osman and Timmins, 1981: 4). This lunacy feeds into the idea of a wilful contrariness that drives and characterises Toxteth and its residents.

For the Express, the careful construction of the disturbances as emblematic of a challenge to law and order, was part of a larger campaign to resurrect the Riot Act that was repealed in 1969 and which “had made it a felony for an assembly of more than twelve people to refuse to disperse after being ordered to do so and having been read a specified portion of the Act by a lawful authority” (Pearsall and Trumble, 1996: 1242). The Riot Act would have made
it possible to further criminalise the disturbances and those rebelling, thus the *Express*’ call for its invocation suggests a view that those on the streets were marked by deviousness and illegality. Only three days after the disturbances hit Toxteth, an opinion piece in the *Express* entitled “Terror in the streets” discusses the ‘riots’ in Southall and Toxteth (see Fig. 6.14):

Having been one of the most law-abiding countries in the world—a by-word for stability, order, and decency—are we changing into something else? We do not believe that the British public will stand for it. If riots like these continue to occur with all their damage to innocent people, property and injuries to our sorely tired policemen—150 police were injured over the weekend—there will be growing demand for tough, specific and effective action to put an end to them…To that end Sir David McNee floated the idea of reviving the old Riot Act, which could make it easier and simpler for the police to deal with the legal side of the riots (Express, 1981b: 8).
The following day the *Express*, again, calls for a new Riot Act, turning it into an *Express* crusade: “The Daily Express called for this in the wake of Brixton. Now other voices are joining in” (Express, 1981c: 8). The reason that they provide for the need for such a Riot Act is because “we want to see fewer policemen injured and more arrests and conviction of hooligans and professional agitators who stimulate anarchy and violence” (Express, 1981c: 8). Here we see firstly that the *Express* is involving itself in matters of politics as it calls for the implementation of a new Riot Act, raising questions about the political neutrality of the press. Secondly, we see that they are using the opposition of the hooligan mob against the police as justification for an act that would further criminalise the people involved in the disturbances who were, in fact, responding to decades of structural violence. Several days
later still, the paper again calls for the Riot Act to “be reintroduced in one form or another” (Express, 1981d: 8). An article from July 9th 1981 entitled “Are the young really protesting or are they sowing the first seeds of anarchy?” features a double-page spread of photographs and interviews with members of the public (all of whom are staunchly against the disturbances). At the bottom of the second page is a boxed article about the Riot Act being successfully used earlier in the century (Express, 1981e: 8-9), carefully placed to suggest that the solution to those who roam the streets “like packs of wild animals” (Express, 1981e: 8-9), is straightforward and ready to be enacted. In the Express’ calls for the rekindling of or re-enactment of the Riot Act, we see that the paper, famous for its ‘crusades’ continues to perpetuate stigma against those involved in the disturbances in Toxteth by pitting them against the police as representatives of law, order and Britishness.

By constructing the disturbances as ‘riots’ and those revolting as a ‘mob’ with hooligan tendencies, the press implies that the events and those involved are dangerous, lawless, and outside normal social values and norms. Labelling them as a ‘mob’ negates the claims of structural deprivation, racism and inequality, and, instead, criminalises them as oppositional and defiant. By pitting the disorderly mob against the police—who represent order and discipline—the press perpetuates the image of lawlessness, which is characterised as being at odds with the status quo of the nation. The ‘mob’ is further discursively created through the use of war/battle imagery and notions of madness, both of which suggest that those rebelling pose a threat to mainstream society to which they are opposed.

The press exerts power through language. It possesses the “power of naming” (Melucci, 1996: 182), which is a power that only rests with those occupying a dominant position in society. Roger Fowler affirms the role of the press as an agent of power, as a means of transmitting the dominant ideology of the ruling class, in this case, the Conservative government (1991: 135). We can understand this by turning to Bourdieu, who tells us that symbolic power is a “power of constituting the given through utterances, of making people see and believe, of confirming or transforming the vision of the world and, thereby, action on the world and thus the world itself” (1991: 170), which relates to Melucci’s power of naming. Symbolic power is a form of normalising power or power over life (in Foucauldian language), that sees society maintained and administered in a particular way through social norms and regulations. The press choice of language, of structuring those revolting as a ‘mob’ promotes certain social norms and regulations that constitute a pliant and docile
society, which condemns those creating disorder and fails to consider the structural causes lying behind the disturbances. Further, the language choice “hierarchises” (Foucault, 1984: 144) society, placing those revolting in a position of scorn and condemnation, outside what is normal, into oppositionality. Ultimately, the language choices used by reporters during the Toxteth disturbances serve to alienate those residing in Toxteth, which is affirmed from the perspective of the propaganda model. Oppositionality paints Toxteth as a place outside the common-sense understanding of society and, as such, it functions as the common enemy that Herman and Chomsky describe (1988: 29), and paints them as outcast members of society.

6.3.4 Stranger-making in action
Creating strangers
Where naming, negativity, and oppositionality impose an identity externally on Toxteth, the notion of stranger-making is useful for understanding how the residents of Toxteth were made socially distant and silent, thereby depriving the area of an internally constructed identity. This section turns to the idea of stranger-making and how it is enacted in two key ways.

Simmel’s conception of the stranger can be particularly helpful when understanding notions of foreignness, which feed into the press construction of Toxteth. Through the use of tag-phrases we are told that Toxteth is an “immigrant area” (Crowther and Chesworth, 1981; Osman et al., 1981: 1), “the multi-racial area’ (Cooke, 1981), “an inter-racial community just south of the city centre” (Halsall, 1981: 1), and “virtually a black ghetto” (Mirror, 1981a: 13) (see Fig. 6.15 A-E). All of these tag-phrases serve to stigmatise Toxteth but in a particular way. Rather than stating that Toxteth is ‘bad’ in some way (what would amount to territorial stigma through negativity), the press casts Toxteth as the home to strangers who have “come[s] today and stay[s] tomorrow” (Simmel, 1908: 1), referring to immigration patterns. Toxteth is referred to in these examples using spatially fixed language such as a “community just south of the city centre” and “ghetto”, both of which give a spatial fixity to Toxteth as part first of Liverpool but, more broadly, as part of the geography of the United Kingdom.

References to Toxteth as being “Liverpool’s multiracial area” (Times, 1981a: 2), as “an enclave within the general area of Liverpool 8” (Osman, 1981: 2), and later as “the ghetto area of Liverpool” (Brayfield, 1985: 11) (see Fig. 6.15 F-H) serve to intensify the attempt by the press to show Toxteth as being embedded within the geography of Liverpool but bearing
a different identity to the rest of the city. Such phrases imply that Toxteth is categorically different and, though spatially fixed, remains socially disconnected in racial and ethnic terms. The assumption presented in these examples is that Toxteth stands as an example of blackness and foreignness compared to the rest of the white city. Certainly, Toxteth did have—and continues to have—a higher black population than the rest of Liverpool (Gifford, 1989: 39-40) but these examples from the press highlight the way in which race was invoked as a means of creating difference between Toxteth and the rest of Liverpool. This process amounts to stranger-making as it proceeds to ground Toxteth in spatial terms (nearness) but, through racialization, creates a notion of social difference and distance (farness).

Figure 6.15: News cuttings demonstrating the idea of stranger-making.
The racialization of place ties into Caroline Knowles’ argument that it was through the racialization of the disturbances of 1981 that areas of Britain came to be known in the public imaginary geography of Britain. Such areas became known through their racial and ethnic difference:

Previously little-publicised parts of British cities — Toxteth (Liverpool), St Paul’s (Bristol), Notting Hill and Tottenham (London) — became places in the ethnic topography of Britain precisely because of these conflicts. They did so in particular circumstances. They were placed on the popular ethnic map of the nation by the urban disturbances which erupted in these and other places, throughout the 1970s and early 1980s. These racialised urban geographies… transformed ethnic neighbourhoods into territories (Knowles, 2003: 90)

Here, Knowles agrees that the racialization of the disturbances led to the areas in which the disturbances occurred being entered into the “popular ethnic map of the nation” (2003: 90). The places became known for their blackness, their foreignness, their ‘strangeness’ and, while embedded within a larger conurbation, each comes to represent something separate to that larger, containing city. They “became places” (Knowles, 2003: 90), highlighting that Toxteth, St Paul’s, and the other areas that saw urban disturbances in the 1980s, suddenly became places in their own right, separate and removed from the larger conurbation—they were made socially distant from the rest of the city. Knowles also shows how core and event stigma can co-exist. In the racialization of the disturbances, the events of the disturbances are the catalyst for core attributes relating to race, to attach to the stigmatised identity.

Simmel explains that a characteristic of the stranger is that “he has not belonged to it from the beginning, that he imports qualities into it, which do not and cannot stem from the group itself” (Simmel, 1908: 1). In the case of Toxteth, through terminological choice, the press constructs the stranger as differing in origin, not sharing a common Britishness. For example, the term ‘immigrant’ (Crowther and Chesworth, 1981; Osman et al., 1981: 1) or “Liverpool’s largest coloured community” (Guardian, 1981d: 2) construct Toxteth residents as bearing a different social and spatial origin and, in so doing, make strangers out of them. In this way,
Toxteth is cast as a place of strangeness and difference. It is shown to belong to the British Isles but not to Britishness as it remains distant and marginal. In so doing, the press grounds Toxteth in a spatial geography of Britain that, in Simmel’s language accounts for the area’s ‘nearness’ but it creates distance by highlighting difference and removes Toxteth from the identity of both Britain and of Liverpool.

*Silencing strangers*

Another way in which the press structures Toxteth and its residents as distant strangers is through the silencing of the voices of those on the streets in 1981 and other residents.\(^{10}\) Referring back to the definition of social distance—which in turn defines the creation of a stranger—we see that social distance is “usually measured by the amount of social contact between groups” (Mayhew, 2015). The press, by silencing Toxteth residents and not making their voices part of the main and public discourse about the disturbances, keeps Toxteth set aside from the rest of society and structures ‘Toxteth and its residents as being spatially fixed but socially separate from the mainstream ‘us’. This amounts to an abuse of power by social elites who exercise discourse control and dominance, depriving residents of a stake in the discourse about Toxteth (van Dijk, 1995: 20).

Of the 1,950 articles written between January 1\(^{st}\) 1900 and December 31\(^{st}\) 1999, only 218 articles (11.2%) include a quotation from a resident (Fig. 6.16). Of those, 110 articles (5.6%) quote a resident exclusively. This compares with 947 articles (48.6%) where an outside source (police, policymaker, politician, or representative of any official body) is quoted exclusively. Of note is that 785 articles (40.3%) do not include any quotations, raising questions about the morphing of facts and opinions in the press. Considering the 496 articles written between the commencement of the disturbances in July 1981 and the end of that year, only 48 include a quotation from a resident of Toxteth. Twenty-five of those 48 articles include a quotation from a Toxteth resident as well as an outside source, meaning that only 23 articles (4.6%) of all articles interview a Toxteth resident solely. On the other hand, 281 of the 496 articles (56.7%) interview an outsider solely. This shows a clear imbalance in how Toxteth residents are represented in the press coverage of the disturbances (compare Figs. 6.16 and 6.17). Quotations are used to supplement the facts of the article, to provide first-hand or eyewitness accounts of what happened, to fairly evaluate both sides of a story, and

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\(^{10}\) Not all residents of Toxteth were involved in the disturbances, of course, but I argue that the smear of Toxteth in the press tainted all residents.
to support the reporter’s claims (Jullian, 2011: 768). This tells us that the reporter’s role is to create detachment and social distance between themselves and the object of their report.

My findings show the creation of a social distance between reporters and residents, but a social alliance and proximity between reporters and other outsiders. This reflects the position of reporters as elite voices that determine who speaks and who can define what constitutes news. There is, however, an almost blatant omission of the views of Toxteth residents, with less than 10% of the 496 articles between July and December 1981 quoting a resident. This finding connects with Chomsky’s thesis that “the media serve the interests of state and corporate power, which are closely interlinked, framing their reporting and analysis in a manner supportive of established privilege and limiting debate and discussion accordingly” (Chomsky, 1989: 21—necessary illusions). By silencing residents and privileging the voices of state actors, such as police and politicians, the media is supporting the dominant and powerful ideologies governing society, and silencing voices that could

Figure 6.16: Quotation source of articles between 1900 and 1999.
put forth a counter or opposing ideology. Relatedly, presenting only voices of the powerful in reports and quashing the opinions and views of ‘ordinary’ inside voices normalises power and implies that these voices speak the truth. This suggests that the views of official sources were foregrounded either by individual reporters or by the newspaper itself through the editorial process. It seems unlikely that all reporters (especially those from the left-wing press who were more sympathetic to the structural causes of the disturbances) would have chosen to silence residents, which implies that there were other factors at play. Reporters, commentators and politicians interviewed as part of this study offered several reasons why the voices of the residents of Toxteth went largely unheard.

The first reason for not including the voices of residents is one of personal safety. An editor of a British current affairs news magazine explains, “you can get the shit beaten out of you in somewhere like Toxteth if you go around saying, ‘what’s happened?’” (2017, interview). This implies that it was may have been deemed too dangerous by reporters to seek out residents for interview during and following the disturbances. Conversely, seeking official sources did not pose such a risk to personal safety. David Rose, a former Guardian journalist, concurs and explains that the reputation of Toxteth and the prospect of imminent danger may have put off some journalists from venturing too far in Toxteth and from talking to residents. He
further reflects on the death of a photographer, David Hodge, during the Brixton disturbances, and highlights the dangers that reporters faced during the disturbances:

Once reputation attaches to an area, people get quite scared. If you’re in Toxteth and you don’t know the place, and you haven’t got any contacts, you don’t know how to make contacts, you don’t know how to get into the community, you will be nervous. You’re a white person in an area where...you know...Liverpool people have a very strong sense of their own identity anyway and tend to look with some derision at, sort of, naive southerners. So, I think there’s a lot of that tension and nervousness about it. Sometimes, you know, it’s not ill-founded. I mean...there was a photographer killed in the Brixton riots in 1985 when somebody dropped a breezeblock on his head from a great height and...a reporter was really horribly wounded—he was slashed across the face with a knife. So, you know, people were quite nervous and it’s much, much easier if you go and talk to the cops: cops [are] only too happy to you know, put out their version (2017, interview).

Here, Rose notes that the reputation of an area is enough to detract reporters. This mounting reputation may stem, in part, from media articles with negative valence, suggesting that media contributes to a self-fulfilling prophecy. As Tsafti and Cohen explain, the reputation need not even be based on reality for it to have impact (2011), meaning that if the perception of danger is there, this is likely enough to keep reporters away. But it is in this keeping away from Toxteth that the press make strangers of Toxteth residents by establishing persistent distance between residents and the readers of the press.

Charles Clarke, former Home Secretary (2004-2006), who helped to arrange the Community Challenge conference in response to the disturbances, explains that the perception of danger was, indeed, high. However, he argues that the role of danger and crime influenced residents in their willingness to speak up, regardless of the actions of reporters. He explains that there was a group that “exercised significant control over parts of the community in Toxteth in a
way that terrified people. They were a frightening group of people” (2017, interview). The leader of the group in question was a convicted drug dealer, gangster, and community leader in Toxteth during the 1980s, who controlled the community through fear (Heseltine, 2017, interview). This reference to the criminal element in Toxteth suggests that interviews from residents may have been difficult to attain because of fear among residents combined with fear among journalists because of the reputation of this group.

Sometimes, however, keeping away from Toxteth and its residents was not solely the choice of the reporter. A former *Times* journalist who wrote about the aftermath of the disturbances explains that “I honestly don’t think I went there”, adding that she wrote from the newsroom in London and any on-the-ground information came in the form of Press Association wires that were Telexed into the *Times* office and were to be incorporated into reports (2017, interview). This explanation suggests that residents were not interviewed simply because there was no reporter there to interview them. It was, on the other hand, far easier to interview policymakers, police, and key outsider figures remotely as they were available for interview by telephone or they made public statements that were available to reporters. This implies that the press structure imposed on reporters meant that social distance from residents was required whereas official voices were foregrounded and shown to be part of the same social discourse and episteme as the rest of the readership. The aforementioned editor of the British news magazine explains that contacting the police is a common practice in journalism:

> I mean, there’s always interplay between police and press, you know, from local papers upwards because…if you’re a local paper that’s where you get half your stories and there’s nothing sinister about that. You know, a journalist’s sort of first training is you come in on Monday morning, you ring the police, the fire brigade, the ambulance, you know: has anything happened? … The public is entitled to know what their public services are doing and what incidents have happened so, that’s always going to happen and I think it should happen (2017, interview).
While the police represent a useful source for journalists, this relationship between the police and the press has become normalised in the world of journalism, though; as the editor quoted above continues, the Leveson inquiry into press ethics and practices, revealed that sometimes this relationship can go too far and, in recent years, “they [the police] were dictating what the press said and in particularly in the phone tapping and other scandals and those relationships were too close” (2017, interview). This tells us that there is a fine line between the police directly influencing what is put in the press through providing tips, and the press using the police as a sole source. It is apparent, however, that it is a common practice for the police to inform reporters of stories and to provide statements, and this is entirely possible even when writing remotely. Impossible, however, is the careful courting of residents to provide interviews when journalists do not visit the location about which they are writing. In this way, reporters not only maintain social distance from the residents of Toxteth but also maintain geographical distance, relegating residents into the category of stranger.

While many reporters may have written remotely, countless others did visit Toxteth both during and after the disturbances. A former Mirror journalist adds that the “first thing we did there” was talk to residents (2017, interview). If this were the case, though, it seems odd that only 9.7% of all articles should include a quotation from a resident. Martin Wainwright, former Northern Editor of the Guardian explains that residents were, in fact, often interviewed and their quotations included in the copy. However, he adds that their quotes would be the first to be omitted during the editorial process because they were deemed to represent only one person’s opinion as opposed to the view of a politician, for example, who, as a result of his/her democratic election, was seen to represent the views of the population more fully (2017, interview). This view is echoed by Nick Davies, the investigative journalist who uncovered the News of the World phone hacking scandal, who explains:

There is safety (legal and political) in rehearsing an official line, ie whatever is delivered by press officers acting for police or govt [government] or local authority, whereas a quote from the streets may leave the newspaper exposed to challenge, formal complaint or legal action. Over and again, you will find that reporters feel safe (a key word) to report the police saying that rioters have been violent; and unsafe to report rioters saying police have been violent unless they have
objective, unshakeable confirmation (Davies, 2017, interview).

His account, combined with that of Wainwright, goes some way to explain that it may be during the editorial process rather than the writing process that the voices of residents are drowned out in order to make sure that the newspaper remains free from accusations of libel.

The need for views to be seen as reliable, traceable, and representative of the population is more intense in print rather than broadcast media. In television or radio broadcasts, the interviewee can be seen/heard making a statement, thereby reducing the possibility for the quote to be fabricated. In print media, however, readers and editors may doubt the veracity of some quotations—particularly those from unnamed sources. It may then, according to Wainwright and Davies, be preferable for editors to omit quotations from residents for fear of accusations of fabrication. This reading tells us that many reporters who were on the ground sought out residents for interview but that the editorial process silenced those with an insider perspective.

Though journalistic and editorial practices may have resulted in the silencing of voices, there is another potential explanation for not including the voices of residents. That the media refer to those involved in the disturbances as a ‘mob’ and to the events as ‘riots’ has implications for the inclusion (or exclusion) of resident voices. By using the term ‘mob’ to describe those on the streets, the press tacitly implies that they are deviant, criminal and intent on creating disorder. By framing them as such, it is little surprise that their quotations are not included in press reports; it would be unusual for the press to give a chance to ‘criminals’ to explain their point of view and interpretation of events. David Rose, formerly of the Guardian, references former Home Secretary Douglas Hurd’s (1995-1989) reaction to the Handsworth disturbances in Birmingham in 1985. Hurd arrived in Birmingham and

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11 While this may be less true for television news where on-the-spot reporting is preferred, even in this medium, shortcuts are taken so that journalists do not have to be physically proximal to the place about which they are reporting. Huxford’s study of US news shows that there is even an increasing reliance on digital manipulation to superimpose a reporter onto live image of the scene of a news story (2007: 662). Huxford highlights that this not the norm in television news reporting but that in his study, one third of reports used this technique, which he terms ‘virtual proximity’ (2007: 662).
declared that the ‘riot’ was “not a cry for help but a cry for loot” (Reitan, 2003: 109). Rose explains that:

By framing it in that way he’s basically saying to any media, if you talk to these people and find out what they’re doing— and not just in Handsworth but in Toxteth and elsewhere, too—you are talking to criminals. This is a law and order issue. This is not about politics. This is not about deprivation. This is not about inequality. This is about criminality and nothing else. And that was the government’s line so I think that’s part of it, too, especially the Conservatives (2017, interview).

Framing the disturbances as riots and those on the streets as a mob means that, through oppositionality, Toxteth’s residents are placed outside the status quo. This contributes to the process of stranger-making as the ‘mob’ is identified as being spatially tied but socially distant to the rest of the population.

The semantic choices used to describe Toxteth residents, combined with consistently negative coverage is thought to have led to a feeling of disillusionment among residents about the press. Charles Clarke explains this viewpoint and says that “they [residents] see people talking about them in patronising ways, often misleadingly, and so they say ‘well, fuck off’” when reporters do ask for an interview (2017, interview). This means that the negative coverage, reporting styles, patronising tones, and terminological choices may have ultimately led to reporters being excluded from the very interviews that they needed for their reports.

The reasons for not quoting residents range from reporters not being physically present in Toxteth to residents’ voices being edited out during the editorial process. Regardless of the reason for their omission, it is apparent from data that residents’ voices are missing from press coverage of the disturbances and this is inimical to both the quality of the coverage, which is missing an on-the-ground element, and to the credibility of the picture that is being presented of Toxteth. Though Devereux et al. assert that the media provide “a window into the place from which the audience themselves are socially distant” (2011a: 130), the window that the media are providing is voyeuristic and, by privileging the voices of outsiders, serves
to add distance to the relationship between readers and residents of Toxteth. The coverage assumes that the official voices speak the truth and do not acknowledge that there are multiple realities of what is happening in Toxteth. The message that the omission puts forth is that the residents of Toxteth do not warrant their voices to be heard and the voices that should be central to the story of Toxteth are, in fact, marginalised. They are removed from the social discourse, rendering them strangers—geographically tied but socially set adrift from the mainstream discourse surrounding the disturbances.

The marginalization of the voices of Toxteth residents conforms both to Bourdieu’s notions of symbolic power as the means of getting people to believe certain visions of society and of the world (1992: 170), and to the Foucauldian control of populations through discourse. From a Bourdieusian perspective, a vision of the world is created whereby Toxteth residents are, and should be, marginal to the main discourse. In this vision, the official voices always speak the truth and should drown out those of insiders. This contributes to a hierarchisation of discourse with some voices seen as more valuable or worthy of hearing than others, which ties in with the Foucauldian notion of population control and hierarchisation. By situating Toxteth residents outside the dominant narrative, they are placed symbolically beneath officials who represent the ruling or dominant class. Contemporary power is disciplinary in nature (Foucault, 1984: 140-1) and is passed on through discourse rather than force. Foucault tells us that “discourse transmits and produces power” (1984: 101), thereby explaining the act of inclusion or exclusion of a person or group from the discourse is an act of, and production of, power.

Linking this to media studies, we can see that this connects to the idea of media controlling society and setting the agenda, or determining what people think about (Cohen, 1963 in McCombs and Shaw, 1968). By putting forth certain stories, certain angles, and providing quotations from select sources, the media determines who gets heard and which perspectives are entered into the common-sense understanding of society. Moreover, this agenda-setting is influenced by the close ties between the press and political powers (Herman and Chomsky, 1988; Chomsky, 1989). Chomsky tells us that “media serve the interests of state and corporate power” (1989: 21), meaning that the population is controlled and regulated (in Foucauldian language) for political ends that further the aims of powerful state and corporate actors. We can see this chapter as the press laying the way for dominant agents of state
power to continue to exert power over Toxteth and for Toxteth to be marginalised as outside the status-quo.

The discourse (composed of what is said and what is not said, who speaks and who is silent) is a means of creating a vision of truth and power in which the most vulnerable members of society, oppressed by structural causes, continue to be oppressed and are cast as strangers. They are deprived a voice and the ability to self-define, and are made ‘unknown’ to the rest of society other than through their geographical relationships. The continued omission of Toxteth residents serves to regulate society and to preserve the status quo: giving Toxteth residents a voice would serve to empower them where silencing them continues to keep them socially oppressed.

6.4 Conclusion
This chapter has shown that notions of identity are central to the transition from primitive stigmatisation to territorial stigmatisation of Toxteth by the press. This transition has been precipitated by the occurrence of the “discrete” events (Hudson, 2008: 253) of the disturbances about which media attention coalesced.

Four techniques were used by the press with relation to notions of identity: naming, negativity, oppositionality, and stranger-making. Drawing on existing tropes and attributes established during primitive stigmatisation, through naming, the press externally brands a place onto which negative imagery and oppositional traits can be attached. In the case of Toxteth, the press selected a name not widely used by residents but already primitively stigmatised, and imposed it on the area. Through negativity, the press painted a place as lacking positive attributes, smearing it with tainting language and negative visual imagery, resulting in the discursive construction of an area imbued with aversiveness. Use of negative visual imagery, juxtaposition, and tag-phrases, all created a ready-made vision of Toxteth that is problematised. Oppositionality, as employed by the press, constructs an area and its residents as being wilfully contrary to the status quo and the rest of society. One way that this is achieved is through terminological choice (such as referring to ‘riots’ or ‘mobs’). It constructs the place and its inhabitants as an untameable threat to the order and discipline of society, suggesting that they display the signs of wilfulness, deviance, and defiance in the face of authority. These techniques all construct an identity of Toxteth externally, using press imposition of imagery and characteristics to define and label the area.
Through stranger-making, the press make the residents and the place into a remote and voiceless entity that is socially distant from the rest of mainstream society. The strangeness can be understood as threatening but, more so, it conjures up ideas of not belonging and hierarchisation of social strata, tacitly placing Toxteth residents at the bottom of the social strata and outside social norms. Where naming, negativity, and oppositionality externally impose an identity and image onto Toxteth, stranger-making denies internal identity construction. The media exert a power in the construction and deprivation of Toxteth’s identity that serves the common-sense vision of Toxteth as outside the status quo, as different, and as a place to be feared and cast asunder.

The territorial stigmatisation of Toxteth can be seen to work concurrently on notions of identity construction and on identity denial. Where identity construction is an external process that operates through the application of names, of negative valence, and of oppositional traits, identity obfuscation through stranger-making relies less on the imposing of an identity and more on the denial of internal identity construction by silencing the voices of insiders almost entirely. Where primitive stigmatisation of Toxteth matches with Hudson’s core stigma typology that arises from the area’s perceived “core attributes” (Hudson, 2008: 253), and is based around descriptive and indirect castigation of the area, this chapter has shown that “discrete” or “anomalous” events (Hudson, 2008: 253) aid in transitioning primitive stigma into territorial stigmatisation in the Wacquantian style. The events-based stigma adheres so strongly because of the existing, low-grade, oblique stigma that has predated it and has allowed a backdrop of denigration to occur.
Chapter 7: Toxteth as the ‘inner city’: understanding the language of stigma

7.1 Introduction
An article in the *Express* in 1981 is titled provocatively with ‘Toxteth: Grim warning we can’t ignore’ (Evans, 1981: 10). The first paragraph of the article tells readers that “racial tension and discrimination in Toxteth, Liverpool, offered a grim warning of trouble ahead for every British city which mustn’t be ignored” (Evans, 1981: 10). A black banner across the top of the article features bold, capitalised white letters that read: “LEARN THE LESSONS OR RIOTS COULD SPREAD ACROSS BRITAIN, SAY MPs” (Evans, 1981: 10). The article is drawing on the findings of a Home Affairs Committee meeting that acknowledged the deprivation, racial discrimination, and ethnoracial enclosure in Toxteth. While the government findings adequately acknowledge the structural issues that led to the disturbances, the press remoulded the message into an ominous caution for the rest of the country. In this article, echoing the findings of the Home Affairs Committee, Toxteth is crafted as the ‘inner city’ in which “Liverpool’s ethnic minorities were concentrated” (Evans, 1981: 10). This crafting of Toxteth as the ‘inner city’ as a form of territorial stigmatisation is the focus of this chapter. By constructing Toxteth as the epitome of the problematised inner city, government and the press enable a certain discourse of privatised solutions and interventions, showing how territorial stigma can emerge and become activated for political ends (Slater, 2017).

This chapter addresses subsidiary research question 3: *How do moments of stigmatisation extrapolate and connect to a broader social, political and economic context?* It picks up the story of stigma temporally in 1981, as the events of the disturbances have transformed the previous form of primitive stigma based on core attributes into a pernicious and adhesive stigma defined by discrete events. I begin by offering a short account of the notion of the ‘underclass’, a concept that is foundational in understanding the notion of the ‘inner city’. I then expand on the symbolic value and meaning of the idea of the ‘inner city’ itself as it was operationalised in British policy for context, before building on the work of Jacquelin Burgess whose work on the coverage of the ‘riots’ throughout Britain in the summer of 1981 resulted in her thesis about the ‘myth of the inner city’ (Burgess, 1985). She argues that “not only were these violent and dramatic happenings very clearly located but the press were anxious to find some causal link between the riotous behaviour and the conditions of life in the inner cities” (2008: 193). Her conclusion is that the press create a myth of the inner city as “alien, outsider ‘normal’ places. It is populated by white and black people who are outside
‘normal’ society. Both the inner city and its inhabitants threaten the values and standards of ‘civilised society’” (Burgess, 1985: 206).

Concurring with Burgess, and writing with the benefit of more than 30 years of hindsight to analyse policy developments, I show how the press use of the term ‘inner city’ to describe Toxteth at once deprives the area of its unique contours, while entering it into regional and national discourses of the ‘inner city’, which connect to a bigger picture of the language of territorial stigma in Britain. I begin this chapter by reviewing the ideas of the ‘underclass’ and the ‘inner city’ and the connotations implied when the term is used, before discussing how, through press use of the term ‘inner city’ in relation to Toxteth, the focus of the discourse is ‘up-scaled’ to an urban or national level that monolithises Toxteth and obscures its uniqueness, masking it instead as an inner city, with all of the symbolic baggage that the moniker entails. The rest of the chapter shifts to show the context in which the inner-cityising of Toxteth occurred and how the use of the term in relation to Toxteth connects with a larger political endeavour under PM Margaret Thatcher to use Toxteth as the poster child of inner cities—both in terms of problems and solutions. I show the effects of the combined press and political discourse of the inner city in relation to Toxteth in the way in which it eased the entry of gentrifying forces into the city. Finally, I conclude with a reflection on the bigger picture of the language of territorial stigmatisation in Britain and how terms such as ‘inner city’ contribute to a stigmatising discourse about place.

7.2 The ‘underclass’
The term ‘underclass’ has been used and operationalised as “a form of sociological shorthand” (Bagguley and Mann, 1992: 113), “used to describe a section of society which is believed to exist within but at the base of the working class” (Bagguley and Mann, 1992: 113). Bagguley and Mann here refer to the symbolic value and discursive power of the term ‘underclass’. The term is highly controversial—and, some argue, largely mythologised (Bagguley and Mann, 1992; MacDonald, 1997). While the term does not feature directly in any of the press coverage of Toxteth, the term is worth exploring as it ties to the concept of the ‘inner city’ which is a spatialised manifestation of the concept, and the imagery associated with the idea of the ‘underclass’ is operationalised in coverage of Toxteth.

The idea of the ‘underclass’ can be traced back to Karl Marx’s notion of the ‘lumpen-proletariat’, the : 


‘Floating, latent, and stagnant’ persons ([Marx, 1967] p. 794)—the first three segments—are marginalized members of the working class who form the ‘reserve army’ of workers. The fourth segment—the lumpen-proletariat—remains outside the labor force (and thus the working class) and consists of social deviants, misfits, criminals, and other dregs of society (Devine and Wright, 1993: 79).

Here, Marx’s notion of the lumpen-proletariat is grounded in the language of class structure, highlighting the existence of a left-behind population: social outcasts who are the lowest of the low. The description sounds remarkably similar to the contemporary discourse of the “feral underclass” described by Michelle Gill (2012: 12) that plagues society, a vision that has gained traction, as I shall show, through the reliance on Charles Murray’s model of the ‘underclass’. While Marx’s construction of the lumpen-proletariat is callous and disparaging, with moralising overtones, he maintains that the position of the lumpen-proletariat is the “consequence of capital accumulation—the human victims of the capitalist economic system” (Devine and Wright, 1993: 79), thereby recognising that the ‘underclass’ occupy such a position in the stratified society because of structural rather than individual failings.

The inter-war years saw a preoccupation with the notion of “an hereditary ‘social problem group’” (Macnicol, 1987: 293). This discourse was enmeshed with ideas of eugenics, social engineering, and a genetic view of intellect (Macnicol, 1987: 296). Richard Meegan, in his writing about Liverpool, notes that this ‘social problem group’ was sometimes spatialised in references to the ‘urban problem’ (2003: 53), and he states that Liverpool has historically served as a prime example of what he references Peter Hall as referring to as the “city of the permanent underclass” (Hall, 2002 in Meegan, 2003: 53).

While the post-war years saw a general decline in the prevalence of these linkages between genetics and social difference, they were drawn on again by Sir Keith Joseph, Secretary of State for Health and Social Services under Conservative PM Edward Heath. In 1974, he referred to the ‘cycle of deprivation’ and suggested that the solution to the problem was “to extend birth control facilities to such mothers who were ‘producing problem children, the future unmarried mothers, delinquents, denizens of our borstals, subnormal educational establishments, prisons, hostels from drifters’” (Macnicol, 1987: 294). Here, Joseph was
suggesting that the solution to deprivation and deviance was sterilisation, thereby indirectly suggesting that the solution to deprivation should occur at the individual scale rather than at a structural or societal scale.

Joseph’s views on the ‘problem’ population are reminiscent of the ‘underclass’ debate that was gaining ground, particularly in the United States. Gunnar Myrdal, writing in 1962, used the term ‘underclass’ to refer to “an excluded minority left economically redundant through technological progress under capitalism” (MacDonald, 1997: 4), an understanding that would later influence scholars such as Loïc Wacquant and William Julius Wilson. Ken Auletta’s conception of the ‘underclass’ had a cultural element, too, as he pointed to “the inability of the underclass to assimilate into the American way of life. His underclass included drug addicts, drunks, drop-outs and drifters, bag ladies and released mental patients, street criminals and other hustlers, alongside the ‘passive poor’ and long-term welfare dependants” (MacDonald, 1997: 4-5). While Auletta’s writings on the underclass were stigmatising and pathologising, it was Charles Murray’s conceptualisation of the ‘underclass’ that helped to give a popular and political resurgence to the concept. Murray, the American political scientist whose work on the links between race and intelligence in his book *The Bell Curve* has been highly criticised, is “the man behind the underclass” (Vallely, 1995). Vallely continues to offer a concise account of Murray’s vision of the ‘underclass’:

> [It is] the notion that there is a group of unskilled, unemployable, unmarriageable, welfare-junkie, crime-prone, drug-taking amoral proles who are somehow different from “the rest of us”. This is the thinking that has provided a cloak of respectability for attacks on single mothers, plans to introduce draconian cuts in welfare benefits and even for the idea that illegitimacy should be restigmatised (1995).

Writing in 2001 and reflecting on his earlier work, Murray details the three factors that contribute to the emergence of an ‘underclass’: the dropout of young males from the labour force, an increase in violent crime, and births to unmarried women (Murray, 2001). While his views were gaining traction among socially and politically conservative groups in the United States, they were beginning to trickle into the British discourse, largely through an article in the *Sunday Times*. The paper approached Murray and asked him to examine whether the UK had an underclass. Reporting on his findings, the *Times* explains that the growth of the ‘underclass’ “is responsible for the grave social problems facing inner cities of the United States” (1989: 2). Drawing on a fear of transatlantic convergence, the article continues to state Murray’s thoughts on the current state of affairs in Britain, concluding that the outlook for Britain with regards to combating the growing underclass is dismal as neither the Conservative nor the Labour party “can do anything to stop the growth of such a class in this country” (1989: 2).

Here, the press not only demonstrates its leanings to the conservative status quo by giving such credence to the opinions of an avowed conservative thinker, but it also creates a moral panic surrounding the idea of what Michelle Gill terms the “feral underclass” (2012: 12) that cannot be tamed, controlled or, indeed, stopped by either political party. The message being put forth is that “the happy security and ordered stability of wider society” is in imminent danger from the onslaught of a deviant and depraved section of society (MacDonald, 1997: 1-2).

Where Murray focused on the pathologized notion of the ‘underclass’, sociologist William Julius Wilson developed a theorisation of the underclass, which, while also criticised (see Bagguley and Mann, 1992), supported a more structural view of the condition of the underclass. In his book, *The Truly Disadvantaged: The Inner City, the Underclass, and Public Policy*, Wilson argued for an approach to the ‘underclass’ that “emphasized how the plight of disadvantaged groups can be related to the problems of the broader society, including problems of discrimination and social-class subordination” (2012 [1985]: 5). His work considers the spatial dynamics to the ‘underclass’, which he often refers to as the ‘ghetto underclass’ (2012 [1985]), and he describes a left-behind population who have been abandoned in the inner city ghettos of the US by black middle-class professionals who have fled the ghetto (Macnicol, 1987: 315). As Wilson himself argues, however, this liberal view
of the ‘underclass’ which considers racial and class dynamics, has been subsumed by the more conservative view (2012: 5).

Whether or not there is such a thing as the ‘underclass’ is beyond the scope of this thesis and, while scholars such as Runciman are adamant that such a class does exist (Runciman, 1990 in MacDonald, 1997: 2), it is the application of the discourse of the ‘underclass’ that is most relevant here. Loïc Wacquant, who was a doctoral student of Wilson, reflects on the notion of the ‘underclass’ in Urban Outcasts where he refers to it as a “phony concept” (2008: 8). He concurs with Bagguley and Mann’s assertion that the term ‘underclass’ is a form of shorthand (1992), explaining that, “the rhetoric of the ‘underclass’ has conferred a veneer of scientific legitimacy on upper- and middle-class fears of the black subproletariat trapped at the bottom of the dualizing urban order” (2008: 89-90).

Here, as well as situating the idea of the ‘underclass’ in discourses of race and urban chance, Wacquant highlights the way in which particular words are laden with meaning, with particular ‘images’ and symbolic imagery being operationalised (Hall et al., 1978: 98 in Vanderbeck, 2003: 371). He also underscores the way that discourse plays out in a moral panic, relying on “upper- and middle-class fears” of racialized spaces (2008: 89-90). While Murray’s conception of the ‘underclass’ do not directly point to race, the concept of the ‘underclass’ is subtly linked to race. Wacquant further elaborates on the link between race and the fear of the ‘underclass’:

US social scientists and public policy experts grew alarmed about the alleged emergence and consolidation of a black ‘underclass’, characterized as entrapped in decaying inner cities, prone to antisocial behaviours, and increasingly isolated from the broader society (2008: 229).

While Wacquant demonstrates that the idea of the ‘underclass’ is racially linked on the US side of the Atlantic, Michael Jacobs offers an explanation of the term on the British side. He explains:

As industry has fled the cities, people have followed. Left behind are those for whom capital no longer has need: the
older men with redundant skills, the unskilled and unemployed, many of them Black; the poor, the sick and the old, in rented housing which makes them immobile, and with no money to improve the derelict landscapes in which they find themselves (1988: 1942).

Jacobs’ analysis focuses on the class aspect to the ‘underclass’ in addition to the racial aspect, highlighting the multiple images that dwell within the notion of the ‘underclass’. The formulations of the ‘underclass’ put forward by Jacobs, Wacquant, and Wilson are based on the notion of the socio-spatial retrenchment of the capitalist economy. For Jacobs, as the above quotation highlights, it is those left behind in cities after the movement of capital, that constitute the underclass (1988: 1942). For Wacquant, it is those “entrapped in decaying inner cities” (2008: 229) that are the ‘underclass’. The remainder of this chapter turns to a discussion of the discursive construction of the ‘inner city’ which features in the media coverage of Toxteth. However, understanding that the notion of the ‘inner city’ is, in part, the spatialisation of the ‘underclass’ is foundational in establishing a comprehension of the nuances of the inner city discourse.

7.3 The inner city
As Vanderbeck explains, the “underclass is also often associated with a spatial imagery” (2003: 372). Towards the close of the 20th century and the early 21st century, the ‘underclass discourse attached itself to the idea of “deprived council estates” (Vanderbeck, 2003: 372) but it has, historically, been connected to the discourse of the racialised inner city. In this study, the term ‘inner city’ was frequently operationalised carrying with it certain symbolic baggage, which is the focus of this section.

“The term ‘inner city’ is both symbolic, conjuring up notions of race, class and deviance (Burgess, 1985; Gilroy, 1987) and tightly bound with a social and policy history on both sides of the Atlantic. Ngram data on Google shows that the peak use of the term ‘inner city’ in American English occurs in 1975. Carried by what appears to be a fear of the transatlantic convergence, the peaks in British English occur first in 1981 and then in 1989, closely matching the leadership of PM Thatcher (1979-1990).

The story of the inner city began in the United States and the idea of it travelled across the Atlantic as a fear that race riots and racial enclosure would come to plague British shores,
too. Accordingly, in the UK, the term ‘inner city’ has been applied in policy since the late 1960s and early 1970s (Imrie and Thomas, 1999: 5), and has been problematised as ‘the inner city problem’ in response to perceived “urban decline” (Imrie and Thomas, 1999: 5). Based on the belief that inner city problems were pathological and related to the problems of individuals and families, several government schemes were initiated in the 1960s including the Urban Programme (UP) and the Community Development Programme (CDP) under Labour Prime Minister, Harold Wilson (1964-1970 and 1974-1976). The CDPs, combined with other area studies, reoriented the vision of the inner city from solely pathological in origin to consider larger structural causes. Under Labour PM James Callaghan (1976-1979), a White Paper and a parliamentary act reaffirmed the view that the problems of the inner city were more structural than pathological, and the role of the economy was foregrounded. Under Labour, the central government dispensed funds that were spent at a local level, and the role of the local authority was paramount (HMSO, 1977 in Lawless, 1989: 40).

This local authority-level focus changed when Margaret Thatcher became Prime Minister (1979-1990) as her government bypassed local government and embraced a central, managerial approach to the questions of the inner city. Michael Heseltine, serving as Secretary of State for the Environment, further changed the tone of British inner city policy as he introduced pump-priming initiatives and public-private partnerships, reflecting the Conservative government’s belief that the private sector could ‘fix’ the inner cities (Lawless, 1989: 60-76). Where the Labour party’s economic focus on the inner city problem had involved diverting funds towards local authorities to spend as necessary, the Conservative government under Thatcher turned towards the private sector and businesses to solve issues. This necessarily resulted in a “value for money” approach (Imrie and Thomas, 1999: 25), with the Thatcher government reformulating the inner city question as a marketising of lives and spaces.

As well as its policy and political history, the term ‘inner city’ also has a symbolic story that connects the term with ideas of race and otherness. Loïc Wacquant explains that the term is “the geographical euphemism used by normal US social science to designate the black ghetto, precisely to avoid naming it” (Wacquant, 2008: 10, emphasis in original). In part because of the term’s history, the idea of the inner city is highly symbolic and is tied to ideas of blackness and deviance. Paul Gilroy explains that “Britain’s ‘race’ politics are quite inconceivable away from the context of the inner-city which provides such firm foundations
for the imagery of black criminality and lawlessness” (Gilroy, 1987: 311), thereby implying that the inner city is intricately bound up with notions of race and criminality. Similarly, Jacquelin Burgess maintains that the idea of the inner city is based on a myth of “an alien place, separate and isolated, located outside white, middle-class values and environments” (Burgess, 1985: 193). Here, Burgess argues that the inner city is painted as an alien territory that sits outside white British norms and values. Studying US inner cities, Peter Parisi and Briavel Holcomb explain that “the term ‘inner city’ has become a kind of geographical periphrasis to designate African-Americans. Using the term, journalists can describe urban problems—drugs, crime, teen-age pregnancy—with a note of sociological rigor that might well appear racist if represented in terms of people” (1994: 385). Here, Parisi and Holcomb acknowledge that ‘inner city’ has become a byword for social problems as perceived by the media.

7.4 Inner-cityisation of Toxteth in the press
In her study of the various 1981 disturbances (including Toxteth, Brixton and Moss Side), Jacquelin Burgess notes that the idea of the inner city was used in the press to connote a mythologised notion of substandard physical environment, white working class culture, black culture, and street culture (1985: 206). She argues that the press functions hegemonically to maintain “existing social conditions” (Burgess, 1985: 222), and to underscore the fact that areas experiencing ‘riots’ should be feared. According to van Dijk’s argumentations, this is achieved by the press providing “carefully selected facts” (1996: 16) that direct the reader to produce the “preferred models of the elites” (1996: 16), whose interests are “largely supported by the mainstream press” (1996: 22). In this case, the dominant view of the elites is that inner cities are to be feared, avoided and contained in line with the Conservative policies of the 1980s. Crucially, any suggestion of a structural cause of the disturbances is removed and, instead, the ideology that Toxteth is deviant is normalised in the press.

In examining press use of the term ‘inner city’ over the 20th century, it is apparent that the Guardian is the only newspaper that uses the term ‘inner city’ in relation to Toxteth prior to 1981 and this usage is minimal (a total of 6 articles from 1974 to 1980) (see Fig. 7.1). All newspapers see a sudden soaring of the terms appearing together in 1981 with three articles in the Express, five in the Mirror, 37 in the Times, two in the Financial Times, and 36 appearances in the Guardian. The usage in the press then decreases and peaks again in 1985 with roughly half the level of usage compared to 1981, coinciding with the proliferation of inner city policies under Thatcher’s Conservative government (see Fig. 7.1); particularly reflecting the
advent of the Urban Development Corporations (UDCs) which, though “given legal
definition in Part XVI of the Local Government, Planning and Land Act 1980”, came into
effect in 1981 (Lawless, 1989: 81). This suggests that the intensity of press coverage mirrors
the government’s focus and policy changes, as discussed later in the chapter.

![Figure 7.1: Use of the term ‘inner city’ during the 20th century.](image)

From this dataset, it is apparent that the press employs the term ‘inner city’ in ways that are
connected to notions of scalar governance and that reflect the government discourse of the
day. The first use of the term ‘inner city’ works at a regional scale and spatially ties Toxteth
to the city of Liverpool or the region of Merseyside in which it represents the ‘inner city’ of
the wider area. Through this use, the press moves the focus away from Toxteth alone and
connects it to a larger urban or regional focus that obscures the unique identity of Toxteth,
making it a city-wide or regional focus. It applies symbolic and social values of the inner city
to Toxteth, masking its unique contours and making it part of a regional geography. The
second use connects Toxteth to a larger debate and discourse of the inner city at a national
or British scale. In so doing, the press at once creates a monolithic view of all inner-cities
and generalises Toxteth’s issues and identity so that they become part of a national discourse
and debate. Both scalar uses of the term obfuscate the individuality of Toxteth, either tying
it to a larger region or to the nation. By doing this, the challenges of Toxteth are made to seem part of a larger discourse that warrants a regional or national intervention. These processes also reflect the Conservative government policy of the 1980s that saw an increasing nationalization of inner city policy (Fraser, 1996: 57) or, termed otherwise, a nationalization of the local. This connection between the application of the label of ‘inner city’ and scalar governance echoes Tonkiss’ assertion that the inner city is a “dense form of government” (2005: 81).

### 7.4.1 Urban and regional up-scaling

The term ‘inner city’ is widely used to connect Toxteth to the larger discourse of the city of Liverpool and the region of Merseyside (see Fig. 7.2). An example of this use of the term can be seen in an article in the *Times* where the reporter, in a discussion of the “conditions that led to the riots” in 1981 in Toxteth, refers to the area as “inner city Liverpool” (Times, 1982a: 2). This labelling of Toxteth in such a way masks the individuality of the area and, instead, loads the area with symbolic values and a spatial focus, connecting it to the urban-scale focus of Liverpool rather than a local, district-level focus. Similarly, in an article in the *Guardian*, the piece opens with reference to the “Toxteth riots” before, two sentences later, referring to the “more than £10 million worth of damage in Liverpool’s multi-racial inner city” (Guardian, 1981e: 2). In this way, Toxteth’s identity is scaled-up and morphed into that of Liverpool’s inner city, defining it only in relation to the larger city, thereby denying an aspect of its identity. It is portrayed as an area of problems, blackness and deviance at a

![Figure 7.2: News panel highlighting the use of the term ‘inner city’ to connect Toxteth to the larger geography of Liverpool and Merseyside through up-scaling.](image)

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A | The hope and optimism in Toxteth that grew after last year’s riots has turned again to despair, community leaders said last night. They said that the conditions that led to the riots still exist, despite the efforts of Mr Michael Heseltine, Secretary of State for the Environment, to pour millions of pounds into inner city Liverpool.

B | Details of the “guerrilla” tactics are given in a confidential report prepared by Mr Kenneth Oxford on the riots which caused more than £10 million worth of damage in Liverpool’s multi-racial inner city.

C | In Toxteth, this weekend’s riots were different again. In a run-down inner-city area of Merseyside the resentments and potential violence of both young blacks and young whites focused on the police. Local politicians are now saying they have been warning of some time that the area was a tinderbox.

D | He will look not just at the problems of the riot area in Toxteth, but at the whole area of Merseyside and will hope to draw lessons for Government policies in other inner city areas.
larger regional scale. Toxteth’s individual character is masked by the ‘inner city’ label applied to it. David Leigh and Lindsay Mackie, writing in the *Guardian*, again apply the ‘inner city’ label to Toxteth. They write that “in Toxteth, this weekend’s riots were different again. In a run-down inner-city area of Merseyside the resentments and potential violence of both young blacks and young whites focused on the police” (Leigh and Mackie, 1981: 11). Here they transmit a particular vision of the Toxteth, removing its individual identity and spatially up-scaling it by casting the area in relation to Merseyside, whilst also socially defining it in relation to crime and dereliction.

Such regionalization of the constructed inner city of Toxteth is seen in article about Heseltine’s investigative work following the disturbances. John Carvel, a *Guardian* reporter writes that Heseltine “will look not just at the problems of the riot area in Toxteth, but at the whole area of Merseyside” (Carvel, 1981: 2). Here the discursively constructed and particular vision of the inner city of Toxteth is abandoned as the discourse is up-scaled from the specific issues experienced in Toxteth to a county-wide concern. The use of the term ‘inner city’ defines Toxteth spatially, obfuscating its unique local identity and defining it as an area of government attention within the larger regions of Liverpool and Merseyside. This press use of the term is reflective of the political reality that was shaping policy decisions regarding the inner city that were occurring at city-wide or regional scales rather than at the level of the urban core itself.

### 7.4.2 National up-scaling and the generalising of the inner cities

The labelling of Toxteth through this first use of the term ‘inner city’ connects closely to the second use of the term, which generalises and changes the scale of Toxteth, connecting it to a larger national discourse (see Fig. 7.3). This second use of the term builds up a monolithic and national-scale vision of what British inner-urban areas are like. In the *Express* in 1981 (Fig. 7.3 A), Max Hastings generalises all inner urban areas when discussing the disturbances, writing that:

> The essential, unstated demand of the principal riot areas of the inner cities is that local black communities should be allowed to exist by their own rules and habits above all freely circulating marijuana (Hastings, 1981: 9—Ex25).
Here, Hastings creates a generalised caricature of all inner cities as places of free-flowing drugs, blackness, and deviance. His assertion paints all inner cities as hotbeds of deviance. His reference to ‘the inner cities’ highlights his treatment of all inner urban areas as the same in terms of character and difficulties. Similarly, an article entitled ‘Holidays of Hope’ (Fig. 7.3 C) discusses an initiative that will see “twenty teenagers from Brixton and Toxteth” go on holiday with policemen with the hope that it will “ease tension in the inner-city troublespots” (Express, 1982a: 13). In this example, too, the inner city is made general and

Figure 7.3: News panel highlighting the use of the term ‘inner city’ to up-scale the focus to the national level.
monolithic: all areas have the same problems that can be remedied in the same way, through external intervention and through government and private sector presence. This external intervention approach is reflective of Conservative policy at the time that was imposed by central government on local areas, largely bypassing the local authorities with knowledge of the area and its individualities.

This generalising trend is apparent especially in articles relating to Heseltine’s involvement in Liverpool as Minister for Merseyside. In an article about his time in Liverpool and being pelted with eggs by demonstrators (Fig. 7.3 B), careful juxtaposition highlights the implicit use of the inner-cityisation of Toxteth by the press. The article states that “Mr Heseltine was referring to the violent and abusive reception he got the previous day at Croxteth and Toxteth in Liverpool” (Kent, 1982: 5). The reporter quotes Heseltine speaking with determination about continuing his efforts. He says, “I will be back in Toxteth in a few weeks” (Heseltine in Kent, 1982: 5). The next paragraph transitions from this mention of Toxteth to a discussion of inner cities: “Mr Heseltine said he was very dismayed about the state of the inner cities and how they had decayed over the past 70 years” (Kent, 1982: 5). This juxtaposition of Toxteth with the larger discourse of the inner cities up-scales it from the local to the national scale, moving the discussion away from one specific inner city area (Toxteth) to a state-level observation. The reporter both implies that Toxteth is to be seen as an ‘inner city’ with all of the symbolic baggage that such a label connotes, and masks all of the unique nuances of Toxteth’s identity by generalising and placing it as part of a generic ‘inner city problem’ to be solved at a national level as opposed to a distinctive and specific set of issues related to a particular place.

A similar use of the term is seen again when referring to Heseltine’s plan for a Garden Festival in the city (Fig. 7.3 D). “Mr Michael Heseltine, Secretary of State for the Environment, announced a £10m jobs boost for Merseyside last night. He plans to develop Europe’s biggest garden exhibition amid the debris of July’s clashes in Toxteth, Liverpool” (Times, 1981b: 2). Following a brief discussion of the garden festival movement, which originated in Germany, Heseltine is then quoted as saying that “national garden festivals provide great opportunities for the rejuvenation of run-down inner-city areas” (Heseltine in Times, 1981b: 2). Here, Toxteth is sandwiched between two generalizations at different scales, both of which ignore the local character of Toxteth. By beginning the article with mention of improvement to Merseyside, the reporter regionalises the focus, considering the
plight of the region more generally rather than Toxteth specifically. Then, the reporter refers to the ‘debris’ of Toxteth, bringing the focus back to the specific area before generalising to a national level by referring solely to ‘inner cities’. Here the press coverage mirrors the Conservative policy of inner city aid, which actually had a regional and national focus, implemented at a national level; the Merseyside Development Corporation (MDC), the Garden Festival, the Speke Enterprise Zone and other urban policies did little to help the inner cores of the city and, instead, took a decidedly regional focus directed at Merseyside as a whole. The policies, then, could be argued to be regional and national rather than local in focus.

Coverage of Heseltine’s work in Liverpool—and, indeed, the work itself—is frequently associated with press up-scaling from the local to the national. In an article in the *Guardian* (Fig. 7.3 E) about the Environment Secretary’s secondment to Liverpool “to judge inner city policies all over the country” (Aitken, 1981: 1), the reporter explains that “the choice of Liverpool for the main inquiry underlines the belief of Ministers that the Toxteth riot contained factors which are typical in other areas” (Aitken, 1981: 1). Here the *Guardian* both produces and reproduces the inner city discourse coming from the Conservative government. It argues that Toxteth stands for a national issue and, as such, the discourse is scaled up from a local concern where it could deal with the specificities of Toxteth to a national concern that relates to and represents the ‘inner city problem’.

An article in the *Mirror*, at first reading, appears to employ a slightly different approach to coverage of the ‘inner city’ and takes on a critique of “Mrs Thatcher’s Year of the Inner City” and her “fact-finding’ tour of the inner-cities” (Wigmore, 1987: 4) (see Fig. 7.4). The coverage suggests that the Conservative party is doing too little and not truly engaging with the issues at play, writing that “unlike Mrs Thatcher, the *Mirror* has followed the failing fortunes of the inner-cities for years…[which] have suffered riots during the Thatcher years…[and] have suffered heavily under Mrs Thatcher’s cash cut-backs” (Wigmore, 1987: 4). However, the language used by the *Mirror* remains as stigmatising as the other newspapers in this study. In their feature on the inner cities, reporter Barry Wigmore describes the Falkner Estate in Toxteth:

Outside was a scene that should never exist in Britain heading for 1990. The rats are bigger than cats on the Falkner Estate.
Four-storey blocks of flats crowd in, bleak brick and concrete, with boarded windows looking blindly over total devastation. Tumbling weeds, rusty barbed wire, a shattered fence swaying drunkenly, and occasionally—very occasionally—a car picks its way through the glass from many windows and bottles, and the housebricks in the road. No one should have to live in a place like this....This is Toxteth, Liverpool 8, the scene of the bloody riots in 1981, and they all started from here on the crumbling Falkner Estate. It’s the sort of inner-city ghetto that breeds discontent (Wigmore, 1987: 4).

This coverage uses emotive and figurative language. It uses negativity in the form of visual imagery (as discussed in chapter 6) to conjure up an image of a truly damaged place, presumably, with the paper’s left-wing bent, meant to elicit horror in the readers that government has failed Toxteth residents. Instead, what is conveyed is a stigmatising view of Toxteth and, in addition to the damning description of the area, it is then generalised as part
of a larger inner city problem. The Mirror’s coverage style is reminiscent of the work of Victorian philanthropists and reformers such as Charles Dickens, Charles Booth, and Friedrich Engels who, concerned about the conditions evident in the early modern city sought to draw attention to the poor and the appalling conditions that they endured but, in so doing, further stigmatised the very group they were trying to assist (Deverell, 2007: 36). The Mirror’s coverage of the inner cities follows a similar trend: it highlights the plight of those living in the inner cities and suggests that the political elite are doing too little to help; however, through language use, the paper continues to reaffirm the stigma of inner city living.

Press coverage of the inner city in relation to Toxteth involves morphing scales, transmuting the local to the regional or the national, suggesting that the press mirrors government discourse and policy, as discussed in the following section.

### 7.5 Connecting press discourse to political discourse

#### 7.5.1 The political and policy discourse of the ‘underclass’

While the term ‘underclass’ is not used in relation to Toxteth in press coverage, the framing of Toxteth as the ‘inner city’ is grounded in the discourse of the ‘underclass’, as discussed earlier in this chapter. Burgess asserts that the idea of the inner city is used by media and policymakers to refer to a mythologised place of substandard housing, white working class culture, black culture, and street culture (1985: 206). Her description of the presence of social ‘others’ refers to the constructed notion of the underclass; thus, in order to understand the political discourse of the ‘inner city’, it is important to see that the concept of the inner city does not exist independently of the notion of the underclass.

As discussed earlier in the chapter, the idea of an underclass gained political traction in the 1980s in the United States, largely through the work of Charles Murray (Baeten, 2010). The seemingly simple term came to stand for all that “was going wrong in the city” (Baeten, 2010: 238), thereby highlighting the linkage between the spatialized ‘inner city’ and the idea of the ‘underclass’. Once Murray’s discourse entered British discourse through his *Sunday Times* piece and subsequent coverage, the concept and resultant punitive policies took hold—though less than was the case in the United States (MacDonald, 1997: 7). While the word ‘underclass’ was rarely operationalised overtly in policy and political discourse, it came to be foundational for the Conservative governments of the 1980s and 1990s, the New Labour
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government (1997-2010), and latterly, the Conservative government of PM Cameron (2010-
2016).

Murray’s vision of the ‘underclass’ (much like Auletta’s) is based on “single mothers, young
unemployed males and the like who would rather rely on crime and overgenerous social
security benefits than complete with society’s virtues of marriage, work ethic, discipline, thrift
etc. (Baeten, 2010: 238). Baeten’s explanation here points to the central premise of the
notion of the idea: this left-behind population are undeserving, for their position in society
is the result of their own personal and moral failings, their lack of ambition and ‘aspiration’—
a term that would come to feature often in PM Cameron’s policies (Tyler and Bennett, 2015).
This vision moved the focus away from a structural concern with society to a focus on the
role of the individual and his/her ability to define his/her destiny.

For Baeten, the idea of the ‘underclass’ and the constructed vision of a feckless section of
society “underpinned the British Conservative government’s social budget cuts in the 1980s”
(2010: 238). These cuts were particularly damaging, and Joel Krieger explains that “the
transition to the Thatcher era increased the level of hardship, and its extent, and removed
the immunity from cuts of some previously protected client populations” (1987: 183).
Krieger continues to detail the cuts that were enacted, noting that social security, sickness
and unemployment benefits were all slashed, and Family Income Support was also targeted
(1987: 183). It is notable that these cuts affect the most vulnerable in society and, crucially,
the very population targetted under the ‘underclass’ moniker: single parents, the unemployed,
the excluded, and the marginalised.

These cuts were justified, however, by the Murray-oriented vision of the underclass that
paints poverty and exclusion as the fault of the individual, not the society. Thatcher drew
on the images of the constructed ‘underclass’ in her response to the disturbances of 1981
when she stated, “what is wrong with modern society is not material deprivation but
disorientation” (1981: 1). Here, she diverts attention away from the causes of the
disturbances being analysed at a systemic or structural level and, instead, refers to moral
‘disorientation’, implying that individuals are responsible for their own outcomes.

The idea of the underclass was again drawn on again both by Conservative PM John Major
(1990-1997) and, later, by New Labour. Major’s ‘Back to Basics’ campaign sought to
demonise members of the constructed underclass, as the Conservative Party espoused nostalgic and traditional values. While never directly stated as being oriented towards family values, the campaign has largely been interpreted as a call to values of family life and marriage that were seen to be lacking in the ‘underclass’ (MacDonald, 1997: 8). The reference to the underclass was more obvious under PM Blair. Imogen Tyler argues that New Labour “unshackled poverty from economic inequalities and reframed it as a psycho-cultural problem” (2013b: 4). Blair even referred to the obstacle of “an underclass of people cut off from society’s mainstream” (Blair, 1997 in Tyler, 2013b: 4). Here, reference to the ‘underclass’ is apparent and overt. He continues, describing the ‘underclass’ as being a “dead weight of low expectations” (Blair, 1997 in Tyler, 2013b: 4), implying that the ‘underclass’ represents a millstone to the rest of ‘decent’ society’. The careful structuring of the underclass discourse justifies punitive policies that see the ‘dead weight’ penalised because their poverty is no longer connected to structural inequality but to personal and moral failings. This attitude was further evident in the language used by PM Cameron in response to the 2011 ‘riots’ in British cities. For Imogen Tyler, the civil unrest was the result of punitive neoliberal sanctions that disproportionately affected the most vulnerable in society (2013b). For PM Cameron, however, the ‘riots’ were part of a “slow-motion moral collapse” and that they “were not about poverty” but rather ‘about behaviour’” (Tyler, 2013b: 4). Here Cameron, though not directly using the term ‘underclass’, refers to the same tropes that the underclass discourse has created, namely individual immorality. Tyler argues that structuring the civil unrest thus allowed “political elites [to capitalise] upon these events as a means of legitimating a further programme of austerity-driven welfare reforms...which punish the most socially marginal and economically disadvantaged citizens within the British state” (2013b: 7).

It is clear, then, that the discursive construction of the idea of an underclass has been absorbed into policy and political circles, and, as a concept, it has been unleashed by dominant voices in society (politicians, the media, and academics) to justify punishing policies. The concept of the underclass also fed into the discourse of the inner city—the spatialisation of the underclass—discussed next.

### 7.5.2 The Thatcher government’s views on Liverpool

The discourse of the ‘underclass’ and Thatcher’s views on Liverpool and Merseyside justified significant government cuts and punitive actions. The concept of the ‘underclass’ also served as the foundations and backdrop to the idea of the ‘inner city’, the labelling of which relied
on the idea of a ‘problem population’ that was, in some way, morally degenerate. While the discourse of the ‘underclass’ was largely actioned at a social and economic scale, the ‘inner city’ discourse was actioned at an economic and urban scale. The Thatcher government labelling of Toxteth as the ‘inner city’ further justified its fiscal policies as part of a wider urban agenda.

Press coverage of the notion of the inner city closely follows the political discourse of the time, which treated Toxteth as the *enfant terrible* of the perceived inner city problem of the 1980s. This builds on a longer story of government wariness towards and opposition to the city of Liverpool as a whole. Using the Margaret Thatcher Archives, it is possible to find official documents that point to her government’s wariness towards the city of Liverpool and the county of Merseyside. In Geoffrey Howe’s (Chancellor of the Exchequer from 1979-1983) ‘The right approach to the economy’ speech in which he outlines the proposed actions of the future Conservative government, he notes Merseyside alongside areas of Scotland, Wales, the North East and Ulster, as being one of the “worst discouragements to enterprise”—enterprise being one of the future Conservative government’s priorities (Howe, 1977). Here, Merseyside is shown to be at odds with the party’s aims. A year later, in December 1978, only months before Thatcher became prime minister, her advisor Keith Joseph wrote a letter in support of Geoffrey Howe’s suggestion of establishing a Merseyside Task Force. In the top right corner of the letter, Margaret Thatcher writes, “I am very much against the idea” (Joseph, 1978: 1). She further annotates the letter to mark her agreement with John Hoskyns, policy advisor, who “thinks it [a Merseyside Task Force] will be a distraction from our main purposes” (Joseph, 1978: 1). Joseph’s letter continues that “the other objection is that Merseyside is notorious for obstruction and our ideas have least chance of flowering in that particular soil” (Joseph, 1978: 1). The tone of this letter and Thatcher’s comments imply that aiding Merseyside falls outside the aims of her main economic objectives, and that Conservative ideals are not likely to take hold in Merseyside. In this way, Liverpool is structured as being separate from the rest of the country and a challenge to, and outwith, government economic policy.

Once the disturbances had commenced, the party rhetoric towards Liverpool moved from exasperation at its “obstruction” to an antipathy that was apparent in the desired withholding of funds from the city and the county. In a secret letter from Howe to Thatcher in August 1981 entitled ‘Liverpool’, he writes of Heseltine’s plans for the city and advises “of the need
to be careful not to over-commit scarce resources to Liverpool…and having nothing left for more promising areas” (Howe, 1981). Here, Howe not only hierarchises urban areas and places Liverpool at the bottom of this hierarchy as a less ‘promising’ area, but he directly advises against investing money in a city in need, in favour of waiting for “brighter ideas for renewing economic activity” in other areas (Howe, 1981). His hierarchisation is shown to be based on the predicted value-for-money and economic gains, and he ranks Liverpool as low on this scale. This is the now-infamous letter in which Howe concludes with his opinion on the benefits of a managed decline for the city:

I cannot help feeling that the option of managed decline, which the CPRS [Central Policy Review Staff] rejected in its study of Merseyside, is one which we should not forget altogether. We must not expend all our resources in trying to make water flow uphill (Howe, 1981).

Howe’s comments about the allocation of funds reflect the Conservative Party’s foregrounding of economic solutions to social and structural problems. A similar focus can be seen in John Hoskyns’ note to Thatcher on 10 July 1981, days after the disturbances broke out in Toxteth. Here, unlike Howe, Hoskyns prioritises the role of money in solving Toxteth’s disturbances. He states that any minister sent to the area “must be seen to spend money”. But, he adds that “this money is likely to be money wasted” (Hoskyns, 1981). Money and financially-oriented solutions are constructed as the Conservative Party’s main response to an issue, even when it is acknowledged that spending money will not ameliorate the situation. This focus on financial solutions to structural problems underscores the Conservative Party emphasis on financial solutions as part of a wider urban policy agenda. Imrie and Thomas frame this as the Thatcher government’s foregrounding of “market goals over social and community objectives” (Imrie and Thomas, 1999: 28) and Howe’s letter shows a prioritisation of fiscal returns over the social conditions of Liverpool.

7.5.3 The Thatcher government and the inner city
The Thatcher government labelling of Toxteth as the ‘inner city’ further justified its fiscal policies as part of a wider urban agenda. The labelling relied on the core stigma and race- and class-based stereotypes of the idea of the inner city—Parisi and Holcomb’s “geographical periphrasis…[to] describe urban problems” (1994: 385). Applying this term—
which was echoed by the media as the earlier part of this chapter has shown—conjures up notions of disorder that warrant intervention.

Only months after taking office, a letter was sent from Thatcher’s private secretary to the Department of the Environment detailing Thatcher’s opinions on the inner city. She did not favour “a major review” of policies but rather preferred “a simplification of the existing bureaucratic processes and much greater emphasis on the private sector and voluntary effort, with the public sector concentrating on creating the right climate and conditions for enterprise to flourish” (Pattison, 1979). This statement highlights Thatcher’s concern with privatising solutions to the constructed inner city, and simplifying the “bureaucratic processes” implies a centralization of policy rather than having local authority involvement.

However, while the term ‘inner city’ has clear symbolic connotations and value, finding a cohesive and coherent definition of what the Thatcher government meant by the term is more difficult. Indeed, finding a consistent understanding of the inner city problem amongst the members of Thatcher’s government is a challenge as Thatcher, Howe, and Joseph were opposed to Heseltine’s more ambitious plans for inner city revival. In a personal interview, Lord Heseltine stated, in response to questioning what he meant by the term ‘inner city’, that “it’s like an elephant, difficult to define but you recognise it when you see it. And so, first thing to do is to look for derelict sites and empty buildings or whatever” (Heseltine, 2017, interview), suggesting that dereliction is the key feature he looked for when defining the inner city; he added, “I hate dereliction” (2017, interview). His pamphlet, ‘Reviving the Inner Cities’, published in 1983, opens with the following:

The inner city problem is about concentrations of relatively poor people, inadequately educated and trained, living in badly maintained housing in areas of declining economic activity, rising unemployment and increasing crime and vandalism. It is not necessarily a problem of physical location. Many inner cities are relatively prosperous. Many outer housing estates meet the conditions I have set out. The inner city label is about concentrations of social deprivation and economic decline. We know what we mean by the inner city problem (Heseltine, 1983: 3).
This, combined with Lord Heseltine’s own statement from 2017, suggests that the general Conservative government view of the inner city defined by Heseltine stems from economic decline, increasing deviance, dereliction, and poverty. However, what the definition does not depend on is geographical location. Reference to the inner city being a byword for “concentrations of social deprivation and economic decline” that may even be in “outer housing estates” (Heseltine, 1983: 3) is revelatory: with this structuring, we can understand why policy attention on the ‘inner city’ was, in fact, regional or national in focus, in accordance with the press up-scaling of Toxteth. The UP, the UDGs, the Garden Festival, the Land Registry, the Enterprise Zones, and the MDC did not focus on the inner-cityised Toxteth but on the rest of the city of Liverpool, the region, or even the country as a whole. The Conservative inner city policies did not have to focus on inner urban areas at all but on anywhere that met the vague criteria that “you recognise it when you see it” (Heseltine, 2017, interview). This not only tells us that up-scaling and re-scaling were largely inevitable with this focus, but that the stigma of the ‘inner city’ was used by the Conservative Party as a label or shorthand to signify economic decline, dereliction, and deviance. The term was largely symbolic, suitably vague, and served to label areas—regardless of their geographical location—in order to justify privatised intervention in the area. The very term ‘inner city’ when used in relation to Toxteth not only stigmatises it, but justifies the presence of a “dense form of government” (Tonkiss, 2005: 81) in the general area.

7.5.4 Toxteth and Thatcher’s urban agenda
Thatcher’s government used Toxteth—and the wider city of Liverpool—as the enfant terrible of British inner cities and urban problems. While Heseltine and Thatcher were at odds over the ways to tackle it, Toxteth came to typify the constructed inner city problem, and more so, the proposed solutions to the problem. Though Toxteth was seen as the catalyst for intervention and was portrayed as the problem, the focus of government was wider (or, up-scaled, as discussed earlier in the chapter). In his report entitled ‘It took a Riot’, which was leaked to the press, Heseltine explains that “Merseyside has been suffering from long term decline at least since the Great War…Nor are prospects good” (Heseltine, 1981: 1). He continues, referring to the industrial decline in the city, and then turns to discussion of Toxteth, writing that despite problems throughout the city, “of course, the headlines have concentrated in Liverpool 8 or Toxteth and here the problem is most acute” (Heseltine, 1981: 4). Here, Heseltine sets up the justification for using Toxteth as the poster child of problems while up-scaling the solution to the rest of the city.
Indeed, it was to Toxteth that Michael Heseltine rushed in the aftermath of the disturbances and there he stayed as Minister for Merseyside for the next twelve months. In a personal interview, he explained that,

> Once a week every Thursday night I would go to the Aldephi—not the Adelphi, the Atlantic Tower Hotel—and I would sit with my official team that I had created from the private sector, and we would go through the notebook which had thirty pages, one for each project...so I was clerk of works for thirty projects (Heseltine, 2017, interview).

As this quotation illustrates, Liverpool was the target of 30 regeneration projects in the wake of the disturbances. While the Brixton disturbances resulted in the Scarman Inquiry and subsequent Report, the direct political involvement in Liverpool and Toxteth was far greater, with Ministerial presence in the city for a year. No other inner city area that saw disturbances received the same attention as Toxteth. In this way, not only was Toxteth made the poster child of the problems of the inner city but it was used as the example of the possible solutions: direct central government intervention, private sector involvement, private investment, and bypassing local authority decision-making. Indeed, in ‘It took a Riot’, Heseltine emphasises that he was quick to gather support from “some 30 representatives of the Financial Institutions...to join the Government in a comprehensive examination of the role of the private sector in financing urban development and in the revival of the older urban areas” (Heseltine, 1981: 9), thereby highlighting the urban agenda of Thatcher’s government. A letter from Tom King (Minister of State for Local Government, 1979-1983) on 16 July 1981—less than two weeks after the disturbances in Toxteth broke out—suggests “private sector involvement” to “tackle economic and employment problems in the inner cities” (King, 1981), highlighting the privatization agenda put forth by the Thatcher administration.

The Thatcher government was thus operationalising Toxteth as the inner city problem and solution as part of a wider agenda of solving urban problems through the entrance of the private sector into the inner city. The government built on the stigma of the events of the disturbances, turned Toxteth into a core stigmatised area through the use of the term ‘inner
city’, and used Toxteth as the example for urban ills and the proposed solutions. That the press echoed this construction and stigma of Toxteth as the example of the inner city problem highlights the close interplay between press and politics. The Thatcher Archives show official documents that highlight the closeness between Thatcher and editors and owners of right-leaning newspapers, suggesting a closeness between the media and politicians that results in the press closely following the line of the government of the time. Documents reveal Thatcher’s private lunch with Rupert Murdoch to bypass the Monopolies Commission in his purchase of the *Sunday Times* (Ingham, 1981a), of letters expressing a close friendship with David English, editor of the *Daily Mail*, in which Thatcher states that “I hope I will not let you down” (Thatcher, 1979a), and a letter to Larry Lamb—once editor of the *Sun* and later of the *Express*—thanking him for his support and adding the she owes him “a great debt for the confidence you put in me. I hope to repay it over the next few years by the actions that I take” (Thatcher, 1979b). On a note from Press Secretary, Bernard Ingham, in which he advises that the PM turn down a request from the *Sun* to be involved in their 10th anniversary, Thatcher has written in the margin: “The Sun is a friend—will do” (Ingham, 1981b). In interviews with journalists, however, they affirmed that political involvement did happen but each denied that it was prevalent at their respective paper. These close relationships between Thatcher and editors and owners of the British press suggest a closeness and intertwining of aims and actions. It represents van Dijk’s assertion that elite voices dominate both politics and the press (1995: 20), and further reflects Herman and Chomsky’s propaganda model that sees “mutual interests” (1988: xi) and elite and unquestioned sources as determining press coverage (1988: 112).

### 7.5.5 From stigma to gentrification

One of the effects of the government operationalising of stigmatised tropes with regard to Toxteth in order to justify private intervention in the wider area, was a tide of gentrifying forces. Territorial stigma and gentrification “form two sides of the same conceptual and policy coin” (Kallin and Slater, 2014: 1351) and, in the case of Toxteth, the correlation between private sector regional involvement and the stigma surrounding the inner city is evidenced in the *Guardian* in 1988. Martyn Halsall writes that “luxury apartments along the Liverpool waterfront are probably the most curious by-products of the anger which fueled the Toxteth riots in 1981” (1988: A30). These new apartments in the renovated Albert Dock, redeveloped through the MDC, attracted a waiting listing of 1,700 names and “new owners include an inevitable lubrication of yuppies; barristers, accountants and business persons” (Halsall, 1988: A30): a far cry from facilitating change for those living in the discursively
constructed ‘inner city’. This highlights the urban and regional focus of the MDC that sought to make area changes that would supposedly trickle down into the deprived urban cores, and the resultant influx of gentrifiers in the renovated areas.

Having already been enacted to justify intervention, the government and press label of the ‘inner city’ now facilitated the arrival of gentrifiers, highlighting the power inherent in discourse and language. Nearly 20 years after the disturbances, the *Express* reports on the “invasion of the yumbies” or “Young Upwardly Mobile Bohemians” who “are educated and creative, but also crave a sense of reality by living in Britain’s gritty inner cities” (Minton, 1998: 24) (see Figs. 7.5 and 7.6). Describing a group that appears similar to the current hipster subcultural movement or the French ‘Bourgeois-Bohème’ movement, reporter Anna Minton writes that in addition to craving a creative career, purchasing fair-trade and ethical products, and enjoying the outdoors, a Yumbie:

Lives in inner-city areas around the country and particularly favours places once tarred with the urban front-line tag, such as Brixton in London, Hulme in Manchester or Liverpool’s Toxteth (Minton, 1998: 24).

This highlights the effect that the label or ‘tag’ of ‘inner city’ given by both government and the press had on the future of Toxteth and the arrival of gentrifying forces: the perceived ‘grittiness’ serving as a magnet for young people seeking a ‘real’ experience. The very act of labelling an area as the ‘inner city’ permitted the arrival of a wave of gentrification. This is echoed in a report in the *Guardian* in 1999, which additionally reflects the media’s role on shaping external public perceptions that are opposed to internal or insider views of an area. Linda Grant, writing in the *Guardian*, explains, “say Toxteth in London, and people think, “Riots”. Say Toxteth in Liverpool, and they think, “Yuppie gentrification”. Toxteth is now Liverpool’s Islington” (Grant, 1999: C8). Here Grant explains that Toxteth has seen an influx of gentrifiers in recent years, echoing Kallin and Slater’s assertion that “stigmatisation lays the foundations for state-sponsored gentrification…The ‘blemish of place’ was not only constructed by the state, but also the target for demolition by the state” (2014: 1353, emphasis in original).
Figure 7.5: A double-page spread in the Express on the rise of the 'Yumbie'.

Figure 7.6: The Express’ description of the Yumbie movement.
While this study stops at the close of the 20th century, state-sponsored gentrification was seen to peak in the years after the turn of the century with the Housing Market Renewal (HMR) Pathfinders scheme initiated in 2002 by the Labour government under PM Tony Blair (1997-2007). Based on the idea of housing market failure, defined by “high vacancy rates, increasing population turnover, low sales values and, in some cases, neighbourhood abandonment” (Allen, 2007: 123), the HMR scheme—which was ultimately abandoned—was a scheme of mass demolition that would have used Granby, Toxteth as one of its sites. The ‘housing failure’ it noted had, in Toxteth’s case, been the result of decades of disinvestment, retrenchment of social services, and public resources. The HMR scheme would have required:

The mass demolition of approximately 50,000 ‘unwanted’ dwellings in Merseyside…with at least 11,000 of these being located in the inner-urban ring of the city of Liverpool…The purpose of this mass demolition programme is to provide large parcels of land to developers, who will be charged with the task of creating an inner-urban dwellingscape that is attractive to middle-class house purchasers (Allen, 2007: 123).

This quote highlights the lynchpin in the HMR vision: attracting capital and the middle-class to previously deprived areas. The HMR scheme demonstrates the state-led gentrification that arose in parts of Liverpool—including Granby—immediately following a period of government and media stigmatisation of Toxteth. While it is impossible to draw a direct correlation between the stigmatisation and the state-led gentrification process, these findings match Kallin and Slater’s observations in Craigmillar, Edinburgh where a period of intense stigmatisation by official bodies was followed by a process of gentrification (2014).

Today, the debate over housing regeneration in Toxteth continues with the Granby 4 Streets Community Land Trust (CLT) which has successfully implemented an independent and community-led redevelopment project. This has occurred at the same time that private developer Placefirst, teamed with Liverpool City Council have, after several years of failed trials, submitted a plan for the Welsh Streets—once the focus of the HMR Pathfinder initiative—to be redesigned to make “aspirational” properties that will appeal to a variety of
Toxteth is being marketed and gentrified by the state and private investors. A webpage on property developer Aspen Woolf Ltd.’s website draws on the label and idea of the inner city problem as it explains that:

For many people, Liverpool’s Toxteth area is synonymous with the 1981 riots where a civil disturbance broke out between police and local youths. However, despite the negative image this portrayed, its repercussions only highlighted the greater need for social stability and increased investment across Liverpool’s inner-city areas...Today, Toxteth is a hotbed of investment, buoyed by relatively inexpensive housing and attractive rental yields. Its close proximity to the city centre, Baltic Triangle, and Liverpool’s universities has appealed to property developers from all over the country, meaning that regenerated Toxteth is now a great place to invest (Pooley, 2016).

This highlights the call to investment being made by property developers and the private sector in Toxteth who define the area first in relation to the ‘riots’ and, secondly, in purely economic terms. This shows how the discourse surrounding Toxteth has shifted from a discourse of strife and urban disorder to one of investment potential. The term ‘inner city’ is entered seemingly as a periphrasis to signal to investors the type of area that this is. However, in the language of investment, the term ‘inner city’ is now no longer smeared with vice and dereliction but is, instead, attached to ideas of appealing urban grit, ‘realness’ and profit. The grassroots initiative of the Granby 4 Streets CLT sits in opposition to the private developments, showing the grassroots potential to overcome creeping privatization. The Placefirst and Aspen Woolf stories highlight, however, the tenacious attempts of state-led and state-initiated gentrifying forces.

### 7.6 The language of territorial stigma

The use of the term ‘inner city’ is one example of the discourse of territorial stigma or denigration in Britain today that explains how generalised terms are used by policy and media to enact symbolic violence on those enduring structural inequalities. Kirsteen Paton, in her work on gentrification, notes that discourses that convey Otherness—often for economic ends—do so through “pejorative discourses of council estates, ‘sink’ estates, ‘problem’
neighbourhoods” (2014: 3), meaning that key terms are operationalised—in her work—to enable gentrification and other castigatory processes. Javier Ruiz-Tagle reminds us that “territorial stigmatisation can be defined as a collective symbolic representation, through language and symbols” (2017: 314), reminding us of the importance that individual terms play as part of a national discourse of stigma.

This chapter began with a review of the concept of the ‘underclass’. While none of the newspapers in this study used the term ‘underclass’ directly in reports about Toxteth, the term remains deeply stigmatising and reflects a wider social and political context in which the discourse of the inner city was operationalised. Essentially, the term ‘underclass’ is spatialised into the notion or myth of the ‘inner city’, and Robert Vanderbeck argues that the “underclass is also often associated with a spatial imagery” (2003: 372). In Vanderbeck’s case, he is discussing the constructed link between the ‘underclass’ and “deprived council estates” in the 1990s (2003: 372), however, the predominant discourse in 1970s and 1980s Britain connected the notion of an ‘underclass’ to Britain’s inner cities connoting at once ideas of class and race (Jacobs, 1988: 1942). For Vanderbeck, the term is bonded to, and often used as a metaphor for, societal decay (2003: 372).

The term ‘underclass’, as the earlier part of this chapter showed, is connected to a far longer history of the ‘socially excluded’, problem families, left-behind populations, and the perceived “hereditary ‘social problem group’” (Macnicol, 1987: 293). The term’s sudden revival in the 1970s and 1980s reflects what Michael Jacobs describes as an “almost ritualistic…‘discovery’ by the media and politicians” of urban deprivation roughly once every decade (1988: 1942). Although there are two main strands to underclass literature and discourse—one promulgated by Charles Murray’s pathological view and the other more structural view by William Julius Wilson—the dominant discourse of the underclass follows Murray’s more pathological approach that sees “the moral failings of the poor themselves” as the reason for their precarious position (Vanderbeck, 2003: 374). This pathologized and moralised view of the ‘underclass’ is tightly bound up with conservative rhetoric (Macnicol, 1987; Bagguley and Mann, 1992; Vanderbeck, 2003) that seeks to normalise poverty and exclusion through the use of discourse and policy.

In their discussion of representations of the ‘underclass’, Bagguley and Mann explain that the term ‘underclass’ is largely used as a form of ‘sociological shorthand. A way of referring
to a social phenomenon with which we are all very familiar” (1992: 113). This is reminiscent of Parisi and Holcomb’s argument that the term ‘inner city’ is used as “a kind of geographical periphrasis to designate African-Americans. Using the term, journalists can describe urban problems—drugs, crime, teen-age pregnancy—with a note of sociological rigor that might well appear racist if represented in terms of people” (1994: 385). This highlights the way in which individual terms or themes are laden with ‘images’ and symbolic imagery (Hall et al., 1978: 98 in Vanderbeck, 2003: 371). In the case of the ‘underclass’, the images associated with the term are similar to those invoked through the term ‘inner city’. Returning to Charles Murray’s own image-laden rhetoric, we see that workforce dropout, violent crime, and promiscuity and illegitimacy are used as the key building blocks on which the idea of the ‘underclass’ is built. It is then enacted widely in media, creating a moral panic that shifts the debate away from “the problems faced by the underclass” (vis-à-vis the structural conditions) to the “problem of the underclass” (the pathologised vision of poverty) (Bagguley and Mann, 1992: 114). This indicates the pernicious effects of operationalized discourse that sees an entire debate shifted away from structural inequality and the malign sociospatial effects of capitalism to a pathologised debate about a ‘problem’ population.

The terms that convey territorial stigma are largely time- and location-dependent. Where the term ‘rookery’ would once have conveyed images of a sordid underworld (Severs, 2010; Wacquant et al., 2014), the term has fallen out of vogue. The term ‘slum’ is still used but has been augmented by the advent of new and emotive terms such as “council estates, ‘sink’ estates, ‘problem’ neighbourhoods” (Paton, 2014: 3). The term ‘inner city’ characterised the middle to the end of the 20th century and continues to linger. The lineage of territorial stigma can be understood by considering linguistic changes.

Tom Slater’s recent work on the construction of the ‘sink estate’ picks up on this theme as he notes that the term ‘sink estate’—popularised from the 1970s—is used as a “semantic battering ram…by institutions and individuals in positions of power” (2018: 879) in order to “procure consent for punitive policies directed at those living at the bottom of the class structure; policies that cause enormous disruption” (Slater, 2018: 879). His work highlights the way in which the term ‘sink estate’ has been used by policymakers, think tanks, and government to paint estates as home to criminals and an ‘underclass’ that represent a threat

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12 Google Ngram data shows a steady decline in the terms ‘rookery’ and ‘rookeries’ from around 1950, with the greatest peak occurring at the close of the 19th century.
to society. This operationalising of stigma resulted in government pledges to demolish sink estates and to replace them with private—and highly profitable—dwellings (Slater, 2018). While Slater’s work focuses on the use of the term ‘sink estate’ by powerful actors working ‘from above’, Butler, Schafran and Carpenter (2018) study the use of the term ‘shithole’ on social media to understand how language and labels play a part in a British discourse of denigration. Their study shows that the term ‘shithole’ plays into a national discourse used by both insiders and outsiders from all over the United Kingdom. As a slang term, it is clearly not used by politicians in official discourse, but their study shows that the discourse of denigration and stigma is not limited solely to powerful actors acting ‘from above’ but is used in the everyday discourse by the general population to convey ideas about space and place.

While this thesis considers the role of discourse of denigration and territorial stigmatisation in the United Kingdom, principally, the same trend can be viewed in France where the term ‘banlieue’ has become stigmatised by “the wider public, the media and politicians” (Garbin and Millington, 2012: 2068). Paul Kirkness who conducted ethnographic research on the banlieues surrounding Nîmes, France, notes:

> Media attention to France’s banlieues has increased steadily since the early 1980s and it has developed to consider these places largely as security concerns and a burden for the rest of the country… This discursive shift has contributed to the popular imagination of banlieue spaces as always negative and tainted… Statistics, mappings, naming, territorialised positive discrimination via urban policy: all have generated the banlieue as a singular homogenised place in need of outside help, assistance, and securitisation (Kirkness, 2014: 1281-2).

Here Kirkness highlights that the discourse of the banlieue has been operationalised for policy ends, showing such areas as in need of rescue from the state, in much the same way as the discourse of the inner city in Britain has functioned. As Wacquant argues:

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13 The exception to this is the comments allegedly made by US President Donald Trump (2017-) in January 2018 when he referred to “shithole countries”.
Once a place is publicly labelled as a ‘lawless zone’ or ‘outlaw estate’, outside the common norm, it is easy for the authorities to justify special measures, deviating from both law and custom, which can have the effect – if not the intention – of destabilising and further marginalising their occupants, subjecting them to the dictates of the deregulated labour market, and rendering them invisible or driving them out of a coveted space (Wacquant, 2007: 69).

Stigma, in this way, plays a particular role in the discourse of a nation, and is enacted through language in order to justify policies and practices that have regulatory or penalising consequences for residents. The language that is used varies by time and place but for Wacquant, Slater and Pereira, however, earlier stigmatising terms differ from later examples. They argue that “the disgrace that afflicts contemporary boroughs of dispossession differs from the spatial smear of earlier epochs” (2014: 1273). This thesis has shown that Wacquant et al. are correct in their assertion that there is a new intensity of stigma with the arrival of the era of advanced marginality, but I have shown that primitive stigmatisation based on background or core attributes not only existed, but was fundamental for the later arrival of post-Fordist territorial stigma. Instead of seeing the “spatial smear of earlier epochs” as fundamentally different and belonging to a different body of study, I argue that seeing the two forms of stigma as interconnected and dependent on each other, is perhaps an alternative view that can aid in understanding where stigma originates and how it forms.

7.7 Conclusion
This chapter began by showing how the media reported on Toxteth as the inner city before stepping back and examining the context in which this media discourse operated. The rest of the chapter was concerned with showing both how the press and politicians are so closely intertwined that one echoes the other, how Thatcher’s government interweaved Toxteth with the idea of the inner city, and how the government used the stigma of the inner city to paint Toxteth as a problem and to highlight the potential solutions to the problematised inner city. This solution, for the Thatcher administration, involved the soliciting of private capital which resulted in state-led gentrification of Toxteth. The press use of the term ‘inner city’ in relation to Toxteth can be seen as part of a larger discourse that was occurring in which Toxteth was being operationalised to justify intervention and, ultimately, privatization.
of the inner city, transmuting it from a geographically- and socially-defined area into an economic entity. The chapter finished with a discussion of how the term ‘inner city’ is one example of a broader language of territorial stigma in which generalised terms come to be operationalised by populations and politicians to stigmatise and justify social Othering or castigatory actions.

The final section of the chapter showed where future research can be directed: towards the understanding of the language of territorial stigma. Initial research highlights the role that certain words, phrases and tag-phrases play in the stigmatisation of areas. Ultimately, this chapter has shown the ways in which different discourses intermingle and build on each other to operationalise stigma through the use of linguistic tropes. Thatcher’s government built on the background or core stigma of Toxteth that had already been established—in part through the media—in order to operationalise the discourse of Toxteth as the inner city problem. The media, in turn, reproduced this discourse, highlighting the interplay between strands of discourse.
Chapter 8: Stigma after the disturbances

8.1 Introduction
The last chapters of this thesis have addressed the first three subsidiary research questions to access the overall question guiding this thesis: *how and why does the press territorially stigmatise Toxteth, Liverpool in its coverage during the 20th century?* I have addressed the research gap that Slater identifies (2017) regarding the emergence of stigma by showing that Loïc Wacquant’s assertions about territorial stigma are simultaneously correct and incorrect. Chapter 5 shows that, contrary to Wacquant’s assertion, a form of primitive stigmatisation of Toxteth existed in the national press prior to the disturbances of 1981. This primitive form of stigma is characterised by a focus on inter-community strife, increasing criminality, and stigmatisation of housing and building structures, all of which smear Toxteth. The difference between primitive stigmatisation and later forms of territorial stigmatisation is the level of directness and obliqueness of the stigma. Where the stigma prior to 1981 is largely indirect, with heavy reliance on implied meaning and context, stigma of the post-Fordist era is more direct and assertive. In this way, Wacquant is correct in his contention that territorial stigmatisation is a “protrusive feature” of advanced marginality (2008: 169) for, during this era and in line with the operationalising of stigma for political and economic ends, and as the press becomes increasingly marketised in a neoliberal sphere, territorial stigma attains unprecedented depth and gravity.

This background stigma that is indirect but ever-present can be thought of as ‘core-stigma’ which Bryant Hudson describes as stigma arising from an entity’s “core attributes—who it is, what it does, and whom it serves” (2008: 253) and the press, as has been shown, is complicit in the creation of this core stigma. Chapters 6 and 7 highlight the stigma constructed by the press in relation to what Hudson refers to as ‘event stigma’ which “results from discrete, anomalous, episodic” and “negative” events (Hudson, 2008: 253)—the disturbances. The disturbances in 1981 equate to the event about which the press construct event stigma and, in the case of Toxteth, it was the occurrence of these ‘discrete’ events that morphed Toxteth’s primitive stigma into territorial stigma. I hypothesise that the primitive core stigma that existed prior to the disturbances and prior to the era of advanced marginality, allowed the press to create a more adhesive event stigma with relation to Toxteth.

This chapter is situated temporally after the disturbances. It begins by offering some context into the social, political and economic situation in Liverpool and Toxteth in the aftermath of
the disturbances. The chapter shows how the press takes the event stigma created by the disturbances and transforms elements of it into core stigma based on perceived area attributes. This does not mean that the stigma transforms back to primitive stigma for, now fully activated, stigma around Toxteth exists in a partially autonomised form that has gained national and international notoriety, and is now activated for political and economic ends. Territorial stigma after the disturbances relies on both the event stigma of 1981 and on core attributes to mark and to smear the area, representing another layer of discourse. This chapter addresses subsidiary research question 4: Does the stigmatisation of Toxteth by the press continue after the disturbances of 1981 and, if it does, how does this stigma transform? I argue that through the legacy of the disturbances, criminality, and celebrity connections, Toxteth is stigmatised at the close of the 20th century.

‘Legacy of the disturbances’ relates to the way in which the disturbances continue to feature in the news, as the discourse of the disturbances in Toxteth is entered into other discourses and debates, and is a means of the press converting event stigma into a more enduring form of adhesive core stigma. Toxteth is stigmatised as it is entered into a larger contextual debate about the role of police in society, with events and actions in Toxteth being used as an example of police practices. As time passes, the name ‘Toxteth’ comes to stand as an eponym for the disturbances, and serves as a reference point for time and events, as well as becoming an emblematic marker of all things negative. In this way, the events of the disturbances of 1981 are not allowed to die and their effects continue into the next decade both through direct reference and through the eponymisation of Toxteth. The legacy of the disturbances can be seen as the way in which the discourse about Toxteth and the disturbances is repeatedly operationalised and entered into new discourses, not giving it the chance to fade away.

Criminality is often heralded as a marker of territorial stigmatisation (Wacquant, 2008). In the case of Toxteth in the years after the disturbances, the media focuses on a perceived increasing criminality in the area, marking Toxteth with a smear of deviance and lawlessness. In particular, Toxteth is mentioned in relation to gangs, gun violence, and joy-riding, all suggesting a sense of disorder and deviance. News articles underscore the danger inherent in the area, painting Toxteth as not only oppositional to authority but implying that the area is out of control and cannot be tamed.
Finally, the stigma of Toxteth is shown to endure through the reference to celebrity heritage. In the 1990s, articles about footballer Robbie Fowler, actor Jean Alexander, and musicians Gerry Marsden and Peter Wylie, make reference to their Toxteth roots. Although celebrity heritage is often used to instil positive imagery and connotations in place branding (Ashworth, 2009; Ashworth and Kavaratzis, 2011), in the case of press reports of celebrity heritage in Toxteth, the marring of the area is ever-present with celebrities being portrayed as ‘having made it big’ despite their connection to Toxteth. In this way, Toxteth is painted as a burdensome obstacle or hindrance that residents must overcome in order to succeed. It is used as a symbolic millstone that has attempted to drag down and slow down the progress of successful individuals.

In this chapter, I discuss each of these themes, demonstrating that while the events of 1981 were a key stigmatising moment in Toxteth’s story of stigmatisation (event stigma), the press permitted stigma to endure even after the disturbances had ended (through the transfer back to stigma based on core attributes). Through primitive stigmatisation prior to 1981, Toxteth became visible and stigmatised indirectly, allowing a strong and pernicious stigma to adhere during the disturbances of 1981 (more than it did in other areas, such as Chapeltown). The final part of Toxteth’s story of 20th century press stigmatisation shows that the media allowed stigma to endure and built upon previous tropes and ideas to continue to negatively represent the area.

8.2 After the disturbances
In the aftermath of the disturbances, as this study shows, media attention on Toxteth persisted as Michael Heseltine, Secretary of the State for the Environment, arrived in Liverpool and was made Minister for Merseyside as he debated regeneration efforts through the Merseyside Task Force. Convinced that private investment was the solution to the struggling city, he famously invited a group of businessmen to tour the city with him and to send “industrial leaders” to the city for the year (Tickell, 1982). A pet initiative was the International Garden Festival, conceived prior to the riots but offered by Heseltine to the city as a means of attracting tourism and investment to the city, whilst also boosting Liverpool’s image (Holden, 1989: 17-18). The International Garden Festival took place in 1984, the same year that the newly renovated Albert Dock reopened and only a few years before the Tate of the North opened in the city (Belchem, 2006: 517).
In chapter 7, I discussed the regional and national focus of the urban policies of the Conservative Party under PM Thatcher (1979-1990). These policies were generally disliked in the city as they were seen as insufficient, under-funded, and yet more acronym-based projects that had failed to address the underlying structural issues in Liverpool (Murden, 2006: 447). This mistrust of Conservative policies helped lead to the emergence of the Militant Tendency that came to control Liverpool City Council between 1983 and 1987, having taken over the District Labour Party (DLP) in 1978 (Pye, 2018). Taking control of the City Council after years of Liberal minority control, the Trotskyist Militant Tendency fought under the banner of “no cuts in jobs and services and no rent and rate rise to compensate for Tory cuts”, which appealed to a city suffering from severe economic deprivation and decline (Murden, 2006: 455). Militant fought against the Conservative cuts, and enacted a policy of job creation and urban regeneration including the construction of 5,000 new council homes (Murden, 2006: 455-6). Militant is most known for its ‘illegal budget’ that saw the Council vow to spend more than it had, and which Thatcher’s Conservative government staunchly opposed, ultimately resulting in the expulsion of leading Militant figures from the LLP. The legacy of Militant is debated but even taking into account the vast social improvements that the group made in the city, the Militant takeover of the City Council stigmatised the city, marking it as economically unattractive and tumultuous (Murden, 2006: 457; 463).

Despite the efforts of Militant in the City Council and of Heseltine acting as Minister for Merseyside, Liverpool was still struggling. By 1993, it gained European Objective One status reflecting the city’s perceived plight in comparison to other European cities (Belchem, 2006: 517; McIntyre-Brown, 2001: 209). This European status provided funding to the city, which did, in fact reach Toxteth and its residents. A local media initiative called Toxteth TV was established as a result of the Objective One funding and continues to run today, offering media training and technical skills to the local community. Similarly, the Kuumba Imani Millennium Centre was established in Toxteth to serve the minority community there with the aim of supporting the local community (European Union, 2008: 31; 49).

As the close of the millennium drew near, the city remained a shadow of what it had once been. It had begun the century as a shining example of international trade and prosperity and closed, crumbling and needing European aid. It had seen a century of change: demographic, political and industrial. Decline in trade, subsequent unemployment, two
world wars, poor housing conditions, economic recessions, and community relations had shaken the city to its core, all in 100 years.

8.3 The legacy of the disturbances
Chapters 6 and 7 have highlighted how the press, through discursive construction and connection with larger socio-political debates, constructed an event stigma surrounding the disturbances in Toxteth. When the flames had died down, the police withdrawn, and the streets were quiet again, the press interest in the disturbances did not cease. Instead of following a similar retreat, press coverage focused on the legacy of the disturbances, transmuting the event stigma into core stigma, and eponymising Toxteth so that it came to represent a concept as much as a place. Press use of the area as a reference point and as emblematic and symbolic of the ills of society, morphed Toxteth from a geographical to a social entity. This is attained through general after-effects coverage, through the construction of a debate about the role of police, and through the eponymisation of Toxteth.

8.3.1 After-effects coverage
General after-effects coverage of the disturbances relates to the follow-up from the events of the summer of 1981. The press covered trials in relation to the disturbances and also highlighted the work of Secretary of State for the Environment, Michael Heseltine. A *Times* article in January 1982, some six months after the disturbances, ‘names and shames’ Christopher O’Donohue for his role in the disturbances. He is charged with “directing young children throwing petrol bombs at police and preparing cars as battering rams to run into cordons of officers” (*Times*, 1982c: 2). The trials of those involved in the disturbances brought out suggestions of police violence. It was reported that O’Donohue was cleared of his charges, stating that “he was bullied by the police into making a false confession”, with his solicitor suggesting that he was physically assaulted by the police (*Times*, 1982d: 3). The press reported on various Toxteth residents being cleared of charges (see *Times*, 1982e: 2; *Times*, 1982f: 2), and on stories of false charges made against the police. One particular story that attracted media attention was the claim by Michael Blaney that a policeman had attempted to castrate him with a machete during the disturbances. He was charged with wasting police time and sentenced to six months in prison (*Times*, 1982g: 3; Evans, 1982: 5; *Guardian*, 1982c: 5) (see Fig. 8.1).

In addition to reporting on the trials of those supposedly involved in the disturbances, the press also covered the trial of the police who were charged with the killing of David Moore,
'A' man who claimed that he was almost castrated by riot police was sentenced to six months's imprisonment yesterday for inventing the story.

The court was told that Mr Michael Blaney, who alleged that a policeman wielding a machete had attacked him during last year's Toxteth riots, was encouraged to make the allegations by journalists, and manipulated politically by the Liverpool & District Defence Committee.

Blaney, unemployed, of Myrtle House, Toxteth, changed his statement three times and was charged with wasting police time.

A man who said that a policeman, wielding a machete, had tried to castrate him during the riots in Toxteth, Liverpool, appeared in court yesterday, charged with wasting police time.

Lmichael Blaney, aged 28, of Myrtle House, Toxteth, received a severe laceration to his penis in the disturbances, in July, last year. He said that the injury was inflicted by one of three officers who, he said, attacked him. He said they were carrying a truncheon, a baseball bat, and a machete.

**Machete claim cost 5,000 police hours**

Figure 8.1: Coverage from the Guardian and the Times detailing the story of Michael Blaney.

A police van driver told senior officers after a disabled man had died from injuries received when hit by the vehicle during the disorders at Toxteth, Liverpool, last July: “At no time did I drive at anybody”, Mold Crown County was told yesterday.

Two Merseyside police officers pleaded not guilty to unlawful killing.

The jury were also told by prosecution counsel that earlier, on a “confused and hectic night”, a senior officer had briefed his men that they did not have general permission to use vehicles as tactical weapons.

**Police cleared of manslaughter in Toxteth riot**

A young Merseyside police constable giving evidence at Mold Crown Court against two policemen accused of manslaughter after the death of a man in the Toxteth riots, said yesterday that one of them, PC James Keenan, had shown great courage in driving a van towards rioters to protect his colleagues.

Figure 8.2: Coverage of the trial into the death of David Moore.
a disabled man crushed by a police vehicle during the disturbances. The Times report that Moore was “illuminated in the headlights and then he was struck by the vehicle, probably on its front left side. There was no slackening of its speed of about 20 mph and no brakes were applied” (Osman, 1982:2). The police officers involved were found not guilty of manslaughter (Sharratt, 1982a: 4). The articles (see Fig. 8.2) about the police trial highlight the difficult conditions endured by the police before Moore was killed, with one policeman praised for “great courage in driving a van towards rioters to protect his colleagues” (Sharratt, 1982b: 3).

Coverage of trials was supplemented by anniversary coverage of the disturbances. An article in the Times a year after the disturbances of 1981 has the title “Street scars remain in Liverpool 8” and offers the press the ability to cover again the events of the previous summer, re-entering the disturbances and Toxteth into public discourse. The article (Fig. 8.3 B) continues to give a detailed account of the previous summer’s events:

Last year shops were burnt and looted. The police fired CS gas for the first time in an English city and we [sic] themselves attacked in unprecedented violence, on one night alone 450 officers were treated for injuries, and doctors reported considerable numbers of local people hurt. Petrol bombs were thrown: cars were burnt and whole streets were devastated in outbreaks of violence which lasted throughout July. Perhaps surprisingly, only one person died, Mr David Moore, aged 22, a cripple (Kershaw, 1982: 3).

Despite the article’s assertion that “the anniversary passed off relatively peacefully” (Kershaw, 1982: 3), having given a detailed account of the previous year’s uprising, the reporter comments that “the police’s main complaint is that certain sections of the media have chosen to blow up out of proportion what they claim are ‘minor incidents’” on the anniversary (Kershaw, 1982: 3). This report on the media’s exaggeration of events is directly at odds with the rest of the report that resurfaces stories from the past year.

The anniversary coverage in the Express is equally bleak (see Fig. 8.3 A). Criticising television for not being able to “resist an anniversary”, the report also appears, ironically, unable to
‘resist an anniversary’ and takes the opportunity to describe Toxteth in harsh and negative language, stating that “camera teams are out once more in this unlovely area of Liverpool, scouring the squalid streets and lingering on the careworn faces of their beleaguered inhabitants” (Express, 1982b: 19). This harsh depiction of Toxteth further invokes stigma of the area and refers back to imagery concocted the previous summer. Anniversary coverage of the disturbances allows the media to re-enter event stigma into the public discourse but transferring it from an event-based stigma into a background or core attribute that now consistently afflicts Toxteth, smearing the district with stigmatising imagery and connotations once again.

Figure 8.3: News cuttings from the first anniversary of the disturbances.
As well as reporting on the trials of those involved in the disturbances and on anniversary coverage, the after-effects coverage also includes a focus on the role of Michael Heseltine in Liverpool. The press structure Heseltine’s involvement in Liverpool as a direct consequence of the disturbances in Toxteth. In fact, Lord Heseltine’s involvement with the city had begun prior to this and in a personal interview he stated that “I had begun this relationship with Liverpool in 1979” working on UDCs, the Garden Festival and the listing of the Albert Dock to prevent it from being demolished (Heseltine, interview, 2017). This earlier involvement is acknowledged by John Carvel of the Guardian (see Fig. 8.4 A) who describes Heseltine’s earlier involvement but surmises that the “riots…changed the cash priorities” (Carvel, 1982: 3). Largely his earlier involvement in the city is ignored by the press, however, and mention of Heseltine in relation to Toxteth (and, indeed, to Liverpool more generally) in the Times only begins after the disturbances in 1981, highlighting press silence on his earlier efforts with regard to the city. Press coverage of Heseltine’s time in Toxteth after the disturbances connects his involvement with the violence of summer 1981. An article in the Times (see Fig. 8.4 B) entitled ‘Heseltine’s Toxteth’ reads:

On a visit to the Toxteth area of Liverpool he [Heseltine] toured some of the projects to improve the environment and to create employment which were set in train after the 1981 riots (Times, 1983a: 5).

Here, the Times both states incorrectly that Heseltine’s involvement began as a result of the disturbances, and, from a symbolic perspective, implies that that the disturbances warranted a national government response. A further Times article entitled ‘Man who brought business and hope’ has a picture of Heseltine in front of the Liver Buildings. It is captioned with “Start of a mission: Mr Heseltine in Liverpool in 1981” (Faux, 1990a: 6), obliquely implying that Heseltine had no involvement in the city of Liverpool before the disturbances of 1981 (see Fig. 8.4 C). By ignoring the actual genesis of Heseltine’s involvement, the press further link investment and government involvement in Liverpool with the disturbances, which ultimately creates a continuing legacy. It protracts the role of the disturbances and transmutes the stigma of an event into a background core stigma as Toxteth is repeatedly entered into the discourse of government intervention. Further, situated against the background of the perceived portent of the Militant Tendency who threatened illegal budgets
and massive social reforms, the portrayal of a calm Conservative presence in the guise of Michael Heseltine made a certain political point, too, implying a need to save the city from itself through recognised and privatised means that sustained the status quo.

**8.3.2 The role of the police**

The second way in which the legacy of the disturbances endured was through a discussion that emerged in the press about the role of the police. The first way in which the notion of policing entered the press coverage in relation to Toxteth was in relation to the findings of the Scarman inquiry and the subsequent actions by Chief Constable Ken Oxford of Merseyside Police. The Scarman inquiry and resultant report, commissioned by Home Secretary William Whitelaw in the aftermath of the Brixton disturbances of April 1981, considered the role of the police in “a multi-racial society” (Scarman, 1981: 126). Though mainly focusing on the events in Brixton, London, the report also features an addendum about Liverpool and Scarman refers to Liverpool throughout the report. The inquiry was to examine two key problems: the problem of “policing a multi-racial community in a deprived inner city area where unemployment, especially among young black people, is high and hopes are low” (Scarman, 1981: 15), and “the difficulties, social and economic, which beset the
ethnically diverse communities who live and work in our inner cities” (Scarman, 1981: 15). One key finding of the Scarman inquiry is the need to improve police relations with minority communities in Britain (Scarman, 1981: 137). Scarman proposes that this could be tackled through the use of community policing, “a style best epitomised, perhaps, in the image of the Home Beat Officer or the friendly bobby-on-the-beat” (Scarman, 1981: 140).

The idea of foot patrols was becoming popular in the United States at the same time, and Kelling and Wilson’s ‘broken windows theory’ extolls the virtues of foot patrol policing (1982), arguing that community policing can help to maintain a sense of order. At the beginning of 1982, some six months after the disturbances of July 1981, Chief Constable Ken Oxford decided to introduce a community policing scheme in Toxteth to solve “the area’s troubles” (Guardian, 1982a: 4). In the Guardian (see Fig. 8.5 A), coverage refers to the new style of policing being used to create “a new atmosphere in the riot zone of Toxteth, Liverpool” (Guardian, 1982a: 4)—the term ‘riot zone’ also serving to continue to connect Toxteth to the legacy of the disturbances. The article states that, in addition to addressing crime:

They [the police] were also to report damaged telephone boxes, stolen cars, and ice-damaged roads, as they mixed in the multiracial community visiting shops, schools and talking to people in the street (Guardian, 1982a: 4).

As well as this coverage clearly connecting to Kelling and Wilson’s ‘broken windows theory’, which sees that “disorder and crime are usually inextricably linked” (1982), the coverage serves to mar Toxteth as a place not only of crime but of physical dereliction and abandonment. The fact that the police were being called upon to report on the dereliction in Toxteth, suggests that the police force was being used to police the physical environment as well as the social environment. Kelling and Wilson’s findings suggest that physical disorder influences people’s perception and fear of crime (1982), and the police and press focus on physical dereliction in Toxteth connotes ideas of undercurrents of social disorder in society. An article in the Mirror in 1982 (see Fig. 8.5 B) has the provocative headline, ‘Help us, say battered policemen of Toxteth’ and opens with a plea to the people of Toxteth, which reads, “the people of riot-scarred Toxteth were urged yesterday to ‘get off their backsides’ and help
the police” (Mirror, 1982a: 5). The newspaper followed this with another article (Fig. 8.5 C) a month later stating that the “battered community of Toxteth wants more jobs and extra police to clamp down on soaring crime” (Mirror, 1982b: 11). These articles further the push for increased policing in Toxteth and justify Ken Oxford’s community policing plan. The community policing scheme was reported, in the Times and the Guardian, to be failing. The Guardian reports that since the initiation of the community policing scheme in 1982, Toxteth’s crime rates actually increased (Guardian, 1983a: 4). The Times reports that “since community policing began three weeks ago, officers on foot patrol have been ambushed and stoned by gangs of youths” but that “Mr Kenneth Oxford, Chief Constable of Merseyside, yesterday denied reports that he was about to abandon his community policing experiment in Toxteth” (Times, 1982h: 2).

An editorial in the Times (see Fig. 8.5 D) suggests that policing since the disturbances has changed not only because of the move to community policing but also through “more sophisticated and effective methods for quelling disturbances before they get out of hand” (Times, 1983b: 15), which falls into a broader discussion of the role of police in society. The editorial, which is deeply supportive of the police, continues that:

Happily we shall not see again the spectacle of vulnerable policemen cowering, near defenceless, behind plastic shields as missiles rain down and petrol bombs set fire to
inflammable blue tunics. Tactics and training as well as kit have improved. The police now move in fast to disperse crowds and thwart the creation of ‘no-go’ areas occupied by rioters for hours on end (Times, 1983b: 15).

Using references to the disturbances of 1981 that portray the police as victimised protectors, this quotation structures Toxteth as a continuing danger to society that the police, as defenders of British society and values, have had to act on to prevent the threat from further damaging society. Ironically, the editorial is entitled ‘Peace on the streets’, despite the piece referring to the hardening of police tactics and the increased toughness of their approach.

Despite the toughening of some police policy, the use of CS gas was discussed in the wake of the Toxteth disturbances and in the years after the disturbances, the press continued to refer to the events of 1981 as part of a discourse about the use of weapons and CS gas. Home Secretary Douglas Hurd determined (see Fig. 8.6 A) that “plastic bullets or CS gas can only be used in cases that pose a threat to life or serious injury. The weapons can no longer be used in cases of public disorder that threaten only the widespread destruction of property” (Bevins, 1986: 1). Similarly, the Times reported on the use of water cannons being “ruled out by the Government” (Wood, 1987: 5). A search of Hansard reveals that the use of water cannons was discussed regularly in both Houses of Parliament since the disturbances of 1981, serving as an example of the press echoing the official government debate and discourse.

Figure 8.6: News cuttings showing the new discourse about the appropriate use of CS gas, the army, and police powers in conflict.
The strong link back to the disturbances of 1981 was common in the press coverage of the debate about the role of police in society. In a piece in the *Times* (see Fig. 8.6 B), reporter Peter Hennessy writes that “the riots of 1981 reopened an old constitutional question: at what point and in what way should the Army be called in if the police are failing to cope?” (Hennessy, 1983: 2). Hennessy reviews a lecture given by the Chief of Defence Staff about the role of the Army in public order, and concludes that (see Fig. 8.6 C):

> Since 1981, that ‘grey area’ has been filled by the police. They are much better placed now in terms of equipment, training, speed and flexibility of response which, senior officers reckon, is one reason why riots have not recurred (Hennessy, 1983: 2).

This highlights the move since the disturbances to strengthen the British police in terms of training and resources. Connecting the increased police powers to the disturbances transfers the event stigma of the disturbances to a core stigma of danger that lingers in relation to Toxteth. This stigmatisation implies that Toxteth is a place of danger that was perilous enough to warrant a hardening of police policy.

The coverage of policing in the aftermath of the disturbances is another way in which the legacy of the disturbances is transferred from an event stigma to a core stigma. By continuing to enter the discourse of the disturbances and Toxteth into a debate about policing, the event stigma of the Toxteth disturbances of 1981 cannot fade away as it is continued to be operationalised as part of a larger discourse. The actions of the police during the disturbances are protracted to form the backdrop to a debate about the role of the police in society. By using the disturbances as the necessity on which the policing debate rests, Toxteth and other areas that saw disturbances are further stigmatised as they are shown to be trouble spots that require lasting state intervention.

### 8.3.3 Eponymisation of Toxteth

Toxteth was also used as a reference point and its name became eponymised after the disturbances, as the name became used as a symbol for all things negative. This eponymisation and use as a reference point allowed the press to enter the name and idea of Toxteth into many discourses, while further stigmatising the area through the frequent direct and indirect references to the problems of the district. Toxteth was used as a geographical
marker, as in a *Guardian* article (see Fig. 8.7 A) in which Lindsay Mackie writes about the success of the Weller Streets Housing Cooperative whose residents fought to stay together in the new houses built after compulsory purchase of their terraced houses. The new houses were to be built “near the scene of the Toxteth riots” (Mackie, 1982: 5), thereby both geographically and socially placing the story in proximity to danger, strife, and trouble.

In addition to being used as a geographical and social marker, Toxteth was also morphed into a temporal marker. In the *Times* (see Fig. 8.7 B), in a timeline of community architecture initiatives, amongst major steps forward in the history of the community architecture movement, the entry for 1981 reads “inner city riots erupt in Brixton, Toxteth, Moss Side” (Knevitt and Wates, 1985: 11), using areas that saw disturbances as a temporal reference point. The causes and structures behind the disturbances are ignored as the events simply become a temporal marker. The use of Toxteth as a temporal marker was sometimes less direct. In an article by David Walker of the *Times* (see Fig. 8.7 C) about the loss of jobs in “inner urban cores” (Walker, 1982: 8), Walker offers a quotation that was given prior to the disturbances in 1981, and states “that was written before Toxteth” (1982: 8). Here, Toxteth is shifted from being a geographical entity to a temporal entity. It has been eponymised, with the name of ‘Toxteth’ coming to stand for all of the events that occurred there in 1981.

Figure 8.7: News panel showing articles that demonstrate the eponymisation of Toxteth.
Similarly, in an interview with playwright Alan Aykbourn (see Fig. 8.7 D), Aykbourn is quoted as he eponymises Toxteth. He states, “I feel threatened by the fact that the fabric of society is under tremendous tension at the moment. Occasionally you get the odd Toxteth or bomb in the Park” (Aykbourn in Appleyard, 1982: 7). Not only is Toxteth eponymised but it comes to be symbolic of all that is negative in society that serves as a threat to social norms. Aykbourn’s voice is used as the voice of rational thought, social norms, and the status quo and his structuring of Toxteth serves to position it as a threat to society. Toxteth comes to represent the events of the disturbances and, despite time having passed, the legacy of the street violence is perpetuated by the press.

Toxteth comes to stand for racial difference in an article by Robert Kilroy-Silk in the *Times* (see Fig. 8.7 E). Discussing the “conspiracy of silence about the ‘white riots’” throughout Britain (Kilroy-Silk, 1987: 8), he argues that:

> Screaming newspaper headlines would have announced the fact, had those involved in some of the more serious disturbances been black. Pompous editorials would have preached at us. Had the riots occurred in Brixton, Toxteth, Moss Side or somewhere similar, then judicial inquiries would have been launched (Kilroy-Silk, 1987: 8).

Here, Kilroy-Silk first positions whiteness in opposition to blackness, implying that ‘black’ disturbances would receive more attention than white. He then argues that disturbances in somewhere like Toxteth, would have attracted more attention, subtly linking Toxteth to blackness and racial difference.

The disturbances are used as a social marker, too. In another article about the community architecture movement, Charles Knevitt writes about the St Mary’s Street area of Southampton (see Fig. 8.8 A). He states that “it does not suffer from extreme poverty, unemployment or bad race relations, and on a sleepy Sunday afternoon it is hard to imagine the sort of scenes which took place in Brixton and Toxteth four summers ago” (Knevitt, 1985: 10). The problems of St Mary’s are unique and it did not suffer street violence like Toxteth, Brixton or Moss Side. The inclusion and reference to Toxteth seems out of place yet it connects the story of St Mary’s to a different discourse: one of urban decline and
“blight” (Knevitt, 1985: 10). It also serves to ‘rank’ the area as bad, but not as bad at Toxteth. In this way, the disturbances come to represent a social marker of deviant and negative behaviour.

Toxteth is used also as a marker to highlight a landmark moment in policing, too (see Fig. 8.8 B-D). In an article about the resignation of Peter Wright, Chief Constable of South Yorkshire in the aftermath of the Hillsborough football disaster, a *Times* article (Fig. 8.8 B) references key moments of Wright’s career, stating that he “has been a senior officer through some of the most troubled and sensitive events of the last decade...He was an assistant chief constable on Merseyside during the Toxteth riots of 1981” (Davenport, 1990: 2). Relatedly, an article about police constable Frank Grunnill’s retirement and his retirement gift of his police horse (Fig. 8.8 C), selects two key moments to highlight the intensity of his career: the Hillsborough disaster and being “on the front line during the Toxteth riots of 1981” (Faux, 1990b: 11). Chief Constable Ken Oxford’s obituary in 1998 (Fig. 8.8 D) described “his big test” in policing as the “Toxteth riots when he authorised his officers to fire CS gas canisters

![Figure 8.8: News cuttings showing how Toxteth was used as a social marker and marker of policing.](image-url)
to disperse the crowds” (Campbell, 1998: 22). The disturbances are foregrounded in the obituary as a marker of tough policing. In these extracts, the legacy of the disturbances is perpetuated and attention is drawn to Toxteth again, even many years after the events of 1981. Moreover, the disturbances are being structured as a key moment in policing, and the structural causes of the violence, the loss of life, and the police brutality said to have contributed to the events (Scarman, 1981) are all overlooked in favour of structuring Toxteth as a symbolic moment in 20th century British policing.

Sometimes the references to Toxteth as a centre of strife and trouble are more oblique and suggestive rather than direct, in the same way that primitive stigma earlier in the century relied on context and presumed knowledge. In a spoof article comparing life on Mars to life on Earth (Fig. 8.9 A), Annabel Levy, writing for the Times states that “Mars is like a cold, high-altitude desert—the same as Toxteth in January, really” (Levy, 1996: 5), thereby tacitly referring to the barrenness of the district. The comment relies on presumed reader understanding and past exposure to articles about the dereliction and bleakness of Toxteth.

A feature article in the Times by Harry Thompson (Fig. 8.9 B) recounts a journey on the Tran-Siberian railway and uses Toxteth as emblematic of negative traits. When describing the train carriage, Thompson uses a comparison to Toxteth, stating that “the Russian train compartments were defended by more locks than an old lady’s flat on a Toxteth council estate” (Thompson, 1995: 37). Here, the name of Toxteth is connotes ideas of crime and

Figure 8.9: News cuttings showing Toxteth being used as a comparative marker and reference point for negativity.
vulnerability and the reader is expected to be aware of the inferences being made. Likewise, the name comes to stand for a deprived social situation and precarious living in an editorial in the *Times* that discusses the Soviet lack of unemployment in the Eastern bloc.

The article (Fig. 8.9 C) reads, “better, it may be said to be employed and unfree in Kiev than jobless and free in Toxteth or Brixton” (Times, 1982b: 13). This comparison relies on the ideological dominance of the Soviet-controlled Eastern bloc as being a challenge to freedom. With this basis, the editorial suggests that it is better to sacrifice freedom and be employed in the Soviet Bloc, than to be ‘free’ and unemployed in Toxteth. This implies that the situation in Toxteth is more dire than the loss of personal freedom. As well, the reference represents precarity of living and joblessness, and, through the inclusion of two places known for the disturbances of 1981, makes indirect reference to the legacy of the disturbances. Relatedly, an article in the *Guardian* in 1992 about Russian debt and investing in the former Soviet Union uses Toxteth as a simile to express the bleak investment conditions (Fig. 8.9 D). The article concludes with a quotation from “an observer” who says that investing in the former Soviet Union is akin to “buying a semi [detached house] in Liverpool and being told that the whole of Toxteth comes with the house (Elliot et al., 1993: 21). Here, in a discourse totally unrelated to Toxteth, the district is entered in a symbolic sense to portray a dire situation. That these comparisons rely on comparing Toxteth to the Soviet Union is no coincidence; according to Herman and Chomsky’s propaganda model, the reliance on media in the 1980s to reference Soviet communism invokes fear in the hearts of readers making them more pliable (1988). By painting Toxteth as worse even than the spectre of communism, the media give a bleak and terrifying vision of Toxteth as a threat to society.

The legacy of the disturbances is perpetuated in the years after the disturbances by entering Toxteth into different discourses and in revisiting the events of 1981. General after-effects coverage refers to the trials, the anniversary coverage, the role of Michael Heseltine, and the emerging debate on the role of police in society. Toxteth is positioned as the cause for some of these debates, thereby seemingly justifying its insertion into larger discourses. The result is that the disturbances are not allowed to be forgotten; rather they are morphed from singular events into defining attributes that perpetuate the legacy of the disturbances.

8.4 Criminality
For Wacquant, in the era of advanced marginality, crime and the fear of crime are potent ingredients in the stigmatisation of place. His oft-cited definition states that “no-go areas”
are “fearsome redoubts rife with crime, lawlessness and moral degeneracy where only the rejects of society could bear to dwell” (2008: 29). His crime hypothesis is echoed in the subsequent literature (see, for example, Devereux et al., 2011a; Devereux et al., 2011b; Jensen and Christensen, 2012; Rhodes, 2012; Cohen, 2013).

Crime is also prominent in media literature, with crime coverage and crimes seen to be markers of newsworthiness (Chermak, 1994: 97; Devereux, 2011a; 2011b). Crime coverage has long been a staple of news coverage and “early newspapers sensationalised crime to increase circulation” (Chermak, 1994: 95). With most readers of the press removed from the realities of the crimes being reported, the media plays the role of “surrogate for members of the public who have limited exposure to crime and violence” (Chermak, 1994: 96), and carries information regarding crime to the general public who receive the news. Chermak maintains that “accordingly, the news media can be influential in shaping opinions and attitudes about crime” (1994: 96). But, high levels of crime reportage do not necessarily correlate to high levels of actual crime because of media distortion and bias (Garofalo, 1981; Heath and Gilbert, 1996; O’Connell, 1999), and certain crimes are foregrounded in the media. Criminologist, Gregg Barak argues that:

The news media consistently underplay petty, nonviolent and white-collar offenses while they overplay interpersonal, violent, and sexual crimes. Invariably, media portrayals of criminals tend to be one-dimensional reflections of the crimes commonly committed by the poor and the powerless and not those crimes commonly committed by the rich and powerful (Barak, 1994: 11).

Indeed, Chermak continues to highlight the fact that “ordinary crime is not news…Crime news must be simple and unambiguous so that the story can be placed quickly within an already established framework that can be easily followed by the audience” (1994: 99). This ‘framework’ relies on existent tropes and stereotypes of groups of people and places (Petersen, 2016:26) but the use of these stereotypes feeds into the creation of territorial stigma. Sociologist Nick Petersen argues that “the incorporation of neighborhood stereotypes into individuals’ cognitive maps helps them make sense of their spatial surroundings by determining which areas are dangerous and/or crime-prone” (Petersen,
The linkage between purportedly extraordinary crime and place stereotypes means that the press’ search for ‘suitable’ and newsworthy stories of criminality feeds into the further stigmatisation of a place and its population by highlighting its negative characteristics and smearing it with notions of lawlessness and deviance.

In the case of Toxteth, press coverage during the disturbances of 1981 left a legacy framework of a negative, oppositional, and socially distant place and population upon which further stories of criminality easily attached—a backdrop of persistent and enduring stigmatising forces. This ‘core’ stigma (Hudson, 2008: 253; Holt and Wilkins, 2015: 84) is based on what is seen as being part of the area’s “core attributes (such as poverty or high-crime levels)” (Holt and Wilkins, 2015: 84). The press, between 1982 and 1999, focused primarily on three types of crime in relation to Toxteth: killings, drugs and gangs, and joy-riding. These all fall into Barak’s breakdown of prominent media coverage of “interpersonal, violent and sexual crimes” (1994: 11) and, combined, likely have some effect on increasing the fear of crime—and the stigmatisation of Toxteth as a dangerous and crime-ridden place—among readers (Heath and Gilbert, 1996).

### 8.4.1 Killings

As shown in chapter 5, elements of the primitive stigmatisation of Toxteth relied on notions of increasing criminality that shifted from a focus on domestic attacks and crimes to violent and random crime as the century progressed. The latter part of the 20th century maintained this focus on random, violent crime, suggesting that Toxteth was unpredictable and volatile. A story in the *Guardian* in 1985 serves as an example of the press reportage of random and violent crime (Fig. 8.10 A). In an article entitled ‘Death fight witness “terrified to appear”’, the reporter writes:

> Six witnesses to a fight in Liverpool in which a man was stabbed and later died are terrified to come to the city to identify suspects, a court heard yesterday…The charges arose from an incident outside Toxteth sports centre on August 10 when Mr Jeffrey McNish, aged 22, from Brixton, London, was beaten and stabbed three times. He died a week later” (Guardian, 1985b: 2).
The report continues to explain that the black population of Toxteth did not cooperate with police in the request for volunteers to form an identity parade, and, unrelatedly, that the witnesses of the murder “expressed extreme fear” at returning to Liverpool (Guardian, 1985b: 2). This implies both that the residents of Toxteth—who are also reported to have turned the court into a “bear garden” (Guardian, 1985b: 2)—are unruly, and that they instil fear in people. The murder is constructed by the press as being supposedly random and, therefore, suggests a sense of impending danger and lack of control in Toxteth.

The sense of violence and terror is furthered in the ‘News in brief’ section of the Guardian (see Fig. 8.10 B) in 1981 where there is a brief report entitled ‘Man shot dead’, which reads:

Police were last night hunting a masked gunman who shot dead Andrew John, aged 30, as he walked along a busy road near his home in Toxteth, Liverpool, on Saturday evening (Guardian, 1991: 2).

Figure 8.10: News coverage of Toxteth relying on notions of violent crime.
As with crime coverage in the earlier parts of the 20th century that formed a type of primitive stigmatisation (see chapter 5), this stigmatisation is indirect and does not employ overt stigmatisation through the use of tag-phrases and negative imagery. It negatively smears Toxteth, however, by feeding into and building on a framework of existing negative core attributes that paint the area as dangerous and worthy of fear. Crucially, the press focuses on violent crimes committed by those marginalised in society; it does not focus on the structural or symbolic violence weighing heavy on Toxteth.

One article in the *Guardian* does directly smear the area but it does so through the voice of a local resident. The article (Fig. 8.10 C), with the subtitle ‘Lawless Britain’ tells of the attempted murder of Toxteth shopkeeper, Said Badrous. “A raider attacked Mr Badrous last month and slashed his throat”. (Ward, 1993: 6). Despite Perspex barriers and mesh windows, Badrous was still almost mortally wounded. A police detective inspector is quoted as saying that the raider did not steal anything but appears to have tried to decapitate the shopkeeper, implying that Toxteth is an area of senseless crime where even people who take precautions cannot be saved. Unusually, a resident is quoted in this article, but he is quoted as condemning the area as a “hot spot” for drugs. He states, with regards to the worsening of conditions and safety in Toxteth, that “people put it down to unemployment but I was unemployed when I was younger and I didn’t do this kind of thing”. He refers to nostalgic views of neighbours scrubbing their front steps, and friendly but effective police constables who kept the area in order. He speaks on condition of anonymity because of fear. That the *Guardian* uses a local resident as the mouthpiece for the stigmatisation of the area is in line with Devereux et al.’s assertion that the media is more likely to quote a resident when they are stigmatising their own place of residence as opposed to praising it (Devereux et al., 2011a: 133). The article continues to blame drugs for the ills of Toxteth, which is a common example of a constructed moral panic that sees drug use linked to crime and hooliganism that cannot be controlled (Cohen, 2002: 112). The article—although about an attempted murder rather than an actual killing—serves to construct an image of Toxteth as riddled with violent and random crime fuelled by drugs, and as a place feared even by its residents.

The coverage of killings in relation to Toxteth does not always include murders and manslaughter that occurred in the area itself but, rather, may reference the killer being from Toxteth. This is the case in a 1982 with a story about a woman who arranged to have her husband murdered in Peterborough (see Fig. 8.11). Muriel McCullough “phoned her
husband to say goodnight as her hired gunmen waited to murder him”, calling to ensure that he would be in bed so that the murder plot could go ahead (O’Flaherty, 1982: 5). Three men, in addition to Mrs. McCullough, stood on trial for the murder of William McCullough. In the Mirror, reporter, Frank Corless, writes that Mrs. McCullough “hired a hit squad from Toxteth to kill her husband” (1982: 1). Linking the ease with which Mrs. McCullough was able to hire a hit squad with Toxteth, smears Toxteth with overtones of violence, criminality, and the prominence of a dangerous underworld of criminals. In the Express, Joseph Scanlon and James Collingwood, two of the men involved, are labelled as being from Toxteth. The other man, Alan Kay, is said by the paper, to be from Liverpool. It is striking that Scanlon and Collingwood are labelled as being from a specific district of Liverpool—Toxteth—but
Kay is listed as being from the city more generally rather than a specific district. Here, Toxteth is being singled out in a crime story, fitting with the existing tropes and frameworks about the area. The *Times* lists all three men involved as being from Toxteth (Osman, 1982: 3). In the *Guardian*, however, the men are reported to be from particular streets in Liverpool (Guardian, 1982b: 2). This coverage adds specificity to the story without directly stigmatising the district of Toxteth and offers an alternative means of adding detail to a report without engaging in stigmatisation of an area with an already-damaged reputation. This approach, however promising, is not used consistently by the paper and in 1983, in an article entitled ‘Killer is gaoled’, the perpetrator of a murder is labelled by the *Guardian* as being from Toxteth (Guardian, 1983b: 2).

### 8.4.2 Gangs

Some of the stories of murder are related to the second crime theme of gang violence. An article in the *Guardian* in 1983 tells of an inquiry into police brutality at a protest outside Walton Prison in Liverpool regarding the proposed transfer of Dennis Kelly, a prisoner, from Walton to Wakefield Prison. The prisoner in question is reported to be “serving a life sentence for the gangland murder of Mr Billy Osu, a newsagent in the Toxteth area of Liverpool” (Morris, 1983: 2). Another story in the *Guardian* about a campaign to free Dennis Kelly tells of the details of the murder (Fig. 8.12), including the fact that Kelly is said to have “stabbed him [Osu] through the heart” (Sharratt, 1983: 3):

> In the early hours of last November 15, two men approached a Toxteth newsagent, Willian Osu, aged 38, in the Kowloon Club in Nelson Street and a fight started. Mr Osu staggered out and got into a taxi. The taxi driver found that he was bleeding from a stab wound and drove him to hospital where he died in the operating theatre two hours later (Sharratt, 1983: 3).

Coverage of this murder stated that the crime was gang-related (Morris, 1983: 2—g513) and the coverage of gang violence in Toxteth was common during the latter part of the 20th century. Gang-related crimes were widely reported in relation to Toxteth, hinting that the area is lawless and governed through fear, violence and intimidation, thereby adding to the core stigmatising attributes about Toxteth. In 1986, the *Times* reported that raids occurred in Toxteth during which seven people were arrested and “material believed to include heroin
and a sawn-off shotgun was seized” (Times, 1986: 1).

One particular gang-related event served as a catalyst for increased violence and much media attention. In 1995, David Ungi was murdered as he drove through Toxteth. Vivek Chaudhary, writing for the Guardian, explains the background to the killing on “Toxteth’s run-down streets”:

> The recent violence is thought to stem from a dispute over ownership of a Dingle pub where Mr Ungi and his friends were regular drinkers. A local black businessman and some associates tried to take it over and the white regulars tried to drive them out. In February a cousin of Mr Ungi was shot and seriously wounded, and Mr Ungi was involved in a fight with a black gang member in the pub (Chaudhary, 1995a: 2).

Not only does Chaudhary’s article (Fig. 8.13 A)—accompanied with a picture of armed police—smear Toxteth with a moral panic over the prevalence of gangs, it also directly
stigmatises the area (Fig. 8.13 B) by referring to it as having “run-down streets” and being “blighted by unemployment and poverty” (Chaudhary, 1995a: 2), thereby further smearing the area in terms of physical dereliction and appearances. The juxtaposition of ‘run-down’ surroundings and gang violence conjures up notions of the ‘broken windows’ theory, which argues that physical signs of dereliction hint at underlying social disturbances and decline (Kelling and Wilson, 1982).

With relation to the violence, the Guardian states (Fig. 8.13 C) that “police and locals are quick to point out that the rivalry between the gangs is not based on race” (Chaudhary, 1995a: 2), but the headline suggests otherwise (Fig. 8.13 D) as it reads “Race tensions flare in drug dealers’ crossfire” (Chaudhary, 1995a: 2). Similarly, the Times states that Ungi’s murder is due to “lucrative organised crime rackets” and rival gangs. While the police are quoted in an article in the Times as maintaining that the gang killings are not based on racial divisions, the headline of the article (Fig. 8.13 E) misleadingly states, “shootings blamed on rival black and white gangs” (Alderson, 1995a: 3). This divergence between the text of the articles and the

Figure 8.13: News panel showing coverage of gang violence in Toxteth in the 1990s.
headlines highlights the role of subeditors who would “write the headlines, they lay out the pages, they write the captions for the photos” (Rose, 2017, interview) as opposed to the reporter who writes the text of the story.

While the *Times* suggests—amidst talk of gang violence—that the killings may be due to organised crime, the press refers instead to the killings as being part of escalating gang violence. Organised crime and gangs differ in terms of structure, activities, and “relationships with other groups” (Decker et al., 1998: 401). However, despite the significant differences between the two entities (Decker and Pyrooz, 2014), both the *Guardian* and the *Times* hone in on the idea of gangs, referring to “‘cowboy’ gangsters” (Times, 1995: 2) and “open gang warfare” (Alderson, 1995b: 4) operating in the area “for control of the drugs trade” (Chaudhary, 1995a: 2). The *Times* refers to Ungi as being “involved with a predominantly white gang in Toxteth” (Times, 1995: 2), and the *Guardian* (Fig. 8.14 A) adds that:

The gang with which Mr Ungi was involved is white and is largely made up of two families with strong roots in the Dingle, a predominantly white area of Toxteth. According to the jangle (Toxteth slang for street rumours), the killing was carried out by a rival black group, based in the Granby Road end of Toxteth, where most of the black community lives (Chaudhary, 1995a: 2).

This focus on the racial element of gang violence fits with Marjorie Zatz’s findings that imagery surrounding gangs combined with notions of ethnic difference yields a moral panic based on “the threat of disorder” (Zatz, 1987: 129) and otherness. This structuring implies a sense of violence, lawlessness, and difference to an area, and socially distances it from the rest of society. Further, reference to the Toxteth slang term ‘jangle’ also serves to further stigmatise and other Toxteth, implying that the area is linguistically different from the rest of the country.

Following Ungi’s killing, the press reported on a spree of shootings in Toxteth. This reflects sociologist Barry Glassner’s observation that the media engage in “christening isolated
incidents as trends” (2004: 820), reflecting the fact that a technique of the media is to upscale and exaggerate. On 9th June 1995, the *Guardian* (Fig. 8.14 B) reports that:

A 22-year-old man was shot in the stomach and then dumped at a hospital yesterday, the latest in a series of gangland-style shootings in the Toxteth area of Liverpool (Guardian, 1995a: 6).

The killings were reported for the rest of the year and into 1996. In December 1995, Paul Ogbuehi was “shot dead in the Toxteth area of Liverpool” (Guardian, 1995b: 6) and, on the anniversary of Ungi’s killing, “a man was shot dead in a betting shop in Toxteth” (Ward, 1996: 4).

*Figure 8.14: News cuttings showing coverage of gang-related violence following the killing of David Ungi.*
Some of the shootings were said to be directly related to the Ungi killing. On 26th October 1995, the *Guardian* reported another shooting of a woman “believed to be the wife of a man charged with attempting to murder alleged gang leader David Ungi” (Ward, 1995: 7). In March 1996, police were investigating the attempted murder of the man suspected of killing Ungi (Fig. 8.14 C):

> Police in Liverpool are investigating links between a drive-by shooting which left a man seriously injured, and the murder of a gangland figure, David Ungi. John Phillips, aged 35, was under armed guard in hospital last night after he was shot by several men who drove off in a car in Toxteth. Mr Phillips had been charged with attempted murder after Mr Ungi was shot last year, but the case was dropped in court. The later murder of Mr Ungi in May sparked a wave of shootings in the city (Guardian, 1996: 9).

Phillips died later in the year, drawing more media attention to Toxteth and the gang violence there (Hetherington, 1996: 7). Even when the killings were not thought to be connected to the gang violence in which Ungi was purportedly involved, Ungi and the fear of gangs were invoked in the press. In the *Guardian*, in an article entitled ‘Woman hit by stray bullet’, Vivek Chaudhary writes that a man and woman were hit by stray bullets in the city centre and that a man named Paul Forster had been shot in Toxteth. Despite stating that “police stressed that the shooting of Mr Forster was not thought to be linked to Mr Ungi’s murder”, Chaudhary adds that (Fig. 8.14 D):

> The latest round of violence follows the murder on May 1 of David Ungi, who was shot dead in Toxteth. This led to a series of shootings and violent incidents in Liverpool, which increased fears of a drugs-related gang war breaking out (Chaudhary, 1995b: 2).

The addition of the final clause of this paragraph connects the violence in Liverpool to a fear of drug-based gangland violence emerging in Toxteth and amounts to a level of fear-
mongering. It establishes gang violence as a background core attribute that defines the character of Toxteth.

An *Express* feature entitled ‘Britain’s Flashpoints’ (Fig. 8.15 A&B) pinpoints Manchester, Birmingham, Bradford, Stockton, Liverpool, Motherwell, Paisley, Cardiff, Dundee, Sheffield, and Leeds as areas where “terrorised residents complain that police are powerless and that once-safe streets are just turning into no-go zones” (*Express*, 1993: 35). Under the heading Liverpool, the article refers only to Toxteth:

Toxteth was once Britain’s top flashpoint after drug pushers and gangsters staged confrontations with police. Now officers claim they are driving peddlers off the streets. A recent swoop netted £20,000 in drugs. Guns were seized and 13 people arrested. A backlash began two years ago after two young children were mown down and killed by a stolen car” (*Express*, 1993: 35).

*Figure 8.15: A feature in the Express highlighting drug and gang-related violence in Toxteth.*
8.4.3 Joyriding
Not only does the ‘Britain’s Flashpoints’ piece in the *Express* refer to the presence of ‘gangsters’ but it makes reference to the presence of joy-riding. The case mentioned in the article refers to the deaths of Adele Thompson and Daniel Davies who, with a friend “were flung 70ft through the air while collecting for a Bonfire Guy” (Hornby, 1992: 16). The article (Fig. 8.16 A) explains that Christopher Lewin and David Nnah:

Raced through a red light before hurtling along a busy Toxteth street at 70mph. The Mazda weaved through parked cars and skidded sideways, tyres screeching, as the driver made handbrake turns. It careered out of control, hit a school wall and struck the three children (Hornby, 1992: 16).

Coverage of the trial of the joyriders attracted much media attention, highlighting the fighting in court as relatives of the deceased threw items at the accused (Express, 1992: 19). More disturbances broke out as the court sentenced the accused to what was seen by the families of the victims to be too short sentences (Guardian, 1992: 4; Guardian, 1993: 3). The *Guardian* reported that family members in court shouted that they would be waiting for Lewin on his release from prison (Guardian, 1992: 4). This coverage, which highlights the intense anger and grief felt by the families, also serves as a subtle observation by the press that the victims’ families are not behaving according to the normalised set of behaviours expected in court. This serves to subtly draw attention to the ‘otherness’ and oppositional nature of the residents of Toxteth.

The press also covered the aftermath in Toxteth as Liverpool City Council named two streets after the deceased, and as residents “erected barricades in Granby Street to stop joyriders using it as a racetrack” (Faux, 1991: 3). This act of community solidarity was interpreted negatively (Fig. 8.16 B), however, in the *Express* with Peter Hitchens writing:

In the battle-hardened Liverpool suburb of Toxteth, police have wisely turned a blind eye to the building of a huge illegal barricade in a road where “joy” riders endangered the lives of children. The only other place I know of where this happens is Soweto. Welcome, Toxteth, to the Third World (Hitchens, 1993: 8).
This transfers discussion of a collective community response to tragedy into a diatribe and smearing of Toxteth as a place associated with slum-dwellings, poverty, violent uprisings, and poor black-white community relations.

Sean O’Connell, writing about the history of joyriding, explains that by the late 1980s and 1990s, the activity was seen as being largely perpetrated by unemployed males with low academic attainment and who “live within the working-class inner city or in deprived council estates” (O’Connell, 2006). Focus on stories of joyriding in Toxteth, then, indirectly and subtly connect Toxteth with attributes of worklessness, deprivation, and the inner city.

Combined, press reports and structuring of reports of killings, gang violence, and joyriding present an image of Toxteth as unruly, dangerous, and unpredictable. Certainly, it is true that the events reported in the press occurred, but the consistent reporting of these crimes, using certain imagery, juxtapositions, and comparisons structure Toxteth as outside the social norms of society. Toxteth and its residents are positioned as threats to personal safety and as threats to national social norms and values. As discussed in chapter 5, crime reporting of Toxteth follows an synoptical approach whereby the many view and judge the actions of the few (Mathiesen, 1997). Journalists and the editorial system of newspapers serve as “creative mouthpieces” (Mathiesen, 1997: 226) and they determine what is included and excluded from the discourse. They establish the status quo and, importantly, point out to the general public what kinds of behaviour fall outside the status quo. In so doing, the press not only exert a form of Foucauldian biopolitical power over society (1984: 137) but also structure society...
and space, hierarchising behaviours, populations, and places according to their position in relation to the status quo that they reproduce. The press select the types of crimes to report and the language that they use to describe them, focusing more on unusual, random and violent crime as opposed to “white-collar offenses” and abuses of power (Barak, 1994: 11).

8.5 Celebrity heritage

Another way in which stigmatisation of Toxteth is sustained in the aftermath of the disturbances is through references to famous residents of the area. Celebrity heritage is often invoked in discussions of place image but it has not been observed before as an instrument in territorial stigmatisation. It is used widely in place branding which applies principles of marketised branding to a location; it can be thought of as “the totality of the thoughts, feelings, associations and expectations that come to mind when a prospect of consumer is exposed to an entity’s name, logo, products services, events, or any design or symbol representing them” (Lindsay, 2000 in van Ham, 2008: 127). Van Ham continues that anything can be branded, including places, and Gregory Ashworth, who researches place branding techniques, argues that one of the key instruments in place branding is the ‘Gaudi gambit’ or the linking of a place with a celebrity:

In the search for a unique identity, places associate themselves with a named individual in the hope that the necessarily unique qualities of the individual are transferred by association to the place. This technique could be called the ‘Gaudi gambit’ in recognition of the notably successful personality branding of Barcelona in the 1980s with an extremely distinctive and recognisable architect and designer of some 60 years earlier, such that the image of the city is now inseparable from the creative work of the artist (2009: 11).

Celebrity heritage is, then, often invoked to positively link a place with a popular figure: the symbolic capital (Bourdieu, 1984) of a celebrity is invoked with the hope that the celebrity brand will transfer to a place. The relationship between celebrity and place does not follow this pattern in relation to Toxteth, however. Instead of using a celebrity to enhance a place’s image, in the case of Toxteth, the press use the name and idea of the area to enhance the level of success attained by the celebrity. Through stories of celebrity success, Toxteth is pitched as the obstacle that the famous and successful had to overcome in order to attain
success, thus heightening their level of achievement. Toxteth is shown as being a handicap and a hindrance in the lives of celebrities who have achieved success despite their roots. In this way, Toxteth is transformed into a symbolic millstone that drags down those trying to succeed. Toxteth is invoked to further highlight the success of celebrities who have made it despite their roots, suggesting an even higher level of achievement.

In the *Mirror* in 1987, a reporter covers a story of actress Jean Alexander, who is famous for her role as Hilda Ogden in the soap opera, *Coronation Street*. Reporting on her performance in front of the royal family, the reporter comments on Alexander’s origins, stating that “she was born in Liverpool and brought up in the tough Toxteth district in a little terraced house, just like No 13 Coronation Street, where Hilda lives” (Mirror, 1987: 14). The article proceeds to explain how financially secure Alexander is since gaining her role in *Coronation Street*, indirectly comparing her fortunes to when she lived in “tough” Toxteth. The addition of the tag-phrase ‘tough’ serves to remind readers that the district is to be condemned and positions Alexander’s rise to fame and prominence in the public sphere as particularly impressive given her start in life. Toxteth is made into a symbol of difficulty that Alexander had to overcome in order to succeed in life.

In an article in the *Express* in 1985, reporter Jenny Rees writes about Gerry Marsden of the band Gerry and the Pacemakers, and his continued musical success. Discussing the song for which Gerry and the Pacemakers are most known—the unofficial Liverpool Football Club (LFC) anthem, ‘You’ll never walk alone’ that originated in the musical *Carousel*—Rees explains that Marsden “was only 15, a Toxteth kid and habitual street fighter, when he heard the song himself” (Rees, 1985: 9). Reference to being “a Toxteth kid” who was engaged in street violence, constructs Toxteth and its youth as violent and lawless. Rees adds that Marsden is now a millionaire who owns three houses, suggesting Marsden’s upward movement away from and out of Toxteth: from street fighting to success. Similarly, Pete Wylie of the band Wah! Is described as living “in a tough area of Liverpool” (Mirror, 1982c: 17). The article highlights Wylie’s attempts to draw attention to the poverty and “hard times” experienced in Liverpool of the 1980s but, the references to Toxteth as being “deprived” and in relation to ‘the dole’ underscore connotations of poverty and strife. However, the structuring of the article subtly implies that it is only because Wylie has “made it big” as a musician that he has enough power to have a voice to speak on issues related to Toxteth and
Liverpool more generally, thereby insinuating that those from Toxteth who have not succeeded are disenchanted, disenfranchised and voiceless.

The role of celebrity success despite troubled roots in Toxteth is most pronounced in the case of Robbie Fowler. A former professional footballer who played for LFC, Leeds United, Manchester City and Blackburn Rovers between 1992 and 2009 (Premier League, 2018), he attained fame in newspaper headlines during the 1990s as his career with LFC and the England team soared. His football prowess was picked apart by the press with commentators remarking on his “breathtaking style” (Hughes, 1996: 46). His personal life was also subject to media scrutiny (see Grant and Atkinson, 1996: 20). But whether writing about his aptitude for football or his love life, journalists and commentators frequently included mention of his childhood in Toxteth as a hindrance and as a spectre that still looms over his life.

An article about Fowler’s then-girlfriend, Lisa Brown, begins:

Robbie Fowler was out on a date with his girlfriend and desperate to find some little token of his love that he could give her. But for the impoverished Toxteth kid, all that came to hand was a bottle top lying on the pavement…Five years after his bottle top tactic fell flat, Robbie pulls the same pretty blonde into his arms and gives her a long, lingering kiss. They are at the end of a magical, no-expense-spared evening out—alone on the plush sofa in the bedroom of the £300,000 mansion in Liverpool’s Mossley Hill…In the old days all Robbie could manage was a 20p bag of chips—which Lisa had to pay for—followed by a clumsy kiss behind a block of flats. But this time the £6,000-a-week star pulled out all the stops, collecting her in his gleaming burgundy Audi and treating her to all the drinks (Grant and Atkinson, 1996: 20).

This tabloid piece (see Fig. 8.17 A&B), focusing on a human-interest story, flits between Fowler’s humble past and his salubrious present. The reporters obliquely compare a block of flats in Toxteth to a mansion in Mossley Hill, “a 20p bag of chips” to an Audi and drinks, and a bottle top as a gesture of affection to a “no-expense-spared evening out”. Fowler’s
past is structured as impoverished and is used to highlight his current levels of financial success and attainment. In so doing, however, Toxteth is smeared as a place only worth escaping and is operationalised as a symbol of struggle, as it is constructed as the obstacle he had to overcome in order to achieve success.
Relatedly, in the *Times* (Fig. 8.18 A), Fowler’s rise from “the tough suburb of Toxteth” is referred to as “Merseyside’s version of the American dream” (Holt, 1997: 48), implying that playing for LFC and moving out of Toxteth is symbolic of to success and achievement, with Toxteth being tacitly painted as the antithesis to success, prosperity and good fortune. Yet, despite his rise to success, the millstone of Toxteth still hangs around his neck in press coverage as Fowler’s success is defined in relation to his beginnings in Toxteth. Figure 8.18 (B-I) shows that, like Gerry Marsden, Fowler is referred to as “the Toxteth Kid” (Mirror, 1993: 30; Tanner, 1993a: 19; Hughes, 1994: 17; Price, 1994: 25), “the kid from Toxteth” (Tanner, 1993b: 32) or the “Toxteth teenager” (Tanner, 1993c: 27; James, 1994: 25), and during an episode in which Fowler was charged with misconduct for homophobic insults directed towards Graeme Le Saux, his “tough childhood in Toxteth” is referenced (Lacey, 1999: A3) drawing attention to his roots and implying that his Toxteth origins are explanation

| A | Fowler is a revered figure on Merseyside, the successor to talismanic figures such as Kevin Keegan, Kenny Dalglish and Ian Rush, and a better finisher than any of them. What is more, he is one of Liverpool’s own, born and brought up in the tough suburb of Toxteth, a local lad who still lives in the city. His rise and rise is Merseyside’s version of the American dream. |
| B | The Toxteth kid with the touch of class has now hit a remarkable 11 goals in 11 senior games. |
| C | Robbie Fowler, the Toxteth kid burdened with the “new Rush” tag, spurned a clutch of chances to make a dream home debut. |
| D | Shyly, suddenly, the extrovert turned introvert. The Toxteth Kid trudged back down the field to reclaim his prize. |
| E | But Fowler, the kid from the Toxteth, is the first to do it in a cup match. |
| F | It wasn’t just the way the Toxteth teenager took his goals for his first Premiership hat-trick that had Reid gasping. |
| G | Cup career off to a scoring start. The Toxteth kid, who launched his Coca-Cola Cup career with six goals in two legs against Fulham, said: “This game can’t come around quickly enough for me.” |
| H | The unknown Toxteth teenager got his chance in the wake of Liverpool’s diemal derby defeat at Goodison in September—and scored 15 goals in just 23 games. |
| I | Comparisons have been drawn between Le Saux’s comfortable middle-class Jersey background and Fowler’s tough childhood in Toxteth. But when it comes to upbringing, Fowler is no more typical than Le Saux. Football still has strong working-class roots but the days of discovering talent on the streets or down a mine have long gone. |

Figure 8.18: Selection of articles highlighting Robbie Fowler’s journey to celebrity, and the press’ labelling of him as the ‘Toxteth kid’.
for his outbursts. In an article in the *Mirror* called “Robbie burns for a chance with England”,
which tells of Fowler’s ambitions to play for the England football team, the text of the article
begins with the statement that “the rise of Robbie Fowler was virtually pre-ordained from
the day he was ferried from training to his Toxteth home in the luxury of Kenny Dalglish’s
Mercedes” (Keith, 1995: 60). Here, Toxteth is juxtaposed with the luxury of a Mercedes.
Where the Mercedes represents luxury and superfluity, Toxteth tacitly comes to stand for its
antithesis: poverty and lack. This view of Toxteth relies on assumed reader knowledge of
the disturbances but also paints the area with core attributes of poverty, suffering, and
depredation.

This message is furthered by the large cartoon that accompanies the article (Fig. 8.19), which
shows an enlarged and caricatured Fowler making a kicking motion. At his feet is a caricature
of Kenny Dalglish and his Mercedes and a goalpost full of footballs. In the bottom right of
the cartoon is a direction post signposting ‘Toxteth’ to the left and ‘England’ to the right.
The direction of writing informs readers’ perceptions of time and the creation of mental
timelines (Furhman and Borodisky, n.d.; Bergen and Chan Lau, 2012). Sense of time
connects closely to language. In English, language is written from left to right. In Hebrew,
for example, writing occurs from right to left. Hebrew speakers, when asked to make
‘temporal order judgements’, situate earlier events on the right and progress—concomitant
with Hebrew writing patterns—towards the left (Furhman and Borodisky, n.d.: 1007). On
the contrary, “English speakers always represented time as moving from left to right”
following writing patterns in English (Bergen and Chan Lau, 2012). Returning to the
caricature of Fowler, we see that on the direction post, ‘Toxteth’ is placed on the left,
implying that is where Fowler started his journey. ‘England’ is on the right side, suggesting
that Fowler is moving towards and forwards in time to success with the England football
team. That the two places are at opposite sides of the pole suggests first that Fowler must
‘leave’ Toxteth in order to be a successful England footballer and, second, that Toxteth is
separate to and the polar opposite to all that symbolises England and all that is English. The
image serves to cast out Toxteth as a geographical and social other. Remaining in Toxteth
moves him away from his ambitions and results in regression.

In an article entitled “Fowler ready to break with the past” (Fig. 8.20 A&B), discussing
Fowler’s selection in the England squad despite several incidents in which Fowler was fined
and disciplined for homophobic taunts and ‘pranks’, reporter Matt Dickinson writes that
“the journey from the Toxteth estate, where many of his friends remain, into a millionaire
Figure 8.19: Cartoon of Robbie Fowler from the Express.
idol has occasionally taken him off the straight and narrow” (Dickinson, 1999: 43). This implies that Fowler’s Toxteth heritage still presents him with barriers that he must overcome, such is the change that he has experienced in fortunes. Again, “the Toxteth estate” is here contrasted directly with being a millionaire and, as such, Toxteth is painted as poverty-stricken and troubled.

In the same article (Fig. 8.20 C), reporter Matt Dickinson extends the stigma to the city level as he writes that:

In suspending Fowler for six matches, the FA [Football Association] gave the impression that it would happily have suspended him for a lifetime—but not everyone, mercifully, dismisses him as a caricature Scouser who is more trouble than he is worth (Dickinson, 1999: 43).

Not only is Fowler smeared in this extract, but Liverpudlians in general are characterised as worthless troublemakers.

Some mentions of Fowler stigmatise Toxteth by showing that football has allowed Fowler an escape from the area (Fig. 8.20 D). Rob Hughes, football correspondent for the Times, explains that football has “taken him from Toxteth, that troubled area of Liverpool, to the more sedate Mossley Hill, where he has purchased a five-bedroomed house for himself, his mother, two brothers and a sister” (Hughes, 1996: 46). This implies that football has been the conduit that has allowed him to escape Toxteth and to leave the stigma of his roots behind. This is somewhat ironic given that the press consistently and persistently refer to Fowler’s Toxteth origins, thereby refusing to forget his roots.

Even when his roots are not directly or overtly criticised, reporters make mention of the fact that Fowler hails from Toxteth. In an article about “a fracas at a hotel” (Thomas and White, 1999: A1), the reporters mention that “Fowler, born in the Toxteth district of Liverpool, played his last game of the season on Saturday” (Thomas and White, 1999: A1). There is no reason to mention that Fowler is from Toxteth in this article. His origins are not relevant to the story about a hotel brawl and the reference seems out of place. Searches on the Times archive for Neil Ruddock and Jamie Redknapp, two footballers who also played for LFC
While the role of the celebrity has been considered in relation to place in the study of place branding, it has not been considered in territorial stigma studies, yet in the case of Toxteth, there is a clear relationship between celebrity and place. Toxteth is operationalised by the press in stories of celebrity success as a means to highlight the obstacles on the way to attainment. It becomes a symbol of struggle and it represents difficult beginnings that make success even more acute. Toxteth is, in this way, smeared; it is constructed as a negative location that is in opposition to success, affluence and achievement. Through both text and images, Toxteth is positioned as a place to leave and to escape. It is also used as an explanation for bad behaviour; in the case of Fowler, his Toxteth roots are referenced in an article about his misbehaviour, thereby painting Toxteth entirely negatively as a place of trouble, and as an explanation for anti-social behaviour. The stigmatisation of Toxteth as a struggle and a millstone is reliant on the weight that the name carries as a result of a century of indirect primitive stigmatisation, and direct and overt territorial stigmatisation in the era of advanced marginality; that is, the stigma is able to adhere because of the stigmatisation that preceded it.
8.6 Conclusion

The story of the enduring stigma in the latter part of the 20th century is a story of the transfer of stigma back from event stigma that characterised the disturbances of 1981, into a background core stigma according to Hudson’s event/core stigma typology, thereby making the stigma of Toxteth enduring and lingering. This occurs through three types of coverage. First, the ‘legacy’ coverage amounts to a press reluctance to ‘let go’ of Toxteth. Through general after-effects coverage, Toxteth features in the public discourse as reporters follow-up on what is happening in Toxteth since the disturbances. The most pernicious aspect of this legacy coverage is the eponymisation of Toxteth whereby the geographical entity becomes transfigured into a social, racial, temporal marker. This highlights the weight of the name of Toxteth whereby it becomes operationalised by the press and comes to stand for much more than the streets, boundaries, and geography of the area.

Where the legacy coverage shows the references to Toxteth and the insertion of the discourse of the disturbances into other debates and discussions, the second way that the press continues the stigmatisation of Toxteth is through discussion of criminality. This supports much of the existing territorial stigmatisation literature that sees criminality as a marker of stigma. I also connected this concern for criminality with the media and showed that the media has a strong concern for stories that exhibit and expose criminality. I highlight that there are three types of coverage of criminality that are apparent in the press coverage of Toxteth in the latter part of the 20th century: killings, gang-related violence, and joy-riding. This is in-line with Barak’s assertion that the press relay stories mainly of violent crime and tend not to consider non-violent or crime committed by elite members of society (1994: 11). This is apparent in the coverage of Toxteth; although the Scarman report and, later, the Gifford report underscored police brutality, institutional racism, and structural inequalities that bear down and limit the opportunities of Toxteth residents, in comparison to the coverage of the violent crime in Toxteth, structural and symbolic violence (in which the media is implicated) goes largely unreported and uncontested. The result is the portrayal of Toxteth as a dangerous and violent location beset by crime and violence.

The final way in which Toxteth’s stigma is perpetuated and continued in the aftermath of the disturbances is through the insertion of Toxteth into discourses of celebrity success. Whereas the presence or heritage of celebrities is seen as something of a boon in place branding literature, in the case of Toxteth, this is not the case. Rather than celebrities being entered into a discourse of place, I showed that Toxteth is entered into a discourse of
celebrity success and triumph. The role that Toxteth plays in this discourse is one of a symbolic millstone that drags down those striving for success. The reason that this symbolic millstone or obstacle can be constructed is because of a presumed and assumed knowledge of both the primitive stigmatisation that preceded that disturbances and the event stigma that define Toxteth.

This chapter has shown how stigma not only morphs from event stigma back to core stigma, drawing on elements of the event stigma, but also how, through reliance on stigmatising core attributes, territorial stigma comes to endure. This lingering of stigma relies on frequent reference to past events, on the morphing of a geographical construct into a temporal and social construct, and assumed shared knowledge of tropes, symbolic language, references and motifs. In this way, a territorially stigmatised place can be entered into multiple discourses as it represents more than its geography.
Chapter 9: Conclusion

9.1 Introduction

The people of Toxteth don’t like the Press. They feel their real anger and their real problems were neglected in a flurry of clichés and sensationalism after last year’s riots. The Press is, to them, on the other side (Rees, 1982: 6).

Jenny Rees, writing in the *Express*, captures here the tensions between Toxteth and the media industry. She aptly notes that the media coverage of the disturbances devolved into the language of stigma, debasement, and stereotypes. She further captures the position of power occupied by the press in relation to Toxteth: the press is not for the people of Toxteth. It does not hold power to account but represents the ‘other side’, the side of power and authority. The strained relationship between the national press and Toxteth did not start with the disturbances, however. As this thesis has shown, the story was unfolding as the 20th century dawned. An era of what I have termed ‘primitive stigmatisation’ defined the coverage of Toxteth prior to the disturbances. Consistently, the press, occupying a position of power, have stigmatised Toxteth first based on its perceived core attributes of inter-community strife, criminality, and substandard housing, and later, on the event stigma of the disturbances. Following the disturbances, the press reverted to focusing on core stigmatising attributes of criminality and barriers to celebrity heritage. It also converted the event stigma of the disturbances into a core stigma that cemented permanently the legacy of the disturbances on Toxteth’s identity.

The previous four chapters have traced this story of Toxteth’s stigmatisation by the British press from 1900 to 1999. This chapter begins by recapping the primary research question and the subsidiary research questions, and detailing how each of these has been addressed through this thesis to show how the media industry has operated to the detriment of Toxteth. Then, I turn to a methodological finding of this study that discusses how Hudson’s notions of core and event stigma can be used effectively in place-based studies to categorise the changing patterns of stigma over time. Next, I turn to the two main theoretical findings of the thesis: 1) how the concept of primitive stigma can help to give a longitudinal view of the construction of stigma and how the idea can better show us how territorial stigma of the era of advanced marginality adheres so strongly, and 2) how fear is an underlying theme that the media use to justify their approach, which is “supportive of established privilege and limiting
debate and discussion accordingly” (Chomsky, 1989: 21). Finally, I provide some suggestions for further research.

9.2 Contributions and summary of findings

Reflection on sources and methods

This study used a combined quantitative/qualitative content analysis that drew on the CDA tradition. The 1,950 newspaper articles were sourced from the Times, the Guardian, the Mirror, the Express, and the Financial Times between 1900 and 1999. The newspaper texts offered an invaluable means of accessing how outsiders stigmatise place. Focusing on Toxteth, Liverpool, I was able to show that the press have stigmatised Toxteth since at least the dawn of the 20th century and, while this stigma has changed and morphed over time from primitive to territorial stigma (see discussion in 9.4), there has been a level of stigmatisation present throughout the 20th century in relation to Toxteth. This content analysis accessed the first part of the study’s research question and sought to understand how the press territorially stigmatise Toxteth in its coverage during the 20th century. More detailed discussions of the significance of the findings of this content analysis are found in the rest of this chapter.

In addition to critically analysing 1,950 newspaper articles, the study was augmented by a small production analysis achieved through interviews with 11 journalists and 2 policymakers. While the majority of the analysis in this thesis builds on the content of the newspapers, the interviews with journalists and politicians added a background understanding about the production of news and the production and reproduction of discourses of stigma in the press.

The policymakers’ comments added context to the study and, in particular, the comments from Lord Michael Heseltine were beneficial in understanding that the story of policy involvement in Toxteth began before 1981. This explanation highlights the way in which the media not only silenced residents of Toxteth, but also omitted key details in the years prior to the disturbances of 1981 (see 5.3 for a thorough discussion of media silences), thereby failing to give a detailed picture of the reality of life in Toxteth.

The interviews with journalists were particularly useful in understanding how news was constructed and why news was constructed. The content analysis of texts alone could explain how the press territorially stigmatise Toxteth but it could not access the second part of the main research question: it could not address why the press stigmatises place. As the research
progressed, I soon came to see that I needed to move ‘beyond the text’ or ‘behind the text’ and to understand how the discourse of stigma was produced. Key questions were emerging around why insider voices were not being heard (insider voices feature in less than 10% of coverage), why stigmatising tag-phrases were consistently used in the years after the disturbances, and why almost all articles bore a negative valence. The interviews picked up what the texts alone could not. Journalists were able to explain that in many cases they did not visit Toxteth when writing articles about the area (see section 6.3.4) or that if interviews with residents did occur, these voices were later cut by editors. Their explanations revealed that the use of tag-phrases and other discursive tropes were embedded in the journalistic tradition and, largely, went unquestioned (see section 6.3.4), as did the silencing of insider voices (see 6.2.5 and 6.3.4). The political economy of the media machine, according to a Chomskian analysis, conditions journalists to preferentially report negative stories in order to sell copy (see section 6.2.3)

Ultimately, the inclusion of interviews with journalists allowed me to access the political economy of the media machine by moving beyond and behind the text. I was able to understand the forces that were at the core of journalism and that drive journalists. Suddenly, through these interviews, it became apparent that press bias was grounded not in left-right politics but rather in the dominant and elite suppression of minority voices for the promulgation of capitalism. This analysis would not have been possible had the study been limited solely to a content and discourse analysis of newspaper articles.

**Contributions**

The introductory chapter of this thesis detailed a primary research question and subsidiary questions that this study was to address. The question guiding the research was: *how and why does the press territorially stigmatise Toxteth, Liverpool in its coverage during the 20th century?* The question would be answered through addressing four subsidiary research questions. I shall now discuss each of these questions in turn and show how each was addressed.

1. **How is Toxteth portrayed prior to the disturbances of 1981 and can traces of stigma be detected prior to the era of advanced marginality?**

This question was addressed in chapter 5 and involved analysing press coverage from January 1900 to July 1981. The coverage prior to 1981 was characterised by media silences, of stories unreported, and of voices unheard. In the immediate aftermath of the disturbances, the
Mirror published a story about life in Toxteth “BEFORE the fury spilled over” (1981a: 13). This highlights the levels of structural deprivation that were present in Toxteth prior to the eruption of the disturbances; however, stories of structural decline went unreported until the disturbances served as a catalyst and rendered interesting to the left-wing readership of the Mirror the stories of structural conditions. This press silence on structural issues highlights the structure of the press within society as described by Noam Chomsky; the press is owned by elites and the vision of the world that media put forth is to the benefit of other elite and dominant groups in society with whom they are complicit in manufacturing consent among the population (Herman and Chomsky, 1988; Chomsky, 1989). Drawing attention to structural problems amounts to drawing attention to political deficiencies and weakness in the status quo. For the press, who “serve the interests of state and corporate power” (Chomsky, 1989: 21), drawing attention to structural issues would be to draw attention to weaknesses in the state apparatus. I suggest that, instead of doing this, the press conform to Devereux et al.’s ‘pathological gaze’ (2011a; 2011b), smearing Toxteth with core stigmatising attributes that mar the area as being deficient in some way but—crucially—deficient because of its population rather than because of structural forces.

Thus, rather than focus on structural issues, the press stigmatise Toxteth in three ways prior to the disturbances: 1) through inclusion of stories about inter-community strife, 2) through a focus on crime and criminality, and 3) through reference to shortcomings and failings in housing stock. The press focus on inter-community strife is directed principally towards Catholic-Protestant sectarian strife and, at a lower level, towards racial disharmony. Inter-community strife was shown to operate at different scales, with sectarian disharmony being activated at a district-level and referring to sectarian disputes occurring at marches and parades in Toxteth. This stigmatises Toxteth within the city of Liverpool as being a place of otherness. Racial discord is depicted in the press as operating in the ‘south’ of Liverpool or on individual streets referenced as being part of the city of Liverpool. This stigma operates at a different scale and serves to stigmatise Liverpool as a city as being a place of religious and racial otherness.

By focusing on crimes in Toxteth, the press come to associate the area with a sense of danger and fear, amounting to a core attribute of criminality that readers come to associate with the area. The beginning of the 20th century captures stories of domestic crime before shifting to stories of violent and more unpredictable crimes and violence. The focus on crime marks
the area as one of threat and peril, and implies that the area is beyond the control and reach of the law. Stories of crimes range from stabbings and gruesome tales of murder to benefits fraud and assaults, and the attention on the variety of unpredictable crime paints the area as ungovernable and volatile. I interpreted the press focus on crime using Mathiesen’s synopticon that is “an enormously extensive system enabling the many to see and contemplate the few” and amounts to a form of “surveillance in modern society” (Mathiesen, 1997: 219, emphasis in the original). The press, in this way come to be an agent of biopolitical and regulatory power and control that engages in “control of the soul” (Mathiesen, 1997: 218), telling readers what behaviour is socially and legally deviant and normal. The media come to define social norms but this power comes with reporters and editors becoming the “creative mouthpieces” that narrate society (1997: 226) and focus the attention of the many upon the few.

The final form of stigmatising core attribute on which the press focus prior to the disturbances is the substandard nature of housing in Toxteth. References to subdivided properties, the use (and explosion) of paraffin heaters, building collapses, and fires in multi-occupancy dwellings all draw on presumed reader knowledge and context that would have alerted readers to the substandard nature of housing in Toxteth. The oblique references to the nature of housing stock is illustrative of this early form of stigma that existed prior to the disturbances: it is indirect but grounded in contextual knowledge and the construction of core attributes about an area. However, as the century progresses, the press begin to directly stigmatise housing stock, inserting irrelevant references to property being council-let, for example, in order to stigmatise the area and the residents.

I conceptualised this stigma that existed prior to the age of advanced marginality as ‘primitive stigma’ and I offer a fuller summative account of the concept in section 9.4 below. Primitive stigmatisation demonstrates that traces of stigmatisation could be found prior to Wacquant’s territorial stigma. This primitive stigma relies on obliqueness, allusions to deficiencies, vice, crime, and inferiority, thereby gradually constructing a degrading and damaging stigma around Toxteth.

2. What discursive and linguistic techniques does the press use to stigmatise Toxteth during the disturbances of 1981?
The second subsidiary research question considered stigmatisation at the peak moment of press coverage: the disturbances of 1981. This question was addressed in chapter 6 and it sought to understand how, at its peak, stigma was enacted by the media. Where the previous research question considered the role of core attributes as the means through which stigma was enacted, addressing this question saw the reliance on events to stigmatise Toxteth; that is, while the stigma of this era built on the primitive stigma established in the years prior to the disturbances, the events of the 1981 were the main drivers of stigma in this era. During this peak of coverage there was less of a focus on crime, inter-community strife, and housing stock; in fact, there was an almost blatant omission of the structural causes that contributed to the disturbances in favour of a description and an identity construction of Toxteth based entirely around the occurrence of the disturbances.

The press constructed the identity of Toxteth through four techniques—naming, negativity, oppositionality and stranger-making. These techniques simultaneously imposed an identity on Toxteth while depriving residents of the ability to define their area and its attributes.

In the case of naming, the press used the name ‘Toxteth’ to refer to the area that was locally known as ‘Liverpool 8’. When the disturbances broke out in the area, the name ‘Liverpool 8’ would not have been familiar to most readers of the press; however, because of the primitive stigmatisation of Toxteth during the earlier parts of the 20th century, the name or ‘brand’ of Toxteth was already linked with notions of crime, strife, and paucity of housing. Using the name of ‘Toxteth’ to brand the area during the disturbances permanently associated the area with social disorder and violence, through subsequent discursive techniques. The name of Toxteth carried significant weight and, in the aftermath of the disturbances, was enough to carry a story from a few column-inches to a front-page splash. I interpreted this using Alberto Melucci’s ‘power of naming’ (1996), which sees that the dominant bodies in society use their power and status to name, define and brand areas of society.

Press use of negativity allows the branded Toxteth to be filled with unfavourable imagery and damaging reputations. I showed that 98.8% of all newspaper coverage between the outbreak of the disturbances and 31st December 1981 was negative in valence. This reinforces the image of an area that is entirely negative and bearing no positive attributes. Descriptions of Toxteth rely on imagery that paints the area as a place of vice, destruction
and dereliction. Juxtaposition and insertion of Toxteth into different discourses—such as the discourse of war—associates the area with adverse themes and ideas. Where symbolic language, juxtapositions, and imagery all indirectly smear Toxteth, the use of tag-phrases are a means through which the press directly stigmatise Toxteth in terms of negativity. Tag-phrases rely on existing stereotypes of race and strife that, once activated, contribute to the further stigmatisation of the area (Schemer, 2012). These short descriptors not only directly tell readers what characteristics to associate with Toxteth and which stereotypes to draw on, but they serve as an example of the press imposing a normalised and pathological identity on Toxteth rather than allowing the identity to emerge internally and project outwards.

By constructing Toxteth as oppositional, the press also stigmatise Toxteth by implying that the area is in opposition or in some way ‘against’ both social norms and British society. Reporters and editors achieve this by the careful positioning of Toxteth in relation to other entities including the royal family who serve as representatives of Britain and all that Britishness entails. I also highlighted the way in which the press structure the disturbances as ‘riots’ and those on the street as ‘rioters’ or a hooligan ‘mob’. This construction permits a vision of the disturbances as illegitimate, unfounded and illegal. The terminological choice both places the disturbances and Toxteth in opposition to authority and the law, and casts a value judgment as to the validity of the claims of those on the streets. The judgment implies that those on the streets have no claims on which to be protesting and it dismisses the actions as invalid and unnecessary and, consequently places the disturbances as in opposition to British legal authority. This vision is enhanced through images that pit the deviant ‘mob’ in opposition to the police who, through positioning, are shown to be on the same ‘side’ as the readers.

Where naming, negativity and oppositionality were tactics used by the press to impose an identity that stigmatises Toxteth, stranger-making explains the press’ depriving Toxteth residents of their ability to self-define. This is achieved through social distancing and the silencing of resident voices. I showed that less than 10% of articles written between the outbreak of the disturbances and the end of 1981 included a quote from a resident of Toxteth or an ‘insider voice’, and only 4.6% of all articles interview an insider solely. On the contrary, 56.7% of articles interview an outsider solely. This not only creates strangers out of Toxteth residents, whose voices are not heard in the public debate about their own area, but it raises questions about who the coverage serves and who gets to speak. The voices heard in the
press are the voices of official sources rather than of the residents of Toxteth. This reflects Herman and Chomsky’s assertion that “the mass media themselves also provide ‘experts’ who regularly echo the official view” (1988: 24), explaining that the voices of ‘dissenters’ who do not agree with the official view are not going to be featured. With the official view being that the events in Toxteth were illegitimate and unfounded ‘riots’ by a lawless section of Toxteth, it makes sense that the voices selected by the press to echo this vision are the police, politicians and—very occasionally—a disgruntled resident who upholds the same official view.

This second subsidiary research question highlights the ways in which the press gather around the concept of identity to stigmatise Toxteth. Reporters rely on naming, negativity, oppositionality and stranger-making to impose a stigmatised identity on Toxteth, while denying insiders a voice in their own stories, thereby reflecting the dominant power structure that allows elite voices to speak but deprives insiders a voice. Above all, however, this coverage uses the foundations of primitive stigma but primarily relies on the events of the disturbances to cement an identity of Toxteth as negative, oppositional and socially distant.

3. How do moments of stigmatisation extrapolate and connect to a broader social, political and economic context?

The third subsidiary research question sought to engage with the full extent of the CDA approach and to connect the language used in relation to Toxteth with the broader social, political and economic context. I addressed this question in chapter 7. First, I showed that press use of the term ‘inner city’ in relation to Toxteth is involved at varying scales and generalises the focus away from the specifics of Toxteth and upwards to a regional or national focus. This up-scaling moves the focus away from the unique contours of Toxteth and turns the focus instead to a general ‘inner city problem’ defined by the symbolic values attached to the term: blackness, criminality, deviance, lawlessness, and poverty (Burgess, 1985; Gilroy, 1987; Parisi and Holcomb, 1994). It also echoes the political use of the term that sees the focus of Toxteth as an inner city ‘up-scaled’ to focus on national or regional solutions to Toxteth’s unique problems.

I showed that the Conservative policy on inner cities was suitably vague and not spatially bound, allowing anywhere that met ambiguous characteristics of “we know what we mean by the inner city problem (Heseltine, 1983: 3) to be the target of inner city intervention. I
showed that this intervention was connected to a wider political context of the Conservative
government’s urban privatization policies and that Toxteth became the poster child of the
inner cities, highlighting the perceived problems and proposed solutions. Unlike other urban
areas, it warranted the secondment of a minister—Michael Heseltine as Minister for
Merseyside—and a range of 30 initiatives to ‘solve’ the inner city problems. Using letters and
memos from ministers, I highlighted the fact that from the start, the Conservative solution
to the problems in Toxteth was a privatization agenda; the various ‘inner city’ policies that
proliferated under PM Thatcher’s Conservative government did little to help the areas that
they labelled as ‘inner city’ and, instead, worked at the larger urban, regional or national scales,
referring back to the up-scaling also visible in the press. Relying on the symbolism of the
inner city as black, poor and deviant, the government supported the involvement of the
external, white, middle-class private sector to ‘save’ the inner cities.

Further, framing Toxteth as an inner city moves the focus away from the local, unique
characteristics and issues associated with Toxteth and, instead, generalises the focus and
implies that all inner cities can be treated and remedied the same way, through national, state-
led and private-sector interventions. I demonstrated that, following the stigmatisation of
Toxteth as an inner city, there was a period of regional regeneration and local gentrification
with the very term ‘inner city’ attracting an influx of ‘yumbies’ who sought residence in a
out areas of Toxteth for gentrification, resulting in the language of stigma being replaced by
the language of economic returns and investment potential, reflecting the fact that
stigmatisation and gentrification are two sides of the same coin and that one facilitates the
other (Kallin and Slater, 2014). This also highlights the potential consequences that arise
from using stigmatising discourse, showing that the application of stigma can have
deleterious effects for the area and its residents who are first subjected to the stigmatising
label applied to them and their area, before falling victim to the creeping privatization and
gentrification.

4. Does the stigmatisation of Toxteth by the press continue after the disturbances of 1981 and, if it does, how
does this stigma transform?

The final subsidiary research question addressed in chapter 8 points to the enduring stigma
that continued after the events of the disturbances. Like the stigma that existed prior to the
disturbances that relied on core attributes to smear the area, the stigma after the disturbances
relies on core stigmatising attributes and on converting the stigma of the disturbances into a core stigma that endures.

The stigma of Toxteth after the disturbances is apparent in three ways: the legacy of the disturbances, criminality and celebrity connections. ‘Legacy of the disturbances’ sees the event stigma of 1981’s uprisings being transformed into core stigma, meaning that Toxteth comes to be permanently associated with ‘the riots’. This occurs through general after-effects coverage including reports on trials and the anniversary of the disturbances, through a larger debate on the role of the police in society, and through the eponymisation of Toxteth. After-effects coverage involves a continued focus on Toxteth as home to violent and anti-social behaviour. Repeated coverage of the effects of the disturbances means that Toxteth is not permitted to escape the legacy of the events of 1981 and the press allows the stigma to linger.

The coverage relating to the role of police in society involves the emergence of a debate about policing that relies on references to the disturbances in Toxteth as justification for increased police powers, police protection, and new policing practices including foot-patrol policing. Reliance on the disturbances continues to further associate Toxteth with riotous behaviour, transforming the stigma of discrete and temporally-fixed events into a perennial attribute. The eponymisation of Toxteth further makes the disturbances of 1981 a timeless characteristic from which Toxteth cannot escape. Through eponymisation, Toxteth came to be a reference point and a social and geographical marker, as well as a temporal marker. The name ‘Toxteth’ came to stand for the events surrounding the disturbances and often the name was used alone without the terms ‘riots’, ‘disturbances’ or ‘uprising’ to refer to the events of the summer of 1981. This relies on presumed reader knowledge and perpetuates the legacy of the disturbances which adheres to Toxteth. It created a legacy framework of attributes of deviance, violence, and fear upon which other stigmatising tropes could be added.

As well as relying on the legacy of the disturbances, the second technique that the press used to stigmatise Toxteth after the disturbances is a focus on criminality. This is consistent with other literature on territorial stigma in the age of advanced marginality where crime and criminality are used as stigmatising markers. The crimes that the press covered in relation to Toxteth were all violent and random crimes, reflecting the press’ tendency to preferentially report on violent crime committed by ‘the poor’ as opposed to institutional and structural
violence enacted by social elites (Barak, 1994: 11). The press reported on killings in Toxteth, on gang-violence—which they painted as an uncontrollable epidemic—and on joyriding.

The final technique upon which the press rely to stigmatise Toxteth in the era of advanced marginality is through reference to celebrities. In this case, Toxteth is entered into discourses of celebrity success in order to highlight the struggles endured on the path to fame and fortune. Unlike in place branding literature, the role of the celebrity does not enhance the reputation of an area but, instead, serves as a symbolic millstone that threatened the success of the celebrity. Through this narrative, a particularly distasteful and stigmatising image of Toxteth is created in order to underscore the levels of success attained by the celebrity. Origin in Toxteth also serves as a justification—as seen in the example of footballer, Robbie Fowler—for ‘bad behaviour’. The celebrity discourse is a means through which the oppositionality of Toxteth in relation to the rest of Britain is furthered as it is highlighted as being at odds with the rest of the country’s values and norms.

The three techniques used to stigmatise Toxteth in the aftermath of the disturbances involve the application of core stigma to the area and transition the event stigma of the disturbances into a more enduring core stigma that comes to define the area.

Combined, the research questions of this study have highlighted the ways that the press territorially stigmatise Toxteth, through reliance on core attributes, stigmatising events, and tropes of fear. This stigmatisation occurs in ways that the literature predicts, especially in relation to reporting of crimes, inter-community strife, and violence. However, the study shows that stigma also occurs in ways that we have not seen before, including through the transformation of place into reference points and temporal markers, and through the insertion of a stigmatised place into a discourse of celebrity success. This research shows that stigmatisation of place was occurring prior to the era of advanced marginality, suggesting that stigma has a longer history than the current literature suggests, in line with Loyd and Bonds’ assertions (2018). The next three sections of this chapter will detail three of the core findings that can be drawn from this study, one methodological and two theoretical.

9.3 Core and event stigma
This thesis has demonstrated the methodological benefit of including Hudson’s (2008) work on core and event stigma into the literature on place-based stigma. Holt and Wilkins (2014) successfully incorporated the notion of event-based stigma in their study on the impact of
the murders by Fred and Rosemary West on the population of Gloucester and the stigmatisation of the city; however, apart from their work, the idea of core and event stigma has not widely been incorporated into the sociology and geography literature on place. A key finding of this thesis is that, methodologically, using core and event stigma can be a helpful addition to territorial stigma studies as we try to understand more about the type of stigma and the origins of the stigmatising discourse.

Core stigma relies on the ‘attributes’ that Erving Goffman describes. He explains that these attributes, when relating to a person, refer to “a person who is quite thoroughly bad, or dangerous, or weak” (1963: 12). These attributes ‘discredit’ and ‘reduce’ the status of the individual in the minds of others. For Hudson, this core stigma hints at the very essence of the entity: “who it is, what it does and whom it serves” (2008: 253). This thesis has shown that the idea of core stigma can be applied to place, too, and that thinking of stigma in this way can be helpful for understanding, categorising and typologising place-based stigma.

In this study, the stigma in the early part of the 20th century was seen to be built first on core attributes. The era prior to the age of advanced marginality was defined by a core stigmatisation of Toxteth: a stigmatisation based on the area’s attributes and perceived—and constructed—characteristics. Toxteth was shown, at its essence, to be defined by strife, turmoil, criminality, and substandard housing, with the press repeatedly alluding to these discrediting flaws. The gradual press construction of this image resulted in a low-level but enduring stigma that relied on these constructed attributes from which Toxteth cannot escape because of continual press attention. This core stigma creates a generally negative view of Toxteth in the public imagination, allowing later, more intense stigma to take hold.

Event stigma relies not on essential attributes but, rather, on the occurrence of “discrete, anomalous, episodic events” that mark an entity out as being in some way flawed (Hudson, 2008: 253). Come 1981, the disturbances served as a catalyst to shift the stigma from core to event stigma. Rather than defining Toxteth based on background attributes that gradually stigmatised, Toxteth was instead stigmatised for the occurrence of the disturbances that shone an unfavourable light on the area, resulting in a high-intensity of stigma for a short period of time. I argue that it was, in part, due to the primitive stigmatisation that relied on core attributes that the event stigma was so adhesive. I showed that areas that experienced similar events, such as Chapeltown in Leeds, did not experience the earlier press reliance on core
stigma. This appears to translate into a less adhesive stigma despite similar events occurring in the 1970s and 1980s; a Google image search for Toxteth reveals photographs of derelict houses and images from the disturbances, suggesting that the stigma attached to Toxteth still lingers. A similar search for Chapeltown reveals photographs of noteworthy buildings and property for sale. Seemingly, despite similar events occurring, foundational primitive stigma was not present in Chapeltown, meaning that the event stigma had less onto which to latch.

Following the disturbances, the stigma surrounding Toxteth changed again. No other events bore the same magnitude as the disturbances of 1981, and the intensity of coverage petered out. The press stigmatisation of the area continued but, without the ferocity of the disturbances, the stigmatisation had to rely on core attributes once again. However, the press also transitioned the event stigma into core attributes through their coverage, continuing to reference the disturbances and creating a normalised discourse that saw Toxteth as persistently connected to the events of 1981, thereby converting event stigma into core stigma. The press also used Toxteth as a reference point and a temporal, geographical, and social marker. This contributed to the transformation of event stigma surrounding the events of 1981 which are distilled into background attributes.

Using core and event stigma allows us to categorise the type of stigma being applied to an area. The emergence gap noted by Slater (2017) can be addressed through the use of Hudson’s stigma types, as tracing the transition from one to another can help understand how stigma is developing and morphing over time. In the case of Toxteth, this meant that I could show how the press applied stigma differently according to context. The typology allows researchers a way of understanding whether a place is being stigmatised for perceived (or constructed) underlying attributes or for events. If we can understand why and how the stigma is being applied, we shall be able to better understand the origins of place-based stigma.

**9.4 A conceptualization of primitive stigmatisation**

Theoretically, this thesis developed a concept of primitive stigmatisation to explain earlier forms of place-based stigma, which answers the ‘how’ part of the main research question: *how and why does the press territorially stigmatise Toxteth, Liverpool in its coverage during the 20th century?* The concept of primitive stigma helps to explain *how* the press engaged in the stigmatisation of Toxteth during the early part of the 20th century. Where the main body of literature from Wacquant on territorial stigma suggests that territorial stigma is decidedly different to
previous forms of spatial smear (Wacquant et al. 2014), more recent literature suggests that there is a need to remove the temporal restraints from the conceptualization of territorial stigma and to consider its longer history in order to fully understand its structure (Tyler and Slater, 2018; Loyd and Bonds, 2018): primitive stigma is a way to understand the earlier section of the temporal continuum of place-based stigma.

This thesis concurs with the current literature and has explored the longue durée of stigma in the 20th century highlighting that the story of stigma begins prior to the era of advanced marginality. I suggested that it is helpful to see the earlier form of stigma as the prelude to the more protrusive territorial stigma that comes later. I positioned this stigma as ‘primitive’ stigma, echoing Marx’s use of the term ‘primitive’ in ‘primitive accumulation’ which reflects the conditions that preceded the capitalist system (1867: 874-5). For Marx, primitive accumulation marked the end of the feudal economic system through which labourers had direct contact with the land as means of production, and the violent transition to the capitalist society where the peasant is forcibly removed from the means of production. Where feudalism allowed the peasant worker to control elements of means of production and to retain some of the fruits of his labour, capitalism saw the private ownership and enclosure of land, and the necessity for the labourer to sell their labour (Marx, 1867: 874–875). It is this transition from feudalism to capitalism that Marx terms ‘primitive accumulation’, which can be seen as the foundational process that preceded capitalism and upon which it was built.

Following this model, I see primitive stigmatisation as the necessary precursor to territorial stigmatisation in the era of advanced marginality. It sets the stage for the pernicious, politically- and economically-motivated stigma that exists in the post-Fordist era. It builds up a background stigma that saw, in this thesis, the reputation of Toxteth being gradually eroded and smeared so that when a major event occurred, the essence of Toxteth was already tainted. Much like primitive accumulation, primitive stigma can be seen also from a temporal angle, marking the transition zone between the industrial era and the post-industrial era, implying that the story of place-based stigma can be seen as a consequence of the industrialising city rather than as a feature of the post-industrial society. I have shown that primitive stigmatisation bears different characteristics to later forms of territorial stigmatisation in the era of advanced marginality, however; it is more oblique, less direct, and relies on subtle contextual knowledge rather than direct and overt stigmatisation as is apparent in the era of advanced marginality.
This primitive stigmatisation relies on core stigmatising attributes that built up a low-level, steadily increasing background stigma. In the case of Toxteth, primitive stigma was based on three key themes: inter-community strife, criminality, and substandard housing. These three themes were used to build up a gradually stigmatised vision of Toxteth as a place characterised by dispute and dissention, deviance, and paucity of resources and infrastructure. These are core elements rather than specific events, and the defining feature of primitive stigmatisation as I have structured it, is that it relies on core elements and is oblique, indirect and gradual, rather than direct and related to events. It relies on the gradual accumulation of a foundation of stigma relating to a person or place.

Primitive stigma, apart from being a temporal phenomenon, can also be understood discursively. Indeed, primitive stigma is grounded in discourse and relies on contextual knowledge and subtle inferences. Where language and discourse would, during the era of advanced marginality, be used to directly label places as worthy of stigmatisation through tag-phrases and images that are structured to show residents of Toxteth in opposition to the police symbolising law and British values, for example, discourse in the era of primitive stigma was less direct. In the years prior to the disturbances, we have seen that the press relied on subtle references to, among other things, the use of kerosene heaters in homes in Toxteth in 1960s (see section 5.7). By the 1960s, kerosene heating use had declined in Britain apart from in the most deprived homes. For readers of the 1960s press, reference to the use of kerosene heaters in Toxteth would have served as a subtle indicator to the ‘type’ of area Toxteth was. The reference to a type of heater would allow readers to ‘read between the lines’ and come up with what van Dijk describes as a ‘model’—or a way of viewing a situation, population or place—thereby helping them to formulate a vision of what the area was like (1996: 14).

Relatedly, persistent reference to the presence of the Orange Order, for example, would have been aware of the Order’s association with working class culture (see section 5.5). Repeated reference to the presence of the Orange Order in Toxteth would, then, alert readers to a class dynamic in Toxteth and smear the area with notions of poverty, Irishness, and inter-community strife. The notion of Irishness would, in particular, signal to readers the presence of society’s perceived ‘dregs’ and make suggestions about the area’s ‘otherness’ (Belchem, 2005; 2007).
The insertion of reference to kerosene heaters and the Orange Order are examples of specific contextual references. The primitive stigmatisation of Toxteth relies, in these instances, on reader knowledge to ‘read between the lines’ and to understand what the inclusion of certain words, phrases or pieces of information indicate and imply. Often, primitive stigma, while still defined by obliqueness and indirectness, was built up through the frequent interlacing of Toxteth with other discourses such as that of crime and inter-community strife. Here, the connections are made through the careful and considered reporting of certain topics. My argument is not that these crimes and public disturbances did not occur; rather, I have suggested that it is the imbalance in attention that the press paid to these themes as opposed to focus on the structural violence being enacted upon the residents of Toxteth, on which the press remained silent. By focusing on particular discourses and drawing subtle connections between Toxteth and notions of crime, strife and a lack of safety, gradually the press builds up an image of Toxteth as a violent, dangerous, unruly, and oppositional location of which the general public should be wary and fearful. Later, the press coverage of Toxteth relied on direct forms of stigmatisation such as through the use of tag-phrases that inform readers of the very traits that they should associate with the area. Reliance on indirect and oblique connections, however, forms the foundations of primitive stigma: it is through subtle and oblique references that require ‘reading between the lines’, inclusions and interweaving of Toxteth with other discourses that the press enacts primitive stigma on the area.

While Wacquant, Slater and Pereira (2014) differentiate between ‘earlier forms of spatial smear’ and later territorial stigma, I argue that the earlier ‘spatial smear’ is a form of primitive stigma that can be seen as foundational for later forms of more pernicious and overt stigma. I suggest that this theorisation of primitive stigma as a precursor to territorial stigma can be useful for understanding the longer history of place-based stigma. It does not create a stark division between previous eras of stigma and contemporary stigma as Wacquant et al. suggest (2014), but still acknowledges that there is a difference between earlier and later forms of stigma. Rather than separate earlier stigma from the story of contemporary stigma, however, it suggests that territorial stigma can be seen as a story or a continuum that begins in the industrial era and endures—changing in type and intensity—into the post-industrial epoch. Crucially, the conceptualization of primitive stigmatisation acknowledges that the territorial stigma of the post-Fordist metropolis cannot simply emerge at the dawn of the post-
industrial era. Rather, this prominent and pernicious form of stigma is enabled because of its origins as a low-level oblique stigmatising force.

9.5 Media stigmatisation
Referring back to the quotation by Jenny Rees that opened this chapter, she explains that “the Press is...on the other side” (Rees, 1982: 6). The press occupies a position of power that is in tension with those about whom journalists write. This thesis has shown the ways that the press stigmatised Toxteth during the 20th century and hints at a larger story of media stigmatisation of place. I have highlighted the fact that the press relied consistently on tropes of violence, crime, danger, and oppositionality. These themes position Toxteth as a place of fear. The press construct Toxteth monolithically, according to one sole outsider perspective, as a threat to society and social norms. Quite why the media is involved in the stigmatisation process can be explained by using Chomsky’s propaganda model and Foucault’s conception of regulatory biopolitical power, and refers back to the ‘why’ aspect of the main research question: how and why does the press territorially stigmatise Toxteth, Liverpool in its coverage during the 20th century?

For Chomsky, the media operate according to the propaganda model that sees a five-part filtering system influence what is included in news reports. It involves ownership, funding, sourcing, flak, and fear all being used to determine what is covered in news reporting. This filtering system is not an obvious and overt self-censoring mechanism but begins in the education system which caters for conformity and obedience (Chomsky, 1997). It determines what is socially acceptable to be said and which worldview can be put forth. This worldview is dominated by powerful elites and major corporations who determine what people think about and suggest ways that they should think about them. In this way, press ownership determines whose interests are at the heart of all reporting. It is in the interests of the dominant groups in society to maintain the status quo that enables their power and dominance. Newspaper ownership, since the mid 19th century, has become concentrated in the hands of fewer and fewer powerful individuals as the advertising industry began to influence media, concentrating power and capital in the hands of the few. As powerful corporations, media function to make a profit and to sell an audience to advertisers. They seek to make a profit both through the sale of copy and through the sale of audiences to advertisers (Herman and Chomsky, 1988). The function of the media is not to serve society and to hold power to account, for they are complicit in society’s power relationships.
For Chomsky, “the real mass media are basically trying to divert people” (1997)—to concentrate attention on particular topics and away from major societal issues. This is apparent in the press coverage of Toxteth. The media uses tropes of fear and violence in Toxteth to divert attention away from the actual structural issues of deprivation, class and racial inequality, police brutality, and institutional racism that threaten the status quo and existing power structures. This can be seen both during the era of primitive stigmatisation and later during the era of territorial stigma. During primitive stigmatisation, the press remained silent on the issues of deprivation and inequality that were plaguing Toxteth, instead electing to focus on superficial stories and constructed attributes that provoked a sense of fear in the minds of readers. In the era of the disturbances, the right-wing press remained silent still on the structural issues inherent in Toxteth. The left-wing press sometimes broke this silence and raised questions about police brutality and violence but, generally, both sides of the press-political spectrum remained supportive of the status quo that saw increased police powers and the furtherance of the current situation. In the years since the disturbances, the press has reverted to smearing Toxteth with superficial stories and constructed attributes. This smearing of Toxteth ultimately creates a spatial and social bogeyman against which society can unite. This spectre of fear is particularly useful in uniting society and making it more malleable according to the wishes of dominant groups in society (Herman and Chomsky, 1988). Constructing the problems in Toxteth to be viewed as pathological—the faults of deviant, oppositional residents—means that eponymised Toxteth serves as an example to the rest of the population to keep them obedient and under control.

The media serve as a means of social control that directs the thoughts and minds of the public (Chomsky, 1991: 32) and that sees control of society not by force, but through regulation of the mind (Chomsky, 1991: 29). This emerged as society became ‘freer’ and power exerted through force was no longer effective (Requiem for the American Dream, 2015). This is reminiscent of Foucault’s regulatory biopower that shows a decline in juridical power—power by force—and a rise in prevalence in power over life through biopower (Foucault, 1984: 144). Biopower is a regulation of bodies in society that does not operate through force and violence, but through the conditioning and normalization of various aspects of society. Akin to micro-management, biopower involves the administration of life (Foucault, 1984: 138). Merging notions of biopower with Chomsky’s structure of the media system reveals that in the stigmatisation of place, the media works to subdue and to turn the public into passive objects (Requiem for the American Dream, 2015).
Putting forth a vision of Toxteth as a fearsome and terrible force in society, then, can be seen to support three major aims of the press: to sell copy, to support elite structures, and to divert attention from other issues. As corporations, it is in the interests of the press to sell copy and to sell audiences to advertisers (Herman and Chomsky, 1988), both of which will perpetuate the dominance of media corporations in society. This dominance enmeshes the media industry with other powerful actors in society, and media corporations act to maintain this position of primacy and status quo through using other elite voices as sources, through not questioning societal structural issues, and through omitting dissenting voices. Controlling the minds of readers diverts attention away from major structural issues and the focus on Toxteth as a place of fear offers a social and spatial bogeyman against which society can unite. Pathologising Toxteth and its residents diverts attention away from the true causes of problems and, instead, makes the area into an example that can be used to ensure ‘proper’ behaviour and obedience to social norms from the rest of society.

9.6 Further research
While select scholars are now accepting that there is a longer history to territorial stigmatisation and more to be learned by trying to access the production of stigma (Tyler and Slater, 2018; Loyd and Bonds, 2018), there remain key areas that warrant further study. It would be beneficial to repeat this study through a thorough analysis of press stigmatisation during the 20th century in other stigmatised locations to ascertain whether the findings hold true across various geographies. Wacquant provides a useful list of areas ranging from South Central Los Angeles to the Meadow Well Estate in England, and from Bijlmer in the Netherlands to the Bronx in New York (2008: 238). For Wacquant, these are areas that have gained national status as areas of extreme disrepute and would be ideal locations to trace the emergence and formation of territorial stigma and to gauge whether the emergence of stigma in these places follows the same patterns as Toxteth—a period of primitive stigma characterised by a reliance on core stigmatising attributes, before an event cements the eponymisation of the area in the public imagination, succeeded by a return to a reliance on core attributes to stigmatise the area.

Another useful project would be to consider visual and auditory media in addition to the press. Devereux et al. (2011a; 2011b) and Arthurson (2014) incorporated other media types into their studies and their findings were consistent with my study of the press. However, a view proffered by both Jon Snow of Channel 4 News and Martin Wainwright of the Guardian is that including residents’ voices is more common in televised news coverage where it is
easier to recognise where the quotation comes from, as opposed to in the press where insider voices could be viewed to be fabricated.

These studies could, with sufficient time and resources, take a comparative angle that compares a stigmatised area to a non-stigmatised area to ascertain where the stories diverge and at what points stigma comes to adhere in the stigmatised location but not in the non-stigmatised area. Largely, non-stigmatised locations are overlooked in territorial stigma studies but comparative studies that consider the levels of press coverage for a stigmatised locale in comparison to the coverage for a non-stigmatised area would be highly beneficial. This study references a brief examination of other areas of Liverpool and their coverage and stigmatisation in the press but a closer and more detailed comparative analysis is required to understand why stigma adheres to some places and not to others. Incorporating non-stigmatised locations into studies of stigma would be of great benefit to the field.

More generally, there remains a significant need to consider the emergence of stigma, as evidenced by Slater (2017). I suggest that this ‘emergence’ can be subdivided into a focus on the temporal development of stigma and the linguistic or discursive production. The temporal aspect can be addressed by embracing historical aspects to studies of stigma and to using a mélange of archival sources and interviews with older residents, which are not normally used in territorial stigma studies that often—but not exclusively—rely on ethnographic studies in the contemporary moment (see Gourlay, 2007; Holt and Wilkins, 2014; Keene and Padilla, 2010; Morris, 2013; Rhodes, 2012; Slater and Anderson, 2011). De-privileging the contemporary moment through a reliance on archival sources and ethnographic and interview research with older residents, which focuses on the historical moment, will allow the temporal gap to be fully explored.

The linguistic and discursive production gap involves studying the language use and discourse patterns inherent in stigma in order to understand discursively where the stigma originates. The study on the use of the term ‘shithole’ by Butler et al. (2018) offers an example of a stigmatising term being traced to understand the construction of stigmatised places in the public imagination. This thesis has taken a different—but still discursive—tack and, rather than trace a specific popular phrase over time, has followed mentions of a particular place over time to see how the name is used and represented by the press. Future studies that trace the use of key terms or linguistic tropes (such as ‘inner city’) or that examine
the discourse surrounding a place over time will help us to understand how language is intimately involved in the labelling and stigmatising of geographies and their populations. Possible studies that interrogate the way that people talk about place could involve the use of surveys or mapping exercises that allow participants the chance to define geographies of stigma in a relational sense. Surveys that access people’s feelings about particular places or about certain phrases, or that ask people to associate areas with certain notions or to rank them in terms of favourability could be beneficial to understanding how language is involved in the stigmatisation process.

Tracing the stigmatisation of Toxteth in the press tells part of a larger story of stigmatisation as it develops and changes throughout the 20th century. It demonstrates how stigma presents differently at various times and in diverse contexts, and how place-based stigma has a longer history than territorial stigmatisation literature has traditionally acknowledged. While territorial stigmatisation in the Wacquantian sense, defined by political and economic activation, is prevalent in the post-Fordist era, an earlier form of primitive stigma existed that gradually smeared Toxteth and allowed later forms of stigma to adhere so tenaciously. This thesis has shown the imperative to incorporate history and language into the study of territorial stigma in order to understand the origination of stigma. Research so far in the field has told us much about the activation of stigma and the lived experience of stigma in the contemporary age; understanding where stigma comes from and its history is the next challenge.
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Times (1982e). Toxteth man cleared of riot charges. 8 January, p. 2.


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Appendix 1: Coding manual

**Type**
- Editorial
- Feature
- Finance
- Image
- Letter
- Listing
- News
- News in brief
- Opinion
- Parliament
- Review
- Sports
- Stop press

**Codes and subcodes**

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Community relations
Cuts
Gifford Inquiry
Heseltine
Incitement
Inner city policy
Lack of involvement
Race relations
Reference point
Policy
Political visit
Positive
Award
Bravery
Charity
Community
Education
Entrepreneurship
Example
Nature
Success
Temperance
Race
Apartheid
Colonialism
Community relations
Crime
Deprivation
Discrimination
Education
Gifford Inquiry
Identifier
Media
Need for aspiration
Race relations
Religion
Charity
Church closure
Community relations
Decentralisation
Investment
Judaism
Political work
Pope visit
Regeneration
Ritualism
Sectarianism
Riots
Anniversary
Anti-police
Anti-Tory
Attack on emergency services
Bravery
Cause
Comparison to royal wedding
Criminality
David Moore
Deprivation
Education
Effects
Garden Festival
Heseltine
History
Hooligan
Inquiry
Insurance
Investment
Media
Outsider group blame
Police-community relations
Police powers
Police violence
Politics
Pro police
Race relations
Reference point
Religion
Royal intervention
Scarman Inquiry
Trial
Youth
Royalty
Visit
Social
Breakdown of family
Class
Community group
Drugs
Fertility
History
Loss of national pride
Parenting
Prostitution
Safety
Social problems
Symbolic value
Antithesis to something positive
Emblematic of negative
Geographical marker
Humour
Irony
Reference point
Appendix 2: Interview questions

1. I have read several articles that you wrote about Toxteth particularly around the time of the riots. Why were you sent to cover those stories? Where were you based and did you have experience of Liverpool?

2. What do you remember about your time reporting in Toxteth? Did Toxteth have a reputation at the time?

3. Did you have a choice regarding the angle and topic covered in your articles or were these suggested by an editor? Did you ever see an article in print that you had written that had been significantly altered during the editing process?

4. Many newspapers described the riots and the situation in Toxteth at the time using language that described the rioters as hooligans. Was there a reason that the press took this stance?

5. Many newspapers give a descriptor of Toxteth. For example, a reporter may say “Toxteth, the troubled area of Liverpool”—why do newspapers use these descriptors?

6. How do you handle the dilemma of only covering a place when something negative has happened there (i.e. bad stories make good news)? Does this mean that once a place has earned a negative reputation this is something that will be referred back to again and again in the descriptors mentioned above?

7. Very few articles in any newspaper talked to residents about the riots or the issues in Toxteth. Most include interviews with police or politicians. Is there a reason that residents were rarely interviewed?
8. There is the famous anecdote that Margaret Thatcher could call up the Sun and influence what was put into the paper. Is this rumour regarding the level of political involvement in the press accurate?

9. Can you briefly explain the editorial structure at the Guardian? Who, as a reporter, were you responsible to?

10. How long did you work in journalism?