Ethnicity and its Role in Local Elections in the Context of Transmigration: Case Studies from Lampung, Indonesia

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The candidate confirms that the work submitted is his own and that appropriate credit has been given where reference has been made to the work of others.

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Abstract

The Indonesian political system has moved away from authoritarianism and has become more democratic. As a result, broad features of social and political change have been observed during the reform period. Further, decentralisation has provided a more democratic electoral system in Indonesia. The mode of election of local officials has been changed from an indirect to a direct one. Since 2005, local leaders – governors, city mayors and heads of regency – along with provincial and local assembly members have been chosen by voters.

As a consequence, there has been a resurgence in ethnic identity in local elections. This thesis looks at the intersection of ethnicity and local politics in the context of elections for the posts of mayor and head of regency in Lampung. Lampung in the south of Sumatra has an unusual ethnic make-up because in the past 100 years both the Dutch colonial administration and Indonesian Government have been implementing a transmigration programme, attempting to move people from densely populated areas to less densely populated ones. The result is not only an extremely mixed society but also conditions in which the local population has become an ethnic, and sometimes religious, minority in its own homeland.

In this thesis, I select three case study areas in Lampung. One is the provincial capital, which can be considered multi-ethnic, but the other two are dominated by Javanese, who have held positions of political power as an outcome of the last three local elections. My research leads me to argue that there is a revival of ethnicity and transmigrant political identity in local elections in the transmigration-affected areas, with a power balance struck between Javanese and Lampungese in these areas. However, in an area unaffected by transmigration, ethnic sentiment plays second fiddle to a number of other factors, including the performance of the incumbent. My argument thus runs contrary to that of a number of scholars working on similar issues in other parts of Indonesia, who see ethnicity and ethnic organisations playing a diminishing political role in local elections.
Table of Contents

Acknowledgement ........................................................................................................ iii
Abstract ......................................................................................................................... iv
Table of Contents .......................................................................................................... v
Abbreviations ................................................................................................................ ix
List of Figures ................................................................................................................. xii

Chapter 1 Introduction ................................................................................................. 1
1.1 Subnational Elections in the Context of transmigration .................................... 3
1.2 The Case of Lampung ......................................................................................... 7
1.3 Research Aims and Objectives .......................................................................... 11
1.4 Structure of the Thesis ....................................................................................... 13

Chapter 2 Researching Ethnic Politics in a Patronage Democracy ....................... 17
2.1 Understanding Ethnicity and Ethnic Identity .................................................... 17
2.2 Ethnic Politics and Voting .................................................................................. 21
2.3 Ethnicity and Patronage in Contemporary Indonesian Local Politics ........... 26
2.4 Ethnic Politics and Patronage Democracy in a Broader Context .................. 34
2.4.1 South East Asian and South Asian Political Experiences ......................... 34
2.4.2 African Political Experiences ....................................................................... 39
2.5 Conclusion ............................................................................................................ 41

Chapter 3 Political Context, Provincial Setting and Migration Programmes .......... 43
3.1 Introduction: Provinces, Regencies and Cities ................................................... 43
3.2 An Introduction to the Context of Politics and Elections in Indonesia .......... 45
3.2.1 Understanding religion and electoral politics in Indonesia ......................... 45
3.2.2 Politics in the reform era: decentralisation, elections and Putra Daerah ....... 50
3.2.3 Subnational elections and their mechanism ................................................. 53
3.3 Lampung: Geography, Politics and Ethnic Coalitions .................................... 55
3.3.1 Setting the scene in Lampung .................................................................... 55
3.3.2 Political and socio-economic conditions in East Lampung, Metro and Bandar Lampung ........................................................................ 60
3.3.3 Patronage and money in Lampung politics ................................................. 66
3.3.4 Ethnic coalitions in Lampung’s politics ...................................................... 73
3.4 Migration and Its Impact on Lampung’s Population ....................................... 77
3.4.1 The transmigration programme: a brief review ........................................ 77
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3.4.2 Spontaneous migrants and ethnicity in Lampung</td>
<td>86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.5 Conclusion</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Chapter 4 Research Design and Methodology</strong></td>
<td>91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.1 The Use of Qualitative Methods and A Case Study Approach</td>
<td>91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.2 Data Collection Methods</td>
<td>94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.2.1 Document analysis</td>
<td>95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.2.2 Media analysis</td>
<td>95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.2.3 Direct observation</td>
<td>96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.2.4 Research interviews</td>
<td>97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.3 Data analysis</td>
<td>103</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.4 Data Management</td>
<td>104</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.5 Ethics and Ethical Considerations</td>
<td>105</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.6 Reflecting on Positionality</td>
<td>106</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.7 Research Limitations</td>
<td>107</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.8 Conclusion</td>
<td>109</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Chapter 5 The Political Role of Transmigration and Ethnic-Religious Based Organisations in Lampung</strong></td>
<td>110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.1 ERBOs in Lampung: Typology and Overview</td>
<td>112</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.2 PATRI: Representing Transmigrants in Lampung</td>
<td>116</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.3 Sunda Ngumbara and Pajar, for Sundanese Migrants</td>
<td>119</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.4 Puwnten, Representing the Interests of Bantenese</td>
<td>121</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.5 Penginyongan, for Central Javanese in Lampung</td>
<td>124</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.6 PHDI, Religious Hindu council</td>
<td>127</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.7 PBL, the Lampung Balinese Community</td>
<td>128</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.8 PSMTI, National and Provincial Branches Representing Indonesian-Chinese</td>
<td>130</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.9 Lampung Sai, Projecting Native Sentiment and Interests</td>
<td>135</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.10 Reflections and Conclusion</td>
<td>139</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Chapter 6 New Natives and Subnational Elections in Metro</strong></td>
<td>142</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.1 The History and Establishment of Metro, the City of Transmigration</td>
<td>143</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.2 ‘Natives of Metro’, or Asli wong Metro: the Changing Identity of Transmigrants in Metro</td>
<td>146</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.3 Ethnicity and Subnational Elections</td>
<td>152</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.4 Support from the Bureaucracy, Money in Campaigns and Subnational Elections</td>
<td>163</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
6.5 Conclusion ........................................................................................................168

Chapter 7 Power Relations in Majority Javanese East Lampung..............170

7.1 Local politics in Javanese Transmigration Areas .................................171

7.2 The Informal Political Role of NU in Subnational Elections ............174

7.3 Dealing with The Majority: the Survival Strategies of The Lampungese in Local Politics .................................................................180

7.3.1 The ethnic geometry of East Lampung .............................................180

7.3.2 Strategies of the Lampungese elite: political coalitions with the Javanese .................................................................................182

7.3.3 Lampungese heads of local political parties .................................184

7.3.4 All residents of Lampung are Lampungese ...................................186

7.3.5 Javanese culture and symbols as an elite Lampungese strategy ........................................................................................................187

7.4 The minimal role of parties and comparative subnational election ....189

7.5 Conclusion ........................................................................................................195

Chapter 8 Electoral Politics in the Provincial Capital, Bandar Lampung.....197

8.1 The History of Migration to Bandar Lampung .....................................198

8.2 The Local Context of Bandar Lampung: Beyond the Ethnicity Issue...202

8.3 The Pragmatic Approach of Political Parties and the Role of Money in Electoral Politics .................................................................206

8.4 Incumbency, Populist Programmes and the End of Ethnic Sentiment .................................................................................................212

8.5 Conclusion ........................................................................................................222

Chapter 9 Subnational Election in the Context of Transmigration.........224

9.1 Reflections on the Empirical Chapters: Political Legacies of Transmigration and Subnational Election Dynamics in Lampung........224

9.1.1 Asli Wong Metro: the revival of ethnicity and transmigrant political identity in transmigration-affected areas........................225

9.1.2 The political role of ERBOs in strengthening ethnic sentiment and the minimal role of parties in subnational elections ....227

9.1.3 Local politics in Lampung and Indonesia: a patronage democracy narrative ..........................................................228

9.1.4 The Javanese-Lampungese power balance in transmigration-affected areas ..............................................................................230

9.1.5 Ethnic sentiment on the back seat: politics in the provincial capital .........................................................................................230

9.2 Lampung’s Elections in the Context of Transmigration ....................231
9.3 A Contribution to the Theory of Ethnic Politics ............................................ 233
9.4 Future Research .................................................................................................. 235

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>References</th>
<th>236</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Appendix A</td>
<td>253</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appendix B</td>
<td>256</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appendix C</td>
<td>264</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appendix D</td>
<td>265</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appendix E</td>
<td>268</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Abbreviations

ERBO : Ethno-Religious Based Organisation
LAMPUNG SAI : The Lampungese ERBO
NU : Nahdlatul Ulama
PAJAR : Sundanese Migrant Community Organisation
PATRI : Association of the Children of Transmigrants in the Indonesian Republic
PBL : The Lampung Balinese organisation
PENGINYONGAN : The Javanese Coastal Migrant Community Organisation
PHDI : The Indonesian Religious Council of Hindu
PSMTI : The Indonesian Chinese Clan Social Association
PUWNTEN : The Bantenese Migrant community organisation
SUNDA NGUMBARA : Sundanese Migrant Community Organisation
List of Table

Table 1. 1 Cities, regencies and population numbers in Lampung Province...........9
Table 1. 2 The proportion of Javanese and Lampungese as a percentage of
the population ..................................................................................................10
Table 3. 1 Results of the 1955 general election .........................................................47
Table 3. 2 Number of seats in the national assembly per party between 1971
and 1997..................................................................................................................49
Table 3. 3 Distribution of seats in the national assembly (People’s
Representative Assembly), 1999-2014 ..........................................................53
Table 3. 4 Distribution of seats in Lampung’s provincial assembly 2014 .............57
Table 3. 5 List of local government leaders (regency heads and city mayors)
and their party affiliations in 2016.................................................................58
Table 3. 6 Total area of plantations in Lampung ......................................................59
Table 3. 7 Ethnic composition of the three research location
s in Lampung (in %)..........................................................................................60
Table 3. 8 Geography, demography and socio-economic information ..................65
Table 3. 9 Elected local leaders between 2005 and 2012 based on locality in
Lampung Province .........................................................................................75
Table 3. 10 Current ethnic-based coalitions in subnational elections and
elected pairings in Lampung province based on locality in 2013, 2014
and 2015..............................................................................................................76
Table 3. 11 Percentage of Indonesia’s total population residing in provinces
and special regions of Java and on Bali, 1971-2010 .........................................80
Table 3. 12 Population growth in the most densely populated provinces in
Indonesia (population/km²). ................................................................................81
Table 3. 13 Number of people living in poverty in provinces on Java and on
Bali, 2017.............................................................................................................81
Table 3. 14 Number of transmigrants from 1905 to 2012 ....................................82
Table 3. 15 Transmigration in the provinces of West Kalimantan and Central
Kalimantan........................................................................................................83
Table 3. 16 General Comparison table on the similarities and difference of
research sites ......................................................................................................85
Table 3. 17 Citizens of Lampung by migration status, 1930-1986....................87
Table 3. 18 Population figures for Lampung province by ethnicity in 2000 and
2010....................................................................................................................87
List of Figures

Figure 1-1 Map of Lampung Province ................................................................. 8
Figure 2-1 Disaggregating ethnicity ................................................................. 20
Figure 2-2 Equilibrium of ethnic favouritism .................................................... 24
Figure 3-1 Photograph of the house of a Balinese transmigrant descendant ........ 62
Figure 3-2 Photograph of an agricultural irrigation project established by the Dutch colonial administration in Metro .................................................. 63
Figure 3-3 The role of money in Indonesian subnational elections ...................... 71
Figure 3-4 Concentration of Javanese in Indonesia ........................................... 88
Figure 3-5 The distribution of Javanese and other ethnic groups across Lampung Province ............................................................................................. 89
Figure 5-1 Inauguration of Ahmad Heryawan, governor of West Java, as head of Sunda Ngumbara’s advisory board ................................................... 120
Figure 5-2 Penginyongan activities in support of a candidate in South Lampung regency ................................................................................................. 125
Figure 5-3 PSMTI officials at the inauguration of the organisation’s Lampung branch ................................................................................................. 133
Figure 5-4 Newspaper advertisement showing the social and cultural activities of the PSMTI in Lampung ................................................................. 134
Figure 6-1 Photographs illustrating the work of forest clearance to establish the new city of Metro by the Dutch and transmigrants in 1930s ..................... 145
Figure 6-2 Map of Metro ..................................................................................... 146
Figure 6-3 The abbreviated name of Paidjo in a campaign advertisement .......... 157
Figure 6-4 Campaign posters for Sudarsono and his running mate in the 2015 Metro mayoral elections ........................................................................ 159
Figure 6-5 Factors that influenced voting decisions in Metro’s subnational election in 2015 ......................................................................................... 161
Figure 6-6 Merchandise such as bags, books, CDs and T-shirts designed to counter corruption, provided by a youth movement during a large-scale campaign against money in politics in the 2015 mayoral election in Metro .. 167
Figure 7-1 Map of East Lampung ...................................................................... 172
Figure 7-2 Illustration of voter mobilisation and support provided by NU in East Lampung’s subnational elections ......................................................... 178
Figure 7-3 The Lampungese candidate for regent, Yusran Amirullah (second from right), posing beside Javanese shadow puppets during his political campaign .................................................................188

Figure 8-1 Map of Bandar Lampung .................................................................201

Figure 8-2 Herman Hasanusi (second from left) visiting flood-affected areas in North Teluk Betung sub-district in March 2016.................................................................216

Figure 8-3 The incumbent’s opponent exploits the issue of ethnicity in Bandar Lampung’s mayoral election. The poster’s caption below the candidates reads in translation, “Mr. Bro [Thobroni Harun] chooses Kang Nizar (Komarunizar), a man of Banten” .................................................................................218
Chapter 1
Introduction

On 26 July 2015, the mayoral candidate of Bandar Lampung, Muhammad Yunus, together with his running mate, Ahmad Muslimin, visited the office of the city’s electoral commission to register their candidacies. Their visit had attracted a large audience; many of his supporters wore distinctive costumes and accessories. Before he registered his candidacy, Yunus asked the commissioner to recite a poem, ‘The Poor’, written by Rendra, one of Indonesia’s leading poets.

Yunus is not a career politician. Instead, he looks back at many years of social activism: a politically engaged student in the 1990s, he was actively involved in the overthrow of the Suharto regime in 1998. Yunus was the only independent candidate in 2015.\(^1\) He holds to centre left, social democratic views, shaped by the political thought of Jurgen Habermas, which he discovered during his studies in Germany. Yunus’ primary political goal was to make the people of Bandar Lampung ‘happier’. This refers to an analysis of his campaign team, which suggested the need for an improvement in Bandar Lampung’s happiness index. To this end, Yunus campaigned to enhance the provision of education, health and employment. This included the introduction of a monthly minimum wage up to Rp 10 million (roughly £512 pounds).\(^2\)

Today, there are plenty of opportunities to become actively involved in politics. This stands in great contrast to the decades before 1998. Back then, those involved were typically closely related to the Suharto regime. For example, city mayors and heads of regencies were appointed directly by the central government. Local council

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\(^1\) Law Number 8/2015, which replaced Law Number 1/2014, states that subnational election participants can either come from party coalitions or be independent candidates. An independent candidate is defined as a non-party candidate who has been nominated for a subnational election.

\(^2\) In September 2018, the conversion rate was around 19,000 rupiah to one pound.
meetings were merely ceremonial events. Regional or local leaders were carefully scrutinised and usually political patrons of the Suharto regime (Hicks, 2004). Obviously, these practices did not reflect democratic values. When the regime changed in 1998, the new democratic system was associated with the promise of equal opportunities when it comes to candidatures for political posts (Choi, 2007). As a result, many young people felt attracted to politics as a potential career choice.

Indonesia is the largest archipelago country in the world, with more than 17,000 islands, and is home to members of more than 100 ethnic groups. The Indonesian government recognises six religions, Islam, Catholicism, Hinduism, Buddhism, Protestantism and Confucianism. Not surprisingly, ethnicity and religion play a key role in political campaigns in Indonesia.

This is one of the reasons why subnational elections in Indonesia have become ‘political’ festivities -- glorious, stormy and dynamic events. The newspapers are full of political advertisements; the local television presents many political debates; television ratings rise if a particular broadcaster is showing a favourite debate show; and the city and regency are made colourful with campaign materials, posters and leaflets. Advertisements in the local media and on television are an obligatory means of socialisation for anyone hoping to be elected.

Candidates use various means to attract voters. In particular, they use particular issues that could enhance their electability, including capitalising upon ethnic-religious sentiment (Aspinall et al., 2011). Local elections have meant that cities and districts have moved forward and become more dynamic and that local businesses, in particular those in the advertising sector, have come to receive many orders, including from local newspapers and local television stations. Furthermore, for the less educated and poorer voters, local elections are also a time for them to obtain food from candidates, including rice, sugar and cooking oil. It is common practice as voting day nears for candidates’ teams to intensify their efforts to woo voters by distributing food, materials and money. For the common people, local elections are like a party. Most people are considered pragmatic voters who are happy to receive food, materials and money in exchange for votes.

However, this implies that running for public office in Indonesia is a costly endeavour. Candidates must either invest a great deal of money from their own pockets or obtain
financial support from the business community to maintain cash flow during the campaign. The result is a pragmatic, and sometimes unhealthy, relationship between candidates and businesspeople, increasing the level of corruption in Indonesia, in particular at the local level. For example, the mayors of Batang and Cilegon in Java were arrested by the Indonesian Corruption Eradication Commission in August and October 2017, respectively, for taking bribes from the business community.

However, the provision of materials and monetary goods is not random. Typically, members of specific ethnic or religious groups benefit from those contributions more than others, depending on the candidate. This brings into play ethnic-religious identities and attempts by politicians to capitalise upon ethnic-religious sentiments. In order to understand the importance of this phenomenon for contemporary Indonesia, I first briefly introduce the history of the transmigration programmes that both colonial and independent Indonesian governments initiated, and then discuss the implications for policy making at local and regional level.

1.1 Subnational Elections in the Context of transmigration

The transmigration programme was a political initiative designed in 1905 by the Dutch colonial administration of what was known between 1816 and 1945 as the Dutch East Indies. It involved the relocation of landless people from Java, Bali and Madura to less populated areas, in particular Papua, Kalimantan, Sumatra and Sulawesi. After Indonesia proclaimed its independence in 1945, the national government led by President Sukarno adopted, through Government Act 56/1958, its own transmigration programme. Suharto, Indonesia’s second president, who led the country from 1966 to 1998, decided to continue the relocation of ethnic Javanese to other parts of the country. The programme was finally abolished in 2015.

Many authors argue that the transmigration programme was not just a large-scale resettlement programme. Instead, they argue that national policy makers introduced or continued the transmigration programme to pursue at least two political goals. First, the transmigration programme was, in particular for the Suharto regime, a strategy to ensure political stability across the country. To this end, the regime would ‘Javanise’ the archipelago, that is, promote Javanese culture and resettle ethnic Javanese
throughout the archipelago (Colchester, 1986). Second, the transmigration programmes was seen to strengthen the unity of the nation, to enhance national integration, and to bolster the Indonesian national defence system through military transmigration – deploying military personnel to the borders and remote areas of Indonesia (Elmhirst, 1999; Levang, 2003).

Furthermore, the strategies of establishing Javanese representation and installing Javanese bureaucratic ‘personnel’ across the nation were utilised in order to maintain and strengthen national integration (Elmhirst, 1999, p.823) and to maintain the central governmental structure. This indicates that, despite being presented as a development programme, transmigration also fulfilled the political motive of strengthening national integration in Indonesia by relocating members of the majority Javanese population to places throughout the archipelago (Levang, 2003), including posting military personnel (mostly Javanese) to border areas of the Indonesian archipelago.3 This helps to explain why Javanese culture has played such a significant role in the process of assimilation for the project of national integration in Indonesia (Elmhirst, 1999; Levang, 2003).

The transmigration programmes had a profound long-term impact on the ethnic composition of many regions in Indonesia. Lampung is just one example (Benoit, 1989; Central Statistical Bureau of Indonesia, 2013b; Central Statistical Bureau of Indonesia, 2013a). While the Lampungese formed a majority of the population in the province in 1930, they had become a minority in their homeland by the end of the 1970s. This is because Lampung was the province that received most and first migrants from Java (Côté, 2014). Consequently, the percentage of Lampungese decreased dramatically, from 70% in 1920 to less than 15% by the mid-1980s, and Lampung now has one of the highest proportions of migrants to ‘native people’ in Indonesia as well as the biggest concentration of Javanese outside Java (see Figure 3.2) (Kusworo, 2014; Benoit, 1989).

The transmigration programme has had multiple consequences – cultural, environmental and social; in addition, the process of relocation of millions of people has also had political consequences. This thesis focuses on subnational elections in

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3 In the Suharto era, three institutions linked to the state were used to stabilise national politics and maintain national integration: the military, Suharto’s political party Golongan Karya (Golkar), and the bureaucracy. The transmigration programme became the medium for deploying bureaucrats and military personnel throughout the Indonesian archipelago.
Indonesia and aims to show that the transmigration programme left political legacies that still influence the campaigns and results of subnational elections today. Indeed, as (Côté, 2014, p.116) argues, “the impacts of migration have been greatly magnified since the fall of the Suharto regime in 1998, with the gradual introduction of decentralization, regional autonomy, and direct elections of local district heads”.

Following the political reforms in 1998, Indonesia has slowly transformed into a democratic country. Of particular importance to this study are the post-1998 measures that were used to decentralise the country and provide greater power to the regions and municipalities. As stated above, before 1998 local and regional government leaders were chosen by members of the relevant local assembly. Historically, these elections were frequently subject to interference. The election of local leaders was generally a process to legitimate the candidate with the political ‘blessing’ of the Suharto regime (see chapter 3.3.3 and 3.2.3). In 2004 the national government adopted Law 32/2004, enabling direct elections of political leaders at local and regional level. It is fair to say that, thanks to this law, elections at subnational level have become more democratic and dynamic (Choi, 2007).

As a result of those legislative changes, direct elections have been held since 2005 for provincial and local leaders -- governors, heads of regency and city mayors -- and for provincial, regency and city assemblies. One consequence of this proliferation of elections has been that the size of ethnic groups within an administrative circumscription has become an important factor in subnational elections. Chandra (2012) reminds us about the relationship between ethnic demography and the electorate. Demographic shifts within a country can affect electoral results. The democratisation of the early 2000s resulted in political processes that hinge on ethnic identities and belonging. Decentralisation has also provided greater opportunity for Putra Daerah (literally, ‘sons of the region’) to obtain power by being elected as local leaders. Putra Daerah is the term used to refer to ‘native’ local people in Indonesia. This term is often used to distinguish between local people associated with a territory over generations and in-migrants and their descendants, especially in relation to political affairs.

Domination by Putra Daerah in local politics is seen in various parts of Indonesia, including Sumatra, Sulawesi and Kalimantan. The exclusive political rights of Putra Daerah were established as a reaction against the domination of central government
in the Suharto era. However, local politics in two centres of transmigration in Lampung, Metro and East Lampung, provide a counter trend, where local leaders (mayors and heads of regency) have been descendants of Javanese transmigrants in the last three consecutive subnational elections. On the other hand, although the Lampungese are a minority in their province, constituting only 13.5% of the population compared with 64% for the Javanese, they are able to control and dominate local power elsewhere in the province (see Tables 3.9 and 3.10). Most regency heads were ethnic Lampungese between 2005 and 2012 (Warganegara et al., 2013).

Subnational elections in Indonesia have attracted considerable scholarly attention, including work by Tanasaldy (2007) and Aspinall et al. (2011). However, there is little research into the role of transmigration in subnational elections in Indonesia. In particular, publications in English tend to separate the study of transmigration and local politics in Indonesia into two different domains. While the literature on transmigration explores the role of transmigration in development, as well as in social, cultural and environmental affairs (Elmhirst, 1997, p.12), it does not explore its political role. Moreover, the literature concerning subnational elections in Indonesia does not put a high premium on the role of ethnicity or, more specifically, the ethnic legacies of the transmigration programme (Tanasaldy, 2007; Aspinall et al., 2011). Further, none of the extant literature has studied the political legacies of transmigration upon current subnational election results. The literature on local Indonesian political studies has also failed to present a comprehensive examination of the landscape of local politics in transmigration-affected areas.

This thesis bridges the gap between the literature on transmigration and studies focusing on ethnicity and electoral studies in Indonesia. I argue that ethnic composition as a legacy of transmigration plays a key role in subnational elections in Lampung. In doing so, this thesis not only explores the importance of ethnicity as a consequence of political reform but also analyses other important factors that influence the dynamics of local politics in Lampung. Those related factors are the role of money, the importance of political patronage and networks, incumbency and the deployment of bureaucracy.

In terms of theory, Chandra (2007b) provides a general point of view on the narrative of democracy in patronage-based democratic countries where ethnicity is still an important aspect of the exchange of political interests between elites and voters in
elections. I engage with this theory in order to analyse the Indonesian context, even though not every detail of Chandra’s argument is appropriate for helping to understand the Indonesian context. As we shall see later in this thesis, Chandra’s argument needs to be strengthened by acknowledging that ethnicity is not the sole factor influencing subnational elections (I will discuss this in more detail in Chapter 2). The strength of her argument very much depends on the degree to which a region is or was affected by large-scale population movements such as the transmigration programme. In my thesis, I confirm her line of reasoning for areas affected by transmigration. In contrast, regions shaped much less or not at all by transmigration display a more complex picture: while ethnicity certainly plays a role, classic factors discussed in the literature on political behaviour, in particular incumbency and policy, take a much more prominent role.

In stating my case, I take issue with claims made by Indonesianists such as Aspinall (2011) and van Klinken (2008), who emphasise the diminishing importance of ethnicity and ethnicity-based organisations in Indonesian elections. However, as stated above, the strength of this argument differs according to place: the role of ethnicity is greater in areas characterised by waves of transmigration in the past and smaller in areas shaped by much less inward migration. Ethnicity remains a critical factor in those areas that have been marked by transmigration.

1.2 The Case of Lampung

This study focuses on transmigration and electoral politics in Lampung, a province in the south of Sumatra. Up until 1964, Lampung was a part of the province of South Sumatra. However, Law 3/1964 established the province of Lampung, it has a total area of 35,288 square kilometres (Central Statistical Bureau of Indonesia, 2016c) and borders the provinces of South Sumatra and Bengkulu in the north, the Sunda Strait in the south, the Java Sea in the east, and the Indian Ocean in the west (see Figure 1-1 below).
As of 2015, Lampung has 8,117,268 inhabitants (Central Statistical Bureau of Indonesia, 2015a). They live in 13 regencies, comparable to counties in the United Kingdom, and two cities, urban areas that form their own jurisdiction independently from the regencies that surround them (see Table 1.1 below).

Lampung was the first location of the transmigration programme initiated by the Dutch colonial administration in 1905. As a result of one century of relocation to Lampung, the province has become a heterogeneous society. In addition to the Lampungese themselves, many more ethnicities live in Lampung, including the Bugis of South Sulawesi, the Batak of North Sumatra, Javanese, and South Sumatrans. Thanks to
its diversity, Lampung is representative of the country as a whole, a multi-religious and multi-ethnic society.

Table 1. Cities, regencies and population numbers in Lampung Province

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>City or Regency</th>
<th>Total Population</th>
<th>Total Area (km²)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Central Lampung Regency</td>
<td>1,239,096</td>
<td>3,802.68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Lampung Regency</td>
<td>1,008,797</td>
<td>5,325.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>City of Bandar Lampung</td>
<td>979,287</td>
<td>296</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Lampung Regency</td>
<td>972,579</td>
<td>700.32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Lampung Regency</td>
<td>606,092</td>
<td>2,725.87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanggamus Regency</td>
<td>573,904</td>
<td>3,020.64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Way Kanan Regency</td>
<td>432,914</td>
<td>3,921.63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tulang Bawang Regency</td>
<td>429,515</td>
<td>3,466.32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pesawaran Regency</td>
<td>426,389</td>
<td>2,243.51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pringsewu Regency</td>
<td>386,891</td>
<td>625</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Lampung Regency</td>
<td>293,105</td>
<td>2,142.78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Tulang Bawang Regency</td>
<td>264,712</td>
<td>1,201</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mesuji Regency</td>
<td>195,682</td>
<td>2,184</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>City of Metro</td>
<td>158,415</td>
<td>61.79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pesisir Barat Regency</td>
<td>149,890</td>
<td>2,907.23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>8,117,268</strong></td>
<td><strong>34,623.80</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Central Statistical Bureau of Indonesia (2015a) and Central Statistical Bureau of Indonesia (2016b).

I selected three locations in Lampung to carry out fieldwork: two areas affected by transmigration, Metro and East Lampung, and one area which was not designated as a resettlement location for transmigrants, Bandar Lampung, the capital of Lampung. Areas affected by transmigration are characterised by an overwhelming majority of Javanese. In particular, East Lampung and Metro are known as ‘early footstep’ locations, having received transmigrants both in the colonial era and after independence. Even in areas that were not part of the transmigration programme, the
Javanese are in most cases the largest ethnic group; such is the case in Bandar Lampung. These can thus be labelled multi-ethnic areas.

Why does this thesis analyse the case of three subnational elections in three locations impacted differently by transmigration? Subnational elections, especially elections for city mayor and head of regency, were chosen after considering some factors. First, these elections afford a more dynamic opportunity for a study of local politics, especially in the context of ethnicity-based power, when compared for example with elections of local assembly members. Second, as Indonesia conducts mayoral and regency elections every five years, the schedule, with subnational elections conducted in December 2015, suited the timeframe of my PhD studies. On the other hand, local assembly elections were conducted in April 2014, six months before my PhD research officially began. Third, examining mayoral and regency elections helps tell a clearer story about ethnic politics than do local council elections because it casts into relief the strategies of individual candidates and the political elites that support them rather than the role of political parties, as would be the case for local assembly elections.

Table 1.2 The proportion of Javanese and Lampungese as a percentage of the population

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Regions</th>
<th>Javanese (%)</th>
<th>Lampungese (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>East Lampung Regency</td>
<td>81.2</td>
<td>8.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>City of Metro</td>
<td>71.8</td>
<td>10.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>City of Bandar Lampung</td>
<td>40.5</td>
<td>15.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Central Statistical Bureau of Indonesia (2013).

Unlike with Metro and East Lampung, the Javanese living in Bandar Lampung did not move there as a direct consequence of the transmigration programme. Even though there is no exact data on this migration process, most of the Javanese living in Bandar Lampung are professional workers (for example, lecturers, government employees and businesspeople) rather than workers in the agricultural sector – the employment sector that is most closely associated with transmigrants and their descendants.  

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4 This claim is derived from my experience of living and working in Bandar Lampung for more than ten years.
Other Javanese have migrated spontaneously over decades and centuries (see Chapter 8). Moreover, Bandar Lampung is the capital of the province, and its political characteristics might best represent the political dynamics of Lampung as a whole. Table 1. 2 presents the proportion of Javanese and Lampungese in the three research locations.

1.3 Research Aims and Objectives

This thesis examines the dynamics of subnational elections in the context of transmigration. More specifically, I explore the nature of political campaigns and the electoral outcomes of subnational elections in Lampung, distinguishing areas characterised by higher and lower degrees of transmigration to the province.

My research connects one of the most important social phenomena in Indonesian history, one that is now largely in the past, the transmigration programme, with the contemporary state of ethnic politics in Indonesia, which is largely predicated on the decentralisation of power with all of its ambiguous consequences. My own interest in this subject was given specific focus by what I argue in this thesis is a tendency in the literature to downplay the role of ethnicity in subnational elections and in particular to write transmigration out of the story altogether. I set out therefore to provide a fine-grained analysis of the motives and impulses affecting subnational elections in Lampung. The research questions I attempt to answer relate to the role of ethnic identity in subnational elections, the interplay between Lampungese and transmigrants (Javanese and Balinese) in local politics, the nature of the involvement of ethnic and religion-based organisations, and the influence of patronage and clientelism in the local political process. I observe these factors in my three case-study locations, each of which throws a somewhat differing light on the nature of the ethnic politics of Lampung. My thesis presents itself therefore as a revisionist corrective to narratives that tend to foreground money politics over residual ethnic issues occasioned by transmigration.

This thesis focuses on the issue of ethnicity in local politics as a result of the prolonged implementation of transmigration programmes in Lampung. My aim is to investigate and understand the political legacies of transmigration on the campaigns and results
of subnational elections in Lampung, and how ethnicity sits alongside other factors in shaping local electoral contests. To this end, I pursue the following objectives:

First, I seek to shed light on the political role of organisations representing the descendants of transmigrants – that is, ethnic-religious based organisations (ERBOs) -- in local politics. I analyse the historical development of these organisations, their organisational structure, membership and ideological viewpoints, as well as the political support they provide to candidates in local elections in Lampung.

ERBOs are part of a wider institutional network that influences people's political identity and ethnic affiliation. Secondly I focus specifically on Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), one of the largest ERBOs and one of Indonesia’s most influential Muslim organisations, and research its political role.

My third objective, looking beyond ERBOs, is to examine how identity and affiliation of candidates and voters is shaped in areas characterised by transmigration. This involves an in-depth understanding of the history and process of transmigration in each case and an analysis of how the legacies of this process inform the language, symbols and policies of contemporary political campaigns in Lampung, the patterns of domination and resistance between majority and minority ethnic groups, as well as the link between patronage and ethnic identity.

An important part of understanding the long-term impact of transmigration on electoral politics is to explore the political strategy deployed by the Lampungese as they seek to maintain their position in local politics in those areas with a majority of Javanese transmigrants. This, my fourth objective, involves analysing local Lampungese political experiences in transmigration affected areas. I do this by examining local elections in areas with a majority of Javanese transmigrants, by analysing the role of political parties in local elections, and by investigating the political survival strategies used by the Lampungese minority in dealing politically with Javanese transmigrant descendants in subnational elections.

Ethnicity, however, is not the only factor that impinges on electoral politics. My fifth objective, therefore, is to analyse the extent to which other factors affect the outcome of electoral contests. Political networks and patronage, money politics, support from the bureaucracy and the advantages of incumbency all play a part in affecting the
outcome of mayoral and regency elections. The interplay between these various factors can be quite subtle, making interpretation open to discussion.

1.4 Structure of the Thesis

This thesis is organised into nine chapters. Chapter 1 has introduced the reader to subnational elections in the context of transmigration. The second section presented the case study locations and the reasons for choosing Lampung as the research location. The third section introduced the research aims and objectives of this thesis. This section explains the structure of the thesis.

Chapter 2 provides a literature review and discusses the conceptual approaches underpinning studies of ethnic politics and patronage. The chapter consists of five sections, the fifth of which presents a conclusion. The first offers an understanding of ethnicity and ethnic identity; this is followed by an explanation of ethnic politics and voting. The third section explains contemporary Indonesian (local) political studies from the point of view of ethnicity and patronage. The fourth section explores the issues behind ethnic politics and patronage in a global context; it consists of two sub-sections, one on South and South East Asia and the other on Africa.

Chapter 3 discusses the general setting and basic information underpinning the research, including background information on the research locations as well as key research topics. Firstly, the chapter provides general information on provinces, regencies and cities. The second section provides an introduction to the context of politics and election in Indonesia. In this section, I explain three important contexts: understanding regional electoral politics in Indonesia, politics in the reform era and a brief history of subnational elections and their mechanism. The third section introduces the reader to relevant aspects of the geography, politics and ethnic coalitions in Lampung. It consists of four discussions: setting the scene in Lampung, political and socio-economic conditions in East Lampung, Metro and Bandar Lampung and a brief explanation of the dynamics of ethnic coalitions in Lampung’s politics. The fourth section provides a discussion of the transmigration programme and spontaneous migration in Lampung.
Chapter 4 discusses the research design and methodology employed in this thesis. The chapter starts with an introduction to the methods employed and cases chosen, followed by details about data collection methods. The third and fourth sections explain how the data were managed and the various ethical considerations involved. In the fifth section, I reflect on my position as a Lampungese and what this means to my own research. The sixth section raises and discusses some of the limitations of my research.

Chapters 5 to 8 present the empirical findings of this thesis. Chapter 5 discusses the political role of ERBOs in Lampung, including analysis of eight different ERBOs. The first part of the chapter provides a general understanding of ERBOs in Lampung, explaining the typology and providing an overview of each ERBO. By applying Fennema’s conceptual framework of ethnic organisations, this chapter examines ERBOs with respect to four key aspects: membership, political roles, political involvement, and classification of the organisation (Fennema, 2004). The chapter discusses how some organisations have been categorised as ethnic interest organisations, religious organisations, or as a mix of ethnic associations and ethnic political associations, as well as ethnic identity organisations. The chapter also defines ERBOs in terms of whether they are politically active or passive. Section two introduces PATRI (Perhimpunan Anak Transmigran Republik Indonesia, Association of the Children of Transmigrants in the Indonesian Republic), an ERBO which represents transmigrants in Lampung. The following sections introduce a number of other ERBOs, some that are politically active, others passive, that stand for the interests of Sundanese, Bantenese, Balinese and Indonesian-Chinese. The final substantive section discusses the political role of Lampung Sai, the Lampungese ERBO. The chapter concludes that even within the two types of ERBO, both those that are politically active and those that remain largely out of the political fray, with their different notions of political support and activity.

Chapter 6 examines local politics in Metro, a transmigration-affected location. This chapter analyses how local politics here have been shaped, starting with a discussion of the historical context and legacy of the transmigration programme under Dutch rule. The chapter concludes that there are several legacies of transmigration in the local politics of Metro. The second section discusses, in the context of mayoral elections, what it means to be a ‘new’ native of Metro or Asli Wong Metro. The local elite use the sentiments of being a native of Metro to influence the decisions of voters. Over
the last few decades, and particularly after the implementation of the direct system for subnational elections in 2005, local politics in Metro have been characterised by the domination of migrant descendants over Lampungese. The themes of ethnicity and mayoral elections in Metro are elaborated in section three. The fourth section discusses support from the bureaucracy, campaign funding and money in subnational elections. At the centre of this chapter stands the attempts to construct a new identity for the descendants of transmigrants as ‘new’ natives, a phenomenon not seen elsewhere.

Chapter 7 expands on local politics in the second transmigration-affected location under review, East Lampung. It begins with an explanation of the general background to local politics in the regency, where the positions in local politics are primarily occupied by the descendants of Javanese transmigrants. The second section analyses NU’s informal political role in subnational elections and the kind of political support it provides for particular candidates. On the basis of data gathered from participants, I analyse the informal political support offered by this organisation for particular candidates in subnational elections. The third section of this chapter discusses the survival strategy used by the Lampungese to maintain their political position in areas with a Javanese majority, the most common of which is to form inter-ethnic coalitions in subnational elections, especially with the Javanese. The fourth section explains the minimal role played by political parties in subnational elections and their role as ‘vote-getting machines’, a role that is taken on instead by the ERBOs. The case of local politics in East Lampung shows that the role of ERBOs is more important than that of political parties; a discussion of the results of the regency elections in 2005, 2010 and 2015 is provided in this section. In the final section, I conclude that the issue of ethnicity is still relevant and is one of the most important considerations among voters, and this is reinforced by the important political role played by ethnic-religious based organisations.

Chapter 8 discusses local politics in an area that did not form a part of the transmigration programme, Bandar Lampung. As the capital city of Lampung, this city has a different political history from the two transmigration-affected areas. The chapter starts by exploring the local political dynamics, particularly those of the party nominations for mayoral candidates. The first section discusses the history of Bandar Lampung with special regard to migration processes. In the second section, I relate how, unlike in Metro and East Lampung, in Bandar Lampung local politics goes
beyond the ethnicity issue. The third section looks at how the selection of candidates for the mayoral elections is dominated by pragmatic considerations; this section also discusses money and political parties in the local politics of Bandar Lampung. The fourth section examines incumbency, popular programmes and the absence of ethnic sentiment in mayoral elections.

Chapter 9 presents five conclusions. First, the revival in the post-1998 reform era of ethnic sentiment has led to a reaffirmation of ethnic political identity in transmigration-affected areas such as the application of Asli Wong Metro political identity in local politics in Metro. Second, ERBOs promote and strengthen ethnic sentiment, helping to shape the electoral decisions that voters make. Third, I argue that there are similarities in the role played by patronage democracy between Lampung and Indonesia as a whole; patronage democracy has become an important narrative of day-to-day local politics in Lampung. Fourth, I underline the Javanese and Lampungese power balance especially in transmigration-affected Metro and East Lampung. Fifth, I show that politics in areas that were not transmigration destinations provide a different narrative in which a number of factors including the good performance of the incumbent reduces the role played by ethnic sentiment in elections. Of these conclusions, it is the first one that stands out strongest and defines this research.
Chapter 2
Researching Ethnic Politics in a Patronage Democracy

2.1 Understanding Ethnicity and Ethnic Identity

The previous chapter discussed the background to the research, including its aims and objectives. This chapter will provide a literature review that embeds the current research in wider currents of thought. This thesis is more focused on the study of ethnic politics rather than ethnicity per se, and therefore, in order to provide a deeper understanding of the theoretical framework of ethnic politics, this chapter begins with a basic explanation of the concept of ethnicity, followed by a more detailed discussion of ethnic politics and voting in section 2.2.

Further, it will show that there is no significant existing literature that explores the intersection of transmigration and local politics in Indonesia, although some research has related transmigration to political issues, taking stock on its impact on national integration (Hoey, 2003).

A number of studies of transmigration focus on social, cultural, gender and environmental issues (Zaman, 2002; Elmhirst, 1997; Elmhirst, 2000), yet none of these discuss the political legacies created by the transmigration programme and its effect on subnational elections in Indonesia, a theme that is especially pertinent in relation to ethnicity and political identity construction. This chapter is organised as follows. In this section, I review some definitions of the terms ethnicity and ethnic identity, before providing an examination of the literature on ethnic politics and voting in section 2.2. Section 2.3 then discusses ideas coming out of the literature on local politics in Indonesia, including the link between ethnicity and patronage, as well as various issues concerning subnational elections in Indonesia. Section 2.4 applies these questions in a broader context.
Here, I introduce and discuss the various definitions that are given for ethnicity and ethnic identity by academics within ethnicity studies. Hutchinson and Smith (1996, pp.8-9) have put forward a typology of three theoretical approaches to understanding ethnicity: primordialist, social constructivist, and transactionalist. Primordialists argue that ethnicity is “static and naturalistic”; social constructivists (also sometimes referred to as instrumentalists) understand it as “socially constructed”, believing it to be “a social, political and cultural source for different interest and status groups”; and transactionalists such as Barth (1998, p.9) conceive it as a unit of ascription under which “social boundaries ensure the persistence of the group”.

Horowitz (1971) noted that academics often use the concepts of “race” and “ethnicity” interchangeably. The concept of race closely relates with colour classification and differences in colour; it can be used as a basis for loyalties or a symbol of identity for a particular community. On ethnicity, Hutchinson and Smith (1996, p.4) have explained that:

“The term ethnicity is, quite clearly, a derivative of the much older term and more commonly used adjective ethnic which in the English language goes back to the Middle Ages. The English adjective ‘ethnic’ in turn derives from the ancient Greek term ethnos and it was used as a synonym of gentile, that is, non-Christian and non-Jewish pagan (itself a rendering of the Hebrew goy) in New Testament Greek. In French, for example, the Greek noun survives as ethnie, with an associated adjective ethnique. As the English language has no concrete noun for ethnos or ethnie, the French term is used here to demote an ethnic community or ethnic group.”

Jenkins (2008, p.10), using a social anthropology approach, argues that ethnicity has increasingly been seen as the key factor of “group differentiation” in Europe, North America and the broader global context. In short, Jenkins (2008, p.14) has argued that ethnicity is “a matter of cultural differentiation […] an identification […] externalized in social interaction and the categorization of others, and internalized in personal self-identification” (ibid, p.14). Similarly, Hutchinson and Smith (1996, p.5) have pointed out that ethnic identity and ethnic origin “refer to individual levels of identification with a culturally defined collectivity, the sense of the part of the individual that she or he belongs to a particular cultural community”.

Chandra (2012) maintains that ethnicity is a broader concept than this, and that the relationship between ethnicity and other factors gives rise to it possessing a plurality of definitions from many different points of view. For Chandra, ethnic identity is not a single concept: “It is not one big concept or three, but many tens of narrow ones, each
logically connected to the others” (ibid, p.11). In short, there are two categories that can be used to understand the concept of ethnicity: ethnic structure and practice – and both these concepts “can be disaggregated” in various ways. Furthermore, she argues that:

“Ethnic structure refers to any concept that describes nominal descent-based attributes that characterize individuals or populations or the nominal categories generated from these attributes. These include, in no particular order: an individual’s repertoire of attributes, the repertoire of nominal ethnic identity categories generated from these attributes, the distribution of attributes and category repertoires in a population, the characteristic of attribute-dimensions (e.g., their degree of stickiness or visibility), the relationship between attribute-dimensions (e.g., cross-cutting, nested, or ranked) and so on. Ethnic practice refers to any concept related to the attributes and ethnic identity categories activated by individuals and populations in different contexts.” (2012, p.11)

The concept of “ethnic practice” discussed by Chandra (2012, p.13) results in a very dynamic definition of ethnicity. For example, activated ethnic categories could be used to differentiate between two distinct categories of identity: public and private. Public identity has two dimensions: non-institutionalised politics (for example, violence and protest) and institutionalised politics (for example, voters and parties). In this sense, Chandra’s thinking differs from primordialist thought. Chandra argues that ethnic identity needs a consensus rather than a given definition, as the primordialists believe.

Chandra therefore takes issue with Horowitz, who developed a definition of ethnicity from a primordial perspective, relying on factors relating to physical appearance (Horowitz, 1971). Chandra’s understanding of ethnicity provides a more practical and quantified conception, suggesting that it should not merely be represented by “descent-based attributes”, but rather should incorporate a wider array of features that make reference to individuals and populations in different contexts (Chandra, 2012, pp.11-12). Thus, ethnicity is not a single concept (see Figure 2-1).
Chandra (2012, p.14) claims that descent-based attributes are “sticky” and “visible” properties. Stickiness is associated with the “body”, as for example with the colour of the skin. Stickiness is the property of “being difficult to change”, whereas visibility refers “to the availability of raw data even in superficial observation” (ibid, p.14). Horowitz (1985), in contrast, argued that ethnicity is a social concept that is based on “the myth of collective ancestry”, and characterised by the “trait” of the “innate”. This conception of ethnicity relies more on the traditions that are transferred from one generation to another.

Writing about ethnic identity, Chandra defines it as “a subset of categories in which descent-based attributes are necessary for membership” (Chandra, 2007b, p.9). Along similar lines, Takei (1998, p.59) has argued that, instead of considering “ancestry and culture” as the natural factors of ethnic identity, we should understand collective memory as the key for unveiling the general idea of ethnic identity. Relying on Weber’s insistence that ethnicity is a social construction (Hechter, 1976), he argues that ethnicity is something related to the “belief in common ancestry” that results in “collective political action” and “collective interest” (ibid, p.10); this is relatively similar to the concept of politics as collective identity as argued by Parekh (2008). For Chandra (2007b), ethnic identity should be clearly defined before it can be used in assessing or building theories of ethnic identity.

In the context of Indonesia, I support the position that ethnicity is a socially ubiquitous category, as described by Goebel (2013). This enables us to argue that ethnicity is related to culture and language: it is defined by analysing the language spoken, customs and habits associated with a particular ethnic group. No single definition of ethnicity is sufficient to reflect the complexity of the Indonesian context with its great
demographic diversity. In terms of numbers belonging to one ethnic group or another, I have used government data as provided in the official ethnic population survey by the Indonesian Government in 2010. According to this survey, which is conducted every 10 years by the Indonesian Government, ethnicity is simply defined based on patrilinealism and self-identification at the time the survey is conducted (Central Statistical Bureau of Indonesia, 2013a).

According to Ananta et al. (2015, p.19) the method used in Indonesian ethnic surveys is based on “self-identification”, according to how the respondents define themselves. “With self-identification, the name of an ethnic group is recorded according to the perception of the respondent”. In my experience, most respondents provide an ethnic identification that tallies with their father’s ethnic group (patrilinealism). If a child is born to parents of mixed ethnicity -- a Javanese father and a Lampungese mother, for example -- she or he will almost certainly identify him or herself as Javanese in the national ethnic survey.

2.2 Ethnic Politics and Voting

Having briefly discussed the concept of ethnicity in the previous section, this section will now explore the nexus between ethnicity and voting.

When looking the intersection between ethnicity and politics, there are three approaches that are used for understanding the nexus between ethnicity and politics – primordialist, instrumentalist, transactionalist -- affect voting behaviour in a variety of ways. The relationship between ethnicity and political behaviour has been discussed extensively by both primordialists and social constructivists. Primordialists hold that ethnicity influences the results of elections, arguing that majority ethnic groups have greater opportunities to win than minority groups (Dahl, 1973; Guinier, 1994; McGann, 2004). Primordialists hold to the basic view that the majority group dominate the minority in the political arena. However, this claim has been rejected by Chandra (2007b), who suggests that the argument that majority groups have a political advantage in electoral competitions is overly simplistic. Social constructivists believe that ethnic identity is socially constructed and therefore influences the demographic pattern that affects the electoral result. For transactionalists such as Barth (1998), however, social boundaries are the key for understanding relations
between ethnicity and politics. The discussion that follows considers each of these positions in turn – primordialist, social constructivist and transactionalist.

It was Horowitz (1971) who developed the classic approach to the theory of ethnic politics and mobilisation from a primordialist standpoint. He described three dimensions that are widely accepted today and regarded as the basis for understanding the importance of ethnic, racial and religious matters in a particular political context. These three dimensions are the structure of group differentiation, the locus of political interaction and the question of colour. Horowitz (1985, p.12) claimed that political competition always has “ethnic consequences” in a heterogenous and divided society.

Theoretically, ethnicity and the application of ethnic sentiment in a particular election becomes one of the most important aspects of voting behaviour. Cohen (1996), for example, pointed out that ethnicity is essentially a political phenomenon: people never experience conflict merely because of different cultural backgrounds, but rather because those different cultural backgrounds are associated with particular political cleavages, whereby people are connected to each other through mutual interests. The logic of this way of thinking can be applied to explain how politicians use ethnic sentiment for political purposes, for example in elections.

Horowitz (1985) pointed out that, in ethnically divided countries, ethnic-based conflict provides the central focus of politics, with every conflict relating to competition for political power. This implies that ethnic-based electoral competition may occur in ethnically diverse countries such as Indonesia, India and Malaysia. However, in Indian and Malaysian politics, ethnic-based parties are embedded within the political system and become the most effective medium of reciprocal relations between the interests of voters and elites. The absence of ethnic-based political parties in Indonesia, by contrast, has meant that relations between voters and elites are less visible.

For social constructivists, however, “electoral politics is an important process affecting ethnic identity change” (Chandra, 2012, p.28). This position is also adopted by social constructivists such as (Weiner, 1967; Young, 1979; Shamsul, 1999). For this group of academics, identity is a process of social construction. As one of the most influential constructivist theorists of ethnic politics, Chandra (2006, p.398) emphasises the
importance of building a common consensus on the definition of ethnic identity. Similarly to Chandra, Chettri (2014, pp.225-226) argues that:

“The enactment of ethnic politics also performs the latent function of making democracy more inclusive, accessible and relevant to those whose transition to democracy is recent. This has led to the evolution of ethnic democracy, a regional form of democracy where ethnic identity works in tandem with democratic institutions to establish a political system that is representative of the people, their culture and their politics”.

In this sense, Chettri also claims that the “lack of consensus and failure to address socio-economic grievances successfully” are among the problems of ethnic-based democracy but also part of “the nature and outcome” of political contestation where there is a dynamic interplay between ethnicity and democracy (ibid, p.226). From a different point of view, Chandra (2007b) also argues that the power of collective action is always based on the collective interests of particular ethnic groups, and this is commonly used to manipulate the electorate to gain political support. This phenomenon is seen to occur in a diverse range of patronage democracies, including India and Indonesia. Chandra (2007a) further argues that similar cultures make political transactions easier in patronage democracies, and that this is further evidence that ethnic similarity is essential for the drawing out of relationships between elites and voters in a patronage democracy where ethnic and religious sentiments are the key media for communication between elites and voters.5

Consequently, in a country with a patronage democracy, ethnic voting is based on the premise of “elites and voters seeking both material and psychic goods” (Chandra, 2007b, p.12). This raises a couple of important questions: How are the reciprocal benefits between elites and voters linked? How can the benefits be distributed amongst elites and voters? How can voters be effectively targeted? After all, beneficial reciprocal relations between elites and voters are the most important aspect of voting decisions in patronage democracies.

In response to the idea of distribution of resources alongside ethnic sentiment, Chandra (2007b, p.1) claims that “voters in patronage democracies […] choose between parties by conducting ethnic head counts rather than by comparing policy platforms or ideological positions”. Thus, ethnicity becomes an important factor that

5 Patronage democracy is defined as states where elected officials may distribute resources controlled by the state to voters on an individual basis (Chandra, 2007b).
links the political interests of elites and voters. Two actors are central to patronage democracies: benefit-seeking voters and office-seeking elites. In order to forge a common interest between these two groups, the presence of either material or psychic goods, or some combination of the two, is needed. Chandra (2007b, p.11) claims that patronage democracy:

"Typically approximates a situation in which observer (voters) are forced to distinguish between individuals (the recipients of past patronage transactions) under severe information constraints. These severe information constraints produce a self-enforcing equilibrium of ethnic favouritism: voters expect co-ethnic elites to favour them in the distribution of benefits and elites expect co-ethnic voters to favour them in the distribution of votes".

In a newly-established democratic country characterised by uneven development, “it is difficult for voters to estimate the probability that an (elite) party will support their interests” (Hislope, 2005, p.578). These information constraints can “force the voters and politicians to favour co-ethnic groups in the delivery of benefits and votes”. In this context, voters are more motivated to vote for the elite with a similar ethnic background. Thus, ethno-based voting is an effective way of promoting the mutual interests of the voter and the candidate. Furthermore, the limited information available to the voter is a way of further encouraging an equilibrium of ethnic favouritism in patronage democracies (see Figure 2-2).

**Figure 2-2 Equilibrium of ethnic favouritism**


Transactionists such as Barth, on the other hand, argue that ethnicity does not come from within individuals but relates to the “boundary of their group” so that “interaction is key, not isolation” (van Klinken, 2003, p.108; Barth, 1998). Barth (1998, p.22) also claims that the process of migration and conquest has contributed towards changing the ethnic identity of the individual or group. Migration thus also has political consequences, especially within electoral competitions. There are some similarities, then, between Barth and the social constructivist proponents, who share an
understanding of the characteristics of ethnic (groups), with “the possession of a limited set of cultural differentiae which separate insiders from outsiders” being the essential factor rather than their internal homogeneity (Chandra, 2007b, p.37).

Chandra’s (2007b) analysis of Indian politics provides a similar story to Lampung’s local politics, especially with regard to voting in subnational elections. In transmigration-affected areas, the symptoms are generally similar to those Chandra is writing about and theorising in India, that is to say, the essence of ethnic politics lies in the way that state resources are distributed by the elite based on ethnic interests. However, Chandra’s ideas about the role of political parties in a patronage democracy do not suit the Indonesian political context where the role of informal politics in subnational elections is more significant than the formal dimension. In this thesis, therefore, I am relying not only on the social constructivist definition of ethnic (identity) politics to examine ethnic politics in subnational elections; local politics is such a challenging phenomenon in Indonesia, it needs various approaches to explain its dynamics and take into account a variety of factors including political networks, the role of money and the importance of incumbency.

As a result of the dynamic nature of local politics in Indonesia, no single theory is able to provide a comprehensive explanation. This thesis therefore draws on a number of theoretical approaches to portray politics in the three different research locations. For example, in Chapter 5 on the political role of ERBOs, I have applied Fennema’s (2004) theory of ethnic organisation, which builds on the author’s conceptualisation and characteristics of ethnic organisation. Fennema (2004) identifies four different types of ERBO: namely, ethnic associations, ethnic interest organisations, ethnic political associations, and ethnic identity organisations. I also refer to Tillie and Slijper’s (2006) discussion of ERBOs based on their organisational missions. Each type of ERBO has a different approach in subnational elections: a critical assessment of the informal political role of ERBOs in local politics of Lampung will be presented in the next chapter and in Chapter 5. In this sense, I observe that the informal (or non-party) dimension of politics plays a significant role in the Indonesian political context nowadays; for instance, one need look no further than the role played by ethnic-religious based organisations (ERBOs) in providing support for a particular candidate in subnational elections. ERBOs become very important actors – much more important than political parties -- in distributing state resources on the ground (this will be followed up in Chapters 5, 6 and 7).
Berenschot (2018), in the context of a comparison between Indian and Indonesian politics, states that the political party has become the dominant institution that organises the campaign, including distributing gifts and money to voters in India, but it is very different, he writes, with Indonesian politics, where campaigns organised by politicians rely on personal networks, parties and pragmatics volunteers.

Chandra’s theorising on the nature of ethnic politics in a patronage democracy is relevant in the context of local politics, especially in transmigration-affected areas such as Metro and East Lampung. However, the case of local politics in Bandar Lampung, an area unaffected by transmigration, shows that local electoral politics is not all about ethnicity. Here, then, this thesis calls on other theoretical arguments that help explain complex and dynamic phenomena. For example, Trounstine (2011) has written on the advantage of being the incumbent in elections. This argument therefore supports the discussion in this thesis and my point that ethnicity is not the sole factor in electoral dynamics in the context of Indonesia and needs to be considered alongside incumbency, money and political networks.

To sum up, the dynamics of local politics in Indonesia have led me to apply various theories and arguments. As an umbrella theory, both Fennema and Chandra have similar points of view on the role of ethnicity as the essential factor behind electoral dynamics. Further, these two arguments can also claim to be embedded with social constructivist approaches to ethnic politics.

2.3 Ethnicity and Patronage in Contemporary Indonesian Local Politics

The previous section examined the broader context of work on ethnicity and politics and related this to the Indonesian context. In this section, the focus is more specifically on Indonesia and the positions taken by Indonesianists on the role of patronage alongside ethnicity and other factors in accounting for voter behaviour and the relationship between elites and voters in subnational elections. The themes underpinning the research of Indonesianists include the political behaviour of elites, ethno-religious issues that involve subnational electoral contests, and patronage and the role of political networks.
Like colleagues writing on and theorising from India, Indonesian specialists have also focused on the nature of patronage democracy. David (1994, p.82) writes that:

“The politicization of ethnicity becomes even more likely where patrimonial elites seek to mobilize popular support so as to promote their own individual political positions, since appeals to communal solidarity have the advantage of cutting across and inhibiting class alignments. In the urban areas of Indonesia, many patron-client relationships are probably not communally based. But the large majority (about 85 per cent) of Indonesians live in rural village communities, and the patrons with major social and political influence are those community leaders who have access to material resources or elements of traditional authority”.

Beyond this focus on patronage democracy, research on Indonesian politics includes work on democratisation and ethnic politics (Aspinall, 2011), on the role of religion and ethnicity in local politics (Aspinall et al., 2011), on the role of brokers, patronage and clientelism in local politics (Aspinall and Sukmajati, 2016; Aspinall and As’ad, 2015), on ethnic politics in West Kalimantan (Tanasaldy, 2012) and on ethnicity and local politics in Kendari (Sjaf, 2014). At the centre of this work is the issue of ethnicity vis-à-vis religion, patronage democracy and vote-buying in the context of the weakness of Indonesian political institutions in local politics.

In their focus on issues of ethnicity and patronage, some scholars have provided extensive analyses of ethnicity, patronage, local elites and electoral politics in Indonesia, and in particular locations in Indonesia (Tanasaldy, 2012; Aspinall et al., 2011). Tanasaldy (2012), for example, analyses Dayak politics in West Kalimantan, explaining the political contests that exist between Dayaks and Malays. However, this research fails to analyse the pattern of migration that resulted in the balance of population numbers of these two ethnic groups and the impact of this on local politics.

Aspinall’s (2011) research into ethnic politics leads him to claim that the issue of ethnicity is of lesser importance in subnational elections due to the political compromises that take place amongst the elites in Indonesia. He finds that political bargaining is not based on similarity between party manifestos but on more pragmatic factors. However, this research lacks an understanding of the context within which political compromises are made, compromises that mask the role of ethnicity in the

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6 Brokers are the persons or groups who mediate the interests of candidates and voters in an election especially in relation to vote-buying activities.
bargaining. Consideration of what lies behind these compromises is needed in order to refine Aspinall's findings.

(2008)'s research bears similarities to Aspinall's work in that he puts forward the idea that ethnic clientelism plays a limited role in contemporary Indonesian politics, emphasising the diminishing role of ethnicity in local politics. Van Klinken concludes that ethnic organisations such as the South Sulawesi Family Association (KKSS) fail to mobilise their members in support of particular candidates in subnational elections due to a lack of internal consolidation caused by a polarisation of interests among its members (ibid, p.57). However, his findings do not provide strong evidence that ethnicity is playing a diminishing role in local politics as his research is based on a limited number of ethnic organisations in a specific location. Further research is needed with a greater number of ethnic organisations to produce a comprehensive analysis of the influence of ethnicity in this context.

Research on the importance of ethnic patronage and political networking has been conducted by Davidson and Henley (2007), who studied the role of adat (customs) in local politics. They argue that adat is one of the most important aspects for understanding the current dynamics of Indonesian local political. The idea of an adat community became a more overtly political movement in the reform era. For instance, the political networks associated with adat communities became a trigger for the revival of the exclusive political role of Putra Daerah in the local politics of Indonesia (see Chapter 1.1). This was advocated by adat communities across Indonesia as part of the process of political bargaining in an attempt to reduce the revival of ethn-nationalist sentiment during the early years of political decentralisation in the reform era.

Côté and Mitchell (2016) claim that the issue of Putra Daerah is essential to an understanding of local politics in Papua and the Riau Archipelago. Taking a comparative approach between the case of Putra Daerah in Indonesia and in West Africa, the authors argue that the exclusive narrative of Putra Daerah becomes one of the electoral strategies deployed by local politicians to mobilise voters. But this also creates a greater chance of inter-ethnic conflict between locals and migrants. While this research is comprehensive in the way it relates Putra Daerah to subnational elections and conflict over domination of local politics, it fails to provide an
understanding of the influence that the process of migration can have on inter-ethnic political conflict and competition in Indonesia.

Buehler and Tan (2007) analyse the dynamics of local politics in Indonesia in terms of the influence of the local democratisation process on ethnicity and clan politics in several subnational elections in South Sulawesi, focusing on the relationship between party and candidate. They argue that local politics in South Sulawesi have been captured by the Limpo family, one of the most powerful clans in South Sulawesi. Syahrul Yasin Limpo is the current governor of South Sulawesi, and he is the provincial leader of the Golkar party. During his two periods of service as governor, a number of his relatives have been installed as public officials and politicians, including his sister Dewi Yasin Limpo, who later became a member of the national assembly, and his brother Ichsan Yasin Limpo, head of Gowa regency between 2005 and 2015.

Aspinall and As’ad (2016)’s research has a similar concern to that of Buehler and Tan. Their work, which focuses on Central Kalimantan, seeks to explain the revival of family politics in Indonesian local politics in general and in Central Kalimantan in particular. Although Aspinall and As’ad conducted their research in different locations to Buehler and Tan, their findings in Central Kalimantan indicate that domination of politics by powerful families is also a phenomenon in Central Kalimantan. Aspinall and As’ad (2016) attribute the strength of family politics to the weak socio-economic conditions of Indonesian society, as a result of which money and ethnicity have become the medium for vote casting in subnational elections.

Specific research on clientelism and voting behaviour in Indonesia has been conducted by Allen (2015). Allen claims that patron-client relations between the voter and candidate exist in areas where the state plays a dominant role in the economic sector, especially with regards to the distribution of goods once a particular candidate has been elected in a subnational election. Similar research has also been conducted by Aspinall and Rohman (2017). Although their research is more focused on identifying the typology and role of political brokers in local politics in Indonesia, it nevertheless also examines how brokers and their political networks become vote-getting machines for particular candidates.

The studies introduced above focus on the importance of political networks and clientelism in local politics in Indonesia. Even research on patronage is largely
concerned with the study of political networking and clientelism. Blunt et al. (2012) focus on similar issues, but their work relates to a different narrative on political patronage in Indonesia. They analyse the impact of patronage on the bureaucratic process of government, arguing that patronage has affected the performance of services delivered by local government.

The impact of democratisation has led to the establishment of a new elite in Indonesia. Studies on elites have also been conducted by a new generation of Indonesian scholars (Honna, 2012; Mietzner, 2012; Bandiera and Levy, 2011; van Klinken, 2009). Their research focuses on various issues within Indonesian elite studies. For example, Bandiera and Levy (2011, p.1329) claim that “evidence from local government outcomes in Indonesian villages suggests that policies are closer to the preferred outcomes of the elites when the polity is divided along ethnic lines”. They argue that elites are always connected to ethnicity in Indonesian local politics. The emergence of a political role for the local elite has also been studied by Savirani (2016), whose research focuses on the domination of one family in Pekalongan in Central Java. She argues that “institutional factors have a mixed impact on the fate of the local dynasty” and family politics needs to adapt their strategy to the maintenance of their power in local politics (ibid, p.417).

Currently, the main debates among researchers working on Indonesian local politics revolve around money politics, gangsterism and the role of local power brokers in controlling state agencies and resources. The contested elites and their behaviour – such as the domination by local mafias over resources, networks and clans in local politics – are the central themes of Sidel’s work on Indonesian local politics (2004, p. 17). In their studies on the role of money in Indonesian local politics, (Aspinall et al., 2017; Aspinall and Rohman, 2017) have drawn attention to the significant role played by money in electoral contests.

The existence of family politics in South Sulawesi, Central Kalimantan and Central Java point to the strong presence of political patronage in local politics during the reform era with its flagship policy of decentralisation. This suggests that local strongmen use their power to maintain political interests by establishing patron-client politics. The political domination of the Limpo family, for example, suggests the extent to which the local politics of Indonesia is dominated by local elites and political patrons. However, most of the research on the emergence of local elites has been
limited to specific locations, such as Central Kalimantan and Pekalongan. There have been no comparative analyses undertaken in order to create more comprehensive research findings.

Specific research on the role of local elites and the phenomenon of patron-clients relations in managing Indonesia’s natural resources has been conducted by Zuhro et al. (2009), Eilenberg (2009) and Nasution (2018). Eilenberg has pointed out that decentralisation has created more complex relations between local elites and the state, particularly when it comes to two issues: the governance of natural resources and issues related to borderlands. The collusion between local elites and foreigners over illegal forest logging has become a significant environmental problem that is poorly managed by state regulators in the decentralised era. Eilenberg conducted research on the day-to-day political interactions between local elites and the state in the context of negotiating and claiming authority over land on the borders of protected forests. Set in West Kalimantan and placed at the nexus of a newly created regency and illegal loggers, this research shows that there are complex relations between the local elite and the state: “The reshuffling of authority since decentralization has sharpened the (interethnic) struggle over resources at the local level” (2009, p. 224). A similar conclusion is reached by Nasution (2018) in his research on conflicting demands from the state, conservation interests, mining companies and local people in drawing boundaries around Batang Gadis National Park in North Sumatra.

Although Eilenberg has provided an interesting analysis of the impact of decentralisation on natural resource management, the socio-economic issues that can be a trigger for activities that cause environmental damage are not engaged with in her research. Nasution, on the other hand, points to the paradox created when an international conservation body and a mining company ally themselves to local elites who then adopt policies which are seen by many local villagers as detrimental to their interests. In sum, decentralisation has resulted in a paradox in Indonesia. It would appear that the greater political opportunity that the central government has given local government has not allowed the latter to create better policies for local people. Rather, costly subnational elections have led to local elites spending time and money winning votes rather than undertaking urgent political tasks such as tackling poverty.

At the national level, Aspinall (2014b) addresses the issue of patron-client politics in Indonesia’s national assembly. He examines the effect of the open list system on
parliamentary elections and claims that it has created a patronage-based political system where personalism is more important than party affiliation. Dettman et al. (2017, p.119), in a study of the 2014 national elections, find there to be an in-built advantage to the incumbent in the open-list proportional system. Their research challenges much of the existing literature, which tends to cite the disadvantages faced by the incumbent seeking re-election. Dettman et al. (2017) find that “the Indonesian case appears to be more typical of advanced industrial democracies: incumbency offers a consistent advantage to candidates for legislative elections, one that cannot be reduced to any systematically observable candidate characteristics” (ibid, p.119).

Choi (2007) analyses the role of national parties in nominating candidates in subnational elections by taking the Riau Archipelago gubernatorial election as a case study. He has claimed that although the national parties have a strong role in nominating candidates, they have no significant role in conducting the electoral campaign because of their weakness in delivering the “national platform” to supporters (ibid, p. 342). This poses challenges for political parties, given that popular candidates at both national and provincial level become more interested in attracting voters rather than in the political manifesto of the party. The weak institution of the political party is a result of elite pragmatism, which neglects the importance of providing good political education to voters. For example, political parties become more concerned with giving money or gifts than with explaining their political manifesto during their campaigning.

Studies of the impact of decentralisation on contested inter-ethnic power and ethnic conflict in Indonesia have been conducted by Indonesianists such as van Klinken, who has researched communal violence in Kalimantan and its distinctive nature when compared to conflicts in Sulawesi and Maluku (van Klinken, 2007). He argues that the conflict in Kalimantan can be characterised neither as civil strife, as occurred in Ambon (Maluku) or Poso (Central Sulawesi) nor as a prolonged religious-based conflict, but is rather a conflict based around contested political power between two dominant ethnic groups – the majority Dayak and minority Maduranese people. In this context, Brown and Diprose have argued normatively that the ethnic-religious conflict in Poso should be dealt with through subnational elections. They claim that local elites should “promote local civic identities” in an effort to “bridge ethno-religious cleavages” during the subnational election process, and that collective peacebuilding could then emerge from the grassroots level of society (2007, p.1).
In reviewing the literature on local politics and ethnicity in Indonesia, of which some of the more salient works are discussed above, it becomes clear that most of this work uses either an institutionalist or a behavioural approach, without considering how a focus on processes of transmigration or migration can provide a new outlook on ethnic politics in Indonesia. Despite the various focuses and perspectives of this body of research, no one has sought to analyse what the political legacies of transmigration are in the context of local elections.

Most of the research completed on this set of issues differentiates between the issue of ethnic politics and transmigration in Indonesia; there has been a failure to elaborate on the intersection between transmigration and Indonesian local politics. The current literature on ethnic politics in Indonesia is not able to provide a comprehensive understanding of the unforeseen legacies of transmigration on contemporary local elections. Côté (2014, p.116) claims that “large-scale population movements have always affected the local political landscape in Indonesia”. This thesis therefore endeavours to analyse local elections in the context of transmigration in Lampung province by analysing political legacies created by prolonged transmigration on local elections.

The role of ethnicity vis-à-vis religious and patronage politics in local Indonesia became a major issue after the political reforms of 1998 and the political demands associated with the calls issuing from Riau and Papua for independence from central government in early 2000, for example. Ethnic politics were weakened by the Suharto regime in the name of integration and nationalism. In the Suharto era, ethnicity and religious affairs were categorised as a sensitive and fragile issue; ethno-politics and political Islam were marginalised in the name of building national integration (Hefner, 2000).

Finally, this political phenomenon is different nowadays: political reform has transformed the government from an authoritarian political regime to a more democratic government. Local politics are more dynamic, especially after the implementation of local elections. Under the Suharto regime, ethnic-religious sentiment was banished from the political arena, including elections. Now, however, ethnic-religious sentiment is widely used as one of the major issues in local elections. The democratisation of local elections has become a catalyst for the study of ethnic politics in Indonesia.
2.4 Ethnic Politics and Patronage Democracy in a Broader Context

While the previous section has focused on the Indonesian context, this section places those discussions in a wider context by briefly reviewing ethnic politics and patronage democracy in other countries and regions, focusing on South East Asia, South Asia and a number of African countries. The legacy of the colonial era on ethnic politics forms a key part of the discussion below. The ethnic segregation policy that was implemented by the Dutch colonial administration in Indonesia, for example, created a prolonged and ongoing conflict between native and non-native Indonesians, as well as setting some ethnic groups up in contra-distinction to and ultimately in conflict with others. The core argument in this section is that colonisation has left a powerful political legacy on ethnic politics and patronage politics in various countries, with Malaysia and Singapore being prime examples.

2.4.1 South East Asian and South Asian Political Experiences

In this sub-section, I argue that the colonial legacy has led to the creation of contested ethnic politics and patronage democracies in a number of countries in Asia and Africa. Thus, as a consequence of the colonial legacy and the strong patronage social structure within colonial society, the concept of ethnic-based powersharing is key for understanding power relations among ethnicities. Post-colonial theorists such as Shamsul (1999, p.3) have argued that the presence of “colonial knowledge” is needed to deconstruct those colonial legacies and to put forward a counter-construction of ethnic nationalism in the post-colonial era.

Ethnic politics and related issues such as religious affairs and patronage networks are becoming central issues in a number of countries across South East Asia. Ethnic politics has been a medium of political consensus and bargaining among ethnic groups in these two regions for many decades. Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand and Myanmar all provide examples of how ethnicity has influenced contests over power in electoral politics. However, ethnic configurations and segregations within political and social systems are influenced by prolonged colonisation in most of the former colonised countries. In Malaysia the construction of political identity has been heavily influenced by British colonialism, with the nature of British colonialism
and British understandings of ethnicity as well as the British style of democracy affecting both its political and legal systems.

Theoretically, Malaysia applies a consociational model of democracy (Lijphart, 1969), i.e. a model of democracy that is established as a result of political bargaining among inter-ethnic groups. Lijphart (1977) explained that four requirements are needed to establish a model of consociational democracy: a grand coalition, mutual veto, ethnic proportionality and ethnic autonomy. The heterogeneity of Malaysian society is the result of a prolonged period of colonisation. A disharmonious process of construction and assimilation over many decades has resulted from the segregation policy of the colonial era. Shamsul (2001, p.365) argues that:

“What I have tried to demonstrate in a very schematic manner is of [sic] how an identity is constituted, in this case ‘Malay’ and ‘Malayness’. The definition of the two terms was (re)created within the framework of colonial knowledge that constructed a ‘Malay identity’ by way of various investigative modalities. Even the term bumiputera, introduced in 1971, does not really refer to something new: it is merely a new term for what in the 1891 census was already officialised as the category of ‘Malays and other Natives of the Archipelago’.”

Malaysia shows how ethnic politics, political identity and ethnic identity have been created by a forced political consensus among the ‘native’ elites and the coloniser. For example, the terms Malay, Malay-Chinese and Malay-Indian are political terms that were forcefully implemented by the British colonial rulers to provide room to establish an ethnic-based political system. Prior to this policy, British colonialists had “shaped the investigative modalities devised by the British to collect the fact” (Cohn, 1996, p.5) so that they could easily drive the “epistemological space” of the colonised (Shamsul, 1999, p.5). In this context, Shamsul has also pointed out that “Malay ethnicity is not innate but rather learned or constructed, and Malay-Malayness has been created as the result of intersecting historical, cultural and social factors at a particular moment in a culture’s life and history” (Shamsul, 2001, p.355).

Although some researchers such as Mohammad (2008) and Pepinsky (2009) make claims about the symptoms of the decline of ethnic politics in Malaysia, especially after the result of the general election in 2008, Weiss (2012) emphasises the role of new media that influence current Malaysian political dynamics. Ethnicity is still key in understanding the general context of Malaysian politics. Furthermore, the Malaysian general election in May 2018 illustrates a slightly different narrative, wherein the 61-
year-old coalition of the Barisan Nasional (National Front) was defeated by an alliance of newly established opposition parties called Pakatan Harapan (Alliance of Hope). In the context of the elite, there are signs that there is more political room for descendants of non-Malays to be appointed as high-ranking government officials, examples being the appointments of the Malaysian Chinese Lim Guan Eng as finance minister and Tommy Thomas, who is of Indian descent, as attorney general.

However, rather than presuming that ethnicity is the only issue within the Malaysian political landscape, we should also note that “religious issues are excessively politicised” (Hamayotsu, 2014, p.61). This indicates that ethnicity cannot be separated from religious affairs in Malaysian politics, just as it cannot in the politics of Indonesia. In Malaysia maybe more than anywhere else, ethnicity is central to national politics. The country functions to the extent that consociationalist ethnic politics is the basis of consensus amongst the three biggest ethnic groups: the Malays, Malaysians of Chinese descent and Malaysians of Indian descent.

Political competition among the three major ethnic-based parties and opposition coalitions was for many years the political medium of democratic consolidation and compromise in Malaysia. According to Lijphart (1969, p.211), the consociational democracy model used in Malaysia is typically a “fragmented but stable democracy”, which means that political bargaining becomes an effective and proper way to deal politically with the various political interests of the ethnic groups within the political system. Malaysia is fragile in terms of its national integration due to its ethnic heterogeneity, but politically, as long as ethnic bargaining can be well maintained, the problem of ethnic conflict can be reduced. This has remained the case, despite periods and episodes of conflict and crisis. The case of Malaysia shows that in a heterogeneous society political consensus among elites is needed in order to sustain and maintain political power.

Singapore provides another example of how deeply a British colonial administration influenced the political landscape. As a former British territory, the case of Singaporean politics is similar to that of Malaysia in many senses; its history has been entirely shaped by the requirements of British colonialism, as has its ethnic make-up. Official understandings of ethnicity are rooted in British colonial prescriptions. In the modern city-state of Singapore, the role of the Malay population in politics has gradually diminished in the face of ethnic Chinese political domination. This argument
is supported by research by Tan (2013, p.1) who argues that “with all electoral constituencies consisting of a majority 75% Chinese population, Malay and Indian voters are permanently relegated to [sic] a minority position, both in numbers and in electoral strength”.

As in Malaysia, political power involves some form of interaction between its three biggest ethnicities: Chinese, Malay and Indian. Currently, Singaporean politics is dominated by the People’s Action Party (PAP), which appears to be an inter-ethnic membership party but includes some organisations based on ethnicity such as Singapore Malay National Association and Singapore Chinese Party. Furthermore, the domination of the PAP provides a political example that “an electorally legitimized authoritarian regime can perpetuate itself in the long term” (Barr, 2014, p.9). However, it is worth noting that in 2017 Halimah Yacob, a woman of mixed Tamil and Malay descent, was chosen to be Singapore’s president.

While Myanmar was also a British colony, the conditions surrounding the interplay of ethnicity and central power in the country differ considerably. Ethnic groups such as the Shan have been fighting separatist wars for many decades, first against successive military governments and more recently against the government led by Aung San Suu Kyi. While most of these conflicts are ethnic and territorial rather than religious, this is not true of the conflict with the Muslim Rohingya in the west of the country. This can be seen as an example of how a combination of ethnicity and religion can be manipulated to create conflict based on contentious power. Farrelly (2014, p.264) argues that ethnic politics in Myanmar are a combination of “cooperation, contestation and conflict”.

To some extent, the interplay of ethnic politics and political patronage in South East Asia shares similarities with ethnic politics and patronage democracy in South Asian countries such as India. In India, another former British colony, a plural society with various ethnic groups and languages was maintained by British colonial administrations through a policy of ethnic segregation not at all dissimilar to that implemented in Malaysia and Singapore. However, in the context of India, the ethnic, political and ideological diversity among the elites has resulted in ethnic and religion-based electoral competition that is complex and contentious (Jaffrelot, 1999). One should not presume that Indian politics can be fully explained with reference to ethnicity; the caste system also plays an important role. As Chandra (2016, pp.207-
210) reminds us, higher castes obtain greater political benefit compared with lower castes in the dynastic politics of India’s patronage democracy. Indeed, caste plays a significant role in defining Indian politics.

In the case of India, ethnic politics and party allegiances are the key underpinnings of contested power among elites. Chandra (2011, p.151) argues that ethnic parties are defined in terms of the “interests of an ethnic group” and the ethnic group itself is “a subset of categories in which descent-based attributes are necessary for membership” (ibid., p.154). Theoretically, there are two form of ethnic party: ethnic-based and multi ethnic-based. Mozaffar and Scarritt (2000) have provided a further explanation of the different definition of ethnic and the multi ethnic-based party; they argue that the distinction between those two concepts is merely based on how many ethnic groups support a party’s political existence in a particular electoral competition.

Chandra (2011) argues that the basic divisions in an ethnic-based party are founded on the ethnic group’s political interests. In this sense, the more configurations of ethnicity in a country, the greater the possibility of establishing an ethnic-based party. This stands in contrast with Indonesia, where the absence of ethnic-based political parties has meant that relations between voters and elites depend much more on inter-personal ties whereas in India transactions involving either material or psychological motives are the key factor behind relations between elites and voters. According to Pliavsky (2014, pp.14-15):

“By binding people into particularistic top-down loyalties and ties of direct exchange, patronage appears to undercut the free choice which ought to guide the electoral process; by making voter-clients dependent on politician-patrons, it seems to invert the very idea of democracy as the people’s rule”.

In this sense, the personal capabilities of a politician become the key source of relations between the politician and voters both in Indian and Indonesian politics. The difference lies in the configuration of political interest: it is more complex in India compared with Indonesia due to the existence of ethnic-based political parties. The intersection between religion and politics, and ethnic-religious based conflict especially between Muslims and Hindus driven by local (political) actors traps Indian politics in a prolonged conflict that is both contentious and dynamic (Berenschot, 2009).
This sub-section has argued that the establishment of ethnic politics is due to the impact of prolonged colonial legacies in countries such as Malaysia, Singapore and India. These countries suggest that soft bargaining power among the ethnicities is essential and a proper way to deal with the various ethnic-based political interests. This situation is exacerbated by the ethnic segregation policies that was implemented during the colonial era.

### 2.4.2 African Political Experiences

The application of ethnic sentiment in elections and patronage democracy are also found in African politics, where ethnic diversity and varied ethnic political interests have reinforced the role of political patronage across the region. African politics is typically discussed using three major political narratives: patronage politics, kinship and patron-client relations. Koter (2013) argues that the presence of intermediaries is needed to ensure the support of ethnic-based political groups in Africa and that local leaders are the key to ensuring political support for a particular candidate. Therefore, we can see that patronage political networks are a central part of African politics.

Patronage politics in African states confirms the importance of informal structures in political life. This includes the role of local leaders in attracting votes from particular ethnic groups. However, there is no single theory that helps explain the phenomenon of ethnic and patronage politics. Indeed, the major cause of contested ethnic politics has been reliance on the ethnic constructions of the colonial period, but in some cases the role of the military also affects identity construction in the political arena. Writing along social constructivist lines, Berman (1998, p.350) claims that:

> “Recent research has revealed that modern African ethnicity is a social construction of the colonial period through the reactions of pre-colonial societies to the social, economic, cultural and political forces of colonialism. Ethnicity is the product of a continuing historical process, always simultaneously old and new, grounded in the past and perpetually in creation”.

He goes on to say that patron-client relations present themselves as a more complex blend of “assimilation” and “bureaucratic authoritarianism” as a consequence of European colonisation (ibid.). According to Lindemann (2011, p3), who undertook a comparative study of political coups in Zambia and Uganda, if there is an ethnic balance or a display of “the same ethnic preference” between the military and
government, the potential for military coups is reduced, Uganda being a negative case in point. With their different experiences, Zambia and Uganda confirm that the institutional approach of applying ethnically based powersharing is still a major way of dealing with contested inter-ethnic power in Africa.

Political kinship is also seen as an important factor in elections, as in the cases of Burundi and Rwanda. Difficulties with the democratic process has resulted in prolonged ethnic conflict, and to overcome this situation, the elites of these two countries have implemented different policies: integrationist for Rwanda and a consociational model for Burundi, sharing power based on ethnopolitical interest (Vandeginste, 2014). If the cases of Burundi and Rwanda are examples of attempts to establish institutional answers to inter-ethnic political contestation, conversely, Nigeria represents a different approach. There, religion and ethnicity are intertwined, leading to ethnic conflict of differing intensity and longevity in various parts of the country.

Ethnic-religious sentiment is the essential factor for an understanding of the daily politics of Nigeria (Oboh, 2017). In contrast to many patronage democracies, where the minority are presumed to be a powerless ethnic group in electoral competition, Nigeria proves something of an exception. The political dominance of the three biggest ethnic groups in Nigeria has therefore resulted in the need to establish a fourth force as an alternative to mediate the distinctive political interests between the majority ethnic group (Lergo, 2011). Further, money and the phenomenon of vote-buying through patron-client relations between politician and businesspeople also play a significant role in the electoral politics of Nigeria (Francis et al., 2015).

In Kenya, patron-client relations and ethnic politics have been recognised as one of the most important aspects of politics. Once again, as with other former colonised countries, ethnic politics and patron-client relations here are a result of prolonged colonisation and differing political interests among ethnic groups (Berman et al., 2009).

To sum up, as we have seen in a number of Asian and African countries and as has been studied intensively by post-colonial theorists such as (Shamsul, 1999; Brown, 1994), especially in the context of South East Asia, former colonial countries provide strong evidence that ethnic politics in a post-colonial context cannot be disentangled
from colonial legacy. The colonisers had a vital role in creating the ethnic segregation that leads to the establishment of ethnic politics, especially ethnic-based competition in electoral politics.

2.5 Conclusion

In this chapter, I have critically discussed the approaches and theoretical insights contained in the literature on ethnic politics in particular as it applies to Indonesia. The existing literature shows a limited understanding of the link between subnational elections and the large-scale movement of people in a patronage democracy like Indonesia. In the context of Indonesian studies, transmigration and subnational elections have been seen as two different topics. On the other hand, the influence of ethnicity on electoral voting behaviour has become a major issue for sociologists, geographers and political scientists.

In the first part of this chapter, I reviewed three different approaches to the study of ethnicity in politics: primordialist, social constructivist and transactionalist. I reviewed at some length the ideas advanced by Chandra and argued that her conceptualisation of the Indian situation was of relevance to Indonesia. In particular her development of the social constructivist approach provides me with a model to analyse the context of my research, especially the dynamics of ethnic politics and patronage democracy in three research locations in Lampung. To some extent, however, Chandra’s argument needs to be reinforced by considering that ethnicity is not the sole issue in electoral politics. Other factors such as the advantage of performing well as incumbent (Trounstine, 2011) and political networks (Aspinall and Sukmajati, 2016) are also important.

I then in the second section developed these theoretical insights on the ethnic politics and voting, exploring three main approaches to understanding ethnicity and politics. The social constructivist approach is best placed to support the analysis in this research. In the third part of the chapter I reviewed academic studies on Indonesian local politics looking at various issues including ethnicity, the role of money and political networks. I suggest that none of these issues on its own can provide a proper explanation of current Indonesian local politics, which depend on many complementary factors.
In the fourth part, I reviewed work on ethnic politics and patronage in a broader context, taking as examples some South East Asian and African Countries including Malaysia, Singapore and India. In the latter part of the chapter, I explained how the dynamics of ethnic politics has emerged as a result of a prolonged colonisation. Colonisation has consequences for ongoing social, political and cultural dynamics; ethnic politics have been the consequence of ethnic segregation policies during the colonial era.

Building on the literature examined above, this chapter has argued that most of the research on ethnic politics and patronage studies in Indonesia has simply looked at the relations between elites and voters. Current research fails to show how the demographic shift created by a prolonged transmigration programme influences the dynamics of ethnic politics in subnational elections. Most studies only focus on the exchange of political interests that occurs between voters and elites and refrains from investigating other factors that can construct the dynamics of ethnic politics in subnational elections. This thesis thus endeavours to bridge this gap in the literature by making the argument that political legacies have been influenced by transmigration, as seen in Indonesian subnational elections.
Chapter 3
Political Context, Provincial Setting and Migration Programmes

3.1 Introduction: Provinces, Regencies and Cities

This chapter provides a general overview of the political, geographic and demographic settings in which this research took place, with the aim of introducing Indonesia’s historical and contemporary political contexts, placing a particular emphasis on political patronage and the role of money and ethnicity in Lampung from the time of independence to the present day.

In the early 2000s, a more democratic relationship between national and subnational government was established through Law 22/1999, which delegated authority to the provincial and local levels. The Indonesian political system today comprises five levels: central, provincial, city or regency, sub-district (kecamatan), and urban settlement (kelurahan) or rural village (desa). People are directly involved when it comes to electing each level of government; governors, heads of regencies, city mayors and provincial, city and regency assembly members are elected to five year terms, with the first direct elections for local leaders, i.e. city mayors, regents and governors occurring in 2005. A core idea behind Indonesian political decentralisation is that the unitary state allocates decentralised political power to the city and regency level rather than to the provincial governments. Legally, the governor of a province acts as the representative of central government in provincial government, as mandated by Law 23/2014. Practically, however, the governor has limited authority in directing or governing city and regency governments; he or she merely acts as a ‘voluntary’ supervisor of local government institutions, without providing any sense of direction to either heads of regencies or city mayors.
Cities and regencies are at the same level but differ in terms of size and population density: cities are larger urban settlements whereas regencies have a more rural character. Political decentralisation gives city and regency governments more independent authority to govern their territories. For example, city and regency governments now have full responsibility to manage the basic needs of people, such as health care and primary education. Moreover, according to Law 23/2014, the provincial government may only interfere in city or regency affairs when the development of the overall province is concerned, for instance in the case of inter-regency road building projects. This implies that the provincial government, led by the governor, is less influential than heads of regencies or city mayors and typically takes a coordinating rather than directing role.

Relations between the different levels of government come to be based on pragmatic considerations when the results of the provincial election are not in line with those at city or regency levels. In Indonesia, it is not uncommon for a governor to come from a different political party than their counterpart at the regency or city level and, when this happens, adjustments and compromises are called for at both levels (Tryatmoko, 2013). Likewise, pragmatism dominates relations between the different parties when villages, regencies, cities and provinces are governed by political parties that are not part of the national government in Jakarta.

This chapter is organised as follows: Section 3.1 provided an introduction to provinces, regencies and cities. Section 3.2 explains the context of politics and elections in Indonesia; it consists of three important discussions: understanding religion and electoral politics in Indonesia, understanding politics in the reform era and understanding subnational election and their mechanism. Section 3.3 is concerned with the geography, politics and ethnic coalitions of Lampung; it takes an in-depth look at the three research locations. This section consists of four discussions, setting the scene in Lampung, political and socio-economic conditions of three research locations (East Lampung, Metro and Bandar Lampung), patronage and money and their impact on Lampung’s politics and an explanation of ethnic coalitions in Lampung’s politics. Section 3.4 explains transmigration and its impact on Lampung’s population.
3.2 An Introduction to the Context of Politics and Elections in Indonesia

3.2.1 Understanding religion and electoral politics in Indonesia

Since Indonesia’s independence in 1945, the landscape in the country has been shaped by a number of political conflicts and reforms, especially during the terms of the first two presidents of Indonesia, Sukarno and Suharto, and the so-called political reform era that began in 1998.

Indonesia’s first president, Sukarno, oversaw the first phase of contemporary Indonesian politics in the 1940s and 1950s. In this period the country experimented with a democratic political system characterised by competition between three major political ideologies: communism, nationalism, and Islamism. These three ideologies have been associated with numerous political parties, namely the Indonesian Nationalist Party (PNI), the Indonesian Communist Party, the Modern Muslim Party, and NU, the Muslim organisation mentioned in Chapter 1. The results of the first general election suggested that party ideology had become an important feature of electoral competition in Indonesia.

The establishment of Islamic political parties and other movements was a reaction to Dutch rule in Indonesia before 1945. NU is the largest Islamic organisation in Indonesia, established in 1926. Together with other organisations, NU combined the promotion of Islam with the struggle for independence from the Dutch colonial administration. Thus, these organisations played a key role in the development of Indonesian nationalism, not the least on the grounds that Dutch colonial rule stood in contrast to Islamic values. NU is not only the biggest Muslim organisation in Indonesia, but it also plays an important role in Indonesian political development (Bush, 2009). Meanwhile, it has many affiliated bodies such as Muslimat (NU Women’s Organisation), Ansor (NU Youth Organisation) and Patayat (Young Female Muslim of NU). Each of these organisations has a different social and political goal, depending on the context and the level in which it operates. For instance, Ansor has been established to empower NU youth members in various social and cultural activities within the organisation while Patayat was established more to empower the young female members of NU especially in the field of gender equality.
Muhammadiyah, established in 1912 by Muhammad Dahlan, is the second largest Islamic organisation in Indonesia. This organisation was a response to the global Islamic reformation movement of the 19th century that aimed to restore the golden era of Islam between the 7th and the 14th century, a movement that spread not only through the Middle East but also in Indonesia (Rosyadi, 2013). If Muhammadiyah is mentioned as an example of a modern Islam movement, in contrast, NU represents a different standpoint, combining a more traditionalist interpretation of Islam with a greater degree of flexibility when it comes to aligning Islamic values and local culture.

With regards to political Islam, Geertz (1976) argued that three variants of Javanese religion have influenced Indonesian society and contributed to Indonesian political culture. These three variants are Abangan (nominal Muslim), Santri (devout Muslim) and Prijaji (Javanese aristocrat). Geertz characterised these variants as follows: “Abangan, representing a stress on the animistic aspects of the over-all Javanese syncretism and broadly related to the peasant element in the populations; Santri, representing a stress on the Islamic aspect of the syncretism and generally related to the trading element (and to certain elements in the peasantry as well); and Prijaji, stressing the Hinduist aspects and related to the bureaucratic element” (1976, p.6).

The devout Muslim category, Geertz wrote, engages socially and politically with numerous political groups and Islamic organisations, including NU. Geertz’s argument has been criticised by scholars such as White (2007) and Swidler (1996, p.302), who argued that, “Geertz's polemical stands--in favour of interpretation and against explanation, for description over theory, and against all general theory--are red herrings. However, I would argue that Geertz’s perspective on the structure of Indonesian society is still relevant and providing an understanding of the relations between social forces, religion and politics in present day Indonesia. Further, according to a study conducted by Gaffar (1988, p.359) on the voting behaviour of Javanese voters, Santri tend to support Islamist groups whilst Abangan consistently vote for secular parties. In this context, an ideological linkage can be seen to exist between NU and some Islamist parties in contemporary Indonesia, particularly PKB, which was established by leaders of NU in the early years of the political reform era.

These variants influenced the political support that each political party received in the 1955 elections. When it comes to relations between ethnicity, religion and organisational preferences, Emmerson (1976, p.224) argues that distinctions in one dimension, say ethnicity, mirror distinctions in another, for instance organisations.
Members of the national assembly are therefore typically differentiated by the degree of their religious sentiment rather than their political and social orientations. For example, Abangan and Prijaji have or had a political affiliation with PNI and the Indonesian Communist Party, which was banned in 1966. On the other hand, Santri have been associated with Islamic parties such as the Modern Muslim Party and NU.

The “antipathy” of NU towards the rise of communism in Indonesia is an indicator of the tensions between the Islamic political movement and the communists (Fealy and McGregor, 2010, p.39). NU was a central player between 1959 and 1965, but the party joined a nationalist-socialist-religious political alliance only reluctantly – because of the tensions mentioned above (Hefner, 2000, p.86).

The first general elections in Indonesia, held in 1955, were very competitive. Each of the major political parties was associated with a particular ethnic-religious group. Table 3.1 presents the results of the election. We can see that three political parties, PNI, the Indonesian Communist Party, and NU, received much support on the island of Java. Meanwhile, Muslim political parties prevailed in areas outside Java.

### Table 3.1 Results of the 1955 general election

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of Party</th>
<th>Ideology</th>
<th>Percentage of votes</th>
<th>Number of votes in Java</th>
<th>Number of votes outside Java</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PNI</td>
<td>Nationalist</td>
<td>22.3</td>
<td>6,964,595</td>
<td>1,470,058</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Modern Muslim Party</td>
<td>Islamist</td>
<td>20.9</td>
<td>405,703</td>
<td>7,498,183</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NU Party</td>
<td>Islamist</td>
<td>18.4</td>
<td>5,945,993</td>
<td>1,009,148</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesian Communist Party</td>
<td>Communist</td>
<td>16.4</td>
<td>5,497,766</td>
<td>676,914</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Parties</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>22.0</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>100</strong></td>
<td><strong>18,814,057</strong></td>
<td><strong>10,656,53</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Feith (1957).

However, Indonesian politics took a dramatic turn after alleged communist involvement in the failed coup in 1965. Power was wrested from a civilian government by the military in a bloody conflict that led to the killing of up to half a million people suspected of being Communist sympathisers (Crouch, 1988, p.160). Suharto, Indonesia’s second president, took power from Sukarno through this violent action,
and established what became officially known as the New Order Government. Between 1966 and 1998, Suharto sought to enhance the wealth of his family while initiating a process of country-wide industrialisation.

The main beneficiary of Indonesia's late industrialisation was Vis a Vis, a business conglomerate owned by the Suharto family and his cronies (Hicks, 2004). Nevertheless, Vis a Vis became an important driver of economic growth in the country. At the same time, the Golkar became Suharto's electoral machine and dominated politics in Indonesia from the early 1970s well into the late 1990s. Golkar benefited from Law 3/1973, which forced established political parties to either split up into several parties or to merge with others. Four Islamic parties -- NU, the Muslim Solidarity Party, the Islamic Association Party, and the Islamic Education Party -- had to unite with the National Development Party. Meanwhile, five nationalist parties -- PNI, the Christian Party, the Catholic Party, the Murba Party, and the League of Upholders of Indonesian Independence – had to merge with the Democratic Indonesian Party (Labolo and Ilham, 2015).

This policy successfully diminished the political power of supporters of Indonesia’s first president Sukarno. As a result, from 1977 on only three political parties participated in general elections. General elections in the era of Suharto were full of intrigue and manipulation. The political goal of Suharto’s regime was to ensure the continued domination of the Golkar. Table 3. 2 presents the election results in Indonesia between 1971 and 1997.
Table 3.2 Number of seats in the national assembly per party between 1971 and 1997

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Golkar</td>
<td>236</td>
<td>232</td>
<td>242</td>
<td>299</td>
<td>282</td>
<td>325</td>
<td>Nationalist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Development Party</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>Islamist-Nationalist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Indonesian Party</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>Nationalist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NU Party</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>Islamist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muslim Solidarity Party</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>Islamist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PNI</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>Nationalist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Islamic Association Party</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>Islamist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Christian Party</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>Christian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Catholic Party</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>Catholic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Islamic Education Party</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>Islamist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>League of Upholders of Indonesian Independence</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>Nationalist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Murba Party</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>Proletarian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>360</td>
<td>360</td>
<td>364</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>425</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: (Electoral Commission, 2008; Feith, 1957).

At the same time, Suharto worked hard to reduce the role of Islamic politics in Indonesia. Although a Muslim himself, Suharto was raised in a culture influenced by Hindu and Javanese values, and was focused on building Indonesian nationalism and national integration; unity in diversity became the symbol of forced integration. The interests of the state was his ultimate priority, rather than the interest of any particular ethnic-religious group. Political formations with religious backgrounds or identities were strictly controlled by his government (Hefner, 2000, p.93), and this resulted in a number of ethnic-religious insurgencies across the nation in his era.
Between the early 1970s and the late 1990s, the Indonesian economy suffered from corruption and nepotism, laying the foundation for a system of political patronage that lasted for decades and resulted in great imbalances across the country when it came to growth and welfare. The inequality and economic fragility of the Suharto years were two of the reasons that led to the emergence of grassroots organisations in the 1980s opposing Suharto's regime. The South East Asian economic crisis in 1997 finally triggered the overthrow of Suharto in 1998.

Since the political reform era in 1998, local politics in Indonesia have been politically fragmenting along ethnic-religious lines. Local elites have capitalised on this during elections (Jumadi and Yaakop, 2014; Miichi, 2014). This has happened, for example, in subnational elections in the North Sumatran city of Medan, in West Kalimantan, in Jakarta and in Lampung. In all these cases, religion and ethnic sentiment have been used to attract both voters and candidates.

Today, however, religion occasionally combines with ethnicity to form a toxic ingredient in the Indonesian political scene. The result of Jakarta's latest gubernatorial election gives an insight into the importance of ethnic-religious sentiment in subnational elections (Warganegara, 2016). The ousting and conviction on blasphemy charges of the governor of Jakarta, Basuki Cahaya Purnama (also known as Ahok), a Christian of Chinese descent, is an example. A similar story can be seen in the 2005 subnational elections in the regency of Poso in Central Sulawesi (Brown and Diprose, 2007) and in West Nusa Tenggara's 2008 gubernatorial election, in which ethnicity and religious sentiment played an important role (Kingsley, 2012).

3.2.2 Politics in the reform era: decentralisation, elections and Putra Daerah

Since the fall of Suharto, Indonesia has become a fully democratic country. Many structural changes have been made, one of the most important of which being the decentralisation of political power, which has granted cities and regencies greater autonomy. Following this political reform and as a consequence of changes in the electoral system, elections are more dynamic and competitive. Previously, in the Suharto era, the only elections were for the national assembly and local assemblies. Local leaders such as city mayors and heads of regency were formally elected by local assembly members while the regime chose the candidate before the election
process took place. In the Suharto era, elections were just ‘a game’ controlled by central government.

Today, the national level consist of the presidential election, the election of members to the People’s Consultative Assembly, which is divided into two assemblies, the Regional Representatives Assembly and the People’s Representative Assembly, whose elected members represent every province in Indonesia, with each province returning four members. Elections for local government consist of gubernatorial elections at provincial level and elections for city mayor and head of regency. Alongside these are elections to provincial and city and regency assemblies. These are familiarly known as pemilukada (an abbreviation of pemilihan umum kepala daerah, or general election of regional heads). The current direct election system to governor, mayor and head of regency was initiated in 2005.

At the same time, the process of democratisation has also led to the establishment of a large number of new political parties or formations that build on their predecessors from the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s. The Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (generally known by its acronym, PDI-P), a nationalist party led by Megawati Sukarnoputri, the daughter of Sukarno, won in general elections twice, with Megawati becoming vice president in 1999 and president in 2001. The current president, Joko Widodo, also comes from the ranks of the PDI-P. The political reform era has been dominated by four political parties: two nationalist parties – the Demokrat Party and the Great Indonesian Movement or Gerindra Party – and two Islamic nationalist parties – PKB and PAN (Partai Amanat Nasional, or National Mandate Party) (see Table 3. 3 ). The Demokrat Party was established and led by Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, who later became the sixth president of Indonesia, and the Gerindra Party was established by its current leader and presidential candidate Prabowo, once a close associate of former president Suharto. The PKB and PAN are indirectly associated with the two biggest Islamic movements, NU and Muhammadiyah.

Another consequence of political reform, one that needs to be considered along with elections and parties, is the political position of Putra Daerah, ‘sons of the region’ at local levels of government (see Chapter 1.1). The decentralisation law 22/1999 grants more authority to local government to manage its government based on local interests and values. It led to greater political authority for Putra Daerah in local politics after many years under the control of central government. This is in part the result of
demands made by local elites on central government in the early years of political reform. Putra Daerah sentiment can be seen in local elite bargaining with central government for Riau to gain provincial status in the early 2000s and in the resistance of Papuans against transmigrants. These are examples of the strength of sentiment of Putra Daerah (Haboddin, 2012). The priorities given to Putra Daerah mean that they have a head-start in securing strategic positions in local government (Hill and Shiraishi, 2007).

The impact of Putra Daerah remains weak in present-day Indonesian local politics, except for some area such as Aceh and Papua, where the central government has provided a special law to maintain the position of Putra Daerah. Law 25/2001, the Special Autonomy Law for Papua, explicitly provides political priority for native Papuans to be local leaders and local bureaucrats. However, many critics regard this law as kind of soft diplomacy undertaken by central government to decrease the popularity of the pro-independence movement (McGibbon, 2004). In the context of local politics in transmigration affected areas such as Metro and East Lampung, the minority status of the local Lampung population and the shift in political identity from transmigrant to Asli Wong Metro (natives of Metro). These two factors have significantly reduced the significance of Putra Daerah and have therefore weakened the political position of Lampungese in local politics (see chapter 6.2 for a detailed explanation).

In general, there are two sorts of argument related to the Putra Daerah. According to the first, Putra Daerah represent a kind of resistance movement from the early years of political reform after the prolonged domination of the central government over local people in the Suharto era, which was characterised by domination by a single ethnic group (Javanese) over Indonesian social, cultural and political life. Politically, the movement for rights for local people affected the consciousness of local people, who had previously been seen as inferior; it gave them more power to compete with migrant groups. Second, the Putra Daerah movement is seen as being a consequence of grassroots inter-ethnic and religious conflicts (van Klinken, 2007), such as occurred in Sampit, Central Kalimantan, and more recently between Lampungese locals and Balinese transmigrant descendants in Balinuraga village in South Lampung (Sujadmiko and Meutia, 2015).
Table 3. Distribution of seats in the national assembly (People’s Representative Assembly), 1999-2014

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Political Party</th>
<th>1999</th>
<th>2004</th>
<th>2009</th>
<th>2014</th>
<th>Ideology</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PDI-P</td>
<td>153</td>
<td>109</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>109</td>
<td>Nationalist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Golkar Party</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>128</td>
<td>106</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>Nationalist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gerindra Party</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>Nationalist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democrat Party</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>148</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>Nationalist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PKB</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>Islamist-Nationalist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PAN</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>Islamist-Nationalist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prosperous Justice Party</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>Islamist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Democrat Party</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>Nationalist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Development Party</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>Islamist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>People’s Conscience Party</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>Nationalist</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


3.2.3 Subnational elections and their mechanism

The overthrow of Suharto in May 1998 was a historic moment for the student-led opposition movement in Indonesia. Student groups, together with others, had six demands: amending the national constitution, prosecuting Suharto and his accomplices, introducing regional autonomy, removing the dual function of the military in national defence and politics, implementing and complying with the rule of law, and policy making on the basis of good governance principles. In response to demands for regional autonomy, President Baharuddin Jusuf Habibie, who had succeeded Suharto, adopted new legislation governing national and subnational government relations.

Two new decentralisation laws, Laws 22/1999 and 25/1999, replaced Law 5/1974. The former of the two new laws focuses on regional autonomy whilst the latter governs fiscal relations between national and subnational government. These laws became the foundation of local democracy in Indonesia between 1999 and 2003. Thanks to the increasing participation of people in every aspect of local government, policy makers were under pressure to respond to demands for better public services, more
accountable government, and enhanced transparency. This also included a focus on specific political rights for Putra Daerah in local politics.

In 2003 central government revised existing legislation and adopted Law 32/2004. Up till that time, mayors and heads of regencies and governors had been elected indirectly by the national assembly bodies or local assemblies at municipal, regency and provincial level. According to Law 32/2004, these officials were now to be elected in direct elections. As a result, between 2005 and 2013, 1,026 regencies, cities and provinces in total held direct elections to determine their leaders. Law 22/2007, adopted in 2007, proclaimed that national and subnational elections be held simultaneously. In 2008, the second revision of the Local Government Law allowed independent candidates to run in subnational elections.

In this context, two mechanisms have been introduced for nomination of candidates in subnational elections. According to Law 8/2015, Art. 40, pairs representing a political party or coalition require the support of 20% of all votes in the local assembly or of 25% of the number of eligible voters in previous local assembly elections. According to Law 8/2015, Art. 41(2), the requirements for independent candidates running in subnational elections are as follows:

a. In a regency or city with a population of up to 250,000, independent candidates must be supported by 10% of the total population.

b. In a regency or city with a population between 250,000 and 500,000, the candidate must be supported by 8.5% of the total population.

c. In a regency or city with a population between 500,000 and 1,000,000, candidates must be supported by 7.5% of the total population.

d. In a regency or city with a population of more than 1,000,000, candidates must be supported by 6.5% of the total population.

e. Supporting votes must come from at least 50% of all sub-districts (kecamatan or equivalent administrative area below regency level).

The 2014 presidential elections saw a contest between two candidates, each supported by multi-party coalitions: Joko Widodo, supported by the Great Indonesia Coalition, and Prabowo, endorsed by the Red White Coalition. Although Joko Widodo won the presidency, the Red White Coalition subsequently obtained the majority in the national assembly and adopted Law 22/2014. This legal act withdrew direct election of candidates at the city, regency and provincial levels and returned those
powers to the respective assembly bodies, reintroducing the indirect election of subnational leaders.

Many ordinary people as well as academics and civil society groups protested against Law 22/2014, arguing that it represented a shift away from the idea of political decentralisation as introduced in the early 2000s. In response to these protests, President Widodo issued a government regulation, Law 1/2014, to retain direct elections for subnational leaders. This is in line with the constitution of Indonesia, according to which the president may, in critical situations, suspend legal acts passed by the national assembly.

There are several substantive components of Law 1/2014, the most important of which is the continuation of direct elections for local leaders. To strengthen this regulation, the national assembly passed Law 1/2015, which provided further legal authority for direct elections. This was bolstered through further legislation, Law 10/2016.

This account, however, belies the dynamic and contentious nature of Indonesian politics. Various political changes have occurred due to changes in political regime. Starting with a civilian regime from 1945 to 1966, Indonesian politics was under the control of the militaristic-clientelistic regime headed by Suharto for almost 32 years. Since 1998, political reform has been changing the Indonesian political system in a more democratic direction, giving significant amounts of authority to local governments. After more than 20 years of political reform, however, the decentralisation of Indonesian politics continues to be contentious and costly in terms of corruption in every level of government.

3.3 Lampung: Geography, Politics and Ethnic Coalitions

3.3.1 Setting the scene in Lampung

Lampung Province in the southern part of Sumatra Island has the second largest population on the island and the largest number of voters. Geographically, Lampung is important as the hub that connects Sumatra with Java. In the context of ethnicity, Lampung is also an important location; its ethnic pluralism as the consequence of a
prolonged transmigration programme also contributes to the socio-economic and political dynamics of the province. This section provides a brief explanation of the various geographical, political and ethnic issues within Lampung province.

According to the Central Statistical Bureau of Indonesia (2015b), 8,117,268 people live in Lampung, distributed across 13 regencies (which are roughly comparable to counties in the United Kingdom) and two cities (urban areas that form their own jurisdiction independently from the regencies that surround them). As a consequence of the transmigration programme, Lampung has a heterogeneous society; apart from the Lampungese, this includes Bugis of South Sulawesi, Batak of North Sumatra, Javanese, and South Sumatrans among others.

As a middle-income province, Lampung is a hub linking the island of Sumatra with Java, from which it is separated by the Sunda Strait; it is home to one of the busiest seaports in Indonesia, the Bakauheni Seaport. According to the Central Statistical Bureau of Indonesia (2016c), Lampung has plentiful marine and mineral natural resources. This has encouraged companies to explore oil, uranium and natural gas. Lampung’s reputation as one of the world’s leading surfing destinations means that part of its coastline has begun to be exploited as a tourism destination.

Lampung’s provincial government is supported by roughly 8,730 staff of various ranks and with various duties (Central Statistical Bureau of Indonesia, 2016c). The provincial assembly has 84 members who represent up to 10 political parties. According to the results of the 2014 general election, PDI-P won the largest number of seats in the provincial assembly, 17 out of a total of 84. They are followed by the Demokrat Party with 11 seats, Gerindra with 10 seats, Golkar with nine seats, and three parties with eight seats each, the Prosperous Justice Party, the National Mandate Party, and the National Democrat party (see Table 3. 4 ).
Table 3. 4 Distribution of seats in Lampung’s provincial assembly 2014

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Political Party</th>
<th>No. of elected representatives (men)</th>
<th>No. of elected representatives (women)</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PDI-P</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Demokrat Party</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gerindra Party</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Golkar Party</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Democrat Party</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prosperous Justice Party</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PAN (National Mandate Party)</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PKB (National Awakening Party)</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Development Party</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>People’s Conscience Party</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>84</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Central Statistical Bureau of Indonesia (2016c).

Currently, a majority of Lampung heads of regency and city mayors are members of the PDI-P, with five out of 16 political leaders coming from this party, compared with four leaders that are associated with the Demokrat and the National Democratic Parties, two with PKB and one each with the National Mandate and Golkar (see Table 3. 5 ). Conversely, the governor of Lampung is from the Demokrat Party, which only provides three heads of regency. This is problematic if Lampung’s governor wishes to consolidate his power; divided subnational political power means that cooperation amongst regencies and cities is dynamic and in flux. Provincial policies have periodically been unable to obtain strong support from the regencies and cities, and vice versa. Conflicts of interest can be regularly observed because of the different political affiliations and personal interests held by key actors.
Table 3.5 List of local government leaders (regency heads and city mayors) and their party affiliations in 2016

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Jurisdiction</th>
<th>Leader</th>
<th>Political Party</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lampung</td>
<td>Muhammad Ridho Ficardo</td>
<td>Demokrat Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pesawaran Regency</td>
<td>Dendi Ramadhona</td>
<td>Demokrat Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Way Kanan Regency</td>
<td>Raden Adipati</td>
<td>Demokrat Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>City of Metro</td>
<td>Pairin</td>
<td>Golkar Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Lampung Regency</td>
<td>Chusunia Halim(^7)</td>
<td>PKB</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pringsewu Regency</td>
<td>Sujadi Saddat</td>
<td>PKB</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central Lampung Regency</td>
<td>Mustafa</td>
<td>National Democratic Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Lampung Regency</td>
<td>Agung Ilmu Mangku Negara</td>
<td>National Democratic Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Pesisir Regency</td>
<td>Agus Istiqlal</td>
<td>National Democratic Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mesuji Regency</td>
<td>Khamamik</td>
<td>National Democratic Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>City of Bandar Lampung</td>
<td>Herman Hasanusi</td>
<td>PDI-P</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Tulang Bawang Regency</td>
<td>Umar Achmad</td>
<td>PDI-P</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tulang Bawang Regency</td>
<td>Winarti(^8)</td>
<td>PDI-P</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanggamus Regency</td>
<td>Bambang Kurniawan</td>
<td>PDI-P</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Lampung Regency</td>
<td>Parosil Mabsus</td>
<td>PDI-P</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Lampung Regency</td>
<td>Zainudin Hasan</td>
<td>PAN</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Compiled by author.

To count the number of those in poverty, the Indonesian Statistical Bureau distinguishes between a food poverty line and a non-food poverty line (Central Statistical Bureau of Indonesia, 2016b). The food poverty line is defined as the ability “to achieve a caloric intake of 2,100 calories per day per person. The value of this caloric intake is calculated based on the actual consumption of a food basket which consist of 52 food commodities […] Meanwhile, the non-food poverty line is obtained by first calculating the mean of actual consumption of a non-food basket which

\(^7\) Chusunia Halim is the first woman to be elected regent of East Lampung.

\(^8\) Winarti is the first woman to be elected regent of Tulang Bawang.
consists of 27 commodities, by reference population" (Bresciani and Valdés, 2007, p.139). The latest survey, conducted in 2015, shows that the number of poor people in Lampung was 1.1 million, i.e. 13.53% of the total population (Central Statistical Bureau of Indonesia, 2016c, p.101).

The agricultural, fishery and plantation sectors are the strongest in Lampung. The province is the largest sugar producer in Indonesia, paddy production was 3.5 tonnes in 2015, and the province also specialises in the production of pineapple, coffee and rubber (ibid, p.132). Table 3. 6 details the main crops produced within the province in 2015. It is also worth noting that Lampung is home to one of the biggest naturally preserved forests in Indonesia; 4,620.3 km² have been designated as a conservation area. The total area of forest in the province is 5,427.05 km² (ibid, p. 145), meaning that Lampung is one of the most important places for tropical forest and climate change studies in Indonesia.

Table 3. 6 Total area of plantations in Lampung

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of crops</th>
<th>Total area of plantation (km²)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rubber</td>
<td>2,384.95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coconut</td>
<td>891.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oil Palm</td>
<td>2,370.21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coffee</td>
<td>1,612.53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pepper</td>
<td>457.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cocoa</td>
<td>765.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tobacco</td>
<td>6.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clove</td>
<td>79.44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>8,566.84</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Central Statistical Bureau of Indonesia (2016c).
3.3.2 Political and socio-economic conditions in East Lampung, Metro and Bandar Lampung

This section informs the reader about the geography, demographics, government and socio-economic characteristics of East Lampung, Metro and Bandar Lampung, my three research locations. I start with a comparative look at various key factors before looking briefly at each location in turn.

Table 3.7 shows the ethnic composition in the three research locations. The Javanese represent more than 70% of the total population in Metro and East Lampung, while they only have a relative majority of a little more than 40% in Bandar Lampung.

### Table 3.7 Ethnic composition of the three research locations in Lampung (in %)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ethnicity</th>
<th>East Lampung</th>
<th>Metro</th>
<th>Bandar Lampung</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Javanese</td>
<td>81.2</td>
<td>71.8</td>
<td>40.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lampungese</td>
<td>8.4</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>15.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sundanese</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>11.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bantenese</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>7.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic groups of South Sumatra</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>10.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Balinese</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minangkabau (West Sumatra)</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>3.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chinese</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>3.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bugis (South Sulawesi)</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Batak (North Sumatra)</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>2.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other ethnicities</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>3.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unanswered</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Central Statistical Bureau of Indonesia (2013).

The fisheries and food processing industry and trade are the biggest sources of income for Bandar Lampung. This is somewhat similar to Metro, where processing, trading and the service sector dominate. In East Lampung, the agricultural sector is
the biggest source of income. However, there is no in depth research so far about the correlation between transmigration and the poverty rate or the Human Development Index (HDI); Lampung’s HDI is 66.95, 75.10 for Metro, 74.81 for Bandar Lampung and 67.10 for East Lampung. Both Metro and Bandar Lampung have strong educational institutions, explaining their higher HDI scores.

Bandar Lampung has a poverty rate of 11.65%, which is slightly lower than that of Metro, where the rate is 11.7%, and East Lampung, where it is 18%. Their status as urban areas means that the cities of Metro and Bandar Lampung have more favourable socio-economic conditions than East Lampung (Central Statistical Bureau of Indonesia, 2015d; Central Statistical Bureau of Indonesia, 2015e; Central Statistical Bureau of Indonesia, 2016a). Table 3.8 offers information relating to the geographic, economic, political and demographic features of Bandar Lampung, East Lampung, and Metro.

East Lampung consists of 24 sub-districts, more than Metro and Bandar Lampung, and 264 rural villages, with a total of 10,235 government employees responsible for the provision of various services. It has 50 representatives in its local assembly representing eight political parties. Metro, in contrast, has 4,385 government employees to support the city government. It is comprised of five sub-districts and 22 urban settlement. Metro has the smallest number of city assembly representatives, only 25, and nine political parties. Bandar Lampung, finally, consists of 20 sub-districts and 126 urban settlement, and is administered by 11,622 government employees. The composition of the local assembly varies from one city or regency to another, meaning that it can be home to between 20 and 50 representatives, calculated on the basis of the total population (Central Statistical Bureau of Indonesia, 2015d; Central Statistical Bureau of Indonesia, 2015e; Central Statistical Bureau of Indonesia, 2016a).

East Lampung has the highest number of voters amongst the three research locations. In the 2015 elections, it had a total of 797,229 registered voters. By contrast, Bandar Lampung had 632,079 voters, and Metro had a total of 112,372. Voter turnout differed between the three locations. Metro had the highest level of voter turnout, at 77.19%. By contrast, the turnout in Bandar Lampung was 66.28%, and in East Lampung, it was 63.43% (Electoral Commission, 2015c). We can also see that the level of political participation in urban areas (Metro) was higher than in rural areas.
East Lampung has a total area of 5,325 km², meaning that it is the biggest of the three research locations. The Gross Domestic Product per capita of East Lampung is around Rp 30.2 million (c. £1589), which is higher than in other areas affected by transmigration. East Lampung is inhabited by 1,008,797 people, making it one of the most populated regencies in Lampung, outnumbered only by Central Lampung (Central Statistical Bureau of Indonesia, 2015b).

East Lampung has been one of the most important sites of transmigration. The Raman Utara sub-district, for instance, is largely shaped by Balinese transmigrants, and one may be forgiven for thinking one is in Bali given that the sub-district is equipped with cultural ornaments of the Balinese. Although the current inhabitants are for the most part descendants of transmigrants, they still preserve the traditions and culture or their ancestors. Figure 3-1 below shows a house of a Balinese transmigrant who has installed Hindu prayer aids and Balinese ornaments.

**Figure 3-1 Photograph of the house of a Balinese transmigrant descendant**

![Figure 3-1 Photograph of the house of a Balinese transmigrant descendant](image)

Source: Author (2016).

Metro differs considerably from all other cities or regencies in Lampung, given that it has historically been associated with the Dutch transmigration programme. The city
is the smallest in Lampung, with a total landmass of 68.74 square kilometres, and its population of only 158,415 is the second smallest. Likewise, Metro’s Gross Domestic Product per capita is around Rp 25.6 million (ca. £1,347) (Central Statistical Bureau of Indonesia, 2015d; Central Statistical Bureau of Indonesia, 2015e). This is relatively small compared to the other two research locations.

As a result of the transmigration programme, the Javanese form an ethnic majority in Metro; indeed, the population pattern is similar to other areas characterised by transmigration, including East Lampung. Coming to this city is reminiscent to visiting a territory in Java, given that nearly everyone tends to speak Javanese instead of Indonesian. The city’s landmarks still reflect the Dutch colonial administrative legacy. Figure 3-2, for instance, shows an agricultural irrigation project developed by the Dutch colonial administration.

**Figure 3-2 Photograph of an agricultural irrigation project established by the Dutch colonial administration in Metro**

Source: Author (2016).
As the capital city of Lampung, Bandar Lampung differs geographically and demographically from East Lampung and Metro. Bandar Lampung only covers an area of 197.22 square kilometres, but has a higher population density than the other two areas. It is home to 979,287 people, slightly fewer than East Lampung (Central Statistical Bureau of Indonesia, 2015b). Bandar Lampung is the centre of economic activities in the province. Thus, it is not surprising that the Gross Domestic Product is higher than any other city or regency in Lampung. It stood at Rp 35.3 million per capita (ca. £1,857) in 2014.
### Table 3. Geography, demography and socio-economic information

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of City or Regency</th>
<th>Land Area (km²)</th>
<th>Total Population</th>
<th>Administration and Government</th>
<th>Political Features</th>
<th>Gross Regional Domestic Product Per Capita</th>
<th>Population in Poverty (%) between 2010 and 2014</th>
<th>Human Development Index in 2015</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lampung Province</td>
<td>34,623.80</td>
<td>8,117,268</td>
<td>a. consists of 2 cities and 13 regencies &lt;br&gt;b. consists of 227 sub-districts and 2,463 rural villages &lt;br&gt;c. 8,730 government employees</td>
<td>a. 84 provincial assembly members &lt;br&gt;b. 10 parties occupy seats in the provincial assembly</td>
<td>Rp 253,162,540 (£13,324)</td>
<td>1,100,680 (13.53%)</td>
<td>66.95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Lampung Regency</td>
<td>5,325.05</td>
<td>1,008,797</td>
<td>a. consists of 24 sub-districts and 264 rural villages &lt;br&gt;b. 10,235 government employees</td>
<td>a. 50 local assemblies &lt;br&gt;b. 8 parties occupy seats in local assembly</td>
<td>Rp 30,280,000.00 (£1,593)</td>
<td>172,210 (18%)</td>
<td>67.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>City of Metro</td>
<td>68.74</td>
<td>158,415</td>
<td>a. consists of five sub-districts and 22 urban settlements &lt;br&gt;b. 4,853 government employees</td>
<td>a. 25 local assemblies &lt;br&gt;b. 9 parties occupy seats in local assembly</td>
<td>Rp 25,672,100.00 (£1,351)</td>
<td>17,080 (11.7%)</td>
<td>75.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>City of Bandar Lampung</td>
<td>197.22</td>
<td>979,287</td>
<td>a. consists of 20 sub-districts and 126 urban settlements &lt;br&gt;b. 11,622 government employees</td>
<td>a. 50 local assemblies &lt;br&gt;b. 10 parties occupy seats in local assembly</td>
<td>Rp 35,310,000.00 (£1,077)</td>
<td>102,750 (11.65%)</td>
<td>74.81</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Central Statistical Bureau of Indonesia (2013); Central Statistical Bureau of Indonesia (2015a); Central Statistical Bureau of Indonesia (2015b); Central Statistical Bureau of Indonesia (2016b).
3.3.3 Patronage and money in Lampung politics

There are now numerous issues that are central to Indonesian subnational elections beyond the issue of ethnicity. These include the practice of family politics, and the role of money, including how it influences the voter and how candidates are supported by local businesspeople. This section will now discuss these major issues as they relate to subnational elections in Lampung. A further issue of overwhelming importance that of ethnicity, is dealt with in the context of spontaneous migration in section 3.4.2. I cannot claim that Lampung is representative, but it is certainly safe to suggest that it is indicative, in that the points made below indicate a nexus between patronage and money from which various conclusions can be drawn about the nature of politics and society throughout the country.

Since the end of the Suharto regime in 1998, five individuals have served as governor of Lampung: Oemarsono (1998-2003), Tursandi Alwi (2003-2004), Sjahroedin (2004-2008 and again from 2009-2014), Syamsurya Ryacudu (2008-2009), and Muhammad Ridho Ricardo (since 2014). The last two, Sjahroedin and Muhammad Ridho Ricardo, were directly elected as the consequence of rule changes in 2005.

The Sjahroedin family dominated local politics in Lampung between 2003 and 2014. The family has had two governors in its ranks – Sjahroedin and his father Zainal Abidin Pagar Alam, who was also a leader of PNI in the early 1960s. Prior to becoming Lampung’s governor, Sjahroedin also held a high-ranking position in the police as deputy chief of the Indonesian National Police. Sjahroedin’s eldest son was the regent of South Lampung from 2010 to 2015, and his youngest son was the deputy regent of Pringsewu from 2012 to 2017. His second son was a member of the People Representative Assembly, representing Lampung from 2009 to 2014, and his sister was a provincial member of the Regional Representatives Assembly. This political clan has dominated politics in Lampung for almost a decade (Warganegara et al., 2013). According to Acciaioli (2000, p615), kinship functions as “the common idiom in which solidarity relations are framed”.

Business-driven politics is common practice in Lampung. The current governor, Muhammad Ridho Ricardo, was politically and financially supported by a sugar company during the gubernatorial election in 2014 (Berenschot and Purba, 2014;
Hermawan et al., 2017). This suggests that the emphasis has shifted from kinship to corporate influence in Lampung. Since 2014, this company has successfully installed its candidates in several regencies in Lampung. Hadiz (2007, p.889) observes:

“There are two sets of interests being marginalized in local politics in Indonesia. They are class-based interests in opposition to the Indonesian brand of predatory capitalism that has survived the demise of the New Order, and the technocratic ideologues who potentially threaten coalitions of power deploying money politics in order to safeguard their predatory interests. In other words, post-authoritarianism has certainly been characterized by broader political participation through the institutions of electoral politics; however, political contestation remains confined to coalitions of local predatory interests”.

Whilst Lampung’s politics appear to have been moving toward a strong business orientation even as ethnic sentiment continues to play a major role especially in some Javanese majority areas, in other parts of Indonesia such as Banten, Central Kalimantan and South Sulawesi, kinship politics still dominate (Aspinall and As’ad, 2016; Buehler, 2013; Hamid, 2014). In Bali, rivalry among aristocratic families still influences daily local politics (MacRae and Putra, 2008). In the latest of Banten’s gubernatorial elections in 2017, the clan headed by Tubagus Chasan Sochib successfully dominated and installed as vice governor Andhika Hazrumi, the son of former Banten Governor Ratu Atut Choisiyah. According to Hamid (2014) and Facal (2014), Ratu Atut Choisiyah’s father and Andhika Hazrumi’s grandfather, Tubagus Chasan Sochib, played a crucial role in continuing the domination of his family in Banten province.

However, there is much evidence to suggest that the family dynasty has not led to an improvement in public services (Hamid, 2015). This kind of dynastic rule tends to lead to a deterioration in local government functions, and this is detrimental to local democratic development (ibid.). The family has been able to control local politics in the province by relying on a local vigilante group (Okamoto and Hamid, 2008). The family was thus able to take control of the local budget and to award infrastructure projects to companies with which they had connections (Hamid, 2015). Sidel (2004) argues that this is a symptom of the revival of local strongmen, which has occurred not just in Indonesia but in the Philippines and Thailand as well.

Similarly, local politics in South Sulawesi is dominated by the Limpo family. According to Buehler (2013), the dominance of the Limpo family started when Syahrul Yasin Limpo was appointed as head of the regency of Gowa in 1994 and again in 1999.
Currently, he is the governor of South Sulawesi province, and during his administration, he has been able to install members of his family into important political positions, including his brother, daughter and nephew. This is a similar story to that of the Djunaid family in Pekalongan, Central Java (Savirani, 2016). This political narrative shows that, in some parts of Indonesia, local politics are still dominated by power that is distributed through family patronage.

In Lampung, power has shifted from a dominant family to a dominant company. The political presence of this sugar company has influenced local politics and economics in the province significantly. Given the company's reliance on natural resources for its sugar business, ensuring that local government accommodates and supports their business interests, for instance, by renewing land leases, has encouraged them to influence local political outcomes. This accords with Bettinger (2015, p12)'s claim that the process of decentralisation has also influenced political conflicts over national resources. Specifically, local elites now use natural resources as a means of political bargaining.

This phenomenon was discussed by a Lampung politician whom I interviewed and who told me that, "Indeed, this is a symbiotically mutual relationship between businessman and local politician. They [businessmen] need ease of doing business; for instance, they need support from politicians to extend a land lease. [Therefore] it is easier if they have a patron-client relationship" (INT34, October 2015; similar sentiments were expressed by INT36, March 2016, INT38, November 2015, and INT39, February 2016). Meanwhile, Khemani (2010, p1) has also claimed that decentralisation in some countries including Indonesia has tended “to facilitate vote buying, patronage or pork-barrel projects” and money-driven political activities in general.

The presence of globally operating plantation companies in Lampung is a result of geographical factors, including the quality of the soil, precipitation, and its proximity to Java. In the words of a former manager plantation company,

“Lampung is a good place for a plantation because of its geography and the quality of soil. The country is flat, it rains a lot and it is located near to Java, which is our biggest consumer. Lampung is a good place to be in this business” (INT37, March 2016).

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9 Information on interviews is provided in Chapter 4.2.4.
These companies produce sugar, palm oil and bananas, but are also involved in food processing. As a result, there is a great demand for leased land, a demand which can be satisfied more quickly thanks to good relations with local policy makers. This relationship became more dynamic when the process of decentralisation empowered local elites, resulting in complex political conflicts over natural resources among local and national elites as well as resource users (Varkkey, 2012).

However, it is not only the business community that benefits from good relations with policy makers. In order to run expensive campaigns and to provide potential voters with material goods prior to elections, candidates need to make sure that the war chest is well filled. Patron-client relations between the business community and local political elites are seen as a solution here, and are evidence of the existence of clientelist politics. In costly local elections, the role of money is important. Patron-client relations between business and local political elites are needed and they are dependent on one another; businesspeople need a ‘proxy’ among the local political elite to ensure their business’ survival. In contrast, local politicians need funding from business.

One local politician explained this relationship as follows: “Indeed, they need security and comfort when doing business so the company must have a good symbiotic mutual relationship with the local elite. They are playing [politics], especially in those areas where they have a plantation” (INT28, November 2015). This view was echoed in other interviews (INT38, November 2015; INT36, March 2016).

The mechanism through which money influences local politics and elections is illustrated in Figure 3-3 below. However, problems emerge when the interests of the business community and those of local people clash. For example, Lampung regularly suffered from electricity black-outs (as it still does). However, the establishment of a new power plant would have disturbed the operations of a nearby sugar plantation. Policy makers, informally on the payroll of the company, found it hard to resolve this conflict of interests and elected to delay the decision (according to confidential information given to the author).
One social activist in Lampung claimed:

“Where there is a dispute between business and public interest, it seems the elites have been slow in responding. For instance, in the case of regular blackouts in Lampung, the local government failed to respond immediately due to a conflict of interest. The power distribution is ideally through … Company’s plantation, but the Company refused it because it will disturb production in their plantation and proposed an alternative route” (INT35, March 2016; a similar sentiment voiced by INT36, March 2016).

This supports the argument put forward by Evaquarta (2008), who suggests that, in the era of decentralisation, the relationship between local policy makers and the business community in Indonesia is characterised by patrimonialism. Tomsa (2015, p.215) adds that “local executive elections in particular are no longer simply a trigger for corrupt behaviour, but also a catalyst for the exposure of corruption.”

In order to regulate the role of funding in subnational elections, the Indonesian Electoral Commission adopted two rules, Rule 7/2015 on Campaign Regulations for Subnational Elections and Rule 8/2015 on Candidate Funding in Subnational Elections. These rules have become key legal acts detailing sources of funding that may be accepted by policy makers. For instance, Section 26 of Rule 7/2015 outlines the material goods that may be handed out to potential voters. This includes ball point pens, umbrellas, and t-shirts with a value of no more than Rp 25,000 (ca. £1.50) per person. But abuse of these rules occurs everywhere, and the practice of corruption and bribery between election officials and politicians makes the situation worse. Regulations are not enough to reduce these illegal activities; a lack of civic morality is the major reason why these matter have not been resolved (INT36, March 2016; INT32, February 2016). Figure 3-3 explains how money influences local politics in Indonesian subnational elections.
Sources: Adapted by the author from (United States Agency for Development Programme, 2003; Electoral Commission, 2015f; Electoral Commission, 2015e)
Money in local politics typically takes one of two forms: legal and illegal funding. What constitutes legal funding is clearly explained in Rule 8/2015. Legal campaign funding comes from an individual or a group of people, from a political party or electoral platform, or from companies. The limits to funding for candidates are as follows: individuals may donate up to Rp 50 million (ca. £2631) and companies up to Rp 500 million (ca. £26,310) per candidate. In costly subnational elections, the role of money is important. There are at least four illegal sources of funding for candidates in subnational elections: illegal donations from individuals or groups; illegal donations from companies; income through gambling activities, where ‘entrepreneurs’ bet on the electoral victory of a specific candidate and, in order to enhance their chances, support that candidate during the campaign; and loans offered by the business community (see Figure 3-3 for a detailed illustration).  

The Electoral Supervisory Board is in a relatively weak position when it comes to supervising vote-buying activities. This is mainly related to the lack of human resources and authority to solve the problem; additionally, bureaucratic procedures and requirements to coordinate with police and attorneys delay or render impossible meaningful responses. The head of Lampung’s Electoral Supervisory Board explained that her institution is weak when it comes to supervising vote-buying activities. “We lack human resources and authority to solve the problem [of money in politics],” she told me. “[There are too many] bureaucratic procedures and we have to coordinate with other institutions such as the police and local attorneys” (INT32, February 2016).

The role of money in Lampung’s local politics is replicated in other parts of Indonesia. A Lampung politician whom I interviewed discussed the influence of money obtained from illegal gambling activities in the following words:

“I have found gambling activities in local elections since 2007. Some businessmen indulge in gambling activities by betting on who is going to win the elections. They use their gambling money to illegally support a particular candidate during his campaign. That money is mostly used for political purposes, and if their candidate wins, they will get money from their winning bet; they will also get some projects from the elected candidate in the future” (INT36, March 2016).

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10 Betting is illegal in Indonesia but is quite common.
An important player in Indonesia’s money politics is the broker. Aspinall (2014a) discusses the importance of brokers in creating an effective political connection between candidates and voters. He goes on to say that the broker in Indonesian electoral politics can take one of three models: the “activist brokers, who support a candidate based on a political, ethnic, religious, or other commitment; clientelist brokers, who desire long-term relations with the candidate or with more senior brokers, with the goal of receiving future rewards; and opportunist brokers, who seek short-term material gains during the course of a campaign” (ibid, p.560).

It is true that money is only one of the factors that can provide an opportunity for candidates to win in subnational elections, and a solid financial basis does not guarantee electoral success. Shin (2015, p.145) explains:

Using data from over 550 participants in Jakarta, Indonesia, I have shown that the socioeconomic status of voters shapes their demand for patronage: when both patronage and policy are offered, poor, less-educated voters tend to desire patronage over policy while well-off, better-educated voters tend to desire national public goods.

These political narratives are useful in helping understand what is going on in the context of local elections in Indonesia. Money and patronage networks, as well as ethnic and religious sentiment, are important factors accompanying political power in contemporary local Indonesian politics. The case of Lampung provides an insight into the ways in which local politics in Indonesia are at the same time both dynamic and pragmatic.

3.3.4 Ethnic coalitions in Lampung’s politics

The demographic shifts in Lampung, a consequence of transmigration and spontaneous migration (see section 3.4), have affected how policy-makers gain and share power. Many members of Lampung’s political elites believe that a political coalition between Lampungese and Javanese candidates is required to successfully compete in subnational elections. We therefore observe a rise in inter-ethnic electoral teams at provincial, city and regency level.

Before the implementation of new subnational election regulations in 2005 – before, that is the advent of direct elections of local leaders -- Lampungese candidates were always appointed as the head of regency by the local assembly. But under this new system of popular election, no Lampungese candidate has been elected as regent in
three consecutive subnational elections in regencies affected by the transmigration programme. Demographic factors are hugely important; in short, the majority Javanese in those regencies have a political advantage over the minority Lampungese.

Table 3. 9 and Table 3. 10 illustrate different years of implementation of direct election for city and regency in Lampung, and how Lampungese candidates have formed political coalitions between 2005 and 2015, mostly with Javanese politicians as deputy heads of regency, mayors and governors. In Lampung, demographic issues have led to an elite coalition between ethnic groups, dominated by the Lampungese and Javanese (Warganegara et al., 2013). This type of inter-ethnic contestation, bargaining and coalition, and the revival of ethnic politics that have created it, is also occurring in other part of Indonesia, for instance in West Kalimantan (Tanasaldy, 2007; Tanasaldy, 2012) and in Kendari, capital of Southeast Sulawesi, which has seen inter-ethnic power struggles (Sjaf, 2014).

Lampungese have mostly entered into coalition with Javanese and have become the supporting act on electoral tickets, as deputy head of regency and deputy city mayor. Coalition politics have become the key to electoral success.

---

11 While direct elections for local government leaders were introduced in 2005, it was only in 2015 that elections for officials at all levels were held simultaneously throughout the country. Previous gubernatorial elections in Lampung, for example, were held in 2008 and 2013. The government is now planning to make a single event of both local and national elections in 2024.
Table 3.9 Elected local leaders between 2005 and 2012 based on locality in Lampung Province

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pairing (regent/mayor-deputy)</th>
<th>Regency/city</th>
<th>Ethnicity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tamanuri- Bustami</td>
<td>Regency of Way Kanan</td>
<td>Lampungese-Lampungese</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Edy Sutrisno- Kherlani</td>
<td>City of Bandar Lampung</td>
<td>Javanese and Lampungese</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zulkifli Anwar- Wendy Melfa</td>
<td>Regency of South Lampung</td>
<td>Ethnic from South Sumatran-Lampungese</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lukman Hakim- Djohan</td>
<td>City of Metro</td>
<td>Javanese-Lampungese</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Satono- Noverisman Subing</td>
<td>Regency of East Lampung</td>
<td>Javanese-Lampungese</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Andi Achmad- Mudyanto</td>
<td>Regency of Central Lampung</td>
<td>Lampungese-Javanese</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abdurahman Sarbini-Agus Matowardjo</td>
<td>Regency of Tulang Bawang</td>
<td>Lampungese-Javanese</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bambang Kurniawan-Sujadi Sadat</td>
<td>Regency of Tanggamus</td>
<td>Lampungese-Javanese</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zainal Abidin- Rohimat</td>
<td>Regency of North Lampung</td>
<td>Lampungese-Lampungese</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mukhlis Basri- Dimyati</td>
<td>Regency of West Lampung</td>
<td>Lampungese-Javanese</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sjahroedin- Djoko Umar Said</td>
<td>Lampung Province</td>
<td>Lampungese-Javanese</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rycko Menoza- Eki Setyanto</td>
<td>Regency of South Lampung</td>
<td>Lampungese-Javanese</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lukman Hakim- Saleh Candra</td>
<td>City of Metro</td>
<td>Javanese-Lampungese</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Herman Hasanusi-Tobroni</td>
<td>City of Bandar Lampung</td>
<td>Lampungese-Javanese</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bustami Zainuddin-Raden Nasution</td>
<td>Regency of Way Kanan</td>
<td>Lampungese-Lampungese</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Satono- Erwin Ariffin</td>
<td>Regency of East Lampung</td>
<td>Javanese-Lampungese</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arisandi- Musiran</td>
<td>Regency of Pesawaran</td>
<td>Lampungese-Javanese</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pairin- Mustafa</td>
<td>Regency of Central Lampung</td>
<td>Javanese-Lampungese</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sujadi- Handitya</td>
<td>Regency of Pringsewu</td>
<td>Javanese-Lampungese</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bachtiar Basri –Umar Achmad</td>
<td>Regency of West Tulang Bawang</td>
<td>Lampungese-Lampungese</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khamamik- Ismail Ishak</td>
<td>Regency of Mesuji</td>
<td>Javanese-Ethnic from South Sumatran</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hanan Rozak-Heri Wardoyo</td>
<td>Regency of Tulang Bawang</td>
<td>Lampungese-Javanese</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mukhlis Basri- Azhari Makmur</td>
<td>Regency of West Lampung</td>
<td>Lampungese-Lampungese</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bambang Kurniawan-Shamsul Hadi</td>
<td>Regency of Tanggamus</td>
<td>Lampungese-Javanese</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3. 10 Current ethnic-based coalitions in subnational elections and elected pairings in Lampung province based on locality in 2013, 2014 and 2015

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pairing (regent/mayor-deputy)</th>
<th>Regency/city</th>
<th>Ethnicity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agung Ilmu Mangkunegara-Paryadi</td>
<td>Regency of North Lampung</td>
<td>Lampungese-Lampungese</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sujadi- Fauzi</td>
<td>Regency of Pringsewu</td>
<td>Javanese-South Sumatran</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ridho Ficardo- Bachtiar Basri</td>
<td>Lampung Province</td>
<td>Javanese-Lampungese</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Herman Hasanusi - Yusuf Kohar</td>
<td>City of Bandar Lampung</td>
<td>Lampungese-Ethnic from South Sumatran</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pairin-Djohan</td>
<td>City of Metro</td>
<td>Javanese-Lampungese</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mustafa-Loekman Djojosemarto</td>
<td>Regency of Central Lampung</td>
<td>Lampungese-Javanese</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zainudin Hasan- Nanang Ermanto</td>
<td>Regency of South Lampung</td>
<td>Lampungese-Javanese</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Raden Adipati Surya- Edward Anthony</td>
<td>Regency of Way Kanan</td>
<td>Ethnic from South Sumatran-South Sumatran</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chusnunia Halim- Zaiful Bukhori</td>
<td>Regency of East Lampung</td>
<td>Javanese-Lampungese</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dendi Romadhona- Eriawan</td>
<td>Regency of Pesawaran</td>
<td>Ethnic from South Sumatran-Lampungese</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agus Istiqal-Erlna</td>
<td>Regency of West Pesisir</td>
<td>Lampungese-Lampungese</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author (2018).

The heterogeneous ethnicity of Lampung affects how local elites gain and share power. Many of the political elite believe that a coalition between Lampungese and Javanese in particular, or with other ethnic groups, is needed in order to win subnational elections.

Broadly speaking, the shifting of the election system in local government has affected the political culture of local democracy especially in Lampung. In a subnational election system, an ethnicity-based coalition is essential for victory, the ethnic majority will have the greatest opportunity to take on local power. This would appear to support the arguments of primordialist ethnic political theorists such as Horowitz (2014).

Finally, in the political reform era, the enormous flux in local politics has allowed Lampungese to dominate local politics and create a political coalition with the majority Javanese population. This is true for much of the province, but not for areas of mass
transmigration, where Japanese dominate local politics. However, this phenomenon contradicts the era of former President Suharto; over the course of 32 years, between 1966 to 1998, Zainal Abidin Pagar Alam was the only Lampungese appointed as the Governor of Lampung.

3.4 Migration and Its Impact on Lampung’s Population

3.4.1 The transmigration programme: a brief review

Indonesia is the largest archipelago country in the world and is characterised by notable differences when it comes to the number of inhabitants and the population density of each island (Hardjono, 1988, p.427). To illustrate, Java is a small island compared to Kalimantan and Sumatra. However, it is the most densely populated island in Indonesia. According to numerous studies, overpopulation in some islands is a key reason behind large-scale poverty, and it is these socio-economic problems that motivated the Dutch colonial administration and later the Indonesian government to initiate transmigration programmes that would move people from more densely populated islands such as Java and Bali to less populated islands, in particular Sumatra, Kalimantan and Papua (MacAndrews, 1978; Arndt, 1983; Hugo, 1995; Zaman, 2002).

The Dutch transmigration programme aimed to reduce poverty and population density on the island of Java by relocating Javanese to the outer islands. It is useful to distinguish four phases of transmigration in Indonesia: the colonial era (1905-1944), the old order era (1951-1968), the new order era (1969-1997), and the political reform era (1998-present).

Historically, the transmigration programme was initiated in 1905 by the Dutch colonial administration. During this first wave of transmigration, 155 families were relocated from the regency of Kedu in Central Java to Bagelen, a village in the regency of Gedong Tataan in Lampung. This reflected a desire to compensate for the negative effects associated with colonial rule in Indonesia. The Dutch Ethical Policy proposed in the late 19th century to make concerted efforts to provide education to local people, to establish irrigation systems for farmers, and to reduce overall poverty through the relocation of people to less densely populated islands – this is where the colonial transmigration programme kicked in. In total, from 1905 to 1941 the Dutch colonial
administration moved 200,000 people from Java and Bali to other less densely populated islands (Levang, 2003, pp.10-11).

To reduce social tension, particularly in Java, the Dutch colonial administration initiated a re-launch of its own transmigration programme, which had lapsed since the early years of the century, by constructing three enormous irrigation projects and the new city of Metro in Lampung province (Levang, 2003). Thus, in the second phase of the transmigration between 1931 and 1941, the Dutch, together with the transmigrants themselves, were successful in establishing the new city of Metro (ibid.). According to Muzakki (2014, p.9), there are two technical reasons behind the Dutch transmigration programme in Metro. First, in the early 1930s, the population density in the south of Sumatra, including Lampung, was relatively low, at roughly 12 people per km$^2$. Second, the customary community leader had a forward-looking outlook on the way that expanding the living area would create a more prosperous society. As well as Javanese, some Balinese were also moved to Lampung as transmigrants as well.

The transmigration programme continued during the terms of office of the first and second presidents of Indonesia and the political reform era. Indonesia’s first president, Sukarno, officially implemented a new transmigration programme in 1950 through a presidential decree, later formally regulated by Government Act 56/1958. On 12 December 1950, 77 people from 23 families were relocated to Lampung, the first wave of transmigration organised by the government of independent Indonesia. Today, this day is commemorated as Transmigration Day. At that time, the transmigration programme was associated with four main objectives: to reduce poverty, to increase the welfare of people, to strengthen national unity and enhance integration, and to strengthen national defence. The latter aim refers to the relocation of people in border areas to inland locations or other islands, enabling the military to establish proper border installations and fortifications.

Suharto decided to continue the transmigration programme, integrating it into his Five-Year Development Plan for Indonesia. Consequently, six transmigration plans were implemented between 1969 and 1999, as a result of which about 6.4 million people were relocated away from Java and Bali. The demographic shift that occurred as a result of this programme has been illustrated statistically by Levang (2003), who
shows how the programme increased Lampung’s population from 157,000 in 1905 to six million people in 1990.

Further, in the context of the transmigration programme after Indonesian independence, a similar policy to establish new cities was implemented by the Indonesian government, although this had different scales and purposes. For instance, in the decentralisation era, the high demand for labour for oil palm plantations in Kalimantan resulted in a new city known as Kota Terpadu Mandiri being formed in the transmigration area (Potter, 2012).

Table 3.11 presents population figures for Java and Bali. At the latest survey from the Central Statistical Bureau in 2010, the total population of Indonesia was 237,641,326, 58.8% of whom were living in Java and Bali. Java is also the most densely populated island according to data released by the Central Statistical Bureau of Indonesia (2015c), with all provinces in Java and Bali island being the most densely populated in Indonesia.
Table 3. 12 shows population change in the seven most densely populated provinces from 2008 to 2015. It shows the rapidity with which population continues to grow on Java and Bali, especially now that the transmigration programme has been terminated.

Table 3. 11 Percentage of Indonesia’s total population residing in provinces and special regions of Java and on Bali, 1971-2010

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jakarta</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>4.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Java</td>
<td>18.1</td>
<td>18.6</td>
<td>23.9</td>
<td>20.1</td>
<td>17.3</td>
<td>18.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central Java</td>
<td>18.3</td>
<td>17.2</td>
<td>19.3</td>
<td>15.2</td>
<td>15.1</td>
<td>13.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yogyakarta</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>1.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Java</td>
<td>21.4</td>
<td>19.7</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>17.3</td>
<td>16.8</td>
<td>15.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Banten</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>4.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bali</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>1.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>65.4</strong></td>
<td><strong>63.3</strong></td>
<td><strong>74.4</strong></td>
<td><strong>60</strong></td>
<td><strong>60.1</strong></td>
<td><strong>58.8</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Central Statistical Bureau of Indonesia (2012).
Table 3. 12 Population growth in the most densely populated provinces in Indonesia (population/km²)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>2008</th>
<th>2009</th>
<th>2010</th>
<th>2013</th>
<th>2014</th>
<th>2015</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jakarta</td>
<td>12,355</td>
<td>12,459</td>
<td>14,518</td>
<td>15,015</td>
<td>15,173</td>
<td>15,328</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Java</td>
<td>1,108</td>
<td>1,124</td>
<td>1,222</td>
<td>1,282</td>
<td>1,301</td>
<td>1,320</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yogyakarta</td>
<td>1,107</td>
<td>1,118</td>
<td>1,107</td>
<td>1,147</td>
<td>1,161</td>
<td>1,174</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central Java</td>
<td>0,995</td>
<td>1,002</td>
<td>0,989</td>
<td>1,014</td>
<td>1,022</td>
<td>1,030</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Banten</td>
<td>1,065</td>
<td>1,085</td>
<td>1,106</td>
<td>1,185</td>
<td>1,211</td>
<td>1,237</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Java</td>
<td>0,794</td>
<td>0,798</td>
<td>0,786</td>
<td>0,803</td>
<td>0,808</td>
<td>0,813</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bali</td>
<td>0,645</td>
<td>0,652</td>
<td>0,676</td>
<td>0,702</td>
<td>0,710</td>
<td>0,718</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Central Statistical Bureau of Indonesia (2015c).

Table 3. 13 presents the number of people in Indonesia living in poverty. The total number is 26.6 million, of whom 14 million live in Java and Bali. Thus, about 53% of Indonesia’s poor live in Java and Bali. This compares with 6.2 million on Sumatra Island and only 0.99 million on Kalimantan Island (Rachman, 2017).

Table 3. 13 Number of people living in poverty in provinces on Java and on Bali, 2017

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>Total Number in Poverty</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jakarta</td>
<td>393,130</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Java</td>
<td>3,774,410</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Banten</td>
<td>699,830</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central Java</td>
<td>4,197,490</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yogyakarta</td>
<td>466,330</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Java</td>
<td>4,405,270</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bali</td>
<td>176,480</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>14,112,940</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Central Statistical Bureau of Indonesia (2017b).

Table 3. 14 provides details about the number of people relocated from Java to various other locations in Indonesia through the transmigration programme. This includes
general transmigration and swakarsa transmigration, which is a movement partly supported by the government, from 1975 to the present day.\(^\text{12}\) Nationally, the number of transmigrants and their descendants is estimated at more than 20 million people.\(^\text{13}\)

**Table 3. 14 Number of transmigrants from 1905 to 2012**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Era</th>
<th>Years</th>
<th>Type of Transmigration</th>
<th>Number of Relocated People</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dutch and Japan Occupation</td>
<td>1905-1944</td>
<td>General</td>
<td>203,069</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sukarno</td>
<td>1951-1968</td>
<td>General</td>
<td>404,979</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suharto (5-Year-Plan I)</td>
<td>1969-1974</td>
<td>General</td>
<td>185,184</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suharto (5-Year-Plan II)</td>
<td>1974-1979</td>
<td>General</td>
<td>366,421</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suharto (5-Year-Plan III)</td>
<td>1979-1984</td>
<td>General</td>
<td>2,141,900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suharto (5-Year-Plan IV)</td>
<td>1984-1989</td>
<td>General</td>
<td>2,255,256</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suharto (5-Year-Plan III and IV)</td>
<td>1975-1984</td>
<td>swakarsa</td>
<td>513,042</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suharto (5-Year-Plan V)</td>
<td>1989-1994</td>
<td>General</td>
<td>840,340</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-Year-Plan VI+Transition Era</td>
<td>1995-2004</td>
<td>swakarsa</td>
<td>89,302</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reformation</td>
<td>2005-2012</td>
<td>General</td>
<td>247,566</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reformation</td>
<td>2005-2012</td>
<td>swakarsa</td>
<td>35,890</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**TOTAL** 
6,769,907


Besides Lampung, there are other major areas of transmigration in Indonesia, such as West Kalimantan and South Sulawesi. Transmigration programmes initially began in 1955 in West Kalimantan. According to the Labor and Transmigration Office (2013), 225 families, or 1114 people, were relocated from Java Island to Kuala Dua Village in Pontianak Regency (currently Kubu Raya Regency). Charras (2007) has calculated that the number of transmigrants in West Kalimantan was 368,807 in 2000. The latest

\(^{12}\) In addition to the fully-funded transmigration programme, there is another transmigration programme called the swakarsa programme, which is self-funded, with the transmigrants coming to specific locations through their own volition, and the government providing only the land and house.

data, from 2013, show that 127,554 families, or 526,540 people, have been successfully relocated to West Kalimantan in total, which has led to the creation of 216 new villages and 11 new sub-districts in West Kalimantan (Labor and Transmigration Office, 2013) (see Table 3. 15).

Table 3. 15 Transmigration in the provinces of West Kalimantan and Central Kalimantan

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>West Kalimantan</th>
<th>Central Kalimantan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pre 5-Year-Plan 1960-1968</td>
<td>5,222</td>
<td>3,465</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971-1973</td>
<td>4,244</td>
<td>6,567</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974-1979</td>
<td>17,764</td>
<td>6,299</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979-1984</td>
<td>122,158</td>
<td>79,481</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984-1989</td>
<td>33,251</td>
<td>99,185</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989-1994</td>
<td>101,012</td>
<td>51,422</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994-1999</td>
<td>85,156</td>
<td>126,745</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999-2001</td>
<td>n.a</td>
<td>5,409</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>n.a</td>
<td>1,319</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>n.a</td>
<td>n.a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>526,540</strong></td>
<td><strong>379,892</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Charras (2007) and Labor and Transmigration Office (2013).

The impact of a prolonged transmigration programme also results in a slightly different degree of developments within the transmigration-affected locations. For instance, the bulk of the transmigration to Metro occurred during the colonial era, earlier than it did in East Lampung. It was therefore better resourced. The Javanese transmigrants in Metro remain economically better off than those in East Lampung. Although there are similarities shared by these two locations, such as the cultural domination of the Javanese, East Lampung has a slightly different economic narrative, in which people work more in the agricultural sector and as labour in plantation companies.

East Lampung has a lower HDI than Metro (see Table 8.8). This also indicates that the different handling of the transmigration programme resulted in a different characteristic upon a particular transmigration-affected location. Metro was well
prepared and established by the Dutch colonial administration as the central location of the transmigration programme, which aimed to relocate people from Java Island, the most densely populated island in the then Dutch East Indies. At the same time, however, both Metro and East Lampung have an extreme unbalance in the ethnic makeup of their populations, with Javanese forming by far the largest ethnic group in both locations. Table 3.16 shows the basic differences and similarities between key factors across the three research locations.

In a different story, the transmigrants who came to West Kalimantan more than a decade ago arrived in several phases, and their number is not sufficient to mean they form a majority as in Lampung. Two local ethnic groups, the Dayaks and the Malays, remain the first and second largest ethnic groups in this province: 35% for Dayaks and 34% for Malays compared with only 9.74% of Javanese (Ananta et al., 2015). As a result, in the context of ethnic-based political power, West Kalimantan local politics is a case in which power is shared between the Dayaks and the Malays (Tanasaldy, 2012). This contrasts with local politics in Lampung, where the existence of a Javanese majority due to a prolonged transmigration programme has meant Javanese transmigrant domination in those areas affected by transmigration.

The situation is similar in South Sulawesi, where the impact of transmigration has not resulted in political domination by Javanese transmigrants in the province. The impact of prolonged transmigration has not significantly changed the demographics of South Sulawesi. The local ethnic groups, the Bugis and Makassarese, are still the two largest ethnic populations in South Sulawesi; Bugis form the largest ethnicity with 45% of total population while the Javanese, the ethnic group most associated with transmigration, are in fifth position, constituting only 2.86%.

Today the transmigration programme is no longer in force. In line with the decentralisation efforts of the early 2000s, Indonesia’s central government has delegated major parts of the programme to subnational levels, in particular to the provinces and regencies, who plan and carry out relocation programmes, mainly with a view to enhancing local development. As specified by Government Regulation 3/2014, the central government only acts as an advisor.
Table 3.16 General comparison of similarities and differences amongst the research sites

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Research sites</th>
<th>Demographics</th>
<th>Geography</th>
<th>Transmigration characteristics</th>
<th>Resources and nature of business interests</th>
<th>Key political factors in local elections</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| East Lampung   | • large majority of Javanese transmigrants  
• one of the lowest HDI indices within Lampung Province  
• large numbers of poor people, about 18% of total population | • rural region with extensive agriculture and plantations | • transmigration-affected location  
• domination of Javanese transmigrants in social, cultural and political life | • plantation crops, primarily sugar  
• other agriculture  
• tourism  
• fishery | • importance of Javanese and transmigrant sentiment in local politics  
• importance of political role of ERBOs in local politics (e.g. the political role of NU)  
• minimal role of political parties in local elections |
| Metro          | • large majority of Javanese transmigrants  
• economically better off and people have a better education compared to East Lampung | • urban region with a small agricultural sector | • transmigration-affected location  
• domination of Javanese transmigrants in social, cultural and political life | • services and trading  
• agriculture | • the importance of Javanese and transmigrant sentiment in local politics  
• less importance of political role of ERBOs in local politics  
• advantage of being incumbent  
• prevalence of vote-buying activities in local elections  
• minimal role of political parties in local elections |
| Bandar Lampung | • far smaller number of migrants  
• mainly spontaneous migration from Sunda and Banten in west of Java with more Lampungese compared to Metro and East Lampung  
• economically better off and better education than East Lampung | • urban area surrounded by Lampung bay | • transmigration-unaffected location  
• a more heterogeneous community | • trade and industry  
• services  
• fishery  
• tourism | • back seat for Javanese and transmigrant sentiment in local politics  
• less important political role of ERBOs in local politics  
• importance of incumbent’s performance  
• minimal role of political parties in local elections |
3.4.2 Spontaneous migrants and ethnicity in Lampung

Spontaneous migration has also contributed to the shifting composition of the population in Lampung. Elmhirst (1997, pp.91-92) argues that spontaneous migrants are the “unwelcomed unintended consequences” of transmigration. In their work on migration to Kalimantan, Smith and Bouvier (1993, pp.107-112) distinguish at least three causes of spontaneous migration: economic reasons, involving both push and pull factors; family and personal motivations; and conflicts within the community. Charras and Pain (1993, p.22), define a spontaneous migrant as:

Someone who chooses his destination and the moment for his departure without the intervention of any institution. A spontaneous settler is someone who finds land and agricultural employment or non-agricultural employment but in a rural setting, outside the village managed by the Transmigration or, at the present time, any other formal organising programme (sic). The spontaneous migrant may have been recruited by an individual, a sponsor, who organises his voyage and finds work or land for him. This may be a person from the receiving region but may also be an established settler from the same region of origin.

A first wave of spontaneous migrants arrived from South Sumatra province to Lampung in the late 19th century. These people came to Lampung in response to the declining power of the Palembang Sultanate, in the east of Sumatra, which was annexed by the Dutch colonial administration in 1860 (Sevin, 1989, p.89). The Dutch made Batavia (today Jakarta) the new transit location for Lampung pepper, thereby weakening the economy in those territories that belonged to the former Sultanate. In particular, people belonging to Bengkulu and South Sumatra decided to migrate, mainly settling in North Lampung.14 As a result, the current demographic composition of Lampung is a mix of local, transmigrant, and spontaneous migrant populations.

Lampung has been a prime destination for spontaneous settlers from Java. These people came due to the access to available land or in response to invitations from family members who had already migrated to the economically better-off Lampung. We possess no reliable data on the number of spontaneous migrants who came to Lampung. However, Smith and Bouvier (1993) estimate that the number of spontaneous migrants is actually larger than the number of transmigrants who have come to Lampung via the official government scheme. According to Fassbender and

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14 Primarily people from the Rejang, Pasemah and Semendo sub-ethnic groups migrated to Lampung, settling for the main part in North Lampung.
Erbe’s calculation, cited by Elmhirst (1997, p.92), “between 1950 and 1978, around 62% of migration to Lampung was spontaneous”.

Table 3. 17 and Table 3. 18 show population trends of ethnic groups in Lampung from 1930 to 2010. Nowadays, 64% of all citizens in Lampung are Javanese, outnumbering all other ethnic groups.

**Table 3. 17 Citizens of Lampung by migration status, 1930-1986**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Natives of Lampung/Lampungese</td>
<td>218,000</td>
<td>360,000</td>
<td>458,000</td>
<td>556,000</td>
<td>661,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spontaneous migrants</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>498,000</td>
<td>577,000</td>
<td>1,057,000</td>
<td>530,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Descendants of spontaneous migrants</td>
<td>123,000</td>
<td>184,000</td>
<td>804,000</td>
<td>1,652,000</td>
<td>2,340,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transmigrants (excluding local transmigrants)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>375,000</td>
<td>107,000</td>
<td>135,000</td>
<td>199,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Descendants of transmigrants</td>
<td>35,000</td>
<td>55,000</td>
<td>513,000</td>
<td>755,000</td>
<td>1,002,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td>406,000</td>
<td>1,667,000</td>
<td>2,775,000</td>
<td>4,627,000</td>
<td>5,250,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


**Table 3. 18 Population figures for Lampung province by ethnicity in 2000 and 2010**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ethnicity</th>
<th>Number of People in 2000</th>
<th>Percentage of Population (%)</th>
<th>Number of People in 2010</th>
<th>Percentage of Population (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Javanese</td>
<td>4,113,731</td>
<td>61.8</td>
<td>4,856,924</td>
<td>64.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lampungese</td>
<td>792,312</td>
<td>11.9</td>
<td>1,028,190</td>
<td>13.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sundanese and Bantenese</td>
<td>749,566</td>
<td>11.2</td>
<td>901,087</td>
<td>11.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Sumatran</td>
<td>236,292</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>416,096</td>
<td>5.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>754,989</td>
<td>11.3</td>
<td>406,108</td>
<td>5.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Central Statistical Bureau of Indonesia (2013a) and Central Statistical Bureau of Indonesia (2001).
Figure 3-4 presents the concentration of Javanese in Indonesia. Lampung has the fourth highest concentration of Javanese out of all the provinces, and displays the most significant percentage concentration of Javanese outside Java (Ananta et al., 2015).

Figure 3-4 Concentration of Javanese in Indonesia

Sources: Ananta et al. (2015).

It should be noted that Javanese are not the only ethnic group living on the island of Java; there are another nine ethnic groups living on Java -- Badui, Bantenese, Bawean, Boyonase, Betawi, Cirebonese, Maduranese, Osing and Sundanese.15 The Betawi are ‘native’ people of Jakarta, their name deriving from Batavia, the colonial name for Jakarta (Ananta et al., 2015). Banten, the province from which Bantenese hail, was only created in 2000, hived off from West Java, which is the provincial home of the Sundanese. Not surprisingly given the proximity of Banten province immediately across the Sunda Straits, Bantenese have been in Lampung since the 17th century when the province was part of the territory of the Bantenese Sultanate. Consequently, relations of the Lampungese with the Bantenese became closer than with any other migrant group in Lampung. Meanwhile, the Sundanese also came to

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15 The island of Madura, part of the province of East Java, off the north east coast of Java is home to most Maduranese, but many Maduranese live on the mainland of Java.
Lampung mostly as spontaneous migrants. Lampung also has a considerable number of people from certain sub-ethnic groups of Javanese ethnicity. One of the largest of these is Javanese Penginyongan or Inyong. Inyong people come from three regencies in Central Java: Banyumas, Pekalongan and Kebumen.

Figure 3-5 shows the distribution of Javanese within Lampung. Six areas are defined by a majority of 70% Javanese or more: Metro, Pringsewu, Tulang Bawang, West Tulang Bawang, Mesuji, East Lampung and Central Lampung. Three of these locations -- East Lampung, Metro and Pringsewu – are historically associated with the transmigration programme.\(^\text{16}\)

**Figure 3-5** The distribution of Javanese and other ethnic groups across Lampung Province

Source: Data taken from Indonesian Central Statistic Bureau (2013) and Badan Informasi Geospasial, analysed and re-drawn by the author (2018).

\(^{16}\) Pringsewu would therefore have been a good research location, too. However, no subnational elections were held in Pringsewu in 2015, which is why it was excluded from this study.
3.5 Conclusion

This chapter has laid the ground for the research that will be introduced in the four empirical chapters by providing a general introduction to relevant aspects of Indonesian politics and transmigration. It has also supplied information on the socio-economic conditions of each research location.

In the first part of this chapter, I gave a brief introduction to the provinces, regencies and cities of Lampung. I suggested that decentralisation has resulted in a more dynamic and messy local government structure in Indonesia. The second part of this chapter explained the context of politics and elections in Indonesia, beginning with an introduction to electoral politics in Indonesia and politics in the reform era and providing a brief explanation of the subnational election mechanism. The third part of this chapter focused on Lampung, providing an introduction to the three research locations. I also offered an overview of local politics in Indonesia, taking various cases of local politics outside Lampung as examples. In general, I showed that patronage democracy has occurred not only in Lampung but also in other part of Indonesia. This section ended with a brief explanation of inter-ethnic based coalitions in Lampung’s politics. The fourth section offered some contextual background on migration and its impact of Lampung’s population. It consisted of two discussions, a general introduction to the transmigration programme and to spontaneous migrants and their impact on the ethnic configuration of Lampung. Thus this chapter has provided a crucial basis for understanding the overarching arguments of this thesis.
Chapter 4
Research Design and Methodology

4.1 The Use of Qualitative Methods and A Case Study Approach

The purpose of this chapter is to discuss the research design and methodology employed in my research. Specifically, I discuss how this research was designed, how I worked in the research locations, how I collected and analysed the data and what the ethical issues were that I needed to address. I introduced my reasons for choosing these three locations in Chapter 1.2.

In discussing the research design and methodology, this chapter consists of seven sections. Section 4.1 justifies the use of a qualitative approach and case study method. This is followed by an introduction to and discussion of the data collection methods in Section 4.2. This consists of four sub-sections: on document analysis, media analysis, direct observation and participant interview. Section 4.3 considers issues related to data management, including the protection of data during fieldwork. In Sections 4.4 and 4.5 I discuss ethical considerations and reflect upon my positionality and my personal experiences. Section 4.6 introduces some of the limitations of my research.

This research aims to explain political campaigns in subnational elections in Lampung, Indonesia – and the results of these elections – and show how the distinction between areas affected by transmigration and those largely unaffected by transmigration helps understand the role of ethnicity and ethnic sentiments. Qualitative methods, with their reliance on in-depth interviews, allow for a deeper investigation of the subject at hand and enable researchers to explore personal perceptions. On qualitative approaches, Mahoney and Goertz (2006, p.230) argue that “a core goal of qualitative research is the explanation of outcomes in individual cases” and that “a central purpose of research is to identify the causes of these
specific outcomes for each and every case that falls within the scope of the theory under investigation”.

The case study approach is chosen here for at least two reasons. First, it enables me to analyse the legacies of transmigration in subnational election campaigns and electoral results. The analyses that support this particular research need a specific context that can be used to explain a wider context and phenomenon, and this is a characteristic of the case study approach (Gerring, 2006). Secondly, this research attempts to make a detailed analysis of ethnic politics in two distinct areas, two that have been affected by transmigration and one that has not been. Again, this calls by definition for the sort of analysis that can only be effected through the examination of specific cases (Gerring, 2006; Gerring, 2004)

An ethnographic method could in certain circumstances be more useful in understanding the deeper context of ethnic politics in Lampung rather than the approach offered by using case studies (although of course the two can be combined). Furthermore, the ethnographic approach implies a method in which the researcher is able to interact directly with the subject of the research on a real-life basis. As a result, ethnography can provide a deeper analysis of the personal experience of a particular issue within a social context. However, the need for comparative work and a shortage of the time that is required for solid ethnographic work led me to rely on a more specific focus on a number of cases.17 Using case studies also provides a tool to select cases based on specific reasons, enabling me to justify my focus on Lampung as an example of the legacy of transmigration on subnational elections.

Lampung is distinctive compared with other regions and closer to one end of the spectrum in relation to the range of transmigration patterns in Indonesia. As a result of the occurrence of prolonged transmigration programmes in this province, Lampung provides plenty of material for a study of the intersection between subnational elections and transmigration in Indonesia. It is also nonetheless very useful because it relates in interesting ways to other provinces and because it represents well the issues that have arisen as a consequence of transmigration. Lampung is chosen in

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17 For an interesting discussion of some of the issues involved with ethnographic field work, see: https://generic.wordpress.soton.ac.uk/ethnographicencounters/2015/07/24/the-advantages-and-disadvantages-of-different-research-methods/
part because the patterns it provides of subnational elections and their consequences in a transmigration area can be used to analyse other areas in Indonesia.

Demographically, the Lampungese in Lampung are a small minority compared to the descendants of Javanese migrants, the result of a prolonged transmigration programme and of spontaneous migration. According to the latest population survey, the Javanese constitute 64% of the total population; the remaining 36% are distributed across more than 10 ethnicities (Central Statistical Bureau of Indonesia, 2013a) (see Chapter 3.4.2).

This study compares subnational elections in two areas shaped by large-scale transmigration and one area not characterised by high numbers of transmigrants. Comparative analysis is one of the most common methods used in the social sciences. However, Lijphart (1975, p.163) argues that the “the comparative method is not a simple method because it is by no means easy to identify comparable cases”. Thus, the most important issue is to find appropriate, comparable cases. To do so, the researcher needs to categorise the cases to be analysed in order to understand the extent to which they are similar or different to other cases. Another key concern is whether a small or large number of cases should be selected.

There is a similar narrative between the cases of Metro and East Lampung, where ethnicity and the effect of prolonged transmigration have left political consequences for day-to-day politics. In contrast, a different narrative can be found in Bandar Lampung. Here, election results remain unaffected by transmigrant populations, and ethnicity is much less of an issue in subnational elections. Spontaneous migration and a better educated population number among the distinctive factors that have meant politics in the province’s capital city are different from the two areas affected by transmigration.

To compare subnational elections in areas affected by transmigration and areas which are not, we need trustworthy data collection methods, as explained in the next section, especially given that these two types of location are both in Lampung and the fact that transmigration has left different legacies in various subnational elections. The thesis offers a comparative analysis between these two types of location to look at how transmigration has influenced subnational elections, particularly from the point of
view of ethnic politics, while also considering the mutually linked issues of money politics and patronage.

### 4.2 Data Collection Methods

The data collection stage involved various steps. I first analysed policy documents and media sources. I then visited the research locations and engaged in direct observation of events and people. Third, I carried out face-to-face semi-structured interviews with key actors. Data was collected in two stages: stage 1 took place in July and August 2015; stage 2 lasted from October 2015 to March 2016. Table 4. 1 summarises these steps.

**Table 4. 1 Flow of activities**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Length of Activity</th>
<th>Activities</th>
<th>Organisations</th>
<th>Locations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>First fieldwork period in July and August 2015 (one month)</td>
<td>Approaching and recruiting interviewees</td>
<td>Subnational election offices</td>
<td>Bandar Lampung</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Obtaining preliminary data on transmigration and subnational elections through document collection</td>
<td>Local governments</td>
<td>Metro</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>National Archive of Indonesia</td>
<td>East Lampung</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Lampung’s Provincial Archive</td>
<td>Jakarta</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Indonesian Institute of Science</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Local media</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Direct observation</td>
<td>Political parties</td>
<td>Bandar Lampung</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Analysis of documents</td>
<td>Offices of ERBOs</td>
<td>Metro</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Analysing media</td>
<td>Electoral Commission</td>
<td>East Lampung</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Local governments</td>
<td>Jakarta</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Private offices and homes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Newspapers</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Second fieldwork period from October 2015 to March 2016 (five months)</td>
<td>Interviewing research participants</td>
<td>Political parties</td>
<td>Bandar Lampung</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>ERBOs</td>
<td>Metro</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Electoral Commission</td>
<td>East Lampung</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Local governments</td>
<td>Jakarta</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Private offices and homes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Newspaper offices</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
4.2.1 Document analysis

Between July and August 2015, I obtained policy documents from political parties, ERBOs, government and Electoral Commission archives, but also legal acts and regulations governing subnational elections. These documents were mainly used in conjunction with data derived from research interviews. A majority of these documents could be found online; I downloaded them in HTML, PDF or MS Word-compatible formats. However, a few documents were only available as paper copies, and others could only be accessed through personal contacts. Some documents turned out to be less relevant for my analysis. This includes the internal rules of political parties, which seemingly are very similar to each other and do not reveal anything specific.

4.2.2 Media analysis

There are three major newspapers in Lampung, but I mainly relied on two of them: the Lampung Post and Tribun Lampung. The Lampung Post (published in Indonesian despite the English language title) is the oldest newspaper in Lampung, established in 1974 and owned by the Media Indonesia group, a leading media company owned by Surya Paloh.\(^1\) Tribun Lampung is a low-cost newspaper but one that is influential, not least due to its capacity to reach a high number of readers throughout the province. It is owned by the Kompas Group, the company that owns Kompas, the most popular and distinguished newspaper in Indonesia. Furthermore, I also retrieved relevant information using online media sources.

The material that comes from newspapers was collected from July 2015 to July 2016; during that period, I was collecting political news related to information on the subnational elections as well as all necessary related contextual background stories. The media analysis helped me in particular to secure background information about current political issues and the activities of ERBOs in subnational elections, as well as profiles of candidates.

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\(^1\) Surya Paloh is a leading Indonesian businessman who owns the Media Indonesia group and is national chair of National Democrat Party.
4.2.3 Direct observation

At the time of the subnational elections in December 2015, I visited all three study locations: Bandar Lampung, East Lampung and Metro. During this period, I was living in Bandar Lampung. The nearest location is Metro, which is up to a one-hour drive from the capital city. East Lampung is a two-hour drive away. At that time, I visited several locations and met various people, including voters and officials at polling stations. My conversations were entirely informal and unrecorded. They were not designed to feed directly into my research as interviews. They were, however, invaluable in giving me the background context enabling me to undertake a richer analysis.

During the fieldwork process, one of the most important stages in qualitative research, I systematically took field notes, detailing my thoughts and observations. According to Arthur et al. (2014, p.171), “Field notes can provide an opportunity to record what researchers see and hear outside the immediate context of the interview, their thoughts about the dynamic of the encounter, ideas for inclusion in later fieldwork and issues that may be relevant at the analytical stage”. Furthermore, I relied on audio recordings and took photographs. I also requested and in all cases obtained permission from campaign managers to follow candidates’ campaigning activities, mainly in July and August 2015.

Following campaign activities also gave me an understanding of the cost of the campaign process in subnational elections. The candidates attempted to attract voters to their campaign rallies by hiring famous singers or actors. Their presence tended to mean that people coming to rallies were less interested in listening to political speeches than in meeting celebrities.

On the day of the local elections, 9th December 2015, starting from Bandar Lampung in the early morning, I drove to Metro to visit some of the polling stations, where I found long queues of voters and polling station officials carefully distributing queue numbers for the voters. The stage of casting the ballot was simple: voters were called one by one by the polling station officials, with an official then distributing the voting card before the voter went to the ballot box to choose their intended candidate. Prior to leaving the polling station, each voter had to dip a finger into ink to prevent double voting. I also went to some of the polling stations in Bandar Lampung and East
Lampung. What I got from visiting these polling stations in the three different locations was the sense that voters were enthusiastic about participating in the process.

### 4.2.4 Research interviews

According to King and Horrocks (2010, p.6), in qualitative research the interview is the most useful and frequently deployed tool for gathering data. This research relied upon in-depth interviews with numerous people. Further, I used purposive sampling methods to identify potential interview participants. Bryman (2012, p.418) writes that “purposive sampling is a non-probability form of sampling. The researcher does not seek to sample research participants on a random basis. The goal of purposive sampling is to sample cases/participants in a strategic way, so that those sampled are relevant to the research questions that are being posed”.

Given that participants were selected purposively, the question was how to approach them? I initially got in touch with potential interviewees in July and August 2015 via email, telephone and face-to-face meetings. Technically, the process of selecting the participants involved several steps and criteria.

First, I selected interview participants based on their role and the position that they held. For example, local political party leaders were selected because I needed access to information regarding current issues particularly in regard to subnational elections, such as the campaign and the process of nominating the candidate. Thus, I interviewed former governor Sjahroedin in order to get his view of Lampung’s politics. To understand the functioning of ERBOs, I interviewed a number of leaders of ERBOs.

Second, I selected interview participants based on their occupation and their work. For example, I selected participants from the election supervisory board, which was important in order to hear their view of the process of supervision regarding money politics in the elections. Furthermore, I also interviewed a former national Electoral Commission member to know more about the electoral mechanisms that apply in subnational elections. This discussion was also important in helping me understand how the situation on the ground affected the organisation of elections given such factors as the occurrence of regular political conflict among local elites and the huge number of voters.
Third, I selected interview participants based on their knowledge and experience of specific issues that formed part of my research. For instance, I interviewed a journalist who had investigated the role of a particular company in supporting a candidate in the elections.

Fourth, the process of selecting interviewees was based on my personal experience and academic judgment. As I have been working intensively on Lampung politics for more than 10 years as an academic and as a political analyst, it was easier for me to choose potential interviewees for my research than it would otherwise be. The process of approaching participants involved two mechanisms. The first was to use my already existing personal contacts. The second was to go through an intermediary; this was especially useful when approaching transmigrant descendants; one of my friends who is a transmigrant descendant assisted me in making direct contact with a number of transmigrant descendants.

Most of the participants in one-to-one, face-to-face interviews represented various elite positions. They were, among other things, political leaders, government officials and heads of ERBOs. Table 4.2 provides an overview of all the interviews. A more detailed list can be found in Appendix A.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Organisation/Institution</th>
<th>Information gathered</th>
<th>No. of interviewees</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Former governor of Lampung</td>
<td>Local government</td>
<td>• role of political parties in local politics &lt;br&gt;• dynamics of local political phenomena &lt;br&gt;• issue of ethnicity in local politics &lt;br&gt;• ethnicity and transmigrant sentiment in local politics</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesian senator for Lampung</td>
<td>Regional Representatives Assembly of Indonesia</td>
<td>• dynamics of local politics phenomena &lt;br&gt;• issues of ethnicity in local politics &lt;br&gt;• ethnicity and transmigrant sentiment in local politics</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local political party leaders</td>
<td>Local political parties</td>
<td>• role of parties in local politics &lt;br&gt;• process of nominating candidates in the election &lt;br&gt;• how money influences politics &lt;br&gt;• issue of ethnicity in local politics &lt;br&gt;• ethnicity and transmigrant sentiment in local politics</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chair of chamber of commerce</td>
<td>Indonesian Chambers of Commerce</td>
<td>• information on the relationships between business and politics in Lampung</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Former manager of sugar company</td>
<td>Sugar company</td>
<td>• sugar company and its political activities in local politics &lt;br&gt;• support given by sugar company to candidates</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political parties members</td>
<td>Election supervisory board of Lampung</td>
<td>• vote-buying activities &lt;br&gt;• how a particular sugar company supports candidates in local election &lt;br&gt;• negotiation process of nominating candidates in local elections including political deals made between politicians and businessmen in local election &lt;br&gt;• how gambling activities and the role of money influences the local politics dynamic</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Head of provincial election supervisory board</td>
<td>Election supervisory board of Lampung</td>
<td>• process of election supervision &lt;br&gt;• the challenges and problems faced by election supervisory board including vote-buying activities &lt;br&gt;• election fraud activities</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political journalists</td>
<td>Tribun Lampung and members of an alliance of independent journalists</td>
<td>• business-driven political activities &lt;br&gt;• issues of ethnicity in local politics &lt;br&gt;• ethnicity and transmigrant sentiment in local politics</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Head of NGO</td>
<td>Legal dispute NGO</td>
<td>• election fraud and vote-buying activities &lt;br&gt;• business-driven politics activities</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heads of ERBOs</td>
<td>ERBOs</td>
<td>• role of ERBOs in local politics &lt;br&gt;• importance of ethnicity issues in local elections</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
As was mentioned earlier, initial contact with potential interviewees was conducted either by email or over the phone. All potential interviewees were sent a consent form and were made aware of the nature of the research. This was all sent out before the fieldwork commenced to give them time to fully understand the details and decide whether they wanted to be involved. In July and August 2015 – a month after my progression from provisional PhD student to doctoral candidate – I visited several locations. These were not just the research sites but also the locations of relevant

| Campaign managers | • issues of ethnicity in local politics  
• inter-ethnic coalitions in local politics  
• ethnicity and transmigrant sentiment in local politics  
• political support given by ERBOs  
• ethnic attributes and local elections  
• strategy used by Lampungese to maintain their political power in local politics  
• political network  
| • campaign process  
| • process of ethnic/political coalitions in local election  
• issues of ethnicity in local politics  
• ethnicity and transmigrant sentiment in local politics  
• incumbency  
• political networks  
3 |

| Local election candidates | • campaign process  
• process of ethnic/political coalitions in local elections  
• issues of ethnicity in local politics  
• ethnicity and transmigrant sentiments in local politics  
• political networks  
• incumbency and election  
• money politics and vote buying activities  
• strategy used by Lampungese to maintain their political power in local politics  
| • campaign process  
• process of ethnic/political coalitions in local elections  
• issues of ethnicity in local politics  
• ethnicity and transmigrant sentiment in local politics  
| 6 |

| Transmigrant descendants not belonging to the categories above | • issues of ethnicity in local politics  
• ethnicity and transmigrant sentiment in local politics  
• personal feelings as a transmigrant descendant  
• political activity and affiliation of the transmigrant descendants  
| • issues of ethnicity in local politics  
• ethnicity and transmigrant sentiment in local politics  
| 6 |

| Total | 44 |
documents that were needed for this project, including the Indonesian Institute of Science and the National Library of Indonesia in Jakarta.

During that time, I also took the opportunity to once again make contact with potential interviewees; most had stated an informal intention to join the research project within up to seven days after the first contact. Each of the participants was given between one and two weeks to consider whether they would be able to participate in the project and respond by email or phone. If no response was received, they were contacted again and once again asked for their participation or, failing that, suggestions for other potential interviewees.

None of the potential interviewees refused to participate in the project. However, the interview process itself was very challenging, particularly because schedules would regularly change, especially in the case of those who held important positions within government or business. To overcome this, I provided respondents with a choice of potential interview dates and times, to respect their prior commitments. As a result of these difficulties, I was able only to interview one person from the business arena.

Seventeen out of 44 of my interviewee were transmigrant descendants. They came from various professions, and belonged to different generations and genders. Among their number were first, second and third generation descendants. They also came from various professions such as farmers, teachers, lecturer and managerial and professional positions. Some of them were involved in ERBO activities.

To help the interviewees better understand the topics that would be raised and discussed, I also prepared a brief research information sheet (as well as the informed consent form). These were distributed to all participants alongside the request letter (provided in Appendices C and D). This is important, as it made participants more familiar with the research as a whole, questions that would be asked, the research design and the methods used. The participants were asked to sign the consent form. Most interviews were conducted in Lampung, at the three fieldwork sites, Bandar Lampung, Metro and East Lampung.

The interviews were mostly conducted in Indonesian; only one interview was conducted in a mixture of English and Indonesian. Most interviews took between one and one and a half hours, but some took more than two hours. Generally, the
interviews followed the format of the semi-structured interview. This mode of interview allows us to obtain a wider and deeper perspective and feedback on the interview results. It also provides a good opportunity for the researcher to explore and ask further more detailed questions. All my participants were have the interviews recorded on a small audio device. At the same time, I took the occasional brief note so as to ensure that I had something to fall back on in case of a problem with the recording.

Drever (2003, p.1) explains that a “semi-structured interview means that the interviewer sets up a general structure by deciding in advance what ground is to be covered and what main questions are to be asked”. In addition, this type of interview is useful because it gathers more factual information, collects the views and statements of interviewees and explores their personal experiences and motivations when it comes to particular issues in subnational elections.

Many interviews were conducted with members of political and cultural elites. Harisson (2001, p.94), writing in a context relevant to my research, argues that “the elite interview basically wish[es] to explore how political institutions operate, how important decisions are made and how political power is attained”. Thus, it is an attempt to uncover information from those who hold or who have held important and relevant positions of power. Although there is no difference between interviewing elites, experts and non-elites, the knowledge gap between these various participants should be considered. Bogner et al. (2009, p.106) argue that:

“No systematic differences can be determined as far as access to the field and actual interaction in the interview are concerned. Similarly, there are no fundamental differences between the target groups for expert interviews or interviews with the elite. In fact, the notion of the expert and the notion of the elite overlap in two key criteria: the knowledge and the power at their disposal. At the same time, both criteria also play a decisive role in distinguishing experts from the elite”.

I explore some of the issues involved in using elite interviews in Section 4.6 on research limitations.
4.3 Data analysis

When using qualitative data analysis techniques, there are two important points that need to be considered. There is no precise method used to analyse data, and it is common that the process of analysing data starts alongside the initial data collection itself. In this project, thematic data analysis was used. Brooks and King (2012, p.1) say that, “template analysis [thematic analysis] is a technique for thematically organising and analysing qualitative data. The data involved are usually interview transcripts, but may be any kind of textual data, including focus groups, diary entries, text from electronic interviews (via email/ web-based chatrooms, social networking sites etc.) or open-ended question responses on a written questionnaire”.

Bryman (2012, pp.578-580) argues that the basic idea of thematic analysis is to provide a matrix that can be used to categorise the theme to which all of the data corresponds and in so doing dividing it into “a central theme and subthemes”, which are categorised in a matrix. Harrison (2001, p.103) suggests using “a matrix or mesh of connections (differences/similarities) between your interviews” in order to organise data. By using the matrix on a particular theme, the interview results can be analysed systematically. So, what is a theme? According to Bryman (2012, p.580), a theme is:

1. "a category identified by the analyst through his/her data;
2. that relates to his/her research focus (and quite possibly the research questions);
3. that builds on codes identified in transcript and/or field notes;
4. and that provides the researcher with the basis for a theoretical understanding of his or her data that can make a theoretical contribution to the literature relating to research focus."

Braun and Clarke (2006, p.79) remind us that, “thematic analysis is a method for identifying, analysing and reporting patterns (themes) within data, it minimally organizes and describes your data set in (rich) detail”. In this project, I therefore provided themes relevant to the main objectives of the research. The theme was taken according to the central theme of each particular chapter in this thesis. For instance, some of the themes were raised as a result of the interview process but some were prepared before the process of interviewing began. Further, each of the chapters has
a slightly different matrix theme, given that each empirical chapter in this thesis seeks to answer a different research question.

However, to maximise the analysis, the number of themes extracted was often different amongst the interviewees, given that every participant in this research played a different role and had different levels of understanding about the questions that were being asked. This is because of the importance of ensuring a “balance between analytic narrative and illustrative extract” (ibid, p.96), one of the requirements of good thematic analysis. For example, questions on particular topics surrounding being a transmigrant were more often directed towards transmigrant descendants, whereas discussions of money in politics or party coalitions was better being directed at local party leaders.

4.4 Data Management

The collected information was transcribed in Indonesian within a month of the interview being conducted, during which process any identifiable information was removed in the case of those participants whose personal identity was to be hidden (for example, name, occupation, age, address and other personal details). Data were stored on both the University of Leeds’ servers and a personal laptop, which had been password protected and which had had Sophos installed by the University’s School of Geography IT technician before fieldwork started in July 2015. Sophos is important in ensuring the confidentiality of information in case files are stolen or other unforeseen circumstances occur. No one other than myself was able to access the data. I also ensured that data regulation legislation in both the United Kingdom and Indonesia was respected.

The personal names of people in positions of power have been retained in this thesis – with their express permission in all cases. This is a standard procedure, and one that reflects both their social standing but also, more importantly perhaps, the fact that their names can be easily traced by anyone who is interested, and therefore there is no point in anonymising them. Other participants, however, were anonymised, again with their consent. This is explained in more detail in section 4.5 below.

I coded the interviews based on the topics raised in the interview. In order to create a richer and more complex analysis deriving from the interview material, I combined
interview results from many sources in order not to rely only on specific interviews for views on specific issues. For example, the result of an interview with a participant that is explored in one chapter can also be used to expand on the responses from another participant in another chapter, but it still follows the broader theme discussed in each chapter.

4.5 Ethics and Ethical Considerations

The University of Leeds required ethical review and approval prior to my fieldwork beginning in Lampung. The application was approved on the 17th June 2015. The most important ethical issues raised in the course of this study were confidentiality and anonymity.

As this research involved interviews with prominent people for whom it would be easy for interested readers to work out their identity, I had to decide to what extent to anonymise my participants. Most of my interviewees agreed not to be anonymised. However, in order to put them at ease, even where I received their permission, I decided to anonymise some interviewees who gave me information that might be considered sensitive. This proved particularly useful when discussing issues such as the role of money and particular companies in local politics in Lampung. In these cases, I informed the participants in the course of the interview that it would be more appropriate to anonymise them in my research. Besides this, as mentioned above, where it would be difficult to guess the identity of an interviewee, their name was withheld.

During the project, the standard research ethics guidelines outlined by the University of Leeds (and elaborated upon below) were followed. The research objectives were explained to the participants by the researcher prior to the interview so that participants could have an opportunity to decide whether they would be involved or not. Moreover, the participants were also provided with information on the methods used in this research and detailed information on the research and what kind of data would be collected.

To put participants at ease, they were able to request withdrawal from the research before April 2016, after which the data would be coded and analysed. Their withdrawal
after this data would be problematic for the validity of the data and analysis. Participants were requested to sign an informed consent statement and told that the transcript would be kept for a period of up to two years and that after the end of the project the transcript will be deleted permanently.

4.6 Reflecting on Positionality

Closely related to ethical considerations, it is important to reflect on the fieldwork experience as a PhD researcher. The process was completed in two stages. During my two periods of fieldwork, which lasted up to six months, I mostly stayed in the capital city of Bandar Lampung, visiting other fieldwork locations to conduct interviews with participants.

It might be thought that doing intensive research in the researcher’s hometown would be easier than it would for an outsider. However, this was contradicted by my feelings at the time and my ambition to keep myself as a detached researcher and avoid emotional attachment to either the context or location of the research. Working as a lecturer at the University of Lampung, I have had the opportunity to conduct regular research in the fieldwork locations. Having a better understanding of the research locations was the benefit that I gained from my working background as a lecturer and researcher at the University of Lampung.

My other professional role as a specialist social and political analyst and consultant also gave me the chance to understand local political issues not just in Lampung but also in other parts of the country. These roles also gave me the opportunity to conduct more in-depth analysis of many issues concerning local politics in Indonesia and discuss matters with colleagues from different regions and universities across the country.

I myself am Lampungese. Working and researching in the area where I live brought two advantages. First, I was able to more fully understand the context and issues in these regions, particularly with regards to daily local political activities. Second, this situation allowed me to deliver a better-informed analysis of particular issues, especially in the context of contested political power between the Lampungese and Javanese.
Although I have worked several times in collaborative research projects both inside and outside Lampung, this is the first time I have been researching in a way that must fulfil international standards of research. I found that transforming myself from a local or national level researcher to an international level researcher was a huge challenge, especially given that English is not my primary language and that living in Leeds presented a number of cultural challenges.

Interviewing various levels of elite helped me to learn many things. For instance, I found that fixing an interview with an elite participant could be a fraught process. Some participants wanted to be interviewed in a luxurious cafe or restaurant; others preferred their office or house. Some paid the bill, but for the most part I had to pay both for them and their staff. There were times when I spent Rp. 500,000 (ca. £30) at a meeting. I did not expect this to happen, but put it down to a process of bargaining and a means of obtaining access to particular participants. Some of the public figures whom I interviewed wanted to be interviewed in a private room or even in their own home. They invited me into their ‘luxurious’ house. Discussing issues in these private spaces made them more relaxed and prepared to discuss personal as well as political issues.

4.7 Research Limitations

As with many research projects, especially those for a PhD, there are various constraints which result in limitations to the research. These are for the main part logistical and relate to such issues as time in the field and lack of research assistance. In the case of my research, the limited research budget I was awarded by the Indonesian Government did not cover my fieldwork expenses, so I saved money from my living costs. This contributed to some of the limitations of the research, such as the limited number of participants, especially from non-elite groups that could be interviewed.

It is important to state that there are limitations to the use of elite interviews. Harisson (2001) explains that the elite interview has a drawback in that bias may be introduced due to the personal interests of the interviewee. In this sense, Richards (1996) argues that the disadvantage in conducting elite interviews in research relates to the reliability of the information given by the elite member.

“The reliability of the interviewee is sometimes questionable. This often results from failures in his/her memory. The older the witness, and the further from
events they are, the less reliable the information (though the more willing they may be to talk). This is partly a result of the stretch of time, but interviewees also have the problem of confusing what they can actually remember of events, with what they have later read on the same subject. They may also adjust their interpretation of an event in order to avoid being seen in a poor light or, in some cases, they may have an axe to grind.” (ibid, p.200)

As a result, the researcher must bear in mind that the information provided by the elite interviewee may be partisan, relying on his/her personal interests, especially when discussing a political interest which clashes with that of another member of the elite (ibid., p.201). With this in mind, I tried to ensure that I deployed my experience as a researcher in this field to reduce the possibility of having ‘one side of a story’ passed off as an authoritative account. At the same time, to some extent these issues apply to interviews with non-elite participants. The difference, perhaps, lies with the apparent authority held by the elite member, and this is something that needs to be carefully considered and handled by the researcher.

Further, the use of a political broker is also beneficial in order to obtain a better idea of the situation on the ground, in particular as it related to sensitive and awkward questions. For example, discussions with political brokers also gave me a big opportunity to raise questions that could not be answered by a political party leader: for example, the question of how much money is given by a particular candidate to the party leader to secure official party support in a local election. Based on my research experiences, the political broker was also key in obtaining undercover stories on local elections and in explaining how financial support for a candidate was obtained from gambling or through a particular company.

The political broker is also a useful source on sensitive issues in local politics. For example, I felt relatively free and relaxed in asking about the role and motives behind the sugar company in Lampung in supporting financially particular candidates including how much money was spent by particular companies to support candidates in local elections. The discussion also included strategies to win elections; brokers felt free to speak with me about particular political strategies used to mobilise voters including vote buying scenarios. Further, with this type of question, a proper answer might not have been obtained if I had interviewed the sugar company’s managers or the candidate or local political party leaders. This also calls for personal acquaintanceship rather than a formal interview. This helped me get a comprehensive sense of my interviews.
In an ideal world, with more time and resources at my disposal, I would have interviewed more non-elite residents, and might have accompanied this with a quantitative survey to gauge voter intentions and motivations. The combination of qualitative interviews and quantitative survey might have resulted in more comprehensive research results. That is not to say, however, that there are not specific advantages to be gained from a study that focuses more specifically on local elites, and hopefully I have been able to exploit these advantages in my thesis.

4.8 Conclusion

In this chapter I have discussed the research design and methods applied in this project. The chapter began with a discussion of the qualitative nature of the research design, reflections on the case study method and methodological choices when it comes to case selection. This was followed by a discussion on the more ‘technical’ aspects of my research, including data collection techniques. In discussing my own positionality and the limitations of this research, I stressed two aspects. The first of these was my own identity as a Lampungese scholar and analyst active over many years in Lampung. I discussed the implications of this for my research. The second was my reliance on elite interviews, and here I drew attention to some of the possible drawbacks of this approach.

My use of research techniques will become clear in the four empirical chapters that follow. Suffice it to say at this juncture that the chapters reflect slightly different balances between research techniques. Chapter 5, with its discussion of the activities of a variety of ERBOs, relies on the result of interviews alongside media and document analysis. Media analysis and direct observation are used more extensively to supplement material gained from interviews in the analyses of electoral politics in Metro, East Lampung and Bandar Lampung in Chapter 6, 7 and 8 respectively.
Chapter 5

The Political Role of Transmigration and Ethnic-Religious Based Organisations in Lampung

Discussion of ethnic minorities and politics is like a puzzle in which pieces do not fit together neatly as in a jigsaw but overlap messily. If we examine the picture at the national level, all ethnicities in Indonesia are in a minority except for the Javanese. This situation can create multiple difficulties and tensions. According to Schlehe (2011, p.149), “Ethnic and cultural pluralism must always be organised and managed. In particular, the relatively young post-colonial nation-states are confronted with the challenge of defining and ordering both local diversity and national identity”.

This chapter discusses the political role played by ethnic-religious based organisations (ERBOs) in local politics in Lampung. To this end, I analyse the strengths and weaknesses of particular ERBOs, as well as their political strategies, membership patterns, and organisational structures. There is already a wealth of studies exploring ethnic revivalism and the political role of ERBOs in Indonesia. Schiller (2007) has analysed the revival of the East Kalimantan Dayak Association, arguing that the organisation is successful in attempts to construct indigenous solidarity in East Kalimantan.

Van Klinken focuses on the political role of the South Sulawesi Family Association (Kerukunan Keluarga Sulawesi Selatan, KKSS), which he calls “arguably the largest ethnic organisation in Indonesia” (2008, p.35). He argues that the influence of KKSS has been weak in recent elections, suggesting that clientilism has found its limits in local politics. Although ethnic and family-like solidarity exists, as do protective patrons, ethnic organisations face two problems: the limits of the “clientelist network” and the presence of a “more pressing interest than pleasing their ethnic patron” (ibid, p.57). “A clientelist network becomes politically effective only by scaling up local face-to-face relationships to the electoral district, which can be national” (ibid, p.37). Thus, the
clientelist network is ineffective if the relationship occurs with direct contact between the patron and client.

My analysis updates that of van Klinken and involves a larger number of ERBOs. Based on an analysis of the political activities of ERBOs during the 2015 local elections in Lampung, I argue that ERBOs possess the capacity to strengthen ethnic sentiment in subnational elections and may therefore function as effective campaign machines and potentially be deployed as vote-getter machines, depending on the type and classification of the ERBO itself. This challenges the arguments of van Klinken, who claims that the role of ethnic-based organisations is now limited in local elections (ibid, pp.35-65), as shown by the case of KKSS.

This chapter does not aim to discuss how effective ERBOs are as vote-getting machines in local elections, nor how significant ERBOs are as a factor in mobilising voters; this would need a causal statistical analysis. What this chapter does is identify the strategies used by individual ERBOs in mobilising their members in local elections. It does this through an analysis that involves categorising and classifying ERBOs by type and by explaining how political support is given to particular candidates in local elections.

In this chapter, I argue that there are two categories of ERBO, one that is politically active and another that is politically passive. Politically active ERBOs tend to be involved in seeking votes for individual candidates. This argument runs through the 10 sections, each of which, apart from section 5.1, introduces one ERBO. Section 5.1 provides a general understanding of the typology and an overview of each of the ERBOs in Lampung. This is followed by the sections introducing each of the ERBOs consecutively, especially in terms of establishment, membership, political role and involvement in local politics. The chapter reveals the diversity of approaches and positions among these ERBOs, making solid conclusions difficult. That said, however, it is clear from the research recounted in this chapter that a number of ERBOs exercise some significant degree of political influence on voters.
5.1 ERBOs in Lampung: Typology and Overview

The increase in the size of the middle class after the downfall of President Suharto subsequently contributed to the growth in the number of ERBOs in Indonesia. Members of these organisations have been characterised as well educated and more interested in participating in politics and getting involved in ethnic-based group activities (Fennema and Tillie, 1999; Fennema, 2004). Generally, citizens need a free choice to join or leave organisations for them to be voluntary and fully autonomous (Fennema, 2004, p.431). The reforms of 1998 and thereafter enabled citizens to make this choice and engage in civil-society activities, resulting in the establishment of a considerable number of ERBOs.

Reuter (2009, p.869) writes that, “Local revivalism, in Indonesia and elsewhere, may be in part a response to globalisation and, thus, transcends nation-states…. Revitalisation movements have flourished in Indonesia as a whole, and national factors contributing to this phenomenon need to be considered…. In this case, decentralisation of state authority in the post-Suharto reform era has created opportunities for local interests and identities throughout Indonesia to be expressed within a liberalised political framework”.

According to Noor (2012, p.1), “As Indonesia’s political landscape continues to expand with new agents and actors taking to the political stage, so its civil society is expanding with new civil society organisations, lobby groups and pressure groups”. In response to the political decentralisation and democratisation that took place after 1998, several ERBOs emerged in Lampung with ethnic and religious values forming the basis of their organisational missions. The eight most important organisations are: PATRI, representing transmigrants and their descendants; Lampung Sai, representing 'native' Lampungese but open to all inhabitants of the province; the Javanese coastal migrant community organisation, Penginyongan; two Sundanese migrant community organisations, Sunda Ngumbara and Pajar; the Bantenese migrant community organisation Puwnten; the Lampung Balinese organisation, PBL; the Indonesian Chinese Clan Social Association, PSMTI; and the Indonesian Religious Council of Hindu, PHDI (see Table 5.1). Further, there is another important organisation, one that might be considered an ERBO and that plays an important role in the local politics of Lampung, namely Nahdlatul Ulama (NU). However, the political role of NU will be discussed in Chapter 7.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of organisation</th>
<th>Membership</th>
<th>Political role</th>
<th>Example of political involvement in elections</th>
<th>Classification</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PATRI</td>
<td>transmigrants and their descendants only</td>
<td>passive</td>
<td>minimal involvement, and only in gubernatorial election in 2008</td>
<td>ethnic interest organisations and ethnic identity organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sunda Ngumbara and Pajar</td>
<td>Sundanese and their descendants but also open to interested people of other ethnicities</td>
<td>passive</td>
<td>unidentified</td>
<td>both bodies are ethnic associations and ethnic identity organisations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Puwnten</td>
<td>Bantenese only and their descendants</td>
<td>active</td>
<td>local elections for city of Bandar Lampung mayor in 2015 and South Lampung regency head in 2015</td>
<td>ethnic association and ethnic political association</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Penginyongan</td>
<td>Penginyongan only and their descendants (from Central Java)</td>
<td>active</td>
<td>local elections for South in 2015 and North Lampung regency heads in 2013</td>
<td>ethnic association and ethnic political association</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PHDI</td>
<td>Hindu believers only (majority of Lampung Balinese)</td>
<td>passive</td>
<td>unidentified</td>
<td>ethnic association and ethnic identity organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PBL</td>
<td>Lampung Balinese only</td>
<td>active</td>
<td>local elections for South and Central Lampung regency heads in 2015</td>
<td>ethnic association and ethnic political association</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSMTI</td>
<td>Indonesian-Chinese only</td>
<td>passive</td>
<td>unidentified</td>
<td>ethnic association and ethnic identity organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lampung Sai</td>
<td>open to everyone</td>
<td>active</td>
<td>gubernatorial elections in 2008</td>
<td>ethnic political associations</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Each of the ERBOs has adopted a different strategy to support political candidates in subnational elections and to influence public debates. I will discuss them in more detail below. In brief, however, Penginyongan, with its membership drawn exclusively from three regencies of Central Java, is generally more engaged in political activities.
PATRI, by contrast, has a larger number of members, all of them transmigrants, but is politically less active. Lampung Sai, an organisation representing native Lampungese, pursues a more inclusive political strategy and cooperates with other ethnic communities in Lampung.

Chettri (2014) argues that the idea of ethnicity, ethnic identity and politics are socially constructed and those concepts are an integral element. Further, Chettri has pointed out that “ethnicity and ethnic identity may have emerged recently as conceptual categories, but they have always formed an intrinsic component of the lived experiences, history, politics and culture of the region” (ibid, p.1). According to Fennema (2004, p.443), ERBOs share a common identity whereby their membership reflects a similar ethnic background. However, ERBOs may differ as to their mission, which will either relate to the maintenance and preservation of an ethnic culture, the pursuit of social-economic interests restricted to a specific ethnic group, or the achievement of shared political goals.

Likewise, Tillie and Slijper (2006) refer to their organisational mission as a key feature of ERBOs. Fennema (2004) then goes on to unpack the organisational features of ERBOs. Relying on a social capital approach, he uses three indicators: organisational density, organisation filling and institutional completeness. Fennema explains that:

“The organisational density provides us with a measure that gives the number of organisations per ethnic resident…. The concept and measurement of organisational filling compensates for such a bias. Organisational filling is defined as the number of affiliates or members of ethnic organisations divided by the number of ethnic residents…. Institutional completeness refers to the diversity of the ethnic organisations. An ethnic community is institutionally complete if all the services the members of the group require and all collective goods that they can produce are provided by or through ethnic organisations” (ibid, p.441).

Fennema separates ERBOs into four categories: (1) ethnic associations based on “a common identity”; (2) ethnic interest organisations referring to “the common social-economic interest”; (3) ethnic political associations based on “a shared conception of the common good”; and (4) ethnic identity organisations focused on “the maintenance of the ethnic culture” (ibid, p.443).

By applying Fennema’s classification to the ethnic organisations, my research suggests that PATRI can be classified as a combination of an ethnic interest organisation and ethnic identity organisation. ERBOs that can be considered both
ethnic associations and ethnic identity organisations are Sunda Ngumbara, Pajar, PHDI and PSMTI. Meanwhile, there are three ERBOs that are a mix of ethnic association and ethnic political association, while Lampung Sai is the only organisation that can be categorised as an ethnic political association due to the organisation’s inclusive membership and persistent focus on local political goals in Lampung.

The framework used in this thesis to assess whether a particular ERBO is categorised as politically active or passive is based on the political support given to a particular candidate in local elections. Thus, the categorisation of politically passive and active groups is based upon their role in influencing and contesting local politics in Lampung. Some ERBOs, such as Penginyongan, Lampung Sai, PBL and Puwnten, are classed as politically active as they support a particular candidate during local elections and undertake various political activities in Lampung.

Their political activities have meant that these organisations have proven themselves able to attract and provide political support in local electoral competitions. Meanwhile, PATRI, Sunda Ngumbara, Pajar, PHDI and PSMTI are less political because of self-imposed restrictions on political platforms and objectives and their emphasis, as migrant associations, on ‘preserving the culture of their homeland’. These ERBOs are typically politically passive organisations, meaning that there is no evident attempt by any of them to lend political support to particular candidates in electoral competitions.

The next sections explain each of the ERBOs from the point of view of their membership, their political involvement in local elections and their type as an ERBO.

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19 The assessment of whether an ERBO is classified as politically active or passive relies on the results of interviews, and document and newspaper analysis as well as observation of particular ERBOs’ activities in Lampung.
5.2 PATRI: Representing Transmigrants in Lampung

The first moves to establish an organisation to represent the interests of transmigrants and their descendants were made in 1993. According to the organisation’s website, it was felt that there was a need for a group that could be a gathering point for transmigrant descendants but that could also strengthen the potential of transmigrant descendants in various positions. Empowering the young generation of transmigrant descendants was a major goal at the time of the organisation’s establishment.\(^{20}\)

PATRI was established in 2004 in Jakarta, roughly a hundred years after the initiation of the transmigration programme in Indonesia. According to an interview that Muhajir Utomo, the former national leader of PATRI, gave to me, the extensive delays in creating a formal organisation for the descendants of transmigrants after 1998 had much to do with the desire of transmigration leaders to respect the values of the local population and their political features (INT1, October 2015). Muhajir Utomo explained,

> “Why was PATRI established on the 16th of February 2004 -- almost 100 years after the initiation of the transmigration programme in Indonesia? To be honest, we are Javanese [transmigrant descendants]; we felt that we live in other people's land. So, if we live outside our homeland, we have to consider many things, including respect for local people and their values. That's why we established PATRI 100 years after the first transmigration programme” (ibid.).

Today, many descendants of transmigrants have better jobs and positions than their ancestors. Some of them are mayors or heads of district, successful transmigrant descendants in the political arena. From the perspective of many transmigrant descendants, transmigration was a long-term project for human development and its benefits could only be understood after many years. Muhajir Utomo added that:

> “Some people looked at us as a marginalised and vulnerable people but after 100 years we proved that we could be more successful than our ancestors were. For instance, many of us … have become engineers, entrepreneurs, medical practitioners, even professors. You have to understand that transmigration is a long-term project; this is not an instant people’s relocation programme. Transmigration is a project for developing human resources”.

PATRI members have often lacked the confidence to engage and compete in subnational politics, and many descendants of transmigrants have experienced isolation and marginalisation. Muhajir Utomo put it in the following words:

\(^{20}\) https://kissparry.com/Patri/sejarah-Patri/
“Sometimes, when I was a child, I myself had a feeling of inferiority and lack of confidence in dealing with [native] Lampungese, especially when we were having a group [meeting] or discussion with them”. In this context, the comments of a third generation transmigrant are revealing. He told me that, “We know we are not locals. As migrants sometimes we feel inferior but as I am living in an area which was previously set up as a transmigration city, I don’t have feelings of inferiority as the majority of people living in this city are Javanese transmigrants” (INT11, January 2016).

PATRI’s informal involvement in subnational politics began with their leader, Muhajir Utomo, who was a professor in soil science and former rector of the University of Lampung. Born into a poor transmigrant family, he obtained a PhD in soil science from the University of Kentucky in the U.S. and was later appointed rector of the University of Lampung between 1998 and 2006. Muhajir Utomo ran in a gubernatorial election in 2008, but he was beaten by a Lampungese candidate, Sjahroedin, who is currently the head of Lampung Sai. Coincidentally, the 2008 gubernatorial elections became a contest between the leaders of the two most influential Lampung-based ERBOs, PATRI and Lampung Sai. However, PATRI withheld political support from Muhajir Utomo in the election, with the result that many PATRI members must have cast their votes elsewhere. Sjahroedin secured almost 1.5 million votes, 43.27% of the total votes available, while Muhajir Utomo received just 119,329 votes, 3.41%. Sjahroedin enhanced his electability by choosing a Javanese transmigrant descendant as his candidate for deputy governor.

PATRI is strict and exclusive about its membership; anyone who is interested in joining PATRI must be a transmigration descendant or have relations with transmigrant descendants through marital status (PATRI, 2004). PATRI has a bigger membership than the other ERBOs in Lampung. Nationally, only NU has a bigger membership than PATRI.21 PATRI has, therefore, the potential to bring political support to a particular candidate in local elections by capitalising on transmigrant political sentiment.

The establishment of PATRI is based not only on aiming to maintain ethnic culture but also on sharing common socio-economic interests among its members. PATRI

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21 http://www.nu.or.id/post/read/86221/survei-terbaru-muslim-di-lampung-72-persen-nu
aims, so Muhajir Utomo told me, to empower its members. Its activities are not only related to the preservation of Javanese culture, to which end cultural events such as Javanese shadow puppet shows are held, but also to teach members how to run a business.

PATRI’s unwillingness to appear to be engaging in political activity, especially to support a particular candidate in a local election, has meant letting native Lampungese take political leadership positions in Lampung and has much to do with their view that the Lampungese possess privileges as native people. Several of my interviewees shared the sentiment expressed to me by Muhajir Utomo: “We still have a feeling that we are transmigrant descendants. Well, let the Lampungese become political leaders in their homeland; let us just become professionals” (INT1, October 2015).

However, even though the elite of PATRI have refused to give any political support to member candidates, ethnic sentiment still seems to exist in the organisation’s elite perspective both at national and regional level, especially in bringing to bear its influence on the choice of candidates to run in local elections. According to Muhajir Utomo, PATRI supports candidates according to their capabilities and only secondarily according to ethnicity. In this sense, PATRI remains passive in the local politics of Lampung. For example, I saw no evidence that PATRI gave any organisational support to a particular candidate in local elections.

This view was corroborated by my interviewees, and was clearly expressed by Muhajir Utomo:

“PATRI is a politically neutral ERBO. We do not give support to any political party or candidate in local elections, so that if then any of our members decide to become members of a political party or involved in a local election, that is a personal matter not an organisational endorsement.” (INT1, October 2015)

However, for some transmigrant descendants, this position can be frustrating. Two of my interviewees, one a second-generation transmigrant and the other a third-generation transmigrant, told me they would be more comfortable if the elected local leaders were Javanese transmigrants rather than Lampungese (INT13, March 2016; INTT14, March 2016). This is not to say, however, that transmigrants and their descendants have no role; in some areas strongly shaped by the transmigration
programme, the role of transmigration descendants is still crucial, as we shall see in Chapters 6 and 7.

5.3 Sunda Ngumbara and Pajar, for Sundanese Migrants

Established in 1983, Pajar is a Lampung-based community organisation for Sundanese migrants that have come to Lampung from the province of West Java. Sundanese people have come to Lampung both through the transmigration programme and through spontaneous migration. Sundanese migrated to Bandar Lampung in significant numbers after the devastating Krakatoa eruption in 1883 (Elmhirst and Darmastuti, 2018).

The leader of Pajar, Undang Rosyidin, told me that, “Because we miss Sunda, we established this organisation to remember our homeland and also to create a feeling of home for us while staying in Lampung” (INT4, February 2016; INT8, January 2016). According to the organisation’s internal rules, it acts as a forum for Sundanese migrants in Lampung (Pajar, 2012). Most Pajar members believe in the importance of practising their language and preserving traditional Sundanese music. Pajar has included as members several sub-ethnic groups of Sundanese in Lampung, including Bantenese. However, after Banten was transformed into a province in 2000, the Bantenese formed their own ethnic-based organisation, Puwnten, and are no longer part of Pajar.

The extension to Lampung in 2015 of the activities of the national organisation Sunda Ngumbara has reduced the role of Pajar to that of affiliated organisation. Sunda Ngumbara is an organisation of Sundanese migrants active at the national level. Their aim is to unify Sundanese migrants, as explained by their leader, Rosyadi: “Sunda Ngumbara was established to unify all the Sundanese migrants across Indonesia….For the Lampung branch, this organisation aims to be a gathering point for Sundanese migrants living in this province” (INT3, February 2016). The governor of West Java automatically acts as the head of the advisory board of Sunda Ngumbara. Figure 5-1 below shows the official inauguration of the governor of West Java as head of the board.
Generally, both Sunda Ngumbara and Pajar claim that their membership is not restricted to ethnic Sundanese (Pajar, 2012; Sunda Ngumbara, 2015). For instance, Sunda Ngumbara admits anyone interested in learning about and practicing Sundanese culture. As the leader of Pajar, Undang Rosyidin said,

“For us, everyone is warmly welcome to join Sunda Ngumbara, as long as he or she has an interest in West Java in general. For example, anyone who is studying in Bandung [capital city of West Java province] and is able to speak Sundanese and knows about our culture is welcome to join this organisation. So, we are not only an ethnic-based organisation, but also a culture-based organisation.” (INT4, February 2016)

Based on Fennema’s framework, these two Sundanese-based organisations are a mix of ethnic association and ethnic identity organisation. Their aims are fundamentally to preserve Sundanese culture and form a gathering point for Sundanese in Lampung. Neither organisation gives formal support to its members; their strict codes of conduct compel them to be politically neutral. However, in East Lampung in 2015, elite members of Pajar allegedly persuaded a member of the organisation, Chusnunia Halim, to stand for election. In this case, the provincial official denied the report and maintained that this was a personal affair involving a colleague in the East Lampung branch of Pajar.
The elite of this organisation believe that Pajar’s involvement in local politics is just as a facilitator and mediator for those participating in political activities, for example for their members running for public office:

“We just assist and facilitate for members who have a political interest in the election; any [member] is welcome to communicate their political manifesto in front of all members. What we want to achieve … is, at the least, that the members of our community know there is a candidate from our community…. We just make it possible for the candidate to meet our community.” (INT3, February 2016; similar sentiments were expressed by INT4, February 2016).

In summary, according to their internal rules, these organisations are neutral with regards to political activities and affiliations. Leaders of both organisations have claimed that, “If one of our leaders at the regency level told us that he supported a particular candidate in local elections, that is definitely a personal view, not an organisational decision” (INT3, February 2016), and, “As an organisation, we never officially support a candidate in any local election” (INT4, February 2016). In this sense, these two Sundanese-based organisations can be classified as politically passive ERBOs.

5.4 Puwnten, Representing the Interests of Bantenese

Puwnten, the Bantenese community organisation, was established in Jakarta on the 7th April 1996 in order to represent Bantenese interests across several areas, including in economic and social matters (Puwnten, 2006), as made clear by a leading member of the organisation, Budihardjo:

“Why did we establish Puwnten? There are several reasons. First, we wanted to ameliorate the image and perception of the Bantenese; as you know, Bantenese are claimed as Jawara [martial arts fighters] and that is absolutely wrong. Historically, the Bantenese community is led by Ulama [Islamic teachers] not Jawara. We should be visible and respected, so we established this organisation to bring about this situation.” (INT5, February 2016)

The public perception that Bantenese are a roguish ethnic group remains strong in Indonesia, so the establishment of Puwnten is an attempt to change that sentiment. In Lampung, the Bantenese saw themselves as having been marginalised. For instance, although they are the fourth largest ethnic group in Bandar Lampung, with 68,468 Bantenese living in the city (Central Statistical Bureau, 2013), the Bantenese have never played a major political role there. This phenomenon became a concern for the internal membership of Puwnten, as revealed by the organisation member
quoted above, who told me that, “We have a huge number of members, particularly in Bandar Lampung. Bantenese form the fourth largest ethnic group in Bandar Lampung. Thus, we have a potential number of voters and are able to influence local power” (INT5, February 2015).

The establishment of Puwnten itself was a reaction to the cultural hegemony of the Sundanese over the Bantenese in West Java. Simon (1991) argues that this is not a domination by force, but more a cultural hegemony that occurred due to the consent given by the Bantenese and Sundanese elites themselves. As a result, after Banten was established as an independent province in 2000, the Bantenese community were no longer affiliated with the West Javanese community organisation.

Inter-ethnic relations between the Lampungese and Bantenese have grown close; this is the result of several historical factors. The relations started during the 16th to 18th centuries, when the port of Banten (next to the modern city of Jakarta) was an international centre for trade in commodities including pepper from Lampung (Wijayati, 2014). The Lampungese and Bantenese therefore have a closer relationship than other ethnic groups in Lampung, aided by their proximity. The prolonged spontaneous migration that has occurred from Banten to Bandar Lampung has contributed to the large number of Bantenese in Lampung, especially in Bandar Lampung, the city with the largest Bantenese population in Lampung.

As with Penginyongan, Puwnten uses exclusive membership criteria. This means that membership is open only to Bantenese and their descendants. Some exceptions are made for people who are married to Bantenese. Puwnten is a politically active ERBO, particularly in regions where the Bantenese have a large population such as in Bandar Lampung and in Pesawaran and Tanggamus regencies. This can be seen in their involvement in support of candidates in local elections, as in Bandar Lampung’s local elections in 2015. Puwnten claims that it is engaged in a long-term political strategy designed to influence local politics in Lampung. The leader of the organisation, Budihardjo, told me that:
“Currently, we are in the stage of raising and creating solidarity among the Bantenese. As you know this is a long-term project. We cannot directly get a major position by suddenly conquering local politics. We have to build that solidarity first by empowering the community in many aspects such as the economy, education and health. For instance, we have our own ambulance; these ambulances are provided only for the Bantenese.” (INT5, February 2016)

There are several political strategies applied by Puwnten to deal with local politics. The first is through community empowerment. Puwnten have set out clear stages of this strategy firstly through informal meetings and discussions and then through community rallies around particular political events such as supporting a Bantenese candidate in local elections. According to Budihardjo, “Once we have given the community a sense of empowerment, we can use it for political activities” (ibid.).

He added that:

“We are still in the process of developing Bantenese sentiment among our members. We know that the voters currently are very pragmatic. Somehow, if we propose a candidate with a lack of capability [even if he is Bantense], we will lose. Meanwhile, the existence of this organisation has not been approved yet by all Bantenese. [Our branch of Puwnten] is only three years old… so we need more time … to be recognised by the whole Bantenese community….I hope that the ongoing empowering process … will increase political sentiment amongst the Bantenese in future elections. Puwnten’s consolidation phase to raise members’ consciousness will take at least five years and will empower the Bantenese in many fields” (ibid.).

Secondly, Puwnten offers its support to particular candidates in local elections based on certain conditions, meaning that the organisation will support a candidate if Puwnten’s requests (or sets of requests) are accepted by the candidate. On this matter, Budihardjo explained that:

“I said to Herman Hasanusi [mayoral candidate in Bandar Lampung’s local election in 2015] ‘We will help you in the local election as long as you care for the Bantenese. Involve the Bantenese in social and economic activities, for instance, by adopting pro-poor policies such as the implementation of an economic policy for coastal areas’” (ibid.).

This is important because most Bantenese live and work in coastal areas of Bandar Lampung as fishermen or fishery traders, and many are still below the poverty level. This pattern of political relationships suggests a clientelist approach to politics, with political support given to the candidate who accommodates internal ethnic interests. Van Klinken (2008, p.36) elaborates on this as follows:
“It is a relationship between politicians and specific groups of clients based on a direct exchange of votes for concrete rewards. The clientelistic relationship is always unequal, but it does not have to be face-to-face or particularly normative. Clientelistic politicians use the intimate knowledge they have of their constituencies to build hierarchical relational pyramids that deliver specific goods (jobs, permits, contracts, etc.) in exchange for votes”.

Thirdly, Puwnten deploys Bantenese Islamic teachers to mobilise Bantenese voters in local elections. Traditionally, Islamic schools (Pesantren) are the first school that Bantenese children attend. The community has a long tradition of Islamic values, and many Bantenese become Islamic teachers in Pesantren. Islamic teaching plays an essential role in ensuring and securing political support for Puwnten in local elections, for example, in local elections in Bandar Lampung and South Lampung. Charismatic Islamic teachers are able to influence the political preferences of members of the Bantenese community. This is a point made by (Okamoto, 2004), who argues that informal Bantenese leaders such as Islamic teachers are able to mobilise Bantenese voters for political events.

In this sense, Puwnten is typical of the politically active ERBOs, as indicated for example by the political support it has given to particular candidates in Bandar Lampung and South Lampung. Using Fennema’s framework, Puwnten can be categorised like many of the other ERBOs considered here as both ethnic association and ethnic political association involved not only in preserving Banten culture but also in activities related to politics in Lampung.

5.5 Penginyongan, for Central Javanese in Lampung

Penginyongan, a provincial, ethnic-based organisation in Lampung, was established by Yasir Hadibroto, Lampung’s fourth provincial governor, after he had stepped down from his post in 1998. The current leader of this organisation, Dewi Widyansih, explains:

“Let me tell you about our history. Penginyongan is a sub-ethnic group of Javanese living in … Central Java … in … [and around the cities of] Banyumas, Pekalongan and Kebumen…. We speak Inyong [a Javanese sub-language]… So if we miss speaking Inyong, we meet and practice it. Our symbol of unity is our language. Historically, our organisation was established by former Governor Yasir Hadibroto as a way of gathering together the Javanese coastal migrant community in Lampung.” (INT2, December 2015)
Issues of origin and ethnic background are important considerations for Penginyongan. The organisation insists on blood ties and ethnicity as the requirement for membership. Although its constitution claims that Penginyongan is just a cultural organisation, its involvement in supporting particular candidates remains clear and obvious. For instance, when talking about previous local elections, in South Lampung in 2015 and North Lampung in 2013, Dewi Widyaningsih told me that, “Nowadays is an era in politics when everyone and every organisation should be engaged in political activities. At least, if the candidate we support is elected, someday, if we need something, the elected candidate will care about us” (ibid.). Figure 5-2 shows Penginyongan activities during the campaign process in a local election in South Lampung in 2015.

Figure 5-2 Penginyongan activities in support of a candidate in South Lampung regency

Source: Lampung Raya (2015)

Penginyongan’s involvement in political support activities is related to maintaining its organisational existence, in particular, the need for funds to cover the operational costs of the organisation. In the words of Dewi Widyaningsih, “Our existence depends on [our presence in] local government. We also have donations from every member, which equates to about 5,000 rupiah [25p] each” (INT2, December 2015). Penginyongan supports candidates who are of Javanese Inyong extraction. I was able to infer that if an Inyong candidate gets elected, Penginyongan members are expected
to have access to projects within local government infrastructure plans, thus providing a clear economic motive behind the political support.

Penginyongan’s role in local elections can be exemplified as follows. In the gubernatorial elections of 2008, Penginyongan supported Sjahroedin because his wife comes from Banyumas Regency, a Javanese Inyong territory. Penginyongan supported Edi Sutrisno, a Javanese of Inyong descent, in local elections in Bandar Lampung in 2010. In local elections in South Lampung in 2010, Penginyongan supported Rycko Menoza because his mother is a Javanese Inyong. In 2013 in North Lampung, it supported Agung Ilmu Mangkunegara, whose wife is from Brebes in an Inyong-dominated part of Central Java.

How is the support given? Penginyongan political support is formal and relies upon organisational approval as well as advertising in support of a particular candidate in local newspapers. This means that support given to a particular candidate is based on a formally taken organisational decision rather than on the personal interest of a member of the organisation. Usually, support is formalised through a letter from Penginyongan to a particular candidate. Penginyongan’s leader, Dewi Widyaningsih explained to me that:

“Our organisation’s support in local politics is clear and formal. For example, in the local elections in North Lampung in 2013, we supported Agung Ilmu Mangkunegara. I organised a meeting with 17 sub-district Penginyongan leaders in North Lampung. Around 500 people attended. These 500 people then had a duty to organise our members in every sub-district to ensure they chose Agung in the election; these men were also deployed to introduce Agung’s political manifesto to the voter. We were able to help in securing Agung’s victory.” (Ibid.).

Those examples present a clear picture of the model of political support given by Penginyongan in local elections in Lampung. Penginyongan’s political support in local elections depends on ethnic background and blood ties of a candidate: whether a particular candidate comes from the Inyong sub-ethnic group or has relationships with Javanese Inyong descendants through marital status. Furthermore, in some cases, if there is no Penginyongan candidate, the organisation will support candidates with beneficial relations with members of the Penginyongan community, as was the case when Penginyongan supported Yusran Amirullah in the East Lampung local elections in 2015.
Penginyongan can be classified as a combination of ethnic association and ethnic political association. It is a politically active organisation, lending its support to various candidates in local elections and involved in the local politics of Lampung.

5.6 PHDI, Religious Hindu council

The Balinese community in Lampung is grouped into two influential organisations, PHDI and PBL (see section 5.8). PHDI is actually a nationwide religious organisation that is not restricted to Balinese members but open to all Hindu believers. However, the existence of PHDI has always been closely associated with Lampung’s Balinese, as the majority of Balinese in Lampung are Hindu and, according to Seregig (2014, p.81), the number of Balinese Hindus in Lampung has grown from 40 in 1956 to 998,997 in 2012. It is currently estimated that only 5,000 Javanese Hindus live in Lampung while Lampung has the largest Balinese Hindu population outside Bali (ibid.).

A leading member of the organisation, Ketut Pasek, explained that, “We are just for Hindu believers, so if they are Javanese but Hindu, they can join this organisation; Javanese are estimated to form up to 8% [of our membership]” (INT6, February 2016). This is in contrast to PBL, which is far more politically active and whose membership is solely Balinese. From a Balinese perspective, Hinduism aligns with the cultural traditions of Bali; many elements of Balinese culture are based on Hinduism. In this sense, Balinese values are embedded and integrated within Hinduism.

As a religious Hindu council, PHDI cannot become involved in political activities or engagement; this is based on both the internal rules of the organisation and the national law on religious councils in Indonesia. Because it represents Hindus in Lampung, PHDI acts more as a mediator between the various political interests of its members without giving any formal organisational support to various political contestants in Lampung. Ketut Pasek added that:

“Usually, we invite people to become members regardless of their political background. We explain that even if we have different political affiliations we are Hindu so we should respect each other. We are not allowed to use the PHDI for our personal political interests. That is why we always appoint as our leader a politically unaffiliated person who is not going to engage with any political party”. (INT6, February 2016)
Given its distance from local politics, PHDI can be categorised as a politically passive ERBO. None of the evidence found so far shows that PHDI supports any candidate in the local elections of Lampung. Ketut Pasek told me, however, that, “While we do not have any affiliation with political parties and do not officially support any candidate in the election, we have a special structure which accommodates and facilitates the political activities of our members” (INT6, February 2016; see also PHDI (2016). Because of its organisational commitment to preserve Balinese culture in Lampung, PHDI can be classified as an ethnic association and an ethnic identity organisation rather than just a religious council.

5.7 PBL, the Lampung Balinese Community

Established in 2005, PBL is another ERBO in Lampung that can be categorised as politically active. With a large number of Balinese in Lampung as a consequence of transmigration as well as spontaneous migrants from Bali, PBL plays an important role as the centre of political interest internally and externally for the Balinese in Lampung. It is both an ethnic association and an ethnic political association, based on Fennema’s framework of ethnic organisations. However, unlike Puwnten, which is still in the process of internal consolidation, PBL is well established as the only Balinese organisation focused on political activities.

Komang Koheri, the organisation’s leader, told me that their political goal is clear: to install as many Balinese as possible as either local leaders or member of local councils (INT43, February 2016). For example, they have a political goal of installing five to eight Balinese members to the local council in every district or city in Lampung. The PBL leader said this was important as by capturing local power the organisation had the chance to influence local government policy based on Balinese interests.

PBL is widely known as one of the most prominent political campaign groups in Lampung’s local politics. Its involvement in local politics is a consequence of its position as a minority ethnic group intent on gaining stronger political bargaining power over other ethnic groups in Lampung. An interview with Komang Koheri in the Lampung Post (2015) illustrates this point well:

“We are ready to unite the [Balinese] voters to secure the victory of Mustafa and Lukman in local elections in the Central Lampung regency. The Balinese community have given proof so far. For instance, in the last local council
election, we were able to secure three Balinese candidates from the Central Lampung regency who were elected as provincial assembly members."

Another example of PBL support in local elections was revealed by Komang Koheri in a different interview. There he said, “Given my support for the successful team of Zainudin Hassan and Nanang Ermanto, I hope that the Balinese will support this couple in South Lampung’s local election” (Lampung Post, 2016b). The narrative behind the political support given by PBL is similar to that of Penginyongan: if none of the candidates are of Balinese descent, support is given to the candidate with the closest relations who can offer the greatest organisational benefit to the Balinese community.

In the context of how to mobilise Balinese voters, Komang Koheri explained to me in an interview that:

“Our political target is persistence in Lampung; we want to install between five and eight local council members from the Balinese ethnic community in every regency and city. We have supported many Balinese candidates in local elections. So, how to mobilise the Balinese in elections? In a formal organisation meeting, we decide who is going to be supported by our organisation in the election; then after that, we deploy the Pemangku [Hindu priest in Balinese culture] to mobilise the Balinese to give their support to the chosen candidate.” (INT43, February 2016)

Komang Koheri told me that when it comes to the role of the Balinese community leader in securing appropriate support for candidates in local elections, the informal leader in a village – such as the customary community leader – is much more influential than any formal government official (Seregig, 2014). The customary leader, he added, is “chosen not based on heredity but on merit” and not on the caste system (kasta), which is present in the Balinese and wider Hindu communities.

From their activities in local elections, we can see that, unlike PHDI, PBL is a politically active organisation. This can be seen in the political support given to candidates in the local elections, such as in Central Lampung and South Lampung, as well as in its leader’s statements of PBL support for particular candidates in local elections.
5.8 PSMTI, National and Provincial Branches Representing Indonesian-Chinese

Chinese have been present in Lampung province since the 17th century (Merlinda, 2015). A note written by a Chinese explorer and writer explained that the Chinese were familiar with Lampung as they recognised the existence of the biggest kingdom in Lampung, Tulang Bawang, familiarly known as the kingdom of To Lang Pohwang (杜朗峇望, dù lǎng bā wàng in Mandarin). The Chinese had been eyeing Lampung as a potential place to do business in the early 1600s. Up to 486 Chinese had settled and lived in Lampung by 1905, considerably more than the 108 Arabs and 146 Europeans living there at the time (Leirissa, 1995, p.2).

The Dutch colonial administration, through its ethnic segregation policy, contributed to the slow nature of the progress made by the Indonesian-Chinese in being recognised as both politically and culturally Indonesian. Dutch segregation resulted in an “antagonistic relationship” between the indigenous Indonesian and Chinese communities (Park, 2010, pp.77-78).

In apparent contrast, Suharto’s policy of giving the Indonesian-Chinese a privileged position in the economic sector meant that they had a close relationship with the Indonesian political elite and not least with the Suharto family itself. Even though they only constituted “3% of Indonesian population [they] owned 70% of private sector assets” (Hicks, 2004, p.12). Indeed, they often had greater wealth themselves than members of the political elite, leading to what might be termed economic cronyism. Suharto was keen to keep the Chinese away from power, scared of the potential for ethnic Chinese to introduce communism into the country in the late 1960s (Lan, 2009). Consequently, Suharto’s policy meant that the Indonesian-Chinese suffered discrimination culturally, politically and socially. For instance, they were banned from joining the national or local bureaucratic system and becoming members of political parties.
Turner and Allen (2007, p.123) highlight the role of the 1998 anti-Chinese riots, in which more than a thousand Indonesian-Chinese were killed, and the ambivalent reaction to them:

“The history of antagonism towards the Chinese Indonesians in Indonesia must not be forgotten so that the mistakes of the past can be avoided in the future. The tragic riots and murders that transpired in 1998 directly and disastrously impacted thousands of Chinese throughout Indonesia. It is evident that this crisis spurred a diverse range of reactions from Chinese Indonesians. While a number of wealthy Chinese, along with their much-needed capital, fled Indonesia, other affluent and many middle and lower class Chinese had very dissimilar reactions to these events. For these individuals there emerged a diverse range of long-term strategies interlinked with new and (re)emerging identity formations. While clearly revealing the incapacity or failure of the Suharto administration to assimilate the Chinese Indonesians into Indonesian society, these developments also make apparent that Indonesia must undergo substantive legal, political and ideological changes so that ethnic-based disasters, such as the atrocities of the past, can be circumvented in the future”.

In the political reform era, central government has provided more space for the cultural development of the Indonesian Chinese, such as through the creation of Chinese ethnic-based associations and by encouraging the celebration of Chinese New Year. Chinese community organisations have flourished. Giblin (2003) discusses the influence of the growing number of civil society organisations created by Indonesian-Chinese:

“all promoting their national and ethnic identities in strategic ways, engaging with the discourses relating to national identity and Chineseness in Indonesia…. They wanted to overcome anti-Chinese stereotypes… by showing that they were genuine Indonesians, and by using the already accepted discourses of nationalism, they hoped that non-Chinese Indonesians would be more accepting of them”. (Giblin, 2003, p.367)

One of the biggest Indonesian-Chinese community associations is PSTMI, which emerged as a response to the political and cultural alienation the community had experienced (Suryadinata, 2001). PSMTI (which in Chinese is called 印华百家姓协会 yinhua baijiaxing xiehui) was established in Jakarta on 28th September 1998 (PSMTI, 2013) in large part in response to the anti-Chinese riots (Herlijanto, 2004; Siddik, 2010).

Suryadinata (2001, p.503) explains that the Chinese in Indonesia consist of two groups, peranakan, which refers to those who are “culturally more assimilated”, and
132

totok, referring to “culturally less assimilated” Indonesian-Chinese. Thinking in this way forces a different perspective when looking at the role of the Chinese in the general landscape of contemporary Indonesian politics. According to this standpoint, most totok Chinese are now peranakan and have assimilated, although there are still boundaries between communities, not least because very few Indonesian-Chinese have converted to Islam.

One of the successful political demands of the Indonesian-Chinese community was that the term Cina (used to refer to Indonesian-Chinese) be changed to Tionghoa in the Indonesian Citizenship Law (Law Number 12/2006). This new term has had a social and political impact on the landscape of political identity in Indonesia as it has meant that the Indonesian-Chinese have been formally accepted as an official ethnicity in Indonesia after a long period of social and political discrimination (Setijadi, 2016; Chua, 2004).

Park (2010) claims that the establishment of Indonesian-Chinese organisations has resulted in improved relations between indigenous and Indonesian-Chinese communities. However, it is clear that the Indonesian-Chinese community is still in the political consolidation phase today. This can be explained on the basis both of their lesser involvement in local politics compared with other ethnicities and of the ongoing impact of social pressure held over from the Suharto era, prompting Indonesian-Chinese to focus more on business rather than politics. Nevertheless, it should be mentioned that recent years have seen the advent of a small number of prominent Indonesian politicians of Chinese ethnicity. The most notable of these is Basuki Tjahaya Purnama, the ethnic Chinese and Christian ex-governor of Jakarta whose jail sentence on blasphemy charges is mentioned Chapter 3.2.1.

According to its internal rules, PSMTI is a social and cultural organisation specifically for the Indonesian-Chinese and not affiliated with any political party (PSMTI, 2013). With regard to its membership, PSMTI applies exclusive criteria that mean only Indonesian-Chinese are eligible to join. The organisation sees its main objective as being to mediate between and facilitate the common interests of the Indonesian-Chinese community by assisting the government in finding solutions for better relations between the Indonesian and Indonesian-Chinese communities (ibid.).
PSMTI officials at the inauguration of the organisation’s Lampung branch


PSMTI has branches at the national and provincial levels in Indonesia. Figure 5-3 above shows national officials from PSMTI inaugurating Lampung's provincial PSMTI office in 2017. PSMTI in Lampung Province is currently led by Christian Chandra. There is no record of the PSMTI being involved in subnational elections in Lampung. At this stage, the PSMTI’s main goal in Lampung as elsewhere in Indonesia is to obtain parity of treatment as a fully Indonesian organisation. PSMTI focuses therefore on cultural rather than political activities. Figure 5-4 shows an advertisement in a local newspaper in Lampung related to the cultural activities of the Indonesian-Chinese community in the province. This advertisement indicates how PSMTI is attempting to gain greater recognition among the Lampung public.
Figure 5-4 Newspaper advertisement showing the social and cultural activities of the PSMTI in Lampung

Source: Lampung Post (2016a).
However, the younger generation of Indonesian-Chinese are more attracted to political activities, and in Lampung some have been elected as provincial and national assembly members. These include Hartarto Lojaya of the Demokrat Party and Sudin, the leader of the PDI-P in Lampung. Hartarto Lojaya, an Indonesian of Chinese extraction, tried to run in Bandar Lampung in 2015. However, he failed to get his party’s support (see Chapter 8). Chong (2014, p.2) argues that, “In this democratic space the Chinese are free to participate in electoral politics and run for public office, but very few of them have been elected because the Chinese are still perceived as an alien minority by the pribumis (indigenous Indonesians)”. As a result, they are more likely to act as shadow players in local politics rather than themselves becoming candidates.

Thus, we can argue that the reluctance of the Indonesian-Chinese community leadership to enter mainstream politics remains strong in many parts of Indonesia including Lampung because as double minorities (of non-Indonesian origin and non-Muslim) the Indonesian-Chinese are at a distinct disadvantage compared, for example, to the Balinese in Lampung. Even though the majority of Balinese are non-Muslim, they are of Indonesian origin. In this sense, the door is opened wider for the Balinese than for the Indonesian-Chinese. For example, in East Lampung, out of a total of 50 local assembly members, three are Balinese but none is Indonesian-Chinese, and of the 85 provincial assembly members, four are Balinese and only one is Indonesian-Chinese descent.

It is clear that PSMTI is a politically passive organisation within Lampung’s local politics. During my research, I found nothing to suggest that PSMTI has given formal political support to a particular candidate in local elections. PSMTI can be considered a combination of ethnic association and ethnic identity organisation.

5.9 Lampung Sai, Projecting Native Sentiment and Interests

Lampung Sai is a native ethnic-based organisation, initially established in Jakarta in 1968 by Lampungese who were living and working in the Indonesian capital. The three founders of this organisation are Alamsyah Ratuprawira Negara, who served as Indonesian Religious Affairs minister between 1978 and 1983, Achmad Bakrie, the prominent Indonesian businessman who later established one of the country’s leading
businesses, the Bakrie Group, and Marjoeni Warganegara, who was the founder of Krakatau Steel, the first Indonesian national steel company, and served as its first director between 1970 and 1975 (INT7, February 2016).

Historically, Lampung Sai was established as a response to the need for Lampungese living outside Lampung to gather together. Mawardi Harirama, a leading member of the organisation explained, “Lampung Sai was established by the Lampungese as a medium for Lampungese gatherings in Jakarta; this organisation also has a cultural mission, to introduce Lampungese culture nationally and internationally” (ibid.).

After the political reforms in 1998, Lampung Sai became a more political organisation and began to make demands related to the political role of the Putra Daerah in local politics (see Chapter 3.2.2). In the early 2000s, the issue of the political position of Putra Daerah rose in significance in Indonesia, increasing the importance of Lampung Sai in ways similar to the rise of the East Kalimantan Dayak Association in East Kalimantan. Both organisations represent the native population in their territories and both have argued that the issue of privileges for the Putra Daerah is essential in view of Suharto-era policies of national integration. Political decentralisation has played into the hands of ethnic Lampungese, “help[ing] to recirculate ideas about ethnicity” and the “politicisation of ethnic identities” as well as “custom revivalism” (Goebel, 2013; Tyson, 2010; Jacobsen, 2002).

Ethnic minorities such as the Lampungese face a challenge in competing with bigger ethnic populations in their ‘home’ territory. Duncan (2007) argues that there was always the possibility that decentralisation would have an adverse effect on a politically marginalised ethnic minority. Thus, the challenge for native organisations such as Lampung Sai is to compete in local politics regardless of whether ethnic sentiment is used by a majority ethnic-based organisation. In response, Lampung Sai has had to implement an effective political response in particular to Javanese sentiment in local elections.

The application of a campaign tagline, *Lampung itu satu*, or Lampung is one, has been important in appealing to Javanese voters in local elections. As a result, even though a minority ethnic group, Lampungese are able to compete in local politics; indeed, more than 60% of the heads of regency and city mayors are Lampungese.
(See Chapter 3). The case of Lampung contradicts the arguments of primordialist theorists in ethnic politics who state that the majority ethnic group always obtains political advantage in elections (Dahl, 1973; Guinier, 1994; McGann, 2004).

There are three strategies used by Lampung Sai to counter Javanese ethnic sentiment and compete with the Javanese majority in local politics. The first is to reduce the sense of being a majority ethnic group in Lampung among Javanese ethnic-based organisations. Lampung Sai has a systematic campaign based on the idea of ‘Lampungeseness’. A leading member of Lampung Sai, Mawardi Harirama explains: “We visited the regencies and declared that we are all Lampungese, this is the land of Lampung and everyone should be feeling Lampungese so we just want to reduce ethnic sentiment within Lampung... We did it to reduce ethnic feelings, particularly Javanese sentiment” (INT7, February 2016). The current head of Lampung Sai, Sjahroedin told me that, “Even if Javanese sentiment is reduced, it won’t benefit the Lampungese politically in elections because there are so many fewer Lampungese compared to Javanese, but if [Javanese] sentiment is revived especially in local elections, the Lampungese won’t be able to compete politically with them” (INT24, October 2015).

The second strategy is to apply a traditional Lampungese value, called mawarei, in order to bridge the differences between the Lampungese and other ethnic communities in Lampung. Mawarei is a traditional Lampung custom of inviting and proposing people from other ethnic groups to become part of Lampung culture. It can also serve to build inter-ethnic understanding between locals and transmigrants as well as reduce ethnic sentiment. In the words of Mawardi Harirama, the Lampung Sai member quoted above: “We are therefore proposing to the other [ethnic] groups to be part of Lampung custom” (INT7, February 2016). Lampung consists of 84 marga, or custom communities. Each marga has its own leader. It is common for a marga to invite newcomers to become members.
The third strategy is for Lampung Sai to apply an inclusive cultural strategy by trying to engage politically and culturally with other ethnic groups, and invite people from other ethnic communities to join Lampung Sai. This was put to me by Mawardi Harirama in the following terms:

“Since political reform began we have conducted a quite intensive campaign by visiting all the regions in Lampung declaring that Lampung is one, that there are no other Lampungese. We all are Lampungese no matter whomever and wherever our ancestry. As long as we are born, living and working in Lampung, we are Lampungese…. Membership of Lampung Sai is open for everyone who loves Lampung, that means that membership is not exclusively for the Lampungese but also for those who love Lampung” (ibid.).

This sentiment was emphasised by Sjahroedin when he was running for governor in 2008, a point he repeated in a later newspaper article, where he wrote that, “Every ethnicity is welcome in the Lampung Sai organisation so that we are able to cooperate and support each other” (Lampung Post, 2016).

To show that Lampung Sai has become a more inclusive political movement, it has organised inter-cultural carnivals. The carnivals have involved cultural events presented by inter-ethnic groups in Lampung. Organising inter-ethnic discussions is another activity commonly undertaken by Lampung Sai. According to my discussions with Mawardi Harirama and other political leaders in Lampung, Lampung Sai’s campaign on inclusive values increased the level of inter-ethnic support Sjahroedin received during his campaign in 2008. However, this alone was not sufficient. This strategy was complemented by forming an inter-ethnic coalition with the Javanese. Sjahroedin paired with Joko Umar Said in 2008. Joko is a senior bureaucrat and has Javanese ethnic background.22

The strategy to find a Javanese candidate to become Sjahroedin’s deputy was discussed by elite members of Lampung Sai prior to the opening of the nomination period of the gubernatorial election. Before choosing Joko as Sjahroedin’s deputy in the 2008 gubernatorial election, Lampung Sai leaders first nominated the head of PATRI, Muhajir Utomo, as the potential deputy governor candidate for Sjahroedin.

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22 This is also based on my personal academic judgement when looking at how Sjahroedin was that he was too strong for his contender in the gubernatorial election in 2008. He won the election with a total of 43.27% of votes. Given that only 13.5% of population is Lampungese, it is clear that Sjahroedin received support from voters of other ethnicities.
However, Muhajir Utomo rejected the proposal as he held different views on how to develop Lampung. This story was confirmed by Muhajir Utomo himself:

“They listed me as the vice-governor candidate for Sjahroedin because I am a Javanese, the former rector of the University of Lampung and also the head of PATRI. They did it potentially to get support from ethnic Javanese.” (INT1, October 2015)

Lampung Sai has few internal conflicts because its political aims are consistent. According to Isbodroini, quoted in Haris (2007), the issue of Putra Daerah in Lampung remains strong and with it the belief that the Lampungese should occupy positions of local power, and this became the ultimate agenda of Lampung Sai during the post-political-reform era. In short, the issue of native political privilege in the early 2000s driven by Lampung Sai was successful in bringing some Lampungese into positions of power after a long period during which they were marginalised politically.

Based on the discussion above, it is clear that Lampung Sai is a politically active ERBO. Instead of giving support to particular candidates, it has been able to deliver its leader, Sjahroedin, to the post of governor of Lampung, a position he held from 2003 to 2014, including victory in a direct election in 2008. Thus, according to Fennema (2004), Lampung Sai is an ethnic political association with persistent political interests.

The next section offers a reflection on the ERBOs discussed above.

5.10 Reflections and Conclusion

According to Fennema (2004), the basic difference between ethnic interest organisations and political parties is that ethnic organisations do not seek formal representation in national and local assemblies. Ethnic organisations intend to access the “political process” but do not have any formal “political representation” and focus only on one policy arena (ibid., p.443). This is true for PATRI, Sunda Ngumbara and Pajar, who set up their organisational objectives to focus on empowering their respective ethnic communities.

On the other hand, it is difficult to determine the role of PHDI in local politics. So far, this organisation has shown itself to be a purely religious council that stays away from
political activities. However, we cannot deny that the relationship between ethnicity and religion is hard to separate in the Balinese community. Hinduism and Balinese cultures are complementary and bound together, so it can be argued that ethnicity also represents religious interest. Seregig (2014, p.80) supports this view by explaining that Balinese culture is in line with the basic religious values underpinning Hinduism; talking about Balinese political interests also relates to the interests of Hindu believers in Lampung. Meanwhile, PBL represents an example of a more political Balinese ERBO. This ERBO is more of an ethnic political association, even though it could also be categorised as an ethnic association. This is apparent, for instance, in its role in supporting particular candidates in local elections in South Lampung and Central Lampung in 2015. By capitalising on Balinese ethnicity, PBL has been actively playing in ‘a political zone’ of local politics in Lampung.

PBL, Penginyongan and Puwnten are each both ethnic associations and ethnic political associations -- active in supporting candidates in local elections and intent on preserving their culture as well. Finally, the only ERBO that can be categorised exclusively as an ethnic political association, Lampung Sai, is the organisation that became the symbol of Lampungese political resurgence in the reform era after several decades of powerlessness in the Suharto era.

In the context of Lampung, the ERBOs play a distinctive part in political activities and support, particularly in local elections. Based on experiences in the three research locations, as one of the biggest ERBOs in Indonesia, NU plays a significant political role in supporting a particular candidate in local elections, such as the political support given to Chusnunia Halim in East Lampung (see Chapter 7.2). On the contrary, none of the ERBOs plays a significant political role in supporting a particular candidate in Metro. Puwnten, however, provided political support for a particular candidate in Bandar Lampung's local elections. PBL aggressively supported a candidate in Central Lampung and South Lampung in 2015. Meanwhile, Penginyongan has supported Agung Ilmu Mangkunegara in North Lampung’s local elections.

My research reveals that ERBOs are influential in raising ethnic consciousness for political purposes. Van Klinken (2008) writes of the limits of ethnic clientelism amongst ethnic-religious-based organisations seeking to attract votes. While this research supports the argument that ERBOs tend to be inefficient vote-getting machines, we can conclude nonetheless that ERBOs are important as facilitators and mediators of
political campaigns. Where ERBOs have a consistent political target, they have the potential to bring in votes, as shown by PBL and Lampung Sai.

Even though the Lampungese are a minority in Lampung, Lampung Sai’s head was governor of Lampung from 2003 to 2014. Various political strategies have been practised by Lampung Sai, but obtaining inter-ethnic support has always been important. Meanwhile, PATRI and PSMTI, have a different approach in dealing with local political contests. PATRI, the biggest ethnic organisation in Lampung, has become a potentially major player in local politics, but it remains less political because it lacks political motives and is unwilling to play on ethnic sentiment.

Furthermore, even though there is a significant number of ERBOs based purely on ethnicity in Lampung, these ERBOs fall short of the institutional completeness discussed by Fennema (2004). Fennema (2004, p.441) claims that “an ethnic community is institutionally complete if all the services the members of the group require and all collective goods that they can produce are provided by or through ethnic organisations.”

Finally, the various strategies adopted by ERBOs in Lampung show both their internal dynamics as well their distinctive political approach in dealing with local politics. In summary, PATRI plays a quiescent role in local politics unlike Lampung Sai and PBL. Penginyongan and Puwnten have a strong commitment to dealing with and influencing local politics by garnering political support in local elections. On the other hand, Sunda Ngumbara and Pajar have remained moderate in their aims and sit in ‘a comfort zone’; they claim that they have no intention of involvement in local politics but are more focused on cultural issues.
Chapter 6
New Natives and Subnational Elections in Metro

The previous chapter analysed the political strategies of ERBOs in local politics in Lampung. This chapter will focus on the political legacies of the transmigration programme on subnational elections in Metro. It argues that ethnic identities play a key role but interact with other important factors: primarily political networks and campaign funding. This chapter explains the importance of being a Javanese transmigrant descendant in the local politics of Metro, indicating that this attribute is essential for a candidate to be elected in subnational elections. Furthermore, discussion in this chapter supports the overall argument of this thesis concerning the essential factor of ethnicity in local elections, especially in transmigration-affected locations.

I develop my argument in five steps. Section 6.1 offers a historical overview of the city with a particular focus on Metro’s profile as a key destination during the transmigration programme. I then explore in Section 6.2 how the transmigration policy has influenced local culture in this part of Lampung and has resulted in the construction of a new identity centred on ‘the new natives of Metro’, Asli wong Metro in Javanese. Section 6.3 examines the implications of these changes for subnational elections in Metro and compares the role of ethnic identity with factors such as political networks, before taking an in-depth look at the 2010 and 2015 elections in Metro. Section 6.4 focuses on the relationship between campaign funding and subnational elections. In the last section, I argue that Metro’s local politics cannot be separated from transmigration and its legacy and that transmigrant political identity has become the core feature; nevertheless, I maintain that other factors need to be considered, such as the role of money.
6.1 The History and Establishment of Metro, the City of Transmigration

This section offers a brief history of Metro and provides other relevant information on the city’s geography and government structure.

New cities were established elsewhere by the Dutch colonial authorities and especially after independence by the Indonesian government, but these have been of a smaller scale. More recently, in the decentralisation era, the high demand for forced labour for oil palm plantation in Kalimantan has resulted in a new city being formed in the transmigration area (Potter, 2012). Metro itself, however, is the only city founded entirely through transmigration in the Dutch colonial era that is still well established today.23 It is of course no longer a destination for transmigration, given that the programme is defunct. While there was a certain amount of transmigration to the city, from Bali as well as Java, after independence, the largest single coordinated movement of people occurred in the late 1930s.

Historical research conducted by Ilham et al. (2016) indicates that Metro derives from the Javanese word mitro, which means ‘partner’. It could also be translated as ‘togetherness’, as historically the establishment of this city involved many peoples and communities. However, another source suggests that the name was taken from the Dutch word, meterm, meaning ‘centre’, due to its location in the centre of kolonisatie and in the centre of Lampung.24 Historical evidence also reveals that Metro was previously a community forest owned by the native Nuban clan, who occupied it as their customary land (Muzakki, 2014; INT10, February 2016). According to Levang (2003, p.10), the impact of an economic crisis in Java due to plantation crop failure in 1931 and the resultant wave of unemployment led the Dutch colonial administration to relocate people from Java to the new settlement of Metro.

Before relocating people from Java to Metro, the Dutch colonial authorities began with a prolonged campaign about the success of the first transmigration kolonisatie programme to Gedong Tataan in Pesawaran Regency, near Bandar Lampung. In

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23 Levang (2003) explains that the Dutch colonial administration established a similar city, a venture that failed due to a financial crisis. In this sense, Metro therefore could claim to be the only successful city established for relocating people from the densely populated island of Java.

1935, they first actually moved 1,386 families from Gedong Tataan to Metro. This was followed by the relocation of 3,300 families from Java in 1936 (Ilham et al., 2016). To help the relocated people feel at home, the colonial authorities divided Metro into dwelling areas or bedeng, equal in status and similar to a village. Technically, people that relocated used terms based on where they came from in Java and named the villages using Javanese terms such as Adipuro and Hadimulyo. The bedeng were divided into four administrative areas (Ilham et al., 2016; Muzakki, 2014).

Figure 6.1 illustrates the steps involved in creating Metro in the early 1930s. The Dutch colonial administration appropriated the customary land and distributed it to the transmigrant community. Each family got 1000m$^2$ for housing and around 7200m$^2$ of paddy fields. In the late 1930s and early 1940s, 47,000 people were relocated to what was then the regency of Sukadana in Lampung province. The process of relocating people from Java to Metro meant that most people in Metro from 1937 onwards were Javanese, with a small number of Balinese too. This therefore influenced economic, cultural and political aspects of daily life. According to a first generation transmigrant:

“We needed time to make a shelter; it was around six months before we moved into our own home…. So before the home made by my father was ready to be lived in we stayed in the shelter. As you know, Metro was a forest at that time; no one lived in Metro before the Dutch transmigration programme. In the beginning, I sometimes felt afraid of living there.” (INT16, March 2016)

During the Japanese occupation between 1942 and 1945, Lampung province consisted of three regions, Teluk Betung, Metro and Kotabumi. We can assume from this that during the Japanese occupation, Metro was one of the more important regions within Lampung province. In the era of Dutch colonial administration and under Japanese rule, the role of the head of the customary community still existed. In 1952, customary rule was abolished and the government instead established a new format for local government. According to this, Metro became a sub-district (kedewaan) and then, in 1976, capital of Central Lampung regency (Bappeda, 2015). Metro was promoted to the status of administrative city in 1987. Further, in the political reform era, Law Number 12/1999 established Metro as an independent city, splitting it from Central Lampung Regency (Central Statistical Bureau of Indonesia, 2013a).

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25 Kedewaan is similar to the present day kecamatan. This term was especially used in the era of Sukarno in 1950s.

26 https://www.teraslampung.com/sejarah-transmigrasi-di-lampung-metro/
In the present day, Metro covers an area of 68.74 km² in the central part of Lampung. It shares borders with two other regencies, Central Lampung and East Lampung. According to the 2010 census, 145,471 people live in the city, of whom 73,027 are male and 72,444 female (Central Statistical Bureau of Indonesia, 2013a). Most citizens of Metro work in government, trade and agriculture. Metro is known within Lampung as a city with high levels of education (see Chapter 3.3.2). It has the highest proportion of children attending school in Lampung (Central Statistical Bureau of Indonesia, 2015e). In 2014, participation was 100% for elementary and junior high schools, whilst for senior high schools it was 83.4% (ibid.). Metro comprises five sub-districts, each governed by a sub-district head, and 22 urban settlement (ibid.) (see Figure 6-2).

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27 The government divides schooling into three categories: elementary school (from age 7 to 12), junior high school (from age 13 to 15) and senior high school (from age 16 to 18).
The next section discusses the political legacies of the Dutch transmigration programme for local politics in Metro. It also discusses the idea of transformation of identity from migrant people to a newly-established native of Metro.

6.2 ‘Natives of Metro’, or Asli wong Metro: the Changing Identity of Transmigrants in Metro

In this section, I discuss the cultural responses of the native Lampungese to the transmigration policy, how the Javanese transmigrants in Metro slowly developed an identity centred on a sense of being native to Metro – on being an Asli wong Metro -- and what this meant for relations between Lampungese and Javanese. The sense of identity represented by Asli wong Metro is a special case not seen outside transmigration affected areas of Lampung province.
Local principles of community life are vital factors underpinning inter-ethnic relations in regions associated with transmigration in Indonesia. The country has periodically witnessed massive conflicts between natives and transmigrants, in particular in regions where the transmigration programme was implemented over a long period of time. This includes, for instance, Central Kalimantan, where the natives Dayaks and the transmigrant Maduranese were in conflict in 2001. These conflicts indicate the continued salience of ethnic and related issues, suggesting that ethnic issues are still at work in Indonesian local politics and that ethnic sentiment can be capitalised upon by local elites to gain the support of voters (Chandra 2007; Chandra 2012).

Lampung, however, has been relatively free of ethnic conflict compared to other areas of transmigration in Indonesia. Most of the conflict in Lampung has been caused more by issues such as land conflict between the customary community of Tulang Bawang and Sugar Group companies (Berenschot and Purba, 2014; Hermawan et al., 2017). One of the key reasons could be mawarei, the set of customs deriving from the idea that ethnic groups other than the native Lampungese may still be ‘culturally Lampunge’ (see Chapter 5.9) (Côté, 2014). This principle of inclusiveness is not particular to the Lampungese. Other ethnicities have similar principles. For example, Bugis in South Sulawesi practice Siri’ Na Pacce, which emphasises respect for others and the obligation to help others (Darwis and Dilo, 2013). The widespread application of such principles in Indonesia has greatly supported national integration and unity.

In the context of Lampung, this principle has made it easier to support the arrival and integration of transmigrants and to maintain inter-ethnic peace. Hadikusuma (1989. pp. 119-123) suggests that the above-mentioned principle rests on four pillars. In Lampungese customary law these are called Piil Pesenggiri:

a. **Juluk Adek**: If a child is born, the first duty of the father or grandfather is to give a special name that reflects Lampung’s customary rules. This name will be formalised in customary ceremonies when the child gets married.

b. **Nemui Nyimah**: The Lampungese are encouraged to be outspoken and direct rather than diplomatic.

c. **Nengah Nyappur**: The Lampungese encourage the creation of an inclusive society, in particular for immigrants and transmigrants. It is this third principle that is crucial for the success of the transmigration programme in Lampung.
The transmigrants can be sure to be culturally recognised by the native Lampungese.

d. Sesakai Sesambayan: This principle encourages people to undertake communal work. For instance, when a family organises a customary gathering, the neighbours are invited to assist them during the preparations.

As mentioned earlier, Metro was built on what had been customary land. This land belonged to the Lampungese clan of Nuban. We may consider two interpretations: first, the Dutch colonial administration forced the Nuban to give away their land for the establishment of new communities, or, second, Lampungese communities voluntarily used the principle of inclusivity vis-à-vis transmigrant communities. Mawardi Harirama, the leading member of Lampung Sai whom I quoted in Chapter 5, told me that:

“We [Lampungese members of the Nuban clan] follow principles according to which we have to respect other ethnicities. Lampung was chosen because it is closest to the island of Java and one of the less densely populated regions within the Indonesian archipelago. I also believe that the Dutch chose Lampung as a transmigration destination due to the Lampungese principle and spirit of inclusive communities. So the Nuban clan gave their customary land for the new city of Metro.” (INT7, February 2016)

This argument is supported by Sudarsono, a transmigrant descendant who was also a mayoral candidate, he asserted that:

“We do appreciate the behaviour of those native Lampungese in 1937 who organised a customary meeting and provided land for the transmigrants. At that time my father was one of the witnesses; my father helped clear the forest, and this has been beneficial for his descendants. We now feel like natives of Metro.” (INT10, February 2016)

The contribution of Javanese transmigrants to the construction of Metro has, therefore, resulted in the idea of being Asli wong Metro, a transformation from transmigrant to a new form of native. According to one of my respondents:

“Our parents established this city. So in short, we feel we have failed if we cannot do our best for the city. In contrast, non-natives of Metro do not have this emotional link to the city.” (INT13, March 2016; similar sentiments were expressed by INT16, March 2016)
A third generation transmigrant adds:

"My grandfather was a transmigrant during the Dutch colonial period in 1938. He was from East Java, and he lived in Metro since 1938. My father was born in 1947, and I am the third generation. I was born in 1973. Although most of us are third generation, if you asked about the influence of transmigration, I am sure that the feeling of being part of transmigration still exists". (INT11, January 2016, similar to points made in INT14, January 2016, INT15, March 2016, and INT42, January 2016)

While transmigrants initially received customary land from the Nuban clan, after some decades, descendants of transmigrants felt that they were living on their own land. According to the third generation transmigrant quoted above: "I don't feel strange and lacking in confidence living here. This because I am staying in a city where a majority is from Java, and I am a transmigration descendant. [Metro] was once established by our ancestors" (INT11, January 2016).

Table 6.1 summarises the ethnic configuration of Metro. The Javanese form the largest group with 71.8% and the Lampungese the second largest with roughly 10%, followed by more than eight other ethnicities with 4% or less (Central Statistical Bureau of Indonesia, 2013a). The Javanese dominate Metro not only in terms of the sheer number of people who live in the city. It also shows in many other respects, including culture and language. The most widely spoken language within the city is Javanese. Several interviewees pointed to the fact that Javanese not Indonesian or Lampungese was the language spoken in Metro, and that while Lampungese living in the city could speak Javanese, transmigrant descendants were unlikely to be able to speak Lampungese (INT13, March 2016; INT14, January 2016; INT15, March 2016).
Table 6.1 The population in Metro by ethnic group

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ethnicity</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Javanese</td>
<td>104,590</td>
<td>71.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lampungese</td>
<td>14,015</td>
<td>10.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic groups from South Sumatra</td>
<td>6,418</td>
<td>4.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minangkabau (West Sumatra)</td>
<td>4,821</td>
<td>3.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sundanese</td>
<td>4,459</td>
<td>3.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chinese</td>
<td>3,306</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bantenese</td>
<td>3,247</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other ethnicities</td>
<td>1,676</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Batak (North Sumatra)</td>
<td>1,255</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unanswered</td>
<td>1,108</td>
<td>0.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Balinese</td>
<td>469</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bugis (South Sulawesi)</td>
<td>107</td>
<td>0.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>145,471</strong></td>
<td><strong>100</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Central Statistical Bureau of Indonesia (2013a).

The transformation of transmigrant identities towards one centred on being the new ‘natives’ of Metro may be explained by the concept of indigenism put forward by Ramos (1998, p.5). The author argues that “indigenism is the result of many overlapping factors that history has compounded in an extraordinary case of collective overdetermination”. Ethnic similarity and the status of being a transmigrant, therefore, lead to a new form of indigenism, the idea of being a new native. To understand this phenomenon, Li (2000, p.151) argues that “a group’s self-identification as tribal or indigenous is not natural or inevitable, but neither is it simply invented, adopted, or imposed”.

The idea of Javanese transmigration descendants and the contribution of their ancestors in building Metro has, therefore, resulted in the idea of Asli wong Metro, and relates to the concept of ‘invented’ identity transformation as explained by Li (2000).
The feeling of being at home in the city creates a group feeling, as one interview respondent explained:

“As natives, we feel ashamed if we do something immoral or corrupt in this city. Because this is our ‘village’ -- our parents established this city. So in short, we feel we have failed if we cannot do our best for Metro. In contrast, if this city is led by a non-native of Metro, they will not have an emotional attachment, so if they do something wrong, they won’t think too much about it.” (INT10, February 2016)

There is no doubt that after many decades of the transmigration programme in Metro, transmigration descendants feel they have transformed themselves into Asli wong Metro. This sense is qualified by a second generation transmigrant, who told me that, “Our feelings are that we are Javanese and transmigrants, and this contributes to the domination of this sentiment over activities that are associated with the city including politics. We prefer to elect a candidate who has an ethnic similarity and fate to ours” (INT14, March 2016). It is open to question therefore to what extent, if at all, the concept of Asli wong Metro can be considered inclusive and in line with the Lampungese custom of Nengah Nyappur.

The mayoral candidate Sudarsono explained to me that the issue of natives in Metro has been used to remind people in the city about their ‘homeland’ and encourage them to believe that it would be preferable if they elected a candidate who is a transmigration descendant (INT10, February 2016). The use of the term ‘native of Metro’ in the subnational elections corresponds to what Parekh (2008, p.32) refers to as the “politics of collective identity”. In Metro this means the collective identity of being a Javanese transmigration descendant is part of being proud of a community that established Metro through the transmigration programme. In Sudarsono’s words: “According to our survey, the issue of being a transmigration descendant is still important in Metro, and it can persuade the voters” (INT10, February 2016) Other interviewees expressed a similar viewpoint (INT13, March 2016; INT14, January 2016; INT16, March 2016).

As a new form of transmigrant identity deployed especially in local politics, Asli wong Metro can be seen as a continuation of Javanese domination of social, cultural and political affairs in Metro. Javanese society is hierarchical as a result of the prolonged cultural and religious influence of Hinduism. It is relatively hard to change status within Javanese society. Lampungese values, in contrast, are more flexible and inclusive,
making it possible for people of other ethnicities to be part of Lampungese society (INT 7, February 2016).

Javanese domination within the city of Metro manifests itself not only in demographic terms but also in many other respects, such as culture and language. However, customs can be defined as “an idiom mobilised by many different groups for many different purposes” (Bourchier, 2007, p.113). In this context, the smaller number of Lampungese has resulted in a lack of capacity on their part to mobilise for political resources. According to a transmigration descendant who is also a former politician:

“I do not feel any discrimination here in Metro, maybe because we are a majority people here. It feels as if the natives feel inferior here. For instance if we go to market, most of the conversations are in Javanese, so the natives [Lampungese], I think, feel inferior in the city… We feel strange when we are outside this area. We feel strange when we go to areas where the natives are in a majority, such as Liwa [in West Lampung regency]. When we go to the market there, they speak Lampungese, but in Metro, people speak Javanese, so when we see natives speak Lampungese, we feel strange.” (INT11, January 2016; similarly sentiments were voiced by INT13, March 2016).

The domination of transmigrant descendants over cultural, social and political matters has been socially constructed and is a consequence of the widespread and long-term transmigration policy. The sense that transmigrant descendants exercise cultural hegemony over the Lampungese – as seen, for example, in the domination of Javanese language and culture and the establishment of Asli wong Metro identity – is a significant transmigration legacy. Finally, the concept of Asli wong Metro suggests a certain sense of ethnic unity among Javanese transmigrants, as well as a desire to exploit this unity as a tool to mobilise voters in Metro’s local elections.

6.3 Ethnicity and Subnational Elections

In this section, I discuss ethnicity in subnational elections in Metro: how inter-ethnic coalitions are made, especially the coalition between the Javanese and Lampungese, how ethnicity is used in subnational elections including use of Javanese symbols and language, and what this means for elections in Metro.

Debate over the role of ethnic issues in local politics increased in the early 2000s, largely as a result of the push for decentralisation prevalent in Indonesia at the time.
This issue remains significant, and migration has had, as Côté (2014, p.116) asserts, an important impact, even if money in politics and vote buying have become pressing issues in the second phase of implementation of subnational elections in the early 2010s. Some researchers have even argued that a new form of political patronage in Indonesia is appearing as ethnic clientelism has reached its limits in Indonesian local politics (van Klinken, 2008).

Local politics in Metro are dynamic, especially when looked at from the perspective of power competition between Javanese transmigrants and Lampungese. Three consecutive subnational elections in Metro, held in 2005, 2010 and 2015, provide evidence for the dominance of Javanese transmigration descendants (see Table 6.2). In all cases the elected city mayor was a descendant of Javanese transmigrants, including the current mayor, who represents the Golkar party.

There are at least two points of comparison between the results of the mayoral elections held in 2010 and those held in 2015: the ethnic backgrounds of the candidates and the political competition between the incumbent and non-incumbent candidates. Firstly, one candidate pairing in the 2010 elections were incumbents, Lukman Hakim and Djohan, who was the deputy city mayor. As the incumbent mayor, Lukman Hakim had a greater opportunity to receive informal support and deploy bureaucratic resources. This occurs in many places in Indonesia where civil servants flout the rules and support particular candidates in subnational elections. Sulistiyanto (2009, p.198) argues that, “the incumbents have already occupied public office, have controlled the bureaucracy, have formulated policies and have implemented the programmes, in comparison to their opponents who may not have all of these advantages”.

Secondly, in the context of contested ethnicities in subnational elections in Metro, there were only three pairings in 2010, and they were only contested by people of two different ethnicities, Javanese and Lampungese. Two tickets had a Lampungese paired with a Javanese running mate whilst there was only one, the eventual winner, which was led by a Javanese with the Lampungese as running mate. In 2015, however, there were five pairings, which offered more variation because there was a Bantenese candidate. Nevertheless, three pairings were a mix of Javanese and Lampungese, whereas one was Lampungese and Javanese and one was a combination of Bantenese and Javanese.
In the three mayoral elections (in 2005, 2010 and 2015) that have been held in Metro, the pairings of a Javanese candidate for mayor and a Lampungese running mate have been winners. Lukman Hakim was elected in 2005 and 2010, Pairin in 2015. Table 6. 2 and Table 6. 3 provide a breakdown of the ethnic make-up of mayoral candidate pairings.

Typically, Javanese voters tend to decide how they will vote “based on major preferences in their neighbourhood, in keeping with the communal spirit of living in harmony as well as to avoid conflict and to respect neighbourly relationships – a custom famously known in Javanese as ‘anut grubyuk’” (Wawan, 2016, p.239; INT33, October 2015). This helps to explain why ethnic-based voting is culturally prevalent in the Javanese community.

In the 2005 subnational election, Lukman Hakim, of Javanese transmigration descent, chose as his running mate Djohan, a Lampungese. This pair won the election by defeating the incumbent pair, Mozes Herman and Sudarsono, gaining 38.27% of the vote (Electoral Commission, 2005). Furthermore, in 2010, Lukman Hakim once again won the election, this time by defeating the man who had been his deputy, the Lampungese Djohan. In the 2015 mayoral election, an ‘imported’ candidate, Pairin, who is also of Javanese transmigrant descent, paired with Djohan and defeated the other candidates, winning 39.47% of the vote (Electoral Commission, 2010).  

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28 Pairin was imported in the sense that he had been head of Central Lampung regency.
Table 6. 2 Metro mayoral election results, 2005, 2010 and 2015

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Candidates In 2005 and running mate</th>
<th>Ethnicity</th>
<th>Total votes and percentage in 2005</th>
<th>Candidates in 2010 and running mate</th>
<th>Ethnicity</th>
<th>Total votes and percentage in 2010</th>
<th>Candidates in 2015 and running mate</th>
<th>Ethnicity</th>
<th>Total votes and percentage in 2015</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Atien Suryati and running mate Muhyin</td>
<td>Javanese and Lampungese</td>
<td>5,521 (8.15%)</td>
<td>Lukman Hakim and running mate R Saleh Chandra Pahlawan</td>
<td>Javanese and Lampungese</td>
<td>30,615 (43.72% - Elected)</td>
<td>Sudarsono and running mate Taufik Hidayat</td>
<td>Javanese and Lampungese</td>
<td>15,841 (18.67%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lukman Hakim and Djohan</td>
<td>Javanese and Lampungese</td>
<td>25,912 (38.27% - Elected)</td>
<td>Abdul Haris and Juhri Abdul Muin</td>
<td>Lampungese and Javanese</td>
<td>9,794 (13.99%)</td>
<td>Abdul Hakim and Muchlido Aprilist</td>
<td>Bantenese and Javanese</td>
<td>24,670 (29.07%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozes Herman and Sudarsono</td>
<td>South Sumatran and Javanese</td>
<td>22,582 (33.35%)</td>
<td>Djohan and Herno Iswanto</td>
<td>Lampungese and Javanese</td>
<td>29,614 (42.29%)</td>
<td>Pairin paired with Djohan</td>
<td>Javanese and Lampungese</td>
<td>33,499 (39.47% - Elected)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somad and Sukisno</td>
<td>Lampungese and Javanese</td>
<td>4,634 (6.84%)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Supriadi and Megasari</td>
<td>Javanese and Lampungese</td>
<td>926 (1.09%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zakaria Ahmad and Darius</td>
<td>Lampungese and South Sumatran</td>
<td>9,065 (13.39%)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Okta Novandra Jaya and Wahadi</td>
<td>Lampungese and Javanese</td>
<td>9,932 (11.70%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: (Electoral Commission, 2015d; Electoral Commission, 2010; Hadiawan, 2009).
From the three subnational elections completed, we can see that the inter-ethnic based coalition is still relevant when seeking to understand local politics in Metro. This is most starkly visible when we consider that from the first subnational elections in 2005 until the most recent ones, the elected leaders were always of Javanese transmigrant descent. What is more, in the last three elections, elected leaders have always opted for a deputy who is of Lampungese descent. Being a Javanese transmigrant is still important when it comes to electoral issues.

Coalitions between Javanese and Lampungese candidates are therefore a plausible strategy to attract voters from both ethnic groups. One third generation transmigrant and former politician supported this view:

“I do believe that coalitions between Javanese transmigration descendants and Lampungese are still significant in local politics, particularly in areas where Javanese transmigration descendants form the majority of the population. So this is a strategy between transmigration descendants and the natives of Lampung in order to gain local power. It is like 'a give and take' between them, a form of power sharing.” (INT11, January 2016; similar views were expressed by INT16, March 2016)

However, there are more nuanced readings possible. One of my participants, Muhajir Utomo, himself a descendant of Javanese transmigrants, argued that Javanese candidates form ethnic coalitions with the Lampungese in order to show gratitude to the Lampungese who provided their land for transmigrants (INT1, October 2015). Furthermore, coalitions between the Javanese and Lampungese also reduce feelings that the transmigrants are now dominating Lampung. The same participant claimed that, “The coalitions between Javanese transmigrants and Lampungese are ideal as they reduce the domination of one ethnic group. As far as I am concerned, I believe that the Javanese do a good job when it comes to bridging the interests of [Javanese and Lampungese].”

Further, the importance of understanding Javanese culture in political campaigns was discussed by one Lampungese candidate, who argued that, “as a consequence of the fact that the majority of people in Metro are Javanese, I often use the Javanese language, and sometimes I mix it with Indonesian to socialise my manifesto to the voter. This is important. I want to create a feeling that I am close to them even though I am Lampungese.” (INT9, January 2016)
A further indication that the majority ethnic culture in Metro has an influence on daily political life is provided by a Javanese language campaign tagline used by a number of candidates, ‘Piye-piye penak wonge dewe’, meaning ‘somehow, it is more comfortable to be led by us’. One of the pairings running in the 2015 mayoral elections, the Javanese transmigrant descendant Pairin and the Lampungese Djohan, merged their names into Paidjo, which is itself a common Javanese name (see Figure 6-3). They used this name in numerous pamphlets and advertisements.

Figure 6-3 The abbreviated name of Paidjo in a campaign advertisement

Source: Pairin and Djohan’s campaign team (2016).

Metro’s mayoral elections in 2015 were very competitive (see Table 6. 3). The ballot papers listed five candidate pairings from various backgrounds, including professional politicians, bureaucrats and entrepreneurs. According to Law Number 8/2015, Art. 39b, which regulates the election of governors, heads of regencies and mayors, candidates may be independent or represent coalitions of political parties. In Metro three pairings represented coalitions of political parties; the other two consisted of independent candidates. According to Law Number 8/2015, as Metro has a population of 161,830 (Electoral Commision, 2015), independent candidates must obtain the endorsement of at least 10% of the total population, i.e. 16,183 voters.29

29 Technically, a voter must fill in a signed support form for the candidate; the form is provided by the Election Commission. The form must then be handed over to the candidate, along with a copy of the voter’s identity card. The candidate submits it to the local election office for further verification.

157
Table 6. 3 Key facts concerning the subnational election in Metro in 2015

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Candidates</th>
<th>Party support</th>
<th>Total votes and seats in the local council</th>
<th>Ethnic coalition</th>
<th>Number of votes in 2015 elections</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sudarsono and running mate Taufik Hidayat</td>
<td>Democrat Party, PKB and People’s Conscience Party</td>
<td>seven seats in local council</td>
<td>Javanese and Lampungese</td>
<td>15,841</td>
<td>18.67%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abdul Hakim and Muchlido Aprilist</td>
<td>Great Indonesian Movement Party and Prosperous Justice Party</td>
<td>six seats in local council</td>
<td>Bantenese and Javanese</td>
<td>24,670</td>
<td>29.07%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pairin and Djohan</td>
<td>PDI-P, National Democrat Party and National Mandate Party</td>
<td>nine seats in local council</td>
<td>Javanese and Lampungese</td>
<td>334,999</td>
<td>39.47%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supriadi and Megasari</td>
<td>Independent candidates</td>
<td>20,394 direct support by voters</td>
<td>Javanese and Lampungese</td>
<td>926</td>
<td>1.09%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Okta Novandra Jaya and Wahadi</td>
<td>Independent candidates</td>
<td>19,718 direct support by voters</td>
<td>Lampungese and Javanese</td>
<td>9,932</td>
<td>11.70%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: (Electoral Commission, 2015d; Tribun Lampung, 2015a; Tribun Lampung, 2015b).

Sudarsono (himself a Javanese transmigration descendant) distributed Javanese-language pamphlets with the campaign slogan ‘Iki sing asli wong Metro’ (we are the real native people of Metro). In communicating this slogan, he was quite successful in altering the public perception and setting a political agenda focusing on the origins of the native people in the city. According to Olzak (1983, p.357), ethnic mobilisation could be defined as “collective action that takes some set of ethnic markers” – for instance skin colour, language, and territorial identification – and exploits it, and that is exactly what Sudarsono did, as he himself openly admits.
Sudarsono tried to capitalise upon the issue of being a native of Metro (Figure 6-4). He declared that he was one of the “real native” people of Metro and that his father was a first generation transmigrant in the 1930s. However, Sudarsono assured me that being a native is not the only issue that won votes for him; other factors also need to be considered, such as campaign funding. He told me that,

“The issue of transmigration descendants remains important and could attract voters. Transmigration remains important in subnational elections as long as it is complemented by a good campaign programme, but we cannot deny the role of money in politics. In my experience, I was defeated in the last subnational election due to a lack of funds. If I had had money at that time, even if I had less than the other candidates, I could have won the election. I am sure of it.” (INT10, February 2016)
In the case of Metro, identity has a political dimension that can be capitalised upon in local elections. Sudarsono added that:

“I began my political career as the head of a village, so I was close to the community. When I ran for a seat in the local assembly, you can imagine that I won without a massive campaign because people already knew me. I followed this by campaigning in the mayoral election. As I am a native of Metro, I understand Metro. By participating in this election I just wanted to prove that Metro is for the native people of Metro. This is our land and village” (ibid.).

This view was supported by a second-generation transmigration descendant:

“The sentiment of being a Javanese transmigration descendant is still sufficient to influence voters. According to my understanding, the issue is still significant and is taken into consideration by voters…. They are more enthusiastic when they vote for candidates who are descendants of Javanese transmigrants.” (INT14, January 2016)

This illustrates how the identity of being a Javanese transmigration descendant is still used by local elites as a political campaign tool and contradicts the view of Tirtosudarmo (2016, p.170), who claims that “Javaneseness has been more transformed into a social and cultural identity rather than political identity” and argues that competition between Javanese and Lampungese takes place more on the basis of economic than political interests (ibid.).

A more equivocal finding issues from a survey undertaken by one of the leading Indonesian pollsters, Saiful Mujani Research and Consulting. Their survey was carried out from 20th to 22nd November 2015, three weeks before the local elections in Metro. According to their findings, being a native of Metro is the fourth most important factor when citizens of Metro go to the polls; for roughly 6.7% of all respondents this is the number one criterion. The most important factor is the degree to which a candidate cares for the people (22.5%), followed by perceptions of the candidate’s experience (16.5%), and questions of honesty and corruption (7.3%). It is unclear, however, why 6.7% of Metro voters choose their leader primarily on the grounds of his or her relationship to Metro (see Figure 6-5). This would require further study.
Figure 6-5 Factors that influenced voting decisions in Metro's subnational election in 2015

Factors influencing the voting decision in Metro

- Care to people: 22.5%
- Having an experience in government structure: 16.5%
- A native of Metro: 7.3%
- Member of the party I support: 6.7%
- Religious leader: 4.8%
- Proven results: 4.4%
- Empathic person: 4.4%
- Comes from leader’s family: 4.1%
- Relatives: 5.1%
- Following family choice: 5.1%
- Member of the party I support: 2.9%
- Well-educated person: 3.5%
- Religious leader: 3.2%
- No preferences: 3.8%
- Comes from leader’s family: 4.1%
- Empathic person: 4.4%
- Proven results: 4.8%
- Relatives: 5.1%
- Following family choice: 5.1%
- A native of Metro: 6.7%
- Care to people: 16.5%
- Having an experience in government structure: 22.5%
- Other reason: 7.9%
- Unanswered: 2.9%

Table 6. 4 Reasons given by voters for choosing particular candidates

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reason for choosing</th>
<th>Sudarsono and Taufik Hidayat</th>
<th>Abdul Hakim and Muchlido Aprilist</th>
<th>Pairin and Djohan</th>
<th>Supriadi and Megasari</th>
<th>Okta Novandra Jaya and Wahadi</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Care for the people</td>
<td>22.0%</td>
<td>20.0%</td>
<td>19.0%</td>
<td>29.0%</td>
<td>39.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Having experience in government structure</td>
<td>12.0%</td>
<td>12.0%</td>
<td>25.0%</td>
<td>14.0%</td>
<td>11.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Honest and clean person</td>
<td>4.0%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>6.0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>14.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A native of Metro</td>
<td>17.0%</td>
<td>1.0%</td>
<td>6.0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Following family choice</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>1.0%</td>
<td>9.0%</td>
<td>29.0%</td>
<td>11.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relatives</td>
<td>6.0%</td>
<td>6.0%</td>
<td>4.0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>6.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proven results</td>
<td>6.0%</td>
<td>6.0%</td>
<td>4.0%</td>
<td>14.0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emphatic person</td>
<td>1.0%</td>
<td>4.0%</td>
<td>7.0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>6.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comes from leader's family</td>
<td>7.0%</td>
<td>2.0%</td>
<td>1.0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>11.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No preferences</td>
<td>7.0%</td>
<td>2.0%</td>
<td>4.0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious leader</td>
<td>1.0%</td>
<td>9.0%</td>
<td>1.0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Member of the party I support</td>
<td>5.0%</td>
<td>4.0%</td>
<td>1.0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Well-educated person</td>
<td>2.0%</td>
<td>4.0%</td>
<td>1.0%</td>
<td>14.0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political party leader</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>1.0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other reason</td>
<td>5.0%</td>
<td>11.0%</td>
<td>10.0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>3.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Sudarsono campaigned strongly on connections to Metro. The figures shown in Table 6. 4 suggest that this was a successful tactic. 17% of voters chose him for this reason, it was more than any other candidates. This sheds a different light on the more generalised answers to the survey question about factors influencing voter decisions. Meanwhile, the candidate of Bantenese ethnicity, Abdul Hakim, lost support because he was not born and brought up in Metro even though his running mate was from the city. A prolonged campaign against him on account of his Bantenese ethnicity was, in my view, an important reason for his lack of success. At
some points during my fieldwork, I found that the level of negative campaigning faced by Abdul Hakim was more intense than that experienced by others. But ethnicity was not the only factor involved. Abdul Hakim was criticised for having two wives; this affected his popularity, particularly amongst women voters (INT11, January 2016; INT14, January 2016).

The views of Chandra (2006, p.397) are relevant to an understanding of the place of Javanese transmigrants and ethnic identity in the local politics of Metro. She writes of “descent-based attributes, which means a subset of identity categories in which membership is determined by attributes associated with or believed to be associated with” ethnicity. The attributes of the Javanese transmigration descendants themselves can be defined in terms of personal and social identity. We can also think in terms of their desire to “maintain a particular structure of power” (Parekh, 2008, p.15). Moreover, in the context of Metro’s local politics, the transformation of transmigration descendants into Asli wong Metro is also a symptom of how descent-based attributes work in electoral competition.

6.4 Support from the Bureaucracy, Money in Campaigns and Subnational Elections

In this section, I introduce some of the other factors that need to be considered in the context of subnational elections in Metro: support from the bureaucracy and campaign funding. Indeed, transmigration is not the only issue in subnational elections in Metro. As we have already seen, there are other issues in local politics in Lampung as well as in Indonesia as a whole; among these are the role of money politics, brokers and networks (Aspinall, 2014a; Aspinall and As’ad, 2015; Vel, 2005). Here, I shall consider first the role played by bureaucrats, whose job means that they should retain political impartiality.

The local bureaucracy is a powerful factor in supporting an incumbent’s campaign, as a number of researchers have found (Subianto, 2009). The reasons behind this are pragmatic, part of the give-and-take of politics. Political support means that bureaucrats see it as beneficial to strategically position themselves behind an incumbent looking for a second term. Law Number 8/2015 prohibits bureaucrats from offering political support to candidates in subnational elections. Nevertheless, some
bureaucrats ignore the regulations, largely because of a lack of enforcement. One elected candidate interviewed for this research remarked, "I competed with the incumbent and as far as I am concerned, at that time the incumbent was able to mobilise the bureaucracy which made it easier [for him] to get votes" (INT9, January 2016; and similarly INT12, December 2015). (Chapter 8.4 examines the advantages of incumbency in the context of mayoral politics in Bandar Lampung.)

The same interviewee claimed that his voters had limited access to official voter registration cards. "Many of my supporters did not get the voter registration card; if they do not have the card that means they are not able to vote". Additionally, the list of eligible voters is released by the registration office every five years; this office is under the authority of the city mayor or head of regency, and the incumbent has the opportunity to influence the office to attract only voters who would elect incumbents. Even though there is an appeal process for those who fail to make the voter list, it is a time-consuming and complicated process.

Illegal support by the bureaucracy for incumbent candidates in their re-election campaign is a common feature of Indonesian subnational elections. Subianto (2009, p.346), in his research on subnational elections in West Kalimantan, argues that, "As the incumbent, they can effortlessly mobilise lucrative financial support from the local business community and make use of all levels of bureaucracy to garner votes for themselves on election day." However, in the context of Metro's 2015 mayoral election, none of the candidates were incumbent. This meant that the competition was keener as no one could deploy the bureaucratic structure to their advantage.

Money likewise has an important role in determining success in subnational elections in Metro, as indeed elsewhere in Lampung and Indonesia (see also Chapter 8.3 for a discussion of the role of money in Bandar Lampung elections). Subnational elections are costly in Indonesia; this impacts on the funding needed by candidates. Candidates therefore often form a relationship with businesses. On the role of money in Metro’s mayoral elections, the candidate Sudarsono explained that:

"I have only two trump cards: my Javanese transmigration origins and my programme, but I don’t have much money. If I had 10 billion rupiah [ca. £500,000], I am sure I would have won in the last local election. I do not have enough money. That is my only problem." (INT10, February 2016)
Another of my interviewees expressed similar views:

“In my opinion, in Metro, there were …, let’s say, three important candidates. The first was Pairin, who is a transmigration descendant, paired with Djohan. The second was Abdul Hakim, who is not a transmigration descendant but has a good political network, and the third candidate was Sudarsono, who is a transmigration descendant and is also head of [one of the groups representing] transmigration descendants in Metro. However, [Sudarsono] is ‘sorry to say’ that he does not have enough money. So we can see from this that both transmigration and money are needed and are complementary factors…. The candidate who is going to win the local elections is the transmigration descendant who also has a large amount of money. In short, transmigration sentiment in subnational elections still exists, but it is not everything and needs to be supplemented by other factors.” (INT11, January 2016)

Participants from several professions told me that money in politics and vote-buying is prevalent in Metro (INT11, January 2016; INT12, December 2015). The issue of money in elections has become a major issue in Indonesian politics more generally. For instance, Aspinall and As’ad (2015) argue that money in politics and networks, including brokers, are the dominant factors in local political competition in Indonesia nowadays. We can see that the role of ethnic-based brokers in subnational elections also occurs in Metro. One third generation descendant and former politician remarked that:

“The way they have organised money in politics is so systematic. According to regulations, every candidate in a subnational election has one official witness in every polling station, while the regulations on how many unofficial … witnesses are allowed is not mentioned clearly. The candidates are using the lack of rules to recruit as many unofficial witnesses as possible in every … polling station. The unofficial witnesses -- or, as we call them, shadow witnesses -- can also be voters for the candidate that hired them. Every candidate has at least 10 to 20 shadow witnesses in every polling station. The way it works is that the candidate gives the shadow witnesses some money to work with. The shadow witnesses are also used to recruit relatives or friends to vote for the candidate who hired them.” (INT11, January 2016)

The networks used to select the unofficial witnesses rely on members of the transmigration descendant community itself. Candidates tend to choose members of their family, relatives or close friends to be their unofficial witnesses. The idea of using relatives from transmigration communities as unofficial witnesses was discussed by the participant quoted above, who said:
“The shadow witnesses working to recruit voters are drawn from their close relatives. There is also a coordinator for every ‘level’ of shadow witness, for example, a coordinator at the village or urban settlement level. The coordinator’s main jobs are to coordinate shadow witnesses in door-to-door campaigns…. So the unofficial or shadow witness comes to the voter’s home and gives the voter stuff for the kitchen [for example] and money. The total is between Rp. 50,000 [ca. £3] and Rp. 200,000 [ca. £11] for each voter.” (Ibid., and similarly INT41, December 2015)

It is worth noting that candidates use relatives to capitalise on ethnic sentiment. This is related to issues of trust; relatives are more trustworthy than non-relatives, especially when they are distributing gifts and money to voters. However, there were only two official investigations into this issue in the city in 2015, one of the fewest of any election in Lampung (Election Supervisory Board, 2015). We can see from Table 6.5 that the number of allegations of inappropriate spending in elections in 2015 is one of the lowest in Lampung. However, inappropriate behaviour is difficult to observe and prove because it is systematic, illegal and involves many actors, including candidates, voters and officials. For example, those wishing to complain about inappropriate behaviour have to report to the electoral supervisory board, a complicated and time-consuming process that requires the informant to provide several pieces of evidence.

**Table 6.5 Allegations of illegal money in politics reported in eight subnational elections in Lampung in 2015**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>City or Regency</th>
<th>Number of allegations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pesisir Barat Regency</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central Lampung Regency</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Lampung Regency</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Lampung Regency</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pesawaran Regency</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Metro City</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bandar Lampung City</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Way Kanan Regency</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

However, circumstantial evidence suggests that there has been a decreasing use of money in politics in the last few years and that this is due to the influence of youth movements and other civil society groups protesting against money politics. This was discussed by one interview respondent, who reported that, “We did a massive campaign against money politics using pamphlets, organising discussions and making a short movie. All those activities are having a deterrent effect on both sides apparently, among both candidates and voters” (INT12, December 2015) (see Figure 6-6). Given that the majority of Metro’s residents are of Javanese descent, the film is entitled in Javanese ‘Nomor piro wani piro’ (Who wants to be chosen? How much do you offer us?).

It became an important tool in the campaign against vote buying.

Figure 6-6 Merchandise such as bags, books, CDs and T-shirts designed to counter corruption, provided by a youth movement during a large-scale campaign against money in politics in the 2015 mayoral election in Metro

Source: Author (2016).

There is a further factor behind the apparent decreasing role of money in politics in the 2015 subnational elections. Neither of the incumbents participated in the 2015 elections, so the potential for deploying the bureaucratic infrastructure as a political

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30 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xxr9Nlw8OQk.
31 In a discussion with a leading member of this movement, I was told that in the early stage of this youth movement, it was self-funded, but later some activities were also supported financially by the Electoral Commission (INT 12, December 2015).
broker to distribute money from local businessmen was smaller (Subianto, 2009; Hidayat, 2009). According to a participant, “Money was given without any constraints in 2010; they gave money without any subtlety or evasion; this is what I observed. It occurred due to the fact that the participants were both previously incumbent” (INT12, December 2015).

In the case of subnational elections in Metro, the issue of ethnicity, political networks, transmigration descent and money politics are bound together and complement one another. These factors influence voters in various ways. However, the lived experience of being Javanese and a transmigrant descendant is key in understanding the local political conditions in Metro.

6.5 Conclusion

Local politics in Metro revolve around transmigration identity or in-group feeling as migrant descendants are still an important and integral part of the story of the city and therefore of its political processes. This chapter has shown that the transmigration movements of the 1930s have left a political legacy that influences the politics of the city today.

The transmigrant political identity of being Asli wong Metro is a central factor behind local elections in Metro. The three consecutive subnational elections in 2005, 2010 and 2015 show that the elected mayor always comes from among Javanese transmigrant descendants.

This spirit of common identity becomes therefore a useful tool to mobilise the voters in Metro’s subnational elections. In Metro, transmigration sentiments construct a particular ethnic identity and influence the decisions of voters in elections. The issue of ethnicity vis-à-vis transmigration sentiment is still significant and has become a complementary issue in subnational elections. However, there is no single issue that is able to comprehensively explain the results of subnational elections, including in the case of Metro. Ethnicity and Javanese transmigrant sentiment are not the only issue for voters in subnational elections. As in other parts of Indonesia, the role of money in politics and networks of brokers and abuses of power by local bureaucrats
are also important, long-standing issues in local politics, as we shall see again Chapters 7 and 8.

Finally, this chapter argues that there is no one single issue in local Indonesian politics, even in the case of Metro, where ethnicity is clearly so important. We see instead a dynamic configuration of issues, including the role of money, networks and incumbency. The role of ethnicity and construction of identity as *Asli wong Metro* is, however, central to an understanding of local electoral politics in Metro, supporting the arguments of Chandra (2012), as outlined in Chapter 2.1.
Chapter 7
Power Relations in Majority Javanese East Lampung

The previous chapter has revealed some of the political legacies of the transmigration programme on local politics in Metro. We saw in particular how transmigration and the issues deriving from it have become transformed into an ethnic identity politics and have been used for specific political purposes in mayoral elections. This chapter discusses the local politics of ethnic identity in the regency of East Lampung by analysing the domination of Javanese transmigrants. The core argument focuses around four important narratives in subnational elections in East Lampung: the domination of local politics by Javanese, the political role of Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), the political strategy applied by the minority Lampungese in relating to the majority Javanese during elections, and the minimal role of local political parties in elections. While the focus of this chapter remains on the impact of ethnicity on the results of local elections in East Lampung, other factors are considered too, factors that have been important in paving the way to electoral success. This chapter concentrates on the results of the local elections of 2015. The results of the 2005 and 2010 elections are also brought into play so as to provide a reflection on the current situation on the ground in East Lampung. This chapter shows the extent of political domination by Javanese transmigrant descendants in the local politics of East Lampung. The chapter also explains the political role and support afforded by NU to particular candidates in local politics. The argument put forward in this chapter shows that ethnicity is an essential factor but other factors such as the role of the political networks of ERBOs also play a significant role in helping a candidate be elected in local elections.

This chapter consists of five sections. Section 7.1 introduces the importance and the context of ethnicity and transmigration in East Lampung, bringing it into an analysis of local politics in this Javanese-majority area. Section 7.2 discusses the informal political role of NU in supporting candidates in subnational elections. It sheds light on
the organisational networks that are an important aspect of subnational elections and the ways in which NU supports particular candidates in elections. Section 7.3 reviews the political strategies used by the Lampungese elite in dealing with the Javanese majority. The final substantive section, section 7.4, explains the minimal political role of political parties and includes a comparative insight into the 2010 and 2015 elections in East Lampung.

### 7.1 Local politics in Javanese Transmigration Areas

This section presents the story of the political domination of East Lampung’s local politics by Javanese transmigrants. It first provides some brief information on the geography and demographics of East Lampung.

East Lampung is one of the pivotal locations of transmigration in Lampung. The total population in East Lampung in 2015 was 1,008,797 people, which makes it the second most populated regency in Lampung (Central Statistical Bureau of Indonesia, 2015a). The Javanese make up 80% of the population (compared with 72% in Metro; see Table 7.1). Geographically, the total area of East Lampung is 5,325 km², 15% of the total area in the province of Lampung (see Figure 7-1).

There are 20 sub-districts in East Lampung, which are divided into 264 rural villages. The agricultural sector is the leading sector, employing almost half of the regency’s population (Sub-National Level Development Planning 2014). Sukadana, the capital of East Lampung, was an important area for transmigration in the Dutch colonial period prior to the creation of Metro in the 1930s. Metro had in fact been part of Sukadana. As mentioned earlier, the Dutch relocated 200,000 people from Java through _kolonisatie_ (transmigration programme), of which Sukadana received 47,000 between 1935 and 1941 (Levang, 2003, p.10-11).
Figure 7-1 Map of East Lampung

Source: Data was taken from Badan Informasi Geopasial Indonesia, analysed and re-drawn by the author (2018).
Table 7.1 The ethnic make-up of East Lampung in 2010

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ethnicity</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Javanese</td>
<td>772,915</td>
<td>81.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lampungese</td>
<td>80,000</td>
<td>8.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sundanese</td>
<td>36,975</td>
<td>3.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bantenese</td>
<td>20,618</td>
<td>2.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Balinese</td>
<td>15,747</td>
<td>1.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic groups from South Sumatra</td>
<td>7,959</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>People of other ethnicities</td>
<td>6,733</td>
<td>0.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bugis (South Sulawesi)</td>
<td>3,845</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minangkabau (West Sumatra)</td>
<td>3,761</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Batak (North Sumatra)</td>
<td>1,966</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chinese</td>
<td>752</td>
<td>0.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unanswered</td>
<td>368</td>
<td>0.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>951,659</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Central Statistical Bureau of Indonesia (2013a).

Meanwhile, local politics in East Lampung have seen the majority Javanese population establish political domination in the years since the advent of direct elections. This is similar to the situation in Metro, where the majority Javanese transmigration descendants are dominant in local power structures. The domination of Javanese transmigrants in East Lampung in three consecutive regency elections is due to a number of factors including demographics, political networks and ethnic sentiment. However, it important to note that, as in Metro, Javanese dominance is reinforced through ethnically based political coalitions with the Lampungese minority (see Section 7.3). This situation finds an echo in the points made by Chandra (2012, p.39), who argues that:

“Democracy requires fluid majorities and minorities in order to survive. Ethnically divided societies, however, tend to produce ‘permanent’ majorities and minorities, based on an ethnic census. Consequently, democracy in ethnically divided societies is threatened. The threat, according to these arguments, can be mitigated by ‘cross-cutting’ or ‘multipolar’ structure of ethnic division or by institutions that limit the power of the winning majority”.

173
The narrative of local politics in this area can be described as contest and compromise among the majority and minority ethnic groups, especially between the Javanese and Lampungese. Local politics in East Lampung provide a lesson in the importance of the impact of ethnicity on subnational election results. East Lampung’s politics also tell us something about the role of the political networks provided by ERBOs and the importance of using a political strategy to sustain some foothold on power for the minority in local politics. In partial contrast to Metro, where ethnicity is still the central issue in local politics, East Lampung’s local politics show a slightly different picture, with ERBOs – primarily in this case NU – playing a more significant role here in boosting the dynamics of local politics. Alongside issues related to ethnicity, East Lampung local election results illustrate the importance of having a good political network.

The next section discusses the informal political role of NU in giving political support to certain candidates. The discussion starts with a look at the political links between the transmigration programme and groups such as NU.

**7.2 The Informal Political Role of NU in Subnational Elections**

This section discusses the role of NU in the local politics of East Lampung. My main argument here is that NU plays an important role in political campaigns and provides significant political support to its chosen candidate.

NU actually formed its own political party to run in the first Indonesian national elections in 1955. However, after a number of decades it withdrew from such direct political activities as a consequence of the political marginalisation of Islamic interests under the Suharto administration (see Chapter 3). With Suharto’s overthrow, NU returned to the political scene. Abdurahman Wahid, the fourth president of the Republic of Indonesia (1999-2001), had been national leader of NU between 1984 and 1999 and was founder of the National Awakening Party (PKB), which, in its early stages, was associated with NU. Wahid’s aim behind forming this party was to accommodate the political interests of NU members in elections. Imam Zuhdi Adnan, who is a leader of NU at regency level, told me that, despite NU’s previous direct involvement in politics, “According to our khittah [organisation roles], we are a neutral organisation and formally do not have any political affiliation” (INT21, January 2016).
Nevertheless, links between PKB and NU remain and are based on ideological factors (see Chapter 3). While a member of NU is not automatically a party member and vice versa, it seems that most members of NU support PKB. Indeed, Bush (2009, p199) argues that, “Politicians within the NU continue to enjoy the fruits of the special relationship between NU and PKB”, and he writes of “the political influence” of Abdurahman Wahid. Wahid, however, died in 2009.

As a consequence of the similarities between their ideological positions, NU provides information and political support for PKB candidates in subnational elections in many parts of the country. This was discussed by the national chairperson of the party, who is on record as having said, "I do appreciate that we secured victory in 140 regions in the previous subnational elections, and this is due to the support and solidarity of the members of NU given to the party which NU culturally ‘gave birth’ to” (Iskandar, 2015).

The development of NU in East Lampung has been associated with the presence of transmigration programmes in this regency. In this sense, my findings indicate that the process of relocating people through transmigration programmes has transferred and distributed Islamic values within the transmigrant-receiving locations. Indeed, others have found that the development of various Muslim mystical brotherhoods (tarekat) is strongly linked with Maduranese transmigrants in several areas such as West Kalimantan province (van Bruinessen, 1995).

Transmigrants relocating to transmigration centres such as East Lampung come from politically and religiously diverse backgrounds. However, most are associated with the Islamist group ASWAJA (Ahl al-Sunnah wa al-Jama’a or, in Arabic, أهل السنة والجماعة). ASWAJA values have been associated with NU in Indonesia for a long time. There are no data on the number of NU members in East Lampung. A senior member of the organisation told me that, “Almost 80% of the Muslims in this regency are followers of ASWAJA, so we can say that they are members of NU” (INT22, January 2016).

32 “ASWAJA is an ideological movement that adopts a middle way between rationality and scripture. For NU, knowledge is not just contained in the Koran and As Sunnah (the second holy book of Islam) but also stems from rationality and empirical reality.” Translated and retrieved from http://www.nu.or.id/about/paham+keagamaan (Accessed on 17th November 2016).
We can assume that those practising ASWAJA values such as learning NU’s *Yellow Books* in Pesantren Islamic boarding schools become members of NU. NU’s *Yellow Books* are a compilation of books written by classical *salaf* Islamic scholars and are associated with the Islamic values practised by NU members. These books historically came from the Middle East, contain various Islamic disciplines, comment on particular issues of Islamic studies and are written in Arabic script.\(^{33}\) It is commonly known that Pesantren in Indonesia are associated with NU. According to Riyadi (2004, p.3), out of 11,312 Islamic boarding schools in Indonesia, 7,306 are affiliated with NU.

In the context of subnational elections in East Lampung, the elected head of the regency, Chusnunia Halim, is a second generation Javanese transmigration descendant and is a member of NU, as well as being a PKB member. Her father is an Islamic teacher who had taught at Lasem Islamic boarding school in Central Java before migrating to East Lampung. He also established an Islamic boarding school in East Lampung. Her grandfather was one of the co-founders of NU in Indonesia.

The national leader of NU, Said Aqil Siradj, has gone on record in support of Chusnunia Halim:

> “Nunik [Chusnunia Halim] is in our NU organisation and is a member of the national parliament from PKB. She is also a descendant of one of the greatest NU leaders and our co-founder, Ma’shoem Ahmad Lasem. Nunik has a good personality and is well educated, so it is our duty to support her as candidate to become head of East Lampung Regency. God willing, she will be a trusted and capable person to develop this region and carry on as an NU member”.\(^{34}\)

This clear statement of NU’s role in local politics through support of a specific candidate was corroborated by one of my interviewees (INT22, January 2016). In the regency elections in East Lampung in 2015, NU members provided political assistance to Chusnunia Halim and her running mate. For example, some senior leaders of NU urged several times for unity amongst members of NU in giving political support for Chusnunia Halim (INT21, January 2016). This was in contrast to the previous two elections, in 2005 and 2010, when a lack of organisational solidarity occurred because there was more than one candidate from NU.

\(^{33}\) [http://www.nu.or.id/post/read/40844/kitab-kuning](http://www.nu.or.id/post/read/40844/kitab-kuning)

\(^{34}\) [https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=G0X1Ghclhc](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=G0X1Ghclhc)
“This is amazing,” enthused one interview respondent. “Finally, we can achieve unity by having only one candidate in the regency election…. Previously, we were unable to do this; we always had more than one candidate from the NU” (INT19, December 2015; similar sentiments were expressed by INT20, January 2016, and INT22, January 2016). Furthermore, having an elected candidate who also comes from a leading NU family was another factor that was seen to increase unity within the party. The NU interviewee quoted above said, “She is our fellow member. She is also the descendant of one of our great co-founders, Ma’shoem Ahmad Lasem, so we have to support her as our tradition is to keep respect with our founder” (INT22, January 2016).

How did NU provide support to Chusnunia Halim and her running mate? What does a successful team structure look like? Political support was given by the NU Women’s Organisation, who organised regular campaigns and Islamic worship meetings and distributed campaign tools and gifts such as stickers, ASWAJA books and Islamic veils to members (INT20, January 2016; INT21, January 2006). NU’s Women’s Organisation has a good network in every sub-district of East Lampung; they have 24 sub-district and 264 rural village offices. In every operational zone, they have a member who is responsible for mobilising their members to vote for their candidate. By engaging with this network, those running for office can gain political advantage not available to other candidates (INT21, January 2016).

By activating and involving sub-district branches, NU’s Women’s Organisation becomes a political medium and a successful team, sitting between the candidate and voters. One organisation leader explained that, “We deploy sub-district branch members to distribute campaign tools and gifts in our attempt to attract votes. [These members] folded 120,000 veils before distributing them to members and potential voters” (ibid.). This level of work requires a good network and active members (see Figure 7-2).
Campaigning through the medium of worship, especially for Muslim voters, is a preferred model in Indonesian local politics. The campaign proceeds alongside worship activities. This represents a significant advantage for candidates endorsed by Islamic organisations and affiliated bodies, which are able to use activities related to religious worship as a means of political campaigning, as happened with Chusnunia Halim. One (unsuccessful) candidate remarked to me in their interview that, “Because NU is an Islamic organisation, campaign through worship activities is the favourite campaigning tool during elections, particularly for our members, and Chusnunia Halim is so lucky because she got political support from NU’s Women’s Organisation”
Another senior member of the organisation argues that, “We are all one big NU family, and I am impressed that everyone is working enthusiastically for Chusnunia Halim” (INT19, December 2015).

Furthermore, NU also deploy a team, a so-called tim sembilan or ‘team of nine’, with a duty to strengthen the internal solidarity of NU and act to mobilise potential voters, especially NU members. The team consists of influential Islamic teachers and board members of NU. According to NU’s regency leader, this team has a duty to organise members of NU in support of Chusnunia Halim. The team consists of board members and a number Islamic teachers known for their charismatic style; they have a duty to mobilise the membership of NU and other potential voters (INT21, January 2016; also INT20, January 2016).

According to NU’s data, there are nearly 4.5 million NU members in Lampung, which would represent about half of Lampung’s ca. 8.3 million inhabitants. While this is likely to be an inflated figure, it does give a sense of the organisation’s strength and popularity. The Islamic teacher becomes the one who can mobilise NU members for political purposes. Kusama (2014) and Saxelbøl (2002) argue that the relationship between NU’s Islamic teachers and students are strong, especially in Pesantren schools. With this in mind, it is conceivable that some Islamic teachers also act to draw votes for particular candidates. Above all, it should be borne in mind that the heartland of NU is in Java, and that its popularity in Lampung is closely linked to the prevalence in many parts of the province of transmigrants from the island.

NU’s role in supporting PKB candidates sheds new light on the various forms of patronage in the local politics of Indonesia as outlined by Aspinall and Sukmajati (2016). Informal political support given by NU to particular candidates in subnational elections has provided a substantial boost to candidates, as shown by the case of Chusnunia Halim. Indeed, this study supports their argument on the informal politics of vote brokers, with politicians tending to trust the clientelist structure that they themselves have created rather than depending on political party machinery to mobilise voters.

But the case of NU’s political support in East Lampung provides new evidence that the patronage model of exchanging political interests between the elite and voters

http://www.nu.or.id/post/read/86221/survei-terbaru-muslim-di-lampung-72-persen-nu
does not always simply take the form of mutual economic interest, i.e. vote buying, this is due to pride as a member of NU and this ERBO is also potentially used as for medium for strengthening clientelist relations between elite and voter.

7.3 Dealing with The Majority: the Survival Strategies of The Lampungese in Local Politics

The emphasis in the previous section was on the political role of a religious organisation, albeit one with strong links to ethnicity. In this section the focus returns to issues related solely to ethnicity, and in particular to attempts by native Lampungese to ensure that they have a voice in political power structures.

7.3.1 The ethnic geometry of East Lampung

In a broader context, the implementation of the subnational election system has, since 2005, led to an increased airing for ethnic-religious issues. Thus, the new subnational elections have contributed to a situation where ethnic composition within a region plays an important role in political competition in local politics.

Huber (2012) has studied the impact of electoral systems on electoral outcomes. He argues that various electoral systems lead to the saliency of ethnic group sentiment (ibid, p. 986). In other words, different systems have different political consequences. For example, the first-past-the-post system currently in use in Indonesia in subnational elections may lead to a greater dominance of the majority ethnic population than a proportional representation system.

As a consequence of the prolonged forced migration programme both in the era of Dutch colonial administration and in post-independence Indonesia, the demographic make-up of the population has shifted radically within East Lampung. As we have seen, more than 80 percent of the population of East Lampung are ethnic Javanese, with the remaining 20 percent distributed across 10 ethnicities (see Table 7.1). This minimises the opportunity for inter-ethnic power struggles but means that the Javanese have dominated the last three regency elections, starting with the decade-long administration of Satono in 2005 and continuing with the current administration
of Chusnunia Halim. The imbalance between the population of Javanese descent and other ethnicities is an important factor that leads to the political weakness of the Lampungese in the local politics of East Lampung. The majority Javanese voters have dominated every subnational election in East Lampung, including elections to the local regency council (for a detailed explanation, see Chapter 3.4).

An alternative position was taken, however, by a member of the Javanese elite, who argued when I interviewed him that: “This is the era of decentralisation, so at this stage, the Lampungese obtain many more advantages than Javanese transmigration descendants” (INT1, October 2015). This argument is supported by Tirtosudarmo (2016, p.171), who claims that Javanese sentiment cannot be mobilised for political advantage in elections in Lampung because the basic rivalry between the Lampungese and Javanese is based on “various economic [issues] especially land ownership” interests rather than ethnicity. Tirtosudarmo’s point rings true to some extent: as we see in the discussion on the role of money politics in Metro (see Chapter 6.4) and in Bandar Lampung (Chapter 8.3), economic issues are one of the most important aspects of electoral competition, but in transmigration areas such as East Lampung ethnic sentiment is still the favoured way of obtaining political support, as should be clear from the discussion in this chapter.

However, the picture has not always been so clear-cut, as suggested by the view expressed by the member of the Javanese elite quoted in the previous paragraph. Between 2000 and 2005, as a result of policies promoting the political interests of Putra Daerah in local politics, the Lampungese elite temporarily found themselves in a strong position in the local politics of this regency. But Javanese political domination in East Lampung’s local politics resumed when a powerful ethnic Javanese figure, Satono, won in 2005 in the first electoral contest for regent by capitalising on issues facing the Javanese in East Lampung. This victory by a member of the Javanese elite represented a comeback for Javanese in local politics and in the bureaucracy – a return, albeit under different circumstances, to the situation in the Suharto era, when the majority of local bureaucrats and politicians were Javanese.
A senior politician and campaign manager expressed the situation thus:

“This was a consequence and a blowback response to the Putra Daerah policy [of the early 2000s]. The rise in Javanese sentiment brought political advantages for Satono. He received massive support from many Javanese groups such as PATRI. The campaign tagline was also clear at that time: Javanese must vote for the Javanese candidate.” (INT18, October 2015)

7.3.2 Strategies of the Lampungese elite: political coalitions with the Javanese

To cope with their political weakness, the Lampungese elite deploy a number of strategies to counterbalance the majority Javanese. First, they create inter-ethnic political coalitions with the majority ethnic group itself. Second, they have attempted to install a Lampungese as regent. Third, they implement an inclusive political strategy by claiming that all residents of Lampung are Lampungese. Fourth, Lampungese candidates try to win over Javanese ethnic sentiment by using Javanese culture and symbols in subnational election campaigning material. This strategy is similar to that employed by Lampungese in Metro (see Chapter 6.2).

According to information obtained from the interviews, inter-ethnic coalitions, particularly with the Javanese, are the preferred strategy used by the Lampungese elite to maintain their political influence in the local political arena. On these inter-ethnic coalitions, one campaign manager explained that, “We have to be more realistic as we [Lampungese] are a minority in this regency, so forming an ethnic coalition probably increases our opportunity to win in this election” (INT19, December 2015 similarly with INT40, November 2015).

The situation in much of Lampung, with its larger discrepancy in the size of ethnic groups, is different to that in some areas of Indonesia. In West Kalimantan, where political competition mostly occurs between the largest and second-largest ethnic groups, no one ethnic group is able to form a majority in local government (Peluso and Harwell, 2001; Tanasaldy, 2007; Kristianus, 2016). Here the rivalry referred to in Chapter 3 between the ethnic Dayak and Malays contrasts with the approach adopted by the Lampungese elite, who, as we have seen, tend to form political coalitions with the Javanese majority. In fact, the small size of the Lampungese proportion of voters rules out head-to-head rivalry and invites political coalitions given the centrality of ethnicity in voting choices.
We can see this at work by looking at three examples of running pairs elected as regent and deputy regent of East Lampung since 2005, made up of one Javanese and one Lampungese respectively: Satono and Bahusin in 2005, Satono and Erwin Arifin in 2010, and Chusnunia Halim and Zaiful Bukhori in 2015. In the local politics of other parts of Indonesia, it is common that inter-ethnic coalitions drawn from both the majority and minority elite seek political support from a wider range of ethnicities. In the context of East Lampung, however, ethnic groups other than Javanese and Lampungese represent only 3% or fewer of the population and so tend to get left out of the picture.

The classic account on inter-ethnic coalitions and power-sharing in divided societies is that put forward by Lijphart (1969, p.216), who suggested that the successful implementation of the consociational democracy model is dependent on whether elites “have the ability to accommodate the divergent interests.” In this context, by accommodating the Lampungese elite into local power structures, the Javanese elite appears to be eager to achieve political stability within the regency. The desire for political coalition with the Lampungese is not only based on political motives; cultural legitimation is now a very important reason behind these kinds of coalition. One of my interview participants, a local politician, said of the phenomenon that, “Indeed, actually we are confident that we can win local elections without a coalition with the Lampungese, but we prefer to sustain political stability within this regency; by accommodating the Lampungese elite, we believe that we get cultural legitimation as they are the locals and they historically provided the land for us” (INT18, October 2015).

According to Yusran Amirullah, an unsuccessful Lampungese candidate for regent, from the point of view the Lampungese elite, an inter-ethnic coalition with the Javanese was part of a political strategy to win the 2015 election. This is the most effective way for them to maintain their power in the regency. “In the early stage of my candidacy,” he told me, “I wanted to form a coalition with the Balinese candidate, but most of my supporters rejected the idea. They [the Balinese] are also a minority population, and [this person] is also not a Muslim. It would be better to have a coalition with a Javanese” (INT17, January 2016). This comment makes it clear how difficult it is to disentangle issues of ethnicity from religious matters in local politics.
7.3.3 Lampungese heads of local political parties

Attempting to fill vacant positions as local head of a party is another strategy used to reinforce the Lampungese political profile – this is true in Metro as it is in East Lampung. This strategy derives its effectiveness from the centralised nature of the mechanisms of political party decision-making in Indonesia. Decisions made by officials at lower levels need to be approved by those higher up in the organisational hierarchy, bolstering the importance of local party leaders specifically and the patron-client relationship more generally. In this context, Tomsa (2008) argues that the patron-client relationship in Indonesian party politics is a symptom of the political system as a whole, with four levels of governance within any political party: national, provincial, regency and sub-district. Although the election system for local party leaders is, in theory, totally democratic, local party leaders still depend on the “political blessing” of the central political party chairperson. As we shall see in section 7.4, political parties, however, play a rather insignificant role in elections in Lampung.

This raises the question as to how the Lampungese dominate the top positions of local political parties in East Lampung. First, in the early 2000s, as a consequence of policies designed to support Putra Daerah, Lampungese enjoyed the right to occupy the post of local political party leader in East Lampung. Lampungese were subsequently able to maintain their position within local political parties. As a result, almost all of the current political party leaders in East Lampung are Lampungese. In the words of one local politician, “You can see that almost all of the local political party leaders are Lampungese here…This is a strategy by Lampungese to retain their power; they can get it as a consequence of the exclusive political rights of Putra Daerah in local politics” (INT18, October 2015). The hierarchical structure mentioned above helps to maintain this situation. If the provincial party leader is Lampungese, they tend to choose a Lampungese person as the leader of the political party at lower levels, as the higher level of political parties plays an important role in appointing the lower level party leadership. The weak nature of parties as institutions also contributes to the strength of party patrimonial relations (Tomsa, 2008).

By installing Lampungese as heads of local political parties, the Lampungese minority are seeking several advantages. The leader of a local political party has considerable authority in choosing a fellow Lampungese as a candidate in local assembly elections. This has led to a policy of ethnic patronage for the Lampungese elite and also means
that there are more Lampungese appointments. Table 7. 2 shows the composition of the various heads of local political parties in East Lampung according to their ethnicity.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Ethnicity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Head of PDI-P</td>
<td>Lampungese</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Head of National Demokrat Party</td>
<td>Lampungese</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Head of PKB</td>
<td>Javanese</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Head of Prosperous Justice Party</td>
<td>Javanese</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Head of Great Indonesian Movement</td>
<td>Lampungese</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Head of PAN</td>
<td>Lampungese</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Head of Demokrat Party</td>
<td>Lampungese</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Head of Golkar Party</td>
<td>Lampungese</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Head of People's Conscience Party</td>
<td>Lampungese</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Compiled by the author.

However, Table 7. 3 shows a different picture: 29 elected regency assembly members are Javanese and 14 are Lampungese. While the Lampungese dominate the top ranks of political parties, other areas of political activity reflect approximately the ethnic composition of the regency, even if Lampungese have a proportionately bigger share of assembly members. It is worth noting, however, that assembly members have been elected from a range of minority ethnicities. The ability of the Lampungese to win a bigger share of local assembly seats also relates to the strategy deployed by the Lampungese themselves. As the Lampungese have dominated the position of local political party leader in East Lampung, they have been able to prioritise Lampungese candidates in local assembly elections. This is symptomatic of the patronimial – not to say clientelist – state of political parties in Indonesia. Indeed, patronage politics condition the nature of party politics and party institutionalism in Indonesia; those who want to be nominated in subnational elections must have a strong personal connection with central party officials. This reflects the institutional weakness of parties in Indonesia (Tomsa, 2008).
### Table 7.3 The constitution of the regency assembly in 2014 based on ethnicity

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Ethnicity</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Local assembly members</td>
<td>Javanese</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Lampungese</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Balinese</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Batak (North Sumatra)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ethnic groups from South Sumatra</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Minangkabau (West Sumatra)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Bugis (South Sulawesi)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td></td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Compiled by the author.

#### 7.3.4 All residents of Lampung are Lampungese

Another important strategy involves the inclusive political approach used by the Lampungese elite, as in Metro, and reflected in the position adopted by Lampung Sai, the biggest Lampungese ERBO, that all of those living in Lampung being Lampungese no matter what their ethnic background (see Chapters 5.9 and 6.2). This inclusive political strategy is useful for reducing Javanese ethnic sentiment in local politics because it encourages political cooperation rather than competition, especially in areas where Javanese migrants have a large majority, as in the case of East Lampung and Metro. Sjahroedin, the former provincial governor of Lampung, told me that, “It is our strategy to reduce ethnic sentiment in local politics; we know we are a minority and it is beneficial if we [Lampungese] are more inclusive in many areas” (INT24, October 2015). As mentioned in the previous chapter, this can be seen to spring from the set of Lampungese customs and norms known as mawarei, which act as a sort of welcoming umbrella under which all are invited to shelter as long as they see themselves as Lampungese.

A different point of view was expressed by a member of the Javanese elite who is also the leader of PATRI, Muhajir Utomo, who claimed when I interviewed him that: “This is the era of decentralisation, so at this stage, the Lampungese obtain many more advantages than Javanese transmigration descendants” (INT1, October 2015).
This argument is supported by Tirtosudarmo (2016, p.171), who claims that Javanese sentiment cannot be mobilised for political advantage in elections in Lampung because the basic rivalry between the Lampungese and Javanese is based on “various economic [issues] especially land ownership” rather than ethnicity. Tirtosudarmo’s point has some purchase: as we saw in the discussion on the role of money politics in Metro (see Chapter 6.4), economic issues are one of the most important aspects of electoral competition, but in some transmigration areas such as East Lampung ethnic sentiment is still an important means of obtaining political support.

7.3.5 Javanese culture and symbols as an elite Lampungese strategy

Using Javanese culture and symbols is a strategy employed by the Lampungese elite in order to obtain wider support from Javanese voters. The use of the Javanese language during campaigns and the holding of cultural and Javanese shadow puppet events are just some of the ways that the Lampungese elite can stay close to the majority Javanese voters. One Lampungese candidate pointedly remarked, “You are asking me why I am speaking in Javanese and using a cultural approach? Indeed, this is based on the reality that they are in the majority and, politically, I want to win their hearts” (INT17, January 2016; see also Figure 7-3). It can thus be presumed that the application of Javanese culture is another pragmatic strategy deployed by the Lampungese elite to obtain the sympathy of Javanese voters.
Figure 7-3 The Lampungese candidate for regent, Yusran Amirullah (second from right), posing beside Javanese shadow puppets during his political campaign

Source: Candidate team (2015).

According to this approach, the use of Javanese symbols and culture provides political help for the Lampungese because it helps them become better associated with the Javanese community. The effort of the Lampungese elite to use Javanese culture and symbols relies upon the important role of “ethnic attributes” in a patronage society (Chandra, 2012). To attract Javanese voters, the Lampungese candidate Yusran Amirullah was not only advertising himself in newspapers and on local television wearing Javanese clothing (Javanese traditional hat and customary dress), he also hired a popular Javanese singer to release a Javanese music album containing some of his campaign materials, and the video was available on YouTube.36 These are among the ways that Lampungese candidates try to come closer to the majority Javanese voters.

To appeal to Javanese sentiment, electoral teams produce political taglines in the Javanese language. Among them are the following: Javanese vote for Javanese (wong Jowo pilih wong Jowo); for a woman, the important [thing is to be] Javanese (wedok o sing penting Jowo); Lampungese vote for a Javanese, [so it looks] strange if Javanese do not vote for a Javanese (Lampung pilih Jowo, mosok wong Jowo ora

36 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lbCnCE-pjKc
According to a campaign manager whom I interviewed: “The political tagline is so important in raising awareness among Javanese voters, especially the elderly. This reminds them that a Javanese candidate is competing in the local election” (INT18, October 2015). Another campaign manager told me that, “Ethnic symbols such as language and traditional costumes … are essential in reassuring voters from a particular ethnic group. At any rate, we attempt to convince them [by appealing to their] ethnic sentiments” (INT27, October 2015).

In summary, the Lampungese apply a number of political strategies to retain a slice of power. First, they use inter-ethnic coalitions with Javanese. Second, they use entrenched positions to take up leadership roles in local political parties. This strategy is deployed to keep the Lampungese close to the mechanisms of local power. Dominating local political parties makes it easier for the local party to make more ethnic-patronage based decisions. Third, the Lampungese elite have been using Javanese culture and symbols as part of their campaign strategy. Fourth, the Lampungese elite are able to manage growing Javanese sentiment in local politics by applying an inclusive political strategy.

7.4 The minimal role of parties and comparative subnational election

In the previous section we noted that Lampungese hold top posts in political parties in East Lampung. In this section, however, we find that political parties have played a minimal role in subnational elections in East Lampung in 2010 and 2015, certainly compared with ERBOs. We can see this in the case of NU’s role in the 2015 election in East Lampung (see section 7.2). This section analyses subnational elections in 2005, 2010 and 2015 and sees ethnicity as the central issue in the last three elections.

For many candidates, political parties are needed in order to enable them to officially register with the local office of the Electoral Commission. Mietzner (2010, p.182) has argued that one of the reasons for the minimal role of political parties in Indonesia’s direct elections in general is due to the “commercialisation of the nomination process and insignificance of ideological affiliations”, and the financial ability of the candidate plays a significant role in the process of candidate nomination, for example, in assembly elections. In this sense, the process of democratisation might be seen to
be being subverted by party politics creating an opportunity for practices common under the old regime to return and influence the electoral system.

The number of political parties able to participate in elections is decided by the Indonesian Electoral Commission (Komisi Pemilihan Umum), who base their decision on an assessment conducted every five years and on the results of previous national elections. National elections in Indonesia occur every five years. It is also common for members of the national assembly and the government to produce new electoral laws every five years and enact particular criteria for those wishing to stand for election. As a result, there are differing election laws every five years and the requirements that political parties have to follow change. This has an effect on the participation of political parties in national elections: for example, 48 political parties participated in the 1999 national elections; 24 did so in 2004, 38 in 2009 and only 12 in 2014. This subsequently affects the number of parties able to participate in subnational elections; the greater the number of political parties, the more diverse the political interest, which could mean a shift towards party coalitions. As a result of the fewer number of political parties in 2015 compared to 2010, the number of candidates was lower.

In terms of political party support, there was a different pattern of political party support in 2010 compared to 2015. In 2005, the Golkar candidates, Satono and Noverisman Subing, won the regency elections. In contrast, in the elections in 2010, Satono, with his new running mate Erwin Arifin, turned down support from Golkar and ran successfully as an independent candidate, defeating in the process a candidate supported by various political parties (see Table 7.4). In this sense, we can see how the ability of political parties to mobilise voters was called into question by a candidate who became the first independent to win a subnational in Lampung.

This suggests that a political party is needed only for the process of candidate nomination. The role of parties in local politics is indeed minimal, with their lack of capacity in mobilising voters precluding them from becoming a vote getting machine in subnational elections; this means that a political party is only needed by a candidate for the purpose of certain formalities, albeit important ones. Running as an independent candidate, however, needs a huge amount of money as voters will not offer a copy of their identity card freely, and identity cards have to be shown in order for an independent candidate to obtain the requisite number of supporters. As we
have already seen, voters demand some money in exchange for their support for an independent candidate (INT44, November 2015).

Candidates generally prefer to maximise the political role of ERBOs rather than political parties, and this for two reasons. First, ethnic-based organisations are more loyal and elicit stronger emotional feelings. Second, these organisations are less commercially oriented than political parties.

The elected candidate in 2010 was the incumbent, Satono, an independent candidate of Javanese ethnicity with no party affiliation. He defeated three other candidates, each of whom was standing for a party (see Table 7.4). Satono and his running mate also exploited the support provided by ERBOs such as Penginyongan. Adopting a Javanese cultural approach, Satono communicated with his voters using a Javanese shadow-puppet show organised by an ERBO called the Javanese Shadow Puppetry Association, which focuses on the preservation of the Javanese culture.

Satono also managed to use the Javanese shadow puppets to explain policy implemented by local government during his first five-year administration from 2005 to 2010. A political journalist told me in interview that, “Satono used Javanese shadow puppets to communicate with voters during his political campaigns in 2005 and 2010, and this helped to influence Javanese voters. He is really popular with the Javanese” (INT23, October 2015). Basuki (2006, p.1) explains that Javanese shadow puppets are not only a form of entertainment for Javanese people, they are also “a power game” and “a medium to disseminate Javanese values”.

The popularity of Satono decreased in East Lampung after the 2010 elections. He was found guilty in a corruption scandal involving more than 119 billion Rupiah (c. £7,000,000). At the time of writing, in the summer of 2018, almost six years after he was officially convicted, Satono is a fugitive from the general attorney of the Republic of Indonesia, and the government cannot find him to execute the 15-year jail sentence.37

37 http://duajurai.co/2016/10/22/4-kepala-daerah-dan-mantan-di-lampung-yang-terjerat-kasus-korupsi-1/
Only two out of nine local political party leaders are Javanese, which contributes to the low number of Javanese able to run in subnational elections: in three cases out of five, the candidate for regency head is Lampungese not Javanese. Indeed, occupying or installing a Lampungese as the local political party leader is one of the strategies deployed by Lampungese (see sub-section 7.3.3). This indicates that the Lampungese are more powerful in terms of candidacy prior to the election process. The Lampungese elite use this domination as a bargaining tool in their dealings with the Javanese elite, offering a Lampungese candidate as running mate for the Javanese candidate with the best winning potential.

As the leadership of a political party is so patrimonial in Indonesia (Tomsa, 2008), the central political party leader is the main figure in nominating candidates. As a result, party elites can nominate candidates for head of regency based on the interests of the most powerful person within a party. In this context, we can see that a smaller number of Javanese run in the elections compared with Lampungese, but it is the majority Javanese voters who decide who wins. In some senses, the fewer Javanese contesting the elections the better for Javanese transmigrant candidates as their votes are divided between fewer candidates.

The most recent regency election, in 2015, was won, as we have seen, by Chusnunia Halim and Zaiful Bukhori (Table 7.5). They were strongly backed by NU, which can itself be seen as an ERBO. They defeated candidates with strong party backing. It should be noted that both in this election as well as the preceding one, party coalitions were formed without regard to apparent ideological positions. For example, the varied ideological backgrounds of parties which supported Citra Persada in the 2010 elections -- PAN (Nationalist-Islamist), Gerindra (Nationalist), Indonesian Justice and Unity Party (Nationalist) and Concern for the Nation Functional Party (Nationalist) -- clearly indicate that coalitions are not entirely based upon ideological background. In 2015, Chusnunia Halim and her running mate were supported by a coalition of nationalist and nationalist-Islamist based parties, the Demokrat Party and PKB, which, as we have seen, has a close ideological affinity with NU (see section 7.2). Meanwhile, the defeated candidate was supported by parties of various ideologies, including the National Mandate Party, the Golkar Party and Gerindra.

When we compare the two most recent elections for East Lampung regent, a number of differences emerge. First, there were a larger number of candidates in 2010 than
in 2015. This is likely to be because the local elite were more politically divided in 2010 than in 2015 as a result of the particularly hard-fought and bitterly contested 2009 national elections. Secondly, none of the candidates in the 2015 subnational elections was an incumbent. This is in contrast to the 2010 subnational elections, when, as the only incumbent, Satono and his running-mate obtained many political advantages (see Chapters 6 and 8 for similar cases in Metro and Bandar Lampung).

These included the ability to deploy the local bureaucracy. According to one of the defeated candidates in 2010: “I was defeated by an incumbent for several reasons. As well as being influential and popular, Satono deployed the local bureaucracy for his political interests…. For example, about 120 rural village heads were suddenly removed from their post and replaced by others because they were deemed not to be loyal to the incumbent” (INT17, January 2016). Similar sentiments were expressed to me by another of the failed candidates in the 2010 elections (INT7, February 2016). It is relatively common for incumbents to use local government budgets to create development programmes designed in such a way as to become vote winners. For example, social security funding is targeted on communities made up of potential voters (see Chapter 8.4).
### Table 7.4 Candidates, ethnicity, party and ideology in 2010 in the East Lampung regency elections

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Citra Persada and Yuliansyah</td>
<td>Minangkabau and South Sumatran</td>
<td>PAN (Nationalist-Religious) Gerindra (Nationalist) Indonesian Justice and Unity Party (Nationalist) Concern for the Nation Functional Party (Nationalist)</td>
<td>31,027 (6.24%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yusron Amirullah and Bambang Imam Santoso</td>
<td>Lampungese and Javanese</td>
<td>Demokrat Party (Nationalist) Concern for the Nation Functional Party (Nationalist) PKB (Nationalist-Islamist) Crescent Star Party (Islamist)</td>
<td>172,869 (34.77%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Noverisman Subing and Soemarsono</td>
<td>Lampungese and Javanese</td>
<td>PDI-P</td>
<td>56,012 (11.27%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Satono and Erwin Arifin</td>
<td>Javanese and Lampungese</td>
<td>Independent candidate</td>
<td>237,251 (47.72% elected)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


### Table 7.5 Candidates, ethnicity, party and ideology in 2015 in the East Lampung regency elections

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yusran Amirullah and Sudarsono</td>
<td>Lampungese and Javanese</td>
<td>PAN (Nationalist-Religious) Gerindra (Nationalist) Golkar Party (Nationalist)</td>
<td>232,473 (46.83%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chusnunia Halim and Zaiful Bukhori</td>
<td>Javanese and Lampungese</td>
<td>PKB (Nationalist-Islamist) Demokrat Party (Nationalist)</td>
<td>263,926 (53.17% elected)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It should be clear therefore that parties have a role in local elections, but it is a limited one, limited to the appointment of candidates. In this, central party officials tend to have a dominant voice. Once that has been decided, there is little deployment of party machines. It is much more a case of the candidate seeking support from ERBOs and from his or her supporters, drawn, generally, from the same ethnic group.

7.5 Conclusion

The historical, political and social context of a prolonged transmigration programme, the creation of a majority population of a particular ethnicity within a region and the political role played by NU are all essential components when seeking to understand local electoral competition in East Lampung. This chapter also explained the sorts of strategies used by Lampungese to ‘deal with’ the majority Javanese in regency elections. Although the discussions presented in this chapter are specific to elections to the post of regent in East Lampung, the same issues concerning ethnicity, concerning the role of ERBOs and political parties and concerning actions taken by incumbents and the bureaucracy present themselves elsewhere in Lampung, especially, as we have seen, in Metro. Equally, they play themselves out in different electoral contests, which here there is insufficient space to examine.

The domination of Javanese transmigrants in East Lampung started in the era of Satono in 2005. Satono was a symbol of the political resistance of Javanese transmigrants against the political rights granted to Putra Daerah in the early years of political reform between 2000 and 2005. The changing mode of election from election through the local assembly to a direct system of election -- a one-person one-vote system -- created the political domination of Javanese transmigrants over the local politics of East Lampung. Three consecutive elections to the post of head of regency, in 2005, 2010 and 2015, have provided evidence of the political domination of Javanese transmigrants in this regency.

Further, this research also found that the informal role played by NU has strengthened the position of the candidates it endorsed. NU’s network and its members’ loyalty mean that it is able to support the candidate in a variety of ways such as distributing gifts and campaign tools. Further, the role of some Islamic teachers in attracting votes shows the importance of religious institutions. Meanwhile, there are several strategies
used by the Lampungese elite when dealing with the Javanese majority. These are a kind of a ‘pragmatic politics’, a political path used in order to maintain their influence and power. What is more, the fact that the ethnic composition of the winning political partnerships makes it clear that ethnicity is still an important factor and that Javanese sentiment is attractive for both elites and voters. Ethnic clientelism is still a strategy deployed by the elite. For instance, although Chusnunia Halim and her running mate had lower levels of funding and political experience than Yusran Amirullah and his running-mate, the elected candidate is a transmigration descendent and has a more extensive political network through the informal power of NU.

This chapter contributes to the discussion put forward by Aspinall and Sukmajati (2016) in their research on “varieties of patronage” in Indonesia. The case of East Lampung shows that ethnicity and organisational patronage amongst ERBO members are not always based upon mutual economic benefit – even though in some cases they clearly are – but can emerge on the basis of a spirit of pride amongst Javanese transmigration descendants and NU members. Further, the case of the political role of NU in East Lampung confirms that “a trusted” political network is needed to run “the clientelistic relations” between voter and elite (ibid, pp.19-20).
Chapter 8
Electoral Politics in the Provincial Capital, Bandar Lampung

The two previous chapters have discussed ethnic politics in two transmigration-affected areas, Metro and East Lampung. This chapter focuses on an area that has not been affected by the transmigration programme. However, the impact of spontaneous migration has influenced the political dynamics of Bandar Lampung. The argument put forward in this chapter reflects a different set of circumstances from that advanced in the two that precede it. This chapter emphasises in particular the role of incumbency as a key factor, among others, in local elections, but sets incumbency among other factors – the pragmatic approach of political parties and the role of money in politics – as an explanatory device. Starting with an explanation of the strength of ethnic sentiment in the 2005 subnational elections, the current narrative of Bandar Lampung’s politics suggests that ethnicity is not now the central issue, but that performance by the incumbent is.

The two previous chapters discussed ethnicity in the context of transmigration, arguing that it is one of the most important factors in subnational elections. However, they also provided some evidence of the political advantage of being incumbent. This chapter offers further support for this narrative by analysing the experience of Bandar Lampung’s incumbent city mayor in the 2015 elections. The chapter also analyses the elections of 2005 and 2010. In this chapter I aim to reveal a different face of local Lampung politics, one in which is less important compared to Metro and East Lampung. I argue that the performance of the incumbent is the key factor that facilitates re-election for a second term. This chapter completes the overall argument of this thesis that ethnicity is central but is not the sole factor in local elections. The political advantage of being incumbent also needs to be considered as another important factor in local elections.
The chapter begins with the history of the migration process within Bandar Lampung followed by an explanation on the political power dynamics among the local elite in Bandar Lampung from the point of view of ethnicity. Section 8.3 discusses the pragmatic approach adopted by political parties in mayoral elections, especially in the dynamic process of nominating supported candidates, and includes a discussion of the role of money. Section 8.4 examines specifically the political advantage of being incumbent in mayoral elections.

8.1 The History of Migration to Bandar Lampung

_Ingin mengangkat derajat martabat Orang Banten. Dengan apa? Tanggal 9 Desember memilih pasangan nomor urut 3._
[We want to raise the pride of the Bantenese. How to do it? On the 9th December, vote for candidate number 3]
(A Bantenese candidate’s speech during the campaign for city mayor)

Bandar Lampung is the oldest city in Lampung and one of the oldest on the island of Sumatra, established on 17th June 1682. The city had been part of the territory of the Bantenese Sultanate, and a representative from the Bantenese Sultanate, Pangeran Aria Dipati Ningrat, governed the city. Historically, there were three phases in the city’s development: first, occupation by the Bantenese Sultanate, followed by the era of Dutch colonial rule, and finally the era of Indonesian independence (Pemkot, 2016). It is unsurprising, therefore, that this city is so engaged with both Bantenese and Sundanese cultures (see Chapter 5.4).

According to the Staatsblad[^39] 1912 number 462, Bandar Lampung was part of the province’s then capital, Teluk Betung, in the Dutch colonial era. During the Japanese occupancy, Teluk Betung merged with Tanjung Karang and Teluk Betung. In the era following Indonesian independence, Tanjung Karang and Teluk Betung were part of South Lampung regency, later becoming sub-districts of Bandar Lampung. After Lampung was hived off from South Sumatra and made a province in its own right in 1965, Tanjung Karang and Teluk Betung were chosen as the capital city of Lampung, and they later changed their name into Bandar Lampung.[^40]

[^38]: The Bantenese Sultanate was one of the biggest Islamic kingdoms in Indonesia, established in the early 16th century.
[^39]: Staatsblad is the Dutch official paper.
[^40]: [https://bandarlampungkota.go.id/new/statis36-Sejarah-Singkat.html](https://bandarlampungkota.go.id/new/statis36-Sejarah-Singkat.html)
According to Elmhirst and Darmastuti (2018, pp.150-151) there have been several periods of migration to Bandar Lampung. First, the precolonial era in the 17th century saw the impact of the spice trade, especially on the Bantenese Sultanate. During this era, Lampung was the centre of the spice trade between Sumatra and Java (Masroh, 2017; Ariwibowo, 2018). As a result of the economic impact of pepper trading between 17th and 20th century, many Sundanese and Bantenese migrated to Bandar Lampung. The second was at the start of the Dutch colonial era, when Teluk Betung sub-district became the centre for the Dutch colonial administrative office in 1851. The third followed the eruption of Krakatoa eruption in 1883, which killed 36,000 people and had a huge impact on the city. The restoration of the Bay of Lampung therefore needed many workers, resulting in many migrants coming to Bandar Lampung including Javanese, Bugis, Maduranese, Sundanese and Bantenese. Fourth, the impact of the *kolonisatie* programme that was implemented in 1905 resulted in many rural Javanese transmigrants coming to Bandar Lampung from other *kolonisatie* locations in Lampung in the 1930s. Fifth, there was a further migration of Bugis from South Sulawesi in the 1960s as a consequence of the civil strife in Sulawesi from 1950 to 1965. Sixth, second and third generation transmigrants arrived from elsewhere in Lampung due to the closure of the agricultural frontier and the establishment of protected forests from 1980 onwards.

In terms of demographics, Bandar Lampung is similar to some other cities or regencies in Lampung affected by transmigration -- but not to Metro and East Lampung -- in so much as Javanese are the largest ethnic group, but they make up less than 50% of the total population. This is different to transmigration-affected areas such as Metro and East Lampung, where the Javanese make up over 72% and 81% of the population respectively (see Table 8-1).
Table 8.1 The ethnic make-up of Bandar Lampung in 2010

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ethnicity</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Javanese</td>
<td>357,512</td>
<td>40.54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lampungese</td>
<td>139,236</td>
<td>15.78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sundanese</td>
<td>105,520</td>
<td>11.96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ethnic groups from South Sumatra</td>
<td>90,881</td>
<td>10.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bantenese</td>
<td>68,468</td>
<td>7.76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chinese</td>
<td>29,706</td>
<td>3.36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minangkabau (West Sumatra)</td>
<td>29,544</td>
<td>3.35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>other ethnicities</td>
<td>28,946</td>
<td>3.28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Batak (North Sumatra)</td>
<td>20,195</td>
<td>2.29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bugis (South Sulawesi)</td>
<td>5,286</td>
<td>0.59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Balinese</td>
<td>3,647</td>
<td>0.41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>no answer</td>
<td>2,860</td>
<td>0.32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>881,801</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Central Statistical Bureau of Indonesia (2013a).

Bandar Lampung’s geographical proximity to the island of Java and its historical connections with the Banten Sultanate as well as the Sunda Kingdom, which controlled the west of the island, have conditioned the patterns of migration and the ethnic make-up of the city (for the illustration of the map of Bandar Lampung, see Figure 8-1).
In the early years of Indonesian independence, Bandar Lampung, or to be more precise, Teluk Betung and Tanjung Karang, was governed by Raden Abdul Basyid, who was named the city’s first mayor in 1948. In the Sukarno era, the city had three mayors, Sumarsono from 1956 to 1957, Zainal Abidin Pagar Alam from 1957 to 1963, and Alimudin Umar from 1963 to 1969. Meanwhile, five persons were appointed as mayor in the New Order era of Suharto, Thabrani Daud from 1969 to 1976, Fauzi Saleh from 1976 to 1981, Zulkanaen Subing from 1981 to 1986, Nurdin Muhayat from 1986 to 1995 and a politician also named Suharto from 1995 to 2005. In these two eras, the members of the local assembly elected the mayor, but as we know the election process was only ceremonial as the central government had already selected their man, especially in the era of Suharto. Since the advent of direct popular elections, two mayors have been chosen, Eddy Sutrisno from 2005 to 2010 and the Lampungese Herman Hasanusi from 2010, who was re-elected in 2015 and will serve until 2020.41

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41 https://bandarlampungkota.go.id/new/statis36-Sejarah-Singkat.html
8.2 The Local Context of Bandar Lampung: Beyond the Ethnicity Issue

During the early period of subnational elections in 2005, the issue of ethnicity still dominated the political narrative of Bandar Lampung with ethnic political taglines to the fore -- "Wong Jowo pilih Jowo", or “Javanese vote for Javanese”, and “elek-elek wonge dewe”, or “even if she/he is not so good, she/he is part of us”. These political taglines became part of the daily campaign of Eddy Sutrisno who, as the only Javanese candidate, took full advantage. The candidate’s campaign manager explained:

“In my view, I think it was a different story in 2005 and 2010. As I remember it, ethnic sentiment was still high in 2005. In my opinion, this was because this was the first time direct election were implemented at the local level, and you know that Javanese are the majority in this city. So, I think the Javanese elite and candidate tried to capitalise on ethnic sentiment by looking at the political advantage of being the majority in Bandar Lampung. In my view, ethnic sentiment has decreased in every subnational election since. Indeed, there were strong ethnic sentiments in 2005 but not today. Voters are more rational and look at what the incumbent has done so far in the last five years.” (INT21, October 2015)

Given the prominence of ethnicity as a factor in the 2005 elections, Eddy Sutrisno chose Kherlani, who had a Lampungese background, as his deputy candidate. Sutrisno’s campaign team used in particular the following two slogans: ‘Wong Jowo piling wong Jowo’ and ‘Piye-piye penak wonge dewe’, meaning “Somehow, it is more comfortable to be led by us”. However, the narrative changed in 2010, when Sutrisno was defeated by Herman Hasanusi, who was re-elected in 2015.

There would appear to have been at least three reasons why Sutrisno failed to win a second term.42 Firstly, he was considered a poor political performer. According to a survey conducted by Al Kaisya (2012), these factors included inefficient campaign methods, a lack of leadership ability, and a lack of significant development projects. Sutrisno’s defeat in 2010 supports the theory that an incumbent without a good performance in their first period of office will be penalised politically at the next elections (Trounstine, 2011). Secondly, however, Sutrisno was the only Javanese candidate in the 2005 elections, alongside four Lampungese candidates and one

42 This is based on my personal assessment drawn from living in Bandar Lampung during Sutrisno’s period of government between 2005 and 2010.
Bantenese (Hadiawan, 2009). In 2010, there were two Javanese candidates, and as a consequence, the Javanese vote was split, although it must be said that there were four Lampungese candidates, one of whom, Kherlani, had been deputy mayor under Sutrisno (see Table 8. 2 ). Thirdly, the candidate supported by the PDI-P won each time -- Sutrisno in 2005 and Hasanusi in 2010. There does, however, appear to be no direct correlation between the number of parties supporting a candidate and the candidate’s chances of winning.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mayoral candidates in 2005</th>
<th>Supporting party/independent candidate</th>
<th>Mayoral candidates in 2010</th>
<th>Supporting party/ independent candidate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sjahrazad and Rudy Syawal</td>
<td>Golkar Party</td>
<td>Sauki Shobier and Syamsul Rizal</td>
<td>Independent candidates</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nuril Hakim and Zamzani Yasin</td>
<td>Demokrat Party</td>
<td>Herman Hasanusi and Thobroni Harun</td>
<td>PDI-P</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Reform Star Party</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Bung Karno Nationalist Party</td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>Ulema National Awakening Party</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Crescent Star Party</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td>National Party of Indonesia of Marhens Party</td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>Wealthy Indonesia Party</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>New Indonesia Party</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>National Front Party</td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>Republikan Party</td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>Democratic Renewal Party</td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>Patriot Party</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td>Merdeka Party</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Regional Unity Party</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Pakarpangan Party</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Indonesian Justice and Unity Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Functional Party of Struggle</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Indonesian Nahdlatul Community</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Indonesian Unity Party</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Pelopor Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Labour Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haryanti Syafirin and Tarwo Kusnarno</td>
<td>PKB</td>
<td>Kherlani and Heru Sambodo</td>
<td>Golkar Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eddy Sutrisno and Kherlani</td>
<td>PDIP</td>
<td>Eddy Sutrisno and Hatono Hasan</td>
<td>Demokrat Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Crescent Star Party</td>
<td></td>
<td>Prosperous Justice Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Reform Star Party</td>
<td></td>
<td>United Development Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Democratic Nationhood Party</td>
<td></td>
<td>Gerindra Party</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>PAN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Democratic Nationhood Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Concern for the National Functional Party</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Indonesian Workers and Employers Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Irfan Nuranda and Kuswandi</td>
<td>United Development Party</td>
<td>Domiril Hakim and Sugianto</td>
<td>Independent candidates</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abdul Hakim and Zainal</td>
<td>Prosperous Justice Party</td>
<td>Nurdino and Dian Kumia Laratte</td>
<td>Independent candidates</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: (Hadiawan, 2009; Al Kaisya, 2012).
Currently, Bandar Lampung’s diverse population implies a greater possibility of politically charged conflicts of interest amongst local elites as shown by the competition among candidates to get official political party support. Conflicts of interest have also occurred internally within political parties; for example, Nizwar Affandi and Yusuf Kohar competed against each other to win the backing of the Demokrat party in 2015 (see Table 8.3).

Among the reasons for the lesser importance of ethnicity in local politics is, as we have already mentioned, the gradual and unorganized nature of transmigration from nearby places on the island of Java. Another important reason is that, as the capital city, Bandar Lampung has more educated people compared to other areas in Lampung. Data show that Bandar Lampung has more higher-degree graduate workers than any another city or regency in Lampung. According to the Central Statistical Bureau of Indonesia (2017a), 23.3% of the total number of employees in Bandar Lampung in 2017 held a bachelor degree. Further, according to the Central Statistical Bureau of Indonesia (2016d), the school enrolment ratio of Bandar Lampung is the highest in the province: 78.02% of the population of school age (age from 7 to 18) attend school. It is perhaps not surprising therefore that in Bandar Lampung, voting decisions appear to be made along what might be considered more informed lines. This assumption is supported by the results of a survey conducted by Kurniawan et al. (2017). According to the survey, 35.8% of voters attended campaign rallies because they wanted to hear candidates’ political manifesto while 8.6% said they attended out of desire to receive money and 6.8% to be given freebies. Only 0.8% of voters referred to the issue of ethnicity as the reason for their attendance at campaign rallies.

As Bandar Lampung is the provincial capital, its local elites have greater political and economic clout. They are generally considered to be more pragmatic and more determined to retain their power and privileges. This leads to a hesitancy in acting against the interests of the incumbent mayor. In the words of one candidate, “Everyone in this city assumes that the incumbent cannot be defeated in the local election, and this has an effect on the party’s attitude toward the candidate. For pragmatic reasons, [the party] tends to accommodate the political interests of the incumbent instead of competing against him” (INT28, November 2015). In 2015 incumbency became an important factor in determining the mayoral election results in Bandar Lampung. Herman Hasanusi, the elected city mayor, was able to put
together popular, vote-winning programmes during his first administration from 2010 to 2015.

When considering local elections in Indonesia, there are many variables that need to be taken into account, as we have seen in previous chapters. Local elections in Bandar Lampung show that ethnic sentiment and symbols have declined in importance in the three direct mayoral elections, and now play a much lesser part than they do in transmigration-affected areas like Metro and East Lampung.

8.3 The Pragmatic Approach of Political Parties and the Role of Money in Electoral Politics

This section explains the approaches adopted by political parties in nominating candidates and focuses on the dynamics of political power amongst the local elite in Bandar Lampung. It argues that they are informed predominantly by a spirit of pragmatism. The section also examines the ways in which money influences the process of nominating candidates in the Bandar Lampung's mayoral elections.

Power in the city became the subject of contest when some leading figures attempted to formalise support for political parties. Political jockeying for position began two years before the 2015 elections. Four candidates declared their intention to run in the mayoral election: the incumbent Herman Hasanusi, Hartarto Lojaya (an Indonesian-Chinese politician), Thobroni Harun (local leader of the moderate Islamic party PAN) and Nizwar Affandi (a senior politician in the Demokrat Party).
Table 8.3 The number of seats held by each political party in the municipal assembly after the assembly elections held in 2014.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of political party</th>
<th>Number of seats</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PDI-P</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PAN</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prosperous Justice Party</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Demokrat Party</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Demokrat Party</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gerindra Party</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Golkar Party</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesian Justice and Unity Party</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>People’s Conscience Party</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PKB</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesian Justice and Unity Party</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>50</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Table 8.3 illustrates the political configuration of each of the political parties in the municipal council in Bandar Lampung. PDI-P is the only party that has met the 10-seat requirement and which can thus nominate a candidate without the need to form a coalition with other parties (see Table 8.4). The other parties must form political coalitions, which means that every party has to find a political partner. However, due to the diminishing role of party ideology, coalitions are dynamic and shifting. As a result, municipal elections tend to be very pragmatic affairs, especially in the ways in which parties form coalitions and nominate candidates.

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43 As mentioned in Chapter 3, according to Law Number 1/2015, to be able to officially run for city mayor, a candidate must be supported by 20% of the total seats in the local assembly, which equates to 10 seats in the Bandar Lampung assembly. Alternatively, a candidate is able to run as long as they obtain the direct support and signatures from 2.5% of eligible voters through an independent candidate mechanism. Law Number 1/2015 is the Law for formalising the Government Rule Number 1/2014 on the local election. Later, Law Number 10/2016 replaced this Law. This Law states that candidates for city mayor must have the support of a minimum of 20% of total seats in the local assembly.
One potential candidate, the Indonesian-Chinese candidate, Hartato Lojaya, was unable to fulfil the requirement to secure the backing of 10 assembly members. Further, the failure of his coalition with Thobroni Harun, the former deputy city mayor, is another reason why he was unable to run. As the head of the Bandar Lampung branch of PAN, Thobroni Harun already had the support of seven assembly members and just needed three extra members to be officially nominated. The tendency to support popular incumbents instead of alternative candidates is another reason. However, many believed that the coalition between the Indonesian-Chinese Hartato Lojaya and Thobroni Harun, who is of ethnic South Sumatran extraction, would represent a competitive challenge to Hasanusi, the incumbent.44

Meanwhile, as mentioned in the footnote above, the regulations also allow candidates to run as independents so long as they have the signatures of 2.5% of the electorate. There was one independent candidate in the last mayoral election in Bandar Lampung, but when I discussed with Juniardi, a candidate for mayor of Metro, why he had not run as an independent candidate, he told me this requires a huge amount of money (INT44, November 2015). He said, “I also considered running as an independent candidate but I decided against. Do you know why? ... Getting signatures in order to become an independent candidate is also costly because most people asked me for some money in return for their support and signature, so I quit the idea of running because I did not have enough money” (ibid.).

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44 Herman Hasanusi was born on 17th May 1956 in Pagar Dewa district of Tulang Bawang regency. Coming from a poor family, he started work as a government employee in 1977. Prior to being elected as mayor of Bandar Lampung, he was the head of the investment board, finance bureau and the department of regional incomes of Lampung Province under the Sjahroedini administration. He is the Lampung provincial head of the Cakra Buana ‘task force’ of the PDI-P.
Table 8. 4 Candidates for the Bandar Lampung mayoral elections in 2015.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mayoral candidates</th>
<th>Supporting party/ independent candidate</th>
<th>Support from local assembly members/ voters</th>
<th>Number of votes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Muhammad Yunus and Ahmad Muslimin</td>
<td>Independent candidates</td>
<td>Obtained 76,030 signatures from voters</td>
<td>8,326 (2.01%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Herman Hasanusi and Yusuf Kohar</td>
<td>PDI-P PKB Prosperous Justice Party Gerindra Nasional Demokrat Party Demokrat Party</td>
<td>31 seats in city assembly</td>
<td>358,249 (86.66%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thobroni Harun and Komarunizar</td>
<td>PAN People’s Conscience Party Indonesian Justice and Unity Party</td>
<td>10 seats in city assembly</td>
<td>46,814 (11.32%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Another potential candidate, Nizwar Affandi, of Lampungese ethnic extraction, had a political platform focused around what he called “nine ways of changing the future of Bandar Lampung” (INT28, November 2015). This political tagline is quite normative and ambitious -- Nizwar Affandi argued that Bandar Lampung should be a more liveable city. Affandi is a Demokrat Party politician. In the early stages, he expected that his party would support his candidacy, but he failed to form a coalition that could nominate him to run in the election because his party preferred forming a coalition with the incumbent rather than have their own candidate. He told me that:

“Every party believes that the incumbent is impossible to defeat because of his high popularity in Bandar Lampung. I am in the opposite camp. I believe that our party’s candidate could defeat the incumbent if we have a good strategy. However, my party decided to join with the incumbent and refuse my proposal to support our internal candidate. This is evidence of its pragmatic approach, supporting a candidate not based on platform but on chance of winning and, of course, money given [in return for support]. I can give an illustration: even though I were a member of the party or even its leader, the party would still want some money [from me] before nominating me in an election” (ibid.).

In the early stages of the election, competition occurred amongst four candidates: Hartato Lojaya and Nizwar Affandi from the Demokrat Party, Herman Hasanusi, the incumbent from the PDI-P, and Thobroni Harun, the PAN candidate. Nevertheless,
only two political party nominees ended up running as candidates in the 2015 elections, Hasanusi and Harun. One interviewee, who was a campaign manager, explained that, “Previously, we thought that at least four candidates would participate in this local [mayoral] election but, in fact, only two candidates ran officially from political parties. It seems that most political parties are not confident enough to compete against incumbent candidates” (INT27, October 2015). Another campaign manager echoed these views: “In my opinion, political parties are seeing that the incumbent is too strong to be defeated, so they have decided to make a political coalition with the incumbent instead of competing against him” (INT27, October 2015). The high popularity of the incumbent thus influenced political party elites not to nominate their candidate. If we look at the composition of various parties in the local assembly, we can see that there were at least three or four candidates that could officially have run in the 2015 election. However, in fact, only two candidates nominated by political parties and one independent candidate were on the ballot paper.

In this context of pragmatism, ideological values are not considered as the basis of party coalitions. Pragmatic reasons are more important when explaining political coalitions. In this situation, the role of money is the key factor. One candidate said, “In my view, there are two reasons why a coalition of parties would support a particular candidate: the probability of the candidate winning and how much money the candidate has given to the party. Political support by a party for a candidate does not come free” (INT26, November 2015).

This pragmatic attitude when forming coalitions to support a particular candidate in local elections is not unique to Bandar Lampung; it takes place elsewhere in Indonesia. The formal decision to support a candidate in subnational elections is dynamic and could change at any time. Commonly, the candidate will receive support at the last minute, but the candidate is unable to confirm their participation before they are officially registered by the party to the electoral commission unless they are running as an independent. In general, the party will only give support to a candidate who meets two criteria: they have a high possibility of winning and they have abundant financial resources. Together this is referred to as a political dowry, mahar politik.

Discussing the amount of money given by a particular candidate to the political party elite in order to obtain official support varies, one senior politician put it this way:
“The amount of money varies: a bigger party which has more seats in the local assembly, of course, receives more money than a smaller one. Some estimates put it at up to 5 billion rupiah [ca. £295,000] to obtain a letter of recommendation of official support from a particular party. You know -- to receive a recommendation from a political party to be nominated is really costly”. (INT28, November 2015)

Extra money should also be given to local assembly members in return for their support. In the words of the politician quoted above, “It is generally said that up to 250 million rupiah (£12,500) should be given for each of member of a local assembly by the party officially supporting a particular candidate in local elections” (ibid.).

Local party leaders in Lampung have not denied the importance of the role of money in Indonesian local politics, particularly in Lampung. However, one political party chairman told me that, “We need money in politics, but for me and our party, the popularity and capacity of the candidate is more important” (INT29, December 2015; similar sentiments were expressed by INT31, January 2016, and INT33, October 2015). Another party leader agreed: “Yes, we do believe that running in local elections requires money, but we also think about giving political opportunities to our party members. For example, in the case of the mayoral elections in Bandar Lampung, we know that it is hard to defeat the incumbent, but we still support our party member to run in the election” (INT30, October 2015).

Practice in Bandar Lampung differs little if at all from elsewhere in the country. The only difference is that in richer areas like Jakarta the costs are greater. What is more, money is important at various stages: pre-election, during the election itself and post-election. Further, every stage has consequences for the way that money influences politics (for a detailed discussion of funding and the role of money in local politics, see Chapter 3.3.3).

When assessing the probability of a particular candidate winning a local election, most political parties hire professional political consultants to conduct a survey of the candidate’s popularity. The consultants are then asked to work on ways to increase the candidate’s popularity once they have been officially selected (Mietzner, 2009). Trihartono (2014, p.154) points out that elites use pollsters as a “political vehicle” to retain political power. This can be counterproductive, as the consultants’ fees should

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45 This money given to individual assembly members is classified as a bribe and is illegal.
be met by the candidate, which means, once again, that they need to have sufficient financial resources.

The popularity and electability of a candidate is inconsequential if the candidate does not have financial resources or help from groups of businesspeople or business firms. Thus, a successful candidacy requires a high level of popularity and a high level of financial resources. In one sense, politics is a contest amongst groups of capitalists who are willing to provide money for candidates in local elections. Business-driven politics would be an appropriate way to characterise local politics in contemporary Lampung but also in most other parts of the country (Berenschot and Purba, 2014; Hermawan et al., 2017). Such, then, is the nature of local politics in Bandar Lampung and of the pragmatic outlook of local politicians.

8.4 Incumbency, Populist Programmes and the End of Ethnic Sentiment

In the previous section, we discussed the pragmatism of political party leaders in nominating candidates for the mayoral election and the dynamics of political power and money among the local elites. This section provides an analysis of the political advantages associated with being incumbent when it comes to standing for a new term. It also discusses the sort of popular programmes delivered by incumbents in order to strengthen their positions and make them more likely to win a second term. Information obtained from interviews is supported by a document analysis of local government budgets during the first administration of Herman Hasanusi, from 2010 to 2015.

Many studies have been undertaken on the electoral and political advantages associated with incumbency both in Indonesia and more generally elsewhere (Trounstine, 2013; Trounstine, 2011; Hadiz, 2007; Skoufias et al., 2014; Sulistiyanto, 2009; Dettman et al., 2017). The political advantage of being incumbent is the most common narrative not only in Indonesia but also in advanced industrial democracies. Conceptually, I argue that good performance by incumbents rather than well-resourced money politics of a kind referred to in the preceding section is the key to being re-elected, as illustrated by Trounstine (2013). Research by Skoufias et al.

46 An incumbent’s performance is usually monitored by regular surveys conducted by independent political consulting firms.
(2014, pp.20-22) shows that in the Indonesian context during the year before a local election, expenditure changes significantly and is used to “buy political support” from voters. This claim is supported by Kumorotomo (2009, p.19), who reveals a “general tendency” for the Indonesian local government budget to be influenced by the political agendas of the incumbents. Sjahrir et al. (2013, p.342) have also argued that, “political budget cycles are significantly stronger if the incumbent runs for re-election.”

However, the equation is easily reversed. A poor showing or a fall in popularity, perhaps because austerity and retrenchment measures were introduced, makes re-election harder. The incumbent faces a disadvantage if they do not perform well during their first term in office. For example, in the election for regent of North Lampung held in 2013 (see Chapter 3.2.3 for elections in 2013), the opponent was able to defeat the incumbent because the incumbent was considered to have performed badly and achieved little during their first administration. The same applied in the 2010 election in Bandar Lampung, when Sutrisno was beaten by Hasanusi. According to Hamid (2014b, p.106), based upon the experience of the gubernatorial elections in Jakarta in 2012, there are a number of reasons that may make it more difficult for the incumbent to be re-elected:

“(1) social breakdown and declining capability of the government; (2) corrupt, draining political traditions and the bad image of political parties; (3) changes at the level of the economy, culture and society; and (4) the emergence of forms of political representation outside of traditional political institutions, especially social media.”

It is of course common in Indonesia’s elections as well as in elections elsewhere in the world for the incumbent to be able to obtain political advantage. Implementing a popular programme becomes a prudent way of winning the ‘hearts’ of the people in the run-up to local elections. Sulistiyanto (2009, p.198) has pointed out that the incumbent has a political advantage through the use of populist programmes such as ensuring that poor people do not have to pay for their healthcare as well as protecting the price of agricultural commodities such as rice, vegetables and cassava (Grzymala-Busse, 2008). There are a number of local politicians in Indonesia whose high rates of popularity have enabled them to retain power; such is the case, for example, with Tri Risma Harini in the city of Surabaya and Abdullah Azwar Anas in Banyuwangi regency in East Java Province.
In the context of Bandar Lampung’s 2015 mayoral elections, Hasanusi was able to fall back on his track record whilst his opponent could only offer promises. Hasanusi and his running-mate won the election with 358,254 of the votes (86.66% of the total). This percentage was one of the highest in all the local elections in Indonesia in 2015. According to several of my interviewees, Hasanusi’s ability to reap such success was down to two factors (INT26, November 2016; INT27, October 2015). First, his leadership style put him close to local people and particularly the poor. Second, the incumbent successfully implemented popular programmes in three areas: education, healthcare and infrastructure.

According to a survey conducted by Bizcom Political Consultancy of the University of Lampung in 2015, a month before the local election, the electability rating of the incumbent was 84.1%, the highest among all the candidates (Bizcom, 2015). Hasanusi’s popularity meant that the majority of political parties supported him in the local election; six political parties supported him, with a total of 31 members in the local assembly. This contrasts with his contender, Thobroni and his running partner, who received support from only three parties with 11 members (Table 8. 4). The Bizcom Political Consultancy survey also gives some reasons why voters chose a particular candidate. These are shown in Table 8. 5 below.
Table 8.5 Reasons for choosing candidates in the Bandar Lampung mayoral election, 2015 (percentage).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reason for choosing candidate</th>
<th>Muhammad Yunus and Ahmad Muslimin</th>
<th>Herman Hasanusi and Yusuf Kohar (incumbents)</th>
<th>Thobroni Harun and Komarunizar</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Economic competence</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>20.3</td>
<td>35.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strong on security and safety</td>
<td>25.0</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>14.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Able to fight corruption</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>14.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious leadership</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Candidate comes from political family</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Honesty</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Authoritative and firm person</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cares for people</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>36.6</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sociable person</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>13.2</td>
<td>21.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Native of Bandar Lampung</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Has a greater chance of winning</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Follows others</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other reasons</td>
<td>25.0</td>
<td>10.4</td>
<td>14.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No answer</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>100</strong></td>
<td><strong>100</strong></td>
<td><strong>100</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Bizcom (2015).

During his first administration, Hasanusi was considered to be very approachable. According to both several of my interviewees and to local newspaper reports, he regularly visited all parts of the city and quickly responded to people’s needs and requests, particularly the need for deep wells, clean water and public toilets, as well as the hiring of new Islamic teachers (INT27, October 2015; INT39, February 2016). Media reports also make it clear that he was prompt in visiting people affected by flooding (Antara, 2016; see also Figure 8.2). The Hasanusi style of what one might call ‘soft populist’ political leadership is becoming a trend in Indonesian politics, especially after Joko Widodo’s success in becoming president through this leadership...
approach. Sulistiyanto (2009, p.192) has claimed that this kind of leadership makes it easier “to win the hearts and minds of the ordinary people”.

**Figure 8-2 Herman Hasanusi (second from left) visiting flood-affected areas in North Teluk Betung sub-district in March 2016.**

Sources: Anita (2016)

To overcome Hasanusi’s popularity, his rivals raised the issue of ethnicity, hoping that ethnic sentiment would enhance their appeal as they were of various ‘non-local’ ethnicities. Thus, campaign tools and advertisements that capitalised upon ethnicity were deployed in order to revive ethnic sentiment, as the example in Figure 8-3 below shows. This strategy reflected the fact that the Bantenese, South Sumatrans and Sundanese – the ethnicities from which the politicians were drawn -- make up 30% of the population in Bandar Lampung (Central Statistical Bureau of Indonesia, 2013a).
One of Hasanusi’s rivals, Komarunizar, put it to me that:

“There are four reasons why I deployed the issue of ethnicity in the last local election. First, I saw that the potential number of ethnic voters is huge. I had formed a coalition with someone of South Sumatran ethnic background so the ethnic coalition between us would be significant for the voter. Second, I wanted to raise the welfare level of Bantenese, as I saw that the majority of Bantenese in this city are poor. Thirdly, I saw that ethnic sentiment among the Bantenese itself is strong, which is another thing that potentially could be capitalised upon. Finally, in my opinion, although the Bantenese are relatively numerous, they are powerless in the city’s government structures. So, I wanted to change this situation”. (INT25, January 2016)

In the election itself, however, Komarunizar, who is himself Bantenese, only received 11.3% of the total votes, far less than what one would expect if we assume that people of particular ethnic groups vote for candidates of the same ethnicity. These results are at odds with what occurs in transmigration-affected areas, where ethnicity is still an essential part of the plot. Ethnicity is no longer a major factor in attracting Bandar Lampung’s voters. Komarunizar expressed his disappointment, saying that, “During the campaign, I regularly used ethnic sentiment and ethnic symbols. For instance, I spoke Bantenese during the campaign, and I sought to remind voters about the historical ties between the Bantenese and Lampung. I also came to meet people from various ethnic backgrounds such as Chinese, West Sumatrans and others. But it was useless, it didn’t work at all” (ibid.) (See Figure 8-3).
Figure 8-3 The incumbent’s opponent exploits the issue of ethnicity in Bandar Lampung’s mayoral election. The poster’s caption below the candidates reads in translation, “Mr. Bro [Thobroni Harun] chooses Kang⁴⁷ Nizar (Komarunizar), a man of Banten”.

Source: Author’s photograph of a campaign poster (2016).

Muhammad Yunus, one of the candidates shared his view on why Hasanusi was popular in the eyes of the public and why he won the most votes: “I think there are two programmes that made the incumbent so popular in the election. He was able to fulfil the basic need of the people in this city. Those programmes are free education and free healthcare for nearly everyone. Meanwhile, infrastructure projects did not

⁴⁷ Kang is a Bantenese male title. The Javanese language uses a similar title.
really garner public attention. I know this from our survey" (INT26, November 2015). As Trounstine (2013, pp.180-182) writes, incumbents have a greater opportunity to learn what their constituents want, and cities in particular are the place where the incumbent tends to win re-election.

Table 8.6 shows the popular (and populist) programmes created during his first five-year administration between 2010 and 2015. The data show that Hasanusi focused on six popular programmes: education, health, infrastructure development, environment and sanitation, the local economy and social-religious affairs. Of these six programmes, the first three were key in increasing the candidate’s popularity amongst voters. Further, budget items in the table 8.6 is not include expenditures that were provided from joint programmes shared between directorates within the city council.

Education in particular is a burden for people on local incomes. Education in state schools, which the vast majority of students attend, is free, but peripheral costs such as school uniforms are a burden. It is these costs that Hasanusi’s policy had local government cover. His policies on education, which are more extensive than can be set out here, are not exclusive to Bandar Lampung; other cities and regions – including Sukohardjo and Karanganyar in Java -- have also implemented similar policies. Former President Yudhoyono actively implemented similar policies to increase his popularity (Rosser and Joshi, 2013, p.185; Rosser et al., 2011). However, the policy of cutting the costs of schooling makes demands on local government budgets in an era of decentralisation. It is often the case, therefore, that this type of programme is designed to look attractive to voters but contains little substantive change.
Table 8. 6 List of populist programmes introduced by Bandar Lampung’s Mayor Hasanusi.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sectors</th>
<th>Examples of populist programmes</th>
<th>Total funds allocated, 2010 to 2015</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>a. Free peripherals for school</td>
<td>Rp. 592,518,815,206 (£31,185,200)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>b. Vocational training/non-formal training related to improving people’s skills</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>c. Improving the quality of teaching and educational staff</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>d. Improving the quality of school management</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>e. Early childhood education policy</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Rp. 76,374,925,242 (£4,019,732)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health</td>
<td>a. Free health service for the poor</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>b. Supervisory programme on the quality of drugs and food</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>c. Improving nutrition levels</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>d. Improving the quality of Bandar Lampung citizens’ health</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>e. Improving Bandar Lampung’s health infrastructure, such as hospitals and clinics</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infrastructure</td>
<td>a. Development project for roads and bridges</td>
<td>Rp. 1,492,605,076,836.50 (£78,558,161)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>b. Roads and bridges maintenance programme</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>c. Improving the capacity of the city’s drainage</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>d. Improving and developing the quality of public markets</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>e. Development of the transport infrastructure</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Environment and sanitation</td>
<td>a. Reducing environmental pollution and introducing a programme on natural disasters</td>
<td>Rp. 92,723,028,101 (£4,880,159)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>b. Policy on natural conservation and protection</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>c. Climate change anticipation programme</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>d. Improving the quality of the watershed based on a community approach</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>e. Domestic waste collection policy</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local Economy</td>
<td>a. Entrepreneurship training</td>
<td>Rp. 6,375,796,650 (£335,568)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>b. System improvements for small businesses</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>c. Training to improve employment skills</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>d. Creating job opportunities for unemployed people</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>e. Creating a market for products from small businesses</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social and Religious Affairs</td>
<td>a. Policy for the empowerment of poor and vulnerable people</td>
<td>Rp. 15,676,128,264 (£825,059)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>b. Policy on homeless</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>c. Policy on improving the quality of family life</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>d. Policy on natural disaster prevention</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>e. Policy on child and women protection from sexual and criminal abuse.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Meanwhile, populist programmes have also been introduced in the health sector, such as plans to provide Rp 76 billion (ca. £4 million) for 19 health programmes, including a free healthcare system in the city. Hasanusi’s call for free health insurance for the people of Bandar Lampung helped strengthen his chances of being elected for a second term. Interestingly, the city’s health protection scheme is supported and paid for by a tax on cigarettes, a decision that has proved to be controversial.\textsuperscript{48} Aspinall (2014c, p.1), however, believes that large-scale free healthcare policy, both at the national and local level in Indonesia, is not matched by service quality improvements because of “oligarchic power and corruption”.

However, the biggest allocation of budget funds is provided for the city’s infrastructure development projects -- Rp 1.4 trillion (£78 million) for infrastructure projects (Table 8.5). The major project being undertaken by Hasanusi’s municipal government is the construction of four flyovers; this had already made a mark during the mayor’s first term. Regular maintenance (not always a top priority for municipal and regency governments in Indonesia) and an increase in the capacity of the city’s roads is another popular programme that has been undertaken by the Hasanusi government. Since the inception of the era of decentralisation in 2000, little significant infrastructure investment or development had occurred, a ‘street-level’ view that was confirmed by informal conversations during my fieldwork.

It is no easy task to defeat the incumbent. A classic successful example, however, occurred in 2012, when Joko Widodo, now Indonesia’s president, and Basuki Purnama (Ahok) defeated the incumbent, Fauzi Bowo, to become governor and deputy governor of Jakarta. Okamoto (2013, p.12) attributes their victory to the fact that “Jokowi and Ahok successfully offered some hope for change with their communicative skills and their achievements as local leaders”.

In addition to implementing populist programmes, the political advantage associated with being incumbent creates an opportunity to deploy the local bureaucracy as ‘a hidden’ political machine, as we saw in Chapter 6.4. Many researchers have

\textsuperscript{48} In the decentralisation era, the central government allows local government to find a third party source for additional revenue. According to Home Ministry Regulation Number 13/2006, local government revenue consists of three categories, namely, its own sources of revenue, a balancing fund and other local government legal revenue. The cigarette tax is one such kind of balancing fund, meaning that the city/ regency level of local government is given a share of the tax by the provincial government.
explained this phenomenon as a form of political patronage between elected candidate and local bureaucrats, either based on ethnicity or on political and economic advantage (Purwoko, 2015). Many of my conversations at the grassroots level have suggested that the incumbent exploits the bureaucracy to persuade the voter.

One participant in my research, who was a candidate in the 2015 mayoral election, claimed that, “The incumbent [Mayor Hasanusi] is putting pressure on the heads of local communities to stop my activities as an Islamic teacher during the local election. For example, after I had preached in the Al Hidayah Mosque, the head of the local community was relieved of his position on the mosque’s governing body” (INT25, January 2016). This bears some similarities to the case of the Metro mayoral election in 2010, when the incumbent informally deployed the government structure to persuade voters to back him (see Chapter 6.4). Incumbents do indeed have an armory of weapons at their disposal to win support for their re-election campaigns.

8.5 Conclusion

This section offers a summary of the political story behind Bandar Lampung’s mayoral election in 2015. The explanations advanced in this chapter are still far from the final word on what motivates voters in a city like Bandar Lampung. However, it is clear that things are very different there when compared with transmigration-affected areas such as Metro and East Lampung. Indeed, this study confirms that there are distinct political phenomena that distinguish local politics in Bandar Lampung from the two transmigration-affected areas. Unlike in areas affected by transmigration, the issue of ethnicity was not central in attracting voters in Bandar Lampung in the 2010 and 2015 elections. A Javanese candidate was successful in 2005, but in the following two elections, the minority Lampungese defeated not only the Javanese candidate but also candidates from other ethnicities. Rather than ethnicity, successful implementation of a populist programme by the incumbent has become an essential factor in Bandar Lampung’s mayoral election.

The case of Bandar Lampung also confirms the importance of party pragmatism and the role of money in local politics. So strong was Hasanusi’s position that most parties opted to support him. As we have seen in this chapter, money is an essential
necessity for politicians seeking election, but an incumbent can use the local budget to fund his way into the hearts of voters.

Incumbency, populist programmes and a decline in ethnic sentiment -- these three aspects form an important element in Bandar Lampung’s local politics. However, what the case of Bandar Lampung shows above all is that the performance of the incumbent is key, and helps explain why Eddy Sutrisno lost in 2010 and Herman Hasanusi won in 2015.
Chapter 9
Subnational Election in the Context of Transmigration

9.1 Reflections on the Empirical Chapters: Political Legacies of Transmigration and Subnational Election Dynamics in Lampung

In this chapter I recap and reflect on the findings of my study, as well as discussing its theoretical contribution and the possibilities for future research. In this thesis I examined mayoral and head of regency elections in two areas affected by transmigration, Metro and East Lampung, and one area unaffected by transmigration, Bandar Lampung. In the case of the two transmigration-affected areas, we saw that identity as a Javanese transmigrant – and descendant of Javanese transmigrants -- is a central factor in local politics, and one that is capitalised on by candidates. However, the results in the location unaffected by the transmigration programme presents a different story, one in which a range of issues come to prominence.

In general terms, this thesis has contributed to our knowledge of the intersection between transmigration and local politics in Indonesia. It has brought together these two subjects of research, which previously had been examined more or less discretely. Previously, there had been only research that examined the impact of prolonged transmigration programmes on the dynamics of contemporary local politics in Indonesia.

My thesis has explored how transmigrant identity, ethnic symbols and languages are used in subnational elections. More specifically, in Chapter 5 I explored the role of ERBOs and showed that there are two types of ERBO in subnational elections, those that are politically active and others that are politically passive. In Chapter 6, I explored the use of the concept of new native or Asli wong Metro as a central feature of identity politics in local elections. In Chapter 7, alongside a discussion of ethnicity, I explored the role of NU, as well as the political strategies deployed by the Lampungese when
dealing with the Javanese majority in local politics. In Chapter 8 I reviewed local politics in Lampung’s capital city, Bandar Lampung, and reached a more mitigated conclusion about ethnicity, incumbency, patronage and money politics.

This chapter starts with an introduction, after which it reflects on the political lesson learnt in transmigration-affected areas, which broadly show that ethnicity and transmigrant identity are still central issues in subnational elections. I organise this chapter into four sections. Section 9.1 consists of five reflections on the empirical chapters. In sub section 9.1.1, I argue that being a transmigrant descendant offers a political advantage that can be used by a particular candidate; transmigration thus becomes a political identity in subnational elections. Sub-section 9.1.2, discusses the political role played by ERBOs in subnational elections by examining different types of ERBO and explaining their political role. I discuss the informal political role of NU and the minimal role played by political parties in contemporary subnational elections. I then put forward a comparative assessment of local politics in Lampung and relate it to other parts of Indonesia in sub-section 9.1.3, illustrating the phenomenon of patronage democracy in the context of Lampung and Indonesia. I argue that the phenomenon of patronage democracy appears not only in Lampung but in other parts of Indonesia too. A discussion on the lack of political power of the Lampungese and the domination of Javanese in transmigration-affected areas forms the basis of sub-section 9.1.4. Here, I discuss why Javanese transmigrants are so dominant in subnational elections and how political strategies are applied by the Lampungese to counteract that dominance. In sub-section 9.1.5, I review the politics of Bandar Lampung. In the chapter’s second section I provide an overall reflection on Lampung’s politics, and a general argument derived from the findings of this thesis. This is followed by a section on the theoretical contribution of this thesis. The last section looks forwards to possible future research.

9.1.1 Asli Wong Metro: the revival of ethnicity and transmigrant political identity in transmigration-affected areas

The three direct elections for mayor and head of regency in Metro and East Lampung show that the politics of ethnic identity plays an important role; transmigrant identity, ethnic symbols and ethnicity are central issues, sitting alongside and indeed above other factors such as the role of money and a candidate’s political networks. In
addition to leaving political legacies, transmigration has left cultural and social ones too. Ethnic revivalism is one of the most important phenomena that have arisen in the political reform era, reaching its peak in the first iteration of direct elections in 2005. In the context of Metro and East Lampung, this sentiment has served to reinforce transmigration-related identities, for example, in the shift of political identity from migrant to new native in Metro, using the Javanese slogan Asli wong Metro. This is a specific phenomenon not seen outside Lampung. This political identity is also used to remind voters that the city where they live now was established by their ancestors, implying that the transmigrant descendants have a political advantage in subnational elections. This was shown by Sudarsono, a descendant of transmigrants in Metro. He regularly used ethnic sentiment in his campaign during the subnational elections of 2015 (see Chapter 6).

In East Lampung, the successful candidate, Chusnunia Halim, also regularly spoke in Javanese when communicating during the campaign. Her team also used Javanese language political taglines (see Chapter 7). Similar occurrences were also noted in other transmigration-affected areas, where candidates of Javanese transmigrant descent also used ethnicity and transmigrant identity as a way to attract voters. I showed in Chapter 7 that a candidate with a transmigrant identity and good political network will have a better chance of winning in East Lampung. This is shown in the case of Chusnunia Halim and is a reminder that ethnicity is a tool for obtaining electoral support (Chandra, 2007b; Chandra, 2012).

However, things were different in Bandar Lampung, a city whose population, drawn from 10 ethnicities, is more balanced than that of the other two field work locations. The Javanese in Lampung’s capital – not themselves transmigrants – make up ‘only’ 41% of the population, while Lampungese make up around 16% of the total population. The number of spontaneous migrants and their descendants results in a different political narrative; the larger number of Sundanese and Bantenese mean that other factors are important, weakening the dominance and influence of ethnic sentiment in local politics and leading to a situation where a host of other factors such as money and political networks are key.
9.1.2 The political role of ERBOs in strengthening ethnic sentiment and the minimal role of parties in subnational elections

In discussing the role of ERBOs in electoral politics, it is important to distinguish between those that are politically active like Lampung Sai and PATRI and those that see their role as being more social and cultural. Taken as a whole, however, we saw that ERBOs occupy an important place in the narrative of subnational elections in Lampung, their internal coherence and strength influencing the nature of the political support they give. It is a different story, however, when it comes to political parties in local Indonesian elections. Parties, we have seen, are pragmatic and have almost no ideological platform; instead, they only seek economic advantage. Money and a patrimonial relationship are the most powerful factors affecting whether a particular party offers political support to a candidate (Mietzner, 2010; Tomsa, 2008). Party candidates for local elections are initially nominated according to their ties to central party leaders and their ability to raise money for their campaigns and pass funds on to the party elite.

In theory, political decentralisation should have provided an opportunity for local political parties to become more independent and meant that the party works for its constituency to fulfil basic needs. However, in reality this has not happened. Party elites are pragmatic, meaning that support for a candidate is not determined by their personal capabilities or capacity. For example, coalitions that form in subnational elections are not based on similarities in terms of ideology or political goals but are instead driven by economic concerns and patrimonial relationships.

There is no doubt that money plays a significant role in the formation of party coalitions in subnational elections across the country (Mietzner, 2010). The political coalitions in the subnational elections in my three case studies have shown this in action. However, this kind of pragmatic political deal-making is difficult to uncover as many local political elites strongly deny such practices.

The activities of ERBOs, however, tend to contradict this picture of backroom political machinations. Their open support for candidates is, for the main part, not based on money, although as we saw with Chusnunia Halim in East Lampung a form of patronage is involved. This is not to say that ERBOs are always effective. In the case
of some subnational elections in Lampung ERBOs were unable to provide sufficient political support for a particular candidate. There are four ERBOs in Lampung that are politically active. Most of their political activity is associated with the democratisation and decentralisation of the reform era. The involvement of Lampung Sai in local politics was triggered by a backlash against the domination of a Java-based central government under Suharto that took expression nationwide in the Putra Daerah movement. The political effectiveness of ERBOs in subnational elections depends on the solidity of their internal structures and the capacity of local leaders to manage various political interests. Undivided elite political interest within the ERBO is key to obtaining the maximum political support.

In other words, the role of the party as a medium of political campaigning tends to be replaced by ERBOs in subnational elections. The political role of NU in East Lampung and the support given by PBL for candidates in South Lampung and Central Lampung show that ERBOs remain useful in strengthening ethnic sentiment within an ethnic group and that they can also be deployed during political campaigns. This adds some important nuance to the arguments of van Klinken (2008) and Aspinall (2011), for whom ethnic organisations have diminishing impact in local politics, especially in terms of attracting votes. My research has instead shown that ERBOs can be an effective medium for political campaigning and can be used successfully to attract votes; however, the extent to which they do so depends on the type of ERBO.

9.1.3 Local politics in Lampung and Indonesia: a patronage democracy narrative

Subnational elections are a dynamic contest in Indonesia; there are various key factors that can generate a victory for a particular candidate. Even where ethnicity is the principal force, political networks, patron-client relations and the role of money are also important. Furthermore, none of these factors are more important than the other; they instead complement one another. In short, the candidate needs to have at least these four key factors to increase their chance of winning subnational elections.

Patronage democracy has become a central political narrative of local politics in contemporary Indonesia, as it has in Lampung, with local politicians are able to distribute resources controlled by the state on an individual basis. But, as discussed in particular in Chapter 8, there is a basket of factors influencing voting decisions in
subnational elections that is more important than another, especially in the context of transmigration affected area in which ethnicity still play essential role. The case of South Sulawesi shows that family politics are another important issue in local politics in Indonesia; the Limpo family has dominated local political life there for several decades (Buehler, 2013). In Banten, the family of Ratu Atut Choisyah has dominated politics (Hamid, 2015). Similarly in Lampung the Sjahroedin family and a number of sugar companies occupied a dominant position. As mentioned in Chapter 3.3, the role of some of Lampung’s sugar companies in providing financial support for particular candidates in subnational elections is another important factor (Berenschot and Purba, 2014; Hermawan et al., 2017). The ambitions of sugar companies to obtain additional land for their plantations has forced them to secure political support from local politicians. This occurs in other parts of Indonesia: in Jakarta, for example, Basuki Cahaya Purnama, the defeated candidate in the 2017 gubernatorial election, was linked politically with the property conglomerate group of Agung Podomoro (Wilson, 2017). In this sense, the narrative above has revealed that the patronage model of democracy, with its links to corporate power, exists in the local politics of Indonesia as well as in Lampung.

What this shows is that the politics of patronage is prospering in Indonesia, and this is true of Lampung too. However, to characterise Lampung politics entirely in these terms is to miss out various other factors and in particular the role of ethnicity and, with it, religion. Striking a balance between the various factors discussed in chapters 6, 7 and 8 is not easy, especially because there is so much variance within a province such as Lampung and because of a diminution in Putra Daerah power. However, as we have seen through many instances in chapters 5, 6 and 7, and not least through the adoption of the Javanese-language slogan Asli wong Metro, ethnic identity counts for a lot in the sorts of specific conditions that Metro and East Lampung represent. It is very important, therefore, not to write ethnicity (and religion) off the map of Indonesian local politics. To do so would be to misrepresent seriously both the continuing impact of transmigration and more broadly the nature of the forces that drive electoral politics in the country today.
9.1.4 The Javanese-Lampungese power balance in transmigration-affected areas

As we have seen, Javanese transmigrants and their descendants dominate the politics of those areas like East Lampung and Metro where they have settled in overwhelming numbers. To maintain their ability to deal politically with the dominant Javanese in subnational elections, the Lampungese elite have implemented several political strategies (see Chapter 7.3). First, they have arranged inter-ethnic political coalitions with Javanese transmigrants, running for posts as deputy in mayoral and regency elections. Second, they have successfully installed Lampungese as heads of local political parties. Third, Lampungese candidates have deployed Javanese ethnic sentiment by using Javanese culture and symbols, particularly during election campaigns. Fourth, they have conducted an inclusive political strategy by claiming that all residents of Lampung are Lampungese. These political strategies are relatively effective in reducing the effects of Javanese domination.

As a result of the Javanisation programme enacted by Lampung’s (Javanese) governor under the direction of the central Suharto government in the New Order era, no one from the Lampungese ethnic group was appointed as governor between 1973 and 2003. Since then, the province’s governor has been Lampungese. When direct elections took place in early 2005, Lampungese candidates were still able to benefit from the advantages that had been given to Putra Daerah at the outset of the reform era. Today, outside of transmigration-affected areas most local leaders are Lampungese. Currently, Lampungese leaders dominate politics not only at the provincial level but in many regencies in areas unaffected by transmigration. This tends to be the case even where the Lampungese are far from being the largest ethnic group, as, for example, in Bandar Lampung.

9.1.5 Ethnic sentiment on the back seat: politics in the provincial capital

There are several issues that need to be addressed when explaining local politics in Bandar Lampung and the diminishing role of ethnicity in subnational elections. First, it would appear that the higher share of educated people among Bandar Lampung’s electorate results in fewer votes along ethnic lines, reflecting conclusions drawn by Chandra (2007). Secondly, as it has not been affected directly by the transmigration
programme, Bandar Lampung’s politics is underpinned by a different narrative, represented by the spontaneous migration that has resulted in a significant number of Bantenese and Sundanese in the city and has led to a greater degree of balance between ethnic groups in Bandar Lampung. The Bantenese in particular have been more influential here than they have been in other parts of Lampung.

All of this is not to say that there is no room to exploit ethnicity in local political life in Bandar Lampung. For example, one of the contenders for mayor capitalised on his mixed Bantenese and South Sumatran ethnicity during his political campaign. However, his approach failed. Above all, perhaps, the story of subnational elections in Bandar Lampung is an ‘ordinary’ one, according to which what counts above all is how performance in office is seen. Eddy Sutrisno, the Javanese who was elected mayor in 2005, was voted out in 2010 because, so it was widely reckoned, voters did not think much of his record in office. Herman Hasanusi, the Lampungese candidate who beat him, however, was seen to have performed well and was overwhelmingly returned to office in 2015. But my research and my lived experiences as a political commentator and academic in Lampung make it clear to me that, as became apparent in the contests for mayor of Metro, incumbency brings with it considerable advantages, not least because of the opportunity it affords to exploit the bureaucracy for electoral ends. This chimes with points made in the general literature (Trounstine, 2011; Trounstine, 2013).

These are the five main conclusions that I draw from my research. They have specific purchase in the context of Lampung, but they also resonate more widely with local politics in contemporary Indonesia.

### 9.2 Lampung’s Elections in the Context of Transmigration

In this section, I reflect upon subnational elections in the three case studies by comparing the results of subnational elections in areas in Lampung affected by transmigration and those unaffected. I also ask what this means for local politics in Indonesia as a whole. This is the first study to examine the political legacies of transmigration on local electoral results. The evidence from my fieldwork shows not only that a prolonged transmigration programme has left some political legacies but
also that these have grown stronger in recent years, when there has been something of a revival in transmigrant political identity.

Further, following candidates on the stump from their campaign offices to rallies brought home to me the deficiencies of the democratic process. These stem from a lack of education in the broadest sense among many voters, the pragmatic not to say unprincipled approach of members of the local elites and the patron-client relations between voters and elites. Many if not most voters did not appear to be making their own independent choice of candidate but were following their family and patron in choosing a particular candidate.

In general, local elections have become more dynamic and contested since the adoption of direct elections in 2005. The introduction of direct elections at subnational levels has made the study of local politics in Indonesia more challenging but also more rewarding, as a number of researchers including Aspinall and Sukmajati (2016) and Buehler (2013) have discussed. A pragmatic and post-ideological elite, costly electoral contests, the power of money, patronage and political networks, and the role of ERBOs, the help given to Putra Daerah – all these are important factors to consider when studying local electoral dynamics in Indonesia. Alongside them, however, I have argued that you must place ethnic and religious sentiment.

Lampung was chosen in part because the patterns it provides of subnational elections and their consequences in a transmigration area can be used to analyse other areas in Indonesia. The case of Lampung’s local elections has provided a political narrative on two different types of research location, transmigration affected and unaffected areas. Further, the case studies provided by Lampung’s local politics can be used to offer a wider understanding on similar situations in other parts of Indonesia.

However, Lampung’s local politics also indicate that ethnicity is not the sole factor in subnational elections. The case of Bandar Lampung’s mayoral election shows that incumbency with a good performance during the first term gives a political advantage to the incumbent when it comes to the prospect of re-election. Lampung’s local politics tell us that the ability to capitalise on ethnicity and religious sentiment, patronage and political networks as well as money for votes are all complementary and important factors.
In Lampung the transmigration programme was first implemented in the 1930s, and it has clearly made a mark, particularly on the social, economic and political affairs of the province. It has led to a pronounced demographic shift in the province’s population; while the Lampungese were in the majority in 1930, today they make up only 13.5% compared with 64% of Javanese ethnicity (see Table 3.17 (Benoit, 1989; Kusworo, 2014). The political legacies of transmigration on subnational elections have resulted in the emergence of different political narratives in those regions affected by transmigration.

9.3 A Contribution to the Theory of Ethnic Politics

In this section, I discuss the contribution of this thesis to the development of theories of ethnic politics, especially in the context of Indonesian politics. I engage in particular with some of the issues discussed and arguments put forward by two prominent Indonesianists, van Klinken and Aspinall. My findings support their arguments in some respects but not in others. They support Aspinall’s argument that “there are places in Indonesia where ethnicity is now central to local politics” (Aspinall, 2011, pp.310-311). Aspinall claims that in areas that are “ethnically homogenous”, especially in the “Javanese heartland”, and places home to “mixed populations” that are made up of Javanese, Malay and Bugis diaspora in Sumatra, Kalimantan and Sulawesi, ethnicity still counts and becomes a political preference for the voter (ibid.).

My research inflects Aspinall’s arguments by adding to his list those areas coloured preponderantly by transmigration like Metro and East Lampung, where ethnicity is a central issue within local politics. The patterns that Aspinall noted for the Javanese heartlands should therefore be extended to areas beyond Java where the majority ethnic population was formed by transmigration. Aspinall is correct in claiming that in “mixed populations” with a strong Javanese, Malay and Bugis diaspora, ethnicity is the central issue, but he needs to consider too that in areas heavily impacted by transmigration a similar political situation exists.

My findings point towards the importance of ethnic organisations, in contrast to both van Klinken (2008) and Aspinall (2011, p.301), who claims that “ethnic organisations have little political impact” in subnational elections. In contrast, I have shown that some ERBOs have significant political impact: they work to preserve ethnic sentiment amongst their members and can deploy this as an effective tool to attract voters. While
it is true that some ERBOs “lack the power to significantly influence” voters in subnational elections (Aspinall, 2011, p.303), my findings show that others are involved in raising ethnic consciousness for political purposes, and more specifically to support specific candidates in subnational elections.

The findings that I have laid out in this thesis suggest that the constructivist approach to ethnic politics advocated by Kanchan Chandra is a useful tool for analysing the context of ethnic politics and patronage democracy in Indonesia, especially in the context of subnational elections in transmigration-affected areas in Lampung province. My research on ethnic politics partly supports Chandra’s ideas; her argument is also helpful when interpreting the case studies in this thesis, in that she argues that a region’s status as an urban area, with well-educated and economically better-off citizens, leads to different voting patterns. This occurs in Bandar Lampung, where ethnicity is less influential compared to other factors, and voting patterns are influenced by an incumbent’s political record more than by ethnic sentiment. In this sense, Chandra’s argument need to be reinforced with the idea that to some extent, a good performance shown by the incumbent during first term of office, is another important factor on the road to re-election.

Social constructivist theorists believe that ethnic identity is socially constructed. In this sense, this research has supported the basic arguments of social constructivists by arguing that the revival of *Asli wong Metro* signifies a new ethnic identity in local politics. The influence of a prolonged transmigration programme can be seen as part of a social construction process first undertaken by the Dutch colonialists. Therefore, it becomes a trigger and important factor in shifting ethnic identity especially in transmigration-affected areas from transmigrant descendant to *Asli wong Metro* (new native of Metro).

Furthermore, the theoretical insight used in this thesis provides a narrative of the complexity of the phenomenon of local politics in Indonesia. Thus, it cannot be explained using a sole theoretical argument. The dynamics of Indonesian local politics, particularly the case of local elections in the three research sites, need a set of theories to be applied, as also explained in Chapter 2. In this sense, various approaches are applied that are associated with social constructivist arguments in this thesis; this therefore shows that the social constructivist arguments about ethnic politics are relevant in providing a theoretical umbrella for explaining the local election
phenomenon in both transmigration-affected and unaffected locations of Lampung, Indonesia.

9.4 Future Research

In this thesis, I have not attempted a comprehensive investigation of all aspects of local politics in contemporary Lampung, let alone Indonesia. I have, however, argued that ethnicity remains an important factor in certain areas but that this should not obscure the more general pattern in which patronage, money and political networks are primary determinants of political events. In this sense, there is a revisionist element to my argument.

There are a number of avenues that future research might take. Firstly, to broaden the context of the study, comparative studies involving bigger and more diverse geographical areas would allow for a more comprehensive understanding of the impact of transmigration on subnational elections in Indonesia. For example, future work could beneficially include a focus on political outcomes in other transmigration-affected areas such as those in North Sumatra or West Kalimantan. Comparing Lampung with findings from other parts of the country would be more demanding, but it would create a wider perspective on the political legacies of transmigration on contemporary Indonesian social, cultural and political life. Secondly, I have concentrated here on elections for mayor and head of regency in a limited number of areas in Lampung. A broader analysis would seem a useful next step, involving research that examined patterns in the electoral sphere more generally. The sorts of issues that might be teased out include the role of corporations and leading figures in the business world in Lampung politics or the impact of spontaneous migration on the local politics of places like Bandar Lampung. Thirdly, it would surely be a worthwhile endeavour to compare local electoral politics in transmigration-affected areas with roughly similar cases in other countries: the Federal Land Development Authority (FELDA) in Malaysia, for instance. Comparative study of this type would result in a more complex and comprehensive understanding of how ethnicity plays itself out in other parts of South East Asia.
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249


### Appendix A

#### List of Interviews

Details of the interviews are as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organisation and Position</th>
<th>Date of Interview</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Former Governor of Lampung and Local Political Party Leader</td>
<td>2015.10.26</td>
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<tr>
<td>Indonesian Senator for Lampung Province</td>
<td>2015.11.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local Political Party Leader 1</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local Political Party Leader 2</td>
<td>2015.10.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local Political Party Leader 4</td>
<td>2015.12.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local Political Party Leader 5</td>
<td>2016.01.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>2015.10.21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Campaign Manager 2</td>
<td>2015.10.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Campaign Manager 3</td>
<td>2015.12.24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<tr>
<td>Local Election Candidate 2</td>
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<tr>
<td>Local Election Candidate 3</td>
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<tr>
<td>Local Election Candidate 4</td>
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<td>Local Election Candidate 5</td>
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<td>Former Manager of Sugar Company</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Head of Provincial Election Supervisory Board</td>
<td>2016.02.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Position</td>
<td>Date</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Head of Transmigration, Religious and Ethnic Based Organisation 1</td>
<td>2015.10.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Head of Transmigration, Religious and Ethnic Based Organisation 2</td>
<td>2015.10.24 and 2016.02.16</td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>Role</td>
<td>Date</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>--------</td>
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<td>Third Generation of Transmigration Descendant</td>
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<td>Political Journalist 2</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Former of Local Electoral Commission</td>
<td>2015.12.28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Head of NGO for Political and Legal Dispute</td>
<td>2016.03.18</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix B

Example of an Interview

I: I begin with the first questions. In your opinion, do the ethnic symbols used in the local election, such as the Javanese hat (*Blankon*), and the speeches and campaign taglines in Javanese languages, or the Lampungese ethnic symbols, such as wearing the traditional costume, during the campaign period seem important? Have you suggested that your candidate applies these methods as well?

R: I think those you have mentioned, such as ethnic symbols or ethnicity specifically, are not the only factors in the local election. Indeed, those are important, but again those are not the only things in my opinion. What I understand is the issues are different between one region and another. For instance, in the Metro, we were absolutely thinking of using the Javanese symbols, as the majority of the population in Metro are Javanese transmigrants. But we also have to remember that Metro is an urban area, so the people are more open-minded and pluralist. In short, we do have to consider the ethnic symbols but this is not the only issue when we have to decide who is going to be nominated by our party. In the Metro’s local election, as you know, our candidate is Bantenese, not Javanese, though his deputy candidate is a Javanese candidate. That is why we also suggest to our candidate that they use the Javanese symbols and speak Javanese regularly during the campaign period. Again, I told you, the ethnicity is important, but this is not the only issue, but I agree, we do consider it as well. Another example: in the local election in East Lampung, we have paired our candidate who is Javanese with the Lampungese incumbent. At that time, we think that the head of regency’s incumbent was Lampungese, so it might be good if he took a Javanese person as the deputy candidate, and we have the right person and he is in our party member and he is also from a Javanese ethnic background. But again, even though he is Javanese, he has also been a local council member for two periods, so he has good social capital and experience to run as the candidate in the local election. See this pattern: we do consider the ethnicity of the candidate, but we also think about another factors. So, we look at the area, and in an area such as Metro and East Lampung, yes, we consider the ethnic background of the candidate a great deal.

I: How about the case of the local election in Bandar Lampung?

R: First of all, we thought that we needed to nominate a candidate but only after conducting a popularity survey of each candidate. Therefore, we calculated our probability of winning; finally, we did not nominate our party member to run in the local election. We supported the incumbent. But you asked me about the ethnic factor. Indeed, Bandar Lampung was different, we did not consider the ethnicity. If I could tell you about the story in 2010 local election......

I: For sure. What was the story of the previous local election in Bandar Lampung; did you also consider using the issue of ethnicity in that local election?

R: Our candidates were a pair, one Javanese and one Lampungese, in the 2010 local election: the city mayor candidate was a Javanese candidate with high popularity, and we had paired him with our party member, who was Lampungese, as the vice mayor candidate. So at that time, our candidates are Javanese and Lampungese, but even though we have a good ethnic combination, they were still defeated by a pair with a Lampungese and South Sumatran ethnic combination. Indeed, we considered
ethnicity in 2010, but in 2015, the story was different; after analysing the result of the survey, the incumbent was very popular and he seemed hard to defeat, so the party decided to support him without nominating our party member as the deputy. No point running our candidate, because the incumbent was so popular!

I: So, according to your previous explanation, the result of the popularity survey is important and it becomes one of the factors of your party’s decision to nominate a particular candidate in the local election?

R: Yes, we also look at the result of a survey as one of the factors in the decision, but again not only the survey, but many others factors, as I told you.

I: How about the local election in 2015? Did your party also conduct a survey before nominating a candidate?

R: Yes, but the 2015 local election is different: the incumbent was so popular, and it was hard to defeat them, relying only upon a single issue, such as ethnicity, for example.

I: My further question is, does your party consider the ethnic background of the candidate in a local election?

R: Yes, but this is only one factor among many. Basically, we have two reasons for nominating a candidate in a local election. Firstly, do we have any eligible internal candidates to nominate, and secondly, the popularity and electability of the candidate. Then, these two factors will be combined with the ethnicity. Of course, we prioritise the internal party member who has a similar ethnic background to the majority ethnic group in the particular area of a local election. We could not deny it: the ethnicity is a bound to be another factor, in my opinion. The ethnicity could be a trigger that stirs the sentiment of the voter. For example, in East Lampung, which was dominated by the Javanese population, with the Javanese up to 75 percent, the idea of putting forward ethnicity - particularly, nominating a candidate with a Javanese background - is so important. In this area, the combination of Javanese and Lampungese is so essential. That is why, in the 2015 local election, we proposed our party member as the deputy head of the regency, paired with the incumbent, who also came from the majority ethnic group of the Javanese as well.

I: Sorry for repeating the question; I just want to make sure: was your nominated party member in the 2015 East Lampung local election Javanese?

R: Yes, looking at his name, his is a very Javanese name.\textsuperscript{49}

I: So, I just want to emphasize my question again: does the ethnicity factor depend on the area of ‘battle’?

R: Indeed, again, I repeat, East Lampung, Metro and Central Lampung are the areas where the ethnicity factor is still important, but not for the regency of West Pesisir, for example, in my opinion.

\textsuperscript{49} Name could not be mentioned to guarantee the anonymity.
I: Do you suggest to your candidate that they use ethnic symbols? Such as a Javanese political tagline during the campaign process? For instance, as it was in the transmigration area, did you suggest your candidate use the sentiment of being a descendant of transmigrants on the voter?

R: For sure, from the point of view of ethnicity, that issue is so important, including considering ethnic symbols, but you have to recognise that, for me, the real symbol of being Javanese is the candidate being really Javanese instead of a Lampungese who uses the blankon (Javanese traditional hat), attempting to be passed off as Javanese, for example. We can manipulate the use of symbols but the ethnicity is real when associated with a particular person. Furthermore, if we support the genuine Javanese people to run in the local election, we do this just as a reminder for Javanese voters; we just want to remind them about our candidate’s ethnic background, because the voters already know that our candidate is Javanese. So, in short, the symbol is just for a sort of ethnic identification. We could identify him as well from his name; Javanese names are commonly used by the Javanese, and I think a Javanese name is a symbol already that she/he is a Javanese. In short, ethnic symbols and sentiment could influence the voter if they are embedded with other factors.

I: Now, turning to the issue of money politics and vote buying in local elections, what do you think about this phenomenon? Could you give me a pattern of money politics activities? How they give money to the voter etc.?

R: This is according to my personal experience, at least. I was nominated for deputy of head of regency five years ago and three times I have successfully been elected as the local parliament member. In my opinion, the pattern of money in politics is no different between the past and now. So, according to my opinion, money is not the only factor that could change the result of an election. Many winning factors need to be considered in the local elections. Some voters elect us because of friendship, because the candidate is our neighbour etc. There are many reasons someone is elected in an election; for example, it is weird, if we do not elect our friend or our Islamic teacher or our fellow villager. That is the real pattern of voting; the election is not all about money! Could also be possible that we elect somebody to be head of regency because we come from the same party as well.

I: How about the floating voter: how do you manage and maintain their political decision, or how can you get their votes?

R: Yes, this is a good question. I think a political or social scientist already knows how to do it. If I illustrate how we do it, it is like a football game; sometimes, we have to know when to apply man-to-man marking or zonal marking etc. In the election battle, securing our voter base is so important; by installing our political network in our voter base zone, it is possible to do it. I found that in an area where money politics is massive, the voter tends to abstain in local elections. For example, in the area where the voters are more rational. For me, I personally apply my network to maintain it. I deploy them to find out the exact needs of their community. We have to be a more pragmatic in this case; we have also to be aware of the regulations or we could be disqualified by the electoral commission. I asked them (my voter base) what they need as a community. You know, currently the regulation of campaigns is more flexible; we can give something to the voter but no more than Rp 50,000 (equivalent to £3). Currently, we can hire them (the voter) as our volunteer; before these new regulations, we played fait accompli with the electoral supervisory board. I also asked my successful team/my political network to identify the community needs: if they needed balls for playing football, I would give them balls, or if a young Islamic group wanted
to be provided with Islamic musical instrument tools, I tried to provide it. So if we were talking about regulations, those activities are illegal, but we try to cover it with cultural traditions, giving a ball for the youth community or giving a donation for religious activities are common activities in our culture.

I: If the money is important, what about the network for distributing the money? What do you think about this?

R: According to our party's experience, we could not win the election without collaborating with other networks. To win the local election, depending on our political party network alone is still not sufficient. We need another party network; we need to find a trusted person to be our political network. However, I agree with you: we absolutely need another person to be our political network, they serve by distributing and finding the information related to the election competition. These networks are so important because they work as vote getters.

I: In your opinion, why are the voters so pragmatic nowadays? Is this due to poverty, that they (the voters) are poor, or any other reasons?

R: As far as I am concerned, poverty is not the only factor. As I just illustrated, if the candidate gives Rp 50,000, do they automatically become rich? I do not think so. I see, the voter thinks whoever the elected candidate is and becomes their leader, the situation will not change, apparently. So they are frustrated already with this situation; they are apathetic about this condition. So simply, they (voters) think only pragmatic things, whatever I could get from the local election event. I think this is because of a lack of political education; they (the elite and voters) never think about the dangers for us of vote-buying practices. The voters do not care whether the elected candidate qualifications are a businessman, academic, bureaucrat; they do not care about it! Even I think this is so important (candidate background).

I: So in your opinion, what is the voter preferences for a candidate, currently?

R: The pragmatic voter, they just look at the economic motive, or sometimes, they just look at who persuades them: for example, if the head of a community persuaded me to elect a particular person. And this is a multilevel activity, apparently: voters get voters!

I: You have the experience of being elected three times as a local parliament (council) member; in your opinion, do you believe that to run for a local election, candidates need suitable funding?

R: Indeed, funding for political activity is obligatory. Could you imagine how someone could be interested in voting for you, if you do not activate your network? I do not believe that people elect you for only preaching and speaking without persuading them. At least, money is needed to sustain and support the network performance. Politics is not free, for instance; activating the vote getter machine, we need money! That is why we asked the potential candidates that might be nominated by us, how much money they have. Furthermore, to increase popularity, we also need money; it is impossible that we just stay at home and our popularity increase automatically. I do not think so!

I: In your opinion and of course according to your party's experience, what is the intention of a particular company or group to give funding to a candidate; how do they (the candidate) get funding?
R: Our candidates get funding from our internal party members; we calculate the required funding for some strategic programmes that could increase our candidate’s popularity with the voter. Calculating and providing a programme that is suitable to increase their popularity.

I: How about getting funding from a particular company that has a business or plantation in a particular area?

R: Indeed, we try to approach them as well, but we could not rely only on them; we try to cooperate with them. For sure, we try to approach them but we are not capable enough to do that.

I: If your party has an external candidate, which means the candidate is not from your internal party, do you ask them where they get funding for contesting a local election?

R: Some of them answer my questions, some do not. But their answer is so diplomatic; you have to understand that the company has hired some middleman. I do not want to say that they are a broker. Occasionally, if the company needs to do something, they have deployed their man to do it, so the communication is not direct, but through the middleman. So every candidate can claim that they are financially supported by a particular company. So, sometimes, we just realised that we cannot depend on the funding from the company alone. But, you already know I think, according to regulations, a particular company can give financial assistance to every candidate of up to 5 billion rupiah.50 Once again, I repeat, we never depend only on the financial assistance of our candidate from a particular company.

I: How about your experience of local elections in 2010?

R: My experience, hmmm. At that time, I was only the head of regency deputy candidate; according to what I know, the intensive communication was between the head regency candidate and a particular company, so the communication was not with me as the deputy candidate. Indeed, some of the company wanted to meet our head of regency candidate. I remembered that we just presented our political manifesto to that company. When we were there, we are able to do a soft campaign, to speak with their employees (indeed, they are potential voters as well) about our political manifesto. So, aside from financial backing, this company also has employees that could potentially become voters for us.

I: This is a specific question: what is their (the company's) purpose in giving some financial backing to a particular candidate in a local election?

R: What I understand, this is all about business; they want to run a proper business without any distraction from local government. Maybe another issue is land leasing. But, our party never discusses it; we do not want to have an illegal deal between us. For instance, doing something that is illegal and restricted by law. No, we do not want such a deal.

I: Are there any political economic motives?

50 According to the regulations, it supposed to be up to 500 million rupiah.
R: I think so. No free lunch in politics, but not everything is illegal business, and sometimes you know that our (local) government is not really welcome with the business sector.

I: How about the party pragmatism nowadays? The political coalition is so pragmatic in local elections, so according to your experience (your party experience), what kind of personal approach is used by the candidate to obtain political party support?

R: Let me make some clarification. You know, establishing and running a party is not easy; it is really costly, but I can assure you, our party is not like that. Some believe that the local election event is a good time to make money, getting money from many sources, but, as far as I am concerned, money is not the only factor to nominate someone in the local election for our party. For example, if a particular candidate has more money, our support is not automatically given to that candidate. We always say to the candidate that the money given to our party will be transformed into programmes that could help improve their popularity and electability in the local election. As an example, if I told the candidate we need 2 billion rupiah that means we do not receive that money directly, but we make some programmes. For instance, 1 billion rupiah would be used for hiring or paying the personnel that could be our vote-getting machine. Again, this is not talking about money only; we have election campaign programmes that need money and that money (suitable funding) obviously needs to be provided by our candidates. That is it! So money is not everything; we do not want to be really pragmatic, unless our constituency will leave us!

I: How important is money for getting party support? And how much is it?

R: First of all, again, of course, we prioritise our party members for nomination as candidates. We also nominate external members, but again we are looking forward; if there is no benefit for us, why should we support external members - for instance, in Metro, East Lampung or West Pesisir? Those areas are the examples in which we have successfully nominated our internal party members, but if the external member of the party wants to be nominated, it is not only about money. If he has a lot of money but he/she does not have a chance to win, we would not accept his application. That is why, the money is different between one candidate and another. For instance, any candidate might just need a lesser amount of money compared with another candidate; for example, our candidate in Bandar Lampung. He needs just 30 percent of the total budget compared to our candidate in East Lampung. So, we calculated it! It also depends on the characteristics of the location: in Bandar Lampung, we proposed a candidate that provided between 500 million and 1 billion rupiah, but in another area it might be triple or double. So principally, it is different from one area to another. But you know, I could say that money is not everything. Again, we do not want to insult ourselves; we are an ideological party. Believe me, as far as I am concerned, the candidate that ran from our party, I think, they do not feel disappointed. We believe that our party performance is not ‘behind’ another party.

I: So, this is about party coalition: what are the factors of party coalition considered by your party in local elections?

R: To be honest, in a coalition, we do not look at the ideological background of the party, honestly, we do not think whether those parties are the red, yellow, green or blue as long as the coalition is already fulfilling the minimum requirement of delivering officially the candidate. Furthermore, so we definitely do not look the ideological
background of party; we can see that we can have a coalition with Golkar Party or PDIP Party, for example.

I: So this is not according to the party’s platform or ideology?

R: Ideology does not matter, right? As long as this is acceptable by law, if we have a similar ideology, then we make a coalition; this is absolutely good! For example, if we make a coalition with Persatuan Pembangunan Party, that is good, but to be honest, that gives us little chance as we come from similar ideological background. So, in short, sometimes, we just think that as long as the requirement to nominate a particular candidate in the local election is fulfilled, we do not care about ideology, it is more important that our candidate can be nominated and run in the local election.

I: Instead of considering fulfilling the minimum requirements for nominating a particular candidate in the local election, are there any other considerations when making a party coalition?

R: I think, we just think about practical reasons, of course. There are many factors that need to be considered for making a party coalition. Simply, we just discuss with our party coalition partner what we want to do, what we need to do; it is more a technical reason. So, in short, we just discuss two main topics: practical and technical things. For example, the red white coalition: this was a national level party coalition in the previous presidential election. This coalition is going nowhere currently; they do not exist anymore. If the national party coalitions are in doubt, how about us, the parties in at the provincial or regency level? Can you imagine!

I: This is interesting. Do you also discuss the ethnic factor as well when making a coalition with other parties in local elections?

R: As I have explained to you, we also consider it, but that is not the only consideration; we consider also that the ethnic background of our candidate in order to make a coalition with another party. Even the final decision depends on the central party, but sometimes we have to be realistic if our candidate does not come from the ethnic group that we want. However, many believe, such as in East Lampung or Central Lampung regencies, that the pair of candidates must come from an ethnic combination of Lampungese and Javanese; if it does not, we cannot win the local election. But, again, this is not the only factor.

I: So, this is my last question: according to your opinion as a politician, what political learning might we take from local politics in Lampung in general?

R: I think local politics in Lampung is still traditional, the voter is still traditional and the traditional voter is more in number than rational voters. I think that is my opinion.

I: What do you think about traditional?

R: What I meant by a traditional voter is that they are still not a rational voter, their political preference still relies on the family, blood-tie relations, relatives, so they are not choosing the candidate based on the capacity of the candidate, for example, such as Jokowi. I think Prabowo (Presidential Candidate in 2014) is more capable but culturally our voter tends to accept the leadership style of Jokowi (Elected President in 2014).

I: What do you mean by familism in politics?
R: The voter still believes in the family choice or their relatives; the voter is still traditional, so that, the approach used to persuade them (the voter) is to use the ethnic sentiment. So, ethnicity is still considered by us; we are of course thinking about the pragmatic reason. I just realised, my friend who living in Japan and Korea told me that becoming a local council member is not really complicated - just discussing with the voters, arguing the political platform and that’s it. Ours is so complicated!

I: In your opinion, what do you think about ethno-based power in local elections? What do you think about ethnic coalitions in local elections: for example, should the pair come from an ethnic combination of Lampungese and Javanese or vice versa? As you know, the Lampungese are only 13.5 percent of the total population in Lampung. But, interestingly, even in the minority, the Lampungese still dominate the number of elected heads of regency and city mayors?

R : As I told you, the ethnic group is important but we also think about another issue; we also think about his/her leadership capacity even though we realise that our party’s membership are mostly Javanese compared to another ethnic groups. I think the Lampungese are able to dominate the local politics because the Lampungese are better able to serve as politicians. In my opinion, they have a strong desire to get into power; their personality is also more confident.

I: What do you mean by more confident?

R: I think, but this is my opinion, typically, the Lampungese is more progressive than the Javanese. They are more active; they are also more expressive in delivering something. But, I think, Javanese people are also willing to get into power, but have little confidence or bravery. Culturally, the Javanese prefer to accommodate something instead of becoming involved in a conflict. For example, even in a village in which the majority of inhabitants are Javanese, up to 95 percent, the head villager is always Lampungese.

I: Do you believe in power-sharing in Lampung or is this because the Javanese as the majority population just give an opportunity to the Lampungese (as the locals)?

R: I think this is because of those two factors. For example, the Javanese tend to have a simple and easy lifestyle compared with Sumatrans. The Javanese have less ambition for the politics of Lampung, in my view. As a Javanese person, I could say, it is okay that we are not in power but can live comfortably; we realise that the Javanese person is a migrant in Lampung. I also could argue that the process of migration of the Javanese to Lampung is also because the Javanese want a better life, not political positions. In my opinion, as long as the Lampungese political leadership is good enough, we would never complain. I see that many of the Lampungese who served as heads of villages can provide better circumstances for most of the villagers, who are Javanese.
Appendix C

INFORMED CONSENT FORM

Title of Research:
“Ethnicity and its role in local elections in the context of transmigration: case studies from Lampung, Indonesia”

By agreeing the information provided below, I fully understand that my involvement in this project are to complete the Interview, discussion which is conducted as part of the above mentioned project. Please, tick the box if you agree with the statements:

- [ ] I confirm that I have read and understand the information sheet explaining the above research and I have given the opportunity to ask questions about the project;
- [x] I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free to withdraw from research (up to early April 2016). In addition, I am free to decide as to answer or not any particular questions; Should I wish to withdraw from this project, I understand that I can do it by contacting the researcher via email: gyaw@leeds.ac.uk
- [x] I give permission to the supervisory team and peer reviewers to have an access to my responses for academic purposes ONLY; I understand that my name will be revealed in research materials as well as be identifiable in any reports resulting from the research;
- [x] I agree that data collected from me to be used in the future research
- [x] I agree to take part in the above research and allowing data collected to be used in the relevant future research

Name of Participant: Budihardjo
Signature: [Signature]
Date: 16/02/2016
Name of Researcher: Arizka Warganegara
Signature: [Signature]

*) this is an English version. It will be translated into Bahasa before the fieldwork
Appendix D

INFORMATION SHEET

You are being invited to take part in research, titled:

“Ethnicity and its role in local elections in the context of transmigration: case studies from Lampung, Indonesia”

The research will be conducted in the University of Leeds by Arizka Warganegara, a PhD student of School of Geography. However, the fieldwork will take place in Indonesia (Lampung); and the activities will cover a various interview with participants.

Before deciding on taking part on this project, it is important and recommended for you to understand the entirely project aims and objectives. Please read the following information carefully and discuss it with others if you wish. Ask us if there is anything that is not clear or if you would like more information. Take time to decide whether or not you wish to take part. Thank you for your attention.

| Aims | Transmigration plays a significant impact on the ethnic revivalism and power relations particularly in Lampung, Indonesia. Transmigration was a policy which was implemented by Dutch colonial and Soeharto for moving people from Java Island to less populated Island such as Sumatera, Kalimantan and Papua in order to relieve the poverty. In the Dutch colonial era, transmigration program was familiarly known as the kolonisatie. Currently, Transmigrasi program has impacted on the number of population in Lampung. In addition, this is a qualitative research by using a case study methods, in-depth interview with several key informants, observation, media and document studies will be primary data whilst the secondary data will be gathered from journals, books and articles. The general aims of this project is to analyse the influence of the transmigration toward the local politics in three research locations of Lampung. |
| Why I have been chosen? | You have been chosen as participant based on: |
| Interview: | The participant will be selected by using a purposive sampling. According to those concepts and to make interview list are systematic, I will then select interview participants based on their role and the position that they held. For example, local political party leaders. |
| | Second, I selected interview participants based on their occupation and their work. For example, I selected participants from the election supervisory board. |
| | Third, I selected interview participants based on their knowledge and experience of specific issues that formed part |
of my research. For instance, I interviewed a journalist who had investigated the role of a particular company in supporting a candidate in the elections.

Fourth, the process of selecting interviewees was based on my personal experience and academic judgment.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>What Types of Information will be sought from me</th>
<th>There are several information that would be needed in this research:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a. Information on general data and understanding on transmigration policy both in the past and present</td>
<td>a. Information on general data and understanding on transmigration policy both in the past and present</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. General data and information on ERBOs in Lampung</td>
<td>b. General data and information on ERBOs in Lampung</td>
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<td>c. Information on the role of ERBOs in local politics</td>
<td>c. Information on the role of ERBOs in local politics</td>
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<td>d. Information on the symptom of ethnic revivalism and identity in local power</td>
<td>d. Information on the symptom of ethnic revivalism and identity in local power</td>
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<td>e. Information on the role of ethnic symbols and money used to attract the voters in local politics</td>
<td>e. Information on the role of ethnic symbols and money used to attract the voters in local politics</td>
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<tr>
<td>f. Information on the strategies used by Lampungese in subnational election.</td>
<td>f. Information on the strategies used by Lampungese in subnational election.</td>
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<td>g. Information on funding for a political campaign in local politics</td>
<td>g. Information on funding for a political campaign in local politics</td>
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<td>h. etc.</td>
<td>h. etc.</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

| Time Commitment | Interview is planned to take time one to two hour per session. First fifteen minutes will be allocated to reveal the general understanding on this research, aims and the clue idea of questions. |

| Risk and Benefit | No significant personal risk will be faced by participant in this project both physical and emotional as well as financial. |

| Participant's Right | You can withdraw from study up to the early of April 2016. After this dateline, because the withdrawal after April 2016 could disrupt research process onwards |

<p>| Our Responsibility | Data collected will be transcript within seven days after the interview conducted. Moreover, data will also be stored both in the office computer (main university hard drive) and personal laptop and it also will be equipped by installing the password. During the project, supervisor will be able to access the data and no other third parties will be eligible to access the data (Interview). I will also ensure that data protection will be based on the data regulation Act in the United Kingdom and Indonesia. |</p>
<table>
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<tr>
<th><strong>What will happen next in regard to the research results?</strong></th>
<th>The data gathered will be used for my doctoral dissertation, and also it will use to support my publication on several journals.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Who is organising and funding of research</strong></td>
<td>The research is organised by the School of Geography and it is funded by Indonesian Ministry of Higher Education, Research and Technology, Republic of Indonesia.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Contact for further information</strong></td>
<td>For further inquiries about this study, you may contact: Arizka Warganegara School of Geography Faculty of Earth and Environment University of Leeds LS2 9 JT Email: <a href="mailto:gyaw@leeds.ac.uk">gyaw@leeds.ac.uk</a> Mobile: +447860112512</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

*) this is an English version. It will be translated into Bahasa before the fieldwork
Appendix E

The example of the ERBOs internal rule of PSMTI

CHAPTER I
Name, Time and Location

Article 1
Name
1. Paguyuban Sosial Marga Tionghoa Indonesia in Chinese language “印华百家姓协 会” (Yin Hua Bai Jia Xing Xie Hui), in English, Indonesian Chinese Clan Social Association
2. Paguyuban Sosial Marga Tionghoa is then abbreviated as PSMTI

Article 2
Time
PSMTI was established in 28th of September 1998

Article 3
Location
The central office of PSMTI is located in the capital city of Indonesia, Jakarta, and it is allowed to have branches either in Indonesia or abroad.

CHAPTER II
The Organisation Foundations

Article 4
Principle
PSMTI is based on and following the PANCASILA values.

Article 5
PSMTI is following the Indonesian constitution alongside with its amendments.

CHAPTER III
The Function of Organisation

Article 6
Humanity, brotherhood, pride, harmony and compassion

Article 7
Character of Organisation
1). PSMTI is characterised as a social and cultural organisation.
2). PSMTI does not follow a political practice activities and not affiliated with any political parties
3). PSMTI will not turn into a Political Party.
Article 8
Function

1). as a sharing and interaction forum among the Indonesian-Chinese.
2). as the aspiration forum for the Indonesian-Chinese.
3). as a facilitator in order to strengthen relations among Indonesian Chinese clan associations.
4). as a forum for communication and interaction with state institutions, government agencies, organisations and other related community components.
5). as a forum to achieve the ultimate objectives of the PSMTI.
6). as a medium of mediation of dispute among the Indonesian Chinese and between Indonesian-Chinese Marga.

CHAPTER IV
Goals and Efforts

Article 9
Aim

1). PSMTI is willing to involve in the Republic of Indonesia activities in all fields in order to achieve prosperous and prosperous society.
2). PSMTI is also aims to maintain the national integration as it was mandated by the Indonesian founding fathers.
3). to maintain harmony and brotherhood among fellow Indonesian-Chinese citizens.
4). to foster the harmony and brotherhood with other components of society.
5). to achieve an equality of rights and obligations

Article 10
Effort

1). Increasing the awareness of Indonesian-Chinese to Indonesian society, nation and state.
2). Practicing a pure harmony and continuing to involve in a development of the nation and state.
3) Holding activities in the fields of social, cultural, educational, sports, health and community welfare.
4). Organising meetings, counselling, coaching, assistance needed in order to maintain harmony and brotherhood among fellow PSMTI members or with other community.

CHAPTER VI
Membership

Article 12
Membership

PSMTI membership is Indonesian Chinese.

CHAPTER VII
Rights and Obligations of Members
Article 13
Member Rights

1). Right to speak.
2). Voting rights.
3). the right to vote and be elected as a chairman of organisation.
4). the right to get guidance, assistance and protection.

Etc.