Subjectivity and Bilateral Relations

A Lacanian Discourse Analysis of the Sino-Japanese ‘History Problem’
from 1982 to 2012

Hai Guo

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The candidate confirms that the work submitted is his/her own and that appropriate credit has been given where reference has been made to the work of others.

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For Min Li
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Abstract

Despite deepening economic interdependence, Japan and China had rocky relations due to the so-called ‘history problem’, a controversy over the very different understanding of the Second Sino-Japanese War (1931-1945) held by the two sides. Why did the ‘history problem’ persist as a political issue in Sino-Japanese relations? To the question, this thesis has a twofold argument: 1) The ‘history problem’ was a discourse revolving around the ‘Victim-victimizer Duality’, a bilateral norm that relationally structured Japan and China’s respective subject position (identity) as the victimizer and the victim; 2) The ‘history problem’ persisted, because the different discursive strategies that social agents on both sides deployed to negotiate the Victim-victimizer Duality had created a vicious circle, a situation in which the Chinese government demanded recognition of victimhood from Japan while the Japanese government responded in ways that fragmentised China’s victimhood. Over time, the vicious circle accumulated resentments between the two sides, thereby turning the ‘history problem’ into a persisting bilateral issue. Using a method rooted in the psychoanalytic theory of Jacques Lacan, the thesis analyses three major sub-issues in the ‘history problem’, i.e., the Textbook Issue, the Yasukuni Issue, and the Nanking Massacre Debate. The data of the discourse analysis are based on primary sources including news articles in People’s Daily, official documents of the Diet proceedings, unclassified documents collected from the Diplomatic Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, and interviews with members of the Japan-China Joint History Research Project, etc. Overall, this thesis contributes to the study of Sino-Japanese relations by offering new insights into the bilateral dynamics centred around the ‘history problem’; it also contributes to International Relations (IR) theory by developing a methodology that enables IR researchers to more effectively analyse how subjective factors (e.g., identity, fantasies, anxieties, etc.) shape the formation of political discourses in international relations.
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Note on Romanisation of Chinese and Japanese Names

In this thesis, the names of the Chinese and Japanese people are given in the ‘family name first’ order. The only exceptions to this are in reference to authors who have published in English and give their own names with the family name last (e.g., the Chinese American writer Iris Chiang). All Chinese words are presented in standard pinyin without tonal markings. All Japanese words are transliterated under the Hepburn system including the use of macrons, except in place names that are commonly used in English, such as Tokyo.

List of Abbreviation

APEC – Asian Pacific Economic Cooperation
CASS – Chinese Academy of Social Science
IR – International Relations
PRC – People’s Republic of China
MOEJ – Minister of Education of Japan
MOFAJ – Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan
LDP – Liberal Democratic Party
ODA – Overseas Development Assistance
US – United States
UN – United Nations
UNESCO – United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
WWII – World War II
Chapter 1: Introduction

All history is contemporary history.

--Benedetto Croce

Who controls the past controls the future; who controls the present controls the past.

– George Orwell

This thesis analyses the intricate interrelation between human subjectivity and the formation of political discourses in International Relations (IR). It asks two main questions, one empirical, another theoretical. Empirically, it seeks to explain why the ‘history problem’ discourse persisted as a political issue in Sino-Japanese relations, despite increasingly prosperous economic ties and cultural exchange between the two countries? Theoretically, it asks an often overlooked yet unresolved question in IR theory: How can an effective analysis of the subjective dimension of international politics be carried out? In IR, researchers tend to neglect the subjective dimension in international politics, because the literature of IR theory lacks workable methodologies that gear towards analysing how the subjective dimension shapes social and political formation. This thesis aims to fill this research gap by developing a Lacanian approach that synthesised Lacanian psychoanalytic theory, poststructuralist research design, and coding technique of the Grounded Theory Method.

Since the early 1980s, the relationship between Japan and China has been reeling from the so-called ‘history problem’, a transnational controversy over the very different understanding of the Second Sino-Japanese War of 1931-1945 held by the two sides. The ‘history problem’ generated resentments among the Chinese over what was seen as the unwillingness of the Japanese to repent for Japan’s past wrongdoings, as well as frustrations among the Japanese over what was seen as China’s Japan-bashing propaganda. Along with the territorial dispute, public opinions in Japan and China saw the ‘history problem’ as one of the biggest obstacles in Sino-Japanese relations. According to an opinion poll carried out in 2017, 65.6% of the Japanese respondents and 87.2% of the Chinese respondents said that the ‘history problem’ was an obstacle to Sino-Japanese relations; and compared to the polls done in previous years, the figure has increased, showing that the transnational disagreement over the ‘history problem’ became
worsened rather than relieved over time (Genron NPO, 2017, p.22). 2018 marks the 40th anniversary of the peace and friendly treaty signed by Japan and China. In a message to Prime Minister Abe Shinzō, Chinese Premier Li Keqiang repeated the old-fashioned slogan that the two countries should ‘take the past as a mirror and look forward to the future’ (Huang, 2018), connoting a disagreement on how the history was interpreted. With the divergent perceptions of the past held by the Chinese and the Japanese, it is very hard to anticipate how the friction will recede.

The persistence of the ‘history problem’ in Sino-Japanese relations presented two puzzles to IR scholars. The first puzzle concerns the paradox of ‘cold politics and hot economy’. According to integration theory, growing economic interdependence should lead to improved political ties (Dreyer, 2014); however, in Sino-Japanese relations, the opposite occurred: Sino-Japanese relations were featured by strong cooperations in economic relations and deep-seated distrust in political relations (Koo, 2009, p.205). It seemed that the more economically convergent Japan and China were, the more politically divergent they became in coming to terms with the past (Kawashima, 2006, p.361).

The second puzzle is about the generational change and the force of historical narratives. Conventional wisdom tells us that time heals past bad blood; but in Sino-Japanese relations, this has not been the case. In the 1970s, the ‘history problem’ was not an issue between Japan and China at all; but in the 1980s, the ‘history problem’ emerged as a political issue in the bilateral relations (Hiroshi, 2014, p.1); in the 1990s and the 2000s, the ‘history problem’ and discourses built around it began to exert more and more force in shaping Japan and China’s mutual perception and foreign policymaking. This phenomenon is paradoxical, because only a rather tiny proportion of the Chinese and the Japanese population living today have direct experience of taking part in the Second Sino-Japanese War, and the number will decrease to zero

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1 According to statistics released by National Bureau of Statistics of the People’s Republic of China, in year 2013 there are 81 million senior citizens who age above 70-year-old, amounting to approximately 6.04% of the population (for statistics see: http://data.stats.gov.cn/workspace/index?m=hgnd). In Japan by year 2013, only 3.6% of the population had direct war experience as adult (born before 1928), and 10.8% of Japanese had indirect experience as children (born between 1929 and 1940). By contrast, 85.6% of Japanese have never had any war experience (for statistics see: http://www.stat.go.jp/data/jinsui/index.htm; and http://tmaita77.blogspot.co.uk/2013/08/blog-post_15.html).
in a few years (He, 2006 p.2; Tōgō, 2008; Hiroshi, 2014 p.1). In other words, time did not heal but rather reignited the wound of the past between Japan and China.2

How to account for the persistence of the ‘history problem’ in Sino-Japanese relations? The dominant approach in the existing literature (i.e., the instrumentalist approach) argues that the ‘history problem’ persisted as a handy political instrument used by political elites. On the one hand, the Chinese government used the ‘history problem’ as a diplomatic leverage against Japan (see: Bennett, 2008; Calder, 2006; Cooney & Sato, 2008; Drifte, 2005; Heazle & Knight, 2007; Hoshino & Satoh, 2012; Malik, 2006a; Malik, 2006b; Manicom & O’Neil, 2009; Roy, 2004; Rozman, 2002; Schneider, 2008). On the other hand, the political elites on both sides used the ‘history problem’ as a political instrument to incite nationalistic sentiment among the public, in order to justify the elites’ ruling legitimacy (Kushner, 2007; Qiu, 2006; He, 2004; 2007; 2009). For the instrumentalist approach, the ‘slippery’ thing called ‘subjectivity’ played little role in the rationalistic agenda-setting process and political calculation performed by political leaders and the states.

However, many researchers find the instrumentalist approach dissatisfactory, for it adopts a research framework that problematically circumvents the subjective dimension of international politics, the political significance of which is unneglectable. For instance, Chih-Yu Shih (1995) describes that Japan played a central role as an ‘Other’ in the psychological foundations of Chinese foreign policy making and consolidated China’s reinvention of ‘Self’ as a sovereign state in the late 19th and 20th century (p.544; emhpasis added); Seaton (2010) contends that ‘the war maintains a powerful grip on the modern Japanese psyche’ (p.6); Whiting and Xi (1990) argue that the traumatic experiences resulting from Japan’s invasion on Chinese soil have left a deep scar on the Chinese psyche that remains to these days (cited in Suzuki, 2007 p. 25); Wan (2008) suggests that emotions have become a serious obstacle to an improvement of relations and to keeping the relationship on a more even keel (p.62; p.86; p.112;p.156; p.256); Gustafsson (2014a), in his analysis of Sino-Japanese memory politics, argues that continuity in recognition makes agents feel secure in their identities (p.121); Ria Shibata (2015) emphasises that

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2 The situation, of course, is not unique to Japan and China. In contemporary politics, history of wars often turn out to be wars of histories. In the West, the historians’ debate (Historikerstreit) over the uniqueness of the Holocaust in Germany in the late 1980s (Heuser, 1988; pensley, 1989; Berghahn, 1991), the ongoing debate over the genocide of aborigines in Australia (Macintyre and Clark, 2004; Mellor et al., 2007), and the recent debate over the removal of Confederal statues in the U.S. (Bidgood et al., 2017), all pertain to cases where the divergent interpretations of the past held by different groups within a nation severely challenged the national history and identity.
it is important to analyse subjective factors such as memory, trauma, and experience, concluding that ‘while the Chinese people continue to feel bitter about their suffering and the lack of genuine Japanese atonement for its war guilt, the majority of Japanese people, suffering from historical amnesia, feel frustrated with endless Chinese demands for apology and reparations’ (p.79); Yang (2001a) argues that the ‘history problem’ has deeper roots in human psychology (p.22). Those remarks highlighted the significance of subjectivity not just in analysing the ‘history problem’ in Sino-Japanese relations, but also in analysing international relations more generally.

Subjective factors – such as identity, passion, guilt, shame, narrative, fantasy, emotion, affect, desire, etc. – should be analysed on their own terms, rather than be treated as mere epiphenomena of realpolitik. But unfortunately, IR scholars have not paid sufficient attention to the subjective dimension. As Ross comments, the IR discipline ‘generally adopt[s] frameworks and methodologies that conceal social dimensions of emotion that otherwise seem intuitively plausible’ (Ross, 2014, p.15). To analyse the ‘history problem’ discourse more thoroughly and to shed light on the subjective dimension of international politics, we need a research methodology that puts the relationship between human subjectivity and political/social formation at the forefront of political analysis.

This thesis offers such a methodology, i.e., an approach of discourse analysis rooted in the psychoanalytic theory developed by French psychoanalyst Jacques Lacan. Lacan was best known for his linguistic approach in re-reading the work of Sigmund Freud and the emphasis on the primacy of language in constituting human psyche and society. Lacan’s theory has far-reaching influence in both psychiatry and social sciences, for his theory provides researchers with sophisticated conceptual tools to make sense of subjectivity and the underlying mechanism by which subjectivity shapes the dynamism of social relations. In IR, Lacan’s theory is most influential among scholars of poststructuralism, who draw on Lacan to analyse international politics and to critique the intellectual ideology behind the dominant IR theory (see: Heikka, 1999; Edkins, 2008; Epstein, 2010; Arfi, 2010; Salgó, 2013; Solomon, 2015).

With a methodology informed by the Lacanian theory, this research will analyse three cases (sub-issues) in the ‘history problem’, namely, the Textbook Issue, the Yasukuni Issue, and the Nanking Massacre Debate. To establish the empirical data for the discourse analysis, this thesis

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3 Examples include the studies of political theory (Žižek, 1989; Stavrakakis, 2007), culture (Bracher, 1997), law (Schroeder, 2008), racism (Seshadri-Crooks, 2000), organisational behaviour (Arnaud and Vanheule, 2007), and religion (DiCenso, 1994)
made use of a significant number of primary sources, including relevant governmental documents, archival documents, news articles, and interview materials (see: pp.71-76). Thus, this research expands not only the narrow, empirical field of Sino-Japanese relations but also the broader, theoretical field of IR theory by shedding new light on the Sino-Japanese ‘history problem’, using new documentary evidence relating to the issue, and developing a systematic research framework that accentuates the interrelations between human subjectivity and the formation of political discourses in international relations.

**Research Question and Argument**

This research asks two overarching questions, one empirical, another theoretical. The empirical question is related to the ‘history problem’, while the theoretical question is related to how subjectivity can be researched in IR. I will first discuss the empirical question, before turning to the theoretical one.

The Empirical Question: Why did the ‘history problem’ persist?

The empirical research question: *What accounts for the emergence and persistence of the ‘history problem’ discourse in Sino-Japanese relations since the 1980s despite prosperous economic ties and booming cultural exchange between the two countries?*

To answer the main empirical question, I ask the following sub-questions:

1) How has the existing literature addressed the research question?
2) What aspects or factors in international politics has the existing literature neglected in analysing the ‘history problem’ discourse in Sino-Japanese relations?
3) Can new lights be shed on the questions from a theoretical viewpoint informed by Lacanian psychoanalysis? If so, How?

To the empirical research question, my argument is twofold: 1) The ‘history problem’ was a discourse revolving around the ‘Victim-victimizer Duality’, a bilateral norm that relationally structured Japan and China’s respective subject position (identity) as the victimizer and the victim; 2) The ‘history problem’ persisted, because the different discursive strategies that social agents on both sides deployed to negotiate the Victim-victimizer Duality had created a vicious circle, a situation in which the Chinese government demanded recognition of victimhood from
Japan while the Japanese government responded in ways that fragmentised China’s victimhood, making the Chinese government repeat their demand more strongly. Over time, the vicious circle accumulated resentments between the two sides, thereby turning the ‘history problem’ into a persisting bilateral issue.

To be more specific, the vicious circle refers to a feedback loop as follows: 1) perceiving Japan as underrecognising China’s victim identity, the Chinese government demanded that Japan fully recognise the Victim-victimizer Duality as the bilateral norm; 2) to repress to the Chinese demand, the Japanese government framed the ‘history problem’ in terms of technicalities, fragmentising China’s victim identity, and thereby, inciting the Chinese government into making more demands; 3) additionally, right-leaning Japanese politicians, who grew resentful of the Chinese government, contested that the existing bilateral norm was anti-Japanese. Over time, the vicious circle accumulated mutual resentment: the Japanese became increasingly resistant towards the Victim-victimizer Duality, while the Chinese became increasingly insecure about their victim identity.

The argument derives from the Lacanian theorisation of ‘four discourses’. To start with, the subject’s identity is defined by ‘the Symbolic’, a socio-linguistic network that structures how the subject relates to the others, hence the subject’s identity (see: pp.40-51). In other words, identity is not an internal property that the subject possesses, but an external effect that the Symbolic imposed on the subject. This definition of identity implies that changes of identity are subject to changes of the Symbolic. To change the Symbolic, the subject can deploy four distinct discursive strategies: the master’s discourse that asserts authority, the university’s discourse that frames things in terms of technicalities, the hysteric’s discourse that questions the authority, and the analyst’s discourse that transforms social relations and creates new identities. Each discourse produces specific effects on the Symbolic and social agents involved: the master’s discourse generates resentment in the Other, the university’s discourse fragmentises the Other’s subjective identity, the hysteric’s discourse generates knowledge about the subject’s social relations with the Other, and the analyst’s discourse motivates the Other to articulate their identity anew. The four discursive strategies are what Lacan terms as the ‘four discourses’ (see: pp.51-58), a conceptual device that helps us to map how subjects communicate with the other in ways that generated anxieties (in the master’s discourse), fragmentation of identity (in the university’s discourse), knowledge (in the hysteric’s discourse), and new identity (in the analyst’s discourse).
In Sino-Japanese relations, Japan and China’s identities were relationally structured by the Victim-victimizer Duality, a pre-established bilateral norm that defined Japan and China’s respective identity as the victimizer and the victim (see: Chapter 5). The Textbook Issue of 1982 destabilised the Victim-victimizer Duality, and social agents on the two sides confronted the uncertainty of their identities by enacting different discursive strategies. In the case of the ‘history problem’, the Chinese government enacted the master’s discourse to articulate the Victim-victimizer Duality, the Japanese government enacted the university’s discourse to repress the Victim-victimizer Duality, and some Japanese right-leaning politicians enacted the hysteric’s discourse to question the Victim-victimizer Duality. But these three discursive strategies created in the bilateral relations more and more anxieties: The university’s discourse used by the Japanese government fragmentised China’s victim identity, making the Chinese demand more recognition of victimhood from Japan; the Chinese government used the master’s discourse, creating resentment among the Japanese; right-wing Japanese politicians grew resentful of China’s demands and thus questioned the Victim-victimizer Duality, making the Chinese government more assertive in defending the Victim-victimizer Duality. The only discourse that can transform the Symbolic is the analyst’s discourse. But the analyst’s discourse was absent from bilateral discourses centred around the ‘history problem’. In other words, the ‘history problem’ persisted as a product of the vicious circle, in which both sides tried to work through a discursive cal-de-sac: the Chinese government attempted to have the bilateral relations structured according to the Victim-victimizer Duality, while the Japanese government avoided having the bilateral relations so structured.

The Theoretical Question: How to analyse the subjective in international politics?

The theoretical question: How can an effective research framework or methodology be developed to make sense of the subjective dimension of international politics, such as anxieties, fantasy, identity, emotions, affect, and desires (as opposed to what are conventionally understood as ‘objective’ factors, such as economic, military factors, etc.) without problematically reifying state-actors as unitary, essentialised, and personified entities?

To the theoretical question, I argue that an approach of discourse analysis informed by Lacan’s psychoanalytic theory can better make sense of how the subjective dimension shapes international politics (e.g., why certain discourse is more persistent than others). This is achieved by conceptualising state identity as a discursive effect of the Symbolic, rather than an essentialised,
reified entity. In addressing the subjective dimension of international politics, there are two major schools of thought, namely, constructivism and poststructuralism. Constructivism conceives of state identity as a causal determinant that precedes and shapes state behaviour. I argue that the constructivist conceptualisation of state identity is problematic, because it invites a tautological argument: Researchers can only determine a state’s identity by looking at how the state behaves, but the state’s behaviours are supposed to be the effect, rather than the cause, of the state’s identity.

By contrast, the Lacanian approach – an approach which belongs to the school of poststructuralism and one which this thesis adopts – avoids the problem of making a tautological argument. By conceptualising identity as an effect of the Symbolic (discourse), we can grasp the constitutive relationship between identity and behaviours – the subject’s identity informs their behaviour and the subject’s behaviour performs their identity. This way, we circumvent the need to theorise states as person-like entities that ‘feel’, ‘emote’, and ‘possess’ identities. Instead, we turn to look at how social agents at different levels used different discursive strategies to confront the structural lack of unity, wholeness, and certainty in the Symbolic and the collective identities structured therein. This approach allows researchers to more systematically analyse how subjectivity shaped international politics, because analysis of the subjective dimension no longer relies on the assumption that state-actors have subjective properties such as emotions and affects; instead, the analysis turns to examine the discursive process by which individual or organisational subjects performed speech to negotiate their collective identities by altering the Symbolic with different discursive strategies, and what discursive effects were generated in the discursive process (see: Chapter 3).

**Structure of the Thesis**

This thesis is arranged in the following structure. The second chapter – Chapter 2: Literature Review – reviews the current academic discourse of the ‘history problem’, the study of subjectivity in IR, and how previous studies approach the research question raised by this thesis. I will demonstrate the research gap, re-examine pertinent theories in IR, and point towards the need to draw on the Lacanian theory to develop a new methodology for analysing the ‘history problem’ and, more generally, the subjective dimension in international politics.

Chapter 3 will introduce the theory, method, and research design of the thesis. I will first introduce the key Lacanian terms used in the thesis. The most important concepts are Lacan’s

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4 Lacan calls the fundamental lack in the subject’s identity and the Symbolic ‘the Real’.
‘four discourses’. ‘Four discourses’ stand for four different discursive strategies that social agents adopt to confront the destabilisation of the Symbolic in Sino-Japanese relations. After clarifying the theoretical/philosophical premise of the thesis, I will provide a detailed account of the method, research design, and technical procedures for conducting the discourse analysis. At the end of the chapter, I will layout the database upon which each of the analytical chapters is based.

Chapter 4 aims to establish the socio-political context of the three sub-issues of the ‘history problem’, i.e., the Textbook Issue, the Yasukuni Issue, and the Nanking Massacre Debate, by outlining the evolvement of each sub-issue. The context will enable readers to be better informed about the background of the ‘history problem’ and also allow the subsequent analytical chapters to be more focused.

Chapter 5 will analyse the Textbook Issue using primary sources including over news articles in People’s Daily, unclassified documents obtained from Diplomatic Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, and Japanese Diet proceeding made during the Textbook Issue of 1982, 1986, and the 2000s. I hypothesise that the Textbook Issue emerged and persisted as a discursive process by which the Chinese and the Japanese governments enacted different discursive strategies to deal with the destabilising of the Victim-victimizer Duality, the Symbolic that structured Japan and China’s subject positions (identities) relationally. More specifically, the Chinese government enacted the master’s discourse, with the master-signifier of ‘matter of principle’, instituting the Victim-victimizer Duality as the norm of the bilateral relations; the Japanese government enacted the university’s discourse to frame the Textbook Issue in terms of technicalities, repressing a clear-cut articulation regarding the Victim-victimizer Duality; some Japanese politicians enacted the master’s discourse with the master-signifier of ‘educational sovereignty’, contending that China unjustly interfered with Japan’s domestic affairs.

Chapter 6 analyses the Yasukuni Issue using primary sources including news articles of People’s Daily, official documents of the Diet proceedings, the Collective View of the Japanese Government on the Yasukuni Issue made by Japanese prime ministers and Chief Cabinet Secretary, Question & Written Answers Documents (shitsumon shuisho to tōbensho 質問主意書と答弁書) relevant to the Yasukuni Issue. I will argue that the Yasukuni Issue, similar to the Textbook Issue, has also been a discourse revolving around the Victim-victimizer Duality. Whereas the Chinese government demanded its Japanese counterpart to accept the so-called Militarist/People Dichotomy (i.e., a narrative that differentiated the militarists and the Japanese
people in attributing war responsibility), the Japanese government was discontent with the Chinese agenda. Interactions between the two sides led to an impasse – neither side could agree with each other’s attribution of war responsibility. In addition, some right-leaning Japanese politicians enacted the hysteric’s discourse, challenging the Victim-victimizer Duality.

Chapter 7 will analyse the Nanking Massacre Debate using primary sources including news articles of People’s Daily, official documents of the Diet proceedings, Question & Written Answers Documents relevant to the Nanking Massacre Debate, and interviews conducted with members of the Japan-China Joint History Research Committee in 2016. I will argue that the Nanking Massacre revolved around the interpretation of the Tokyo Trial, and, similar to the previous cases, persisted as a process by which the Chinese and the Japanese used different discursive strategies to negotiate the Symbolic that structured their subject positions (identities) relationally as the victim and the victimizer. Specifically speaking, the Chinese government enacted the master’s discourse with the master-signifier of the Tokyo Trial to counter the Japanese denialist who destabilised the Victim-victimizer Duality and to repress the dividedness of the Chinese victim identity structured therein. Some Japanese politicians enacted the hysteric’s discourse to challenge the master-signifier of the Tokyo Trial in order to deny the Nanking Massacre. The Japanese government enacted the university’s discourse to repress the master-signifier of the Tokyo Trial, framing the Nanking Massacre as an academic issue that could be resolved by historical research. The discourse analysis of the Nanking Massacre Debate will show that academic knowledge was ineffective, if not counterproductive, when served as a common ground for discussing the ‘history problem’ between the two sides, because the professional discipline of history was produced by the university’s discourse, a discourse that compounded the historiographical narrative, and thus fragmentising the Victim-victimizer Duality. This the Chinese government found disagreeable.

Chapter 8 will make concluding remarks and tie together the various issues covered in the previous chapters. I will highlight the argument put forth by this research, the theoretical implications for IR, the limitations of this research, and provide a direction and area for future research.
Chapter 2: Literature Review – The History and Problem of the ‘History Problem’

Introduction

In this chapter, I will provide a wide-ranging review of the English-, Chinese- and Japanese-language literature relating to the ‘history problem’ in Sino-Japanese relations. To be more specific, I will explain what the ‘history problem’ is, and how the existing academic literature understands the persistence of the ‘history problem’; and then, I will move on to assess the existing literature critically and point out the need to look at the subjective dimension of international relations in order to develop a more in-depth explanation of the research question.

The ‘History Problem’ Discourse

What is the ‘history problem’ in Sino-Japanese relations? There are two ways to understand this concept. First, the ‘history problem’ refers to a wide-ranging cluster of political issues, including the Textbook Issue, the Yasukuni Issue, the Nanking Massacre Debate, the ‘comfort women’ (the military sexual slavery system), Japanese apologies and abandoned Japanese chemical weapons, etc. (Bu, 2015; Togo and Hatano, 2015). Second, the ‘history problem’ refers to a political process by which issues of the ‘history problem’ became politicised into a series of diplomatic issues between Japan and China.

This thesis analyses the ‘history problem’ in the latter sense, i.e., ‘history problem’ as a political process. Crucially, the ‘history problem’ is not just about how the same history is differently interpreted; it also involves the mutual resentment generated from the different ways the Chinese and the Japanese understood the ‘history problem’ (Gustafsson, 2016b). The Chinese public primarily understood the ‘history problem’ as having been caused by Japan’s unrepentant attitude towards its past wrongdoings; whereas the Japanese public primarily understood it as having been caused by China’s anti-Japanese propaganda. This thesis looks at the ‘history problem’ as a political discourse in Sino-Japanese relations and, thus, will focus primarily on how the ‘history problem’ evolved onto the diplomatic agenda between the Japanese and Chinese government.

The ‘history problem’ in Sino-Japanese relations initially started in 1982. At that time, the Japanese Ministry of Education allegedly made a controversial recommendation to a history textbook, a recommendation that changed the word ‘aggression’ into ‘advancement’ in sections describing Japanese military actions in China during the 1930s and the 1940s (see: Rose, 2005).
Seeing this recommendation as whitewashing Japan’s invasion of China, the Chinese government issued diplomatic protests to the Japanese government. The Textbook Issue was a controversy over how the Japanese army’s wartime atrocities in China was described in Japanese history textbooks, and similar controversies occurred in 1986 and the late 1990s, when Japanese right-wing groups organised themselves to produce history textbooks with an overt revisionist ideology that justified Japan’s war in Asia and omitted the description of the Nanking Massacre and comfort women.

In the 2000s, the ‘history problem’ was turned into a major source of bilateral tension with the Yasukuni Issue. The Yasukuni Issue was concerned about whether or not Japanese prime ministers and cabinet members should pay tribute to a ritual site called the Yasukuni Shrine (yasukuni jinja 靖国神社). The Yasukuni Shrine enshrines 14 ‘Class A’ war criminals, who were judged by the International Military Tribunal for the Far East (the Tokyo Trial henceforth) as responsible for organising Japan’s war in Asia and the Pacific during the World War II; therefore, when Japanese political leaders visited the shrine in public capacity, the Chinese government condemned them as glorifying militarism. The diplomatic row first surfaced in 1985 when the Chinese government lodged a diplomatic protest against Japanese Prime Minister Nakasone Yasuhiro’s visit to the shrine, stating that his worshipping the war criminals hurt the Asian people’s emotions. The diplomatic row died down with Nakasone’s concession but was reignited in the 2000s, when Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi Junichirō began to pay regular tribute to the Yasukuni Shrine despite fierce Chinese criticisms (see: Griffith, 2014). Due to the negative effect that the Yasukuni Issue had on the bilateral relations, many political analysts used the term ‘hot economy, cold politics’ to describe Sino-Japanese relations (Yamamoto, 2005; Tsuji, 2005; Takahashi, 2005; Kenzō et al., 2009; Koo, 2009).

The most politically sensitive sub-issue in the ‘history problem’ discourse is the Nanking Massacre Debate (Sun, 2002, p.14). The Nanking Massacre refers to the mass murder and rape committed by the Japanese army against Chinese civilians and soldiers during the occupation of the city of Nanking during the Second Sino-Japanese war in 1937. The event made its way into China’s official narrative in the 1980s (Wang, 2017), and since then, has been commemorated as an official symbol of China’s collective trauma (Gao and Alexander, 2012) and became a ‘stumbling block in Sino-Japanese relationship in the 21st century’ (Mitter, 2007 p. 11). The controversy was primarily about the very different figures regarding how many Chinese people were killed by the Japanese soldiers in the event. The Chinese maintained that the death toll of the Nanking Massacre amounts to 300,000, but the Japanese side in general disagreed
with the Chinese figure. In Japan, there were multiple, sometimes competing, voices: the Japanese government maintained that the number of casualties should be determined by further research; some scholars estimated that the number of people killed varied from a few thousand to twenty thousand; some denialists contended that the Nanking Massacre did not exist at all. In the media discourse, the Chinese media lamented the Japanese ignorance and denial of the Nanking Massacre. By contrast, in the Japanese media, there was not much discussion about the event; when there was, the discussion was largely dominated by a few vocal rightists who framed the Nanking Massacre as an ‘anti-Japanese propaganda’ fabricated by the Chinese.

The Textbook Issue, the Yasukuni Issue, and the Nanking Massacre Debate will be analysed by this thesis. But this does not mean that I downplay some other sub-issues in the ‘history problem’ discourse, such as the issue of comfort women (Yoshimi, 2002), chemical weapon (Hanaoka et al., 2006), and compensation movement (Rose, 2009, chap. 4). The Textbook Issue, the Yasukuni Issue, and the Nanking Massacre Debate were singled out for analysis, because they have exerted more political impact on the governmental relationship between Japan and China than the other sub-issues: the Textbook Issue marked the beginning of the ‘history problem’, the Yasukuni Issue was one of the most controversial issues in Sino-Japanese relations between 2001 and 2006, and the Nanking Massacre remained a source of bilateral conflict recently with the UNESCO row. A piece of more detailed background information about the three sub-issues will be given in Chapter 4. In what follows, I will move on to review how the existing literature addressed the persistence of the ‘history problem’ in Sino-Japanese relations.

**Existing Literature**

To gather the existing literature, I used keywords including ‘history problem’, ‘history issue’, ‘Sino-Japanese relations’, and ‘China-Japan relations’, etc., to search for results relevant to the

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5 It is very hard to find any activities or reports in Japanese regarding the Nanking Massacre in Japan by google search using the keyword nankin jiken 南京事件; on Yahoo.jp, most of the results found on the internet are blog-articles which criticise the Nanking Massacre as China’s anti-Japanese propaganda. But these articles seem marginalised by Japan’s mainstream media and hardly represent the whole of the Japanese social attitude toward the Nanking Massacre. Therefore, I believe that the Japanese public attitude towards the Nanking Massacre should be described as ‘lacking in attention’, if not ‘indifferent’.

6 In 2015, the Chinese government requested to register disputed Chinese documents recording the mass murder and rape committed by the Japanese troops after the Fall of Nanking of 1937; the Japanese government warned last year that it might withdraw the funding if UN agreed with China’s request. In 2016, after the Chinese request was accepted, Japan suspended more than $34m funding of that year as a protest.
research question in English-, Chinese-, and Japanese-language sources in the search engines of Google Scholar and Web of Science. After the searching, I collected 136 academic books and articles.

Not all research spoke directly to the research question. Depending on the authors and the pertinent academic paradigm, the discussion of the ‘history problem’ took on different variants, such as ‘politics of apology’ (Yamazaki, 2005), ‘reconciliation’ (Rose, 2009), ‘national myth-making’ (He, 2007), ‘conflicts of historical understanding’ (Liu & Wakashima, 2009), ‘divergence of war memory’ (Seraphim, 2008) or ‘identity politics’ (Seo, 2008), etc. Also, many researchers deployed more of a descriptive approach that examined the historical evolution of the ‘history problem’ and discourse built around it empirically without explicitly making an explanatory argument regarding why the ‘history problem’ persisted (see: Rose, 2009; Berger, 2012; Saito, 2016). Furthermore, some research did not address the ‘history problem’ per se but rather situated it in the context of the rivalry between Japan and China (Wan, 2006; Heazle and Knight, 2007), the development of the Japanese nationalism (Rose, 2000; Nozaki, 2002; Seaton, 2007; Nozaki, 2008; Seldon and Nozaki, 2009; Killmeier and Chiba, 2010), and the evolution of the Chinese nationalism (Whiting, 1983; Whiting, 1989; Whiting and Xin, 1990; Callahan, 2004; Callahan, 2006; Coble, 2007; Wu, 2007; Yuan, 2008).

However, it is still possible to group the results into different clusters. According to their arguments and the underpinning theoretical assumptions, I have sorted the results into four groups: 1) the literature in the Japanese- and Chinese-language sources; 2) the instrumentalist approach; 3) the nationalist approach; 4) the constructivist approach. I will turn to them in the following sub-sections.

Academic discourses in Japanese- and the Chinese-language sources
I will first discuss the academic discourses about the ‘history problem’ in the Japanese- and Chinese-language sources, because they are not only academic works, but also, to a great extent, reflect how the ‘history problem’ was understood differently by the Japanese and the Chinese. In general, both the Japanese- and Chinese-language literature put a strong emphasis on leaders’ behaviours and how such behaviours constituted the ‘history problem’. In particular, the Japanese academic discourse tended to adopt a descriptive writing-style that avoided making explanatory arguments with normative implications, while the Chinese academic discourse tended to carry with it a strong normative implication that was explicitly critical of the Japanese government’s ‘incorrect’ historical understanding.
The Japanese literature typically focused on empirically reconstructing the process of how the ‘history problem’ became politicised in Sino-Japanese relations. Many authors in the Japanese-language literature are scholars or former officials who, more or less, were involved in China-related foreign affairs for the Japanese government. For instance, Okabe Tatsumi (岡部達味), who conducted detailed historical research tracing the process of China’s responses to Japan regarding the ‘history problem’ since the Textbook Issue of 1982 (Okabe, 2006), was the former president of the Japan-China Friendship Committee for the 21st Century. A similar figure of scholar-official is Togo Kazuhiko (東郷和彦), a former Japanese diplomat, who has published prolifically on the topic of the ‘history problem’ in both English- and Japanese-language, including a review of Murayama Statement’s impact on Japan’s relations with China and Korea (Togo, 2013), Japan’s historical memory and nationalism (Hasegawa and Togo, 2008), and a systematic review of the history-related political issues that Japan has with its neighbouring countries (Togo and Hatano, 2015).

Takahara Akio (高原明夫; who was also a former visiting scholar at the Japanese Embassy in Beijing from 1996 to 1998), Hattori Ryūji (服部龍二), and Hatano Sumio (波多野澄雄) – members of the Japan-China Joint History Research Committee (an intergovernmental project established in 2007 by the Japanese and the Chinese government to address the ‘history problem’) – also contributed to the study of the ‘history problem’ discourse. Takahara's work is a process-tracing research that describes the diplomatic history of Sino-Japanese relations from 1972 to 2012 and its relationship to the ‘history problem’ (Takahara and Hattori, 2012). Hattori Ryūji’s research reconstructed most of the key episodes of the ‘history problem’ discourse that Japan had with China and Korea, including the Textbook Issue, the Yasukuni Issue, the Comfort Women Issue, the Kono Statement, and the Murayama Statement. As he emphasises, his research deliberately avoided making strong criticism or argument (Hattori, 2015). The similarly dispassionate approach was taken by Hatano, who offered perhaps the most comprehensive assessment of Japan’s post-war reconciliation settlement with the Asian countries since Japan’s defeat in 1945 (Hatano, 2011).

Ōnuma Yasuaki (大沼保昭), a professor in international law at Tokyo University and a former director of the Asian Women’s Fund, is yet another noteworthy author. Focusing more on the Comfort Women Issue that Japan has with Korea, he criticised the conservative historical understanding that saw Japan’s military operations during the WWII as what ‘emancipated’ Asian nations; further, he critically assessed the legitimacy of the Tokyo Trial and regarded it as the starting point of the ‘history problem’ (Ōnuma, 1997; Ōnuma and Egawa, 2015). There
are some other academic works that also focused on reconstructing the ‘history problem’ using official documentaries. These works include: Kasahara’s assessment of the Japan-China Joint History Research Project (Kasahara, 2011), Nagata’s analysis of the Chinese government’s official responses to the Textbook Issue (Nagata, 2013), Iechika’s analysis of the connection between China’s patriotic education and the ‘history problem’ (Iechika et al., 2012), and Liu’s historiographical research about how the Japanese and the Chinese interpretation of history developed differently (Liu et al., 2006).

The Chinese literature was less descriptive and tended to be very critical of Japan’s rightist ideology and the Japanese government’s insufficient repentance. The most systematic work focusing on the ‘history problem’ in Chinese-language was done by Bu Ping (步平), the Chinese chairman of the Japan-China Joint History Research Committee (Bu, 2015). Similar to his Japanese counterparts, Bu Ping was a historian who meticulously traced the historical development of various issues in the ‘history problem’, including the war reparation issue, the Textbook Issue, the Yasukuni Issue, and abandoned Japanese chemical weapons, etc. Bu argued that the ‘history problem’ persisted because the settlement of Japan’s war responsibility was insufficient and kept the rightist ideologues in Japan alive (Bu, 2015, pp.1–7). In a similar vein, Guan Jianqiang’s monograph analysed the ‘history problem’ from the perspective of international law (Guan, 2016), arguing that the insufficient settlement of Japan’s war responsibility in the Tokyo Trial led to a situation where Japan and China were trapped in the ‘history problem’ (ibid. p. 2). Li Xiushi, a professor of Fudan University, published a monograph that provided a thorough historical examination of the Textbook Issue by relating it to the change of Japan’s socio-political context from 1868 to 2012, concluding that the Textbook Issue was an ‘index of Japan’s political tendency’ (Li, 2012). Compared to their Japanese counterparts, the Chinese researchers mentioned above invariably wrote in a way that was highly critical of the Japanese right-wing social movement and ideology.

The critical attitude was widely shared by the Chinese literature on the ‘history problem’. Most Chinese scholars conclude that the ‘history problem’ was a major obstacle in Sino-Japanese relations (Jiang, 2004; Zhang, 2004), that the persistence of the ‘history problem’ should be attributed to Japan’s right-leaning historical understanding that beautifies Japan’s militarism (Zhang, 2005; Zhu, 2005), and that Japan’s ‘incorrect’ historical understanding pertained to a manifestation of its anti-China and pro-U.S. foreign policymaking as upheld by the LDP (Wang Ping, 2005; Wang Shaopu, 2005). Some other Chinese scholars focused on the media discourse, including how People’s Daily depicted the Yasukuni Issue (Xu, 2015) and how the Japanese
media reported the issues of the ‘history problem’ (An, 2009). Some other scholars examined Japan and China’s distinct political value and cultural perception, emphasising that the ‘history problem’ persisted because the Chinese and the Japanese held national stereotypes that cultivated negative mutual perceptions of each other (Peng, 2007; Hu, 2008; Zhu, 2018).7

Both the Japanese- and the Chinese-language literature have their strengths and problems. The Japanese literature excelled at offering careful reconstructions of the historical development of the ‘history problem’ discourse. However, they often avoided arriving at more explanatory arguments to address why the ‘history problem’ discourse persisted.8 By contrast, the Chinese literature was less descriptive and more inclined to explain the persistence of the ‘history problem’ discourse in terms of Japan’s right-leaning political tendency or political leaders’ behaviours. The Chinese research suffered from the problem that they were often so critical of the Japanese right-wingers and Japanese leaders that their writing style appeared to be more accusatory than analytical.9 Also, the majority of the Chinese literature focused much less on analysing how the Chinese side had contributed to the development of the ‘history problem’. Though the speech and behaviours of some Japanese politicians were indeed outrageously wrong and deliberately insensitive, the explanatory power of the Chinese research was comprised by a lack of self-reflection. To analyse the ‘history problem’ more thoroughly, it is analytically desirable to take bilateral dynamism into account without taking a one-sided view on the issue. As a commentator said, ‘Japan is not solely responsible for the gulf that separates it from its neighbours’ (Kristof, 1998, p.42).

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7 It should be noted that I have discarded due to the repetitiveness; in fact, some papers, which are mostly published during the height of the Yasukuni Issue between 2001 and 2006, seem more like critical commentaries (that usually consist of just few pages) rather than academic research.

8 As a result, when I was doing the review of these works, I felt rather difficult to pin down a definitely argument from the text.

9 For instance, in a paper discussing the ‘history problem’ between Japan and China, the author states very explicitly that ‘the problems that occurred in Sino-Japanese relations – such as the issue regarding the history textbook and the Yasukuni Shrine – were all caused by the Japanese side, not the Chinese side. To improve Sino-Japanese relations and promote peace in Asia, the Japanese leaders have to solve their problem of historical understanding by giving up the ideology of “Throwing off Asia and Entering Europe”’ (Zhang Haipeng, 2004, p.1). Some other scholar argue that ‘Japan has not totally admitted its wrongdoing in the past, taken responsibility, and sincerely apologised…Some Japanese are making troubles with the “history problem”, which is why two sides are still having disputes’ (Zhang Senlin, 2005, p.23), that the ‘history problem’ is caused by Japan’s anti-Chinese insecurity policy since the end of the Cold War (Zhang, 2007, p.18), and that the persistence of the ‘history problem’ discourse is partially caused by the ‘structure-less historical view’ held by the Japanese academia (Bu, 2007, p.4).
The problems with some of the research in the Japanese descriptiveness and the Chinese criticality may be attributed to what LaCapra describes as historians’ ‘issue of transference’.

According to LaCapra, historians must ‘articulate the relation between the requirements of scientific expertise and the less easily definable demands placed on the use of language by the difficult attempt to work through transferential relations in a dialogue with the past having implications for the present and future’ (LaCapra, 1996, pp.126–127). In other words, the Chinese and Japanese historians’ subjectivity and research practices were unavoidably shaped by their national identities, historical narratives and political arrangement in which they were involved. Whereas the Japanese descriptiveness might indicate a tendency to avoid articulating Japan’s war responsibility, the Chinese criticality might indicate an indignation that the Chinese had towards the Japanese when communicating sensitive issues such as the definition of aggressiveness of Japan’s war against China, the death toll of the Nanking Massacre, and Japanese prime ministers’ visits to the Yasukuni Shrine, etc.

That said, the issue of transference applies also to researchers living in any other culture or society (including the author of this thesis). Thus, I am not suggesting that the Japanese- and the Chinese-language literature are less objective than the English-language literature. However, when scholars engaged with a political discourse that involved international politics and their national identities, the issue of transference may more likely occur. The English-language literature may be less cumbered by the issue of transference, and therefore, can provide productive insights into the persistence of the ‘history problem’ in Sino-Japanese relations. In the English-language sources, there are three major approaches to the ‘history problem’, namely, the instrumentalist approach, the nationalist approach, and the constructivist approach, to which I will turn now.

Instrumentalist approach

The instrumentalist approach argued that the ‘history problem’ discourse emerged and persisted, because the Chinese Communist Party (CCP henceforth) and the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP henceforth) used the discourse as a political instrument for leveraging the opponent or/and gaining political legitimacy from domestic audiences. There are two types of variants in the instrumentalist approach, namely, the ‘history card’ argument and the elite-manipulation argument.

The ‘history card’ argument is perhaps the most widely employed type of argument in the English-language literature (see: Bennett, 2008; Calder, 2006; Cooney & Sato, 2008; Drifte,
2005; Heazle & Knight, 2007; Hoshino & Satoh, 2012; Malik, 2006a; Malik, 2006b; Manicom & O’Neil, 2009; Roy, 2004; Rozman, 2002; Schneider, 2008). Attributing the main responsibility to the CCP, the ‘history card’ Theory argued that the CCP strategically and rationally used the history of Japanese imperialist aggression as a bargaining tool for advancing its political interests, both at home and abroad (Manicom and O’Neil, 2009, p.218): on the international arena the CCP used history-related issues to take advantage of Japan’s war guilt and draw out political concessions from Tokyo; in domestic politics, the CCP used the history of Sino-Japanese War to present itself as a patriotic force, thereby enhancing its claim to governmental legitimacy (Rozman, 2002). For instance, when the Textbook Issue was reported by the Japanese media in June 1982, the Chinese government did not lodge any protest; from 30 June 1982 to 20 July 1982, the Chinese state-run media did not report the Textbook Issue in a critical tone (Rose, 2005b, p.82). However, the tone changed sharply on 20 July 1986. At that time, the CCP’s mouthpiece People’s Daily issued an article that condemned the distortion of historical facts in Japanese primary and secondary school textbooks, kicking off a two-month-long press campaign against the Japanese historical revisionism.

Given PRC’s notorious record on freedom of the press, many academics and journalists see the outburst of ‘history problem’ as the CCP’s manipulation for political and economic gains. Buruma (1994) criticized that the textbook controversy came as timely leverage for the Chinese government to use against Japan, ‘so it was in Deng’s interest to embarrass the Japanese, to twist the knife a little’ (pp. 126–127). Chalmers Johnson (1986) commented that ‘the Chinese government was truly interested in Japanese school textbooks, but there can be no doubt that it founds in the textbook controversy convenient leverage to try to bring the Japanese government to heel, in which it was largely successful’ (p.424). Hoshino and Satoh (2012) also remarked that Beijing’s use of the ‘history problem’ became increasingly ‘excessive’ especially during Koizumi’s presidency (p. 187), and such excessive use of the ‘history problem’ in China’s Japan policy often compels one to question ‘how much of this sensitivity is actually to do with the war and how much of it simply uses the symbolism of the war to reflect more contemporary worries’ (Yang, 2010, p.91). Mitter (2000; 2003), in a similar vein, argued that the PRC government reconfigured the remembering of China’s war with Japan since the 1980s in order to tackle the challenges that it faced in the 1980s and the 1990s: domestically, the PRC government needed Chinese nationalism to stand as a unifying ideology to replace the out-dated ideology of orthodox communism and to bridge the economic gap caused by China’s rapid yet uneven development; internationally, the PRC government renewed the official narrative of
the past to enhance the prospect of unifying Taiwan and counter the U.S.-Japan Security Alliance (Mitter, 2000, p.280).

If the ‘history card’ argument is somewhat one-sided by putting too much blame on the Chinese government, the national mythmaking argument (Kushner, 2007; Qiu, 2006; He, 2004; 2007; 2009) is more comprehensive, for it took bilateral dynamism into account. With a much more sophisticated theoretical framework, the national mythmaking approach concentrated on the bilateral interactions rather than the politics being played out in one particular socio-political context (Gustafsson, 2011, p.28).

National mythmaking argument contended that the ‘history problem’ in Sino-Japanese relations persisted because the ruling elites in both China and Japan manipulated national myths to secure their foundation of legitimacy (He, 2009a, p.1). As He argues, ‘national myths can cause a significant memory gap to develop between former enemy countries’, and ‘divergent memories influence foreign policy making through two mechanisms, emotion and intention, that can poison popular relations and exacerbate mutual threat perception at both popular and official level’ (ibid., p.25). This argument was premised on the observation that both the Japanese and the Chinese government were facing a legitimacy crisis and found reviving the nationalist movement as a solution. In Japan, facing the so-called the ‘lost decade’ coupled with natural disaster, ageing society, declining living standard, increasing suicide rate, and a lack of national identification, etc. the conservatives had resorted to nationalism to fix their shaking foundation of legitimacy (Satoh, 2010, p.572). This right-leaning, nationalist political agenda was most noticeably pushed by Prime Minister Koizumi. During his term from 2001 to 2006, Koizumi visited Yasukuni Shrine on a regular basis despite strong criticisms from the domestic Left and Japan’s Asian neighbours (ibid., p.574). As a result, the LDP has become increasingly reliant on historical revisionism that pleaded for Japan’s becoming a ‘normal country’ with ‘healthy patriotism’, as opposed to what the conservatives called ‘masochistic views on history’ (He, 2009 pp. 237–243; Kushner, 2007 p.815).

In the Chinese context, after the collapse of the USSR, and with the outbreak of the Tiananmen Incident, the ideology of communism lost its appeal to the public. Since the 1980s, China has witnessed a wide spread of social dissatisfaction due to the rapid economic growth, increasingly widening social disparity, and rampant corruption that led to a domestic legitimacy crisis of the CCP and international isolation. To address this crisis, in 1993 ‘Jiang felt an urgent need to resort to patriotism, the lowest common denominator in the deeply divided society, to glue it together’ (He, 2009a, p.245). Similar to his Japanese counterpart, Jiang promoted patriotism
by manipulating national myths. The national mythmaking was reflected in the publication of new history textbooks that highlighted the Sino-Japanese War of 1937-1945, the establishment of patriotic education sites, and Jiang’s demand for a written apology from Japan in 1998 (Wang, 2008, p.789). National mythmaking of both sides produced ‘negative emotions and perceived intentions that worsen[ed] the overall climate of opinion regarding each country’ (He, 2009 p.33), pressured the governments on both sides to adopt an ever more hawkish position, and perpetuated the ‘history problem’ (ibid., p.33).

In brief, the instrumentalist approach emphasised the role played by the political elites and the states. These social agents balanced the need to appease to diplomatic relations with foreign states and, simultaneously, the need to maintain the ruling party’s political legitimacy at home.10

The major problem with the instrumentalist approach is that it misanalysed the subjective dimension of the ‘history problem’ discourse due to the assumption of ‘reflexive gap’. For instance, when analysing the emotional aspects in the ‘history problem’, He made a very clear distinction between the elite, who manipulated emotions of the mass, and the mass, who were subjected to the elites’ national mythmaking (He, 2009b, p.33). However, such elite/mass distinction overlooked the possibility that the elites themselves may also be implicated in the national myth that they created. Such problem resulted from assuming that there is a ‘reflexive gap’ between leaders and the mass (Ross, 2014, p.56): the elites were assumed as hyper-rational beings who controlled and were emotionally unaffected by national myths infused with emotional elements and fantasies, while the public/masses were considered emotionally susceptible to the national myth forged by the elites.

Although the political elites’ capability to exploit the ‘history problem’ discourse should not be discounted, the ‘reflexive gap’ – the assumption that the political elites are hyper-rational and the mass are hyper-emotional – has to be called into question. Suzuki’s analysis of the CCP’s role critiqued the presumed hyper-intellectuality of the political elites (Suzuki, 2007). First, as the intensification of the ‘history problem’ tended to produce a negative effect on economic ties, a downturn in Sino-Japanese economic relations could counterproductively deteriorate the political legitimacy of the CCP, whose authority heavily relied on its capacity to

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10 For instance, Yamazaki argues that the ‘history problem’ has been reproduced by Japan’s ‘dilemma of words’: while offering apology to its neighbours, the Japanese government has been desperately trying to balance the acknowledgement of apologising for the wrongdoing in the international stage with the need to satisfy various constituencies with different historical interpretation domestically (Yamazaki, 2005, p.135).
deliver economic development consistently (Downs & Saunders, 1999; cited in Suzuki, 2007 pp.26-27); second, hyping the ‘history problem’ could create a greater military instability to the CCP, as an image of fervently anti-Japanese China may legitimate the Japanese government to strengthen its military power with a specific view to China’s ‘threat’, (Suzuki, 2007a, p.25); last but not least, the assumption about the political elites’ hyper-rationality leads to a paradoxical inference: if they were ‘rational actors who balance the need to maintain domestic legitimacy with the pursuit of longer-term international objectives’ by their very ability to manipulate historical memory strategically (Downs and Saunders 1999, p.123; cited in Suzuki, 2007 p.27), they should have been rational enough not to politicise the ‘history problem’ discourse with Japan for the two reasons mentioned above. As Ross (2014) rightfully points out, ‘the notion that leaders are inherently capable of rising above the emotions of the masses understates the ubiquity of emotional experience’ (p.56). In other words, it is problematic to assume that political leaders are not immune to emotional experiences.

Yet another problem with the instrumentalist approach is the distinction between ‘facts’ and ‘myth’ (for instance, see He, 2009 p.29; Qiu, 2006 pp.32-6). This problem is especially prominent in the elite-manipulation argument. Informed by Paul Cohen (1998, pp.212–214), He and Qiu both distinguished between ‘mythologisers’ and historians. While ‘mythologisers’ ‘pick and choose facts according to political convenience’ (He, 2009 p.29-30), historians seek to construct history ‘on the basis of the evidence available, as accurate and truthful an understanding of the past as possible’ (ibid., p.29). Premised on this dichotomy, their research concluded that the persistence of the ‘history problem’ in Sino-Japanese relations resulted from the state’s intervention, which impeded public access to objective facts about those issues related to the ‘history problem’. Such conclusion problematically neglected the fact that mutual consensus on some basic historical facts does not rule out ‘the possibility of creating narratives that emphasise “our” good and “their” bad actions/qualities and deemphasises our bad their good actions/qualities’ (Gustafsson, 2011, pp.298–299). Furthermore, the claim of ‘historical objectivity’ overlooked the subjectivity of historians themselves in producing historical knowledge. As Trouillot (2015) insightfully points out, even the creation of historical sources the intervention of power distorts (p.26). Historians’ writings are the product of the historians’ social and political context; historians’ standards of objectivity are socially constructed by the social relations, political institutions, and power relations from which the production of knowledge derives (Drayton, 2011). The intervention of power in the production of history is especially salient in the ‘history problem’ discourse, where historians and their writings were often inevitably subject to the states’ political agenda.
Therefore, it is more productive to include the analysis of how the subjectivity of the political elites and states are also implicated by the social construct (national identity, historical narrative, ideology, etc.), rather than to exclude them from the analysis. As Seo (2008) argues, the emergence of the memory of the Nanking Massacre in China and comfort women in Korea vis-à-vis Japan can be better understood as a part of the new subject-formation process, rather than an objective problem in the discipline of positivist history (p.371). To understand the persistence of the ‘history problem’ discourse, it is more desirable to go beyond the ‘reflexive gap’ assumption and the distinction between ‘facts’ and ‘myth’.

Nationalist approach

The nationalist approach argues that the ‘history problem’ discourse can be understood as a result of a bottom-up nationalist movement that pressurised the government to take a tougher stance on issues relating to the ‘history problem’. For instance, Rose emphasised how ‘cultural nationalism’ – i.e., “popular” nationalism driven by intellectuals, journalists and writers and focusing on debates about history, culture, national “values” (Rose, 2000, p.170) – was mobilised on the popular level, concluding that ‘although élites in both countries were active in promoting patriotism in the 1980s and 1990s, their efforts had limited impact, whereas cultural nationalism, on the other hand, managed to capture the popular mood’ (Rose, 2000, p.169). Likewise, Reilly understood the ‘history problem’ as a result of the instigation of nationalistic narratives by what he calls ‘history activists’, who have ‘mobilised popular sentiments, lobbied for official support and exacerbated tensions between China and Japan’ (Reilly, 2006, p.189).

In a similar manner, Gluck invented the term ‘memory activists’ to describe the civil societies in Japan, China, and Korea that were intent on exposing Japan’s war crimes and keep the memory of the victims of the WWII in Asia alive (cited in Jager and Mitter, 2007, p.324).

The bottom-up nationalism pressurised the Japanese and the Chinese government to articulate nationalistic stance in the ‘history problem’ discourse against each other, and consequently, perpetuated the reproduction of the ‘history problem’ in Sino-Japanese relations. For instance, Lind (2010) highlighted that what causes the problem with history between Japan and China is a ‘vicious circle’ created by the interaction between the Sino-Japanese diplomacy at the governmental level and the Japanese nationalist groups’ reaction at the popular level: whenever Japanese leaders showed a gesture of repentance towards China by offering apology on
the matter of historical issues, it produced a backlash from nationalist groups who decry ‘masochistic’ tendencies at home and ‘foreign interference’ from China.\textsuperscript{11} Focusing on the Chinese agenda, Yuan (2008) argued that the ‘history problem’ discourse is caused by China’s ‘sentimental nationalism’ that ‘reacts to what perceived as injustice and insult done to China and has a strong victim mentality’ (p.212). In a similar vein, Chan and Bridges (2006) argued that persistence of the ‘history problem’ – characterised by the Yasukuni Issue during the Koizumi era from 2001 to 2006 – resulted from ‘clashes of reactive nationalism’ between Japan and China mobilised by social agents at the popular level, rather than directed by the government (p.127).

Some other research highlighted that the undercurrents of nationalism still remained in both countries and could be productive of mutual mistrust (Hagström, 2009, p.223), and that the Chinese and Japanese policymakers find themselves increasingly constrained by the nationalist sentiment expressed from the bottom-up (Reilly, 2011, p.463; Kang, 2013, p.161).

The nationalist approach highlighted the agency of social agents at the civil/popular level. However, the problem with this approach is that it seldom went beyond describing popular nationalism in Japan or China, much less analysing the subjective factors therein. Most of the research in the nationalist approach acknowledge that nationalism is inducive of subjective factors including political passion (Whiting and Xin, 1990), ambivalent psychological complexes (Ijiri, 1990), resentment (Kristof, 1998), sentimental emotions (Yuan, 2008), and humiliation (Callahan, 2004; Wang, 2008), etc. However, the nationalist approach tended to regard these subjective factors as epiphenomenal, bypassing developing a more systematic methodology or framework to analyse how these subjective factors contributed to the persistence of the ‘history problem’. In other words, though the nationalist approach was perceptive of the subjective dimension of the ‘history problem’, it did not develop a systematic framework to analyse it.

\textsuperscript{11} Accordingly, the vicious circle of interaction between Japan and China consists of the following stages: 1) in the first stage, the victimised state may express concern for the historical injustice and call for repentance from the perpetrator state; 2) second, the perpetrator state leader attempts to offer apology, which produces backfire from conservative groups who put forth counter-narratives that whitewash the past wrongdoings. Such counter-narratives will often cause nationalistic emotion in the victimised state, provoking criticisms towards the perpetrator state; 3) The criticisms by the victimised state is often deemed as antagonistic with malicious intention by the conservative groups, who will, in turn, produce even more nationalistic opinions, resonating new and more criticisms in the victimised state.
Constructivist approach

The constructivist approach argued that the persistence of the ‘history problem’ between Japan and China has been a product of identity politics: when Japan and China as state-actors articulated conflicting perspectives on each other’s historical narrative, they tended to denounce the other party’s identity in protection of their own, causing negative perception and mutual antipathy (see: Suzuki, 2005; 2007; 2009; 2014; Gustafsson, 2012a; 2012b; 2013; 2014a; 2014b; Hall, 2010; Shih, 1995; , 2015; Huang, 2015).

The analytic framework deployed by the constructivist approach is informed by the IR theory of Constructivism. This strand of theory emphasises that states’ self-identities are formed through social interactions (Olick, 1999; Neumann, 1999). Starting from on this socio-psychological conceptualisation of self-identity, the constructivists contended that the ‘history problem’ and the discourses built around it derived from an ‘othering’ process, by which China and Japan estranged each other to construct their identities (Suzuki, 2007b; Suzuki, 2014; Hagström, 2015; Lindgren and Lindgren, 2017). Accordingly, after the foundation of the PRC in 1949, China had difficult relations with the International Society: it was an outsider in the world of liberal democracies, it had poor economic development and human right records, and it was perceived as a threat to the Western Bloc (Suzuki, 2007a, p.33). Being an ‘other’ of the International Society, China’s national identity was featured by the narrative of ‘humiliation’ and developed a victim identity against the outside world. Thus, China’s victim identity led to the construction of a ‘victimising other’, in which Japan played a crucial role (ibid., pp.38-41). On the other hand, Japan also increasingly constructed China as the ‘other’ in order to construct a Japanese identity as a ‘bullied state’ whose sovereignty was violated by foreign countries. For both the Left and the Right in Japan, since the 1980s, China has taken over the U.S. as Japan’s dominant ‘other’, who was perceived to have interfered with Japan’s domestic affairs (Suzuki, 2014, pp.8–15). Therefore, the ‘history problem’, for both sides, pertained to an ‘othering’ process by which they constructed their identities.

Another strand of argument in the constructivist approach drew on recognition theory (Lindemann and Ringmar, 2011) and ontological security (Ringmar, 1996; Mitzen, 2006b). Based on the claim that routinised recognition has a positive correlation to the stability of bilateral relations, this strand of argument contended that the ‘history problem’ persisted, because social agents’ specific behaviours and speech disrupted Japan and China’s routinised practice of recognising each other’s ideal identity, causing the issue of ‘ontological security’ (Gustafsson,
 Accordingly, whereas China (as state-actor) desired Japan to recognise China as a victim state, Japan wanted China to recognise Japan as a peaceful and economically superior state. Whereas the mutual recognition of the desired identities remained relatively stable in the 1980s and the 1990s, Koizumi’s visits to the Yasukuni Shrine constituted a ‘Japanese misrecognition of China’s identity, a misrecognition that has led to feelings of being offended’ (ibid., p.627); on the other hand, China’s patriotic education, coupled with the rise of China’s economic power and the violent anti-Japanese demonstrations during the mid-2000s, misrecognised Japan’s identity as a peaceful and economically superior state (ibid., p.629). The misrecognition of identity between Japan and China threatened their respective ‘ontological security’ – i.e., ‘the need to experience oneself as a whole, the continuous person in time – as being rather than constantly changing – in order to realize a sense of agency’ (Mitzen, 2006a, p.342). Thus, the ‘history problem’ discourse in Sino-Japanese relations can be seen as a result of Japan’s attempt to protect its ontological security when its identity was misrecognised by China, and vice versa (Gustafsson, 2013, p.71).

The constructivist approach has greater explanatory power than the previous approaches, because it used a much more developed analytical framework that engages with the subjective dimension. However, its analytical framework suffered from the problem of ‘reification of states’, i.e., the problem of having to reify states as unitary actors and to assume a state’s identity as located in the body of the state. This entailed the conundrum of having to justify why what we know about human beings in social psychology can be applied to states. To quote Krolikowski (2008), who critiques the ontological security theory:

To attach the concept of ontological security to a reified state is to ignore the broader connections between globalization, institutional change and ontological security needs in Giddens’s thought. To take the state as given is to miss the incidence of globalizing forces upon this institution and its changing form and functions, including the provision of ontological security. The state should be understood not as subject to ontological security but as one of the structures involved in individuals’ efforts at managing this condition. (p.133)

Although the constructivist arguments were intuitively plausible in explaining the persistence of the ‘history problem’, their explanatory power was compromised by the problem of state-personhood: whereas people do have an identity, it does not mean that states also have identities; whereas the interaction between people can explain people’s identity, it does not necessarily apply to states. Moreover, it is often difficult to clarify how the formation of the
state’s identity is different from that of a person’s. Constructivists seem to agree that collective consciousness is qualitatively different from individual consciousness, yet most constructivists still analyse international relations by making an analogy to interpersonal relations. As critically pointed out by Epstein (2011), a poststructuralist IR scholar informed by the Lacanian theory, ‘the assumption that individual interactions will explain what states do rests on little more than a leap of faith, or indeed an analogy’ (p.341).

Brief Summary

As assessed previously, the existing literature is marked by a lack of effective analysis of the subjective dimension of the ‘history problem’ discourse. The instrumentalist approach misanalysed the subjective dimension of the ‘history problem’ discourse due to the problematic assumption of ‘reflexive gap’, an assumption that excluded the political elites and states from the implication of socially constructed discourses; the nationalist approach was perceptive of the subjective factors induced by nationalism, but did not provide a systematic framework to analyse their relations to the persistence of the ‘history problem’; the constructivist approach was intuitively plausible with a sophisticated analytical framework that engaged with the issue of collective identity, but the analytical framework suffered from the problem of ‘reification of states’.

As this thesis is grounded in the discipline of IR, I want to pick up from a critique of the constructivist approach. As mentioned above, the major problem with the constructivist approach is the ‘reification of states’, a conceptualisation of state identity that stipulates states as essentialised entities. This conceptualisation has prevented the constructivist approach from effectively capturing the constitutive relationship between social agents’ identity and actions. In contrast, the poststructuralist school in IR, informed by the Lacanian conceptualisation of subjectivity, can provide a useful critique, from which we can develop a more effective analysis of the subjective dimension of the ‘history problem’ and international politics more generally. I will show this in the next section.

Subjectivity in IR: Constructivism, Poststructuralism and Lacanian Theory

A lack of effective analysis of the subjective dimension of the Sion-Japanese ‘history problem’ indicates, more generally, a lack of effective research framework to analyse the subjective dimension of international politics in IR theory. This points towards the need to make a reassessment of the pertinent IR theories. In fact, few IR scholars deny that the issue of subjectivity is
unneglectable in analysing the formation of international politics (Hutchison, E., & Bleiker, R, 2014 p.491). This is especially so in cases where parties in conflicts were informed not by a rational calculation of power and material interests, but rather, by subjective factors such as anxieties, affects, emotions, identity, and fantasies, etc. Back in the early 1970s, no less a figure than Hans J. Morgenthau (1973) decried a lack of appreciation of the roles of subjective dimension – challenging phenomena such as charisma and love – in international politics (p. 31) and wonders if there exists ‘a counter-theory of irrational politics, a kind of pathology of international politics’ (ibid., p. 7).

Morgenthau’s struggle derived from the rigid way in which the rationalists in IR conceptualised the ontology of state identity (Moravcsik, 1998; Mearsheimer, 2014). Accordingly, the rationalists have three key theoretical assumptions regarding the ontology of state identity: 1) that state actors are ‘atomistic, self-interested and rational’; 2) state interests are assumed to be external to social interaction, with their interests already formed before entering social relations; 3) ‘society is understood as a strategic realm, a realm in which individuals or states come together to pursue their pre-defined interests’ (Reus-Smit, 2005, p.192). In other words, the rationalists conceptualised that states are calculative rational actors whose identities were established prior to, and independent from, social interaction (Lebow, 2008, p.485).

In the ‘Fourth Great Debate’ at the end of the 1980s, the rationalist conceptualisation of state identity was challenged by the school of constructivism (Keohane, 1988). Rather than treating state interests as pre-given and static, constructivism emphasised 1) that state interests are socially constructed (Wendt, 1999), 2) that state identity shapes state interests and informs state behaviour (Tickner, 1996; Gourevitch, 2002; Adler, 2012, p.103), and 3) that states’ identities are constantly subject to change in the process of social interactions between states (Adler et al., 1998; Lynch, 1999). The constructivist conceptualisation of state identity enables constructivists to include the changes of state interests into the analytical framework through studying the process by which states’ perception of strategic interests change over time due to the transformation of state identity caused by states’ internalisation of social norm in inter-state interactions (Adler, 1997; Checkel, 1999, 2001; McSweeney, 1999; Crawford, 2002; Suzuki, 2005; 2009). In other words, constructivists argue that state identity shapes state interests, which in turn guide state behaviour.

But by understanding identity as what precedes state behaviour, the constructivist conceptualisation of state identity stumbled into a logical pitfall (Bucher and Jasper, 2017, p.394). According to constructivism, state identity is a causal determinant of state interests and behaviours; so to account for state interests and behaviours, we need to find out what identity the
state in question has. However, in order to determine the state’s identity, we must, paradoxically, examine how the state behaved. Therefore, the constructivist conceptualisation of identity as preceding state’s action, as Alexandrov (2003) correctly points out, ‘invites a tautological line of argument’ (p.38). Because of the tautological argument inferred from the constructivist assumption, scholars critique that the constructivist’s essentialist conceptualisation of identity – that is, conceiving of identity as a unitary entity preceding and guiding state behaviour – cannot serve as an adequate analytical foundation for explaining state behaviours (Guzzini, 2005; Kratochiwil, 2008; Epstein, 2013).

How might the essentialist conceptualisation of identity misanalyse the persistence of the ‘history problem’? We may consider the following instance. When analysing the persistence of the ‘history problem’, constructivism-informed research contended that the ‘history problem’ persisted because China and Japan possessed incompatible identities that threatened each party’s ontological security, making social agents securitise their national identity through the politicisation of national histories (see: Gustafsson, 2013). However, it is precisely by looking at the politicisation of representation of the past that we may determine the specific type of identities that China and Japan possessed. This entails the problem of having to reify states as a person-like entity that feels, remembers, and intents; otherwise, they cannot ‘have’ identities. Furthermore, the constructivist argument’s explanatory power is compromised by the presumed causal relationship between identity and behaviour. While not discounting identity’s power in guiding state behaviour, one may ask: ‘Is it not equally true that state behaviour constructs state identity constitutively?’ To put differently, constructivists might confront the following counterargument: Identities did not precede social agents to guide them to politicise representation of the past; rather it was the politicisation of the ‘history problem’ that enabled the construction of Japan and China’s respective identity. In other words, with the essentialist notion of identity, the constructivist approach fails to see that the relationship between identity and behaviour is constitutive rather than causal.

The poststructuralism in IR seems to provide a more reliable theoretical framework to grasp the constitutive relationship between the actor’s identity and the related behaviours. Rather than conceptualising the ontology of identity as a unitary entity preceding and guiding the actor’s behaviour, the poststructuralists conceptualise identity as a discursive effect of performance (Campbell, 1998a, p.8). It means that identity is thought of not as an essentialised entity located in the ‘body’ of the reified state, but as a structurally unstable, fluid identification process constantly involving a series of performative actions (Weber, 1998; Laffey, 2000).
A major intellectual source that informs the poststructuralist critique of constructivism is the psychoanalytic theory of Jacques Lacan (Epstein, 2010; Solomon, 2015). According to Epstein’s (2010) Lacanian critique of the Wendtian constructivism, the Lacanian theory refuses the notion that identity can ever achieve a complete closure or wholeness; rather, for Lacan, identity is but an illusion that the subject compensates for the structural incompleteness and undecidability inherent to the ontology of subjectivity and social reality (Stavrakakis, 2007; Epstein, 2010, p.10). In other words, identity is understood not as a pre-given, unitary entity that precedes and determines the subject’s behaviours, but rather as an illusion enacted to repress the ‘constitutive lack’ at the core of subjectivity (Epstein, 2010, p.334). So when it comes to analysing the subjective dimension of international politics, it is more productive to look at how social agents creatively deployed discourses to repress the structural lack and incompleteness in their subjectivities. This way, we grasp identity not as an entity or a ‘thing’, but as part of a continuous process of identification. For instance, from a Lacanian perspective, the securitisation of identity was constructive rather than protective of identity, because states preserved their identities precisely by performing ‘being threatened’.

An advantage of using the poststructuralist-Lacanian theory to analyse the subjective dimension of international politics is that the researcher can circumvent the problem of having to reify states (Epstein, 2010, p.342). Since state identity is de-essentialised and conceived of as a discursive effect of performative actions, the analysis of identity becomes no more about how state ‘feels’ or ‘emotes’, but about how social agents at different social levels perform actions and speech to creatively alter the symbolic network that structures their subject positions (identities) relationally (ibid., p.343). So instead of having essentialised, unitary identities ‘possessed’ by person-like state-actors clashing against each other, the analysis of subjectivity in international politics can shift the focus to the discursive process by which social agents intervened a symbolic network of a particular political issue to alter their subject positions (identities) procured therein. In analysing the ‘history problem’, for instance, an analysis informed by poststructuralism and the Lacanian theory would argue that the ‘history problem’ was not about how Japan and China as state-actors ‘felt’, but rather about the ways in which social agents at different social layers deployed political arrangements and strategies to construct, reconstruct, and deconstruct the symbolic network that defined their respective subject positions (identities) so as to repress the constitutive lack in their subjective identities. With the Lacanian theory, we can analyse the subjective dimension of international politics without anthropomorphically assuming that states can ‘feel’ or ‘emote’.
Another advantage of using the Lacanian theory in IR is that the poststructuralist theoretical orientation allows the researcher to interpret knowledge as a discursive exercise of power by denying the clear-cut distinction between the subjective and the objective, fact and value (Campbell, 2007). This is extremely important to analyse the persistence of the ‘history problem’, where historical knowledge and facts were the very forefronts of political conflicts. Whereas the existing literature about the ‘history problem’—especially research in the Japanese- and Chinese-language—tend to regard historical knowledge and facts as objective discoveries, a research informed by the poststructuralist analytical orientation would see them as social constructs produced by power that promoted some identities, social arrangements, or a political agenda while marginalising some others. For instance, in terms of the Nanking Massacre Debate, the Japanese government’s standpoint has been that the number of casualties is to be confirmed by further research. From a perspective informed by poststructuralism and the Lacanian theory, we may ask what social arrangements is promoted or repressed by the discourse of knowledge.

Despite the theoretical insightfulness of the Lacanian theory, the poststructuralist school in IR has remained marginalised and labelled as a ‘dissident thought’ (Calkivik, 2017) that ‘prizes epistemological and ontological logomachy above clarity’ (Jarvis, 2000, x–xii). There are two major reasons for it. First, poststructuralism is less of a theory or paradigm than a mode of critical thinking that draws on the wide range of thinkers such as Jacques Derrida, Michel Foucault, Gilles Deleuze, Jean Baudrillard, Jacques Lacan, Slavoj Žižek, and so forth (see: Edkins and Vaughan-Williams, 2009). By deconstructing the essentialised concepts such as state, sovereignty, and identity, the poststructuralist critique more or less has shaken the comfortable metaphysical ground of rationalism (Ashley, 1989, p.272), inviting disciplinary distaste from the rationalists who accuse poststructuralism of promoting irrationalism, relativism, and nihilism (Brown, 1994; Cochran, 1995), of being productive of ‘mostly criticism but not much theory’ (Walt, 1991, p.223). In other words, the theoretical commitment of poststructuralism radically undermines the metaphysical knowledge foundation of realism, liberalism, and constructivism, rendering itself subject to disciplinary hostility. Second, most of the poststructuralist works are theoretically driven towards critiquing the metaphysical knowledge foundation of IR, power hegemony, and ethics in international politics (De Masi, 2015), while falling short of developing a workable methodology to analyse international affairs empirically. This problem is especially true when it comes to using the intellectual source of Jacques Lacan and Slavoj Žižek, whose continental writing style is criticised by Anglo-Saxon empiricists like Noam Chomsky as being deliberately esoteric and obscurantist (Thompson, 2013).
But fortunately, more and more researchers in IR and in social sciences draw on the insights provided by the psychoanalytic theory of Lacan, and his most prominent contemporary interpreter Slavoj Žižek, to think through the issue of subjectivity in politics, thereby giving us much clearer methodological inspirations. Epstein’s research provided much-needed theoretical critiques of the constructivist conceptualisation of identity in IR (Epstein, 2010; Epstein, 2013); analysing the anti-whaling discourse in Australia, Epstein illustrated that individuals and international organisations, rather than states alone, can also be integrated into the poststructuralist discourse analysis (Epstein, 2008). Hansen (2006a) developed a highly systematic poststructuralist research design that allows researchers to analyse the constitutive relationship between identity and the making of foreign policy by conceptualising identity as discursive, relational, socially implicated, and always articulating a Self and series of Other (p.6). Drawing on Jacques Lacan and Slavoj Žižek, Edkin argued that the discipline of IR should be attentive to ‘the political’ – ‘the establishment of that very social order which set out a particular, historically specific account of what counts as politics and defines other areas of social life as not politics’ (Edkins, 1999, p.2), and that traumatic memory should be seen as central to understanding the formation of political authority (Edkins, 2002; Edkins, 2006; Edkins, 2008). Focusing on Lacan’s notion of subjectivity, Solomon rethought the relationship between time and identity in IR (Solomon, 2014), analysed the mutual infusion of affect and discourse in responses to 9/11 (Solomon, 2012), and argued that the reason why a socially constructed ‘war on terror’ became the prevailing common sense after 9/11 is because it ‘channelled certain kinds of desires and thus allowed adherents to identify a certain kinds of subjects – in particular, subjects who would feel less insecure after a national trauma’ (Solomon, 2015, p.10). Eszter Salgó (2013) reflected upon the relationship between psychoanalysis and politics, arguing that political communities are informed by shared unconscious or conscious fantasies in which mythicised histories of the political community are deeply entrenched; in times of social chaos and economic uncertainty, individuals tend to retreat into fantasising about the society’s mythical past, an imaginary Garden of Eden promising the jouissance – the return to the merger with the mother. Heikka’s (2010) explored the dimension of desire and identity in Russia’s foreign policymaking. Badredine Arfi’s (2010) used the Lacanian concept ‘fantasy’ to analyse the discourse IR theory in the form of Wendtian constructivism. Some other research informed by the Lacanian theory can be found in political theory (Glynos, 2012), organisational studies (Harding, 2007; Driver, 2009; Contu et al., 2010; Fotaki et al., 2012), political analysis of nationalism in Europe (Stavrakakis, 2005; Stavrakakis and Chrysoloras, 2006) and in China (Wu, 2014), studies of racism (Seshadri-Crooks, 2000), critical legal studies (Salecl, 1993;
Schroeder, 2008), anthropological studies (Arnaud, 2003; Vidailet, 2007), and religious studies (DiCenso, 1994), etc. These research invariably were informed by the Lacanian argument that identity is not an essentialist entity but rather exists in a series of frustration that repres- sively prevents the subject from realising the non-existence of full identity or antagonism-free political community (Žižek, 2000, p.98). This thesis picks up with the poststructuralist line of argument in IR and will develop a workable methodology to address the subjective dimension of the ‘history problem’ discourse in Sino-Japanese relations.

**Summary**

In this chapter, I have reviewed briefly the history of the ‘history problem’ and how the existing literature addressed the research question proposed by this thesis. I categorised the existing literature into four groups, namely, the academic discourses in Japanese- and the Chinese-language sources, the instrumentalist approach, and the nationalist approach, and the constructivist approach. With a critical assessment of each group of literature, I identified that the existing literature has the problem of lacking an effective analysis of the subjective dimension of the ‘history problem’. In particular, I critically discussed the constructivist approach, whose intuitively plausible explanation was cumbered by the problem of reification of states. With a cri- tique of the constructivism informed by poststructuralism and the Lacanian theory, I contended that the problem with the constructivist approach is rooted in the essentialist conceptualisation of identity in constructivism. Picking up from the poststructuralist critique of constructivism, I argued that using the psychoanalytic insights of Lacan and Žižek can allow us to circumvent the problem of reification of states, and thus, develop a more theoretically adequate research framework to examine the subjective dimension of international politics. In the following chapter, I will discuss the Lacanian approach in details, presenting the methodology that this thesis used for analysing the ‘history problem’.
Chapter 3: Theory and Method: a Lacanian Discourse Approach

Introduction

Now I will turn to discuss the methodology of this thesis. The methodology that I developed for the research is called Lacanian Discourse Approach (LDA), an approach that synthesised Lacan’s psychoanalytic theory, the poststructuralist research design, and the coding technique of the Grounded Theory Method. The LDA seeks to account for how the subjective dimension shapes the reproduction of political discourse by mapping four distinct discursive strategies which structure the subject’s speech act: the master’s discourse that asserts authority, the university’s discourse that frames issues in terms of technicalities, the hysteric’s discourse that questions the authority, and the analyst’s discourse that reveals the incompleteness of the other’s identity.

This chapter is divided into five parts. First, I will explain in details the key Lacanian concepts used in the thesis, including the subject, register theory (i.e., the Symbolic, the Real, the Imaginary), and the four discourses (i.e., the master’s discourse, the university’s discourse, the hysteric’s discourse, and the analyst’s discourse). Second, I will move on to discuss the method, including research design and technical procedures with which the discourse analysis is executed. Third, I will showcase why one might prefer the LDA to existing IR approaches which circumvent the subjective dimension of international politics.

Theory: Beyond the Individual/Collective Dichotomy

The LDA is a methodology informed by Lacan’s psychoanalytic theory. It is designed to analyse the subjective dimension of international politics. Theoretically speaking, like other approaches that draw on psychological theories, one who uses the LDA in analysing political and social affairs has to justify two key questions.

First, why might one justify the use of an individual-oriented psychoanalytic theory in analysing collective phenomena? The answer to the first question is: Lacan’s psychoanalytic theory is applicable in analysing issues in international relations, because it conceptualises both individual identity and collective identity as socially constructed. More precisely, Lacan understands the subject as ‘speaking subject’ that is social, linguistic, and split, as opposed to biological, organic, and unitary. This way, the LDA circumvents the limit imposed by the individual/collective dichotomy from which the need for justification derives. I will discuss this aspect in detail in the following subsection of ‘The Lacanian subject’.
Second, where is the subjective dimension located and how is it manifested in politics? The answer to the second question is: the subjective dimension of politics can be located conceptually by identifying what Lacan calls ‘the object-cause of desire’. The object-cause of desire is considered a motor force of reproduction of discourses. It is discursively constructed as a ‘missing object’ that the subject desires but is stolen by the other. With a thorough reading of data relevant to the research topic on a case-by-case basis, the object-cause of desire can be located as a reoccurring theme around which subject’s speech revolves. Thus, one is allowed to see parties involved in political disputes as ‘speaking subjects’, whose speech acts are conditioned by the four ways (the master’s discourse, the university’s discourse, the hysteric’s discourse, and the analyst’s discourse) that they relate to the object-cause of desire invested with anxieties. This analytical process allows the researcher to tangibly concretise the elusive subjective dimension, without having to have unmediated access to people’s mind. I will discuss this in more detail in the subsection of ‘The Four Discourses’.

The Lacanian subject

The subject is the most fundamental concept in LDA, and the Lacanian theorisation of subject allows for using psychoanalytic theory to facilitate the discourse analysis of the ‘history problem’ and other political issues alike in IR. Here, I want to highlight two aspects to justify the use of Lacanian theory in IR and to pave the way for analysing the subjective dimension of international politics. First, the subject is conceptualised as decentred, with its identity being an effect of discourse (the Symbolic). What follows is that both individual and collective identities are ontologically homogeneous, because they are both discursively and socially constructed. This conceptualisation of the subject enables us to apply psychoanalytic theory to the study of collective identity. Second, in the analysis of subjectivity in international politics, we should focus on the subject position rather than how the subject feels. The subject’s identity is defined not by some inner psychological state, but by the particular subject position that the subject occupies in a discourse in relation to other subjects. So instead of searching for collective feelings, it is more practical and pragmatic to examine how the subject is posited in a discourse, and how the subject adopts different strategies to alter the structure of discourse to redefine their identity.

The decentred subject

The word ‘subject’ has three basic meanings: first, philosophically, it means the existence of human beings; second, linguistically, it means the speaker – the ‘I’ – in a sentence; third, legally,
the subject means the one who is subjected to the power of another (Evans, 1996, p.198). Crucially, Lacan makes a clear distinction between the ego and the subject, two different concepts that are often conflated by ego-psychology (as opposed to psychoanalysis). Whereas the ego (or identity) is part of the Imaginary order, the subject is part of the Symbolic – the subject is a passive effect of discourse, the intersubjective socio-linguistic network. For instance: ‘I am writing’. Here, the subject is the effect of the grammatical rule in English and the socio-cultural common sense shared by the speaker and the listener (reader). The subject – the ‘I’ (as opposed to the ‘me’) – is only rendered meaningful retroactively in a grammatically complete sentence (i.e., a signifying chain). Therefore, the subject is not the master of its own house, but is rather the retroactive effect of the totality of the Symbolic, i.e., the language, culture, law, custom, and the social relations. To quote Kevin DeLuca (1999):

Far from being the fully conscious source and sovereign of discourse, then, the subject is the ongoing effect of social discourses, a product constituted within the matrix of linguistic and material social practices. In this sense, the subject is not a content, but a performance, a happening born, existing, and transformed in social discourses (p.339).

With such socio-linguistic understanding of subjectivity, the subject is understood as de-centred: it is split, divided, and alienated between the enunciation (the speaking) and the enunciated (the speech), rather than as atomistic and unitary. To be more precise, the Lacanian subject is constitutive of two facets: 1) the enunciated subject (or the spoken subject) as the signifier that represents the subject in the act of enunciation in discourses; and 2) the enunciating subject (the speaking subject) who performs the act of enunciation (Cuéllar, 2010 p.89). In a text or a speech, we always imagine a speaker existing prior to the speech. However, the speaker’s existence is an effect retroactively created by the speech. In Žižek’s words, ‘the cogito is not a substantial entity but a pure structural function’, who ‘can emerge only in the interstices of substantial communal systems’ (Žižek, 2009 p.8). Fink (1996) also point out that ‘existence is a product of language: language brings things into existence (makes them part of

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12 As Žizek (1989) insightfully explains: ‘The subject is always fastened pinned, to a signifier which represents him for the other, and through this pinning he is loaded with a symbolic mandate, he is given a place in the intersubjective network of symbolic relations’ (p.113). As Evan also points out, the Lacanian subject – the ‘I’ – should be understood properly by referring to the linguistic and legal aspects from which the word originally derive: on the one hand, it is the effect of linguistic construct; on the other hand, it is always subjected to the power of the Symbolic network in which it is caught up (Evans, 1996, p.198).
human reality), things which had no existence prior to being ciphered, symbolized, or into words’ (p. 25). In other words, the subject is retroactively constituted in an intersubjective network. Lacan calls this intersubjective network the Symbolic, to which I will turn in the next sub-section about the register theory.

Drawing on Lacan’s decentralising approach to subjectivity, the poststructuralism in IR defines states as ‘speaking subjects’ (Epstein, 2011, p.328): states are no longer taken as essentialised, unitary entities existing in a relatively stable form overtime with pre-established identity; rather, states (as well as individuals) are discursive beings, the effect of discourses; it is by the effect of speech that identity and power of states are maintained. This theorisation leads to a poststructuralist opposition against the constructivism (see: pp.37-38): in constructivism, states are seen as essentialised entities with perception and intention, and discourses are seen as the product of states.\footnote{See Wendt’s ‘Anarchy is What States Make of it: The Social Construction of Power Politics’. In it, Wendt (1992) proposes that ‘the raw material out of which members of the state system are constituted is created by domestic society before states enter the constitutive process of international society’ (p. 402).} By contrast, the Lacanian conceptualisation of the subject reverses the constructivist argument – it sees states as the product of discourses (the Symbolic). In other words, states are constructs of speech. Theorising states as constructs of speech implies that there is no essential distinction between the collective subject and individual subject. For Lacan, it is the Symbolic (the social-cultural-linguistic network) – rather than the inner biological process or the organism’s genetic expression – that constitutes subjectivity. Therefore, individual subject and collective subject are both speaking subjects. States are not biological organisms like individuals. However, because both collective and individual identities are discursively constructed, their identities are formed and developed with similar mechanisms. Upon this theoretical premise, we suspend the individual/collective distinction and are allowed to apply Lacan’s psychoanalytic theory to analyse issues in IR.

Subject position over how the state ‘feels’

Another implication of the Lacanian theorisation of subjectivity is that the analysis of collective identity can be more effectively conducted by focussing on ‘subject position’, rather than how the state ‘feels’ – a task that is almost impossible to undertake in IR.\footnote{In a conference where I presented a paper relating to the use of psychoanalytic theory in IR, I was reminded by an audience that ‘you can’t put a state on the couch’, like what a psychoanalyst does to their analysand.} A subject position refers to a place-holder or a position within a discourse (Epstein, 2010, p.343). A society, for instance, can be seen an assemblage of different linguistic domains that offer various subject positions

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for the subject to occupy; thus, the subject acquires their identity by performing the role as regulated by the corresponding discourse (Sheikh, 2017, p.5). The most obvious instance may be the discourse of gender – the discourse of gender offers, more often than not, a binary sexual positionality (male-female) that regulates people’s sexual desire (sexual orientation and how one is supposed to establish sexual relations), behaviours (how to walk like a man/a woman), dressing codes (ties for men/skirt for women), and speech (how to designates one’s gender through the use of specific words or voice), etc. In the discourse of gender, one’s sexual identity is defined more by the subject’s speech act and social performance which allows the subject to take up a position than by the genetic-biological feature of one’s body.

The same principle of subject position can be seen in international relations. For instance, Epstein’s analysis of the anti-whaling discourse looks at primarily at how Australia constructed its identity by tapping into the whaling discourse to position itself as different from Japan (Epstein, 2008). Thus, a state’s identity is not defined by any inherent cultural or biological essence in the state’s ‘body’ or how the state ‘feels’; rather, a state’s identity is defined by the subject position that the state takes up in an intersubjective network, a discourse that involved multiple participants. In Sino-Japanese relations, the ‘history problem’ was a discourse that offered a set of binary subject positions – the victim vs the victimizer – that social agents, including scholars, politicians, individuals, and organisational agents could occupy. By performing speech act, they tapped into the discourse and occupied subject positions constructed therein; changing one’s subject positions involves the alteration of the discourse, which restructures how subjects involved relate to one another altogether. By prioritising ‘subject position’ over ‘how the state feels’, we can circumvent the difficulty of having to identify the ‘feeling’ of states. In analysing the ‘history problem’, this thesis focuses not on how Japan or China ‘felt’, but on the ways the Chinese and Japanese social agents deployed different strategies to maintain and alter the Victim-victimizer Duality that relationally structured their subject positions (identities).

The three psychoanalytic registers: the Symbolic, the Real, the Imaginary

So far, I have elaborated on Lacan’s theorisation of the subject. The subject, contrary to the ego, is understood as an effect of the Symbolic. To further explicate subjectivity and the structure of identity, I now turn to introduce Lacan’s psychoanalytic theorisation of the three registers of subjectivity, namely, the Symbolic, the Real, and the Imaginary. The theory of the three registers is a classification system that describes the structure of the human psyche. Most of
the Lacanian thoughts have to be understood in relation to the theory of the three registers. The three registers are radically heterogeneous, each referring to a distinct psychoanalytic experience (Evans, 1996, p.135). Accordingly, human subjectivity exists in the overlapping of the three registers: the subject belongs to the Symbolic, the identity (i.e., ego or the imaginary completeness of one’s self) belongs to the Imaginary, and that which is neither symbolised nor imagined belongs to the Real. In discourse analysis in IR, we may understand the Symbolic as the shared norm in international politics that defines state identity, the Real as the breach of the Symbolic, and the Imaginary as a social construct enacted by social agents to repress the Real.

The Symbolic as norms

The Symbolic refers to the realm of intersubjective context where the subject comes into being. Drawing on the French anthropologist Claude Lévi-Strauss’s idea that the social world is universally structured by laws regulating kinship relations and the exchange of gifts (Lévi-Strauss, 1969), Lacan defines the Symbolic as primarily pertaining to the social practices of exchange, including languages, customs, social structure, and laws that underlie how social members relate to each other (Lacan and Fink, 2007, p.229). And since the most elementary exchange is communication, the Symbolic is essentially a linguistic dimension. In addition, the Symbolic also refers to the ideal of the subject’s identity, the point from which one is being seen (Žižek, 2002, p.11); in other words, the Symbolic corresponds to how individuals relate to themselves. As the Symbolic exists before the individual’s birth (e.g., a child is named even before it is conceived by the mother), to be a subject (a speaking being) is to be inescapably caught up in the Symbolic. The individual has to learn how to speak the language of others, how to behave according to the social norm, and how to be a member of the family, etc. – ‘individual subjects are what they are in and through the mediation of the socio-linguistic arrangements and constellations of the register of the Symbolic’ (Johnston, 2016, col. 2.3). In order to have an identity, one is forced to be mediated by the Symbolic, for it is only in the Symbolic that one is able to communicate with others and thus obtain identities from others – ‘Man thus speaks, but it is because the symbol has made him man’ (Lacan and Fink, 2007 p. 229).

The concept of the Symbolic partially links to the notion of ‘international norms’ in constructivism in IR, a notion highlighting that norms – mutually agreed upon standards – play

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15 Because it is in the Symbolic that the subject finds the ideal from which its identity is judged, the Symbolic identification is also called ‘ego ideal’, whereas the Imaginary identification is called ‘ideal ego’. We may translate the Symbolic into the Freudian ‘superego’ that represents the father, the prohibition, the social norm, the law, and the moral standard, by which the ego’s conduct is judged (Freud, 1994, p.80).
important roles in shaping states’ policy options, perception of interests, and behaviours (Wendt, 1999). But contrary to constructivism in IR, Lacan’s subject (cf. state as actor in constructivism) is not a producer or starting point of the Symbolic (cf. shared norm in international politics); rather, the subject is a product, an effect of the Symbolic: there is no pre-established identity located in the body of the subject; rather, it is only through intersubjective social practices with the Others that the subject acquires its identity and body (Epstein, 2010 p. 345). However, it does not mean that the subject is devoid of any agency or is a mindless puppet determined totally by the Symbolic: the Symbolic is a social construct that is structurally incomplete, contingent, and conventional; it is subjected to deconstruction and needs constant support from subjects’ social interactions and performative practices to sustain its wholeness. This dimension, in which the Symbolic is collapsed and reconfigured, is what Lacan calls the Real or trauma. It is in the Real that the subject has agencies to transform its and others’ identities relationally.

**The Real as traumas**

The Real is perhaps the most important yet difficult concept in Lacanian theory. The difficulty in understanding this concept comes from the fact that the Real is defined as ‘that which resists symbolisation absolutely’ (Lacan, 1991, p.66). In other words, the Real cannot be described linguistically. That said, we may still locate the Real negatively in relation to the Symbolic: following Žižek (1989), since the Real is what resists the Symbolic (i.e., verbalisation, socialisation, and discipline by language), the Real can be identified as a ‘failing point of the Symbolic’, a point where the contingency of the Symbolic is revealed, making the subject unable to make sense of their identity and social reality (p.74). Thus, Lacan understands trauma as the Real, and the Real as traumatic (Lacan, 2004, p.53). The Real, as it resists the Symbolic, cannot be expressed verbally; however, it nonetheless can be manifested as distortions of the Symbolic. A good example is a sound: a sound pertains to the register of the Real, because it does not have any positive meaning; in a sound, meaning is generated only when the subject interprets the sound in relation to the Imaginary (linking the sound with an image of a moving object) and/or the Symbolic (associating the sound with a word in language). In social life, the Real can be manifested as natural disasters (Great Kanto Earthquake), terrorist attack (9/11 Attack), collective violence (the Holocaust), economic crisis (the subprime mortgage crisis of 2007),

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16 For instance, if one is well socialised in the modern world, the sound ‘apple’ can hardly not mean anything, be it a kind of fruit or a smartphone brand.
and so forth. These events are understood as a traumatic manifestation of the Real, for they radically change the background against which people navigate their everyday life and make sense of social reality.

The concept of the Real as trauma has several important implications for discourse analysis in IR. First, whether or not an event is traumatic does not depend on any external standard or pre-existing characters (e.g. the number of death toll or the scale of the damage inflicted upon the subject); rather, a trauma is subjectively defined by the extent to which it disrupts and obliterates the Symbolic in which the subject is embedded. It follows that what is traumatic for someone may not be the same for others – for instance, a destructive event (e.g. losing one’s house in a fire) may not be traumatic for a financially well-established adult, and a trivial event (e.g. losing one’s toy) may not untraumatic for a child.

Second, the manifestation of trauma is belated: an event does not manifest itself as a trauma immediately after it took place; rather, an event is constructed retroactively as a trauma, when the subject encounters the Real, i.e., the limit or failing point of the Symbolic. In other words, an event may not manifest its traumatising effect on the subject right after it took place; rather, an event becomes a trauma belatedly, after the intervention of the Symbolic, when the subject encounters a traumatic disruption of the Symbolic in which it lives (Žižek, 1989, pp.192–193). This second aspect of Lacanian trauma explains the belatedness or afterwards-ness of trauma, a phenomenon which Freud discovered among the German soldiers as early as the 1910s.

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17 But I have to note that these examples are not quite what Lacan meant by ‘the Real’. They are just linguistic instances that signify the Real rather than the Real itself. In other words, they are ‘fingers pointing to the Moon’, rather than the Moon itself.

18 Think about the Boston Massacre of 1770 in the U.S. – a ‘massacre’ in which only two people were killed.

19 An instance may be a person who loses her partner: the death of her partner as such may not be traumatising at that moment; however, the traumatising effect may surface when the person goes to bed and realises that her partner is gone – in this case, as her daily routine is disrupted (i.e., as the Real is manifested in the Symbolic), she begins to subjectively recognise the loss of love one as a traumatic event.

20 In his study of war neuroses, Freud discovers that one of the outstanding features of traumatic neuroses (i.e., what later is called PTSD) is that ‘an injury or wound sustained at the same time generally tended to prevent the occurrence of the neurosis’ (Freud, 2015, p.4). Freud noticed that patients of traumatic neuroses seemed to be ‘unharmed’ by the intensity of an overwhelmingly violent event (e.g., war or severe accident) at its occurrence and in a considerable time afterward; however, traumatic neuroses are triggered belatedly after the patient returned from the battlefield. In a seemingly well-protected environment, the patient repeatedly re-experiences the traumatic past in the form of flashback, hallucinations, and nightmares, sometimes even without being triggered by external stimuli (ibid., p. 3). For an event to be a traumatic event means that it has to go through what Freud calls latency – a period of time during which the event is repressed and remains unconscious to the subject’s consciousness.
Finally, whereas the subject’s identity is an effect of the Symbolic, of which it has little control, the subject nonetheless has agencies to reconstruct its identity by confronting with the Real (trauma). Trauma is a manifestation of the Real, a radical disruption of the Symbolic; it means that the Real (trauma) allows the subject to reconstruct the Symbolic by performing social practices. And since the subject’s actions and social practices constitute its identity and relations to the others, the subject’s way of confronting with the trauma determines its and the others’ identities.21 However, confronting with the Real is not a pleasant business, because the Real is the object of anxiety – it lacks any symbolic mediation that can represent it as an object in the subject’s world of words and categories, and therefore, it is ‘the object of anxiety par excellence’ (Lacan, 1988, p.164; cited in Evans, 1996 p.163). Bistoen (2016) points out that the subject may respond to a collective trauma in three different ways: first, to cover up the trauma with fantasy; second, to refrain from narrative that offers clear-cut solution and remain ambiguous about the traumatic issue; third, to embrace the invalidation of the old identities, desires, and dreams, so forth (pp. 128 – p. 129). In this sense, a trauma (the Real) is destructively transformative (or transformatively destructive), giving the subject freedom outside the Symbolic to decide who they are.

The Imaginary as fantasies

I mentioned in the above paragraph that one of the ways to confront the Real is to cover it up with fantasy (Bistoen, 2016, pp.128–129). Here, ‘fantasy’ is a Lacanian term, a term understood as ‘a defensive attempt to give meaning to a part of the Real that resists to the Symbolic’ (Verhaeghe, 2001, p.53). The term has to be explained in relation to the third register of psychoanalytic experience, the Imaginary.

The Imaginary is the dimension associated with consciousness, self-awareness, wholeness, oneness, and identity (the subject’s ego). It is in the Imaginary that the subject’s identity – the sense of the ‘I’ or ‘we’ as a distinctive being separated from the outside – is formed. In the Imaginary, the subject is able to experience itself as unified and the social reality as consistent. Lacan’s thesis derives from his clinical observation called the ‘mirror stage’: human infants obtain a sense of narcissistic pleasure when they find out that they are able to master their own image in the mirror (Lacan and Fink, 2007, pp.75–79). However, the infant’s sense of mastery and wholeness is frustrated by the lack of motor control of their own body. To overcome this

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21 To put it in another way: the Real, manifested as trauma, is a broken part of the subject’s social reality, and actions taken by the subject to deal with this broken part of the Symbolic reconstructs the Symbolic, hence the identity of the subject and its relations to the others.
frustration, the infant identifies with the image in the mirror so that they can have an imaginary sense of agency. It is at this moment that the ego (self-image, identity) emerges (ibid. p.79). In other words, identity – as an experience in the Imaginary – comes close to a form of self-deceptive idolatry: the wholeness of the infant’s ego is a fantasy that represses the Real, that is, the infant’s lack of control of its biologically fragmented body. Gradually, the image in the physical mirror is replaced by images in social ‘mirrors’: the subject may identify with its social image reflected in social interactions, such as appraisal, love, hate, criticism, sexual relations and politics, etc.; in other words, it is by identifying with an external image reflected in others that the subject establishes an illusory sense of autonomy, wholeness, and agency. However, these identities that provide the subject with a sense of unity – be it one’s body or social identity – are imaginary constructs created by the subject’s fantasy.

Fantasy functions to help the subject repress the Real by offering the subject a(n) (illusory) sense of wholeness and compensating for the lack and inconsistency in the Symbolic (i.e., the social reality). It is important to note that the Lacanian fantasy is irreducible to imagination or an antonym of the word ‘reality’. Rather, the Lacanian fantasy is understood as a cognitive interface that supports the subject’s reality. As Žižek notes, ‘[F]antasy is on the side of reality: it is, as Lacan once said, the support that gives consistency to what we call “reality”’ (Žižek, 1989, p.44). Fantasy supports reality in the sense that it renders the subject’s anxiety over the incompleteness of its identity and inconsistency of the Symbolic conceivable and controllable in imaginary ways. In public life, fantasy takes the form of political ideologies and collective narratives (i.e., nationalism, racism or religious fundamentalism) that provide a cognitive interface with which the subject navigates itself and finds its identity (Glynos and Stavrakakis, 2008). In international politics, social agents enact fantasy in order to defend against the encountering with the Real, e.g., traumatic events such as the 911 Attack that threatens the completeness of the Symbolic (see: Solomon, 2015).

The fantasy achieves a temporary closure by providing the subject with an illusory sense of completeness at the price of projecting aggressiveness onto the outside world. According to Žižek (1993), the construction of fantasy involves two fundamental elements: object-cause of desire (French: object petit a) and ‘theft of enjoyment’ (Dean, 2016, pp.20–23). Object-cause of desire is an unattainable missing object around which the fantasy is organized. Through

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22 For instance, nationalism is a collective fantasy which sets the national subject as the protagonist in a world where nations compete against one another for limited ‘living space (lebensraum)’. Similarly, communism sets up the imagined scenario in which the proletariats fight a constant ‘class struggle’ against the capitalist class.
identifying with the fantasy, the subject projects desire toward an object-cause of desire, an object supposed to repair the lack of wholeness in their being (Lacan, 1980, pp.86–87). The ‘theft of enjoyment’ is a socially constructed ‘other’ who is alleged to have stolen the subject’s object-cause of desire, and thus is perceived by the subject as the target of aggressiveness. In other words, by scapegoating the ‘theft of enjoyment’, the subject suppresses the Real of his/her existence and compensates the structural lack within themselves. But the subject’s attempt to regain the wholeness of identity is necessarily futile, because the wholeness of the identity is illusory and does not exist in the first place. As Žižek remarks, ‘what we conceal by imputing to the Other the theft of enjoyment is the traumatic fact that we never possessed what was allegedly stolen from us’ (Žižek, 1993, pp.203–204). Therefore, the significance of the ‘theft of enjoyment’ implies that the subject’s identity can be maintained as long as enmity is generated, so that the subject can keep projecting their anxiety and aggressiveness onto the other to repress the Real.

The Four discourses as four fantasies

I have just mentioned in the above sub-section that the subject may identify with a fantasy to confront with the Real that disrupts the Symbolic. This leads to the question of what type of fantasy the subject identifies with. Lacan stipulates that there are four types of fantasies that the subject can deploy to confront with the Real: the master’s discourse that asserts authority, the university’s discourse that frames issues in terms of technicalities, the hysteric’s discourse that questions the authority, and the analyst’s discourse reveals the fragmentation of the incompleteness of the other’s identity (Lacan, 2007, p.17). These four discourses are four different discursive structures, representing different ways that the subject relates to the object-cause of desire in communicative practices (Johnston, 2016, chap. 2.4.3). The formalisation is used by Lacan to analyse the crucial factors through which language exerts formative and transformative power in the social phenomena, namely, governing, educating, protesting, and revolutionising (Bracher, 1988, p.107). The introduction of the four fantasies requires a basic understanding of the terms: the four positions of discourse, and the four components that occupy that four positions.

Four positions

To start with, I need to introduce the basic structure of Lacan’s discourse. The structure can be illustrated as the following scheme and I will explain each position in the following paragraphs (Lacan, 1999, p.18). Accordingly, there are four positions in a discourse: agent, other, product,
and truth. The two positions on the top – agent and other – (see the graph below) refers to what is overt and explicit in a discourse, whereas the bottom positions represent what is covert, implicit, latent, and repressed (Bracher, 1997, p.109):

\[
\begin{array}{c}
\text{agent} \\
\rightarrow \\
\text{truth} \\
// \\
\text{product} \\
\end{array}
\]


1) The agent: the agent is the starting point of a discourse, as any discourse necessarily starts with a person’s speech act. Thus, this position represents the speaker or the author of a speech; it represents the most active or dominant position that defines the discourse.

2) The other: Any discursive practice is directed at an audience, and the other is the external subject addressed by the agent. The other is the receiver of the agent’s message; it is interpellated and called upon for action. Here, the arrow (→) represents the act of speaking and addressing.

3) The product: as the agent addresses the other, the agent has a certain purpose and its speech generates some effect. This is represented as the product at the bottom right. The bar, separating the other and the product, means that communicative practices between the agent and the other always creates excess and leftovers.

4) The truth: the agent’s speech is motivated by an unconscious knowledge, something about the agent that the agent does not know and cannot be fully verbalised. This position is represented by the (hidden) truth. The bar, separating the agent and the truth, that the truth is hidden and repressed by the discourse. The double bar (//), separating the product and the truth, means that the agent’s unconscious truth can never be verbalised by speech. It should be noted that what sets a discourse in motion is the truth rather than the agent, because the truth functions as the agent’s unconscious purpose of speaking.
**Four components of discourse**

Lacan’s theory argues that the four positions of discourse are occupied by four components; each of them is represented by a symbol: S1, the master-signifier; S2, a chain of signifiers; $, the divided subject; and a, the object-cause of desire (Lacan, 1999, p.17). This is a notoriously difficult part of Lacan’s theory that will need to be explained in some details:

1) **Master-signifier (S1):** a master signifier is a word or concept that ‘allows the other terms of discourse to operate together and to assume (or be assumed to have) a degree of naturalness’ (Neill, 2013, p.8). It is taken as self-evident by the speaker to make a discourse meaningful and intelligible; it is a signifier that does not need any explanation or further justification. Examples include family, freedom, democracy, nation, God, sin, heaven, hell, etc. Crucially, a master-signifier is ‘any signifier that a subject has invested his or her identity in’ (Bracher, 1997, p.111), meaning that the master-signifier confers to the subject a sense of unity, meaningfulness, and completeness in its identity. We can recognise the presence of a master-signifier in a text by the way in which the agent and the other communicates in a discourse: the sender uses the master-signifier to anchor, explain, or justify its claims or demands; the receiver also takes the meaning of the master-signifier as valid without saying (ibid., p.112).

2) **Chain of signifiers (S2):** chain of signifiers refers to the network of signifiers linked together. Chain of signifiers represents a particular set of knowledge, value, and acquired practices. It is the ‘diacritical, synchronic, systematic aspect of language’, an articulation of signifiers, the network of relationships, and the system of differentiated elements (Bracher, 1997, p.110). With Lacan’s famous thesis that ‘the unconscious is structured like a language’, the chain of signifiers also represents the unconscious of the subject, the knowledge about the subject that the subject does not know. The chain of signifiers is rendered meaningful and readable through being mediated by a master-signifier (ibid.).

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23 A master-signifier may or may not explicit appear in a text, and the identification of a master-signifier depends on the researcher’s subjective reading.
3) The divided subject ($) symbolizes the subject who feels fragmented and unsatisfied. It is so because of the master-signifier (S1): although the master-signifier (S1) confers to the subject a sense of unity in its identity, such sense of unity is imaginary – language (the Symbolic, the spoken ‘I’) can never exhaustively represent the subject’s being (the Real, the speaking ‘I’); when the subject used a master-signifier to represent its identity, the master-signifier eliminates other possibilities of what the subject might become. Therefore, the subject is always divided, fragmented, and alienated in the Symbolic.

4) The object-cause of desire (a): the object-cause of desire is the ‘lost object’ that embodies the dividedness of the divided subject (Žižek, 1989, p.158). To avoid the anxiety generated by the lack of its being, the divided subject ($) retroactively posits an object which is missing but can eradicate the lack of its being once regained. Therefore, the object-cause of desire represents the Real of the subject’s identity; it also generates desire by reifying the subject’s lack. In this sense, the object-cause of desire (a) can be recognised in discourses as the ‘thing’ that ‘offers the possibility of stopping up the gap, filling the lack’ (Bracher, 1997, p.114), or that which conceals the inconsistency of a collective identity (Žižek, 1997, p.178). For instance, the object-cause of desire could be a relationship (marriage), a commodity (Coca-Cola), an idea (democracy), or any other things; it gives promise and hopes to the subject: ‘after gaining this, the void of my being will be filled’. Yet, the subject’s desire can never be satisfied by a positivist object, because the object-cause of desire is an imaginary construct in the fantasy that never exists in the first place (Žižek, 1996, p.144).

**The Four discourses**

After the four positions and four terms are introduced, I want to turn to explain Lacan’s four discourses. The four discourses represent four different ways in which the subject relates itself to the object-cause of desire in a fantasy. I will explain them one by one, starting with the master’s discourse.
1) The master’s discourse:

\[
S_1 \rightarrow S_2 \\
\text{—} \quad \text{—} \\
S \quad // \quad a
\]

The master’s discourse is the primary discourse from which the other three discourses derive (Evans, 1996, p.46); it is the discourse that produces value, judgement, and meaning; it is also the discourse that enacts an autonomous, self-identical ego by instituting a master-signifier (Bracher, 1997, p.117). Thus, the most active agent in the master’s discourse is the master-signifier (S1) that structures a chain of signifiers (S1 → S2). The functioning of the master’s discourse is seen in both the structure of individual psychology and the structure of political movements. In the late 1960s, when the Leftist movement was prevailing in Paris, Lacan made the comment that the rioting students were not revolutionising but merely asking for a ‘new master’ replacing the old one. After receiving the message, the chain of signifiers is put to work and produces object-cause of desire (a), an object that represents the lack of the master-signifier, the element which cannot be assimilated into the knowledge system ruled by the master-signifier. However, the lack is repressed (S2/a), so is the agent’s self-division (S1/$) experienced as dissatisfaction over the fragmentation of the subject’s identity. In other words, the master’s discourse is blind to the contingent foundation of its identity (Bracher, 1997, p.121).

2) The university’s discourse:

\[
S_2 \rightarrow a \\
\text{—} \quad \text{—} \\
S_1 \quad // \quad S
\]

24 For instance, Lacan argues that the teaching of philosophy is a practice of promoting certain ways of thinking, feeling, desiring, and acting: ontology tends to see all phenomena in terms of the master-signifier of ‘being’, whilst ethics attempts to signify all actions in terms of the master-signifier of ‘good’ (Lacan and Grigg, 2008, p.20).
In the university’s discourse, the agent is the system of knowledge, usually represented by scientists, academics, and researchers, who try to discipline the object-cause of desire ($a$), the thing that represents the subject’s incompleteness, cognitive limitation, and that which cannot be assimilated into the Symbolic (represented as $S2 \rightarrow a$). The hidden truth is that the validation of knowledge is surreptitiously guaranteed by a master-signifier ($S2/S1$). For instance, science is surreptitiously ruled by some master-signifiers such as ‘objectivity’, ‘fact’, ‘scientific method’, and ‘evidence’, etc. Those signifiers determine what can be regarded as ‘scientific fact’, what questions can be asked legitimately, what puzzles can be solved, who can be appointed in a research institute, and how much funding scientists can obtain from the government or corporations (Kuhn, 1996). The product is the divided subject who feels increasingly confused and alienated ($a/$); examples of this divided subject may be a patient who is utterly perplexed by her doctor’s medical terminologies in diagnosis or people who, in trying to better understand their economic situation, find themselves bewildered by the jargons of economics. In this discourse, as the subject cannot perceive the hidden master-signifier, objectivity is established (represented as $S1//S$). The university’s discourse represents the hegemony of positivist science in modern societies. In Sino-Japanese relations, the Japanese government had enacted the university’s discourse ($S2$) to deal with the ‘history problem’ ($a$), repressing the articulation of Japan’s war responsibility ($S2/S1$) and making the Chinese feel subjectively fragmented ($a/$).

3) The hysteric’s discourse:  

\[
\begin{array}{c}
S \rightarrow S1 \\
\_ \_ \\
n/ S2
\end{array}
\]

The hysteric’s discourse is primarily marked by the agent who questions and challenges the master-signifier (represented as $S \rightarrow S1$). Psychoanalytically, it takes the name from its most striking instance of ‘hysteric neurosis’ – the subject refuses to embody the master-signifier that constitutes their positions made available in the Symbolic (Bracher, 1997, p.122); the divided subject ($S$), thus, is a manifestation of the subject’s alienation repressed in the master’s discourse (identity, norm, and value) and the university’s discourse (system of knowledge). This discourse is driven by the object-cause of desire: the hysteric agent ‘goes at the master and demands that he or she show his or her stuff, prove his or her mettle
by producing something serious by way of knowledge’ (Fink, 1996, p.133). The hysteric agent is motivated by an unease, dissatisfaction, and a sense of incompleteness (represented as $/a$); it searches for meaning and identity to overcome its dividedness. The result is the production of solutions and answers in the form of a system of knowledge (represented as S1/S2). The product, however, is always outside the point and cannot fully fulfil the subject’s sense incompleteness (represented as a/$).

4) The analyst’s discourse: 

\[ a \rightarrow $ \]

\[ - \rightarrow - \]

\[ S2 \rightarrow S1 \]

The analyst’s discourse is the reverse of the master’s discourse; it is the only discourse that can effectively transform the subject’s identity and its relations with the others. In this discourse, the object-cause of desire becomes the agent, addressing the subject (represented as a $\rightarrow$). Unlike the master’s discourse (in which the agent speaks from a position of authority) or the university’s discourse (in which the agent speaks from a position of expertise), the analyst’s discourse addresses the divided subject with openness and ask: what do you want from me (Schroeder, 2008, p.107)? Through listening and studying the subject impartially without making moral judgement, the speaker arrives at a position sustained by a particular knowledge about the divided subject’s psychic economy or the subject’s unconscious fantasy (represented as a/S2) (Bracher, 1997, p.125); the speaker motivates the subject ($) to reconstruct its identity by instituting or identifying with a new master-signifier (represented as $/S1$). Crucially, the master-signifier is not imposed on the subject; rather, the subject produces the master-signifier, giving new meaning to the subject’s social reality. In social life, this corresponds to the act of listening to the other. For instance, in the National September 11 Memorial & Museum, people’s story and traumatic experience in the 9/11 Attack (the divided subject $)$ are articulated to the audiences (a $\rightarrow$ $); The articulation of the traumatic experience brings about a change of public consciousness and memory, hence the transformation of the collective narrative organised by a new master-signifier that resists the dominant discourse of ‘war on terror’. In the ‘history problem’ in Sino-Japanese rela-
tions, however, the analyst’s discourse is yet to emerge. The lack of the analyst’s discourse explains the lack of change despite the presence of abundant political dialogue (the master’s discourse), academic research (the university’s discourse), and competing narratives (the hysteric’s discourse).

**Method: Research Design and Coding Technique**

It is useful to bear in mind that Lacan’s theory is based on his clinical research and experience as a psychoanalyst, whose most important technique is ‘free association’: during the analytic session, the patient (or analysand, as Lacan terms) is asked to speak whatever comes to her mind, while the analyst pays attention to every seemingly senseless word spoken by the patient and tries to find patterns and laws within it. Therefore, the meaning of a word is not derived from some externally pre-determined, universal referent; rather, the meaning of a word can only be established by making connections internally to other words articulated by the patient. This means that a research design informed Lacan’s psychoanalytic theory should not impose theory onto the database; rather, the method should be inclusive and open-ended, being able to exact and generate meaning and categories within the database.

Due to the methodological concern, this research adopts the poststructuralist discourse analysis in IR (Hansen, 2006) and Strauss and Corbin’s Grounded Theory Method (1997) to establish its method and research design. Building on Foucault, Derrida, Kristeva, and Laclau and Mouffe (both are Lacanian scholars), Hansen’s poststructuralist discourse analysis gives very clear outline in how to map out intertextual models to trace the construction of identity in foreign policymaking practices and how to sample data for discourse analysis in IR (Hansen, 2006, chaps 4–5). The Grounded Theory Method is a fundamentally inductive research process, and thus can absolve the reductionism of the research. Four steps will be followed to conduct the discourse analysis: establishing the context, sampling data, coding the data, and tying up the result. I will now turn to discuss each of them in the following sub-sections.

**Establishing the context**

Any reliable political/social study requires a thorough contextualisation of the event in question. For discourse analysis, meaning is context-dependent; it does not inhere in language and texts themselves, but rather derives from the network where the signifier relates to other discursive practices and communicative events (van Dijk, 2005, p.71). Thus, analysing discourse and establishing context have a dialectical relationship, because a discourse cannot be established
without the context being established, and vice versa (Chouliaaraki and Fairclough, 1999, p.101). To analyse any discourse, it is prerequisite to first establish the relevant context.

At this initial stage, the researcher asks: In what historical, institutional, and social background were the textual data of the discourse produced? What broader social events or political debates were they tied into? Under what condition were they uttered? How were they received by the relevant social agents? These questions are addressed by reading secondary sources relevant to the researched topic extensively. Drawing on Reisigl (2017 p. 53), each case study of the discourse analysis of this thesis (i.e., the Textbook Issue, the Yasukuni Issue, the Nanjing Massacre Debate) will be contextualised by paying attention to the following four dimensions: 1) the intra-textual dimension – ‘The immediate, language internal co-text and co-discourse regards thematic and syntactic coherences, lexical solidarities, collocations, connotations, implications, presuppositions and local interactive processes’ (ibid.); 2) the intertextual dimension – ‘Intertextual and interdiscursive relationship between utterances, texts, genres and discourses (e.g., with respect to discourse representation, allusions, evocations) is a further contextual research dimension’ (ibid.); 3) the institutional dimension – ‘Social factors and institutional frames of a specific context of situation include: degree of formality, place, time, occasion, addressees, interactive and political roles, political and ideological orientation, gender, age, profession, level of education, ethnic, regional, national, religious identities, etc’ (ibid.); 4) the socio-political dimension – ‘On a meso- and macro-level, the broader socio-political and historical context is integrated into the analysis. At this point, fields of action and the history of the discursive event as well as of discourse topics are looked at’ (ibid.).

Through establishing the context, the researcher would not only see the big picture of the discourse, but also better navigate herself in finding the source material for further analysis. This leads to the second step, the establishment of the database. The contextualisation of this thesis is presented in Chapter 4.

Sampling data

This highly crucial step involves selecting and collecting textual materials for the work of analysis. At this stage, the research has to define the scope of the research and collect primary sources according to selection criteria.
The initial collection of textual materials

Building on Hansen’s (2006) discourse analysis research design (p.57), the scope of the research will be of three layers of intertextual models: the official discourse, the wider public debate, and popular culture. The pre-set scheme for data collection is as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Intertextual Models</th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 3A</th>
<th>Model 3B</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Analytical Focus</td>
<td>Official discourse:</td>
<td>Wider public debate:</td>
<td>Cultural representations:</td>
<td>Marginal political discourse:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Heads of states</td>
<td>Political opposition,</td>
<td>Popular culture</td>
<td>Social movements</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Governments</td>
<td>The media discourse</td>
<td>High culture</td>
<td>Academics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Senior civil servants</td>
<td>The academic discourse</td>
<td></td>
<td>NGOs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>High ranked officials</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Illegal associations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>International institutions</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Object of Analysis</td>
<td>Official texts,</td>
<td>Political texts</td>
<td>Film</td>
<td>Marginal newspapers,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Direct and secondary intertextual links</td>
<td>Parliamentary debates</td>
<td>Literature</td>
<td>Websites,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Supportive texts,</td>
<td>Speeches</td>
<td>Television</td>
<td>Books</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Critical texts</td>
<td>Media texts</td>
<td>Photography</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Editorials</td>
<td>Manga</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Opinion and debate</td>
<td>Music</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Public campaigns</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Intertextual links</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Goal of Analysis</td>
<td>The stabilisation of official discourse through intertextual links</td>
<td>The hegemony of official discourse</td>
<td>Reproduction of identities in cultural representations</td>
<td>Resistance of identities imposed by the hegemonic discourse</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The response of official discourse to critical discourses</td>
<td>The likely transformation of official discourse</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>The internal stability of media discourses</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The three layers of intertextual models construct a set of general categorisation as guidance to narrow down analytical focus, but this alone does not suffice the task of producing substantial questions to be pursued or proved a full account of how concrete research designs should be established (Hansen, 2006, p.67). To enhance the analytical rigour of the research design, the research design will include three additional dimensions (see Figure.1):
1) Number of Selves (Subjects) – whether one or multiple Subjects are examined.
2) Temporal Perspective – whether one makes a study of one particular moment or a longer historical development.
3) Number of Events – and third, whether the analysis is based on one event or multiple events. Methodologically, the intertextual models and the three additional dimensions form the basic structure of discourse analytical research design.

With the methodological guideline stated above, the research design will be presenting the ‘history problem’ discourse as shown in the figure below (see Figure 5.3):


Number of Selves: China, Japan

The 'history problem' discourse

Temporal Perspective: 1982 – 2012

Number of Events: Debate over the 'history problem', including: 1. Textbook Issue 2. Yasukuni Shrine Issue 3. Nanking Massacre Debate
I identify three events in my thesis for analysis, namely, the Textbook Issue, the Yasukuni Shrine Issue, and the Nanking Massacre Debate. I have justified my choice in Chapter 2. To reiterate my justification, I choose these cases according to the two criteria, i.e., political relevance and contested-ness between the Japanese and the Chinese public. The Textbook Issue, the Yasukuni Shrine Issue, and the Nanking Massacre Debate have been politically relevant and heatedly contested in contemporary Sino-Japanese relations. In particular, the Textbook Issue is said to be the starting point of the ‘history problem’ in the Sino-Japanese relations (Rose, 2005, p.82). The Yasukuni Shrine Issue – the transnational contestation over whether or not Japanese Prime Ministers should be able to officially visit the national commemorative facility that enshrines the A-class war criminals – was a major political issue that dramatically hindered the Sino-Japanese relations during the Koizumi period from 2001 to 2006 (Griffith, 2014). The Nanking Massacre Debate remains a controversial topic transnationally that involves participants from China, Japan, Taiwan, and North America (Feng, 2017). The Nanking Massacre Debate has been an ethical and political concern for the researchers in the Joint History Research Committee and still remains a destabilising factor in the bilateral relations.

Throughout, the three case studies are analysed separately to shed light on the overall discursive structure and evolution of the ‘history problem’ discourse. It should be noted that the Initial Collection as outlined above is a provisional scheme that allows the researcher to initialise the sampling process. It means that the sampling process does not stop after the provisional scheme is established and is constantly active throughout the research.

*Theoretical sampling*

Theoretical sampling is ‘the process of data collection for generating the theory whereby the analyst jointly collects, codes, and analyses his data and decide what data to collect next and where to find them, in order to develop his theory as it emerges’ (Glaser and Strauss, 2000, p.45). In simpler terms, theoretical sampling allows the researcher to change her sampling scheme as she progresses in the research. In the theoretical sampling, the process of sampling is controlled by the emerging data rather than by the provisional sampling scheme. This helps

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25 The selection is determined by making reference to *The Handbook of History Problem* by Togo Kazuhiko and Hatano Sumio (2015), *Sino-Japanese History Problem and the Sino-Japanese Relations* by Bu Ping (2015), 11 semi-structured interviews that I conducted with members of the Japan-China Joint History Research Committee, and the research done by other scholars in the field (see: Chapter 2).

26 This is reflected by the APA Hotel incident in February 2017, when the Chinese Foreign Ministry openly criticised the APA Hotel’s putting books denying the existence of Nanking Massacre into drawers in hotel rooms.
to resolve a crucial dilemma in data collection: during data collection, a researcher can often find herself bound to a provisional sampling scheme that does not fit the phenomenon under study as the research progresses. So rather than collecting data aimlessly by convenience or relying on the underdeveloped provisional scheme, the researcher uses insights gained from the coding process to further motivate data collection (Tucker, 2016, p.428).

Coding the textual materials

The collection of data goes hand in hand with an inductive research technique called ‘coding’. A code in qualitative inquiry is most often ‘a word or short phrase that symbolically assigns a summative, salient, essence-capturing, and/or evocative attribute for a portion of language-based or visual data’ (Saldana, 2015, p.3). Coding refers to the process of organising and sorting data by assigning codes to specific units of the textual material, such as a word, a sentence, or a paragraph. Rather than pigeonholing data into a priori theoretical framework, the research formulates theories from the data by developing provisional codes via empirical study and abstraction (ibid.). Each provisional code that emerges in the research process earns its way into (or gets discarded by) the research by being repeatedly presented (or being significantly absent) in the empirical data.

Initially, the researcher starts to sample data without any hypothesis. The empirical data collected is labelled with codes through two ‘circles of coding’, i.e., the First Cycle Coding and the Second Cycle Coding (Saldana, 2015, p.45). From the codes, the researcher abstracts key categories. The research moves on to analyse the properties of each category and the interrelations between categories. Based on the analysis of the interrelated categories, the research formulates themes. Themes refer to the ‘outcome of coding, categorisation, and analytic reflection’ rather than something that is in itself coded (Saldana, 2015, p.13). From themes, the research formulates a substantive theory, i.e., a theory that works for the particular case or cases studied by the research (Strauss and Corbin, 1998, p.55). The substantive theory can be further abstracted into a formal theory, a theory applicable to other relevant cases. The process of recoding and re-categorising data will be carried out until a point when no details can be added to reformulate the theory. Now the data are said to be ‘saturated’ and the coding process, as

27 The technique of coding is drawn from Grounded Theory developed by Glaser and Strauss (Glaser and Strauss, 2000) and other qualitative sociologists (Strauss and Corbin, 1997; Strauss and Corbin, 1997; Charmaz, 2014). An IR scholar has also advocated that discourse analysis in IR can benefit from Grounded Theory by making use of the coding technique (Milliken, 1999 p. 234).
well as the data collection, should stop. The process of coding, as described above, can be schematised as the graph below:

![Coding Scheme Diagram]

Coding scheme

More specifically and technically speaking, the process of coding data can be divided into two major procedures, namely, the First Cycle Coding and the Second Circle Coding. They can be further specified as follows:

**First Cycle Coding:**

1) **Select the appropriate coding method.** The *Coding Manual for Qualitative Researchers*, Johnny Saldana (2015) lists 6 types of different coding methods (p. 43), each containing three to four different coding options. Depending on the nature of the researcher’s project, the researcher may ‘mix and match’ these methods and coding options to apply to her/his research. As this thesis aims to explore how the subjective dimension – including ideology, 

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28 Grammatical methods, elemental methods, affective methods, literary and language methods, exploratory methods, and procedural methods.
emotions, affect, etc. – accounts for the emergence and persistence of the ‘history problem’ discourse in Sino-Japanese relations, I choose most of the coding options from Affective Methods and Procedural Methods, because they give me the analytic focus on the subjective dimension of the discourse as well as an open-ended coding scheme with theoretical flexibility. More specifically, the research will adopt the following coding options:

a) Open Coding:

Open Coding is about breaking down qualitative data into separate parts, closely analysing them, comparing them for similarities and differences, and attributing data with conceptual labels (Strauss and Corbin, 1998, p.102). I use Open Coding as a starting point of the coding process, a period of digesting and reflecting on the data before more specific coding works begin. In the initial coding process, I will jot down around 20 to 30 new codes. These codes are all open-ended, partial, provisional, and perspective (Clarke et al., 2017, pp.7–8), providing a provisional grounding for further coding and sampling. Throughout the research, these codes will be filtered, refined, and discarded in further research.

b) Emotion Coding:

Emotion Coding taps into the emotional dynamics written in the textual materials (Saldana, 2015, p.86). In this process, I label emotions that the author may have actively or unconsciously displayed to explore the emotional process of the discourse. As this research primarily analyses textual materials, I will aim at coding semantically distinct emotions, i.e., emotions that are linguistically recognisable through the use of language. Paul Ekman (1992) famously proposes that there are 6 basic emotions shared by people in all cultures: anger, happiness, surprise, disgust, sadness, and fear. Cognitive scientists also found that Ekman’s emotion set is calculated to be the most semantically distinct (Bann and Bryson, 2013 p. 12), meaning that these emotions are highly representable and communicable through texts and discursive practices. Drawing on Ekman, I will start labelling the data with 6 emotional codes: anger, happiness, surprise, disgust, sadness, and fear.

c) Values Coding:
Values Coding reflects a speaker’s values, belief, and attitudes. It concerns representing speakers’ worldview, ideology, self-identity, political position, and opinions on specific issues (Saldana, 2015, p.89). *Value* is one’s judgement regarding what is good, important, desirable, and fits one’s ethical principle or standard of behaviour. *Belief* refers, roughly, to a representational structure where the subject regards something as true (Schwitzgebel, 2015). *Attitude* refers to a ‘psychological tendency that is expressed by evaluating a particular entity with some degree of favour or disfavour’ (Eagly and Chaiken, 1993, p.1). Through Values Coding, the researcher is able to explore cultural values, intra-subjective, and intersubjective experiences and actions displayed in discourses.

d) Domain and Taxonomic Coding:

In a discourse, a speaker organises their speech by making use of shared cultural knowledge that is taken for granted without explicit justification. Domain and Taxonomic Coding pertains to a mean to discover the shared cultural knowledge and cultural references in the data (Saldana, 2015, p.133). With an extensive reading of data, the researcher is able to discern the categories embedded in the shared cultural knowledge and their structure. A domain is a category that categorises other categories (McCurdy et al., 2005, p.44), whilst taxonomies are ‘simply [hierarchical] lists of different things that are classified together under a domain word by members of a micro-culture on the basis of some shared certain attributes’ (ibid., p. 45). In other words, domain includes taxonomies; they constitute a single paradigmatic grouping, i.e., a linguistic system that speakers take for granted when they communicate with other members of the society (McCurdy et al., 2005, pp.35–6). Nine possible *semantic relationships* exist within domains (Spradley, 1979, p.111). They are:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Form</th>
<th>Semantic Relationship</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Strict Inclusion</td>
<td>X is a kind of Y (Revision of history textbook is a kind of militarism.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Spatial</td>
<td>X is a place in Y, X is a part of Y (Taiwan is part of China.)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
3. **Cause-effect**  
   X is a result of Y, X is a cause of Y (The revision of history textbook is a cause of the resurgence of militarism.)

4. **Rational**  
   X is a reason for doing Y (Criticising the textbook issue is a reason for interfering in Japan’s domestic affairs.)

5. **Location for action**  
   X is a place for doing Y (Education is a place for teaching peace.)

6. **Function**  
   X is used for Y (Textbook is used for constructing social concepts.)

7. **Means-end**  
   X is a way to do Y (Revising history textbook is a way to change the public consciousness.)

8. **Sequence**  
   X is a step (stage) in Y (Revising history textbook is a step in changing the constitution.)

9. **Attribution**  
   X is an attribute (characteristic) of Y (Revising history textbook is an attribute of the Japanese militarism.)

For the analysis, I choose one or several semantic relationships. Data are examined to locate examples of the chosen semantic relationship, and the related taxonomies are listed in a worksheet. The worksheet visualises how a domain is structured and gives insight into how discourse shapes identities and perception regarding specific political issues.

e) **Theming the Data**

The theme refers to an *outcome* of coding and categorisation through analysis and reflection, rather than the coding itself (Saldana, 2015, p.139). In the process of Theming the Data, the researcher is required to identify what a set of coded data is about with a concise phrase or sentence. At the end of the First Cycle Coding, the researcher may conclude several themes and describe them in detail. These themes work as several theoretical constructs that organise a group of repeated ideas (Auerbach and Silverstein,
The theme should be stated ‘as simply as possible during the First Cycle Coding for “meaning condensation”’ (Saldana, 2015, p.140) and tied together ‘to explain why something happens or what something means’ (Rubin and Rubin, 1995, p.57).

**Second Cycle Coding**

Second Cycle Coding pertains ‘advanced ways of reorganising and reanalysing data coded through First Cycle Coding. The goal is to construct a more refined conceptualisation of the coding result produced in the First Cycle Coding. Using the analogy of assembling a (possibly IKEA) wood furniture, Saldana (2015, p.150) likens the First Cycle Coding as a process whereby someone makes sure all necessary assembly parts are there on the floor, whilst the Second Cycle Coding as a process whereby she assembles those parts into organised furniture. There are two steps in the Second Cycle Coding, namely, Axial Coding and Theoretical Coding:

f) Axial coding:

Axial Coding is a coding procedure whereby ‘data are put back together in new ways after open coding, by making connections between categories. This is done by using a coding paradigm involving conditions, context, action/interational strategies, and consequences’ (Strauss and Corbin, 1990, p.96). The ‘axis’ of Axial Coding is categories emerged in the First Cycle Coding (Saldana, 2015, p.159). During this process, I reduce the number of codes by sorting similar categories into more concise and inclusive conceptual categories, so that ‘the code is sharpened to achieve its best fit’ (Glaser, 1978, p.62). In other words, Axial Coding is essentially a way of exploring relationships among categories and making connections between them.

g) Theoretical Coding:

Theoretical Coding (also called ‘Selective Coding’) is the last coding process in Grounded Theory methodology. It involves a process whereby we unify all categories and subcategories around a core theoretical concept, a category that has the greatest explanatory relevance to the phenomenon (Strauss and Corbin, 1998, p.104). In Theoretical Coding, the researcher should explain how each category is related to the core theoretical concept (Saldana, 2015, p.165). In principle, the generalisability of the
concept is achieved through a process of abstraction during the entire research. In principle, the more abstract the concept is, the more generalisable is the theory (Corbin and Strauss, 1990, p.16).

All in all, the process of reviewing and analysing the data through the First Cycle Coding and the Second Cycle Coding generates a theory regarding the research questions. The process of coding can be schematised as follows:

Tying up the result

After going through the First and Second Cycle Coding, the researcher would have accumulated a substantial amount of codes, analytic memos, and notes. Based on these materials, my writing will be guided by three sets of questions informed by the Lacanian theory:

1) Locate the Real – What is the antagonistic part – the politicised and undecided part – of the discourse as reflected in the database? What is the thing that resists symbolisation in the discourse? What subjects are involved in the antagonistic discourses? How do the discourses manifest the Real discursively? What is the void around which the discourses of the ‘history problem’ revolve?

2) Locate the fantasy – Is there any fantasy (in the Lacanian sense) that functioned to cover up the Real? How frequently and in what context does it surface in the discourse? Can we identify the structure of it?
3) Locate the specific type of fantasy at work – Does the fantasy identified fit into one of the four discourses described by Lacan? How? Can we describe the underlying unconscious motivation and effect of the fantasy to see how it influences the development of the discursive practices of the ‘history problem’?

**Database and Research Design for Each Case Analysis**

Having discussed the theory and method of the research, I now want to turn to discuss in more details about how the database is established as well as the specific research design of each case analysis.

**Database**

Empirical data in the analysis are established according to the selection criteria outlined previously (see: pp. 60-63). Accordingly, three layers of intertextual models are involved: official discourse, wider public debate, and cultural representation (ibid.). The data selection can be further enhanced by adding Number of Selves, Temporal Perspective, and Number of Events. The research design of each case can be elaborated as follows.

**The Textbook Issue:**

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Number of Selves
- Japan and China

Intertextual Models
- Official Discourse
- Wider Political Debate

Textbook Issue in Sino-Japanese Relations

Temporal Perspective
- Historical development from 1982 to 2012

Number of events
- Textbook Issue
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Based on the data selection criteria as stipulated in the ‘Method’ section, I base the discourse analysis on the following textual materials:
News articles in *People’s Daily* (1982 – 2012): The total number of articles that have been coded is 326. All articles are collected from the Electronic Database of *People’s Daily*; the date ranges from 1 January 1982 to 31 December 2012. Three keywords are used in the search engine: ‘Japan (*riben* 日本)’, ‘History (*lishi* 歷史)’, and ‘Textbook (*jiaokeshu* 教科書)’.

Chinese academic papers: Using the keyword ‘Textbook Issue (*教科書問題*)’, 52 pieces of academic essays, dated from 1 January 1982 to 31 December 2017, have been collected on the National Centre of Philosophy and Social Sciences Database.

MOFAJ documents: The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan published two internal documents about how to deal with China and Korea’s diplomatic protests regarding the Textbook Issue in 1982 and 1986. The electronic copies of the documents have been obtained from the Diplomatic Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan located in Tokyo, Japan.

Official documents of Diet proceedings: Using two keywords – ‘China (*chūgoku* 中国)’ and ‘Textbook Issue (*kyōkashō mondai* 教科書問題)’ – 175 Diet proceedings, date from 1 January 1982 to 31 December 2012, have been transcribed from the Search System of Diet Record.

Interview data: The researcher has conducted interviews with 11 interviewees from the Japan-China Joint History Research Committee, a research hub established in 2007 by the Japanese and Chinese government to address the long-standing dispute over the ‘history problem’.

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The Yasukuni Issue

1) News articles in *People’s Daily* (1980 – 2012): 326 pieces of articles containing the keywords ‘Japan’ and ‘Yasukuni’ have been coded. All articles are collected from the Electronic Database of *People’s Daily*. The date ranges from 1 January 1980 to 31 December 2012. Three key words are used in the search engine: ‘Japan (riben 日本)’ and ‘Yasukuni Shrine (jingguo shenshe 靖国神社)’. The searching starts from 1980, because the year 1980 was the first time that the state-run Chinese media mentioned the Yasukuni Issue. *People’s Daily* is an official newspaper of the Chinese Communist Party, ‘a crucial part of the party-state machine’ (Wu, 1994). Also, as Edward Griffith points out, the tone of official and the non-media on the Yasukuni Issue during the Koizumi era of 2001-2006 were highly unified. Thus, the discourse in *People’s Daily* is highly representative of the Chinese official perception of the Yasukuni Issue vis-à-vis Japan.

2) Official documents of the Diet proceedings: Using two keywords – ‘China (chūgoku 中国)’ and ‘Yasukuni (Yasukuni 靖国)’, 442 Diet proceedings, date from 1 January 1985 to 31 December 2012, were transcribed from the Search System of Diet Record and coded. The National Diet (kokkai 国会) is Japan’s bicameral legislature where significant domestic and foreign affairs, including the Yasukuni Issue with China, is discussed.

among 467 elected members in the House of Representatives (shūgiyin 衆議院). Thus, these records politicians’ discussions about the Yasukuni Issue should be considered highly representative of the Japanese official discourse on the Yasukuni Issue.

3) The Collective View of the Japanese Government on the Yasukuni Issue: Since 1978, the Prime Minister and the Chief Cabinet Secretary had issued 7 pieces of ‘Collective Views of the Government (seifu tōitsu kenkai 政府統一見解)’ in response to domestic controversies on the Yasukuni Issue. These documents are representative of Japan’s official stance towards the Yasukuni Issue.

4) Question & Written Answers Documents (shitsumon shuisho to tōbensho 質問主意書と答弁書) which are relevant to the Yasukuni Issue in House of Councillors and House of Representatives: According to the Diet Act (kokkaihō 国会法), member of the parliament has the right to request the Cabinet to give answers and explanation about political issues in the form of written documents. Using the keyword yasukuni (靖国), I have accumulated 29 pieces of Q&A documents relevant to the Yasukuni Issue. They are exchanges between members of the parliament and the Cabinet, and can usefully demonstrate how the discourse of the Yasukuni Issue has been presented and evolved in Japan’s official circle.

The Nanking Massacre Debate:
Based on the data selection criteria as established, I base the discourse analysis on the following textual materials:

1) News articles on *People’s Daily* (1980 – 2012): 166 pieces of news articles, whose titles contain the keyword ‘*Nanking datusha* (the Nanking Great Massacre)’, have been collected from the electronic database of *People’s Daily*.\(^{32}\) The data ranges from 1 January 1980 to 31 December 2012.

2) Official documents of the Diet proceedings: Using the keyword ‘*nankin jiken* 南京事件’ or ‘*nankin gyokusatsu* 南京虐殺’, 94 pieces of relevant Diet proceedings have collected from the Search System of Diet Record.\(^{33}\) The data ranges from 1 January 1980 to 31 December 2012. Each record is read closely and carefully to exact contents relating to the analysis.

3) Question & Written Answers Documents (*shitsumon shuisho to tōbensho* 質問主意書と答弁書) relevant to the Nanking Massacre Debate: Using the keyword ‘*nanking jiken* 南京事件’

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\(^{32}\) [http://0-rmrb.egreenapple.com.wam.leeds.ac.uk/index2.html](http://0-rmrb.egreenapple.com.wam.leeds.ac.uk/index2.html)

\(^{33}\) [http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/](http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/)
南京事件’, 2 pieces of Question & Written Answers Documents relating to the Nanjing Massacre Debate were collected. The data ranges from 1 January 1980 to 31 December 2012.

4) Interview data: The researcher has conducted interviews with 11 interviewees from the Japan-China Joint History Research Committee, a research hub established in 2007 by the Japanese and Chinese government to address the long-standing dispute over the ‘history problem’. I raised the question to Bu Ping, Rong Weimu, and Kawashima Shin regarding how the Nanking Massacre was discussed in the committee. Their accounts provided valuable first-hand experience relating to how academics from both sides confronted with each other in the Nanking Massacre discourse.

5) A Collection of Historical Materials of the Nanking Massacre: This series of books is by far the most comprehensive academic publication of the Nanking Massacre. The research will establish part of the historical context of the case by making reference to this publication.

**Added Values of the Lacanian Discourse Approach**

Having introduced the methodology and database, I now will turn to discuss the added value of the LDA. Why does one in IR want to adopt this framework/methodology? The reasons for doing so is that the LDA can: 1) foreground the subjective dimension in the political analysis; 2) make sense of why actors pursue policies that seemingly go against rational reasoning; 3) explain why some political discourses were more persistent than others. I will explain them in the following subsections.

**Foregrounding the subjective dimension in political and social life**

Like any conceptual tool, whether one wants to use the LDA depends a great deal on what she wants to analyse. The LDA is useful when one’s research focuses on analysing the subjective dimension, that is, how identity, anxieties, desires, and fantasies shape political formation, etc. More specifically, the LDA foregrounds the subjective dimension in political formation by devising a unique Lacanian concept: the object-cause of desire. As mentioned previously, the object-cause of desire creates anxieties (Lacan, 1988, p.164; cited in Evans, 1996 p.163). By examining how the subject (i.e., the speaker or social agent) relates themselves to the object-
cause of desire, we can interpret how anxieties are produced in discursive practices and, in turn, drive the (re)production of discourses.

More precisely, the LDA can account for the persistence of a political discourse (e.g., the ‘history problem’ discourse in Sino-Japanese relations) by mapping the four different ways that the subject relates to anxiety: in the master’s discourse, the subject’s speech generates anxiety; in the university’s discourse, the subject represses anxiety by framing it in terms of technicalities; in the hysteric’s discourse, the subject is driven by anxiety to question the authority; and in the analyst’s discourse, the subject embodies the object-cause of desire, the object of anxiety itself. This thesis is an instance of using the LDA to explore the subjective dimension in the specific context of the Sino-Japanese ‘history problem’. Rather than treating the ‘history problem’ as a byproduct of realpolitik, the thesis examined how social agents in Japan and China communicated the ‘history problem’, and thus found out how the discursive strategies they deployed generated anxieties that turned the ‘history problem’ into a persisting bilateral issue. In other words, the LDA proffers to explicate the dialectical relationship between the subject’s anxieties and the reproduction of political discourses.

Making sense of ‘irrational’ side of politics

Further, with its psychoanalytic underpinning, the LDA allows researchers to explore the irrational side in actors’ decision-making process. For instance, when the Chinese government criticised the Japanese government for giving approval to the controversial history textbook in 1982, the Chinese decision was arguably counterproductive from a pure instrumentalist view, because the Chinese criticism may not only hurt China’s diplomatic relations with Japan, but also China’s economic outlook, regional security, hence the Party’s legitimacy (Suzuki, 2007). Another instance is America’s War on Terror. As Jacobsen (2013) points out, ‘cognitive explorations of 9/11 cannot explain why Americans – “unaided” by the drumbeat of incessant insinuations – came to identify Saddam Hussein as the culprit when the evidence to the contrary was abundant’ (p.16). Political and social processes are permeated with cases where agents acted irrationally. These cases cannot be sufficiently accounted for by cognitive explanation, such as misperception, miscalculation, and ignorance.

The attempt to explore the irrationality of politics is by no means novel. Many scholars have researched the irrational dimension in political disputes (Brinton, 1993; Wirls, 2010; Huemer, 2018). But the LDA is particularly useful in this endeavour, because the Lacanian concept of fantasy allows researchers to circumvent the rational/irrational dichotomy and examine how
the subject’s social reality is structured by particular, idiosyncratic fantasies. According to Lacan, fantasy is defined as an imaginary construct that forecloses an ideological system and enables the subject to experience reality; unlike rationality, fantasy is not conceived of as universal; each political community is bonded and conditioned by its own particular fantasy. Thus, the ‘irrationality’ in political decision-making and processes can be explained in terms of how a particular fantasy structures the subject’s experienced reality, hence their speech and actions. For instance, actions pursued by the Chinese government and the Bush government can be explained in terms of the fantasy of the master’s discourse; in this fantasy, the speaker’s speech act, which asserted its authority, was driven by an incompleteness or fragmentation of the speaker’s identity (S1/$).

Another merit of the LDA is its methodological flexibility, which allows researchers to conduct their analysis with adequate theoretical premise on the one hand, and draw reliable conclusions through inductive reasoning on the other hand. For instance, instead of rationalising the actors’ behaviours (e.g., that Bush’s true decision to invade Iraq was veiled some secret schemes that have not been declassified), the LDA focuses on interpreting and explicating the unique and often idiosyncratic fantasy that structured the ways social agents experienced social reality and performed actions accordingly (Glynos and Stavrakakis, 2008). In other words, the LDA analyses how the subject performed speech and actions by examining the particular fantasy in which the subject was embedded. So rather than imposing a deductive, pre-given answer on the data, the LDA offers an inductive, tangible principle for interpreting data.

Explaining the persistence of political disputes

But why might one choose the LDA rather than the existing approaches that examine rhetoric alone without taking into account the subjective dimension? The answer is that the LDA is useful for making sense of why some political disputes are so persistent. We may consider this question with reference to Kreb’s and Jackson’s model of ‘rhetorical coercion’, a theory that regards the search for subjective motives as unnecessary in most political analysis.

To be precise, Krebs and Jackson (2007) argue that we can describe and explain political processes and outcomes by looking at rhetoric alone, i.e., what actors said, to whom, in what context, without examining actors’ motives. Thus, a discourse can be modelled as a process of
‘rhetorical coercion’: In this model, a Claimant seeking to effect policy change directs an argument towards the Opposition in view of a Public; the rhetorical coercion is successful when the Claimant deprives of the Opposition of rhetorical resources to create a reply that the Public finds acceptable (ibid., pp.43-44). Regardless of whether the Opposition sincerely believes in the Claimant’s argument or not, the Opposition would have to yield to the Claimant’s rhetorical coercion, if the Opposition’s rhetorical resources have been exhausted. Therefore, in this model, subjective motives of the parties are not particularly relevant in making sense of political processes and outcomes.

But the scope of rhetorical coercion has limitation. First, examining rhetoric alone cannot sufficiently account for the persistence of all political discourses. If a political dispute is only conditioned by strategic choices of rhetorical resources available to actors in a specific context, then, we may expect this political dispute ends, when one party’s logical error is exposed or when one party runs out of rhetorical resources. But in reality, this is rarely the case. For example, in the Japan-China Joint Research Project, the Chinese scholars insisted the official account of the death toll that 300,000 people were killed in the Nanking Massacre, despite that the Japanese scholars pointed out the lack of reliable documentary evidence; and despite abundant evidence regarding the actuality of the Nanking Massacre, Japanese right-wingers insisted that the Nanking Massacre was a fabrication. While not disproving the model of ‘rhetorical coercion’, examining rhetoric alone cannot explain the persistence of certain political disputes such as the ‘history problem’ in Sino-Japanese relations.

Moreover, examining rhetoric alone is insufficient for analysing situations where parties involved in a dispute talk past each other. As Jackson and Krebs themselves point out, their model is effective only when there is a Common Public whom the Claimant can credibly involve in the debate against the Opponent (Krebs and Jackson, 2007, p.57). In other words, the model of ‘rhetorical coercion’ requires an observable ‘public sphere’. The ‘public sphere’ thus functions as a ‘meta-language’ shared by both the Claimant and the Opposition. For instance, we may use ‘rhetorical coercion’ to analyse, say, how the Democrats in the U.S. used rhetorical strategies to coerce the Republicans to, say, accept the bill of gay marriage in view of the American public. However, this model is less useful in understanding situations where parties

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34 More specifically, the Claimant’s argument consists of a frame that defines the issue and a set of implications from which the Claimant argues should follow. In response, the Opposition may either accept or reject, resulting in four different scenario: policy change (the Opposition accepts both the frame and implications), framing contest (the Opposition rejects the frame), implication contest (the Opposition accepts the frame but rejects the implications), and mix (the Opposition rejects the frame but accepts implications);
involved do not identify with the same ‘public sphere’. Although Jackson and Krebs contend that much of political and social life lies within their model’s scope (ibid. p.58), it is no less correct to suggest the opposite. For instance, the ‘history problem’ discourse between Japan and China could be accounted for less by a rhetorical contestation where one side attempted to manoeuvre another side in view a commonly shared Public, than the distinct discursive context from which their respective interpretations of the ‘history problem’ derived. This is the case, because social agents in the ‘history problem’ discourse identified with conflictual ‘public spheres’, ‘trapped’ within their own linguistic domains (i.e., fantasies), and talked past each other.35

The LDA can serve as a systematic methodology to make sense of such disorganised situations. Through a thorough coding of the data, we can outline particular fantasies that the social agents identified with. And then, with the ‘four discourses’, we can formally map the master-signifier that organised the fantasy (S1), the knowledge at work (S2), the fragmentation of the subject’s identity ($), and the object-cause of desire that generates anxieties (a). This way, the researcher is allowed to have a tentative overview of the cause and effect of the subject’s speech act and how social agents’ communicative practices reproduced a particular dispute. Throughout, we can deploy the LDA to analyse persisting political contestations where social agents talked about different issues while believing that they were debating about the same issue.

**Summary**

In this chapter I have introduced the theory and method of Lacanian Discourse Analysis (LDA), an approach that synthesised Lacan’s psychoanalytic theory, the poststructuralist research design, and the coding technique of the Grounded Theory Method. I have argued that the LDA enables us to productively analyse the subjective dimension of the ‘history problem’ discourse in Sino-Japanese relations and other political issues alike in international politics. In this next chapter, I will begin the discourse analysis by taking the first step of the methodology, that is, to establish the historical-political-social contexts of the three sub-issues that the thesis will analyse.

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35 The Cold War is a classic example: both camps were uttering speech within their own linguistic domain with incommensurable ideological contents.
Chapter 4: Background of the ‘History Problem’

Introduction

In this chapter, I will establish the historical-political-social contexts for the three sub-issues in the ‘history problem’, i.e., the Textbook Issue, the Yasukuni Issue, and the Nanking Massacre Debate. The contextualisation is guided by the principles established in the previous chapter and will lay stress on key events that marked the development of the discourse. Rather than a historical or historiographical account that describes the ‘history problem’ exhaustively, this chapter functions as a detailed backdrop against which the discourse analysis in Chapter 5, 6, and 7 are conducted and refer to.

The Textbook Issue

The Textbook Issue refers to the international controversy over the alleged distortion of historical facts and the beautification of Japanese militarism in Japanese high school history textbooks between Japan and China (Rose, 2005a, p.1). It is an especially salient episode in Sino-Japanese relations, because it marked the starting point of the ‘history problem’ and for the first time revealed the very different historical understandings held by the two sides. The Textbook Issue has erupted three times: in 1982, 1986, and 2001. The issue started with Japan’s domestic discourse over the right-wing movement that aimed to produce more nationalistic history textbooks. As the history books’ contents offended the Chinese, the Chinese government lodged complaints and criticisms against the Japanese government’s irresponsibility and lack of willingness to correct the offending contents. Eventually, what was originally Japan’s domestic politics became a source of diplomatic tension between Japan and China.

Textbook Problem as Japan’s domestic problem

The Textbook Issue originally was originally about how the Japanese themselves should interpret the legacy of WWII. Thus, it connected to a series of domestic issues in post-war Japan, such as Japan’s political ideology, educational reform, democratic social movements, and so forth (see: Saito, 2016, pp.62–64).

After Japan’s defeat in the WWII, the Allied Occupation Forces in Japan directed a series of social reforms, including an education reform that abolished Japan’s pre-war State-control System (kokuteisei 国定制) for textbook compilation. Under the State-control System, the Japanese government previously had the monopoly to determine the content of Japanese primary
(since 1904) and middle school history textbooks (since 1943). With these history textbooks, historical education in prewar Japan inculcated among schoolchildren the ideology of Emperor worship (Namimoto, 2012, p.34). In 1948, the GHQ abolished this system and replaced it with the Inspection System (kenteisei 検定制), giving private publishers, academics, and teachers significant liberty in authoring school textbook.

The reform of Japan’s textbook compilation system led to a societal struggle over how Japan’s wartime past should be interpreted and written in history textbooks for schoolchildren. The struggle was polarised between two camps, namely, the progressives (mostly teachers and academics) and the conservatives (mostly LDP politicians, the Ministry of Education of Japan (the MOE henceforth), and various right-wing groups (Rose, 2009, p.54). By the early 1950s, only a fraction (less than 3%) of the textbooks were compiled by the state. As the democratic movement and anti-war sentiment were on the rise in the immediate post-war period, the progressives had gained significant ground in the struggle.

To countered the situation, the conservatives put forth a policy orientation called ‘compilation by private publishers and inspection by the state (minhen kokukan 民編国管)’. It was designed to enable the LDP to exclude ‘unpatriotic’ contents from textbooks through tighter inspection procedures (Umehara, 1993 p. 52). In 1953, the conservative politicians in the parliament passed a law that permitted the MOE to pass or fail textbooks through a system of textbook authorisation. Afterwards, the conservatives ensued a series of movement to tighten up their control over the history textbook. In 1955, the conservative Japan Democratic Party published a pamphlet entitled ‘The Problem of the Alarming Textbook (ureubeki kyokasho no mondai 憂うべき教科書の問題)’, a pamphlet that criticised the left-leaning tendency in Japan’s history education. In 1956, the MOE began to appoint ‘textbook inspection officers’, further strengthening the conservatives’ control over the textbook inspection system.³⁶ Moreover, the MOEJ issued guidelines to suggest that the word ‘advance’ should replace the word ‘invade’ to describe Japan’s military actions in China during the WWII (Besshi, 2002, p.135). As a result, 80% of the textbooks failed the MOEJ’s inspection screening (ibid.).

Many progressive intellectuals carried out counter-offence against what they saw as ‘regression’ in historical education and freedom of expression. The most notable figure among them was the liberal historian Ienaga Saburo, who sued the MOEJ for violating intellectual freedom (Nozaki, 2008, p.176). As the Supreme Court of Tokyo convened in the Sugimoto

³⁶ See: http://www.mext.go.jp/a_menu/shotou/kyoukasho/1260255.htm
Decision that the MOEJ’s inspection was ‘unconstitutional’ (Beer, 1975, pp. 85–87). Japan’s textbook inspection system during the 1970s experienced a significant liberalisation. For instance, Japan’s wartime atrocities, including the Nanking Massacre, came to be taught in some history textbooks published in the mid-1970s (Besshi, 2002, p. 136). With lenaga’s victory in the long-standing legal battle against the government, the inspection of the textbooks by the MOEJ drew significant media attention, becoming a major topic in the Japanese public domain.

Textbook Problem as an International Issue (1982-1986)

The Textbook Issue went international in 1982. On 26 June, Asahi Shimbun reported that the textbook inspection by the MOEJ ‘was to return the history textbook content back to the pre-war authoritarian tone’. A number of similar news report and television programmes followed to publicise the Textbook Issue. Accordingly, the MOEJ was accused of making recommendations that watered down Japan’s wartime atrocities in China (see: Rose, 2005 pp. 83–84). The most controversial aspect was the recommendation that involved changing the word ‘aggression’ into ‘advance’ in describing Japan’s military actions in China during the WWII. However, the reports turned out to be initiated by mistakes: the changes of wording were ‘recommendations’ made by officers of the MOEJ, rather than a revision adopted by the publishers. Nonetheless, the report had stirred up public opinion in Japan, and subsequently, attracted the Chinese media’s attention.

A few days after the issue was reported in Japan, the Chinese Xinhua News Agency published a bulletin on the issue on 29 June entitled ‘Ministry of Education of Japan Distorts History in Textbooks’. On the following day, Remin Ribao issued a similar report entitled ‘Ministry of Education of Japan Distorts History and Beautifies War of Aggression through Textbook Inspection’. Notably, these reports by the Chinese state-run media did not openly criticise the Japanese government, nor did they internationalise the Textbook Issue as a diplomatic issue.

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37 The Judge Ryōkichi Sugimoto of Tokyo District Court held that the Ministry of Education’s interference with lenaga’s textbook authoring violated Article 26 of the Constitution of Japan, which indicates that textbook screening system must not infringe upon academic freedom and freedom of expression (Beer, 1975, p. 86).

38 Asahi Shimbun, 26 June 1982

39 The Chinese responded to the Textbook Issue with critical tone on 20 July, which was before the time when it was found out that the Textbook Issue was initiated by inaccurate reportage on 28 July 1982 (Rose, 2005a, p. 86). Understandably, this was not taken into account by the Chinese government. In Japan, a subsequent investigation found out that none of the history textbooks printed in 1982 used the word ‘advance’ in describing Japan’s war with China.
Notably, no further mentioning of the textbook issue appeared in the Chinese media between 30 June and 20 July (Rose, 2005a, p.82).

The decision to lodge diplomatic protests to the Japanese government was initiated by a member of the Politburo of the Communist Party of China, Hu Qiaomu (胡乔木). After reading about the Textbook Issue on 23 July 1982, he was ‘deeply mortified’ (Li, 2000 p. 80) and immediately made a phone call to his secretary Li Hong (黎虹), advising that the central government express diplomatic concern over Japan’s ‘historical revisionism’: ‘The sooner the better, and it’s best to get it published tomorrow’ (Huqiaomuzhuan bianxiezu, 2002 p. 461). Whereas the politicisation of the Textbook Issue in Sino-Japanese relation was unlikely to be hyped by Hu Qiaomu single-handedly, it should be noted that Hu Qiaomu was in charge of the Party’s propaganda and one of the most powerful leftist ideologues at that time (Kokubun et al., 2017, p.156); also, in the CCP where the state tightly controlled the media, understandably his instruction had a significant power over the state-run media and the propaganda department. On the next day (24 July), *People’s Daily* dedicated the whole front page to reporting statements by the PRC’s mass organisations, including Sino-Japanese Friendship Association, All China Student Federation, and All-China Youth Federation. All of them condemned the MOE’s ‘distortion of historical facts’. Other Chinese major media followed *People’s Daily* with similar articles published to condemn the MOEJ (Rose, 2005a, p.93).

The Textbook Issue became a diplomatic issue on 26 July 1982, when Director of the Chinese Foreign Ministry’s First Asian Affairs Department Xiao Xiangqian (肖向前) lodged an official diplomatic protest to the Japanese ambassador to China Watanabe Kōjō (渡辺幸治). Xiao expressed China’s disagreement with MOEJ’s decision and demanded that the ‘distortion of historical facts’ be corrected. In particular, Xiao made references to three passages: that which replaced the ‘invasion of North China’ with ‘advance into North China’; that which replaced ‘all-out invasion of China’ with ‘all-out advance into China’; and that which attributed the Nanking Massacre to the ‘stubborn resistance of the Chinese troops’ (Rose, 2005a, p.94). On 29 July, in response to China’s diplomatic protest, the Elementary and Secondary Education Bureau Chief Suzuki Isao (鈴木勲) issued a three-point statement to the Chinese ambassador to Japan Wang Xiaoyun (王曉雲). However, the Chinese saw Suzuki’s explanation as nothing more than a Japanese gimmick to shift the government’s responsibilities to the so-called

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40 The Japanese statement is as follows: 1) The Japanese government will listen humbly to Chinese opinion and would like to explain the situation fully; 2) The textbook should reflect the spirit of Japan-China Joint Communiqué
private publishers’. On the next day (30 July), the Chinese ambassador expressed disapproval of Suzuki’s explanation, accusing the MOEJ of betraying the spirit of the two key treaties signed between Japan and China (i.e., Japan-China Joint Communique and Treaty of Peace and Friendship between Japan and China).41

Since then, the Chinese government took the Japanese government’s attitude towards the Textbook Issue as what signified a potential revival of the Japanese militarism. Against what was labelled as ‘Japan’s historical revisionism’, the Chinese state-run media launched a two-and-a-half-month-long press campaign. Commentaries, reports, and editorials had appeared in People’s Daily, Guangming Daily, Workers’ Daily, and other major media; most of the media discourses resembled those in People’s Daily (Rose, 2005a, p.134).42 The press campaign lasted from 31 July to 18 September and struck the Japanese by surprise.

Under pressure, the Japanese realised the importance of explaining Japan’s educational system and screening processes to the Chinese. On 10 August, Hashimoto Satoshi (橋本恕), Public Information and Cultural Affairs Bureau Chief of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and Ōsaki Hitoshi (大崎仁), Director-general of the Science and International Affairs Bureau of the Education Ministry, were accepted by the Chinese for a state visit on 9-12 August 1982. But the visit did not alleviate the bilateral tension. In the meeting with Xiao Xiangqian, Hashimoto did not show any willingness to revise the textbook at all but repeated what angered Xiao Xiangqian in the first place, i.e., the argument that Japanese citizens had intellectual freedom and the right to publish, that the drafting of textbooks in Japan was based on the private initiative, and that criticising a country’s textbooks pertained to a kind of interference of domestic affairs (Besshi, 2002, p.137). Outraged, Xiao left his seat during the meeting (ibid.). 2 to 3 hours later, Xiao came back and expressed his strong disapproval of Hashimoto’s explanation: ‘Isn’t your explanation the same as the rhetoric of some right-wing media in Japan?’ (ibid.). The next day, after further negotiation, Hashimoto and Wu Xueqian (吳學謙), the Vice
Director of Ministry of Foreign Affairs of China, struck a ‘gentlemen’s agreement’: the Chinese would recognise Japan’s ‘educational sovereignty’, while the Japanese would revise the ‘distorted history’ (ibid.). Prime Minister Suzuki made a statement on 17 August 1982 to calm the Chinese, affirming that ‘Japan should accept criticism from its Asian neighbours of school textbooks termed as “distorting” Japan’s actions before and during the Second World War’ (Rose, 2005a, p. 108).

On 26 August, After MOFAJ and MOEJ reached a consensus regarding how to deal with the Textbook Issue, Chief Cabinet Secretary Miyazawa issued the Miyazawa Statement, an official statement that represented Japan’s stance towards the Textbook Issue. The Miyazawa Statement had three points. The first one demonstrated Japan’s commitment to the Japan-China Joint Communique, and that Japan’s acknowledgement of its past wrongdoings in China (MOFAJ, 1982). The second point indicated Japan’s willingness to listen to neighbouring countries’ criticism over the Textbook Issue (ibid.). The third point reaffirmed the Japanese government’s intention to make a concession to its neighbours by changing the Guideline for Textbook Authorisation (ibid.).

The Miyazawa statement was intended to show the Japanese government’s willingness to revise the textbook, without having to revise the textbooks immediately. And since nothing specific had been done, the Chinese government rejected the Miyazawa Statement. On 28 August, Wu Xueqian expressed the Chinese government’s dissatisfaction with the Miyazawa Statement to Ambassador Katori Yasue, because the statement lacked any references to specified actions to be taken to correct the history textbook.

Taken by surprise, the Japanese side decided to re-explain their stance to the Chinese government. On 6 September, Ambassador Katori met with Wu Xueqian to add a supplementary explanation. The new explanation stated that the textbooks causing the diplomatic problems for use for spring 1983 would undergo revision under the new criteria one year in advance in

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43 Whereas the MOFAJ demanded that the spirit of Sino-Japanese Joint Statement should be reflected in the school textbooks, the MOEJ wanted to preserve Japan was unwilling to revise textbooks for foreign pressure (see: Rose, 2005 p. 109).

44 ‘Japan is keenly conscious of the responsibility for the serious damage that Japan caused in the past to the Chinese people through war and deeply reproaches itself’.

45 ‘From the perspective of building friendship and goodwill with neighbouring countries, Japan will pay due attention to these criticisms and make corrections at the Government’s responsibility’.

46 ‘The Government will revise the Guideline for Textbook Authorization after discussions in the Textbook Authorization and Research Council and give due consideration to the effect mentioned above’.
1983-4 (Rose, 2005a, p.116), to which the Chinese government showed approval. On 9 September, Miyazawa announced that ‘the Chinese side has evaluated the [Japanese] Prime Minister’s judgement and the government’s policy of taking responsibility for the corrections, and with that in mind the problem between China and Japan has been controlled diplomatically’; \textsuperscript{47} 
People’s Daily issued a report on the next day, stating that ‘though there was still much left to be desired, the Chinese government has seen improvement on the Japanese side’. \textsuperscript{48} These announcements implied that the Textbook Issue of 1982 as a bilateral issue had eventually been quieted down.

But in 1986, the Textbook Issue emerged again when the right-wing group, National Conference to Defend Japan or People’s Conference to Protect Japan (Nihon wo mamoru Kokumin Kaigi 日本を守る国民会議),\textsuperscript{49} produced a revisionist textbook called New History of Japan (Shinpen Nihonshi 新編日本史). This textbook not only gave positive judgment to Japan’s pre-war policies, but also contained overtly nationalistic ideology. Though the MOEJ demanded 800 changes in 1985, the textbook finally passed the textbook inspection process on 27 May 1986 (Rose, 2009, p.56). A few days later on 4 June, Director of the Information Department in the Chinese Foreign Ministry Ma Yuzhen (馬毓真) organised a press conference to express China’s dissatisfaction over the ‘beautification of war’ of the right-wing history textbook (Besshi, 2002, p.140). A few days later (7 June 1986), Yang Zhenya (楊振亞), the Director General of the Asian Bureau of the Chinese Foreign Ministry, submitted a memorandum to the Japanese Ambassador Matano Kagechika (股野景親), requesting that the erroneous contents be corrected.

Perhaps due to what both sides had learned in 1982, the Textbook Issue of 1986 was contained quickly. On the Japanese side, Prime Minister Nakasone promptly directed the MOEJ to conduct re-inspection; afterwards, 38 offending passages regarding Chinese history, Korean history, and Emperor System were revised.\textsuperscript{50} On 22 June, the Chinese government responded to Japanese government’s action with a report stating that ‘the Japanese government has announced that they will correct the offending textbook according to the Miyazawa Statement of

\textsuperscript{47} Asahi Shimbun, 1 September 1982.
\textsuperscript{48} People’s Daily, 10 September 1982.
\textsuperscript{49} The group has been renamed as Japan Conference (Nippon Kaigi 日本会議).
\textsuperscript{50} Nakasone’s action gained some trust from the Chinese, partially due to the his close personal ties with the Chinese leaders and the fact that he once clearly made a clear acknowledgment that Japan’s war with China was a ‘war of aggression’ in a parliamentary occasion (Berger, 2012, p.170).
1982’ (People’s Daily 22 June 1986). This implied that the Chinese had decided to put the
diplomatic row to an end.

Reoccurrence of the Textbook Issue in the 2000s

The third wave of the Textbook Issue occurred in the mid-1990s. With the end of the Cold War,
the death of Hirohito, and Japan’s continuing economic stagnation since the Plaza Accord of
1985 (Genda and Rebick, 2000), in the 1990s Japan’s civil society and political circle experienced
a wave of conservative movement (Rose, 2009, p.60). At the civil level, there were two
major conservative organisations heavily involved in the Textbook Issue, i.e., the Association
for the Advancement of the Liberalist View of History (Jiyū-shugi shikan kenkyū-kai 自由主義
史観研究会) and the Japanese Society for History Textbook Reform (Atarashii rekishi-
kyōkasho wo tsukuru kai 新しい歴史教科書を作る会; Tsukurukai henceforth). The former
was founded by Professor Fujioka Nobukatsu of Tokyo University in July 1995. The latter was
jointly founded by Fujioka and Professor Nishio Kanji of the University of Electro-Communications
in December 1996. Tsukurukai was enchanted with intellectual sophistication that oldfashion right-wing groups normally did not have. Thus, they attracted support from conserva-
tive intellectuals and artists, including right-wing manga artist Kobayashi Yoshinori and Pro-
fessor Takahashi Shirō of Meisei University. The aim of Tsukurukai, as indicated on its official
website, was to ‘correct the textbooks that depict Japan inappropriately and have schoolchil-
dren study with textbooks that make them proud of Japan’.51

Echoing this conservative movement was the creation of the Diet Member’s Alliance for a
Brighter Japan (Akarui nihon kokkai giin renmei 明るい日本国会議員連盟), formed in June
1996 by over 100 LDP members and headed by the ultra-conservative politician Okuno Sei-
suke. Regarding the Textbook Issue, Okuno criticised that the comfort women were ‘commercial
activities’ run by private businessmen and called for removing such ‘anti-Japanese’ con-
tents in Japan’s history textbook.52 In the LDP General Council, some members criticised that
depictions of the Nanking Massacre, the comfort women issue, and the Marco Polo Bridge
Incident in Japan’s history textbooks were inappropriate and damaged Japan’s national pride
(Rose, 2009, p.59). In the 1990s, Japan’s mainstream politics moved gradually away from the

51 See: http://www.tsukurukai.com/aboutus/index.html
52 Xinhua News Agency, 6 April 1996
post-war pacifism and towards the Japanese Neo-conservatism (JNC), an anti-liberal movement that propagated among the participants an idealistic conception of Japan’s pre-war legacy (Takahashi, 2010, p.24). The Japanese Neo-conservatives accused leftists and the liberals for abandoning Japan’s national tradition, including the cultivation of national pride in Japan’s pre-1945 modern history.

With the neo-conservative movement, Diet sessions on 11 and 18 December 1996 saw discussions that called for removing the Miyazawa Statement from the Guideline for Textbook Authorisation (Rose, 2009, p.59). The neo-conservatives succeeded partially in 2000, when it was revealed that only one out of the seven textbooks under inspection that year contained contents of the comfort women. Additionally, the term ‘invade’ was replaced by ‘advance’, Nanking Massacre was toned down as ‘Nanking Incident’, and the description of Unit 731 was deleted (Rose, 2009, p.60). The most controversial episode was the publication of the New History Textbook, a rightist history textbook produced by the Tsukurukai. This textbook explicitly denied Japan’s responsibility in the Macro Polo Bridge Incident and glorified Japan’s war with China as a ‘war of liberation’.  

The Chinese government expressed strong discontent with Japan’s textbook inspection in September 2000. In a press conference, when asked about the Chinese government’s view on Japan’s recent textbook screening, spokesman of the Chinese Foreign Ministry Sun Yuxi (孫玉璽) said that ‘the Nanking Massacre, the enforcement of comfort women, and the 731 Unit were notorious crimes committed by Japanese militarism’, and highlighted that ‘the essence of the Textbook Issue is about Japan’s understanding of history’.  

The Textbook Issue became compounded in April 2001 when the MOEJ announced that The New History Textbook passed the textbook inspection for publication. The announcement was soon followed by the Korean and the Chinese government’s protests. State-visits were cancelled, calls for the Japanese government to correct the offending contents were announced, and press conferences were organised to condemn the way the history denied and glorified Japanese militarism (Rose, 2009, p.63). On 16 May 2001, Deputy Head of the Asia Bureau of the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs Cheng Yonghua (程永華) signed a memorandum with

53 This development was considered as a major setback from the liberal perspective and soon met criticism in Japan, becoming the Third Textbook Issue.  
54 People’s Daily, 13 September 2000.
Japanese ambassador Nomoto Yoshio (野本佳夫), soliciting eight specific demands for correction. On the next day, the Chinese demands were directly rejected by Prime Minister Koizumi Junichirō. The Textbook Issue became further complicated in July 2001 when Fusō-sha, the publishing house of *New History Textbook*, started to sell the authorised draft of the textbook as a ‘commercial version’ on the book market.

Although the episode of the Third Textbook Issue may look like a repetition of the first one in the 1980s, the Chinese media did not launch any press campaign as they did in 1982. Whereas there were 101 articles related to the Textbook Issue in 2001, in 2002 the number decreased dramatically to only 5. On 11 April 2002, the spokeswoman of the FMPRC Zhang Qiyue (章啟月) stated that the Chinese government would ‘continue to pay attention to the issue and reserve the right to react’. As indicated by many researchers (Beal et al., 2001; Yang, 2007; Rose, 2009; Kokubun et al., 2017), compared to what was done in 1982, the Chinese government had adopted a relatively more pragmatic approach. By 2002, the Textbook Issue had become, for better or worse, overshadowed by the Yasukuni Issue.

**Yasukuni Issue**

The Yasukuni Issue refers to the diplomatic issue between Japan and China regarding whether or not Japanese Prime Minister should pay official tribute the Yasukuni Shrine – a ritual site in central Tokyo that commemorates Japan’s war dead, including 14 ‘Class A’ war criminals prosecuted in the Tokyo Trial. The Yasukuni Issue began in 1985 and had been especially debilitating to the bilateral relations during the Koizumi era from 2001 to 2006. In 1985, Japanese Prime Minister Nakasone’s official visit to the Yasukuni Shrine on 15 August was followed by a diplomatic row, in which the Chinese government accused the Japanese government of glorifying Japanese militarism and whitewashing history. Since then, the Yasukuni Issue

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55 These demands were: the 1920s’ anti-Japanese movement and boycotts in China; Manchuria; the occupation of Nanking; the Nanking ‘incident’ and the numbers killed; the nature of GMD and CCP resistance to Japan; the Marco Polo Bridge incident; the Greater East Asia declaration of 1943; resistance under the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, and the Tokyo trial.


57 The book sold some 710,000 copies and greatly enhanced *Tsukuru Kai’s* popularity among the grass-root citizens (Oguma and Ueno, 2003).

58 The data are found by keyword search on Electronic Version of the *People’s Daily* (*People’s Daily dianziban*). The keywords were: ‘jiuokeshu 教科書’, and ‘lishi 歷史’ and ‘riben 日本’. See: [http://0-rmrh.egreenap-ple.com.wam.leeds.ac.uk/index2.html](http://0-rmrh.egreenap-ple.com.wam.leeds.ac.uk/index2.html)

59 *People’s Daily*, 11 April 2002
became a source of diplomatic conflict. From 2001 to 2006, as Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi paid regular tributes to the shrine despite strong protests from China (and South Korea), the Yasukuni Issue became highly politicised and was arguably one of the most debilitating factors for Sino-Japanese relations from 2001 to 2006 (Seki, 2008, p.91). The Yasukuni Issue has a highly symbolic character that even some academics with adequate knowledge about the history of the Yasukuni Shrine and Japanese politics do not find the Yasukuni Issue immediately comprehensible (Shibuichi, 2005; Doak, 2008, p.47).

The Yasukuni Issue has to be understood in relation to the Yasukuni Shrine, whose history can be divided into three periods. First, there was the ‘ascending period’ during the pre-war era from 1869 to 1945 when Yasukuni Shrine had been strongly incorporated into the power of the state and military. Second, the ‘descending period’ was marked by the year of 1945 (i.e. the end of the WWII) when Yasukuni Shrine was formally separated from the state. The third phase is the ‘controversial period’ since 1985 when Japanese Prime Minister Nakasone visited the Yasukuni Shrine in official capacity, and since then, making the issue an international controversy.

Yasukuni Shrine Before 1945

The Yasukuni Shrine was a product of the State Shinto (kokka shintō 国家神道), the unification of the political and the religious authority under the name of the Japanese Emperor. Established since 1869, it had been a ritual site for commemorating Japan’s national martyrs who died military death for the Emperor’s cause. As Japan’s imperial warfare went on with a series of military victories against the Russian and the Chinese, the popularity of and offerings to the Yasukuni Shrine significantly expanded and it gradually became a central symbol of the State Shinto that fundamentally shaped Japan’s national consciousness and militant culture during the WWII (Takenaka, 2015 pp.59-62).

As Breen (2008) points out, the Yasukuni Shrine’s raison d’être is its ritual, the shōkon ceremony (p.144). In fact, when the Yasukuni Shrine was formally established by Ōmura Masujiro (大村益次郎 1824-1869) in 1969 in Kudan, it was named Tokyo Shōkonsha (東京招魂社),60 from which the ritualistic nature can be clearly appreciated. Grounded on the idea of loyalty towards the Emperor and patriotism, the shōkon ceremony was dedicated to com-

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60 It was not until 1879 that it was renamed as Yasukuni Shrine.
memorating (顕彰 kenshō) loyalists who sacrificed their life for the Emperor. This idea, however, had never appeared in any religious belief in Japan before the 1860s, including in Buddhism and Shinto (Ōe, 1984 p.15). The first shōkon ritual – the prototype of the Yasukuni Shrine – was done at Ryōzen-reimeisha (京都靈山靈明舎) in Kyoto in December 1862 under the supervision of the Shintoist ideologue Fukuba Bisei (福羽美静 1831-1907). The ritual’s grounding ideals were ‘reverence for the Emperor’ (尊皇 sonnō), respect for the kami (敬神 keishin), and patriotism (愛国 aikoku). These ideals can still be found in Japan’s conservative groups today (Katō, 2007 p.418).

Therefore, rather than an ancient tradition, the Yasukuni Shrine could be seen as a modern political invention designed to propagate Japan’s ideology of Emperor-centred nationalism.61 Notably, the shōkon ceremony was both politically selective and nationally exclusive. First, different from the traditional Shintoism and Buddhism that transcended political differences,62 the shōkon ceremony was solely dedicated to commemorating the pro-Emperor loyalists prosecuted in the Ansei Purge. Following the establishment of the first shōkon ceremony, the Chōshū and Satsuma Domain propagated commemorations and rituals that worshipped Kusunoki Masashige (楠木正成 1294-1336), a legendary samurai loyalist who fought for Go-Daigo Emperor.63 Apotheosising the legendary loyalists, these commemorative performances legitimated the Chōshū-Satsuma samurais’ political struggle against the Bakufu.

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61 Societies maintain their identities through ritual performance. Paul Connerton (1989), in his much-celebrated work *How Societies Remember*, insightfully points out that it is through commemorative ritual performances, rather than the mode of production, that collective communities such as nations are reproduced and maintained. Examples can be ubiquitously spotted in almost any collective community. From the seizure of its power in 1933 and the outbreak of the war in 1939, intensive celebration and commemoration constantly reminded the subject of the Third Reich the ideology of the Nazi (Connerton, 1989, p.41); Chinese new year is celebrated every year spring according to the Chinese calendar as a reminder of the Chinese cultural identity; Eastern holidays in Britain, likely wise, becomes ingrained into the protestant’s unconsciousness even for non-believers. Each culture and nation’s existence is marked by its unique ritual performance. As Callahan (Callahan, 2006) points out, ‘the nation does not arise from the ideology of its leaders, as much as through popular performances’ (p.179).

62 For instance, the Japanese Buddhism embraced the principle of ‘egalitarianism for friends and foes (おんしん-平等 oshin-byōdō 怨親平等)’.

63 Notably in 1864, Shimazu Hisamitsu (島津久光 1817-1887) put forth a construction proposal for the Minatogawa Shrine in Kobe. The proposal was followed by the popularisation of Nankō Matsuri, a series of festive commemoration in memorial of Kusunoki (Hata, 2008 pp. 48–49). See : official website of the Minatogawa Shrine: [http://www.minatogawajinja.or.jp/history/](http://www.minatogawajinja.or.jp/history/)
during the late 1860s, and also consolidated their cultural status as the dominant ruling class after the Meiji government of 1868.

Moreover, the 1862 shōkon ceremony was highly nationalist. According to the ritual script of the ceremony, Japan’s national essence was rooted in Shinto and Japan’s national identity was positioned against the Western ‘other’: ‘We give sincere condolence to our comrades, for they had punished the foreign barbarians in Yokohama who came to offend us from afar; for they had endeavoured to make Japan the noblest and strong nation in the world […] The attempt of reviving the Shinto Priest did not succeed. For the souls of the deceased loyalists, we pray for the accomplishment of our enterprise in the future’ (Katō, 1976 pp. 452–453). Here, the ‘enterprise in the future’ referred to the establishment of the State Shinto, a modern political invention centred around the Emperor-centred nationalism.

The Yasukuni Shrine reified Japan’s pre-war nationalism in three significant aspects. First, the shōkon ceremony rectified a sense of chosenness of the nation, i.e., Japan as ‘the noblest and strongest nation in the world’. Second, the shōkon ceremony had been strongly invested with a desire for national rebirth. Among the Meiji leaders, the traditionalists tended to associate Meiji Restoration with the revival of the Kenmu Restoration of Emperor Go-Daigo to legitimate their political agenda (Sakurada, 2000). Finally, in the shōkon ceremony, ritual performance was firmly grounded on the belief in a supreme saviour who came down to the earthly world to resurrect the chosen nation; the Emperor, in the shōkon doctrine, was precisely such figure the living God the (現人神 Arahitogami) who became present at a particular time, standing at the apex of Japanese culture (Schmidt, 1994, pp.5–6). These three symbolic configurations (i.e., a sense of chosenness, the desire for a national rebirth, and the appearance of the Emperor as the saviour of the nation) constituted Japan’s Emperor-centred nationalism, a powerful ideology that would have established the historical barrier demarcating the past (the Tokugawa Era) and the present (the reign of the Meiji Emperor). In the contemporary discourse, Japanese conservatives often asserted that the Yasukuni Shrine was Japan’s ‘spiritual pillar’, the key to ‘take back Japan’, and the reason why ‘the Japanese are Japanese’ (see: Watanabe, 2014; Kobayashi, 2005; Kawamura, 2003). Given the historical position that the Yasukuni Shrine occupied in Japan’s national memory, it is only natural that it became a holy site for the conservatives who desired to revive Japanese patriotism and nationalism.
Yasukuni Shrine After 1945

After Japan’s defeat in 1945, based on the idea of ‘separation of church and state’, the Occupation authority (the General Headquarters, the GHQ henceforth) issued the ‘Shinto Directive (shintō shirei 神道指令)’ to the Japanese government to formally separate the Yasukuni Shrine from the Japanese state, declaring the end of the State Shinto. Since then, any state-associated sponsorship or official connection to the Yasukuni Shrine (e.g., the prime minister’s tribute paid to the shrine) was deemed unconstitutional and socially controversial. From 1945 to 1982, the Yasukuni Issue became Japan’s domestic issue revolving around the problematics of constitutionality and religious freedom.

More specifically, the political controversy over the Yasukuni Shrine in the post-war era primarily revolved around the Article 20 of the Constitution of Japan. On 15 December 1945, the GHQ issued the Shinto Directive, ordering the Japanese government to strip off all forms of public support that the State Shrine had during the pre-war era and of its ‘ultra-nationalistic and militaristic’ trappings based on the principle of separation of church and state (CIE, 1945, p.85). One year later, the post-war Constitution was adopted as an amendment to the Meiji Constitution in accordance with the provisions of Article 73 of that document. In Article 20 of the Constitution, it reads: ‘Freedom of religion is guaranteed to all. No religious organization shall receive any privileges from the State, nor exercise any political authority. No person shall be compelled to take part in any religious act, celebration, rite or practice. The State and its organs shall refrain from religious education or any other religious activity’. This interpretation over the paragraphs of Article 20 of the Constitution became the major legal obstacle to the resumption of state support for the Yasukuni Shrine.64

The first time that the Japanese Supreme Court addressed the constitutionality of Article 20 was in the case of Kakunaga v. Sekiguchi in 1977,65 when the Supreme Court had to decide whether it was constitutional for the municipal government to remunerate Shinto priests for performing a ritual with some religious significance for a ground-breaking ceremony at a construction site. The court concluded that the government did not violate the constitution, based

64 From 17 August 1945 to 6 November 1987, only three Japanese Prime Ministers did not visit the Yasukuni Shrine, namely Ashida Hitoshi, Hatoyama Ichiro, and Ishibashi Tanzan. Such an effort is strongly associated with the discourse of Japan as a ‘(ab)normal country’. Japanese conservatives, in the postwar era, have for long lamented that Japan is an ‘abnormal country’ that lacks a health patriotism and legitimacy to deal with external threats or emergent situation by using military force (Hagström and Hanssen, 2015, pp.73–74).

65 See: http://www.courts.go.jp/app/hanrei_en/detail?id=51
on the judicial interpretation that the purpose of the Shinto ritual was more of a cultural custom than a religious performance, and thus would not possibly promote or encourage Shinto or oppress and interfere with other religions (Abe, 2011 p. 454). Another example was the Japan v. Nagaya, a legal case in which the Supreme Court had to decide whether the Japanese government had violated the constitution when a Christian widow (Nagaya Nasuko) of a deceased member of the Self Defence Force (Nagaya Takafumi) sought compensation for her Christian husband’s enshrinement in the Yasukuni Shrine by the Regional Office in March 1972 without her consent (Tanaka, 2002 pp. 123–131). The Supreme Court, with the same legal standard applied in the Kakunaga v. Sekiguchi, decided that the Regional Office’s act of enshrining the widow’s deceased husband was not unconstitutional, stating that the government’s enshrinement of her husband was for the purpose of ‘raising the social status and morale of SDF members’ and ‘would not be considered by the general public as having the effect of State drawing attention to a particular religion, or sponsoring, promoting, or encouraging a specific religion or suppressing or interfering with a religion’ (Weeks, 1995, p.703). Though decisions in both cases stated that the government’s use of Shinto priests or the Yasukuni Shrine did not violate the constitution, the constitutionality of Article 20 drew considerable public attention to the issue of religious freedom.

Strong opposition from religious groups later became another major hindrance for the conservative politicians’ agenda of restoring state-support for the Yasukuni Shrine. In 1969, when the LDP introduced into the Diet the ‘Bill for the National Establishment of the Yasukuni Shrine (yasukuni jinja hōan 靖国神社法案)’, a coalition of opposition parties and religious groups of 56 religious groups submitted a demanding paper that requested the bill to be withdrawn (Tomura, 1974 pp. 219–221). In March 1975, the government tentatively introduced the ‘Expression of Respect to the War Dead Bill (hyōkei hōan 表敬法案)’, a bill that would have permitted the Emperor, governmental leaders, and members of the SDF (Self Defence Force) to worship the Yasukuni Shrine. But due to strong protests from the religious groups and the opposition parties, the government hastily withdrew the bill even before it could be discussed in the Diet (Powles, 1976, p.491).

66 In fact, religious groups’ resistance against the Yasukuni-worship was nothing new in the post-war Japan. Back in the pre-war days, there had been the infamous ‘1932 Yasukuni Shrine Incidence’, in which three Christian students from the Sophia University were criticised by the media for refusing to follow their military training officer’s order to offer reverence at the Yasukuni Shrine on 5 May 1932 (Sneider, 1990).
To circumvent the oppositions, the LDP conservatives adopted two different strategies. One of them was to distinguish between ‘private’ and ‘public’ visit to the Yasukuni Shrine. For instance, when Prime Minister Miki Takeo visited the Yasukuni Shrine on 15 August 1975, he emphasised that he visited the shrine in ‘private capacity’, and therefore did not violate the constitution (Shibuichi, 2005, p.206). Three subsequent Prime Ministers – Fukuda Takeo, Ohira Masayoshi, and Suzuki Zenko – copied this approach and framed their de facto public visits to the shrine as ‘private’ as so to circumvent the issue of constitutionality.

Another strategy was to remove the religiousness in the prime minister’s visit to the Yasukuni Shrine by arguing that the Yasukuni-worship, rather than a religion, pertained to a national ritual inclusive of various religions in Japan. This approach was intensely discussed under the Nakasone administration in 1984 by members of the Yasukuni Advisory Board (kakuryo no yasukuni sanpai mondai ni kansuru kondankai 閣僚の靖国神社参拝問題に関する懇談会). In the third discussion of the Yasukuni Advisory Board held on 22 October 1984, representatives from the Association of Shinto Shrines problematised the religiousness of the Yasukuni Shrine. ‘From the academic point of view,’ they argued, ‘there are quite a few scholars who question whether the Yasukuni Shrine should be seen as a “religion”; furthermore, ‘the enshrinement of the spirit, in practice, does not contradict the Japanese citizens’ religious life. … In fact, the Yasukuni Shrine is essentially an object of worship for all Japanese citizens, rather than an object of faith as a religious sect’ (RLRB of NDL, 2007 p. 1055). Similarly, the Japan War-Bereaved Families Association (Nippon izokukai 日本遺族会; henceforth Izo-kukai) argued that the religiousness of the Yasukuni Shrine was questionable, because the Yasukuni Shrine’s status as a religious institute was imposed by the GHQ during the occupation period (ibid. p. 1062). As discussed in the 15th conference on 25 June 1985, it was noted that there were only two ways to make an official visit to the Yasukuni Shrine constitutional: first, to argue that the Yasukuni worship was not a religion; second, to remove the religious significance of the official visit by not following Shinto religious customs (ibid. p. 1106). From the

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67 The argument is termed as kokka shintō hishūkyō setsu (国家神道非宗教説). It echoes the thesis proposed by the Shintoist Kamo Momoki (賀茂百樹 19867-1941), who problematised the ‘religiousness (shūkyōsei 宗教性)’ of the Yasukuni-worship. His idea was that the Yasukuni Shrine, rather than a religious institute, should be seen as a national ritual site that transcends the differences in sex, religions, and classes. The political implication of Kamo’s theory was that all Japanese subjects, Shintoists or not, should be able to fulfil their duty of offering reverence to the Emperor at the Yasukuni Shrine regardless of their religious belief, classes, and gender (Hata, 2015 p. 41).
pro-Yasukuni Japanese nationalists’ perspective, if the religiousness of the Yasukuni-worship could be dissipated, they might finally circumvent the legal and social obstacles to their agenda.

On 15 August 1985, when Nakasone officially visited the Yasukuni Shrine, he adopted the strategy of removing religiousness in his visiting by not following the standard Shinto practice of ‘twice bowing, twice clapping and one-time bowing (nirei ni hyakushu ichirei 二礼二拍手一礼)’. Instead, he bowed only once. On the same day, Chief Cabinet Secretary issued a statement that said: ‘the government is not supposed to conform to religious practices prohibited by the constitution’ (Hatano, 2011 pp. 116–117). This statement suggested that the Prime Minister did not follow violate the constitution, because he did not follow any religious tradition. Throughout the process, Preoccupied with the issue of constitutionality, the Nakasone administration seemed to have not taken into account that his official tribute to the shrine may invite foreign countries’ criticism.

Yasukuni Shrine as a Bilateral Issue

Before 1985 when the Chinese made an official protest against Nakasone’s visit, the Yasukuni Issue remained Japan’s domestic issue. In fact, only marginal media attention had been paid to the Yasukuni Problem in the Chinese discourse. During the 1950s, the word ‘Yasukuni (靖国 jing guo)’ only appeared twice and was never reported on its own term (Xu, 2015 p. 64). During the entire 1960s, no media attention had been paid to the Yasukuni Problem at all. The first formal Chinese reaction against the Yasukuni Problem was on 29 January 1971 when the party month-piece issued a criticism against the ‘anti-revolutionary’ trend in Japan.\textsuperscript{68} Similar rhetoric appeared on 29 January 1972: ‘the Yasukuni Shrine of Japan…has become a stronghold for the Japanese anti-revolutionaries who propagate militarism’.\textsuperscript{69} However, this criticism did not politicise the Yasukuni Problem in the Sino-Japanese relations. This was the case, because the diplomatic relations between Japan and China had not been normalised until 29 September 1972. From 1973-1979, though Japanese Prime Ministers in office had invariably visited the shrine (but not in the so-called official capacity), no Chinese report was released to criticise the Yasukuni Issue.

\textsuperscript{68} People’s Daily, 29 January 1971. It was reported: ‘in the Yasukuni Shrine, Japanese anti-revolutionary force is propagating Bushido spirit and the ideology of “loyalty to the Emperor and love for the country” in order to indoctrinate the evil thought of militarism to the general public’.

\textsuperscript{69} We can see that the ‘militarist-people dichotomy’ was strongly emphasised.
Yasukuni Shrine as a Bilateral Issue

Before 1985 when the Chinese made an official protest against Nakasone’s visit, the Yasukuni Issue remained Japan’s domestic issue. In fact, only marginal media attention had been paid to the Yasukuni Problem in the Chinese discourse. During the 1950s, the word ‘Yasukuni (靖国 jing guo)’ only appeared twice and was never reported on its own term (Xu, 2015 p. 64). During the entire 1960s, no media attention had been paid to the Yasukuni Problem at all. The first formal Chinese reaction against the Yasukuni Problem was on 29 January 1971 when the party month-piece issued a criticism against the ‘anti-revolutionary’ trend in Japan.70 Similar rhetoric appeared on 29 January 1972: ‘the Yasukuni Shrine of Japan…has become a stronghold for the Japanese anti-revolutionaries who propagate militarism’.71 This criticism, however, did not politicise the Yasukuni Problem in the Sino-Japanese relations. From 1973-1979, no report was ever released on the Yasukuni Problem, though Japanese Prime Ministers in office had invariably visited the shrine (but not in the so-called official capacity).

The absence of Chinese attention paid to the Yasukuni Issue may largely be attributed to the fact that the 14 ‘Class A’ war criminals were not found out to be enshrined in the Yasukuni Shrine until 1979. In 1979, it was revealed in the Japanese media that Matsudaira Nagayoshi (松平永芳 1915-2005), who became the Head Priest of the Yasukuni Shrine in 1978 (Hi-gurashi, 2008), secretly moved the 14 ‘Class A’ war criminals prosecuted in the Tokyo Trial to the Yasukuni Shrine.72 After this episode, in the 1980s, the Yasukuni Problem became ‘dialecticised’ (or internationalised) as a bilateral issue.

The first time China showed concern over the Yasukuni Shrine was on 17 August 1980, two days after Japanese Prime Minister Suzuki Zenkō (鈴木善幸 1911-2004) paid a visit to Yasukuni Shrine in private capacity. When the party mouthpiece, People’s Daily, reported this issue as Japan’s domestic affairs, it did not make any criticism. However, when Suzuki Zenkō visited Yasukuni Shrine in private capacity again on 15 August 1982, People’s Daily changed its tongue drastically and issued an editorial that criticised Japanese Prime Minister’s visiting of the Shrine as ‘harmful to the Sino-Japanese relations.’73 On 15 August 1985, the FMPRC

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70 People’s Daily, 29 January 1971. It was reported: ‘in the Yasukuni Shrine, Japanese anti-revolutionary force is propagating Bushido spirit and the ideology of “loyalty to the Emperor and love for the country” in order to indoctrinate the evil thought of militarism to the general public’.

71 We can see that the ‘militarist-people dichotomy’ was strongly emphasised.

72 Asahi Shimbun, 19 April 1979; Sankai Shimbun, 21 April 1979.

73 People’s Daily, 15 August 1982.
made a formal statement that criticised the official visit to the Yasukuni Shrine by Japanese Diet members, asserting that Nakasone’s official visit to the Yasukuni Shrine would hurt the emotions of Asian people.  

Since then, the Yasukuni Shrine became a symbolic index of Sino-Japanese friendship. Given China’s strong reaction over the Yasukuni Problem, most of Nakasone’s successors (from 1987 to 2001) refrained from visiting the Yasukuni Shrine, except for Miyazakii, Hashimoto Ryutaro, and Koizumi Junichiro; in particular, Koizumi Junichiro visited Yasukuni Shrine on regular basis from 2001 to 2006; his visits were followed by intense diplomatic denouncements from the Chinese government, and in various Chinese cities in 2005, a series of anti-Japanese demonstrations. Since 1980, the FMPRC has never failed to issue denouncements when Japanese prime ministers and high-ranking Japanese officials visited the Yasukuni Shrine. For instance, the Chinese made denouncement on 29 December 2016, when the conservative Defence Minister Inada Tomomi (稲田朋美) visited the shrine; and on 15 August 2018, denouncement was made when Prime Minister Abe Shinzo paid ritual fees to the Yasukuni Shrine.

The Nanking Massacre Debate

The Nanking Massacre refers to ‘the killing and raping of large numbers of Chinese together with widespread looting and arson over a relatively short period of time (usually given as six to seven weeks) by the Japanese military prior to and following the capture of the city of Nan-king on 13 December 1937’ (Askew, 2004, p.1). In Sino-Japanese relations, the different interpretations over the responsibility, the scale, and the number of casualties of the Nanking Massacre held by the two sides became a transnational controversy called the Nanking Massacre Debate. The Chinese government has consistently maintained that in the Nanking Massacre the death toll amounts to more than 300,000; the Japanese government, while not denying the tragic happening of the atrocity, has maintained that ‘there are numerous theories as to the actual number of victims, and the Government of Japan believes it is difficult to determine the correct number’. The different interpretations, especially the statistics of the casualties, was rooted in the legacy of the Tokyo Trial.

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74 Remin Ribao, 15 August 1985.
75 See: http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/area/china/j_kogi01.html
76 http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/web/fyrht_673021/dhdw_673027/t1585434.shtml
Nanking Massacre and the Tokyo Trial

The Chinese government estimated that the death toll of the Nanking Massacre amounts to 300,000. This number was originated from the judgement of the Tokyo Trial. After the end of WWII, in 1946, the Alliance established the Nanking War Crime Tribunal (Nanking Trial henceforth) and the International Military Tribunal for the Far East (the Tokyo Trial henceforth) to charge Japanese Imperial Army officers. These two trials determined the Chinese official account regarding the death toll of the Nanking Massacre. According to the verdict of the Nanking Trial given on 10 March 1947: ‘From 12 to 21 December 1937…more than 190,000 disarmed Chinese soldiers and civilians were killed by machine guns with their corpses burned to destroy proof. Besides, we count more than 150,000 victims of barbarous acts buried by the charity organisations. We thus have a total of more than 300,000 victims’ (Hu, 2005 p. 389). The statistics came from the damage survey conducted by the Committee of Loss and Damage in the Battle of Nanking (南京抗戰損失調查委員會 Nanking kangzhan sunshi diaocha weiyuanhui). According to the survey, the exact number of the Chinese death toll during the Nanking Massacre, by the time of 10 April 1946, was amounted to 295,525 (SHAC, 1997 p. 524). The Tokyo Trial validated the existence of the Nanking Massacre at an international level. According to the Tokyo Trial’s judgement, ‘organized and wholesale murder of male civilians was conducted with the apparent sanction of the commanders on the pretence that Chinese soldiers had removed their uniforms and were mingling with the population’, with at least 12,000 non-combatant Chinese killed in indiscriminate killing and approximately 20,000 cases of rape occurred during the first month of the occupation (IMTFE, 1977, p.1012). Given the fact that the Japanese government accepted the judgement of the Tokyo Trial, the military tribunal’s verdict became principal evidence for the Chinese government to maintain the claim that 300,000 people were killed.

However, the factuality of the Nanking Massacre was compounded by the problem with the Tokyo Trial’s legitimacy. More specifically, the Tokyo Trial’s legitimacy was greatly undermined by three factors: first, the judgement actively prejudiced itself against the defence in both the legal process of prosecution and, undermining its legal credibility as a fair trial (Sedgwick, 2009, p.1240); second, the Tokyo Trial also failed to give voice to the victims of the

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78 This number, it should be noted, will have become the symbol of the Chinese collective trauma as well as the focal point of controversies in in Sino-Japanese relations since the 1980s.
Nanking Massacre by the selective process of victims\textsuperscript{79} and suppressing victim’s emotions in testimonies (ibid., pp. 1247-1250); furthermore, by not bringing Emperor Hirohito before the court, the Tokyo Trial failed to construct a persuasive narrative that can unite the Japanese younger generation in repugnance in what the imperial government had done and in disidentification of their wartime history (Brook, 2001, p.676). Therefore, the Tokyo Trial was less an effective way of restoring relationships amongst post-conflict groups, than a symbolic apparatus to impose the historical consciousness of the Allied. As the legal flaws in the Tokyo Trial effectively united some Japanese who reject the court’s judgement as a ‘victor’s justice’, the Tokyo Trial became the starting point of the Nanking Massacre Debate, rather than an ending point of it (see: Ushimura and Higure, 2008). Based on the rejection of the Tokyo Trial’s legitimacy, the actual death toll of the Nanking Massacre was challenged, and some right-wing Japanese activists denied the existence of the event as a whole (see: Shudo, 2005). The Tokyo Trial’s legitimacy planted the seeds of what would become a political issue in the Sino-Japanese relations a few decades later.

**Nanking Massacre in postwar China**

The Nanking Massacre was not integrated by the Chinese government into the official narrative during the Mao era. Between 1946 and 1982, only 3 articles related to the ‘Nanking Massacre’ (Li and Huang, 2014 p. 41). In fact, the Nanking Massacre was even conflictual with the triumphalist narrative propagated by the Party in the immediate postwar period. In October 1950, when Beijing decided to send troops to the Korean Peninsula to fight against the UN Force led by the U.S. approaching the Chinese-Korean border (Jian, 1995, xi), the CCP’s released a nation-wide propaganda project called ‘The Great Movement to Resist America and Assist Korea (偉大的抗美援朝運動 weida de kangmei yuanchao yundong; RAAK henceforth)’ to mobilise mass support for the state’s military action in Korea (Rawnsley, 2009 p. 306). Nanking became one of the major cities where the propaganda was carried out. The Party tried out various strategies to construct people’s hatred against the U.S. One of the strategies was linking the presence of the U.S. with the old hatred against the Japanese and the memory of the Nanking Massacre. To do this, the authority organised demonstrations, radio programmes, and meetings.\textsuperscript{80}

\textsuperscript{79} Only three victims were given the symbolic opportunities to deliver their testimonies before the court, namely, Liang Dingfang, Sheng Deyi, and Wu Zhangde (Sedgwick, 2009, p.1248).

\textsuperscript{80} On 11 February 1951, about 20,000 workers participated in a demonstration called ‘Protest against the Militarisation of Japan by the U.S.;’ on 8 March, 120,000 women were organised to participate in a similar event, in which the accusation of Japanese atrocities in Nanking was the main topic (Liu, 2009 p. 12). Survivors and people from
But the authority put down the Nanking Massacre quickly, as the collective trauma offered no triumphalist story to boost the military morale.

During the Mao era, there was only one academic work about the Nanking Massacre. In 1962, Gao Xingzu (高興祖 1928-2001), a history professor of Nanking University, wrote *Nanking Massacre -- A Documentary of the Japanese Atrocities*. This monograph is widely believed to be the very first academic work on the Nanking Massacre in China. However, in 1963 the authority prohibited his work from publication.\(^8\) According to his colleague Wu Shimin (吳世民), the Chinese authority found the work ‘inappropriate’ with the booming Sino-Japanese diplomacy that became ‘semi-official’ in the early 1960s (Johnson, 1986b, p.406). The Cultural Revolution devastated the Chinese academia, and so postponed the publication of Gao Xingzu’s work even further. The book remained unpublished until 1979 when the academic industry finally came back to normal (Wu, 2015).

### Nanking Massacre in Postwar Japan

In postwar Japan, the Nanking Massacre was more of a folklore-like story that few people heard of. In the 1950s, accounts about Nanking Massacre could only be found in literary works, such as *Peonies* (牡丹 Botan)\(^8\) by Mishima Yukio (三島由紀夫 1925-1970) and *Time* (時間 jikan)\(^8\) by Hotta Yoshie (堀田善衛). However, they never generated much publicity in Japan.

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\(^8\) An interesting fact is that Gao Xingzu gave his unpublished book to a group of Japanese who visited Ningbo in 1965. The exact information about the group is yet to be confirmed.

\(^8\) *Peonies* (牡丹 Botan), a short story published in 1955, depicted the repressed memory of the Nanking Massacre. In the story, ‘I’ was invited by a friend to visit a peony garden owned by an old man named Kawamata who planted 580 peonies with each flower having its own name in Chinese characters. As it turns out, there is an unspeakable crime behind the beauty of the 580 peonies: the old man was ‘the ring-leader in the Rape of Nanking’ who evaded the war-crime trials, and the 580 peonies in the garden represent 580 women that he killed ‘gladly and meticulously’ (Mishima and Chambers, 2001, p.54).

\(^8\) *Time* (時間 jikan), a novel in diary form that portrays the Nanking Massacre from the perspective of a Chinese man named Chen Yingdi (陳英諦). Underpinning the whole novel was the depiction of Japanese soldiers’ cruelty, the war among the KMT, the CCP, and the Japanese Army, and the desperation of the protagonist whose wife and child were tragically killed by the Japanese soldiers during the Nanking Massacre. In particular, the novel, with Chen Yingdi’s narration, even highlighted the number of the death toll in Nanking: ‘…some believe as many as 430,000 people perished. In Japan, this massacre was kept hidden from the people’ (Hotta, 1957 p. 649). This work is unique
By 1955 when the conservatives re-established themselves as the dominant political power, the narrative of the Nanking Massacre almost vanished from Japanese history textbooks (Yoshida, 2009, p.53).

The situation changed in the 1960s. In 1966, the history of the ‘Killing Contest’ in Nanking Massacre appeared in Ōnori Minoru’s (大森実 1922-2010) non-fictional book Tiananmen in Flame (天安門炎上). Coincidentally, in the same year, Shimono Ikkaku (下野一霍 1889-1969) and Mainichi Shimbun journalist Gotō Kōsaku (五島広作) published The Truth of Nanking Battle (南京作戦の真相 nankin sakusen no shinsō), in which they aimed to clear the Kumamoto Sixth Division of the charge of the Nanking Massacre (Yoshida, 2009, p.59). In 1967, Hora Tomio (洞富雄), a Japanese historian and a professor of the Waseda University, published The Mystery in Military History (近代戦史の謎 kindai senshi no nazō), the first academic work on the Nanking Massacre published in Japan. Based extensively on the reading of the Tokyo Trial documents, Hora’s book confirmed the existence of the Nanking Massacre and criticised Japan’s militarism as responsible for the atrocities. However, due to the ongoing Cold War and extremely limited exchange between Japan and China, the discourse of the Nanking Massacre in the 1960s had not yet entered the Japanese public consciousness, much less a source of diplomatic dispute.

In the early 1970s, with the Nixon Shock of 1971 and the subsequent China Boom, the Nanking Massacre found increasingly more pathways for expression and came into the Japanese public horizon. In 1971, Honda Katsuichi (本多勝一) travelled to China to interview surviving victims of the Nanking Massacre, subsequently published the book A Journey to China in its form in that it is told from the victim’s perspective; also, it is arguably the only Japanese post-war novel that used the Nanking Massacre as its main narrative setting.

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84 Entering Nanking, sublieutenant Noda Tsuyoshi and Mukai Satoshi promised to have a contest on who was the first to kill 100 people from the suburb of Jurongshan to the city of Nanking…’ (Ōmori, 1966 p. 186).

85 Shimono Ikkaku was the chief of staff of the Kumamoto Sixth Division (熊本第六師団 kumamoto dairokku shidan) at the time of the incident.
A best-seller in 1972\textsuperscript{86}, the book told of the infamous episode of ‘Contest of Killing 100 People Using a Sword’.\textsuperscript{87}

Honda’s book provoked some die-hard Japanese conservatives who published articles and books to ‘debunk’ the factuality of the ‘Killing Contest’.\textsuperscript{88} Revolving around the ‘Killing Contest’ and the number of death tolls, a debate over the Nanking Massacre in Japan came into shape in the 1970s. This debate was polarised between two sides, namely, the Illusion School (the rightists) and the Great-Massacre School (the leftists) (Yoshida, 1987 p. 39). The former, with a nostalgic admiration for the pre-war Japanese patriotism, dismissed the ‘Killing Contest’.

\textsuperscript{86}This journalistic work and its subsequent publication, as Honda recalls, was directly motivated by the Vietnam War: in 1966, he went to Vietnam as a war correspondent and witnessed American war crimes, which led him to investigate Japanese war crime committed in China. Honda’s work can be seen as an extension of Japan’s progressive and pacifist discourse, which carries strong anti-militarist message and set in motion a fierce debate over the Nanking Massacre.

\textsuperscript{87}The ‘Killing Contest’, in the book, is told of by ‘Mr. Jiang’. Highly likely the name refers to Jiang Genfu (姜根福), whose mother, younger brother, and sister were killed and father kidnapped by Japanese soldiers during the Nanking Massacre. His original surname was Xu 徐. After being homeless for years, he was adopted by another family and changed his surname.

\textsuperscript{88}Among them was Yamamoto Shichiei (山本七平), who published an article entitled ‘Apology from Asahi Shimbun (朝日新聞の「ゴメンナサイ」Asahi Shimbun no Gomennasai)’ in the January Issue of Shokun! (諸君!), criticising that publicising the Nanking Massacre (and especially the ‘Killing Contest’) was self-serving and counter-productive in healing the wound and reducing distrust between the Japanese and the Chinese. Honda Katsuichi and Yamamoto Shichihi, engaged in a cascade of debates on Shokun!. Yamamoto claimed that ‘The Contest to Kill 100 People Using a Sword’ written in Honda’s work was no more than a scuttlebutt fabricated by the Chinese (Honda, 1984 pp. 175–176), while Honda argues that the incident was indeed real and that it is logically absurd and unethical to use partial inaccuracy of the eyewitnesses’ account to debunk the existence of ‘Killing Contest’ as a whole (ibid., p. 223). Following Yamamoto, non-fiction writer Suzuki Akira published The Illusion of the Nanking Massacre (南京虐殺のまぼろし), which denied the existence of the ‘Killing Contest’ and cast doubt on the official number of casualty of the Nanking Massacre (i.e., 300,000). This book received Ōya Sōichi Non-fiction Award in 1973. Although Suzuki’s work did not deny the existence of the Nanking Massacre per se, its narrative created the prototypical argument shared by the Illusion School later on: any part in the history of the Nanking Massacre that does not conform to the denialist logic (e.g., the claim that a Japanese blade cannot physically perform the task of killing more than three persons) can be used to lead to the conclusion that the whole Nanking Massacre is a hoax fabricated by the Chinese and the Allied Forces to bash Japan. In 1975, Yamamoto Shichihei published Japanese Army in Myself (私の中の日本軍 Watashi no Naka no Nihonjun), in which he dismissed the Nanking Massacre as a whole as a fabricated story. Against Yamamoto’s vehement denialist argument, the Waseda historian Hora Tomio updated his research and published Nanking Massacre – A Criticism against the Illusionisation Work (南京大虐殺——「まぼろし」化工作批判), which pointed out logical fallacies in Yamamoto Shichihei and Suzuki Akira’s denialist accounts. Notably, Hora Tomio was the only professional historian working on this particular subject matter during the 1960s and 1970s in Japan (Kasahara, 2007 p. 122).
as mere hearsay and questioned the number of the death toll by criticising the legitimacy of the IMTFE. The latter, led by Hora Tomio, Honda Katsuichi, and Takasaki Ryūji, strongly condemned the rightist view and emphasised the need to reflect on Japan’s war responsibility (Yoshida, 1987 p. 39). During the 1970s, the debate over the Nanking Massacre had been confined to the Japanese themselves. As Yang comments, the Nanking Massacre in Japan is ‘a micro-cosm of the clashes between larger ideological undercurrent in postwar Japan in terms of evaluating the past and making choices for the future’ (Yang, 2001, p.77). In this sense, the Nanking Massacre discourse in the 1970s Japan was more of a discourse concerning Japan’s national identity, rather than a discourse about how the Japanese collectively confronted the demand and voices from the former victims.

The ‘New Remembering’ of the Nanking Massacre in China since the 1980s

After the Textbook Issue of 1982, public and academic interest in the Nanking Massacre in China was stimulated significantly. In 1982, a press campaign was launched against the Japanese historical revisionism. During the same year, Central News Documentary Film Studio (中央新聞記錄電影製片廠 zhongyang xinwen jiluying zhipianchang) produced Nanking Massacre (南京大屠殺 Nanking Datuisha), the first documentary film on the Nanking Massacre. On 11 August 1982, the Association of Historical Studies in Jiangsu Province (江蘇省歷史學會 jiangsu sheng lishi xuehui) held the first academic conference on the Nanking Massacre, in which major scholars in Nanking were invited to criticised Japanese Monbushō’s approval of the revisionist history textbook and showcase their research about the Nanking Massacre. With the increased public and academic interests, the Nanking University published the first systematic compilation of historical materials about the Nanking Massacre.

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89 Academic Symposium in Memorial of the 37th Anniversary of the Victory of the Chinese People’s War of Resistance against Japanese Aggression 紀念中國人民抗日戰爭勝利三十七週年學術座談會.

90 Three eyewitnesses were invited to the conference. Jiang Genfu (姜根福), a survivor and eyewitness of the Nanking Massacre, interviewed by Honda Katsuichi in 1971, was invited to describe his tragic experience during the Nanking Massacre. Gu Junren (顧俊人), who worked in the administration office of Gulin College in 1937, offered his witness of atrocities committed by Japanese soldiers in the International Safety Zone during the Nanking Massacre; Fan Liang (范良), a management staff working at Sun Yat-sen Mausoleum, described how he saw security guard Huang Huisan (黃惠三) was killed. For more details, see:
http://www.nj1937.org/yxzcz/tzxcz201608/t20160805_4070703.html

91 侵华日军南京大屠杀史料 Special Collection of Historical Materials on the Nanking Massacre Committed by the Japanese Aggressors.
Against this backdrop, in March 1984, the government of Nanking proposed the construction of the Nanking Massacre Memorial Hall. The memorial hall opened on 15 August of the next year. From then on, the discovery of important historical materials exploded. Culture-wise, with the patriotic education and the marketisation of the cultural industry since the 1980s (Seo, 2008, p.387), the Nanking Massacre, with the proliferation of ‘trauma cinema’, became widely represented as a national trauma (Troost, 2014, pp.54–55). By the time of the mid-1990s, the Nanking Massacre had become a fundamental symbol of the Chinese nationalism.

Internationalisation of the Nanking Massacre

After the mid-1990s, the Nanking Massacre became increasingly international. In 1996, the American Chinese author Iris Chang published *Rape of Nanking*. The book became an instant best-seller in the U.S., stimulating the Japanese denialists to organise a counterattack against the Chinese narrative. In 2000, the denialists led by Higashinagano Shūdo founded the Japanese Association of Nanking Studies (*Nippon nankin gakkai* 日本南京学会), a pseudo-academic society geared towards falsifying the Nanking Massacre. In 2001, the Tsukurakai published *New History Textbook*, in which authors removed the description of the Nanking Massacre. With Prime Minister Koizumi’s tribute to the Yasukuni Shrine, the Nanking Massacre Debate was further intensified in the bilateral relations.

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92 The construction of the memorial hall started with a city-wide investigation to collect sources related to the Nanking Massacre from survivors and eyewitnesses of the Nanking Massacre. After a 5-month investigation, the authority concluded that the number of surviving victims and eyewitnesses of the Nanking Massacre amounted to 1756; among them, there are 176 people who survived the killing, 544 people whose relatives were killed by the Japanese Army, and 44 women who were raped by Japanese soldiers (Xia, 2013 p.36).

93 In 1985, Vautrin’s diary was discovered; in 1988, Miner Searle Bates’ letters, which described Japanese atrocities during the Nanking Massacre, were discovered by religious scholar Zhang Kaiyuan (章開元) in the Library of Theology at Yale University (Yu, 2015 p. 103); in 1990, George Rosen’s Telegraph, which informed the German government about ‘atrocities and criminal acts not of an individual but of an entire Army’, was discovered in an archive in German Federal Archives in Potsdam (Brook, 1999, p.260); in 1991, the films and pictures of Japanese soldiers abusing Chinese civilians, filmed by the American missionary John Magee, were uncovered; in September 1994, the ‘Hirota Telegraph’, which is said to mention the Nanking Massacre for the first time on 17 January 1938 (Studies, 2016, p.123), was unclassified and discovered by the Chinese scholar Wu Tianwei (吳天威) at the National Archive of the United States (Sun, 2000 p. 96); in January 1995, the diary of Robert O. Wilson, an American doctor who worked at Gulou Hospital (鼓樓醫院 *gulou yiyuan*) in Nanking and witnessed ‘horrendous raping and killing committed against the Chinese civilians’, was rediscovered in Gulou Hospital (Zhu, 2015 p. 3); then in 1996, John Rabe’s diary, a crucial piece of documentation where hundreds of atrocities were recorded, came to light with the American Chinese scholar/writer Iris Chang’s effort (Chen, 1996).
To alleviate the detrimental effect that the ‘history problem’ had inflicted upon the bilateral relations, in 2007, the Chinese and the Japanese government agreed to establish the Japan-China Joint History Research Project. This intergovernmental project assembled scholars from both sides to discuss sensitive historical issues, the Nanking Massacre included. According to the research report released in 2010, the scholars agreed with the fact that the Nanking Massacre did exist, but had a disagreement on the number of casualties (Bu et al., 2010).

In 2012, the Mayor of Nagoya, Kawamura Takashi (河村隆之), in a speech to a delegation paying a courtesy visit as part of Nagoya and Nanking’s sister city relationship, told a delegation of visiting officials from Nanking that ‘the Nanking Incident probably never happened’. The shocking statement was followed by condemnations from the Chinese Foreign Ministry and suspension of city exchange by the government of Nanking city.

In 2014, the Chinese government established 13 December as the National Memorial Day for the Nanking Massacre. This indicated that the Nanking Massacre became fully incorporated as a collective memory of the PRC. Due to its highly symbolic character, the Nanking Massacre Debate continued to be a politically sensitive topic between Japan and China. An example is the UNESCO row:94 in 2015, the Chinese government requested to register disputed Chinese documents recording the mass murder and rape committed by the Japanese troops after the Fall of Nanking of 1937; the Japanese government warned last year that it might withdraw the funding if UN agreed with China’s request. In 2016, after the Chinese request was accepted, Japan suspended more than $34m funding of that year as a protest. A more recent example of the politicisation of the Nanking Massacre is the APA Hotel Incidence. In February 2017, a Japanese hotel chain – APA Hotel – came under fire when two guests uploaded a video about how they found out that books claiming Nanking Massacre to be a fabrication were put in the room’s drawer. Chinese residents in Japan protested against the APA Hotel and clashed with Japanese right-wing groups. The Chinese media reported this incidence, and the Chinese Foreign Ministry’s condemned the APA Hotel. In Sino-Japanese relations, the Nanking Massacre Debate remains a sensitive issue, and potentially, a source of regional friction.

**Summary**

In this chapter, I have outlined the social-political-institutional context of the three sub-issues in the ‘history problem’, namely, the Textbook Issue, the Yasukuni Issue, and the Nanking

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Massacre Debate. Based on the background information, I will begin to analyse each of the cases in the following chapters.
Chapter 5: The Textbook Issue – the Peril of the Victim-victimizer Duality

Introduction

This chapter analyses the discourse of the Textbook Issue in Sino-Japanese relations. I argue that the Textbook Issue has been a discursive process by which the Chinese government, the Japanese government, and Japanese politicians enacted different fantasies (psychoanalytic discourses) to confront the destabilising of the ‘Victim-victimizer Duality’, a bilateral norm that structured Japan and China’s respective subject position (identity) as victimizer and victim. More precisely, the Chinese government enacted the master’s discourse with the master-signifier of ‘matter of principle’ to demand a full recognition of the victim identity from Japan, generating anxieties in the Japanese; the Japanese government operationalised the university’s discourse to resist China’s demand, generating fragmentation of the Chinese identity as victim; some Japanese politicians enacted the master’s discourse with the master-signifier of ‘educational sovereignty’ to reconfigure the Symbolic that structured the Sino-Japanese relations.

Findings

In the reading and coding process, I identified dozens of codes and categories; to formulate the argument, the codes and categories were merged into three major themes: 1) The Chinese government insisted that the Victim-victimizer Duality should remain the Symbolic for Sino-Japanese relations; 2) social agents in the Japanese political circle resisted the imposition of the Symbolic by the Chinese; 3) Self-other identities were reproduced in the Imaginary. In the following sub-sections, I will explain each theme in turn.

Theme I: The Chinese Government imposed the Victim-victimizer Duality on Sino-Japanese relations by framing the Textbook Issue as a ‘matter of principle’.

The Chinese discourse was characterised by a strong attachment to the Victim-victimizer Duality, the Symbolic that structures Sino-Japanese relations. In the Victim-victimizer Duality, Japan was defined as China’s victimizer and China as the victim. The Chinese insistence can be interpreted as a process by which the Chinese government enacted the master’s discourse

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95 Whereas there are other categories emerged during the coding process, many of them were either merged or collapsed with more inclusive categories to produce the working hypothesis.
with the master-signifier of ‘matter of principle’ to put the anti-revisionist press campaign at work (S1→S2) and to conceal the dividedness of the Chinese identity (S1/$). The master’s discourse, however, generated anxieties in the other (S1→S2/α). This discursive process set the ‘history problem’ in motion.

The politicisation process of the Textbook was initiated with the Chinese government’s articulation of a master-signifier – ‘matter of principle’. In fact, at the beginning of the Textbook Issue, the Chinese government had framed the Textbook Issue as a ‘matter of principle’ or ‘a political issue that matters to the political foundation of Sino-Japanese relations’. In other words, the Chinese government insisted that the bilateral relations should be structured according to the Victim-victimizer Duality, a norm that defined China as the victim and Japan as the victimizer.

To begin with, it is imperative that we look at how the Chinese discourse predicated on the Japanese subject in the context of the Textbook Issue. When the Chinese media launched the press campaign to accuse the Japanese government of giving approval to the controversial textbook, the Chinese articles invariably used the word cuangai 篡改. This word means ‘to tamper with’ or ‘to mess with’ in English. A representative instance is a short-commentary (duanping 短評) entitled ‘The History of Japan’s Invasion of China Should Not Be Tampered With (riben qinlve zhongguo de lishi burong cuangai 日本侵略中國的歷史不容篡改)’. Afterwards, the People’s Daily had kept using it as a standardised expression to describe any offending alteration of history textbook.

The significance of the word 篡改 can be illustrated by comparing it with its homophone,窜改. The choice of character makes a difference, for it reveals how the Chinese side framed the Textbook Issue. Both 窜改 and 篡改 mean ‘to alter’, but there is a subtle distinction between them: the former (窜改) is used to describe the alteration of ‘textual materials, such as statistics, legal documents, words in articles’, while the latter one (篡改) is used to describe

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96 Initially, the Textbook Issue was called a ‘matter of principle (yuanzexing wenti 原則性問題)’; then in the 2000s, the Textbook Issue was referred to as a ‘political foundation of Sino-Japanese relations (zhongri guanxi de zhengzhi jichu 中日关系的政治基础)’.
98 For instance: using ‘advance’ instead of ‘aggression’ to describing Japan’s military actions in China, misinterpreting the Mukden Incident as an ‘accident (gūhatsu jiken 偶發事件)’ rather than a premediated aggression, omitting the death toll number of the Nanking Massacre, etc.
99 People’s Daily, page 6, 9 December 2015.
someone tampering with ‘significant and abstract ideas, such as political theory, policies, history, academic hypothesis, spirit, and so forth’. Linguistically speaking, the character of 篡 signifies actions involving seizing a politically superior position or changing an existing political order. For instance, ‘to usurp the throne’ is written as 篡位, with the character 篡 meaning ‘to usurp’ and the character 位 meaning ‘the throne’. Therefore, the usage of the word 篡改 indicated that the Chinese state construed the MOEJ’s approval of the controversial textbook as an attempt to alter not only the textual contents of history textbooks but also, more importantly, the symbolic of Sino-Japanese relations (i.e., the Victim-victimizer Duality).

The Chinese official discourse had persistently emphasised that Japan’s historical understanding, as reflected by the Textbook Issue, pertained to a ‘matter of principle’ (yuanzexing wenti 原則性問題) to Sino-Japanese relations. For instance, Vice Director of Ministry of Foreign Affairs of China Wu Xueqian lodged an official protest to the Japanese government on 6 August 1982, stating that ‘the Chinese government considers Japan’s acknowledgement of the history of Japanese militarism’s invasion of China a matter of principle to the development of the bilateral relations’. In explaining what ‘a matter of principle’ was, Wu made reference to the Japan-China Joint Communique of 1972: ‘When China and Japan normalised their state relations, through dialogue, the two governments specified this issue in the Japan-China Joint Communique’.

In the statement, Wu referred to the fifth paragraph of the document; the paragraph was written as follows:

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100 People’s Daily, page 6, 9 December 2015.

101 In other words, the alteration of wording (i.e., from ‘aggression to ‘advancement’) of the Japanese history textbook not only had academic significance; more importantly, it is one that involved a changing of political order that is morally undesirable. Passages of Sino-Japanese relations in Japan’s history textbook, in this sense, was regarded as a medium of international order and reflection of Japan’s political morality. History as academic subject, then, is neither negotiable nor can be regarded as a purely academic activity, because the political and moral implication that it has outweighs its intellectuality. This is not to suggest that the objectivity of historical research can be disregarded or watered down if necessary – quite the contrary, the Chinese understandably has always insisted their version of history is the objective one. Such ‘historical monotheism’ implies that the Chinese government believes that: 1) there is only one truth in history; 2) the truth of history necessarily implies a collective’s moral attitude and political order towards another party, which, in this case, is China.

102 People’s Daily, page 1, 6 August 1982.

103 That is, Japan’s acknowledgement of Japanese militarism’s invasion of China.

104 People’s Daily, page 1, 6 August 1982. The Japan-China Joint Communique was perhaps the most important document in Sino-Japanese history, for it defined the character of Sino-Japanese relations and formed political consensus – however interpretatively flexible it could be – in written form.
The Japanese side is keenly conscious of the responsibility for the serious damage that Japan caused in the past to the Chinese people through war, and deeply reproaches itself. Further, the Japanese side reaffirms its position that it intends to realize the normalization of relations between the two countries from the stand of fully understanding "the three principles for the restoration of relations" put forward by the Government of the People's Republic of China. The Chinese side expresses its welcome for this.105

More precisely, the Chinese government saw this paragraph in the treaty as what represented the Symbolic of the bilateral relations: Japan recognised its identity as a victimizer of the Chinese, and the recognition of the Victim-victimizer Duality defined the bilateral norm. Interpreting the bilateral norm in terms of the Victim-victimizer Duality, the Chinese government saw MOEJ’s approval of the controversial textbook as breaching the Symbolic laid down by the Japan-China Joint Communique of 1972. The emphasis of the Victim-victimizer Duality was repeated in the Second Textbook Offence of 1986 by Director of the Chinese Foreign Ministry’s First Asian Affairs Department, Yang Zhenya: ‘the Chinese government strongly demands that the Japanese government implement the spirit of the Japan-China Joint Statement, to meet the commitment made in 1982, and to eliminate the negative effect that the [textbook] issue has inflicted upon the friendship between China and Japan’.106

The instituting of the master-signifier (‘matter of principle’) was facilitated by the argumentation that Japan’s war with China was a premeditated act of aggression. This argumentation framed Japan as a subject who had the intent to wage the war and thus must take the war responsibility. The subject referred to either the Japanese government as the proxy of the Japanese nation or Japan as a holistic subject, depending on the context. Such framing was key to China’s victim identity vis-à-vis Japan: as a lack of clear intent might lead to the blurring of moral responsibility, only when it was taken for granted that Japan had committed wrongdoings against the Chinese intentionally, could the moral responsibility be assigned to the current Japanese government to sustain the Victim-victimizer Duality. In particular, the Chinese discourse adduced the Tanaka Memorial as proof of Japan’s premeditated war of aggression. The Tanaka Memorial was presented in a long commentary article entitled ‘Understand History Correctly and Realise Generational Friendship’ on 7 July 1986 in People’s Daily. The main idea was to refute the Japanese right-wing arguments that Japan did not invade China or/and that the war

106 People’s Daily, page 4, 10 June 1986.
with China was not premeditated. To argue that Japan’s invasion was premeditated, the author adduced Tanaka Memorial as the key evidence:

The war carried out by the Japanese militarism had been prepared for a long time. As early as 1932, Tanaka Giichi had proposed a “Guiding Principle on Japan’s China-policy” in the Tanaka Memorial, a principle that describes in detail how resource-rich China’s northeast region and inner-Mongolia are and the necessity of occupying these regions. It barefacedly said: “To conquer China, we must first conquer Manchuria and Mongolia; to conquer the world, we must conquer China”. 107

When the Third Textbook Offence broke out in 2001, the Chinese attachment to the master-signifier of ‘matter of principle’ remained consistently the same. On 5 April 2001, the Director of Foreign Ministry of China, Tang Jiaxuan (唐家璇) criticised the Japanese government for ‘not committing to the Japan-China Joint Communique and Japan-China Joint Declaration’, emphasising that ‘correctly understanding the history of the Japanese militarism’s invasion of China is an important political foundation for Sino-Japanese relations’. 108 On the other hand, the Tanaka Memorial had become widely accepted by the Chinese official circle as sufficient evidence for validating Japan’s war responsibility.

From the development of the Chinese discourse on the Textbook Issue in 1982, 1986 and 2001, the primary concern of the Chinese side was to counter any argument that may potentially blur Japan’s war responsibility. As identity exists in duality, a victim identity can only be enacted by a victimizer identity; and as a victimizer can be defined as a victimizer only if they had the intention to harm, it is necessary for the Chinese official discourse to maintain the degree of planning behind Japan’s invasion and aggression. 109 But paradoxically, the emphasis on the Victim-victimizer Duality revealed a lack of mutual recognition of the Symbolic. This can be seen in how the Japanese government responded to China’s demand for full recognition of the Victim-victimizer Duality from Japan.

109 But the trouble with this in the case of Sino-Japanese relations is that it is questionable if a collective subject who can take the moral responsibility really exist. The issue of morality and responsibility is traditionally associated with individual, so the philosophy of responsibility does not fit easily with collective agents. In philosophical literature, scholars debate against each other whether or not large groups such as nation-states have intention of their own like individual agents.
Theme II: Japan resisted the Chinese imposition of the Victim-victimizer Duality with the university’s discourse and the master’s discourse.

The Japanese discourse is characterised by the university’s discourse, a discourse that the Japanese government enacted to resist the Chinese government’s demand for full recognition of China’s victim identity. In the university’s discourse, the ruling party framed the Textbook Issue as a technical issue (S2→a), hiding the political subject who was demanded to articulate a definitive identity or statement to put the discourse to an end (S2/S1). However, this discourse produced fragmentation of identity for the Chinese subject (S2→a/$), making the Chinese government increasingly uncertain about its subject position (identity) as defined by the Victim-victimizer Duality.

**Framing the Textbook Issue in terms of technicalities**

What stands out in the discourse of technicalisation is what I coded as the ‘consistency principle’. It refers to the argument that Japan’s military action in China before 1945 is recommended to be described on equal terms with the European powers that invaded China in the 19th century. The ‘consistency principle’ had been used very frequently during the Textbook Issue in 1982 and 1986. It first appeared in a Diet Member Committee on 29th July 1982, when the Textbook Issue had become internationalised for the first time. During the session, Narazaki Yanosuke (楢崎弥之助) of the Japan Socialist Party, and Tōson Kazuo (藤村和男), the Direct of Middle School Textbook Inspection who represented the MOEJ, had a confrontational exchange over how the MOEJ viewed China’s criticism of the Textbook Issue. The dialogue has to be quoted at length (HoR, 29 July 1982):

Narazaki: Perhaps the Chinese had some misunderstanding [because of the difference in the educational system]. But such saying is an insult to the Chinese. What is at stake is not institutional differences but how the Japanese government understands historical facts, in terms of which there isn’t any so-called ‘misunderstanding’. [...] So why the word ‘aggression’ was changed into ‘advance’? Do you think that changing ‘aggression’ into ‘advance’ is fair and objective? If so, could you specify the reasons for it?

Tōson: In the history textbook there was a description of the European powers’ presence in Asia in the 19th century. Occasions such as the United Kingdom entered the Chinese continent was represented in the textbook as ‘European power’s advancement into China [中国への列強の進出]’. But when it comes to the Sino-Japanese War, it was represented as ‘war of aggression towards China.
If in the former case you used the word ‘advance’, why don’t you use the same expression in the latter case? This was the reason that we made the recommendation. Although people might think that the inspection officer wanted to use the word ‘advance’, there has not been a single case where the word ‘aggression’ has been changed into ‘advance’.

Narazaki: From the Ministry of Education’s perspective, it seems that ‘aggression’ conveys a negative impression. This seems why you came up with the idea that ‘aggression’ should be changed into ‘advance’. What is your opinion on this point?

Tōson: It is a principle that history should be written according to the commonly accepted knowledge [通説]. When it comes to representing the past, the author should use objective expressions in a balanced way. For instance, ‘advance’ is more objective than ‘aggression’ linguistically. When the consistency of expression is lacking [in the textbook], we recommend a more objective term to be applied in all circumstances (people yelling: ‘This is wrong!’).

The above conversations showed that some Japanese politicians actually agreed with the Chinese interpretation over the Textbook Issue, that is, the Textbook Issue should be seen as a matter involving value judgement. But such view was deflected by the university’s discourse of Narazaki, who framed the Textbook Issue as a technical problem about using ‘aggression’ and ‘advance’ inconsistently in the textbook manuscript.

The same argumentation was deployed by Ogawa Heiji (小川平二), the Minister of Education, and Suzuki Isao (鈴木勲), the Director of the Bureau of Primary and Middle School Education of the Ministry of Education, during the Committee of Culture and Education on 6 August 1982 when they confronted with criticisms from the opposition parties (HoR, 6 August 1982):

Yuyama Isao (湯山勇, from the Japan Socialist Party): You said that changing the wording [from ‘aggression’] into ‘advance’ was for unifying different expressions. […] So how do ‘advance’ and ‘aggression’ differentiate from each other conceptually? How are the two concepts defined?

Suzuki: With regards to changing ‘aggression’ into ‘advance’, we hope to use a more objective expression to narrate history. European power’s wars with China were described as ‘advance’. Japan’s wars with China were described as ‘aggression’. Because those wars were close to each other historically, we recommended that ‘advance’ be used.
Arishima Shigetake (有島重武, from Kōmeitō): Did you recommend to change the word of ‘aggression’ to ‘advance’ on the ground that the latter is more objective than the former?

Kogawa: I do not exclude the word ‘aggression’ from being used in the textbook. I have stated many times: wars between China and the other countries were described as ‘advance’, but wars between China and our country was described as ‘aggression’. It seems to be more consistent to unify the expression in writing history textbooks, and ‘advance’ seems to be a relatively more objective expression. This is a fact about how we gave the recommendation.

In fact, the LDP had consistently used the university’s discourse to defend the MOEJ’s textbook recommendation. In a Diet meeting in 1984, Takaishi Kunio (高石邦男), the Direct of the Primary and Middle School Education Bureau of the Ministry of Education, drew on the argument in parliamentary debate with Takizawa Kōsuke (滝沢幸介) of the Democratic Socialist Party (HoR, 20 July 1984):

Takizawa: You mentioned there is the issue of ‘balance’. Previously it was stated [by the Ministry of Education] that for the sake of having a balanced expression, the use of ‘aggression’ and ‘advance’ has to be unified. But how about other historical events? Do you apply the same principle to the northern territory? Let’s say Britain invaded China. I think, then, it should be said that the Soviet Union invaded Japan, too. So, do you mean that if the author uses the word ‘aggression’, then, the same wording has to be used in any other cases? Or what do you mean by ‘balance’?

Takaishi: In the Chinese continent there have been various historical events. For instance, if the British presence in China is described with the word ‘advance’, then, it is not imbalanced to describe Japan’s presence alone as ‘aggression’. This is why we gave the recommendation about the wording of ‘aggression’ and ‘advance’.

The conversation above highlighted that the MOEJ framed the Textbook Issue in terms of technicalities. The argument was that historical events were not consistently described: the European countries’ military actions in China in the 19th century were described as ‘advance’, whereas Japan’s military actions in China was described as ‘aggression’. In order to unify the expression, inspection officers made the recommendation that the author should change the word ‘aggression’ to ‘advance’ on the ground that ‘advance’ is more objective than ‘aggression’
in a technical sense. Intellectualisation can be a form of resistance against anxiety (Evans, 1996, p.5). The technicalisation argument enabled the LDP to remove Japan’s subjectivity from the discourse (S2/S1), repressing confrontation and conflict with the Chinese by redefining the Textbook Issue as a technical matter.\textsuperscript{110} But intellectualisation only \textit{repressed} rather than \textit{resolved} the issue. This was why the Chinese government did not find the Japanese explanation satisfactory.

\textit{Articulating Japan’s master-signifier: educational sovereignty}

Similar to the Chinese government, the Japanese political circle also instituted its own master’s discourse, whose master-signifier was ‘educational sovereignty’. Deployed by the conservative LDP, this discourse constructed the Textbook Issue as a matter of Japan’s \textit{educational sovereignty} (\textit{kyōiku shuken 教育主権}) that was threatened by the Chinese. This discourse reproduced the existing idea that Japan, as a sovereign nation-state, should have the absolute right to determine the content of history textbooks and the educational experience of the Japanese school children, and this sovereignty to national education should not be interfered by external forces. Logically associated with this category was the saying that China’s behaviour – i.e., demanding Japan to correct the offending passages in the history textbooks – pertained to \textit{interference of domestic affairs} (\textit{naisei kanshō 内政干渉}). The discourse of ‘educational sovereignty’ is vital to the Japanese political discourse in that it not only deflected China’s accusation but also reproduced Japan’s collective identity through estranging China as Japan’s other.

The notion of educational sovereignty was first brought up in 1982 by Miura Takashi (三浦隆) of the right-leaning Democratic Socialist Party. On the Committee of Culture and Education held on 30 July 1982, Miura contended that the Japanese government should make a proactive response to China and Korea’s criticisms. However, he also hinted that ‘textbook is fundamental to our country as a sovereign state and should be compiled independently. Thus the correction of textbooks should also be based on our country’s independent decision’ (House of Representatives, 1982d).\textsuperscript{111}

\textsuperscript{110} At a more subjective level, it reveals a subtle dissatisfaction held by the Japanese conservatives over the way in which Japan is judged unfairly compared to its European counterparts. The underlying message is – to put it colloquially – ‘Japan is not the only bad guy in the world, and the European countries also did bad things’. I will unfold this point on intellectualisation in more detail in the section of Discussion.

\textsuperscript{111} さて、教科書はもとよりわが国は主権独立国家であるならば自主的に作成すべきものであり、そして改訂することもまた自主的にわが国の判断において行うべきことはあたりまえのことであります。
The idea that Japan should have the educational sovereignty to compile textbooks as it willed was not restricted to the right-leaning parties. In fact, Tachiki Hiroshi (立木洋) of the Japan Communist Party also stated that ‘how the Japanese people should be educated matters to Japan’s sovereignty, consequently, I don’t think that Japan should accept every demand made by foreign nations’ (House of Representatives, 1982a). Though the Democratic Socialist Party and the Japan Communist Party differed from each other hugely in terms of ideology, they nonetheless shared the consensus that the production of textbook pertained to Japan’s sovereignty. This interesting contrast showed how prevalent and unquestioned the master-signifier – ‘educational sovereignty’ – was in Japan’s political circle.

The collective consensus on ‘educational sovereignty’ lent itself to, and was reinforced by, the idea that the Chinese demand for textbook correction constituted an ‘interference of domestic affairs’. Notably, such view was expressed by three cabinet members of the Suzuki administration in 1982, namely, Direct of National Land Agency Matsuno Yukiyasu (松野幸康), Minister of Post and Telecommunication Minowa Noboru (箕輪登), and Director General of Science and Technology Agency Nakagawa Ichirō (中川一郎). In particular, on 23 July 1982, Matsuno openly described China and Korea’s protests as ‘interference of domestic affairs’ that worsened the situation and made the Chinese government withdrew its invitation for a state visit by the Minister of Education Ogawa Heiji in August 1982 (Takasaki, 2002, pp.31–32).

In the wake of the Second Textbook Offence in 1986, Abe Shintarō, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, highlighted Japan’s autonomy and sovereignty in the similar vein:

The Textbook Issue is Japan’s domestic problem, and I believe that Japan has the responsibility to decide it by Japan’s own accord based on her sovereignty and her obligation towards Japanese citizens. Consequently, whereas such attitude towards foreign affairs may be seen problematic, we must be determined to carry out Japan’s sovereign in the Textbook Issue. I firmly believe that we must put the Miyazawa Statement together as one of the government’s will to address the problem in an entirely self-disciplined, self-autonomous form. This problem matters to Japan’s sovereignty and as an independent country, and this principle [of determining issues about textbooks in a self-autonomous way] must remain firm (HoR, 1986).

The master-signifier of ‘educational sovereignty’ continued to prevail in the Japanese political circle in the Textbook Issue of 2001. One of the most vocal contenders is the right-wing
politician Nishimura Shingo (西村信吾), who argued that the official view held by the Foreign Ministry was untenable:

The director of the foreign ministry said that China’s action does not constitute interference of domestic affairs, because China did not threaten Japan with any word implying coercion, and coercion is defined as the situation where one is threatened by weapons. However, the textbook of the Japanese citizens is an issue that we the Japanese citizens are unable to put forth a counter-argument. China knew it and issued their protest against us. This is interference of domestic affairs, this is coercive. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs did not think so and sold Japan’s soul of diplomacy. The Chinese government asserted that criticism against its human rights pertains to interference of domestic affairs. So why are we keeping silent on the Textbook Issue? Politically speaking, I believe this is nothing more than a sign that we have surrendered to China. The deputy minister said that it is not a violation of national sovereignty and that we have not been coerced. But my understanding is that we have (HoR, 2001b).

The two categories – ‘educational sovereignty’ and ‘interference of domestic affairs’ – effectively marginalised other anti-thesis by framing the Textbook Issue as an issue revolving around China’s violation of Japan’s national sovereignty. This discursive process repressed the dividedness of the Japanese discourse on the Textbook Issue (S1/$). In fact, the Textbook Issue has multiple aspects, including the domestic aspect of Japan’s post-war pacifism and international aspect of Japan’s relations with China and Korea. But the discourse of ‘educational sovereignty’ had made prominent and contentious the international aspect while downplayed the domestic aspect. In 1982, there were still discussion about how the Textbook Issue was associated with the ideology of Japan’s post-war democracy (see: HoR, 1982b), and how the Textbook Issue mattered to Japan’s historical understanding regarding Japan’s own gruelling wartime episode, the Battle of Okinawa, where hundreds of Okinawan people were forced by the Japanese Army to commit compulsory mass suicide (ibid.). But by the 2000s, political discourses about the Textbook Issue’s relation to Japan’s pacifism, democratic movement, intellectual freedom, and the memory of Okinawa had become more and more obscured. As Masaaki (2008) notes, educational awareness about the Okinawan mass suicide had not seen improvement until 2007 (p.10). In other words, the master’s discourse, with the master-signifier of ‘educational sovereignty’, concealed the fragmentation of Japan’s identity that potentially could have been revealed in the Textbook Issue (S1/$).
Theme IV: Self-other identities were reproduced in the Textbook Issue.

Social agents both sides defended their respective identity as unitary and whole in the Imaginary by externalising aggressiveness onto the other. In the Chinese discourse, China’s identity as a morally superior nation was reproduced via an attribution process that constructed Japan as an ‘untrustable’ subject with a hidden agenda to re-militarise and as an inferior ‘island nation’ dwarfed by the superior ‘continental nation’ (i.e., China). The Japanese discourse, with the dichotomous discourse of ‘kentei vs kokutei’, reproduced Japan’s superior identity as a superior liberal democracy that embraced the freedom of speech, as opposed to China’s identity as an inferior, totalitarian state.

**China othered Japan as untrustable**

Whenever the Chinese government’s demand for full recognition of the Victim-victimizer Duality was deflected by the Japanese government in the Textbook Issue, an attribution process by which the Chinese social agents constructed theories to explain Japan’s ‘unrepentant attitude’. I term this attribution process ‘the Discourse of the Untrustable Japanese’. There were two major theories in it, namely, Japan’s secret agenda of remilitarisation and Japan’s national character. I will explain these two theories in turn.

‘Japan’s secret agenda’ refers to Japan’s secret political agenda of becoming a militarised state. The hidden agenda discourse was used by the Chinese officials and media to accuse Japan of being unrepentant in the ‘history problem’. The basic idea was that the Japanese government had been re-militarising itself by deliberately ignoring the right-wing tendency in education and giving approval to the revisionist history textbook. Thus, the Textbook Issue was interpreted as an obvious manifestation of Japan’s plan of re-militarisation. The Chinese accusations made on these terms were invariably speculative and theoretical, providing no concrete evidence that could prove that Japan’s hidden agenda. When the Chinese government lodged the first official protest regarding the Textbook Issue to the Japanese ambassador on 6 August 1982, Xiao Xiangqian said:

> The Japanese Ministry of Education’s attitude towards the textbook inspection is extremely unseemly, and it is questionable what its intent is’ (MOFAJ, 1986 p. 9; emphasis added).

A similar argument was repeated a few days later on 10 August 1982 in *People’s Daily*:
The Japanese Ministry of Education is trying to cover up the historical fact in the inspection process and thinks that it is unnecessary to tell the next generation of Japanese about Japan’s war of aggression against China. This is ridiculous. What is their intention? They want no other than to contaminate the next generation of the Japanese children with militarist ideology. This is intolerable for the Chinese and the Japanese people.\footnote{People’s Daily, page 4, 10 August 1982.}

Similarly, a speculative statement was issued a few days later by one of the People’s Daily articles:

The issue of tampering with history and beautifying militarism is not a singular phenomenon, rather, it reflects a political movement, a political thought (emphasis added).\footnote{People’s Daily, page 6, 14 August 1982.}

Suspicion about Japan’s political ambition towards re-militarisation was a major theme in many academic essays that analysed the Textbook Issue in Sino-Japanese relations. For instance, after the Third Textbook Offence broke out in 2001, a Chinese scholar published a journal article that said ‘Japan’s intention and aim behind giving approval to the [right-wing] history textbook have to be analysed and studied seriously (Zhao, 2001 p. 19; emphasis added). Three reasons were put forth by this author: first, the Japanese government did not want to acknowledge its war responsibility; second, the Japanese government wanted to institute a new political ideology for the Japanese people; third, Japan had the intent to remilitarise itself and become a great power again (ibid.). The argumentation logic was rather simplistic, relying more on speculation than evidence: Japan unrepentant attitude towards the Textbook Issue showed that it wanted to remilitarise. Most of the other academic essays relevant to the Textbook Issue from 2001 to 2005 followed the same argumentation logic. A typical example was an essay written by Tang Chongnan (湯重南), a senior researcher of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences who later was recruited as a member of the Japan-China Joint History Research in 2007. In his 2001 essay entitled ‘The Essence of Japan’s Textbook Issue’, Tang argued:

The Textbook Issue is but a signal. It signals that Japan is heading towards a dangerous direction and that Japan is experiencing some changes in its national strategy. […] The Japanese government let the right-wing textbook go unchecked. This reveals its double-sidedness and limitation on the issue of historical understanding (Tang, 2001 p. 47).
Throughout, the Chinese discourse attributed the Japanese government’s speech and behaviours in the Textbook Issue to Japan’s hidden agenda of remilitarisation. Expressions such as ‘intent’, ‘reflection’, and ‘signal’ were deployed to conceptualise causal relations between the MOEJ’s approval to the controversial textbook and Japan’s secret agenda of re-militarisation. By establishing such a semantic relationship, the Chinese discourse constructed Japan as politically untrustable.

Another discourse – ‘the discourse of Japan’s national character’ – attributed Japan’s unrepentance to Japan’s ‘national character (guomin xing 國民性)’. The attribution process constructed Japan as an ‘island nation’ whose unique psychological attributes account for Japan’s attitude and behaviour regarding the Textbook Issue. This line of argumentation is usually cloaked with superficial Marxist theory and dubious references to The Chrysanthemum and the Sword: Patterns of Japanese Culture by American anthropologist Ruth Benedict (often without citing the page number). For instance:

Japan is a resource-poor island nation. […] In the isolated island condition, the Japanese nation formed an ambivalent psychological trait that exhibits superiority complex and inferiority complex simultaneously; Japan developed a dual personality of being open-minded and conservative at the same time. […] The Japanese psychology and personality are manifested in the Textbook Issue. […] As a foreign scholar pointed out in The Chrysanthemum and the Sword, the European culture is a culture of guilty, and Japan a culture of shame. Consequently, some Japanese try to reverse the verdict given to Japan’s war of aggression. Apart from their unmentionable political ambition, what they are considering is the issue of “face”. […] All in all, we will have a deeper understanding regarding the show that the Japanese put up by incorporating Japan’s political intention and their national psychology into our analysis (Zhao, 2001 p. 48; emphasis added).

The same argumentation that attributed Japanese unrepentant textbook policy to Japan’s national character appeared in a 2005 essay written by Liang Yunxiang (梁雲祥), a professor of International Relations at Peking University. To quote at length:

Japan’s traditional culture attaches a lot to interpersonal relationships, emphasises mutual respect and teamwork, but lacks the ability to respond to the outside world. They always get overly scared and do not know what to do with the outside world. This [psychological traits] often manifested in international relations. In dealing with foreign countries, they feel proud of themselves but also feel inferior to others at the same time. With regards to the issue of historical understanding, they do not
have any moral standard to stipulate what is good and evil. Not having a moral standard they replace the historical judgement against the evil [i.e., the Tokyo Trial] with ancestor worship [...] As American anthropologist Benedict concluded in *The Chrysanthemum and the Sword*, the Western culture is a culture of guilt, requiring the westerners to repent very often; by contrast, the Japanese culture is a culture of shame that does not have any concept about whether or not one is guilty, but cares only about whether or not one feels shameful. Consequently, some people in Japan never acknowledge Japan’s war of aggression as a crime and try to attribute it to the historical zeitgeist of colonialism. They do not seek the cause within themselves, feel shameful for being defeated, and do not think it is necessary to reflect and repent the crimes they have committed. Rather, they have trying to find an opportunity to cleanse the shame of defeat.

This attribution process established an imaginary causality between Japan’s cultural character and Japan’s ‘incorrect’ stance in the Textbook Issue. More precisely, it constructed a duality of ‘Repentant Germany vs Unrepentant Japan’ by making reference to Benedict’s notion of ‘guilt vs shame’: the former was constructed as morally superior and the latter morally inferior. The Germans were represented as a ‘culture of guilt’ that ‘fully’ acknowledged their wrongdoings and war responsibility; the Japanese, unfavourably compared to the Germans, are depicted as unrepentant, retaining an ambiguous attitude regarding their past wrongdoings, due to their inferior national character, i.e., the ‘culture of shame’. Here, the Chinese discourse operationalised two cultural discourses, namely, the discourse of cultural essentialism and the discourse of cultural prejudice against Japan, to facilitate the discursive construction of ‘the Untrustable Japanese’. Cultural essentialism makes presumptions about the Japanese culture, constructing the Japanese subject whose mentality, disposition, and behaviour are determined by some ‘cultural psychology (*wenhua xinli* 文化心理)’ or ‘national character (*guominxing* 国民性)’. On the other hand, Benedict’s anthropological study about Japan was deployed to reinforce a deep-seated Chinese stereotype against the Japanese that saw the Japanese as ‘morally corrupted’ and ‘psychological perverted’. When these two paradigms were combined, they produced the impression that the Japanese never reflected on their past, because of their unique yet inferior national character.

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114 Among the Chinese, and especially in the internet discourse, there is the popular notion that ‘the Japanese don’t have morality’. There are also numerous discussion over ‘why the Japanese are so perverted’. The Discussions over the Japanese perversion often revolved around the ‘weirdness’ of Japan’s cultural products, such as films, animation, and pornography.
The attribution discourse had two functions. First, it functioned as a discursive process to reproduce China’s collective identity. Meanings and identities are constituted through difference; collective identities are often reproduced with the representation of danger and difference (Campbell, 1998b, p.77). In the Chinese discourse, Japan was represented as dangerous and different: Japan had the hidden agenda of remilitarisation and was a morally inferior ‘island nation’. Second, by imagining the other according to anti-Japanese cultural stereotypes, the attribution processes ameliorated the Chinese subject’s anxiety triggered by the potential loss of its identity. Categorising Japan as an ‘island nation’, ‘psychologically perverted’, and ‘morally corrupted’ enacted that China’s identity as a ‘continental’, ‘psychologically healthy’, and ‘morally superior’ nation, creating a narcissistic sense of national pride and illusory sense of wholeness in the nation’s collective identity. Rather than engaging the other in a dialogue, the attribution discourse defended its identity through imagining the other as inferior.

**Japan othered China as ideologically different**

A similar process of constructing the ‘Self vs Other’ polarity can be found in the Japanese discourse. More precisely, Japan’s national identity was reproduced in the *kokutei vs kentei* polarisation. In English, *kokutei* means the State-control System, referring to the textbook compilation system used by pre-war Japan, Korea, and China; *kentei* means the Inspection System, i.e., the textbook compilation system currently used in Japan in the postwar era. The *kokutei vs kentei* polarisation emphasised the institutional difference between Japan and China in the textbook compilation, attributing the happening of the Textbook Issue to China’s (intentional or unintentional) misunderstanding of Japan’s textbook system. Ultimately, it reproduced Japan’s superior identity as a liberal democracy that embraced the freedom of speech as opposed to China’s inferior identity as a totalitarian state.

A few instances can be adduced here. The *kokutei vs kentei* polarisation was initially put forth in the Textbook Issue of 1982. On 19 August 1982, Ōsaki Hitoshi (大崎仁), the Director of Bureau of International Scholarship of the Ministry of Education, stated that it was essential to make the Chinese government understand the difference between state-designated system and the inspection system used by Japan (HoR, 1982b):

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115 Textbooks in China are state-designated, whilst textbooks in Japan are produced with the inspection system.
I have stated that the Ministry of Education does not have any intention to shift responsibilities to the private publishers, but I do think that it is of importance to clarify the different characters between the state-designated system and the inspection system with necessary documents.

The argumentation became especially widespread in the Third Textbook Offence of 2001. Shimomura Hakubun (下村博文), an LDP politician and a member of the right-wing organisation, ‘Diet Members to Discuss Japanese Future and History Education (日本の前途と歴史教育を考える議員の会)’, argued that China and Korea’s criticisms pertained to a violation of Japan’s educational system (HoR, 2001c):

Our country’s textbooks are not state-designated. They are produced on the basis of the inspection system. Furthermore, it is from eight different publishers rather than one single publisher that the Education Committee adopted the textbooks to be used. Thus, it is problematic that China and Korea criticised our textbooks without considering Japan’s textbook system. I believe that we must protect our textbook inspection system from political intervention.

In a meeting of the Committee of Security on 4 April 2001, defending Japan’s inspection textbook from China’s interference was connected to the discourse of defending Japanese citizens’ political freedom. As Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Etō Seishirō (衛藤征士郎) said (HoR, 2001d):

As I have often stated, our country’s textbooks, unlike China’s and Korea’s, are not state compiled textbooks. So our government and the textbook inspection officers do not coerce the authors to adopt a specific historical understanding. More importantly, our country’s constitution firmly supports and protects our citizens’ rights, including the freedom of expression, freedom of publication, and freedom of speech. As politicians, we should watch over the inspection of our textbooks.

Emphasising the institutional difference between Japan and China, the LDP politicians, especially those working for MOEJ, made the case that the Textbook Issue was caused by China’s misunderstanding of Japan’s educational system. There were two underlying messages in this discourse: first, China was a totalitarian state that was institutionally different from Japan, a liberal democracy; second, the Textbook Issue was caused by China’s totalitarian political system, a polity considered as inferior.
For instance, the dichotomy was deployed by Kōno Yōhei, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, who was confronted by Yoshioka Yoshinori (吉岡吉典) of the Japan Communist Party on a Diet conference on 17 April 2001 (House of Representatives, 2001a):

Yoshioka: You’ve said a lot about the administration process of the textbook inspection. But I think the other side can hardly understand. The reason is that it was the Japanese government that recognised the inspection process and gave textbooks approval to be published. As a result, to some degree, the inspection reflects the Japanese government’s historical understanding. This is so because we also had textbooks that did not pass the inspection in the past. But I don’t want to start a debate on this. I would like to confirm an issue regarding the Association of Creating New History Textbook. The content of the history textbook produced by that group is not in alignment with the Japanese government’s official historical understanding. How should we understand that our government seemed to contradict its own commitment?

Kōno: The Chief Cabinet Secretary, as well as the Minister of Education, has made comments regarding this issue. The comment said: “our country’s textbook inspection system is based on the idea that textbooks are to be published by private authors and the creative works of the publishers. Textbooks do not carry any specific historical understanding or historical view. Thus the inspected textbooks are not supposed to express [historical] understanding that is the same as the government's official view.

The discursive effect of the ‘kokutei vs kentei’ polarisation was twofold. On the one hand, the polarisation constructed China’s identity as an alien ‘other’ who is ideologically and institutionally different from Japan. In particular, the ‘kokutei vs kentei’ duality instantiated two other identity dualities, namely, ‘China vs Japan’ and ‘totalitarianism vs liberal democracy’. This way, the ‘kokutei vs kentei’ polarisation functioned to construct Japan’s identity as a superior, liberal democracy embracing the freedom of speech, as distinct from the inferior, totalitarian China. On the other hand, by emphasising Japan and China’s difference in textbook policy, the polarisation removed Japan’s subjectivity from the discourse of the Textbook Issue. Thus, the ‘kokutei vs kentei’ polarisation could be considered as a defence mechanism that enabled the Japanese government to procrastinate emotionally and politically distressing confrontation with the Chinese government in the discourse of the Textbook Issue.
Discussion

In the previous section, I have analysed the discursive processes by which the Japanese and the Chinese government negotiated the Victim-victimizer Duality that structured Japan and China’s subject position (identity) relationally as victimizer and victim. Also, I have argued that the Chinese government perceived the Textbook Issue as what signified a breaching of the Symbolic, i.e., the Victim-victim duality. The Chinese government and the Japanese political circle dealt with the breaching of the Victim-victimizer Duality by enacting different psychoanalytic discourses: the Chinese government enacted the master’s discourse with the master-signifier of ‘matter of principle’, the Japanese government enacted the university’s discourse, and some Japanese politicians enacted the master’s discourse with the master-signifier of ‘educational sovereignty’. In what follows, I will recapitulate how social agents operationalised fantasies in the Textbook Issue.

The master’s discourse enacted by the Chinese government

In the Chinese case, the fantasy at work was the master’s discourse. It set other discourses in motion in that the Chinese government’s criticism of the Japanese government on the Textbook Issue was the starting point of the ‘history problem’ discourse in Sino-Japanese relations. A master’s discourse can be recognised by the installation of a master-signifier. In the master’s discourse, the agent assumes a sense of naturalness without any need for justification other than itself and speaks from a position of authority relating to identity, ethics, or value. In the case the Textbook Issue, the Chinese government spoke from the position of the victim who assumed a moral authority with the master-signifier of ‘matter of principle’. The construction of the fantasy can be further clarified by making reference to the schematisation of the master’s discourse.

1) As we see in the scheme, the master-signifier addressed the chain of the chain of signifiers, representing how the Chinese discourse on the Textbook Issue functioned on a basic level: the Chinese argumentations directed against the historical revisionism and the Japanese government were consistently organised around the signifier of ‘a matter of principle’ (S1 → S2). The ‘matter of principle’ referred to the Victim-victim Duality, the norm that defined Japan as the victimizer and China as the victim.
2) The master-signifier created anxieties, and the anxieties were reified by the object-cause of desire \((a)\). The object-cause of desire became a void around the discourse of the ‘history problem’ revolved. The object-cause of desire resided in both the Chinese and the Japanese sides: the Chinese deemed the Japanese as unrepentant, and never repentant enough; the Japanese resented the Chinese for always holding on to the anti-Japanese sentiment. The object-cause of desire calls for a solution – ‘something should be done’, to repair the divided subject, to conceal the gap, the void in the Symbolic and the subject’s identity structured therein.

3) The hidden truth was that the master-signifier is underpinned by fragmentation of the subject \((S1/$)\). The subject was fragmented because the Symbolic that structured its subject position (identity) was intruded by the Real. The Real was superficially represented by the idea that Japan was to whitewash the history of aggression, denying its identity as China’s victimizer; but what it actually represented was the essential uncertainty over the subject’s identity. The dividedness, uncertainty, and fragmentation of the subject are hidden. However, the hidden fragmentation also motivated the subject to articulate the master-signifier, making demands to the other: the Chinese government had made strong diplomatic protests to the Japanese government, to conceal the uncertainty over the Victim-victimizer Duality and the identity constructed therein.

The university’s discourse enacted by the Japanese government

The Japanese government confronted the Real by enacting the university’s discourse. In the Japanese discourse, politicians and the ruling party framed the Textbook Issue in terms of ‘objectivity’, proclaiming that the word ‘advance’ was actually more ‘neutral’ and less ‘judgemental’ than the word ‘invasion’ for describing Japan’s conduct in the Second Sino-Japanese War. This corresponded to the defining feature of the university’s discourse, where the most prominent place was the subject of knowledge, rather than identity or value.

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\begin{align*}
S2 & \rightarrow a \\
\_ & \_ \\
S1 & \_//\_ $ \\
\end{align*}
\]
1) In the university’s discourse, the agent speaks from the position of knowledge (S2). The agent imposes a system of knowledge upon object-cause of desire, the manifestation of the Real ($a$). This process corresponds to the discursive process by which the Japanese officials framed the Chinese protest over the Textbook Issue as a technical or academic problem ($S2 \rightarrow a$). The university’s discourse created a sense of scientific objectivity, as the fragmented subject was unable to perceive the master-signifier ($S1/S$).

2) The master-signifier is veiled under technical languages. Here, the master-signifier ($S1$) referred to the Japanese government’s articulation of its stance towards the Victim-victimizer Duality, the Symbolic that structured Sino-Japanese relations. But a clear-cut, unequivocal articulation was repressed by the technical discourse ($S1/S2$): history textbooks must be objective, thus we are not allowed make claims arbitrarily. The Japanese government’s response to the Chinese demand for textbook revision has been ambiguous and slippery as well: the Japanese side showed ‘understanding of neighbouring states’, yet hesitated to undertake immediate revision; the Ministry of Education seemed reluctant to make effective changes, yet it did not overtly reject the Chinese demand for a revision. As a result, the Japanese government’s value-judgement was made invisible in the discourse.

3) The university’s discourse produced uncertainty and fragmentation in the subject. For the Chinese government, the Japanese government’s explanations were hitting around the bush and missing the target: what the Chinese wanted was not ‘objective knowledge’ or rationalising explanations, but full recognition of the Symbolic. The Chinese were left wondering and felt uncertain about the Symbolic, hence its victim identity structured therein ($S2 \rightarrow a/S$). It was unclear whether Japan still acknowledged the Victim-victimizer Duality. The ambiguity of Japan’s attitude and the uncertainty of identity, in turn, motivated the Chinese government to lodge even stronger demands to the Japanese government for a definitive recognition of the Symbolic.
The master’s discourse enacted by the Japanese politicians

Some of the Japanese politicians in the parliament enacted the master’s discourse to deal with the Real of the Victim-victimizer Duality. The master-signifier was ‘educational sovereignty’. The discourse can be explicated as follows:

\[ S1 \rightarrow S2 \]

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\[ $ \_ $ \]

\[ // \]

\[ a \]

1) The word ‘sovereignty’ was the master-signifier that defended Japan’s identity from China’s criticism. The master-signifier assumed a sense of naturalness, corresponding to the meaning of ‘sovereignty’: sovereignty, though its definitions have varied historically, is marked by the absoluteness of authority and exclusivity of jurisdiction within a territory (Núñez, 2014 p.645). On the basis of defending Japan’s ‘educational sovereignty’, politicians in the parliament articulated their support for the textbook’s approval, claiming that China was ‘interfering with Japan’s domestic affairs’ (S1→S2).

2) The master-signifier represses the divided subject. The Textbook Issue had originated as Japan’s domestic issue about how the Japanese should interpret the legacy of imperial history before 1945. But as China became involved in the Textbook Issue, the focus shifted gradually from the domestic to the international area. The increased use of ‘educational sovereignty’ in the parliament, thus, framed the Textbook Issue as an international issue while concealed the social division of Japan (S1/$).

3) The master’s discourse produces the object-cause of desire. It is the leftover of the symbolisation, a manifestation of the Real. In the Japanese discourse, the master-signifier of ‘educational sovereignty’ (S1) chained the argument that China interfered with Japan’s domestic affairs (S1→S2); this argument, however, made the Textbook Issue further contestable and politicised. The Chinese government and media reacted strongly against the Japanese argument, refuting that the Japanese government should not shift
its responsibility with such an excuse. It made the Chinese desire Japan’s repentance and the Japanese desire China’s appreciation of Japan’s sovereignty. Thus, the master’s discourse added more and more anxieties into the discourse of the Textbook Issue (S1 → S2/a).

Summary

In this chapter, I have argued that the Textbook Issue has been a discursive process by which the Chinese government, the Japanese government, and Japanese politicians, by enacting different fantasies (psychoanalytic discourses) to confront the breaching of the ‘Victim-victimizer Duality’: the Chinese government enacted the master’s discourse with the master-signifier of ‘matter of principle’, articulating the Victim-victimizer Duality as the standard norm for the bilateral relations; the Japanese government enacted the university’s discourse, framing the Textbook Issue in terms of technicalities and repressed a clear-cut articulation of Japan’s political stance towards the Victim-victimizer Duality; some Japanese politicians enacted the master’s discourse with the master-signifier of ‘educational sovereignty’, arguing that the Chinese government interfered with Japan’s domestic affairs and violated Japan’s national sovereignty.

The master’s discourse enacted by the Chinese government set in motion all other discourses in the Textbook Issue by instituting the master-signifier of the ‘matter of principle’ (S1). The master-signifier organised the chain of signifiers that criticised the Japanese government’s lack of repentant attitude (S1→S2), repressed the dividedness of the Symbolic and the subject positions (identities) defined therein (S1/$), and produced the object-cause of desire, the unassimilable elements in the discourse (a) that generated anxieties, dissatisfaction, resentment, and desire (S1→S2/a). The generation of subjective elements further reproduced the discourse of the ‘history problem’ between Japan and China. The similar situation can be seen in the Yasukuni Issue, to which I will turn now.

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116 People’s Daily, page 4, 16 April 2001
Chapter 6: The Yasukuni Issue – the Politics of the Militarist/People Dichotomy

Introduction

This chapter is a discourse analysis of the Yasukuni Issue in Sino-Japanese relations. I argue that the Yasukuni Issue has been a discursive process by which the Chinese and the Japanese governments confronted the uncertainty of the Victim-victimizer Duality that structured the subject positions (identities) of China and Japan relationally. Whereas the Chinese government enacted the master’s discourse with the master-signifier of the ‘Militarist/People Dichotomy’ to demand recognition of victimhood from Japan and repress the dividedness of China’s victim identity, social agents in the Japanese political circle enacted the hysteric’s discourse to challenge the master-signifier instituted by the Chinese.

Findings

Three themes stood out from the database: 1) The Chinese government defended the Symbolic (the Victim-victimizer Duality) with the master-signifier of the Militarist/People Dichotomy; 2) The Japanese political circle were discontent with the Symbolic that structured Japan’s victimizer identity vis-à-vis China; and 3) The Yasukuni Issue became an othering process on both sides. The three themes are synthesised into the hypothesis that the Yasukuni Issue was a discursive process by which the Chinese and the Japanese governments confronted the uncertainty of the Victim-victimizer Duality. This argument (hypothesis) is consistent with the hypothesis propounded in the discourse analysis of the Textbook Issue in Chapter 5. But it should be noted that in the Yasukuni Issue the Japanese government enacted the hysteric’s discourse, rather than the university’s discourse or the master’s discourse, to confront the breaching of the Symbolic.

Theme I: The Chinese government defended the Victim-victimizer Duality by articulating the master-signifier of the Militarist/People Dichotomy.

For the Chinese government, the Yasukuni Issue breached the Victim-victimizer Duality that structured the Sino-Japanese relations. More specifically, the Chinese government saw the Japanese cabinet members’ tributes paid to the ‘Class A’ war criminals in the Yasukuni Shrine as a violation of the Militarist/People Dichotomy, a narrative by which the Chinese government justified the renouncement of war reparation from Japan.
In the Chinese discourse, one of the most significant categories in the Yasukuni Issue is the Militarist/People Dichotomy. This category appeared in more than half of the Yasukuni-related articles published in the 1980s, and has consistently appeared in the Chinese government’s official statements relevant to the Yasukuni Issue since 1985. The Militarist/People Dichotomy was a narrative about Japan’s war responsibility. More specifically, it argues that Japan’s war responsibility for the Chinese people during the Second Sino-Japanese War should only be attributed to the ‘Japanese militarists’, who were separated from the ‘Japanese people’.

This Militarist/People Dichotomy was originally derived from the diplomatic normalisation between the two countries in 1972. On 27 September 1972, when the Chinese Minister of Foreign Affairs Ji Pengfei (姬鹏飛 1910-2000) and his Japanese counterpart Ōhira Masayoshi (大平正芳 1910-1980) were on their way to the Great Wall, they had an informal conversation as to whether or not the word ‘militarist’ should be used in the joint communique (Ishii et al., 2003 p. 92):

Ōhira: Tanaka Prime Minister’s visit to China this time is to represent the Japanese citizens holistically and express the willingness to reflect on the past. Since Japan is reflecting on the war as a whole, we would like to use this wording.

Ji Pengfei: China differentiates a few Japanese militarists and the majority of Japanese citizens. The Chinese way of thinking is showing a good intention to Japan.

So whereas the Chinese insisted on dividing the Japanese people and the Japanese militarist, the Japanese wanted the national government to represent the Japanese people as a whole. Eventually, the Japan-China Joint Communique, signed on 29 September 1972, did not incorporate the word ‘militarist’. Morita Hajime (森田一), the then Secretary to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, explained in a television interview the difficulty that the Japanese found in accepting the Chinese argument:

What is and is not precisely militarist is difficult to define. The most extreme interpretation would suggest that the Emperor is the victimizer. Or is he actually a victim? Both sides [the Chinese and the Japanese] kept silent about the issue of the Emperor. If this debate continues, it will eventually
relate to the interpretation of the Emperor. So for Japan, this is a sensitive issue that must be handled carefully.\(^{117}\)

The impasse had arguably led to a tacit compromise: whereas the Chinese government did not incorporate the word ‘militarist’ in the document, the Japanese government offered an apology to acknowledge its role as a victimizer in the past. The compromise allowed the Chinese to use the narrative of Militarist/People Dichotomy to justify their renouncement of war reparation from Japan. Since the Militarist/People Dichotomy functioned as a justification for the renouncement of war reparation from Japan, the Chinese government tended to see acts that violated the Militarist/People Dichotomy as unacceptable as they would render the renouncement meaningless. Paying tributes to the ‘Class A’ war criminals in the Yasukuni Shrine fell within this category that the Chinese government found unacceptable.

With the development of the Textbook Issue and the Yasukuni Issue in the 1980s, the very different ways of handling the reparation issue held by the two sides became more and more unneglectable.\(^{118}\) In People’s Daily, the Militarist/People Dichotomy appeared frequently in reports about the Yasukuni Issue in the early 1980s. On 16 August 1982, People’s Daily published an article entitled ‘A Handful of People in Japan Erect Monument for War Criminals but Opposed by the Majority of Japanese People (riben yixiaocuo ren wei zhanfan shubei zaodao guangda riben renmin fandui 日本一小撮人为战犯树碑，遭到广大日本人民强烈反对)’.\(^{119}\) The title characterised how the Chinese official discourse framed the Yasukuni Issue: the Japanese are discursively divided two opposing parts – the ‘people (renmin 人民)’, who are said to be ‘the majority’, and the ‘militarists (军国主义分子 junguo zhuyi fenzi)’, who are said to be ‘the minority’. The dichotomous narrative was regurgitated by news articles in People’s Daily, including an editorial published on 21 August 1983. In the editorial, the author said that ‘the political influence and activities of a few militarists who attempted to revive militarism have surpassed previous years’ and that ‘the fruit of Sino-Japanese relations is not to be ruined

\(^{117}\) See the video (5:37-6:00): [http://phtv.ifeng.com/program/xlsj/detail_2012_02/28/12837190_0.shtml?from=related]

\(^{118}\) The difference has never become more serious than it was in 1972; it has been there already; it just becomes more explicit as time goes on.

\(^{119}\) 16 August 1982, page 6, People’s Daily
by a few people who dream of reviving militarism’. In both instances, People’s Daily constructed the Yasukuni Issue as having been caused by a few ‘militarists’ acting against the will of the Japanese ‘people’.

After Nakasone’s official visit to the Yasukuni Shrine in 1985, the Chinese government asserted the Militarist/People Dichotomy as China’s official approach to the Yasukuni Issue with Japan. In an editorial, People’s Daily expressed China’s concern that official tribute to the Yasukuni Shrine paid by the Japanese cabinet members may overturn the Militarist/People Dichotomy as the norm defining how Japan’s war responsibility towards China had been interpreted bilaterally:

Forty years after the WWII, the Chinese government had consistently adopted a policy that separates the majority of Japanese people from the minority of Japanese militarists and cooperated with the Japanese people to prevent the tragedy from reoccurring… But regrettably, when the Japanese government decided to visit the Yasukuni Shrine officially, it said that “it will reflect deeply upon the pain and suffering that Japan had brought to the Asian nations”, yet also stated that “the goal of the visiting is to mourn the war dead who sacrifice their lives to protect the nation.” Such contradictory statements blur the aggressive nature of Japan’s war and hurt the feeling of the Chinese and other Asian people.

In another article relating to the Yasukuni Issue, the author emphasised the significance of the Militarist/People Dichotomy by framing China as an active agent who took the initiative in giving up the reparation:

About the issue of war reparation, Zhou Enlai pointed out that our starting point should be the people’s friendship between the two nations. In the past, the Chinese people suffered from the burden of having to pay reparation to foreign nations, now we should not let the Japanese people suffer from the realisation of Japan-China friendship. So after the other important issues were solved, we

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120 21 August 1983, page 6, People’s Daily

121 This discourse, needless to say, is an oversimplified rhetoric than a genuine representation of historical facts. Japan’s famous liberal film-maker Itami Mansaku, in his 1946 work The Question of War Responsibility (戦争責任者の問題 sensō sekininsha no mondai), wrote that numerous civilian organisations, including prefecture committees, neighbourhood groups, civil defense units, women’s groups, etc, voluntarily supported the mobilisation of Japan’s war with China and America. Whereas Japan’s Pacific War was mobilised by a highly authoritarian government dictated by the Army, but such mobilisation also required voluntary participation from the Japanese.

122 22 August 1985, People’s Daily
took the initiative to renounce the war reparation (the Chiang Kai-shek government renounced demand for war reparation first; such illegal act established a fait accompli that had considerable influence on the issue) (emphasis added).\textsuperscript{123}

From the Lacanian perspective, the Militarist/People Dichotomy was a master-signifier that the Chinese government used to justify the settlement of the war reparation issue between Japan and China. The master-signifier of the Militarist/People Dichotomy (S1) veiled the lack of war reparation paid by Japan, repressing a sense of incompleteness in the Chinese subjectivity vis-à-vis Japan (S1/$); the subjective incompleteness was manifested as officially expressed dissatisfaction over Japanese political leaders’ attempt to normalise Japan’s identity through restoring state-sponsorship for the Yasukuni Shrine, where 14 ‘Class A’ war criminals, who symbolise Japan’s victimizer identity, are enshrined.

The relationship between the master-signifier of the Militarist/People Dichotomy (S1) and the divided subject ($) can be seen in how the Chinese state-run media explained the Chinese government’s decision to renounce the war reparation from Japan in the 1972 normalisation process. For instance, in a \textit{People’s Daily} article published on 06 July 1987, the author (He Fang) wrote:

People still remember the catastrophe of the war. But the Chinese people always believe that those who were responsible for the war of aggression are a few militarists, rather than the Japanese people and politicians in the postwar era. Consequently, when the People’s Republic of China was founded, the Chinese government and people did not revenge; instead, they took the initiative to renounce war reparation and worked towards restoring the tradition of civil diplomacy to build up a bilateral friendship.\textsuperscript{124}

Such explanation consisted of two parts: 1) the Chinese government considered both the Chinese and the Japanese \textit{people} as victims of Japanese militarists; 2) due to such consideration and Chinese people’s generosity, the Chinese government took the initiative to renounce the demand for war reparation from Japan. In other words, the ‘Militarist/People Dichotomy’ validated China’s renouncement of war reparation from Japan. The corollary is that if the Japanese government denied the Militarist/People Dichotomy, the Chinese government’s reasoning for the renouncement of war reparation in 1972 could not stand. From the Chinese government’s

\textsuperscript{123} 27 October 1985, page 3, \textit{People's Daily}

\textsuperscript{124} 6 July 1987, page 6, \textit{People's Daily}
perspective, Japanese prime ministers’ tribute paid to the Yasukuni Shrine, where the victimizers (e.g., the 14 ‘Class A’ war criminals) are enshrined, constituted a denial of the ‘Militarist/People Dichotomy’, blurring the distinction between the victim and the victimizer.

The Chinese concern over Japan’s violation of the Militarist/People Dichotomy can be read in an article written by Hu Qiaomu, a permanent member of the Central Advisory Commission, and the former president of Xinhua News Agency. In a front-page article in People’s Daily on 8 July 1987, Hu wrote in commemoration of the 40th Anniversary of the Marco Polo Bridge Incident and commented on the Yasukuni Issue:

In recent years, there are so many issues in Japan-China relations. In 1982, there was the Textbook Issue; in 1985, Japanese prime minister and cabinet members paid tribute to the Yasukuni Shrine where war criminals are enshrined … How do we make of these issues? They show nothing else but that the Japanese authority has not taken action to seriously execute the principle set up by the Japan-China Joint Communiqué and the Treaty of Peace and Friendship between Japan and China.125

On the same day, People’s Daily published the speech delivered by Sun Pinghua (孫平化), Head of the Chinese Delegation of the Japan-China Friendship Association. Sun commented on the Yasukuni Issue in the similar vein:

In the Sino-Japanese normalisation process of 1972, the Japanese government has made it clear that Japan was responsible for the invasion of China. The Chinese government, for the sake of perpetual friendship between the Chinese and the Japanese people and of not increasing Japanese people’s financial burden, took the initiative to renounce demand for war reparation from Japan. In the following years, with a forward-looking attitude, we seldom mentioned that unfortunate history. But we have to seriously point out that there are a few people, including a few socially influential people, who do not want to acknowledge the aggressiveness of Japan’s invasion of China. They distort historical facts and prevents Japan-China relations from developing healthily. As we all know, the Textbook Issue and the issue of paying official tribute to the Yasukuni Shrine are derived from this.126

125 8 July 1987, page 1, People’s Daily
126 8 July 1987, page 4, People’s Daily
Statement of Hu and Sun showed that the Chinese government did not see the Yasukuni Issue as an isolated event but as essentially related to the bilateral norm, i.e., the Victim-victimizer Duality. Thus, for the Chinese, the Yasukuni Issue became an indicator of Japan’s commitment to the Victim-victimizer Duality.

The Chinese attitude can be seen from the Chinese foreign ministry’s reaction towards Nakasone’s cabinet members’ official tribute paid to the Yasukuni Shrine on 15 August 1987:

The essence of the Yasukuni Issue is about whether Japan can correctly treat the war of aggression committed by Japanese militarism. That some members of the Japanese government paid official tribute to the Yasukuni Shrine has de facto blurred the nature of the war, hurt emotions of the victims, and strengthened the influence of those who attempt to revive militarism.\(^\text{127}\)

Han Nianlong (韓念龍), former Vice President of Chinese Foreign Ministry, also emphasised that the Chinese government perceived the Yasukuni Shrine as an indicator of Japan’s commitment to the Symbolic of the bilateral relations established in the 1972 Setup rather than a singular event:

There are some issues in Sino-Japanese relations in recent years, such as the Textbook Issue, the Yasukuni Issue, and the Kôkaryo problem. These issues are not isolated, but related to whether or not Japan abides with the political principle structured by the Japan-China Joint Communique and Japan-China Friendship Treaty.\(^\text{128}\)

Since the 1990s, the narrative of ‘China took the initiative’ disappeared, showing that China’s collective identity as the victim vis-à-vis Japan became increasingly uncertain and fragmented. In the articles from 1990 to 2012, no article that described China as a proactive agent who took the initiative to renounce the reparation can be found. Rather, People’s Daily increasingly related the reparation issue to Japan’s lack of repentance over its past wrongdoings. For instance, before Koizumi’s much-anticipated visit to the Yasukuni Shrine, The People’s Daily published an article that framed on the 50th anniversary of the Hiroshima and Nagasaki Nuclear Bombing in terms of the Militarist/People Dichotomy:

\(^{127}\) 18 August 1987, page 4, People’s Daily
\(^{128}\) 23 October 1988, page 6, People’s Daily
The Japanese people are innocent. The militarists who led Japan to the road of invasion had committed crime to the people in Asian nations, and eventually, to the Japanese people. … Regrettably, in the postwar era, Japan had never held the militarists responsible for their crimes when it comes to the bombing of Nagasaki and Hiroshima. Furthermore, these militarists, after receiving capital punishment in the international tribunal, became enshrined as ‘God of the Nation’s Protectors’ in the Yasukuni Shrine. This not only humiliated history, but also humiliated the 200,000 souls of Hiroshima and Nagasaki.\footnote{07 August 1995, page 6, People’s Daily}

Gradually, the Chinese discourse on the Yasukuni Issue became more and more associated with the war reparation issue. For instance, two weeks after nine cabinet members paid tribute to the Yasukuni Shrine on 15 August 1995, People’s Daily published an article on 31 August 1995, highlighting that Japan had failed to pay sufficient war reparation to the victimised states in Asia:

Due to the very complex international context, Japan paid much less war reparation than Germany did. Due to the manipulation of the U.S., in 1951, most countries – except Burma, Philippine, Indonesia, and South Vietnam – had renounced war reparation from Japan in the San Francisco Treaty. In paying the relatively small amount of reparation, Japan did not show its sincerity and tried to hold down the reparation as much as possible… Recently, there are more and more Asian nations that demanded Japan to take its responsibility of paying reparation seriously, and in our country, there are individuals who demanded the Japanese government to pay reparation. This shows how bad the Japanese government had done in paying reparation to the victims.\footnote{31 August 1995, page 6, People’s Daily}

In the 2000s, when Sino-Japanese relations became severely troubled by the Yasukuni Issue, People’s Daily published a number of articles that associated the Yasukuni Issue with the reparation issue. From 2000 to 2012, there are altogether 12 articles relevant to Japan’s war reparation issue, and most of them were published from 2000 to 2005 when the Yasukuni Issue was the front-page topic in Sino-Japanese relations.\footnote{The keyword used for the searching is: Japan (\textit{riben} 日本) and reparation (\textit{peichang} 赔偿).} The result can be visualised in the chart as follows:

\footnote{130}
The data shows that the more Japanese cabinet members paid official tributes to the Yasukuni Shrine (starting from 2000), the more People’s Daily published articles relevant to the war reparation issue. This was the case because the Chinese government considered official tributes to the Yasukuni Shrine by Japanese cabinet members and prime ministers to be undermining the ‘Militarist/People Dichotomy’, i.e., the master-signifier that the Chinese government used to justify its renouncement of war reparation from Japan. For instance, one of the articles in People’s Daily was entitled ‘Japan should sincerely apologise and pay reparation – an interview with the Head of Korean History Association Su Jungha’. In it, the North Korean historian reportedly said:

Japan must reflect upon its history deeply, apologise sincerely and pay its reparation in full amount. Only by doing these can Japan be a true member of the international community. 132

This argument was more clearly pronounced by an article written by the Vice President of the School of Japanese Studies of Chinese Academy of Social Science, Jin Xide (金熙德), who criticised some Japanese scholars of denouncing the bilateral norm established in 1972 as outdated for the current development of Sino-Japanese relations:

In recent years, some scholars cannot adjust to the speed of China’s development. Rather than remaining calm and objective, their position becomes gradually indistinguishable from the rightists. One of the significant arguments that they put forth is so-called “1972-Setup-outdated-theory”. This critical flaw of this argument is that it totally disregards the basic fact that China had offered enormous forgiveness to Japan in the Sino-Japanese normalisation process, and tried to force China to make a concession with the increasing popularity of the Right in Japan. … The hidden message of

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132 15 August 2005, page 3, People's Daily; it has to be noted that Japan has not paid reparation to North Korea yet, as the two countries have not signed any peace treaty.
the ‘out-dated-theory’ is that only Japan is allowed to undermine the political foundation of Sino-Japanese relations, and China is not allowed to react. When Koizumi paid tribute to the Yasukuni Shrine, China should not say anything; when the rightist textbooks are published, China should remain silent; when Japan touched upon the Taiwan issue, China should be tolerant. Even if China exercised some restrained reactions, China is said to be ‘stubbornly stuck with the 1972-Setup’ (emphasis added).

Here, the ‘tremendous forgiveness (jida de kuanshu 極大的寬恕)’ referred to China’s renouncement of war reparations from Japan. In other words, the Chinese government considered Japanese prime ministers’ tributes paid to the Yasukuni Shrine as what breached the Victim-victimizer Duality, and China’s reaction over the Yasukuni Issue was to remind Japan of its commitment to the Victim-victimizer Duality. From the Lacanian perspective, the Chinese government enacted the master’s discourse, in which the master-signifier was instituted to repress the fragmentation of the subject’s identity, i.e., the unresolved issue of war reparation between Japan and China in 1972. I will recapitulate how the master-signifier was deployed in the ‘Discussion’ section.

Theme II: The Japanese political circle displayed discontent with the Victim-victimizer Duality.

The Yasukuni Issue in the Japanese discourse was characterised by a collective discontent over the Victim-victimizer Duality, the Symbolic that structured Japan’s subject position (identity) as a victimizer vis-à-vis China. The agent in the Japanese discourse was most notably marked by the divided subject ($) driven by dissatisfaction ($/a) to challenge the dominant master-signifier ($→S1), the Militarist/People Dichotomy instituted by the Chinese government.

The Japanese political circle was discontent with the master-signifier of the Militarist/People Dichotomy. The discontent can be found in the speech by Itagaki Tadashi (板垣正), a far-right LDP politician, an advisor of Izokukai, and a representative of Nippon Kaigi. In fact, Itagaki was one of the most vocal politicians who openly expressed Japanese dissatisfaction over the 1972 Setup. In a conference of ‘Research Commission about International Affairs (kokusai mondai ni kan suru chōsaikai 国際問題に関する調査会)’ held in the House of Councillors on 25 February 2000, he described Sino-Japanese relations as ‘unhealthy’ due to the issue of Victim-victim Duality:

133 17 March 2006, page 10, People's Daily
China attacked Japan blatantly, criticising that our prime minister’s tribute to the shrine is a glorification of war and that we have not reflected on our past conduct enough. With regards to this criticism, we neatly restrained ourselves and tried our best to accommodate China’s need. We said to them: ‘We have fully reflected on our past conduct’, ‘Our nation invaded you in the past’, ‘We are very sorry’. But truly healthy bilateral relations cannot be built on this kind of dialogue (House of Councillors, 2000a p. 8).

The discontent was also pronounced by Okabe Tatsumi (岡部達味), a China scholar of Tokyo University. In the research commission. Okabe showed (partial) agreement with Itagaki’s discontent. He argued that the current Sino-Japanese relations were not functioning on an equal basis, because China approached the Sino-Japanese relations with dichotomous thinking (or so-called ‘black-and-white logic [zendama akudama ron 善玉悪玉論]’), according to which Japan had to take total blame for issues of the ‘history problem’:

‘As an unseasoned player in international relations, China is stuck with the “black-and-white thinking”. Though I do think that Japan wronged China in the past, it is obviously wrongheaded to consider all issues in terms of ‘black-and-white’ logic. But that’s exactly what China does. Whenever there’s a conflict, the Chinese side always demands the Japanese side to take all responsibilities. We do have a lot of politicians who feel guilty and apologised about the war. But this has been taken for granted by the Chinese’ (House of Councillors, 2000a p. 9).

As the Head of the China-Japan Friendship Committee for the 21st Century of the Japanese Side from 1997, Okabe revealed that the issue of Victim-victimizer Duality and its detrimental effect on Sino-Japanese relations had already been discussed among diplomats and scholars from both sides:134

I had been invited to the China-Japan Friendship Committee for the 21st Century as an expert committee member for two terms. In the committee, we had a debate over this issue. In the past, I said that I couldn’t describe the current Sino-Japanese relations as healthy and Sino-Japanese relations

134 Established by the Japanese and Chinese government in 1984, the China-Japan Friendship Committee for the 21st Century is an intergovernmental organisation dedicated to Sino-Japanese diplomacy. It now has been renamed as New Japan-China Friendship Committee for the 21st Century. See: https://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/china/committee0507-2.html
should be equal. Now my opinion has changed: if the bilateral paradigm does not change, the situation will be very bad and very troublesome. Generation changes. The new generation of Japan, especially those born in the postwar period, do not bear war responsibility. I said to the Chinese: do you not advocate transnational solidarity? If transnational solidarity goes towards your direction, it would be good; but if not, it would be troublesome (House of Councillors, 2000a p. 9).

To emphasise China’s inappropriately moralistic approach to the Sino-Japanese relations, Obake made reference to *Mito Kōmon* (水戸黄門), a Japanese period drama (*jidaigeki* 時代劇)\(^{135}\) that was on prime time television from 1969 to 2001:

All in all, though there are many other issues, at least, truly healthy Sino-Japanese relations should be one that functions on an equal basis. I am not trying to mock *Mito Kōmon*, but a relationship in which one side self-righteously present their *inrō* [a small, traditional Japanese case that shows one’s authority as a feudal lord] while the other side lower their heads to apologise is not desirable (House of Councillors, 2000a p. 9).

In *Mito Kōmon*, each episode typically ended with a brawl in which the disguised protagonists defeat a crowd of samurai and gangsters, culminating with the presentation of the *inrō*, a Japanese case that reveals the hero’s identity – the historic Tokugawa Mitsukuni, former vice-shōgun and retired second daimyō of the Mito Domain. Over time, the comical scene – in which the heroes presented the *inrō* to show authority and demanded obedience – became a satiric cultural reference for describing someone who exhibited moral authority awkwardly, e.g., expecting others to bow down and apologise. In other words, the phrase ‘someone presents his/her *inrō* (*inrō wo dasu* 印籠を出す)’ was used to ridicule self-righteous people who demanded obedience from others (see pictures below).\(^{136}\)

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\(^{135}\) *Jidaigeki* a genre of drama that is often set during the Edo period of Japanese history, from 1603 to 1868.

\(^{136}\) For a more concrete demonstration of the scenario, please see the following video: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qH60VSTrwx

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A scene in which heroes showed *inro* and protagonists bowled their heads obediently.

Okabe’s reference to *Mito Komon* is noteworthy in that it metaphorically highlighted how the Japanese found China’s demand for repentance from Japan self-righteous and out-dated. It also highlighted the Japanese discontent over the Victim-victimizer Duality, which the speaker did not find acceptable for the long-term development of Sino-Japanese relations. In Lacanian terms, the speaker spoke from a position of a divided, dissatisfied subject ($$, challenging the master-signifier ($\rightarrow$S1). Thus, we may understand such discourse as the hysteric’s discourse, to which I will recapitulate in the ‘Discussion’ section of this chapter.

The idea that the bilateral relations did not function on an equal basis was echoed by Nakae Yōsuke (中江要介), a former Japanese ambassador to China from 1984 o 1987. As he argued in a ‘Research Commission about International Affairs’ on 12 April 2000, the internationalisation of the Yasukuni Issue was essentially associated with the way that the reparation issue was dealt with in 1972. His statement is worth quoting at length:

The reason why Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai, and the other CCP leaders gave up demand for war reparation from Japan is that war responsibilities had been attributed to a few militarists rather than the Japanese people. This enabled them to normalise diplomatic relations with Japan. As you remember, Prime Minister Tanaka thought that the normalisation would not take place if China demanded huge reparation amounted to some hundred million dollars. The precondition for the normalisation was China’s renouncement for the reparation. [Omitted] And here the Tokyo Trial and Article 11 of the San Francisco Treaty are linked to the Yasukuni Issue: according to the Article 11 of the San Francisco Treaty, Japan accepted the judgments of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East and of other Allied War Crimes Courts both within and outside Japan and agreed to carry out the sentences imposed thereby upon Japanese nationals imprisoned in Japan. [Omitted] So here you have the ‘Class A’, ‘Class B’, and
'Class C’ war criminals. If Japan does not pursue those war criminals’ responsibilities, then Japan’s position is not consistent with Zhou Enlai’s theory that the China’s renouncement of reparation liberated the Japanese people. There isn’t any problem in visiting the shrine in an individual capacity. However, visiting the shrine in an official capacity as a prime minister or cabinet member, for China, can be associated with the problem of whether or not Japan is trying to restore the reputation of the war criminals. On 15th August 1985, China and South Korea protested Prime Minister Nakasone’s official tribute to the Yasukuni Shrine. I was then working in Beijing and had a lot of negotiation with President Hu Yaobang. This has never been made public until now, and today is the first that I said this (House of Councillors, 2000b p. 3).

Here, Nakasone clarified that the Chinese protest against Nakasone’s tribute to the Yasukuni Shrine in 1985 was derived from the Chinese government’s concern about the Victim-victimizer Duality, i.e., the justification for renouncing war reparation from Japan in the 1972 normalisation. Thus, the Chinese government’s protest against Japanese prime ministers’ visit to the Yasukuni Shrine created a political dilemma that constrained the pro-Yasukuni Japanese politicians: for them, restoring state-sponsorship for the Yasukuni Shrine is necessary for normalising Japan; but it also means to denounce the Victim-victimizer Duality, hence the bilateral norm of Sino-Japanese relations.

The Chinese protest made the Japanese identity fragmented, setting in motion the hysteric’s discourse that challenged the master-signifier of Militarist/People Dichotomy ($\rightarrow S1$). One of the politicians who openly questioned the Militarist/People Dichotomy was Yamatani Eriko (山谷えり子), an LDP member affiliated with Nippon Kaigi. In a conference of ‘Committee of Foreign Affairs and Defence’ on 28 April 2006, she said:

I was there when the Chinese ambassador Wang Yi (王毅) attended LDP’s Commission of Foreign Affairs. [Omitted] At that time, Wang Yi said that all the Japanese people were victims, and the victimizers were a few militarists. But looking back on the history and reflecting upon the war, I am afraid that we the Japanese cannot agree with such a simplistic division. I feel that we have to talk about this issue at a deeper level (House of Councillors, 2006b, p.2).

The Japanese discontent with the Militarist/People Dichotomy was also articulated in Koizumi’s statements. In order to neutralise the detrimental effect that his tribute to the Yasukuni Shrine had on Sino-Japanese relations, Koizumi attempted to alter how the Yasukuni Issue was framed in Sino-Japanese relations during his term by de-emphasising the political significance of the Yasukuni Issue to Sino-Japanese relations. First, he stressed that his tribute to the shrine
was meant for ‘mourning and peace’. On 21 April 2001, Koizumi issued a statement to justify his visiting as an act of mourning when he paid a visit to the Yasukuni Shrine for the second time:

The purpose of my visit was to sincerely mourn those who lost their lives for the nation and family since the Meiji Restoration. I believe that the present peace and prosperity of Japan are founded on the priceless sacrifices made by those who lost their lives in wars. It is important that throughout the days to come we firmly adhere to the resolution to embrace peace and renounce war to ensure that we never resort to tragic war.\(^{137}\)

Koizumi’s emphasis on mourning enabled him to regularise his tribute to the Yasukuni Shrine, even when Sino-Japanese relations was at stake. When asked about what he thought about the impact of the Yasukuni Issue on Japan’s relations with China in a conference of ‘Budget Committee’, he argued:

The Yasukuni Issue may be a problem in Sino-Japanese relations. But I visited the Yasukuni Shrine to mourn the war dead with the hope that war will not happen again. I don’t think the Chinese side will reject my proposal for the state visit just because of this one problem, for there are many wider aspects of Sino-Japanese relations. How to mourn our country’s war dead should be our own business (House of Councillors, 2004a, p.17).

Koizumi’s speech corresponded to the hysteric’s discourse in that the agent’s challenge against the master-signifier created new knowledge in Japan’s China policy ($ \rightarrow a/S2$). On more than one occasion, he emphasised that the bilateral relations should not be pre-occupied with the Yasukuni Issue and should be structured in what he called a ‘future-oriented (mirai shikō 未来志向)’ model. The first time he used the word ‘future-orientation’, in a context related to the Yasukuni Issue with China, was in a conference of ‘Budget Commission’ on 9 October 2001. When asked about how he was to deal with the Chinese government’s criticism over his tribute to the Yasukuni Shrine, he said:

It is said that China is afraid that visiting the shrine means the revival of Japan’s militarism. But from my perspective, I paid tribute to the Yasukuni Shrine because I respect the value of peace. I

\(^{137}\) The statement is entitled ‘Observation by Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi on the Visit to Yasukuni Shrine’. See: https://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/pm/koizumi/observe0204.html
was there to express my grief for the war dead and our promise to never fight a war again. Based on a historical reflection on the past, I want to contribute to a future-oriented Sino-Japanese friendship (House of Councillors, 2001, p.3; emphasis added).

In a plenary session on 30 October 2001, Koizumi stated again that he was to develop with China a ‘future-oriented cooperative relations based on reflection upon the past (kago no hansei no ue ni mirai shikō no kyōryoku kankei 過去の反省の上に未来志向の協力関係)’ (House of Councillors, 2001b, p.9). Since then, ‘future-orientation (mirai shikō 未来志向)’ had become a catch-phrase among the LDP politicians (including Prime Minister Koizumi himself) when the Yasukuni Issue with China was discussed in Diet conferences. From 30 October 2001 to 3 October 2006, there were 28 conferences where speakers used the word ‘future-orientation’ in a context related to the Yasukuni Issue or Sino-Japanese relations. The conference, time, and the speaker who used the phrase are listed as follows:

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<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Name of the Conference</th>
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<td>04/02/2003</td>
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<tr>
<td>22/01/2004</td>
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<td>23/03/2004</td>
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<tr>
<td>29/03/2004</td>
<td>Committee on Audit and Oversight of Administra</td>
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138 Another statement that exemplifies the discourse of ‘future-oriented’ Sino-Japanese relations can be found on 26 November 2006, when Koizumi stated in a Diet conference that: ‘I believe now the friendship development of Japan-China relations is running smoothly. I met President Hu Jingtao in APEC. We reached the agreement that both countries will place more importance on Japan-China relations with a future-oriented approach. Our relations will not only continue to be friendly but also share a great number of areas in which the two countries can cooperate. I believe that the Yasukuni Issue is not so important in Sino-Japanese relations. Looking at the big picture of Japan-China relations, the Yasukuni Shrine is but one issue, which won’t dictate the Japan-China relations as a whole. [Omitted] I told President Hu Jingtao that I visited the Yasukuni Shrine with the feeling that the war should not be repeated ever again’ (House of Councillors, 2006a, pp.8–9).
A noteworthy fact is that the word ‘future-orientation (mirai shikō 未来志向)’ stopped appearing after October 2006. This implies that the word was coined by the Koizumi administration to craft the bilateral norm. Koizumi’s strategy was to give China recognition of the 1972 Setup by acknowledging Japan’s wrongdoing in the past, while simultaneously kept paying official tributes to the Yasukuni Shrine regularly. But Koizumi’s strategy failed to alter the bilateral norm due to its one-sidedness: whereas such settlement may satisfy the Japanese political circle internally, the Chinese government had no reason to recognise Koizumi’s proposal as a new norm of Sino-Japanese relations. Thus, the Victim-victimizer Duality remained the Symbolic that structured Japan and China’s subject positions (identities).

Theme III: The Yasukuni Issue became an othering process for both sides.

Similar to the Textbook Issue, social agents on both sides consolidated the imaginary wholeness of their respective identity by externalising aggressiveness onto the other. In this process,
the Chinese ‘othered’ the Japanese as unrepentant, whilst the Japanese ‘othered’ the Chinese as unspiritual.

**China othered Japan as unrepentant**

After Koizumi paid homage to the Yasukuni Shrine on 15 August 2001, *People’s Daily* published a great number of articles relating to Japan’s identity as an ‘unrepentant’ nation. I term this type of article as the discourse of the ‘Unrepentant Japanese’. The discourse focused primarily on Japan’s unrepentant attitude towards its wartime conduct, accused Japan’s lack of Asian identity, and unfavourably compared Japan’s unrepentance with the supposedly repentant Germans. The discourse of the ‘Unrepentant Japanese’ made its initial appearance in *People’s Daily* on 16 August 2001, one day after Koizumi’s visit to the Yasukuni Shrine. In an article entitled ‘Why Japan does not Reflect on History Seriously?’ the author (*Pang Zhongying* 龐中英) wrote:

‘Because of the politicians’ homage to the Yasukuni Shrine, Japan’s relations with China and South Korea have been worsened significantly. Why does it still continue to do so? I think the crux of the problem is Japan’s lack of identification with Asia. Japan lacks an Asian identity, and we seldom hear Japanese politicians describe Japan as an Asian country’.\(^{139}\)

Similar to China’s discourse of the Textbook Issue, China’s discourse of the Yasukuni Shrine deployed the discourse of cultural essentialism that attributed Japan’s unrepentance to Japan’s ‘national character’. For instance, in an article entitled ‘A Look at Japan’s “National Consciousness” from Koizumi’s Visit to Yasukuni Shrine’, the author argued that Japan had a ‘national consciousness’ that championed power and neglected morality: ‘Japan believed that it was not defeated by Asian countries, so it does not have to apologise to them. Being submissive to the U.S. is because the U.S. is superior in power. But Japan is not willing to be apologetic towards the weaker Asian nations’.\(^{140}\) Similarly, a great number of Chinese articles made reference to Japan’s geography in elaborating on Japan’s ‘national character’, stressing Japan’s lack of Asian identity. In an article published on 24 April 2001, the author wrote:

The Japanese Archipelago is like a few ships connecting with one another. Viewing from the archipelago, the Asian continent is an amazing landmass. Because of historical and geographical reasons,

\(^{139}\) 16 August 2001, page 3, *People's Daily*

\(^{140}\) 21 August 2001, page 6, *People's Daily*
the Japanese nation is inherent with a crisis awareness and a sense of isolation. With little interaction with other nations, Japan was the beneficiary of its neighbours but never quite knew how to make friends with them. In the mid-19th century, faced with colonialism from the West, Japan revolutionised itself with Meiji Restoration and advocated ‘Exiting from Asia and Entering into Europe’. [Omitted] Though Japan has changed significantly in the postwar era, Japan still lacks a self-awareness as ‘a member of Asia’. Japan is still self-centred and lacks the courage to reconcile with its neighbours.141

The stereotypical Chinese imagination of the Japanese was made apparent: Japan was depicted as a small island nation, as opposed to China, a big continental nation; and due to Japan’s island environment and isolation from the outside world, the Japanese people were also said to be ‘small’ psychologically: they were unwilling to interact with the outside world, their unrepentant behaviour in the ‘history problem’ with China and Korea reflected their mindset. By constructing the ‘otherness’ of Japan as ‘small’ in both size and psychology, the discourse constructed an imaginary Chinese identity that was thought of as comparatively ‘big’ in both size and psychology.

Another genre in the discourse compared Japan’s attitude regarding war responsibility unfavourably with Germany. In an article entitled ‘Face History, Earn Respect’, Germany was described metaphorically as Japan’s ‘mirror’, a role model of how to be repentant. The contrast was made most obvious in an article entitled ‘Facing up to History and Shirking Responsibility (直面歷史與推卸罪責 zhimian lishi yu tuixie zuize)’. The title implied a comparison between the German government that ‘faced up to history’ and the Japanese government that ‘shirked responsibility’. In it, the author wrote:

After the WWII, the international society began to pursue war responsibility of Germany and Japan. Half a century has passed, they demonstrated a completely different attitude. Germany has been forgiven, but Japan is shirking responsibility without any sense of regret. [Omitted] As early as 1970, Prime Minister Brant of Federal Republic of Germany knelt down at the monument to victims of the Warsaw Ghetto Uprising. The story moves people’s heart even now. By contrast, Japan tried to avoid the history of aggressiveness as much as possible. They called “invasion” as “advance-ment”, “Day of Surrender” as “Day of the End of Pacific War”, etc. Japanese Prime Minister dis-

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141 24 August 2001, page 7, People's Daily
regards the victimised people of Asian countries and insists on paying an annual visit to the Yasukuni Shrine where war criminals were enshrined. How can Japan receive its Asian neighbours’ forgiveness in such a situation?\textsuperscript{142}

Similar articles, with titles such as ‘Sincerely Reflection and Hiding in Every Possible Way (真誠反省與百般掩飾 zhencheng fanxing yu baiban yanshi)’, \textsuperscript{143} ‘Very Strong Contrast (強烈的反差 qianglie de fancha)’, \textsuperscript{144} ‘Why Japan Doesn’t Feel Guilty (日本為什麼自感無罪 riben weishenme zigan wuzui)’\textsuperscript{145}, ‘Ridiculous Exculpation (荒唐的辯解 huangtang de bianjie)’, reproduced the same comparative discourse, accusing Japan of not being ‘German’ enough, i.e., being unrepentant of its war responsibility.

\textit{Japan othered China as unspiritual}

The Japanese discourse of the Yasukuni Issue during the Koizumi era (2001-2006) was characterised by a ‘Self vs Other’ discourse that ‘othered’ China as ‘communist’, ‘unspiritual’ and lack of respect for religions. More specifically, the discourse of the ‘Unspiritual Chinese’ enabled the Japanese politicians to 1) deflect China’s criticism of the Yasukuni Issue; 2) to fantasise Japan’s positive self-image as ‘religious’ and ‘spiritual’; and 3) to conceal the social antagonism (i.e., the domestic conflicts derived from the Yasukuni Issue, namely, the issue of constitutionality and religious freedom). To begin with, we should examine how the Yasukuni Issue was framed as a ‘Self vs Other’ discourse when it was politicised in the early 2000s.

The ‘Self vs Other’ polarisation was most clearly articulated by the conservative ideologue Okuno Seisuke. In a parliamentary discussion in the House of Representatives on 14 June 2001, Okuno was invited to talk about Japan’s constitution in the free discussion session. In the session, Okuno touched upon the Yasukuni Issue. But rather than relating the Yasukuni Problem to the issue of constitutionality, Okuno made the case that the Yasukuni Problem was caused by Japan and China’s distinctive views of life and death (shiseikan 死生観):

The Chinese communists may think that they are criminals, but the Japanese don’t think so. In Japanese Buddhism and Shintoism, anyone who dies becomes kami and Buddha. We don’t ask what they did during their lifetime. Even if they are criminals, we perform religious rituals to calm

\textsuperscript{142} 13 August 2004, page 15, \textit{People’s Daily}
\textsuperscript{143} 27 January 2005, page 3, \textit{People’s Daily}
\textsuperscript{144} 17 May 2005, page 3, \textit{People’s Daily}
\textsuperscript{145} 18 May 2005, page 3, \textit{People’s Daily}
their souls. So we have different perspectives on religion. I previously talked about national character. I hope the cabinet understand my point about national character (House of Representatives, 2001 p. 13).

Based on a stereotypical image of the ‘communist state’, China was imagined as ‘unspiritual’ and ‘atheist’. Such stereotypical image authenticated Japan’s identity as ‘spiritual’ and ‘religious’. Okuno’s discourse became widely accepted in the Japanese political circle. For instance, Secretary of the State, Machimura Nobukata (町村信孝) deployed Okuno’s argument in replying a question regarding Japan’s Yasukuni Issue with China:

China and Japan are very different in terms of their views of life and death. Of course, I am not saying that all the Japanese and the Chinese hold the same view. But I do believe that there is a very clear difference. In Japan, more often than not, we believe that whatever people do during their lifetime, they become kami and Buddha after their death. But in China and Korea, this is not the case. They believe that a person who commits a crime in the land of life will have to be punished also in the land of death (House of Representatives, 2004, p.8).

In a ‘Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defence’ conference, Miura Issui (三浦一水), an LDP member of the parliament also attributed the phenomenon of ‘hot economy, cold politics’ of Sino-Japanese relations to the very different views of life and death held by the Chinese and the Japanese:

The Yasukuni Issue with China is really giving us headaches. Fundamentally speaking, I think that the Japanese and the Chinese have very different ways of thinking. From my understanding, at least, the Japanese don’t have the tradition of ‘beating up the dead’. But for the Chinese, one cannot escape stigmatisation even if he is dead. I don’t have positive evidence to prove this, so I hope people of the foreign ministry who are familiar with this topic can explain a bit more on this matter (House of Councillors, 2004b, p.3).

Nishimiya Shinichi (西宮伸一), Japan’s Ambassador to China, reinforced Miura’s hypothesis by making reference to a story in Records of Grand Historian (史记 shiji, a fundamental text of the Chinese civilisation and historiography) to strengthen the argument that the Chinese have the tradition of humiliating the dead:
I don’t have a specific example, but according to Records of Grand Historian, there is a relevant story in 450BC: there was a person called Wu Zixu, whose father was killed the King Ping of the State of Chu. So Wu Zixu fled to the State of Wu and campaigned against King Ping. After defeating the State of Chu, Wu Zixu exhumed King Ping’s corpse and gave it lashes to exact vengeance (ibid.).

The discourse that constructed the Chinese as different from the Japanese in terms of spirituality and religious traditions continued to appear under the Noda administration in 2011. At that time, there were proposals that the Yasukuni Issue could be solved by separating the ‘Class A’ war criminals from the Yasukuni Shrine, a proposal to which China and Korea showed agreement. Concerning this proposal, the LDP politician Furukawa Yoshihisa questioned Prime Minister Noda on 14 September 2001:

There is the so-called “Separated Enshrinement” supported by the Chinese and the Koreans. However, our country’s view of life and death is completely different from theirs. In Japan, whoever dies becomes kami and Buddha. So consoling their spirits is our genuine attitude of religion and view of life and death. Japan should abide by the Japanese view of life and death to console the spirits of those who died for the country and exclude any interference of domestic affairs. Prime Minister, what do you think about this? Moreover, the so-called ‘Class A war criminal’ is really a label created by the Tokyo Trial. Prime Minister, you often use the word ‘Japanese pride’. Such pride comes from our country’s history and tradition. I hope to listen to your opinion about this. (House of Representatives, 2011, p.11)’

Here, we could see that the discourse of the Yasukuni Problem was constructed by the LDP conservatives as a ‘clash of values’ between Japan and the foreign nations, i.e., China and Korea. The discursive construction of the Yasukuni Shrine in the 2000s was very different from what it was before: in the 1970s and the 1980s, the Yasukuni Issue revolved mostly around the violation of constitution by politicians’ visits to the Yasukuni Shrine; however, in the 2000s, discussions about the constitutional violation were overshadowed by the ‘Japan vs China’ discourse. The change of the discourse can also be demonstrated in the following table:
As demonstrated above, Yasukuni-related documents that mentioned ‘violation of the constitution 违憲’ increased from 2 to 73 from 1975 to 1984. At that time, the Japanese public debated the issue regarding whether the Diet members’ visit to the Yasukuni Shrine was constitutional or not. However, from 1985 onwards, the issue of constitutionality became less and less discussed in the Diet. Given that the Yasukuni Issue had been internationalised since 1985, it could be inferred that the Yasukuni Problem became more of an international issue about Japan’s identity than a domestic issue about constitutionality. Therefore, China had replaced constitutionality, becoming considered the major obstacle for normalising the Yasukuni Shrine as a national ritual. The change of the discourse consolidated Japan’s national identity by enacting a fantasy wherein the object-cause of desire (the state-support for the Yasukuni Shrine) was narrated as stolen by the theft of enjoyment (the unspiritual Chinese). Throughout, an imaginary sense of wholeness in Japan’s identity was constructed by projecting the subject’s aggressiveness, deriving from the subject’s structural dividedness and antagonism, onto an external other.

**Discussion**

Previously, I have examined the key themes and categories of the Yasukuni Issue in both the Chinese and the Japanese discourses. Similar to the Textbook Issue, the Yasukuni Issue was a
discursive process by which the Chinese and the Japanese government confronted the Real, i.e., the potential breakdown of the Victim-victimizer Duality that structured the two sides’ subject positions (identities). In this process, the two sides deployed different discursive strategies: the Chinese enacted the master’s discourse that instituted the master-signifier of the Militarist/People Dichotomy; the Japanese government and political circle enacted the hysteric’s discourse that challenged the master-signifier. I will recapitulate how the process in the following subsection.

The master’s discourse enacted by the Chinese government

In the Chinese discourse, the fantasy at work was the master’s discourse with the master-signifier of the Militarist/People Dichotomy. The discourse was driven by a subjective sense of dividedness and incompleteness derived from the settlement of the reparation issue in 1972 (S1/$). I will explain the process as follows:

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\begin{align*}
S1 & \rightarrow S2 \\
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1) The Chinese discourse on the Yasukuni Issue corresponded to this process of the master’s discourse in that the Chinese government consistently grounded its criticism against Japanese prime ministers’ tributes to the Yasukuni Shrine on the master-signifier of the Militarist/People Dichotomy (S1 → S2). The message that the Chinese government sent to the Japanese government was: since the Victim-victimizer Duality depends on having war responsibilities attributed to the war criminals, worshipping the war criminals violates the bilateral norm. With the Militarist/People Dichotomy, the Chinese government made a clear-cut value judgement, instituting the identity of victim and victimizer. It also implied that the master-signifier was taken for granted and it is unintelligible to question its validity and naturalness.

2) The master-signifier repressed the subject’s uncertainty over its subject position (identity) in the Symbolic (S1/$). This discursive process was manifested as China’s dissatisfaction over the war reparation issue. In the diplomatic normalisation with Japan in
1972, the Chinese government justified the renouncement of war reparation from Japan with the master-signifier of the Militarist/People Dichotomy, to which the Japanese government did not give explicit recognition. The lack of recognition from Japan signified the lack of certainty in the Chinese subject, motivating the Chinese government to assert authority to reassure the Victim-victimizer Duality as the bilateral norm.

3) The master-signifier addresses the other to formulate a coherent discourse, generating anxieties in the addressee (S1→S2/a). Criticising Japanese prime ministers’ tributes paid to the Yasukuni Shrine, the Chinese government demanded the Japanese government to adopt a ‘correct historical understanding’ by stopping visiting the shrine. Such a demand created anxieties in the Japanese political circle: the politicians could not openly refute the Chinese demand due to the political and ethical concern, nor could they simply accept China’s demand, as doing so might violate Japan’s political autonomy. The anxieties further fuelled the reproduction of the ‘history problem’ discourse at the Japanese end.

The hysteric’s discourse enacted by the Japanese political circle

The Japanese discourse on the Yasukuni Issue can be recognised as the hysteric’s discourse. In the hysteric’s discourse, the agent spoke from a position of a discontent subject who challenged the dominant master-signifier, i.e., the Militarist/People Dichotomy that the Chinese government imposed on Japan.

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\begin{align*}
S & \rightarrow S1 \\
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a \quad \| \quad S2
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1) Discontent with China’s criticism at the Yasukuni Issue, the Japanese politicians argued that the war criminals should not be so simplistically defined as the victim and the Japanese people the victimizer. For them, separating the militarists from the whole of the Japanese people was problematic for several reasons: first, the Tokyo Trial was not
considered a fair trial; second, the Emperor’s war responsibility could be put in spotlight if Japan recognised the Militarist/People Dichotomy; third, the Militarist/People Dichotomy was seen by them as a black-and-white thinking that stigmatised Japan’s wartime past and fragmented Japan’s national identity. Thus, the pro-Yasukuni Shrine politicians challenged the master-signifier articulated by the Chinese, i.e., the Militarist/People Dichotomy ($ \rightarrow S1$).

2) The questioning subject was motivated by anxieties, an underrepresented resentment, an overwhelming unease ($/a$). In the Japanese discourse on the Yasukuni Issue, the politicians who challenged the Militarist/People Dichotomy articulated a collective desire to make Japan a ‘normal country’ and a dissatisfaction over Japan’s identity as China’s victimizer. Lamenting the loss of Japan’s traditional value and national identity in the postwar era, the Japanese conservatives regarded the revival of the Yasukuni Shrine as a way to normalise Japan’s national identity. But the subtle unease was underrepresented, because Japan accepted the judgement of the Tokyo Trial in the form of treaty and allied with the U.S. As one only desires what is lacking, the desire for Japan’s becoming a ‘normal’ country became increasingly stronger among the conservatives, when China criticised Japanese prime ministers’ visits to the Yasukuni Shrine in 1985 and in the 2000s.

3) The effect of the hysteric’s discourse was the generation of new knowledge and technical solution to the agent’s unease, i.e., Koizumi’s new terms for his China policy, ‘future-orientation (mirai shikō 未来志向)’. With this new idea of Japan’s China-policy, Koizumi attempted to transform the Symbolic that structured the Sino-Japanese relations and Japan’s victimizer identity produced therein. Another product of the hysteric’s discourse was the establishment of the Japan-China Joint History Research Project in 2007 (to which I will turn to discuss in more in detail in the next chapter). The project was initiated by the Japanese government when the relationship between Japan and China was at its lowest due to the divergence over the ‘history problem’. Scholars were gathered to work out solutions for the divided subject ($\rightarrow S1/S2$). This new type of knowledge generated by the hysteric’s discourse enabled the hysteric subject to assess knowledge about itself that it did not know – the joint research revealed political divergence and unconscious desire on both sides (S2). The knowledge about the subject
(S2) might lead to the emergence of the analyst discourse, the only discourse that has the potential to change of the Symbolic.

**Summary**

In this chapter, I have argued that the Yasukuni Issue has been a discursive process by which social agents in Japan and China enacted different fantasies (psychoanalytic discourses) to confront the breaching of the Victim-victimizer Duality that structured their respective subject positions. The Chinese government enacted the master’s discourse to cover up the fragmentation of its victim identity with the master-signifier of the Militarist/People Dichotomy, whereas social agents in the Japanese discourse enacted the hysteric’s discourse that challenged the master-signifier of the Militarist/People Dichotomy. The hysteric’s discourse geminated the idea of ‘future-oriented Sino-Japanese relations’ and the Japan-China Joint Research Project as possible solutions to the underrepresented unease of the Japanese. However, a change of the Symbolic that structured the subject positions for Japan and China did not occur, because no new master-signifier has been instituted. As Lacan argues, it is only with the analyst’s discourse – the discourse in which the subject presents themselves as the object-cause of desire (a) for the other – that social relations can be restructured with a new master-signifier.
Chapter 7: The Nanking Massacre Debate – the Problematic of the Tokyo Trial

Introduction

In this chapter, I will argue that the Nanking Massacre Debate emerged and persisted as a discursive process by which social agents in China and Japan, by enacting different fantasies, negotiated the Victim-victimizer Duality, the Symbolic that structured their subject positions relationally: the Chinese government enacted the master’s discourse with the master-signifier of the Tokyo Trial; some Japanese politicians in the parliament enacted the hysteric’s discourse to challenge the master-signifier of the Tokyo Trial; the Japanese government enacted the university’s discourse to repress the master-signifier instituted by the Chinese government.

Findings

Three themes are exacted from the data: 1) the Chinese government responded to the denial of the Nanking Massacre by articulating the master-signifier of the Tokyo Trial; 2) the Japanese political circle resisted the master-signifier of the Tokyo Trial with the hysteric’s discourse and the university’s discourse; 3) the two sides reached an impasse in the Japan-China Joint History Research Project.

Theme I: The Chinese government responded to the denial of the Nanking Massacre by articulating the master-signifier of the Tokyo Trial

The Nanking Massacre and the death toll of the event symbolised China’s identity as Japan’s victim, and the denial of the Nanking Massacre created uncertainty about China’s victim identity. To repress the uncertainty, the Chinese government enacted the master’s discourse with the master-signifier of the Tokyo Trial. The articulation of the master-signifier created anxieties, among some right-leaning Japanese politicians, making the divergence between the Japanese and the Chinese over the interpretation of the Nanking Massacre increasingly severe.

The Nanking Massacre in the Chinese discourse emerged initially as a response to the disruption of the Victim-victimizer Duality. As it was in the Textbook Issue and the Yasukuni Issue, in the discourse of Nanking Massacre, the Chinese government was highly reactive to any attempt on the Japanese side that may potentially violate China’s subject position as the victim vis-à-vis Japan.
The connection between the discourse of the Textbook Issue and the discourse of Nanking Massacre can be seen in the absence and presence of articles relating to the Nanking Massacre that criticised the Japanese denialists in *People’s Daily* in 1982, 1983 and 1984. The first time that the Chinese government articulated its criticism against Japan on the issue of the Nanking Massacre was in 1982 when the Textbook Issue became a diplomatic issue between Japan and China. On 2 August 1982, *People’s Daily* issued an article entitled ‘How can History be Usurped – Record of the Japanese Army’s Massacre in Nanking’. In the article, the author demonstrated a strong dissatisfaction over the Japanese Ministry of Education’s recommendation that ‘the Nanking Massacre was caused by the stubborn resistance of the Chinese troops’. A similar article was published a few days later with the same title, adding graphic descriptions of how the Japanese soldiers brutalised the Chinese people in the Nanking Massacre.

The expression of the Chinese dissatisfaction over Japan’s interpretation of the Nanking Massacre was strongly associated with the phrase ‘reverse the verdict (fan an 翻案)’. The Chinese media used this phrase to describe the unlawfulness of the denial of the Nanking Massacre by the Japanese rightists. For instance, in an article published on 13 August 1982, the author concluded that: ‘The Japanese Ministry of Education attempted to reverse the verdict of the Nanking Massacre. The Chinese people and the people of the world, including the Japanese people, will never allow such thing to happen’.

Here, the ‘verdict’ referred to the judgement convened by the Nanking War Crime Tribunal (Nanking Trial henceforth) and the International Military Tribunal for the Far East (the Tokyo Trial henceforth). In 1946, the Nanking Trial and were established to judge Japanese Imperial Army officers accused of war crimes, including the Nanking Massacre. According to the verdict of the Nanking Trial given on 10 March 1947: ‘From 12 to 21 December 1937…more than 190,000 disarmed Chinese soldiers and civilians were killed by machine guns with their corpses burned to destroy proof. Besides, we count more than 150,000 victims of barbarous acts buried by the charity organisations. We thus have a total of more than 300,000 victims’ (Hu, 2005 p. 389). The Tokyo Trial further validated the criminality of the Nanking Massacre. According to the IMTFE judgement, ‘organized and wholesale murder of male civilians

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146 *People’s Daily*, page 4, 2 August 1982.
147 *People’s Daily*, page 5, 13 August 1982.
149 This statistics came from the damage survey conducted by the Committee of Loss and Damage in the Battle of Nanking (南京抗戰損失調查委員會 Nanking kangzhan sunshi diaocha weiyuanhui), according to which the exact
was conducted with the apparent sanction of the command considering the pretence that Chinese soldiers had removed their uniforms and were mingling with the population, with at least 12,000 non-combatant Chinese killed in indiscriminate killing and approximately 20,000 cases of rape occurred during the first month of the occupation (IMTFE, 1977, p.1012).

Thus, the judgement of the Tokyo Trial – which gave the Nanking Massacre an international validation – became the master-signifier that the Chinese government used to refute any Japanese argument that questioned the official death toll (300,000) or the existence of the Nanking Massacre. People’s Daily published a great number of articles structured by the master-signifier of the Tokyo Trial.

On 14 August 1982, one day before the anniversary of the End of World War II, People’s Daily published an article entitled ‘The End of the Chief Culprit of the Nanking Massacre (Nanking datusha zhufan de xiachang 南京大屠杀主犯的下場)’. It narrated the story of how Matsui Iwane and Tani Hisao, the two culprits responsible for the Nanking Massacre, committed horrifying atrocities in Nanking and, most importantly, received capital sentences in the Tokyo Trial and the Nanking Trial respectively: ‘Justice has been done. The Chinese people’s revenge has been taken. It has been a fair trial’.150 In both articles, the Tokyo Trial was the master-signifier. First, the Tokyo Trial was described as a fair trial that brought justice and revenge for the Chinese people, and therefore, due to the ethical concern, should be not questioned or challenged. Second, the Tokyo Trial validated the existence of the Nanking Massacre, whose reconstruction relied heavily on the testimony of the trials.151

The use of the Tokyo Trial as the master-signifier in arguing against the Japanese denialist account reoccurred in the Second Textbook Offence in 1984. On 3 August 1984, a few weeks after the Japanese Ministry of Education issued the result of the textbook screening, an article

number of Chinese death toll of the Nanking Massacre, by the time of 10 April 1946, was amounted to 295,525 (SHAC, 1997 p. 524).


151 In fact, the first generation of historical materials about the Nanking Massacre compiled by the Chinese historians was also based on the verdict of the Tokyo Trial. In 15 December 1987, the 40th Anniversary of the Nanking Massacre, People’s Daily reported the publication of Historical Record of the Nanking Massacre Committed by the Japanese Army Invading China (qinhua rijun Nanking datusha shigao 侵華日軍南京大屠殺史稿). Accordingly, the book was primarily based on the verdict and testimonies of the Nanking Trial and the Tokyo Trial.
about a discovery of the proof of the Nanking Massacre was issued. In it, the author emphasised that the newly discovered proof – two Japanese soldiers’ diaries – suggested that ‘the Nanking Massacre was carried out organisationally (Nanking datusha shi you zuzhi de jinxing de 南京大屠杀是有組織地進行的)’. This article stressed strongly the premeditated nature of the Japanese atrocities in Nanking, reflecting a clear attribution of war responsibility: the victims were the Chinese people, and the victimizers were the Japanese Army.

On 13 August 1984, Cai Jingyi published an article in *People Daily* entitled ‘How Can History be Usurped? The Record of the Nanking Massacre Committed by the Japanese Army’. The article was written as a critical response to the Ministry of Education of Japan’s (MOEJ) textbooks recommendation that the Chinese believed to unjustly attribute the atrocities of the Nanking Massacre to ‘the stubborn resistance of the Chinese troops’. In the article, the author began with a refutation against the textbook recommendation by the MOEJ, described graphically the Japanese atrocities, and ended the article with a triumphal narrative of the Tokyo Trial:

In 1946, the International Military Tribunal of the Far East began to bring to trial 28 Japanese war criminals, including Matsui Ishine. Because of the atrocities in Nanking, Matsui Ishine was executed by hanging in 1948. Tani Hisao was extradited to the Nanking Trial in 1946, and was executed in the next year. This is the end that the invaders deserved. Their crimes will be stigmatised on the pillory of history. The Chinese people and the people of the world, and the Japanese people, will never allow the Ministry of Education of Japan to reverse the verdict of the Nanking Massacre.152

In the late 1980s, the theme of ‘proof’ became a central part of the Chinese discourse on the Nanking Massacre. This theme signified the Chinese subject’s desire to search for evidence to prove the existence of the Nanking Massacre and to refute the Japanese denialists. Among the 160 pieces of articles relating to the Nanking Massacre in *People’s Daily*, 40 of them are coded with the category of ‘proof’, with the most frequently seen metaphor being ‘ironclad of proof as irrefutable as mountains (tie zheng ru shan 铁证如山)’. We can see this from an article published on 14 August 1985. In it, two-thirds of the words were written under the sub-headline of ‘The Ironclad Proof of the Three-hundred Thousand Victims is as irrefutable as mountains’.153 Identical expression repeatedly made appearances in *People’s Daily*, especially in

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reports relating to new evidence discovered by the Chinese and Japanese historians.\textsuperscript{154} The theme of ‘proof’ was emotionally attached to the Japanese denial of the Nanking Massacre, showing that the trauma of the Nanking Massacre bore a double meaning: one the one hand, there was the trauma of being brutalised and raped; on the other hand, there was the trauma of denial, i.e., having one’s proof of trauma denied and forgotten.

The trauma of denial can be seen in a 1987 film, *Evidence of the Massacre in Blood* (屠城血證  tucheng xuezheng), the first Nanking Massacre-related film produced in China.\textsuperscript{155} The storyline revolves around the main character Zhan Tao’s (展濤) effort to protect photos of Japanese soldiers committing atrocities against the Chinese, i.e., the proof of the Nanking Massacre. The true trauma conveyed by the film, as Michael Berry insightfully points out, is instigated less by the Nanking Massacre *per se* than by the struggle over the ‘proof’ of the Nanking Massacre: ‘The true tragedy of the film is that just as the characters portrayed in the film struggle to prove that the massacre actually happened, so *Massacre in Nanking*, which was made on the 50\textsuperscript{th} anniversary of the tragedy, is still struggling with the same issue – only this time, the film itself replaces the photographs as the chosen medium’ (Berry, 2001, p.88).

The desire for proof signified a lack of it, and the lack was sutured by the master-signifier of the Tokyo Trial. In a *People’s Daily* article entitled ‘Lies Cannot Cover up Truth Written by Blood (谎言掩盖不住血写的事实)’ in 1990, the author deployed the Tokyo Trial as a rhetoric tool to refute Japanese right-wing politician Ishihara Shintaro’s argument that ‘the Nanking Massacre is a Chinese fabrication’.\textsuperscript{156} The article featured the basic argumentative structure of the Chinese official discourse of the Nanking Massacre: 1) the Tokyo Trial made the judgement that the Nanking Massacre happened and 300,000 people were killed by the Japanese Imperial Army; 2) the denialist account has an evil intention to reverse the verdict convened by the Tokyo Trial, hence the existence of the Nanking Massacre.


\textsuperscript{155} Directed by Luo Guanqun (羅冠群) and starred by Chen Daoming (陳道明), it was not only enjoyed wide audiences in primary and middle schools as a multi-media material for China’s patriotic education, and was awarded the 1987-1988 Ministry of Film & Broadcasting Award and the 1991 Tokyo World Peace Film Festival Award for the best drama.

\textsuperscript{156} *People’s Daily*, 14 October.
The similar argumentative pattern can later be found in almost any arguments against the Japanese denialists in *People’s Daily*.\(^{157}\) For instance, in 1995, in commemoration of the 50\(^{th}\) Anniversary of China’s War of Resistance against the Japanese Aggression, *People’s Daily* published an article about a new history book about the Nanking Massacre, and refuted the Japanese denialists on the ground of the Tokyo Trial:

In the postwar, the case of the Nanking Massacre was tried to in the Tokyo Trial and the Nanking Trial, and Matsui Ishine and Tani Hisao were given capital sentences. However, in the last 40 years, some people in Japan have always been attempting to deny the Nanking Massacre, hence the aggressiveness of Japan’s war with China. These attempts are futile. History is made of facts that had already happened. Those in Japan who attempted to deny the crime of invading China committed blasphemy to history, and they deserve to be condemned by the Chinese and the Southeast Asian people who suffered from Japan’s war of aggression, by the peace-loving people of the world.

On 31 August of the same year, *People’s Daily* published a long essay about the Nanking Massacre. It not only described the atrocities but also enumerated events relating to the Japanese denialists’ attempts to ‘reverse the verdict’ of the Tokyo Trial after the 1980s, including: the Textbook Issue of 1982, the publication of *The Illusion of the Nanking Massacre* by Tanaka Masaaki, the Textbook Issue of 1985, Ishihara Shinto’s statement that ‘the Nanking Massacre was a Chinese hoax’ in 1990, the Minister of Law Nagano Shigeto’s claim that ‘the Nanking Massacre was fabricated’ in 1994, and the Minister of Environment Sakurai Shin’s claim that ‘the purpose of the Pacific War was not to invade other countries’, etc. To criticise the Japanese denialist, the author said:

The bloody atrocities committed by the Japanese Army invading China is proved by three hundred thousand casualties’ corpses, and can be confirmed by the tens of thousands of testimonies written with blood. Nowadays, there are still 1700 survivals and eyewitnesses alive, and we also have the verdict convened by the International Military Tribunals of the Far East and the Nanking War Crime Tribunals as the legal basis. These are ironclad cases judged by history that cannot be shaken by some liars with ulterior motives. The absurd fallacy that beautified the war of aggression, pertains to a despicable act of reversing history and confusing good and bad.\(^{158}\)

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\(^{157}\) It should also be noted that this article was selected as a reading text in the Fifth Volume of Middle School Chinese Textbook (Renjiao version) in 2001. See: [http://news.sina.com.cn/o/2017-12-13/doc-ifyps4kp2742392.shtml](http://news.sina.com.cn/o/2017-12-13/doc-ifyps4kp2742392.shtml)

\(^{158}\) *People’s Daily*, page 9, 31 August 1995
The same argumentation can be seen in another article of 1997 that reported an academic conference about the Nanking Massacre held in Nanking on 13 December. Accordingly, the participants of the conference condemned the Japanese denialists who denied the existence of the Nanking Massacre by questioning the legitimacy of the Tokyo Trial:

The Tokyo Trial was a trial of justice conducted according to international laws and convention. According to the principle of fair trial and procedure stipulated in the Charter of the Court, all defendants have the right of defence. The trial received 4336 pieces of evidence, called 419 witnesses to testify in the court, had 779 people testified in writing, lasted for 2 years and 7 months, tried 818 times, and was concluded with a 1218 page long verdict. The Nanking Massacre was the most prominent Fascist atrocity during World War II and was resolved in the International Military Tribunal of the Far East. Based on a large number of witnesses and material proof, the court confirmed that the Japanese Army had committed massacres in Nanking, constituting an epoch-making atrocity in modern history. The verdict dedicated two chapters, entitled ‘The Attack of Nanking’ and ‘Nanking Massacre’, validating the crime that the Japanese invaders committed in Nanking. The legitimacy, justice, and authority of the Tokyo Trial are unquestionable.\(^{159}\)

Then in 2003, Zhu Chengshan, the Curator of the Memorial Hall of the Victims of Nanking Massacre by Japanese Invaders, wrote an article about a group of ‘Japanese senior people in the economic circle’ who travelled to Nanking. Accordingly, they invited Zhu to dinner and challenged him that the Nanking Massacre was a Chinese hoax. To refute the Japanese denialists, Zhu wrote:

The first question: Is the Nanking Massacre a hoax fabricated by the Chinese? The number of 300,000 casualties was neither issued by the government of the Republic of China nor the government of the People’s Republic of China. It was not even proposed by the Chinese researchers. The number came from the verdict given by the International Military Tribunal of the Far East and the Nanking War Crime Tribunals.

Thus, it was on the ground of the Tokyo Trial that the Chinese government maintained the contested death toll. From the Lacanian perspective, the Tokyo Trial functioned as a master-signifier that enabled the Chinese government to confront the uncertainty of China’s identity

\(^{159}\) *People’s Daily*, page 6, 13 December 1997
as the victim vis-à-vis Japan since the outbreak of the history problem since 1982. The key function of the Tokyo Trial as the master-signifier can be seen by comparing how the Nanking Massacre was memorised before and after 1982. Before the 1980s, the Nanking Massacre was not an officialised symbol of national trauma in China, largely because the victim-victimizer was relatively stable and that the verdict of the Tokyo Trial remained relatively uncontested. Though the argument that Sino-Japanese relations during the Cold War had been dictated by Japan’s war guilt may be oversimplified (Hoppens, 2016, p.10), the Japanese war guilt and Chinese victimhood were still mobilised as one of, if not the most prominent rhetoric resources in diplomatic exchange between the two countries from 1949 to 1972. The mobilisation of Chinese victimhood had formed an international norm that naturalised the Victim-victimizer Duality. But the Textbook Issue of 1982 destabilised the Victim-victimizer Duality, the bilateral norm that structured China’s victim identity vis-à-vis Japan. Thus, when the Victim-victimizer Duality was destabilised with the Textbook Issue, the Nanking Massacre Debate emerged as China’s collective trauma and a political issue in Sino-Japanese relations, to compensate the uncertainty of China’s victim identity.

Theme II: The Japanese political circle resisted the master-signifier of the Tokyo Trial with the hysteric’s discourse and the university’s discourse

The Japanese discourse on the Nanking Massacre is characterised by social actors’ resistance against the master-signifier of the Tokyo Trial. More specifically, the Japanese government enacted the university’s discourse to repress the articulation of the master-signifier, whilst some right-leaning politicians enacted the hysteric’s discourse to challenge the master-signifier of the Tokyo Trial.

**The Japanese government framed the Nanking Massacre in terms of academic knowledge**

The Japanese government’s discourse of the Nanking Massacre is predominantly characterised by a tendency to frame the Nanking Massacre as an academic problem, rather than a political issue as contended by the Chinese government. First, the Japanese framing of the Nanking Massacre was semantically different from the Chinese one. In the Chinese context, the Nanking Massacre has been consistently termed as *Nanking datusha* (南京大屠杀). The term can be literally translated as ‘the great massacre of Nanking’, implying a systematic killing and the victimizer’s brutality. By contrast, the most common term in Japan was *nankin jiken* (南京事
This term can be literally translated as ‘Nanking Incident’, implying a relatively neutral and (seemingly) objective attitude (Askew, 2004, p.2).

The Japanese government had held this position very consistently since 1982 when the issue of the Nanking Massacre began to emerge as a bilateral issue with the outbreak of the Textbook Issue. The first time that the Japanese parliament began to discuss the Nanking Massacre was 30 July 1982, a few days after the Textbook Issue became politicised between Japan and China as a diplomatic issue. On a conference of Committee on Education, Funada Hajime asked Suzuki Shun about the Japanese government’s attitude on the Nanking Massacre (House of Representatives, 1982a, p.3). In response, Suzuki stressed the historical evidence relating to the Nanking Massacre was insufficient:

About the Nanking Incident, we don’t have enough direct historical materials, especially about the number of casualties. The estimation of the death toll varies from a few hundred thousand to twenty or ten thousand, and there may be errors due to the lack of historical materials. For the textbook screening, we aim to avoid using unconfirmed numbers in textbooks. This is a principle of the screening process applied to not only the Nanking Incident. Also, the context of the incident is unclear. If we do not clarify the historical context, then, it is difficult to understand the historical significance of it (ibid., p.3).

In a conference of the Committee of Education held on 4 August 1982, the Minister of Education Ogawa Heiji said in response to a question regarding how the government was going to deal with China’s demand of changing the wording of the Nanking Massacre in the controversial history textbook that the history textbook ‘should be based on objective facts’ and the Ministry of Education will recommend cancelling whatever description ‘that is not grounded in objective facts’ (House of Representatives, 1982b, p.16).

The similar rhetoric was adopted by Takaishi Kunio, Head of Bureau of Education on 28 June 1984 in a conference of the Diet Committee. In the conference, Uehara Kōsuke, a leftist politician of the Socialist Party, asked about the government’s official stance on the Nanking Massacre. Representing the government, Takaishi replied that the government believed that the number of casualties had to be confirmed with further research (House of Representatives, 1984a, p.33). When Uehara moved on to argue that the crux of the problem is not about quantity, but about the quality of the incident, Takaishi replied:
I didn’t say that we can’t put the Nanking Incident in our textbooks. But, in terms of showing the number of casualties, we need to have recognised academic works written by public institutions as the basis of the evidence. It is inappropriate to teach children an estimated number. Without the support of public institutions with academic authority, our textbook would be left in a precarious ground. This is why we don’t want to mention the number in the textbook (House of Representatives, 1984, p.34).

From Takaishi’s reply, we can see that the Japanese government framed the Nanking Massacre Debate as an academic problem so that they could depoliticise the controversy. This strategy was not only adopted by the ruling party to respond to the Left, but also to the politicians on the Right, who have been rather dissatisfied with the fact that descriptions about the Nanking Massacre made appearances in Japanese history textbooks. In a conference of the Committee on Education held on 20 July 1984, Takizawa Kōsuke (滝沢幸介), who contended in the conference that the Tokyo Trial was ‘the victor’s judgment’, questioned whether history books denying the Nanking Massacre could possibly pass the screening. Takaishi responded to him with the university’s discourse:

In general, the screening of history textbook is based on the established knowledge in the academia. It has been written by most of the academic papers and history books that the Nanking Incident does exist. So it is not against our principle if we let such textbooks pass the screening? (House of Representatives, 1984b, p.21).

The LDP consistently framed the Nanking Massacre as an issue of academic research in the 1990s and the 2000s when confronting oppositions from both the Left and the Right. In a conference of Committee on Education on 1 November 1994, Kogure Yamato (木暮山人), a conservative politician of New Progressive Party (shinshintō 新進党), questioned the appropriateness of the textbook screening process. Accordingly, the screening process gave approval to a history textbook maintaining that there were approximately two hundred thousand people killed in the Nanking Massacre. In response, the delegate of the government, Nozaki Hiroshi (野崎弘) said:

It is a fact that there are controversies regarding the number of the death toll of the Nanking Incident. But there are also textbooks that do not mention the number of casualties. In fact, among the eight middle school history textbooks, two of them do not mention the death toll of the Nanking Incident.
And among the fifty high school history textbooks, twenty-one of them do not mention the specific number of the death toll. If the author used an estimated number in the textbook, what we do, according to the principle of textbooks screening, is to point out what can be improved in the textbook manuscript. This is our basic stance. When there are various theories regarding one historical event, we allow the author to base their writings on established academic research. We don’t actively assert our opinion; instead, we give recommendations with the attitude that writers are allowed to make use of historical research widely accepted by the academia. This is how we conduct the screening right now (House of Councillors, 1994, pp.19–20).

Nozaki’s reply corresponded to the university’s discourse, not only because he made the controversy over the Nanking Massacre sound like an academic exercise, but also because his speech neutralised Kogure’s question by turning it into a matter of the bureaucratic knowledge about the ‘principle’ of the screening process.

In the 2000s, with the development of the Yasukuni Issue, more and more right-wing politicians began to challenge the Chinese narrative of the Nanking Massacre, especially the death toll. In response, the Japanese government enacted the university’s discourse to suppress the challenge from the Right called for adopting a more hawkish stance against what they saw as China’s anti-Japanese propaganda. On 13 July 2005, when the anti-Japanese demonstration erupted in various Chinese cities, the LDP politician Matsumara Jin contested that the Chinese account of the death toll in Nanking Massacre (i.e., 300,000) was highly questionable and demanded that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs should explain Japan’s official stance. The delegate of the government, Saiki Akitaka (齋木昭隆) replied that the historical truth of the number was still under investigation:

Hata Ikuhito, an academic authority in the research of the Nanking Incident in Japan, estimates that people who were killed illegally in the incident ranged from 38,000 to 42,000. Kaikoshô, an organisation of retired military servicemen, claimed that the number of casualties is estimated to be 3000 or 6000. In any case, the number of non-combatant people who were killed after the Japanese Army entered the city is, unfortunately, difficult to be confirmed (House of Representatives, 2005 p.19).

Saiki’s statement argued that the government’s position on the Nanking Massacre was and should be based on the academic paradigm; such position has been consistently held by the ruling party (LDP) and the cabinet members. Because of the repetitiveness of the discourse, I will not go into any more details here. In fact, the Japanese government’s tendency to frame
the Nanking Massacre as an academic issue has been articulated in a statement on the official website of the Foreign Affairs of Japan:

The Japanese government believes that it cannot be denied that following the entrance of the Japanese Army into Nanking in 1937, the killing of a large number of non-combatants, looting and other acts occurred. However, there are numerous theories as to the actual number of victims, and the Government of Japan believes it is difficult to determine the correct number.\(^{160}\)

The rhetoric at work in the statement is worth noting. First, the statement was articulated in a passive tone: instead of articulating that the Japanese Army committed the atrocity, it said that such atrocities ‘occurred’, linguistically hiding the subject who committed the atrocities. Second, the acknowledgement of the Nanking Massacre, if there is, was expressed not in a positive tone but in the form of double negation (i.e., it cannot be denied that…). Finally, the statement emphasised the undecided nature of the number of casualties.

The Japanese government’s rhetoric in the statement served two functions. First, through the statement, the Japanese government gave the Chinese a minimal acknowledge of their victimhood to stabilise the bilateral relationship while maintaining Japan’s autonomy. Second, from the Lacanian perspective, the objectivity displayed in the Japanese government’s statement repressed the master-signifier of the Tokyo Trial, according to which the Japanese Army killed more than two hundred thousand Chinese soldiers and civilians. However, the illusion of objectivity implied a lack of definitive articulation about the issue at stake, fragmentising China’s victim identity. Thus, the university’s discourse was limited in dealing with the politics of identity in it generated more fragmentation and uncertainty rather than consistency and certainty in the subject’s identity.

*Conservative politicians questioned the Tokyo Trial’s Verdict*

In the Japanese discourse on the Nanking Massacre, the discourse that questioned the legitimacy of the Tokyo Trial was also noticeable. As this discourse questioned the master-signifier that the Chinese side used to maintain their claim of the death toll in the Nanking Massacre, this discourse can be seen as the hysteric’s discourse.

The most vocal politician in this discourse was Ishihara Shintaro. On 2 June 1994, in a conference of Committee on Budget, Ishihara called China ‘*shina* (シナ), a derogatory label for

China’ instead of ‘chūgoku (中国)’. He not only defended the politicians who denied the Nanjing Massacre, but also argued that the Chinese civilians were killed by the Chinese troops, rather than the Japanese Army (House of Representatives, 1994b, p.15). Ishihara’s denial of the Nanking Massacre was based on the denial of the legitimacy of the Tokyo Trial:

The communist government built a memorial hall in Nanking and wrote that the Japanese killed 300,000 of their people. Who in the cabinet went there? Who? If there is, please raise your hand. Well, there’s nothing wrong about visiting the memorial hall. I have not been to that place in Nanking. It seems that no one has been there, either. But we know that the number ‘300,000’ is inscribed on the wall of the memorial hall. So, this government, a government that embraces the communist ideology, built a memorial hall which says that we the Japanese killed 300,000 Chinese people. This is unthinkable and contradicts lots of eyewitnesses’ accounts. Moreover, the guilt of having committed the Nanking Massacre was imposed upon us by the Tokyo Trial like a bolt from the blue. We were completely astounded at that time (House of Representatives, 1994, p.16).

And when the delegate of the government replied him that ‘it cannot be denied that there were non-combatant people killed in the incident’, Ishihara directed his criticism against the legitimacy of the Tokyo Trial again:

I know what you mean. […] But in terms of the death toll, there is a problem with the Tokyo Trial. In the trial, Matsune Ishine, the general who was executed for being responsible for the death of 300,000 people within 6 weeks. In brief, executing him served to reflect that there was the killings were systematic and executed by orders. But there was no such thing. It was impossible. The U.S. and other victors wanted to verify that the incident was done systematically, but eventually, they did not manage to do that. In the end, the General Matsui Ishine and Hiroda Kōki took the responsibilities and were hanged. The crime was lack of supervision. Speaking of lack of supervision, there were a few generals who were in charge of the battlefield in central China. The commander who ordered to attack Nanking was Asaka-no-miya, a prince from the royal family. The Soviet Union talked about pursuing the war responsibility of the Emperor, and the royal family was to be involved in the trial. So for his own fame and for the nation’s fame, Matsui took the responsibility of ‘lack of supervision’ and subsequently received the capital sentence. This is very important (House of Representatives, 1994, p.17).

Here, by calling the U.S. and other alliance countries as ‘the victors’, he made reference to the idea that ‘the Tokyo Trial was a victor’s judgment’, implying the anti-Japanese aspect of
the Tokyo Trial. Moreover, by highlighting that the Alliance had failed to verify a system of order to prevent the massacre in Nanking, Ishihara argued that Japan was not ‘responsible’, or, at least, did not have the intent to kill the non-combatant Chinese. But most importantly, Ishihara’s argumentation made the case that the Nanking Massacre was a product of the Tokyo Trial, a ‘victor’s judgement’; logically, it led to the conclusion that the Nanking Massacre was an anti-Japanese hoax.

The same rhetoric was pronounced by Kogure, who said explicitly in a conference of Committee on Education held on 27 October 1994 that the Nanking Massacre was a result of the Tokyo Trial. Making reference to the account of Morio Migaku (森王琢), a brigade commander who participated in the Attack of Nanking, Kogure said:

> As we all know, the origin of the Nanking Massacre is the Tokyo Trial. It is a common sense of the world that the trial was absurd. For the leaders of the trial, MacArthur and President Truman, the Tokyo Trial was a mistake, according to some reports. Moreover, the chief prosecutor Keenan had confessed that the trial was wrong. It is in the trial that the Nanking Massacre was reported. The Japanese people believe that such a deplorable thing exists. Or they are made to believe. The reason is that the mass media at that time stirred up the story (House of Representatives, 1994a, p.20).

In the 2000s, conservative politicians continued to frame the Nanking Massacre as originated from the Tokyo Trial. In a conference of Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defence, Yamatani Eriko requested information about documentary resources relating to the ‘Contest of Killing 100 People Using a Sword’, a wartime account of a contest between two Japanese soldiers who competed each over who could first kill 100 Chinese with their blades during Japan’s attack in Shanghai and Nanking in 1937 (House of Councillors, 2004, p.2). After the delegate of the government provided the information, Yamatani turned to ask if the Tokyo Trial, which she deemed illegal, could be reassessed:

> The Tokyo Trial, and trials made by various countries to judge the so-called war criminals, are marked by inappropriate fact-finding, lack of guarantee in defence right and statement right, and the violation of the principle of no penalty without law. In fact, many of our people believe that this trial cannot be quantified as a fair trial conducted by modern nations… (ibid., p.4)

Here, the speaker did not straightforwardly deny the Nanking Massacre, but made the case the Tokyo Trial should be re-evaluated, hence the existence of the Nanking Massacre. In order
to question the verdict of the Nanking Massacre, Matsuhara Hajimei used the same discursive strategy to point out the inconsistent fact-findings in the Tokyo Trial. In a conference of Committee of Foreign Affairs, he said:

With regards to how many people were killed due to the Nanking Massacre, according to the Tokyo Trial, there were more than 200,000 civilians and captivated soldiers killed in Nanking and the surrounding area within the initial 6 weeks after the Japanese Army occupied the city. To make the estimation less like an exaggeration, it is said that the number was proven by the statistics provided by the burial teams and the other organisations; they buried around 155,000 corpses. This is the judgment convened by the Tokyo Trial on 11 November 1948. So the number of 200,000 is an estimation based on the number of 155,000. But the thing is, after the Nanking Incident, Bates, the then professor of Nanking University, and the consultant of the Taiwanese ruling party KMT, said that there were 40,000 people being killed. I reckon that the white journalists from America said the same at the beginning.

What differentiated the speech of Matani and Matsuhara from that of Ishihara was that the former did not deny the existence of the Nanking Massacre in an outright manner. Nonetheless, both argumentations challenged the Chinese account of the Nanking Massacre on the basis that the verdict of the Tokyo Trial was unfair and imprecise. The hysteric’s discourse interrogated the master-signifier with the following syllogism: 1) the Tokyo Trial was a victor’s justice, an unfair trial; 2) the claim that 300,000 were killed in the Nanking Massacre was validated by the Tokyo Trial; 3) therefore, the number of the death toll and the very existence of the Nanking Massacre should be questioned.

Theme III: The limitation of academic knowledge in containing the bilateral dispute over the Nanking Massacre

Academic discourse could not serve as a common ground to settle the controversy of the Nanking Massacre between Japan and China. As we have seen, the Japanese government framed the Nanking Massacre as an academic issue, but the Chinese government was unsatisfied with the Japanese agenda. This was the case because academic discourse pertained to the university’s discourse: the university’s discourse repressed the master-signifier and generated dividedness, doubt and fragmentation in the subject’s identity. But the Chinese government did not desire to have their victim identity fragmentised.
The limitation of the university’s discourse can be seen in two vignettes of the Chinese and the Japanese confronting each other, namely, the television appearance of Azuma Shirō and the Japan-China Joint History Research Project. In both cases, the Chinese were challenged by the university’s discourse enacted by the Japanese scholars. As a result, the two sides did not converge on a consensus regarding the Nanking Massacre, especially the death toll. Academic research may generate facts, but it could not articulate to the ‘truthfulness’ of a collective trauma such as the Nanking Massacre; also, academic research on the matter of the Nanking Massacre tended to produce more ambiguity to the Victim-victimizer Duality, which was undesirable for the Chinese government’s agenda.

**Azuma phenomenon**

In China, Azuma Shiro’s lawsuit was arguably the most impactful event that made the Chinese public be aware of the divergent interpretation of the Nanking Massacre between Japan and China. In the late 1980s, more and more former Japanese soldiers came to confess their war crimes during the WWII (Yoshida, 2011 pp. 205–214). Among them was Azuma Shiro, who participated in the Battle of Nanking in December 1937. 40 years later, in 1987, he published his diary *My Nanking Platoon*. Written during his time in China and in the Nanking Massacre, the diary recorded a horrendous story: on 21 December 1937, near the Nanking Supreme Court, Nishimoto (西本) and a group of Japanese soldiers put a Chinese man into a mailbag and cold-bloodedly burned the live victim with gasoline. According to Azuma’s diary, Nishimoto tied a grenade with the bag and kicked the victim into a pond to ‘cool him down’; the victim died with an explosion in the water (Azuma, 1999 p. 4).

This record got Azuma and his diary’s publisher Aoki Shoten into a lawsuit. Though Azuma used pseudo names in his diary, many of the soldiers were identifiable. The officer Nishimoto, who cruelly killed a Chinese man in the mailbag as recorded in the diary, was Azuma’s superior Hashimoto Mitsuhara (橋本光治). In April 1993, supported by Kaikōsha, a Japanese organisation of retired military servicemen, Hashimoto charged Azuma with libel. Hashimoto denied any war crime by arguing that it was physically impossible to contain a person with a mailbag; that there was no pond near the Nanking Supreme Court; and that there was no eyewitness around when the purported event happened. In April 1996, Tokyo District Court convened that Azuma lost the case, with the reason that ‘it is too dangerous for the executor [to tie a grenade to a mail bag]; it is impossible to perform such a dangerous task’ (Yamauchi, 2000 p. 168). The political meaning of the lawsuit was further compounded by
Itakura Yoshiaki (板倉由明), who wrote an article in Getsuyō Hyōron, stating that Kaikōsha not only wanted to help restore Hashimoto’s fame, but also, more importantly, hoped to create an opportunity to falsify the fabrication of the Nanking Massacre (Itakura, 1993; cited in Yamauchi, 2000 p. 165).

The Chinese government soon got involved in the controversy. On 22 December 1998, Tokyo Supreme Court made the verdict that Azuma lost the case again. On the next day (23 December 1998), Foreign Ministry Regular Press Conference Spokesman Zhu Bangzao (朱邦造) openly condemned the verdict, criticising the court as ‘ignorant of historical fact’. On 28 December 1998, Zhu Bangzao reiterated China’s stance regarding the lawsuit, emphasising that ‘Azuma’s lawsuit is not simply a civil lawsuit, it is essentially the Japanese right-wing’ attempt to deny the Nanking Massacre using Japan’s legal procedures. This verdict severely hurts the feeling of the Chinese people’ (Yoshida, 2009, p.161). For the Chinese side, Tokyo Supreme Court’s verdict was a ‘denial of trauma’ that lent legitimacy to the denialists’ reasoning: a partial factual deficiency in the narrative of the Nanking Massacre could be used to deny the existence of the event as a whole. Though the court did not deny the existence of the Nanking Massacre per se, its ruling produced a negative image of the Japanese government among the Chinese public, who tended to see the Japanese legal system as supporting the right-wingers’ denialist account.

This impression held by the Chinese was amplified in 1999 when Azuma travelled to Beijing to participate in one of the most popular television show broadcasted by China Central Television Channel 2 (CCTV2), ‘Tell It Like It Is (Shihua Shishuo 實話實說)’.\textsuperscript{161} The talk show, entitled ‘Memory of the War (戰爭的記憶 zhanzheng de jiyi)’, invited a variety of audiences, including Azuma’s daughter, Azuma’s lawyers, a group of Japanese political activists, scholars, critics, survivor, and eyewitnesses of the Nanking Massacre, Japanese students studying in China. In front of the Chinese audiences and his daughter, Azuma confessed how he executed three Chinese during the war.

Azuma’s confession, however, was challenged by Mizutani Naoko (水谷尚子), a Japanese scholar studying at Renmin University. In a Q&A session, she asked Azuma: ‘The judge pointed out there are three ambiguous points in your diary, what do you think about that?’\textsuperscript{162}

\begin{center}
\textsuperscript{161} For the full episode of the show, see: \url{http://www.nj1937.org/jyhd/hpxx/201607/t20160705_4014108.html}
\end{center}

\begin{center}
\textsuperscript{162} The ‘three ambiguous points’ refer to the three details in Azuma’s diary that the Supreme Court considered as physically impossible and had eventually led to the loss of his lawsuit: first, that tying a grenade to a mail bag is too
\end{center}
When Azuma was replying, she interrupted Azuma’s speech and said: ‘I have read the account written in the court verdict thoroughly. Please answer the second question’.

For some of the Chinese audience, Mizutani’s question and interruption sounded as if she was making a disguised criticism against Azuma by alluding to the Tokyo Supreme Court’s verdict. Perhaps as a result of this, she became the Chinese audience’s target of criticism. At the end of the first half of the programme, a Chinese audience challenged Mizutani: ‘What do you think about the Nanking Massacre?’ Mizutani’s did not directly answer the question: ‘First, I think that this talk show is about Mr Azuma’s lawsuit, so I didn’t expect that I would be asked to discuss the Nanking Massacre’.163 And then, in the second half of the programme, Mizutani was confronted by a Chinese audience who asked her: ‘The Japanese government has never been able to “tell it as it is” [shi hua shi shuo 實話實說]; this has done harm to generations of Japanese young people. Now, here is a former Japanese soldier who participated in Japan’s war of aggression against China and “tells it as it is”. Do you believe what he says?’ Mizutani replied defensively again: ‘Aizuma-san is already 87-year-old. I acknowledge that parts of what he stated in the lawsuit are reasonable. But there is still something unclear in what he stated due to his age’. Although Mizutani quickly added that she believed what Azuma witnessed during the war was true, her insistence on the Tokyo Supreme Court’s judgement reproduced how the Chinese stereotypically perceived the Japanese interpretation of the Nanking Massacre: that factual deficiency can deny the trauma of the Nanking Massacre as a whole (i.e., that Azuma was too old to reconstruct the scene accurately).

Mizutani’s interaction with Azuma and the Chinese audience showed that the university’s discourse was rather limited putting an end to the international controversy of the Nanking Massacre. This is the case because scientific objectivity disregards what Žižek calls the ‘distinction between factual truth and truthfulness’: the very factual deficiency in the subject’s report of his/her traumatic experience (e.g., killing and raping) bears witness to the truthfulness of the report; conversely, the virtue of clarity actually disqualifies the traumatic-ness of the subject’s experience (Žižek, 2010 p. 4). In Azuma’s case, the very inaccuracy of his testimony (if it were inaccurate indeed) proved the traumatic atrocities that he experienced in Nanking to be true. Mizutani’s speech subjected Azuma’s narrative to the legal and scientific discourse. It constituted a denial of the truthfulness, hence the denial of the trauma of the Nanking Massacre.

163 まず、この番組は、東史郎さんの訴訟について…あ、ごめんなさい、東さんについてです。
The limitation of the university’s discourse was also shown by the Japan-China Joint History Research Project. As highlighted previously, what the Chinese government wanted from the Japanese government was a full recognition of its victim identity as well as a recognition of the militarist/people dichotomy. The Japanese government’s strategy of framing the Nanking Massacre as an academic issue was counterproductive, because this approach produced more equivocation rather than a definitive articulation of the Victim-victimizer Duality. Before I embark on the analysis of the Japan-China Joint Research Project, a brief background about the case has to be given.

By 2006 the Sino-Japanese diplomatic relations were worsened severely with China’s criticism against Koizumi’s regular visit to the Yasukuni Shrine. In such a turbulent context, the two governments initiated the Japan-China Joint History Research Project (JHRP henceforth), aiming to alleviate the damage that done to the bilateral relations by the ‘history problem’. As an intergovernmental scholarly project, the JHRP brought together key scholars on both sides to conduct research regarding the history of Sino-Japanese relations. The whole project is divided into three successive historical period – the ancient/medieval era, the modern era, and the postwar era. With accordance to this division, the whole committee was divided into three corresponding subcommittees. Members of each subcommittee made decisions collectively regarding the research topics. In addition to the research report, they also wrote comments on each other’s work. The research report was released in 2010 with two volumes on the ancient history (Book I) and the modern history (Book II). However, the third volume (Book III) was withdrawn from publication due to demands made by the Chinese side (Kitaoka, 2010, p.13).

The setting of the JHRP highlighted the process of university’s discourse, i.e., how knowledge was made in service of an underlying ideology. Discipline-wise, the JHRP pertained to political history, a discipline that has an inseparable relationship with the ideology of nation-state. The discipline of political history was established by German historian Leopold von Ranke (1795-1886), one of the most important historians of the 19th century who founded the modern scientific historiography (Stern, 1988, p.45). One of the major characters of the Rankean history is that it focused rather exclusively on historical processes of nation-states, i.e., their foreign relations with other nation-states, their systems of government, constitution, and administration (Bourne, 1896, p.398). As critiques point out, since the Rankean history...
regarded only official sources as credible evidence, it reflected historical narrative sponsored by the state, and thus, was far from being ‘scientific’ or ‘neutral’ as it proclaimed (Schaff, 2014, chap. 1). Rather, the Rankean history was embedded in the nationalist ideology to legitimise the establishment of European nation-states in the 19th century, making nation-state the exclusive subject of the historical narrative (Goucher and Walton, 2013, p.518). Such ideological functionality could be found in the JHRP.

Though how scholars were appointed remains unclear, the outcome of the appointment indicated an ideological functionality that put the focus on nation-states. First, almost all the appointed researchers of the subcommittee of modern history came from the discipline of political history. On the Japanese side, it is notable that no outspoken left-winger had been recruited. Researchers who had been appointed to form the sub-committee are all political scientists and historians specialising in political history. On the Chinese side, scholars were all unexceptionally specialists on Sino-Japanese diplomatic relations. In fact, CASS even selected Sino-Japanese relations experts who barely have a formal record of historical research on the ancient/medieval Japanese history to form the Sub-committee of Ancient and Medieval History. It should be noted that most of the scholars are from the Modern Chinese History Research Institute (近代史研究所) at the Chinese Academy of Social Science (CASS).

165 I approached my interviewees, but was unable to exact any information that can determine the selection process.

166 The Japanese members include: Kitaoka Shinichi (北岡伸一), Professor, Faculty of Law, The University of Tokyo; Kojima Tomoyuki (小島朋之), Professor, Faculty of Policy Management, Keio University; Hatano Sumio (波多野澄雄), Professor, Graduate School of Humanities and Social Sciences, University of Tsukuba; Sakamoto Kazuya (佐藤和男), Professor, Graduate School of Law, Osaka University; Shōji Junichiro (庄司潤一郎), Professor, Chief of First Research Office, Department of Military History, National Institute for Defense Studies of the Ministry of Defence.

167 Bu Ping (步平) Director, Institute of Modern History, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences; Wang Jianlang (王晓光), Deputy Director, Institute of Modern History, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences; Rong Weimu (荣维木), Vice Chief Editor, Editorial Section of "The Journal of Studies of China’s Resistance War Against Japan", Institute of Modern History, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences; Tao Wenzhao (陶文钊), Senior Fellow, Institute of American Studies, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences; Xu Yong (徐勇), Professor, Department of History, Peking University; Zang Yunhu (臧運祜), Associate Professor, Department of History, Peking University.

168 Jiang Lifeng (蒋立峰), Director, Institute of Japanese Studies, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences; Tang Chongnan (湯重南) Professor, Institute of World History, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences; Wang Xiaoqiu (王晓秋), Professor, Department of History, Peking University & Director, Research Institute of China’s Foreign Relations History, Peking University; Wang Xinshe (王新生), Professor, Department of History, Peking University.

169 The reason for such an arrangement is said to be that the Chinese side did not expect to have joint research on the ancient/medieval history. My cautious guess is that the Chinese side wanted to ensure the accomplishment of
The CASS was central to the production of official Party historiography (Weigelin-Schwiedrzik, 1993, p.157). In fact, it is precisely under the name of ‘modern Chinese history (近代史)’ – where most of the Chinese researchers were from – that research on Party historiography was initially conducted (ibid.). Whereas I would not go so far as to suggest that the scholars’ writings were necessarily a carbon copy of the official history, it should not be overlooked that the most of the Chinese researchers in the subcommittee of the modern history in JHRP were from an institute heavily influenced by the party-state ideology. And though many of the Chinese scholars proclaimed to adopt a Marxist approach to the research, their approach was methodologically similar to their Japanese counterparts in that their research focused strongly on the history of nation-states and tended to marginalised other agents.

Further, the report pertained to a historical narrative of two nation-states (Japan and China) and was produced through the epistemological framework codified by the nationalist ideology. Whereas the publication of the JHRP might not reflect the official position held by the two governments, it is through the nationalist ideological lens that the researchers were selected. Whilst not discounting the scholars’ agency to produce knowledge independently, the JHRP scholars’ epistemological frameworks were, to a great extent, pre-determined in the agenda-setting process.

The content of the report represents the different ways the two sides interpreted the Victim-victim Duality. Whilst the Chinese took an approach that prioritised acknowledge of the Victim-victimizer Duality over pure evidence-based research, whereas the Japanese did not. But that is not to say that the Japanese research was necessarily more ‘objective’ than the Chinese side. From a Lacanian perspective, the different approaches indicated the different ways the two sides confronted the Victim-victimizer Duality. Such differences are evident, if we compare the respective narrative expressed in the research in more details.

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170 (Weigelin-Schwiedrzik, 1993, p.157) As Susanne Weigelin-Schwiedrzik points out,

171 北岡伸一 and 歩平, 「日中歷史共同研究」報告書 第1巻 古代-中近世史篇 (勉誠出版, 2014), 34.
The Chinese narrative suggested that Japan’s invasion of China was premeditated. In Part I – Chapter 1, ‘The Inception of Modern Relationship’, Chinese authors took up an entire section to highlight Fukuzawa Yukichi’s idea of ‘Leaving Asia and Joint Europe (Datsua nyūō 脫亜入欧)’ as well as the construction of expansion-oriented military force (waizhengxing jundui 外征型軍隊) advocated by Sakuma Shōzan (佐久間象山) and Yoshida Shōin (吉田松陰),172 which had laid the ideological and institutional foundation for Japan’s continental expansion in the later course of history (Xu, Zhou and Mi, 2014, pp.53–57). In Part I – Chapter 2, which deals with the history from 1894 to 1911, the Chinese authors define the First Sino-Japanese War (1894 – 1895) as not only a large-scale military invasion by Japanese militarism against China and Korea but also a turning point of the modern East Asian international relations (Xu, Zhou, Dai, et al., 2014, p.133). Particularly, it is also argued that Japan’s total invasion against China, starting from the 1937 Marco Polo Bridge Incident, had been foreshadowed by Japanese army’s garrison in Beijing, which was made possible by the signing of Boxer Protocol on 7 September 1901 (ibid., p.139). In Part I – Chapter 3, Wang Jianlang argues that it was Japan’s insistent expansionist China-policy that led to the lack of improvement of the bilateral relations (Wang, 2014, p.197).173 If the three chapters in Part I can be said to have depicted the ideological root of Japan’s invasion, then, Part II narrates how Japan’s militarist intention became unfolded and actualised. In Part II – Chapter 1, Zang Yunhu accentuated the historical necessity of Japan’s invasion: the happening of the Manchurian Incident was a ‘necessary product (biran de chanwu 必然的産物)’ of Japan’s aggressive China policy (臧, 2014, p.276); Japan’s quitting of the League of Nation on 27 March 1933 was a ‘necessary outcome (必然的帰結)’ resulted from the Manchurian Incident and the establishment of Manchukuo (ibid., p.281). Rong Weimu continues to highlight on the historical causality in Part II – Chapter 2, arguing that the Marco Polo Bridge Incident, though considered a coincidence at that time on its own terms, was a necessary outcome of the Japanese militarism from a historical perspective: the all-out war of aggression had its root in Japan’s militarist ideology and the Japanese China Garrison Army (chūtongun 駐屯軍), who stationed at the strategic position in Fengtai (豊台) and whose operation was not in compliance with the Boxer Protocol, had already been there preparing to react to any occurrence of incident as window opportunity to execute the long-

172 It should be highlighted that the Japanese author on this part, Kawashima Shin, points out that Fukuzawa's notion of ‘Leaving Asia’ may not have been as well-received by the Japanese public at the late 19th century as it had been later by the historians in postwar era.

173 (王, 2014, p.197)
planned invasion (Rong, 2014, p.360). In sum, the Chinese scholars laid considerable stress on Japan’s preparedness and intentionality to invade China, implying a very clear attribution of war responsibility and distinction between the victim and the victimizer.

By contrast, the Japanese narrative suggested that the war was not necessarily a result of Japan’s intention to invade. To be specific, the Japanese scholars were at pains to highlight how the history could have ended up differently, how Japan was internally divided, and that how Japan’s invasion was overdetermined by multiple factors, rather than solely predetermined by Japan expansionist intention. In Part I – Chapter 2 ‘Confrontation and Accord: Japan and China Pursue Different Courses’ where the First Sino-Japanese War (1894 –1895) was discussed, Kawashima Shin maintains that ‘[T]he hostility was by no means irreversible at this point, though; it must not be overlooked that a variety of options were still available to both Japan and China in charting their respective futures and in developing Sino-Japanese relations’ (Kawashima, 2014, p.86). In Part I – Chapter 3 ‘Japan’s Continental Expansion Policy and the Chinese National Revolution Movement’, in which the history from 1914 to 1931 is examined, Hattori Ryūji, while recognising that Japan’s issue of the Twenty-one Demand to China was unreasonable, argues that ‘[E]ven so, Japan did not dive precipitously into nonstop expansion onto the continent from this time forward’, and ‘one of the defining characteristics of the period was the potential for cooperation and the attempts made in that direction, such as several projects that aimed to achieve at Sino-Japanese collaboration and cultural exchange’ (Hattori, 2014, p.190). In Part II – Chapter 1 ‘The Manchurian Incident and the Second Sino-Japanese War’, Tobe Ryoichi points out that the Kwantung Army and the Japanese civil government, rather than being two parties under a unified command, were largely mutually malcontent agencies with conflictual political interests and different ideologies; the military leadership within the Kwantung Army was no less factional, since ‘even the more radical elements in the army high command were averse to the idea of seizing Manchuria’ (Tobe, 2014, p.239). In Part II – Chapter 2, ‘The Sino-Japanese War of 1937–45: Japanese Military Invasion and Chinese’, Hatano Sumio and Shōji Junichirō argue that the ‘total war’ was not so ‘total’, because the clashes between the two sides are characterised by two distinct features: first, Japan and China actually avoided official war declaration on each other until 1941, when the game changer, the United States began to fight Pacific War with Japan; second, there had been countless peace feelers (wahei kōsaku 平和工作) during the entire period through various channels sent out by the Japanese (Hatano and Shōji, 2014, p.319). Similarly, Japan’s attempt to send out peace feelers was also stressed at considerable length in a separate section in Part II – Chapter 3, where the
Outbreak of total war between Japan and China is scrutinised (Hatano, 2014, pp.417–419). In brief, the Japanese scholars’ works are characterised by their efforts to demonstrate that the course of history was overdetermined by multiple factors, rather than Japan’s premeditation to invade China, and therefore, the outbreak of the total war was not an outcome conspired by a singular, unified subject.

The Nanking Massacre was a major historical event that reflected how the Chinese and the Japanese researchers approached the Victim-victimizer Duality differently. In terms of research-orientation, whereas the Japanese mainly focused on objective questions, such as ‘What happened during the Nanjing Incident?’ and ‘What objective condition had resulted in the brutalisation?’; by contrast, the Chinese accentuated the subjective cause of the event, and thus ask ‘Why the Japanese committed such a horrific atrocity’ or ‘What psychological propensity made the Japanese brutalise the Chinese?’.

For the Chinese, it was imperative that both sides have an agreement upon the Nanking Massacre’s factual existence. Bu Ping had emphasised in an interview that a mutual agreement on the existence of the Nanking Massacre and a clear-cut recognition of China’s victim identity were the precondition for the joint-research to be initiated. Rong Weimu, who was responsible for writing a part of the modern history, told me how he had a disagreement with his Japanese counterpart over the research of the Nanking Massacre: in one of the research seminars, a Japanese researcher contended that the Chinese KMT army also had responsibility for the happening of the atrocity, because all information available to the KMT army at that time suggested that the army garrisoned in Nanking could not stand a chance against the Japanese troops; should they have surrendered, many lives could have been saved. Rong Weimu strongly disagreed with the Japanese scholar’s argument and replied that ‘it was our choice to fight’ and that ‘the battle was a matter of national integrity’. Throughout, Rong maintained that positioning the Chinese as the victimised in the war and the Japanese army the victimizer was a ‘matter of right and wrong (dashi dafei, 大是大非)’. The Japanese were rather discontent with the Chinese approach. As Tobe Ryoichi told me, the Chinese research of the Nanking Massacre had been overridden by a sort of ‘presumption of guilt’ – they took the existence of the Nanking Massacre as absolutely unquestionable before any empirical research was done, blocking any further discussion of the event.

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174 Interview with Tobe Ryoichi.
175 Interview with Bu Ping.
176 Interview with Rong Weimu.
177 Interview with Rong Weimu.
178 Interview with Tobe Ryoichi.
The two different ways of approaching the research, from the Lacanian perspective, can be seen as two different strategies adopted to confront the disruption of the Victim-victimizer Duality. The Chinese enacted the master’s discourse, articulating a categorical acknowledgement of the Nanking Massacre; also, the Chinese research was organised by the master-signifier of ‘victimhood’ to stress the brutality of the Japanese soldiers and the culpability of Japan’s militarist policies. The Japanese adopted the university’s discourse: knowledge, rather than value, spoke as the authority; attentions were given to technical details rather than value judgment; but in this discourse, the master-signifier was hidden, rendering the text appeared as ‘unstructured’, as complained by their Chinese counterpart. ‘Objective’ research of such kind could not satisfy what the Chinese side desired, i.e., a clear-cut recognition of victimhood from Japan. The Japanese research gave the Chinese precisely the opposite: attention to details and explorations of the multiple potentials in the political process rendered value judgement elusive, deconstructing the pre-pre-established understanding of victimhood.

**Discussion**

The Nanking Massacre Debate disrupted the smooth functioning of the Symbolic, the Victim-victimizer Duality that structured Japan and China’s subject positions (identities). To confront the disruption of the Victim-victimizer Duality, the Chinese government enacted the master’s discourse with the master-signifier of the Tokyo Trial; the Japanese government enacted the university’s discourse to repress the master-signifier; some Japanese right-leaning politicians enacted the hysteric’s discourse to challenge the master-signifier. I will recapitulate the discursive process in the following sub-sections.

**The master’s Discourse enacted by the Chinese government**

The Chinese government enacted the master’s discourse with the master-signifier of the Tokyo Trial. More specifically, the agent in the Chinese discourse tended to speak from a position of authority. It defined the death toll of the Nanking Massacre as unquestionable and grounded the argumentation on the verdict of the Tokyo Trial. The articulation of the master-signifier repressed the dividedness of the subject’s identity – i.e., that the victim’s identity was contested and contestable; it also produced anxieties in the others.
1) In the master’s discourse, the speaking agent was a master-signifier representing value, judgment, and coherent identity (Bracher, 1997, p.111). The Chinese discourse on the Nanking Massacre, thus, can be recognised as a master’s discourse in that the agent spoke from a position of coherent identity and judgment. With the master-signifier of the Tokyo Trial, the master’s discourse grounded its assertion regarding the Nanking Massacre, including the death toll of 300,000. When the Japanese denialists violated the Victim-victimizer Duality, the Chinese government used the Tokyo Trial as a counterargument against them (S1 → S2).

2) The articulation of the master-signifier repressed the fragmentation and dividedness of the subject, who feels insecure about the coherency of their identity (S1/$) – this corresponded to the process by which the Chinese authority established the Nanking Massacre as a national trauma in the 1980s: the Nanking Massacre made its way into China’s official narrative as a response to the Textbook Issue of 1982, an event that signified the breaching of the ‘political foundation’ of Sino-Japanese relations, i.e., the Victim-victimizer Duality. Thus, the Chinese government asserted its normative authority to cover up the subject’s anxiety over its fragmented (victim) identity.

3) The enactment of the master’s discourse, however, produced resentment among the Japanese. The signifying chain (S1 → S2) – the Chinese discourse on the Nanking Massacre – created a leftover, excessive anxieties that could not be verbalised. This process corresponded to the fact that some questions – for instance, the number of casualty and the secondary responsibility of the Chinese troops – became so politically sensitive that it could no longer be discussed in official channels: as the subject positions of the victim and the victimizer were established as categorical, the Chinese government saw any discourse that challenged the verdict as violation of the master-signifier, i.e., a ‘reverse
of the verdict (fan an 翻案)’. The object-cause of desire represents an unspeakable resentment held by some of the Japanese politicians and motivated the Japanese denialists (e.g., Ishihara Shintaro) to challenge the death toll and even the very existence of the Nanking Massacre, producing a hysteric’s discourse ($/a→S1/S2).

The hysteric’s discourse enacted by the right-leaning Japanese politicians

In the hysteric’s discourse, the agent spoke from a position of being alienated and divided; it challenged the master-signifier, desiring to receive a solution to their unease. The hysteric’s discourse corresponded to the speech articulated by some right-leaning, conservative politicians, who denied the existence or/and the death toll by challenging the narrative of the Tokyo Trial.

$ \rightarrow S1$

$a \quad // \quad S2$

1) In the hysteric’s discourse, the agent (the speaker) was the divided subject who questioned the master-signifier. In the Japanese political circle, the politicians who denied or questioned the Chinese narrative of the Nanking Massacre invariably challenged the narrative of the Tokyo Trial ($\rightarrow S1$). The right-leaning politicians protested that China’s anti-Japanese propaganda degraded Japan’s national prestige and Japan’s nationhood by arguing that the Tokyo Trial was a ‘victor’s justice’ that should be reassessed. And as the discourse of the Nanking Massacre, as they proclaimed, was ‘originated from the Tokyo Trial’, the Nanking Massacre was no more than an anti-Japanese hoax fabricated by the victors.

2) The agent’s speech act, in the hysteric’s discourse, was motivated unconsciously by an unease ($/a$). For instance, when Ishihara spoke of the Nanking Massacre hysterically: he called China with the derogatory word shina; he blustered and boasted, showing a
boorish insensitivity to express his discontent over China’s anti-Japanese agenda. The hysterical way that Ishihara spoke about the Nanking Massacre signified the unease that underpinned his fragmented speech ($/a$). The unease was represented as the object-cause of desire, because the unease was underrepresented and could not find expression in the official channel dominated by the Victim-victimizer Duality.

3) The divided subject challenged the master-signifier and demanded a solution to their unease. The solution, in the Japanese case, was the production of knowledge ($\rightarrow$ S1/S2). Whenever the right-leaning politicians challenged the Chinese narrative of the Nanking Massacre, they requested the ruling party to adopt more hawkish measures to confront the Chinese narrative. The Japanese government responded to their interrogations by framing the Nanking Massacre as an academic issue to be resolved in the future. The knowledge, however, could not satisfy the hysterical unease ($a/\rightarrow$).

The university’ discourse enacted by the Japanese government

The Japanese government enacted the university’s discourse to confront the breach of the Symbolic. Rather than straightforwardly yielding to the verdict of the Tokyo Trial, the Japanese official agenda was to maintain that the Nanking Massacre be subject to academic scrutiny. The Japanese government spoke from a position of knowledge and expertise, rather than value or judgment; it interpellated the object-cause of desire, the mystery of the Nanking Massacre. However, it produced more ambiguity than certainty in determining the identity of the victim and the victimizer by hiding the master-signifier, i.e., the Tokyo Trial.

1) The Japanese government, whether confronted with the Left or the Right, maintained that the description of the Nanking Massacre in history textbooks should be subject to the academic paradigm. Such discourse was shared by Mizutani, who regarded Azuma’s diary and memory as unreliable on the Chinese television programme, maintaining that Azuma’s account was ‘inaccurate’ due to his old age. The Japanese research in the Japan-China Joint History Research demonstrated a similar attitude of putting strong stress on the objectivity of the research. They all spoke from a position of scholarship and expertise (S2) to discipline and contain the problem (S2$\rightarrow$a) in terms of academic technicalities.
2) The agent (S2) repressed and covered up the master-signifier. In the Japanese discourse, both the Japanese government and the researchers in the Japan-China Joint History Research Project ground their argument towards the Nanking Massacre on the positivist paradigm of historical studies. Thus, the researchers avoided using the verdict of the Tokyo Trial, the master-signifier of the master’s discourse enacted by the Chinese (S2/S1). The repression of the master-signifier enabled the Japanese side to postpone giving a definitive answer about the Victim-victimizer Duality as demanded by the Chinese. For the Japanese side, the event was still unclear, and therefore, ‘more research has to be done’. The Japanese approach did not further undermine the Symbolic of Sino-Japanese (i.e., the Victim-victimizer Duality), but it created no resolution to the transnational controversy, either.

3) Can the university’s discourse ameliorate the burden of the past? Hardly, because the university’s discourse created more uncertainty than certainty as to the issue of identity. The Japan-China Joint History Research was a pertinent example: the Japanese research, meticulous and rigorous as it was, focused on demonstrating the ‘multiple possibilities in the course of Sino-Japanese history’. As Kawashima Shin suggested, the aim of the project was to promote mutual understanding and the spirit of ‘agree to disagree’ (Kawashima, 2010 p.19). However, the well-intended agenda led to more division of the victim identity, making the Chinese feel insecure (S2→a/S): the outbreak of the Second Sino-Japanese War was not necessarily premeditated, Japan was not a unified subject, the KMT Army might have committed arson that hurt the Chinese, and the KMT could have surrendered to avoid the tragedy. Thus, the Japanese approach to the history of Sino-Japanese war brought about the fragmentation of the Chinese victim identity. Because of a lack of clear-cut recognition of the Victim-victimizer Duality, the Chinese government did not propagate the research actively. Eventually, the report of the Japan-China Joint History Research, released in 2010, did not generate impacts upon the bilateral relations proportional to its initiation process.

Summary

In this chapter, I have argued that the Nanking Massacre Debate emerged and persisted as a discursive process by which social agents in China and Japan enacted different discourses to confront the disruption of the Victim-victimizer Duality. The Chinese government enacted the
master’s discourse with the master-signifier of the Tokyo Trial to counter the denialist account that breached the Victim-victimizer Duality, and to repress the dividedness of the Chinese identity structured therein. The Japanese government enacted the university’s discourse to repress the master-signifier of the Tokyo Trial imposed by the Chinese, framing the Nanking Massacre in terms of technicalities that could only be resolved by further academic researches. Some Japanese politicians enacted the hysteric’s discourse to challenge the master-signifier of the Tokyo Trial in order to deny the Victim-victimizer Duality. The examination of the Azuma phenomenon and the Japan-China Joint History Research Committee further showed that knowledge could not serve as a common ground that made resolving the Nanking Massacre Debate possible. This was the case because the university’s discourse tended to repress the articulation of a definitive moral judgement and make the subject’s identity more uncertain. The uncertainty of identity was exactly what set the ‘history problem’ in motion in the first place.
Chapter 8: Conclusion

In this thesis, I have sought to account for the persistence of the ‘history problem’ in Sino-Japanese relations from 1982 to 2012 with a Lacanian approach. I have reviewed the existing literature, laid out the methodology and database, and analysed three sub-issues of the ‘history problem’. In this chapter, I will recapitulate my argument, foreground some of the implications of the thesis for the studies of Sino-Japanese relations and IR theory, and then point out directions for future research.

Recapitulation of the Research Questions and Arguments

What accounts for the persistence of the ‘history problem’ discourse in Sino-Japanese relations since the 1980s? My answer to the research question is twofold: 1) The ‘history problem’ was a discourse revolving around the ‘Victim-victimizer Duality’, a bilateral norm that relationally structured Japan and China’s respective subject position (identity) as the victimizer and the victim; 2) The ‘history problem’ persisted, because the different psychoanalytic discourses that social agents on both sides used in confronting the destabilisation of the Victim-victimizer Duality had created a vicious circle: whilst the Chinese government demanded Japan recognise its victim identity, the Japanese government responded with technical solutions that fragmentised China’s victim identity, making the Chinese government more assertive in demanding recognition of its victimhood from Japan. Since the Textbook Issue of 1982, the vicious circle accumulated more and more fragmentation of identity, anxieties, dissatisfaction and resentment in Sino-Japanese relations, thereby turning the ‘history problem’ into a persistent political discourse.

I arrived at the argument by analysing three sub-issues of the ‘history problem’ in Chapter 5, Chapter 6, and Chapter 7. Although each sub-issue has its own characteristics, they all centred around the destabilising of the Victim-victimizer Duality, a bilateral norm that structured Japan and China’s relationship as one between the victimizer and the victim. Thus, the ‘history problem’ persisted as a process of negotiating the bilateral norm: the Chinese government insisted on maintaining the Victim-victimizer Duality, while the Japanese political circle resisted giving it a full recognition.

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179 The Textbook Issue revolved around whether the Japan’s war against China during the WWII should be defined as ‘war of aggression’, the Yasukuni Issue revolved around the narrative of the ‘Militarist/People Dichotomy’ which the Chinese used to attribute Japan’s war responsibility, and the Nanking Massacre revolved around the legitimacy of the Tokyo Trial.
Thus, the Textbook Issue of 1982 marked the first time when the Chinese government and Japanese political circle coped with the destabilisation of the bilateral norm that defined their identities. To confront the destabilisation of their identities, the Chinese government enacted the master’s discourse, instituting master-signifiers to impose the Victim-victimizer Duality on the bilateral relations; the Japanese government enacted the university’s discourse to repress the master-signifiers imposed by the Chinese government; some Japanese conservatives in the parliament enacted the hysteric’s discourse to challenge the master-signifiers imposed by the Chinese government. In other words, the ‘history problem’ was a discursive process by which social agents involved enacted different psychoanalytic discourses (fantasies) to compensate for the uncertainty of the bilateral norm.

Why different social agents deployed different psychoanalytic discourses (fantasies)? Because by the performance of different psychoanalytic discourses was driven by different unconscious truth. The Chinese government enacted the master’s discourse, because the master’s discourse repressed the dividedness of China’s victim identity through the articulation of a master-signifier (S1/$). The Japanese government enacted the university’s discourse, because the university’s discourse repressed the master-signifier, giving the Japanese government a mean to neutralise the Chinese demand for a ‘correct historical understanding’ without articulating a definitive stance on the Victim-victimizer Duality (S2/S1). The right-leaning Japanese politicians enacted the hysteric’s discourse, because they were driven by deep-seated dissatisfaction over how China perpetuated Japan’s victimizer identity ($/a).

The discursive effects produced in social agents’ interactions created a vicious circle, in which the Chinese government demanded recognition of victimhood from Japan while the Japanese government responded with the university’s discourse that fragmentised China’s victimhood. As illustrated in the analysis, the three sub-issues of the ‘history problem’ was mainly dominated by China’s master’s discourse and Japan’s university’s discourse. While the former created anxieties (S1→S2/a), the latter fragmentised the addressee’s subjective identity (S2→a/$). In the context of the ‘history problem’, this means that interactions between the Chinese and the Japanese government had reproduced, on the one hand, anxieties among the Japanese (S1→S2/a), and on the other hand, uncertainty over the victim identity among the Chinese (S2→a/$). In other words, the ways the Chinese government and the Japanese government communicated the ‘history problem’ had resulted in a ‘downward spiral’: the more they interacted, the more the interactions created anxieties among the Japanese and fragmentation of identity among the Chinese.

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The only Lacanian discourse that has not appeared in the ‘history problem’ is the analyst’s discourse. The analyst’s discourse, according to Lacan, is the only discourse that can transform social relations. In this discourse, the agent is informed by subjective knowledge about the divided subject; the agent addresses the divided subject, making the latter articulate a new master-signifier that re-organises the pre-existing social relations. The analyst’s discourse can only be initiated by a process of openly listening and understanding the Other without making moral judgments (like a psychoanalyst), rather than by reading events through one’s pre-existing ideological framework.¹⁸⁰ In the ‘history problem’ discourse, one of the few occasions where the analyst’s discourse was enacted was Azuma’s confession of his conducts in the Nan-king Massacre in front of the Chinese audience in the Chinese television programme in 2000. Through his confession, he embodied the object-cause of desire for the fragmented subject, Chinese audience ($ \rightarrow \$): ‘I was a Japanese soldier, the object of your hatred. I confess what I did in the Nanking Massacre. Now, what do you want from me?’ But unfortunately, Azuma’s efforts had been largely compromised, if not entirely thwarted, by the university’s discourse enacted by Mizutani who framed Azuma’s diary and confession in terms of technicalities (See: Chapter 7, p.194). A change of the ‘history problem’ may need more agents like Azuma to speak out. But because such effort has been rather limited in Sino-Japanese relations, the prospect of a bilateral reconciliation over the ‘history problem’ looks rather bleak for now.

Implications

The aim in this study was set against a research gap in IR, a gap that is characterised by a lack of effective analysis of the subjective dimension of the ‘history problem’ in particular and in international politics in general. The thesis fills the research gap by analysing empirical data of the Chinese and the Japanese governmental discourses with the Lacanian Discourse Approach, an approach of discourse analysis that synthesised the Lacanian psychoanalytic theory, the poststructuralist research design, and the coding technique of the Grounded Method Theory (see: Chapter 3). With new empirical insights and theoretical novelty, this thesis made several contributions to the existing body of knowledge in both area studies and IR.

¹⁸⁰ The group of people who are most suitable for initiating the analyst’s discourse are historians and scholars who have accumulated knowledge about the ‘history problem’ and are able to address the ‘divided subject ($\$’ – that is, the Chinese subject who feels their victim identity is under threat and the Japanese subject who are dissatisfied with their identity as the victimizer.
Accordingly, the first major contribution of the thesis is that it offers new insights into how to account for the persistence of the ‘history problem’ from a perspective that foregrounds the subjective factors in politics. Policymakers, journalists, historians, and political scientists have long called for paying attention to the dimension of human subjectivity and psychology in analysing the ‘history problem’ (see: p.10). However, a considerable proportion of the literature on the ‘history problem’ between Japan and China (and Korea) tended to perceive the ‘history problem’ as a result of political manipulation of the elites, circumventing the salience of subjective factors in international politics. Although some political scientists have done IR-grounded research that informed the significance of identity in Sino-Japanese relations, no research has been done from a perspective explicitly informed by psychoanalytic theories. The lack of psychoanalytic intervention into this area is accounted for not only by the disciplinary suspicion against psychoanalysis in the IR paradigm but also, more importantly, due to the lack of workable methodologies to render the slippery ‘subjectivity’ tangible and analysable in IR. Looking through the lens of the Lacanian psychoanalytic theory, this thesis has shown that the ‘history problem’ was caused by the different ways social agents in Japan and China negotiated the destabilisation of an international norm that structured their identities. In addition, this thesis also raises an objection to the conventional view that more thorough historical research holds promise for ameliorating the tension over the past between the two nations. From a Lacanian perspective, technical knowledge is far from politics-free and neutral; rather, it often serves to repress the articulation of new identities.

A second important implication of the thesis is that the research develops a workable methodology to facilitate the analysis of the subjective dimension of IR. When it comes to the studies of the subjective dimension of international politics and social movements, there are two common obstacles that researcher may run into, one theoretical, the other technical: First, the theoretical obstacle is about how to analyse subjectivities in international politics without having to reify collective agents; second, the technical obstacle is about how to develop a workable methodology systematically analyse the interrelations between human subjectivity and political/social formation.

This thesis developed a research methodology to tackle both obstacles. First, the Lacanian Discourse Approach (LDA) circumvents the reification of states by conceptualising states as ‘speaking subjects’, whose identities are defined by the subject positions that the intersubjective network (i.e., the Symbolic) imposed on them. Thus, we are allowed to analyse the subjective dimension of states, not because they are some kind of humanlike ‘supra-organism’, but
rather because collective identity and individual identity are both socially and discursively constructed. Second, we can analyse the subjective dimension of international politics by devising the poststructuralist research design and the coding technique of the Grounded Theory Method. Whereas the former provides us with an intertextual model that can guide the sampling process and define the scope of the analysis, the latter provides us with flexible coding schemes to abstract, refine, and formulate hypotheses. Throughout, by merging the poststructuralist research design and the coding technique of Grounded Theory Method with the Lacanian psychoanalytic theory, this research developed a research framework that could be tangibly used by other researchers who have research interests in studying how subjective factors shaped the formation of international relations and what made certain political discourse (e.g., the ‘history problem’ between Japan and China) persistent.

**Limitation of the Research and Future Direction**

The thesis has analysed the ‘history problem’ discourse at the governmental level. However, the thesis has not included in its analytic scope the cultural representations at more popular levels. So whereas the thesis has illustrated the official discourses constructed around the ‘history problem’, how the ‘history problem’ has been articulated with the non-official discourses remained understudied. In fact, at the initial stage of the research, I considered the potential of including the non-official discourses into the analytic scope. However, I eventually discarded such an attempt due to the concern was that the monumental quantity of data would go beyond the analytic capacity of a PhD thesis. Therefore, the future research of the ‘history problem’ can be very much enhanced by including cultural representation and marginalised discourses in the wider spectrum of the Japanese and Chinese society.

Also, it should be noted that this thesis did not address some other sub-issues in the ‘history problem’, such as the comfort women issue, the chemical weapon issues, and the compensation movements, etc. With former Chinese comfort women breaking the silence about their traumatic experience, the comfort women issue between Japan and China have attracted more and more public attention. If the bilateral relations worsened in the future, it would not be a surprise that the comfort women issue becomes a new frontier of the ‘history problem’. Though I have justified the reason for excluding them from the thesis, it should be admitted that the study of the ‘history problem’ discourse in Sino-Japanese relations can be greatly improved by including these cases in future studies.
Finally, the research can be extended in comparative and longitudinal ways. For example, I have in this research argued that the ‘history problem’ was a discourse centred around the Victim-victimizer Duality. Further research can thus elaborate on this point by studying comparatively the ‘history problem’ between Japan and Korea to exact the differences and commonality that the Japan-Korea and Japan-China dyads have. In addition, the comparative research could be extended to the France-Germany or Poland-Germany dyad. Also, further research can also take a historical perspective to ask whether or not, and how, the Victim-victimizer Duality had functioned in Sino-Japanese relations before the Textbook Issue of 1982.

**Concluding Remarks**

This thesis has analysed the ‘history problem’ discourse through the lens of psychoanalysis and sheds light on the importance of looking at the subjective dimension of international politics. International politics is not just about material factors, but is fundamentally infused with subjective factors such as identity, emotions, affect, memories, and fantasies. Why do interpretations of the past become a source of conflict between nations? From a Lacanian perspective, it is because the history is the Real, a realm where the subject maintains a certain agency to control its subject position through the projection of fantasies. This is well demonstrated by the ‘history problem’ discourse, a process by which social agents in Japan and China negotiated their subject positions and sustained their autonomy by enacting different fantasies. This process shows that history is not merely an impartial system of knowledge; rather, it is a public context embedding an international community, whose self-images are determined relationally by the subject positions procured therein. The construction of an ‘imagined community’ relies on a shared history that configured subject positions that all parties involved agree to occupy. In North East Asia, an effort to build up such a shared history has been lacking, perhaps with the rare exception of former Japanese Prime Minister Hatoyama, whose grand project of the East Asian Community was initiated by making apologies for Japan’s past wrongdoings to the Chinese and the Koreans. But Hatoyama’s apologetic China policy did not work in his favour. His failure reminds us that the speech alone is sometimes a blunt tool for crafting identities anew. As Lacan reminds us, to articulate new identities, we need more listening rather than speaking: it is with the analyst’s discourse – the discourse in which the agent listens to and understands the other impartially, making itself the object-cause of desire for the other – that social revolution and change of human relationships may emerge. However, this is yet to happen in Sino-Japanese relations.
Reference


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Appendix I

Here are the four political documents that constitute the political foundation of bilateral relations:

I. Joint Communique of the Government of Japan and the Government of the People's Republic of China

Prime Minister Kakuei Tanaka of Japan visited the People's Republic of China at the invitation of Premier of the State Council Chou En-lai of the People's Republic of China from September 25 to September 30, 1972. Accompanying Prime Minister Tanaka were Minister for Foreign Affairs Masayoshi Ohira, Chief Cabinet Secretary Susumu Nikaido and other government officials.

Chairman Mao Tse-tung met Prime Minister Kakuei Tanaka on September 27. They had an earnest and friendly conversation.

Prime Minister Tanaka and Minister for Foreign Affairs Ohira had an earnest and frank exchange of views with Premier Chou En-lai and Minister for Foreign Affairs Chi Peng-fei in a friendly atmosphere throughout on the question of the normalization of relations between Japan and China and other problems between the two countries as well as on other matters of interest to both sides, and agreed to issue the following Joint Communique of the two Governments:

Japan and China are neighbouring countries, separated only by a strip of water with a long history of traditional friendship. The peoples of the two countries earnestly desire to put an end to the abnormal state of affairs that has hitherto existed between the two countries. The realization of the aspiration of the two peoples for the termination of the state of war and the normalization of relations between Japan and China will add a new page to the annals of relations between the two countries.

The Japanese side is keenly conscious of the responsibility for the serious damage that Japan caused in the past to the Chinese people through war, and deeply reproaches itself. Further, the Japanese side reaffirms its position that it intends to realize the normalization of relations be-

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tween the two countries from the stand of fully understanding "the three principles for the restoration of relations" put forward by the Government of the People's Republic of China. The Chinese side expresses its welcome for this.

In spite of the differences in their social systems existing between the two countries, the two countries should, and can, establish relations of peace and friendship. The normalization of relations and development of good-neighborly and friendly relations between the two countries are in the interests of the two peoples and will contribute to the relaxation of tension in Asia and peace in the world.

1. The abnormal state of affairs that has hitherto existed between Japan and the People's Republic of China is terminated on the date on which this Joint Communique is issued.


3. The Government of the People's Republic of China reiterates that Taiwan is an inalienable part of the territory of the People's Republic of China. The Government of Japan fully understands and respects this stand of the Government of the People's Republic of China, and it firmly maintains its stand under Article 8 of the Potsdam Proclamation.

4. The Government of Japan and the Government of People's Republic of China have decided to establish diplomatic relations as from September 29, 1972. The two Governments have decided to take all necessary measures for the establishment and the performance of the functions of each other's embassy in their respective capitals in accordance with international law and practice, and to exchange ambassadors as speedily as possible.

5. The Government of the People's Republic of China declares that in the interest of the friendship between the Chinese and the Japanese peoples, it renounces its demand for war reparation from Japan.

6. The Government of Japan and the Government of the People's Republic of China agree to establish relations of perpetual peace and friendship between the two countries on the basis of the principles of mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual non-aggression, non-interference in each other's internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit and peaceful coexistence.
The two Governments confirm that, in conformity with the foregoing principles and the principles of the Charter of the United Nations, Japan and China shall in their mutual relations settle all disputes by peaceful means and shall refrain from the use or threat of force.

7. The normalization of relations between Japan and China is not directed against any third country. Neither of the two countries should seek hegemony in the Asia-Pacific region and each is opposed to efforts by any other country or group of countries to establish such hegemony.

8. The Government of Japan and the Government of the People's Republic of China have agreed that, with a view to solidifying and developing the relations of peace and friendship between the two countries, the two Governments will enter into negotiations for the purpose of concluding a treaty of peace and friendship.

9. The Government of Japan and the Government of the People's Republic of China have agreed that, with a view to further promoting relations between the two countries and to expanding interchanges of people, the two Governments will, as necessary and taking account of the existing non-governmental arrangements, enter into negotiations for the purpose of concluding agreements concerning such matters as trade, shipping, aviation, and fisheries.

Done at Peking, September 29, 1972

Prime Minister of Japan

Minister for Foreign Affairs of Japan

Premier of the State Council of the People's Republic of China

Minister for Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China
II. Treaty of Peace and Friendship between Japan and the People’s Republic of China

Japan and the People's Republic of China,

Recalling with satisfaction that since the Government of Japan and the Government of the People's Republic of China issued a Joint Communique in Peking on September 29, 1972, the friendly relations between the two Governments and the peoples of the two countries have developed greatly on a new basis.

Confirming that the above-mentioned Joint Communique constitutes the basis of the relations of peace and friendship between the two countries and that the principles enunciated in the Joint Communique should be strictly observed.

Confirming that the principles of the Charter of the United Nations should be fully respected.

Hoping to contribute to peace and stability in Asia and in the world.

For the purpose of solidifying and developing the relations of peace and friendship between the two countries.

Have resolved to conclude a Treaty of Peace and Friendship and for that purpose have appointed as their Plenipotentiaries:

Japan: Minister for Foreign Affairs Sunao Sonoda

People's Republic of China: Minister of Foreign Affairs Huang Hua

Who, having communicated to each other their full powers, found to be in good and due form, have agreed as follows:

[Article I]
1. The Contracting Parties shall develop relations of perpetual peace and friendship between the two countries on the basis of the principles of mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual non-aggression, non-interference in each other's internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit and peaceful co-existence.

2. The Contracting Parties confirm that, in conformity with the foregoing principles and the principles of the Charter of the United Nations, they shall in their mutual relations settle all disputes by peaceful means and shall refrain from the use or threat of force.

[Article II]

The Contracting Parties declare that neither of them should seek hegemony in the Asia-Pacific region or in any other region and that each is opposed to efforts by any other country or group of countries to establish such hegemony.

[Article III]

The Contracting parties shall, in the good-neighborly and friendly spirit and in conformity with the principles of equality and mutual benefit and non-interference in each other's internal affairs, endeavor to further develop economic and cultural relations between the two countries and to promote exchanges between the peoples of the two countries.

[Article IV]

The present Treaty shall not affect the position of either Contracting Party regarding its relations with third countries.

[Article V]

1. The present Treaty shall be ratified and shall enter into force on the date of the exchange of instruments of ratification which shall take place at Tokyo. The present Treaty shall remain in force for ten years and thereafter shall continue to be in force until terminated in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 2.

2. Either Contracting Party may, by giving one year's written notice to the other Contracting Party, terminate the present Treaty at the end of the initial ten-year period or at any time thereafter.
III. Japan-China Joint Declaration on Building a Partnership of Friendship and Cooperation for Peace and Development

26 November 1998

In response to an invitation extended by the Government of Japan, President Jiang Zemin of the People's Republic of China made an official visit to Japan as a State Guest from 25 to 30 November 1998. On the occasion of this historically significant first visit to Japan by a President of the People's Republic of China, President Jiang met with His Majesty the Emperor of Japan, and held an intensive exchange of views with Prime Minister Keizo Obuchi on the international situation, regional issues and the overall Japan-China relationship. They attained a broad common view and, based on the success of this visit, declared as follows:

I

Both sides shared the view that as the world in the post-Cold War era continues to undergo great changes toward the creation of a new international order, further economic globalization is deepening interdependence and security dialogue and cooperation are making constant progress. Peace and development remain major issues facing the human society. It is therefore the common wish of the international community to build a new international political and economic order which is fair and rational, and to strive for a peaceful international environment in the twenty-first century that is even more firmly rooted.

Both sides reaffirmed that the principles of mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual non-aggression, non-interference in each other's internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit and peaceful co-existence, as well as the principles of the Charter of the United Nations, are the basic norms for relations between states.

Both sides positively evaluate the efforts made by the United Nations to preserve world peace and to promote the economic and social development of the world, and believe that the United Nations should play an important role in building and maintaining a new international order. Both sides express support for the reforms of the United Nations including the reform of the

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183 https://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/china/visit98/joint.html
Security Council, in order for the United Nations to further embody the common wish and collective will of all Members in its activities and policy decision making process.

Both sides stress the importance of the ultimate elimination of nuclear weapons, and oppose the proliferation of nuclear weapons in any form whatsoever, and furthermore, strongly call upon the nations concerned to cease all nuclear testing and nuclear arms race, in order to contribute to the peace and stability of the Asian region and the world.

Both sides believe that both Japan and China, as nations influential in the Asian region and the world, bear an important responsibility for preserving peace and promoting development. Both sides will strengthen coordination and cooperation in the areas such as international politics, international economy, and global issues, thus positively contributing to the endeavor for the peace and development of the world aimed at the progress of humanity.

II

Both sides believe that, after the Cold War, the Asian region has continued to move toward stability and the regional cooperation has deepened further. In addition, both sides are convinced that this region will exert greater influence on international politics, economics and security and will continue to play an important role in the coming century.

Both sides reiterate that it is the unshakable fundamental policy of the two countries to maintain the peace of this region and to promote its development, and that they will not seek hegemony in the Asian region and settle all disputes by peaceful means, without recourse to the use or threat of force.

Both sides expressed their great interest in the current financial crisis in East Asia and the ensuing difficulties for the Asian economy. At the same time, both sides recognize that the economic foundation of this region is sound, and firmly believe that by advancing rational adjustment and reform based on experiences, as well as by enhancing regional and international coordination and cooperation, the economy of Asia will definitely overcome its difficulties and continue to develop. Both sides affirmed that they would positively meet the various challenges that they faced, and would respectively make their utmost efforts toward promoting the economic development of the region.
Both sides believe that stable relations among the major nations of the Asia-Pacific region are extremely important for the peace and stability of this region. Both sides shared the view that they would actively participate in all multilateral activities in this region, such as the ASEAN Regional Forum, promote coordination and cooperation, and support all measures for enhancing understanding and strengthening confidence.

III

Both sides reviewed the bilateral relationship since the normalization of relations between Japan and China, and expressed satisfaction with the remarkable development in all areas, including politics, economics, culture and personnel exchanges. Further, both sides shared the view that under the current situation cooperation between the two countries is growing in importance, and that further strengthening and developing the friendly and cooperative relations between the two countries not only serve the fundamental interests of their peoples, but also positively contribute to the peace and development of the Asia-Pacific region and the world as a whole. Both sides reaffirmed that the Japan-China relationship is one of the most important bilateral relationships for the respective country, deeply recognized the role and responsibility of both countries in achieving peace and development, and expressed their resolve to establish a partnership of friendship and cooperation for peace and development toward the twenty-first century.

Both sides restated that they will observe the principles of the Joint Communique of the Government of Japan and the Government of the People's Republic of China, issued on 29 September 1972 and the Treaty of Peace and Friendship between Japan and the People's Republic of China, signed on 12 August 1978, and reaffirmed that the above-mentioned documents will continue to be the most important foundation for the bilateral relations.

Both sides are of the view that Japan and China share a history of friendly exchanges spanning more than 2,000 years, as well as a common cultural background, and that it is the common desire of the peoples of the two countries to continue this tradition of friendship and to further develop mutually beneficial cooperation.

Both sides believe that squarely facing the past and correctly understanding history are the important foundation for further developing relations between Japan and China. The Japanese
side observes the 1972 Joint Communique of the Government of Japan and the Government of the People's Republic of China and the 15 August 1995 Statement by former Prime Minister Tomiichi Murayama. The Japanese side is keenly conscious of the responsibility for the serious distress and damage that Japan caused to the Chinese people through its aggression against China during a certain period in the past and expressed deep remorse for this. The Chinese side hopes that the Japanese side will learn lessons from the history and adhere to the path of peace and development. Based on this, both sides will develop long-standing relations of friendship.

Both sides shared the view that expanding personnel exchanges between the two countries is extremely important for advancing mutual understanding and enhancing mutual trust.

Both sides confirmed an annual visit by a leader of either country to the other, the establishment of a Tokyo-Beijing hot line between the two Governments, and the further enhancement of personnel exchanges at all levels, in particular among the younger generation who will shoulder the heavy burden of the future development of the two countries.

Both sides shared the view that, based on the principles of equality and mutual benefit, they will formulate long-term, stable, cooperative economic and trade relations, and will further expand cooperation in such areas as high technology, information, environmental protection, agriculture and infrastructure. The Japanese side reiterated that a stable, open and developing China is significant for the peace and development of the Asia-Pacific region and the entire world, and restated its policy of continuing cooperation and assistance for the economic development of China. The Chinese side expressed its gratitude for the economic cooperation extended by Japan to China. The Japanese side reiterated that it will continue to support China's efforts for the early accession to the WTO.

Both sides positively evaluated the beneficial role played by their bilateral security dialogue in increasing mutual understanding, and shared the view that they would further strengthen this dialogue mechanism.

The Japanese side continues to maintain its stand on the Taiwan issue which was set forth in the Joint Communique of the Government of Japan and the Government of the People's Republic of China and reiterates its understanding that there is one China. Japan will continue to maintain its exchanges of private and regional nature with Taiwan.
Both sides affirmed that, based on the principles of the Joint Communique of the Government of Japan and the Government of the People's Republic of China and the Treaty of Peace and Friendship between Japan and the People's Republic of China, and following the spirit of seeking common major benefits while setting aside minor differences, they would work to maximize their common interests and minimize their differences, and, through friendly consultations, appropriately handle the issues, differences of opinion and disputes which currently exist and may arise in the future, thereby avoiding any restraint or obstacle to development of friendly relations between the two countries.

Both sides believe that through establishment of a partnership of friendship and cooperation for peace and development, the bilateral relations will enter a new level of development. To this end, a wide range of participation and sustained effort not only of both Governments, but also of the peoples of both countries, is essential. Both sides firmly believe that, if the peoples of both countries, hand-in-hand, thoroughly demonstrate the spirit shown in this Declaration, it will not only contribute to the friendship of the peoples of both countries for generations to come, but also make an important contribution to the peace and development of the Asia-Pacific region and of the world.
IV. Joint Statement between the Government of Japan and the Government of the People's Republic of China on Comprehensive Promotion of a ‘Mutually Beneficial Relationship Based on Common Strategic Interests’¹⁸⁴

In response to an invitation extended by the Government of Japan, President Hu Jintao of the People's Republic of China made an official visit to Japan as a state guest from May 6 to May 10, 2008. During his visit to Japan, President Hu met with His Majesty the Emperor of Japan. President Hu also had talks with Prime Minister Yasuo Fukuda, and they reached a common understanding on various points related to the comprehensive promotion of a "mutually beneficial relationship based on common strategic interests" and issued the following joint statement.

The two sides recognized that the Japan-China relationship is one of the most important bilateral relationships for each of the two countries and that Japan and China now have great influence on and bear a solemn responsibility for peace, stability, and development of the Asia-Pacific region and the world. They also recognized that the two countries' sole option is to cooperate to enhance peace and friendship over the long term. The two sides resolved to comprehensively promote a "mutually beneficial relationship based on common strategic interests" and to achieve the noble objectives of peaceful coexistence, friendship for generations, mutually beneficial cooperation, and common development for their two nations.

The two sides again stated that the Joint Communique of the Government of Japan and the Government of the People's Republic of China issued on September 29, 1972, the Treaty of Peace and Friendship between Japan and the People's Republic of China signed on August 12, 1978, and the Japan-China Joint Declaration issued on November 26, 1998, are the political foundation for advancing the Japan-China relationship in a stable fashion and forging the future of the relationship. The leaders confirmed that they would continue to observe the principles enunciated in the three documents. Moreover, both sides confirmed that they would continue to uphold and fully implement the common views enunciated in the Japan-China Joint Press Statements of October 8, 2006 and April 11, 2007.

¹⁸⁴ https://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/china/joint0805.html
The two sides resolved to face history squarely, advance toward the future, and endeavor with persistence to create a new era of a "mutually beneficial relationship based on common strategic interests" between Japan and China. They announced that they would align Japan-China relations with the trends of international community and together forge a bright future for the Asia-Pacific region and the world while deepening mutual understanding, building mutual trust, and expanding mutually beneficial cooperation between their nations in an ongoing fashion into the future.

The two sides recognized that they are partners who cooperate together and are not threats to each other. The two sides again stated that they would support each other's peaceful development, and they shared the conviction that Japan and China, that uphold the course to peaceful development, would bring great opportunities and benefits to Asia and the world.

(1) The Japanese side expressed its positive evaluation of the fact that China's development since the start of reform and open policy, saying China's development has offered great opportunities for the international community including Japan. The Japanese side stated its support of China's resolve to contribute to the building of a world that fosters lasting peace and common prosperity.

(2) The Chinese side expressed its positive evaluation of Japan's consistent pursuit of the path of a peaceful country and Japan's contribution to the peace and stability of the world through peaceful means over more than sixty years since World War II. The two sides agreed to strengthen dialogue and communication on the issue of United Nations reform and to work toward enhancing common understanding with each other on this matter. The Chinese side attaches importance to Japan's position and role in the United Nations and desires Japan to play an even greater constructive role in the international community.

(3) Both sides stated that they would resolve bilateral issues through consultations and negotiations.

Regarding the Taiwan issue, the Japanese side again expressed its adherence to the position enunciated in the Joint Communique of the Government of Japan and the Government of the People's Republic of China.
Both sides resolved to cooperate together while building frameworks for dialogue and cooperation, cooperate together based on the following five pillars:

(1) Enhancement of mutual trust in the political area

The two sides recognized that fostering mutual trust in the political and security area is of great significance to the building of a "mutually beneficial relationship based on common strategic interests" between Japan and China and resolved as follows:

To build a mechanism for the periodic exchange of visits by the leaders of the two countries, with the leader of one country visiting the other country once a year in principle; to convene summit meetings frequently, including holding meetings on the occasion of international conferences; to strengthen the mechanism for exchange and strategic dialogue between the governments, parliaments, and political parties of the two countries; to improve communication regarding the two countries' bilateral relationship, their domestic and international policies, and the international situation; and to endeavor to enhance the transparency of those policies.

To enhance the exchange of high-level visits in the area of security, promote various forms of dialogue and exchange, and further enhance mutual understanding and trust.

To engage in close cooperation to develop greater understanding and pursuit of basic and universal values that are commonly accepted by the international community and to deepen once again understanding of culture that Japan and China have cultivated and shared together over their long history of exchange.

(2) Promotion of people-to-people and cultural exchange as well as sentiments of friendship between the people of Japan and China

The two sides confirmed that persistently promoting mutual understanding and sentiments of friendship between the people and particularly the youth of their two countries would contribute to the strengthening of the foundation of friendship and cooperation between Japan and China over generations and resolved as follows:

To implement a full spectrum of cultural and intellectual interchange by broadly developing exchanges between the two countries' mass media, friendship cities, as well as sports and private organizations.
To promote youth exchange on a continuing basis.

(3) Enhancement of mutually beneficial cooperation

The two sides resolved to engage particularly in the following areas of cooperation so that Japan and China, which have a major influence on the world economy, can contribute to the sustainable growth of the world economy:

To conduct cooperation with particular priority on the areas of energy and the environment, based on the recognition that they have a responsibility to future generations and the international community to engage in such cooperation.

To promote mutually beneficial cooperation and expand common benefits in a wide range of fields, including trade, investment, information and communication technology, finance, food and product safety, protection of intellectual property rights, business environment, agriculture, forestry and fisheries industries, transport and tourism, water, and healthcare.

To strategically and effectively use the Japan-China High-Level Economic Dialogue.

To work together to make the East China Sea a "Sea of Peace, Cooperation and Friendship."

(4) Contribution to the Asia-Pacific region

The two sides agreed that Japan and China, as major countries in the Asia-Pacific region, would maintain close communication and strengthen their coordination and cooperation regarding issues in the region. They resolved to promote cooperation with priority on the following:

To jointly do the utmost to maintain peace and stability in the Northeast Asia region and to together promote the Six-Party Talks process. Moreover, both sides shared the recognition that the normalization of Japan-North Korea relations is of great significance to the peace and stability of the Northeast Asia region. The Chinese side welcomes and supports efforts to resolve the outstanding issues of concern between Japan and North Korea and normalize the bilateral relations.

To promote regional cooperation in East Asia based on the three principles of openness, transparency, and inclusiveness and to together promote the realization of peace, prosperity, stability, and openness in Asia.
(5) Contribution to the resolution of global issues

The two sides agreed that, as Japan and China shoulder greater responsibility for the peace and development of the world in the 21st century, they would strengthen coordination regarding key international issues and together promote the building of a world that fosters lasting peace and common prosperity. The two sides resolved to engage in the following cooperation:

To actively participate in the building of an effective post-2012 international framework on climate change based on the Bali Action Plan and the principle of "common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities" under the framework of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change.

To strategically undertake effective cooperation and together make appropriate contribution to promote the resolution of global issues such as energy security, environmental protection, poverty, contagious diseases, and other global issues which are common challenges that the two countries face.

Issued in Tokyo on May 7, 2008

Prime Minister of Japan

President of the People's Republic of China
Appendix II – A Brief Demonstration of the Data Coding Process

Here is a brief example of how I coded the data to analyse the Japanese discourse on the Yasukuni Issue. According to the methodology outlined in Chapter 3, the analytical procedures can be broken down into the following steps: 1) Establish the database; 2) Generate codes in the first cycle of coding; 3) Refine the codes into categories, and the categories into themes in the second cycle of coding; 4) Formulate themes into a theory (or hypothesis or argument). In what follows, I will demonstrate how I undertook each step.

I. Establish the database

A. I collected Diet proceedings relevant to the Yasukuni Issue on the search engine of Diet Conferences Search System (http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/) with the keywords of 靖国 and 中国. The result was 442 relevant documents.

B. I then transcribed all the documents into a word document so that I could skim the text, search for keywords, and jot down notes, review my notes more efficiently (this procedure could be assisted by Nvivo and other software alike).
II. Generate codes in the first cycle of coding

A. In the first cycle of coding, I skinned the text and made some initial notes based on my existing knowledge about the discourse. For instance, I encountered a noticeable comment made by Okabe Tatsumi, who said that China’s ‘black-and-white thinking’ was unhealthy for the bilateral relations. I marked Okabe’s speech, because it seemed to be a reoccurring theme in the Japanese discourse. His comment was finally included in the discourse analysis (see: p.150).

B. I repeated the above coding method until I finished skimming the text for the first round in order to produce notes and codes, symbols that I would merge into categories. All the codes were written as comments in a word document. Using a Macro called ‘extract comments to new documents’, I then extracted all the notes, memos, and codes into a chart in a separate Word document, where the codes, the coded texts, and the corresponding page number are displayed:
C. The chart was then pasted onto an Excel document for further manipulation and sorting. In the Excel document, I cleaned the data by collapsing similar codes, modifying inaccurate codes, and discarding redundant codes:
D. As it is shown in the table below, I made 238 memos (notes) in the transcript and generated 38 different codes. The number of codes generated is arranged from the largest to the smallest as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Code</th>
<th>Times of Appearance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Victim-victimizer Duality</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ODA as Reparation</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japanese Self vs Chinese Other</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interference of Domestic Politics</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mourning and Peace</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tokyo Trial</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Class A Criminal</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Demand for Visit</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More Explanation</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religiosity</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Facility for Mourning</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diplomatic Card</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reparation</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anti-Japanese education</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Separate Enshrinement</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972 Setup</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Repression</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree to Disagree</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constitution</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reflection</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anti-Japanese</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Final Settlement of the Postwar Politics</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chidorigafuchi National Cemetery</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Problem of Heart</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hu Qiaomu</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Domestic Support.</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>American concern</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Future-oriented Sino-Japanese relations</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Patriotism</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Substitution</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peace and Mourning</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unilateralism</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nationalism</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Natural human emotion</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ma Licheng</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Grand Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>238</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
E. In order to more coherently identify the key issues regarding how social agents spoke about the Yasukuni Issue in the Japanese discourse, I followed Saldana’s ‘strategy of focusing’, that is, to limit the number of ideas emerged from the study by exacting the top 10 to 15 codes (Saldana, 2015, p.186). And then, I explicated each of them in an analytic memo as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Code</th>
<th>Analytic Memo</th>
<th>Comment text</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Victim-victimizer Duality</td>
<td>The code ‘victim-victimizer duality’, in the Japanese discourse on the Yasukuni Issue, is mainly associated with a Japanese discontent over the ways Japan and China’s identities were defined relationally. For instance, Okabe (p.230 in the transcript) argued that ‘China is still a rather un sophisticated player in international politics who perceives the wartime past with dichotomous thinking (善玉悪玉論)’. The ‘dichotomous thinking’ refers to China’s polarising way of seeing Sino-Japanese relations: Japan as the victimizer and China the victim.</td>
<td>善玉悪玉論に関しましては私が申しましたとおりでございますが、特に中国は、国際政治に対する経験が浅いということもございまして善玉悪玉思想に凝り固まっているということがあったわけございまします。したがいまして、事実、日中戦争に関しましては日本は悪かったと私は思っておりますけれども、あらゆる問題を善玉悪玉で考えることは明らかに間違いである。（Okabe Tatsuomi, p.230）</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japanese Self vs Chinese Other</td>
<td>This code describes the discourse by which the Japanese politicians constructed a Japanese self by othering China in the discourse on the Yasukuni Issue. There were two identity dualities: religious Japan vs areligious China; democratic Japan vs authoritarian China. Both dualities constructed Japan as superior to China. The former constructed Japan as superior in religion and spirituality, while the latter constructed Japan as superior in political character.</td>
<td>同時にまた、日本では、人間が死なば、神道では神、仏教では仏とされて、肉体は滅んで魂は永遠に生き続けていくものだ、こういうように考えられておるものだから慰霊の行事は欠かせないのだ、生前に何をしておったかということは一切問わない、元寇の役のときにも鎌倉幕府は元軍の死者と日本軍の死者とを一緒にして大法要をやっているのですよ、こういうことを申し上げましたら、中国も同じですよ、こういう陳健さんのお答えが返ってまいりましたので、共産主義は、宗教はアヘンと言うじゃありませんか、こんなことを申し上げたわけではございません。（Okuno Seisuke, p.70）</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Interference of Domestic Politics

Texts coded with 'interference of domestic politics' centred around the issue of sovereignty. Japanese politicians protested that China's protest against prime minister's visit to the Yasukuni Shrine violated Japan's sovereignty to decide its internal affairs, i.e., how Japanese soldiers should be enshrined and whether or not Diet members should visit the Yasukuni Shrine. Languages displaying strong discontent are identifiable in the coded texts.

ODA as Reparation

ODA stands for 'official development assistance', a programme that has provided a total of 3.65 trillion yen ($32.4 billion) in yen loans, grants, and technological cooperation to China since 1979. Some conservative Japanese politicians often talked about the Yasukuni issue in relations to the ODA, alluding to the idea that the ODA could be seen as a kind of 'informal reparation' paid to the Chinese, and that the Chinese were unreasonable in milking the Japanese on the Yasukuni Issue again and again. My reading is that the ODA associated strongly with the Victim-victimizer Duality: some politicians used it to neutralise Japan's identity as a China's victimizer; some other politicians used as a protest, to display their discontent with the Victim-victimizer Duality. However, it should be noted that the ODA issue was often discussed in a suggestive, allusive manner. Thus, I don't have robust enough evidence to make the claim that some Japanese politicians took ODA as 'informal reparation'.

しかし、若干のこの掛け違いが、ボタンの掛け違いがあったのかなと。したがって、ODAを幾らやっても、これは賠償金というとらえ方をしたとは言っていませんが、言った人も、言った首相もいますけれども、中国の国民は全く分かっていな、分からなかった。この日本のODAが、さっき総理が言われたように中国国民に正当に評価されていれば、反日デモとかというようなことは起こらなかったかもしれませんが、いう気がいたします。中国側が一方的に靖国参拝をやめろと言うだけでは私は事態は進まないと思います。

自国の戦没者に哀悼を示す、どのような表現を自国の方々がされるかというのは自国それぞれ事情があります。(by Koizumi Junichiro, p.82)
**Mourning and Peace**

The Chinese framed Koizumi’s visits to the Yasukuni Shrine as a revitalisation of militarism, while Koizumi defended that he visited the Yasukuni Shrine for mourning and peace. Thus, this code ‘mourning and peace’ refers to Koizumi’s way of framing his visits to the shrine. This contrasting way of framing Koizumi’s action indicates that the meaning of action, especially the actions of key politicians, are subject to subjective framing by actors.

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**Tokyo Trial**

The code ‘Tokyo Trial’ describes situations where the speaker contested the legitimacy of the Tokyo Trial, a trial that charged 14 Japanese military high commands of committing war crimes. Indeed the controversy over the Yasukuni Shrine stemmed from the Tokyo Trial: The Chinese accused Koizumi of glorifying the 14 ‘Class A War Criminals’ enshrined in the Yasukuni Shrine. Speakers contesting the Tokyo Trial displayed significant discontents over how Japan was judged unfairly by the Tokyo Trial, thus arguing that China’s protest was unjustified.

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私の靖国参拝も、そういう観点から、今日の平和と繁栄は、現在生きている人だけで成り立っているものではない、多くの先輩の方々の努力、そして、第二次世界大戦において、心ならずも戦場に赴かなければならなかった、命を落とさなければならなかった、そういう方々のとうと犠牲の上に今日の日本の平和と繁栄があるということを忘れてはならない、そういうことから、私は、戦没者に対する敬意と感謝、哀悼の誠をささげる意味で靖国参拝を行っている、二度と戦争を起こしてはならないという気持ちを持って靖国を参拝しているんだということをお話し申し上げました。（by Koizumi Junichiro, p.116）

だから、マッカーサーとして、彼らの戦争目的は、ラージリー、主に、自衛のための戦争だったとマッカーサーが証言しているという事実も、ちょっと我々は言葉の片隅で知っておかにゃいかぬ、事実としてね。占領した側が言っているんだだから。これは我々が言っているんじゃない、マッカーサーがアメリカの議院で証言した。これは公開文書になっておりますので、御存じだと思います。（Masho Taro, p.192）
### Class A Criminal
This code talks about the idea of removing the 14 'Class A War Criminals' from the Yasukuni Shrine, as proposed by some scholars. But the proposal could not be undertaken because religiously it is impossible to separate souls from the Yasukuni Shrine.

### Demand for Visit
This code describes the situation where the speaker demanded the prime minister to visit the Yasukuni Shrine. It is featured with hysteric urges, discontent, and demand for solutions from the authority.

### More Explanation
This code describes the situation where the speaker believed that the Yasukuni Issue was stemmed from a lack of mutual understanding between Japan and China, and thus by explaining how the Japanese saw the Yasukuni Shrine could help to ease the Chinese concern. It comes close to a kind of university's discourse, where the speaker framed political controversies in terms of technicalities.

### Religiosity
Texts coded with 'religiosity' concerned primarily with whether or not Japanese Prime Minister's visit to the Yasukuni Shrine may violate the Constitution of Japan. To circumvent the potential violation, the conservative politicians were preoccupied with framing the act of visiting the Yasukuni Shrine as a non-religious practice.

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それから、靖国参拝のことですけれども、確かに中国はそれを問題にしているんですが、問題は、靖国参拝というよりは、いわゆるA級戦犯がそこに祭られているということが問題なので、靖国参拝問題と言うと必ずしも正確でない、本当に正確性を追求するのであれば、いわゆるA級戦犯が合祀されている靖国を首相が参拝するという問題だということになるんですね。(Takahara Akio, p.127)

菅内閣では昨年も、そして一昨年も、一人の閣僚の参拝もありませんでした。そしてまた、野田新内閣総理大臣も、国のために殉じた方々に感謝と敬意を表することをしないと言う。そんなことで、本当に日本の危機を克服できるのでしょうか。答弁を求めます。(Arimura Naoko, p.233)

そうした首脳同士の直接の話合い、あるいはもちろん日中外交会談でも、あるいはそのいわばそうなレベルでの話合いの中でも、先方の理解を得るべく、再三にわたっていろいろなレベルで話合いを行っておりまして、そういう外交努力を通じて先方の理解を得るというオーソドックスな方法でやっていくことが大切であると、かように考えております。(Machimura Nobutaka, p.154)

こういう形であるならば憲法上にも、またよく御説明をすれば各国の御理解も得られる、こういう気持ちで公式参拝のあの宗教色を排除した形での追悼をするという形をとらせていただきましたが、どういうふうなときに公式参拝するかというようなことについてはいろいろ検討していくことになるかと思いますが、公式参拝の姿を正しく理解をしていただくようにむしろ努力をしていくというところに主眼を置いて進んでまいりたいと、こう考える次第でございます。(Fujinami Takao, p.3)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Facility for Mourn- ing</th>
<th>This code describes the discourse where the speaker framed the Yasukuni Shrine as a facility for mourning. This framing enabled the speaker to neutralise two issues, namely, that the shrine was originally constructed as a religious facility, and that 14 'Class A War Criminals' are enshrined there.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Diplomatic Card        | The code 'diplomatic card' is used to describe the discourse in which speakers assessed China of using the Yasukuni Issue as a diplomatic leverage against Japan.                                                                                       | 御祭神についてのA級戦犯の問題でございますとか、これは確かに平和条約で日本政府は極東裁判を追認しておりますからそういう事実はございますけれども、そういうものをとやかく批判したり、あるいは今おっしゃいましたような灯籠の問題につきまして、歴史の事実というものをどう判断するか、批判するかということを考えているわけではないわけではございます。
(Matoba Junzō, p.34)

また、靖国問題について、これはこの間、日中首脳会談でもいろいろと話があったわけですけれども、この靖国問題について、例えば我々が譲歩をしてそれですべて決着が付くんだろうかという疑念を持っております。小泉さんが参拝をやめた、あるいはA級戦犯の分祀を行った、それでこの問題に最終的に決着が付くだろうか。我々の不安は、この靖国問題というのはあくまでも中国にとっては外交カードにしかすぎなくて、この問題で譲歩をしたらまた次の問題が出てくるんではないかという大変な不安を持っております。これについて莫先生としてどうお考えになっているかということをお伺いしたいと思います。
(Sekō Hiroshige, p.103) |
Reparation describes the situation where the speaker argued that the Yasukuni Issue was caused by the reparation issue. In 1972 when Japan and China normalised their relations, the Chinese leaders renounced the demand for the war reparation from Japan. As the renouncement was written in the joint communiqué of 1972, the reparation issue set in motion a kind of 'moral economy': China was defined as a morally superior victim who waived the huge sum of reparation for the sake of bilateral friendship, and Japan a beneficiary of China's generosity. Japanese Prime Minister's visit to the Yasukuni Shrine, thus, was interpreted by the Chinese as overturning China's moral superiority. This saying, however, was not given much attention in the Japanese discourse.

Anti-Japanese education

The code 'diplomatic card' is used to describe the discourse in which speakers accused China of using the Yasukuni Issue as a diplomatic leverage against Japan.

それは、御承知のように、日中共同声明を観られるように、本文の第五項にありますが、配付資料の第六ページにございますが、第五項、「中華人民共和国政府は、中日両国国民の友好のために、日本国に対する戦争賠償の請求を放棄することを宣言する。」、こう書いておりまして、字面から見ると、中日友好のために放棄したん、だから友好が実現されようだったら賠償は放棄する用意はなかったのだということに理屈としてはなるわけです。ですから、目中友好がうまくいかないばかりじゃなくて、日本側に日中友好に対する姿勢に陰りがあったりあるいは間違いがあったりすると、これは賠償を放棄したことについて黙ってはおられないぞという中国の姿勢が出てくることを暗に示しているというところまでは字面を読む限りではわかるんですが、実はそれもう一つ問題がある。(Nakae Yōsuke, p.57)

それは代表的な問題が靖国神社の首相参拝でございますけれども、これはもう戦没者追悼という我が国の内政の問題でございまして、外国からとやかく言われる筋合いのものではない、私はこう思っておりますけれども。どうして中国が常にこの問題を外交カードとして出していくのか、大変遺憾に思ったり残念に思っているわけでありませけれども、こうしたことは、中国国民に対する中国政府のいわゆる配慮といいますかパフォーマンスといいますか、そうした背景があるんではないかと私は思っているわけであります。それには、中国は小学生のころから抗日教育しておりますから、歴史認識、特に靖国神社問題等で我が国に物を言わないと中国の国民が納得しない、そうしたことだと私は思っているんです。(Mizuochi Toshiei, p.133)
III. Refine the codes into categories, and the categories into themes in the second cycle of coding

A. In the second cycle of coding, the aim was to unify the codes generated in the previous procedure into interconnected categories, and then, categories into themes. To do this, I wrote down the codes and categories on papers. I chose to handwrite, because writing texts down has more physical attributes or characteristics that enable me to recollect them better than manipulating them on screens. Some notes by which I conducted the second cycle of coding can be shown as follows:

B. Then, after collecting my thoughts and notes on the discourse, I sorted all the categories into different groups, to see if I could connect them into more coherent themes. What I found out was that the Japanese discourse on the Yasukuni Shrine revolved around the question of ‘who should be mourned’. I then wrote down the theme so as to further clarify my hypothesis.
IV. Formulate themes into a theory

By further reviewing my codes and categories, I formulated themes into the theory to account for the political significance of the Yasukuni Issue in the Japanese discourse. I concluded that for the Japanese, the crux of the problem in the Yasukuni Issue lied in how the Japanese decided their identity as the victimizer in relation to the Chinese. This theory corresponded well to my initial hypothesis that the ‘history problem’ in Sino-Japanese relations was centred around the issue of Victim-victimizer Duality. As this hypothesis was consistently generated in the analysis of the Textbook Issue and the Nanking Massacre Debate, in the writing-up, it was taken as the main argument of the chapter.