

**THE MONGOLIAN PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC, 1924-1928,  
AND THE RIGHT DEVIATION**

**by**

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## ABSTRACT

The thesis examines the history of the MPR between 1924 and 1928, establishes a chronology of events and identifies the personalities involved. It describes the creation of political structures after Soviet models; the transfer of the Mongolian economy from the Chinese to the Soviet system; the growth of secular education; and the attempt to subject the organization and economic power of the Buddhist church to state control. These developments were strongly influenced by the Mongols' desire to remain independent of China and to assume the form and characteristics of powerful nation-states. However the heavy demands of allegiance to the USSR and the Comintern distorted native aspirations and compelled Mongols to give up ideas of Pan-Mongolism, Buddhist reform and an independent foreign policy.

Until the end of 1926 modernization and the integration of the MPR into the Soviet system was gradual but from 1927 the Comintern ordered stricter measures of class discrimination, harsher religious policies and a more rapid construction of state capitalism. Some Mongolian leaders believed the demands unsuitable to Mongolian conditions. The Comintern fomented differences among the leadership and in 1928 most former MPRP leaders were ousted on the charge of Right Deviation. The USSR's deteriorating foreign relationships and Stalin's plan for the rapid industrialization of the USSR were root causes of this development. Unquestioning loyalty of the MPR to the USSR was required for strategic reasons. Cooperative and state forms of capitalism would facilitate the transfer of more Mongolian products to the Siberian industries.

The thesis draws the conclusion that the MPRP submitted to Comintern demands in 1928 through conviction, coercion and because there was no alternative ally prepared to guarantee Mongolian independence. It also points to the experience of the MPR as a suitable development model for nomadic, pre-industrial societies. The MPR may also be compared with other states traditionally linked with China but now closely associated with the USSR.

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PREFACE

In 1921 Mongolian forces led by the Mongolian People's Party (MPP) and part of the 5th Soviet Red Army marched into the town of Niislel Khuree (Urga) and declared an independent Mongolian state. The Bogd Khaan, the most senior of the Buddhist clergy and a reincarnation of one of Buddha's disciples, was made head of state as a limited monarch but real power was in the hands of the Party. When the Bogd Khaan died in 1924 the Central Committee of the MPP proclaimed a republic. Soon afterwards at the Third Congress of the MPP a power struggle among party leaders apparent since 1923 was resolved. Danzan, who had led the Party since its foundation in 1920, was shot as a traitor and many of his supporters were imprisoned or expelled from the Party. Power was transferred to younger leaders who favoured closer ties with the Soviet Union and the Comintern. The policies of national unity that had prevailed between 1921 and 1924 gave way to a programme which promoted the interests of the poorer sections of the population and discriminated against those of princely birth or of high rank in the Buddhist church.

In the latter half of 1926, however, the Party showed signs of splitting into new factions. There was considerable dispute over the continued presence in central and local government of the former princes and officials who had served in the pre-revolutionary government system. In 1927 and 1928 more radical members of the Party's central organizations, encouraged by the Comintern, protested that the main leadership had promoted policies which allowed a native

bourgeoisie to emerge. This was not in the interests of the poorer ards (commoners) and endangered the stability of both the Mongolian and Soviet states. Those responsible for these policies were held to be guilty of deviating to the right of a general party line of non-capitalist development laid down at the Third Party Congress. Under pressure from the opposition and representatives of the Comintern these so-called Right Deviationists admitted that they were at fault. They were demoted or sent for political retraining and a new Central Committee was formed from members of the opposition and younger cadres. The new committee worked closely with the Comintern to draw up a new programme of political and economic policies. As a result the country moved into a period of severe class discrimination with the confiscation of property, enforced collectivization and the beginning of a systematic destruction of the Buddhist church.

No detailed study of this period, monograph or review article, has been produced by historians of either the east or the west. There are, however, useful reviews in general histories although they were published about twenty years ago. The most scholarly general history by Mongolian historians was published in 1969<sup>1</sup> and the best work in English, The modern history of Mongolia by C.R. Bawden, in 1968.<sup>2</sup> American studies such as Robert A. Rupen's Mongols of the twentieth century<sup>3</sup> and George G.S. Murphy's Soviet Mongolia<sup>4</sup> are also useful but should be read with caution because they were written under the constraints to the examination of the history of Communist societies imposed during the McCarthy era.

Mongolian and Soviet historians generally deal with the period 1924-1928 in a cursory fashion, especially the phenomenon they describe as the Right Deviation. This reticence is born of uncertainty as to what the correct view of the period should be. In 1986 a leading Mongolian historian in private conversation said, "This is a difficult period. We do not talk about it." The leaders condemned as Right Deviationists have never been fully rehabilitated. Any more rehabilitation would undoubtedly raise difficult questions about the motives of USSR and Comintern policies imposed on the Mongolian People's Republic from 1928. Since Mongolian-Soviet relations are still not open to critical discussion it is unlikely that the period 1924-1928 and the Right Deviation will be examined by Communist historians for the time being.

However this period is not worthy of study simply from the point of view of what it does or does not tell us about Mongolian-Soviet relations. It also marks an important stage in the development of the modern Mongolian state and Mongolian society. This is the period when the shape and character of the present Mongolian People's Republic came into being. New forms and methods of government were instituted; the foundations of modern economic life were laid down; there was a planned attack on illiteracy, western-style schools were opened and a new set of guiding principles emerged to challenge Tibetan Buddhism. There had, of course, been earlier, piecemeal attempts at reform and modernization, notably between the revolutions of 1911 and 1921. However it was only after the foundation of the Republic and the ratification of the first State constitution that a planned pattern of change began to be implemented in both town and

countryside. The life of the average rural Mongol was not vastly changed during these years, but certainly fundamental changes were taking place in traditional Mongolian society.

This thesis is a study in eight chapters of the history of the Mongolian People's Republic from 1924 to 1928. It attempts to describe major events in the development of the state from the time of the death of the Bogd Khaan to the ousting of the first republican leadership. The study covers: the political, administrative and economic developments of the period; the response of Mongolian society to the changes and the growth of opposition to them particularly in the Buddhist church; foreign policy issues, Comintern influence and the attitude of the MPR to Mongols living beyond its borders; and finally a chronology and analysis of the Right Deviation.

### Source Materials

In spite of reservations about Mongolian scholarship covering the period in question, specialized monographs, articles and collections of documents in the MPR are important sources of information. Of particular value are anthologies of contemporary documents and memoirs. The copious material in the Mongolian national archives is not open to western scholars and Mongolian and Soviet historical writings therefore provide valuable access to them.

There is, however, a surprisingly varied amount of older source material of both a primary and secondary nature readily

available, which can be found in T.E. Ewing's bibliographical articles covering the period 1911-1940,<sup>5</sup> the bibliography of the MPR compiled by E.N. Yakovleva in 1935<sup>6</sup> and R. Rupen's bibliography of Mongols of the Twentieth Century published in 1964.<sup>7</sup> Important primary sources are party documents, government resolutions, laws, treaties and agreements. The most useful secondary sources are articles published in the contemporary periodicals (excluding newspapers) published in the MPR. The journal Khozyaistvo Mongolii published by the Bank in Ulaanbaatar from 1926 to 1931<sup>8</sup> and the semi-official journals Novyi Vostok<sup>9</sup> and Zhizn Buryatii<sup>10</sup> are especially informative. Many of the contributors worked in Mongolian government and economic organizations or for Soviet trading organizations. Another valuable source is a volume of memoirs of party members published in 1978<sup>11</sup> which includes previously unpublished material on the Right Deviation. It has to be used with caution, however, because events and dates have occasionally been confused by the passage of time.

It must be accepted that the study of early revolutionary Mongolia faces a shortage of materials reflecting the experience and lives of those whom the Party did not favour. Mongolian historians do not write biographies of such people, nor indeed do they publicize the short-comings of Party heroes. People who fell from grace have frequently been written out of official history. Studies published in the MPR before 1961, for instance, often omit the names of individuals from accounts or as signatories to documents. The political memoir and autobiography of the Diluv Khutagt, a Living Buddha who trod a careful path in the 1920s, and was arrested

and sent for trial in 1930, is of particular interest. His account was recorded by Owen Lattimore in the United States where the Diluv Khutagt died in 1965 but it was not published until 1982.<sup>12</sup> Before publication the information supplied by the Diluv Khutagt was only available through the writings of Owen Lattimore and Urgunge Onon who knew him personally. Besides being a warmly human account of personal experience, the book provides a rare glimpse of the period from the point of view of an individual who was neither a party member nor a poor commoner.

During the course of my research I have tried to read as much as possible of the available, relevant literature. I have consulted works in several European languages and in Mongolian but the most valuable sources are in Mongolian and Russian. I believe my thesis to be the first study of the MPR in the years between 1924 and 1928 in which this source material has been brought together.

### Transliteration and Spelling

In transcribing Mongolian words and proper names from the Cyrillic I use the system of William A. Brown and Urgunge Onon in their translation of the History of MPR. This differs only slightly from the International Cataloguing Rules system for transcribing Russian Cyrillic, which I use for Russian words and names. Therefore ~~ж~~ is represented by j for Mongolian words and by zh for Russian words. Because this thesis is on Mongolian history I have chosen to use j and not zh for Buriat names such as Jamtsrano. The Mongolian letters ~~ж~~ and ~~ч~~ which are not used in

the Russian Cyrillic alphabet are transcribed with ö and ü respectively.

I transcribe Mongolian from its spelling according to the Cyrillic alphabet because this alphabet is standard in the MPR.<sup>13</sup> Therefore personal names, titles and geographic names appear in forms different from those of other English language texts which transcribe from the old Mongolian script. I refer, for instance, to the Javzandamba Khutagt and not the Jebtsundamba Khutuktu, Khiagt instead of Khiakta and ard instead of arat.

Mongolian words describing Mongolian objects and ideas have been transcribed according to the Mongolian spelling even when anglicized versions exist, e.g. ger instead of "yurt", togrog and not "tugrik". Ulaanbaatar is preferred to Ulan Bator, which is a transcription of the Russian spelling for the capital of the MPR. "Lama", however, is retained in preference to the Mongolian lam because "lama" is a Tibetan word and already widely understood in English.

CHAPTER ONEINTRODUCTION 1OUTER MONGOLIA UP TO 1921

At the beginning of the twentieth century the territory of Inner Asia which lies between the Gobi desert and Eastern Siberia was a part of the Manchu or Ch'ing Empire of China. It was known to the world as Outer Mongolia and the majority of its inhabitants were nomadic, Khalkh Mongols. In 1691 the secular and religious leaders of the Khalkhs had submitted to the Manchu Emperor, Kang Hsi, in return for protection against their enemies, the Western or Oirat Mongols who lived to the west of them.<sup>1</sup> Other groups of Mongol peoples living to the south and east in the region of Inner Mongolia had been absorbed into the Manchu Empire some decades earlier. The terms Outer and Inner Mongolia indicate the location of these areas vis-à-vis China. However, the Buriat Mongols who live in the region of Lake Baikal in Siberia were never subject to Manchu rule.

For administrative purposes Outer Mongolia was made up of four aimags or provinces, each of which was subdivided into a number of khoshuus or banners. A prince who was a descendent of Chingis Khan ruled each khoshuu on behalf of the Emperor. The princes were given titles, privileges and salaries, including exemption from state taxes, and in this way they were controlled and kept loyal to the dynasty.

During the Manchu period Mongolian society was made up of

ruling and non-ruling princes, ards or commoners and Buddhist monks or lamas who might be of princely or common birth. Some ards called kham\_jilga paid no state taxes but were tied in service to the ruling princes as domestic servants and cared for the herds of their wealthy masters. Others, the so-called free ards, paid the taxes that the princes levied on the Emperor's behalf. Free ards had also to perform various types of corvée services called in Mongolian alba. Alba included the provision of horses to maintain a state postal relay service (örtöö), border guard duty (kharuul) and other military services and periods of duty in the seal office (tamga) of the local administration. The khoshuu princes of each aimag had regular meetings in the aimag assembly (chuulga). There were also some higher administrative institutions staffed by Manchus and Chinese but these rarely interfered with the conduct of affairs at local level. The high degree of local autonomy in Outer Mongolia was the key to the long-lasting relationship of the Khalkhs and the Manchus.<sup>2</sup>

The secular aristocracy was not the only source of native power in Outer Mongolia, however. A large proportion of the male population, approximately  $\frac{1}{3}$  by 1900, were lamas<sup>3</sup> who were outside the secular administrative system. Altan Khan of the Tumet was the first Mongol prince to abandon Shamanism and adopt Tibetan Buddhism or Lamaism in the sixteenth century and most Mongols of Inner and Outer Mongolia followed his example before submitting to the Manchus.<sup>4</sup> The princes of the Church, the incarnations of Buddhist saints, had not only religious prestige but great political and economic power. The Mongolian incarnations were called khuvilgans and khutagts and by the twentieth century there were 140-150 of them in Outer Mongolia.<sup>5</sup>

The most powerful and holy was the Javzandamba Khutagt<sup>6</sup> and in the world of Tibetan Buddhism he was surpassed only by the Dalai Lama and the Panchen (Tashi) Lama of Tibet. His monastery called Ikh Khüree (Great Monastery) on the banks of the Tuul River in northern central Khalkh became the focus of the religious, cultural and commercial life of Outer Mongolia and was one of the few settlements in a land of nomads. The Russians called the town Urga, others used the Chinese form of Ikh Khüree, Da Khüree, but many ordinary people called it simply Khüree.<sup>7</sup>

The political prestige of the Javzandamba Khutagt derived not only from his religious status, but from the fact that the first incarnation, who was recognized in the seventeenth century, was the son of Gombodorj, the Tüsheet Khan.<sup>8</sup> There were, eventually, four khans of Outer Mongolia. They gave their names to the four aimags and they were the highest ranking of all the princes. The discovery of the Javzandamba Khutagt gave added prestige to the Tüsheet Khans and at the same time established the line of the incarnation among the highest in the land. This was further reinforced by the recognition of the second Javzandamba Khutagt in Gombodorj's grandson.<sup>9</sup>

The Manchu Emperors regulated the power of the Javzandamba Khutagts by granting them titles and privileges and by reserving the right to confirm each incarnation discovered. The Javzandamba Khutagt was given a seal and there were 13 other high ranking khutagts who were similarly honoured. Seal-holding incarnations had special privileges including the right to have families of ards in their service. These were called shav'nar and like the khamjilga they

paid no state taxes or alba. The shav' nar of the Javzandamba Khutagt were so numerous that a special organization was established to administer them. This was called the Ikh Shav' (literally the "Great Disciple") and it was comparable to an aimag. However, it had no fixed territory and the ard families under its jurisdiction were scattered throughout the four aimags where they tended the vast herds of the Ikh Shav' and the Javzandamba Khutagt.<sup>10</sup>

For two centuries the Manchus and Khalkh Mongols coexisted within a system that guaranteed the traditional relationships of Mongolian society, the continuity of the nomadic, herding lifestyle and the prosperity of the Buddhist religion. The price the Mongols paid for this guarantee was loyalty and a willingness to defend the Inner Asian frontiers of the Empire. In the eyes of the Mongols this relationship was one of alliance. Then in 1908 the Imperial government announced that a series of reforms known as the New Administration ✓ were to be extended to Outer Mongolia.<sup>11</sup> They were already being implemented in China and Inner Mongolia and it was clear that they spelled the end of the special relationship of Manchu and Mongol, the end of autonomy and isolation and the end of all that was traditional in the life of the Mongols. In 1911 the Khalkhs drove out Manchu officials and Chinese soldiers from Ikh Khüree. They declared Outer Mongolia an independent state and crowned the Eighth Javzandamba Khutagt Emperor.<sup>12</sup>

The leaders of this uprising claimed they acted to protect the Mongolian way of life, its traditions and religion. This revolution was essentially nationalist not social, one of the earliest

nationalist revolutions in Asia, yet neither at the time nor subsequently did it attract any great attention outside. A theocratic state headed by a living Buddha seemed, on the surface, to have little in common with the democratic model of a nation state which was attracting considerable interest in Asia and Africa at this time. Nevertheless the leaders of the revolution did have something more in mind than the mere preservation of tradition. A central government organization was set up consisting of five ministries and a western-style parliament with two chambers. The Khüree settlement was renamed Nisilel Khüree (Capital Monastery) because of "the custom to name the cities in which the emperors of the nations of the world reside as the 'capital'.." <sup>13</sup> There was even a decree instructing government ministers to wear western clothes! It is clear from this that, directly or indirectly, the ideas of nationalism and the nation state as they spread from western Europe to Asia and the colonial world had reached the Khalkh Mongols. However vaguely these ideas were understood, they found a fertile soil in the Mongols' own aspirations for independence.

### The Growth of National Awareness

In the 19th century a variety of internal and external pressures caused widespread poverty, vagrancy and banditry among Mongols of both Outer and Inner Mongolia. By 1900 traditional society was assailed by further dangers. The reasons why the Khalkh Mongols chose to end their allegiance to the Manchu dynasty are basically fourfold: widespread poverty and crippling debt; fear of cultural annihilation as a result of reforms; the influence of

new ideological models acquired variously through contact with Inner Mongols, Russians, Tibetans and perhaps also Japanese; persistent agitation by Inner Mongols like Khaisan,<sup>14</sup> who was a leading figure in the events of 1911.

The Manchus exercised a policy of isolating the Mongols from the other peoples of their Empire in order, it is claimed, to preserve the supposedly military character of the Mongols in case they were needed to defend the empire. It was believed that too close an association with the sedentary, agricultural Chinese would soften the Mongols.<sup>15</sup> Chinese were forbidden to colonize the Mongol territories, Chinese traders were not allowed to take their wives and families there, marriage between Chinese and Mongols was prohibited and Mongols were not permitted to use the Chinese language.<sup>16</sup> These restrictions were increasingly disregarded as the Chinese trading presence in Mongolia expanded. Even so the Mongols were reluctant to adopt Chinese customs and ideas, and Confucianism made little impact with Buddhism remaining dominant in Mongolian life. In general, the Mongols regarded their herding, nomadic existence<sup>as</sup> superior to the Chinese lifestyle.<sup>17</sup>

The Mongols' isolation was, however, breaking down to some extent by the 19th century. Tibetan lamas and traders, in addition to the Chinese, were common visitors, and Russians also, with whom the Mongols had been acquainted for many centuries, came in increasing numbers as the Tsarist Empire and its fur trade expanded eastwards.<sup>17</sup> On the other hand western European traders, travellers and missionaries were rarely seen. This meant that new cultural influences now affecting other parts of Asia had limited impact among the Mongols

and then mostly at secondhand. Nevertheless, the Khalkh Mongols, like other small groups of less developed peoples were caught up in the global strategic changes brought about by the trading and colonizing activities of Europeans, especially from the middle of the 19th century.

Nationalist consciousness and the desire for independence were given impetus by the Mongols' deteriorating relationship with the Manchu imperial government. When the Khalkhs submitted to K'ang-hsi in 1691 they did not consider themselves dependent subjects so much as allies. The Manchus themselves recently emerged from a tribal society understood this kind of relationship and how to exploit it. They imposed their control on the Mongols by granting honours and autonomy rather than through coercion and subjection. As they became more settled and sinified, however, the Manchus began to develop what Owen Lattimore has called "an 'anti-historical' conception of the Empire, treating China as the centre and base and the frontier dominions which had originally been the base, as auxiliaries."<sup>18</sup>

A second reason for the change in the Manchus' attitudes was the change in the nature of the internal and external problems facing the imperial government. In the 17th century control of the Inner Asian frontiers was the key to the stability of the Chinese state. By the 19th century, agents of the states of western Europe were pressing on the eastern seaboard and the Russians were gathering on the north eastern frontier. These newcomers were all clamouring for a stake in the Chinese economy. At the same time there was considerable unrest within the Empire itself. As the Chinese popu-

lation increased there was an imbalance between land and population<sup>19</sup> which gave rise to a succession of rebellions during the 19th century.

Mongols of both Outer and Inner Mongolia were affected by these developments. Higher taxes were levied and Mongolian soldiers were called up to subdue the rebels.<sup>20</sup> While the latter was by no means popular the former was especially hard because payments were demanded in silver instead of in livestock as was customary in earlier periods. The Mongolian economy functioned mainly on a ✓ barter system and therefore the silver had to be obtained from Chinese trader-moneylenders whose interest rates were high.<sup>21</sup> At the same time, Chinese farmers who were also suffering from economic hardship began to move, illegally, into Inner Mongolia. Traditional grazing grounds were appropriated and even purchased from Mongolian princes causing further hardship to the Mongolian and herdsmen.<sup>22</sup> Mongols who understood the causes behind these circumstances and events began to question the stability of Manchu rule and ask themselves whether the time had not come to end the Manchu-Mongol alliance.

In 1900 the Boxer rebels took up arms against Europeans in China only to suffer humiliating defeat.<sup>23</sup> Foreigners occupied Peking and demanded huge indemnities in recompense for loss of life and property. Only now did the Chinese realize how close they were to losing all sovereignty over their country and the entire Chinese population threw itself into a frenzy of activity to repay the national debt and stabilize the economy.<sup>24</sup> The imperial government was on the point of collapse and only saved itself by acceding to

demands for political, economic and educational reforms.<sup>25</sup> In 1906 it was announced that these reforms were to be applied in Inner Mongolia also. They included extensive administrative reorganization, economic development, education and unrestricted colonization by Chinese. The Inner Mongols were left in no doubt that their life-style, traditions and religion were in jeopardy and from this time nationalist activity and resistance increased considerably.<sup>26</sup> The Khalkh Mongols were not slow to take warning either, especially ✓ after 1908 when the imperial government decided to extend the reforms to Outer Mongolia.

The events and circumstances described above are major causes of the Khalkhs' actions in 1911 but it is also possible that the appeal of new political conceptions of the independent nation-state played a part. The Mongol tribes of both Outer and Inner Mongolia had long recognized a familial relationship. On several occasions over the centuries there were attempts at unification under a single khan, usually involving force. The idea that Mongols belonged to one family was a powerful if somewhat romantic notion that was particularly potent among certain groups at least until the Second World War. It was romantic insofar as the mass of Mongols had always resisted being under the control of one or other of their groups. For the Khalkh Mongols the idea of a nation-state was much more realistic. Descendants of one tribe, they inhabited a single territory, spoke one language and could claim a political unity going back to the days of Gersenz in the sixteenth century.<sup>27</sup>

The political structure established after the 1911 revolution is a strong indication that the nation state model was not unknown to the

Khalkhs, but it seems likely that they acquired such ideas from a variety of sources.

The Chinese were greatly influenced by the Japanese in the acquisition of western political concepts. The Inner Mongols learned of these ideas from the Chinese and passed them on to the Khalkhs. But we should not rule out the part played by Tibet. The Khalkhs had close religious and commercial links with Tibet. In spite of the less than friendly attitude of the government of the 13th Dalai Lama towards the British some political concepts were gleaned from the British administration of India. When the Younghusband Expedition occupied Lhasa in 1904 the Dalai Lama took refuge in Outer Mongolia. According to a Buriat nationalist writer some Mongolian nationalists had plans for a joint Mongol-Tibetan movement to throw off Manchu rule. The Dalai Lama was to head this movement but the Javzandamba Khutagt apparently objected to the Dalai having control of many thousands of Mongols.<sup>28</sup> Relations between the two incarnations were very cool at this time also because the Dalai Lama took offence at the Javzandamba's dissipated lifestyle.<sup>29</sup> When the Dalai Lama eventually left for Peking the idea of a Mongol-Tibetan liberation movement fell apart. There is however scant evidence to suggest that the Khalkhs acquired political ideas directly from either Japanese or western Europeans although Mongolian historians have recently made a case for influence by the 1905 Russian revolution.<sup>30</sup>

## Independence and Pan-Mongolism

Through whatever agencies the Khalkhs acquired the models of the state they set up in 1911, their ultimate goal was clearly not a Khalkh state but an All-Mongol state. In December the Javzandamba Khutagt, or the Bogd Khaan as was his title as head of state, sent out a message to all ruling princes and leaders of Mongols living beyond the borders of Khalkh announcing Mongolian independence and inviting them to unite under his kingship.<sup>31</sup> Some were unable to accept his terms and made representation to the new republican authorities in Peking seeking greater autonomy for themselves.<sup>32</sup> However 35 of the 49 khoshuu princes of Inner Mongolia did declare initial allegiance to the Bogd Khaan.<sup>33</sup> A number of rebellions flared up in Inner Mongolia and in 1913 the government of Niislel Khüree sent troops to assist fellow Mongols against the Chinese.<sup>34</sup> This war had to be abandoned because the Mongolian government ran out of funds and the Russians refused any support. Nevertheless some princes nomadised with their subjects into Khalkh and individual Inner Mongols and Buriats from Siberia moved to Niislel Khüree. For a brief period they had high hopes of a flourishing Mongolian state with Khalkh as its centre. Many of these outsiders were given posts in the government and the army. Of one such Buriat, Ts. Jamtsrano who founded a school and published a newspaper in Niislel Khüree, it is said:

"He placed full confidence in the new  
upsurge in the Mongolian state ....."

and he was

"...profoundly convinced that a new time  
of prosperity was dawning in Mongolia,

and that popular education would soon be rising to the same level as among other people." 35

The idea of Pan-Mongolism - one state embracing all Mongols - appealed to most groups of Mongols at one time or another but it was, in truth, a dream with little likelihood of realization. In many areas of Inner Mongolia the Chinese exceeded the Mongolian population. That part of Siberia which was inhabited by Buriats was quite firmly under Russian control. There was an age-long reluctance of one group of Mongols to submit willingly to the leadership of another. As Owen Lattimore remarked in 1934:

"the average Mongol cannot think of Mongol unification except as the result of a war between Inner and Outer Mongolia to determine the right of leadership."<sup>36</sup>

The Khalkhs rapidly became suspicious of the Inner Mongols who had joined the Bogd's government and by 1915 many Inner Mongols had lost their jobs and returned home.

Although fiercely nationalistic Buriats were keen to be a part of the Bogd Khaan's Pan-Mongolia the government of Niislel Khüree was reluctant to accept Buriatia as genuinely Mongol territory. The Buriat way of life and their language had become markedly different from those of other Mongols and, in addition, the Khalkhs were traditionally very suspicious of the Buriats. This attitude was especially apparent in 1919 when a White Russian leader Grigorii Semenov, who was believed to be part Buriat, attempted to form a Pan-Mongolian government. He assembled a group of Buriat and Inner Mongolian nationalists

at Dauria where the Chinese Eastern Railway joins the Trans-Siberian Railway. The conference decided to form a federal state comprising Khalkh, Buriatia, Inner Mongolia and Barga, which is in present-day Heilungchiang Province. An Inner Mongolian incarnation, the Niis ✓ Gegeen, was chosen as Prime Minister and other posts were reserved for representatives of the component regions. The conference had some Japanese support, including financial, and it was decided to seek international recognition for the new state at the Paris Peace Conference. However the Khalkh Mongols refused to be involved in a movement that was dominated by Buriats and the Bogd Khaan had no intention of ceding power to a lesser incarnation from Inner Mongolia. Without the Khalkhs and also because of the withdrawal of Japanese support soon after, the Dauria government rapidly collapsed.<sup>38</sup>

Pan-Mongolism also conflicted with existing Russian interests in East Asia. In the summer of 1911 the Russians had given their support to the Mongolian revolution<sup>39</sup> as a result of an appeal by leading Khalkh Mongols. Afterwards they gave both practical and economic assistance to the new government and made representation to the Chinese government on the Khalkhs' behalf. However when the Treaty of Khiagt was signed by the Mongols, the Russians and the Chinese in 1915, the Mongols were only given autonomy under China.<sup>40</sup> The Russians did not press for full independent status because they were already bound by a series of secret treaties contracted with the Japanese between 1905 and 1910, under which the northern part of the Chinese Empire was divided into spheres of influence. Manchuria and parts of Inner Mongolia were in the Japanese sphere and Outer Mongolia fell to the Russians.<sup>41</sup> Furthermore Russian trade with the Chinese

was growing. The Russians had considerable investment in the Chinese Eastern Railway and were loath to put these interests in jeopardy by making excessive demands on behalf of a country where their economic prospects were not so high. Needless to say the Russians' unwillingness to support Mongolian government forces fighting in Inner Mongolia in 1913 and Russian reluctance to press for full Mongolian independence made them very unpopular in the eyes of Mongols but because the Russians were the Mongols' only allies, apart from the Tibetans,<sup>42</sup> they were in no position to argue.

#### The Autonomy is Abrogated

The autonomy lasted until 1919. During this time progress in reform was hampered by internal disputes. Government planning was rudimentary and budgeting non-existent. Many of those in power were exceedingly conservative and wanted no change at all. The energies of the Bogd Khaan and his circle of high lamas were spent in a power contest with the hereditary ruling princes. High government officials who were not lamas were dismissed and important opponents were in some cases poisoned. In this way the state lost its partially democratic character and became a theocracy after the fashion of the Dalai Lama's Tibet.<sup>43</sup> State funds were squandered by the court and the lamas condemned as against religion such things as progressive education, newspapers and the exploitation of natural resources. The khoshuu princes who comprised the upper house of the Mongolian parliament believed that the only way to end this state of affairs was to turn to China. By now any appeal to Russia was out of the question because of the 1917 Revolution and Civil War.

✓ In 1919 the princes negotiated with the Chinese High Commissioner Chen I to end the autonomy. Together they drew up an agreement of 63 articles which reaffirmed Chinese sovereignty but offered safeguards for Mongolian hereditary rule.<sup>44</sup> Outer Mongolia was returning, in effect, to its status under the Manchu Emperor and the religious leaders were eliminated from the secular affairs of government. The upper house was unanimous in its support of this move.

The Chinese government dispatched an army forthwith under general Hsü Shu-cheng to implement the agreement. In fact Hsü ignored the agreement and instead embarked on a series of reforms of his own. These included major Chinese colonization and the complete absorption of Mongols into Chinese society. The princes lived to rue the day they agreed to end their country's separate status.<sup>45</sup>

By now it must have seemed to many Khalkh Mongols that the autonomy had been a total disaster. In fact the period from 1911 to 1919 was an important time in the transition of a herding society, subject to an alien and sedentary empire, to an independent industrial-agricultural state. By setting up their own government, seeking aid and alliances from non-traditional sources and by welcoming the assistance of outsiders with special skills, Russians, Buriats and Inner Mongols, the Khalkhs laid themselves open to an entirely new set of experiences. Outer Mongolia had moved decisively into a sequence of change.

At first, that change was limited to Niislel Khüree. These new opportunities became open to a wider range of people within society. Poor but able-bodied youths were offered employment in the Bogd's army. The literate could find work in the ministries and other organizations of the government. The Buriat Ts. Jamtsrano opened a progressive school<sup>46</sup> and published a newspaper called Shine Tol' (New Mirror).<sup>47</sup> The latter caused a tremendous stir in Niislel Khüree. Lamas were shocked by statements such as that the earth was round and they ordered the editor to confine himself to topics of general interest and in line with religion.<sup>48</sup> Soon afterwards the school and the paper were closed down but another newspaper the Niislel Khüreenii Sonin Bichig (Capital Monastery News) was published from 1917.<sup>49</sup> It is not possible to assess fully how new ideas were influencing the citizens of the Mongolian capital at this time because primary sources such as these newspapers are not available to western scholars. Nevertheless the autonomy must have given thoughtful people a glimpse of a new kind of life possible in a state where the government works for the interests of the nation, and not just for its own advantage.

Among the people affected by these influences were the government officials who made up the lower house of the Mongolian parliament. They were exceedingly angry when the princes ended the autonomy and dissolved the parliament. Some of them began to meet in the ger (tent) of Danzan, an official in the Ministry of Finance. There they discussed how they might reverse the decision and they also plotted, though without success, to assassinate Hsü Shu-cheng.<sup>50</sup> A second group was in the habit of meeting in the ger of Dogsomyn Bodoo, a lama who worked in the translators' school run by the Russian embassy. They knew Ts.

Jamtsrano, the newspaper editor and also some of the refugees of the 1905 and 1917 revolutions who had recently formed a soviet and a trades union in the Mongolian capital.<sup>51</sup> Bodoo's group is said to have discussed social and political ideas and was well acquainted with the facts of the 1917 Russian revolution. The two groups, known as the East Urga Group (Danzan's) and the Consular Hill group (Bodoo's), eventually merged to form the Mongolian People's Party (MPP).

The Party came into being after members of the two groups met I.V. Sorokovikov, a Comintern agent who visited the Niislel Khüree Soviet in 1920. The Mongols, knowing what was understood in the west by a political party and wishing to make the best opportunity of this meeting, made somewhat exaggerated statements about their "party" (in Mongolian nam, which also means "group"). They told Sorokovikov that it had existed for two years, had about 500 members and also had the support of another party (nam) of minor officials.<sup>52</sup> Sorokovikov was clearly unaware of these exaggerations and at a second meeting he assured them of the Soviet government's willingness to assist their struggle for national liberation. They should, he said, make representation to the Soviet Russian consul in Troitskosavsk, just across the border from Khiagt.<sup>53</sup>

The possibility of this assistance gave the impetus to form a party and this took place on 25 June 1920 in Danzan's ger.<sup>54</sup> The party oath comprising an introduction and nine articles stated emphatically that the abrogation of the autonomy was against the wishes of the people. It went on to define the aims of the party thus:

"the goals of the Outer Mongolian People's Party are: to liquidate the foreign enemy which is hostile to our religion and race; to restore lost rights; to improve sincerely the internal government; to give total attention to the interests of the poor and lowly masses; to preserve forever our internal rights; and to live, neither oppressing nor being oppressed."<sup>56</sup>

At the same meeting lots were drawn and Danzan and Khorloogiin Choibalsan, who had been a member of the Consular Hill group and knew Russian, were chosen to make the dangerous journey to Soviet Russia.<sup>56</sup>

The story of the delegation and its journey has been studied extensively by scholars in Mongolia, the USSR and the West and needs only to be mentioned briefly here.<sup>57</sup> Danzan and Choibalsan were eventually joined by five others, Bodo, Chagdarjav, Sükhbaatar, Dogsom and Losol. Several written representations were made to the Soviet authorities defining the aims and requests of the delegation and of the MPP. The delegates asked for material assistance in order to fight for national autonomy, by which they meant independence, yet as in 1911 the ultimate aims of the party were not clearly defined and there is evidence of some disagreement among the leaders. In fact, before they joined the other delegates, Bodo and Chagdarjav had drawn up an Alternative Appeal which speaks of the existence of two distinct groups or parties. One, to which the authors obviously belong, is described as democratic-republican, spreading national-revolutionary ideas. The other is a nationalist-conservative party comprising princes and minor officials. On the

latter's request the two have united to fight for national independence, on condition that help is sought from Soviet Russia.<sup>58</sup> The appeal does not go so far as to say whether the nationalist-conservatives are identical with the East Urga Group or whether they merely embrace the sympathetic mass of officialdom in the Mongolian capital. The issue was probably deliberately blurred in the same way that the Party had originally been described to Sorokovikov. However there were, at times, sharp disagreements between the two Group leaders, Danzan and Bodo, which are only partly explained by personal antagonism. At one stage the partisans of each group even took to walking on opposite sides of the street until the Russians pointed out that such behaviour could seriously affect the success of their requests.<sup>59</sup>

In spite of Sorokovikov's assurances of help, the Soviet government made no haste to do anything positive until the Civil War spilled over into Mongolia. This happened when the White Russian Baron Ungern von Shternberg invaded Mongolia in November 1920 intending to turn the region into a base from which to attack the young Soviet state.<sup>60</sup>

By this time Hsü Shu-cheng had returned to China to attend to other problems and played no further part in the history of Mongolia. Ungern drove out the Chinese soldiers who had been left in Niislel Khüree and so gained brief popularity with the Mongols. This approval soon turned to horror as the Mongolian population was subjected to a reign of terror by the White Russians. Ungern's troops treated the local people without mercy; they conscripted soldiers and requisitioned whatever they wanted from the Mongolian population with great cruelty.

The Moscow government feared for the security of Siberia, the Far Eastern Republic and that vital artery, the Trans-Siberian railway. Appeals were made to China to deal with Ungern but China was too involved with problems of its own and did nothing. Only now did the Russians take practical steps to provide the MPP with material assistance.

By this time five of the original seven delegates were trying to build up the party organisation in Troitskosavsk, in Siberia just north of Khiagt, and to recruit a Mongolian army. They were completely cut off from the party organization in Niislel Khüree including Bodo and Dogsom who had been sent back to continue party work there. Danzan who, with Chagdarjav and Losol, had undertaken negotiations in Moscow, was still trying to obtain what the Soviet government had promised. In February news came that Ungern and his forces were again in Niislel Khüree and it was clear to the Party-in-exile that the time had come to make use of whatever resources it had if the country was ever to be free again.<sup>61</sup>

From 1-3 March 1921 about 30 people who were either party members or sympathizers met secretly in Khiagt to lay their future plans.<sup>62</sup> Danzan chaired the meeting on the first two days, which is an indication of his leading position in the Party, and Sühbaatar chaired the final session. Much of the discussion was given over to military matters. An army command comprised Sühbaatar who was Commander-in-Chief, Namsrain Belegsaikhan, Chief of Staff, Danzan and two Russians, nominated by the Red Army. Damdiny Sühbaatar (1893-1923) was chosen to lead the Mongolian army because he had

served in the forces of the autonomous state. He was the son of exceedingly poor parents who had migrated to Ikh Khüree in search of work where he was fortunate to be given some education. After the revolution of 1911 he joined the army and was trained as a machine-gun unit commander. He had a distinguished record in both training and service in the war in Inner Mongolia in 1913 and later as a border guard. Sükhbaatar was undoubtedly a talented soldier and he was also extremely popular with his men, many of whom were to join him in the liberation forces.<sup>63</sup>

The meeting was also an important event in the history of the MPP because it gave formal definition to the aims and aspirations of the Party. On the opening day, Danzan as Chairman declared the following three objectives: the elimination of disorder, the defence of the Buddhist religion and the achievement of independence. At the closing session two documents were passed as resolutions of the meeting. Ts. Jamtsrano was the author of the documents, the first of which was a "Proclamation of the Mongolian People's Party to the People of Outer Mongolia" and the second a statement of Ten Aspirations,<sup>64</sup> later known as the Khiagt Platform, which served as a party programme until 1925.

The introduction to the Proclamation was couched in Marxist terminology and comprised what T.E. Ewing has described as

"an orthodox Marxist-Leninist diagnosis of the World War and an exegesis of Communist political philosophy." 65

It was followed by a call for national liberation and social emancipation of poor and weak nations such as Mongolia and Tibet. The Proclamation itself, however, is expressed in traditional Mongolian bureaucratic language. It states that ards throughout the land are in agreement to "sincerely and resolutely take possession of their own land and rivers" and aim to "open the great road of progress, to restore the state which was destroyed."<sup>66</sup> In similar language the Ten Aspirations express a desire for social change as well as preserving Mongolian traditions.

"Our People's Party will examine what will become of such questions as external and internal government (policy), religious beliefs, long established Mongolian customs and ways of life, the present world situation and the future. We will resolve them in conformity with the long-term well being and progress of the Mongolian nation. However, if we consider it appropriate to stop those things which are not beneficial to the masses, which are harmful or not in accordance with the current times, or which are dying or already backward, then we will if possible alleviate them; otherwise we will not refrain from liquidating them by using harsh measures."<sup>67</sup>

The record of the meeting at Khiagt, which was later known as the First Party Congress, shows that the leaders of the revolution of 1921 really had a foot in two ideological camps: that of the traditional intellectual world of Mongolia and the iconoclastic, levelling world of Marxism. At the most basic level, the demands made in 1921 were little different from those of 1911:- national independence, the protection of Buddhism and the unification of the Mongol peoples. (The last named is also included in the Ten

Aspirations). However the new leaders were no longer princes, important officials and lamas but what might be described as rising intellectuals. Some of them were also exceedingly poor and very young; they included men under 20 and few were over 40 years old. To such people the Marxist promises of a fairer share of the world's goods and a right to determine one's own destiny were very appealing. However, their grasp of the full context of Marxist thought was limited. Only one or two of the educated Buriat members of the Party could have been familiar with the Marxist classics because none were translated into Mongolian until 1925. This is why we find a policy of protecting religion going hand in hand with more overt Marxist ideas.

Even though there were underlying contradictions in the aims of the MPP at this time the Comintern was willing to support the Mongolian revolution as a matter of policy. The theories of revolution upheld by the Comintern were formulated in the context of the advanced industrial societies of Europe. The belief was that in such countries the proletariat would rise up to overthrow capitalism. However Asian and African societies, where the proletariat was rudimentary or non-existent, were also finding in Marxism the inspiration to rebel against the ties of colonialism.

The international Communist movement had no wish to support the growth of capitalism in such countries only to have to overthrow it again. The theory had to be expanded to include the type of revolution occurring in countries like these. Therefore the United Front policy of support for national liberation movements was accepted by the Second Comintern Congress in 1920. The struggle for independence

was expected to precede the rise of the proletariat and the class struggle. In such cases the Comintern would give its support to progressive groups such as the bourgeoisie who were seeking to break out of colonial and other dependent relationships. This explains why the Far Eastern Secretariat of the Comintern worked so closely with the MPP at this time. There were at least three of its representatives at the Khiagt meeting and one of them, S.S. Borisov, an Altai Oirat, took the post reserved for a Comintern representative on the Central Committee of the MPP.<sup>68</sup>

### The 1921 Revolution

On 13 March a Provisional Government was formed. It was headed by Chagdarjav, a well travelled and educated lama, although he was replaced soon after by Bodo who had returned from Niislel Khüree. There were five other Khalkh members and a further post was reserved for a representative from Uriankhai, the area to the north east of Khalkh which later became the Republic of Tannu Tuva. The members of the government were assigned no special responsibilities but were to work first to rid the country of foreign invaders. Later they should assemble representatives of the people who would elect a regular government and ratify a constitution.<sup>69</sup> The Provisional Government issued decrees and sent letters to men of consequence to elicit their support. Ards, princes and lamas flocked to join the freedom-fighters as the northern districts of Mongolia were liberated.

The armed struggle began in earnest on 18 March when the border town of Khiagt was wrested from Chinese soldiers by a handful of Mongols against enormous odds.<sup>70</sup> Immediately afterwards the Provisional Government moved into the town and renamed it Altan Bulag

(Golden Spring). Fighting continued throughout April and fresh appeals for assistance were made to the Russian authorities.

In May the Russians finally responded by sending a detachment of the Fifth Red Army to assist the destruction of Ungern's forces. On 8 July Sükhbaatar led his victorious troops into Khüree followed by the Russians. Two days later, former ministers of the Bogd Khaan's government handed over their seals of office, symbols of their ruling power. The Bogd Khaan was restored to his throne but real power was in the hands of the Provisional Government.<sup>71</sup> Bodoos was the Prime Minister and Foreign Minister, Danzan the Minister of Finance, Da Lama Puntsagdorj the Minister of Internal Affairs, Sükhbaatar the Minister for the Army and L. Magsarjav Minister of Justice.<sup>72</sup>

On the surface the Mongolian state was restored to its position at the end of 1911 and for many this was a cause for great rejoicing. But the world around this state was vastly changed from what it had been in 1911. North China was a battle ground for numerous warlords; in Russia and Siberia Bolsheviks ruled; and between Lake Baikal and the Pacific, a new pro-Soviet state, the Far Eastern Republic (FER) was enjoying a brief existence.

Within Mongolia itself the success of the revolution brought fresh factors into play. The 1911 revolution had placed Inner Mongols in prominent government positions. In 1921 it was sympathizing Buriats who filled these posts. Some of them were working on active instructions from the Comintern because of their revolutionary

background and ability to speak Russian. They were not just Comintern agents, however. Those who made some of the greatest contributions to the Mongolian state in the 1920s were, in fact, fierce nationalists and Pan-Mongolists and were an interesting and dynamic feature of the decade.

A second factor was the change in the power structure. Although the Bogd Khaan was the titular head of state, secular power was to be in the hands of an elected assembly. However, equality in the representative process was to be within limits. The new leaders and their supporters were profoundly disillusioned both by theocracy and by the princes who so willingly sold out to the Chinese in 1919. Yet out in the countryside the influence of princes and lamas was deeply entrenched and when the euphoria of driving out the foreign invaders died down, they began to form factions in opposition to the new regime.

A third consequence of the 1921 revolution which makes it very different from the 1911 revolution was the strengthened alliance with Russian Bolsheviks and the international Communist movement. It must be said that the Mongol revolutionaries entered into this relationship of their own free will but they could scarcely have foreseen the kind of obligations it would eventually place on them. This was to be the single most important factor in the political, economic and cultural development of Mongolia and at the same time it was to isolate Khalkh Mongols from China and other world states just when they were ready to widen their external relations.

All these factors played a formative role in the state whose foundations were laid in the 1920s. However before any real development could take place the regime had to attend to two urgent tasks. It had to legitimize itself and establish its right to rule above that of all other claimants. It also needed to clarify to itself and the Mongolian people what it aimed to do for Mongolia and what methods it would use. This is the story of the years 1921 to 1924.

CHAPTER TWOINTRODUCTION 2THE STRUGGLE FOR LEGITIMACY: 1921-1923The Mongolian State Seeks Recognition

Once the Provisional Government was installed in Niislel Khüree the new regime made efforts to secure the recognition of the Mongolian state abroad. The Soviet government was requested to mediate with China on Mongolia's behalf<sup>1</sup> and a series of representations were made to Peking before a formal agreement was reached in 1924.<sup>2</sup> For a long time the Chinese were unprepared to discuss what they considered internal affairs with another state. The presence of Russian soldiers and advisers in Mongolia was looked on as an occupation by unwanted, outside forces. The Soviet negotiators' task was made no easier by the fact that they were also seeking recognition of the Soviet government and this gave the Chinese added bargaining power over Mongolia. The Peking government did not, however, attempt to use force to recover Mongolia.

In September 1921 the Mongolian government sent a declaration of independence to the diplomatic representatives of other states in Peking and expressed a willingness to open friendly relations.<sup>3</sup> This was generally ignored because most governments accepted Chinese claims to Mongolia without question. However it did not hinder the American Consul in Kalgan, Samuel Sokobin, from paying a visit to Niislel Khüree in September where he was handed a note in person by the Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Bodoo. The note stated:

"In strengthening the internal conditions of the country the People's Government has made a proposal to all governments to establish friendly relations with them. Respected Minister! Knowing your high government enjoys the confidence of the people, we make this our appeal to you; the Bogd Khaan, the government and the people wish to conclude with your government a treaty of friendship, to exchange diplomatic representatives, to establish and develop further trade relations in the interests of both our states."<sup>4</sup>

Although the Americans refused to recognize the Mongolian government a number of American government officials visited Mongolia between 1921 and 1924 and American companies traded there.

Only the Soviet government was prepared to open formal diplomatic relations with the Mongolian government. In the autumn of 1921 a delegation travelled to Moscow to sign what Mongols now considered to be the first equal treaty in the history of Mongolia.<sup>5</sup> The delegates were Sükhbaatar, Commander-in-Chief of the Army, B. Tserendorj who was appointed deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs in July, Danzan Minister of Finance, the Da Lama Shirnendamdin, who represented the Bogd Khaan and Erdene Batkhan a Buriat who acted as interpreter.

Under the treaty which was signed on 5 November 1921 all previous treaties between the contracting parties were declared null and void. The two sides recognized each other's government as the only legal government and agreed to exchange diplomatic representatives. The principle of extraterritoriality was abolished and each agreed

to give no shelter to people or organizations hostile to the other. Provision was made for future agreements on border limitation, post, telecommunications, railway services and trade, and a number of Russian owned enterprises in Mongolia, including the telegraph station at Niislel Khüree and the Khiagt tannery, were handed over to the Mongolian government. After the treaty was signed arrangements were made for the Mongols to receive a Soviet government loan of 1,000,000 roubles to be repaid in products.<sup>6</sup> The Mongols, for their part, made a donation of 1000 head of livestock for war and famine relief in Siberia as a mark of gratitude for the Red Army's assistance in driving out the Chinese and White Guard forces.<sup>7</sup>

Before they returned home the Mongolian delegates were granted an audience with Lenin who gave them some personal advice.<sup>8</sup> He recommended that the MPP struggle against foreign imperialists and look on the friendship of the Soviet people as the best guarantee of their independence. He also advised that cooperatives be formed in order to develop the national economy on non-capitalist lines. When asked if the MPP should become a Communist party he told them:

"I do not advise you to do so because a party cannot just be changed into another."

He explained that a Communist party is by nature a party of the proletariat and said,

"You must work hard to establish your government, economy and culture until a proletariat is created from the herding masses which later on will help to transform the people's revolutionary party into a Communist party. To change simply the name is dangerous."<sup>9</sup>

The use of the term "revolutionary" to describe the MPP is curious since it was not incorporated into the Party's title until 1924. However the record of this conversation is not contemporary but was compiled from the recollections of Tserendorj and B.Z. Shumyatskii which were published in 1926 and 1930 respectively.<sup>10</sup> Indeed the details of the meeting with Lenin do not appear to have been made public in Mongolia at all before then and his advice was only recognized as especially valuable after the serious political upheavals of 1924.

### Establishing a Government Structure

Within Mongolia itself the new rulers were faced with the task of establishing order and control. When the Bogd Khaan was restored to his throne he retained his power over religious affairs but in secular matters he was little more than a figurehead. After the death of his mother in 1887 the Eighth Javzandamba Khutagt had led a life totally unsuitable for a man of his religious calling which gravely offended the religious sentiments of other church leaders.<sup>11</sup> He drank to excess, indulged in female companionship, fathered a son and went blind from syphilis in 1915. As a political leader his autocratic rule and squandering of public funds<sup>12</sup> had lost him much confidence among the secular ministers and officials. But, because he was the Eighth Javzandamba Khutagt, holy incarnation of one of the Buddha Shakyamuni's disciples, he was still worthy of the utmost respect in the eyes of the faithful. Any disrespect to the Bogd Khaan was calculated to bring the gravest of suspicion on the regime, as it well knew.

The Bogd's position as the head of state was clearly defined in the document called the Oath-taking Treaty signed on 1 November 1921.<sup>13</sup> He was to have no secular power whatsoever, not even the right to veto legislation, but was required to agree to whatever decrees the Prime Minister put before him. In the case of war the government might make decisions without informing him at all. The final clause of the treaty declared:

"This law has been promulgated in order to strengthen the Mongolian People's government, that religion may flourish, to promote harmony in internal affairs and honour abroad. Therefore the Bogd Khaan and the government have sworn a sacred oath to honour and keep this law." <sup>14</sup>

How impressed the high lamas of the Bogd's court were with the Party's methods of promoting religion we shall shortly discover.

Real power and the making of decisions lay in the hands of a party whose membership was extremely small. A brochure published in 1928<sup>15</sup> suggests that by September 1921, there were no more than 164 members, although it had the support of a successful army behind it. The leaders of the Party, the Central Committee, had been elected at the March meeting in Khiagt. Danzan, founder of the East Urga Group and chief delegate of the 1920 delegation to the Soviet Russia, was chairman and Dar'zavyn Losol and Tseren-ochiryn Dambadorj were members. Losol was a former lama and member of Bodoo's Consular Hill Group.<sup>16</sup> Dambadorj (1899-1932) was one of the young Mongols educated in Irkutsk during the autonomy. He came in contact with the party while working as a telegraph clerk in Khiagt.<sup>17</sup>

A fourth seat on the Central Committee was reserved for a represent-

ative of the Comintern. S.S. Borisov, an Altai Oirat who worked for the Comintern's Far Eastern Secretariat, was the first occupant but he was replaced shortly by Elbegdorj Rinchino.<sup>18</sup>

Rinchino<sup>19</sup> was one of the most important figures in the Mongolian power structure until 1925. He was born a Buriat about 1885, received a Russian education and attended the University of St. Petersburg. He was acquainted with various political groups in Siberia, including Populists, Social Democrats and Communists and played a part in the upsurge of Buriat consciousness at the beginning of this century. It is likely that Rinchino influenced the development of the political ideas of that section of the Party which had been educated in Irkutsk. Choibalsan lodged in his home and Dambadorj knew him. Rinchino's association with the MPP dates from 1920 when he acted as interpreter for the delegation of that year. After the Provisional Government was installed in Khüree he was especially responsible for directing the new regime towards the Soviet state and the international Communist movement. According to the Diluv Khutagt, Rinchino was "taking the lead in directing all Party and Government matters" in December 1921.<sup>20</sup>

Leading Party members also filled the ministerial and high executive posts of the government. In addition to Bodoov, Sükhbaatar and Danzan there were D. Chagdarav, the deputy Prime Minister,<sup>21</sup> and L. Magsarjav the Minister of Justice,<sup>22</sup> both of whom were members of the Consular Hill Group. The former was a wealthy lama and close friend of Bodoov. He appears to have been highly educated, well travelled and experienced as a business man. The Diluv Khutagt

was none too complimentary about him, however, calling him

"light-thinking, deficient in care and caution, and heedless in anything whatever and by running about and talking with one person and another had come to lead a great many people."<sup>23</sup>

The Provisional Government also attracted the services of men who were sympathetic to the Party's outlook and had useful administrative skills. The Da Lama Puntsagdorj<sup>24</sup> was a senior administrator in the Ikh Shav'. He had some influence with the Bogd Khaan and was said to have a grudge against the Erdene Shandzudba Badmadorj, head of the Ikh Shav' administration. Puntsagdorj was made Minister of Internal Affairs in the provisional Government. Balingiin Tserendorj (1867-1927)<sup>25</sup> was the deputy foreign minister. He had served in the Foreign Ministry during the autonomy on whose behalf he visited St. Petersburg in 1913 and attended the 1915 treaty talks in Khiagt. Tserendorj was one of the signatories to the abrogation of the autonomy but after 1921 he became very anti-Chinese. He was one of the outstanding public figures in Mongolia in the 1920s. The ministries and other public bodies were manned by many of similar background. These professional officials were able to read and write the Mongolian script and had valuable administrative experience. Their services were essential to the MPP.

It was intended that the Mongolian state should eventually have a constitutionally elected assembly of representatives of the people. Because groups of White Guards were still disrupting some parts of the country the authorities in Niislel Khüree deferred elections for a year and summoned a provisional assembly instead.<sup>26</sup>

The National Provisional Khural, or the Provisional Little Khural as some historians describe it, (khural means "assembly", "gathering" or "meeting") first met on the 28 October 1921.<sup>27</sup> The newspaper

Uria reported:

"Now, representatives of the four aimags and Ikh Shav', ministers, deputy ministers and executive officials of the five ministries such as Internal Affairs, representative officials of the army and the people's education office and representatives of the Youth League and army offices meet every Tuesday and Thursday. They criticise conditions in the state and among the masses and discuss matters concerned with future improvement. The beis<sup>28</sup> Dugarjav has been elected chairman and Bavaasanjav [Bavaasan] vice-chairman."<sup>29</sup>

The National Provisional Khural was an advisory body. It had a fixed composition of 60 members and it was stipulated that five ards and one prince must be chosen from each of the four aimags and the Ikh Shav'.<sup>30</sup> This was to guarantee that 92% of the membership was ard. The assembly continued to meet until January 1924 when it was dissolved, presumably because elections for a regular Khural were underway.<sup>31</sup> A contemporary Russian observer Anatolii Kallinikov remarked:

"the general structure of the Khural proved on the whole, to be tame"<sup>32</sup>

but there is probably truth in the assessment of the Mongolian historian Shirendev that the Khural was

"an important step in having the broad masses participate in national affairs....."<sup>33</sup>

The Provisional Government had already begun issuing decrees before it was installed in Niislel Khüree and many of the reforms ordered were at the expense of the hereditary ruling princes. They were deprived of their ranks, salaries and numerous privileges. They were forbidden to wear ceremonial garments or buttons of rank on their hats and could no longer use public services such as the horse relay service or örtöö for private needs.<sup>34</sup> In 1922 they lost the right to the service of khamjilga who were declared free ards.<sup>35</sup> The behaviour of princes as administrators was closely scrutinized and many were turned out of office for bad government or for treating their subjects cruelly. They and princes who died in office were gradually replaced by elected representatives,<sup>36</sup> although at first sons of princes were often elected in their place.<sup>37</sup> Those princes who did retain their positions found their traditional autonomy over khoshuu affairs sorely hampered by the presence of special government representatives.

The special representatives (in Mongolian töläönii tūshmed) were assigned first to the aimags and the Ikh Shav' and then to some khoshuus. Their tasks were to make known party policy, to ensure that government decrees were carried out, to set up local party organizations and supervise the change to an elective system of local government. In the Ikh Shav' they also kept a close watch on expenditure on food and religious services which the government aimed to reduce. Some special representatives helped to set up schools in the countryside and all were involved in the census of 1923. They were given seals of office and generally enjoyed great power; in disputes with the khoshuu princes their word was final.<sup>38</sup> Curiously,

not all of the special representatives were party members.<sup>39</sup>

As the princes felt themselves constrained and threatened, rumours began to circulate that people like Sükhbaatar were unable to direct national affairs.<sup>40</sup> Some left the country in the hope of persuading the Peking government<sup>41</sup> or Chang Tso-lin<sup>42</sup> the warlord in Manchuria to overthrow party rule. Others merely grumbled. There were, however, some princes who were sympathetic to the ideals of the MPP. They renounced their former ranks and privileges, cut off their queues and offered their services to the government. Among them were Navaannerin the former Tsetsen Khan,<sup>43</sup> last <sup>to survive</sup> of the four khans of Khalkh, and Khatanbaatar Magsarjav<sup>44</sup> a minor prince and military leader who covered himself in glory in the 1911 and 1921 revolutions. In spite of this support and that of enlightened churchmen the forces of opposition to the regime were building up. From December 1921 a series of plots were brought to light, evidence of forces within the aristocracy, the Church and even in revolutionary circles which challenged the Party's right to rule.

### Handling Opposition

The first challenge came from the Church. In December 1921 the Saj Lama Jam'yandanzan, who was head of the Bogd Khaan's personal bodyguard, was arrested on the eve of allegedly attempting to seize power.<sup>45</sup> He was accused of intending to reinstate the Bogd as unlimited monarch with the aid of a force of 300 Tibetans. When soldiers searched his ger (tent) they discovered some weapons and a white flag bearing a picture of the Buddha. Otherwise evidence for

the plot is thin. The Bogd Khaan denied all knowledge of it and pleaded for leniency. Danzan the Party Chairman agreed and the Saj Lama was pardoned.

If the Saj Lama was guilty his actions were directed towards righting a specific wrong done to his master the Javzandamba Khutagt. However the churchmen were beginning to smart under the effects of new laws that affected them personally; their privileges were curtailed, they were forbidden to tax the faithful and they lost the right to the services of shav' nar who were freed like the khamjilga. Pardoning the Saj Lama may have been a diplomatic move to prevent a general hardening of the religious opposition. On the other hand the "discovery" of this plot may have been a ploy to distract public attention from a potentially more dangerous problem within the Party which involved the Prime Minister Bodo and the recently formed Youth League.

The Mongolian League of Revolutionary Youth was formed in August 1921 on the model of the Soviet Komsomols. The members were aged 16-25 and they were expected to assist in the work of publicizing party and government policies, engage in cultural and educational work and become the party members of the future. Choibalsan was elected secretary and within a month 70 members, mainly from the ranks of radical, young, lower officials, were enrolled.<sup>46</sup> For some years the League was completely separate from the Party and was more closely influenced by the Youth Comintern than the Party was by the Comintern at this time. It is likely that the Russian Starkov, who had been a political education adviser to the Mongolian army, was closely involved

with the League, and also Rinchino.<sup>47</sup> There were representatives of the League on the Provisional Little Khural and various other government bodies and the League enjoyed more power than would normally be considered appropriate to people of that age and experience. Consequently it rapidly grew into a monster child, threatening the very party that gave it birth.

Late in 1921 Bodoos was drawn into arguments with the Youth League, apparently over the amount of Russian influence that could be permitted in the Mongolian state. He antagonized League members by calling them "little children" and said they were not mature enough to get involved in government affairs.<sup>48</sup> Bodoos was well known for his hasty temper. During the 1920 visit to Russia, Danzan had called him a "difficult man, proud and haughty."<sup>49</sup> However, according to Serge Dalin, a Comintern official who wrote a short book on the Youth League in 1924, it was not only Bodoos who was irritated by the younger group. Dalin suggests that the entire party leadership was at loggerheads with it.<sup>50</sup> The MPP therefore tried to split the League by attracting its less radical members onto its own side. Then the train of events becomes unclear. In January of 1922 Bodoos retired from his government posts along with his close friend the deputy Prime Minister Chagdarjav. The immediate reasons are puzzling. A biography of Sükhbaatar states that Bodoos forced women to abandon their traditional elaborate headdresses and forbade them to wear more than a small amount of gold jewellery.<sup>51</sup> By so doing, it is claimed, he tried to push the revolution faster and further than other, wiser Party members were prepared to. Sükhbaatar was most upset that women should be treated in this fashion. He arranged a meeting to return the confiscated jewellery and declared

that Bodo's resignation was no loss either to the Party or the government.<sup>52</sup>

On the face of it, it seems as if the Party had almost caused its own downfall. In view of a similar train of events in 1924 when Danzan was ousted from his position of power we may wonder whether the affair was not engineered or at least manipulated by Rinchino, with or without Comintern advice. The Diluv Khutagt said that in December 1921 Bodo had quarrelled with the Comintern representative.<sup>53</sup> There were certainly issues that the two men disagreed on. Rinchino did not approve of Bodo's approach to the USA to open diplomatic relations, for instance.<sup>54</sup> Was Bodo driven to resigning in order to install someone who was more cooperative and generally popular as Prime Minister? It is unlikely that such questions will ever be answered.

Bodo was replaced as Prime Minister by the Jalkhanz Khutagt Damdinbazar, one of the most senior incarnations who was extremely able and popular.<sup>55</sup> Although he has been scornfully portrayed as little more than a figure-head<sup>56</sup> he was in fact an experienced politician who had held high public office during the autonomy.<sup>57</sup> He is said to have shown genuine concern for the Mongolian nation and was opposed to theocracy even though he was a churchman.<sup>58</sup> Even more important he was able to get on with people as the Diluv Khutagt recalls:

"... the young fellows who on entering the Party had cut off their queues and hair and changed their hats and clothes were in awe of the Jalkhanz Geegen and

some of them were unable to face him; but when some of the men got up in the new style met the Gegeen and the Gegeen did not reprove or blame them or anything of that kind, their minds were set at ease and those who had joined the Party were not hindered (in meeting him) it is said."<sup>59</sup>

Fears for the safety of the government continued however and in 1922 the security services were formed. The army already undertook intelligence work and this was extended in May when what is described as a "secret office" was formed within the Military Council. The Chairman of the Council was Rinchino but Sükhbaatar is credited with the initiative for this particular office.<sup>60</sup> It was also Sükhbaatar who, some time after, sent soldiers to dispose of a serious threat to security in the west, the Ja Lama Dambijantsan.<sup>61</sup>

"Ja Lama" was an assumed title for the man was probably not a lama at all. He was in fact a Kalmuck<sup>62</sup> adventurer who claimed to be the incarnation of Amursana, an Oirat prince-hero of the eighteenth century. He had visions of setting up a Western Mongolian (Oirat) state and had been stirring up trouble in the Khovd region for years. He was a cruel yet appealing figure who played on the religious and nationalist feelings of the Western Mongols. His reappearance in Western Mongolia after 1921 was unlikely to mean anything but trouble for the government of Niislel Khüree.

Sükhbaatar therefore sent out a party of soldiers to deal with the Ja Lama. They disguised themselves as lamas, tricked their way into the Ja Lama's presence, and there they slew him. As they made their getaway it occurred to them that ordinary people, to whom

the Ja Lama seemed almost immortal, would not believe that he was dead so they went back, cut off his head and returned with it to Niislel Khüree. <sup>63</sup>

In July 1922 the Office of Internal Security, the Mongolian Secret Police, was formed. <sup>64</sup> Its chief was a Mongol called Baldandorj <sup>65</sup> who was assisted by a Soviet adviser, Andrei Sorokin. <sup>66</sup> Other Russians employed by the office were Batorun <sup>67</sup> who had previously worked with Sükhbaatar and Baljeron <sup>68</sup> who knew Rinchino. The brief of the Office of Internal Security was to struggle against so-called feudal-theocratic plots.

The Secret Police acted quickly. By August, 40 men had been arrested and tried for counter-revolutionary activities and 15 were shot. <sup>69</sup> Among them were a number of former Party and government members including Badoo, Chagdarjav and Puntsagdorj. The main charge was that they had plotted to overthrow the existing government and restore the previous one under the unlimited monarchy of the Bogd Khaan. The Minister of Internal Affairs Puntsagdorj was said to have used, occasionally, the words "Bogd Khaan Unlimited Monarch" in official documents. <sup>70</sup> Badoo was accused on many accounts: he aimed to set up a reactionary government under China and while Prime Minister had had treasonable contacts with Sokobin, the American Consul in Kalgan, <sup>71</sup> Chang Tso-lin, the Japanese and the Ja Lama. <sup>72</sup>

The methods of the Secret Police were not guaranteed to give the accused a fair trial. No real evidence was ever produced to substantiate the charges of treason and we cannot be sure that this

"plot" ever really existed. It is possible that the whole affair was part of the manoeuvring of the Mongolian state closer to the USSR and the Comintern by Rinchino and his supporters.

These were dangerous times for people who were not wholly with the regime and coercive measures were used to pacify the population. Only this can explain how a small number of special government representatives, for instance, could control the vast country areas where the Church and traditional economic and social structures were entrenched and support for the regime was less than enthusiastic. Some western observers speak in terms of a reign of terror with prisons full and people disappearing without trace.<sup>73</sup>

In 1923 yet another plot was exposed involving former ruling princes and high lamas. It was taken very seriously and many were executed.<sup>74</sup> It was alleged that in the summer of that year a scribe called Tserenpil drew up a false document in the name of lamas and princes and sought to obtain aid from Japan in order to reinstate the theocracy by means of a coup on the lunar New Year's Day. About thirty people were implicated and the leader was said to be a high-ranking incarnation, the Manjshir (Manjusri) Khutagt. Sükhbaatar, who died in February 1923, is said to have been troubled in his last hours by a vision of Tserenpil running riot in the streets of Khüree.<sup>75</sup> When the plot was discovered, although many were condemned, the Manjshir Khutagt was completely exonerated. It was later alleged that his innocence was engineered by the Jalkhanz Khutagt and the deputy Prime Minister Tserendorj.

Although potential counter-revolutionaries could be kept under control by terror and coercion, the continuing discord between the MPP and the Youth League was less easy to deal with. Both organizations were members of the international Communist movement and had advisers posted to their Central Committees. The MPP asked to join the Comintern in March 1921 and was admitted as a sympathizing member with consultative rights soon after.<sup>76</sup> The Youth League joined the Youth Comintern, also as a sympathizing member, in December 1922.<sup>77</sup>

The dispute centred around what was the correct revolutionary policy for the Mongolian state and part of the problem was that the Comintern and the Youth Comintern were giving out conflicting advice. There were similar disputes between the RCP and the Komsomols in the Soviet Union for the same reason. However there was an additional problem that was peculiar to the Mongolian situation. The MPP was a young and inexperienced party with a very small membership. It had scarcely time to establish what its ideology and policies were before it was plunged into the daily administration of a state. Although the Youth League also contributed to public service it had generally more time than the Party to devote to political theorizing and debate. Hence the Party was pragmatic while the League was more radical.

The Youth League began to move into a position of complete independence and opposition to the Party in 1922. The question of independent status was discussed at the League's First Congress in July 1922,<sup>78</sup> and a resolution in its favour was passed at its Second Congress in July 1923.<sup>79</sup> The MPP was not prepared to let this go

unchallenged and hastily summoned a congress of its own at the very time the Youth League was meeting.

At the time this congress was described as the Party's First Congress but in 1924 the Khiagt meeting came to be regarded as the First so the 1923 congress is now called the Second. It was later claimed that leading members of the Party objected to holding such a meeting at this time. The MPP was inadequately prepared, funds were low and certain leaders who should have attended were out of the country.<sup>80</sup> Rinchino himself was away in Moscow for economic discussions.<sup>81</sup> According to the Russian historian, Zlatkin, the congress met because of Comintern pressure.<sup>82</sup>

A slim volume of congress proceedings was published in the MPR in 1974.<sup>83</sup> It is by no means complete; most of the discussions are missing and it tells us little more about Party and League relations than is known from other sources.<sup>84</sup> It does name the presidium officials and gives names and ages of all the delegates however. The chairman was Dorj, aged 29, of Zasagt Khan Aimag. His deputies were Dejid-Osor, 28, of Altan Bulag and Danzan. Other members of the presidium were Mishigdorj (31), Natsagdorj (18), Gombodorj (37) and Avirmed (25).<sup>85</sup> All but Danzan and Natsagdorj, who later achieved fame as the MPR's first modern poet failed, apparently, to make any further mark in the history of the MPP. What we do not know is how many of the delegates and members of the presidium were also members of the Youth League and if they attended both the Party and the League Congresses. It is surely of significance that the representative of the Comintern at the Second Party Congress, Zorigt, (i.e. the Russian Starkov) was actually an official of the Youth Comintern.<sup>86</sup>

The two main items on the agenda of the Youth League's congress were the question of the League's status and the matter of transforming it into an organization of ards. A resolution was passed which declared the League completely independent of the Party. The League maintained that the MPP was holding back in the struggle against feudalism and theocracy and therefore it could not allow itself to be linked with the Party.<sup>87</sup> It agreed to undergo a purge to get rid of members who were not of ard origin. This was duly carried out and it is recorded that by May 1924 90% of the Youth League members were ards although there is no statement of the proportions before the purge.<sup>88</sup>

The Party Congress also passed a series of resolutions in the interests of ards. The Leninist principles of party membership, as laid down by the Second Comintern Congress in 1920, were formally accepted<sup>89</sup> and in accordance with this resolution a purge was ordered. There was a discussion of the document the "Ten Aspirations" (the Khiagt Platform) and a few minor changes were made to render it more appropriate as a party programme.<sup>90</sup> Economic changes were discussed, though with little thought as to how they could be realized.<sup>91</sup> A significant resolution was passed on the Mongolian Central Cooperative however. This organization was formed in 1921 when Chinese trading was at a standstill. The main investors were wealthy princes and churchmen, the Bogd Khaan being the largest,<sup>92</sup> and few were party members. The Congress resolved that the cooperative should be turned into a mass organization.<sup>93</sup> Finally there was a call for strengthening friendship with the Soviet Union and liquidating all who tried to destroy that friendship.<sup>94</sup>

There seems some doubt as to whether the resolutions of this congress reflect the genuine wishes of the Party. At the Third Congress a year later it was reported that the resolutions were rumoured to be the work of two or three people and few of them had been carried out.<sup>95</sup> One useful outcome of the Second Congress was the reorganization of the Central Committee.<sup>96</sup> It was enlarged to 15 members and there were to be three departments dealing with general matters, propaganda and organization. The general department would be concerned with finances, discipline and publicizing meetings. The propaganda department would train and organize propagandists, publish books and journals, supervise and criticise the government and arrange cultural events. The organization department would set up cells and offices and keep membership records. Those elected to the Central Committee were Danzan (known as Japan-Danzan), Tserendorj, Rinchino, Danzan, Dorj, Dorjpalam, Damdin, Natsagdorj, Buyannemekh, Jantsrano, Dambadorj, Dejid-Osor, Ravdan, Namjiljav and Dugarjav. The five candidate members were Losol, Bavaasan, Gombo, Mönkh-ochir and Mishigdorj. Baataryn Danzan (1875-1930) was chosen as chairman of the Central Committee.<sup>97</sup> He is better known by his nick-name, Japan-Danzan, which alluded to a visit he made to Japan in 1916 and distinguished him from S. Danzan the Commander-in-Chief. Japan-Danzan was formerly a lama and minor official of the pre-revolutionary government. He had apparently renounced his religion and in 1921 he joined the MPP. A Soviet article of 1925 described him as a leader of the Party's left who had cherished the hope of a Mongolian republic since 1915.<sup>98</sup>

The final act of this congress was to set up a joint Central Committee commission with the Youth League to examine the relationship of the two organizations and to try to reconcile them.<sup>99</sup> Eventually an Eight Point Plan was drawn up which was something of a compromise. The Youth League was declared to be independent in its internal affairs and it had the right to criticise the Party. The Party was to help and direct the League whose members were permitted to transfer to the Party at the age of 21 and obliged to at 25. Unfortunately, when this document was presented to the Youth Comintern, it did not approve of it and so the issue was still unresolved by the summer of 1924.<sup>100</sup>

### Summary

The Party and government that came to power in 1921 was a loose unity of progressives of all social groups. They had a notion that certain injustices in the Mongolian social and political orders must be corrected and they wanted to see a strong and flourishing national state. As they laboured to find ways and means of achieving these desires and as the danger to their state from external sources receded arguments and disagreements resulted in factionalization. The struggle between Danzan and Bodoov over policies and who was the real leader of the Party was resolved in 1922. Danzan won and Bodoov lost his life. In this struggle the catalyst, though not the primary cause, was the Comintern, through its agent Rinchino.

In spite of the 1921 Treaty of Friendship with the Soviet Union the influence of the Russian authorities over Mongolian life was less than that of the Comintern in these years. There was a rapid

turnover of Soviet diplomatic agents and not all of them or the Russian advisers in Niislel Khüree were popular with the Mongols. Furthermore, the Russian trade presence was minimal until a trade agreement of 1923 opened the way for Soviet trading organizations to compete with the Chinese traders who had flocked back once the fighting had stopped. (See Chapter 5).

As the Party continued to strengthen its position through legislative and coercive means the Comintern, in line with its own changing policies, made use of the continuing disruptive behaviour of the Youth League to alter the character of the MPP. The resolutions of the Second Party Congress mark the beginning of "ardization" - the process of making the Party and government the sole province of ards of the lowest economic groups. This was to break the hold on the MPP of nationalists and the intelligentsia of Niislel Khüree officialdom, whose leader was Danzan. While Danzan and his circle were still in control little was done to implement the Congress resolutions. Therefore Danzan had to go. From 1923 Rinchino and Danzan sparred with one another in the Central Committee and in the Military Council. Before they broke out into an open fight, however, the Party experienced a stroke of good fortune in its search for legitimacy: the Bogd Khaan died.

CHAPTER THREE1924 MONGOLIA BECOMES A REPUBLIC

The Bogd Khaan died, apparently, of a malignant disease of the throat<sup>1</sup> at the age of 54.<sup>2</sup> The high lamas of his circle had begged permission to levy for a service to pray for his recovery but the Central Committee refused.<sup>3</sup> He passed away at 4 a.m. on 20 May 1924. His corpse was carefully embalmed and gilded after which it was placed in a temple where the faithful could venerate it.<sup>4</sup>

Under normal circumstances holy incarnations did not produce heirs. However the Bogd Khaan had taken a consort called Dondogdulam. She had been crowned with him in 1911 and had been given the title Ekh Dagina.<sup>5</sup> The couple had adopted a son and tried, without success, to have him recognized as the Bogd Khaan's heir. However, nothing more was heard of the boy after the autonomy.

The Ekh Dagina died suddenly in 1923. It is rumoured she was strangled on the Bogd Khaan's instructions, but since she had been deeply involved in the intrigues of the court, it is equally possible that the lamas of the court disposed of her in the course of their own factional manoeuvrings. The Bogd Khaan took another consort after her death but nothing ever came of his plans to found a dynasty.<sup>6</sup>

The usual practice on the death of a Javzandamba Khutagt was for the high lamas to ask permission of the Manchu Emperor to initiate a

search for the next incarnation. Since the time of the Third Javzandamba Khutagt, all such incarnations had to be born in Tibet within nine months of the death of the previous one. The discovery was subject to the approval of the Emperor. Because the MPP had, in effect, assumed the authority of the Manchu Emperors, application for a search was made to the Central Committee as soon as the eighth incarnation died. The Party was faced with two alternatives: to recognize a Ninth Javzandamba Khutagt and endure all the consequences of lama regency during his minority, or to end the monarchy altogether and risk offending the religious sentiments of the general population.

#### The Declaration of the Mongolian People's Republic

The Central Committee procrastinated and on 30 May it announced that the time was not ripe for searching for a new khutagt.<sup>7</sup> A week later on 7 June it ended the monarchy and declared the state a republic, to be called the Mongolian People's Republic (MPR). The Ministry of Internal Affairs was told to spread the news throughout the land and an announcement appeared in the Party and government newspaper Ardyn Erkh ("People's Rule") on 25 June.

The state was to have no president and supreme power was vested in an elected national assembly called the Great Khural (Ikh Khural). 1911 was still considered to be the date of the foundation of this state but the numbering of the years from 1911 were no longer to be according to the Bogd Khaan's reign title "Elevated by the Many" (Olnoo Örgögsön). They were to be numbered, instead, according to the

year of the Mongolian government. Hence 1924 was to be the 14th Year of the Mongolian Government. Finally, 11 July, the anniversary of the 1921 liberation of Khiagt, was made a public holiday. In this way the importance of both 1911 and 1921 for the independent Mongolian state was recognized.<sup>8</sup>

On 27 June the government announced that the hall which had been built for the Bogd Khaan to hold civic ceremonies and receptions would be transferred to the government and adapted for the use of that Great Khural. The building, together with gold, silver and nephrite seals and documents, symbols of the Bogd Khaan's secular authority, were transferred to the government with great ceremony. The seals and papers were brought by car from the palace to the government building where army cadets, their swords unsheathed, mounted a guard of honour and government ministers waited to receive them. To the sound of music which was customarily played whenever the Bogd Khaan went abroad, the guard saluted and the precious items were carried in. After a careful inspection they were sealed in an iron box and borne away to await the instructions of the Great Khural. The music continued playing and the guards marched off down the street.<sup>9</sup>

The transfer from monarchy to republic was carried out with dignity and there is little evidence of open opposition. The idea of a republic was not, of course, a new one. Bodoo had described his party as "democratic-republican" in his Alternative Appeal of 1920<sup>10</sup> and in a speech at the First Great Khural in November 1924 Tserendorj suggested that establishing a republic was considered in 1921.<sup>11</sup> The Youth Comintern writer Dalin attributed the "painless"

establishment of the Republic to three years campaigning by the Youth League.<sup>12</sup> That may have been true in the capital, but out in the countryside few objected because they did not know about it. the Third Party Congress in August a representative of the Youth League called Gombojav remarked:

"But what is a Republic? Surely this is still unknown in the provinces. I hope that the delegates when back at home will explain to the people the aim and meaning of the new form of government.<sup>13</sup>

What was the subject of some dispute was the question of whether or not to have a president. Some believed a president to be little different from a monarch, and therefore it was decided to follow the example of Switzerland and the Soviet Union and have supreme power vested in an elected assembly instead.<sup>14</sup>

### The Fifth Comintern Congress

The Bogd Khaan's death was indeed timely for it coincided with a change in Comintern policies concerning member parties. This was formulated at the Fifth Comintern Congress which met in Moscow from 17 June to 8 July.<sup>15</sup> This Congress marks the beginning of the dominance of the international Communist movement by the RCP, replacing that of the German party. A slogan of "bolshevization" for all member parties was adopted which implied that they should become parties of the masses, Marxist in spirit, working for the victory of the proletariat over the bourgeoisie and taking instruction from the Comintern. They were, in effect, to conform to the ideas and practices of the RCP, an obligation which reduced the opportunities for dissension and increased

the danger of deviation and opportunism. The principle of "bolshevization" was drawn up with European parties chiefly in mind. In multi-party states where the Communist party did not enjoy state power it was possible to "bolshevize" and at the same time continue the United Front policy as a means of working for socialism by overthrowing social democracy. In a country like the MPR, however, where only one party existed and that party controlled the state, the policies of the United Front and "bolshevization" had different implications and could be expected to cause friction not only in the Party but also throughout government and society.

A delegation of Mongols travelled to Moscow to attend the Comintern Fifth Congress. Among them was Dambadorj, head of the Central Committee's organization department.<sup>16</sup> Rinchino may also have been present and Sodnombaljiriin Buyannemekh,<sup>17</sup> the chairman of the Youth League, who attended the Youth Comintern Congress which followed the Fifth Comintern Congress. Most of the speeches at the Comintern Congress were delivered in German and it is unlikely that any of the MPP delegates understood them. They would have presented a report on conditions and events in the MPR, however, and received instructions to carry out when they returned home. From later events we can assume that the Mongolian delegates were given three specific instructions; to remove from party membership those people such as former princes and lamas who were not genuine ards, to redefine foreign policy and make the alliance with the USSR its central feature, and to clarify the nature of Mongolia's future economic development. Buyannemekh was told to effect a reconciliation of the Party and Youth League.

## Party Organization and Recruitment

Both the Party and the League had developed in numbers and organization since 1921. In 1923 and 1924 there was a concerted membership drive and many small groups of members or cells were formed in both organizations. The cells were attached to government and public offices, the army, and the aimags and khoshuus of the countryside. They were linked with the Central Committees of the parent organization through aimag and town committees.

There are many descriptions of the founding of cells in memoir literature and they show that people from all ranks of society were being enrolled at this time, including former princes and lamas. Budjavyn Choindon of Tüsheet Khan aimag has recorded how the 120th cell was founded in the summer of 1924.<sup>18</sup>

"After explaining the aims and tasks of party members Sudevdonoi<sup>19</sup> and the others drew up a list of people being considered for enrolment to party membership. Among them were princes, officials and scribes who were clamouring to join and I myself was one of those who were seeking to join the Party.

After the princes and officials had voluntarily renounced the privileges they had previously enjoyed they were put on the list. An investigation was made of those listed. They were made to swear the oath and then sign their names. There were about twenty of them.

. . .

Those elected to Party membership assembled in the ger and Sudevdonoi opened the first meeting of the cell. This became the 120th cell of the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party. The day our cell was set up the weather was bright and beautiful and my heart was overflowing with joy. I have not forgotten it to this day."<sup>20</sup>

### The Third MPP Congress

In August 1924 representatives of some 121 party cells and offices arrived in Niislel Khüree to attend the Third Congress of the MPP. This Congress has come to be regarded as a watershed in the history of the MPR and in the development of revolutionary MPR because, in the words of the official History of the MPR the Congress:

"advanced formally for the first time as the MPRP(MPP) general political line the historical inevitability of the non-capitalist development path."<sup>21</sup>

Karl Marx studied the societies and states of Europe and reasoned that states move towards Communism through a series of inevitable historical stages. He predicted that the capitalist stage as it existed in his lifetime would be overthrown by the oppressed proletariat and replaced by socialism. However when Lenin realized that the largely pre-capitalist societies of Asia and Africa were looking to the 1917 Russian Revolution and the international Communist movement for inspiration to fight for independence he reasoned that it was nonsense to insist that they should, after liberation, create a capitalist industrial economy, only to have to overthrow it again to reach the socialist stage. Therefore he taught that:

"....backward countries can with the aid of the proletariats of the advanced countries shift to soviet institutions, can pass through specific stages of development, and can shift into communism by by-passing the stage of capitalist development."<sup>22</sup>

In 1966 the MPRP (MPP) Institute of Party History published a series of documents compiled in honour of the 40th anniversary of the Third Party Congress.<sup>23</sup> Although Mongolian leaders after 1924 stated frequently that the MPR was "bypassing capitalism", the main economic activity, livestock herding, continued to be organized on a private basis and it was not until after the Second World War that "bypassing capitalism" became a major factor in economic development. By the 1960s livestock herding was collectivized and large amounts of aid and practical assistance from the USSR, China and the CMEA led to considerable growth in industry and agriculture (crop-raising) on a state-owned basis.<sup>24</sup> This may <sup>explain</sup> why the documents of this particular Congress have been made widely available.

The records of the Third Party Congress have been drawn from archival material, contemporary Mongolian press accounts and contemporary Russian reports. They give a detailed account of the daily events of the Congress, some insight into the personalities of its leading participants and a picture of the changes beginning to affect Mongolian life. In particular they show how the policy disputes and power struggles within the Party itself and between the Party and Youth League were resolved.

There are other useful sources on the Third Congress. A contemporary English translation based on the Russian text of the Third Congress protocols was published in Tientsin in the 1920s.<sup>25</sup> This version has a few passages omitted from the Mongolian text but it does not include the account of the violent argument that broke out on 26 August and ended with the shooting of Danzan the Chairman. Two recently

published memoir accounts have added further insight. These are by Tsendenbaljiriin Tseveg, a Secretary of the Congress and Batyn Bayar, who sat on the commission which investigated Danzan and sentenced him to death.<sup>26</sup>

The Congress opened with greetings from the various Party and government departments, the USSR and the Comintern and then the Congress officials were elected. Danzan, Commander-in-Chief of the Army, was voted Chairman of the Congress and a former prince, Minjüür, was the Deputy Chairman. There were three Congress Secretaries, Dorjpalam, a member of the Central Committee, Bavaasan, a senior government secretary and Secretary of the Youth League<sup>27</sup> and Tsendenbaljiriin Tseveg of Tsetserleg Mandal aimag (formerly Sain Noyan Khan aimag). There was also a Control Commission of five, Bayar, Gongor, Davaajav, Gonsojav and Damdin.<sup>28</sup>

A large part of the Congress was given over to reports of Party and government departments and other public bodies, which were followed by lengthy discussions. Many problems were brought to light including a shortage of public funds, the lack of experienced cadres, poor communications between Niislel Khüree and the rural areas, widespread illiteracy and the low level of political awareness. Many recommendations were made, including a large-scale reorganization of government departments and offices, and the resolutions of the Third Congress became the basis of the agenda of the First Great Khural which would assemble at the end of the year.

Much of the work of the Congress was conducted in a good-humoured way, aiming to find practical solutions to problems and

conditions facing the Mongolian government and society. Nevertheless, underneath this lay unresolved internal disputes and disagreements which had existed for a year or more. In addition there were angry feelings aroused by recent acts of the Soviet government and the new Comintern demands. The Congress was stirred up by three issues especially; foreign relations, the transformation of the Party by purging and recruitment into a party of the poorer ards, and the question of how the economy should be developed.

Of these three issues the delegates as a whole felt most keenly about foreign relations. Mongolia's ties with the USSR had increased considerably since 1921, and the Soviet government gave financial aid, practical assistance and favourable trade conditions. Yet in spite of the 1921 friendship treaty and the Second Party Congress resolution in favour of Mongol-Soviet friendship, there is ample evidence from remarks made at the Third Congress to show that the Russians were not universally popular in the MPR. Their trading methods were strange to the Mongols, they were seen to be interfering in Mongol affairs and many Mongols thought them rude and overbearing. For example it was said of one Russian who worked for the Mongolian customs service:

"Mr. Vollosovich is to the Customs a kind of 'genius of the mountains', a bogey to frighten the children. True, it is not always pleasant to work with him, but he is doubtless an inestimable worker."<sup>29</sup>

The Mongols were most angry about the section of the Sino-Soviet Treaty of 1924, which referred to the status of the Mongolian state. Article Five read:

"The government of the USSR recognizes that Outer Mongolia is an integral part of the Republic of China and respects China's sovereignty therein."<sup>30</sup>

Chicherin, the Soviet Commisar of Foreign Affairs, had attempted to counterbalance this by stating:

"We recognize the Mongolian People's Republic as part of the Chinese Republic, but we recognize also its autonomy in so far-reaching a sense that we regard it not only as independent of China in its internal affairs, but also as capable of pursuing its foreign policy independently."<sup>31</sup>

From the USSR's continuing relationship with the MPR, it is clear that the Soviet government accepted the wording of the 1924 Treaty in order to safeguard its own interests in China. It had no intention of allowing the Chinese government a foothold north of the Gobi. Nevertheless the Mongols deeply desired that full independence be publicly acknowledged. When the Soviet Ambassador A.I. Vasil'ev greeted the Third Congress he was forced to choose his words very carefully.

"...it is clear to me that you Delegates at the Congress and you members of the People's Party are the brains of the whole of Mongolia and the real masters of this country."<sup>32</sup>

This was outright flattery, as were his words of acknowledgement of his election as honorary member of the Congress:

"Your election is the best appreciation of the work I have done in Mongolia. But for the future too, my principle remains the same: You, Mongols are the Masters of the country and whoever comes here, be it from North and South, must be only a guest. The masters are you, only you."<sup>33</sup>

However Vasil'ev took pains to point out that the stability and strength

of the MPR was dependent on that of the Soviet Union implying that the MPR could not afford to quarrel with its ally.

Vasil'ev was also constrained to explain his government's policy towards Uriankhai which was another bone of contention between the two countries. Uriankhai was on the northwestern border of the MPR and had been a part of the Ch'ing Empire. Although its population was mainly Turkish-speaking they had longstanding and close relations with the Mongols of Khalkh. Some of the inhabitants of Uriankhai were Tibetan Buddhists and the Mongolian script and literary language was the only form of literacy. When the Mongols of Khalkh declared independence in 1911 the literate leaders of Uriankhai expressed a desire to link the future of their territory to that of Khalkh. However, Russian colonization in this area, sporadic in the late 19th century, was steadily increasing and by 1922 there were about 10,000 Russians living in Uriankhai. From their ranks the Tannu Tuvan People's Party (TTPP) was born and in 1922 an All-Uriankhai Congress declared the country independent under the protection of the RSFSR.<sup>34</sup> Thus the Tannu Tuvan People's Republic (TTPR) came into being.

The new political organization was not popular with the native population, however.<sup>35</sup> Taxes were said to be high and soldiers were used to subdue opposition, for instance when the government stores in the Kemchik region were broken into. Many fled into the Khovd region of Mongolia. They told the authorities there that the government of Tannu Tuva intended to exterminate them and begged for protection and the annexation of Uriankhai.<sup>36</sup> The Mongolian government protested to the Soviet government but the latter was not to be

moved. Vasil'ev acknowledged to the Third Party Congress:

"We are friends with you, but sometimes there are quarrels and misunderstandings even between brothers." 37

He said that a commission of "honest and reliable men" had been sent to investigate the matter.

Whatever the Mongols' response to the Russian ambassador's words, it was Rinchino's task, as representative of the Comintern, to encourage closer relations with the USSR and the international Communist movement. He described the world situation as perceived by the Comintern, the crisis of capitalism and the inevitability of a Second World War. He dwelt on the threat of invasion of the MPR by the Chinese warlords Chang Tso-lin and Wu Pei-fu and said that Mongolia's only hope of survival was as a part of the international Communist movement.<sup>38</sup> He proposed that the resolution of the Second MPP Congress Mongol-Soviet friendship be repeated. Danzan objected, saying "a superfluous repetition can only be harmful." However, the motion was carried.<sup>39</sup>

This difference of opinion between Rinchino and Danzan was not unusual, reflecting what was a long-standing antipathy between the two men dating back at least to 1923. On one level it was a personal quarrel between two people, one of whom was very practical in outlook (Danzan) and the other (Rinchino) who based his ideas and decisions on the theories of Marx and Lenin. It was also a struggle for power, each contender having a circle of loyal supporters. A third aspect was the opposition of Khalk Mongols to Buriats and Russians holding

positions of influence.

Danzan had successfully maintained his position as leader of the Party and the independence movement since 1920, and was rid of one serious contender, Bodo, in 1922. In 1923, however, Danzan lost two influential supporters, Sükhbaatar and the Jalkhanz Khutagt, both of whom had died. At Sükhbaatar's funeral, Danzan had described his relationship with the Commander-in-Chief as being like "twin lambs".<sup>40</sup> Sükhbaatar's death was doubly disastrous for Danzan, however, because it caused him to overstretch his capabilities and so lose respect. Danzan became Commander-in-Chief, a post he was entirely unsuited to. According to a Soviet military adviser, Sorokovikov, he refused to pay any serious attention to military matters and the needs of his army.<sup>41</sup> Danzan was also thrown into closer association with Rinchino at this time because the latter was Chairman of the Military Council. It was here and in the Central Committee that the two men attracted their factional support. According to Rinchino Danzan was supported by twenty members of the government, five or six on the Military Council and seven or eight in the Central Committee.<sup>42</sup> As for Rinchino, his supporters presumably included a section of the remainder, members of the Youth League and a number of men whom he had known as schoolboys in Irkutsk.

Most of what we know about the Danzan/Rinchino dispute comes from the documents of the Third Party Congress, although there are hints of it in other sources. They disagreed on the amount of contact the MPR should have with the Chinese, Mongol unification and whether or not the problem of lamas in the Party should be

discussed. They also differed over whether a photograph of Sükhbaatar should be hung in every Party office or not.<sup>43</sup> It is hardly surprising that they should have disagreed over the Comintern's instructions for the MPP in 1924.

In his opening speech at the Third Congress, Danzan acknowledged the contribution of the Comintern to the MPP and the Mongolian state.<sup>44</sup> However it was Vasil'ev and Rinchino who laid the greatest emphasis on the Party's obligations to the Comintern and especially the obligation to become a party of the masses. In accordance with this, Rinchino had produced a booklet called "The Future Form and Circumstances of the Mongolian Revolution" and he summarized its recommendations for the delegates of the Congress.<sup>45</sup> He said that because the Party's ultimate goal was Communism its members should be left-wing ards who would wield power on behalf of the masses. Therefore the purge ordered by the Second Congress must be carried out. Danzan did not object to such a purge, but he was averse to full "ardization" (i.e. "bolshevization" in a Mongolian context) because, he said:

"...not all nobles are reactionaries  
nor all common people honest."<sup>46</sup>

In his booklet Rinchino also advocated the development of state capitalism in trade and industry as a means of preventing the growth of private capitalism. After his theses had been discussed he proposed:

"Now we are free. We can arrange our life as it pleases us. There is no need to pass through all stages of capitalism. Better let us at once adopt the Soviet regime, without going under the yoke of exploitation."

But Danzan replied:

"Does this mean that the right of private property must be curtailed in Mongolia? Of course such a resolution can be carried ... I am ready to accept it ... But so far we have no capitalists in Mongolia and thus the question is not one of the present but of the future. Rinchino's proposal may be accepted, but practically it has no importance."<sup>47</sup>

Rinchino then retorted . that the MPP had an obligation to follow the Comintern and that capitalism must not be allowed to develop, and once more Danzan was forced to back down in the face of Rinchino's argument and powers of oratory.

It is curious how Danzan consistently gave way to Rinchino's proposals during the Third Congress and we must conclude either that the latter's supporters outnumbered Danzan's or that Danzan was constrained by the presence of outsiders such as Vasil'ev. In the Central Committee he had, according to Rinchino, openly abused the Buriat shouting:

"Elbegdorj [Rinchino] is a cheat, Elbegdorj is a stirrer of the government put there by the Russians, Elbegdorj is the opponent of revolution, and an oppressive dictator."<sup>49</sup>

On other occasions Danzan totally ignored Rinchino and only showed interest when the Chinese or his own supporters were mentioned.<sup>50</sup>

Even if Rinchino's following at the Third Congress was greater than Danzan's, the latter still had great influence generally. Rinchino's future in the MPR and in the Comintern now depended on a successful adoption of the Comintern's instructions. This meant more than passing resolutions in favour of "ardization", state capitalism and Mongol-Soviet friendship. While Danzan stood in the way such resolutions could well be ignored as the resolutions of the Second Party Congress had been. Therefore Danzan must be overthrown completely. The documents covering the events of the latter part of the Congress strongly suggest that Rinchino, having pressed every advantage in the Congress discussions and decision-making, then exploited the bad relations existing between the Party and the Youth League to destroy Danzan for ever.

The Youth League had already interrupted the Congress once, at the 12th session when some 400 arrived, allegedly, to greet the Congress.<sup>51</sup> As the Congress building was small the delegates went out into the street where Buyannemekh, Chairman of the Youth League, addressed them on the League's behalf. He praised the Party, saying its aims and tasks were the same as the League's and assured the delegates:

"There is no rupture, no misunderstanding between the Party and our Union. We are guided by the Comintern who issued identical instructions to you and to us."<sup>52</sup>

He admitted that some reactionaries existed in both organizations but insisted that both bodies were victims of "malignant rumours and calumnies"<sup>53</sup> and he welcomed the resolution of the Congress to purge the Party. Danzan accepted the good wishes of the League on the Congress's behalf and declared:

"What has happened today is very auspicious, showing the concord that reigns between both our organizations."<sup>54</sup>

But before the League was brought under party control and true concord reigned it was to bring about the downfall of the Danzanist faction.

Between the 17th and 18th session of the Congress there was a two-day recess. When the delegates reassembled Danzan failed to appear for three hours. He arrived armed and complaining of agitation against him in the army, cancelled the day's proceedings and left.<sup>55</sup> The assembly was thrown into confusion and Dambadorj launched into a passionate outburst against the Chairman.<sup>56</sup> He accused Danzan of hindering the work of the Congress, of having become <sup>a</sup> Khan and of planning a military coup perhaps that very night. "Shall we live to see the morrow?" he asked.<sup>57</sup>

In the midst of this uproar a delegation of Youth League members arrived, begging to put a serious matter before the Congress.<sup>58</sup> During the two-day recess the Youth League was responsible for the arrest of several men, including Congress Secretaries and Dorjpalam, and Buyannemekh, Chairman of the Youth League for failing to attend a military <sup>a</sup> training session. The sessions were organized daily by the League Committee of Niislel Khüree but because absenteeism was increasing three members of the Office of Internal Security, Gombo, Bayar and Sanduijav,<sup>59</sup> had been instructed to punish offenders with a two-day jail sentence.

That the Youth League should arrange a training session during the Party Congress at all, and require important officials to attend arouses suspicion that there were political motives behind the arrests. Bavaasan had antagonized the League by challenging its right to arrest members of the government, had sacked the League Committee of Niislel Khüree and secured the dismissal of Gombo, Bayar and Sanduijav from the security service.<sup>60</sup> Moreover in 1921 Bavaasan had become Deputy Chairman of the Provisional Little Khural, a body which had very poor relations with the Youth League.<sup>61</sup> As for Buyannemekh it was later said that he was a leader of the extreme left wing of the League, which for some strange reason, had allied with Danzan.<sup>62</sup> Dorjpalam was also a supporter of Danzan.<sup>63</sup>

The affair is further complicated by the fact that also during the recess, rumours of a Chinese attack on Khovd were circulating and Tserendorj the Prime Minister was extremely angry when Bavaasan who was to make a report on this, failed to turn up. Tserendorj took the League to task for interfering in matters they were too young to understand. He told them that they ought to put the Mongol nation first, chided them for factionalism in their ranks and for paying too much attention to Buriats and Russians like Rinchino and Starkov, when it was well-known that Rinchino and Danzan had a long-standing argument.<sup>64</sup>

Rinchino had remained remarkably quiet until this point and he was now obliged to defend his position. First of all, he distanced himself from the Youth League and its bid for independence

saying that this was a dangerous policy and mistaken. Then he drew the attention of the assembly to what he described as a sickness within the Party. He held Danzan responsible for this and made a series of charges against the Chairman.<sup>65</sup>

The most serious charges were speculation and profiteering in collusion with the Chinese. When Danzan was Minister of Finance in 1922 he had cancelled an agreement to purchase flour for the Army from Verkhneudinsk and when the Army's supplies ran out in 1923 he bought more dearly from the Chinese.<sup>66</sup> He had established a motor vehicle transport service with a Chinese firm called Dalai Kho when Rinchino had negotiated a similar arrangement with the Soviet Union.<sup>67</sup> He had also sent Mongolian soldiers to protect Chinese merchants who were buying skins in Tsetsen Khan aimag<sup>68</sup> and he permitted another Chinese firm Ta Shen Kuei, a large Shansi trading firm, to collect debts which the government had annulled.<sup>69</sup>

Other charges concerned state security. Rinchino accused Danzan of making a Chinese spy head of <sup>the</sup> Training Directorate in 1923 while he, Rinchino, was abroad. This was said to have split the Service and fomented angry quarrels in the Party.<sup>70</sup> Danzan was also said to have had contacts with unnamed Chinese so-called militarists from whom he had received a letter concerning a proposed meeting. The existence of this letter was withheld for a fortnight.<sup>71</sup> A further allegation, that Danzan, Bavaasan and the Gun Lamjav, Governor of the Khovd region had plotted to overthrow the government is recorded in Bayar's memoir.<sup>72</sup>

If Danzan's crimes were as serious as Rinchino implied it is surprising that he kept quiet about them as long as he suggested. What is most interesting, however, is the evidence of Bayar which shows that all these charges had already been discussed at a meeting of the Youth League, probably between the 17th and 18th sessions of the Congress.<sup>73</sup>

Also present at this meeting, if Bayar has remembered correctly, were Tserendorj, Rinchino, Choibalsan, Japan Danzan and Dambadorj.<sup>74</sup> Rinchino told the meeting:

"Your criticism is not just a matter for the League's meeting. Choose some representatives and send them to the Third Party Congress."<sup>75</sup>

This is strong evidence that the real reasons for the arrests were not absenteeism but a deliberate attempt to provoke a major crisis.

Bayar's evidence should be taken seriously because he was one of the delegates chosen.

Rinchino closed his speech of accusation offering the delegates two stark alternatives. If they went with Danzan, he said, they headed toward "disaster for the masses, national shame, a black hell of destruction." If they turned to the left they would choose "freedom and the true shining sun of ard rule."<sup>76</sup>

After a moment's silence there was thunderous applause. Then Dambadorj heaped recriminations on Bavaasan and Buyannemekh. Bavaasan was accused of conspiracy in 1922. He was also alleged to have opposed elections for khoshuu chairmen and the annulling of ranks and titles of ruling princes. He was a flatterer, said Dambadorj, of men in high places, such as Bodo, Danzan and Tserendorj.<sup>77</sup>

Of Buyannemekh it was said that he had, in partnership with Starkov the Youth Comintern advisor, caused a split in the Youth League over the issue of independent status. However Dambadorj did say that Buyannemekh was a true revolutionary and only guilty of being too easily led by others.<sup>78</sup> Since Rinchino's name had also been linked with Starkov's by Tserendorj, it is possible that Buyannemekh was left to take the blame for a misjudged policy that was actually implemented by Soviet citizens. If so, it would not be an isolated case, as we shall see in 1928.

Rinchino and Dambadorj won the day. The Security Services were instructed to arrest Danzan and at one o'clock on the morning of 27 August Batorun announced the deed accomplished.<sup>79</sup> Later in the day a commission was formed to investigate the Youth League<sup>80</sup> and the following evening the same commission was enlarged and instructed to investigate the charges against Danzan and the other detainees. Choibalsan, now acting Commander-in-Chief in Danzan's stead, headed the commission, which also included Tüvshintör an executive official of the Ministry of Justice and Nasanbat, a military commissar. There were also, significantly, three additional members of the Youth League, including Ts. Tseveg. The commission was ordered to complete its investigation and report back to the Congress within 24 hours.<sup>81</sup>

The report was read out to the delegates on 30 August. Danzan was condemned on all Rinchino's charges and on further charges of promoting Mongolian capitalism and hindering the development of the Mongolian cooperative. Reference was made to secret documents revealing that Danzan was plotting counter-revolution but there is no mention of

the Congress actually examining any of them. He was sentenced to death by shooting and his property was to be confiscated leaving only enough for his widow and family to live on. From what we are told about this investigation, it seems unlikely that Danzan was given any opportunity to defend himself.<sup>82</sup>

Bavaasan was also condemned to be shot for holding the aims, doctrines and oath of the Youth League in contempt, refusing to attend compulsory military exercises and for threatening to shoot any Youth League member who tried to enforce attendance at those exercises. The report says he tried to destroy the Security Service and to take responsibility for military training away from the League's Khuree office. In addition, Bavaasan was found guilty of plotting against the state with a man called Tseren.<sup>83</sup>

Three other detainees, Dorjpalam, Buyannemekh and an unidentified Gombojav were given a lighter punishment. The Commission attributed their involvement in the affair to their "shortcomings" and they were sentenced to thirty days imprisonment but were not expelled from the Party. The report concluded with the statement that the sentences were intended as a warning to all those who associated with foreigners or exploited the ards and recommended that such people be purged from the ranks of the Party.

There was silence after the reading of the report, a whisper here and there, and finally applause broke out. It was not until Minjüür the Deputy Chairman asked if the report should be adopted that delegates realised that the sentence had already been carried out.

Everyone was stunned. At this point the Soviet Ambassador Vasil'ev rose from his seat and pronounced his blessing on the act. On his own admission he had understood very little of what had been going on since he spoke no MÓngol but now he comforted the delegates saying they had acted correctly and as was done in the Soviet Union. Their action, he assured them, would improve relations between their two countries. Delegates should go home and report to their localities what had happened.<sup>84</sup>

With the death of Danzan and the downfall of his supporters most of the old nationalist leadership was driven from the Party or subdued and the factionalism that had torn party and public organizations was ended. A new and younger leadership more willing to accept direction from the Comintern and the Russian advisers came to power. There was, however, one curious survivor in this upheaval, the 56 year old Prime Minister Tserendorj.

During the course of the dispute over Danzan a number of potentially damning remarks were made about Tserendorj. It was alleged that Tserendorj tried to protect Bavaasan; that he was implicated in the abrogation of the autonomy in 1919; and that the secret letter concerning talks with Chinese militarists was seen on Tserendorj's desk although Tserendorj had assured Rinchino that he knew nothing of such a letter.<sup>85</sup> However Rinchino could not take on Tserendorj and Danzan at the same time. Tserendorj had immense popular support and was one of the outstanding statesmen of the 1920s. He was extremely hard-working and it may even be true to say that his experience in administration made him irreplaceable at the time. He also had a

reputation for being very anti-Chinese. Tserendorj underwent further criticism because of his past but he remained in office until his death in 1928 and was honoured with a state funeral.

### The Central Committee

Before the Congress closed it elected a new Central Committee. Dambadorj became the Chairman while continuing to head the Organization Department. His close friend, Navaandorjiin Jadamba, who had been at school with him in Irkutsk, was made Deputy Chairman. Ganjuuryn Gelegsenge a pre-revolutionary government official was Party Secretary, and Khayankhyarvaa, who only joined the Party in 1924, was appointed to the Propaganda Department. Other important full members were Rinchino, Tserendorj, Choibalsan and Anandyn Amar, the Foreign Minister. There were also candidate members including D. Natsagdorj, acting Chairman of the Youth League, Sanjiin Dovchin, who had been a local government officer before the revolution, Losol, Jamtsrano, another Danzan, Yanjmaa the widow of Sükhbaatar, who was the official women's representative, Navaandorjiin Nasanbat, a military commissar, and Magsarjav, Deputy Minister for the Army. The new Committee went away with instructions to investigate all Party members and transform the MPP into a party of ards, to improve all party organizations and to draw up a new Party Programme.<sup>86</sup>

There were other members of the Central Committee whose names are not recorded in the documents. Of the fourteen who are named, half were below the age of thirty and four more under forty. The Chairman was only 25 years old and his Deputy was the youngest member at 24. Those who were considered old were Tserendorj (56), Magsarjav (47) and

Jamtsrano (44).<sup>87</sup> Also significant is the presence of at least three who had been educated in Irkutsk, Dambadorj, Jadamba and Choibalsan, and who had known Rinchino there. Furthermore Nasanbat was probably Jadamba's elder brother.<sup>88</sup> Some Central Committee members had been associated with the Party since 1921 but others like Amar and Khayankharvaa had joined in 1923 and 1924 respectively.<sup>89</sup>

Rinchino's victory and continued presence on the Central Committee made the position of Buriats in the Party and the government secure for some years to come. Jamtsrano's position was unchanged and, as we shall see later, others like Erdene Batkhan, who was shortly to become Minister of Education, and Ishdorj of the Ministry of Economic Affairs prospered and made a significant contribution to the new state during the next four years. Though Rinchino's supremacy was to be short-lived, the Buriat influence was sustained and Rinchino was replaced as Comintern representative by M.I. Amagaev.

Without doubt those who gained most from the Third Party Congress were Dambadorj and Jadamba. They were to maintain their positions on the Party executive until ousted in 1928 as so-called Rightist Opportunists or Deviationists. Jadamba's name appears regularly during the years up to 1928, in particular as the head of various special commissions,<sup>and</sup> he was clearly a useful committee man. He was also very popular and was capable in business.<sup>90</sup>

### The Third Youth League Congress

A month after his success at the Third Party Congress Jadamba was made Chairman of the Youth League when it met on 27 September for its own Third Congress. Other MPP Central Committee members elected to the League's Central Committee were Khayankharvaa and Navaḁserengiin Gonjoon, and Choibalsan joined the League's Control Commission. This Congress ordered a new League Programme to be drawn up and declared that the League must submit to party control and assist the Party. Members were told to make known how "reactionary forces" had been destroyed and to keep a close watch lest any similar tendency should arise in the future. The energies of the League members were to be channelled into literacy campaigns, the immediate objective being to make all Niislel Khüree members and 70% of the entire membership literate. Youth League members should also be involved in a wide range of cultural activities such as publishing and organising clubs, and musical and dramatic performances. From this time it became mandatory for Youth League members to transfer to the Party by the age of 25.<sup>91</sup>

### The First Great Khural and the Constitution

The stage was now set for the final decisive act of 1924, the holding of the First Great Khural which would ratify the first Constitution of the MPR. Party and League members were sent out to all parts of the country to tell the people what was to happen and how they should choose their representatives. It was not a straightforward task because although people were instructed to vote for ards there were many princes who were elected and had to be disqualified.

For instance two princes in Bogd Khan uul aimag, Tseren-ochir of TüsHEET Khan khoshuu and Dugarjav of Ikh Dulaan uul khoshuu were disqualified and fresh elections had to be held.<sup>92</sup>

In Niislel Khüree a committee was busy preparing the agenda for the Khural and another made practical arrangements for the meeting place and other facilities. Those delegates who had no friends or relatives in the capital with whom they could stay had to be lodged with Party members or government employees.<sup>93</sup> Meanwhile a commission of 20 members was completing the draft of the Constitution under the direction of a Comintern representative Turar Ryskulov, a Kazakh, who had arrived recently in Niislel Khüree.<sup>94</sup> Ryskulov had been associated with the Bolsheviks since 1917 and had seen service in Turkestan and in the Kirgiz (Kazakh) Republic. Between 1922 and 1924 he was the Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of Nationalities. Other members of the Constitution Commission included the Prime Minister Tserendorj who was Chairman, Luvsanchoi, Genden, Gonjoon, Givaabaljir, Jadamba, Dambadorj and Rinchino.<sup>95</sup>

The First Great Khural opened to the sound of martial music on the 8th November 1924. The officials sat at a long table covered with a red cloth and round the hall hung pictures of Lenin and Sükhbaatar. Outside the building was a large painting of Lenin by a Mongolian artist and the Party and government buildings were decorated with red ribbons. Memoir accounts describe the delegates inside the hall as colourfully dressed in the traditional costume of their respective regions, Dörvöds in white deels with black borders, Buriats with red-tasselled hats and Kazakhs with feathered hats. Many others wore sheepskin deels<sup>96</sup> faced with blue cotton which indicated

their humble origins.<sup>97</sup> Only 77 of the 90 elected representatives actually attended the Khural and all were men. Seven of them were listed as totally illiterate. Many were officials of central or local government. Six of the delegates are listed as taij (princes), including a Kazakh from western Mongolia. Nine were officially lamas but were employed by the state as teachers and local government officials. There was also one from an agricultural khoshuu which suggests that he was a lama of very low status. All the lama delegates were Party members. In fact only 13 of the 77 delegates were members of neither the Party nor the Youth League.<sup>98</sup> Besides the elected representatives the heads of government also took part. All delegates had freedom of speech and could only be arrested with the Khural's agreement.<sup>99</sup>

The Prime Minister opened the proceedings at 11 a.m. on 8 November. Jadamba was elected Chairman and Ölziitiin Badrakh,<sup>100</sup> a Dörvöd Mongol,<sup>101</sup> Deputy Chairman. Gelegsenge and Dugarjantsan were general secretaries. The honorary presidents included Kalinin, Chicherin, Vasiliev, the Soviet Ambassador, Erbanov, Prime Minister of the Buriat Mongol Autonomous Soviet Republic (BMASSR), Ryskulov, and Dambadorj. Greetings were read out from national organizations, representatives of foreign states and organizations and telegrams of solidarity were sent to the Comintern and the USSR.<sup>102</sup>

The assembly was ratified as the embodiment of supreme government power in the MPR. Then all the reports of government departments, local authorities and the various national and party organizations were read out and discussed. Ryskulov, who in 1925 published a detailed article of the proceedings of the First Great Khural, observed that

the delegates felt free to express their feelings and make criticisms and proposals of their own.<sup>103</sup> Many of the issues discussed by the Third Party Congress were debated again. The Ministries of Finance, Internal Affairs and Justice were criticised and improvements ordered. In foreign policy the overriding importance of friendship with the USSR was emphasized. Much time was devoted to a discussion of economic development both from the point of view of improving the traditional livestock herding and also the creation of new industry and the exploitation of national resources like minerals and forests. The assembly declared in favour of developing a socialist state-owned economic sector in both town and countryside. Along with industrial development the congress recommended the formation of trade unions whose members would constitute the basis of a proletariat. Education was also reviewed in detail following the formation of a new Education Ministry under Onkhotyn Jam'yan.<sup>104</sup>

The most important act of the First Great Khural was the ratification of the Constitution because it laid down the basis on which the MPR should be constructed and the direction for future political, social and economic development. It was modelled on the 1918 constitution of the RSFSR<sup>105</sup> and it compares closely with the Constitution of Tannu Tuva of October 1924.<sup>106</sup> Before the vote of ratification was taken the Chairman proposed that any questions on the Constitution be discussed first, but there is no record of any controversial questions. The Constitution received unanimous approval on the 26th November.<sup>107</sup>

In the first part of the Constitution, the fundamental laws

of the MPR were laid out beginning with the rights of ards. Mongolia was declared an independent People's Republic and there was no mention of Chinese sovereignty. The aim of the Republic was to end the so-called feudal-theocratic regime and to set up a republican order whose supreme organ of power was a Great Khural elected by the people. The Khural would elect the government. All land, minerals, forests and water were the property of the people. All international agreements made before 1921 were abrogated. Private and institutional debts to foreign usurers were annulled. Economic planning was in the hands of the government and a state monopoly of foreign trade was to be introduced gradually. The nation's freedom was to be protected by the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Army and all ard youths were to receive military training. Church and State were declared separate and religion a matter for the individual conscience. Freedom of expression, freedom of assembly, free education and equality without discrimination by nationality, race or sex were recognized. However individuals or groups could be deprived of rights if they used them to the detriment of the State. Former noble titles and the sovereign rights of incarnations were abrogated. Foreign policy was to be coordinated with the aims and interests of small, oppressed nations and revolutionary workers of the world who were struggling to bring an end to capitalism and aspiring to Communism. Nevertheless if circumstances demanded it, friendly relations with other foreign powers might be entered into.

The Constitution then had a number of sections dealing with government structure and procedure. There are statements of the powers and responsibilities of the Little Khural, which held supreme power between sessions of the Great Khural, and the Council of Ministers. The system of

local government is described. There was to be a series of local assemblies elected by the local population at various levels which would elect their own officials each year. The Constitution guaranteed voting rights for all men and women from the age of eighteen, except those who lived by exploiting others, such as traders, usurers, former princes, Buddhist incarnations, lamas who lived permanently in monasteries, the insane and people who had been condemned of a crime such as theft by a court of law.

A long section dealt with budgetary matters. The Great Khural had the power to approve government budgets and without its approval no expenditure was to be made. Local government, traditionally free to levy its own taxes, was to remain so but within certain fixed limits. Each assembly had to have its yearly and half-yearly budgets approved by the assembly of the level immediately above.

In the Constitution's final section the seal, crest and flag of the Republic were described. They were all to feature the Soyombo symbol.<sup>108</sup> During the discussion on the Constitution a delegate called Sereeter had asked the meaning of this symbol which suggests that it was not widely known. The Prime Minister explained that it symbolized the Mongolian nation.<sup>109</sup> Also during the discussion, a resolution was passed renaming Niislel Khüree Ulaanbaatar (Red Hero).

The passing of the Constitution was cause for loud cheers and celebration. In the lower hall of the Central Committee a banquet of cakes, kumiss and mutton was laid out for the delegates. Jadamba led the singing. After a number of traditional songs, Rinchino's wife sang the Internatsionale which her husband had translated into

Mongolian. The whole assembly stood up in respect. Then Gonjoon, Bayar and others sang songs in praise of the Great Khural and the Red Flag which they had composed for the occasion, improvising in the Mongolian tradition. Outside in the main square people cheered loudly as the Constitution was read out. There was a military parade, a red banner bearing a picture of Sükhbaatar was presented to the leaders of the Khural. As a finale there was a display of fireworks.<sup>110</sup>

### Summary

The quest for a suitable political form for the independent state began in 1921 and ended in 1924. The death of the Bogd Khaan made it possible to throw off the last vestiges of the traditional political system and adopt a republican one with a constitution that was based on democratic principles. It was, however, democracy with fixed limits. The Mongolian term ardchikh used to express "to democratize" is derived from the word ard. Ard is exclusive, in the same way that "People" is exclusive in Marxist terminology. Princes and churchmen were not included in this term. It was not difficult therefore to focus the attention of an undeveloped, largely unschooled people on the limits of the term rather than to extend its use to embrace the population of the entire nation as had seemed the intention in 1920 and 1921. To what extent the principle of "ardization" as applied by the regime's new leaders was a factor in producing the transformations of the next four years is one of the subjects to be examined in forthcoming chapters.

CHAPTER FOURBUILDING THE REPUBLIC - PARTY AND GOVERNMENT ORGANIZATION1925 - 1927

In 1925 the MPP took measures to transform itself into a class-based, hierarchical organization with a strong central authority and upholding clearly defined aims and ideology. The measures included purges and enrolment campaigns, a new programme and new regulations, the formation of a network of party cells and offices throughout the land, and extensive propaganda work in conjunction with literacy campaigns.

The First Purge of the MPP

In January 1925 the Central Committee formed a special commission under the leadership of Jadamba the Deputy Chairman to purge the Party as the Third MPP Congress had ordered. The commissioners included members of the Central Committees of both the Party and the Youth League and they were given the following instructions.

"The task of purging the Party, which has the aim of improving the quality of the composition of the Party, includes enabling poor and middle ards to enrol in the Party so that it becomes a party of poor and middle ards. When the purge is carried out, too high demands must not be placed on the poor and middle ards and those workers engaged in handicraft enterprises. First of all it is necessary to purge the Party of former White Guards, officials of the old regime, enemies of the revolution, former feudalists and careerists making use<sub>1</sub> of party membership for their own benefit."

At this time ards described as poor owned less than 50 bod of livestock and the so-called middle ards between 50 and 300 bod. The bod was a traditional Mongolian unit of livestock and in the 1920s one bod was equivalent to either one horse, cow, bull or yak or half a camel or seven sheep or 14 goats.<sup>2</sup>

As instructed, the commissioners subjected the poor and middle ards to cursory questioning only. Bat-Önöriin Ölziikhutag, an employee of the Ministry of the Army, was asked why he had joined the Party and what he thought the Party should do in future. His answers were satisfactory and then he too joined the commissioners.<sup>3</sup> Party members who owned more than 300 bod or who were high lamas, former princes or pre-revolutionary officials were closely examined and the purge was no pleasant experience as the following memoir shows:

"It was really funny to see the important officials and aristocrats who had formerly held high positions like khoshuu prince, khoshuu tuslagch<sup>4</sup> and zakhiragch<sup>5</sup> coming into the examination ger frightened and looking cautiously about them. They thought that the authority of the people's revolution was immense emphasized their own lack of power."<sup>6</sup>

The purge continued throughout 1925 and into the spring of 1926.<sup>7</sup>

### The Party Programme of 1925

In March 1925 there was a plenary meeting of the Central Committee.<sup>8</sup> Members were full of enthusiasm. They discussed a draft of the new Party Programme that was to replace the Khiagt

Platform, and the draft Party Regulations. They also drew up a series of measures for hardizing the Party and spreading ideology. Present at the meeting were Ryskulov who helped to compile the new Programme and Siren Natsov who had recently replaced Starkov as official Youth Comintern representative. Natsov described the meeting as a "turning point in the history of the national-freedom movement of the working masses of Mongolia" and this change of direction was marked by renaming the Party the "Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party "(MPRP).<sup>9</sup>

The Party Programme<sup>10</sup> reflected both the spirit of the constitution and the Comintern's instructions to "bolshevize" or "hardize" the Party. It comprised a brief preface and three sections. The first section on the world situation was a lengthy criticism of the evils and shortcomings of the capitalist system. The second section analyzed Far Eastern affairs and the MPR's place within them. Section Three contained the Party's plans for its own structure and development, and its policies for the political, social and economic organization of the Mongolian state. The central feature of foreign policy was a close political and economic alliance of the MPR with the USSR, together with relationships with Communist and revolutionary movements of the Far East and friendly links with ards (workers) worldwide.

The Central Committee passed the Programme provisionally and submitted it to the Comintern for approval. The Comintern was not satisfied, however, and returned the document with instructions to rework the theoretical parts. In particular the Comintern demanded

that the role of the October Russian Revolution in the Mongolian Revolution of 1921 be given greater emphasis. The Party was also criticized for devoting a special paragraph (Paragraph 39) to the sufferings of Inner Mongols and for expressing its determination to support their struggle for emancipation on account of the close ties of tradition, lifestyle and language of the Khalkh and Inner Mongols.<sup>11</sup>

It seems likely that Rinchino and Ryskulov were held jointly responsible for Paragraph 39 since Ryskulov was the official Comintern adviser on the Programme and Rinchino was known for his support of Pan-Mongolism.<sup>12</sup> Furthermore at the March Plenum Rinchino made the mistake of referring to Semenov's Pan-Mongolist movement of 1919 as "democratic".<sup>13</sup> The Comintern and the USSR consistently condemned this movement saying it was opposed to the interests of ards because Semenov received support from Japan and they tended to view other manifestations of Pan-Mongolism in the same way.<sup>14</sup> Until 1925 the Comintern had neither opposed nor encouraged the Mongolian Party's Pan-Mongolist tendencies but from this time pressure was exerted to persuade the MPRP to give up its aim of unifying the Mongol peoples. This explains why the new economic advisor, M.I. Amagaev,<sup>15</sup> a Buriat who was known for his opposition to sentiments of Pan-Mongolism, was appointed Comintern representative to the Central Committee in September. Ryskulov departed and Rinchino was completely eclipsed by Amagaev and he disappeared from the ranks of leadership of the MPR after 1925.<sup>16</sup>

Amagaev was a dominant personality at the Fourth MPRP Congress which opened on 23 September 1925 for eight days.<sup>17</sup> He

launched an attack on Pan-Mongolism as expressed in the draft Programme, telling the delegates that the Party must fight not only for the interests of the Mongol tribes but for all backward and enslaved peoples of the world.

"Outer Mongolia must not take upon itself the role of sole unifier of the Mongol lands and peoples, ignoring the wishes of the working masses of these people. The problem of unifying the Mongol peoples is a matter of the future voluntary association of these workers the day after the victory<sup>18</sup> of their national revolutionary movement."

The Congress gave way and issued a statement saying that Pan-Mongolism was dangerous because it tended to upset the balance of the alliance between the MPRP and other such movements in the Far East, in particular those in China. This indicates that the Comintern or the USSR foresaw the possibility of Khalkh Mongols returning to the Chinese fold after the victory of the Chinese revolution. The Programme was amended to refer to the Mongolian national-revolutionary movement as only one of many such movements. A further amendment gave greater emphasis to the 1917 Revolution in accordance with the Comintern's wishes. A revised text of the Programme was to be circulated to all party committees for comment and then submitted to the Comintern for further scrutiny.<sup>19</sup> It was hoped that the Fifth MPRP Congress would then be able to pass the Programme but it was not ready in time. The whole issue of the Party Programme indicates the constraints on independent policy-making by the MPRP that Comintern membership entailed.

## The Party Press

The Central Committee's Organization and Propaganda Department was split in 1925 and the work of the new Propaganda Department, especially its literary work, expanded considerably. A party press publishing newspapers and pamphlets had existed since 1921.<sup>20</sup> From 1924 to 1925 the Party and government jointly produced a newspaper called Ardyn Erkh (People's Rule). It was supposed to appear each month in 3000 copies but that proved impossible because of shortages of money and paper.<sup>21</sup> In 1925 the paper ended its association with the government and was published by the Central Committees of the Party and the Youth League instead. It was renamed Ünen (Truth) and carried articles of propaganda, general education and literature, and G. Navaanamjil was its editor for several years.<sup>22</sup>

Papers for a more specialized audience also appeared. The Youth League brought out Mongolyn Khuv'sgalt Zaluuchudyn Evlel<sup>23</sup> (Mongolian Revolutionary Youth League) from 1925. There was a paper for school children, Pioner (Pioneer) and Büsgüichüüdiin Sanal (Women's Viewpoint)<sup>24</sup> for women.<sup>25</sup> None of these papers came out as frequently as intended. Büsgüichüüdiin Sanal, for instance, was supposed to appear monthly but there were only 30 issues between 1925 and 1936.<sup>26</sup>

The Central Committee also launched a programme of translation which, for the first time, enabled Khalkh Mongols to consult the Marxist-Leninist classics. B. Ishdorj,<sup>27</sup> a Buriat who worked for the Ministry of Economic Affairs, produced the first Mongolian translation of the Communist Manifesto with footnotes and commentaries

on difficult words. He found political and scientific terminology difficult to translate into Mongolian but "on the whole he was equal to his important task."<sup>28</sup> Many propaganda pamphlets were also being produced to explain party policies, the Party Programme and why Danzan was shot, for example.<sup>29</sup> It is not possible to assess how widely party literature was read in the 1920s, and it should not be forgotten that the party press could not compete with the amount of rival propaganda that the Church was able to put into circulation. Nevertheless, literacy campaigns led by the Youth League, were also an important part of party propaganda work at this time and as the number of literate party members increased so did the need for political and ideological reading matter.

### Training Party Workers

Another initiative of the March 1925 Plenum was the Party Central School which opened in April 1925 for the education of party workers. There were various short courses for training propagandists for specialized work in the army or among women, for example, and an 18 month training scheme for full-time party workers.<sup>30</sup> By 1926 170 students had completed various courses. Ma Ho-t'ien, a Chinese visitor to the MPR, described the school as it was in 1927.<sup>31</sup> 104 men and 36 women were taking the 18 month course. Most were Khalkh Mongols but there were also a few students from Uriankhai, Barga, Inner Mongolia and some Buriats all of whom had passed an entrance examination. Tuition was free and in addition the students received board, lodging and a personal allowance of two Chinese dollars a month. Ten months were spent on general educational subjects and

the remaining time on politics and party principles. The school was equipped with display material on geography, history and ethnography, Buddhist statues,<sup>32</sup> pictures of revolutionary heroes and political posters. A student of the second intake, Tsesenjvyn Choijil, volunteered to attend after his local party cell received a letter from the Youth League committee of Bogd Khan uul aimag asking for a member to be sent to the school. Choijil did so well in his first year examination that he was made an assistant teacher for the remaining period of his education.<sup>33</sup>

The MPRP sent other young people to the new political training institutes such as the Communist University of Toilers of the East (KUTV)<sup>34</sup> which had branches in Moscow and Irkutsk. Here students from among the eastern nationalities of the USSR and from colonial countries received three years training in Marxism-Leninism and the history of the RCP, history, historical materialism, mathematics, natural sciences, chemistry, physics and philology.<sup>35</sup> The instructors included leading Communists of the day and a woman student, Dugaryn Densmaa, remembers being taught by N.K. Krupskaya, Lenin's widow and Clara Zetkin, Chairman of the Women's Comintern.<sup>36</sup> Those students who were not Soviet citizens were taught mainly in English but the Mongols received their training alongside the Soviet nationals. At the Moscow institute they were given an interpreter and a Buriat teacher called Badamyn Tagar assisted those who graduated in 1928.<sup>37</sup> It is not clear how many Mongols studied at KUTV in the 1920s. About 70 were sent to the USSR in 1925 and the numbers rose to 250 in 1926. However they include students attending institutions of general education, military academies and other vocational schools as well as

KUTV.<sup>38</sup> Graduates of KUTV and of the Party Central School were destined to play an important role in future political events in the MPR, including the overthrow of the Right Deviation in 1928.

### Party Congresses

The MPRP continued to hold a congress annually from 1924 until 1929. The proceedings of these congresses have been published in the MPR but have not, unfortunately, been available for western scholars to study. The resolutions of the congresses however are accessible.<sup>39</sup> There are also a Russian transcript of the Fourth Congress,<sup>40</sup> and partial reports in periodicals of the Fifth<sup>41</sup> and Sixth<sup>42</sup> and Seventh.<sup>43</sup> The records of discussion at the Third Party Congress revealed much about conditions in Mongolia and the opinions and outlook of party members in the early part of the decade. It would be desirable to compare this with the evidence of documents of later congresses but in the absence of such material the picture must be pieced together from other sources.

### Drawing Close to the Rural Masses

The Comintern instructed the Party to "draw close to the masses" but the masses did not, in the beginning, receive its approaches with any great enthusiasm. When Amagaev visited the MPR in 1924 he was forced to the following conclusions:

"The broad masses of the population not so much consciously, perhaps, as instinctively feel that they are supporters of the present people's government but they do not actively display it. [ my emphasis: JN ] In general the masses of the people of Mongolia are politically illiterate, not only have they no particular skill in public administration but they are at the mercy of tradition and the psychology of a herding lifestyle, the philosophy of which is margaashism (hope in tomorrow). Only the most advanced, developed individuals from among the masses are coming forward and entering the ranks of the People's Party and the Youth League."<sup>44</sup>

Contemporary evidence for the next four years suggests that those attitudes were changing, but only slowly. Many of the rural ards who did join the Party and even those who held official positions did not involve themselves energetically in party work and complaints of margaashism<sup>45</sup> were common. Instructions from headquarters were ignored and literature was often left undistributed. A delegate at the Fourth Party Congress described the situation:

"All the delegates are in agreement that there is ignorance among the rural masses of the Party. But that is inevitable if there is no guidance and there are not enough sufficiently experienced people to carry out work in these areas. It is often the case that ... you go to a cell meeting, travelling a distance of several örtöö on horseback. You arrive at the place and discover that there is not a meeting and so you go home again with nothing to show for it. There must be detailed instructions so that this does not happen. The CC [Central Committee] has let this circumstance slip out of sight ... It must be given serious attention."<sup>46</sup>

As Comintern representative Amagaev recommended that attention be given to political theory and the enforcement of discipline to

overcome the problems and he criticized delegates at the Fourth Party Congress for the time spent on the discussion of practical problems.<sup>47</sup>

This recalls similar criticisms of the pragmatist Danzan made by Rinchino at the previous congress. However the Fourth Congress took note of rural problems and passed a series of resolutions to improve the political education of rural party members and to encourage ards to enroll. There were to be local study groups and visits from full-time, peripatetic party instructors, propaganda meetings for non-members and clubs providing music, drama and films.<sup>48</sup>

Party membership was rising steadily at this time. By the Fourth Party Congress the pre-purge membership of 4000 was restored.<sup>49</sup> It rose to 7,600<sup>50</sup> in the spring of 1926, and reached 11,600 by the Fifth Party Congress in September.<sup>51</sup> It is likely that about 4,000 of the new members had actually transferred from the Youth League leaving about 3200 completely new recruits.<sup>52</sup> Not all of the latter joined voluntarily however. At a meeting of the Central Committee in March 1926 Badrakh who headed the Organization Department said that "local party organizations are often unaware of their rights and duties, interfere with the state organizations, forcibly recruit members etc."<sup>53</sup> It was felt that the Central Committee should have greater control over the rural party and that improved communications could do much to promote that. Members of the Central Committee and the Little Khural were sent out to instruct local committees in their duties, to bring them under the closer control of headquarters and to encourage rural members generally to be more conscientious.<sup>54</sup>

When the Fifth Party Congress met in September 1926 Amagaev

expressed his approval of the work of the Central Committee over the past year but said that efforts to "draw closer to the masses" were "feeble".<sup>55</sup> Dambadorj the Party Chairman was less critical, however. He praised the party organization in Arvaikheer khoshuu of Tsetserleg Mandal aimag. This was the only khoshuu in the country to have a party cell in all of its 20 districts (Mon. sum).<sup>56</sup>

When the Sixth Party Congress opened in September 1927, 400 sums of a total 700 in the MPR had party cells.<sup>57</sup> This was disappointing to the MPRP but was a considerable increase on the 121 cells in existence in 1924. Although only 2% of the entire population was enrolled in the Party the actual figure of 11,586<sup>58</sup> was almost ✓ three times the figure for 1924. A large proportion of new members who enrolled after the purge of 1925 were illiterate and that, coupled with the rapid increase in membership over a very short period, put a great strain on the educational resources of the party organization. At the same time the MPRP had very extensive government responsibilities which also made great demands on its manpower resources, especially the literate, and therefore we should not be overly critical of its efforts in the countryside. Had the Comintern not pressed the MPRP to become a mass party so rapidly, it might have been able to use its resources more economically and perhaps attract members more by the example of a dynamic organization and less by bullying unwilling and confused ards.

## Organizing Youth

In addition to its more general work of building up the rural party, the MPRP put considerable effort into setting up organizations for women, children, and workers and employees. The Trade Unions will, however, be discussed in the next chapter. From 1925 the Youth League's activities were directed and controlled by the Party, whose leading members dominated the Central Committee of the Youth League. Like the Party, the Youth League was purged in 1925 and new members were enrolled. By 1926 there were 5000 full members and almost as many candidate members.<sup>59</sup> As a result there was a high proportion of young people enrolled in political organizations and consequently available to work for the civil and public services.

The MPRP also set up two organizations for younger children. In 1925 51 pupils of the Ulaanbaatar Middle School were enrolled in the Pioneers. There were two sections called after Marx and Lenin and they met regularly with members of the Youth League for discussion.<sup>60</sup> In 1927 other Pioneer groups were formed in Altan Bulag, Khovd and the aimag centres. D. Natsagdorj, leading member of the Youth League and poet was the first chairman of the Pioneers' Bureau.<sup>61</sup> An organization for even younger children, Baatarchuudyn Baiguulaga (the Organization of Heroes) was started in 1926 for 7-10 year olds.<sup>62</sup> Neither this nor the Pioneers could command a mass influence because they were based on state schools and the monasteries still dominated Mongolian education at this time. However a framework was established for training the young in political ideas which would come into its own when secular schooling provided by the state became the norm.

The Youth League was the chief training ground for future party members and it was also an important labour pool for the Party. Its members were active as propagandists, taught the illiterate to read and write and were involved in cultural work. Some toured the countryside performing concerts and plays. The plays had a high propaganda content.<sup>63</sup> Princes and lamas were portrayed as cruel, greedy and oppressive but the representatives of the new regime were caring and provided opportunities for education and economic benefits for the poor. Youth League members were also used as propagandists in the army and were expected to discourage soldiers from deserting.

From 1925 to 1927 the Youth League was advised by S. Natsov of the Youth Comintern, a man like Amagaev, who adhered strictly to the Comintern's policies. In 1925 Sen Katayama, a Japanese Communist, also paid a brief official visit to the Mongolian Youth League.<sup>64</sup> By this time the problems between the Comintern and the Youth Comintern had been resolved. The Youth Comintern was no longer an independent organization and did not issue orders that conflicted with those of its parent organization. However because the Youth League had dual responsibilities it was still theoretically possible for it to oppose the Party on ideological or policy issues. Indeed the existence of various sections within the international Communist movement was potentially a powerful tool for exercising the divide and rule principle. This was to happen in 1928 when the party leadership was accused of deviating. As in 1924 the Comintern was to make use of the Youth League and also the Trade Unions, which were members of the Profintern, to overthrow party leaders who challenged the suitability of the Comintern's directives for the MPR.

### Women's Groups and the Emancipation of Women

From its foundation in 1920 the Party accepted the principle of equal rights for men and women but there were no women party members until 1923 when Yanjmaa, wife of Sükhbaatar, and a few others joined.<sup>65</sup> In March 1924 five of them had a meeting with Dambadorj, Head of the Central Committee's Organization Department and as a result a Women's Section was formed in the Central Committee. It was to be responsible for the enrolment and political education of women, the promotion of literacy and general education for women, and women and children's health and welfare.<sup>66</sup>

By August 1924 there were only 24 women party members,<sup>67</sup> although 300 young women had joined the Youth league.<sup>68</sup> It was difficult for married women to find time for party activities and many women, married or single were hindered by family opposition. One early female party member gives some idea of the treatment women received. Dogoryn Puntsag was 24 years old when she joined in 1924. In the autumn she went to the capital and one day she met an official she knew. The man asked her how she could be flaunting herself about the city when her mother lay ill at home, and he urged her to hurry back at once. It was just a trick for when she arrived she found her mother in perfect health. The official chided the mother for allowing her daughter to get involved with the "Reds" and a lama uncle ordered her to send Puntsag to tend the herds. She was not to be given a horse, however, for then she could escape to Ulaanbaatar again. The "Reds", said the lama, would all go to hell after death. Whatever the mother's private opinion, she was obliged to search through her daughter's personal belongings and destroy her

books and her party membership card. Puntsag did not give up easily, however, and later became secretary of her local cell. She says she was not the only woman to suffer such treatment.<sup>69</sup>

Even within the ranks of the Party women had to overcome indifference to their presence since it took the men some time to get used to the idea that women could be literate, educated and contribute to public life. This was the 18 year-old Pagmadulam's experience when she reported on the Women's Section at the Third Party Congress.

"The delegates, visibly bored, smoke their pipes desperately. The windows, for some unknown reason are shut: the room is full of smoke and stink; the delegates belch loudly passing the pipes to one another."<sup>70</sup>

Nevertheless party work among women developed steadily from 1925 and there was always at least one female member of the Central Committee. The Third Congress elected Yanjmaa;<sup>71</sup> in 1925 Tsoodol was elected<sup>72</sup> and in 1926 she was joined by Erdenejav.<sup>73</sup> In 1925 the Women's Section was enlarged to a full department and the first adviser from the Women's Comintern, V. Tarantaeva, arrived in the MPR.<sup>74</sup>

A Women's Congress was held annually from 1924 and unlike the congresses of other party organizations, it was open to members and non-members alike. The participants discussed the resolutions of the Party Congress, the international revolutionary movement of women, women's affairs world-wide and the care of mothers and babies. They also elected representatives to various committees of the Party and the Youth League, the Trades Unions Council and other bodies.<sup>75</sup> Delegates at the Third Women's Congress in 1926 voted to join the Women's Comintern.<sup>76</sup>

By 1928 there were about 1,073 female party members and a further 1,000 women in the Youth League.<sup>77</sup> Several dozen women had attended short courses at the Party Central School for women's organizers and 160 were working for the Party and the League.<sup>78</sup> They were also moving into other non-traditional areas of labour; 71 were in government service and 38 worked for the trade unions.<sup>79</sup> 600 women were members of tailors' unions, many of them employed to make army uniforms.<sup>80</sup> Girls were taking their place at the school bench too. In 1928 there were 551 girls out of a total 2,915 children in primary school; 30 of the 103 pupils in middle school were girls and 22 were studying abroad, mainly at KUTV.<sup>81</sup> Party membership gave a few women the opportunity to travel and come into contact with women of other nationalities. International Women's Day has been celebrated in the MPR since 1924 but delegates were also sent to take part in the celebrations in Moscow. When Yanjinsüren, Tsoodol and Nansalmaa went in 1927 they also visited Soviet factories and saw the special facilities such as canteens and nurseries that were available to women there.<sup>82</sup> It was the Party's efforts on behalf of women that enabled them to widen their experiences and take hold of their constitutional rights and so have a share in the running and enjoyment of their country.

### The Organization of Central Government

Where the constitution was silent the Party Programme of 1925 boldly stated:

"The People's Party enjoys full power in the Mongolian People's Republic ..."<sup>83</sup>

The Great Khural in which supreme power was vested was elected for one year and assembled once only in that year. It was a body for discussion and for ratifying the laws and statutes that were drawn up by the ministries.<sup>84</sup> Planning and policy making was in the hands of the Party. What was agreed in the Central Committee was generally passed by the Party Congress and on the basis of those resolutions the agenda of the Great Khural was drawn up. This <sup>may</sup> explain why the proceedings of party congresses have been published and republished while only the resolutions of the khurals have been issued in recent years. The full proceedings, apart from those of the First Great Khural, remain in the archives of the MPR.

The Second Great Khural, 6-8 November 1925, had extensive discussions on local government, tax reform and the judicial system. It also ordered the dispersal of the personal property of the Eighth Javzandamba Khutagt.<sup>85</sup> The Third Great Khural, 1-13 November 1926, devoted much of its attention to economic planning and passed tax laws.<sup>86</sup> The Fourth Great Khural, 1-16 November 1927 resolved to improve and widen the scope of the economy. It decreed that a state bank be formed and that the Mongolian currency, the tögrög, be transferred from the silver to the gold standard.<sup>87</sup>

The delegates of the Great Khural elected from their number a Little Khural which met twice within the year and held supreme power between the sessions of the Great Khural. Initially there were 30 members, including the 12 members of the government or Council of Ministers, and from the 30 a standing presidium was elected.<sup>88</sup> All members of the First Little Khural, except for two, were party members.

The exceptions were representatives of distant regions where the party organization had not yet penetrated.<sup>89</sup> From 1925 to 1927 the Chairman of the Little Khural was P. Genden. He was an ard from Arvaikheer uul khoshuu in Tseterleg Mandal aimag and he was 29 years old in 1924.<sup>90</sup> Little is known of his early career, nor that of his successor Damdinsüren.<sup>91</sup> The Second Great Khural enlarged the Little Khural to 45 members<sup>92</sup> and the Fourth Great Khural reduced the presidium to three.<sup>93</sup>

The government was relatively stable between 1924 and 1928. Tserendorj remained Prime Minister until his death in February 1928, Khatanbaatar Magsarjav was Minister of the Army until he died in 1927 and Erdene Batkhan was Minister of Education from 1924 until 1928. The only minister to lose his post and leave the service of the state altogether was the Minister of Internal Affairs from 1924 to 1925, Navaannerin, the former Tsetsen Khan. He, apparently, fell a victim to class discrimination, failed to be reelected at the Second Great Khural and retired to a monastery.<sup>94</sup> He was replaced by Anandyn Amar, who had been Minister of Economic Affairs since 1924. In 1926 there was a government reshuffle. Jadamba became Minister of Economic Affairs while continuing to be Deputy Party Chairman. Ö. Badrakh, Minister of Finance, was replaced by Sanjiin Dovchin and Dendeв took the place of Naidansüren as Minister of Justice. Dorligjav was Minister of Foreign Affairs in the middle of 1926 but it is not clear how long he retained this position. Another member of the government was Amagaev in his capacity as Chairman of the Economic Council. After 1924 all government members were party members and often held senior party posts concurrently.<sup>95</sup>

### The Ministry of Justice and the Creation of Courts

Before 1921 Outer Mongolia was subject to Manchu Law and an even older customary law dating back to the Code of Chingis Khan.<sup>96</sup> Trials took place at various levels of the civil administration from the khoshuu to the Emperor. Torture was commonly used both to try and to punish<sup>97</sup> and even if a plaintiff won his case he might find himself punished if he had brought the case against his own ruling prince. The monasteries were an entirely separate legal domain with their own law, judicial procedures and punishments which were quite as cruel as those of the secular system.

The provisional government intended to publish a new code of law based on principles of humanity and equality. Princes and ards were to be treated alike, and torture was to be replaced by periods of imprisonment under humane conditions, although some forms of corporal punishment were retained. Certain political crimes and the refusal to obey military orders carried the death penalty by shooting.<sup>98</sup> The old system of collective responsibility was abolished and only condemned persons were to be punished. Although Danzan's property was confiscated after his execution, the Third Party Congress ordered that his wife and children were to be left with enough to live on.<sup>99</sup>

The new judicial system only came into practice by degrees and legal matters were handled under both systems for some time. The Ministry of Justice itself tried and sentenced serious criminal and civil cases. The Office of Internal Security dealt with political cases such as treason and in the countryside, many officials still worked to

the Manchu system. Torture, though banned, was still practised especially by the monasteries as this report to the Fourth Congress shows:

"At the Lama Gegeen monastery the Chairman of the Shav' khoshuu administration, the Shandzudba, tortured an ard who had galloped his horse in front of the Lama Gegeen's ger. He burned his body with red-hot iron and threw him in gaol. Also at the Lama Gegeen monastery Genden, an official of the khoshuu administration, suspended an errand-boy by his hands because he had ridden the official's horse without permission. And even as we sit here now, a 16 year-old boy in Sain Shav' on the border of the khoshuu is in chains because he dared to run away from the monastery."<sup>100</sup>

In January 1925 a Council for the Direction of Court Affairs was formed to organize a complete new judicial system and in June a commission was set up to put this system into practice. Members of this commission included the Prime Minister, the Minister of Justice, P.V. Vsesvyatskii, a Soviet legal advisor, and four others.<sup>101</sup>

For some years the Party was more concerned with internal security than the behaviour of the common criminal and it is not surprising that the first of the new courts was the Political Court which began to operate in 1925. Its chairman or judge was Choibalsan and other court officials included Baldandorj, Head of Security Services, and Dambadorj. This court was entirely separate from the Ministry of Justice but sentences had to be confirmed by the government and the Minister of Justice could appeal against them.<sup>102</sup> This was more generous than the justice meted out to Bodo and Danzan but we do not know to what extent appeals were allowed.

The Second Great Khural discussed and passed a series of statutes concerning courts and judicial procedures. According to the statute on courts:

"...the fundamental aim of the new courts should be to protect the interests of the people and to protect the state."

and

"courts maintain and protect the freedom obtained through the people's revolution..."<sup>103</sup>

Soon afterwards, a Provisional Court with a judge, state prosecutor and a representative for the accused began to function, which handled a variety of cases formerly dealt with by the Security Services. These included revolt against the state, sabotage against state property, bribery and forging currency.<sup>104</sup> It is not clear how this court differed from the Political Court mentioned in the previous paragraph.

Between 1926 and 1927 the khoshuu, aimag and city courts were formed. They were annually elected bodies, except in khoshuus of ten or fewer sums, where the chairman of the khoshuu acted as judge. The khoshuu courts handled small cases, for instance thefts of less than 20 bod of large livestock. The aimag courts dealt with cases involving larger sums, homicide and the infliction of injury. City courts handled both types of cases.<sup>105</sup>

In 1927 the Provisional Court was replaced by the Supreme Court. It was the highest court of appeal and its officers were appointed by the Little Khural.<sup>106</sup> The Council for the Direction of Court Affairs was then disbanded. The Ministry of Justice was relieved

of its judicial powers and responsibilities and reorganized into four sections; a general section which dealt with courts and investigation, and notarial, prison affairs and legal affairs sections. The chief concern of the Ministry from now on was administration.<sup>107</sup>

Although the structure of the new system is well-documented there is little information on how it functioned in practice. There appear to be no published records of cases examined and therefore we have little idea of the nature and level of crime. Nor have investigative procedures been described. A statute of 1927 ordered the appointment of public investigators to 12 centres. Their powers were considerable and included the investigation of crime, deciding whether there was a case to be brought, and the general supervision of court activities. None were appointed immediately, however, because of shortage of money and qualified personnel.<sup>108</sup> A six-month course in legal studies was held at the College in Ulaanbaatar in 1926 but only 18 graduated in the spring of 1927 and were sent to work for the Ulaanbaatar Militia Committee and the rural courts.<sup>109</sup> Next to nothing is known about the work of the militia at this time either.

### Local Government in the Countryside

From 1925 the transfer of local government from the pre-revolutionary system to an elective system was complete except in remote parts of the west and Dariganga and the use of the special government representatives, the töLöönii tūshmed, was discontinued.<sup>110</sup> In country districts the lowest level of local government was the arv, a grouping of 10 families or households. Above the arv was the bag comprising 5 arvs or 50 families, the sum with 150 families, the khoshuu comprising three to 25 sums and at the highest local level was the aimag or province with 15 to 30 khoshuus. In 1926 there were altogether 12,000 arvs, 2,400 bags, 800 sums, 120 khoshuus and six aimags.<sup>111</sup> The aimags and khoshuus had elected khurals and a varying number of full-time officials and employees. The sums elected their own officials but the bag officials were appointed by the khoshuu khurals.<sup>112</sup>

The khoshuus were formerly known by the names of the ruling princes and the aimags (once four) were named after the four khans of Outer Mongolia. After the Republic was founded the aimags and their districts were all renamed from the geographic<sup>al</sup> features of their localities. From west to east the aimags were:

1. Chand'man Uul aimag (formerly part of Zasagt Khan aimag)
2. Khan Taishir Uul aimag (formerly part of Zasagt Khan aimag)
3. Tsetserleg Mandal aimag (formerly Sain Noyon Khan aimag)
4. Bogd Khan Uul aimag (formerly Tūsheet Khan aimag)
5. Khan Khentii Uul aimag (formerly Tsetsen Khan aimag).<sup>113</sup>

The sixth aimag was Delger Ikh Uul aimag and was based on the secular population of the Ikh Shav'. In 1923 former shav' nar were organized into khoshuus with elective assemblies. The chief administrator of the Ikh Shav', the Erdene Shandzudba, became an elected official and he was assisted by a special representative appointed by the government.<sup>114</sup> In April 1925 the Ikh Shav' was abolished and replaced by Delger Ikh Uul aimag with 17 khoshuus which became subject to the Ministry of Internal Affairs.<sup>115</sup> Because this aimag did not have a geographical location the Second Great Khural wanted to abolish it completely and merge its population into the administrative districts where they actually lived. However this apparently caused some anxiety to the former shav' nar so the idea was abandoned for the time being.<sup>116</sup> Shav' nar in the service of other khutagts were organized into separate secular khoshuus. If there were not enough families to make up a single khoshuu they were absorbed into neighbouring khoshuus.<sup>117</sup> In May the five subdivisions of Dariganga, an area formerly under the direct control of the Manchu court for the breeding and supply of imperial horses, were united into a single khoshuu of 18 sums.<sup>118</sup>

Until 1927 local government was free to levy tax according to its needs without intervention from central government. D. Mikhel'man an official of the Mongol-Soviet Bank, described local financing as it was in 1926.<sup>119</sup> The aimag khural drew up the budget for the khoshuus and the khoshuu khurals for the sums. Income came from many sources: internal customs dues, granting patents, renting fields for crop-growing or haymaking and the lease of hunting and fishing rights. There was also some direct taxation but it was not uniform and could vary not only from aimag to aimag

but from khoshuu to khoshuu. Where tax was levied it was based on the livestock a family owned and the rates were variable. Local government income was used to pay the wages of officials, khoshuu schools, örtöö, policing and local courts. There were no fixed rates however and salaries, for instance, varied so that the chairman of one sum might receive 75 Mexican Dollars (MD) a month and another only 25 MD. In 1927 local government finance was standardized and a single tax was levied on all except lamas living in monasteries. The rates on which the new tax was levied depended on the amount of livestock a family or household owned.<sup>120</sup>

While the local government system of elected khurals and elected officials appeared orderly enough in theory, in practice it was rather confused during the first few years of the Republic. The special government representatives who had been responsible for helping local officials and residents to understand the policies and instructions of central government were withdrawn from 1925 to 1926, except in Dariganga where they remained until 1927 and many local officials were left in great uncertainty about their proper duties.<sup>121</sup> The new codes of law were slow to appear and instructions from central government often failed to reach their destinations.<sup>122</sup> This was frequently because the initial recipient could not read the direction or because of the inadequacies of the örtöö service, although at the Fourth Party Congress Amagaev put the blame on the "shortcomings" of the Ministry of Internal Affairs.<sup>123</sup>

In 1926 temporary travelling instructors were sent out by central government to inform local officials of their duties.<sup>124</sup>

Provincial government also made efforts to improve the efficiency and behaviour of local personnel. In 1925, for instance, the Khan Khentii aimag authorities sent the following advice to the khoshuu office of Khan Khentii uul.

"First an official matter should be made the same as a household matter (i.e. it should be considered as very important); one should attempt to be gracious to the masses from the bottom of one's heart. Second, as is stated in the classics, one must be honest to oneself and only then can one be honest to others. One should keep in one's heart the old saying 'If you are not honest to yourself you cannot be honest to others.' One should be honest not for one's own sake and benefit in matters as small as a hair .... In general, one should not seek physical comfort and should avoid shelving official documents and piling them up ... and on no account should one slouch arbitrarily and haughtily in ones chair."<sup>125</sup>

Central government ordered numerous reforms of the örtöö from 1921 which were aimed at reducing the burden of this service on the ards. In the past princes and lamas had made use of it for personal as well as official reasons which demanded a considerable outlay in horses, gers and food from people who could ill afford to provide these things. Before 1921 an estimated 300 riding horses per day were in use on four major routes out of Niislel Khüree while in the whole of 1924 only 21,315 horses were used.<sup>126</sup> In 1925 there were further reductions and a part or a whole of the alba was made commutable into a money tax.<sup>127</sup> 27 stations on the route from Ulaanbaatar to the south-west transferred to a motor vehicle service run by the state.<sup>128</sup>

Although the changes in the örtöö made life easier for ards they did not make the service more efficient. It may simply have been that ards were being asked to make too many changes at once or

perhaps they did not feel the same responsibility towards the new government system as they had towards the princes and officials of the old system. Under the principle of equal treatment for all more people were being required to serve on the örtöö. Under a new law of 1925 former princes and other wealthy people were to be the first to serve. However it was later alleged that they forced poor people to do so in their stead.<sup>129</sup>

The Third Great Khural tried to improve the örtöö by laying down stricter specifications for the number of horses and gers to be provided at different stations. One sheep was allocated as food for seven people, a Tibetan doctor was to be on call to administer first aid and a scribe was to check documents and keep records.<sup>130</sup> However the Fourth Great Khural was still not satisfied with the service and ordered further investigations.<sup>131</sup>

By 1926 Party leaders were beginning to put the blame for the inadequacies of local government on local officials who had been in service since the Manchu period.<sup>132</sup> It was assumed that these men were deliberately sabotaging the new system. There is little direct evidence to support this although as young party and Youth League members began to treat them as a class separate from the "genuine ards" some may have worked with little enthusiasm. In any case it was not merely the local officials who performed poorly. Local khurals were affected by the indifference of the electorate. In 1927 Dambadorj told the American reporter Anna Louse Strong:

"in practise, the Mongols do not wish to take the time and money for a trip to the assembly and so, in the last elections, only 30,000 people took part."<sup>133</sup>

The simplest explanation of the problems of local government is that people needed time to adjust to the changes taking place. In spite of its shortcomings the new system was a considerable achievement and in less than a decade the traditional system of hereditary rule had been completely replaced by a structure that was fairly democratic. Furthermore, by standardizing local government, subjecting it to the control of central government and, in addition, giving the country population a voice in central government, the regime established a structure that, in time, could do much to enhance the sense of nationhood and loyalty to the state among the citizens of the MPR.

### Urban Administration

Not all Mongols lived in the khoshuus of the countryside. Large numbers of lamas lived in monasteries and for administrative purposes they continued to exist as separate from the secular population during the 1920s. There was also a settled secular population. During the last decades of the 19th century many poor people left their native khoshuus and came to settlements, especially Khüree, in the hope of making a livelihood. By the 1920s secular city dwellers also included employees of the government and of the public and cultural organizations. In 1921 Ivan Maiskii published the following estimates of the populations of the main urban settlements based on the 1918 census.

Niislel Khüree	100,000	
Uliastai	3,000	
Khovd	3,000	
Mongol Khiagt (later Altan Bulag)	4,000	134

These towns were subject to considerable upheaval in 1921 and the reports of the 1924 census give no figures which can be compared with those of 1918. The Second Great Khural recorded a figure of 61,000 for the population of Ulaanbaatar in 1925 comprising:

Mongols	14,780	
Lamas	20,000	
Chinese	23,919	
Russians	1,772	135

In that year the Central Committee had decided that those Mongols who lived permanently in the city and had no home in the countryside should be regarded as residents of the City District. 510 such households or 1,497 individuals were registered and a further 4,321 households or 11,533 individuals were listed as temporary residents.<sup>136</sup>

It was clear to the government that towns were to play an increasingly important role in Mongolian society as permanent centres of administration, industry and culture and would therefore require a system of local government that took this into account. Until 1924 the Ministry of Internal Affairs took charge of the day-to-day business of Niislel Khüree, not including the monasteries. Then a provisional City Administration was set up and the city divided

into 23 wards, again excluding monasteries. There was an elected khural of 45 representatives who chose a chairman and secretaries by secret ballot.<sup>137</sup> In 1925 the Chinese trading centre called Naimaa khot or Maimaicheng became a district of Ulaanbaatar and was renamed Amgalanbaatar.<sup>138</sup> The regulations of the City Administration passed by the Second Great Khural defined its structure, procedures and responsibilities. The last named included the day-to-day running of the city, the control and maintenance of public buildings and works, lighting, water, fire protection, cleansing, transport, health care, education, tax collection and the control of trading.<sup>139</sup>

A visitor to Ulaanbaatar in 1926 described it as

"...a city of deep contrasts, typical of a country that is experiencing a period of fundamental changes. Modern conveyances such as airplanes and motor cars, contest their right with the time-honoured means of transport - the long files of majestic camels and clumsy bullock carts." 140

There were shining temples and palaces, colonies of gers, and wooden houses in the Chinese and Russian styles. Public buildings and gers of officials and educated Mongols were lit by electricity. The streets were sometimes so narrow that only one rider could proceed at a time and they were roamed by packs of fierce dogs who lived off dead beggars and attacked anyone else who was not sufficiently careful.<sup>141</sup> The same observer relates how a sentry was overpowered one night; in the morning nothing was left but his sword, rifle and part of his coat.<sup>142</sup>

In each ward there were cells of party and Youth League members which were responsible to the city committees of each organization. These people were active in the City Administration

and also performed many voluntary works on behalf of the city community. For instance Youth League members cleared away huge piles of rubbish that had accumulated over many decades.<sup>143</sup> From the end of 1925 the City Administration derived its income from taxes on land and buildings and a variety of impositions on such things as motor vehicles, a share of the profits of industries and businesses and from public entertainment.<sup>144</sup> However this income could not immediately provide all the services that were desired and the foreign community also made individual contributions. Some Russians are said to have run an orphanage from 1924 to 1926<sup>145</sup> and Russian and Chinese traders clubbed together to provide a new fire engine to replace an old one which had been in service since the autonomy.<sup>146</sup> Chinese coachmen bought gilded, painted carriages at an auction of Bogd Khaan's property. Pulled by pairs of shaggy horses, these were the first "buses" in Ulaanbaatar.<sup>147</sup>

### Summary

In spite of shortcomings described above the establishment of permanent administrative structures in both the Party and the state was a considerable achievement given the conditions of the time. Moreover the administrative changes in central and local government were a potentially unifying factor within the state, giving the centre control of the peripheries and the peripheries the opportunity to share in the work and decision-making of the centre.

There were, however, limits to the full and effective functioning of government at all levels in these years and the Party could not claim to have completely fulfilled its aims to modernize the administrative and public organizations. The Party made considerable strides in increasing both membership and influence. Nevertheless with a membership of only 2% of the population and a similar number in the Youth League it was not possible to fill all official and representative posts with party members so other help had to be utilized. In 1927 there were 20,000 representatives in local and central government from the level of bag to that of the Great Khural.<sup>148</sup> In addition there was a steadily increasing number of permanent civil servants and employees of public organizations. Even so, party membership was the key to success in the new Mongolia. All government ministers and senior officials were members of the Party as were all but one of the members of both the Trade Union Bureau and the Board of the Mongolian Cooperative.<sup>149</sup> In the army party members accounted for 80% of the officer class.<sup>150</sup>

The achievements in structural change and administration in this period were chiefly the Party's. As we shall see in the next chapter many of the economic reforms of the period owed much to Russians who were working in the MPR. However, although the Mongols adopted a Soviet system of government there is little to suggest that Russians actually worked in ministries and departments except as advisers or as specialists like doctors and veterinarians. Nor did the Comintern interfere directly with government administration until about 1927 when it began to demand the removal of Manchu-trained officials. Even Amagaev the Comintern representative seems to have limited his contribution to critical remarks

at party congresses and reserved his major efforts for economic reform. Therefore the Party and government must be held mainly responsible for both the successes and inefficiencies but I would like to suggest that the former outweighed the latter.

CHAPTER FIVETHE MONGOLIAN ECONOMY IN THE 1920s

The real transformation of the economic life of the Mongolian state began in 1923. In that year the government drew up its first budget and began to consider economic planning. A favourable trade agreement was signed with the USSR and plans for a joint Mongol-Soviet bank were drawn up. Between 1923 and 1928 three major aspects of economic change can be defined. First, Mongolia was transferring from a mainly natural or barter economy to a money economy based on a new, national currency. Secondly, from being a region politically dependent on China with no specific income or practice of state budgeting it became an independent country with a planned economy and budget. Thirdly it ceased to be a country whose sole economic resource was livestock and whose consumer goods were provided by trade with China and became instead one with a more diversified economy and, more important, acquired a new dominant trading partner, the Soviet Union.

For two centuries the Mongolian economic system was a part of the Chinese system. The Chinese were the Mongols' chief trading partners and in addition they provided services that the Mongols either did not wish to or could not provide for themselves. As an agrarian peasantry they tilled the earth and grew some grain and vegetables, as a proletariat they engaged in construction work and mining and as a bourgeoisie they offered commercial services including credit facilities. However in the 19th century Mongolian society experienced the:

"breakdown of a traditional pattern of living under the impact of economic stagnation, and the collapse of a feeling of responsibility for the public welfare on the part of authority."<sup>1</sup>

A few individuals and monasteries grew very rich but many people were reduced to vagrancy, theft and grinding poverty. In Khalkh the population began to fall and several western observers at the end of the century predicted the imminent demise of the Mongol peoples.<sup>2</sup> Economic dependency on the Chinese system contributed much to this state of affairs but additional factors were the political organization of the Mongols during the Manchu period and the privileged position of the Church which in economic terms took much from secular society but put little back in return.

Dissatisfaction with economic conditions played an important part in the rise of Mongolian nationalism and the government which came to power in 1921 determined to carry out some economic reform. By so doing it was hoped to create a prosperous state with sufficient revenue to provide a range of social services for the inhabitants and in addition to redistribute economic resources more fairly in order to raise the standard of living of the poorer sections of the population. The government expected to do this in part by tapping hitherto undeveloped resources, including manufacturing, mining, agriculture and forestry but it did not attempt to define in any detail its plans and methods for reform.

The Soviet government had a much clearer notion of the kind of economic policies it wished to see the Mongolian government

applying. The USSR, like Tsarist Russia, looked on Mongolia as a valuable potential source of raw materials for the industries of Siberia and of food for the Siberian towns. For most of the 1920s the economy was the Soviet government's chief interest in Mongolia and the main area of Mongolian affairs in which the Soviet government agents intervened directly. In other areas such as political or social affairs Soviet influence was indirect, either through the Comintern, which the Russian Communist Party dominated from about 1923, or through the many Buriat Mongols who chose to work for the new Mongolian state. The Soviet government aimed to cut off the Mongolian economy from the Chinese system and to integrate it with the new Soviet system. In order to achieve this it made use of a variety of methods including financial loans to the Mongolian government; Soviet financial advisers; trade, transport and communications agreements; joint ventures such as a bank which offered both central banking and credit facilities; and the exertion of ideological pressure through the agency of the Comintern.

In effect, Mongolia was exchanging one type of dependency for another. The Soviet Russians justified this by saying that the Mongols were oppressed and exploited by Chinese and other foreign capital and at the Third MPP Congress in 1924 introduced Mongolian leaders to Lenin's concept of bypassing the capitalist stage of history as the basis of the economic development of the MPR. In 1925 and 1926 Amagaev put the theory into a Mongolian context. He warned Mongols that if free trade, uncontrolled lending and speculation were allowed a native bourgeoisie would arise and with it private capitalism. Therefore the Mongolian government must resist

this by creating state capitalism and so protect the interests of ards.<sup>3</sup> The USSR and the Comintern used ideas such as these to persuade the Mongolian government to plan its country's economic development in such a way as to gain control of all economic resources. The surplus could then be channelled into the Soviet economic system.

Until 1925 economic planning meant little more than estimating the government's income from various sources and supervising its expenditure through a Department of State Control. This department was founded in 1922 to prevent corruption and ensure that other government departments conducted their financial affairs according to the regulations.<sup>4</sup> In 1925 the full bureaucratic framework for promoting economic development was set up which included the reformed Ministry of Finance which was the state treasury, the new Ministry of Economic Affairs, the Department of State Control, which became a full Ministry in November 1925 and the Economic Council. The Economic Council<sup>5</sup> formed in 3 February 1925 was in charge of all economic planning and decision-making. It had overall responsibility for matters of finance, planning laws and regulations, and in 1926 it also assumed responsibility for the work of the Ministry of State Control when the Ministry was abolished in order to save money.<sup>6</sup> The Economic Council drew up the important economic reforms of the period such as those concerned with currency, customs and taxation but there is little information on the Council's day-to-day activities.

In the latter half of 1925 Amagaev became Chairman of the Council. He already had considerable experience in economic planning in the governments of the Far Eastern Republic (FER) and the Buriat Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic (BMASSR), and in 1923 the Central Committee of the MPP had requested his help in planning the Mongolian economy. At first it was said that he could not be spared but in November 1924 he was elected to the First Little Khural,<sup>9</sup> even though he was not present, so some agreement must have been reached. He eventually arrived in Ulaanbaatar in the summer of 1925 to advise the Ministry of Finance.<sup>10</sup>

In a recent biography<sup>11</sup> Amagaev is described as a man who worked hard night after night and who was not given to jumping to conclusions but considered everything very carefully.<sup>12</sup> He was not a Russian but a Buriat and it is possible that the Khalkh Mongols originally asked for him in person in preference to the Russian advisers who preceded him. However, unlike many other educated Buriats of this period, Amagaev was not a Pan-Mongolist but was staunchly loyal to the Comintern. By 1924 the Comintern was calling on all its members to protect the safety and stability of the USSR as their internationalist duty. Therefore Amagaev promoted economic policies which were in the interests of the USSR and did not attempt to draw up a plan based on an independent analysis of Mongolian conditions.

## GOVERNMENT AND FINANCE

### Taxation

In 1921 the Provisional Government took over a system whereby most of the state's income was obtained from customs dues, both on goods crossing the national borders and on goods transferred from one district to another within the country. This income had been used chiefly to finance the ministries of the government and the court of the Bogd Khaan. However the treasury had been emptied by Baron Ungern von Shternberg and virtually no customs dues were being collected because most of the Chinese traders had fled.

It was imperative for the stability of the government that it should become solvent as quickly as possible. The Soviet Union cancelled all the debts owed by the autonomous government to the Tsarist government and made a loan of a million roubles repayable in livestock, to the Mongolian government.<sup>13</sup> This immediately placed the Mongolian government under an obligation to the Soviet government. At the same time a number of former Russian-owned industrial enterprises such as tanneries and wool-washing plants in Niislel Khüree and Altan Bulag were handed over to the Mongolian government without charge.<sup>14</sup> Then as order was restored the Chinese traders began to return to Mongolia and the collection of customs duty was resumed.

During the period of the Provisional Government revenue continued to be derived from indirect sources. In addition to customs duties these included profits from the newly acquired state enterprises and from the Mongolian Mutual Aid Cooperative<sup>15</sup> which

was formed in 1921; the state monopoly of alcohol sales; rents from property leased to foreigners; licences issued to traders; and loans from the Soviet Union.<sup>16</sup> As more and more private traders began to operate in Mongolia the proportion of government income from customs rose from 22% in 1922 to 78% in 1924.<sup>17</sup> At this time the government's official currency for accounting was the Chinese silver lan which was equivalent to 37.5 grams of pure silver. In 1924 an estimated 2,400,000 lan was collected in customs dues and 40% of that sum came from internal customs.<sup>18</sup>

Bookkeeping and statistics in this period were rudimentary but there was some effort to plan the government's income and expenditure. In December 1921 representatives of the four aimags and the Ikh Shav' met to discuss this<sup>19</sup> but the first real budget was drawn up in 1923 and fixed at 2,600,000 lan.<sup>20</sup> 60.4% of that sum was set aside to create a regular army.<sup>21</sup> Although the White Russian forces had been fully routed by the end of 1922 Mongolia's long border still needed to be defended and Sükhbaatar's army had very little modern weaponry and equipment.<sup>22</sup> Other allocations were 15.8% for financing the economy, 7.3% for education, 5.4% for communications and 11.1% for administration.<sup>23</sup> However the government regularly underspent on its allocations. In 1924, for example, records suggest that over one million lan was not spent<sup>24</sup> but this was certainly saved deliberately in order to finance the Mongolian Trade and Industrial Bank which opened in that year.

In 1925 when the Mexican dollar replaced the lan as the official currency for accountancy purposes in the MPR<sup>25</sup> state income

was approximately 8,300,000 MD and expenditure 7,400,000 MD. In 1926 income was estimated at 11,800,000 MD and expenditure at 11,200,000 MD. Customs dues were still the largest regular source of income and expected to bring in about 3,700,000 MD in 1926. Other sources yielding more than one million MD were the state-owned industrial enterprises, the alcohol monopoly and the Veterinary Service. Approximately one-third of government expenditure was on recurring items and the remainder on non-recurring items such as construction work. 40% of expenditure on government departments was on salaries and about two million MD was allocated for medical work, agriculture, post and telegraph services and education. Tugarinov, a bank official, analysed state income and expenditure and attributed the steady increase in the former to three factors: investment of new sources of income from taxation, improved fiscal apparatus and the development of profit-making enterprises or services by the government.<sup>26</sup>

In 1925 the Second Great Khural decided to change the basis of government revenue from indirect taxes to a direct tax, the progressive livestock tax.<sup>27</sup> This had been under discussion for some years and in 1924 a census<sup>28</sup> was taken to ascertain the amount of livestock owned by the Mongolian population. There are a number of reasons why a livestock tax should commend itself both to the Mongolian and the Soviet governments. Firstly, customs as a basis of state revenue is an unstable source being a prey to the fluctuations of the foreign trade market. Secondly the Soviet Union intended to attract the import and export trade presently operating between the MPR and China. High customs tariffs on many Chinese goods, especially those regarded as luxury items, were now being applied by the Mongolian

authorities to force the Chinese traders out.<sup>29</sup> The Soviet trading organizations, on the other hand, had the benefit of favourable customs agreements and as they won trade from the Chinese the amount of customs duty collected could be expected to drop. Thirdly internal customs duty which accounted for a considerable proportion of the total duty, was being deliberately phased out because it was a financial burden to the ordinary ard population. A fourth possible reason for the change to direct taxes is that the Mongols wanted to organize their state in the manner of other more advanced states.

The economic planners also regarded the progressive tax as a powerful weapon for class discrimination. Taxes levied during the Manchu period were paid only by the free ards but the new tax was to be levied on all livestock including the monastic herds and it was to be applied uniformly throughout the country. Moreover Amagaev expressed the belief that the progressive character of the tax would act as a stimulus for increased production in the rural economy.<sup>30</sup> Another important aspect of the tax was that in addition to replacing the customs dues as a source of state revenue, it was also to replace the various forms of imposition levied autonomously by local government. Therefore it would serve also to strengthen the control of local government by central government.

Although the Economic Council was largely responsible for the details of the new tax system the idea of a unified progressive tax had been put forward much earlier. In 1922 a tax law was passed which included a marginal variation in rates and to which

all were liable without exemption.<sup>31</sup> However it was not applied with any uniformity and it did not replace other forms of govern-  
 32  
 ment revenue. The Progressive Tax Law was passed by the Third Great Khural in 1926 and came into force in January 1927. Those owning 21-50 bod of livestock were taxed at a basic rate. Less than five bod were fully exempt and between six and 20 were partially exempt. 51-100 bod were taxed at 3% above the basic rate and then the percentage increase on the basic rate rose steeply so that owners of herds of 5001-5500 bod were charged at 84% above basic rate and of over 10000 bod at 120%.<sup>33</sup> Pedigree livestock and its offspring were exempt from tax if judged to be of a high standard. This was to encourage the improvement of breeding strains. Other tax privileges were offered to families wishing to supplement their incomes by taking up agriculture or to improve the quality of their herds by making hay or building protective structures against adverse weather conditions. The law took into account the seasonal variations in the livestock economy and directed that the taxes be collected at times when there was likely to be a surplus of animals and produce.<sup>34</sup> The livestock tax was intended to be a money tax payable in the new native currency, the tögrög which was introduced in December 1925. Payment in kind was only permitted if products were needed for consumption in schools or by the military.<sup>35</sup> However it proved impossible to apply this rule rigidly because there were insufficient tögrögs in circulation. In 1928 the Mongolian Cooperative was still handling animals delivered in payment of tax in distant areas.<sup>36</sup>

Because the progressive livestock tax was introduced in 1927 and was drastically altered after a sharp political swing to the left in 1928 it is difficult to assess what it might have achieved as a tool for economic change in its original form. Nor is there much evidence to show whether it was fully applied at first or how the rural population received it, although we do know that the monasteries resisted it, in some cases quite violently. However there were at least two obvious political results. First local government autonomy was ended and this in its turn facilitated the campaigns of confiscation of livestock and the collectivization of the rural economy in the period 1928-1932 which were waged on the orders of the Comintern.

### Credit and Banking

Before 1921 Mongolia had no native banks. The Chinese and some large monasteries ran an extensive money-lending system<sup>37</sup> and individuals and central and local government made use of its services. Russian and Chinese banks operated for a brief period in the early 20th century but had withdrawn by 1921.<sup>38</sup>

The Mongolian and Soviet governments agreed to finance a bank jointly but it was the Soviet government which drew up the plans. In January 1924 these were delivered to the Mongolian government by the new Soviet ambassador A.I. Vasil'ev. The shareholders were the Mongolian Ministry of Finance and the Soviet government each of which

provided 250,000 roubles as founding capital. The Bank was to hold the accounts of all government ministries, departments and public organizations and the government was also entitled to borrow up to one fifth of the funds in circulation. The Bank opened for business in Niislel Khüree in June 1924 under the name Mongolian Trade and Industrial Bank (Mongolyn Khudaldaa ba Aj Üildveriin Bank.)<sup>39</sup> By 1926 there were also a number of local branches at Altan Bulag, San Beise, Sain Shav', Uliastai, Khovd, Tsetsen Khan and Yegüzir. The last two branches were open seasonally between April and December.<sup>40</sup>

When it was first founded, the Bank's prime purpose was to promote the development of Soviet Mongol trade and also industry and agriculture in the MPR. It provided credit for setting up new industrial enterprises, for construction, the state farms and also for private agriculture.<sup>41</sup> In addition the Bank offered an advisory service on the acquisition of breeding stock, the purchase of agricultural equipment, setting up farm buildings and also gave credit for covering the cost of immunization.<sup>42</sup> Since farm machinery was difficult to obtain the Bank set up its own warehouse in Altan Bulag.<sup>43</sup> Other activities of the Bank included the provision of insurance,<sup>44</sup> chiefly against fire, and trading in green tea and manufactured goods from China, often in collaboration with the Mongolian Cooperative and the Soviet trading agencies.<sup>45</sup> The Bank also ran a Mongol Soviet Business Club which published the journal Khozyaistvo Mongolii from 1926 to 1931.<sup>46</sup>

By 1927 it was evident that the Bank was so profitable that delegates at the Sixth MPRP Congress were eager for the Mongolian government to take over the entire venture or else set up its own bank. This would mean that all profits would go to the Mongolian state and not have to be shared with the USSR.<sup>47</sup> The Fourth Great Khural ordered that a state bank be formed<sup>48</sup> and this was official policy for some years. Nothing was actually done however, perhaps because the Soviet Union did not approve, and the MPR did not have a state bank until 1954.

The existence of the joint Mongol-Soviet bank was an important weapon in the war to integrate the Mongolian economy with the Soviet economy and its support of trade was a particularly important part of this. The Bank's main clients were the Mongolian Mutual Aid Cooperative and the Soviet trading organizations. Together they formed 91% of all creditors<sup>49</sup> and the Cooperative alone was responsible for 40% of the Bank's assets.<sup>50</sup> However the Bank was also important to the Soviet government because it gave that government a financial interest in the Mongolian government. Furthermore the directorate and staff of the Bank were mainly Russian and Buriat<sup>51</sup> which meant that foreign citizens were in a position to oversee all the financial activities of the Mongolian government.

### Establishing the Tögrög as a Domestic Currency

The Mongols had no currency of their own but a variety of forms of exchange were in use in the first three decades of this century.<sup>52</sup> At the most basic level the barter system operated.

Livestock or its products were exchanged for agricultural products such as grain and tea or manufactured goods like fabric, books and vessels. Silver ingots had become wide-spread in the 19th century after the Manchu government started to levy tax in silver. Bricks of tea of various sizes were also a very common form of currency and some monasteries used the shar tsai ("yellow tea") as a unit of accountancy.<sup>53</sup> As the bricks passed from hand to hand they became worn and deteriorated in value. They were cumbersome to carry about but tea formed an important part of the Mongol diet so they were highly valued. From the beginning of the 20th century a number of different foreign currencies were in common use in Mongolia, both paper and metal, in particular the Chinese yanchaan or silver lan, gold and silver roubles, Chinese copper coins and the Mexican dollar which circulated widely in East Asia.<sup>54</sup>

In 1921 the Soviet government granted the Mongolian government a loan to establish an official Mongolian currency. At the time there was some discussion in Soviet circles about whether or not a primitive country with a barter system of trading really needed its own currency<sup>55</sup> and in 1923 the Mongolian government actually issued some banknotes in denominations of Mexican dollars.<sup>56</sup> At the same time the North China Herald newspaper reported that large amounts of silver were being moved into Mongolia and D. Mikhel'man, a Russian bank official, later reported that a million Mexican dollars worth of silver coins and ingots were imported which did not appear in the accounts of the customs service.<sup>58</sup> We can only speculate that this activity was connected with the plan to establish an official currency.

It is not clear whether the Mongolian Trade and Industrial Bank was originally intended to function as a central bank issuing its own currency and controlling the circulation of money. However in February 1925 the Mongolian government decided to issue the tögrög as the national monetary unit<sup>59</sup> and this was done through the Bank. The first denominations were to be in the form of banknotes. There were initial fears that ordinary people would be suspicious of these because<sup>of</sup> their experience with the paper rouble which had become worthless after the 1917 revolution<sup>60</sup> but when the first notes appeared on 9 December 1925 it was reported that:

"people turned them round with fascination, looked at them, read the writing, and were overcome with joy."<sup>61</sup>

Mikhel'man also commented:

"The Mongolian population of Urga valued the banknotes as a symbol of their national independence on a new monetary front - they accepted them without any display of offence or obstruction. Of course, the city population is the most sensitive and cultured but the factors operating within the city have, without doubt, their effect on the periphery too although to a lesser extent."<sup>62</sup>

The History of the MPR speaks of the opposition of Chinese traders to the tögrög,<sup>63</sup> but this is not entirely borne out by contemporary evidence. One Russian observer says that they received the tögrög with satisfaction.<sup>64</sup> On the other hand anyone attempting to undermine general confidence in the new currency risked a gaol sentence of two years and one year if they refused to accept it.<sup>65</sup>

The first notes issued were in denominations of one, two, five and ten tögrögs, each tögrög backed by 18 grams of silver.<sup>66</sup>

In February 1926 23,000 tögrögs worth of coins appeared.<sup>67</sup> Notes and coins were put into circulation throughout 1926 both from the Bank's headquarters <sup>in</sup> <sup>n</sup> Ulaabaatar and from provincial branches.<sup>68</sup> From January 1926 all government employees were paid in tögrögs. As the Bank's turnover increased and the exchange rate of the tögrög against the lan rose demand for the new currency rapidly outstripped supply. In September 1926 bank officials conducted a survey which revealed that the tögrög had not yet penetrated all corners of the land.<sup>69</sup> When new tax laws came into force in January 1927 all taxes and customs dues were to be paid in tögrögs<sup>70</sup> but it is unlikely that this rule was applied very strictly for some time and there were still reports of currency shortages in some areas in 1929.<sup>71</sup>

There seems little doubt that the tögrög appealed to Mongols for nationalist reasons. When it was first issued many wished that it should be on the gold standard as the strong currencies of the world were.<sup>72</sup> The Russians resisted this at the time but in April 1928 the tögrög was transferred.<sup>73</sup> The existence of the tögrög as the only legal tender did release the Mongols from the tyranny of a multi-exchange system over whose rates they had little control. On the other hand it was linked to the Soviet currency system and, therefore, became another means by which the Mongolian economy was integrated into the Soviet system.

### TRADING ACTIVITIES

In the early 1920s Mongolia's main trading partner was China. Chinese merchants and Chinese agents of English, American and other western firms bought Mongolian livestock and animal products, including 80% of all Mongolian wool exported.<sup>74</sup> In return Chinese consumer goods were supplied according to the Mongols' taste. Chinese merchants had an excellent transport system and they had built up a long-standing relationship with their customers. They were willing to sell on credit and always treated customers sympathetically and hospitably.

The Chinese did not have complete control of the Mongolian market however. A few individual Russian traders resumed activity when peace was restored in 1921 and a third operator was the Mongolian Mutual Aid Cooperative (Mongolyn Khariltсан Туслалтсакh Khorshoo). It was founded at the end of 1921<sup>75</sup> with the encouragement of the Comintern but for several years party members showed little interest in it. By January 1922 the Cooperative had a capital of 14,000 MD and there were 70 shareholders, the largest investor being the Bogd Khaan.<sup>76</sup> Besides buying directly from herdsmen the Cooperative also bought Mongolian produce from Chinese middlemen and sold to Anglo-American firms.<sup>77</sup> Many employees were actually Anglo-American or Russian emigrés in the early days.<sup>78</sup> At this time the Cooperative was not especially popular with the rural population since, like the Russian merchants, it did not trade in the same free and easy terms as the Chinese. Cooperative employees were not always considered polite and the consumer goods that customers wanted were frequently unavailable.<sup>79</sup> Nevertheless by 1924 Cooperative outlets had increased to 24 branches, 86 sub-branches and there were offices in Moscow,

Kalgan, Tientsin and Khailar.<sup>80</sup> Unlike the Soviet cooperatives the Mongolian Cooperative did not restrict itself to one activity. In addition to trading it ran a number of manufacturing enterprises on the government's behalf, including the tannery and military uniform factories of Altan Bulag and several plants for processing intestines, washing wool and making sugar and soap.<sup>81</sup>

In 1923 the Soviet government began to influence the pattern of Mongolian import and export trade. A trade agreement<sup>82</sup> was concluded with the Mongolian Government and as a result a number of Soviet trading agencies began to operate in Mongolia. Tsentrosoyuz, an agency which had been active in Mongolia before 1921 had returned in 1922.<sup>83</sup> It was joined by others such as Sherst',<sup>84</sup> Dal'gostorg,<sup>85</sup> Torgpredstvo<sup>86</sup> and Sibgostorg.<sup>87</sup> Some were only procurement agencies and their small capital enabled them to purchase limited amounts. Also seasonal products were only available at certain times of the year. The goods that the trading agencies could offer in return were few. The USSR was recovering from a civil war and there was a general shortage of goods even for home consumption. Moreover Soviet imports were not always to the Mongols' taste. Soviet cotton, for example, was considered inferior to the Chinese product.<sup>88</sup> Nor was the Soviet trading practice to the Mongols' liking. The Russians would not buy wool on wet days because it weighed more than on dry days. Neither would they buy wool that was very dirty.<sup>89</sup>

Under the terms of the trade agreement the Soviet agencies were instructed to coordinate their business with the Mongolian Cooperative.<sup>90</sup> From this time the MPRP, under pressure from the

Comintern, began to involve itself more in the work of the Cooperative and to encourage party and Youth League members to join the Cooperative. Also the Second MPP Congress ordered that all employees of the Cooperative be vetted.<sup>91</sup> In the same year the Ministry of Finance lent the Cooperative 300,000 lan<sup>92</sup> to expand its activities and in 1924 a further million lan was received.

Although the ordinary Mongols of the countryside showed an obvious preference for Chinese goods and trading methods the authorities, influenced by Soviet attitudes to Chinese capital, began to display increasing hostility towards the Chinese merchants. The latter's trading licences were frequently held up, they were accused of falsifying accounts and smuggling, forced to pay customs dues sometimes to the full value of the goods and the Bank refused their drafts. This affected the small traders more quickly than the large firms and when their money was gone they were thrown in gaol. In 1927 Ma Ho-t'ien saw many Chinese shops in Ulaanbaatar empty of goods and said that the proprietors made a living by secret money-lending.<sup>93</sup> Soviet traders, who were not subject to licencing and harrassment, took advantage of the favourable conditions and bought up Chinese warehouses to store their own goods in or to set up industrial enterprises such as wool-washing depots.<sup>94</sup>

The Soviet trading organizations made efforts to investigate the Mongolian market potential. In 1925 they held a trade conference<sup>95</sup> in Ulaanbaatar where they discussed cooperation with the Mongolian Cooperative and criticized themselves for competing in the Mongolian market. The conference recommended the introduction of credit facilities by Soviet trading organizations, fixing purchase prices

for Mongolian products at world price levels, and a reduction in import prices of Soviet goods. The Mongolian Cooperative had the right to fix prices but the Russians continued to discuss the subject in 1926. Some said that they must offer higher prices than the Chinese were willing to pay for Mongolian products. Others wanted lower prices because they said world prices were artificially high.<sup>96</sup>

The Russians also gave serious consideration to the type of goods they ought to offer the Mongols. The most important item imported from the USSR was grain or flour.<sup>97</sup> In 1924 and 1925 over 80% of the flour consumed in the MPR came from the Soviet Union.<sup>98</sup> However it was expected that the MPR would eventually grow grain for itself. On the other hand sugar, another Soviet import, would always be required as would tea.<sup>100</sup> One writer suggested that tea be imported into Vladivostok from China and then reexported to the MPR in the Mongols' favourite brick sizes.<sup>101</sup> The Russians also hoped to break into the textile market and planned to import 25-26 million metres of heavy cotton for use as summer clothing in 1926. The first million metres were not apparently, highly approved of, although in the Russians' opinion the quality was higher than that of the Chinese dalemba and they thought that the Mongols only needed to get used to it.<sup>102</sup>

In 1927 the Soviet trading organizations attempted to consolidate their position in the Mongolian import and export trade market by eliminating the competition that existed among themselves. They were united into a single joint stock company with a capital of 1,500,000 roubles and traded under the name of Stormong.<sup>103</sup> This

company now had the sole right to import and export goods between the Soviet Union and the MPR in cooperation with the Mongolian Cooperative. By autumn 1927 there were 100 permanent Stormong outlets and 50 travelling shops.<sup>104</sup> The bank official, B.I. Onishchenko, was Stormong's first head.

As a result of these efforts by the Mongolian government and Soviet representatives there was a sharp reduction in Chinese trading in the MPR from 1925. In 1924 there had been 1443 Chinese firms with representatives in Mongolia but by 1926 many had withdrawn so that only 60 remained.<sup>105</sup> Also many of the 62 Anglo-American firms present in 1924 had ceased trading by 1926.<sup>106</sup> The Mongolian Cooperative had improved its position and was now handling 25% of the total trade turnover.<sup>107</sup> Whereas in 1924 24.1% of exported goods went to the Soviet Union that share had risen to 57.8% by 1926.<sup>108</sup> The Chinese share of the export trade fell from 86.3% in the 1923-1924 season to 14.6% in the 1928-1929 season.<sup>109</sup> However in the same period the Chinese share of the import trade only fell from 86% to 42% in spite of the sharp turn to the left in Mongolian politics in 1928.<sup>110</sup> This was because the USSR was still unable to provide the range of goods the Mongols required.

This willingness to accept Chinese goods even after the severe swing to the left raises the question of whether the Mongols were really whole-hearted in their desire to get rid of the Chinese trading presence. Until 1924 it was hoped that China and Mongolia could continue their economic relationship if on a more equitable basis and even after that when the Mongolian government's official

policy was to ease out the Chinese traders there is evidence of some ambivalence towards the latter. In August 1927 an international trade fair was held in Ulaanbaatar.<sup>111</sup> Over 150 firms took part, there was a turnover of 1,500,000 tögrögs and it was judged a great success. Among those represented were 149 private firms of which 99 were Chinese, 22 were Mongol, eight were Anglo-American and 20 were private Russian traders. Stormong and the Mongolian Cooperative together did over 200,000 tögrögs worth of business which suggests that the Chinese made a reasonable profit. Whether this is evidence of a stronger position of so-called "foreign capital" than the statistics suggest or whether it was a last-ditch stand by the Chinese and Anglo-Americans to recapture some of their former trade is now impossible to say because of the political developments after 1928.

In spite of the considerable efforts of the Soviet Union to gain control of the Mongolian trade market it was to some extent favoured by factors beyond its control. The Civil War in China and the effects of world trade also contributed to the changes in Mongolian trade patterns. For instance, banditry in Inner Mongolia made the transport of goods through that area very difficult. The reduction in the Chinese purchase of Mongolian wool also owed something to the fall in world wool prices. In 1925 Chinese and western firms had bought in excess of demand and they were in no haste to buy more in the early summer of 1926. Therefore the Soviet organizations and the Mongolian Cooperative were able to buy up almost the entire product of that year and at prices above the average world market prices.<sup>112</sup> By 1927 approximately 80% of the Mongolian wool trade was in the hands of the Russians.<sup>113</sup>

## Transport and Communications

Soviet trading representatives frequently stated that Mongol-Soviet trade could be improved with better transport facilities. In the 1920s most freight was carried by camel- or bullock-cart caravans over the route from Ulaanbaatar to Kalgan. There were altogether eight major routes but some had fallen into serious disrepair since the autonomy. At certain seasons they were not always passable because of adverse weather conditions and because there were few bridges. Even bridges on the Altan Bulag-Ulaanbaatar route, the second most important, were in great need of repair. Metalled roads did not exist and neither did water transport or railways.<sup>114</sup> Soviet trade experts pressed the Mongols to repair the northern routes saying that goods sent through Russia on the TransSiberian railway to Vladivostok at preferential tariffs could be forwarded to their ultimate destination more cheaply than by sending them via Kalgan to Tientsin.<sup>115</sup> The same route could also be used to import Chinese goods.<sup>116</sup> In the second half of the 1920s the Ministry of Economic Affairs undertook repairs on routes from Ulaanbaatar to Altan Bulag, Uliastai and Khovd and between San Beise and Üüd. The USSR also gave some assistance for the repair of roads and the construction of bridges.<sup>118</sup>

The Mongolian government gave consideration to the development of motor transport and was encouraged by the Soviet trade delegation of 1925 to buy a large quantity of oil products to store until required. This was an attempt by the Russians to forestall the Americans whom they feared would corner that market for themselves.<sup>119</sup> In the same year a motor vehicle service called Mongoltrans was set up to carry passengers and freight. It had offices in Ulaanbaatar, Altan Bulag

and Kalgan.<sup>120</sup> Motor transport was a government monopoly and on

2 June 1926 the following announcement appeared in the journal

Khozyaistvo Mongolii:

"From 10 June all carriers of cargo, by cart or automobile, on arrival in a town where there is a Mongol-transport office must register their destination. Anyone other than Mongoltrans carrying cargo without a licence for private individuals and organizations, will be detained."<sup>121</sup>

However other motor vehicle services did operate for some time including a Soviet firm Transport.<sup>122</sup>

Water transport was also of interest to the Soviet trading agencies and Soviet experts conducted surveys of a number of Mongolian rivers to see how suitable they were for transporting goods. In 1926 the Soviet and Mongolian governments signed a ten year agreement permitting the Selenga Steamship Company to work the Selenga and Orkhon rivers.<sup>123</sup> Freight was carried on steamships and barges and because this reduced travel time by many days it also reduced costs. This was especially welcome in 1926 when there was a general 10% rise in freight tariffs following a particularly severe winter.<sup>124</sup>

In May 1925 a Soviet pilot A.I. Lapin landed the first aeroplane, a Junker, in the MPR. Between 1926 and 1928 there was an air passenger and freight service from Moscow to Peking via Ulaanbaatar.<sup>125</sup> The arrival of aeroplanes in Ulaanbaatar caused great excitement but the Church warned people:

"Bad times have set in. The flying iron birds bode no good. They portend the end of the world. He who will see them will turn grey and die early ..."<sup>126</sup>

Young Mongols were not put off, however. It is said that hundreds applied to train as pilots. 26 were sent to the USSR, and later returned to serve in the Mongolian Air Force.<sup>128</sup>

Telegraph communication was important both for trade and diplomatic purposes. In 1921 the Soviet government transferred the Tsarist Russian Telegraph Station in Niislel Khüree to the Mongolian government without charge.<sup>128</sup> In 1924 and 1927 the Mongolian and Soviet governments signed telegraph agreements which enabled the MPR to have links with the USSR, China and western Europe.<sup>129</sup> Inland telegraph lines were also erected and in 1926 Ulaanbaatar was linked with the western part of the country by telegraph.<sup>130</sup>

The Mongolian postal service also underwent changes in the 1920s. Official internal correspondence was carried on horseback by the örtöö service. Letters sent outside the country before the revolution often carried Russian or Chinese stamps. Mongolian postage stamps were first issued in 1924. They probably had the dual purpose of providing some revenue and at the same time of bearing witness to the MPR's independent status. It has been estimated that in 1926 and 1927 about 1000 items per month were being sent out of the country by registered post, mostly between April and December. Much of the external post was sent to China for reasons of trade and it went by rail through Siberia, entering China at Manchuli. Since

Mongolia was not recognized by the Universal Postal Union all letters had to be restamped on the Siberian border. Besides the registered post there was a much larger quantity of unregistered mail. There was a sharp reduction in mail to China after 1927.<sup>131</sup>

## THE DEVELOPMENT OF MEANS OF PRODUCTION

### Livestock

The traditional form of production in Mongolia was livestock herding. The Russians were anxious to acquire the surplus animals and animal products and they encouraged the Mongols to look on herding as the main form of production for the future as well as the present. The 1924 census established the total animal population to be approximately 17,000,000 head<sup>132</sup> and the human population 615,878 individuals or 80,064 families which works out at an average 20.2 bod<sup>133</sup> of livestock per head of population.<sup>134</sup> However the Russians believed that the MPR was capable of supporting 15,000,000 head of large animals (cattle, camels and horses) and 100,000,000 head of small animals (sheep and goats).<sup>135</sup> These figures were certainly far above what was realistic in a society where economic relations were still tied to traditional social relations and where traditional methods were being practised.

The MPR, deep in Central Asia, suffers extreme weather conditions in terms of precipitation, temperature variations and strong winds and until this century the herds had very little protection from these extremes. Although winter pastures were rather more sheltered than summer pastures large numbers of animals died each year from bitter cold, starvation or burial in snowdrifts. The Mongols did

not build shelters or enclosures nor did they regularly make hay for winter feed. Predators such as wolves carried off unwary animals despite the well-aimed stones of children or the ferocity of the Mongolian dogs and cattle plague spread by draft animals from Inner Mongolia was common. Other killers of animals were pneumonia, glanders, mange and rabies, the last caught by dogs from the wolves they attacked.

The Mongolian government took very little action to increase the productivity of livestock herding. Tax concessions were offered to those who were willing to improve their herds by providing winter fodder and protective shelters but it is not known how many accepted the offer. However the Mongolian government, encouraged by the Russians, did give some consideration to animal welfare. The Russians were prepared to support this because welfare practices had a direct and positive effect on the quality of trade goods. Disease reduced the availability and quality of products such as milk, wool and hides.

During the autonomy the Tsarist Russians had run a vaccination station at Songino near Niislel Khüree. In 1923 this was sold to the Mongolian government<sup>136</sup> and run by a Veterinary Department under the Ministry of Finance.<sup>137</sup> In 1925 the department was transferred to the Ministry of Economic Affairs and expanded into the Veterinary Administration under the headship of a Russian veterinarian called A.A. Dudukalov. By 1926 there were 22 veterinary stations and 38 workers in the MPR and it was hoped eventually to divide the country into 10 regions each with an animal doctor, ten technicians and 37 assistants.<sup>138</sup> By 1927 there were nine branch offices each with a doctor, 23 stations

manned by veterinary assistants and two vaccination centres.<sup>139</sup>

In 1923, training courses for veterinary assistants were held at Songino and in 1927 another course was held in Ulaanbaatar from which 12 students graduated in 1928.<sup>140</sup> It seems likely that some of the people who worked for the Administration were not Soviet Russians but White Russians.<sup>141</sup> In spite of Mongolian government's declared loyalty to the Soviet Union it was not uncommon for White Russians to be employed in public services.

Since the Russian trading organizations refused to buy animals which had been infected by cattle plague, in the 1920s the Veterinary Administration was mainly involved in vaccinating animals against this disease of which there were a number of serious outbreaks between 1925 and 1930.<sup>142</sup> This was not particularly easy, however. The service was not free, staff and medicines were in short supply<sup>143</sup> and the Church was opposed to vaccination on religious grounds. The ordinary rural herdsmen were very superstitious and needed little encouragement to refuse to have their animals vaccinated. Nevertheless 50,000 head of livestock were vaccinated in 1924 and the success rate was said to be high.<sup>144</sup> On the other hand animals sometimes died from a secondary cause such as pneumonia after vaccination and that too made the herdsmen wary of the needle.<sup>145</sup>

In addition to protecting Mongolian cattle the Russians made use of the Veterinary Administration to prevent the spread of the infection into Siberia or the region of the Chinese Eastern Railway. This was not always popular with the rural Mongols. In

1926 there was a severe outbreak of plague at Sain Shav' and the Veterinary Administration wanted to forbid all movement of animals out of the stricken area. The owners of livestock and draught animals protested strongly and the authorities were forced to give way a little. Only inoculated bullocks were permitted on the Ulaanbaatar-Altan Bulag route and loads had to be covered with tarpaulins instead of the usual skins. A certified guard accompanied each caravan and small parties were encouraged to join together to reduce the cost of the guard.<sup>146</sup>

The Veterinary Administration also inspected and branded livestock conducted experiments in animal care and collected statistics.<sup>147</sup> In December 1926 a veterinary conference was held in Ulaanbaatar. Delegates recommended that the numbers of staff be increased and that veterinary services be publicized.<sup>148</sup> An interesting sideline of the work of the Veterinary Administration was the vaccination of humans against smallpox.<sup>147</sup>

In 1926 and 1928 the total number of livestock was estimated to have risen to 19,200,000 and 21,300,000 respectively.<sup>150</sup> The actual figures need to be accepted with caution but they do indicate that there was an increase in productivity during the 1920s. How far this was due to the restoration of peace in the countryside and how much to veterinary measures is impossible to say. However, given favourable conditions and improved herding techniques, including greater attention to animal health, it is clear that even higher increases could be expected but this was unlikely to occur while livestock was owned by a few rich men and monasteries and cared for by poor ards who reaped little personal benefit.

## Industry

Industry was not entirely unknown in Mongolia before the revolution and the Mongolian government was well aware of its potential for creating wealth. During the autonomous period there were a number of small enterprises for the semi-processing of livestock products, including the tanneries, wool-washing plants and an intestine processing factory, all of which were run by Russians. In addition there was an electricity generating station, a printing house and working coal and gold mines. The workers were mainly Chinese and Russian, and Mongol workers were very few. The Chinese were especially prevalent in the construction and mining industries.

After 1921 most of the Russian owned enterprises became the property of the Mongolian state and were run by the Mongolian Cooperative. The Mongolian government had no firm plan as to how industry should be developed and run. Geleta, the Hungarian engineer who designed an electricity station and the People's House in Ulaanbaatar commented:

"The Mongolians at first did not take kindly to industrial work ... they considered industrial work, and particularly building, which involved the carrying of loads, as below the dignity of a self-respecting Mongolian and only fit for Chinamen and coolies."<sup>151</sup>

Even when persuaded to work in construction they had little idea of the principles of engineering. An Austrian visitor in 1926 described a two-storey house designed and built by Mongols who forgot to include the staircase!<sup>152</sup> For this reason the Mongolian

government was obliged to continue employing the services of the Chinese.

The Soviet Union, like Tsarist Russia, believed that Mongolian industry should not be independent and self-sustaining but closely linked to Soviet industry. Products of the livestock industry such as wool, skins, leather and intestines could be semi-processed in the MPR and then exported to the Soviet Union for finishing. Some products could then be returned to the MPR either as finished goods or to be made into consumer goods for consumption on the home market.

In 1907 Russians in Mongolia began to process the intestines of sheep and goats for export to Hamburg as skins for sausages. The intestine factories were handed over to the Mongolian government in 1921 and run by the Mongolian Cooperative which had a monopoly in the export of intestines. There were centres in the countryside for collecting intestines at a price of 20 to 30 cents a set. From 1924 the processed intestines were sold to the Soviet agency Kishpromtorg which exported about 600,000 km of intestines each year. The Russians hoped to persuade the Mongols to eat less themselves and to sell even more. By 1926 there were several workshops for processing intestines in Ulaanbaatar, Altan Bulag and Van Khuree. The workers were all Russian but the Mongolian government hoped to train native operatives to man further plants.<sup>153</sup>

In the latter half of the 1920s industrial enterprises mainly in Ulaanbaatar and Altan Bulag were beginning to thrive as the demands for their products increased. In 1926-1927 the Altan

Bulag tannery processed 24,000 hides, 3,000 sheepskins and made 5,000 felt boots.<sup>154</sup> New factories using finished materials from the USSR were opening. In Ulaanbaatar a carpet factory went into production in 1925<sup>155</sup> and a handicraft workshop for military uniforms was employing 300 women<sup>156</sup> and another workshop opened in 1926 to produce boots, saddles and saddle straps.<sup>157</sup>

In general, agents of the Soviet government put their greatest efforts into production that was directed towards the exporting of trade goods to the USSR and much less into enterprises which only served the domestic market. The latter included mining, construction and forestry although there is very little known about the last in this period. These industries were run by the Mongolian government using mainly non-Russian foreign expertise and Chinese labour. In 1926 the Ministry of Economic Affairs formed a building cooperative, known by the Russian name, Mongolstroi. The Bank and the Mongolian Cooperative each invested 20,000 tögrögs in it.<sup>158</sup> Its task was to repair older buildings, design and cost new ones and also to repair and construct bridges, roads and wells.<sup>159</sup> Materials were supplied by sawmills, ironworks and brickworks which were set up to supply the necessary materials and a Swiss called Walder ran the brickworks from 1926 until 1928.<sup>160</sup> Most of the labour for these enterprises was supplied by the Chinese.

A number of buildings both large and small had been constructed by 1928, including several hundred family dwellings, schools, hospitals and workshops.<sup>161</sup> The Central Customs building and Ulaanbaatar Middle School<sup>162</sup> which opened in 1926, were among the larger

works and the showpiece, which attracted the attention of Mongols and visitors alike, was a large hall shaped like a ger and humorously known as Tümbeger nagoon "The pot-bellied green one".<sup>163</sup> It was designed by Jozsef Geleta and was erected with Chinese labour.<sup>164</sup> Geleta described the building thus:

"The new theatre is 100 feet long and 50 feet high, and is an up-to-date building in every sense. There is an imposing vestibule, a library and a restaurant. The auditorium is the usual horse-shoe shape, with boxes and stalls, and a total seating capacity of 1,200. The whole theatre is electrically ventilated and the stage has the most modern lighting equipment."<sup>165</sup>

In this hall Party congresses, Great Khurals, drama, films and concerts were held.

### Mining

The Ulaanbaatar generating station built by the Russians during the autonomy ran on coal from the Nalaikh mines situated about 35 km from Ulaanbaatar. There was also a small coal mine near Khovd which supplied the Khovd barracks<sup>166</sup> and there were rumours of further deposits in the Ölöt khoshuu in the west which the Ölöts, a group of Oirat Mongols, attempted to conceal.<sup>167</sup> The mines were national property and worked by Chinese labour. They produced mostly lignite, a brown coal best suited for use in the production of electricity, but surveys revealed a better quality grey coal at a greater depth.<sup>168</sup> Mining operations were very primitive and in 1926 coal was still being brought up by hand-operated windlasses or in baskets. Facilities for transporting the coal were poor and

affected the price of the commodity. If bought on site one pood (16.38 kg) cost 7 cents. If transported to Ulaanbaatar by bullock cart it cost 40 cents a pood and 25 cents if taken by lorry.<sup>169</sup>

The Ministry of Economic Affairs hoped to build a narrow-gauge railway to alleviate this problem.<sup>170</sup> In 1925 32,000,000 kg were consumed and this was expected to increase to 80,000,000 kg in 1926. It was estimated that the Nalaikh stocks would last for 100 years.<sup>171</sup>

The Mongolian government was eager to lease mining concessions to foreigners but had little success. Some mining equipment was bought from Germany and a few Europeans spent short periods in the MPR as mining advisers to the Mongolian government. Among them was Bernhard Waurik, a German, who stayed for a year. It is possible that the Soviet Union discouraged the Mongolian government from pursuing the matter of mining concessions on the grounds that they were a form of capitalist exploitation. However it is equally possible that the Mongols were just unable to contact those foreign companies which might have wanted to mine in the MPR. The Russians themselves had no immediate desire to exploit Mongolian mineral wealth but Soviet scholars did undertake a number of geological surveys in the 1920s which indicates that the Soviet Union had future plans.<sup>172</sup>

### The Formation of Unions

Although the Soviet Union was less interested in the purely domestic industries of the MPR it did indirectly assist the Mongolian government to tackle the problem of the absence of a native proletariat by setting up native unions. The Comintern instructed the MPR to form labour unions in 1924 and Russians working in the MPR were active in the movement from its early days.

Labour unions were not entirely unknown in Mongolia because Russians who had set up the Niislel Khüree Soviet after the February 1917 Revolution had also organized a Union of Workers and Employees. Shortly afterwards workers at the Mongolor gold mines at Züun Mod did likewise. When Ungern's army fell on Niislel Khüree the unions were forced underground and many of their members were slaughtered.<sup>173</sup> In June 1921 survivors formed a new union and cooperative with 300 members and other Russian unions were also organized between 1921 and 1924. However the movement in Mongolia was not without difficulties, including factionalism and a shortage of funds.<sup>174</sup>

The First Great Khural instructed Dambadorj the Party Chairman to set up a Mongolian union organization. In 1925 the Russian unions came under its authority and employees of the Mongolian government and state enterprises were also enrolled.<sup>175</sup> The organization was in three national sections, Mongolian, Russian and Chinese, but this immediately caused problems. There were complaints in newspapers and in the Central Committee of the domineering attitude of the Russians, Chinese embezzlement and Mongolian squabbles.<sup>176</sup>

In 1926 the movement was reorganized into unions that were based on industries and they were responsible to a Union Bureau. Dambadorj was Chairman of the Bureau and other members were Dendev, Shatar, Bondarenko<sup>177</sup> a Russian and Shen Chen-lo a Chinese.<sup>178</sup> Shen Chen-lo was probably the Shan whom Ma Ho-t'ien met and described as a Comintern agent.<sup>179</sup>

Ma attended a meeting of one of the unions, the Employees Society. Its members were small Chinese businessmen, tailors, bath-house keepers and restaurateurs, who Ma said, had been forced by the Mongolian government to join the society. They paid a dollar to join, 50 cents a month in ordinary dues and 40 cents for medical dues. Over half of the income went to the Union Bureau. The meeting was attended by 10 members, including three who had recently been brought from Shanghai to operate new German printing presses. Ma was unimpressed by the conduct of the meeting. It was dominated by Shan, a self-important individual who shouted, interrupted and pushed everyone around.<sup>180</sup> It is difficult to imagine what this and similar unions actually did for their members. Bondarenko of the Union Bureau openly admitted that the Ministry of Internal Affairs was reluctant to grant Chinese workers passports in spite of the state's need of their labour, and the unions were powerless to help their members acquire the necessary documents.<sup>181</sup>

Until 1926 the unions were limited to Ulaanbaatar but afterwards they were organized in other industrial centres like Altan Bulag and Nalaikh. The first Trade Union Congress met in August 1927.<sup>182</sup> Three principles were adopted: the Mongolian Unions should join the international trade union movement, the Profintern; the unions were a mass organization of employees and workers who were striving for the economic and political prosperity of the republic; because of Mongolia's geographical situation the unions should be orientated towards the USSR but at the same time they should offer all manner of assistance to the trade unions of China. The Profintern accepted the Mongolian Unions as

a member, sent its greetings and ordered that trade union literature be translated into Mongolian.<sup>183</sup>

There is insufficient data for assessing what the unions contributed to economic development in the 1920s. They seem to have been chiefly a means of organizing an additional political force in support of the MPR. By June 1928 there were 5,528 members including 728 government employees, 643 employees of trading organizations, 202 medical workers, 168 transport workers and 329 tailoring workers according to the Mongolian historian of the Mongolian working class, V. Tüdev.<sup>184</sup> We may suspect that union membership was largely obligatory for these people and that their political awareness was limited as it was in other spheres of Mongolian life. Tüdev writes that only 348 Trade Unionists were members of the Party and 153 were members of the Youth League.<sup>185</sup> However, after joining the Profintern, the Mongolian union movement became a force that could be manipulated against the party leadership as indeed it was in 1928.

### Agriculture

While industry was beginning to make a modest contribution to the economy in the 1920s agriculture or crop-raising played a less significant role, in spite of frequent Party resolutions that it should be encouraged to develop. Many Mongols looked on agriculture as a way of life inferior to herding and preferred to acquire grain, which was an important dietary item, by trading. Nevertheless the cultivation of wheat, barley and vegetables was not unknown in Outer

Mongolia. From the 18th century the Chinese had farmed for the needs of the military and trading communities of Khüree, Khovd and other settled centres. In the Khovd region some Mongols also engaged in agriculture as a form of alba. Others hired themselves out as farm labourers and the monasteries had many fields which were cultivated by shav'nar, poor lamas or hired Chinese.

The Soviet citizens gave very little practical assistance to improve the production of food crops in the MPR but the Mongolian government acquired from the USSR two models for organizing agriculture, the state farm and the collective. In 1922 the Provisional Government ordered state farms to be created on the Khar river, a tributary of the Orkhon, and in the Taryachin khoshuu of the Khovd region. The former was 100 hectares in area and had an income of 40,000 lan while the latter's income was 18,000 lan.<sup>186</sup> By 1924 there were altogether 10,000 hectares under cultivation.<sup>187</sup>

A description of <sup>the</sup> state farm in Taryachin khoshuu by Milyushin, a Soviet observer, suggests that the government exercised little control over state farms. The local ards who had formerly worked the land as alba under Chinese supervision did not earn a wage as workers on Soviet state farms did but were simply given seed and told to produce wheat and barley seven-fold. The harvest of 1923-1924 failed utterly because it was eaten by field mice and the wheat quota was not fulfilled. Tools were primitive and farmers had to acquire them at their own expense.<sup>189</sup>

In 1925 the government introduced measures to improve agri-

culture and decided that state farms should be run as collectives whereby the means of production were owned by the workers. The obligation to produce a specified quota was ended although there was still a requirement to supply the army with hay. The government agreed to supply equipment and some of it reached the Taryachin khoshuu from the USSR in time for the 1925 harvest. In 1925 the Khovd Administration was formed and the Taryachin khoshuu came under its control. However state farms continued to be under-productive, in Milyushin's opinion, because of high labour costs and the incompatibility of Mongols to the regular, often boring work which machinery only partly alleviated.<sup>190</sup>

The Mongolian government had originally intended that all crops would be produced on state farms as early as 1922 but this was clearly impossible because of lack of money and a shortage of people with farming skills. However, Chinese and Russian farmers who had fled before Ungern's forces reappeared by 1922. Although no longer permitted to own land or property they were allowed to lease farm land from the khoshuus. Rents were fixed by the Ministry of Finance and paid to the local administration which retained 40% and sent 60% to the Ministry. Leases ran for three years and the Ministry of Finance was supposed to inspect the land each summer. Tenants were expected to keep the land in good heart, make use of timber only under controlled conditions and they could be expelled from the country if they did not observe the regulations.<sup>191</sup>

Agriculture was to be dogged by other problems such as the absence

of irrigation, wind erosion, a shortage of capital and expertise, and the lack of any real encouragement from the Soviet Union, for whom the livestock economy was of more immediate importance. At the Fifth Party Congress Amagaev said that agriculture was only just above subsistence level and that many of the farms which were productive, were worked with sweated labour.<sup>192</sup> There was a slight increase in the area of land under cultivation during the 1920s but, according to Ma Ho-t'ien, only 0.02% of the total area of the MPR was farmland<sup>193</sup> and in 1928 90% of all farmers were Chinese. Therefore agriculture was a very minor branch of the economy at this time.

### Hunting

Neither was there much change in the hunting economy of the MPR during the 1920s although game, like all other national resources, had been declared by the constitution to be the property of the People.<sup>195</sup> There had long been a market for Mongolian furs in Russia and Russians came regularly to hunt and to purchase pelts from the Mongols. The skins they prized most were marmot, squirrel and fox. Game as a source of food was not used to a great extent although the Mongols had long eaten the flesh of the marmots they trapped for pelts. The rivers and lakes of the MPR teemed with fish but the Mongols generally disliked fish and preferred to rent lakes, especially in the south, to the Chinese.

The Provisional Government introduced licensed hunting but it was extremely difficult to enforce the regulations in such an under-populated country. At the Third MPR Congress there were

accusations of foreigners poaching squirrel and sable.<sup>196</sup> In 1925 the Ministry of Economic Affairs became responsible for licensing and conservation and a number of new laws and regulations were passed. Closed seasons and quotas were established for various species, although dangerous animals such as wolves could be killed at any time of the year.<sup>197</sup> In spite of recommendations that the acquisition of pelts be strictly organized and controlled hunting remained in the sphere of private enterprise during the 1920s. Many of the hunter-traders were White Russians who had escaped the 1927 revolution and the life of a hunter kept them away from any dangerous attention.

### Summary

The economic changes of the 1920s created a necessary groundwork for future development. The most important achievements were the Bank and its regulation of money within the MPR, the steady growth in state income and the tax reforms. These permitted the state institutions to function, offered hope of future well-being and helped to confirm the stability of the ruling group. Other developments in processing, manufacturing, construction and transport were also valuable because they demonstrate a commitment to exploit non-traditional resources in a non-traditional way and established a model for the future.

The leading role of Soviet citizens in this transformation has to be acknowledged. In areas like banking where they were extremely active much was accomplished. In others like agriculture where Mongols were left much to their own devices little was achieved. It is not just

that they lacked direction; most of the resources were pressed into those areas where the USSR had an interest. It is a fact that the Soviet Union's chief concern was to extend the trade relations between the two countries and this is why banking, veterinary care and road repairs assumed priority. On the other hand the Mongolian government reaped considerable benefit also and it is certainly to its credit that it was prepared to cooperate fully with the Soviet workers in contrast to the grudging way the autonomous government accepted the services of the Tsarist Russian advisers.

Whether we can describe the economic changes of the 1920s as non-capitalist development is questionable. A number of state-owned institutions were set up such as the Bank, Mongolstroi and Mongoltrans and there is little evidence of Mongolian initiative in private enterprise outside the traditional. The organization of livestock remained unchanged and the livestock tax came too late in the period to show whether it was capable of redistributing wealth to any degree. In truth, a socialist economy could not be achieved in four short years under the kind of conditions prevailing in the MPR and certainly not before the position of a wealthy church as a unit outside secular society was tackled. The concept of non-capitalist development is an important one in the history of 20th century Mongolia and its roots in the 1920s are particularly interesting but as a yardstick for examining and analysing this period non-capitalist development is something of a distraction. The achievements of the period need to be considered on their own terms.

## CHAPTER SIX

### SOCIAL AND RELIGIOUS POLICIES AND THE LAMA REACTION

The conservative, religious forces that dominated Mongolia during the autonomy saw no reason for social change. However, increases in foreign contacts and a genuine widening of perspectives among intellectuals of the capital led some sections of the population to appreciate that social change was crucial to the survival of an independent Mongolian state. The government that came to power in 1921 displayed a greater commitment to reforms for promoting the well-being and improvement of Mongolian society, which in turn would enhance the prosperity of the Mongolian state. Political measures especially were used to encourage equality in social structures. Between 1921 and 1924 the princely class was **abolished** and after 1924 ards were promoted in government and public organizations. Economic reform also encouraged social change by offering alternative lifestyles to Mongols but the effect on Mongolian society in the 1920s was minimal. Russians and Buriats dominated commerce and industry; poor Chinese continued to make up the proletariat and a considerable part of the agrarian peasantry; and the ordinary rural herdsman was generally slow to take up the challenge of the new Mongolia.

In spite of a population of less than 1,000,000 the MPR had some surplus people who could in theory be transformed into new social groups. During the 19th century the towns attracted many desperately poor people to whom traditional rural society could not offer a living. Others wandered the countryside as vagrants and many

only marginally better off struggled to make a living in the countryside. The Party was also conscious of the monastic populations which it considered to be engaged in no work that was useful to society. It also looked on some of the lamas who lived in monasteries as people suitable for transferring to other social groups. Neither they nor the ranks of urban and rural poor could form a proletariat, armed force or other class important to the new Mongolia in their present conditions however. They were illiterate, unskilled and a prey to disease and deformity. First they needed to acquire practical skills and new attitudes of mind suitable for playing a full part in the development of the state. Some investment in their physical well-being was also necessary.

The Buddhist Church was by no means the only force holding back the development of Mongolian society but it was the most entrenched. During the 1920s political and economic reforms, education and a series of specific religious policies all contributed to loosen the hold of religion on society and its attitudes. As a result the Church represented the Party's most formidable opponent until it was destroyed in 1939.

### Mongolian Education and Medicine before the Republic

Until 1921 a large part of Mongolian education was in the hands of the monasteries. Many young boys, aged six or seven, were sent to study with lama teachers through the medium of the Tibetan language.

Some acquired only enough knowledge to be able to chant a few prayers. Those who became fluent in Tibetan might attend the Buddhist university of Gandan in Khüree<sup>1</sup> or the monastic institutions of Tibet to study subjects such as theology, philosophy, literature, astrology, medicine and other Buddhist sciences.

In addition to the monastic schools there were also small khoshuu schools for training future civil servants to read and write in the Mongolian script, calligraphy and perhaps Manchu. These schools were not especially popular with parents, however, because they made their offspring liable to periodic service in the khoshuu administration. In the towns of Ikh Khüree, Uliastai and Khovd, more advanced schools taught Manchu and Chinese. Graduates of the secular schools, when not engaged in administrative service, would take private pupils. In this way boys and girls of even poor families were able to acquire some reading and writing skills and perhaps mathematics.<sup>2</sup> One such pupil was the future Commander-in-Chief, D. Sükhbaatar. Yanjin, the wife of his teacher, O. Jam'yan, recalled:

"One spring evening Damdin brought his fourteen-year-old son to my husband as a student. Like the other children, Sükhbaatar came to our home every morning with his books under his arm. He studied diligently, was serious and feared his teacher. Sükhbaatar's education lasted for two to three years."<sup>3</sup>

The treatment of sickness was in the hands of lama doctors who had studied Tibetan medicine. They were skilled in diagnosis and treatment with herbal medicines. However many ordinary people could not afford their services and resorted instead to the

spells and concoctions of itinerant and untrained quacks. Others put their faith in shamanistic-type ceremonies.<sup>4</sup> Neither the real doctors nor the quacks could cure the really serious infectious diseases, tuberculosis, influenza and syphilis, that were prevalent at this time, however. It has been estimated that almost the entire population was affected by venereal disease in the 1920s<sup>5</sup> and, what is more, lamas bore some responsibility for its spread. In spite of taking a vow of celibacy many lamas did not deny themselves the pleasures of the flesh. They associated with prostitutes and took concubines. Indeed, in a country where one third of the male population was bound officially to celibacy, there were large numbers of women unable to find marriage partners and many of these were forced into prostitution with both lamas and Chinese.

During the period of Provisional Government social services for the general population were minimal because the government had neither the money nor the manpower to invest in such things. However a considerable portion of the government's budget was spent on the army at this time and some literacy and general education courses and health care were provided for soldiers. Even so the quality of all social and material provision for army personnel was criticized at the Third Party Congress in 1924.<sup>6</sup> Jamtsrano remarked:

"When a cow gets sick, a doctor is at once called, but when a tsirik [soldier] is ill no attention is paid to the fact."

In 1923 the Second Party Congress issued a statement on economic policies which acknowledged that universal education and health care must be made available because they had an important role to play in the well-being of the economy.<sup>8</sup> Nowadays it is accepted in most countries that people who are unable to read and write cannot take a full and active part in public life and that sick people contribute poorly to economic development. In early 20th century Mongolia, these were quite revolutionary ideas as was the concept that the state should provide the remedy to these problems. However, before the foundation of the MPR government expenditure on education was limited and on health non-existent so very little was actually achieved.<sup>9</sup>

### Education

The Provisional Government had a People's Education Department from its early days. In 1923 an official of that department, a Buriat called Erdene Batkhan, was asked to draw up a policy for education. He recommended that between six and seven per cent of the state budget be set aside for education.<sup>10</sup> In 1924 the department was enlarged to a full ministry with a staff of 25, increasing to 36 in 1925.<sup>11</sup> The first minister was O. Jam'yan, who was also head of the Scientific Committee,<sup>12</sup> but in December 1924 Batkhan succeeded him and remained Minister of Education until 1928.<sup>13</sup>

Batkhan was born about 1888 and died about 1947.<sup>14</sup> There is little information on his life before the revolution. In 1920 he

acted as guide to I.M. Maiskii who was gathering information for his book Sovremennaya Mongoliya.<sup>15</sup> In 1921 he interpreted for the Mongolian delegation which signed the Mongolian-Soviet Friendship Treaty. Serge Wolff met him in Germany in 1926 and described him in the following words:

"He was ... a rather vain and not a particularly brilliant man but he was wholly devoted to what he considered to be his Ministry's task. His own cultural standard was perhaps that of a teacher in a secondary school in a European provincial town. He seemed to me ... rather conscious of his high office ... he was very obstinate and therefore at times difficult to deal with, especially with German businessmen or representatives of institutions ... But in the main my work with him was interesting and went rather well."<sup>16</sup>

Batkhan is remembered with respect in the MPR for his work as Minister of Education.<sup>17</sup> Not only did he organize the state education system but he taught in its schools, arranged for the production and printing of textbooks and attended personally to the acquisition of educational materials in Europe.

About the time that the Ministry of Education was founded, there were 16 primary schools in Niislel Khüree and Naimaa Khot (Maimaicheng). They provided education for about 400 children under the age of 16. Other schools opened in 1925 in Khovd, Uliastai, Altan Bulag, the four aimag centres, the Ikh Shav', Khatgal Kharuul and at least two khoshuus.<sup>18</sup> Many of the new schools had no permanent premises and no textbooks and it is difficult to imagine the pupils learning much more than the Mongolian script.<sup>19</sup> Even in the capital where facilities were a little better, standards were extremely low,

according to a German diplomat who visited a primary school in 1922. He compared it with what he called the native schools of Africa.<sup>20</sup>

There was a detailed report on education at the First Great Khural and it is clear that ordinary delegates recognized the importance of education. The discussions brought to light a number of drawbacks to the provision of schooling, including a desperate shortage of teachers, lack of educational materials and an overall problem of finance.<sup>21</sup> Short courses for training teachers were started in 1923 and had so far produced ten but Rinchino suggested that these teachers would require further training because knowledge acquired rapidly was soon forgotten.<sup>22</sup> A further problem was that no-one knew just how many children of school age there were so that it was difficult to estimate the number of teachers needed. Jamsrano suggested that 400 would be required to cover the aimags.<sup>23</sup>

When Ma Ho-tien was in Ulaanbaatar at the end of 1926 the majority of teachers there were either Buriats or Inner Mongols.<sup>24</sup> In 1924 Baradin, head of the Buriat Scientific Committee, met one Buriat teacher who had been educated in Japan and knew some English.<sup>25</sup> Out in the countryside those who ran the schools were men who had been officials when Outer Mongolia was under Manchu rule. They were the rural intelligentsia and many had probably run the khoshuu schools.<sup>26</sup> The young ards who were sent for teacher training in Ulaanbaatar after 1921 tended to remain there rather than returning to their native khoshuus.<sup>27</sup> In addition to the training courses in the capital teachers were also expected to train new ones during their vacations but it is not clear whether this had any great success.<sup>28</sup>

Ma Ho-tien described a number of educational institutions in Ulaanbaatar. He went to a primary school<sup>29</sup> and included the Regulations for Primary Schools in his book Chinese Agent in Mongolia.<sup>30</sup> He also visited the first middle school which was founded in 1923.<sup>31</sup> At the time of Ma's visit the principal was a Buriat called Hajagoyev. The curriculum included sciences and foreign languages. The school had its share of the Bogd Khaan's property but books were very scarce. A Buriat teacher who was a graduate of a Russian normal school was teaching geology from a Russian textbook and the students made notes in Mongolian. The provision of books was the responsibility of each institution<sup>32</sup> and because Mongolia had so few scholars capable of writing textbooks suitable for use in a Western educational system it is hardly surprising that Buriats able to use Russian texts were welcome in the teaching profession.

In 1922 a College (Oyutny Surguul') was opened for the training of teachers and other public servants. In 1923 short courses in teacher training, bookkeeping skills for cooperative workers and law were being taught.<sup>33</sup> In the beginning, many of the students had such a low level of literacy that they were first given a general education before proceeding to their special training. It was something of an embarrassment that when courses were advertised, the most suitable applicants were often Buriats. In 1925 24 out of 30 students on a course for cooperative workers were Buriats. This offended Khalkh Mongols, one of whom remarked at the Fourth Party Congress:

"I do not say we must not take Buriats or that they are not equally citizens of our Republic. But it must also be pointed out that Mongols too crave education." <sup>34</sup>

When Ma Ho-tien visited the College in 1926 it was housed in the former summer palace of the Bogd Khaan. The Dean was an Inner Mongol from Jehol called Huo Kuan-sheng who had come to Mongolia at the time of Hsu Shu-cheng. He had a staff of eight which included Jamtsrano and Batkhan. There were then 70 pupils, of whom 20 were girls, studying on a teaching course. Two years were spent on general educational subjects to a standard Ma described as normal school, followed by a year of teacher training. Ma also said that the Dean was troubled by poor discipline! <sup>35</sup>

The College continued to run short commercial and technical courses and there were evening classes in politics for civil servants. Another institution taught crafts and technical skills. It was started in 1924 with 100 pupils learning mechanics, carpentry, boot-making, wheelmaking, pottery, leather crafts, sewing, painting, drawing and driving. <sup>36</sup>

The Ministry of Education financed the schools in the capital and provided buildings. Technical training was paid for by government departments. In the countryside, however the khoshuu schools were supported by the local administration on the basis of the special tax ordered by the First Great Khural <sup>37</sup> and were housed in gers. In some schools pupils were provided with all material needs including clothing but the Third Great Khural of 1926 decreed that only poor children should receive free clothing. <sup>38</sup> Parents were expected to pay for the pupil's board but, as Batkhan remarked to Anna Louise Strong, many parents were unwilling to do so, although they were happy enough to pay for a son's keep in a monastic school. <sup>39</sup>

Equipment and textbooks continued to be a serious problem throughout the 1920s. Batkhan said of European knowledge: "We must learn it - or perish."<sup>40</sup> In 1925 he wrote to the Russian author Maksim Gorky asking advice on what kind of material, primarily Russian fiction, ought to be translated into Mongolian. Gorky replied:

"... as far as I can judge about the soul of the Mongol from the books I have read about Mongolia, I think that your people would benefit mostly by the advocacy of the principle of activity. Europe owes all that is beautiful and worthy of respect by other races precisely to its active attitude to life ..... I think that the biographies of such personalities as the men of science Pasteur and Faraday, as Franklin, Garibaldi and others would be useful ... Such biographies are no less important from the standpoint of education than works of fiction."<sup>41</sup>

In 1926 Batkhan travelled to Germany where he ordered maps and charts in the Mongolian script,<sup>42</sup> projectors, films and cameras<sup>43</sup> and also 100 typewriters, the first to be built for writing the Mongolian script. They were made by the Berlin firm of Wanderer Werke which accepted the order as a pioneering challenge and, in the hope of receiving further orders, supplied the first hundred at very little profit.<sup>44</sup> A new printing press was purchased from Germany at the same time<sup>45</sup> and although neither it nor the typewriters were specifically for educational purposes, education benefitted nevertheless. In 1927 Jamtsrano was able to publish a textbook of geography.<sup>46</sup>

The link with Germany also included a unique and fascinating educational venture.<sup>47</sup> The German ambassador to the USSR, Count

Brockdorf von Ranzau invited a number of Mongolian children to be educated in German schools.<sup>48</sup> In 1926 a group of 30 boys and five girls aged 13-17, all former pupils of the Ulaanbaatar Middle School, arrived in Berlin. One of their German teachers described them as "children of workers, orphans and half-orphans" and Ish-dorj, the government official who accompanied them said they had been chosen "for their ability and behaviour."<sup>49</sup> The children became pupils of the Freie Schulegemeinde Wickersdorf and the Schul-und Werkgemeinschaft Letzlingen where they studied German language and general subjects. Several went on to special training in tanning, mapping, agriculture, mechanics, brickmaking, textiles and photography, either in technical schools or as apprentices in German firms. Four went to the Paris Lycée, one studied with the German orientalist Erich Haenisch in Leipzig and yet another went to Sweden. The headmaster of the school at Wickersdorf described the application of the children to their work:

"Their behaviour is striking. They have their own laws. It appeared to us as if it were commandments and prohibitions which were given to them to take with them. An over-stepping of those is out of the question. Their reserved, stubborn consistency leads again and again to the thought that they possess rules. On the other hand, whatever happens they carry out what they have undertaken."<sup>50</sup>

This calls to mind a remark that Batkhan made to Anna Louise Strong in 1927: "When the Mongol is interested, he will work to the end."<sup>51</sup>

Unfortunately the stay in Germany was cut short in 1929 as a result of political changes introduced by the Seventh Party Congress but, brief as the students' education was, it provided the MPR with a range of new skills which could be put into practice immediately.

Wolff who had undertaken all the practical arrangements of the education venture was able to renew his acquaintance with many of the students when he visited the MPR in 1964. Some had become doctors and teachers, others worked for the government, one was a theatre director and another an associate of the Academy of Sciences.<sup>52</sup>

In 1925 some 80,000 children of school age<sup>53</sup> were said to be living in the MPR, although this figure may not be entirely accurate. In 1927 Natsov recorded a much higher estimate of 135,000 aged 8-16 years who did not receive any state education.<sup>54</sup> In 1925 less than 1,000 were attending state schools<sup>55</sup> and in 1927 there were just under 3,000<sup>56</sup> of whom 551 were girls.<sup>57</sup> The Third Great Khural of 1926 stressed that state education for all should be introduced within ten years.<sup>58</sup> Meanwhile the monastery schools were still attracting far larger numbers than the state schools. Dambadorj told Anna Louise Strong in 1927 that 66,000 boys were monastic pupils,<sup>59</sup> although the Mongolian historians Pürevjav and Dashjamts give a much lower figure of 15,000.<sup>60</sup> In the words of Batkhan

"For three centuries our people have been used to their schools and the boys are all ambitious to go to them." 61

Nevertheless by this time 75 khoshuus were offering some kind of secular schooling, making a total of 100 such schools in the whole country.<sup>62</sup>

## Health and Hygiene

Education made considerable progress in the 1920s, given the conditions prevailing in the region at that time. Health and hygiene, on the other hand, received rather less attention and public money. Education was the responsibility of a full ministry from 1924 while health care was left to a department of the Ministry of Economic Affairs. While the education service was able to attract Buriats with the necessary skills, no Buriats were available either to organize the health service in the way that Batkhan organized education or to treat the sick of the MPR. Article Three, item ten of the Constitution declared

"So as to give the labouring people true access to knowledge, the Mongol People's Republic will organize for them complete general instruction free of charge." 63

However the only reference to health care was that sanitary matters were the responsibility of the Great Khural.<sup>64</sup> Individual party members nevertheless began to make demands for health care and Jamtsrano proposed to the Third Party Congress that Mongols be sent to train as doctors of western medicine.<sup>65</sup> This was not feasible then however because no Mongols had reached the necessary standard of general education and proficiency in foreign languages. The only possible, immediate solution was to make use of the available skills of lama doctors and the service of foreign doctors.

Ordinary people had great confidence in Tibetan medicine and the Party wanted to open state clinics offering both Tibetan and western medicine.<sup>66</sup> Within the Party there was some debate as to the relative merits of either system and some wanted to dispense with Tibetan

medicine and use only the western system.<sup>67</sup> Foreign doctors were not, of course, unknown in Mongolia; a Swedish visitor to Niislel Khüree in 1919 met several foreign nationals claiming to be doctors, including Russians, Japanese, Koreans and Chinese.<sup>68</sup> Yet in spite of a professed reverence for western medicine Russian doctors were not given a great deal of encouragement by the authorities as Jamtsarano revealed to the Third Party Congress:

"It is easy to pass a resolution about European medicine, but shall we be able to carry it out? You will remember the last year a very good physician, Doctor Shastin, was invited. But what a lot of trouble it cost to get the funds for the fitting up of a hospital. We met with the greatest obstruction and the matter dragged on for many months. The doctor was almost sent away. And now the same people ask: 'is it possible that your doctor has done nothing all this time?' "<sup>69</sup>

Dr. P.N. Shastin was then in charge of the Mongolian Army's medical department and remained in practice in the MPR until 1934.<sup>70</sup>

While the authorities procrastinated missionaries of the Swedish Mongol Mission attempted to alleviate the plight of the sick of Niislel Khüree. In 1919 a mission station including a school and a clinic, opened and by 1924 up to 1,000 Mongols a month were being treated.<sup>71</sup> Judging from the mutilations described by Sven Hedin, the Swedish explorer, the patients included some of the poorest people of the capital.<sup>72</sup> Mongolian soldiers, Chinese residents and lamas also attended. In return for treatment the nurses were offered khadags,<sup>73</sup> long strips of silk, on which were placed one or two dollars. These donations kept the clinic open and it was hoped that a fuller

service could eventually be offered.<sup>74</sup> However the clinic was closed down in 1924, a week after the Bogd Khaan died, and the missionaries were sent packing because soldiers were showing some interest in the religious tracts they received with their medicine. The Russian officers in the barracks confiscated the tracts and protested to the authorities.<sup>75</sup>

The First Great Khural ordered that the health of school children be cared<sup>76</sup> for but what was actually done is not clear. A state clinic providing western and Tibetan medical treatment opened in 1925 and in 1926 a Mother and Baby Clinic<sup>77</sup> was started but there is little information available on these services. The Second Great Khural of 1925 issued a number of resolutions on health, calling for a public hygiene campaign, doctors for rural areas, the study of the medicinal virtues of mineral waters, of which there are many springs in the MPR, and the training of young people as medical assistants.<sup>78</sup> Also in this year the government allocated 2.71% of the state budget for health purposes.<sup>79</sup>

Already in 1923 the Military Council had organized a commission to clean up the capital. They had the assistance of the Russian trading organizations, the Tibetan Office<sup>80</sup> and European doctors in this task. In 1924 it was announced that fines would be levied on those who polluted the city, although quite what this implied is not clear, and anyone who reported such behaviour could be rewarded with as much as 75% of the fine.<sup>81</sup> Members of the Youth League helped by removing large mounds of rubbish that had accumulated over many decades. Even so, changing old habits was a slow process.

The Chinese cemetery with its coffins above ground gave off an unbearable smell.<sup>82</sup> Mongols continued to relieve themselves in public places, refusing to make use of a number of public lavatories erected by a Hungarian refugee at the behest of the government. They considered it was more hygienic for the scavenger dogs to dispose of human faeces.

### Society and Religion

The education and health services were not universally popular and that was mainly because of the influence of the Buddhist religion. Between 1921 and 1924 the Party restricted the political power of the Church to some extent but its economic power and its spiritual influence were largely untouched. There were over 100,000 lamas, 600 large monasteries and temples and over 1,000 small foundations.<sup>84</sup> The Party had only 11,600 members by 1927 and therefore it could not afford to offend either the lamas or the faithful laity. But while the Church stood firmly in the way of change the MPR had little hope of becoming a strong and prosperous state. Therefore the Church had to be reformed, controlled or broken but initially the Party was undecided as to what kind of religious policy it should adopt.

Until the time of the death of the Bogd Khaan the regime aimed chiefly to control the political power of the monarch. His power was drastically reduced by the Oath-taking Treaty the Civil List was cut down, collecting taxes from the faithful in the form of enforced donations was forbidden and expenditure on religious

observances was restricted. Any imagined attempt to restore the Bogd Khaan to his former position as a monarch with unlimited rule was handled ruthlessly by the Secret Police as the affairs of the Saj Lama and Tserenpil bear witness.

Even so relations between the Church and the Party were confused. The Party was not, in the beginning, an anti-religious organization. The Mongolian army fought to protect the Yellow Faith and the Javzandamba Khutagt in 1921. Lamas were among the founder members of the MPP and some of the secular members were known for their loyalty to religion. The Diluv Khutagt recalled that Choibalsan kept Buddhist statues in his ger until 1928<sup>85</sup> and Jamtsrano defended Buddhism in the press. Nevertheless the Church was fully aware that the Party's closest allies, the Bolsheviks, were no friends of religion and it was quick to take any action or remark against the political and economic position of the monasteries as opposition to the faith itself. The Youth League was especially hated by churchmen because its members were far less cautious in their criticism of the Church and the degeneracy of some lamas than were members of the Party.

The matter was further complicated by the fact that there were also lamas who supported the Party and its policies for change. It is not particularly surprising that lamas should support the independence movement of 1921 because a number of monasteries had come under Chinese attack in 1920. Some in the south of the country were completely ransacked with serious loss of life and Gandan and other monasteries of Ikh Khüree were fired on. Yet when the euphoria of victory in 1921 had died away and rumours were circulating that the Party intended to

persecute religion, there were lamas, even incarnations, who joined the Party as a result of the recruitment campaigns of 1923 and 1924. It was later suggested that they had done so merely to save their own skins or to increase respect for lamas and monasteries but as we have no record of the lamas' own point of view, it is better to retain an open mind and assume that some, at least, joined out of genuine conviction.

There was a body of religious opinion in the 1920s that was deeply offended by the immorality of some professed lamas and by the accumulation of monastic wealth when so many went poor and hungry. Religious writers had long raised their voices against the evils of drink, smoking and fornication but the senior academics of Gandan were particularly repulsed by the lifestyle of the Seventh and Eighth Javzandamba Khutagts.<sup>86</sup> In the latter part of the 19th century a Buddhist revival occurred among the Buriats as a result of the clash of Russian and Mongol culture and education systems. This movement became known as "Purer Buddhism" and its central tenet was that lamaism had become degenerate and only concerned for its own power and prosperity. The reformists wanted to return to the Buddha's teachings of celibacy, the renunciation of private property and a sacred respect for all living creatures.<sup>87</sup> Buriat and Khalkh churchmen were in regular contact and a number of Khalkh lamas were receptive to the ideas of the Purer Buddhism movement and its reformist ideas. It was not just high lamas who expressed these sentiments. Professed lamas of the lower degrees also favoured change and some wanted to end the institution of khutagts and khuvilgans.<sup>88</sup> Incarnations were not found in the earliest

form of Buddhism but had been introduced into the faith by the Tibetans.

The support and sympathy of progressive lamas, active or passive, was however outweighed by the more traditional and reactionary sections of the religious establishment. Therefore Party members were uncertain whether they could trust lamas, and became uneasy about admitting them to the Party. It was also realized that there was an ideological conflict between a lama's vow to preserve life and the party oath which required members of the Party to be ready to take up arms when required to do so.<sup>89</sup> By the time that the Republic was founded the Party had a clearer conception of its aims and policies. Under the influence of changing Comintern policies as directed through its agents in Mongolia, some factions were pushed out of the Party and those who were left were prepared for a closer alliance with the international Communist movement. As a result there were changes in policy towards religion and the monasteries from 1924, although the Party retained an ambivalent attitude towards the Yellow Faith until 1928.

### The Search for the Ninth Javzandamba Khutagt

Although the high lamas of Ikh Khüree were refused permission to search for a Ninth Javzandamba Khutagt they sent out envoys to investigate boy children who were born within nine months of the death of the Eighth. According to a Manchu ruling the Javzandamba

Khutagts had to be reborn as Tibetan commoners, but the journey to Tibet was dangerous at the best of times and the cost of bringing an incarnation to Mongolia prohibitively expensive so there had been attempts in the past to overturn this ruling. By 1925 such a journey was almost impossible because of banditry and warlordism in China.

At the beginning of 1925 it was rumoured that the Ninth incarnation had been reborn as the son of a poor woman called Tsendjav. The woman was said to be a shaman who heard mysterious voices and her son was said to have prophesied the future glory of a Buddhist Mongolia.<sup>90</sup> Three lamas were sent to prepare the child for discovery and a delegation went to Tibet to inform the Dalai Lama.<sup>91</sup> The Central Committee issued a statement saying that there was no evidence that the child was the Ninth Javzandamba Khutagt and in order to discourage further speculation set up a commission of its own to look into the matter.<sup>92</sup>

The lamas continued to put pressure on the civil authorities by making requests to initiate a search and by putting forward the names of children of appropriate age. Rumours of discoveries circulated constantly including a candidate in Inner Mongolia.<sup>93</sup> At the same time the lamas launched a propaganda campaign through their own vast publishing and distribution machine. A Buddhist writer called Choizon is credited with wanting to make Mongolia the centre of Tibetan Buddhism in Central Asia and spoke of the "religion of the Javzandamba Lama of the north."<sup>94</sup> Many books and pamphlets were printed which predicted great disasters for unbelievers and protection for those who prayed and spread the teaching. The campaign was as

effective among the illiterate as the literate: a work called the "Book of Stone" (Chuluuny Bichig) was printed in miniature so that it could be worn as an amulet.<sup>95</sup>

The Party refused to be moved by this pressure however, and instead cast doubt on the existence of a Ninth Javzandamba Khutagt by referring to a widely believed legend of Shambala. According to this legend the Ninth would not appear until he marched into the country in the person of the General Khanamand, leading a force of the mythical realm of Shambala.<sup>96</sup> There was considerable propaganda value in this legend because Shambala could be identified with the powers of the day. Some said it was Russia, others Japan. The Fifth Congress of the MPRP passed a resolution that the Dalai Lama must be consulted before any further action could be taken.<sup>97</sup> This was most effective as a further tactic of delay because by now all travel between Mongolia and Tibet had virtually ceased. Indeed nothing further was done until 1929 when the discovery of any more Javzandamba Khutagts was forbidden.<sup>98</sup>

Meanwhile a more positive line was adopted concerning the Bogd Khaan's property. The usual practice was that the personal property of a khutagt or khuvilgan was inherited by a new incarnation on the death of the previous one. The Bogd Khaan had accumulated all manner of curious and valuable objects. Many were of religious significance but he also owned clothes, furniture, clocks, musical instruments, art treasures and mechanical toys, of which he was particularly fond. There was even a menagerie of animals which have since been stuffed and can be seen in the Bogd Khaan Museum in Ulaanbaatar. The Fourth Party Congress deliberated at length over

these objects. Some maintained that they belonged to the Church while others said they were really the property of the people because they had been acquired as taxes and enforced donations. The Second Great Khural finally instructed that they be distributed in three groups.<sup>99</sup> Religious objects were to remain with the Church and the remainder were to be used for the purpose of education and public health. In fact many of the Bogd's worldly goods were actually sold in the market in Ulaanbaatar and costly objects went for a fraction of their original value.<sup>100</sup> Jozsef Geleta, a Hungarian refugee, was engaged to turn the Winter Palace into a museum and the objects he describes can still be seen there.<sup>101</sup> The dispersal of this property and the transformation of the Ikh Shav' into a secular aimag were decisive blows to the institution of the Javzandamba Khutagt. In the unlikely event of a new incumbent there would be very little in the way of a material inheritance.

### The Regulation of Lamas

In 1925 the Central Committee formed a special commission with arbitrary powers over religious affairs. Its members included Amar, Magsarjav, Tserendorj, Jamtsrano, Rinchino, Gelegsenge Jadamba, Dambadorj, Khayankhyarvaa and Damdinsuren.<sup>102</sup> Party policy towards religion and the future of religion in the MPR was defined in a published document. It discussed the political consciousness of lamas, the opposition of high lamas to the Party and explained the principle of discrimination of different ranks of lamas which the Comintern had instructed the Party to adopt.<sup>103</sup> In fact that advice had been given in 1922 but was then ignored.

Three classes of lamas were officially defined in a decree of May 1925.<sup>104</sup> High lamas included khutagts and khuvilgans and also senior monastic and shav' administrators. In the middle group were ordinary lamas who had passed their examinations and taken vows, the gavj<sup>105</sup> and gevsh.<sup>106</sup> The lower lamas were the disciples and lama servants who waited on halls, prepared food and engaged in other menial tasks because their families were too poor to support the cost of full ordination. Because the middle group were seen as unstable, having the opportunity to rise further in the hierarchy, some writers speak only of higher and lower lamas.

The reasons for attempting to set one group of lamas against another was not simply to attack the power base of religion. The Party and government were also anxious to make use of the huge reserve of manpower in the monasteries and tried to draw some of this pool into the general labour market.

The Second Great Khural of 1925 ordered that lamas should be allowed to leave monasteries, be given some animals from the monastic herds and start a new life.<sup>107</sup> Between 1924 and 1927 large numbers of lamas did leave the monasteries and a figure of 35,000<sup>108</sup> has recently been suggested. Attempts to encourage lama craftsmen to form handicraft artels with government assistance met with little success however.

The Second Great Khural also tried to restrict the number of under 18 year olds joining the monasteries.<sup>109</sup> It was declared illegal to force anyone to become a lama against his will. There are indeed

many sad tales of pious parents returning unhappy, runaway sons to the monasteries where they might have been punished severely for insignificant misdemeanours or the inability to learn their lessons quickly.<sup>110</sup> In 1926 it was made illegal for more than two male children in a family to become lamas<sup>111</sup> and according to another law anyone found guilty of becoming a lama without permission could be fined between 50 and 300 togrogs or spend up to six months in jail.<sup>112</sup> In spite of these measures the overall number of lamas was not reduced<sup>113</sup> and we can therefore assume that the laws were not applied with any strictness.

The number of lamas of military age was also a serious problem for a country with a small population and a huge border to control. Not all lamas lived in monasteries, however. Many left after their schooldays were over and returned to live permanently with their families although they still enjoyed lama status. The Second Great Khural declared that all lamas not living in monasteries or not fully ordained should be liable for military service.<sup>114</sup> Furthermore any lamas found guilty of administering torture (by no means unknown!)<sup>115</sup> were to be secularized and mobilized immediately.<sup>116</sup> All lamas were obliged to pay the military tax.<sup>117</sup> Again, how effective these laws were and just how many lamas were mobilized into the army is impossible to say.

### Monasteries Submit to Secular Control

Initially class discrimination was intended not so much to break up the monastic structure altogether but to give those lower lamas who wanted to remain in the monasteries a better deal. In the mid 1920s some lower lamas began petitioning for a fairer share of monastic doles and a voice in the administration of the monasteries. Two lamas of Ikh Khüree, G. Choidabra and Erdenepil, with a following of 50-60 ordinary lamas, drew up a six-point plan for democratic reforms in monasteries. However it is said that the high lamas called them enemies of religion and, with the support of government officials, drove them from their monasteries.<sup>118</sup> If this is correct it suggests that the government was not only unwilling to antagonize powerful senior lamas but also unprepared to allow unregulated reform of monastic administration.

In 1925 the government set up a temporary Office of Religious Affairs through which to have a greater influence over monastic affairs. It was replaced by a permanent Office in 1926 and in the same year the relationship of government with the Church was defined in the Law of Separation of the Church and State.<sup>119</sup> Like the constitution this law stated that religion was a matter for the individual conscience and incarnations were denied the right to rule. In the second section of the new law the monasteries and lamas were subjected to the secular rule of law and government, and the system of administration was briefly described. An office in Ikh Khüree was given responsibility for the monasteries of Ikh Khüree and Gandan while other monasteries were to have an elected administration. To ensure that the government's

instructions were carried out and that the law was not violated, special government representatives were to be appointed to all these offices.<sup>120</sup>

### Limiting the Church's Wealth

Although the government now had administrative control over lamas and shav' nar the Church still had great economic power. Monastic livestock was supposed to be transferred to the shav' nar in 1923 but in practice the monasteries continued to administer the herds as before.<sup>121</sup> Thus there was little change in the lives of the shav' nar and because nothing was contributed to the state budget from these herds, the rate of national economic development was slow.

Monastic wealth was based on livestock acquired as taxes or as donations which would bring merit to the giver. The 1918 census estimated church holdings to be approximately 2,000,000 head.<sup>122</sup> In spite of the upheavals of 1920 and 1921 and a severe winter in 1923-24 in which many animals died, the monastic herds increased to 2,900,000 by the time of the 1924 census.<sup>123</sup> They accounted for 20% of the entire livestock population of the MPR and 20% of all monastic animals actually belonged to the Javzandamba Khutagt and the monasteries of the Khüree.<sup>124</sup>

Livestock and other church property was administered in units called jas<sup>125</sup> of which there were some 3,600<sup>126</sup> throughout the country.

Professional lama administrators were responsible for these funds. Animals were distributed into the care of shav'nar families who were required to give back to the jas specified quantities of products such as wool, felt, butter, milk and milk products. The amounts differed from jas to jas. Any surplus could be retained by the herdsman and in favourable circumstances they could expect to keep about 30-50%. On the other hand if animals were lost in epidemics or natural disasters or even if they just died of old age the caring family was liable to make up the loss. The family also had to recompense the jas if the animals failed to produce sufficient wool, milk or other products.<sup>127</sup>

This situation led the Church to prosper even in bad times when the rest of the country was suffering. Between 1924 and 1927 a number of regions were struck by severe weather conditions and poor families owning less than 10 head of livestock rose from 28% to 35% of the population. At the same time monastic livestock holdings increased to 3,343,785 head,<sup>128</sup> that is 24% of the entire national livestock population.

Livestock accounted for 40-50% of the average monastic income and in some cases it could reach 60-70%.<sup>129</sup> Other monastic property included buildings and precious religious objects, like books, statues, paintings, vessels and musical instruments. During the autonomy the Ikh Shav' especially, acquired a good deal of farmland, as a result of enforced donations. Monastic farm land was worked by poor lamas or shav' nar or else rented out to Chinese.

The farmers had to produce fixed quotas or make good the loss.

At Ulaangom in the northwest, for instance, a tenfold increase was required on a sack of seed. <sup>130</sup>

The great prosperity of the Church was due to its privileged position in Mongolian society and the careful exploitation of its income and property by professional administrators.<sup>131</sup> The latter were responsible for trading animal products, farm crops and artistic objects made by lama craftsmen. Monasteries also engaged in large-scale transport, land rental and usury. They were willing to lend almost anything - animals, bricks of tea, tiiz<sup>132</sup> and silver - and in return charged even higher interest rates than the Chinese. Even in the late 1920s when the Mongol-Soviet Bank was offering credit facilities the monasteries continued to provide local government with loans. The monasteries were also bases from which Chinese traders could operate. The lamas adopted Chinese methods of trading and collaborated with the Chinese in commercial activities.

The Provisional Government did not immediately attempt to tax monasteries. Instead it tried to divert the sources of church income into the secular sector by forbidding monasteries and incarnations to impose taxes on shav'nar and extract enforced donations from the population generally. However there were calls to tax jas animals and the monasteries reacted by concealing some of their livestock from the census of 1924. In 1924 Chojjilsüren, a government special representative (tölöönu tüşmel) in Tsetserleg Mandal aimag, devised a tax of monastic herds and in 1925 Magsarav, of Khövsgöl in the northwest, planned to impose taxes on three <sup>134</sup>

local monasteries. This plan was discussed at the Second Great Khural and a resolution to tax the monastic herds was passed. 41 voted in favour of this, 11 were against and 5 wanted only half of the jas holdings to be taxed.<sup>135</sup> However these figures still leave a possible 20 or so who presumably abstained or were not present which could mean that the dissention was greater than the given figures imply.

The rates for taxing monasteries were laid down in the 1926 tax law passed by the Third Great Khural. The rate for a jas of 50-100 bod was 40 möngö; of 100-500 bod, 70 möngö; of 1,000-5,000 bod 1.20 tögrögs; of over 5,000 bod, 1.50 tögrögs.<sup>136</sup> In 1927 monastic buildings became liable for tax and monasteries were obliged to provide örtöö service.<sup>137</sup>

### The Religious Opposition

The reaction of the Church to the Party's religious policy was summed up at the Fifth Party Congress by Dambadorj in the following words:

"Extremely typical is the present growing activity of reactionary lamas. A series of measures undermining the former privileged situation of the lamas, which were carried out in recent years have weakened in no small way the former influence of lamas over the masses of the people. Moreover, the abolition of the theocracy, the regulation of the (Ikh) Shav' administration, the equalization of lamas to the rest of the population for the purposes of taxation etc., all these things have kept the lamas politically passive for some time. Reactionary lamas kept to their monasteries, large and small, waiting for better times. At the present time this period of hibernation has come to an end. Lamas are showing great activity in their search

for a form of organization which expresses their political existence and influence." <sup>138</sup>

The suggestion that lamas had been largely passive until this time was perhaps a little too simple. In response to the propaganda of the Party cells, newspapers, pamphlets, posters and drama, all of which attacked the lamas and the Church quite openly, the Church itself issued a flood of propaganda of its own.<sup>139</sup> The Church's capacity for printing, distribution and preaching was far greater than anything the Party could draw on at this time and it was no problem for the Church to muster the nationwide support of the faithful by a mixture of threats and promises of great blessing. However the Church did not organize any formal, united opposition to the regime.

In 1925 a new kind of reaction in the form of riots and violent demonstrations began to take place. Most of what is recorded seems to have been a spontaneous response to government interference in monastic administration and the imposition of taxes. In 1925 senior lamas at Ulaangom monastery in the north west arrested the government's special representatives, Dogsom and Luvsantseren. The elected local khural was prevented from meeting and communications with Khovd were cut off. Unrest spread to adjoining areas and had to be put down by soldiers from Khovd.<sup>140</sup> This incident is particularly interesting because it appears to have some connection with Dörvöd separatism, although Khalkh Mongols living in the surrounding areas were also involved. The Dörvöd were a group of western Mongols who were not fully integrated into the administrative system of the MPR until 1927. The unwillingness of Dörvöd and Khalkhs to be ruled by one another had a long historical tradition. After the 1921 revolution some Dörvöd

families migrated across the border to Sinkiang and others rallied around the Ja Lama. Sambuu, later premier of the MPR, who wrote a book on lamas and religion,<sup>141</sup> alleged that the uprising at Ulaangom was organized by high lamas in collusion with local former princes and had the dual object of overthrowing the revolutionary government and separating the western part of the country from Khalkh.<sup>142</sup> Sambuu also mentioned a similar uprising in Khovd in 1927.<sup>143</sup> It was led by an official called Shaalov and also involved high lamas who objected to the taxation of jas livestock. These insurgents also wanted to detach the western region and make it a border province of China.

In general Mongolian historians have emphasized the role of high lamas as initiators of violent reaction and played down the involvement of the lower lamas. The policy of the MPR to discriminate between the high and low lamas aimed to increase the lower lamas' awareness of the exploitation, harsh treatment and unfair share of temple doles by their superiors. It is true that there were increasing demands for more equal treatment as the affair of Erdenepil and Choidabra mentioned above shows. However the Mongolian historians overlook the fact that even low lamas had a genuine interest in maintaining the traditional order, however short-sighted that might have been. They had, after all, chosen to remain in the monasteries after their school days and take their vows. There was social status in being a lama and opportunities for the ambitious, and the power of religious feeling should not be underestimated. There is evidence to suggest that some lower lamas reacted as violently as their superiors to the new administrative measures imposed by the government and they too organized riots.

In 1926 rioting broke out at Bayantümen monastery in Khan Khentii uul aimag when 200 ordinary lamas, led by two of their number, Ishjamts and Molom, wrecked the local administration office. The government acted swiftly and ruthlessly. A special commission was set up under the chairmanship of Jadamba, the Deputy Party Chairman, and soldiers were dispatched to suppress the violence. Ishjamts and Molom were shot as examples to anyone considering doing likewise and other leaders were thrown into prison.<sup>144</sup> In its report to the Fifth Party Congress the commission maintained that the true leaders were not the ill-fated Ishjamts and Molom but high lamas.<sup>145</sup> However no specific evidence was offered to support this. The fact remains that 200 ordinary lamas felt strongly enough to take action against the new administration.

A similar incident took place in Namnam Uul khoshuu in Tsetserleg Mandal aimag. It has been described in the memoir of G. Genden who was working for the Party in that district:

"In 1926 a man called Jambal who worked for the aimag party committee of Tsetserleg Mandal aimag, came to Namnan Uul khoshuu and carried out propaganda work there. The high lamas of Namnan monastery started a riot. They seized the flag from the door of the party office, tore it to pieces and beat the propagandist Jambal against a wall. At that time Jambal and I were working in this aimag's office."<sup>146</sup>

As far as we can tell these demonstrations were spontaneous and localized but that did not dispel fears that some larger initiative against the Party and the government, similar to the Tserenpil affair of 1923, was being planned. Between 1925 and 1928 these suspicions were

especially associated with the Tibetan Panchen (Tashi) Lama or the Panchen Bogd as he was known among the Mongols. The Panchen Bogd was second only to the Dalai Lama in holiness. In 1924 he was forced to flee Tibet for political reasons and he spent the winter of 1925-26 in Peking.<sup>147</sup> Amar, the Deputy Prime Minister and member of the Religious Commission, and Navaannerin, the Internal Affairs Minister went to Peking on official business at this time. The Diluv Khutagt has recalled that:

"They used this opportunity to go to see the Banchin [Panchen] Bogd, it is said, and pressingly invited him, saying that it was imperatively necessary that he should make a visit to the territory of North Mongolia."<sup>148</sup>

This visit is not recorded in any other known source but it raises speculation about whether the Mongols were trying to pursue an independent foreign policy.<sup>149</sup> A similarly curious incident is the "embassy" of 30 Mongols and three Russians which Nikolai Roerich mentioned as travelling to Tibet in 1925. Most of the members of the delegation died in mysterious circumstances.<sup>150</sup> Then in 1926 the Third Great Khural ordered the appointment of a special envoy to formulate a treaty of friendship with Tibet to allow for closer relations although nothing ever came of it.<sup>151</sup> These three events must surely have had some religious purpose as well as attempting to maintain an independent line in foreign policy. However without further information it is difficult to say how far they reflect the regime's ambivalence towards religion and its desire to make use of the spiritual influence of Tibet in general and the Panchen Bogd in particular, for political purposes.

There was great propaganda value in the Panchen Bogd for both the Party and the Church because many other groups were trying to make use of his religious prestige. Inner Mongol nationalists wishing to achieve independence sought his blessing, Japanese Buddhists tried to win his support for a Pan-Buddhist region in North Asia and the Peking government endeavoured to make use of him against the Dalai Lama. Most serious for the MPR was the Panchen Bogd's connection with Chang Tso-lin whose links with the Japanese were considered a threat to the security of the Far East, including the MPR and the USSR.<sup>152</sup>

In 1926 the government of the MPR produced a propaganda leaflet which attempted to discredit a rumour circulating at the time.<sup>153</sup> According to this rumour, the Panchen Bogd was about to lead an invasion of the MPR by 80,000 soldiers and 88 heroes, Chinese soldiers, Chang Tso-lin and the Changjia Lama, who was the most senior incarnation in Inner Mongolia and traditional rival of the Javzandamba Khutagt. The numbers of the troops are strongly reminiscent of Buddhist mythology and call to mind the potent legend of Shambala. The founder of the line of the Panchen Bogd is said to have lived in Shambala before he was reincarnated to live in the monastery at Tashilhunpo.<sup>154</sup>

The Panchen Bogd was a potential and powerful focus for counter-revolutionary activity in the MPR where he already had many supporters and great wealth. In 1920 a Tibetan called Eregdelbürelgüü came from Tashilhunpo and began soliciting large donations of silver and livestock for the purpose of building a temple on Mongolia for the Panchen Bogd to stay in. Eregdelbürelgüü remained in the country for over ten years and preached that men and women should prepare

themselves for the war of Shambala.<sup>155</sup> The high-ranking incarnation the Yegüzir lama is also said to have invited the Panchen Bogd to stay in his monastery during the 1920s although he never came.<sup>156</sup>

It is not at all clear whether any genuine counter-revolutionary plot involving the Panchen Bogd ever existed and we may be sure that the Tibetan incarnation made as much use of all the groups trying to enlist his support as they made of him. Nevertheless the whole situation made the Comintern extremely nervous and in January 1927 the Far Eastern Secretariat issued the MPRP with the following instructions:

"Given the present political situation in the south, the lamas, who are objectively opposed to the Party and the people's revolutionary government, could establish contact with Chinese militarist groups and particularly with Chang Tso-lin and with Japanese imperialism which is backing him. From this point of view the Buddhist conference which is now being called together by Mukden and Japan in Peking and the luring to it of the Panchen Bogd represent a great political danger which could lead to the consolidation of internal and foreign counter revolutionary forces in Mongolia."

The Party must not forget that reactionary lamas are still not finally broken but have only retreated. Therefore we can expect a new attack from these lamas. The Party must be prepared for this. The Party must first of all work out a united and fundamentally firm policy on the lama question."<sup>157</sup>

The demand for a firmer line against the Church caused great concern within the Central Committee and Gelegsenge of the Religious Affairs Commission and Durgarjav, head of the Organization Department of

the Central Committee, were sent to Moscow to plead that it was not appropriate to conditions in the MPR. The appeal met with little success and the delegates returned with orders to implement the directive forthwith.<sup>158</sup> From this point the Party's religious policy became caught up in the general argument of whether the leadership was guilty of deviating to the right of a "general line", a subject which will be discussed more fully in the next chapter. However the issue does focus strongly on the question of how much the Party was in favour of religion in its reformed state enjoying an official role in the MPR and how far the so-called gentle treatment of the Church until now was the careful tactical approach of a regime which was basically opposed to religion, particularly in its organized form. The answer must be that there were different schools of thought within the Party and perhaps always had been. One of these schools which had a powerful presence in the Central Committee honestly believed that reformed Buddhism had an acceptable role to play in the MPR. This is stated no-where more clearly and officially than in the Law of Separation of Church and State. Article Two of that law states:

"Because the religion of Shakyamuni is not specially harmful to the present democratic system and independence and scientific progress and because our people's government looks favourably on the Buddhist Shakyamuni religion, the preservation, the study and propagation of its teachings are protected by law." 159

Within two years this article was taken as evidence that rightist opportunists had wormed their way (in Mongolian shurguulakh) into the Party and distorted the Party's true policy. Yet among the leaders, who made positive statements in favour of reformed Buddhism were men who had been Party members since its early days, Dambadorj

the Party Chairman who was a member of the Central Committee in 1921, Jamtsrano who drew up the Party's Ten Aspirations at the First Congress and Choibalsan, Consular Hill Group member, who kept Buddhist images and suggested at the Fourth Party Congress that the religious objects belonging to the Bogd Khaan ought to remain with the church.

Jamtsrano has been treated as spokesman of the Purer Buddhism movement in the MPR<sup>160</sup> although the ideas he expressed about the relationship of Buddhism and Marxism-Leninism are to be found in the writings of other highly educated Buriats of the day, notably Agvan Dordjiev, who was a close adviser of the Dalai Lama for some years, and Baradin, head of the Buriat Committee of Sciences. Their thesis was that unlike Christianity and Islam there was no conflict between Buddhism and Marxism-Leninism, and indeed it was sometimes claimed that Buddhism was an atheistic religion.<sup>161</sup> In a book called Foundations of Buddhism quoted, it must be admitted, in a hostile article in 1932, Jamtsrano made the following statements:

"The great Gautama gave to the world the perfect teachings of Communism. All attempts to make a god out of a great revolutionary lead to absurdity ... The present understanding of community makes a beautiful bridge from Buddha - Gautama to Lenin. We pronounce this formula not to exalt it or to lower it but as an obvious and indisputable fact .... The principle of fearlessness, the principle of denial of ownership, the principle of the value of work, the principle of the dignity of a human being without class or other difference, the principle of reality, the principle of love on the basis of self-awareness are the legacy of the teachers (e.g. Buddha and Lenin) of continual joy for humanity ... We know how Lenin valued Buddhist truth." 162

In 1926 Jamtsrano published an article in the Mongolian Youth League journal which took readers to task for criticizing religion and urged them to learn to distinguish between what was correct and what was incorrect.<sup>163</sup> Another book which was published anonymously in Ulaanbaatar about this time also draws parallels between Buddhism and Marxism-Leninism.<sup>164</sup> It was variously attributed to Jamtsrano and E.I. Roerich, the wife of Nikolai Roerich, although quite why a well-known writer like Jamtsrano should publish anonymously is not clear.

These were confused times when traditional ideas and beliefs were being increasingly challenged by foreign, supposedly scientific, new ones and the MPRP was rapidly approaching a point where it had to choose between Buddhism and Marxism-Leninism. But until 1928 there were enough people who believed that both ideologies could co-exist. As late as the summer of 1928 an international meeting of Buddhists was planned in Ulaanbaatar and it was only cancelled when the Comintern put strong pressure on the so-called Rightist leadership. However, the Purer Buddhist movement came to the world of Tibetan Buddhism too late to offer the latter a chance of survival in a region dominated by the Comintern. Moreover the methods the MPRP used to control the Church were precisely those methods which had been devised by the RCP to destroy the Orthodox Church and religious faith altogether in the USSR. Larry Moses has drawn attention to the close parallels in the treatment of the Russian Orthodox Church and the Mongolian Buddhist Church.<sup>165</sup> In the early days of party rule in both countries the main attack was on the

political power of the religious institution. In 1925 the Metropolitan Tikhon died and the RCP used manipulative and obstructive tactics in the election of a successor. At the same time the Russian Party fostered discord and schism in the Russian Church which led to a proliferation of sect-like groups such as the Living Church and Renovationists. Energies were dissipated in doctrinal disputes instead of mounting a united opposition to the RCP's policies. Like the Mongolian Church, the Russian Orthodox Church was bound by a series of legislation beginning with a Law of Separation of Church and State in 1918, which limited its control over its own administration, economic affairs and education. Since the Comintern increasingly held up the example of the Soviet Union as a model for states working for socialism it is hardly surprising that the MPRP was pressed to adopt the Soviet religious policy. We ought not to forget, however, that many members of the MPRP were not avowed atheists in the way that the members of the RCP were. This, rather than tactical cleverness, explains why the MPRP did not adhere to every detail of the Soviet model.

CHAPTER SEVENTHE MPR, THE COMINTERN AND THE RIGHT DEVIATION

When the MPP joined the Comintern in 1921 its main object was to gain international support for its aspirations for national independence. It soon became apparent that membership carried a wide range of obligations which affected the organization and outlook of the Party and, consequently, the range of policies implemented by the Mongolian government. As a result of Comintern influence the nationalist leaders of the MPP, some of whom had been in power since 1920, were overthrown and a new younger group came to power prepared to implement policies favourable to the Comintern. The Mongolian policies were formulated to complement policies of the Soviet government because, as the Fourth Comintern Congress of 1923 had decreed, it was the duty of all workers of the world "to proclaim their moral, political and economic solidarity with Soviet Russia."<sup>1</sup>

The Comintern's demands affected the MPR in three areas: the economy, the political structure of the Party and the state, and foreign affairs. Guided by representatives of the Comintern the administrative structures of the MPRP and the Mongolian state were modelled on their Soviet counterparts and the Mongolian economy was integrated with the Soviet system. These changes were described in Chapters Four and Five respectively. They were introduced gradually and hence the traditional and the new coexisted for a time. This tended to obscure the fact that the ultimate results were indeed going to be radical. The MPR's conduct of foreign policy

was affected in the same way but it was also fundamentally influenced by the Soviet Union which was the only country prepared to give diplomatic recognition to the new Mongolian state. This to some extent concealed the fact that the Comintern was trying to limit and manipulate the MPR's right as a de facto independent state to determine its own foreign policy. In spite of this the MPR did enjoy new international relationships and a wider range of foreign contacts than before.

#### Foreign Relations of the MPR

The embassy which the Mongolian government established in Moscow in fact presented an opportunity for Mongolian diplomats to meet representatives of other states and in practice to enjoy fruitful if informal relationships with a number of western European countries. The most encouraging contacts were the trade and educational links with Germany, but Mongolian officials also had opportunities to visit France, Switzerland, Sweden and Italy. Clearly the Mongols felt that they could pursue these contacts to only a limited extent. For instance while the Soviet government had diplomatic relations with Germany at this time the Mongols were apparently not free to develop similar links themselves. In 1926 a German businessman offered to take up this question with his government but Ishdorj, head of the Mongolian mission in Berlin, was politely non-committal.<sup>2</sup>

Similar restrictions seem to have applied to the Mongols' Asian connections. In China the Mongolian Party and government had contact with the KMT and with the warlord Feng Yü-hsiang but

the Comintern issued dire warnings about the predatory intentions of other warlords like Wu Pei-fu and Chang Tso-lin.<sup>3</sup> It was unlikely in fact that the Khalkh Mongols would wish to have any association with the warlords who openly claimed that the territory of the MPR was part of China. Chang Tso-lin even planned to invade the area in 1921 and 1923 but was only distracted by more pressing developments at home.<sup>4</sup> The Comintern also warned about Japan's intentions<sup>5</sup> but there is little evidence to suggest that the Mongolian government was seeking an alliance in that direction. In fact by 1926 Japanese citizens who had found their way to the MPR over the last two decades were rounded up and either imprisoned or expelled for alleged spying. A physician and a few prostitutes were then the only Japanese citizens left at liberty in the MPR.<sup>6</sup>

The controls exerted on the MPR are even more clearly illustrated by the manner in which the USSR and the Comintern manipulated the association of the Khalkhs with other Mongols. Efforts apparently aimed at establishing a united state of all Mongols were the MPR's only significant attempt to formulate an independent line in foreign policy. This the Comintern put a stop to in 1925, as was described in chapter four, and then the Comintern took upon itself the responsibility of monitoring contacts between the Khalkhs and other groups of Mongols.

In 1926 the MPR was compelled to sign a treaty of friendship with the Tannu Tuvan People's Republic (TTPR).<sup>7</sup> By so doing the Mongolian government renounced all claims to the territory of Uriankhai. The treaty was in fact more a means of keeping the Mongolian and Tuvan

peoples apart than of bringing them together for it does not appear to have led to any substantial trade or cultural links between the MPR and the TTPR. The only obvious link was the Tuvan Central Cooperative which had an office in Ulaanbaatar.<sup>8</sup> The Mongolian Mutual Aid Cooperative did not have a branch in Kyzyl, the Tannu Tuvan capital, as far as we know.

The Comintern and the USSR, for strategic reasons, were interested in developments among Inner Mongols as well as in the progress of the MPR. However apprehension regarding Pan-Mongolism made them hesitant to encourage contact between the MPR and Inner Mongols. Nevertheless it was the case that some Inner Mongols had chosen to come to live in the MPR and many more in China looked to the MPR for support for their nationalist aspirations. The Comintern tried to manoeuvre the Khalkhs into relationships that were acceptable to itself and to the USSR. In the mid 1920s this Comintern activity was associated with efforts of Feng Yü-hsiang<sup>9</sup> who controlled a large area of northern China including parts of Inner Mongolia. Feng was opposed to Chang Tso-lin and was in alliance with the Soviet government and the Comintern for a time.

In the winter of 1924 Feng sponsored a conference of Inner Mongolian nationalists at which an Inner Mongolian People's Party (IMPP) was formed.<sup>10</sup> By 1925 some 300 full members and 3,000 candidate members had been enrolled. In October of that year an IMPP Congress<sup>11</sup> was held in Kalgan and among those who attended were Mikhail Borodin, the Comintern representative to the KMT, Feng and an MPRP delegation. Among the last were Dambadorj and Buyannemekh,

the writer who had narrowly escaped death at the Third MPRP Congress. The IMPP Congress issued a manifesto<sup>12</sup> to the people of Inner Mongolia which reflects the Comintern policies for peoples seeking independence at that time. In typically Marxist language the manifesto condemned feudalism and called for an elective system of local and national government. The IMPP was presented as a branch of the freedom movement of China rather than as a Mongolian people's movement and the aims of the Party included the overthrow of so-called imperialists and militarists in China. Little is known about the activities of the IMPP after the congress and it seems unlikely that it was encouraged to look towards the MPRP for guidance or material assistance. Buyannemekh was left in Kalgan for a period to edit the IMPP newspaper<sup>13</sup> but this was more a means of isolating him from the MPRP for a while on account of his former involvement with Danzan. In 1927 the IMPP split as a result of the KMT's defection from the Comintern.<sup>14</sup>

Relations between the MPR and the Buriat Mongol Autonomous Socialist Republic (BMASSR) were more extensive but they were often conducted according to the rather formal pattern of exchange visits by official cultural, economic and friendship delegations. The Scientific Committees,<sup>15</sup> forerunners of the Academies of Science, cooperated and Baradin, the Chairman of the Buriat Scientific Committee, was also a member of the Mongolian Scientific Committee.<sup>16</sup> There were other educational contacts and a group of children from the Ulaanbaatar Middle School visited the BMASSR in 1925 and gave performances of a play.<sup>17</sup> In this period also there were several study visits to the BMASSR to "learn of Soviet experience" and trade between the two areas increased considerably.<sup>18</sup>

### Comintern Involvement in Internal Affairs of the MPR

In contrast with the constraints imposed on the MPR's external relations, policy making within the country appeared to be allowed a greater degree of freedom. There was certainly room for a range of options within the MPR in the mid-1920s but this relatively free atmosphere reflected the climate of opinion in the USSR which was still operating under the terms of Lenin's New Economic Policy, even though this was being challenged by factions formed after Lenin's death. The MPR was also a less immediate concern to the Comintern than the larger and more advanced countries of Asia such as China and India, where revolutions were expected in the near future. Indeed, in the structure of the Comintern the MPRP was not under the Asian Bureau at all but part of the Far Eastern Secretariat. This placed the MPR on a par with the non-Russian republics of the USSR and policies implemented in those republics were, in some ways, very similar to those that the Mongolian government was encouraged to adopt. The Mongolian government was able to exercise some personal initiative in the way it carried out those policies but Amagaev and Natsov, the Comintern's representatives in the MPR, always made sure that they had the support of sections of the Mongolian leadership. The memoir accounts of the period were of course written, in most cases, after an officially approved interpretation of the events had been established but if accepted at face value they indicate that Amagaev was largely responsible for causing a divide in Mongolian party and government circles.

In January 1926 the Comintern had sent a letter<sup>19</sup> to the MPRP urging it to act against Pan-Mongolistic tendencies, to resist

attempts to protect the property and rights of lamas and former princes, to guard against exploitation by Chinese traders and to block alleged moves to keep rural citizens out of public service. There was nothing unusual about these instructions and although no copy of the text is available there is no reason to suppose that the letter contained any direct criticism of Mongolian party leaders. However on the question of placing young rural ards in positions of authority some differences of opinion apparently developed among the Mongolian leadership during 1926, perhaps because older and more experienced leaders felt that many of these country youths lacked the necessary experience and political awareness to be employed in senior executive posts. Ölziikhutagt, a delegate at the Fifth MPRP Congress in September, remembers that there were disputes about the merits of older and younger people in the service of the Party and the state and similarly over rural and city members.<sup>20</sup> According to Navaannamjil, the editor of *Ünen*, someone referred to the 59 year old Prime Minister Tserendorj as "an anachronism in a revolutionary state."<sup>21</sup> Dambadorj, the Party Chairman, also remarked that old officials were generally hostile to the regime and had to be carefully watched.<sup>22</sup> Memoir literature also suggests that there were disputes between leaders of the Party but does not give any reasons for them. Navaannamjil mentions differences between Dambadorj on the one hand and Amagaev and Genden on the other.<sup>23</sup> In Amagaev's biography also there is an allusion to a dispute between Amagaev and "the Right" which lasted for two years.<sup>24</sup> Amagaev was evidently dissatisfied with the congress resolutions on rural ards in positions of authority and reported this to the Comintern.

In January 1927 the Comintern's Far Eastern Secretariat sent a further directive to the Central Committee of the MPRP.<sup>25</sup> The tone of this directive seems to have been stronger than that of earlier communications. It ordered that older Manchu-trained officials were to be replaced by younger party members; that all compromise with the Church must be set aside and a policy of firmness adopted instead; and that external connections with Japan, Chang Tso-lin and the Panchen Bogd be abandoned on the grounds that they were counter-revolutionary. The MPRP discussed the directive but concluded that the Party was developing along correct lines and it upheld the resolutions of the Fifth Party Congress.<sup>26</sup>

Nevertheless the Central Committee was concerned about the severity of the directive concerning lamas and religion. It had previously understood that any action concerning the Church had to be taken very cautiously to avoid offending the religious sentiment of the laity. The apparent change in the Comintern's attitude and its refusal to make allowances for conditions in the MPR was decidedly confusing if not disturbing. Two members of the Central Committee, Gelegsenge and Dugarjav, were sent to Moscow to plead that the instructions were inappropriate to Mongolian conditions as described in chapter six. The Comintern was in no mood to grant concessions and sent the delegates home with strict instructions to do as the January directive had ordered.

**Why a Mongolian Right Deviation?: the Soviet Union**

This change in the Comintern's behaviour had, in fact, very little to do with Mongolia itself, but was influenced by changes in international affairs as they affected the USSR. The USSR had enjoyed reasonable relations with the capitalist world as it pursued its United Front policy in the hope of promoting revolution in Europe. By 1927 these hopes had receded and as a result of a series of events in that year the USSR began to feel itself increasingly isolated and surrounded by hostility. In the spring Germany joined the hated League of Nations<sup>27</sup> and in May Great Britain<sup>28</sup> broke off diplomatic relations with the USSR.<sup>28</sup> In June there was an attack on the Soviet embassy in Warsaw and Voikov a diplomat was killed.<sup>29</sup> The Soviet government was convinced that Britain was involved. Events in the east were equally alarming. In April Chiang Kai-Shek, leader of the KMT in China broke with the Comintern and the Chinese Communist Party thus dashing expectations of an Asian revolution beginning in China.<sup>30</sup> Japan also, under its new prime minister Tanaka, was showing signs of taking up an independent attitude to world politics. Soviet fears of Japanese aggression in the Far East<sup>31</sup> were heightened in July 1927 when a document known as the Tanaka Memorial was published.<sup>32</sup> The authenticity of the document has never been established but at the time it was widely accepted as genuine. It outlined Japanese intentions to colonize and develop Manchuria and Mongolia<sup>33</sup> for the benefit of Japan's surplus population and to feed Japanese industrial development. The policy was a threat to the eastern borders of the Soviet Union and Soviet economic interests in the area in particular the railway interests.

Faced with hostility east and west Soviet leaders called on the international Communist movement to be ready to protect the USSR as its first duty. In August 1927 Stalin declared:

"An internationalist is one who without reservations, unconditionally, openly, honestly, is ready to defend and protect the USSR, because the USSR is the basis of the revolutionary movement!"<sup>34</sup>

These were all compelling reasons why the MPR should be prevailed upon to narrow its circle of international relationships, but there were other reasons too why loyalty should be linked with demands for considerable internal change in the MPR. By 1927 Stalin had manoeuvred himself into an extremely powerful position in the Soviet Union, by playing off first one and then another group of Soviet leaders.<sup>35</sup> When the likelihood of a socialist revolution in Europe began to appear remote Stalin reasoned that the USSR must be prepared to build socialism alone. He propounded the theory of "Socialism in One Country"<sup>36</sup> and planned to achieve it by means of a massive drive for industrialization backed by resources squeezed from the agricultural sector. The resources of the MPR and also the TTPR were to be integrated into this vast plan. Therefore

✓ it was necessary that the governments of these allegedly independent republics have full control of the rich resources that were in the hands of private individuals and the monasteries. Unwillingness to carry out the necessary reforms was regarded as a deviation from their **Parties'** general line and consequently a threat both to their national independence and to the stability of the Soviet state.

When the MPRP challenged the Comintern it did so mainly on

grounds of national interest but it is not unlikely that they also acted with a certain stubbornness at the peremptory orders. According to an article published in 1929<sup>37</sup> a prominent member of the government, who was not named, was threatened with dismissal but remained at his post because "feudal theocrats" and the "rising bourgeoisie" put pressure on the leadership. It is possible that the official concerned was Tserendorj and if so the reluctance to name him even in 1929 is understandable. Tserendorj was immensely popular and the state funeral<sup>38</sup> granted to him when he died in February 1928 is evidence of his standing and the respect felt for him. The official could, alternatively, have been Magsarjav, Minister of the Army, a former prince who was equally popular.<sup>39</sup>

Whoever the official was, his continued presence in the government angered the more radical faction of the MPRP which began to promote slogans such as "Back to the decisions of the Party Congresses and the Khurals" and "Struggle against the distortion of the general line."<sup>40</sup> The same article of 1929 identifies the leaders of this faction as P. Genden, Chairman of the Little Khural and Ö. Badrakh, Minister of Finance and close colleague of Amagaev in the Economic Council.<sup>41</sup>

### The Sixth MPRP Congress, 1927

When Chiang Kai-shek withdrew from the Comintern in 1927<sup>42</sup> M. Borodin, who had been the Comintern's representative to the KMT was forced to flee China and he broke his journey to Moscow at Ulaanbaatar.<sup>43</sup> A number of senior Comintern officials came to meet

him there. The Sixth MPRP Congress was about to open and Borodin was given leave to address the assembly. This was the Comintern's first public statement on events in China. It also gave the Comintern an opportunity to teach the MPRP an object lesson.

Borodin outlined conditions in China up to the time of Chiang's defection and said that subsequent events were the result of the Chinese Communist Party's failure to follow Comintern instructions, causing a collapse of the united front of the CCP and the KMT which had existed until then. Instead of supporting agricultural revolution and class struggle in the Chinese cities the CCP had continued to support the petty bourgeoisie. Alliance with the bourgeoisie had been acceptable to the Comintern earlier but Borodin implied that the CCP had erred by continuing that policy for too long. However Borodin is reported not to have gone into great detail for the whole affair was actually a great embarrassment to the Comintern.<sup>44</sup> Trotsky, who was now out of favour in the USSR, had maintained for some time that the Comintern's policy towards China was entirely wrong.<sup>45</sup>

The Mongols apparently were very interested in what Borodin had to say and asked many questions. Unfortunately these were scarcely recorded even in the contemporary press because, in the opinion of Borodin's biographer, the questions were "dangerous."<sup>46</sup>

✓ The Comintern may well have had fears that the MPRP, or at least the section of the leadership that was challenging its instructions in 1927, might be attracted by the KMT's example although no statement suggesting this has been brought to light. This was a reason

for Borodin to show how disobedience to the Comintern's instructions could lead to grave error. The Sixth MPRP Congress<sup>47</sup> responded with resolutions to improve national defence and it reaffirmed support for the Comintern and "true revolutionaries of the Far East." Parties which made pacts with the capitalist countries were condemned. However, as we shall shortly see, the MPRP leaders did not entirely abandon their policy of independent relations with other leaders in the East.

Contemporary accounts of the Sixth MPRP Congress<sup>48</sup> do not suggest any great disagreement among the delegates about internal affairs. The Central Committee was given a vote of confidence for the way in which it was handling the economy although there was some suggestion that economic development could be speeded up.<sup>49</sup> The desire to bring the Mongol-Soviet Bank under the full control of the MPR<sup>50</sup> may well have been considered a means to that end but of course it may also have substantiated in part the later charge that the MPR intended to end its alliance with the USSR and the Comintern.

From what party members later recalled it is clear that the leaders of the Party were subject to some criticism at the Sixth Congress for having rightist tendencies. One delegate says he was even asked to give his aimag's opinion of the "Right Deviation".<sup>51</sup> Several delegates have since suggested that the leaders were afraid to face criticism and called for unity instead.<sup>52</sup> Some of the criticism concerned disputes about the employment of young rural party members in the official posts. It is curious to read that

the Comintern representative spoke in support of the existing leaders<sup>53</sup> although for exactly what reason and against whom he defended them is not made clear. This representative was not Amagaev, although he was still in the MPR at the time of the Sixth Congress, but A.I. Shotman.<sup>54</sup> He did not remain long in Ulaanbaatar, possibly because he was not firm enough with the MPRP Central Committee.

Amagaev left the MPR soon after the congress, probably to attend the tenth anniversary celebrations of the October Revolution in Moscow.<sup>55</sup> A party of Mongols also made the journey, including the editor of *Ünen*, Navaannamjil. Dambadorj asked him to take a letter to Comintern headquarters. Navaannamjil was not told what the letter was about but he was asked to observe the reaction of the recipients carefully and to make sure that any reply was telegraphed to Dambadorj.<sup>56</sup> Unfortunately Naavaannamjil tells us no more about this but he does add that a representative of the Youth League visited the offices of the Youth Comintern and received some instructions.<sup>57</sup>

### Party Disunity Deepens

In January 1928 Petrov, head of the Comintern's Far Eastern Secretariat, wrote a personal letter<sup>58</sup> to Dambadorj repeating the earlier directives that the Party must exclude Manchu-trained officials and high lamas from government and strengthen its alliance with the working masses and their rural representatives whom he called the "conscience of the masses."<sup>59</sup> Petrov also said that

the Party must also adhere to the general line and to the alliance with the USSR which, the latter maintained, was crucial to the MPR's independence.<sup>60</sup> The letter was intended for Dambadorj's eyes only but he divulged its contents to the rest of the Central Committee and it was published in pamphlet form.<sup>61</sup> Dambadorj answered the letter<sup>62</sup> and the Comintern replied with a 58 point plan for defeating the Right.<sup>63</sup>

When the Central Committee met in April<sup>64</sup> the dispute between the Right and the Left could no longer be disregarded by making pleas for unity. A memoir of Tagar,<sup>65</sup> a Buriat who had been appointed to interpret for Raiter,<sup>66</sup> the new Comintern representative, shows what the atmosphere was like:

"People like leading members of the Central Committee Jadamba and Dugarjav, Head of the Propaganda Department were extremely hostile to the Comintern representative Raiter. At this meeting, while the Comintern representative Raiter was speaking Jadamba stared through the window as if he were not paying attention and then when Raiter went to sit down he looked towards him and said 'What is this nonsense you are talking?' He also asked him in disgust if he was saying it to cause a split in the Party. Comrade Dugarjav said he should stop talking about inconsequential matters such as the town and the countryside and the old and the young. 'The unity of our Party is important' .....<sup>67</sup>

Left wing members like Badrakh and Ts. Jigjidjav who was head of the Mongolian Cooperative complained that democracy was being stifled and the struggle against the so-called feudal classes hindered.<sup>68</sup>

The supremacy of the Right was sustained. Resolutions were passed<sup>69</sup> expressing confidence in the way that the decisions of the

Sixty Party Congress were being carried out. Local government was obeying instructions energetically, and ards and women were being attracted into the Party. It was acknowledged that capitalism was stabilizing and that Japan was emerging as a state that must be taken into account. It was also acknowledged that "elements of the old ideology" were prospering. In spite of this the Central Committee believed that all such problems could be overcome and did not constitute any great danger.

✓ Since the deep disunity within the Central Committee could not be ignored a commission of Central Committee and Central Control Commission members was formed to investigate it.<sup>70</sup> The chairman was Choibalsan and although he later emerged as a leader of the Left it is by no means clear whether he was so aligned at the time of this commission. In fact the Right dominated the commission but the Left was supported by the presence of Raiter the Comintern representative. His popularity had not increased since the April Plenum. According to Tagar, whenever Raiter said something that pricked the conscience of the Rightists, they complained that what they had said had been wrongly interpreted to him.<sup>71</sup> ✓ The commission concluded that it was not Rightist policies that were endangering the Party but the actual disunity and recommended strong disciplinary measures to control this.<sup>72</sup> Dambadorj reported the findings to the Comintern, and stated yet again that what the Comintern was asking was "completely incompatible with actual present conditions."<sup>72</sup>

The Comintern was no more prepared to give consideration to these findings than the right wing of the MPRP leadership was to

listen to the complaints of the Left. Petrov sent yet another letter back ordering a firm, leftist course.<sup>74</sup> He specified the confiscation of livestock and property from so-called feudalists, the use of monastic funds and livestock for the benefit of ards and measures to restrict the activity of capitalists. Dorligjav, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, then made a number of proposals in support of Petrov's directive but according to B. Shmeral', a Comintern official who visited the MPR later in 1928, they were "swept under the carpet."<sup>75</sup>

### The Sixth Comintern Congress

✓ The Sixth Comintern Congress met in Moscow from 17 June to 1 September 1928.<sup>76</sup> By this time in the USSR Stalin had defeated the supporters of Trotsky on the left and then those of Bukharin on the Right. The RCP was purged and Bukharin himself was only saved from expulsion by confessing that he had deviated to the Right. The New Economic Policy, which Lenin had instituted to build an economy devastated after the Civil War, was outlawed and replaced by a grandiose plan for the rapid industrialization of the USSR. ✓ The Sixth Comintern Congress expressed its approval of other RCP purges and ordered that all other member parties eradicate the Right Deviation from their ranks. Furthermore the Comintern, dominated as it was by the RCP, ordered the parties of the MPR and the TTPR to implement the same economic strategy as the USSR. This explains why the Comintern was now placing greater emphasis on the need for the MPRP to return to the so-called general line of non-capitalist development. In former disputes between the Comintern and the MPRP the issues of pre-revolutionary officials in public service and the religious question had been more prominent.

### The Rise of the Graduate Opposition

At this point opposition to Dambadorj, Jadamba and their circle began to harden as members of various state and party organizations began to support the Left. The Party Central School was split. N. Nasanbat the director, who was Jadamba's elder brother, supported the Right<sup>77</sup> but several teachers including Lkhumbe,<sup>78</sup> Shagdarjav<sup>79</sup> and a Buriat called Konyaev<sup>80</sup> joined the Left. Students of the school, especially those who had graduated recently were also divided in their views. Other divisions were apparent in the Central Control Commission and the Military Training School.

✓ Another group whose left wing was to be a profound influence in turning the tide of opinion against the Right comprised young graduates of the KUTV. About 20 had just returned from the USSR and one of them, a woman called Densmaa<sup>81</sup> later recalled:

"At the time we were studying at KUTV the activities and ideology of the Right Deviation which existed in our party leadership were explained to us .... We returned to our country in the summer of 1927 [1928] to put our skills into practice and went to work in the countryside as propaganda brigades of the Central Committee of the Party."<sup>82</sup>

The propaganda work of these young graduates, coupled with the efforts of graduates of the Party Central School, many of whom were now working in the aimag and khoshuu party committees, gives credence to the idea ✓ of a Rural Opposition which Mongolian historians say caused the downfall of the Right Deviation. Without this agitation it is difficult to imagine the rural party, which was portrayed as confused and apathetic at successive Party Congresses, opposing anything.

The Right leadership still treated the split as a purely domestic concern and when it was realized that the breach was not going to be healed by persuasion it determined to use coercion.

✓ Badrakh lost his position on the Central Committee and Genden was removed from the Little Khural.<sup>83</sup> Shortly afterwards, a number of prominent left wing sympathizers were arrested.<sup>84</sup> They included Laagan, a member of the Central Control Commission, and two teachers of the Party Central School, Lkhumbé and Shagdarjav. All three were Dörvöd Mongols. A young army officer called Dashzebge was also detained.

News of the arrests reached the Comintern during its Sixth Congress and Dambadorj, who was in Moscow for the occasion, was interrogated. He told the Comintern that the men were probably arrested for involvement in an attempt to separate Chand'man Uul aimag in the west of the MPR from the rest of the country.<sup>85</sup> When they were released in September, Lkhumbé maintained that the charge was trumped up.<sup>86</sup> It was no secret that the Comintern disapproved of Dörvöd separation and therefore it seems unlikely that loyal supporters of the Comintern would allow themselves to get involved with this.

There is no record of what else passed between Dambadorj and the Comintern or in what frame of mind he returned to the MPR, but about this time rumours began to circulate that the MPR intended to end its alliance with the Comintern and the USSR. A man known as Oros Gombo,<sup>87</sup> an employee of the Mongolian embassy in Moscow, returned to the MPR to attend the Seventh MPRP Congress in September 1928.

Gombo informed the Left that while Dambadorj was in Moscow he had entertained a group of officials from the Japanese Mission. One of the Japanese had remarked that the USSR had seized Uriankhai and therefore was an unreliable ally.<sup>88</sup> The implication was that the MPR should look to the Japanese instead for friendship. At the Seventh Congress Dambadorj firmly denied that he had any intention of allying with Japan.<sup>89</sup> Nonetheless it would be strange if senior leaders had not even considered the possibility of alternative alliances. In the summer of 1928 the Diluv Khutagt came to Ulaanbaatar seeking permission to make<sup>a</sup> pilgrimage to the Panchen Bogd who was in China then. There seemed a distinct possibility that the Diluv Khutagt would travel for Jamtsrano asked him if he would undertake a mission for the government at the same time. Permission to travel was eventually refused, ostensibly because of unrest in China. However Jamtsrano told the Diluv Khutagt in private that there was a certain amount of disagreement in the government but that if this was settled he might still go and a car would be sent to fetch him from his monastery.<sup>90</sup> The Diluv Khutagt did not discover the nature of the mission and we can only speculate whether this had anything to do with the MPRP's alleged desire to break with the Comintern.

The summer of 1928 was clearly a dangerous time in the Mongolian capital. According to Mrs. Walder,<sup>91</sup> wife of the Swiss manager of the Ulaanbaatar brickworks, a sense of impending disaster hung in the air. The European community had very little idea of what was happening. Mrs. Walder records that there was much whispering

behind locked doors; anxious political refugees, White Russians who had lived in Mongolia since the 1917 Russian Revolution or even the 1905 revolution, went about white-faced then sold up and fled to China.<sup>92</sup> ✓ Supporters of the Mongolian Left were also forced to meet in secret. Tagar, the Buriat interpreter, believed he was being watched,<sup>93</sup> and Choijil, a rural party secretary, tells how he was approached by a man with a queue whom he recognized as Perenelei, a former prince, whom he thought had been appointed to spy on him.<sup>94</sup>

✓ During the summer the Youth Comintern sent a letter<sup>95</sup> to the Mongolian Youth League ordering its members to oppose the Right of the MPRP. News of this letter spread rapidly to the aimags and party officials visiting the rural khurals, which were being held at the time, were questioned closely about whether there was indeed a Right Deviation in the Party and the League.<sup>96</sup> In Ulaanbaatar the KUTV graduates began campaigning in the Party and the Youth League cells. According to Densmaa:

"... only two or three people among the League and Party members to whom I went were in agreement with the letter: the majority disagreed ... When Comrade Eldev-ochir and the others sent me, he said 'Go and make a list of the people who agree with the KIM [Youth Comintern] letter.' So three of us, including Gombo and myself went off made the list and returned. In general, in the places where the comrades went, they met with great opposition. After this we carried on the struggle against the Rightists in secret."<sup>97</sup>

A month before the Seventh Party Congress delegates began to arrive in the capital, and supporters of the Left met to discuss

how they could overcome the Right. Among them were the graduates of KUTV, the Party Central School, the Tver Military Academy of the Soviet Union and groups of army cadets. B. Eldev-Ochir<sup>98</sup> emerged as the leader of this section of the opposition, and it is more apt to describe it as a Graduate rather than a Rural Opposition. In all probability Eldev-Ochir was specially trained for this role at KUTV. Other prominent leaders of the left who were present at the meetings were Genden, Badrakh and Jigjidjav.<sup>99</sup>

✓ The Graduate Opposition drew up a programme of measures for "protecting the general line," entitled "Aspirations of the Left" Züün (Jigüüriinkhnii Ermelzekh Sanal).<sup>100</sup> 29 people signed including seven from Chandaman' Uul aimag Badrakh, Tögs, Dadan, Erdene, Borbandi, M. Shagdarjav and Lkhumbe.<sup>101</sup> Shagdarjav and Lkhumbe were the teachers of the Central Party School who had been under arrest but were released by the intervention of officials of the Comintern who arrived in the MPR in September. The involvement of so many Dörvöd among the Graduate Opposition raises the interesting question of whether there was a substantial Dörvöd dimension to the Left.

### The Comintern Delegation and B. Shmeral'

Memoirs of party members leave us in no doubt that it was the Comintern presence, with the backing of the Graduate Opposition that brought about the downfall of Dambadorj and his supporters. In September a seven-man Comintern delegation whose leader was Bohumir Shmeral'.<sup>102</sup> arrived in Ulaanbaatar. Shmeral' was a Czech who had

been the leader of the Czech Communist Party when it was created in 1921. In 1922 he became a member of the Executive Committee of the Comintern and was given special responsibility for the East and China. A member of the Mongolian Left described him as "a very tall man, with a gentle face and a rosy complexion."<sup>103</sup> He adopted a fatherly attitude towards the MPRP during his stay in the MPR but his high office and the size of his delegation must have made it clear that the Comintern would offer no concessions. Shmeral's colleagues included McDonald, an American labour leader and journalist whose real name was William F. Dunne,<sup>104</sup> Amagaev, the former Comintern representative in the MPR, Vartanian,<sup>105</sup> a Finn who represented the Youth Comintern and three more whose names are not recorded.<sup>106</sup> None of those named were Russians and this may have been intentional, to deflect any potential anti-Russian feeling and to emphasise the international character of the Comintern.

The delegation proceeded to investigate the Party and its allied organizations and many groups and individuals were interviewed in private. Choijil for instance recalls being asked whom of Jadamba, Dambadorj, Badrakh and Genden he thought was "correct."<sup>107</sup> Then one day Eldev-Ochir and other graduates of KUTV, the Party Central School and the Tver Academy called on Shmeral'. Although most of them had not been elected as official representatives, Shmeral' told them they must attend the Seventh Party Congress and "If it is necessary you may all speak." He asked them to prepare statements on the recent letter of the Youth Comintern and on the Right Deviation.<sup>108</sup>

At this point the tide turned against Dambadorj and his supporters. When the Second Congress of the Mongolian Trade Unions

✓ met the party leadership was condemned as rightist and the Comintern delegates prevailed upon the congress to elect a new and very left wing union executive.<sup>109</sup> The Central Committee of the Youth League met in October. ✓ This too condemned the Right of restricting the political transformation of the MPR and made several radical proposals, including the confiscation of property of former princes and churchmen, in order to set up a fund for the benefit of the poor, and the withdrawal of credit facilities and tax benefits from the rich. The Youth League also criticized party leaders for allegedly failing to rebuff Chinese accusations of Red imperialism by the USSR in the MPR.<sup>110</sup> The resolutions of the League were set out in a pamphlet and put before the Central Committee of the MPR.<sup>111</sup> In 1924 the Youth League was similarly used to break the opposition of those party leaders who resisted Comintern demands. Then it was done covertly but in 1928 it was done quite openly.

There were angry scenes at the October Plenum of the Party's Central Committee. A fierce argument broke out between Badrakh and Genden on the one hand and Dambadorj, Jadamba and Gelegsenge on the other.<sup>112</sup> It was only settled when Shmeral' took charge of the meeting. His speech is preserved in the Czech Communist Party archives and a part is available in a French translation.<sup>113</sup> Much of it was ✓ taken up with standard Comintern arguments for the supposed danger of Rightist policies. Shmeral' also stated:

✓ "During the past months the Executive Committee of the Comintern no longer doubted the existence of a Right faction in the MPRP and concluded that if the danger was not immediately eliminated it would bring about the collapse of the ruling power of the MONGOLIAN people, the rupture of links

with the Comintern and the distancing of the MPRP as far as breaking off relations with the USSR."114

This seems to confirm certain earlier impressions that the alleged rightist character of policies over the past two years was not clear. Shmeral' also said that as late as August when Dambadorj was in Moscow, ✓ the Comintern was unable to pinpoint just which leaders actually were Rightists.<sup>115</sup> From Shmeral's words it can be concluded that the Right Deviation has to be seen as an assessment of potential developments and tendencies rather than a description of political activities that had already occurred. This must be borne in mind when reading the statements of some historians who have later described this period of Mongolian history in a way that makes it appear that tendencies had become fact. If Dambadorj had been guilty of anything more than "tendencies" he may well have suffered the kind of retribution that Danzan had at the Third MPP Congress.

Even so the way that the Right was overthrown has much in common with the way Danzan was ousted. In both cases the Youth League was used to divide the Party and the Comintern and Youth Comintern representatives in both cases were largely responsible. ✓ That Amagaev played a similar role to that of Rinchino in 1923 and 1924 seems to be confirmed by another statement of Shmeral's at the October plenum of 1928:

"Certain comrades are of the opinion that former representatives of the Comintern have made errors and therefore our commission has been sent to clarify this question. The facts only show us that Comrade Amagaev had foreseen the existence of the Right in your Party."<sup>116</sup>

### The Seventh MPRP Congress

✓ The Right leadership of the MPRP was defeated by the alliance of the Left and the Comintern delegation at the Central Committee Plenum, but it still had to face the Seventh Party Congress. This met from 23 October to 10 December.<sup>117</sup> [Dambadorj] arrived in the green palanquin which had once belonged to the Bogd Khaan.<sup>118</sup> Around the assembly hall there was a cordon of secret police because shots had been fired through the windows shortly before.<sup>119</sup> Inside the building 192 elected representatives had gathered and there were 100 more who had consultative status.<sup>120</sup> Many of the latter were probably invited to attend by Shmeral'. Shmeral' continued to have discussions with all kinds of people and delegates made their criticisms openly.

There were 25 days of reports and discussions and the delegates asked more than 2000 questions.<sup>121</sup> Then one day an anonymous document was found on the congress executives' table. According to Choijil,<sup>122</sup> who was a delegate at the Seventh Congress this revealed a third faction in Mongolian politics which was led by Oros Gombo, the former employee of the embassy in Moscow, and Bayar of the Security Services.<sup>123</sup> The Diluv Khutagt also stated in his memoirs that Oros Gombo made a total of 62 accusations against Dambadorj at the Seventh MPRP Congress

and it is possible that they were contained in this document.<sup>124</sup> Dambadorj apparently defended himself successfully against all the charges<sup>125</sup> but it was too late to save his position as Party Chairman.

The Congress made extensive changes in economic policy<sup>126</sup> and ordered that a five-year plan be drawn up as had been done in the USSR. The socio-economic classes were redefined so that anyone owning more than 200 bod of livestock was regarded as rich. The new tax laws, implemented in 1927, were to be reformulated so that the rich would pay at even higher rates. Property was also to be confiscated from wealthy former princes and high churchmen and used to help the poor develop their own livestock economies or to take up new activities such as crop-raising. Severe restrictions on credit facilities were ordered, and customs tariffs, veterinary charges etc. were to be levied according to the ability to pay.

After the Congress Dambadorj and Jadamba were taken into custody for a brief period and the atmosphere in Ulaanbaatar was very unpleasant for Mongols and foreigners alike. This can be understood from the reaction of Dambadorj's wife. She sent a servant to the Walders to tell them of her husband's arrest and to ask for their help. She believed that unlike Mongols or Russians the Swiss could offer some assistance without coming to harm themselves. There was little the Walders could do, but they did take Dambadorj's camera and field glasses into safekeeping. These objects were discovered shortly

afterwards when the Walders' own home was searched. Then an army post was set up between the house and the brickworks, obviously to intimidate the foreigners. The soldiers erected a target on a nearby slope and anyone coming out of the house was directly in the firing line. When the family dog was shot Mrs. Walder lost her temper and frogmarched the offending officer to the brickworks. Her husband seized a gun and pointed him in the direction of the authorities. There and then Walder handed in his notice but it was two months before the family received permission to travel.<sup>127</sup>

### The Fifth Great Khural

The Fifth Great Khural was held between 14 December 1928 and 23 January 1929.<sup>128</sup> Many of the delegates of the Seventh Party Congress were present at the Great Khural<sup>129</sup> and their enthusiasm had not abated. They sat through three weeks of government reports, questions and answers when the principles and plans of the Seventh Party Congress became firm government policy. The resolutions were drawn up rapidly in the final three days.

There was extensive discussion on international affairs as they related to the MPR. Evidence of Japan's predatory intentions on Mongolia was presented<sup>130</sup> and there were also reports of incursions from the east in the summer of 1928 by Chinese and Barguts and of border disputes in the south and southwest.<sup>131</sup> The Khural declared it had no confidence in the Nanking government which maintained that the MPR was part of China.<sup>132</sup> Amar<sup>133</sup> who had succeeded Tserendorj as Prime Minister, emphatically denied Chinese accusations

of Red imperialism by the USSR in Mongolia.<sup>134</sup> The Great Khural readily reaffirmed its support for Mongol-Soviet friendship and the telegraph agreement between the USSR and the MPR was extended until 1931.<sup>135</sup>

The assembly followed the Party Congress in basing franchise and eligibility for public service on social class. Not to do so, it said, was a violation of the constitution.<sup>136</sup> A special commission was ordered to purge all government, trade and economic institutions of such "alien elements" as former princes and Manchu-trained officials, and White Russians were no longer welcome in the Mongolian public services. It was said that they caused friction with the Soviet advisers.<sup>137</sup> The Buriats were not similarly singled out as unwelcome but a number lost their position in the leadership for supporting the Right. A representative called Tsedenjav complained that many Buriats cared more about their wages than their work.<sup>138</sup> Tsedenjav was from Chandman' Uul aimag and that gives some further support to the notion that Dörvöd Mongols now entering national politics were perhaps seeking a means of making their mark in the MPR as the Buriats had done since 1921 and perhaps of replacing the Buriats altogether.

The Khural also discussed the economy. The Ministry of Economic Affairs was accused of not doing enough for the poor and middle ards, and of caring more about increasing income from trade than working for the good of the masses. There were complaints that the development of industry had been unsystematic.<sup>139</sup> At the Fifth Khural the MPR moved closer to establishing a state trading monopoly by ordering that a department of trade be set up to direct

national commercial activities. Suggestions that this should come under the authority of the Mongolian Central Cooperative were resisted, however, since it was felt that the Cooperative should be simply a trading organization and not a body regulating trade.<sup>140</sup> Cooperative associations of herdsmen and cropraisers were approved and the Khural was specially concerned that more land be opened up for growing grain.<sup>141</sup>

The Ministry of Finance was instructed to revise the livestock tax and to calculate tax on immoveable property<sup>142</sup> which would have considerable consequences for the monasteries. As regards the establishment of a national bank which the Fourth Great Khural had approved, it was reported that no action had been taken because there were insufficient funds available. The Fifth Khural was therefore asked to give directives to enable work to commence.<sup>143</sup>

The chief resolution on religious policy was the ban on the search for the Javzandamba Khutagt or any other reincarnation.<sup>144</sup> The Khural also ordered that lamas in monastic schools be taught to read and write in the Mongolian script, the intention being to break down further the influence of religion and Tibetan culture.<sup>145</sup> In the allocation of available school places the principle of class discrimination was to be applied and the cost of medicines based on ability to pay.

There were no reports from the aimags but there was a discussion on the minority peoples of the west, such as the Dörvöd, Zakhchin and Kazakh. It was agreed that not enough had been done for these people and reforms in local government and political education

were ordered.<sup>146</sup> The government's interest in this area was not merely benevolent. Torgut Mongols were still nomadizing back and forth across the Sinkiang border<sup>147</sup> and hereditary rulers had great influence. In other areas Kirgiz bandits from the USSR were rustling and harrasing the local population.<sup>148</sup>

### The Turn to the Left

The Seventh MPRP Congress and the Fifth Great Khural were not just a means of ousting one set of leaders and replacing them with a younger set. They did, in fact, mark a dramatic turning point in the history of the MPR. This began immediately in 1929 with a drastic purge and large numbers of people lost their voting rights and the opportunity to take part in public life. More stringent tax laws and confiscations were implemented to effect a transfer of wealth from those deemed to be rich in order to assist the ard poor. At the same time a state monopoly of foreign trade and the refusal to have relations with any state but the USSR and the TTPR effectively completed the process of aligning the Mongolian economy with that of the Soviet Union. The Chinese trader virtually disappeared from the Mongolian scene overnight.<sup>149</sup>

The Eighth Party Congress which met in April 1929 drew up a Five-Year plan of impossible proportions.<sup>150</sup> Meanwhile between 1929 and 1931 individuals and monasteries were relieved of herds and immoveable property in a series of confiscations just as the Russian kulaks had their land, animals and machinery taken from them. At the same time as in the USSR there were campaigns of enforced

collectivization and also many Mongolian ards were compelled to join the Party.<sup>151</sup> Unfortunately all this led to a great deal of confusion. Many people were either apathetic or showed resistance to being herded into advanced cooperative production units. They were quite unable to cope with the demands of this new lifestyle so that huge debts were run up in the first year.

The Party seemed totally blind to the implications of its actions. A number of show trials of the dispossessed took place, one of the most famous being that of the Diluv Khutagt.<sup>152</sup> The ards, for whose benefit the confiscations were carried out, were deeply offended at such treatment of a holy man. They were further antagonized by the severe anti-religious campaign which was conducted during these years. An Anti-Buddhist League similar to the Soviet "League of the Militant Godless" was formed.<sup>153</sup> Statues of the Buddha were desecrated, stupas were destroyed and young lamas were thrown out of their monasteries. It was all more than the population could stand. Ards churchmen and members of the old aristocracy joined forces and the country erupted into civil war. At least one rival government, known as Ochirbat's Yamen, was set up in the Khövsgöl region of the northwest.<sup>154</sup> Instead of producing more for the Soviet industries the whole of the MPR was in danger of being lost to the Soviet camp altogether. In 1932, Soviet troops descended on the country and pacified it with ruthless efficiency. The Mongolian leadership changed yet again and a "New Turn" policy was introduced.<sup>155</sup> The five-year plan was discarded and most of the collectives dismantled. The general verdict was that the Mongolian Party leaders had completely misunderstood the

Mongolian situation and pushed the revolution into a stage for which the country was not prepared. The Mongols themselves were held entirely responsible for what had happened and the Comintern accepted no responsibility whatsoever. That was laid at the door of a "Left Deviation."

CHAPTER EIGHTCONCLUSION

The first four years of the Mongolian People's Republic was a period of restructuring. All aspects of Mongolian life were affected to some extent but the most extensive changes concerned the political organization and the economic system. Mongolian society, on the other hand, remained relatively undisturbed with the Church retaining its position of privilege. The traditional framework of social relationships was to some extent maintained with many herdsmen still tending the livestock of former princes and of monasteries. This period from 1924 to 1928 was a transition from a native order which had been part of the Chinese world to a new structure that derived ultimately from a European political and economic model - the Soviet Union. That Mongol peoples with their society deep in central Asia and their profound beliefs in Tibetan Buddhism, should have embarked on such a transformation at all suggests either that their new leaders had undergone something akin to a religious experience or else that they were acting under some form of duress.

The underlying objective of the Khalkh Mongols in their revolutions in 1911 and 1921 was to achieve independence from China. Some leaders did cherish a desire for social reform especially in 1921, but this aim was definitely secondary to the struggle for

national independence. The successes of 1921 were possible only because the MPR which spearheaded the revolution had as an ally the Soviet government, which was prepared to give military assistance. The Soviet Russians were in control of a state which was itself undergoing cataclysmic changes and their leaders were filled with zeal and revolutionary ideals. Moreover they were struggling for the very survival of their state, their political system and their own ruling power in the face of worldwide hostility. This situation had a profound effect on their relationships with surrounding peoples, the Mongols included. It shaped Soviet policies towards the Mongols and especially the manner in which they encouraged the Mongols to consolidate independence from China. The new Mongolian government can be seen as being caught up in the aftermath of the Russian revolution and finding itself having to agree to the demands the Soviet Union placed upon it either directly or indirectly through the Comintern.

Outside observers at the time, and no doubt many Mongols who were excluded from the ruling circle, believed that the Mongolian government adopted Soviet-style policies not by choice but because they were compelled to do so. That is not entirely correct. When the MPP aligned itself with the international Communist movement, no doubt as a prerequisite for receiving Soviet aid in 1921, it could conceivably have drawn up a plan for its own political and economic development. In fact the kind of changes that the Party wished to see taking place in the new state were never clearly defined and neither were the processes and methods by which they should be

accomplished. Instead, the Party devoted its efforts, not unnaturally, to driving the Chinese and Ungern from Mongolian territory but remained vague about what should be done after victory was achieved. When Niislel Khüree was liberated in July 1921 the Party suddenly found itself faced with the day-to-day problems of running a state. The priorities were national defence, restoring the solvency of the government and establishing the legitimacy of Party rule. However, party membership was small, and there was little time for mulling over political theories and drawing up detailed manifestos. In this respect the MPP was in a different position from most other modern political parties which had many years of experience in opposition during which time they formulated their theories and their programmes and built up a network of politically conscious supporters. Because state power came to the MPP before it could establish its own identity and gain any insight into political planning and organization, it perhaps tended to ask few questions about the advice and instructions coming from the USSR and the Comintern and the motivation behind them.

Nevertheless there were tensions between the Mongols on the one hand and representatives of the Comintern and the Soviet Union on the other throughout the 1920s. These tensions were at the heart of the conflict between the Mongolian Party and the Youth League between 1921 and 1924 and led to the execution of Danzan during the Third MPRP Congress. The specific cause of the tension between the leaders of the MPRP and the Comintern in 1927 and 1928 was the clash of Mongolian and Soviet national interests or, to use the language of the Comintern, nationalism versus internationalism. How the

Comintern resolved these differences has been described in the previous chapter but the Mongols were finally brought to obedience by standard Comintern methods: through persuasion that its policies were "correct" and that to adopt any alternative model put the independence of the MPR in jeopardy; by the manipulation of individuals and groups associated with the Mongolian Party and manoeuvring them into opposing positions on the left and right; and finally by <sup>the</sup> open coercion of senior officials of the Comintern.

The fact that the Mongolian leadership was prepared, in the end, to submit to Comintern demands of absolute obedience shows that in spite of deep unease with some of the policies it was being told to implement it was not yet felt that the demands were so intolerable that the only response was outright refusal. There is little direct evidence of the Right having serious intentions of breaking off relations with the Comintern. Indeed the rumours of this which circulated at the time may well have been manipulated by the Comintern as a further ploy to warn party members of the potential dangers of ignoring advice. A number of possible reasons why the MPRP did not break away from the Comintern in 1928 can be suggested. The first is the existence of a growing body of opinion within the Party that was genuinely convinced by Comintern arguments, however shallow the political understanding of many people may have been. Secondly leaders may not have been prepared to put at stake the growing economic prosperity of the Mongolian state that owed much to the Bank and the trade and other agreements in force between the MPR and the USSR. Thirdly it should not be forgotten that men like Dambadorj and Jadamba had come to power having contributed, not

merely to the overthrow of Danzan and Bavaasan, but also to their execution. When it became apparent that Schmeral' and his team were not in the MPR to discover whether or not the Mongols' arguments about the unsuitability of Comintern policies were valid, but only to compel obedience, the leaders of the Right, remembering that Danzan and his supporters had been condemned for rightist opportunism, may have felt that a confession of error was preferable to a martyr's death.

A fourth reason for continuing the alliance with the Comintern and the USSR was the desire to protect Mongolian independence. In spite of the obviously subordinate nature of the relationship of the MPR with the USSR, the term "independence" still has validity when considered from a Mongolian point of view. The MPR was not colonized by the USSR, paid the Soviet government no taxes and was not directly governed by Russian officials. The 1921 friendship treaty guaranteed a separate structural existence of the two states and the Soviet Union did not attempt to absorb the MPR formally into the Soviet Union as it did Tannu Tuva. The USSR upheld its role of protector of Mongolian independence out of strategic considerations vis-à-vis China. Had it not been that the MPR was an important factor in Sino-Soviet relations it is possible that the USSR might have produced reasons for admitting the MPR into the Union. Such considerations were not so clear cut in the 1920s and Mongols may have felt it was unwise to abandon the guarantor of its independence when there was no other power to replace it. In Mongol eyes no leader of China could be trusted as an ally since none recognized that Mongols had a right to be separate from China. Japan was too far

away and whatever it was that Japanese officials suggested to Dambadorj when they met in the Mongolian embassy in the summer of 1928 it was clearly less attractive than the alignment they had with the Soviet Union. Moreover the Mongols were well aware of the Japanese occupation of Korea. Taken together these four factors provided sufficient reason for the MPRP to choose to remain within the international Communist movement for the time being, however distasteful it might be. Internationalism was chosen for reasons of nationalism.

For the Khalkh nation the overthrow of the so-called Right Deviation was both a beginning and an end. It was the end of most of the nationalist aspirations still surviving from the decade between 1911 and 1921 and Mongols were obliged to give up hopes of maintaining a religious dimension in public life. The centuries-long orientation of Mongol society towards China was over and the Mongolian government no longer exercised any independence in the pursuit of its foreign policy.

From this time the character and organization of Mongolian society went through radical changes. The Buddhist Church was systematically destroyed and Buddhist philosophy was eliminated from all aspects of Mongolian life. The livestock herding economy was largely disrupted. From a long term perspective the overthrow of the Right Deviation marks the beginning of state economic planning, not simply on a national scale but as part of a group of socialist nations with the USSR as Patriarch. It also looks forward to the present activity of the CMEA. For this reason the development

of the MPR from 1928 is a valid starting point for the study of the relations and workings of the present day Communist Bloc.

The experience of the Mongolian People's Republic is unique because it is strategically situated between two major powers, the Soviet Union and China and has had longstanding historical associations with the latter. However, the MPR may also be regarded as a development model for pre-industrial nomadic societies. The obvious comparisons that come to mind are the newly emerging states of black Africa. This kind of development is celebrated in the terminology of modern Mongolian and Soviet historians as bypassing capitalism. In western historical analysis the tendency to examine Mongolia only in terms of its relevance to Sino-Soviet relations and to categorize the MPR as a 16th republic of the USSR has led students to ignore the important example of the MPR as a development model.

Another area of potentially interesting comparative research would be an extended study of countries peripheral to China and traditionally under Chinese influence but which, in modern times have been drawn towards the USSR. Obvious examples are North Korea and Vietnam, both of which offer extremely interesting comparisons and contrasts. A further and slightly different subject for comparative study would be the experiences of the Mongolian and Tibetan peoples in modern times. Close political and religious relations existed between the two countries for over three centuries. Both experienced a growth of nationalist feeling in the early years of this century and both were courted by representatives of the governments of St. Petersburg and Moscow. However their paths of development have diverged radically since the 1920s, the MPR in association

with the USSR and Tibet with China. Study of the MPR In the period 1924 to 1928 offers not only insights into the life of a particular emerging central Asian state but also raises issues relevant to other states in Asia and the Third World facing similar developmental problems.

REFERENCESPREFACE

1. History of the MPR (1977).
2. Bawden (1968).
3. Rupen (1964) Pt. 1.
4. Murphy.
5. Ewing.
6. Yakovleva.
7. Rupen (1964) Pt. 2.
8. Khozyaistvo Mongolii. Ulaanbaatar: 1925-1931.
9. Novyi Vostok. Moscow: 1922-1930.
10. Zhizn' Buryatii Verkhneudinsk 1924-1929.
11. MakhNyn akhmad...
12. Diluv.
13. The old Mongolian script was cursory and alphabet.  
It was borrowed from the Uigur Turks in 1204 and is still used by Mongols living in China. In 1941 the MPR decided to introduce the Cyrillic script but it was not in full use until the 1950s.

CHAPTER 1INTRODUCTION 1OUTER MONGOLIA BEFORE 1921

1. C.R. Bawden (1968) 79-80.
2. For a description of the administrative system in Outer Mongolia during the Manchu period see: David M. Farquhar (1960).
3. Dashtseveg; 9 Pürevjav and Dashjamts 8.
4. C.R. Bawden (1968) 27-34.
5. Pürevjav and Dashjamts 30.
6. On the lives of the Javzandamba Khutagts see C.R. Bawden (1961); Pozdneyev 319-392.
7. Roerich, G. 135.
8. C.R. Bawden (1968) 33, 53-54.
9. Ibid 58.
10. On shav' nar see Pürevjav 100-111; Pürevjav and Dashjamts 30-32; Bawden (1968) 163-164.
11. Ewing (1977) 50-51.
12. Ewing (1977) 41-116; Ewing (1980) Between ... 23-43; Bawden (1968) 187-196.
13. Ewing (1977) 107-108; Ewing (1980) Between ... 37.
14. Khaisan was a Kharchin Mongol official from Inner Mongolia. He was involved in land disputes between Mongols and Chinese immigrants. He witnessed the massacres of many thousands of people in his own and neighbouring areas in 1891 during a Chinese uprising. In 1909 Ramstedt met him in Outer Mongolia trying to stir up the princes to demand independence from the Manchus. He went on to play an important role in the revolution of 1911. For further information see Hyer (1979) 97-98; Ramstedt 212-228; Nakami.
15. Jagchid 147.
16. Bawden (1968) 86.
17. On early Mongol-Russian relations see Rossabi.

18. Lattimore (1935) 38.
19. Cambridge History of China 10, 109-110.
20. Lattimore (1935) 205; Underdown (1981) 160.
21. Ewing (1977) 30; Underdown (1981) 158.
22. Lattimore (1935) 78-87; Heissig 77; Underdown (1981) 159.
23. Hsü 460-487; Cambridge History of China 11, 115-130.
24. Wright 18-19.
25. Cambridge History of China 11, 375-415.
26. Underdown (1979) 203-204; Rupen (1958) 256.
27. Gersenz was the youngest son of Dayan Khaan, the last khan of the Eastern Mongols. The majority of the Khalkh tribes were his inheritance and he nomadized with them into the territory of the present day MPR. The four khans of Outer Mongolia were his descendents. After his death the domain was divided among his seven sons.
28. Rinchino 70-71.
29. Geleta 67.
30. Puntsag.
31. Ewing (1977) 117.
32. Underdown (1979) 207-209.
33. Ibid 206-207; Ewing (1977) 117.
34. Ewing (1977) 135-137; Ewing (1980) Between ... 51-53.
35. Ramstedt 228.
36. Lattimore (1935) 55-56.
37. Hyer 99.
38. Ewing (1980) Between ... 119-122; Kallinikov (1926) Natsional' no. 35
39. Ewing (1977) 54-62; Ewing (1980) Between ... 26-32.
40. Ewing (1977) 189-206; Ewing (1980) Between ... 67-76.
41. Dallin 87-119 passim; Tang 61-67.
42. On the Mongol-Tibetan Treaty of 1913 see Ewing (1977) 129-130, 104; Mehra (1969).

43. Ewing (1977) 331-335.
44. Ewing (1977) 339-349; Ewing (1980) Between ... 136-140.
45. Ewing (1977) 350-371; Ewing (1980) Between ... 143-158.
46. Perry Ayscough and Otter-Barry 110.
47. Ibid.
48. Ibid 143.
49. History of the MPR (1976) 756 n.90.
50. Kallinkov (1928) U istukov Pt.1; Ewing (1977) 404-405; 404-405; Ewing (1980) Between ... 167-169; Isono (1976).
51. Ewing (1977) 398-404; Ewing (1980) Between ... 161-166; Isono (1976).
52. Ewing (1977) 414-416; Ewing (1980) Between ... 174-176.
53. Ewing (1977) 417; Ewing (1980) Between ... 176.
54. Ewing (1977) 417-419; Ewing (1980) Between ... 177-178; MakhNyn tovch ... 22-23; History of the MPR (1976) 66-74 passim.
55. Ewing (1977) 418; Ewing (1980) Between ... 176.
56. Ewing (1977) 419; Ewing (1980) Between ... 179.
57. Ewing (1977) 419-438; Ewing (1980) Between ... 179-193; History of the MPR (1976) 74-83; Bawden (1968) 210-216.
58. Ewing (1977) 427-429; Ewing (1980) Between ... 194-201.
59. Ewing (1977) 432; Ewing (1980) Between ... 199-201.
60. Ewing (1977) 460-470; Ewing (1980) Between ... 232-238.
61. Ewing (1977) 466-470; Ewing (1980) Between ... 199-201.
62. Ewing (1977) 525-531; Ewing (1980) Between ... 232-238.
63. For biographical information on Sükhbaatar see Bat-ochir and Dashjamts; D. Sükhbaatar ...; Gongor and Dolgorsuren; Ewing (1977) 407-408; Ewing (1980) Between ... 169-170.
64. For a text of the Proclamation see MakhNyn tüükhend ... 3)-33; for the Ten Aspirations see Ibid 33-36.
65. Ewing (1977) 527; Ewing (1980) Between ... 234.
66. Ewing (1977) 528; Ewing (1980) Between ... 234-235.
67. Ewing (1977) 529; Ewing (1980) Between ... 235-236.

68. Ewing (1977) 569.
69. Ewing (1977) 531; Ewing (1980) *Between ...* 238; *History of the MPR* (1976) 112-113.
70. Ewing (1977) 532-537; Ewing (1980) *Between ...* 238-243; *History of the MPR* (1976) 118-121.
71. Ewing (1977) 557; Ewing (1980) *Between ...* 255; *History of the MPR* (1976) 152-154.
72. *History of the MPR* (1973) 300.

## CHAPTER 2

### INTRODUCTION 2

#### THE STRUGGLE FOR LEGITIMACY: 1921-1923

1. For the text of the Mongolian government's request 10 September 1921 see *Mongol-Zövlöltiin Khariltsaa* 66-67 (in Mongolian); *Sovetsko-Mongol'skie otnosheniya* 43-44, also in *Revolyutsionnye meropriyatiya ...* 185-186 (in Russian); Eudin and North 204-205 (in English); see also *History of the MPR* (1976) 165. For the text of the Russians' reply 14 September 1921 see *Mongol-Zövlöltiin khariltsaa* 67-68 (in Mongolian); *Sovetsko-Mongol'skie otnosheniya* 44-55, also in *Revolyutsionnye meropriyatiya ...* 186-187 (in Russian); Eudin and North 205-206 (in English); see also *History of the MPR* (1976) 165.
2. For a detailed account of the negotiations between the USSR and China see Pollard *passim.*; Whiting 155-235.
3. For the text of this declaration in Mongolian see *Mongol-Zövlöltiin Khariltsaa* 69-70; in Russian, *Sovetsko-Mongol'skie otnosheniya* 46-47, also in *Revolyutsionnye meropriyatiya ...* 135-137.
4. *Revolyutsionnye meropriyatiya ...* 137-138.
5. For a text of the treaty in Mongolian see *Mongol-Zövlöltiin khariltsaa* 82-83; in Russian see *Sovetsko-Mongol'skie otnosheniya* 58-61; *Revolyutsionniye meropriyatiya ...* 187-190. For an account of the negotiations and treaty see *History of the MPR* (1976) 161-163; Berlin 131-135, Eudin and North 126-127.
6. Kapitsa and Ivanenko 57.

7. History of the MPR (1976) 164.
8. Mongol-Zövlöltiin khariltsaa 81-82; Sovetsko-Mongol'skie otnosheniya 56-57; Kapitsa and Ivanenko 43-44; Berlin 135-136; History of the MPR (1976) 161-163; Eudin and North 206-207.
9. Mongol-Zövlöltiin khariltsaa 57; Sovetsko-Mongol'skie otnosheniya 81-82.
10. Tserendorj Khuv'sgalt Zaluuchuudyn Evlel 1926 no. 4 and Shumyatskii Vostochno Sibirskaya Pravda 1931, 30 June, quoted in History of the MPR (1976) 162. B.Z. Shumyatskii had responsibility for Siberia and Mongolia in the Soviet Commissariat of Foreign Affairs in 1921.
11. Pozdneyev 366-368; Hyer 99.
12. Ewing (1977) 331.
13. For a text of the Oath-taking Treaty in Mongolian see MakhNyn tüükhend ... 114-115; in Russian, Revolyutsionniye meropriyatiya ... 31-38. See also History of the MPR (1976) 171-172.
14. MakhNyn tüükhend ... 115.
15. History of the MPR (1976) 167; Shirendyb (1963) 365.
16. Losol (1890-1939) was a lama of humble origins who served as a chaplain to the Bogd's forces in Inner Mongolia in 1913. He wrote a history of the revolution with Kh. Choibalsan and D. Demid (see Bibliography under Choibalsan). Ewing (1977) 403, 442.
17. Ewing (1977) 569-570.
18. Ewing (1977) 569.
19. For biographical information on Rinchino see Rupen (1959) passim; Eudin and North 202; Ewing 455.
20. Diluv 122.
21. For biographical information on Chagdajav see Diluv 258; Ewing (1977) 402.
22. For biographical information on L. Magsarjav see History of the MPR (1976) 742 note 13.
23. Diluv 97.
24. For biographical information on Puntsagdorj see History of the MPR (1976) 758 note 109; Diluv 255.

25. For biographical information on B. Tserendorj see Shirendev (1965); BNMAUyn ankhdujaar ... 321 note 16.
26. Revoluyutsionnye meropriyatiya ... 27-30.
27. This is the date given in BNMA Uyn ankhdujaar ... 322 note 17. Earlier publications give it as 26 October ((History of the MPR (1976) 168)) and 27 October ((Kallinkov (1925) 77)).
28. beis: a Manchu title for a prince of the fourth rank.
29. Uria no. 8 quoted in BNMAUyn ankhdujaar ... 322 note 17.
30. Revoluyutsionnye meropriyatiya ... 27-30.
31. BNMAUyn ankhdujaar ... 322 note 17.
32. Kallinikov (1925) 77.
33. History of the MPR (1976) 170.
34. Revoluyutsionnye meropriyatiya ... 94-118 passim.
35. Ibid 98-99.
36. History of the MPR (1976) 170.
37. Revoluyutsionnye meropriyatiya ... 57.
38. Sanjdorj (1969); Revoluyutsionnye meropriyatiya ... 20-22.
39. Chetvertyi s'ezd ... 31.
40. History of the MPR (1976) 168; Shirendyb (1963) 369.
41. Amagaev (1924) no. 2, 8.
42. History of the MPR (1976) 192, 789 note 195.
43. For further information on the Tsetsen Khan see below p. Dashtseveg 98.
44. For biographical information on Khatanbaatar Magsarjav (not to be confused with L. Magsarjav, Minister of Justice) see Shirendyb (1980); Onon (1976) 105-142.
45. On the Saj Lama's plot see Bat-ochir and Dashjamts 119; Khangaalakhynkhan 22-23; Navaannamjil 257; Purevjav and Dashjamts 62; Revoluyutsionnye meropriyatiya ... 129.
46. History of the MPR (1976) 167, 790 notes 201, 202; Byambajav 28-29; Kallinikov (1926) Natsional' no- ... 92-93.
47. MANyn guravdujaar ... 163-164, 263.

48. Navaannamjil 258.
49. Choibalsan, Losol and Demid, quoted in Ewing (1977) 300.
50. Dalin 25.
51. Navaannamjil 257.
52. Batochir and Dashjamts 122.
53. Navaannamjil 258.
54. Ibid 122-123.
55. Baradin (1924) Poezdka ... Pt. 2,20.
56. Navaannamjil 258.
57. Diluv passim; Dashtseveg 15-16; Lattimore (1955) 132, 161; Bawden (1968) passim; History of the MPR (1976) 191-192.
58. Ewing (1977) 428; Ewing (1980) 183-184.
59. Diluv 123-124.
60. Khamgaalakhynkhan 4.
61. For biographical material on the Ja Lama see Lattimore (1955) 56-61; History of the MPR (1976) 796 note 43; Rupen (1979) 32-33; Diluv Khutagt 241.
62. The Kalmucks are Oirat Mongols whose forebears migrated to the Lower Volga about 300 years ago.
63. Revolyutsionnye meropriyatiya ... 130-133. Gongor and Dolgorsuren 47-49; Diluv 126-127.
64. History of the MPR (1976) 191.
65. Khamgaalakhynkhan 4.
66. Ibid 5.
67. Ibid 4, 6-8.
68. Ibid 7.
69. Revolyutsionnye meropriyatiya ... 126-130.
70. History of the MPR (1976) 191.
71. History of the MPR (1976) 796 note 45.
72. Diluv 122.
73. Stanton, US Consul in Kalgan 1924, quoted in Rupen (1979) 32; Ma 113.

74. History of the MPR (1976) 192, 798 notes 53 and 56; Diluv 127. Shirendyb 104-105.
75. D. Sükhbaatar ... 23-24.
76. History of the MPR (1976) 111.
77. MKhZiin ankhdugaar ... 57.
78. Ibid 7-29; Kallinikov (1926) Natsionnal'no ... 93-94; Dalin 35-38; Byambajav 35-37.
79. Dalin 40; Kallinikov (1926) Natsionnal'no ... 96.
80. MANyn guravdugaar ... 42.
81. MANyn khoyordugaar ... 18.
82. Zlatkin (1950) 148.
83. MANyn khoyordugaar ...
84. MAKhNyn tüükhend ... 59-67; History of the MPR (1976) 188-189; MANyn guravdugaar ... 42, 110, 112, 122; Mongolia yesterday ... 25, 54, 57, 61.
85. MANyn khoyordugaar ... 12-13; 156-158.
86. Ibid 15.
87. Kallinikov (1926) Natsional'no ... 96.
88. Byambajav 59.
89. Damdinsuren (1969) 12.
90. MANyn khoyordugaar ... 45-48.
91. Ibid 133-140; also in MAKhNyn tüükend ... 94-101.
92. Meshcheryakov 47.
93. MANyn khoyordugaar ... 38, 127-128; MAKhNyn tüükhend ... 61.
94. Ibid 59; MANyn khoyordugaar ... 26.
95. MANyn guravdugaar ... 42.
96. MANyn khoyordugaar ... 143-145.
97. Ibid 142-143.
98. MANyn guravdugaar ... 259; Spal'vin.
99. Ibid 127-128.
100. Kallinikov (1926) Natsionnal'no ... 96-97.

CHAPTER THREE1924 MONGOLIA BECOMES A REPUBLIC

1. Baradin (1924) Poezdka ... Pt. 2, 22, 24.
2. The Bogd Khaan was born in Tibet in 1870, the son of an official in the service of the Dalai Lama. He was early recognized to be the 8th incarnation of the Javzandamba Khutagt and came to Mongolia with his family as a young child.
3. Shirendyb (1956) 114.
4. Baradin (1924) Poezdka ... Pt. 2, 24.
5. Ekh means mother; Dagina was a female Buddhist deity.
6. Geleta 193.
7. Shirendyb (1956) 114.
8. Revolyutsionnye meropriyatiya ... 80-81; Shirendyb (1963) 436-437; History of the MPR (1976) 199-200.
9. Shirendyb (1963) 437; Shirendyb (1956) 116.
10. Ewing (1977) 428; Ewing (1980) 183-184.
11. BNMAUyn ankhdugaar ... 35.
12. Dalin 44.
13. Mongolia yesterday ... 19. This comment is missing from the Mongolian version of Gombojav's speech.
14. BNMAUyn ankhdugaar ... 35.
15. Carr (1976) Foundations ... 122-124.
16. MANyn guravdugaar ... 259.
17. For biographical information on Buyannemekh see Buyannemekh 5-10.
18. MAKhNyn akhmad ... 271-275.
19. Sudevdonoi had replaced D. Natsagdorj on the Central Committee when the latter asked permission to attend the University in Petrograd. MANyn khoyordugaar ... 146.
20. MAKhNyn akhmad ... 272-273.
21. History of the MPR (1976) 194.
22. Ibid 5.

23. MANyn guravdugaar ...
24. Sanders 84-87.
25. Mongolia yesterday ...
26. MAKhNyn akhmad ... 71-74; 241-247.
27. Bavaasan was Deputy Chairman of the Provisional Little Khural in 1921.
28. MANyn guravdugaar ... 25-26.
29. Mongolia yesterday ... 55.
30. Tang 381.
31. Ibid 382.
32. Mongolia yesterday ... 17.
33. Ibid 20.
34. Amagaev (1924) 6.
35. Natsov (1926) described the years 1921-1925 as a period of "Mongolofilism" in Tannu Tuva.
36. Mongolia yesterday ... 38. This is omitted from the Mongolian documents.
37. Ibid 18.
38. Ibid 21-24; MANyn guravdugaar ... 27-30.
39. Ibid 58-59; Mongolia yesterday ... 32.
40. D. Sükhbaatar ... 260. Sükhbaatar was a member of Danzan's East Urga group.
41. Bawden (1968) 280.
42. MANyn guravdugaar ... 169.
43. D. Sükhbaatar ... 265-266.
44. MANyn guravdugaar ... 13; Mongolia yesterday ... 17.
45. Ibid 29-30; MANyn guravdugaar ... 45-49.
46. Mongolia yesterday .... 28.
47. Ibid 33.
48. MANyn guravdugaar ... 59.

49. Ibid 169.
50. Ibid 173.
51. Ibid 110-112; Mongolia yesterday ... 48-49.
52. Ibid 48.
53. Ibid.
54. Ibid 49.
55. MANyn guravdugaar ... 156.
56. Ibid 157-159.
57. Ibid 157.
58. Ibid 156.
59. Ibid 161; MAKhNyn akhmad ... 71-72.
60. MANyn guravdugaar ... 161-162.
61. See Chapter 2 passim.
62. Kallinikov (1926) Natsional'no...79.
63. MAKhNyn akhmad ... 205.
64. MANyn guravdugaar ... 163-164.
65. Ibid 164-172.
66. Ibid 166.
67. Ibid 168. Dalai-Kho was a Chinese trading and transport company. It was still operating in the MPR In 1926 as advertisements in Khozuyaistvo Mongolii show.
68. MANyn guravdugaar ... 167.
69. Ibid 170. Ta Shen Kuei was still operating in the MPR in 1926 and advertising in Khozuyaistvo Mongolii.
70. MANyn guravdugaar ... 170.
71. Ibid 174.
72. MAKhNyn akhmad 74.
73. Ibid 72.
74. Ibid.
75. Ibid 73.
76. MANyn guravdugaar ... 171.

77. Ibid 173.
78. Ibid.
79. Ibid 175.
80. Ibid 180.
81. Ibid 190; MAKhNyn akhmad ... 245.
82. MANyn guravdugaar ... 209-210. For a slightly edited Russian version see Revolyutsionnye meropriyatiya ... 133-135.
83. As note 82. There is no further information available on Tseren.
84. MANyn guravdugaar.
85. Ibid 174.
86. Ibid 215; Mongolia yesterday ... 69.
87. BNMAUyn ankhdugaar ... 304-307.
88. MAKhNyn akhmad ... 267.
89. MANyn guravdugaar ... 256,264.
90. Strong 380; MAKhNyn akhmad ... 281.
91. Kallinikov (1926). Nasionnal'no ... 98-99; Byambajav 65-66.
92. Sanjdorj (1974) 141.
93. Ibid.
94. Eudin and North
95. Sanjdorj (1974) 146.
96. Deel: a Mongolian traditional gown worn by men and women.
97. MAKhNyn akhmad ... 27-28; Sanjdorj (1974) 142.
98. For a list of delegates see BNMAUyn ankhdugaar ... 304-307.
99. Shirendyb (1956) 129.
100. Ö. Badrakh explained to the Third Party Congress on behalf of the Youth League the reasons for the arrest of Bavaasan. He was elected to the Central Committee in 1924 and remained a member until 1932.

101. The Dörvöd were a group of Western or Oirat Mongols who lived in the Khovd region of the MPR. At this time they had a strong desire to be separate from the MPR.
102. BNMAUyn ankhdugaar ... 15-32.
103. Ryskulov.
104. O. Jam'yan (1864-1930) was a pre-revolutionary official, teacher of Sukhbaatar, member of the Consular Hill Group and in the 1920s he headed the National Library.
105. A text of the 1918 RSFSR may be found in Triska 2-16.
106. Friters.
107. BNMAUyn akhdugaar ... 258-267. For a text of the constitution in Mongolian see Ibid 297-302 or MAKhNyn tüükhend ... 125-128; in Russian, see Revolyuetsionnye meropriyatiya ... 191-200; in English, see China Year book Triska 292-299.
108. The Soyombo script was created in 1686 by the First Javzandamba Khutagt, Zanabazar. The name Soyombo comes from Sanskrit and means "self-generated". The Soyombo symbol is made up of letters of this script with a moon and star at the top, and a lotus at the base and came to be regarded as a symbol of national independence and sovereignty. It still appears on the flag of the MPR. Mongolia (1980) no. 5, 27; MAKhNyn akhmad ...
109. BNMAUyn ankhdugaar ... 265.
110. Ibid 279-280, 362 notes 131, 132.

#### CHAPTER 4

#### BUILDING THE REPUBLIC

#### PARTY & GOVERNMENT ORGANIZATION

1. Shirendyb (1954) 28. The quotation is a translation of a Russian translation of the originally Mongolian documents. Russian translations of such documents often reflect the style of the original and may seem strange to those familiar with standard Russian. I have attempted to translate such documents accurately into English but not to alter the style to any great extent.
2. D.M. (1926)K voprosu 105; Zlatkin (1950) 180. Strong 385. Dambadorj told Strong that a man with less than 50 bod was poor because "He has nothing else at all, neither bread nor any farm products. The increase from these cattle will certainly not feed his family for a year. And if they eat the animals before they have time to reproduce, they will have nothing..."

3. MAKhNyn akhmad ... 175.
4. Khoshuu tuslagch - the most senior administrator of the pre-revolutionary khoshuu government.
5. Zakhiragch - the khoshuu administrator immediately below the tuslagch. (See 4. above).
6. MAKhNyn akhmad ... 287.
7. Kallinikov (1926) Plenum ... 114.
8. For the resolutions of the Plenum see MAKhNyn tүүkhend ... 129-135.
9. Shoizhelov (1925) Perelomnyi ... 211. Natsov sometimes wrote under the penname Shoizhelov.
10. A text of the Party Programme of 1925 appears in MAKhNyn ikh бага ... 93-120; a shortened text omitting sections 1 and 2 is in MAKhNyn tүүkhend ... 148-156.
11. MAKhNyn ikh бага ... 110.
12. In 1927 Rinchino published an article justifying Pan-Mongolism in terms similar to Paragraph 39 of the Party Programme. See Rinchino.
13. Shoizhelov (1925) Perelomnyi ... 208.
14. Ibid.
15. For a biography of Amagaev, or Amuga as he was known in the MPR see Egunov.
16. Rupen (1959) 388 states that Rinchino was "de facto dictator in Outer Mongolia" until 1928 or 1929. Contemporary documents show that to be incorrect.
17. There is a shortened Russian version of the documents of the Fourth MPRP Congress. See Chetvertyi s'ezd... The Mongolian records have been published recently in the MPR but have not been available outside the country. For resolutions of the Fourth MPRP Congress see MAKhNyn tүүkhend ... 135-147.
18. Chetvertyi s'ezd ... 47.
19. Ibid 5.
20. Before this Mongolyn Ünen (Mongolian Truth) was published in Irkutsk by the Comintern on behalf of the MPP. See Zayatuev.
21. MANyn guravdugaar ... 37; Mongolia yesterday ... 25.
22. Navaannamjil 265.

23. The predecessor of Mongolyn Khuv'sgalt Zaluuchuudyn Evlel was Manai Zam (Our Road) first published in 1922.
24. Büsgüichüüdiin Sanal changed its name in 1926 to Emegteichüüdiin Sanal which has the same meaning.
25. For further information on the Mongolian press see History of the MPR (1976) 380-381; Zayatuev; Batchuluun.
26. Ibid 28.
27. B. Ishdorj was a journalist on Mongolyn Ünen, a teacher. He headed the Ministry of Economic Affairs delegation in Germany from 1925-1929. See Wolff (1945) and (1946) passim; Mongolia Today
28. Ibid 3.
29. MAKhNyn tovch ... 106.
30. Sanjdorj (1974) 208.
31. Ma 115-117.
32. The property of the Bogd Khaan was dispersed by the Second Great Khural in November 1925. One third of it was to be used for educational purposes.
33. MAKhNyn akhmad ... 264-265.
34. KUTV is an abbreviation of the institute's Russian title Kommunisticheskii Universitet Trudyashchikhsia Vostoka.
35. Eudin and North 85-86.
36. MAKhNyn akhmad ... 125.
37. Ibid 124.
38. History of the MPR (1976) 217.
39. MAKhNyn tüükhend ... 135-147 (4th); 164-177 (5th); 180-190 (6th). See also MAKhNyn ikh бага ... 133-150 (4th); 157-171 (5th); 175-187 (6th).
40. Chetvertyi s'ezd.
41. Kallinikov (1926) Pyatyi s'ezd.
42. Natsov (1928) VI S'ezd; Dugardzhap.
43. Erdene-Ochir (1929) Povorotnyi ... ; Mosina.
44. Amagaev (1924) pt. 1, 7-8.

45. "Margaashism" is derived from the Mongolian margaash meaning "tomorrow".
46. Chetvertyi s'ezd ... 29-30.
47. Ibid 68-69.
48. Ibid 40-42; MAKhNyn tüükhend ... 140-141.
49. Chetvertyi s'ezd ... 27.
50. MAKhNyn tovch ... 110.
51. Ibid 111, Kallinikov (1926) Pyatyi s'ezd ... 97.
52. Badzaron and Kallinikov 124; MAKhNyn tovch ... 112; Byambajav 88.
53. Kallinikov (1926) Itogi ... 144.
54. Ibid.
55. Kallinikov (1926) Pyatyi s'ezd ... 90.
56. Ibid 98.
57. Natsov (1928) VI S'ezd ... 324.
58. Ibid 323.
59. Byambajav 88.
60. Ibid 67,69; Badzaron and Kallinikov 124.
61. Natsagdorj 12. Natsagdorj composed the Pioneers' Song in 1925. Ibid 29.
62. Byambajav 69.
63. For examples of early modern plays see Buyannenekh; Natsagdorj. See also Gerasimovich 36-39.
64. Byambajav 75-76. Sen Katayama published an account of the MPR at the time of his visit. See Sen-Katayama.
65. BNMAUyn ankhdujaar ... 320 note 13.
66. Batchuluun 34. The five women were D. Khasnavch, a primary school teacher, Badamtseren, D. Pagmadulam, wife of the poet D. Natsagdorj, Kobune Rinchino, probably the wife of Elbegdorj Rinchino, S. Badamjav, wife of Ts. Jamtsrano. Since Badamjav's name appears as a signatory to the documents of the First Party Congress in 1921 she could perhaps be regarded as the first female party member.

67. MAKhNyn tovch ... 112.
68. Kallinikov (1926) Natsionnal'no ... 102.
69. MAKhNyn akhmad ... 192-193.
70. Mongolia yesterday ... 37.
71. Ibid 69; MAKhNyn guravdugaar ... 215.
72. Chetvertyi s'ezd ... 100.
73. Kallinikov (1926) Pyatyi s'ezd ... 105.
74. Batchuluun 35.
75. Ibid 49-50.
76. Kallinikov (1926) Itogi ... 142.
77. Batchuluun 51.
78. Ibid.
79. Ibid.
80. Strong 382.
81. Batchuluun 47.
82. Ibid 56-62. Yanjinsüren and Tsoodol took part in the Fourth Party Congress and Yanjinsüren may have been the wife of O. Jam'yan, Sukhbaatar's teacher.
83. MAKhNyn tüükhend ... 149.
84. BNMAUyn ankhdugaar ... 299-300.
85. BNMAUyn ikh бага ... 38-55; Amagaev (1925) Vtoroi Velikii ...
86. BNMAUyn ikh бага ... 56-68; Kallinikov (1926) Tretii ...
87. BNMAUyn ikh бага ... 69-81.
88. BNMAUyn ankhdugaar ...
89. Ibid. One was Dautbai, a Kazakh from the west and the other Avirmed a Youth League from Dariganga. At 31 he was technically too old to be in the League but that rule was not strictly enforced at this time and probably less so in areas where there was no Party organisation.
90. BNMAUyn ankhdugaar ... 305. There is remarkably little biographical information on P. Genden considering his important position.

91. Brown and Onon suggest he was Sodnomyn Damdinsüren who attended the Khiagt Congress. See History of the MPR (1976) 237, 766 note 56. However there were several men called Damdinsüren who were active at this time and there is some confusion in the index to op. cit. about which one filled which post.
92. Sanjdorj (1974); History of the MPR (1976) 219.
93. Ibid 237.
94. Dashtseveg 98. The source states that he was given the rank of ded khamba (deputy abbot) and was ridiculed in the press in 1926.
95. Names of ministers are very often not mentioned in the early sources. This information has mostly been gleaned from the biographical notes at the end of MANyn guravdugaar ... Ma 103 lists ministers in early 1927.
96. Ryazanovskii.
97. Vsesvyatskii 90-91.
98. Klopov 42.
99. MANyn guravdugaar ... 209-210.
100. Chetvertyi s'ezd 86.
101. Sangidanzan 11.
102. Klopov 43.
103. Sangidanzan 12.
104. Ibid 13.
105. Ibid 14-15, 18.
106. Ibid 19-20.
107. Ibid 16.
108. Ibid 15. Eleven of the centres are named.
109. Ibid 20.
110. Sanjdorj (1969) 233.
111. D.M. (1926) Mestnye financy ... 101.
112. Ibid.
113. Natsov (1926) Mongol'skaya ... 101.

114. Revolyutsionnye meropriyatiya ... 61-73.
115. BNMAUyn ankhdujaar ... 365 note 139; Sanjdorj (1974) 196; Purevjav and Dashjamts ... 24; Dashtseveg 91.
116. Kallinikov (1926) Pyataya sessiya 153.
117. Pürevjav and Dashjamt 24-25.
118. History of the MPR (1974) 230; BNMAUyn ankhdujaar ... 352 note 109.
119. D.M. (1926) Mestnye financy ... 104-106.
120. For a description of this tax see Chapter Five.
121. Chetvertyi s'ezd 85.
122. Ibid.
123. Ibid.
124. Sanjdorj (1974) 165-166.
125. History of the MPR (1976) 226-227.
126. BNMAUyn ankhdujaar 328 note 32.
127. D.M. Mestnye financy ... 112.
128. History of the MPR (1976) 224.
129. Ibid 215.
130. D.M. Mestnye financy 110-111. BNMAUyn ikh бага ... 60.
131. BNMAUyn ikh бага ... 73.
132. Kallinikov (1926) Pyatyi s'ezd.
133. Strong 384.
134. Maiskii 106.
135. BNMAUyn ankhdujaar ... 349 note 96.
136. Dүgersüren 96.
137. Ibid 921.
138. Ibid 25-26.
139. Ibid 23-24.
140. Roerich G. 134.

141. Ibid 134-142.
142. Ibid 141.
143. Dügersüren 15.
144. B samoupravlenie ... 115-116.
145. Dügersüren 14. It is not clear whether these Russians were Bolsheviks or White Russians and whether they cared for Mongolian children or only Russians.
146. Ibid 60. Fire was a constant hazard and accounted for the majority of insurance claims. Insurance was available through the Bank. See Chapter Five.
147. Roerich, G. 140.
148. Natsov (1928) VI S'ezd 324.
149. Ibid.
150. Ibid.

#### CHAPTER FIVE

#### THE MONGOLIAN ECONOMY IN THE 1920s

1. Bawden (1968) 147.
2. Maiskii 13-14.
3. Amuga (1926) K voprosu ... 12-16; Egunov 30.
4. Shirendyb (1956) 97-98.
5. Sanjdorj (1974) 181-182.
6. Ibid.
7. Egunov 48-71 passim.
8. Ibid 75.
9. BNMAUyn ankhdugaar ... 275-276.

10. Egunov 77, 83.
11. Ibid.
12. Ibid 39.
13. Kapitsa and Ivanenko 43-44.
14. Ibid.
15. On the Mongolian Mutual Aid Cooperative see p. 133-136.
16. Zlatkin (1950) 144.
17. BNMAUyn ankhdugaar ... 146 note                      Zlatkin (1957) 186;  
Zlatkin (1950) 144.
18. BNMAUyn ankhdugaar ... 146-147. The same total is quoted  
in MANyn guravdugaar ... 120 and Chetvertyi s'ezd ... 80.  
However itemized sums only add up to 2,200,000 lan.
19. BNMAUyn akhdugaar ... 345 note 86.
20. Tugarinov (1926) 77.
21. Zlatkin (1950) 145-146.
22. The Mongolian army of 1921 had been given some equipment by  
the Soviet government and captured some from defeated Chinese.
23. Zlatkin (1950) 146.
24. Tugarinov (1926) 77.
25. The lan was equivalent to 1.42 MD.
26. Tugarinov (1926) 77.
27. BNMAUyn ikh бага ... 40-41; Postanovlenie Vtoroi ...
28. The census covered the four aimags and the Ikh Shav'  
and excluded the Khovd region. The results cannot be  
regarded as completely accurate because standard forms  
were not used and owners of large herds tried to hide some  
of their stock or transfer it nominally to others. See  
Shortakovich (1926) Uchet ... ; Shostakovich (1926) Skot  
Mongolii ... ; DM (1926) K voprosy ...
29. Ma 126-127.
30. Amagaev (1926) k voprosu ... 13-16.

31. Minis 127-128.
32. BNMAUyn ikh бага ... 41-42; Polozheniya o mestnykh ...
33. Minis 131; D.M. (1926) Mestye financy ... 107.
34. Ibid 108.
35. Ibid.
36. Murphy 114.
37. On Chinese money-lending see Sanjdorj (1980) passim.  
on monastic lending see Pürevjav 87-100.
38. On pre-revolutionary banks see Perry-Ayscough and Otter-Barry 123.
39. Buyantogtokh 38.
40. Khozyaistvo Mongolii 1926, Nov, advertisement.
41. Buyantogtokh 39.
42. Gavrilov (1926) Dvukhletie ... 66.
43. Ibid.
44. Rostsishevskii (1926) Gostrakh ...  
Rostsishevskii (1926) Operatsii ...
45. Gavrilov (1926) Dvukheltie ... 65-66.
46. Ibid 66.
47. Dugarzhap 78-79; MAKhNyn tүүkhend ... 183.
48. History of the MPR (1976) 221; Buyantogtokh 38;  
BNMAUls khöröngötnii ... 280-281.
49. History of the MPR (1976) 220; Zolotarev (1926) 1924-1926. 130.
50. Ibid.
51. Buyantogtokh 38.
52. Mikhel'man (1926) Denezhnaya ... 9-10.
53. Pürevjav 86.
54. For information on the circulation of the Mexican dollar in  
the Far East see White 270-271.
55. Nikitine 28. The author states that this was discussed in  
Bolshevik economic journals but cites no references.

56. Carr (1968) Socialism ... 843.
57. North China Herald 23 November 1923. See also Cleinow who states that large quantities of silver were taken from monasteries and other private sources to Leningrad to be made into coins. It is doubtful whether monastic silver was used for this purpose at this time.
58. DM (1926) Torgovyi balans ... 61.
59. Mikhel'man (1926) Denezhnaya ... 11. For a text of the regulations for issuing banknotes see Kann 1008-1010 (in English); Pravitel'stvo Mongol'skoi ... (in Russian).
60. N.E. (1926) no. 2, 118; D.M. (1926) Denezhnaya ... 13.
61. History of the MPR (1976) 220.
62. D.M. (1926) Denezhnaya ... 14-15.
63. History of the MPR (1976) 221.
64. Zolotarev (1926) 1924-1926, 131.
65. Pravitel'stvo Mongol'skoi ... 136; Kann 1010.
66. History of the MPR (1976) 220. For photographs of early Mongolian banknotes see Kann opposite pages 1008 and 1009.
67. N.E. (1926) no. 2, 119.
68. Khod denezhnoi ... 124-125.
69. L.G.
70. Buyan togtokh 38.
71. Toktokho 45-46.
72. Mikhel'man (1926) Denezhnaya ... 11.
73. BNMAU khorongotini ... 280-281. D.M. Sh. 64.
74. Volkov (1926) Sherstyany ... 14.
75. Revolyutsionnye meropriyatiya ... 144-146.
76. Shirendyb (1956) 97; BNMAUyn ankhdugaar ... 355 notes 117, 118; Meshcheryakov 47.
77. Ibid.
78. Ibid.
79. Mongolia yesterday ... 65; Chetvertyi s'ezd ... 66, 68.
80. BNMAUyn ankhdugaar ... 236; Meshcheryakov 48.

81. BNMAUyn akhhdugaar ... 355 note 117.
82. Istoriya Sovetsko 78. There is no available published text of this agreement.
83. Amagaev (1924) Zhizn' Buryatii no.4-5, 6; Istoriye Sovetsko ... 78; History of the MPR (1976) 246, 811 note 74; Nikiforov (1926) Itogi ... passim. Tsentro soyuz was active in Mongolia, especially in the west, from 1919 as a trading organization. Its employees suffered badly at the hands of Ungern's forces. When it resumed activity in 1923 it was mainly as a procurement agency for the Siberian industries.
84. Sherst' was a Soviet wool procurement agency.
85. Dal'gostorg was the Far Eastern state trading organization.
86. Torgpredstvo was the trading office of the Soviet government.
87. Sibgostorg was the Soviet trading organization of Siberia. See Ravota Ulanbatorskoi ...
88. Onishchenko (1926) Sostoyanie ... 23.
89. MANyn guravdugaar ... 186; Mongolia yesterday ... 65.
90. Meshcheryakov 49-50.
91. MANyn khoyordugaar ... 38; MAKhNyn tüükhend ... 60.
92. Mongolia yesterday ... 63. It was said that the loan of 1924 was made because the money was unspent and the Ministry did not want it to remain idle.
93. Ma 126-127.
94. Ibid 75.
95. Onishchenko (1926) Itogi ...
96. Ibid 4.
97. Shostakovich (1926) Torgovlya ... 109.
98. Nikiforov (1926) Itogi ... 166.
99. Ibid 163.
100. Ibid 163, 166.
101. Ibid 163; Kulakov.
102. Volkov (1926) Nachalo ... 161-162; Onishchenko (1926) Sostoyanie ... 23.

103. Mongol-Zōvlōltiin khariltsaa ... 176-178; Sovetsko-Mongol'skie otnosheniya ... 142-144; Istoriya Sovetsko ... 81; Strong 390-391.
104. Ibid 391.
105. Meshcheryakov 50-51.
106. Ibid 57.
107. Natsov (1926) Mongol'skaya ... 103; Yudin 77.
108. Meshcheryakov 60.
109. History of the MPR (1976) 249. Zlatkin (1957) 201.
110. Ibid.
111. Dūgersüren (1963) 32.
112. Volkov (1926) Nachalo ... 157; Volkov (1926) Sherstyany ... 14.
113. Istoriya Sovetsko... 81.
114. Senenov (1926) Transport ...
115. Ibid 39; Kulakov 101.
116. Kotov 63-64, 74.
117. Kulakov 101.
118. History of the MPR (1976) 216.
119. Iz deyatel'nosti ... 123.
120. History of the MPR (1976) 216; Istoriya Sovetsko ... 92.
121. Khozyaistvo Mongolii (1926) no. 3 advertisement.
122. Ibid no. 1 advertisement.
123. For a text of the agreement see Mongol-Zovlōltiin Khaviltsaa ... 157-160; Sovetsko-Mongol'skie otnosheniya 125-127.
124. Solnyshkov 108.
125. Carr (1964) Socialism ... 852-853; Sharavnyambuu 7; Civil aviation ... 8-9; Mongolian airlines. For a text of the air traffic agreement see Mongol-Zovlōltiin khariltsaa ... 163-165; Sovetsko-Mongol'skie Otnosheniya ... 129-130.
126. Sharavnyambuu 7.

127. Ibid.
128. History of the MPR (1976) 176.
129. For a text of the agreement see Mongol-Zövlöltiin khariltsaa ... 122-125, 169-170; Sovetsko-Mongol'skie otnosheniya ... 93-96; 134-136.
130. History of the MPR (1976) 217.
131. Sutcliffe.
132. Shostakovich (1926) Skot Mongolii 86. This is an estimate based on the findings of the census and adjusted to allow for the animals of the Khovd region which was not covered by the census. Other sources such as History of the MPR (1976) 216 give a much lower total of 13.7 million which is based on a Russian article published in 1941 and may be less reliable.
133. Shostakovich (1926) Uchet ... 85. This figure is also adjusted to allow for the population of Khovd.
134. Shostakovich (1926) Skot Mongolii ... 88.
135. Kallinikov (1926) Pyatyi s'ezd ... 95.
136. Maidar 14.
137. Revolyutsionnye meropriyatiya ... 178-184.
138. Dudukalov 22.
139. History of the MPR (1976) 215.
140. Maidar 24.
141. Ibid 94-95. Choibalsan later accused the White Russians of stealing money from the Veterinary Administration and sending it to China.
142. Ibid 95.
143. Ibid 14.
144. Ibid 95.
145. Dudukalov 20.
146. Chumnaya ... 167-168.
147. Dudukalov 23.
148. Maidar 72-73.
149. Dudukalov 21.

150. History of the MPR (1976) 216. These figures are taken from a publication of 1941 and therefore should be accepted with caution.
151. Geleta 225.
152. Strasser 267.
153. Bugakov.
154. BNMAU|s khöröngötnii ... 222.
155. History of the MPR (1976) 216.
156. Dügersüren (1963) 12.
157. History of the MPR (1976) 216.
158. History of the MPR (1976) 217.
159. Dügersüren (1963) 42.
160. See Winter passim. This book is based on the memoirs of Mrs. Walder.
161. Dügersüren (1963) 45.
162. Ibid.
163. MAKhNyn akhmad ... 179.
164. Strasser 267.
165. Geleta 226.
166. Milyushin (1926) Ocherk... Pt. 2. 17.
167. Tokmakova 11.
168. Monokhin 142-143; Tokmakova 11.
169. Ibid.
170. Ibid.
171. Monokhin 143.
172. Tokmakova 11. Kozlov's expedition in 1925 found crystal, topaz and quartz at Gorikh near Ulaanbaatar.
173. Bondarenko 46-51; Tüdev 63-64.
174. Bondarenko 51-53.
175. Sanjdorj (1974) 145.

176. Bondarenko 53; Kallinikov (1926) Itogi ... 145.
177. Bondarenko wrote a detailed article on the origins of the Mongolian labour movement. See Bondarenko.
178. Bondarenko 55.
179. Ma 122.
180. Ibid 120-123.
181. Bondarenko 75.
182. Ibid 76.
183. Malgauzi 56-57.
184. Tüdev 65, Malgauzi 61 and Strong 382 are in general agreement with Tüdev's figures but MAKhNyn tovch ... 112 gives a total membership of 2,500 for 1927 which the other sources quote for 1925.
185. Tüdev 65.
186. Roshchin 160.
187. Ibid 239.
188. Milyushin produced a number of studies of Mongolian agriculture. See Milyushin (1924); Milyushin (1926) Ocherki ... Pts 1-3.
189. Ibid Pt.2 8-12.
190. Ibid 13-16.
191. Polozhenie o zemlepol'zovanie.
192. Amuga (1926) K voprosu 6.
193. Ma 154.
194. Tsaplin 128.
195. BNMAUyn ankdugaar ... 297-29.
196. Mongolia yesterday ... 56.
197. Pravila okhoty ...

CHAPTER SIXSOCIAL AND RELIGIOUS POLICIES AND THE  
LAMA REACTION

1. Baradin (1924) Poezdka 17-18.
2. Rinchen (1972) 68-71; Manjiin ...
3. Batochir and Dashjamts 9.
4. Although Shamanism was largely superceded by Buddhism in the 16th century there were still some shamans in the countryside in the 20th century. Tantric Buddhism also contained many elements similar to Shamanism.
5. Hedin 91.
6. MANyn guradvugaar ... 110; Mongolia yesterday ... 40.
7. Ibid 47.
8. MAKhNyn tüükhend ... 100-101.
9. See Chapter 5.
10. BNMAUyn ankhdugaar ... 339 note 67. In the first budget 7.3% was allocated.
11. Ibid 338 note 62.
12. Ibid 337 note 61. On the Scientific Committee, which later became the Academy of Sciences, see History of the MPR (1976) 382-382; Ma 123-125.
13. Ibid 339 note 68.
14. MANyn guravdugaar ... 265 gives his dates as 1890-1947 but the History of the MPR (1976) 788 note 191 figures are preferred.
15. Maiskii.
16. Wolff (1946) 79.
17. To show ... In this article Batkhan is described as "a man of no ordinry endowments, one of the first Mongolian intellectuals."
18. BNMAUyn ankhdugaar ... 116-117.
19. Ibid 121.

20. Nikitine 10.
21. BNMAyn ankhdugaar ... 134; 338 note 65.
22. Ibid 134.
23. Ibid.
24. Ma 81, 85, 91, 92.
25. Baradin (1924) Poezdka ... 22.
26. Kallinikov (1928) Pyataya ...
27. Ibid.
28. BNMAUyn ikh бага ... 40.
29. Ma 88-91.
30. Ibid 189-194.
31. Ibid 91-92.
32. Chetvertyi s'ezd ... 94.
33. BNMAUyn ankhdugaar ... 119.
34. Chetvertyi s'ezd ... 94.
35. Ma 84-88.
36. BNMAUyn ankhdugaar ... 120; Dүgersүren (1963) 13.
37. BNMAUyn ikh бага ... 112.
38. Ibid 64; BNMAUyn ankhdugaar ... 141.
39. Strong 397.
40. Ibid 399.
41. To show ... 21.
42. Wolff (1946) 85-86.
43. Ibid 77.
44. Ibid 88-89.
45. Ma 121.
46. Natsov (1929) Sotsialno' ... 46.
47. For a detailed description of the Mongolian pupils' education in Germany see Wolff (1946); Wolff (1971).

48. Wolff (1946) 75.
49. Wolff (1971) 259.
50. Ibid 259-260.
51. Ibid 294-311.
52. Strong 399.
53. Chetvertyi s'ezd 79.
54. Shoizhelov (1928) VI s'ezd ... 323.
55. Chetvertyi s'ezd ... 79.
56. Shoizhelov (1928) VI s'ezd ... 323.
57. Batchuluun 47.
58. BNMAUyn ikh бага ... 63-64.
59. Strong 387.
60. Pürevjav and Dashjamts 103. This figure tallies with Shoizhelov's figures (note 53 above).
61. Strong 395.
62. Byambajav 90.
63. China Year Book 796.
64. Ibid 797.
65. MANyn guravdugaar ... 106; Mongolia yesterday ... 47.
66. Ibid; MANyn guravdugaar ... 106.
67. Mongolia yesterday ... 42.
68. Ollén and Eriksson 100.
69. Mongolia yesterday ... 47.
70. MANyn guravdugaar ... 265.
71. For an account of the work of the Swedish Mongol Mission, including its work in Inner Mongolia see Ollén and Eriksson Hedin 90-93.
72. Ibid 91.
73. Ibid 92. A khadag was a long strip of silk presented in greeting as a mark of respect. Hedin adds that it had acquired a monetary value of 20 cents at this time.

74. Ibid 93.
75. Ollén and Eriksson 114-115; Baradin (1924) Poezdka ... Pt. 2, 21.
76. BNMAUyn ikh бага ... 63.
77. Dүgersүren (1963) ... 64.
78. BNMAUyn ikh бага ... 46.
79. Zlatkin (1950) 175.
80. Dүgersүren (1963) 15-19 passim. The Tibetan Office looked after the interests of Tibetans, including traders, in Ulaanbaatar in the 1920s.
81. Dүgersүren (1963) ... 52.
82. Roerich, G. 141.
83. Geleta 222-223.
84. Dashtseveg 8.
85. Diluv 177-178.
86. Bawden (1968) 165-168.
87. Manjigine 249-250; Pүrevjav and Dashjamts 96-97; 112-114.
88. Baradin (1924) Poezdka ... 25.
89. Chetvertyi s'ezd... 50-51.
90. Roerich, G. 132; Pүrevjav and Dashjamts 70.
91. Pүrevjav and Dashjamts 69; Dashtseveg 90; Roerich, G. 132.
92. Pүrevjav and Dashjamts 99.
93. Roerich, G. 132.
94. Pүrevjav and Dashjamts 68.
95. Ibid.
96. Damdinsүren, Ts. (1978)
97. BNMAUyn ikh бага ... 57.
98. BNMAUls khöröngötnii ... 78.
99. Ibid 69; Chetvertyi s'ezd 97-100.

100. Strasser 284-5.
101. Geleta 260-262.
102. Dashtseveg 103.
103. Pürevjav and Dashjamts 80; Moses 182.
104. Pürevjav and Dashjamts 92.
105. Gavj: a rank of professed lamas.
106. Gevsh: a rank of professed lamas.
107. Pürevjav and Dashjamts 81.
108. Dashtseveg 95.
109. Ibid 81.
110. Pürevjav and Dashjamts 76.
111. Ibid 82.
112. Ibid 83.
113. Dashtseveg 111.
114. Pürevjav and Dashjamts 81.
115. Pürevjav and Dashjamts 76, 78.
116. Ibid 82.
117. Ibid.
118. Ibid 87-88.
119. BNMAUyn khöröngötnii ... 75-77.
120. Ibid 76-77.
121. Dasht<sup>e</sup>sv<sub>x</sub>veg 42.
122. Maiskii 120-123; Pürevjav and Dashjamts 36.
123. Ibid 35-36.
124. Dashtseveg 19.
125. Moses 192. Jas or monastery treasures included not only live-stock but land and trade goods.
126. Dashtseveg 19.
127. Ibid 36-41.

128. Natsov (1929) Sotsial'no- ... 39 Moses (1977).  
186. Larry Moses suggests that the absence of a Javzandamba Khutagt and his demands contributed to this increase.  
Moses 187.
129. Pürevjav and Dashjamts 41.
130. Ibid 42.
131. Miller 87-91.
132. tiiz - banknotes issued by some monasteries based on units of brick tea. See Rintchen.
133. Pürevjav 85-100; Miller 104.
134. Dashzeveg 95.
135. Dashzeveg 95; BNMAUyn ikh бага ... 45.
136. Pürevjav and Dashjamts 105-106.
137. Ibid.
138. Kallinikov (1926) Pyatyi s'ezd ... 93-94.
139. Pürevjav and Dashjamts 61; Bawden 265.
140. Ibid 66.
141. Sambuu.
142. Ibid 144-145.
143. Ibid 145.
144. Pürevjav and Dashjamts 108.
145. MAKhNyn tüükhend ... 176-177.
146. MAKhNyn akhmad ... 82.
147. Dashtseveg 153 note 1; Shakabpa 263-264.
148. Diluv 131.
149. For a discussion of Mongolian foreign policy see Chapter Seven.
150. Roerich N. 289-290. This may have been an unauthorised delegation to announce the discovery of the Ninth Javzandamba Khutagt. If so, the presence of Russians is curious.
151. BNMAUyn ikh бага ... 59.
152. Natsov (1929) Sotsial'no ... 39;

153. Pürejav and Dashjamts 95.
154. Damdinsüren (1978).
155. Dashtseveg 154.
156. Diluv 205.
157. Natsov (1929) Sotsial'no ... 39.
158. Ibid.
159. BNMAUls khöröngötnii 75.
160. Manjigine 250. He was also called the ideologist of the Right Deviation. Dashtseveg 100.
161. Manjigine 250.
162. Ibid.
163. Dashtseveg 104.
164. Manjigine 250.
165. Moses 175-180.

#### CHAPTER SEVEN

##### THE MPR, THE COMINTERN AND THE RIGHT DEVIATION

1. Carr (1976) Foundations ... 122.
2. Wolff (1945) 294.
3. MANyn guravdugaar ... 28; Mongolia yesterday ... 22.
4. History of the MPR (1976) 789 note 195; McCormack 55, 118.
5. Shoizhelov (1925) Mongoliya ...; Natsov (1926) Mongol'skaya ... 101; Shoizelov (1925) Perelomnyi ... 209. See also Carr (1964) Socialism ... 845.
6. Ma 129-30 Dr. Kojima treated patients mainly for venereal disease. He had a Russian assistant who was also his wife. Ma also reports that posters condemning Japanese activities in Korea and Manchuria were displayed in Ulaanbaatar.

7. History of the MPR (1976) 805 notes 6, 7. Eudin and North ... 259. Amuga (1925) 10.
8. Khozyaistvo Mongolii carried advertisements for the Tuvan Central Cooperative in 1926.
9. For biographical information on Feng Yü-hsiang see Sheridan; Wilbur and How 66, 330-331, 342, 516. Feng is said to have had plans for uniting the MPR and Inner Mongolia. He wrote frequently in his diary that Russian influence should be restricted in the MPR (Wilbur and How 516) and he refused to recognize the independence of the MPR (Ibid 342).
10. Chetvertyi s'ezd ... 9; Genkin 191; Eudin and North 259. The IMPP's predecessor was the Young Mongol Movement, also known as the National Revival Club of Barga whose leaders were Merse and Pao Yun-ti.
11. Genkin 191-192; Eudin and North 259.
12. Genkin 192-195.
13. Buyannemekh 7. The IMPP organ was called Dotood Mongolyn Ardyn Setguul (The People's Magazine of Inner Mongolia.)
14. The IMPP Congress elected Pao Yun-ti as Chairman and Merse, Altan and Ulanfu to the Central Committee. When the KMT broke with the Comintern Pao Yun-ti sided with KMT and Ulanfu joined the CCP. In 1928 the Bargut section of the IMPP reformed into a new party, the Young Bauga Party.
15. See Chapter Six note 12.
16. Malakshanov 67.
17. Ibid 66. The play performed was The Deceitful Lama.
18. Ibid 67-68.
19. Dardinsüren (1978) 63; Kartunova and Shakhmazarova 181; MAKhN ba Kommunist ... 121.
20. MAKhNyn akhmad ... 177.
21. Navaannamjil 266.
22. Kallinikov (1926) Pyaty s'ezd 93.
23. Navaannamjil 265.
24. Egunov 87.
25. Natsov (1929) Sotsialno ... 39. See also Chapter Six.
26. MAKhNyn tüükhend ... 177.

27. Carr (1976) Foundations ... 58.
28. Ibid 143.
29. Ibid 9.
30. Ibid 737-753.
31. Ibid 95-103.
32. Republican China 181-185.
33. What the term "Mongolia" encompassed was left vague. It might have meant those areas of Inner Mongolia which the Japanese-Russian secret treaties designated as lying within the Japanese sphere of influence. The Soviet government suspected it also included areas like the MPR which had been in the Tsarist Russian sphere.
34. Carr (1976) Foundations ... 126.
35. Ula<sup>m</sup> 64-75.
36. Ibid 67-69.
37. Erdeni-Ochir (1929)' povorotnyi moment 51.
38. Shirendev (1965) 28.
39. Shirendyb (1980) 39.
40. Erdeni-Ochir (1929) Povorotnyi moment 51.
41. Ibid.
42. See note 30.
43. Jacobs 298-300.
44. Ibid 298-299.
45. Ula<sup>m</sup> 72-73.
46. Jacobs 299.
47. MAKhNyn tüükhend ... 180-181.
48. Dugarzhap (1928); Natsov (1928) VI s'ezd ...
49. Natsov (1928) VI s'ezd ... 324-325.
50. See Chapter Five.
51. MAKhNyn akhmad ... 178-179.

52. Ibid 238-239; 179.
53. Erdeni-Ochir (1929) Povorotnyi moment ... 52.
54. MAKhN ba Kommunist ... 123, 198; MAKhNyn akhmad 179, 235.
55. There is no record of Amagaev's involvement in the MPR between the Sixth and Seventh Congresses.
56. Navaannamjil 275.
57. Ibid 276.
58. MAKhN ba Kommunist ... 125; Le Comintern ... 47, 50, MAKhNyn tүүkhend ... 469 note 114.
59. Ibid.
60. Ibid.
61. MAKhNyn tүүkhend ... 195, 269 note 114; Le Komintern ... 50.
62. Dambadorj's reply is not available but it may be surmized from other statements of 1928 that he did not accept that the Party was guilty of any deviation.
63. MAKhNyn tүүkhend ... 469-470 note 115.
64. Ibid 191-192.
65. Tagar previously acted as interpreter for Mongolian students at KUTV in 1927-28. See Chapter Four.
66. There is little information published on Raiter. MAKhN ba kommunist ... MAKhNyn akhmad ... 223.
67. Ibid. Tagar dates these events incorrectly as 1927 instead of 1928.
68. MAKhNyn tovch ... 123-124; History of the MPR (1976) 237-238.
69. MAKhNyn tүүkhend ... 191-192; MAKhNyn tovch ... 124.
70. Ibid.
71. MAKhNyn akhmad ... 223.
72. MAKhNyn tүүkhend ... 193.
73. MAKhN ba kommunist ... 125.
74. Le Comintern ... 47.

75. Ibid 47,49.
76. Carr (1976) Foundations ... 192-222.
77. MAKhN akhmad ... 267.
78. Ibid 166, 224, 266. For details of Lkhumbe's career during the period of Left Deviation see also Ibid 215, 218, 219, 254.
79. Ibid 166, 224, 266.
80. Ibid 265. Konyaev taught history.
81. For Densmaa's memoir see Ibid 123-29. See also Chapter Four. Densmaa's family was very friendly with the family of Yanjmaa wife of Sükhbaatar.
82. Ibid 125. Densmaa says her student group returned in 1927. In fact it is clear from the context and the memoirs of others that they returned in 1928.
83. MAKhNyn tovch ... 124. The source states that Genden lost his position as Chairman of the Little Khural. In fact he was replaced as Chairman by Damdinsuren at the Fourth Great Khural in 1927. See History of the MPR (1976) 237. However he may have remained a member of the Little Khural. This is one of several inaccuracies of detail in MAKhNyn tovch ...
84. MAKhNyn tovch ... 124, MAKhNyn akhmad ... 224; Le Comintern ... 47.
85. Ibid.
86. Ibid.
87. i.e. Jadambyn Gombo. Oros is Mongolian for "Russian". This is the same Gombo who was one of the commissioners who arrested Bavaasan in 1924 for not attending the Youth League's military training session. See MANyn guravdugaar ... 161. Later in 1924 he was elected to the Central Committee of the Youth League. See MAKhNyn akhmad ... 206. In 1929 Oros Gombo was shot as traitor to the revolutionary cause. See Le Comintern ... 50; Diluv 135.
88. Erdeni-Ochir (1929) Povоротnyi ... 57.
89. Ibid; Diluv 133.
90. Ibid 177.
91. For Mrs. Walder's memoirs of her stay in the MPR see Winter. Mrs. Walder had apparently little interest in politics and although she knew Dambadorj and Jadamba she seemed to be unaware of their high standing in the Party and government.

92. Ibid 189.
93. MAKhNyn akhmad ... 224.
94. Ibid 267.
95. Ibid 126; Le Comintern ... 47.
96. MAKhNyn akhmad ... 265.
97. Ibid 126.
98. For biographical information on Eldev-Ochir see Ibid passim; Banzragch (1965); Khamgaalakhynkhan 12.
99. Jigjidjav was a member of the Central Committee and the Cooperative Board.
100. MAKhNyn akhmad ... 265-266, MAKhN ba kommunist ... 124.
101. MAKhNyn akhmad ... 266. Other signatories were P. Genden, Jigjidjav, Sharkhüü of the Military Council, Sodnom, Chairman of the Youth League, Z. Shijee, B. Eldev-Ochir, Bayartsaikhan, a graduate of KUTV, Tsendsüren a judge, Mishigdorj of the Mongolian Cooperative, Buyandelger, "Rough" Radnaabazar, Dagvadorj, Ts. Nasanbaljir, Danshiitsoodol, Oros Gombo, Jamsran, Gonchig, an army officer, Erentsen, B. Bayar, B. Tagar and Ts. Choijil. One name is missing if the figure of 29 is correct.
102. For biographical information on Shmeral' see MAKhN ba kommunist ... 162-177; Le Comintern ... 46.
103. MAKhNyn akhmad ... 236.
104. MAKhN ba kommunist ... 198; Le Comintern ... 46. He was also known to the Mongols as Billdani (i.e. Bill Dunne). History of the MPR (1976) 810 note 62.
105. Le Comintern ... 46.
106. History of the MPR (1976) 238.
107. MAKhNyn akhmad ... 266.
108. Ibid 128.
109. Erdeni-Ochir (1929) Povorotnyi ... 52.
110. Ibid; Byambajav 94.
111. Erdeni-Ochir (1929) Povorotnyi ... 53. For the resolutions of this meeting see MAKhNyn tүүkhend ... 194-196.
112. MAKhNyn akhmad ... 83.

113. Le Comintern ...
114. Ibid 46.
115. Ibid.
116. Ibid 49.
117. For an account of the Seventh MPRP Congress see Erdeni-Ochir (1929) Povоротnyi ...; Mosina.
118. MAKhNyn akhmad ... 167.
119. Ibid 267.
120. Ibid.
121. Erdeni-Ochir (1929) Povоротnyi ... 57.
122. For Choijil's memoir see MAKhNyn akhmad ... 262-270.
123. Ibid 267-268. The existence of this faction may not have been evident at the time in spite of what Choijil says. Gombo and Bayar both had illustrious careers before they were condemned of treason and shot in 1929. Nevertheless it seems likely that the punishments advocated for Right Deviationists by Gombo and Bayar in 1928 were harsher than what was proposed by other left wing leaders. See Le Comintern ... 50.
124. Diluv 133.
125. Ibid.
126. For resolutions of the Seventh MPRP Congress see MAKhNyn tuukhend ... 196-225.
127. Winter 207-219.
128. For an account of the Fifth Great Khural see Erdeni-Ochir (1929) V Velikii ...
129. Ibid 50.
130. Ibid 53.
131. Ibid 54.
132. Ibid 55.
133. On Amar's earlier career see Chapter Four.
134. Erdeni-Ochir (1929) V velikii ... 53.
135. Ibid 56-57.

137. Ibid.
138. Ibid.
139. Ibid 66.
140. Ibid 67.
141. Ibid.
142. Ibid.
143. Ibid 68.
144. Ibid 69. BNMAUls khöröngötnii ... 78.
145. Erdeni-Ochir (1929) V Velikii ... 70.
146. Ibid 74-76.
147. Ibid 74.
148. Ibid 75.
149. Consumer goods were still imported from China however.  
See Chapter Five p. 137.
150. MAKHNyn tovch ... 136-138.
151. Bawden (1968) 303-315.
152. Diluv 187-212.
153. Bawden 313.
154. Ibid 315-320.
155. Ibid 346-359.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

BMASSR:	Buriat Mongol Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic
CCP:	Chinese Communist Party
CMEA:	Council for Mutual Economic Assistance
FER:	Far Eastern Republic
IMPP:	Inner Mongolian People's Party
KIM:	Kommunisticheskii Internatsional Molodezh (Youth Comintern)
KMT:	Kuomintang
KUTV:	Kommunisticheskii Universitet Trudyashchikhsia Vostoka
MPP:	Mongolian People's Party
MPR:	Mongolian People's Republic
MPRP:	Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party
NEP:	New Economic Policy
RCP:	Russian Communist Party
RSFSR:	Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic
TTPP:	Tannu Tuvan People's Party
TTPR:	Tannu Tuvan People's Republic
USSR:	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

GLOSSARY OF MONGOLIAN WORDS

Aimag: province

Alba: service to the state

Ard: commoner, people

Ardchlalch: to democratize

Arv: a local government administrative unit of 10 families

Bag: an administrative unit of local government comprising 50 families

Beis: a Manchu title for a prince of the fourth rank

Bod: a unit for calculating livestock

Chuulga: league assembly: an assembly of all khoshuu princes  
in pre-revolutionary Mongolia

Dalemba: a type Chinese cotton fabric.

Deel: a traditional Mongolian gown worn by men and women

Gavj: a rank of professed lamas

Ger: Mongolian conical felt tent; yurt

Gevsh: a rank of professed lamas

Jas: the contents of a monastery treasury including livestock, land,  
trade goods etc. administered as a unit

Khaan: emperor

Khadag: a strip of silk presented as a mark of respect

Khamjilga: families tied in the service of princes

Khan: king

Kharuul: border guard duty

Khoshuu: banner: a subdivision of a province

Khural: meeting, gathering, assembly

Khutagt: a Buddhist incarnation

Khuvilgan: a Buddhist incarnation

Margaash: tomorrow

Nam: nartv. group

Örtöö: the public horse relay service

Shandzudba: chief administrator of economic affairs in a monastery

Shurguulakh: to worm one's way into something, to infiltrate

Shav' nar: families tied in the service of Buddhist incarnations, especially of the Javzandamba Khutagt

Sum: the local government organization below the khoshuu. Original meaning an arrow

Taij: a prince.

Tanga: seal; public office where a seal was kept

Tiiz: banknotes issued by some monasteries based on units of tea bricks

Tölööni; түшмел (pl. түшмед): special government representative

Tuslagch: highest administrator in the pre-revolutionary khoshuu government

Zakhiragch: pre-revolutionary administrator deputy to the tuslagch in the pre-revolutionary khoshuu government